
**Abstract**

We analyse how men incarcerated in Helsinki Prison managed through talk their stigmatized identities as prisoners. Three strategies are identified: ‘appropriation’ of the label ‘prisoner’; claiming coveted social identities; and representing oneself as a ‘good’ person. The research contribution we make is to show how inmates dealt with their self-defined stigmatized identities through discourse, and how these strategies were effects of power. We argue that stigmatized identities are best theorized in relation to individuals’ repertoires of other (non-stigmatized) identities which they may draw on to make supportive self-claims. Prisoners, like other kinds of organizational participants, we argue, have often considerable scope for managing diverse, fragile, perhaps even contradictory, understandings of their selves.

**Keywords**

Stigma, identity, identity work, discourse, prisons, prisoners, power
Introduction

This paper analyses how inmates in Helsinki Prison managed actively through talk their stigmatized ‘prisoner’ identities. A stigma is understood generally as ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ and which reduces an individual ‘from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman, 1963: 3). A stigmatized identity is an effect of power and can marginalize an individual resulting in that person being disqualified from full societal acceptance. Stigmatized individuals and groups are, nevertheless, able often to cultivate alternative positive conceptions of their selves, and to enact self-serving impression management tactics, which accommodate, mitigate, transmute, deflect, defend and contest understandings of their selves. Referred to as identity work, this perspective depicts people as ‘intelligent strategist[s]’ (Giddens, 1994: 7) who reflexively create, repair and discard identities in continuing efforts to maintain self-esteem and secure social support (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003; Watson, 2008). This scope for identity work is apparent even in alien and austere environments such as penal institutions, where the requirements for formal organizational order may conflict with the raw exigencies of ontological survival.

Our study draws on and contributes to the literatures on one particular kind of identity work, stigma management (Goffman, 1963), and more broadly to understanding of how people respond to identity threats (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999; Breakwell, 1983; Gabriel, Gray, and Goregaokar, 2010; Learmonth and Humphreys, 2012; Petriglieri, 2011). In so doing, we analyse some of the ‘discursive antagonisms’ that Clarke, Brown and Hope-Hailey (2009) suggest may characterize people’s identity narratives, and which render an individual ‘a struggling, thinking, feeling, suffering subject’ (Gabriel, 1999a: 179). This research is aligned with theorizing which eschews the ‘positivist roots’ of much academic criminology and aspires to counteract the ““eclipse”” of qualitative prison research’ (Jewkes, 2011: 63) and the
cold, calculated and surgical prison studies that it often produces (Bosworth, et al., 2005: 259; cf. Crewe, 2007; Rowe, 2011; Ugelvik, 2012). In contrast with traditional theorizing, which portrays stigmatized people as passive victims of prejudice and discrimination; we argue that they are co-constructors of social outcomes. Our investigation is also of value because, as Paetzold, Dipboye and Elsbach (2008: 186) note, ‘There has been a relative neglect…of research on stigmatization in organizational…settings’. In order to analyse how a community of inmates understand and manage their stigmatized status, we focus in particular on how they socially constructed and sustained their realities through use of language ‘as a representational technology’ (Chia and King, 2001: 312).

The research contribution this paper makes is threefold. First, much stigma research has been criticised for ‘neglecting the stigmatized person’s viewpoint’ (Yang et al., 2006: 1525; for exceptions see Cohen and Taylor, 1992; Rowe, 2011) and prioritizing theory and research technique rather than the perceptions of people. Our study contributes by focusing specifically on prisoners’ talk about their stigmatized selves, and their efforts to shape deviant identity outcomes, in a Nordic context. Second, the literature on stigma management concentrates generally on how stigmatized people minimize the social costs of their stigma in relation to others; our study is concerned also with how prisoners dealt with their self-defined stigmatized status for their own satisfaction. Third, current theorizing is dominated by functionalist frames; we contribute by analysing how prisoners’ management of their stigmatized identities was disciplined by discursive practices, constituting them as effects of power (Foucault, 1977). Moreover, this study is important because stigma, fundamentally, is an all too common human observation that seeks to communicate and justify negative responses to perceived difference: stigmatizing and being stigmatized are an unavoidable,
cross-cultural, ‘universal phenomenon, a shared existential experience’ (Yang et al., 2006: 1528) that requires sustained research.

**Identities, Stigma, and Identity Work**

Identities are available subjectively to individuals in the form of self-narratives (Giddens, 1991) which they ‘work on’ through internal soliloquies (Athens 1994) and interactions with others (Beech, 2011). These identities are constituted within, and derived from, discursive regimes which provide materials and opportunities for individuals and groups to author reflexively accounts of their selves. Our concern is how prisoners manoeuvre actively in relation to the discourses available to them, i.e. engage in identity work. Identity work refers to ‘the mutually constitutive processes whereby people strive to shape a relatively coherent and distinctive notion of personal self-identity’ (Watson, 2008a: 129; cf. Snow and Anderson 1987; Svenningson and Alvesson, 2003). Seeking to realize their aspirational selves (Thornborrow and Brown, 2009), people in organizations draw on available discourses in continuing experiments with ‘possible’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986), ‘potential’ (Gergen, 1972), ‘provisional’ (Ibarra, 1999) and ‘alternate’ (Obodaru, 2012) etc. identities. However, penal institutions are not (usually) voluntarily entered by inmates, may restrict their scope to work on and to realize desired selves, and, for some, function to construct stigmatized identities *qua* prisoners (Cohen and Taylor, 1992; Rowe, 2011; Sykes, 1958; Ugelvik, 2012). Identity work in such environments is, thus, an especially precarious process that is (potentially) laden with insecurities and self-doubts (Collinson, 2003).

A stigma is any perceived physical, social or personal quality that leads a social group to regard those characterized by it as having tainted, inferior or discredited identities (Goffman, 1963). Some social psychological theorizing individualizes stigma, regarding it as an ‘attribute’ (Goffman, 1963) or ‘mark’ (Jones et al., 1984) which defines an individual as
deviant and his/her identity as flawed or spoiled, engulfing them totally. Most theorists, however, recognize that stigma is context dependent, and that it results from processes of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, which are profoundly social. Much ethnographic thinking accounts for the development of stigmatized identities through individuals’ ‘moral careers’ in which people learn to apply societal perspectives in their local worlds (Goffman, 1963). Scheff (1966) suggests that stigmatized identities are produced through processes of labelling, whereby discrediting labels, interpreted continuously through language and symbols, come to assume ‘master status’ (Markowitz, 2005). Anthropological and sociological approaches focus on how systemic discriminatory practices, both incidental and intentional, are incorporated into and perpetuated at micro (personal social interactions), meso (organizational and institutional procedures and strategies) and macro (cultural norms, industry practices and Government policies) levels (Link and Phelan, 2001). Such work recognizes also that the construction and experience of stigma are constituted differently across social contexts and can shift over time through the dynamic interactions of discourses.

