ELITE SOLIDARITY, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CONTESTED ORIGINS OF BRITAIN’S FIRST BUSINESS SCHOOLS

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Abstract

Britain is often depicted as a laggard in management education before the late creation of two graduate business schools in London and Manchester in the mid-1960s triggered the emergence of a new academic sector. According to the dominant narrative, the anachronistic views of Britain’s industrial leaders and disdain of its universities for practical learning constrained developments in the field. Through the lens of elite theory, we offer a reinterpretation of the formation of Britain’s first business schools informed by archival research, suggesting that they arose from an evolutionary process rather than a crucible event. The story of the creation of Britain’s first business schools has never been told from the perspective of elite agency. Our study reveals the emergent managerial elite of the post-war era growing into something altogether more powerful. Our main contribution to theory is to demonstrate that, while expanding management education ostensibly contravened elite interests, elite interaction in the field of power at a time of national urgency amplified elite influence, prefiguring their role as ‘influence elites’ today.

Keywords: Business Schools; History of Management Education; Management Learning; Qualitative Methods.
According to prevailing wisdom, before the second half of the twentieth century, British firms displayed little interest in management education, believing that managers were born, not made (Keeble, 1992; Williams, 2012). What mattered were the dispositions and abilities of those chosen to lead and experience acquired on the job (Edwards, 2009; Kast, 1965). The scientific management movement championed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States (US) by production engineers (Taylor, 1911), passed by largely unnoticed. Hence the slow take-up in Britain of modern methods for increasing the efficiency and profitability of operations (Locke, 1989). Not until the early 1960s, when studies revealed that manufacturing productivity was far lower in Britain than in the US, did the industrial elite recognize the need actively to develop management capabilities (Tiratsoo, 2004). Even then, support for Britain’s first business schools in London and Manchester, which opened in 1965, was lukewarm, as differences between business and academia persisted (Barnes, 1989; Wheatcroft, 1970).

In this article, we challenge the dominant narrative of management education in Britain to offer an alternative narrative informed by elite theory and archival research, suggesting that Britain’s business schools have deeper roots than commonly recognized. The formation of the London Business School (LBS) and Manchester Business School (MBS) in the mid-1960s belies a deeper history, representing a coalescence of existing interests rather than a dramatic break with the past. Re-examining the foundations of British management education allows us to recast business schools in the present and future (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011). Doing so is important given the multifaceted role they are expected to perform in society as socially responsible actors, working ‘for the general good’ (Child, 1969: 264; Spicer, Jaser, & Wiertz, 2021). We pose two related research questions. First, how did Britain, seemingly from a near standing start, successfully launch the London and Manchester business schools in the 1960s? Second, what can we learn from the British
experience to inform the development of business schools in the future? Our research questions are broad in nature to enable us to consider the story of the creation of Britain’s first business schools holistically, from the perspective of the networks and relationships that form the connective topography of the elite landscape, during our study period and looking ahead (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006).

Our study contributes to the burgeoning body of literature that reappraises the history of business schools and management education (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015; Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Larson, 2020; McLaren, 2019; Spicer et al., 2021; Üsdiken, Kipping, & Engwall, 2021; Wanderley & Barros, 2020; Wanderley, Alcadipani, & Barros, 2021). Studying the formation of Britain’s first business schools through the lens of elite theory lends a novel perspective, illustrating how configurations of domain-spanning actors combine to determine the socio-political order (Harvey & Maclean, 2008; Maclean, Harvey, & Press, 2006; Reed, 2012; Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). We provide a contextualized historical reinterpretation of how, through elite solidarity, Britain’s business schools emerged to become the powerful force they are today (Lindsay, 2008). We suggest that, while the story of the creation of Britain’s first business schools is ostensibly one of transformation, closer inspection reveals it as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. We make a methodological contribution to scholarship on the history of management education in business schools through the rich analytical process we develop for analysing historical data. Our primary contribution to theory is to uncover the development of ‘influence elites’ by showing how concerted action in the field of power at a time of national urgency (Franks, 1963), propelled by an ethos of social responsibility, served elite interests, presaging their role as ‘influence elites’ today (Wedel, 2017). The story of the formation of Britain’s first business schools has not been told from an elite perspective (Savage & Williams, 2008). Our study addresses this lacuna, illuminating the dynamic nature of elite agency over time that led to the formation of
the two new schools (Reed, 2012). New understanding of the emphasis accorded to service and shared purpose in the narrative we present highlights how business schools can create social value in the future.

Our article unfolds as follows. The next section explains the relevance of elite theory to our narrative, before reviewing the literature on the origins of Britain’s first business schools, explicating, and questioning the dominant narrative. We then specify our methodology, sources, and analytical methods. In the following section, we present our findings and propose an alternative narrative divided into three periods: antecedents (pre-1960), coalescence (1960-64), and enactment (1965-68). We conclude by considering the lessons emerging from our research, and how these may inform fresh thinking about socially responsible management education in the future.

THE ORIGINS OF BRITAIN’S FIRST BUSINESS SCHOOLS

Elite Action in the Field of Power

The story we tell below draws on elite theory, and shows elites expanding their remit into management education in the UK. We follow Bottomore (1966: 14) in defining elites as ‘functional, mainly occupational groups that have high status (for whatever reasons) in a society’. When applied to higher education, ‘elite’ denotes ‘first class’ or ‘high prestige’. The field of power refers to the integrative social space in which elites from different backgrounds come together on equal terms to discuss issues of mutual interest (Bourdieu, 1996). It thus serves as a ‘metafield’ which transcends individual fields and organizations, bringing together elites from business, government, academia, and the civil service, at the ‘command posts’ of society (Mills, 1956; Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). Dinners, clubs, and events provide the meeting-places where the personal networks and bonds of affiliation needed to function efficaciously in the field of power are forged, and strategic conversations are played out (Maclean, Harvey, & Kling, 2017). Here, elite actors ‘make accounts’, producing
legitimating discourse designed to shape public opinion (Giddens, 1984: 29). The best-connected elites serve as ‘bridging actors’, forming coalitions to influence societal decision-making processes (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Lindsay (2008: 62) calls this ‘convening power’, which he discerns as one of the most powerful resources available to elites. The most skilful bridging actors assume a tertius iungens (or ‘third who joins’) approach, a strategic orientation whereby pivotal lynchpin actors unite disconnected others from different life worlds to advance common interests (Obstfeld, 2005: 104). From an elite perspective, acting in a socially responsible manner for the greater good confers vital legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1996; Harvey, Gordon, & Maclean, 2021). It is through such networked collective action or ‘distributed leadership’ by those at the command posts of society that societal logics of action may be changed (Mehra, Smith, Dixon, & Robertson, 2006). We now consider the literature on the formation of Britain’s first business schools, exploring and questioning the conventional narrative.

**The Dominant Narrative**

The demands on British industry of World War I sparked interest in modern methods of management (Weatherburn, 2020). Progressive industrialists like Quaker employer Seebohm Rowntree championed the cause through a series of business lectures, coupled with the launch in 1926-27 of management research groups (MRGs) in which members studied best practice and learned from each other (Keeble, 1981; Maclean, Shaw, Harvey, & Booth, 2020). Child (1969: 103) states, however, that the interwar management movement remained ‘alien to the great mass of practising managers and employers’, while Wilson and Thomson (2006: 181) describe it as small-scale. British universities, beyond maintaining their B.Com. degrees and experimenting with postgraduate courses on a minimal scale, are presented as unconcerned with serving business needs, displaying an ‘antipathy to university business training’ (Keeble, 1992: 121). Perceived as ‘aloof from the sordid world of practical affairs’
(Thomas, 1980: 86), they reflected the British ‘aristocratic aversion to trade’ and remained stubbornly opposed to management education (Robertson, 1970: 12).

Likewise, whereas the idea of developing people for business careers found favour in US universities and colleges (Engwall & Danell, 2011), mirroring the interest taken in scientific management by practitioners (Hassard, 2012), British universities resisted offering courses for current or future managers (Thomas, 1980; Williams, 2012). Some were suspected of deflecting graduates from a business career (Sanderson, 1972). Several pioneers did buck the trend. In the early 1900s, commencing with Birmingham in 1901, the universities of Aberdeen, Belfast, Cardiff, Durham, Edinburgh, Exeter, Hull, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Nottingham, Reading, Sheffield, Southampton, and St Andrews launched undergraduate degrees in commerce, with some offering master’s programmes and doctoral study (Kadish, 1991; Murphy, 1953; Sanderson, 1972; Smith, 1928). These early attempts, however, achieved modest success and had seemingly little impact on reactionary business attitudes. Keeble (1984: 298) notes that it proved ‘an uphill struggle to “sell” the graduate to British employers’. The universities of Oxford and Cambridge were especially slow to change, regarding industry as ‘an unpleasant eventuality, preferably to be avoided’ (Barnes, 1989: 17). Attitudes in boardroom and factory remained ‘resolutely anti-intellectual’ (Tiratsoo, 2004: 119), perceiving ‘little need of the man with a scholastic training in business’ (Keeble, 1992: 122), while graduates preferred the professions and government service, deemed more prestigious than business (Keeble, 1984).

