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Looking After Number Two? Competition, Cooperation and Workplace Interaction

Tim Barmby^{}, John G. Sessions^{**} and Alexandros Zangelidis^{*}*

** Department of Economics
University of Aberdeen Business School
Edward Wright Building
Dunbar Street
Old Aberdeen
AB24 3QY
Scotland*

*Email: tim.barmby@abdn.ac.uk
Email: a.zangelidis@abdn.ac.uk*

*** Department of Economics and IZA
University of Bath
Bath
BA5 7AY
England*

Email: j.g.sessions@bath.ac.uk

Abstract: We look for cooperation in a real-world setting in which optometrists absent less frequently in two-chair than one-chair offices because of the externality such behavior imposes on their co-worker. We motivate our empirical analysis by developing a model of worker interdependence in which two workers can either compete or cooperate. We show that, relative to a single worker working in isolation, competition unequivocally increases absence whilst cooperation may increase or decrease absence. Our empirical analysis of a unique data set finds explicit support for cooperative behavior.

Key Words: Absence; worker interdependency.

JEL Classification: J33, J41, J54.

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1. Introduction

Economists have traditionally modeled human behavior in terms of individual constrained maximization, saying relatively little about the effect of relationships between family, friends, neighbors and work colleagues. Such neglect perhaps reflected not an ignorance of the importance of such interactions, but rather an awareness of how difficult it is to model theoretically, and measure empirically, such phenomena. This reticence has, to some extent, dissipated in recent years with a flurry of work emerging on the relationship between social interaction and phenomena such as crime [Glaeser et al. (1996)], educational choices [Sacerdote (2001, Lalive and Cattaneo (2009))], school drop-out behaviour [Evans et al. (1992)], labour supply [Grodner and Kniesner (2006)], unemployment [Topa (2001)], disability behavior [Rege et al. (2009)] and retirement [Duflu and Saez (2003)].

Of particular relevance to this study is the nascent body of work seeking evidence of cooperation in the workplace [see, for example, Bandiera *et al.* (2005, 2009, 2010, 2013), Carpenter and Seki (2011), Mas and Moretti (2009)].¹ We contribute to this literature by modeling and measuring the relationship between a very precise workplace interaction and outcome. Very few employees work in complete isolation and so one would expect employee-interaction to be important for many workplace decisions and, therefore by extension, the labor market equilibria that relate to those decisions. A prime example is absenteeism.

There is a small, but growing, literature examining worker-interaction and absenteeism [see, for example, Ichino and Maggi. (2000), Skåtun and Skåtun (2004). Heywood and Jirjahn (2004), Heywood et al (2008), Barmby and Larguem (2009), Hesselius et al. (2010), Dale-Olsen et al. (2011)]. Most of this literature has, of necessity, tried to

¹ For a review of the literature examining field experiments both within and between firms, see Bandiera *et al.* (2011).

interpret data where the margin of interaction between workers is to a large extent unknown. In the real world setting we examine here, that of optometrist services, the margin is very clearly defined because of the nature in which the service is organized. Each firm (i.e. workplace) is staffed by either one or two optometrists. In the latter case the two workers are substitutes in production - the absence of one imposes a utility cost on the other who is expected to undertake additional work for no additional pay. By identifying such costs we are able to derive clear comparisons as regards absence behavior within single- and two-worker firms.

To motivate our empirical analysis we extend the theoretical framework developed in Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) - hereafter BST. BST focus on an atomistic worker whose health is represented by a continuous random variable, δ , and who absents if realized health is above some threshold level, $\tilde{\delta}$, determined by wages, sick pay and contracted working hours. In our extension, firms comprise two interdependent workers who either cooperate or compete with one another by maximizing joint or individual utility accordingly. We show that sickness absence decisions are strategic complements - the more likely worker 1 is to absent, the more likely will worker 2 call in sick since the latter's expected utility is increasing in worker 2's health threshold (i.e. with the likelihood that worker 2 does not absent).

Within this extended framework we derive the equilibrium absence rates for three cases of interest - single-worker firm; two-worker non-cooperative firm; two-worker cooperative firm - and show that, relative to the single-worker optimum, non-cooperation implies a lower health threshold, and so higher absence, whilst cooperation yields either a higher or lower health threshold. Intuitively, if workers choose to maximize their own individual utility rather than the joint utility of themselves and their co-worker, then there

will be inefficiently high absence due to the effort externality an absenting worker imposes on his non-absenting colleague. Cooperation internalizes this externality and permits an efficient level of absence to be reached.

Our empirical analysis of a unique data set suggests that absence is indeed lower when employees work in pairs rather than in isolation, a result that lends support for the cooperative equilibrium outcome in our theoretical model. Our study, thus, also contributes to the literature on absenteeism; by extending the framework of analysis beyond a single worker, and by showing that when absence causes negative externalities for co-workers, models that do not account for the existence of co-workers are misspecified.

The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 recapitulates the original BST contribution, which Section 3 then extends to a two-worker environment. Our empirical analysis is set out in Section 4 and final comments are collected in Section 5.

2. Single Worker

To motivate our empirical analysis we follow BST in assuming that individual workers make utility maximizing absence decisions conditional on a realization of their state of health. BST models individuals as homogenous risk neutral utility maximizers endowed with a stock of time, T , which they allocate between work and leisure. Utility is an increasing function of income and leisure, with individuals attaching a weight to each depending upon some parameter, δ , representing their general level of health. We assume that δ is increasing in sickness and uniformly distributed over the unit interval, with individuals valuing non-market (i.e. leisure) time more as $\delta \rightarrow 1$.² Thus:

² We assume that δ is uniformly distributed over the unit interval to simplify exposition. We show in a series of appendices, however, that our results are invariant to any assumed single or joint distribution over δ .

