Understanding criminal mobility: the case of the Neapolitan Camorra
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Abstract
Italian mafias are now present and active abroad, and many national legal economies are undermined by their activities. The American government responded to this threat in 2011 by introducing an ‘executive order’ that blacklisted the Camorra’s (the Neapolitan mafia) activities in the United States. Recently, there has been a growing debate on criminal mobility and, in particular, why, when and how Italian mafiosi move out of their territory of origin and expand into new foreign territories. Recent literature suggests that Italian mafias change their behaviour across territories and will succeed in ‘transplanting’ when there are emerging new markets. This article examines some brief case studies of camorristi in Europe to discuss these concepts of mafia mobility; and it concludes by suggesting that there is no ‘one size fits all’ analysis and that more attention should be paid to the interdependence of territories.

Keywords
Italian mafias, Neapolitan Camorra, criminal mobility, interdependence of territories.

Introduction
Mafia mobility is not a new phenomenon: in the 1960s and 1970s mafiosi travelled extensively outside the Mezzogiorno region and Italy, as illustrated by the famous ‘Pizza Connection’ case in the United States between 1985 and 1987 (Lupo 2008). Sicilian mafiosi travelled across the Atlantic to sell heroin, confirming Pino Arlacchi’s (1988) thesis that the Sicilian mafia had changed from an agrarian mafia to a business one. However, there is limited material available and relatively little is known about the social processes of mafia mobility ‘because of the lack of trustworthy and homogeneous data . . . ’(2013, 2). Additionally, there seem to be many conflicting narratives about the current situation, in particular the harm Italian mafias cause abroad. For example, in the 1990s, there was a general ‘fear of the expansion of the Italian mafia to the whole of Europe’ (Paoli and Fijnaut 2006, 304). This does not appear to have occurred, but it has been suggested that Italian mafias now have local established ‘representatives’ with their own ‘branches’ in different member states (305). The example of the Camorra’s control over the magliari network, the army of Neapolitan travelling door-to-door salesmen, in different member states, seems to confirm the local presence of Camorra associates, but this is more fluid and less predictable than previously envisaged (see QdN–1, QdN–2, b). Indeed, Francesco Forgione, former President of the Italian Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, argued that: when you arrest a boss in Caracas or Toronto, Malaga, or Nice, in Romania, or in Bogota or Amsterdam or Scotland, it does not mean that this boss has chosen these cities as a more or less exotic destination to spend his holidays or escape from the law. The truth is that these places have for years now been
central to the criminal markets managed by Italian mafias. They are the unequivocal sign of a silent and decennial colonisation that has not spared a single corner of this planet. (2009, 26)

Recently, a report from the European Parliament, entitled ‘International Organised Crime in the EU’, suggested that transnational organized crime in Europe is not the expression of the transplantation of foreign mafias (2011, 14), rather it is ‘local at all points’ (15), continuing: ‘It is not because a diaspora exists in a country that this diaspora will automatically serve as “soldiers of crime” of a Mafia and it is not because drug trafficking exists that we can infer a Mafia exists’ (15). Europol recently established a special unit to monitor Italian mafias in Europe and published a ‘Threat Assessment on Italian Organised Crime’ which gave, for the first time, an overview of the four main mafias and their activities in the European Union (EU), but it remained very general (Europol 2013).

Clearly, Italian mafiosi are present abroad: in 1992, seventy Italian mafiosi were incarcerated in French prisons (Gayraud 2008, 159); in 2009, sixty-two camorristi were arrested in Spain, while the 2011 German Bundeskriminalamt ‘Annual Report on Organised Crime’ states that 169 Italian mafiosi suspects and thirty groups were identified in Germany (BKA 2012). Few details were available for the UK and the Netherlands, although the Dutch police published a report in 2011 on the presence of the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta in Holland (Politie 2011).

However, there were no official figures.

A recent Transcrime Report (2013) estimated the number of Italian mafias abroad by examining the reports of the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA; Antimafia Police) and the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA; National Antimafia Prosecution Service) between 2000 and 2011. They estimated that in Spain there were 177 representatives, in Germany 151, in Holland 105, in Albania 82, in Greece 59 and in France 51 (Transcrime 2013, 220–221). But how reliable are these data? According to this same document, there was no reported presence of the ‘Ndrangheta in the UK (230, figure 106). However, the recent ‘Operation Metropolis’ by the Antimafia Prosecution Office in Reggio Calabria highlighted that members of the ‘Ndrangheta had contacts in Belfast (see Galullo 2013).

We also have an unclear picture of Italian mafias abroad because European member states record their activity differently. And yet, mafia mobility is a subject that should be of concern to all governments and citizens, for Italian mafias are violent organizations that challenge the very foundations of democracies (Allum and Siebert 2003) by encouraging the development of clientelisti and corrupt institutions, by infiltrating legal and illegal economies and by dominating civil society.