Overwhelmingly, stigma theorists have attended to interactional processes of stigma management, i.e. the attempts made by those with putatively stigmatized identities to mitigate the social and psychological costs of their notional stigmas (Slay and Smith, 2011). Rather than accept passively demeaned identities attributed to them by others, studies demonstrate consistently that stigmatized individuals ranging from illiterate consumers (Adkins and Ozanne, 2004) to Gulf War veterans (Shriver and Waskul, 2006) work actively to manage their conceptions of self. A considerable number of stigma management strategies have been identified, including feigning normalcy, dissociating from stigmatized identities, retreating from society, restricting interaction with the non-stigmatized, managing information disclosure to prevent being disqualified from normal social roles, and creating self-affirming
spaces where people can associate selectively with those who accept them (Anspach, 1979; Snow and Anderson, 1987). Our study is most closely aligned with research which focuses on the construction of positive personal identities through talk (Snow and Anderson, 1987), though we recognize that in most instances, individuals interweave multiple stigma management strategies and tactics as they negotiate and adjust to the complex demands of managing a deviant identity in on-going social situations.

Dominant functionalist perspectives on stigma and identity, which suggest that stigmatization is a beneficial process which enforces social control, ignore or gloss over the extent to which stigmatization and stigma management are implicated in forms of established knowledge which constitute relations of power (Foucault, 1977). Stigmatized identities are, at least in part, effects of disciplinary processes – surveillance, categorization, normalization, and correction – which fabricate individuals as subjects and reproduce social order through the regulation of conduct. Such identities are construed also through technologies of the self – such as ‘examination’ and ‘confession’ – by which individuals’ author their selves in terms made available by disciplinary practices ‘in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault, 1988: 18). Yet, as agency is inherent in the regulation of meaning (Clegg, 1975) and as Foucault suggests in his later work, individuals may both engage in micro-processes of resistance and discover their selves as responsible beings who choose to enjoin disciplinary practices to realize desire. Thus may stigmatized identities be embraced, rejected, appropriated, modified and adapted by reflexive, responsible people concerned to ‘shift the limits that define who they are’ (Thornborrow and Brown, 2009: 359).
There is a considerable literature on inmates’ identities, some of which is concerned with their stigmatization, though most of these studies are of the stigma that attaches to ex-convicts rather than serving prisoners (Foucault, 1977; LeBel, 2012; Opsal, 2011; Rowe, 2011). One dominant strand of Western societal stories position prisoners and ex-prisoners as irredeemable, as people who are always and necessarily different from ‘us’, and therefore culpable, and suspect (LeBel, 2012; Opsal, 2011). For their part, prisoners’ sense of their stigmatized status is sealed by formal degradation ceremonies such as court proceedings and convictions. These are followed, as Goffman (1961: 24) has observed, by a ‘series of abasements, humiliations and profanations of self’ such that the prisoner’s ‘self is systematically, if unintentionally, mortified’. Inmates’ spoiled identities are then generally reinforced on a quotidian basis by prison regimes that pattern rigidly their everyday activities, and coerce them into ‘toxic’ relationships with other prisoners and guards (Sykes, 1958; Ugelvik, 2012). Prisoners are stereotyped frequently as ‘generically criminal’ by prison staff their encounters with whom are structured by forms of ‘systemic’ power and regime positionings of them - via sentence plans, psychologists’ reports and disciplinary records - which render them uncomfortably visible, examinable and ‘correctable’ (Foucault, 1977).

In these circumstances, prisoners have continuously to work on ‘how to accommodate to prison life’ and decide the ways in which they should ‘resist or yield to its demands in order to make life bearable, in order to preserve some sense of identity’ (Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 34). Although the sociological and penological literatures are suffused with identity issues, and the context of prison itself presents a prism through which we may study the effects of continuous and insistent stigmatization, there are surprisingly few studies of prisoners’ stigma-management strategies. One exception is Opsal (2011) who shows that women inmates work on socially valued versions of their selves by refusing to accept stigma,
neutralizing techniques such as condemning their condemners, insisting that they have become ‘different’ people, and emphasizing culturally coveted social identities (such as ‘mother’). Other research suggests that although some convicts deny their stigma (Benson, 1985) others relish their label, and may regard their inmate status as a badge of honour (Yablonsky, 2000). This said, while it is clear that prisoners are, to an extent, active authors of their identity stories, able to deploy multiple discourses centred on, for example, educational attainment and material possession to embrace or combat stigma, the specific modes of talk by which they articulate status, and emphasize the significance or unimportance of their incarceration are under-explored.

To summarize, our primary concern is with prisoners’ stigma-management identity work. Our analysis draws on Foucault’s conception of power as positive, productive, exercised and existing in action: through power individuals are transformed into subjects ‘who secure their sense of what it is to be “worthy” and “competent” human beings through the social practices that it creates or sustains’ (Knights and Morgan, 1991: 269). We also explore stigmatized identities in relation to theorizing which suggests that organization-based individual identities are multiple, antagonistic and fragile. This study is important in the context that while rich interpretive ‘explorations…best reveal the prison’s social contours’ (Crewe, 2007: 144), yet this genre is ‘not merely an endangered species but a virtually extinct one’ (Wacquant, 2002: 385; cf. Phillips and Earle, 2010; Ugelvik, 2012).

**Research Design**

The aim of this interpretive study was to produce an in-depth account of the daily lives of prisoners in Helsinki Prison, Finland. While the identities of correctional officers have attracted recent attention (e.g. Lemmergaard and Muhr, 2012; Tracy and Scott, 2006; Tracy,
Myers and Scott, 2006), inmates’ identities have received relatively little interest from scholars in management and organization studies\textsuperscript{ii}. There are, though, at least three main grounds for focusing on prisoners. First, as prison populations worldwide increase (Garland, 2001), there is a concomitant need to understand the ever-more common experience of incarceration. Second, as Foucault (1977) recognized explicitly, there are evident parallels between prisons and other institutions - such as factories, schools and hospitals - making findings from penal institutions relevant to a broad category of organizations. Third, prisons are systems of near ‘total power’ (Sykes, 1958: xvi) permitting unique insights into contemporary processes of alienation and depersonalization and their implications for individuals’ identity work\textsuperscript{iii}. As Crewe (2007: 123) observes, in prisons ‘the consequences of power and powerlessness are...vividly manifested’. More generally, we note that most attention has been focused on US ‘super max’ prisons which function merely to contain prisoners, and that there is a continuing need for the investigation of other prison systems, especially those, such as Nordic penal institutions, which emphasize prisoner rehabilitation (Pratt, 2008a,b)\textsuperscript{iv}.