Even the demands of World War II and the difficulties of post-war adjustment did little to shake the belief that experience on the job was the sole means of acquiring management skills (Sanderson, 1972; Wheatcroft, 1970). However, things had begun to change with the formation of a small but growing managerial elite (Child, 1969). Companies were increasing in size and complexity, and competent managers were needed to lead them
efficiently (Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, 1993). Government, which before the war had shown little interest in the quality of British management, realized that a perceived ‘technology gap’ with the US might be a ‘managerial gap’ (Robertson, 1970: 13). Poor management might explain the relatively low levels of productivity that dogged Britain’s manufacturing and service sectors (Tiratsoo, 2004). Study groups that visited the US in the late 1940s and early 1950s under the auspices of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity confirmed this view (Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, 1993; Tomlinson, 1997). Since enhancing productivity was key to boosting economic growth, the government moved to promote better management and opportunities for management education. It backed the formation of the British Institute of Management (BIM) in 1947 and established a committee in 1945 chaired by management pioneer Lyndall Urwick to devise a national scheme for management education, which, based in technical colleges, began in 1949 (Brech, Thomson, & Wilson, 2010; Thomas, 1980).

The national scheme, in its first incarnation, was not a success, identified with low levels of attainment and prestige (Mosson, 1965), awarding just 1,450 certificates and diplomas by 1960 (Keeble, 1992), and marred by a shortage of good quality teachers and a lack of support from industry (Wheatcroft, 1970). Firms of all sizes deemed the scheme unnecessary, such that ‘the practical cooperation of industry … was not forthcoming’ (Wilson & Thomson, 2006: 168). This led management education progressives to launch two private post-experience colleges: the Administrative Staff College at Henley (1947) and Ashridge Management College at Berkhamsted (1959) (Dimock, 1956; Kumar, 2019). Yet the government and many industrialists remained concerned that too little was being done to combat Britain’s productivity problem (Tiratsoo, 2004). This sense of disquiet amongst the political-economic-governmental elite prompted in 1962 the establishment of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) composed of management, trades union and government representatives, supported by a National Economic Development Office (NEDO)
with administrative, research, and policy functions (Tomlinson, 1997; Wheatcroft, 1970). Crucially, the NEDC (1963: para. 26) recognized in its second report, *Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth*, the need ‘for at least one very high-level new school or institute somewhat on the lines of Harvard Business School’. US business schools provided a model to emulate, albeit adapted to British business needs (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015). This view was echoed in the influential *Report of the Committee on Higher Education* (1963), chaired by Lord Robbins, to whom witnesses ‘complained that the present arrangements for management education are deficient’ (para. 408), urging that ‘at least two major postgraduate schools should be built up’ (para. 410).

Lord Franks, Provost of Worcester College, Oxford, was invited by a coalition of industrialists and government officials to ‘render a signal service’ by designing a scheme to introduce graduate schools of business to Britain (PRO, 1963f). As a multi-positional elite actor with experience of various sectors of national life – as academic leader, ambassador, civil servant, and bank chair – he was well placed to exert influence (Wakeford & Wakeford, 1974). Dahrendorf (1995: 420) describes him as ‘the great national ombudsman of the period’, and Barnes (1989: 20) as ‘one of a very small number to whom, when all else failed, it was natural to turn’. Franks consulted widely and in November 1963 recommended establishing schools in London and Manchester as key centres of industry and commerce. Franks (1963: para. 1) affirmed the ‘acknowledged urgency’ of the mission, caused by the ‘urgent need for more competent managers’ and the ‘urgency of more and better education and training facilities for managers’ (Franks, 1963: para. 5). The Franks Report is described as ‘momentous’ (Wilson, 1992: x), after which management education in Britain experienced rapid development. The Schools were to produce managers ‘better fitted to foresee and decide well in swiftly-changing situations’ (para. 5). Both were to be associated with prestigious universities, awarding their degrees, but exercising autonomy under the joint
control of academic and business leaders (Barnes, 1989). Funding, governance, curricular and staffing issues were resolved by a working party chaired by Lord Normanbrook, reporting in February 1964.

Under the Normanbrook plan, swiftly accepted by government and industry representatives, the capital costs of the two schools and operating costs for seven years were shared between business and government. The Normanbrook Report (1964: para. 8) identified partnership as key to success, such that ‘the responsibility for running a Business School should be shared in partnership between the University concerned and business, and this joint responsibility should involve joint control of policy and money’. British business responded enthusiastically to a fundraising campaign led by the Federation of British Industries (FBI), the BIM, and the Foundation for Management Education (FME). By late 1964, when the subscription closed, the campaign had raised £5 million (£103.62m. in 2020 prices), exceeding its target (Wheatcroft, 1970). The new flagship graduate schools of LBS and MBS opened in 1965, offering post-experience courses before launching postgraduate taught courses a year later. However, both schools are said to have struggled to overcome the longstanding anti-academic prejudices of the business community, despite its financial support, and battled to achieve recognition until well into the 1970s (Barnes, 1989).

**Questioning the Dominant Narrative**

We do not question the factual basis of the dominant narrative. Following Lipartito (2014: 284, 301), who advocates a ‘dialogic research process of engaging a historical subject’ to ‘debate or dialogue with others who have worked on the same or related topics’, our challenge is one of emphasis and interpretation. The dominant narrative highlights the slow diffusion of management education in a country where family business had long been prominent and on-the-job training was preferred (Murphy, 1953). Keeble (1984: 17), whose doctoral research investigates why British industry rejected management education and
business graduates from 1890 to 1950, finds that ‘early management education in [Britain] is not a success story, and it has in most quarters been written off as a non-event’. While observing that ‘the idea of scholarly training for business had been much more alive than is usually suggested’, she concludes that ‘none had any great success’ (Keeble, 1992: 93, 120). Elite universities preferred status to utility (Barnes, 1989; Wakeford & Wakeford, 1974). This held little place for any ‘functional learning directly aimed at a specific vocation’ (Coleman, 1973: 101). Hence, ‘the idea of a university-trained professional manager was never accepted’ (Keeble, 1984: 302). Exhibiting ‘a propensity to move only slowly towards the new’ (Keeble, 1992: 3), it was only in the 1960s that Britain woke up to the need to ‘start earning its living’ (Barnes, 1989: 15).

The overall effect, in our view, is to amplify differences in management thought and practice between Britain and its competitors, while downplaying achievements in management education and research before 1960. The creation of LBS and MBS and subsequent flowering of UK business schools come across as an ‘explosion in management education’ (Wheatcroft, 1970: 5), a sharp break with the past arising from concerns over British competitiveness (Tiratsoo, 2004; Tomlinson, 1997). This gives the impression of a bolt from the blue, whereby ‘traditional scepticism about the need for, or possibility of, formal education for management seemed finally to have been dispelled’ (Thomas, 1980: 71). In other words, the establishment of Britain’s first business schools constitutes a ‘management education revolution’ (Wheatcroft, 1970: 143).

We query this interpretation since, without prior experience and capabilities, it would not have been possible to launch LBS and MBS so rapidly, nor to instigate the host of other initiatives that swiftly followed. Business engagement with universities had been building gradually for some considerable time (Sanderson, 1972; Smith, 1928; Williams, 2012). As the Balfour Report on industry and trade remarked in 1927, ‘there is a growing
acknowledgment amongst progressive employers of the value of a university degree in business’ coupled with ‘an increasing number of firms and organisations which definitely prefer university men [sic]’ (Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927: 242). The report documents the extensive range of commercial training provided across the UK, inside and outside universities (pp.160-178 and pp.219-255), alongside the widespread provision of evening classes by commercial and technical colleges, aimed mainly at office workers (Guerriero Wilson, 2011), which accompanied the rise of research departments within firms. This paints a different picture, according to which the ‘increasing involvement of the universities with industry is perhaps the most important single development in the histories of the British universities over the last hundred years’ (Sanderson, 1972: 391).

RESEARCH PROCESS

Historicizing Organizational Research

We situate our study within the growing body of organizational research that seeks to historicize organizational research (Bucheli & Wadhwani, 2014; Kipping & Üsdiken, 2014; Maclean, Clegg, Suddaby, & Harvey, 2021; Maclean, Harvey, & Clegg, 2016; 2017; Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014). Clark and Rowlinson (2004) emphasized the need for greater interaction between organizational and historical research, advocating a ‘historic turn’. The application of historical methods in organizational research has since become more explicit epistemologically and methodologically.

Our stance in this article is integrationist (Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004), blending history and organizational research in the manner of ‘historical organization studies’ to synthesize historical analysis and organization theory (Godfrey, Hassard, O’Connor, Rowlinson, & Ruef, 2016). Such an approach ‘draws extensively on historical data, methods and knowledge, embedding organizing and organizations in their socio-historical context to generate historically informed theoretical narratives attentive to both disciplines’ (Maclean et
al., 2016: 609). We draw on the conception of ‘historical organization studies’ that Maclean et al. (2016: 614) identify as ‘history as narrating’. This implies adopting a narrative approach that privileges historical storytelling and argumentation to generate a contextually informed theorized storyline designed to elucidate the origins of contemporary phenomena. Our intention is to identify and illuminate the interactions between elite actors, the state, and other institutions that led to the formation of the two business schools. Vaara and Lamberg (2016) propose that strategic processes are inherently historical, embedded in contexts and constructed in fields of practice that are historically and culturally constructed and transmitted. This applies also to management education in Britain as a field of enquiry, emphasizing the socially constructed nature of its history and its gradual sedimentation into a dominant narrative (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011). The growing body of work concerned with historicizing organizational research highlights the critical effect of ‘prior context’ on the strategic agency of individual actors or groups (Hassard, 2012: 1435). Attention to contextual factors helps to explain how management education in Britain evolved sui generis and did not mirror management education found elsewhere (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015; Cooke & Kumar, 2020; Kumar, 2019; Wanderley & Barros, 2020; Wanderley et al., 2021).

