Perception and Practice: Participation, Evaluation and Aid Harmonisation in Ethiopia

Virginia Williamson

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath
Department of Social and Policy Sciences
Centre for Development Studies
October 2009

COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation.
# CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

**ABSTRACT**

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**GLOSSARY**

## CHAPTER

1. **INTRODUCTION**

   1.1 **RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH**

   1.2 **SUMMARY OF THE THESIS**

   1.3 **RESEARCH BOUNDARIES**

   1.4 **NARRATIVE AND STRUCTURE**

      1.4.1 Narrative
      1.4.2 Structure

2. **AID AND ITS MANAGEMENT**

   2.1 **INTRODUCTION**

   2.2 **AID AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT: CONGRUENT AND COMPETING DISCOURSES**

      2.2.1 Development Management as Normative Project
      2.2.2 Historical Analysis
      2.2.3 Development Management as Public Administration
      2.2.4 Ethnographic Studies of Development Management
      2.2.5 Critical Management Studies
      2.2.6 Positioning Within Development Management Discourse

2.3 **THE NEW AID ARCHITECTURE**

   2.3.1 Introduction
   2.3.2 Development of the New Aid Architecture
   2.3.3 The NAA and the Global Political Economy
## 2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation within the NAA</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2</td>
<td>Historical Development of Aid Evaluation</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3</td>
<td>The Purposes of Evaluation</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.4</td>
<td>Critical Approaches to the Concept of Evaluation</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.5</td>
<td>Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2.5 CHANGING NORMS OF PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2</td>
<td>The Role of Participation in the NAA</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3</td>
<td>Indigenous Forms of Participation</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4</td>
<td>The ‘Professional’ in Participation Discourse</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.5</td>
<td>Participatory Space, Transaction and Power</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. METHODOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH AND ITS ORIENTATION</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>Research Objective</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Research Question</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>Formative Experience Influencing the Research Methodology</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>SOCIAL ACTOR ORIENTATION: SOCIAL AND KNOWLEDGE INTERFACES</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>The Social Actor</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
<td>Applying a Social Actor Perspective to Complimentary Literatures</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>TRANSACTION, MOTIVATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Information Asymmetry in Explaining Aid Relationships</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>Analysing Trust and Motivation in Aid Relationships</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3</td>
<td>Geopolitics, Information Asymmetry and Polity</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4</td>
<td>Shared Mental Models</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>CULTURAL ANALYSIS AND MENTAL MODELS</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1</td>
<td>Cross-Cultural Research, Epistemology and Ontological Discussion</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2</td>
<td>Selected Foci in Cross-Cultural Research</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1</td>
<td>Ethnography of Aid</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2</td>
<td>Research Methods</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.3</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6.4 Country Selection 102
3.6.5 Research Relationship with Addis Ababa University 102
3.6.6 Selection of Donors 103
3.6.7 Negotiating Access 103
3.6.8 Logistical Constraints 106
3.6.9 Pattern of Fieldwork: numerical data on interviews 107

4. ETHIOPIA: HISTORY, GEOPOLITICS AND AID RELATIONS 109

4.1 INTRODUCTION 109

4.2 THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS 110

4.2.1 Ethiopian History and Identity 110
4.2.2 Religion, Socio-Economy, Ethnicity 113
4.2.3 Political Systems 118
4.2.4 Geopolitical Context within the Horn of Africa 123

4.3 AID RELATIONS 126

4.3.1 History and Pattern of Foreign Aid 126
4.3.2 Donors: Canada 129
4.3.3 Donors: Ireland 133
4.3.4 Donors: Sweden 136
4.3.5 The Framework for NAA Adoption 141
4.3.6 The 2005 General Election and Aid Relations 145
4.3.7 Key Issues for Aid Relations 146

5. ETHIOPIA: CULTURE AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS 148

5.1 INTRODUCTION 148

5.2 KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL DISCOURSE 149

5.2.1 Synthesising National and International Literatures 149
5.2.2 Recurring Themes: Dualism, Continuity, Synchronicity 151

5.3 RELIGION 153

5.3.1 Orthodox Religious Practice 153
5.3.2 Religious Syncretism 154

5.4 CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP AND COMPETITION 155

5.4.1 Traditional Conceptions of Leadership 155
5.4.2 Continuity of Governance Patterns 157
5.4.3 Opposition, Legitimacy and Conflict Resolution 157
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1</td>
<td>Consensus, Heterogeneity and Confusion</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>AGENCY AND INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.1</td>
<td>Agency in Development Agencies</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.2</td>
<td>Knowledge from 'The Field'</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.3</td>
<td>Shift From Technical to Political Imperatives</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4.1</td>
<td>Development Management Discourse</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4.2</td>
<td>Development Management and Ideology</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4.3</td>
<td>Development Management and Cross-Cultural Discourse</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4.4</td>
<td>A Schema for Normative Development Management</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEXES**

A. Summary of WIDE Analysis 313
B. Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 322
C. Maps 325

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 326
FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic Illustration of the Literature Review 23
Figure 2.1 Discourses in Development Management 26
Figure 3.1 Linked Literatures 65
Figure 3.2 Consensus, Information and Polity, adapted from Waterman and Meier (1998: 188). 81
Figure 4.1 ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005 127
Figure 4.2 ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005 disaggregated by donor 128
Figure 4.3 Canadian ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 129
Figure 4.4 Irish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 133
Figure 4.5 Swedish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 137
Figure 6.1 Formal and Information Administrative Structure 181
Figure 6.2 Local Evaluation Framework 217
Figure 7.1 The ‘Dialogue Architecture’ 247
Figure 7.2 Conception of Congruence and Disjuncture in Identities within the local aid chain 261
Figure 7.3 Principal-Agent expansion to Consider Polity 278
Figure 8.1 Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity in Mental Models 302
Figure 8.2 A Schema for Normative Development Management 311

TABLES

Table 2.1 Simplified Conceptual Model of Post WWII Aid Orthodoxies 30
Table 3.1 Number of Interviews Held 108
Table 6.1 Comparative Overview: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam 222
Table 6.2 Emerging Themes from the Ethiopian Data 228
Table 7.1 List of Themes by Degree of Congruence 243
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge with great appreciation the funding support I received from the University of Bath, in the form of a University Research Studentship, and thank the staff of the Department for their support and advice. My supervisor, Dr. James Copestake, has been unfailingly supportive and encouraging, and accepting of the breadth of literature and concepts that the cross-cultural nature of the thesis has included. He has provided feedback promptly, his advice has been consistently constructive and stimulating. I owe him an enormous debt of gratitude.

My thanks, too, to Dr. Philippa Bevan for providing access to her team’s primary data to set me on my way, and for our challenging conversations on the terrace at the Ras Amba. I am also grateful to Dr. Alula Pankhurst for his insights and help in setting up the research. As a result of this, I also received logistical support from the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Addis Ababa. My research assistants, former students from that department, were knowledgeable, helpful and tolerant, making the research process so much easier for both me and my respondents. My thanks go to Kibrom Fisseha, Solomon Debebe and Agazi Tiomlissan, and also to Yisak Tefere and Feleke Tadele for their friendly advice. Ann and Frank Rispin and Judith Altshul gave me warm hospitality in Addis Ababa. I am particularly grateful to my family and friends for their support throughout, despite my absence, either literally or metaphorically, in a place from where communication links were poor. Above all, I am grateful to my respondents, both habesha and ferengi, who gave me their time and opinions from which I have learnt so much.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the role which culture and belief systems play in influencing perceptions and practice of participation in evaluation in aid-funded development. The research followed the programmes of three bilateral donors in Ethiopia, a pilot country for aid harmonisation, which has a Revolutionary Democratic government. The New Aid Architecture (NAA) assumes that recipient countries will adopt liberal democracy and New Public Management, recognising them as superior to their own ideology and institutions. Donors' assumptions, and the implied consensualism of the NAA, were fractured when the government demonstrated it had not accepted democratic pluralism and donors withdrew budget support, designing a new modality with greater controls in response.

The two ideological approaches share a consensual rhetoric in which citizens are expected to participate - voluntarily/individually in liberal democracy, and obligatorily/collectively in revolutionary democracy. The meaning and purpose of participation and evaluation were strongly shared in northern Ethiopia, where government-community interaction synthesises with customary practices of participation and evaluation. In contrast, donors' understanding of participation and evaluation was partial and uncertain, differentiated most clearly by professional background and nationality. By employing Denzau and North’s ‘shared mental models’ as an analytical tool within an underlying social actor perspective, it was possible to trace elements of culture and belief systems, from which mental models are formed, through to the development values and practice of all four countries (Ethiopia and the three donors).

The research proposes a normative approach to development management which engages constructively with policy formulation and management practice, recognising the role that culture and belief (religion and/or ideology) play in countries’ differential development values, objectives and practice. This requires greater interrogation of the political systems which underpin development policy formulation, and a more comparative approach, involving greater reflexivity, to the development management approaches of other countries, whether like- or differently-minded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Area-based programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADLI</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPR</td>
<td>Annual Programme Performance Review (CIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Annual Progress Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOFED</td>
<td>Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (Regional government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAA</td>
<td>Country Financial Accountability Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Critical Management Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAR</td>
<td>Country Procurement Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Citizen Report Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUD</td>
<td>Coalition for Unity and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Development Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Donors Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBS</td>
<td>Direct budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Ethiopian Orthodox Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HICE</td>
<td>Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey (Ethiopia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Finance Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-government organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (both Ireland and Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MfDR</td>
<td>Managing for Development Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Federal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>New Aid Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADETES</td>
<td>Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN/E</td>
<td>Poverty Action Network, Ethiopia (NGO umbrella group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASDEP</td>
<td>Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (2nd PRSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Protection of Basic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCU</td>
<td>Programme Coordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Performance Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Project Information Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM&amp;E</td>
<td>Participatory monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCAP</td>
<td>Public Sector Capacity Building Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REST</td>
<td>Relief Society of Tigray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARDP</td>
<td>Sida-Amhara Rural Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPRP</td>
<td>Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (1st PRSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEK</td>
<td>Swedish kroner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNNP</td>
<td>Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoSA</td>
<td>Sociology and Social Anthropology (Department of)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAF</td>
<td>Strategic Results Assessment Framework (CIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector Wide Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigray People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRSP</td>
<td>Tigray Regional Support Programme (DCI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UTV  Evaluation Unit, SIDA
WeD  Wellbeing in Developing Countries
WFP  World Food Programme
WIDE Wellbeing and Illbeing in Development, Ethiopia
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMU  Welfare Monitoring Unit (Ethiopia)

Exchange rate: US$1 = 8.6 Ethiopian birr (ETB)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bäal Egziabher</td>
<td>Saints day, 29th of the month, Ethiopian calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debo</td>
<td>Labour for food reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equb</td>
<td>Rotating savings scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferengi</td>
<td>Foreigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemgamma</td>
<td>Evaluation (gengam in Tigrigna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got</td>
<td>Sub-kebele administrative level (Amhara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habesha</td>
<td>An inclusive term, originally ‘tribe’, now used as ‘Ethiopian’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iddir</td>
<td>Self-help association, usually for burials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idil</td>
<td>Chance (fate, luck, opportunity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebele</td>
<td>Sub-woreda administrative level (Amhara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kushet</td>
<td>Sub-kebele administrative level (Tigray)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maheber</td>
<td>Association, generally in honour of a saint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriam</td>
<td>Saints day, 21st of the month, Ethiopian calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengistawi buden</td>
<td>Government team (30 households)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam-ennā warq</td>
<td>Wax and Gold (oratorical style)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selassie</td>
<td>Saints day, 7th of the month, Ethiopian calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senbete</td>
<td>Sunday association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimageles</td>
<td>Council of Elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabia</td>
<td>Sub-woreda administrative level (Tigray)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonfel</td>
<td>Labour reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woreda</td>
<td>Sub-regional administrative level, equivalent to district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yilungta</td>
<td>Self-restraint in communication, reticence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

International development is a normative project, and current aid orthodoxy for poverty reduction centres on good governance as the vehicle to achieve this. Discourses about the form and quality of participation and about aid effectiveness reflect this approach. International donors’ focus on participation and evaluation as ways of improving and measuring aid effectiveness shifted during the 1990s with the move from project to programme modality. Current aid orthodoxy, the New Aid Architecture (NAA), is based on the premise that donors and recipient governments (and governments and their citizens) reach consensus about developmental goals and strive to achieve them by working in ‘partnership’. It assumes that recipient countries will adopt liberal democracy and New Public Management, with expectations that civil society will monitor government performance and the electorate will hold the government to account via multiparty elections. The NAA was introduced as a guidance document for donors, *Shaping the 21st Century* (OECD, 1996). King describes this as “one of the clearest expressions of a set of donor-driven and donor-selected policies, strategies and targets that have been agreed by the OECD members states on behalf of the developing world” (King, 2004: 15).

The terms ‘participation’ and ‘evaluation’ are linked in discourse (see 2.4 and 2.5) in arguments for improved aid effectiveness. The rationale for the research was to explore how participation, particularly in evaluation, was conceptualised within donors’ aid chains, and in donor-government relations, and to investigate what factors facilitate or constrain stakeholders’ participation in evaluation of aid-funded development interventions. The research adds to this literature by exploring how participation and evaluation were perceived and practised within one cultural and political country context (Ethiopia) during a period of two years (2004-2005), when the new instruments were introduced and then tested by political events.

The research employed an ethnographic approach to the aid chains of three bilateral donor programmes, from the setting of development objectives by
donor governments through to participation and evaluation in development activities at community level. Based on a social actor epistemology, the fieldwork sought to understand the cultural and institutional factors which constrained or enabled participatory practice (focusing on issues of power, agency, role and culture) and to explore the extent to which these were country-specific.

The thesis confirms the necessity of taking a 'long view' of the development process to take account of the culturally-embedded nature of mental models, of both developers and those they hope ‘to develop’ through the allocation of aid. The central argument of the thesis is the importance of recognising firstly, that ‘development’ is a transactional, cross-cultural arena in which actors’ strategies and receptivity to change are guided by their own mental models and their conception of others; and, secondly, that mental models reflect underlying power relations and culturally rooted political beliefs. The contribution of this thesis is to add to the development management literature by arguing the potential value of these factors in informing development policy and practice. A concomitant argument is made, that development policy which assumes the superiority of Western models of participation and of accountability may lack relevance and legitimacy in the local context and may also fail to meet local, sometimes more exacting, standards. Being alert to these inconsistencies encourages comparison with the increasing democratic deficit and declining trust in systems of governance, for example in the United Kingdom.