\textit{Context.} Built in phases from 1874 onwards, Helsinki Prison is the oldest ‘high-security’ prison in Finland, and according to its prisoners, the ‘harshest’. To prevent organised crime and gang violence, during the 1990s the prison had undergone a series of changes in its security measures. This resulted in the partitioning of the previously open ‘general population’ into 12 closed cellblocks (located in four main three-storey wings). These cellblocks housed approximately 320 male inmates, most of them serving long-term sentences for serious violent and drug related crimes. The occupants of the blocks had little or no contact with one another at any time. The ten acre compound in which the prison was located contained a number of ancillary facilities, guard towers and staff dwellings, and was
surrounded by a high wall. The prison staff comprised of a warden and three deputy wardens, 125 security officers, and 58 support staff (e.g. mental health professionals, medical staff, social workers, cooks etc.). Despite its tough reputation among prisoners, the Finnish penal system is based on an ideology of ‘humane neoclassicism’, very different from the retributive philosophy of many US regimes, and stresses ‘both legal safeguards against coercive care and the goal of less repressive measures in general’ (Ikponwosa, 2006: 387). According to the Finnish Sentences Enforcement Act (1974: 612), inmates are to be subjected to no other punishment than the loss of freedom, rehabilitation services are to be made available to those who want them, and prisoners are to be treated in a just and dignified manner.

_Data collection._ To gain access to Helsinki Prison, the primary researcher approached the Criminal Sanctions Agency (CSA), a subdivision of the Ministry of Justice that has responsibility for the enforcement of sentences in Finland. Once a research permit was granted by the CSA, and preliminary discussions were held with the deputy warden in charge of operations, interviewees were then recruited by posting advertisements on prison noticeboards. The advertisement described the project as a sociological study focusing on the daily lives and viewpoints of prisoners. Once a convenient batch of prisoners volunteered, the researcher compiled a schedule with (generally) no more than one interview session per weekday. The interviews were conducted in the administrative section of the ‘staff’ building, with each prisoner individually escorted by a guard who then left the room. Based on voluntary participation, our sample was, inevitably, one of convenience, though we have no grounds to believe that it was unrepresentative in any significant respect. It appeared that many of the interviewees had signed-up for this project out of sheer boredom with their daily routines, while others seemed to be driven by a need to share their personal concerns with somebody willing to listen.
All the data were collected, transcribed and translated by the primary researcher, a native Finnish/English speaker (and co-author of this paper). Over the course of 12 months (June 2009 to June 2010), 44 audio-recorded semi-structured interviews were conducted, ranging between 60 and 120 minutes in length, with a median duration of 90 minutes. Finnish language transcripts were produced within two days with translation into English language transcripts immediately afterwards. The interviews were open-ended ‘conversations’ with “embedded questions” (Fetterman, 1989: 49) phrased in colloquial Finnish. Interviews began with broad questions about prisoners’ daily lives, activities and thoughts, and these were followed by invitations for inmates to elaborate further on what the researcher considered interesting emergent themes. Additional data were collected in the form of official documentation about the Finnish penal system. Our main sources were the research commissioned and published by the CSA and the literatures available in the Finnish National Library of Criminology. In addition to interview sessions, several site ‘tours’ were made through the prison compound, taking in the various facilities and prisoners’ living quarters. Though always accompanied by a security officer, the researcher was allowed to engage with prisoners, conduct brief ‘in situ interviews’, and also to take photographs of the physical setting.

Interpretive research of this kind ‘…is a means of self-discovery’ (Humphreys, Brown, and Hatch, 2003: 7) in which the hopes, fears, personalities, past experiences and prejudices of scholars are crucially implicated. It is important to appreciate that the primary researcher was a relatively young male with no prior experience of being in a prison, and who found data collection at times both exhilarating and frightening. Initially, to broker his anxieties he met with the prison psychologist, who was also the institution’s appointed key liaison officer.
for the project. While this was useful, it remained the case that each interview was extraordinarily emotionally draining. The inmates placed great importance on ‘authenticity’, and when on prison premises he felt under surveillance by prisoners: always under suspicion, continuously assessed, and subject to their judgement. Dressed in casual clothes, sporting visible tattoos, and with a demeanour honed in the ‘rough’ East-Helsinki district of the city where he had spent much of his youth, he was, he thought, to a certain extent, able to present an ‘acceptable’ face to interviewees. During the conversations he sought to forge common bonds, not least by enacting the roles of empathetic social worker and vocal ally against ‘the system’. Yet the inmates ‘us versus them’ attitudes toward those whom they perceived to be authority figures, and his outsider status, meant generally that there was a ‘feel-able distance’ between him and the men; and as a result he found himself always anxious and vigilant regarding his conduct and safety.

Data analysis. Predicated on an understanding that discourse is a primary means by which worlds are constructed and power exercised (Fairclough, 1989), our data were analysed using a form of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) which involved the inductive generation of coded categories. Substantial numbers of diverse codes were ‘discovered’ in the data which were then variously linked, refined, coalesced and discarded over several months as we circled back and forth between the data and concepts from the literature. In so doing, our focus was on the sense that inmates made of their selves, and in particular how they constructed and dealt with their identities as stigmatized individuals. Ultimately, three specific discursive means by which prisoners managed their self-construed stigmatized identities emerged: appropriation (forms of redefinition) of the label ‘prisoner’; connecting to socially valued roles; and emphasizing that they were not just criminals but ‘good’ people. While our procedures were relatively systematic we acknowledge that our project was ‘driven
by personal curiosity’ (Jewkes, 2011: 64; Humphreys, 2005), that the choices we have made ‘reflect our (doubtless idiosyncratic) preferences’ (Brown and Lewis, 2011: 877), and that the account we offer is a compromise that symptomizes the ‘crises of representation and legitimation’ faced by qualitative researchers seeking to story the experiences and opinions of others (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 576).

