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Bibliography
In 2001 I published an article on the “Long Peace of ASEAN” in the *Journal of Peace Research*. I focused on the fact that despite endless discussions on the problems of Southeast Asian conflict-resolution capacity, the lack of regional pooling of sovereignty, the weakness of crisis management institutions, etc., the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have so far remained very peaceful. I noted that many of the Europe/West-centric approaches to security and conflict failed to explain the relative peace of East Asia. The fact that one does not recognize the characteristics that were associated to peace of Western Europe does not mean that Southeast Asia could not be peaceful. Southeast Asia did not have many wars and its conflicts tended to be much less intensive in the area of the ASEAN, even if the Southeast Asian approach to peace does not correspond to the approach of Western Europe, which has become the “default approach” to peace in the literature of international relations theory and peace and conflict studies. Over the years I have developed my ideas on the reasons for the relative peace in Southeast Asia. I also came to realize that even if pacification of Northeast Asia, including China has taken place with a slightly different timetable, the recipes are rather similar to the ones found in Southeast Asia. It seems that the entire East Asia defies many of the assumptions regarding to the “causes of peace”. This is why I thought that studying the recipes of peace in East Asia could be interesting not only for the sake of understanding of East
Asia, but for the enrichment of the theory of international relations and the study of peace and conflicts. For me the project to understand the Long Peace of East Asia proved that I was right: East Asian experience can emancipate us from many of the Europe-centric biases of our thinking of peace. At the same time it gives many new tools to the toolbox of peacemaking. I hope that this book convinces the reader of this.

I owe a great debt to many people who were helpful to my research. I have been impressed and influenced by the great names of East Asian studies, who have also commented and/or encouraged my work. Amitav Acharya, Robert Ross, Surpong Peou, David Kang, Kevin Clements, Chung-in Moon, Jong Kun Choi, Keyuan Zou, Emilian Kavalski, Zhang Tiejun and Kim Beng Phar deserve my deepest gratitude.

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positive and encouraging. To some extent it has returned my faith in academic institutions as allies, rather than enemies of scholarly innovation.

I would like to thank my language editor, Leena Höskuldsson, who did a great service to my readers in straightening out not only my language but often also my thoughts related to the difficult issues of peace and war. Thanks are also due to the great editorial team of Ashgate. This is the third single-authored book I have written with Ashgate; if it is up to me, it will not be the last.
Objectives

East Asia has become peaceful without scholars generally even realizing this. When recipes for peace are sought, we often look at Western-European experiences of integration, lower borders and turning of historical enemies into friends. However, the long peace period in Western Europe is not unique: similar periods have also been experienced elsewhere, but these have not portrayed strongly in the creation of generalizations on peace. Instead, Europe has largely dominated the field. However, during the past three decades, East Asia has been more peaceful than Europe, Americas or any continent, in terms of the numbers of battle deaths per capita. Like Europe, East Asia used to be the most belligerent area in the world, just before its dramatic change. Since East Asia is a spectacular case of pacification, and since it has not much affected our theorization of peace and conflict, it is a very useful case to study. Perhaps peace in East Asia can be sustained? Perhaps it can be deepened? Perhaps the East Asian peace model can be emulated elsewhere?

The present book starts from the pragmatic interest of peace research as a tool of reducing suffering caused by war. Its ultimate objective is to contribute to the reduction of the number of people killed by conflicts and political violence by offering understanding that can help remove causes of war, criticize the knowledge that constitutes the legitimate forms of violence, deconstruct social realities within which war is a rational strategy, and construct interpretations and social realities that help create peace. Later in this chapter, I shall explain the general approach of neo-pragmatist study of the long peace of East Asia and its contribution to the current understanding of East Asian security. Furthermore, I shall substantiate my
arguments on the long peace of East Asia. But before all of that, though, I shall define the two
main concepts of the topic of this book, “peace” and “East Asia”.

**Security and Peace**

The question of what can be included in the concept of peace and what not depends at least on
three things. Firstly, it is a practical question of what one wants to focus on, what kind of
clusters of issues one can analyse and which issues make an interesting totality.

Secondly, the question is of the analytical relevance that the different issues under focus
have for each other. There are analytical ways to study all of the various kinds of threats and
how their “inclusion into the security realm” affects the way they are being dealt with (on
securitization theory, see for example Waever 1995). However, if one wants to find ways to
prevent threats to peace, the roots of environmental threats and threats to people emanating from
authoritarian violence, it is not analytically possible to find coherent analytical approaches for
the venture. The study of the source of environmental threats requires understanding of biology,
environmental studies, etc., while the study of intentional threats by enemies (conflict studies)
requires a very different approach.

Thirdly, focus and framing of what belongs together and what does not, is a political
matter as associations and dissociations are social realities.

In traditional East Asian security studies and research in international relations,
association between people’s security and national security has been seen as weak while the
association between regime survival and security has been very strong. Peace is stability of
order, and lack of uncontrolled change (Leifer 1989; Mearsheimer 2001; Ikenberry and
Mastanudo 2003; Christensen 1999; Goh 2008. This characteristic in old Malaysian security
thinking is analysed by Shamsul 2007). Opening up to broader concepts of peace and security –
such as human and non-traditional securities – has lately promoted the political importance of
human survival in security and peace studies in East Asia (Peou 2009; Strategic Peace and
International Affairs Research Institute 2007; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006; Acharya 2004) even if nations are still considered as crucial instruments of the security of citizens even in the East Asian human security literature (Dan 2007; Enoki 2007). Concepts of non-traditional security and human security are tolerated in the debate as long as it is clear that the security of human beings cannot be in contradiction with the security of the state (Peou 2009; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006). This is why more radical concepts of human security that incorporate authoritarian violence in the phenomenon of security threats (Booth 2007; Krause 2007) are viewed with suspicion.

Since the objective of this book is to look at the long peace of East Asia as a phenomenon positive for people (peace as a concept needs normative relevance), it cannot consider Pol Pot’s stable rule in Cambodia as peace regardless of how safe it was for the state. The starting point of this study is the security of people, while the security of states for the long peace of East Asia is seen in the instrumental value of the states to their citizens. The security of Pol Pot’s Cambodia had a more distant association to peace than, for example, today’s Japan, Indonesia or South Korea have. From this human-centered political point of view, I have to take a ruling different from that of the mainstream East Asia literature, in favor of including repressive authoritarian violence into the conceptual category of threats to peace. In an analysis that aims at grasping the big picture of developments it is difficult, though, to include violence against civilians (either by governments or by terrorist groups) consistently, because reliable numeric data on this type of violence is missing for periods before 1989. I have nevertheless assessed the impact of this problem to my conclusions in Chapter 2. Furthermore, I have made qualitative references to authoritarian violence as a threat to peace also later, in the analysis of the sources of such a peace.

Since my intention is to try to explain and understand how the long peace of East Asia has been developed and constituted, I cannot simultaneously consider non-human threats to security as threats to peace. When looking at the sources of conflicts, I shall be operating with
intentional threats to people and states, and thus, the modelling will involve interaction. However, there is no intentionality or interaction between casualties and an earthquake, and thus the modelling of such a threat would need to be very different from that of genuine conflict threats. Thus I define threats to peace as man-made, intentional, and a threat to human life. I use the indicator of battle deaths as one of the most useful proxies for the analysis of the kind of peace that I want to study. While some others (Goldsmith 2007; Chich-Mao 2011) use militarized interstate disputes as their indicator of conflicts, I feel that a definition that values human lives and focuses on violence against people is better indicated by the number of people who have died as a direct consequence of conflict.

In East Asian peace studies conflicts are often seen as violent disputes between several states or between a state and intrastate groups. Analysis of intra- and interstate conflicts is often kept separate as the explanations of these could require very different theoretical apparatuses. Existing literature shows often in intuition that while interstate warfare has declined in East Asia, intrastate warfare has increased. This is claimed explicitly at least in Narine (2002: 195) and Vatikiotis (2006). This, of course is not the case if the amount of conflicts is measured by the number of casualties. As I shall show in Chapter 3, conflict violence has declined drastically after the 1970s.

Yet in some of the existing literature intra- and interstate violences are treated in a single explanation. Lee Jones (2010; 2012), however, sees Southeast Asian conflicts as reflections of social struggle between classes, and thus denies the strict differentiation of intra- and interstate conflicts. According to Jones, ruling elites of ASEAN frame peace and security in class-terms, while the national framing with strict norms of non-interference is just the technology of hegemonic ideological power for the elites: it is useful for the elites if people and external powers perceive East Asia as strict with the norm of sovereignty because it helps the elites in their management of elite–people relations.
The fact that battle deaths in East Asia have disappeared simultaneously in intra- and interstate relations suggests that it could be possible to find common sources to intra- and interstate peace. However, the much more drastic decline in interstate conflict suggests that there are also independent sources of interstate peace that do not affect, or affect less, intrastate conflicts. Due to the fact that my analysis concludes that many of the intra- and interstate conflicts have similar roots, and due to the fact that my argument of the sources of conflict suggests that intra- and interstate conflicts are parts of the same conflict dynamics, I shall try to cover both intra- and interstate peace in this book. Internal conflicts are often at the core of wars in East Asia, but mostly they escalate only once external powers get engaged in the originally domestic conflicts. Furthermore, development orientation that became the prominent approach to governance once East Asia became pacific, affects both intra- and interstate warfare. Once states tackle the economic grievances of potential rebel constituencies, they no longer need to divert the attention of dissatisfied populations by demonizing external enemies. In this way, the developmentalist approach to security has contributed simultaneously to peace within and between states. Thus it seems that the sources of the two types of conflicts are so intertwined that an analysis of one also reveals most of the sources of the other one. In this respect I have to conclude with Jones (2012), that the distinction between intra- and interstate dynamics is not as real as it is presented.

While my conceptual apparatus considers violent disputes between any groups as relevant threats to peace, my quantitative mapping of the reality of East Asia peace is limited by the fact that there is no reliable data that pre-dates the year 1989 on the extent of conflicts that do not involve states. I have made estimates of the impact of this problem on my conclusions in Chapter 2 and treated non-state conflicts as conflicts in my qualitative analysis.

The concept of peace in this book is undeniably negative. The absence of political violence and fatalities of such violence is the narrow meaning of peace in this book. That positive peace – cooperation for the removal of structural violence, or disarmament for the more
productive use of resources and more trusting cooperation between potential conflicting parties – is left out of the main analysis of this book is due to the fact that East Asia has not yet expanded its peace to the more positive structural and cooperative problem-solving directions. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the small and declining number of fatalities of traditional conflicts between two or more armed groups is at the core of the long peace of East Asia. The negative nature of the long peace of East Asia will be revealed in the empirical exploration of the peace in chapter 2, and the potential for moving from negative to positive peace will be speculated in Chapter 8.

**East Asia as a Region to be Focused on**

What is a relevant region for the study of peace and conflict is, again, a practical, an analytical and a political issue. A region is created by interpretations, and the association of some localities with some other localities, the ruling of someone out and someone else in a region is about as political an issue as is possible in world politics. Defining regions is political gerrymandering. In East Asia, the basic setting has been that China, the mightiest regional power, has promoted regionalism that excludes non-Asian powers (mainly the US, but also Australia and New Zealand). This is understandable as these powers could tilt the otherwise favorable power balance in the region. The countries most concerned about the rise of Chinese power, such as Japan, would be eager to be more inclusive in the definition of the region. The central role of ASEAN in East Asian exclusive regionalism has been an interest for many ASEAN countries to support the Chinese concept of regionalism, while those ASEAN countries most threatened by China, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, also have a motive to support the Japanese, inclusive concept of region (Malik 2006).

Analytically, the more inclusive concept of ‘Asia-Pacific’ has been promoted by theorists that are convinced of the influence of the global superpower on East Asia’s security (Goh 2008; Leifer 1989; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003; Duffield 2001; Yahuda 2011;
If the US influence in East Asia is dominant, it makes no sense to analyse regional dynamics without considering the Pacific aspect of Asia. Alternatively, scholars sometimes also perceive broader Asian regionalism with the strong role of the US so dominant that the difference between South and East Asia matters only little. Such scholars analyse Asian politics in the global context of US hegemony (Shambaugh and Yahuda 2007). Some scholars also see the difference between South Asia and East Asia so small that the entire area can be seen as a region (Goldsmith 2005, 2007; Alagappa 2003).

Scholars who see East Asia as a region, based on the group of countries active in ASEAN + Three (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, China, South Korea and Japan), but including also East Timor, North Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan and perhaps the easternmost part of Russia in the region, often emphasize the importance of China in the regional power dynamics and the role of ASEAN in the regional institution building. These scholars rarely emphasize the dominance of the US in the regional peace and conflict issues (Kang 2007 and 2010; Beeson 2009; Pempel 2005; Mahbubane 2008; Weissmann 2011; Suh and Katzenstein 2004).

Finally, scholars who focus on regions as ‘regional security complexes’ tend to be hesitant to extend the concept of region very much. They would like to analyse Northeast and Southeast Asia separately. As Jong Kun Choi and Chung-in Moon (2010) suggest events in Thailand are very pertinent for any of the ASEAN members, while they are not so important for the security of North Korea. Similarly, referring to interdependence, one can say that

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1The starting point of the analysis of security complexes is the materiality-based realization that “[s]ince most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 4). Regional security complex requires that the regional level can be distinguished from the global; only the superpowers are truly relevant for each region, while the regional level is at least as important as the global level for the security of a region.
developments in Taiwan are less important for Indonesia than they are, for example for South Korea. This is why East Asian region is not an analytically useful concept for these scholars.

On this issue I have to disagree with Moon and Choi. Since I do not believe that one could find exogenous objective causes to war and peace, generalizations on war and peace do not need to be sought in regions that have similarities in their objective conditions. This is why physical distance and other objective differences between Southeast and Northeast Asia do not matter that much. However, according to Moon and Choi, it is the lack of critical interdependence that makes it impossible to study the entire East Asia as one region. While I admit that physical interdependence can be important in the creation of a region, I think that the commonness of approaches to security and the commonness of security identity, as demonstrated by the fact that East Asia has sought security cooperation in the framework of ASEAN + Three as well as East Asian Summit, are more important reasons for treating East Asia as one. If one wants to study regional dynamics of security as such, interdependence is crucial, while if one is interested in understanding how peace emerges and is sustained, it is more relevant to study regions with optimally similar conditions, identities, norms and approaches that could explain or help understand security developments than to study interdependent regions.

The fact is that most of East Asia has started to cherish economic development and to respect sovereignty and military non-interference simultaneously and stopped focusing on divisive issues aiming instead at face-saving in their diplomacy. These similarities, which do not extend beyond East Asia (certainly not to the Pacific or to South Asia), make East Asia analytically more relevant as a region than areas that are more interdependent. This is why the focus in this book is on East Asia, rather than Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia separately, or the entire Asia. I will focus on East Asia, including the current ASEAN area, China (and Taiwan), the Koreas, Mongolia and Japan, even if it were true that security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia are somewhat independent of each other. The region
focused in this book will exclude Eastern parts of Russia, as Russia does not identify itself primarily as an East Asian nation, and it does not subscribe to the East Asian approaches to conflict prevention.

**A Pragmatist Research Program**

In order to develop a consistent theory of East Asian security and peace, and in order to understand existing conclusions on the topic, it is necessary to define what the developed theory will be used for, and to analyse what others have used their theories for. In this section I shall first discuss the expectations to this book in relation to the theory it develops. Then I shall show how the neo-pragmatic research programme relates to other “theories of theory”.

This study views the long peace of East Asia from the perspective of pragmatic interests common to peace research. An analysis of this period of peace aims at finding ways to sustain it, improve it and emulate it elsewhere. As such this study could be called pragmatist. However, while my pragmatism borrows from the work of the classical pragmatists Charles Sanders Pierce, William James and John Dewey, it also borrows from Erich Fromm’s notion of the activist theory of knowledge, as well as the post-modernist work on knowledge and practice by Richard Rorty.

This pragmatic study aims at producing knowledge that advises us on how to adjust to the social and material realities that surround us and on how to change conflict-prone structures and processes. Knowledge must be able to put various actors in conflict prevention “on top” of the complex structures and processes of the East Asian conflicts. It will have to help them with their conflict prevention. The intention is not to produce a mirror image of reality, or to claim a correspondence between sentences that explain and analyse the reality, and the reality itself. The intention of pragmatic studies is not to be truthful in this sense. Nor is it to produce a description that would maximize coherence with a worldview or some more general understandings. Both of these objectives have often been in the minds of scholars who have designed criteria of truth
The present book does not seek explanations that reduce complex conflict processes and structures to their logical atoms as was the intention of Bertrand Russell (1984/1919) in his theory of explanation. In fact, such a purpose is viewed with suspicion as it seems very pragmatic to focus on systemic levels of reality, instead of assuming that the explanation could be built atomistically from elements. For example in the chapter on the norm of non-interference as a source of East Asia’s ability to prevent conflict escalation (Chapter 5), I try to show how pragmatic it is for the prevention of conflict escalation to consider the entire interactive game of escalation and the meanings it gives to individual move/choices, instead of considering each move atomistically as something that then jointly builds up the reality of conflict escalation. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to produce explanations that help the controlling and manipulating of conflict developments, and this sometimes requires not only the understanding of the parts or the totality but also the interaction between the two.

Thus, knowledge – the aim of this study – is an adaptation strategy towards “the world out there”. At the same time the knowledge and consciousness of those of us involved in the conflict are part of the construction of the conflict reality. If we believe, as political realists do, that norms do not belong to world politics, we will verify this belief in our action. Similarly if we consider sovereign states as the main actors of international relations, our belief in states make them real and important in world politics.

The objectives of my study do not give their meanings themselves, and their meanings and properties are not natural as such; the process of knowing what they are involves our interests and is more active on the part of the observer than scientific realists would like to admit. Truth is not a picture of a reality or a correspondence with it; reality is reality, whilst

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2 Hempel for example, suggests that it would be possible to construct sentences by using only observational terms that directly mirror the reality (Hempel 1965). However, for classics of the correspondence model of truth, see Russell (Russell 1984). For the coherence view, see Putnam (Putnam 1981).
truth and knowledge of reality are approaches and active orientations towards the reality. Erich Fromm (1973), for example, claims that any relationship between thought and reality is characterized by continuous intentional purposive activity on the part of the mind, rather than “knowing” being passive sensory receptivity. Instead, knowing is activity that is guided by the purposes we have for the reality around us. As Georg Herbert Mead has said, we relate to the reality around us by giving it meanings that depends on how we intend to use it (Mead 1934). Pragmatic peace research could claim with William James that consciousness is teleological in nature: that the understanding of all mental activity and its products must include reference to the agent’s purposes and interests.

In order not to lose some of the opportunities of conflict prevention, we should also see knowledge as a creator of social realities, not just as something that adapts us to existing material realities. “A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality”. True beliefs are “those that prove useful to the believer” (Margolis 2005). This applies to material as well as ideational realities. Thus the question related to both socially and materially created realities is not what the truth is (as a mirror image of reality), but what should be regarded as true and as reality. We should not think that we can conquer an army of two million men with the military force of an army of ten thousand men. Practice will prove us wrong if we do. Similar logic applies to socially created, ideational realities. Whether we should consider states a reality of life in world politics depends only on whether they serve a purpose. Thus a pragmatic theory will not ask whether our previous action suggests that states are real, important and immoral,

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3According to Charles Sanders Pierce, human beings are so completely hemmed in by the bounds of their possible practical experience, their minds are so restricted to being instruments of their needs and desires that they cannot in the least mean anything transcending those bounds (Colapietro 2005). According to William James “everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real” (James 1912: 81; see also James 1977: 279, and Suckiel 2009).
but whether we should consider them as such and continue to act as if that was the only way world politics could function. This book, therefore, does not simply look at the power of norms and constructions of realities for their existence; it goes further than that. It assesses the utility of various social constructs and interpretations by conflicting parties of the social reality and seeks opportunities for the deconstruction of interpretations and social constructs that are harmful for peace and opportunities for the construction of social realities useful for peace. As Charon says about symbolic interactionalism, this research does not just analyse which constructs, created by symbolic interaction, exist; it is also interested in studying the actual “symboling”, the manipulation of symbols by active persons, defining and redefining their social realities (Charon 1995: 63).

Peace research puts the event of battle death at the center of its attention and gives it a negative normative value and defines the prevention of such an event as the pragmatic purpose of its scholarship. As such our pragmatic peace research does indeed recognize the existence of material realities that are independent of our consciousness. One also needs to share with Charles Sanders Peirce the recognition of law-like forces that objective realities are driven by (Shook and Margolis 2009). Regardless of our consciousness and our meaning-giving about shooting and dying, a bullet that penetrates someone’s heart causes a death. Yet, it is very pragmatic to make a distinction between objective and socially created realities. The difference between the material realities that we create meanings for in our thinking, and the truths and realities that only exist in our minds, is pragmatically important. The strategic difference is that social will has total control over the latter, while the bullet will always be hard and it will always penetrate our bodies no matter how much we believe in amulets and spells that make the enemy’s bullets soft. The great majority of conflict realities, such as the existence of politically relevant international actors, let alone rules that we construct for politics and conflict, are of the nature that they would not exist without our knowledge of them. The reason why this
is useful to recognize is that it allows us one more opportunity for the prevention of conflict violence.

On the one hand, we can manipulate material realities by exerting material influence (for instance, mutually disarming nations in order to make the capacity of killing smaller). On the other hand, together with the individuals relevant to the reproduction of a social construct we can deconstruct a conflict-inducing social construct without having to do anything to the material realities. The usefulness of this distinction can be revealed by imagining strategies of stopping a bullet by changing social constructs, or strategies that always attempt to change realities through the manipulation of the material parameters of these realities. Treating rebellious conflict violence, for example, as an objective response to grievant economic realities allows rebel constituencies to blackmail benefits by expressing new demands as grievances that objectively result in acts of violence.

Another strategic, pragmatic benefit in not trying to reduce material junctures to the discursive and the socially constructed, or not trying to explain the socially constructed as material is related to the differences in strategies of blocking or rerouting objective and discursive junctures of conflict. If we assume that all junctures are material and objective, our conclusion will be that we have to destroy the objective prerequisites of war. In a partisan setting this means destroying the enemy. But by doing this we might create new discursive normative prerequisites of war. The terrorists who attacked bars popular among western people on Bali in 2003 and in 2007 were objectivists who considered western power as something objectively founded and as a material prerequisite of the perceived spread of western values, and the western aggression against Muslims in the Middle East. However, by hitting innocent civilians on Bali, these terrorists disregarded the fact that they were also strengthening the very normative prerequisite of the violence that they were fighting against. By attaching an appalling normative precedence to their own side, they managed to create, in the minds of many Western leaders and voters, a lot of support and legitimacy for force against radical Muslims. Ignoring
the non-material realities their effort to weaken the West actually strengthened their enemy tremendously. After the Bali attack, the 9/11 incident, and all the main terrorist strikes ‘against the West’ the world was lined up behind the US, and it took many violent and illegitimate strategies by the US to gradually erode that support.

For a pragmatic study it makes a lot of sense to build the analysis on top of the already existing research, so that we need not reinvent the wheel again. This means that neo-pragmatism can use theories that aim at different objectives, just as long as it is clear how to use theories with different missions. Thus the next step in this study will be an analysis of how to use the existing theories of East Asian security in a pragmatic manner.

Some scholars of East Asian security and peace want to theorize the regularities and determinants of security dynamics in East Asia (positivist theories), while some want to theorize what is made real in interpretations, social practices and language and what could be possible (constructivist theories), how things should be – morally or rationally (normative theories), and how people should interpret the security realm around themselves in order to pragmatically serve the interests of peace (pragmatist theories, the choice of this book). If we study the regularities of the empirically observable dynamics, the theory can offer a tool for explanation and even prediction of what is going to happen to the long peace of East Asia. At the same time if we look at what would be possible, new understanding can open our eyes to strategic choices in East Asian security that have not been considered possible in the past. The third type of a theory aims at prescriptions based on a moral code or a calculation of rationality. The usefulness of a prescriptive theory for pragmatist research is equally obvious: in fact pragmatism is a normative theory, only with a pragmatic criterion related to the reduction of violence.

Theories that aim at revealing general regularities, often of causal nature, between analytically independent conditions (inequality and conflict, for example) are useful for a pragmatic study as they reveal correlative relationships between conditions that are relevant for
practical efforts to make peace. While Chi-Mao (2011), Goldsmith (2005, 2007), Svensson and Lindgren (Svensson 2011; Svensson and Lindgren 2011), seek explanations to peace and war from exogenous conditions, most other explanations represent some kind of soft causality (Weissman 2011; Mearsheimer 2001; Kim 1997). Regularities are useful for peace making, even if they are not hard and even if they do not create perfectly accurate predictions. If we, for example, find out correlative regularities between dyadic democratic liberalism and peace, this regularity motivates our search for the possible causal mechanisms that involve the two. Once we can identify the causal relationship, and perhaps manipulate it, it would be possible for us to block or redirect some of the parts in the path to conflict not only in one conflict but in all those conflicts that the regularity somehow touches. This does not require, as claimed by many opponents of the study of correlative relationships and regularities in social sciences (Suganami 1996; Dessler 1991; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Kurki 2008; Lebow 2009b), an ontology in which social realities are regulated by social laws. We can still study the specific causal and constitutive paths to conflicts, and we can still believe in the power of purposive, underdetermined individual and collective action, but if we find similarities, generalizations and regularities, they do have pragmatic value. If, instead of finding singular causal chain, we find causal paths that is similar in many places either in one historical or cultural context, or in several contexts, then our ability to block and redirect that causal path to conflicts can help us prevent more than just one conflict.

Even weaker correlative associations and regularities have a great pragmatic value in peace research as even weak associations between structures, events or conditions on the one hand and war on the other, can have an impact on many lives. Even weakly significant correlations expose relationship between war and some conditions that are with high probability not accidental but very real. Suganami suggests, that the dyadic regularity of liberal democracies not fighting one could just as well be a coincidence, and undermines the regularity on those grounds (Suganami 1996 83). This is of course possible but extremely improbable.
Russett has shown that the probability of absence of wars between liberal democracies between 1816 and 1980 is \(0.000000000000000002\%\) (Russett 1996: 85). Even correlations that are just barely “significant” are pragmatic for peace. If there was a way to prevent a risk that with 95% probability is associated with war, then surely one should not ignore it. Furthermore, Suganami tries to downplay the findings by Rudolph Rummel by saying that his studies of the regression coefficients between state properties and conflicts were all below 0.35. For Suganami, those correlations were useless. However, such correlations nevertheless suggest that the conditions explain over 10% of the variation in conflict propensity. If we then assume that we could change state properties to reduce the likelihood of wars in general in a way that would reduce the likelihood or intensity of wars by more than 10%, then we would have been able to rescue more than 3.9 million lives last century, taken that wars killed about 39 million people during the 100 years of the 20th century. For the 3.9 million people and their friends, Rummels findings would not have been meaningless even if they were weak as correlations. Thus regularities are practical, even if we do not assume that our social life is regulated by them, and even if we do not assume that our collective and individual freedom is totally non-existent because of them. It seems that in some core issues related to the theory of East Asian security, such as the future peacefulness of China, theories that aim at regularities and predictions tend to have illusory disagreements caused by unclarity of purposes of theorizing. Some theories aim at generalizing conflict realities from inductive empirical observation, while others deduce from great historical generalizations to specific cases in East Asia and then predict the future of East Asia on the basis of such deductions. Very often the historical focus of these studies is different and thus the predictions or generalizations are incomparable.

For example, Measheimer’s analysis belongs to the deductive category of research when he predicts the unavoidable conflict between the US and China once the quality and
quantity of China’s material power resources overtake those of the US (Mearsheimer 2001; see also Kim 1997). According to Mearsheimer, the structural setting where a new hegemonic challenger overtakes the old hegemon, is inherently unstable, and that a power battle between the old and the new hegemon (the battle of titans) is almost inevitable. This prediction deducts from the experiences of hegemonic transition and follows the history of world politics over several centuries.

However, much of the criticism of Mearsheimer’s ideas focuses on the current situation and claims that there are no signs of China growing more aggressive – quite on the contrary: China has assumed a more positive attitude towards responsible international cooperation and multilateralism (Zheng Bijiang 2005; Johnston 2003). The contradiction between this claim and that of Mearsheimer is illusory, since also Mearsheimer predicts that China will demonstrate good behavior until it gets closer to the material requisites of global leadership. While Mearsheimer analyses the future his critics analyse the present and the past.

The focus on observable and measurable realities (rather than for example, interpretations and peace, or social constructs and conflict) in the first type of theories is a limitation, but clearly not something that would make this type of theorizing useless for pragmatic research. However, the deterministic interpretation of causal regularities is often problematic as it rules out free (underdetermined, “uncaused”) individual action outside the focus. As Fromm writes, in such explanation a human being is assumed to be exclusively determined by conditions outside himself. “He has no part in his own life, no responsibility, and not even a trace of freedom. Man is a puppet, controlled by strings – instincts or conditioning” (Fromm 1973: 71). Obviously the whole idea of pragmatic research is based on the possibility of someone to select strategies in order to maximize chances of peace, and if such voluntarism does not exist in the explanation of the security dynamism, pragmatism becomes impossible. In this study I do assume causality roughly in the sense presented by positivists, but only for materially caused structures and events. In order to be “on top of things”, able to work for peace
one needs to be able to know the causal regularities, but also the causal mechanisms of material structures. If we think that spells can make us invulnerable we exaggerate the creative power of the ideas and that makes us careless about the dangers of war. Even some unreflexive (Ricoeur 1981), rigid (Harsanyi 1956) behaviour can be treated as mechanistically determined, exogenously caused and predictable.

Yet pragmatic explanation cannot explain everything as mechanistically deterministic, since we will have to leave space for the pragmatic action. Instead, pragmatic research can study the interplay, dialogue between purposive, at least partially undetermined collective or individual action and material and social structures. On the one hand, that purposive action creates new social structures and changes material conditions, and on the other it is conditioned by them.

In my explanation of the long peace of East Asia, I will look at three purposive social approaches, or cultures and how they interact with the ideational and material structures of peace and conflict. This research strategy draws from Wendt’s analysis (Wendt 1998) of cultures of anarchy, but identifies very different cultures than the ones Wendt identifies.

I will look at an approach or a culture where the state identity is interpreted in a revolutionary and in a developmentalist manner, assuming that the purpose of the state is either revolution or counter revolution or economic purpose. While revolutionism and developmentalism are purposive approaches they also create a culture that defines the purposes of states, and this clearly affects the ways in which states manage to stay out of conflicts. It is possible to look at the material consequences of the revolutionary and developmentalism cultures by looking at how much conflict the two strategies produce. Furthermore, I will also look at purposive action (on a meta-level), where people struggle to change the culture from revolutionary to developmentalism. In this historical process existing revolutionary social and materialized structures (such as jails for those who do not cherish the revolutionary culture)
resist the change despite the fact that these cultures are largely man-made and exist mostly in the minds of people.

In addition to the interplay of revolutionary and developmentalist purposive collective and individual actions on the one hand and social and material structures of peace and war on the other, I will also look at the cultures of internationalist solidarity/interference and the culture of sovereignty and non-interference. Here too, I will study how these cultures interact and constitute conflict relevant effects and how purposive collective and individual action changes the former type of a culture into the latter type. Instead of again looking at how these cultures affect conflict onset, I will analyse their constitutive powers on the escalation of conflicts, once conflicts have already started.

Finally, I will look at the cultures of conflict termination and their interaction with the ending of wars, conflicts and disputes.

In my analysis of the ways in which East Asian states, leaders and people construct their social realities and create approaches or cultures to reality, I will not be able to study observable things only. I will need to study interpretations and norms in order to identify conflict cultures/approaches. The rejection of meanings and non-observable social realities has lead positivist scholarship into assumptions that observable regularities are always necessary. China’s growing assertiveness is a necessity as its position vis-á-vis the US improves, simply since there is empirical evidence of an observable correlation between hegemonic transitions and hegemonic wars. Yet, social regularities do not need to be as fixed as physical regularities (water boils at 100 degrees Celsius) and to know this can be very important for pragmatic peace research. Anarchy may be what states make of it, but if state leaders think that there is just one, objectively determined way for the international system to work, they might work within that system, and the system survives only because its actors do not understand the availability of alternative ways of conducting and interpreting world politics. This is also why it is practical
that constructivists reveal what is possible (rather than just what is actual). As Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar 1997) has suggested opportunities for different paths are part of the existing realities. Thus the analysis in this book of the paths that lead to the adoption of developmentalism, the norm of non-intervention and the approach of allowing a face saving for one’s enemies takes the availability of alternative routes into account and speculates the optional routes to peace and war (Lebow 2009a).

The relation between the positivist and constructivist theorists is not always constructive. A lot of unproductive debates take place due to the fact that there is no clarity about when the intention of a theory is to explore opportunities and what could be possible, and when it is to find determinants of causal regularities. While many of the realist and liberalist theories of peace and war aim at revealing regularities in the relationship between power and economy on the one hand and conflict probabilities on the other (see, for example, Leifer 1989; Goldsmith 2007), much of the constructivist discussion of Acharya (2000), Cho (2011) and Ba (2009), for example, is about what could be possible, not what exists as a reality. The intention of the latter kind of scholarship is not just to identify realities, but to show the nature of these realities, and to show how they are dependent on the social practices that the actors use for reproducing them. Realists and liberalists often judge constructivist theories by assuming that they, too, aim at mapping realities and can thus be judged by testing the influence in East Asian politics of norms, identities, practices, languages and consciousness (Narine 2002; Jetschke and Rüland 2009). However, constructivist theory aims at dissolving realities as given determinants. Empirical evidence about norms not mattering in a specific instance is not a proof that they could not matter. In this way theory makes it possible for societies to emancipate themselves from some of the realities.

Constructivist theory could be used, for example, to show that actions of states are not determined by their histories, power political settings or economic structures. Instead, the realities they face are at least partly constructed by their own practices, language and thinking,
all of which states can change without any change in any material ‘realities’. Thus the debate, for example of the role of norms in East Asian security between realists and constructivists is illusory, at least in part: even if evidence tells us that states have not applied any coherent norms in some security-political conditions, this does not rule out the opportunity that states might have had if they had adhered to some norms.

The neo-pragmatist theory of theory in this book subscribes to the constructivist ontology that emphasizes the existence of socially constructed realities and processes relevant for peace researchers. In this analysis important opportunities for action for peace can be designed by understanding the ways in which people create peaceful realities by reinterpreting social categories, and reinventing political and security identities (generative causality and constitution of realities). This is an extension to the pragmatist positivist thinking of limiting research only on material realities, and causal regularities between material, mutually analytically separate variables.

One of the constructivist ways of revealing the potential of emancipation from some of the “realities as perceived by realists” is through critique of naturalized social constructs (Booth 2005; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams 1997). Here the contribution of a theory is that it reveals naturalized ‘realities’ that conflicting parties no longer see as something they have power over. For example, actors of ethnic conflict often consider ethnic identity as given, and in their political language, the naturality of such a perception could hide the opportunities for alternative identities and for the transformation of the agent structure of conflict. While such use of a theory is rare in East Asian conflict studies it is not entirely extinct. Hamilton-Hart (2009), for example, criticizes the naturality of conflict definitions by revealing that violence in an orderly situation claims more lives than conflicts as they are defined in the East Asian autocratic tradition. Similarly, Jennifer Mustapha (2012) criticizes the post-9/11 hegemonic narrative that naturalizes the division in the world between “those who are with us and those who are with the terrorists”. Sometimes efforts to reinterpret the rules of international relations clearly
denaturalize realities that we have taken for granted. The understanding of ASEAN principles of non-interference as rational interstate approach to conflict prevention and the naturalization of state actors has been criticized in the class-based analysis of Lee Jones (2012). Jones reveals that important parts of international relations in ASEAN function as class relations rather than nations being somehow natural actors of ASEAN politics. Similarly, the naturality of states as sole actors of East Asian relations has been criticized in various theories of human security (Matsumae and Chen 1995; Dupond 2001).

In order to map the opportunities available for the deconstruction of social constructs harmful for peace, and the construction of more peaceful realities, critical use of the theory is sometimes necessary for pragmatic research. If denaturalization of harmful constructs is needed to reveal that there are alternative ways of interpreting social realities, then this type of theoretical mission also belongs to the neo-pragmatic research that this book subscribes to.

In addition to using a theory to reveal how things are and how they could be, normative research on East Asian conflicts and peace also uses a theory to reveal how things should be (see for example, Alagappa 2003). The discussion on normative realities has been intensive on the question of the alternative concepts of security in East Asia. The main questions in that debate have been whether human welfare should be brought into the framing of security (that is, should it be securitized) or whether military security of states should be a completely isolated phenomenon with highest priority. Should non-military threats to people, non-traditional security and human security also be constructed in the same realm of security as military security of states (Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006)?

A related issue is whether, then, non-traditional and human-security concerns justify military action just as the security of states does (Fukushima and Tow 2009; Enoki 2007; Dan 2007). These questions clearly use the theory as a vehicle to investigate how things should be. According to the progressive input of the Commission for a New Asia, a group of 16 respected
Asian intellectuals, humanitarian concerns can justify intervention, but only as a last resort, for purely humanitarian purposes, under a UN mandate, with the acceptance of the population of the country, and only if there is an extreme threat to human security and legality (Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan 1995; for the same basic conclusion, see Fukushima and Tow 2009). Some writings (Nishikawa 2007; Booth 2005; also Peou 2009a, to some extent) construct human security so totally on par with the military security of states (which in East Asian discussion is undeniably seen as an important part and an instrument of human security) that it is difficult not to suspect that these writings reveal a preference to an even more intrusive concept of human security (Hamilton-Hart 2009). At the same time, those writings that return the issue back to the question of what is, rather than what should be, construct human security as empirically alien to East Asia and deny especially the intrusive interpretations of the concept by referring to the fact that this kind of thinking has not traditionally been prominent in Asia (Dan 2007; Enoki 2007).

In some cases the quest for how things should be is guided by pragmatism. According to Peou (2009: 3–4) for example, “if human security is to stay analytically useful as a concept that can be operationalized and relevant in policy terms, we need to prioritize policy commitment, motivate policy action, and assess policy outcomes”. Thus Peou sees the truth of human security as crucially dependent on the pragmatic consequences of it as an adaptation strategy to reality, or even as a conceptual construct of social reality. Furthermore, he also assesses the concept of human security from the point of view of whether or not it can be “sold” to the policy community: “My hope is that the concept … can be better accepted and applied if we succeed in building a concept that is neither too elastic nor too restrictive, combining theoretical insights into one that is neither too parochial nor too eclectic” (Peou 2009: 7). In his analysis of security community studies (2005) Peou blends political pragmatism into his assessment of analytical merits of such studies, clearly showing his commitment to the neo-pragmatic thinking. This leads us to a new way of using theory to expose which social constructs are practical to be considered as real. The leading question here is not how things are,
how they could be or how they should be (in some moral normative sense), but how it would be practical for us to believe them to be.

It is clear that pragmatic research on peace and war has to be sensitive to any material realities, just as it needs to understand the options offered for the change of social constructions by means of denaturalization of ‘realities’ that have been taken as granted or natural. Pragmatic research has to be sensitive about the possibility that realists, liberals and constructivists all are in the right in their empirical positions; only their theoretical objectives are different. Pragmatic research needs to be sensitive to the opportunities of using theories to reveal both what is and what could be. It is practical not to ignore material realities (say, by challenging an army hundred times greater than one’s own), while it is useful to judge what kind of social constructs should be considered as real/useful in order to know what kind of realities could exist.

**Quantitative and qualitative evidence on peace and war in East Asia**

While different theorists of the security of East Asia place different expectations for their theorizing, they also accept different types of evidence for their theories. This section will explicate the perhaps unorthodox approach to the substantiation of claims on peace and conflict in this book and relate this approach to the ways in which East Asian security studies so far have tried to substantiate their arguments.

Substantiating claims made on peace and conflict in East Asia have to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of quantitative and qualitative schools. On the one hand it is important that one does not only settle for such questions and such models that can be elegantly studied by using the latest quantitative methodologies. Too often identities, interpretations and norms, for example, are ignored by scholars who might very well pay much attention to these things in their private lives, simply because they are difficult to measure. For the same reason scholarship sometimes rules out generative causality or processes of mutual construction. One cannot
measure social realities either that are largely created in the process of interpretation. Yet scholars might, in their private lives, be masters of critical sense-making in the mutual constitution of identities and policies. They may for example encourage their children to do their homework by considering them intelligent and diligent and thereby slyly creating an expectation that pushes the children to work hard. Literature of East Asian conflict studies has been affected by the traditionalism that the maxims of quantitative methodology have pushed mainstream scholarship despite the fact that East Asian peace research has hardly ever been very quantitative (with the exception of Goldman 2007, Chih-Mao 2011, Svensson and Lindgren 2011 and Svensson 2011). This offers this volume some opportunities for the re-interpretation of East Asian security and conflict by using some of the insights of symbolic interactionalism and constructivist interpretative scholarship.

At the same time scholarship that acknowledges the importance of socially constructed realities, processes of mutual constitution, and other things that are difficult to measure by counting quantities of something material, sometimes rejects quantitative methods of substantiating claims even if the scholarship does not fully mobilize the theoretical possibilities of constructivist theory. In the recent theorizing on peace and war this allergy towards numbers has occasionally expressed itself in rather amateurish critique of some of the research results of the findings of quantitative peace research. Very often small reliability issues are seen as fundamental issues that render research results useless as was discussed above in relation to the question of correlative regularities. General conditions and regularities that reveal risks of war

4 See for example Suganami’s treatment of the differences in Wallace’s and Diehl’s analysis of arms race (Wallace 1979; Diehl 1983; Suganami 1996). While Wallace and Diehl have very differing methodological choice and while they produce very different conclusions on the correlative relationship between arms races and conflicts, they both clearly conclude that the frequency of wars is much greater for powers who are in an arms race than for powers that are not. This way, while the comparison of the two studies may be embarrassing as it reveals differences in approaches, from the pragmatic point of view the prescription of both studies is that an arms race is a warning sign for a conflict.
are important for peace research even if the regularities were weak and the correlative relationships were of low statistical significance.

The allergy towards numbers is clear also in the constructivist study of East Asian peace and conflicts even if that research rarely utilized the opportunities constructivist research offers. One can, in fact, very seldom read literature on East Asian conflicts and peace that fully utilizes the options offered by the analysis of the social realm of security-related realities, Acharya 2001, Peou 2009, Ba 2009, Busse 1999, and a few others being exceptions. Thus the antipathy that East Asian scholarship on peace and conflict has to substantiating claims by means of quantification is difficult to understand especially since generalizations are made on trends and patterns that are geographically and historically so huge that they cannot possibly be grasped without generalizing the methods of analysis. As a result scholars often maintain that something is general or typical (claiming something about the frequency of occurrences), or that some peaceful or conflict-prone outcomes are generally associated with some conditions, approaches, or discourses (claiming a correlative relationship) and yet substantiating their claims by references to singular cases.

Due to this, theoretical debate often gets bogged down to disputes about the representativeness of various contradictory examples. There is no consensus on the things that are being explained and understood, such as the trends in peacefulness. For example, Vatikiotis’ claim (2006) that both the number of conflicts and the number of conflict fatalities are increasing, while for example, Svensson and Lindgren (2011) show that there is a downward trend for both. Statistics of battle deaths (Kivimäki 2011) and the number of more severe conflicts (Kivimäki 2008) seem to suggest that the East Asian trend towards reduction of violence is uniform almost without exceptions.

There is not full consensus on the trends related to conditions either that are mobilized for the explanation of peace or conflict. Some claim that East Asia did not get any more
democratic while it became more peaceful (Kivimäki 2001), while the general impression of others is that democracy is progressing in the region (Rüland 2009; Acharya 2010). Similarly, there is an almost unanimous view that ASEAN developmental attitude was associated with actual development and interdependence from the very beginning of the organization, while statistical evidence shows that interdependence and development generally regressed during the first decade of ASEAN.

Somehow, despite the problems of quantitative data and the shortcomings of quantitative methods, let alone the problematic assumptions (objectivism, mechanistic materialism, blindness towards non-quantifiable “invisible meanings”, and social realities) that are often associated with much of quantitative research, we cannot avoid using quantitative indicators and proxies for making all these claims that are ultimately quantitative in nature. This is one of the starting points in the attitude towards the ways of substantiating the postulates of this book.

One of the main contributions of this book is related to the above mentioned process of navigating between Scylla and Charybdis. Instead of hitting both, as I fear much of East Asian peace-studies scholarship does, this study tries to avoid them. This will be done by trying not to neglect social structures, the articulation of social realities, and the processes of mutual constitution. For these the study of historical contexts and careful analysis of discourses will be conducted. At the same time this study will try to avoid the temptation of making quantitative claims without engaging statistical data and methods for the substantiation of them. In short the present book mobilizes numbers without neglecting interpretations and discourses.

While trying to mobilize quantitative sources in a study that does not see determinants of peace as material, one needs to take into account a few precautions, though. If this study believed in mechanistic causation of peace by material conditions, it would be easy to measure material conditions and peace, and the quantitative analysis could produce reliable conclusion
on correlative relations. However, since I study approaches and cultures, and yet try to quantify them in order to understand the generality of some approaches, I will have to choose proxies for my investigation of these cultures as well as for my treatment of peace.

Peace is not just absence of fatalities. It would be difficult to imagine peace in a situation where a stronger military power imposes its terms on weaker powers, and the weaker powers, despite the intolerable nature of the terms, cannot protest due to the superiority of the stronger power. Yet, the absence of fatalities does indicate that there are not as intolerable conditions as there are in situations where people are actually willing to risk their lives to change the conditions. This is why in my analysis of peace, I will measure general trends by using conflict statistics and statistics of battle deaths. I will go deeper into the critique of this proxy indicator in Chapter 2, but already at this stage it is important to remember that battle deaths is just an observable proxy of the peace I try to study.

The use of quantitative sources in the study of the causal chains that lead to peace in East Asia, I need to use proxies that too, are not entirely satisfactory as indications of the largely immaterial, ideational realities, approaches and cultures that I see as causally powerful in the generation of the long peace of East Asia. If I claim that the emergence of a developmentalist state identity contributed to a culture that was better at preventing the onset of conflicts I will have to identify developmentalist state identity by assuming proxies, such as the frequency of the concept of “economic development” in texts that define the role and tasks of the state. This does not mean that the concept as such causes peace, but instead, that the developmentalist identity that can be found by looking at texts that define the roles and purposes of the state did. Since one cannot observe state identities or other important junctures in the generative chain to peace, and since one nevertheless has to substantiate one’s claims about the role and identity of states, one does need to use proxies that indicate something that cannot be measured directly. Thus the correlative relationship between certain words in texts and peace is treated as something that indicates the relationship between certain state identity and peace. Using proxies
instead of measuring the social realities that I claim as responsible for some changes in the peacefulness of the region is something that affects the reliability of my conclusions. However, to remedy this, I have also looked at the specific historical path of the transformation from revolutionist to developmentalist culture and tried to link peace with the developmentalist state culture within the historical context of the pacification of East Asia. This way, the use of proxies in quantitative investigation is not the only method of establishing the mechanism in which developmentalism produces the decline in the probability of an onset of conflicts. Similarly, the measurement of the norm of non-interference (and face-saving) uses proxies in administrative texts and identifies a new culture of non-interference (or face-saving) by means of identifying correlative relationships between proxies and the de-escalation of conflicts (or termination of wars). But again, the use of proxies in numerical treatment is complemented by historical analysis of processes and a quantitative treatment of the concrete relationship between number of conflict fatalities and intervention before the peaceful period. This way, even though opting for some of the positivistic methodologies, this study does not rely on them.

**Structure of the book**

After this introduction to the main concepts and to the research approach, I shall proceed to uncover the phenomenon to be explained (the dependent variable, if one wants to borrow terminology from natural sciences) by sketching the profile of the long peace of East Asia. This will be done in Chapter 2, which shows how dramatically East Asia has changed, what kind of “peace” one can speak about in the region and what the main exceptions of such a peace are. Chapter 3 will then present the main argument of this book in brief and show the correlative evidence to it. This chapter will walk the reader through the overall evidence about the change in the East Asian approach to security, and the associations between that approach and the
dramatic change in the security situation. Three elements of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ approach to the interpretation of the world and regulating it with norms have contributed most to the creation of a peaceful East Asia. These elements are

   a) developmentalism
   b) non-interference, and
   c) face-saving.

It seems that the different elements of the ‘ASEAN Way’ approach tackle different phases of the conflict process. This fact will be used in the structuring of the book: the analysis moves from the prevention of the onset of conflict (Chapter 4) to the prevention of the escalation of conflicts (Chapter 5) into wars once the prevention of the onset of conflict has failed (Chapter 6).

The identity of East Asian states as “developmentalist”, with an excessive focus and interest in the promotion of economic growth seems to be associated with the fact that violent disputes and conflicts do not erupt so easily any more. This will be established in Chapter 4.

The fact that East Asia has turned its back to the military interference in each other’s domestic conflicts, the second ASEAN pillar of peace, has meant that if conflicts emerge, they will not escalate into wars. This will be shown in Chapter 5. This second element seems to contribute more than any other of the elements of the ASEAN Way, to the peacefulness of East Asia.

The final element of the ASEAN Way, the intent at saving face and seeking for a solution dignified for all, tackles the issue of the termination of conflicts if such still occur. The ASEAN Way of terminating conflicts, now common in the entire East Asia, will be studied in Chapter 6.
After the presentation of the strategic elements that have contributed to the pacification of East Asia, I will take a step further to the roots of the long peace of East Asia, by investigating how the ASEAN Way approach was generated in East Asia. The establishment of the ASEAN, and the great transformation in Chinese approach to security in the 1960s and the 1970s will be examined. Instead of presenting exogenous causal conditions for the emergence of the ASEAN Way, Chapter 7 will reveal the narratives that legitimized the new approach and generated the ideas of the elements of the ASEAN Way. In this way, the explanation of the long peace of East Asia will be based on the revelation of the successful strategy/approach/discourse that brought about the peace, and on the revelation of the historical context that generated this approach.

