SUBJECT POSITION AND PEDAGOGIC IDENTITY OF JAPANESE LEARNERS STUDYING SPANISH AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE IN COMMUNICATIVE LEARNING SETTINGS AT THE TERTIARY LEVEL IN JAPAN

Volume 1 of 3

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education, contains no material previously published or written in any medium by another person, except where appropriate reference has been made.
ABSTRACT

This study addresses the question: How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity? The response is informed by an empirical pedagogical problem located at the tertiary level in Japan: What makes acquirers attain higher levels of language mastery in foreign language (Spanish) settings informed by communicative language teaching? The attempted answer is framed within cultural-historical activity theory, the cultural theory of Holland et al. (2001), and Basil Bernstein’s code theory. These theories have been combined using Marxian-Hegelian notions of culture and subject, which allow language development and mastery to be treated as the acquisition by an individual of a cultural tool (semiotic mediation) subject to both individual agency and historical forces. The organisational and pedagogical contexts of three institutions engaged in Spanish language education have been analysed using motive-action/educational task as the unit of analysis that situates the observation in between micro and macro levels of analysis, in combination with the methodologies for ascertaining subject position provided by Bernstein’s code theory and the cultural theory of Holland et al. This procedure made it possible to determine acquirers’ coding orientations (orientations to meaning) and to establish comparisons between organisation and learning settings. The findings indicate that acquirers who have a formal trajectory of language learning and who are able to recognise grammar instructional discourse – i.e., who possess a representational gaze – attain better levels of language mastery (active realisation) than those with informal trajectories (e.g. learning languages overseas in a conversational fashion without following a formal programme) and who do not recognise grammar instructional discourse. Evidence is provided to indicate that there is no way to avoid representational-function programmes. The bottom-up move within Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development is suggested as a feasible intervention without a drastic reshaping of the programmes.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAT</td>
<td>Cultural-Historical Activity Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>Communicative Language Teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Code Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Square Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLS</td>
<td>Partial Least Squares Path Modelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Second Language Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STI</td>
<td>Systemic-Theoretical Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBLT</td>
<td>Task-Based Language Teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPD</td>
<td>Zone of Proximal Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPOD</td>
<td>Zone of Potential Development</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The concept of freedom is central in the dialectical tradition. It provides an orienting point for social scientific research, and gives substantive content to the idea of full human development. A main aim of research in the dialectical tradition is understanding how to create conditions for full human development.

(Chaiklin, 2012, p. 33)

But this speech diversity achieves its full creative consciousness only under conditions of an active polyglossia. Two myths perish simultaneously: the myth of a language that presumes to be the only language, and the myth of a language that presumes to be completely unified.

(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 68)

1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study arose as a response to an empirical pedagogical problem located at the tertiary level in Japan: What makes a relatively small segment of acquirers attain higher levels of language mastery in foreign language (Spanish) settings informed by communicative language teaching?

The question is informed by my informal observations and research on students’ resistance to foreign language education in Japanese universities, although here I am trying to phrase the problem in a more positive or constructive way. Simply stated, I plan to study the difference between students who succeed and those who do not in their communication courses in Spanish as a foreign language at Japanese universities.

By addressing the empirical pedagogical problem, I believe I will contribute to improving the foreign language teaching and learning conditions of many practitioners and students. The Japanese and non-Japanese instructors who teach Spanish as a foreign language at tertiary institutions in Japan often have to face
students’ silent resistance every single working day, especially if they are teaching at universities that do not specialise in foreign language education. Instructors pay a heavy toll for teaching the infamous dainigaikokugo (second foreign language) classes, that is, classes in foreign languages other than English. Things are not quite right for them. It is as if they teach knowing that something is wrong but they are unable to spot exactly what it is. Japanese Spanish grammar instructors often complain about their students’ lack of academic skills, and native Spanish instructors feel they are wasting their time trying to convey a real picture of what Spanish-speaking societies are and the ways they view and act in the world. Students face a similar situation. Some of them believe they are studying in an honest way, when in fact their instructors are tacitly demanding something completely different from them. In other words, this work addresses the problem of the different expectations attached to teaching and learning that instructors and students have.

Although the study is focused on the oral communication or conversation class, usually taught by a native Spanish instructor, the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the study call for a thorough examination of the curriculum as a whole, especially the grammar class, which is usually taught by a Japanese instructor. Let me introduce now those underpinnings.

In order to deal with the problem theoretically and empirically, this thesis will also address a theoretical problem located in the field of the sociology of education: *How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity?*  

The question is formulated by putting together two interconnected theoretical frameworks. The first one is the socio-genetic analytical framework and explanatory principle that is the trademark of the dialectical tradition. To most readers, this tradition is associated with Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, Alexander Luria, Alexei Nikolaevich Leont’ev and many other Soviet scholars and researchers but, as Chaiklin (2012) and Blunden (2010) point out, the dialectical
tradition goes far back to thinkers such as Karl Marx, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and even Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The basic principle is that human consciousness and activity are predicated on social relations, not on concepts or ideas that descend from heaven or are stored in one’s own head waiting to be activated by certain stimuli. The central concern of the socio-genetic theoretical stance is the issue of human development and freedom. Social relations develop human beings in a process of acculturation which is done mainly by semiotic means (especially by speech) that transform the subject. The objective is to have the individual appropriating the means to liberate him or herself from arbitrary social conditions by generating new social relations. A very simple speculative extension of this principle would compel us to analyse the problem of success or failure in mastering a foreign language by carefully looking at the social relations that are constituted in the foreign language pedagogies. The final question is: Do these social relations contribute to the students’ emancipation, to their self-control, to their knowledge of the world (i.e. their conscious awareness) and to new forms of agency? This question deals with the very notion of mastery. I am using the term here to convey the idea that students achieve what the pedagogic system is explicitly or implicitly compelling them to achieve, not what I would like the pedagogic system to encourage them to achieve. Therefore, I am lowering my personal expectations and restricting the problem to the official realm of the Japanese educational system in my analysis. Mastery shall be understood in that dimension. Nevertheless, this thesis seeks to transcend the limitations imposed by the pedagogic system in its current form and therefore I believe we will have to tackle the problem of what means to master a language beyond the official line or the limitations instructors and students encounter in their daily practice. My position as a person, a researcher and a foreign language instructor is inscribed within the dialectical tradition, even though the present work will not deal with direct interventions that seek to transcend the status quo, I hope this thesis will open a way to produce interventions that seek to give students the language and intellectual tools they need in order to become true agents in the vast array of social settings in which Spanish is or can be used, or as a way to access knowledge that will empower them in their everyday lives.
The second theory corpus is sociological and deals with the importance of looking at institutions as the intermediate loci that regulate social positions and eventually modulate discourse, including the pedagogic discourse deployed by instructors and students in the classroom. This corpus has been advanced by A.A. Leont’ev under the heading *structure of activity*, by Basil Bernstein through his *code theory* and by Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte Jr, Debra Skinner and Carole Cain as *cultural theory*. In the case of this corpus, the semiotic means referred to above and activity in general are transformed into discourse, that is, as the use of different linguistic and non-linguistic systems in which we take into consideration the positioning of subjects. Again, a very simple speculative extension of this theoretical stance compels us to analyse the social configuration of institutions and learning settings, subject positions and discourse. The basic message of this theoretical corpus is that social positions matter. Social relations regulate discursive practices but discourse also cements social relations. The key to untangle this relation is analysing the positioning of subjects and institutions. Eventually, we have to look at how power distributes different forms of consciousness through discourse.

The ideas briefly introduced above will be unwrapped and expanded in the following chapters. By addressing the theoretical problem I believe I can offer new ways to understand and analyse the relationship between intersubjective and intrasubjective activity, especially the role institutions play in modulating pedagogic discourse.

### 1.2 PEDAGOGIC CONTEXT

I would like to situate the study in the precise context in which it was born, in which the empirical pedagogical question was formulated. In order to do this, I prefer to offer my own personal views, based on my personal experience, rather than collecting a myriad of papers and references that will *objectively* advance my views. Therefore, the reader must assume that this introduction is biased. I am aware that there may be some opposing views about foreign language education in
Japan out there, and in fact, during my teaching career I have changed my original views many times. Nonetheless, I still believe that the trajectory of my career reflects an epoch, an age marked by pedagogic transition and extreme challenges. I also think that it constitutes, perhaps, a more interesting, reading.

I have been a Spanish language instructor in Japan since 1993. I started teaching in the Department of Spanish in a vocational school in the Kansai region (western Japan) as a full-time instructor and a couple of years later I moved onto teaching university students as a part-time instructor and lecturer. Curiously, the students at the two-year vocational school were very eager to learn Spanish and they reached intermediate levels of language mastery almost without fail. However, I could not say the same about many of the language students at four-year universities, especially those who took Spanish as a second language. This was a perplexing problem since society at large seemed to agree that university students were more capable and academically more prepared than vocational school students.

The programme at the vocational school was intensive. Students had many conversation classes, taught by native Spanish speakers like myself (eight chronological hours per week), and also some grammar classes taught by Japanese instructors. Classes were kept small, with less than ten students each. There was a lack of instructional materials to teach Spanish as a foreign language. Unlike the English as a second language (ESL) publishing market, there were not many publishing houses producing Spanish texts at the beginning of the 1990s. The first commercial textbooks were published by SGEL (Sociedad General Española de Librería), a company that manages the distribution of newspapers and magazines at the newspaper kiosks in Spain. A few textbooks were also published by Spanish universities, especially by the University of Salamanca. The most commonly deployed method of instruction in communication classes was the audiolingual method, which consisted of practising dialogues and doing structural drills, but always combined with conversations about different topics that were not contained in textbooks, which were the dominant activity.

At the end of the 1990s we started using newly available teaching material, which
was halfway between the notional-functional method and the communicative approach. For grammar classes, Japanese instructors always favoured Spanish grammars written by Japanese university professors. These books succinctly explained in Japanese some grammatical features and presented the grammar using schemata, resembling a handbook of Latin grammar. The instructor explained the contents and students had to solve structural problems and try to make sense of the expressions, usually by translating them. Students also learned how to read commercial information and translate business letters. They also were trained in business etiquette, to prepare them for the recruitment season. The education was somehow linked to the students’ prospects of landing jobs in Japanese corporations as clerks, bank tellers or skilled factory workers, but was not necessarily connected to places in which they could use their language skills. Most of the students were successful in the labour market, but a few had more difficulty. Some students had real personal difficulties fitting in to Japanese society and required a lot of guidance; a guidance that my Japanese colleagues generously and constantly gave.

The vocational school also organised evening courses in Spanish at beginner, intermediate and advanced levels for members of the public in general. Those courses were attractive to me and I liked teaching them because I could get to know mature Japanese people. My impression is that they were not as shy as Japanese youth. In fact they were very assertive and opinionated; they were knowledgeable about world affairs, read the newspapers, listened to international broadcasts and had stories to tell. In fact they helped me to connect with Japan and the issues affecting Japanese society in a much more complex way. Most of the studies referred to foreign language education do not consider this segment of the Japanese population. Getting to know them showed me that most of the characteristics of Japanese learners’ learning and communication styles that circulated in journals were not accurate.

In those days, vocational schools provided education to those who could not pass university entrance examinations, to students whose parents did not have the financial resources to pay for four years of university tuition (Japanese tuition fees
are among the highest in the world) and living expenses, and to students who would inherit their parents’ small business but wanted to spend two years of relative leisure before committing their lives to a very demanding schedule. Some of them also enrolled in a vocational school because they had already learnt about their academic limitations during high school. In other words, the students had already been selected by the educational system and some did not even bother to take a university entrance examination. In some cases the selection I am talking about was literal, for homeroom teachers in Japan issue recommendation letters to higher education institutions depending on the academic skills of their students enabling each student to enrol in a given programme. In fact, many tertiary organisations in Japan offer a number of vacancies to certain high schools. The numbers are high if the university and the high school belong to the same educational corporate group. The system could be considered to be a fast-track admissions scheme. The students knew the vocational school was their place. Yet, school life there was good and fulfilling. All problems aside, the students wanted to learn and the instructors wanted to teach. The instructors got to know the students well and worked together in the production of cultural events such as Spanish-language theatre plays, speech and essay writing contests and cultural festivals. Whilst one could easily argue that a lot of language was learnt through those activities, I believe the actual language learning was achieved by the organisation of those activities in Spanish.

Even if students did not land a job that required the use of their Spanish skills, they wanted to learn Spanish in order to know more about themselves. They could discover a new world of possibilities, perhaps dream about places where they wanted to spend their holidays when they settled down: places they did not know much about and which seemed warm and charming. Most of what they knew about Spain and Latin America at that time was from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games and a few old songs from the Mexican trio Los Panchos like Bésame mucho or La Bamba, which were listed at the karaoke parlours. Television and radio hardly broadcast any news concerning Spain or Latin American countries. The international news slot was filled with news from Washington DC. We did not know much about the United Kingdom or Europe either. I was quite appalled to
find out that in Japan there was no cable television and many Japanese students had never met or spoken to a native Spanish or English speaker. Compared with the great variety of information sources that people in Chile, my home country, enjoyed at that time (e.g. cable television, national and international newspapers), not to mention that in almost any school’s roster you may find surnames belonging to at least ten different national backgrounds, including our own native ethnic groups, Japan looked very isolated and boringly homogenous. The internet and satellite and cable television would come a few years later and finally put an end to the information seclusion of the 1990s.

However, we had a growing problem. The number of students enrolled at the vocational school had been decreasing dramatically for the last two years. In fact it was an indicator of the circumstances almost every single vocational school was facing in Japan after the Ministry of Education liberalised the university curriculum in 1991, paving the way for universities to increase their student enrolment. Vocational schools were looked down upon and could not compete in terms of branding with larger and more prestigious organisations. Employers were hunting graduates attached to organisation brands. I had no choice but to start teaching at universities. The world of the foreign language vocational school would soon be over.

I taught my first university class at a public university in 1997. To my surprise, university lessons were much more physically and mentally demanding than the ones I taught at the vocational school. Whilst students at universities specialising in foreign language education, that is, with foreign studies faculty and departments, tended to be more motivated and keen on learning Spanish, students at universities that did not specialise in foreign language education did not seem to be interested in learning anything at all. After all, they were not majoring in Spanish but in something else, and not unlike the situation in the vocational school sector, corporations did not care much about what subjects graduates from the humanities specialised in at the time of recruiting them.

The classes were packed with students. A colleague of mine boasted he taught a
conversation class in one university with about 150 students. Whilst that number seems ridiculously high, the usual number of students enrolled in a communication course in an organisation not specialised in foreign language education ranges from 25 to 45, which is still high for any course on practical skills. The organisations specialising in foreign language education cut that number in half in oral communication classes but usually would not cut the number of students in grammar classes, as they are considered to be theoretical, not practical classes. The field is dominated by industrial models and economies of scale. This model is also reflected in the full-time part-time instructor ratio at both kinds of institutions. It was quite common to have only one or two full-time instructors, usually Japanese nationals who would liaise with administration staff such as the office for academic affairs, for every ten, fifteen or twenty part-time instructors.

At universities that did not specialise in languages, Spanish lessons were organised for different faculties. Thus, instead of putting together Spanish courses for students of many faculties, which could have amounted to a sort of melting pot of different interests, learning styles and academic aims, separate courses were delivered to first- and second-year students of particular faculties. In those circumstances the faculty *pathos* came to light, with instructors talking about from which faculty students were best suited to or more interested in learning a foreign language than other faculty students. At one particular organisation where I was teaching, students from the faculty of Law were considered disciplined, systematic but lacking social skills and a bit boring; whereas students of the faculty of Social Sciences were considered to be undisciplined but communicative and funny. I thought all this labelling of faculties was fascinating, as it created a sort of relational universe. In fact, some instructors, Japanese and foreign alike, measured their level of happiness by counting the number of hours they taught at different faculties.

Yet, the breach between the university specialising in foreign language education and those not so specialised was not that wide. Overall, successful students at both organisations seemed to learn Spanish *despite* the educational system, not because of it. What I mean is that the great majority of students did not get to master the
language, and the segment which did amounted to less than one quarter of the student population. As one colleague of mine always points out, if you take away all the support from the instructor at the time of talking, all the cueing and rephrasing, no one would be able to understand the student and his or her message would not come across in an actual Spanish-speaking context overseas.

Communication instructors soon have to learn how to communicate à la Japonaise and be very good at inferring what the student wants to say based on minimal cues, gestures and silence. I have noticed that even Japanese colleagues have a hard time understanding what Japanese students were trying to say, in expressing their ideas or desires, even if they shared to a higher degree than I possibly could the implicit Japanese cultural context. The exercise of producing simple presentations in Spanish about Japanese food and menu choices to the Spanish public with the help of PowerPoint may turn to be a very demanding one. Even if the student shows pictures of the ingredients and says something like ‘you have to mix this with that’ or ‘cut this in … slices’, which is still valid to me, he or she is compelled to use a great variety of verbs and verbal forms, and there is no way out of it. Without those verbs we may well prescind from the presenter altogether. Silence is not an option, when the presenter is being asked a question, unless he or she (explicitly) asks the public for help on prompting a word or expression, which is fine with me as well. The question is: Are the communication demands on this kind of presentation in Spain far removed from the communication demands the Japanese culture imposes on his own speakers or presenters in Japan? I do not think so. And even if there are differences, there are ways to negotiate and iron them out. But those who engage in the Apology of Japanese Silence will clearly realise that in the corporate Japanese world one’s minute silence in front of a PowerPoint slide is not good enough, neither is it good enough at a job interview.

This has nothing to do with asking students to sound like native speakers; it has to do with the problem of going beyond communication contexts in which words have a referential role directly connected to the environment, that is, in context-dependent situations. Communication is not a fixed notion. It is culture-dependent. But the burden of the communication is mostly on the speaker
of the foreign language. He or she will have to deal with the coding of the implicit elements of his or her culture and needs to be prepared to do so if the communication is ever going to happen and not be reduced to insurmountable stereotypes, for the whole idea of communicating in a foreign language is about transcending the local context or redefining it.

There has appeared a certain theoretical literature that treats the communication instructor as a sort of neo-colonialist agent involved at once in Japan bashing and Western deification. Those views ignore that communicating in any foreign language (in teaching and learning one, for instance) means that student and instructor definitely lose any ethnocentric viewpoint they may have assumed. The student will start questioning the view of his or her own native language as the only possible language and the instructor will struggle to select the most stable zone of a language to be taught just to realise that his own native language is in fact a non-unified system. Provided that teaching and learning are done in a respectful manner, I do not see any problem in producing a clash between the dissimilar ideological views carried by national languages, for those national languages (and Spanish is a multinational one) are subject of the constant work of centrifugal forces. What is unacceptable to me is to treat the teaching of any language as something that should be innocuous, for it is not, demanding the impossible task of freeing language from its ideological burden and its communicative power. Every time I have to teach a particular Spanish expression I am choosing one from many different possibilities, representing different social contexts and positions, appealing to different sensibilities. Language, any language, is the place of ideological struggle, and, in my view, the way to get rid of its ideological burden is by examining it through other languages (including the centrifugal forces within one’s own language), not by skimming it or presenting it in a cage, ignoring the forces that are acting through it. In this regard, teaching foreign languages is all about the relativisation of ideological systems and therefore it is a tool at the service of human freedom.

Most Japanese universities designed language programmes, and still do, in which there was a division between grammar and conversation classes. A Japanese
instructor would teach Spanish grammar and a native Spanish instructor would teach conversation. Japanese instructors were meant to do the theoretical explanations, considered to be the *hard* part of the teaching. Non-Japanese instructors were given the task of motivating students by imprecise means instead. Very few programmes introduced other courses that could have reinforced certain aspects of language teaching such as laboratory classes, where students could do structural drills; reading and writing courses, which would have helped students reflect on cultural differences; or introductory history or cross-culture courses through which students could have understood the social background of, let us say, particular pragmatic features of Spanish or Latin American speakers.

A four-year programme at a university specialising in foreign language education is based fundamentally on grammar and communication courses during the first two years of study. Some organisations offer short-term intensive courses in a Spanish-speaking country lasting up to one month for first- or second-year students. Students may be encouraged to spend up to one year overseas in some higher education institution and get credits if they take regular courses at an accredited university, usually one for which an exchange agreement is in place. At the third year, students will have to choose a seminar course leading towards the writing of their undergraduate thesis. Practical language courses are then cut by half. Seminars may cover a wide range of disciplines; linguistics, history, literature, economics and so-called area studies. In contrast, foreign language programmes at universities that do not specialise in foreign language education may last up to two years and will be almost completely limited to Spanish grammar and communication.

Regarding instructional materials, both kinds of organisations continue to use grammar manuals written in Japanese for the grammar class. At universities specialising in foreign language education, the communication instructor usually chooses a textbook informed by the communicative approach or the task-based language teaching method, which I consider to be part and parcel of communicative language teaching pedagogies. Usually, these textbooks are organised following a functional progression rather than a grammatical one and
come with audio recordings and an exercise book. They try to develop in a balanced way the four basic language skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking.

At organisations that do not specialise in foreign language education, both the communication and the grammar instructors may share the same textbook. As a rule, the text is produced in Japan by a team of Japanese and non-Japanese writers and will tend to follow a grammatical progression. Lessons usually contain one dialogue, grammatical explanations in Japanese, structural drills and a handful of very restrictive communication tasks. In fact, I believe that the kind of task contained in these textbooks is closer to a communication exercise. The difference between an exercise and a task is that in the former, the learning contents and procedures are clearly indicated and a lot of attention is paid to some aspect of the language’s grammatico-pragmatical system. Students are to avoid changing either the stipulated contents or the instructional sequence. In the latter, only the object of the task is given. Students have to figure out what to do and how to do it. More recent publications are accompanied by a CD containing audio recordings of dialogues and drills, and a few are sold together with video recordings of dialogues or communication situations and several briefings on cultural aspects of a given Spanish-speaking society.

Even though the instructional materials reveal different philosophical and methodological paradigms, the question is how those instructional materials are being used. I became very skilful at changing the object of an exercise contained in one of those Japanese manuals and transforming it, to a certain degree, into a communicative task. However, the instructional material imposes a certain logic that is hard to avoid or circumvent. Therefore, textbooks reveal a partial but important picture of what is going on inside the foreign language classrooms. However, we must understand how the material is actually being used in the classroom.

1.2.1 Classroom collapse and resistance
By the end of the 1990s primary and secondary teachers across the country started to witness a social phenomenon called *gakkyû hôkai*, which can be translated as *classroom collapse*. The phenomenon involved the deterioration or total collapse of a class in the hands of undisciplined students who committed violent acts, undermining the school’s authority. At university level we had our own version of the classroom collapse in the form of classroom disruption or education resistance. It did not take a violent form, though: the resistance was much more subtle as it involved the silent scorning of the system. Students were tired, overworked and non-responsive. One could ask a question of a student and get no answer. Not even ‘I do not know’. Students who knew the answer to a question would not answer either, even if asked directly to provide the answer. Many sat at their desks and started to sleep. Some pretended or simulated study when in fact they were doing something else. Around half of the students came to class intermittently, undermining any form of progression through the syllabus. They forgot to bring their textbooks or dictionaries. Some of them came to class without a pen to take notes or forgot to put in their contact lenses and therefore they could not read the whiteboard. At communication classes, students pretended to do the conversational tasks but in fact they were chatting with their peers in Japanese about something else. They were more focused on texting friends on their mobile telephones or doing the homework for other classes.

At the beginning of the 2000s the Spanish department at the vocational school had already closed down and I was working part-time in five universities, teaching an average of fifteen 90-minute classes per week. Two of those universities were specialising in foreign language education and the rest did not have a language department. Out of those five, there was only one, a public university specialising in foreign language education, where I did not experience students’ education resistance. Therefore, of those fifteen classes, I felt relatively fulfilled as an educator in only two. The remaining thirteen were a kind of living hell. I spent most of my teaching time trying to discipline students. Good students also suffered as they were ostracised by their recalcitrant peers. They demanded from instructors an impossible mission: the enforcement of disciplinary rules on disruptive students. Students who resisted education were aiming at the soft collapse of the classroom.
by creating an atmosphere that was not conducive to learning, forcing the instructor to lower the academic standards. To me, it seemed as if the students knew exactly what they were doing and acted in a co-ordinated manner, even though I was sure they were not actually conspiring to annihilate the class. It seemed to me that they were deploying the same strategies they had cultivated in their high-school years against their Japanese teachers. I remember sending one student to the academic affairs office for talking to a friend on his mobile phone while I was teaching. The device’s battery was gone so the student had plugged the phone to the charger and was talking in one of the corners of the classroom. Disciplining a clear breach of the rules like that was easy, I thought. It was much harder to discipline students who would scorn the class and the educational system as a whole. Nonetheless, that night, the head of the Spanish programme telephoned me home saying that I created a big problem for him, as he had to apologise on my behalf. His message was that the staff at the academic affairs office thought I was overreacting and he made me promise him that I would never respond like that again in a similar situation. His advice was to let students do what they wanted and then not pass them at the end of the course. In other words, I was told to use evaluations as a form of enforcing the social order. The message was clear: I was to deal with the problem alone and within the classroom walls. No much time passed until I developed a kind of nervous breakdown and soon I was feeling so depressed that I decided to consult a psychotherapist. I could not understand what I was doing with my life. I thought I had been hired to teach Spanish, to introduce students to a language that would open up the doors to a good number of rewarding possibilities. Students were paying costly tuition fees to attend university and yet, nothing seemed to be right.

I was not alone. Many Japanese and non-Japanese colleagues were suffering severe mental distress. Perhaps not everyone developed depression, as I did, but they were not having a good time either. The talk of the day was how to develop strategies to cope with classroom disruption. Thus, instead of focusing on preparing lessons, how to develop new instructional material or how to teach better classes, we were discussing how to become law enforcement agents. A couple of years later, many universities started to include questions that reflected
the state of affairs in the course evaluation surveys they gave to students to fill out at the end of the semester such as *Does the teacher maintain the social order in the classroom? Does s/he effectively deal with classroom interruptions such as use of mobile phones?* What I found particularly galling is that those surveys were administered by the office of academic affairs at every university, by the very same people who did not support instructors in the disciplining of students. And they were asking questions about the management of classroom disruption to the very same perpetrators of classroom disruption.

### 1.2.2 Instruction as a disciplinary tool

One of the major problems we had is that we began disciplining students through instruction, not by explaining the moral principles underlying the regulation of conduct. Even this attempt was not very effective because some universities started applying a policy that did not allow instructors to fail more than 10 per cent of the students, and students soon learned about it. Given the fact that resistance was rampant, we tried to exert control by applying hierarchical forms of control through instruction that ran counter to the instructional paradigm of the communicative methods we tried to deploy such as the *communicative approach*. In a nutshell, the communicative approach assumes that language is learned through meaningful communication, that is, through *real-life* situations that necessitate communication to be solved. This involves giving students a certain degree of freedom and self-control over the task sequence and roles they play. It requires their collaboration, for they have to engage themselves in some form of experiential learning, which, unfortunately, cannot be regulated from the outside unless they conceptually understand what they are doing and agree with its means. For instance, if after forming working groups or pairs students started to talk in their mother tongue about anything except the contents targeted in the instructional task, we could not tolerate the situation and took back control by deploying more teacher-centred methods of instruction, controlling speech turns, calling participants in, and in general, by involving the class as a whole. Another way to exert control and discipline was by checking periodically if students had done their homework effectively, or by introducing partial tests or examinations. Again, the
problem is that such easy forms of checking homework involved giving tasks based on pedagogies that are alien to the communicative approach such as structural drills, especially on written form. The proper assessment of communication is a lengthy process and in fact I believe it can only be done by evaluating the process, not the outcome. Put another way, individual homework is based on forms of reflection which are not equivalent to the parameters of oral conversation, which requires communicative readiness and automaticity. Any examination of communicative processes, furthermore, runs against the very principles of communication as they are understood in Spanish-speaking societies, for they value spontaneity above anything else. The testing of communication mastery is done by setting and controlling the communication context. Communication in Spanish-speaking societies is all about pushing the limits of the context, not blindly adhering to it. This is done because social relations tend to be considered horizontal, even in circumstances in which they are hierarchical, and there are higher degrees of criticism and relativisation of social positions than in Japan. Jokes are made in those situations precisely to soften and level up hierarchical relations. In fact, making jokes is part of a ritualistic form of communication that aims to partially undermine social hierarchies. The problem is that jokes, to be effective, cannot be rehearsed, and therefore there is no point in teaching them in an explicit manner. The way to teach this kind of ritual is complex and depends, to a large extent, on imitation. In conclusion, the instructional paradigm was the communicative approach and apparent student-centred pedagogies, but the quest for disciplining and controlling students kept us from applying that paradigm.

The implicit requirement imposed by the communicative approach may be at odds with certain social contexts and relations in Japanese social life, but a certain degree of freedom to communicate is absolutely necessary to learn anything at all. The adult learners at the vocational school’s evening courses did not have any problem at all with communicating in a horizontal way. Therefore, I cannot subscribe to the idea that Japanese communication styles are completely hierarchical and students cannot draw from particular experiences in which they had to collaborate and assume more horizontal social positions. Schooling
necessarily involves some form of explicit participation. Perhaps students must go back to their primary education years, in which their participation seemed more chaotic, less structured, and draw from those communication experiences. Or communication instructors must excel in orienting students on their instructional tasks, diminishing the need for creative approaches. Nevertheless, communication instructors did not have many chances to try out some approaches to come to terms with different communication styles. Students’ resistance did not allow them to do so in the first place.

Japanese colleagues did not suffer the instructional dissonance that non-Japanese instructors encountered in communication classes because the pedagogies of teaching grammar, which hardly touch any notions of pragmatics except a rather simple divide between formal and informal ways of communication, do not require the introduction of new social contexts and communication requirements. In fact, an additional problem of the made-in-Japan grammar textbooks is that language samples are taken out of the blue, created by their authors, that is, they are not extracted from any linguistic corpora, and do not correspond to any real communication need. They are used to demonstrate the language’s syntactic or morphosyntactic features, not its communicative functions. Thus, even though grammar instructors encountered students’ resistance to foreign language education, they could effectively discipline students through instruction without compromising their instructional paradigm. Communication instructors were not that lucky.

1.2.3 Dissonance in communication pedagogies

Communication instruction constituted a major contradictory process. The dissonance between the objectives set for the pedagogic process and the pedagogic means to achieve them by resorting to instruction as a disciplinary tool created an impossible situation. After all, communication instructors were mostly hired to teach actual communication. At least they were told to do that. In fact, a good selling point of a university programme is this idea of having students on campus interacting with foreign faculty members and actually learning a foreign language.
Some universities go beyond that and picture students abroad communicating in Spanish with native speakers. Perhaps all this is part of a collective fantasy. I must point out here that a few universities were more honest and did not hire communication instructors to teach communication but grammar, instead. Instructors were compelled to use Japanese. In those cases, instructors did not experience any problem at all except the need to brush up their Japanese skills. However, at universities where teaching communication was required, instructors had no other choice than to reduce the dissonance by setting different pedagogical objectives and betraying the communication and internationalisation prospects of the programme, which the organisation was not willing to support in the first place, as it was unwilling to discipline students. Not doing so would have meant assuming an extreme position always subject to being dubbed as a neo-colonialist pedagogy that did not pay respect to the pedagogic ways of the local social context. The instructor then would have followed the way of Mr Keating, the English teacher in the film *The Dead Poets Society*, who uncompromisingly taught the true stuff and the true ways of poetry, literature and drama but ended up being outmanoeuvred by an important segment of his own students, marginalised, and expelled from school. Fortunately, Mr Keating did not have to be called a neo-colonialist in the film, for he was an American teaching in an American school. Communication instructors had to be much more cynical.

Teaching Spanish as a foreign language would play, eventually, a role similar to that played by the teaching of Latin – a dead language – the Western world for centuries: brain training and accessing old written texts. Communication instructors were invited to kill the language (and symbolically kill themselves) and teach its dead version. Thus, reading a Spanish dialogue from a textbook amounted to the same operation as reading a passage of Livy’s *Ab urbe condita*, although the literary quality of the former was much inferior. Instructors, like zombies, may have dressed up the dead text by having students read it aloud or making a drama out of it, but its communicative potential as the expression of actual social relations taking place *hic et nunc* in the Spanish speaking and writing worlds, and in the classroom, as a bridge between two dissimilar worlds, was aborted, and with it the possibility of students connecting with those worlds. However, Spanish is
not a dead language, and the communication instructor, even if metamorphosised into a zombie, is never absolutely dead. Actual sparks of communication may emerge at any time. In fact, even dead languages like Latin produce sparks and ignite fires.

I started a new form of cognitive therapy at that time: scientific research. I started researching education resistance, trying to answer the questions of what the origins of that phenomenon were and what it meant to be a successful student in communication learning settings. These two questions summarise the problem. On the one hand, resistance was predominant in organisations that did not specialise in foreign language education. On the other, in both kinds of organisations only a quarter of the students actually achieved language mastery. The present thesis is the culmination of a long process that started in 2003.

During all these years teaching Spanish I noticed that not everybody understood the problem in its true dimension. On the one hand, there was a big gap between specialist and non-specialist organisations. Instructors who worked in the former remained pretty much ignorant of the ordeal it was to teach the foreign-language-other-than-English courses. On the other hand, as already seen, the grammar instructor did not suffer from instructional dissonance disease and had not experienced first-hand the same levels of distress that the communication instructor had.

There was also a coding problem that was (and still is) reflected in our academic conferences: the research carried out on a specialist organisation could not be completely applied to the organisation not specialising in foreign language teaching. If we wanted to understand the phenomenon, we had to develop a language of description and analysis of pedagogies that transcended this gap and allowed generalisations to be made. In fact, we had to produce a language of description of pedagogies that went beyond actual grammar and communication pedagogies at either specialist or non-specialist organisations.

I was having another problem as well. The applied linguistics and language
teaching literature I had consulted for more than a decade seemed unable to provide answers to the problem. After studying the theoretical principles of second-language acquisition (SLA) and applying its pedagogies for more than a decade, I gave up. It was hard to admit it but the SLA theoretical corpus did not constitute a science capable of explaining and analysing mind formation. It did not deal with the problem of consciousness, of social consciousness; human development and freedom; discourse and power. It seemed as if the SLA field was operating with many tiny theories that addressed specific problems, like a patchwork, but single, simple principles that could unify theory and research were missing. Therefore, if the reader of the present study feels that I have abandoned the SLA field, he or she could not be more right. What I have not abandoned, though, is my concern with teaching foreign languages. I have not abandoned my colleagues who teach foreign languages every day in Japanese universities, and my students. Therefore, in this study, communicative language teaching will be recontextualised and brought into the realm of the dialectical tradition, not the other way around. I am using the term communicative language teaching because I want to establish a recognisable link with SLA scholars and practitioners but, as already seen, my theoretical and empirical paradigms are quite different. I believe a more reasonable approach is to recontextualise SLA theory and practice in the light of psychological and sociological sciences, particularly Vygotskian psychology and Bernstein’s educational sociology. And this is exactly what this thesis is all about.

The teaching conditions may have changed from the 2000s. Perhaps the pedagogic settings are no longer dominated by cases of extreme collective resistance to learning as I experienced them. Since 2010 I have not taught the foreign-language-other-than-English courses but focused on teaching Spanish at universities specialising in foreign language education. I have a full-time job now at a university specialising in foreign language teaching. But still I hear fellow instructors from other universities commenting how difficult is to teach those classes. The talk of the day is motivation, how to motivate students. Even grammar instructors are concerned about motivating students. Yet, I believe the percentage of students that achieves higher levels of mastery is still small, even in university
departments specialising in Spanish and Latin-American studies. The present thesis will try to address that issue.

In conclusion, I hope the reader will soon understand why I am so concerned with providing descriptions that allow us to compare different teaching and learning contexts, for I am trying to address at once the problem of attaining mastery in dissimilar organisations and learning settings. I believe my experience of nineteen years in Japan teaching Spanish as a foreign language in a dozen organisations, from introductory to advanced courses, from oral and written communication to Spanish and Latin American culture and history, give me a solid base from which I can approach this important matter.
CHAPTER 2: SUBJECT, AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOURSE

The individual person is a limiting case of a subject, but in general, the individual-as-subject can only be the endpoint of a long-drawn-out, still-unfinished historical process.

(Blunden, 2007, p. 257)

First, we must show that the learning of a scientific concept differs from the learning of an everyday concept in much the same way that foreign language learning in school differs from learning a native language. Second, we must show that relationship between the development of the two types of concepts are much the same as the relationships between the processes of foreign and native language development.

(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 222)

I will define pedagogic discourse as a rule which embeds two discourses; a discourse of skills of various kinds and their relations to each other, and a discourse of social order. Pedagogic discourse embeds rules which create skills of one kind or another and rules regulating their relationship to each other, and rules which create social order ... Often people in schools and in classrooms make a distinction between what they call the transmission of skills and the transmission of values. These are always kept apart as if there were a conspiracy to disguise the fact that there is only one discourse.

(Bernstein, 2000, pp. 31-32)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the problematic conceptualisation of individual agency in relation to social institutions with the aim of providing a conceptual framework that overcomes, on the one hand, epistemologically unsustainable dualisms such as individual/society, and on the other hand, accounts based on distorted determinisms, whether they represent voluntarist political agendas or not. I argue that the problem of agency – how to describe, analyse and eventually explain the capacity of an agent to act in the world – is deeply rooted in a given conception of subject. Without an appropriate working concept of subject, individual agency can be perceived, on the one hand, as culturally determined, the product of social structures (culturalism), or, on the other hand, as enjoying higher but deceptive
degrees of autonomy or self-determinism (constructivism). Furthermore, without such a definition, the integration of the sciences that have traditionally studied human agency, such as ethics, psychology and sociology, is practically impossible.

Cultural-historical theories based on the work conducted by Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, Alexander Romanovich Luria, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin and Alexei Nikolaevich Leont’ev in the former Soviet Union provide a sociogenetic framework of analysis of the development of consciousness and behaviour that satisfies some of the aforementioned requirements. These theories can be said to belong to the dialectical tradition at large. With the exception perhaps of Bakhtin’s theoretical corpus, they all draw on Marx’s theory of society and social subject and the principles of dialectical materialism, which provide an important ontological foundation. This foundation avoids dualistic constructs such as individual/society that introduce profound epistemological limitations and distortions.

I argue throughout this chapter that these theories, particularly cultural-historical activity theory, and others that draw on them such as Basil Bernstein’s code theory and the cultural theory advanced by Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte Jr, Debra Skinner and Carole Cain (Holland et al., 2001), provide a sound account of agency. This account will help us to address the theoretical and pedagogic problems posed in the present study concerning the mastery of oral Spanish as foreign language by Japanese students in communication learning settings at the tertiary level.

Drawing on Andy Blunden’s (2007, 2010) critique of activity theory, I attempt to set the foundations for a non-conventional definition of subject that allows the reconceptualising of deterministic or voluntaristic views of individual agency, society and culture, bridging, above all, psychology and sociology.

By taking up the notion of subject, I explore the issue of agency with a twofold purpose. The first one is integrating cultural-historical activity theory with Bernstein’s code theory, which can be regarded as a model of cultural transmission that, unlike other sociological accounts, establishes an inherent relation between
social structure and discursive forms. Discourse (in our case pedagogic discourse) condenses subject and institutional positions, and therefore obeys at once the logic of social or historical forces and individual consciousness or psyche. In other words, discourse concentrates the conflict between cultural tools as expression of societal needs such as education, the social dynamic of learning as a specific intermental process, and as vehicles of the subject’s self-control, mastery or development, that is, as an intramental process. In this regard, I argue that discourse is eminently a sociological notion, analytically more powerful within this dimension than interaction, practice, language or communication. The second purpose is to incorporate accounts – not unlike those portrayed in Bakhtin’s theories of communication – that view identity as a process taking place in multivoiced, socially constructed worlds, such as the work done in cultural theory by Holland et al. (2001). Their theory of identity and agency in figured worlds – which not only draws on Bakhtin but on Vygotsky, A.N. Leont’ev and Pierre Bourdieu – allows incorporation of the individual’s narrative as a discursive account of her self-consciousness and identity construction into empirical analysis. In other words, the integration of the theoretical bodies of Bernstein, and of Holland and colleagues, not only helps in understanding how culture modulates and is modulated by the subject’s social position but offers a methodological approach to tackle empirical research on this area.

All these theories have different theoretical and empirical strengths and weaknesses. For instance, unlike cultural-historical activity theory, Bernstein’s code theory lacks an account of subject change or development. Code theory represents a powerful sociological account of cultural production and reproduction at the structural level, but it is not sensitive to subject development. The strength of code theory is that it offers theoretical and methodological instruments to unveil cultural and social constraints in pedagogical processes by means of analysing the positions subjects take as a result of differentials in the distribution of power and principles of control, which are aspects that remain largely undertheorised in cultural-historical activity theory. Furthermore, the cultural theory of Holland and colleagues (2001) is sensitive to social position but lacks psychological accounts of intramental processes and mind formation, which are the main concerns of
Vygotskian psychology.

Although I believe Bernstein’s code theory provides the theoretical and empirical backbone in the present study, I will start this literature review by providing an introduction to the problem of subject, agency and discourse along the historical development of the cultural-historical tradition, as it provides the basic notions to be expanded and the basic problems that need to be addressed throughout the present research. I will then introduce Bernstein’s code theory in depth, together with Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory. In other words, I will begin explaining the socio-genetic principle of cultural-historical psychology and then move on to explore some sociological and ethnographic accounts of the same principle.

2.2 AGENCY AND THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT

2.2.1 A materialist socio-genetic, socio-historical model of development

Right up to the first quarter of the twentieth century, psychology was still having trouble finding a theory and a language of description that allowed it to account for both sensory and rational cognition (i.e., lower and higher psychological functions) without falling into, on the one hand, Cartesian body-mind type of dualisms and the idealist determinisms of Cartesian thought, and, on the other hand, cases of extreme objectivation, such as behaviourism, which studied external behaviour while rejecting out of hand the study of human consciousness.

Luria (1985) points out that the central issue of a psychology that could overcome these problems is precisely the study of consciousness, especially how humans transcend the bounds of sensory experience (lower functions) and are able to abstract individual features of things, perceiving their links (higher functions) (p. 17). The study of consciousness is firmly bound to the study of language, whose basic element is the word. Protohistorically, Luria views words as emerging out of human labour, particularly out of the division of labour, as a means of organising and giving an account of increasingly complex social relations. It is through labour
that words started to go beyond their immediate referential role, or sympractical character, intertwined with practice, i.e. their meaning arose solely out of concrete practical situations and activities, and then became part of a synsemantic structure, acquiring independence and becoming meaningful only in the company of other words, thus forming part of a system. The study of the emergence of complex forms of conscious behaviour thus depends upon the analysis of the social forms of human historical existence. This represents a complete departure from the teachings of traditional psychology at the time (p.27).

More concretely, Luria is referring to a particular model of description and explanatory principle grounded in the socio-genetic and socio-historical model of development as set out by Vygotsky (1987, 1997a). In this model, the development of higher conscious psychological functions is understood as mediated, especially through sign-using, social, collaborative activity. Functions such as voluntary attention, logical memory and the formation of concepts appear twice, after a long series of developmental events, first on the interpsychological level, and later on, on the intrapsychological level (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56).

Luria explains that the model used constitutes the basic position of a Marxist psychology. The approach is grounded in dialectical materialism. The origins of human consciousness are not located in the soul or in the brain but in ‘humans’ actual relation with reality’ (Luria, 1985, p. 30), especially in their social history, which is intimately linked to labour and language.

I would like to stress that, in both Vygotsky’s and Luria’s accounts of the socio-genetic and socio-historical model of development, language is not seen as a system of logical propositions but is considered social activity itself and therefore it should be regarded in their theoretical framework as a form of proto-discourse, language in use or practice. In fact, Vygotsky’s (and Bakhtin’s) work on language has been rendered sometimes as a theory of verbal communication (see Akhutina, 2003) to make absolutely clear that by using the term language we are not talking about the subject matter of modern linguistics.
Vygotsky (1978) proposed a ‘complex, mediated act’ as a link between stimulus and response. He saw in this ‘auxiliary stimulus’ the key to understanding the development of higher mental functions rather than a ‘mere additional link’ (p. 40). For Vygotsky, the auxiliary stimulus serves the specific role of reverse action, as it brings the psychological operation to higher and new forms, allowing humans, by the aid of extrinsic stimuli, to regulate their own behaviour from the outside. The solution therefore blurs the line between external and internal activity and provides, as Wertsch and Stone (1985) assert, ‘a bridge that connects … the social with the individual’ (p. 164). Thus, the key concept of mediation, as Daniels (2001a) points out, ‘opens the way to a non-deterministic account in which “psychological tools” serve as the means by which the individual acts upon and is acted upon by social, cultural and historical factors’ (p. 100).

Among many forms of mediation made possible by artefacts, Vygotsky focused on language for a number of reasons. This was because, according to Lee (1985, pp. 76-77), (a) linguistic signs are ‘reversible’, they can be both stimulus and response, allowing language to be internalised and then used to regulate behaviour; (b) language is multifunctional, it can be used as a means to organise multiple goal-oriented activities; (c) language serves the purpose of communication, that is, of sustaining social action and, closely linked to this, (d) language allows, on the one hand, generalisation, that is, it can depict common characteristics of phenomena through various levels of generality, and on the other, self-reflection – unlike other sign systems, language can refer to itself with ease. The generalisation and self-reflection qualities of language create the possibility of abstract thinking, and abstract thinking finds reality and form in language (expression) in a dialectical fashion (thinking and speech).

As has been already seen, although language and speech are to a certain extent interchangeable terms – compare Kozulin’s (1986) rendition of Vygotsky’s (1987) Thinking and speech as Thought and language – speech stresses the fact that Vygotsky was concerned with studying speaking acts and their relation to thinking processes and not with the grammatical and semantic system, langage in Saussure (see Rieber and Carton, 1987). In consequence, within Vygotsky’s framework,
language refers to instantiations rather than to a universal.

Nonetheless, this focus on mediation by means of the linguistic sign was supplemented by A.N. Leont’ev’s advancing of a full-fledged theory of activity in which attention was paid to societal structure, an aspect that, although included in Vygotsky’s unit, had been neglected to some extent. In this regard, I do not believe that the unit of analysis advanced by Leont’ev constitutes an altogether different unit. In the next section I will discuss the problem of the unit of analysis with the aim of presenting a unifying approach between the Vygotskian and Leont’evian traditions.

2.2.2 Consciousness and the problem of the unit of analysis

Vygotsky advanced the need in psychology for a method of analysis that relied upon units instead of elements of analysis. The advantage of working with such a method is that the unit reflects the complexity of a whole, eventually eliminating epistemological contradictions and deterministic or voluntaristic accounts of social phenomena.

This particular methodology, as Chaiklin (1996) maintains, can be traced back to a philosophical tradition of dialectic logic whose more characteristic imprints are the developments introduced by Hegel in the first third of the nineteenth century, and subsequently by Marx, Ilyenkov and others. In other words, Vygotsky’s concern with finding a unit of analysis of human development reflects his interest in ontological and epistemological issues, as well as his intention to find an explanatory principle for the origin of consciousness. In his own words:

In contrast to the term ‘element,’ the term ‘unit’ designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible part of the whole. … A psychology concerned with the study of the complex whole must comprehend this. It must replace the method of decomposing the whole into its elements with that of partitioning the whole into units. Psychology must identify those units in which the characteristics of the whole are present, even though they may be manifested in altered form. Using this mode of analysis, it must attempt to resolve the concrete problems that face us. (Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 46-47)
In search of such a unit of analysis, Vygotsky advanced the use of ‘word meaning’ (p. 47) as one that could capture both the representational aspect of thought (generalisation and abstraction) and the socio-communicative function of speech (socio- and self-regulation) (pp. 43-51). Nonetheless, the unit already implies the fact that the link between stimulus and response is mediated action. In this regard, we have to note again that the sign here is not the Saussurean sign but the utterance, that is, sign-as-action or, as Vygotsky puts it, ‘a verbal act of thought’ (p. 47). Vygotsky is stressing the fact that, among mediated acts, the subject matter of psychology is mediation by means of psychological tools, especially speech.

Vygotsky maintained that the sign, especially the one linked to true (scientific or theoretical) concepts, mediated mind in a way that other tools (including everyday concepts) did not. Mediation by means of true concepts brought about generalisation, abstract thought and analytical faculties, and therefore took the subject away from the immediacy of everyday contexts and spontaneous learning vectors of development (p. 189). As Vygotsky points out, ‘conscious awareness enters through the gate opened up by the scientific concept’ (p. 191) leading to the mastery of those functions.

In conclusion, Vygotsky was concerned about explaining the origins of consciousness as it relates to development and therefore chose not only a unit of analysis of mental life but one that could explain the emergence of those higher functions. Thus, as Blunden maintains, not unlike Marx when he advanced the commodity as the subject matter of capital, Vygotsky advances ‘word meaning’ as the unit of consciousness and the subject matter of psychology (2010, p. 114).

Vygotsky’s unit presents some limitations though, as it was addressing not a sociological problem but a psychological one. Rodriguez Illera (1995) affirms, for instance, that the ineffectiveness of cultural-historical psychology lies in the fact that the social and cultural references tend to be nonspecific (p. 200). Even though Vygotsky was concerned with socially situating semiosis, his approach did not address issues of social structure or class or the differentiation of the subject beyond the joint activity of a few subjects in more or less laboratory-like contexts.
Vygotsky’s (1987) ‘functional method of dual stimulation’ (p. 127) seems to support the view that, even if Vygotsky was concerned about socially situating semiosis, the analytical tools deployed belonged in fact to a proto-sociological stage. In this method, subjects are presented with two sets of stimuli. ‘One set of stimuli fulfills the function of the object on which the subject’s activity is directed’ (p. 127), that is, the problem from which a true concept can be formed. ‘The second function as signs that facilitate the organization of this activity’ (p. 127), which comprises the socio-communicative activity that helps to solve the problem introduced earlier. This unambiguously shows that Vygotsky’s analysis of semiosis paid attention to the social relations from which consciousness emerges. However, as already mentioned, the analysis is restricted.

One of the main problems is that the sharing of the object of activity has more or less been taken for granted. This induced A.N. Leont’ev (1979, 1981) to analyse the structure of activity in order to determine the societal object or motive of activity and the goal that directs the individual’s action, for sense emerges from that relation, opening a way to expanding Vygotsky’s minimalist approach.

I prefer to define Leont’ev’s analysis of activity as an expansion of Vygotsky’s original work and therefore I do not completely agree with theorists who tend to see in Leont’ev a maverick departure from Vygotskian principles. In fact, presenting Vygotsky’s unit as one that is focused on semiosis, and that of Leont’ev as focused on activity (see Kozulin, 1986; Zinchenko, 1985), reflects a very narrow interpretation of Vygotsky’s intent. These views, as we will see later, have been an enduring part of the basic position of the so-called sociocultural tradition and cultural-historical activity theory, respectively.

Yet even if we are inclined to believe A.N. Leont’ev’s approaches to the problem of the emergence of mind represent a more orthodox Marxist perspective whereby we are going straight back to Marx’s (2000) *Theses on Feuerbach*, reclaiming the foundation of consciousness on ‘real, sensuous activity’ (p. 171), Marx (Marx and Engels, 1974) in *The German Ideology* proves Vygotsky right by considering
language as ‘practical consciousness’ (p. 51) and the ‘immediate actuality of thought’ (p. 118). The actual problem seems to be that Marxist theorists did not tackle the issue of a theory of knowledge, logic and thought until the middle of the twentieth century, and therefore the link between social consciousness and language remained undertheorised for decades.

A.N. Leont’ev’s (1961, 1977, 1981) works, published three or four decades after Vygotsky’s death in 1934, reflect a different set of formulations altogether and a terminology that draws on the groundwork of Soviet philosophers on the dialectic of subject and object (see Lektorsky, 1977). Thus, Vygotsky’s Marxian notions related to the importance of semiosis seem to be not aligned with those of his contemporaries. In fact, as Bruner (1987) comments, ‘Vygotsky’s Marxism is closer to Althusser, Habermas, and the Frankfurt School than to the Soviet Marxism of his times or of ours’ (p. 2).

The final evidence that Leont’ev was not working in opposition to but expanding Vygotsky’s unit is the way he deals with the issue of language. Even if Leont’ev refers to consciousness as the result and shaper of activity, he does give language the key status accorded to it by Vygotsky:

But what is consciousness? ‘Consciousness is co-knowledge,’ as Vygotsky loved to say. Individual consciousness can exist only in the presence of social consciousness and language, which is its real substratum. In the process of material production, people also produce language, which serves not only as means of social interaction but also as a carrier of the socially elaborated meanings that are embedded therein. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1981, p. 56)

For A.N. Leont’ev, the structure of consciousness is in fact the structure of activity. The emergence, development and functioning of consciousness is predicated on the functions of activity. Moreover activity, in turn, is directed by consciousness. Awareness requires a certain degree of reflection on the relation between societal and individual motives, something that can only be achieved through mediation by means of signs. In fact, Leont’ev points out that the sign as an objective image is different from other kind of images that also mediate activity. Thus it is here that
the relation between objective and personal meaning (sense), as captured in Vygotsky’s (1987) dialectical unity of ‘thinking and speech’ (p. 109), is regarded as the formative of consciousness. Sense is concretised in words, that is, in ready-made tools that are the product of social relations, but cannot be completely expressed in words. As Bakhtin asserts, the word is half one’s and half someone else’s, indicating that the sign, as a ready-made tool that is the product of social relations, represents a gap between objective and subjective motives. Signs shed a light on social relations, but they also obscure them. Ideology is the expression of this gap.

I will return to the issue of the structure of activity once I unfold the notion of subject that appears more appropriate for the integration of cultural-historical activity theory, code theory and culture theory.

**Beyond ontological holism and dualism**

The problem of the unit of analysis brings other issues to the forefront as well. I would like to focus on the analysis of the differences between sociocultural theory and cultural-historical activity theory to explore a theoretical bridge between them and also to address the problem that arises from the indivisibility of the individual and society with the purpose of proposing a unit that is adequate to the research aims of the present study. To this effect, I agree with Matusov (2007) when he concludes that the appropriate unit of analysis is one that pays attention to the goals of the research rather than being a universal fix, but at the same time it is necessary to address the nonseparability of individual-society from an ontological perspective if we want to introduce both an account of societal structures and at the same time differentiate the individual agent.

According to Engeström and Miettinen (1999), the unit of analysis of cultural-historical activity theory is ‘object-oriented, collective, and culturally mediated human activity, or activity system’ (p. 9). Owing to the collective nature of the activity system, activity theory considers activity systems as evolving over lengthy periods of time. By collective, Engeström and Miettinen stress the fact that
the activity system is not concerned with individual action separated from activity. Activity is not reducible to individual actions. To this purpose, they advance a methodology in which the researcher must produce a dialectic rendition of both systemic and subjective views. Based upon this unit, they make a strong distinction between cultural-historical activity theory and the sociocultural theory of mediated action (see Wertsch, del Rio, and Alvarez, 1995).

On the one hand, Engeström and Miettinen maintain that the sociocultural theory of action does not capture the ideas of historicity, object orientedness and the collective make-up of human activity. Since they neglect collective practices, context appears as the external envelope of individual action, failing to capture the ontological complexity of collective motives, including the irrational aspects of actions. Wertsch (1998), on the other hand, maintains that sociocultural analysis takes ‘mediated action’ (p. 24) as a unit of analysis. Wertsch (2002) points out that in the analysis of mediated action, that is, the analysis of the use of cultural tools, or mediational means, an ‘irreducible tension’ (p.11) between active agents on the one hand and cultural tools, on the other, is brought to the forefront, referring in a more essential way to the contradictions between the collective and the individual.

Daniels (2001a) plays down the differences that Engeström and Miettinen ascertain about the treatment of context in the sociocultural tradition by pointing out that mediated action, as a unit of analysis, ‘provides a kind of natural link between action, including mental action, and the cultural, institutional and historical context in which such an action occurs’ (p. 78). Daniels concludes that although there is still some purpose in discussing these traditions as if they were distinct, in practical terms, the distinction between sociocultural theory and activity theory is becoming blurred (p. 85). As is implied by Daniels, the roots of the debate can be traced back to the dialectic nature of the unit of analysis or notion as it was intended originally by Vygotsky and, shortly afterwards, by A.N. Leont’ev. Alongside Daniels, Cole (1996) in a rather Hegelian tone, draws a middle line between the two traditions by reminding us that the unit of analysis cannot be understood as two different levels of activity but instead, two instances of a single process, a position – as already mentioned – shared by Blunden (2010)
in his immanent critique of the theory of activity. In fact, it is time to resort to a Hegelian notion of subject (as a unit of analysis in its own right) to bridge theoretically more adequately both of the units seen so far and to introduce Bernstein’s code theory and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory.

2.2.3 A Marxian-Hegelian notion of subject

Crucial to the understanding of agency within Marxian theory is Marx’s criticism of materialism. In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx (2000, p. 171) criticised the materialism of Feuerbach and all its previous forms because, above all, they failed to consider human activity within the relationship of subject and object. In contrast, Marx’s brand of materialism viewed the emergence of the subject but through the subject’s own objective activity. By adopting and developing in the field of psychology Marx’s notion of practical activity as a link that contains both the subject and the object of activity, activity theory set out on a different theoretical footpath. Lektorsky (1977, p. 101) summarises this important theoretical development by pointing out that, in Marx, the problem of the subject-object relationship starts from the basic question posed by philosophy, because in activity, the object is being subjectivised and the subject objectivised. Thus, the subject of external and internal activity is not simply a separate corporeal individual but a person becomes a subject, doer, knower, only to the extent that she has mastered the modes of activity developed by society.

I argue that the distinction between – and the analysis of – the (corporeal) individual and the subject is essential to connecting Vygotsky’s unit of analysis with the unit in cultural-historical activity theory. In both dialectical materialism and Hegelian idealism, the subject is always emerging. The individual controls his own body, his own activity, according to the referential frame given by society’s rules, which compel him to look at himself. The demands to regulate his activity come from the outside, modulated by the use of language. Therefore, as Smolka, De Goes and Pino (1995) uphold, the mastery of these modes of activity marked by the division of labour can only be achieved by cultural means, that is, by semiotic mediation.
Blunden (2007) points out that culture has been for cultural-historical activity theory the missing link between the individual psyche and society. By theorising the individual psyche in terms of society within a psychological theoretical frame, the founders of cultural-historical activity theory left undertheorised social formations, ideologies and institutions. In other words, cultural-historical activity theory left culture out of the dichotomy of ‘individual psyche-society’ (p. 254). Blunden asserts that although orthodox Marxist theory considers it a flagrant mistake to theorise society and history subject to the laws of individual behaviour, this never discouraged the founders of cultural-historical activity theory’s from formulating the individual psyche in terms of society. On the one hand, according to Blunden, this shortcoming is the result of the situated practice of the early developers of cultural-historical activity theory who were working with communitarian ideas of society that did not present the contradictions of current postmodern societies. The postmodern individual does not necessarily identify with institutions or social movements; her identification cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, part of the problem also lies in psychology uncritically appropriating notions from the social sciences.

By the same token, Sawyer (2002) notices a number of critical limitations brought about by two important theoretical assumptions of sociocultural theory, which apply to cultural-historical activity theory as well: (a) process and methodological ontology; and (b) the individual-social inseparability. By these Sawyer refers to the assumption that the ‘individual and the social are inseparable, both in reality and ontologically (distinct entities do not really exist), or methodologically (the analyst cannot meaningfully distinguish between what is internal to the individual and what is external context)’ (p. 284-285). He believes that these theoretical assumptions lead to a distinctive methodology: ‘a rejection of the individual subject as the unit of analysis in favor of an action or event unit of analysis. In practice this leads to close empirical study of symbolic interaction in naturally occurring microsocial situations using ethnographic and qualitative methods.’ (p. 285). Sawyer points out that inseparability does not enable sociologists to account for the constraining power of external social forces, for macro-sociological structures or patterns, for history, or for material conditions. Eventually, Sawyer
proposes ‘analytic dualism’ (p. 297) as a way to overcome both process ontology and inseparability. In other words, individual and society are to be seen as analytically distinct, yet inherently interrelated, levels of analysis.

There is yet another alternative more in line with the original tenets on which Vygotsky drew when he outlined his approach to psychology. In contrast to Sawyer’s analytic dualism, Blunden proposes to extend cultural-historical activity theory by using Hegelian dialectics (Individual-Particular-Universal) and develops two trichotomies. The first one consists of adding culture as an intermediate link between individual and society. The second one, which I will explore later, deals with the notion of subject. The first trichotomy is expressed in the following terms:

In CHAT [(cultural-historical activity theory)] terminology, the trichotomy is (a) the individual, that is, the single, mortal human psyche; (b) culture, that is the mass of objects or artefacts that are inherited from the past and only spring to life when they are used by individuals – buildings, languages, crops, laws, libraries, technology, and so on; and (c) society, that is the particular, continuing corporate activities in which individuals use culture in collaborative activities or conflict and are taken up by one individual as another leaves off (Blunden, 2007, pp. 255-256).

By introducing culture, Blunden is able to break the dichotomy of individual psyche-society, bringing in objective constraints such as organisational or institutional rules, as well as those imposed on the human body, adding analytical complexity. In consequence, the idea that culture is subject not only to human agency but also to objective constraints is hard to dismiss. The reason is culture’s material make-up. Even if one might reject notions that appeal for the acceptance of some kind of determinism outside human agency, such as social or historical laws, one would have to acknowledge the fact that cultural tools are made out of what is given by nature, that is, a limited diversity and quantity of material resources. Likewise language is ultimately supported by human organic conditions, by the human body. However, acknowledging the existence of objective constraints does not amount to accepting absolute material or organic determinism. Hence, one is not required to agree completely with Durkheim’s (1950) defence of the sociological method – which maintains that the determining cause of a social
fact must be found in the social fact that precedes it, not in the state of the individual consciousness – to admit that there is a breach between the logic of the socio-historical forces and the logic of human consciousness. To sum up, Blunden’s Hegelian unfolding of cultural-historical activity theory’s unit allows the introduction of an ecological or social influence approach.

The analysis of the acquisition of the modes of activity evolved by society by cultural means, especially through language, brings to the forefront once again the problem of the analysis of the functioning of language both in its social and individual dimensions. In this regard, I maintain that the theory of activity that drew on and contributed to the development of the underpinnings of Soviet philosophy from the 1950s offers invaluable insights. I argue that the attention paid by Leont’ev to the issue of semiosis as ideology is part of a larger endeavour set in motion by a number of scholars who drew on Marx’s early works and the German philosophical tradition from Fichte to Hegel to elucidate the problem of the relation between the real and the ideal. In other words, they were looking at the expressions of the ideal (consciousness) that could best explain fundamental collective and individual illusions such as fetishism and reification (see Ilyenkov, 1977a, 1977b). Before I approach in more depth the issue of the subject and subject position, I believe it is necessary to sum up those underpinnings in the light of Blunden’s proposal, especially those related to the dialectic of subject and object.

Meanings are ready-made, historically-evolved products, abstract forms that obey the logic of their own social development (e.g. the historical development of a discipline or science) and the laws of the social order, the ideological notions of society – religious, philosophical and political. When internalisation occurs, meanings become part of the consciousness of individuals. They become both objects and means of comprehension of reality, something that A.N. Leont’ev (1977) refers to as the ‘duality’ (p. 195) of meanings. Leont’ev illustrates the double life of meanings in the consciousness of individuals in the following terms:
… all older schoolchildren know the meaning of an examination mark and the consequences it will have. Nonetheless, a mark may appear in the consciousness of each individual pupil in essentially different ways; it may, for example, appear as a step forward (or obstacle) on the path to his chosen profession, or as a means of asserting himself in the eyes of the people around him, or perhaps, in some other way. This is what compels psychology to distinguish between the conscious objective meaning and its meaning for the subject, or what I prefer to call the ‘personal meaning’. In other words, an examination mark may acquire different personal meanings in the consciousness of different pupils. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 197)

Let us analyse the other side of the coin, that is, meaning in its objective dimension, subject to the logic of the social relations that produced it, yet always in conflict with the logic of its internal development. As Leont’ev asserts:

… consciousness owes its origin to the identification in the course of labour of actions whose cognitive results are abstracted from the living whole of human activity and idealised in the form of linguistic meanings. As they are communicated they become part of the consciousness of individuals. This does not deprive them of their abstract qualities because they continue to imply the means, objective conditions and results of actions regardless of the subjective motivation of the people’s activity in which they are formed. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 197)

Let me give an example of these two dimensions. The particular kinds of bonds of a person to the state that cement his or her civic rights and duties have been evolving in the course of history. Many terms have been used to express these bonds such as citizenship, subjecthood and nationality. The terms are always evolving depending on how the state and the persons define these bonds. Thus, the objectivity of the word citizen is contested.

Something similar occurs on the subjective dimension of the term. I remember, for instance, how difficult was for film director Scandar Copti, a Palestinian born and raised in Jaffa, to talk about his membership of the State of Israel while introducing his film Ajami in the 2010 Nara International Film Festival in Japan. Copti, a Palestinian citizen of the state of Israel, uses the resources available to filmmakers in the country to make films that question the moral legitimacy of the Israeli state and the contradictions of people like him who consider themselves
Arab nationals. In Chile, my own country, something similar happens with the Mapuche indigenous people, who do not consider themselves Chilean but Mapuche, although they are for legal purposes Chilean citizens.

Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s example above about the meaning of an exam mark for a schoolchild, we can have an imaginary glimpse of what a military conscription sign containing the word citizens may mean for Arab citizens in Israel or for Mapuche people in Chile. Although the former are not required to serve in the national army, the latter were until not long ago (conscription is not mandatory in Chile nowadays). A concept that belongs to theoretical systems such as Law or History soon enters the subjectivity of Arab or Mapuche subjects in ways that are very different to the subjectivity of Israeli and Chilean subjects, forming part of the core words used not only in the description of their identities but as the very formatives of those identities.

It is worth remembering that the problem is not merely semantic or, more broadly, grammatical. Words like citizen are part of utterances that obey speech genre systems, that is, words form part of codified forms of the whole utterance. For me, the French expression Citoyens!, which means ‘Citizens!’, represents a dramatic call of imperious attention that I associate back to the films I have seen and the books I have read about the French Revolution. In fact, I can still hear in my mind the voice of Georges-Jacques Danton, played by Gerard Depardieu in Andrzej Wajda’s film Danton, calling the mob on the streets of Paris to beware the despotic enforcement of public security carried out by Robespierre’s Committee of Public Safety, as this institution inaugurated the Revolution’s Reign of Terror. However, I cannot recall any such a desperate call in English or Japanese. The closest expression I have learnt in English is contained in the inaugural addresses of the United States presidents. Abraham Lincoln addressed the American people in 1861 by calling them Fellow-citizens. A similar expression was used by President Barack Obama in his inaugural speech in 2009: My fellow citizens. Yet these expressions were not as exclamatory as Danton’s call. Remember that Danton appealed to the citizens of France to revolt against Robespierre’s methods. Eventually, Danton’s life was on the line. He ended up being lawfully guillotined.
In the American case, the addresses given by the presidents of the Union seemed to reflect a much calmer situation. Nonetheless, the speakers were addressing the citizens as their equal, members of the different states of the Union. In contrast, when the prime minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, accepted to form his government in 2010 he started with *Her Majesty, the Queen, has asked me to form a new government*... A similar formula was used by former Japanese prime minister, Naoto Kan, in his inaugural address in 2010. After referring to the Emperor, he used the expression *kokumin-no mina san*, which translates as ‘fellow nationals’, to address the people of the nation. Within constitutional monarchies, the formation of government is linked to the power of the sovereign, whereas in a republican system, the president addresses the citizens of the country directly, as there is no power above him or them. This confirms that the idea of citizenship carried by the English word *citizen* is different depending on the subjects. Cameron as a citizen (horizontal relationship) was still a subject of the Crown (vertical relationship). Obama was only a citizen (horizontal relationship). In Spanish, Simón Bolivar addressed the first Colombian congress in 1830 using the expression *¡Conciudadanos!*, which can be translated as ‘Fellow-citizens!’; a much closer expression in stylistic terms to that of Danton. Yet in his inaugural address in 2010, the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, exclaimed *¡Gracias a Dios! ¡Gracias Colombia!* , that is, ‘Thank God! Thank Colombia!’ Thus, although Santos kept the exclamation, he departed from a purely Colombian republican tradition.

The above examples, which are informal recollections of speeches given by real or fictional characters in which a person addresses his compatriots depending on the historical circumstances and their social position, remind us not only about the analytical complexities of the context of speech acts, and the contexts that speech creates as well, but the importance of the institutions in mutually shaping context and speech forms. Even the simplest act of addressing people depends upon social relations that are mostly mediated by institutions (marriage, family, school, corporation, parliament, government, church, market, union, etc.) and closely regulated as well by historically developed speech genre systems.
What I believe A.N. Leont’ev does by introducing us to the problem of meaning is presenting discourse as a proto-sociological category. Leont’ev is departing from a view of the linguistic sign within the rather restricted dimension of the context, which in pragmatics or in a theory of communication is expressed as the context of the utterance. Instead, Leont’ev is using the notion of language in its discursive capacity, as a sociological category.

Language, being an abstract product and having abstract form by expressing ready-made, historically evolved meanings, is nonetheless modulated by ideas of what are considered legitimate forms of discourse and activity in particular activity systems. In other words, discourse could be defined as language use within the ideological constraints and affordances of social relations, as an expression of the objectivation of the subject and the subjectivation of the object, or, in short, as the relationship between language, structure and agency.

Social relations are subject to social rules and social positions. Conceptual development not only determines higher forms of consciousness, such as categorical thinking, but dispositions such as practical mastery and views about the social order. The pedagogical relation takes place in particular activity systems where subjects make up their objects according to their historical aggregation of activity systems, their subjectivity, and the historically-developed social expectations set for the pedagogic activity, that is, the objective conditions of cultural production and reproduction.

Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev, Blunden (2007) believes that the disassociation between the ideal form of language as meanings and the materiality of the social relations that makes meanings possible or affords them, raises three distinct contradictions. First, social practices may not coincide with the subjective conceptions of the individuals performing them. Second, social practices may be at odds with the cultural norms and laws originally and supposedly governing them. Third, meanings that become residues or sediments of cultural expressions (language and laws) may be in contradiction with the implied meanings of ever-unfolding social practices. For Blunden, these contradictions act as forces of
social change and will be manifested as contradictions in the psychology of individuals (p. 257).

One does not have to come back to the dramatic examples of the implications of the objective notion of citizenship in the subjectivity of Mapuche citizens of Chile and Palestinian citizens of Israel to illustrate the point that Blunden is making. In our case, Japanese students and instructors have to adapt to the new expectations about what it means to be a university student and a foreign language university instructor. Some students have never talked to a foreign national in their life and do not know their communication style, not to mention that every national has a different background and perhaps a communication style. Instructors, whether Japanese or foreign nationals, have their own set of expectations about what the product of foreign language education is. The study programme may be composed of contradictory objectives, with some instructors targeting, for instance, the dissolution of the Japanese-self of students, and others targeting the reinforcement of their Japanese-self. Some instructors may seek the practical mastery of oral Spanish, whilst some others may seek the theoretical mastery of grammar. Some Japanese instructors use the grammar class to talk about Spanish culture and therefore they are more interested on giving students a glimpse of a foreign world than actually demanding from them academic knowledge in relation to that world. Instruction is based on anecdotes. Some native Spanish instructors may want to reproduce the kind of academic objectives set by the higher education institutions in their country of origin, which may or may not have a correlate with the objectives set by the Japanese institutions. At the same time, there may be students willing to explore a different identity and others that may be afraid of doing so. In conclusion, the sociological and psychological aspects of instruction of a subject matter or skill are very complex.

A.N. Leont’ev (1977) maintains that the depth of these contradictions is regulated ultimately by the division of labour. The emergence of the social division of labour and private property brought about the disintegration of the former correspondence between meanings as phenomena of social consciousness and as phenomena of individual consciousness. Socially-evolved meanings start living a sort of double
life in the consciousness of individuals (p. 197).

2.3 SUBJECT POSITION, DEVELOPMENT AND DISCOURSE

The contradictions pointed out by Blunden are not only echoed in A.N. Leont’ev’s views on activity theory but in Bernstein’s ideas of culture reproduction, particularly in code theory and in Holland et al.’s (2001) theories of identity and agency. I argue that by centring it on the subject, Blunden’s extension of the trichotomy individual-culture-society allows integration of these theories within a common ontological framework. I will now explore the issue of subject and subject position in the light of Blunden’s Hegelian rendition of subject.

For Blunden, a non-reified notion of society must take charge of individuals’ mediated activity as a means of collaborating – or confronting – one another. The individual psyche is but one aspect of a larger unit of analysis, that is, the subject. In consequence, the subject is understood as a self-conscious system of activity or the identity of agency (the capacity of acting in a world but also of moral responsibility), ‘cogito’ (knowledge or understanding) and self-consciousness (or identity). Blunden points out that these instances are, nonetheless, never in absolute identity with one another. In other words, the subject is a process that is never complete or absolutely adequate at any given moment. The individual person is a mere limiting case of a subject, but as a whole, the individual-as-subject is the result of a long but still unfinished historical process (p. 257). To sum up, the subject emerges as a consequence of objective, mediated activity, which is afforded by the use of culturally developed artefacts that are subject to social or historical laws.

I will try to demonstrate forthwith how these theories are not only inscribed within this framework. I will deal first with the method advanced by A.N. Leont’ev and other theorists under the notion of structure of activity, applied to explaining and analysing foreign language development, and then I will make a brief summary of the basic tenets of code theory and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory.
I should point out right from the outset that by structure A.N. Leont’ev refers here to moments of a single formative unit, ‘activity-action’, not to a hierarchical structure of determinations. One should avoid seeing one level of the structure as higher than the other. The ‘units’ or ‘formations’ refer first to co-constituting external and internal aspects and involve complex dynamic transformations, and second to the link that exists between the subject and the object, but with the particularity that they are being instantiated at once (see A.A. Leont’ev, 2006a).