$$u = (1 - \delta)x + \delta l \quad (1)$$

where x (l) denotes income (leisure). Prospective workers sign enforceable employment contracts that specify a particular level of remuneration, w , in return for a particular supply of effort. Considerations as to the intensity or quality of effort are ignored and for simplicity productivity is construed by mere attendance. After the contract is signed, but before production commences, each worker realizes his state of health and makes an *ex post* utility maximizing decision as regards absence. This decision is derived from a discrete choice with workers comparing between the two alternative of absence, a , or non-absence, na , with the utility payoffs using the utility function in (1) given by:

$$u^{na} = (1 - \delta)w + \delta(T - h) \quad (2)$$

$$u^a = (1 - \delta)s + \delta T \quad (3)$$

where s denotes the (exogenous) level of sick pay and h denotes contractual hours. It is apparent that the relative magnitude of these payoffs depends on δ with the worker being indifferent between absence and non-absence at a critical level of health $\delta = \tilde{\delta}$ such that:

$$u^{na}(\tilde{\delta}) = (1 - \tilde{\delta})w + \tilde{\delta}(T - h) = (1 - \tilde{\delta})s + \tilde{\delta}T = u^a(\tilde{\delta}) \quad (4)$$

which implies:

$$\tilde{\delta} = \frac{w - s}{w - s + h} \quad (5)$$

$\tilde{\delta}$ may be interpreted as the worker's reservation, or threshold, level of sickness - the level of sickness at which the worker is indifferent between absence and non-absence - and thus

defines a utility maximizing decision rule. To be sure, the worker will choose absence for all $\delta > \tilde{\delta}$ and non-absence otherwise. The situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 following.³

Figure 1: Single Worker - Reservation Level of Sickness

3. Two-Workers

3.1 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium

Our point of departure from BST is to consider the situation where production in the firm is undertaken by two workers, $i = 1, 2$, who behave in the way just described. Their work, however, is interdependent in the sense that the absence of one imposes a cost on the other, possibly in terms of extra effort, which is equivalent to supplying additional hours $e \in (0, h]$. Thus, the utility payoffs to worker 1 from not absents and absents are:

³ Note that the above decision rule may be derived equivalently from expected utility maximization - see Appendix A1 for the assumed uniform distribution case and Appendix A2 for the general distribution case.

$$u_1^{na} = (1 - \delta_1)w + \delta_1 \left[T - h - (1 - \tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] \quad (6)$$

$$u_1^a = (1 - \delta_1)s + \delta_1 T \quad (7)$$

where $\tilde{\delta}_2$ denotes worker 2's worker's reservation level of sickness. Equating these payoffs to yield worker 1's reservation sickness level implies the following reaction function:⁴

$$\begin{aligned} u_1^{na}(\tilde{\delta}_1) &= (1 - \tilde{\delta}_1)w + \tilde{\delta}_1 \left[T - h - (1 - \tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] = (1 - \tilde{\delta}_1)s + \tilde{\delta}_1 T = u_1^a(\tilde{\delta}_1) \\ \Rightarrow \\ \tilde{\delta}_1 &= \frac{w - s}{w - s + h + (1 - \tilde{\delta}_2)e} \equiv R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

And similarly for worker 2:

$$\begin{aligned} u_2^{na}(\tilde{\delta}_2) &= (1 - \tilde{\delta}_2)w + \tilde{\delta}_2 \left[T - h - (1 - \tilde{\delta}_1)e \right] = (1 - \tilde{\delta}_2)s + \tilde{\delta}_2 T = u_2^a(\tilde{\delta}_2) \\ \Rightarrow \\ \tilde{\delta}_2 &= \frac{w - s}{w - s + h + (1 - \tilde{\delta}_1)e} \equiv R_2(\tilde{\delta}_1) \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

$R_i(\tilde{\delta}_j)$ denotes worker i 's reaction function - i.e. worker i 's optimal reservation level of sickness as a function of worker j 's reservation level of sickness. It is apparent that the two reaction functions are upward sloping implying that the two workers' reservation sickness levels are strategic complements for one another. To be sure:

$$\frac{\partial R_i(\tilde{\delta}_j)}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_j} = \frac{(w - s)e}{\left[w - s + h + (1 - \tilde{\delta}_j)e \right]^2} > 0 \quad (10)$$

⁴ We show in Appendix 3 that this decision rule is utility maximizing for the two workers under any distribution of δ .

And:

$$\lim_{\tilde{\delta}_j \rightarrow 0} R_i(\tilde{\delta}_j) = R_i(0) = \frac{w-s}{w-s+h+e} \equiv \tilde{\delta}_i^{\min} \quad (11)$$

$$\lim_{\tilde{\delta}_j \rightarrow 1} R_i(\tilde{\delta}_j) = R_i(1) = \frac{w-s}{w-s+h} \equiv \tilde{\delta}_i^{\max} \quad (12)$$

Such that:

$$\Delta R_i \equiv R_i(1) - R_i(0) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{\delta}_i^{\max} - \tilde{\delta}_i^{\min} \equiv \Delta \tilde{\delta}_i = \frac{(w-s)e}{(w-s+h)(w-s+h+e)} > 0 \quad (13)$$

The reaction functions and associated Nash equilibrium, $\tilde{\delta}^n = (\tilde{\delta}_1^n, \tilde{\delta}_2^n)$, are illustrated in Figure 2 following:

Figure 2: Two-Workers – Nash Equilibrium Reservation Sickness

Figure 2 graphs the two workers' reaction functions as upward sloping in $(\tilde{\delta}_2, \tilde{\delta}_1)$ space, illustrating the idea that each worker's optimal reservation level of sickness is an increasing function of the his co-worker's reservation level of sickness. Intuitively, the more likely it is that one worker will absent (i.e. the lower is $\tilde{\delta}_j$) then the more likely it is that the other worker will also absent (i.e. the lower is $\tilde{\delta}_i$) given the potentially higher costs of attendance.