In Chapter 8 I shall look into the future, and seek to estimate the durability of the long peace of East Asia and how it could be further strengthened and deepened. Here I will return to the discovery of Chapter 2 about the narrowness and negative character of the East Asian peace and see whether East Asia could be moved from negative peace to a positive peace (using the terms of Johan Galtung). Finally in Chapter 9 I will then discuss the contribution of the East Asian experience of a long peace to the theory of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies. I shall make suggestions on how the experience of East Asia should be incorporated into the body of the international-relations theory of peace and conflict and how the theory of international relations and peace could avoid being too European, in its empirical orientation.

Thus the structure of the book can be summarized in the following manner:

1. Introduction. Aim, concepts and approach
2. The phenomenon to be explained: the long peace of East Asia
3. The main argument: contribution of the ASEAN Way to the long peace of East Asia
   4. Developmentalism and the prevention of the onset of conflicts
5. Non-intervention and the prevention of the escalation of conflicts into wars

6. Face-saving and the termination of conflicts

7. How was the successful approach generated?

8. Will the long peace survive; how could it be made broader, positive and more sustainable?

9. What can the East Asian experience offer to theories of international relations, peace and conflicts?
Chapter 2

The Phenomenon to be Explained: The Long Peace of East Asia.

Introduction

At the core of the phenomenon of East Asian Peace there is the empirical observation that the annual number of battle deaths in East Asia has declined by 95% after 1979\(^5\), compared to the annual level of battle deaths from 1946 to 1979. Any approach in peace research that values life, and has a problem with the violent ending of life, must acknowledge the value of this sudden development.

For the legitimacy of the concept or claim on East Asian Peace, annual arithmetic averages of battle deaths are a better indicator than any measures that focus on the consistency of the lack of conflict. Any measure that is equally affected by each life lost due to a conflict is meaningful regardless of whether lives are lost continuously and gradually in many conflicts, or seldom in a few conflicts only, but then in greater numbers. This is because the normative justification for the concept of East Asian Peace is the value of lives. When looking at the drop in the number of battle deaths in East Asia, I count them as percentages of the original pre-1980 situation. In this way the

\(^5\) Uppsala/PRIO data often assumes an even distribution of battle deaths for each conflict year (unless more accurate information is available). For example, if the low estimate of the number of casualties in Zaire’s government’s conflict with the rebels of the Independent Mining State of South Kasai in 1960-1962 was 75, then the assumption is that 25 battle deaths occurred in each of the three years. Thus it is not possible to take the end date of the Sino-Vietnamese war as a cut-off point to our investigation. Instead, we consider 1980 as the first year of East Asian Peace. The Uppsala data does not distinguish battle deaths between conflicting parties. Whenever this chapter refers to national statistics, they are calculated by assuming that battle deaths in conflicts with two or more nations involved, are distributed evenly.
focus is on (the phenomenon of) peace after 1979, rather than the war before 1980, as variation in the number of battle deaths during a peaceful period is more strongly reflected in the percentage of the drop in the average number of battle deaths than in similar variation in the absolute average number of battle deaths before the peaceful period.

In this chapter I shall show how statistics of battle deaths prove that East Asia has become more peaceful than before, and more peaceful that most other regions in the world, but I shall also look at other indicators of violence to see how broadly based peace is in East Asia. This examination will exclude the possibility that the long peace of East Asia is an illusion caused by our narrow focus on battle deaths of standard conflicts; instead, it will show that battle deaths have not just moved to new kinds of conflicts or new categories of violence. It will also show that violence has not grown in other categories in a way that would undermine the spectacular decline in the number of battle deaths in standard conflicts. In addition to analysing the phenomenon of the long peace of East Asia, this chapter will also look at the issue of the timing of such a period of peace.

When looking at battle deaths I will focus on perhaps the most used dataset program, the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset released in 2005, covering the period of 1946–2002 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The dataset was updated to the year 2005 in 2006 by Bethany Lacina, Patrick Meier, and Martin Schüepp. This was further updated in October 2009 by Gabriel Uriarte and Bethany Lacina, and extended to 2008. According to the dataset’s homepage, a small number of minor corrections to the data were made at this stage. The PRIO dataset is compatible with the list of conflicts in the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch,
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002, PRIO dataset from hereon) for years 1946-2008, and the version 2.0 is compatible with the Correlates of War Dataset (Sarkees 2000) for the period 1900–97 and the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset on civil conflict for the period 1945–99. In addition to studying the version of the PRIO dataset I shall compare it with the new Uppsala dataset (v5/2010), and study their relationship to other data such as the Correlates of War (COW) data. When looking at other types of violence, I have chosen datasets that seem most authoritative and reliable for comparisons in time and between countries.

**Battle Deaths and the Long Peace of East Asia**

If we want to answer the question of whether East Asia has become much more peaceful or not, we cannot operate on the basis of annual battle deaths data. Annual data tells us whether East Asia has avoided battle deaths in a particular year, and how battle deaths have developed, but it does not answer the general question of whether a period after 1979 was peaceful compared to the period before 1980 (but after 1946). To answer that question we simply need to know how many people conflicts have killed during that entire period. But then either we should be comparing periods that are equally long or we would need to take the arithmetical average of annual conflict fatalities for each period. Since the post-1979 period is not as long as the post-1945 and pre-1980 period, we must operate with annual averages for the pre-1980 and post 1979 periods. 6

6 Even though this might seem entirely self-evident, I feel that I need to lay this out clearly as there has been criticism of my use of arithmetical averages in the description of the peacefulness of the post-1979 period.

The nature of East Asian peace can be examined on the one hand by looking at high estimates, low estimates, and best estimates of various data sources of conflict...
fatalities. Neither the low nor the high estimate is a safer estimate as such. It is sometimes assumed that an estimate is more secure and scientific if it only codes battle deaths that can be surely verified (Sundberg 2005; Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). This is presented as an argument for using the low estimate. However, this would mean that the most secure estimate would be the one with the strictest source criteria, leading the strictest and most reliable scientist to conclude that no conflicts have ever been fought. There is no reason to assume that an estimate that is too low is any better than an estimate that is too high. Experts of most East Asian conflicts tend to disagree more with the low estimate than the high estimate. The low estimates of both PRIO dataset versions and the Uppsala dataset on fatalities of Aceh conflict in the beginning of the 2000s are systematically lower than the number of those people killed by the conflict that Kontras (2005), an Indonesian human rights NGO can name. Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo (2007) could also name a much greater number of people killed in the Bosnian War than the number of casualties the low estimates of the Uppsala and PRIO data suggest. The fatalities in the non-state conflict in West Kalimantan are estimated at levels that are lower than the number of skulls, some scholars have witnessed on the conflict scene. Whether we want to avoid exaggerating or underestimating the perception of fatalities depends on our purpose. If we want to make sure that some policy does not cause conflict, we had better take a magnifying glass and look at the high estimates, but if we want to condemn to death perpetrators of conflict, we had better count only casualties with no reasonable doubt, and opt for the lower estimate.

However, it is possible to use the margin between the high and low estimates “to be on the safe side” with one’s argument. Yet the margin is different in different
datasets and even in different versions and datasets. If one compares the belligerent period in East Asia (1946–1979) with the peaceful one and wants to be on the safe side with one’s conclusion on East Asia’s pacific turn, one could compare low estimates of the belligerent period with high estimates of the peaceful period. Since the Correlates to War data only has best estimates, and the Uppsala data only measures part of the peaceful period, one can only use the PRIO dataset versions of the battle death data to make the safe argument about East Asia’s pacification. But the two versions have very different safety margins, as the difference between high and low estimates of average annual battle deaths in version 2.0 is only 15% while in version 3.0 it is 76% (low estimate is just 24% of high estimate, or high estimate is more than 4 times higher). The difference in margins between low and high estimates makes different datasets or versions incomparable. For version 2.0 low estimates are likely to be closer to the correct number of battle deaths, while, for sure, the correct number of fatalities is more likely to be between the high and low estimates of version 3.0 than version 2.0. Thus, a calculation of average annual battle deaths based on high estimate during the peaceful period and low estimate in the belligerent period will be more conservative and secure if version 3.0 is used. Such calculation on the basis of version 2.0 concludes that at least 94% of annual battle deaths have disappeared, while according to version 3.0 the percentage is at least 79. For the claim on East Asian pacification this means, however, that unless the estimate for the belligerent period is twenty times too high, or the estimate for the pacific period is just one-twentieth of the correct one, battle deaths have, indeed, declined.

Is it then likely that battle death counts could be totally incorrect and that the long peace of East Asia could be just an error of measurement? It is clear that estimates
of battle deaths are difficult, and thus averages counted on the basis of these estimates are not well in line. One clear problem with the use of battle death data for assessing developments in East Asia is that datasets also serve studies that only need to operate with classes of severity of armed violence, and which only want to examine the frequencies of the different classes of militarized disputes, such as non-violent militarized disputes, conflicts (with more than 25 fatalities), and wars (with more than 1,000 fatalities). This means that for many conflicts the high estimate of fatalities is set for 999 or/and the low estimate at 25, simply to denote that this incident at least is a conflict, or/and that it is as serious as a war. This tendency is clearest in the conservative 3.0 version of the PRIO dataset. Almost half (47%) of the East Asian conflicts are estimated to have either a low estimate of fatalities at 25 or a high estimate at 99. In 29% of conflicts the high estimate was at 999 and the low estimate at 25. Well over one-third of conflicts (38%) in version 3.0 were assumed to have had at least 25 fatalities. The earlier version (2.0) was in this respect much better for those who are not operating with conflict categories but want as good estimates of battle deaths as possible. In “only” 22% of East Asian conflicts the coding used the lower limit of conflict definition as a low estimate (and only 5% of conflicts had 999 fatalities as high estimate). The varying use of the fatality limits of conflict definitions in fatality data, in addition to the varying degrees of “conservatism” in body counts, also reduces the comparability of the datasets. It is likely that this practice of “rounding” low estimates to 25 and high estimates to 999 has expanded the margin between the high and the low. Thus if version 3.0 has a wide margin between the high and low estimates, and yet the high estimate of fatalities during the peaceful period is still slightly over one-fifth of the
low estimate of the belligerent period, this deficiency in the data only seems to further confirm the thesis of the long peace of East Asia.

Different methodological choices also lead to different estimates. Gerdis Wischnath and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2011) pay attention to the fact that although the Uppsala and PRIO datasets share the same conflict definition their coding criteria differ. While the PRIO datasets define the entire conflict as eligible for battle death counts, the Uppsala data distinguishes between incidents of one-sided violence and conflicts inside conflicts, making the coding criterion more restricted. On a global level, the authors then conclude that the Uppsala data records only about 50% of battle deaths compared to PRIO 3.0 dataset (PRIO 3.0 estimates are 100% higher than the estimates of the Uppsala dataset). The same can be seen in East Asia, where the PRIO dataset 3.0 records 89% (but the 2.0 version only 13% higher) higher battle-death estimates than the Uppsala dataset for 1989–2005. It is quite clear that due to the differences of the different datasets caused either by different coding methodologies, or by the different degree of conservatism (difference between high and low estimates), it is not possible to combine datasets in one analysis. The Uppsala data on battle deaths reaches closer to the present day than the PRIO dataset, but the PRIO data reaches also to the belligerent period in East Asia. Therefore, using the generally lower estimates of the Uppsala data for the data period from 1989 and the more historical data from PRIO datasets would exaggerate the positive change in East Asia. As a result I shall use the PRIO 3.0 dataset as the main data in this book, and the other datasets just for control purposes.

If it were possible to distinguish the nature of violence (whether a conflict or one-sided violence) incident by incident, the Uppsala method could be a substantial improvement in assessing of battle fatalities, as it would make it possible to identify the
subtle changes between different types of violence in conflict dynamics (Pettersson, Themnér, Högbladh and Kreutz 2011). Yet, this could lead to difficulties in definitions: if battle deaths are defined as civilian and military fatalities in a conflict where both sides are armed, when, then, does a civilian belong to a militarized collective entity of a conflict party? As such this does not create problems for assessing East Asia’s peacefulness, providing that there is no systematic change in warfare from pure conflict to mixed conflict, with incidents of extensive one-sided violence. Since the Uppsala data does not extend further than 1989, the assessment of the peacefulness of East Asia has to be based on the PRIO data, which is less detailed about the nature of the incidents. Thus the examination of the peacefulness of East Asia will have to be based on observations on conflict that are primarily between armed parties, while conclusions will be drawn also from incidents that are targeted against some unarmed groups.

Furthermore, while the PRIO datasets use various sources including historical compendia of casualty statistics from conflict monitoring projects (IISS, 2003), the SIPRI Yearbook (annual) as well as case studies, government reports and the media, the Uppsala dataset uses mainly and primarily (but not exclusively) the automated events data-search by VRA software (see http://vranet.com/FAQ.html) from various public sources, including news agencies, journals, reports of international organizations and NGOs using the Factiva news database, supplementing this with similar data as the PRIO datasets rely on, if the events data is insufficient for a certain conflict (Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). This, too, makes Uppsala’s data collection more restrictive as public sources often under-report heavily (typically in authoritarian countries in the case of East Asia, and especially in Burma/Myanmar), leading the Uppsala data into rather conservative coding practices (Sundberg 2005; Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). The
methodologies of the datasets tend to suggest whether the data avoids exaggerating or understating the number of casualties. Sundberg (2009: 5) therefore argues that it is possible that there are more fatalities than the UCDP high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there are fewer than the UCDP best estimate. If this is the case it seems that the Uppsala best estimate could almost be treated as the low estimate. Relying only on a verified report of fatalities could be supported on grounds of making data comparable between countries and periods of time. Relying on case studies exposes battle death coding to biases that make country comparisons difficult. If for example Burma scholars exaggerate Burmese violence, estimates about this country could not be comparable to estimates about countries that have been studied by people who want to underestimate fatalities. Yet, the Uppsala method could risk continuous under-reporting, or, even worse, bias suggesting that authoritarian countries are more peaceful than they actually are. For example, many members of the coalition of NGOs in Aceh, who registered conflict casualties during the last years of conflict in Aceh claim that the number of fatalities reported by the (military-controlled) media, was much lower than the number of fatalities reported by the NGOs, who also listed names of the people killed by conflict (Ronnie 2012). In an analysis of the relationship between democracy/authoritarianism and peace, this could be problematic.

Due to the differences in coding practices and definitions, the results of battle deaths in both the belligerent period and the peaceful period of East Asia differ rather much. If we look at the average annual conflict fatalities during the belligerent period, the variation is from less than 80,000 (low estimate of PRIO dataset version 3.0) to over 300,000 (version 3.0 high estimate), while the averages for the peaceful period range
from over 17 hundred (low estimate of PRIO dataset version 3.0) to over 16 thousand (version 3.0 high estimate).

**Table 2.1: Estimates or average annual fatalities in non-state, extra-state, intra-state and interstate conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1946–79</th>
<th>1980–2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COW (wars only)</td>
<td>117,514</td>
<td>3,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low 3.0</td>
<td>76,286</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low 2.0</td>
<td>152,317</td>
<td>2,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high 3.0.</td>
<td>313,679</td>
<td>16,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high 2.0</td>
<td>179,735</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To estimate the reliability of the individual data of datasets one can also take a look at the differences in estimates for 1989–2005, which is the part of the peaceful period where the two latest PRIO datasets overlap with the new Uppsala dataset. In Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the difference to the newest, Uppsala data, has been shown as percentage of the Uppsala data of the PRIO data estimate.

**Table 2.2: Low estimates, 1989–2005**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>1,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5/2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As mentioned above the comparisons of low estimates or high estimates do not make much sense since different versions of the PRIO dataset have very different degrees of “conservatism”, with version 3.0 placing the high estimate almost always higher than others, and the low estimate lower than others. Somehow, to produce better estimates, one would need to operate on the basis of a best estimate. This is slightly arbitrary in the case of operating with PRIO data, as such an estimate is often missing (for almost 1/3 of conflicts) and the high and low estimates yield to the extremes of the definition of conflict (>25 casualties) that is not yet war (max. 999 casualties). Wischnath and Gleditsch (2010) have suggested that a best estimate can be produced by counting the best estimate from the arithmetic mean of the low and high estimates. For PRIO data version 2.0 this way of calculating makes sense as the best estimate often is close to the mean of high and low estimate wherever it is given in the dataset. However, in version 3.0 this is not optimal as best estimates are often closer to the low estimate. They are still closer to the mean than the lower estimate and thus replacing the best estimate with a low estimate for those conflicts that lack a best estimate would make even less sense. I have calculated, on the basis of the global data, how close the best estimate is to the low and high estimates wherever the best estimate is given, and then I have used this proximity to produce a new best estimate for those conflicts where it is missing. This

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>261%</td>
<td>5,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>335%</td>
<td>6,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5/2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
way we can compare better best estimates of the average number of annual battle deaths in each dataset. Again, the percentage of the PRIO figure compared to the Uppsala figure is given.

**Table 2.4: Comparison of best estimates of PRIO and Uppsala datasets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1989-2005</th>
<th>Annual averages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0 new best estimate</td>
<td>115% 1,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 new best estimate</td>
<td>159% 2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5/2010 best estimate</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three data sources are now closer to one another than if high or low estimates are examined, or if best estimates are produced as means of high and low estimates, wherever the data source has not given such estimates. However, the Uppsala best estimate is still considerably lower than the PRIO best estimate. If one looks at the years 1992 and 1994 and the conflicts that produce the greatest differences in estimates, one can identify two potential sources for differences. Then main differences are related to conflicts where the PRIO data has not produced best estimates. If for these conflicts one had used low estimates, the differences in annual averages would have evened considerably. The conflicts were mainly between the central government of Burma/Myanmar and its ethnic challengers, especially the ethnic Mong Tai Army (MTA) in Shan State in 1994, and the KNU in Karen State in 1992. Both conflicts involved plenty of incidents of one-sided violence. Thus, it is possible that the more fine-grained, incident-by-incident approach of the Uppsala dataset is the reason for the difference in estimates. Another possibility is that public sources tend to under-report
fatalities in distant peripheries of authoritarian states. In the case of the fighting of the
MTA, some of the episodes were clearly between the MTA and the United Wa State
Army rather than directly between the MTA and the Burmese Army. Thus these
episodes could have been interpreted as non-state conflict. The fact that the Uppsala
dataset on one-sided violence (Sundberg 2009; Eck and Hultman 2007) and the Uppsala
dataset on non-state conflict (Eck, Kreutz and Sundberg, 2010) do not report any
fatalities of one-sided or non-state violence in Burma/Myanmar for years 1992 and
1994 means that the difference in estimates could be caused either by my ruling on best
estimates or by the problem of under-reporting of fatalities in authoritarian peripheries.
Most Burma specialists would be inclined to say that the Uppsala estimate of slightly
over 1000 fatalities in both conflicts (1992 and 1994) underestimates the severity of the
two confrontations.

Even though datasets have very different estimates of the number of battle
deaths during both periods, it seems that the difference between the two periods is not
so different between datasets, versions and estimates. Due to differences in coding
criteria the level of battle deaths might seem different, while the “shape of the fatalities
curve” tends to be relatively similar as Graph 2.1 indicates: the new best estimate refers
to the estimate where missing data is replaced by data that assume that the relative
distance from high and low estimates to the best estimate is the same as the average
distance in the cases that the best estimate is given.

Graph 2.1: Best estimates of fatalities in East Asia, 1946–2005 (/2008)
Three main problem areas of incompatible data can easily be identified from the graph. The number of casualties of the Vietnam–US War have been coded differently in the two versions (version 2.0 estimating a greater number of total losses of life), and they have been attributed differently to different years (version 3.0 suggesting that a greater share of fatalities took place in the last years of the war). This variation is not caused by arbitration of best estimates; best estimates for these years, for the main conflicts where there is variation, exist in the original datasets. Even though this difference is the greatest in absolute numbers, its challenge to the claim of the long peace of East Asia is relatively small. Even greater changes in absolute terms during the belligerent time will not impact too much on the ratio of average annual fatalities between peaceful and belligerent periods.

Another great difference in the absolute terms is related to the estimate of the fatalities in the war in Tibet in 1959. For this conflict the best estimate of fatalities had
been lowered to less than one fifth of the number of casualties in the version 2.0 low estimate. Bethany Lacina (2009) explains the agonizing choices between conflicting sources for her 3.0 version, concluding that the high figures cited in various sources seem incredible, given the asymmetry of power between the Chinese and Tibetan forces. This ruling does not feel reasonable, given that the great majority of bullets that kill in combat are shot into the back of soldiers (thus an asymmetry of powers, Collins 2007), and that most casualties of wars take place during the high asymmetry of a surprise attack and during the great disparity of forces of the last months of war, just before one of the sides surrenders. Power asymmetry fuels rather than prevents violence in conflict, even if it might make the onset of conflict less likely. However, it is likely that in such power asymmetry that existed in 1959 in Tibet, many of the incidents should be treated as one-sided violence. Since the dataset on one-sided violence does not extend to 1959, this cannot be verified. The best estimate of 3.0 also corresponds closer to the estimate of the Correlates of War project estimate on the conflict. While this is the most striking difference in the estimates of East Asian conflict fatalities, one where, again, many area specialists would not be supportive of the dropping of the version 2.0 estimate to less than one fifth, its impact on the claim about the long peace of East Asia is minimal. This is because it only shakes the body count of the belligerent period where even a great drop in fatalities in absolute numbers only constitutes a small correction in percentages (as the number of fatalities is already so high).

The third main difference between the best estimates of versions 2.0 and 3.0 is in the period from 1980 to 1988. Even if the absolute difference in the estimates of the two versions is small, this period contributes to 88% of the difference between the annual average number of battle deaths for the peaceful period of East Asia. Put together,
version 3.0 codes 160,318 casualties in East Asia for those years, while the best estimate in version 2.0 was just 76,074 – less than half of the estimate of version 3.0. If we look at wars only (conflicts with annual casualties over 999) the numbers drop to 134,749 and 59,177 now showing an even greater difference between the two versions. If one compares the latter estimates with the COW estimates, it is clear that the COW data is almost exactly in the middle of the two PRIO estimates. The estimate of COW for fatalities in wars in East Asia from 1980 until 1988 is over 50% larger than the best estimate of version 2.0, while the best estimate of version 3.0 is just under 50% higher than the COW estimate.

The explanation of the variation is not the uncertainty perceived in the coding practices about specific cases of conflict. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program occasionally publishes a list of uncertain cases. However, none of the above-mentioned cases that have produced greatest uncertainties for the claims of the long peace of East Asia are included in the list. The explanations are therefore the following. Firstly, the main differences in best estimates are in domestic conflicts in the peripheries of authoritarian countries (Indonesia/East Timor, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar) making estimates vulnerable to the under-reporting that is typical for closed societies. Secondly, the fact that they take place in authoritarian countries implies that some episodes of the conflict belong to the realm of genocide or one-sided violence. Since the Uppsala data on one-sided violence does not yet reach to the beginning of the 1980s, this possibility cannot be assessed further. Finally, all of the significant differences were in conflicts where the original Uppsala data in version 3.0 for best estimates was missing. Thus, the

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This data is taken from Sarkees 2010. The online version lacks information of many of the intra-state conflicts (which Sarkees classifies as extra-state conflicts).
difference can be related to the fact that my arbitrary method of assigning best estimates to conflicts where these estimates are missing is not applicable for these conflicts. While this variation in estimates will not challenge the thesis of the long peace of East Asia in any way, it does affect our estimate of how peaceful the long peace of East Asia has been. If East Asia has been as peaceful as the version 2.0 suggests, it has been more than twice as calm if version 3.0 is correct.

Even with relatively drastic differences between estimates of fatalities in individual conflicts, annual averages tend to even out and we are talking about a more modest variance. Despite the fact that the PRIO dataset versions 2.0 and 3.0 belong to the same dataset, annual averages based on data from the Correlates of War project and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program tend to find themselves somewhere between the two versions of the PRIO data. When comparing the average annual fatalities during the belligerent period and the pacific period in East Asia, this is once again the case:
### Table 2.5: Casualties before and after 1979: several estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average annual fatalities in 1946–79</th>
<th>Fatalities in 1980–2005 as % of fatalities in 1946–79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COW[1]</strong></td>
<td>117,514</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low 3.0</td>
<td>76,286</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low 2.0</td>
<td>152,317</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high 3.0</td>
<td>313,679</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high 2.0</td>
<td>179,735</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best estimate 3.0</td>
<td>149,259</td>
<td>5.75%[2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best estimate 2.0</td>
<td>165,452</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New best est. 2.0</td>
<td>165,443</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New best e. 3.0</td>
<td>146,979</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] COW data is for wars only. For 1946–79 COW dataset lacks data on fatalities of the second phase of the Laotian war. The definition of the categories of war differs from those of the PRIO and Uppsala datasets.
I have previously claimed (Kivimäki 2011) that the average annual annual of battle deaths after 1979 was 5 and not 6% as this calculation shows. This difference is due to the fact that I here compare the periods 1946–1979 and 1980–2005, while in my previous calculation my comparison was between the periods 1946–1979 and 1980–2008. This time, comparing dataset versions 2.0 and 3.0 of the Uppsala data, I must stick to the years available for both datasets. This is why the years 2006–08 have been left out of the examination this time. As these years were very peaceful, they dragged the average from 5.75 to under 5.5 and thus the previous lower best estimate of the average post-1979 annual battle deaths.

It seems that according to this data the annual average amount of fatalities in East Asia range from 1.73 to 5.75% of averages during the belligerent period in 1946–79. Thus, 94–98% of fatalities have disappeared. The basic claim of the long peace of East Asia program seems very solid.

East Asia’s peacefulness can also be demonstrated by its share of global battle deaths. East Asia’s share of global population is now about 31%, while it was slightly lower in 1946. This would make us assume that East Asia could have about 31% of global conflict fatalities. If it is substantially higher, East Asia is belligerent, while if it is substantially lower East Asia should be considered peaceful. Using the same estimates as above, we can see that before 1979 East Asia was, indeed, belligerent, while ever since 1979 it is now peaceful.
### Table 2.6: East Asia’s share of world’s conflict fatalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EA BD as % of world</strong></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–1979</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2008/05</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since East Asia’s share of global battle deaths during the belligerent period is somewhere between 75 and 82%, and since this share has dropped to somewhere between 3 and 7%, the comparison with the global share testifies to the fact that we can speak about the long peace of East Asia if battle deaths are the measurement of peacefulness.

### The Short Peace of East Asia

What the theorists of East Asian Peace have not discussed so far is the fact that East Asia experienced a short period of relative peace already in the 1950s starting at the Geneva Conference of 1954 and ending when war escalated in Vietnam after the entry of US ground troops in 1964. This short peace should attract attention of scholars of the long peace of East Asia. Could this short peace have been caused by the same forces that created the longer peace two decades later? Geneva Conference did attempt to satisfy some minimum defensive interests of the main powers of the region, just like peace according to Robert Ross (1998) was brought about in the 1970s in the US–China
relationship-centered East Asia. It and the five principles of Chinese international relations from 1955 temporarily consolidated the rules of respect for sovereignty and non-interference, which some constructivists have seen important for peace in post-1979 East Asia (Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2011).

Secondly the short peace could be interesting for the study of the long peace of East Asia because it can point to the weakness of such a peace. What made the peace regime collapse at the beginning of the 1960s? Could conditions that ended peace then return and end the long peace of East Asia? Why did communism rise to the degree that made the US escalate its military action in East Asia? Why did China opt for proletarian internationalism and abandoned the five principles after the disastrous Great Leap Forward? Would it be possible that the current peace could be risked by undermining the US-vital interests in East Asia? Could the US become expansionist again, and start threatening the regime of non-interference? Could domestic developments in China lead to another reorientation of the country, and end up in China starting to focus on expansion as a remedy for its internal problems of legitimacy?

For such analysis it makes sense to explore what we know about the period after the Geneva Conference of 1954. If we look at the period of the short peace of East Asia as one starting in 1955 and ending in 1963, just before US ground troops enter Vietnam, we can see that the number of battle deaths during this period had declined considerably compared to the overall belligerent post-World War II period.
Table 2.7: The Short Peace of East Asia, 1955–63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low estimate (version 3.0)</th>
<th>High estimate (version 3.0)</th>
<th>Best estimate (version 3.0)</th>
<th>Low estimate (version 2.0)</th>
<th>High estimate (version 2.0)</th>
<th>Best estimate (version 2.0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average annual BDs</td>
<td>12,693</td>
<td>70,158</td>
<td>24,239</td>
<td>23,326</td>
<td>30,483</td>
<td>26,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of BDs compared to 1946–1979.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that because the level of battle deaths is so much lower (78–84%) than during the entire belligerent period that we should pay attention to this period. Something positive happened around the time of the conclusion of the Geneva Conference and the adoption by China of the Five Principles. However, this short peace was not as drastic as the long peace of East Asia after 1979. While battle deaths were reduced they were still on a level that was 3.1 (best estimate in version 3.0)–8.9 (low estimate of version 2.0) times higher than after 1979. Furthermore, the effect was not long lasting, and one could almost say that the build-up of adversary powers in East Asia in the 1950s was predicting the trouble that then started in the 1960s. While the ending of the short peace is marked by the higher fatality counts after the entry of US ground troop in Vietnam, communist insurgency had already elevated the annual number of battle deaths considerably from the beginning of the year 1960. Yet there seem to be similarities between the long and the short peace of East Asia, and thus it
would be essential for East Asia scholars to see if short peace can teach us something about peace and its fragility in East Asia.

**Battle Deaths of Other Types of Political Violence**

What can immediately be observed about East Asian Peace is the drastic decline of the number of battle deaths in standard conflicts. The idea of “standard conflicts” borrows its definition from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. According to this source a conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” Battle deaths, in turn, refer to mortal casualties, civilian or combatant, caused directly by conflict. However, this concept of peace simply as lack of battle deaths in conflict is too narrow: there can be conditions with no battle deaths that we would not like to see as peaceful. There is a possibility that instead of pacification, East Asian conflict has simply shifted to forms that are not instantly observed by looking at battle deaths in “normal conflicts”. If this were the case, the long peace of East Asia would be an illusion – just a matter of definition. This section will look at the different types of conflict and try to investigate whether East Asia has really become more peaceful or if normal conflicts have simply been transformed into other types of violence.

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8This section and the following section on “Beyond Battle Deaths” contain text from my earlier article (Kivimäki 2010, Taylor and Francis license number 3124121358640). However, in the present chapter reference is no longer made to PRIO’s battle death data version 2.0 but instead to version 3.0. Data on conflict termination has also been updated. The analysis is now based on the newest version of the Uppsala conflict termination data.
**Authoritarian Violence**

When looking at the phenomenon of East Asian Peace, the standard Uppsala/PRIO dataset definition of conflict requires that both sides of the conflict need to be armed and organized, and furthermore, one of them must be the state. Theoretically this is a serious limitation. The war in Rwanda that caused something between 58,300 and 800,000 battle deaths was fought between the government of Rwanda and Tutsi civilians. Since the Tutsi side of the war was unarmed, it does not qualify as conflict, according to the Uppsala definition. Thus, if Rwanda were in East Asia, we could be learning from the recipes of peace in Rwanda in 1994, focusing on when the Hutu government slaughtered about half a million unarmed Tutsi civilians.

Conflict research sometimes talks about one-sided violence as conflict, where only one of the sides is armed and organized. According to the codebook of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, one-sided conflict is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. Yet, extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded from the Uppsala definition of one-sided conflict/violence. If we look at data that is available from

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9 Note that the concept of one-sided violence is not related to the concept of one-sided crisis of the International Crisis Behavior project of Maryland University. According to the International Crisis Behavior project, one-sided crisis is “an international crisis in which one actor perceives itself to be in crisis by virtue of a verbal or physical act by an adversary, but where that adversary does not perceive itself to be in crisis mode” (ICB codebook).

10 The data on one-sided conflicts since 1989 has been presented in the following sources; Kreutz 2006; Eck and Hultman 2007; Human Security Brief 2006. It is available at
1989 to 2005 (both years included) we could conclude that one-sided conflict should somehow be taken into account in assessments of the long peace of East Asia, since one-sided conflict has globally caused almost half of the number of casualties compared to traditional conflicts. Thus one-sided conflicts are a significant limitation to the usefulness of normal conflict battle death data as an indicator of peace. One could identify two types of one-sided conflict: killings by non-government groups of unarmed civilians, and killings of unarmed civilians by governments. The former category is likely to be a smaller threat to the meaningfulness of the long peace of East Asia due to the smaller volume. For example, according to the US State Department’s data (various years) on terrorist incidents, the average global number of terrorist killings between 1982 and 2003 was about 700 and 700 killings compared to the number of annual global fatalities in any other type of conflict is a very small number. However, a government’s democidal conflict behaviour is likely to contribute significant distortions to concepts that disregard this type of violence. A government could manage to pre-empt conflict by going after dissidents even before they could mobilize. If this were the case, one could be talking about an “authoritarian conflict” instead of a peace. What if the East Asian Peace is similar to the authoritarian peace of Eastern Europe between 1956 and 1989? The rhetoric of the “Asian Way” strengthens this suspicion. According to Prime

[http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm), Data on one-sided conflict since 1989 in this chapter systematically refers to these sources.

11 However, one-sided conflicts have also not been as deadly and as frequent as traditional conflicts. If one considers the case of Hutu government’s one-sided violence against the Tutsi as a special case, and looks at other cases only, one could see that the annual number of casualties of one-sided violence drops to less than one-tenth of the number of casualties of normal conflicts. There is a clear reason for considering the case of Rwanda in 1995 as a special case, since it contributed over 80% of all one-sided conflict casualties since 1989.
Minister Mahathir Mohammad (1989) of Malaysia, the indigenous Asian approach pays less attention to individualistic human rights, and seeks instead collective harmony, even if this would require harsher treatment of individuals. According to Suharto, the authoritarian ex-president of Indonesia, the ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic diversities that exist in Indonesia would cause conflict if too many liberties were implemented in the country (Suharto 1991; see also views of army chiefs (Nasution 1964; Murdani 1987). Finally, according to former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1994) of Singapore, the collective priority of development made it imperative for Singapore to contain destabilizing individual initiatives. What if all this means that modes of authoritarian violence that were introduced with the justification of the “Asian Values” rhetoric, were the reason why battle deaths disappeared from conflict statistics and reappeared in statistics of authoritarian one-sided conflict? This would totally undermine the whole concept of East Asian Peace. We could say that the 900–1,800 unarmed East Timorese killed by the Indonesian forces after their referendum on independence, or probably many more killed after the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, or the 500-2500 demonstrators killed during the Tiananmen Square incident within the period of the East Asian Peace poses a challenge.

The problem with studying the challenge of government killings (democide) to the long peace of East Asia is the lack of comparable data. Democide data often includes indirectly intentional casualties of government actions, such as casualties of forced movements, when people die of hunger after being placed in an area that cannot sustain their livelihoods.
Rudolph Rummel’s data on government killings is among the most cited (1994; 1997). However, its definition of what he calls democide includes, in addition to direct killings of the groups of citizens by the government:

a) deadly conditions in prisons, concentration camps, under forced labour, for prisoners of war, or in recruit camps;

b) murderous medical or scientific experiments performed on human beings;

c) deadly torture or beatings;

d) encouraged or condoned murder or rape, looting and pillaging during which people are killed;

e) a famine or epidemic during which government authorities withhold aid or knowingly act in a way which makes conditions more deadly; or

f) forced deportations and expulsions resulting in deaths.

One cannot compare Rummel’s data with the Uppsala data on one-sided violence or conflicts, because of two reasons. On the one hand, Rummel’s definition includes indirect conflict casualties – this inclusion exaggerates the number of casualties. On the other hand, Rummel only counts casualties of the government’s violence, while the Uppsala data looks at one-sided violence exercised by civil society actors as well. The Uppsala data seems to suggest that governmental one-sided violence constitutes almost 90% of all one-sided violence. Data on terrorist violence seems to suggest that this type of violence is indeed much less extensive. This reduces the relevance of the second problem. However, the first problem, indirect casualties, makes the two data incomparable. It also seems that the different types of conflict have very
different ratios between direct and indirect casualties. While the Uppsala statistics of direct battle deaths suggest that normal conflicts cause twice as many battle deaths than one-sided conflicts, Rummel’s data suggests that one-sided (and only government-initiated one-sided) violence causes six times as many (direct and indirect) casualties as conflicts (Rummel 1994). Clearly, one-sided conflicts seem to cause more indirect casualties. The way to compare earlier data on one-sided violence and the more recent data since 1989 of the Uppsala dataset, is through an assumption that tendencies in East Asian one-sided violence can be measured by looking at the relationship between East Asian and global casualty levels, and assuming that if East Asia’s share of these casualties increases or decreases, this also indicates an increase or decrease in absolute levels. This assumption is based on the premise that we do not have any reason to assume that the East Asian ratio between indirect and direct casualties should differ from the global ratio.

Rudolph Rummel reveals data that suggests that East Asia has traditionally been exceptionally prone to one-sided conflicts where the government takes the lead. According to his data, Communist China has contributed to almost 30% of democide casualties in the world, while Nationalist China and a number of other East Asian governments had been among the top 20 democidal regimes in the world. Just before the beginning of the East Asian Peace, Pol Pot’s government earned the questionable honour of reaching a world record in the share of the total number of people killed by their government. Furthermore, most Indonesia-specialists \(^\text{12}\) would claim that the transition from President Sukarno’s rule to President General Suharto’s rule in Indonesia involved somewhere between 500,000 and 1.5 million mortal casualties due

\(^\text{12}\) See for example, Cribb 1990.
to the government’s one-sided violence. While the numbers Rummel presents are vastly different than those of the Uppsala conflict dataset, due to differences in operationalization and definitions, one could assume that the geographical shares of governments’ one-sided conflicts could remain relatively unaltered regardless of whether one counts indirect casualties or not.

The main East Asian episodes of democide have taken place in the context of China’s Great Leap Forward, the struggle between nationalist and communist forces in China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and in the aftermath of Indonesia’s General Suharto’s takeover. All these major periods were before 1979. Yet the genocide in East Timor in 1999 and the Tiananmen Square (1989) incident took place after 1979. According to Rummel’s calculations, China alone (communist and nationalist China put together), accounts for over 30% of global democide during the 20th century, and an even higher
percentage after the two World Wars. At the same time, Uppsala data since 1989 reveals that the entire East Asian region has only twice (in 1989 and 1999) reached 30% of global battle deaths in one-sided conflicts after 1988.

On average, East Asian one-sided violence after 1989 is no longer more than 1.2% of the global share of one-sided conflict battle deaths. All this suggests that the claim that there would be a considerable increase in one-sided conflicts is not credible. On the contrary, the indicator of this kind of battle deaths clearly also testifies to East Asian Peace. Thus, the limitation related to one-sided violence does not pose a fundamental challenge to the notion of East Asian Peace. However, on the basis of this data, we do know that East Asia has been peaceful (if measured by battle deaths in conflicts and one-sided conflicts) after 1979 and before 1989, but we cannot be sure exactly when. Thus, even though the claim of East Asian Peace is based on a definition of peace where the government is not violently challenged by armed opposition, East Asian Peace seems to exist also as peace where also violence against unarmed groups is minimal. While the killings by Indonesian and Chinese governments in the aftermath of the 1999 referendum in East Timor and related to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 are an exception to the rule of declining one-sided conflict, one could also say that it is precisely these two governments that have cleaned up their act most drastically after the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. While it seemed to be slightly outside the

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14 It seems that the Graph 3.2. suggests a higher figure. This is due to the fact that the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when the East Asian share was 0.0%, caused over 80% of all battle deaths in one-sided conflicts since 1989. Thus during the rest of the years, the East Asian number of casualties is considerably higher than the average of 1.2% which is the percentage of all East Asian casualties as a proportion of all global casualties from 1989 to 2006. Yet even without the Rwandan genocide, the East Asian share of global battle deaths in one-sided conflicts is no more than 6.2% – a share clearly disproportionate to the East Asian population share of 32%.
drastic decline of battle deaths, in terms of keeping the levels of one-sided violence down, the Philippines has managed to perform rather well. The conflict in Mindanao, which is also the largest Philippine source of battle deaths, is troublesome from the point of view of one-sided violence. However, even there, the government has according to Uppsala and PRIO data, managed to avoid genocidal practices. The government of Myanmar, however, stays outside the long peace of East Asia in this category of conflict as well.

**Non-State Violence**

The second, form of conflict to be examined in this section is the one that does not involve the state. The Uppsala definition of conflict requires that one of the conflicting parties is the state. For conflicts where “the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year”, the Uppsala Conflict Data Project codebook uses the name “non-state conflict”. Naturally, this limits the common-sense relevance of any concept of the long peace of East Asia: East Asia should not be called a peaceful area if non-state war were to rage there. Instead, it should probably be called East Asian anarchy. The fact that non-state conflict is on the rise makes this limitation even more serious. However, empirically, non-state conflicts tend to cause much fewer battle deaths (non-state conflicts cause 6% of battle deaths compared to normal conflicts, to be precise) than conflicts that comply with the standard definition, and this makes this limitation less serious as an empirical issue. Furthermore, the number of non-state battle deaths in comparison to normal conflict casualties is less than 4% in East Asia.
At the same time, conflicts between communities are often very harmful for the social fabric of areas, and thus cause indirect effects and casualties that are disproportionate to direct battle deaths. Based on this, one could assume that the limitation is slightly more meaningful than the 6% would suggest. In East Asia, the problem of non-state conflicts or non-state one-sided violence has mainly been relevant in Burma/Myanmar and in areas where unarmed migrant populations from central areas of the conflict country become targets of displaced frustration and hate by separatist armed groups. However, conflicts have traditionally been more closely related to the state in East Asia than in many other regions, and the extent of spontaneous conflict between civil society groups is less pronounced than for example in Africa, where the state has less relevance for most of the societies. In fact, the share of East Asia in global non-state violence is less than 1.5% (between 2002 and 2005). Furthermore, violence that non-state actors inflict upon unarmed groups is non-existent in large parts of East Asia. In fact, the Uppsala Conflict Dataset has not recorded a single such conflict since the beginning of 1989 in Indo-China (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) and Northeast Asia (the Koreas, Japan China, Taiwan and Mongolia). Thus, all in all, it is clear that the volume of non-state conflict simply makes it less likely that this is the problem that challenges the legitimacy of the conception of East Asian Peace. Even if there was a reason to believe that non-state conflicts have started to cause more battle deaths, they still cause less than 4% of battle deaths compared to normal conflict battle deaths. In this way, this ignored category does not challenge the legitimacy of calling East Asian peaceful. The long peace of East Asia, therefore, is peace that is not only characterized by the lack of normal or one-sided conflict but also by low levels of non-state conflict.
Low levels of non-state conflict were not, however, something that had emerged just before 1979, but instead something typical of East Asia over an extended period time.

**Homicide**

A step further from non-state conflict is violent crime, which sometimes, like when we are talking about gang wars, is rather similar to conflicts. Here the difference is that the incompatibility in crime does not normally concern governance or territory (although disputes about gang territories do sometimes motivate violence between criminal gangs). Furthermore, one incompatibility does not normally cause more than 25 battle deaths, but instead incidents of “criminal battle deaths” are numerous and separate, with each causing less than 25 casualties. Homicide as battle death would be a relevant category if it was sufficiently close in terms of definition, as current rates of homicide in East Asia have only been matched by conflict battle deaths in major wars. If there was a suspicion that law enforcement has been lax, and because of this the state becomes involved in violent incidents with, say ethnic gangs less often, this category of violence could challenge the notion of East Asian Peace. Law enforcement and conflict are discursively connected in East Asian debate as countries sometimes refer to East Asian collectivist values where tolerance towards individualistic, but immoral ways are met with tougher sanctions. If this practice disappeared around 1979, this could explain the drop in conflict battle deaths even without an emergence of something that could be called the long peace of East Asia. It could be possible that conflict violence did not really disappear after all, but was simply transformed into criminal violence, as the East
Asian states simply gave in to dissidents and gave up the maintenance of order. We could then call this East Asian criminal anarchy instead of the long peace of East Asia. If this were the case it would be demonstrated in a decline of the conflicts that the government is a party to, but simultaneously demonstrated in an increase in murders (and one-sided violence by civil society groups). If there has been a violent way to address grievances alternative to conflict (such as through crime) after 1979, this could explain the disappearance of conflict battle deaths, which then would erode the legitimacy of the notion of East Asian Peace.

An investigation of the trends of violent crime is tedious. The only source of relatively reliable data that can be used for cross-country comparisons as well as the investigation of trends over time is the data produced by the ten United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS) from 1970 until 2006. Obviously this limits the observation of the pre-1980 period, as data on the period from the Second World War to 1970 is missing.

If one tries to find a crime category that could be sufficiently close to the indicators of conflict it would need to be homicide, since our conflict definition deals with fatal phenomena. To specify further, we should be looking at evidence on murders – intentional homicides, rather than unintentional – and we should be looking at actually committed intentional homicides rather than attempts. Our starting point in the analysis of whether there is any normative relevance for claiming that East Asia is pacific by

pointing to the decline in battle deaths was based on the preference for life and against the taking of lives. Since conflict is defined as intentional violence with political objectives, looking at murder statistics naturally loosens the definition of motives of violence, but should not loosen the definition of intentionality or the mortal outcome. Thus, we will follow the data on intentional homicide, which the UN Organization on Drugs and Crime defines in the following manner: “Intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide.”

While conflicts are collective phenomena, criminal violence is only rarely so. There is recent data on organized crime, but not historical surveys that could enable a comparison of the situation before and after 1979. Furthermore, organized crime statistics do not normally differentiate between mortal and non-mortal crime, and this distinction, as mentioned before, is crucial for the normative relevance of our conception of East Asian Peace. Thus our investigation of criminal “conflict” will have to give up the criterion of collectiveness: this violence is not necessarily collective, driven by ideologies, or ethnic, religious or other communal loyalties, but can be, and often is, driven purely by individual greed.

The UN data on intentionally committed (suspected) homicide is based on information that UN member states have chosen to make available to international

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16 Questionnaire to the national coordinators, which has been the basis of the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems.

17 The number of suspected committed murders is slightly higher than the number of convicted murders. For the purpose of this investigation the number of suspected murders is more useful because of the conservative criteria of murder having to be proved and attributed to someone “beyond reasonable doubt”. If I would operate with convicted
exposure. This means that homicides committed by a government are likely to be under-
reported. However, since the critical hypothesis was that perhaps governments have
given up the maintenance of order, governmental crime is not what we are after in our
analysis of homicide statistics. The hypothesis of conflict violence being transformed
into governmental authoritarian violence was tackled by the analysis of one-sided
conflict.

In some cases the fact that UN statistics rely on the records of its member
countries means that the practices of recording homicides might vary from country to
country, despite the fact that the UN has given a unified set of definitions for each
crime. If we were to compare homicides in democracies and dictatorships, or developed
and developing countries, it would be difficult to use the UN data that relies of records
of the member countries. It is likely that such data has a bias against democracies and
developed countries, which are less likely to fail to record each crime, or manipulate the
statistics to the liking of the elite. However, since East Asia has both developed and
democratized since the 1970s, this problem can be addressed. If homicide statistics
show that East Asian homicide rates have not deteriorated substantially, then we can
rule out the possibility of conflict battle deaths having been converted into criminal
violence.

Sometimes the comparison over time also seems to be limited in the UN data.
The third survey covering the years 1980–1986 seems to produce higher results for

murders I would also need to ignore cases where murder has undoubtedly happened, but there is no certainty about
the perpetrator. While convictions try to minimize the number of convicted innocent people, our investigation would
need to establish the best estimate for the number of murders. For this, suspected murders are a better indicator than
convicted murders.
many countries than the other surveys. In addition to this, in 15 countries, the years that
were common to either the second (1980) or the fourth survey (1986) were reported
substantially differently.\textsuperscript{18} However, ignoring the results of the third survey does not
substantially change the results below.

The main challenge with this data is not unreliability or biases, but the fact that
data is missing from many important countries, for instance from the pre-1980 period
for China and Burma/Myanmar, while the post-1979 period of the latter is likely to be
undermined. The Indo-Chinese states Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are all without
homicide data in the UN dataset. Furthermore, data for other East Asian countries are
missing for an average of half of the years. Thus the remaining data could only be seen
as a sample of all homicide data, even if it is perhaps a relatively extensive and
representative sample.

It is not possible to compare East Asian homicides with global levels of
homicides, simply because both the global and the East Asian data are insufficient.
Comparisons could only be made of the available data on the basis of average casualties
per population of each country.

The available data can clearly prove wrong the suggestion that conflicts in East
Asia have been converted into crime. East Asia has not become a criminal anarchy. It
seems that despite the fact that the countries have become more able and willing to
truthfully report each homicide, the levels of reported homicide have been reduced.
While the global average number of per capita homicide rates in the post-1979 period

\textsuperscript{18} There were clear deviations in the reports of overlapping years other than those related to the third survey, for six
other countries. None of these clear data problems were related to East Asian countries.
was slightly higher than in 1970–1979, East Asian per-capita homicide rates are down in all but one (Malaysia) of the seven countries where the data was available both for the pre-1980 and post-1979 period. While East Asian per-capita homicide levels were at global levels in the 1970s, the average East Asian level was less than half of the global levels after 1979. Thus homicides have not taken the place of conflict battle deaths – on the contrary, criminal violence in clearly on the decline in East Asia. However, while it is clear that post-1979 is more peaceful when criminal violence also is considered, one cannot clearly show that 1979 would somehow have been a watershed year. It might be true that homicides have been reduced relatively consistently since 1979, but if homicides are seen as an indication of conflict, then 1980 can by no means be considered as the first peaceful year. On the contrary, homicidal violence can only be seen to have reached a stable low level at some time in the mid-1990s. A graph of the countries with the fullest data available shows the tendency:

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19 If counted on the basis of the average of national averages it was almost 25% higher, while if counted on the basis of regional averages, it was 3% lower.