A key aspect of the historic turn is an expectation of reflexivity (Tennent, 2021). Reflexivity is a methodological stance, appropriate to ‘questioning the very narrative that is created when looking for alternatives’, such that ‘even the consideration of archives and documents should be reflexive’ (Barros, Carneiro, & Wanderley, 2019: 280, 282). It highlights that archives are non-neutral sites where knowledge is inscribed and produced – which may explain why over time one narrative assumes ascendancy over another (Schwarzkopf, 2021). We were mindful that archival data comprise ‘only a partial representation of a particular reality’ (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015: 486). Being implicated in power relations, archives are also integral to the maintenance of elites (Clegg et al., 2006).
Archival Research

We took a deep plunge into the archives to discover more about the antecedents, formation, and early years of LBS and MBS. Archives are a key constituent of historical research, especially those ‘unique, noncirculating records’ housed in special collections (Hill, 1993: v). The materials they store represent the selective remnants of human endeavours, determined largely by the context of the times. Our own search yielded a rich collection of documents from the UK Public Record Office (PRO), the London School of Economics (LSE) Archives (LSEA), and Manchester University Archives (MUA). Copies were made of the most telling documents (reports, briefing notes, minutes of meetings, letters, speeches, press releases and miscellany) to create a corpus of 405 documents, as summarized in Table 1. Documents in the PRO (1960-68) stem from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour, National Economic Development Office, and the University Grants Committee (UGC). Documents in the LSEA stem from its Department of Business Administration (1903-1965), the papers of Sir Arnold Plant, a leading LSE professor, and miscellaneous collections. Records at the MUA come from the Department of Industrial Administration (DIA) (1919-1965) of Manchester College of Science and Technology (MCST) and the University’s Faculty of Economic and Social Studies (1903-1968). Two research team members undertook archival searches over four months in 2019. A third team member conducted archival research on the interwar management movement primarily at the Borthwick Institute for Archives, University of York, and LSEA, which house material on Rowntree and the MRGs respectively.

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Historical Data Analysis
Our reading of the corpus was informed by the literature on British management education, as explored in our literature review. This said, in keeping with a reflexive approach, we sought to consider our assembled texts with fresh eyes to remain open to discovery. Decker (2013: 166) likens making sense of archival documents to entering ‘a story that was told in disjointed fashion and needed to be pieced together’. Having gathered a substantial body of texts, we set about reading each document reflexively, against the grain of the dominant narrative, to identify correspondences and disparities (Barros et al., 2019). This involved two team members engaging in four analytical processes, as elaborated in Table 2. First, we established a chronological timeline of events and activities (sequencing). Second, we located activities in their situated context(s), attentive to temporal embeddedness (contextualizing). Next, we looked for causal connections between elite actors, interactions, events, and outcomes (exploring). Finally, we critically interrogated the activities and interactions referenced in the documentary record to elucidate the effects of historical context on elite agency (re-interpreting).

A salient aspect of this exercise was that it began to uncover the complex interplay within the field of power across a broad set of agentic elites engaged in forming alliances with others to realize desired change (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). It thereby elucidated the ‘inherently dynamic nature’ of elite interactions over time (Reed, 2012: 205). Through (re)reading the documents in the manner indicated above, preliminary patterns began to form (Berg, 2009). The following themes crystallized as we sharpened our thinking – promoting management education, bringing actors together, building critical partnerships, emulating US models, enhancing national competitiveness, and encouraging competitive responses – which in turn generated three core phases, outlined in Table 3.
Longitudinal research examines change as it unfolds over time (Yates, 2014). Diachronic analysis uncovers the interactions that culminate in change (Lipartito, 2014). What became clear as we analysed our assembled material was that it was naturally conducive to a ‘temporal bracketing’ strategy (Langley, 1999). Ordering events and activities that occurred over time into discrete but sequential contiguous phases permits the ‘examination of how actions of one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent periods’ (Langley, 1999: 703). This facilitates the articulation of the generic underlying logics that characterize the temporal flow of organizational life (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013), thus enabling:

‘further deep contextualization of the history of management education, as well as analyses that address continuities, similarities, disjunctures, and difference between and within specified moments of time and place.’ (Cooke & Kumar, 2020: 22)

Three core periods took shape from the progression of interactions and events that formed our data, characterized by a ‘certain continuity in the activities within each period and… certain discontinuities at its frontier’ (Langley, 1999: 703). We labelled these phases ‘antecedents’ (pre-1960), ‘coalescence’ (1960-64) and ‘enactment’ (1965-68). Table 3 provides illustrative quotations for each, encapsulating how themes emerged from our data and generated core periods.

From the above processes there emerged a body of chronologically ordered, contextually situated pieces of evidence, arranged as three temporal brackets. While some were supportive of the dominant narrative, many others were suggestive, when combined, of an alternative view of the creation of LBS and MBS. The emerging counter narrative challenges the dominant narrative outlined above in emphasizing the deep roots of Britain’s
first business schools, the degree of elite solidarity underpinning their creation, and the sustained collaboration between business and government that eventually brought success.

REVISITING THE ORIGINS OF BRITAIN’S FIRST BUSINESS SCHOOLS

The three arguments underpinning our reinterpretation of the origins of Britain’s first business schools pertain to antecedents, coalescence, and enactment. First, regarding antecedents (pre-1960), we suggest that Britain accomplished far more in management education before 1960 than the dominant narrative implies (Dahrendorf, 1995; Kadish, 1991; Smith, 1928; Williams, 2012). British educators and their business allies emerge as more innovative than suggested. The prevailing wisdom downplays these achievements and direct connections between past endeavours and the creation of LBS and MBS. Second, with respect to coalescence (1960-64), we contend that the dominant narrative overlooks the high degree of elite solidarity and strategic nature of elite conversations, imbued with an ethos of social responsibility in the national interest, that resulted in the coalescence of practical plans in the early 1960s. The effect is to underplay attainments, failing to appreciate that the foundations were purposefully being laid over time for a comprehensive national system of management education (Tomlinson, 1997). Third, with reference to enactment (1965-68), we propose that the available documentary evidence suggests that LBS and MBS got off to a better start than is commonly acknowledged (Robertson, 1970). Table 4 summarizes the landmark events that comprised our three periods and maps these to the archives and references consulted.

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Antecedents (pre-1960)

Britain’s interwar management movement. Britain’s interwar management movement was a highly networked movement orchestrated by elites to promote the interrelated causes of
improved management practice, management education and research. The movement was informed by an ethos of ‘business as service’, in which the antecedents of corporate social responsibility may be discerned, founded on the premise that ‘profit could be allied to social good’ (Maclean, Shaw, & Harvey, 2022: 7). The social responsibilities of managers and their ‘contribution to the well-being of the wider communities’ were therefore to the fore (Spicer et al., 2021: 462).

At core were the Rowntree lecture conferences, begun in 1919 and open to managers at all levels, covering a wide range of subjects designed to improve industrial efficiency and work relations. The 38 conferences held between 1919 and 1939, of which 25 took place at Balliol College, Oxford, drew delegates from over 400 firms. Attendees heard papers, many printed for wider distribution, by industrialists, functional specialists, management theorists, consultants, and politicians. Altogether, 312 papers were delivered, including contributions from prominent US speakers like industrialist Henry Dennison (1927) and organizational theorist Mary Parker Follett (1926; 1928). The lectures were complemented by the formation of MRGs, bringing together managers to find solutions to common problems through data sharing, site visits, and identification of best practice. On average 99 large and medium-sized firms participated in MRGs (1927-1938), peaking at 121 firms in 1931. They were bolstered by engagement with business academics, notably from the universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Leeds, Liverpool and Manchester, Regent Street Polytechnic, LSE and MCST. The MRGs’ activities entailed disseminating ideas through printed reports and sharing information via factory and office visits. They formed relationships with professional associations, urged members to problem-solve with practitioners, provided advice, and formed sub-committees to address specific management issues. Topics explored at meetings were multifarious, including accelerating economic recovery; export trade; forecasting; handling purchases; knowledge transfer; psychology in industry; reducing waste; sales
organization and developments; steam extraction; and superannuation schemes (MRG, 1927; 1928; 1929). In testimonials, managers emphasized the singular benefit they gleaned from sharing ideas and experience with representatives from non-competing member firms (MRG, 1938).