**Constructing and managing stigmatized identities**

We present our data in four sub-sections. First, we establish that most inmates regarded their identities *qua* ‘prisoners’ as stigmatized. Second, we examine how the men ‘appropriated’ their prisoner identities and redefined them so as to maintain that they were different from other inmates, to reject the label ‘prisoner’, and/or to emphasize the benefits of being incarcerated. Third, we investigate how the men attempted to connect with an array of societally valorized identities as friends, potentially future productive workers, and as family members. Fourth, we discuss how our interviewees sought to author versions of their selves as ‘good’ people who were capable of moral development.

**Stigmatized Identities**

In general, the inmates constructed their selves as possessing stigmatized identities, by virtue of being serving prisoners, drawing on societal, prison and familial discourses. Perceptions of stigma vary by degrees, and it was clear that, for some, recognition of their stigmatized status was sufficiently intense (arguably) to be intra-psychically problematic. This is consonant with other research, which suggests that the reflection of ‘prisoner’ and ‘criminal’ identities by the ‘looking glass’ (Cooley, 1902) of institutions can be ‘particularly painful’ (Rowe, 2011: 580), a challenge to manage emotionally (Greer 2002), and may even lead to psychological breakdown (Toch 2009):
‘It doesn’t feel good at all… it really does get on your nerves… as they say, it eats you up inside like a rat’ (Peter).

The men recognized that societal views on convicted felons were typically negative:

‘We’re just inmates. Scum of society’ (Marko).

‘…you get labeled by normal people pretty easily… They’ll look at you in a different way if they know that you have been to prison…and you notice how their attitudes change immediately’ (Jukka).

On a quotidian basis, they said, their devalued identities were maintained and reinforced through their interactions with prison guards who derided and infantilized them. Prisoners complained that they were subject to ridicule by the guards who laughed at their problems, refused to explain decisions, and were disrespectful and hypocritical in their dealings with them:

‘They treat us like cattle in here. They’ll go into their guard booths laughing at us, making fun of our illnesses and problems…. We’re animals and they are above us, that’s how it is’ (Erik).

Moreover, their experience of prison with what inmates described as rigid and highly restrictive routines, poor quality institutional food, substandard healthcare, and arbitrarily applied rules, conspired to buttress and sustain devalued identities:

‘…every time they lock a door behind you, they step on you…. every time they lock you up and even if you don’t think about it, it leaves a mark in your subconscious’ (Tommy).

Perhaps most crushingly, prisoners’ stigmatized identities were also constructed in relation to their friends and family members, who, for example, sometimes voiced shame to be related to a felon or shunned them:

‘She’s [mother] ashamed and won’t accept that I’m in a place like this, not even after so many times… She’ll bring money to the gate [administrative office] but she won’t see me’ (Sergei).

These findings resonate with other research which has described prisoners’ stigmatized identities as effects of power formed at the intersection of ‘institutional interests in formal order’ and inmates’ preoccupations with their selves and in particular their lowly position
(Phillips and Earle, 2010: 364; cf. Sykes, 1958). Being ascribed ‘prisoner’ status was generally, in our case, accompanied by knowledge that society, prison officials, friends and family now saw them as ‘one of them’, not just a criminal but an ‘immoral other’, who in addition served as a ‘contrast agent’ helping to construct those outside the prison walls as normal, decent people (Becker, 1973; Ugelvik, 2012: 264). Such self-understandings were reinforced more–or-less consistently and continuously by relations of institutional power which privileged those with supposed ‘expertise’ (e.g., psychologists) and discretionary power (such as the guards), who subjected the men to intrusive forms of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and examination, and who could ‘facilitate or hinder [their] progression through the penal system’ (Rowe, 2011: 587).

**Appropriation of the label ‘prisoner’**

The inmates deployed three ‘appropriation’ strategies (the active making over of a ‘thing’ into one’s own) for managing their stigmatized status: some insisted that they were in an important respect ‘different’ from most prisoners and so not reasonably categorized with them; others declined to define themselves as ‘prisoners’ or ‘criminals’; while still others accepted that they were prisoners but maintained that their inmate status had significant positive associations or implications. Although distinct, the strategies are not mutually exclusive, and prisoners sometimes made use of more than one. These attempts to re-interpret what being a prisoner meant were, arguably, not dissimilar to the efforts of conventional workers in organizations to appropriate reflexively organizational discourses in their pursuit of valued objectives and preferred identities (Brown and Humphreys, 2006; Coupland, 2001; Humphreys and Brown, 2002; Thomas and Davies, 2005).
First, some inmates sought to position their selves as atypical, special, or unusual prisoners, who should not therefore be attributed the negative corollaries associated with ‘normal’ inmate status. Eric, for example, accomplished this by maintaining his innocence:

‘I know that nobody believes me, although the investigating police know the truth but don’t care, I did not do it... I’m in here because I’ve been framed. I really don’t feel as if I belong here’ (Erik).

Peter questioned whether he was guilty of a criminal offence and sought also to differentiate himself from other prisoners on the basis that his ‘crime’ had been determined through contestable interpretation and involved no violence:

‘I’m in here for a white-collar crime... it’s a bit different than killing people or stealing cars... this kind of thing doesn’t belong in my life. For some people it’s a routine, going to one prison after another... not for me... This lot are different to me.... I’m the only guy in our block who hasn’t committed a violent crime’ (Peter).

A second stigma management tactic used by inmates was to contest whether they were in fact appropriately labelled as ‘prisoners’ or ‘criminals’. Johan and Mikael, members of an international motorcycle club, drew on biker mythology to maintain that although they were physically confined, they were not ‘prisoners’; rather, they embraced being incarcerated as natural concomitants of their life trajectories as bikers:

‘...it's pretty much down to how you think about it. I see myself as a tourist... I'm just taking a time-out’ (Mikael).

‘I don’t think of myself as a prisoner’ (Johan).

Niko, on the other hand, admitted to killing a man in a drunken rage (‘I just lost my mind’), but denied that he was a ‘criminal’, preferring instead to describe himself as a first-timer, 50 year-old electrical technician who had merely experienced ‘a bit of an accident’:

‘The way I see it is that even though I have committed a crime, I’m no criminal’ (Niko).

Others not only declined to define their selves in terms of the penal or (more broadly) judicial systems, but insisted that other (socially acceptable) labels were appropriately descriptive of
them. Hannu, for example, was adamant that he was a formerly successful businessman whose ‘true’ identity would be re-assigned to him on his re-entry into society:

*When I walk through them open gates, I'll be just like everybody else.... I'm not [a prisoner], I'm just a regular guy, and that’s that* (Hannu).