This article looks initially at the empirical material available before considering the existing theoretical concepts and implications. First, it defines the difficulty that exists for a researcher in studying Italian mafias abroad; second, it analyses four short (because of editorial constraints) case studies of Neapolitan clans abroad; third, it discusses the analytical issues raised by these case studies. Finally, it concludes that further research is needed which would focus on the interdependence of territories and the adoption of less rigid approaches in order to understand better their social, economic and political roles abroad.

It is important to note that this article does not seek to create a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen [1972] 1980), nor contribute to the debates around European
immigration and the ‘alien conspiracy theory’ of organized crime in countries like the UK (see Hobbs and Antonopoulos 2013). Rather, it presents empirical data relating to the movement mechanisms of Camorra members and their associates across Europe, in order to raise awareness about how members of criminal groups organize, travel and functionally exploit opportunities, territories and networks. As Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe highlighted, our intention here is not to ‘smear the reputation’ of the hundreds of thousands – or millions – of law-abiding people of the country in which a criminal organisation operates’ (2005, 4) or the immigrants in new countries; ‘the focus is only on the very, very, very few who engage in organised crime’ (4), and, in this article, those who travel or are active abroad.

Studying Italian ‘mafia mobility’ in Europe
The aim of this research was to analyse the observable presence and activities of the Neapolitan Camorra in western Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain and the UK) in order to gain a realistic synopsis of the situation and to understand ‘the politics of mafia mobility’. In other words, to ascertain what Camorra mobility entails: is it a sporadic presence, a solid criminal Neapolitan diaspora, or the migration of powerful Camorra bosses? We do this so that we do not underestimate or exaggerate the presence and activities of camorristi abroad. We do not seek to minimize other threats, but we wish to go beyond oversimplification and stereotypes relating to criminal mobility and Italian mafias.

Initially, material was sought in the five chosen countries of study, but it proved to be very limited: the Dutch authorities were unwilling to discuss openly the presence of Italian mafias with researchers. The British police, on the other hand, still have ‘a relatively low understanding and perception of the Criminal mobility and the Camorra phenomenon’, as one high-ranking police officer explained (interview, 20 May 2012, London). And, although in France, Spain and Germany there is greater awareness of Italian mafias according to their annual police reports (see BKA 2011; Ministerio del Interior 2011), there was scant information concerning them. For example, in 1988 a young Neapolitan was murdered in Mainz, Germany, but it was unclear whether it was the result of a Camorra turf war in Naples (see Metropolis 2007) as this murder was never investigated in Germany. The lack of primary material in the five member states led this research to start with the Neapolitan perspective, that is the point of view of the Neapolitan police and judiciary who search for camorristi abroad. With the assistance of the Neapolitan Prosecution Service, specific case studies of Camorra members who travelled abroad and were active in non-traditional mafia territories between 1980 and 2014 were identified, a wide range of judicial and police material as well as interviews with practitioners were collected, and individuals were invited to tell the story of these criminal clans and their activities away from Naples. A multi-disciplinary qualitative methodological approach was developed to analyse this original empirical material.

Using case studies has disadvantages, but it is one of the most useful ways of studying organized crime groups because it allows us to ‘investigate[s] a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence’, thereby enabling the researcher to ‘focus on a particular issue, feature or unit of analysis’ (Noor 2008, 1602). This in-depth analysis of clans/associates present in five countries highlighted a clear trend, that Camorra associates were active and visible in four main sectors: (1) acquisitive and unorganized crime; (2) drug importation and distribution; (3) production and distribution of counterfeit goods; and (4) money laundering. Camorra clans were active in these areas in Naples and abroad and their activities went beyond the mafia activities studied by Gambetta (1993), Fijnault (2001), and Varese (2011a).
The four short case studies analysed here are emblematic of these four sectors. The picture that they present is one of diversity, variety, open-ended and ad hoc networks, or, to use Bauman’s (2000) terms, of ‘liquid’ networks, as opposed to the ‘solid’ clans active in Naples, a terminology already used by others (Forgione 2009; Beatrice 2013). Associates are present in new territories and are interacting with members of new international criminal networks and markets, but there were no Camorra settlements as such. The Camorra’s presence abroad has been described by the DNA as ‘a soft presence’ (2013, 71), presumably as opposed to a ‘hard’ presence in Campania.

Evidence of the Camorra in Europe
It appears that, since the 1980s, camorristi have been active in these four sectors and our examples are: acquisitive crime in the UK by the Rossi clan; drug trafficking in Spain by the Amato-Pagano clan; counterfeit goods in Germany by the Secondigliano Alliance; and money laundering in Spain by the Polverino clan (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

These brief case studies have been chosen to determine whether established theories can explain the different elements of Camorra mobility but also to provide a general overview of Camorra activities and presence abroad. For each case study, more than two official judicial and police documents were used, together with in-depth discussions with public prosecutors, police officers and pentiti involved in the case.

