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Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment

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1 ABSTRACT

2 Punishing group members who parasitize their own group's
3 resources is an almost universal human behavior, as evidenced by
4 multiple cross-cultural and theoretical studies. Recently, researchers in
5 social and behavioral sciences have identified a puzzling phenomenon
6 called "antisocial punishment": some people are willing to pay a cost to
7 "punish" those who act in ways that benefit their shared social group.
8 Interestingly, the expression of antisocial punishment behavior is
9 regionally diverse and linked to the socio-psychological dimensions of
10 local cultural values. In this review, we adopt an ecological perspective
11 to examine why antisocial punishment might be an advantageous strategy
12 for individuals in some socio-economic contexts. Drawing from research
13 in behavioral economics, personality, social psychology and
14 anthropology, we discuss the proximate mechanisms of antisocial
15 punishment operating at an individual level, and their consequences at
16 the group and cultural levels. We also consider the evolutionary
17 dynamics of antisocial punishment investigated with computer
18 simulations. We argue that antisocial punishment is an expression of
19 aggression, and is driven by competition for status. Our review elucidates
20 the possible socio-ecological underpinnings of antisocial punishment,
21 which may have widespread repercussions at a cultural level.

22 ***Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment***

23 “It is not surprising that there should be a struggle in man
24 between his social instincts, with their derived virtues, and his lower,
25 though at the moment, stronger impulses or desires.” (Darwin, 1871,
26 p.104)

27 Recent reports on antisocial punishment have drawn attention to
28 the duality of human nature. *Antisocial punishment* can be defined as
29 paying a cost to reduce the resources of a person whose previous
30 cooperative behavior benefited the punisher and their group. In past
31 research, the focus tended to be on *altruistic punishment* – paying a cost
32 to reduce the resources of a person who previously exploited group
33 resources. Altruistic punishment has become an area of particular interest
34 because it offers a potential resolution of the quest to understand human
35 cooperation. Extensive cooperation in humans, often considered
36 surprising in light of Darwinian natural selection theory, has been
37 investigated in numerous empirical and theoretical studies (e.g. Gintis,
38 Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2005; Henrich et al., 2004). Altruistic
39 punishment, despite its negative proximate motives¹ and, sometimes,
40 detrimental effect on average payoffs,² has been proposed as a form of

¹ Rather than turning the other cheek and continuing to cooperate, motivated by anger humans use punishment towards selfish individuals (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

² (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Wu et al., 2009)

41 pro-social behavior promoting cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
42 Moreover, it inspired a new theory of the evolution of human cooperation
43 - strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000). However,
44 more recent investigations of the full range of available and expressed
45 punishment behavior across cultures have highlighted the existence of
46 antisocial punishment. This has led some to reconsider the “dark side” of
47 human behavior, including a tendency for spite and hyper-
48 competitiveness (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009;
49 Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008; Jensen, 2010).

50 Our review is motivated by the unexplained cultural variation in
51 antisocial punishment revealed by Herrmann et al. (2008). We propose
52 that the high levels of punishment directed toward cooperators in places
53 like Muscat, Athens and Riyadh reflect different pressures in these socio-
54 economic or cultural environments. These pressures affect the perception
55 of group identity, which leads to changes in individual behavior. We
56 argue that, despite lowering absolute levels of resources across a society
57 taken in aggregate, antisocial punishment may constitute a successful
58 individual strategy for establishing social status and receiving its
59 benefits. This ecological interpretation of costly punishment allows us to
60 present it devoid of ethical loading and enables a better understanding of

61 its functional causes.³ In addition to proposing and justifying this
62 theoretical framework, we also emphasize some unresolved questions
63 about costly punishment, and offer testable predictions.

64 The review is organized as follows. We first focus on the various
65 definitions of costly punishment and how they relate to the concept of
66 altruism in different disciplines. Next, we discuss how methodological
67 manipulations of the cost-to-impact ratios of costly punishment affect its
68 use. We observe that the amount of costly punishment meted out to
69 others (in particular, antisocial punishment) is rationally adjusted to
70 exploit its effect of increasing the positive difference between one's own
71 and others' payoffs. In the proceeding sections we discuss antisocial
72 punishment at three levels: cultural, group and individual. At each level,
73 we show how antisocial punishment could bring advantages despite its
74 initial cost. Crucially, the benefits from using antisocial punishment may
75 result from punishers acquiring a higher status within their groups. In the
76 last section, we present the evolutionary perspective on antisocial
77 punishment and its ultimate consequences for a population, as well as, for
78 individuals.

³ Reproductive timing in human females viewed from an ecological
perspective is a notable example of how socially undesirable behaviour, such as teenage
pregnancies, can be neutrally explained and considered a biologically sensible strategy.

79 In this review, to fully understand antisocial punishment, we
80 consider both its *proximate* and *ultimate* causes (Scott-Phillips, Dickins,
81 & West, 2011). A *proximate* explanation refers to the mechanism that
82 leads an individual to express a behavior, while an *ultimate* one describes
83 the evolutionary context that resulted in the appearance of (normally,
84 selection for) a behavior or trait. While many authors have shown that
85 this distinction can be difficult to make (Scott-Phillips et al., 2011;
86 Thierry, 2005), drawing it allows us to investigate two complimentary
87 explanations for why antisocial punishment occurs. First, we focus on the
88 workings of antisocial punishment – the proximate mechanisms that
89 drive it; then, we discuss why it might have evolved – the evolutionary
90 dynamics might have caused it. The answer to the former question is
91 provided primarily by experiments using behavioral economics games
92 while the answer to the latter one comes from computer simulations of
93 evolutionary processes.

94 **Costly punishment terminology**

95 Economists, psychologists and biologists often use the same
96 phrases to mean different things. When drawing together knowledge
97 from various disciplines, it is important to precisely determine what is
98 understood by terms such as *altruistic* or *antisocial* punishment in each,
99 and to define the specific usage in the present discussion. Our use of the
100 word *punishment* originates within the context of behavioral economics

101 experiments, in which researchers typically employ the Public Goods
102 Game (PGG) with punishment, the Ultimatum Game (UG) and/or the
103 Third Party Punishment game (TPP). PGGs can be played one-shot or for
104 multiple rounds (for the implications which follow from this difference,
105 see Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). They can also be played with or without
106 punishment opportunities. If a sequence of PGGs is played, the player's
107 group membership can be maintained or different participants may be
108 grouped together in each round. In the latter case, any consequences of
109 punishment do not affect the punisher. UGs and TPPs are, typically, only
110 played for a single round.

111 PGGs represent a social dilemma because the individual's
112 interests are in conflict with the group's interests. In PGGs, a group of
113 individuals can contribute some portion of their allocation to the public
114 pool, which benefits everyone equally. Individuals who do not contribute
115 anything, or contribute less than others, gain a payoff advantage. In
116 PGGs with punishment, after a round of the PGG, individuals can
117 anonymously punish others (usually at a cost-to-impact ratio of 1/3). In
118 UGs, one individual (the proposer) can share an amount of money
119 between themselves and a recipient. After the proposer's offer, the
120 recipient decides whether they accept it, in which case both parties
121 receive the respective amounts. Alternatively, the recipient can reject the
122 offer, in which case no one receives anything. The act of rejection
123 represents the act of costly punishment because both the recipient and the

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124 proposer suffer a cost. TPPs greatly resemble UGs, with the major
 125 difference being that the recipient in the TPP is passive and cannot
 126 punish. Instead, an extra third person, not benefitting from the split, has
 127 an opportunity to spend money on punishing the proposer.

128 In an experimental setting, people mete out costly punishment
 129 towards uncooperative individuals, even when there is no opportunity to
 130 interact with them again (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Such punishment has
 131 been dubbed “altruistic” because the punisher decides to pay a fee to
 132 reduce the payoff of free-riders, and this action is likely to make free-
 133 riders increase their cooperative contributions in future interactions.⁴
 134 Hence, in congruence with the biological definition of altruism (West,
 135 Griffin, & Gardner, 2007), punishment is costly to the actor and
 136 beneficial to the recipient, where the recipients are individuals interacting
 137 with the punished person in the future. The biological definition of
 138 altruism refers to the lifetime fitness consequences of a behavior, which

⁴ Fehr and Gächter’s definition of altruistic punishment is encapsulated in the following two quotes: “Punishment may well benefit the future group members of a punished subject, if that subject responds to the punishment by raising investments in the following periods. In this sense, punishment is altruistic.” (p.137, Fehr & Gächter, 2002). “Thus, the act of punishment, although costly for the punisher, provides a benefit to other members of the population by inducing potential non-cooperators to increase their investments. For this reason, the act of punishment is an altruistic act.” (p.139, Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

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139 are impossible to capture in behavioral economics experiments. For the
140 sake of convenience, we adopt Fehr and Gächter's term "altruistic
141 punishment" to describe a phenomenon occurring in short-term
142 experimental interactions, although we acknowledge that this definition
143 might be misleading (see Sylwester, Mitchell, & Bryson, submitted).