Management education was core to the movement’s purpose. Rowntree (1920) set the agenda in 1920, arguing that too little had been done to train ‘officers in the industrial army … for high administrative posts.’ In his view, senior executives needed ‘a good knowledge of business administration … because [they do not] work in watertight compartments.’ This knowledge might be gained though university courses like those provided by the LSE and MCST or through systematic reading, site visits and attendance at conferences. The thrust of Rowntree’s argument, which crystallized during his study tour of US firms in 1921, was that ‘the administration of business is a science’ that might be researched and taught in universities and promoted by professional bodies and through collaborative endeavours (Rowntree, 1922). It was this thinking that inspired the formation of centrally coordinated MRGs in 1926, aided by C.F. Merriam of British Xylonite, Eric Geddes of Dunlop Rubber, and Urwick, to ‘encourage cooperation between manufacturers in the solution of management problems’ (MRG, 1927).

The MRG governing body formed an education committee and encouraged universities and colleges to work with its groups (MRG, 1928). Academics from Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester universities and MCST became active members. An accounting lecturer in the DIA at MCST saved one firm £1,000 annually (£73,190 in 2020 prices) by reorganizing a single department (MUA, 1934). In Birmingham, MRG members learned from Professor Sargant Florence how to use ‘official and other business indices’ in decision-making (MRG, 1932: 15). Such grass-roots interactions suggest a growing collaboration between business and academia, especially in embedding management as a core
subject within the curricula of professional bodies like the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and the Institution of Electrical Engineers in the mid-1930s. By 1936, management courses were taught at 60 institutions, including 19 universities and polytechnics (Munro, 1936).

Building on this foundation, World War II reinforced the notion that efficient management was integral to the wellbeing of industry and society (Ivory et al., 2006). The effect was to strengthen the cause of management education in the 1940s and 1950s at a time when policymakers believed the wartime collaborative spirit could be projected into peacetime through ‘selfless public service’ (Dunsire, 1956: xii). The political ascendancy of the Labour government (1945-1951) saw Britain take a different approach to socio-economic reconstruction than elsewhere, introducing nationalization and state intervention that informed the social responsibilities of managers going forward (Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, 1993). State ownership of industry, which grew more slowly in Britain than in Europe in the early twentieth century, rose substantially, accounting for 20% of the economy by the late 1940s (Millward & Singleton, 1995).

**London School of Economics.** Lord Franks’ endorsement of London University in 1963 to host one of Britain’s first business schools stemmed from the LSE’s prior achievements in postgraduate management education. As a school of applied social sciences, LSE had introduced B.Com. and M.Com. degrees in 1919. By 1927-28, it had a combined enrolment of 262 students, offering a grounding in business and business-related disciplines including accounting, economics, finance, marketing, statistics, languages, and commercial law (Smith, 1928). By the late 1920s, under Director Sir William Beveridge, it was deemed a world-leading centre of research and teaching in social sciences. The school’s growth in the interwar years owed much to Beveridge’s connectivity within government and industry
circles (Dahrendorf, 1995). It is therefore unsurprising that progressives like Rowntree turned to him to further the cause of management education.

Leaders within the interwar management movement were acutely aware of the growing reputation of graduate business schools in the US. Lecture conferences, MRGs, professional bodies, and university and college courses were valuable in raising management standards, but it was clear that the movement might be boosted by the creation of a flagship postgraduate institution comparable to Harvard Business School (HBS). In 1928, the initiative was seized by a group of business leaders led by Rowntree. The goal was to create a Department of Business Administration (DBA) at LSE financed by personal and corporate subscriptions to offer ‘higher training in business administration based on scientific study of actual business conditions and problems’ (LSEA, 1929a). In 1929, fundraising began to cover estimated start-up costs of £5,000 per annum (£324,831 in 2020 prices) for five years. This was backed by corporate leaders, the FBI, MRG Council, and the Association for Education in Industry and Commerce. A press campaign asserted that:

‘The ever-increasing complexity of modern business demands from its administrators a more comprehensive outlook and experience than formerly… Just as America has its Harvard Business School and similar University establishments, so in this country we should develop our own specialised University training for business administration based on our own particular problems and needs’ (LSEA, 1929b).

The fundraising campaign was successful, enabling the formation of a management committee composed equally of business leaders and LSE academics, and the appointment of economist Jules Menken as DBA Director in 1930 (LSEA, 1930a; 1930b).

The DBA was active until 1964 when its role as London University’s graduate school of business administration was superseded by LBS. From 1931-32, it delivered a one-year postgraduate Diploma in Business Administration (DBA) for 20 students annually (LSEA, 1964a), after consultation on the curriculum with colleagues at Harvard, including Dean Wallace Donham, which ‘proved invaluable in starting the Department’s work along the best
lines’ (LSEA, 1933: 6). The curriculum included courses in business administration, marketing, retailing and sales management, accounting, finance, statistics, and personnel management. It aimed ‘to develop the quality of judgment and breadth of view required for solving the practical problems which emerge in the course of business life’, and to this end ‘instruction [was] carried on mainly in small classes, including what is known as the Case Method’ (LSEA, 1933: 7). A novel feature of the DBA was the weekly seminar ‘Discussions with Business Men [sic]’, to discuss business problems informally. Senior executives of top British companies like Imperial Chemical Industries, Dunlop Rubber, Cadburys, and Selfridges (LSEA, 1933: 19-20) led the 29 seminars held in 1933-34. After 1945, led by Professor Ronald Edwards, whose speciality lay in accounting and commerce, attendance at the seminar, now styled ‘Problems of Industrial Administration’, was opened to industrialists, executives, and civil servants. Each discussion was based on ‘a paper prepared by an expert and pre-circulated in advance’ (LSEA, 1949). What was dubbed the Edwards seminar became institutionalized as a high-level think-tank informing Britain’s industrial policies and practices (LSEA, 1988).

The dominant narrative of the formation of Britain’s first business schools underplays the significance of the LSE DBA as a forerunner of the graduate business school (LSEA, 1934). In 1934, Professor Arnold Plant replaced Menken as Director, remaining in post until 1964. Plant integrated the DBA within LSE structures, focusing on delivering an outstanding practical yet theoretically grounded programme delivered by top-tier professionally engaged academics (LSEA, 1935). Besides Plant and Edwards, eminent LSE professors delivering courses included economists Lionel Robbins and Ronald Coase, statistician Arthur Bowley, financial economist F.W. Paish, industrial relations pioneer Henry Phelps Brown, and accountants Harold Edey and W.T. Baxter. Throughout the Plant era, the department remained closely connected with industry, as evidenced by its research and publications, the
Edwards seminars, alumni feedback, student sponsorships, work placements and graduate recruitment by leading companies at home and overseas (LSEA, 1964a; 1064b).

**Manchester University and MCST.** Well before Lord Franks earmarked Manchester as the location for one of Britain’s first business schools, the city was recognized as a centre of excellence for business education. The Victoria University of Manchester based its claim for selection on its track record and that of its affiliate, MCST, which before 1966 delivered sub-degree and degree-level courses. MCST had served since 1905 as Victoria University’s Faculty of Technology and awarded university degrees. Business education in Manchester thus progressed along twin tracks before the early 1960s. On the first track was the Victoria University Faculty of Commerce, founded in 1903 with support from industry (MUA, 1902) to provide ‘training adapted to the needs of those intending to enter business’ to ‘develop talent’ (Chapman, 1907: 598). It offered a flexible programme in ‘higher commercial education’ based on courses in economics, commerce, industrial organization, accounting, banking, law, mathematics, statistics, and languages, leading to the award of a B.Com. (MUA, 1903). Student numbers rose from 40 in 1907 to 160 in 1927 (Smith, 1928) and 287 in 1962 (MUA, 1962). On the second track was the DIA of MCST, founded in 1918 on the initiative of 11 ‘prominent employers’ (MUA, 1919). The DIA conducted research and provided courses for part-time students in ‘industrial management, works organisation, economics, factory law, wage systems, factory costing, business statistics, industrial relations, and industrial organisation’ (MUA, 1938) and offered similar courses within science and engineering degrees (Macfarlane & Ottewill, 2001). In 1928, the DIA launched its full-time graduate programme in industrial administration ‘to provide instruction in the techniques and problems of industrial management’ (MUA, 1938). Students worked inside firms besides attending lectures and debating case studies. A period of rapid growth began in 1945 and by 1952-53, the DIA had a student population of over 1,000, including 96 full-time
postgraduates. DIA Director James Bowie confirmed that its students had little difficulty in finding employment:

‘It has been our experience in Manchester that students do not require to be placed. Through their many contacts with industry, students find their own niches, and few survive unattached to the end of their course to fill the many positions offered by employers.’ (Bowie, 1930: 183)

The accomplishments of Manchester University and MCST do not square with the argument that before the 1960s British universities failed to recognize the value of management education. The Faculty of Commerce and DIA responded to demand by educating large numbers of students and working with professional bodies to embed management within professional training courses. The DIA was responsive to industrial collaboration, running courses for professionals on cost accounting and quality control by statistical methods (MUA, 1942). When, in 1945, regional industrialists asked for instruction in advanced management methods, it established a management forum that ran until 1951, publishing 24 ‘monographs in higher management’ (MUA, 1953). In the early 1960s, the twin tracks along which management education had developed in Manchester merged in anticipation that the time was ripe to create a graduate business school comparable to the best in Europe and the US. The outcome was the formation in 1962 of MANSMA, the Manchester School of Management and Administration, with the goal of ‘launching a business school primarily to encourage the development of senior executives’ (MUA, 1963).