Paolo Scritto is a good example of a camorrista who was involved in ad hoc and non-systematic petty criminal activities in the UK. Scritto started to visit the UK in 2004 and moved there permanently in 2006. He spent 18 months on the run in the north of England, but was arrested in 2007 and became a state witness in 2008. Given more time, he suggests, he would have sought to develop more sophisticated criminal activities in the UK because it was ‘a free port’.

Scritto was the nephew of the Rossi brothers from a district in the centre of Naples and was considered to be a senior member of this clan, as well as a killer and a useful ally of more powerful Camorra families. Although the Rossi clan was relatively small, it was functional to the expansionist plans of these bigger clans, such as the Licciardi clan. Scritto moved to the UK because he was wanted by the judiciary in Naples, and because he knew the country well and had some solid British contacts. Thus, he had an accessible and supportive ‘niche of familiarity’ (Von Lampe 2012), which, unusually, was not based on tight family blood ties but on friendship.

Figure 1 Map Showing the Locations of Four Case Studies of Camorra Movement within Europe.
Source: Created by Panos Kostakos, 2010.
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Table 1 Four camorristi: An Overview
Camorrista Country
Criminal activity/abroad
Reason for migration
Reason for location
Relationship with homeland
Boss abroad?
No. of members
Paolo Scritto
(Rossi clan)
UK Acquisitive crime Wanted Familiar network
Permanent contact Yes 2–4
Raffaele Amato
(Amato-Pagano clan)
Spain Drug trafficking/
money laundering
Camorra war Familiar network
Permanent contact Yes 50
Pietro Licciardi
(Secondigliano alliance)
Germany/Czech Republic
Counterfeit goods
Wanted Familiar network
Permanent contact Yes 10
Giuseppe Polverino
(Polverino clan)
Spain Drug trafficking/
money laundering
Wanted Familiar network
Permanent contact Yes 10 fl

1 Paolo Scritto in 2005 was condemned for Camorra association with drug and firearms trafficking.
2 Raffaele Amato in 2010 was condemned to 20 years in prison.
3 Pietro Licciardi in 2011 was condemned to 8 years in prison for his involvement in illegal counterfeit activities.
4 Giuseppe Polverino in 2012 was condemned to 20 years in prison for Camorra association.

He did not take his whole clan with him or try to replicate the clan’s Neapolitan structure; he did take his family and a number of close associates (two to four) who were in trouble with the law in Italy and wanted to leave Naples. This group of people cannot really be called a ‘settlement’ or a ‘clan’; neither did they ‘colonize’ towns in England; it was a loose disorganized network and looked like a small group of friends. No locals were recruited to join his Camorra clan in the UK, but Scritto in turn was co-opted into the criminal activities of his British hosts, where he remained rather subordinate. These British associates were ‘white-collar’ criminals, and seem to have used him to do their dirty work (intimidate other associates who were not repaying debts).8 In Naples, the Rossi clan was relatively small and unstructured, involved with contraband cigarettes in the 1980s and then drug distribution, as well as the extortion of local businesses such as garages (see QdN–3). None of these activities was reproduced abroad. In the UK, Scritto participated in some forms of acquisitive crime (purchasing a car fraudulently and taking it to Naples) and was the general dogsbody of his English contacts. There was also a possible joint project of sending counterfeit shoes from the UK to be sold in Naples. Scritto’s
British contacts were his accomplices and provided him with advice and protection.

Scritto’s interaction with the UK was based on his functional needs; he was able to hide there while a war was declared in his district in Naples. However, he did not stay away from Naples, as territory is everything for camorristi, and was continuously travelling to direct the war against his rivals and enemies and to protect his turf. Thus, he tried to manage his clan’s affairs and a war from abroad but also saw economic potential within the UK, new and vibrant opportunities that he wanted to develop.

The Amato-Pagano clan from the Melito district spent a lot of time in Barcelona and Malaga. Its leader, Raffaele Amato, whose clan became known as the ‘Spagnoli’ (Spaniards) (PdN–1, 15) or ‘scissionisti’ (breakaway group) (13), spent a considerable amount of time in Spain between 2004 and 2006. Since 1995, Amato had been one of the main drug traffickers for the Di Lauro clan, importing cocaine from South America via Spain into Naples.9 This provided him with a reputation, precise knowledge, important contacts, access to specific networks, and a considerable freedom to travel around Spain.

Until 2004, his involvement with Spain was similar to that of other Neapolitan drug-traffickers importing drugs into Italy: like legitimate businessmen, they travelled to buy goods in one country to sell them in another. Amato had stable contacts and a group of Neapolitans in Spain whom he could rely on (in TdN 2010b); a niche support system abroad (see TdN 2010a, 85). In 2004, his relationship with Spain changed dramatically: it became an imposed ‘second home’ and ‘refuge’ for him and his clan members as he was involved in a full-blown turf war in Naples (the so-called la faida di Scampia) when the new leader of the Di Lauro clan, Cosimo Di Lauro, sought to replace him with younger members; the Amato-Pagano clan resisted and war broke out.