2.3.1 The structure of activity

One of A.N. Leont’ev’s greatest contributions to the theory of activity is the development of the foundations for analysing the structure and function of activity. As is the case with the already seen contemporary rendition of activity theory given by Engeström and Miettinen (1999) in which activity is the non-divisible unit of analysis, A.N. Leont’ev (1977) points out that ‘Activity is a non-additive unit of the corporeal, material life of the material subject … it is a unit of life, mediated by mental reflection, by an image, whose real function is to orientate the subject in the objective world’ (p. 182). Referring to the structure of activity, Leont’ev asserts:

Being, the life of each individual is made up of the sum-total or, to be more exact, a system, a hierarchy of successive activities. It is in activity that the transition or ‘translation’ of the reflected object into the subjective image, into the ideal, takes place; at the same time it is also in activity that the transition is achieved from the ideal into activity’s objective results, its products, into the material (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 181).

This hierarchy of successive activities makes a distinction between collective activity and individual action based on the principle of division of labour. What makes activities different from one another is their object or motive. Furthermore, the basic components of human activities are goal-oriented actions, which, when carried out in particular instrumental conditions, are called operations. A particular action may coincide or not with the objective of the activity, revealing the complexity of production based on division of labour. For A.N. Leont’ev (1977),
activity and action are ‘non-coincidental realities’ (p. 186). On the one hand, an action may have different motives, that is, it may realise completely different activities. On the other, one and the same motive may give rise to various goals and hence a variety of actions.

To illustrate the functionality of these units, Leont’ev (1977, p. 185) gives the example of a person whose motive is to obtain food. His activity is stimulated by food; nevertheless he has to perform actions that are not directly aimed at obtaining food, such as the making of trapping gear. Whether he uses the gear or passes it to other participants in the hunt in exchange for part of the catch or kill, in either case, his motive and goal do not directly coincide.

A.N. Leont’ev believes these component units of activity form its macrostructure. However, as we have already seen, Leont’ev does not believe these units can be used to dissect activity, but rather, they constitute different ‘planes of abstraction’ (p. 186). He points out that actions are not separate things included in activity, but activity exists as action or a chain of actions. Nonetheless, some actions tend to be instrumentalised when they are included within another action, a transformational process that A.N. Leont’ev (1978) calls ‘tecnization’ (p. 66). Leont’ev alerts us, however, to the fact that when an operation is apparently removed from the activity by means of carrying it automatically, it does not mean that it has been separated from the action, as the action is never separated from the activity, since the operation is still one of the means to carry out the action of the subject.

As already seen, what makes activities different from one another is their object or motive. Nonetheless, as, D.A. Leont’ev (1992) asserts, it is only when that objective motive is shared by the subjects who are part of the activity system and a concrete plan of action (operational structure) emerges spontaneously or is explicitly formulated that the activity can be called a ‘joint activity’ (p. 49). Thus, joint activity is regulated by a common store of meanings and purposes. In other words, there must be alignment in the mediational activity carried out by individuals so that they can become co-subjects.
D.A. Leont’ev (1992) stresses the fact that true joint activity, although similar in structure, is not an addition to individual activity, but replaces it. The various components of joint activity ‘are distributed among two or more subjects who at the particular moment are engaged in non-individual activity different from the activity jointly distributed among them, of which they are hence co-subjects’ (p. 49). Thus, D.A. Leont’ev maintains that in joint activity not only the operation structure but also the motivational-sense structure of this activity is shared by its co-subjects. Furthermore, that plan requires an evaluation of the resources at hand to achieve the object of the activity. As A.N. Leont’ev points out:

…apart from its intentional aspect (what must be done), the action has its operational aspect (how it can be done), which is defined not by the goal itself, but by the objective circumstances under which it is carried out. In other words, the performed action is in response to a task. The task is the goal given under certain conditions. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1979, p. 63)

Motive-action is not necessarily an action well planned in advance. The ontology of activity, in which the different units that form its structure constitute different planes of abstraction, allows for an operation eventually to reach the status of motive-activity, depending on the particular circumstances of the activity system (e.g. the level of awareness of the individuals who are part of it). In contrast, a very well-planned motive-action can become a single individual operation or action and extinguish itself, because it was never grasped as a joint-activity by the individuals who are part of the activity system, because the motive was not transmitted in the proper way, the consciousness differentials were irreconcilable, or they simply resisted the motive, among other reasons.

I would like to move now onto the issues concerning the development of a foreign language. Let us explore how the structure of activity as an analytical framework and method has been used in explaining and analysing foreign language development. It is important to have in mind that in the dialectical tradition we are not dealing with language acquisition or learning abstracted from the problem of the psychological and social development of the individual. In fact, Vygotsky inaugurated the subject of child development by introducing the problem of the learning of a foreign language, along with learning how to write one’s own
language and the introduction of the theoretical concept. In my view, we are dealing with different categories of metalinguistic processes. Therefore, foreign language learning is not a subset of the socio-genetic theory of development but it is an intrinsic part of it. The same can be said of Bakhtin’s theory, with which we will deal briefly afterwards when we introduce Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory.

2.3.1.1 Speech as activity and language development

In the dialectical tradition, the analysis of the development of both native and foreign languages is carried out by giving language the status of activity. Thus, meaning does not reside in the mind of the speaker but in the interaction between speaker and listener. A.A. Leont’ev (2006b) reminds us that “…in L.S. Vygotsky’s definition, the meaning of a word is the ‘unity of generalization and association, communication and thinking’” (p. 71). In this regard, when deploying the term language in the dialectical tradition we are referring to a relation between cultural ready-mades whose existence precedes the learner, communication and thinking. We should not remit ourselves to the conceptualisation given to it in modern linguistics as a set of rules, as a code extracted from its communicative instantiations. As Wertsch (2007) comments, Vygotsky, drawing on his mentor Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, considered language as activity and therefore focused on speech, as opposed to language (p. 185).

Implicit in this view is the idea that the boundaries between external (social speech) and internal activity (inner speech) are blurred. In other words, meaning is activity and, as such, it can be analysed by resorting to the already seen general theory of activity advanced by A.N. Leont’ev:

The fact that the macrostructure of external, practical activity shares certain features with that of internal, theoretical activity allows us to make an initial analysis of activity without regard to the form in which it appears. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 59)

This implies that development is predicated on some kind of situated cognition in which operations occurring on an inner plane cannot be abstracted from their
external, societal plane, that is, the structure of activity. It is another way of saying that object and subject do not exist independently, for they are moments of something that cannot be divided or severed. That unit is activity itself. Subject and object are but moments of activity. Focusing on the social (as activity theory does) or the psychological (as cultural historical psychology does) aspects of speech is a matter of assuming a temporary point of view, for these two aspects are inseparable.

As seen above, in activity, the societal object or motive and the goal that directs the individual’s action are no coincidental realities. Therefore, sense (personal meaning) can be defined, as A.A. Leont’ev (1977) does, borrowing from A.N. Leont’ev, as the ‘relationship between motive and goal’ (p. 34). This implies that sense depends upon social instantiations, that is, on the repertoire of cultural tools produced by society. In the words of A.A. Leont’ev, citing A.N. Leont’ev again:

If ‘meaning is a reflection of reality independent of a person’s individual, personal relationship to it, sense defines what meaning is for me, for me personally”; it is ‘that aspect of an individual’s consciousness determined by his own relationships’ … Sense is not a concretization of meaning; rather, ‘sense is concretized in meanings (as a motive is concretized in goals)’. But without this concretization, sense does not exist; ‘a personal sense is always a sense of something; pure sense without an object is as meaningless as an essence without an object’. (A.A. Leont’ev, 1977, pp. 33-34)

This material view of speech and thought, as depending on the actual formation of social objects implies, in turn, a peculiar understanding of the sign. The material nature of the sign, as a tool to be mastered in a process of (intergenerational) enculturation, extends representations beyond the boundaries of the individual organism. Yet in contrast to the appropriation of the non-sign tool, the sign, in its ideal, abbreviated form in inner speech, is a unit that (1) reorganises lower psychological functions such as sensorimotor functions by placing them in the system of conceptual thought, (2) reorganises the developmental line worked out by the individual himself or herself prior to being introduced to true (theoretical) concepts or conceptual systems and (3) plays a role in programming external speech.
Thus, unlike the non-sign tool, which is outwardly oriented, the sign is a tool that plays a role in reorganising both inner and outer activity. As Bugrimenko and El’konin (2002) point out, the introduction of the sign represents a transition from the natural to the cultural, a process that should not be seen as a lineal, non-disrupting one but one full of contradictions (p. 22). In its innermost functioning, meaning is considered to be a process whose structure is at once associative and disjunctive, rather than merely associative (p. 21), which has important implications in conceptual instruction, as we will see later on.

2.3.1.2 Foreign language development

In this section I will deal first with the general problem of psychological development and second with the particular problem of foreign language development.

Language development is the cornerstone of psychological development at large since Vygotsky (1987) traced back the social origins of higher psychological functions to the moment thinking and speech intersect – thinking becomes verbal and speech intellectual (p. 112) – serving, as already seen, two differentiated functions: a representational function and a communicative one; the former being predicated on the latter.

Vygotsky maintains that as soon as the use of signs is incorporated and internalised, the actions are qualitatively transformed and organised along entirely new lines. In consequence, speech plays a critical role in both internal and external activity, being essential in the development of a variety of functions such as generalisation and abstraction, in self-regulation, and in the organisation of external practical activity (p. 112). Inner speech is therefore essential in the process of thinking.

According to Wertsch (2007), in advancing word meaning as a unit of analysis, Vygotsky sought to highlight the importance of studying thinking and speech as
part of a fundamental unity, which prior to that had been systematically ignored by psychology (p. 183). Wertsch reflects on this germinal opposition, which is at the base of the emergence of control on internal and external activity, by contributing the distinction between explicit and implicit mediation and grounding it in Vygotsky’s ‘functional method of dual stimulation’ (1987, p. 127). This understanding of differentiated forms of mediation will arguably shed light on the complexity of development processes and the implications that semiotic mediation bears upon them.

The method of dual stimulation was conceived by Vygotsky to observe externally the emergence of internal processes. As its name suggests, subjects were presented with two sets of stimuli. One set fulfils the function of the object on which the subject’s activity is directed. The second functions as signs that help the subject in organising this activity. By explicit mediation, Wertsch is referring to the first set of stimuli, in the sense that they are intentionally and overtly introduced into problem-solving activity (e.g. by using material supports such as diagrams or even the written word). In contrast, by implicit mediation he is referring to the second set, which characteristically involves spoken language whose make-up is transitory and transparent, since the signs used pre-exist in everyday communication. Thus, a dialectical relationship emerges between forms of mediation that target the solution of objective problems and forms of mediation needed to organise activity to accomplish them, the former being a function of the latter.

The starting point is Vygotsky’s (1978) analysis of the relation between learning and development in preschool and school-age children within the framework of a thorough critique of various predominant psychological theories of instruction. Vygotsky eventually concludes that learning and development constitute a non-identical unity, establishing a dialectical link between them. Development is a consequence of learning activity but not every form of learning leads to development. For development to take place, learning must be organised in such a way that it sets in motion a variety of transformations of behaviour. Hence, he points out that ‘the only “good learning” is that which is in advance of development’ (p. 89).
Vygotsky (1987) makes a distinction between spontaneous and formal learning. He advances the hypothesis that the development of scientific concepts – a process that takes place mainly through formal schooling – leads to forms of generalisation and abstraction of internal forms of activity, which foster mastery. This is because generalisation brings about reflection – e.g. through the organisation of the means to achieve an action – or conscious awareness about external and internal activity. In other words, the formal instruction of conceptual systems opens the way to conscious awareness, self-regulation and mastery in a manner that spontaneous learning does not (p. 191).

To sum up, by development, Vygotsky is referring to the restructuring of the psychological functions needed to achieve self-regulation in the process of participating in joint activity. By learning, in contrast, Vygotsky is referring to a process of mastery of tools that do not necessarily require the restructuring of psychological functions.

Language development is subject to the basic premises formulated by Vygotsky about concept formation, including the more general implications inherent in the notion of zone of proximal development. Vygotsky defines the zone of proximal development in the following terms:

*The strength of the scientific concept lies in the higher characteristics of concepts, in the consciousness awareness and volition.* In contrast, this is the weakness of the child’s everyday concept. The strength of the everyday concept lies in spontaneous, situationally meaningful, concrete applications, that is, in the sphere of experience and the empirical. The development of scientific concepts begins in the domain of conscious awareness and volition. It grows downward into the domain of the concrete, into the domain of personal experience. In contrast, the development of spontaneous concepts begins in the domain of the concrete and empirical. It moves toward the higher characteristics of concepts, toward conscious awareness and volition. The link between these two lines of development reflects their true nature. This is the link of the zone of proximal and actual development (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 220).

The problem Vygotsky is highlighting here is that the theoretical concept and theoretical systems require forms of speculative reflection whose production and
teaching differ drastically from the emergence of spontaneous concepts. Spontaneous concepts are brought to the process mainly by the students; theoretical concepts, by the instructor. Theoretical concepts are, nevertheless, mediated by everyday or spontaneous concepts.

It can be argued that foreign language development is a particular occurrence of concept mediation, since the mediation of foreign language concepts does not depend solely upon spontaneous concepts but upon the complete conceptual-semantic system of the native language, including the scientific concepts that have reorganised the spontaneous concepts in the native language. Thus, according to Vygotsky, native language development proceeds upward, that is, from spontaneous to scientific concepts, whereas foreign language development proceeds downward, on a line similar to the development of theoretical concepts. There are some differences worth mentioning, though:

To a limited extent, learning a foreign language also requires mastering the semantic aspect of foreign speech, just as the development of scientific concepts requires the mastery of the scientific language (i.e. the mastery of scientific symbolism) … Problems arise, however, if we attempt to extend this analogy further. In learning a foreign language a system of developed meanings is given from the outset in the native language. This existing system is a prerequisite for the development of the new system. In the development of scientific concepts, on the other hand, the system emerges only with the development of the scientific concept and it is this new system that transforms the child’s everyday concepts … This system which emerges with the scientific concepts is fundamental to the entire history of the development of the child’s real concepts. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 223)

Consequently, in the dialectical tradition, adult foreign language education relies on concept-based methods of instruction in the native language, especially during the early stages of instruction, because it has to take account of the fact that, contrary to native language development, foreign language development is achieved first and foremost by conceptual understanding and second by a transition of actions into unconscious operations or internalisation, a process predicated on the emergence of abbreviated sign forms in inner speech. I argue that this constitutes a development route or blueprint based on a sequence of functions that need to be mastered. Let us see how this works.
2.3.1.3 A zone of proximal foreign language development

The zone of proximal development, however, is not a metaphor for instruction or for determining intended processes at inter- and intrapersonal level with the aim of achieving microgenetic internalisation, but a formulation that mediates between learning and development. We have to remember that for Vygotsky (1987) ‘The only instruction which is useful in childhood is that which moves ahead of development, that which leads it’ (p. 211).

Vygotsky introduced the zone of proximal development as part of a rather general analysis of child development, addressing a particular age period. Thus, as Chaiklin (2003) maintains, the zone of proximal development mediates between learning and ontogenesis – the trajectory of individual development – and warns against confusing it with microgenetic processes. The main purpose of the zone of proximal development is to determine the psychological functions that need to mature in the child so that she or he can carry out certain activities.

Special attention must be given to the leading activity, which is a notion that helps in identifying the particular social interactions that are likely to contribute to the development of the functions leading to the structural reorganisation of a child’s psychological functions (Chaiklin, 2003). In other words, there are targeted forms of activity requiring from the individual particular forms of social interaction that help to develop the functions enabling him or her to carry out those targeted forms of activity. In consequence, particular forms of interaction, such as problem solving and role-playing – which may be framed as concrete learning tasks – will help the individual develop the psychological functions (e.g. voluntary memory, generalisation, abstract analysis, speech activity, etc.) needed to carry out a historically-formed and socially-sanctioned activity.

I argue that we can translate the principle of the zone of proximal development to the field of foreign language development by setting up a developmental model or blueprint that actually guides adult instruction. I will introduce below a general idea of how this may work. However, I would like to explore a bit further what
top-down instruction entails.

Contrary to the view that seems to associate conceptual instruction with some kind of constraining and rigid unilateral top-down approach to education aimed at producing *genius* learners, it is important to stress that Vygotsky (1987) presented an interconnected model of the relationship between theoretical and everyday or spontaneous concepts, rather than a univocal top-down one. In fact, he warns against empty ‘verbalism’ (p. 169), a form of instructional malaise whereby theoretical concepts are not linked to everyday referents. By development, Vygotsky is referring mainly to the development of higher psychological functions associated with abstraction and logical thinking, but this does not mean that other functions do not develop as well, since higher mental functions are but one aspect of the child’s cultural development. Alongside this view, Hedegaard (2002) points out that instruction within the zone of proximal development can be characterised as ‘a double move between appreciating the traditions of practice that have characterised students’ everyday life and concepts and procedures central for subject-matter traditions’ (p. 78). According to Vygotsky, the formation of concepts develops simultaneously from the direction of the general and the particular. Theoretical concepts are developed out of verbal definitions. As part of an organised system, these verbal definitions descend to the concrete, to the child’s experience. In contrast, everyday concepts tend to develop outside any definite system. Their direction is upwards, toward abstraction and generalisation.

Everyday concepts and theoretical concepts are interdependent; both have a role in mediating mental activity. As Daniels (2001a) points out, Vygotsky argues that the systematic, organised and hierarchical thinking associated with scientific concepts becomes progressively embedded in everyday referents and thus achieves a general sense in the contextual richness of everyday thought (p. 53). This implies that the formation of theoretical concepts allows the individual to reflect across contexts and gain control of dissimilar situations, but that leads, in turn, to new ways of social interaction and forms of social bonding, which are always context-tied. The dialectical interdependency of theoretical and everyday concepts is also expressed in the aforementioned distinction between explicit and implicit
mediation grounded in Vygotsky’s functional method of dual stimulation. In other words, theoretical concepts are mediated by everyday concepts in teaching-learning activity, as it constitutes a particular form of joint activity.

As we have already seen, the zone of proximal development, as a construct, does not seem the most adequate for analysing adult development. Vygotsky’s conceptualisation was restricted to the analysis of a particular age period. Alternative conceptualisations such as Negueruela’s (2008) zone of potential development (ZPOD), which is an attempt to translate the zone of proximal development’s underpinnings into the second language development field, represents a step forward. In a nutshell, the ZPOD is expressed through three principles: (a) conceptual development, (b) granting mediation the status of a psychological process, and (c) creative imitation. Thus, the ZPOD seems to be an invaluable construct for instructional design. However, it does not address the need to give an account of the relationship between the learning task (i.e. actions, operations) at microgenetic level and the projected vector of development (i.e. activity) at ontogenetic level, especially when one undertakes an analysis of instruction. What I miss from the ZPOD is the blueprint that guides adult instruction from the very first steps onto higher levels of mastery and beyond.

I argue that a viable alternative is to look carefully at A.A. Leont’ev’s insights into the relation between foreign language development and the structure of activity. In the case of adult foreign language development, the activity of speaking a given language entails many expectations (e.g. certain ideas about participation in communication activity such as communication readiness) and may comprise many related activities in order to accomplish it. This would require, according to A.A. Leont’ev (1981), different forms of activity, from speech activity to communication activity, both in the native and the foreign language (pp. 21-30). Speech activity is defined as speech whose ‘guiding motive is the production of correct and appropriate speech’ (p. 23), whereas communication activity is defined as speech whose motive lies outside the concrete speech acts but is specific and can only be satisfied by means of speech. In A.A. Leont’ev’s terms:
…the student must learn to establish, with the help of the new language, an independent communication activity, that is to say an activity, the aim of which is not the immediate satisfaction of concrete practical objectives, but the setting up of contact and mutual understanding, the establishing of interaction with the other members of his social group (collective), the impact of the knowledge, skills, system of social values (convictions), or emotions of another individual or group. The teacher’s explanation, the pupil’s answer (here we have in mind not a language lesson but a more general situation), the lecture or report, the commentator’s speech on television – these are all forms of communication activity (A.A. Leont’ev, 1981, p. 23).

More specifically, these activities are: (a) communication activity in the native language and speech activity in the foreign language in order to lay the foundations for speech activity teaching, (b) foreign language speech activity and discrete foreign language speech acts with the object of achieving foreign language speech operations and habits, (c) foreign language speech activity and foreign language speech acts as part of non-verbal communication activity with the object of transforming the foreign language speech activity into foreign language speech acts, and (d) foreign language communication activity with the aim of achieving not only linguistically correct speech but also the best possible utterances.

Every activity presupposes the mastery of the previous one, although a slight alteration of this order suggested by A.A. Leont’ev is not significant. The most important aspect of this sequence is that it does not deal with specific instruction at the microgenetic level but provides links between operations in general (i.e. actions to be abbreviated) and activity targets at ontogenetic level. These activities represent a basic blueprint from which a leading activity can be designed for each step of the sequence.

After the initial stages have been accomplished, the programme for the creation of speech habits follows a pragmatic progression. Hence, it is a semantic-pragmatic model of development. In other words, controlled or non-controlled utterances in the foreign language depend in this schema on conceptual instruction given in the student’s native language. A.A. Leont’ev is also drawing on Gal’perin’s work on controlled learning and concept-based instruction (see Gal’perin, 1969, 197, 1989a,
1989b, 1989c, 1992a). A.A. Leont’ev (1981) maintains that the transition from communicative intention to the actual utterance, that is, the formation of operations, is not easy. Nonetheless, the task of instructors is ‘to “get rid” of the intermediate stage as quickly as possible and to bring the psychological structure of the utterance in the foreign tongue as close as possible to that which operates in the mother tongue’ (p. 27). Therefore, according to A.A. Leont’ev, besides being acquainted with the rules of translation from the native to the foreign language, it is essential to get acquainted with the rules that govern the transition from the speech operation of the native language to those of the foreign language.

This represents an analytical advantage for no matter what the SLA instructional method or technique being used (e.g., the grammar-translation method, the audio-lingual method, the silent method, the direct method, structural drills, the communicative approach) we can always ascertain what kind of psychological function the particular method or technique is trying to develop. Thus, different methods may be used in targeting the same kind of function. This, in turn, will allow us to compare different foreign language learning settings regardless of the instructional method or technique being deployed.

To sum up, the dialectical tradition’s approach to foreign language development consists of linking together the functional systems that are needed in the production of speech, instead of relying on the gradual increase in grammatical complexity according to a natural order of development, as is the case of many SLA approaches to foreign language instruction (see the input hypothesis (Krashen, 1985), the morpheme studies in Ellis (2008, pp. 82-91), and Pienemann’s (1998) processability theory).

For all the ontological and epistemological problems that communicative language teaching presents, such as being still dominated by a cognitivist paradigm in which the social is kept at bay or is assumed to be constant and universal (see Johnson, 2004, pp. 85-99), as an explanatory principle of language development, it reproduces the socio-genetic underpinnings of the dialectical tradition. As Ellis (2003) points out, ‘CLT [(communicative language teaching)] aims to develop the
ability of learners to use language in real communication’ (p. 27). Drawing on Brown and Yule (cf. 1983), Ellis further asserts that communication involves ‘two general purposes—the interactional function, where language is used to establish and maintain contact, and the transactional function, where language is used referentially to exchange information’ (p. 27). This claim is significant because it reproduces at the foreign language pedagogical level Vygotsky’s distinction between language’s socio-communicative and representational functions.

In communicative language teaching we even find two major approaches that could be homologated – if properly adapted to fit an ontogenetic paradigm – to the double move between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal development. Borrowing from Howatt (cf. 1984), Ellis distinguishes a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ version of communicative language teaching:

The former is based on the assumptions that the components of communicative competence can be identified and systematically taught … Thus, instead of (or perhaps in addition to) teaching learners the structural properties of language, a weak version of CLT proposes they be taught how to realize specific general notions such as ‘duration’ and ‘possibility’, and language functions such as ‘inviting’ and ‘apologizing’ … In contrast, a strong version of CLT claims that ‘language is acquired through communication’ (Howatt 1984: 279). That is, learners do not first acquire language as a structural system and then learn how to use this system in communication but rather actually discover the system itself in the process of learning how to communicate. (Ellis, 2003, p. 28)

In conclusion, there are links that are worthwhile to explore when analysing learning settings apparently informed by communicative language teaching, as they could be rather easily translated into the dialectical tradition, especially into the proposed foreign language development blueprint advanced by A.A. Leont’ev.

I will leave here the discussion about foreign language development in order to keep building up a theory of pedagogic discourse that can incorporate both Vygotsky’s views on development and the ideas of A.N. Leont’ev and A.A. Leont’ev on the structure of activity together with Bernstein’s code theory and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory.
Although we can see in A.N. Leont’ev’s method of analysing the non-coincidental nature of collective activity and individual action the introduction of sociological categories that extend Vygotsky’s word meaning as a unit of analysis, we are still missing a full-fledged theory of discourse in which the role of intermediate organisations or institutions not only are fully accounted for but they are framed within the rationality of differentials in the distribution of power, on which educational systems are built on. For all the theoretical weight that the cultural-historical activity theory tradition has on the problem of agency, I believe that Bernstein’s code theory brings in a singular sociological dimension that will complement it.

2.3.2 Bernstein’s code theory

Bernstein (1971) inaugurated his research on code theory by examining differences in achievement between middle-class and working-class students in the United Kingdom and tracing them back to differentials in interpretative principles or orientations to meaning (p. 6). If intellectual capacity is considered to be normally distributed among a given student population, why then did working-class learners have lower achievement levels than their middle-class peers? Bernstein’s answer was to inquire about orientation differentials.

These differentials, eventually, were explained by Bernstein as the outcome of pedagogic practices based on principles of recontextualisation of discourse, or pedagogic discourse, regulated by the pedagogic apparatus, or pedagogic device. In other words, Bernstein was not only situating pedagogic discourse within the sociological structure of the pedagogic apparatus but gave discourse the status of transformational principle, operating as the distributer of knowledge and forms of consciousness.

I will refrain from entering here into a proper ontological argument about the constructs knowledge and discourse in Bernstein’s sociology, as I am tempted to understand knowledge as a particular form of discourse as well. It will suffice to point out that for Bernstein (2000) knowledge may have many forms, including
theoretical and practical knowledge. Knowledge is also subject to different epistemic verification criteria, such as ‘local’ knowledge, whose verification largely depends on common sense; or ‘official’ or ‘school(ed)’ knowledge (p. 156), whose epistemic verification criteria is based precisely on uncommon sense. Overall, what transpires from Bernstein’s use of the term knowledge is that he is referring to socio-historical constructs that are relatively independent from the way they are produced and put into circulation. Thus, in his seminal essay on vertical and horizontal discourse (pp. 155-174), which deals precisely with knowledge structures, Bernstein refers to knowledge as being ‘realised’ through discourse (p. 156). Knowledge remits us to epistemic relations, whereas discourse remits us to social relations.

As far as discourse is concerned, Bernstein’s use of the term is relatively recent. In fact, one can trace its appearance back to volume IV of the series entitled ‘Class, codes and control’ (see Bernstein, 1990). Nonetheless, the term still coexists with another terms: ‘(pedagogic) communication’ (p. 9) and ‘pedagogic text’ (p. 193). There is no use of the term discourse in prior volumes. The notion is conveyed somehow by the term transmission, as in ‘knowledge transmitted’, in volume III (Bernstein, 1975, p. 89), and, in volume I (Bernstein, 1971), by the terms ‘linguistic realization’, ‘speech variants’ (p. 15), ‘language-use’ (p. 33), ‘forms of communication’ and ‘form of the language’ (p. 43). However, no matter how the concept is rendered in actual words, Bernstein’s conceptualisation has always been sociological, paying attention to power differentials, social class and distribution of labour. In this regard, the concept of discourse as ideology or the process of naturalisation of subject positions through which a dual function of recognition and misrecognition is performed has always been closer to the one deployed by Althusser (1971, pp. 171-172) than the way it has been deployed in pragmatics in connection with a more loosely defined social context.

What is the pedagogic device exactly? The pedagogic device can be defined as the apparatus whereby educational institutions select and recontextualise the knowledge produced in actual fields of production, whether academic or not.
Thus, in our case, Japanese tertiary organisations select, on the one hand, diverse academic knowledge such as linguistic, applied linguistic, philology or history, produced in different fields of production (research groups, academic societies, universities, conferences, publications) and, on the other, local knowledge such as agreed forms of conveying meaning by a certain Spanish-speaking community mainly through a vast array of arts and media (press, radio, television, literature, theatre etc.).

The device, according to Bernstein (2000) provides three interrelated rules: ‘distributive rules, recontextualising rules and evaluative rules’ (p. 28), which in a less abstract way can be rendered as curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation.

By distributive rules, Bernstein understands the distinction of two classes of knowledge, the ‘thinkable class and the unthinkable class … one class of knowledge that is esoteric and one that is mundane’ (p. 29).

In modern society today (this is indeed a very brutal simplification which I will develop later), the control of the unthinkable lies essentially, but not wholly, in the upper reaches of the educational system. This does not mean that the unthinkable cannot take place outside the educational system, but the major control and management of the unthinkable is carried out by the higher agencies of education. On the other hand, the thinkable in modern complex societies is managed by secondary and primary school systems. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 29)

These two classes of knowledge have different forms of abstraction that relate ‘the material world and the immaterial world’ (p. 29), which are regulated by the division of labour and the particular relation between meanings and their material base. In other words, Bernstein is referring to the regulation of power relations between social groups by means of distributing different forms of knowledge and creating, therefore, consciousness differentials, whether we understand these differentials as orientations to meaning or pedagogic identities.

The meanings which are not directly linked to a material base create a potential discursive gap. Put in a rather blatant way, there is knowledge to be taught, which ensures the reproduction of institutions and social relations, and there is
knowledge to be produced, which has the potential to reshape institutions and social relations. For Bernstein, ‘this potential gap or space … is the site for the unthinkable, the site of the impossible, and this site can clearly be both beneficial and dangerous at the same time … [it] is the meeting point of order and disorder, of coherence and incoherence. It is the crucial site of the yet to be thought’ (p. 30). More specifically:

Any distribution of power will attempt to regulate the realisation of this potential…The modes of the regulation will differ, but the gap will always be regulated. Any distribution of power will distribute the potential of this gap in its own interest, because the gap itself has the possibility of an alternative order, an alternative society, and an alternative power relation (Bernstein, 2000, p. 30).

It is worth mentioning that, paradoxically, in the process of controlling the access to these two forms of knowledge, ‘the contradictions and dilemmas are rarely suppressed’, for ‘in controlling or attempting to control the realisations of the gap, it must necessarily reveal the modes which make connections between the two worlds’ (p. 31). In other words, the very same process that hides or regulates the separation between the thinkable and the unthinkable reveals and allows social change to happen. At a practical level this happens when students recognise a crack or some form of incoherence in the teacher’s discourse and ask questions that can only be answered by drawing on other resources stemming from other areas of a field of production of knowledge or other fields altogether. Discourse is then surpassed by other discourse but soon a form of evaluation of the dislocation takes place. The teacher may feel compelled to contain the dislocation by pointing out that what is required to understand the problem is rather difficult (or dangerous), and it is better to see it at a later stage, deal with it with the student apart from the class, on a one-on-one basis, or disregard it altogether.

Thus, the recontextualisation process is done by means of the pedagogic discourse. Pedagogic discourse is defined as ‘a rule which embeds two discourses; a discourse of skills of various kinds and their relations to each other, and a discourse of social order’ (pp. 31-32). Here, Bernstein is introducing the notions of instructional discourse and regulative discourse. Yet, for Bernstein, ‘there are not
two discourses, there is only one’ (p. 32), for instructional discourse, the discourse that creates skills, is a function of regulative discourse, or the discourse that creates order, relations and identity.

However, the recontextualisation process, which entails the move of discourse from the production field to the position of pedagogic discourse, creates in fact an imaginary discourse. This implies that for Bernstein, pedagogic discourse is not a discourse but a recontextualising principle whereby ‘other discourses are appropriated and brought into a special relationship with each other, for the purpose of their selective transmission and acquisition’ (p. 32). It is important to emphasise that the grammar taught in class is also an imaginary discourse that does not represent the actual field of production of the grammarian. In fact, this happens with any pedagogic discourse, whether it contains theoretical concepts or not.

This notion has direct implications for Vygotsky’s ideas of mind formation and development through the introduction of theoretical concepts. What Bernstein is stressing is the fact that those theoretical concepts are not actual theoretical concepts, as they do not belong to the production field in which they were produced but correspond to an imaginary discipline that is ultimately dominated and modulated by particular notions of the social order. In the case of the discourse that does not contain theoretical concepts but everyday concepts, let us say, the discourse of a communication class where implicit forms of instruction are used, the Spanish produced will constitute an imaginary form of Spanish, not the actual discourse produced in Spanish-speaking communities.

Furthermore, the recontextualising principle not ‘only recontextualises the what of pedagogic discourse, what discourse is to become subject and content of pedagogic practice’ but ‘the how; that is the theory of instruction’ (p. 34). By the what, Bernstein is referring to ‘the translation of power, of power relations’ or classification. By the how, he is referring to ‘the translation of control relations’, or framing (p. 5). Bernstein views the theory of instruction as ancillary to regulative discourse, containing ‘within itself a model of the learner and of the teacher and of the relation’ (p. 35).
In our case, we are concerned about the instructional methods deployed in teaching Spanish as a foreign language, which are cultural tools in themselves. Our concern is primarily with communicative forms of instruction such as communicative language teaching. We are therefore required to analyse the kind of social order that this method of instruction carries within it and in the particular way it is deployed in the communication classroom.

Finally, the evaluative rules are the transformation of the pedagogic practice from its abstractness into its concrete form at the level of classroom practice. ‘At the most abstract level, pedagogic discourse specialises time, a text and a space, and brings these into a special relationship with each other’ (p. 35), that is, specialising meanings to time and space. At an intermediate level of abstraction, time will be transformed into age, text into content and space into context. The final transformation is from age into acquisition, content into evaluation, and context into transmission (p. 35-36). Bernstein is referring here to the special relation that evaluative rules create between the curriculum’s contents and the time units employed in the pedagogic process, which create a hierarchisation of contents. Some contents are seen to be more important than others and therefore more time units are given to them. In other words, pedagogic discourse at its most concrete level creates a relational space between pedagogies, evaluation and learning.

Bernstein goes on to signal that ‘Evaluation condenses the meaning of the whole device’ (p. 36), that is, evaluation is the moment in which we can judge the extent to which the distributive rules (i.e. the distribution of knowledge) have been accomplished. The evaluative rules bring the what and the how into a final relation to each other. The recognition of the what is assessed by evaluating the capacity of the student to recognise what is asked for, the context of the text, that is, passive realisation; and the recognition of the how is assessed by evaluating the capacity of the student actually to produce the required text, that is, active realisation. Let me give you an example about evaluative rules. Sometimes students do not do well in an examination not because they are unable to produce the right answer to a problem (produce the appropriate text) but because they have not understood what the problem was all about and what was demanded from them. Thus, the
possession of evaluation rules comprises recognition (passive realisation) and (active) realisation on the part of students (pp. 16-18). We can see now that the differential in the possession of recognition and realisation rules is an indicator of the students’ orientation to meanings in terms of the perceived relevance of those meanings (p. 18).

The purpose of the device is none other than providing ‘a symbolic ruler for consciousness’ (p. 36). By ruler, Bernstein is exploiting the term’s two meanings, one linked to having the power over consciousness, and the other linked to ‘measuring the legitimacy of the realisations of consciousness’ (p. 114).

2.3.2.1 Pedagogic code

So far I have given a general outline of Bernstein’s theory. Let us analyse now the specific way of determining the pedagogic code of any recontextualisation practice. Let us start by the notion of pedagogic code itself.

A pedagogic code is a function of a particular social formation or qualities of social structure involved in the (re)production of those very formations. More specifically, code refers to a set of socially-acquired principles that are involved in the internalisation and organisation of orders of relevance whereby students orientate towards meaning. A code is therefore a set of principles whose function is to recognise the other and sustain social (trans)formation.

Unlike other theories of cultural reproduction, Bernstein’s (2000) code theory regards forms of communication as a function of external power relations that are carried in the discourse itself, that is, in its structure. As a consequence, the analysis of discursive forms must be part of a comprehensive account of the external boundaries created by the distribution of power differentials, such as those that arise from the division of labour, for those boundaries also have an intrasubjective dimension, giving rise to imaginary identities. The degree of complexity of the social division of labour manifests in the coding orientation, i.e., on the orientation to meanings:
The simpler the social division of labour, and the more specific and local the relation between an agent and its material base, the more direct the relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of a restricted coding orientation. The more complex the social division of labour, the less specific and local the relation between an agent and its material base, the more indirect the relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of an elaborated coding orientation. (Bernstein, 1990, p. 20)

As already seen, Bernstein (2000) is concerned with both the translation of power relations and of control relations. On the one hand, the translation of power relations into principles of classification and how these principles establish social divisions of labour – and therefore identities and voices – is called classification. This is the structural level. For Bernstein, these classifications conceal the arbitrary nature of power relations, produce imaginary identities, replace the non-essential by the necessary, and build psychic systems of defence that may lie at an unconscious level. On the other hand, the translation of control relations into forms of realisation of discourses – and therefore messages – is called framing. This is the interactional level. More specifically, classification (C) refers to the degree of maintenance between categories (subjects, spaces/agencies, discourses). In fact, for Bernstein, the key metaphoric element of classification is the idea of boundary. Framing (F) refers to the communicative outcomes of the relations between categories within the pedagogic relation. Framing between subjects refers to the control they have over selection of instructional contents and roles (e.g. the roles acquirers and transmitters assume to carry out pedagogic tasks), sequence, pacing, and evaluation criteria, that is, the discursive rules that regulate instructional pedagogic practice. It also refers to the hierarchical rules which regulate norms of social conduct, or regulative pedagogic practice, according to what is seen as legitimate or appropriate in a given pedagogic context.

Bernstein asserts the existence of the pedagogic code in this form: ‘+/– are the strengths of classification and framing ±C/F’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 14). In other words, the existence of the pedagogic code is predicated on the variations in the strengths of classification and framing. Where framing is strong, the instructor has explicit control over selection, sequence, pacing, criteria and the social base from which ideas of the social order spring. Where framing is weak, the student has
more *apparent* control over the communication and its social base. Indeed, Bernstein stresses the fact that the control the student brings to bear is apparent. Furthermore, Bernstein also points out that classification can have an internal value (Ci) (for example, arrangements of the space and objects in it, as well as classification of dress, of posture, of position), while framing can have an external value (Fe) (for example, social class may play a role if it enters pedagogic communication) adding sensitivity to the description.

Thus, Bernstein advances the way pedagogic codes can be written:

\[
\frac{E}{\pm C^w/\pm F^w}
\]

where E refers to the orientation of the discourse (elaborated): ——— refers to the embedding of this orientation in classification and framing values. Thus variation in the strength of classification and framing values generates different modalities of pedagogic practices (Bernstein, 2000, p. 100).

The assessment of pedagogic code above is based upon ascertaining the position subjects take up in social practice. Thus, Bernstein advances a method of determining the subject’s position by examining (a) the characteristics of the division of labour within a given social formation (voice) and (b) the forms of communication internal to that division (message). Power is a means by which voice is constituted and control is a means by which message is formed. The logical relations between voice and message amount to actual codes inasmuch as they position subjects not only with respect to discourse but to the relationships between and within them (Bernstein, 1990).

2.3.2.2 *Boundaries and consciousness*

Voice is a manifestation that is at once predicated on but in opposition to forms of distribution of power. Hence, voice emerges from intrasubjective and intersubjective divisions whose boundaries are set by more or less liquid social constructs or particular social formations such as class, which spring from
differentials in the distribution of power. It is here that the problem of consciousness emerges since the differential in the distribution of power amounts eventually to a differential in the distribution of forms of consciousness (e.g. access to and therefore recognition and production of discursive forms). Therefore, attention needs to be paid to the external and internal boundaries set by the forms of distribution of power. It is in those boundaries that the personal and collective experience is structured. However, this does not entail a passive or mechanical formation. Diaz (2001), for instance, notices that boundaries and transgressions are interdependent and defines Bernstein’s notion of voice as ‘the living condition of power within the limits structured in experience by the subject’ (p. 87). To sum up, the analysis of the distribution of labour is a pre-condition to understanding differentials not only in terms of access to discourse but to forms of consciousness as well.

I would like now to analyse the logic between voice and message in code theory, and to explore succinctly the issue of the conscious and the unconscious in semiosis in general.

As is the case with Vygotsky’s socio-genetic theory, in which internalisation is not necessarily equal to conscious mastery, the pedagogic subject in code theory carries inherently a theory of the unconscious. I am far from unwrapping here a fine-grained analysis of the unconscious in code theory and how this compares to the work of the Frankfurt School or to theories of structuration, especially to Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and symbolic capital, which draw, as Steinmetz (2006) maintains, on substantial readings and interpretations of psychoanalysis, especially on Lacan’s ideas on subject formation and internalisation of the symbolic order. Suffice it to point out that alongside Davis (2004), Lapping (2008) and Ivinson (2011), I see a strong connection between the way the unconscious is treated in code theory and a psychoanalytical – especially Lacanian – notion of subject formation. I also establish strong links between the emergence of the subject and the structure or form of semiosis, which paradoxically unveils and obscures social relations at the same time.
At an ontological level, the unconscious in Marxian thought and a significant number of post-Freudian theories rests on the nonidentical relation between subject and object, that is, on what is eventually internalised, especially the sign in its abbreviated form, as a reflection that stands out from other objective images – as fetishism, in the end, rests on the form of the commodity (see Marx, 1976). In other words, knowledge emerges from indeterminacy or from a principle of nonidentity of the subject as the subject draws on social semiotic systems (including non-linguistic signs) to structure the individual experience and agency (perception being one more form of agency). This coincides with Lacan’s structuralism and with the status he gave to the sign as a structure from which the unconscious emerges.

Perhaps the most interesting contribution made to unmasking both the paradoxical concealing and revealing dimensions of semiosis in recent years is the work done by Kockelman (2006) in the field of anthropology. Kockelman establishes a theory of meaning that equates the commodity with semiosis. This is done by first abandoning the dichotomy subject-object and its Hegelian dialectical relations, and Saussure’s signifier-signified to explain meaning, and deploying, instead, the Peircean trichotomy sign-object-interpretant and equating it with Marx’s logic of the commodity: use-value, value and exchange-value. Hence, semiosis has to take into account the abstract system comprised by all speech acts, just as the commodity’s value is ultimately determined by the abstract sum total of the values of all commodities in the marketplace. In other words, semiosis is not identical to itself since every act of semiosis (e.g. speech act) enters the abstract space of all possible interpretations – understood as the relation between sign and object made by an interpretant – altering, by its very addition, the sum total of all interpretations. Through this operation, social relations, affect and, more importantly – given the positivist conception of language in modern and contemporary linguistics – the speech act are given the status of immaterial commodities. Semiosis as a particular form of commodity obscures and mystifies at once social relations. This is a condition inherent to its relational structure.

By the same token, Bernstein (2000) asserts that communication is needed because
power establishes differentials in the distribution of forms of consciousness. Stated somewhat tautologically, communication forms are not arbitrary but respond to power differentials. In order to close the gap produced by the lack of a unified consciousness, communication is needed. However, communication itself brought about different forms of consciousness in the first place. This compels Bernstein to maintain that, eventually, all forms of pedagogic communication (i.e. discourse) are calls to sustain a particular moral order, helping to explain why the instructional discourse is finally a function of regulative discourse (see Diaz, 2001). In conclusion, from an ontological point of view, unlike Saussure’s structuralism, Bernstein’s code theory represents a brand of structuralism based on a principle of incompleteness, grounded on a nonidentical relation between subject and object.

I would like to leave here the discussion on Bernstein’s code theory and turn to Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory, as it will shed light onto some of the problems touched by Bernstein, especially regarding the emergence of (pedagogic) identities, but more importantly to the analytical framework they advance in order to ascertain subject position.

2.3.3 A relational semiotic analysis of subject position

Holland et al. (2001) configure their ideas on identity and agency drawing on Vygotsky’s socio-genetic analytical framework, and the conceptions of A.N. Leont’ev and Bourdieu of the self in practice, supplementing them with Bakhtin’s views on self-authoring. Their focus on narrativised and dramatised accounts of self, which are, nevertheless, regulated by socio-relational and socio-interactional structures, amounts to a semiotic approach to analysing subject position.

Thus, they deploy two intertwined notions that configure their semiotic approach. The first one is the notion of figured worlds, which is associated with the construction of the identity through semiotic means, by resourcing to narratives, genres and voices. The second one is the notion of positional identities, which is associated to the interactional and relational social world which distributes the access to the aforementioned semiotic means.
Whilst they acknowledge the fact that Vygotsky paid attention to the social realm, they miss social elements that Bakhtin emphasised. Their critique is focused on two aspects: first, they believe the conflictual nature of social relations and the role institutions play in modulating them are undertheorised; and second, they miss a complex analysis of the conflicting nature of ready-made artefacts used in inner and social speech processes. In their own terms:

While the social was clearly important to Vygotsky, we miss the elements of power, status, stratification, and ownership that Bakhtin emphasized. In Vygotsky’s vision cultural forms became fused with mental life within social interaction, but he avoided attention to the conflictual in social life or to the oppressive nature of many institutions in which humans interact [with] these cultural forms … And so we miss the social struggles and conflicts that drive aspects of inner speech. Vygotsky recognized differences between inner speech (speech for one’s self), and social speech (speech for others), and thus recognized a tension, for example, in moving from inner to social speech. But the tension lay in such contrast as those between the ‘sense’ of a word or phrase for one’s self, the connotations and memories of the contexts of the word’s use, and the ‘meaning’ of a word or phrase for generalized others. Bakhtin view of the social and the fusion of the social with cultural forms was much more complex. (Holland et al., 2001, pp. 176-177)

Holland and colleagues draw on Bakhtin’s notions of ‘self-fashioning’, which they call the ‘space of authoring’, and ‘dialogism’ (p. 169), an interpretation of the underlying principle of Bakhtin’s literary theory and philosophy of language given by Holquist (1990), to formulate their notion of figured worlds. The notion of figured worlds is deployed to analyse the person as a composite of many, often contradictory, self-understandings and rather impermanent identities.

Let us start with the notion of dialogism. Holland et al. (2001) assert that the ‘…figured world of dialogism is one in which sentient beings always exist in a state of being “addressed” and in the process of “answering”’ (p. 169). According to Holquist (1990), Bakhtin understands the individual as always being in a state of being addressed by messages coming from the natural environment or from other persons, whether they are psychological stimuli, natural language, social codes or ideologies. The individual existence always takes a position and from that position is compelled to answer or ignore those messages. The response, in the
case of persons’ messages is articulated by ‘making sense’ or producing ‘meaning’ out of the utterances (p. 47).

The question is why the individual person must take up a social position, even if that position involves ignoring, rejecting or resisting his or her own social position? I believe a possible answer to this question is given by the fact that sense must take the form of an object; it must be objectivised in tools widely available in society, in meanings that, although they may be the object of conflicting views, are widely recognised and somehow understood as such. According to Bakhtin (1981), the word is a pivot between ourselves and others: ‘In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else’s’ (p. 345). Therefore, the individual is subject at once of socio-historical forces and of his or her own personal trajectory and there is no way out of this.

At a more abstract level, a similar contradiction between subjective and objective forces takes place. For Bakhtin languages and voices form part of a system in which there is unity and division at the same time, which Bakhtin refers to as centrifugal and centripetal forces:

Every utterance participates in the ‘unitary language’ (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).

Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272).

The process of subjectivation is accompanied necessarily by social objectivation. This implies a creative appropriation of meanings and forms of language, that is, of socio-ideological belief systems and of speech genres or forms of discourse. The appropriation takes place in a space constituted by the interrelationship of differentiated vocal perspectives on the social world. Therefore, the authoring of the self is always multivoiced, but positional and institutional, nevertheless.
It is worth underlining the fact that Holland and colleagues are not referring to some kind of abstract and distant voices as the materiality of figured worlds but concrete and familiar referents linked to the social institutions that modulate social positions:

Cultural worlds are populated by familiar social types and even identifiable persons not simply differentiated by some abstract division of labour. The identities we gain … are thus specifically historical developments, grown through continued participation in the positions defined by the social organization of those worlds’ activity. (p. 41).

Let us analyse how the process of appropriation takes place. Alongside Vygotsky’s ideas of appropriation through imitation, which are at the basis of the zone of proximal development, cementing the space of collaboration, Bakhtin saw the appropriation of discourse by the subject as a progression in consciousness awareness. Thus, the appropriation of the tool takes place before the individual can make full sense of it:

When someone else’s ideological discourse is internally persuasive for us and acknowledged by us, entirely different possibilities open up. Such a discourse is of decisive significance in the evolution of an individual consciousness: consciousness awakens to independent ideological life precisely in a world of alien discourses surrounding it, and from which it cannot initially separate itself; the process of distinguishing between one’s own and another’s discourse, between one’s own and another’s thought, is activated rather late in development. When thought begins to work in an independent, experimenting and discriminating way, what first occurs is a separation between internally persuasive discourse and authoritarian enforced discourse, along with a rejection of those congeries of discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch us.

Internally persuasive discourse – as opposed to one that is externally authoritative – is, as it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly interwoven with ‘one’s own word’ (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 345).

For Holland et al. (2001), the space of authoring is a particular zone of proximal development, ‘… extremely important in an explication of the development of identities as aspects of history-in-person’ (p. 183). This space is marked by improvisation, but an improvisation that is a reconfiguration of language (and therefore of action). In other words, the individual is not completely free to answer
to the world but at the same time is not completely constrained by that language. Every attempt at reconfiguring the world and every identity that emerges out of that process is both an individual and social endeavour. In fact, as Holland and colleagues assert, it is a form of co-development (p. 270). The individual consciousness, therefore, is socially distributed.

Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s concept of activity, they advance the notion of figured worlds to analyse how subjects explain themselves, the positions they assume, the imaginative solutions they give or the actions they take in a narrativised and dramatised form when a particular event unfolds. Their focus is on language as activity, since the word (i.e. speech) is a pivot between external and internal planes.

The external is expressed in the ready-made characteristics of the word and its link to the now vestigial social relations that shaped its meaning, but drift away in the course of history. The internal is expressed in sense, that is, to paraphrase A.N. Leont’ev, the relation between motive and object or the relation between the subjective and the objective. More specifically:

Persons develop more or less conscious conceptions of themselves as actors in socially and culturally constructed worlds, and these senses of themselves, these identities, to the degree that they are conscious and objectified, permit these persons, through the kinds of semiotic mediation described by Vygotsky, at least a modicum of agency and control over their own behaviour.

Significant to our concept is the situatedness of identity in collectively formed activities. The ‘identities’ that concern us are ones that trace our participation, especially our agency, in socially produced, culturally constructed activities—what we call figured worlds. (Holland et al., 2001, pp. 40-41)

The dialectical nature of language puts the person under a form of literary vocational spell, understood here as a practice in imaginative and liberating observation of one’s situation in the world and a form of self-regulation that is, nonetheless, constructed with restrictive, given, ready-made elements (e.g. words, voices, speech genres, styles). Thus, the Bakhtinian concept of the space of
authoring is used to capture an understanding of the mutual shaping of figured worlds and identities in social practice.

Regarding the situatedness of identity, Holland and colleagues argue that ‘…figured worlds, like activities, are social encounters in which participants’ positions matter’ (2001, p. 41). They deploy the notion of positional identities to make a distinction between aspects of identity associated with figured worlds, that is, ‘storylines, narrativity, generic characters, and desire’, and aspects that have to do with ‘one’s position relative to social identified others, one’s sense of social place, and entitlement’ (p. 125). It is precisely here that power and control enter into the analysis:

Positional identities have to do with the day-to-day and on-the-ground relations of power, deference and entitlement, social affiliation and distance – with the social-interactional, social-relational structures of the lived world. Narrativized or figurative identities, in contrast, have to do with the stories, acts, and characters that make the world a cultural world. Positional identity, as we use the term, is a person’s apprehension of her social position in a lived world: that is, depending on the others present, of her greater or lesser access to spaces, activities, genres, and, through those genres, authoritative voices, or any voice at all (Holland et al., 2001, pp. 127-128).

Holland and colleagues are concerned with the transformation of social positions into dispositions. They argue that social positions ‘… become dispositions through participation in, identification with, and development of expertise within the figured world’ (p. 136). The transformation does not only work unilaterally, though: ‘People may develop a “sense” (in Bourdieu’s terms) of their worlds, an expertise in the use of cultural artifacts that may come to re-mediate their positions in them’ (p. 137).

In conclusion, for Holland and colleagues individual consciousness and identities emerge from the individual’s attempt at reconfiguring the world, a process that is marked by improvisation and carried out by the very same affordances and constraints inherent in semiosis. Although they draw extensively on Vygotsky, they explore analytical notions such as figured world and positional identities to
add the conflicting dimension of cultural tools as they are used in producing and reproducing social relations and the very institutions that bind together those relations.

Overall, we have seen throughout this discussion that even though Vygotsky works with a notion of language as speech and activity, he falls short of actually working with a fully-fledged sociological notion of discourse. A.N. Leont’ev’s structure of activity is an attempt theoretically and empirically to unwrap Vygotsky’s *word meaning* unit of analysis in order to introduce the actual position subjects assume in social relations. However, the method of contrasting collective activity and individual action does not seem sufficient to account analytically for the institutional aspects that modulate social positions and discourse, especially when those institutions (i.e. schools, universities) are the key intermediary organisations involved in shaping social consciousness and the pedagogic apparatus, embodied in the educational institution, acts to recontextualise the theoretical systems that are being communicated through pedagogies. That recontextualisation process not only acts upon the selection of the theoretical systems to be taught but modulates the pedagogic process as well. It is as if all the effort made by Vygotsky on advancing pedagogies that can effectively deliver the human being from ignorance could be easily brushed away by watering down pedagogies. That is the power of the pedagogic apparatus as a moderator of the theoretical concept.

I do not want to suggest that cultural-historical activity theory does not offer the right analytical framework, for it does, provided that an empirical extension is worked out. We have seen that development, understood as socially generated, is a key aspect in Vygotsky’s work and I have argued that it is absolutely necessary to provide a blueprint for foreign-language development, a blueprint that allows us to determine if and how instruction is fostering development. In other words, we have to position ourselves between microgenesis and ontogenesis. We cannot succeed in determining a zone of proximal development for foreign language pedagogic relations if we are unable to establish first which psychological functions need to be developed in the first place through what kind of instruction.
That blueprint has been advanced by A.A. Leont’ev as an application of A.N. Leont’ev’s insights into activity. Speech, no matter whether in the native or a foreign language, is activity. The golden rule is to analyse activity according to its object and therefore we can ascertain the kind of activity foreign language speech is depending on its object. Is the object of speech outside or inside the speech system we call language? If the object is internal, that is, the linguistic production is all about producing grammatical utterances, we are facing speech activity; if the object is external, we are facing communication activity, and so forth. Thus, instead of analysing a myriad of instructional methods or techniques as if they were organising principles, we ought to determine if those methods are being used in accomplishing certain psychological functions. Here, the denomination of the instructional method or technique does not matter, as one method may share the functions it targets with other methods. Activity gives us an ontogenetic object and action gives us a microgenetic goal. Yet, I believe the next step is to climb up the sociological ladder from speech as activity to discourse.

What I have been trying to convey through this discussion is the fact that we are lacking ready-made tools that enable us to explore empirically the problem of mastery in complex pedagogic settings. We need to answer why a segment of the student population, in a sociological dimension, as a group being sociologically profiled, achieves higher levels of foreign-language mastery: why pedagogic discourse is different for different segments of the student population. Here, Bernstein’s insight is decisive. Differences are produced by differentials in the distribution of knowledge or consciousness, which are called orientations to meaning. Bernstein’s code theory provides an empirical way to approach the assessment of those differentials by paying attention to the subject matter boundaries (the curriculum) and the principles of control of discursive practices within those boundaries. These have been set by the educational institutions. In other words, Bernstein’s code theory provides the means to carry out an empirical analysis of the social structure, especially how power differentials bring to bear intra- and inter-subjective divisions and identities that are manifested in discourse, with special emphasis being made on implicit semiotic mediation, which is the carrier of the social order and the structuring principle of instruction. The positions
subjects take can be ascertained through an analysis of the structure and the active and passive realisation of discourse by students. However, Bernstein’s code theory does not tell us much about the potential for activity, about the aspirations of subjects, for it is focused on the outcome of the pedagogic apparatus as a ruler of consciousness, on the evaluation of the pedagogic process within its restrictive set of rules that act as recontextualisation principles. Code theory takes the point of view of the instructor. It is here that cultural theory enters the scene. Holland and colleagues advance a method of accessing the figured world of subjects as they rationalise the appropriation of cultural tools they have made and reflect about their social position. The analysis allows for taking up the position of the student.

Let us sum up the discussion by pointing out that this chapter has dealt with language as the quintessential form of development. However, we have seen that language as activity, as speech, is not enough to ascertain the sociological dimension of development. The process of appropriating cultural tools such as speech takes place in institutions which act as intermediary social organisations that modulate at once speech and social relations. They act as modulators of meanings and the actual concrete forms that those meanings take as objects. In such analysis speech is no longer speech but discourse, that is, language or speech in which there is an assessment of the social positioning of subjects. Discourse, as a sociological category, is therefore inherently associated with the notion of subject. Subject is a relational process of subjectivation and objectivation. It is within this relation that a fair analysis of individual agency can be obtained.
CHAPTER 3: EPISTEMOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHOD

But this present has a name: it is the present of absolute knowledge, in which consciousness and science are one and the same, in which science exists in the immediate form of consciousness, and truth can be read openly in the phenomena, if not directly, at least with little difficulty, since the abstractions on which the whole historico-social science under consideration depends are really present in the real empirical existence of the phenomena.

(Althusser, see Althusser and Balibar, 1997, p. 137)

In a crucial way the evolution of the theory is a function of the attempt to develop greater powers of description, greater conceptual clarity and control, increased generality and increased delicacy at the level of detail. This evolution is directly related to the extensive empirical research which the theory has both influenced and responded to.

(Bernstein, 2000, p. 211)

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out the epistemological, conceptual and methodological framework for the thesis. It explains how and why the thesis combines the approaches of the dialectical tradition, mostly represented by, but not limited to, Vygotsky’s psychology and Bernstein’s sociology, and argues for the coherence and productivity of bringing these two theorists together in this way. There are several stages to this argument. The first and overarching argument relates to a conception of dialectical method. I begin by setting out the general features and advantages of a dialectical approach. I then develop a more specific argument about the different ways in which Bernstein and Vygotsky might be understood to develop dialectical methodologies. While both might be understood as dialectical in some way, Vygotsky remains in a more traditional Hegelian-Marxian mode of dialectical methodology, while Bernstein foregrounds the need for social scientific research to engage in a movement between the theoretical and the empirical. I position this thesis, then, as taking a Bernsteinian mode of dialectical methodology.
The second key argument relates to the conceptualisation of the social. I argue that while the social is key to Vygotsky’s account of individual development, his theory lacks an operationalisable conception of the social. At the same time, Bernstein’s sociology, which provides tools for an analysis of the social, lacks an account of individual development or learning. Since this thesis is interested in both individual developmental trajectories in language learning and the social and institutional constraints on (or construction of) instructors and students subjectivities in the articulation or instantiation of these trajectories, neither Vygotsky or Bernstein alone can provide the necessary conceptual tools for my endeavour. The later sections of the chapter develop in some detail the tools provided by Vygotsky and Vygotskian scholars to provide an account of language development, and then the tools provided by Bernstein to construct an account of the social.

It is worth also noting in advance the way a notion of the dialectic is maintained through these sections of the chapter: in the movement between two conceptual frameworks, both of which offer a distinct and necessarily incomplete perspective; and in the ongoing and always incomplete construction of the subject in the movement between what we might call an individualised psychology, an idea of language/Spanish and a specific institutional and social context.

### 3.2 METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the present thesis is based on Bernstein’s *translation device*. By *translation device* what is meant is the linking of the theory and the empirical problem under certain epistemic conditions, for they depend on one another and it is in the research methodology that their languages of description must be developed and intersect. More precisely, by languages of description, Bernstein (2000) refers to the devices that allow the translation of one language into another in a non-circular way. This amounts to an operation in which the ‘principles of description, although derived from the theory, must interact with the empirical contextual displays so as to
retain and translate the integrity of the display’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 91). It is therefore a form of translating the theory to the empirical problem so as to grasp its whole complexity but keeping the translated device relatively autonomous from the theory.

This particular aspect of the translation device, that is, the avoidance of circularity, together with code theory, attracted me to Bernstein’s theory in the first place, making me reflect about the nature of theoretical and empirical practice. Whilst developing a method to address the problem of classroom disruption at the tertiary level in Japan, which would later be integrated under the subject foreign language education resistance (Escandón, 2004), I came to the conclusion that my approach had a serious empirical limitation. The deployment of the notion of habitus allowed me to describe the problem to a great extent, but I knew I had reached a dead end in terms of making it empirically operational, which eventually meant that its explanatory power was severely constrained. The notion of habitus, together with other notions belonging to Bourdieu’s sociology, lacked explanatory power as well. The problem was its circularity. Habitus – these ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) – was a product of habitus and I could not overcome its circularity. I could only recognise these systems but I could not have any idea about their specific formation. Thus, I was limited in terms of understanding why certain segments of the student population resisted education, even though the resulting taxonomy and description of their disruption look superficially impressive. In other words, it amounted to a classification of symptoms disconnected from the causes. I remember in particular the categories for different forms of simulation students developed. In some cases, they complied with the classroom rules but ended up not carrying out the instructional task under established parameters. Resistance amounted to a sophisticated form of pretence. At that time I knew I had to adopt a different theory and method and I was examining various dialectical approaches: activity theory, distributed learning, and communities of practice. Therefore, when I wrote my original research proposal I knew it had to comply with two basic requirements. The first was the problem: I did not want to start addressing again the problem of resistance, for it was worded too negatively and it made me feel more
depressed than I already was with having to experience every day, as a language instructor, disruptive classrooms. The wording had to be positive. Why not study and give an explanation for success? What made students succeed in communicative language teaching contexts? More than a problem with the wording, I did not want to search for students’ wrong deeds but for good deeds, instead. I believe that studying resistance is, eventually, like studying crime. You soon are too focused on searching for the unlawful that you become obsessed with it and may start disregarding lawful behaviour. The second point was that I needed a theoretical and methodological approach that allowed me to address the question without incurring circularities. I wanted to explain the problem, not only describe it and I decided not to draw strong theoretical and methodological boundaries but to draw on any theory and methodology that allowed me to effectively address the problem. That was when I met my supervisor and he directed me to the advantages of combining Bernstein’s sociology and Vygotsky’s psychology (for his views, see Daniels, 2001b, 2004, 2008, 2010). In fact, Bernstein’s sociology not only had the potential to address partially the problem I wanted to resolve but it also offered me a set of methodological principles to curtail or eliminate circularity altogether.

Right from the beginning, I found the following assertion:

…if we take a popular concept, habitus, whilst it may solve certain epistemological problems of agency and structure, it is only known and recognised by its apparent outcomes. Habitus is described in terms of what it gives rise to, and brings, or does not bring about. It is described in terms of the external underlying analogies it regulates. But it is not described with reference to the particular ordering principles or strategies, which give rise to the formation of particular habitus. The formation of the internal structure of the particular habitus, the mode of its specific acquisition, which gives it its specificity, is not described…Habitus is known not by its output, not by its input. Putting it crudely, there is no necessity between the concept or what counts as a realisation. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 133)

Bernstein’s assertion is far more sophisticated than the conclusion I drew regarding the theoretical and empirical dead end I had reached whilst deploying Bourdieu’s sociology in my research, but our conclusions were identical.

Eventually, the problem of method seemed to have overtaken the initial pedagogic
problem, but in fact the two, the practical pedagogical problem and the method, are
dialectically related. What is clear now is that by addressing the methodological
problem I am in a position, I believe, to offer an original contribution to the
educational field in general, and to close ties between sociology and psychology.
Furthermore, I believe the SLA field is nowadays being dramatically
recontextualised (see Sanz, Igoa and Escandón, 2012) by drawing on the dialectical
(sociocultural) tradition and this thesis can also be seen as a direct contribution to
that process. Last but not least, I do not forget that by addressing the practical
pedagogic problem, the work can be seen as an original contribution to improving
instructors’ pedagogic practice and students’ chances of developing mastery in a
foreign language such as Spanish, with all the complexities and benefits that the
mastery of a cultural tool has.

In the following sections I will attempt to address the advantages that the translation
device presents for research and discuss the links between theory and empirical
research, especially in light of producing a theoretical and empirical hybrid as is the
case with the present thesis and its methodological implications. I will also provide
the exact method and advance a research model.

Theory and empirical research, a dialectical approach

What is Bernstein’s translation device all about? Bernstein (2000) understood the
internal language of description (L¹) as the ‘syntax whereby a conceptual language is
created’ and the external one (L²) as ‘the syntax whereby the internal language can
describe something other than itself’ (p. 132). In other words, on the one hand, pure
theoretical derivations (an internal language of description) are inadequate, as they
will disregard or exclude (a) the actual conditions of the object being researched or
(b) accurate descriptions of phenomena, and, on the other hand, the researcher
cannot fully rely on empirical constructs (an external language of description) for
they lack any norms outside the logic of their own relations.

This represents a dialectical conception of research that I believe shares some
aspects with the dialectical tradition of the kind Vygotsky drew on when advancing
his psychology. Let me review first the principles that inform dialectics and approach the problem of theory and empirical research from Vygotsky’s practice. In the interest of saving time, I will not touch on the differences between dialectical idealism (Hegel) and materialism (Marx). Thus, both forms will be considered as part of the same dialectical line.

I believe there are two important premises in the dialectical tradition: the first one deals with the nature of the ideal and the second one, with the way to proceed in order to produce absolute truth, that is, a method of enquiry that eventually detaches knowledge from empirical observation. Thus, theoretical knowledge is something said about something, i.e., it maintains the form subject and predicate, but absolute knowledge is not, for it is a philosophical speculation that unites subject and predicate. In other words, absolute truth is the unification through philosophical means of theoretical and practical knowledge (see Hegel, 1910).

First, under Marx’s conception, the ideal is not what is in the mind of the individual as opposed to reality, something that stands outside the mind – as it is in the vulgar conception of the term –, but socially realised human life activity, whose existence precedes (and therefore is external to) the individual mind. The ideal nonetheless is established in cultural tools, its material form, and this implies its reification (Ilyenkov (1977a). Thus, for Marx the ideal is grounded in social relations, especially in the actual conditions of human existence. The categories that guide human activity have their origin in human activity and, therefore, the method to liberate human beings from their own misconceptions or illusions is the dialectical method by which the ideal is enquired after through examining those conditions.

Second, in relation to the exact method, Marx in Grundisse advances this when addressing the problem of a science of political economy:

It seems to be correct procedure to commence with the real and the concrete, the actual prerequisites; in the case of political economy, to commence with population, which is the basis and the author of the entire productive activity of society. Yet on closer consideration it proves to be wrong. Population is an abstraction, if we leave out for example the classes of which it consists... If we start out, therefore, with population, we do so
with a chaotic conception of the whole, and by closer analysis we will gradually arrive at simpler ideas; thus we shall proceed from the imaginary concrete to less and less complex abstractions, until we arrive at the simplest determinations. This once attained, we might start on our return journey until we finally come back to population, but this time not as a chaotic notion of an integral whole, but as a rich aggregate of many determinations and relations...The concrete is concrete because it is a combination of many determinations, i.e. a unity of diverse elements. In our thought it therefore appears as a process of synthesis, as a result, and not as a starting-point, although it is the real starting point and, therefore, also the starting-point of observation and conception. By the former method the complete conception passes into an abstract definition; by the latter the abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete subject in the course of reasoning. (Marx, 2000, p. 386)

Marx is obviously talking about concepts such as value or labour when he refers to the ‘concrete’ but it can be applied to other fields of research as well. The method is also known in social sciences as immanent critique. The categories it works with come from imaginary concrete forms and not from empirical (i.e. sensory, experiential) apprehension, although it does not exclude empirical forms of apprehension at intermediate stages. In fact, the intermediary process is required. The intermediate judgements are eventually criticised and, to complete the process, the critique is criticised as well, which means that a philosophical stance is assumed. In other words, the fundamental difference is the conceptual organisation given by the method, which attempts to capture in germ-cell form the total number of determinations of a system. What it guarantees is the conservation of the totality or whole, which ensures in turn that no single determination is above the others. As already seen, it is a method whereby existence (the actual conditions of life, or actuality) as grasped by reason are united with the ideal, or concept, a procedure that will reveal inner contradictions and produce the absolute idea. As Hegel points out in The Encyclopaedia Logic:

As unity of the subjective and the objective Idea, the Idea is the Concept of the Idea, for which the Idea as such is the object, and for which the object is itself—an object in which all determinations have come together. This unity, therefore, is the absolute truth and all truth, it is the Idea that thinks itself, and at this stage, moreover, it is [present] as thinking, i.e., as logical Idea. (Hegel, 1991, p. 303)

The end result of such a procedure is beyond theoretical and practical knowledge or,
as Hegel, adds in the commentary (Zusätze) to the above assertion, ‘The absolute Idea is first of all the unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea, and hence equally the unity of the Idea of life with the Idea of cognition’ (p. 303). Further, Buchwalter (1991) defines it as a methodological approach that has as its principle the ‘identity of reason and reality’, as a way to avert ‘the dichotomy of descriptive and prescriptive analysis’ (p. 253). This assertion is the key to an understanding of the implications of immanent dialectics for research.

In the case of the notion of habitus that I mentioned above, the notion served well at the beginning in terms of its descriptive power, but it lacked prescriptive power, for it did not embrace the totality of the phenomenon it tries to deal with, i.e. explaining human action, leaving outside the very formation of habitus. This meant that eventually its descriptive or analytical power was compromised, for that seems to be the nature of the relation between the abstract and practical ideas, they are co-constituted. Immanent critique, on the other hand produces notions that are both an analytical framework and an explanatory principle. However, as I will attempt to show later on with the case of Vygotskian psychology, it still must rely on intermediate, empirical forms of verification, that is, an external language of description, even if this criterion is borrowed from methodological paradigms that do not belong to the dialectical tradition.

Let me go back now to Bernstein’s translation device. For Bernstein the quest for validity must extend beyond the boundaries of the text. Moore (2001), referring to this principle formulated in Bernstein’s ideas of sociological research, maintains that textual circularity – explaining a text through the very same text – is not enough. The epistemic conditions set by Bernstein (2000) focus on the construction of ‘what is to count as an empirical referent’ (p. 133):

…the external language of description (L²) is the means by which the internal language (L¹) is activated as a reading device or vice versa. A language of description, from this point of view, consists of rules for the unambiguous recognition of what is to count as a relevant empirical relation, and rules (realisation rules) for reading the manifest contingent enactments of those empirical relations. Principles of description, then, consist of recognition and realisation rules. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 133)
By recognition rules, Bernstein is referring to the ability of an agent to recognise what the requirements for the production of a given text are, which are regulated by the degree of insulation between categories. By realisation rules, he is referring to the ability of an agent to produce an adequate text, which is regulated by the principles of control or interaction (pp. 104-105).

Bernstein sees differentials in terms of how research deploys the internal and external languages of description, which he calls ‘modes of enquiry’. He sees differentials that go from one extreme, in the ‘classical experimental context’, to the other, the ‘ethnographic position’ research (p. 134).

Let us take first the mode of enquiry posed by the experimental research. Here, variables are controlled and what occupies the imagination of the researcher is the design of the context:

Here we can say that the language of description \( (L^2) \) is embedded in the context it created. The text produced by the ‘subject’ is less the response but more the created context…from the point of view of the researcher, it is the realisation rule which is responsible for the design of the context…In this mode of enquiry the researcher has the realisation rule that generates the context and the recognition rule is embedded in the realisation rule. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 134)

In contrast, in the ethnographic research, the subjects have the recognition and realisation rules, but the model from which these rules are derived are tacit. The goal of the researcher is to find the rules and the model.

The problem is to construct the tacit model. If the researcher fails to construct the model s/he is marooned in the specific contexts and their enactments, and is in no position to appreciate the potential of the meanings of that particular culture, and thus its possible enactments. Without a model, the researcher can never know what could have been and was not. But the model the ethnographer constructs to grasp the potential semantic of the culture will not be only the tacit models of the members. Such models enable members to work the culture but not to know its workings. Cultures are not transparent in this respect. The models that attempt to show the transparency of the culture are constructed by the internal language of description \( (L^1) \). (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 134-135)
Thus, Bernstein recognises in each case the need to provide a criterion by which the text means something beyond itself. Put in other words, in the experimental case, the researcher must provide proof of what counts as true realisation on the part of the subject for the researcher is limiting his or her capacity to listening to the subject’s own voice. In the case of the ethnographer, a simple grounded method or, let us say, a constructivist research design is not enough because the subjects being researched may overlook the real workings of the culture they live in even if they are competent agents in that culture. A model needs to be constructed.

Moss summarises in a more comprehensible and colloquial way the two general directions the modes of enquiry take:

The researcher must be ‘prepared to live with the muddle which is the unordered data, and enjoy the pleasure of its potential, in order to be able to generate the theoretical apparatus which is specific to it’ (Bernstein, personal communication). Get in there too soon with the theory and it will overwhelm the data, limiting its potential to say something new. Delay pulling back from the data too long, and the researcher runs the risk of ending up submerged in the specifics, with no way of identifying the general principles which underpin the whole. (Moss, 2001, p. 18)

Thus, the L¹-L² mode of enquiry (description I) runs the risk of silencing the subjects and the L²-L¹ mode of enquiry (description II) may not lead to an internal language of description capable of going beyond the subjects of the study. That is why the translation must meet the requirements of the translation device.