Coalescence (1960-64)

The analysis presented above explains why London and Manchester universities were chosen to host Britain’s first business schools. Each had carried the torch of scientific management for decades, working with industrial partners. When opinion rallied behind the idea of creating business schools in the early 1960s, each university drew strategically on its past to shape the emerging discourse and determine future outcomes.
From a government perspective, progress had been made since 1945 in increasing provision for management education. Even under a Conservative government from 1951, the social imperatives for management and industry continued, affecting the style and content of British management (Larson, 2009; 2020). The emergence of the Cold War began to influence the place of management in Western democracies (Cooke & Kumar, 2020). What is striking is the high level of agreement quickly reached about what Britain must do to improve the quality of its corporate management. A diploma in management studies for aspiring middle managers, delivered part-time through a network of 34 technical colleges, had been instituted in 1949 and revamped in 1961 (PRO, 1962a). This was gaining traction and seen as important in meeting the developmental needs of recent graduates and others at lower managerial levels. In-house courses for graduate management trainees were commonplace and, at a more senior level, the management colleges at Henley and Ashridge attracted considerable numbers to residential courses on topics relating to decision-making and business policy (PRO, 1962b). As a precursor, Henley might have been considered Britain’s first business school were it not for its private status. What was recognized as lacking, however, was ‘an entirely new business school which should set a cap on the body of business teaching … and raise it to a higher level’ (PRO, 1963e).

To the fore in lobbying for greater university involvement in management education was the FME, chaired by J.W. Platt, a former senior executive at Shell. Platt had the backing of influential elites like Lord Chandos, chair of Associated Electrical Industries, and Sir Keith Joseph, lawyer, and chair of construction firm Bovis, who moved seamlessly between the worlds of business, politics, and higher education. The FME had been founded in 1960 by Sir Keith alongside businessman John Bolton, a Harvard MBA graduate with a keen interest in advanced management education, to promote management studies in universities by raising funds from industry to make seed corn grants (PRO, 1962a; Thomas, 1980). Bolton’s drive
and funding served as a catalyst (Wilson, 1992). This gelling of interests was indicative of the seriousness with which the project to build business schools was viewed. It spoke of a new elite solidarity whereby key stakeholders were pulling in the same direction. Platt underlined the need for business to exercise social responsibility:

‘This calls for wisdom and statesmanship in business men [sic] of a new order. They must recognise the responsible place which they occupy in the overall policy of Government… It follows that business must consider its social responsibilities and the part it can play in the better ordering of society’ (PRO, 1962b: 4-5).

Like Franks, Platt served as a lynchpin, connecting sections of the British elite from his base at Shell headquarters (MUA, 1963a). Both emerge as bridging actors, assuming a tertius iungens approach, uniting disconnected others in pursuit of shared competitive advantage (Obstfeld, 2005). Long before the commissioning of the Franks report, the idea of funding higher-level management education as a joint venture between government and business had found favour among progressive members of the governing elite. So strong was the emerging consensus that in January 1963, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Boyd-Carpenter, thought it unnecessary to hold ‘a formal meeting of Ministers’ before commissioning the UGC to devise a ‘concrete scheme for the development of management education’ based on the FME proposal to share costs equally between business and government (PRO, 1963a).

Debate intensified after the publication of the NEDC report in April 1963, urging the creation of at least one graduate school of business. At a dinner held at the Savoy in May hosted by Sir Antony Bowlby of engineering conglomerate GKN, attendees discussed a paper headed ‘A School of Business and Organization’ prepared by Jim Parsons, GKN’s personnel director. This proposed that ‘a first class business school’ must do more than ‘teach accepted business practice’; staff needing ‘to devote 50% of their time to research … to help solve business problems and to provide a better basis for business education in the future.’ Created ‘on the American pattern’, the new graduate business school should be a semi-autonomous
part of a university, located in an industrial region with good transport links. Like motor manufacturer Lord Rootes, he championed the nascent University of Warwick in Coventry as potential host (PRO, 1963b). Parsons’ ideas proved influential, barring his support for Warwick, dismissed as fanciful given the perceived need to locate the new business schools in indisputably elite universities (PRO, 1963c).

The field of power provides opportunities for gatherings of different elites to meet on an equal footing (Bourdieu, 1996). The Savoy dinner in 1963 prompted the formation of a coalition of powerful actors determined to establish Britain’s first business schools. At a meeting in June hosted by Platt and attended by Bowlby and John Marsh, BIM Director, it was agreed that differences should be set aside and a plan developed for ‘two British business schools (… London University? … Manchester University?)’, each offering ‘the full range of business school activity’ (PRO, 1963d). A flurry of consultations ensued with universities, business leaders, and British alumni of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (PRO, 1963e), culminating in a dinner for industrialists in July at Devonshire House hosted by Lord Rootes (PRO, 1963f). The upshot was the invitation one week later for Lord Franks to ‘narrow down the many possibilities’ and produce a ‘defined plan’ to establish ‘one or more Business Schools of the highest quality’ (PRO, 1963g).

Franks, with a personal network spanning business, government, and academia that exemplified the notion of ‘power as network’ (Reed, 2012: 204), was ideally placed to mediate. He considered almost 150 communications from universities and colleges, firms, businesspersons, and representative bodies (Franks, 1963: para. 2). Margaret Wheatcroft, seconded from the NEDO, provided support, drafting a report on US business schools based on interviews. Her findings confirmed the need to provide postgraduate and executive courses in schools of ‘high prestige’ with ‘a very considerable degree of autonomy’ (PRO, 1963h). Of the universities considered by Franks, London and Manchester, given their
locations, reputations, histories, and expertise, stood out as most likely to deliver. This explains the widespread endorsement of the Franks report after its publication in November 1963 (PRO, 1963i), and the swift acceptance by government of Normanbrook’s financial proposals in May 1964 (PRO, 1964a). Elite solidarity had won the day.

**Enactment (1965-68)**

Elite solidarity was equally important in ensuring the swift launch of LBS and MBS at the apex of Britain’s evolving system of management education. Sir Sydney Caine, LSE Director, and co-author of the London University submission to Franks, put the interests of the federal University of London above those of his own academic departments. He closed the DBA and its long-running postgraduate diploma to enable LBS to establish itself free from local competition (LSEA, 1964). Caine and three senior LSE professors identified with the DBA, Edey, Edwards and Yamey, agreed to serve on the LBS council chaired by Lord Plowden (PRO, 1966), ‘another of that very small number of people to whom in those days it was natural to turn’ (Barnes, 1989: 24). The Edwards seminar series moved to LBS, although Edwards declined Plowden’s offer to be its first director (LSEA, 1988). In Manchester, the freedom of MBS to determine its future was protected by Vice-Chancellor Sir William Mansfield Cooper, who resisted attempts to transfer existing staff and courses to the new entity. This meant preventing his own Faculty of Economic and Social Studies from pursuing its ambition, while leaving MCST’s DIA free to chart its own course as part of the newly established University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST) (MUA, 1964a; 1964b). Remaining connected to a former technical college could have proved reputationally damaging for MBS as it sought to emulate Harvard and rival LBS (Owen, 1966). MBS instead became an integral part of the University of Manchester, with its own governing council (PRO, 1967c).
What these early developments signalled was a shared determination to deliver for Britain two graduate business schools comparable to the best in the world. Achieving this goal required the injection of large resources, recruitment of strong teams, and the swift launch of winning courses. Securing financial resources was unproblematic as British business welcomed the idea of co-financing ‘the first large-scale plan in this country for management education’ (PRO, 1964b). Normanbrook estimated that industry should provide at least £2.1 million (£43.52m. in 2020 prices) to meet its share of start-up costs. In the event, £5 million (£103.62m. in 2020 prices) was raised by the end of 1964 (PRO, 1965c). LBS and MBS were effectively gifted the financial means to establish themselves among the first rank of international business schools, with excellent premises and facilities.

A joint panel of UGC and FME representatives supported academic and financial planning, overseeing the appointment of founding directors with strong academic and business credentials. Arthur Earle, who took charge at LBS, had led Hoover’s business in the UK and held a doctorate from the LSE (Barnes, 1989). Grigor McClelland, who had turned his family’s grocery business into a supermarket chain, moved to Manchester from a fellowship at Balliol College (Wilson, 1992). Both prioritized the assembly of well-supported academic teams. This proved less problematic than might have been expected. By September 1966, LBS had a permanent teaching staff of 14, including six professors, seven researchers, librarians, and administrators (PRO, 1966a). MBS had a permanent teaching staff of 14, including three professors, 10 researchers, librarians, and administrators (PRO, 1966b). Tellingly, the academics appointed in this first wave, several already distinguished (R.J. Ball, econometrics; Harold Rose, finance; Ken Simmonds, marketing) and others to become so (Karen Legge, organizational behaviour; Andrew Pettigrew, strategy), were British, suggesting LBS and MBS could draw on a larger pool of talent than commonly supposed.
The Normanbrook report (1964: 2) assumed that LBS and MBS would each ‘provide a one-year course for 200 post-graduate students and two post-experience courses annually, each for 100 students’, making for maximum student populations of 300. No research had been conducted to validate projected demand. British industry and the government were taking a leap of faith, which proved justified due to support from the business community. LBS and MBS launched 12-week residential executive development programmes for middle managers in 1966, with three intakes of about 50 students at MBS and two intakes of over 50 students at LBS (PRO, 1966a; 1966b). That same year LBS launched a 6-week senior executive programme and MBS responded in 1967 by offering a 3-week top management programme. What impresses at both schools is the number of large firms sending delegates, totalling 132 at LBS in 1966 alone (PRO, 1966a). The launch of one-year postgraduate programmes was more problematic, partly because LBS and MBS saw little prospect of rivalling top US schools without conforming to the two-year Master of Business Administration (MBA) norm. LBS won the argument. A meeting of the joint panel in November 1965 agreed that ‘it would not be practicable to resist the London Business School’s considered judgment that the academic requirements called for a 2-year postgraduate course’ (PRO, 1965c). This expressed grudging acceptance of LBS’s position, the distinctiveness of business schools, and their normalization within the system. MBS followed suit with a two-year offering, ‘desperate… to keep up with the Joneses (in the shape of their rivals at London)’, as one observer put it (PRO, 1967b). Robertson (1970: 14) remarks however that the two schools spent more on accommodation than on teaching facilities, such that MBS was obliged to borrow money from the FME. Wilson (1992) notes that MBS struggled to meet its MBA intake target, the market for a two-year MBA proving difficult outside London, pushing MBS towards bespoke courses such as those in banking. Yet claims made in the critical Owen Report (1970), which galvanized anti-business school
Wilson (1992: 31) concludes that, despite initial problems, ‘the character of McClelland’s leadership had led to the design of courses which were generally accepted as being relevant to the needs of management’.