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This turf war lasted a year and there were more than seventy murders in Naples (TdN 2010a, 12). It has been suggested that at the height of this war there were about 200 Neapolitans in Barcelona (Domenech 2011), with about twenty Camorra families seeking refuge there to avoid being eliminated. Children of camorristi were born there and some even attended the Italian School (see PdN–1). One could suggest that it amounted to ‘a settlement’, but it was always envisaged as a temporary one that would eventually become a functional operating base for the clan and its drug trafficking.

Spain was important to the clan for many reasons. First, it was a safe and familiar location and was the place where the war campaign and strategies were decided. Second, firearms were constantly being sent from Spain to Naples to conduct the war, as were men to carry out attacks on their rivals; these men had the advantage of surprise as their faces were unknown in Naples. Lastly, the clan’s familiarity with Spain meant that it was possible to reinvest their illegally made profits in foreign credit institutions, notably in Monaco, an activity in which white-collar accomplices played an important role. It became very difficult to detect the source of the money which, having been recycled, was to be reinvested in property in Spain. The relationship between Naples and Spain was constant and there was a systematic and functional exchange between the two locations (see PdN–1).

Counterfeit activities managed by Camorra clans were as reliant on Naples as the drugs trade but for different reasons. Pietro Licciardi was one of the leaders
of the Alliance of Secondigliano and the brother of Gennaro, Vincenzo and Maria Licciardi. He was one of the first managers of a ‘criminal economic holding’ (QdN–1, 4) dedicated to producing and selling counterfeit goods, set up by the Alliance in the 1980s. This ‘holding’ was in effect a fixed board of directors consisting of criminals and businessmen, that had a criminal foundation and shareholders. Its main objective was to sell counterfeit goods. The clan invested money made from drugs and extortion in the production and importing of these counterfeit goods, which they would then impose on the Neapolitan magliari network of door-to-door salesmen, who were either recruited in Naples by local members or in Germany, forced into selling their products at their prices. The magliari network not only had to sell the Alliance’s counterfeit goods but also had to respect the prices suggested and pay a tax for being allowed to do so (see QdN–2).

Pietro Licciardi was highly familiar with this world because some of his close friends and relatives were working in this area in Europe (see Brancaccio 2011); Luigi Giuliano described him ‘as a real and true magliaro’ (verbale 5 February 2003, in TdN 2004, 57). It is interesting to note that the decision to take over the magliari network was an economic decision made by the Alliance in order to expand into new markets: it responded to the demand for leather jackets from Eastern Europe. The takeover of this network coincided with Pietro Licciardi’s need to disappear from Naples because he was wanted for murder. He was able to go to eastern Germany, where he had a support system of relatives and friends. He managed this activity both from Naples (pre-1999) and Chemnitz (1998–99) and his decisions were final; however, there were advisers and representatives who mediated when necessary.

The Alliance’s takeover of the door-to-door network of magliari, extended across Europe and the world; however, this does not mean that in every country there was a fixed Camorra settlement. Instead, there were groups of travelling magliari and sometimes an Italian-Neapolitan immigrant who acted as the interface between the clan and the magliari network. But the already existing magliari were extensively recruited in Naples among the unemployed and sent abroad. Abroad, they were not recruited but violently forced to work for the alliance. They returned to Naples to replenish their stock, and would transport their goods to their different markets. Violence was used with the magliari when they did not respect orders, but it was rarely used with local citizens. Money made in Germany was regularly returned to Naples to the common fund as well as to pay Neapolitan manufacturers. The Alliance’s activities clearly reveal the interaction and interdependence of the two locations; a continous cycle.

Giuseppe Polverino is another interesting example, whose case shows the continuous interaction and interdependence of two territories, whilst enabling us to grasp the notion of functional money laundering. Polverino was the heir of the Nuvoletta clan from the Marano-Quarto district and was thought to have been ‘established in Spain for decades’ (TdN 2011, 128). In his younger days, he was considered to be a killer and bodyguard for the boss, Don Lorenzo Nuvoletta (24). The Nuvoletta clan was one of only three Camorra families affiliated to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and this provided it with power during the 1980s and 1990s owing to its extensive international contacts. Thanks to the Sicilian influence, it was one of the clans that made the transition from contraband and drugs activities to legal investment, for example in cement companies. Nevertheless, the Nuvoletta clan has always been extensively involved in a variety of illegal activities with connections abroad. In the 1970s the clan was smuggling cigarettes, but by 1989 it had moved on to the trafficking
of hashish from Morocco into Spain and Italy, using Neapolitans who needed to pay off their debts to the clan (‘L’hashish di Nuvoletta’ 1989).

