



Citation for published version:

Wehner, L 2011, Roles and Actions of Leadership: Brazil and the South American Others. in N Godehardt & D Nabers (eds), *Regional Powers and Regional Orders*. Routledge.

Publication date:
2011

Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print

[Link to publication](#)

University of Bath

Alternative formats

If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

7 Roles and actions of leadership

Brazil and the South American others

Leslie Wehner

Introduction

Leadership is key to understanding the emergence and future consolidation of regional powers both in their own regions and at the global level. Recent works on new regional powers have emphasized the need to study leadership and the lack of followership, or of contestation to the aspiration of these powers that is intended to change the asymmetric representation in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as well as gain more influential positions in these institutions (see Schirm 2010; Flesmes 2010; Malamud 2009). Whereas leadership is defined in these scholarly works in terms of material capabilities (hard power) and soft power, they lack a clear characterization of which types of leadership the regional power relies on when it ‘acts’ at both the regional and global levels.

Stefan Schirm (2010) focuses, for example, on Brazil’s aspirations at the global level, but pays little attention to how the role of leader is conceived and performed, as well as contested, ignored and followed by other actors at the regional level. Focusing on one contender of regional power leadership may be considered an important initial step in the conceptualization of the dyadic leadership–followership of Brazil–Argentina and of Germany–Italy, as Stefan Schirm does. However, what remains to be seen is the permutations of followership and non-followership among actors from the same region as that of the regional power, and at both levels – the regional and the global. The challenge of including different potential followers – achieved by studying both leadership and lack of followership, for Brazil’s case – is taken on by Andrés Malamud (2009: 131), who rightly asserts that the quest to understand Brazil’s regional influence in South America has been conducted with ‘velvet gloves’, or through soft power, and that the study of the harder side of power has been restricted to only the global stage. Daniel Flesmes (2010: 100) also mentions that Brazil’s leadership in South America has been regarded as that of a passive regional power, which is similar to Sean Burges’ (2006) description of Brazil’s leadership as lacking both ‘sticks and carrots’. The latter also develops the concept of consensual hegemony as a structure in which dominance and coercion are not part of the power project of the regional power. Consensual

hegemony is about ‘the creation of consensus through the constructive inclusion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive outcomes’ (Burges 2008: 81).

If Brazil’s consensual hegemonic project is about reaching consensus on positions and courses of action with other neighbouring states, then what types of leadership(s) does a consensus-seeking hegemon use to both create and to sustain this type of hegemonic structure? What this approach lacks is an appreciation of the dynamic side of leadership and its forms. In other words, if Brazil lacks ‘sticks and carrots’, and can be depicted as masterminding a consensual hegemonic project in the South American region as well as reserving its harder means for the global level, then which type of leadership is Brazil relying on when it performs the role of leader, both in South America and at the global level? Moreover, if self-role conception – including leaderships roles – does not exist without others – including follower roles – then the question must be asked: how do other South American states see Brazil’s role conception and actions at both of these levels?

This chapter explores the connections between role theory and leadership theory – the latter mainly, yet not exclusively, being used in negotiation theory – from an actor-centred perspective. The purpose of this is, first, to systematize the role of leader, by using different types of leadership in order to avoid the risks resultant from treating leadership not as a role but as an umbrella concept in the study of regional powers. The second function of this chapter is to illustrate the theoretical dimensions, giving a brief overview of Brazil’s role conceptions – and the views of others about Brazil’s role conception(s) – as well as its actions in political and security matters as a regional power, both in South America and at the global level.

I argue that leadership is multifaceted and can be played out as a role in many different ways – such as roles of entrepreneurial, intellectual and structural leadership – and by different actors on the regional or on the international stage, because leadership is an ‘activity’ that under certain conditions can be shared. Yet, this sharing of leadership is more plausible and possible when entrepreneurial means are emphasized in the discursive articulation and actions of the leadership role, rather than when the construction of a role of leader is based on structural means, and when such structural leadership excludes the regional others through its rejection of shared leadership. Structural leadership is not, necessarily, the equal translation of material capabilities or hard power into hard leadership nor is it an objective measure, since such objectivity is discursively articulated.

In my view, the roles of leadership are constructed both in reference to and with others, as well as possessing the capacity to be performed through different types of leadership. This co-constitution of the role of leader in a relational way between the self and the other is not exempt of role conflicts, as the views of states about what leadership is may diverge in their essence, as well as being dependent on the context in which such a role is performed – be it in regional or global social settings. In other words, exerting leadership does not always secure

1 the achievement of foreign policy goals as leadership may be contested and/or
 2 ignored. Thus, the co-constitution of roles beyond leader – that is, potential
 3 followers are allies, balancers, bandwagoners, free riders and/or exist as
 4 independents – does not mean the automatic subordination of others' roles, in a
 5 hierarchical sense, as the ignoring and contesting of leadership implies a certain
 6 equality and horizontality in some of the roles performed by others.

7 The importance of studying self-role conceptions and the external views and
 8 actions of a regional power is that they might provide insight into how regional
 9 others judge Brazil as both a regional and as a global actor. The view of others is
 0 an understudied aspect in the literature of both role theory – where the self-
 1 conception has predominated (see Holsti 1970; Walker 1987a; Grossman 2005)¹
 2 – and of regional powers. Second, assessing roles as a co-constitutive process
 3 between the self and the other may shed light on how Brazil translates its foreign
 4 policy goals into outcomes, as well as further illuminating some of the factors
 5 that hamper the realization of them. Third, the role expectations of others that
 6 emerge from the social articulation of roles, their rejection and/or any indiffer-
 7 ence to them influence and affect Brazil's role performance both in the South
 8 American region and globally.