The rationale for the research places it within the development management subset of development studies. I regard development management as a normative endeavour, requiring purposeful engagement with policy and practice. Resulting from my own experience and ontological reflection, my approach to development management is to engage with discourses from other disciplines to inform and appropriately contextualise policy, planning and evaluation. The thesis therefore draws on literatures and concepts from a number of different disciplines - cultural anthropology, sociology, history, political science, cross-cultural studies and institutional economics - in order to understand the multi-faceted nature of donor-government and government-community relations.
1.2 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS

International development is a normative project, and current aid orthodoxy for poverty reduction centres on good governance as the vehicle to achieve this. Discourses about the form and quality of participation and about aid effectiveness reflect this approach. The New Aid Architecture is concerned with attitudinal change, and tends to assume that liberal democracy and public management reforms will be adopted by recipient countries because their existing ideologies and administrative institutions are inadequate. This thesis explores the cultural and institutional factors which affect (constrain or enable) forms of participation in aid evaluation, drawing upon data from three bilateral donors’ programmes in Ethiopia - a pilot country for aid harmonisation. By focusing on governance, the NAA effectively pitched one meta-narrative, liberal democracy, against the narrative of ‘Ethiopia’, which was particularly strong.

The principle goal of this thesis is to address an issue for development management: what accounts for the differences in the practice of participation, particularly in aid evaluation? The conceptual framework is grounded in Norman Long’s social actor approach but includes concepts from transactions analysis to explore issues of motivation and trust, referencing these against cross-cultural research into social identity and individualism-collectivism. The analytical focus draws on Denzau and North’s concept of ‘shared mental models’. This argues that mental models originate in culture and belief systems (including religion and ideology) and facilitate decision-making under uncertainty. They suggest that learning takes place gradually through sharing information and discussion of values, with plasticity of language assisting assimilation. Significant shifts in mental models only occur when belief systems are found to be inadequate to explain experience.

The research confirms that actors’ differential understanding of participation and evaluation is rooted in their own culture and belief systems. Despite the existence of specific areas of contestation, there was greater homogeneity and clarity of conceptualisation and practice of participation and evaluation within the hierarchy of Ethiopian government-citizen relations than amongst the donors. Ethiopian government systems firmly structure the practice of participation and evaluation, constraining individual agency in Western liberal democratic terms. In contrast, some donor staff found donor structures and practice often
conflicted sharply with their own value systems and mental models. This was most apparent for those who had joined donor agencies as technical specialists and found that political skills were in greater demand than technical expertise. Disjunctures were also accentuated by differences between central and regional offices of the donors, and increased use of national staff.

Although all three donors supported the harmonisation agenda, the range of modalities they used provided them with different opportunities to find out about local forms of participation and evaluation. Not all chose to access these opportunities, and length of engagement alone was not sufficient to achieve discursive congruence. Greater congruence was found in the meanings and values expressed within agency interviews and policy documentation than between donors. Links could be traced between each country’s patterns of communication, attitudes to giving and forms of civic engagement (including Ethiopia’s), and its political, cultural and religious roots.

The ‘up-stream’ modalities of the New Aid Architecture reduce the level of interaction between in-country donor staff and local government and their citizens while, at the same time, harmonisation increases the interaction between donors, creating a second cross-cultural arena based on the premise of shared values and political beliefs. In both arenas, lack of clarity about terms such as participation and evaluation, and ambiguity in their use, masks uncertainty and hides differences. While the research demonstrates some sharp disconnects between donor and Ethiopian understanding and practice of participation, accountability and evaluation, some rhetorical positions were found to be shared: these include the role of exhortation and communication skills, and the importance of civic ‘duty’.

The coherence and consistency of Ethiopian descriptions of participation and evaluation, and the strength of national narrative, including the role of development, demonstrated the relative strength and validity of structures and institutions which accorded with local notions of entitlement and purpose. The thesis calls for greater reflexivity on the part of donors and researchers, to recognise that national identity and the longevity of customary practice can be empowering, and that international practice may be less effective and less equitable than the practices which donors expect to see replaced.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The shared mental models concept helps to consider disjunctures as well as congruence, and the research identified areas of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity which offer discursive ‘room for manoeuvre’. Denzau and North suggest that, when mental models are shared, single words can be used to communicate complex ideas and that plasticity of language assists congruence. In Ethiopia, where oratorical skill is particularly admired, participation and evaluation had relatively specific meanings and purpose, compared to their fluidity and uncertainty among donors. Denzau and North also argue that learning is a gradual process of sharing cultures and belief systems, unless a conceptual crisis forces re-evaluation of the mental model. The EPRDF, a Revolutionary Democratic party, had been in power in Ethiopia since 1991 and, while some donors had adopted federal budget support, others were more equivocal. Post-election violence in 2005 caused harmonising donors to suspend budget support or reduce their programmes and to design a new modality (“Protection of Basic Services”) which gave them a more interventionist role.

Donors failed to effect the attitudinal change in Ethiopia that it assumed would effect the adoption of liberal democracy. The use of a framework such as Denzau and North’s may help indicate to development managers the relative strengths of different polities, the extent to which objectives and meanings are shared and the relevance of alternative modalities. The thesis concludes by arguing that development management discourse should interrogate the role which culture, belief systems and information, the mediating factor in shared mental models, play in the formulation of development policy and practice.

1.3 RESEARCH BOUNDARIES

The research focused on cultural and institutional factors affecting participation in evaluation. It did not directly evaluate or explore the effectiveness of donors’ programmes, but does draw on secondary literature such as OECD-DAC peer reviews, academic texts and evaluation reports. It did not compare the efficacy of different evaluation methods, whether participation results in increased aid effectiveness, or whether participation results in improved evaluation. The evaluation systems of donor, such as multilateral agencies or international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), are not discussed except in relation to their
interaction with the three bilateral donors. The interview questions were limited to exploration of the perception and practices with regard to participation and evaluation within the aid chain of the three donors' programmes.

There were a number of factors which restricted the fieldwork. A limited number of donors were interested in taking part, but it was helpful that those who did were all actively engaged in the new aid modalities. However, sensitivity about their relationship with Ethiopian central government departments meant that they did not facilitate access to federal ministry officials for me and an attempt at informal access failed. However, because the three donors had regional programmes, I concentrated instead on regional government and its sub-levels with no insuperable difficulties, although poor infrastructure restricted my access to more remote villages. Access to a donor-government monitoring and evaluation forum was vetoed by one bilateral donor who had declined to take part in my research, but a few multilateral agency staff agreed to key informant interviews and gave me relevant documents. The fieldwork coincided with parliamentary elections, and the political events which included unexpectedly high level of violence delayed fieldwork. It did not cause me to reduce it except in one administrative area near the border area with Eritrea.

1.4 NARRATIVE AND STRUCTURE

1.4.1 Narrative

The initial research idea originated from reflection on my experience working in a project management role for a development consulting company and observing the development management process. Because I was tracking the ‘project cycle’, I was aware of the genesis of many of the projects and the degree to which they were based on evidence. Sometimes the project cycle was so extended that the premises on which the project was originally designed were no longer current. The intended beneficiaries were rarely consulted and, if they were, their views were rarely taken into account, usually because their preferences did not coincide with those of the donor or the government. Although involvement of government counterparts and national consultants was required by projects' terms of reference, working relationships between donor, government and project staff were often tense, with poor or missed
communication, conflicting personal goals and project goals open to mis- or re-
interpretation by the different stakeholders. These occurred even when actors
believed they were able to communicate well, or when they were motivated to
communicate well but failed. In other situations, failures in communication were
either not noticed, or not referred to and masked by culturally-based norms of
polite behaviour. As an example, I was surprised to find that an international
consultant could, despite his fluency in the local language and claims for special
insights into local structures, political and cultural norms gained over many
years’ residence, be unreceptive to information and ideas provided by national
staff and local leaders; it seemed that ingrained perceptions prevented him from
doing so.

In this thesis, I have used an analytical concept from Denzau and North, ‘shared
mental models’, in which ‘mental models’ are derived from culture and belief
systems. Writing the thesis, during which I drew on discourses from a number of
disciplines, I struggled to get the right balance between my interpretations,
mediated by my own mental model, and discourse which might be written by
others with similar or very different mental models. I had to work out the extent
to which I should adjust my interpretation to the ‘narratives’ within these
discourses.

Gould suggests that social scientists’ approach to knowledge is differentiated by
their interest in “the contingent nature of knowledge and a desire to problematize
the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’ become constituted as knowledge and,
therefore, the basis for action” (Gould, 2007: 288). As the use of parenthesis
indicates, the word ‘fact’ is loaded with certainty and implied power; superior
levels of ‘knowledge’ are required to turn information into ‘fact’. Interpretivist
social science recognise that ‘facts’ are usually a matter of interpretation. By the
end of the thesis, I had concluded that it was important to distinguish clearly
between information, the catalyst for sharing mental models (cf. Denzau and
North), and ‘knowledge’. Taking up Gould’s point, I visualise problematising as
part of a process of knowledge production, but, because of my mental model
which has led me to regard development management as a normative
endeavour, I am wary that too much emphasis on problematising crowds out the
purposeful value of ‘information’. I therefore argue in Chapter 8 that discourse,
being a matter of interpretation, must consider the author(s)’ mental model; in
other words, I argue for greater reflexivity. This is clearly an acceptance of the
“contingent nature of knowledge”, but a mental models approach requires recognition of the role which culture, religion and ideology play in the construction of mental models.

In development, the term ‘Western’ applied to knowledge construction, values and political structures is used to denote a worldview developed largely as the result of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This research found that donor staff from three different countries which are normally included under the ‘Western’ umbrella had different values and practices, and each country had a dominant value which was observable in their development objectives: geopolitical stability, empathy and solidarity+knowledge. Using them as an example, and endorsing Craig and Porter’s identification of the New Aid Architecture with the ‘Third Way’ form of liberal democracy, I provide a schema (in Chapter 8) for normative development management to engage with culture and ideology to order to understand the mental models behind policy formulation. The ‘shared’ component of Denzau and North’s approach is the extent to which mental models rely on inductive reasoning or respond to information provided by another (mental model). The schema suggests that normative development management requires study of empathy, knowledge and belief systems but this needs to be grounded in ‘information’. Making the information explicit permits the analysis.

This chapter and Chapter 8 ‘top and tail’ the thesis by setting the broader context of the research, indicating the implications for a normative development management and thus for development policy. The chapters which follow gradually focus down to two chapters (6 and 7) containing the results of interviews with Ethiopian and donor respondents, before expanding again as the analysis deepens. I have included rather more ‘information’ in these two chapters than another author might have done. This was for three reasons. Firstly, I undertook the research and its analysis using a social actor perspective (Long, 2001), acknowledging individuals’ agency and strategies. The degree of heterogeneity and fluidity of the knowledge interface, from Long’s approach, is a key part of the analysis. Furthermore, my mental model leads me to value the role of the individual within society. Secondly, since the analysis was directed by my own mental model, and because my social science research training instilled the principle of validity, it was important to retain sufficient data to allow others’ to critique the analysis. The third reason is the role which the data has played in
developing the reflexivity which I learnt through engaging with the concept of ‘community’.

Back home in the UK writing the thesis, I engaged with my local ‘community’ in a way I had not really done since I was a child. I had interviewed over one hundred people in Ethiopia and the interviews have played like a videotape at the back of my mind as I have experienced Third Wayism at work, observing the dynamics of government-community interaction, the participatory space that it provides and the differing levels of agency which allow people to speak out as individuals or through their associational life, or not at all. I therefore owe a debt of gratitude to my Ethiopian respondents, and wanted to retain their input, rather than edit it out. It allowed me to realise that Third Wayism is being imposed on developing countries under the current orthodoxy, even though - in the UK at least - we, as citizens, are still working out the extent and implications for ourselves. With the donor respondents, too, I heard the difficulty that most of them had in equating their own value systems and sense of agency with the development policies formulated not just back at their agency headquarters but in the centres which devise and globalise development orthodoxies.

1.4.2 The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores current discourses about aid, participation and evaluation. The discussion of aid is presented in two parts: first, a review of development management as a field of study addressed by differing disciplinary discourses; and second, an exploration of the current aid orthodoxy, the NAA. A second strand of literature review (in Chapter 3) involves the identification of the key concepts which inform the analysis: a review of discourses about trust and motivation, leading to the selection of ‘shared mental models’ as the focus of the analytical framework. This leads on to a reflective review, as a non-anthropologist, of cultural analysis. Chapter 3 then discusses other influences on my own ontological perspective and my epistemology, and concludes by describing the research methods used and the logistics of fieldwork.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the contextual background to the research in Ethiopia. Chapter 4 is a review of the historical, anthropological and political science literature, includes a discussion of Ethiopia’s geopolitical importance
Chapter 1: Introduction

and provides a history of aid and donor-government relations, tracking the three donors’ aid trajectories. Chapter 5 provides information about Ethiopian institutions and explores the literature on customary practices of participation and evaluation. These two chapters provide the contextual background against which the findings of the fieldwork with Ethiopian government staff, local leaders and farmers, written up in Chapter 6, can be read. Subsection 1.4.1 reflected on the importance of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 7 starts with documentary analysis of the donors’ development values, and concepts of participation and evaluation, and goes on to present and analyse the interviews with national and international donor staff.

The literature review therefore covers several chapters. The logic of this is demonstrated in the range of intersects between the different domains of the research, illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.

![Diagram of Literature Review](image)

**Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic Illustration of the Literature Review**

Analysis of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7 is carried out alongside the findings, and assesses the actors’ agency, cultural repertoires and opportunities and mechanisms for acting strategically at the development interface. The two
Chapter 1: Introduction

chapters are linked around the themes of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity as arenas for dialogue.