20 If counted on the basis of the average of national averages it was almost 53% lower, while if counted on the basis of regional averages, it was 61% lower.

21 In this presentation the missing data has been filled in assuming that the homicide situation has developed in a linear manner from the last available data-year to the first available data-year after the gap.
As can be seen, the homicide rates of East Asian countries become more similar after the two main trouble countries, Thailand and the Philippines, have found ways to curb criminal violence. In terms of East Asians as a population, the lack of Chinese figures for most of the years is a problem. However, per-capita homicide levels for China tend to be far lower than those of the global level, though the tendency is difficult to estimate on the basis of the data that the UN statistics provides for the country (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1986). Thus it is difficult to say whether the availability of Chinese data could weaken the results regarding the decline of crime in the region. It seems at least that with its low levels of homicide, Chinese data would definitely not, if fully

22 During this short period homicide numbers went first down but then up again in the last two years, ending on a level that was higher than any other year.
available, contribute to an interpretation according to which the long peace of East Asia could be challenged by violent crime.

**Beyond Battle Deaths**

The number of conflict-related fatalities is a good indicator of peacefulness for analysis that respects human life and aims at scholarship that can reduce the number of human lives lost due to warfare. From this perspective, the indicator of battle deaths has normative relevance as an indicator of peacefulness. The lack of battle deaths is probably also an indicator that somehow relates to all definitions of peace: there is no concept of peace that would allow a large number of battle deaths. Furthermore, mortalities are a practical indicator; whether or not something is a conflict (especially if we do not require conflicts to produce battle deaths) is often a difficult matter to define in a universally acceptable way, whereas whether a person is dead or not is more clear-cut (yet if he died as a direct consequence of the conflict or not can also be a matter of interpretation). Yet this indicator of battle deaths certainly does not empty the concept of peace. There are many other elements of peace that battle-death statistics do not measure.

**Indirect Conflict-Related Fatalities**

If one looks at mortalities, one can choose between deaths of combatants, which is the narrowest category covering military deaths only; battle deaths, which covers both civilian and military deaths resulted from a conflict; and conflict-related mortalities, a category which includes casualties of conflict-related famine, disease and other indirect conflict-related calamities. It would be difficult to argue, on the basis of our normative starting point of valuing life, that the annual level of battle deaths is a worse indicator of
conflict and peace than the level of military casualties. From the point of view of normative relevance it would be difficult to ignore civilian casualties of war in the definition of peace. However, there is an immediate problem with battle deaths related to a very short causal chain from conflict to deaths. According to the Uppsala conflict dataset definition, battle deaths include the following.

[T]raditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.

If death does not follow directly from a bullet/bomb of war, it is not seen as a battle death. This could be seen to reduce the normative relevance of the concept. The article by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) that launched the standard battle-death statistics already warned about the limitation of focusing only on battle deaths and not on indirect costs of war, too. When comparing the severity of conflicts, why would we want to ignore the casualties of famine or mortal disease caused by conflicts? At the same time, disease and famine in war contexts are almost always also results of poverty or one-sided violence. Direct battle deaths measure those deaths that are caused by war only. Thus, what can be claimed on the basis of battle death data is that East Asia is experiencing peace where conflict no longer causes destruction that would threaten the lives of people as such. However, even if conflict alone did not directly cause fatalities it would be serious enough if conflict was part of an East Asian complex humanitarian
emergency. Were that to happen, we would not be talking about the long peace of East Asia, but instead about East Asian complex humanitarian emergency where conflict is one of the components.

However, empirical investigation seems again to lend its support to the genuineness of the notion of the long peace of East Asia. It seems clear that the general vulnerability of the population affects the indirect effects of conflicts. Conflicts cause famine and disease-related fatalities especially when the welfare system is poorly developed and food security is not guaranteed with emergency measures, or when the regime or rebels use access to food or health services as tactics of war. Thus the ratio between indirect and direct fatalities is dependent on the will and the ability of the conflicting parties to avoid loss of lives.

The question of willingness to avoid indirect conflict casualties relates to one-sided violence due to the fact that famine and diseases are not something one can pin on organized military opponents only. As discussed in the section on one-sided conflict, it seems that especially East Asian governments have utilized the control over the access to food and health services as a weapon that they have used against their opponents. The famine of 1997–1998 in Papua killed hundreds of people, especially in the areas where separatist anti-government activities were taking place; the Hmong people of Laos fought against the communist-nationalist forces in the 1960s and 1970s; the Muslim Moro and Malay of the Philippines and Thailand often complain about discrimination surrounding vital services. However, as mentioned in the section on one-sided conflict, the main incidents of indirect violence in a conflict context took place before 1980, while the more current cases could be described as more incidental and exceptional elsewhere than perhaps in Burma/Myanmar, where the denial of access to international
humanitarian work has been for decades, and still is, a systematic policy of the government. Thus it is probable that the ratio between indirect and direct casualties in conflicts is declining, and the number of indirect casualties, caused by the democidal practices of the governments, is declining in all areas of East Asia except perhaps in Burma/Myanmar, where the number of indirect casualties is still not possible to assess.

Regarding the ability to avoid indirect fatalities of conflict, it is likely that the best indicators are related to those economic indicators that tell something about how people survive unexpected changes (such as poor harvests, natural disasters, etc.) in general. Life expectancy, education and many other indications of human development could, therefore, be used to estimate to what extent indirect fatalities are caused by vulnerability to conflict. If we look at the human development index, which consists of equal components of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita, we realize that again, only Burma/Myanmar’s and perhaps East Timor’s case is not entirely clear. All other East Asian citizens (even if there is no data on some of them in the pre-1979 period) seem to develop rapidly. If one calculates on the basis of UNDP’s *Human Development Reports* one can see that the average human development indexes of East Asian countries after 1979 range between 11 (the Philippines) to 36% (Indonesia) higher compared to pre-1980 period. Thus the ability of East Asia, except for Burma/Myanmar, to avoid indirect casualties due to conflicts has increased. Since

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23 The minister for information explained this in a positive framing by saying that humanitarian assistance is given (and international humanitarian assistance is allowed access) to non-fighting or cease-fire territories in order to offer an incentive for peace (discussion by the author in October 2006, in the framework of a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Myanmar International and Strategic Studies Institute fact-finding mission for EU scholars and officials.

both willingness and ability of the region (with the exception of Burma/Myanmar) to avoid indirect fatalities due to conflicts has improved, it seems clear that peace in the region indeed means substantially lower levels of conflict-related fatalities, not just lower levels of battle deaths.

**Conflicts Without Fatalities**

Another challenge to battle deaths as an indicator of the lack of peace could be the existence of non-violence conflicts over territories or governing power. If this was the case, should we then forget the notion of the long peace of East Asia and, instead, talk about East Asian non-fatal war? Here a measure of the lack of peace that is not based on the loss of life could be seen as less powerful in terms of its normative relevance: if we want to reserve the word ‘conflict’ for something with a very negative value, there have to be casualties involved. Thus conceptually, non-violent conflicts do not seriously challenge the notion of the long peace of East Asia, which is based on low levels of fatalities. Even if it was discovered that the number of non-violent conflicts rose tremendously as the East Asian Peace started, we would not need to abandon our concept. The miracle of the long peace of East Asia would simply be in East Asia’s ability to manage conflicts so that they do not cause fatalities.

**Reign of Fear**

Sometimes it is fear that prevents people from taking up arms even if they are suffering and lack non-violent options. Again, living under fear and unbearable conditions does not correspond to our common-sense view of peace. Could “East Asian Peace” in fact be a dystopia similar to the ones described by George Orwell and Aldous Huxley in *1984* and *New Brave World* respectively? In these novels, popular grievances keep on
piling up, but the efficiency and brutality of the repressive system causes fear in people and groups, and prevents them from staging revolts. Surely if fear was the main causal determinant of “East Asian Peace”, the concept would lose its normative relevance and we should not call it peace at all. Instead of the long peace of East Asia we would be dealing with an East Asian authoritarian peace. If the long peace of East Asia is of the Orwellian nature, we should not consider it a genuine peace, and we should not take it as a mode whose recipes could be emulated elsewhere.

In order to decide whether the long peace of East Asia is real, or if it simply has been caused by increased fear, and in order to see if the profile of the long peace of East Asia is Orwellian, we need to look at the development of fear in the polities of East Asian nations. We have already looked at one-sided violence and realized that the fear that could be preventing people from any acts that could lead to conflict is not based on systematic killings of the population by the governments. The fear that we would be talking about when studying the Orwellian hypothesis would be a fear of predictable punishment for any activity that aims at challenging the system. Thus we are talking about the practices and the rights of the executive to punish people, and the possibilities of the people to address their grievances and change the system. If the government has a credible deterrent to keep the population under tight control in order to keep societal peace, we would be talking about some kind of an Orwellian peace. If this predictable credible deterrent emerged just before or during the drastic decline of battle deaths, we would not be able to rule out the possibility that this Orwellian fear-based control is the reason for the declining number of battle deaths. In the latter case we should not talk about peace at all.
The ability of the rulers to maintain predictable fear among the population is dependent on conditional sanctioning opportunities of the state. Since we are not looking at fear based on the practice of killings (one-sided violence), our investigation will be directed towards the legal punitive system – to what extent the executive can punish people (intensity of punishment), and on which scale this punitive system is used. Both of these elements are needed, since we cannot imagine an Orwellian society where the state could only subject its citizens to mild punishment (say minor fines), and neither could we imagine such a society in a state that can only punish murders, but cannot restrict its citizens with regard to any other category of actions. An Orwellian society is one where the rulers are unrestricted in controlling all kinds of activities, and where the instruments of this control imply extreme punishments for actions that are not desired by the state.

If we look at the punitive system of the governments in East Asia, a good indicator of deterrence is the practice of capital punishment. Aside from torture, for which we do not have reliable cross-country comparable data, the right of the state to take a citizen’s life is probably the most useful crude indicator of whether the state does or does not have means for severe punishment. If a country has this extreme instrument in its use it does not necessarily mean that it is Orwellian. We can talk about an Orwellian setting only if capital punishment exists, and at the same time, the executive branch of government has unrestricted power to practise it, to control any element of societal life, and especially if the citizens lack the capacity to change the system. But nevertheless, the possession of extreme instruments of punishment is a necessary element in an Orwellian setting.
If one looks at the capacity to punish as a possible cause for the elusive peace after 1979, one has to conclude that the availability of mortal sanctioning of societies is not the cause of the disappearance of battle deaths. On the contrary, the number of East Asian countries in possession of the opportunity to practise capital punishment has declined since 1979. Amnesty International\textsuperscript{25} lists countries and puts them into four categories:

A. Those whose legislation makes capital punishment totally impossible,

B. Those whose legislation does not allow capital punishment in response to normal crimes,

C. Those whose practice is not to punish citizens with death for normal crimes,

and

D. Those that still practice the death penalty.

\textsuperscript{25}http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries#allcrimes
Table 2.8: Average share of countries with four orientations to capital punishment, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2008</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we look at the averages for the post-World War II period until 1979, and compare them to the post-1979 period, we realize that in each of the categories, East Asia has rather become more liberal than authoritarian, and less Orwellian,. Thus this component does not support the idea of considering fear as the explanation for the disappearance of battle-deaths. However, fear could profile the peace of East Asia, as it is clear that East Asian states are better equipped with coercive tools to control their citizens. Fear could play a more important role here than in the rest of the world. Graph 3.4 shows the comparison by focusing only on the practice of capital punishment (category D).
Graph 2.4  Share of countries that practice capital punishment

However, even this graph presents a picture that is too rosy for East Asian Peace. It is mostly the least populous countries – Brunei and East Timor at their birth in 1957 and 1999, and Cambodia and Laos in 1989 – that have given up capital punishment, whilst Indonesia and China, and most of the other bigger nations still practice the death penalty. South Korea and the Philippines are the only exceptions to the rule: while the Philippines totally banned capital punishment in 2006, South Korea has simply not practiced it since 1997. This indicates that for South Koreans as well, the threat is there, despite the fact that capital punishment is not in practice. If one looks at the share of citizens living in countries with death penalty we can see that over 92% of East Asians still live in those countries. If one takes into account that in practice the Philippines government is also being accused of large-scale killings of journalists critical to the government, directly or through proxy militias, one could conclude that
the threat of the death penalty is a reality for almost all East Asians (only East Timorese and Cambodians are exempt).

**Graph 2.5 Percentage of East Asians living in countries that practice capital punishment**

Access to harsh measures alone does not, however, constitute authoritarian, Orwellian peace, if the government is well controlled and its exercise of coercive measures is restricted to crime control only. However, if the state can use its strong coercive measures in an unlimited manner, we could imagine an extremely violent and coercive setting even if there were no fatalities. Polity data, which is probably the most used quantitative dataset on the development of political systems, has information for each country about the development of the limits on the authority of the executive to use the coercive measures and methods of control. This data is useful for our purposes when comparing the pre-1980 period after the World Wars with the post-1979 period.
Polity data builds a scale starting with (1) “Unlimited Authority”: a category reserved for states where there are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). At the other end of the scale is category (7) “Executive Parity or Subordination” for countries with accountability groups having effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Between the extremes are cases in category (3) with “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” and (5) “Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority”. The former is for countries where there are some real but limited restraints on the executive: the legislature initiates some categories of legislation; the legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees, and attempts to change some constitutional restrictions (such as prohibitions on extending his term). The latter is for countries where the executive has more effective authority than any accountability group, but it is subject to substantial constraints by them. Legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action. Legislature sometimes also refuses funds to the executive. The legislature makes important appointments to administrative posts, and the legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country. Additionally, the scale has intermediate categories between values 1 and 3, 3 and 4, and 5 and 7.

Even the definition of the Polity variable on executive constraints is problematic, and the coding of this variable has been more difficult than the coding of other polity variables. Executive constraint is the element that could help investigate whether the strong coercive instruments at the disposal of the states in East Asia are used at will without proper control and constraint. Yet, we should be cautious with regard to treating the scale. If we consider it, as has been the purpose in polity data, as an additive scale,
and if we thus consider that the distance between the categories is the same, we could again study the averages of post-1979 and pre-1980 (1946–1979) periods. Again, we will see that the long peace of East Asia has not been caused by fear.

**Table 2.9: Constraints to the executive, East Asia and in the world**

Constraints to the executive in East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Constraint Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1980</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-1979</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constraints to the executive in the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Constraint Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1980</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-1979</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it seems clear that constraints to the executive authority are higher in post-1979 East Asia than before, one could also see that they are nevertheless lower than the global levels. If we are more careful with the Polity data and do not necessarily accept the additive nature of the scale on executive constraints, we can still clearly see that East Asia has moved in the right direction. The most common category for countries for both periods was the category of “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” (3). However, for the pre-1980 period, 45% of the country-years (for example, Indonesia in
1972) were in a worse situation than that, while in the post-1979 period only 17% of the country-years’ executives were less controlled than that. While in the pre-1980 period 24% of country-years had better control of executives, while after 1979, 42% of country-years experienced a better situation. Thus regardless of how we interpret the result, we cannot assume that the relaxing of the control of the executive has brought about fear that prevented battle deaths after 1979. Constraints on the executive have clearly increased in time in East Asia.

At the same time, the long peace of East Asia is still characterized by authoritarianism, since both the coercive instruments at the disposal of the executives are on average harsher in East Asia than globally, and because of the fact that the executive has on average always been less constrained in East Asia than in the rest of the world. Even if fear is not the explanation of low levels of violence, it is part of the political life in many parts of East Asia.

While the availability of capital punishment was a threat to almost all East Asians (all but East Timorese, Cambodian and Philippine citizens), the low level of constraints of the executive also affects a greater number of people for a greater number of years than they affect country-years. If we again assume that the Polity data scale is additive, we can calculate the average level of constraint to the executive for each person. While the global average is closer to “Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority” than “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority”, the average for East Asians is closer to “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” all through the period of the post-1979 era, with more than two thirds of the population still living under regimes that have only slight to moderate limitations to executive authority. Yet, the level of constraints on the authority of the executive for an average East Asian
remained under the level of slight to moderate (3) all though the period before 1980, so regardless of how we measure it, there has been progress in this aspect.

**Negative Peace**

If the long peace of East Asia is simply established by referring to the low numbers of battle deaths and the relative absence of direct violence, its core is negatively defined as lack of something (fatalities). However, our common sense would suggest that we should define peace both in positive and in negative terms as Johan Galtung (1969) suggested. For Galtung, peace is not only the absence of war, but also positive cooperation towards the elimination of the threat of conflict, as well as towards the rectification of the structures of violence.

Furthermore, common sense would suggest to us that the long peace of East Asia has little meaning if it occurs in a structure where no one directly kills anyone else, but where structures of distribution expose a part of the population to inhumane conditions that eventually kill them before it is their time to die. In the Galtungian tradition, structural violence is present when human beings are influenced by structures so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. An extreme version of structural violence is such that kills people unnecessarily before their optimal life expectancy. According to Galtung and Høivik (1971) this extreme structural violence can be operationalized in a way that makes it comparable to direct violence, as both deprive people of years of life. The number of lives deprived indicates the gravity of violence – direct or indirect – and this can be measured by the same unit of measurement, i.e., numbers of years. While this definition is elegant in its ability to produce a common measurement for structural and direct violence, it has been criticized (Eide 1971: 71) for its inability to strictly define how to calculate the number of years
lost through structural violence. More specifically, the problem is in the difficulty in defining fair conditions to which the structurally violent conditions can be compared to. Galtung and Høivik (1971: 73) talk about “avoidable deaths that occur because medical and sanitary resources are concentrated in the upper classes”, but how can one define avoidable deaths? Can we say that all inequality is structural violence if it prevents people from reaching their potentials, or is this definition inherently ideological? Only an extreme egalitarianist would say that the structure is violent if someone who does not want to work for more than 10 hours per week cannot go golfing as often as someone who works 60 hours per week. Most would even say that people who do not want to earn enough money to buy an expensive car with optimal safety features do not deserve one. Yet, according to Høivik and Galtung, a 40-year-old who has enjoyed life instead of earning money for a safe car is a victim of structural violence if he suffers an avoidable death in a road accident that could have been avoided with optimal safety equipment. According to Galtung and Høivik, in conditions where life expectancy is 80 years, he would be subject to the same amount of violence as two 60-year-old people who get shot in war. Even if this proposition would not be supported by many, most people would probably say that a structure where only white people have access to public health services (even if all members of society pay taxes to maintain these services) is structurally violent. I have suggested elsewhere (Kivimäki 2001b) that exploitation and structural violence should be defined by equal opportunities to seek resources, instead of equal resource enjoyment. A loss of the years of life is avoidable. It is only caused by structural violence if it has been caused, not by one’s own actions or the resources one has achieved for oneself, but by the structural limitations to one’s actions to avoid loss of years of one’s life. However, with this definition, any easily
measurable operationalization of how East Asian countries should be, so that we could call their existence peace, becomes impossible. Yet, even if the difficulty of operationalization could prevent us from measuring the lack of positive peace in East Asia, measurability should not guide our definitions and assessment of whether or not the notion of the long peace of East Asia makes sense.

While inequality could be measured by many already-existing measurements and statistics, deaths caused by unequal opportunities cannot be measured by already existing measurements. Accusations of discrimination have been at the root of many of the conflicts in East Asia. In Burma/Myanmar especially, there have been accusations of Burman primacy over seven established ethnic minorities in the central areas, as well as the domination of main minorities over sub-ethnicities and non-native ethnicities in the ethnic states (Shan, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Chin and Rakhine). In Thailand Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces (Pattani, Narathiwa, and Yala), have complained of lethal discrimination and lack of access to basic health and nutritional services. Before the peace in 2005, Acehnese claimed (and Papuans still do for themselves) a right in the say of opportunities for ethnic Acehnese in comparison to the Javanese majority population of Indonesia. Indigenous groups (Malay and Dayak) also complained about impoverishment based on race, and the privileges taken by the migrant groups, most specifically the Madurese. In Maluku, many Muslims accused the local Christian administration of Maluku and parts of Sulawesi of discrimination against and disregard of the basic needs of the Muslims of the area. In some areas claims were made in the opposite direction, too. Laos with the Hmong population, the Philippines with its Moro-Muslim population, and China with its Tibetan population face similar claims.
In addition to racial and ethnic structures of violence, governance conflicts have often been caused by perceptions of extreme inequality between economic classes. Rebellious communist movements have still been active after the collapse of the Soviet Union in many East Asian countries. While the formal Burmese Communist Party was defeated at the end of 1980s, many of the opposition movements continue to draw their legitimacy from the social and economic inequality of opportunities in the country. In the Philippines, the communist challenge to the government is still strong, and it continues to mobilize especially by using the grievances of the landless classes in order to gain support. Thus, in terms of structural violence, it is likely that East Asia has not reached a positive phase of peace. With the level of economic development of the Southeast Asian countries especially, this structural violence is also likely to affect life expectancy, and thus cause the loss of years of human life. Yet, one cannot formulate a hypothesis that could threaten the very legitimacy of the notion of East Asia peace by suggesting that structural violence has been the explanation for the decline in direct violence. The contrary seems to be the case: the existing discriminatory ethnic and class structures cause direct violence (as well as criminal violence), rather than channel direct violence to other forms.

Galtung’s criteria for positive peace related to cooperation towards the removal of the sources of conflict and structural violence are also problematic for East Asia. East Asia would not have achieved its steep decline of battle deaths without effective cooperation regarding the transformation of structures that cause conflict. Community building, economic development and the creation of economic interdependence are all measures that have probably greatly advanced the prospects of peace in the area. However, what Galtung had in mind, too, was the explicit focusing on conflict
resolution as a requirement for such cooperation. This aspect of positive peace is also very weak in East Asia.

According to Uppsala University’s Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2011) only 5% of terminated conflicts ended in a peace agreement in post-1979 East Asia, while the percentage before 1979 was 15.26 This data gives us the first indicator of peace, which indicates a worse East Asian performance after 1979. This disappearance of peace agreements in East Asia is special and cannot be explained by referring to global trends. It seems that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a way to terminate conflicts has increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979 to post-1979 averages. Clearly the hesitance to focus on politically divisive issues is common to post-1979 East Asia.

The prominence of non-political termination of conflict in ceasefire agreements is also common to the post-1979 East Asian pattern of conflict management. Ceasefires constituted only 2% of conflict termination cases in East Asia before 1979, while after 1979, the share of ceasefire agreements with confidence building rose to 11%, and simple ceasefire agreements to 5%. There had been a global increase (again comparing the pre-1979 and post-1979 averages) in this category, too, from 10% to 15%, but nothing as spectacular as in East Asia (from 2% to 16%). The share of conflict terminated by no action at all also increased after 1979. Before 1979, 48% of conflicts terminated were already at that time terminated without any visible “peace action”. This share increased to 68% after 1979. While the trend could be explained by referring to a

26 This peculiarity has been revealed by Isak Svensson, 2011.
similar global pattern, the fact remains that globally, this type of conflict termination only takes place in less than half (43%) of the conflict termination cases.

Thus we can clearly say that the long peace of East Asia is mostly negative in nature. While East Asian economic development has not been detrimental for the poor, it has not entirely avoided ethnical or class-based inequality in opportunities available to East Asians. Furthermore, while East Asia has managed to transform its conflict structures, it has been inefficient in conflict resolution, and as a result, it still has disputes which in a matter of days could turn battle death statistics upside down. If East Asia has only produced just over 100,000 battle deaths since 1979, it could produce ten times that in only a matter of days if a nuclear war were to erupt on the Korean peninsula or between Taiwan and China. Thus peace in East Asia lives under a shadow of great risks of war.

**The Beginning of the Long Peace**

If the shift from belligerence to peacefulness in East Asia can be established on the basis of the existing PRIO, COW and Uppsala data, the next interesting question is, when did this change take place? For this we must look at the trends without looking into the details of each year. If we take a 5-year running average of annual conflict fatalities, we see that the change took place right after the ending of the Vietnam–US War and the following bilateral conflicts between Vietnam and China. If radical change is the criterion, it seems that the year 1979 would be the best candidate for the watershed between belligerent and peaceful East Asia.
However, if we assume an absolute criterion of peacefulness for the long peace of East Asia we might have other possible years for its beginning. Depending on “how much peace” we expect from the long peace of East Asia we can already see that the change from belligerent to pacific took place between 1979 and 1994. If we assume that East Asia cannot be defined as peaceful before there are (measured by a 5-year running annual average) less than 10,000 annual casualties, peace started somewhere between 1981 and 1994.

We might also define the watershed year in relative terms, comparing the new period with the old. If we say that, we can talk about East Asian relative peace only once a certain percentage of casualties has disappeared from the period’s annual average compared to the annual average of the post-war period before the beginning of the peaceful period. Graph 2.7 shows the development of this according to various estimates by PRIO.
If we expect 96% to have disappeared before we can call the period peaceful, the beginning of the long peace of East Asia can be placed somewhere between 1978 (low estimate of version 3.0) and 1987 (high estimate of version 2.0).

Profile of Peace

The thesis of the long peace of East Asia has been emphasizing the drastic decline in interstate warfare, rather than focusing on the declining number of fatalities in intrastate wars. The differences between the estimates of different datasets on this are not big even though the estimates of interstate wars of East Asia trend to decrease slightly as newer estimates are created. However, since this is true both for the belligerent and peaceful periods, it seems that different estimates are almost perfectly similar regarding the drastic (99.8–99.9%) decline in interstate conflict.
However, as the long peace of East Asia thesis claims, peacefulness is not restricted to inter-state conflict only. The COW, PRIO, and Uppsala data are in agreement that conflict between states and non-state actors outside state territory has disappeared from East Asia. These colonial wars seem to stay outside East Asia due to the strong states, even if the War on Terror tends to bring back fighting by Western coalitions against non-state terrorist actors outside Western states.

The claim about the decline in intra-state conflict seems robust, even though estimates vary on how much this type of conflict has been reduced. While the best estimate of PRIO data’s version 2.0 claims that this decline has been about 93%, the newer version estimates decline at under 90%. All in all variation between all estimates of PRIO, Uppsala, and COW is between 81 and 97% for both intra-state conflict and for such intra-state conflict that eventually gets internationalized.

The Uppsala and PRIO data distinguish between conflicts that have been fought about issues of territory and issues of governance. The newest data of both has a category for conflicts where both of these issues are central. This distinction is interesting as one could assume that the great change in 1979 that could have contributed to peace in East Asia is China’s turn from revolutionism to developmentalism, and its respect for non-interference and sovereignty. Perhaps this did indeed offer the long peace of East Asia a chance. However, it seems that the main reduction in conflict fatalities took place in territorial conflicts. China’s reduced interest in exporting its communist way of governance could have been expected to contribute to a decline in governance conflict rather than territorial skirmishes. What the new PRIO data does not reveal (and Uppsala data cannot touch due to limitations in the period of coverage) is that some of the allies of Burma’s Communist Party were ethnic
militias (such as the country’s greatest ethnic militia, of the Wa-people) who used to receive Chinese aid for their territorial ambitions. The PRIO data does not classify their conflict with the Burmese government in the 1970s and 1980s as a governance conflict, even though Chinese support to them was arguably motivated by the Chinese promotion of communism. To classify the fight of communist ethnic militias of Burma/Myanmar as purely territorial could be a mistake in the coding practices of PRIO’s data project.

The thesis of the long peace of East Asia has claimed that it is not based on a skillful conflict resolution that dissolves disputes before they escalate into conflicts or wars. Instead, it has been claimed that East Asia has become skillful at preventing the escalation of conflict rather than at preventing it altogether. Analysis based on MID data in Kivimäki (2002) revealed that East Asia and ASEAN have not managed to prevent non-violent disputes and disputes that do not lead to 25 casualties. Furthermore, analysis on the basis of the numbers of conflicts (Kivimäki 2008) reveals that the number of conflicts has not drastically declined while the amount conflict fatalities has dropped. The newest PRIO and Uppsala data seem to strengthen this conclusion by offering a variable on the intensity of conflict with two categories: intensive (over 999 casualties) and less intensive (with less than 1,000 but more than 25 casualties). While earlier versions have suggested that it is mostly intensive conflicts that have declined, the new data suggests that only the amount of intensive conflicts has declined, while the number of fatalities in less intensive conflicts has actually increased!! If measured by the new measure of best estimates of the PRIO data version 3.0, minor conflicts cause annually 6% more fatalities than they did during the belligerent period. Low and high estimates tend to support this assertion. At the same time, fatalities in major conflicts
are down by over 99% regardless of the version of data one chooses.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, the long peace of East Asia is not about conflict resolution, and it is not about conflict avoidance or prevention either. It is first and foremost about the ability to prevent the escalation of conflicts into full-blown wars.

According to COW and the earlier versions of PRIO data, the Philippines is the only country in East Asia where conflict fatalities have actually increased rather than decreased. While the estimates of the contribution of the Philippines to the total conflict fatalities in East Asia during the regions peaceful period have been downgraded from 46 to 23\% from PRIO datasets version 2.0 to 3.0, and further in the latest version of the COW data, all the data seem unanimous that the Philippines is so far the only country that has defied the long peace of East Asia. Thailand will join the Philippines, unless it finds away to manage separatist and authoritarian violence in its Southern-most provinces. The great variation with regards to estimates of the share of the Philippine fatalities of the total East Asian fatalities in the two versions of the PRIO dataset is not as much due to changes in the estimates of the Philippine conflict, as it is due to changes in the assessment of the amount of fatalities elsewhere. With the doubling of the best estimate of fatalities after 1979 in East Asia, a stable estimate on the Philippine violence shows as a halving of the Philippine share in fatalities. The even lower share of the Philippine fatalities in the COW data, again, is related to the fact that the Philippine violence tends to be constant, but not very intensive. Thus conflicts in the Philippines (mostly between the government and its Muslim and communist challengers) rarely exceed the 999-fatalities limit that COW’s coding practice considers as a threshold of a war.

\textsuperscript{27} According to COW data this drop is “just” 97\%.
According to 2.0 the Philippines is the great, only exception; according to 3.0 the Philippines is less anomalous. According to COW, the share of the Philippines as a producer of battle deaths is vastly smaller. But the Philippines is still an exception, the only one.

If we look at the new data on fatalities, we can also see that new estimates of violence before countries joined ASEAN have changed and limited the explanation of the contribution of the “ASEAN Way” to the long peace of East Asia. While in the earlier version of the PRIO data, it seemed that the Philippines was the only country where the average annual number of conflict fatalities increased after the country joined ASEAN, it now seems, on the basis of version 3.0 of the PRIO data and the new COW data, that Thailand has also had more annual violence after it joined ASEAN than before the establishment of the association.

**Conclusion**

Data on East Asian conflict-related fatalities, despite great variation, seems to tell a tale of an astonishing pacification of the region. If not used for a very detailed profiling of this peace, the accuracy of the existing Uppsala, PRIO and COW data is sufficient as the foundation of generalizations on tendencies and associations between the conditions for and the changes in this peace. East Asian turn to a more peaceful coexistence has been convincingly shown.

The investigation of the profile and depth of peace showed that the long peace of East Asia is a relative phenomenon with some exceptions. There are still conflicts and violence in the region, and the risk of war has not ended either. It seems that Burma/Myanmar is not fully a part of the East Asian relative peace phenomenon.
because it does not share the same level of peace as the rest of the region while the Philippines is totally and Thailand partly outside the phenomenon.

Furthermore, the long peace of East Asia has a slightly Orwellian nature. There is not much authoritarian violence in it, but the threat of violent authoritarian measures nevertheless plays an important role in disciplining East Asians. Despite the reduction in the availability of capital punishment by East Asian governments, and despite the better surveillance of the users of authoritarian means, East Asia is still more authoritarian than the rest of the world.

Finally, one has to notice that the long peace of East Asia as a notion is legitimate only in a negative sense of peace. Yet since East Asian Relative Peace is real, the next step in the investigation of this phenomenon is to try to find explanations for it. Such a drastic turn for the better deserves an explanation even if the phenomenon is not coupled with positive peace.

Another reason why the long peace of East Asia requires investigation is that its explanation is not obvious and clear. East Asia has become peaceful even if it does not seem to be based on a solid, strong power balance (Leifer 1989), strong security institutions (Rüland 2000), even if it cannot resolve its conflicts (Svensson 2011) and terminate some of the major security threats (such as the risk of a nuclear war on Taiwan or on Korea), or even if its integration has failed to pool sovereignty to regional bodies (Hund 2002; Narine 2002) and even if there are still many protests (Svensson and Lindgren 2011) and disputes and smaller conflicts in the region (Kivimäki 2008). The new threats of terrorism do not seem very serious as their contribution to battle deaths is still relatively minimal (Kivimäki 2003), but even there, East Asia does not
seem to have found the silver bullet. Yet scholars who conclude (Michael Vatikiotis 2006) that conflicts and conflict casualties have increased with democratization, the decline in US involvement, and the rise of terrorism in East Asia are clearly wrong in their conclusions. With democratization many conflicts have become more visible, while the threat that terrorism poses to wealthy consumers of the global media has highlighted this type of violence. Yet, terrorism and the recent conflicts that have been fuelled by spontaneous civil-society groups have resulted in a marginal number of fatalities and thus compare poorly with conflicts of the 1960s or the 1970s. East Asia has, undoubtedly, become more peaceful, not more belligerent.

The curve of East Asian battle deaths already reveals that the long peace of East Asia does not simplistically follow the global trends of power. East Asian battle deaths ended before the ending of the Cold War, while the beginning of it did not have a systematic effect on battle deaths. Thus the study of the long peace of East Asia will require a more sophisticated approach than the one that simplistically derives regional developments from global power political changes.

A closer look at individual nations suggests that most US allies do not benefit from US strength, at least in terms of security. On the contrary, as will be shown in Chapter 5, US power correlates positively with battle deaths, especially in US-allied countries in East Asia. Thus the most simplistic interpretation of the theory of hegemonic stability that suggests that hegemonic leadership predicts peace in the countries subordinate to the hegemon has very little currency in East Asia. It could, however, be true that the US promotion of a developmental attitude has contributed to the peace among development-oriented East Asian states. It could also be suggested that change from a negative to a positive (or an accommodating) attitude towards the US
contributed to stability in East Asia. This change seemed to contribute to the Japanese peace in 1945, to the ASEAN/Indonesian peace since 1967, to the Chinese peace after the transition from 1972 to 1979, and to the Indo-Chinese peace a decade later.

The classical explanation of democratic peace seems also to be dubious in the East Asian context. Goldsmith (2007) has shown that economic rather than political structures and institutions seem to explain peace in Asia. The long peace of East Asia follows development and interdependence, while democracy seems to have a more complex relationship with peace as I have shown elsewhere (Kivimäki 2012d). Democracy has some correlative associations to peace, but the interference of external powers to domestic governance issues before 1979 tended to dominate the relationship between democracy and conflict. After 1979 East Asian regimes sought legitimacy by offering economic development and prosperity to their people. Democracy became less relevant for the legitimacy of governance and the lack thereof lost its legitimizing effect with regard to international intervention. In the post-1979 peace regime states respected each others’ sovereignty regardless of their political system. This way also wars of liberation of various sorts ended. Thus, at least on its own, the theory of democratic peace does not seem to lead the research on the long peace of East Asia far.

A liberal model of peace could have more explanatory power since after 1979 governments of East Asia have emphasized the need to develop and trade with each other. Goldsmith (2007) also suggests that there is a significant relationship between economic interdependence and peace. However, Southeast Asian peace started while the level of development was very low and continued to be low, and during the first decade of this peace interdependence continued to decline. Before the ASEAN, the very nations that were at war, Malaysia (including Singapore) and Indonesia, were the most
interdependent of East Asian nations. Thus the long peace of East Asia in Southeast Asia at least was not mechanistically produced by liberal interdependence or development (Kivimäki 2001).

As an exception, the long peace of East Asia could offer some interesting new cases for the development of *ceteris paribus* conditions for global theories on peace. Regional contexts, especially those have been studied less than the various Western contexts, could be meaningful in the explanation of peace. Furthermore, it could be that the unexpected and less recognized periods of peace of East Asia could underline the importance of social constructs different from the more thoroughly studied Western constructs, to the determinants of peace and war. The long peace of East Asia could prove a case that could enrich peace research by offering examples alternative to the ones that have been used for the development of more general theories of peace.

Making better sense to the exceptional peace of East Asia will be the mission of the following chapters. At the end of the book I shall take a look at how the exceptions can enrich the general theories of regional peace. I shall start the explanation by showing how the ASEAN formula of peace seems to be associated with the success of East Asia.
Chapter 3

The Main Argument: The Contribution of the ASEAN Way to the Long Peace of East Asia

Introduction

As we have now seen that the long peace of East Asia is real, our attention will turn to the questions of how East Asia become became so peaceful, and why this change took place. Before going into details of the relationship between different conditions, structures, discourses, etc., it makes sense to start with a fact that the long peace of East Asia begun inside ASEAN in 1967. While ASEAN was initially unable to create peace in all of Southeast Asia, let alone East Asia, it seems that its members have experienced less war after joining the association. The main question of this chapter is therefore: is the long peace of East Asia a creation of an approach, a discourse, norms or something else that was generated in the emergence and development of ASEAN?

In this chapter, “ASEAN peace” refers to the absence of conflicts (inter- and intra-state) within the area that at each point in time belonged to ASEAN. Originally, this meant just a part of Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines

28 This chapter is based on my article (Kivimäki 2011, Oxford University Press license Nr. 3124110689921). However, in the present chapter reference is no longer made to PRIJO’s battle death data version 2.0 but instead to version 3.0. Data on conflict termination has also been updated. The analysis is now based on the newest version of the Uppsala conflict termination data. For comments to an earlier version of the manuscript, presented at the ISA conference in 2008 in San Francisco, I am grateful for Amitav Acharya, Robert Ross, Mathilda Lindgren and Isak Svensson.
and Singapore – while eventually, it came to encompass all of Southeast Asia: Vietnam from 1995, Laos and Myanmar from 1997 and Cambodia from 1999. By Southeast Asia, I then mean the ten countries that are currently members of ASEAN.

By tracing the origins of a regional phenomenon to its local roots we may attempt to understand the prevailing cause-and-effect factors. Is it possible that the long peace of East Asia began in ASEAN and spread, like a benign disease, to the rest of East Asia? It seems from the symptoms (the end of interstate war, decline in intra-state conflict, greater decline in conflict casualties than in militarized disputes, inability to resolve conflicts) that the ASEAN ‘disease’ could provide a diagnosis for the peacefulness of East Asia since 1979.

This chapter argues that the two processes of pacification (in ASEAN and in East Asia) are interlinked, and that the ASEAN approach to security that has spread to all of East Asia is associated with greater peace on the entire subcontinent. A full explanation of this requires both a disclosure of the correlative relationship between the ASEAN approach in East Asia and its pacific outcome, and an explanation of the mechanism by which the ASEAN way produces a certain profile of pacification, both in East Asia and in ASEAN. This chapter aims first at revealing the correlative relationship between plausible causes and effects and the following chapters 4-6 will then take the elements revealed in this, into a closer analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 will

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29 Philosophers have different ideas about the primacy of these two elements. The fact that this chapter focuses on the correlative aspect does not mean that I support the line, which says that an explanation requires first and foremost the revealing of the correlative regularity between elements of social systems.
explain the cultural/historical context in which the successful ASEAN Way culture was generated, not only in Southeast Asia, but also in China.

Thus the starting point in this chapter is to prove that East Asia has adopted an approach or a culture that I call “the ASEAN Way”, and that after the adoption also its security developments have been similar to those within ASEAN. This is necessary because complex processes are tackled in so many studies by using qualitative methods without first investigating how common and representative these processes are.

Thus, this chapter lays the foundation for an investigation in the following chapters that will also conduct historical analysis and process tracing to reveal the mechanism by which the ASEAN Way produces peace in East Asia.

The ASEAN Way is treated in this book as a discourse or a culture, an approach consisting of several norms as well as interpretations of identities and realities. I do not claim that ASEAN as an organization or an actor is the cause of East Asian pacification, but simply that an approach/culture/discourse that we call the ASEAN Way was common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia and was correlated with success in the prevention of conflict. One could say that the approach, or elements of it – such as the focus on development rather than revolution – caused the establishment of ASEAN, not the other way around. What seems even more plausible is that ASEAN as an entity and an identity has been interlinked to the successful, peaceful ASEAN approach in a mutually strengthening association, one in which both constitute each other. As explained in Chapter 1, the fact that I try to use quantitative methods does not mean that I would subscribe to the world-view of most quantitative analysis. It is important to know at this stage if the ASEAN Way approach actually is the same approach that was
utilized in East Asia after 1979 and if that approach was then associated with the similar record of success. This can only be proven by looking at measurements that grasp the entire area for a number of decades. Clearly numerical description is needed for that. Yet, this does not lead us to assume that the correlative associations found have to be a result of causal mechanisms between mutually exogenous factors. On the contrary, the ASEAN Way is already a way to peace, and peace clearly strengthens it. It would not be wise at this stage to rule out the possibility of the ASEAN Way not being a traditional external condition that has caused peace in East Asia, but that peace and the approach have a more mutual, complex and constitutive relationship.

The argument about the role of the ASEAN approach in the pacification of East Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of the conflict frequency, the number of battle deaths and conflict termination, which, as explained in Chapter 1, are all based on the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data. Instead of engaging various modes of conflict as in the previous chapter, I shall from now on mainly look at standard conflicts and use the version 3.0 data on battle deaths for the measurement of conflict propensity. Both the approaches and the outcomes will be contrasted with those approaches and outcomes 1) before ASEAN members joined ASEAN; 2) in East Asia before 1979; and 3) approaches outside East Asia. This is to rule out the possibility that Asian approaches were there already at the time of war and instability, as well as the possibility that ASEAN and East Asian pacifications are just global trends that cannot be explained from the point of view of East Asia’s own approaches.

I shall first define what we mean by the ASEAN Way, and then operationalize it (by defining it into measurable components). Then I shall look at the statistics of conflict and conflict termination in East Asia and ASEAN and see whether the pattern defined by ASEAN documents, declarations and praxis as the ASEAN Way can be found in East Asia, and whether this way is somehow unique to the area. Then I shall compare the outcomes of this approach in East Asia and ASEAN, and also to other areas where the ASEAN Way was not adopted.

The ASEAN Way

The ASEAN Way is not totally unique in all of its elements. But despite standard references to common diplomatic principles, the core elements are different from security orientations of other areas. The final chapter of this book will deal with the difference between the East Asian/ASEAN approach and the Western principles. However, there is an ongoing debate on whether the East Asian approach actually mainly reflects Chinese strategic tradition (Kang 2007) or regional culture (Shambaugh 2004/2005) instead of the ASEAN Way. In this chapter I shall organize the orientation that we call the ASEAN Way and its reflections on the profile of security into measurable proxy components. This way the claim of an association between the ASEAN Way and positive security developments can be made verifiable. Later I into measurable components show that it is exactly the principles generally known as the ASEAN Way that have spread to East Asia.
According to the ASEAN declaration of 1967, its two main goals are economic development (growth, cultural development and social progress) and regional peace and stability. While this sounded very trivial, the developmentalist undertone of the declaration clearly contradicted the earlier revolutionary approach of some of the countries in the region, most distinctively Indonesia. It also contradicted the approaches of those Southeast Asian countries that did not join ASEAN, as well as the approaches of many other developing countries in the revolutionary 1960s. ASEAN practice has verified that these two objectives, economic development and regional stability, were the main goals of the organization. The latter objective was previously interpreted in an elitist manner almost identical with the stability of the regimes themselves, while after the democratization of much of Southeast Asia, peace and stability have attained new meanings, some of them now approaching the concept of human security.\footnote{ASEAN elitism during its first decades is best revealed by statements of the New ASEAN leaders who want to contrast the old elitist ASEAN with the New ASEAN. For example, Indonesia’s president Susilo Bambang Yudhyonon has gone public in saying that “[w]e have to listen to them [people] and that is actually the spirit of the ASEAN charter, where ASEAN should show that it is no longer elitist but cares for not only matters of government but also civil matters in all ASEAN nations”, cited in Abdussalam (2009).}

The principles of the ASEAN Declaration were further elaborated upon by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. The emphasis on non-interference was clear, as the three first principles out of the six somehow related to the principle. According to the TAC, ASEAN principles are the following:

- mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
- the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
- non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
- settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
- renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among the regimes.

Instead of intervening in problems and supporting conflicting parties against each other, the ASEAN approach has been to allow the states to deal with their problems, even if this is done by means of violent repression. According to Singapore’s former Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar (1997), “ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of ASEAN… Let us maintain it in the twenty-first century.”

There is qualitative research available on the impact of the principle of non-interference on the level of political action, and even if the desirability of this principle and the recent interpretations of it are under debate, scholars are relatively unanimous that during the first decades of ASEAN, the principle has managed to translate into reality. ASEAN is still unanimous about the minimum conditions of non-interference: ASEAN countries should not use troops to support rebels or other countries that are in conflict with the government of another ASEAN state. Before the ASEAN declaration

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32 For a view that the principle will survive political practice, see, for example, Ramcharan (2000). For the view that it is about to, and should, change, see Kao Kim Hourn (2000). Both scholars accept the fact that non-interference has been an important principle that has also in reality guided the work of ASEAN countries.
such support was common, as exemplified by the Malaysian confrontation and several colonial and post-colonial struggles.

If one looks at conflict statistics, it is clear that the tendency to hesitate in taking a stance in favor of rebels in another country’s internal conflict has been translated into actual reality: there has not been a single case of one ASEAN country using troops to support an organization fighting the government of another ASEAN country. Out of 139 conflict dyads (years of conflict between two conflicting parties) between ASEAN countries and their domestic challengers, there has not been a single dyad where another ASEAN country has supported the rebel side with troops. While there are no reliable statistics on economic support to rebels, it seems that aside from Malaysia’s safe haven for Pattani and Aceh rebels, and probable Indonesian safe havens for Pattani, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaaf Group soldiers, there have been no clear cases of either voluntary economic or political support for rebels fighting an ASEAN government. It seems that, in addition to not supporting rebels in other ASEAN countries, ASEAN countries have not in general been eager to support rebels in countries outside of ASEAN. The original members have not, for example, participated in Burma/Myanmar’s conflicts with its ethnic and political opposition. This explains why Burma/Myanmar has been able to focus on its domestic enemy without the fear of external involvement. Before joining ASEAN, current ASEAN countries had supported insurgents in 29 Southeast Asian conflict dyads. The support by US allies of counterrevolutionaries in Indochina is a prominent example registered also by the Uppsala data, but the Indonesian military action against Malaysia soon after the Azhari revolt of December 1962 should also be seen as an example of support of the insurgents of fellow Southeast Asian regimes.
In promoting peace and stability, the strategy of ASEAN has not been to address problems head-on. To use Deutsch’s (Deutsch et al. 1955) terms, ASEAN has an element of a “no-war community”, which, rather than resolving conflicts, just avoids them. The long Jakarta Process related to the management of disputed territories in the South China Sea exemplifies this very well, as this process contributed to the avoidance of war but did not even try to resolve the sovereignty disputes. However, this does not necessarily mean that ASEAN would not aim at the permanent end of war from the Southeast Asian side (as the original concept of a “no-war community” assumes), but instead, cooperation for long-term peace has focused on building the constructs that unite the nations, so that interests for peace would permanently become stronger than interests of war. Amitav Acharya (2000: 18) tried to prove the utility of ASEAN as an emerging security community, not simply as a myopic “no-war community”. However, I would maintain that Acharya’s argument did not consider all options. Even though a “simple, no-war community” might not seem durable, a community that does not resolve disputes can also transform conflict structures and thereby permanently remove the risk of wars. This is the type of security community that I see in ASEAN. The fact that ASEAN does not resolve conflicts while still addressing long-term needs of conflict transformation was acknowledged even by Michael Leifer (1996), who did not otherwise see a lot of value in ASEAN. Thus, instead of conflict resolution, the focus of this approach has been to “try to build up something that unites us, and cope [note: not resolve, but cope] with all the problems that separate us.”33 According to Narine (2002: 31) and Askander, Bercovitch and Oishi (2002), conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues (such as territorial disputes) and compartmentalizing issues so that they

33 President Fidel Ramos, quoted in Djiwandono (1994: 49).
do not hamper diplomacy and trade. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way aims at downplaying — by means of disallowing public debate — the divisive issues for the sake of harmony. This approach of not getting involved in difficult issues resonates with the approach of not getting involved in other countries’ wars.