Bernstein sees a complex relation between the internal and external languages of description; a relation determined by the position the researcher and the subject being researched take regarding the possession of recognition and realisation rules for both languages. Thus, the particular modes of enquiry will remain under a dialectic paradigm provided the right movements from L¹ and L² are exhausted in research, producing some kind of synthesis. This means that a tool of enquiry widely considered positivist or quantitative can actually be part of a dialectic relation with other more interpretive or qualitative tools. The methodology and the method are also situated in a particular context, both in terms of the actual material conditions of the research and the historical state of abstraction of the categories or science.
Under this framework, empirical research cannot, of course, be understood in the terms of an empiricist science. Vygotsky’s dialectical approach, for example, articulates theory and empirical observation in ways quite different to other traditions. The point of departure of Vygotsky’s research is from concrete forms such as development, mediating activity or word meaning, following the method advanced by Marx in the development of political economy. Vygotsky, explaining the method deployed in studying the development of higher mental functions asserts on a purely dialectical key that

...because of the close tie between the method and the material base of our research..., to present a formula means to disclose beforehand the central idea of the whole study, to anticipate to a certain degree its conclusions and results which may be fully understood, convincing and clear only at the end of the exposition. (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 39)

This is a pure dialectical approach. However, when faced with the problem of presenting the exact method, even though the framework is cultural-historical, and therefore dialectical, Vygotsky draws on Engels and presents a criterion of proof based on the natural sciences:

We have decided to present the formula which is the basis of our method and to develop the basic idea of our research as a working hypothesis at first. In choosing this way of presenting it, we might depend, in this case, on the words of Engels, which precisely express the methodological significance of our way of thinking. He says, “The form of development of natural science, insofar as it thinks, is the hypothesis. Observation discovers some new fact which invalidates the former method of explaining facts pertaining to a specific group. From that moment the need arises for new methods of explanation based at first only on a limited number of facts and observations. Subsequent experimental data lead to refinement of these hypotheses, eliminate some of them and correct others, until finally a law is established in pure form. If we should want to wait until the date is ready for the law in a pure form, it would mean suspending thoughtful research until then, and for this reason alone, we would never get to the law” (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 555).

(Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 39)

Are we witnessing Vygotsky’s empiricist turn? I do not think so. The true concepts which underlie his methods in psychology such as development or mediating activity were derived from dialectical social science, that is, they pertain to or are an
extension of a network of concepts that were not developed through sensual, immediate experience. Such concepts belong to a scientific system, the dialectical tradition at large. Vygotsky (1987) considered scientific concepts to be ‘the purest type of nonspontaneous concept’ insofar as they can only be acquired through scientific instruction, that is, their development line is different to the one used to develop spontaneous concepts (p. 177), that is, concepts that are gradual generalisations of experience. Even true scientific practice does not share with spontaneous concepts a bottom-up development path. Nevertheless, Vygotsky did resort to empirical verification of his method, especially through experimentation, but this does not mean that he worked with immediate categories that emanated from empirical data. As Vygotsky points out:

In our view, an entirely different form of analysis is fundamental to further development of theories of thinking and speech. This form of analysis relies on the partitioning of the complex into units. In contrast to the term “element”, the term “unit” designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible part of the whole. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 46)

Thus, the complex notions we sometimes take for granted in Thinking and speech (Vygotsky, 1987) have been verified through diverse forms of experimental research. In fact, empirical research (L²) served Vygotsky as a validation criterion of the general method (L¹) or model he had found, that is, the genesis of higher mental functions was a case of development that depended on mediating activity, especially by means of signs. In Vygotsky’s own words: ‘We intend to subject to precise, empirical research the role of signs and behaviour in all its real uniqueness’ (p. 61). Moreover, as A.N. Leont’ev (1997) comments, ‘For Vygotsky the hypothesis of the mediation of mental functions, combined with the historical-genetic method, opened new perspectives for his research’ (p. 23) and furthermore

… does the hypothesis of mediation suggested by Vygotsky really allow us to isolate a new and adequate universal unit of the structure of mental functions? If this were true, then Vygotsky might proceed to the solution of the problem of consciousness from the position of the historical-genetic method. But first this general hypothesis had to be verified. Models for such a verification became first memory and later attention … In the course of the experiments on attention, the mediation hypothesis was once again confirmed …’ (A.N. Leont’ev, 1997, p. 24)
A criterion of proof based on *experiments* may not always be required, but any research process requires an empirical criterion of proof in terms of the procedures being used or the translation between the internal and external language, even if the research involves, for instance, comparing two theoretical systems or giving new light to a conceptual system as part of an hermeneutical method, let alone with intervention research.

What is the main difference between Vygotsky’s approach and the one advanced by Bernstein? First of all, the translation device does not deal with absolute truth, but with intermediate links between theoretical and practical knowledge. The translation device does not require that the knowledge of the internal language of description be derived from book knowledge, that is, the kind of philosophical speculation of absolute knowledge sought by Marx. Nonetheless, the use of the translation device does not prescribe its avoidance. In other words, it does not forbid the use of the type of concepts developed through Marxian social science or Vygotsky’s psychology. However, there are few implications we must notice. The most important one is that the activation of an empirical validation principle implies (a) the dissolution of the unified prescriptive and descriptive aspects of knowledge and (b) the admission that the theory is subject to change in light of the empirical evidence or gap between the internal and external language of description. Thus, Vygotsky, when deploying *mediating activity* as a method must, during the research process, through the particular model used, define if the translation is operating mainly as an explanation or a description. The empirical process does not admit the use of both at once, although they are mutually constituted and in fact they are being co-constructed at once. As Bernstein (2000) asserts, ‘the real problem is that the two processes of constructing description [the internal and the external] are not discrete in time. They are going on together, perhaps one more explicit than the other’ (p. 135).

Nonetheless, the avoidance of circularity is based eventually upon a form of empirical proof that I recognise, borrowing Popper’s (1959) ideas, as a *principle of falsification*. This means that proof or verification is inverted. A positive empirical result does not verify the hypothesis but only confirms that it has not yet been
falsified, not in the specific terms set by the language of description. This inversion of common-sense epistemology puts the theoretical imagination ahead of empirical practice, suggesting that the hypothesis is constructed not as a mere collection of empirical evidence or elements. Thus, the design of empirical procedure must target key areas susceptible of being falsified. In fact, as seen above, this is implicitly done by Vygotsky and his team but with the double purpose of expanding the theory’s analytical or descriptive power (see Vygotsky, 1997a). However, the principle in the dialectical tradition of working with notions, i.e. with absolute truth in a Hegelian sense, tends to minimise empirical practice when reporting research outcome. If one reads Thinking and speech, one gets the idea that the method is incontestable. This is because we are never presented with the true prototype, the twists and set backs of theoretical development and empirical research. In contrast, everything starts very neatly with the method, derived from the dialectical tradition, the unit of analysis already in synthetic form (i.e. word meaning, ‘the inner aspect of the word, in its meaning’, Vygotsky, 1987, p.47), and concepts belonging to the scientific network (e.g. ‘inner speech’, p. 44) and we embark on a developmental or narrative line that is not chronological. In other words, synthesis reigns over analysis, erasing the tracks of research production.

The problem is when there are areas (a) empirically unaccounted for, such as what is exactly the social in Vygotsky’s system, which in fact opens a way for activity theory to develop, but in a kind of theoretical schism (see Engeström and Miettinen, 1999), or (b) empirically very problematic, such as what kind of mediation is inner speech (i.e. ‘speech that is psychologically inner and that functions in a manner analogous to external egocentric speech’, Vygotsky, 1987, p. 71). There are cases, especially when inner speech is linked to inner programming and coding, in which empirical data falsify several hypotheses derived from Vygotskian psychology (see Průcha, 1972, pp. 53-99). Not in Vygotsky’s psychology, but in Soviet psycholinguistics, one gets the impression that the concept of inner speech is contested or lacks precision and it is better to return to the concept of speech activity in general without making distinctions between inner and external/social speech. In either case, it seems that the empirical chaos is far ahead of the possibilities of theoretical reorganisation without advancing a new notion. In conclusion, one seems
to get to a theoretical dead end when using true dialectical notions that do not correspond to the phenomena empirically described and a new formulation is required altogether. In other words, the ontological-epistemic knot of the dialectic tradition does not have room for vertically integrating, in pyramidal fashion, knowledge that does not seem to be accounted for in the aggregation of determinations, requesting a complete restructuring of the model. It rather follows a spiral form of integration. In fact, as it will be seen in our case, the solution is to work out a new formulation, rather than collecting together a series of elements.

Finally, there have been areas of Vygotsky’s theory that have experienced change or expanded in terms of analytical power in light of empirical processes without changing its basic assumption. This has introduced classification categories that expand the analytical power of the theory without changing the theoretical paradigm. This could be considered a pure mode II of enquiry. An example of this are the experiments done to prove the socio-genetic nature of the development of higher mental functions, in particular, the experiments about the use by the child of external tools that allow controlling his/her behaviour (e.g. memory) until those tools are no longer needed, for the activity has been internalised. In these experiments the reaction time was measured among other parameters such as the number of repetitions needed until the activity was internalised. Thus, Vygotsky (1987) points out that in the light of the experiments he can recognise three types of such revolution or transition of an external operation to an inner plane: the seam type, in which the child uses an intermediate tool to connect the stimulus and the reaction; the whole, in which the child transfers the complete series of external stimuli; and finally the one in which the structure of the process is completely assimilated by the child and he begins to use verbal stimuli (p. 117). Such a categorisation does contribute better to analysing the developmental process of memory but it is formulated in the light of and shaped by the empirical evidence. It is fundamentally a description II mode of enquiry. In other words, the researchers, and Vygotsky was working with a team of them, let the data talk, but always within the dialectical framework already accounted for above. Furthermore, empirical processes led Vygotsky and his team to proclaim laws, not unlike Newton may have proclaimed the law of universal gravitation, such as is the case with the ‘genetic law of
memory’ (p. 185), which in fact was formulated by A.N. Leont’ev after doing a longitudinal study in which the coefficients of word retention (memory) in children for direct (e.g. without the help of a mediating tool) and mediated cases were compared. Both curves, representing these two different development lines, were compared and the law was called ‘the parallelogram of the development of memory’ (p. 185) because of the peculiar shape of both curves. Vygotsky succinctly defines it as ‘mnemotechnical memory must be considered as a process of mastering memory with the aid of external stimuli-signs’ (p. 185). Vygotsky is even concerned about the generalisation of the experiments’ outcome, asserting that ‘the data was collected on a very large number of children and adults’ (p.185), not unlike any researcher is concerned nowadays with the generalisation potential of an experiment or case.

In conclusion, the fact that Vygotsky was working with concepts derived from Marxian social science does not overwrite the need to adopt an empirical validation criterion at intermediate levels of enquiry. This does not eliminate the possibility of eventually presenting the results of research in synthetic form, as Vygotsky clearly does in *Thinking and speech*. Therefore, I do not see an intrinsic incompatibility between the dialectical tradition and Bernstein’s translation device, provided that a common, compatible concrete form that articulates the theoretical hybrid is deployed in the internal language of description. The external language of description always implies a dialogue with empirical practice and there is no way out of this. The actual difference stems from the fact that immanent critique implies the assumption of a philosophical standpoint, something that it is missing in Bernstein’s sociology. In other words, the kind of accumulation of knowledge allowed or sought by immanent critique is different to the kind of accumulation of knowledge allowed or sought by Bernstein’s translation device, and more particularly by Bernstein’s sociological method. In the former, the intermediate links between theoretical and empirical knowledge are eventually dissolved by adopting a philosophical stance that does not admit empirical observation, and therefore takes a post-hoc position, which is the whole idea of an *absolute*. The process is subsumed into being. As Hegel (1991) comments, ‘the absolute Idea is to be compared with the old man who utters the same religious statements as the child, but for whom they carry the significance of his whole life’ (p. 304). As Sloterdijk (2010) asserts, the
dialectical or Hegelian position is set on the conviction that one needs to be located at the end of the process to be able to tell the truth. Thus, recognising is remembering and understanding is reconstructing. In the latter, there is a progressive integration of knowledge into more abstract concepts that do not necessarily carry the whole aggregation of determinations. Eventually, the theory tries to preserve its empirical potential. As Bernstein (2000) asserts, ‘a theory is only as good as the principles of description to which it gives rise’ (p. 91). Further, the presentation of the accomplishments seems always incomplete. As Bernstein points out, ‘… for me the aim of a paper is productive imperfection. That is it generates a conceptual tension which provides the potential for development… the papers are the means of discovering what I shall be thinking, not what I am thinking’ (p. 211).

Finally, I believe, like Marx and Vygotsky, that the use of a dialectical notion does open ways for a more critical integration of theories than the mere addition of them, as attention will be paid to all possible determinations. However, the theory will be translated, so as to describe and explain empirical problems. This is what will be attempted here.

3.3 RESEARCH METHOD

3.3.1 Solving some problems in the conceptualisation of the social

What, then, are the assumptions made in the present thesis? What is its method? Briefly put, it is the ascertaining of subject position under the fundamental tenets of a socio-genetic framework and a common conception of subject. These fundaments are shared by all the theoretical bodies that will be drawn on: the cultural-historical tradition, especially cultural-historical activity theory, Vygotskian approaches to understanding agency and identity, such as Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory, and Bernstein’s code theory.

The question is why the present methodology needs to draw on these different theories. A simple answer was already given above when I pointed out that the social in Vygotsky’s psychology remains empirically unaccounted for. In other
words, word meaning is a unit of mind formation that does not allow empirical
descriptions of how macrostructures shape intersubjective relations and vice versa.
Thus, I have to draw on a series of theories that do provide that empirical aspect in
order to translate the theory into the empirical problem at hand.

There are several difficulties with what constitutes the social in Vygotsky’s
psychology. As Hasan points out:

…‘the child’ in Vygotsky remains undifferentiated; whatever the historical
rationale for this, the role of social structure and of social positioning is
never foregrounded in Vygotsky. It appears as if semiotic mediation would
have the same efficacy, no matter what the environment for the interaction.
(Hasan, 2005, p.41)

This constitutes a paradox in Vygotsky’s theory since he viewed the development of
language as subject to the socio-historical laws of dialectical materialism. As Lee
asserts, language development, in Vygotskian thought, is part of a dialectical
relation with the organisation of production (Lee, 1985, p. 75). Yet the aspects of
school organisation, social organisation, social class are rarely accounted for. Hasan
strengthens this view in the following terms:

… speech, Vygotsky maintained, is social; semiotic mediation is social. But
when it comes to the process of mediation, it appears to be curiously
a-social. Vygotsky’s is a theory that would celebrate the social foundations
of mental development, while disregarding almost completely if not
entirely the role of language in enacting social relations, as well as the
relevance of social relations to mental development… The child after all is
not just a repository of mental functions; through the living of life in
community, s/he is first and foremost a social person. But in the discourse
on semiotic mediation, the mediator and mediatee remain socially
innocent; the acculturated adult mentioned sometimes in connection with
semiotic mediation remains in Bernstein’s terms, ‘culturally non-specific’
and neither participant seems to be located in the social structure, which in
no way appears to impinge on their life. (Hasan, 2005, p. 149)

Although the criticism seems unwarranted, for the social is there in all the
theoretical formulations of Vygotsky, starting by word meaning, Hasan points out
that the social aspect of the formation of the human psyche has not been specified
enough in empirical terms.
The criticism does not come exclusively from the Bernsteinian camp (Hasan was a member of Bernstein’s Sociological Research Unit at University of London) but from cultural theoreticians and researchers, and even from the sociocultural camp. Bakhtin’s theory of *authoring the self* provides for Holland et al. (2001) an answer to Vygotsky’s lack of analysis of the materiality of social relations. Drawing on Wertsch, Minick and Arns (1984), they point out that:

> While the social was clearly important to Vygotsky, we miss the elements of power, status, stratification, and ownership that Bakhtin emphasized. In Vygotsky’s vision cultural forms become fused with mental life within social interaction, but he avoided attention to the conflictual in social life or to the oppressive nature of many institutions in which humans interact these cultural forms. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 177)

I will return to this point later to point out that Bakhtin’s theory does not solve the problem of delivering a comprehensive and detailed empirical analysis of the social, although it is a step on the right direction. The question, then, is what exactly is the social in Vygotsky’s psychology, one of the leading developments of the dialectical tradition?

For Blunden, the social in Vygotsky is *represented* by the figure of the adult who bridges the universal reservoir of social tools to the child through the particular kind of activity that takes place in the zone of proximal development. However, the assumption was that in this relation, framed under particular organisations such as the school, the family or the State, there were not problematic aspects. It was A.N. Leont’ev who started to touch on those problematic aspects of the social structure under the notion of activity. The activity of individuals depends on their social position. As A.N. Leont’ev points out:

> Despite all its diversity, all its special features the activity of the human individual is a system that obeys the system of relations of society. Outside these relations human activity does not exist. *How it exists* is determined by the forms and means of material and spiritual communication that are generated by the development of production and that cannot be realised except in the activity of specific individuals. It stands to reason that the activity of every individual depends on his place in society, on his conditions of life. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1977, p. 182)
The possibilities for the use of cultural tools, that is, the means of material and spiritual communication A. N. Leont’ev refers to above, are determined by the subject’s social position. Under this model, human agency is understood as the capacity of a subject for action after assuming a concrete position (the emergence of object/motive) in a process that is social and historical and requires accessing universal mediational means (a social repertoire of cultural artefacts). The formation and emergence of objects/motives and the actions individuals engage in to pursue or fulfil them are inseparable from semiotic mediation. During this process, the fabric of social life is altered and the subject’s position changed as well.

*Subject comprises the social as a whole*

As was already mentioned in chapter 2, the ascertaining of subject position depends upon working with a Hegelian *Notion* of subject, such as the one advanced by Blunden (2007). In a nutshell, this procedure consists of subsuming the individual psyche under the larger unit of subject as a way to link the social macrostructure of power and control with the social micro processes of the formation of the individual psyche. Blunden’s proposed solution is condensed in the following way:

A subject is therefore the identity of agency (or moral responsibility, the capacity to do something), “cogito” (knowledge or understanding), and self-consciousness (or identity). Agency, cogito, and self-consciousness are however never in absolute identity with one another; the identity of agency, cogito, and self-consciousness is a process, never complete or fully adequate at any given point... This trichotomy constitutes the *definition* of subject and allows the development of subjectivity to be traced through the independent development, reciprocal transformation, intersection, relative unity, and contradictions between its three components. As such this definition bridges the sciences of ethics, sociology, political science, psychology, and so forth. (Blunden, 2007, p. 257)

Blunden’s formulation helps in bridging the social macrostructure and the micro processes involved in mind formation through a series of relationships. The ongoing process of identification of agency, cogito and self-consciousness implies that in ascertaining the subject’s position we are dealing with differentials in (a) the capacity of individuals to operate in the social world and the potential to change it from within, (b) the mastery of the cultural tools that represent affordances and
constraints, including a certain structural determination given by the need to reproduce the social system and the conditions necessary for the appropriation of those cultural tools, and (c) the identity, understood as the individuals’ self-reflection, which draws on the very same cultural tools of point (b) above and therefore represents conflicting positions, but the logic of its formation must have a correlate with points (b) and (a) above.

I will refer in a moment in detail to how cultural-historical activity theory, Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory, and Bernstein’s code theory can shed light onto these relations. First, let us concentrate on the unit of analysis.

As was already seen, the method in the dialectical tradition depends upon finding a concrete that serves both as a framework of analysis and an explanatory principle. Blunden’s formulation is completed with the advancement of a Hegelian notion of subject in which we can pay attention to the whole system of determinations and therefore constitutes our unit of analysis:

Hegel defines the subject as the identity of three moments, each of which mediates the other two: Individual (e.g., meaning a single, finite, mortal individual psyche), Particular (e.g., meaning the continuing activity of individuals, in definite, continuing forms of social practice), and Universal (e.g., meaning the eternal and universal products of culture mobilized in activity and mediating the activity of individuals). This notion can be utilized to achieve a radicalization of notions of social subjectivity, not just at the individual level as already achieved by CHAT but also in relation to culture and society. (Blunden, 2007, p. 258)

As an even handier formulation, Blunden sees the three moments of subject as ‘psyche-activity-culture’ (p. 263). He asserts that in cultural-historical activity theory, the social macrostructure and the individual psyche are subsumed under the notion of activity. Blunden suggests that in the case of working with the above notion of subject, activity alone cannot be used to subsume the entirety of social institutions and the entirety of culture and a finer grain of analysis is needed in order to ascertain individual agency (p. 263). In other words, a simple deployment of the notion of activity is not enough.
My proposal therefore is to use Bernstein’s code theory as a sort of general framework for analysing the links between (a) the social structure (e.g., the university organisation, curricular schemes) and (b) the structure of the individual’s experience, which is given in terms of coding orientations, that is, as forms of organisation of the relevance of meanings.

Consubstantial to this is the deployment of the concept of (pedagogic) discourse as the recontextualising principle whereby knowledge and discourses are appropriated and communicated by institutions in ways that (re)produce the social structure, acting as a modulator of meanings, of the things we can and cannot think. This means that, unlike Vygotskian theory, in Bernstein’s code theory we are no longer dealing either with speech or language, for these concepts lack the sociological dimension of social structuring, i.e., they are non-specific. Whilst it is clear that Bernstein is concerned with speech or the individual instances of language production (see Bernstein, 1971, p. 174), making unsustainable the criticism that his theory is a form of structuralism, speech, as activity, is framed within the relationship between language (as a universal), social structure, social relations, and individual agency. In other words, in discourse, language use or speech acts depend upon the position of the speaker, that is, on the subject’s position. I will return to this in a moment to add another dimension to discourse in general so as to produce a more accurate analytical notion, as I see Bernstein’s notion of discourse does not suffice.

What, more precisely, is Bernstein’s code theory? Bernstein is concerned with the reproduction of culture, especially with socialisation processes that shape the discursive possibilities of individuals and structure their experiences. Unlike other theories of culture reproduction (e.g. Bourdieu’s sociology), Bernstein views discourse as reproducing in its own inner logic the external power relations that shape it. This suggests that the power field does not shape discursive practices from without but the structure of those discursive practices also gives rise to the power field. Thus, for Bernstein, symbolic systems are at the same time realisations and regulators of the structure of social relationships.
Codes, or speech systems, as Bernstein (1971) calls them in their earliest formulation, ‘create for their speakers different orders of relevance and relation. The experience of the speakers may then be transformed by what is made significant or relevant by different speech systems’ (p. 144). Bernstein draws on (a) Durkheim’s notion of boundary (see Muller, 2001) to analyse the relationships between symbolic order, social relations and the structuring of experience in terms of different forms of social integration (organic and mechanical solidarity) combining it with (b) Marx’s notion of social class, paying attention therefore to the subject’s social position. Thus, Marxian theory provides theoretical tools not only for analysing social formations in terms of the class-structured distribution of power, but most crucially it provides the theoretical principles to explain social change. Different forms of socialisation, shaped by class structure, orient the individual towards different forms of (speech) codes, which in turn control access to relatively context-tied or context-independent meanings, structuring as well the individual’s experience.

What Bernstein does is to place a Kantian-informed descriptive dichotomy such as Durkheim’s notion of the boundary (e.g., the sacred and the profane, or organic and mechanical solidarity) under the Marxian notion of class structure. The notion of class structure, although capable of producing a low-level description of cultural transmission, is very powerful in terms of explaining the social formation and change of symbolic systems. As Bernstein points out:

One major theory of the development of and change in symbolic structures is, of course, that of Marx. Although Marx is less concerned with the internal structure and process of transmission of symbolic systems, he does give us a key to their institutionalization and change. The key is given in terms of the social significance of society’s productive system and the power relationships to which the system gives rise. Further, access to, control over, orientation of and change in critical symbolic systems, according to the theory, is governed by power relationships, as these are embodied in the class structure. It is not only capital, in the strict economic sense, which is subject to appropriation, manipulation and exploitation, but also cultural capital in the form of the symbolic systems through which man can extend and change the boundaries of his experience. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 172)

This hybrid constitutes the basic fabric of Bernstein’s code theory. Therefore, in
Bernstein’s code theory, the notion of classification does not only refer to boundaries marked by cultural tools but to different forms of power distribution. Durkheimian theory provides the way to analysing experience in terms of its grounding in social relations, but it does not explain how those social relations were formed. In other words, the social system and the symbolic system are static. Unlike Best (2007), who asserts that ‘Bernstein’s earlier neo-Durkheimian analysis is much more effective in terms of understanding of the relationship between agency and structure’ than the later use of a Marxian-based notion of agency (p. 123), I believe that, on the contrary, it is precisely Marx’s notion of class structure and social position that allows Bernstein’s code theory to account for both the mutual shaping of the individual and the social structure in a non-deterministic fashion. Bernstein stresses this point in the following way:

Without a shadow of doubt the most formative influence upon the procedures of socialization, from a sociological viewpoint, is social class. The class structure influences work and educational roles and brings families into a special relationship with each other and deeply penetrates the structure of life experiences within the family. The class system has deeply marked the distribution of knowledge within society. It has given differential access to the sense that the world is permeable. It has sealed off communities from each other and has ranked these communities on a scale of invidious worth. We have three components, knowledge, possibility and invidious insulation. It would be a little naïve to believe that differences in knowledge, differences in the sense of the possible, combined with invidious insulation, rooted in differential material well-being, would not affect the forms of control and innovation in the socializing procedures of different social classes. I shall go on to argue that the deep structure of communication itself is affected, but not in any final or irrevocable way. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 175)

Bernstein is making the case for the importance of social class in structuring experience through discourse, as discourse is the fundamental means of distribution of knowledge. Yet, Bernstein is leaving open the possibility for changing the structure. This introduces a dynamic way of viewing social and individual experience, which it is missing in the original conceptualisation made by Durkheim.

Durkheimian theory lacks the sort of social intervention position that Marxian theory inherently assumes. In Marx, social position is ascertained to produce social change, not
to analyse social phenomena passively. Therefore, Bernstein’s drawing on Marx also must be understood as carrying through this interventionist dimension as well. A simple overview of Bernstein’s work reveals that he is trying to correct the sort of arbitrariness generated by class structure in terms of students’ access to cultural tools differentials. He is not only concerned with understanding how social structure shapes individual consciousness and agency and vice versa, but concerned with producing social change. Overlooking, disregarding or diminishing this dimension in Bernstein’s theory in general, as I believe Best does, steals from it its transformative vocation.

A real matter of concern is how to go about ascertaining class and social position while overcoming the difficulties and limitations that a classic theory of class structure poses, as societies grow more complex every day. I will return to this in a moment. Let me now explain the main relationship that I will establish between Bernstein’s code theory and cultural-historical activity theory.

3.3.2 A non-conventional notion of discourse

The notion of activity will be deployed together with Bernstein’s code theory to ascertain discourse as units of functions that correspond to different development vectors but also units that are socially structured by virtue of social positions. My concern is to find a way of breaking down pedagogical interaction into significant units that can contain both their (a) development characteristics, that is, as targeting a particular form of appropriation or mastery of a universal cultural tool with the aim of changing the subject and (b) the subjects’ current social position. This constitutes the basic complementary formulation of discourse. As Rodríguez Illera points out:

I believe that Bernstein’s conception of the subject is very similar in its genetic format to that derived from Vygotskian psychology in spite of the fact that emphasis is placed differently and that the fundamental resort to the course of development does not exist in Bernstein’s case. Of course, they may be viewed as complementary; in Vygotsky the social and cultural reference is usually nonspecific (and therein lies its ineffectiveness), while for Bernstein it is central and generates the code modalities. Or from the opposite view, there is nothing in Bernstein’s work that can be considered a mechanism of change at the subject level, while the content of Vygotsky’s position rests on the idea of the Zone of Proximal Development. (Rodríguez Illera, 1995, p. 200)
This implies that the notion of discourse is deployed in a non-conventional form that should condense the dialectical relationship between the actual social position of the subjects and their intended social position. In other words, discourse will differ as it will comprise the specific contradiction between social activity and individual action in which certain developmental vectors emerge. The development vector is a function of language’s socio-communicative and representative functions, or, put in terms of the zone of proximal development, the dialectical relationship between the zone’s upper (scientific/theoretical concepts) and lower reaches (spontaneous/everyday concepts).

3.3.3 Language’s differentiated functions and communicative language teaching

Communicative language teaching (CLT) seems to reproduce within the foreign language pedagogical field Vygotsky’s model of socio-genetic development. As Ellis (2003) points out, ‘CLT aims to develop the ability of learners to use language in real communication’ (p. 27). Drawing on Brown and Yule (1983), Ellis further asserts communication involves ‘two general purposes—the interactional function, where language is used to establish and maintain contact, and the transactional function, where language is used referentially to exchange information’ (p. 27). For Vygotsky, in turn, the transactional or representational function of communication is subject to the development of the interactional function. In other words, the representational function cannot be built on if intersubjective links are not established through communication in the first place. In Lee’s words:

Vygotsky believed that language eventually comes to serve two major well-differentiated functions for the adult. For adults, these two functions of social contact (communication) and representation are constantly interwined. Ontogenetically, the representational function grows out of the social-communicative function that is primary. The major body of Vygotsky’s work on language development focuses on showing the long and gradual differentiation between these two functions, then the use of the representational function to regiment both itself and other speech functions, and the consequent internalization of speech… Vygotsky’s insight was to see that the use of language to represent functions would result in two dialectically related but contrasting ‘vectors’ of development. Language used to represent to represent or refer to referential aspects of
language use eventually results in the development of logic and abstract thought. Language used to represent the means-end and interpersonal aspects of communicative interactions leads to the development of ‘inner speech’ and linguistically mediate motivation. (Lee, 1985, pp. 82-83)

Communicative language teaching also seems to reproduce the development vectors within the zone of proximal development, although on a dualistic key, with the issue about the explicit-implicit instruction option and the code-communication dilemma, as if these instructional approaches were exclusive and not complementary. Let us remember that the code-communication dilemma deals with opposite views held by practitioners and SLA scholars regarding second language instruction. Thus, code, on the one hand, refers to forms of instruction that introduce the linguistic code, i.e., a theoretical system. Communication, on the other hand, refers to forms of instruction that deal with real communication. Nonetheless, in recent accounts there is agreement on asserting that the representational aspects of language are a function of its socio-communicative dimension (see Brown and Yule, 1983; Ellis, 2003). Thus, for Stern (1983) code refers to a view of language as formal or academic and the way to approach its instruction is analytically. From an alternative perspective, language use in the natural language environment is ‘communicative’, inasmuch as it is non-analytical or ‘experiential’ (p. 405). In other words, and translated to the dialectical tradition, a dialectical contradiction exists between spontaneous and theoretical concepts or between the lower and upper reaches of the zone of proximal development.

More specifically, there are two contrasting visions of communicative language teaching: the weak and strong versions, respectively. As Ellis (2003) points out, the former is based on the premise that the elements of communicative competence can be identified and systematically taught, incorporating explicit instructional methods with the aim of achieving general notions such as ‘duration’ and ‘possibility’, and language functions such as ‘inviting’ and ‘apologizing’ (p. 28). In contrast, a strong version of communicative language teaching claims that language is acquired through communication and therefore instruction should rely fundamentally on implicit pedagogies. We must notice here that learning is linked to explicit instructional methods, whilst acquisition is linked to implicit
Let me give an example. If an instructor believes students need to master the foundations of the target language formal system, she or he will select instructional tasks in which the target language is discussed and reflected, especially by means of using theoretical concepts. In contrast, if the instructor is targeting the creation of speech habits, she or he will select instructional tasks that necessarily do not deal with metalinguistic terms, as the formation of habits requires casting reflection out. The introduction of theoretical concepts in such an instructional task will introduce back levels of reflection that do not contribute to the creation of speech habits. Thus, instructional tasks need to be analysed in terms of their relationship to sought developmental vectors as part of the overall development objectives of the activity system. In other words, the deployment of the notions of development and activity solves the problem of situating pedagogic discourse between ontogeny and microgeny. This will help in recontextualising SLA’s methods of, or approaches to, instruction (e.g., communicative language teaching) under Vygotskian and Bernsteinian theories.

### 3.3.4 Discourse and generalisation

In summary, discourse is understood as two mutually constituted dialectical systems: the activity system and the development system. The combined use of code theory and activity theory allows us to assign discourse a pedagogical code. This will allow us in turn to transcend organisational barriers for what used to be interaction has been segmented according to developmental targets. Thus, we can compare the specificity of discursive practices in terms of development objects across pedagogical contexts.

Although I am framing here a methodological problem, the issue is a very practical one as well. One of the main challenges both SLA practitioners and researchers face is to provide some kind of codification of the organisation and learning setting so that their research or reflection can have higher levels of generalisation, that is, the findings can be of use in institutions other than the ones the studies
were conducted in. In the Spanish-as-a-foreign-language context in Japan, there are many aspects that contribute to making this kind of codification a difficult methodological and empirical undertaking. First, the findings of the research carried out in organisations specialising in Spanish teaching do not make sense or are irrelevant to the practitioners who work in organisations that are not specialised in teaching Spanish. The differences are enormous. Whilst in the former students can enjoy almost three years of intensive study (the fourth one is more or less dedicated to finding a job), including in many cases one year of study abroad, the latter usually comprises a programme limited to a few hours per week for a maximum of two years. The opposite is also true: the findings of the research carried out in organisations that offer Spanish as an option among a pool of foreign languages, whether mandatory or not, do not make sense or are peripheral to those practitioners or researchers who work in organisations specialising in teaching Spanish. Second, how can we provide an account of language teaching that is not subject to unsubstantiated labels or non-scientific accounts? In other words, as I have already mentioned, I think it would count as a flagrant mistake just to classify a course or lesson based upon the label produced by the instructor without a thorough inspection of the claim or accept *prima facie* the label used in the organisation’s syllabi such as ‘Spanish Grammar I’ or ‘Spanish Conversation I’. Moreover, there are a myriad of labels out there. Thus, what could be conversational for one instructor may not be so for another. Our teachers’ associations and conferences are pretty much divided within and without between the linguistic and the pedagogic camps. The former is represented by the Spanish linguist or philologist, a Japanese native speaker who teaches Spanish grammar; whereas the latter is represented by the Spanish instructor, a native speaker of Spanish who teaches the practical aspects of language use. Among the former, there are instructors who stick to the ways they were taught three, four or five decades ago and try to reproduce those pedagogies in the courses they teach, including a vernacular version of the grammar-translation method or a systematic presentation of the Spanish grammar that pays attention to the gap that exists between the linguistic consciousness of the Japanese and the Spanish speaking people. Let me give one example of this: the place the Spanish subjunctive should take in the curriculum is always a matter of debate because it is extremely difficult
to translate the sense of one into the other; although Spanish articles are taught during the first two or three lessons, they are hard to grasp for the speakers of a language like Japanese that uses none. There are also younger generations of Japanese instructors who underwent extensive training in Spanish or Latin-American universities or language schools and therefore had more opportunities to experience other language teaching pedagogies. Furthermore, even among the native instructors, there is a similar generation gap. Older generations tended not to specialise in SLA but in so-called area studies (e.g. Spanish and Latin American studies), developing their own methods of instruction and materials, and among the ones who have gained a master degree in Spanish as a foreign language, there seems not to be a common understanding of teaching methods and approaches, such as the communicative language approach, which supposedly is informed by communicative language teaching. In fact, a lot of time is spent in conferences trying to reach an agreement about what version of communicative language teaching we are speaking of. Moreover, instructors often express the view that they would like to be true to their ideal pedagogic identity and teach their courses using a particular approach, such as one based on task-based language teaching or content-based teaching, but soon find out that the kind of curriculum they encounter at their particular university, including the omnipresent curricular grammar-conversation divide, the selection of textbooks, the structural or spatial disposition of the classroom, let alone the expectations, abilities and motivation of students, make them transform dramatically their approach and turn out practicing an unintended eclectic mix that is hard to define. In other words, the structure imposes a heavy toll even though practitioners may not deal with those structural issues for they are out of their reach.

Let me go back to activity and its capacity to segment discourse and link both macrostructures and micro processes.

3.3.5 Speech as activity, discourse

Similar to Vygotsky’s theory of consciousness formation and the development of higher psychological functions, A.N. Leont’ev’s (1977, 1987, 1981) theory of
activity draws on the socio-genetic premise that intrasubjective processes have their formative stages and eventually depend upon intersubjective ones. In fact, Leont’ev’s theory avoids drawing a dividing line between these two planes and opts for referring to them as *human activity* in general (see A.N. Leont’ev, 1977; 1978). Within A.N. Leont’ev’s theory of activity, activities are distinguished according to their *objects*. The objects of activity satisfy necessarily societal needs. The organisation of activity towards a particular object is called *motive*. For A.N. Leont’ev, the division of labour makes impossible that the object/motive of activity coincides with the products individuals partaking in that activity produce through their own *goal-oriented actions*. In other words, even in the simplest technical division of labour, no single individual action can satisfy the needs of each participant and thus constitutes an intermediate result.

For A.N. Leont’ev, action corresponds therefore to a process subject to a conscious goal, that is:

> It will easily be understood that this “intermediate” result which forms the pattern of man’s labour processes must be identified by him subjectively as well, in the form of an idea. This is, in effect the setting of the goal, which determines the method and character of the individual’s activity. (A.N. Leont’ev, 1978, p. 185)

Goal formation, therefore, can be said to be a process of reification whereby the abstract is made concrete. Thus, the idea or goal that directs action has a Janus face: on the one hand, the subject is conscious of the object of activity, and on the other, there is a fetishist component attached to this process by simple virtue of being an objectivation that came about by resourcing to already available ready-mades, which are translations of the social relations that have (re)produced or developed them along time. The fetishist component of the idea is that, in order to last in the mind of the subject, or to be communicated, it needs to be represented, embodied in a tool. That tool, as a token, is mistaken as objective reality because the bonding needed to satisfy societal needs legitimise and naturalise the relation between activity and tool over time (see Ilyenkov, 1977a, 1977b, 1982).
This has enormous implications for our endeavour, for pedagogies (e.g. CLT-based pedagogies, instructional methods, approaches) are also tools and therefore our analysis must uncover what they, as reifications, stand for as legitimate educational forms.

The non-coincidental nature of societal activity and individual action is a source of permanent contradiction but also the locus of change, as the very emergence (or formative) of the action’s goal is but a subjective construction that arises by the use of cultural tools (e.g. a speech-mediated idea, a product), which are culturally and historically developed by the community. In other words, personal sense (subjective meaning) is possible (concretised) due to the existence of societal meaning (objective meaning) that precedes it. Furthermore, not only the emergence (or formative) of the action but the tools to carry it out (e.g. methods of production/organisation) are all expressions of objectivised societal activity.

The social dimension of individual action is also present in the case of operations, i.e., in the actual realisation of an action according to the material conditions available and the specific methods used to achieve its goal. Again, the resources at hand (e.g. the methods or procedures to achieve it) are of a collective nature even though they are the expression of individual action. For instance, if the goal of an action is to read and understand a given text passage, this can be done by consulting words in a bilingual or monolingual dictionary, by asking questions to peers or to the instructor about the meaning of words or by deducing their meaning without consulting anyone. Thus the operation, even if it is the expression of individual practice, draws on different cultural tools and adapts to particular conditions.

Due to their recurrence or convenience some operations may become automatic and seem to be out of the individual’s conscious grasp. The process whereby an action is embedded in another one is called by A.N. Leont’ev (1978) ‘technization’ (p.66). Operations can nonetheless be transformed back into reflective actions when individuals encounter performative problems. A.N. Leont’ev alerts us to the fact that when an operation is apparently removed from the activity by means of
carrying it out automatically, it does not mean that it has been separated from the action, as the action is never estranged from the activity, since the operation is still one of the means to carry out the action of the individual.

The notion of technization has very important implications in this study, since foreign language development in its foundational stages can be considered as a long process of technization in which unconscious control over speech is sought. The idea is to free the consciousness of the students from speech processing acts, so that they can focus on activity that does not necessarily have verbal performance in the foreign language as an object. The idea is that the foreign language becomes invisible. A fundamental aspect of technization in regard to foreign language development in adult students is that actions are eventually abbreviated, becoming automatic. However, because instruction is largely dependent on the deployment of theoretical concepts, the automatic process can be expanded at the time of difficulty and the student can go back to analysing and reflecting on language as an object at any given time. I will go back at this issue in a moment.

Let us translate A.N. Leont’ev’s ideas on activity into a foreign language pedagogic context. Let us suppose an instructor instructs students to carry out a pedagogic task which requires some form of joint work as part of a series of tasks that contribute to achieve the objects of pedagogic activity already set by some notion of what is considered desirable foreign language educational practice. A group of students (Group A) discusses the object of the task and organises the way to approach it using their native language. Another group of students (Group B) does the same, but uses the target language instead. Although both groups accomplish the instructional task’s object, the actual operations differ from one group to another.

There is yet another dimension to this, and that is the individual dimension. Even if both groups approached the task in identical fashion, that is, their operational structures coincided, the meaning of the goal-oriented actions involved in carrying out the task may be different from one individual to other, depending on how they,
as social subjects, are socially positioned. Thus, even if individuals carry out the
same operations, the meaning of a goal-oriented action rests on the overall motive
they have set for the activity. If what motivates student A is to obtain a pass and
what motivates student B is to learn the foreign language to study abroad, we
encounter actions that are similar in their operational structure but are completely
different in terms of their meaning. In other words, what varies is their
motivational structure and personal sense (subjective meaning). We will cover this
in more detail when we go through the notion of (pedagogic) identity.

What is clear from this example is that the societal need that drives the provision
of foreign language education to students as either a way to have them joining the
global community, reasserting their sense of nationality, acquiring invaluable tools
to get work done in cross-cultural settings, or even landing a job, and the
individual need of teaching or studying can only be accomplished through
collective activity. These aspects of societal and organisational needs among
others can be ascertained through code theory and will be referred to later. Yet the
collective objects of the activity and its motive also may represent a mismatch for
the needs of the individual or particular groups of individuals. Most members of
Group A are willing to carry out the task to successful completion, that is, they
share the action’s goal, but their operations substantially differ from those of
Group B. Furthermore, individuals have different motives, which might be
reflected or not in the actual operations they engage in.

In Japan, for instance, the emergence of a series of classroom disruptive practices
at university level in the 1990s might have altered the provision of foreign
language education up to a point where the object of activity was to sustain some
form of educational activity not subjected to disruption regardless of its foreign
language pedagogic merits (see McVeigh, 2002). In other words, the priority was
to discipline students, not necessarily teaching them a foreign language. Going
back to our example above, even if the instructor started with a clear activity
object, he or she will have to respond in some way to the fact that the individuals’
motives for activity differ even if operations look remarkably similar among
students.
3.3.6 Discourse as foreign language development

This brings us to the issue of vectors of foreign language development. If the instructor is targeting a certain foreign language development vector, which can be expressed as an object of activity, his or her actions will take the form of different operations depending on how students recognise and carry them out, taking into account, their motivational and operational structures. Therefore, I argue that the key to a successful analysis of foreign language activity is to ascertain the relationship between the action and the motive of activity in the actual form the goal of an action is made operational, that is, in what is called the task. As it will be seen later, this will be in actual fact the unit of analysis of discourse.

Following the general principles of the theory of activity A.A. Leont’ev (1981) advances a scheme of speech as activity that pays attention to the vectors of development, state of consciousness and degrees of automaticity of second-language instruction. After A.A. Leont’ev and also drawing on Gal’perin (1969, 197, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) and Robbins (2003), I have put together a table that systematises activities, tasks in relation to speech activity and the state of consciousness of students (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Speech as activity and related mediational means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive-activity</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Object of motive-activity</th>
<th>Tasks/Object of motive-actions (unit of analysis)</th>
<th>State of consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second floor (rhetorical)</td>
<td>L2 communication activity</td>
<td>To attain not only linguistically correct speech but best possible utterances</td>
<td>Motive-actions that place the motive of speech outside concrete speech acts (e.g. dominant activities: conducting an interview, making a presentation, producing a summary, etc.)</td>
<td>Complete unconsciousness. Unconscious control.—The object of conscious grasp is related to a standard preserved in the memory, without any conscious interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First floor (functional)</td>
<td>L2 speech activity + L2 speech acts as part of non-verbal communication activity (Active speech)</td>
<td>To transform the L2 speech activity into L2 speech acts</td>
<td>Motive-actions that have textual production for object but whose aim is the completion of a non-verbal task (e.g. solving functional problems: making a reservation, giving directions, describing people, etc.). Students are placed in situations where they will be compelled to use speech as a tool.</td>
<td>Conscious control.—Students are required to exercise conscious control, they are no longer directly aware of the object of conscious grasp, but may gain such awareness at any moment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground floor (structural)</td>
<td>L2 speech activity + discrete L2 speech acts (Reactive speech)</td>
<td>To practise discrete speech acts included in the L2 language speech activity in order to transform them into speech operations and subsequently into speech habits.</td>
<td>Motive-actions that aim at the production of speech acts within a (contrasting and restricted) set of rules (e.g. rehearsing a dialogue, rehearsing a list of utterances, completing a ‘structural’ drill—filling blanks).</td>
<td>Actual consciousness.—The conscious mind of the student is called on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation (substructural—vocabulary, grammar, phonetics)</td>
<td>Dominant L1 (and L2) communication activity + L2 speech activity</td>
<td>To lay the foundations for speech activity teaching</td>
<td>Motive-actions that aim at the acquisition of mediational tools (e.g. grammar rules, phonetics, verb conjugation schemata, vocabulary)</td>
<td>Actual consciousness.—The conscious mind of the student is called on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the objects of activity and tasks may seem familiar to the instructors who are not acquainted with the work of A.A. Leont’ev, i.e., they may recognise them as part of their teaching, the advantage of this scheme is that it offers a sequence of activities according to intended development objects, that is, in regards to the development of psychological functions at an ontogenetic level. In other words, the instructional methods or approaches are subject to or will be chosen depending on their contribution to the achievement of those objects and not the other way around. In sum, SLA researchers and practitioners have been focusing most of the time on microprocesses (e.g. microgenesis) but the relationship between microgenetic and ontogenetic levels of analysis has been largely ignored or confused.
A.A. Leont’ev (1981) makes key distinctions between speech activity, speech acts and communication activity, all depending on the object/motive of the activity. Thus, he speaks of speech activity when ‘the guiding motive is the production of correct and appropriate speech (as in a language lesson)’, speech acts, as part of non-verbal activity, ‘when the motive for speech is non-specific and is common to that activity as a whole’, and finally, communication activity, ‘when the motives for the speech lie again outside the concrete speech acts but are specific and can only be satisfied by means of speech’ (p. 23). Speech, therefore, is not seen as an independent activity but in the system of motives. As A.A. Leont’ev points out, speech can be an independent activity but only in a metalinguistic form, when the object is to construct a correct utterance, as it is the case in speech activity. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the motive of activity also is associated to states of consciousness. The idea is that the student learns to form ‘new language automatically, without any participation of the conscious mind’ (p. 22). However, that learning process must involve the participation of the conscious mind during the first stages (i.e. foundation and structural, see Table 3.1). The ultimate object is that the student engages in communication activity, that is, in activity in which the foreign language occupies a peripheral stage and it is at the service of communicating and, consequently, attention is not given to the formation of language. The communicative intention is rendered automatically in the foreign language.

In the SLA tradition there have been historically two ways to go about the study programme, which I find deeply problematic: (a) to adopt an eclectic collection of learning methods or approaches, which more or less could coincide with the activities proposed by A.A. Leont’ev, perhaps not following the exact sequence (e.g. the use of a variation of the grammar-translation method together with some form of communicative language teaching) or leaving some stages out, and (b) to rely on a single solution whereby only one method or approach is thought to do the trick (e.g. the use of task-based instruction). In either way there seems to be a mutually reinforcing relationship between, on the one hand, the method or methods that rule or inform practice, and, on the other hand, students staying in what I call a comfort zone, that is, a zone that, unlike the zone of proximal
development, will not help students in developing psychological functions. Thus, the deployment of instructional methods that end up being carried out mechanically, assimilated externally, without actual personal involvement, might also be seen as students’ silent demand to stay in the comfort zone. The SLA approach, nonetheless, does not afford reflecting on the social structure. Therefore, the actual causes for having students remaining in the comfort zone are not addressed.

It must be highlighted here that, as Robbins (2003) points out, development is not linear and necessarily entails periods of frustration that are subsumed by catharsis (p. 145). Second language development should be seen as the consequence of a learning process designed to overcome well-programmed challenges set in the right gradient of difficulty. A too steep gradient may be of no help in maturing certain psychological functions. Yet, a too soft path will not be of help either as it will keep students in the comfort zone. Thus, whilst A.A. Leont’ev believes the order of the sequence could be slightly varied and activities can be mixed, as they are in fact in any pedagogical practice, he points out that it is very difficult for the student to go far beyond the next stage or floor level without having achieved the prior one:

Naturally, this sequence is of a very general character, and merely indicates which ‘floors’ would be unthinkable if the others have not been built. In practice, we always put the finishing touches to the lower floors while work on the upper floors is already under way; the mastering of vocabulary and grammar, for instance, continues in parallel to the formation of speech activity and its conversion into speech acts. (A.A. Leont’ev, 1981, p. 25)

According to this scheme, the most reflexive and less automatic part is located in the lower floors, that is, what I have called substructural/foundation and structural levels, and the less reflexive but more automatic is located in the upper floors, that is, in what I have called the functional and rhetorical levels. In the upper levels, the activity is no longer reflexive with regard to the form of the speech but on the objects the speech refers to and the communicative intentions (see Table 3.1).

Functional activity represents a breaking point regarding reflective activity due to
the fact that it requires higher levels of automaticity of L2 language production. The object is the creation of speech habits but paying attention to the communicative intention that arises spontaneously. The object of the *speech acts* is non-verbal. In this case students do not perform a task pursuing a linguistic object. This has been reflected in the SLA literature that deals with CLT’s strong version, in which the instructional tasks do not prompt a rigid set of procedures to accomplish their object, including the language the task should be approached in. At the functional floor, students are free to communicate what they want, accessing their experiences in order to carry out instructional tasks. It is for this reason that in functional activities *active speech*, instead of *reactive speech* is produced (see Robbins, 2003, p. 84). The former is characterised by a higher degree of spontaneity: the themes that students bring to the table or the ways they solve the problem posed by the task are as varied as their personal experience and interests. Moreover, it is possible that they resource to their native language to solve the problem posed by the instructional tasks. The latter is well represented by instructional tasks in which contents are jealously controlled by the instructor or by the instructional designers: imagine the learning activities of the audiolingual method that try to create linguistic habits. In those learning activities the number of elements is limited and the communicative intention is tamed so that the focus is put onto the automatic acquisition of a speech pattern. Here, the object of the speech act is linguistic.

### 3.3.7 Discourse and its unit of analysis

As already seen, (societal) activity and (individual) action are non-coincidental realities by definition. This contradictory or, more precisely, dialectical condition is the consequence of the social division of labour. The question about second language development is how we can give an account of this contradiction without missing its totality. In other words, how can our account take into consideration the structural and interactional aspects of activity? I believe the answer is to use the *task*, in terms of motive-action, in its relationship with motive-activity as a unit of analysis. Thus, we position the analysis between microgeny (instructional forms) and ontogeny (development vectors). It is worth mentioning that ontogeny
is also a function of the organisational structure, more specifically, of the division of labour, and, therefore, the assessment of targeted development vectors also tells the story of the particular curricular and disciplinary divide. Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship between macro and micro levels of analysis.

Figure 3.1 Organisation and learning settings: relationship between structure (macro level) and interaction (micro level) and its unit of analysis

More specifically, the assessment of the task should take first the point of view of the instructor, who not only ranks higher in terms of the possession of power to set the object of the activity, by virtue of his or her investiture, but also in terms of his or her capacity to draw on resources or cultural tools (i.e. methods, approaches, instructional tasks). This power differential is expressed in the zone of proximal development by the idea of appropriate ‘collaboration’ and ‘instruction’ (see Vygotsky, 1987, p. 211). As Vygotsky puts it:

In school, the child receives instruction in what is accessible to him in collaboration with, or under the guidance of a teacher. This is the fundamental characteristic of instruction. (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 211)
The fact that the zone of proximal development is a space of collaboration does not mean that there are no knowledge/power differentials. This, of course, does not guarantee that students will share the task’s object. In fact, motive-action should be assessed in its totality. Thus, whilst the instructor may set a task according to an intended development vector or unknowingly setting a development vector by drawing on a particular instructional tool, students may alter it and the task could be transformed in terms of its relation to motive-activity. This is of course the locus of students’ deviation or resistance. There is also the possibility that the task is adjusted by the instructor to meet new requirements in light of how students co-construct its object, changing its relation to motive-activity. Nonetheless, by selecting the task, as communicated and implemented first by the instructor, we are able to fragment the pedagogic discourse continuum.

3.3.8 Pedagogic code of the task

Bernstein’s code theory may further help giving shape to such a typology, specifically to the task in relation to motive-activity (i.e., foundation, structural, functional and rhetorical (see Table 3.1), including management, which refers to activities aimed at managing the class and the course as a whole.

For Bernstein (1971), the system of social relations generates (speech) codes, i.e., functions or speech systems that symbolise the intent of the speakers in an explicit way, either verbally or extra-verbally, and generate ‘different orders of relevance and relation’ (p. 144).

Bernstein holds that the degree of complexity of the social division of labour manifests in the coding orientation, i.e., on the orientation to meanings.

The simpler the social division of labour, and the more specific and local the relation between an agent and its material base, the more direct the relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of a restricted coding orientation. The more complex the social division of labour, the less specific and local the relation between agent and its material base, the more indirect the relation between meanings and a specific material base, and the greater the probability of an elaborated coding orientation. (Bernstein, 1990, p. 20)
This implies that elaborated and restricted codes have different values in terms of predicting semantic (lexical) and syntactic selections.

In the case of an elaborated code, the speaker will select from a relatively extensive range of alternatives and the probability of predicting the organizing elements is considerably reduced. In the case of a restricted code the number of these alternatives is often severely limited and the probability of predicting the elements is greatly increased. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 125)

Thus, we see that in an elaborated coding orientation the discourse, if it is going to be understood by the listener, is self-explanatory, as it draws from different sources, contexts or traditions. In contrast, in the restricted coding orientation, because speaker and listener both share the base or context, the discourse does not need to be self-explanatory. In a more Vygotskian tone, the restricted and elaborated coding orientation may reflect the deployment of different conceptual systems within the pedagogic relation, from spontaneous concepts (restricted) to theoretical concepts (elaborated).

The pedagogic code is ascertained by assessing the dialectical relation between structural (classification) and interactional (framing) levels. As has already been seen, classification (C) refers to the degree of maintenance between categories (subjects, spaces/agencies, discourses), whilst framing (F) refers to the communicative outcomes of the relations between categories within the pedagogic relation. Framing between subjects refers to the control they have over the selection of instructional contents and roles (e.g. the roles students and instructors assume to carry out instructional tasks), sequence, pacing, and evaluation criteria, that is, the discursive rules that regulate instructional discourse. It also refers to the hierarchical rules that regulate norms of social conduct, or regulative discourse, according to what is seen as legitimate or appropriate in a given pedagogic context.

Bernstein (2000) points out that instructional discourse and regulative discourse do not move in complementary relation to each other, since regulative discourse is embedded in instructional discourse, claiming that ‘where there is weak framing over the instructional discourse, there must be weak framing over the regulative
discourse’ (p. 13). In other words, all forms of instruction correspond to a view of the social world or the social order. These aspects are analysed through the notion of *framing*, which deals with the principles of control over several aspects of the instructional discourse and with the degree of assertion (from implicit to explicit) of conduct and structure of hierarchical relations of regulative discourse.

Bernstein’s code theory is especially concerned about the regulative aspects of discourse as they are usually empirically overlooked. This concern constitutes an empirical extension of Vygotsky’s notion of *mediation* and it is in fact one of the strengths of code theory, as it allows for the analysis of how discourse mediates action in an invisible way. Let us see in more detail this aspect of code theory as it relates to Vygotsky’s ideas on mediation.

Vygotsky was able to point out two forms of semiotic mediation when referring to the dialectics of speech and thought: explicit and implicit mediation. Wertsch (2007) discusses this dialectical relation in terms that the former is ‘explicit in the sense that it is intentionally and overtly introduced into problem solving activity, often by an outside party’, especially by means of a material tool, whereas the latter is ‘informal in that it typically involves spoken language, whose materiality is transitory and seemingly ephemeral’ (p. 191), that is, it involves the use of tools such as speech.

The distinction is also contained in language’s representational and socio-communicative function: some words are used in addressing the object of the activity and some others are used in sustaining the social bonds needed to accomplish it. By the same token, drawing on Bernstein, Hasan (2005) understands *visible* semiotic mediation as ‘the conscious discourse aimed at mediating a specific category of reasoning, a certain range of technical concepts and a particular relation to the physical phenomena of the world whereby the world is classified and categorised in a certain way’. In contrast, *invisible* semiotic mediation is understood as ‘how the unself-conscious everyday discourse mediates mental dispositions, tendencies to respond to situations in certain ways and how it puts in place beliefs about the world one lives in, including both about phenomena that are supposedly in nature and those which are said to be in our culture’ (p. 152).
When analysing foreign-language instruction, the focus is put most of the time on explicit mediation, and little or nothing is said about implicit mediation. Teaching conversation skills seems to address this difficulty by explicitly teaching through a so-called direct approach the implicit features observed in conversational analysis and oral discourse theory (see Richards, 1990). These disciplines analyse spontaneous conversation. However, even if the implicit features of spontaneous conversation are explicitly taught, the instructor needs to organise that teaching relying mostly on implicit forms of mediation that may or not be resisted by students.

My impression is that the direct approach has serious limitations as it fails to directly link conversational mechanisms such as turn-taking with the actual social structure that shapes those mechanisms, especially social ideas about hierarchy or conduct. In other words, in order to teach the logic and mechanisms of turn-taking used, let us say, in conversational Spanish in Spain, the instructor will have to eventually change the views held by students about what is considered appropriate conduct. The problem is how to have students moving away from the subject positions they actually have and assuming a social position they have never experienced, even if it is through a sort of play or pretence. Can students situate themselves in an unknown social context that is explicitly transmitted and be able to internalise, appropriate it and make it their own? In other words, what is the exact zone of proximal development?

The following paradox can occur as well: in order to teach turn-taking in horizontal hierarchical schemes the instructor has to resort to instructional means that rely on a vertical hierarchical scheme. In my experience, the teaching of the mechanisms of conversation does not guarantee that students will apply those mechanisms because the Japanese organisation of the social space will tend to prevail and students may not be able to understand the need for certain mechanisms not linked to actual experiences in Japanese society. For instance, the hierarchical relations between senior and junior Japanese students, which are nonexistent or uncommon in Spain or Latin America, are difficult to address when students have to try horizontal forms of turn-taking. The same goes for ways of grouping within the classroom. Male and
female students often sit separately from each other, which may considered as a form of educational resistance by conversation instructors who come from societies with different gender boundaries (see Escándon, 2004).

Students who have returned from study abroad programmes seem to have a higher status compared to those who have not. More generally, there are very difficult issues about collaboration and individual accountability. Some students will not address the instructor directly even after being called on individually, but will mediate their response through the group, tending to deliver a group answer. These are just a few of the issues a foreign instructor needs to deal in conversation classes in Japan, which touch the very fabric of Japanese social relations. Furthermore, in many oral proficiency tests, the particular form of mediation the examiner is using, i.e. implicit mediation, is not fully taken into account when evaluating the examinee’s proficiency. Implicit mediation does not follow a strict protocol and therefore, whilst the examination design tries to control the explicit mediation variable (e.g. by applying all sorts of validation and reliability criteria), it leaves inexplicably unchecked the implicit mediation variable.

Any instructor knows that the students’ performance varies considerably depending on the kind of help they receive or not from the instructor, sometimes rooted in paralinguistic clues, such as smiling, nodding, spatial features of the examination room, the way the seats are located, etc., let alone helping defining indirectly a word or giving clues about its proper use, interpreting/facilitating the imaginary social context or situation of the task, etc.

The distinction between explicit and implicit mediation brings to the forefront the complexity of pedagogic discourse as shaper of cognitive functions but also of social rules. In other words, coinciding with the socio-genetic principle of the development of higher mental functions, these are eventually a function of social rules, of particular ideas of what the social order is or should be. Figure 3.2 summarises the network of notions already seen, leaving temporarily out the notions of classification and framing, which will be covered in more detail in the next section. Thus pedagogic discourse is the outcome of the social position in terms of the
contradiction between individual action and societal activity. Discourse mediates development in terms of targeted development vectors, which are the outcome of the dialectic between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal development, which can also be expressed in terms of socio-communicative and representative functions. The nature of discourse is essentially a regulative one, even if instructional discourse (more visible by default) may disguise its (more invisible by default) function as a projection of social mores or values.

![Diagram of discourse and development vectors](image)

**Figure 3.2** Discourse as determined by the actual subject position and future development targets

### 3.3.9 Voice and message

Let me expand now the notions of classification and framing in Bernstein’s code theory, as I will try to explain further how discourse’s pedagogic coding is ascertained.

For Bernstein, classification gives rise to **voice**, and framing gives rise to **message**. More precisely:

From this perspective classificatory (boundary) relations establish ‘voice’. ‘Voice is regarded somewhat like a cultural larynx which sets the limits
on what can legitimately put together (communicated). Framing (control) relations regulate the acquisition of this voice and create the ‘message’ (what is made manifest, what can be realized). (Bernstein, 1990, p. 260)

This constitutes an important development in code theory for Bernstein is able to put together the distribution of power and principles of control of macrostructure and interaction into two interlinked categories that help in understanding the reproduction and change of the social system, social relations, subject position, the emergence of identities and the shaping of discursive practices. Together with task, the unit of analysis of discourse, they form a powerful hybrid in which it is possible to analyse the connections between social structure, social position, identity and targeted subject position (development) and anticipated identity. In fact, for Bernstein, identity emerges ‘through differential specialisation of communication and of its official base’ (p. 204), which is given by variations in (a) the distribution of power (classification) and (b) the principles of control (framing). Furthermore:

‘Voice’ referred to the limits on what could be realised if the identity was to be recognised as legitimate. The classificatory relation established ‘voice’. In this way power relations, through the classificatory relation, regulated ‘voice’. However, ‘voice’, although a necessary condition for establishing what could and could not be said and its context, could not determine what was said and the form of its contextual realization; that is the ‘message’. The ‘message’ was a function of framing. The stronger the framing the smaller the space accorded for potential variation in the message. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 204)

Yet identity is not the only construction that emerges from differences in classification and framing, or, put another way, identity is the more visible construction. Bernstein sees the forms of communication that classification and framing give rise to through the pedagogic process forming consciousness, disguising ‘the arbitrary nature of power relations’ and also giving rise ‘psychic systems of defence internal to the individual’ (p. 12). In other words, the classification that operates at the macro structure also produces intrapsychological classification. This is done in order to maintain the classification and avoid the contradictions and conflict inherent in the arbitrary.
We can say, then, that the insulation which creates the principle of the classification has two functions: one external to the individual, which regulates the relations between individuals, and another function which regulates relations within the individual. So insulation faces outwards to social order, and inwards to order within the individual. Thus, externally, the classificatory principle creates order, and the contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas which necessarily inhere in the principle of classification are suppressed by the insulation. Within the individual, the insulation becomes a system of psychic defences against the possibility of the weakening of the insulation, which would then reveal the suppressed contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas. So the internal reality of insulation is a system of psychic defences to maintain the integrity of a category. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 7)

There seems to be an ontological necessity by the subject to maintain and defend a given identity as form of outward orientation to the social world and as a way to maintain internal coherence. Lapping (2008) suggests that the psychic defences are deployed as a way to cover over the dependency of the individual on the community, the sphere of the profane, and the assertion of his or her autonomy, the sacred sphere of knowledge specialisation, to use Durkheim’s terms. Nonetheless, according to Bernstein (2000), insulation is permeable, as ‘these psychic defences are rarely wholly effective and the possibility of the other, the unthinkable, the yet to be voiced, is also rarely silenced’ (p. 7). I will return to this when I introduce Holland et al.’s theory of figured worlds, in which identities are seen as constructed or self-authored by resourcing to many, sometimes contradictory voices or identity models.

Let me now put this in the context of foreign language teaching in Japan. If a particular university decides to divide the foreign language teaching programme into two different subjects, e.g. grammar and conversation, the voice in every one of the subjects will be quite different to the voice in one organisation in which no such division is in place. In the former, the instructor of grammar may feel compelled to only teach grammar and ignore the actual communicative aspects or potential of language constructions. By the same token, the conversation instructor may feel it is inappropriate to teach grammar and will avoid any questions made by students regarding syntax or semantics. In the latter, it may be possible to deal with all aspects of language teaching within the same lesson, even if that means
that the instructional tasks will lack clear developmental objects. The instructor may well accept the interruption of a functional task in order to explain a grammatical point, or move beyond the grammar explanation into the communicative potential of a certain grammar construction.

Voices, that is, what is considered legitimate practice, will drastically differ, as well as the identities of those who are given the task of teaching those subjects. Will a grammar instructor reassert or resist his identity as a grammar instructor? Will a student reassert or resist his identity as a conversation/grammar student? How will both mutually recognise each other as legitimate identities? Yet this classification will also have repercussions on the way control is exerted in the classroom, for different subjects or disciplines represent, overall, different development vectors. Disciplines impose a certain teaching logic as well as a traditional form of instruction, which may or may not reflect the historical formation of the discipline (not its recontextualisation by the educational institutions).

For instance, the teaching of Spanish grammar still depends upon the deployment of grammatical categories that come from the teaching of Latin, which passed down to the teaching of Spanish as a native language. In fact, grammar textbooks follow pretty much the same sequence structure, modified to the special needs of Japanese speakers. I have never come across a grammar class in Japan that employs, for instance, functional linguistics either to present or analyse grammar. The introduction of these concepts requires a lot of top-down instruction, especially when the categories deployed in the teaching of Japanese do not coincide or they are not taught at all at the primary and secondary levels. Most of the grammar categories used in teaching Spanish (e.g. article, adjective, adverb, verb tense, subject, predicate, etc.) come from the teaching of English, not Japanese. These categories are not very useful when analysing the Japanese language. In contrast, teaching conversational Spanish under the strong version of the communicative language teaching approach requires avoiding theoretical concepts and focusing on situational instructional tasks (e.g. at the supermarket, at the airport, at the real state agency) that demand from the student taking control
over practice and group or pair-work management. Furthermore, instructors will exert different forms of control depending on the developmental objects set for the activity/subject. In other words, the message will also vary. Yet the contrary must be considered as well: if students do participate, asking many questions or making specific demands they can impose on the class a different message, which may eventually lead to a different classification, i.e. instructors may talk to each other and reorganise the programme. Students being quiet and avoiding personal engagement in instructional tasks may also, as already seen, change the form of control exerted by the instructor. The instructor may have to strengthen the control over instructional tasks or change the method of evaluation in order to secure some kind of preferred involvement from students, but sacrificing the introduction, for instance, of necessary instructional tasks that give students apparently more control over their own learning.

As has already been seen, the instructor may directly and explicitly assert a conduct model (an identity) by demanding certain behaviour from students or praising certain roles, but also may resort to strengthening the instructional discourse, tacitly enforcing a conduct model, which is a function of the regulative discourse through the instructional discourse. The differentials in classification and framing therefore represent differentials in forms of socialisation, which are given by forms of recognition (consciousness) of what constitute legitimate discourse and forms of discursive production or realisation that also can be seen as legitimate discourse.

Let me return to the issue of ascertaining discourse’s code and expand the notion of classification to introduce its internal value, as well as framing’s external value, something that may sound as a paradox, given the fact that classification is external and framing, internal, by default.

Bernstein (2000) asserts the existence of the pedagogic code in this form: ‘+/– are the strengths of classification and framing ±C/F’ (p. 14). Where framing is strong, the instructor exerts explicit control over instructional discourse (i.e., selection, sequence, pacing, criteria) and regulative discourse (i.e., the social base). Where
framing is weak, the student has more apparent control over the communication and its social base (p. 13). Nevertheless, classification can have an internal value (Ci) (for example, arrangements of the space and objects in it, as well as classification of dress, of posture, of position), while framing can have an external value (Fe) (for example, social class may play a role if it enters pedagogic communication) adding sensitivity to the description. A summary of these relations is depicted in Figure 3.3. In our case, legitimate or illegitimate dress or posture becomes part of knowledge of Spanish within the classroom, that is, within the recontextualisation of Spanish discourse that takes place at the Japanese university, as opposed to Spanish as the reproduction means and outcome of production fields. In the same way, class relations become a part of transmission within the classroom.

Let us review now what these relations entail. On the one hand, the particular form in which the space and objects that are used during the pedagogic process (e.g. classroom chairs, desks, notice boards), as well as the regimentation of the student body through dressing elements such as uniforms or bodily habits such as posture, which establish boundaries among the population, are all but instances of internal classification values (Ci). On the other hand, framing can adopt an external value (Fe). It is remarkable how little attention is given to the sizeable Spanish-speaking Latin American population living in Japan by Japanese universities specialising in Spanish language education. Thus, how students’ and instructors’ practices are engaged or not with other communities of practice such as other university departments, for instance, through drama or speech competitions, or immigrant communities, Latin American music and dance clubs, schools, Spanish associations, etc., are all examples of the external component of framing relations.
Students who favour a practical approach to language learning may choose a particular university for its prospects of using a foreign language in practical ways, for instance, through a study abroad or exchange programme, which may tend to shape students’ motivation for learning a foreign language, giving them a concrete learning goal. This is not to mention that access to these programmes represents a case of socio-economic selection. The students who cannot afford them will not even bother to apply to them, or may not look forward to the offering of such programmes when selecting a university. The policy followed by a particular organisation may prescribe engaging into economies of scale and grouping students in large grammar or conversation classes. All of these are important determinations that will shape pedagogic discourse. Pedagogic discourse, in turn,
may reshape as well classification boundaries. As was already mentioned, students may break the boundaries by establishing pedagogical relations with instructors other than their subject instructor. Even instructors may agree on collaborating with one another despite the subject division found in the curriculum. As was already seen, there is yet another determinant of discourse linked to message, which is internal to interaction itself or *framing*. Once the instructor chooses, consciously or unconsciously, a particular development object, this imposes certain demands on interaction. In other words, the instructor under given structural circumstances has certain freedom to choose a development target, but once that decision is made and a particular instructional task is communicated in order to achieve this goal, i.e. the operationalisation of the action, the *task*, everything is set for particular forms of interaction that are correlated to the development vector being sought. For instance, a instructor who seeks students carrying out *tasks* whose object is non-linguistic will have to surrender control over the instructional sequence and contents. Students will be able to bring in their own repertoire of meanings (experiences). On the contrary, a instructor who aims at having students carrying out *tasks* with a linguistic object (e.g. a structural drill), will have to exert control over the contents and the instructional sequence; students will not be able to bring in their own experiences and repertoire of meanings. Overall, what the coding orientation expresses here *internally* is that there is a correlation between development vectors, *tasks*, language’s differentiated functions and particular forms of interaction. Figure 3.4 summarises these relationships. Thus, we may say that Bernstein’s code theory finds its homologue in A.N. Leont’ev and A.A. Leont’ev’s activity theory, applied to second language development, and Vygotsky’s conception of dialectical development vectors and language’s differentiated functions by virtue of sharing a common point of departure: a socio-genetic explanatory principle and framework of analysis of the development of higher psychological functions.
In consequence, we are ready to introduce the way Bernstein writes pedagogic codes:

\[
\frac{E}{\pm C^{se}/\pm F^{se}}
\]

where E refers to the orientation of the discourse (elaborated): ——— refers to the embedding of this orientation in classification and framing values. Thus variation in the strength of classification and framing values generates different modalities of pedagogic practices. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 100)

In sum, the dialectical relation between classification and framing, on the one hand, and between instructional discourse and regulative discourse, on the other, brings into question the view that there is an infinite freedom to choose a given pedagogy by the part of instructors. Moreover, the opposite is also true: a particular instructional method or approach, if sustained, will certainly give particular direction to foreign language development. The question is what exactly are these
correlations and functions and what do they depend upon?

3.3.10 Identity, where trajectory and future activity meet

Subject position is ascertained in Bernstein’s theory by evaluating the capacity the individual has to recognise (also called passive realisation) instructional discourse and regulative discourse and produce or realise (also called active realisation) texts that comply with both the rules of instruction and social order (see Morais and Neves, 2001, p. 198). By ‘text’, Bernstein (2000) means ‘anything which attracts evaluation’ (p. 18) and therefore the term must be understood as any kind of discourse that is being evaluated, not necessarily a written text. Recognition is a function of classification, that is, the boundaries created by the division of labour; whereas realisation is a function of framing, the principles of control of discourse. In other words, pedagogic discourses are recognisable for the degree of specialised language they deploy as they move away from common sense. A more intensive division of labour is necessarily associated to a specialised language. Thus, the student is able to recognise what the context of discourse is by establishing discursive boundaries. However, the actual production of a text that abides to the discursive rules of a given discipline is a function of reproducing, eventually, the regulative principles established through the pedagogic relation. Put another way, recognition is about determining what the context or question is; realisation is about answering the question in the right way, attending the rules of the game.

A few words need to be said about recognition and realisation, especially in terms of possessing passive and active realisation of instructional and regulative discourses. Bernstein (1975) asserts that although the role of pedagogic institutions is to have students adopting a subject position committed to their instructional and regulative discourses, variations in recognition and realisation, in terms of understanding and accepting the instructional and regulative means and ends, actually produce different subject positions that eventually may be at odds one to another. These subject positions are described as commitment, detachment, deferment, estrangement and alienation (Bernstein, 2000, p. 96; Singh, 2001, p. 255).
In cases where the possession of realisation rules is accompanied by the appropriate aspirations, motivations and social values, that is, appropriate socio-affective dispositions, then we may affirm subjects have truly internalised or appropriated those rules, that is, they have made them their own (see Morais and Neves, 2001). They have committed to them. However, we have to consider that those motivations, aspirations and values are framed within the pedagogic relation, and therefore they depend on the pedagogical context. For this reason, in the present study, mastery will be understood restrictively as the possession of realisation rules, according to the demands set by the pedagogic relation. Yet, we have to make a distinction between the actual socio-affective dispositions of the ‘activities in the field of production of discourse’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 34), that is, the actual production of Spanish as discourse, and the socio-affective dispositions of the pedagogic activity. The former may inform the latter but once they are framed in the pedagogic relation they acquire independence. This is because we are dealing not with Spanish but with a language that has been appropriated and recontextualised by the educational system by virtue of a pedagogic device (see Bernstein, 2000, pp. 25-39). Bernstein gives the following example of the difference between discourse and pedagogic discourse:

When I was at school I spent three years in a large room with wooden benches and with side benches with saws and hammers and chisels. After three years, I had a pile of wood chippings as high as the bench itself. But what was I doing? Well, what I was doing was this: outside pedagogy there was carpentry, but inside pedagogy there was woodwork. In other words, here was a transformation of a real discourse called carpentry into an imaginary discourse called woodwork. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 33)

Here, distributive rules (power) operate to regulate the access to the fields of production of discourse. In fact, power relations actually not only control the access to the fields of production of discourse but create the fields and their rules. We are dealing, in other words, with pedagogic discourse, not with actual discourse. As Bernstein points out:

...pedagogic discourse is a recontextualising principle. Pedagogic discourse is constructed by a recontextualising principle which selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses
to constitute its own order. In this sense, pedagogic discourse can never be identified with any of the discourses it has recontextualised. (Bernstein, 2001, p. 33)

Can instructors expect students to become foreign nationals, that is, to internalise a set of values shared by the societies in which the foreign language is spoken? It may help in certain cases but it can be argued that students academically succeed (achieve mastery) without having to drastically change their inner selves to adjust to the actual expectations of the field of production of Spanish as discourse. Nonetheless, they are required to possess adequate socio-affective dispositions as established in the pedagogic relation. Notice that by ‘adjust’ to the expectations of the field I mean to ‘influence’ or ‘transform’ the field.