144 Altruistic punishment requires that (a) punishers suffer a cost for
145 punishing and (b) punished individuals are thereby induced to become
146 more pro-social. Hence, in behavioral economics, the term "altruistic
147 punishment" is defined through the negative economic outcomes to the
148 punisher and positive economic outcomes to the group. When
149 psychological drives are considered, altruistic punishment seems to be
150 motivated not by the altruistic desire to help the group but rather by
151 negative feelings towards cheaters and the willingness to harm them
152 (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). It could be argued that these negative emotions
153 are a consequence of egalitarian preferences and that the underlying
154 psychological motivation is, therefore, altruistic (Cinyabuguma, Page, &
155 Putterman, 2006; Denant-Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007;
156 Nikiforakis, 2008). However, studies investigating egalitarian
157 preferences typically use games that measure the degree to which people
158 are willing to reduce others' income, rather than their own income. A
159 reduction of others' income is as likely a result of competitive
160 preferences as egalitarian ones. Therefore, it is questionable whether

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161 punishment behavior should ever be considered “altruistic”, in the folk-
162 psychological sense.

163 Researchers working on costly punishment noticed that in
164 behavioral economics experiments some punishment is directed not to
165 free-riders but to cooperators instead (the earliest record of this
166 phenomenon is provided by Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). This
167 punishment type has been dubbed, antisocial (Herrmann et al., 2008),
168 spiteful (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005) or perverse (Cinyabuguma et
169 al., 2006). Antisocial punishment, the “sanctioning of people who behave
170 prosocially” (p.1362, Herrmann et al., 2008), is defined in a broader
171 manner than altruistic punishment (see Table 1). Both altruistic and
172 antisocial punishment are costly to the punisher and even more so to the
173 punished, but the definition of antisocial punishment makes no reference
174 to the consequence of such punishment to group cooperation and welfare.
175 Rather, antisocial punishment focuses on the punishment’s target: it is the
176 punishment of those who give more than the punisher.

177 Herrmann et al. (2008) found a statistically significant negative
178 correlation between antisocial punishment and cooperative contributions
179 measured across all subject pools. However, as shown in Table 1,
180 antisocial punishment can sometimes be functionally neutral or even
181 altruistic, in the sense that punishing an individual with a higher
182 cooperative contribution can prevent this person from reducing the level

183 of their contributions or even encourage them to contribute more⁵. Such
 184 an effect can be enhanced by the fact that, in PGG, punished individuals
 185 typically do not know who punished them. As a result, they may suspect
 186 that the punishment came from a cooperator and hence is deserved. This
 187 thread of reasoning finds support in Herrmann et al.'s (2008) data. In 12
 188 out of 16 participant pools, receiving antisocial punishment did not
 189 correlate negatively with contributions in the following rounds.⁶

190 In this review, we will stick to the terms “altruistic” and
 191 “antisocial” punishment because, although imprecise and ethically
 192 loaded, they are well established in the literature. In our opinion, the
 193 evidence suggesting the psychologically- or biologically-altruistic
 194 character of punishment is weak. In the experimental setting, the
 195 altruistic nature of punishment can be identified only when repeated
 196 PGGs are played with different participants in each round, or in one-shot
 197 TTPs, but even then it is possible to find selfish explanations for
 198 punishment, for example spite. Moreover, punishment of free-riders,
 199 instead of positively affecting future contributions, may actually decrease

⁵ Such an effect has been noticed by Herrmann et al. (p.1366, 2008): “Some antisocial punishment can be efficiency-enhancing in intent to induce the punished individual to increase his or her contributions.”

⁶ See Table S7B in Herrmann et al.'s (2008) supplementary material. Cities where participants decreased cooperation after being a victim of antisocial punishment: Bonn, Minsk, Samara and Istanbul.

200 them (Sylwester, Mitchell & Bryson, submitted). Therefore, in this
201 review we will use *altruistic* to denote any punishment meted out by
202 cooperators to free-riders. Depending on the study, cooperators are either
203 defined with respect to individual cooperativeness (those who contribute
204 more than, or equally to, another individual are cooperators, while those
205 who contribute less are free-riders) or to average group contributions
206 (those who contribute more than, or equal to, the group mean are
207 cooperators, those who contribute less are free-riders). *Antisocial* will be
208 used as it was defined by Herrmann et al. (2008). Therefore, any
209 punishment imposed by free-riders on cooperators, or individuals of
210 equal contributions, will be referred to as antisocial.

211 **1. The price of punishment**

212 Researchers investigating costly punishment typically assume that
213 punishment is more costly to the punisher than to the punished. Due to
214 convention rather than any particular rationale, the most commonly used
215 cost-to-impact ratio is 1:3; it costs the punisher one point to reduce the
216 payoff of the punished individual by three points. Although costly
217 punishment can be considered irrational from the perspective of
218 maximizing the absolute payoff, it does follow a rational rule when
219 relative payoff is prioritized.

220 Expenditure on punishment is strongly affected by the cost-to-
221 impact ratio. The general finding is that the use of punishment decreases

222 as the punishment price increases (e.g. Anderson & Putterman, 2006).
 223 Despite this, some costly punishment (mostly directed at uncooperative
 224 individuals) is observed even when the cost to the punisher is larger than
 225 the cost to the punished individual. Antisocial punishment does occur,
 226 though rarely, even with a high relative cost of punishment (Anderson &
 227 Putterman, 2006).⁷

228 There is variation in the results reported concerning sensitivity to
 229 the relative cost of punishment. Using data from U.S. participants,
 230 Carpenter (2007) analyzed the behavior of free-riders who punished
 231 cooperators, cooperators who punished free-riders and free-riders who
 232 punished other free-riders.⁸ Out of the three groups, free-riders punishing
 233 other free-riders were most sensitive to the price of punishment. Free-
 234 riders who punished cooperators did not condition their punishment
 235 decisions on price. Carpenter's results contrast with those obtained by
 236 Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher who used a sample of Swiss participants
 237 (2005). These researchers found that when the cost of punishment is the
 238 same to the punisher as to the punished, antisocial punishment

⁷ In Anderson and Putterman's (2006) study there were three price-to-impact conditions with ratios in condition 1: 0/100, 30/100, 60/100, 80/100, 120/100, condition 2: 0/100, 5/100, 10/100, 20/100, 30/100 and condition 3: 30/100, 40/100, 50/100, 60/100, 70/100.

⁸ Free-riding was defined as a negative deviation from the group average. Punishment price-to-impact ratios were as follows: 1/4, 1/2, 1/1, 2/1, 4/1.

239 disappears.⁹ When punishment resulted in lowering the payoff of the
 240 punished person to a greater extent than reducing the cost to the punisher,
 241 sanctioning of cooperators by defectors and defectors by other defectors
 242 occurred frequently.

243 Egas and Riedl (2008) varied the cost and the impact of
 244 punishment and investigated how such a manipulation affected
 245 cooperation and punishment decisions in repeated PGGs played by Dutch
 246 speakers from around the world.¹⁰ As in Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher's
 247 study, cooperative individuals were willing to punish when the cost to the
 248 punisher was equal to, and even when it exceeded the cost to the
 249 punished, though in such cases cooperation was not maintained. Unlike
 250 in Falk et al.'s study, Egas and Riedl observed antisocial punishment of
 251 more cooperative individuals in all cost-to-impact conditions.¹¹ In
 252 agreement with Falk et al.'s results, antisocial punishment was highest
 253 when its cost was relatively low in comparison with the impact on the
 254 punished (28% of all punishment acts). However, it remained at the level
 255 of 22.3% and 18.5% in the two conditions where the cost to the punisher

⁹ In their study there were two price conditions: a low-sanction condition with a price-to-impact ratio of 1/1 and a high-sanction condition in which the price-to-impact ratio of punishing cooperators was 1/3.33 while punishing defectors was 1/2.5.

¹⁰ The price-to-impact ratios used by Egas and Riedl were: 1/3, 3/1, 1/1 and 3/3

¹¹ The researchers call this counter-intuitive punishment.

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256 was equal to the impact on the punished. Surprisingly, even when the
257 punishing cost exceeded its impact by three times, antisocial punishment
258 was still present (13% of all punishment acts).

259 What happens when punishers themselves can decide about the
260 cost-to-impact ratio of their punishment? Theories of inequality aversion
261 (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) suggest that the punisher should use a ratio
262 that would result in minimizing the payoff difference between themselves
263 and the punished. However, if punishment is motivated by the desire for
264 revenge, competition or the pursuit of social status, punishers should
265 adjust the ratio in a way to create an inequality favorable to them. A
266 critical test of these predictions was conducted using the Dictator game
267 with punishment, in which recipients were allowed to decide how much
268 money they wished to deduct from the dictator's account and where the
269 cost of punishment to the punisher was always \$1. Two-thirds of the
270 resultant punishments were inequality-seeking. That is, the punisher
271 decided to deduct from the Dictator more money than was necessary to
272 maintain equality. One-third did deduct only the amount of money
273 necessary to reach equality or less (Houser & Xiao, 2010).