Again, the approach of not focusing on disputes and problems, but instead just working for common interests is clearly reflected in the ASEAN peace-making record. The number of cases in which conflict has been terminated is low — only 18 — because of the difficulty in tackling these conflicts. Less than 13% of the conflicts in ASEAN have been terminated, while the global figure is almost double that (21%). However, the special character of the ASEAN Way and the effort to shy away from divisive political disputes shows in the rarity of peace agreements (Svensson 2011). Only once or has a conflict been ended by a peace agreement (Aceh Memorandum of Understanding in 2005), while globally, 14% of terminated conflicts end in a peace agreement. The share of peace agreements dropped from 14% (seven successful peace agreements) to 6% with Southeast Asian countries joining ASEAN. The numerable efforts to resolve the Malaysian Confrontation by inviting external help and explicitly focusing on the disputes in the talks of Manila (July–August 1963), Bangkok (February 1964) and Tokyo (June 1964) clearly demonstrate that the Southeast Asian tendency of not focusing on divisive issues did not exist before the emergence of ASEAN. In the ASEAN Way, conflicts are terminated without settling the divisive political disputes. Here the dominant manner of terminating conflicts clearly does not involve any focus on the conflict as such (not even a ceasefire), but simply allows the conflict to fizzle away by means of inaction. Over three quarters of terminated ASEAN conflicts end this way, thus testifying to the effectiveness of tackling conflicts indirectly by not directly
touching upon any of the conflict-causing issues. Indonesia’s conflict episodes with separatist Acehnese and Papuans before the Henry Dunant Centre and Helsinki Process in Aceh were all terminated this way, as were many of those conflicts in Myanmar involving ethnic minorities (many of these episodes with Karen groups) which did not end in ceasefires. Less than half (22 out of 49) of Southeast Asia’s conflicts were terminated in this way before nations joined ASEAN, but within ASEAN, this form of conflict termination became prominent.

Instead of focusing on head-on disputes, ASEAN countries have focused on building conditions of order and peace. The common ASEAN commitment to economic development, ‘ASEAN developmentalism’, is often mentioned as the main tool in constructing a harmonious ASEAN community of nations. This was not the case before ASEAN. According to President Sukarno, for example, ‘Indonesian people can take everything for the sake of revolution’.

After the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia’s new president, General Suharto, silenced any voices advocating policies that did not serve economic development. This economic emphasis quickly became the founding principle of the new ASEAN cooperation. Developmentalism has three kinds of plausible conflict effects:

1. Conflict fatalities might have declined because economic roots of intra-state conflicts were now dealt with by means of development.
2. Inter-state conflict declined as states no longer needed to seek legitimacy from expansionist and adventurist revolution.

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35 For the view that developmentalism still is important in ASEAN and in East Asia, see Beeson 2008. For an opposing view, see Dittmer 2007: 829–833.
3. Focus on development might have created a sense of positive interdependence that positively affected the relations between states and peoples.\textsuperscript{36}

These plausible mechanisms in which developmentalism generates peaceful policies will be discussed right after this chapter.

Consensual decision-making involving maximum efforts to save face for everybody involved characterizes the diplomatic approach of ASEAN. This can be done in a) lengthy negotiations and b) quiet, c) non-legalistic, d) personal e) confidence-building aimed at f) gradual down-playing and prevention (or sometimes resolution) of disputes g) by means that can be accepted unanimously, h) by using the principle of the lowest common denominator.\textsuperscript{37} The idea of seeking consensus, no matter how watered-down and no matter how much time and personal persuasion it takes, overrules any attempt at majority decision-making.

All this is reflected in conflict statistics in the disappearance of conflict terminations by victory. Since the ASEAN Way is about avoiding loss of face, it rules out the forcing of one’s opponents to capitulate, and this is also what the statistics show.

\textsuperscript{36} As will be shown in Chapter 4, developmentalism did not necessarily mean objective development or interdependence. It seems that at least the Philippines and Myanmar have not developed as fast as the rest of the world during their membership in ASEAN, while new members of Indochina developed faster before than after joining ASEAN.

Not a single victory has been recorded in ASEAN countries, compared to the situation before joining ASEAN, when 11 out of 49 terminated conflicts, or 22%, ended in that way.\(^\text{38}\) To some extent, the decline of conflict termination by victory conforms to the global pattern, but at the same time, the global decline is less drastic and, as a matter of fact, during the past three decades the global share of conflicts ended by victories has been 22%.

In summary, the ASEAN Way of managing conflicts can be presented in the following manner:

1. Conflicts are managed by honoring the sovereignty and non-interference of other ASEAN countries. While Jones (2012) has shown that this principle has not been consistent on all levels of interference, it has been consistent on the highest levels of interference: intervention with military forces. ASEAN countries have not supported rebels in conflict with military force.\(^\text{39}\) This is unique compared to the situation in the pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia and in other parts of the world, too.

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\(^{38}\) Indonesia defeated the anti-communist Darul Islam revolt (1959–62) and the separatist campaign of the “Republic of Southern Maluku”, while Malaya managed to defeat its communist challengers (until 1960) and the Azhari Revolt (1962). Myanmar defeated the Mon resistance, and made a ceasefire with the New Mon State Party just before joining ASEAN, and the Vietnam–US War ended in the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975.

\(^{39}\) Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand contributed troops to the International Force for East Timor, which came to pacify the pro-Indonesian militias that refused to accept the result of the East Timor referendum for independence. Despite the tense situation, and despite the linkages between the militia and the Indonesian military, the INTERFET was not a force that challenged the Indonesian rule, as Indonesia had on its own promised to respect the result of the referendum that eventually lead to the independence of East Timor. Uppsala/PRIO conflict datasets do not classify this conflict as direct military interference.
2. The formula for ASEAN peace has been based on a strategy that does not focus on conflict issues. This has been reflected in low levels of conflict termination and a high share of conflicts being terminated by no visible action, and a low share of conflicts terminated by peace agreements. This, too, is unique when compared to pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia and to other parts of the world.

3. Downplaying conflict the ASEAN Way is a developmentalist approach. This element of the ASEAN Way is reflected in public discourses emphasizing development. The subjective valuation of economic growth differs from pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia, as well as from other parts of the developing world of the 1960s.

4. Finally, the ASEAN diplomatic style avoids situations where one of the conflicting parties could lose face, and thus it is reflected in a conflict termination record with a low frequency of defeat to one of the parties.

**East Asia and the ASEAN Way**

The four characteristics of the ASEAN Way were also adopted by East Asian states around 1979. The first of the four characteristics of the ASEAN Way was the adoption of the Westphalian idea of the recognition of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference and non-support for forces fighting governments of other East Asian nations. This change as a rhetorical principle began in East Asia at the end of the 1970s and translated into a course of action in which especially China stopped its subversive support to regional communist insurgencies gradually, and the US and its allies stopped their direct military support against counterrevolutionary groups. All of the East Asian
nations interpreted the agent structure of East Asian security as one dominated by states in a same manner despite power political rivalries, conflicts of interest and ideological differences in domestic approaches.

In East Asia literature, the prominence of the principle of military non-interference in East Asian diplomacy is not disputed. The debate is more one of whether these principles will or should dominate inter-state relations in the future. Amitav Acharya’s theories on the emerging East Asian security community do not seem to suggest that this cluster of principles will be seriously threatened, while according to some, non-interference will not play a central role in future East Asia diplomacy. Yet, regardless of different interpretations of the role of the non-interference principle, no one seems to be claiming that the principle of avoiding support with troops to rebels that are fighting against another East Asian government (minimal non-interference) has been compromised.

If one looks at the change from the viewpoint of conflict statistics, it is seen that before 1979, East Asian States were engaged in 35 conflict dyads after the Second World War in which they supported – with military troops – the enemy (domestic or international) of another East Asian state. China’s support of various communist groups and allied Western support against communist-nationalists, especially in the context of Indochina wars and the Korean War, were the dominant forms of external interference in internal conflicts. However, after 1979 this stopped, and there was no longer a single dyad in which one East Asian State lent military support to an enemy of another East Asian state. This cannot be explained as a global trend, since in the rest of the world,

\footnote{See for example, Acharya 2004b.}

\footnote{Chalermplanunupap 2009. The author was special assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN}
there have been 27 conflict dyads involving external support for groups fighting a
government, constituting a decline (from pre-1980 to post-1979 periods) of only 35%.
The total support of military non-interference promoted by the ASEAN Way seems to
characterize post-1979 East Asia, too.

However, until the end of the 1980s, China did sponsor some communist parties
in East Asian countries economically and politically, while the pro-US members of the
ASEAN gave some support to Khmer rouge in the 1980s to oppose the power of
Vietnam (and Soviet Union) in the region. Yet this support never meant direct support
by troops as the Uppsala and PRIO conflict data corroborates. There are no reliable
statistics on lower levels of support of insurgents, except for the fact that the Chinese
support of the Burmese Communist Party contributed to a great deal of conflict in
Burma until 1987. However, after that China ceased this support, and by the end of the
1980s, neither China nor any other East Asian state supported any group fighting
another East Asian state. Thus, from this perspective, the approach of East Asia was
very similar to that adopted in Southeast Asia on the establishment of ASEAN.

The principle of non-interference indicated by the statistics of non-support for
enemies of neighboring countries also had some declaratory expressions. As in
Southeast Asia earlier, the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation also
became central to East Asian diplomacy, and therefore the formal adoption of the
document as the foundation of ASEAN-led cooperation was not difficult. The close
similarity between the East and Southeast Asian approaches was also emphasized by the
ease with which the ASEAN-based institutions – ASEAN Dialogue mechanisms,
ASEAN Plus Three, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, The Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, etc. – were adopted in East Asian diplomacy.
While efficient in the prevention of violent conflict, this common approach and orientation was not particularly suited for the prevention of authoritarian violence in Southeast Asia or in East Asia, as the experiences of Tiananmen Square in 1989, transitional violence in Indonesia in 1965–67 and the last years of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines from 1981–86 testify. Yet also authoritarian violence declined as was statistically shown in the previous chapter. Thus, ASEAN and East Asian profiles of pacification were, in this respect, very similar. East Asia was not very efficient in resolving conflicts either, as can be seen in the continuing high number of militarized disputes (see Chapter 6 of this book). The record of East Asian conflict termination after 1979, therefore, is also quite similar to that in ASEAN.

The patterns of conflict management in East Asia have also changed along lines similar to those in ASEAN. Disputes and divisive issues are not tackled directly. As in the case of ASEAN, slightly more conflicts are being terminated in post-1979 than in pre-1979 East Asia. In addition the new approach to conflict termination is very similar both in ASEAN and in East Asia. What is surprising is that in neither of these areas was conflict terminated by resolving the dispute behind the violence. Only 3% (one case: Aceh peace agreement)\(^{42}\) of terminated conflicts have ended in a peace agreement in

\(^{42}\)While the termination of conflict in East Timor in 1998 was previously classified in the category “other types of termination”, the newest Uppsala data suggests that also this conflict was terminated in a peace process. Even though East Timor is not part of the ASEAN it is part of East Asia and thus the ruling is relevant. An important role in the termination of this conflict was played by the international intervention, but yet, the process did not involve a humiliating victory over Indonesia, because it did involve some peace negotiation (under some kind of military pressure). If the case can be ruled as a peace negotiation process, the share of peace negotiations in the newest version of termination data rises to 5%. This weakens the conclusion on the disappearance of peace negotiation, but does not seriously challenge it.
post-1979 East Asia, while the percentage before 1979 was 16 (7 cases out of 48 terminated conflicts). The “disappearance of peace agreements” in East Asia and in ASEAN is special and cannot be explained away by referring to global trends. It seems that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a method of terminating conflicts has increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979 averages to post-1979 averages. Clearly, reluctance to focus on politically divisive issues is common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia. This also testifies to the fact that East Asia has followed the ASEAN Way in its transformation. The tackling of difficult political issues has become less important for conflict termination in East Asia as well, just as had happened previously within ASEAN.

The developmentalist path of ASEAN was eventually adopted by the entire East Asia about a decade later. The transformation of China into a developmentalist state after more than a decade of a power battle between developmentalist and revolutionist forces happened at the time when Japan and Korea were developing their doctrines of comprehensive security in the latter half of the 1970s. Economic grievances were explicitly tackled, while revolutionary discourses blaming others for the lack of economic performance (diversionary discourses) became unpopular. Development became the prime declared objective and rationale for states, and the rationales of nationalism and revolution were put in the back seat. Subjective focus on development

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43 All of them were in Southeast Asia. However after 1979 peace agreements cannot be found in those countries that were not yet ASEAN members, while before 1979 there were plenty of peace agreements in those countries.

44 For this development, see, for example, Lo 2001. For analysis that associates developmentalism with East Asia in a more global investigation, see Robinson and White, eds., 1998. For analysis that argues for the link between East Asian development and success in conflict prevention, see Goldsmith 2007: 5–27.
also translated into impressive objective economic progress with the exception of North Korea, Burma/Myanmar and the Philippines (arguably the three most violent East Asian countries).

Finally, it seems that the priority of saving face has also been adopted from the ASEAN Way by East Asian governments. The effort to defeat ones enemies no longer belongs to the code of conduct. Instead, efforts are made to at least try to conceal victory by offering ceasefire agreements to the losing side. While the share of victories out of all conflict terminations in East Asia declined from twelve (out of 48) to three (out of 37 terminated conflicts) after 1979, the pattern was the same, but less drastic than in ASEAN, where victories disappeared entirely. Although this corresponds to the global pattern to some extent, it is clear that both East Asia and ASEAN declines were more drastic, and in the end the share of victories declined to a much lower level than the global one. While the global share of victories declined to one half compared to the share before 1980, it remained at 22% in the post-1979 situation, whereas in ASEAN victories had disappeared totally and their share in East Asia was less than 9% (the share has declined to one third of what it was before 1980).

**Consequences of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN and in East Asia**

The claim that the ASEAN Way may be the reason behind East Asian pacification seems to be supported by a comparison of East Asian approaches to security after 1979 and the ASEAN Way. However, the argument also requires that the consequences of this approach are similar. Both areas have to be successful, and the profile of their successes has to be similar: they have to be successful in similar issues and perhaps less successful in other similar issues.
The first issue when looking at the outcomes of East Asian and ASEAN security approaches is that the similar approaches used by the original ASEAN members since 1967, the late-comers since 1995, 1997 and 1999 and East Asia since 1979 have managed to reduce battle deaths and conflicts causing casualties in both places. In both cases, success has been measured by the ability to avoid conflict escalation, and, to a lesser extent, by the ability to prevent disputes from turning violent. The success of the ASEAN Way has definitely not been a question of the ability to avoid or resolve disputes. As I have shown elsewhere (Kivimäki 2008) by using the statistics of the number of conflicts and militarized interstate disputes, the number of militarized disputes was not reduced substantially despite the reduced number of battle deaths and conflicts.

In terms of the type of violence, it seems that the ASEAN Way has especially managed to prevent inter-state conflicts. In the case of ASEAN, there has been no interstate conflict involving more than 25 casualties per year between two ASEAN members, despite the fact that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization.45 This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially after 1987.

The success of ASEAN peace can be seen in the difference between conflicts (Table 3.1.) and battle deaths (Table 3.2.) before and after joining the organization. We can see in Table 3.2. that the number of battle deaths has not decreased systematically on joining ASEAN, as both Thailand and the Philippines have had more battle deaths.

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45 There is some disagreement about this with regard to the recent clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. However the generally conservative and restrictive (only direct battle deaths) estimates of the PRIO and Uppsala statistics, this dispute did not escalate into conflict levels (at least 25 fatalities in a single year).
per year after joining ASEAN. For Thailand, this is explained by the continuation of the Vietnam-US War and the instability, which spilled from it over to the Thai side. The decline in conflict fatalities in Thailand was delayed because of that. However, all in all, the average annual number of casualties that ASEAN nations have experienced compared to what they had earlier is just 8.3% as Table 3.2 shows.  

---

It is clear that the Vietnam–US War had a great influence on the difference between ASEAN and pre-ASEAN violence. Yet, even if we subtract the effect, not only of the great Vietnam–US War from 1965 until the mid-1970s, but of all Vietnamese wars (and there have not been wars in Vietnam after the country joined ASEAN), the difference would still be great. Without all Vietnamese conflicts, the number of ASEAN battle deaths has still been reduced to just 35% compared to the time before the countries joined ASEAN.
Table 3.1: Number of conflict dyads before and after joining ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of conflicts</th>
<th>Annual average</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before joining</td>
<td>As ASEAN member</td>
<td>As ASEAN member</td>
<td>Decline %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>-347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Number of battle deaths before and after joining ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of fatalities</th>
<th>Annual average</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before joining</td>
<td>As ASEAN member</td>
<td>As ASEAN member</td>
<td>Decline %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>223,209</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>4,292</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The decrease in the number of battle deaths between ASEAN countries cannot be seen as a global or a regional trend, but must be seen as something specific to ASEAN countries. In fact, as Graph 4.1 demonstrates, ASEAN is an exception even in its own area, where the number of battle deaths was on the rise at the same time that ASEAN countries experienced increasing peace. Global (excluding East Asia and ASEAN) numbers of annual battle deaths increased substantially after the establishment of ASEAN as well as after 1979, and did not start to decline before 1992.

**Graph 3.1. Battle deaths in Southeast Asia**
The emergence of the ASEAN Way is also associated with a reduction in the number of conflict dyads that claim lives (Table 3.1). Again, the pattern is not without exceptions: Thailand and the Philippines had more conflict years after joining ASEAN than before while there is no clear change in Indonesia. Yet concerning the average annual number of conflicts involving ASEAN all countries dropped from 9 to 5, 43% of the earlier figure. This is convincing, but not as convincing as the decline in the number of battle deaths.

However, it seems that the most drastic ASEAN contribution in Southeast Asia is to interstate relations. ASEAN members have not yet fought a single war, despite the fact that they were often in conflict before their memberships.
Table 3.3: Inter-state conflict and the ASEAN Way

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All conflict dyads</th>
<th>Conflicts with future ASEAN member</th>
<th>Conflicts with ASEAN member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern has been the same in all of East Asia. The fact that the number of battle deaths fell more drastically than conflicts can be seen by comparing Graph 3.1 on page 00 with Graph 3.3.
To make the presentation comparable with that of ASEAN peace, we can also calculate the average numbers of battle deaths for the period from the Second World War to 1979 and compare it with the average number of battle deaths from 1980 to 2005.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that the number of battle deaths dropped rather drastically in all but two East Asian countries, the Philippines and Thailand. The average decrease was even more drastic than that among ASEAN countries. The average number of annual battle deaths per population, we will realize that both the Philippines and Thailand have become more peaceful, as the battle deaths per population have gone down by 37% and 27% respectively. The average annual number of battle deaths for the entire East Asia has declined by 97% rather than 95% if the increase of region’s population is controlled for.
average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia after 1979 fell by 95% compared to that before 1979 (while the drop in ASEAN countries after membership was “just” 92%). At the same time, the average national number of conflicts after 1979 was 72% of the levels up until 1979. Thus, common to ASEAN and East Asia was the decrease in the number of conflicts and the even more drastic decrease in the number of battle deaths.

Table 3.4: Number of conflicts in East Asia before and after 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of conflicts Before 1980</th>
<th>Number of conflicts After 1979</th>
<th>Annual average Before 1980</th>
<th>Annual average After 1979</th>
<th>Decline %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnams</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5: Number of fatalities in East Asian conflicts before and after 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of fatalities</th>
<th>Annual average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before 1980</td>
<td>After 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>179,748</td>
<td>47,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>320,062</td>
<td>52,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,265,703</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>93,079</td>
<td>53,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>30,108</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>13,212</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreas</td>
<td>995,384</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>45,867</td>
<td>42,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4,465</td>
<td>4,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnams</td>
<td>2,027,722</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,975,395</td>
<td>203,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While ASEAN’s most spectacular achievement was that of ending conflicts between member states, the trend was the same in East Asia. There has been only one inter-state war since 1979 in East Asia (China–Vietnam 1987), with something between 300 and 4000 battle deaths, while before 1979, China alone was involved in 13 interstate war
dyads with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and India with a total of almost 140,000 battle deaths, and the Koreas fought five war dyads with almost 1.3 million casualties.

The explanation in East Asia is neither a global trend nor a pacification of a greater region. While the number of East Asian battle deaths dropped by 95%, the global average excluding the East Asian figures increased 2.8 times. The number of East Asian battle deaths as a percentage of the global number clearly shows that East Asia is outstanding in its pacification. As was seen in table 3.5 East Asian share of global conflict fatalities has dropped from 76% to 6%.

Conclusions

It seems that the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to those of ASEAN after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts has also been very similar. The ASEAN Way is, indeed, practiced in post-1979 East Asia, and the developments in the realm of security after the adoption of this approach are the same. Thus it seems plausible that the origin of the long peace of East Asia could be found in the collectively shared approaches and orientations known as the ASEAN Way. There is a need to look at the various components of the “ASEAN Way” to see whether and how they contribute to the pacification of domestic governance and foreign relations before one can be sure that similar approaches and similar outcomes are not a result of intervening phenomena. However, the correlative relationship is there and the ASEAN Way is associated with success, also in the rest of East Asia.

48 The reason for presenting East Asian change as a graph and ASEAN change as a table is because different nations joined ASEAN at different times.
Since different elements of the ASEAN Way approach affect different phases of conflict differently, I shall structure my closer look at these elements chronologically. I shall study conflict onset, and the focus on things that unite, especially, developmentalism, as an approach to conflict prevention in Chapter 4. From conflict onset I shall, in Chapter 5, move to approaches to escalation once conflict has already started. The focus will be on the approach to how external powers are being allowed to be involved in the conflict. Chapter 6 will then take a look the termination of conflicts focusing on the question of face-saving and avoidance of victories in conflicts after 1979 on the one hand, and on the other, on the problem of the failure of conflict resolution in East Asia. After the closer look at the elements of the successful strategy of pacification of East Asia and the mechanisms that these elements used in the generation of the long peace, Chapter 7 will then look at the historical context in which this pacification was made possible, and in which the successful culture of conflict prevention was generated.
Chapter 4

Developmentalism and the Prevention of the Onset of Conflicts

Introduction

This chapter will look at the contribution of the approach that does not focus on disputes, but on development and its contribution to peace in East Asia. More accurately, at this stage I shall look at an identity of the state that has made the onset of conflicts less likely. Even though it was concluded in Chapter 2 that the main challenge that was solved after 1979 was the escalation of conflicts into wars, it is important also to examine how East Asia has managed to reduce the likelihood of the emergence of destructive conflicts and wars. Yet, since the prevention of escalation has been the main reason for success in East Asia since 1979, we must remember that the developmentalist identity and role of states as a way to tackle conflict onset, is of secondary importance, while the norm of non-interference, discussed in Chapter 5 is the primary reason for the long peace of East Asia.

As suggested in Chapter 3, the main ASEAN Way of avoiding the onset of the war is by focusing on things that unite, economic development being the core of concern. The East Asian strategy of avoiding the onset of conflict has been based on defining economic development (rather than revolution, expansion, national pride etc.) as the main task regimes and as the main identity of states. This strategy based on development-identity of states I will call “developmentalism”.

While non-interference (Chapter 5) is clearly a regional orientation (individual countries cannot prevent intervention if others do not subscribe to the norm of non-interference), developmentalism is possible locally. Indonesia, for example has been
focused on development already since 1967, while Burma/Myanmar was not much interested in anything but national security and regime survival until only recently. Thus the impact of developmentalism can be identified by means of inter-state comparisons and the number of battle deaths in one country during its developmentalist and non-developmentalist phases.

It was claimed in Chapter 3 that developmentalism and dispute aversion were something that ASEAN adopted upon its establishment, while the rest of East Asia followed the suit more than a decade later. However, if the contribution of the focus on things that unite, especially development, is analyzed in detail, it will be possible to make more detailed conclusions on the level of commitment to uniting development at different times in different countries. I shall in the beginning look at how the big wars were related to developmentalism and harmony thinking, and how these orientations were related to the onset of peaceful periods. I shall also look at how developmentalism relates to intra- and inter-state conflicts. Before all of this, though, I shall briefly look at existing the literature on the association between developmentalism and peace and then review how developmentalism has developed in East Asia over the years in different countries. I shall develop a simple additive scale of the commitment of regimes and constituencies to development as a unifying focus of East Asian states and then use that scale for the comparisons.

Since I am not studying the region in its entirety, but instead comparing nations in it for their peacefulness and for their commitment to development, it makes sense to take battle deaths per population as the main indicator of peacefulness (instead of looking at battle deaths without adjusting them into the population of the state). Comparing Singapore’s peacefulness with China’s peacefulness would not make sense
without controlling the influence of population size in the analysis. Thus instead of average and actual annual numbers of conflict related fatalities, I shall adjust the number of battle deaths to population by dividing each year’s actual number by the population divided by million. Thus the conflict indicator shows how many fatalities there are for each million people.

The relationship between an approach of states towards others or towards their citizens, to focus on things that unite rather than divide, and the peacefulness of these states, is not entirely exogenous. One could, for example, say that fighting wars obviously focuses on divisive things. Yet it is not empirically trivial to say that peace strategy can be focused on problem-solving, which again focuses on divisive issues, or on harmony, which focuses on things that unite. Here, too, as will be in the case with interference and conflict escalation (Chapter 5) and in the analysis of East Asian face saving in conflict termination (Chapter 6), I need to look at an association that despite its partial endogenousness is empirically interesting.

**Previous Work**

In the theory of negotiation and dispute resolution, an approach that neglects the divisive issue of dispute has been almost unanimously disapproved until the 1990s and the emergence of the idea of conflict transformation. While the traditional security studies were focused on strategies to contain enemy aggression by means of power and deterrence, peace research has taken a more conciliatory approach by focusing on efforts to resolve disputes that lie behind the aggressive behavior of conflicting parties. The crucial role of dispute resolution and the focusing on the divisive issue of disputes in peace research can be seen in the fact that one of the two main peace research
journals reveals in its name, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, the centrality of the research on resolution for the discipline. To counter the harmony approach of not focusing on divisive issues such as disputes, Louis Kriesberger (1998) distinguished between constructive conflict (argument that raises the divisive problem issues) from the violent and destructive one. In the similar vein William Ury (2008) introduced the concept “positive no”, an approach, where yielding to unacceptable terms of interaction is negative, while confronting ones collaborator and not accepting terms that constrain the relationship is more positive to the relationship. While there are no empirical studies verifying that such an approach would be useful in intra-state or inter-states relations, the idea of favoring active problem-focus in conflict prevention is widely accepted. The experience of East Asia seems to raise a doubt to this: perhaps excessive focusing on problems and disputes can sometimes construct a reality where interaction is dominated by divisive rather than uniting issues.

Only in the literature of the 1990s on the so-called conflict transformation (see for example Väyrynen 1991) is it recognized that a single-minded focus on disputes might not be an optimal strategy for conflict prevention. In some cases structures can be transformed into more peaceful ones even without having to resolve any disputes. One of the structural avenues of peaceful change is the development of positive economic interdependence, the so-called liberal or capitalist peace. Regardless of the severity of disputes, positive interdependence can make them look smaller in comparison with the common interests of development. Kristian Gleditsch has found that whenever countries lack a motive for territorial expansion and they have a continued interest in serving and protecting a given population, then conflict is rare among developed countries especially if they are geographically clustered (Gleditsch 2003). The level of
development has also been found to be a qualifying variable for peace between
each other only if they are developed. Gartske confirms this by discovering that the
level of development (as measured by GNP per capita) is not significantly associated
with inter-state peacefulness. Thus development has been found relevant for peace, but
only as one of the components. Its impact is dependent on the existence of other
conditions. Another strand of research emphasizes the type of economic development
and says that contract-intensive development typical of “advanced capitalism” appears
to cause peace (Mousseau 2009). Mousseau’s analysis also moves towards a more
constructivist direction by explaining the relationship between contract-intensive
capitalism and peace by referring to the peace-inducing norms that advanced capitalism
socializes to states and citizens. Development no longer causes peace as an objective
condition, but instead, the relationship is more complex, and some would say less
exogenous. Even if the claim is not as tautological as “civilized, contract-oriented
peaceful capitalist countries are peaceful”, the relationship is more along the lines of
generative causality than strict Humean, objective causality.

While the theory of capitalist peace usually refers to inter-state peace, development
is also associated to intra-state peace. Here the association is less qualified:
development is good for peace in general. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2002), for
example, the level of development substantially raises the threshold of violence and
contributes to the removal of frustration motives for violence.

One of the most powerful regional arguments in favor of the positive impact of
development on peace in Asia has been presented by Benjamin E. Goldsmith (2007),
who showed the clear association between capitalist (trade) interdependence-based
development between the Asian states and their likelihood of peacefulness in intra-Asian inter-state relations. According to Goldsmith Asian capitalist peace has regional differences. Asian conflict trends tend to be less associated to democracy than the global patterns while they also seem to be more associated with international capitalism. Goldsmith’s focus was on objective structures of economic interdependence in Asia, rather than some socially constructed or development-specific realities.

A more constructivist version of Goldsmith’s, and Collier and Hoeffler’s objectivist analyses has been presented by Amitav Acharya, who claims that East Asian and ASEAN peace is institutional, normative and identitive, and that material development follows the social constructions rather than the other way around (Acharya 2001). This is the argument of the present book, too: the ASEAN Way approach leads to peace and material changes that then also consolidate peace. Ba (2009) has emphasized the role of socialization in East Asian conflict prevention, while Acharya (2001) and Jetly (2003) underline the importance of endogenous norms and their effect in reducing violence. Developmentalism as subjective valuation of economic development has been suggested as the reason for the long peace of ASEAN (Kivimäki 2001). Instead of assuming like objectivists, that material wealth reduces objective grievances and thus affects motives of violence, the process to peace for constructivists is more direct. Once states are identified as instruments for development, and once development becomes the main objective of rulers and citizens destructive wars, intra- and inter-state, become unattractive, regardless of whether the states are successful in promoting prosperity. This logic applies both to intra- and inter-state wars: if the people and leaders appreciate development they will try to avoid both internal and interstate wars. Thus the constructivist explanation of capitalist peace is applicable for the explanation of the long
peace of East Asia, which is mostly related to the ending of wars between East Asian countries, but also to the decline in the number of battle deaths in intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, if states and citizens prioritize development, they have to cooperate and develop contacts with one another. East Asian identity and the density and quality of interaction between East Asian countries (Tan and Cossa 2001; Acharya 2001) have been emphasized in the constructivist explanations of capitalist peace in East Asia.

It can be argued that constructed relationships between developmentalist preferences, identities and policies can be tested by measurable proxies. Even if the measurement of associations between two phenomena cannot prove exogenous, objective relationships (since the relationship between common liberal interdependence and peace can be a result of our belief that other capitalist countries are our friends), one can still falsify, or at least cast doubt on claims on the existence of exogenous cause–effect relationships by referring to correlative relationships that are inconsistent with the picture of objectivist explanations of liberal/capitalist peace in East Asia. The use of observable proxies is the strategy of this chapter even if the argument will be that in liberal/capitalist peace of East Asia I am talking about a partly endogenous relationship between developmentalism and peace where the “independent variable” is not conceptually entirely independent of the dependent variable. In my investigation of the contribution of developmentalism in the long peace of East Asia, I shall also show how development, rather than commitment to development, seems like a less credible explanation for the long peace of East Asia.

**Developmentalism**
Objective *level of development* refers to a condition where the incomes are high and poverty is low. *Development*, in turn, means that there is progress towards a higher level of development. The fundamental difference between objective development and *developmentalism* is the fact that the latter exists only in the minds of people while the former can be measured in studies as an objective outcome of policies. If people ceased to value development, developmentalism would disappear, but development and the level of development, as growth and per capita income would persist.

On the one hand, developmentalism is an attitude (by the regime) that sees the promotion of liberal economic development and poverty reduction as one of the main tasks of the state, while on the other, it is an orientation (of the people) where the legitimacy of the state is seen crucially dependent on the performance of the national economy. Developmentalism is an orientation and a discourse rather than a result of a policy and thus it cannot be measured by observing the outcomes of actual economic policies of the state (even though it is highly likely that without developmentalism it is difficult to produce economic growth). Economic policies reflect developmentalist orientation regardless of whether this developmentalism leads to actual developmental outcomes or not.

Despite the fact that developmentalism cannot be measured by looking at the end result, development, developmentalism is goal oriented. It has to look at the experience and learn from it in order to maximize economic growth. Developmentalism is not an ideological attitude where rhetoric of development never meets the empirical test of material reality. Development portrays sometimes frequently in states official rhetoric, but only as an ideological concept. Mao’s great leap forward was launched as a development-oriented effort, even though the ultimate objective of it (even in the
rhetoric) was not growth but ideologically oriented transformation from agricultural economy to communism (Perkins 1991). However, what it lacked for that period to qualify as a developmentalist period was an effort to look at observed results rather than deriving beliefs about development and what brings about it from the doctrine. To some degree developmentalism, therefore, also means some kind of rationality with regards to an attitude that is open towards evidence on success and failure (as opposed to the attitude of Pol Pot or the Gang of Four who derived their experience of the economy from the doctrine).\(^{49}\)

Analysis in this section takes its departure from the literature on developmentalism (Beeson 2009; Doner et. al. 2005). However, there are two important exceptions. The existing literature does not differentiate between objective development achievements and subjective orientation towards development. Unlike in the literature on developmental state, in our definition, developmentalist state need not assume a central role in development, just as long it prioritizes development.

Developmentalism can be either equitable (aiming at poverty reduction) or non-equitable (aiming at general growth), but it cannot focus of development of the regime only. Cleptocratic orientation of the regime is not developmentalist even if it does aim at economic benefits of the regime itself. Yet, developmentalism does not necessarily mean an administration free from corruption. In some cases, developmentalism has been interpreted as originating in the business interests of the military, or the political elite, but if the partisan economic interests of the elite are compatible with the economic

\(^{49}\) More on this discussion in Chapter 7.
interests of the people or the national economy in general, obsession to develop, with a hidden corrupt agenda, should still be seen as developmentalism.

Developmentalism should be seen as an approach where security-related priorities do not have such primacy that they would consider economic priorities secondary. Security paranoia that makes countries willing to limit the flow of resources important for development substantially (as in Burma/Myanmar) or paranoia that values security much higher than beneficial trade relations (as in Sukarno’s anti-imperialist Indonesia of the 1960s) compromises the primacy of development.

With regards to domestic conflicts, developmentalism as a policy that recognizes the legitimacy of the economic grievances of rebel constituencies differs from security-obsessed policies that emphasize a military option for conflict areas. This way developmentalism is a softer option than militarism or legalism, and it is easy to see that it is not conceptually entirely separate from security, even though the successfulness of the hard military approach and the softer developmentalist approach are empirical questions.

With regards to foreign relations, developmentalism as a policy tries to avoid the damage to the economy from the deterioration of external relations. In this respect developmentalism as an approach is by definition also at least to some extent peaceful in intent. The relationship between developmentalism and peace is thus, especially in relation to inter-state warfare, endogenous. Furthermore, it is clear that developmentalism and peace are not associated just in a one-directional: developmentalist identity of the state does promote peace, but successful peaceful development also constitutes developmentalist state-identity.
For the quantitative analysis I will measure regimes and constituencies with a simple additive scale in accordance to the following criteria.

1. *Regimes and constituencies with no commitment to development*: Paranoid security concerns, ultra-nationalism, communism or democracy define the purpose of the state, leaving little or no room for utility maximizing economic policies. Such eras are characterized by policies that treat economic policies as an instrument of revolution, expression of national identity, or something else than economic development. The category of zero-commitment to developmentalism is wide, ranging from regimes that are still too occupied with national-building and national-revolutionary politics, or nations whose regime stability is so low that the leaders are unable to focus on any economic policies to regimes who systematically sabotage the nations’ economy. The extreme cases of Pol Pot and the last years of Sukarno, or some of the worst years of the Burmese Junta could deserve a category of their own: \(-1=\text{negative commitment to development}\). However, since the statistics of conflict fatalities during those regimes are unreliable, mostly due to the lack of good data on authoritarian one-sided violence (conflict against unarmed people) before 1989, the additional category would not manage to bring much new information. This is why the category 0 (=zero commitment to development) will be left wide.

2. *Regimes and constituencies with intermediate commitment to development*: A regime which is not alien to developmental priorities but is mostly preoccupied with something else could be classified as one with weak commitment to development. In the case of weakly committed regimes government texts mention development, but they often also mention political, religious or other
rationales that compromise developmental rationality. These overriding orientations could be revolutionary hesitance of accepting foreign involvement in a country’s economy, policies to promote one ethnic group in economic competition at the expense of developmentally rational competition, or strict rejection of trade with a politically compromising, yet economically vital trading partner. In this category of states the regime or the citizens do not consider the promotion of development as an important function of the state. Nationalist or revolutionary credentials, populist, developmentally hostile merits are more important in political competitions. Among the regimes with intermediate commitment to development, some have a stronger commitment than others. In these cases the regimes are mostly concerned by development priorities but do not define the mission of the state, and thus other priorities keep competing with development priorities in the official discourse, although developmental priorities are not in obvious contradiction of these priorities. Developmentalist credentials (commitment and full understanding of the functioning of the economy) offer political capital in political competition, but these merits are not in a dominant position. Due to the fact that it is simply impossible to establish objective criteria for the classification of intermediate commitment into weak and strong the two potential categories have been collapsed into just one category, intermediate commitment. This despite the fact that weak measuring will reduce the appearance of strength of the association between developmentalism and conflict in statistical analysis.

3. Developmentalist state: The most developmentalistic category of regimes/constituencies is one where political, ideological, religious and security
commitments are not in contradiction with the primacy of economic development. The government and the citizens see development as the main task of the state. Economic performance is the ultimate criterion for the success of a regime.

This classification is very rough and thus coding of nations into these categories does not need stricter quantitative coding criteria. Qualitative criteria presented above suffice. Evidence of commitment to development is very different in different countries and setting quantitative coding criteria that define where evidence has to be found for each nation could reduce subjectivity in coding, while at the same time it would also reduce common sense accuracy of coding decisions. In this sense coding in this chapter takes a relatively similar approach to the one taken for Polity data, which, as this coding, sets criteria for each category, but does not set quantitative coding criteria. Instead of assuming that it would be possible to analyze the discourses of different cultures by studying comparable documents by the state, I will opt for a meta-analysis strategy. I will code country years to the three categories by using the assessments of political discourses of each country in the central research literature. To reduce subjectivity we have presented the final coding results in two workshops and five East Asia specialists have carefully gone through them. Only rather few changes have been suggested to the coding rulings. The presentation of coding in this chapter makes the coding rulings very transparent to the readers who can then judge whether coding decisions have been accurate enough to warrant conclusions of this chapter.

The Classification of East Asian Regimes and the Degree of Commitment to Development

Regimes with Lacking Commitment to Development (I)
The various regimes of Burma/Myanmar have until recently not been much focused on development and their approach to stability has definitely never been emphasizing development as a remedy for conflicts. During the unitary democracy of the 1950s, political consideration was on political and ethnic issues, the political culture pushed rebels to demand self-determination rather than development, and the government made occasional compromises towards the rebels by promising measures of improving the self-expression of the rebel constituencies. According to Robert H. Taylor (2005: 12) economic development did not portray in the priorities of the state and on the level of citizens, economic survival strategies were sought together with fellow members of the race, rather than with the entire state. Thus instead of seeing the promotion of prosperity as the main function of the state, black market emerged as the backbone of the economy, including the funding of opposition movements.

Despite the differences in approach between the civilian, semi-democratic rule of the 1950s, and the military controlled rule and counter-insurgency approach after that, development never played a significant role in the government rhetoric of Burma/Myanmar until the late 1990s, while government approach were characterized by a negative commitment to development. Economy was to serve nationalist and security purposes in a system that emphasized the Burmanization of the economy regardless of what this did to economic growth (Cribb 2006: 736-7). The total subordination of the economic needs to political priorities could be seen in much of the military regimes policies, but it was best exemplified by the junta’s decision in the 1960s to declare the banknotes worth more than a certain amount invalid (Demonetization Law May 17, 1964). This measure was taken to combat economic crime, but it hit criminals and businessmen alike. Burmese military regimes destroyed
actively the economies of potential rebel constituencies and this policy also affected the national development. The doctrine of “four cuts”, introduced in the 1970s, is a good example of this approach: according to this rebel constituencies were cut from supplies, information, recruits and food, in order to weaken their military strength (Smith 1999). This is why I classify Burma/Myanmar until 1997 a country with a lacking commitment.

Not until the late 1990s, during the rise of General Khin Nyunt, did the rhetoric of development enter the regime’s thinking, despite the fact that military priorities still overruled many of the crucial economic rationales. In 1997 the regime, which was until then called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), reflecting the paranoid security rationales, was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). This, together with the acceptance to join the ASEAN, reveals a modest change in the identity and discourse of the state, even if part of this apparent change was needed merely for external branding of the regime (Taylor 2006: 15). The change does not constitute a fundamental transformation in the framing of the regime’s attitude towards development and counter-insurgency, but it does reveal the acceptance of the regime that it has to offer some economic benefits to its people. After 1997 the government started seriously working with some infrastructure projects, while at the same time focusing on falsifying the government’s economic statistics to show better results. The role of development (no longer just bribing of the ethnic leaders) in ceasefire agreements also suggest that development has become a more prominent source of government’s legitimacy in the 1990s.

The domination of the competition between communism and anti-communism in the Korean Peninsula probably justifies the classification of both Koreas into the zero-
development-commitment category in the 1940s and the 1950s. North Korea’s continuing commitment to the Songun principle of military primacy suggests that the military discourse still guides the country and that the military continues as the ‘supreme repository of power.’ Blending military primacy with a revolutionary identity demonstrated the weakness of economic priorities in the official discourse (Haggard and Noland 2007). The secondary role of economic development in the official discourse is expressed also in Juche ideology that adapts power-political maxim also to economic policy: political ideas of self-sufficiency rule even when they go against efficiency and international comparative advantage in economic policies (Cumings 2005). The peripheral priority of economic development and growth can be seen in the fact that an authoritative document on the Juche idea (Kim Jong Il 1982/1998) uses the concept ‘development’ 36 times, and only five times to refer to economic aspects of development, while only using the word ‘growth’ three times, not a single time referring to economic growth. The declared insensitivity of the North Korean government on development and economic side payments in nuclear negotiation completes the picture and rules the country to the same category of zero-commitment until today. As a nation that has been peaceful since 1953 and yet totally insensitive of development priorities, North Korea constitutes the main exception to the association between development orientation and peace.

At the same time as North Korea invented the discourse of Songun, South Korea started developing, after its strong political, anti-communist focus, into a developmentalist state. While national unification and the fight against communism had been the discourse that sets priorities in politics during the reign of Syngman Rhee, 1948-1960 (Rhee 2001), and while undoing the autocracy of the previous regime had
been the political priority of the interim period before the rule of Park Chung-hee, developmental priorities started to get prominence as an important part of anti-communism (Lee 2005). Already in 1961, South Korea could be coded as a country with interim commitment to democracy (but the primary focus on the politics of self-sufficiency limited Korea’s economic growth orientation), and in 1963 economic growth took such a dominant position in the identity of the state and documents produced by it, so that the country could already be labeled as developmentalist, despite the country’s still poor economic performance (Lee 2005).

A clear case of zero-commitment to development was demonstrated by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. The documents of economic planning were characterized by revolutionary zeal, rather than growth-oriented pragmatism (Chandler, Kiernan and Boua 1988), while policies reflected almost total disregard of the economy (Chandler 1999: 119-122) and economy’s subordination to the objectives of political development, especially collectivism (Locard 1996: 151-300). Arresting and killing of the entire educated population during Pol Pot were perhaps the clearest signs of the lack of commitment to economic priorities (Chandler 1999/2000: 123-129). The first decision to revive the economy after Pol Pot was to restart banking in the country at the end of 1979 and to reintroduce national currency in the beginning of the 1980s (Gottesman 2003). Before that, one could only talk about zero-commitment to development.

However, it seems that radical political decisions that were destructive to the economy were also made during the more radical period of Prince Sihanouk’s rule. For political reasons, Sihanouk refused to accept development cooperation and deeper economic interaction from its two biggest economic development partners, the United
States and Thailand. Furthermore, he nationalized trading companies, banks, insurance, and major industries, all moves that disregarded economic rationality for the sake of ideological priorities. Despite the fact that Sihanouk tried to get external development assistance from several sources, his action was derived from nation-building priorities and ideological doctrines (Osborne 1994). Thus we classify also his rule in the category of developmentalist zero-commitment. The rule of Lon Nol, despite its liberal reform and US aid, should likewise be classified as zero-commitment due to the fact that the political culture was so totally obsessed by militaristic paranoia and corrupt power play (Slocomb 2010).

The Soviet style revolutionary rule with little economic role for the state in Mongolia until the beginning of the democratic revolution in 1989 clearly qualifies the country into the category of states with no commitment to growth and economic development. It could be argued that the lack of commitment to economy by the state, together with international developments in the Soviet world, gave rise to the democratic revolution as elections and economic reforms were the main motives of the popular uprising (Rossabi 2005). Although the following year (1990) was plagued with political stifle, economic reforms started already in 1991, justifying the elevation of Mongolia into the middle category of development orientation, but in this book the country has been categorized as a developmentalist state from 1996 onwards, after the adopting of a developmentalist identity and a market economy.

Also Indonesia has experienced a period where development was considered as something contradictory to the identity of the state (Bunnell 1966). Year 1957 marks the beginning of such a period of radicalization and revolutionarization of President Sukarno’s government. According to Howard P. Jones (1973: 44), American
ambassador in Indonesia, it became almost treacherous to be concerned of development issues during that time. Speeches by President Sukarno reveal the contradiction between developmentalism, on the one hand, that was seen as associated with capitalism and imperialism, and on the other the Indonesian identity as a nationalist, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary force among the global New Emerging Powers (Sukarno 1964). “Sukarno’s devotion to nationalist and prestige projects was not only costly in itself, but also tended to divert attention from the tasks of economic stabilization, development and welfare” (Mortimer 1974/2006: 247). Sukarno’s refusal to nominate a single economist for the drafting of Indonesia’s *Eight Year Overall Development Plan*, his phrasal of the document as being “rich in fantasy” (Feith, 1963: 83) demonstrate this attitude, too. Another demonstration of total lack of commitment to development can be found in President Sukarno’s nationalist policies to awards the establishment of Malaysia. Instead of attempting to make Indonesia’s campaign against Malaysia less costly Sukarno chose strategies that maximized the economic costs. At one stage Sukarno demonstrated his disapproval of Malaysia by banning Indonesian trade to Malaysia, including Singapore, which was the route for 90% of Indonesian exports (Jones: Chronology of Events, September 21, 1963, Jones papers, box 63). Revolutionary and ultra-nationalist obsessions plagued Indonesia’s orientation until the fall of Sukarno, and the beginning of developmentalist autocracy under General Suharto in 1966. This is why Indonesia from 1957 to 1966 is classified as a state with no commitment to development.

Revolutionary radicalism (with greater economic focus on redistribution than growth) and focus on political independence characterized the popular sentiments of *Vietnam* before the independence of the country from France (Ho Tai 1992; Ho Chi
Minh 1973), while the colonial and the national royal leadership was obsessed by partisan greed rather than national prosperity (McFarland Lockhart 1993). While after the Geneva Conference in 1954 President Ngo Dinh Diem managed to generate modest economic success (Winters 1988: 34-36), this was more the result of the strong American economic aid. The government’s unwillingness to engage in growth generating policies and the focusing on personal rather than national welfare was seen by the US advisers of the Vietnamese regime, as one of the main reasons why South Vietnam was unable to create economic and political stability in the country (Lansdale 1972). The establishment of several military-controlled governments before the “fall of Saigon” in 1975 did not help South Vietnam develop any sense of economic profile for the state. This is why the French Vietnam as well as South Vietnam are coded in this study as states with no commitment to development.

For _North Vietnam_ and Ho Chi Minh, development and prosperity were objectives of the state, but since they were on the one hand presented as instruments of independence and equality, and since economic thinking of North Vietnam was governed by dogmatism rather than pragmatic learning from evidence or economic development (Ho Chi Minh 1973) it would be difficult to code North Vietnam to any other category but the category of states with no commitment to development. The intensification of political and military focus during the last years of Vietnam War did not change the situation, and while it is possible to detect genuine reorientation of the identity of the state as an instrument of prosperity and development until the 1980s (Griffin 1998).

Regimes that struggle with political instability or are in the middle of their independence struggle were naturally focused on political and military administration

Finally, colonial administrations in Southeast Asia might have been developmentalist in their orientation of their own economies, but their policies were certainly very sensitive towards the development of their colonies. Thus, the colonial administrations have also been judged as zero-committed.

*Regimes with Intermediate Commitment to Development (2)*

Although it is difficult to make a distinction between major and minor commitment to developmentalism, this is attempted in this presentation. However, to facilitate the interpretation of complicated matters I shall then collapse the major and minor commitment regimes into one category in the quantitative presentation.

The drastic experiences of Pol Pot’s economic destructivism pushed Indo-China towards socialist developmentalism. This process, however, was slow, and the years before the main developmentalist reforms after the mid-1980s were characterized by careful expansion of developmentalist arguments in government rhetoric. During the process of Indo-China from revolutionary economies into developmentalism, the regimes continued to base their legitimacy on revolutionary rhetoric, while also giving some attention to development imperatives. This period from 1980 to 1985 could be considered the period of minor commitment to development, while the first years after the main reform could be considered as major commitment, but not yet full commitment to developmentalism. Here, during the first half of the 1980s quite like in
Burma/Myanmar after 1997, developmentalist rhetoric had a role, while action was still largely directed by political priorities (Gottesman 2003).

While being mostly focused on paranoid security priorities (that often are rather hostile to development priorities) as well as unstable governments that are in principle development-oriented but unable to pursue developmentalist policies, military regimes with minor concern for development also fall into this category: *Thailand* in 1948–57, 1964–73, 1992–97 (Wyatt 2003) and 2006–08, and *Indonesia* during the first five post-Suharto years, as well as during Suharto’s years of cleptocracy in 1993–1998 (Robison and Hadiz 2004), are examples of this level of commitment to democracy. General Plaek Phibulsongram’s rule in Thailand from 1948–1957 sought progress but mainly for the sake of national image, rather than for the sake of the development of the national economy (Terwiel 1980). Economic rationalism was also seriously compromised by corruption and strong emphasis on ethnically motivated redistribution (World Bank 1978). While development was an important objective of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, (December 1963–October 1973), corruption and paranoid security priorities made national development a secondary priority. Also Kriangsak Chomanan 1978-79 was obsessed by security concerns (Wyatt 2003). Yet, he was keen on resolving security concerns by recognizing the legitimate grievances of potential rebel constituencies, and this made him focus more on development also as a counter-insurgency tactic.