9 In the following section, I give a description of what role theory is and its
 0 main concepts. Then, I introduce leadership as a concept and the typology
 1 developed by Oran Young (1991), which has been broadly used in negotiation
 2 theory. I also link Young's typology of leadership to role theory. As Young's
 3 work is presented in behavioural terms and with more emphasis on the perspec-
 4 tive of the self (ego), I highlight the social dimension of leadership. Leadership
 5 as a role cannot exist if there is not an *other* (alter) that plays the part of *role*
 6 *sender* (cf. Nabers 2010a), and if there are not expectations that emerge during
 7 this process of discursive co-constitution between leaders and the different type
 8 of followers or non-followers.

9 In the last part of this chapter, I focus on Brazil's role conception and then on
 0 the actions it takes when it performs the roles of leadership. I then assess whether
 1 the types of leadership chosen at both the regional and global levels are consist-
 2 ent or not with the self-conceptions and expectations of others, as well as how
 3 others see Brazil as a regional power in three key areas: *regional integration*;
 4 *conflict resolution*; *Brazil's aspiration to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC*.
 5 These others, in this work, are secondary regional powers from within South
 6 America. Secondary powers, and not small powers, have the ability to facilitate,
 7 hamper and challenge the emergence, consolidation and performance of Brazil's
 8 roles. Thus, I focus on the views of Brazil held by Argentina and Chile – the
 9 latter is a significantly understudied power within the South American context.

0 Argentina and Chile have been labelled, along with Venezuela, as secondary
 1 regional powers (cf. Flesmes 2010; Flesmes and Wojczewski 2010). These two
 2 authors have conceptualized the term secondary regional powers to focus on
 3 material attributes as a sine qua non for being a secondary regional power: that
 4 is, military and economic resources. Once this conceptualization is achieved,
 5 they introduce ideas and norms only as part of the strategies for leadership

and/or (non-) followership. Thus Flesmes and Wojczewski (2010) overlook the social and relational dimension of power as a constitutive process of role formation and role enactment. However, roles are not only achievements for a state because of its material resources, but they are also constructed through a constant social interaction between the self and the other in inter-state relations.

Types of leadership as roles

Role theory provides an elaborate set of concepts that can be used in the analysis of foreign policy and international relations as it possesses descriptive, organizational and explanatory value (see Walker 1987b: 2). Moreover, it also allows us to link agent and structure (see Aggestam 2004: 57–62; Thies 2010: 7–8), as well as to focus on different levels of analysis – be these the individual, the state and/or the systemic level (Thies 2010: 5–7). The roles that an actor engages in are not a mechanistic process of enacting or playing different roles depending on what situation the actor faces. It is certainly not about choosing without limitations from a basket of multiple roles. Roles are for sure contextually determined; yet, roles are also patterns of expected and socially learnt behaviour that emerge out of the social interactions between the self and the other (cf. Elgström and Smith 2006: 5; Aggestam 2004: 65). ‘Role theory assumes ... that states are “actors” who behave consistent with specific roles with which they identify’ (Chafetz *et al.* 1996: 732).

The taking on of a role is not only a behaviouralist act, but is also grounded in the identity held by the actors that perform that role. As Dirk Nabers (2010a: 9) argues, ‘Roles are therefore the basis of identities, but are the same time filled with meaning through identity, or ... identification. Identity means the incorporation of the meanings and expectations associated with a role into the self.’ In other words, the taking of a role is part of the intersubjective dialoguing/conflicting between the self-role conception and the role expectations and prescriptions of other actors, as well as the role conceptions of those others (cf. Holsti 1970: 238–9). In the construction, and performance, of roles, as a social process, there is a constant struggle for recognition about the roles states have and play (cf. Wendt 2003: 510–20). Thus, role taking as a one-way street does not exist, as the self-role concepts and the performance of those roles are usually socially articulated in reference to a counter-role (Thies 2010: 3).

Such a counter-role is not necessarily, or always, an opposing role; in fact, in some instances it may complement the self, as for example, when two or more states exert agreed joint structural, intellectual or entrepreneurial leaderships, in which both actors are performing the roles of leaders. What role theory has to offer for an empirical analysis of regions and regional powers is the development of the ideational basis of external policies and the concerns and concrete external actions – in this case, of Brazil as a regional power and its ‘potential’ regional followers (cf. Elgström and Smith 2006). It also allows us to assess how role-identity discourses and actions shape, maintain and transform a structure of inter-state social relations in a regional setting.

1 The self-role conception is the *ego's* own definition, and it defines respon-
 2 sibilities and obligations of the self in foreign policy matters (Aggestam 2004:
 3 64; Holsti 1970: 12). It is the product of a nation's socialization process that is
 4 influenced by societal characteristics (Holsti 1970; Grossman 2005). However, a
 5 self-role conception is also shaped by the role prescription and role expectations
 6 of others (Elgström and Smith 2006: 6). A self-conception indicates what the
 7 limits of proper behaviour are, when a role is performed. Role prescription or
 8 role expectations 'pertains to those expectations that other actors (*alter*) pre-
 9 scribe and expect the role-beholder (*ego*) to enact' (Aggestam 2004: 64).² As a
 10 state can adopt different roles from within its role set – and because the more
 11 roles one state has the better it is prepared for social life – then role enactment is
 12 the effort and amount of time spent in a role vis-à-vis the other roles in a state
 13 repertoire (see Thies 2010: 2–3; Thies 2001). Finally, role performance is
 14 defined as the actual behaviour of actors or how a role is played. The perform-
 15 ance character of a role also depends upon external views – that is, the expecta-
 16 tions of others about how and within which limits the enactment of a role should
 17 be performed or played either at the regional and/or the global level (cf. Elg-
 18 ström and Smith 2006: 6; Aggestam 2004: 65–6).

