Finlandization and the Peaceful Development of China

Introduction

The rise of China has sparked a new type of geopolitical debate in Asian security studies. The neighboring countries of China can soon find themselves in a similar geopolitical situation as Finland found itself after the Second World War: there was a great power in the vicinity and the balancing force of this giant was far away. Consequently, several scholars have started seeking comparative evidence that could be applied to the development of possible strategic scenarios for the future of China's neighbors. Some scholars have started using the concept of Finlandization as a tool of such comparative exercise. During the past few years some elements of Finlandization could even be found in the subtle policy changes of some of the Chinese neighboring states, as the pace of China’s rise has started accelerating. Some scholars suggest elements of Finlandization in the changes of South Korean policies of Park Geun-hye administration.

The study of Finlandization in Asia continues David Kang’s search for policy options between balancing and bandwagoning. Seeking a third way from the experience of Finland may sound far-fetched, but since we do not have empirical experience of Asia's future, we will have to use comparative empirical cases that have a similar geopolitical context to the one Asia will be experiencing with the rise of China. Kang has sought such cases from East Asia’s history, but Finland's experience could be another one of such cases. It is also a good comparative case as it has been well theorized to allow distilling of lessons from this case to cases that might be similar from the point of view of power politics.

Using Finlandization for the analysis of Asia's future often borrows from the hawkish anti-Soviet intellectuals in Austria and West Germany, mainly the right wing politician former Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber (in 1953) and German conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss and political scientists like Walter Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal. These thinkers accused Finland of surrendering to the Soviet Union despite the country's ideological affiliation with Western democracies. The concept of Finlandization was invented for the analysis of a mistake to be learned from.

1 I am grateful for Prof. Chung-in Moon for the idea of looking at Asia through the lense of Finlandization. I am also very grateful for the anonymous referees and the Editor-in-Chief of the CJIP for so many constructive suggestions.
At the same time, Asian comparison to the Finnish experience does not have to rely on negative interpretations of Finlandization only. Such geopolitical realists as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, feel that there is something positive to be learned from the Finnish experience. This school of thought suggests that Finland yielded in a way that took the Soviet Union’s defensive security interests into account without undermining the West’s defensive security interests. They claim that the structure of interaction between the West and the East constituted a security dilemma, where the traditional military search of security always deteriorated the security of the opposing bloc, and thus provoked corresponding military strengthening on the opposing side. This way the search of military security never really increased the level of security of either side as it was always balanced by military counter measures. In this context Finland's non-threatening strategy was seen directly addressing the problem of security dilemma, making Finland’s search for security non-threatening to others.5

The intention of this article is to use the concept of Finlandization as a neutral tool for the analysis of the possible futures of the emerging political asymmetry in East Asia. Finlandization is treated within a geopolitical realist framework and the focus is on those East Asian countries that are currently adapting Chinese power by balancing it with the assistance of US power. Finlandization will be seen as a theoretical alternative, which could in the future reflect the power realities of growing Chinese power. Finlandization will be utilized as a conceptual tool by

a) analytically and conceptually investigating the dimensions of asymmetry identified in the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union,

b) empirically seeking positive and negative lessons (lessons on how to do and how not to do) from Finlandization and

c) comparatively applying the lessons to the context of the balancing East Asian countries.

Such an analysis aims to contribute to the debate on how East Asian neighbors of China could find a rational strategy towards the rising China. It aims to show how East Asian nations could avoid compromising their autonomy by learning from Finland’s mistakes. It also aims to show how they could learn from the Finnish way of tackling extensive dependence and the security dilemma.

My analysis will first define Finlandization and identify the three dimensions of it. The problems and the benefits of Finlandization presented in the theoretical literature can be identified in these three dimensions. Then these three dimensions will be investigated empirically first in the cold war context of Soviet-Finnish relations, and then in the context of China’s relationship with East Asia. Finally, the article will conclude the main lessons Finlandization concept and the empirical experience of Finland can offer to China and its balancing East Asian neighbors.

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The geographical focus of the article is on the East Asian balancers, i.e. powers that seek to engage US military power in an effort to balance the growing power of China. As such, this article considers Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. The argument for learning from Finlandization is different for balancers than it is for those that some would say, have already jumped into the Chinese bandwagon and are not seeking US power to balance the resulting asymmetry (North Korea, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Mongolia). Therefore, only balancers have been focused in this article. Since Finlandization is a strategy somewhere between bandwagoning and balancing, it is also more in line with the ethos of geopolitical realism that the concept of Finlandization represents, to assume that it is the balancers rather than the bandwagoning nations that will have the option of utilizing the lessons of Finlandization once China becomes even mightier.

Taiwan has been excluded from the analysis even though it, too, balances Beijing’s power with its US military support. This is because mutual recognition of sovereignty is one of the normative assumptions of the definition of a Finlandized relationship and therefore China’s relationship with Taiwan cannot be Finlandized. Vietnam is included in the analysis even though the country is not formally in an alliance with the United States and in fact has a conflictual history with the West. This is because in the issue of territorial disputes, Vietnam has clearly opted for balancing the Chinese threat by inviting US involvement in support of the country’s security if not maritime claims.

**Finlandization as a foreign policy approach**

In order to use Finlandization as a conceptual tool, we must define the concept well. Finlandization is an approach that relies on a geopolitical interpretation of realism and applies that approach to a relationship of power asymmetry and geographical proximity. In other words, Finlandization is an approach that focuses on states, considers power resources as central in world politics, and relates them, on the one hand, to the interest of nations to remain sovereign, and on the other to the competition of big power for prominence and relative position in world politics. Due to the realist focus on power in the debate on Finlandization, specific objectives of Finland or East Asian balancers are of secondary influence. The ability of a small country to maintain its independence and territorial integrity are the main instrumental values that deserve our attention. These interests, again, are crucially dependent, within this geopolitical realist conceptual system, on power resources and geography, rather than special national preferences of the states.

While realism normally considers norms and morality as irrelevant in world politics, it seems clear that Finlandization gives defensive interests legitimacy, while considering offensive security interests, i.e. ability to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries as

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6 Roy calls the Philippines and Singapore soft balancers and adds Vietnam and Malaysia also to the group, albeit with hesitation. Thailand Roy sees as a more classical balancer. Since Roy does not cover Northeast Asia, he ignores South Korea as one of the balancers. See, Dennis Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 27, no. 2 (2005): 305–22.

7 As these countries do not ally themselves with China (the defense arrangement between China and North Korea could possibly be treated as an alliance), they are not in the bandwagon in the original sense of the term (Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
somehow illegitimate. It is possible to identify the same normative stand in the Chinese version of geopolitical realism.\(^8\)

In order to distinguish between wise and unwise elements of Finland’s strategy, I suggest that Finlandization be split into three dimensions.

**Material dependence:** In geopolitical realism material dependence is seen the foundation of asymmetry between the Finlandizer and the Finlandized\(^9\). It is seen as the root cause of the ability of the Finlandizer to demand compromises in the autonomy of the Finlandized country. Critics of Finland claim that Finland did not manage to limit its dependence on the Soviet Union, while defenders of Finland claim the opposite.

The source of dependence in the case of Finland and East Asia is different. In the case of Finland, Soviet Union had just demonstrated its strength in a war, which then demonstrated the asymmetry of powers between the two nations. In the case of China’s neighbors dependence was a consequence of a less dramatic, positive process of economic and political strengthening of China. Yet the objective consequence was the same: both found themselves next to a great power, and far away from all those powers that could balance the neighboring great power.

**Autonomy:** Secondly, the problem of Finlandization is related to degrees of autonomy: how much autonomy a small power manages to muster despite the power asymmetry. The question of autonomy is not only linked with the material basis of asymmetry, but also with policies: according to the critics of Finlandization, small countries could be more principled and stubborn in their relationship with their big neighbor, when it comes to questions of sovereignty.