Also the period after Thaksin was characterized as interim rather than full commitment to development. The reign of the anti-Thaksin government in Thailand included an episode in 2007 where the police and the military allowed anti-Thaksin popular protesters into the main international airport seriously disrupting the main
logistic infrastructure of the development of modern Thailand. The government has shown understanding towards economic priorities, but not to the degree that would justify a conclusion that development was among the prime concerns of the government. Furthermore, the government’s position on the main conflict area – the Southern provinces – has not recognized the legitimacy of the economic grievances of the rebel constituencies (McCargo 2008; Ismail and Arifin 2011: 169-180). This is why I would classify this regime as a government with a minor commitment to development. Furthermore, the popular debate has moved from the developmentalist type into one where the opposition is more interested in a say, and in justice rather than development: the opposition to the government can no longer be pacified by offering development to the rebel areas. If Thaksin’s period was coded as a developmentalist period, this would modestly weaken the claim of association between developmentalism and peace.

Finally, for many developmentalist countries, the first years of nation-building, before heading for greater commitment to development, are characterized by the dominance of nation-building priorities, while the priorities of development exist but cannot surface yet. *Malaysia/Malaya* and *Brunei* after Malayan independence (1959) is an example of this category of nations until the ending of the Malaysian Confrontation (1966). The description of *Singapore* before the formal independence (1959–1965), *Indonesia* after independence struggle, before Guided Democracy period (1950–1956), and the *Philippines* before Magsaysay’s presidency fall into this category.

Major commitment to development in most cases is the phase when the identity of the state apparatus is about to become developmentalist. Developmental priorities are tried as major priorities, but their primacy is not yet taken for granted and the purpose of the state as the promoter of national prosperity is not yet considered as something
natural and self-evident. Cambodia (1984–1994), Vietnam and Laos (1986–89) had to mature towards developmentalism after accepting their major liberalizations before their new dogma became a practice (Gottesman 2003). For Malaysia and Brunei (1966–69) this transition was not from ideological to developmental but from nation-building to developmental priorities^{50}, while in Thailand in 1978–1979 it was from political instability to General Prem Tinsulanonda’s stabilizing developmentalism and in 1998–2000 to Thaksin Shinawatra’s national developmentalism. In the latter case Thaksin’s refusal to “developmentalize” his policies in the Southern conflict provinces (Ismail and Arifin 2011: 169-180) qualified his national developmentalism so that it could be considered as genuine developmentalism. Prem’s and Thaksin’s reigns are border cases and could probably also be coded as fully developmentalist regimes. Doing so with Prem’s period would strengthen our conclusions on the relationship between developmentalism and peace, while classifying Thaksin’s period would weaken it.

In Indonesia during the regime of President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono since 2004, and in the Philippines after the people’s power, democratic rhetoric has already become the main foundation of legitimacy of the state and this had limited the level of developmentalist commitment as something primary or as the identifying element of the state identity. This is why it seems that strong developmentalist commitment is not a stepping stone to a fully developmentalist state for Indonesia and the Philippines. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Indonesia is a border case. It could probably still be coded as developmentalist, too. If this was done, my conclusions on the peacefulness of developmentalist states would look stronger.

^{50} An excellent account of the transition in Malaysia can be found in Prime Minister Mahathir’s (2011: 201-221) memoirs.
A parallel case to Indonesia and the Philippines was Sarit Thanarat’s *Thailand* in 1959–1963, except that developmentalism was not compromised by democracy but rather the lack of it and the primacy of security measures in Sarit Thanarat’s Thailand due to the regime’s negative attitude to democratic rights of the population. Thanarat’s rule was a mirror image of Magsaysay’s rule in the *Philippines* (with some of the same US advisers in counter-insurgence), but instead of taking place in the Philippines where democracy and soft rule had some tradition, it took place in the security-paranoid Thailand of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, despite great emphasis on development, and the recognition of legitimate grievances of potential rebel constituencies, General Sarit Thanarat was also obsessed about military means of counter-insurgence, and this, at times, went against the rationales of developing economy (Thak 2007).

**Pure Developmentalists (3)**

The developmentalist orientation in its purest form was represented by the Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, whose approach to counter-communist battle was based on the recognition of the economic grievances of people and on a vigorous policy to address these concerns (Lansdale 1972; Hartendorp 1961). This policy was weakened after the demise of Magsaysay in 1957, and by the nationalist populism of President Carlos Garcia (1957–1961). Garcia revised the approach to counter-insurgency, too, by declaring the Communist Party of the Philippines illegal rather than focusing on the economic grievances of potential rebel constituencies. Economic development was once again at the center of official attention once President Diosdado Macapagal (1961–1965) took over presidency. Despite the fact that President Macapagal was not as liberal or as pro-Western as Magsaysay, his (1966; 1968) speeches and political accounts clearly show that quite as for Magsaysay, for Macapagal, too, generating prosperity was
the main purpose of the nation. It was also the most important element in the strategy of counter-insurgency.

The Philippine developmentalism ended after the cleptocratic regime of Ferdinand Marcos had consolidated its grip of the economy and politics (1955–1968) (Overholt 1986). While the country has been less development-oriented and more democracy-oriented since then, it seems that the new president, Benigno Aquino III, focuses on addressing the grievances of potential rebel communities in his counter-insurgency strategy. However, the Philippine political culture seems to have been, after Marcos, more focused on expression values (that Marcos’ martial law severely curtailed) than development (Kivimäki 1995).

Suharto’s authoritarianism in Indonesia from 1967 until 1993 was another example of pure developmentalism. It utilized an alliance between the president, economic technocrats and Catholic/ethnic Chinese businessmen as a vehicle for development-obsessed policies and focused on development as a vehicle for power, stability and resilience (Robison 1986/2009). While the rule of Suharto was undoubtedly corrupt from the very beginning, the interests of ethnic Chinese business elite, top generals and the Suharto family went in unison with the priorities of a capitalist development path (ibid.).

The perception of the Catholic military elite as a threat to Suharto’s power eroded this approach in the beginning of the 1990s and gave rise to Muslim generals, and led to the downfall of the Catholic generals, and to the erosion of the role of the Chinese business elite thanks to the role of Suharto’s own family. Priorities of personal enrichment, power-political priorities, and the politicizing civil society meant that the
commitment to development was no longer as clear from 1993 to 1996, while the last
two years of Suharto’s rule and the first years of post-Suharto period (1997–2001) were
further marred by political concerns of the stability of the regime in the context of an
economic crisis, giving even less space for developmentalist orientations (Robison and
Hadiz 2004).

After the nationalist presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (late 2004), Indonesia
started focusing more on development under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
However, by then the regime’s foundation of legitimacy was in its popular mandate, and
its way of resolving conflicts was no longer purely developmentalist. Also the
expectations of people were not only related to development but democratic self-
expression too. The status as world’s third biggest democracy has become an important
part of Indonesia’s identity, taking the place of the identity of Indonesia as a fast
developing country. This clearly reflects in Indonesia’s policies towards the promotion
of democracy in the ASEAN, and could be clearly seen in the Indonesian leadership in
the pushing of Myanmar into the path of democracy. This is why I code these years in
Indonesia as intermediate, rather than full commitment to development, even though
this decisions could obviously be challenged.

The policy of Thailand’s Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–88) and the first term of Anand
Panyarachun (1991)\(^{51}\) with a strong association between national unity and poverty
reduction (Prem), and economic reforms and legitimacy (Anand) also represent rather

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\(^{51}\) The terms of PM Prem were from March 3, 1980 to August 4, 1988, while Prime Minister Anand’s first term was from March 2, 1991 until March 23, 1992. For the preparation of the quantitative probing of the relationship between developmentalism and peace, I need to assign one number describing the level of developmentalism for each year. This is why the terms have been defined here as if they lasted for years.
pure form of developmentalism. While the speeches by the Philippine leaders and Indonesia’s Yudhoyono reflect the assumption of development as instrumental to democracy (and thus an attitude according to which development is only instrumentally valuable as it supports democracy) the relationship between democracy and development seems the opposite in Anand Panyarachun’s thoughts. For Anand, sustainable democracy is important as it creates preconditions for a positive investment climate and economic development (Anand 2008). Especially the first term of Anand Panyarachun 2 March 1991–23 March 1992 was very developmentalist as the military needed to use economic performance of the government to justify their decision to remove the previous, popularly elected prime minister from power in favour of Anand Panyaratchun.

While the national policies of Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand could be treated as pure developmentalism, his policies in critical conflict areas did not reflect developmentalist logic. Instead of accepting the legitimacy of economic grievances of rebel constituencies, his approach, especially in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwa was based on brutal power logic (McCargo 2008). Conflict was to be addressed by means of military power. As a result his rule from 2001 to 2006 cannot be classified as developmentalist (even though his foreign and general national economic policies perhaps could).

In Indo-China, socialist developmentalism that reminded of China’s Deng Xiaoping’s socialist developmentalism, even if it did not necessarily want to identify with it, was launched in principle by the economic modernization, the so-called “renovation” of the sixth Party Conference of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and the Laotian government introduced its “new economic mechanism” (NEM) both in 1986
(Griffin 1997). This change in Vietnam and Laos ended the primacy of the ideological and communist identitive approach to development. After some years of maturing, Vietnam’s and Laos’ political discourses could be considered as almost purely developmentalist. This prioritization of economic performance gradually led to many liberal reforms that helped the actual economic development. However, since developmentalism is an approach and since it is not conceptually bound to any objective results or any specific liberal ontology within the economic elite of the country, it is probably well based to consider Laos’ and Vietnam’s approaches as fully developmentalist after 2–3 years of the initiation of the “renovation policies” (1989–).

While Cambodia, too, introduced some developmentalist reforms in the 1980s, economic logic has also been subjected to political interests. The first economic plan of 1986–89 defined that for “the peasantry, selling rice and agricultural products to the state is patriotism; for the state, selling goods and delivering them directly to the people is being responsible to the people”. Economic rationalism did not feature as the leading rationale but political motives, such as patriotism did. Yet that plan also testified to the fact that the state had responsibilities in the development of the economy. Documents and practices revealed that in the 1990s this sentiment matured and Cambodia could be classified as a developmentalist state when it started making political decisions to approach ASEAN membership from 1995 onwards (Hughes 2003).

Singapore, after its independence (1965) and the more politically colored period of self-governance and changing status in relation to Malaya and Malaysia (1959–1965), has clearly belonged to the purely developmentalist category of states. Singapore’s prime minister’s own description of Singapore’s history clearly reveals the identity of state as an instrument of prosperity and development, while the unique “corporate concept of citizenship” in Singapore further testifies to the developmentalist framing of the country. The state’s role has been to facilitate growth and prosperity, while the ability to make economically rational choices has been the main credential and merit of government officials (Lee Kuan Yew 2000). In addition to meritocracy, development-orientation has also been reflected in the drive to prevent corruption and eradicate personal challenging objectives for public decisions (ibid.).

Japanese regime has claimed its legitimacy by offering prosperity to its people, after the imperialist, ultra-nationalist strategy for legitimacy had collapsed after the Second World War. Even though Japan’s developmentalism, and state identity was very much controlled by the US n the beginning, it is possible to see Japan’s state as an instrument of prosperity and the US support as an additional boost for such an orientation (Downer 2011: 408-11). This is why the country is coded as a developmentalist state all though the period under analysis in this book.

Malaysia had already focused on development, and to some extent its counter-insurgency strategy recognized the legitimacy of economic grievances of the constituencies of the Communist rebels already during the times of the Malayan emergency (1948–60). Consensus regarding the ASEAN developmentalist principles further strengthened this commitment. However, it was not until the 1969 Malay riots that the national purpose of the state, and the foundation of legitimacy of the regime
were associated to the developmental output of the government. New Economic Policies had racialist elements that supported the Malay ethnicity over considerations of perfect economic rationality, but since the Malays were the biggest economic group the economic interests of the main population were never brought to conflict with the priorities of the national economy (Mahathir 2011: 198-9; Mahathir 2012).

While Brunei became independent only in 1984, its conflict statistics are available separate from Malaysia already from 1962. Since the sultanate did not have fatalities before (or after) that it is assumed here that its conflict statistics start with 0 casualties, when it received relative self-governance together with Singapore in 1959. However its commitment to development followed the Malaysian line until 1984, after which its own policies reveal a typical ASEAN developmentalist approach with very little indication of seeing the state’s role as something else than development promotion (Saunders 2002). Priorities of self-enrichment could perhaps be seen as one challenge to Brunei’s developmentalism, but even there, self-enrichment does not seem to be in contradiction with priorities of national economy.

Developmentalism in East Asia

It is clear that developmentalism was increased together with the pacification of the region. However, equally clear was it that developmentalization of the region did not happen overnight just before the pacification of the region in 1979. More accurately, developmentalism gained strength in East Asia in two main phases, before 1967 in the process of resolution of the Malaysian Confrontation and the establishment of ASEAN, and again in 1978-79 with the victory of Deng Xiaoping in the domestic power battle in China. ‘East Asian Tigers’, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong had
become obsessed about development already before ASEAN, and they could be seen as partial explanations to the appeal of developmentalism in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, of course, East Asian Tigers were naturally affected by the success of Japanese developmentalism and economic rise. The contribution of developmentalism in the long peace of East Asia can be initially mapped by looking at the difference in commitment to economic prosperity and development among East Asian countries before and after 1979.

Table 4.1. Developmentalism in East Asia, before and after 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitment to development 1946-1979</th>
<th>1978-2008</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Decline in battle deaths per population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1. immediately shows that developmentalist mentality has progressed in the region simultaneously with the decline of the number of battle deaths. A more detailed investigation shows some of the strongest cases where the linkage between developmentalism and peace can be found. China, as one of the countries with most battle deaths after the Second World could be the clearest case for this association, as China’s drop in the number of battle deaths is very dramatic, and as its commitment to development was also very drastic and it took place closely before the 1979. Most other countries became developmentalist before China, and Indo-China followed a few years after. In general, Indo-China can be seen as another good example of the power of developmentalism in the pacification of states, while there has not been a single case where one could think that developmentalism has increased war potential or where decline in developmentalism has reduced the amount of battle deaths. Thailand and the Philippines are the two only countries in East Asia where average annual number of battle deaths has been bigger after 1979 than before 1980, and these countries were also countries with a very modest commitment to development (Philippines being the only country with a declining commitment). The very belligerent Burma/Myanmar has not become very developmentalist either, while Indonesia, with a limited increase in the commitment to development, seems to have become only slightly more pacific. Thus the association between developmentalism and peace seems at first sight to be convincing. The only exception to the rule is the fact that even though developmentalism has not declined in North Korea, it has become peaceful when battle deaths per population are seen as an indicator.
However, in order to examine the linkage between developmentalism and peace one needs to take a more detailed look at the observations of the two variables each year. The three levels of commitment to development are presented in the following table.

**Table 4.2: Levels of developmentalism in East Asia after the World War II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Commitment to development</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1946–2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1946–2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 North and South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975, both belonged to the same category of states with little or no commitment to development.
War, Peace and Commitment to Development in East Asia

If we look at the most intensive wars (highest battle deaths per population), we can see that they all take place in countries with no commitment to development. Korean War years, Vietnam War years when the US had started participating, years of the Vietnamese independence war, and the Cambodian civil war during Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes, all took place in countries with zero-commitment to development. The first war dyad in a country with at least some commitment to development was during the 1980s in Cambodia, where the war that had started during zero commitment, continued. Year 1980 of that war was the first conflict dyad in a country with elementary commitment to democracy and it was dyad number 49 in the order of destructiveness of conflict dyads. To get to the next war in a country with some developmentalist commitment, we will have to search the list of conflict dyads (that has been arranged in the order of destructiveness per population) to dyad number 179! It seems quite clear that at least the worst wars are related to no commitment to development.

If we then look at the peaceful years in the history of East Asian countries after the Second World War, we can see that 56% of them have been experienced in developmentalist countries (with development indicator 3). By comparing of the average numbers of battle deaths per million people in countries with no commitment to democracy, intermediate commitment to development and strong developmentalist commitment, we can verify the observation that the level of developmentalism is crucial to peace in East Asia\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{54} This does not change if we assume that developmentalism affects in one year’s delay, even though the average of battle deaths in zero-commitment countries is slightly lower and in category 2 slightly higher.
### Table 4.3. Battle deaths and commitment to development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENTALISM</th>
<th>Average number of battle deaths per million people</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>2150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>43,4</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,99</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>8,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries with no commitment to development have over 300 times more battle deaths per million inhabitants than developmentalist countries. If we rule out the case of North Korea, which is the most stunning exception, as an example of peacefulness without any commitment to economic development, the result is even more staggering. However, security problems are an important reason for not focusing on development (even if they are also an important reason for doing so), and thus I will look at the nature of the relationship carefully. It seems, again, that the relationship between our dependent and independent variable is again mutually interdependent. Peace allows nations to focus on development, while development orientation fosters peace. If one looks at the average numbers in the following year for countries in the three different levels of developmentalism (assuming that peace follows developmentalist orientation) one can find substantially greater difference between the highest and the lowest commitment category averages, than if one looks at averages of battle deaths the previous year in the three levels of development (assuming that developmentalist orientation follows peace). This suggests that although the relationship is interdependent, developmentalism predicts peace better than the other way around.

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55 In the former case states with no commitment to development lose 337 times more people in wars than developmental states, while in the latter case states with no commitment to development are 257 times more
When looking at the relationship between developmentalism and peace I must also investigate the relationship between development and developmentalism as an orientation. Developmentalism can be useful for peace either as a way to focus on things that unite, or as an orientation that improves chances for development and prosperity, which again are the real reasons for peace. The ASEAN way of focusing on things that unite would not get support from the East Asian experience if the latter was the case and the real cause for peace was prosperity and development. If one looks at the correlation of development and peace in East Asia after the Second World War, it seems clear that such an association does not exist. Regardless of whether one looks at year to year comparisons between growth and peace or correlates annual levels of growth with the following year’s battle death numbers per million people, one fails to find any significant correlation.

Prosperity, however, is significantly associated with peace. But multivariate regression analysis reveals that even this association loses its significance if one examines it together with developmentalism. It seems that developmentalism is the variable that is genuinely associated with peace rather than development, which seems to be a side-product of peace-promoting developmentalism (Kivimäki & Kivimäki 2011).

belligerent than developmental states. Even though correlations are an imperfect indicator due to the skewed distribution of observations of battle deaths per million people (in most years there are no fatalities in most countries), and due to the lack of independence between observations in time series (war in year x in country y predicts war in country y in years x-1 and x+1), it is justified to note that also the correlations are greater if we correlate the following year’s population-adjusted battle deaths with the level of developmentalism (assuming that developmentalism has causal powers over peace), than if we correlate the previous year’s population-adjusted battle deaths with the level of developmentalism (assuming that peace causes developmentalism). The respective correlations between peace and developmentalism are 0.471 (sig .000, N=912) and 0.451 (sig .000, N=914).
Historical analysis highlighting periods where developmentalism and prosperity did not coincide seems to confirm this finding. When looking at periods when countries had low commitment to development together high levels of per-capita income (development), the following periods can be identified:

1. Mongolia 1982-90
2. Philippines, 1968–86
3. Thailand, 1973–77
4. China 1965-76

By choosing the years of greatest discrepancy in favour of developmentalism the following periods can be identified:

1. Indonesia, 1967–73
2. Vietnam 1989-93
3. South Korea 1963-67
4. Philippines 1962-65

Furthermore, the first years of Singapore’s independence, Malaysia after the ethnic riots of 1969, Brunei in the beginning of the 1970s (Kivimäki & Kivimäki 2011) experienced times when their income levels were very low within their national standard, while their commitment to development was very high. Of the years of the most extreme discrepancy between high commitment to development but low levels of development (39 country years, counting also years of poverty relative to the national standards), there were conflict fatalities only during three years. During none of these
years were there 10 or more fatalities per 1000 000 people. All these conflict years were in Indonesia during the first years of Suharto’s authoritarian developmentalism, and they were all in conflicts that had started already before the new Indonesian commitment to development.

At the same time, there was genuine peace only in Mongolia, of the 60 country-years of most extreme discrepancy between low commitment to development with high level of development. While many of the turbulent years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution seem peaceful in the PRIO/Uppsala battle death dataset, the fact remains that if authoritarian violence and non-state violence were included in this dataset, none of the years would show peacefulness. The period where the level of development was highest compared to the commitment to development was in Cambodia between 1960 and 1974. Conflict caused more than 190,000 fatalities during that period in Cambodia, while also in the Philippines, almost 3,000 battle deaths were caused by conflict and war 1980–83. At the same time, only 4,010 people were killed in all conflicts of the 39 years of extreme commitment to development at the time of extremely low level of development.

This already seems to suggest that developmentalism, rather than development is crucial to peace. However, if one looks at the greater trends in the expansion of peace in East Asia, one can see that the emergence of the ASEAN peace took place in a very low level of income, but after countries had re-interpreted their identities as developmentalist states. It seems clear that the specific ASEAN peace is influenced more by the approach that focuses on development, than objective level of development. Also the pacification of China took place in the same manner to a less dramatic degree: when China opted for Deng’s materialist interpretation of socialism where the material
wellbeing of the workers gained priority, rather than abstract ideational principles of revolution, China opted for developmentalism while still being desperately poor. Yet despite poverty, quite like ASEAN, China quickly became much more peaceful.

Conclusions

It seems clear from Chapter 2 that once East Asian states get into a conflict, the crucial factor determining whether the conflict becomes intensive or not is whether the conflicting parties allow external interference in the conflict. Whether conflicts escalate or not is the crucial issue in the explanation of the long peace of East Asia, as it seems that it is primarily conflict escalation that has disappeared from the region, not so much conflicts as such. Yet, the question of the onset of a conflict is also relevant. For that the orientation that sees states as instruments of welfare and prosperity and that sees the promotion of development as the main goal in politics has been crucial. Developmentalist states have been much less prone to the eruption of conflicts.

The relationship between developmentalism and peace is only one where developmentalism as a condition affects peacefulness. It is clear that peace also affords the emergence and consolidation of the developmentalist discourse where the primary role of the state is seen in the promotion of prosperity of citizens. However, statistically it seems that developmentalist approach is more often taken before the emergence of peace, than the other way around. With developmentalism we are not talking about an objective condition, but an intentional approach, and thus it is not useful for us to treat it as an objective condition that determines the level of peace. Instead, developmentalism is an approach that is undoubtedly often also aimed at fostering peace and its association proves, rather than causal relationship, that it has been a successful approach.
in East Asia. Statistical analysis is needed to measure its successfulness, and to show that it is possible to reduce conflicts by focusing at things that unite, such as development, and not just by focusing on disputes that need resolution.

Now that the ASEAN Way approach to the prevention of conflicts has been studied, it is time to move on to the crucial element in the ASEAN Way, the approach that aims at the prevention of conflict escalation. This will be the theme of the next chapter.
Chapter 5

Non-Intervention and the Prevention of the Escalation of Conflicts into Wars.

Introduction

It seems clear from the previous chapter that developmentalism has played a crucial role in making the onset of conflicts less likely. However, we have also seen (Chapter 2) that the miracle of the long peace of East Asia is not really the disappearance of conflicts, but the disappearance of conflict escalation. After the scrutiny on the onset of conflicts, I shall now look at why conflicts have no longer escalated into wars in East Asia after 1979 – a fact that has constituted the largest proportion of the long peace of East Asia and, thus, requires an explanation. But again, I will not produce explanations that would show an objective regularity between exogenous objective conditions. Instead, again, I shall look at what made peace possible, rather than trying to explain some deterministic regularities that lead to peace. Therefore, the intention is to show how a normative approach made peace possible, rather than trying to show natural-science type of probabilistic or fully deterministic causal relations. By leaving intentional action a space, this type of exploration will also facilitate the search for formula that could be practical for peace.

Military interference and conflict escalation are not mutually entirely exogenous, as it is not possible to interfere militarily in the absence of a conflict. Yet, an approach to peace can either be based on the idea of lowering borders and setting domestic criteria for regional states (such as there exists between EU members in the so-called Copenhagen criteria), or it can be based on the respect of sovereignty (elevating of
borders) and non-interference. Despite the partial endogenousness of the relationship between peace and non-interference, to study this relationship empirically makes sense. It makes a lot of sense in East Asia where the peace approach has been based on non-interference, given the strong global consensus of the virtues of “lowering borders” and pooling of sovereignty to regional organizations (Narine 2002) in the literature of regional peace. Yet, when studying relationships where there seems to be some conceptual relationship between empirically interlinked phenomena, one has to be open to the possibility that one does not necessarily find strictly causal relationships between the conditions studied, but that indeed, one can find empirically interesting processes of mutual constitution.

The decline in East Asian conflict fatalities took place just after the introduction of a clearer consensus on the norms of sovereignty and military non-interference in the region. As discussed in the previous chapter, this norm was common to both ASEAN and East Asia after 1979, and in both places it was associated with a similar profile of peace. This chapter explores in detail the role of big powers and the role of this norm in the constitution and causing of the decline of East Asian battle deaths.

I shall first look at the subordination of East Asian conflict developments to the changes in global big power politics, power relations and power structures. I shall show that peace in East Asia was not a simple product of external influence in the region. I shall also show that in fact the external interference by military means has been the main curse in the region and here I am primarily focused on big-power influence, but

56 I use here the words (military) ‘interference’ and ‘intervention’ interchangeably as synonyms. The definition of the term will be presented in the second section of the chapter, while literature of both interference and intervention will be mobilized for the integration of this study into the existing literature.
also the intervention of any power into domestic disputes. It has been the disappearance of such intervention that has constituted the disappearance of warfare in East Asia. Military interference – especially against capitalism by China and the Soviet Union, and against communism, by Western allies – has constituted and caused most of the violence experienced in East Asia before the end of the 1970s. This belligerence can be associated to the lack of norm against military interference in East Asia before the Guam Doctrine (1968), the US–Chinese rapprochement, the establishment of ASEAN, and the Chinese change from revolutionism to developmentalism.

Furthermore, this chapter will argue that the norm of military non-interference entered into East Asian rhetoric as well as practice in the 1970s, and has affected international relations and internal disputes of the region ever since. The emergence of the norm will be shown by an analysis of the core agreement and declarations about international relations, while the practice that followed will be demonstrated by references to statistics of conflict dyads where an external power interferes into a domestic dispute. It will be argued that the change in the norm and practice of military interference had a crucial association with the drastic decline of battle deaths as escalation from conflicts to wars disappeared after the norm and its adoption in 1979 onwards.

It can be seen from the record of conflicts in the post-World War 2 period that conflicts have escalated almost only when external powers have interfered militarily in domestic conflicts. Thus it can be concluded that the norm of military non-interference, which became theory and practice in East Asia with the ending of the 1970s, is associated to the long peace of East Asia in 1979 onwards. This chapter will lend
support to the global findings of Lacina, Gleditsch and Russett (2005), who suggest that intervention to conflicts by big powers is one of the main commonalities in major wars.

It seems that military interference is too often seen outside of its interactive context, where the interference constitutes a dialogical move in a process of escalation. Interference is analyzed for its “causes” – how it deters, how it punishes and how it defends – while it seems that the experience of East Asia suggests that military interference should be analyzed as something where adversaries together constitute a dialogue of coercion. Similarly, the power of the norm of non-interference should not only be seen in its costs for interference only. Instead, one should see how the mutually applied norm also gives incentive for non-interference for international adversaries. If one antagonist respects the norm the chances that his opponent also respects it increase. Thus the norm tackles the logic of escalation by both creating costs for intervention, but also rewards for non-intervention.

While exploring the relationship between non-interference and peace in East Asia, this chapter will not insist that non-interference alone is the reason for the long peace of East Asia. On the contrary, non-interference works together with other elements of the ASEAN Way in an interdependent manner.

The empirical analysis will first utilize a periodization of post-World War II history, which will then be correlated to the statistics of battle deaths in the region and in the individual countries of the region. For the analysis of the impact of the non-interference norm, I shall utilize the great difference in conflict violence before 1980 compared to the period after 1979. The norm in focus is one that recognizes the sovereignty of states in their management of domestic affairs of countries, and rejects
any rationales (revolutionary, humanitarian, democratic etc.) suggesting that other states can interfere militarily with their own troops in the domestic disputes of other countries. This perspective is pragmatic, as decisions between norms that reject states sovereignty (for example, norms that justify military interference in order to promote revolution or democracy/freedom) and norms that reject such interventions no matter what, need to consider the all implications, constitutive and causal, of military interference. It is not sufficient to consider the causal effects of intervention (through deterrence, for example), one also has to consider how intervention already in itself constitutes another step in the game of escalation.\textsuperscript{57}

**Big Powers and the Long Peace of East Asia**

Neo-realist explanations of East Asia assume that there is a strong association between the development of East Asian security situation and the changes in the global power structure.\textsuperscript{58} A variation of the argument towards the direction of the English school of international relations is Evelyn Goh’s argument that similarly focuses on global power relations, but which also acknowledges the relevance of the normative mitigation of these global structures in regions. The shape of the influence of global power structures is bargained regionally in a process where big powers get their legitimacy and roles in regional politics, and the regional rules of big-power politics are being designed (Goh

\textsuperscript{57}The argumentation on how military interference constitutes belligerence is necessarily tautological in the sense that military interference is by definition belligerence. However, often this belligerence is argued for as an instrument against further, greater belligerence, or as a deterrent of the initial belligerence. This is why it is also necessary to study how much violence interference itself constitutes, and not just how much violence it causes as an endogenous variable.

\textsuperscript{58} For the general argument, see Waltz (1979). For the ASEAN-specific argument, see Leifer (1999): 25-38; Mearsheimer (2001).
Yet, even for Goh’s thesis to be credible, there should be a correlative relationship between the variation in great power relations and East Asian conflicts and battle deaths. Otherwise big-power politics might cause changes in security situation; it might affect, say, the way in which alliances are formed, how military capabilities develop, etc., but this relatively irrelevant for the actual conflict developments.

Before taking a more detailed look at how big powers, with their policies, affected the emergence of peace, I shall take a general look at the correlative relationship between power constellations and battle deaths.

**Periods of Global Power Politics**

The main change after the Second World War in the global power structure was the emergence of US leadership and the challenge to it by the Soviet Union. US power positions and leadership started rising in the Philippines already long before the American global hegemonic mission. In China this emerging leadership was testified by the US interest in military support of the nationalist forces, first against Japan and then, in the Chinese Civil War, against the communists, during the immediate post-war years. In 1948 it was demonstrated in Indonesia by the strong reaction to the communist/peasant Madiun Rebellion. In Malaysia at the end of the 1940s, the US exercised indirect power in support of the UK, against something that was at the core of the Cold War divide: communist insurgency. In the rest of East Asia, US leadership was consolidated after the Bangkok meeting of regional US ambassadors in 1950.

The Cold War framework of global power structure ended at the end of the 1980s or in the beginning of the 1990s. In terms of US military power, the collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the US, while the American economic power had
declined already from the late 1970s. Political leadership lost part of its rationale and legitimacy with the disappearance of aggressive communism in the beginning of the 1990s, while at the same time the unipolarization of the military constellation simultaneously emphasized the US role. From the point of view of global power structures and world leadership the interim period after the fall of Cold War (1991) and the beginning of the “global war on terror” (2001), is the third period in the development of the global power structure.

For some analysts the emergence of a new mission with the war on terror in 2001 emphasized the political role of the US. The threat of terrorism demonstrated in the strike on the US heartland on 11 September 2001, consolidated US leadership, and created a new reason for compliance to the world leader among the “global subordinates”. These changes have to be taken into account when defining the periods to be correlated to the peacefulness of East Asia. Furthermore, in addition to the development during US leadership, I shall also look at how the variation of the power of the US (and the regional Soviet, perhaps even Chinese) leadership affected the variation of peacefulness between and inside countries. Somehow US (and Soviet) leadership is more real for countries that fully accept it and react to it by committing themselves into Western (communist) military alliances.

In conclusion the periods of global power structure can be determined in the following manner. Instead of fine-tuning the periods in a way that takes the small country-by-country variations into account, my statistical examination will assume uniform timing for the beginning and the ending for each period.

1. Pre-Cold War period, 1946–1949


4. War of terror period, 2002–

Association between Global Power and Peace in East Asia

If we look at the impact of the beginning of the Cold War on East Asia in 1950 and the subsequent actions of the US to strengthen its leadership with alliances and a military presence in the region, one can see that the effect of the emergence of the Cold War hegemony on battle deaths in East Asia has been varied rather than systematic. If one looks at the average number of conflicts of each nation before and since 1950 one can see development patterns.

It seems that about a half of the nations experienced more and about a half less conflicts, measured as annual averages. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, China and the Koreas experienced smaller average annual number of conflict dyads during the Cold War than during the preceding post-World War 2 period, while Burma, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (especially South Vietnam) experienced a greater number. Japan had become pacific immediately after the Second World War and Mongolia had already done so before that.\(^{59}\) The East Asian average remained the same during the Cold War and before it –after the Second World War.

Before summarizing the results, it is important to notice that data on conflicts and battle deaths seems to testify to the fact that the Cold War period does not seem to function as a coherent period. Instead, the period seems to be divided between two, by

\(^{59}\) Mongolia had border clashes with China in 1947–48, but the Uppsala data does not list them as conflicts, presumably because of the low number of casualties.
the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. This is why in Table 5.1. I have added columns at the end of the table that reveal the difference between the three first and the last decades of the Cold War.

Table 5.1. Periods of global power structure and the number of conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1.25</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>4.73</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of countries</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we sharpen our focus and look at battle deaths, more conclusive evidence emerges. Only Malaysia/Malaya and China (and Taiwan) were better off during the Cold War power structure than before it, while Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines\(^\text{60}\), Thailand, Vietnam and Korea lost, on annual average, more people in

\(^{60}\) The population of the Philippines grew faster than the number of battle deaths, and therefore, if one looks at statistics of battle deaths per population, Philippines can no longer be seen to have lost more people once US
conflicts than they had before the rise of US leadership. The Malayan Emergency could be seen as a war that belonged to the logic of the Cold War. Yet, its casualties were most intensive before the emergence of US leadership in 1950. China lost an enormous amount of people in the Korean War, but this did not change the fact that its average annual number of casualties in 1946–1949 was higher than in 1950–1989.\footnote{However, as mentioned before, also the Chinese civil war could easily be classified as the first Cold War battle in the region as this war was about communism against anti-communism, and because US troops were already deployed for the containment of communism (Blum 1995: 21-22). Without the Chinese Civil War the average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia and in China would have been much higher during the Cold War than before it. If also Malaysian emergency was classified as a Cold War conflict, all East Asia was better off before than after the rise of US power and the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Since comparisons of battle deaths makes little sense unless one adjusts them to the population, table 6.2. reveals battle deaths per one million people.} However, as mentioned before, also the Chinese civil war could easily be classified as the first Cold War battle in the region as this war was about communism against anti-communism, and because US troops were already deployed for the containment of communism (Blum 1995: 21-22). Without the Chinese Civil War the average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia and in China would have been much higher during the Cold War than before it. If also Malaysian emergency was classified as a Cold War conflict, all East Asia was better off before than after the rise of US power and the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Since comparisons of battle deaths makes little sense unless one adjusts them to the population, table 6.2. reveals battle deaths per one million people.

leadership started. At the same time, though, US leadership in the Philippines started already earlier than elsewhere, and the period of 1946–49 was in reality already a period of US leadership in the Philippines.

\footnote{Due to the huge population of China, the East Asian average number of casualties was still greater before than after the rise of US global leadership.}
### Table 5.2. Periods of global power structure and the number of battle deaths per million people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
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<td>192</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1,521</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, French</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,636</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,272</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, unified</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries most tightly allied militarily to the big powers, Vietnams and Koreas, as well as countries that were forced to the big power proxy wars, such as Cambodia were the most violent countries during the Cold War. At the same time, while US allied Philippines was very belligerent, Thailand and Japan were not. Indonesia, who was until 1965 skeptical about US leadership, and more sympathetic ever since, experienced a rise of casualties once it had come closer to the US camp. If battle death statistics revealed information on authoritarian one-sided violence, this change would have been even clearer. Yet, in general, the changes in big power setting were not entirely
conclusive. Big power influence was not systematically negative, and it was definitely positive for most of the allies.

However, an investigation of regional policies to big power influence, more systematic results start to emerge. If we look at the Cold War period and divide it between two phases depending on how the region defined its relationship to big powers (two last columns) we can see that the period when big power competition in East Asia was not limited by regional norms of non-interference (1950-1979) was much more (more than ten times more) belligerent than the period when big power competition was restricted by regional norms of military non-interference. This can be seen in battle death statistics of most countries, and only the Philippines\textsuperscript{62} clearly seem to contradict this regularity. This regularity will be examined further in context of East Asian conflicts and wars, in the next sub-chapter.

All East Asian countries had less conflicts and conflict battle deaths after the end of the bipolar Cold-War power structure than before. This needs to be kept in mind for the analysis of military interference of outside powers, as it seems that this can only be understood as something related to the dialogical logic of escalation when conflicting big powers fail to see their own moves as something that constitutes the process of escalation.

The beginning of the war on terror in 2001, where no bipolarity could emerge due to the weakness of the terrorist challenger, seemed to have some systematic general effect on peacefulness in East Asia. Yet its influence on overall peacefulness in East

\textsuperscript{62} Even in the Philippines, the reason for slight intensification of conflict after 1979 was not related to big power politics. It was much more related to the domestic contradictions of the last years of the autocratic rule of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Asia was negligible. It seems that the war on terror gave rise to conflicts and battle deaths in those countries where conflicts had some basis in Islam – i.e. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. The governments in these countries used the rhetoric of the war on terror to justify the utilization of intensified violence against their opponents, especially those that had Muslim populations. In doing this, they created local processes of local escalation of violence because authoritarian violence was seen as a proof of the need to rebel against the government (and the counter-action, in its turn, was seen as a foundation of legitimacy for further authoritarian violence).

At this stage it can safely be concluded that the changes of global power structures were not associated with major changes in the development of peace and conflict in East Asia. The beginning of Cold War seemed to escalate conflict, and whenever there was a structural setting for dialogical processes of escalation, this is when the conflict risk was at its highest. However, the fact that the main change in the region happened in the middle of a bipolar global power structure suggests that power structures did not dictate developments in East Asia. East Asians seemed to have more power on their own region than is often understood.

In order to understand the interplay between global and international realities in the region and inside East Asian states, I shall now turn my attention to the problem of East Asia’s rules of engagement with big powers in conflict situations. The main element in these rules is the norm of non-interference.

The Definition and Operationalization of Military Interference
Military interference or intervention refers to conflicts where the original dispute is between domestic actors – the challengers of territorial or governance arrangements and the state – and where a foreign power participates in the conflict with its combat forces in favor of one of the domestic conflicting parties. This interference by an external power might be motivated by partisan interests in the domestic issue, an interest to increase one’s own power/influence or something else. Yet, the action of interference always relates to supporting either a foreign government or its domestic challengers with military forces in a conflict that is about domestic issues.

It would be possible to examine several levels of interference, but this chapter will focus on the highest form, where external powers send combat troops in support of domestic contestants in another country. During the Cold War interference was, with only one exception (Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia), related to domestic disputes between communists and anti-communists. During the post-911 era military interference has related either to terrorism or to “democracy enforcement”. Neither of these types of post-9/11 military interference has entered East Asia.

When operationalizing military interference, one has to make some decisions related to the operationalizations and the border/line cases of interference. It is clear that, in the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Sarkees 2000) and in the Uppsala and PRIO conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002), conflict type category 4 – internationalized intra-state conflicts, where external powers participate in a domestic conflict with combat forces – refers to cases that I would call military interference. Regardless of whether the external powers lend their support to the government or to its challenger,

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63 There is research on East Asian Peace and secondary support, which, in fact, points to rather different relationships of the two than this chapter suggests. See Melander and Svensson 2011.
they are interfering in a domestic battle with their combat troops. The distinction between government-supporting and government-opposing interference is meaningful when we study the effect of interference on battle deaths and when we study how East Asia changed after 1979.

Some conflicts in the category of inter-state conflicts fall into the category of military interference. Vietnam and Korea were divided into two territorial realities across the conflicting cleavage of communists and anti-communists, which as a conflict incompatibility was clearly domestic, as it was about whether the country was to be ruled as a communist or as a non-communist country. The origin of the wars in both Korea and Vietnam was a domestic battle that became internationalized once China, Soviet Union and the US and its allies entered with their combat troops.

The doctrine and reality of non-interference in ASEAN and the entire East Asia has already been discussed in the previous chapter. However, the acceptance of such a norm by the big powers is probably also important for the realization of non-interference in East Asia. Such acceptance is not always forthcoming as we can see in most other parts of the world. As will be shown at the end of this chapter the East Asian strategy of the creation of non-interference could have been part of the reason for the fact that both China and the US were prepared to accept to yield to the norm, while the Soviet Union was already weakened at the time when it would have been possible (once its regional naval power was strong enough) for it to break against the East Asia norm.

American willingness to offer intrusive help to challengers of East Asian regimes declined during the Vietnam War and due to the diplomatic victory of Nixon and Kissinger in negotiations with China that guaranteed the defensive interests of the US with regard to China (Kissinger 2011). The new American security doctrine in East
Asia, the Guam Doctrine (or the Nixon Doctrine) emphasized the primacy of self-help in security issues (Nixon 1973), an approach that was much easier to harmonize with the new East Asian approach to non-interference. The Nixon Doctrine was so favorable to the idea of non-interference that it was possible for Nixon to declare, together with Zhou Enlai that “[n]either [the US or China] should seek hegemony in the Asian Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony” (Nixon 1973: 20). “Neither is prepared … to collude with another against other countries or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interests” (Nixon 1973: 22).

With the abandoning of the Cultural Revolution and the strengthening of a developmental orientation (under a doctrine of material socialism that focused on the concrete material advancement of the masses) in China, support to regional subversive communist movements faded (Deng 1982). The country pushed aside its class-based view of international relations and started emphasizing an anti-hegemonism that rejected the right of external powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of Asian nations (Deng 1978).

**Association between Military Interference and Battle Deaths**

We can classify conflicts into four categories: 1. extra-systemic conflicts, 2. conflicts that were genuinely between states, 3. conflicts that remained intra-state with no external military interference, and 4. conflicts that were intra-state by the nature of the dispute, but were internationalized by military interference. When comparing these categories we realize that it is not about conflicts that merely concern relations between the states; it is the phenomenon of intra-state conflict becoming international that we
need to explain if we want to understand East Asia warfare after the Second World War. Internationalized intra-state conflicts contributed to 63–78% (high and low estimates of PRIO battle death data version 3.0) of post-World War 2 battle deaths in East Asia. The contribution to these conflicts can be pinpointed to two things—the emergence of intra-state conflict, and its internationalization—both of which are present in each conflict of this category. Thus military interference is part of the explanation of a substantial share (65–78%) of East Asian conflict violence.

When assessing the role of military interference in East Asian violence, the crucial issue is whether we should focus on the emergence of intra-state conflict, or its escalation as a result of its internationalization. One way to assess this is to compare the intra-state conflicts that did internationalize and those that did not. If we assume that the impact of internationalization can be measured by comparing battle deaths per year in each of the types of conflict, we will realize that 94–98% of battle deaths in intra-state conflicts depend on whether or not they will be internationalized. A causal link from the internationalization of a conflict to increased battle deaths would be plausible because external resources mean a greater capacity for destruction. Of course intervention as such also constitutes an escalation of conflict. Yet it could be possible that countries would be interested in participating in domestic conflicts if they are dangerous, or it could be possible that conflicting parties in an intra-state conflict would be more likely to allow external interference if the conflict is dangerous.

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64 In case of the original standard PRIO/Uppsala/Correlates of War classification of conflicts, some of the East Asian inter-state conflicts were related to inter-state relations, while some others were related to a real internal conflict and its internationalization, and the division between the conflicting states was created by the conflict.
If we examine discourses that justify military participation in the conflicts of other states, it seems that conflict fatalities have not been a direct reason for interference in East Asia during the time when external powers did interfere militarily in the affairs of East Asian nations. Doctrines of humanitarian intervention to prevent further suffering are recent. On the contrary, it looks as if the logic of power was quite alien to the empathy for the suffering masses. A citation by President Harry S. Truman regarding possible US involvement in the Second World War demonstrates this cold logic very plainly. Truman preferred a strategy of US involvement according to which “[i]f we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstances” (New York Times, 24 June 1941). Truman was not the only one. Mao Zedong did not mind sacrifices as long as his objectives were fulfilled: “If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain, while imperialism would be razed to the ground, and the whole world would become socialist: in a number of years there would be 2.7 billion people again and definitely more” (November 1957, Low 1976). Mao was even willing to sacrifice up to a third of his own people in a nuclear war just as long as this would result in the victory of socialism. While the Soviet leaders were perhaps more careful with the public declarations, it is likely that humanitarian intervention was not included in the strategic toolbox of any of the big powers operating in East Asia during the Cold War.

Instead of humanitarian concerns, US willingness to interfere in a civil war was related to three main interests. Originally, the American interest to interfere militarily in East Asia was related to the so called Domino Theory (Eisenhower 1954: 382; Kennan
1947: 566–82), according to which the main interest of the US in East Asia was to contain communism so that communist nations would not expand their power in the world by subverting countries one by one into becoming communist enemies of the US. In this logic US interference was warranted if the political geography of the country to be interfered with was such that a communist victory was plausible, and if a US military engagement could hinder this. As such the rationale for interference was not directly sensitive to the intensity of the domestic warfare.

The main institutions of military interference, the South-East Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO (Dulles 1980/1954: 155) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements, FPDA (Report of the Five-Power Military Conference 1954) were both motivated by the objective of preventing the geopolitical advance of China and the Soviet Union. While power politics played the primary role in this rationale of military interference, economic interests also featured in the calculations. Losing countries to the communists also meant losing access to valuable materials. The copper and tin of Malaya and the rice of several of the Indochinese countries were often mentioned as additional motives for attempting to prevent the dominoes from falling (see, for example William Lacy 1954).

While the objectives of the Soviet bloc for engaging militarily in intra-state conflicts were freighted with ideology, the logic of Soviet and Chinese expansions of the communist sphere of influence and the defense of communist allies mirrored the Western position (Zhihua 2000; Yafeng 2008). Originally, this mutual geostrategic containment and expansion mainly utilized strategies of deterrence in the prevention of communist/imperialist aggression.
According to Dulles, “the greatest cause of war is miscalculation by an aggressor who thinks he can get away with something cheap and then all of a sudden he finds that he can’t, and if he had known in the beginning, he probably wouldn’t have tried it” (Dulles 1955/1978: 19). Although it is not very sensitive to the intensity of a conflict, it is easy to see how this logic of deterrence feeds into the intensity of a conflict. Both the Soviet Union (and China) and the United States saw each other as aggressors and both sides saw their own moves in this game of escalation as demonstrations of their own resolve, while seeing the moves of the other as aggression that constituted escalation, and thus required punishment. The unwillingness to see any symmetry between the communist and anti-communist power poles prevented both from seeing their own strategies as part of a process of interaction or as a mutual constitution of escalation.

The original logic of containment at the beginning of the 1950s focused on an international power balance, but towards the end of the 1950s a more domestic orientation was assumed. The mechanism of the communist advance was no longer a massive attack like in Korea, but instead, the subversion of a domestic power balance by means of ideological manipulation and the indirect use of power (Zhühua 2000). The American counter-strategy was at first a similar interference in domestic political power battles. The American approach was to manipulate internal political structures by means of aid, bribery and covert operations, but this was later also supplemented by increasing direct military assistance to the anti-communist forces (Statler and Johns 2006). The first approach, with CIA sponsorship of the main anti-communist parties and candidates
(Pauker 1990; Lansdale 1972), assassination plots against radical politicians (McGehee 1983), and finally direct military coups (Draper Report 1959; Lansdale 1959), was still the containment of communism but on a new and different domestic level.

While this approach produced a drastic decline in battle deaths in the beginning, the number of battle deaths in internationalized intra-state conflicts started to increase, once military coups and direct military support for anti-communist domestic factions became fashionable (Nashel 2005). Military assistance with combat troops became more likely once the conflict had reached a certain level of intensity. This was one of the two ways in which the relationship between interference and intensity could be a progression from intensity to interference. The other was related to the rationales of receiving combat troops. The fact that military help was not accepted by the leaders of host countries until the situation was severe suggests that the correlative relationship between intensity and foreign interference could also be from intensity to interference. Leaders were sometimes interested in inviting intrusive US interference, but not one

65 Edward G. Lansdale, a CIA operative in the Philippines in the 1950s, and in Vietnam in the 1960s, describes openly the participation of the CIA in the presidential campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in his book In the Midst of Wars: America’s Mission to Southeast Asia. Guy Pauker, a military intelligence operative and an academic specialist of Indonesia revealed the CIA funding of the Masjumi Party in the Indonesian elections of 1955 in a private interview with the author in Santa Monica, CA, in May 1991.

66 Ralph B. Lovett, a former CIA station chief in Manila, revealed a secret CIA plan together with the US ambassador, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance to assassinate Claro Recto, an opposition contender for the presidency in the Philippines.