19 Leadership, for role theory, is a performative act. Leadership as a concept is
 20 an elusive one and it is highly contested in international relations, despite the
 21 fact that it is a constitutive element of all spheres of politics (Young 1991).
 22 Leaders seek recognition, status and power to advance collective purposes.
 23 Despite a leader having a self-interest in achieving common goals by mobilizing
 24 followers and convincing others to follow, such interest may have to be down-
 25 graded or moderated through the articulation of a discourse with a sense of fair-
 26 ness and flexibility, so as to accommodate others' interests and in order to make
 27 compromises and adjustments necessary to achieve the desired goal (cf. Deese
 28 2008: 22). For James Burns (1979: 134), leadership is not always about bringing
 29 together opposing interests; it is also about detecting common positions and
 30 interests that have not yet been mobilized. Thus, 'leaders have a special role as
 31 activators, initiators, mobilizers'.

32 Talking about leadership as a role under one generic label has the risk of
 33 making leadership (leader) an umbrella term. In this sense, Oran Young (1991)
 34 has contributed to the development of the role of leadership in international rela-
 35 tions by pinpointing its different faces and forms in institutional negotiation set-
 36 tings. Leadership is a key variable in understanding success and failure in
 37 international negotiations (Young 1991: 281; Deese 2008). Young develops
 38 three types of leadership to analyse international bargaining settings. These three
 39 proposed types of leadership are: structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial.
 40 Structural leadership is exercised by the state and its officials, who hold the most
 41 resources (Deese 2008: 25–34). Young (1991: 289) refers to structural leader-
 42 ship as the translation of material capabilities into leverage for the bargaining
 43 process. The most common way to exert this type of leadership and to attract
 44 followers is through the promise of material rewards and the use of threats. In
 45 order to get things done in a negotiation setting – for example, to conclude an

agreement successfully – the promise of rewards or sanctions should be carefully crafted and have credibility for the others (Young 1991: 290).

Structural leadership allows for coalition-building to achieve the goals of the leader (Nabers 2010b: 58). In addition, structural leadership may be exerted in joint ventures, as has been the case in some WTO negotiations rounds in which the EU and the US have pursued shared goals to gain more leverage by utilizing their respective material capabilities (see Deese 2008: 84–125). However, the essence of this type of leadership is self-serving purposes, or, as Malnes (1995: 106), asserts ‘[it] boils down to clever bargaining spurred mainly by self-interest’. In other words, the role of a structural leader can be understood as a self-serving enterprise in which ‘followers’ are seen as instrumental actors that also have similar interests in a particular course of action and in a specific outcome. It is also about changing and enforcing the goals and the positions of potential followers to match or suit those of the structural leader(s). In both cases, using ‘carrots and sticks’ are fundamental strategies to mobilize followers behind the leader.

Whereas the exertion of structural and entrepreneurial leadership can be attributed to states and their representatives, for Young intellectual leadership is an exclusively individual attribute that may have a connection to states or other types of corporate identities (see Young 1991: 298). However, states and international organizations such as the OECD, as a consequence of them having corporate identities, may also exert intellectual leadership. In this sense, intellectual leadership relies on the use of expert knowledge to shape the way of thinking of principals in international affairs. This form of leadership can be displayed by officials, states, epistemic organizations as well as epistemic communities. Young says that an ‘[i]ntellectual leader is an individual – [state, or organization] – who produces intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining’.³ This form of leadership can also be exercised in other social settings, as it is a reflective or deliberative process of exchanging arguments (Nabers 2010b: 58).

The third variety of leadership is entrepreneurial leadership, which ‘relies on negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants’ (Young 1991: 293). This leadership involves the ability to convince and attract the counterpart towards an agreement. Persuading the counterpart to change their initial choices without positive or negative enforcements is a component of entrepreneurial leadership. Yet, it is also about mobilizing actors with common interests who are still passive and who have not yet joined together for the realization of such commonly perceived goals. This type of leadership is about bridging, mediating and acting as an honest broker through the use of consensual reasoning and skills.

Therefore, leadership is not only ‘the ability to make others follow goals and positions which these others did not previously share’ (Schirm 2010: 200), but it is also the ability to detect and initiate common actions based on extant shared goals. Leadership is not only based on power and resources, as Schirm defines

the term, conflating power and leadership. A leader, from a state-centred perspective, is not only a leader because it is stronger than the other or because it has more political and economic weight than the counterpart to change the follower's mind or course of action (cf. Deese 2008: 35). Leadership is also about persuading the counterpart, as much as it is about creating the need of the self and the other to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes and/or common regional and/or global goods. This type of leadership is consensual in its essence, as it is about attracting and persuading, without enforcing.

As Burges (2006, 2008) contends, with regard to hegemony rather than leadership, states like Brazil can also act without using 'sticks and carrots'. Leadership is the other side that co-constitutes hegemony in whichever form hegemony takes. Entrepreneurial leadership is *selves-serving* (self–other) rather than *self-serving* (the self), as structural leadership is. It also entails a principle of the joint taking of responsibility for the benefit of the shared regional space that the different states occupy. Entrepreneurial leadership includes interests of the self and the other, socializes them and shares them. Mutuality is key in this type of leadership, both in its origin and in its performance. Entrepreneurial leaders also have an interest, or are at least biased, towards the pursuit of a particular course of action or a goal; yet, it does not enforce the follower to follow its particular interests or stakes.

This separation of types of leadership is far from perfect, as Malnes has argued (1995: 106–7), but it still offers some positive elements that shed light on, and systematize, the role conception of Brazil, both in South America and on the global stage. Moreover, it also allows greater specificity of the roles that Brazil is engaged in under the label of leadership(s), as well as clarity about its role performance in relation to, and with, other South American states. The exertion of these types of leadership does not automatically and always secure followership. Yet, what the study of these variants of leadership can offer is an analytical systematization of the self-role conception, role expectations and role actions/performance based on the acceptance, rejection or indifference when the roles of leaders in these three forms are enacted.

A gap in Young's theoretical approach to leadership is that he constantly refers to this term as a role in international affairs, yet he does not provide a further elaboration on the role of leader from a role theory perspective. Also, he does not link its typology with role theory. When Young refers to the term role he is not using it as a synonym for influence as most literature on international relations does. Quite the contrary, he refers to leadership as a multifaceted action and to the leaders – be these individuals or states – as those who act (see Young 1991: 285, 287–8, 307). Thus, what follows is a linkage of role theory and the different types of leadership, especially in its structural and entrepreneurial variants.