The Nash equilibrium in the two-worker situation is given by the intersection of the two reaction functions at $\tilde{\delta}_1^n = \tilde{\delta}_2^n = \tilde{\delta}^n$ which implies:

$$\tilde{\delta}^n = \frac{(w-s+h+e) \pm \sqrt{(w-s+h+e)^2 - 4(w-s)e}}{2e} \quad (14)$$

We can compare the two-worker situation to the single worker equilibrium most readily by focusing directly on the reactions functions set out in expressions (8) and (9). Taking worker 1, for example, and assuming perfect attendance by worker 2 yields the single-worker reservation level of sickness:

$$\lim_{\tilde{\delta}_2 \rightarrow 1} R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) \equiv \tilde{\delta}_1^{\max} = \frac{w-s}{w-s+h} = \tilde{\delta} \quad (15)$$

It is apparent that the Nash Equilibrium is not Pareto efficient and that a collusive agreement between the workers would be mutually beneficial. To see this, we first derive in Appendix A4 the expected utility of worker 1 within the two-worker setting:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} &= \int_0^1 u_1 f(\delta_1) d\delta \\ \Rightarrow \\ \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} &= \tilde{\delta}_1(w-s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] + \frac{1}{2}(T+s) \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Maximizing worker 1's expected utility with respect to worker 2's reservation level of sickness yields:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_1\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_2} = \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\delta}_1^2 e > 0 \quad (17)$$

Thus worker 1's expected utility is an increasing function of worker 2's reservation level of sickness; intuitively, worker 1's expected utility increases with the probability of worker two attending work since this reduces worker 1's expected effort cost. This implies that worker 1's utility increase as he moves up his reaction function in Figure 2, implying that his indifference curves are 'u-shaped'. To be sure, totally differentiating (16) with respect to $\tilde{\delta}_1$ and $\tilde{\delta}_2$ and setting the resulting expression to zero implies:

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbf{E}\{u_1\} &= \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_1\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} d\tilde{\delta}_1 + \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_1\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_2} d\tilde{\delta}_2 = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \\ d\mathbf{E}\{u_1\} &= \left\{ (w-s) - \tilde{\delta}_1 \left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] \right\} d\tilde{\delta}_1 + \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\delta}_1^2 e \right\} d\tilde{\delta}_2 = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Worker 1's indifference curves are thus given by:

$$\left. \frac{d\tilde{\delta}_2}{d\tilde{\delta}_1} \right|_{d\mathbf{E}\{u_1\}=0} = \frac{2 \left\{ \tilde{\delta}_1 \left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] - (w-s) \right\}}{\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e} \quad (19)$$

Recall from (8) that along worker 1's reaction function we have:

$$\tilde{\delta}_1 \left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] = w-s \quad (20)$$

such that:

$$\left. \frac{d\tilde{\delta}_2}{d\tilde{\delta}_1} \right|_{d\mathbf{E}\{u_1\}=0} = \frac{2 \left\{ \tilde{\delta}_1 \left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] - (w-s) \right\}}{\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e} = 0 \quad (21)$$

Worker 1's indifference curves are therefore horizontal as they cross $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$. Increasing $\tilde{\delta}_1$

beyond the level defined by $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ whilst holding $\tilde{\delta}_2$ constant yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. \frac{d^2 \tilde{\delta}_2}{d\tilde{\delta}_1^2} \right|_{d\mathbf{B}\{u_1\}=0} &= \frac{2[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e]\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e - 2\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e \left\{ 2[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] - (w-s) \right\}}{\tilde{\delta}_1^4 e^2} \\ \Rightarrow \left. \frac{d^2 \tilde{\delta}_2}{d\tilde{\delta}_1^2} \right|_{d\mathbf{B}\{u_1\}=0} &= \frac{2[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e]}{\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e} > 0 \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Thus, worker 1's indifference curves are positively (negatively) sloped to the right (left) of $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$. Similar arguments apply to worker 2 such that the Nash equilibrium implies an intersection of the two workers' indifference curves - see Figure 3 following:

Figure 3: Pareto Inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium

The Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient and a mutually preferable, cooperative outcome, $\tilde{\delta}^m$, is possible to the northeast of $\tilde{\delta}^n$ within (u_2^n, u_1^n) . The cooperative solution, $\tilde{\delta}^m$, will lay somewhere along a contract curve mapped out by the tangencies of the two workers' indifference curves above (u_2^n, u_1^n) , the precise location depending upon the relative bargaining powers of the two workers. One possible solution is illustrated in Figure 4 following:

Figure 4: Cooperative Solution

3.2 Cooperative Equilibrium

We derive the cooperative equilibrium formally by first obtaining the joint expected utility of the two workers. It is shown in Appendix A5 that this is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^1 \int_0^1 (u_1 + u_2) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= (\tilde{\delta}_1 + \tilde{\delta}_2)(w-s) - \frac{1}{2}(\tilde{\delta}_1^2 + \tilde{\delta}_2^2)(w-s+h) - \frac{1}{2}[\tilde{\delta}_1^2(1-\tilde{\delta}_2) + \tilde{\delta}_2^2(1-\tilde{\delta}_1)]e + T + s\end{aligned}\quad (23)$$

Maximizing expected joint utility as given by (23) with respect to worker 1's reservation level of sickness yields:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u\}}{\partial \delta_1} = (w-s) - \tilde{\delta}_1[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] + \frac{\tilde{\delta}_2^2}{2}e = 0 \quad (24)$$

Solving for $\tilde{\delta}_1$ yields:

$$\tilde{\delta}_1 = \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{\delta}_2^2 e}{w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e} \quad (25)$$

And by symmetry, maximizing expected joint utility with respect to worker 2's reservation level of sickness yields:

$$\tilde{\delta}_2 = \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e}{w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_1)e} \quad (26)$$

The solution to (25) and (26) yields the joint utility maximizing critical levels of sickness

$\tilde{\delta}^m = (\tilde{\delta}_1^m, \tilde{\delta}_2^m)$. Given the symmetry of the two workers, it must be the case that