67 The need to move to the domestic level of containment instead of operating on a more international, geopolitical level, was revealed first time in one of the meetings of the Five Power Defense Arrangements in 1954 (Report of the Five-Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia 1954).
involving American combat forces unless there was a degree of seriousness to the situation. According to a Washington insider, Frances X. Winters (1988), President John F. Kennedy suggested to South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1961 that the US would send 700 ground troops to South Vietnam to assist in an anti-communist counter-insurgency. President Diem did not accept the offer: “Vietnam does not wish to become a US protectorate” (Winters 1988: 36). However, after heavy fighting in 1962 and 1963 (and after the killing of Diem), US ground troops were welcomed in April 1964.

The average intensity (fatalities per year) of intra-state conflicts that external powers do not enter into was just 11–42% (high and low estimates) compared to the intensity of conflicts that do attract external involvement. So the association between intensity and external interference is partly from high intensity to external military interference (and not the other way around). Yet, if we look at the timing of battle deaths, we shall realize that the intensity of conflict when external powers entered the domestic conflict was very low compared to the intensity that the entry of external powers introduced to a conflict. Thus, the association between intensity and interference is also – and as I shall show below – much more importantly from interference to intensity. The cases below are the greatest contributions to battle deaths in conflicts that have been internationalized.

In Korea the conflict was aggravated by the presence of foreign combat troops from the beginning, as the country was already occupied by the Soviet Union in the North and by the US in the South when the communist rebellions started in the South. Communist uprisings had started in several places long before but the first massive
incident happened on the island of Jeju on April 3, 1948.\textsuperscript{68} Soviet and American troops left in 1949, and so the initial large-scale conflict between communists and anti-communists in Korea started as a “domestic” Korean conflict. The offensive from the North started on June 25 1950 and the US-led UN counter-offensive started a few days later. Together with the Chinese involvement later on this drove the conflict into the most intensive (in terms of the absolute number of casualties per year) war since the Second World War. The military presence of international combat troops increased the capacity for destruction in Korea from the very beginning. As most comparable and reliable statistics reveal data on an annual basis, it is difficult to say how many casualties were caused before the Chinese and Americans entered the conflict. It is likely that the contribution of the external players was very substantial (bigger than in Vietnam). However, since there is no reliable way of knowing, I shall leave Korea out of the quantitative scrutiny of the overall contribution of the internationalization of intra-state conflicts in East Asia.

In Vietnam the conflict started in the context of colonial domination. However, the battle against the communists in the South can be separated from the battle for independence – a conflict that started as an intra-state conflict. Up to 97.4\% of the battle deaths of the Vietnam War were produced in the phase after the US entered with its combat troops, the Soviet Union had started assisting especially with the air defense of the country, and China had stationed mostly non-combat troops there. External

\textsuperscript{68} Surprisingly, Uppsala and PRIO datasets do not recognize the Jeju rebellion, which according to Baker (2009) wiped out 10\% of the Jeju population, and according to a more modest estimate of the Correlates of War Project claimed 40,000 lives.
involvement intensified the conflict 22 times, if intensity is measured by the average number of battle deaths per year in the conflict.

In Cambodia, conflict also started in a colonial context. However, here too it is possible to separate the war of independence and the extra-systemic colonial fighting between the French colonial masters and the Khmer Issarak from the communist versus anti-communist Khmer Rouge War. The Khmer Rouge War in 1967–1969 has often been coded as an intra-state conflict, even though US troops were operating in Cambodia at the time and the country’s leadership had already in 1965 turned to China and the Soviet Union for military assistance. However, since the main international involvement was mostly subordinated to the Vietnam War and not the Khmer Rouge War, the latter war is not at this stage considered internationalized. However, after 1969 the conflict was internationalized both by the US and North Vietnam. At that time the communists received assistance both from China and North Vietnam, and due to the latter connection indirectly also from the Soviet Union (Mosyakov 2004). In this conflict the intensity (measured by average number of casualties per year) of violence increased 29 times after it was internationalized. Up to 98.5–98.8% (low and high estimates) of casualties of this conflict were produced during the international phase of the war.

In Laos it is possible to separate colonial warfare from communist warfare. Also here there was a clear pause between the two, even if much of the same problematique, persons and groups were involved. The conflict started as an intra-state conflict in 1959, but was quickly internationalized by the neighboring Thailand the next year, and by the US in 1963. By the time, the roles of China and the Soviet Union in support of communist combatants were also important besides that of North Vietnam, which
effectively occupied parts of the country for most of the conflict years. Up to 95% of the casualties were produced in the internationalized phase, even though the intensity of the conflict did not increase more than 61%. The intensity of the conflict increased further after the interference became more global and the resources of the Cold War enemies were mobilized for combat.

*Malaysia* is a difficult case for an analysis of the internationalization of conflict. On the one hand, it is clear that the conflict related to the merger of Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo was greatly aggravated by the internationalization of the conflict by Indonesian “volunteers” and military forces. On the other hand, the conflict was not fully internal in the first place as the country was still occupied by the UK, which participated in the conflict as well as in the anti-communist counter-insurgency campaigns related to the Malayan Emergency. Reliable comparisons between internal and international phases of the conflict would not be possible in the same manner as in the cases of the Indo-Chinese countries. Even if it is easy to see that the internationalization of the conflict increases the intensity of the conflict, there is no original domestic phase that the internationalized phase could be compared to. Thus it is not possible to see how much the transition from internal to international cost in terms of human lives. It is just possible to see that the intensity of conflict declined once Malaysia barred international combat troops from its country. Furthermore, it is possible to see that the internationalization of internal conflict had its main effect on battle deaths only once there was interaction between two external antagonistic players: the presence of the UK justified Indonesian violence in Malaysia, while the presence of Indonesia justified violence by the UK. This logic was clearly present also in Indo-China, where
the logic of proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union/China generated a lot of escalation.

In Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, China and the Philippines domestic conflicts did not get fully internationalized in the sense that the main conflict datasets do not recognize a substantial presence of external troops in combat operations. With regard to the Chinese civil war one could challenge this view69, but in the other cases the (US) external military support was mostly of a nature that perhaps constituted secondary support (certainly in the Philippine and Thai struggle against communism: it did not constitute military interference in the sense that external troops were not in combat functions in domestic wars). Thus when assessing the contribution of the internationalization of intra-state conflicts in East Asia before 1980, we should remember that many of the intra-state conflicts did not internationalize. Yet, if we compare the number of battle deaths, we must also conclude that those conflicts that did internationalize were those that were most meaningful for the overall constitution of belligerence of East Asia in 1946–1979. And of the internal conflicts that did become international, up to 97–98% (low and high estimates) of battle deaths took place after the external interference had started. Internationalization contributed to 95% of conflict intensity, if this can be concluded by comparing the phase before and after the internationalization of the conflict. Clearly military interference in intra-state conflicts was a major conflict problem in the belligerent East Asia prior to 1980.

69 US troops, that were in China to disarm the Japanese troops, also participated in the Chinese civil war in support of the nationalists against the communists (Blum 1999: 21-22).
Mechanism of the Contribution of Interference to Battle Deaths

While there is no consensus about or even comprehensive analysis of the correlative relationship between military interference and conflict intensity, there are some case-specific models of a plausible causal or constitutive mechanism behind the correlative relationship between conflict intensity and military interference. The starting point of these arguments is in the fact that increased external resources for destruction lead to more battle deaths in conflicts. But the argument is much more sophisticated. According to Lyall and Wilson III the mechanized, clinical mode of battle (with the extensive use of air power) may be efficient in inter-state battles, but in counter-insurgency this type of battle is not useful. Such counter-insurgency effort remains insensitive to the grievance that fuels rebellion, and might even strengthen the resolve of the people to fight (Lyall and Wilson III 2009). This mechanized, air-power-driven warfare is especially typical of democracies that fight wars in faraway places. These wars might be difficult to legitimize to the domestic constituencies, especially if they produce loss of life among the country’s own population. The effort to avoid own casualties, which tends to be the main reason for opposition to participation in distant wars, external interference tends to the mechanization of combat, and this again tends to power-intensive, low-manpower militaries. Such a war doctrine does reduce the number of own casualties, but at the same time it leads to high levels of indiscriminate violence inside the country where foreign troops are sent. As a result interference kills a lot of people that it is supposed to defend (Merom 2003; Mack 1975). Even though these mechanisms that link high intensity with external interference have been criticized in case studies for nuances (see e.g. Caverley 2009/10), it seems clear that all of the Indo-Chinese conflicts tend to support the main gist of the argument: domestic critique of the
war in the US pushed American administrations to greater hardware intensity and reliance on airpower, and thus to inefficiency in relation to conflict objectives, but intensity in terms of battle deaths per year. While there is less data and openly accessible analysis on the interference by socialist countries, one cannot rule out that also autocrats have political pressures from the people and from the bureaucracy and the military, if military interference results in many battle deaths on the side of the intervener. Thus the same logic of military myopia could play an important role also in the interference by the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam.

The above-mentioned “Military Myopia” argument is appealing in the explanation of the problem of military interference in East Asia, but it does not explain why the security elites of external powers wanted to engage in faraway intra-state wars in the first place. When looking at the arguments about anti-imperialism from the Eastern bloc, or the arguments about the falling dominoes or the Draper Committee argument about the need for the encouragement of the military elites of frontline countries, it seems clear that the reason why external powers were interested in interfering in domestic conflicts was related to the interaction of the interference between the global enemies, the US and the Soviet Union. Both considered their own moves in the game of global escalation as independent deterrents with causal effects on the utility calculations of the opponent. Showing strength was supposed to give disincentives to the opponent for aggression. However, both sides failed to consider their own moves as part of a process of symmetrical interaction. Without going into the debate about constitution and causality, the problem was that both sides considered the causal effects of their actions, but failed to see what their own moves constituted in the
dialectical processes of escalation. Interference did not just cause something, it already was part of the escalation.

After the Nixon (or Guam) Doctrine that emphasized a development orientation and regional and national self-help in security affairs (Nixon 1973), and after the ASEAN commitment to the same principles (ASEAN Declaration 1967) and finally after China’s move to become developmentalist rather than a revolutionary helper of international revolutions (Deng 1982), East Asia moved to a strategy whose impact on conflicts and battle deaths will be revealed in the following section.

**Association between Non-Interference and Peace**

The new approach of non-interference was clearly a major contribution to the fact that after 1979 conflicts did not escalate into war intensity. The number of average annual casualties in internationalized intra-state wars was reduced by 98.3–99.5% (high and low estimates). The only conflict where military interference took place was the conflict of the Cambodian government against the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, where the government was supported by Vietnam. Only once (in 1989) did these Cambodian conflicts escalate into a war intensity if we follow the low estimates of conflict related fatalities, while they were a full war during the entire time of internationalization if we follow the high estimates.

If we look at the nature of military interference we shall find another feature that relates to the likelihood of conflict escalation. While military interference took place in 32 conflict years against an East Asian government before 1980, this ended altogether after 1979. This is relevant as it seems that it is indeed an intervention against the government of the territory that is generally most closely associated with intensity of conflicts (Regan 1996). Not a single time did East Asians interfere the governments of
other East Asian countries; nor did they allow extra-regional military interference by the big powers against East Asian governments (the case of Interfet in East Timor in 1998 is a difficult border case, though). This is clearly significant to conflict escalation potential. If we look at the difference in the influence of support of vs. the opposition to governments regarding conflict escalation, we will realize that after the Second World War 31 times out of 32 dyads, when external military interference was opposing an East Asian government, conflict escalated into war intensity. However, only in seven of the 20 cases of military interference in support of an East Asian government did the conflict escalate into a war.\textsuperscript{70} Since all ten conflict dyads of internationalized intra-state conflicts were of the type where external (Vietnamese) interference was in support of rather than in opposition to the government, it is natural that conflict dyads were not as deadly.

While it will not possible to trace the process in which conflicts do not escalate (it is not possible to observe a process that never took place), it is possible to try to understand how non-interference was possible, and how it was felt legitimate and acceptable as a foundation of the de-escalation of conflict in East Asia.

While military occupation and strong limitations on a state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence were the foundation of collective security in Europe, the East Asian way to peace seems to have been the opposite. This can only be understood in the historical context of the two regions. In Europe expansionist ultra-nationalist states had been perceived as the main security challenge in the Second World War, so it was natural that a curtailment of national sovereignty seemed an attractive and legitimate foundation of the terms of peace. However, since East Asian warfare was

\textsuperscript{70} Here the calculation is based on low estimates. If high estimates were used, the situation is more even as almost all internationalized inter-state conflict dyads were on war intensity if high estimates of battle deaths were used.
traditionally (and certainly in the two main wars, Korean and Vietnamese) a story of the disrespect of national sovereignty, and since interference was always a multiplier of sufferings of war, it was natural for East Asia to find consensus in terms of peace that were based on a respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Non-interference might not be an objective, global recipe for peace. The success of a regional security regime depends, in part, on its legitimacy, which again is dependent on historical contexts. Legitimacy for non-interference is generated in the narratives of the past and the diagnoses of the problems of past wars. East Asian narrative and diagnosis of the past internationalized conflicts logically pointed to a strategy based on sovereignty and non-interference.

The fact that the East Asian military non-interference norm mainly disallows interference against (not so much in favor of) the government is due to the East Asian power political contexts (Jones 2012). An authoritarian, harmony-emphasizing culture has been crucial for the appeal of the non-interference principle (Neher 1994). Democratization has created pressures against the broad political principle of non-interference (Neher and Ross 1995), but the core of military non-interference – the norm against sending troops to support a challenger of a fellow East Asian nation – is very much intact. There has been no military interference since 1990.

The only way to explain the mechanism of the contribution of military non-interference to peace in East Asia is to look at what interference no longer does to conflict escalation in East Asia. A very explicit ban on military interference has increased the political costs of interference in an economically very interesting area. This ban, together with the weakening of the Soviet Union in East Asia in the 1980s has ruled out Soviet military intervention. The Chinese and eventually also Vietnamese
growing focus on development rather than revolution has discouraged Chinese and Vietnamese interventionism. Furthermore, the regional norm against interference together with the easing of the tension between China and the US in the 1970s has made it possible to keep the US and China out of any East Asian national defense of internal stability. Easing of tension has made it possible for China and others to allow US military limited role in East Asia, while allowing the US to accept the limits to its military role. While US military presence is acceptable, the US also accepts a limitation of its presence rather than an active combat role. This has been possible partly because of the fact that China has accepted to abstain from military support of communist movements in East Asia.

Since interference and intervention ended already at the end of the 1970s, we cannot explain it only as a result of the ending of the Cold War. The regions own decisions to take a negative view of permanent military bases and zero tolerance towards military interference to help challengers of regimes have been meaningful as they have, as a very public orientation, created political costs for anyone willing to ignore this regional orientation.

The de-escalation of conflicts by means of moving an external capacity to fight wars away from the region has not been an idealistic reliance on the power of norms, though. Creating normative costs has been just one of the elements. The other element has been the idea of reducing the incentive of foreign interference by denying access to the opponents of the potential powers interested in military interference. The main motive for the US to enter the Vietnam War was the presence of communist forces in the country. Similarly the main interest of the Soviet Union to help Vietnam was the presence of the US in South Vietnam. The norm of non-interference has constituted a
situation, which has secured the defensive interests in de-escalation of all parties. In short it has had a major role for the long peace of East Asia.
Chapter 6

Face Saving and the Termination of Conflicts.

Introduction

While the decline in the number of East Asian battle deaths has been a positive development, the new East Asian approach to conflicts and interaction is not necessarily successful in its entirety. I have already shown how developmentalism has reduced the probability of the onset of conflicts, while non-interference has drastically contributed to the region’s ability to avoid conflict escalation. The emergence of peace in the 1970s does not therefore logically require that East Asia had adopted a new, successful approach to conflict termination. Exploration of the ratio of conflict termination to conflicts on the basis of the Uppsala conflict-termination data (data published in Kreutz 2010), reveals that there has not been a significant positive change in the record of East Asian conflict termination after 1979.

Empirical analysis does, however, show that East Asia’s approach to conflict termination has changed around the time that the number of East Asian battle deaths collapsed. But it is less certain that the new approach in all its elements contributed to the new peace. On the one hand, conflict termination approach has not managed to make conflict termination much more frequent. On the other hand, approach to conflict termination can have had an impact on East Asian conflict behavior: a pattern of conflict termination can reveal how countries perceive conflicts, conflict objectives and the conditions in which conflicts can be terminated. Thus, even if conflict termination has not become more efficient conflicts can have become less deadly if countries do not expect conflicts only to end in the total destruction of one of the conflicting parties.
The two main changes in the East Asian approach to conflict termination were the near disappearance of military victories and the near disappearance of successful peace processes. Both changes were related to the overall change of approach in East Asia, from a confrontational, power-political approach that mobilized publicity and people for the victory in intra- and interstate disputes, into a more discrete, personalistic, indirect approach that rarely focuses on divisive issues such as disputes, but that rather focuses on the tackling of the grievances behind disputes and on saving the face of all parties of disputes.

By using the Uppsala conflict-termination data (Kreutz 2010) we can summarize the pattern of conflict termination in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2¹¹</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with conflict regulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low activity</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining alliance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹¹ I discussed one of the two peace processes in Chapter 3 and concluded that the latest Uppsala data on the peace process of East Timor could be erroneous and that in fact the only peace process that was genuinely the reason for the disappearance of conflict is the Aceh peace process.
Disappearance of Victories

The first, potentially positive, transformation in the East Asian approach to conflict termination that can be seen reflected in the summary of Table 7.1 is the near disappearance of victories. For a more detailed analysis Table 6.2 lists the conflicts that have been terminated in a victory:

Table 6.2 Victories in East Asia after the Second World War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting party 1</th>
<th>Conflicting party 2</th>
<th>Conflict duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Taiwanese insurgents</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>APLP (Arakan Peoples Liberation Party), Mujahid Party</td>
<td>1948–1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>BMA (Beik Mon Army, faction of the NMSP, New Mon State Party)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>PNDF (Pawnguawng National Defence Force)</td>
<td>1949–1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Republic of South Moluccas</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Military faction (Navy)</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>1958–1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>North Kalimantan Liberation Army</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>1965–1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge/FUNK</td>
<td>1967–1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>KNUFNS, Khmer Rouge, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>1978–1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the belligerent period East Asian states often sought to humiliate their domestic challengers with a victory. This can be seen in the record of Chinese, Malaysian, Indonesian, Burmese and Thai approaches (Table 6.2). In most cases the enemy that was defeated and humiliated was an ethnic rebel organization, and the defeat often constituted a humiliation for the entire ethnic group. The conflict then continued.
as the ethnic group re-established the defeated ethnic militia\textsuperscript{72} or established new militant organizations,\textsuperscript{73} against the government. In the case of Thailand, the challenger was not always ethnic (or a political) group, but a faction in the military, but the response of the government was nevertheless one that did not aim at mutual benefit or “dignity for all” or tackling of grievances of the rebel constituencies. Instead the objective was power political, the intention was to defeat the enemy and make it incapable of retaliation. In Brunei the conflict against the North Kalimantan Liberation Army took place in a colonial context. Only in Cambodia (1998) did this practice of humiliating one’s domestic enemies by means of military defeat continued beyond 1979, but not after the country joined the ASEAN. Also the conflict that was terminated by victory in Cambodia was one that had started already before the beginning of the peaceful phase in East Asia.

The approach of seeking victory instead of offering face saving for one’s enemies was also applied to some conflicts with international enemies. Of these conflicts the Vietnam War had naturally the biggest impact on battle deaths, because it

\textsuperscript{72} The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) reorganized itself after being defeated and continued its fight until 1981 (a good account of the Malaysian effort against it can be found in Mahathir 2011). the Republic of South Moluccas re-established itself in the Netherlands; it still exists but is not fighting (Nikijuluw, 1999).

\textsuperscript{73} PNDF (Pawnguang National Defence Force) was defeated, but its members returned to the battle ground as members of the Burmese communist Party or as members of the Kachin Independence Organization or Kachin Independence Army. APLP (Arakan Peoples Liberation Party) and the Mujahid Party were defeated as organizations in the very beginning of Burmese military dictatorship. However, many of the members of the two organizations established new organizations for the Rakhine/Arakan State Muslims. Conflict there has not ended so far (Pedersen in Kivimäki & Pedersen 2008). The crushing of Tibetan resistance was also more dependent of people than formal organizations, and thus discontent continued among the people that had been crushed in 1950 and flared up in a new armed clash in 1959 and smaller incidents ever since (Sperling 2004).
was from the beginning driven to a power-political path where only a victory could save the face of a conflicting party (Anderson 2011). Only the conflict between Vietnam and China ended in a victory after the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. Even this conflict started before the peaceful period and the victorious side – Vietnam – had not yet become developmentalist, with respect of the non-interference principle, when it terminated the conflict victoriously.

It would not be fair to claim that Indonesia did not aim at a military victory in Aceh at the turn of the century, or that Burma/Myanmar did not try to defeat its ethnic enemies and that the Thai or the Philippine army did not intend to suppress victoriously their separatist Muslim insurgencies in their countries even after the beginning of the peaceful period in East Asia. However, they were not obsessed about winning in the same way as the parties of the Cold War proxy wars were obsessed about defeating their enemies. There have been two positive changes that are reflected in the near disappearance of victorious conflicts.

One of the positive changes is that developmentalism has penetrated conflict termination efforts. East Asian countries are often very simple-minded of the benefits for stability of economic development in rebellious areas, such as Tibet, Papua, Aceh (Husain 2007). As will be discussed in the final chapter of this book, developmentalism has not always been sufficient for the termination of intra-state conflicts in East Asia.

74 While the 1951 agreement between China and the disputed representatives of Tibet stipulated that “the purpose of the agreement was to enable Tibet to repel the imperialist forces and realize peaceful liberation, and to create prerequisites for Tibet to join the other parts of the country”, the White Paper on Tibet from 2011 defines the purpose of the Chinese policy in Tibet as unity, and the method as offering prosperity and development: “China implements the ethnic minority policy of promoting unity and achieving common prosperity and development.” (Chinese Government 2011)
but it has been a better alternative than the simple-minded pursuit of military victories (Kivimäki 2012c).

Developmentalist regional framing also helped East Asia get rid of its Cold War framing of inter-state relations and conflicts. The Cold War narratives of the inevitable victory of socialism or capitalist freedom dominated East Asian thinking of interstate relations and disputes until the 1970s and this affected conflict termination (see for example Anderson 2011). In a framing where the main contradiction of the world is between communism and capitalism, two fundamentally opposed political systems, the logic of relative power easily invades the thinking of international relations and portrays disputes as zero-sum games. Within such a setting, face saving is not feasible. Only once East Asia had developed a framing of their own in the 1970s could they be released from the zero-sum framing of international conflicts.75 The Sino–Chinese conflict in 1979 exemplified the transition. While the first phase of it was oriented towards the objective of a victory (even if not a total victory as the Cold War conflicts often were), this changed in the 1980s. Once the regional order consolidated in the 1980s even the conflicts between Vietnam and China tended to fizzle away because of the concerns of economic development rather than resolution of disputes (Hood 1992). Even though negotiations failed to produce a peace agreement and even if the first phase of Sino–Vietnamese conflict ended in a victory rather than in a peace process, this conflict represents a case where the dispute was explicitly (even if not successfully) negotiated in the beginning of the conflict.

75 But since the transition in the approach to the termination of international conflicts was not drastic, one should not exaggerate this point.
The other thing was the ending of populist, popular mobilization of conflicts. During the belligerent 1960s international relations, especially with regard to the US and China, or towards the perceived colonial powers or neo-colonialists were often driven by popular mass campaigns. Burma’s (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no. 31, 1967: 217–219. and no. 34, 1968: 190–191), Indonesia’s (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no. 29, 1967: 196–7; no. 29, 1967: 225), Malaysia’s (National Chinese News Agency May 20, 1969) and sometimes also the Philippines’s (van der Kroeff 1967) dissatisfaction towards Chinese support of communist subversion was demonstrated by officially sanctioned or at least officially tolerated popular action against the Chinese Embassy, Chinese property and ethnic Chinese. Similarly, Chinese dissatisfaction towards US policies in Vietnam, Soviet hegemonism, and anti-Chinese actions in Southeast Asia and even lack of support to Mao Zedong’s political thinking in Mongolia were demonstrated by Red Guard actions against foreign embassies (see Chapter 7 of this book).

This pattern of people’s diplomacy often invited opportunities for regimes to release popular anger against foreign targets (Wright 1965). For governments that did not actively remove grievances that gave rise to rebellion, this was a tempting option. As will be shown in the following chapter, this option was taken at least by the Indonesian and the Chinese governments, and it contributed to the intensity of communist subversion in Southeast Asia during the Cultural Revolution as well as to the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s.

The following chapter will show that conflict resolution became very secretive and personalistic in the late 1960s and in the 1970s removing the option of
popular/populistic diplomacy from the menu of the options of governments. Internal conflict pressures were supposed to be tackled by means of domestic development, while the diversion of domestic pressures against external enemies was explicitly condemned (Anwar 1994). Divisive issues were not supposed to be discussed in public and thus mobilizing masses for victory in a dispute became less common (Soesastro 1995: iii-ix; Haller-Trost 1995). Yet, one should not exaggerate this change as it is clear that in the most recent maritime territorial disputes between China and Japan, as well as between China and the Philippines, popular diplomacy and arguments appealing with the rhetoric of victorious battles have once again been mobilized.

Given that wars ending in a victory contributed to almost one-third of the battle deaths, and given that conflicts that were framed by the objective of victory (those that were terminated in a victory) were the most intensive conflicts in East Asia (with the highest number of battle deaths per year), it could be assumed that the near ending of victories in East Asia might have had its contribution to the long peace of East Asia.

**Disappearance of Peace Negotiation**

The other clear change that can be seen in the summary of changes in conflict termination in Table 6.1 is the near disappearance of conflict termination by peace agreement (Kivimäki 2008; Svensson 2011). While conflict termination by victories often tell something about the framing of the entire conflict, and not just about the approach to conflict termination only, the disappearance of successful peace agreements

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76 This claim is based on a calculation from the Uppsala conflict-termination data and PRIO battle-death data (version 3.0), according to which 32% of the casualties of the conflicts that were terminated after the Second World War in East Asia were from conflicts that ended with a victory to one of the conflicting parties. The number of casualties in victorious wars is bigger than the number of conflicts terminated in any other way.
probably tells more about the approach to divisive issues such as conflict disputes. Table 6.3 lists the conflicts that have ended in peace negotiation. Only one or two of them are from the peaceful period in East Asia.

**Table 6.3 Successful termination of conflicts by peace agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party 1</th>
<th>Party 2</th>
<th>Year (of the conflict)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Indonesian nationalist and communist militias</td>
<td>1946–1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Vietminh</td>
<td>1946–1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Pathet Lao, Neutralists</td>
<td>1959–1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Netherlands/Supporters of West Papuan Independence</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Malaysia (and the UK)</td>
<td>1963–1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos (and the US)</td>
<td>Pathet Lao</td>
<td>1963–1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>1997–1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
<td>1999–2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the wars in East Asia (with Laos 1959–61 and 1963–1973 being the only exception during the belligerent period) that ended with a negotiated solution tended to be wars of decolonization and re-colonization after the Japanese occupation. They were possible to negotiate as the concept of colonialism was already unsustainable economically and politically. If we look at the origin of the ASEAN peace (discussed in detail in Chapter 7) we can also see that peace processes of these wars were dominated

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77 See footnote 1 of this chapter for a reservation of the coding of this conflict termination.

78 While the Franco–Thai War after the Second World War (and during it) was not directly related to colonialism of Thailand, which was never colonized, it was related to the return of the French colonial occupation in Indo–China (see, Tully 2002: 327–49).
by extra-regional powers.\footnote{The influence and manipulation by the US in the failed efforts to settle the Malaysian Confrontation have been well documented by the US Ambassador at the time, in Jones, 1974.} Once the ASEAN way of settling conflicts emerged, explicit negotiation on disputes became rare and the explicit focusing of disputes was felt alien to the region (Soesastro 1995; Snitwongse 1998). The difficulty of negotiating on peace could be clearly seen in the original ASEAN countries, and later in China, while Northeast Asia seems to have been a bit more open (though no more successful) towards tackling disputes head on. Recently, there have been several processes suggesting that the East Asian shyness towards explicit tackling of disputes could be overcome. Yet, peace negotiation to resolve disputes during the long peace of East Asia often still tends to be driven, or at least considerably influenced, by external powers. The Six-party Talks have a strong American fingerprint,\footnote{Several studies close to the US administration testify at least to the perceptions of the dominant American role in the Six-party Talks. See, for example, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 2006.} while the explicit negotiation on the Cambodian conflict was also externally driven by the UN (see UNAMIC, undated).

With the exception of the war in Laos (1963–1973), none of the cold war proxy wars with US combat troops were negotiated successfully. The framing of those wars was power-political, and thus about relative gains. Such wars tended to end in victories if they were to end. The disappearance of the Cold War framing of international politics and the emergence of a more regional framing in the late 1960s and in the 1970s probably contributed to the decline in battle deaths and the emergence of the long peace of East Asia.
The near disappearance of explicit conflict resolution in East Asia is related to three elements of the ASEAN Way of conflict prevention. First, it is related to the effort to focus on things that unite rather than on things that divide. Disputes divide and thus they are difficult to deal with. When Ahtisaari was mediating the conflict in Aceh in 2004, he often had to initiate discussions on issues that the conflicting parties were “too polite” to raise. For example the issue of a fair administering of the revenue sharing from the natural resources of special province of Aceh was not raised by the independence-minded Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement). Thus this issue needed to be brought on the negotiation table by the mediator even though it was undoubtedly one of the central issues of discontent for the GAM (discussions with the mediators, especially President Martti Ahtisaari April 2004).

The other reason why disputes are often not dealt with is the strategy of addressing concerns of rebel constituencies (or dissatisfied neighboring nations) by addressing their grievances. Instead of negotiating with the Papuans or the Muslim rebels of Southern Thailand, or the main independence-minded people of Tibet, governments try to satisfy the needs of the constituencies of these rebels. In this way the government does not need to lose face by recognizing rebels as legitimate actors in the conflict problematics, but they can make compromises just like in negotiations (anonymous interview data).

Thirdly, the strict interpretation of non-interference has made it difficult for other states or other external actors to offer good services mediation or arbitration in conflicts where the government of an East Asian country is a conflicting party. Yet, as one of the leading Southeast Asian mediators and peace negotiators, Ambassador Wiryono Sastrohandojo said in 2007, “you cannot play ball and be the referee at the
same time”. Conflicts where the government is a conflicting party often need external “interference” and this is difficult in East Asia. However, Malaysia has recently played a constructive role in the mediation and facilitation of several conflict resolution efforts (Razak 2011), while Indonesia has allowed two NGOs to mediate in the Aceh peace process (Hasan 2007) and the Philippines has allowed Indonesian and Malaysian mediation and facilitation of peace talks in two of its conflicts (Misuari 2010).

The difficulty of East Asian governments to tackle their disputes head on in explicit peace negotiation is likely to be a problem for East Asian stability. This is especially the case in disputes where the ASEAN Way does not fully function, for instance in the maritime territorial disputes. There one would have to resolve the disputes eventually the disputes. As things are now conflicts end in inaction, which allows face saving for conflicting parties, but which also fails to settle the dispute.

The near disappearance of successful peace processes has not meant that peace is not negotiated at all. It seems that there are initiatives to revive the tradition of peace negotiation in East Asia. While in the North (in Six-party Talks), such initiatives are often lead by the United States (but also South Korea and China, for example), the experience of a successful peace process in Aceh has energized many emerging fragile peace processes in Southeast Asia. The main Indonesian architect of the Aceh peace, Vice President Jusuf Kalla has also managed to negotiate peace in Poso and in Ambon. Neither process actually ended violence as it had already ended before. This is why these processes are not coded as successful peace processes despite the fact that they dramatically consolidate the existing ceasefire and created the political terms for it. Furthermore, the Philippines has managed to negotiate two peace agreements with its Islamic opponents on the Island of Mindanao. Yet these agreements did not end
violence on the island and therefore they are not coded as successful peace process. Finally, also Myanmar has managed to negotiate on peace in the spirit of dignity for all (rather than victory for some and defeat for others). The 2007 National Convention process qualifies as a massive peace negotiation process, but there, the fact that the government was playing and acting as the referee too, hindered the feeling of ownership of the negotiated constitution from the ethnic groups who participated in the negotiation process (Kivimäki 2008a).

Since the revival of the tradition of peace negotiation is still only an unfinished process, it cannot be studied empirically. I shall, however, return to the promise of the recent efforts in peace negotiation in the more speculative final chapter, which not only concludes the findings of this study on the pillars of the long peace of East Asia but also speculates about the future prospects of this still fragile peace.
Chapter 7

Generation of the Successful ASEAN/Chinese Approach

Introduction

The previous chapters have revealed a systematic correlative relationship between the elements of the ASEAN Way and the decline in conflict and battle deaths, while previous studies have shown how these elements might serve peace in current Southeast Asian interaction (see for example, Acharya 2001). The success of the ASEAN Way has often been attributed to the commitment of the political elites to these principles but also to the feeling of ownership to these principles (Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2001). Such commitment and feeling of ownership is then explained as the foundation of common East Asian identity and perception of common interest (Ba 2011; Acharya 2001). What has remained unclear is the reason why these elements of conflict management have become owned by the East Asian elites, and how the commitment to them has been generated. The present chapter will tackle this omission in the existing research by going to the genesis of ASEAN transition to the ASEAN Way and the genesis of the Chinese transition to non-interference, developmentalism and face saving. It will uncover the background of the success of the ASEAN Way – how it was generated, and how this formula for peace gained support among regional leaders and how the East Asian commitment to and ownership of the ASEAN way emerged. Since this development took place in two separate historical processes, one in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1960s, and one in China in the 1970s, I shall divide this chapter into two, one part for each historical process.

The chapter does not seek explanations that could associate the success of the
ASEAN Way to beneficial exogenous conditions. Instead, it uses Rogers Smith’s idea of generative causality, where causes and effects are not exogenous, but part of a common historical context (Smith 2003). Effects are not deterministic or probabilistic responses to external conditions. Instead, they follow logical historical processes, where social and historical contexts have causal powers as they give sense to certain conclusions. In this chapter the crucial mission is to explain the historical context where the ASEAN Way started making a lot of sense for China and for Southeast Asian states and elites. Success was generated by motivating the commitment of the East Asian elites to the ASEAN Way and by giving an indigenous sense to the ASEAN formula of conflict prevention.

**Origin of the ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia**

ASEAN was initiated by five nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Yet, it was established largely as a response to the difficult relationship of two of the founding members, Indonesia and Malaysia. The greatest change in ASEAN interstate relationships was indeed needed for the relationship between these two countries. This is why special attention is devoted to the transformation of the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia: the change in the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia reflects best the genesis of ASEAN pacification. This is not meant to signal a claim that only Malaysia and Indonesia were important for the establishment of ASEAN, on the contrary; Thailand and the Philippines, but certainly also Singapore had their important roles in the Southeast Asian regional transformation. However, focusing on the biggest transformation could make it easier to observe the change in the Southeast Asian approach to conflicts and the result of that change.
As the first step, this part will analyze the problems that ASEAN sought answers to. For the relationship between the two most belligerent nations before the establishment of ASEAN, these problems were related to the Malaysian Confrontation in 1963–1966, and the failure to resolve it by using standard best practices of conflict resolution. It was the commonly experienced problems that gave rise to two of the principles of the ASEAN Way: non-interference and developmentalism. Because of the heavy Western pressure these efforts were perceived as alien, and they failed to gain the local commitment and the feeling of ownership among the Southeast Asian nations. However, after several international efforts, a different, more local approach to the resolution of the confrontation was eventually adopted. The principles of this approach were later generalized to Southeast Asian interstate relations and this led into the establishment of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN – in 1966–67. The new approach might have been less orthodox from the dispute-resolution point of view, but it nevertheless managed to gain regional commitment to the ASEAN Way. The new approach succeeded in creating a regime of interaction that could become a basis of conflict prevention in decades to come. This regime could later be copied by East Asia with the same results of peacefulness.

The Malaysian Confrontation

The Vietnam War and Indonesia’s anti-neocolonialist campaign against the establishment of an independent, pro-British Malaysia (by merging Malaya with Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak) framed the Southeast Asian political life in the mid-1960s. The latter campaign also involved the Philippines that had an overlapping territorial claim with the emerging Federation of Malaysia. Thailand was one of the nations that offered its good services for the resolution of the ‘Malaysian
Confrontation’. While the Vietnam War was a more global conflict, with the Soviet Union supporting the communists and the United States supporting the Saigon regime, the Malaysian Confrontation involved the Southeast Asian countries that later established a cooperative regime which successfully tackled the disputes that the countries were to face.

The Philippine resistance of Malaysia was non-military, and concentrated merely against the idea of including North Borneo into the federation as the State of Sabah. The Indonesian opposition, however, was more fundamental and involved many military strategies. Yet both countries were prepared to aim at a victory against a colonial creation: for the Philippines the victory was to be limited (Sabah), while Indonesia aimed ‘to eat raw-mengganjang’, or to Crush Malaysia, which then became the name of the conflict. There was no room for consensual dialogue aimed at saving everybody’s face in the conflict – something that was so typical of conflict resolution in the Southeast Asian societies. Furthermore, the objectives of both the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrated a lack of any respect to Malaysia’s internal affairs or national sovereignty – principles that characterized the ASEAN approach to security. The commitment to the idea of non-interference and the norm of respecting sovereignty emerged after the Confrontation as an antithesis to the approach that had created trouble to the region. Commitment to non-interference was a product of this historical context where intervention had caused hurt to all states of the region. Obviously the Vietnam War that escalated by the interference of external big powers also emphasized the need for a regional norm according to which sovereignty of regional countries had to be respected.

The official grounds for the Indonesian leadership rejecting Malaysia were based on its being an undemocratic merger orchestrated by the feudal Malayan elites and the neo-
colonialist United Kingdom (Indonesian Embassy undated; Indonesian Embassy 1964). As a proof of the fact that the establishment of Malaysia did not bring about real de-colonization or real independence for Malaysians, Sukarno pointed to the request by the United Kingdom to retain military bases in Malaysia (Sukarno 1964).

The fact that Malaysia’s establishment was supported by Indonesia until the end of the confrontation with the Dutch to decolonize Irian Jaya indicates that there were other motives for the Malaysian Confrontation than those presented in public. According to the American Ambassador in Malaysia (Baldwin 1984: 109), Sukarno, a charismatic revolutionary leader, needed a conflict for the support of his power. Conflict and struggle were needed as an essential part of the function of the state in order to justify its leadership by a revolutionary figure. Concentration on economic problems would have been necessary for the tackling of grievances that motivated desperate, violent popular action, but this was inconsistent with the political identity of Sukarno. If bringing economic development was expected from the state, revolutionary leaders like Sukarno were no longer needed for the management of state affairs. Sukarno could not tackle economic problems and compensated this deficiency by articulating a revolutionary reality where economic rationality did not exist. This he did, for example, by refusing to nominate a single economist to the team which was to design the government’s Eight Year Overall Development Plan and then praise the product of the team for being ‘rich in fantasy’ (Feith, 1963: 83).

However, the people of Indonesia did experience the economic realities and the fact that they did not have enough food to eat made them grievant. While tackling economic conflict grievances was not compatible with Sukarno’s revolutionary political approach, popular anger had to be channeled away from the political leadership to imperialist and colonialist conspirators.
Once the Netherlands had left Irian Jaya, Indonesia did not have such conspirators on their own soil. In the absence of domestic battles of liberation, Indonesian revolutionary leadership needed to move on to expansionism and adventurism abroad (Pauker 1963). This was essential to contain the problems that were caused by the incompatibility of the revolutionary approach with the focus on tackling economic problems head on. Confrontational nationalistic discourse had to be created as logic that accommodated Sukarno’s continued leadership and redirected grievances to actors outside the national political elite (Poulgrain 1999).

The hurt caused by the revolutionary state ideology and the neglect of developmental responsibilities of the state gave rise to the regional commitment to the main element in the prevention of the onset of conflicts of the ASEAN Way. After the Malaysian confrontation (and the rule of President Sukarno in Indonesia) development was considered as a responsibility of regional states in order for the region to avoid diversionary wars, where popular dissatisfaction emanating from economic trouble was channeled to aggression against other regional states. Again the common experience of a problem generated the commitment to a regional remedy.

The conflict behavior was based on the Indonesian mass support of President Sukarno’s confrontational policies. Just as in China during the Cultural Revolution, Indonesia waged war by mobilizing voluntary fighters by using the Defense Force organization and the Communist Party organization. Later, also the military personnel were covertly used to support the ‘spontaneous’ people’s militias. The solidarity of the people was maintained by strict control of the media for the purpose of constructing nationalistic myths against Malaysia and concealing the weaknesses of the Indonesian claim, revealed by the negotiations with the Malaysian politicians. The records of Bangkok meetings show that the Malaysian delegation was able to discredit Indonesia’s arguments against Malaysia rather convincingly and that, in direct negotiations, it was very difficult for the Indonesians to sustain any grounds for their
claims (Record of the 1st Meeting of the Political Committee 1964; Memorandum on Tripartite talks 1964; USIS 1964). Yet in public they were always very confident of the justification of their cause.

International pressure on the prevention of further violence between Malaysia and Indonesia was focused on efforts to resolve disputes about Malaysia’s establishment. However, the focus on narrow conflict resolution did not tackle the contextual realities of the conflict. If Indonesia needed a struggle, no dispute resolution could end such a struggle, unless the identity of the revolutionary state of Indonesia was altered. The initial efforts to solve the conflict involved US-mediated negotiations between the conflicting parties in the so-called Manila Conference on July 29 – August 5, 1963, in the so-called Tripartite talks in Bangkok on February 5–9, 1964, and in the Tokyo Negotiations on 18–July 20, 1964. Furthermore, popular referendum was used twice to determine the will of the people in the areas that – according to Indonesia – were reluctant to join Malaysia. Furthermore, the mediation effort used third party advice from a group of eminent experts from Afro-Asian governments. Finally, also coercive persuasion was used. A presidential envoy, Robert F. Kennedy, was sent to deliver President Sukarno a threat of a US military involvement in case Indonesia did not stop its aggression. All these means of conflict resolution testify openess from the conflicting parties to focus on the problems and to accept external help. Furthermore, they exemplify the standard diplomatic tools and best practices of conflict resolution. However, none of them worked. Instead, the ill-advised, narrow-minded focus on conflict resolution and the reliance of the standard international tools of crisis management just created alienation among Southeast Asian countries. Developmentalism was needed to tackle the root causes of conflict, while empowerment of regional efforts were needed to gain local ownership of peace, and to avoid the alienation of Indonesian elite from the internationally dictated conflict management approaches.
The publicly announced reasons why the solution formula of the Manila Conference – a UN monitored referendum – failed to satisfy the Indonesian party were two technical problems of the arrangement. First of all, Indonesian observers of the plebiscite were refused an entry to Malaysia by UK customs officials from the very beginning of the process. Some of the Indonesian observers were working for the Indonesian intelligence establishment and had to be changed before the Indonesian delegation could enter the country. Second, British officials announced the unification of Malaysia already before the UN had announced the results of the plebiscite on September 14, 1963 (Harriman 1969; see also Suwito of Indonesia in the Record of the 1st Meeting of the Political Committee 1964).

Yet it was more probable that the reason for not accepting the result of the plebiscite was rather the fact that Indonesia as a revolutionary state simply did not appreciate the outcome of it. Indonesia had no culture for respecting the voices of ordinary people and therefore it was not difficult for President Sukarno simply to ignore the referendum result once it turned out to be against Indonesia’s interests. Contrary to the predictions of the Indonesian political elite, the merger was supported by an overwhelming majority of Malaysians (Jones 1974). Thus Indonesia rejected the result despite earlier promises. It was obviously easy for Indonesia to backtrack from its promises as it seemed that Indonesian leadership was not really committed to the process of the negotiation. Despite the best practices, Indonesia did not feel ownership to it, and thus it was politically possible for the revolutionary leadership to backtrack on explicit commitments in the process. More importantly, despite the economic grievances, due to the revolutionary political discourse, reckless moves in the negotiations were not even condemned by the Indonesian people, who seemingly supported President Sukarno’s adventurism (Mackie 1974).

The next problem in the negotiations was a dispute of whether substantial peace negotiations could be resumed before the withdrawal of Indonesian military and volunteers in
the area (Memorandum on Tri-partite Talks 1964; Record of Ministerial Meeting 1964). At the beginning of the negotiations Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subandrio was willing to accept an agreement where Indonesia would have withdrawn from the area. Later however, the Indonesian stand became more determined after the meeting and it was declared that only the removal of colonialism could make the volunteers withdraw. This, again, in the Indonesian interpretation would have meant that political negotiations would have needed to be concluded successfully before militias would leave (USIS 1964; Record of Ministerial Meeting 1964).

Bangkok negotiations were also made more difficult by the lack of effort in searching for a face-saving formula for Indonesia. If Indonesia had to yield and withdraw, it wanted Malaysia to make some concession, too. Without this, the revolutionary Indonesian leadership would have lost face and credibility as the leaders of a struggling revolutionary state. At the same time, Malaysia and the UK wanted to avoid the impression that the Indonesian military aggression could be rewarded in any way. In the Tokyo negotiations, Indonesian negotiators also pointed to the humiliation caused by the Malaysian–UK declaration of the federation without a warning or prior negotiations or without waiting for the UN referendum results. For Indonesia, face-saving was clearly a major problem. According to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subandrio, Indonesia would have been a ‘laughing stock’ had it not pursued a confrontation (Record of the 1st Meeting of Heads of Governments 1964). The problem of international insensitivity towards the need of Indonesia to get a dignified solution added to the motivation of regional elites to commit to norms of face-saving in conflict resolution. Without such a norm Malaysian confrontation would have continued, and all regional powers saw how

81 See ‘Record of the 2nd Meeting of the Political Committee’, Bangkok, February 8, 1964. See also Poulgrain 1999. This became later also the rationale of US determination to reject Indonesian face-saving, see Subritzky 2000: 162.
Finally in the last process of peace talks in Tokyo, Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal came up with a solution that an eminent Asian–African group would be invited to give advice on how to settle the issue. This could have been a face-saving option for Indonesia because the solution could not possibly be affected by ‘the colonialists’; in this way also Malaysia would be more of a Southern, as contrasted to Imperialist, creation (*Record of the 1st Meeting of Heads of Governments 1964*). This suggestion was problematic, however, since it did not define whether Indonesia had to withdraw before the African–Asian group would start its consideration (*Record of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Government 1964*). Yet at the meeting of the heads of state in Tokyo, Indonesia’s President Sukarno accepted to honor the advice given by the group: ‘*W*hatever decision or suggestion the commission makes, I shall accept’ (*Record of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Government 1964*). Later however, after having consulted with the radical sectors of the Indonesian bureaucracy, Sukarno rejected the Macapagal formula (US Embassy 1965). Clearly, again, the lack of local ownership together with the radical political climate in Indonesia made it easy and necessary for Sukarno to backtrack on his promises in negotiations.

None of the measures of the initial negotiation process helped solve the disputes behind the conflict. Nor could they reduce the tension or the underlying dissatisfaction, which gave rise to the disputes. Most of all these measures failed to please the radical Indonesian masses whose determination was sufficient to sustain the conflict. However, commitment of the elites was also lacking. On that level it seemed that the main problem of the internationally accepted best practices of conflict resolution was that they were not adjusted to the local political and cultural contexts. Thus they could not generate commitment or the feeling of ownership among the regional political elites.
The Genesis of the ASEAN

While the conflict resolution processes in Manila, Bangkok and Tokyo had failed, fighting in Borneo de-escalated eventually in late 1965 and early 1966, because of factors unrelated to the resolution process. It is perhaps meaningful for the ASEAN style of conflict prevention that the conflict that gave rise to ASEAN was never resolved, while the efforts of explicit peace negotiation only turned attention to things that divided the conflicting parties.

Instead of peace negotiations, structures of conflict were transformed by changing the identity and power constellation in Indonesia and by altering the rules of interaction in Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s approach to conflicts changed as a result of an internal political transition. Pressures against the government had grown too great for the political elite to manage by means of channeling frustration to international adventurism, and Indonesia experienced a short but bloody civil war. As a result, anti-communist forces within the military emerged as winners. The victorious political elite were identified as the opposing pole to the revolutionary leadership. Suharto, the new president, gained his legitimacy as the person who rescued Indonesia from communism and the dominance of China.

From this political platform it was much easier for the new leadership to take a different approach to economic grievances and to the reformulation of the identity and function of the state. As opposed to the dangerous revolutionism, the function of the New Order state was to be a vehicle of prosperity and economic development. If this was the new role of the state the old revolutionary political elite became obsolete. The new rationale for the state offered also personal benefits for the new leaders. This is why the new elite could be kept loyal to the new, developmentalist interpretation of the
state. Tackling economic grievances was important for security, and thus the military, which had a primacy for security, had to be involved. Giving the military a role in an economy that tended towards a degree of corruption was beneficial for the individual top officers, and thus individual interests of the elite soldiers consolidated the stability of the developmentalist state-ideology on the top levels (Anderson 1983). On the level of ordinary people, a system that finally explicitly dealt with popular economic grievances consolidated the stability of the New Order for decades to come. Internationally, the new setting was also more stable than the old one. External adventurism was no longer needed for the leadership to stay in power and domestic economic development required international stability rather than conflict.

Yet the risk of further confrontation with Malaysia was there. The nationalist, anti-communist army, with the exception of some key officers at the Army Strategic Command and the Army Intelligence, had been supporting the Confrontation and all the disputes related to it were still unresolved. The new, more stable Indonesian state identity and power balance had to be translated into acceptable regional power constellation. For this, new ways of communication between nations were needed. These new ways had to be such that regional states could relate to and feel ownership of them. A setting where leaders could break their promises as easily as Sukarno could, would not bring about regional stability.

