SECURITISING EDUCATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM OR LOSING DIRECTION?

by Bill Durodie, University of Bath

ABSTRACT: This article examines the growing relationship between security and education, particularly in the light of the UK government’s Prevent Duty that seeks to tackle radicalisation in a variety of milieus, including universities. However, rather than seeing this process as being merely one-way, through a so-called securitisation of education (in the parlance of the Copenhagen School of International Relations), what is explored here is the dialectic between these two spheres. It is suggested that a heightened sensitivity to the supposed consequences of inflammatory rhetoric on the well-being of supposedly suggestible or vulnerable students has been in existence within education for quite some time. In that regards, the securitising efforts of politicians and officials are pushing against an open door. What’s more, it is proposed that the inability of the authorities to hold the line in support of absolute freedom of expression, within academia and beyond, tactly encourages the very people the government would hope to detract.

Keywords: securitisation, radicalisation, terrorism, extremist, education, therapeutic, Prevent Duty, free speech, hate speech, academic freedom

1. INTRODUCTION

A recent Special Issue of this Journal set out to examine the overt and covert linkages between security and education in the light of concerns over terrorism and radicalisation, and particularly the presumed mechanisms to defuse these through intelligence gathering (Gearon, 2015). There are many ways in which the fields and remits of security and education could be understood to overlap and interact. Primarily, in recent times though, scholars have focused on the terminologies and mechanisms by which the latter has been held to have been altered by elements pertaining to the former. Accordingly, and possibly most pertinently, as the re-elected British Prime Minister David Cameron has announced his determination to tackle what he sees as the scourge of radicalisation through efforts in schools, colleges and universities (amongst other places), to root out extremist ideology and ban hate speech (BBC News, 2015, May 13), we could focus on how those terms and categories are defined, or on any associated processes and legislation, as well as the impact of all these on academic freedom.

The aim here though is to explore the possibilities of a reverse process – the mechanisms whereby the language and practice of security appear to be being transformed by certain actions and assumptions already common to the world of education. Instead of asking how the new security discourse and associated legislation affect education, we will examine aspects of how a so-called therapeutic culture, that a number of scholars have identified as having emerged within and shaped what we understand to be education today (e.g. Frawley, 2015; Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009; Furedi, 2004), now impacts on the outlooks and actions of those working in related security arenas. Rather than the securitisation of education that some presume, it may rather be the therapeutisation of security that we are really observing.

2. SECURITISATION?

Speaking ahead of her Party’s eventual election victory on 8 May 2015, and in response to a BBC exit poll that pointed to the coming result, the British Home Secretary, Theresa May (who was to retain her Cabinet post), advised that the new Conservative government would move swiftly to strengthen the online surveillance powers of the police and security services. The Communications Data Bill that
was supported by the Prime Minister David Cameron (and originally proposed by his predecessor in that post, Gordon Brown) had, she remarked, been blocked by the coalition partners to the previous government, and she was now ‘determined to bring that through’ (The Guardian, 2015, May 9).

Labelled by its opponents a ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ (Liberty, 2015), the legislation would augment the existing Data Retention Regulations of 2014 that already mandate Internet Service Providers and mobile phone companies to retain email and telephone contact data for a period of 12 months, by having to include the records (though not the content) of internet browsing activities and mobile phone messaging. The eventual Bill is likely to pass discreetly into law, overshadowed by other government priorities and significant controversies concerning its relationships to Scotland, Europe and the Human Rights Act.

Notably, the new law would, in part, serve to effectively monitor compliance with another central element of government policy – that relating to education through the Prevent Duty, which expects, amongst other elements, every tier of the educational establishment to filter online content and promote policies referring to possible harm and associated sanctions with a view ‘to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (UK Government, 2015a), a notably passive formulation.

The growing interface between security and education has been evident for a while leading, at one time, to a troublesome spat between the responsible Ministers (BBC News, 2014, June 8). However, differences aside, the notion that there is a necessary connection between the two appears to be widely supported right across the political spectrum. Even among those apparently concerned as to the possible implications of these new policies for individual privacy and community cohesion there are many who, at least implicitly, have promoted the assumed need for early intervention in education by the authorities.1

But despite the previous, Labour-led political administration in the UK having proposed a direct link between challenging violent extremism and empowering students against this through education (DCSF, 2008), the connection is far from evident – let-alone the parallel they provided to Irish terrorism some twenty years previously (DCSF, 2008, p.3). The latter, aside from having suffered its own internal exhaustion, was primarily targeted through more traditional, political and military means. More importantly, at that time a generation ago, there was never any parallel system of prevention through education implemented, or even assumed. It seems more likely that the impetus for the linkage between security and education is more recent and has come from elsewhere.