**Adaptation:** Thirdly, Finlandization can be identified on the dimension of attentiveness to big power's security interests. A small power can be unrealistic about its geopolitical position and this could lead into a conflict with the big power and consequently to the loss of independence. At the other end of the spectrum there is a risk that the small power is so attentive that it loses its ability to make rational and moral security political decisions.

**Material dependence in the cold war context**

The need for rational adaptation to asymmetric power relationship is based on a perceived material asymmetry. Such a perception is often based on the fact that the dependent nation has far less military resources than the big power and its economy has the potential for a much lesser contribution to the big nation than the potential contribution of the big power to the dependent nation. In addition to resource disparity, Finlandization was considered to have been a function of conscious choices that emphasize this asymmetry. In the military realm, emphasizing asymmetry could mean that the dependent nation offers bases and allows permanent stationing of troops on its territory. In the


economic realm, active overly submissive strategy would mean policies that isolate the dependent nation and make it dependent on trade with the neighboring big power.

Finland's military dependence on the Soviet Union could be measured by a comparison between Soviet and Finnish military spending. However, since Finland and the Soviet Union already had had a war military spending did not tell as an accurate story of the military imbalance as did the result of the war. It is clear that the war showed the Soviet Union that Finnish military power was sufficient to cause a lot of damage and loss of lives and time to the Soviet Union. At the same time it also told the Finns that Soviet Union would eventually emerge victorious even if it was burdened by other adversaries on other fronts.

Finland from 1944 to 1947 was a country monitored by the allied forces (in the form of a Soviet-dominated surveillance commission), while from 1944 until 1956 Porkkala, a peninsula only 40 km from the capital city of Helsinki, was occupied by a Soviet military base. This meant that the first contracts and security practices between Finland and the Soviet Union emerged under considerable Soviet control over Finland.

Yet, after the ending of the occupation of Porkkala in 1956 Finland did not allow Soviet troops on its territory, and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union lacked provisions for automatic assistance if Finland of the Soviet Union was under threat. Contractually, Finland was committed to let the Soviet Union help Finland’s defense in a case where a mutual enemy tried to attack the Soviet Union through the Finnish territory. Contractually such help was decided upon mutually in consultation between the two, but the political reality was of course that the Soviet Union could not wait behind its border if an enemy that was clearly stronger than Finland, was about to march through Finland against the Soviet Union. According to President Paasikivi, the original architect of Finland’s post-WWII foreign policies, “we will not allow an attack through our territory against the Soviet Union, and if we cannot defend against it alone, we will get help from the Soviet Union … the Soviet Union would under no circumstances wait for an enemy to cross Finland.”

The fact that the Soviet Union did not build automatic infrastructure (contracts and interoperability) to help this “mutual assistance” also helped Finland’s defense. Such infrastructure would have made Western alliance assume that the Finland’s territory would be a springboard of Soviet aggression. Mutual assistance was never actualized and only once, on October 30, 1961, did the Soviet Union demand consultations on joint defense against a common enemy with a clear insinuation that such a consultation.

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10Leino, Kommunisti Sisäministerinä (Communist as the Minister of Internal Affairs), 224.
As can be seen in Graph 1, Finland maintained a relatively low dependence on Soviet trade and a non-existent dependence on the Soviet investments. On average, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s share of Finnish exports was 17.8%. The Soviet Union was the source of 15.4% of Finland’s imports and 16.6% of Finland’s total foreign trade was with the Soviet Union. Yet, Finnish economy was naturally much smaller than that of the Soviet Union. At best, Finland’s exports were just over 8% of Soviet exports and imports a bit over 6% of Soviet imports. Thus the scale of economics was very asymmetrical. However, Finland never allowed itself to be too dependent on trade with the Soviet Union, partly in order to avoid Soviet economic blackmail and partly to avoid its economic future being dependent on the success of the Soviet economy. There is no documentation of the conscious doctrine (already authored by the first post-war president, Juho Kusti Paasikivi) of not allowing Finland’s trade with Soviet Union to rise above 25% of Finland’s total foreign trade, but statistics give support to the rumor of the existence of such a conscious policy.

In addition to military and economic dependence, political discourses could have lead Finland into a political dependence. While Finland’s contractual commitments did not bind it to the Soviet defensive strategy, the Soviet rhetoric and interpretation of the world occasionally made it difficult for Finland to stay outside the Soviet sphere. Part of the Soviet world view and interpretation of the world was the idea of bloc politics. Soviet leaders talked about peace-loving countries that were opposed to imperialists and neo-colonialists. It was difficult for Finland to find a neutral place in such a view of world politics. Active policies for peace were automatically associated with the Soviet camp, and thus, whenever Finland was trying to work for the long term goals of pacifying its region, it was easily assumed by the Soviet Union to be following the program of the peaceful countries against the

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11 The data in the graph and in other trade data in this article is from “IMF eLibrary Data,” accessed February 13, 2015, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/.
imperialists. If peaceful initiatives were by definition associated with the Soviet camp, it was easy for the Soviet Union to claim defensive cooperation from Finland against threats to the peace-loving countries. For example, the Soviet Union assumed Finland’s help at the United Nations in the Berlin crisis, not because of its neighborly status, but because Finland had chosen to work for peace. According to Krushchev, as recorded by President Kekkonen on September 15, 1961, “It is truly incomprehensible that Finland abstains from voting when it is a question about proposals made by the Soviet Union for world peace and the security of small neutral countries… We had every right to expect support from Finland in the campaign to safeguard world peace.”

**Autonomy and sovereignty in the cold war context**

According to President Kekkonen “The foreign policy of every nation naturally has to consider the defense and protection of independence as the main goal, but a country in the position of Finland has to be exceptionally careful in directing its attention to this question.” Yet, international security interests were seen as prior to the domestic interests, and thus those issues in which domestic and foreign policy questions were mixed were exceptionally difficult. Many concluded that the line between domestic and foreign policies was fluid and difficult to draw. It was like a line drawn on water. Claims of Finlandization or an overly soft attitude towards the Soviet Union often focused on alleged compromises Finland had made in issues that should have been considered domestic.

Finland was beneficial for the Soviet Union as a showcase of peaceful coexistence between countries of two different economic and political systems and, the Soviet Union did not want to, nor would Finland have accepted, any support for the Communist party in Finland’s domestic affairs as a result. Finland’s presidents during the time of Finlandization were both non-socialist. Paasikivi was affiliated with a liberal democratic party that now uses the name National Coalition Party, while Kekkonen belonged to a centrist agrarian party which is now known as the Center Party. Finland’s communist party was legal, but remained one of the smallest communist parties of Western Europe for most of its post-World War II history. According to President Kekkonen’s own diary, he emphasized on September 4, 1960, in a speech at the Soviet Embassy “that Finland will remain “capitalist” Nordic democracy, even if all other states chose a communist path.” After the short period under the surveillance of the allied commission, communists were also rarely accepted by coalition cabinets. Communists were among the few parties that never participated in cabinets during the first decade of President Kekkonen’s rule (1956-1966).

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16 Tuure Junnila, Jäädytetty Demokratia. (frozen Democracy) (Jyväskylä: Gunnerus, 1960); Kare, Tähän on Tultu: Paasikiven Linjalta K-Rintamaan (This Is Where We Have Bocome. From the Paasikivi-Line to K-Line); Löwenthal, Vom Kalten Krieg Zur Ostpolitik (from Cold War to East Politics).
The Soviet acceptance of Finland’s political system also meant restraints to Soviet contacts with Finnish communists (after the immediate post-war period). Ambassadors with ties with communist politicians were often called back to Moscow, since according to the Soviet interpretation, the promotion of communists would have constituted interference in internal affairs. Finnish communists were also domestically under strict surveillance for their ties to Moscow. Inappropriate ties to Moscow often ruled out the communist participation in Finnish cabinets. Furthermore, also Soviet leadership occasionally punished Finnish communists for trying to introduce Soviet influence in Finnish domestic politics.