As leadership is multifaceted, it will be argued here that the three types of leadership developed by Young (1991) are roles in their own right. In this regard, role theory has not further developed the role of leader, rendering it an umbrella term. Leadership as one amorphous role without emphasis on its

constitutive differences lacks clarity on what is acceptable or not for other states in the region from which the regional power comes; that is, the kind of leadership attributed and accepted by others. These other states may be more welcoming of one of the roles of leadership played by the regional power than of the others. In addition, there may be distinctive characteristics when a state like Brazil plays one of the roles of leadership either at the regional or global level. A regional power like Brazil may also spend more time enacting and using one type of leadership over others, thereby making the different forms of leadership roles in their own right.

Furthermore, treating Young's typology as independent roles also allows us to reduce, in an analytical sense and for the study of regional powers, the extant ambiguity between the role of leader and that of a mediator/facilitator, which can also be attributed to a regional power when it acts in its neighbourhood. Mediating involves being a leader, specifically in the entrepreneurial and structural forms. When playing the role of structural leader, or entrepreneurial leader, it can be said that the distinctiveness of the role of a mediator becomes blurred, as what 'the mediator' is exerting is actually the role of either structural or entrepreneurial leadership. Exerting mediation as a structural or entrepreneurial leader depends on whether the mediating party utilizes 'sticks and carrots', or employs persuasion and consensual skills to achieve the peaceful resolution of a conflict.

Ole Elgström (2007: 449) highlights that the role of mediator is close to that of leadership, and that mediators are supposed to be impartial, while leaders usually have an agenda or an interest. However, when leaderships are used as roles beyond negotiation theory, a leader can mediate by using its leadership roles to solve internal conflicts in a third country or between two countries, with the purpose of preventing direct (negative) consequences for the leader. A leader – structural or entrepreneurial – may have a stake, or at least be biased, in the matter in which it is mediating and yet still be able to produce change and deliver a successful outcome (Jönsson 2002: 222). A pertinent example might be regions and regional conflicts in which a regional power can act as a leader by mediating or facilitating an agreement between two conflicting parties. The interests of the regional power that is acting as either a structural or as an entrepreneurial leader are first to achieve a peaceful resolution to conflicts within a state or between states that may affect the status or reputation of the regional power as a leader able to keep peace in its region. Second, another interest may be the prevention of external involvement, which might undermine the regional power's role conception of itself as a leader committed to regional peace-keeping; the expectations of regional others towards the regional power; and the future role performances as both a structural and entrepreneurial leader. In other words, mediating may be incorporated into the ways in which entrepreneurial and structural leaderships roles are performed in a regional and/or global order.

Therefore, a regional power can self-define, and others can prescribe, accept and reject different roles of leaderships, depending on the context of the situation and on the identity of the various actors. Structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial leaderships are roles and, as such, may be enacted and performed by a

regional power, as well as shared with others, and shaped by others in both regional and global settings. As with most roles, an actor can downgrade a role from its discourse, and draw from another one in order to articulate and enact a new role. However, the formation of a new role is always socialized with and by the other states from the beginning of the role formation. These others may also accept, or reject, the new role discourse. In other words, a regional power can change different leadership roles by creating a discursive need to perform a new type of leadership that takes into consideration both the setting and the others. This change of leaderships roles – for example, from structural to entrepreneurial or vice versa – allows us to understand how a regional power such as Brazil plays the roles of leader in its different forms vis-à-vis its regional others. It also allows us to systematize the performance of the roles of leadership by an actor, as well as elucidating the eventual reasons for both successful and failed outcomes when the roles of leaderships are played.

South America: Brazil and the others

Brazil's self-role conceptions and foreign policy actions

Three underlying principles of Brazil's foreign policy are autonomy, universalism and grandeur. Other key words have also become constitutive of Brazil's foreign policy principles – such as negotiation and pragmatism, as opposites to the use of military and economic strength (Fortuna 2007: 15). In addition, Brazil, along with the other Latin American countries, has created an international society of which two pillars are sovereignty and non-intervention (see Kacowicz 2000). The principle of *autonomy* can be described as keeping available the country's room for manoeuvre in its external relations and thus preventing commitments that would bound its future action related to its global actor status. *Universalism* sets as its goal the keeping of harmonic relations with all countries, irrespective of the political regime and the economic model of those others (cf. Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009). *Grandeur* has been conceived of as part of Brazil's destiny. Brazil's grandeur was in the past expressed in Brazil's quest for a permanent seat in the League of Nations and in the UNSC, after the First and Second World Wars respectively (Mullins 2006: 79). In this regard, these principles, in a broad sense, and the goals attached to them have remained prominent in the foreign policy actions of Brazil.

However, under the presidencies of Fernando Collor de Melo (1990–92), Itamar Franco (1992–94) and Fernando H. Cardoso (1995–2002), the ongoing changes of globalization were also integrated into the driving principles of Brazil's foreign policy. These global changes are synthesized in the principles of *autonomy through integration* and that of shared sovereignty, instead of the traditional view on sovereignty. The practical side of autonomy through integration was the creation of the MERCOSUR community in 1991 (see Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira 2007: 58–61). The main intention behind the adoption of shared sovereignty is the defence of universal values, alongside other countries

that share the same worldview, through the formation of international regimes. It also promotes Brazil's proactive participation in international affairs, so as to change the distortions of the existing multilateral institutions (Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira 2007: 62).