This talk is a version of what Riessman (2000) refers to as ‘resistant thinking’ and what psychodynamic researchers theorize as ‘denial’ (Brown and Starkey, 2000). Rather than accept their prisoner status these inmates denied (negated or disowned) this epithet, and the power/knowledge claims associated with it. Characterized often as a ‘primitive’ and ‘magical’ process (Laughlin, 1970: 57) with potentially dangerous consequences, in this instance denial functioned (arguably) to support inmates’ self-esteem in difficult circumstances.

A third, and the most widely used strategy for managing stigma, was for inmates to emphasize the positive aspects of their prisoner status. This discourse took three related forms. Prisoners commented frequently on the opportunities that being a prisoner made available to them for reflection and self-improvement:

‘I feel much stronger in here... This place builds your character...in here, you get stronger in your mind’ (Jukka).

Inmates highlighted the quality of life they had in prison, and in particular the comradeship and support offered to them by other prisoners, sometimes suggesting that these were superior to that which they had experienced in conventional society:

‘Really, in here, it’s like, you respect your fellow inmate, and he respects you back and you show it too and I haven’t experienced this kind of thing anywhere else’ (Marko).

Lastly, a few inmates embraced their prisoner status as a mark not of stigma but of social esteem, a lifestyle choice deserving of respect:

‘So it's [being a prisoner] just one more... how should I put it, status symbol’ (Mikael).
Prisoners’ appropriation strategies symptomize the limits of total institutions to shape subjectivities, and illustrate how individuals are ‘activists on their own behalf’ (Thoits, 1994: 144) able to ‘neutralize painful meanings and experiences, foster instrumentally beneficial identities and resist the assertion of systemic power’ (Rowe, 2011: 587). Of course, in their insistence that they were somehow ‘special cases’, their denials that they were in fact prisoners, and insistence that penal life offered them resources to sustain an authentic sense of self-worth, inmates may also be understood as taking refuge in romanticizing fantasies that afforded unreal, substitutive satisfactions which compensated for their inability to fulfill or to gratify their goals (Laughlin, 1970). Such a perspective suggests that inmates’ appropriative strategies were technologies of the self (Foucault, 1977), the employment of which was a means of deflecting attention from, and easing the pains associated with, stigmatized meanings. However, in our case, as with some of the instances investigated by Gabriel (1995), inmates’ fantasies not only insulated them from painful ‘realities’ but gave expression to (arguably adaptive) feelings of heroic defiance and the rejection of guilt, in ways which humanized and offered consolations. There are no easy answers or simple interpretations: prisoners’ talk was an effect of disciplinary power but also a ‘stubborn assertion of agency’ (Bosworth, 1999: 3) in which pleasure and pain, conformity, resistance, and fantasy were intimately and perhaps inextricably bundled.

Connecting to socially valued roles

In their talk, inmates sought often to connect to culturally coveted social identities as friends, (potentially) productive workers and, most importantly, as family members, in particular fathers. Inmates said that they formed close friendship groups, some of which were based on previous allegiances. Prisoners’ discussions of themselves as friends engaged in reciprocal relationships of succour, trust, and support were important in part because they served to
define themselves in these terms. There is a substantial literature that suggests ‘friendship’ is valued by people as a supportive and mutually beneficial relationship which is chosen rather than imposed, reflects shared interests and intimacy, maintains ontological security, and is integral to accounts of self (Giddens, 1991). In-group friendship is particularly valued by the stigmatized who take comfort in ‘sympathetic others’ who share the stigma, and from whom they can learn coping strategies and alternative interpretations of it (Goffman, 1963).

Particularly interesting were inmates’ assertions of their social value to others. Jaakko, for example, positioned himself as a good friend to his fellow prisoners whom he assisted by leveraging his knowledge of the law:

‘Let’s say that compared to the general population here, I know a lot of things, and that’s why they come to me when they need help. And when I’ve done things for others, sometimes it has worked out nicely’ (Jaakko).

Hannu described himself as having had a successful business career, asserted that he had a wide circle of friends, including many outside of the prison community who occupied positions of power, and who depended on him:

‘...many people depend on me. And it’s not like I only have criminal friends. For example, one of my friends just made it as a judge. Fucking economists, bank employees, all sorts of regular people and they all want to have to do with me. I don’t feel like an outcast or anything’ (Hannu).

While actual friendships may have served needs for intimacy and promoted cooperation and communication, constructing their selves as integral to networks of friends was also a means of countering stigmatized understandings because it allowed them to make sense of themselves as socially adept members of a community (Gibbons, 2004). Relatedly, talk about their altruistic behaviour was a means of representing themselves, both to their selves and others, as functioning participants in trust-based relations in which they voluntarily gave to others with no immediate expectation of reward, and thus as creditable individuals. Their talk about friends and the importance of friendship to them implied a series of self-claims about
their capacity for empathy, intimacy and mutuality, willingness to share and trustworthiness – traits, their talk implied, not generally associated with ‘stereotypical’ prisoners.

The men spoke also about the productive worker roles that they had once played in society and/or that they intended to take on once they were released:

‘I’ve been promised a job when I get out. I have a friend who has an accountancy firm’ (Jesse).

‘I have this new goal, to study to become an electrician’ (Jari).

These future ‘possible selves’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986) were similar in kind to those of employees in conventional organizations in that they consisted of individually significant hopes and aspirations which functioned, in part, as incentives for future behaviour in relation to work (Coupland, 2004). This said, inmates’ projected work selves were not apparently highly elaborated, complex or composed of multiple elements – factors which have been found to be correlated with proactive career behaviour. The point here is that prisoners have been found often to talk about ‘grandiose plans for the future’ (Crewe, 2007: 140), and it may be that these notional possible selves served less as motivational cues than as useful means for managing, perhaps distracting from or compensating for, stigmatized identities.

Prisons are gendered spaces, ‘deeply inscribed by discourses of masculinity’ (Crewe, 2007: 139), in which being a ‘real man’ is a contested subject position that is practically and performatively accomplished, in part, through talk about traditional male roles as husbands, brothers, fathers and grandfathers (cf. Carrabine and Longhurst, 1998; Newton, 1994; Ugelvik, 2009). ‘Fatherhood’ in particular is a readily available and established social category that for marginalized men such as prisoners allows access to societally valued identities as, for example, moral teacher, breadwinner, sex-role model and nurturer (Lamb,
In this talk they often positioned themselves in accord with societal norms as selfless and caring people concerned to fulfil diligently their familial obligations:

‘I’m not worried about myself. I don’t care if I do my time here in this bunker or in an open prison. I’m thinking about my family and kids’ (Erik).