274 Researchers have tended to focus on costly punishment where
275 both the punisher and the punished suffer a cost. It is possible to imagine
276 that non-monetary punishment, in the form of a reprimand that does not
277 affect either the punisher's or the punished's payoff, has some effect on
278 cooperation. Indeed, both costly and non-monetary punishment were

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279 found to increase cooperation, but the effect of non-monetary sanctions
280 weakened over time (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003). As in
281 other studies on costly punishment, monetary sanctioning was predicted
282 by both negative and positive deviation from the punisher's cooperation
283 level, indicating the presence of altruistic and antisocial punishment.
284 However, in the condition where non-monetary sanctions were used,
285 while the effect of altruistic punishment persisted, antisocial punishment
286 was absent. Masclet et al.'s (2003) study is important in that it gives
287 insight into the motivations behind antisocial punishment. The fact that
288 non-monetary reprimands were not used to punish antisocially indicates
289 that the reason for using antisocial punishment is not to change other
290 individuals' future economic behavior but to negatively affect their
291 payoffs.

292 The presented evidence does not allow for an unequivocal
293 conclusion about how the cost-to-impact ratio of punishment affects
294 antisocial punishment. While some studies show that changing the cost-
295 to-impact ratio affects antisocial punishment to a greater extent than
296 altruistic punishment and that antisocial punishment is more likely to be
297 reduced when the ratio is unfavorable to the punisher, others do not
298 report such an effect. Despite the mixed findings reported in the studies,
299 it appears that antisocial, rather than altruistic, punishment is more
300 sensitive to the manipulations of the cost-to-impact ratio. In line with this
301 conclusion is the fact that sanctioning cooperators does not occur when

302 their payoffs cannot be altered. Moreover, free-riders who are potential
303 antisocial punishers are less willing to buy costly information about
304 other's contributions than more cooperative individuals who become
305 altruistic punishers (Page, Putterman, & Garcia, 2008). This suggests that
306 some instances of costly punishment, in particular antisocial punishment,
307 may function as aggressive acts, and are not contingent on the previous
308 cooperative behavior of the punished individuals. In sum, in apparently
309 irrational costly antisocial behavior, the decisions to punish are, at least
310 in some studies, logically tied to the effectiveness of such punishment
311 and to the ability to increase the positive difference between others'
312 payoffs and one's own.

313 **Cross-cultural variation in punishment**

314 A human sense of fairness is omnipresent but takes on different
315 forms around the world (Henrich et al., 2005). A cross-cultural analysis
316 of punishment in UGs and of TTP games revealed a consistent trend; as
317 the offered amount approached an equal split, recipients in the UG and
318 observers in TTP were less willing to punish (Henrich et al., 2006).
319 Interestingly, in some societies a small fraction of recipients sanctioned
320 those whose offers were hyper-fair i.e. those who donated more than an
321 equal split would predict. The suggested reason for such behavior,
322 observed mostly in gift-giving cultures, was the reluctance of recipients
323 to feel indebted to the proposers and the subordinate position resulting

324 from such a debt. In consequence, cooperators were punished
 325 antisocially, but, interestingly, in this situation the cost to the punisher
 326 was even higher than the cost to the punished.¹²

327 Punishing generous individuals appeared as a *leitmotiv* in
 328 Herrmann et al.'s (2008) cross-cultural study on costly punishment,
 329 conducted in 16 comparable subject pools. Participants from different
 330 cities across the world played multi-round PGGs, with each round
 331 followed by a punishment opportunity. Herrmann et al. (2008) found that
 332 the level of antisocial punishment, measured as punishment towards
 333 individuals whose PGG contributions were equal to or exceeded the
 334 punisher's contributions, varied dramatically across societies. Notably,
 335 high levels of antisocial punishment were observed in Greece, Turkey,
 336 the former Soviet Union and the Middle East while lower levels were
 337 found in the U.S, Australia, the Far East and Northwestern Europe¹³.
 338 Previous experiments, conducted in places with low levels of antisocial
 339 punishment, showed that the opportunity to punish positively affected
 340 group cooperation. However, not surprisingly, in subject pools where

¹² In splits where the proposer offers more than a fair share to the recipient (e.g. 30 for the proposer and 70 for the recipient), a recipient who rejects the offer suffers a higher cost (70) than the "punished" proposer (30).

¹³ Scandinavia, the UK, Germany & Switzerland. Southwestern Europe, e.g. France, Spain & Italy were not tested.

341 cooperators were punished heavily, cooperation levels did not increase
342 with punishment.

343 In an attempt to explain the observed cross-cultural variation,
344 Herrmann et al. investigated possible relationships between antisocial
345 punishment and a number of socio-demographic factors. Democracy
346 ranking and a measure of the prosperity of a country (GDP per capita)
347 were negatively correlated with antisocial punishment, suggesting that
348 high socio-economic development coincides with the cooperation-
349 enhancing function of punishment. Antisocial punishment was also
350 related to various cultural dimensions of the investigated countries (see
351 Hofstede, 2001) e.g. it occurred more often in places where the inequality
352 in society was high (high Power Distance), where ties between
353 individuals and their in-group are strong (low Individualism), where
354 gender differences tend to fade away (low Masculinity) and where
355 uncertainty avoidance is high.

356 In their analysis, Herrmann et al. (2008) emphasized two factors
357 as possible explanations for the cross-cultural variation in antisocial
358 punishment: the norms of civic cooperation and the rule of law. The
359 norms of civic cooperation is a measure based on questions used in the
360 World Values Survey describing the strength of abiding cooperative
361 norms in a society and the level of disapproval for breaking them. The
362 rule of law is an indicator developed by the World Bank to describe the
363 extent to which people perceive their government, police, courts and

364 authorities as fair, trustworthy and effective at law enforcement. Both
365 measures were negatively correlated with antisocial punishment.
366 Additionally, the researchers investigated a link between Inglehart's cultural
367 dimensions "traditional vs. secular-rational values" and "survival vs. self-
368 expression values" and antisocial punishment. They found less antisocial
369 punishment in cities where self-expression values i.e. social liberties and
370 personal freedom mattered more than survival values, which represent
371 economic and physical security.¹⁴

372 With so many interdependent predictors of antisocial punishment,
373 it is difficult to determine their relative importance and assess their
374 explanatory power. While Herrmann et al. focused on predictors
375 involving ethical evaluation of certain behaviors by the society (norms of
376 civic cooperation); and the quality, efficiency and fairness of a
377 centralized sanctioning system within a society (rule of law), it is
378 possible to imagine that differences in antisocial punishment are driven
379 by other societal characteristics. For example, if antisocial punishment is
380 proximately motivated by dominance and the desire for social control, it
381 would be reasonable to focus on its relationship with power distance and
382 survival/self-expression values. High levels of antisocial punishment
383 would be expected in places where social hierarchy and demonstration of

¹⁴ This correlation is unsurprising given that Inglehart's "survival vs. self-expression values" are related to Hofstede's power distance and Individualism-Collectivism dimensions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

384 power play an important role, and in harsher environments where
385 individuals need to focus on local competition with their neighbors in
386 order to succeed.

387 The variation in cooperation observed in Herrmann et al.'s (2008)
388 data was affected by individual heterogeneity and group-level differences
389 and most importantly by the membership in a "world culture" (Gächter,
390 Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010).¹⁵ Apart from the cultural differences in the
391 average cooperation level when punishment was possible, there were also
392 some interesting differences in the patterns of reacting to punishment. In
393 subject pools with high levels of antisocial punishment, the level of
394 cooperation remained low but relatively stable. In contrast, in places
395 where punishment of free-riders dominated and antisocial punishment
396 was scant, some participants, when the opportunity to punish was
397 introduced, almost immediately increased their pro-social contributions
398 (e.g. Boston, Nottingham, Copenhagen, Bonn, Zurich and St Gallen). In
399 other subject pools the increase in cooperation occurred gradually over
400 the course of rounds (e.g. Seoul, Chengdu and Melbourne). In general,
401 clustering the subject pools according to the Inglehart and Baker (2000)
402 schema did approximate the patterns of the reactions to punishment but

¹⁵ World cultures have been defined following Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Hofstede (2001) as a way to capture their historical and cultural backgrounds.

403 there were exceptions. Melbourne, categorized as an English speaking
404 culture, together with Nottingham, displayed a pattern similar to those
405 observed in the cities of the Confucian culture-type. Boston, on the other
406 hand, resembled the pattern observed in protestant non-English speaking
407 Europe.