While it was clear both to Finns and the Soviet leaders that support for communist conspirators would have constituted a breach of the Soviet respect for Finland’s independence, there was confusion and disagreement between Finns and the Soviet leaders about what constituted other types of intrusions on Finland’s sovereignty.

The post-war political occupation of Finland by the allied commission created a precedent in which the Soviet Union was allowed to judge which of the Finnish politicians represented “a policy of aggression” and which did not. The allied commission demanded that seven of the main representatives of “the policy of anti-Soviet aggression” be tried and convicted of war crimes. Among these were the former president, Risto Ryti and the former prime minister, T.M. Kivimäki. Since Finland had several times before and during the Second World War allowed enemies of the Soviet union to use Finnish territory against Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership felt that it had the right to decide, which politicians were trustworthy in this commitment not to do this again.

Still in 1972, President Kekkonen’s term as president was extended exceptionally by a parliamentary majority that was sufficient for a speedy exception to the constitution in order to enable Finland to join the EEC as an associate member, as the Soviet Union could see this as a friendly move only if it could have confidence in the foreign policy elite. The word “confidence” became the symbol of this mechanism of Soviet control. Where ever the Soviet Union used its economic power to influence Finland’s presidential elections or cabinet formation, the normative legitimacy of such exercise of power was based on the concept of confidence. “Confidence” was part of the agreed framework of the Fenno-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet Union did not have “confidence” in certain personalities. “Confidence” thus offered the Soviet Union a pathway to Finland’s domestic governance, and compromised Finland’s autonomy and democracy.

18 Karjalainen and Tarkka, Presidentin Ministeri (president's Minister), 176.
20 Ibid., 104.
21 Prime Minister Paasikivi’s notes on the discussion on this can be found from his entries from January 23, 1945 onwards in Paasikivi, J K Paasikiven Päiväkirjat (Paasikivi’s Diary), Parts 1-2 (edited by Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge), 92-6.
22 A majority of 4/5 of the parliament was needed for such an exception to the constitution. The president was normally elected by people in an indirect election. The process of negotiation within the parliament is described by Lasse Lehtinen, one of the parliamentarians who voted in favor of the exception in Lasse Lehtinen, “Näin Kekkonen Junttasi Läpi Poikkeuslain (This Is How Kekkonen Bullied through the Constitutional Exception),” Helsingin Sanomat, August 10, 2014.
The lack of institutionalization of confidence meant that the entire relationship was tied to personalities. The Finnish foreign policy doctrine was called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line after the two personalities that made the greatest contribution to the strategy. This tied confidence to the policy to those figures. This personification of “trust” made it dangerous for Soviet “confidence” to go against these individuals in any political question.\(^\text{23}\) During the crisis of 1958 and 1961 in Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union, all the challengers to Kekkonen in the formation of the cabinet (1958), and in the presidential election (1961) emphasized that they supported Finland’s current foreign policies,\(^\text{24}\) but opposed Kekkonen’s domestic power politics. Despite this, their challenge to the manager of foreign relations, President Kekkonen, was treated in the Soviet Union as challenge to the foreign policy direction. Opponents of the two presidents often interpreted this association as intentional.\(^\text{25}\)

On the other hand, the personification of “confidence” also made it possible for trusted Finnish political leaders to issue recommendations to the Soviet leaders on the trustworthiness of other politicians. This offered a devastating tool for trusted Finnish politicians to use against their political enemies.\(^\text{26}\) One of President Kekkonen’s political rivals, called this practice a “snitch campaign”.\(^\text{27}\)

It is not known how much the personification of confidence was intended by its Finnish beneficiaries, or how much Soviet leaders wanted to use it as a way to help their friends in the Finnish administration. It is likely that the personification of trust at least to some extent survived because of the personal interests of some Finnish politicians and because of the Soviet interest in keeping political leaders rewarded for being trustworthy. It was the main problem for Finland’s autonomy, however. Finland was vulnerable to the abuse of Soviet confidence as a political tool that could have risked Finland’s autonomy and democracy: “since foreign policy is primary to domestic policies, this means in my experience … that an inappropriate foreign policy also leads to the loss of influence in domestic and economic issues.”\(^\text{28}\) Thus, Soviet confidence could penetrate into all political spheres and exclude politicians from power whenever for some reason they were not trusted by Soviet leaders for their foreign policy ideas. In addition to politicians the Soviet “surveillance of confidence” was extended, at times, to the media, too. Whenever there were writings hostile to the Soviet Union, this was interpreted as evidence of the tendencies against good relations. Both Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen saw the role of the media as problematic and both occasionally exercised their power over


\(^{24}\)The foreign minister of the coalition cabinet that the Soviet Union started its passive resistance, for example, said according to President Kekkonen’s notes in the party congress that we will resign from the cabinet if it tries to change the foreign policy line an inch Kekkonen, *Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen's Diary)*, Part 1, 1958-62., 113..

\(^{25}\)Kekkonen’s challenge in the presidential election of 1961 similarly emphasized in his speeches that his foreign policy line was no different from that of Paasikivi See the memoirs of the presidential candidate in Olavi Honka, *Muistelmia ja Mielipiteitä (memoirs and opinions)* (Helsinki: WSOY, 1972).


\(^{27}\)Karjalainen and Tarkka, *Presidentin Ministeri (President’s Minister)*, 190.

Although self-censorship in the media with relation to stories on the Soviet Union was limited to one aspect of Finland’s foreign policies, it was dangerous to democracy and even autonomy.

Rational adaptation in the cold war context

According to Finland's president, Finland had to base its foreign policy on the realities of power: “The Soviet Union will remain a great power after this war. The fact [is] that this great power is our neighbor … we cannot do anything about it. These are the premises we have to base our conclusions on.” From this Kekkonen deduced that Finland has to work with the Soviet Union as it was too weak to oppose it. Working with powers hostile to the Soviet Union would not be an option as that would have made Finland the first battle ground for big powers. As Kekkonen said “It cannot be in the interests of Finland to be the last frontier of some great power (US/UK/Germany) at the Russian border. This way Finland would always have to be on alert and still it would be the first to be fed to the enemy (the Soviet Union).” Henry Kissinger’s warning to Ukraine repeats this logic almost word by word.

Finland’s unwillingness and inability to balance Soviet power militarily by relying on the power of the United States was a conscious choice that could be seen as rational adaptation: as long as the Soviet Union did not feel the US threat through Finland, it did not need to pull the country too close to its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union insisted on removing the danger of Finland being used militarily against it, while Finland wanted to interpret this as fully compatible with the idea of neutrality. If Finland was strong (but never strong enough to be threatening from the Soviet point of view) it could defend itself against an attack on the Soviet Union through Finland. If Finland did this all by itself, it would not be threatening to Nato either, as Finland alone could not be a sufficient force against the Western alliance. Thus, Finland could be a zone that promoted crisis stability as it was less provocative for Nato to start a countering defensive move in the vicinity of Finland’s borders if Finland was taking care of its own defense rather than being helped by the Soviet Union. As long as the Soviet Union did not intend to attack Nato through Finland, it was, therefore, actually better off if Finland was neutral than in the provocative setting in which Finland’s territory had Soviet military installations and bases. Similarly, it was useful for Nato forces not to come too close to the Finnish border so that the Soviet Union would not be provoked into “helping” Finland’s defense. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union had learned how its own right to cross Finland and use Western parts of the country as the far outposts of the Soviet defense had provoked Finland to allow similar rights to Germany (in Spring 1940, soon after the ending of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union), and thus while promoting its offensive interests the Soviet Union had inadvertently harmed its defensive interests.