During the second mandate of F.H. Cardoso (1999–2002), Brazil paid more attention to its region, as South America was seen as the necessary basis for reaching the status of global player. This involvement in regional affairs was focused on the goals of security and democratic stability (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006: 30; Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009; Turcotte 2008: 793). In this sense, the role of entrepreneurial leader was preferred by Brazil for the establishment of stronger links with the rest of South America. This role of leader was enacted through creating the need to have regular presidential summits. Symbolically, the first presidential summit was held in Brasilia in 2000. Moreover, Brazil also played the role of entrepreneurial leader by offering first its mediation skills to end the conflict of 1995 between Ecuador and Peru, between whom a final peace treaty was eventually signed in Brazil's capital in 1998. Brazil also shared its mediating role in the solution of this conflict with countries like Argentina, Chile and the United States.

However, Brazil has also played the role of structural leader in South America. First it did it with the creation of the MERCOSUR, in which both Brazil and Argentina exerted joint structural leadership. The MERCOSUR's creation and maintenance is seen as a shared enterprise between these two countries (see Malamud 2009). Playing the shared role of structural leader was also exerted by both Brazil and Argentina to impede the return of authoritarianism in Paraguay in 1996. The main bargaining chip of these two countries, so as to make Paraguayan General Lino Oviedo desist from a coup attempt, was the threat of expelling Paraguay from the MERCOSUR (Oelsner 2005: 173), and showing the potential negative economic implications of this decision. Brazil and Argentina also acted together in subsequent political crises in Paraguay in 1999 and 2000 (Gratius 2007: 17).

According to Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006: 30–3), under the presidency of Lula da Silva (2003–) Brazil's quest for South American regional leadership has become more salient than ever. Yet, Brazil's role as an entrepreneurial leader has been performed only to mediate in crises if it was called to do so. Thus, Brazil has been able to keep the principle of non-intervention by intervening when its mediating skills are accepted without direct enforcements. For example, Brazil mediated in the solution of the impasse that led to an attempted *coup d'etat* in Venezuela (2002), and in the subsequent formation of a 'group of friends of Venezuela' (2003) to facilitate the dialogue between the government and the opposition. It also used its consensus-building skills to solve the constitutional crises in Bolivia and Ecuador; it has attracted other South American countries (Chile and Argentina) to participate in the peace-keeping mission in Haiti (Turcotte 2008: 795–6), and it helped to reduce the tensions between Colombia–Ecuador and Venezuela in 2008 (Shifter and Siegel 2010: 98–9). These were possible by highlighting the constitutive elements of the role of entrepreneurial leader such as consensus, dialoguing, inclusion and non-enforcement.

Regarding the UNASUR – created in 2004 and with its constitutive treaty signed in 2008 – Brazil has also performed the role of entrepreneurial leader, as it articulated the need for an institution that could integrate all South American countries; its institutionalization and function have been shared with regional others. For example, the permanent Secretariat is supposed to be situated in Quito, Ecuador, and the first two *pro-temporare* presidencies were held by the then Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, and by the current Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa. In addition, Brazil supported the election of former Argentinean president Néstor Kirchner as the UNASUR Secretary-General (*La Nación* 2010).

Most recently, President Lula and Néstor Kirchner were important actors in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela. However, when Presidents Manuel Santos (2010–) and Hugo Chávez (1999–) met to resolve the conflict and to re-establish diplomatic relations, only the UNASUR Secretary-General was present as a moderator between both parties, while the Brazilian leader was not (*La Tercera* 2010: 13).

Yet, the accentuated emphasis on the role of entrepreneurial leader has also showed some of the limitations of Brazil's involvement in South America, such as the rejection of Brazil's mediation in what Chile considers to be a bilateral problem with Bolivia, over the issue of access to the sea (Wehner 2010a: 17). In addition, Brazil did not seek to solve the problem between Argentina and Uruguay about the cellulose plants in La Plata. In fact, Brazil did not get involved in this issue at all, claiming that it was rather a bilateral matter, and as such it did not concern the MERCOSUR or Brazil (see Turcotte 2008: 799–800). Moreover, Brazil had to accept Bolivia's nationalization of Brazil's main fuel company, PETROBAS, since it lacked structural capacity; the latter did not want to enact the role of structural leader in order to resolve this issue, for in doing so it could be criticized for breaking the principle of non-intervention in a coercive way.

The discursive articulation of the role of entrepreneurial leadership, and the constant enactment of such a role vis-à-vis the role of structural leader in Brazil's political agenda, has been based on a process of constantly downgrading and downplaying the concept of leadership as a whole at the regional level. Brazil understates the key word 'leadership' in its official discourse as leadership is usually associated with self-serving purposes and coercion in both Brazil's diplomacy and among its potential followers (cf. Burges 2006: 24; Gratius 2007: 23–5). In this sense, Brazil's leaders do not want to create a project that implies attempts to exert a 'mini-hegemony' (Gratius 2006: 7), nor one that appears to unfold a hegemonic system that is characterized by domination and coercion (Burges 2008: 71).

One of the famous sentences in the articulation of a discourse that downgrades the concept of leadership as a key word in Brazil's official vernacular has been expressed in sentences such as: 'Brazil does not want to lead anything' (da Silva 2006). This has happened alongside the highlighting of the point that Brazil is not interested in unfolding a project of hegemony based on coercion

and intervention. At the same time, Brazil presents itself as being concerned with political developments that may trigger crisis in, and bring instability to, the South American countries. To allow for Brazil's involvement in crisis management, without contradicting the declared principle of non-intervention, this country has included in its discourse and in its constitution of the role of entrepreneurial leader the word 'non-indifference' as a defining element of its foreign policy actions. '[We] do not believe in external interference in internal affairs, but we do not seek refuge in omission and indifference before problems that affect our neighbours' (Lula da Silva 2004, quoted in Spektor 2010: 194).