408 Running identical experiments with the same experimenter and
409 instructions allows us to unravel cross-cultural variation in antisocial-
410 punishment behavior. By employing a slightly different design, and
411 comparing the behavior in subject pools from two countries, we may
412 illuminate other cross-cultural patterns, not visible using the earlier
413 experimental method. While costly punishment increases cooperation in
414 Boston (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008), it does not do so in
415 Beijing (Wu et al., 2009). In contrast, Herrmann et al. (2008) found that
416 the opportunity to use punishment positively affected contributions in
417 both subject pools, and that both Chinese participants from Chengdu and
418 US participants from Boston exhibited similar levels of costly
419 punishment, with only marginally higher level of antisocial punishment
420 in China. Unlike in Herrmann et al.'s paradigm with a PGG, in Dreber et
421 al.'s and Wu et al.'s experiments participants had an opportunity to
422 cooperate, defect or punish within a dyad, in each round. Wu et al. (2009)
423 discovered high levels of indiscriminate punishing in China in
424 comparison to the US. The researchers explained the differences between
425 theirs and Herrmann et al.'s study by the differences between protocols

426 used. In the repeated PGG, Chinese participants might have recognized
427 the concept of reputation, so important in their culture, whereas in the
428 dyadic encounters this concept was not applicable.

429 Another cross-cultural study, conducted by Gächter and
430 Herrmann (2009), supported their 2008 results. In an experiment
431 comparing antisocial punishment in Swiss and Russian participants, it
432 was confirmed that the punishment directed at cooperators in one-shot
433 games meted out by Russian participants was higher than antisocial
434 punishment in Switzerland.¹⁶ What merits attention is that participants in
435 both investigated regions could accurately predict the levels of antisocial
436 punishment, which suggests that common cultural origins predispose
437 people to correctly assess the cooperative and uncooperative intentions of
438 the members of their cultural group. In Russia, participants exhibited
439 more exploitative behavior in the sense that, even if they expected high
440 levels of cooperation from others, their own cooperative contribution was
441 lower than Swiss participants' contributions. Introducing punishment had
442 a positive effect on cooperation in Switzerland but a detrimental effect on
443 cooperation in Russia. In the latter case, this effect was mostly driven by
444 the change in the behavior of top contributors, who, presumably
445 expecting antisocial punishment, became less cooperative.

¹⁶ The reference level was the group average.

446 Evidence that an opportunity to punish produces different types of
447 behavior in different cultures is growing. In a recent study, American and
448 Romanian students showed a similar level of cooperative behavior when
449 it was measured by games without punishment (Ellingsen et al., 2012).
450 However, in repeated PGGs with punishment, American students tended
451 to use cooperation-enhancing altruistic punishment, while Romanian
452 students frequently meted out antisocial punishment. Interestingly,
453 Romanian students often used indiscriminate punishment targeting both
454 cooperators and non-cooperators. This finding is in line with our re-
455 analysis of Herrmann et al.'s dataset (Sylwester, Mitchell & Bryson, in
456 preparation), showing a non-exclusive use of antisocial and altruistic
457 punishment.

458 It is plausible to expect that, within a given culture, socio-
459 demographic factors will modulate the occurrence of antisocial
460 punishment, as they do with cooperation and third-party punishment
461 (Marlowe et al., 2011). In a study conducted in rural and urban Russia,
462 socio-demographic variables were found to affect cooperative but not
463 punishing behavior (Gächter & Herrmann, 2011). High levels of
464 antisocial punishment were unrelated to the age group and region of the
465 sample but, surprisingly, participants with a university degree and those
466 who were members of a voluntary organization exhibited higher levels of

467 antisocial punishment.¹⁷ It is important to note, however, that one-shot
468 games were used in that experiment and different patterns might be
469 revealed if participants are allowed to interact in the same group for a
470 longer period of time, as in Herrmann et al. (2008).

471 So far, the evidence gathered by Herrmann et al. (2008) provides
472 the most complete picture of antisocial punishment in different cultures.
473 The patchwork of other studies that differ in methodology do not
474 facilitate a coherent theory of the driving forces behind the variation in
475 antisocial punishment. The direction of the correlations between
476 antisocial punishment and different socio-economic factors suggests that
477 certain conditions can contribute to its occurrence. More specifically, it
478 appears that antisocial punishment frequently takes place in cultures
479 where the potential cost of it is low in relation to its benefits, for
480 example, in places where norms are frequently infringed, free-riding is
481 commonly approved of and legal sanctioning institutions are not
482 perceived as being fair or efficient. In such places, the potential cost of
483 being caught red-handed when punishing cooperators is low in
484 comparison to places where unethical behavior is strongly penalized and
485 disapproved of by both members of the society and legal institutions. On
486 the other hand, we observe antisocial punishment in places where there is

¹⁷ Though voluntary organisations in the former Soviet Union might have a different character from voluntary organisations in established market economies.

487 a lot to be gained from acquiring a higher rank in the group (even at a
488 cost of the absolute payoff) and where status and power may have a
489 dramatic impact on the quality of life and survival. In cultures with high
490 power distance the benefits coming from having a dominant status are
491 much higher than where power distance is low. In places abundant in
492 resources and with low inequality, gaining power might bring smaller
493 ecological benefits than in places where resources are low and
494 competition is fierce.

495 **Antisocial punishment at the group level**

496 Variation in antisocial punishment occurs at various levels.
497 Starting from the top, we can consider cultures (e.g. as defined by
498 Inglehart & Baker, 2000), populations within a culture, groups within a
499 population and individuals within a group. Micro-level behavior
500 modulates macro-level, so examining individual drives and social
501 influences within different environments may help explain variation in
502 the cultural make-up. In this section, we discuss between- and within-
503 group competition that may be affecting the observed variation in
504 antisocial punishment. Punishment can be imposed within one's own
505 close social group or it may be inflicted on individuals from another
506 group. Since altruistic punishment enhances group welfare in the long
507 run (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008) while antisocial punishment can
508 be expected to decrease it, the use of these two types of punishment

509 towards in-group and out-group members should be contingent on the
510 severity of inter- and intra-group competition.

511 ***Inter-group competition***

512 The parochial preferences widely documented in humans
513 manifest themselves in people favoring individuals from their own social
514 group (Tajfel, 1970). In-group favoritism can occur in any situation
515 where an individual has an option to positively or negatively affect
516 another individual's well-being. Hence, we should be able to observe
517 selective use of altruistic and antisocial punishment towards in-group
518 versus out-group members. Costly altruistic punishment might be a
519 useful tool for enhancing a group's cohesion and cooperation,
520 particularly when it is done within one's own social group and not
521 inflicted on out-group members. In contrast, antisocial punishment,
522 which is likely to result in reducing group cooperation and coordination,
523 could be an effective way to gain competitive advantage over another
524 group when inflicted on members of an out-group. This in-group out-
525 group reasoning might be underlying the observed variation in antisocial
526 punishment. Excessive generosity displayed by some individuals can
527 possibly be interpreted as a signal of dominance rather than cooperation.
528 High status of these cooperative individuals distinguishes them from the
529 rest of the group. In consequence, cooperators are not perceived as in-

530 group members and fall victim of antisocial punishment.¹⁸

531 When costly punishment is meted out within one's own group,
 532 effective altruistic punishment and inhibited antisocial punishment will
 533 positively affect the collective payoffs of individuals as a group. This, in
 534 turn, can increase the odds of one group gaining advantage over another
 535 in between-group competition. Where between-group competition has
 536 significant consequences, being a relatively weak individual in a
 537 dominant group may be better than being a dominant individual in a
 538 subordinate group (Queller, 1994; Wilson, 2004).

539 The same logic can be applied to a situation when individuals
 540 have an opportunity to punish members of an out-group. It is reasonable
 541 to expect that with a higher degree of between-group competition the use
 542 of antisocial punishment towards out-group members will increase.
 543 Directing antisocial punishment to out-group members may undermine
 544 the out-group's cooperation or make the mechanism of norm
 545 enforcement through altruistic punishment less effective. Either could
 546 increase the competitive status of the punisher's own group.

547 Indeed, experiments conducted in Papua New Guinea with two

¹⁸ In a recent study, U.S participants voted to expel from the group not only the most selfish members, but also the ones who excessively contributed to the public good and used little of it (Parks & Stone, 2010). Social comparison mechanisms, combined with the unwillingness to adhere to high norms established by the over-generous individuals, were proposed as explanations for this phenomenon.

548 distinct social groups revealed that altruistic punishment was highest
 549 when the person in charge of the split, the recipient and the punisher
 550 came from the same social group, and also when only the recipient and
 551 the punisher came from the same group (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr,
 552 2006). Most antisocial punishment was observed in the latter case,
 553 confirming that punishers were more likely to punish in a way that
 554 negatively affected payoffs of an out-group member. In another study
 555 with artificially created groups of Japanese participants, a similar pattern
 556 was observed (Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004).¹⁹ Punishing of
 557 free-riders by cooperators happened more frequently when done within
 558 one's own group (this result was also obtained by McLeish & Oxoby,
 559 2007), but, interestingly, free-riders meted out harsher punishment on
 560 other free-riders from an out-group rather than in-group. In Shinada et
 561 al.'s (2004) study, antisocial punishment was minimal and no in-
 562 group/out-group effects were reported. Perhaps this is unsurprising,
 563 given Japan's high GDP and the strong rule of law in that country.