The emergence of LBS and MBS at the apex of the management education pyramid spurred ambitions elsewhere. Franks (1963: para. 43) justified their special treatment because they represented ‘natural foci for … widespread effort’. They thus constituted ‘a major reinforcement at the national level’ in management education designed to dovetail with increased efforts to build up teaching and research elsewhere. The government through the UGC and FME supported numerous initiatives from the cash reserves arising from the 1964 appeal. By 1964, 62 courses were publicly funded in 18 universities, including Birmingham, Lancaster and even Oxford, with further courses offered by commercial and technical colleges (Guerriero Wilson, 2011; PRO, 1965a). The envy the two schools aroused among rival institutions was turned to good effect as those that lost out on selection by Franks intensified their efforts to strengthen management education (PRO, 1966c). By January 1966, plans had been implemented at several institutions. Aston University entered the market via its Small Business Administration Centre. Strathclyde announced the launch of an MBA degree. The MCST DIA, which became part of UMIST, later merged into the new University of Manchester, reinvented itself as a Department of Management Sciences (Torrington, 2002). Lancaster became a hub for operations research, and in 1967, City University launched an MSc in administrative sciences (Williams, 2006). This flurry of activity testified to the robust competitive response to the creation of LBS and MBS.

In short, our data do not corroborate the dominant narrative in portraying a faltering start for Britain’s business schools (Robertson, 1970). Instead, we suggest that the creation of two aspirational business schools in London and Manchester emerged from deep roots to
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this article, we present a contextualized reinterpretation of the formation of Britain’s first business schools informed by extensive archival research. Our research challenges the assumptions that little was happening pre-1960; that the arrival of the ‘Frankies’ constituted a radical break with the past; and that what emerged constituted ‘too little, too late’ (Tomlinson, 1997). Prior research does acknowledge pre-1960 activities (e.g., Larson, 2020; Wilson, 1992). Larson (2020: 161), for example, points to ‘the substantial provision already available in this area’, observing that the needs of Britain’s managers were drawing increasing attention throughout the 1950s. But the narrative which has gained the most traction is that there were ‘few signs yet of the “revolution in management education” attributed to the 1960s’ (Keeble, 1984: 304). It thus becomes hard to understand how LBS and MBS ‘came into being at all’ (Thomas, 1980: 89). We suggest instead that the rise of management education in the UK resulted from an evolutionary process, with business directly involved much earlier than commonly acknowledged (Kadish, 1991; Smith, 1928). The application of elite theory brings a fresh element to this debate. As William Ashley, who founded the University of Birmingham’s Faculty of Commerce, argued in 1903:

‘the leaders in this new movement… aim at nothing less than the education of the future officers of the mercantile and industrial army; of those who will ultimately, as independent manufacturers and merchants, as members of firms, as directors or managers of companies, have to guide business policy, to make decisions, to run risks, to assume responsibility’. (Ashley, 1903: 31)

Earlier we posed the question, how did Britain, apparently from a near standing start, successfully launch LBS and MBS in the 1960s? In answer, we suggest that the new business schools did not constitute a dramatic break with the past. On the contrary, LBS and MBS grew out of fertile soil. As *Business Week* remarked:
‘British management education is by no means the wasteland that might be thought from the feeling of urgency about its improvement. There is a good deal of it, and much of it is high quality’. (PRO, 1963: 84)

Within the University of London, LBS built on the foundations in business administration laid by the LSE, which had sustained a strong academic programme in the field for over three decades (Dahrendorf, 1995). Within the University of Manchester, the long history of management education and research had created capabilities and industrial connections that post-Franks could be exploited at MBS (Smith, 1928; Thomas, 1980). The creation of LBS and MBS and ensuing initiatives marked the realization of what the Rowntree lectures and MRGs had anticipated in the 1920s, the culmination of a long campaign by associated business leaders to bring about a prestigious, effective, university-based system for educating managers (Fay, 1920). The interwar management movement emerges as a vital staging post in the advent of what became a vibrant academic sector, and a key step in the professionalization of management practices (Khurana, 2007; Maclean et al., 2020; Spicer et al., 2021). The rise of Britain’s first business schools thus comprised an evolutionary process rather than a crucible event (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). Casting the formation of Britain’s first business schools in the light of a revolution nevertheless proclaimed a bold new start, promising a bright future. Two new business schools that emulated Harvard and MIT told a good story that served the interests of business schools, business leaders and government alike, more satisfying than one which had been ‘simmering’ for years (Larson, 2020: 161). This may explain why the dominant narrative has lasted so long. One advantage of archives is the opportunity they afford to revisit settled narratives that have become institutionalized. Since the period under study is in the past, ‘the focal events have a future as well as a past’ (Yates, 2014: 274). From the vantage point of the present, we can see that the new schools galvanized a thriving academic sector as others followed suit.
One question that arises is what changed to intensify activity from 1960? We suggest that it was the coalescence of business, political, academic, and administrative elites at the ‘command posts’ of British society that resulted in the crystallization and, crucially, implementation of practical plans (Mills, 1956; Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). This newfound elite solidarity was propelled by a widespread recognition that two business schools might strengthen British competitiveness, allied to a fear of being left behind by the US with its economic, technological, and educational prowess (Tiratsoo, 2004; Tomlinson, 1997). Elites were also energized to come together in defence of their own interests (Maclean & Harvey, 2016). The conjuncture was marked by the rise of Labour and the Soviet Union, prompting fears amongst businesspeople of the advent of a ‘socialist Leviathan’ (Wood, 2000: 446). Together with the birth of the European Economic Community, the fallout from the Suez crisis, and the impact of “stop-go” economic policies, this induced a sense of unease and national urgency (Larson, 2020).

Government enthusiasm for the plans laid by Franks, Normanbrook and others in the field of power proved a game-changer, uniting actors across the political spectrum. Critically, it provided much-needed public funding that, added to the financial backing of industry, saw the plans through to fruition and beyond. Administrative elites and officials from a range of public institutions played a vital role. What this coalescence represents is thus concerted action by elites focused on management education. It resulted from ‘distributed leadership’ by a broad set of actors from different fields (Mehra et al., 2006; Scott, 2008), infused by a sense of urgency and acting in a spirit of social responsibility. The fruits of their collective action were visible not only in the two new business schools but in numerous others that followed in their wake.

We posed a second research question that asked what we might learn from this experience to inform the development of business schools in the future. Our narrative
highlights the role of business schools in terms of the exercise of social and moral responsibility. While conducting this research, we have been struck by the moral responsibility exercised by key players in bringing their plans to fruition. The interwar management movement was informed by a Quaker-inspired principle of corporate responsibility and an ethos of public service (Burton & Turnbull, 2019; Maclean et al., 2022). MRG members believed they had a ‘moral responsibility’ to promote management education in Britain (MRG Governing Body, 1928: 5). When Lord Franks was approached, he was asked to ‘render a signal service’ to the country (PRO, 1963d). In the role of honest broker or tertius iungens (Obstfeld, 2005), Franks (1963: para. 19) reported that universities and business should unite in a spirit of ‘shared responsibility’ in the national interest. Business leaders, politicians and academics were invited to consider their social responsibilities and the collective role they might play in building a better society. Crucially, there was a recognition that university-level management education should be publicly funded, with the involvement of government in the process proving a game-changer.