$\tilde{\delta}_1^m = \tilde{\delta}_2^m = \tilde{\delta}^m$ such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\delta}^m &= \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}(\tilde{\delta}^m)^2 e}{w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}^m)e} \\ \Rightarrow \\ \tilde{\delta}^m &= \frac{(w-s+h+e) \pm \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{4(w-s+h+e)^2 - 24(w-s)e}}{3e}\end{aligned}\quad (27)$$

Whilst it is difficult to compare the Nash and cooperative solutions directly from (14) and (27), it is apparent from an examination of the Nash reaction functions (8) and (9) and the cooperative expressions (25) and (26) that the cooperative solution must entail a higher equilibrium critical level of sickness for the two workers. To see this, we first define expressions (25) and (26) as:

$$\tilde{\delta}_1 = \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{\delta}_2^2 e}{w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e} \equiv C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) \quad (28)$$

$$\tilde{\delta}_2 = \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{\delta}_1^2 e}{w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_1)e} \equiv C_2(\tilde{\delta}_1) \quad (29)$$

It is apparent that, in terms of Figure 2, $C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ is upward sloping, coincides with $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ at $\tilde{\delta}_2 = 0$ and lays to the right of $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ at all $\tilde{\delta}_2 \in (0,1]$. To be sure:

$$\frac{\partial C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_2} = \frac{\left\{ \tilde{\delta}_2 \left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] + (w-s) \right\} e}{\left[w-s+h+(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right]^2} > 0 \quad (30)$$

And:

$$\lim_{\tilde{\delta}_2 \rightarrow 0} C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) = C_1(0) = \frac{w-s}{w-s+h+e} \equiv \tilde{\delta}_1^{\min} = R_1(0) = \lim_{\tilde{\delta}_2 \rightarrow 0} R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) \quad (31)$$

$$\lim_{\tilde{\delta}_2 \rightarrow 1} C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) = C_1(1) = \frac{w-s + \frac{1}{2}e}{w-s+h} > \frac{w-s}{w-s+h} \equiv \tilde{\delta}_1^{\max} = R_1(1) = \lim_{\tilde{\delta}_2 \rightarrow 1} R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2) \quad (32)$$

Analogous arguments apply to the relationship between $C_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$ and $R_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$ such that it must be the case that $\tilde{\delta}^m > \tilde{\delta}^n$.

Comparing the reaction functions $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ and $R_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$ with $\tilde{\delta}$, the single worker's reservation level of sickness as defined by equation (5), it is apparent that $\tilde{\delta}_1^{\max} = R_1(1) = \tilde{\delta}$ and $\tilde{\delta}_2^{\max} = R_2(1) = \tilde{\delta}$, which implies that the crossing point of $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ and $R_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$ must lay to the southwest of $\tilde{\delta}$ such that $\tilde{\delta}^n < \tilde{\delta}$. Therefore, as compared to the single worker situation, two workers who do not act cooperatively when working together will each have a lower reservation level of sickness and thus a higher level of absence. We also know that the cooperative outcome implies a higher reservation level of sickness as compared to the non-cooperation equilibrium such that $\tilde{\delta}^m > \tilde{\delta}^n$. What we do not know is how $\tilde{\delta}^m$ compares to $\tilde{\delta}$. Depending on the value of effort, $\tilde{\delta}^m$ may be located to the northeast of $\tilde{\delta}$, as per Figure 5 following, or to the southwest of $\tilde{\delta}$ between $\tilde{\delta}^n$ as per Figure 6 following:

Figure 5: Cooperative and Nash Solutions (i)

Figure 6: Cooperative and Nash Solutions (ii)

It is apparent from expressions (8)-(9) and (28)-(29) that the larger is e , the additional effort cost from co-worker absence, the further will $C_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ [$C_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$] lay to the right of [above] $R_1(\tilde{\delta}_2)$ [$R_2(\tilde{\delta}_1)$], the further to the northeast will the cooperative functions intersect and the more likely will it be the case that $\tilde{\delta}^m > \tilde{\delta}$. Intuitively, the larger the potential gains from cooperation, the more likely will attendance rates within two-worker firms exceed those within single-worker firms.

4. Empirical Analysis

We test our theory by comparing the absence rates of workers who work either alone or in pairs. By examining the interaction between the latter, we are able to ascertain whether the evidence suggests a cooperative or competitive (i.e. Nash) equilibrium outcome. Empirically, if the level of absence is estimated to be lower in two-worker as compared to single-worker

firms, then that should be interpreted as evidence of cooperation, since the critical level of sickness can only be higher in the former than the latter when workers act cooperatively. The opposite result would have an ambiguous interpretation, since it is possible under both the competitive and cooperative scenarios to have a lower reservation sickness level and therefore a higher level of absence. Symbolically, whilst we know that $\tilde{\delta} > \tilde{\delta}^n$ and $\tilde{\delta}^m > \tilde{\delta}^n$, we are unable to tie down the relationship between $\tilde{\delta}$ and $\tilde{\delta}^m$.

Our data comprise the daily absence records of sixty-four optometrists employed by a private ophthalmic optician company and who are allocated to one of its twenty-two practices operating in the northeast of Scotland over the period April 2005 - September 2008. The original sample consists of 18007 observations that reduces to 17943 after excluding the first observation of each optometrist in order to create the lag absence variable. On average, optometrists appear in the sample for 504 days, with a standard deviation of 228 days. The optometrists are professional service providers who examine eyes, prescribe spectacles or contact lenses, give advice on visual problems and detect any ocular disease or abnormality, referring the patient to a medical practitioner if necessary. Alongside them, there are dispensing opticians who meet with the patients after the eye examination with the optometrist and who provide advice on spectacles and related products. Finally, each practice has also a receptionist in charge of booking appointments and managing the cash register.