564 One-shot TPP experiments have also been conducted in India to
 565 investigate the impact of the different caste memberships on punishing
 566 behavior. While high-caste participants punished norm violators more
 567 severely than low-caste participants (Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2009),

¹⁹ The group distinction was created by telling participants that the other
 members either belonged to their own or a different academic unit.

the caste differences in the punishment of cooperators were not significant (Fehr, Hoff, & Kshetramade, 2008). Investigating spiteful behavior of low and high castes, using a series of binary choice Dictator games (in which one person decided about the split of a given amount of money), provided mixed results. When presented with a choice between 70/90 (other/self) distribution and 90/90 distribution, 42% of high caste participants and only 21% of low cast participants chose the first (spiteful) option. In contrast, when deciding between 150/150 and 100/160 distributions, 83% of high caste and only 53% of low caste participants chose the first (equal split) option (Fehr et al., 2008). In the seven possible choices, high caste participants preferred the spiteful distribution more than low caste participants in only one case (in which the p value was marginally significant). However, the researchers concluded that “high-caste subjects (compared to low-caste subjects) are considerably more likely to reduce others’ payoffs if behind, or to take other spiteful actions” (p.499, Fehr et al., 2008).

Mere in-group/out-group categorization may not invoke hostility and antisocial sanctions. As argued above, what triggers inter-group conflict and aggression is the social level at which the most significant competition takes place. In a sample from Swiss army platoons, group-membership *per se* did not affect the occurrence of antisocial punishment but resulted in more altruistic punishment when the victim of defection was in-group and the defector was out-group (Goette, Huffman, Meier, &

591 Sutter, 2010). However, when between-group competition was
592 introduced, costly punishment was mostly imposed on cooperators and
593 free-riders from the out-group. At the same time, in-group cooperation
594 increased. This points to an important role inter-group competition plays
595 in inducing antisocial punishment (and Schadenfreude, see Leach,
596 Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). Competition with the out-group
597 can also induce excessive and wasteful punishment of in-group members.
598 Contests between groups resulted in above-rational expenditures on
599 competition but also in high expenditures on within-group punishment of
600 individuals whose financial engagement in the conflict was lower than
601 the group's average (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2010). High
602 expenditures on costly punishment in the presence of competition have
603 also been found by Sääksvuori et al. (2011).

604 The levels of antisocial punishment observed in conventional
605 PGG experiments appear to be low when contrasted with the levels
606 towards the out-group members induced by conflict. A possible
607 interpretation of this would be that punishment in ordinary PGG is only a
608 side-effect of mechanisms evolved for conflict situations. The act of
609 costly punishment, when taken out of the PGG context, can be perceived
610 as mere aggression. Engaging in aggressive interactions with out-group
611 members in the presence of conflict may be advantageous, in that it may
612 help preserve a group's resources such as territory. Herrmann et al.
613 (2008) found a negative correlation between antisocial punishment and

614 scores on the individualism/collectivism dimension. Antisocial
615 punishment occurred more often in places where group identity plays a
616 great role and where, in general, ethnocentrism and xenophobia are more
617 pronounced. A possible explanation for this pattern might be that
618 participants perceived other anonymous players as members of an out-
619 group rather than in-group.

620 When extracted from the context of PGGs, costly punishment
621 might be an effective weapon used in inter-group conflicts because the
622 cost of aggression is smaller than its consequences to the opponent.
623 Using altruistic punishment in conflict, although still effective at the
624 individual level, might not work in the long term, because it may result in
625 the out-group becoming more cooperative and coherent. Instead,
626 antisocial punishment of out-group cooperators undermines the stability
627 of the other group's social norms.

628 ***Intra-group competition***

629 In ecological contexts where intra-group competition is fierce,
630 individuals will use aggression towards members of their own group.
631 Costly punishment typically decreases average payoffs (Dreber et al.,
632 2008; Wu et al., 2009), however, it might be useful for displaying
633 aggression and gaining relative advantage over the punished individual.
634 Previous research has shown that people do care about their relative
635 payoff within a group. For example, Saijo and Nakamura (1995) made
636 participants face a non-dilemma in which the payoff maximizing choice

637 was to contribute the whole allocation to the public pool²⁰. Although the
 638 contributions to PGG in the non-dilemma condition were higher than in
 639 the standard dilemma, a considerable number of participants still
 640 refrained from contributing and failed to maximize their payoff. The
 641 average amounts saved in the non-dilemma situation were higher than the
 642 average investments to the public pool in the traditional dilemma version
 643 of the PGG. This indicates that in the no-dilemma situation more
 644 participants chose the non-optimal (non-payoff-maximizing) outcome
 645 than in the traditional dilemma, indicating that the non-dilemma may
 646 have been taken as a spiteful dilemma.

647 Saijo and Nakamura (1995) concluded that there exists a
 648 population of spiteful individuals who value their ranking within the
 649 group more than their absolute payoff. In a similar but more recent study,
 650 even when the payoff maximizing decision was to contribute everything
 651 to the public pool, a considerable number of participants did not do that
 652 (Kümmerli, Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, & West, 2010). The
 653 researchers described this phenomenon as “resistance to extreme
 654 strategies” or “imperfections” and discovered that a considerable number
 655 of participants perceived their group members as competitors rather than

²⁰ Saijo and Nakamura (1995) used two variants of the PGG marginal per capita return from each point invested: low return (standard PGG) where each invested point yields 0.7, and high return (anti-dilemma) where each invested point yields 1.43 points.

656 full collaborators even when competition has been deliberately repressed
657 by the experimental condition. Analogously, the reluctance to accept an
658 unfair split in the UGs described earlier may be dictated not by the norm
659 of fairness but by competitive preferences and/or simple heuristics
660 (Binmore, 2007).

661 Could this competitive tendency in humans be an artifact of lab
662 experiments using specific homogenous samples (see Henrich, Heine, &
663 Norenzayan, 2010)? Recent studies revealed that “spiteful” punishment
664 (measured as the rate of rejection of offers in the Ultimatum Game, UG)
665 is as frequent in large-scale as in small-scale societies, while the
666 occurrence of “altruistic” third-party punishment is mostly limited to the
667 large-scale ones (Marlowe et al., 2008, 2011). Moreover, participants
668 from the large societies tend to use more third-party punishment than
669 spiteful second-party punishment. Marlowe et al. (2011) suggested that
670 this distribution of the third- and second-party punishment points to the
671 spiteful origins of human cooperation. An aversion to a personally-
672 unfavorable unequal split, regardless of whether it is caused by fairness
673 concerns or spiteful preferences, appears to be a human universal (see
674 also Price, 2005).

675 If the long-term relationship between rank in a group and success as an
676 individual is strong, then paying a small cost in order to acquire a higher
677 rank by harming another individual may pay off in the long run. There
678 are numerous examples in the animal world where the dominant

679 individual benefits disproportionately from being higher-ranked than the
 680 second-highest individual in the hierarchy. Reproductive skew – that is,
 681 the monopolizing of reproduction by alpha males and females – has been
 682 observed in many species (e.g. Nelson-Flower et al., 2011; Setchell,
 683 Charpentier, & Wickings, 2005; Sumner, Casiraghi, Foster, & Field,
 684 2002). Rank may be particularly important in smaller groups in which it
 685 is possible for one individual to control all potential competitors
 686 (Kutsukake & Nunn, 2006).
 687 In a situation where between-group competition is relatively low, the in-
 688 group members become the main competitors for resources. In such
 689 circumstances, one should expect indiscriminate punishment because
 690 both altruistic and antisocial types of punishment increase the positive
 691 payoff difference between the punisher and the punished. By Sylwester et
 692 al.'s calculation (submitted), over 50% of participants from Muscat,
 693 Athens, Samara and Riyadh in the Herrmann et al.'s (2008) study used
 694 both antisocial and altruistic punishment over the course of ten rounds.
 695 Both types of punishment were sometimes used within the same round²¹.

²¹ 11% of all punishment opportunities in Muscat and 9% in
 Riyadh showed mixed strategies. This is despite the fact that only half of
 the participants in the groups of four were able to punish this way on any
 given round, since by our definitions the highest contributors could not
 punish antisocially, nor the lowest altruistically.

696 In the data gathered by Herrmann et al. (2008), there is a negative
697 relationship between GDP per capita (the measure of prosperity in a
698 country) and the amount of antisocial punishment. GDP per capita is also
699 highly correlated with the rule of law, used by the researchers as the main
700 explanatory variable for antisocial punishment. Both the rule of law and
701 antisocial punishment are constructs created to describe peoples'
702 attitudes and behaviors. The correlation between the two is important but
703 circular – it is difficult to infer causality. GDP per capita is
704 interdependent with these characteristics but is also a measure describing
705 the socio-ecology of a given place and defines its living conditions. A
706 common finding in both biology and sociology is that as resources
707 become scarcer, local competition between individuals increases
708 (Briones, Montana, & Ezcurra, 1998; Grossman & Mendoza, 2003). In
709 the context of enhanced local competition caused by waning resources,
710 relative payoffs may matter more than absolute payoffs. In societies with
711 high income-inequality and economic instability, the perceived risks
712 caused by decreasing resource availability may maximize competitive
713 predispositions and induce aggression towards in-group members.