Included in Chapter 6 is a brief comparison of the development values, associational life and customary forms of evaluation of Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam. This indicates that, despite the particularity of Ethiopia, of which it is proud, the forms of participation and evaluation found there are also apparent, to a greater or lesser extent, in the other two countries, particularly in Vietnam. Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the usefulness policy makers and to development management of taking a mental models approach, which uses culture and its institutions, and belief systems (religion and/or ideology) and its institutions, to anticipate learning options and outcomes. It advocates greater use of donor as well as recipient country comparison in assessing the trajectories of differential aid policies and development practice.
CHAPTER 2
AID AND ITS MANAGEMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews three sets of literature providing the discourse relevant to explore the role of participation in monitoring and evaluation within the complexity of the aid chain. The first section, 2.2, explores current discourses in development management, identifying its changing patterns and suggesting four main approaches to its study. Section 2.3 discusses the current aid orthodoxy, the ‘New Aid Architecture’, tracking its development and relating it to the global political economy. Discourses on evaluation and concepts of participation within monitoring and evaluation are discussed in 2.4; and changing norms of participation in aid discourse are reviewed in section 2.5.

2.2 AID AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT: CONGRUENT AND COMPETING DISCOURSES

Review of development management literature identifies overlapping discourses which come from different disciplinary traditions. This section starts (2.2.1) with a discursive exploration of the distinctive qualities claimed for development management, based on the conception of development as a ‘normative project’. The first of four ‘disciplinary’ discourses, the historical analysis of aid management (2.2.2), is a clearly defined field, closely related to patterns of aid funding, aid policy and their trajectories. The second discourse is development management as a subset of public sector management (2.2.3). The next two discourses share normative concerns about development management’s ‘managerialism’ but each claims a particular epistemological view. These are ethnographic studies of development management (2.2.4) and the application of Critical Management Studies to development management (2.2.5). The section ends with reflection on my own position within the discourse (2.2.6).
2.2.1 Development Management as a Normative Project

Development management discourse displays anxiety about its values and its role in management, hence discussion of its normative quality. Thomas describes development management as a contested field “with inherent ambiguities” (Thomas, 2007: 384) and some of these ambiguities are explored below. While there are various, evolving subsets of the development studies literature called ‘development management’, the subject is also an interest broadly shared by most individuals in the ‘aid industry’. The literature is fragmented by technical specialisms, each claiming a disciplinary-privileged perspective, so that, despite widespread cross-industry engagement with the management of development, “the international development community remains relatively stovepiped, and analysts and practitioners within one specialization tend not to talk much to those outside their area of expertise” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 995).

Figure 2.1 below conceptualises this diagrammatically, indicating that there is a general, normative interest within the development ‘industry’ in development management, occupied by several fields of discourse varying by the space which they occupy in the literature, and the level of their engagement with development management praxis.
Aid is distinguished from other types of government funding by being raised and macro-managed in one country and disbursed and meso- and micro-managed\(^1\) in another. The ‘aid chain’ is complex, running vertically from taxpayer in the donor country to intended beneficiary in the recipient country, and horizontally between donor governments, between donors and recipient governments and between recipient country structures, its institutions and citizens and their ‘expert advisers’. Ideological, political, cultural, socio-economic and demographic differences influence how transactions take place in cross-cultural encounters requiring “identification of anomalies, surprises and counter-intuitive observations that challenge received theory of ways of looking at the world” (Hood, 2005: 22), and the need to accept uncertainty, paradox and disjuncture (Uphoff, 1996: xii). Brinkerhoff claims that development management is inherently reflexive, with the result that “Development specialists have a history of disillusionment and self-criticism” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 356). Certainly, “[i]ntegral to the structure and performance of the industry is uncertainty about the nature and causes of underdevelopment, and the mechanisms by which development progresses” (Copestake, 2005: 55). As the industry constantly tries to ‘improve’ development practice and management, the issue is whether policies are - or should be - evidence-based, as donor rhetoric suggests, or are contingent on wider political and cultural processes. Lewis and Mosse suggest that policy follows practice, rather than forming it, therefore policy is an interpretation of practice (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 4). Watson, on the other hand, suggests that there are structural reasons why donors present development plans as ‘idealized’ and ‘optimistic’ rather than confront reasons for failure of the previous approach, particularly where there were political dimensions associated with the failure (Watson, 2003: 307).

For those who see development as an ‘inherent good’ (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 15), its management should be more value-driven than other forms of public administration. However, Thomas regards development management as “an ideal rather than a description of what takes place” (Thomas, 2000, quoted in Cooke, 2004: 612), implying that development management is not such an applied discipline as Brinkerhoff suggests. Some of the literature is provided by disheartened former senior employees of donor agencies, and from

\(^1\) Meso-managed via PRSPs and decentralisation; micro-managed by local government officials.
“academic/activist-consultants who have emerged from a pragmatic engagement with aid/development with more questions than answers” (Gould, 2004: 268).

From within ‘normative development’ discourse, Wilson reclaims professional ‘technocracy’ from its “pejorative label in contemporary development discourse” which is critical of ‘experts’ on the grounds that they lack local knowledge and are unreceptive to different worldviews (Wilson, 2006: 509). Drawing attention to the extent of expertise and empirical experience, Wilson notes that, rather than being “part of the problem” (ibid: 513), these experts offer the opportunity for ‘learning with’ in a “non-strategic, dialogic relationship between actors” for the purpose of joint knowledge creation rather than focusing on “strategic self-interests” (ibid: 517) as their critics imply.2

Alan Thomas’s three conceptions of development management are widely cited in the literature on values in development management. In the first, management in development related to management’s task of “long-term historical change”. Development as “deliberate efforts at progress” he called management of development. He subsequently took a different approach, defining development as progressive change which was the result of an orientation rather than a task. This orientation should “guide all activities of development organisations, not just specific development interventions”, acting as a form of both motivation and organisational compliance and making development management distinct from ‘conventional’ management, thus management for development (Thomas, 1999).

Latterly (2007), Thomas’s approach became more congruent with that of Brinkerhoff, discussing development management in terms of ‘values’. While Thomas’s three approaches to defining development management have provided a useful point of reference, his recent engagement with Brinkerhoff’s more deliberate focus on the political nature of development management appears to have led Thomas to a more ‘applied’ perspective, by reflecting on the legitimacy of value selection, in other words ‘whose values?’, on accountability (the efficacy of one’s own values and the values of others) and on the tension associated with conflicting values (Thomas, 2007: 386). He concludes that

---

2 Discourse on the role of the professional is discussed in 2.5.4
values, being deeply-held, cannot be imposed on others, and that exchange of ideas, “influencing, steering, negotiation, looking for common ground, and so on, are of more importance than trying to force agreement for the implementation of a rationally defined programme of action” (ibid: 387).

The current aid orthodoxy is based on liberal democratic values, including citizen participation via civil society structures and multiparty democracy (see 2.3 and 2.5.2). It places considerable emphasis on the normative role of ‘good governance’ but, as Brinkerhoff points out, good governance “is strongly mediated by the realities of interest group politics, patronage and conflict” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 988). McCourt agrees that development management must therefore engage with politics, despite its traditional separation (McCourt, 2001: 221), but this entails confronting values embedded in Western ideological positions and a willingness to consider alternative models including those drawn from indigenous management systems (ibid: 226).

2.2.2 Historical Analysis

Development management responds to changes in international public administration methods as well as aid ‘fashions’ (Hirschmann, 1999: 289). Each orthodoxy becomes obsolescent as changing political agendas and the discovery of new ‘scientific’ paradigms redefine ‘development’ (Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003: 15) in a “perpetual change for the better” for which there is often weak empirical evidence (Easterly, 2002: 234; Killick, 2004: 5).

Historical analysis of development management is the longest-running discourse and its review is necessarily abbreviated here. Historical analysis tends to divide aid funding into ‘epochs’ characterised by both forms of aid and objectives for aid. These can loosely be called aid orthodoxies, because of their presentation by international finance institutions (IFIs) and their leading proponents as being both universally applicable. The following summary draws on Turner and Hulme, 1997; Copestake, 2005; and Brinkerhoff, 2008, and Table 2.1 overleaf, summarised from Copestake (2005), conceptualises the orthodoxies in the form of a typology.
Table 2.1 - Simplified Conceptual Model of Post WWII Aid Orthodoxies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid orthodoxy</th>
<th>Theoretical framework</th>
<th>Normative framework</th>
<th>Operational framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive planning</strong></td>
<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Economic growth, aid as cold war patronage and ideological tool</td>
<td>5 year plans, turnkey projects and market intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projectized development</strong></td>
<td>‘Blue print’ project cycles</td>
<td>Basic needs approach</td>
<td>Integrated rural development projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural adjustment</strong></td>
<td>Neoclassical analysis</td>
<td>Fiscal weakness of the state inhibits growth</td>
<td>Program aid with conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy management</strong></td>
<td>Aid as contested arena for policy negotiation</td>
<td>International development targets; global ‘stability’</td>
<td>Process approaches, pooled funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Copestake, 2005: 71-73.

Comprehensive planning, based on modernisation theory and technical transfer, was expected to counteract the influence of the Soviet Union. During the 1950s/60s, the state was seen as the “primary development actor”, and donors paid little attention to corruption, in part because of the Cold War (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 986). Failure of confidence in the state's ability to achieve modernisation resulted in a shift to decentralised, donor-funded projects providing technical assistance via expert ‘change agents’ to effect knowledge transfer. Criticism of this methodology centred on weak long-term sustainability of project interventions, and the imposition of external forms of knowledge, undermining indigenous forms. A growing faith in the market under the developing neo-liberal agenda resulted in the next development ‘paradigm’\(^3\), structural adjustment, which further reduced the role of the state in development, and included donor demands for (mainly fiscal) policy reform reinforced by financial conditionality. This shift marked the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. What McCourt calls the Washington model of public management was “a cost-driven model of reform” (McCourt, 2001: 232). In the fourth and current ‘paradigm’, policy management, the state was rehabilitated as part of ‘the solution’, providing

---

\(^3\) I use the term ‘paradigm’ in its secondary meaning, a ‘sorting device’ (Hunt, 1989: 2).
sound economic policies, providing basic services and public goods in response to democratic accountability, hence ‘good governance’ (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 987). The move to policy management, concurrently with the rise of post-modernism, has attracted a much broader disciplinary discourse than the previous development strategies, which had been dominated by economists. The change in development focus from socio-economic improvement to ‘good governance’ through the imposition of policy reform and attitudinal change (through civil service reform and capacity building) suggested a universal order which hides the paradoxes and disjunctures in development practice.

This shifting of aid orthodoxies should compel development studies, and therefore development management, to be “a historical exercise” which takes into account contextual factors which dictate the path of development (Brett, 2000: 799). A purely historical review of aid’s orthodoxies is unable to supply this level of analysis, without including the antecedents of each orthodoxy and its application in different country contexts. The historical approach does, however, employ a degree of political analysis of donors’ ideological positions.

2.2.3 Development Management as Public Administration

Aid is managed as part of wider donor government administration, described by Brinkerhoff and Coston as development management’s ‘parent discipline’ (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 348). Development administration history closely reflect the evolution of development paradigms: during the period 1945-1979, it focused on restructuring and leading developing country public sector bureaucracies to undertake central planning, infrastructure, and economic management (Brinkeroff, 2008: 989), but during the 1980s and 1990s (the “state as problem” period), the emphasis shifted to policy management. The concurrent introduction of private sector management techniques into the public sector led to the re-labelling of development administration as ‘development management’ (ibid: 989). In the post-Cold War period and with the introduction of ‘third way’ politics in the West, development management expanded again to encompass the promotion of free and fair elections, third sector development and local accountability through community empowerment (Craig and Porter, 2004).
The introduction of private sector thinking to public sector management evolved into New Public Management (NPM). NPM is based on liberal-democratic principles of the reduction of the state and democratic accountability. Its “infinite reprogrammability” provides “an ‘apolitical’ framework within which many different values could be pursued effectively”, but which was susceptible to political interest groups (Hood, 1991: 3-8). Discourse tends to focus on the transfer of NPM to the South, but it should be noted that in Europe NPM is regarded as an Anglo-American formulation, which European countries have adopted selectively and which they interpret and implement differently.

Applied in development management, NPM permitted “a coming together of two seemingly irreconcilable positions. The view of the Right concerning the need to break down the power of powerful interest groups … have found their counterpart .. in the softer more socially responsive traditions associated with the championing of poverty-focused international aid.” (Brown, 1998: 133). It resonated with donors’ agendas for increased participation and with donors’ move from project to programme modality. NPM’s components (accountability, performance measurement, management by results) are observable in current development practice, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and their performance indicators; decentralisation; and community-funded welfare services. The incorporation of NPM into aid orthodoxy is clearly a challenge for development management, because it has narrowed the range of ‘acceptable’ aid modalities and limited the tools of assessing effectiveness of poverty reduction strategies (donors’ and governments’) to the use of aggregated data.

Despite donors’ emphasis on policy and civil service reform, “the analytical framework of the MDGs resembled a simplistic machine model that largely ignored institutional factors and governance” (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009: 2). When acting independently of each other, donors acknowledge that social groups in developing countries have differing expectations of the benefits of aid and different levels of power required to implement them, and may well reject

---

4 NPM was first instituted in the UK and New Zealand but subsequently adopted by many OECD countries (Hood, 1991: 3)
5 NPM is described as “the one-size-fits all managerial solution” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 351)
6 See Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Noordhoek and Saner, 2004; Barzelay and Füchtner, 2003; Politt et al., 2007.
new management and governance systems because they conflict with their own “values, systems and knowledge of their own society” (Brett, 2000: 799).

Increasing acknowledgement of such contextual factors among the donor community has resulted, at agency level, in the (limited) development and use of analytical techniques such as the Drivers of Change (DOC) approach but DOC analysis has had limited application because it assumes that change is incremental, requiring an extended time-frame, thus conflicting with donors’ rhetoric on aid (and consequent short time-frame) and threatens disbursement priorities (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009: 5-6).