Foremost among these must be the advent of the reconceptualization of security through the prism of human security whereby, primarily in the aftermath of the Cold War, the referent for security shifted from the state to the individual and, in particular, the latter’s assumed existential sense of vulnerability (Buzan, 1991). This, in its turn, opened the door to securitisation – the possibility that state (and other) actors might transform specific problems into security-related concerns in the pursuit of their agendas. These now encompass a wide range of issues and discourses, typical of which have been the securitisation of health (e.g. Elbe, 2010), and the securitisation of development (e.g. Duffield, 2007).

But, as an insightful critique of the latter identifies, the related literature seems a little one-sided in its trajectory (Pupavac, 2010). Applying this more dialectical approach to the subject under consideration here, a similar case could be made that Foucault’s conceptualisation of populations as being disciplined by modern institutions, or contained by Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic efficiency, tends to be asserted on the basis of assumed power relations with little regard for the possibility that the contemporary culture of education might in its turn influence how security is conceptualised and applied by those in authority.

In sociological terms education can be understood to serve various significant functions, including the socialisation of children and the transfer of knowledge. Some recent critiques have pointed to a possible shift in emphasis from the latter to the former (Furedi, 2009; Hayes, 2004; Evans, 2004). This might also encourage the adoption of a dominant cultural outlook, which prioritises security as an assumed existential need.

Accordingly, the relevance of the concept and application of securitisation seems clear. In an excellent contribution and writing in a similar vein in relation to health, two Australian researchers identified how influenza had become ‘constructed as a matter of national security’ (Wraith and Stephenson, 2009, p.222). They explored how the fear of bioterrorism encouraged a militaristic demand for perpetual preparedness, constant surveillance and eternal vigilance. They noted how this
offers unfocused authorities clear actions to engage in, thereby making ‘an uncertain future available to intervention in the present’ (Wraith and Stephenson, 2009, p.225).

A related literature examines how risk management has become a new organising framework in a period lacking clear direction (Durodié, 2013a, p.81). It has, it is claimed, ‘provided a hesitant and isolated elite with an agenda and a new, if limited, sense of moral purpose’ (Durodié, 2007, p.441). Worse, by promoting an emphasis on procedural management through expert knowledge this can both disenfranchise people from the possibility of solving their own problems and allow the authorities ‘to become fixated on external threats rather than examining their own internal confusions’ (Durodié, 2011, p.12). It is to these that we must now turn our attention.

3. PREVENTION?

The opening months of 2015 were marked by a series of terrorist atrocities – the Charlie Hebdo massacre and associated events in France (BBC News, 2015, January 7), the release of footage of the barbaric immolation by the so-called Islamic State group (ISIS) of a captured Jordanian pilot (The Guardian, 2015, February 4), and the shootings during an event to discuss freedom of expression at a cultural centre in Copenhagen (BBC News, 2015, February 14). These were further augmented by the absconding of three bright, British schoolgirls to join ISIS in Syria, presumably to become putative ‘Jihadi Brides’ (BBC News, 2015, February 20), and the revelation of the identity of so-called ‘Jihadi John’ (BBC News, 2015, February 26), held responsible for a number of associated, high-profile, medieval-style beheadings. Within that context, the policy announcements by the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, at the end of the previous year appeared almost prescient. These presented proposals for new measures that were to expressly mandate various public bodies, including local authorities and health authorities, as well as prisons and the police, but more pertinently to the discussion here, schools, colleges and universities, to take on more of a prominent role in dissuading those in their charge assumed vulnerable of becoming associated with terrorism from doing so.

The ensuing Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 then imposed a Prevent Duty under section 26 of the new legislation upon these ‘specified authorities’ with some minor alterations and delays introduced prior to the 2015 general election to avert dissent from those concerned as to its possible impact on any putative academic freedom. The Home Office issued ‘Prevent Duty Guidance’, which outlined the steps assumed necessary ‘to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. Unlike previous official guidance this was now legally mandated. It means that the individuals responsible for any associated institutions affected by the Act are now liable to external intervention in their affairs, to include severe penalties, such as fines and prison terms, if they systematically fail to implement the requisite measures and procedures (UK Government, 2015a). The effect of this is to transform risk management from a lose organising principle to guide societies that lack a broader strategic vision into a set of laws that impact on everyone.