714 **Individual variation in antisocial punishment**

715 Differences in punishment strategies also exist within groups
716 from relatively homogenous populations. There are two possible
717 explanations of individual variation in antisocial punishment in such

718 groups. Sanctioning cooperators could be a strategic behavior dependent
719 on the immediate circumstances, or it could constitute a relatively stable
720 part of an individual's personality. These two possibilities are not
721 exclusive – recent results indicate that both may be true.

722 Negative reciprocity – responding to harmful behavior with harm
723 (also known as revenge or retaliation) – is widespread in humans.
724 Evidence from UGs shows that, across the world, people would rather
725 give up their profits than allow their partner to take a disproportionately
726 large share (Henrich et al., 2005). Similarly, in PGGs, people are willing
727 to punish those who exploited them and, as a result, became better off
728 (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In another study, participants playing PGGs, who
729 were kept aware of the running-total earnings of fellow players,
730 contributed significantly less than those who knew both earnings and
731 contributions. These, in turn, contributed less than participants knowing
732 contributions only (Nikiforakis, 2010). Further, punishment increased
733 dramatically when both earnings and contributions were known in
734 comparison to the condition with known contributions only. Punishment
735 was not greater when only earnings were known, but it was also not less
736 (Nikiforakis, 2010).

737 Proximately, negative reciprocity results from the neurological
738 underpinnings of vengeance. Individuals who punish those who behave
739 unfairly derive satisfaction through the activation of reward circuits in
740 the brain (De Quervain et al., 2004). De Quervain et al. (2004)

741 implemented an experimental condition where the result of an unequal
742 split was due to chance, rather than to an intentional decision of their
743 partner. In this case, the majority of participants reported no desire to
744 punish and only three out of 14 participants sanctioned their partners by a
745 small amount. De Quervain et al.'s results may be indirectly applied to
746 antisocial punishment considering that costly punishment of cooperators
747 is, at least to some extent, motivated by revenge.

748 Herrmann et al. (2008) suggested that retaliation might be a
749 possible reason for antisocial punishment. In the majority of the
750 investigated subject pools, the amount of the received punishment is
751 positively related to the scale of antisocial punishment. However, the
752 design typically used in behavioral economic experiments on costly
753 punishment does not allow for pinpointing revenge. In a standard setting,
754 punishment is anonymous and participants are unaware of who punished
755 them (e.g. Egas & Riedl, 2008; Falk et al., 2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2002;
756 Herrmann et al., 2008). They also cannot see how much punishment
757 other individuals receive and, thusly, they cannot assess whether
758 sanctioning affects their contributions. Unless the punished individual is
759 the top contributor, they might expect that any punishment they receive is
760 “deserved” and may have come from a more cooperative person. In any
761 case, their revenge is blind: individuals can only try to guess who
762 punished them in the preceding rounds.

763 A few studies have investigated the consequences of revealing the
764 identity of punishers and adding the possibility of targeted revenge to the
765 design. In some conditions of the experiments of Denant-Boemont et
766 al.'s (2007), Nikiforakis's (2008) and Cinyabuguma et al.'s (2006) after
767 the first punishment stage participants were able to pay to reduce others'
768 payoffs for a second time. Depending on the study, participants were
769 provided with different information about the punishment decisions of
770 others. In Denant-Boemont et al.'s (2007) study participants were either
771 told all details about punishment decisions and the identities of the
772 punishers (full information condition), only who punished them and by
773 how much (revenge only condition) or information about how other
774 players were punished (no revenge condition). In the "no revenge"
775 condition, despite the extra punishment stage, participants' contributions
776 remained stable and similar to those observed when no extra punishment
777 opportunity was available. In contrast, when participants could target
778 those who punished them in the past, in the "full" information and
779 "revenge only" conditions another punishment stage resulted in a
780 decrease in cooperation. While in the "no revenge condition", the amount
781 contributed to the PGG above group average negatively correlated with
782 received punishment, this was not the case when individuals could target
783 those who punished them (full information and revenge only conditions),
784 suggesting the occurrence of antisocial punishment.

785 Nikiforakis (2008) adopted a design similar to Denant-Boemont
786 et al.'s "revenge only" condition, in that participants could only punish
787 those who had just punished them. Antisocial punishment levels were
788 similar in the condition where counter-punishment was possible and in
789 the control standard condition with one round of punishment. However,
790 when counter-punishment was enabled, both altruistic punishment and
791 cooperation declined dramatically. In the counter-punishment stage,
792 those who were punished antisocially were more likely to counter-punish
793 than those who were punished because of their low contributions. In
794 Cinyabuguma et al.'s (2006) experiment, participants learned how much
795 punishment was assigned to individuals who contributed above, below or
796 equal to the average of group contributions without knowing which
797 specific individuals were punished and by how much. Here, the addition
798 of another punishment stage did not result in participants lowering their
799 contributions. Neither did it lead to a significant increase in
800 contributions.

801 In all three studies, in conditions where participants could target
802 those who punished them in the past, the extra punishment stage
803 negatively affected contributions to the public good. In those cases,
804 punishment following contributions was lower than in the control
805 condition without the second punishment stage. Clearly, the fear of
806 revenge, suppressed sanctioning behavior in the first punishment stage,
807 which in turn reduced cooperation. However, in the second stage of

808 punishment, sanctioning occurred frequently and was directed to both
809 those who had previously punished altruistically and antisocially. In
810 conclusion, individuals who behave in an uncooperative way and are
811 subsequently punished, when given a chance, tend to retaliate. A
812 combination of anger and the lack of guilt were found to be the main
813 emotional causes of such negative reciprocity (Hopfensitz & Reuben,
814 2009).

815 Blind revenge is likely to be the motivation of some of the
816 punishment observed in Herrmann et al.'s study. However, instances of
817 punishing cooperators, though rare, occurred even after the first round of
818 the PGG (the first punishment opportunity), where negative reciprocity
819 can be excluded as a possible motive. In several studies, negative social
820 preferences have been examined in circumstances where no motive for
821 punishment existed. When participants of an experiment conducted in the
822 Netherlands could destroy the partner's money without the fear of
823 retaliation, they did so in 40% of decisions (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). In
824 another experiment with Ukrainian participants, the destruction rate more
825 than doubled, from around 11% to 25%, when the cause of destruction
826 was made obscure to the partner (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011). This
827 suggests that the way in which experiments are framed, combined with
828 enhanced anonymity, can have a dramatic impact on people's behavior.
829 The fact that cooperative behavior is often measured through experiments

830 that include an option to give, but not an option to take, may lead to
 831 biases in the interpretation of results.

832 Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) speculated that reducing another
 833 person's income even at one's own cost "gives pleasure". Such an
 834 interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the known "warm glow" effect
 835 caused by helping others (Andreoni, 1995) and the finding that
 836 contributing to the public good activates reward areas in the brain
 837 (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007), though there is known to be
 838 individual variation in the level of such social rewards (Nettle, 2006).

839 How can we then explain the high levels of "nastiness" observed in
 840 Abbink and Sadrieh's (2009) and Abbink and Herrmann's (2011)
 841 studies? It might be that rather than being pleasant, high levels of
 842 harming behaviour have been caused by the action bias, a preference to
 843 perform a given action rather than not do anything (Baron & Ritov, 2004;
 844 Patt & Zeckhauser, 2000). High rates of negative social behaviour might
 845 simply be an experimental fluke caused by the absence of any positive
 846 alternative. In a study where both costly rewards and costly punishment
 847 could be used, costly punishment almost disappeared while rewarding
 848 others remained at a stable high level over the course of rounds (Rand,
 849 Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009).²²

²² Interestingly, in Rand et al.'s (2009) experiment conducted in the U.S.,
 unlike in other studies, punishment and reward decisions were not anonymous, so

850 A propensity for antisocial punishment may constitute part of a
 851 person's stable personality profile. In psychology, the Social Value
 852 Orientation (SVO) scale categorizes people with regard to how they
 853 value their personal payoff with reference to others' payoffs. A common
 854 finding is that the majority of participants (on average 46%) have, what
 855 SVO calls a "pro-social" orientation i.e. they choose that they and the
 856 other individuals receive an equal payoff (Au & Kwong, 2004). A
 857 smaller proportion of individuals (38%) choose the selfish option that
 858 maximizes their own absolute payoff. There is also an even smaller
 859 group (12%) that the SVO labels as "competitive". Competitive
 860 individuals favor a split that results in an increase in their own relative
 861 payoff, unlike selfish individuals who seek to maximize their absolute
 862 payoff.²³ While SVO may offer a proximate reason for why some
 863 individuals express antisocial punishment, it does not address the

participants could target those who affected their payoffs in the past. Despite this possibility of revenge (discussed in detail earlier in this section), punishment patterns resembled those observed in experiments with an anonymous design. Only a small amount of antisocial punishment occurred (see Rand et al.'s supplementary material). Herrmann et al. (2008) also reported very low levels of antisocial punishment in their only American city.