29 Paasikivi, J K Paasikiven Päiväkirjat (Paasikivi’s Diary), Parts 1-2 (edited by Yrjö Blomstedt and Matti Klinge); Kekkonen, Urho Kekkosen Päiväkirjat (Urho Kekkonen’s Diary), Part 1, 1958-62.
31 Ibid., 131.
32 Ibid., 132.
The Finnish adaptation strategy towards the Soviet Union was based on four premises:

1. In an asymmetrical setting, the small power has to find a security strategy that *takes into account the interests* of the big power. President Kekkonen’s stand was that Finlandization had to be more useful for the Soviet Union than alliance with it or its occupation of Finland.34

2. There is a difference between *defensive* and *offensive* security interests. The former is more important than the latter. In a structural setting, defensive interests are also compatible with the defensive interests of other countries. Thus Finland could be useful to the Soviet security interest without escalating tension in the Western camp (which was also in the interests of both Finland and the Soviet Union), only if Finland made a distinction between the Soviet defensive and offensive interests and attended to the former only. This is why Finland did not want to activate mutual defense assistance with the Soviet Union as this would have been interpreted as serving Soviet offensive interests as well. Kekkonen used the word “war psychosis” in his successful argument in 1961 against consultation on defense cooperation in his effort to explain to Krushchev why it was in the Soviet defensive interest not to insist on “assisting” Finland in the defense of its own territory.35

3. Finland’s neutrality and especially its willingness to prevent its territory from being used in attacks on the Soviet Union (but also on the West) had to be *trusted* by the Soviet Union (as well as the West), before it could be useful for the defensive interests of the Soviet Union (and the West). Trust provided freedom for the development of Finland’s defense, and even to the rationale of buying defense-related hardware both from the Soviet Union and from the West.36

4. Finland’s foreign policy wanted the Nordic countries of Europe to remain *free of nuclear weapons* primarily for two reasons.37

   a. Finland’s strategy of making its search for security non-threatening and beneficial for the defensive security interests of other countries was based on the logic of conventional warfare, in which defensive interests could be served by preventing all countries from using one’s territory against another. However, the logic of stability in the nuclear weapons scenario was based on deterrence, in which physical defense was a threat as it could deny counter strike against the country that launched the first strike. This is why Finland’s adaptation strategy worked only if Nordic countries remained free of nuclear weapons.

   b. Furthermore, if Norway and Denmark were to receive US/Nato nuclear weapons this would create precisely the increased tension that Finland tried to prevent by means of

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36 Ibid., 462.
its neutrality. The benefit for the Soviet Union of not actively helping Finland’s defense was the fact that Nato was not provoked into the militarization of its areas near Finland.

Material dependence on China

Military asymmetry
It would not be possible to rule whether Finland was too dependent on the Soviet Union to conduct rational policies, and thus it would neither be possible to define when East Asia could be too dependent on China. However, the fact that Finland was criticized for being too attentive and too dependent suggests that it was a border case. Therefore, comparison to Finland could be useful to determine when East Asia moves to the risk zone.

Using military expenditure as means of measurement, we can see in Table 1 that with the exception of the Koreas and Japan all other East Asian countries are militarily as meaningless as Finland was in comparison to the Soviet Union. Exact percentages are not meaningful, as logistics and especially the relationship to (and interoperability with) the balancing forces of the United States is so much more meaningful for the military balance than percentages between 6% and 0%.

Table 1. Military expenditure compared to PRC military expenditure, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>18.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5.18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contractual arrangements also affect asymmetry, as they might make is easier to justify the use of military capabilities (in terms of appropriateness). When thinking of the possibility of China creating a similar asymmetry with any of its neighbors as the Soviet Union created in Finland, one has to remember that there is no recent history of Chinese occupation of its East Asian neighbors, and this must be significant for the practices of asymmetry in that region. Furthermore, China does not have institutional military access to its smaller neighboring countries even to the extent that the Soviet Union had to Finland. China has not formed military alliances nor has it requested permission to station military forces or conclude agreements on “mutual assistance”, except in North Korea. Furthermore, China’s neighbors have no institutional obstacles to balancing China’s power with the power of the US, while Finland could not seek alliances with forces hostile to the Soviet Union.

Foreign policies of China's neighbors are not (yet) limited to a specific logic of peacefulness in the same way as the Soviet Union tried to limit Finland's security policies by attaching the label of “peacefulness” only to pro-Soviet initiatives. While China does consider itself peaceful, current
Chinese rhetoric does not associate peace with a bloc. Instead, China declares its opposition to bloc politics.\textsuperscript{38} Even though occasionally Chinese public debate neutralizes China’s positions of peace and justice as something all countries would need to concede (such as in the debate over the Chinese dream that was seen in several articles of the Peoples’ daily as necessary for the whole world), and even though China considers some of its specific positions as indisputable,\textsuperscript{39} China’s foreign policy rhetoric does not generally associate peace, justice or legality with its “own side”. Thus China had not prepared the military balance in a way that would force its neighbors into its own camp the way the Soviet Union did with Finland during the cold war.

Finally, opportunities for military pressure in an asymmetrical relationship arise not only from the material strength, historically created patterns of interaction and practices or the existence of institutions and interpretations that make such pressure possible, but also from normative structures that reduce the costs of military pressure. While the Soviet Union had no legitimate and politically costless excuses for the use of military force against Finland (except if it misinterpreted the mutual assistance stipulation in the TFCMA), China has maritime territorial claims to Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Thus China does not need to find excuses because it can always refer to its right to “exercise sovereign control” in these areas. Thus it could be said that militarily China has more convenient ways of imposing its will on its neighbors in issues related to territorial disputes, despite the lack of formal military pacts. However, this perceived legitimacy of military influence is limited in Southeast Asia to the disputed maritime areas. It is conceivable that China will expand its de facto control to all the maritime areas it claims, but this does not really pose an existential threat to other claimants as these islands are generally not permanently inhabited by citizens of any of country. The military setting, and perhaps Chinese military objectives as well, do not seem ripe for Chinese dominance. China will have military superiority over its neighbors, but no institutional or normative access points to military pressure beyond its limited objectives in the maritime territories it claims.

**Economic Dependence**

Despite the lack of military pressure beyond the disputed maritime areas, it is clear that China has economic leverage over East Asian countries. As can be seen in Graph 2 (compare to Graph 1), China’s economic dominance is extensive even in countries that politically and militarily ally themselves with the United States.


\textsuperscript{39} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha And Nansha Islands,” *Beijing Review* 7 (February 18, 1980).
Chart 2 reveals that The Philippines and Vietnam are both much more dependent on Chinese export markets than Finland ever was on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Japan is more dependent on the Chinese export market than Finland was on average on the Soviet export market, while South Korea is about as dependent as Finland was on average. Only Thailand and Singapore, of the East Asian balancers have remained less dependent on Chinese trade than Finland on the Soviet trade. The development of Singaporean and especially Thai trade, however, suggests, that it will not take long before both countries are at the same level as Finland was on average with the Soviet Union. For South Korea and Japan, dependence on China is mutual and thus it does not create a similar asymmetry as the one between Finland and the Soviet Union.

However, if one looks at imports as well (see Graph 3), it is easy to see that even South Korea is much more dependent on trade with China than Finland was on the Soviet Union. One should note however, that while Japan, South Korea and ASEAN as a bloc are dependent on the Chinese economy, strong economic ties have also made China more dependent on these economies. While Finland’s trade never exceeded 10% of the value of the Soviet trade, the value of Japan’s trade is currently one third of Chinese trade, while the value of Korea’s trade is one fourth. Assuming that ASEAN can develop sufficient cohesion to bargain as a bloc, the dependence of East Asian balancers is not quite as extensive as national statistics suggest.
Material imbalance in dependency is not, however, the only thing that determines the risk of becoming forced to be attentive to the interests of China. Norms and rules about how economic leverage can be used are also very important. Whether it is diplomatically and politically very expensive or not to use economic coercion for political benefit makes a big difference. There is a great difference in such rules between China and the Soviet Union.