Facing a dilemma between their own accountability and ceding control to recipients, donors ostensibly adopted process management which, theoretically, binds together policy and “iterative cycles of analysis and practice” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 357). This ‘evidence-based’ concept of process conflicts with the political nature of aid and political influences on its management, where the move to a “politically infused, multisectoral, multiorganizational model” requires “the integration of politics and culture into management improvement” (ibid: 348-349). Of the authors currently engaged in development management discourse, it appears to be those authors who approach development management from a public sector management perspective, such as McCourt and Brinkerhoff, who explicitly track ideological influences on development management practice.

McCourt argues that the MDGs’ renewed emphasis on improved public services led to increased interest among sector specialists in development management (McCourt, 2008: 472). The next subsection looks as the role of anthropologists in development management discourse.

2.2.4 Ethnographic Studies of Development Management

Anthropologists claim two characteristics of their approach to ethnography of development management. The first is that their critique is grounded in practice, conceiving development “as daily rout and relationships which cope with disjunctures” (Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003: 19), “setting aside self-representations of bureaucratic rationality in order to uncover more of the inner workings of development agencies” (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 3). The second characteristic claimed is a strong normative thread: “ethnographic enquiry is informed by moral issues embedded in practice as well as broader frames of
moral reflection” (Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003: 19). For Gould, anthropologists are better placed to assess development practice, firstly because they “often identify with the marginalized and disenfranchised”, and secondly because they “will often have a better understanding of the recipient’s social context than the development practitioner” (Gould, 2004: 276).

While a few anthropologists have drawn on the mainstream management literature, anthropologists’ main contribution has been the application of ethnographic methods to the study of development management. Labelled “aidnography” by Gould (Gould, 2004), these have focussed largely on the practices of the staff of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, in which anthropologists have been engaged as staff (see Eyben, ) or as sub-contractors (see Mosse and Lewis, 2004; Grammig, 2002).

A further thread within the ethnographic approach claims that disjunction between policy and practice is necessary to sustain active discourse, thus anthropologists position themselves as “antagonistic observers”, “characterized by critical distance and a basic hostility towards the ideas of development and the motives of those who seek to promote it.” (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 50, 6). As their critique is grounded in praxis, some anthropologists are concerned that, as “reluctant participants they are complicit in the management project” (ibid: 6). They share this concern with authors from Critical Management Studies (CMS).

2.2.5 Critical Management Studies

The engagement of anthropologists with ideas from mainstream management is soundly criticised by authors from critical management studies. Unlike “aidnography”, Critical Management Studies (CMS) is not grounded in practice but is “primarily, an academic phenomenon” which says “that there is something wrong with management, as a practice and as a body of knowledge” (Fournier and Grey, 2000: 12, 16). Its assumption of a ‘critical position’ means “CMS research is a relatively closed system” unable to engage with other management points of view (Schuurman, 2000: 11-12). Instead, reflexivity is conceptualised

---

7 Lewis et al. used organisational culture as a way of understanding how development organisations (inter)act (Lewis et al., 2003)
8 Aid ethnographers and CMS critique the ‘managerialisation’ of current aid orthodoxy.
within CMS as “perpetual critique” of own philosophy and methodology (ibid: 19).

In common with the ethnographical approaches to development management, the application of CMS to development management responded to the perceived managerialisation of aid orthodoxy during the 1990s. Dar and Cooke “believe there is something intrinsically wrong with the very idea of management and its applications in international development”, in particular the “amoral, virally pernicious, globalizing managerialism” of the current aid orthodoxy, centred on the PRSP process and policy reform, orchestrated by the World Bank (Dar and Cooke, 2008: 1, 5).

CMS rejects management’s assumption of performative intent, that is “inscribing knowledge within means-end calculation” (Fournier and Grey, 2000; Clegg et al., 2006: 19), and it mistrusts texts (Fournier and Grey, 2000: 19) so that “permanent critique, including a critique of any promesse de bonheur, is all we can do in the face of postmodernism, however painful this limitation may be.” (ibid: 21). The paradox of this situation, where permanent critique “effaces or appropriates the voices of those in the name of whom they claim to speak”, led to a debate whether CMS should engage constructively with applied management or whether this would lead to CMS becoming “just another ‘tool kit’ for managers” who would use it to increase their own legitimacy and domination (ibid: 24).

By engaging with ‘critical development studies’, Dar and Cooke claim that CMS can become “The New Development Management” (Dar and Cooke, 2008). Although they invoke Thomas’s ‘management for development’, their rejection on behalf of CMS of constructive engagement with management appears at odds with its normative intent.

### 2.2.6 Positioning within Development Management Discourse

### ‘Management’ and ‘Managerialism’

The preceding sections have noted both overlap and distinction between different disciplines. Although Brinkerhoff (2008: 991) commends the “theoretical eclecticism” of development management for its ability to “accommodate a large
variety of analytic occupants”, the problematic lack of a discrete domain for research which he identifies is exemplified by disjunctures in the vocabulary of development management.

The ethnographers and the CMS authors tend to conflate managerialism with management. McCourt describes this conflation as a ‘real problem’: he defines managerialism as “the belief that every political problem has a management solution, so that the means of management substitute for the ends of policy”, hence the uncritical adoption of some private sector management models into development orthodoxy (McCourt, 2001: 222). The emphasis on indicators under the current orthodoxy “allows efficiency to become an end in itself” and thus ‘managerialist’ (ibid: 238).

Another aspect of the discourse on managerialism is the confusion apparent between the use of ‘political’ and ‘technorational’ as descriptors of development management. Brinkerhoff sees development management as shifting away from bureaucratic ‘technorational’ management to a “politically-infused, multisectoral, multiorganisational model” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 348), while Lewis, following Craig and Porter (2003), regards the same process as a shift from a focus on poverty reduction (therefore, political) to a technorational model based on the MDGs, PRSPs and budget support (Lewis, 2008: 53). I have used Brinkerhoff’s descriptors in this thesis.

**Reflection on development management discourse**

The brief review of the four current discourses in development management raises several issues. Apart from arguing NPM is part of a neoliberal agenda, the literatures tend to avoid engagement with the role of different bilateral donor governments in its formulation or its alternatives. By focusing on specific organisations, either particular bilateral donor agencies or more frequently the World Bank, attention is deflected from the donor government’s political objectives and policies. Another concern is the tension between the ‘uncertainty’ of development practice and the disciplinary ‘moral high ground’ found within the literature, “generat[ing] endless and competing versions of virtuous prescriptions for social betterment” (Gould, 2007: 271), where degree of normative-ness,

---

9 Mosse goes further, by describing “a new managerialism in international development” as the conceptual tool of “the new institutional economics” (Mosse, 2005b: 5).
critical-ness or emic-ness affords the holder an apparently privileged grasp of the problem, though not necessarily the solution. Development management has to contend with a (post-development) critique which “is an anti-authoritarian sensibility, an aversion to control” where “there is critique but no construction” (Pieterse, 1998: 366).

There are, however, an increasing number of calls for greater reflexivity. Among these, Pieterse suggests that development management’s ‘uncertainty’ is both an expression of, and an opportunity for, reflexivity “in a social and political sense, as a participatory, popular reflexivity, which can take the form of broad social debates and fora on development goals and methods” (ibid: 369, italics in the original). Craig and Porter advise those working in development “to be frank and blunt about the limited political and economic outcomes of their own institutionalized doctrine and practice” and consequent accountabilities (Craig and Porter, 2006: 274). In the afterword to *The New Development Management*, Escobar draws in the ethnographic and critical studies approaches to support Gibson-Graham’s call for an “ethical and political development”, one which would meet, for example, “local needs more directly, using the surplus to strengthen communities; recognizing consumption as a viable route for development; … and acknowledging the interdependence of people, nature, things and knowledge” (Escobar, 2008: 202). Bebbington also calls for a more constructive approach\(^\text{10}\) to development studies by re-grounding discourse in development practice. He singles out Cornwall’s “refreshing humanist edge” (Bebbington, 2004: 281) which provides a reminder (to donors and to ‘brokers’) that citizens “shape their own conditions of engagement and find and use their own voice” outside the participatory spaces created for them (Cornwall, 2004: 85).

The discourse which identifies development management as a sub-set of public sector management, thereby acknowledging the political drivers of both management techniques and development policy, has the greatest resonance with my own experience. Its starting point, that development management is an applied discipline orientated by values, is far more ontologically rewarding than the CMS approach which eschews constructive engagement with management. I concur with Brinkerhoff that development management is “an applied discipline

\(^{10}\) Recalling an admonition that “you do what you can” (Bebbington, 2004: 278)
with permeable boundaries, [which] draws on a mix of analytic intellectual and practical tools” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 990). Normative development management is therefore a constructive (purposeful) endeavour - management for development. The ethnographic approach offers the opportunity to study, from within, the transactions of those engaged in the aid chain, as donors, recipients or development professionals, and is one which I have used methodologically in this research.

2.3 THE NEW AID ARCHITECTURE

2.3.1 Introduction

Section 2.2.2 provided a list of aid orthodoxies which have been applied by the international community since the 1950s. This section explores discourse on the current orthodoxy, known as the New Aid Architecture (Farrington and Lomax, 2001: 533), locating it within the current global political economy.

2.3.2 Development of the NAA

The development of the NAA arose, as its predecessors had done, from disillusionment about the previous model, structural adjustment linked to economic conditionality. In 1996, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD published a document ‘Shaping the 21st Century’, setting out the agenda for the new orthodoxy, which it introduces under a heading ‘Values and Interests’. Labelling the document in millennial terms, it takes a multilateralist approach and identifies the ‘international community’s’ concerns as creating opportunities for poor nations to participate in the global economy, and reducing conflict and bad governance. The document then sets out the targets for international development, which became the MDGs. The language used does not reflect a particularly strong moral argument for reducing poverty, although humanitarian need is mentioned as one of three motives, along with [donors’] enlightened self-interest, and solidarity to take global issues (at this stage, 1996, the list of global issues does not contain ‘security’). The document speaks about a ‘vision of progress’ in which poor countries could have “profound influence in shaping the 21st century” (OECD-DAC, 1996: 3, 5). This included ‘A Stronger Compact for Effective Partnerships’ where “each developing country and its
people are ultimately responsible for their own development” (OECD-DAC, 1996: 5).

**The principles of the New Aid Architecture**

The main components of the NAA are: debt relief, the formulation of a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) from which a PRSP is formulated in consultation with civil society and donors; and civil service reform. This is translated into donor practice as harmonisation of donor programmes, alignment of donors’ financial management systems with government systems, and conceptualising the relationship between donor and recipient as one of ‘partnership’, and thence ‘ownership’.

**Funding structures and aid modalities**

The first stage in developing the structure was the World Bank’s concept of the CDF, a “single, overarching development strategy for a given Third World country, to which individual first World nation development agencies contribute” (Cooke, 2004: 613). The next step for a country to obtain loans from the World Bank and IMF is to prepare a “satisfactory” PRSP, in consultation with civil society, NGOs, and other donors and creditors” (Easterly, 2002: 223).

The PRSP is based on the idea of policy reform, ostensibly to meet agreed MDG targets, but assumptions are made about the link between administrative and fiscal reforms including reform and poverty reduction, because: “policy conditionality is intended to improve the policy environment and hence aid effectiveness” (Killick, 2004: 21). Although Shaping the 21st Century and the OECD-DAC documents on harmonisation and aid effectiveness do not preclude other lending modalities, direct budget support (DBS) and programme aid is described as ‘the way forward’ (OECD-DAC 1996, OECD, 2005e: 13). Thus, the NAA allowed donors to continue changing their dominant funding modality from projects to programmes. Killick notes that although the move to programme aid was justified on grounds which included “stronger influence on the policy environment, superior ownership properties, greater overall coherence”, the root reason was the belief that programme aid had lower transaction costs than project aid (Killick, 2004: 18). This reason, however, is usually hidden behind claims for increased ownership. Where it is expressed, as in the Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003), it is in terms of lower transaction costs for
recipient governments’ management and financial systems. However, as Killick points out, “the concept of transaction costs is being used to justify really large changes in the modalities of aid” (ibid, 2004: 21).

**Ownership, alignment and harmonisation**

Ownership, alignment and harmonisation are specified both as the route to aid effectiveness, and as the way by which effectiveness could be monitored. The OECD-DAC says very little about the meaning of ‘ownership’, other than to use the number of countries with PRSPs as an indicator of its progress. *Shaping the 21st Century* talks more about ‘responsibility’ as being the basis for partnership (OECD, 1996: 14), sharpened in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) to a commitment from recipient governments to ‘exercise effective leadership’ of their development strategies.

Academic commentators tend to argue that ‘ownership’ is necessarily rhetorical, firstly, because imbalance of resources (and therefore power) between donor and recipient country makes it difficult for donors to cede ownership, even if it was in their interests to do so; and secondly, because demands for accountability from donors’ domestic principals limits ownership unless donor and recipient share congruent values and balanced incentives. The logic of the NAA requires donors to use the PRSP as a planning and control document for their own aid strategy. Similar rhetoric surrounds partnership, “an aspiration, not a fact” (Booth et al., 2005: 4). Concepts of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ are built around Western concepts, “rules, ways of working and attitudes which reflect donor convenience and donor power” (Hubbard, 2005: 367). Thus, "PRSPs remain steadfastly part of the neo-liberal agenda and are simply a new ‘technical framework’; which does not address uneven power relations within countries and between them and donors." (Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 161).

The Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003) included a greater role for the OECD-DAC and the European Union, coordination with regional bodies such as the World Bank’s Strategic Partnership for Africa as well as country-level coordination mechanisms (OECD, 2005e: 37). Harmonisation therefore takes place between donors at international, regional and country level, encouraging ‘collusion’ between donors and potentially reducing a recipient government’s room for manoeuvre (Easterly, 2002). On the other hand, donors have different
objectives so that “the more astute [recipients] may be able to manoeuvre between different donors, wholly satisfying none” (Burnell, 1997a: 119).

Although the NAA’s main justification was the reduction of recipient’s transaction costs, donors anticipated that programme aid would lower their own transaction costs. However, dialogue with government and other donors increased staff inputs. Transaction costs included loss of contextual knowledge through reduced contact with ministries and local level engagement (Killick, 2004: 21-22), the need to resolve conflicting values and norms, and negotiate consensus (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 355).