This is an activity that Giuseppe Polverino would continue to organize more efficiently in Spain during the 1990s. While the Nuvoletta clan, it is believed, had by the 2000s invested heavily in the legal economy, the Polverino clan had a balance between legal and illegal activities – the bread and meat sectors together with extortion rackets and international drug trafficking (TdN 2011, 26). In 1997, Polverino was arrested in Naples after four years on the run. In 2006, he was released from prison near Pisa with ‘semi-freedom’ (part-time custody), whereby he still had to respect certain prison conditions (see PdN–2). As he tried to reorganize his clan’s activities from afar, he became aware of possible police surveillance and consequently decided to leave his residence and go on the run again. He went to Tarragona in the province of Barcelona, where he had a good knowledge of the hashish market and various import networks, and also a network of resident friends and associates across the country. Together with these clan members, he managed the hashish import business into Italy from Spain (see PdN–2). He and his group, more or less, controlled this market in the south of Italy and sold to contacts in the north of Italy as well as to Calabrians in the south (TdN 2011, 79–91).

Although Giuseppe Polverino was far removed from his territory of origin in Spain, he continued to control tightly local civil society, legal and illegal activities (extortion, usury, and drug distribution) in Quarto-Marano. It was argued that ‘nothing moved’ without Polverino’s say-so (see TdN 2010b, 2011). In Quarto, there was a special telephone that one member carried around with him and this was a direct line to the Boss (il ‘telefono rosso’ [the red mobile phone]; see TdN 2011, 162). Although Polverino managed the drug import business from Spain, he also instructed his trusted representatives to carry out orders in Quarto.

In addition, Polverino extensively invested in both territories and in Quarto he recycled and laundered his illegal profits through a variety of business ventures, including bars, shopping centres, flats and cars. He also invested the profits made from selling drugs in Italy in Spain, for example real estate in Tenerife and San Carles de la Rapita (Tarragona). His local Italian business advisors travelled regularly from Italy to Spain to provide him with financial advice, bank accounts and Spanish registered companies for him to invest in (see PdN–2, 224–236). He did not need to access native Spaniards as he had cosmopolitan Neapolitan businessmen to assist him but had the contacts. Moreover, it seems that Polverino also enjoyed political influence in Quarto, with one local councillor even travelling to Spain to seek his advice (see TdN 2011, 179–184).

Existing literature
These four brief case studies provide a picture of disorganized, complex and fluid networks. Many authors have studied the Italian mafias moving from their territory of origin, and researchers in the 1990s and early 2000s sought to understand why and how Italian mafias were able to move from the south of Italy to the north, and abroad. To describe this phenomenon they used terms such as ‘diffusion’, ‘contagion’ (Sciarrone 1998, 2014), ‘colonization’ (Massari 2001), ‘entrenchment’ (Armao 2003), ‘transplantation’ (Varese 2011a, 2011b), ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘localism’ (Morselli, Turcotte, and Tenti 2011), and ‘functional diversification’ (Campana 2011, 2013).

While all these terms are useful in explaining some aspects of mafia mobility,
they are somewhat limited. For example, Sciarrone’s (1998, 2014; Sciarrone and Storti 2014) one is the only approach that allowed for an analysis of the different contexts; while Varese (2011a) developed the ‘property-right theory of mafia emergence’10 showing that mafiasemerge and transplant when certain key structural conditions are present in the economy. The critical factor is proximity to a sudden market expansion that is not properly regulated by the state and the presence of people who can step in to regulate such markets [. . .]. Effective states can ensure the orderly development of markets, and hence, neutralise a mafia’s transplantation or emergence. (12)

But, in our view, general concepts are difficult to apply to the diffuse reality of the Camorra abroad; motives for movement described as ‘strategic motives’, the presence of a clan in a new territory as ‘a settlement’ or ‘colonization’, the organization of a clan as ‘a local branch’, and the activities of a clan as ‘property rights’ and ‘functional diversification’ cannot be applied satisfactorily to the Camorra.

One misconception about the reason why Italian mafias move abroad is that it is for economic gain only (see Sciarrone 1998, 2014; Varese 2011a). While profit maximization plays a key role in driving and determining actors’ choices, it cannot always explain why camorristi or their associates leave Naples and Campania and why they choose a specific destination. In general, camorristi will do what is convenient for them. To analyse this, the migration literature and ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors have proved fruitful. Sciarrone (1998, 2014) explained the motives for the movement of mafiosi to the north of Italy and identified the importance of the ‘forced stay’ policy; push factors. Varese (2011a) also noted that motives for migration were often ‘unintended consequences’ of other events which forced mafiosi to leave their territory of origin, rather than strategic calculations. Many camorristi did not want to leave Naples but were forced to do so. Our findings are similar to those of Varese, who identified that mafiosi ‘move to places where they had a previous contact, a trusted friend or a relative’ (2011a, 8).