As learned from the previous section, during the cold war, the Soviet Union actively tailored economic concessions to political compromises. China’s declaratory foreign policy, however, rejects the political conditionality of economic relations. This declaratory policy and practice makes it more costly for China to use economic pressure to gain political benefits. China’s economic asymmetry is thus less likely to push its neighbors into excessive concessions. Yet, the cohesion of the ASEAN is crucial to balance dependences in Southeast Asia and to make dependence interdependence: China can remain dependent on the ASEAN economy, but never on the economy of any of the single ASEAN country.

The balancing nations could be divided into three categories on the basis of their dependence on China. On the one hand Singapore and Thailand are mostly dependent on the United States and not very much on China. Yet, it is clear that there is still an asymmetry in the relations between these countries on the one hand, and China, on the other. Only in issues where Thailand and Singapore can coordinate their bargaining with ASEAN, can they create more symmetrical power political relationships with China. Militarily, Thailand’s proximity to China can make balancing more difficult in the future, as the credibility of US ability to help Thailand in a military confrontation with China can become questionable. This way Thailand could be interested in listening to Kissinger’s analysis on geopolitical realities of even learning from Finland.

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Secondly, South Korea and Japan, again are clearly very dependent both on the United States and China. Their dependence on China is greater as the dependence of Finland on the Soviet Union during the Second World War. However, they are both also quite dependent on the United States, while China is also very dependent on both countries. Since both are very central players in the East Asian security game, it would be important for both to learn about strategies that address the dangers of regional security dilemma formations. “Security dilemma sensitivity” would be important for both countries. Since the strategy of Finlandization is one of the socially rational strategies in the context of a security dilemma, the lessons of Finlandization could be interesting also to these two nations.

Thirdly, Vietnam and the Philippines are balancing nations that nevertheless are much more dependent on China than Finland ever was on Soviet Union, and generally almost as dependent on China as Mongolia, North Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are. For these countries balancing is an option provoked by the perceived threat and power of China, but one that simultaneously provokes Chinese assertiveness. One could say that China’s assertiveness towards the Philippines and Vietnam on the one hand, and the Philippine and Vietnamese strategy of inviting greater military role of the United States mutually construct each other’s legitimacy. Thus, the relationship of the two countries with the rising China is a problematic one. Its social irrationality can be modeled as a security dilemma, and therefore, strategies like Finlandization that address the problems of security dilemma could be useful for Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as for China.

**Autonomy and sovereignty in the East Asian context**

The fact that not all China's neighbors are led by their communist parties creates a similarity between them and Finland. Support for communist rebellions was part of the doctrine of proletarian internationalism in China during the Cultural Revolution. At the end of the 1960s, China had no diplomatic relations with practically any country of importance for its security and trade. This was because the radical proletarian internationalist approach that pushed it to interpret international relations as class struggle rather than interaction between states. This class-interpretation made it difficult for China to respect the sovereignty of states, or even recognize states as meaningful actors in international relations. Furthermore, in the case of Indochina, China has had interests in rectifying the approach of Indochinese communist parties. One could imagine that this motive could in some cases be a domestic necessity given that to some extent the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party could be related the correct interpretation of the socialist ideas. However, after the adoption of the development-oriented role for the state, and after reaffirming China's commitment to the norm of respecting the sovereignty of other countries, with some delay in Burma and in Vietnam-controlled Cambodia in the 1980s, China stopped its support of communist subversives and communist parties.

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Due to China’s strong critique of the Soviet social imperialism, interference in the implementation of socialist policies has become difficult also in those countries where communist parties are in power. Yet, there is no normative consensus over how much and in what kind of situations and issues China could support leaders of other Southeast Asian countries without being considered to interfere in domestic power battles.

In addition to supporting one’s own political system and governance, interference could also be motivated by other things. If, for example, China’s growth was seriously threatened by constrained access to oil and gas, one could only guess how much China would respect, its neighbors’ sovereign right to choose the market for its energy trade. China’s respect for the sovereignty of its developing economic partners has already been suspected in several countries (Reed & Correspondent, 2006; Verhoeven, 2014). Furthermore, although China now intends to respect the sovereignty of other nations, what guarantees that this approach will continue? During the Cultural Revolution, China was definitely not in compliance with the norm of respect for sovereignty as it exported communism and supported rebellious insurgents in several of its neighbors with the result that practically nobody wanted to work with China. Yet China had already first declared its commitment to respect for sovereignty in its five principles of 1954 (“Five Principles of Peaceful Cooperation,” 1954), while the Principles of Foreign Aid emphasize the same commitment to non-interference.

However, China declares that a relationship between itself and other countries is based on equality and common interest rather than the promotion or imposition of Chinese ideologies and models of domestic governance. Since the ending of the Cultural Revolution, China has reaffirmed its commitment to anti-hegemonism and this, in official Chinese parlance, has meant refraining from imposing Chinese ideas relating to domestic administration on other countries. In 2004, President Hu Jintao announced what he referred to as the “Four No’s”. The doctrine of peaceful rise also simply involves convincing others of the usefulness of mutually beneficial economic state-to-state cooperation with China, without any Chinese interference in the domestic policies of other countries.

Yet declarations do not always matter as Finland saw in its relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite its declarations, the practice of China’s respect for sovereignty could be different in the future. Verhoeven claims that “While Chinese government officials still piously align their rhetoric to this cardinal principle of post-1949 diplomacy, it is increasingly clear that Beijing is de facto gradually

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abandoning its commitment to not interfering in the domestic politics of African states.”

He does admit however that Chinese influence in domestic political systems is not similar to that of the Western powers. Tiejun explains the difference by claiming that while Western powers use their own value systems to judge what is “good governance” that has to be supported, China talks about “efficient governance” that allows the country itself to define the direction, while China simply supports efficiency in achieving the goals the country sets, assuming they are mutually beneficial.

Very often, however, efficiency is supported simply in governance that is related to country’s economic cooperation with China. In this respect, the policy might be selfish (in the promotion of mutual gains), but perhaps not hegemonic or intrusive into the domestic politics of neighboring countries.

Nevertheless, selfishness could also yield hegemonic practices in specific situations. When domestic groups in economically important (energy producing) countries have had programs that go against Chinese economic interests or when there have been domestic groups that are against China’s unification with Taiwan, China has been tempted to interfere in domestic power battles. Barma claims that China prefers Myanmar and Zimbabwe to remain autocratic in order to avoid competition from the West in these countries. Furthermore, Kurlantzick claims, referring to a Singaporean diplomatic source, that China’s ambassador to Zambia had warned people against voting for the opposition, which mobilized people in demonstrations against poor labor conditions in Chinese companies in Zambia. It is clear that if a Singaporean diplomat views such developments with concern, countries in the immediate Chinese military sphere of influence such as Thailand and Vietnam but also the Philippines and South Korea see the emergence of such interference as worrying. Yet, Chinese violations of sovereignty (for example, in Zambia) have so far been very limited and since they are based on self-interest rather than some ideological justification, it is likely that they can be contained by the fact that disrespecting sovereignty would entail costs to China’s soft power.

The violation of sovereignty goes against the soft power effort of China to make its neighbors “work with” it rather than working against it. This interest is likely to remain more important than the sporadic gains China can achieve by temporarily abandoning the norm of respecting sovereignty. The credibility of China’s effort to attract neighboring countries to work with it is largely based on these declarations of anti-hegemonism, and this has emphasized the cost of deviating from this line.

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Finally, the association of Chinese international identity with anti-hegemonism has also made domestic interference politically costly.