Let us analyse this sort of splitting of socio-affective dispositions. In a communicative instructional task that requires collaboration among group members to arrive to the solution to a problem, students may comply with the requirements and procedures set by the task (which usually demand the situated establishment of social relations according to the societies that have Spanish as a native language), but may not have actually internalised it. As soon as the task is accomplished, students will return to a state in which collaboration (the Spanish-way or Latin-America-way so to speak) may not be present. This situation is typical in the assessment of communication, for assessment or evaluation ‘condenses the meaning of the whole [pedagogic] device’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 36).

At the time of the oral assessment students engage in the tasks appropriately, simulating the right dispositions. Communication instructors may wish every teaching day to be like that, but as soon as the assessment is over, students go back to their Japanese selves, to the network of Japanese university social relations, with its own views on hierarchy and conduct values. In other words, the right motivations, aspirations and values are difficult to assess and may be confounded. The accomplishment of the regulation rules implies an embedded form of simulacrum of Spanish as a real vehicle of communication. Consequently, as Wertsch and Stone (1985) assert, mastery differs from internalisation inasmuch as it does not necessarily require appropriation. Although qualitatively different, the mechanism in place, paradoxically, is that of resisting legitimate forms of
discourse by complying with the requirements of the pedagogical relation and realising the appropriate text. What transpires is that students who have motivations, aspirations and values that are more compatible with the realisation rules of regulative discourse may potentially have less problem with that realisation. In some cases, instructors may evaluate realisation as artificial or not completely adequate but they may not be allowed to fail students on those grounds. In other words, regulative discourse is negotiated in the classroom, as it always implies a relation of some sort, even if that relation is a dominator-dominated one, whereas the socio-affective dispositions that the foreign language instructor believes are the most appropriate may be external to the pedagogical context, the organisational setting and the educational system as a whole.

Yet again, the problem is that the actual field of production of Spanish discourse (and also the fields of production of linguistics, literature, history and other discourses) does partially inform the pedagogic discourse in terms of regulative discursive practices, as it is being appropriated in different ways. Bernstein (2000) asserts that the regulative discourse is in fact the provider of ‘the rules of the internal order of instructional discourse itself’ in terms of instructional ‘selection, relation, sequence and pace’ (p. 34). He goes on and asserts that recontextualisation principle, of which regulative discourse is the dominant discourse, recontextualises not only ‘the what of pedagogic discourse’ (e.g. the subject matter or discipline, or the pedagogic sequence) but the how, ‘that is the theory of instruction’ (p. 34). In other words, the regulative discourse orders and dominates the instructional discourse.

Another way to look at the ancillary relation between instructional discourse and regulative discourse is through the film Karate Kid. In that film, two competing karate pedagogies are shown. On the one hand, we have a Western instructor who teaches karate by promoting competition among apprentices. The aim of karate is competing and winning competitions without paying too much attention to the means deployed, only to the ends. The activity is outwardly oriented. On the other hand, we have an old Japanese karate instructor from Okinawa who is teaching karate to one apprentice. His teaching focuses on the process. He wants the apprentice learning techniques but being patient. Honour, fair-play and achieving
some form of self-realisation are far more important than winning a karate competition. The activity is inwardly oriented. Eventually, we have not only two karate styles, but we can argue that the kind of karate practiced by the team of apprentices of the Western instructor and the kind of karate practiced by the apprentice of the Japanese instructor amount to two different sports or martial arts. The interesting thing is that the techniques (e.g. the kicks, locks, restraints, throws, etc.) are codified, they are given technical names, but they are all sustained by the philosophical approach to the subject and to instruction, by regulative discourse.

The question is that karate does not exist in itself but in the particular, in the institutions that practice it and develop it. Practicing and developing a subject or discipline must necessarily incorporate pedagogies that ensure its reproduction, otherwise disciplines and practices die. We may be tempted to call the kind of karate practiced by the old Japanese instructor the real one, but there is no real karate. What Bernstein is saying with his use of ‘real’ is that the real is an actual codified form that owes its existence to the agreed criteria held by actual institutionalised social practices. The old Japanese instructor also recontextualised karate through a pedagogic device in an attempt, perhaps, of instilling in the apprentice some morals which were missing in the social environment in which the pedagogic practice took place. If he had taught karate in Japan, his regulative discourse might have changed, since social competition is not an issue. Nevertheless, in Japan, there are different karate schools which emphasise different principles as well.

The implication is clear and important: individual development is framed within the limits the recontextualisation produced by the pedagogic device impose as well. However, Bernstein also points out that contradictions and dilemmas of the recontextualisation process ‘are rarely totally suppressed’ and ‘the very pedagogic process reveals the possibility of the gap’ (p. 31). Here, Bernstein is referring to the gap between the thinkable and the unthinkable. The total suppression of the unthinkable is not possible for it is a source of enticement toward activity. At the level of instructors, instructors target the actual production field of Spanish discourse, although eventually, the evaluation will not be informed by actual
Spanish discursive realisations but by a text instead. Nevertheless, instructors may be required to believe that courses are actually a bridge to the field of discursive production. Moreover, at the level of students, students may be required to believe that their discursive practices are actual discursive realisations and not mere pedagogic discursive production.

The discursive gap operates then as a source of illusio or imaginaries with vast implications for identity and subject position. Let us take first Bourdieu’s notion of illusio. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) defines illusio as the interests the social agents have in participating in a social game. ‘Interests that are both presupposed and produced by the functioning of historically delimited fields’ (p. 115). Put another way, illusio refers to the interest agents have to engage in a game in which they will have to abide by certain rules but in a field that has been restrained. For Bernstein, the pedagogic apparatus produces that delimitation through pedagogic discourse itself. Bernstein (2000) refers to this as the transformation of ‘unmediated discourse to an imaginary discourse’ (p. 33). More specifically, Bernstein asserts that:

As pedagogic discourse appropriates various discourses, unmediated discourses are transformed into mediated, virtual or imaginary discourses. From this point of view, pedagogic discourse selectively creates imaginary subjects. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 33)

In conclusion, the fact that the actual field of production of Spanish as discourse is out there imposes some form of relation with the pedagogic discourse, which reveals the gap between both fields of production. ‘[I]n controlling or attempting to control the realisations of the gap, it must necessarily reveal the modes which make connections between the two worlds. The power relations, for which the distributive rules are the relay, are then necessarily subject to change’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 31). Thus, every historical change in foreign language pedagogies in formal schooling reveals how the discourse is recontextualised time and time again.

However, the actual difference between the real (unmediated) discourse and the pedagogic (mediated) discourse is that the former has the potential to transform
the field of production, whereas the latter does not have that potential. Any
discursive form, in my opinion, whether plain or pedagogic discourse, configures
an **imaginary**, a form of **misrecognition** given by some form of projection and
reflection of the self through symbolic means in which the self is necessarily
configured at a social plane by the other, by the other’s discourse. However, the
symbolic, i.e. discourse, is always incomplete (even though is **misrecognised** as
complete) and therefore it is always impossible to grasp the real (see Lacan, 1991,
p. 166).

An interpretation of the network of conceptual relations of the pedagogic device as
shaper of imaginary subjects such as Spanish Communication and Spanish
Grammar, and subject position is depicted in Figure 3.5. In sum, the pedagogic
discourse is structured by the pedagogic device, which Bernstein (2000) defines as
a system of rules that regulate ‘the communication it makes possible, and in this
way it acts selectively on the meaning potential’ (p. 27). ‘The device continuously
regulates the ideal universe of potential pedagogic meanings in such a way as to
restrict or enhance their realisations’ (p. 27). Further, the device is composed of (1)
distributive rules, by which knowledge is distributed to different social groups.
This amounts, for Bernstein, to distributing ‘different forms of consciousness to
different groups’ (p. 114); (2) recontextualising rules, which construct the
pedagogic discourse as such, especially in terms of selecting a regulative principle
that will structure the forms of instruction; and (3) evaluative rules, which provide
the criteria by which realisation will be judged, a form of ‘ruler for consciousness’
(p. 28). In conclusion, unlike **discourse**, **pedagogic discourse** is a case of discourse
that has been subjected to a recontextualisation process in which the communication
possibilities of language have been restricted or framed.
Figure 3.5 The pedagogic device as shaper of imaginary disciplinary subjects and subject position

There are various methods to ascertaining recognition and realisation. One is advanced by Bernstein himself and relies on the labelling of students by their instructors. I will refer to this in a moment when I deal with Holland et al.’s theory of figured worlds. The other two I will briefly mention here have to do with (a) presenting students with discourse fragments and having them classify those segments according to disciplinary subject (see Daniels, 1995) and (b) developing an external language of description of practices whereby appraisers evaluate...
classification and framing in terms of strength (from weak to strong classification/framing) (see Daniels, 1995; Morais and Neves, 2001). These two methods will be used in the present study. Method (a) above is built on the assumption that the individual who is able to correctly classify discourse as belonging to a particular discipline or school subject possesses recognition rules. Method (b) is built on the assumption that organisational context and classroom interactions can constitute a system in which different relations, including instructional and regulative practices can be coded in terms of their relative strength. It is therefore, an extension and translation of the relations depicted in Figure 3.3. I will, however, supplement these methods by deploying the notion of trajectory so as to understand the impact that class structure has over recognition and realisation rules.

As already mentioned, the ascertaining of social class is somewhat complex in societies in which capital, capital goods, commoditisation, migration movements, international markets, among other factors, erase traditional boundaries and create fast-changing new ones. The access to a personal computer and a printer can be seen as both the acquisition of a commodity but also of capital goods. Many Japanese households can afford a trip overseas, but what they do whilst in a foreign land is different and may reflect class structure (e.g., going to a holiday resort or thematic park versus visiting art or science museums; travelling in organised travel tours versus travelling on their own). Access to university is widespread among the Japanese high-school student population, reaching a rate of 50.2% in 2009 (MEXT, 2012), yet there are many differences between faculties in terms of educational excellence even within the same organisation. Although class-structure mechanisms of selection and distribution of cultural capital still operate, it is the ascertaining of those mechanisms that is extremely difficult.

The proposed construct to overcome this problem is the notion of (second language education) trajectory. What is then is trajectory? Within the cultural-historical tradition, Griffin and Cole (1984) and Chaiklin (2003) draw on Vygotsky’s (1967; 1987) notion of leading activity to identify the social relations that promote the development of functions that lead to the structural reorganisation of psychological
functions. The leading activity contributes to the reorganisation of prior developmental stages, transforming them into customary processes. Wertsch (1998) refers to the same operation as *dominant activity*. It is necessary to emphasise that this reorganisation is not lineal or progressive, and in fact is accompanied by some form of crisis in which improvisation is key. Drawing on Vygotsky, Robbins (2003) indicates that the successful process of internalisation is ‘…long and arduous and is ultimately a result of what Vygotskian terminology refers to as catharsis’ (p. 89). This means that the cathartic experience or ‘magic moment’ (p. 89) follows after periods of tension and frustration. Thus, second language development is the result of a process informed by a ‘principle of maximal frustration’, which is acknowledged to be ‘the antithesis of many methods in practice today’ (p. 90). The search for acquirers’ past *improvisations, magical moments, or leading activities*, therefore, seems fundamental in any account of trajectory.

These episodes must be understood as enabled by organisations or activity systems that are class-regulated. Let us think for a moment on what a foreign language is for an individual who has lived overseas with his or her parents because his or her father was commissioned by a multinational Japanese corporation to live and work there, and what a foreign language is for an individual whose family is settled in rural Japan and has never come across a foreigner in his or her life. One can imagine that in the former case, a second language is no longer a school subject but a practical communication tool; whilst in the latter, a second language is fundamentally a school subject. Yet again, the understanding of what a second language is for an individual whose parents work in a Japanese factory and are in communication with relatives living overseas, because his or her ancestors emigrated from Japan in the middle of the 20th century, is quite different to the practical conception of a foreign language by an individual who has not had that experience. In all three cases it is quite hard to assess social class by using the classic parameter of ownership or control of production means.

Furthermore, educational organisations appropriate knowledge and recontextualise it in different ways according to a different set of aims. Some of those aims may come down directly from Japan’s Ministry of Education, but some of them do not. Private
high schools and universities in Japan may have supplementary but different aims to those of the Ministry of Education regarding foreign language education. Just to give one example, a Christian university is not only interested in teaching a foreign language as a discipline or business tool but as a means of accessing the Christian scriptures, communicating with overseas institutions or missionaries or having students break away from their ethnocentrism and fostering a sort of universal identity. The process of recontextualisation varies enormously. Trajectory, therefore, is an intermediate construal between class relations and the distribution of different forms of communication and ways of making meaning that differentially position subjects. Combined with code theory, especially with the methods code theory has for ascertaining the pedagogic codes of organisational and learning settings, trajectory can help in providing valuable data on class structure.

Let us go back to Bernstein’s code theory and in particular to the way of ascertaining the possession by the individual of recognition and realisation rules. The method fundamentally relies on the instructors’ labelling of students’ realisation, but in the present study it will be supplemented by deploying Holland et al.’s (2001) notion of figured worlds and their anthropological approach.

Drawing on A.N. Leont’ev’s notion of activity, Holland et al. define figured worlds as a close system of ‘historical phenomena, to which we are recruited or into which we enter, which themselves develop through the works of their participants’ (p. 41). The position participants take up in social encounters matter:

…figured worlds, like activities, are social encounters in which participants’ positions matter. They proceed and are socially instanced and located in times and places, not in the ‘everywhere’ that seems to encompass cultural worlds as they are usually conceived. Some figured worlds we may never enter because of our social position or rank; some we may deny to others; some we may simply miss by contingency; some we may learn fully. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 41)

In any figured world, positions are taken up, constructed and resisted. This notion is deployed to analyse how subjects explain themselves, the positions they assume, the imaginative solutions they give or the actions they take when a particular event
unfolds in narrativised and dramatised form. Thus, identity and agency are studied taking into account the subjects’ own definitions of their social space, the positions they take up within and their own resourceful constraints.

Let me focus on the similarities and differences between Bernstein’s code theory and Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory. First, attention needs to be placed to the regulation of conduct, character and manner in terms of expectations, which are condensed in a network of figured identities, which may or not be communicated by instructors to students (or acquirers, in Bernstein’s terms). Bernstein (2000) sees labelling as a function of framing, that is, of the principles of control of the pedagogic discourse:

…the rules of social order refer to the forms that hierarchical relations take in the pedagogic relation and to expectations about conduct, character and manner. This means that an acquirer can be seen as a potential for labels. Which labels are selected is a function of the framing. Where the framing is strong, the candidates for labelling will be terms such as conscientious, attentive, industrious, careful, receptive. Where the framing is apparently weak, then conditions for candidature of labels will become equally trying for the acquirer as he or she struggles to be creative, to be interactive, to attempt to make his or her own mark. The actual labelling of the acquirer varies with the nature of the framing. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13)

The idea is to ascertaining the subject’s position by assessing a network of figured identities regulated by the specific form and degree of control of the pedagogical relation.

I believe that Bernstein’s code theory, although it provides an explanatory principle for the emergence of identities, poses certain limitations that need to be addressed and overcome. The main limitation is that it does not give a thorough idea of the identity’s potential. This limitation is not located at the theoretical level but rather the empirical use of code theory has overlooked this aspect, perhaps because research has taken a rather classic sociological standpoint. Realisation is about judging students’ past or present performance, an operation done by those who are entitled to judge if the requisites were met or not, that is, by the students’ instructors, the body of evaluators. However, I am also interested in exploring the projected
activity of individual students in terms of future prospects or development. Identities condense the subject’s trajectory and orientation to meanings as judged by those whose already possess realisation rules, but also give an idea of the subject’s potential for change. I believe this dimension is covered quite well by Holland and colleagues’ cultural theory.

Holland et al. (2001) focus on language, since the word is a pivot between the external and the internal. The external is expressed in the ready-made characteristics of the word and its link to the now vestigial social relations that shaped its meaning but which drift away in the course of history. The internal is expressed in sense, that is, the relation between motive and object or the relation between the subjective and the objective. The dialectical nature of language puts the individual under a form of literary vocational spell, understood here as a practice in imaginative and liberating observation of one’s situation in the world and a form of self-regulation that is, nonetheless, constructed with restrictive, given, ready-made elements (e.g. words, voices, speech genres, styles). Every attempt in reconfiguring the world and every identity that emerges out of that process is both an individual and social endeavour. In fact, as Holland and colleagues (2001) like to assert that it is a form of co-development (p. 270). However, the dialogic aspect of intersubjective relations is also preserved in intrapsychological functions and in fact is one of the fundaments of Bakhtinian and Vygotskian theories alike (see Wertsch, 1980).

The Bakhtinian concept of the ‘space of authoring’ is used by Holland et al., (2001, p. 183) to capture an understanding of the mutual shaping of figured worlds and identities in social practice. The space of authoring is marked by improvisation but an improvisation that is a reconfiguration of language (and action) that is inherently conflictual and dialogic. As Bakhtin (1981) points out, ‘In the every rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive world is half-ours and half someone else’s’ (p. 345). This is precisely the inner contradiction of appropriating any cultural tool, a universal. The tool is used in the process of socialisation in which the individual must comply with expectations set from the outside, but also he or she can creatively use the tool to act upon society. In other words, cultural
tools, especially speech, are positioning devices that constitute real pivots between the individual and the social context. The use of those tools is essentially a form of positioning.

Holland et al. (2001) point out that the space of authoring is a zone of proximal development that is significant in an account of the development of historically-situated identities. For them, identities emerge in the course of socially-located individual trajectories:

A Bakhtinian “space of authoring” is then much a particular “zone of proximal development,” and one that is extremely important in an explication of the development of identities as aspects of history-in-person. Bakhtin does not take development as the center of his concerns, as does Vygotsky. Yet he does write about differences between the neophyte, given over to a voice of authority, and the person of greater experience, who begins to rearrange, reword, rephrase, reorchestrate different voices and, by this process, develops her own “authorial stance”. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 183)

In other words, development targets also give rise to different identities as the individual reorganises them in terms of ideal characters or role models. The zone of proximal development must not be seen as neutral enabler of some form of knowledge absorption, for development is about changing the individual. Development is all about the acquisition of an identity capable of dealing with particular psychological functions. It implies a reconstruction of self. In this regard, sense or personal meaning, or how the student is able to engage in societal activity, is a function of particular forms of reflection in conscious form that have a correlate in an assumed identity that enables him or her to carry out the learning process.

For Holland and colleagues, this reconfiguration of self is done by resourcing to models that are familiar:

Cultural worlds are populated by familiar social types and even identifiable persons, not simply differentiated by some abstract division of labour. The identities we gain within figured worlds are thus specifically historical developments, grown through continued
participation in the positions defined by the social organization of those worlds’ activity. They are characteristic of humans and societies. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 41)

They see differences between the position individuals take as a form of self-reflection, a construction that is made by resourcing to multiple cultural tools and therefore voices, but also in relation to their relative social position, which is in fact a sort of entitlement that condenses an activity potential. Holland et al. look for positional markers in subjects’ discursive practices (p. 133), that is, the establishment of boundaries, in similar fashion to the labelling in Bernstein’s code theory. Yet the dialectic between figured worlds in terms of the individuals’ self-constructed narrativity and resourcing to generic role characters as a response to desire, and the individuals self-asserted social position, offer a much more complex sketch of the individuals’ potential for future activity. This dialectic explains why an individual seems to accept, agree with societal objectives or, on the contrary, ignore, reject or resist them. It is here that Holland et al. refer to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to give social positioning the dimension of everyday or ordinary embedment of activity. As Holland and colleagues assert, ‘Positional identities inhabit the landscape of Bourdieu’s habitus (p. 138).

The acceptance or rejection, however, is not mechanical. The distance between how the individual sees him or herself and the actual assertion of his or her social position is an indicator of how the idealised character or identity can be a source of creativity or self-censoring (p. 132). In other words, if there is too much distance between the ideal and the actual position, the individual may feel “compelled to assume the identity of the ‘Other’”, which in fact is a form of silencing his or her ‘native voice’ (p. 132). Resistance can be seen as a form of assertion of one’s own social position and identity, another strategy developed to close the gap between idealised requirements and actual social position.

In the hypothetical example given above, how do individuals who believe learning a language is all about learning a school discipline, not a real communication tool, position themselves to the ideals explicitly or tacitly transmitted by instructors who believe it is a communication tool, not only a school subject? Will they be good or
bad students? Will they work towards adopting a new idealised self or resist it? What sense for the social game do they have and will they develop?

Holland et al. (2001) believe such dispositions, that is, the sense for the game, are the result of a long process:

The development of social position into a positional identity—into dispositions to voice opinions or to silence oneself, to enter into activities or to refrain and self-censor, depending on the social situation—comes over the long term, in the course of social interaction. Relational identities are publicly performed through perceptible signs. People “tell” each other who they claim to be in society in myriad ways. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 137-138)

This telling facilitates our task, for the social positioning depends upon drawing on limited cultural resources, and therefore, meaning making must necessarily have an inner logic configured by variations positioned within the totality of the system.

Not unlike the aforementioned notions of leading activity and catharsis, Holland and colleagues (2001) look at improvisations as moments in which identity reorganisation occurs. Thus, they point out that

Improvisations are the sort of impromptu actions that occur when our past, brought to the present as habitus, meets with a particular combination of circumstances and conditions for which we have no set response. Such improvisations are the openings by which change comes about from generation to generation. They constitute the environment or landscape in which the experience of the next generation “sediments,” falls out, into expectation and disposition. The improvisations of the parental generation are the beginning of a new habitus for the next generation. *Pace* Bourdieu, we suggest that the process is also condensed into the space of a lifetime. In our view, improvisations, from a cultural base and in response to the subject positions offered *in situ*, are, when taken up as symbol, potential beginnings of an altered subjectivity, an altered identity. (Holland et al., 2001, p. 18)

Yet, the problem of working with Bakhtinian theory is similar to the problem already pointed out about using Vygotsky’s *word meaning* as a unit of analysis, although to a less extent: the social remains being non-specific. Not unlike Vygotsky’s theory of the development of mind, Bakhtin’s theory is fundamentally
a theory of human communication in which the unit of analysis is the *utterance*, which can be homologated to Vygotsky’s *word meaning* (see Akhutina, 2003). Bakhtin (1986) sees every speech act as informed by stable generic forms or *speech genres*, which are in turn determined by the ‘specific nature of the given sphere of speech communication, semantic (thematic) considerations, the concrete situation of the speech communication, the personal composition of its participants, and so on.’ (p. 78). Bakhtin goes on to argue that we get to know a language through genre-informed utterances, not through some kind of generative code such as grammar. He asserts that ‘[s]peech genres organize our speech in almost the same way as grammatical (syntactical) forms do’ (p. 79). The difference is that grammar imposes stable and compulsory norms for the speaker, but the generic forms of speech genres are more flexible. One cannot help but establishing a connection between Bakhtin’s speech genres and Bernstein’s study of speech phenomena such as speech hesitation and speech prediction (see Bernstein, 1971). Thus, *speech genre* could well be homologated with Bernstein’s notion of *code*. Nonetheless, as Hasan (2005) points out, social positioning in Bakhtin’s theory of genres seems insufficient:

> Though Bakhtin’s views concerning speech genres are rhetorically attractive and impressive, the approach lacks…both a developed conceptual syntax and an adequate language of description. Terms and units at both these levels in Bakhtin’s writings require clarification; further, the principles that underlie the calibration of the elements of context with the generic shape of the text are underdeveloped, as is the general schema for the description of contexts for interaction. (Hasan, 2005, p. 143)

Therefore, Bernstein’s code theory proves again to be at the centre of our endeavour for integrating these different theories and translate them into external languages of description. In fact it constitutes the vertebral column of this attempt.

In summary, the notion of subject advanced by Blunden embraces an aggregation of determinations which can be expressed as the three moments of subject, i.e., the individual psyche, activity and culture. In order to comprise these three moments of subject, I will be deploying Bernstein’s notion of *pedagogic discourse* as an intermediary link between organisations and learning settings, in which speech or
language is produced according to the position subjects take up within the possibilities generated by the recontextualising principles of the pedagogic device, which translate universal cultural tools through the pedagogic relation. The focus is on using the task as the unit of analysis of pedagogic discourse as it helps in positioning the observation within macro and micro levels of analysis or between ontogeny and microgeny. This will allow understanding instruction as the outcome of the constraints and affordances given by the organisational structure in its relation to development, that is, in its relation to the targeted transformations of subjects. Furthermore, vectors of development, embodied in selected motive-activity appropriate to analysing foreign language development (foundation, structural, functional and rhetorical) will be ascertained in terms of pedagogic codes by using Bernstein’s code theory. This will allow for recontextualising SLA’s notion of communicative language teaching within the dialectical tradition, providing an account of learning contexts. Whilst there is nothing new or original in terms of understanding the pedagogic discourse as activity, I believe research in foreign education repeatedly misses the exact positioning it should adopt in order to attempt capturing the complexity of the whole. In addition, there is nothing new in deploying Bernstein’s code theory in analysing organisations and learning settings either; however, the virtue of the approach presented here lies on its capacity to segment discourse according to functions. In other words, with the exception of the research also informed by Systemic-Functional Linguistics, one of the most problematic aspects of deploying Bernstein’s code theory is the tendency to consider the interaction time of discourse as a continuum. What I am saying here is that discourse is subject to functions which can be described in terms of motive-activity, that is, as development vectors and be codified accordingly for coding orientation using the complex tools developed along many decades of empirical research by Bernstein, his disciples and research colleagues, this time adapted for foreign language pedagogies. The differential in coding orientation, or consciousness, will be tested in terms of trajectory or the aggregation of leading activities as a way to ascertaining the impact of class structure on consciousness formation. Furthermore, in order to assess the possession of recognition and realisation rules by individuals, on which identities are created, maintained or changed, I will use what could be called classic or
traditional Bernsteinian code theory coding methods (see Daniels, 1995; Morais and Neves, 2001), but I will add Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory’s anthropological approach. The ascertaining of recognition rules will be done by presenting students segments of discourse already pedagogically coded in terms of coding orientation (i.e. the particular valence of *classification* and *framing*, from weak to strong). The coding will be done by developing an external language of description of classification and framing which will be checked by instructors and modified accordingly (following a description II mode of enquiry). Students will have to determine if the segment belongs to either a grammar or communication class, depending on the widespread division of disciplines (classification) in the Japanese tertiary level: grammar/communication. Finally, the possession of realisation rules will be ascertained by paying attention to the labelling of students by instructors as a *figured world*, and so the individual identities of students will be ascertained as reflections of potential for future activity in terms of their preferred *development vector* in order to achieve their learning objectives.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH MODEL AND DESIGN

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The present study has two main goals that are interrelated. The first one addresses a major pedagogical problem encountered in the teaching and learning of Spanish as a foreign language in communicative learning settings at the tertiary level in Japan. Informal observation tells me that only a small segment of the student population attains mastery in oral communication in settings informed by communicative language teaching across a variety of educational organisations and I want to know why this is the case with the future aim of tackling the root of the problem through appropriate intervention. The second goal is threefold and deals with the theoretical and methodological assumptions that are used to construct a model to resolve the pedagogical question. In this regard, the second goal is (a) to provide a unifying framework for three theoretical corpora that hitherto have not been used in conjunction. The feasibility of such a framework is subject to theoretical and empirical verification, which actually implies (b) the development of a new underlying epistemic method and methodology, and (c) the development of new instruments of analysis.

4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL

4.2.1 Teaching and learning oral communication at the Japanese university

The way the Spanish as a foreign language study programmes have been put together in Japanese universities for the last three decades divides instruction into two main subject-matters: grammar and oral communication. Spanish grammar is usually taught in Japanese by Japanese instructors, whereas communication is taught presumably in Spanish by native Spanish instructors. On the one hand, grammar is presented as a generative code. Producing adequate sentences is a matter of knowing the language’s algorithm. On the other hand, communication instructors tend to draw on communicative-language teaching methods of
instruction (e.g., the communicative approach, task-based language teaching) to inform their practice in the classroom.

Communicative language teaching, being a fundamental instructional approach of current SLA models (see Johnson, 2001, 2004), is based on a weak and ontologically problematic sociogenetic principle that views language mastery as a competence, that is, as knowledge, acquired through the use of language in social contexts. However, because the emphasis is put precisely on competence, communicative language teaching assumes that the social context is stable and understood by all participants. In other words, communicative language teaching does not recognise that the social context, including its institutions, is constructed through language itself. This implies that communicative-language teaching pedagogies tend to operate on what I call (a) a notion of semantic normalisation, that is, learners have to acquire word meanings, but these are considered, nonetheless, stable entities, and (b) a notion of pragmatic normalisation, that is, pragmatic functions can be explicitly taught because learners understand and can put themselves in all social roles across social contexts. This is problematic because it implies a division between, on the one hand, the learner’s cognitive consciousness and the semantic system of his or her native language, and, on the other hand, between the learner’s linguistic consciousness and the pragmatic system of his or her native language. The learner who has not mastered a second language is subject to the dominance of the semantic and pragmatic system of his or her native language unless he or she has been trained in philosophy or semiology. The ‘world of things’, to use Vygotsky’s (1987, p. 180) term, is constituted through the very same semantic system of the learner’s native language. And the ways to address people and organise activity are also dominated by the pragmatic system of the learner’s native language. Therefore, the fundamental problem I have with SLA research in general is that its ontological foundations are incompatible with the ontological principles of the dialectical tradition, which operates with a true socio-genetic ontology of social being. Unfortunately, this makes the incorporation of SLA methodology and methods, and even of SLA research findings, very difficult. There is no easy reconciliation of SLA and dialectical epistemologies. Nevertheless, this study aims to establish links with
SLA through the recontextualisation of the SLA notions of communicative language teaching under a dialectical paradigm. This may help to establish a bridge between both traditions and serve as a place of common identification.

There are two contradictory ways to go in order for students to acquire communicative competence in communicative-language teaching pedagogies. The first, which corresponds to the *strong version* of communicative language teaching, is communicating in the target language. Instruction is implicit. No elements of the sociolinguistic or grammar codes are (explicitly) instructed. The second, which corresponds to the *weak version* of communicative language teaching, allows for the explicit instruction of pragmatic and grammatical elements of language that are nonetheless framed under pragmatic functions.

These pedagogical conceptualisations seem to represent the top-down and bottom-up moves in Vygotsky's zone of proximal development. The problem is that in SLA they tend to be seen as mutually exclusive. In any case, these conceptualisations are limited in terms of offering a description of actual practices. They inform pedagogies, but are not pedagogies in themselves. Therefore, if one wants to compare pedagogic settings within and across organisations, as is the case in the present study, a more precise categorisation is required.

After working for almost nineteen years teaching Spanish as a foreign language at the tertiary level in Japan, I have informally observed that less than one third of students achieve mastery of oral communication in learning settings informed, presumably, by communicative language teaching. By mastery of oral communication I mean that students can actually cope with the requirements of an unfolding conversation adjusted to the skill levels targeted by instruction under circumstances that acknowledge the fact that one or more interlocutors, and even all of them, are not native Spanish speakers. In this regard, I am using Wertsch’s (1998) notion of *mastery* as ‘knowing how’ (p. 53), a mastery of operations that does not require the appropriation of or identification with a cultural tool. Consequently, mastery of oral skills in Spanish does not require an appropriation of or identification with the socio-affective attitudes and practices of the numerous
fields of production of Spanish as discourse, that is, with the different cultural spheres of Spanish-speaking societies. I do not require native-like mastery of the basic conversation skills targeted by the study programme but rudiments that allow a basic dialogue to take place so as to weaken at once the cognitive and linguistic dominance of the Japanese language and relativise the cognitive and linguistic power of the Spanish language as well. This may require a certain negotiation and mutual recognition of the communicative context between interlocutors, but I am not assuming this context is the real context in which Spanish is spoken. In other words, what I believe the outcome of communicative-language-teaching instruction should be is that, paradoxically, language becomes at times relatively transparent, a mediating tool, and at times, an obstacle to be tackled, an object of study, perhaps even a science. In both cases, as a tool and as an object, the outcome must be adjusted to the context of the classroom but must remain dialogic, allowing for a gradual conceptual build-up. Thus, the outcome is a subcultural metalanguage, but a language, nevertheless, with an emancipatory vocation.

Alongside Bernstein (1975), I argue that this is an ideal outcome that may or not be reflected in the actual pedagogic activity of numerous Japanese tertiary institutions. Mastery, therefore, must be defined and needs to be assessed according to the pedagogical goals and objectives set in every institution and in every course, and, more importantly, according to the actual intersubjective practices that take place in and shape those institutions. In other words, the criteria to be used in evaluating the ideal know-how should not be placed outside the pedagogic activity (p. 136). When I refer to the mastery of oral communication in the aforementioned terms I am taking an ideal position that helps me formulate the problem to be studied, but this should not be confused with the actual ideals set for Spanish as a foreign language pedagogy. This is a basic position that, as we will see later, puts the Bernsteinian sociological approach on a different ground because it places the pedagogic process within the autonomous field of the recontextualisation of knowledge and skills.

The question is why only a small segment of students attain mastery in oral communication in Spanish. In contrast, a large segment of the student population
achieves some degree of language mastery, but not of the kind one would expect in an oral communication class.

My research on resistance to foreign language education at a university not specialising in foreign language education actually depicts a grim picture of a great majority of students resisting learning Spanish as a foreign language, especially in its oral dimension. As a consequence, they hijack the whole pedagogic process so that the programme eventually limits the achievement potential of those students who are targeting the mastery of conversational skills (Escandón, 2004). The assumption is that, knowingly or not, instructors adjust their pedagogies to match the expectations of the majority of students. Instructional tasks that target oral fluency are interpreted by students in different ways. Some of these ways undermine the intent of the task. For the most part, students simulate doing the instructional task but they are not really engaged in the process. For instance, they do the task but in a mechanical way, sometimes restricting their performance to compliance with the very minimum requirements. In this case, the instructor may not be able to point out explicitly to the students that they are not doing the task, because they are. Most of the problems come from the organisation required in order to do the task, that is, its procedural steps. If the procedure is kept open, as is the case in instructional tasks informed by the strong version of communicative language teaching, students will solve the object of the task by resorting to procedural shortcuts. Often, this means that the problem or object of the task is solved in Japanese. If the procedure is set and clearly stated, as is the case with instructional tasks informed by the weak version of communicative language teaching, students may comply with it by doing exactly what is said but disregarding the creative potential of the task, its exploratory learning potential, including the freedom to express oneself. Communicative tasks may be transformed in structural drills or exercises. A course whose initial target is the mastery of oral skills may end up becoming a very loosely organised grammar course.

Drawing on McVeigh (2002) I define resistance not as ‘a conscious, organized, and systematic insurrection against the sociopolitical order’, but as a term that
designates ‘actions and attitudes that do not directly challenge but scorn the system’ (p. 185). Furthermore, this ‘form of subtle resistance ignores rather than threatens and is a type of diversion (if only temporary) from, rather than a subversion of, the dominant structures’ (p. 186). What is implied here is that students’ resistance is not voluntary. The question is, how does it emerge? One may presume that because Spanish instruction takes place in organisations that do not specialise in foreign language education, in which students enrol on the language programme without a clear goal in mind, resistance is rampant. However, my informal observation tells me that although the conditions are better in universities specialising in foreign language education, the problem remains practically unchanged. Only about one third of the student population attains language mastery according to the definition of mastery provided above, even if they are enrolled on a four-year intensive Spanish studies undergraduate programme. In other words, students who attain mastery of oral communication in communicative learning settings do so in spite of rather than because of the pedagogic system.

Students are not conscious about their own resistance to learning, and instructors may partially disregard the issues of social structure when adjusting their instructional methods to match students’ expectations, as these factors may be beyond their control. Hence there is no point in deploying exclusively ethnographic methodology in which a model that attempts to explain the reasons for resistance is to be built by questioning participants, for agents may not be aware of the rules of the complete system of determinations. Instructors who are native Spanish speakers often lack the power to make changes in the study programme. Even instructors who are Japanese native speakers and may have more control over the study programme face similar problems. Overall, the response is to disregard issues that concern social structure and focus on pedagogies instead. This constitutes a severe limitation for bottom-up ethnographic approaches such as grounded or constructivist approaches to research or tautological notions such as Bourdieu’s (1990, 2000) notion of habitus, on which I based my prior research on foreign language education resistance (Escandón, 2004). The answer lies in the construction of a model that can clearly
explain formation of consciousness and therefore allows us to answer why a relatively small segment of the student population attains mastery of oral communication in Spanish in communicative learning settings whilst a larger segment does not.

4.2.2 A sociogenetic holistic model

The proposed model draws on three theoretical bodies that share a common sociogenetic explanation of the formation of consciousness, that is, they all see consciousness as emerging out of social relations: Cultural-historical activity theory, Bernstein’s theory of codes, and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory. Although these theoretical bodies have different strengths in terms of the accuracy of the empirical analysis they afford, they have been put together using an underlying method that preserves cell-like holistic unity (see chapter 3).

By using the term cultural-historical activity theory I am positioning my research with the work of A.N. Leont’ev, as I share his attempt to bridge psychology and sociology, but this does not mean that I do not also drawing on the theoretical corpora advanced by Vygotsky, Luria and the post-Vygotskian tradition that is widely identified as sociocultural theory. Moreover, by cultural-historical activity I mean the contributions to the human sciences of the dialectical tradition in general as an inherently interdisciplinary (see Blunden, 2010) and emancipatory practical endeavour (see Chaiklin, 2012).

In this section I will attempt to summarise the rationale for including these three theoretical bodies into one single model by focusing precisely on their relative strengths and weaknesses. I will not be able to discuss all the theoretical, ontological and epistemological implications of the choices I have made during the construction of such a model taking into account their own merits, because that would make the present study a piece of philosophical research, but I will offer a discussion linked to the particular methodological problem at hand.

First, cultural-historical activity theory with the theoretical scope given above
affords an accurate description and analysis of the subject’s transformation as he or she engages in inter- and intrasubjective activity by means of internalising operations that employ cultural tools. The cultural tool, especially speech (words), represents a form of mediation unique to humans inasmuch as they are both stimuli and response. In the specific case of speech, words that originally were social, external speech, are internalised and help the subject to regulate his or her activity. This amounts to a reorganisation of (natural) lower psychological functions that opens the way to forms of self-consciousness, self-mastery and, eventually, scientific forms of consciousness, that is, the development of higher psychological functions. According to Vygotsky (1997a), the methods deployed in the acquisition of new forms of behaviour are three; assimilation, invention and imitation (p. 109). In every single case the social (intersubjective) plane is ahead of the psychological (intrasubjective) plane, a regularity that is dubbed by Vygotsky the ‘genetic law of cultural development’ (p. 106). For Vygotsky (1997b), self-consciousness is a function of the consciousness of others: ‘I am conscious of myself only to the extent that I am another to myself, i.e., to the extent that I can again perceive my own reflexes as stimuli’ (p. 77).

Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development may be interpreted, as Robbins (2003) does, as an analytical metaphor that helps to represent ‘the fusion of the individual and the social setting’ (p. 34). It is an adjustable blueprint or instrumental method that helps to assess instruction that is ahead of development, with the purpose of developing the child along the aforementioned path. However, these functions and the notion of zone of proximal development are problematic in the study of foreign language education in adults. On the one hand, the development of higher psychological functions cannot be equated with the simple mastery of operations at microgenetic level, that is, with an array of disconnected learning tasks (see Chaiklin, 2003). On the other hand, the adult learner has already achieved a higher degree of self-consciousness and control and therefore the pedagogic approach toward foreign language instruction must take into account that the native language, both as a semantic and a pragmatic system, is mediating the learning of the target language.
Two sets of issues come to mind. The first set deals with the issue of language development, the second with the process of internalisation and the adult learner. In language development, what are the operations that need to be mastered in order to achieve the mastery of a foreign language, especially of oral communication? As is the case with age period in relation to functions in child development, are there functions that need to mature first in order to approach other functions? I believe the answer is given by A.A. Leont’ev (1981) who views the problem of language development as activity. The main parameters of his approach are the object of activity and the state of consciousness of the learner. According to this approach, there are forms of activity which need to be mastered before the learner can move onto fully automatized activity. Thus, ‘foreign language teaching compels us to transmute the learner’s speech activity into speech acts and then into speech operations – a transition from conscious to fully automatized activity’ (p. 41). This represents a conception of language development that relies on the translation of a communicative intention into speech operations in the foreign language. Some activities and operations may seem to have a correlate in SLA methods and techniques of instruction. For example, speech activity may be considered an equivalent in the deployment of some kind of grammar-translation methods, or speech habits may be confused with structural drills. Thus, to a SLA practitioner, A.A. Leont’ev’s approach may appear indistinguishable from those methods. However, for Leont’ev, there is no single method of instruction that serves as a silver bullet. Instructional methods, approaches and techniques are deployed inasmuch as they help to develop language in the aforementioned terms. Another difference is that instruction is based on Gal’perin’s (1969, 197, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) controlled learning approach, which requires that instruction be carried out by providing the students with concept-based forms of instruction that are able to give them a complete orientation to activity.

These two elements – language development as relying on (a) specific psychological functions and (b) complete orientation to activity – constitute what I believe is the ideal image of language development. Without this idea, we would be unable to situate and compare actual pedagogical practices, as it would be impossible to locate the actual reaches of the zone of proximal development.
without a clear description of age period in children’s development. As Wertsch (1998) points out, ‘To make even the simplest observation about development, one must posit some a priori claims about where this development is headed’ (p. 36). Without this benchmark, the whole analysis of pedagogic activity is virtually impossible or futile. This also amounts to refusing an understanding of language development as dependent on nativist or natural order ideas of acquisition, and a strong questioning of current SLA paradigms, such as those based on notions of competence.

Turning to the second set of issues, the process of internalisation and the adult learner, the main question here is what kind of intramental operation is resistance? The student who is resisting foreign language education either has or has not internalised the structure of the operations as they have been introduced by the instructor and negotiated through the pedagogical relation with students: or the way to evaluate the mastery of the operations has been changed and adapted to match the lack of internalisation of the intended structure. Can an adult learner master an operation without internalising it? The problem lies in reflection, a higher psychological function that works by objectivising subjective experience. Whilst the structure of any operation is abbreviated and therefore internalised through a process full of conflicts in which the subject also resists the cultural tool, the process of reflecting on that process produces a form of ontological dualism. It is only then that we may differentiate internalisation from both appropriation and mastery, after some form of introspection that breaks away the total identification with the operation takes place. As Packer (2008) asserts, ‘to know consciousness we cannot rely on introspection because in self-examination mind splits into subject and object: a dualism arises in the act of self-reflection. We can’t establish a psychological science on the basis of what we experience directly (as Husserl tried to do); it must be based on knowledge.’ (p. 20). Knowledge is, eventually, subject to empirical verification. Even though Packer is referring to introspection within the methodological framework of subjective psychology, the principle applies to various methods of subject inquiry. Thus, the moment a single question is made to (or by) the subject about his or her identification with the means or objects of learning, with a particular operation that has been abbreviated, or with
any experience in general, we are triggering a process of objectivation that results
in the ontological dualism subject/object, unless we take a truly scientific stance
and, as Vygotsky suggests, cited in Packer (2008), we construct our own Das
Kapital (p. 20). This implies a move toward what Hegel calls ‘absolute
knowledge’, that is, a kind of knowledge that dissolves the separation between
subject and predicate, and between theory and empirical evidence or verification.
This implies that the research subject not only reflects on the means or objects of
learning but also reaches a final resolution on them through metaphysical
speculative means. However, to accomplish this kind of task is impossible, for not
only consciousness but knowledge is fundamentally social, and therefore the
means to verify knowledge pass necessarily through some further forms of
objectivation. The contradiction may be sublated, that is buried and overcome, but
never completely eliminated and there is no way out of it. In sum, it amounts to a
kind of dialectical empiricism.

What then is the problem with the notion of zone of proximal development applied
to the development of a foreign language? The main problem we face here is that
Vygotsky’s account of the genesis of higher mental functions represents an
abstraction from the social in his quest to understand common traits in human
ontogenetic development. This move may be interpreted as a form of ontological
monism (see Robbins, 2003, pp. 31-39), for internalisation would be treated as a
transformation of the external rather than a reflection of it, or as a form of dualism,
that is, the actual separation of individual from society (see Sawyer, 2002, p. 294).
In the former, the terms reflection (as in self-reflection) and introspection are
methodological anathema. The solution to avert the subject’s self-reflection and
introspection is Vygotsky’s dual stimulation method, which allows the analysis of
internal operations externally without introspection. Yet, the use of that method
keeps reproducing the kind of laboratory and experimental conditions that
perpetuate the individual/society separation, which is the kind of argument
contained in the latter position above.

Although Vygotsky conceptualised development as the outcome of conflict and
crisis, the main contradiction formulated in the notion of internalisation is between
natural (and spontaneous) and cultural tool-mediated processes (that depended on deliberate instruction), not among the social positions of individuals (and institutions) manifested in their different discursive practices, which corresponds more to a Bakhtinian stance. Thus, for Bakhtin (1981) ‘The importance of struggling with another’s discourse, its influence in the history of an individual’s coming to ideological consciousness, is enormous’ (p. 348). It is the latter the one that seems more attuned to our endeavour.

I am not suggesting here that intersubjective conflict is not present in Vygotsky’s conceptualisation, for any fair reading of *Consciousness as a problem for the psychology of behaviour* will clearly disprove that notion (see Vygotsky, 1997b, pp. 63-79), but Vygotsky was concerned first and foremost with putting cultural-historical psychology on solid ground in terms of the precise dialectical relation between organic (biological) and psychological phenomena, that is, the role that ‘reversible reflexes’ (i.e., signs) had in controlling and coordinating behaviour (p. 77). In fact, without this empirical work, the claims of the workability of the socio-genetic law of development in its intersubjective dimension, as representing a unity, could have been easily dismissed.

Let us analyse the problems that emerge from this stance in the construction of a methodology able to link social macrostructure with the social microprocesses (e.g. instruction aimed at learning something) involved in the formation of consciousness. After clarifying the general situation it will be easier to understand why I believe the *adaptations* of the dialectical tradition in SLA have done nothing but translate the same problems to this field. Vygotsky was obliged to deploy a method of historical investigation of child development, but such an endeavour is impracticable and futile in adult foreign language development, for such a method cannot but be socially situated. That is an imperative when different learner groups do not share the same semantico-pragmatic system, that is, the same native language. The conclusions on *mind or language development* from a given setting (e.g., English native speakers learning Spanish versus Japanese native speakers learning Spanish) are not mutually transferable. This means that, unlike Vygotsky’s history of the development of higher mental functions, its outcome
will lack generalisation power as every single native-language-determined semantico-pragmatic system mediates foreign language mastery in different ways. The question of development in such a case will be reduced to a question of ad hoc methods or techniques of instruction. The current SLA approach that draws on sociocultural theory, unfortunately, falls into that trap.

Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development is an instrumental method that puts together the potential for action of the individual with the historically-constructed demands imposed on ontological development, including what is considered an appropriate age period and instrumentalised forms of instruction. More specifically, there is a dialectical relation between the learner’s personal sense and society’s objective meaning, the latter being advanced by the instructor or more knowledgeable peer. Cultural-historical activity theory takes this dialectical relation beyond and offers analytical ways to understand the relation between individual action and collective activity, especially through A.N. Leont’ev’s (1979, 1981) notion of structure of activity. However, as Blunden (2007) asserts, this theorisation is still psychological and falls short of providing an account of the particular social formations that frame pedagogic relations. To use sociological terminology, historical or social laws are dismissed or neglected and we are only left with the life of individuals. In other words, although the historically and materially constructed pedagogic objectives and relations are acknowledged, there are no analytical tools to understand (a) the sociological background of students (e.g., association to a social, political, religious class that distributes experience, knowledge or cultural capital, in different ways, especially through their families and former schooling) and (b) the intermediary institutions such as school, university, the state, the labour market, as corporate loci in which individuals collaborate or compete with one another, in which agreement is forged, but also places in which conflict emerges.

Even the introduction of apparently innocuous scientific concepts as a way to restructure intrasubjective operations (psyche), which is the trademark of Vygotsky’s understanding of the development of higher psychological functions (see Vygotsky, 1987), must be understood in the cultural context of formal
schooling, that is, as fundamentally an ideological process. This process is framed differently depending on the subject’s position and on the role that that institution seeks to perform within the educational system as a whole, what we could call the *institution’s position*. Therefore, networks of scientific concepts or conceptual systems are recontextualised according to the educational aims of each particular institution and eventually mean something very different for students, depending on the organisation they belong to and the positions they take toward pedagogic discourse.

Whilst students’ personal motivations and goal formation are somehow accounted for in Vygotskian literature, we do not know much about the children that participated in Vygotsky’s research as social subjects. Thus, in the section of *Thinking and Speech* that deals with the development of scientific concepts, in which Vygotsky (1987) advances the idea that ‘[i]n scientific concepts, we encounter higher levels of thinking than in everyday concepts’ (p. 214), Vygotsky never asks the question of the different repertoire of everyday concepts that children have access to in order to mediate scientific concepts depending on their educational trajectories, including their family background. The only variable that is accounted for is ‘age group’ (p. 214), but never social class. In fact, any other variable is dismissed: ‘The child performs better on tasks based on scientific concepts … It seems unlikely that this is a function of the child’s familiarity with the material involved, that he is less familiar with falling off a bicycle or the destruction of a ship than with class struggle, exploitation, or the Paris Commune’ (p. 214). We do not even know where the data came from, what kind of pupils participated in experimental research; if the experiment took place in a laboratory and involved children from a vast array of backgrounds or not. Everyday language for Vygotsky seems to be evenly distributed among children, when in actual fact it is not. As Hasan (2005) asserts, summarising these two important aspects that are missing in Vygotskian psychology, “‘the child’ in Vygotsky remains undifferentiated; whatever the historical rationale for this, the role of social structure and of social positioning is never foregrounded in Vygotsky. It appears as if semiotic mediation would have the same efficacy, no matter what the environment for the interaction.’ (p. 41)
A.N. Leont’ev (1978, 1979, 1981), in contrast, starts to explore systematically the links between social position and meaning within a cultural-historical-activity theory theoretical frame. More specifically, A.N. Leont’ev (1978, p. 89) asserts that meanings ‘lead a double life’. On the one hand they are objective products of social life, having their history in the evolution of language and forms of social consciousness, expressing the movement of human knowledge and cognition, ‘as well as an ideological representation of society – religious, philosophical, political’. As objective products, ‘they are subordinated to social-historical laws’. On the other hand, personal sense is concretised in meanings (see also A.A. Leont’ev, 1977), and therefore they obey ‘the internal logic of their development’ (A.N. Leont’ev, 1978, p. 89). This approach puts Vygotsky’s psychology on a different ground altogether as it calls for instruments of analysis of collectives (e.g. rules, laws and forms of implicit regulation).

The deployment of Vygotskian psychology in the study of SLA, especially in studies that draw on the sociocultural tradition or position themselves within that tradition (see Lantolf and Thorne, 2006), has fallen into the same conundrum. Although a fair and accurate account of the complexity of their distinctions and theoretical twists would require a thesis of its own, it suffices to point out here that the sociocultural tradition tends to use word meaning, that is, Vygotsky’s (1987, pp. 43-51) original formulation, as a unit of analysis of consciousness formation, whereas cultural-historical activity theory tends to use activity, that is, A.N. Leont’ev’s (1977, p. 182) formulation. Every single approach within the blurry limits set by these broad generalisations I am making presents various degrees of ontological monism and dualism. In fact, one could not easily argue that sociocultural theory preserves Vygotsky’s intended ontological monism whereas cultural-historical activity theory does not, for both tend to work within a monist ontological framework. Yet, dualist fractures start to appear in practically all approaches as soon as we pay attention to the empirical unfolding of theory and witness its corrupting pull. Even Vygotsky’s approach is contested, as it can be said to embrace individual/social and internal/external dualisms by using the term ‘internalization’ to explain development (Sawyer, 2002, pp. 295-296).
The question is what is meant by socio in sociocultural theory? The answer is given forthrightly by Lantolf (2004) when he points out that ‘despite the label “sociocultural” the theory is not a theory of the social or of the cultural aspects of human existence. … It is, rather … a theory of mind … that recognizes the central roles that social relationships and culturally constructed artifacts play in organizing uniquely human forms of thinking.’ (pp. 30-31).

Lantolf’s stance seems to work fine when the subject’s position and the position of the institution are compatible, but its application can be seriously questioned when there is a mismatch between them. Put another way: What do we make of individuals who resist what they are taught? That is, students who do not make that teaching their own, even though they can show mastery of what has been taught, but not of what they should have learned.

Let me give you one example before I expand the problematic implications of the SLA sociocultural position. It is quite common for oral communication instructors in Japanese universities to evaluate students’ knowledge of grammar through written examinations, even though oral communication is the goal of the course. Presumably, it is a safe way not to fail the two thirds of the class who resisted oral communication instruction. Through everyday practice, this large segment of students influences to a great extent the recontextualisation of course objectives and methods of instruction and evaluation done by the instructor. In other words, this large segment of students pulled the course into their comfort zone and made it eventually impossible for the instructor to evaluate the mastery of oral communication skills. What kind of zone of proximal development is this?

Lantolf and Thorne (2006) believe that Wertsch’s (1998) notions of appropriation and mastery represent a Western reading of Vygotsky’s notion of internalisation that breaks away from Vygotsky’s monism. As we have already seen, for Wertsch, appropriation is ‘taking something that belongs to others and making it one’s own’, whereas mastery refers to ‘knowing how’ (p. 53). An individual may master a scientific system or a foreign language but that does not mean that he identifies with his or her discursive production. In fact, borrowing from Bakhtin (1981),
Wertsch asserts that cultural tools (e.g. words) resist being appropriated: ‘there is often resistance, and there [is] minimally something that might be called “friction” between mediational means and unique use in mediated action’ (p. 54).

In sum, the above terms were introduced by Wertsch in an attempt to account for (a) the individual’s different degrees of control of cultural tools (see also Wertsch and Stone, 1985), and (b) the social positioning of individuals in or through discourse as having a correlate in different agency structures (Wertsch et al., 1993, p. 348). However, for Lantolf and Thorne (2006), Wertsch’s distinction is not warranted since the notion of internalisation already contains the conflicting nature of cultural ‘artifacts’ (pp. 160-165) and in fact ‘accounts for the organic and dialectical relationship between individuals and collectives’ (p. 165). However, as already seen, internalisation is also a debatable notion. As Packer (1993) maintains, it implies a form of dualism, as it creates a dubious inside/outside divide that is hard to sustain from a monist ontological standpoint. Furthermore, borrowing from Sawyer (2002), Lantolf and Thorne (2006) subscribe to Vygotsky’s ‘analytical separation’ position (p. 165) when they assert that ‘Vygotsky’s own research on children reflects analytical dualism to the extent that while he theoretically underscored the seamless and organic connection between the individual and the social, he focused his research on children learning to use mediational artifacts outside of the larger sociocultural framework’ (p. 165).

My problem with all this is that whilst Lantolf and Thorne disagree with Wertsch’s dualistic position, they embrace Vygotsky’s own brand of dualism. In other words, Lantolf and Thorne disregard Wertsch’s incipient introduction of sociological categories, in which the political/ideological aspects of cultural tool-mediated acts start to emerge, whilst at the same time they (a) emphasise an analysis of mind formation in which categories of socio-cultural laws are restricted or absent, which amounts to a practical separation of the individual from social intermediate formations, and (b) implicitly accept the dualism internal/external activity that is contained in the notion of internalisation.

Again, the question is what can we make of the fact that only one third of the
student population actually attains mastery in oral communication in settings apparently informed by communication language teaching pedagogies? Is this a developmental problem to be solved at the instructional level without taking into consideration the social positioning of subjects and institutions?

The answer is a difficult one because I still believe that Vygotsky’s ‘word meaning’ (1987, p. 47), as a unit of analysis of psychology, does carry the contradiction between sense and meaning or, more precisely, the dialectical relation between sense, which obeys the laws of individual development, and meaning, which is subject to socio-historical laws. The problem is how to unfold this unit empirically. In other words, the problem is of method, rather than assuming a non-compromised dialectical, monist, inseparability-driven theoretical stance.

In this regard, the research conducted by Wertsch (1998, 2002), which looks at (a) the appropriation of collective, historical discourse, as being capable of shaping individuals’ experience as if they were direct witnesses of history, and (b) the mastery of accounts in which people are bonded to official discourse in public settings, but they resist them in private settings, achieves a sociological dimension that is difficult to find in other sociocultural research. Wertsch (2002), for that matter, bases his work by exploring the tension between ‘agent’ and ‘cultural tools’ (p. 6) under the notion of ‘mediated action’ (p. 6), which is another way of phrasing Vygotsky’s unit of ‘word meaning’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 47) or ‘complex mediated act’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 40). Thus, the question is how researchers who could be considered to be inscribed within SLA’s sociocultural school are empirically unfolding Vygotsky’s unit rather than judging the works by the contents of superficial labels.

This is why I hold the view that the theoretical gap between sociocultural theory, which works with a unit of analysis that focuses on semiotic mediation, and cultural-historical activity theory, which works with a unit of analysis that focuses on activity, is not significant at the theoretical but at the empirical level when the chosen unit is unfolded in empirical research. Unfortunately, most of the research
in SLA that draws on Lantolf and Thorne (2006) or that positions itself as sociocultural falls short of accounting for the social position of subjects and institutions, leaving agency almost completely unaccounted for (see Aljaafreh and Lantolf, 1994; Antón, 1999, 2003; Lantolf, 1994; Negueruela, 2003, 2008), unless they draw on activity theory, in which case a more robust sociological standpoint is assumed (see Thorne, 2005). However, as I have tried to demonstrate, even activity theory does not address well enough the issues of social macrostructure.

I believe the method introduced in chapter 3, which I summarise again as the expansion of the notion of subject, allows the incorporation of the sociological and psychological dimensions of these two post-Vygotskian schools and represents an alternative solution to Sawyer’s (2002, p. 297) proposed ‘analytic dualism’ whereby individual and society are viewed as essentially interrelated but analytically distinct. Furthermore, instead of seeking to confront both units of analysis, I explore the notion of subject as a bridge that helps to incorporate the psychological and sociological dimensions of mediation.

Second, Bernstein’s (2000) code theory partially addresses the problem encountered by cultural-historical activity theory above by advancing empirical ways of accounting for social formations. Bernstein’s theory focuses on pedagogy as a device that regulates consciousness through (a) the appropriation of the knowledge that is being produced in different production fields, (b) the recontextualisation of that knowledge through the pedagogic practice, and (c) the evaluation of the recontextualisation process, which actually acts as a ruler of the device and of the intended consciousness. The accent is put on pedagogic discourse as a ‘recontextualising principle’ (p. 33). This amounts to placing the accurate analysis of subject transformation that is afforded by cultural-historical activity theory within the context of pedagogic relations that regulate meaning potential. In other words, if cultural-historical activity theory views the pedagogic process that takes place, for instance, in the zone of proximal development, as relying on language and framed within the contradiction between personal meaning (individual action) and objective meaning (collective activity), in Bernstein’s theory the process relies on pedagogic discourse, which actually...
constrains or enhances the realisation of those meanings.

Besides observing the contradictions between individual action and collective activity, which is the method deployed in cultural-historical activity theory, Bernstein’s formulation of the pedagogic device allow us to observe (a) the arbitrariness of the boundaries established among categories (e.g., institutional-labour market relations, subject-matters and curricula, vertical or horizontal relations among faculty); (b) the principles of control of pedagogic practice and the assertion of moral or social order regulation; and (c) the critical moment of evaluation of students’ textual production as complying or not with what is considered adequate realisation. This critical moment actually reveals the hidden social order values that inform pedagogic practice and make it possible to assess pedagogic identities and positions towards the means and ends of instruction and social order rules.

Third, Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory affords an accurate analysis of identity, which is the most visible aspect of consciousness. Their notion of *figured worlds*, which could be defined as the subject’s historical development and continuous construction of a self-narrative in his or her everyday life by resorting to multiple and often contradictory voices, what Bakhtin (1981) calls *heteroglossia*, enters into contradiction with the subject’s self-asserted social position. This dialectic relation affords a complex depiction of the subject’s potential for future activity or agency.

Borrowing from Bakhtin and Vygotsky, Holland et al. (2001) conceive the Bakhtinian *space of authoring* as a particular zone of proximal development: ‘Vygotsky leads us to look at a more asocial, developmental effect of cultural forms, as mediating devices of consciousness. Bakhtin leads us to capture the ongoing social struggles, and the continuous social demands, the responsibility of “answering,” that follow along with the symbolic gift.’ (pp. 185-186). Drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of *dialogism*, which views consciousness and identity as intrinsically dialogical, they assert that ‘Identity, as the expressible relationship to others, is dialogical at both moments of expression, listening and speaking’ (p.
172). This constitutes the core of their ethnographic method to capture the space of positional identities. Thus, a positional identity is ‘a person’s apprehension of her social position in a lived world: that is, depending on the others present, of here greater or lesser access to spaces, activities, genres, and, through those genres, authoritative voices or any voice at all’ (pp. 127-128). In sum, discursive practices form a system of semiotic references that are used by individuals to position themselves, but the act of positioning is inherently a historical and social undertaking, not an abstract or individual one, because the individual depends on distributed forms of semiotic mediation to voice him- or herself. These forms are historically constructed by collectives but also, ontogenetically, by the individual throughout the social relations in which he or she takes part.

There are striking similarities between Bernstein’s notion of identity and Holland and colleagues’ notion of figured world. For Bernstein, identity is built upon principles of external (social) and internal (individual) classification, in terms of the boundaries set to create order and suppress the ‘contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas’ of the social world and its categories (p. 7). Identity amounts to a ‘psychic defence’ that is constituted internally and externally to suppress arbitrariness. Holland and colleagues, drawing on Bakhtin, make a similar case in terms of coming to terms through discursive practices to the internal and external conflict presupposed in language. Identity, under both conceptualisations, is hardly permanent but is constantly forming because it is itself a social category.

I also see a strong connection between some aspects of Bernstein’s method of assessing subject position and identity and Holland and colleagues’ ethnographic approach. Bernstein (2000) asserts that in pedagogic practices the strength between categories (classification) and differences in the principles of discursive control within them (framing) create different forms of ‘labelling’ of students (p. 13), especially when the labelling is done by instructors (Bernstein, 1996, pp. 106-113) and they have to set boundaries between different ‘expectations about conduct, character and manner’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 13). The assessment of such labelling can take the form suggested by Holland and colleagues through their ethnographic study of subject positions and identity in a figured world of
self-narratives. However, figured world is a far wider notion that also allows exploration of the potential for future activity or agency. Whilst I believe Bernstein’s notion of ‘labelling’ can be deployed, it is mainly constrained to the assessment of past achievement from the perspective of instructors, but lacks a projection of potential from the perspective of students.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.3.1 Research questions

Because the model is framed as an external language of description resting on a fundamental underlying hypothesis, although it can be reformulated depending on the findings, the model itself needs to be tested. Therefore, the pedagogical question has a correlate in terms of the theoretical and methodological system that will be put in place to address it. Thus, the questions that frame this study belong to two groups. They correspond to the two goals of the study, theoretical and pedagogical, which reveal the dialectical relationship between the actual empirical, pedagogic problem and the method that needs to be developed in order to address it.

QUESTION 1 (THEORETICAL PROBLEM): How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity?

QUESTION 2 (PEDAGOGICAL PROBLEM): What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative language teaching?

As can be seen, the questions have been framed within the methodological framework advanced in the previous chapter, which combines Bernstein’s code theory, cultural-historical activity theory and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural
theory. The assumptions (a priori) of QUESTION 2 are contained in QUESTION 1 and reflect the basic Bernsteinian stance that says that social structure has a correlate in terms of learners’ realisation of discourse (mastery). In other words, the social structure, that is, the way power is distributed creating boundaries between disciplines, social groups, and the principles of control of the activity that occurs within those boundaries, enter the pedagogic discourse creating different forms of consciousness and temporary identities. Discourse itself can be defined as socially-situated language and therefore inherent in discourse is the social position of subjects.

According to the methodology advanced in chapter 3, the method proposed is to ascertain students’ subject position by working with a Hegelian notion of subject in which all the determinations are accounted for, represented by the three moments of subject: psyche-activity-culture. This implies the deployment of the notion of pedagogic discourse, whose unit of analysis is the task, that is, individual motive-action in relation to societal motive-activity, which allows to ascertaining development targets and paths and assign them a pedagogic code. Tasks are coded by deploying Bernstein’s code theory in terms of orientations (or forms of consciousness) to discourse (from elaborated to restricted), that is, variations in the strength of classification and framing, or pedagogic code. This allows recontextualising communicative language learning pedagogies under our dialectical framework of reference. Subject position is ascertained in terms of discourse recognition (passive realisation) as a function of students’ trajectories (aggregation of activity systems as a function of class structure) and discourse realisation (active realisation). The former is ascertained by assessing students’ trajectories and presenting students with discourse fragments and having them classify them according to their origin (belonging to either grammar or communication). The latter is ascertained by analysing the system of labelling used by instructors within the figured world of students, and by exploring the way students reflect about the figured world of learning Spanish as a foreign language, that is, their position and potential for future activity in terms of their desired development vector vis-à-vis their learning objectives. Finally, the pedagogic identity of students is conceived as the particular relationship that takes place
between trajectory, orientation and the potential for future action, represented by
students preferred development path in order to attain their learning objectives
within the system of demands on active realisation imposed by instructors in
particular learning settings.

I will come back to these procedures after introducing the organisations and
participants secured for the study, as the former had to be adjusted in light of the
asymmetries of access presented by the latter.

4.3.2 Overview of research design

As already seen in chapter 3, the purpose of the study is to contribute as much as
possible to the improvement of the pedagogical conditions in foreign language
education at the tertiary level in Japan in two of the most common institutional
settings: universities specialising in the teaching of foreign languages and colleges
that do not specialise in foreign language education. This implies that certain
comparisons need to be made between both kinds of settings. Furthermore, the
method essayed in chapter 3 and the model essayed in the previous sections calls
for the use of a mixed-model research in which, broadly speaking, sociological,
psychological and ethnographic research instruments can be deployed. The
aforementioned procedures demand putting together qualitative and quantitative
methods and instruments. Thus, the most feasible approach is a mixed-model
research comprising longitudinal case studies.

Originally, I planned to conduct three longitudinal case studies. However, the first
of the three cases had to be terminated without completing the designed research
procedures because of a complete programme reshuffle done by one of the
programme heads. The reshuffle consisted of assigning first-year students,
including those who were part of the original cohort, to different communication
instructors in the middle of the semester. Although I could have incorporated the
reshuffle as part of the development of the conditions of the study programme, I
did not have personal contact with the new instructors. The original instructors
managed to pass the new instructors the final questionnaires to be administered to
student participants and collect them back, but the relationship with the new instructors was indirect and did not allow me to collect enough qualitative data regarding the students’ evaluations. Consequently, the longitudinal case study was abruptly terminated after the administration of the final questionnaire, lacking important data on students’ academic achievement during the last half of the course. However, the data collected before the reshuffle informed the procedures of the other two case studies and therefore I am compelled to incorporate it here as a case study, although in fact it does not constitute a longitudinal case study.

The second one was successfully completed but lacked the ethnographic dimension of the third case, due to certain access restrictions. Nevertheless, I may say with some degree of confidence that the second and third cases, involving a university not specialising in foreign language education and another one specialising in foreign language education, comply with the intended research design. In this section I will systematically return to the issue between ideal research design and the actual conditions in which research was conducted, including the order in which some instruments had to be designed, validated and tried across case studies.

4.3.3 Case studies

I will now introduce the particular organisations that took part in the case studies. This is because, as I have already mentioned, the instruments of analysis are not only an extension of the methodology and method introduced in the previous chapter, and the above model, but had to be adapted to match the asymmetric access I had to the organisations that were studied. After this, I will offer a panoramic view of the procedures adjusted to the actual conditions I encountered in the field. In other words, the revised procedures that will be introduced later are the result of the clash between intended method and available field resources.

I conducted case studies in three higher education institutions (AU, BU and CU, see below). Each case study comprised two courses – one grammar and one communication course – with their respective instructors and students. The differences
in access to the participants in these organisations made me develop more or less qualitative and quantitative research approaches. In other words, even if I had envisioned a qualitative approach based, for instance, on the extensive use of interviews with student participants, I had to adapt it and use open questions through questionnaires to get the data I was looking for. For example, in some cases, I could not observe directly the classes being taught (e.g. in AU and BU) because of schedule constraints or because the institution did not support pedagogic research and imposed many restrictions on pedagogic research either from internal or external researchers. In those cases I could only make audio recordings of classroom interaction in order to codify discursive practices and reach student participants by means of questionnaires. Furthermore, as already mentioned, my collection of AU’s data ended prematurely due to a sudden rearrangement of instructors and courses. This was a major setback for the research. However, I could still use the data already gathered from AU to inform other data collection procedures involving BU and CU. The longitudinal as such could therefore only be completed for BU and CU. In the case of CU, I had complete access to courses and faculty because the university supports pedagogic research. In fact, faculty members were not only keen to grant access but also willing to work together with researchers in order to produce interventions. Pedagogy is not seen as something static but subject to periodic evaluation and improvement by research means. In other words, the institutional settings vary greatly. Some of them allow a kind of positivist approach to research (use of questionnaires, audio recordings or anything that does not substantively alter the normal functioning of courses) but others allow more interventionist research approaches (including classroom observation, video recordings, interviews with students, and more importantly, reshaping pedagogy itself depending on the nature of the research). In sum, the former view research as mere observation of the pedagogic process, whilst the latter see research as an intervention in the pedagogic process. This is not to say that observation is not a form of intervention, which it is, but the stance of the researcher is that of the outsider. This may well reflect the degree of engagement of those universities to the fields of production of discourse. Less access granted to researchers may signal a stronger recontextualising role of (disciplinary) discourses by the part of the institution. In contrast, more access granted to researchers may signal that the institution is not only engaged in recontextualising (disciplinary) discourses but also producing them,
that is, it is an interlocutor in the field of production of disciplinary discourses (e.g. linguistics, psycholinguistics, applied linguistics, SLA) or the field of production of Spanish discourse (e.g. by participating in Spanish-language media, cultural events, etc.).

Overall, I must emphasise that conducting any kind of empirical study in Japan in this area of research is quite difficult because of lack of access, especially to the courses taught by Japanese instructors. Japanese instructors tend not to specialise in pedagogy, applied linguistics or SLA but rather in Spanish philology, linguistics and area studies. Therefore, they do not have a culture of research involving student participants or pedagogies. Higher education institutions tend to build a wall around themselves that separates them from competitors. Citing Amano (1979), McVeigh (2002) asserts that Japanese professors identify first as members of their universities rather than as experts in their specialism (p. 139). Collaboration among local institutions is not common. However, local institutions, especially if they are involved in foreign language teaching and studies, do favour creating partnerships with foreign universities. Another problem is that even if native Spanish speakers teaching in Japan are more accustomed to researching pedagogy, they tend to rank lower in terms of faculty hierarchy. They usually are part-time instructors or lecturers and tend not to have control over the study programmes. I feel lucky to have been able to muster all the support I received from all the instructors, students and institutions involved in the present study. As a result I believe it gives a good account of the kind of institutions involved in foreign language education at the tertiary level in Japan. I am very grateful to each and every one of them for working with me.

The rationale for choosing particular organisations and courses with the aim of conducting case studies was based on the principles outlined in chapter 3, that is, the need to cover the widest range possible of organisational and pedagogical contexts, including institutions specialising in foreign language education and those that do not specialise in this area, and the need to cover the grammar-communication curricular divide. The idea is that the study achieves the highest possible degree of generalisation and, therefore, can contribute to the improvement of a wide array of
pedagogic contexts. I chose a beginners’ course from each institution to limit the number of confounding variables within institutions, since the variety of study programmes adds more asymmetry to the students’ background and makes it more difficult to trace the trajectories of individual student participants. For example, students studying at an organisation specialising in foreign language education may participate in study-abroad programmes from their second year of study, whilst students studying at organisations that do not specialise in foreign language education may not have access to that kind of programme. In other words, it is difficult to compare a second-year or third-year programme at a university specialising in foreign language education with one at a university not specialising in foreign language education. Therefore, all student participants were first-year students.

4.4 DATA COLLECTION

Data on student participants from AU and BU were collected over a semester, of fourteen and fifteen weeks respectively, during autumn 2007. Data on student participants from CU were collected over two fourteen-week semesters starting in autumn 2008 and ending in winter 2009. There are two main sets of data for this category: (a) personal and trajectory data; and (b) recognition of instructional discourse data. The number of participants compared with the number of students enrolled in the programmes per organisation is given in Table 4.1. The disparity between the number of enrolled students and participants is the result of students who (a) decided not to participate in the study or (b) answered questionnaires in an incomplete and careless way, and (c) students whose data sets were incomplete because they did not attend class the day the data were collected.
Data on and from instructor participants were collected, respectively, over a similar time span but lasted four weeks longer. There are four main sets of data for this category: (a) trajectory and organisational data; (b) validation of the recognition instrument of analysis data; (c) students’ realisation data; and (d) labelling of students’ data.

The different data and data sets will be described more comprehensively in the following sections due to the complexity presented by a mixed research method in terms of the intertwining of the data along different procedures.

Data collection on classroom interaction in AU and BU started in the first week of May 2007 with audio recordings of three consecutive classes each in both grammar and communication courses. Data collection on classroom interaction in CU started in the third week of May 2008 with the audio and video recording of three consecutive grammar classes and of two consecutive communication classes.