The data is of particular interest to our theoretical framework because we only observe optometrists working either on their own or in pairs. Specifically, practices that have one examination room (fifteen out of the twenty-two practices in the sample) always have only one optometrist for eye examinations (*single-testing*). In contrast, two optometrists may

test together (*double-testing*) in the seven practices with two examination rooms.⁵ We can therefore distinguish both when (i.e. on which day) and where (i.e. in which practice) examinations were undertaken by one or two optometrists. By comparing the daily absence records between single-testing and double-testing practices, we are able to test whether workers are behaving competitively or cooperatively.⁶

When an optometrist is absent, the scheduled appointments are cancelled and rescheduled unless a substitute optometrist is found. Optometrists are constrained in the number of eye examinations (i.e. appointments) they can perform during a day by the National Health Service (NHS) Scotland. Therefore, optometrists who are absent one day are not expected to make up all cancellations the next day. Furthermore, they are unaware a priori whether or not a substitute optometrist will be sent to the practice. Hence, we assume that when making the decision whether to absent, both single and double-testing optometrists face the same expected cost of absence in terms of the eye examinations that they will have to perform once they return to work.

Double-testing optometrists are close substitutes in production since in the absence of one optometrist the other optometrist, under the terms of their employment contract, may pick up additional appointments, without extra pay, in order to minimize the cancelling and rescheduling of appointments. Therefore, double-testing implies a joint production process that fits well within the framework of our theoretical model.

⁵ Thus, whilst single-optometrist practices can only undertake single-testing, two-optometrist practices can undertake both single- and double-testing.

⁶ The two optometrists operate in separate testing rooms when double-testing and there is normally limited interaction between them during the day. We therefore presume that double-testing does not proffer any additional job satisfaction, which thus precludes alternative interpretations of the cooperative outcome. In addition, there are no differences in the work attributes, such as the workload or the remuneration optometrists receive, between single-testing or double-testing. Hence, we can argue that the relationship we identify between double-testing and absenteeism is not driven by unobserved work-related differences that could act as confounding factors in the estimated models.

Although the majority of optometrists are allocated to specific practices, there is some degree of mobility. Every month a rota schedule assigns optometrists to practices, the allocation being determined primarily by contractual negotiation and the geographical location of the optometrists. A potential issue is that more reliable workers may be allocated to larger practices with two testing rooms, serving more popular areas that have higher demand for their services. To explore this latent selectivity, we examined whether an optometrist's past absence affected his probability of performing double-testing. Our estimates, which are available on request, are based on a linear probability model with clustered standard errors, where aside from past absence we also include a set of controls for the day of the week, the month and the year. In addition we include control variables for working only half-day and for identifying whether the current practice is the practice in which an optometrist spends the majority of her time. The monthly rota is decided at least one month in advance, so for robustness purposes we used optometrists' absence one, two and three month before the allocation is determined. Our results are robust regardless to how far back we go to measure absence and suggest that there is no relationship between past absence and assignment to single- or double-testing. Furthermore, our results remained the same when we also explored whether past absence affects the allocation of optometrists to practices with one or two testing rooms, regardless to whether or not they were performing double-testing on that particular day. Thus, the process of the rota schedule can be considered to be exogenous.⁷

The absence data are constructed using three different company records: (i) the absence records, (ii) the monthly rota schedules and (iii) the business records of the twenty-two practices. The business records contain daily information on which optometrists were

⁷ The two outcomes differ because although an optometrist may be working in a practice that has two testing rooms, she may be working on her own (single-testing) on a particular day.

examining at each practice, enabling us to identify cases where a replacement optometrist was sent to cover a colleague who was absent that day. Furthermore, we can derive daily information on whether: (i) the practice was undertaking *Single-Testing* or *Double-Testing*; (ii) the practice offered eye examination either in the morning or afternoon only (*Half-Day*). Finally, we are able also to identify the practice in which an optometrist spends the majority of their time (*Main Practice*).

Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The number of working days that optometrists missed over the sample period due to absence account for 1.3% of their total contracted days. Despite that fact that there is some flexibility in the allocation of optometrists across practices, optometrists spent three quarters of their working time in a particular practice. Double-testing occurred on approximately 19% of the working days covered by the sample whilst 4% of testing was undertaken on half-days (i.e. with eye examinations appointments only in the morning or afternoon). Finally, we calculate the average probability of a replacement worker being sent to a practice when the originally assigned optometrist is absent. This is estimated at practice level per year. On average, the expected replacement probability is 36.5%. A detailed discussion on how this probability is estimated is presented in Appendix A4.

Table 1: Variable List and Definitions

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. D</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<i>Absence</i>	0.013	0.112	1 if optometrist absent today; 0: otherwise
<i>Lag Absence</i>	0.013	0.112	1 if optometrist absent yesterday; 0: otherwise
<i>Main Practice</i>	0.753	0.431	1 if optometrist's main practice; 0: otherwise ¹
<i>Half-Day</i>	0.040	0.195	1 if testing only in morning or afternoon today; 0: otherwise
<i>Double-Testing</i>	0.188	0.391	1 if two optometrists are assigned to the practice today; 0: otherwise
<i>Replacement Probability</i>	0.365	0.165	Expected replacement probability in current practice

Note: 1. Main Practice is defined annually as the practice in which the optometrist worked more than any other over the year.

The estimated equation of interest is an absence model with a binary dependent variable. The key explanatory variable is *Double-Testing*, a dummy variable that reflects whether or not there are two optometrists that are assigned to perform the eye examinations in a practice that

day. This is the main variable of interest in our analysis, since the sign and significance of the estimated coefficient will indicate whether optometrists, when working together, behave cooperatively to maximize joint expected utility, or independently with their individual expected utility solely in mind. A positive coefficient will have an ambiguous interpretation since $\tilde{\delta}^n < \tilde{\delta}$ and $\tilde{\delta}^n < \tilde{\delta}^m$ whilst $\tilde{\delta}^m$ exceed or fall short of $\tilde{\delta}$ depending upon the effort cost of absence. A negative coefficient, however, can only be interpreted as evidence that workers act cooperatively, since only the cooperative outcome is able to yield a reservation level of sickness in excess of the single-worker equilibrium.