For some inmates the desire to be a responsible father, they said, was a benefit to them in that it had motivated a pro-social shift in their self-concept and an end to the delinquency and drug-abuse that had led to prison:

‘Well, I want to be a good father to the kid. It does change everything... I’m not into drugs anymore; I’m so fuckin’ sick of that shit... I just want to give that kid everything, be a good dad, you know’ (Risto).

The importance to inmates of being a good ‘family man’ is understandable given that many meaningful positive identities based on, for instance, academic degrees and professional careers, were not (generally) available to them. This helps to explain the distress they voiced with a prison system that seemed often to them not to be family-friendly:

‘These people do their best to see that your affairs go to hell, that your family gets broken up and that you remain a criminal’ (Erik).

It is unsurprising that the prisoners drew on conceptions of fatherhood in their definitions of self given the significance of ‘the father’ as prototypically symbolic of masculinity in Judaeo-Christian traditions (Freud, 1912-13). As Bosworth (1999: 7) has commented: ‘...prisoners import ideas, values and morals from currents within society at large’. Inmates, however, were unable to control dominant meanings of ‘fatherhood’, and making a plausible case that they were appropriately regarded as worthy fathers and family men was not straightforward because hegemonic representations of these role identities dictate that they prioritize their family’s needs at the expense of their own. Such commitment, dedication and self-sacrifice were difficult for the men to construct in their talk given the limited opportunities incarceration afforded for familial contact: moreover, the absent and non-providing ‘bad father’ is a recognizable figure within Finnish, and indeed Western public discourse more
generally, and this was a spectre that haunted prisoners assertions of paternal prowess (cf. Miller, 2011). They were in this respect similar to female prisoners (Bosworth, 1999; Greer, 2002) and parolees (Opsal, 2011) disempowered by dominant idealizations of maternity yet who cling to conceptions of their selves as good mothers even though they have little or no actual contact with their children. Thus did prisoners’ identity work drawing on socially valued roles reveal them both as ‘…entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make’ (Rose 1989: 226), and yet caught within webs of power/knowledge that disciplined and confined them.

The ‘good person’ discourse

In line with Goffman’s (1963) observation that people develop an awareness of stigma through a ‘moral career’ in which they learn societal values and perspectives, the prisoners spoke, sometimes eloquently, of their selves in relation to issues of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. This corresponds with other studies which have found that inmates’ conduct is characterized often by ‘ethical values that suffuse codes of acceptable behaviour’ Crewe (2007: 139). The men were very much aware of the moral dimension to their stigma, and were concerned to represent themselves as ethical beings capable of moral development. Inmates said that although others described them as morally inferior they were not generically ‘bad’, and in many instances that they subscribed to moral principles and lived according to societally sanctioned values:

‘I don’t know, I mean I used to think myself that prison was just full of bad people and sure we have a fair share of them too but everything has its limits you know, there are good sides to people too. We’re not just cruel, hardened blokes in here. There are things that are sacred to us too, things we respect. We’re people like everybody else’ (Sergei).

Much has been written about the hegemonic sway of ‘prisoner codes’ which coerce convicts to behave in group-oriented ways, for example, to be loyal, courageous, responsible, protective of prisoners’ shared interests and never to ‘snitch’, ‘grass’ or ‘rat’ on another ‘con’
(e.g., Sykes, 1958; Ugelvik, 2009). Individual prisoners talked, often with pride, about themselves as conforming to their own conceptions of what constituted a ‘good’ person:

‘I have a moral code I live by, and even if I were totally legit and not a criminal, I would live by this code…. When you’ve been honest about something you can be proud of yourself, even in prison’ (Erik).

Others made use of a ‘that was then, this is now’ discourse to maintain that they had become different (improved) people:

‘My values have changed completely. I believe in the good things now, the small things, normal things... peace and goodness and love and that sort of thing... I’ve changed’ (Jari).

While most inmates accounted for their changed identity in terms of general processes of maturation some prisoners said that their transformation into ‘better’ people had a specific identifiable cause. Jari, for example, explained how his altered identity was the result of an epiphany:

‘... I had this spiritual awakening... I’ve always flirted with the idea that there is a God... but it was only then that I thought that I should start building on this’ (Jari).

Saku said he was inspired by reading the books of Pertti Linkola, a famous Finnish environmentalist who lives in the woods and encourages people towards self-sufficiency:

‘Pertti Linkola has been pretty important. I read his books during my seventh year crisis... I didn’t have a TV... it was an awakening for me, almost religious’ (Saku).

Inmates’ efforts to manage stigma by casting themselves as moral agents were forms of self-making activities and performative positioning work (Foucault, 1990) designed to cast themselves as ethically conscious good guys (Presser, 2009). As Ugelvik (2012) has shown, carceral institutions transform prisoners into ‘untrustworthy bodies’ and they are everyday reminded that they are generically criminal, ‘cannot be trusted’ (p.264) and are ‘in need of change’ (p.273). Yet many inmates did not accept passively the subject positions allocated to them by systemic and disciplinary power but monitored, told and retold the ‘truth’ about themselves, assuaging the pain associated with stigma by negotiating, transforming, and reproducing identities that were a part of rather than separate from the moral community of
society in general. In so doing, they sought to open up ‘new aesthetic possibilities’ (Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 23) and to create the self as a moral being, deserving of respect and fair treatment (see Rowe, 2011; Toch, 1993). Inmates’ talk about their characters as decent people drew on societal discourses which valorize moral identities and virtuous selves (Barker, 2002; MacIntyre, 1981), and reconstituted them to ‘fit’ local circumstances, revealing such identities to be ‘contextual, situational, [and] highly specific’ (Jackall, 1988: 6; cf. Kornberger and Brown, 2007). Theirs were attempts to reclaim their humanity, though mostly they also acknowledged that from the perspective of others ‘the person with a stigma is not quite human’ (Goffman, 1963: 5) and that being labelled a ‘criminal’ was not merely a judgement on one’s past but a prediction of likely future behaviour.