### 4.4.1 Overview of organisations and participants

The next sections present information about the institutions, courses, curricula and participants. The names of the institutions and the participants have been coded to protect their privacy, since all participants were ensured anonymity. Written consent was obtained from all instructor participants at the beginning of the study. Student participants were informed of the aims of the study at each stage in which they were

### Table 4.1 Summary of student participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>No. of students enrolled in both Grammar and Communication Courses</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BU</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
involved, written consent was obtained from them, and they were informed that they were permitted to withdraw from the study at any time (see Appendix 4A).

4.4.2 ‘A’ University (AU) specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign language

4.4.2.1 Female foreign instructor teaching communication (GI)

GI, a native Spanish speaker, started teaching Spanish as a foreign language as a part-time instructor in a small language school where she was active for three years. She then started teaching Spanish as a foreign language part-time at the secondary level, a position that she had held until the time of the data collection. In 2003, she started teaching part-time at the tertiary level, in two colleges specialising in foreign language education, positions that she also held at the time the data collection took place. Her educational background is in the humanities but in a field completely different from language education.

_The reason I became a Spanish instructor is not clear. It was not a meditated decision. I let myself fall into it because it enabled me to find a job quickly. After teaching for a while, I started liking it. I thought, to my surprise, that it was something that I could do relatively well. I believe the most important thing is to develop in the students the interest and curiosity for the language and the cultures where Spanish is spoken. If this is achieved, students will know how to find the best way to learn what they need to learn by themselves. As an instructor, what I believe is the most important is not that students learn many grammatical structures or a large vocabulary but to make them feel interested. The Spanish language is too complex to be learnt the way other subjects are learnt. Students cannot study for an examination and forget everything the next day. That’s nonsense. My students always ask me for the contents that will be covered in the exam and I always answer them: from page one. If a student understands this and works to achieve it, his learning will be satisfactory. The one who studies the most is not the one who learns the most but the one who keeps alert inside and outside the classroom. The good student must be interested in the subject and I believe that in order to do_
that she has to have a clear objective. That objective can be very peculiar, but nonetheless [it] is an objective. Students should be open minded, not come to class with a prejudice, something that is very common. Japanese students have a fixed idea of what their chances to succeed are, how their learning process should be and how the instructor should teach, even before attending the first session. If something does not match their ideas, they just feel lost and do not pay attention any more. Their active participation in the classroom is very important, more than what they can do in their homes.

4.4.2.2 Female Japanese instructor teaching communication/grammar (MI)

MI started teaching Spanish part-time as a foreign language at the tertiary level after finishing her MA in Latin American literature. She had completed a BA in Spanish philology in one of the few public foreign-studies colleges that exist in Japan. At the time of the data collection she was holding part-time positions as an instructor in four different colleges. Overall, she had been teaching for a period of ten years, especially Spanish grammar.

After finishing my MA there was no alternative. Students have to work by themselves. The most difficult aspect of teaching is to prepare well ahead what one is going to teach. Japanese students get easily confused if there is some twist in the teaching sequence. Students have to work, think and be active. I think that what distinguishes my teaching from other colleagues is that I make students work hard and think a lot.

4.4.2.3 AU’s programme and cohort

The cohort of students at AU comprised a first-year Spanish communication class (one of four classes in AU’s Spanish language programme, with each class containing approximately seven students). The first-year Spanish communication course lasted two semesters (28 weeks in total) and consisted of two lessons per week (90 minutes each) for each class. In the year of the study, the head of the department decided to rotate the instructors teaching all four first-year communication classes. Therefore, the instructors who participated in the study were
required to hand over their classes in the middle of the semester to a new pair of colleagues. The reasoning behind this decision was to have the only Spanish native speaker, GI, teaching every first-year class during the whole year. Consequently, GI and MI taught their respective cohorts and then moved on to teach another first-year class. The study programme included two 90-minute sessions of grammar, one 90-minute session of language drills, and one 90-minute session of composition per week. This curricular change was announced after the data collection had started and compromised the scope of the analysis, as will be shown below.

4.4.3 ‘B’ University (BU), not specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign language

4.4.3.1 Male foreign instructor teaching communication (JO)

JO began teaching Spanish as a foreign language at the tertiary level in a university specialising in foreign language education. At the time of the data collection, he had completed an MA in Spanish as a foreign language through distance learning and was teaching Spanish as a foreign language full-time in one college and part-time once a week in another one. His prior education had been in the humanities but in a field completely different from language education. He had been teaching in Japan for seven years, especially Spanish communication.

Teaching Spanish was a way to secure a living in Japan. At the beginning, I wanted to work in another field and supplement my income by teaching Spanish as a foreign language, but soon the opposite started to happen. I would be satisfied if my students could express themselves in Spanish to carry out everyday activities, such as shopping at the supermarket, giving directions, introducing themselves, talking about their birthplace or their family. Students should know why they are studying Spanish. Perhaps, I would recommend they take a virtual tour around the Spanish-speaking world to see what is underneath the language. Students should be bold and have a positive attitude towards learning. They should pay attention and be focused during class. They should never be afraid of making mistakes. They should also come to class with the purpose of making the most of the time that they practise with
their peers and to ask me what they don’t understand. My Japanese colleagues teach grammar through many explanations and repetition, substitution and translation exercises. About my native [Spanish-speaking] colleagues, some use new technologies, some follow a rather notio-functional method.

4.4.3.2 Female Japanese instructor teaching grammar (YU)

YU’s educational background was a BA in Spanish philology. She had completed an MA in Spain, where she had also worked as a Spanish-Japanese interpreter and translator. At the time of the data collection YU was teaching Spanish grammar part-time in a couple of universities. She had been teaching in Japan for ten years.

_I believe I have to create the conditions for students to ask me questions. I would like them to be happy and feel satisfied about acquiring new knowledge. They should pay attention, be focused and enjoy what they do. I think during the class I speak much more in Spanish than my Japanese colleagues._

4.4.3.3 BU’s programme and cohort

The cohort at BU was formed by thirty first-year students belonging to the Faculty of Social Sciences registered in the programme. The first-year Spanish programme lasted two semesters (30 weeks in total). Courses on which data were collected are first-semester communication (one 90-minute session per week) and grammar (one 90-minute session per week). The study programme included another 90-minute session of grammar per week delivered by a grammar instructor other than YU.

4.4.4 ‘C’ University (CU), specialising in the teaching of Spanish as a foreign language

4.4.4.1 Female foreign instructor teaching communication (MO)

MO started teaching Spanish as a foreign language in CU after completing her masters and doctoral studies in linguistics overseas. At the time of the data collection she had been holding a tenured post for the last ten years. Apart from
teaching Spanish as a foreign language she was teaching linguistics, SLA, and was tutoring Japanese and international students enrolled in CU’s BA and MA programmes.

I began teaching Spanish because the MA and PhD programme required me to become a teaching assistant. I came to Japan through an exchange programme and I was offered a job here. Instructors should know what students’ requirements and demands are so that they can perform as guides. Learning languages is painful, there is suffering. It is not that instructors teach, [but rather that] students learn, and therefore instructors are guides and they have to be aware of the particular suffering their students are going through so that they can help them out. Students have different methods of learning. The ones who are very successful, and every year we have one of those in our courses, are the ones who are dedicated and don’t work part time. They spend many hours studying, reading, looking words up. They are not particularly communicative. I know other kinds of students as well. They are nice, communicative students, but it is not clear if they can outperform the students of the first kind. Practice is not enough. In order to learn a foreign language there is real dedication and hard studying going on. Japanese instructors focus on grammar and translation, especially translation. My native-speaker colleagues focus on communication.

4.4.4.2 Male Japanese instructor teaching grammar (NO)

NO studied Spanish philology at one of the public foreign-studies colleges, completing his MA there. After graduating, he gained a tenured post and began teaching Spanish grammar and literature. He then completed his doctoral studies in Spain in the field of linguistics. At the time of the data collection he had been teaching Spanish for more than thirty years.

I would like students to love the Spanish language and the Hispanic culture. I would like them to acquire a minimal but solid knowledge of the Spanish language. If you are not interested in the target language, you don’t want to
study it. And it is necessary to give an incentive to the students to learn the vocabulary and the grammatical rules by heart. The most important thing we have to do is to know properly the level students are in and what they want to learn. A course is co-work done by the instructor and the students. It is important to avoid producing an instructor’s monologue that gets the audience bored. Students who are interested and curious about other cultures, the language system and who become involved in the course’s activities are successful. My Japanese colleagues spend more time explaining the grammatical rules and translating. My native-speaker colleagues carry out more communicative activities. I am in between both methods.

4.4.4.3 CU’s programme and cohort

The cohort at CU comprises twenty-one first-year students registered in a programme leading to a major in Spanish language. The programme, during its first year, consists of six mandatory subjects: Grammar 1, Grammar 2, Reading and Grammar, Pronunciation and Grammar, Language Laboratory and Communication. All subjects are taught for one 90-minute session per week. The first-year programme lasted two semesters (28 weeks in total). The data was drawn from the two-semester Grammar 1 and Communication participants.

4.5 DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

Each procedure below is linked to a subset of research questions called procedural questions. Some of them call for the development of or are framed under qualitative or quantitative research methods or instruments. Some procedures comprise more than one research instrument, mixing qualitative and quantitative methods. In this section I will present the intended outcome of the procedure, the actual procedural questions and I will explain what part of the procedure has already been carried out and what is left to carry out during the data analysis stage. I will also be commenting on the ethical implications of the data collection and analysis, including the position and attitude towards data collection and analysis from participants. Thus, rather than having a separate section dealing with the
ethical implications of the data collection and analysis, these will be given for each procedure in the form of commentary.

4.5.1 Ascertaining the pedagogic code of tasks

There are three intended outcomes for this procedure. The first is a description of development paths in terms of moves (top-down, bottom-up) within the zone of practical development and the motive-activity structure per task. The second is the possibility of comparing pedagogies across learning and organisational settings according to the development targets set by the instructor and negotiated with students during classroom interaction. The third is a description of the task in terms of orientation (relevance of meanings) or consciousness requirements, that is, the coding orientation of the task.

4.5.1.1 Research questions

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 1: How do foreign language pedagogies in different organisations and learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity structure)?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 2: What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?

4.5.1.2 Procedure

The procedure is based on segmenting the classroom interaction continuum into tasks, in terms of the operationalisation of actions done by the instructor according to the relationship between motive-action and motive-activity. This is the first step needed in order to translate plain interaction into discourse and relies on the transcription of audio-recordings of classroom interaction. The segmenting is based on A.A. Leont’ev’s (1981) views of language development as an overall transition from speech activity to communication activity, Gal’perin’s (1969, 197, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) views on the state of consciousness and degrees of automaticity, and Robbins’ (2003, p. 84) notions of reactive and active speech.
Thus, every single task, understood as the operationalisation of motive-action, is classified according to the motive-activity structure (foundation, structural, functional, rhetorical). Another category was added: management. Management is defined as the activity aimed at administering the course. In cases in which the management of the course coincides with another category of the motive-activity structure, especially with foundation motive-activity, the latter takes precedence. For instance, if an instructor uses the roll-call either to teach or to have students practise some aspect of the foreign language, the activity will not count as management but as either foundation or structural. The instrument to be used in this classification is contained in chapter 3, Table 3.1. It amounts to a theoretical extension of several theoretical bodies which have been subject to empirical verification by their respective authors. In other words, they are not solely speculative theoretical bodies. Every segmented task is then coded by deploying Bernstein’s code theory in terms of orientations (or forms of consciousness) to discourse (from elaborated to restricted), that is, variations in the strength of classification and framing, or pedagogic code, which constitutes the second step toward transforming classroom interaction into discourse. For Bernstein, pedagogic identities – understood as forms of consciousness –, and therefore subject position, are predicated on particular modes of practice that can be described using descriptors to assess different modes of pedagogic practices or ‘pedagogic codes’ (Bernstein, 2000, p. 99). This language of description emerges from an analysis of (a) the distribution of power, which creates and maintains boundaries in organisational form (classification/structural level), and the principles of control that regulate communication within specific forms of interaction (framing/interactional level). The overall framework is contained in Daniels’s (1995) and Morais and Neves’s (2001) description of classification and framing relations (spaces, agents, discourses, subjects) (see chapter 3, Figure 3.3).

In conclusion, we may argue that pedagogic discourse, as an analytical research method, is the outcome of a simplified rendition of pedagogic interaction, a written (linguistic) representation that condenses but also helps to expand analytically the role of agents in a given setting during the very process of production of the setting according to precise coding filters. These filters help to objectivise those
agents’ activity objects trying to preserve the complexity of the whole. More succinctly put, discourse is a form of representation of subject position.

The translation of interaction into activity and eventually into discourse, properly speaking, through systematic structured observation, was subject to many biases that are worth noting. Some of those biases are the inherent product of the procedure itself, as it constitutes a reductionist version of interaction (e.g., using A.N. Leont’ev’s notion of activity structure, A.A. Leont’ev’s notion of speech activity, and Bernstein’s notion of pedagogic code to make sense of interaction), but some others correspond to the actual practical choices that I had to make in order to gather, structure, and analyse data (e.g., the placing of the IC audio recorders in the classroom and the place the researcher occupied when video recording classroom interaction).

The transcriptions tried to preserve the complexity and sense of the activity and discourse but they do not constitute a reflection of activity or discourse, for they are a projection of the researcher’s ideas about what activity and discourse really consisted of. As a condensation that is based on linguistic means, transcripts contain the researcher’s position.

In the case of AU and BU, classroom interaction was recorded using IC audio recorders. The recorders were worn by the instructor participants about the neck, picking up instructor-student interaction and some background sound, but the recordings did not sufficiently pick up students’ interactions that were occurring away from the instructor. Therefore, along with the interviews held with instructor participants, half a dozen questions were asked with the aim of clarifying what was happening in the classroom, especially in terms of spatial dispositions. This implied the introduction of the instructor’s bias into the interaction codification. In the case of CU, it was not necessary to resort to explanations about classroom interaction, since the sessions were not only audio-recorded in a similar way but also video-recorded. I video-recorded the communication instructor’s sessions, and an assistant recorded the grammar instructor’s sessions. All transcriptions tried to preserve the complex mix of languages that took place in the classroom, ranging
from Japanese to Spanish and sometimes another foreign language such as English, and were based only on the audio data from the IC recorders so as to maintain a consistent approach to the data.

Eventually, I had to limit the study to the structuring and analysis of only one out of three class interaction recordings per course due to the enormous volume of work involved in the transcription and coding of classroom interaction. The ones chosen were those that showed the greatest variety of instructional methods and techniques as this was considered more representative of the activity of the whole.

Also, an external language of description of classification and framing relations adapted to foreign language educational organisations/learning settings was required. This was done by dividing the descriptions in two: (1) Description of classification and framing relations and (2) Discursive and social order rules indicators for foreign-language learning general contexts at the tertiary level in Japan. I will explain the development of these descriptions in detail below.

In order to execute the procedure, which was intertwined with the one dealing with students’ discourse recognition (see section 4.5.3), I had to rapidly carry out the segmenting of tasks and coding for motive-activity. This was done promptly and, due to time constraints, I could not count on appraisers to test inter-coder reliability. However, the validation of the already mentioned language of description of discursive and social order rules relations, which I will explain in detail below, helped me to have a more accurate idea of the development targets set by instructors in particular activities, constituting a form of evaluation of the segmenting and coding for motive-activity. Overall, the characteristics of the coding process, which relied on dividing classroom interaction into small segments, and its overall length, amounted to a recoding procedure, ensuring higher intracoder reliability.

**Description of classification and framing relations**

Data were collected from instructor participants with the aim of understanding the
organisational structure in the university in which they were employed, in terms of external and internal framing and classification values. This was done through a questionnaire administered by e-mail that included coded open-ended questions regarding the aforementioned description of relations, except for instructional and regulative practices, which were part of the next description and was carried out separately. The questionnaire also included questions about their personal trajectories and their social space, developed after Holland et al. (2001), which are part of other procedures (see Appendix 4B for the questionnaire).

The questions spanned the whole range of organisational relations regarding the particular universities in which the instructors were working, their departmental structure, the communication between faculty, the co-ordination with peers, curricular arrangements, the connection between their own programmes and other programmes in countries where Spanish was widely spoken and the relevance of the programmes vis-à-vis the labour market. After collecting and analysing the data in its totality, as a system of relative classification and framing strengths, I put together the table of descriptions that is contained in Table 4.2. This implied two moves. First, a top-down approach of looking at classification and framing relations in general terms in the aforementioned areas (spaces, agents, discourses, subjects) through the outcome of open-ended questions, and second, a bottom-up approach in which the data provided by instructors were organised according to the relative strengths of classification and framing using a simple two-point (strong and weak) classification and framing scale.

The validation of this instrument was hampered by the very same lack of knowledge of the majority of instructor participants about various areas of the inquiry, especially those areas that deal with the internal organisation of departments, the design of study programmes and other issues concerning the relationship between the university and other communities of practice and the labour market. Thus, four of the six transmitter participants were part-time instructors who were not involved in the external or internal relations of their organisations other than teaching a course and selecting its textbook. In the case of AU grammar and AU communication, the textbook had already been selected by
full-time faculty. AU and BU instructors had very limited knowledge of the whole range of relations their organisations engaged in, especially external relations. In conclusion, that form of organisational blackout corresponds to strong classification, but participants could not judge the whole array of relations, restricting the description to all-or-nothing values.

Eventually a relational space for classification and framing values was developed to chart organisational differences. This was based on the coding of both the answers given by the instructors to the questions contained in the aforementioned questionnaire and the observation data collected in the classroom. The questionnaire data was coded for strength of classification and framing across a range of different relations: instructor-instructor (horizontal), instructor-instructor (vertical), between subjects, within a discipline, college-communities of practice, college-colleges, college-employers, academic-non-academic (see Table 4.2). The audio and video observation data was coded for classification and framing in a similar way across the following relations; space instructor-student, space student-student, instructor-student, and student-student. However, the detail of the data, in comparison with the instructors’ interview data, allows for the development of more precise analytical categories, which I will explain below.
Table 4.2 Description of classification and framing relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Strong Classification C+</th>
<th>Weak Classification C-</th>
<th>Strong Framing F+</th>
<th>Weak Framing F-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Space instructor-student</strong></td>
<td>Specialisation of classroom space</td>
<td>Variable use of classroom space</td>
<td>Control of space arrangements by instructor.</td>
<td>Shared control of space arrangements by instructor and students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instructor-student</strong></td>
<td>Instructor assumes the role of instructor and student the role of learner.</td>
<td>Instructor assumes the role of facilitator and student seeks learner’s autonomy.</td>
<td>Instructor controls communication.</td>
<td>Student seems in control of the communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student-student</strong></td>
<td>Students assume fixed roles in their interaction with peers.</td>
<td>Students redefine the roles they play in their interaction with peers.</td>
<td>Students communicate with peers following closely the activities/procedures of an ‘exercise’.</td>
<td>Students communicate with peers in a creative way accomplishing the goals of a given ‘task’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instructor-instructor (horizontal)</strong></td>
<td>Instructors stick to their role according to their discipline or actual division of labour.</td>
<td>Instructors across disciplines cross boundaries.</td>
<td>There is no communication between instructors.</td>
<td>Instructors co-ordinate their work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instructor-instructor (vertical)</strong></td>
<td>Planning roles such as the curriculum are assumed arbitrarily by one instructor or a group of instructors.</td>
<td>Most of the teaching staff shares the job of curriculum planning.</td>
<td>Academic decisions are transmitted unilaterally from a instructor or group of instructors higher within the organisation.</td>
<td>Academic decisions are consensual, made through consultations with teaching staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between subjects</strong></td>
<td>Grammar is seen as an independent discipline from Communication. Subject boundaries sharp.</td>
<td>Grammar and Communication are seen interdependently. Subject boundaries blurred.</td>
<td>Communication and Grammar are taught independently. Communication is taught as an enactment of Grammar (or vice versa).</td>
<td>Communication and Grammar are taught inter-dependently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within a discipline</td>
<td>A sole discipline or school is sought.</td>
<td>The boundaries of a discipline or school are continuously crossed.</td>
<td>Limited selection of contents or instructional methods. Not able to make changes to the syllabus.</td>
<td>Wide selection of contents or instructional methods. Variable syllabus according to context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College-communities of practice</td>
<td>Foreign language is seen as an abstract discipline, isolated from actual uses in communities of practice outside classroom.</td>
<td>Foreign language is seen as an actual communication tool which connects with communities of practice outside classroom.</td>
<td>Foreign language is learned in isolation from real uses in communities of practice outside classroom.</td>
<td>Instructor and Student bring to class language use linked to communities of practice outside classroom or adapt to community demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College-colleges</td>
<td>Foreign language classes are seen as isolated from external college programmes overseas (study abroad, college exchange programmes, postgrads).</td>
<td>Foreign language classes are seen as a step towards accessing external college programmes overseas.</td>
<td>Foreign language is learned in isolation from external college programmes.</td>
<td>Foreign language is learned as a bridge to access external college programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College-employers</td>
<td>Foreign language classes are seen as independent from labour market skills.</td>
<td>Foreign language classes are seen as providing skills to supply labour market demand.</td>
<td>Foreign language is learned in isolation from labour market.</td>
<td>Foreign language is learned as a step forward to accessing the skills demanded by the labour market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic-non-academic</td>
<td>Foreign language is seen as a discipline, independent from everyday use.</td>
<td>Foreign language is seen as a means of everyday communication.</td>
<td>Foreign language production in the classroom emphasises academic skills and language use.</td>
<td>Foreign language production in the classroom emphasises language use in everyday settings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discursive and social order rules indicators

A series of indicators for instructional (discursive rules) and regulative (social order rules) discursive practices were constructed by drawing on Morais and Neves (2001) but adapted to foreign language teaching. Data were collected with the aim of validating this language of description. The validation process included two methods. In the first one, instructor participants were given audio segments extracted from their own course interaction that had previously been provisionally coded on a four-point scale, from weakly (F--) to strongly framed (F++), using the provisional indicators. The data from this method were collected from instructor participants during the last two weeks of the data collection. One of the methodological principles set for this study was to avoid imposing Bernstein’s framing categories, or any other theoretical categories, during interviews with participants or data gathering through questionnaires and therefore they were asked first for their intention or what they were trying to accomplish during that segment. If the answer was considered vague or ambiguous, the participant was then asked, ‘Who exerted more control in this segment, the student(s) or the instructor?’ Hence, the methodology followed Tomlinson’s (1989) hierarchical focusing guidelines whereby research interviews go from the general to the particular, avoiding as much as possible the use of ready-made construals. These data also informed the procedure dealing with students’ recognition of discourse as not only the indicators in coding discourse but also the audio segments given to instructors were used as questionnaire items given to students (see section 4.5.3). The second method was to present each set of attributes/indicators (corresponding to selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, sequence, evaluation criteria, hierarchy and conduct) to the participants written on cards. The participants were asked to organise the cards on a chart according to their level of agreement with the depicted practice, as if they agreed to carry out that practice in their own teaching, and with the relative value of control oriented according to ‘instructor control’ and ‘student control’ (see Appendix 4C). This method was time-consuming and I could only secure the participation of CU’s communication instructor. Because I wanted to incorporate the opinion of a grammar instructor, I had to resort to an external instructor participant (MA). This participant was
Japanese and had fifteen years of experience in Spanish language teaching, specialising in the teaching of grammar, in a large array of pedagogical contexts. The data were gathered during the summer break in 2008, in face-to-face interviews. In this way I managed to get valuable data from practitioners covering both aspects of the curricular divide (i.e., communication and grammar).

In the case of the first method, most of the commentary done by the instructors coincided with the provisional indicators. In the case of the second method, participants offered different views in the area of evaluation criteria and assessment, especially about the role of the instructor and students in assessing students’ linguistic production. These views were incorporated and the indicators were adjusted accordingly.

The resulting indicators and their framing descriptions (after validation) are contained in Table 4.3. They form a four-point ordinal scale: weakly framed (F--), not so weakly framed (F-); not so strongly framed (F+) and strongly framed (F++); or, their equivalent in numerals, weakly framed (1), not so weakly framed (2); not so strongly framed (3) and strongly framed (4). The intervals between each successive point on the scale were not necessarily equal.

The definitions for the indicators grouped under instructional and regulative discourse are the following:

A. Instructional discourse (discursive rules)

1. Selection

1.1 Selecting contents. This indicator refers to the control instructors and students have over the selection of instructional contents. Are the instructional contents limited? Are they given to students? Are students allowed to resort to their personal experience? Can students choose or suggest instructional contents?

1.2 Selection of classroom jobs. This indicator refers to the control instructors and students have over the roles they assume when carrying out instructional activities. Are students allowed to organise themselves
to carry out an instructional activity?

2. Sequence

2.1 When instructing or facilitating. This indicator refers to the control instructors and students have over the instructional sequence (e.g. the programmed steps to complete an instructional exercise or task). Are acquirers allowed or encouraged to find the best instructional sequence for themselves or is this sequence provided and enforced by instructors?

3. Pace

3.1 When introducing a new activity. This indicator refers to the control instructors and acquirers have over the pace of instruction. Can students determine the time they need to carry out an instructional activity?

4. Evaluation criteria.

4.1 When instructing or assessing. This indicator refers to the control instructors and students have over the role of evaluator. Can students become evaluators for themselves or for their peers? Do instructors correct textual production?

4.2 When referring to future assessment. This indicator refers to the degree of assertion of evaluation criteria for future assessment. Do instructors inform acquirers about how the assessment will be evaluated?

B. Regulative discourse (social order rules)

B.1 Learning of socio-affective competences

1. Conduct

1.1 When giving instructions/evaluating text production. This indicator refers to the degree of assertion of models of conduct. Do instructors make explicit models of conduct?

B.2 Distinction of power and control relations

2. Hierarchy

1.1 Students asking questions. This indicator refers to the degree of control students may exert on the relation with their instructors. Can students’ questions to the instructor promote further dialogue?
Table 4.3 Discursive and social order rules indicators for foreign-language learning general contexts at the tertiary level in Japan. After Bernstein (2000) and Morais and Neves (2001)

[Items are coded F++ for strongly framed; F+, for not so strongly framed; F-, for not so weakly framed and F--., for weakly framed.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>F+++</th>
<th>F++</th>
<th>F-</th>
<th>F--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTRUCTIONAL PRACTICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Discursive Rules)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELECTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selecting contents</td>
<td>The instructional contents are provided to the students.</td>
<td>The instructional contents are provided to the students but some personal information or personal experience is elicited from them.</td>
<td>The function of the instructional contents is limited to elicit students’ personal information or experience.</td>
<td>The instructional contents are provided fundamentally by the students (e.g., students give presentations to the class).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of classroom jobs</td>
<td>The instructor uses an unrevealed system of participation (may involve the class as a whole) and chooses those students who will carry out the instructional activity.</td>
<td>The instructor communicates a system of participation for the instructional activity and selects those students who will carry it out. (A previously set method of selection may be used.)</td>
<td>The instructor communicates a system of participation for the instructional activity (e.g., make groups of three; make pairs) but allows students to organise themselves.</td>
<td>The instructor suggests a variable/loose system of participation for the instructional activity but permits students to make the final decision and organise themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEQUENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When instructing/facilitating</td>
<td>The instructor enforces an unrevealed instructional sequence.</td>
<td>The instructor sets and makes explicit an instructional sequence and enforces it.</td>
<td>The instructor sets an instructional sequence (either explicitly or not) but in practice allows students to depart from it.</td>
<td>Students are allowed or encouraged to discover the best instructional sequence for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>When introducing a new activity</td>
<td>The instructor decides the time needed to carry out an instructional activity but does not communicate it to the students beforehand.</td>
<td>The instructor decides the time needed to carry out an instructional activity, informs the students of it, and may assess their progression in order to adjust it.</td>
<td>The instructor consults students beforehand about the time needed to carry out an instructional activity, sets the time but may assess their progression in order to adjust it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION CRITERIA</td>
<td>When instructing or assessing</td>
<td>The instructor takes the role of evaluator (especially by pointing out what is incorrect or missing, indicating what the problem is, correcting it or not). (Top-down move evaluation.)</td>
<td>The instructor refers part of the evaluator’s role to students (especially by pointing out something is incorrect or missing but neither indicating what the problem is, nor correcting it). (Bottom-up move evaluation.)</td>
<td>Students assess each other’s or their own production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When referring to future assessment</td>
<td>The instructor makes explicit the assessment criteria before assessment takes place.</td>
<td>The instructor gives some clues about the assessment criteria before assessment takes place.</td>
<td>The instructor refers to past performances to assert the assessment criteria before assessment takes place.</td>
<td>The instructor does not assert assessment criteria before assessment takes place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGULATIVE PRACTICE (Social Order Rules)</td>
<td>When giving instructions / evaluating text production</td>
<td>The instructor asserts, either explicit or implicitly, a model of conduct according to a non-explicit model of [e.g. You have to co-operate with each other].</td>
<td>The instructor explicitly asserts a model of conduct [e.g. You have to co-operate with each other].</td>
<td>The instructor reinforces (encouraging or inhibiting) an already (explicitly or implicitly) known model of conduct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Learning of socio-affective competences)
| (Distinction of power and control relations) | Students asking questions | The instructor ignores the question. Students do not ask questions. | The instructor answers the student directly. | The instructor asks questions, gives some information or points out some references to guide the student to find the answer by herself/himself. | The instructor answers by promoting discussion between students and instructor in order to arrive at a conclusion. |
Every task corresponding to foundation, structural, functional or rhetorical motive-activity structure was then coded for instructional and regulative discourse using the language of description contained in Table 4.3. If there was more than one event related to the indicators within the task, the median was calculated so as to have a general estimate of each indicator’s framing strength per task. Eventually, the median for all the same motive-activity structure tasks could be calculated in a similar way for each course: BU grammar, BU communication, CU grammar, CU communication. This also allowed the comparison of tasks across courses and organisations.

Table 4.4 is an extract of the coding done for one functional task corresponding to CU communication. I will use this extract to explain the procedure for coding the framing of tasks. The task, in terms of motive-action (see the ‘Motive-action’ heading), comprises the instructor making students recognise and pronounce words carrying the Spanish sounds ‘l’ and ‘r’. These consonants are quite difficult for Japanese to master in oral speech, as the Japanese language does not distinguish them. The instructor writes a pair of words on the whiteboard that look like homophones, one with the ‘r’ and another one with the ‘l’. The first pair consists of the words cala/cara. ‘Cala’ means ‘calla lily’, whilst ‘cara’ means ‘face’. Then, the instructor asks the class as a whole to recognise if the word she is pronouncing corresponds either to the first or the second word. The instructor also makes students practise the pronunciation of those words. The original discourse transcript is contained under the ‘Transcript’ heading. The English rendition has been produced in order to facilitate the reading for all those who cannot read Japanese under the heading ‘English’. The starting and finishing times of the task are given under the ‘Time heading’. The discourse has been segmented in units called ‘lines’ (see the ‘Line’ heading) which contains change in (a) participants’ turns (see the ‘Participant’ heading) or (b) the theme. Events that correspond to the aforementioned indicators are coded for framing using the framing key contained underneath the table’s title under the ‘Framing’ heading. Lower case is used for the coding of instructional discourse indicators, whereas upper case is used for the coding of regulative discourse. Eventually, a framing outline for the task as a whole is worked out as seen above, which is contained under the title ‘Framing outline’ under the ‘Motive-action’ heading. Finally, the rationale for assigning the motive-action within one of the categories of ‘motive activity’ is given under the heading ‘Motive-activity’.
### Table 4.4 Extract of the framing coding for a foundation task (No. 8) in CU communication class

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a nominal number at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into Spanish and English in cursive script.

**FRAMING CODING KEY:** Selection of Contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Framing coding</th>
<th>Motive-action</th>
<th>Motive-activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44:23</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>今日ここまで。ちょっとだけこれあの復習しましょうね。</td>
<td>Today, we will stop here. Let’s make a short revision. Cala [the Spanish word 'calá' means 'calla lily'; in contrast to 'cara', which means 'face'].</td>
<td>SE b F++</td>
<td>MOTIVE-ACTION No. 8: The instructor makes students choose which of the two words she writes on the whiteboard corresponds to the word she is pronouncing. This entails the distinction between sounds L and R. The instructor also makes students practice the pronunciation of those words.</td>
<td>FOUNDATION MOTIVE-ACTIVITY: Dominant L1 communication activity + (written and oral) L2 speech activity intended to reflect on Spanish language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>588</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td>SE b F++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>589</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Uno o dos? Cala.</td>
<td>One or two? Cala.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>590</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td>Cala.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>591</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>ウーん、違う、違う。</td>
<td>Mmm...it isn’t, it’s different.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
<td>Two.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>592</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<td>593</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>594</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<td>595</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>596</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<td>597</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>598</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<td>599</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>601</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>602</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>603</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dos.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uno, dos. 何でしたっけ。Cala.
One, two. What was it? Cala.

Bien. Emm... Hola...
Good. Emm... Hola...
In Spanish ‘hola’ means ‘hallo’; in contrast, ‘hora’ means ‘hour’.

No. Uno.
No. One.

Pero.
Pero. [In Spanish, ‘pero’ means ‘but’, a co-ordinating conjunction; in contrast ‘pelo’ means ‘hair’.]
4.5.2 Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching

The intended outcome of this procedure is a recontextualised account of communicative language teaching within the dialectical tradition, especially Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development, at organisational and learning settings.

4.5.2.1 Research questions

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 3: How can the weak and strong version of communicative language teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and development paths/targets?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 4: Does the foreign language pedagogy in different communication learning settings have a correlate in terms of weak and strong versions of communicative language teaching in SLA?

4.5.2.2 Procedure

The procedure is based on the recontextualising of the notion of communicative language teaching in SLA in light of the dialectical tradition, in terms of language development targets/paths. It draws on Ellis’s (2008) theoretical description of (a) weak and (b) strong version of communicative language teaching. The method consists in analytically comparing theoretical descriptions of communicative language teaching with tasks at particular learning settings across organisations based on the pedagogic code of tasks.

4.5.3 Trajectory and organisations as moderators of recognition and realisation

The intended outcome of this procedure is twofold. First, it seeks to attain an account of how trajectory, organisation and learning setting structure modulate students’ recognition of discourse (or their orientation to discourse) and, consequently, their realisation (mastery). Second, it is set to test empirically Bernstein’s hypothesis about
the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity. Furthermore, I test mastery (realisation) as being determined by the subject’s ability to recognise (individual consciousness) the rules of pedagogical context, which in turn is moderated by educational trajectory

4.5.3.1 Research questions

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 5: What is the foreign language education trajectory of individual students?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 6: What are students’ coding orientations (elaborated/restricted), explained by their recognition of grammar and communication discourses?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 7: How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 8: To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 9: To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?

4.5.3.2 Procedure

The procedure is based on (a) ascertaining students’ foreign language education trajectories as an aggregation of activity systems; (b) ascertaining students’ (coding) orientations in terms of recognition of grammar and communication discourse, and (c) the testing of the influence of students’ trajectories and organisation/learning setting on
students’ discourse recognition and, eventually, on students’ realisation or mastery.

Ascertain students’ foreign language education trajectories

Ascertaining trajectories requires a qualitative method for eliciting students’ leading activity. Griffin and Cole (1984) use the concept of leading activity to indicate activities of great importance to the learner that reorganise other less significant activities. The new activity helps to reorganise and internalise prior stages by transforming them into the everyday, achieving automaticity, in opposition to the new leading activity (p. 51). Therefore, the leading activity is always a reconfiguration whereby already internalised functions are drawn on resourcefully by new demands for sense. The eliciting is based on having students focus on events or situations that helped them to cope better in foreign language learning situations. Attention must be paid to preference for model-determined acts versus explicit top-down instruction (see Gal’perin, 1969, 197, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992a) as well.

In the case of AU and BU, the method of inquiry into acquirers’ experiences in foreign language learning was mediated through a questionnaire containing two open-ended questions: ‘From your experience before taking this course, do you remember any activity or situation that really helped you learn a foreign language?’ and ‘From your experience before taking this course, can you tell me of a satisfactory or enjoyable moment you had while learning a foreign language?’ (see questions 7 and 8, Appendix 4A). Special care was taken not to overwhelm the student participants with a large number of questions, nor did the questions seek to understand students’ complete foreign language educational trajectories, but focused on determining moments in which a reorganisation of activities occurred. In the case of CU, where it was possible to hold interviews with acquirers, a more complete learning trajectory was obtained, but only after obtaining information about improvisations or leading activities. The transcript of those interviews is contained in Appendix 4D. It is worth remembering that trajectories reflect not what the actual trajectory of participants is, but what participants perceive their trajectory to be in terms of a leading activity in which they partook in the past.
search for acquirers’ past leading activities informed the emergence of the following categories of trajectory:

Trajectory 1 comprises acquirers who did not express their involvement in any particular foreign language activity. Their only experience derived from their participation in the education system in Japan, especially in activities that could be recognised as speech activity.

Trajectory 2 includes acquirers who expressed their involvement either in speech acts as part of non-verbal activity (e.g. ‘I could give directions to a foreigner so that he could reach the place he was looking for’) or communication activity in Japan.

Trajectory 3 comprises acquirers who responded that the activities that helped them learn a language the most, or that were more satisfactory or enjoyable, were associated with having been abroad, either for a short high-school trip, as part of a home-stay programme, or because they were living abroad. These activities are associated with speech acts that are part of non-verbal activity and communication activity. However, because the experience of communicating while being abroad is presumably more demanding and varied, these activities are considered of a different nature from those included in trajectory 2. One key aspect of activities that comprised this trajectory is that they may include an array of what Gal’perin (1969) calls model-determined acts, that is, models where the learner does not have an indication of how the act should be carried out (the kind of instruction one is exposed to when learning a language in the country where it is spoken, without formal schooling or training).

Ascertaining students’ coding orientations in terms of recognition of grammar and communication discourses

The data were collected with the aim of determining the students’ recognition of instructional discourse according to the classification deployed by the study programme/organisation (i.e., grammar and communication) and, consequently, their
coding orientation. In BU, a questionnaire was administered to student participants by their communication instructor at the end of the semester. At CU, the questionnaire was administered by their communication instructor at the end of the second semester. At AU, due to the curricular change explained above, the questionnaire was administered at the end of the first semester but the data gathered were not used in the remaining sections of the procedure. The questionnaire listed thirty-seven sample items of instructors’ instructional discourse (see Appendix 4E), selected from classroom interactions at AU and BU. The items were coded, representing in fact different framing values of instructional discourse in areas such as selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, sequence and so on. They also represented regulative discourse in areas such as hierarchy and conduct (see Table 4.3). Participants had to determine if the sample came from either a grammar or a communication course using a nine-point response format, from ‘grammar’ (point 4) to ‘both’ (point 0) to ‘communication’ (point 4). It is pertinent to mention that the format was adopted mainly to facilitate participants’ work and to obtain as many complete answers as possible. The adoption of such a format responds to encouraging higher response rates. Instead of locating one five-point response format for grammar and an additional five-point response format for communication, participants saw only one nine-point response format for the questionnaire items and their English translation and coding. Some of the samples whose original language was Spanish were translated into Japanese so as not to offer a simple choice to participants (e.g. ‘samples in Spanish belong to communication courses and samples in Japanese belong to grammar courses’). Most of these samples contained regulative discourse that could have been expressed either in Japanese or Spanish by the instructor. When translating them, I tried to preserve the discourse’s communicative intention. This was considered problematic from the beginning but there was no other choice. The idea was to confound the languages and preserve the communicative intention of discourse. If the segment were given in the original language, most of the segments belonging to AU communication, which were in Spanish, could have been recognised immediately by students just by discerning the language. The idea was to avoid the Spanish-communication/Japanese-grammar divide.
Two pilot studies were conducted to explore the relationship between discourse recognition and realisation in oral communication courses, one involving BU and another involving CU. For these pilot studies, realisation or mastery was defined as the final grade given by the communication instructors. Correlation tests with the data collected from BU were conducted for recognition of grammar and communication instructional discourse and realisation. A correlative relationship is defined statistically as the joint (co-varying or associated) distribution of two or more variables.

The correlation of recognition of grammar instructional discourse (M = 5.61, SD = .88, N = 19) and realisation (M = 76.05, SD = 15.60) was significant, r = .57, p = .010, but that was not the case for the correlation recognition of communication instructional discourse and realisation.

Correlation tests with the data collected from CU participants were carried out. The correlation of recognition of grammar instructional discourse (M = 4.55, SD = 1.20, N = 13) and realisation (M = 78.23, SD = 12.65) was highly significant, r = .842, p = .000, and inversely, so was that of the correlation recognition of communication instructional discourse (M = 6.07, SD = .81, N = 13) and realisation, r = -.798, p = .001.

The above outcome, although it did not represent statistical proof, for the number of participants was too small to have statistical power, opened a way to looking at the problem from a new perspective. First, it was striking to find out that the recognition of communication instructional discourse was not correlated to realisation or mastery but the recognition of grammar instructional discourse was. Furthermore, in the case of communication lessons at CU, a course that took place in a university specialising in foreign language education, recognition of communication instructional discourse was negatively correlated to realisation or mastery.

The data on students’ trajectory also posed the question of what kind of recognition students with different trajectories had, especially trajectory-3 students, whose learning presumably (a) relied on model-determined acts, that is, an informal approach to learning,
and therefore (b) did not pay attention to grammar instruction. The other question was about what kind of discourse communication instruction is. During the validation of the discursive and social order rules indicators (see 4.5.1.2) and the pedagogic coding of the aforementioned sample items I noticed that theoretical explanations or the facilitating of theoretical systems belonging to grammar classes tended to be strongly framed in terms of hierarchy (e.g., students were not called to participate in the explanation or the instructors answered directly their questions without involving the students in the facilitating process). In contrast, the theoretical explanations or facilitating belonging to communication classes had more chances of being weakly framed. In other words, communication instructors were apparently giving control to students when explaining aspects of theoretical systems, establishing some kind of personal horizontal involvement that run counter to the intuitively vertical relationship needed in order to introduce conceptual systems. For example, let us have a look at item 9, a sample belonging to AU communication, which was coded as weakly-framed Hierarchy (Hierarchy F--): All right. Let us see the word ‘profesor’ [instructor/professor]. ‘Profesor’, is it masculine or feminine? In this case, the instructor, after detecting a mistake in the production of one student, wanted him to reflect on the morphology of nouns. This reflection caused a question to be answered by the student, rather than a top-down explanation of the morphological system of Spanish nouns. The socio-communicative position used by the communication instructor would have transpired even if the item had been rendered into Japanese in the recognition of discourse questionnaire. Overall, this implied a serious revision of forms of discourse that mixed elaborated and restricted coding orientations and socio-communicative and representational functions.

After a thorough analysis of the possibilities, taking into account the trajectories and how the recognition of grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication instructional discourse may relate to realisation, I devised out eight conjectural orientations to meaning, which are plotted in Figure 4.1. These orientations are modulated by two opposite vectors of development, the representational and socio-communicative functions, which find their expression as modes of self-regulation
in elaborated and restricted codes. There are two aspects that should draw our attention. On the one hand, whilst there is no doubt that grammar instructional discourse is fundamentally a form of elaborated code, communication discourse has a double valence, as it can be a form of either elaborated or restricted code. Thus, instructional tasks in a communication course may aim at learning language structural or pragmatic aspects as a system (elaborated) to more ritualistic social forms that arguably can only be transmitted by tacit instruction, such as the right way to address a native speaker (restricted), which are learned mainly by imitation. On the other hand, the socio-communicative aspects of discourse of native Spanish communication instructors seemed to favour more horizontal ways of relating to students when teaching theoretical systems than that of Japanese instructors. Communication instructors may feel compelled (a) to use the ways of relating to *interlocutors* that is considered adequate in real communication contexts among native speakers (e.g., serving as an example of how a native speaker prefers horizontal relations) or (b) to use the ways of relating to *students* in contexts in which Spanish native speakers are instructed (e.g. serving as an example of how instruction would be carried out if it were occurring in an educational institution belonging to a Spanish speaking society). Those ways seemed to be alien to a segment of trajectory-1 students, who might have confused them with grammar discourse just because discourse was aiming at explaining a theoretical system. However, trajectory-2 and trajectory-3 students seemed to be able to recognise the horizontality of hierarchy as a trait of communication discourse or of ritual forms of communication of non-Japanese instructors.
Figure 4.1 Orientations as recognition of grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication discourses, expressed as modes of self-regulation in elaborated and restricted codes

The benchmark for determining the student’s possession of recognition rules for each instructional discourse (grammar, communication, and weakly-framed communication discourse) was if the individual mean for recognition was equal or superior to the course mean. For example, if a student’s recognition mean was above the course mean for communication and grammar discourses but below the course mean for weakly-framed discourse, that student was considered to have an *elaborated orientation* (see shape number 7 on Figure 4.1). Consequently, orientation is a construct that is formulated as a relative possession of recognition rules in relation to the overall discourse recognition of course members. Eventually, the *orientation* for each student participant belonging to BU and CU was worked out using the aforementioned method.

These orientations were helpful when analysing qualitative data linked to students’ identities. Further statistical analysis including regressions and analysis of variance was carried out to understand the exact relation between learning trajectories, discourse recognition (orientations) and realisation or mastery, but the lack of a large sample size compromised the results as there was no enough power to reject the null hypotheses. The whole approach was eventually revised and a new correlation research design was used. These two aspects will be covered in the next sections.

*Influence of students’ trajectories and organisation/learning setting on students’ discourse recognition and, eventually, on students’ realisation or mastery*

A correlational research design was applied to answer PQ7, PQ8 and PQ5, defined as ‘research that involves collecting data in order to determine the degree to which a relationship exists between two or more variables’ (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2010, p. G-2). The limitation of a correlational design is that it does not explicitly have the power to infer causes or effects, because a causal relationship cannot be defined purely in terms of the joint distribution of variables. An empirically observed correlative relationship is an essential but not a sufficient condition for implying causality (Pearl, 2009). In order to establish a causal relationship, proving factual inter-dependence between variables, a researcher must use an experimental design to measure how much the variance in a
dependent (outcome, criterion, or response) variable is influenced by the systematic manipulation of an independent (factor, treatment, or predictor) variable (Ray, 2003); however, the variables used to answer PQ7, PQ8 and PQ9 were collected using a cross-sectional survey, in which the causes and effects were ex post facto and could not be experimentally manipulated. Nevertheless the assumption was made that if a correlative relationship could be established between the variables, then it could be intuitively recognised, in a hypothetical context, that one variable may have a causal influence on another (Holland, 1986).

Choice of statistical methodology. The second stage was to choose an appropriate statistical methodology to answer the procedural questions. A relatively modern technique, known as partial least squares path modelling (PLS) was chosen to support the correlational research design in preference to classical correlation analysis, the one that was conducted in the previous section, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The essential differences between OLS regression and PLS path modelling are outlined in Table 4.5, condensed from Haenlen and Kaplan (2004), Kline (2010) and Hair et al. (2010).

Table 4.5 Comparison of OLS Linear Regression and PLS Path Modelling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS)</th>
<th>Partial Least Squares Path Modelling (PLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Used for over 100 years.</td>
<td>Developed in the last 15 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The linear and additive relationships between one dependent variable and one or more independent variables (usually less than 8) are defined in one simple equation. The focus is on prediction rather than explanation.</td>
<td>The linear and additive interrelationships among a network of many variables (often many hundreds) are visualized in a path diagram. The model is specified by a complex series of simultaneous equations defining predictive relationships between multiple latent and indicator variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only manifest variables, (i.e., measured by the researcher) can be included. Latent variables (i.e., intangible constructs that are difficult to quantify) cannot be automatically operationalized.</td>
<td>PLS automatically operationalizes latent constructs, which are otherwise difficult to measure, by projecting groups of manifest indicator variables into vector space using Principal Components Factor Analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS regression is underpinned by strict assumptions about the measurement levels and distributional characteristics of the variables.</td>
<td>PLS has minimal assumptions about the measurement levels and distributional characteristics of the variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance in the dependent variable is implicitly assumed by regression analysis; however, there must be no variance in the independent variables.</td>
<td>No distinction is made between the variance in the dependent and independent variables. PLS assumes that the latent variables are reliably measured, using a minimum of at least three indicator variables.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS regression partitions the variance in the dependent variable into explained and unexplained or residual variance. The variance in the dependent variable must be homoskedastic (i.e., equal across all of the independent variables). The residuals (i.e., the differences between the observed and predicted values) must be normally distributed.</td>
<td>PLS assumes that all of the variance is useful and can be explained. The variance is maximally partitioned across all of the variables. There is no concern for the distributional characteristics of the variables or the distribution of the residual variance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A multiple linear regression model cannot tolerate multicollinearity (i.e., inter-correlation between multiple independent variables.)</td>
<td>A PLS path model can tolerate multicollinearity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relative importance of the relationships between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables is inferred by the magnitudes of the standardised regression coefficients.</td>
<td>The relative importance of the relationships between the latent variables is inferred by the magnitudes of the path coefficients (theoretically equivalent to weighted partial regression coefficients).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The statistical significance of each regression coefficient is tested using inferential statistics (t test statistic = coefficient/standard error). Violations of the assumptions of regression inflate the standard errors, so that statistical inferences are compromised.</td>
<td>The standard errors of the path coefficients can be computed by bootstrapping (i.e., resampling the data up to 1000 times, and recalculating the coefficients). Statistical inferences based on the standard errors are not compromised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partial least squares path modelling.** The aim of both OLS and PLS modelling is to predict hypothetical relationships between variables; however the two methods compute coefficients which satisfy different mathematical rules. The rules for OLS are much more restrictive than PLS, so PLS is easier to apply in practice; however, the rationale for using PLS in this study was not just because it was easy. PLS was applied primarily because it empowered the researcher to explore multivariate relationships in a complex hypothetical system. The baseline model (excluding the nominal moderating variables, trajectory and organisation) was conceived as a network of thirty-nine manifest indicator variables measured by the researcher and four latent variables extracted from the collected data (contained in Appendix 4F) using Principal Components Analysis (Figure 4.2). PLS path modelling permitted me to answer the procedural questions using a relatively small sample size, without the use of null hypothesis tests, assuming that all of the variance was useful, and could be partitioned across a multitude of variables. In
contrast, OLS regression and other classical methods of inferential analysis (e.g., ANOVA) based on the partitioning of the explained and residual variance between dependent and independent variables suffer from numerous serious drawbacks (Hair et al., 2010). For example, (a) they can only handle a relatively small proportion of the available data set at one time; (b) they require a substantial sample size to provide sufficient power to reject the null hypotheses; and (c) if multiple null hypothesis tests are applied consecutively to one set of data, then the probability of making Type I errors (i.e., the erroneous rejection of false null hypotheses) is elevated. Although regression and ANOVA were attempted initially in this study, the results were compromised, mainly because the sample size was insufficient to generate accurate results. PLS path modelling was therefore chosen, since it was the only other viable alternative to answer the procedural questions.
Figure 4.2 Baseline PLS Path Model for All Participants ($N = 32$)
Sample size. According to the power analysis conducted by Cohen (1992) the minimum sample size to correctly reject the null hypothesis of OLS regression (i.e. the proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable is greater than zero) is $N = 67$ assuming two independent variables, one dependent variable, $\alpha = .05$, a power of 0.8, and a medium effect size. The sample size used in this study ($N = 32$) was too small to conduct such an analysis. A power analysis to determine the minimum sample size was not necessary for PLS path modelling. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 776) ‘PLS is insensitive to sample size considerations’. PLS path modelling is particularly useful in generating estimates even with very small sample sizes (as low as 30 observations or less). The sample size of $N = 32$ used in this study was therefore sufficient to construct PLS path models.

Software. PLS path modelling was performed using SmartPLS software Version 2.0 (Ringle et al., 2005). SmartPLS was chosen due to its user friendliness compared with other modelling programs, especially its impressive graphic user interface (GUI) and its widespread use by many social science and business researchers (Henseler et al., 2009; Temme et al., 2006).

Tracing of a path model. The simple rules of path tracing using the GUI incorporated in Smart PLS were (a) the latent variables (i.e. the composite variables extracted from the indicator variables using Principal Components Factor Analysis) were entered into the GUI as egg-shaped symbols. Each latent variable represented one factor in vector space; (b) the indicators (i.e. the manifest variables measured by the researcher) were entered into the GUI as rectangular symbols; (c) the arrows represented hypothetical cause and effect relationships between the variables. An arrow could be traced forwards or backwards from one variable to another, but never forwards and then backwards (i.e. there were no feedback loops).

Assumptions of the baseline model. The assumptions underlying the construction of the PLS path model in Figure 4.2 were:
Grammar: Items 02, 04, 08, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 30, 32, 35 and 37 were specified as reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a discourse sample from a grammar course. Consequently the arrows flowed out of grammar into the indicators.

Communication: Items 01, 03, 05, 06, 07, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34 and 36 were specified as reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a strongly-framed discourse sample from a communication course. Consequently the arrows flowed out from communication into the indicators.

Weakly-framed communication: Items 09, 10, 12, and 15 were specified as reflective indicators. They reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a weakly-framed discourse sample from a communication course. Consequently the arrows flowed out of weakly-framed communication into the indicators.

Recognition was specified as the hypothesised effect of a combination of grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication. Consequently the arrows flowed out of grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication (the causes) into recognition (the effect). The \( R^2 \) (effect size) was printed within the egg-shaped symbol representing recognition (e.g., \( R^2 = .668 \) in Figure 4.2).

Orientation was specified as a formative indicator of recognition. This is because orientation was measured as the participants’ prior acquisition of recognition rules before attending the particular language course, considering the fact that the items that reflected the ability of the participants to recognise a sample were extracted from a mix of sources different from the setting in which measurement took place and, in the case of CU, none of the items were in fact extracted from CU’s courses.

Orientation was assumed, for the purposes of this model, to predetermine, but not to reflect, recognition. Consequently, the arrow flowed out of orientation
and into recognition. It is possible that orientation could also reflect recognition after a participant had experience in mastering a foreign language; however, the PLS path model assumed that all relationships were unidirectional and no feedback loops were permitted.

Realisation was specified as a hypothesised effect recognition. Consequently the arrow flowed out of recognition (the cause) and into realisation (the effect). The $R^2$ (effect size) was printed within the egg-shaped symbol representing realisation (e.g., $R^2 = .406$ in Figure 4.2).

The instructor’s grade was specified as a reflective indicator. It was a reflective and not a formative indicator of realisation because the grade reflected each participant’s language mastery at the end of the course. Consequently the arrow flowed out of realisation and into instructor’s grade.

Language mastery could not be considered plain linguistic competence since the language of the course includes the acquisition of social rules. In other words, instructors not only grade students based on their linguistic ability but they include other parameters as well (e.g. communication readiness, discipline, confidence, attendance record).

In BU’s case, the score was provided by the instructor at interval/ratio level at the end of the semester. In CU’s case the score was provided also at interval/ratio level at the end of the second semester.

Computation of model parameters. The SmartPLS algorithm was executed to automatically compute the model parameters without intervention or manipulation by the user (Ringle et al., 2005). Three types of parameters were computed: (a) the factor loadings, located next to the arrows between the indicators and latent variables; (b) the path coefficients, located next to the arrows between the latent variables; and (c) the effect sizes, located inside the symbols representing the latent variables.
Loadings: Loadings were computed between the indicator variables (rectangles) and the latent variables (ovals) using Principal Components Factor Analysis. Each loading measured the correlation, ranging from -1 to +1, between a latent variable and each of its corresponding indicator variables. The higher the loading, the stronger was the correlation. Loadings > 0.5 were interpreted as ‘strong’, ‘high’ or ‘heavy’ whilst loadings < 0.5 were interpreted as ‘weak’, ‘low’ or ‘light’. Loadings < .3 were interpreted as very low or negligible (Hair et al., 2010).

Path coefficients: The numbers next to the arrows connecting the latent variables were the path coefficients, representing the partitioning of the variance (i.e. the partial least squares) between the latent variables. A path coefficient indicated the relative strength and direction (positive or negative) of the hypothesised predictive (cause and effect) relationship between a pair of latent variables. The path coefficients in this study were standardised to take into account the different units of measurement of the latent variables; consequently all path coefficients ranged from -1 to 1. The path coefficients were interpreted in the same way as the standardised regression or β weighted coefficients in a multiple regression model. The larger the value of the path coefficient, then the stronger was the partial correlation between the latent variables and the more important was the predictive relationship. Path coefficients > .5 represented the strongest relationships. (For example, a path coefficient = .520 between grammar and recognition in Figure 4.2 represented the strong ability of the participants to recognise grammar instructional discourse.)

Effect size: The number inside an oval symbol was an estimate of the effect size, defined as the proportion of the variance in the latent variable explained in terms of the other latent variables indicated by the inflowing arrows. (For example, $R^2 = .668$ printed in the recognition symbol in Figure 4.2 implied that 66.8% of the variance in recognition was explained by grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication). $R^2$ values > .15 were assumed to be large enough to imply practical and theoretical importance. If
there were no other latent variables contributing to the variance, indicated by no inflowing arrows, then an effect size could not be computed, and the number 0.000 was printed by default inside the oval symbol.

**Moderation.** A moderator is a variable that influences the strength of the relationship between two or more other variables; however, the moderator is not itself correlated with the other variables. If the moderating effect is removed, then the correlation between the other variables is not eliminated (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The answers to PQ8 and PQ9 required an evaluation of whether the nominal variables trajectory and/or organisation influenced the variance explained. The six logical steps used in this study to test the hypothesis that a moderator has an effect, based on the protocol described by Hair et al. (2010) is outlined in Table 4.5. Six models were constructed, as outlined in Table 4.6.

**Table 4.6 Protocol for testing the influence of a moderator**

| Step 1. A baseline model is constructed without moderators. |
| Step 2. The effect size (R^2) is measured. |
| Step 3. A potential moderator is introduced into the baseline model. |
| Step 4. The change in R^2 is measured. |
| Step 5. If R^2 does not change then the hypothesis of moderation is not supported. |
| Step 6. If R^2 does change then the hypothesis of moderation is supported. |

**Baseline model.** The Baseline Model (Figure 4.2) was constructed using the data for N = 32 participants, a combination of members of Trajectory 1, Trajectory 2, and Trajectory 3 at both BU and CU. The Baseline Model represented Step 1 in Table 4.5, providing a theoretical reference point, representing the L2 acquisition activities of the sample of students as a whole, within which the effects of trajectory and organisation could be evaluated.

Communication was most strongly reflected by Items 03, 23, 29, and 33 with loadings of .531, .857, .644, and .695 respectively. Weakly-framed
communication was most strongly reflected by Item 09, with a loading of .966. grammar was most strongly reflected by Items 04, 08, 17, 22, 28, 30, and 32, with loadings of .567, .661, .659, .673, .646, and .779 respectively. The value of $R^2 = .668$ indicated that 66.8% of the variance in recognition was explained by grammar, weakly-framed communication, communication and orientation. The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that recognition of grammar (path coefficient = .620) was the most important predictor of recognition, recognition of communication (path coefficient = .463) was a less important predictor of recognition. Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .023) contributed little or nothing to the variance in recognition. Realisation was positively correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .637). The answer to PQ7 (How much of the variance in the participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by the value of $R^2 = .406$ indicating that 40.6% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition. The rest of the procedural questions for this procedure will be addressed in the data analysis chapter (chapter 5). The data analysis provided above should be understood as an extension of the aforementioned pilot studies, which were set to confirm an important part of both the theoretical underpinnings of the overall research method and the empirical underpinnings of the empirical model.

Table 4.7 Six PLS path models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Model</th>
<th>Source of data</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>All available data</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Data from participants classified in Trajectory 1 (with a preference for strongly framed learning)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Data from participants classified in Trajectory 2 (with a preference for not so strongly framed learning)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Data from participants with classified in Trajectory 3 (with a preference for weakly-framed learning)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Data from participants at BU</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Data from participants at CU</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reliability of Baseline Model. If any of the latent variables in a PLS model are not reliable then the utility of the model is compromised. Consequently, the internal consistency reliabilities of the four latent variables incorporated in the baseline model (Figure 4.2) were estimated using Cronbach’s Alpha. The recommended threshold of Cronbach’s Alpha to indicate a minimum standard of reliability is .6 (Chin, 1999). This threshold was exceeded by all of the latent variables (Table 4.7). Consequently, the measurement of recognition was reasonably well specified in terms of its reliability.

Table 4.8 Reliability of the latent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variable</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar</td>
<td>.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakly-framed communication</td>
<td>.632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main weakness of the model was, on one hand, that realisation was measured only once, based on the instructor’s single grade at the end of the course. Consequently, realisation was represented by only one indicator variable. Ideally, a minimum of at least three reflective indicators are required in order to incorporate realisation into a PLS path model as a reliably-measured latent variable. On the other hand, although the statistical model overcame the reliability issue of counting on a very small sample size, the fact that participants could not be selected at random partially compromised its external validity. In other words, it is theoretically impossible to generalise the findings so that they apply to all foreign-language students, at all times, and in all places. Nonetheless, its objectives, in terms of the development of languages of description, called for the use of a research methodology that mixed quantitative and qualitative research tools and therefore the study was from the very beginning subject to the adoption of a basic non-experimental paradigm. If,
however, the results of the model are representative of the student population, then it can be speculated that foreign language students who possess recognition of grammar discourse do actually achieve higher levels of language mastery, and those who do not, achieve lower ones.

In conclusion, the correlational research design served to confirm the preliminary conjectures reached previously while conducting the two pilot studies that (a) realisation was a function of recognition, with (b) recognition being formed by three principal components: recognition of grammar, communication, and weakly-framed communication discourse; and (c) the recognition of grammar discourse being the most important predictor of recognition.

4.5.4 Pedagogic identities and mastery in sociologically-situated learning settings

The intended outcome of this procedure is twofold. First, it seeks to ascertain the relationship between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation, and the developmental goals set by communication instructors in sociologically-situated settings. Second, it seeks to ascertain the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship between their trajectories, orientations, desired development vector and their realisation or mastery in those sociologically-situated organisation/learning settings.

The pedagogic identity of students is expressed here as the relationship between trajectory (as formative development vector), orientation, desired development vector and the socially-situated demands for realisation set by instructors. In other words, whilst trajectory represents a student’s past development vector and orientation represents his or her present development vector, the desired development vector represents the student’s projection of ways to approach future activity depending on his or her learning goals. By sociologically situated, I refer to a thorough account of how the social structure of the learning setting potentiates or restricts students’ realisation or mastery according to their trajectory and orientation. In other words, it refers to an account of the
pedagogic device.

4.5.4.1 Research questions

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 10: What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication instructors?

PROCEDURAL QUESTION 11: What is the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship between their learning trajectories and orientations, their desired development vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as the final grade given by their communication instructor?

4.5.4.2 Procedure

The procedure consists of two stages. The first one is based on ascertaining the figured world of students by instructors, especially their labelling of them according to their ideas of what constitutes appropriate realisation according to the intended vectors of development set for the course (i.e. the dialectical moves between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal development, or between representational and socio-communicative functions). This includes ascertaining not only the ideal instructional outcome but the ideal possession of realisation rules in terms of the regulative outcome. The resulting data is then contrasted with the data on students’ trajectory and orientation. The second one is based on ascertaining the figured world of learning by students with the purpose of assessing their desired development path vis-à-vis their learning objectives. The resulting data is then contrasted with the data on students’ trajectory, orientation and realisation.

The data on the figured world of students supplied by BU and CU communication instructors were gathered in two phases. During the first phase, the instructors were asked through questionnaires and interviews that took place at the beginning of the data collection process for the kind of student development they were aiming for, based on Wertsch’s (1998, p. 36) ideas on
development as an end point that gives a sense of directionality (see Appendix 4B). In the second phase, which took place at the end of the data collection process, they were asked to place photographs of individual students they taught on a chart with an axis designed to indicate where they perceived the student to lie, from ‘did achieve the objectives of the course’ to ‘did not achieve the objectives of the course’. The instructors were then asked what distinguished one student from another student, or one group of students from another group, so as to access their figured world, that is, how they built the relational space of their own students. Attention was paid to capturing their choice of words (labelling) when describing the students (see Appendices 4G and 4H).

In the case of BU’s communication instructor, the interview was videotaped and a photograph was taken of the chart. In the case of CU’s communication instructor, the interview was audio-recorded and a photograph was taken of the chart.

The data on the figured world of learning by students were collected from thirteen participants from the CU communication course through interviews (see a transcript of the interviews in Appendix 4D). Two questions served to ascertain participants’ beliefs about what they needed to do in order to master Spanish: (a) What would you do to reach the highest level (of Spanish language mastery)? and (b) What is the most important thing to study (Spanish) properly?

Conducting the interviews was problematic because the office I used to carry out the data collection did not have an adequate waiting room, and in fact I could only use the office’s corridor to keep students waiting, nor could I count on the help of an assistant, and it was hard not to have students who had completed the interviews commenting on their impressions about the procedure to their fellow students waiting outside. I could not schedule individual appointments to conduct the interviews because I did not have enough time to address the class as a whole and therefore groups of students assigned
themselves to four or five different time slots on two different days. I decided to interview students in pairs because, if I were in their presence, I could at least control the exchange. If not, then the leaving student might have influenced the rest of the students in the queue while I kept interviewing students individually. Thus, the answer given by the first student of the pair to the questions I posed by might have influenced the answer of the second one. In order to avoid this, I introduced one or two dummy questions at the beginning of the interview. I also avoided each pair of students commenting on the procedure to students on queue by accompanying them out to the building’s exit door. This solution, designed to avert a focus-group kind of scenario, seemed to work. Students rarely manifested the same opinion or used a politeness marker to agree with what the prior student had said but each made her or his own statement anew in an independent manner.

As already mentioned, data on the figured world of learning by students belonging to BU could not be collected because I could not obtain permission to interview students individually. I considered it impracticable to translate the data collection method based on interviews into one based on a written questionnaire.

The number of trajectory-1 participants was five. The number of trajectory-2 participants was one, and the number of trajectory-3 participants was seven. The lack of enough trajectory-2 participants did not allow for a more detailed account of the relationship between this category and the rest of the constructs, however, trajectories could be considered in general as pertaining to two groups or overall categories: Trajectory 1 was considered to represent a top-down move within the zone of proximal development, whereas trajectory 2 and 3 were considered to represent a bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development.

The strongest aspect of the second part of the procedure was that, if the data were contrasted with the first part of the procedure, which was based on prior procedures that represented a mix of a handful of qualitative and quantitative
methods of analysis, a sort of inborn triangulation or cross-examination took place. This allowed generalising, to a certain extent, the findings referred exclusively to CU communication to BU communication as well. In other words, if the recognition of grammar discourse was a predictor of students’ realisation for both BU and CU communication courses, and the findings on the figured world of students by instructors happened to coincide for both learning settings, there are grounds to argue that a given pedagogic identity of CU students linked to higher degrees of mastery may well be the pedagogic identity of BU students with higher degrees of mastery. The degree of generalisation is, however, low, and tentative, subject to further research and procedural refinement.
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS

I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas.

Instructor, BU communication course

Speak, but accurately ...

Instructor, CU communication course

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I analyse the data connected to the procedures already laid down in chapter 4 with the aim of addressing eventually the study’s research questions: How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity? What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative language teaching?

The procedures are part of a model in which a Hegelian notion of subject is deployed. Subject in the Hegelian philosophical system is the identity of agency or the capacity of an agent to transform the world, knowledge or understanding, and self-consciousness or identity. These three aspects of subject are in perpetual contradiction or, put another way, they cannot reach a complete identification with one another. Subject, therefore, is an ever-evolving process, as the agent keeps appropriating cultural tools by which he or she acts and is acted upon society. Thus, the individual is but one moment of subject. Furthermore, the model accounts for all the determinations of subject, represented in three moments; psyche-activity-culture.

In cultural-historical activity theory the individual psyche and the social
macrostructure are subsumed under the notion of *activity*, that is, as collective forms of practice aimed at satisfying societal needs. More specifically, they are subsumed within the contradiction between individual action and collective activity. However, a conventional use of activity theory does not allow us to subsume the totality of social institutions as intermediate cultural loci, as cultural tools themselves. The proposed solution in the present study is to use Bernstein’s code theory as a general framework for analysing the links between the social structure (e.g., the university organisation, curricular schemes) and the structure of the individual’s experience, which is given in terms of (coding) orientations, that is, as forms of organisation of the relevance of meanings. Bernstein’s notion of (pedagogic) *discourse*, understood as the use of language according to the social position of agents subject to the recontextualisation process of the pedagogic structure (pedagogic device), which acts as an expander or constrainer of meanings, and cultural-historical activity theory’s notion of *activity* are deployed. I argue that this makes it possible to put together two mutually constituted dialectical systems; the activity system and the development system. The unit of analysis is the *task*, that is, the relationship between individual *motive-action* and societal *motive-activity* as an operationalisation of action, which permits ascertaining intended *development* targets and vectors and designate them a *pedagogic code*. *Tasks* are coded by deploying Bernstein’s code theory in terms of *orientations* (or forms of *consciousness*) to discourse (from *elaborated* to *restricted*), that is, variations in the strength of *classification* and *framing*, or *pedagogic code*. This makes it possible to recontextualise communicative language learning pedagogies under our dialectical framework of reference. Subject position is ascertained in terms of discourse *recognition* (passive realisation) as a function of students’ *trajectories* (aggregation of activity systems as a function of class structure) and discourse *realisation* (active realisation). The former is ascertained by assessing students’ trajectories and presenting students with discourse fragments and having them classify them according to their origin (belonging to either grammar or communication). The latter is ascertained by analysing the system of *labelling* used by teachers within the *figured world of students*, and by exploring the way students reflect about the *figured world of learning*.
Spanish as a foreign language, that is, their position and potential for future activity in terms of their desired development vectors vis-à-vis their learning objectives. Finally, I argue that the pedagogic identity of students is conceived as the particular relationship that takes place between trajectory, orientation and the potential for future action, represented by students’ desired development vector in order to attain their learning objectives within the system of demands on active realisation imposed by instructors in particular learning settings.

The exact procedural questions (PQs) rendered under each one of the comprehensive procedures are:

**Ascertaining of the pedagogic code of tasks**

PQ1: How do foreign language pedagogies in different organisations and learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity structure)?

PQ2: What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?

**Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching**

PQ3: How can the weak and strong version of communicative language teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and development vectors/targets?

PQ4: Does the foreign language pedagogy at different communication learning settings have a correlate in terms of SLA’s weak and strong versions of communicative language teaching?

**Trajectory and organisations, moderators of recognition and realisation**

PQ5: What is the foreign language education trajectory of individual students?
PQ6: What are students’ coding orientations (elaborated/restricted), explained by their recognition of grammar and communication discourses?

PQ7: How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?

PQ8: To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?

PQ9: To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?

*Pedagogic identities and mastery in sociologically-situated learning settings*

PQ10: What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication instructors?

PQ11: What is the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship between their learning trajectories and orientations, their desired development vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as the final grade given by their communication instructor?

5.2 PEDAGOGIC CODE OF TASKS

The first findings on the pedagogic code of tasks allow us to compare pedagogies across organisational and learning settings. I will proceed to report those findings first and then move to reporting the ones linked to the development vectors and motive-activity structure of tasks across learning settings.

The relational space for classification and framing values helps assessment of
the visibility and invisibility of pedagogic practices in a given setting or organisation. According to Bernstein, instances of weak framing represent invisible, more progressive pedagogies, whereas instances of strong framing represent visible, more traditional pedagogies. The results of the assessment of classification and framing values for internal and external relations across organisations and learning settings are contained in Table 5.1.

### Table 5.1 Internal and external organisational relations, classification and framing, for AU, BU and CU Grammar (Gramm) and Communication (Comm) courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>AU Gram</th>
<th>AU Comm</th>
<th>BU Gram</th>
<th>BU Comm</th>
<th>CU Gram</th>
<th>CU Comm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Space instructor-student</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Space student-student</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Instructor-student</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Student-student</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Instructor-instructor (H)</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Instructor-instructor (V)</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Between subjects</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Within a discipline</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 College-communities</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 College-colleges</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 College-employers</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Academic-non-academic</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
<td>+ + + +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C, classification; F, framing; H, horizontal; V, vertical. Scale: + (strong), - (weak).

### 5.2.1 Organisations

The results indicate that the organisation with the weakest classification and framing values is CU, followed by BU and AU.

AU represented an extreme case of strong classification and framing. AU’s instructor participants concluded that they had to exert strong control over the students due to the small number of students enrolled in the programme (six
students), their lack of active participation and their irregular attendance.

5.2.1.1 Internal values

The major differences between the organisations in this study in terms of their internal values were a relatively more flexible use of the instructor-student space and the student-student space in BU and CU, which corresponds to weaker classification and framing values. In contrast, AU’s space was tightly controlled by both instructors, imposing a more inflexible divide between instructor and student. Students had little or no control whatsoever over spatial arrangements. Communication courses in both BU and CU also reported weak framing in terms of the contents and instructional means deployed by instructors, that is, in the relationship within the discipline. They seemed more prepared to introduce twists or changes in their teaching plan or programme according to the needs of the students as they evolved along the instructional activities. In other words, students seemed more capable of influencing the pedagogic contents chosen by instructors and the pedagogic sequence in which they were deployed.

5.2.1.2 External values

There were major differences in external values. AU’s programme was not solidly linked to Spanish-as-a-foreign-language study programmes overseas. In contrast, BU and CU ran very successful exchange programmes that gave up to one-tenth of the students enrolled in Spanish language courses access to overseas colleges each year, especially to institutions that offered practical programmes. This acted as an external pressure to streamline BU’s and CU’s curricula and get results. It also constituted a stimulus for students to set up personal learning goals. Moreover, BU and CU instructors had a more positive view about their students’ prospects of getting jobs linked to the use of the Spanish language in comparison to their counterparts in AU. Therefore, AU’s classification and framing values were stronger in the college-employers relationship. In the case of BU, instructors expressed that they emphasised the learning of Spanish as a means of everyday communication because the
university did not specialise in teaching Spanish as a foreign language. Therefore, they did not target the teaching of Spanish for academic purposes. In contrast, AU and CU instructors, whilst not opposed to the teaching of Spanish as a means of communication, felt that they had to give to students the academic foundations that they needed if they decided to specialise in Spanish or Latin American studies in the future (e.g. in a post-graduate programme).

A partial answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was provided by the different organisational configurations of classification and framing given in Table 5.1. Evidence was provided to indicate that AU presented the strongest classification and framing of the three organisations. BU and CU presented similar strengths in classification and framing across relations. In terms of Bernstein’s interpretation of instances of weak framing representing invisible, more progressive pedagogies, whereas instances of strong framing representing visible, more traditional pedagogies, AU presented the most visible and traditional pedagogies, whereas, comparatively, BU and CU presented less visible and traditional pedagogies.