Prevent itself was just one element of the four Ps (the others being Pursue, Protect and Prepare) that were originally framed within CONTEST – the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (UK Government, 2011b). CONTEST had been driven by the dawning recognition of the potential problems posed by so-called home-grown radicalisation and was first developed in 2003 (though only published in 2006, the year after the 7/7 London bombings). Together with Prevent it has undergone significant revisions since, in particular subsequent to the election of the UK coalition government in 2010 (UK Government, 2011a). This led to a refocusing around a particular set of values (portrayed as being British), as well as a differentiation and broadening of its remit (by distinguishing community integration from counter-terrorism work, and to include other forms of violent extremism such as that associated with right-wing groups and others). The monitoring of outcomes was also made more rigorous.

Since its inception, hundreds of millions of pounds have been poured into Prevent in order to encourage liaison and dialogue between the authorities and the supposed representatives of various Muslim religious and community groups. But, being more socially and culturally oriented than the other elements of CONTEST, Prevent has always been subject to considerable criticism. Initially, much of this came from traditionally right-wing groups and media who accused the government of consorting with and funding radicals (Policy Exchange, 2006). More recently, and especially after the 2011 revisions, formerly left-wing and radical groups have raised their concerns too, criticising the
partnerships created by Prevent on the grounds that they encourage the infiltration of Muslim communities and justify a culture of suspicion and surveillance (CAGE, 2013).

The latest counter-terrorism policies, including the Prevent Duty, explicitly target the role played by education and educational establishments. Various groups, associations and institutions sought to make their reservations about this clear by responding to the government’s call for feedback on the proposals in November 2014. Many of these raised important points about terminology, academic and religious freedom, as well as trust and accountability (UK Government, 2015b). But they also missed the wider problem, which is that the constant change represented by the seventh such piece of legislation to be introduced since 9/11, aside from bearing some of the hallmarks of a constant cacophony of action for its own sake, feed off and into a culture that has already assumed and implemented many of the measures proposed, including within educational circles.

So, for example, proposed restrictions on outside speakers coming to address University audiences to monitor for tone and content already exist in many places. It is just that, to date, these have largely been introduced by University authorities themselves, or even the National Union of Students (in the UK), on a variety of grounds, but most particularly those pertaining to particular political outlooks deemed to be beyond the pale, as well as the presumed welfare of their students through not wishing to cause hurt or offence (e.g. The Guardian, 2015, February 6; Hayes, 2015).

Indeed, in 2014 one of the constituent Colleges of the University of Oxford banned a debate on abortion on just such grounds, for fear that some of the issues raised might upset the presumed sensitivities of certain students (BPAS, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014, November 19). In the US, similar measures have led to the introduction and, in certain cases, imposition of so-called ‘trigger-warnings’ (Hume, 2015), whereby professors are required to advise students in advance if the content of a particular lecture might be considered likely to upset them (Jarvie, 2014; The Guardian, 2014, March 5; The Telegraph, 2014, October 4). Inevitably, given that contemporary culture encourages an often narrow focus on issues of identity, the list of topics affected by this seems to be ever-expanding – from rape and abortion, through race and colonialism, and beyond to ever more tenuously defined conceptualisations of violence and misdeed.

The point here is that countless measures that seek to protect students from supposedly bad ideas or from getting their feelings hurt already exist. They are part of what passes for mainstream and responsible educational delivery today (Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015). The fact that these simultaneously present young adults as fragile or innocent and in need of such safeguards is rarely interrogated – although President Obama appears to have done so in at least one recent instance (Husband, 2015).

A precautionary culture as a whole has an even longer pedigree, having been formalised into policy before 9/11 (European Commission, 2000). In its turn, the existence of this outlook may have helped to legitimise, if not encourage, the use of so-called pre-emptive strikes in Iraq and elsewhere (Stern and Wiener, 2006; 2011). In other words, society as a whole already accepts a more cautious or febrile, therapeutic approach such that some elements of the security services might better be understood as playing catch-up when examining how this could be implemented within education.

Unfortunately, in doing so, politicians, officials and institutions, knowingly or not, reveal an implicit willingness to act in bad faith. Few really believe such censorious and regulatory approaches are likely to be effective. At best, they might contain the situation. But coercion through legislation is not the same as engagement through inspiration. And there are unlikely to be security solutions to social problems. Indeed, the security services, who are already fully engaged monitoring the few that could pose a real, immediate threat, understand this very well. As noted by the former British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief, Sir Richard Dearlove, in 2014, some of their activities might also be driven by a loss of an appropriate sense of proportionality.