**Discussion**

We have analysed how prisoners managed their self-construed stigmatized identities through strategies of appropriation, and by drawing on discourses concerned with coveted social roles and morality, to make supportive self-claims. Rather than portraying prisoners as helpless victims, passively acquiescent to social processes of stigmatization, we have shown that they are, in their talk, able artfully to dodge and to challenge negative stereotypes and thus to work on versions of their selves that are (seemingly) for them self-satisfying and self-esteem enhancing. Our analysis has built on theorizing which suggests that inmates are ‘highly conscious of their social predicament’ and ‘strategic in the choices they make about how to address it’ (Crewe, 2007: 134). In this section, we build on our analysis to highlight three complementary aspects of organizationally-based stigmatized identities. First, stigmatized identities are best considered not in isolation, but with regard to the (potentially) numerous other, often non-stigmatized narratives of the self that individuals may harbour. Second, understandings of the self as stigmatized are rarely simple, coherent and consistent, but
instead complicated, confused, and sometimes contradictory. Third, stigmatized identities are not appropriately regarded as passive, neutral, disinterested or impartial, or rendered in simplistic terms as ‘functional/dysfunctional’ or ‘positive/negative’, but are, rather, embedded in relations of, and suffused with, power.

Consonant with Cooley’s (1902) understanding that people have many identities and Mead’s (1968) conception of the individual as a ‘parliament of selves’, there is widespread consensus that people work on multiple identities. This is despite the fact that to individuals their identities may often appear centred, unified and singular. Our analysis suggests that stigmatized identities are held with others in repertoires of simultaneously existing self-narratives from which individuals can draw selectively according to the context and purpose of an interaction. This is not to argue, as some theorists have, that multiple identities form stable hierarchies (Stryker, 1980): our findings suggest instead that they are often nuanced, equivocal, to some extent overlapping, inter-penetrating, and with permeable boundaries. A few inmates regarded their prisoner identities as badges of honour while for some, their stigma attached to a past rather than a current self. For most, though, a spoiled identity was a lurking, undesired possibility which was best sublimated or better still swamped by a focus on preferred (Gecas, 1982), aspirational (Thornborrow and Brown, 2009) or other alternate (Obodaru, 2012) selves. Moreover, individuals may require some relatively secure and stable sense of who they are, yet selves are also continuously crafted through internal soliloquies and conversations with others. Thus are self-conceived stigmatized identities subject to ongoing reassessments and reassemblings: arguably, all selves are provisional.

One strand of theorizing posits that people’s multiple identities provide ‘the human subject with a sense of continuity and coherence’ (Worthington, 1996: 13) such that ‘…the Me is
coherent and unified’ (McAdams, 1996: 306). Our data, however, suggest that subjectively construed selves may incorporate not just multiple but somewhat contradictory identities. While perhaps not exhibiting the constant change and wild multiplicity – *multiphrenia* – of post-modern life predicted by Gergen (1972), the prisoners were nevertheless able to draw apparently un-problematically on disparate and antagonistic discourses. After all, inmates’ conceptions of their selves in relation to coveted social roles and as ‘good’ people co-existed with understandings of their identities as stigmatized. Similarly, inmates’ appropriations of their ‘prisoner’ identities – their assertions of difference, denials, and emphasis on notionally positive aspects – constituted quite possibly unresolvable identity challenges in the face of simultaneously held knowledge, and overwhelming day-to-day experiences, which confirmed that they were in ‘fact’ just prisoners in a high security penal institution. That is, rather than experience dissonance, anxiety or discomfort in their attempts to reconcile the competing demands of antagonistic discourses, the prisoners appeared to be content to live with the wriggle room they had to author different versions of who they were for different audiences and circumstances. As Clarke, Brown, and Hope-Hailey (2009: 341) have argued, ‘identities may be stable without being coherent, and consist of core statements but not be unified’.

Prisoners’ stigmatized selves were evidently fragile, insecure constructions, their precariousness being due both to self-doubt and exposure to, and dependency on, others’ (somewhat unpredictable) judgments (Collinson, 2003). While identities authored by employees in work organizations may often be ‘tenuous in the extreme’ (Schwartz, 1987: 328), and involve continuous recursive and reflexive processes to maintain and repair, inmates’ stigmatized selves were particularly vulnerable. Their attempts to appropriate and redefine their status as prisoners, and to draw on discourses that positioned them as playing socially valuable roles and as good people, were symptomatic of aspirations not just for
conventionally acceptable, unspoiled identities, but for existential refuge. Even more so than other kinds of organizational participant, though, this work was often conducted under the shadow of considerable threat: stereotypical negative images of prisoners promulgated by the media, the contempt demonstrated toward them by prison guards and their sometimes strained relations with family and friends on the outside, all functioned as assaults on them. Security of self for those who recognize that they are carriers of stigmatized identities can, perhaps, only ever be a temporary chimera, a delicate, of-the-moment, quasi-fiction, a fleeting triumph (cf. Knights and Clarke, 2012).

Although some studies have recognized that power ‘is essential to the social production of stigma’ (Link and Phelan, 2001: 375) very few have focused on how stigma management strategies are effects of power. Our findings hint at what Foucault (1983: 221-2) suggests is an ‘agonism’ or ‘reciprocal incitation and struggle’ that informs subjects’ efforts to deform and divert for their own purposes the relations of power in which they are caught. On the one hand, the prisoners constructed themselves as realizing their own desires, appropriating and redefining the label ‘prisoner’ and highlighting other (more valued) identities which constituted the self, i.e. doing identity work of their own making. These were attempts to assert a sense of control and to construct themselves as agentic. For them, stigma management through discourse was an expression of autonomy, a means of differentiating them as individuals, a rejection of negative generic, stereotypical categorizations of inmates, an assertion of their individuality. This identity talk was also at times, perhaps, a means of countering or neutralizing the complex emotions – guilt, shame, anguish, embarrassment etc. – that, for some, accompanied being labelled a ‘prisoner’. It was a way of contesting understandings of their selves as morally lacking, and establishing their humanity. Thus their talk about their selves sustained ‘…a set of living arguments that afforded scope for them to
learn from and to adapt to different insights, positions and provocations in ways which were sophisticated, reflexive and dialogical’ (Clarke, Brown, and Hope-Hailey, 2009: 344).

Yet, while inmates had evidently scope to create their own selves and realize their desires through discipline, it is clear that the identities prisoners claimed or to which they aspired were culturally sanctioned. Preferred versions of their selves were, arguably, a disciplinary mechanism which transformed them into self-disciplining subjects, indeed as objects that could be verbalized, judged and improved. These self-constructions had important organizational consequences: inmates’ preferred versions of their selves (such as doing ‘good’ work, engaging in self-improvement, being trustworthy, etc.), in contrast with stereotypical understandings of what it meant to be a prisoner (e.g., violent, unpredictable, irrational etc.), rendered them (mostly) docile and encouraged conformity with official norms and rules. As Bosworth (1999: 30) has observed, domination ‘…is dependent on compliance from those who are subordinate in the power relationship and who need to believe in the legitimacy of their domination’. It was notable that while penal institutions are prone often to disorder, and sometimes full scale riots, Helsinki Prison, despite accommodating some of Finland’s most hardened criminals, had long been untroubled and stable (Brown and Toyoki, 2013). Micro-level activity in the form of identity work may thus have had macro-level outcomes i.e. uninterrupted social order.