5.2.2 Learning settings

External values have already been dealt with, since they measure features belonging to the organisation as a whole, not to individual learning settings.

As can be seen through the classification and framing values contained in Table 5.1, the communication course of each institution in this study presented weaker classification and framing values than the corresponding grammar course. The communication courses may be considered as comparatively more progressive than the grammar courses within an already very traditional or visible pedagogical framework.

CU’s communication course presented the weakest classification and framing values, constituting therefore the most progressive pedagogic context among
the six individual courses.

Internal values

Instructor-student space. At AU and BU the classrooms presented a post-modern design, removed from schemes associated with large-scale education, more flexible and able to accommodate individual students in small groups if needed, up to a maximum of fifty people. The classrooms emulated a small auditorium where the student had a more preponderant position, closer to the board, and raised on a low platform which resembled a stage. BU’s classrooms were larger and well equipped with a PA system (used by the grammar instructor), a set of AV equipment (minidisc and compact disc decks, DVD players) and a large plasma TV monitor that could display information beamed from a personal computer.

CU’s classrooms had the modern imprint of the language laboratory. CU’s grammar classes met in a language laboratory that could accommodate sixty people: the instructor’s desk was raised on a platform and students’ desks were fixed to the floor. The whole room was designed with the purpose of broadcasting information from the instructor’s desk through the PA system or headsets and the monitors situated at the students’ desks. The room and the use made of it by the teacher resembled a small broadcasting studio. The teacher used a wireless lapel microphone to amplify his voice and projected images of textbooks, newspaper clippings and photographs by means of an overhead projector on to the students’ monitors. Most of the time the teacher stayed in his space, but he often crossed the boundaries to reach individual students. When this happened, he continued ‘broadcasting’ the interaction through the use of a wireless microphone, as if the interactions were television interviews.

The CU communication course met in a small language laboratory classroom, accommodating thirty people. It had a large round table equipped for interpreting drills, where the students sat, and a small stage close to the board where the teacher could write and speak to the class as a whole. Nonetheless, the CU communication
course was not completely constrained by the limitations imposed by classroom design. The teacher made use of the space very creatively. In other words, the spatial arrangements, even though they signalled a big divide between instructor and students, could not completely impose a hierarchical relation. The teacher walked down the stage close to the board and mingled with the students by walking around the round desk and speaking with individual students or groups of students.

**Student-student space.** Although at AU and BU the classrooms followed the spatial arrangements of a small auditorium, the desks and chairs were freestanding and could be moved to configure new spatial shapes. AU’s communication instructor had the students form a circle. Her grammar counterpart did not resort to changing the spatial arrangements though. Nonetheless, both teachers controlled all the exchanges between the students since they did not occur simultaneously. Each peer-to-peer interaction constituted a model for the rest of the students.

In the CU grammar course, the students were not encouraged by the teacher to engage in pair work in order to carry out instructional tasks. However, there were many instances of informal communication and backchannelling between peers. This kind of student-student relation was also present in BU’s courses but not in AU’s ones. Class size was one of the determining factors on this. In BU’s and CU’s classes, the students could still experience some anonymity and they engaged in small chats. That was not possible in AU’s courses since there were just half a dozen students enrolled in each course.

Both BU instructors and the CU communication instructor encouraged peer-to-peer activities and therefore rich contributions among students took place. Students could configure their own spaces within the limits set for the activities.

There was no evidence that the spatial features of the classrooms completely determined spatial relationships (instructor-student; student-student) across courses in all three institutions (e.g. use of fixed desks, podium, stage etc.). Space
arrangements seemed to depend more on the kind of interaction teachers sought from students in the classroom rather than the default architectural features of classrooms. This is not to say that the spatial arrangements do not constitute semiotic elements in themselves and eventually could drastically limit certain interactional dynamics, but the evidence indicated that those constraints could somehow be overcome.

A partial answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was provided by the different learning settings, configurations of classification and framing given in Table 5.1. Evidence was found to indicate that AU grammar and communication courses presented the strongest classification and framing of the six learning settings. The CU grammar course seemed closer to AU’s grammar and communication courses in terms of classification and framing strength for internal relations. BU grammar, BU communication and CU communication seemed to have a similar, relatively weak, classification and framing values for internal relations. Finally, CU communication stood up as the weakest in terms of classification and framing values of all learning settings.

5.2.3 Motive-activity structure of BU and CU learning settings

The first set of results included in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 presents the motive-activity structure for BU’s and CU’s courses as a function of the time spent on those activities. Values are presented in the tables contained in Appendix 5A.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 BU grammar course and BU communication course, motive-activity structure as a function of time spent (percentage)

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 CU grammar course and CU communication course, motive-activity structure as a function of time spent (percentage)

The answer to PQ1: How do foreign language pedagogies at different organisations and learning settings compare in terms of tasks (motive-activity structure)? is that the CU communication course presented a very different motive-activity structure from the rest of the courses, as can be seen in the above figures. Tasks (motive-action) had a functional purpose. This means that the objective motive of the activity was to have students producing speech acts as part of non-verbal activity. Students had to carry out instructional tasks that were not fundamentally focused on the structural properties of language but on the attainment of something outside language by means of language. This did not mean that the activity’s ultimate goal was not language acquisition but speech acts incorporated a series of elements (e.g., attention to the dialogical context and
speakers’ intention) that were not present in speech activity as part of foundation and structural activity. This difference, which is strongly linked to the avoidance of what Robbins (2003, p. 84) calls ‘reactive speech’ will be analysed more thoroughly in the next subsection. Nonetheless, a functional motive-activity structure is more aligned with both a strong version of communicative language teaching and Vygotsky’s ideas on the representational functions of language being predicated on its socio-communicative function.

The BU communication course was similar to BU’s and CU’s grammar courses. In fact, it resembled much more closely the CU grammar course than the CU communication course. The BU communication course, with its accent on structural speech activity, was more aligned with a weak version of communicative language teaching. However, in order to perceive clearly the differences between structural speech activity in a communication and a grammar course, it was necessary to analyse the data on framing for instructional and regulative discourse, as will be done in the next subsections.

CU seems to represent a more customary and ideal divide between grammar and communication, with a clear differentiation between what grammar and communication instruction are (e.g. the communication instructor may rely on the grammatical teaching done by her colleague and feel it is not worthwhile to cover again aspects of the language system and vice versa); however, that does not seem to be the case in BU. Although boundaries exist between subjects, these do not seem to be in a relation of complementarity. This may be the result of, on the one hand, a study programme set to produce specialists, as in the case of CU; and on the other hand, a study programme set to introduce Spanish to students who are specialising in something else, as in the case of BU. I do not suggest that all CU students will achieve a high degree of specialisation in Spanish or Spanish and Latin American studies, but at least the university seems to be offering that opportunity to a segment of its students. Again, BU’s programme does not seem to be based on an idea of complementarity between subjects. No instructor is introducing functional motive-activity tasks and therefore, one may ask when students will be confronted with tasks that aim at communication in Spanish. In the
case of BU, there are instances in which the communication instructor apparently intends to introduce an instructional task as part of a functional motive-action task, but soon afterwards the action is reframed under a structural motive-activity. This sudden reframing may be due to encountering students’ resistance.

5.2.4 Learning settings’ pedagogic codes

The data on framing values for instructional practice and regulative practice are presented in Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. More specifically, the figures contain the framing mean of instructional and regulative practices of all motive-actions per course. Regulative practice measures are shown in capital letters in the figures. For the descriptive statistics for the figures above, see the tables contained in Appendix 5B.
Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 BU grammar course, BU communication course, CU grammar course, CU communication course, framing values for instructional practice and regulative practice (median)

5.2.4.1 CU communication course framing values

The CU communication course was delivered mainly in Spanish. The use of Japanese was restricted almost exclusively to the translation of concepts, especially when the instructor rendered the term students asked for in Japanese, instead of explaining it in Spanish. Additional mediational tools included the use of the textbook, audio recordings and a whiteboard.
The course presented weak framing values in key areas related to communicative language teaching, especially in functional motive-actions. The instructional practice presented weaker framing in selection of contents, selection of classroom tasks and sequence. In other words, students were to a certain extent allowed to choose content, to bring their own experiences or knowledge (not necessarily linguistic knowledge) to the instructional practices, to have a say about who they worked with when carrying out instructional tasks, and to alter the instructional sequences of those tasks to find the sequence most suitable to them.

Weak framing of selection of contents also seemed to be accompanied by a surge of concept translation at this stage in functional motive-activities. Students might have been compelled to use the instructor as a living dictionary, especially if the communication did not take a delayed form (as is the case of a written instructional task) but unfolded more spontaneously (i.e., not leaving enough time for the student to use the dictionary, or where its use had been tacitly or explicitly forbidden).

The following extract of classroom interaction between CU’s communication instructor and a female student illustrates this translation surge:

Extract 5.1 CU communication course classroom discourse, functional motive-activity, motive-action No. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Mmm. Apellido. ¿Cuál es tu apellido?</td>
<td>Mmm. Family name. ¿What is your family name?</td>
<td>EC a F++ SE a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>SF1</td>
<td>Apellido. か...</td>
<td>Family name (what is it)?...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>名字。 ¿Cuál es tu apellido?</td>
<td>Family name. ¿What is your family name?</td>
<td>HI F+ EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>SF1</td>
<td>I.</td>
<td>I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The weakening of framing in the selection of contents and the consequent surge in conceptual translation might also be linked to the strengthening of hierarchy (in functional motive-activities). The instructor was being asked by the student about the meaning in Japanese of the concept family name. In this case, the instructor answered the student directly, translating the term (see a hierarchy framing value of + above) and kept the dialogue unfolding. This was due in part to the pressure exerted by the functional motive-activity whereby the communication unfolded rapidly without time to pause in the search for clarifications or explanations.

The following extract also illustrates the link between weak framing in selection of contents, a surge in conceptual translation and the strengthening of hierarchy.

*Extract 5.2 CU communication course classroom discourse, functional motive-activity, motive-action No. 2*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Qué escritor te gusta? ¿Cuál es tu escritor favorito?</td>
<td>What writer do you like? Who is your favourite writer?</td>
<td>EC F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td><em>Mucho escritores.</em></td>
<td><em>Much writers</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Por ejemplo? ¿Por ejemplo?</td>
<td>For example? For example?</td>
<td>EC F-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>例えば。</td>
<td>For example.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>例えば。</td>
<td>For example.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>例えば、例えば、ああ、JK Rowling</td>
<td>For example ... for example, eh ... JK Rowling</td>
<td>HI F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿JK Rowling? Ah, Harry Potter, ja, ja, ja, si muy bien. Vale muy bien.</td>
<td>JK Rowling? Ah, Harry Potter, ha ha ha, yes that’s right. OK, very good.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

On the contrary, at foundation motive-activity level questioning was followed by a relative weakening of hierarchy. There were more instances in which the
instructor did not answer the questions directly but facilitated the answers in such a way that she had students answering the very same questions they had asked by guiding them through. This was done by mining students’ information or making etymological comparisons with English, a language with which the students were more familiar at that stage. Hence, there was evidence that the weakening of framing values for hierarchy was linked to the facilitating role of the instructor at foundation motive-activity level and the fact that at this level reflection on language was encouraged. In contrast, at functional motive-activity level, the instructor asserted her condition as primary knower by quickly translating the terms she was being asked by students so as not to interrupt the conversational pace.

The following exchange (see Extract 5.3) makes clear the effect that partially lifting the control over the selection of contents and selection of classroom jobs had in circumstances where the activity trend favours an already weakly framed distinction of power and control relations. As a consequence of a weakly framed selection of classroom jobs (‘Do you have questions?’), students did ask the teacher questions (‘What is the meaning of oysters?’). Eventually, the teacher decided not to answer those questions directly but facilitated the answers by making other students participate in the process (‘Is there anybody who knows it already?’).

Extract 5.3 CU communication course classroom discourse, foundation motive-activity, motive-action No. 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>546</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Tenéis preguntas? De estas preguntas, ¿tenéis preguntas?</td>
<td>Do you have questions? On these questions, do you have questions?</td>
<td>SE b F-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>547</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Tenéis preguntas? ¿十問ありませんか？あなたは？</td>
<td>Do you have questions? Do you have questions? You?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>¿Qué significa ostras?</td>
<td>What is the meaning of oysters?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>555</td>
<td>SF9</td>
<td>¿Qué significa ostras?</td>
<td>Oysters? What is the meaning of oysters?</td>
<td>EC a F++ HI F--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>556</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Ostras? ¿Qué significa ostras?</td>
<td>Oysters? What is the meaning of oysters?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>557</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>誰か分かった？</td>
<td>Is there anybody who knows it already?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>558</td>
<td>2 or 3 students</td>
<td>カキ。</td>
<td>Oyster.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>559</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>うん、貝。牡蠣。</td>
<td>Yes, a shell. Oyster.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

The values for each framing indicator suggested that, in general, students engaged in experiential socio-communicative functions. Nonetheless, regulative practice was still strongly framed, with the exception of conduct regulation.

Table 5.2 depicts a few examples of conduct regulation that occurred in the CU communication course. All items represent conduct regulation-in-action, that is, regulation of conduct as the instructional task was unfolding, except for item 2. Conduct regulation seems constant because most of the motive-actions were framed within functional motive-activity, that is, the purpose of regulating students’ conduct was linked to the need to regulate functional activity. The higher in the motive-activity structure the instruction was, the more ‘operational’ language production became, moving away from conscious reflection and closer to automaticity. Therefore, conduct regulation served the more immediate goal of regulating a seemingly more chaotic action as it unfolded.

The instructor exerted a tight control through questioning individual students or groups of students (see the coding in Extract 5.3 above) and asserted her position as the primary knower. The instructor’s evaluation criteria were strongly framed as well. This meant that the instructor assumed the role of primary evaluator and was involved directly in the correction of textual production.
The framing of selection of classroom tasks varied depending on the motive-activity structure, with a weakening of framing values the higher the discourse is in the motive-activity structure, as Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 indicate.

### Table 5.2 CU communication course, social order rules, regulating socio-affective competences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive-activity</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>(1) Escuchad. [Students are not paying attention to instructor and keep doing the task or just talking] F+, CU Communication, 207</td>
<td>(1) Attention. Listen. [Students are not paying attention to instructor and keep doing the task or just talking] F+, CU Communication, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) それは自分で勉強してくださいね。勉強しないといけない。自分でこれなにも説明することがないから。自分で説明してください。 F+, CU Communication, 321</td>
<td>(2) Please study by yourselves. You must study. By yourselves, because there is nothing to explain. It is self-explanatory. Please study it on your own. F+, CU Communication, 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) [Addressing SF6] 言ってください。¿Qué tipo de música escuchas? F+, CU Communication, 904</td>
<td>(3) [Addressing SF6] (1) Say it, please. What kind of music do you listen to? F+, CU Communication, 904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis of the classroom discourse suggested that the teacher does not rely on pair work at the management, foundation and structural levels. He or she addressed the class as a whole – a selection of classroom jobs linked to traditional pedagogies – at those levels. At the structural level, though, the teacher weakened the framing of selection of classroom jobs by asking questions to the whole class but allowing students to select themselves individually. The teacher asked for volunteers instead of directly selecting students to participate in the instructional tasks. Extract 5.4 contains one of those instances.
Extract 5.4 CU communication course classroom discourse, structural motive-activity, motive-action No. 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>858</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Bueno. Entonces página 44. ¿Quién quiere leer? Venga. (1) Voluntario para leer. Que no haya leído. Antes que no haya. うーん、前読んでなかった人。Por ejemplo, venga. (1) A. Anabel. Ah, en el número tres. Son jóvenes españoles que dan su opinión. ¿Vale? Sobre... Anabel, 30 años, Valencia. Sí.</td>
<td>Well. Then page 44. Who wants to read? Come on. (1) A volunteer, to read. Someone who hasn’t read. Who hasn’t read before. Umm someone who hasn’t read before... For example, come on. (1) A. Anabel. Ah, number three. They are young Spaniards who give their opinion. Okay? About... Anabel, 30 years old, Valencia. Yes.</td>
<td>(1) SE b F+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

The framing of evaluation criteria seemed to be weakened at the functional level as well, although there are minimum differences at management, foundation and structural levels (see, for instance, the instructor’s acceptance of a student’s grammatical mistake, shown in Extract 6.2, line 103 above). Again, the search for automaticity might have overridden the need for grammatical correction in certain instructional tasks.

5.2.4.2 BU communication course framing values

The BU communication course was delivered mainly in Japanese. The instructor gave most of the instructions in Japanese. In cases of using Spanish, the instructor rendered key utterances in Japanese as well. Additional mediational tools included the use of the textbook and the classroom’s blackboard.

The course presented strong framing values in key instructional practices such as selection of contents and sequence. In other words, students were not allowed to bring in their own experiences or find the instructional sequence that most suited
them since that sequence was provided to them and enforced by the instructor, and the instruction constrained the contents. The areas of weaker framing were the ones related to hierarchy and evaluation criteria. The instructor tended not to assume a direct role as evaluator, engaging students in ways that allowed them to find the answers they were looking for by themselves, paying attention to their own mistakes (facilitating, not instructing) or referring questions to the class as a whole in search of a more knowledgeable student before answering directly. This kind of facilitating, whereby the framing of hierarchy weakened, seemed similar to the case already discussed in the CU communication course above. The BU communication course had a strong component of foundation and structural motive-activities where the Spanish language was analysed and reflected upon.

Framing of selection of classroom jobs seemed to be weaker the higher the discourse is in the motive-activity structure, as is shown in Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15. Thus, at the management level, the selection of classroom tasks was strongly framed (the instructor addresses students as a whole), but less so at foundation and structural level.
The analysis of the classroom discourse suggests that instructor and students resorted more to concept translation the higher the level to which their interaction belongs in the motive-activity structure. This means that there were more instances of concept translation (Spanish-Japanese) at the structural level than at the foundation and management levels, as illustrated in Extract 5.5.

*Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 BU communication course, management, foundation and structural motive-activity framing values (median)*
Extract 5.5 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural motive-activity, motive-action No. 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>(1) 分からない単語は、あればなんか私についてもいけどスペイン語で聞かないと答えません。</td>
<td>If there is any word that you don't understand, you can ask me, but if you don't ask me in Spanish, I won't answer you.</td>
<td>CO F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ECa F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SQ F-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

The strong framing of conduct at the structural motive-activity level was also partly associated with the fact that the instructor commanded students to ask him questions (see Figure 5.15). This produced a surge in questioning from the students’ part that was framed explicitly under the instructional input of the instructor (strong framing). Thus, student questioning did not sound as natural as in CU communication course’s functional motive-activities, where questioning was encouraged tacitly (weak framing) but it did resemble CU communication course’s foundation motive-activity.

The BU communication teacher was encouraging students to ask him questions in Spanish at all times, as shown in Extract 5.5, line 23 and Extract 5.6, line 244.

Extract 5.6 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural motive-activity, motive-action No. 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A ver, por favor. Ahora, ahora y ahora. Tenéis que preguntarme a mí.分からなければならない。Tenéis que preguntarme a mí qué lengua se habla en...</td>
<td>Let’s see, please. Now, now and now. You have to ask me. You have to ask. You have to ask me what language is spoken in... A place you didn’t know. Yes? Please. Did you take notes of the places you didn’t know how to answer, when you answered I do not know, ask me about</td>
<td>CO F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SI? Por favor.分からなかったところはチェックをした、No lo séを答えたところを今私に聞くこと。</td>
<td></td>
<td>HI F+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let’s see, please. Now, now and now. You have to ask me. You have to ask. You have to ask me what language is spoken in... A place you didn’t know. Yes? Please. Did you take notes of the places you didn’t know how to answer, when you answered I do not know, ask me about.
NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

Moreover, strong framing values at the structural level are associated with a tighter control of students who did not comply with the teacher’s instructions (e.g. a call to keep silence, to form pairs). Conduct regulation at this level seemed to be linked to solving problems arising from the instructional practice rather than making general statements about appropriate conduct.

5.2.4.3 CU grammar course framing values

This course was taught mainly in Japanese. Instructions were given in Spanish and soon afterwards the Japanese version followed. Additional mediational tools included the use of audio and video recordings and, more importantly, visual (photographs, newspaper clips, pictures) and textual aids that were projected onto the students’ monitors using an overhead projector. The instructor’s voice was also amplified through the classroom’s PA system. In general, the setup looked as though this class was a television studio, the instructor was the presenter and students were participants in a show that was being broadcast beyond the walls to the general public.

The CU grammar course presented a case of strong framing in most areas of instructional practice and regulative practice. It was a clear example of visible pedagogy.

Conduct regulation presented weaker framing values the higher the level of the discourse in the motive-activity structure, as Figures 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 indicate.
Figures 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 CU grammar course, management, foundation, structural, functional and rhetorical motive-activity framing values (median)
Table 5.3 presents some samples of explicit conduct regulation according to motive-activity at the three lowest levels in the CU grammar course. Most of the regulation of students’ conduct was linked to (a) their need to learn dialogues, verb tenses and lexicon by heart, that is, a regulation based on a reflection whose object was a past action, and (b) the need to regulate an unfolding action, e.g., ‘come quickly’ to pick up the corrected assignment (item 1), meaning, ‘be diligent’, ‘do not waste time’. Thus, conduct can serve two purposes: one, as a warning call to change past conduct (conduct regulation-on-action), and two, as a regulator of an unfolding action, serving the more immediate purpose of regulating instruction (conduct regulation-in-action).

Table 5.3 CU grammar course, social order rules, regulating socio-affective competences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive-activity</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>(1) じゃあ、テスト返却しますので、さくさくっと取りに来てくださいね。 はい、Aさん・・・ [Instructor keeps calling students’ names] F+, CU Grammar 1, 2</td>
<td>(1) Well, I give you back the exam, so please come quickly to pick it up. Well, Mr A… [Instructor keeps calling students’ names] F+, CU Grammar 1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) O sea, ya veo muy claro que vosotros no estáis repasando bien el diálogo. Así que os aconsejo que estudiéis mucho, mucho, mucho, sobre todo el diálogo. Os aconsejo que aprendáis de memoria el diálogo. Diálogo は暗記してください。あの、言わずもがなかなと思って言わなかったけどもちゃんと覚えてないね。F+, CU Grammar 1, 89</td>
<td>(2) I see quite clearly that you are not reviewing the dialogue well enough. My advice is that you study a lot, a lot, a lot, especially the dialogue. My advice is that you learn the dialogue by heart. Learn by heart the diálogo [dialogue]. I thought there was no need to tell it to you but now I realise that you have not learned it well by heart. F+, CU Grammar 1, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>(3) はい、ここまでは皆さん幸せでございました。ここまでなら普通です。散々だったのはその次。Lo más desastroso es la pregunta siguiente. F++, CU Grammar 1, 67</td>
<td>(3) OK, up to here you have been happy. If the exam finished here, it would have been a normal result. The disaster comes next. F++, CU Grammar 1, 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) ¡Uy!, calladitos estáis. 陽気な性格です。F++, CU Grammar 1, 69</td>
<td>(4) Oh! how quiet you are. You are quiet. F++, CU Grammar 1, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>(5) ついでに覚えちゃいましょうね。 F+, CU Grammar 1, 401</td>
<td>(5) Well, learn this tense, learn it by heart. F+, CU Grammar 1, 401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Japonés 皆さんはやいね、リアクションがね。F++, CU Grammar 1, 468</td>
<td>(6) When it is in japonés [Japanese], your reaction is quick. F++, CU Grammar 1, 468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The framing of selection of classroom jobs weakened considerably at the functional motive-activity level, as well as the selection of contents and selection of classroom jobs (see Figure 5.19). At this level, framing values were similar to the CU communication course. Unlike the CU communication course, however, in the CU grammar course the instructional sequence was strongly framed. The instructor interviewed students one by one. Students had the possibility of answering the instructor’s questions but under such circumstances, it seemed unlikely that students could ask the instructor. There was a complete *mise en scène*. It was as if the interviews were being broadcast to the whole class.

The framing of conduct weakened at the higher motive-activity levels. This could be partially explained by the fact that those activities were not part of the composite final grade. Functional and rhetorical activities were not part of the skills that constituted the grammar course’s final grade, at least not in verbal production form. Hence, regulating students’ conduct on those activities might have been deemed unnecessary.

Furthermore, sequence and selection of classroom jobs were strongly framed as functional and rhetorical motive-activities, leaving less room for conduct regulation interventions. When the instructional sequence was strongly framed, students were not allowed to discover by themselves the most suitable sequence to carry out the instructional task.

Nonetheless, this is one of the few instances of weak framing of selection of contents in oral text production. CU’s grammar teacher might require students to use their personal data – therefore looking for a certain form of functionalism – while carrying out a written instructional task, including an assignment or test, but demanding the use of personal information under such conditions was framed by the need to comply with particular grammar rules. Written instructional tasks developed a different kind of automaticity, one that still incorporated significant doses of reflection.
The use of personal information was considered optional in the CU grammar course, as was evident when the instructor asked students to use their personal information:

*Let’s see … it’s not always necessary to write it in this way [the way of the example]. You wrote it as in the example [instead of using your personal information],* Selection of contents, F+, CU Grammar 1, 795; *Here you can draw on your own real case to give an answer,* Selection of contents, F+, CU Grammar, 802.

On the contrary, in the CU communication course, students were encouraged at all times to draw on their own experience and personal information, e.g.:

*Yes. But make it real. Your answer. Please. What kind of music [do you listen to]? For instance, classical music, jazz…,* Selection of contents, F-, CU Communication, 905.

The kind of information to be used by students in the CU communication course was personal by default.

There were other factors involved in the gradual weakening of conduct regulation the higher the level of instruction was placed in the motive-activity ladder in the CU grammar course. Speaking turns and hierarchy were strongly framed and could compensate for a weakening in conduct (see Figure 5.19). In other words, in the CU grammar course, the strong framing of instructional practice might have produced a relative weakening of conduct regulation at the functional motive-activity level.

Finally, this was the only course that registered rhetorical motive-activity (communication activity). The teacher played small segments of documentary videos about Spain or a music video to the class as a whole.
5.2.4.4 BU grammar course framing values

This course was delivered mainly in Japanese. The instructor gave instructions in Japanese followed sometimes by their Spanish version. However, grammatical explanations were given almost exclusively in Japanese. Additional mediational tools included the use of the blackboard, the textbook and a few printed hand-outs with additional instructional tasks or exercises. The instructor also made use of the microphone and PA system available in the classroom.

Overall, the framing values in the BU grammar course were more similar to the BU communication course and the CU communication course than to the CU grammar course (see Figures 5.21, 5.22, and 5.23). This is because the course included foundation motive-activity that presented weak framing in selection of classroom jobs, hierarchy and structural motive-activity with weak framing values in selection of contents, selection of classroom jobs, and hierarchy (see Figure 5.23). The framing values in structural motive-activity were among the lowest registered for motive-activity structures across the learning settings studied.
Selection of classroom jobs was strongly framed in foundation motive-activity but not as strongly as in other courses. This was due to the fact that the teacher communicated the system of participation to the students before the instructional activities took place: ‘We will begin from here’. [Instructor apparently addresses students by the order they are sitting]’, Selection of classroom jobs, F+, BU grammar 1, 50; ‘Let’s see how are we doing. Then we start doing the exercises from number two. Please start from this side on, Selection of classroom jobs, F+, 179. This gave the students time to prepare themselves when questioned by the teacher.

Selection of classroom jobs was weakly framed in structural motive-activity:
‘Please group in pairs and ask questions one to another about Do you like (something)?’, Selection of classroom jobs, F-, 222.

Framing of hierarchy seemed to weaken the higher the discourse was in the motive-activity structure, as is shown in Figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23. Thus, at management level, hierarchy was strongly framed (students did not ask questions), at foundation level the framing weakened (the instructor assumed the role of primary knower answering directly or facilitating the answers) and at structural level most of the questions were answered indirectly by the instructor.

Selection of contents was strongly framed in structural motive-activity but not as strongly as in the other courses at that level. In other words, the instructional contents were provided to the students but some personal information or personal experience was elicited from them. Furthermore, the instructor communicated and enforced an instructional sequence. The framing value was still lower than the rest of the courses at this level.

The answer to PQ2 (What pedagogic code do organisations and learning settings have in terms of the strength of classification and framing?) was provided by the different organisational configurations of framing given in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. AU presents the strongest classification and framing values of all three organisations. CU, on the contrary, presents the weakest classification and framing values, closely followed by BU. Thus, compared with the other two organisations, AU may be considered an example of a traditional (visible) pedagogy, whilst BU and CU may be considered more (invisible) progressive pedagogies. In regard to particular learning settings and their framing values, Figures 5.24 and 5.25 help compare the results at foundation and structural motive-activity, two of the motive-activity structures present in all four settings. A motive-activity-structure-specific analysis arguably enables a more accurate comparison of the relative idiosyncrasies across learning settings.
Overall, the CU grammar course presents a case of very strong framing, compared with the rest of the learning settings, both at foundational and structural motive-activity. In general, the BU grammar course, the BU
communication course and the CU communication course’s framing is weaker at structural motive-activity. Moreover, the CU communication course presents very weak framing in conduct regulation at both motive-activity levels. The BU grammar course presents weaker framing values than the BU communication course at the structural level. In fact, at that level, the BU grammar course presents the weakest framing of all four learning settings. In conclusion, there is a sharp contrast between the way to approach the instruction of grammar in the BU and CU grammar courses. The CU grammar course represents a case of traditional pedagogy, whereas the BU grammar course represents a case of progressive pedagogy with lower framing values at structural motive-activity.

5.2.4.5 Discussion on the weakly-framed regulative discourse across learning settings

Visible and invisible mediation apparently clashed in communication courses whose instructional discourse dealt with grammatical contents but their regulative discourse was weakly-framed. This represented one of the most intriguing contradictions in communication courses, illustrating precisely the point where explicit and implicit mediation intersect.

The most noteworthy contradiction occurred in the BU communication course, where one of the weakest framing values for hierarchy at the structural motive-activity was recorded. However, the instructional content was linked to the facilitating of grammatical rules or the teaching of cultural aspects that constituted the cultural background of the learning tasks. The most remarkable aspect of the BU communication course was the fact that the instructor attempted not to answer directly the questions made by students but facilitated the answers by promoting discussion between students. This might have been possible at foundation and structural level, where reflection was sought, but reflection at the functional level might have obstructed the accomplishment of the pedagogical task’s object.

However, the facilitating was sometimes the consequence of the way the instructor had planned the learning task, as when the instructor instructed
students to ask him questions about the learning task items they could not solve by themselves. Thus, the questioning was visibly mediated not only because a tool had been introduced (e.g. the pedagogical task in textbook form) but in the form of the instructor’s request:

A ver, por favor. Ahora, ahora y ahora. Tenéis que preguntarme a mí. *Tenéis que preguntar. Tenéis que preguntarme a mí qué lengua se habla en ... Alguna parte donde no sabían. ¿Sí?, por favor. Apuntaron las partes donde no sabían contestar, donde contestaron no lo sé, pregúntenme de estas partes.* Por favor. [Let’s see, please. Now, now, and now. You have to ask me. You have to ask. You have to ask me what language is spoken in ... Of some place you didn’t know. Yes? Please. Did you take notes of the places you didn’t know how to answer, where you answered I don’t know? Ask me about those places. Please.] (BU communication classroom interaction, 244)

This kind of task confounded to a certain degree the actual source of the questioning in terms of what was visible or invisible, and might partly explain weaker framing values for hierarchy in BU communication at the structural motive-activity level. A great number of questions the students asked the instructors were actually in response to the instructor’s initiation (‘ask me’). In other words, many questions asked by the students were in response to the instructor’s request. Nonetheless, there were many instances of students making questions *motu proprio*, without being prompted to do so by the instructor. Still BU communication had one of the weakest framing values in hierarchy at the structural level among all courses.

Yet the social value that seemed to be transmitted here is the necessity on the students’ part to participate in the task by asking the instructor questions, according to a particular disposition.

What was not visibly mediated at all was the attempt to involve the class as a whole in facilitating the answer to a question, which was the case in the BU
communication class. Extract 5.7 shows how this was done within the same learning task referred to above.

**Extract 5.7 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural motive-activity, motive-action No. 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>SM16</td>
<td>¿Qué lengua se habla en Dinamarca?</td>
<td>What language is spoken in Denmark?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>SF21</td>
<td>Dina-maru-qués.</td>
<td>Dina-maru-qués [Danish].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dinamarqués o danés. Dinamarca en japonés se dice デンマーク. Bélgica se dice ベルギ. Dinamarca, デンマーク. ¿Más? ¿Más?</td>
<td>Dinamarqués o danés [Danish (accepted adjective) or Danish (more commonly used)]. Denmark in Japanese is Denmaaku, Belgium is Berugi. Denmark, Denmaaku. ¿Anything else? ¿Anything else?</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

The BU communication course was not the only one where this kind of weakly framed mediation took place, as the BU grammar course clearly resembled the BU communication course. The predominant motive-activity in both courses was foundational and structural. The difference is that BU’s grammar teacher did not involve the class as a whole in answering questions asked by students. Extract 5.8 contains a rather long example of how BU’s grammar teacher did not answer the student’s question directly but facilitated it being answered. It also reflects the severe limitations inherent in instruction informed half way between the trial-and-error and the complete orienting basis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>[Addressing a female student] はい、どこが分からない？</td>
<td>What is your question?</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>これってなんかさっき、gusta と gustan に gustamos とかも・・・</td>
<td>A while ago I said that apart from gusta and gustan, there is also gustamos or something like that...</td>
<td>HI F- EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>これは人間関係のときです。</td>
<td>Es cuando se habla de relación entre personas. It is when the relationship between people is talked about.</td>
<td>HI F- EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>人間関係って？</td>
<td>Relationship between people?</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>私の子と好き？私たちの子と好き？気に入られてる？っていうそういう時ですか</td>
<td>Do I like you? Do we like each other? They are being used in those occasions.</td>
<td>HI F- EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>ものものに好きか聞くときは gusta か gustan しか使わない。</td>
<td>When the question is addressing things, only gusta and gustan are used.</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>うん、使わないけど、じゃあ他の活用使わないですか、ということになったらそんなことないですよ、人間関係になったら使うことがありますよ、ということで出していってね、だから二の次ね。二の次って言うのは、これしかないの？とそうするとそんなことはないよ、私と子と好き？だっなら¿te gusta?気に入ってくれる？っていうんだだからそうなるし、っていうのがこの使い方ですよね。だからここはおいといていいのでね。</td>
<td>It's right. But in that way you can misinterpret that another type of conjugation is not used. To avoid that mistake, I placed that information here indicating that it is used when talking about the relationship between people. I did not take it as something secondary. I say secondary to express that there are other conjugations. In order to say ¿te gusto?, do you like me? That's why you have to leave that aside for the time being.</td>
<td>EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>でも...</td>
<td>But...</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>だからこれしかないのか、って思わないでていうことで結論説明として出てくること、いい？だからもし今の質問で～さんのこと好きとか聞くとか、友人関係でそういうのを話題にするときに、ｚａｒｄ好き手も言う形で聞くとか novice、ね、te gusta～とかね、あ、でもこれも三人称で聞いてるから一緒だけど、それが私たちって言う話になったらこういうのが使えますっていうこと。</td>
<td>It's a supplementary explanation to avoid you thinking that the two above are the only possible conjugations. If you talk about your friends and the question Do you like (people's name)? is made. Or if they talk about a singer, Do you like Zard?... etc. Well in these two cases, they have been about the third grammatical person and no difference is made, te gusta... but when it is referred to us other conjugations can be used as well. That’s what I want to say.</td>
<td>EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>あー</td>
<td>Ah...</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>わかる？うん。</td>
<td>Do you understand? Yes.</td>
<td>EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>これは gustamos っていうのは？</td>
<td>Then, gustamos is...?</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gustamosって活用私たちじゃないですか。</td>
<td>The conjugation of gustamos is about we, isn't it?</td>
<td>HI F- EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>はい、では、あの、下に英文・・・</td>
<td>Yes, let’s see, here at the bottom, in alphabet letters...</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gustamosって活用自体が私たちじゃないですか。</td>
<td>The conjugation of gustamos is of we. See the conjugations we</td>
<td>EC a F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>じゃあ、もう私たちの話をしてい るっていうことで。</td>
<td>have covered so far.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>わかるわかった。</td>
<td>You have understood it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>じゃあもうここに入れんでも良 い。</td>
<td>It's no longer necessary to place it here.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>261</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>そうそう、いつも省いてるじゃな いですか。</th>
<th>That's right; always this part is left out. Ah, in this case an object must be placed, otherwise there is no way to know what all is about. If it is about the relationship among people and it says gustamos; the subject is always we. In this case it is not necessary to make it specific.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>SF13</td>
<td>はい。</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>でもこれはこういう使い方もでき るよっていうので出してるだけだ から、テキストで使えばのここ までね。</td>
<td>These are samples of other possible usage. That's what is being contained in the textbook.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

Whilst, in theory, a communication instructor should not necessarily engage in teaching grammar using a complete-orientating-basis-for-action instructional model, one would expect a more comprehensive and organised presentation of the Spanish grammatical system in grammar courses. The BU students attended another grammar course (which was not covered in the present research) as well, but the two courses were not co-ordinated and eventually it transpired that a more comprehensive presentation of the grammatical system did not take place in BU’s programme at all. It was an example of grammatical rules being presented in piecemeal fashion. The example also highlighted the issue of how much attention and resources should be allocated to facilitating individual students, especially when the facilitating seemed vital for every single student to understand the grammatical rules of the Spanish verb *gustar*, and Spanish reflexive verbs in general and to ascertain Spanish linguistic consciousness.
The CU communication course also presented weaker framing values in hierarchy, but only at the foundation motive-activity level. At that level, CU’s communication teacher facilitated the answers to students’ questions by asking the class as a whole for the meaning of a word (see Extract 5.3). At the structural level the task consisted of selected pairs or a pair of volunteers reading an interview contained in the textbook to the class as a whole and it is focused on learning conversational questions such as, ‘What kind of music do you listen to?’. At the functional level, students’ questions were directly answered by the teacher so as not to slow down communication. Operationalisation of speech acts was sought.

Finally, the CU grammar course presented the strongest framing values for hierarchy at every motive-activity level. In fact no question was ever asked by any student. Visible mediation was carried through the use of tools such as exercises and tasks included in textbooks or elaborated by the teacher and shown to students through their monitors. Regulative discourse was strongly framed, demanding students’ attention, carefulness and learning words and rules by heart.

Framing values for conduct varied among the courses, with the CU communication course being the most weakly framed. Compared with BU’s communication instructor, the communication teacher at CU rarely asserted a model of conduct, especially at the foundation and structural levels. The strongest framing values were found at the management and functional levels. It was not surprising to encounter stronger framing levels at the management level, but it was rather unexpected at the functional level. A careful examination of the interaction at this level indicated that CU’s communication instructor regulated the performative aspects of the pedagogical tasks, or regulating functional activity.

5.2.4.6 Recontextualisation of communicative language teaching

The analysis of instructional and regulative discourse in different learning
settings as has been done in the preceding section provides a way to contrast those settings.

**BU communication course, weak communicative language teaching version**

The BU communication course was informed by a weak communicative language teaching version for the following reasons:

(1) The structure of the course privileged structure motive-activity, that is, speech acts were closely monitored to comply with grammatical norms or grammatical structures or the objectives set in the tasks (e.g. ‘be able to talk about what language is spoken in a certain place’ by means of acquisition of adjectives of nationalities through speech activity or controlled analytical speech acts).

(2) Selection of contents was strongly framed. Students could not bring their own personal information or experiences into the learning process. The personal information they provided was reduced more or less to a binary system: ‘I know’ or ‘I don’t know’ the answers to the questions asked for in the instructional tasks.

(3) The instructor tightly controlled the instructional sequence enforcing students’ compliance. The instructor ensured students used the targeted structure (strongly framed instructional sequence), focusing thus on language form.

The instructor’s approach to the instructional tasks contained in the textbook was to focus on the repetition of language patterns as a means to transform speech acts into operations.

For instance, in one of the motive-actions framed under structural motive-activity, the instructor introduced the textbook’s instructional task. The task consisted of asking what language was spoken in a series of locations
(countries, states, regions) listed in alphabetical order. Students had to ask for the language spoken in those places following model dialogues. The models were:

(1) A. What language is spoken in Argentina?  
B. Spanish.  
(2) A. What language is spoken in Canada?  
B. English and French.  
(3) A. What language is spoken in Belgium?  
B. I don’t know.

However, the instructor framed the task by requesting students to take notes of the items they do not know so that they could ask him at the end of the exercise.

When approached by students who did not know which language is spoken in a certain place and asked for it, the instructor told them to wait until the end of the exercise as instructed in the first place, enforcing the instructional sequence. An abridged version of the exchange is contained in Extract 5.9.

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Extract 5.9 BU communication course classroom interaction, structural motive-activity, motive-action No. 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>SM11</td>
<td>¿Qué significa Bale, Baleares?</td>
<td>What is the meaning of Bale, Baleares?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>(1) だから、分からなかったら後で聞いて。 ¿Islas Baleares?</td>
<td>(1) Well, if you do not know, ask me later. Balearic Islands?</td>
<td>SQ F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ここに Islas Baleares.</td>
<td>Here they are Balearic Islands.</td>
<td>HI F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>SM12</td>
<td>¿Cómo es?</td>
<td>How is it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Cómo es? ¿Cómo es? No. ¿Qué lengua se habla en Baleares?</td>
<td>How is it? How is it? No. What language is spoken in Balearic [Islands]?</td>
<td>ECa F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>[Student asks her peer] ¿Qué lengua se habla en?...[Instructor writes on the blackboard]...¿Qué lengua se habla en?...</td>
<td>[Student asks her peer] What language is spoken in?...[Instructor writes on the blackboard]...What language is spoken in?...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>(...)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>SF15</td>
<td>¿Cómo se dice Bélgica en japonés?</td>
<td>How do you say Belgium in Japanese?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>¿Cómo se dice?</td>
<td>How do you say?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
As can be seen, the instructor strengthened the sequence. However, he might have facilitated the recognition of the place (by indicating where the Balearic Islands were on a map) or provided information about how Belgium was translated into Japanese, transforming the instructional task in an opportunity to talk about general or background knowledge. The situation was paradoxical because there was an increase in speech activity but a reduction of speech acts directly linked to the object of the instructional task as a consequence of the strengthening of the framing of sequence and selection of contents.

**CU communication course, weak communicative language teaching version**

The CU communication course was informed by a strong communicative language teaching version for the following reasons.

(1) The structure of the course privileged functional motive-activity, that is, speech acts were part of non-verbal activity (see Figure 5.1).

(2) Selection of contents was strongly framed but framing values were the weakest of the four learning settings. The instructional contents were provided
but some personal information or experience was elicited from students.

(3) Sequence was strongly framed but, again, framing values were the weakest of all four courses. Even though students were not encouraged to find the instructional sequence most suitable to them, the instructor left enough room for students to modify instructional sequences. Creativity was encouraged within certain limits.

The instructor’s approach to the task-based instructional tasks contained in the textbook was to alter them by sustaining a personal dialogue with students on a one-to-one, pair or group basis whilst they were carrying out the instructional task. Thus, the instructor brought the objectives of the instructional task to the personal realm of students, making the few instructional tasks that did not include sharing students’ personal information an experiential learning opportunity.

Here is one example of how this worked. The teacher told the students to look up the instructional task contained in the textbook. The task as depicted in the textbook consisted of matching scattered chunks of personal information in the blank spaces of a profile of the Spanish pop singer Alejandro Sanz (e.g. birthplace, birthday, given name, family name, his mother’s given name, profession, favourite colour etc.). In pairs, students were asked to fill out the blanks by engaging first in a pattern dialogue. The model was provided: A. ‘Singer’, that’s his profession, isn’t it? B. Yes, of course. And Maria [his mother’s name]?

The students started carrying out the task in pairs. Soon afterwards, the teacher approached a pair of students. The exchange is contained in Extract 5.10.
**Extract 5.10 CU communication course classroom interaction, functional motive-activity, motive-action No. 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Part.</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>[Approaching another pair of female students] ¿Dónde nació? Vamos a ver. Yo nací en España. ¿Dónde naciste tú?</td>
<td>[Approaching another pair of female students] Where was he born? Let’s see. I was born in Spain. Where were you born?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>SF7</td>
<td><em>Mi naciste en Japón.</em></td>
<td><em>My were born in Japan.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muy bien. Yo nací en Japón. Y tú, ¿dónde naciste?</td>
<td>Very good. I was born in Japan. And you, where were you born?</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>SF8</td>
<td>También, ¿eh?, yo también nací… ¿ó?...</td>
<td>[Me] too, eh?, I also was born… [confuses the third with the first grammatical person]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>Nací…</td>
<td>I was born…</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>SF8</td>
<td>Nací en Japón.</td>
<td>I was born in Japan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>En Japón. ¿Dónde? ¿En qué ciudad?</td>
<td>In Japan. Where? In which city?</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>SF8</td>
<td><em>De Osaka.</em></td>
<td><em>From Osaka.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Entonces, lugar de nacimiento. ¿Dónde nació él?</td>
<td>Then, birthplace. Where was he born?</td>
<td>EC a F+-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>SF8</td>
<td>Madrid.</td>
<td>Madrid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Muy bien. No hay otro. Muy bien.</td>
<td>That’s right. It can’t be any other. Well done.</td>
<td>EC a F++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘I’ stands for Instructor. Students are identified with an ‘S’ followed by their gender (M = male; F = female) and a numeral at the time they enter the interaction. ‘SS’ stands for two or more students. Japanese language sections have been translated into English and rendered in italics.

FRAMING CODING KEY: Selection of contents (SE a); Selection of classroom jobs (SE b); Sequence (SQ); Pace (PACE); Evaluation criteria (EC a); Future assessment (EC b); Conduct (CO); Hierarchy (HI).

As can be seen, the teacher altered the kind of dialogue proposed in the textbook’s instructional activity and began facilitating the meaning and structure of a question in the grammatical third person (‘Where was he born?’) by asking the students personal questions about where they were born. The teacher momentarily disregarded the form but was interested in meaning. She might have started to lecture about the verbal phrase ‘to be born’ (e.g. by transforming the functional motive-activity into a foundation motive-activity), but she did not. The way she did this was by asking personal questions, thus prompting the use of the students’ personal contents — a territory, unlike grammar structures, where they did have control. This amounts to a demand for spontaneity from students. The procedure was repeated with many other pairs...
in the course of the task and in many other tasks as well. The textbook’s instructional task acquired a new significance under the motive-action/task as promoted by the instructor and understood by the students in this particular case. The teacher selected this kind of facilitating procedure. It was not done in the same way with every student. The teacher assessed each student’s needs and facilitated accordingly.

The answer to PQ3 (How can the weak and strong version of communicative language teaching be described in terms of motive-activity structure and development vectors/targets?) was provided by analysing the dominance of particular motive-activities, their corresponding framing values, and their link to the bottom-up move and top-down move within the zone of proximal development. The BU communication course was dominated by foundational and structural motive-activity. The CU communication course was dominated by functional motive-activity. The results of the analysis show that key indicators of pedagogy that distinguish the weak from the strong version of communicative language teaching are framing of selection of contents and sequence. Strong framing of selection of contents and sequence are associated with a top-down move, whilst weak framing of selection contents and sequence is associated with a bottom-up move. This is due to the differential in the students’ use of their personal experience (everyday concepts) and the introduction of theoretical knowledge by the instructor.

The answer to PQ4 (Does the foreign language pedagogy at different communication learning settings have a correlate in terms of SLA’s weak and strong versions of communicative language teaching?) is that BU communication course was linked to the weak version of communicative language teaching. Evidence indicates that: (1) the structure of the course privileges structure motive-activity, that is, speech acts are closely monitored to comply with grammatical norms or grammatical structures or the objectives set in the tasks; (2) the selection of contents is strongly framed. Students cannot bring their own personal information or experiences into the learning process; and (3) the instructor tightly controls the instructional sequence enforcing
students’ compliance. The instructor ensures students use the targeted structure (strongly framed instructional sequence), focusing thus in language form. The CU communication course is linked to a strong version of communicative language teaching for the following reasons: (1) the structure of the course privileges functional motive-activity, that is, speech acts are part of non-verbal activity; (2) the selection of contents is strongly framed but framing values are the weaker of the two learning settings specialising in the teaching of communication. The instructional contents are provided but some personal information or experience is elicited from students; and (3) the instructional sequence is strongly framed but, again, framing values are the weaker of the two learning settings specialising in the teaching of communication. Even though students are not encouraged to find the instructional sequence most suitable to them, the instructor leaves enough room for students to modify instructional sequences. Creativity is encouraged within certain limits.

5.3 TRAJECTORY AND COMMUNICATION LEARNING SETTINGS, MODERATORS OF DISCOURSE RECOGNITION AND REALISATION

Using a correlational research design supported by the partial least square (PLS) path modeling a multivariate statistical model was constructed to measure the variance in the participants’ realisation in terms of recognition (of grammar, communication, and weakly-framed communication discourse sample items) and test the effect of moderators (trajectory, organisation). The aim was (a) to obtain an account of how trajectory, organisation and learning setting structure modulate students’ recognition of discourse (or their orientation to discourse) and, consequently, their realisation (mastery), and (b) to empirically test Bernstein’s hypothesis about the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity. Moreover, it was aimed at testing mastery (realisation) as being determined by the subject’s ability to recognise (individual consciousness) the rules of pedagogical context, which in turn is moderated by educational trajectory.
Trajectory categories were based on participants’ perceived educational trajectory in terms of a dominant activity in which they partook throughout their schooling. The categories were obtained while preparing the procedure through interviews with CU communication student participants and through written questionnaires administered to BU communication student participants (see chapter 4). The answer to PQ5 (What is the foreign language education trajectory of individual students?) is that students could be assigned to one of three categories. The trajectories were as follows: Trajectory 1 comprised acquirers who did not express their involvement in any particular L2 activity. Their only experience derived from their participation in the education system in Japan, especially in activities recognisable as speech activity. Trajectory 2 included acquirers who expressed their involvement either in speech acts or communication activity in Japan. Trajectory 3 comprised acquirers who responded that the activities that helped them learn a language the most, or were more satisfactory or enjoyable, were associated with having been abroad, either for a short high-school trip, as part of a home-stay programme, or because they were living abroad. These activities are associated with speech acts that are part of non-verbal activity and communication activity. However, because the experience of communicating while being abroad was presumably more demanding and varied, these activities were considered of a different nature to those included in Trajectory 2. One key aspect of activities in this trajectory is that they might have included model-determined acts, where the learner did not have an indication of how the act should be carried out (the kind of instruction one is exposed to when learning a language in the country where it is spoken, without formal schooling or training).

A baseline model that used data from both courses was used as a benchmark (see chapter 4). The results from the baseline model provided the answer to PQ7 (How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?) as the value of $R^2 = .406$ indicated that 40.6% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition.
Two pilot studies and the construction of the multivariate statistical model made it possible to determine that differences in orientation were the outcome of the recognition of three different discourses; grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication discourse (see chapter 4). These orientations are modulated by two opposite vectors of development, the representational and socio-communicative functions expressed as modes of self-regulation in elaborated and restricted codes. Unlike grammar discourse, which is predominantly elaborated, communication discourse has a double valence since it may refer to both theoretical aspects of the pragmatic system of a foreign language (elaborated code) and more ritualistic forms that depend upon tacit transmission (restricted) and depend, for instance, upon the right manner in which to address a native speaker. These forms are learnt mainly by imitation. Finally, native Spanish communication instructors tended to weaken the framing of hierarchy when teaching theoretical concepts by giving students or the class as a whole the opportunity to answer their own questions. In other words, they facilitated the answers in a complex form of reflection instead of answering directly, a form of discourse that was characterised as weakly-framed communication discourse. The answer to PQ6 (What coding orientation (elaborated/restricted) do students have explained by their recognition of grammar and communication discourses?) is that students who were able to recognise all three forms of discourse possessed a comprehensive or integral orientation (Orientation 8). Students who were able to recognise both communication and grammar discourse but lacked recognition rules for weakly-framed communication discourse possessed an elaborated orientation (Orientation 7). Students who were able to recognise grammar discourse possessed a grammar orientation (Orientation 6). Students who were able to recognise weakly-framed communication and grammar discourse possessed a bipolar orientation (Orientation 5). Students who were able to recognise communication discourse possessed an elaborated-communicative orientation (Orientation 4). Students who were able to recognise both communication and weakly-framed communication discourse possessed a communicative orientation (Orientation 3). Students who were able to recognise weakly-framed communication discourse possessed an informal or restricted-communicative
orientation (Orientation 2). And finally, students were able to recognise none of the three discourses possessed a confounded orientation (Orientation 1).

Following a protocol for testing moderators, additional models were constructed for participants in Trajectory 1 (Model I); participants in Trajectory 2 (Model II); participants in Trajectory 3 (Model III); participants at BU (Model IV); and participants at CU (Model V). Three types of parameters were computed: (a) factor loadings between indicator variables and latent variables, using principal components factor analysis, with loadings measuring the correlation ranging from -1 to +1. Loadings > .5 were interpreted as ‘strong’, ‘high’ or ‘heavy’ whilst loadings < .5 were interpreted as ‘weak’, ‘low’ or ‘light’; (b) path coefficients (standardised, ranging from -1 to 1; interpreted in the same way as the standardised regression or β weighted coefficients in a multiple regression model) between the latent variables and (c) the effect sizes (R² values > .15 were assumed to be large enough to imply practical and theoretical importance).

I will proceed to report the results obtained after the construction of the moderator testing models.

5.3.1 Model I

Model I (Figure 5.26) was constructed using only the data for participants classified in Trajectory 1 who had a more formal experience of language learning. Communication was most strongly reflected by nine items (01, 03, 16, 18, 20, 23, 29, 33, and 34) with loadings of -.593, .717, .576, .646, .714, .779, .675, .841 and .694 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by Item 09, with a loading of .825. Grammar was strongly reflected by five items (04, 08, 28, 32 and 37) with loadings of .617, .807, .638, .747, and .673 respectively. R² = .715 indicated that 71.5% of the variance in recognition was explained. This substantial effect size was 4.7% higher than in the Baseline Model. The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that grammar (path coefficient = .620) was the most
important predictor of recognition. In contrast, communication (path coefficient = .178) was a much less important predictor, even less than in the Baseline Model (path coefficient = .463). Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = -.132) was negatively correlated with recognition. Realisation was strongly positively correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .632 compared with 0.637 in the Baseline Model).

The data thus indicates that the trajectory modified the variance explained in the model. A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by $R^2 = .399$, i.e., 39.9% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition. This effect size was less than 1% lower than in the Baseline Model.
Figure 5.26 PLS Path Model I for participants in Trajectory 1
5.3.2 Model II

Model II (Figure 5.27) was constructed using only the data for participants classified as members of Trajectory 2 who considered most enjoyable or beneficial a less formal experience of learning. Communication was strongly reflected by eight items (03, 05, 06, 18, 21, 23, 24 and 29) with loadings of .873, .746, .518, .866, -.727, .708, .666 and .708 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by four items (09, 10, 12 and 15) with loadings of .940, .742, .561, and -.785 respectively. Grammar was relatively weakly reflected by four items (11, 14, 17 and 32) with loadings of -.539, .544, .783, and .661 respectively. $R^2 = .762$ indicated that 76.2% of the variance in recognition was explained. This effect size was 9.4% higher than in the Baseline Model. The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that for participants with a less formal trajectory of learning, grammar (path coefficient = .338) was not such an important predictor of recognition as communication (path coefficient = .435). A low negative correlation was found between weakly-framed communication and recognition (path coefficient = -.211) consistent with a less formal experience of learning. Realisation was only weakly correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .470 compared with .637 in the Baseline Model).

Evidence was provided to indicate that the trajectory modified the variance explained by the model. A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by $R^2 = .221$ indicating 22.1% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 18.5% lower than the Baseline.

In conclusion, a relatively small proportion of the variance in realisation (about 22%) was explained by recognition among the participants in Trajectory 2, who were characterised by a relatively weak ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse.
Figure 5.27 PLS Path Model II for participants in Trajectory 2
5.3.3 Model III

Model III (Figure 5.28) was constructed using only the data for participants classified as members of Trajectory 3 who favoured the least formal experience of learning. Communication was strongly reflected by seven items (05, 07, 16, 21, 23, 24, and 34) with loadings of -.618, .770, .774, .750, -.721, .788 and -.567 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by Item 09, with a loading of .964. Grammar was strongly reflected by items 03, 08, 11, 14, 17, 22, 25, 28, 30 and 32 with loadings of .620, .748, .614, .832, .782, .764, .527, .789, .803, and .861 respectively. R² = .674 indicated that 67.4% of the variance in recognition was explained. This substantial effect size was less than 1% lower than in Baseline Model. Grammar (path coefficient = .524) was a moderately strong positive predictor of recognition, whilst communication was inversely correlated with recognition (path coefficient = -.372). Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .017) contributed little or nothing to the variance. Realisation was only weakly correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .438 compared with .637 in the Baseline Model).

A partial answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by R² = .192 indicating 19.2% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition, substantially (21.4%) lower than the Baseline Model.

In conclusion, amongst the three trajectories, the smallest proportion of the variance in realisation (about 19%) was explained by recognition among the participants in Trajectory 3. These participants, similar to those in Trajectory 2, were characterised by a relative moderate ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse. Trajectory 1 strongly moderated the proportion of the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition relative to the Baseline Model.
Figure 5.28 PLS Path Model III for participants in Trajectory 3
5.3.4 Model IV

Model IV (Figure 5.29) was constructed using only the data only for the participants at BU, not specialising in the teaching of L2. Communication was strongly reflected by seven items (03, 05, 06, 18, 20, 23, and 33) with loadings of .553, .543, .635, .812, .592, .881, and .759 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was reflected by two items (09 and 1) with loadings of -.786 and .769. Grammar was relatively weakly reflected by four items (08, 17, 30 and 32) with loadings of .665, .662, .696, and .534 respectively. \( R^2 = .834 \) indicated a high proportion (83.4%) of the variance in recognition was explained. This effect size was 16.6% higher than the Baseline Model. The importance of grammar (path coefficient = .494) as a predictor of recognition was equivalent to that of communication (path coefficient = .495) but lower than the Baseline Model (path coefficient = .520). Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .095) contributed little or nothing to the variance in recognition. Realisation was moderately correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .596 compared with .637 in the Baseline Model).

A partial answer to PQ9 (To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by \( R^2 = .355 \) indicating that 35.5% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 5% less than the Baseline Model.

It was evident that, relative to the Baseline Model, the organisation moderated the proportions of the variances explained by the model. A relatively moderate proportion of the variance in realisation (about 35%) was explained by recognition among the participants at BU, who were characterised by a relatively moderate ability to recognise both grammar and communication instructional discourse.
Figure 5.29 PLS Path Model IV for participants at BU
5.3.5 Model V

Model V (Figure 5.30) was constructed using only the data for the participants at CU, specialising in the teaching of L2. Communication was weakly reflected by four items (18, 24, 27, and 29) with loadings of .731, .664, .744 and .800 respectively. Weakly-framed communication was strongly reflected by three items (09, 10, and 15) with loadings of .849, .677, and .843 respectively. Grammar was very strongly reflected by ten items (04, 08, 11, 17, 19, 22, 28, 32, 35, and 37) with loadings of .675, .738, .674, .596, .644, .630, .779, .884, .627, and .710 respectively. $R^2 = .679$ indicated a high proportion (67.9%) of the variance in recognition was explained, 1% higher than the Baseline Model. The relative values of the path coefficients indicated that grammar (path coefficient = .739) was a stronger predictor of recognition than communication (negative path coefficient = -.182 compared with positive coefficient = .495 at BU). Recognition of weakly-framed communication (path coefficient = .091) contributed little or nothing to the variance in recognition. Realisation was very strongly correlated with recognition (path coefficient = .755 compared with .637 in the Baseline Model).

A partial answer to PQ9 (To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) was provided by $R^2 = .569$ indicating 56.9% of the variance in realisation was explained by recognition, 16.3% more than the Baseline Model.

It is concluded that a high proportion of the variance in realisation (about 57%) was explained by recognition among the participants at CU, who were characterised by a very strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse and a weaker ability to recognise communication instructional discourse.
Figure 5.30 PLS Path Model V for participants at CU.
5.3.6 Discussion

The findings supported the view that trajectory and organisational differences act as moderators of recognition and ultimately of active realisation. In conclusion, evidence was provided to indicate that the recognition of grammar instructional discourse (an elaborated coding orientation) is crucial in attaining higher levels of language mastery.

Evidence was provided to indicate that acquirers who possessed an elaborated coding orientation (recognition of elaborated-code instructional discourse, especially grammar instructional discourse), that is, orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, attained higher levels of language mastery (realisation) in learning settings either informed by communicative language teaching’s weak or strong version.

The answer to PQ7 (How much of the variance in the student participants’ realisation can be explained in terms of recognition?) is that the proportion ($R^2$) ranged very widely from a minimum of 19.2% in Model III to a maximum of 56.9% in Model V. The proportion of the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition tended to be high when the participants were characterised by a relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, indicated by a high path coefficient between grammar and recognition. The proportion of the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition tended to be low when the participants were characterised by a relatively weak or moderate ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, indicated by a relatively low path coefficient between grammar and recognition.

The answer to PQ8 (To what extent does the student’s trajectory moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition?) is that the variance was strongly moderated by the trajectory. The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among the members of Trajectory 1, who had a preference for strongly-framed learning, characterised by a relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse (Model I). The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition
was lower among the members of Trajectories 2 and 3, who had a preference for weakly-framed learning, characterised by a relatively weak ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse (Models II and III).

The answer to RQ#9: To what extent does the student’s organisation moderate the degree of variance in realisation and how can this be explained in terms of recognition? is that the explained variance was strongly moderated by the organisation. The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among the students at CU, specialising in the teaching of L2 (Model V). The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was lower among the students at BU which did not specialise in the teaching of L2 (Model IV). The students at CU (Model V) were characterised by a stronger ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse than the students at BU. The evidence for this difference was that grammar was a stronger predictor of recognition at CU (path coefficient = .739) than at BU (path coefficient = .494). Nevertheless, at both BU and CU, recognition of grammar was important. Recognition of communication discourse was not so important at CU, indicated by the negative correlation (path coefficient = -.182) between recognition and communication compared with that at BU (path coefficient = .495).

Overall, these findings seem to confirm the soundness of Bernstein’s hypothesis about the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity, at least in the terms in which the theory has been empirically operationalised in the present study. They also suggest that realisation or mastery is determined by the subject’s ability to recognise the rules of pedagogical context, which in turn is moderated by educational trajectory. I will come back to this issue and I will also offer a critique of the research model as a whole in the conclusion chapter.
5.4 PEDAGOGIC IDENTITIES, THE NEED FOR A REPRESENTATIONAL ‘GAZE’

The present section offers an assessment of (a) the development targets set by instructors in terms of the intended vectors of development set for their courses, (b) the relationship between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation and the developmental goals set by communication instructors in sociologically-situated settings, and (c) the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship between their trajectories, orientations, desired development vector and their realisation or mastery in those sociologically-situated organisation/learning settings.

5.4.1 Intended vectors of development

As we have already seen, BU and CU represent two different approaches to language development. The quantitative part of the study showed that recognition of grammar discourse and communication discourse played different roles in these learning settings. Arguably, the BU communication instructor’s preference for communicative language teaching’s weak version or preference for a top-down move within the zone of proximal development required on his part the setting of evaluation criteria that privileged communicative production (the ability to communicate). On the contrary, the CU communication instructor’s preference for communicative language teaching’s strong version or bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development required on her part the setting of evaluation criteria that privileged representational production (the ability to communicate abiding to the rules of grammar). In other words, in the BU communication course, communication was the final end of the pedagogical process; whereas in the CU communication course, it was only the starting point.

The results articulated in the above sections find their match in the discourse of BU and CU communication instructors. Table 5.4 contains a selection of statements given either about the object of the course or the labelling of students over which an idea of the set vectors of development for each learning setting can be made (the source of the data is available in appendices 8B and 8C).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement Number</th>
<th>BU communication course’s instructor</th>
<th>CU communication course’s instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas. I assume that if a native speaker can understand what the students are expressing, then it is fine.</td>
<td>She is talkative, but not rigorous. She talks a lot but does not [speak] well, and in case she is actually making an effort, then she has not learnt [to speak] correctly. Speak, but accurately. Either she is not making an effort or she has not learnt [to speak].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>They do not need to understand everything grammatically first in order to do communicative tasks.</td>
<td>‘As long as I can communicate and people understand what I say’… [she seems to be saying] She does not care about the verb form; that is her policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The written examination reflects communicative tasks performed in the classroom, such as describing one’s own family. Some of the questions are about knowledge acquisition (not skills) like the name of the letters in the alphabet.</td>
<td>…[T]hat they communicate with me, participate in the activities, show enthusiasm for the task, regardless of [grammatical] correctness, and then it does bother me that their correctness does not improve. They need to try out [speaking] so that they also [produce] correctly; only participating in class [is not enough] but also [achieving] correctness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Practice is focused on learning a structure, or anything. I hope that practice helps them to do it right or get used to understanding what they need. If I make them talk, for instance, they know that they will need the 1st [grammatical] person verb form. So, if at the end of the course they use the 3rd person by mistake, then that does not fit in with what we have been doing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The point is that the philosophy that says that only communicating is sufficient does not work for me. It is not attractive to me. Because I end up sounding bad. Twelve years of living in Japan and it annoys me enormously.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence provided indicates very different vectors of development in these
two learning settings. In the case of the BU communication course, the instructor aims at developing a restricted coding socio-communicative function, whereas in the CU communication course, the instructor aims at developing either an elaborated coding socio-communicative function (e.g., communicate accurately about personal experiences) or a representational function (e.g., learn a grammatical structure). Personal communication is an excuse to achieve a representational function.

The pedagogies they use match their course objectives, giving an idea of the link between communicative language teaching and the intended vectors of development. In BU’s case, instruction is mostly explicit (foundational or structural motive-activity), associated with communicative language teaching’s weak version; whereas in CU’s case, instruction is mostly implicit (functional motive-activity), associated with communicative language teaching’s strong version.

A partial answer to PQ10 (What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication instructors?) was provided by the positive match between the instructors’ statement about both the intended vectors of development and the expected pedagogic identities of students for their respective course and the differences that the recognition of grammar and communication instruction had in realisation. There was evidence to indicate that in the case of the CU communication course, which according to the instructor aimed at students achieving grammatical accuracy (an elaborated coding socio-communicative or representational function), the recognition of grammar instructional discourse was a stronger predictor of recognition than the recognition of communication. In fact, the recognition of communication had a negative path coefficient. In contrast, evidence was provided to indicate that in the case of BU communication course, which according to its instructor aimed at students achieving the capacity to communicate ideas regardless of grammatical accuracy (a restricted coding socio-communicative function), the recognition of grammar instruction was an important predictor of recognition but not as strong as in CU communication, and
recognition of communication had a positive path coefficient (in CU it had a negative path coefficient). Furthermore, there was evidence to indicate that in the case of the CU communication course, the intended objective of students achieving grammatical accuracy (an elaborated coding socio-communicative or representational function) set by its instructor matched communicative language teaching’s strong version in terms of its preference for tacit instruction. In contrast, evidence was provided to indicate that in the case of BU communication course, the intended objective of achieving in students the capacity to communicate ideas regardless of grammatical accuracy (a restricted coding socio-communicative function) set by its instructor matched communicative language teaching’s weak version in terms of the move from explicit to implicit instruction).

5.4.2 The figured world of students by instructors

The figured world of students as ascertained by instructors was extracted in schematic form. Figure 5.31 contains a summary of all the labelling of students by the BU communication course’s instructor including their relative position on the recognition (qualitative) axis (‘y’ axis). Figure 5.32 contains a summary of all the labelling of students by the CU communication course’s instructor including their relative position on the recognition (qualitative) axis (‘y’ axis) as well. Data on participants’ trajectory and orientation for both learning settings was also included.
Figure 5.31 Realisation labelling for BU communication course

[The numbers in bold print stand for participants’ identification numbers; letter ‘f’ refers to a female participant, letter ‘m’, to a male one. Students who did not participate in the study, although information on them was provided by the instructor, are identified by the letter ‘n’. Underneath the identification, the first number refers to the participant’s class of trajectory, whilst the second number, after slash, refers to the participant’s orientation.]
Figure 5.32 Realisation labelling for CU communication course

[The numbers in bold print stand for participants’ identification number; letter ‘f’ refers to a female participant, letter ‘m’, to a male one. Students who did not participate in the study, although information on them was provided by the instructor, are identified by the letter ‘n’. Underneath the identification, the first number refers to the participant’s type of trajectory, whilst the second number, after slash, refers to the participant’s orientation.]
It was clear from simple analysis of the data that students who possessed an elaborated coding orientation (orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) attained higher realisation levels across learning settings.

An answer to PQ10 (What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication instructors?) was provided by contrasting participants’ orientations and the relative position students gave them in terms of having achieved the course’s requirements or not (realisation). The organisational or learning setting-tied differences in terms of the variance in recognition did not affect the overall effect that orientation, as a descriptor of recognition, had as a predictor of realisation across learning settings. In other words, orientation was a strong predictor of realisation regardless of learning setting. This was because recognition of grammar (one of the components of orientation) was an important predictor of recognition in both learning settings as it reflected students’ capacity to recognise elaborated coding instructional discourse.

The analysis of students’ recognition and the ideas instructors had about students’ realisation offered a picture in which the demand for discipline or a systematic approach to learning masked the need for the recognition of elaborated forms of communication instruction and the production of forms of communication according to those requirements (e.g. attention to the instructional sequence). In other words, when instructors talked about students’ lack of regularity, they might have been expressing the need for a representational gaze to approach communication tasks in an orderly fashion, that is, to address in an orderly fashion the handling of the second set of stimuli of the dual stimulation. By ‘gaze’ I am referring here to a particular form of recognition of discursive practices (which count as authentic discourse) that takes place during the transmission of horizontal knowledge structures with weak grammar (see Bernstein, 2000).

When BU’s communication instructor, referring to BU14, a Trajectory-2 orientation-2 female student (BU14f [2/2]), pointed out “… she’s got communication aptitude but lacks a sense of regularity as a college student … she tried to communicate with me at
an informal level but could not keep up with the course requirements’ (our emphasis), he might have been referring to the student’s lack of recognition rules for communication tasks that require the analysis of hierarchies, attention to procedural sequences, or strategies that involve organisation of individual and collaborative work. In other words, the student lacked an elaborated coding orientation in combination with either a trajectory 1 or a pedagogic identity 1 or 2. The student seemed to be identified with a pedagogic identity 2 lacking the possession of recognition rules, that is, unable to have a code mismatch.

If the labelling ‘being focused’, ‘constant’, is replaced by ‘recognition and realisation rules for grammar and elaborated-communication instruction’ (i.e. elaborated coding instructional discourse, excluding restricted coding communication instruction: weakly-framed communication), incorporating their intrinsic ‘social order rules’ such as autonomy, systematicity, self-control, proactivity, ability to work in teams and so on, what we encounter here is the basic course requirements for a representational gaze. Consequently, the space that the restricted coding socio-communicative function depicted in SLA occupies in formal communication transmission is very limited. In fact, we may be able to make a further distinction between instructional socio-communicative and regulative socio-communicative. The former is a simulacrum of spontaneous conversation. The latter is the actual communication on which the pedagogical relation is built.

The active realisation of communication discourse is more of a game, a role-play that reflects an elaborated code (e.g., sequences are explained, objectives are expressed, working groups are formed, often according to a set of explicit rules) rather than learning that may result from spontaneous activities where one can hardly recognise who the instructor is. Hence, realisation of communication discourse has a significant and distinguishable representational imprint. What is invisible in real, spontaneous communicative learning settings has been made visible in the pedagogic stage, although instruction does not rely absolutely on strong framing (e.g. there is still place for students to fill up tasks with the content of their choosing, discover the learning sequence best suited to them within the
general sequences set by instructors, and there are moments of horizontality within the instructor-student relationship). In fact, most of the students who were not able to recognise weakly-communicative instruction could still achieve high levels of communication realisation in both learning contexts. Those who did recognise weakly-framed communication discourse, without recognising grammar or (to a lesser degree) elaborated-communication instruction, might not have been able to relinquish control over learning, for that is a prerequisite of conceptual instruction, the gradual transference of control from instructor to student (see Davydov and Markova, 1983). Orientation-2 and -3 students might in fact have misrecognised pedagogic activities as being purely informal and felt unable to put themselves in a subordinate position.

Even if BU’s communication instructor did not consider it important for students to achieve grammatical accuracy, giving more value to their capacity to express ideas, he covertly required organised ways to tackle communication tasks. Hence, BU’s communication instructor – referring to a group of male students who lack study management skills – pointed out: ‘I have to tell them to take notes, otherwise they would simply not take them; they lack the initiative to recognise the need for taking notes …’. Note-taking, as a mediational tool that plays a role in organising communication activity, is nowhere near the kind of tools used in plain, informal, spontaneous conversation. Unless subjects are displaced in space or time, conversation does not rely upon mediational tools other than speech, which is the quintessence of spontaneous conversation. In other words, note-taking as a mediational tool serves a representational function. Implicit was the notion that students who possessed coding orientations lacking recognition of grammar and communication instructional discourses were not only unable to cope with the recognition of elaborated forms of communication instruction but were equally unable to organise the activity needed to tackle the communicative tasks.

As BU’s communication instructor pointed out, ‘BU2 and BU12 are isolated from their peers, they do not participate and they do not compensate for the lack of those things with other abilities’ (our emphasis). He praised BU14’s communication aptitude but disapproved of her lack of discipline. A similar view
was expressed by CU’s instructor when she pointed out that ‘CU11 … doesn’t have distance, but she doesn’t study, I don’t believe she studies …’ (our emphasis). Consequently, ‘distance’ was related to the idea of a hidden asymmetry in the relationship between the instructor and the student. Not having ‘distance’ from the instructor was valued positively by both instructors, but only if supplemented with other ‘abilities’, which were linked to the grammar or representational gaze.