Regardless, we are left with a situation whereby governments increasingly act, not out of conviction, but in order to be seen to be doing something. Equally, Universities and others, where the proposed measures have been discussed and, in many instances, understood to be both unnecessary and unlikely to work will, regardless, introduce new procedures and audits to be seen to be in compliance. That is the logic of the ‘risk management of everything’ (Power, 2004). Little wonder that a significant number of young people appear to be looking for something somewhat firmer to believe in beyond the mainstream. Inevitably, a few will find this in various bizarre and occasionally twisted avenues.
But there is little by way of hard evidence that it is the ideas they receive in schools and universities, or over the internet that could radicalise them (Durodié and Ng, 2008). To presume so is to view people as mindless sponges. Rather it is the hole where real values ought to be that the young actively seek to fill – a hole possibly best exemplified through the recent general election in the UK (as well as that forthcoming in the US too), where no Party sought to stand-out too much or to present a strategic or principled vision for society that might really engage the majority.

4. VULNERABILITY?

The framing of young people as vulnerable to ‘being drawn into terrorism’ is, as previously noted, a passive formulation that implicitly removes their autonomy and agency (as well as, inadvertently perhaps, their accountability) from the picture. Yet, it was the formulation used by Jonathan Evans, the new head of the British Security Service in 2007 in his first public speech to a gathering of newspaper editors, where he also advised that terrorists were ‘grooming’ the young to carry out acts of terror (MI5, 2007). His predecessor in the role had used similar language the year before (MI5, 2006). It was, as at least one academic commentator noted, an approach that turned the war on terror into a child protection issue. According to this view it drew on contemporary ‘fears and anxiety about paedophilia as a way of explaining the threat from Al-Qaeda’ (Furedi, 2007).

The notion that Universities in particular are potential hot-beds of radicalisation has consistently been pushed into the debate by a number of individuals whose arguments have also systematically been repudiated by others. In the UK, a couple of the more vocal advocates appear to confuse causation with association in their work (Glees and Pope, 2005). Nevertheless, and despite accusations (profoundly repeated it would seem) that their work is ‘widely discredited’, they persist in their sense of mission, augmented by a desire to sanction those who fail to see things as they do (The Telegraph, 2011, June 6), and now supported in that by the Prevent Duty legislation.

But to notice that some former students go on to perpetrate acts of terror is as misguided in its conclusion as to the role of Universities in this as suggesting these latter to be incubators for rapists, bank robbers, or any other kind of criminality. Particularly today, when almost half the population of young adults go on to some form of further or higher education, such connections are to be expected. Worse, the proposed solution – to impose restrictions on free speech and to monitor presumed perpetrators – undermines the very role of the University, which ought to be where robust engagement with unpalatable ideas is most expected.

Not surprisingly perhaps, those who have lobbied for bans, describing universities as ‘guardians of our nation’s young’ (The Telegraph, 2011, June 6), feed off and into the dominant social narrative that emphasises a presumed need for students to feel and be kept safe (Beckett, 2014). That is why the new policies represented by the Prevent Duty have been able to achieve such traction. Policy-makers not only believe these uncritically to be common-sense, but also detect that the public mood supports their actions seeing as, in many ways, the proposals are already applied and so they are simply formalising an existing state of affairs.

In a similar way, concerns widely expressed as to the impact of new legislation (and technology) on individual privacy, may also miss the extent to which such infringements are already taken for granted in contemporary society. Few spaces in contemporary society are left unscrutinised and those that are, draw suspicion from those who implicitly promote a cultural script whereby our private lives are presented in pathological terms as sites of abuse, exploitation and violence (Furedi, 2006). But whilst bad things can indeed occur in the private sphere, the presentation of relationships as ‘toxic’ often by those from the other end of the old political spectrum to the advocates and practitioners of security, has already laid the ground-work for monitoring and intrusion.