This suggests that, at the time of our study, the involvement of elites in the formation of Britain’s first business schools was generally positive. Today, however, the concentration of power in the hands of unelected elites is extensive, in Britain and elsewhere (Savage & Williams, 2008). What we have seen is the increasing involvement in myriad domains of a new breed of power broker, connectors who wield influence unobtrusively from ‘multiple moving perches, inside and outside official structures’ (Wedel, 2017: 153). Ideologically driven, sharing a common neo-liberal orientation, these multi-positional actors serve on university councils and business school advisory boards, shaping policy and outcomes (Ball, 2008: Locke & Spender, 2011). The intertwined nature of their activities makes it difficult to discern precisely in whose interests they are operating (Wedel, 2017).
Business schools have privileged private value creation over societal objectives, prompting some commentators to suggest that many of the sector’s pursuits have lost their meaning (Alvesson, Gabriel, & Paulson, 2017). The prioritization of market logics stifles alternative views. Community service, citizenship and an ethic of care are seldom part of the syllabus (Parker, 2018). The relentless pursuit of accreditation and higher global rankings has prompted accusations of a loss of moral compass (Locke & Spender, 2011; Thomas, Thomas, & Wilson, 2012). The lack of a historical perspective in business school curricula is also concerning (Üsdiken et al., 2021). The lessons the Great Depression held for the 2008 financial crisis have been left largely unlearned.

A fundamental assumption of late modernity is that what comes afterwards constitutes progress. Our reinterpretation of the creation of Britain’s first business schools points to the inherent value in what went before. It emphasizes the social value creation that permeated the mission, highlighting the potential of business schools to take meaningful account of societal concerns. The coalescence of actors and interests underlines the need to demonstrate leadership and social responsibility as an integral aspect of the elite equation (Bourdieu, 1996). This entailed reconciling competing interests and adopting a long-term view – something largely absent from the purview of many business schools today. Perhaps the lesson here is that for business schools to change and become more socially responsible, elites need to raise their ambition and commit themselves, in the manner of the ‘committed polity’ advocated by Selznick (1957: 90). Our story hints at a potential future in which, with a public-spirited agenda, ‘business schools can play an important convening role’ as ‘centers for the interdisciplinary understanding of grand challenges’ (Spicer et al., 2021: 463, 464). Yet it also suggests this may be dependent on external economic pressure. Might challenges such as Covid or climate change be enough to ignite this type of change, encouraging elites to ‘enact a responsibility logic’ (Laasch, 2018: 423)? Today’s challenges may be more solvable
if actors exhibit the collective commitment and social responsibility shown during our study period. Research suggests that elites strengthened their positional advantage during the pandemic, underlining the need for management scholars to hold them to account (Bapuji, Patel, Ertug, & Allen, 2020).

Our study has limitations. We have explored the development of Britain’s first business schools since the 1920s, a timescale that coincides with the growth of the interwar management movement and the development of business education at the LSE and Manchester on a serious basis. The roots of management education in Britain run deeper than this. Extending the timeframe of our archival research further back would likely uncover earlier origins than are examined here, and forms an agenda for further research (Edwards, 2009; Kadish, 1991; Williams, 2010); several British universities offering management subjects and B.Com. awards from the 1900s (Ashley, 1903; Smith, 1928). Moreover, in offering a reinterpretation of the formation of Britain’s first business schools, we are mindful that, as Cooke and Alcadipani (2015: 487) observe in this journal, ‘We never can claim a wholly “objective” interpretation of archival data, and recognize even the choice of a particular archive is a reflection of a priori conditions of practical and intellectual possibility’.

Our study makes a methodological contribution to scholarship on management learning and education. Studies on management education that are grounded in archival research are relatively rare in *AMLE*, albeit increasing. Here, we add to studies on the history of management education in business schools informed by extensive archival research (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015; Keeble, 1992; Larson, 2009; 2020; Maclean et al., 2020; Wanderley et al., 2021; Wilson, 1992). More specifically, we make a methodological contribution to the field of management history through the rich analytical process we develop for analysing historical data – entailing sequencing, contextualizing, exploring, and re-interpreting (see Table 2) – which scholars undertaking historical elites studies may find
useful. Taken together, this analytical process generated a narrative that is chronologically ordered, contextually situated, causally explained, and critically (re)interpreted. Our narrative shows that the historical conjuncture was formative of action by elites, enhancing elite cohesion in the public interest. Through rich contextualization, it illuminates the evolutionary nature of the process that led to the foundation of LBS and MBS (antecedents). Consideration of the effects of context elucidates the pressures for the eventual convergence of perspectives on the part of industry and state actors, entailing the resolution of differing views (coalescence). Our study highlights the importance of contextual variables in historical studies, whose effects may inform strategic agency (enactment).

Our narrative enhances understanding of how management education develops deeply embedded in its context. Differing approaches to state and industry interaction explain why management education in Britain was not mimetic of management education elsewhere. While the Anglo-Saxon world is often perceived as monocultural, our study illuminates its inherent variety. As Ashley (1903: 31) wrote, ‘no country has a system to exhibit which other lands can simply copy’. We therefore contribute to research that questions, and complicates, the notion of the US as a unidirectional ‘sender of management knowledge’ (Cooke & Alcadipani, 2015: 484; Cooke & Kumar, 2020; Kumar, 2019; Wanderley & Barros, 2020; Wanderley et al., 2021).

In this article, we offer a contextualized historical reinterpretation of how, through elite interaction in the field of power, Britain’s business schools became the powerful force they are today. While efforts to develop formal management education at university level ostensibly contravened ‘a central elite interest, the maintenance of elite power’ (Thomas, 1980: 101), we show that elite interests, cohesion, and reproduction were better served by broadening the managerial base on which business could draw, to embrace managers that were ‘made’ and not just ‘born’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). The dynamics of elite power
had shifted due to changing competitive environments and an interventionist socialist agenda (Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, 1993). Reconciling the competing interests of business, political, university, and administrative elites made sense for elites themselves. The expansion of management education by its admission into mainstream universities bolstered the exercise of power by elites at a time when this was under threat from the seizure of entire industries. Considered thus, expanding management education emerges not just as an exercise in social responsibility by elites but also as a form of resistance (Scott, 1990). Counter-intuitively, it implied the ‘rejuvenation of elite production systems’ (Clegg et al., 2006: 356), altering the dynamics of power in a way that ensured elites remained on top. Hegemonic positions were reinforced by acting in a socially responsible manner in the national interest, reasserting the ‘right to manage’ through the validation of an elite which, in disinterested fashion, sought to admit others into its fold (Palmer & Barber, 2001). Our theoretical contribution is valuable because it reveals the emergent post-war managerial elite growing into something altogether more powerful. When we ignore the influence of elites in the development of business education, we miss an important sign or portend of the expanded role they have gone on to assume in society, heralding the advent of ‘influence elites’ in the field of power today (Wedel, 2017).

The story of the creation of Britain’s first business schools has never been told before from the perspective of elite agency. We show that, while the story of the creation of Britain’s first business schools is ostensibly one of transformation, closer inspection reveals it as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Our primary contribution to theory is to demonstrate that, while expanding management education ostensibly contravened elite interests, concerted action by elites in the field of power at a time of national urgency amplified elite influence, presaging their role as ‘influence elites’ today.
REFERENCES

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LSEA 1929b. Letter to press on proposed business administration department, 22 March. File REGISTRY/196/A.

LSEA 1930a. Report of the organising committee of the department of business administration, April. File REGISTRY/196/B.

LSEA 1930b. Memorandum on appointments in department of business administration, July. File REGISTRY/196/B.

LSEA 1933. DBA brochure 1933/34. File REGISTRY/196/E.


LSEA 1935. Memorandum on the DBA by Arnold Plant. REGISTRY/196/F.


LSEA 1964a. DBA course statistics and student profiles 1931-64. File PLANT/1/38.

LSEA 1964b. Note on the future of the DBA course by Arnold Plant. File PLANT/1/47.

LSEA 1964c. Letter from Sydney Caine with enclosures to Arnold Plant, 12 October. File PLANT/1/47.


MRG. 1938. Some members’ testimony to the practical utility of the management research group idea.

MUA [Manchester University Archives] 1902. Proposed Faculty of Commerce in the University of Manchester, 1 December. File FES/10.

MUA 1903. Prospectus of courses in higher commercial education session 1903/04. File FES/10.

MUA 1919. Circular letter to Manchester firms from Director, DIA, Dr Stanley Kent, 30 June. File TSM/3/2/1.


MUA 1942. Reports on short courses on cost accountancy and quality control by Dr K.G. Fenelon. File TSM/3/2/1.


MUA 1951. Report by Director, DIA. File TSM/3/1.


PRO 1965c. Minutes of joint panel, 30 November. File UGC7/156.


PRO 1967a. Brief for Minister of State’s visit to MBS on 27 February. File ED 188/162.


## TABLE 1
Documents Gathered from Archives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>United Kingdom National Archives (1960-68)</th>
<th>London School of Economics Archives (1903-68)</th>
<th>Manchester University Archives (1903-68)</th>
<th>Corpus (1903-68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidential Reports</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing Notes, Plans &amp; Memoranda</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes &amp; Notes of Meetings</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published Reports &amp; Brochures*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Statements &amp; Press Releases</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Cuttings &amp; Miscellany**</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Documents</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>405</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Includes course advertising brochures. **Includes examination papers, seminar papers, press cuttings, student and staff lists.