Measuring Effectiveness

Although the NAA exerts pressure on donors to work as a single community (through ‘harmonisation’) and to create a “single design solution”11, seeing the NAA as a tidy centripetal system in which donors act ‘as one’ ignores the multiple centrifugal forces of national politics, institutions, culture and values. These forces also affect donors’ approaches to participation and to monitoring and evaluation, in their own strategies and in their engagement with recipient governments. The OECD-DAC aid effectiveness guidelines include “managing for, not by, results” (OECD, 2005e: 114). As both donors and recipients were to use Results Based Management (RBM), it implied they could ‘learn together’ (Eyben, 2006: 12).

The concept of ‘ownership’ placed the responsibility for the effectiveness of the donors’ change of practice on the recipient government, rather than on the donor (Hubbard, 2005: 369). Government performance on poverty reduction was to be monitored via a policy matrix attached to the PRSP, an Annual Progress Review (APR) and Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs). It was also to be monitored by citizens, directly through civil society involvement in the PRSP process, and indirectly through the ballot box. Consultation has been key component of donor rhetoric around ownership and partnership (Gould, 2006: 82), and thus participation could be ‘scaled-up’ to national policy making (Booth, 2005: 4). The use of civil society to monitor government performance against the PRSP is supposed “to elicit greater commitment to equitable and efficient

11 World Bank (2004), Public Sector Capacity Building Programme, Ethiopia - PID
development policy by obliging governments to debate their policies openly with other actors in their countries” (*ibid*: 1).

The OECD-DAC uses five aspects of the NAA as performance indicators to judge donors’ aid effectiveness and monitor the MDGs: the extent of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability ('mutual assessments of progress') (OECD, 2005f: 2). The percentage of programme aid was to be an indicator of the use of common procedures, and the percentage of joint field missions and diagnostic reviews as an indicator of shared analysis (*ibid*). Although “aid alignment is not an end in itself but a means to an end” (Booth *et al.*, 2005: 1), the effectiveness of the NAA was to be assessed by the extent of its components, not their impact.

Although the NAA was adopted without ensuring in advance that the recipient government had the requisite skills and capacity (Hubbard, 2005: 365, 369), weak capacity could also be found among donor staff. High turnover, lack of country knowledge and perverse incentives such as disbursement pressure and “constant pressure for change” contribute to a lack of organisational learning and dearth of donor staff with broad-based experience (Conyers and Mellors, 2005: 87).

Other critiques of the NAA note donors’ disregard for implementation constraints of PRSPs, whether financial, infrastructural, skills, corruption or political interference (Farrington and Lomax, 2001: 541); unrealistic assumptions about the link between administrative and fiscal reform and poverty reduction (Killick, 2004: 21); the NAA is a “one size fits all” orthodoxy, a “hegemonic vision of the world” (Eyben, 2006: 15). Donors’ political interference in policy formulation damages the ability of local people to hold government to account. Rather than improving coordination and accountability between government and citizens, there are “vast tracts of the nominal state apparatus and of the political realm in general that remain relatively disconnected from this configuration of powers” (Gould, 2006: 92).

Craig and Porter, who characterise the current orthodoxy as neo-liberal institutionalism, comment that the international community has “not been able to

---

12 PRSPs are “worth a try” (Booth *et al.*, 2005: 2).
apply institutional discipline effectively either to its own processes, or to those of many governments it engages”, nor to withstand the appropriation of its new institutional arrangements by “ensconced territorial interests”. (Craig and Porter, 2006: 13-14). This appropriation means that good governance is “mediated by the realities of interest group politics, patronage and conflict” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 988), and its institutions have increased, rather than diminished, the power of governments which the West would classify as authoritarian (Craig and Porter, 2006: 249, 251).

2.3.3 The NAA and the Global Political Economy

Section 2.2 discussed briefly the historic influence of the global political economy on donors’ aid strategies. The key document in the formulation of the New Aid Architecture, *Shaping the 21st Century*, did not include ‘security’ as one of the objectives of aid.\(^\text{13}\) For some time, the international community has paid particular attention to conflict in developing countries, identifying various categories such as ‘fragile states’, and ‘low income countries, unstable states’. Because of their geopolitical strategic importance or previous colonial links, some low and medium income countries in Africa receive higher levels of funding than those with “limited strategic, security and commercial interest” (OPM: 21-22).

The events of 11th September 2001, and the consequent conflicts now referred to as ‘the war on terror’ have been reflected in increased levels of donor funding for security reform in recipient countries, in addition to increased military spending; with security at the forefront of the international agenda, some regimes in Africa were able to ‘downplay issues of governance’, shift dialogue away from ‘soft’ security (welfare), to ‘hard’ security. Cold-war partnerships with dictatorial regimes were revived; and local opposition groups were suppressed as ‘terrorists’ (OECD, 2005f: 63).

The NAA is both a product of the global political economy, and a contributor to it. Maxwell notes that the UN’s Millennium Declaration, from which the MDGs proceeded, included a “commitment to peace, security and the rule of law” (Maxwell, 2005: 3). While this said “there is more to poverty than lack of

\(^\text{13}\) Others included trade, humanitarian concern, and mitigation of “external threats”, including migration, terrorism and HIV/AIDS.
income”, it was also an acknowledgement that “security concerns may swamp development and humanitarian concerns, especially in the EU and the US” (ibid: 4). Abrahamsen argues that, behind the presentation of development as a humanitarian issue, “lurks a certain fear of poverty and the poor” (Abrahamsen, 2000: 17).

2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

2.4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation within the NAA

The NAA challenges monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in a number of ways. Firstly, it requires donors to undertake joint evaluations, although donors have different objectives. The logic of harmonisation precludes independence, and the need for compromise will necessitate some donors lowering their evaluation standards. Secondly, the NAA includes ‘products’ such as ‘governance’, which are difficult to measure, not least because of imprecision and shifts in meaning and purpose (Cracknell, 2000: 270). NPM tools such as performance targets, which are included in the PRSP policy matrix, “specify what organizations are to produce without detailing how they are to do it” and are too ‘rudimentary’ to measure the qualitative nature of, for example, participation (Brodkin, 2008: 323-324). Thirdly, PRSP monitoring systems are confused and imprecise, due in part to donors’ desire to ‘demonstrate’ that their policies worked, rather than to establish chains of causality (Lucas et al., 2004: 31).

PRSP monitoring aggregates data, but “there is general agreement that disaggregation is in principle intrinsically beneficial” (ibid, 2004: 31). Donors intended PRSP monitoring to provide feedback to citizens as well as satisfying donors’ own aid management requirements. However, as well as failing to provide disaggregated, and therefore contextual, data, this form of monitoring may have no validity as far as indigenous concepts of accountability are concerned, let alone be a practical means of holding government to account.
2.4.2 Historical Development of Aid Evaluation

Uncertainty about aid itself is mirrored in critiques of evaluation practice\(^{14}\). These include concern about its quality: “widespread unease about the uneven quality of evaluation products and the limited use of evaluation” (Picciotto, 2003a: 1); and its purpose: “the link between policy evaluation and policy action is often quite weak or entirely missing” (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 305).

As with aid orthodoxy, aid evaluation has an epochal quality, although the epochs are not concurrent. Rebien and Cracknell both present a four-phase, semi-chronological typology. *Phase One* (1960s and 1970s) was positivist and instrumentalist in approach, and it was assumed that evaluation results fed into policy (Rebien, 1996: 19-22); the OECD DAC became a leading force in the development of aid evaluation (Cracknell, 2000: 43). In *Phase Two* (mid 1970s to mid-1980s), responding to aid reduction following the 1973 oil crisis, emphasis shifted from rate of disbursement to effectiveness, with increased resources being made available for evaluation (*ibid*: 44). *Phase Three* (from mid-1980s to the end of the decade) was characterised by concern about the effectiveness of aid and the apparent lack of evaluation to contribute to ‘better’ development. Evaluation methods ceased to be prescriptive, and became context-sensitive and pragmatic as regards time, cost and purpose (Rebien, 1996: 34). The logical framework, and similar, formalised methods of evaluation, received critical appraisal, and PRA was introduced into evaluation practice. Rebien and Cracknell’s *Phase Four* (‘Evaluation at the Crossroads’, 1988 to the present\(^{15}\)) notes that, in addition to increasing demand for (or rhetoric about) the use of participatory methods, changes in development practice further blurred the uncertainties surrounding the practice and purpose of evaluation, specifically the relationship between participation and accountability (Cracknell, 2000: 48).

The tenets of NAA sever the direct relationship between individual donors and intended beneficiaries and, while there is an emerging literature on NAA monitoring, there is as yet no literature on its effect on evaluation; instead, there is comment on the lack of evaluation (Booth and Lucas, 2002: v; Holvoet and Renard, 2007: 77).

---

\(^{14}\) Critics of evaluation practice notably include former heads of donor evaluation units, such as Picciotto (World Bank) and Cracknell (DFID).

\(^{15}\) The ‘present’ being the date of Cracknell’s publication, 2000.
2.4.3 The Purposes of Evaluation

The two most frequently stated purposes of evaluation are accountability ('whether aid is successful') and lesson learning ('why aid is successful'), though some authors suggest that these objectives are broadly incompatible (Cracknell, 2000: 55, Rebien, 1996: 52).

**Accountability**

Accountability concerns not only accepting responsibility for spending taxpayers’ money, but ‘accounting for’ aid effectiveness (Davies, 2003: 3). However, this rhetorical link is hard to identify in practice. Donor staff are thought to avoid commissioning evaluations, due either to disbursement pressure (Carlsson, 1994: 177), or to the difficulties of project management (Cracknell, 2000: 184). The amounts that agencies invest in evaluation “do not correspond to the importance and emphasis that agencies assign to evaluation at a rhetorical level” (*ibid*: 88). Rather, the determining factor for investment in evaluation is the agency’s organisational culture (*ibid*: 181). Whereas accountability used to be interpreted as ‘regularity’, in both attendance and compliance with set working patterns (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 122-123), NPM links accountability to the idea of performance management. The shift to policy and programme aid has made monitoring more difficult, because of the greater intangibility of the objectives (Martens, 2002a: 17, 28). The NAA further distances individual donor staff, and the agency itself, from the (in)effectiveness of their performance, redirecting accountability to recipient governments as the ‘owners’ of development.

**Lesson Learning**

Despite donors’ rhetoric about the importance of organisational learning, the literature suggests that it is limited in practice. While performance management should directly influence objectives and policy (Roberts, 2003: 1), Picciotto suggests that it is the lack of information that allows adoption of aid ‘fashions’, the antidote to which would be improved information flows (Picciotto, 2003b:

---

16 Performance management consists of, *inter alia*, assessment of past results relative to targets, identification of areas of under-performance, diagnosis of the causes of poor performance and either remedial measures and/or the amendment of targets (Roberts, 2003: 5)
Evaluation reports make no contribution to policy formulation (Cracknell, 2000: 188), so the challenge for effective monitoring and evaluation systems is “not only the supply of information .. but more importantly the [policy makers’] demand for lessons learnt about the effect of earlier policies.” (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 305).\(^{17}\)

Carlsson suggests that aid strategies are usually decided “not by reference to sophisticated analysis, but through the use of experience and knowledge.” (Carlsson, 1994: 180), but high staff turnover and dynamic change in orthodoxies reduce this likelihood. According to Cracknell, evaluations have little impact on policy because they emphasise technical objectives and fail to take into account political goals (Cracknell, 2000: 184).

**Political purposes**

Given that development interventions have multiple objectives, it is not surprising that its actors seek a variety of different outcomes from evaluation. Evaluation is intrinsically political because it explores questions of legitimacy and questions the quality of both policy and strategy (Carlsson, 1994: 176). The political will to amend policy depends on the incentives for politicians, and policy-makers and politicians are unlikely to utilise evaluations unless institutions are present which protect them from negative conclusions (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 305, 311).

For donor agencies, evaluation has a range of internal political purposes. In addition to being “an instrument of transparency and control, accountability, … and institutional learning”, evaluations have a legitimizing or ‘marketing’ purpose, “meant to ‘prove’ the aid organization’s successful work to the general public.” (Michaelowa and Bormann, 2006: 313). The agency may also be competing for funding and political position within government, and use evaluations for this purpose (Cracknell, 2000: 184).

Under the NAA, aid is believed to be more effective if donors harmonise and align their objectives and procedures with those of the recipient government. If “achieving shared objectives among group members is a prerequisite for

\(^{17}\) This discourse is the opposite of that provided by Mosse and Lewis (2006: 4), who suggest that policy follows practice, rather than forming it.
effective collective action” (Picciotto, 2003a: 5), disagreements over the objectives or results of evaluations must require a degree of compromise over evaluation criteria, for harmonisation to be achieved. Fear of being accused of ingratitude or of jeopardising future aid flows may deter (potentially aligned) governments from evaluating donors’ “gifts” of aid (Carlsson, 1994: 184). Because development is only one objective of aid, other strategic considerations “may introduce a race to the bottom as donors lower their standards for foreign policy reasons” (Sida, 2002b: 17).

**Participation in Evaluation as an Empowering Process**

Although the process of evaluation can be an exercise in ‘power’ where “[t]he culture of accountability and attribution breeds fear of retribution” (Earle, 2002: 11), there is also a literature, often closely linked with that on participatory monitoring and evaluation (see 2.4.5), linking evaluation with empowerment in two ways. It was seen as a right, for example the assertion that “all stakeholders put at risk in an evaluation have the right to place their claims, concerns and issues on the table for consideration, irrespective of the value system to which they adhere” (Carlsson, 1999: 16). It was also regarded as a tool for effectiveness: “a way of building ownership, since it puts local stakeholders in charge, helps develop skills, and demonstrates that their views count” (Blackburn et al., 1999: 17). However, participatory approaches shift responsibility for international development strategies away from donors to ‘the participants’ (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001: 183). When donors are prepared to insist on and respond to community evaluation, power asymmetries often preclude this ideal. The stronger the power of local elites, the weaker the incentive to institute M&E, and in “political regimes where such positive incentives [to share information] are weak, M&E information is often used as a mechanism to exert top-down control, monitor and restrain their agents.” Such power asymmetries require more than “[t]he mere creation or modification of the rules” to change patterns of behaviour (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 310, 308). Donors’ attempts to use civil society organisations (CSOs) as proxies have not yet addressed these questions of power and legitimacy (Lucas et al., 2004: 14-15).
2.4.4 Critical Approaches to the Concept of Evaluation

Technical criticisms of monitoring and evaluation have claimed that it: (i) is costly and ineffective, (ii) does not involve or benefit intended beneficiaries, (iii) is increasingly specialised and controlled by outsiders, (iv) is used as a tool of control, and that (v) quantitative data is used, rather than qualitative data which would be more sensitive for measuring change (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 15). These criticisms have not led to refinement of those methods, but have been sidestepped by a shift in preferred modality towards programme aid and demands for policy change in recipient countries.