²³ In the SVO scale it is not possible to choose a distribution in which the other individual's payoff would be higher than own payoff.

864 evolutionary underpinnings of its distribution in a population. We will
865 return to this topic in the next section.

866 Behavioral economics has also noted that social preferences are
867 heterogeneous and that people can be classified into distinct types who
868 behave in a relatively consistent and predictable manner (Fischbacher &
869 Gächter, 2006; Gächter & Thöni, 2005; Kurzban & Houser, 2005). Their
870 classification system is somewhat different than that adopted by social
871 psychologists. The majority of individuals fall into the category called
872 “conditional cooperators” or “reciprocators”, that is, they are social
873 learners who react to others’ behavior. Due to their fine-tuning of
874 behavior to free-riders’ lack of cooperation, contributions in PGG decline
875 over time (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). The two smaller groups
876 are made up of cooperators who consistently act in a way that increases
877 group welfare and free-riders who consistently pursue their own payoff
878 maximizing interest.

879 The environment in which one develops may shape individual
880 preferences for punishment behaviour. The choice of punishment type
881 one imposes has been linked to the degree of discounting the future
882 (Espin et al., 2012). In this study, conducted in Spain, present-oriented
883 participants meted out more antisocial punishment and less altruistic
884 punishment than their future-oriented counterparts. Discounting the
885 future and focusing on present competition may be a successful strategy
886 in unpredictable environments with scarce resources. In contrast,

887 enforcing cooperation with an expectation of future benefits is likely to
888 be a successful strategy in more stable and wealthy places (see Hill,
889 Jenkins & Farmer, 2008). Espin et al.'s (2012) results fit well with those
890 obtained by Herrmann et al. (2008), showing a negative correlation
891 between the expression of antisocial punishment and GDP per capita.

892 The notion that individuals' economic decisions in one game are
893 relatively stable and that they can be predictive of the decisions in
894 another game has been challenged by Herrmann and Orzen (2008).
895 Individuals classified as pro-social (altruists and conditional cooperators)
896 in a prisoner's dilemma problem, when presented with a contest game,
897 invested more aggressively than individuals classified as selfish.²⁴
898 Moreover, individuals who played the contest game before, instead of
899 after, the prisoner's dilemma problem showed a decrease in cooperative
900 behavior. Herrmann and Orzen's results suggest that different game
901 contexts may shift individual social preferences; a "pro-social" type may
902 behave cooperatively in games framed as cooperative. When the game is
903 framed as competitive, their preference may reverse. The reduction in
904 cooperative behavior, after participation in a contest game, indicates that

²⁴ In the prisoner's dilemma problem, an individual who defects while their partner cooperates receives the highest payoff. The second highest payoff is when both partners cooperate. A lower payoff is obtained when both partners defect. The lowest payoff, the so called "sucker's payoff", is obtained by a person who cooperates while their partner defects.

905 the exposure to competitive situations and environments may
 906 considerably affect the behavior of otherwise pro-social types²⁵.
 907 When the possibility of punishment exists, social learners use it
 908 and can achieve high levels of cooperation. Ones and Putterman (2007)
 909 examined punishment behavior of individuals who were (unknowingly)
 910 grouped according to their cooperative type²⁶. Punishment patterns (no
 911 punishment, altruistic punishment and antisocial punishment) remained
 912 consistent across a number of rounds and were present even in the end
 913 periods in which there were no incentives to punish, in terms of absolute
 914 payoff. Antisocial punishers grouped together continued to punish
 915 antisocially even in the final periods. Ones and Putterman's (2007)
 916 results provide another piece of evidence indicating that the preferences
 917 people hold cannot be narrowed down to absolute payoff maximization.
 918 Importantly, they also suggest that antisocial punishment is not

²⁵ Note that this does not necessarily undermine the idea of individuals having stable strategies, rather it may mean the strategies are more complex than uniform pro- or antisocial behavior.

²⁶ The cooperative type was determined on the basis of five diagnostic rounds of PGG with punishment. After each round participants were reshuffled between groups in a way to make the groups as diverse with respect to PGG contributions and punishment as possible. Next, participants were ranked according to their average contribution and punishment level in the five diagnostic rounds.

919 necessarily strategic and it may sometimes constitute a persistent
 920 individual strategy.

921 Gächter and Thöni (2005) used a one-shot PGG in order to
 922 determine participants' cooperative preferences. Participants who
 923 contributed similar amounts of money in this diagnostic round were then
 924 grouped together and showed the previous contributions of other group
 925 members²⁷. Hence, unlike in Ones and Putterman's (2007) design,
 926 participants knew they would be interacting with like-minded people.

927 In the unsorted control condition the level of contributions in the
 928 diagnostic one-shot PGG round differed considerably from the first
 929 contribution round in the series of PGGs. This suggests that the prospect
 930 of repeated interaction with people with similar strategies positively
 931 affects behavior of all participants, including otherwise selfish
 932 individuals. In the unsorted control condition, most punishment was
 933 meted out by the lowest and the middle contributors but not by the
 934 highest contributors. Participants from groups with the lowest
 935 contributors meted out a considerable amount of antisocial punishment.

936 As in other studies, the type of cooperative preferences, determined

²⁷ Participants were ranked according to their contribution in the diagnostic round. The three top contributors formed one group, the next three highest the second group etc. For analysis, three classes of groups were created with the third of groups with the highest contributions, the third with the middle contributions and the third with the lowest contributions.

937 through the diagnostic round, remained consistent and affected
938 punishment decisions. When participants knew that they were interacting
939 with others of similar preferences, punishment by high and medium
940 contributors almost disappeared (probably because both groups behaved
941 in a very cooperative way) and the only punishing group were the lowest
942 contributors. The information about whether antisocial punishment
943 occurred in these sorted groups of low contributors is not provided.

944 As indicated above, motivations for antisocial punishment vary
945 and do not necessarily involve revenge. At the most basic level, any
946 instance of antisocial punishment is an expression of aggressive behavior
947 (see Sylwester et al., submitted). Aggression may be used to undermine
948 someone else's cooperative strategy or to defend one's own strategy. It
949 may also result in gaining social status. In our view, costly antisocial
950 punishment functions as a social signal to observers in the same way that
951 altruistic acts do (Barclay, 2006; Hardy & van Vugt, 2006). By using
952 antisocial punishment, individuals build a reputation for aggressiveness,
953 which is likely to benefit them in some social contexts. It should be noted
954 that while punishers may increase their payoff relative to the individual
955 they punish, the cost of punishment means that they could also reduce
956 their own payoff relative to that of non-punishing and unpunished
957 individuals. By design, punishment is a costly game to play.

958 **Antisocial punishment as an evolutionary strategy**

959 When making evolutionary inferences based on behavioral
960 economics experiments, it is important to take into account limitations
961 and external validity of these experiments. Humans evolved in social
962 groups where direct and indirect reciprocity played a role and it is likely
963 that punishers could have been easily identified. Combining costly
964 punishment with reputation can completely change the predicted
965 evolutionary outcomes of different strategies (Santos, Rankin, &
966 Wedekind, 2011). Contemporary large group size, anonymity and market
967 integration may create circumstances resembling those present in
968 behavioral economics experiments (e.g. online interactions). However,
969 one needs to be cautious when extrapolating the results of such
970 experiments to an evolutionary scale. In modern human societies, status
971 is intrinsically related to cooperative reputation (Hardy & Van Vugt,
972 2006). When reputational information is public, as it was during the
973 human evolutionary past, highly cooperative reputation facilitates the
974 acquisition of desirable partners for profitable interactions (see e.g.
975 Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). In the anonymous or pseudo-anonymous
976 settings, used in behavioral economics experiments, at least some
977 proportion of people may revert to the more basic way of establishing
978 dominance – aggression.

979 Traulsen and colleagues (García & Traulsen, 2012; Hilbe &
980 Traulsen, 2012) have recently used computer simulations to model the

981 evolutionary dynamics of reputation combined with sanctioning. They
982 found that adding individual reputation into the simulation selected
983 against all sanctioning, except that meted out to free riders (termed
984 *altruistic* here). This may explain the difference between in-group and
985 out-group behavior reported in the previous section – in-group
986 individuals are, almost by definition, better known to group members
987 than out-group ones. Therefore, the use of antisocial punishment may
988 well vary between these conditions due to the availability of reputational
989 information. It is worth noting, that the above models do not account for
990 reputation gained from antisocial punishment. One can well imagine that
991 an individual would adjust their behavior knowing that their partner tends
992 to punish cooperators. Likewise, an uncooperative individual with a
993 reputation for antisocial punishment might not receive much punishment
994 from altruistic punishers because of a increased probability of retaliation.