Our study has a number of important limitations that need to be acknowledged, and which suggest the need for further research. Perhaps most importantly, this analysis is based on a single site case study with particular features, not least of which are its Nordic prison setting and the self-selecting interviewees who participated in it. Further, the self-making discourse that we have analysed took place in interviews in which were at stake obvious interests and relations of power which mediated what prisoners said. As Opsal (2011: 161) has noted,
‘...the interview process itself is squarely implicated in the self-making claims’ because it is at this site inmates were able narratively to contest and create identities. That is, while in the interviews prisoners were encouraged by the interviewer to focus on their selves in their own words, it is likely that they had their own agendas and reasons for participating in the study. Of equal note are the interests in discourse and relations of power which we (the authors) have brought to our research setting and data and which have informed, shaped and guided our analysis: after all, a variety of other theoretical framings ranging from the positivistic to the psychodynamic could have been deployed to offer very different insights on stigmatized identities.

Conclusions

Our contribution has been to foreground issues of identity, subjectivity and agency which have often been only implicit in studies of imprisonment (Bosworth, 1999: 4). Further, much prisons research has emphasized the hurts, pains, deprivations, anger, frustrations and fears of prisoners; we have shown how inmates are, while accommodating to prison life, able concomitantly to manage effectively their stigmatized identities, to cultivate self-enhancing understandings of their selves as ethically aware, socially valuable, recovering, developing, worthwhile human beings. Finally, we have theorized identity work to be ‘not merely an expression of agency but also of power’ (Brown and Lewis, 2011: 888). Prisoners’ stigma management strategies were forms of disguise that protected them, verbal challenges to authority which defied the universalizing and homogenizing effects of imprisonment, and acts of resistance by which they asserted their autonomy and formed stable and secure versions of their selves (Sykes, 1958). This talk, though, was always in danger of being ‘seen as fictional’ (Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 194), and was disciplined by the discursive resources
afforded by the institution, and the processes of self-examination by which they came to scrutinize, know and transform their selves.

This research contributes also to the burgeoning literature on threatened identities. It is well established that ‘Threats to identity are as ubiquitous as they are unsettling’ (Petriglieri, 2011: 641), and that so-called ‘dirty workers’ are often ‘acutely aware of the stigma that attends their work’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999: 418; cf. Breakwell, 1983). Much less attention has focused on how such threats are subjectively construed and mitigated through discursive identity work in organizational contexts. An important aspect of the contribution we have made is to analyse how a specific cohort of participants in an organization were able variously to ignore and to selectively ‘refocus’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) in authoring accounts of their selves to enact and affirm the meaningfulness of their lives. We choose thus to end on an optimistic note. Even in a prison setting, relatively few individuals told ‘end of the line’ self-narratives in which they positioned themselves as resigned or broken; rather, most inmates said that they had either been ‘temporarily derailed’ or were engaged in controlled experimentation with attractive (post)-prison identity options (cf. Gabriel, Gray, and Goregaokar, 2010). Prisoners, like other, more conventional categories of organizational members, symptomized fundamental insecurities (Collinson, 1992), and their quests for stability and security were, quite probably illusory; yet, through identity-talk, they were in the main able agentically to craft meaningful, hopeful, purposeful selves.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper provided by Caroline Clarke, Alison Hirst, David Knights, Dian Martin, Alex Schwob, and John Sillince.

References


Anspach, R.R. (1979) From stigma to identity politics: Political activism among the physically disabled and former mental patients. *Social Science and Medicine, 13A*: 766-773.


Notes

i So embedded may be legitimate and de-legitimated subject positions that those who are marginalized can find it difficult, perhaps sometimes impossible, to manage effectively their spoiled identities (Link et al., 1991). Permeating societal processes of surveillance, normalization, judgement and examination to which the stigmatized are subject there tends also to be a collective emotionally-laden response to those perceived to be importantly different – a primal fear shared by the stigmatized. In stigmatizing relationships both the stigmatized and those who stigmatize them often feel ‘seriously menaced’ and ‘are engaged in a similar process of gripping and being gripped by life, holding onto something, preserving what matters, and warding off danger’ (Yang et al., 2006: 1528). Those deemed to have transgressed against society, who have been labelled ‘criminals’ and incarcerated in penal institutions, are particularly troubling, not least because they threaten cherished beliefs in the fundamental goodness of people.

ii Had we also collected data from prison officers in the same prison this may well have compromised our ability to speak with inmates, many of whom subscribed to an ‘inmate code’ which proscribed showing support for those in authority.

iii Prisoners, though, are not conventional members of work organizations: the men we interviewed would (mostly) not choose to be in prison, and were not there to earn a salary or to develop a career.

iv While Pratt (2008a,b) has argued forcibly that Nordic prisons are distinctive, we note both that (a) all high security prisons (such as Helsinki Prison) have some common characteristics: defined formally as ‘closed prisons’, they operate on the basis of seclusion, close surveillance and risk management (Garland, 2001); and (b) all prisons have unique features, and research suggests that there is great variability between prison regimes (Crewe, 2007).

v The interviewees varied in age from 25 to 57 with a mean of 35.5 years. Approximately half the men were ‘first timers’, while the rest had previously been incarcerated; at the extreme, one individual was serving his tenth sentence. The men were serving sentences ranging from 9 months to 12 years (a ‘life sentence’ in Finland) with a mean of 5.6 years. With one exception (Peter, who was sentenced for fraud), the men had been convicted for offences involving violence (mostly either manslaughter or murder), serious drug felonies, organized crime, smuggling, robbery and kidnapping.

vi As Phillips and Earle (2010: 362) have noted, we need as researchers to attend reflexively to ‘our own positions and interests’ which influence ‘the questions we ask, the ones we don’t, who we interview and who we don’t, how we interview, how we listen and how we don’t, and ultimately how we understand’.

vii For further in-depth accounts of the troubled and troubling nature of in-depth case study and ethnographic practices in prison settings see Liebling (1999, 2001), King (2000) and Bosworth (1999).