However, the main problems of autonomy are perhaps not related to “Chinese economic imperialism” or efforts to help China-friendly economic policies by means of interference in domestic affairs. On the one hand, the main problems could be related, as was the case with Finland, to cases where foreign policy and domestic politics mix and thus confuses the normative consensus. When a Prime Minister of Japan visits a shrine or when a country’s ministry of education makes decisions on school books, we are talking about domestic decisions. However, if the shrine happens to be Yasukuni Shrine that houses lists the names of enshrined fatalities of nation’s war efforts and includes the names of 1,068 enshrined war criminals, including 14 of whom are considered so-called A-Class criminals, the domestic issue also involves foreign policy concerns. When a Prime Minister pays respects to the memory of serious war criminals, like several Japanese Prime Ministers (Takeo Miki, Jasuhiro Nakasone, Ryutaro Hashimoto, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe) have done since 1975, this could be interpreted constituting support for human rights violations and violations against the sovereignty and integrity of other countries. Could the use of economic, let alone military power, to persuade the Prime Minister not to go to this shrine then be considered a violation of the sovereign autonomy and interference in domestic affairs? Could Japan claim to respect for China’s defensive interests the way it would need to in order to avoid a spiral of escalation in the context of security dilemma, if at the same time Japanese Prime Minister paid respect to war criminals who had not only invaded China, but also violated the interests of the humanity regarding the treatment of human beings? If security dilemma sensitivity requires a certain respect for defensive interests of other countries, it would seem that ritual behavior of prime ministers would have to signal such respect, just as national educational policy should. Certainly in Cold War Finland, this would have been the interpretation. At the same time, the problem is that we do not know how ritual acts should be interpreted, and who should do the interpretation. Do the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine really constitute support of war crimes or do they simply signify respect by the political leaders of a state to people who have sacrificed their lives for that state? There is no objective answer to this, but instead, the answer needs to be agreed upon in a dialogue between Japan and China. Learning from Finland’s experience, the clarity of that answer could be crucial. Normative clarity could deny the justification for interference in domestic politics, but also the disrespect of other countries’ defensive security interests. Whether a prime minister should visit a shrine is not, however, the only issue where normative clarity is needed. There are a number of issues that would need to be resolved in dialogue. Is China, for example, allowed to support a government in its fight against those rebel groups that with their combat operations risk the safety of the pipeline? Furthermore, is China allowed to support government against its democratic opposition that demands the government to abandon unpopular infrastructure contracts with China? In general, rules are unclear, and some of the handlings of Chinese support to regimes takes place in secrecy. All this threatens the autonomy of China’s neighbors, but also the respect China’s neighbors have for China’s defensive security interests.

What is secret cannot be known. This is why it is difficult to say how much sovereign autonomy of China’s neighbors has or will be compromised by secret dealings. The Finnish experience (and leaked secretes) suggests that secret dealings often compromise countries’ sovereign autonomy. Chinese diplomacy is sometimes rather secretive, and this offers opportunities for China to secretly exert
political concessions in exchange for economic cooperation. The political costs of economic coercion for China will be limited to the bilateral relationship between China and the coerced country since others will not know about it. Whatever happens secretly and remains secret will not have political costs. There is a rumor (that this article cannot verify or falsify) that the Philippine acceptance of forming a joint cooperation zone in the South China Sea in 2005 and the Vietnamese joining the scheme were caused by economic pressure from China. Both countries had previously committed to treating territorial disputes in the South China Sea as collective ASEAN matters. Although this has been useful as collective bargaining against China has increased the leverage of the ASEAN countries, both Vietnam and the Philippines went against their previous commitments here even if this then weakened the joint ASEAN stand to the degree that later enabled the Cambodian rejection in the 21st ASEAN Summit in Pnom Penh in November 2012 of treating Chinese assertiveness collectively.

In addition to the problems of secrecy and unclear normative regime of neighborly cooperation, some of China’s neighbors have further problems. China cannot convince Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines of its anti-hegemonism and respect for sovereignty fully as it claims parts of the territory these countries consider their own. These territories constitute a special problem in the Sino-ASEAN relationship, one that undoubtedly complicates the norm of respect of equal sovereignty in Southeast Asia.

**Rational adaptation in the ASEAN context**

At the core of Finland’s rational adaptation strategy was an attempt to avoid aiding big powers with their offensive military capacity. This has addressed the security dilemma by minimizing the risk of the fear for each other of great powers escalating tension and smaller conflicts into wars. In this respect the strategy of East Asia has not been very different. Before the adoption of the relatively similar strategy about two-thirds of conflict fatalities in East Asia after the Second World War were from internal conflicts that external military capacity escalated into wars. External military capacity intensified conflicts on average by 95% if intensity is calculated on the basis of battle deaths per month. Since the Guam Doctrine and the post-Vietnam War fatigue, the United States has been unwilling to “do Southeast Asian wars by itself”. Furthermore, since the ending of the Cultural Revolution in China and the reduced intensity of Soviet subversion in East Asia, support for military capacity targeted against a East Asian government has declined drastically. Conflicts have not been escalated as external forces have not been allowed to use East Asian territories against regional governments. Largely as a result of this the number of annual average battle deaths in East Asia has


56 This, too, has been rumored to have resulted from Chinese behind/the/scenes push. My source for this rumor is a confidential interview with an ASEAN diplomat in March 2014. Also this cannot be verified or falsified by this study.


declined by 95%. While national defensive capacity has grown, none of the nations in the region have managed to develop capabilities that could seriously threaten others, after the United States, the Soviet Union and other external big powers have been unwilling to interfere and prevented from entering in regional conflicts the way they did during the conflicts in Korea and Indochina.

However, rational adaptation in Finlandization also involves a geopolitical element. In areas where geography makes one big power more prominent than all others, small countries should aim at accommodating that big power’s defensive security interests. At the same time they should try to make it beneficial for the neighboring big power to refrain from using small powers for the expansion of big power’s offensive military capacity. Of the East Asian countries the ones that emphasize the need to recognize China’s defensive interests most in their defense posture are North Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Furthermore, countries further away from China, such as Malaysia, Brunei and perhaps also Indonesia do not pose any offensive threats to China as they do not offer the US any additional capacity that China could perceive an offensive threat. Since none of these countries neither offer China their territories or powers for anything that East Asian neighbors or the United States could perceive as offensive, it would be possible to claim that these countries are security dilemma sensitive in Robert Jervis’ sense, none of them seriously threaten others in their own efforts to safeguard their own security.

However, the approach of the balancers is different. Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Thailand and Singapore have chosen a strategy that is explicitly against the logic of Finlandization. These nations balance Chinese power with the power of the opposing great power by engaging in military cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, in maritime territorial disputes also Vietnam occasionally uses US power to balance the push from China. It is clear that this balancing provokes Chinese counter reaction and is in that sense not an optimal strategy to tackle the regional security dilemma. However, one should not analyze the strategies of US allies in isolation of the Chinese strategies as the nature of security dilemma cannot be revealed in absence of sensitivity to interactive dialectical processes.

The search for an external balancer in East Asia is clearly provoked by Chinese assertiveness in the maritime disputes. Japanese, South Korean, Vietnamese and Philippine statements as well as US statements testify to this dialectical relationship over time. Furthermore, China occasionally

60 Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”
pushes ASEAN to refrain from a common stand on issues where China can then utilize the complete asymmetry of relations between itself and individual ASEAN countries. The way in which ASEAN failed to issue a communiqué from its Cambodia summit in 2012 testified how politically detrimental it is for the Sino-ASEAN relationship if ASEAN countries perceive that China tries to persuade small, dependent ASEAN countries not to accept a common stand on issues on which ASEAN interests are at odds with China’s.