However, we refined this analysis by identifying a three-stage decisionmaking process. Stage one comprised ‘push’ factors that propelled camorristi to leave Naples, and stages two and three different ‘pull’ factors. Stage one consists of two main push factors that forced camorristi out of Naples. These were: (1) being wanted by the police or judiciary; and (2) the fear of being murdered (see Sciarrone 1998; Varese 2011a). In stage two, there was one predominant pull factor, that of identifying a reliable familiar network, ‘a niche of familiarity’ (Von Lampe 2012). In other words, a logistical and emotional support system of family and friends. This was the determining pull factor. Then, there were a variety of strategic reasons which make up stage three: (1) identifying wellknown markets and money-making opportunities; and (2) law-enforcement regimes that were perceived to be ineffective with respect to mafia associations. Thus, we find a delicate three-stage interplay of push and pull factors between territories which explain the reasons for departure and choice of location of camorristi abroad; a persistent pattern emerges. For example, Michele Zaza left Naples in 1983 and moved to Rome and then France in 1984 (see TGIM 1991, 117).

His reason to leave was because he feared being murdered by younger rivals,11 and his choice of France could be explained by a guaranteed familiar network in Nice and the fact that he was not too far from Milan nor San Remo, where some of his close associates were based. Raffaele Amato also left Naples because he feared for his life after a turf drugs war exploded in 2004 with his former clan,
the Di Lauro clan. His choice of Spain was determined by the fact that he had friends and associates in Barcelona and was familiar with the Spanish cocaine market because he had contacts with South American importers.

The notion of territory abroad is also interesting. Many authors (Gambetta 1993; Reuter 1985; Sciarrone 1998, 2014; Campana 2011a) have highlighted the importance of territory for traditional mafias, but have not developed the relationship between the home territory and the activities abroad. In particular, the interdependency and how the home territory is the base for all foreign activities (headquarters, operational base, parent company). So there is no ‘colonization’, ‘diffusion’ or ‘contagion’ of mafia-type activities and behaviour into the new territory. Sciarrone (1998, 2014; Sciarrone and Storti 2014a) identified four different forms of behaviour in non-traditional territories in Italy and abroad: ‘settlement, imitation, infiltration and hybridization’. We found that the Camorra’s behaviour abroad was mainly infiltration, not of the territory but of markets and economies.

Territory is one of the most important aspects of the Camorra’s identity in Naples, and without ‘territorial seigniory’ (Santino 1994) it has no social, economic or political power, it has no embedded roots within the local territory. Its control of the territory is its strength in Naples, but abroad lack of territorial control can be seen as one of its weaknesses. Colombie explained:

In Italy, the mafia’s roots in the local territory are both its strength and weakness: clearly, it is very difficult to dislodge them once they are established in the local territory but this also means that it becomes more difficult for them to establish themselves where they have no roots. (2012, 14) Thus, abroad, the Camorra does not control or seek to control new territory, but instead undertakes strategic business activities that relate back to the territory in Naples.

There has been no ‘colonization’ where the Camorra has taken over a set territory, no diffusion of its core activities and behaviour amongst locals, and no contagion. When camorristi move abroad, they are interested in making money fast so we could suggest that they seek to colonize the economy. Seeking to control a territory full-time away from Naples would require too many resources and large amounts of manpower, which they do not necessarily have abroad or want to dedicate to this activity. For example, in Amsterdam during the 1990s, the Stolder clan had associates there who organized the buying and re-orientation of drugs towards Italy; they had no interest in the territory (see TdN 1997).

The use of terms such as ‘settlement’ (Sciarrone 1998, 2014) suggests that there is a substantial group of camorristi living together and this is rarely the case. For example, in Aberdeen the La Torre clan had at most two to three members who resided permanently there and other members came and went. In Granada, Nunzio De Falco had Italian and local associates, but no compact group of Neapolitans living near him (see QdC Sm Campania/Molise 1995). Terms such as a ‘local branch’ are unhelpful as they transmit the image of decentralized activities and autonomous outposts.

The evidence of the Camorra abroad is more complex: strategically camorristi behave differently abroad, in an invisible manner, in order not to draw attention to themselves, and behave like chameleons as they seek to fit in with their new environment (see Allum 2012, 2013), but there exists an interdependency of territories. In Naples, Camorra clans are family-based criminal associations, located in a set territory, which undertake a core of diverse activities, such as
extortion rackets, drug distribution and the selling of counterfeit goods, as well as imposing a social consensus and seeking political contacts. Abroad, they behave differently but are intrinsically connected to the local territory and become a ‘network enterprise’ (Castells 2000, 171) configuration.

It is important to note that clans do not replicate their organizational structure abroad, so it becomes difficult for Italian and foreign law-enforcement agencies to detect them. There have been some suggestions that criminal groups move en masse or replicate their criminal structures in the new territory abroad. For the Camorra this has not been the case, as, although there is evidence of criminals and bosses moving and taking some associates with them, the clan does not move en masse. In particular, the military arm rarely moves abroad permanently. The question that many raise is: Do Italian mafias undertake collaboration with locals in their new host territory and recruit locals into their criminal organization?