## TABLE 2
Analytical Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequecing</td>
<td>Establishing chronology and relative significance of events, adopting a ‘temporal bracketing’ strategy</td>
<td>Chronologically ordered narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextualizing</td>
<td>Locating events in their situated context(s), attentive to historical context and temporal embeddedness</td>
<td>Contextually situated narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring</td>
<td>Seeking causal connections between actors, actions, events and outcomes, using a ‘history as narrating’ approach</td>
<td>Causally explained narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Re)interpreting</td>
<td>Uncovering meaning by critically interrogating a specific case, highlighting the effects of historical context on actors’ agency</td>
<td>Critically (re)interpreted narrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
TABLE 3
Temporal Bracketing: Data, Themes and Core Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrative Quotations</th>
<th>Emergent Themes</th>
<th>Core Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• To develop education in and training for the task of business management and to secure its progressive recognition as a skilled profession with accepted standards of proficiency and conduct (MRG, 1929: 5).</td>
<td>Promoting management education</td>
<td>Antecedents (pre-1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The primary object of the Department [of Business Administration] was the training of selected men and women for responsible posts in business (LSEA, 1935: 3).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bridging different worlds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reference is made from time to time to the practical steps many of the Groups have taken to keep in touch with University Departments teaching management (MRG, 1930: 19).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Building critical partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Department [of Business Administration] was begun by cooperation between a business committee and a university institution in the first instance as an experiment from the point of view of both parties. Experience has shown that the experiment meets a real need and should be continued (LSEA, 1935: 6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalescence (1960-64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• John Marsh [chair of BIM] seems to think our role comes later – in bringing industry, educationists and possibly Ministries together. He is to ascertain what industry wants and to bring the various industrial factions together (PRO, 1963c).</td>
<td>Building critical partnerships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• They wish to emphasise the great importance which they attached to the idea of a partnership between Government and industry in this field and to the acceptance by both sides of a 50/50 sharing of the costs (PRO, 1964b).</td>
<td>Emulating US models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• We have a great deal to learn from the successful practices of the leading American Business Schools… But…it is impossible to select any one American Business School and transplant it (Franks, 1963: para. 8).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emulating US models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is a need in this country for at least one very high level new school or institute somewhat on the lines of the Harvard Business School or the School of Industrial Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (PRO, 1964c).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mr McClelland said at Oxford yesterday that the setting up of the business school was of great long-term importance to the economy of the country: “It is quite essential if we are to regain a fully competitive position in international trade”, he added (The Times, 1965).</td>
<td>Enhancing national competitiveness</td>
<td>Enactment (1965-68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is desirable for the British economy that the products of the business schools should be men who will reach senior management positions sooner rather than later (PRO, 1967).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why is it not possible to direct this School to the North or East, from where it could serve that area and Scotland, as well as the rest of the country, more effectively (PRO, 1965b).</td>
<td>Encouraging competitive responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• They are the British equivalent of such American institutions as the Harvard Business School, and are intended to form the apex of business management education in this country (PRO, 1967a).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
TABLE 4
Periods, Sources and References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods and Landmarks</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
<th>Illustrative References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antecedents (pre-1960):</strong></td>
<td>An evolutionary process leads to foundation of LBS and MBS. In 1920s, interwar</td>
<td>Documents from LSE Archives (LSEA) from Department of Business Administration (1928-65) and papers of Sir Arnold Plant. Documents from Manchester University Archives (MUA) from Department of Industrial Administration (DIA) (1919-65) of MCST and University’s Faculty of Economic and Social Studies (1903-68). For interwar management movement, documents from Borthwick Institute for Archives and LSEA [<a href="http://rowntree.exeter.ac.uk/">http://rowntree.exeter.ac.uk/</a>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalescence (1960-64):</strong></td>
<td>In 1963, Lord Franks invited to introduce elite graduate business schools to Britain. In 1964, Lord Normanbrook chairs working party to agree funding, governance, curricular and staffing issues. Elite interaction by state and industry actors leads to eventual resolution of differing views and coalescence of practical plans.</td>
<td>Documents from LSEA. Documents from UK Public Record Office (PRO) from Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour, National Economic Development Office (NEDO), and University Grants Committee (UGC). Documents from MUA from DIA of MCST and University’s Faculty of Economic and Social Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enactment (1965-68):</strong></td>
<td>Britain’s flagship business schools, LBS and MBS, open in 1965. This marks the</td>
<td>Documents from LSEA. Documents from UK PRO from Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour, NEDO, and UGC. Documents from MUA pertaining to University’s Faculty of Economic and Social Studies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
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### Appendix 1: List of Organizations Featured*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Staff College</td>
<td>Private post-experience college established at Henley in 1947.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP)</td>
<td>Anglo-American Council focused on increasing the productivity of British firms (1948-1952).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashridge Management College</td>
<td>Private post-experience college established at Berkhamsted in 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Electrical Industries (AEI)</td>
<td>British holding company founded in 1928 through merger of electrical engineering companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bovis</td>
<td>British construction company, whose origins lay in early post-war housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Institute of Management (BIM)</td>
<td>Founded in 1947 to promote management education. Merged with Institute of Industrial Administration in 1957.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Xylonite</td>
<td>British engineering company established in 1877 by Daniel Spill, based in East London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadburys</td>
<td>British confectionary company founded by Quaker John Cadbury in Birmingham in 1824.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire House</td>
<td>Office building located in Piccadilly, London, UK headquarters of automobile manufacturer The Rootes Group from 1936 until the 1960s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunlop Rubber</td>
<td>British multinational company founded in 1889 producing rubber goods, especially tyres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of British Industries (FBI)</td>
<td>British employers’ association founded in 1916.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Management Education (FME)</td>
<td>Founded in 1960, was instrumental in helping to raise funds to establish Britain’s first business schools and others that followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest, Keen &amp; Nettlefolds (GKN)</td>
<td>British engineering business founded in 1902.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Her Majesty’s Treasury</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Treasury (the Exchequer), responsible for executing the British government’s public finance policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Business School (HBS)</td>
<td>Graduate business school of Harvard University, located in Boston, Massachusetts, founded in 1908.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoover</td>
<td>US home appliance company with major base in UK, best known for producing vacuum cleaners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)</td>
<td>British chemical company formed in 1926 from four chemical companies, headquartered in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution of Electrical Engineers</td>
<td>Independent professional association representing electrical engineers founded in 1871 and based in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution of Mechanical Engineers</td>
<td>Independent professional association representing mechanical engineers founded in 1847 and based in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Government</td>
<td>Labour Government (1945-1951), responsible for expanding the public sector by nationalising industries, including public utilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London School of Economics (LSE)</td>
<td>The London School of Economics and Political Science, founded in 1895, becoming a college of the University of London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London School of Economics Department of Business Administration (DBA)</td>
<td>Financed by corporate subscriptions to conduct research and offer high-level training in business administration. Began recruiting in 1931 and active until 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Business School (LBS)</td>
<td>Prestigious business school awarding post-graduate degrees, founded in 1964 as a college of the University of London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Research Groups (MRGs)</td>
<td>Launched in 1926-27, brought together managers to find solutions to common problems through data sharing, site visits, and identification of best practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Business School (MBS)</td>
<td>Prestigious business school located in Manchester, founded in 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester College of Science and Technology (MCST)</td>
<td>Served from 1905 as Victoria University’s Faculty of Technology, awarding degrees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester College of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial Administration (DIA)</td>
<td>Founded in 1918, the DIA conducted research and provided courses for part-time students. Launched its full-time programme in industrial administration in 1928.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester School of Management and Administration (MANSMA)</td>
<td>Formed in 1962 as a joint venture between The University of Manchester Faculty of Economic and Social Studies and the Department of Industrial Administration of the Manchester College of Science and Technology. It had the goal of providing courses for existing and future senior executives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester University Faculty of Economic and Social Studies</td>
<td>Began as The University of Manchester Faculty of Commerce in 1903 with financial support from local firms. It offered a Bachelor of Commerce degree and short courses for firms, including railway company employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)</td>
<td>Private research university located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, founded in 1861.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>British government department responsible for education, including schools, higher and further education policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>British government department established in 1916, which in the 1920s assumed responsibility for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Development Council (NEDC)</td>
<td>Economic planning forum set up by British government to improve national competitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Development Office (NEDO)</td>
<td>Office set up to support the work of the NEDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowntree Lecture Conferences</td>
<td>Series of lectures (1919-1939) initiated by Quaker industrialist Seebohm Rowntree to enable employers and employees to explore challenges confronting industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand/Institution</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>Britain’s first luxury hotel, which opened in 1889, famous for attracting rich and powerful guests and diners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfridges</td>
<td>Department store on Oxford Street, London, established by Harry Gordon Selfridge in 1908, now part of Selfridges Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch multinational oil and gas company founded in 1907.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Public Record Office</td>
<td>Guardian of the UK national archives based in London (1838-2003), now part of The National Archives based in Kew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Grants Committee (UGC)</td>
<td>Advisory committee of British government, advising on distribution of grant funding among UK universities (1919-1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Manchester</td>
<td>Public research university located in Manchester, formed in 2004 through the merger of the Victoria University of Manchester and the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST)</td>
<td>College of science and technology in Manchester founded in 1824 that became an independent university in 1965, merging in 2004 with the Victoria University of Manchester to form the University of Manchester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria University of Manchester</td>
<td>Founded in 1851 as Owens College, became Victoria University in 1880 and renamed in 1904 as the Victoria University of Manchester. It merged with UMIST in 2004 to form the University of Manchester.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes universities and colleges, with the exception of those central to our narrative.*