Security dilemma in Southeast Asia is not, however, just a function of external involvement. Due to the rise of Chinese military power, dependent neighboring countries could perceive their security situation deteriorated by this regional development and this could trigger a security dilemma. Even if, for example, the capacity of Vietnam to defend itself cannot threaten the security of the Philippines it is still possible that military capacity that countries consider purely for their own defense constitutes an offensive threat as the proponents of the security dilemma theorize. The asymmetry caused by the rise of Chinese economic and military capacity creates a special problem, since rising China will have capacity to destroy the defenses of most countries in the region. This is another reason why several countries, but perhaps more clearly the Philippines and Vietnam are strengthening their ties with the United States. The invitation of the United States military presence – by the Philippines with its new military bases agreement and by Japan with its government’s efforts to allow a new American base on Okinawa Island and with its new interpretation of the constitutional article 9 allowing Japan to exercise “collective self-defense” – goes against the 35-year old formula for regional security in the long peace of East Asia. Thus the debate on how to ensure that East Asia will not relapse into its pre-1979 violence and security dilemma perhaps also needs input from the debate on Finlandization. In a situation where a small country is geographically closer to one of the great powers, but unwilling to provoke regional security dilemma by offering its territory or resources to the support of the nearby great power, there is a need for arrangements that emphasize the difference between offensive and defensive interests. These arrangements become possible only if there is full respect for the defensive interests of the nearby great power, but also if the arrangement allows the small powers structural and discursive tools for resisting political and economic pressure of, and dependence on the nearby great power. In Finland this was done by committing Finland into defense of its territories against enemies of the Soviet Union, but yet refraining from giving the Soviet Union power that could be considered as offensive by the NATO. At the same time, Finland engaged in Western European political and economic cooperation and became a showcase of the benefits of good relations with the Soviet Union.

In East Asia, China has not requested defensive arrangements except for in Korea. Only North Korea has formalized defense ties with China in the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty of 1961 which, even without an extension (which is likely to happen), will be in force until 2021. This treaty has an automatic mechanism for mutual assistance in North Korea, and in this sense it is not an agreement that allows North Korea any neutrality or contribution to crisis stability. From the point of view of South Korea this could be problematic if South Korea’s relations with China deteriorate. Thus this is a context that has to be taken into account when assessing security dilemma sensitivity of South Korean balancing strategy. To some extent the danger South Korea

causes to North Korea (and China) by hosting US military bases and conducting military exercises in the region is in an interactive, mutually constituting relationship with the North Korean defense arrangement with China. The North Korean military agreement with China does not alleviate the fears of South Korea that North Korean military force could be used against it. At the same time, the counter-force that South Korea seeks, increasingly from the US and from the consolidating trilateral cooperation with Japan, the US and South Korea does nothing to alleviate North Korean or Chinese fears. With Chinese support North Korea could unify the country on its own terms and this forces South Korea to seek assistance from the US for its own defense. North Korea’s nuclear program, too, emphasizes this need. This way not only Chinese assertiveness in the maritime territorial disputes, but also the military relationship of North Korea and China, as well as North Korea’s nuclear potential provoke South Korea to balancing that then again requires counter-balancing from North Korea and China.

Elsewhere such arrangements have not been initiated. This has made it easier for the region to avoid a situation where East Asian countries could be seen as springboard of Chinese aggression. Normatively, there is an opportunity that East Asian countries could use the Chinese anti-hegemonist commitment and identity as a political shield against interventionism, just as Finland used its position as a show window of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. However, the fact that China and several East Asian countries have maritime territorial disputes partly incapacitates this strategy, as it would be normatively possible for an anti-hegemonic China to use force within a territory it considers its own. Thus, while the benefits China gains from its anti-hegemonic identity and image can make interventionism less likely, in the disputed areas Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines are normatively defenseless.

For Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines, however, there is a political adaptation strategy that they could use more effectively than Finland was able to. While Finland could not mobilize Finnish association with the European Free Trade Area in support of anything else than economic issues, Southeast Asian countries have the political association of ASEAN that can be used in political bargaining with China.

**Conclusions**

Finland's experience of material asymmetry with the Soviet Union suggests that good relations between China and its balancing neighbors should avoid extreme dependence of neighboring countries on China. On the contrary, good relations would be easier to maintain if there were limits to the degree on which China's neighbors are dependent on China. Even if geopolitical adaptation would require from neighboring countries (or at least some of them) hesitance towards balancing military relationships, East Asia should continue to engage economically and politically with the United States, Europe and other politically and economically balancing powers. This could help guarantee East Asia’s autonomy and rational adaptation strategies and avoid the destructive logic of security dilemma.

Good trade and investment relations are naturally mutually useful and the potential for mutual benefit in East Asia is vastly greater than it was between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, there are
ways of making this relationship of dependence more equal and thus psychologically more sustainable. For Japan and South Korea dependence on China is not a great problem as China is also dependent on Japan and South Korea. However, for Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand the situation is different. While it would be economically unwise to reduce trade and investment between China and these countries, it would be important to make the relationship of dependence more equal. This could be done by developing multilateralism in Chinese economic and political relations with ASEAN and by allowing ASEAN to negotiate with China as a group. By these means dependence on each other could be more symmetrical than in a situation where China dealt with each ASEAN country separately. This way there would be fewer political reasons for ASEAN countries either to seek balancing of the Chinese power with US help, or for reducing their individual dependence on the Chinese economy.

If ASEAN could bargain on political differences with China as a group, this would enable it to legitimize its growing economic engagement with China. Dependence in the context of interdependence is not detrimental for the Southeast Asian region, while asymmetrical dependence would be. For China, negotiating with the ASEAN as a group, including issues where China has previously wanted to bargain from the position of strength, may be the only way of avoiding Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines from limiting economic interaction for political reasons, or continuing to resort to the US counterbalance in order to avoid an overwhelming asymmetry in the relationship with China. Showing that China does not intend to dominate Southeast Asia and does not mind dealing with ASEAN as a group could be a soft power strategy that ensured continuing growth of mutually beneficial economic interaction between China and ASEAN. This is at least in line with the declared Chinese objectives in the region, and would be consistent with the adaptive logic of prioritizing defensive interests (mutually beneficial trade, defensive security) at the cost of offensive ones (domineering and offensive power play).

This article has shown the weakness of the Finnish strategy in relation to Finland's ability to defend its sovereignty, autonomy and democracy. The first reason for the Finnish failure was related to the lack of clarity on what was meant by interference in domestic affairs. The Soviet Union often felt that it did not interfere in Finland’s domestic matters if it did not force Finland to follow the socialist course or if it did not support Finnish communists to gain power in Finland. However, for most of the critics of Finlandization and in fact for the Finnish leaders, the fact that the Soviet leaders felt they could use veto powers and block the access to power of politicians it did not have confidence with, was a limitation to Finland’s full independence. To avoid compromises to sovereignty and autonomy, East Asia should begin a debate on what the commonly accepted norm of respect for sovereignty could mean in the context of China’s rise. Would sovereignty mean the right to take an independent stand towards the Dalai Lama, Taiwan and Falun Gong? Would, for example visits by state officials to Yasukuni Shrine, or schoolbooks that China considers historically inaccurate and negative towards China be defined as expressions of independence and autonomy or would they be seen as disrespect towards China’s defensive security interests. And if supporting Dalai Lama, for example, by a leader of an East Asian country was considered inappropriate and disrespectful of China’s defensive interests, would this also mean that East Asian media, too, should refrain from such positions. Would it imply that China could simply refuse to have confidence in political personalities in neighboring countries, or would it mean that politicians would be treated in accordance with their institutional
Since China needs good will as President Xi Jinping has declared, it would be a good time now to clarify the rules between states in the context of power asymmetry. China has defined its dreams and China has invited other countries to react to the Chinese Dream. It would probably be a good idea for China’s East Asian neighbors to start defining their own dream and initiate a dialogue on the norms that China’s neighbors expect China to respect. Only by seeking normative consensus on how China should respect the independence of East Asian countries could East Asian relations create normative costs for unfair treatment.