Globally, Brazil has performed the role of structural leader as the only viable way of gaining a permanent seat in the UNSC. Brazil presented this aspiration in a concerted alliance with Germany, India and Japan – in a group known as G4. Despite the lack of, and in some cases ambiguous, regional support for a permanent seat in the UNSC, Brazil has performed the role of structural leader. In this sense, the role of structural leader for this institutional setting has been effected without sharing the role with its South American counterparts. The non-sharing part is that the permanent seat is only for Brazil, whereas countries like Argentina and Mexico would prefer more non-permanent seats instead, or a permanent seat with a rotating system for Latin America, and if that is not possible then for there to be no changes at all in the UNSC (see Malamud 2009; Schirm 2010; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006: 29). Enacting the role of structural leader at the global level has been key in forming an extra-regional alliance with peer countries – namely, G4 – with the purpose of putting pressure on the existing permanent members of the UNSC to reform the institution. However, this enterprise mismatches with what Brazil has discursively articulated at the regional level, where the role of entrepreneurial leader is accepted over the self-serving role of structural leader, especially if sharing this latter role with regional others is not an option.

The regional others – Argentina and Chile

Argentina sees Brazil as a competitive partner. It sees Brazil as a partner in the creation and function of the MERCOSUR (Taiana 2006: 12). 'Argentina sees this partnership as based on an equal footing and not on Brazilian supremacy' (see Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009: 17). This image of a certain equality is related to Argentina's traditional view of Brazil as a competitor for the exertion of influence in South America, and thus it constantly seeks allies to balance against Brazil (Russell and Tokatlian 2003). This competition has become more asymmetrical, favouring Brazil as Argentina has experienced consecutive crises that have undermined its potentiality to be a proactive, relevant actor in the South American region. The crisis of 2001 affected Argentina's economic performance in the region, which also compromised the transformation of the MERCOSUR into a Customs Union (Bouzas *et al.* 2002: 129). In fact, both countries, Brazil and Argentina, are the countries that implement the lesser of the MERCOSUR regulations. This fits in with Brazil's downgrading of the

1 MERCOSUR as an economic project and its upgrading of the MERCOSUR to
2 be a political platform. On the political side, the achievements are more significant
3 as both Brazil and Argentina have shared the role of structural leader to
4 secure the democratic stability of Paraguay. With the inclusion of Venezuela in
5 the MERCOSUR, Argentina has seen in this new regional member an ally to
6 soft-balance Brazil within and beyond the MERCOSUR, and to reduce the
7 extant asymmetry between the two countries (cf. Simonoff 2008: 49).

3 Part of this perception of Brazil as a competitive partner, that is, equal footing
) and not supremacy, suggests that Argentina aspires to play the joint role of entrepreneurial leader with Brazil in the institutionalization and crisis management duties of the UNASUR. In this regard, Argentina's interest is to secure a predominant position in Brazil's foreign policy, as well as to play the role of soft-balancer of Brazil within the UNASUR. The recent election of Kirchner as the UNASUR Secretary-General not only reflects his personal interest in using the post as a platform for a new presidential nomination, as well as the partnership between both countries, but it also responds to the need of unfolding a balancing behaviour towards Brazil. The sharing of the role of entrepreneurial leader between Argentina and Brazil within the UNASUR became evident in their dual effort to facilitate the dialogue between Colombia and Venezuela, during the crisis of July–August 2010.

0 However, the dual exertion of the role of structural leader within the MERCOSUR, and of entrepreneurial leader in the crisis management duties of the UNASUR blurs at the global level, especially, as Argentina sees Brazil's quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC as a self-serving rather than selves-serving enterprise. In principle, Argentina is not against the role of structural leader if it involves a principle of sharing, as the actions of Brazil and Argentina within the MERCOSUR and the UNASUR illustrate. However, the permanent seat excludes Argentina from Brazil's power equation, and it creates the fear that the power gap between the two countries will increase, transforming the extant partnership into a type of subordination. For this reason, Argentina has joined the group 'Uniting for Consensus' along with Italy, Pakistan and others to balance Brazil's and the rest of the G4 members' quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Argentina favours a reform in the UNSC, yet one with new non-permanent members (see Bielsa 2005: 4). This view is also consistent with the desire and the proposal of Argentina to have a permanent regional seat for Latin America based upon a rotation system (Mayoral 2004). These proposals are also consistent with the view of competitive partnership and with the idea of preventing an even larger asymmetric relationship between Argentina and Brazil, which might eventually erase the need for such a partnership in Brazil's foreign policy.

9 Chile sees Brazil as an important ally in South America. Chile has an ambiguous and sceptical view about regional groupings such as that of the MERCOSUR, especially regarding a group political agenda. In fact, Chile has conducted a balancing strategy towards the MERCOSUR by being only an associate member and, at the same time, by trying to reduce the economic dependence and its possible political influence by pursuing an aggressive free trade agreement policy both within and beyond Latin America (see Wehner 2010b).

Regarding the formation of the UNASUR, as well as its ongoing process of institutionalization, Chile has also shown its scepticism about the viability of this project. This is the case despite the fact that the then president Michelle Bachelet (2006–10) served as the UNASUR *pro-temporare* president from May 2008 to August 2009. Chile's reservations about integration schemes are expressed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariano Fernández (2009–10):

The multilateral efforts for integration in Latin American do not have a happy destiny. For this reason, from the beginning of the *Concertación* governments, and without abandoning the integration spirit, [Chile] also uses the practical and effective way of bilateral accords on the Latin American continent; like, for example, the ambitious Treaty of Integration of Maipú signed between Chile and Argentina.

(Fernández 2010: 4)

Chile's view of Brazil is overall a positive one, as the latter represents to Chile a structural ally (Álvarez and Fuentes 2007). However, Chile prioritizes the bilateral dialogue with Brazil over regional integration to prevent a political and commercial entrapment within the MERCOSUR. On security issues and crisis management, Chile welcomes and has shared the role of entrepreneurial leader with Brazil – on the initiative of the latter – to mediate through the use of consensus and dialogue in cases such as that of the institutional crisis in Bolivia in 2008. Whereas Chile accepts, encourages and shapes Brazil's role as an entrepreneurial leader in South America, it does it when it comes to third countries, and it contests and rejects such a role if Chile is one of the parties in the conflicting dialogue, as it was with the issue of sea access for Bolivia in 2003 (Latin American Security and Strategic Review 2003: 2; Wehner 2010a: 17). In addition, Chile also expects from Brazil's role performance that it uses its consensual skills and persuasion to moderate the rhetoric of Chávez, in case it targets Chile as a result of the current ideological divisions between these countries – accentuated recently by the election of a president, Sebastián Piñera (2010–), from the political right in Chile.