Another key methodological question surrounding evaluation has been the extent to which evaluation could, or should, be ‘independent’. Cracknell advocated mixed teams of internal and external evaluators, so that reports are “geared closely to the agency’s operational needs” while retaining ‘scope’ for impartiality (Cracknell, 2000: 80-81). However, the use of consultant evaluators does not guarantee independence (Picciotto, 2003b: 233) and risks principal-agent problems. Other questions of independence arise in evaluation: it is a social process, in which team members negotiate the construction of ‘the truth’, the evaluation report (Wood, 1998: 61-62), and an organisational tool which donors use to “confirm self-fulfilling prophecies about viability” (Mosse, 2005: 3-4).

The rise of social development and participatory approaches in the 1980s resulted in the increased use of qualitative methods and debate about the requirement for, let alone the possibility of, ‘objectivity’ within evaluation. Economists have historically dominated aid evaluation with use of quantitative methods. Their claims for objectivity, independence and ‘methodological rigour’ faced increasing criticism of conventional monitoring methods centred around their lack of responsiveness to real life contexts (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 16).

A further area of concern has been ‘mechanistic’ monitoring. Logical framework analysis (LFA), setting out purpose, indicators, intended outcome, risks and assumptions relating to each goal, was originally devised as a planning tool (Earle, 2002: 1). Although it should be used adaptively, critics of LFA argue that its ‘inherent’ inflexibility precludes responsiveness to unforeseen events and
socio-cultural factors (*ibid*: 6-7). Despite variations in its use, donors retain the LFA to evaluate projects and programmes and its format has been adapted for use as the policy matrix attached to PRSPs and in RBM (Gasper, 2003: 9).

### 2.4.5 Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation

The adoption of participatory monitoring reflected the intention that development intervention should be an iterative process, adaptable to “socio-cultural, economic, political and institutional contexts”, where evaluation is perceived as “a social process for negotiating between people’s different needs, expectations, and world-views” (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 26, 24). The ‘purist’ view of participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) is one where “stakeholders are involved in the design, data collection, analysis and use of phases of the evaluation” (Rebien, 1996: 5), but Estrella and Gaventa found no documented incidence of PM&E “occurring solely at the village or community level” in the literature. In their view, the extent to which an evaluation could be described as ‘participatory’ should be judged by identifying who initiates and conducts it, and “whose perspectives are particularly emphasised” (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 21, 17). Rebien believes “evaluator and evaluatee are locked together and influence each other in a way which implies that they construct or create evaluation findings together.” (Rebien, 1996: 66). This accords with Guba and Lincoln’s “fourth generation” evaluation, in which constructions (not facts) are “the realities of the case”, and where “everything is value-laden and evaluators cannot avoid having to take different value positions into account.” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, quoted in Cracknell, 2000: 332).

The question of who legitimately facilitates PM&E highlights the potential dilemma between partnership, ownership and forms of contract (Blackburn *et al.*, 1999: 6-7, 9). PM&E presumes that information is publicly available and could compromise the power of ruling elites (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 309). Donors currently depend to a large extent on CSOs to monitor the PRSP on behalf of the wider public, to triangulate government data. Although the reason presented is increased democratic legitimacy, “in many African countries [CSOs’] social base is narrow and often urban, cosmopolitan and professional” and their role in monitoring the PRSP process ignores “a lack of clarity about the nature of their engagement …[which] is too often viewed as consensual and apolitical” (Lucas *et al.*, 2004: 18, 13-14).
Writing in 2000 and noting a large gap between rhetoric and reality in donors’ practice of participatory evaluation, Cracknell observed a recent backlash against the participatory approach, suggesting it was related to critiques of Chambers’ work which regarded “the participatory approach as a new kind of tyranny” (Cracknell, 2000: 178). The PM&E literature declined from the early 2000s, as participation in monitoring and evaluation was reworked in donor policy as civil society monitoring of the PRSP and recipient governments were pressured to include local citizens in planning, implementation and evaluation of programme aid funded development activities. Concurrently, the increasing tendency by donors to channel project-type aid through international NGOs necessitated the NGOs changing their own monitoring structures, aligning them to donors’ systems.

2.5 CHANGING NORMS OF PARTICIPATION

2.5.1 Introduction

Discourse on participation is wide-ranging, multidisciplinary and contested. No conclusive definition of ‘participation’ can be offered, because its meaning has been reworked so often by authors from different epistemological and political standpoints. Its ambiguity allows it to be used to conform to changing vogues in development practice (White, 1996: 7-8). Eyben and Ladbury use World Bank’s Popular Participation Learning Group (1991) definition of participation: “a process whereby those with legitimate interests in a project influence decisions which affect them.” (Eyben and Ladbury, 1995: 192); and Hickey and Mohan offer: “Participation essentially concerns the exercise of popular agency in relation to development” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004b: 3). Academic discourse therefore tends towards a normative conception of participation as the exercise of individual agency. The NAA, in contrast, conceives participation as a collective exercise; the individual exercises agency through multi-party democracy, but cedes authority to CSOs when civil society acts as a proxy for the wider public, as in the PRSP process.

19 Non-government organisations (NGO); international NGO (INGO)
This section starts by focusing on participation from a starting point of its intended role under the NAA (2.5.2), via PRSPs, governance and the role of civil society. Discussion of NGOs' legitimacy as the voice of rural communities bridges ‘civil society’ to 2.5.3, which discusses local forms of participation, including African forms of participation. In 2.5.4, discussion of the role of professionals includes reference to the debate emanating from Chambers’ work and on the role of professionals as facilitators and brokers. This broadens into discussion of the role of voice, agency and ‘transformation’. Finally, in 2.5.5, I discuss participation as ‘transaction’ and introduce Cornwall's participatory “space” as a means for conceptualising participation in the aid chain.

2.5.2 The Role of Participation within the NAA

Donor interest in civil society, and its incorporation into the NAA, stems from “the global dominance of neo-liberal ideologies” (Lewis, 2002: 571). Participation is structured into the NAA as ‘good governance’, meaning - under this agenda\(^\text{20}\) - holding government to account through two routes: by the adoption of liberal democracy and through civil society assessment of government policy and performance. Under the NAA, participation “is not primarily a way of using local knowledge, but of using aid to transfer external values and systems to people who would not otherwise have adopted them of their own accord” (Brett, 2003: 15).

By the time *Shaping the 21st Century* was published (1996), the adoption of liberal democracy was no longer regarded by donors as merely an outcome of development, but “a necessary condition of development”, which “can be inserted and instituted at almost any stage in the developmental process of any society”, irrespective of social structures or economic and political conditions (Leftwich, 1996: 4, 17). This “naïve” assumption also ignores evidence that “successful development” is more likely to depend, *inter alia*, on economic markets, on competent, relatively incorrupt administration; and “on a critical minimum degree of consensus between groups and regions about the objectives of growth and the rules of the game for achieving it”, rather than whether the regime is democratic (*ibid*: 19-20).

\(^{20}\) Under some donors’ agendas, ‘good governance’ can refer to legislative reform, financial management. CIDA is an example.
Introduced concurrently with the NAA, decentralisation was envisaged by donors as an arena for political education leading to improved democracy, an expectation shaped by experience in their own countries (Lister and Betley, 1999: 16). Review of developing country decentralisation experience indicated that the expected democratic benefits were contingent on the local context. Where there was a well-developed civil society, decentralisation did indeed invigorate public engagement (Kulipossa, 2004: 468-469) but, where civil society was weak and central government was strong, decentralisation permitted ruling parties to increase central power. In Tanzania under African socialism in the 1960s/70s, this was achieved by central government officials and party leaders moving to regions (Mamdani, 1996: 175). Where central government was weak, as in Benin, rather than improving local democracy, decentralisation increased local rent-seeking; by extending both opportunity and adding administrative levels, decentralisation reinforced the pre-existing political mechanisms, thus consolidating the power of the dominant party (Bierschenk, 2006: 568).

The incorporation of ‘participation’ “is one of the crucial dimensions differentiating the PRSP from previous generations of aid instruments” (Brown, 2004: 238) but the instrumental use of ‘civil society’ to hold government to account “effectively short-circuit[s] the establishment of more participatory forms of governance” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 160), with depoliticising effect (Harriss et al., 2004: 7-8). Although citizens’ access to information to monitor compliance, and their ability to use it, is limited, and “users may well prefer to ‘hand over their participatory rights to professions; thereby saving themselves time, energy and, in some instances, conflict” (Brett, 2003: 13-14), discourse also recognises that CSOs may not be able (or willing) to represent the interests of rural communities, “since they too are bureaucratised, politicised and staffed by indigenous elites” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 254).

Under the ‘social liberalism’ of the NAA (Craig and Porter, 2004), the term ‘civil society’ has greater use for donors’ conception of state relations than it has any meaning for poor people (Eyben and Ferguson, 2004: 168). For them, ‘civil society’ is effectively “associational life outside the state” (Johnson and Wilson, 2000: 1891; Lewis, 2002: 570). The term implies homogeneity, whereas different groups have “different interests, values and concerns, and potentially different stocks of social capital” (Johnson and Wilson, 2000: 1893). Under the NAA, CSOs are given the role of “brokers for the poor” (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 63).
because they are assumed to be ‘more efficient’ and ‘apolitical’ (Waddington and Mohan, 2004: 228). Critics of this approach suggest that CSOs are “bureaucratic, politicised and staffed by indigenous elites” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 254), tend to be urban-based and “may lack a democratic mandate” (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 63) for the role which donors expect them to play.

Donors' intervention in civil society tends to focus on funding NGOs involved in advocacy and raising awareness of democratic processes. In Western liberal democracies, focus is placed on the individual as an ‘active’ citizen who may chose to join an interest group, political party or community organisation, thus seeking “to fulfil themselves as free individuals” (Rose, 1999: 166). Whereas ‘community’ has been a widely used, if often undifferentiated, term in international development to describe local rural populations, its use as a social term in the US and UK was reworked in the 1990s as a political product of ‘third way’ government, with its concept of citizen as consumer exercising power through ‘civil society’, and as a third form of service provision between public and private sectors (ibid: 169). Under this agenda, ‘community’ became synonymous with “notions of voluntarism, of charitable works, of self-organised care” (ibid: 169). The terms ‘civil society’ and ‘community’ are thus widely used in policy in both the donor and recipient country contexts, but with distinctly contextual meanings.

In order to pose a contrast to current ideological conceptions of participation in the West, and to provide background to discourse on Ethiopian concepts of participation and community, the next sub-section focuses on indigenous African forms of participation.

### 2.5.3 Indigenous Forms of Participation

The emergence of local NGOs in Africa should not be regarded as “the flowering of civil society” but as a response to the international agenda, which derives from “wishful thinking or ideological bias than from a careful analysis of present conditions” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 18). CSO proxies at the PRSP negotiation table may lack representative legitimacy, even when citizens’ delegate participation to NGOs because transaction costs are high (Eyben and Ladbury, 1995: 197) or when “citizens are insufficiently informed or organised ... to take advantage” of new participatory spaces (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 60).
Chapter 2: Aid and Its Management

Remarking on the conceptual disjuncture about the meaning and practice of participation in Western and African NGOs, Crewe suggested that “ideological and philosophical orientations are the products of complex historical forces within their own countries” which the other party cannot fully understand (Crewe, 1997: 59). The introduction of new institutional mechanisms of participation may obscure existing, effective channels of participation (Cleaver, 2001: 42).

Discourse on the role of participation in African societies provides alternative viewpoints. Traditional mechanisms of discussion involving the participation of the whole community, with the aim of consensus “without factional divisions” (Nursey-Bray, 1983: 100), allows the individual to enjoy “personal freedom, independence, and respect for his property rights”, but these “individual rights are subservient to those of the community as a whole” (Ayittey, 2006: 65). These mechanisms, in which self-interest tends “to take a backseat to group loyalty and the need to … belong” (Dia, 1996: 54) conflict with Western notions of active citizenship which do not allow for African mores of participation, such as showing respect and avoiding open conflict (Cleaver, 2004: 272). Traditional forms of association, which may include labour-sharing and community self-help mechanisms, are based on reciprocity rather than altruism. Apparently solidaristic, such associations use negative sanctions to maintain conformity. Participation is therefore transactional, with individual strategies being based on non-material self-interest, as well as material, and on the local cultural and political context (Brett, 1996: 9-11). Ayittey points out that, although “individual rights are subservient to those of the community as a whole”, “an African can be totally free, liberated from the moral obligations imposed by society if s/he chooses to live outside the community and fend for him/herself” (Ayittey, 2006: 43, 65). In pursuing independence (in Western terms), the individual loses access to support (social or resources) from the community.