Institutionalization could also help avoid dangers to the full autonomy of East Asian countries at the wake of Chinese rise. Finnish foreign policy doctrine was conceptually linked to personalities rather than institutions or concrete defensive arrangements that could have guaranteed the trustworthiness. The Soviet Union could utilize this in a way that compromised Finland’s autonomy while Finnish politicians could utilize this to their personal political benefit in a way that compromised Finland’s independence and democracy. Learning from this East Asia and China should build their trust by using the instruments of “costly signaling” and institutional binding of their own hands as has been suggested in the theories of some of the leading rationalists in international relations studies. For East Asia, this has a special relevance. Track-two and track 1.5 diplomacy has been tremendously successful in East Asia. However, it has been based on personal relationships and trust between individuals. This, in the new emerging setting of asymmetry, could be dangerous as the example of Finland suggests. The rumors about secret deals related to the ASEAN summit of 2012 and the rumors about deals between Chinese politicians and the former president of the Philippines on the issue of joint development suggest that also in East Asia, secrecy and lack of transparency could sometimes compromise national interests and autonomy (there is the potential even if we judge these rumors false). Thus, the current strong emphasis in the Chinese as well as East Asian governments on transparency and measures to counter corruption should be extended to the relationship between East Asian countries and China. In addition to good personal relations and innovative interaction for the development of new security solutions and concepts, East Asia should find ways of building solid institutional relations as obstacles against violations of sovereignty.

East Asia could consolidate its autonomy also by strengthening the commitment of Chinese declarations. Anti-hegemonism, for example, is easier for China to abandon if neighboring countries do not acknowledge the policy in a positive manner. By positively acknowledging Chinese anti-hegemonism, East Asia could, just as Finland did in its show-window role, entrap China in its anti-hegemonism politically and by helping China make it a corner-stone of neighborhood policies in East Asia. Once the rules of non-interference were very clear and embedded in the relationship, it would be difficult to change them without China losing face and harming its image.

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Booth and Wheeler also theorize the possibility of basing commitment to norms and regimes on something they call “embedded trust”, in which friendship not just between leaders but between societies makes violent abuse of that trust unimaginable. While this was not possible for Finland due to the closed political system of the Soviet Union, it could surely be possible in the relations between China and its neighbors. Embedded trust is more than just an agreement, which can be changed when new leaders emerge. It is society-based and thus more durable. If Sino-East Asian cooperation is mutually beneficial it can also be nurtured by means of a people-to-people relationship.

While East Asia could learn from the mistakes of Finland with regard to their autonomy and democracy, Finland’s “rational adaptation” in the Finnish strategy of “security dilemma sensibility” could be something especially East Asian balancers could learn from. Conventional security strategies, such as balancing, tend to be insensitive of the effects country’s search for security has on the security of other countries. In an asymmetrical relationship, this often means that countries adjoining great powers either unite with the great power and lose their autonomy and become its outposts of against its enemies, or seek a balance from the opposing great power and become outposts of a distant power against a nearby great power. However, as Henry Kissinger has suggested, it is not good for the security of a country to be “either side’s outpost against the other.” Both of these strategies entangle the small power in conflicts between great powers in a way that is harmful for the security of the small power.

Finland’s strategy assumed the priority of defensive interests over offensive and sought attentiveness to the defensive (legitimate) security interests of the neighboring great power in a way that did not provoke the great powers opposed to the nearby power. Finland aimed at credible neutrality that could ensure its full intention and relative capacity to prevent any attacks by any nation against another nation through its territory. Finland’s territorial integrity thus became useful both for the Soviet Union and the West.

East Asia’s original global strategy reflect similar type of neutral inclinations. However, cold war history as well as the new increasing assertiveness of China have pushed some of the East Asian countries closer to a balancing strategy. For Thailand this balancing has historical reasons that could have become increasingly unwise from the point of view of regional crisis stability and security dilemma sensitivity. However, for the Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as partly for Singapore, balancing can only be understood as part of an interactive escalating processes that mostly relate to the territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea. Letting territories which are mostly uninhabited become an issue that invites external balancing and the risk of escalation does not seem rational for China any more than it is for Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines. Either it would be useful to fully postpone the settlement of the territorial disputes and to stick to the non-provocative principles of the Declaration of the Code of Conduct, or China and East Asia should finally aim to resolve the issue by means of negotiation. Both options should involve de-escalation and an adaptive strategy that is more security dilemma sensible, defensive and non-provocative.

In absence of an effective shelving or resolving of the territorial disputes it would be important to de-escalate the tension and counter the temptation to seek US military balancing. This could be done by

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evening the asymmetry between ASEAN countries and China by allowing ASEAN to negotiate on territorial disputes with China as a bloc. Allowing ASEAN a common stand in Sino-ASEAN policies could also be a crucial proof of China’s anti-hegemonic stand, and an essential political concession for the goodwill needed for regional security community in Southeast Asia.

A rational adaptive strategy for the Korean peninsula could start from the premise that the formula should serve both the defensive interests of China and the United States. The North Korean treaty with China does not need to offer China access to offensive cooperation with North Korea as it currently does. There could be similar limitations with regard to interoperability and hardware that would more clearly focus on the protection of the territory against an external attack. To offer long-term security, it should be as much based on North Korean defensive power as cooperative military capacity.

Similarly, instead of offering just any kind of military help (let alone US military bases), the South Korean alliance could be based on serving only the defensive interests of both countries. The idea would be to emphasize that the security of the Koreas as well as the security of the United States and China are interrelated, and thus the two sides of the Koreas must cooperate with their great power protectors in a way that takes the others’ defensive interests into account instead of being insensitive to the logic of the security dilemma. To make this security complex politically feasible, China must apply these measures to ensure its respect for the autonomous sovereignty of the two Koreas, while the United States needs to respect both the autonomy of its military ally and that of North Korea. It is not possible to build a stable adaptive structure of peaceful coexistence unless the international system operates at the level of the international system only, instead of mixing agendas of domestic regime change up with international interaction.

The Korean peninsula also has a special problem with nuclear weapons. This has been tackled by means of deterrence and pressure in that North Korea has tried to deter Western efforts at regime change by means of nuclear armament. Meanwhile the West has tried to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program by exerting pressure and by trying to work for a regime change. Scholars of nuclear armament and disarmament tend to agree however that increasing security threats do not help a decision to abandon a nuclear weapons program. In addition to national pride, nuclear weapons are acquired for the deterrence against external threat, and thus increased threat increases the likelihood of the nuclear strategy being chosen. Removing nuclear weapons from the peninsula would enable the conventional adaptive logic in the region. Furthermore, it would clearly serve the defensive interests of the regional powers as can be seen in the support for this idea over the years. The escalatory logic of deterrence should just be reversed and security dilemma sensitivity should be developed by implementing security measures that would be beneficial for the defensive interests of others as well.

For Korea, rational adaptation would mean a turn from deterrence and pressure based policies to the realization that each of the state actors in the Korean peninsula deserve recognition and autonomy and that such recognition should come with the effort to avoid one’s own need for security harming

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the defensive interests of others. Both South Korea’s relationship with the US and North Korea’s relationship with China should be modified to avoid them serving offensive interests.

This article should be seen as a “provocation” and the first step in a long journey in the development of better security concepts for East Asia where countries will have to adapt to the rise of China. The intention has not been to impose lessons from entirely different historical, political and cultural contexts onto others. In addition to contextual differences, security issues are also specific to the political values countries wish to secure, which is why one should not accept an analysis by a Finn of the ways of adapting to asymmetry in East Asia. Instead, this article is intended to reconstruct a consistent adaptation strategy and follow it in the analysis of a different security context. Since prescriptions in this article have been derived from the ideological and strategic logic of another time and place, they are prescriptive only within a logic that the reader does not need to accept. The main contribution this article offers to the East Asian debate has been the explication of the original concept of Finlandization and the translation of the model in a way that is historically accurate and relevant for Asia. The application of this reconstruction, again, has been more speculative, while the prescriptions for East Asian balancers have been intentionally wild and provocative. Nevertheless, I have felt that these prescriptions are useful because East Asia is about to become involved in a strategic setting of asymmetry that Finland struggled with during the entire cold war period. Since this will be a new circumstance for the region, adaptation to asymmetry cannot be studied in the East Asian context. Thus adaptation strategies of other regions will have to be used even if they could only offer speculative, partial evidence in support of further conceptual discussion in East Asia.