In the case of the Camorra, there are no set rules. They seek to remain within their ethnic group, predominately Neapolitan because of the trust and understanding that they have. Whilst they interact with other ethnic groups for the purpose of business deals, such as buying hashish from Moroccans or cocaine from South Americans and using Poles to transport drugs into Italy, they will employ locals to sell drugs locally, act as body guards or murder rivals; they do not seek local assistance if possible. Camorristi have their own familiar support systems and contacts, constructed of Neapolitans and Italians, but will collaborate with anyone when necessary.

Camorristi and their associates behave differently abroad and are usually less violent, at least until now. Abroad, they focus on the market in which they operate in Naples/Campania. For drug-trafficking, the Camorra is not interested in selling drugs in the Netherlands or Spain but rather in buying and transporting drugs to Italy and selling them to their familiar market. Similarly, for counterfeit goods the Camorra is involved with various networks that oversee manufacture in Naples and China; goods are then sold both in Italy and locally in their new locations through their control of the Neapolitan door-to-door sellers, the magliari network. This leads to the question: What kind of activities do the camorristi undertake abroad?

Varese’s original ‘property-right theory of mafia emergence’ suggested that mafias transplant if the conditions are right: ‘significant opportunities exist for mafias to govern access to valuable markets, offer genuine services of dispute settlement and protection, enforce cartel agreements, reduce competition’ (2011a, 8–9). In other words, they provide private protection. If a mafia does not transplant, is this because there were not the right conditions elsewhere? We believe that this approach may limit us to conceptualizing of mafias as either being permanently settled in a new location providing private protection or not, whereas the patterns that emerge from the Camorra’s activities show that they are highly mobile, extremely flexible and rational, and do not need to put down deep roots in a new territory to be present and active. Part of their strategy abroad is to be invisible, and transplantation might imply some form of visibility, which would ultimately be bad for business.

Both Varese and Campana distinguish between activities in the homeland, where mafias “govern” territory and markets exclusively’ (Varese 2012, 248) and abroad, where they ‘trade’ in illegal activities (Campana 2013, as quoted in Della Chiesa). According to Campana, clans engage in ‘functional diversification’; in Italy they provide core activities of private protection, while abroad
they do not do this; they diversify their activities from one territory to another: he believes that ‘each foreign “branch”, and by extension each locale, had a clear function, and was devoted to a set of specific activities’ (2011, 213). He argued that the La Torre clan from Mondragone ‘operated along the lines of functional diversification, diversifying its activities across territories, but they did not expand or move their core business outside of their territory of origin’ (216); i.e. the protection racket was never extended abroad.

Our evidence indicates that there is another important factor to take into account: the way clan territories interconnect and the feedback process that takes place between both. The La Torre clan recycled money in Mondragone as it did in Aberdeen; in Mondragone and the Lazio region it was active in shops, businesses, stores and land (see Giuliani 2010), whilst in Aberdeen it was also active in restaurants. We believe that Camorras diversify wherever they are, home or abroad, undertaking a variety of activities that interconnect back to Naples. They not only ‘govern’ their territory by imposing extortion rackets but also control activities by dictating who can do what in their specific districts and, they ‘trade’ in different traffics (drugs, firearms, stolen goods) across the region. They do more than just govern. The activities they undertake abroad interlink directly with what they are doing at home; they are one and the same activity, market and network; there exists a clear interdependency between territories.

Camorra clans have increasingly developed functional commercial strategies that connect their home territory with international markets so that they can compete efficiently in financial networks.

Moreover, it seems to be more helpful to conceptualize the Camorra’s activities as a continuous commercial cycle that links the local territory to the new host location, with feedback between both. For example, the Polverino clan sold hashish in Quarto and bought it in Spain to sell it locally in Campania and nationally (the north of Italy and Calabria), whilst the Amato-Pagano clan sold cocaine on the streets of Scampia and bought it in Spain from its Colombian contacts. There is no diversification but rather one activity that links the territory of origin and the new location. From our evidence of the Camorra, territory of origin and new location are an artificial distinction when it comes to their commercial activities, as the Camorra does not appear to ‘diversify’ its activities across territories because it undertakes many varied activities in Naples, in which it governs and controls activities in the local territory as well as trading across the region. However, extortion rackets have rarely been identified abroad and seem to take place extensively in Naples. This is not about commercial activities but about the clan’s relationship with civil society.

The distinction is clearer when it comes to clans’ behaviour vis-a`-vis civil society because they clearly behave differently: they have a different group ethic, values, morals and norms. These Camorra clans show a reluctance to use violence towards non-Italians. This is a strategic choice to become ‘invisible’ in order to be able to undertake criminal activities undisturbed. Although there is some evidence of the use of violence, such as in the takeover of the magliari network, camorristi rarely use violence abroad towards non-Italians if possible. Primarily, because a foreign civil society might not be so passive towards them and, second, because it would be bad for business.