995 It is possible that the high levels of antisocial punishment
996 observed in some subject pools represent a sensible strategy under
997 anonymous conditions. However, punishment that benefits the group can
998 be viewed as a second order public good and can, therefore, improve
999 reputation in non-anonymous settings. It has been shown that the
1000 presence of an audience enhances the use of third-party costly
1001 punishment against norm violators, even if that audience consists solely
1002 of the experimenter (Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007). Investing in
1003 costly punishment that benefits the group is analogous to investing in

1004 cooperation, and may positively affect reputation. Indeed, people who
1005 punish altruistically gain social benefits and higher earnings in paired
1006 interactions, thanks to their reputations as punishers (Barclay, 2006).
1007 Considering this strategic use of altruistic punishment, the high rates of
1008 antisocial punishment observed in several subject pools of Herrmann et
1009 al. (2008), may be manifested quite rarely in real life because of the
1010 reputational advantages of punishing free-riders. The small number of
1011 studies on reputation and punishment, and a lack of cross-cultural
1012 comparison of the effects of reputation, make prediction of the
1013 relationship between them difficult. In places with norms of low civic
1014 cooperation and weak rule of law, reputational benefits from altruistic
1015 punishment might not outweigh the benefits of the dominant status
1016 acquired by low contributions and antisocial punishment.

1017 Evolutionary models show that even a small proportion of
1018 individuals with a particular strategy can have a dramatic effect on
1019 population dynamics. A simple example would be a small number of
1020 defectors who can invade a group of cooperators and make them
1021 disappear from the population (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1974). In a
1022 population where individuals use many different behavioral strategies,
1023 evolution may promote optimal mixes so that the local economic
1024 substrates are maximally exploited (MacLean, Fuentes-Hernandez,
1025 Greig, Hurst, & Gudelj, 2010; Nettle, 2006). Recently, agent-based
1026 modeling has been used to examine the consequences of adding

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1027 antisocial punishment to the repertoire of behaviors available to
1028 individuals in a society. In a simple model, the introduction of antisocial
1029 punishers led to the collapse of cooperation, and punishing antisocially
1030 became the dominant strategy (Rand, Armao, Joseph, Nakamaru, &
1031 Ohtsuki, 2010). In a population lacking a spatial structure costly
1032 punishment was evolutionarily stable. Punishers who could use both
1033 altruistic and antisocial punishment achieved the highest relative payoffs
1034 and eventually displaced non-punishers and punishers who specialized in
1035 one type of punishment. In a spatially structured population, defectors
1036 who did not punish and defectors who punished antisocially did best. In
1037 this case, antisocial punishment was a powerful strategy only rarely
1038 invaded by non-punishing defectors. In further models exploring the
1039 impact of group-structured populations due to Powers, Taylor and
1040 Bryson (2012) this result was showed to hold even in conditions of
1041 between-group competition. More generally, introducing antisocial
1042 punishment decreased the probability of the evolution of cooperation,
1043 though where group-level selection was sufficiently powerful (groups
1044 were small and persistent) cooperation could still evolve. Power et al.'s
1045 (2012) results indicate that antisocial punishment can only have evolved
1046 if it is inextricably associated with some other adaptive advantage, such
1047 as social dominance (see also Rand & Nowak, 2011). The evolutionary
1048 models summarised above lead to the conclusion that most of the
1049 mechanisms that have been proposed for the evolution of altruistic

1050 punishment can also promote antisocial punishment, if such strategies are
1051 not *a priori* excluded from the models.

1052 Costly punishment is usually modeled within the framework of
1053 the tragedy of the commons – despite initial cooperation, eventually all
1054 individuals become selfish payoff maximizers in repeated PGGs.
1055 However, many human interactions are likely to resemble not a tragedy
1056 of the commons but a tragedy of the commune (see Doebeli & Hauert,
1057 2005). Tragedy of the commune refers to a situation when the payoffs of
1058 cooperation and free-riding are based on the Snowdrift Game payoff
1059 matrix. In this game, mutual defection results in the worst possible payoff
1060 for both partners. An individual who defects in response to their partner's
1061 cooperation achieves the best possible payoff. In the tragedy of the
1062 commune cooperative types may co-exist with free-riders and
1063 cooperation can be maintained at a stable but low level (Doebeli &
1064 Hauert, 2005). Low but stable cooperation level was found by Herrmann
1065 et al. (2008) in subject pools with high antisocial punishment. If the
1066 payoff matrices of social dilemmas are more relaxed in real life than is
1067 assumed by a standard PGG, a mix of different cooperative types may be
1068 evolutionarily stable and therefore individuals might not be willing to use
1069 altruistic punishment to enforce cooperative norms.

2. Conclusions

In this article, we have examined the psychological and ecological causes of antisocial punishment at the individual, group, cultural and evolutionary levels. The experimental subjects typically used to investigate costly punishment in behavioral economics were originally heavily biased towards participants from democratic and relatively affluent places (Henrich et al., 2010). This has resulted in antisocial punishment being historically regarded as the “ugly step-sister” to altruistic punishment and treated as a rare phenomenon, not deserving of scientific attention. Thanks to the seminal study by Herrmann et al. (2008), we now know that, although rare in some contexts, in other contexts antisocial punishment constitutes a behavior as widely expressed as altruistic punishment. We have proposed that the contexts where antisocial punishment is pervasive may be the ones in which being locally competitive is likely to provide a considerable improvement in the socio-economic condition of the individual. In these contexts, cooperation remains stable, but it is at a lower level, relative to other regions. This is, possibly, because a small but stable proportion of individuals exhibit a preference for aggressive competition. Antisocial punishment is also more prevalent between individuals who do not consider each other “in-group”. We have presented two explanations for this: both between-group competition, and selection against antisocial punishment in contexts where reputational cost is involved. Antisocial

1093 punishment therefore does not have to be viewed as an exceptionally
1094 complex or perplexing behavior. Rather, it can be easily described as
1095 aggression driven by competition (Sylwester, Mitchell & Bryson,
1096 submitted).

1097 As Darwin (1871) aptly put it, humans normally show extensive
1098 cooperation but in some circumstances their “lower, though at the
1099 moment, stronger impulses or desires” (p.104) may prevail. Recent
1100 reports concerning antisocial punishment have often emphasized the
1101 “dark side” of human nature, indicating such behavior is purely
1102 destructive. However, when viewed from an ecological perspective,
1103 punishing cooperators may be just one way to gain an advantage over
1104 others and may constitute a selfish behavior that positively affects
1105 individual survival and well-being. Costly punishment – whether
1106 altruistic or not – can be seen as a second-order public good because it
1107 may improve group cooperation and payoffs (Yamagishi, 1986). It can
1108 also be viewed as an effective weapon when used in individual
1109 competition.

1110 In addition to disputing that antisocial punishment is irrational,
1111 we have also disputed the hypothesis that costly punishment reliably acts
1112 as an independent mechanism for enhancing cooperation (Fehr &
1113 Gächter, 2002). Rather, when the opportunity to build reputation exists,
1114 punishment should be treated as a derivative of direct and indirect
1115 reciprocity. As Dreber et al. (2008) suggest, “costly punishment might

1116 have evolved for reasons other than promoting cooperation, such as
1117 coercing individuals into submission and establishing dominance
1118 hierarchies” (p.350). Antisocial punishment is one example of such a
1119 mechanism.

1120 We have shown that antisocial punishment, although initially
1121 costly to the punisher, may bring benefits in the long term (see Fig. 1).
1122 The circumstances favoring antisocial punishment are defined by the
1123 groups and cultures within which individuals are embedded. The
1124 evidence indicates that, at a micro-level, antisocial punishment often
1125 takes the form of negative reciprocity and may be a direct response to
1126 other individuals’ behavior or that it is an expression of a competitive
1127 preference. Is *homo homini lupus*? Yes, if the ecological and cultural
1128 pressures make competitive behavior a successful strategy. However,
1129 with omnipresent reputation-based mechanisms of cooperation, which
1130 are not accounted for by behavioral economics experiments, such
1131 pressures are likely to be counteracted in ordinary real world interactions.

1132

1133

1134 **References**

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1414 Figure 1 Antisocial punishment at individual, group and cultural level
1415 with its possible benefits

1416

1417 Table 1

Different Consequences of Costly Punishment in the PGG

	Stage	P1	P2	P3	P4
Round 1	PGG contribution	2	4	10	20
	Punishment decision	P2	-	P1	P2
Round 2	PGG contribution	4	6	10	18

1418 P4's behavior is a classical example of altruistic punishment. A cooperative individual
1419 P4 suffers a cost to punish P2 who contributed less than the group average. As a result
1420 of this punishment, P2's contribution increases in the next PGG round. Consider the
1421 behavior of P1 who punished P2. As a result of the punishment, P2 increased their
1422 contributions. Therefore, P1's punishment can be called functionally altruistic. At the
1423 same time, this punishment would be defined as antisocial (*sensu* Herrmann et al.,
1424 2008) because P1's original contribution, which is lower than P2's contribution, is
1425 treated as a reference level.