Therefore, although BU’s instructor set realisation rules that consisted apparently of the active realisation of informal communication and the enactment of accompanying or intrinsic social order rules, those active realisation rules included, paradoxically, active realisation of elaborated-communication procedures, which did not match at all spontaneous forms of communication. In fact, there was a clear bond between labels such as ‘discipline’, ‘constancy’ and ‘focus’ with the possession of recognition rules for grammar or elaborated-communication instruction. Those labels were used to explain the need for a representational gaze, a grammatical-like orientation, such as when CU’s instructor, talking about CU7 and CU16, qualified the students as being ‘lazy’. In fact those students did not possess recognition of grammar instructional discourse. What the teacher demanded was organisation skills similar to those needed to tackle grammatical tasks, with the added complexity that tasks were no longer carried out individually, but in many cases collectively.

Thus, when confronted with the task of labelling students who actually lacked recognition rules for grammar instruction, communication instructors might have resorted to forms of labelling very similar to the ones used by grammar instructors. The difference is that communication instructors paradoxically requested students not to be afraid of making mistakes. BU’s communication instructor, referring to students, said: ‘[T]hey have to be able to take risks … they should not be afraid of making mistakes’. As his counterpart at CU asserted, first and foremost, they have to be ‘able to communicate with me, participating enthusiastically in the activities, and being able to carry out the tasks, independently of [grammar] correctness’. In conclusion, what both instructors demanded from students was that they engage in some sort of reflective trial or calculated risk taking. Hence, they were required
not only to analyse and reflect on the explicit contents of instruction but also on the means to engage with and carry out the task. For that reason, the model-determined acts orientation associated with spontaneous acquisition was not enough.

It was clear that in both learning settings (BU and CU communication courses), instructors valued positively a *reflective trial or calculated risk taking* approach to communicative tasks by students. This approach was linked to a *representational* (elaborated coding) *gaze*. Thus, Trajectory-1 and elaborated coding orientation (orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) students had an advantage over Trajectory-2 or -3, or restricted coding orientation (orientations 1, 2 and 3) students, for the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among the members of Trajectory 1 and elaborated coding orientations, especially orientation-6 (grammar) students. This finding was relevant for BU communication course’s instructor who apparently did not seek grammatical accuracy from students. Eventually, the labelling of students by the BU communication course’s instructor revealed that BU communication course’s students required a representational gaze as well. In other words, in learning settings either informed by communicative language teaching’s strong or weak version, the possession of a representational gaze (orientation 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8) enabled a segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery than the rest of their peers.

The answer to PQ10 (*What relationship is there between students’ trajectories, orientations, realisation or mastery, and the developmental targets set by communication instructors?*) is that the two different development targets set by BU and CU communication instructors, which correspond to communicative language teaching’s weak and strong versions respectively, required from students a representational ‘gaze’, that is, the recognition of grammar instructional discourse. Furthermore, by representational ‘gaze’ is meant a form of reflexive approach towards communication instructional tasks. Students who possessed a representational ‘gaze’, either because they had a trajectory linked to the possession of recognition rules for grammar discourse (Trajectory 1), or because they belong to an elaborated coding orientation (orientations 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8)
attained higher levels of language mastery expressed both qualitatively (as the figured world of students by instructors) or quantitatively (in terms of the positive correlation between the recognition of grammar instructional discourse and realisation, expressed as the instructor’s final grade; and the moderating effect of Trajectory 1 over the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse and, eventually, realisation or mastery).

5.4.3 The figured world of learning, the case of the CU communication course

The data on students’ desired development vectors and learning goals were collected from participants in the CU communication course through interviews. The specific data for desirable development vectors from Trajectory-1 participants are depicted in Table 5.5. The same data from Trajectory-2 and Trajectory-3 participants are depicted in Table 5.6.

Table 5.5 Desired development vector data from Trajectory-1 participants
[‘f’ stands for female and ‘m’ stands for male in the Coded ID column]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded ID</th>
<th>Trajectory</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CU12f</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>I still have not learned a lot of vocabulary, or acquired the skill to use grammar. So, at the same time in order to improve these points, I would also have to practise properly. I think that is to study while enjoying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU8m</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Honestly, I still do not know vocabulary or grammar, so first I need to learn these basic matters and by acquiring the skill at a certain level, to have communication with Spanish people and learn by using [Spanish] in conversation. Well, the intention or the will to communicate what I feel. Somehow to be understood and at the same time, wanting to understand others. That is the important thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU2m</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>First of all, it would be to learn grammar and increase vocabulary. Then, practice conversation. First, pay good attention to grammar classes. And one has to learn by oneself when it comes to a language, so make an effort to learn vocabulary by heart and now I do not have many chances for conversation, so I would like to study abroad, to enjoy this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CU9f</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Study abroad, practise while having a conversation with native speakers, listening to [Spanish], etc. Learn words and grammar, and try to understand what teachers teach us in class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CU10f</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Study hard the language basics, reaching not only reading ability, but also dictation and conversation to improve skills step by step. Language is different from other classes like mathematics, because it is not enough to learn the formula, so we have to make an effort day by day, trying not to learn a lot at once, in order to get used to it little by little.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6 Desired development vector data from Trajectory-2 and Trajectory-3 participants ['f' stands for female and ‘m’ stands for male in the Coded ID column]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded ID</th>
<th>Trajectory</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CU1m</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>It does not help if I only have the knowledge, so I want to study abroad and by talking to several people, I would improve the level. Sure, pay attention during classes, but not only talk about Spanish language, also talk about other topics related to Spanish or music of Latin American countries. Also, ‘listening to’, including the option of studying abroad. I want to be interested in many things and make all efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU11f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>At the moment, I can try talking using the words I know, but it is so little, my vocabulary. So, I want to focus on improving vocabulary. Lately, I am a bit lazy, so I have to make an extra effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU7f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Study abroad. Speak a lot with natives. Not only attend classes. Yes, it is important. If we study without any objective, it is in vain, if in the future we do not have a chance to use that language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU6f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Currently, it would be to learn words, listen to Spanish and practise conversation, I guess. Right now, I think it is vocabulary. I cannot transmit anything.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU13f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Obviously, pay attention during classes and … I want to study abroad if possible. I want to cross the language barrier that I have to talk in Spanish. First of all, learn daily expressions and some other to talk about things that I am interested in, thus self-motivation would increase my wish to study more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU4f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>I have been in Spanish classes for just two months and I don’t feel any closeness with this language. So, I have to do something on my own, every day. If I don’t go to classes, nothing happens. So, it is obvious that I have to go to classes and also I have to have the intention to ask questions or get involved in the activities. Besides Spanish language, I don’t know anything about Spain or its culture yet. It is important to learn the language, also study cultures and find areas or topics that I consider interesting in order to explore the language more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU3f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I have to expand vocabulary to communicate and also have a good understanding of grammar, talk and practice to talk Spanish easily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU5f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Go to study abroad, always use the dictionary, prepare yourself for the next class, and always pay attention during class, without falling asleep.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pedagogic identities, social functions and motivation

Pedagogic identities were configured as a relation between trajectory, orientation, students’ desired development vector, from the representational function (elaborated code) to the socio-communicative function (restricted code), and realisation. Figure 5.33 depicts participants (circle, square and triangle shapes) according to their chosen vector of development. Within the circle, square and triangle shapes there are, on top, the number identification code for the participant followed by ‘m’ if the participant is male or ‘f’ if the participant is female; in the middle, the instructor’s grade (realisation quantitative); and at the bottom, the trajectory followed by the orientation after the slash mark.

Figure 5.33 Desired development vectors and pedagogic identity of CU communication students [The pedagogic identity of participants is depicted by either a circle (dialectical) or square shape (non-dialectical) which contains, on the top, the participant’s identification code number followed by sex, ‘f’ for female, ‘m’ for male, in the middle, the instructors’ final grade, and at the bottom, the trajectory, followed by the orientation number right after the slash mark. The red square shape represents an outlier.]
Desired development vector 1 (representational-function): A group of five students talked about achieving language mastery through learning grammar, learning the vocabulary by heart and then practising. By practising, they implicitly referred to classroom practice (no mention was made of travelling abroad and practising their language skills with native speakers there). This amounted to an idea of language development close to the one proposed by Oller (1976) with his concept of grammar-based expectancies or expectancy grammar. According to this concept, both receptive language use (listening, reading) and productive use (speaking, writing) are anticipated and planned from the grammar. In other words, the subtextual ideology is less about the existence of two different disciplines, more or less independent from each other, indeed almost autonomous, than about framing communicative mastery within the field of linguistics (grammar).

Desired development vector 2 (socio-communicative-function): A group of four students (CU13, CU4, CU1, CU7) preferred a different vector of development altogether. Whilst they acknowledged the importance of studying and attending class, they believed language mastery was achieved by having social contact with native speakers, travelling abroad and getting to know the countries and cultures where Spanish was spoken. This was seen as a motivational aspect as well as a practical one.

Desired development vector 3 (mixed representational and socio-communicative functions): A group of four students (CU2, CU5, CU8, CU9) expressed their preference for a mixed path, involving studying grammar, practising in the classroom, travelling abroad and talking to native speakers.

As already seen above, the proportion of the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition tended to be high when the participants were characterised by a relatively strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse. In the case of pedagogic identities, those students who possessed recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, the ones who belonged to orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8 and either had a Trajectory 1 (i.e. an informal trajectory) or desired a development vector that included a socio-communicative function, that is, desired
development vectors 2 or 3, achieved higher levels of realisation. This pedagogic identity, identified in Figure 5.33 with the circle shape, could be understood as able to produce a code switching (from elaborated to restricted and vice versa). On the contrary, those students who did not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, they only had recognition rules for restricted forms of discourse, were not able to switch codes, even if their desired development vector included a representational function, for they were not able to recognise discourse linked to that function. Those students are identified with a square shape in Figure 5.33.

The former group of students, able to produce a code switching, can be identified with a dialectical pedagogic identity whereby they are able to cope with double moves within the zone of proximal development. This implies that they may be more able to cope with situations of crisis implied in true development as they will have not only the appropriate motivation to deal with the frustration that precedes the re-organisation of psychological functions but also a representational gaze that enables them to approach communication in a systematic form.

With the exemption made of CU11, who attained higher levels of language mastery (see square shape 11f in red ink in Figure 5.33), although apparently she did not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, students can be classified as belonging to two distinctive pedagogic identities: dialectical and non-dialectical.

The answer to PQ11 (What is the pedagogic identity of students in terms of the relationship between their learning trajectories, orientations, their desired development vector, and their realisation or mastery, expressed as the final grade given by their communication instructor?) is that the pedagogic identity is modulated by the capacity of students to switch codes or have a code mismatch. Evidence was provided to indicate that students with coding orientations that included the recognition of grammar instructional discourse (orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8), who had a code mismatch either at trajectory (a restricted coding trajectory, i.e., trajectory 2 or 3) or desired development vector (a socio-communicative or mixed
representational and socio-communicative function, i.e., desired development vector 2 or 3) attained higher levels of realisation or language mastery. On the contrary, those who did not have a coding orientation that included recognition of grammar instructional discourse (orientations 3 or 4 in this case study) who either did not want or could not have a code mismatch tended to attain relatively lower levels of realisation or language mastery. Arguably, students belonging to the dialectical pedagogic identity can cope better with double moves within the zone of proximal development as they can target socio-communicative functions and have the right socio-affective motivations, but approach instructional tasks in a reflexive and systematic form.

5.5 FINAL DISCUSSION

5.5.1 Discussion on the results addressing the pedagogical question

What communication instructors require from students is the mastery of a complex set of instructional rules and social order rules that can be technically rendered as passive realisation (recognition) of vertical instructional mediation, active realisation of reflective trial approaches to instructional tasks and active realisation of simulated horizontal intersubjective relations. All of these are simultaneously required. Orientation-1 and -2 students (students with a confounded or informal/restricted-communicative orientation) may confuse the requirement of simulated horizontal intersubjective relations as a call to engage in model-determined approaches to learning, which are characteristic of informal, spontaneous learning contexts that they may have encountered during their educational trajectory. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that they had successfully applied model-determined approaches in previous learning experiences. However, in formal communication pedagogic contexts, that assumption is a false one since teachers demand that students engage in communication instructional tasks in a reflective trial fashion, that is, taking calculated risks and paying attention to the correct organisation and sequence of tasks, including ways to interact with peers in team work. In consequence, horizontal relations are part of a simulacrum.
In the case of CU communication, the instructor demands *spontaneity* from students in functional motive-activity tasks, which adds another paradox to the *reflective trial* paradox seen above. This means that students are required to draw on their personal experiences in order to engage with instructional tasks, even though the tasks are set for students to abstract higher levels of linguistic accuracy, relegating language’s socio-communicative function into a second place, especially at the time the evaluation takes place. It is worth recalling that CU’s communication instructor set as development target for her course the ability to communicate in Spanish but linguistically in an accurate way. The demand for both *spontaneity* in functional motive-activity tasks and approaching tasks in a *reflective trial* fashion seems to signal the dialectical contradiction between the two moves within the foreign-language learner’s zone of proximal development.

The same can be said of the demand to *ask questions* in BU communication, which it is also accompanied by the requirement to approach structural motive-activity tasks in a reflective trial manner, opening a way for students to ask not only proxy questions but also genuine ones. This is possible because the instructor must weaken the framing of sequence and contents in order to give room to students to ask questions. The actual contradiction lies in the fact that structural motive-activity is not mechanical at all, as it originally seeks to create linguistic habits, but it does support engaging in theoretical speculation.

From a more general perspective, the data seem to confirm Vygotsky’s (1987) view of foreign language development as a problem linked in similar ways with the development of conceptual systems in the native language, that is, with development fundamentally predicated on top-down moves (from scientific to everyday concepts) within the zone of proximal development. More specifically, at the bottom of the problem may lie what Gal’perin (1992a) discovered empirically about the kind of orientation that second- and third-grade schoolchildren with attention problems have when facing learning tasks: ‘We first tried to ascertain the reason for their inattentiveness and discovered that how the children were oriented to the general meaning of a text, to words or an arithmetic expression, was the cause. The children would catch this meaning and, satisfied with it, would “disregard the details”…’ (p. 65) Orientation-2 or -3 students, who only possess
recognition rules for weakly-framed communication instruction or in combination with recognition rules for communication instruction, may actually disregard the details of a given instructional task and rely heavily on a model-determined orientation, being prone therefore to falling into a non-productive trial-and-error chain. This may reflect those students’ positive attitude towards non-hierarchical forms of communication and their actual disregard of forms of communication that are hierarchical. Furthermore, I argue that their positive attitude towards non-hierarchical forms of communication is associated with native Spanish instructors, who are in fact the ones who apparently foster them. This is problematic for those students eventually will be evaluated by their capacity to have a positive attitude towards hierarchical forms of communication, i.e., instruction, instead. In sharp contrast, students who possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse (orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8) are able to approach instructional tasks in an appropriate way as they possess a representational ‘gaze’ that allows them to organise and systematise what apparently is a task dealing with simple spontaneous conversation or rudiments of structured conversation.

There is evidence to suggest that students with a dialectical pedagogic identity are able to switch codes, from elaborated forms of discourse or representational functions to restricted forms of discourse or socio-communicative functions. The prerequisite for this pedagogic identity is the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, as students’ mere wish or intention to develop language top-down (a desired representative development vector or formal trajectory) is not sufficient. Students with a dialectical pedagogic identity do not only have the appropriate aspirations in terms of a set of learning objectives associated with socio-communicative functions that help bridge the discursive gap between foreign language pedagogies and the actual fields of production of the Spanish language, but also possess a representational ‘gaze’ that allows them to systematise pedagogies and perhaps build-up hypotheses about the grammatical and pragmatic systems of the Spanish language. This also implies that the dialectical pedagogic identity is one that positions itself on the limits of the pedagogic institution, challenging the institutional frame, for students with this identity are able to appreciate (imagine perhaps) and identify with the values of the societies or organisations that produce actual Spanish
discourse and therefore they should, by definition, be able to see the cracks in the recontextualisation process carried by the pedagogic device through the pedagogic discourse. In other words, the right aspirations and socio-affective dispositions lie outside pedagogic discourse, although they are rendered in a restricted form through the instructors’ regulative discourse. This form, however, contains and reflects the arbitrariness of the pedagogic device’s recontextualisation of actual discourses (e.g., knowledge). Students with a non-dialectical identity may have less chances of approaching instructional tasks systematically, although they may desire to enter into communication with foreign speakers in the target language.

The data seem to support Bernstein’s ideas on the verticality of pedagogic discourse. The findings indicate that for foreign language development in formal pedagogic settings, students are required to possess a representational gaze – even when pedagogies are informed by communicative language teaching’s strong version – undervaluing approaches to discourse and activity that depend almost exclusively on a socio-communicative orientation, especially if this is a restricted or an informal one (and one in which students apparently take control over interaction). The evidence shows that there is not much room in pedagogic practice for the horizontal discourses of everyday life, although the pedagogic task may resemble or target the development of everyday-like situations. In other words, the everyday life in the foreign language classroom is part of simulacra whose mastery will eventually be ascertained using formal criteria. One experience is built upon another; one operation upon another. As Bourne (2008) reminds us, no matter how horizontal or weakly-framed instruction may be, instruction is essentially goal-directed. Curricula are staged and hierarchically sequenced. Superior learning stages are built on earlier experiences. In contrast to the horizontal discourses of everyday life, pedagogic discourse is vertical.

In conclusion, the answer to Q#2: What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative language teaching? is that students with a dialectical pedagogic identity attain
higher levels of language mastery in learning settings informed by a strong version of communicative language teaching, as is arguably the case of the CU communication course. In CU’s communication course, the instructor seeks students achieving not only the ability to communicate orally in Spanish but also speech accuracy, as qualitative and quantitative data have shown. Thus, in the CU communication course a negative correlation between students’ possession of recognition rules for communication instructional discourse and realisation or mastery is reported. Furthermore, the data coming from the figured world of students and the intended development targets set by instructors also suggest that in CU communication, communicating in Spanish is not enough and accuracy is sought also. Communicating is a starting point towards achieving higher levels of linguistic appropriateness. A dialectical pedagogic identity is one in which trajectory, discourse recognition or orientation and desired development vectors allow students to cope well with the top-down and bottom-up moves within the zone of proximal development. The dialectical pedagogic identity relies on the possession by the student of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse (i.e. orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8), which allow him or her to approach instructional tasks in a sort of reflective trial or calculated risk-taking fashion through which pedagogies are systematised, contributing perhaps to higher forms of hypothesis building. Students are able to switch code, from elaborated or representational to restricted or socio-communicative forms of discourse. Thus, a student with an informal trajectory, which relies on learning through model-determined acts (i.e. imitation), will attain higher levels of language mastery only if he or she does possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, belongs to orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8. A student who identifies with a socio-communicative development vector will also attain higher levels of language mastery if he or she possesses recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, belongs again to orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8. In other words, the identification with an informal approach either as trajectory or future projection is not problematic inasmuch as the student possesses a representational gaze. However, students with a non-dialectical pedagogic identity, who do not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, who arguably belong to orientations 1, 2, 3 and 4, are not able to switch codes as they seem unable to approach instructional tasks in
a reflective trial or calculated risk-taking fashion, even if they identify with a representational development vector or belong to Trajectory 1, that is, to a formal trajectory. However, most of these students belong to Trajectory 3, that is, they identify with an informal trajectory. The identification with an informal trajectory without possessing recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse seems to put these students at a great disadvantage in terms of mastery attainment, compared with students who belong to a dialectical pedagogic identity.

In the case of a learning setting informed by the weak version of the communicative language teaching, as is arguably the case of the BU communication course, although no complete data about students’ pedagogic identities were obtained, there are grounds to point out with a fair degree of confidence that students who possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, they belong to orientations 5, 6, 7 or 8, do achieve higher levels of language mastery. Therefore, although the possession of recognition rules for communication instructional discourse is positively correlated to realisation or mastery in a learning setting informed by the weak version of the communication approach, as the BU communication course is, the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse is far more decisive as a predictor of realisation. Furthermore, although the data obtained from the figured world of students and the development targets set by instructors confirms that BU’s communication instructor is concerned with having students communicating in Spanish regardless of their level of linguistic precision, the data on students’ realisation points out that even if that is the case, instruction is evaluated fundamentally as an elaborated, representational discourse. This suggests that the same findings linked to CU communication about the need for a dialectical pedagogic identity may also apply in the learning setting of the BU communication course.

What does resistance consist of in the case of Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative language teaching? In light of the findings, the answer is first and foremost the lack of an organised approach toward instructional task that may be summarised as a representational gaze. However,
this does not seem enough if it is not accompanied by some idea of the socio-communicative potential of the Spanish language given either by (a) a trajectory in which the subject engaged in model-determined acts, that is, in real communication with native speakers, especially through imitation, (b) and orientation that includes the recognition of weakly-framed communication instructional discourse, as a token of the subject’s preference for horizontal pedagogic or social relations at large, and (c) a desired development vector in which socio-communicative activity is targeted, that is, the equivalent to an informal trajectory but addressing future learning targets. All these points can be summarised in the contradictory requirements of *reflective trial* and *spontaneous participation*. In contrast, resistance is also an informal approach, that is, spontaneous participation without reflective trial, without a representational gaze. In other words, the student who does treat the communication instructor as an equal, as peer or partner may have a better and useful idea of what the practices in the production field consist of, and also may assume leadership roles when carrying out instructional tasks that require a proactive attitude, compared with students who cannot put themselves in that position. Although this amounts to a good start, it does not contribute to a good learning build-up if not accompanied by some form of reflection on foreign language pedagogies. In fact, instructors treat this kind of student as *participative* and *involved*, they may even like them at a personal level, but lacking *discipline* or *grammar accuracy* or *appropriateness*. Thus, students who are not able to move dialectically within the zone of proximal development, from the reflective trial to the spontaneous participation positions, may be judged as resisting foreign language instruction on oral skills.

There is evidence coming from CU’s grammar instructional discourse that the demand for spontaneity is also present in grammar courses. However, it is in communication courses where the contradiction between reflective trial and spontaneous participation is more exacerbated.

### 5.5.2 Discussion on the results addressing the theoretical question

Bernstein’s work on code theory deals with the reproduction of culture, especially
with pedagogic relations that shape the discursive possibilities of individuals and structure their experiences. Bernstein’s stance differs from other theories of culture reproduction inasmuch as it views discourse as reproducing in its own inner logic the external power relations that shape it. It is implied therefore that the power field does not shape discursive practices from without but the structure of those discursive practices gives rise to the power field itself. For Bernstein, symbolic systems are at once realisations and regulators of the structure of social relationships. Codes, or speech systems, as Bernstein (1971, p. 144) calls them, ‘create for their speakers different orders of relevance and relation. The experience of the speakers may then be transformed by what is made significant or relevant by different speech systems.’

Do we have any evidence in the present study of this co-configuration between the social macrostructure and pedagogic discursive practices that create for agents different orders of relevance and relation? The answer to this question, which is none other than Q1 (How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity?), is that organisations and, more specifically, communication learning settings, strongly moderate the variance in students’ realisation. This is expressed in terms of variance in discourse recognition depending on the instructor’s setting of particular vectors of development and opting to a certain degree for particular legitimate instructional and regulative discursive forms, that is, pedagogic discourse. Pedagogic discourse is associated with particular requirements linked to particular pedagogic identities. Thus, the variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was higher among CU communication students specialising in foreign language education. The variance in realisation explained in terms of recognition was lower among BU communication students not specialising in foreign language education. CU students were characterised by a stronger ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse than their counterparts at BU. The evidence for this difference was that grammar was a stronger predictor of recognition at CU. Nevertheless, at both BU and CU, recognition of grammar was important. Thus, students who possessed recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that
is, BU and CU students with orientations 5, 6, 7 and 8, were selected by their respective organisation to attain higher levels of realisation or mastery, whereas students who did not possess recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, that is, students belonging to orientations 1, 2, 3 and 4 were more likely to attain lower levels of realisation or mastery.

Recognition of communication instructional discourse was not so important at CU. There was evidence to indicate that there was a link between the relatively lesser importance of recognition of communication instructional discourse at CU with its communication instructor ideas of legitimate practice: *Speak, but accurately* ... In contrast, recognition of communication instructional discourse was more important at BU. There was also evidence to link the relatively greater importance of the possession of recognition rules for communication instructional discourse at BU with its instructor’s ideas of legitimate practice as well: *I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas*. In this case, the organisation selected students who possessed recognition rules for communication instructional discourse. However, in general, BU students were characterised by a relatively moderate ability to recognise both grammar and communication instructional discourse, compared with CU students. CU students were characterised by a strong ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, but a moderate ability to recognise communication instructional discourse.

What could then be the structural conditions that produced these differences? The first-year language programmes at both BU and CU had a similar subject division between grammar and communication, however, as the results from the first procedure suggest, the BU grammar course had a much more invisible-pedagogy pedagogic code than the CU grammar course, which might indicate that organisations not specialising in foreign language education might select less traditional forms of pedagogy to teach grammar, perhaps in search of a more friendly approach to teach students who just want to have a taste of Spanish. This also may be one reason why a less specialised way of teaching communication (e.g. communicative language teaching’s weak version) is selected, as the communication instructor may feel it necessary to cover more extensively some
foundation or structural motive-activity tasks. The fact that an organisation is specialising in foreign language education might put more pressure on deploying more specialised forms of grammar and communication education. In conclusion, BU’s programme seems more loosely defined and lacking tasks that can bring about students’ development at the transition from structural to functional motive-activity, as can be seen from the data coming from the motive-activity structure of tasks. This may explain why the BU communication course seemed to have a weaker correlation between the recognition of grammar instructional discourse and realisation or mastery compared with the CU communication course, and a relatively stronger correlation between the recognition of communication instructional discourse and realisation or mastery, compared with the CU communication course, in which the recognition of communication instructional discourse was negatively correlated to realisation. As already mentioned, for BU, communication was the end point, the target of the pedagogic process, whereas for CU, communication was the starting point.

Nonetheless, there was evidence to indicate that framing differentials (control) are as much a function of the objective set for activity as the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular learning setting (structured idiosyncrasy). In other words, once the instructor selects a vector of development according to what he or she perceives is the legitimate pedagogy, the activity imposes a given framing according to the direction the move (bottom-up or top-down) takes within the zone of proximal development, subject to the recognition of the activity by students. In other words, there are certain correlations that are almost unavoidable. For example, functional motive-activity tasks require a certain degree of weakening on the framing of selection of classroom jobs, selection of contents, sequence and pace, since they require students to draw on personal experience (i.e., demand spontaneity). Structural motive-activity tasks, in contrast, seem to open a way for students to ask questions to instructors about theory, something that it is more difficult to achieve in foundation motive-activity tasks, as these tasks demand from instructors to tight control on instructional discourse.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

...by means of what concept is it possible to think the new type of determination which has just been identified as the determination of the phenomena of a given region by the structure of that region? More generally, by means of what concept, or what set of concepts, is it possible to think the determination of the elements of a structure, and the structural relations between those elements, and all the effects of those relations, by the effectivity of that structure? And a fortiori, by means of what concept or set of concepts is it possible to think the determination of a subordinate structure by a dominant structure; In other words, how is it possible to define the concept of structural causality?

(Althusser, see Althusser and Balibar, 1997, pp. 205-206)

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the present study I have drawn on Bernstein’s translation device research methodology with the purpose of formulating an external language of description that could empirically translate the method of the thesis. This approach is condensed in the two research questions that modulate the study: one theoretical, related to the socio-genetic assumption made in the construction of the method (How do the structural conditions of university organisation modulate subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shape individual consciousness and activity?), and the other one addressing a pedagogic problem in the field of foreign language education at the tertiary level in Japan (What sort of common trajectory, pedagogic identity and coding orientation (consciousness) enables a relatively small segment of students to attain higher levels of language mastery (active realisation) in Spanish as a foreign language learning settings informed by communicative language teaching?), which is the problem that motivated the study in the first place.

The method consisted of deploying a Marxian-Hegelian notion of subject whereby subject position could be ascertained. In order to ascertain subject position the whole breadth of determinations of subject had to be embraced, which can be expressed as the three moments of subject, i.e., the individual psyche, activity and
culture. The method then drew on several socio-genetic theoretical corpora in order to produce an ad-hoc research model: Bernstein’s code theory, the cultural-historical tradition, especially cultural-historical activity theory, and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory. These theories covered every single instance of the constitution or formatives of the subject. Bernstein’s code theory served as the backbone that articulated these theoretical corpora, each one of them addressing with their particular strengths every one of the subject formatives.

The approach therefore was marked by a non-essentialist conceptualisation of subject in which the individual is but one moment of subject. This made it possible to overcome, to a certain degree, the dualism individual/society, including inherent forms of determinism, and look at the problem of agency from a dynamic perspective in which its psychological and sociological aspects could be accounted for, from the laws that deal with intramental processes to the laws that deal with historical forces. Put another way, the individual as an agent is not completely free to act in the world but is not completely constrained either, as he or she draws on cultural tools to act upon society but by doing so he or she also allows society to act upon him- or herself.

The locus of this contradiction is discourse and the institutions that serve as intermediate stages, actual embodiments of the social. This implies that the appropriation of cultural tools through the pedagogic process must be done in such a manner that it is self-transparent, providing the individual real access to the sources of the ideological field, the fields of production of discourse. Teaching (and scientific research) should be all about providing the means for people to develop and therefore emancipate themselves (see Chaiklin, 2012). This implies, in turn, the adoption of an epistemology in which a real science of discourse is produced, that is, a cultural-historical approach towards discourse capable, in Althusser’s terms (Althusser and Balibar, 1997), of producing ‘a real self-criticism’ of the present (p. 137). I believe we have to understand that, in Vygotsky, the importance of the theoretical concept and its introduction in the pedagogical process is part and parcel of that aim: creating the conditions for full human development and freedom.
I believe the goals of the study were accomplished, although there were numerous obstacles in the data gathering process. It was not easy to lose the first case study, concerning AU, a university specialising in Spanish-as-a-foreign-language education in the middle of the data gathering process, when there was no turning back, for the procedures concerning AU were linked to other organisations and case studies as well. Lack of access to student participants on the BU communication course also compromised a whole section about the pedagogic identity of students in a learning setting informed by the weak version of the communicative approach, which differed to a certain degree from the learning setting informed by the strong version of the communicative approach, CU communication, to which I secured access. However, most of the questions and issues anticipated during the research design were addressed by the collected data and their respective analysis. Therefore, the provisional answers offer an exhaustive picture of the ability of certain students to achieve higher levels of language mastery. I am not completely confident that all the procedural complexities of a mixed-research design could have been avoided by, let us say, adopting a less eclectic approach without sacrificing the breadth of the present study. I would like to believe that all the resources spent, including first and foremost the involvement of each and every one of the study participants, were profitable.

I will start this final discussion by dealing first with the findings and their relation to the model and the external language of description, rather than listing every single instrument deployed. I will do this following the dialectical tradition: from the concepts that the study gave rise to. In other words, the model, the method and the methodology will be subsumed under those concepts. I will then try to project the study in order to offer some recommendations to practitioners in the field, scholars interested in the dialectical tradition and/or in Bernstein’s sociology, and to researchers who may feel they want to incorporate the approach and instruments to their investigations.
6.2 FINAL DISCUSSION

6.2.1 The problem of the social structure

Instructors and SLA researchers rarely view the social structure as a critical determinant of pedagogic activity. There are few studies on foreign language education in Japan and abroad that bring this dimension into the equation, which constitutes, in my view, a clear avoidance of sociological issues. The same argument can be made about the use of sociocultural theory in SLA, which, as already seen, privileges an account of mind formation without ascertaining the social structure. The social dimension of the socio-genetic underpinnings of the dialectical tradition is represented by intersubjective activity alone. Institutions are not worth analysing, under such conceptions.

The determinations imposed by the organisational structure seem to go unnoticed. On the one hand, perhaps, the attributes or characteristics of the structure are soon embodied in the particular student population of a given learning setting or organisation, which may constitute the living expression of such structural determinations, pretty much like the fetishism inherent in any symbolic representation, in any cultural tool and in any use of them by the subject, which equates in fact to the very constitution of the subject. And this presents an interesting aspect of the structure as the constitutive instance (in terms of laying a set of conditions), for its relational network is soon sublimated into the node that syncretically synthesises it, i.e., the instructor-student relationship. In many cases, these determinations cannot be altered by instructors or researchers for they are a complete given to them, which relativise the viability of any form of research, let alone of intervention research. In fact, prior to embarking on the present research, whilst researching language education resistance, I showed signs of limiting my research only to the aspects instructors could change, that is, instructional methods, without engaging into further analysis of the social structure:

Although I started the research looking for pedagogical and curricular answers with the purpose of giving new guidance to my own and other peers’ practice, I soon realised that pedagogical and curricular approaches had serious limitations. Education resistance is more of a structural
problem embedded in education politics, which calls for the use of more sociological research approaches, and the implementation of political solutions. Having asserted that, the reality is that foreign-language teachers have very limited means of solving problems of a political nature and therefore the main goal of this study is to assess which areas of the problem can be addressed in the short-term or medium-term by encouraging pedagogical and curricular tuning or change, and which ones presumably require a long-term political fix. (Escandón, 2004, pp. 3-4)

Another factor that contributes to the avoidance of the sociological stance in SLA research in our local context is that the tertiary system in Japan does not sustain a bottom-up research culture. This circumstance may be the consequence of a rigid hierarchisation of educational organisations and a marked preference for top-down research. Research is left to be carried out by elite university scholars and researchers working for the Ministry of Education, at least the research that informs national educational reforms and organisational curricular change. Yet, studies about actual foreign language pedagogies are hard to find. More likely, organisations will adopt (and adapt) foreign instructional methods, but they will be subject to a process of strong recontextualisation through which they are watered down or left unrecognisable as spinoffs of their original philosophical paradigm. In this regard, I do not completely agree with the view that foreign language pedagogies are neo-colonial tools, as they are profoundly reshaped by Japanese institutions, and in fact are used in advancing the aims of the Japanese educational apparatus.

As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, most of the research on the actual pedagogy of Spanish as a foreign language in Japan is conducted by native speakers who are part-time or full-time instructors on temporary contracts with little or no say about any aspect of the programme they teach, except, in some cases, choosing the textbook for their own course. Thus, the fact that a curricular divide between grammar and conversation, or any other curricular scheme, is established soon becomes invisible or is forgotten by the presence of the students themselves. I am referring here to structural determinants expressed, on the one hand, as the degree of insulation between teaching subjects matters (e.g. grammar, conversation, language laboratory, culture, history, etc.), faculty organisation (e.g. degrees of
verticality or horizontality in decision making processes linked to the designing, implementation and evaluation of the programme), and, on the other hand, as the degree of insulation between what is taught in the programme and the demands of the labour market; the existence of links between what is studied and prospects for actual practice in a society in which the target language is widely spoken, either at university level or not, or in local communities that use it, such as communities of Spanish-speaking immigrants. All these represent structural factors. They are called *voice* by Bernstein. Voice determines, through arbitrary divisions or *classification*, the composition of the students body instructors face and, eventually, shape interactions or *framing*, which Bernstein calls *message*.

Finally, perhaps we are still under the domination of a cognitive paradigm, which is carried through the very same categories and notions we have borrowed from linguistics to analyse second and foreign *language* learning. As I pointed out in chapter 2, it is extremely difficult to counter the pulling force of the modern linguistic paradigm, which tends to impose the logic of the *speech act* under a very restricting notion of context, instead of the logic of communication in a broader sense. Bakhtin seems to do a better job of getting rid of modern linguistic denominations. Yet, almost every scholar or researcher working on the SLA field still has to use notions such as *code* and *systems* and explain their stance by using our modern-linguistic and cognitivist-ridden common *language*.

Let us discuss now what we have found about the relationship between the social structure and the foreign-language pedagogic processes, or, put in Marxian terms, let us explore the relationship between the dominant and subordinate structures and their degrees of independence.

6.2.1.1 Structured idiosyncrasy

The notion of *structured idiosyncrasy*, although a conceptual result of the study, a *post-factum* construction, is somehow capable of revealing the tension between structure and discourse. What is then structured idiosyncrasy? The term came about in its embryonic and provisional form after developing and validating the
language of description of organisations and learning settings together with the participant instructors and another practitioner who helped in the process (Escandón, 2008a, 2008b). This consisted of translating together code theory and activity theory to operational units that would enable us to gather data with the aim of describing organisations and learning contexts in their relation to the discursive practices of teaching and learning Spanish.

In a nutshell, what was immediately clear through that intermediate procedure was that (a) the organisational structure played a determinant role in setting up pedagogic contexts, pedagogic objects and vectors of development, including rules of pedagogic engagement, and (b) tasks informed by instructional methods and approaches had a life of their own in their relation to development vectors, although they both showed signs of being correlated and co-constituted.

Let me make a brief departure to make clear that task is a specialised concept within cultural-historical activity theory, and it means something substantially different from an instructional task. A task can be defined as the operationalisation of an action. Now, one of the main resources available to instructors in the operationalisation of an action is the instructional task suggested in the textbook. However, the actual recontextualisation the instructor and the students make of the instructional task is but one component of the operationalisation of the task in terms of goal-oriented action.

Going back to the notion of structured idiosyncrasy, what was discovered is that once instructors were positioned in a given context, especially given the particular division of labour that took place through the curriculum, they set certain development vectors and tasks informed by methods of instruction which were correlated to certain moves within the zone of proximal development. By the same token, tasks informed by instructional methods or approaches privileged certain moves within the zone of proximal development and had therefore a particular valence in terms of development vectors as well as differentials in the students’ state of consciousness. State of consciousness refers here to promptings to either consciously reflect on a given matter or to achieve some level of automaticity or
linguistic habit.

Thus, the notion of *structured idiosyncrasy* refers, on the one hand, to the determination imposed on discourse and therefore on development by the societal formation (organisation and learning setting), expressed as the degree of arbitrariness and form of the division of labour, and, on the other hand, the freedom subjects have to choose the object of activity, expressed as the subjects’ degree of control over instructional practices and the assertion of a given moral order that frames those practices.

So, what is more specifically the nature of the relation between the structure of the educational organisation and learning setting, their fundamental characteristics, their fabric or footprint, so to speak, and the nature of the interaction that takes place among instructors and students, which produces and reproduces that structure at the same time, and gives way to different vectors of development? How can we distinguish between forms of *structured idiosyncrasy*? Furthermore, how can we provide an account of these two co-constructed notions, the macro and the micro level of analysis, that allow us to compare organisations and learning settings so that these do not become confounded variables?

The tentative answer is given first by producing a description of classification and framing relations in which the relative strength of the boundaries and the principles of control within several categories are ascertained, especially in terms of the disciplines that form part of the study programme (i.e., the grammar/communication components of a study programme). Second, it is necessary to transform interaction into discourse. This is done by analysing the *operationalisation of actions*, that is, the *tasks*, in relation to motive-activity structure, which is a construct and projection given by the ideal set of steps required to achieve oral language mastery. It is an ideal set through which we can compare tasks and classify them. In our case, that set of steps was constituted by management, foundation, structural, functional and rhetorical motive-activity. The next step is to analyse tasks in terms of framing, that is, in terms of how control is exerted through instructional and regulative discourse. This gives us a pedagogic
code for the task. Tasks belonging to the same motive-activity structure for a particular learning setting can then be compared with those of another learning setting. In this way we learned that BU’s grammar course was far more progressive than CU’s grammar course; but CU’s communication course was far more progressive than BU’s communication course. By progressive we understand here that the pedagogy was less explicit (i.e., a case of relative weak framing).

Overall, this seemed to respond to the differences between an organisation specialising in foreign language education, as is CU’s case, which may allow or require that grammar and communication subjects really differentiate one another, and an organisation not specialising in foreign language education, as in BU’s case, which may not allow a differentiated way to teach grammar or communication or can only afford a less differentiated way to teach them.

The findings associated with the notion of structured idiosyncrasy allow us to ascertain whether a communication course falls into the weak or strong version of the communicative approach. Thus, it was determined that a course fell into the strong version of the communicative approach category if its motive-activity structure privileged functional motive-activity, that is, speech acts were part of non-verbal activity; there was a relative weakening in the selection of contents, that is, the instructional contents were provided to students but some personal information or experience was elicited from them; and there was also a relative weakening of the instructional sequence, that is, the instructor left enough room for students to modify instructional sequences. In contrast, a course fell into the weak version of the communicative approach if its motive-activity structure privileged structure motive-activity, that is, speech acts were closely monitored to comply with grammatical norms or grammatical structures or the objectives set in the tasks; the selection of contents was strongly framed, that is, students could not bring their own personal information or experiences into the learning process; and the instructor tightly controlled the instructional sequence enforcing students’ compliance with the aim of ensuring they used the targeted structure, focusing thus on language form.
Let me give some more general examples that summarise the findings and illustrate the relationships regulated by structural idiosyncrasy. A strong division of labour between grammar and communication allows the communication instructor to target structural and functional motive-activity, whose concrete pedagogical rendition is through forms of discourse that necessarily have to give greater degrees of freedom to students. In other words, they involve, apparently, less control on the instructor’s part. However, if we analyse instructional tasks that promote structural motive-activity, aimed at producing oral linguistic habits, we find that the freedom given to students to rehearse dialogues or sentences opens the way for them to ask questions about the grammatico-pragmatical underpinnings of those rehearsed structures, pulling the activity back into foundational motive-activity. And that is precisely the sort of activity that dominates grammar instruction. In consequence, reactive speech is reactive in terms of communication activity in the foreign language but active in terms of communication in the native language. Now, this is really good, because students are finally testing their own hypotheses about the theoretical underpinnings of the language system in all its complexity; they are actually reflecting motu proprio, spontaneously, on the problem of the linguistic means needed to express their communicative intention, but that also may hamper development, especially if the activity is transformed and not taken back to the structural level, for there will not be continuity towards the next level on the motive-activity scale: functional motive-activity.

What is interesting is that students do not usually formulate those questions when engaged in foundational motive-activity because (a) the teacher controls the class as a whole and (b) students are as yet unable to make sense of the theoretical underpinnings. It is only in the confrontation between theory and practice that they will be able to ask questions. The problem then is when (if ever) students will be pushed to the next level. Well, in the case of a curriculum that makes a strong division between grammar and communication, the instructor may target functional motive-activity, as is clearly the case of the organisation specialising in teaching Spanish as a foreign language. This in turn is supported by instructional tasks that more or less free students to choose who they wish to talk to and about
what, together with a relative freedom to find out the best or most suitable instructional sequence. Unlike structural motive-activity, it involves active communication and therefore personal involvement and spontaneity. It demands from students to draw on personal, meaningful, experiences. Students may ask questions of the instructor about a certain grammatico-pragmatical issue and he or she may want to answer in a way so as not to stop the flow of the conversation, so as not to deviate from the object of the instructional target and the object of motive-activity. But I believe, based on the analysis of the data, this is going to happen only if there is a clear structural division between grammar and communication. If not, the instructor will be tempted to go back down to a structural or foundation motive-activity. I will return to this issue in the next section to discuss the socio-political implications of this conundrum.

Introducing intensive metalinguistic reflection in functional motive-activity is the best way to kill it. As we will see later, there is evidence that confirms that a reflective element is always present (or at least required) in functional motive-activity, but if the activity changes its object, if it is transformed into structural or foundation motive-activity, then it will lose its development potential.

The problem we face here is that for functional motive-activity to take place instructors depend on the students’ responsible exercise of their freedom to communicate. It is, in other words, a form of freedom under tutelage, a form of constrained freedom. This tutelage implies a certain degree of trust and acceptance of this temporary situation in which students are guided by instructors.

In a curriculum with no clear division between grammar and communication, in which the communication course does not stand on its own, which does not abide unmercifully with the object of developing actual communication, resisting students will see there is room to dismiss the actual communication object. And by resisting students I mean students who are not willing or are afraid of putting their personal world, their feelings and views on the line, into the public sphere, as the providers of the real contents of the conversation under the instructor’s tutelage. This operation is subject to the principle of frustration that accompanies actual
development, a process of synthesis which is accompanied by catharsis. The tutelage is therefore the administration of this process leading inexorably to frustration before achieving synthesis and catharsis. I can also characterise it as a form of psychological regression and extreme vulnerability, for the student can no longer take refuge in his own semantic system, in his own language, in reason, if you like. That is quite a severe jump into the vacuum.

Resistance in this case seems reasonable, even a positive trait. Why should a student want to trade what he or she is in language? The process is not minor, it is all about softening the boundaries between what one is in-a-known-language or in-one’s-own-language and what one could be in-another-foreign-language. In this regard, the move from structural to functional-motive activity is more demanding and more complex than the previous moves within the motive-activity structure. I believe that it could be compared to those ages in child development marked by acute crisis.

In case of flagrant resistance, the communication instructor is too tempted to transform functional motive-activity into structural or foundation motive-activity, imposing unequivocal control over students through instructional means. In fact, I believe that there are grounds to understand the basic foreign language pedagogic process as dominated by a baseline inertia whereby the functional motive-activity is always being in a state of ontological jeopardy, ready to succumb to the status quo and the procrastinating position of considering the communication class as a preparation for some, rather distant, possible communication context or situation, as a simulacrum.

This simulacrum turns communication into an abstract object without a concrete correlate, that is, it transforms communication into the very same object of grammar, understood as an abstract, universal system detached from concrete instances. The utterance then becomes an object of study, pretty much like an artefact belonging to the past is exhibited in a museum. Therefore, courses should not be a sort of mixer of motive-activity. It is fundamental that they set clear objectives and stick to them. But that process, to be successful, depends, ultimately,
on the organisational structure, which depends in turn on the (conflicting) role foreign language education is given by society as a whole. Let us discuss this problem in more detail.

6.2.1.2 Functional motive-activity as a de-homogenising process

Through the findings we have learnt that the only courses that targeted functional motive-activity were CU’s grammar and communication courses, that is, courses belonging to the university specialising in foreign language education. In the case of the former, only one of the activities belonged to functional motive-activity structure. Most of them belonged to foundation and structural motive-activities. In the case of the latter, most of the activities did belong to functional motive-activity.

Crucial to determining if the activity belonged to functional motive-activity was if the activity’s object was extra-linguistic, that is, if it really presented a problem that did not focus on producing language. These activities almost necessarily include a higher degree of personal involvement from students as they have to draw on their personal experiences and knowledge to solve the instructional tasks. They tend to be more chaotic and harder to control because they demand spontaneity. Students may also resort to using their native language to accomplish the tasks. This reflects the fact that students are actually determined to get to the end of the task, no matter what. In other words, they are immersed in the problem. The task (and language in which to carry it out) becomes transparent.

Another crucial aspect of functional motive-activity is that students are indirectly required to assume personal and social positions that are gradually departing from the positions prescribed by the pedagogic apparatus, which are dominated by two logics: (a) the more-knowledgeable-instructor/less-knowledgeable-student logic and (b) the logic of the pedagogic power field as the homogeniser of social relations, whereby a false sense of mesocratic homogeneity is created.

Let me give a few examples. In a communication class in which students are communicating about their daily routines, about the television shows they enjoy,
the newspapers and books they read, the pastimes they have, they are in fact taking up positions and making public their private and social life. Thus, if a student comments she reads the *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper, she is taking up a position associated with certain political views, a socio-political position. In this case, the newspaper in question is associated with a centre-left political stance. But even if the student talks about something very simple like how she likes go skiing to Nagano or Switzerland, or how she likes playing badminton at the university club, she will always be taking up a position, a socio-economic position. In conclusion, socio-political and socio-economic positions will start to emerge, fragmenting inexorably this perpetuated idea of belonging to the same world or community of people.

I believe that this process, which may be very customary in Western societies, including Latin American ones, as people are more determined to publicly defend their positions and views, is not very well received in Japanese institutions and is inherently problematic. At least, it should not be taken for granted, because it may be resisted as it runs counter the national ideology that has created the myth that says that every single Japanese person belongs to the middle class, and those that belong to the middle class are equal among themselves.

Alongside McVeigh (2000), I argue that in many Japanese (educational) institutions, communication is dominated by the power field in such a way as to avoid participants taking (immediate) positions. It is a strategy to reproduce the power field and the social relations linked to that power field. As McVeigh points out:

In Japan’s bureaucratized landscape, communication lines should be hierarchical; institutional affiliation (school, workplace, company, nationality) should be clearly categorized; presentations of selves should be performed and displayed in standardized fashion (‘I’ –observes– ‘me’); and individual qualities should not be personalized but modular (the reality, of course, is far more complicated and nuanced). But with so much pressure to accept these imperatives of rationalization, it is no wonder that the official values of the state (especially as seen in school education-socialization) and capital (corporations) discourage one from being *seken-banare* (different from *seken* [the collective, society],...
eccentric, strange), seken-shirazu (unaware of seken rules, naive), or ‘standing out’ (medatsu). Though there is much rhetoric about the importance of expressing one’s individuality (kosei), in the actual daily practices of schooling and labor such expressions are often muted, especially since one is warned about the trap of adopting the individualism (kogin shugi) of ‘foreign’ (read non-Japanese) ways; one’s ‘I’ should carefully monitor one’s ‘me’. (McVeigh, 2000, pp. 158-159)

This is reflected, in the Japanese society at large, for instance, in the generalised use of uniforms, a phenomenon that McVeigh analyses in depth, and, I would add, in the almost complete absence of time slots in which speakers can be questioned about what they have said. At conferences, lectures, talks and public events, the structure of the communication will leave almost no time for exchanging views. Comments will be made after the event and positions will be taken up, but avoiding the possibility of direct confrontation within the communicative event itself.

These notions are debatable because there is no perfect order and every order creates deviance as well. The Japanese society and institutions are not an exception to this rule. To say that discourse is constrained to what happens in the classroom or in a given, clearly limited communicative event such as the classroom lesson, is a form of extreme reductionism, for backchannel and aisle-talks are part and parcel of the pedagogic discourse as well. Perhaps the most important loci of communication in Japan are precisely those instances in which backchannel and aisle-talk take place. However, given our limited research resources and approach, which has highlighted classroom discourse, we have to constrain ourselves mainly to the discussion of classroom discourse.

Thus, the most important problem we face is that functional motive-activity demands that students draw on a good number of experiences that leave no room for hiding personal and social positions in the classroom. In consequence, in a matter of few introductory lessons, students are required to express themselves about a wide range of issues such as character (How would you describe yourself and others? Do you like reading?), body features (Are you thin or fat? Are you in good health? Do you have bad habits?), living conditions (Do you live in a house
or a flat? Where do you live? How is your neighbourhood?), family relationships (Do you get along with your parents?), work (Do you have a part-time job? What do you work in? Does your mother work? What does she do?), etc. Even if students resort to creating an alter personality, that can also be considered as taking up a determined position, e.g. having a knack for comedy, which can be seen as eccentric.

Industrial, market educational models, especially those deployed in teaching a foreign language other than English at an institution not specialising in foreign language education do not seem to create the appropriate conditions for the kind of personal exposure demanded by functional motive-activity. Functional motive-activity calls upon what Bernstein (2000) calls a therapeutic pedagogic identity; an identity capable of caring about students’ private views, feelings and personal development.

Here the concept of self is crucial and the self is regarded as a personal project. It is an internally regulated construction and relatively independent of external consumer signifiers. It is a truly symbolic construction. The identity takes the form of an open narrative which constructs a personal time. (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 73-74)

Large classrooms, the continuous change of (part-time) instructors, the fragmentation of the curriculum for no apparent reason (e.g. overlapping disciplines or subject matters), do not foster the creation of a space in which students can entrust their private lives to instructors and peers, go through turbulent periods of crisis, and develop personal projects. Part-time instructors do not spend enough time on campus to engage in the sort of personal talk with students that can create a therapeutic space, at least not in the required scale. Moreover, they cannot be required to engage in a time-consuming job that is not going to be acknowledged and rewarded as such. This is one of the main disadvantages pedagogic institutions that foster market pedagogic identities have. The market, as the main assigner of resources, is insensible to altruistic forms of activity unless altruism itself is commoditised. But the way market pedagogic identities operate, the way profits and profit margins are made, is precisely by passing to society at large the burden of altruist, non-exchangeable activity. In
conclusion, one could argue that institutions that are (a) subsumed under market economic structures and (b) take up market pedagogic identities that do not produce the structural conditions to foster the kind of identities and care needed for students to go through in-depth personal changes.

What happened then to BU, a university not specialising in foreign language teaching, which did not register any functional motive-activity at all? In BU’s communication course only a slow build-up towards motive-activity was registered, but not functional-motive activity-intensive instructional tasks, as one would have expected. Whilst it is understandable that at the beginning of a course the emphasis would be placed on foundation and structural motive-activities, the layout of the curriculum and the way it was interpreted by the instructors, that is, its weak subject matter classification, was ill-prepared to target functional motive-activity. In contrast, with barely the same amount of time spent on foreign language instruction as a whole, the CU communication course fundamentally targeted functional motive-activity. In other words, we cannot say that BU did not target functional motive-activity because of lack of study time, which is usually one of the many excuses instructors give for the lack of results in courses that belong to foreign-language-other-than-English programmes.

Students at BU were continuously kept in the relative comfort zone of foundation and structural motive-activity, in which reflection is dominant and personal views are left aside, as they require a rehearsal of lines contained on a script. In other words, foundation and structural motive-activity deal with reactive, not active communication. As already seen, given the programmes’ total number of hours of instruction, it seems rather unproductive to focus all the instruction on foundation and structural motive-activity.

The findings also provide evidence of BU’s communication instructor enforcing control over instructional contents when students went on asking genuine questions in Spanish, keeping the activity at the structural motive-activity level. In fact, the instructor did not reply to the questions but enforced the instructional sequence by reminding the students, in Japanese, to follow the procedures for the
structural task. In other words, a few students were targeting functional motive-activity, but the instructor kept the overall tone of the activity at the structural motive-activity level. Furthermore, the widespread use of Japanese by the instructor seemed rather unnecessary and ancillary to foundation and structural motive-activity.

We have to ask ourselves what BU’s instructor was trying to solve by targeting structural motive-activity and speaking in Japanese most of the time in a foreign language communication class. First, BU’s communication instructor was worried that students were not getting enough grammar to move onto more challenging instructional tasks, especially because students’ attendance at that institution was irregular. There were also clear indications of disruptive behaviour by some students, which was accompanied by a surge in the assertion of models of conduct and disciplinary action and the enforcement of instructional sequence, selection of classroom jobs and contents. This kind of behaviour at that organisation may have urged the instructor to plan a course in which students could remain in a relatively comfortable zone, without taking too many risks or causing too much trouble. In contrast, the only assertion of conduct found in CU’s communication course was about the carrying out of the instructional tasks, as she demanded communication to be spontaneous. It did not deal with a breach of classroom rules.

The instructional material used by BU’s communication instructor seemed to support a very controlled way of presenting instructional tasks as a slow structural build-up towards functional motive-activity instructional tasks. I argue that this kind of material serves the purpose of providing instructional aids to keep students under control. Whilst the instructional tasks contained in the textbook may have eventually targeted functional motive-activity, the textbook did not represent much of a variation from other textbooks produced in Japan, which involuntarily aim at killing time in exercises, not real communicative instructional tasks. The kind of material deployed in communication courses in organisations not specialising in teaching Spanish as a foreign language seems to provide instructional control over students. This explains the astonishing similarity among them. They are part and parcel of a set of instructional methods which seek to keep students busy and
under control, avoiding as much as possible them having to take positions on personal and social issues. Perhaps, on the one hand, this kind of material already acknowledges how unfeasible it is to foster a therapeutic pedagogic identity due to the aforementioned structural constraints, including the economic structure of educational institutions. Perhaps, on the other hand, it adapts to the communication style prescribed for Japanese educational institutions in general. Regardless of what causes this kind of reification of instructional tools and materials, the fact is that that kind of material is being historically reproduced and seems extraordinarily stable.

Overall, the prospects for actual functional motive-activity in BU’s communication classroom were diluted. Eventually, neither the communication nor the grammar course targeted functional motive-activity. Therefore, students’ foreign language development might have been suppressed, considering that both courses were targeting the same kind of motive-activity: foundation and structural motive-activity.

6.2.1.3 The need for a representational gaze

In which way does the structure influence the pedagogic process? The intended development targets set by the instructors and the actual activity carried out through the pedagogic relation ends up privileging certain development vectors, as the results coming from the statistical model, designed to measure the correlation between recognition and realisation, and the moderation exerted on realisation by students’ foreign language trajectories and organisations, suggested. The intended development targets and activity operates as a selector of students who possess recognition rules for three different instructional discourses; grammar, communication and weakly-framed communication instructional discourse, that is, students who are able to recognise these forms of instructional discourse. In other words, students with a certain consciousness, who can understand the relevance of different discourses, are said to possess different orientations toward discourse according to their ability to recognise these three types of instructional discourse.
These three forms of instructional discourse differ in their coding orientation, as they point to different orders of relevance. Grammar instructional discourse is characterised by elaborated forms of discourse that rely on the introduction of theoretical concepts. Communication instructional discourse is characterised by both elaborated and restricted forms of discourse, as communication instruction may introduce theoretical concepts to teach the pragmatic aspects of communication explicitly, but also may rely on implicit forms of instruction that are context dependent, such as imitation. Finally, weakly-framed communication instructional discourse is the discourse that targets some theoretical aspect of the grammatico-pragmatic system but weakens the framing in terms of hierarchy. Instead of appearing as the primary knower, the instructor seeks to facilitate the answer to students’ questions so as to get the whole class involved in looking for an answer. This kind of instructional discourse is associated mainly with native Spanish instructors.

Trajectories, that is, students’ preferred vectors of development or leading activities during their prior foreign language studies, also moderate the recognition of the above instructional discourses. Thus, trajectories that privileged informal learning – dependent on model-determined acts (e.g. imitation, induction) – were characterised by a relatively moderate capacity to recognise grammar instructional discourse. In contrast, the trajectory that privileged formal learning – dependent on explicit instruction (e.g., deduction) – was characterised by a high capacity to recognise grammar instructional discourse.

Recognition is correlated with realisation, that is, with the production of linguistic texts that are appropriate to the set of rules set by instructors, and therefore, the capacity to recognise discourse is a predictor of mastery. An informal trajectory seems to hamper the prospects of recognition of grammar instructional discourse by students.

What constitutes a complete puzzle is the fact that in communication courses the capacity to recognise communication instructional discourse is not such a relevant predictor of recognition as is the capacity to recognise grammar instructional
discourse. In fact, the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse is positively correlated to realisation or mastery in communication learning settings informed either by the weak version of the communicative approach (the BU communication course) or the strong version of the communicative approach (the CU communication course). Furthermore, in the case of the latter, the recognition of communication instructional discourse is negatively correlated to realisation. In other words, although the learning setting informed by the strong version of the communicative approach is characterised by functional motive-activity, the course demands from students complete abstraction from the socio-communicative functions that are used in the course and asks for grammatical accuracy instead. It is like telling students, ‘Now that you have had a good time attempting to communicate with one another I will evaluate your capacity to communicate but according to a benchmark set by grammatical correctness’. This is not the case in the learning setting informed by the weak version of the communicative approach, which is characterised by structural motive-activity. In this case, the recognition of communication instructional discourse is positively correlated with realisation, but to a lesser degree than the recognition of grammar instructional discourse.

In conclusion, communication learning settings require from students a representational gaze. This gaze was identified first with the ability to recognise grammar instructional discourse, but, as we will see, there is much more to it.

6.2.2 Paradoxes of foreign language development

The rationale underlying the evaluation criteria employed by BU’s communication instructor – *I do not value formal grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas.* – may be accurate in relation to grammar as a vertical knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is hierarchically organised) but eventually was not accurate in relation to the demands made on students to approach communication systematically – actually to study forms of communication, to approach communication as if ready to dissect it in an operating theatre. It is as if communication under the tutelage of the instructor needs to be secretly reflected
upon. Spontaneity must be controlled. This conclusion is made in light of the data that indicate that those students who did not possess recognition of grammar instructional discourse were rated as underachievers by BU’s communication instructor. In other words, the grammar orientation may be disguising the need for a systematic approach to communication instructional tasks or the communicative aspects of grammar instruction (e.g. production of discrete speech acts). This seems aligned with Cohen’s (2008) assertion about the slow pace of naturalistic acquisition of target-language pragmatics and the need for learners to be exposed from the outset to explicit information about how to perform target-language pragmatics. Unorganised forms of pragmatic instruction seem unproductive. Yet, they demand certain imagination that permits learners to overcome the pragmatic limitations set by the pragmatic system of their own culture.

In contrast, the statement made by CU’s communication instructor – *Speak, but accurately...* – reflects the fact that she is setting hierarchical evaluation criteria for communication. The problem is that communication, that is, the pragmatics of a certain language does not have a vertical knowledge structure, yet instruction might be treated as a vertical construction.

In light of the findings, it gives the impression that there is not much room in communication pedagogies for the horizontal discourses of everyday life, although the pedagogic tasks may resemble or target the development of everyday-like situations. In other words, the everyday life in the foreign language communication classroom is part of simulacra whose mastery will eventually be ascertained using formal criteria. One experience is built upon another; one operation upon another. As Bourne (2008) reminds us, no matter how horizontal or weakly-framed instruction may be (and CU communication had one of the weakest framing values), instruction is essentially goal-directed. Curricula are staged and hierarchically sequenced. Superior learning stages are built on earlier experiences. In contrast to the horizontal discourses of everyday life, pedagogic discourse is vertical.

Because communication instruction presupposes organisation, attention to
procedures and respect for hierarchy during the teaching and evaluation stages, students who only possess restricted coding orientations encounter serious mastery problems. It is argued that students who possess a restricted coding orientation do not deal well with hierarchical relationships, preferring to engage in horizontal communication schemes. In contrast, students who possess an elaborated coding orientation achieve higher levels of mastery because they can appreciate the benefits that organisation, attention to procedures and respect for hierarchy bring to their learning.

Let me introduce here the double paradox students face in learning settings informed by either the weak or strong version of the communicative approach. In the case of the former, dominated by structural motive-activity, the instructor directs students to ask questions as if they were their own and approach activities in reflective-trial fashion, i.e., paying attention to the grammatico-pragmatic system. However, the questions must follow meticulously the instructional sequence of the instructional task. For example, students are requested to ask the language spoken in every single country shown on a map and answer their peers’ question in a specific way. Students are also required to refrain from introducing contents that are not contained in the instructional task. Are the questions formulated after being requested to make questions genuine questions? Not with regard to the contents of the instructional task, perhaps. However, as we have already seen, the relative freedom given to students to practise those structures opens a way for them to inquire about the theoretical underpinnings of the grammatico-pragmatic structure. The answer, if given by the instructor, tends to pull down the task into a foundation motive-activity. The instructor is unable to answer such a question in the target language and the fact that an answer is attempted implies introducing higher levels of reflection that undermine the object of structural motive-activity. Therefore, the activity, instead of going up the motive-activity structure, toward a functional motive-activity, goes down, to a foundation motive-activity.

In the case of the latter, that is, in a communication learning setting informed by the strong version of the communicative approach, the paradox is that students are
requested to draw on their personal experiences, act spontaneously, but approach the instructional task in a reflective-trial fashion, that is, systematically and paying attention to the grammatico-pragmatic system. However, unlike the prior case, the instructor gives more room for students to make changes to the instructional sequence. Spontaneity, nevertheless, is at the service of a representational function. Is that kind of spontaneity really spontaneous? Can a student be spontaneous if he or she is being asked to be spontaneous? The answer is no. The dialogues that develop under these constraints resemble the structured, ritualistic conversation about the weather or sports between a cab driver and a passenger. Yet, taking the initiative is important and eventually creating situations in which the cab driver-passenger dialogue can emerge is valued by the instructor. Unlike the former case, there are more possibilities to move up the motive-activity structure as the context of the framed conversation begins to be more familiar to students.

Thus, structural and functional motive-activities are intermediate positions that tend to move in opposite directions: the former, towards foundation motive-activity, the latter, toward rhetorical motive-activity.

6.2.3 A dialectical pedagogic identity

What kind of pedagogic identity do students have that enables them to cope well with the aforementioned contradictory directions within the zone of proximal foreign language development? First of all, by pedagogic identity we understand here the specific relationship between the student’s trajectory, orientation and desired vector of development. In other words, the past, present and intended (future) vector of development. The tentative answer to the question is that students who have a bipolar, grammar, elaborated or comprehensive orientation, that is, orientations that have in common the possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse, together with either the past or future preference for a socio-communicative vector of development, tend to cope better with both moves and with the contradiction that these moves present. We will say these students have a dialectical pedagogic identity. This implies that students who are able to recognise the value of approaching instructional tasks in a reflective trial
fashion but also are aware that one of the purposes of the activity is to have actual instances of communicative engagement with native speakers (or actual producers of Spanish discourse), tend to do better than those who do not have a representational orientation, even if they desire to have a communicative engagement with native speakers (or actual producers of Spanish discourse). In conclusion, their position is that of commitment (e.g. understand the means and ends of communication pedagogy) and therefore they are able to develop personal projects and therapeutic pedagogic identities. They are able to create social relations that contribute to their emancipation, objectivised or articulated here as a personal project.

Let us analyse this predicament more thoroughly. The representational function, being subsidiary to the socio-communicative function, contains it in condensed or syncretic form. In other words, theoretical conceptual development is only possible if the subject engages in experiential learning with and through the subject matter in problem-solving activity. The use of abstract categories does not necessarily amount to true conceptual understanding if they have not been learnt as part of a hierarchical system of generalisations. However, the use of actual theoretical concepts reflects by definition personal involvement in social relations or so-called experiential learning. We have to adopt here the Vygotskian view that concepts are socially developed, they do not reside in one’s head waiting to be activated, which is the view assumed by nativists. Therefore, when a student is able to grasp a theoretical notion, this means that he or she has gone through a process in which his or her everyday concepts have been reorganised through practical, social activity in order to understand a whole network of generalisations that cannot be, otherwise, spontaneously grasped. The possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse may be a symptom of the conceptual synthesis attained by the subject. The social therefore is contained in the theoretical concept, even though it remains hidden in its condensation of abstractness and concreteness. And this, by the way, is the reason why Vygotsky focused on theoretical conceptual development in the first place. True conceptual development presupposes a rearrangement of experience, a reorganisation of everyday referents or abstractions. This process, according to Vygotsky, begins
with learning a foreign language, learning how to write one’s own native speech and defining concepts.

This brings us back to the problem of the social in Vygotskian theory and why it is not completely true to point out that focusing on mind formation, especially on true conceptual development, equates to disregarding the social context, for the context, the social structure, is abbreviated in the theoretical notions (see chapter 4). Yet, the sociological stance is absolutely required if we want to understand why true conceptual development is elusive for learners that belong to a given profile, whilst it is not elusive at all for students who belong to another.

The present study has highlighted the difficulties that a significant segment of the student population has in attaining language mastery. I am not completely sure if a traditional SLA sociocultural approach could have been deployed to understand why a segment of the student population attains language mastery, whilst another does not. I tend to believe that a sociological approach, like the one I have attempted in this thesis, is better suited to address the problem, but of course, this is always debatable.

The possession of recognition rules for grammar instructional discourse seems to highlight the end result of a process of synthesis whereby the everyday referents linked to everyday concepts in the native language have already been relativised by the student by engaging in practical problems. It is not absolutely necessary for students to go through formal instruction in a foreign language’s grammar system to gain conceptual consciousness of the linguistic means of their native tongue as long as instruction is formal, that is, more explicit than implicit. If the instruction were implicit, then the student would build parallel linguistic systems and conceptual consciousness would diminish. My informal observation of foreign language education in Japan and the observation carried in the present study indicate that the theoretical conceptual systems deployed in language instruction, especially in grammar classes, are very weak, compared with the actual systemic hierarchisation that takes place in the fields of linguistics or pragmatics. Japanese students do not learn Japanese grammar and only begin to be acquainted with
grammatical terms when they approach the study of English. However, even that instruction is not theoretically-intensive, it tends to be formal and to rely on different ways of contrasting the foreign with the native language. The links between the native and the foreign language must be analysed in explicit ways for the pedagogic process to have a higher value in terms of producing conceptual awareness or consciousness. This requires from the student a favourable attitude, or at least a favourable understanding of the objectives and means, toward instruction with higher levels of hierarchisation in terms of instructional sequence and instructor-student relations. This is exactly the kind of instruction that students with an informal orientation (i.e., informal or restricted-communicative and communicative orientations) seem to avoid, as they prefer horizontal instructor-student relations.

6.3 PEDAGOGIC AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

6.3.1 Recommendations to practitioners

The weak and strong versions of the communicative approach and the code-communication dilemma, which view explicit and implicit instruction as opposite courses, reflect the dialectical contradiction between the top-down and bottom-up moves within the zone of proximal development. A general assessment of the status of SLA (see Ellis, 2008) reveals that SLA scholars and practitioners alike have treated these opposite moves as if they were exclusive. In Vygotskian theory, the opposite directions within the zone of proximal development are rather seen as complementary. In fact, development depends upon this contradiction and therefore instruction should be based on a double move (Hedegaard, 2002; Hedegaard and Chaiklin, 2005) between the upper and lower reaches of the zone of proximal development. Yet, the attainment of foreign language mastery at formal tertiary educational settings in Japan seems to depend to a higher degree upon the possession of a representational gaze, that is, a methodical and reflective approach to instructional tasks. This relativises the usefulness of both informal instruction by instructors and informal orientations toward instructional discourse by students. The apparent horizontality of communication instruction, or at least
its objectives, plays against those students who do not have a grammar orientation to instructional discourse. In cases of less elaborated coding instructional discourse (e.g. instructional discourse marked by the weakening of hierarchy, instructional sequence and contents), students with an informal orientation may believe that communicating in the target language is enough, whereas in actual fact they are being evaluated by their capacity to build operation upon operation in a hierarchical way, that is, they are required to possess a representational gaze. Thus, oral language practice at beginner’s level constitutes a form of inquiry detached from the socio-communicative function on which the task is based, such as the completion of a non-verbal task (e.g. solving functional problems: making a reservation, giving directions, describing people, etc.). In other words, students are placed in situations where they are compelled to use speech primarily as a socio-communicative tool, yet they have to approach the task looking at its potential to promote or consolidate their hypotheses about the grammatico-pragmatic system.

In light of these findings the place communication has in foreign language curricula in Japan should be reassessed to acknowledge the actual hierarchical sequence of study programmes and, particularly, learning settings specialising in teaching communication, whether they are informed by the strong or weak versions of communicative language teaching, at organisations both specialising and not specialising in foreign language education. The programmes of both types of organisations are, perhaps involuntarily, heavily based or pursue almost exclusively language’s representational function instead of language’s socio-communicative function, even in communication courses. Therefore, learners who have an informal approach to language learning soon lag behind their course peers as they are not able to understand the importance of approaching tasks in a reflective-trial fashion.

Furthermore, many doubts arise about the viability of non-representational-function approaches to foreign language learning for adult learners. There seems to be no way out of representational-function programmes, even though a majority of learners enrol in these programmes attracted by their
communication prospects. There is evidence to suggest that instructors’ pedagogies should care more for those students whose trajectories and orientations to meaning are informal. In this regard, instructional tasks that promote the bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development could help those students with an informal orientation to instructional discourse.

6.3.1.1 The bottom-up move within the zone of proximal development

What is then an instructional task that promotes bottom-up moves within the zone of proximal development? It consists of any task that compels the student to organise, contrast and analyse speech production in broad theoretical units (e.g., agreement, aspect and modality) so as to infer its grammatico-pragmatic principles. The task is introduced only after the successful completion of foundation, structural and functional motive-activity tasks, that is, after theoretical concepts have been made known, a contrastive discussion has taken place whereby the differences between the native and foreign language linguistic means are analysed, speech habits have been formed through structural drills and the completion of a non-verbal task has been carried out. It is a form of reverse engineering in which the product, speech, is analysed in order to extract its formal-systemic underpinnings. The analysis should be done with the help of materialised forms of semiosis, especially graphs, schemata, drawings, pictures and written speech, and involve different forms of verbalisation in the native and/or foreign language as well (e.g. students explaining each other what the underpinning rules or principles consist of), which, according to Gal’perin (1969), foster internalisation. Put another way, it is a rather more specialised rendition of the maxim that says that to teach is to learn twice. This time the student is teaching him or herself, and teaching fellow students as well. Thus, the use of schemata and verbal explanations to uncover the underlying principles of certain linguistic constructions help students reflect on rather invisible and ephemeral forms of production (i.e. implicit semiotic mediation). These forms seem to be reasonably clear to students who possess a representational gaze and therefore, the task is to target students who lack such a gaze.
I argue that the representational gaze is the locus of the intended foreign language development target set by the instructor, if we pay attention to: (a) the historical construction of ideal foreign language development; (b) the object of collective activity; (c) the goal of individual action; and (d) the technisation of operations. In consequence, ontogenesis and microgenesis become confounded because the student is never fully aware of the object of activity until he or she achieves mastery. This is realised by means of actual engagement in social practice through the opposition between true concepts (conceptual development) and everyday concepts (personal or experiential involvement). Conscious awareness is always realised \textit{a posteriori}. It is the outcome of activity (i.e. the concept) and, therefore, the representational gaze could be broadly and simply defined as \textit{intuition}.

Although it was not part of the present study, Escandón and Sanz (2011) have tested the efficacy of the bottom-up moves in a pedagogical application for teaching Spanish agreement with relative success. Escandón and Sanz’s study concludes that conceptualisations in the native language aimed at solving foreign language tasks play an important role in foreign language development. The data from the study also supports the idea that encouraging learners’ hypothesis-making in their native language, such as under forms of guided induction, helps them achieving oral language mastery.

\textit{6.3.1.2 Explicit evaluation criteria}

Tightening and making more explicit the evaluation criteria, so as to have students with an informal orientation gradually recontextualising their approaches under clear \textit{rules of engagement}, especially in communication courses, may also help to avoid them confounding communication instruction with informal learning.

The findings show that communication instructors rarely indicated the form future assessment would take. Even though there are sections in the syllabi of the communication courses that deal with assessment, these provide very general and abstract guidelines that do not include a clear idea of what is being assessed and how. The only course in which regular assessment was carried out was CU’s
grammar course. In BU’s grammar course it was not clear if homework was actually part of the final assessment method or not. Regular assessments allow students to have a clearer idea of what the requirements imposed by the instructor are and to change the way they approach instructional activities. Japanese students tend to be very conscious of the method of assessment, and some of them demand very clear outlines. The problem is that in communication courses those outlines are difficult to explain. Imagine someone trying to explain you with words the way you will be assessed after taking swimming lessons before you even get into the water for the first time. I believe a better way is actually to show short dramatised video clips of students carrying out the examination tasks and being assessed, shortly afterwards, by instructors, not unlike the kind of assessment that one sees in television shows such as The X Factor or America’s Next Top Model. I am not advocating here the use of scenes in which students who do badly are mocked by judges, but I believe that the kind of judgment instructors pronounce is very close to the kinds made by television show judges, for their judgment deals with areas of non-codified practice, a mix between science and art, between attitude and skills.