Camorra clans develop an intricate relationship between their different territories; there is a functional link whereby camorristi adopt a specific common commercial strategy across territories but different group ethics. This means that their business is the same but their form of behaviour different. The commercial strategy shows how clans connect both locations to reinforce the power of the clan and its group ethics in Naples.
This relationship is two-way: the homeland plays a fundamental role in organizing and determining activities abroad, whether through resources or manpower; the two territories are not separate, with activities linking back to Naples. For example, the Polverino, Amato-Pagano and De Falco clans laundered money in Spain made from drug-selling in Naples, but money made from counterfeit activities by the Secondigliano Alliance in Germany was sent back to Naples for the common fund. There appears to be constant feedback between the territories, with a flow of goods, people and resources, but no independent clan born at either end. There is clearly an organic relationship between both territories which previous studies did not fully recognize. This I call ‘functional mobility’.

I conclude that the existing literature is helpful in explaining some aspects of Camorra mobility, such as the motives, the players and internal structures of a clan, but does not explain other fundamental aspects, such as the relationship between both territories. The existing theories fail to stress the importance of interaction between the local and new location abroad, which is a two-way movement between locations. Furthermore, they fail to recognize the strategies and logic of the different criminal groups. Thus, they do not explain the complexity, fluidity and unsophisticated networks that characterize Camorra clans abroad. Indeed, Camorra clans have solid roots in Naples, but they have clear strategies with which to adapt to new environments and become fluid networks, interlocking into other economic and criminal networks, and this needs to be explained.

Concluding remarks
The initial implications of the findings of this research, in relation to the existing literature, is that the Camorra in Europe does not fit any of the existing explanatory models. The material collected forced us to question some basic assumptions and suggested that criminal mobility is perhaps more complex than some of the literature suggests, with the ‘paradigm of complexity’ (Santino 2010) being potentially a more useful starting point for its analysis. Outside of Campania, clans behave differently and are all diverse, fluid and adaptable (see Sciarrone [2014] for latest developments in Italy). However, there is one general trend which is that we must take into account both contexts, as well as conceiving of criminal mobility in terms of markets and networks in which different criminal groups are connected. Beatrice noted that ‘Camorra organizations have ultimately exploited the globalization of markets and in so doing, have managed their process of camouflage’ (2009, 479), of becoming ‘invisible’ and thereby, they ‘become businessmen’ (478). Or, in the words of a Florida district attorney who commented on the Calabrian Ndrangheta in the United States, the Camorra abroad is ‘invisible, like the dark side of the moon’ (Hooper 2006). It looks for financial investment opportunities that can connect its various territories and does not seek to replicate its visible power structures and activities abroad; but does it pose less of a threat? We still need to improve our understanding of these social, criminal and economic processes in order to comprehend better the true nature of its threat, without over-exaggerating or under-emphasizing it. But, with the limited European material available and existing judicial and police instruments, this still remains a challenging research area as well as a law-enforcement problem.

Notes
1 The research presented here is the result of a sabbatical (2010–2011) and funding
from the University of Bath, (UK). Please note that it is not my intention to harm the reputation or accuse individuals of criminal behaviour, but it is to tell the story of various Camorra clans and their presence and activities in Europe. All the individuals referred to in this text as ‘camorrista’ have been convicted (of mafia association [or other mafia-related crimes]) in the first instance by the Italian judicial system. However, in many cases their final appeals have not been heard and so their convictions have not yet been confirmed at the highest level of judgment and thus, they must be considered innocent.

2 All foreign quotations have been translated by the author.

3 Interview via email (November 22, 2010) with R. Cionti, Italian liaison officer based in Madrid, Spain.

4 To be successful in drug-trafficking activities implies mobility. It could be suggested that without such activities, criminal mobility would be more limited. International drug trafficking transformed mafias from local-national groups to international players (Arlacchi 1988).

5 The name of this clan and camorrista have been changed.

6 Interview with P. Scritto, Italian state witness, Naples, Procura di Napoli, 14 April 2011.

7 Interview with P. Scritto, see note 6.

8 Interview with P. Scritto, see note 6.


10 It could be argued that our definition of the Camorra as a mafia is much wider than Varese’s (2011a) because we include what he would consider purely a form of illegal trade: trafficking of counterfeit goods, drugs, arms and stolen goods. We define them as Camorra because they begin as a Camorra organization in Naples and what we are interested in is understanding how they are mobile across borders and what the implications of this are. This is why we engage with Varese’s approach even if there are some slight differences in what is being studied. Ultimately, we both focus on criminal mobility of mafia-type organizations.

11 Interview with P. Mancuso, Chief Prosecutor of Nola and prosecutor involved in investigating Michele Zaza during the 1980s, 12 April 2011.

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