Chile's role prescription to Brazil at the global level is ambiguous. Chile sees in Brazil's quest for global power status and in its aspiration to reform multilateral institutions a means to manifest its own national interests. However, Chile also indirectly contests Brazil's role of structural leader when it claims a right to a permanent seat in the UNSC with full rights. The Chilean representative at the UN stated that:

At the bilateral level, Chile has supported the aspiration of Brazil and also of Germany, India and Japan to occupy a permanent seat in the Security Council. Their membership would improve the representativity of the Council. . . . Chile makes a specific reservation with regard to the granting of the right of veto to the new permanent members, whether this is immediate or subject to a suspension or moratorium of its exercise.

(Muñoz 2005: 3)

1 Thus, Chile's opposition to grant veto rights may create a status problem for
2 Brazil in its aspiration to being accepted as an equal and accepted into the big
3 global players group, if these veto rights are maintained among the five tradi-
4 tional members.⁴

5 6 7 **Conclusion**

8 By neglecting in its public discourse leadership associated with negative means,
9 Brazil has been able to self-define, enact and perform the role of entrepreneurial
0 leader in South America in a salient way. This role is based on the notions of con-
1 sensus, dialogue, inclusiveness and mediation, without enforcing conformity and
2 cooperation from other neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the role of structural
3 leader has not been completely absent from Brazil's actions on the South American
4 stage; yet, its performative character – sticks – has been limited to crisis manage-
5 ment within the MERCOSUR's small member states, such as Paraguay. In these
6 cases, Brazil has not played such a role in a unilateral way, as sharing the stage with
7 Argentina has made its performance viable. Despite the fact that Brazil has per-
8 formed the role of structural leader on the South American scene, it lacks a defined
9 discursive articulation, because Brazil has consciously downgraded from its public
0 discourse the concepts of leadership associated with enforcement and coercion.

1 The discursive articulation of the role of entrepreneurial leader allows for sharing
2 and broader acceptance among regional others. What remains to be analysed is why
3 these others prescribe, and accept, this role. Three tentative answers that need to be
4 further explored in future are that regional others may be able to shape and influ-
5 ence Brazil's roles and interests, as well as reduce Brazil's room to manoeuvre
6 within South America; that through the ascription and acceptance of Brazil's role of
7 entrepreneurial leader, especially regarding actions towards regional others and not
8 towards these two secondary powers – Argentina and Chile, these countries can
9 reduce the probability that Brazil will unfold a project based on hegemonic supre-
0 macy; and that these secondary powers' room to manoeuvre increases as the negative
1 consequences for choosing not to follow Brazil in some occasions are minimized as
2 'sticks' are not part of this country regional repertoire towards secondary regional
3 powers. Therefore, the going alone of Brazil when it sought a permanent seat in the
4 UNSC was too far away from the co-constitution of roles between the self-
5 conception and the role prescription coming from the secondary regional powers,
6 and the expectations of behaviour that emanate from the social process of co-
7 constituting roles.

8 The roles of entrepreneurial, intellectual and structural leaders exist in the dis-
9 courses and actions of regional powers. Role theory and leadership theory can
0 contribute to a better understanding, from an actor-centred perspective, of how
1 regional powers conceptualize their place in both the regional and global milieus,
2 as well as how others ascribe, shape, accept or reject such roles. Thus, leadership
3 is not only a typology with easily delineated characteristics. Types of leaderships
4 are also fluid and context-specific roles that are conceived and performed
5 socially between the self and the other.

Notes

- 1 An exception is the work of Chaban *et al.* (2006), which assesses how others see the EU as an international actor.
- 2 Words in italics are originals from the text.
- 3 Words within brackets are the author's own addition.
- 4 In a draft proposal Brazil, along with the other G4 countries, proposed a reform for more permanent seats with veto rights. However, this was left out due to the lack of followership from countries that supported the permanent seat for these countries. As a result, the G4 proposed instead a review of the veto system in 15 years (Kern 2005: 1–2).