African socialism drew on traditional mechanisms of consensus, which meant - in the case of Tanzania - that Nyerere regarded alternative views as “selfish and mischievous factional interests” and one-party government “identified with the nation as a whole” made democracy “firmer” (Nursey-Bray, 1983: 104-105). Under African socialism, political leaders were presented as ‘moral agents’ of a strong state. Their citizens were expected to contribute to the development of the nation, in a concept of civic engagement still apparent, for example, in contemporary conceptions of participation in Tanzania (Marsland, 2006: 65).
Donors’ current role for civil society “as not only separate from the state but also as opposed to it” (Dessalegn, 1999: 1) stems from Landell-Mills’ call, on behalf of the World Bank, for donors to support African civil society as a counterweight to the continent’s “kleptocratic sycophants” (Landell-Mills, 1992: 548)\(^{21}\). Abrahamsen claims that “constructing African countries as undemocratic and lacking in good governance reconfirms the continual right of the democratic countries of the North to intervene (Abrahamsen, 2004: 40). However, Landell-Mills’ central argument had been that, just as concepts of democratic participation and accountability in the UK had developed over centuries based on underlying religious belief, governance institutions in Africa should also be built “in tune with the traditions, beliefs, and structures of its component societies”, citing Ayittey’s assertion that “indigenous pre-colonial African institutions were generally democratic, with strong inbuilt systems of accountability and popular participation” (Landell-Mills, 1992: 545, 550-551).

Rather than regarding citizens of developing countries as disempowered, in suspended animation until provided with liberal democracy as a result of donor influence, some traditional African forms of participation and accountability have provided more immediate, culturally coherent and inclusive mechanisms, than those offered by the NAA. While local power relations may account for unwillingness to express conflicting interests (White, 1996: 13), Masaki warns against overemphasizing “the oppressive nature of power” without grounding its conceptualisation in the local context (Masaki, 2004: 136).

### 2.5.4 The ‘Professional’ in Participation Discourse

The extensive literature relating to poor people’s experience of opportunity and exclusion in participation has been swelled by discourse on the roles taken by those working in development, as academics and practitioners. These fall into four broad themes: facilitating empowerment, power related to assumed expertise, power related to roles of interpretation or brokerage, and, fourthly, facilitating ‘transformation’.

---

Participation as ‘empowerment’, proposed by Robert Chambers in ‘Putting the Last First’ (1983), centres around the use of qualitative methods for data collection designed for use with and by local communities, with ‘facilitation’ by development workers trained in those particular techniques. The methods, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), almost became a synonym for ‘participation’ in the ensuing discourse. Critiques of PRA as a route to empowerment focus on its legitimacy: on the use of Western methods which “override existing and potentially legitimate forms of decision-making” (Waddington and Mohan, 2004: 221), and on the assumption that people in the community are currently disempowered and that they “are not already engaged actively as subjects in their own development” (Brett, 2003: 15). Projecting local people as having ’a problem' stigmatises them as weak and powerless, legitimizing outside intervention (Waddington and Mohan, 2004: 220).

Chambers defines PRA as “a mindset, a philosophy, and a repertoire of methods. The essence of PRA is changes and reversals - of role, behaviour, relationship and learning.” (Chambers, 1998: xiv). His “philosophy of participation” is therefore about “personal change in attitudes and behaviour on the part of development professionals (the mindset), and 'empowerment' of poor people they were working with (the philosophy)” (Bevan, 2000: 752).

The debate about the role of the professional which arose from critiques of Chambers’ work, most notably that of Cooke and Kothari (2001), focused on the potential abuse of power conferred by the ‘expertise’ of the professional. Gould suggested this was partly an expression of uncertainty about the role of development, which the development worker was engaged in implementing but might conflict with their sense of ‘vocation’ (Gould, 2004: 278). Chambers advises professionals (in relation to PRA) to “Use your own best judgement at all times” (Chambers, 1997: 1751). Crewe warns that conceiving development workers as homogenous is “as misleading as generalizing about ‘locals”’ (Crewe, 1997: 77). As the NAA exemplifies, policy on ‘participation’ is formulated at the upper end of the aid chain. As policy filters down through aid agencies, “individual actors manage the dissonance between normative claims and reality”, often having to run old and new policies in parallel (Gould, 2004: 282), while having values, experience and conceptual frameworks that may differ from their immediate colleagues (Kaufman, 1997).
Bierschenk found that the weakness of the state in decentralised Benin provided opportunities for ‘brokers’ to operate opportunistically (Bierschenk, 2006: 36). The concept of ‘broker’ as entrepreneur was introduced by anthropologists working in the French APAD tradition\(^{22}\). Olivier de Sardan describes brokers as operating within “the entangled social logic” that exists at the “intersection of development ‘universes’ of donor and recipients”. He equates the entangled social logic approach with Long’s social actor approach, claiming that it elucidates the complexity of development and its actors, including intermediaries and brokers (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 11-12, 16). Brokerage is mediated in the space between local and central government or market structures, where “development aid flows can be interpreted as rent”. Brokers are therefore part of patronage networks, which can include bidding for funds for local communities, using marketing tools such as the ‘correct’ language of development. Potential brokers may include local leaders and NGOs, as well as strategically placed individuals, and Olivier de Sardan reflected on their possible motivation: altruism, activism, material reward or power and influence (ibid: 173-175). External development workers or researchers, acting as ‘translators’ (see below, and Chapter 3) may be “driven by social and political interests” which serve to control ‘beneficiaries’ rather than to empower them (Wright Mills, 1953, cited in Long, 2001: 257).

Olivier de Sardan cites the example of development agents, noting that the literature tends to treat them as ‘transparent’ entities, as ‘transmission belts’, but they mediate between different types of knowledge, between the technical and the popular. Their interaction with their clients requires them to negotiate various logics and tactics but, while doing so, they have to “defend their own personal interests; defend the interests of their institution; [and] mediate between various actors’ interests and those of local factions” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 172). Scaling this up to the mediation of knowledge between social scientists and developers, Olivier de Sardan suggests five possible areas of disjuncture. Firstly, they operate using different forms of knowledge: academic versus management procedures. Secondly, their time-frames for change differ, with pressure on developers to produce short-term results rather than taking the long view. Thirdly, social scientists look for ‘difference’, whereas developers look for similarity. Fourthly, developers assume technical specialists to be allies, they do

\(^{22}\) Association Euro-Africaine pour l’Anthropologie du Changement Social et du Développement. Key proponents are Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk.
not expect them to be critical. Fifthly, they have different systems for professional accountability (*ibid*: 200). Remarkably that speaking for the poor “may be a rewarding business”, de Herdt and Bastiaensen also note that “interface experts have an interest in maintaining the social boundaries of the world-views between which they mediate” (de Herdt and Bastiaensen, 2004: 880-881).

The contribution to the brokerage literature which Mosse and Lewis (2006) provide is the concept of ‘translation’, utilising the term from Latour’s ‘actor network theory’, which posited that different kinds of entities, material and semiotic, interact to form a single network. ‘Translation’ was used to mean the output from a process of joint creation across the network (Strathern, 2000: 15). Mosse and Lewis use ‘translation’ to describe the joint creation of description of an aid intervention, which may be used for policy formation, by a “mutual enrolment and the interlocking of interest to produce project realities” (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 13). To date, there has been little critique or expansion of Mosse and Lewis’ use of the term ‘broker’ in relation to ‘translation’. They assert that the process of translation “invariably” results in “all actors defer[ring] to dominant or official narratives of agency and history that work to reinstate policy ambitions and to conceal divergent and contradictory logics of practice” (*ibid*, 2006: 16). Campbell’s experience in Kenya did not substantiate this, finding differences in ‘the narrative’ within the aid agency, and between government and various NGOs, noting that “a diversity of positions with regard to donor development discourse is possible”. Based on his finding of inter and intra agency divergence, he concluded that “it is important not to over-emphasize the power of bilateral and multilateral agencies” (Campbell, 2008: 263). Mosse and Lewis’ co-authors in *Development Brokers and Translators* (2006) also show that actors operate strategically, presenting different facets to different ‘principals’ (Rossi, 2006), negotiating between the religious and the political in “messy power struggles” (Doolittle, 2006: 70), and demonstrating how meaning can be both naturally and artificially manipulated by different actors so that a “common discursive ground” was not possible (Salemink, 2006: 122). Desai, analysing the role of development agents, argues that their “individual

---

23 Woolcock suggests that international development students should be taught three roles: ‘detective’ (to collect data), ‘translator’, in order to “refram[e] given ideas for diverse groups”, and ‘diplomat’ to mediate ideas between different groups (Woolcock, 2007: 55, 67). Such ‘job titles’ for development workers are, of course, value-laden, cf. Stirrat’s ‘mercenaries, missionaries and misfits’ (Stirrat, 2008).
relationships and development practice shape policy in a way that makes an isolated analysis of strategic and policy changes in national and local contexts inadequate" (Desai, 2006: 188).

Olivier de Sardan’s use of ‘broker’ to describe the role of development agents is a reminder that junior government officials and professional workers have also been described as ‘street level bureaucrats’. Lipsky (1980) identified street level bureaucrats as those who implement government policy at the interface, and in doing so reinterpret policy to make it functional in the local context. In this concept of translation, which is in opposition to that of Mosse and Lewis, the street level bureaucrat has the agency to change policy in a way which makes it contextually applicable. Different modes of implementation may include ‘authority’, ‘transaction’ and ‘persuasion’ or, respectively, ‘enforcement’, ‘performance’ and ‘co-production’ (Hupe and Hill, 2007: 296). The degree of autonomy possible in street level bureaucracy has provoked a number of studies looking at accountability and principal-agent problems (discussed in 3.4). This literature acknowledges both the multiplicity of interactions and the differing political contexts in which street level bureaucracy is involved. Long, who puts social interaction at the core of his ‘social actor’ approach, describes brokers as ‘gatekeepers’ (Long, 2001: 180).

The most recent development in the Chambers/Cooke and Kothari debate about the role of participation, arguing that participation must be transformative, is based on a model from Latin America (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 162). In this post-development perspective, local knowledge and forms of agency (“the localist fallacy”) should be replaced by ‘universal’ “multi-scaled strategies” to attain ‘modernity’ (ibid: 61). Critiques of transformative participation argue that its empirical base is context-specific: the disability-rights movement and others in the US; the ‘case’ of Brazil (conscientisation); and Europe (Habermas’ deliberative democracy). Its proponents assume that transformative participation can be instituted irrespective of local cultural norms of power and communication (Harriss et al., 2004: 1, 11-13). It thus falls prey, as does ‘democratic participation’, to accusations of being externally-driven and being based on Western political concepts and values. This suggests that ‘participation’, whether transformative or aiming at democratic development, is “rarely a response to demands from local people who may well be locked into
hierarchical and deferential structures, but rather promoted in response to western values imported by donors” (Brett, 2003: 14-15).

Grounding concepts of participation to people’s daily lives, Cleaver argues that “empowerment' and 'transformation' require not just the opening up of participatory spaces to transparently debate citizenship, to hold the state to account and so on, but also the more prosaic transformation of everyday life” dominated by fetching water, hard labour, poor health, and dependence on patrons. “Transforming the notion of participation into one of a radicalized and political citizenship, reliant on the open and transparent negotiation of rights, doesn't suddenly do away with the costs of participation. .. In the short term, the disadvantages to them of confronting unequal relations on which they depend, may simply outweigh the costs of acquiescence." (Cleaver, 2004: 275).

2.5.5 Participatory Space, Transaction and Power

This section has explored current conceptions of participation, which assume citizens’ desire to participate and to hold government to account, under the opportunities made available to them by the NAA, or assume that citizens’ participation has to be facilitated (the empowerment discourse) or that citizens must be encouraged to claim participation (“transformation”). In each of these conceptions, actors external to the community define the arena in which participation should take place. Whereas the NAA creates fora for participation between donors, between donors and government, and between government and civil society, ‘up-stream’ modalities restrict the level of participation at which donors themselves engage with aid recipients. Rhetorically, there are multiple spaces in which actors can potentially demand, accept, avoid or be denied participation. Exploring the concept of participatory space, Cornwall describes participation as circumscribed by “political, social, cultural and historical particularities” which more powerfully determine the nature of the space than “idealised notions of democratic practice” (Cornwall, 2000: 51). Hickey and Mohan view participatory space more positively, as “allow[ing] a form of political learning where experiences from one space are transported and transformed consciously or unconsciously in different and new spaces.” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004b: 18). More critical readings see ‘space’ as an arena for the use of power. Thinking spatially allows questions to be asked about how power, voice and
agency are exercised within that space or ‘bounded yet permeable arena’ (ibid: 75).

Outsider intervention introduces the idea of distortion of the natural dynamics of participation, so that “the act of soliciting the ‘voices of the poor’ can all too easily end up as an act of ventriloquism as ‘public transcripts’ are traded in open view” (Cornwall, 2004b: 82). Another way that outsiders intervene is to ascribe labels (beneficiaries, clients, citizens) which dictate the way that local people are viewed, and view themselves; this “influences what they say, and how and whether they are heard” (ibid: 84). Current aid orthodoxy assumes that citizens will either claim participation by voting in elections, or take on the responsibility of participation as civic ‘duty’. The literature reviewed suggested that issues of power, culture and ideology structured how citizens would respond.

White proposes a four-part typology of forms of participation: normative, instrumental, representative and transformative (White, 1996: 8). One of the characteristics of normative participation is ‘display’, by both the ‘facilitator’ and the participant. Even if such participation is purely tokenary, participants may gain positive benefit through a sense of inclusion. Labour-sharing was cited as an example of instrumental participation, and it may be extractive both in political and in practical terms. Labour-sharing may, however, be regarded locally as positive, through increased effort or social bonding (Brett, 1996: 12). Representative participation (improved leverage through voice and agency) leads, in donor rhetoric and some development discourse, via empowerment to ‘transformation’; participation is thus seen as “a means to empowerment and an end in itself” (White, 1996: 9). The actors in the participation agenda are motivated by different interests. While donors focus on the rhetorically inter-related factors of legitimation, sustainability, empowerment and efficiency, citizens, particularly the poor, are interested in inclusion, empowerment, leverage and transaction costs (ibid: 10).

The transaction costs of participation may include conflict (particularly where power is challenged), opportunity costs, and managing self-seeking behaviour against group interests (Brett, 1996: 14). Brett argues that, while participation discourse tends to be bifurcated between participation as rational choice and concepts of trust and fairness, participation at community level is more likely to be seen as ‘team’ production, individual input being subject to the needs of the
group (ibid: 8). Participation is therefore regarded as a common-pool resource, based on strict reciprocity and controlled by negative sanctions and by non-material incentives.