The process towards a regional conflict transformation regime was initially
motivated on the Indonesian side by the pain caused by a long period of confrontations and disregard of economic problems. Furthermore, it was motivated by an elitist interest in containing the popular pressures with something else than foreign policy adventurism (Habib 1991; Hasir 1991). At the peak of Konfrontasi, as early as in 1964, General Suharto, head of KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Command),

“formed operation OPSUS to find contacts in Malaysia who were in favor of ending the confrontation. The special operation was led by a close Suharto associate, Ali Moertopo, from army intelligence who established contacts with Des Alwi, former Prime Minister Syahrir’s adopted son, then living in exile in Malaysia... Des Alwi knew several Malaysian leaders intimately, including Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, and was therefore able to liaise effectively between the OPSUS officers and the appropriate Malaysian leaders. OPSUS was exclusive and secret, its activities confined to a few intelligence officers with close links to Suharto.” (Anwar 1984: 29–30)

The operation lacked any resemblance with open international best practices of conflict resolution and, instead, it could possibly have been defined as treason by some international standards. It was an operation where military officials took contact with the enemy officials without the knowledge of their superiors. However, the personalistic manner that Sukarno dealt with the issue resonated with the local authoritarian practices, and traditional Asian ways of dealing with problems. Promoting the feeling of ownership of this kind of practices was in the interests of the Southeast Asian elites, who were not, at the time, keen on developing practices of transparency and accountability in the region.

The starting point of this way of handling of conflict negotiation that I call the
ASEAN Way had to be personalistic rather than transparent, accountable and institutional. Personalistic approach made the operation successful and locally owned by the Southeast Asian political elite. Emphasizing the importance of personal relationships between elites played to the advantage of the persons in the elite, and thus, linking peace-making with the interests of the political elite, helped emphasize the common interests among elites.

Peace negotiation also took place unofficially in total secrecy. Not even the head of the Army Intelligence was fully aware of the details of the operation that his pro-Suharto subordinates were running. In the creation of contacts, associates of Suharto used a former Indonesian Prime Minister’s adopted son who lived in exile in Malaysia. Because of the elitist nature of political governance, his family relationship to the former Indonesian Prime Minister gave him personal access to many Malaysian politicians including Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak (Pour 1993, 262; Anwar 1994: 29–30). The emphasis of secret diplomacy in ASEAN cooperation helped contain the democratic pressures from the ASEAN population, and was thus useful for the ASEAN elites. Democracy would have limited the elite powers by creating institutions of transparency and accountability. By creating practices of secretive regional dialogue, however, the ASEAN elites managed to associate positive peace-making and regional resilience with the anti-democratic power interests of ASEAN elites.

The process in which power moved to the supporters of dialogue with Malaysia generated the third element (in addition to personalism and secrecy) of the ASEAN Way of conflict management: the idea of face-saving in conflict prevention. After Suharto gained a dominant position in the Indonesian political administration on March
11, 1966, the secretive and personalistic peace process with Malaysia became part of the official Indonesian policies. It was then also broadened to involve not only the Malaysian–Indonesian Army intelligence circles closest to Indonesia’s ruler General Suharto and Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, but also some anti-Communist elements of the so-called Crush Malaysia Command of the Indonesian Defense Forces (Habib 1991; Pour 1993: 265–66). On the level of personalities, this broadening was based on the activity of a pro-Suharto official at the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Department, Brigadier-General Supardjo Rustam. A former Sukarno-appointed military attaché to Malaysia, Brigadier-General Supardjo was able to have personal access both to President Sukarno and his loyalists and to the core group of the peace process at the Indonesian Army Intelligence. Another important link was Sunarsono, an anti-communist Brigadier-General, who was the head of the political section of the Sukarno-nominated Crush Malaysia Command. With these two links between the core group and the old Indonesian confrontationists it was possible to work out, in cooperation with their Malaysian counterparts, a formula that enabled the Indonesian defense forces to abandon the confrontation while allowing the politicians who had favored the arguments for the confrontation to save face (Anwar 1994: 38–41).

The element of face-saving agreed with the Southeast Asian mentalities and made parties involved in this peace-making more committed to the process of bridge-building. Later, when looking at the measurable patterns of conflict management in Southeast Asia and East Asia, it can be seen that this element of face saving translated into a practice, where wars no longer ended in victories over enemies (Kivimäki 2011; Svensson 2011). Instead, the Southeast Asian and East Asian practice developed into a direction where even the weaker party was allowed to withdraw from conflicts without
humiliation. Conflicts in Southeast Asia, and later also in the entire East Asia, tend to fizzle out without clear declarations of victory (Svensson 2011). In the new millennium, the principle of face saving has also been reflected in the peace processes of Poso, Ambon and Aceh, as well as in the several attempts to establish dialogue between the conflicting parties in Papua, where explicit peace negotiations have been motivated by the objective to find ‘solutions dignified for all’ (Husain 2007: 117).

Later, the diplomatic process formalized the normalization of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia. In May 1966, a high-level delegation led by Adam Malik, the Indonesian pro-Suharto foreign minister, had a secret meeting with an equally high-level Malaysian delegation under Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, Indonesia’s original Malaysia-contact, in Bangkok negotiations. On June 6, 1966 Indonesia officially recognized Singapore and on August 11, Malik and Tun Abdul Razak signed a normalization agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. With the exception of Foreign Minister Adam Malik, a close friend of Suharto’s, the people involved in the peace process were the same despite their changing institutional statuses. Due to the pro-Sukarno sentiment among the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Malik kept most of his own institutional staff at the Foreign Ministry in the dark and continued working with the Army Intelligence people and Brigadier-General Sunarsono (ibid.: 41–42).

Even if the ending of the Malaysian Confrontation was a negotiation process technically separate from the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, it can be argued that the latter was based on the personal relationships
and solution principles of the peace process of the former negotiation process.\textsuperscript{83}

The process of establishing ASEAN was merely a generalization of the procedures, practices and agreements reached in the negotiations on the Malaysian Confrontation. The need for a more general arrangement was already articulated and agreed upon during one of the Confrontation related meetings in 1966. The initiative came from Adam Malik, Tun Abdul Razak and Thailand’s Thanat Khoman, who decided that closer regional cooperation was necessary to prevent the recurrence of confrontations between countries in the region (Anwar 1994: 50). According to an advisor of a former Indonesian President, ‘Indonesia’s move towards ASEAN was therefore, inextricably linked to the confrontation policy of 1963–65, for above every other consideration, the new regional policy was designed to undo the damage that confrontative phase had done to the country’ (ibid.: 57; Anwar 2000). One of the key persons in the Confrontation negotiation, Brigadier-General Supardjo Rustam, further claims that the ASEAN was established because regional cooperation had to be something colossal to erase the memory of the confrontation.\textsuperscript{84}

In the negotiations concerning the establishment the ASEAN, the three ministers of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia took key roles. In Indonesia, the main role was played by Foreign Minister Malik and the ASEAN was at times called ‘Malik’s Club’ by the former supporters of confrontational foreign policies (Gordon 1969)! At the same time Malik himself emphasized the role played by his personal associates at the Indonesian military intelligence (rather than the institutional staff at the Foreign

\textsuperscript{83} This interpretation has been rather official, and it was also shared by ASEAN’s Assistant Director III, Hasir bin Mahpodz Ahmad, in an interview with the present author (Hasir 1991).

\textsuperscript{84} Interview material, cited by Anwar 1994: 45.
The contribution to security of the establishment of the ASEAN has arguably been in the development of the diplomatic practices rather than in the content of explicit agreements. *The Bangkok Declaration* of August 8, 1967 as well as the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* (TAC) of 1976 highlight many important principles, but do not really commit the nations into anything concrete, except to the commitment of not insisting on commitments that compromise sovereignty of their fellow ASEAN members. The contributions of the agreements are in their role as a foundation of a regime of continuing negotiation based on personal relationships and strong sense of ownership. Kindly this ownership could be explained by referring to Southeast Asian experiences of warfare and distraction caused by interference and lack of communication. More cynically, the ownership of the regional consensus could be understood through its connections to personal interests of the elite. While developmentalism was directly beneficial for corrupt leaders and militaries, personalistic ASEAN ties consolidated this beneficial domestic order, and offered a non-intrusive external environment.

The same personalities that had negotiated on Malaysian Confrontation continued to be central for the resolution of regional disputes for decades. Almost two decades after the Malaysian Confrontation it was the same Ali Murtopo, who first (on behalf of Indonesia) had negotiated the territorial dispute on Sipadan and Ligitan Islands with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir in September 1985.

Suharto is another example of personalities that continued in his role as a peace-

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85 Malik 1980; see also Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s references to her interviews with Malik’s secretary at the Bangkok Meeting on ASEAN in 1967 (Anwar 1994: 57).
broker in regional disputes. When mediating in 1987 in a diplomatic dispute between
Singapore and Malaysia over the policies towards Israel, Suharto emphasized the
similarity of the economic interests of ASEAN states: in addition to press statements,
Suharto demonstrated the link between the destinies of the two countries by driving the
road that physically connected the two countries whenever he needed to move from
Malaysia to Singapore (Strait Times, December 30, 1987). Thus Suharto was central to
the boosting of the perception of common interest between Malaysia and Singapore.

Personalistic diplomacy broadened considerably from the highest political elite
towards intellectual elites in the 1980s. Private visits and academic conferences are still
widely used in a personalistic way as forums for ASEAN brainstorming and confidence
building (Busse 1999: 50–51). The so-called Jakarta Informal Meetings on territorial
disputes at the South China Sea during the first half of the 1990s between ASEAN (and
after 1991 also with the PRC) diplomats and politicians, for example, represent a rather
‘institutionalized’ form of informal personal relations. These negotiations have
produced the most concrete results so far in dealing with the overlapping claims to
Spratly Islands. For example the PRC’s suggestion on shelving the sovereignty issue
and cooperating for the exploration of the natural resources of the Spratly Islands was a
product of these informal negotiations.

Secretive handling of disputes has also survived the tests of decades in ASEAN.
When the Indonesian military started to investigate ‘foreign activities’ around the
islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and Malaysia during the initial phase
of the dispute about the islands, ‘both Malaysian and Indonesian governments tried to
play down the incident discouraging press coverage and no clear account of the events
was given’ (Haller-Trost 1995: 4; see also Strait Times, July 7, 1982; Asiaweek, July 23,
The clear rationale behind this secrecy was the elite effort to prevent negative popular sentiments. The centrality of this objective is also demonstrated in the fact that ASEAN countries institutionalized their dissemination on conflicts in a way that enabled the control of negative publicity. In Indonesia, for example, General Ali Murtopo, one of the main characters of the resolution of the Malaysian Confrontation and the establishment of ASEAN, was Indonesia’s minister for information during the early days of the dispute regarding the ownership of the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands.

When the ASEAN regime is seen as a solution to conflicts like the Malaysian Confrontation, the strategy of downplaying disputes in public debate makes a lot of sense: the conflict behavior consisted mainly of activities by popular militias encouraged and supported by public elite agitation. Restrictive publicity on disputes is also rationalized on grounds of diplomatic prudence: playing down of disputes simply means that you avoid washing your dirty linen in public (Soesastro 1995: iii–ix).

The dispute on Ligitan and Sipatan rose again after Indonesia had discovered that Malaysia had built some tourist facilities on the disputed islands in 1991. After the protests behind the scenes by Indonesia, the Malaysian government cancelled its program of upgrading tourist facilities in the area, dropped the area from their list of nature reservoir development plan and rationalized both moves publicly on grounds of not harming the mutually beneficial relationships between Malaysia and Indonesia (Business Times, Singapore June 5–8, 1991). The negotiation process was consciously kept out of sight of publicity (Habib 1991). The elite-led process continued with a ministerial meeting in 1991 and with meetings of the heads of the states in 1992, 1993 and 1994 (Haller-Trost 1995: 29). Instead of public washing of the dirty linen, the countries handled the dispute behind the scenes.
With secrecy and personalism also face-saving has been possible in ASEAN diplomacy. In dispute settlement, issues are often avoided, and they are not brought to the publicity for the benefit of the face-saving of individual politicians (Kurus 1995: 409). Also consultations before publicizing initiatives are often based on the rationale of saving faces of individual politicians (ibid.: 410). The principle of face saving was central in the negotiation of the territorial dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia on Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, according to the Indonesian media that explained that the ‘bilateral talks should lead to a compromise to achieve an acceptable solution without either party having to lose face’ (cited in Haller-Trost 1995: 33).

**Generation of Success in the ASEAN Way**

The early efforts to tackle Malaysian Confrontation in the externally dominated negotiation processes during the Confrontation did not only fail to address the main sources of the Confrontation (such as the neglect of economic development in Indonesia); it also failed to convince the conflicting parties of the fact that the resolution mechanisms (mediation, referendum, external advice) were legitimate. The mechanisms failed to relate to the indigenous “normative pre-agreements” of Southeast Asian societies.

The very reasons why the initial conflict resolution failed also unveil the generation of the success of the later negotiation process. At least to Malaysian and Indonesian political elites the narrative of the Malaysian Confrontation generated the legitimacy of the ASEAN Way. The narrative of Sukarno’s disregard of economic trouble and the narrative of the consequences of such neglect constitute the ASEAN legitimacy of ASEAN developmentalism. Due to this narrative it is not possible for people to rebel even against autocratic governments that try to offer prosperity to their citizens. Governments were illegitimate only if they could
not perform well and deliver development. Neither was it acceptable for the political elite to channel popular frustration by blaming other countries for the economic misery of their own country’s population.

Due to the partisan interests, the ASEAN elites have had a strong commitment to the anti-democratic aspects of the ASEAN Way. For decades they were also successful at convincing their people to believe that the ASEAN Way reflected indigenous Southeast Asian conflict management culture. Southeast Asians generally felt that the ASEAN way of dealing with conflicts was their own way and that it was based on the societal values and normative pre-agreements of Southeast Asia. As a result, despite of existing disputes, ASEAN countries have been able to avoid the escalation of conflicts. More recent pressures towards institutionalization have modified the ASEAN Way in the 1990s, while the process of democratization in ASEAN societies has presented a more fundamental challenge to the survival of personalism and secret diplomacy.

The historical analysis of the transition of ASEAN (and especially Malaysia and Indonesia) from belligerent to peaceful does not reveal any mechanisms of peace that could simply be reduced into some objective elements. Instead, material conditions, such as poverty, afforded alternative approaches that then together lead into different outcomes. Taken the crucial role of the decision between revolutionary or developmentalist orientation and the norms of regional cooperation one cannot reveal any mechanisms of peace that could neatly explain the correlative relationship from a condition analytically independent of the peaceful to the dependent variable – peace. Instead, feeling of ownership of regional communication and interaction already implies a more positive relationship to peace than lack of such feeling. On the one hand, material realities do not dictate Southeast Asia’s destiny, because poverty, for example, seemed to serve both the belligerent revolutionary order and the developmentalist transition. Different approaches to the material realities clearly produce
different outcomes. On the other hand, power context, culture and history constrain the approaches that leaders and nations can adapt to the material realities. Due to existing power context it would not have been possible for the revolutionary elite of Indonesia to assume a developmentalist orientation. As soon as the state would have been seen as an instrument for development, people with a revolutionary identity would have become illegitimate as leaders, while economic technocrats would have been able to claim a greater role in state administration. Only an experience of economically insensitive leadership, which involved a lot of hurt and economic grievance could legitimize authoritarian, developmentalist, but corrupt elite that delivered prosperity at the expense of democratic participation.

Because of the historical experience of foreign powers intensifying conflicts in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN elite could consolidate strict norms of non-interference: while protecting people from conflicts that they had experienced in the past it now also protects the elite against pressures of democratization.

Finally, only through the cultural context of respect for face-saving could ASEAN consolidate an order that valued secret personalistic exercise of power that may have served the interest of indigenously legitimate peace. Thus we should not be looking at simple independent and dependent variables when the explanation of the long ASEAN peace moves from established correlative relationships to the analysis of mechanisms that make these correlative regularities understandable. Nor can we simply look at the mutual constitution of peaceful identities and peaceful policies or facilitating material realities and discourses. The analysis of the genesis of ASEAN peace seems to suggest that we need to look at the dialogue between material realities and approaches to these. However, these approaches are conditioned by the legacy of history, power structures and cultural, collectively constructed realities. Only by fully understanding the following five points can we understand the mechanisms with which ASEAN keeps Southeast Asia peaceful (even if not democratic).
1. Why development was objectively needed (poverty and dissatisfaction as threats of state legitimacy, bankruptcy of revolution),

2. Why the new Indonesian leadership was in a position to give it (technocratic identity of the opponents of revolution),

3. Why it was possible and useful for the new leadership to prioritize development as an instrument of security (corruptive interests of the military),

4. Why the other ASEAN national political elites (and the US) felt that it was in their interests to consolidate this developmentalist national regime by means of locally legitimate regional norms that insulate developmentalist Southeast Asian states from external interference (regional elite power interests as the carrot), and

5. Why the people of Southeast Asia found all this acceptable (prosperity as compensation for the lack of self-expression).

While the norms and styles of international relations in ASEAN might be different from the norms in some other parts of the world, they are suitable to the historical context of Southeast Asia (and East Asia). Similarly, while the ASEAN recipes of addressing causes of conflict might differ from those elsewhere, the ASEAN Way of addressing conflict grievances and conflict opportunities tends to be culturally and historically suitable to the area in which the ASEAN Way has been applied (East Asia). For example, the rule of military non-interference is more suitable for Southeast Asia where the history of Chinese export of communism and the US subversion and fight against communism have made the region a battle field of external powers, than it would be for Europe, for example, where the conflict problematique has been perceived to have
revolved around the problem of uncontrolled ultranationalist authoritarian leaders.

Similarly, conflict structures that need to be addressed in Southeast Asia, where (with the exception of the Philippines, see Chapter 2) the legitimacy of states and the popular expectations from regimes are more closely related to development output than popular participation, are different from those in Northern America. Thus, it seems that rather than being caused by simple universal conditions, the ASEAN Way seems to be bound to the cultural and historical contexts of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the explanation of the mechanism of this peace will require historical analysis, which aims at drawing from the difference between historical context and policy orientations before the beginning of the long peace of ASEAN, and the contexts and policies after this peace had started.

**China and the Spread of the ASEAN Way to the Rest of East Asia**

Just like the Malaysian confrontation was the problem that generated the rationale for the new developmentalist consensus that respected sovereignty and prudence, radical experiments of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) were the sources for pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping from 1979 onwards. However, while the struggle between the bankrupt policy line and the new consensus in Southeast Asia was international, that struggle in China was mainly national even if it was much affected by international developments that demanded different political approaches nationally.

China’s change was dominant to the change of Northeast Asia, as the rest of Northeast Asia had been peaceful already since 1945 and 1953, and it affected
peacefulness in Southeast Asia, too, when China moved from insurgency-exporting factor into a responsible, stabilizing factor.

However, another change in Vietnam (then not yet a member of ASEAN) in the 1980s was needed for the transformation of Indo-China into the same East Asian pragmatist, developmentalist, non-interference regimes, which did not aim at humiliation of their enemies, but respected, at least more than before, face saving and dignity for all. This change could also deserve a subchapter. However, since it did not happen in the same historical period of the late 1960s and 1970s, and this change was much more affected by the ending of the Cold War (economic necessities related to the decline of Soviet willingness to aid Vietnam) than changes in East Asia, and since it was also affected by the example and attraction of the ASEAN Way, whose origin has already been explained, Vietnamese transition is (as are the transformations of Japan and South Korea into developmentalism in the 1940s and in 1950s respectively) left out of the focus of this book.

*Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and China’s Transition to Developmentalism*

The Great Leap Forward was an ideologically-oriented economic campaign that intended to transform China’s economy into modern communist economy. Cultural Revolution, again, was a campaign to purify party leadership, the military and the state bureaucracy from incorrect thinking and socialize China to the correct line of Mao Zhedong’s thinking. Originally this campaign started as an educational project, but once it was met with resistance within the implementing sectors of the state bureaucracy, the programme spread to various other theaters of power battle.
Neither campaign was anti-developmental in the sense that they did prioritize economic development. Originally, the intention of the first campaign was to increase production while the limits of Cultural Revolution were carefully drawn by Zhou Enlai, in a way that it would not hamper economic development (Chong-Do Hah 1972: 200). However, in both campaigns, development was not a material, but an ideological goal, the intention was not to produce prosperity as China defines it now, but a modern communist economy. A New Year’s editorial of the People’s Daily in 1967 summarized this position in the following manner:

“Some muddle-headed people counter-pose the revolution to production and think that once the Great Cultural Revolution starts, it will impede production. Therefore, they take hold of production alone and do not grasp the revolution. These comrades have not thought through the question of what is the purpose of farming, weaving, steel making. Is it for building socialism, or is it for building capitalism?” (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation. China Quarterly No. 30 (Apr. – Jun.), 1967, p. 198)

The difference between the position that regards growth as a value in itself, and the position where revolution and socialism are primary, could be seen as the main dividing line in Chinese politics of the 1960s and the 1970s. According to Lieberthal (1975: 1), the main political division in China was between “radicals” and “pragmatists.” The main radicals in the 1960s were Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, and according to many, Mao Zedong himself, while the main supporters of economism in the 1960s were Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen and in the 1970s Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying. While the personified power battle is important for the understanding of the battle between pragmatic and radical discourses, it would be a mistake to follow the power battle simply from the point of view of personalities. Deng and Liu, two leading pragmatists, for example, originally supported the Great Leap Forward (Dittmer 1977, 686), while Zhou, the
former, […] are] “fundamentalists who insist that China must not sacrifice revolutionary values on the altar of economic development”. The position where economic performance was highlighted at the expense of revolutionary principles was often called economism in the radical discourse. According to a radical editorial of the *Peking Review* during the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders belonged to the former group: “Our great leader, Chairman Mao, has long ago thoroughly criticized and repudiated economism.” (“Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung On Opposing Economism”).

The famine after the Great Leap Forward, generated a lot of critique against Mao’s economic policies and lead to the shifting of economic and bureaucratic power to the benefit of pragmatic technocrats, most notably Premier Liu Shaochi and Deng Xiaoping in the beginning of the 1960s. However, the original critique of Mao was not based on the fact that his policy did not prioritize development, as it was against his inability to understand the objective laws of economy. The Great Leap Forwards was after all supposed to make production more effective, not to paralyze it. Yet, most scholars agree that even at the outset, Mao’s objectives were primarily political, not economic (Perkins 1967: 33), and the debate about ‘economism’ emphasized the contradiction between these objectives and development. Once there was a power battle between Mao and Liu, it was natural that attacks were made against economistic prioritization, and that ideological, revolutionary rhetoric was mobilized against rational economic policies. As was discussed earlier in the context of Indonesia, prioritization of

main pragmatist of the early 1970s supported the Cultural Revolution (Perkins 1967; Neuhauser 1967). It was not realistic for these people not to support radical lines in certain phases of political struggle, as more pragmatic discourses would not have resonated with the pre/agreements of the argumentation of the time. This is why it is easier to formulate discourses or cultures and follow their development rather than following individual politicians and their political arguments.
economic growth became seen as treacherous (revisionist). According to Jian Qing, Mao’s wife, and one of the leading figures of the Cultural Revolution, on December 26, 1967, economism was an “evil road” linked to the temptation of “pursuing only personal and short-term interests”. It constituted “the conspiracy of issuing the ‘sugar-coated bullets’ of economic benefits . . . to corrupt the masses’ revolutionary will” (Bridgham 1968, 8–9).

Economic realities, the fact that people were rather naturally programmed to prefer eating to starvation, affected the competition between the discourse that prioritized development and the one that prioritized revolution. The commonly experienced problem of lack of appreciation for economic development generated legitimacy for policies that emphasized development, while the common experience of the Cultural Revolution became a commonly experienced indication of the fact that abandonment of developmentalist preferences and emphasis on revolutionary spirit are not a viable solution to economic problems. Yet, economic hardship did not cause developmentalism, as can be seen from the fact that the power battle after the Great Leap Forward ended to the benefit of the radicals, and gave rise to another radical campaign, the Cultural Revolution.

Furthermore, in addition to lesser commitment to development, the starting point of the two radical campaigns was ideological rather than scientific in the sense that the campaign was advised by realities of the Maoist dogma rather than realities as they were experienced. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand how the campaign could be implemented despite the fact that it created negative growth and large scale famine with 18–45 million fatalities. The fact that the defenders of this ideological line still in 1967 (ibid.) and even in the 1970s (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China
Quarterly No. 43, (Jul. – Sep., 1970), 171–188) used the term Great Leap Forward as a positive model suggests that truth about it was not searched from empirical observation but from dogma: while radical Maoists were willing to sacrifice for revolution, they could not think that an economic program that starves members of the proletariat to death is a model, unless they had closed their eyes of empirical observation and simply looked at how the campaign fitted into an ideological position: revolutionary economics is good for growth because Mao says so, even if experience speaks against it. According to an editorial of the revolutionary newspaper Red Flag, “Revolution can only promote the development of the social productive forces, not impede it. This is a Marxist-Leninist truth, a truth of Mao Tse-tung’s thought.”

After the misery of the Cultural Revolution, there was a common experience of the bankruptcy of a policy that fails to recognize material realities of the economy, and simply insists doctrinal realities instead. This generated legitimacy in the Chinese version of developmentalist discourse for the doctrine of “seeking truth from facts not from ideology”. This doctrine originates from Mao (1941) and was partly justified by this origin, but it was lifted up as a pragmatic starting point to economic management and other sectors of politics by Deng in a keynote speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Deng 1978b). This doctrine, was an alternative to the doctrine according to which “whatever documents Comrade Mao Zedong read and endorsed and whatever he did and said must always

87 According to the analysis of the chronicle, the use of Great Leap Forward as a positive model in argumentation for policy lines was in decline.
determine our actions, without the slightest deviation’. 88 (“The Two Whatevers” doctrine). Instead, guidelines and truths were to be searched from empirical evidence of the objective reality. This gives Chinese developmentalism a content that differs from the dogma-driven developmentalism, where development could simply be imagined, wherever the dogma said that the policy followed was correct for the achievement of development. In practice this meant that Chinese developmentalism joined the ASEAN approach to development by accepting some of the same standards for assessing and evaluating economic performance. This meant a radically new kind of realism to substitute the rosy pictures of previous Chinese superiority in many aspects of politics. According to a chronology of Chinese documents (BBC 1978, 5890; Hook, Wilson and Yahuda 1978a: 945) “Chairman Hua was reported by a Japanese agency as having told Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda on August 12, that China’s economy was still 15 to 20 years behind those of advanced industrial countries, although it had grown by 24 per cent in the first half of this year.”

Thirdly, the rift between radicals and pragmatists was related to the consequential logic of development. According to Chong-Do Hah (1972) the rift between experts, knowledgeable of this “objective logic” (pragmatists, economists) and the “reds” (radicals) was the deepest during the Cultural Revolution. As supporters of the view according to which the truth about development should be sought from empirical experience rather than from a dogma, the pragmatists were naturally more inclined to accept the existence of the objective consequential logic of economic development and to follow the policies that were known to causally produce

88 This radical doctrine of the two whatevers was published by an editorial of the People’s Daily, “Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link”, February 7, 1977.
development for the proletariat. Once the power political struggle between the radicals and the pragmatists had been won by the latter group, it was possible for the National Peoples’ Congress to be informed by the Chairman of the Party that despite the priority that has to be given to politics in political administration, there are objective laws of production that should not be contradicted (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda 1979a). Experts of material objective consequential logic were to some extent above politics even if they needed to work under political guidance, as Liu Shaochi had suggested (Chong-Do Hah 1972: 195). They should be endorsed even if they lacked commitment to Mao’s thoughts as Deng Xiaoping has said: “[W]e should even cherish and praise those specialists without a socialist consciousness.” (Gittings 1976: 493).

While the Cultural Revolution to some extent purged most of China’s economic technocrats it created a political reality where pragmatic technocrats did not matter much (Diao 1970). The situation was very similar to the one in Sukarno’s Indonesia, where economic plans were “rich in fantasy”, but poor in realism. Yet, people did feel the hunger and this common experience formed a common diagnosis of a problem, while the radical solution to the lack of economic expertise of the Cultural Revolution (denial of the need for economic expertise) formed a common perception on how this problem could not be solved. This helped generate legitimacy for Deng’s meritocratic element of developmentalism after 1979.

Details of the struggle between reds and experts regarding to the perceptions on the objective realities of the economy further explain the details of the Chinese developmentalist orientation. The first battle between the pragmatists and radicals, 89

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89 I have identified the main differences between the pragmatic and the radical positions from the critique of Deng Xiaoping of “ultra-leftism” as documented by Gittings (1976; 1979), and from Lieberthal (1977) and Dittmer (1977).
was about the role of incentives in agricultural production. Radicals hesitated to extend incentives that would encourage workers to be more productive, as they felt this would introduce capitalist structures of competition. However, critics of the Great Leap Forwards that had introduced collective agriculture and banned private plots and the centrality of small result-oriented production teams felt that incentives were not only efficient in the encouragement of higher productivity, but also in line with the Marxist idea of defining the deserved receipt as a function of one’s amount of work. Reference to original Marxist and Maoist sources of legitimacy were important for the developmentalists in the discursive battle against radical discourses. Without Maoist correctness it was very difficult to gain legitimacy for policy approaches. The system of incentives was popular among rural people and it showed its effectiveness in the beginning of the 1960s. Local popularity was important for the power battle between radicals and developmentalists as it brought the local regional military and civilian organization on the side of developmentalist argument (Domes 1977). The debate on incentives was important for the birth of Chinese developmentalism, as it enabled the supporters of incentives relate to the global markets, where incentives were an essential element.

Another central element in the pragmatic perception of the objective realities of the economy was related to the need to import technology in order to modernize Chinese economy. Related to this was the need to have financing, in terms of loans and foreign investments that could enable technology purchases. While the radicals

90 This was the argumentative strategy of all Deng Xiaoping’s arguments for agricultural incentives. However it was perhaps best explicated in Deng’s document “On a general programme of work for the whole party and the whole nation”, October 7, 1975 (partly reproduced in Gittings 1976).
emphasized the need for self-sufficiency, the pragmatists felt that modernization was not possible without an injection of imported technology. It was also important that the military leadership was involved in the battle between the two lines. In the beginning of the 1960s, military leaders were divided between the “experts” who felt the need to modernize the military hardware, and the radicals who emphasized the purity of peoples’ warfare that did not need much equipment. The conflicts in 1969 with the Soviet Union and in 1979 with Vietnam, however, injected a reality check for the PLA, showing that China needs new technology to survive in its strategic environment. The need for military modernization, together with the obvious need to improve the technical quality of the PLA personnel generated a situation where especially the central military leadership took the leadership in the drive to import-assisted modernization (Domes 1977).

Again the question was about the primacy of doctrine and purity of revolutionary spirit vs. efficiency of economic development. It is difficult to see why pragmatism won over radicalism in this detail of a policy conflict, but suddenly, when critique escalated against the Gang of Four soon after the death of Mao, one of the main claims against the Gang was that they were sabotaging China’s foreign trade (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda 1977a: 204), as if trade had always been accepted as a positive thing. It is more likely that the general victory of expertise over revolutionary spirit as a guide of state administration contributed to the victory of expert opinions on technology imports, too, rather than trade support having had an independent victory over isolationist interpretation of self-sufficiency. In any case the need to have trade is likely

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91 This division was evident in a twenty-day conference on political work in the army in the General Political Department of the PLA in January 1966 (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 1966a).
to have been one of the key issues why Chinese developmentalism also contributed to the pacification of East Asia. Subjective sensitivity towards technology importations clearly made China more willing to have good relationships with the major sources of technology: Japan, the US and Europe.

While it is relatively easy to trace the developments that generated legitimacy for Chinese developmentalism, it is not possible to explain the victory of the groups promoting the developmentalist line. The century of humiliations from 1839 to 1949 and the glorious victory of the revolution in 1949 were sources that the radical self-sufficiency supporters and supporters of a rebellious international policy could draw from. The victory of developmentalist discourse in the power battle was partly determined by the purely discursive battle that has been analyzed above. However there were undoubtedly voluntary moves and motives, too, that will never be revealed behind the victory. Why did Mao change his view about Deng Xiaoping so many times? Why did the radicals and Mao abandon Lin Biao? Why did Hua Guofeng and his leftist secret police move against the Gang of Four, and why did he then yield to Deng in his economic policies? These are all questions that are relevant for defining why developmentalism won, but that cannot be answered on the basis of an analysis of the discursive battles in China. In addition to choices related to secret elite politics and simple individual voluntary choices, accidental events had their influence. What if Zhou Enlai had not died before Mao? What if Mao had died already in the 1960s (when Liu Shaoxi was stong, or only once Lin Biao had gained the upper hand)? Also the strategies of mobilizing arguments by linking these with existing pre-agreements of argumentation could have been important for the victory of developmentalism. Could Cultural Revolution have been avoided had Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoxi not
overplayed their hand in their opposition of Mao in the beginning of the 1960s (as Neuhauser 1967 claims)? Would Deng have managed to persuade his pragmatism already earlier had he managed to present the link of his developmentalist argument to the argumentative foundation of materialism already earlier (Deng 1982)? The idea during the Cultural Revolution that ideology determines correct action rather than the material experience and practice is difficult to reconcile with the materialist orientation of Mao’s thought. Also the fact that dying peasants during the Great Leap Forward were not seen as a proof of the bankruptcy of a system of economic management represents idealism, which again constitutes a contradiction with the materialist foundation of Marxism and Mao’s thought. All this we do not know as it is likely that the origin of developmentalism in China was partly dependent on individual decisions and strategies. Yet the origin of developmentalism as a legitimate orientation can be established from the above history of the progress of the developmentalist discourse in its context of material and social realities.

*China’s Adoption of the Non-Interference Principle*

Class-based thinking of world politics and the doctrine of proletarian internationalism and peoples’ warfare were commonly accepted pre-agreements of Chinese political argumentation since the revolution. The basic idea of proletarian internationalism is the realization that capitalism is global and thus revolution of the working class also needs to be global. As a result recognition of states as the building block of international relations constitutes a social structure that does not serve the interest of the proletariat.

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92 The idea is from Marx, but the source most often used for the doctrine in China, in addition to later quotations from Mao, is Lenin’s work the *State and Revolution* (1918, Chapter V: “The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of the State”).
Instead, class loyalty that expresses itself, for example in the support of proletarian revolutions in peoples’ warfare – i.e. human intensive warfare based on determination and revolutionary spirit rather than material capacity – elsewhere, is rational for the Chinese proletariat. “In theory China supported all wars against imperialism and all kinds of oppression in the third world” (van Ness 1971: 82).

At the same time, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was also commonly accepted doctrine, developed by Zhou Enlai in the context of Sino-Indian relations in 1954. The five principles are 1. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2. mutual non-aggression, 3. non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4. equality and mutual benefit, and 5. peaceful coexistence. This doctrine articulated a distinction between what is domestic and what is international, and framed states, rather than classes, as the main actors of international relations. Interestingly, the five principles are almost identical to the inter-state stipulations of the ASEAN Way, as defined by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976. The ASEAN Way went further only in expecting each country to take care of its economic problems in order not to push them as instability to the other countries in the region. However, together with the victory of developmentalism, the victory of the five principles over proletarian internationalism constituted the joining of China to the ASEAN Way (which perhaps should not be associated to ASEAN, only, given that the original diplomatic principles were introduced already in 1953 by Zhou Enlai).

93 Five principles were introduced by Zhou Enlai in a speech to the Indian delegation in the beginning of the negotiations (December 1953 – April 1954) on Tibet. They were later incorporate in the introduction of the agreement in 1954 (for the text, see for example, http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/ThePancheelAgreement.pdf)
It was clear that a class-based and a state-based doctrine are incompatible and contradictory. Equally clear was it that following the two doctrines generated very different outcomes both to East Asia’s peacefulness and China’s ability to foster economic growth in a conducive international environment. Due to the need to focus on development, and due to the need to have trade, technology and investments, it was natural that the supporters of developmentalist policies (pragmatists) were in general also supporters of the five principles while the supporters of revolutionary purity (radicals) were supporters of proletarian internationalism.

Difficulties in the creation of a legitimate approach of non-interference

In a country that has received its identity in a class-based revolution, it is not easy to ignore class structure in international relations and endorse an interpretation of world politics based on states, rather than classes. During the campaigns to purify China’s revolutionary spirit and identity this was exceptionally difficult. When purges of the capitalist roaders were shaking the leadership of the country it was challenging to acknowledge capitalist leaders in other countries. Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution, China developed a “True Believer Culture”\(^\text{94}\) where leaders competed against each other in radicalism, in order to secure their positions. Any compromises to this radicalism were felt risky and treacherous. The emergence and frequency of use of concepts like “capitulationism” (Hook, Yahuda and Wilson 1975a: 784), “diplomatic fighters” (as a positive expression of new diplomatic style, Bridgham 1968: 24), “protracted war as the only way to true independence”, and concepts that glorified unyielding sacrifice and militarism, such as Lin Baio’s concept of “spiritual atomic

\(^{94}\) This phenomenon has been first found and theorized by Eric Hoffer (2002/1952) in the context of Nazi Germany, but the phenomenon can be identified in much less extreme contexts, too.
bomb” and his campaign “Everyone is a Soldier” (Lin Biao quoted in Halperin and Wilson Lewis 1965: 63) indicated a culture where compromise was suspect and struggle a proof of credibility. As a proof of the militarization of the debate Lin Biao said on September 2, 1965, that “the destruction, sacrifice and suffering” are guarantees that people do not risk “becoming willing slaves” (of imperialists). Thus sacrifice and suffering help bring “security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of mankind”. (Lin Biao 1965: 62)

Prosperity, at the same time, was seen as “sugar-coated bullet”, dangerous to the revolutionary spirit of people (Jian Qing, quoted by Bridgham 1968: 10). Nuclear weapons were presented as symbols of national pride (“A triumph of Mao Tse-tung’s thought”, Chieh-fang-chiin Pao, NCNA, June 19, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3965, p. 13, quoted in Pollack 1972: 248).

Students, again, competed against each other in Maoist purity and radicalism simply to secure their future in a setting where experienced, patriotic and competent officials lost their position due to “errors in political line”. Students, who did not belong to the “four red groups” (veterans who had participated in the Long March, peasants, landless laborers and members of the PLA) needed to show some exceptional revolutionary credentials to succeed in their careers. While militant terminology sedimented revolutionary norms into the thinking on international relations, standard peace terminology got a negative connotation. Peace negotiation between the US and Vietnam was dubbed defeatism and capitulationism, while the process was seen as “peace talks fraud” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly,

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95 Correspondence with Kim Beng Phar, a scholar of Cultural Revolution, October 2012.
All these concepts participated in the conversion of competition in radicalism into radical doctrine and norms of international relations.

In addition to domestic rationales that made little sense in the international setting, respect for sovereignty, non-interference and the Five Principles in China was made difficult by matters of symmetry and reciprocity. Until October 25, 1971 China was not generally recognized as a state in the United Nations, due to its domestic political system, and this made it difficult for China to legitimize in the Chinese diplomatic debate to recognize the sovereignty of those countries that did not recognize its own sovereignty. According to van Ness (1971: 612), China’s recognition of country’s sovereignty and respect for non-interference principle was often conditional to its recognition of the PRC as the representative of the Chinese seat in the UN. China’s transformation into a country that sees world politics as inter-state, rather than inter-class relations was greatly boosted by the country’s acceptance to the UN.

In some other cases it was difficult for Chinese leadership not to be partial with regard to domestic struggles in other countries as only some of the domestic forces in those countries supported the recognition China’s right to exist as a player in the international arena. However, the most used rationale for not respecting country’s sovereignty and right for non-interference in Chinese foreign policy debate was related to the suspicion of illegitimate representation of the people by the political elite. This difficulty meant that until 1974 China felt great difficulties in respecting the sovereignty of its neighboring East Asian countries. Until then China supported “national liberation”

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96 This dilemma was discussed in late 1972 in conjunction with New Zealand, where the election winner, Labour Party supported diplomatic relations with China, while the new political opposition did not recognize Peoples’ Republic of China (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, The China Quarterly no 53 (Jan. – Mar., 1973): 202).
against colonialist rule and against regimes it saw as puppets of imperialist powers. This, of course, contributed to the escalation of regional intra-state conflicts about governance as well as creating great strains to inter-state relations between China and its neighbors.

In most other countries, although China might have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the government, the Five Principles operated in creating at least some kind of prudence towards interference in domestic affairs as China often did not define its support to a specific group, but acknowledged the right of a country itself to define its own rightful representation. This inhibited China’s military support to most other countries (van Ness 1971). Yet even though not sending troops to most other countries, China showed its support to specific groups during the radical period of the Cultural Revolution by sending military supplies and training to Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Indonesian Communist Party, Philippine Communist Party, Malay Communist Party, and many other rebel groups. Furthermore, political support and encouragement to specific groups was given also in the form of symbolic political recognition. In the national day reception in Beijing, Prince Sihanouk (opponent of Lon Nol’s government) was given the most prestigious place, while two Burmese Communist Party representatives held the second and third most prestigious places, followed by a representative of the (South) Vietnamese Communist Party and then Indonesian and Swedish Communist Party leaders (Hook and Yahuda 1975). The fact that all these opposition figures took a more prominent place than the first representative of a government, shows how far China had drifted from its five principles. It also shows that meddling in its neighbors’ domestic politics was not limited to the condemnation of illegitimate leaders, but also to supporting specific opposition figures as the “real
representatives” of the people and the nation. Michael Yahuda (1968: 109) shows an indication of this collapse of Chinese inter-national politics by pointing to a document where Chinese leadership lists its friends and is unable to list more than two governments, Albania and North Vietnam, and then referring to oppositional groups in all other countries of importance to China. At the time, China was in active political dispute with 32 countries, including all of its strategically important neighbors (at the time even Sihanouk’s Cambodia, and North Korea; see, “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no 29, 1967: 221).

In South Vietnam, where the US role in the national administration was clearer than elsewhere, Chinese difficulty to stick to its principles of non-interference was more difficult than elsewhere. “Lin Piao, in a message to Tran Nam Trung, head of the Military Council of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, on the previous day, had also emphasized the protracted war and said that China will resolutely support you to fight on till complete victory . . .” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no 34, 1968: 194). South Vietnamese government was not seen a representative of the people (but the US) and thus sovereignty was challenged internally in the country.

In Cambodia, China was accused of subversion even during the government of China’s friend Prince Norodom Sihanouk. According to Sihanouk in 1966, China used friendship associations for subversion (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no 29, 1967: 224). Later he also claimed that the Cambodian armed forces had captured several shipments of arms aimed at the Red Khmer subversives (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no 34, 1968: 191). During the Pro-American rule of Lon Nol in 1970-1975, China called Prince Sihanouk’s
exile government (Prince Sihanouk was actually in exile in China after Lon Nol’s coup on March 18, 1970 until the victory of Khmer Rouge in 1975) the Royal Government of National Unity (RGNUC), while the government of Lon Nol was called “the Lon Nol clique” by the People’s Daily commentator article on October 12, 1974 (quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly no 57, 1974: 213). Lon Nol was seen as a puppet of American imperialism and hegemonism. Both in Vietnam and in Cambodia, Chinese challenge to the sovereignty of pro-US regime was military in nature, and it defined the group that China supported and saw as the rightful leader of the country.

During the Cultural revolution, China also called for the overthrow of the Ne Win Government in Burma: “A message from the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma, dated March 28, (1968), said: It is the firm belief of the Communist Party of China that, having integrated all-conquering Marxism-Leninism with the conditions of Burma, the Communist Party of Burma will surely be able to lead the various nationalities of Burma to defeat U.S. imperialism and its agent in Burma – the reactionary Ne Win clique – as well as the accomplice of U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism, and carry the revolutionary armed struggle to final victory” (Peking Review 1968, no. 14’; see also Mao 1968). Again, the narrative of US imperialism planting its puppets to developing countries led to the conclusion where the leaders of Burma were not representatives of the country, worthy China’s recognition, but a clique.

In the Philippines cooperation between local communists and the Communist Party of China predates the victory of the CCP of China. It involves assistance in terms of troops inside the Philippines (Joffe 1965), which, however, were sent for intelligence
and training purposes in support of the so-called Huk-insurgency (van der Kroeff 1967: 115, 120). This interference was seen legitimate because the Philippines, despite formal independence, “remains a slave of the American imperialists”. Again, therefore, Pro-US leadership was not seen as representative of the Philippine people. As a proof of this revolutionary leaders of China pointed to the "parity" clause in the Philippine constitution which gives equal economic rights to U.S. citizens in the country, and to the military bases agreement which permits a 99-year lease to U.S. military installations (van Der Kroeff 1967: 122).

In Indonesia, Chinese support to revolution was first appreciated by the radical leadership of President Sukarno. Despite subversive support of the Indonesian Communist Party, China somehow appreciated the Indonesian leadership that it considered nationalist, revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. However, after the ousting of Sukarno, in a right wing military operation in October 1965, state-to-state relations became difficult. Indonesia accused China of supporting a Communist coup attempt, while China no longer recognized the legitimacy of the new military government as the new leaders had started their “flirt with their masters, the US imperialists” (People’s Daily editorial of October 8, 1968, quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly no. 29, 1967: 196–7). Chinese disrespect of Suharto’s government was also due to rightist orientation of the government and because of the genocidal nature of its transition of power (van der Kroeff 1968). Due to the rejection of the recognition from the official government, it was easier for China then to use the names of the rebel organizations that indicate recognition of their representation of Indonesian people. In Northwestern Kalimantan, Chinese official parlance, for example used the name North Kalimantan People’s Forces

In Malaya and especially in Malaysia Chinese encouragement and training and arms support of rebels continued for a long period of time. The narrative that gave legitimacy for the activity was related to the colonial and then neo-colonial nature of Malaysia and Malaya (“Malayan National Liberation Army Persevering in Guerrilla War” 1968). Instead of calling Malaysia’s first leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman prime minister, *People’s Daily* (April 15, 1965) called his elected government “the Rahman Gang”, and considered him to be a servant of the British imperialism rather that the people of Malaysia.

*People’s Daily* did not recognize the legitimacy of the Thai leaders either, as it called the student riots for the dismissal of Field Marshal Thanom “justified” on October 18, 1974,: “[T]he just demands of the Thai students and people have not been realised. The contradictions between the Thai people and the ruling circles remain very acute.”(Cited in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly* no 57, 1974: 219). Thailand’s government was not seen legitimate as it, too, was seen as serving the US imperialism as “a bridgehead of U.S. aggression against Indo-China” (*New China News Agency*, December 14, 1965; quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly* no 25, January–March 1966: 250), but also as it was an important component in the American strategy of encirclement of China. China’s critique against the Thai government explicates the dilemma for a radical government in relation to respect for sovereignty. Communist and united-front-opposition movements, such as “Thailand Independence Movement” and the “Thailand Patriotic Front”, were seen more representative of the people than the government and
thus, people’s sovereignty was respected more by interference (in support of these movements) than by cooperating with the government in a way that facilitates its repression of the people.

In sum, it seems clear that while China’s disrespect for the sovereignty and the principle of non-interference was largely related to its own doctrines of proletarian internationalism, it was also escalated by the Western-bloc and, later, by the Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of China and its neighbors. If China did not manipulate countries that were used as springboards of hegemonic influence on China, it could not safeguard its own independence. Similarly, if it respected the legitimacy of rulers that were not representative of their people, it could not respect the sovereignty of the people of those countries. Thus the US and the Soviet influence in China’s domestic affairs constituted the legitimacy of Chinese influence in domestic policies of other countries, while the Chinese influence in domestic affairs of these countries constituted the legitimacy of US and Soviet manipulation and interference in domestic policies of China’s neighbors in East Asia.

While Chinese subversion could be justified in China by reference to the class-based concepts of world politics, and by referring to the lack of representativeness of leaders Chinese communists considered as puppets of US imperialism, there was another source of Chinese disrespect of sovereignty of its East Asian neighbors. This source was ethnic loyalty, which fitted badly to any of the ideological sources of Chinese foreign policy, but which nevertheless was an important source of ideational guidance to Chinese approach to world politics.

In Indonesia (after the fall of Sukarno) and in Burma (during Ne Win’s rule),
critique of the government was perhaps primarily related to the government’s treatment of ethnic Chinese. In both countries this theme grew out of a dispute over China’s support, in terms of propaganda, weaponry and training of local communist parties, which, in both cases, were dominated by ethnic Chinese. While the Chinese position in these disputes was difficult to justify by using the radical or the pragmatist doctrine, populist sentiments on both sides drove the conflict and officials just allowed or supported popular expressions of discontent. Both in Indonesia and in Burma popular anger was directed against the Chinese Embassy, and against ethnic Chinese, while the counter-reaction by China was mostly targeted against embassies. While Chinese ethnic foreign policy was strongest towards Burma and Indonesia, it is clear that ethnic sentiments played an important role also in the Chinese disputes with Malaysia (National Chinese News Agency, May 20, 1969) regarding to the May 13 1969 race riots in Malaysia, in the Philippines with regards to the fight against the Huklahab movement (van der Kroeff 1967) and Vietnam whose treatment of the Chinese was mentioned as one of the reasons for the Chinese punitive strike against Vietnam in 1979 (Tretiak 1979, 740-741).