References

- Aggestam, L. (2004) *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*, University of Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Politics 106.
- Álvarez, D. and Fuentes, C. (2007) 'Chile y Brasil: ¿Aliados sin Frontera?', in W. Hofmeister, F. Rojas and L.G. Solís (eds) *La Percepción de Brasil en el Contexto Internacional: Perspectivas y Desafíos Vol. 1*, Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Bielsa, R. (2005) *Statement of the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, UN General Assembly-General Debate, 18 September*. Online. Available at www.un.int/argentina/english/statements/miscellaneous/Bielsa2005.htm#september18 (accessed 14 August 2010).
- Bouzas, R., da Motta Veiga, P. and Torrent, R. (2002) *Informe presentado a la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas*. Online. Available at <http://mkacceb.eu.int/study/studies/32.doc> (accessed 14 August 2010).
- Burges, S. (2006) 'Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25: 23–42.
- Burges, S. (2008) 'Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing the Practice of Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War', *International Relations*, 22: 65–84.
- Burns, J. (1979) *Leadership*, New York: Harper and Row.
- Chaban, N., Elgström, O. and Holland, M. (2006) 'The European Union as Others See It', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11: 245–62.
- Chafetz, G., Abramson, H. and Grillot, S. (1996) 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime', *Political Psychology*, 17: 727–57.
- da Silva, Luiz Ignácio (2006) *Entrevista. El País, 3 November*. Online. Available at www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Quiero/relacion/privilegiada/EE/UU/elpporint/20061103elpepiint_2/Tes (accessed 14 August 2010).
- Deese, D. (2008) *World Trade Politics: Power, Principles, and Leadership*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Elgström, O. (2007) 'The European Union as a Leader in International Multilateral Actions: A Problematic Aspiration?', *International Relations*, 21: 445–58.
- Elgström, O. and Smith, M. (2006) 'Introduction', in O. Elgström and M. Smith (eds) *The European Union's Roles in International Politics*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Fernández, M. (2010) *Chile y el desafío de UNASUR*. Online. Available at www.latercera.com (accessed 7 July 2010).
- Flemes, D. (2010) 'Brazil: Strategic Options in the Changing World Order', in D. Flemes (ed.) *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Flemes, D. and Wojczewski, T. (2010) *Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa*, Hamburg: GIGA Working Paper 121.
- Fortuna, M. (2007) 'La Política Exterior Brasileña: Entre la continuidad y la innovación', in W. Hofmeister, F. Rojas and L.G. Solís (eds) *La Percepción de Brasil en el Contexto Internacional: Perspectivas y Desafíos, Vol. 1*, Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Gomes Saraiva, M. and Malamud, A. (2009) *Comparative Foreign Policy: Argentina and Brazil between Continuity and Change*, Paper presented in ABRI/ISA Joint International Meeting, 22–24 July, Rio de Janeiro.
- Gratius, S. (2006) *Lula Again: Regional Influence without Leadership*, Madrid: FRIDE.
- Gratius, S. (2007) *Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace-Broker?*, Madrid: FRIDE Working Paper 35.
- Grossman, Michael (2005) 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s', *International Politics*, 42: 334–51.
- Holsti, K.J. (1970) 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly*, 14: 233–309.
- Jönsson, C. (2002) 'Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage.
- Kacowicz, A. (2000) 'Latin America as an International Society', *International Politics*, 37: 143–62.
- Kern, S. (2005) *Cambios en el Consejo de Seguridad que podrían impedir una reforma más amplia*, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano ARI N° 106.
- La Nación (2010) *Kirchner juró como secretario general de la Unasur y Mujica admitió 'el costo político' de acompañar la designación*. Online. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1261034 (accessed 14 August 2010).
- La Tercera (2010) *Rol de Unasur en crisis entre Colombia y Venezuela resta terreno a la OEA*. Online. Available at www.latercera.cl (accessed 12 August 2010).
- Latin American Security and Strategic Review (2003) *Hostile Isolation of Chile*. Online. Available at www.latinnews.com/ (accessed 14 August 2010).
- Malamud, A. (2009) 'Leadership without Followers: The Contested Case for Brazilian Power Status', in E. de Rezende Martins and M.G. Saraiva (eds) *Brasil – União Europeia – América do Sul: Anos 2010–2020*, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer.
- Malnes, R. (1995) '“Leader” and “Entrepreneur” in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis', *European Journal of International Relations*, 1: 87–112.
- Mayoral, C. (2004) *La Argentina y el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU*. Online. Available at www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=619728 (accessed 13 August 2010).
- Mullins, M. (2006) *In the Shadow of the Generals: Foreign Policy Making in Argentina, Brazil and Chile*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Muñoz, H. (2005) *Statement by Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations: Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters*. Online. Available at www.reformtheun.org (accessed 9 August 2010).
- Nabers, Dirk (2010a) 'Identity and Role Change in International Politics', unpublished article.
- Nabers, Dirk (2010b) 'Power, Leadership and Hegemony in International Politics', in D. Flemes (ed.) *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Oelsner, A. (2005) *International Relations in Latin America*, New York: Routledge.

- Russell, R. and Tokatlian, J.G. (2003) *El lugar de Brasil en la política exterior argentina*, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Schirm, S. (2010) 'Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16: 197–221.
- Shifter, M. and Siegel, A. (2010) 'Colombia y Ecuador en 2009: el tortuoso camino hacia un restablecimiento de las relaciones', in C. Malamud, F. Steinberg, and C. Tejedor (eds) *Anuario Iberoamericano*, Madrid: Ediciones Pirámide.
- Simonoff, A. (2008) 'La política exterior argentina reciente, con especial énfasis en la relación con Brasil y Estados Unidos', in N. Consani, A. Sepúlveda and Z. Zeraoui (eds) *Las Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina: Argentina-Chile-México*, Santiago: RiL editores.
- Soares de Lima, M.R. and Hirst, M. (2006) 'Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities', *International Affairs*, 82: 21–40.
- Spektor, M. (2010) 'Brazil: The Underlying Ideas of Regional Policies', in D. Flesch (ed.) *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Taiana, J. (2006) 'Objectives and Challenges of Argentina's Foreign Policy', *Diplomacia, Estrategia & Política*, 4: 5–15.
- Thies, C. (2001) 'A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries', *Political Psychology*, 22: 693–725.
- Thies, C. (2010) 'Role Theory and Foreign Policy', in R. Denemark (ed.) *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Online. Available at www.isacompendium.com.
- Turcotte, S. (2008) 'La política de Brasil hacia Sudamérica: entre voluntarismo y resistencias', *Foro Internacional*, 194: 785–806.
- Vigevani, T. and Fernandes de Oliveira, M. (2007) 'Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration', *Latin American Perspectives*, 34: 58–80.
- Walker, S. (ed.) (1987a) *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Walker, S. (1987b) 'The Relevance of Role Theory to Foreign Policy Analysis', in S. Walker (ed.) *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Wehner, Leslie (2010a) *From Rivalry to Mutual Trust: The Othering Process between Bolivia and Chile*, Hamburg: GIGA Working Paper 135.
- Wehner, Leslie (2010b) *Economic Internationalisation through Free Trade Agreements: Intermediate and Small Powers from Latin America*, Paper presented in the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February, New Orleans.
- Wendt, A. (2003) 'Why a World State is Inevitable', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9: 491–552.
- Young, O. (1991) 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society', *International Organization*, 45: 281–308.