Our estimator is a linear probability model with clustered standard errors and our results are presented in Table 2.⁸ The basic model specification (column 1) includes only *Double-Testing* and the predicted average probability of a replacement optometrist being sent to the practice if absent (*Replacement Probability*).⁹ For robustness purposes we also consider alternative specifications that include: (i) the optometrist's absence the previous day (*Lag Absence*) in order to capture any state dependence effects (column 2); (ii) whether the optometrist is working at their main practice (*Main Practice*) and / or working only half a day (*Half-Day*) (column 3); (iii) the days of the week, in order to capture unobserved time preferences (column 4); and, (iv) the month of the year, for unobserved seasonal effects (column 5).

In all specifications considered, optometrists exhibit lower absence when working in teams of two (*Double-Testing*) as compared to when working alone (*Single-Testing*). The

⁸ Given that our dataset is a long panel, consisting of a relatively small number of optometrists observed over a relatively long period of time, we also considered a fixed effects model as an alternative estimator. Since fixed effects regression uses only information from changes within an individual (optometrist), it excludes all individuals who were never absent from work (i.e. zero variation). We therefore decided against such an approach because it would have excluded almost half of the optometrists from our sample.

⁹ As a robustness check, we also incorporated the observed replacement ratio into an alternative specification, restricting the sample to practices that had some level of absence during a particular year. The estimates overall remained the same and are available upon request.

estimated effects suggest that moving from single-testing to double-testing reduces the probability of absence by 0.004 percentage points¹⁰. Whilst small in absolute terms, with an average absence rate of 1.3 percent, this implies a potential relative fall in the probability of absence of 30 percent.

These result supports the cooperative equilibrium outcome in which workers act to maximize joint expected utility and suggests that they have a higher reservation level of sickness, $\tilde{\delta}^m$, than that of a single worker, $\tilde{\delta}$. Diagrammatically, this means that $\tilde{\delta}^m$ is located to the northeast of $\tilde{\delta}$, as per Figure 5.

The remaining results accord largely with our ex ante expectations. Specifically, optometrists exhibit higher absence when working half-days or in practices that are more likely to get another optometrist to cover for absence. Lag absence is also a good predictor of current absence, with optometrists who were absent the previous day being more likely to be absent the following day as well. There is no evidence that optometrists are less likely to absent when working in their main practice and whilst there is some evidence of ‘Monday blues’ there is no real evidence of seasonal variation.

¹⁰ The results are verified also when using a probit model with robust standard errors. Optometrists who work in teams of two are significantly less likely to be absent, although the calculated marginal effects of double-testing are smaller in magnitude than the linear probability estimates.

Table 2: Regression Estimates – Linear Probability

Dependent Variable: Absence = 1

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
<i>Workplace Controls</i>										
Double-Testing	-0.007*	0.004	-0.004*	0.002	-0.004*	0.002	-0.004*	0.002	-0.004*	0.002
Replacement Probability	0.078***	0.019	0.044***	0.008	0.045***	0.009	0.045***	0.009	0.045***	0.009
Lag Absence	-	-	0.474***	0.056	0.474***	0.056	0.474***	0.056	0.473***	0.056
Main Practice	-	-	-	-	-0.002	0.003	-0.002	0.003	-0.002	0.003
Half-Day	-	-	-	-	0.021**	0.009	0.022**	0.009	0.022**	0.009
<i>Day Controls</i>										
Tuesday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.005	0.004	-0.005	0.004
Wednesday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.004	0.003	-0.004	0.003
Thursday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.005	0.003	-0.005	0.003
Friday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.002	0.004	-0.002	0.004
Saturday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.007*	0.004	-0.007*	0.004
Sunday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.005	0.006	-0.005	0.006
<i>Month Controls</i>										
February	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.003	0.004
March	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.004	0.004
April	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.006*	0.003
May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.33 ^{e-5}	0.006
June	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.004	0.003
July	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.006	0.004
August	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-8.42 ^{e-5}	0.005
September	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.004	0.004
October	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.85 ^{e-4}	0.004
November	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.002	0.005
December	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.005	0.005
Constant	-0.014***	0.005	-0.009***	0.003	-0.008***	0.002	-0.004	0.004	-0.001	0.005
Observations	17943		17943		17943		17943		17943	
Log-Likelihood	13894.792		16168.765		16184.497		16188.837		16193.761	

Note: 1. Linear probability estimates with clustered standard errors; 2. Level of statistical significance: * for 0.1, ** for 0.05, *** for 0.01; 3. SE = Standard Error

5. Final Comments

We develop a theoretical model of worker interaction and explore the impact on absence from workers acting cooperatively or competitively. Our model suggests that a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome yields an inefficiently high absence rate on account of the effort externality an absenting worker imposes on his non-absenting colleague. In contrast, when workers cooperate the externality is internalized and a lower, efficient level of absence can be reached. We test the model on a dataset of optometrists who either work in pairs *Double-Testing* or alone (*Single-Testing*). We find that those working in pairs are significantly less likely to absent, a result that supports the cooperative equilibrium prediction from our theoretical model.

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Appendix

A1: Deriving the single-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - uniform distribution

The individual's expected utility may be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^1 u f(\delta) d\delta \\
 &\Rightarrow \\
 \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} [(1-\delta)w + \delta(T-h)] d\delta + \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 [(1-\delta)s + \delta T] d\delta \\
 &\Rightarrow \\
 \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \left[\delta w + \frac{\delta^2}{2} (T-w-h) \right]_0^{\tilde{\delta}} + \left[\delta s + \frac{\delta^2}{2} (T-s) \right]_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 \tag{A1.1} \\
 &\Rightarrow \\
 \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \tilde{\delta} w + \frac{(\tilde{\delta})^2}{2} (T-w-h) + \left[s + \frac{1}{2} (T-s) \right] - \left[\tilde{\delta} s + \frac{(\tilde{\delta})^2}{2} (T-s) \right] \\
 &\Rightarrow \\
 \mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \tilde{\delta} (w-s) - \frac{(\tilde{\delta})^2}{2} (w-s+h) + \left(\frac{T+s}{2} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