Sources of legitimacy for the respect for non-interference norm and sovereignty

Ideologically the doctrine of the Proletarian Internationalism had its appeal, both as a reaction to the decade of humiliation (the commonly perceived problem), and as a

solution to humiliation that was in line with the experiences of the Chinese revolution (the commonly perceived solution to the problem). However, once the Communist party had emerged as a part of international politics, the social structures of inter-state relations emerged as a “reality” for the Chinese. According to Storey (2011), the establishment of Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, created a power political need for a countering bloc. Without such a bloc, China would have been swallowed by American imperialism. For an international bloc however, China needed to appeal to states rather than insurgencies, and thus it needed to recognize the existence and legitimacy of at least some state actors in world politics. This way China’s anti-hegemonism became one of the first sources that generated the Chinese respect for sovereignty of its East Asian neighbors.

The Five Principles and the movement of the non-aligned nations could be seen as a reaction to (or a coalition strategy in) this social reality of international power politics. China needed to declare its respect for states that were represented by governments that China saw imperfect as representatives of their people. As a result Zhou Enlai developed the Five Principles, which were quickly applied to China’s relations to India (Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China 1954) and Burma (Badgley 1967). This strategy was naturally first extended to potentially revolutionary, anti-imperialist developing countries that were not directly dependent on an alliance with the United States (and later also the Soviet Union), but in the 1960s, the strategy included also good relations with “independent” capitalist developed countries (the second intermediate zone), such as Japan98 and France99.

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98 A good documentation of the negotiations with Japan about amity and cooperation can be found in Hook, Wilson and Yahuda 1976.
People’s Daily defined the extent of this strategy of appeasement of the global counter-imperialist bloc as follows: “We insist on peaceful co-existence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and strive for the relaxation of international tension. This is what we have done towards Asian, African and Latin American countries, as well as towards countries in the second intermediate zone.” (People’s Daily, October 1, 1973, quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no 53: 199)

Another counter-hegemonic concession that China made to its class-based interpretation of world politics was related to the logic of reciprocity. It was described above, that China refused to respect the sovereignty of many of those countries that did not respect Chinese sovereignty. This worked the other way around, too. China was naturally more inclined to respect the sovereignty of those countries that recognized the communist government as the Chinese representative in the UN (van Ness 1971).

Through the logic of reciprocity China was lured to recognize the dominant interpretation of world politics as politics among states as China itself, needed recognition in order to function as an actor in world politics. However, this reciprocity worked only once the domestic situation was stabilized to the advantage of the pragmatists, who felt the need for China to interact in world affairs. For the radicals the main danger to Chinese values came from the inside of the country (from the watering

99 All this was frozen for the radical years of Cultural Revolution, when international relations of China stopped to give space to class-based revolutionary policies. By the 1970s, it became clear that the “anti-hegemonic” cooperation with France was no longer a reward of France’s independent attitude to NATO and the US (as was the case in the 1960s, see Yahuda 1968), but its resistance of the Soviet Union. This was abundantly clear in China’s foreign ministers’ statements during his visit to Paris in June 1973 (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no 55, 1973: 606).
down of revolutionary spirit). The danger from imperialists and hegemonic powers, too, was dictated from the internal power structure of these nations. Nothing that China did to appease them or to deter them could really affect this danger (Lieberthal 1977). Thus for the radicals there was no need for reciprocity in word politics, and this is why the fact that China’s inter-state relations were more or less suspended for the most radical years of Cultural Revolution did not really matter for the radicals. In this way the expansion of the respect for the principle of non-interference and for sovereignty of China’s East Asian neighbors had to wait until the pragmatists were in power.

Finally, the respect for sovereignty and the Five Principles was generated by the need to develop and acquire technology. Foreign trade was controlled partly by states that could block such trade with countries that, for example, continued to arm and train rebels and interfere in their domestic affairs. For trade agreements China needed to exercise some prudence towards regimes of countries it wanted to trade with. This need was naturally closely related to the Chinese domestic battle by developmentalist pragmatists against the radicals. It was only developmentalists that perceived the need to trade, while the radical interpretation of Chinese self-sufficiency was often quite isolationist when it came to international economy. This way, the push that the need of trade gave to the Five Principles required developmentalist thinking of Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai and others. It needed an interpretation of Deng according to which “[s]elf-reliance in no way means ‘self-seclusion’ and rejection of foreign aid. We have always considered it beneficial and necessary for the development of the national economy that countries should carry on economic and technical exchanges on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and the exchange of needed goods to make up for each other’s deficiencies” (Deng quoted in Hook and Yahuda 1974: 644).
However, in addition to developmentalist priorities the need for technology also came from the military leaders (both regional and central commands) who understood the role of technology in the defense of China against Soviet Union and its allies; later in the 1970s the danger of Soviet allies became to mean Vietnam especially (Domes 1977). Each of China’s conflicts with external powers – the border war with India in 1962, the border conflict with the Soviet Union and the war with Vietnam in 1979 – functioned as a reality check showing China that with people’s war only, without appropriate war technology, China could not defend itself against future external threats.

Due to strategic push, developmentalist needs and the resistance of hegemonism China finally moved from class-based world politics to state-based international relations in the 1970s. This transition was, at first, fragile and plagued with relapses. The individuals driving this transition were the same that were supporting developmentalism, and for them, the Five Principles was not just a compromise made for the potentially anti-hegemonic Third World and the “second intermediate zone”, but for all countries. This was made very clear by Deng Xiaoping already in 1974 in his speech on Foreign policy: “We hold that in both political and economic relations, countries should base themselves on the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We are opposed to the establishment of hegemony and spheres of influence by any country in any part of the world in violation of these principles. We hold that the affairs of each country should be managed by its own people.” (Peking Review, Special supplement to No. 15, April 12, 1974)
From Revolutionary Victory to Face Saving and Dignity for All
While the transition from radical to developmentalist and from proletarian internationalism to respect of sovereignty were both very dramatic transitions in China’s approach and while these transformations had a tremendous indirect effect on regional peace, China’s explicit approach to conflict prevention changed in a more modest manner. In theory, the revolutionary narrative, the defeat of the oppressor and the victory of the oppressed, is very pronounced (Kraus 1977), while in developmentalist rhetoric mutual gains have greater prominence. The identity and the purpose of the state was defined fundamentally differently during the radical period of the Cultural Revolution than during the developmentalist period. According to Mao, “[t]he kind of state we need today is a dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries and traitors.” (Kraus 1977: 338–9). The great narrative that generated this identity was the narrative of the utter destruction of the oppressor in the glorious revolution of 1946-9. The great narrative of the post-1979 developmentalist China was one where the ultra-leftist radicalism of the 1960s and the 1970s (that sidelined the leaders of the developmentalist China) held real, material prosperity of the proletariat hostage of ideological dogma and power battle. This narrative gives rise to a state that has a much less confrontational identity and purpose. The purpose of politics and state institutions was to serve as an instrument of material prosperity of people
Deng (1982) and as such the state was not as prone to seeking to defeat its enemies and resolving conflicts by aiming at total victories.  

The main great change towards the direction of face saving from an approach focused on victories is the transformation from populist diplomacy to prudent, secretive diplomacy. Quite like in Indonesia and many other East Asian countries in the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution meant the primacy of the masses as a conflict approach. Partly this was related to the aim of Mao to sideline the critics of his Great Leap Forward by relying on his support among the masses (Dittmer 1978). However, the mass-foundation of politics also had an ideological root in Mao’s teachings as the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee’s Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966) documents.

The mass-based foundation of politics of Cultural Revolution was probably the main reason for the extremely confrontational victory-orientation of Chinese politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Populist diplomacy of the masses and the Red Guard organizations were often motivated by domestic power concerns rather than by a consistent foreign policy line, and as such they were difficult to relate to any rational, consequentialist logic of conflict prevention. Red Guard harassed most foreign diplomats and often demanded diplomats of demonstrative practices that were blatantly in contradiction with China’s international commitments to the laws of diplomacy, and policies of non-interference. A driver of the Mongolian Embassy was forced to have Mao’s pictures in his car, and as he resisted his car was burned. This lead to a populist,

Yet, in practice, we cannot deny that peaceful coexistence as a doctrine is a product of revolutionary China, and that the post-1979, developmentalist China has not always been very careful protecting the dignity of its opponents in, say, the South China Sea disputes.
popular reaction in Ulan Batar, which again was retaliated by Chinese masses against Mongolian diplomats in Beijing (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no. 29, 1967: 226). Several other embassies were also raided and some burned in the mass-based conflict approach, often related to disputes over insults against the Chinese leaders or over the position of ethnic Chinese. It is quite clear that much of the mass action can only be understood as demonstrations of loyalty towards Mao, and China. Yet all these acts also had negative consequences to China’s conflict prevention (Klein 1968). This populist popular diplomacy did not end before 1969 as China had severed almost all its international contacts which only eased in 1969 (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation” *The China Quarterly*, no 39 (Jul. – Sept. 1969): 144–168).

In addition to Red Guard diplomacy, media diplomacy during the radical period emphasized more or less total crushing of enemies as an approach to conflicts. Disputes with foreign countries just like with domestic enemies were in the focus of political commentaries and the tone was often very confrontational. Conflicts could only be solved by totally defeating the enemies of China and opponents of the proletarian dictatorship.

While populist diplomacy and confrontational propaganda had been part of the Chinese approach since the revolution, Cultural Revolution brought this approach to the extreme. This created the problem that helped China move to the other direction as consequences of the victory-seeking confrontational diplomacy had ended up in a situation where Chinese contacts in the world were, with only a few exceptions, non-state actors with very little relevance for China’s international interests. China was pushed to traditional negotiation both after the Sino–Soviet clashes in 1969 and Sino–
Vietnamese war in 1979. In neither case, Chinese own revolutionary or developmentalist approach dictated the approach to the conflict resolution. Nor did negotiation produce any real results either. Thus, clearly, one should not consider the transition of China’s approach to terminate conflict prevention as something extreme. Yet, some movement can be detected. Once China realized that it wanted to create better state-to-state relations to its neighbors due to trade or strategic considerations it had to tackle the question of how to resolve the disputes of the past. While media attacks against international opponents continued, change seemed to start on the official level, and the engines of change were individuals who were associated with developmentalist attitude and greater respect for the sovereignty of China’s East Asian neighbors, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. In 1971, change had begun by a move towards a more personalistic, quiet diplomacy with a greater focus on mutual benefits rather than relative victories: “At the formal level relations continued to improve gradually and disagreement continued to be more piano than a year ago” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, The China Quarterly, no. 45 (Jan. – Mar., 1971): 214). Furthermore, the relationship orientation of dispute termination was clear in the quickly increasing frequency of international contacts between China and the leadership of its regional neighbors.

In 1971 the issue of the position of ethnic Chinese was for the first time approached as a matter of negotiation instead of seeing it simply as a confrontation that proved the need to defeat rightist governments. In Burma the Chinese government took care of the losses suffered by Chinese nationals during the riots of 1967, while at the same time China negotiated a more permanent settlement for the position of ethnic Chinese in Burma (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly,
Quite like in Southeast Asia after the Malaysian confrontation, also in China, peace-building started with relations rather than with conflicting issues, and it was aimed at focusing popular attention to things that unite rather than things that divide. Original in the Chinese approach was the mobilization of cultural relations at the outset of dispute settlement. Chinese ping-pong diplomacy as an ice breaker for international relations is well known, but less known is the Chinese approach towards the Philippines with an excuse of introducing basket-ball tournaments between teams from each nation. With basket ball teams followed top diplomats, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping at helm for secret confidential personal buildup of relations (*Peking Review*, no. 13/1974). While the Chinese media was kept uninformed or they were disallowed to publicize the issue, documentation from Southeast Asian sources could verify that already at the very end of 1973, personal commitments were in all silence given by the two leading Chinese pragmatists, Deng and Zhou, on the ending of support to the communist forces in several of the regional states: “According to Indonesia’s foreign minister, ‘China would neither support nor encourage any Communist rebellion in Indonesia’. Both the Malaysian and Thai Governments were said to have received similar assurances from Chou En-lai.” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, *The China Quarterly*, no 58 (Apr. – Jun., 1974): 421). Later such concessions could also be publicized in the Chinese media as the military support to the communist parties of neighboring countries was attributed to Lin Biao, who had already been discredited in the Chinese debate (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975b: 600). The ending of Chinese support to neighboring
communist insurgents was also legitimized by endorsement by the Philippine Communist Party saying that the normalization of relations between the Philippines and China was good for anti-hegemonism, and as such not bad for the revolution in the Philippines either. Both the Philippine and the Chinese Communist Parties agreed also that revolution could not be imported (ibid.). In Thailand, the promise of not supporting communists was made by Mao himself, referring to the need of good state-to-state relations due to the common threat of regional hegemonism of North Vietnam (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975a: 811). After the bankruptcy of populist diplomacy that focused on divisive issues and aimed at defeating of enemies it was natural that the new Chinese approach tried to avoid dwelling on divisive issues and relying on confrontational public rhetoric for dispute termination.

Soon at the initiation of personalistic secret diplomacy media policy on disputes and divisive issues became more controlled. When Thailand’s Deputy Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan visited China for trade negotiations Chinese media did not criticize the Thai system, but told about trade only (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975b: 381). Also in 1975, when China and the Philippines negotiated a deal on trade and mutual recognition, the dispute regarding to territorial claims in the Spratly Islands were totally shunned from the discussion and the media (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975c: 599). When Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Burma in January 1978 to discuss relations of the two countries no public reference was made to the issue of Chinese support to the Burmese Communist Party even though this must have been one of the topics of negotiation (The Times, January 27, 1978). Despite restraint, publicity in divisive issues did not disappear altogether in China, and in this sense Chinese conflict termination approach is not identical with that of most ASEAN states. People’s Daily
has never entirely stopped its aggressive publicity against nations that challenge China’s territorial claims and the rhetoric of victory over adversaries has never fully disappeared. Yet, publicity has not returned to the same populist form that it was in during the Cultural Revolution; nor has China longed for international military victories as it did in India in 1962, and in fact, according to the Uppsala data, it has not achieved a single one after 1979 either. Furthermore, its approach to internal conflicts has been developmentalist: instead of defeating rebellions as it did in Tibet in 1950 and in 1959, and with the Nationalists in the civil war of 1947–49, but instead, it aimed at ending discontent by offering development in rebellious regions. Thus even if the transformation might have been more modest that in some of the ASEAN countries, it can still be concluded that China’s approach to conflict termination did change, mostly as a result of the experiences of misery during the Cultural Revolution, and this change had the very same direction as in ASEAN countries in the late 1960s.
Will The Long Peace Survive? How Could It Be Made Broader, Positive and More Sustainable?

Will the Long Peace of East Asia Last?

It is not realistic for just one chapter to fully answer the question of whether peace will prevail in the disputed East Asian maritime areas, where the formula of the East Asian peace has not much relevance. However, it is useful to briefly look at the challenges that the East Asian formula for peace faces in the maritime areas and elsewhere in the foreseeable future.

There are at least two ways of assessing whether or not the East Asian peace will survive the next few decades. One is to look backwards to see the relapses of peace before the Long Peace of East Asia, and the other is to look at foreseeable new challenges to the East Asian approach.

One can follow the East Asian developments to see how peaceful periods have broken down, and then estimate whether similar conditions and contradictions are emerging with the current peaceful period. The analysis of the collapse of the short peace of 1955–1963 would be the first task in such a strategy.

Secondly, since we now have an analysis of the components of the current peace approach, we will be able to see how these components relate to the foreseeable changes in societies and the international structure to see if the components are sustainable. It seems that at least two current megatrends with a difficult relationship to the pillars of the long peace of East Asia can be identified. On the one hand, societies in East Asia are
getting more democratic and this seems to create pressures at least towards the secretive and personalistic nature of East Asian conflict prevention. Secondly, and less obviously, that East Asian developmentalist orientation can be threatened by the fact that prosperity has continued for a long time, and this has been predicted to imply a change in popular opinions (Inglehart and Wenzel 2009). People who have not seen poverty tend to be more oriented to self-expression values than survival values like economic development. However the East Asian/ASEAN Way of conflict prevention is essentially based on the valuation of economic development.

**Will the Long Peace of East Asia Fall as did the Short Peace of East Asia?**

The short peace of East Asia can be characterized by a sudden relative pause in external interference after France had left Indochina, after the US had dropped its role as the administrator of the post-World War II settlement and before it had sent extensive military presence to Southeast Asian conflict areas. It was the time when the revolutionary China needed some breathing space after its revolution and the war in Korea, before a new revolutionary period and the transformation of Chinese economy from feudal to communist. It was also the time when many of East Asian nations were adopting some principles of non-interference of the Non-Aligned Movement (China’s Five Principles is the most famous of these principles). Furthermore, the Geneva Conference protocol in 1954 introduced some norms not only with regards to the ending of colonialism in Indochina, but also with regards to the external military presence in
In this sense, despite the emergence of SEATO in 1954, and the several US-military alliances already before that, the short peace was characterized as a period of relative military non-interference. Chapter 2 has shown how all of this changed in the 1960s once proxy war of powers external to the region and once Chinese proletarian internationalism penetrated the domestic disputes of East Asian nations.

The short peace was also characterized by the thinking according to which domestic conflict was best contained by means of “winning the hearts and minds” of potential rebel constituencies. In addition to psychological operations amongst the diehard rebel fighters this meant an effort to isolate rebels from their constituencies by showing that the legal non-communist government served the economic interests of impoverished people better than the rebel armies (Lansdate 1972). This meant the need to emphasize poverty reduction and development. This was increasingly the strategy in the Malayan Emergency as the Malayan officials won more power vis-à-vis the British colonialists (Mahathir 2011). At the same time, China needed a breeding space for its own development after the Korean War (Hearden 2012: 54). Instead of pushing revolution, China was pushing for patience in South Vietnam, and wanted to help compromise in the Geneva Conference. The worries related to global power politics, and especially the fear of SEATO motivated a charm offensive among the governments of Southeast Asia (Storey 2011: 4). Thus development was given some space, even...
though developmental priorities never became a commonly accepted norm that countries would have needed to convince each other.

The lack of regional developmental norm made it possible for countries to neglect their development whenever domestic power struggle required that. In China this happened after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, while in Indonesia, Sukarno needed more revolutionary credibility to compensate for his lack of skills in economic management. This lack of regional commitment to development was the main difference of the short peace compared to the long peace of East Asia. After the Cultural Revolution that pushed domestic dissatisfaction into diversionary warfare\textsuperscript{102} and exportation of communist rebellion into the neighboring countries, and after the lessons of Malaysian Confrontation, it was possible for regional states to agree that all countries address the roots of their domestic problems themselves rather than allow them to spill over national borders to other countries. All this was missing during the short peace. The economic trouble and following radicalization of China and Indonesia was allowed to happen without regional protest. Similarly, the authoritarian neglect of popular welfare in South Vietnam was allowed to be framed as an issue of global power politics without seeing it as a threat to regional stability. Thus the lack of a regional norm of developmentalism meant that domestic changes in Southeast Asia (Indonesia), Indochina (South Vietnam) and in East Asia (China) managed to create a situation that together with the interventionist policy of the US escalated from a domestic conflict into international warfare.

\textsuperscript{102} Warfare that diverts domestic dissatisfaction to the government into an external enemy; see Wright 1965.
If the reason for the collapse of a peace regime relatively similar to the long peace in the beginning of the 1960s was the absence of a regional norm of developmentalism and non-interference and these pillars of peace were based a national commitment, the collapse of the short peace does not predict the failure of the long peace. The national commitment to development and non-interference was strengthened in the long peace by regional norms and institutions that make development orientation a responsibility of states towards each other. Thus the foundations of long peace are more solid than those of the short peace.

At the same time the way in which the short peace collapsed should alert us to developments that threaten the pillars of peace in a manner similar to the experiences of the collapse of the short peace of East Asia. Whenever international disputes are being dealt with by mobilizing popular protests against other countries we should be worried when eggs and paint start flying against the embassies of other territorial disputants (Johnson and Shanker 2012), when officers stage protests in a disputed maritime areas (“Aquino stops Panatag protest”, Manila Times online, May 19, 2012) or when parties to disputes start requesting demonstrative military support from super powers against their adversaries (“US should not cross the line to intervene in maritime disputes”, People’s Daily Online, July 30, 2012).

**Are Democracy and Prosperity Threats to the Long Peace?**

Democratization has made it difficult for governments to play down issues that divide and focus on issues that unite. Without control over the media, governments cannot make sure that the populistic media does not blow disputes out of proportion. Also prudence in conflict termination could be more difficult in a democratic regime where public speech cannot be controlled and where democratic regimes need popular support
that victorious conflicts could bring.\footnote{Democracies tend to win their wars or participate in wars they win (Stam 1996).} Democratization in East Asia had already been associated with greater number of demonstrations and non-violent dissidence (Svensson and Lindgren 2011). However, development towards democracy might have its positive impacts on peace to compensate for the weakening elements of the East Asian formula for peace. Some studies suggest that democracies are generally more peaceful than autocracies (Rummel 1995), while others emphasize the democratic dyads: democracies are at least more pacific towards each other (Müller and Wolff 2004). The impact on violence of the association between democratization and demonstrations could be offset by the fact that democracies are more resilient to non-violent popular discontent: demonstrations have not escalated into violence as often in democracies as in autocracies (Davenport 2007; Gurr 2000). This could be because of the fact that democratic institutions make governments more responsive to peoples’ preferences against war (Lake 1992). It seems therefore, that democratic transition will threaten the East Asian peace formula, but not necessarily peace as such.

A look at the tendencies shows instantly that East Asia is not getting more belligerent than before. Thailand has become more warlike after its democratization in the 1990s, while Indonesia experienced a seven-year period of increased violence after the collapse of Suharto. Elsewhere, democratization has not had negative effects. However, if one looks at the relationship between democracy and conflict in East Asia systematically and takes into account also the long-term effects\footnote{On these, see Kivimäki 2012d. The following conclusions are from that study. They measure democracy by using Polity IV data from 2012 (Eckstein 1975).} it is possible to see that after the Second World War democracy has been relatively strongly linked to
peacefulness. Thus while democracy undermines some of the pillars of the East Asian approach to peace it simultaneously creates new ones. If one takes Polity IV data’s value zero as the cutoff point between democratic and non-democratic countries, one can see that autocracies have experienced 20 times as high levels of annual casualties as democracies (Kivimäki 2012d). However, the difference between democracies and autocracies has become much smaller once the long peace of East Asia started (Kivimäki 2012d). The long peace has been largely constituted by the pacification of autocracies close to the level of peacefulness of democracies. This has been largely due to the fact that non-interference norm has made it difficult for countries to escalate domestic conflicts into international wars even if the different concepts of democracy could have legitimized the interference. The pattern before 1979 was that autocracies tended to have problems with their domestic order and then other autocracies or democracies interfered in the domestic conflict over governance and made small conflicts into big wars. When the interference ended, small conflicts about governance remained small. While democracy has made non-interference more difficult it has also reduced the number of small conflicts that could escalate through interference. Thus, democratization has made one of the pillars of peace in East Asia more difficult, while at the same time it has added another pillar to support peace.

105 If one measures belligerence by battle deaths per population the effect of democracy is even more pronounced as autocracies have about 30 times as many fatalities per population as democracies. However, if we take a less demanding coding rule and consider Polity2 value 0 as democracy, autocracies have no longer more than about five times as many battle deaths per population than democracies. There are methodological issues related to the Polity2 value 0 which the present book will not go into; these have been dealt with in Kivimäki 2012d. However, what is clear is that democracies tend to be more peaceful than autocracies in East Asia. Calculations on battle deaths per population in democracies and autocracies are based on the PRIO-data (version 3.0) on battle deaths, UNDP data on population and Polity IV data (version 2012) on polities.
Prosperity tends to direct the attention of people from survival values to self-expression values (Inglehart and Wenzel 2009). This could mean on the one hand that people and states would be less committed to development, which, after all, is a survival value, and that popular self-expression can take ultra-nationalist, racist, or radical political forms (while it could just as well take individualistic, artistic or any other non-destructive forms). If developmental concerns no longer deter people from destructive self-expression and if the new urgency of self-expression makes this possible, while the new democracy makes such self-expression possible, this could lead to protests that highlight rather than hide differences and divisions (Kivimäki 2012e). Isak Svensson and Mathilda Lindgren (2011) have shown that this has already happened to some extent. The long peace of East Asia has been increasingly plagued by non-violent protests and uprisings. Table 8.1 shows the linkage of this to the process of East Asia becoming more prosperous.

**Table 8.1: Challenge of Democracy and wealth to the ASEAN norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reached 2000 USD/annum</th>
<th>Existence of a generation of young men with no experience of poverty</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Open demonstration of political differences by means of demonstrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No/Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(not yet developmentalist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clearly, East Asian prosperity is moving it towards the pattern of populist politics that ruined the short peace of East Asia. However, quite as democracy, prosperity is generally also associated to peace, even if in East Asia it does threaten some of the foundations of the East Asian approach to stability. Wealth and living standard elevate the threshold of violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Lipset 1959) and economic growth (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) is almost as solidly associated with peace. Authoritarian violence is not so common in prosperous countries either (Mitchell and McGormick 1988) while also the association between military coups and poverty is strong (Londregan and Poole 1990).

With the exception of Thailand (and Indonesia until 2005), East Asian prosperity has not brought more conflict, even if the frequency of popular protests has increased. Despite the fact that divisions are now expressed more openly, and that popular participation in the expression of these divisions has increased, commitment to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Coup</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Reaching now</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>In the 1960s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
development has not declined. Figure 8.1 shows the average level of developmentalism, as operationalized in Chapter 4, among East Asian countries.

**Graph 8.1: Average commitment to development among East Asian countries**

Quite clearly, developmentalism has increased rather than decreased, even if the positive development slowed down in the 1990s as countries became more democratic. If one looks at the association between developmentalism, development and peace, one can notice an increasing interdependence (Kivimäki 2012e). While in the beginning of the long peace of East Asia, development, and commitment to development was often seen as an alternative to democratic foundation of the legitimacy of the regime, this has changed during the past decades. The legitimacy of a government is more now related to its democratic credentials than before, but it is also increasingly dependent on a government’s ability to deliver development. Instead of being alternatives, democratic and developmental legitimacies have become complementary. Development and democracy are no longer optional sources of legitimacy of governments; instead, they...
belong to the same package of “modernity”. The state apparatus is expected to act in a modern fashion, and this means efficiency in economic management as well as openness to popular participation. The purpose of the state apparatus is no longer simply to deliver development, but to offer modernity with opportunities both for self-expression and development. In Tibet, Papua, Southern Thailand, Mindanao and Aceh the failure of efforts to simply appease rebels by promises of development is a reflection of the limits of developmentalism as a conflict prevention instrument (Kivimäki 2012e). This way democracy and prosperity will perhaps challenge the old ASEAN Way and the old East Asian approach to peace. But they do not challenge peace as such.

Way Ahead

The long peace of East Asia does not suffer from all the same problems as the short peace did. Thus it does not need to collapse as the short peace did. The new challenges to the East Asian approach to peace do not threaten peace itself either. However, changes in East Asian societies do challenge the old approach and this means that new elements are needed to guarantee peace in East Asia. Furthermore, the long peace of East Asia is a negative peace, an absence of wars, rather than a genuine positive peace.

Despite the fact that it is possible to identify the formula that has worked before, one should not simply defend the old formula. In a dynamic setting part of the old formula has been certain flexibility that has allowed East Asian conflict prevention adjust to the need of the time. Furthermore, flexibility is needed in order to adjust to the different requirements that different regional disputes pose to conflict prevention.
Separatist conflicts have remained a major problem for Southeast Asian intra-state peace, while territorial disputes have continued to plague interstate relations. While developmental concerns have limited both challenges, and while non-interference has made separatist conflicts smaller, it is clear that non-interference and developmentalism have not fully answered the puzzles posed by separatist and territorial disputes. On the one hand, non-interference principle only prevents other states from helping separatist rebels against East Asian governments, but it has not removed the fundamental problem. Since both in territorial disputes and in separatism the dispute itself is about sovereignty, the full respect for each other’s sovereignty does not fully apply to these conflicts.

Similarly, while developmental concerns prevent countries and rebel groups from focusing only on relative gains, development is problematic in separatist conflicts as it directs the separatist society towards the center. Papuan fighters, for example, resent Indonesian development because it is seen as making Pauans Asians and Indonesians, while their preferred identity is Papuan and Melanesian. In territorial disputes of today, developmentalism does not only emphasize interdependence and mutual gains. Especially disputes about maritime territories are often about energy resources that are the bottle neck of national economies of many East Asian countries, especially China. Thus these disputes also point to problems of zero sum nature: if China, for example, gets the ownership of the energy resources of the Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines will not be able to get them. Thus developmentalism does not work to the benefit of common good but instead, if focuses the attention to a conflict of interest.
Due to the changes that challenge the ASEAN Way and due to issue areas under dispute where the East Asian approach to conflict prevention does not seem to work, there is a need to see how the existing peace formula can be developed.

On the one hand, it has been suggested that the threshold of violence should be elevated to prevent conflicts on trivial issues. While common interests related to development go a long way, war should simply be made unimaginable by creating a security community (not just a no-war community) (Acharya 2001) that would make the idea of conflict between Vietnam and China or Dayaks and the Madurese of West Kalimantan as ridiculous an idea as a war between Beijing and Wuhan.

In addition to elevating the threshold of violence, it has been suggested that East Asia should develop ways to resolve, not just avoid, disputes and divisions (Rüland 2000). While East Asian communication has institutionalized from the beginning of the 1990s, ability to resolve conflicts has not developed (Svensson and Lindgren 2011).

At least three approaches can be identified in the East Asian debate for the development of a security community and for the establishment of institutions that could resolve conflicts. One is the approach that I call new developmentalism. This approach aims at innovating ways of mobilizing developmentalist thinking in order to play down conflicts and dispel securitized militaristic thinking by focusing and prioritizing issues where potential conflicting parties have common interests. This can be done until disputes are ripe for resolution. The idea of joint development and regional cooperation in the disputed maritime territories strongly advocated by China is an example of this. The idea with this proposal is “shelving disputes and going in for joint development (PRC Foreign Ministry 2000a)”. Deng Xiaoping defined the Chinese
model of regional cooperation and joint development in a way that leaves the problem of sovereignty for the next generations to solve while using the present to concentrate on joint development (Lo 1989: 167). This approach was explicated later in Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng’s declaration: “China is ready to join efforts with Southeast Asian countries to develop the Spratly Islands, while putting aside for the time being the question of sovereignty.” (Cited in Guoxing 1990: 1) In other words, the strategy is based on restraint, delinking and freezing of issues that divide (the dispute on sovereignty) from the necessary cooperation and focusing on the common interest of development. The same definition was adopted in the ASEAN declaration of 1992 on the peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes as well as in the ASEAN and China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea from 4 November 2002.

The widely supported broader framing of security and the focusing on non-traditional and human security is another example of new developmentalism. However, in this strategy the creation of a developmentalist security community is articulated more explicitly. Speech and practice of cooperation for non-traditional security and joint development and regional cooperation participate in the social construction of a reality of a special type of a security community (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers 2006). In this approach public speech links cooperation with peace and makes war less thinkable. The approach can be seen in this context as an articulation of a reality where priorities of cooperation are more important than the zero-sum-priorities of the militaries (Caballero-Anthony 2006). While aiming at remedying the weakness of a security community in East Asia, this approach explicitly rejects the challenge of dispute resolution, however.
Second approach to complementing the East Asian formula for peace is something I call the legalist approach. It aims at introducing legal discourse as an alternative to militaristic security speech to disputes thereby building a social reality that frames interaction differently. The approach of the eminent Southeast Asian, especially Singaporean persons (ASEAN Expert and Eminent Persons Group, EEP) in the creation of the ASEAN Charter represent this strategy. The main objective of this strategy is to challenge military solutions by offering an alternative, more civilized ways of dispute resolution. With legalistic stipulations on dispute resolution the legalistic approach attempts to articulate social realities, where disputes about the founding principles of relations between East Asian nations (and perhaps between ethnic groups inside East Asian nations as well) appear as matter of legal interpretation rather than issues of security. The effort is to desecuritize (move the issue area away from the realm of security) disputes within East Asia. The security community that this approach aims at building is “marketed” as one for civilized people. Furthermore it is being legitimized as a solution to a problem that persisted before (militarization of disputes) and as a strategy that is associated to the success of more recent regional peace. According to the main drafter of the ASEAN Charter, Dr. Walter Woon: “All the members of ASEAN have had historical experience of gunboat diplomacy by external powers. It is not an experience that anyone would care to repeat in the 21st century.” (Woon 2009: 70).

\footnote{When Walter Woon (2009), one of the main architects of the ASEAN Charter, explains Articles 26 and 27 on dispute settlement, legalistic dispute settlement is associated several times to the commonly desired identity of ASEAN as a \textit{civilized} community.}
In addition to “selling” the legalistic approach as a better approach to interaction and as a way of interaction that corresponds to the civilized identity of East Asians, the intention of this strategy is also to institutionalize it, first in Southeast Asia, and perhaps later in the entire East Asia. The ASEAN dispute settlement in the ASEAN Charter is becoming legally regulated once domestic legislation is changed to conform with the stipulations of the ASEAN Charter and once the exact operationalization of the ASEAN dispute-settlement mechanism has been found. In addition to being institutionalized within domestic legislation Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter allows ASEAN to create a court should that prove to be necessary in future (Woon 2009: 72).

Second step in the institutionalization of the legalization approach is related to professional cultures. When interaction in disputed issues becomes more regulated legally, disputes will be increasingly discussed by lawyers. Even though the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, for example, involved a strong political oversight of regional foreign ministries and heads of states, in reality drafting was overwhelmingly conducted by people from the legal profession (Chan Wah Teck 2010; Ong Keng Yong 2009: 112). This makes the discourse on disputes legalistic further emphasizing the role of lawyers rather than politicians, let alone soldiers. If this is the case, legalistic approach takes over dispute resolution and conflicts become more technocratic, legal conflicts rather than destructive militarized conflicts. Yet, due to the lack of tradition in legalism especially in East Asia’s international relations, and due to the strict interpretations of sovereignty, legalistic strategy will take a long time to root in East Asia. The experiences of Thai–Cambodian border disputes even after the signing of the

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ASEAN Charter clearly show the limits of commitment to de-securitized, legalized interstate relations in East Asia. The fact that ASEAN has had only limited success in socializing China into its legalism is another proof of the fact that legalism is still fragile and not yet very consequential.

The third strategy is the Malaysian and perhaps Indonesian way of moving towards conflict resolution by innovating moderate ways that restrain the contradictions of the existing approaches and the societal changes. This approach could be called the *moderation approach*. Without compromising military non-interference or the focus on things that unite, in this approach East Asian countries can help each other settle conflicts that the conflicting party itself cannot credibly moderate (Najib 2012). This moderate paradigm to conflict prevention aims at introducing conflict resolution to the long peace of East Asia in a way that minimally disturbs the old formula for peace. This is more realistic than the legalistic approach, which assumes that states would be willing to subject their sovereignty to regional legalistic resolution. At the same time it addresses the problem of lacking procedures for dispute resolution in East Asia better than the new developmentalist approach which just pushes resolution to the future.

While offering help to conflicting parties in conflict resolution the moderation approach absolutely rejects powerful persuasion, military threats and partisan interference, while also aiming at tackling the disputes in a prudent way striving for solutions dignified for all conflicting parties, without making disputes a cause of populistic mass action (Husain 2007). Help from outside is always something that the conflicting parties have to invite themselves as has been the case in Aceh, in the Cambodian conflict (Wiryon 2007), the conflict between the government of the Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front
(Najib 2011) – and temporarily in Southern Thailand – but not in Preah Vihear conflict, in Papua, Myanmar, or in Southern Thailand for most of the time. With a moderate ideology of avoiding extreme positions, the strategy of moderation is based on good services in conflicts by outsiders who do not want to seek to cease control over the conflict from the conflicting parties, so that these would be less hesitant to seek external help for conflict resolution (Najib 2011). The main challenges to the strategy of moderation are the disputes where the conflicting parties do not want external help. Furthermore, “moderation” in the Malaysian foreign-policy discourse is defined in an open manner in order to allow international participation to the definition of the concept. Thus the concept is not yet ready to serve as a foundation of a security community or East Asian security identity, even if the practices of moderation have already offered some concrete assistance to the main problem of the long peace of East Asia, namely the lack of dispute resolution.
Chapter 9

What Can The East Asian Experience Offer to Theories of International Relations, Peace and Conflicts?

The Exception of the Long Peace of East Asia: A Challenge to the Theory of Peace and War

East Asia has experienced a peace that has not been generally acknowledged. Yet the phenomenon has been drastic and 95% of annual battle deaths in this vast region have disappeared. What is important, too, is that the conditions surrounding this radical change do not remind of conditions that we have normally associated with long periods of peace. For the development of the theory of conflict and international relations, it is important to incorporate experiences and lessons from different parts of the world. So far, the experiences of the West, and the history of Europe have dominated the buildup of the theory of peace and conflict. This is why it is important to sum up how this study of the long peace of East Asia has enriched the theory.

Before looking at what kind of dilemmas and falsifying information the study of East Asia has brought to the theory of peace and conflicts, it is also important, however, to look at the limits of this study, too. My main claims/assertions of this book have been that

1. East Asia has become pacific by focusing on development and other uniting matters and in so doing it has created a social reality that is less paranoid, less militaristic, and more cooperative. Countries with the lowest of the three levels of commitment to development (no
commitment) have over 300 times as many battle deaths per year per population as countries with the highest level of commitment to development.\footnote{Countries with intermediate level of commitment have over 20 times as many battle deaths per population as countries with the highest level of commitment to development. Calculated from Table 4.3.}

2. If conflicts occur, East Asia’s commitment to the respect of sovereignty and the norm of military non-interference has prevented them from escalating. Domestic conflicts that escalate into international level due to external military interference by combat troops cause majority of East Asian battle deaths. On average 97–98\% of battle deaths in such conflicts take place only once external interference has started. The fact that after 1979 there has been a commonly accepted rule of keeping domestic issues domestic has prevented the vicious circle of escalation. External powers have not had the need, or the justification for their interference as their potential enemies have not interfered either.

3. If disputes still arise and conflicts begin and escalate, East Asian countries have tried to terminate them by playing them down, by avoiding publicity around them and by dealing with the economic grievances that give rise to the disputes. This approach can be contrasted by the highly public, confrontational post-World War II approach, in which the aim was to mobilize to end the disputes victoriously.

4. The foundation of the legitimacy of developmentalism, non-interventionism, and prudence in conflict termination is not in some exogenous conditions. Instead, it is generated in a historical process
where common history of ASEAN and Chinese relations with East Asia, created a common perception of the diagnosis of conflict. It is born out of a historical process where collective memory of the failures and the successes of conflict prevention efforts created a trust on a common conflict prevention approach: the one that respect development, non-interference and face saving. Thus the emergence of the long peace of East Asia is historically specific, and cannot be generalized by studying objective, material conditions independent of common perceptions and common interpretations. This does not mean that East Asian experience would not have relevance for other regions in the world. It means just that generalizations should not be attempted to be drawn from the material conditions, but rather from the lived experience and socially constructed realities of East Asia.

The experience of the long peace of East Asia has contributed many important specifications to the existing theory of peace, conflicts and international relations. It has challenged many central axioms of the existing theory. It is clear from the experience of East Asia that:

1. Hegemonic power, US leadership and especially military presence of superpowers have not been beneficial for peace in the region. On the contrary, as Chapter 3 showed, they have been counter-productive and destructive. This casts a doubt on the theories of anarchy that emphasize the need for global leadership as a remedy for the perils of anarchy.
2. Peace and war are not necessarily derived from global structures of power. Even if it is clear that East Asian countries have had to reorient their external relations, and even if it is clear that their global bargaining was affected by the transformation of the world from a bipolar into a unipolar form, the crucial developments that affected peace and warfare in the region were national and regional, rather than global. This casts doubt on many of the structural realist applications of the analysis of East Asian security. It is clear that Indochinese pacification was crucially affected by the ending of the Cold War, and this did affect the number of battle deaths in East Asia. But the pacification of China and ASEAN took place much earlier than the global changes and these changes had a dominant impact on peace and war in the region.

3. The European Union approach of lowering borders and pooling of sovereignty is not a universal recipe for peace. The lowering of state borders meant military interference in domestic conflicts and this, again, meant greater capacity for warfare and more intensive conflicts. Thus the elevating of borders in East Asia with a consensus about the respect of sovereignty and the norm of military non-interference was more of a recipe than the pooling of sovereignty in regional organizations and the lowering of borders.

4. Peace does not have to be created by resolving of conflicts and disputes. The way to peace that this book has been focused on is not based on concentrating on the disputes at all. Conflicts in East Asia have not been terminated in peace negotiations. Instead, the East Asian experience
suggests that the misery of war can also be minimized by focusing on the prevention of conflict escalation and by creating a reality of harmony in practices that focus on things that unite rather than divide.

5. Peace and war cannot always be explained by referring to causal relations from exogenous conditions to peace or war. This study suggests that the best way of making sense of the long peace of East Asia is to be open up towards the non-causal processes of the constitution of the processes of peace and war. Instead of the removal of exogenous conditions that cause war, peace was generated by approaches and epistemic orientations that constructed peaceful social realities and prevented the vicious cycle of escalatory moves.

While these challenges to the theory of peace and war have been derived from the experience of the long peace of East Asia, it is clear that more general theoretical work has to be done to tackle the challenges that this study has posed to the theory of peace and war. This task cannot be completed in the concluding chapter of this book.

**Exceptions to the Pattern of the Long Peace of East Asia**

In addition to seeing East Asian peace as an interesting exception of several global patterns, scholars of peace and war have to realize that East Asia, too, has its exceptions. While East Asia in general became more peaceful around 1979, this was not the case for all countries. Furthermore, while the components of peaceful approach, the ASEAN Way, tend to be common to East Asian countries in general, some countries have become more developmentalist than others, and some countries respect sovereignty more, while some are still more obsessed by victorious termination of
conflicts than others. Developmentalism, non-interference and the new approach to conflict termination have also developed at slightly different times in different parts of East Asia. In this sense the ASEAN Way as an approach of East Asia after 1979 is not something every member has applied (only) after 1979 (and never before 1980), but instead the “ASEAN Way” and the “long peace of East Asia” can be defined in terms of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance.\textsuperscript{109}

However, there are systematic exceptions to the generalization “ASEAN Way generated the long peace of East Asia that started after 1979” that need more attention. What has so far not been sufficiently noticed in the literature on East Asian peace is the fact that although the decline in the number of battle deaths has been drastic, the belligerence of the pre-1980 period has not been consistent. As mentioned in previous chapters (2 and 7) there was also a short peace within the belligerent period from 1955 until 1963. This period had some similarities with the long peace of East Asia after 1979. It was marked, especially in the Philippines and in South Vietnam (Nahel 2005; Lansdale 1972), but also in Thailand and Indonesia (Jones 1973), by an American encouragement to developmentalist thinking and state identity. Furthermore, as the short peace started with the withdrawal of France from the region and with the Chinese declaration of the Five Principles, the element of exceptionally low levels of external interference was there, too.

\textsuperscript{109} The concept of family resemblance is from Wittgenstein (1953/2001) and refers to conceptual categories that cannot be strictly defined by exceptionless criteria. Instead these categories are characterized by family resemblance, where most of the qualities relevant for the definition are common for the references of the concept, but where none of them are without any exceptions.
The short peace of the 1950s in East Asia needs to be fully studied in order to solve the puzzle of East Asian peace. Was this short period of peace built on similar foundations as the post-1979 East Asian peace? If it was, why did the peace not last? Could the weaknesses of the East Asian short peace haunt the East Asian longer peace period, too? This needs to be investigated. While the research agenda of East Asian peace is a healthy distraction from the global research agenda, the research agenda on East Asian peace itself has to be open to recognize the healthy exceptions of the East Asian peace. Only by recognizing the importance of exceptions can we build realistic models about the generalities of peace and war.

Furthermore, what has not received sufficient attention is the fact that the post-1979 period has not been equally peaceful in all East Asian countries. The failure of the Philippines deserves further investigation. Why is this country an exception to the rule? Are there some conditions or policies of the Philippines that fundamentally differ from the rest of East Asia? Is this country with strong historical reliance on the US different from the peaceful East Asian countries that try to avoid external powers in the region? Or is the Philippine regime’s reliance on economic development as a source of regime legitimacy weaker than such a reliance of other East Asian countries? Perhaps the Western-minded political culture with greater emphasis on democratic rights makes the Philippines less exposed to the developmentalist modes of peaceful East Asian interaction? All these alternative explanations need to be explored in a separate study.

The exception of the Philippines does not look as great if one looks at the number of battle deaths per population rather than just the number of battle deaths. While the latter way of looking shows increase of conflict, the former way shows a modest decline. While it is true that the country has experienced more conflict fatalities during the long peace of East Asia than before that period, the increase in the number of battle deaths is not as great as the increase of the number of population.
There have also been exceptions to the East Asian peace approach. Burma/Myanmar, the Philippines and North Korea have not been very developmentalist even after 1979, while the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, have not really been totally in favor of the same norm of non-interference when they accept foreign troops on their soil. The pacification of Japan and South Korea also took place much earlier than the birth of the non-interference norm in East Asia and the processes of pacification, especially in Japan, were intrusive. Thus these processes did not really belong to the same family of peaceful development as did the pacification of Southeast Asia (except the Philippines) and China.

Finally, as the main element of the peaceful approach in East Asia after 1979 has been the respect for military non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of fellow East Asian countries, it seems that certain disputes of the region have remained outside the peace regime. Escalation of territorial disputes, especially the ones in maritime areas cannot be avoided by respecting the sovereignty of one’s adversaries. On the contrary, the issue of sovereignty is what is at stake in these conflicts. Furthermore, while economic development has been the motivation that has prevented the onset of disputes in East Asia, developmental priorities have not always been constructive to peace in disputes about maritime territories. While the disputants do need each other for trade, the developmental issue in the disputed seas has been energy resources that are of a zero-sum nature: the more one’s adversary gets of these resources, the less is left for oneself. Yet, while the countries are not bound to the positive interdependence by their economic relations in this specific issue, they are in general considerations on trade relations, for example, must affect decisions on how much to push one’s adversaries in territorial disputes. This way the question of disputed maritime territories is at least
partly outside the East Asian peace regime. While the record of East Asian interstate relations has been weakest in issues of disputed territories (both last wars and last interstate conflicts during the peaceful period, have been on disputed territories. Thus it seems natural to assume that the long peace of East Asia is most fragile in these issues.

Conclusions

The purpose of this book has been to make sense of the sudden transformation of East Asia from the world’s most belligerent to one of world’s most peaceful regions. I have shown the association between three socially constructed realities: 1. Developmentalist approach, identity and role of states, 2. The norm of non-interference, and 3. Prudent, face-saving attitude to conflict termination, with the decline in the onset of conflicts, near disappearance of their escalation to wars, and disappearance of violence into inaction. These associations have been revealed by means of statistical analysis. Only numbers could reveal the general tendencies, the systematic regularities and the big picture of peace and war in East Asia. At the same time, the use of qualitative historical process tracing and interpretative methods has been necessary for the revelation of the nature of these associations and regularities.

The present study has not found exogenous causal relationships between objective material conditions and peace. Thus it has not produced knowledge for simple “social engineering” of material conditions for the purpose of conflict prevention. Yet the findings of this study have produced pragmatic understanding. Since it seems that the regularities of the long peace of East Asia are largely generated by knowledge, understanding and social practices rather than material conditions, it has been necessary
for this study to remain sensitive also to the evidence on non-material constitution of peaceful realities.

While discoveries on causal regularities would have been easy to generalize and carry to other regions as lessons for peace, the understanding of East Asian socially created realities will also be useful for other regions. It reveals what was possible in the generation of conditions conducive for peace, even if these conditions are not causally determined. Yet lessons of reasons for success (and failure) of various approaches to interaction might not be possible to carry to other regions simply by emulating the East Asian approaches elsewhere. The meaning and social function of different elements of approaches to politics is influenced by region-specific and culture-specific common historical experiences of problems and their remedies. Thus the same strategy (say lowering borders as was done in post-World War II Europe) might have a different effect in a different geographic and historical context. However, in addition to the falsifying learning (for example, that the European integration strategy for peace does not necessarily work elsewhere), the logic of social construction of peaceful realities of East Asia has positive general features that can be used as lessons outside the East Asian context. The problems of interventionist peace strategies, for example, that the East Asian case reveals so well, are likely to plague interventionist peace enforcement elsewhere, too. The misery of Iraq during the past decade could have been avoided if the lessons of belligerence in post-World War II East Asia (Vietnam War for example) and the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 had been studies more thoroughly.

Similarly, the logic of output democracy or developmentalism – i.e. a conviction that the welfare of citizens is a central task of states and regional political institutions – can be a lesson that could be carried to other regions too. Understanding of the
importance of developmentalism for peace could sophisticate our understanding of the theory of democratic peace, and sensitivize us to the more economic dimensions of democracy in our explanation of conditions for peace.

Finally, and most importantly, the investigation of this study has revealed many processes of inter-dependence in the creation of the conditions of peace and war. It seems, on the basis of the experiences of East Asia, that it would be one of the great tasks for peace research to abandon the single-minded obsession for exogenous causal relationships between objective conditions and peace, and start developing models, in which conflicts and peace are being analyzed as processes, where the action of one conflicting party constitutes the legitimate counter-action of the other conflicting party. Instead of looking at the consequences of the conditions that one’s actions created for the other (say deterrence), we should be studying what our action constitutes in a structure where our and our adversary’s actions are just parts of the same interactive process. To me the most valuable lesson that this study and the experience of East Asia have delivered has been the realization that tackling these vicious cycles of escalation, and promoting inter-active processes of de-escalation is very important for peace research. Developing tools for the analysis and understanding of the mutual creation of legitimacy for violent action by adversaries (and the mutual creation of legitimacy of de-escalatory actions), is one of the main tasks for peace research – a task that the current causal models of peace and war are entirely incapable of tackling.
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