At the same time, the notion that an individual upon hearing somebody speak or coming across ideas on the internet, then begins to alter their behaviour suggests a fairly diminished view of human nature. Unfortunately, this projection of people as fragile is becoming more mainstream today (Heartfield, 2002). The existence of jihadist websites is not disputed, but their mere presence does not explain why their content may resonate with the lived experience of those who actively seek such sites out, rather than accidentally stumbling across them. People select and reject content according to previously developed interpretations and models of the world that they have already internalised.
Ultimately, the internet is a medium for communicating ideas that reflects society. Those who would wish to see its content changed would probably best achieve this by addressing the original issues in society at large. And this ought to not simply assume a ready-made set of supposed domestic or foreign grievances to be the motive force for a backlash either. After all, racism and imperialism were far more prominent and pronounced in the past than they are today.

Rather, we would do well to consider the extent to which it may be the absence of any coherent intellectual framework presented to young people today, together with a lack of meaningful bonds, clear structures, or a sense of shared purpose within mainstream society that act as some of the real drivers (Malik, 2009).

5. SOCIETY SUCCUMBED TO SENTIMENT

At the height of the UK general election of 2015, the Labour Party’s shadow education secretary, Tristram Hunt, visited a school in Derbyshire – an event that was also to serve as a photo opportunity. Exactly three months earlier, in an interview for The Independent newspaper (The Independent, 2015, January 16), he had asserted that his party should confront the perceived threat posed by UKIP (the UK Independence party, portrayed by many as a narrowly nationalistic throw-back to an earlier time that nevertheless now posed a populist challenge to the mainstream political parties).

Settling down next to one of the pupils of Howitt Primary School, the man who was to briefly feature as a potential future leader of the Labour Party asked who the youngster would vote for if he had the chance. “Ehhh, UKIP”, came the reply. Hunt responded “You’d vote UKIP! Very good. Why’s that?” To which the boy replied, “I’d like to get all the foreigners out of the country”. “I see” said the prospective minister as the BBC East Midlands cameras cut away (The Independent, 2015, April 16).

Leaving aside the wisdom of asking and possibly believing what a ten-year old child might have to say of their electoral preferences, the main question one might find puzzling was why the evidently educated and outspoken candidate had been so stumped on the stump. Undoubtedly, various reasons could be put forwards, including the wisdom of entering into a debate with such a young person, though Hunt has worked for the Labour Party ever since its 1997 landslide victory under Tony Blair and would accordingly be familiar with, if not actively support, its policies on children that have accelerated the process of treating youths increasingly as quasi-adults.5

As has been explored elsewhere, contemporary forms of radicalisation and extremism (whatever those terms are held to mean) need have little to do with religion, race, politics and foreign policy, or any form of related grievance and exclusion (e.g. Malik, 2009; Durodié, 2013b). What is being proposed here, in addition to examining the effects of the latest wave of counter-terrorism policy implemented since 9/11 through the prism of their supposed impact on education, is that these developments are consequences, not causes, of an unstated and largely unnoticed cultural drift that is affecting mainstream society.

It is a drift whereby individuals and institutions in positions of authority appear no longer willing to argue – or in some instances even to know – the positions they are held, or assumed, to stand for. They become, in the colourful words of one sociologist writing on a related matter, no better than ‘an anxious, tongue-twisted twerp’ (Waiton, 2012). They seem to fear backing-up what they think or say for fear of causing offence to others and, at the margins, no longer even know why they think what they do in the first place. In this regards, the culture of not causing hurt or offence, which now starts from before primary school (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009), has come home to roost, even among those in positions of authority who ought to take a view and establish their position clearly.

A similar process could be seen to have been at work at the University of Westminster, the alma mater of Mohamed Emwazi (aka ‘Jihadi John’), as expressed in an article written by one of his contemporaries there, Avinash Tharoor, for the Washington Post earlier this year (2015, February 27). In his piece, Tharoor gave the example of a class on Immanuel Kant’s ‘democratic peace theory’ given at the university in which a female student wearing a niqab challenged the lecturer on the grounds that ‘as a Muslim, I don’t believe in democracy’. Tharoor notes how such outlandish opinion was common there at the time, but what perplexed him more was why the instructor had failed to engage, or even attempted to respond to, the woman in any way.
It is this reluctance to stand up for the values one is meant, or held, to affirm that may stand at the root of some aspects of terrorism today – particularly those driven by so-called ‘home-grown’ elements. Febrile responses represent, in the words of one commentator, a form of ‘intellectual and moral corrosion’ that, by failing to counter certain views and positions, ‘calls into question the value of knowledge itself’ (O’Neill, 2015). Another author writing in the same vein, talks in rather similar terms of ‘multicultural capitulation’ to describe the many evasive responses to the earlier Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris (Kennedy, 2015).