Maximizing (A1.1) with respect to $\tilde{\delta}$ implies:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}} &= w - s + \tilde{\delta}(-w - h + s) = 0 \\
\Rightarrow \\
\tilde{\delta} &= \frac{w - s}{w - s + h}
\end{aligned} \tag{A1.2}$$

A2: Deriving the single-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - general case

The individual's expected utility may be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^1 u f(\delta) d\delta \\
\Rightarrow \\
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} [(1-\delta)w + \delta(T-h)] f(\delta) d\delta + \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 [(1-\delta)s + \delta T] f(\delta) d\delta \\
\Rightarrow \\
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} [f(\delta)w + \delta f(\delta)(T-h-w)] d\delta + \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 [f(\delta)s + \delta f(\delta)(T-s)] d\delta
\end{aligned} \tag{A2.1}$$

Integrating by parts using the general rule:

$$\int_a^b v du = uv \Big|_a^b - \int_a^b u dv \tag{A2.2}$$

Assume $v = \delta$ and $f(\delta)d\delta = du$, where $u = F(\delta)$ since $f(\delta)d\delta = du \Rightarrow f(\delta) = du/d\delta \Rightarrow u = F(\delta)$. Therefore:

$$\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} f(\delta) d\delta = F(\delta) \delta \Big|_0^{\tilde{\delta}} - \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} F(\delta) d\delta = F(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} - \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} F(\delta) d\delta \tag{A2.3}$$

And:

$$\int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 f(\delta) d\delta = F(\delta) \delta \Big|_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 - \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 F(\delta) d\delta = 1 - F(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} - \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 F(\delta) d\delta \tag{A2.4}$$

Using the above expressions and noting that $F(\delta) = 1$ when $\delta \in [0, 1] = 1$, the expected utility function can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= F(\tilde{\delta})w + \left[F(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} - \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}} F(\delta) d\delta \right] (T-h-w) + \\
&\quad + [1 - F(\tilde{\delta})]s + \left[1 - F(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} - \int_{\tilde{\delta}}^1 F(\delta) d\delta \right] (T-s)
\end{aligned} \tag{A2.5}$$

Maximizing (A2.5) with respect to $\tilde{\delta}$ implies:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}} &= f(\tilde{\delta})w + [f(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} + F(\tilde{\delta}) - F(\tilde{\delta})](T - w - h) - f(\tilde{\delta})s + \\ &\quad + \{-f(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta} + [1 - F(\tilde{\delta})] - [1 - F(\tilde{\delta})]\}(T - s) = 0\end{aligned}\tag{A2.6}$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}} = f(\tilde{\delta})(w - s) + f(\tilde{\delta})\tilde{\delta}(T - w - h - T + S) = 0$$

which implies:

$$\tilde{\delta} = \frac{w - s}{w - s + h}\tag{A2.7}$$

Hence, the reservation level of sickness, $\tilde{\delta}$, is invariant to the choice of $f(\cdot)$ for δ .

A3: *Deriving the two-worker decision rule from expected utility maximization - general case*

Write joint expected utility as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} (u_1^{na} + u_2^{na}) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 (u_2^{na} + u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \\ &\quad + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} (u_1^{na} + u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 (u_1^a + u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_1^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 u_1^a f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \\ &\quad + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} (u_1^{na} + u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 [- (u_1^a + u_2^a)] f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2\end{aligned}\tag{A3.1}$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_1^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 (-u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \\ &\quad + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 (-u_2^{na}) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \\ &\quad + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} (u_1^{na} + u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 [- (u_1^a + u_2^a)] f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2\end{aligned}$$

Define the third and forth terms of (A3.1) as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{A} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 (-u_2^{na}) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \mathbf{A} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 - \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2\end{aligned}\tag{A3.2}$$

Note that only u_2^{na} out of the four utility components $(u_1^{na}, u_1^a, u_2^{na}, u_2^a)$ is a function of $\tilde{\delta}_1$ and use the property:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \int_{\alpha}^t f(x) dx = f(t) \quad (\text{A3.3})$$

Maximise joint expected utility with respect to $\tilde{\delta}_1$:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} u_1^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} (-u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 (u_1^{na} + u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \\ &\quad + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 [- (u_1^a + u_2^a)] f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 (u_1^{na} + u_2^a - u_1^a - u_2^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^1 (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A3.4})$$

Note that:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{A}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \right] - \frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_1^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \right] = 0 \quad (\text{A3.5})$$

Since:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \right] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \int_1^{\tilde{\delta}_1} u_2^{na} f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \right] \quad (\text{A3.6})$$

Thus, (A3.4) reduces to:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^1 (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{E}\{u_{12}\}}{\partial \tilde{\delta}_1} &= \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_2 = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A3.7})$$

Since $f(\delta_1, \delta_2)$ is a probability density function it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}
& p(u_1^{na} - u_1^a) + (1-p)(u_1^{na} - u_1^a) = 0 \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& (u_1^{na} - u_1^a) = 0 \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& u_1^{na} = u_1^a
\end{aligned} \tag{A3.8}$$

where $p \in [0, 1]$. Thus, in a two-worker setting, individual 1 - and by symmetry individual 2 - will maximize joint expected utility by adopting the decision rule $u_i^{na} = u_i^a$, $i = 1, 2$.