6.3.1.3 A clear division between grammar and communication

As we have already seen, the organisation that does not specialise in foreign language education seems to have problems establishing a clear curricular division between grammar and communication. Thus, in BU, neither the grammar nor the communication course targeted functional motive-activity, hampering students’ prospects of achieving oral mastery. In contrast, the division of labour at CU seemed more productive, as the instructors targeted differentiated motive-activities. This implies that a clear distinction between motive-activities at the time of planning and implementing a foreign language curriculum may work better than courses whose motive-activities overlap.

My only concern here is that the fact that CU’s instructors were tenured faculty may have made it easier for them to hold their ground, especially in the case of CU’s communication instructor, and enforce a clear distinction among motive-activity types. Furthermore, full-time instructors may have more
opportunity to develop a therapeutic pedagogic identity as they have more time to engage in private talk with students. In the case of CU’s communication instructor, she also delivers a seminar on linguistics, applied linguistics and pedagogy, which some of those first-year students may take when in their third year. Within the seminar, a tutor-student relationship develops, rather than an instructor-student one. Overall, there are, at CU, more opportunities to foster a more inclusive approach toward personal development, which are the conditions required to go up the motive-structure ladder, as functional motive-activity requires to face periods of frustration.

It is also worth mentioning that one way of dealing with this problem is by having students reflecting on the Japanese position in general. Thus, instructors may ask students about what Japanese do in general when they face a determined situation. This will encourage students to rationalise on the implicit world of the social and make explicit something that usually is never talked about, as it deals with context-tied situations such as ritualised forms of activity that escape conscious grasp. However, the process is still slower than expressing one’s personal position as in Western and Latin American societies. It requires codifying social behaviour in ways the anthropologist and the Japanese comedian do, but not every single individual is able or ready to do it. Therefore, by talking about the Japanese position in general students are allowed to mask their personal position and finally share the functional motive-activity object. Although the approach requires a slow reflective build-up, this may be better than instructors facing students’ silence.

6.3.1.4 The need for dominant activities

Introducing dominant activities or projects that link up grammar and communication instruction with non-pedagogic practical tasks may help students to reorganise instructional activity (see Robbins, 2003, pp. 81-87). For instance, having students conducting interviews with Spanish speakers and presenting the results to the class as a whole, communicating with Spanish speakers through video-conferencing or doing presentations about different topics to native Spanish speakers, are dominant activities that will help them connect with actual
communities in which Spanish discourse is produced. Robbins believes that ‘there is not one single dominant activity common to all college students’ and recommends that: ‘It is wise to organize a foreign language classroom along lines of trust, by allowing students to find their own dominant activity’ (p. 85). Overall, A.A. Leont’ev (1981) points out that the idea is going beyond communication and having the foreign language serving as ‘a medium which will engage the thought, perception and imagination of the learner’ (p. 65).

Whether carrying out that kind of activities is possible at the non-specialised organisation remains to be seen. Under current circumstances, it requires a major restructuring of study programmes. But specialised organisations may not have such a hard time introducing them.

6.3.1.5 Focusing on structural motive-activity

As already seen, students seem to explicitly test their hypotheses about the language’s grammatico-pragmatical system when carrying out instructional activities that belong to structural motive-activity, not whilst engaged in instructional activities that belong to foundation motive-activity. This is because a certain degree of freedom is given to students to carry out drills and exercises, a freedom that they do not have at the foundation motive-activity level and which allows them to ask questions of the instructors. Therefore, structural motive-activity should be seen not only as the instance when students build up linguistic habits but also the time when students verbalise theory and rules.

According to Gal’perin (1969, 1992c), verbalising theory or rules is a step in the right direction toward achieving forms of abbreviation and internalisation that allow students to have control of operations. The verbalising can be done more easily in the native language and therefore I believe grammar instructors should go beyond the kind of written structural drills they normally have students doing in class and engage in structural drills and exercises that create oral linguistic habits. If a foreign instructor with no command of Japanese (or the subject matter) is in charge of having students practising those drills and exercises, students may
refrain from asking questions, as they could perceive the instructor is unable to actually answer them. But more importantly, the introduction of structural drills in the communication class may compromise the actual targeting of functional motive-activity, which is vital to produce higher levels of technisation (i.e. actions become abbreviated and automatic), unless the communication instructor clearly divides the instructional time in two: structural motive-activity and functional motive-activity. I believe that mixing both is not a good idea.

6.3.1.6 Caution about deploying the trajectory, orientation and identity categories in an essentialist fashion

Constructs such as informal trajectory, orientation or identity are non-essentialist but relational categories. They have been established by comparing groups of students within particular activity systems. Although I have created an inventory to ascertain students who may lack a representational gaze and therefore may present problems in approaching instructional tasks in a reflective manner, I proceed with caution and try to avoid an essentialist labelling of them. It is worth remembering that proving that a student has an informal trajectory does not imply that he or she has an informal orientation. One should carefully analyse all data about the student: trajectory, orientation and identity (please review the theoretical rational below). The inventory is adjusted to the Japanese case. I recommend researchers and practitioners develop their own inventories, adjusted to their own pedagogic settings and realities, so as to not apply reified notions onto students and preserve the whole complexity of the problem.

6.3.2 Theoretical implications

6.3.2.1 The model

The interface between Bernstein’s code theory, cultural-historical activity theory and Holland et al.’s (2001) cultural theory seemed helpful in various ways. First, it helped determining pedagogical contexts across organisations, enabling the comparison of particular forms of discourse and improving somewhat the generalisation of the study’s findings. Furthermore, a relatively clear language of
description of the SLA notion of communicative language teaching was produced within the theoretical framework of the dialectical tradition. This language of description could be deployed by researchers in order to establish a basic blueprint of foreign language learning contexts that avoids confounding them. Second, I argue that it facilitated ascertaining the social positioning of the subject so as to explain how the position (i.e. educational trajectories; orientations) became – more fixed – dispositions (i.e. pedagogic identities). Yet, these pedagogic identities must be understood as non-essentialist constructions. Positions change depending on the relationship between students’ trajectories and orientations, instructional discourse, targeted vectors of development by instructors, and students’ desired vectors of development. Determining the trajectory of a student does not say much about his or her mastery prospects if it is not accompanied by a thorough assessment of the subject position, that is, the assessment must include all the aforementioned categories. Moreover, what applies in Japan’s tertiary foreign language education institutions may not be valid in another context. As already pointed out, the possession of recognition rules for instructional discourse is a relative measure, not an absolute diagnosis, as it relies on establishing relative degrees of recognition according to each course’s arithmetic mean. Before labelling a student as belonging to an informal trajectory or orientation, or a non-dialectic pedagogic identity, a complete assessment of all the student population in a given context must be carried out.

Second, I argue that the adoption of A.A. Leont’ev’s (1981) views on foreign language development as a psychological function whose motive-action varies according to the general type of activity (from speech activity to communication activity, going through discrete speech acts and speech acts as part of non-verbal communication activity) permitted an analytical representation of discourse, such as determining particular messages (framing) according to the structural level of activity being focused on. Moreover, setting motive-action as the unit of analysis allowed the adoption of a non-naturalistic framework to study classroom interaction or any other pedagogical relation in its social dominion. This was a way to put an end to a naturalistic view of (interaction) time (e.g. framing categories as a percentage of natural time) and allowed an analysis of interaction
according to functions. At the same time, this unit – being at the intersection between activity and action/operation – comprised the complexities of both ontogenesis and microgenesis.

The ethnographic part of the study, which was based on Holland et al.’s (2001) notion of *figured worlds*, also contributed to make more explicit hidden cultural aspects that could not be addressed either by the deployment of Bernstein’s code theory or by the use of cultural-historical activity theory alone. In fact, the combination of figured worlds, Bernstein’s code theory and activity theory’s notions on the structure of activity shed a light on the rules that emerged in each of the organisations/learning settings being studied, contributing to describe how those settings were *figured* by instructors and students. It was stimulating to see how the findings that stem from the quantitative use of Bernstein’s code theory matched the results from the qualitative part of the study based on *figured worlds*, both expanding the analytical power of cultural-historical activity theory.

I argue that the use of Bernstein’s code theory in combination with cultural-historical activity theory’s notions on the structure of activity and Holland et al.’s (2001) notion of *figured world* helped develop strong internal and external languages of description, paying respect to all the merits of the theoretical bodies that were chosen but giving voice to the views that stem from the participants themselves, constituting a truly dialectical approach to pedagogical research within the limitations given by restricted access to student participants (the case in BU) or the fact that the longitudinal case study of one organisation (AU) collapsed in the middle of the data collection process due to its curricular reprogramming (see chapter 4).

### 6.3.2.2 Bernstein’s code theory

Bernstein’s hypothesis about the structural conditions of educational organisations modulating subject position, social relations and discourse and therefore shaping individual consciousness and activity were empirically tested in the present study. It can be temporarily concluded therefore that active realisation or mastery is
predicated on the subject’s ability to recognise the rules of pedagogical context, which in turn is moderated by trajectory (i.e. social class). Thus, the individual consciousness, expressed as orientations, upon which mastery depends, is moderated by the educational trajectory of the subject.

In light of the findings that seem to confirm that trajectory, as an intermediate category, moderates recognition and realisation, the coding orientations \( O \), below) to instructional discourse exist in this form:

\[
O = \frac{r I^{\pm F} / r R^{\pm F}}{T^E}
\]

Where \( r \) refers to the passive realisation (i.e., the possession of recognition rules for instructional discourses), \( I \) represents instructional discourse, \( R \) represents regulative discourse, \( \pm F \) refers to the strength of framing, \( T \) refers to trajectory, and \( E \) refers to elaborated code (from restricted to elaborated).

Thus active realisation or mastery is fundamentally a function of orientation (pedagogic consciousness). Orientation, in turn, is predicated on passive realisation (or recognition) of instructional and regulative discourse. The trajectory element of orientation reflects the dialectical relation between activity and knowledge, since trajectory is marked by leading activity, that is, by activity that reconfigures action and from which concepts in different form emerge (from pseudo-concepts to true or theoretical concepts) depending on how local/organic or universal/mechanic social relations are, representing different vectors of development.

Concepts (knowledge) are not passive acquisition but the end result of activity. The empirical accounts of the present study seem to reflect that trajectories are dominated by the divide between school knowledge and everyday knowledge or between commonsense knowledge and uncommonsense knowledge, which,
according to Bernstein, are ultimately modulated by social class.

6.3.2.3 Further research

The study calls for at least two major follow-up studies. The first one would comprise the elaboration of an inventory of orientations addressing foreign language pedagogies at the tertiary level in places other than Japan. The aim of this would be the possibility of determining students’ orientations toward practice right from the outset, identifying those with restricted coding orientations (i.e., informal or communicative orientations). This could be followed up with specific plans to address those students’ lack of adequate conceptual development, including (a) the strengthening of, or making more explicit the evaluation criteria and (b) the use of tasks or, more importantly, leading activities that would ensure the occurrence of bottom-up moves within the zone of proximal development, which could help students with restricted-coding orientation to switch to elaborated coding orientations.

The second follow-up involves the study of the hidden build-up that happens among students in its relation with conceptual development, within the internalisation framework given by Gal’perin. Such a study should pay attention to the way students verbalise relevant hypotheses, helping in the transition from a more material rendition of learning actions to one that occurs purely at an intellectual level, in other words, how particular forms of external speech modulate conceptual development. This could include the study of students who do collaborate in the sharing of hypotheses and those who do not.

Weak framing of regulative discourse in communication courses seem to represent a particular form of instruction where the contradiction between implicit and explicit mediation is noticeable. The instructional part of discourse deals, on the one hand, with categorical thinking – a representational function – (e.g. the morphological difference between masculine or feminine adjectives), but the regulative part, on the other hand, calls tacitly for horizontal forms of participation – a socio-communicative function – (e.g. requesting students’ participation, opinion, elaboration in front of everyone else), especially demanding the
participation of the class as a whole. The instructional part corresponds to visible mediation, whereas the regulative part corresponds to invisible mediation. This kind of mediation seems recurrent at foundation and structural motive-activity levels at both BU and CU communication courses.

CU’s grammar course, on the other hand, represents an extreme example of strong framing of both instructional and regulative discourses. For example, students asked the instructor no questions at all. The instructor asserts himself as the main knower. However, the instructor leaves enough freedom for students to talk through the rules in a collaborative fashion. Students, especially in pairs, do interpret and comment in their own words upon the contents being taught. This context constitutes a clear example of how strong framing does not necessarily mean that some degree of control is exerted by students, especially when they comment upon the contents being taught and engage in hypothesis testing in a collaborative fashion, which constitutes a second, parallel zone of proximal development, especially at foundation and structural motive-activity levels.

Hypothesis testing and therefore internalisation of rules seems to be, on the one hand, first and foremost the consequence of the dialogue established between the instructor and individual students or between the instructor and the class as a whole, and, on the second hand, on the hypothesis testing and rule sharing between students. In other words, internalisation may not only be a consequence of the instructor-student interaction but a consequence of the student-student interaction as well, adding complexity to the notion of pedagogic discourse. Thus, pedagogy can be defined as a particular form of problem solving whereby students draw on different kinds of resources.

Students do engage in joint activity that unfolds in parallel to the instructor’s discourse. Thus, students may place themselves beside the instructor, shadowing his or her discourse with interpretations and commentaries that help them to orientate toward the task or acquire grammatical or pragmatic rules. This sort of parallel space where the shadowing of instructors’ discourse takes place represents a hidden build-up in foreign language development. It is more likely to occur
naturally in a grammar class, since it is more likely that the instructor does not forbid the use of the native language. In a communication class, however, the instructor may ban the use of the native language, urging the creation of speech acts in the target language. Because communication instructors are so focused on what they expect from students (textual production in the target language) and disregard what is forbidden or undesirable (e.g., the muttering of a word in the student's native tongue) and what actually takes place in the classroom, they may not pay attention to the actual inter-mental build-up taking place in spontaneous or guided collaborative activities. This does not mean that the inter-mental build-up does not take place in a class where the use of the native language has been banned but it does in a different way. The interpreting and commenting in the native language in this particular case may take the form of covert chatting during class, or develop after the class has finished. Unfortunately, this form of hidden build-up may be confused with students’ engaging in disruptive practices in cases were learning resistance is widespread. Allowing the shadowing of teaching contents may help to boost a needed hidden inter-mental build-up but also it may be confused by students with a call to engage in disruptive (including passive) behaviour.
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APPENDIX 4A: LEARNING TRAJECTORIES QUESTIONNAIRE AND CONSENT FORM

Questionnaire Number:

**Questionnaire**

*Students’ language learning history and the way they study Spanish*

**Information**

Present questionnaire is one of two questionnaires which are part of a research project conducted by Arturo Escandón (University of Bath, United Kingdom) on the subject of *Students’ language learning history and the way they study Spanish*. Present questionnaire will be followed by another questionnaire at the end of the course. The data collected in both questionnaires will be used to analyse how different students interact in different classroom settings and eventually will be part of a research paper or publication.

The questionnaire form has been delivered to you by your teacher. However, your teacher has agreed to collect the questionnaires, put them in a specially secured envelop, seal the envelope in front of the students and mail the questionnaires to me, the researcher, without inspecting or reading them.

The information and your identity will be kept confidential. No information you provide or your identity will be disclosed to any other party but the researcher. Furthermore, no identifiable personal data will be published.

Thank you in advance for taking your time on this matter. Your help is appreciated and I hope the data collected will help to enhance language programmes in Japanese universities. I will keep track of your answers and I hope you help me out again at the end of the course.

Best,

*Arturo Escandón*

**Consent/Withdrawal from study**

I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published. The identifiable data will not be shared with any other organisation.

I also understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

I give my consent voluntarily and I wish to participate in this research project:

Name: .........................................................................................................
INFORMATION

Please read the following questions carefully and write your answers as detailed as possible. If there is no room in the space provided after the question, you can write the question number at the end of the form in the space provided for comments and continue with your answer. You can also choose to write comments on this questionnaire at the end of the form.

1. Can you tell me what do you, as a student, do in this class?

2. What activities are conducted in this class?

3. What does the Spanish language teacher make students do in this class?

4. What activities do you do in collaboration with other students (if any) and which activities do you on your own (if any)?

5. What kind of learning activities would you like to do in class that is not being done so far?

6. Which activities done in class do you recognise as having helped you to learn?

7. From your experience before taking this course, do you remember any activity or situation that really helped you learn a foreign language?

8. From your experience before taking this course, can you tell me of a satisfactory or enjoyable moment you had while learning a foreign language?

9. Can you compare the way you studied a foreign language before taking this course and the way you do it now? Which way do you think is better?

10. If you were the teacher in this class, what would you make students do?

COMMENTS
APPENDIX 4B: PROFESSIONAL TRAJECTORY AND PEDAGOGIC ORIENTATION, AND ORGANISATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND FRAMING RELATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Note: 1. Questions were originally written in English and then translated into Spanish and Japanese. The three renditions are contained here. The Japanese version was given to participants but was ignored by them, who preferred addressing the questions in Spanish. 2. Questions on professional trajectory and pedagogic orientation are based on Wertsch (1998), Bernstein (1996) and Griffin and Cole (1984); questions on classification and framing relations are based on Bernstein (2000); questions on the labelling of acquirers are based on Bernstein (1996) and Holland et al. (2001).

Coding: A (classification), a (framing)

(1) Personal and professional trajectory
1.1 Can you tell me how you became a Spanish language teacher?
1.1 ¿Me podrías contar cómo fue que te hiciste profesor(a) de español?
1.1 あなたがどのようにしてスペイン語教師になったか教えて頂けますか？

(0) Course information
0.1 What is the title of the class, what does it consist of, which days is it taught and at what time?
0.2 ¿Cómo se llama la clase, de qué se trata, qué días se hace y a qué hora?
0.3 ご担当の授業科目名は何ですか？それは何曜日の何時間目ですか？

(2) Perfection-development
2.1 What would you like the students to learn from this class?
2.1 ¿Qué te gustaría que tus estudiantes aprendieran en esta clase?
2.1 あなたの学生にその授業で何を学んで欲しいと思いますか？

(3) Pedagogic orientation
3.1. What are the most important things language teachers have to take into account when teaching?
3.1. ¿Qué es lo más importante que los profesores de español deben tener en cuenta cuando enseñan?
3.1 スペイン語教師が教える際に考慮すべき最も重要な事は何ですか？

(4) Theories or conceptions of instruction
4.1 What is the best way for your students to learn Spanish?
4.1. ¿Cuál es la mejor manera que tus estudiantes deberían seguir para aprender español?
4.1 スペイン語を学習するためにあなたの学生はどうするのが最良の方法ですか？

(5) Their labelling of students/ ‘figured world’ of acquirers (e.g., conscientious, attentive, industrious; creative, interactive, attempts to make his or her own mark)
5.1. For you, what are the characteristics good students must have in order to do well in your class?
5.1. Para ti, ¿cuáles son las características que los buenos estudiantes deben tener para que les vaya bien en tu clase?
5.1 あなたにとっては、優秀な学生があなたの授業でうまくいくために備えておくべき特性は何ですか？
5.2. What must your students do in your class to succeed?
5.2. ¿Qué es lo que tus estudiantes deben hacer en clase para que tengan buen éxito?
5.2 好成績を収めるためにあなたの学生が授業ですべき事は何ですか？

(Dd) Teacher-teacher (horizontal)
D. 1 What part do you play in the language programme?
D.1 その大学のスペイン語のカリキュラムにおいてあなたはどんな役割を果たしていますか？

d.1 How is the communication between teachers who share the same programme?
d.1 ¿Cómo es la comunicación entre los profesores que comparten el mismo programa?
d.1 同じカリキュラムで一緒に教えている教師間のコミュニケーションはどうなっていますか？

(Ee) Teacher-teacher (vertical)
E.1. How does the curriculum get designed in the institution you are teaching?
E.1 その大学ではカリキュラムはどのように作成されていますか？

E.2. Is your performance as a teacher assessed? By whom?
E.2 あなたのお仕事は評価されていますか？誰が評価を行っていますか？

(e) Who make the decisions about the curriculum? Do you take part in that process?
e.1 ¿Quiénes toman las decisiones acerca del currículum? ¿Tomas parte en ese proceso?
e.1 カリキュラムについての決定は誰が行いますか？あなたはその過程に参加していますか？

(e) How is your relationship with other participants of the educational process (e.g. other teachers, managers)?
e.2. ¿Cómo es tu relación con otros participantes del proceso educativo?
e.2 あなたと、教育活動に関わっている他の人々（その大学の同僚講師、教務担当者など）とはどのように関わりあっていますか？

(e) Which textbooks or materials do you use in class?
e.3 ¿Qué libros de texto u otros materiales usas en la clase?
e.3 あなたは授業中に、どんな教科書もしくは他の教材を使っていますか？

(e) How textbooks or materials are selected in the department?
e.4 ¿Cómo se seleccionan los libros de texto o materiales en el departamento?
e.4 学科の中で、教科書や教材はどのようにして選択されていますか？

(Ff) Between subjects
F. 1. Do you feel your teaching can be situated within a determined discipline (Grammar, Linguistics, Communication, Pedagogy, Literature, History, etc.)?
F.1 あなたの教授活動はある決められた分野（文法、言語学、コミュニケーション、教授法、文学、歴史、その他）の中に位置づけられますか？その場合、どの分野ですか？
f.1 How do you think what your colleagues do in their classes differs from what you do?

f.1 ¿En qué medida crees que lo que hacen tus colegas en sus clases difieren de lo que tú haces en las tuyas?

f.1 （同じ大学のスペイン語の）同僚が彼らの授業で行っていることと、あなたがあなたの授業で行っていることとでは、どのような点で異なっていると思いますか？

(Gg) Within a discipline

G.1. Do you feel comfortable teaching grammatical and communication contents concurrently or you feel it’s better for you to stick to one discipline?

G.1. ¿Te sientes cómodo(a) enseñando contenidos gramaticales y comunicativos a la vez o te sientes mejor ciñéndote a solo una disciplina?

G.1 あなたは、文法とコミュニケーションの内容を同時に教える方が教えやすいですか？それとも、1つの分野だけに限る方が教えやすいですか？

g.1 Do you control what you have to teach or would you rather follow a pre-determined programme?

g.1. ¿Tienes control de lo que tienes que enseñar o tienes que seguir más bien un programa determinado?

g.1 あなたは、教えなければならない内容を自分で調整できますか？それとも、むしろ決めた授業計画（シラバス）に従わなければなりませんか？

(Hh) College - communities of practice

H.1. Do you believe the Spanish learned in your university is fundamentally different to what students can learn in other local associations where Spanish is used, such as immigrant communities, sports associations, dance clubs, etc.?

H.1. ¿Crees que el español que se aprende en tu universidad difiere fundamentalmente del español que los estudiantes pueden aprender en otras asociaciones locales donde se usa el español, tales como colonias de inmigrantes, clubes deportivos, clubes de baile, etc.?

H.1 あなたの大学で学ぶスペイン語は、学生たちが実際にスペイン語の使われる場（移民居住地、スポーツクラブ、ダンスクラブなど）で覚えるかもしれないスペイン語と、基本的に異なると考えますか？

(ii) College - colleges

i.1. Does the Spanish language programme in your university prepare students to further learn Spanish through other institutions overseas (universities, language schools, exchange programmes)?

i.1. El programa de lengua española de tu universidad prepara a los estudiantes para que continúen aprendiendo español en otras organizaciones extranjeras (universidades, escuelas de idiomas, programas de intercambio)?

i.1 あなたの大学のスペイン語のカリキュラムでは、学生たちが外国にある他の教育機関（大学、語学学校、交換留学プログラム）でスペイン語学習を継続するのに備えるようになっているですか？

(J) College - Employers

j.1 Do you feel your course will have some impact on the students’ performance in the labour market?

j.1. ¿Crees que el curso que impartes repercutirá en la forma de inserción de los estudiantes en el mercado de trabajo?

j.1 あなたが教えている授業は、学生が仕事をみつけたり彼らが将来の仕事で活躍できるようになったりするのに役立つだろうと思いますか？

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K.1. When your students profit from your class, where do you imagine they can use their acquired language skills?

K.1. En caso de que tus estudiantes saquen partido de tu clase, ¿dónde imaginas que ellos podrán usar las habilidades lingüísticas adquiridas?

K.1 あなたの学生があなたの授業を生かす場があるとすれば、習得した言語的技能をどのような場で使うことができると想像しますか？
APPENDIX 4C: VALIDATION OF DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL ORDER RULES DESCRIPTIONS

Notes: 1. The teacher orders attributes or indicators written on small cards according to two scales. On the first one (left), the scale goes from high to low familiarity (or agreement) with the practices indicated. On the second one (right), the scale goes from high teacher control to high student control. 2. Items are coded F++ for strongly framed; F+ for not so strongly framed; F-- for weakly framed and F- for not so weakly framed.
## APPENDIX 4D: STUDENTS’ TRAJECTORY AND FIGURED WORLD OF LEARNING INTERVIEWS, TRANSCRIPTION, CU COMMUNICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>はい、英語…</td>
<td>K.A.: Yes, I have studied English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英語、どこで？</td>
<td>Researcher: English? Where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自宅か、学校で、です。</td>
<td>K.E.: At home or at school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>そう。</td>
<td>Researcher: OK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>学校で勉強しました。</td>
<td>K.A.: I studied at school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>おなじみは？</td>
<td>Researcher: Same situation? OK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>勉強するために、楽しいことがありますか？楽しいときがありますか？</td>
<td>Researcher: Is there anything you enjoy while studying? Any moment that you enjoy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>勉強するときですか？</td>
<td>K.A.: While I am learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>何か楽しい？</td>
<td>Researcher: What do you enjoy about it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>覚えたものを実際に使ったりして通じたときが楽しい。</td>
<td>K.K.: I enjoy when I use an expression that I have learned and to be understood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>覚えたことを使って、問題が解けたりすると、身につけるんだ、っていうのが実感できて、すごく楽しいです。</td>
<td>K.E.: Solving questions using what I have learned, I can feel I am learning and I enjoy a lot this sensation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK.前のときと今回違いますか？大学の前と</td>
<td>Researcher: OK. Is there any change before and after university?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>あまり変わらないと思います。</td>
<td>K.A.: No. I do not believe there is a big change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自分が勉強、もともと自が勉強していても、今も自が好きでやってるから、でも、英語は少し知っているが勉強してただけど、スペイン語は何も知らないところでやっていで英語をやるよりも楽しいです。</td>
<td>K.E.: I was studying before because I wanted to, and now I also study because I want to. But, when I studied English, I had some knowledge, but in Spanish, I really started from 0, that is why I enjoy it more than English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>これは、図表を描きましたね、K.A.ね。これは、スペイン語のレベルはどこですか？マイナス、プラスがこちら。今はどこですか？ちょっとマークしてください。自分のレベルは？</td>
<td>Researcher: This is a graph. K.A. in this graph, Where is your level of Spanish? Here is low and here high. Where is the current level? Show me here... where is your level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>そう？まあ、丸してください。</td>
<td>Researcher: Really? Then, mark it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ゼロと…ですか？</td>
<td>Zero and…?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ゼロは一番マイナスですね、一番下。</td>
<td>Zero is the lowest level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>それは大丈夫ですね。</td>
<td>That is the middle level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>もろもろ、多分ゼロではないでしょう。ちょっと上ぐらい？</td>
<td>K.A.: Native...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>わたし、ちょっと上げる。ここかな。</td>
<td>K.A.: A little higher, more and less... I would be here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>そう、あの一番上のレベルできるためには、何をしますか？自分で</td>
<td>Researcher: OK. What would you do to reach the highest level? By yourself?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>まだ、ぜんぜん単語もそんなにたくさん覚えているわけじゃないし、文法も使っているわけじゃないから、そういったところしっかりやって行かないと、本当に実践しないといけないと思います。</td>
<td>K.A.: Still I have not learned a lot of vocabulary, or acquired the skill to use grammar. So, at the same time in order to improve these points, I would also have to practice properly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ケイスケは、自分のレベルは？</td>
<td>Researcher: What about you, K.E.? What is your level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>難しいなあ、1にしとこう。</td>
<td>K.E.: Very difficult... I mark 1...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>エフハハ。</td>
<td>Ahaha...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>難しい、これ。</td>
<td>K.E.: It is difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>いい、そう、上に行くためには</td>
<td>Researcher: Yes, it is. And in order to improve your level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>まさで、単語も文法もまだ知らないんで、とりあえずそれ</td>
<td>K.E.: Honestly, I still do not know have</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
はい、言語を学ぶことに、一番大事なものは何かですか？

Researcher: OK. What is the most important thing about learning a new language?

自分が楽しんでやりたかったと思います。

K.A. I think that is to study while enjoying.

ええと、自分の気持ちを伝えようとする意欲って言うか気持ち、どうにかして自分のことを判ってもらいたいって言うのと、相手のことを分かりたいって言う気持ちが大事だと思います。

K.E. Well, the intention or the will to communicate what I feel, somehow to be understood and at the same time, wanting to understand others. That is the important thing.

OK、ありがとうございました。これだけです。

Researcher: OK. Thanks. That is all.

Y.とY.T., OK。他の言語を前に勉強しましたか？

Researcher: Y. y Y.T. OK. Have you studied any other language?

前にですから？ないです。英語だけです。


どこで？

Researcher: Where?

日本です。授業だけです。

Y.T.: In Japan. Only in classes.

高校とかで。

Researcher: When?

高校まで英語やってて。

Y.: I have studied English until primary and…

おんじんですね。

Researcher: Same… right?

あの、ええと、前に勉強したときに楽しいことはありましたか？

Was there anything you liked when you studied before?

Y.T.: English?

うん。

Researcher: Yes.

僕は英語の発音が好きだったんで、こう聞いたとおりの発音が出来ると話せるようになった、って思うし、たまに話す機会があったんだけど、話していてYour English is very good. とか言われると、やって良かったなって思いましたね。

Y.T.: I liked English pronunciation, and when I felt I could pronounce as I heard, I could confirm that I was learning how to speak. Sometimes I had the chance to speak in English and if I was told "Your English is very good", I said to myself, "It was worth it" or something like that.

僕はなんか勉強してて、文法とか覚えていくんですけど、英語の意味が分かるのもいいんですけど、個人的に洋楽とか聴くんで、歌詞を見てその意味が分かるのが凄くうれしくて、なんか楽しめる幅が広がったか。そういうのが楽しかったと思います。

Y.: I learned grammar by heart, etc., to study English and of course, I was happy to understand English, but mainly, I felt very happy to understand song's lyrics, because I listen to foreign music. It is like my enjoyable world becomes bigger…. That was what I really liked.

前勉強してたときと今の勉強は違うことがありますか？

Researcher: Any change before and now regarding study?

大学と高校でってことですか？

Y.T.: Comparing primary and university?

うん。

Researcher: Yes.

高校の勉強は受験のための英語だから、すごい硬いものだったし、実際日常生活で使うような単語を勉強する代わりに、日常生活で必要なイディオムとか慣用句、慣用的な表現とか知らなくて、で、今は英会話と受験の英語のギャップが凄くてぜんぜん話せないから、改めて英語をがんばらないといけないな、って思うのを感じます。

Y.T.: Study at primary was training for entrance examination training and it was something very… serious, studying words that we will never use in our daily lives. On the other hand we did not know idioms, expressions. But now there is a big difference between conversation in English and English for test, so we have to make again a new effort in English.

ええ、図表を作りましょう。自分のレベルは、これはマイナスね、これは一番上。自分の今の…スペイン語

Researcher: Now, we are going to draw the graph to mark your own level. Here is low and here is high level.
同じですか？
Researcher: Same?
あはは。
I see...
ああ？
Y.T.: First of all, it would be to learn grammar and increase vocabulary. Then, practice conversation.
同じだと思う。やっぱ知識だけじゃダメだと思うんで、留学してみて、いろんな人としゃべることで上達すると思うんです。
Y.: I agree. It does not help if I have only the knowledge, so I want to study abroad and by talking to several people, I would improve the level.
はい。正しい勉強をするために、何をしますか？
Researcher: OK. What would you do to study properly?
具体的にってことですか？
Y.T.: Specifically?
まずは、文法の授業をしっかり受けることと、あとは語学は自分で勉強しないと伸びないと思うから、自分で単語とか覚えることと、あとは会話の機会が今はそんなにないから、それは留学に行ってがんばりたいと思います。
"Listening to", including the option of studying abroad. I want to have interest on many things and make efforts.
はい。ありがとうございました。それだけ。
Researcher: Yes, thanks. That's all.
Muchas gracias.
De nada.
Ah muy bien. Están aprendiendo.
Very good. You are learning.
OK. S.,左手はA。あんたの言語を勉強しましたか？英語とか。
Researcher: OK. S. The one on my left side (left hand) is A. It’s the same question, but have you ever study other language, like English?
英語だけ。
S.: Only English.
英語だけ？スペイン語は勉強しなかったですか？
Researcher: Only English? Haven’t you study Spanish?
していないです。
S.: No.
私も高校のときは英語だけ。
S.: Also in pre-school just English.
はい、それから、前の言語を勉強するときに楽しいことがありましたか？
Researcher: And was there something you liked when you studied that language?
英語ですか？
S.: English?
そうそう。
Researcher: Yes, yes.
ええと、自分で覚えた単語とかフレーズとかが、ネイティブの人と話したときに通じたときが一番面白かったです。それでなんか自分が少しは上達したなぁ、っていうのがわかった。
S.: oh, when I can make understand the native speaker what I am trying to tell by using the words or phrases learned. That was the moment I enjoyed the most. Thus I knew that I was improving a bit at least.
ネイティブとはどこで話しましたか？
Researcher: Where have you talked to the native speaker?
学校のネイティブの人とか。
S.: With a native speaker at school.
それは普通の授業でしたか？
Researcher: In a regular class?
それは自分で行って、放課後とか。
S.: I went personally, e.g. after school.
私は中学校のときに一度アメリカに行って、そのときに自分はぜんぜん英語がしゃべれなくて、楽しい思いでもあったけれども、言葉が通じないというつらい思いもして、で勉強を重ねて高校のときに1年アメリカにまた1年留学に行って、1年終わっていろんな人としゃべるようになって、言葉を使って自分の世界を広げられていく中などを見て、それで言葉を使って楽しいな、と思いました。
A: I went to United States once when I was in high school, I couldn’t do nothing English. It is a good memory, but also it was hard not to be able to communicate. So I started to study and now when I was attending high school, I stayed one year there to study. By the end of that year, I could talk to several people and by so I knew that with language I could expand my world. This experience made me think that it is fun to learn languages.
楽しいな、とね。
Researcher: "Fun", right?
前の勉強と今の勉強の違いはありますか？
Any difference between the previous and current...
相変わらずで、ないです。

S.: More and less the same and there is no change.

前の勉強？

A.: Previous study?

英語の勉強と

English study…

スペイン語と？

A.: In comparison to the Spanish study?

スペイン語のほうが難しいです。

A.: Spanish is more difficult.

でも教えるシステムは同じですか？

Researcher: But, is the teaching system the same one?

うーん、ちょっと違うかもしれない。あの、英語は最初やるときにまったくネイティブの人とかかわりなくじまったけど、今はネイティブの先生の授業もあって、もっと実際的なスペイン語を学んでいる感じがします。

違うことありますか？

Researcher: Any change?

英語とスペイン語で？

S.: Between English and Spanish?

英語とスペイン語の、教えるシステムの違いで。教育

方法。

Researcher: Different teaching system between English and Spanish language.

えっと、特にないです。

S.: Well, nothing in particular.

OK。ええと自分のレベルは、これは一番下でこれが一番上だとするとどこですか？

Researcher: OK. If this is the lowest and this is the highest level, where is your level at?

そう、ええと。これから一番上に行くのに自分で何を

しますか？

OK, What would you do to reach the highest level?

どこか、ネイティブの人たちと話す機会を増やして、機会を…覚えるんじゃなくて、使うことに専念する。

S.: More than anything, create more opportunities to speak with native speakers and it is not only to learn by heart, but dedicate to use them…

はい、自分の

Researcher: Yes, yours?

今の自分のレベルから一番上に行くために何をしますか？

What would you do to reach the highest level?

今はとりあえず、自分が知っている言葉をフルに使っ

てしゃべろうとすることは出来るんだけど、知ってる言

葉があまりにも少ないので、語彙を増やすことをがん

ばりたいと思います。

A.: At the moment, I can try to talk using the words I know, but it is so little my vocabulary. So, I want to focus on improving vocabulary.

最後に、正しい勉強をするためには何が一番大事でし

ようか？何でしょう

Researcher: Finally, What is the most important thing to study properly?

一番大事なのは、いきなり一番上を目指すんじゃなくって、着実にひとつずつクリアしていく事が大事

S.: The most important thing is to make progress meeting the requirements step by step… not wanting to get to the highest level from the beginning.

はい

Researcher: Yes.

ちょっと最近勉強をサボりがちになっていましてので、必ずしもがんばりたいと思います。

A.: Lately, I am a bit lazy, so I have to make an extra effort.

はい、うん、これまでです。ありがとうございました。

Muchas gracias

Researcher: Yes, so far. Thanks a lot.

De nada.

S. and A.: You are welcome.

Muchas gracias a todos.

Researcher: Thanks everybody.

R.N.の右、K.ね。左。

OK。質問は、ええと、他の言

語を勉強しましたか？

Researcher: R.N. to the right. K. to the left. OK. The question is: Have you ever studied another language?

他の言語？

Other language?

今のスペイン語ですね？他の言葉は？

Now, you are studying Spanish, but another language?

英語だけ

K.: Only English.

英語だけ？

Researcher: Only English?

はい

K.: Yes.

あと、教えてもらったわけではないんですが、Xの番組とかイタリア語をちょっとやったことがありますけど。

R.: And it is not that nobody has taught me, but I have studied a little of Italian by watching the X program.

Xで、どれくらい？

Researcher: Ah, X... How long?

半年くらいでやんなくたかった。ちょっとだけ。


半年くらい。

R.: Half a year.
そのとき X 先生を見たんじゃない？多分ね。凄い有名ですよね。

受講した。

英語はどこで？

中学、高校と。

中学校のときに1ヶ月アメリカ行きました。

海外に行ったことは？

ないです。

ええと、前の英語を勉強したとき、英語とイタリア語を勉強したときに楽しいことがありましたか？

楽しいこと？

しゃべる授業は楽しそうでした。文法とじゃないね。

しゃべる？

Oral communication。

ああ、Oral communication。

英文、本とか英語で書かれてる本とか新聞を読めるようになったのが嬉しいかったです。

で、いくつの授業があるのね。昔の授業と、今の教育システム、教育法は違うだろうか？

海外に行ったことは？

No。

ええと、前の英語を勉強したとき、英語とイタリア語を勉強したときに楽しいことがありましたか？

楽しいこと？

しゃべる授業は楽しそうでした。文法とじゃないね。

しゃべる？

Oral communication。

ああ、Oral communication。

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で、いくつの授業があるのね。昔の授業と、今の教育システム、教育法は違うだろうか？

あ、でも高校のときは学校がオーラルをやらなくて。受験校だったら文法しかやなくて。でもここではスペイン語をしゃべるクラスが多い。

私もそう思います。

そうね、はいはい。

図表をしましょう。これは簡単なものですが、これかマインス、こちらはプラス。0から一番上まで、自分のレベルは今どこですか？

スペイン語？

K.: Spanish?

マークしてください。

スペイン語？

K.: Spanish?

うん。

R.: Yes.

でも、いける気がする。

K.: But, I think I am doing fine.

強い。

K.: Yes.

OK

R.: OK.

どうしようかな。

R.: What do I have to do?

自分の頭での、違うスケールだから。そう。

R.: I agree.

図表をしましょう。これは簡単なものですが、これかマインス、こちらはプラス。0から一番上まで、自分のレベルは今どこですか？

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うん。

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強く。

K.: Yes.

OK

R.: OK.

どうしようかな。

R.: What do I have to do?

自分の頭での、違うスケールだから。そう。

R.: It is inside your head, it is a different scale... that's right.

こんなに出してないかなあ。

R.: Maybe I haven’t gone that far.

OKじゃあ、ここから一番上に行くためには何をしますか？自分です。

K.: Study abroad. Speak a lot with natives. Not only attend classes.

これから、一番上のレベルまで行くのに何をしますか？

R.: First, meet study requirements daily and then read the web page in Spanish, listen to music, buy books or movies…. Also, speak a lot with Spaniards.

OK、OK。最後の質問なんですが、正しい勉強をするためには一番大事なことは何か？

K.: For the study.

興味というか、言語そのものがられている国の文化について興味を持ち続けることが大切だと思います。

R.: Interest…, meaning keep having interest in language and culture of those countries where that language is spoken. I think that is the important thing.

うん、だね。大事です、それは。目的なく勉強しても、

K.: Yes, it is important. If we study without any...
無駄だし、自分が使える環境がないと将来的に。objective, it is in vain, if in the future we do not have a chance to use that language.

OK. それだけね。インタビュー終わり。ありがとうございました。Muchas gracias. K. and R.: You are welcome.

Muy fácil ですか？簡単ですか？Excellent. And what about the classes? What about the classes?

難しい。K.: Hard.

M.H., a la izquierda y M.O. a la derecha, a mi derecha. Researcher: M.H. to the left and M.O. to my right.

前に、他の言語を勉強しましたか？Have you ever studied another language?

英語をしました。M.H.: English.

どこで？Researcher: Where?

イギリスに行った。M.H.: I went to England.

どれくらい？Researcher: For how long?

3週間。M.H.: 3 weeks.

3週間、へえ。あとで、多分高校でも勉強しましたか？Researcher: 3 weeks, wow. After, I imagine you also studied English at prep.

はい。M.H.: Yes.

学校で。M.H.: At school.

イギリスに行ったのはいつ？何歳でした？Researcher: When did you go to England? How old were you?

17歳のとき。M.H.: I was 17 years old.

留学生として？Researcher: As a student?

そうですね。M.H.: Yes.

OK. 他の言語を勉強しましたか？Researcher: OK. Have you studied another language?

英語を勉強しました。M.O.: I studied English.

学校です。Researcher: At school.

留学はしなかった？You haven’t studied abroad?

していないです。M.O.: No.

Muy bien ええ・・・OK。楽しいイベントがありましたか？言語を勉強するときに楽しいイベントがありましたか？これまで。Researcher: Very good. Where there any interesting events? While studying the language, where there events that you enjoyed?

英語圏に旅行行ったりすると、話せるのは楽しかったですけど、特にあまりなかった。M.H.: When travelling abroad, I could speak and that was interesting, but not much.

英語を使って、ゲームとかしたり。英語を話す人が日本に来たときに話したり出来るのは楽しかった。M.O.: Play a game using English or when somebody who speaks English comes to Japan it was interesting.

前に勉強したことと、今勉強することで違いはありますか？大学で、スペイン語を勉強すると、違いとか。Researcher: Is there any difference between what you have studied before and what you are studying in Spanish now at the university?

高校のときは、テキストをやって、ひたすら問題集をやる感じでしたけど。今はしゃべったりすることも多いし、聞いたりすることも多いからこちらのほうが楽しいです。M.H.: In prep-school, we had just tests and written questions, but now there are more chances for conversation and dictation, so now, I enjoy much more.

英語は小さいときから影響があるからなんとか出来ることもあったけど、大学に入ってからスペイン語を始めるのは結構大変한다면と思う。M.O.: Regarding English, from children we have the influence and we knew up to some level, but starting Spanish study beginning university, I think it is hard.

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同じぐらいね。

では、一番上のレベルまで行くには何をしますか？

研究者：それ、最高のレベルにいくのに何をしますか？

研究者：OK。What do you think it is the most important thing to study Spanish?

今や、単語から、また思い出す。何にも伝わらないから。

研究者：That is right. Thanks. Very good. Excellent. Thanks.

M. a la izquierda y a la derecha A. Muy bien.

研究者：OK.

ええと、そのときに学生のときに勉強することと、今の勉
強するの違うことがあるのですか？

研究者：The English alphabet is different.

A.: At university, you move on faster. Also, the method is wider than in prep.

研究者：What kind of study?

A.: At prep, study was just about books, reading them, but now, both, English and Spanish we do not use books but novels. Also in Spanish, we study it as a whole, conversation, listening and writing classes.

楽しいイベントがありますか？勉強するにとに。

研究者：Any event you enjoy while you study?

研究者：OK.

研究者：The same. Have you ever studied another language before?

英語です。

研究者：Where?

学校です。

研究者：You too?

はい。

研究者：Have you ever studied abroad?

M. and A.: No.

研究者：OK.

ええと、そのときに学生のときに勉強することと、今の勉
強するの違うことがあるのですか？

M.: Though we have a normal life here in Japan, we have the opportunities to get in contact with English language, so at the beginning of English study at high school, it was quite easy to assimilate it. On the other hand, in Spanish case, it is something totally new and we started from 0, so it was hard.

研究者：Is there any difference between the study you did while being a student and now?

研究者：The English alphabet is different.

研究者：What kind of study?

A.: At university, you move on faster. Also, the method is wider than in prep.

研究者：Any event you enjoy while you study?

研究者：The same question. Have you ever studied another language before?

同じぐらいね。

研究者：Then, what would you do to reach the highest level?

留学とかしたり、ネイティブとしゃべる練習、聞く練習を
したりだと思う。

研究者：There are Spanish vocabulary books that include a CD. I listen to these CD's thinking that it is better to listen to them than watching them.
レベルは同じ？OK、じゃあ自分で何をしますか？この
上のレベルに行こうの。

A：Unlike English, that I have been studying
during high school and prep-school, in Spanish I
am not good at all. So, we have tried to spend
most of the time available with this language.
Furthermore, not only the language, but also
acquiring knowledge about culture of Spanish
speaking countries. From this point of view, I also
have to study Spanish.

言語だけではなくて？OK
Researchers: You mentioned not only the
language. OK.

レベルは同じ？OK。じゃあ自分で何をしますか？

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during high school and prep-school, in Spanish I
am not good at all. So, we have tried to spend
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most of the time available with this language.
Furthermore, not only the language, but also
acquiring knowledge about culture of Spanish
speaking countries. From this point of view, I also
have to study Spanish.
Y.K.: It is a Foreign Language University and everybody comes here to learn a foreign language. Their high level of conscience motivates me.

E.A.: Visit Australia, it was fun and a good experience.

Y.K.: I have been in Spanish classes just 2 months and I don't feel any closeness with this language. So, I have to do something on my own every day. If I don't go to classes, nothing happens. So, it is obvious that I have to go to classes and also I have to have the intention to ask other activities.

De nada. Y.K. and E.A. You are welcome.

MUCHAS GRACIAS. PERFECTO.

Y.K.: I will study abroad if possible. I want to cross the language barrier that I have to talk in Spanish.

What would you do to reach this level?

E.A.: Obviously, pay attention during classes and …… I want to study abroad if possible. I want to cross the language barrier that I have to talk in Spanish.


Researcher: Is this the highest point?

Y.K.: Yes, this is the highest. Here is 0. I think your level is not 0.

Researcher: OK. How is your current level?

Researcher: What would you do to get your Spanish at a good level?

Researcher: First of all, learn daily expressions and other to talk about things that I am interested in, thus self motivation would increase my wish to study more.

Researcher: It is for my research.

E.A.: English.

Researcher: English.

Researcher: Where?

K.: I lived in United States from kindergarten until
て、そこで習いました

ああ、アメリカのどこですか？

イリノイ州のスプリングフィールドっていうところで、州都です。

ああ、そうか。1年間？

3年間。

すごい。

そのときはぺらぺらだったんですけど…

すごいね。

なぜスペイン語を勉強したいのですか？

音楽が好きで、歌手を聞くと、私が好きになる歌手は、スペイン語を話す歌手で、なぜだか音楽は心の奥底が重なるから好きになるじゃないですか。だから、スペイン語を話す人との考え方を似てるからかなって思って、是非スペイン語しゃべられる人たちとしゃべりたいと思ったから自分も学びたったって。

そうか、そうか。あの学校のときと海外に住むときと、今と違うことがありますか？たとえば、スペイン語を学ぶためと、違うことがありますか？

英語ってことですか？

勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

知らない言語だから、やってて楽しいです。単語覚えたりするのは楽しくはないですけど、こう…だんだん分かるようになっていくのが楽しいです。

勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

ええ、これは図表をしましょう。ここはマイナス、これはプラスですよね？このスケールで、自分のスペイン語のレベルはどこですか？

今ですか？

うん、マークして。

どういうことですか？これでいいですか？

いいですね。ええと、アメリカでは、学校…普通の学校に行きました。

はい。普通の

アメリカ…友達はアメリカ人？全員？

全員

国際学校ではないですよね？

じゃないです。

難しかったですか？

難しいですか？

そのときはまったく理解できなくて、何もかもが、小さかったし、ただただ泣いてたんですけど、もうすぐに、1時間くらいでみんな大丈夫？大丈夫？みたいな、なんていうか、聞き取ること、自分からもすらすらと出てくるようになっている練習ですかね。

勉強するために、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

ええ、これはグラフをしましょう。ここはマイナス、ここはプラスですよね？このスケールで、自分のスペイン語のレベルはどこですか？

今ですか？

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勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

ええ、これはグラフをしましょう。ここはマイナス、ここはプラスですよね？このスケールで、自分のスペイン語のレベルはどこですか？

今ですか？

うん、マークして。

どういうことですか？これでいいですか？

いいですね。ええと、アメリカでは、学校…普通の学校に行きました。

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そのときはまったく理解できなくて、何もかもが、小さかったし、ただ泣いてたんですけど、もうすぐに、1時間くらいでみんな大丈夫？大丈夫？みたいな、なんていうか、聞き取ること、自分からもすらすらと出てくるようになっている練習ですかね。

勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

ええ、これはグラフをしましょう。ここはマイナス、ここはプラスですよね？このスケールで、自分のスペイン語のレベルはどこですか？

今ですか？

うん、マークして。

どういうことですか？これでいいですか？

いいですね。ええと、アメリカでは、学校…普通の学校に行きました。

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勉強するときに、楽しいイベント、楽しいことはありますか？

ええ、これはグラフをしましょう。ここはマイナス、ここはプラスですよね？このスケールで、自分のスペイン語のレベルはどこですか？

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うん、マークして。

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ところから、言葉は分からないけど、ただ聞いて教えてくれると感じます。

環境、サポート、友達は凄い良かったですか。

Researcher: That support from friends was excellent.

先生もその、質問しましたか？このレベルは難しい？

K.: Yes.

Researcher: Did the teachers ask you if the level was too high for you or something like that?

アメリカですか？

K.: In United States?

Researcher: Did the teachers ask you if the level was too high for you or something like that?

すごいいいことですね。海外で、他の・・・英語

Researcher: Very good experience. Abroad….

今のはレベルは大丈夫？いつも勉強していた？

Researcher: How is your current level? Did you always keep studying?

高校とかで。

K.: In prep-school, etc.

Researcher: In prep-school, I did not use any English and I have forgotten many things. When I was in high school, I went for a visit once. I could listen and understand more and less by that time….. Of course there were words that I knew but I understood what they meant. However, when I try to speak, the words did not come out and only could say slowly "I do not know how to say ";……

M.: High school, pre-school, and I studied abroad while in prep.

Researcher: Thanks. That is all. Your childhood experiences are really interesting……… live abroad about 3 years…… Yes, thanks.

留学？どこへ？

Researcher: Where?

M.: Illinois, USA

Researcher: Wow. 10 months.

M.: 10 months.

Researcher: How was it?

M.: Very fun.

Researcher: What is your level?

TOEIC は720点とか。でもだんだんしゃべれなくなっ

M.: TOEIC is 720, but I am losing the skill little by little.

Researcher: What about writing and reading?

レポートとかいっぱい書いたりするのに、やっぱり使っ

M.: To write a report, if I do not use it on a daily basis, I forget it.

はい。

Researcher: Yes.

今出来るかちょっと自信がない。

M.: I do not feel confident that I can do it now.

何歳でしたか？

Researcher: How old were you?

M.: Now?

M.: 16 to 17 years old.

Researcher: When you were abroad.

M.: 10 months.

M.: 2 years ago.

Researcher: Yes.

いいですね。ええ、前の勉強のときと、今のスペイン語

M.: Spanish conjunction. Has 6 and it is complicated and hard. Also how to read and pronunciation is hard.
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>教育法は違いますか？たとえば、学生のときと、高校生のときと、アメリカで勉強したときと、今の教育法は違いますか？システムは同じですか？</td>
<td>Researcher: What about the teaching method? For example, between the United States and the current one? Same system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>あんまり、単位とか知らないとて言うのは違うけど、教え方とかはおんなじ感じます。</td>
<td>M.: No... difference of credits system, but I think method is the same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ええと、今ね、これはあの・・・マイナスですね、これは0ぐらいね。これはプラスね。スペイン語のレベルはこれでいうと今のレベルはどこですか？</td>
<td>Researcher: Currently, here is lower and 0 is plus. What is your current level of Spanish?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>だってまだ習って2ヶ月しかたってないのに。</td>
<td>M.: Only two months have passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>そうそうそう</td>
<td>Researcher: Yes, yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ここへんかな。</td>
<td>M.: Around here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>マーキしましょう。</td>
<td>Researcher: Please mark it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>これから、一番上のレベルには何をしますか？自分で。</td>
<td>Researcher: What do you do to reach the highest level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>やっぱり留学したりとか、辞書をちゃんと引いたり、予習したり、授業ちゃんと聞いたり、寝たりとかしないで聞いたり。でも難しそう。</td>
<td>M.: Go to study abroad, always use the dictionary, prepare yourself for next class, and always pay attention during classes, without falling asleep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>難しそう？留学で海外へ行って、それと、授業を受けで勉強する、と。</td>
<td>Researcher: Hard? Go abroad and study during classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK。質問もうひとつあります。あの、前の勉強していたときに楽しいことはありましたか？楽しいイベントとか。</td>
<td>Researcher: OK. I have another question. Was there any funny event when you study before? Any funny event?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>イベント？</td>
<td>M.: Event?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>創したりとか、ネイティブの外国人の方とおしゃべりしたりして、通ったときはすごくうれしかったです。</td>
<td>Theatre plays, when I could make understand speaking with native speakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>あの、スペイン語を学ぶために、何が一番大事なことでしょうか？</td>
<td>Researcher: What is the most important thing for you to study Spanish?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>いっぱい聞くこと。聞いて、言葉、単語の量を増やしたりとかもが大事かな、と思います。</td>
<td>M.: Listen to a lot of Spanish, increase vocabulary by listening, I think.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK。ありがとうございました。小さいインタビューです。変わり。</td>
<td>Researcher: OK. Thanks. A short interview. That is all.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4E: RECOGNITION ITEMS EXTRACTED FROM AU’S AND BU’S GRAMMAR (GRAMM) AND COMMUNICATION (COMM) CLASSES

Note: Items corresponding to weakly-framed Hierarchy (regulative discourse) in communication classes are in bold print.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item and interaction transcript extract</th>
<th>Questionnaire’s rendition</th>
<th>English translation of rendition</th>
<th>Source and coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) La universidad está en la plaza de la Ciencia. Sí o no?</td>
<td>大学は科学の広場にありますか。ありませんか。</td>
<td>The University is in Science Square. Yes or no?</td>
<td>AU’s COMM Conduct F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) この間の金曜日のびっくりテストは出来ましたか？もうそんな昔のことは忘れてしまったか？</td>
<td>この間の金曜日のびっくりテストは出来ましたか？それとも、もうそんな昔のことは忘れてしまいましたか？</td>
<td>How did you do in the spot examination that was done last Friday? Did everyone already forget something that happened so long ago?</td>
<td>AU’s Gramm Conduct F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Un momento, un momento.ちょっと待って。</td>
<td>ちょっと待って、ちょっと待て。ちょっと待って。</td>
<td>One moment, one moment. One moment.</td>
<td>BU’s COMM Conduct F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 毎日はさっき黒板に書いて・・</td>
<td>「毎日（todos los días）」とすっかり黒板に書いて。</td>
<td>A while ago I wrote on the board ‘everyday’ (todos los días)</td>
<td>BU’s Gramm Conduct F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) スペイン語で聞いてください。</td>
<td>スペイン語で聞いてください。</td>
<td>Please make the question in Spanish.</td>
<td>BU’s COMM Conduct F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 分からない単語は、あれば何か私に聞いてもいいけど、スペイン語で聞かないと答えません。</td>
<td>分からない単語は、あれば何か私に聞いてもいいけど、スペイン語で聞かないと答えません。</td>
<td>If there is a word you don’t understand, it is fine to ask me. If you don’t ask me in Spanish I won’t answer.</td>
<td>BU’s COMM Conduct F++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 否定するときはね、動詞の直前にnoを入れる。もしもyoをいれるなら、yo no como。</td>
<td>否定するときはね、動詞の直前に”No”を入れる。もしもyoをいれるなら、”Yo no como”。</td>
<td>To make a negative sentence you place ‘no’ just before the verb. In case of using ‘yo’ [I] as well, it will be ‘yo no como’ [I don’t eat].</td>
<td>BU’s Gramm Hierarchy F+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Muy bien, vamos a ver la palabra profesor.¿Profesor es masculino o femenino？</td>
<td>楽しいですね。では今度は‘profesor’という単語を見ていきます。</td>
<td>All right. Let us see the word ‘profesor’ [teacher/professor]. ‘Profesor’, is it masculine or feminine?</td>
<td>AU’s COMM Hierarchy F–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) ラテン語って何か分かる、みんな？ラテン語って何？説明してくれる人いる？</td>
<td>ラテン語って何か分かりますか？みんな？ラテン語って何？説明してくれる人いる？</td>
<td>Is there anybody who knows what Latin language is? What is Latin language? Who can explain it?</td>
<td>BU’s COMM Hierarchy F–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) ええ、でもそれにバス停のこと？</td>
<td>ええ、でもそれにバス停のこと？</td>
<td>Let’s see, but do you refer to the bus stop?</td>
<td>BU’s Gramm Hierarchy F–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Y para hacer el plural, como hacemos？Que hago para plural. Por ejemplo, la</td>
<td>複数形にするにはどうするんですか？どうしたらよいでしょうか。例えば、”la estudiante”。</td>
<td>And to make the plural, how do we do it? What do I have to do for the plural? For example, ‘la estudiante’ [the</td>
<td>AU’s COMM Hierarchy F–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>では問題です。下にいうのはなんていうでしょう。</td>
<td>では問題です。下にというのはなんていうでしょう。</td>
<td>Now I am going to ask a question. How would you say underneath in Spanish?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>いい?分かれる?</td>
<td>いい?分かれる?</td>
<td>Is it all right? Do you understand?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>まあ、これはLa Habanaという名前はもとは市の名前じゃあなかった。やって、なんかかる場所と言う意味で何か、何かもとは普通の名詞。</td>
<td>まあ、これは&quot;La Habana&quot;という名前はもとは市の名前じゃあなかった。なんかやる場所と言う意味で、もとは普通の名詞。</td>
<td>Let’s see, this one, the name ‘La Habana’ was not originally the name of the city. Originally, it referred to a place where something is carried out, and [it] was a normal [common] noun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>Bueno, en esta conversación está Maiko, tú eres Maiko, tú eres Carlos, de acuerdo y tenemos también un señor, tú eres señor y por último tenemos a Marta, tú eres Marta. Vamos a leer, Maiko.</td>
<td>君がマイコね。君はカルロス分かった? でもう一人男の人もいるから、君がその男のことで、最後のマルタは、君マルタね、では、読みましょう。はい、マイコ。</td>
<td>Well, in this conversation there is Maiko, you are Maiko, you are Carlos, all right, and we also have a gentleman, you are gentleman and finally we have Marta, you are Marta. Let’s read Maiko.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>一番最初の絵をやりたいひとはいらっしゃいますか?いないと言うことは、岩田君です。はい、読んでみ。</td>
<td>一番最初の絵をやりたいひとはいらっしゃいますか?いないと言うことは、岩田君です。はい、読んでみて。</td>
<td>Is there anybody who wants to be in charge of the first picture? If there isn’t anybody means that it’s going to be Mr Iwata. All right, let’s read.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>じゃあこの二人でやって。じゃあやってください。二人だったから誰でも良い。</td>
<td>じゃあこの二人でやって。じゃあやってください。二人だったから誰でも良い。</td>
<td>All right, pair up with that person. Please pair up. With anyone is fine but you have to pair up.</td>
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<td>(21)</td>
<td>O.K., vamos a repetir algunas palabras. ¿de acuerdo? Universidad.</td>
<td>はい、いくつか単語を繰り返して発音してみましょう。いいですか? &quot;Universidad&quot;。</td>
<td>Well, let’s repeat some words, all right? 'University' [University].</td>
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<td>(22)</td>
<td>はい、私がどこそこにいます、という文章をまたひとりづつみんなと違うように作って</td>
<td>「私がどこそこにいま す」という文章をまたひとりずつみんなと違うように作ってください。</td>
<td>All right, now make a sentence to say where each one of you is located, each one a</td>
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</table>
てください。一番簡単なのは私は教室にいます、ですよね。Estoy dentro de la clase。とかいうと一番簡単だったんですが、私が言っちゃったからもうだめー。だれそれの隣に、とかだれそれの後ろに、とかそんなの作って。

番簡単なのは私は教室にいます、よね。

different sentence. The easiest one is 'I am in the classroom'. That would have been the easiest for you 'Estoy dentro de la clase' [I am in the classroom], but you couldn’t use this sentence because I already used it. Use expressions such as 'next to someone' or 'behind someone'.

二人でこの'Hispanoamérica'の地図で、国の名前、スペイン語圏の国名とその首都を読んでみて、チェック。

In pairs look at this map of 'Hispanoamérica' (Countries where Spanish is spoken) and read the names of the countries were Spanish is spoken and their respective capitals, [and] check [them with a mark].

二人でこの"Hispanoamérica"（スペイン語圏の国）の地図を見て、スペイン語系の国名とその首都を読んでみて、チェック。

We did it from singular to plural before, now we do the opposite, from plural to singular.

三人称に直すのが時間かかるようならそれは後にしてくれ、とりあえず聞く、質問したのか書いて。スペース空けといて後で考えて書いてくれても。

If it takes too much time to change the phrase into the third [grammatical] person, first commit exclusively to make questions and write down the answers. Leave one line and then you can think and write it down [the answer in the third grammatical person].

三人称に直すのが時間かかるようならそれは後にしてくれ、とりあえず聞く、質問したのか書いて。スペース空けといて後で考えて書いてくれても。

It's difficult to understand this little difference, but at

It's difficult to understand this little difference, but at
それでは、まずPatio中庭とか
Fuente噴水とかの単語も覚えてしまいなさ
いね。特にPatio=中庭がよく使うんで覚えると
いてください。

The beginning try to
translate it in this way.
Also you have to start
learning words like
‘patio’ (nakaniwa)
[garden/yard] and
‘fuente’ (izumi) [water
fountain]. Especially, the
word ‘patio’
[garden/yard] is used
quite frequently and
therefore, learn it
thoroughly.

| (29)そのスペイン語系の国々はどこにあるのか。ある程度スペイン語の勉強をしていない人は知らないといけないと思うから順番でやったほうが良いと思う。北から始まるか、南から始まる。
| The most important point is where are located the countries where Spanish is spoken. For someone who studies Spanish at certain level, s/he must know them. And so, I think that is better to do it starting either from north or south. 'Desde el norte o desde el sur' [From north or south]. It's better if you do it following a certain order. In that way you will remember, I believe, you will remember where they are.
| BU's COMM Sequence F+

| (30)ならこうしても良いよ。とでもね。質問して答えてくれた一人称だけ書いておいて、スペース空けておいて後で自分で三人称に直す作業をやってくれても良いよ。
| Well, it can be done in this way as well. First you have to make the questions and write down the answers in first [grammatical] person. Then you leave one line so that you can change the sentences to third [grammatical] person.
| BU's Gramm Sequence F-

| (31)Saca la lengua。Más, más, más, fuera。Za。
| Get your tongue out. More, more, more, [get it] out. 'Za' [θa].
| AU's COMM Evaluation F++

| (32)うん、うん、はい、そうです。Al lado de なんとか、ってきたら、誰かに、「中庭かそれから「机のまわりに」椅子があります。椅子は机のまわりにあります。と。
| 'Al lado de' [beside, at the side of] something means that something comes after 'de' [of]. 'Al lado de la mesa' [beside the table], 'mesa' means table and therefore the phrase is the chair is beside the table. That's what it is.
| AU's Gramm Evaluation F++

| (33)No, esto aquí hablan inglés。En Trinidad y Tobago hablan inglés。No español。
| No, here English is spoken. In Trinidad Tobago they speak English, they don't speak Spanish.
| BU's COMM Evaluation F++

| (34)¿Qué hay en la Plaza de la Ciencia?... ¿Qué hay?... ¿Qué hay en la Plaza de la Ciencia?... ¿Qué hay?
| ¿Qué hay en la plaza de la Ciencia?... ¿Qué hay?... ¿Qué hay en la plaza de la Ciencia?... ¿Qué hay en la plaza de
| AU's COMM Evaluation F+
<table>
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<tr>
<th>en la plaza de la Ciencia?...</th>
<th>la Ciencia?...(科学の広場には何がある？何があるだろう？科学の広場には何がある？科学の広場には何がある？)</th>
<th>la Ciencia?...(What is there at Ciencia Square? What is there? What is there at Ciencia Square? What is there at Ciencia Square?)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(35) 違うってだから。広場はplaza, patioは・・・？</td>
<td>違うってだから。広場はPlaza, Patioは・・・？</td>
<td>I told you that it was wrong. Hiroba is plaza [square], patio [garden/yard] is・・・？</td>
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<td>(36) 気をつけて。Otra vez もう一回。</td>
<td>気をつけて。&quot;Otra vez&quot; もう一回。</td>
<td>Be careful. 'Otra vez' [once more] one more time.</td>
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<td>(37) ちょっと足りないよ。まあいいや。</td>
<td>ちょっと足りないよ。まあいいや。</td>
<td>Something is missing. But it’s fine.</td>
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### APPENDIX 4F: RECOGNITION, TRAJECTORY, ORIENTATION AND REALISATION, PRIMARY DATA FOR BU AND CU

#### Table 4F.1—Recognition, trajectory, orientation and realisation, primary data for BU and CU

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Note. GEN = gender, ORG = organisation, TRA = trajectory, ORI = orientation, REA = realisation, * = missing observation.
APPENDIX 4G: BU’S COMMUNICATION COURSE, LABELLING OF ACQUIRERS’ INTERVIEW DATA

September 21, 2007

SUMMARY

1. ‘She is able to communicate but lacks discipline and does not work much.’

2. ‘They do not require to understand grammatically everything first in order to do communicative task.’

3. ‘She tried to communicate with me at an informal level but could not keep up with the course requirements.’

4. ‘I do not value formal/grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas.’

RISK TAKING

The best in risk taking are AO (3/7) and KK (3/7), and RK, then we have SN (1/7) and MA (3/8).

The ones in the middle of the chart show character and motivation.

NO (1/2) is a very passive student and AT (2/2) does not have a regular attendance record. She is communicative but lacks discipline and does not work much.

MS (1/3) has a passive attitude. She is not communicative and tries to do the course’s tasks individually, departing from her peers. In general the segment separated from the rest at the lower end lacks motivation.

ADAPTATION TO CLT

AO (3/7), KK (3/7), YA (3/8) SN (1/7) and AF have a communicative disposition. They are more oriented to the communication. They do not require understanding grammatically everything first in order to do communicative tasks. That is not the case of students in the middle of the chart.

AT (2/2) lacks motivation. She has aptitude but lacks a sense of regularity as a college student. She tried to communicate with me at an informal level but could not keep up with the course requirements.

FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS

SN (1/7), MA (3/8) and ED (1/7) compensate their acceptable but not brilliant communicative aptitudes by being focused and constant.

The ones in the middle of the chart have the given of communication but they are more distracted and their achievement is not that good.
COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The written examination reflects communicative tasks performed in the classroom, such as describing one’s own family. Some of the questions are about knowledge acquisition (not skills) like the name of the letters in the alphabet.

I do not value formal/grammar accuracy. I value much more the capacity to express ideas. I assume that if a native speaker can understand what the students are expressing, then it is fine.

Apart from the interaction in the classroom, I believe that students need to consolidate what they have learned orally by studying at home. O (3/7) did very well in the written exam. That was not the case of K (3/7) I think. But the examination combines communicative attitudes and personal study.

YF (2/6) makes up what she lacks in communication with personal study. That is why I think she is high on the chart.

LEARNING STYLE AND PERSONALITY

Their learning style may be the result of the way they were taught but I believe there is also a personality factor in this.

NO (1/2) and YF (3/3) they isolate from their peers, they do not participate and they do not make up for those things with other abilities. I believe that in this case is more a matter of personality rather than learning style.

It is harder to say which factor is more relevant, either learning style or personality when analysing students at the centre of the chart.
APPENDIX 4H: CU'S COMMUNICATION COURSE, LABELLING OF ACQUIRERS' INTERVIEW DATA

March 11, 2009

SUMMARY

1. “Speak but accurately...”
2. “She is talkative, but not rigorous...”
3. “While I can communicate and be understood, fine, that is her policy”

STUDENTS COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS

NR excluded herself. The boys are fine, but not as much as [to place them] up here. This boy is studious but timid, TY. KA (3/3) is in her own world; she is very cold-hearted. SS had studied Spanish before.

MO (1/6), NM (3/8), YS; participative, intelligent; they have benefited from the course. And then TM (1/5), KA (1/4), YK (3/6); they have also made an effort, but they are not as intelligent and have learnt not as much as the ones above. YK (3/6) may be more intelligent, and I put her in the first line.

Then we have the students that have participated and complied. YF (2/6) is more talkative, and these two are more timid [YT and KH]. AS (3/3) is very talkative and participative, but not very rigorous. She talks a lot but does not [speak] well, and in case she is actually making an effort, then she has not learnt [to speak] correctly. Speak but accurately. Either she is not making an effort or she has not learnt [to speak].

IM is kind of a blunderer. I am going to put her with SA and AK. SA failed last year. Even after having failed, she has done sort of the minimum. KS (3/3), YM are quite lazy, together with RN. YM fulfills some of the requirements; she attends class, but does not participate actively. She can only work with SA, but does not cope with speaking to somebody else, so she brings a report from her psychiatrist. She wrote the diary and passed. [She passed] thanks to written tasks. These [students] do well in conversation.

AS (3/3) is very participative, very nice and gets along with everybody else in the class; she does not create a distance, but does not study. I think she does not study and does not care much about it: ‘As long as I can communicate and people understand what I say...,’ she does not care about the verb form, that is her policy. It is possible I gave her before a grade higher than the one I am giving to her here. It is possible that she did very well in her final examination. She plays the saxophone and always talks about it. During the first part of the course, I used to think that she was very good, but then I changed my mind, and then I changed it again at the end of the course.

The diary and the conversation...there are people who wrote very good diaries but are not able to talk as much or as well. Others prefer to write because they are good at grammar, but the diary was a colloquial communication line with me. They addressed
me. AS wrote the diary well, but it was the only task she did well.

It is easy to compare the boys with each other, but harder to compare them with the girls. YT did well writing the diary and I was astonished, but until I saw that, she seemed lost at sea. He goes unnoticed; he was outshined by his friends. I cannot put him above all the rest, but he got a very good grade; but then all of them are together because they wanted it like that. They did all the group and pair activities together. They are not as high as the girls because these girls stand out very much.

**Participating with a certain level of rigor**

MY sits next to M and I had the feeling that she was improving just like the others, but she was not. The fact that they sit together is very misleading.

(1) That they communicate with me, participate in the activities, show enthusiasm for the task, regardless of [grammatical] correctness, and then (2) it does bother me that their correctness does not improve. They need to try out so that they also [produce] correctly; [it is not enough] only participating in class but also [achieving] correctness.

I do not explain grammar very directly. Correctness is the result of practice. Knowledge comes from other classes. Talking and having all grammatical factors in mind is difficult.

**Practice is focused on learning a structure, or anything.** I hope that practice help them to do it right or get used to understand what they need. If I make them talk, for instance, they know that they will need the 1st[grammatical] person verb form. So, if at the end of the course they use the 3rd person by mistake, then that does not fit in what we have been doing.

Because if I make them talk, is for them to produce [an utterance] using that [grammatical] person, and I let them know when they make a mistake. I say ‘who?’ If he tells me ‘I eats at three o’clock’, I ask ‘who eats at three?’, and he then realizes [his mistake] and says ‘ah! I eat’, although I do not explain too much. But I did explain some things. The point is that the philosophy that says that only communicating is sufficient does not work for me. It is not attractive to me. Because I end up sounding badly. Twelve years of living in Japan and it annoys me enormously.

The students notice that you communicate, but do you set high standards for grammar? Yes, I am doing it like this. Everybody told me through the class’ evaluation that it was the most difficult one. And theoretically, it is not, because we are here to talk. I do not ask them to fill up anything in a test. When they say that my class was the hardest, they mean that talking, saying something meaningful, and talking about it, is much more difficult. They told me that it was the most difficult [course] by far. **Talking and having all grammatical factors in mind is difficult.**

The book was easy to me because it is divided into six levels and, previously, I was using one that was divided into three levels. The class worked out fine because the materials were more suitable. I thought that the textbook A. was easy. The idea I have of university is different. They have another idea of it.
APPENDIX 5A: BU’S AND CU’S DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL ORDER RULES DESCRIPTION UPON MOTIVE-ACTIVITY, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 5A.1—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, framing values, BU and CU

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Table 5A.2—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Management motive-activity, BU and CU

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Table 5A.3—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Foundation motive-activity, BU and CU

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Table 5A.4—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Structural motive-activity, BU and CU

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Table 5A.5—Summary table of discursive and social order rules description, Functional motive-activity, BU and CU

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APPENDIX 5B: ORGANISATIONAL FRAMING VALUES FOR BU AND CU UPON MOTIVE-ACTIVITY STRUCTURE LEVELS, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 5B.1—Summary table of framing values for BU Grammar and Communication upon motive-activity structure levels

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Note: Empty cells indicate no occurrences.