Hunt, and others, is right to assert the necessity of standing up for what you believe in but he appears to have been found morally wanting when it really mattered. This steady ‘corrosion’ of belief, or ‘capitulation’ to circumstances, by those in positions of power and authority, has become part of contemporary culture and it finds its most extreme reflection in the acts of the vexatious few who have been encouraged thereby. Their grievous actions, unlike those of previous terror groups, lack a coherent purpose or direction. They are a product of the societal drift to which the elites, including those in education, appear to have increasingly succumbed.

One of the best exemplars of this may have been at the height of the Mumbai siege in 2008, when one of the perpetrators, Fahad Ullah used the mobile phone of one of the victims to call India TV and conducted a live interview with two journalists there. About a minute into their conversation, the two journalists, each asked in turn ‘What are your demands?’ Ullah answered ‘Wait one minute’ and was heard asking in the background ‘What are our demands?’ Even if he and the other nine involved were simply cannon-fodder sent by some criminal mastermind elsewhere, it remains the case that this latter has still to come forward to clarify their agenda.

Remarkably today, many working in the education sector too have, in numerous instances abandoned the agenda of a true spirit of education, which necessarily confronts individuals with occasionally discomfiting aspects of reality, for a less challenging existence. So, for example, some now report it to be too problematic to present issues such as the Crusades or the Holocaust to particular students who jeer or applaud at the mention of Auschwitz (Short, 2012, p.139). And again, rather than confronting this, as at least one government-funded report exemplifies, the preferred course appears to have been to determine ways in which such moments can best be skirted around (The Historical Association, 2013).

With such a febrile culture already extant it is little wonder that the demands of security services have been able to make such advances into education. And, as indicated above, we also now live in an age of widespread and increasing bad faith. People prefer not to say what they really think and what they do say is often done so more for effect than principle. One expression of this recently has perhaps been the on-going inquiries into why so many Britons were reluctant to tell pollsters who they were really going to vote for in the recent general election there.

If to speak your convictions out loud is to risk causing offence, or indeed to appear bigoted or ignorant, (as is also now, according to Theresa May, to be challenged by the government), then maybe best not to speak your mind at all? In achieving this, many of the dominant trends prevalent within education are beginning to make their full mark upon the world of security.

NOTES

1. For instance, the Muslim Council of Britain (while certainly not claiming to represent all British Muslims), clearly opposes such measures more on the grounds of their possible effects upon integration than in education (see point 9 and section 3 in the ensuing links): http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmccomloc/65/65we25.htm and: http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Response-to-the-Counter-Terrorism-and-Security-Bill.pdf. A similar, education-focused approach emanating from Sufism, can be found here: http://www.fatwaonterrorism.com/

2. See the various links provided in the Appendix below for a sample of their numerous responses.

3. See his 7 July 2014 speech on the matter given at the Royal United Services Institute in Whitehall, London, which is available at: https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E539EC3CF6F5A4/

4. The concept of toxic relationships is increasingly central to a growing literature of both academic and more populist self-help books.
6. A common theme it would seem as it also impacts on the main character of the recent arthouse action film Force Majeure: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/film/force-majeure/review/

APPENDIX

- http://www.britac.ac.uk/templates/asset-relay.cfm?frmAssetFileID=14499

REFERENCES


O’Neill, B. (2015) Why won’t we tell students that Kant is better than the Koran? Spiked-Online, March 2. Available at: http://www.spiked-online.com/newssite/article/why-wont-we-tell-students-that-kant-is-better-than-the-koran/16736


The Guardian. (2014, March 5) We’ve gone too far with ‘trigger warnings’. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/05/trigger-warnings-can-be-counterproductive


The Guardian. (2015, May 9) Theresa May to revive her ‘snooper’s charter’ now Lib Dem brakes are off. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/09/theresa-may-revive-snoopers-charter-lib-dem-brakes-off-privacy-election


The Independent. (2015, April 16) School visit backfires for Labour’s Tristram Hunt as kid says he’d vote Ukip ‘to get all the foreigners out’. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-school-visit-backfires-for-labours-tristram-hunt-as-kid-says-hed-vote-ukip-to-10181500.html

The Telegraph. (2014, October 4) Trigger warnings: more harm than good? Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/11106670/Trigger-warnings-more-harm-than-good.html


Correspondence
Professor Bill Durodie
Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies
The University of Bath
Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY
Email: b.durodie@bath.ac.uk