A4: *Deriving expected utility of worker 1 within a two-worker setting*

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} = \int_0^1 u_1 f(\delta_1) d\delta \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} = \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} \left\{ (1-\delta_1)w + \delta_1 \left[T - h - (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] \right\} d\delta_1 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 \left[(1-\delta_1)s + \delta_1 T \right] d\delta_1 \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} = \left[\delta_1 s + \frac{\delta_1^2}{2} (T - h - (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e - w) \right]_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} + \left[\delta_1 s + \frac{\delta_1^2}{2} (T - s) \right]_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} = \tilde{\delta}_1 w + \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [T - h - (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e - w] + s + \frac{1}{2} (T - s) - \tilde{\delta}_1 s - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} (T - s) \\
& \Rightarrow \\
& \mathbf{E}\{u_1\} = \tilde{\delta}_1 (w - s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [w - s + h + (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] + \frac{1}{2} (T + s)
\end{aligned} \tag{A4.1}$$

A5: *Deriving joint expected utility*

First, define:

$$\mathbf{X}_1 \equiv \mathbf{E}\{u_1^{na}\} = (1-\delta_1)w + \delta_1 [T - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)] \tag{A5.1}$$

And:

$$\mathbf{Y}_1 \equiv \mathbf{E}\{u_1^a\} = (1-\delta_1)s + \delta_1 T \tag{A5.2}$$

Thus, defining the joint utility of the two workers as $u = u_1 + u_2$, we have:

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \int_0^1 (u_1 + u_2) f(\delta_1, \delta_2) d\delta_1 d\delta_2 \tag{A5.3}$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} \mathbf{X}_1 d\delta_1 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 \mathbf{Y}_1 d\delta_1 + \int_0^1 u_2 d\delta_1 \right] d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.4})$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} \left\{ (1-\delta_1)w + \delta_1 [T - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)] \right\} d\delta_1 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 \left[(1-\delta_1)s + \delta_1 T \right] d\delta_1 + u_2 \right] d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.5})$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left[\int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_1} \left\{ w + \delta_1 [T - w - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)] \right\} d\delta_1 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 \left[(1-\delta_1)s + \delta_1 T \right] d\delta_1 + u_2 \right] d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.6})$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left\langle \left\{ \delta_1 w + \frac{\delta_1^2}{2} [T - w - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)] \right\}_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 + \left[\delta_1 s + \frac{\delta_1^2}{2} (T - s) \right]_{\tilde{\delta}_1}^1 + u_2 \right\rangle d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.7})$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left\{ \tilde{\delta}_1 w + \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [T - w - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_2)] + s + \frac{1}{2} (T - s) - s\tilde{\delta}_1 - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} (T - s) + u_2 \right\} d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.8})$$

$\Rightarrow$

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 \left\{ \tilde{\delta}_1 (w - s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [w - s + h + (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] + \frac{1}{2} (T + s) + u_2 \right\} d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.9})$$

Thus:

$$\mathbf{E}\{u\} = \int_0^1 (\mathbf{Z}_1 + u_2) d\delta_2 = \int_0^1 \mathbf{Z}_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \mathbf{X}_2 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \mathbf{Y}_2 d\delta_2 \quad (\text{A5.10})$$

where:

$$\mathbf{Z}_1 = \tilde{\delta}_1 (w - s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} [w - s + h + (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e] + \frac{1}{2} (T + s) \quad (\text{A5.11})$$

$$\mathbf{X}_2 \equiv \mathbf{E}\{u_2^{na}\} = (1-\delta_2)w + \delta_2 [T - h - e(1-\tilde{\delta}_1)] \quad (\text{A5.12})$$

$$\mathbf{Y}_2 \equiv \mathbf{E}\{u_2^a\} = (1-\delta_2)s + \delta_2 T \quad (\text{A5.13})$$

Thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \int_0^1 (\mathbf{Z}_1 + u_2) d\delta_2 = \int_0^1 \mathbf{Z}_1 d\delta_2 + \int_0^{\tilde{\delta}_2} \mathbf{X}_2 d\delta_2 + \int_{\tilde{\delta}_2}^1 \mathbf{Y}_2 d\delta_2 = \mathbf{Z}_1 + \mathbf{Z}_2 \\
\Rightarrow \\
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= \tilde{\delta}_1(w-s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_1^2}{2} \left[w-s+h + (1-\tilde{\delta}_2)e \right] + \frac{1}{2}(T+s) + \\
&\quad + \tilde{\delta}_2(w-s) - \frac{\tilde{\delta}_2^2}{2} \left[w-s+h + (1-\tilde{\delta}_1)e \right] + \frac{1}{2}(T+s) \\
\Rightarrow \\
\mathbf{E}\{u\} &= (\tilde{\delta}_1 + \tilde{\delta}_2)(w-s) - \frac{1}{2} \left\{ (\tilde{\delta}_1^2 + \tilde{\delta}_2^2)(w-s+h) + [\tilde{\delta}_1^2(1-\tilde{\delta}_2) + \tilde{\delta}_2^2(1-\tilde{\delta}_1)]e \right\} + T+s
\end{aligned} \tag{A5.14}$$

A6: Deriving the expected probability of obtaining a replacement in the incidence of an absence

The purpose of the analysis here is to calculate how likely it is for a replacement to be sent to a practice when an optometrist is absent. Based on the information we have on replacement optometrists, we measure the average replacement probability for the practices that had some absence, separately per annum for each practice. This variable is the dependent variable in the equation we estimate, taking values from zero to one. The explanatory variables include the following practice-specific characteristics, calculated annually: (i) the mean absence rate (*Mean Absence*); (ii) the mean number of double-testing days (*Mean Double Testing*); (iii) the mean number of half-days (*Mean Half-Days*); and (iv) the distance of the practice from the company's nearest practice (*Distance*). By construction, there is variation in the dependent and independent variables both across practices and over time. The model is estimated at the practice level using a Tobit estimator and the results are set out in Table A6 following:

Table A6: Regression Estimate

Dependent Variable: Mean Replacement (at practice level)

	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
<i>Mean Absence</i>	21.456***	0.497
<i>Mean Double Testing</i>	0.261***	0.022
<i>Mean Half-Days</i>	1.208***	0.150
<i>Distance</i>	-0.007***	7.35 ^{e-4}
<i>Constant</i>	-0.045**	0.017
<i>Observations</i>	13066	
<i>Log-Likelihood</i>	-12124.816	

*Note: Tobit estimates. Level of statistical significance: * for 0.1, ** for 0.05, and *** for 0.01*

Based on these estimates, we derive the expected replacement probability for all the practices and years in the dataset.