This research explores the perceptions of actors throughout the aid chain who possess different levels of power and opportunity to exercise it at different development interfaces. Accepting that social actors’ strategies are transactional, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 is built on conceptions of motivation, trust, individualism-collectivism and information asymmetry in differing and cross-cultural and political contexts within the development nexus.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Discussion of aid’s changing orthodoxies and the discourses on participation and evaluation in Chapter 2 made reference to differing objectives, values and strategies within the complexity of the aid chain. These influence transactions in cross-cultural contexts and are further complicated by different ideological positions. Holding this range of complexity in mind, I explain below my methodological framework, from concepts, via fieldwork, to analysis.

As Chapter 1 explained, this thesis is a contribution to the development management literature. From the different disciplinary approaches to development management (see 2.2), I identified the public sector management perspective as the one which has most resonance with my own experience and ontological position. As a result, I might have been expected to take a ‘rational’ approach to the research, drawing on management theory, or using a conventional principal-agent model. While I do consider the problem of information asymmetry, the nature of my own management experience led me to a social actor research orientation.

I start by restating the objectives of the research and setting out the research questions (3.2). As a social actor¹ in a qualitative research project, I make explicit the genesis of the research, my own experience in development, and other influences affecting my world-view. Section 3.3 explains my overall research orientation: this is adopted from Long’s social actor approach, chosen in order to understand the lifeworlds of actors interacting at the development interface. A comparative link is made from ‘lifeworlds’ to the concept of ‘mental models’ (later expanded in 3.4.3). I then explain my use of (elements from) two different but, I argue, overlapping literatures. This logic is set out in Figure 3.1 overleaf. Themes of uncertainty, access to knowledge and decision-making are linked across all three literatures. The cross-cutting analytical theme, ‘shared mental models’, although identified from the institutional economics literature,

¹ Long’s concept of the social actor is explored in 3.1.1.
builds on aspects of the social actor approach and also led me to the cross-cultural literature.

Figure 3.1 : Linked Literatures

From the institutional economics literature (3.4), I review concepts of trust, motivation, decision-making and uncertainty, leading me to the selection of Denzau and North’s ‘shared mental models’ as the core analytical tool. In 3.5, I explore selected elements from the cross-cultural literature which the analysis of earlier, primary data from Ethiopia\(^2\) indicated would be useful for analysing participation and evaluation in Ethiopia. Having set out my ontological and epistemological framework and the literatures employed, I turn (in 3.7) to the detail of research methods used, and a description of the fieldwork, including country selection, respondent selection, logistics, methods and constraints.

3.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH AND ITS ORIENTATION

3.2.1 Research Objective

The NAA’s use of consensual strategies such as harmonisation, alignment and partnership, implies that donors share the same values, priorities and practices, and that aid recipients will adopt those same values and practice because they will recognise them as superior to - or at least compatible with - their own. It also assumes that, provided with an enabling environment, implicitly as the result of

\(^2\) This refers to the Wellbeing and Illbeing in Development, Ethiopia (WIDE) study - see paragraph 3.5.2.
donor influence, citizens will take advantage of the structures offered and participate in evaluation of government performance in poverty reduction, holding them to account via democratic processes, namely multiparty elections.

Discourse reviewed in Chapter 2 indicated that the role of both participation and evaluation in donor practice are contested and that, despite rhetorical calls for learning lessons from evaluation, these were not taken up. The nature of the NAA alters the role of participation in evaluation in donor policy and praxis, by transferring responsibility for evaluating donors’ policies on to their intended beneficiaries. This replaced an earlier rhetoric where participation in donor evaluation increased aid’s effectiveness and legitimacy. This research aimed to address these issues by studying participation, particularly in evaluation, within the complexity of the aid chain of three bilateral donors’ programmes in one country context (Ethiopia). By investigating participation in evaluation both vertically (by working with donors, central government, local government staff and their agents, and community members) and horizontally (through an exploration of three donors’ approaches, and donor-government interaction), the research sought a richer understanding of how different actors participate in evaluation, both formally and informally, how these link with claims which donors make for participation and for accountability, both as policy and as practice. The underlying objective was to elucidate the mechanisms which constrain or enable participation in evaluation, and thereby enhance knowledge transfer, with the goal of improved aid delivery.

Responding to another aspect of NPM, the research also looked at ways in which donors and governments use M&E data as a performance management tool and as organisational learning tool. When the research was formulated (2003), donors expressed interest in the role of incentives in performance management\(^3\). I had anticipated (incorrectly, it turned out) that this topic would be relevant to donors but less so to the Ethiopian government. As 2.4.3 made clear, donors’ claims for learning lessons from evaluations are not upheld in the literature.

It is important to make clear what the research did not include. The research did not include evaluation of M&E procedures, or an evaluation of donors’ or

\(^3\) For example, Sida, 2002a.
governments’ development programmes; nor was it a ranking exercise or a case study comparison of donors’ M&E systems.

3.2.2 Research Question

The genesis of the research was my own experience of working in donor-funded project management (see 3.2.3). Despite a rhetoric which presented M&E as an integral part of the project cycle, into which participation could logically be inserted to provide more contextualised data and to respond to the agendas for participation and improved effectiveness, the system for project design, implementation and evaluation did not include mechanisms for this. Although the research took place in a different country context and a different aid modality, partnership and other tenets of the NAA are equally open to the same critique of relevance. Because the NAA reduces opportunities for donors to collect contextualised primary data, the research questions were thus just as, if not more, relevant under the NAA than under project modality.

The constituent parts of the enquiry were, firstly, to identify what role, if any, participation in M&E plays in donors’ formulation of strategies and development planning. Secondly, I wanted to identify donors use participation in M&E as a tool for performance management and organisational learning and, if so, how. From my own previous experience (see below) Thirdly, I was interested to explore the cultural and institutional factors that affect participation – by donors, by federal and local government, by local populations.
These lines of enquiry were intended to answer the underlying question:

*What accounts for the variation in forms of participation in evaluation of donor-funded aid programmes?*

### 3.2.3 Formative Experience Influencing the Research Methodology

Qualitative researchers acknowledge that their research is moderated by their own background, value systems and experience. Reflexivity is advocated “in order to situate the researcher and the field in wider hierarchical systems” and to deconstruct the research process, through choice, selection, fieldwork, writing up and dissemination (Wright and Nelson, 1995: 48). From a social actor perspective, “the researcher is also considered an active agent influencing specific events and the construction of both the social and ethnographic text.” (Long and Long, 1992: 6). Acknowledging this, the ‘writing-up’ process challenges the interpretive researcher, who must constantly reflect on how the research process, the respondents and any data relating to them are being represented. The development of the research idea stemmed from my own background and experience; these and my own value system affected the way that I identified research objectives, approached the research and analysed the results.

*The influence of previous experience on the research process*

Three key areas of my previous experience have, I believed, influenced my approach to this research.

*Public Sector Experience.* During the 1970s and 1980s, I worked in teaching hospitals in the UK and experienced a series of reorganisations, each of which was presented as an advance, ‘the most radical shake-up of the health service since it was established’. Ways had to be found of coping with frequent directives from central government which often seemed irrelevant, and worse, disruptive and wasteful of resources. Coming from a medical family, I identified myself as a ‘coal-face worker’, not a bureaucrat, but the reorganisations finally exhausted my enthusiasm for working in a sector which was so frequently used as a ‘political football’. I learnt that public sector management, so often presented politically in a technocratic way, is about managing conflicting goals,
pursued by competing groups with different coping strategies, interests and values. I developed the approach that, as well as being a ‘constructive’ endeavour (see discussion in 2.2.6), effective management involves understanding these different actors’ interests, strategies and values - and how they interact.

**History.** Studying history as an undergraduate may have led me to take a broader than usual perspective on the research. Historical analysis, the interpretation of events, texts and myths, seemed to be a useful preparation for qualitative research, which also explores perceptions, meanings and identities. Historiography was also a useful tool. While epistemology and hermeneutics in social science research teaching cover some of the same ground, there is no exact equivalent in the social sciences. It seemed to me that historiography puts politics and ideology at the front of hermeneutics, while social science study privileges epistemology. History also involves a complex understanding of time and its relationship with change; it does not assume that change is sequential, or that events occur irrespective of context. Development has in the past often been presented as a linear process, though more recent discourse has focussed on its non-linear trajectory.

**Development Project Management.** The experience of working for a consulting company provided an insight into the way that donor organisations work and how donors and other expatriates interact with government, other national staff and contractors. It also afforded an understanding of the ways in which internal processes affect the external intervention. Because I was tracking the ‘project cycle’, I was aware of the genesis of many of the projects and the degree to which they were based on evidence.

The initial research idea originated from reflection on my experience of the development management process. Sometimes the project cycle was so extended that the premises on which the project was originally designed were no longer current. The intended beneficiaries were rarely consulted and, if they were, their views were not taken into account, usually because their preferences did not coincide with those of the donor or the government. Although the involvement of government counterparts and national consultants was ‘required’ contractually, working relationships between donors, government and project
staff were often tense, with poor or missed communication, conflicting personal goals and project goals open to reinterpretation by the different stakeholders.

**Normative Conception of Development**

Crewe and Harrison point out that “development is clearly .. an ideal, an objective towards which institutions and individuals claim to strive. This aim is seen as inherently good” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 15) and is thus “value relative” (Gasper, 2004: 14). My normative stance on development before joining the industry was limited to some vague idea that everyone was entitled to sufficient material and psycho-social resources to enable them to maintain a degree of security and independence. The experience of working in project management refined my ideas about the value and ethics of the development industry, but the basic stance around ‘equality of opportunity’ remains.

At various points in this thesis, when discussing my approach to management⁴, I have referred to the importance of understanding the interests, values and strategies of the different actors involved. While I can argue this on grounds of effectiveness, I recognise that there is also an underlying ‘political’ stance which is liberal, in the sense of willingness to respect values and opinions different from one’s own⁵.

### 3.3 SOCIAL ACTOR ORIENTATION: SOCIAL AND KNOWLEDGE INTERFACES

#### 3.3.1 The Social Actor

Long describes his ‘social actor’ approach as an expansion of the actor-oriented approach, which rejects social constructionism’s tendency towards rational choice as an explication of individual action. An actor becomes a social actor in interaction with others (Long and Long, 1992: 21, 25), but retains individual agency, so that communities or organisations “are better depicted in terms of ‘coalition of actors’” (Long, 2001: 241). Social actors can be individuals or collectivities (op.cit.) so this approach is appropriate to research which explores

---

⁴ In 2.2.6 and 3.2.3.
perception and practice by individuals within collectivities (communities, governments and donor agencies).

Rather than a dichotomy between structure and agency, Long’s social actor approach “emphasizes the interplay and mutual determination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and relationships, which provide accounts of the lifeworlds, strategies, and rationalities of actors in different social arenas.” (Long and Long, 1992: 4-5). He regards structure as part of the overall explanation for the construction of a social actor’s lifeworld, but not the determining factor. Critical discussion of Long’s work has centred on the relative weight given to structure, arguing that the social actor approach overplays relative levels of agency (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 10). A further critique is that Long has not developed the concept further, but that it remains “narrow and repetitive”, restricted to a particular empirical field (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 13). However, its longevity is reflected in its continued wide use - Long’s social actor approach “remains a touchstone in the anthropology of development” (ibid: 13). It may be that the notion of the social actor’s agency is important to our own individualist culture, for the Western normative project of development and its implied trajectory of (intentional) change.

**Lifeworlds**

Social actors’ frames of reference for decision-making are derived from their individual, taken-for-granted, social ‘lifeworld’. Lifeworlds incorporate actions and meanings influenced by repeated interaction with others. Long stresses that lifeworlds are not “‘cultural backcloths’ which frame how individuals act, but … the product of an individual’s own constant self-assembling and re-evaluating of relationships and experiences” (Long, 2001: 241). However, he also states that a lifeworld “entails practical action shaped by a background of intentionality and values and is therefore essentially experienced as some kind of ordered reality, shared with others” (ibid: 54), which implies that lifeworlds entail transaction. Social actors have agency “in that they possess the knowledgeability and capability to assess problematic situations and organise ‘appropriate responses’” (Long, 2001: 241). While this initially appears consistent with a ‘Chambersian’ understanding of indigenous knowledge⁶, insecurity may mean

---

⁶ Referring to the work of Robert Chambers.
that the ‘appropriate response’ could be to maintain the status quo, because the outcome is more familiar and therefore predictable (cf. Wood, 2003).

While bridging the interface (see below) involves mediation between the different lifeworlds of, for example, a government officer and a poor farmer, a government official born in a rural village may have to reconcile him/herself to both worldviews (Long, 2001: 213). Alternatively, both actors may draw on an imagined or historical past of government-community relations, which guide their responses based on familiarity and multi-period games.

**Interface**

Long argues that a actor-oriented perspective is useful for bridging the ‘dichotomy’ between Western and ‘local’ knowledge (*ibid*: 170). Such an approach examines how actors involved “manage critical knowledge interfaces that constitute the points of intersection between their diverse lifeworlds” (*ibid*: 170). Interface studies provide “insights into the processes by which policy is transformed, how room for manoeuvre and empowerment are created by both intervenors and ‘clients’ and ... [how] ideologies shape the contests that take place over competing paradigms and strategies of development” (*ibid*: 172). For this research, the concept of ‘interface’ is clearly useful for considering the interactions of actors within the aid chain. Interface is not applied solely to binary interaction, but reflects the multiple interactions in which the social actor is engaged. This is a counterweight to the linearity implied by the phrase ‘aid chain’, and Long is particularly critical of the linearity of purpose and outcome assumed in donors’ use of the term ‘intervention’, arguing that the interfaces of development are emergent, contingent and ‘messy’. The concept of social and knowledge interfaces provides an orientation for exploring perceptions and practice at the cross-cultural interstices which occur in bilateral aid chains. Interface can describe the ‘middle ground’ negotiated in the work-place, in government-citizen relations or in social forms of associational life (*ibid*: 69). However, ‘discontinuity’ is central to Long’s definition of social interface, which focuses on discrepancies in values, interests and knowledge (*ibid*: 243) and the interface is more likely to be the site of contention and potential conflict. For Long, therefore, interface studies “are essentially concerned with the analysis of discontinuities in social life” (*ibid*: 177).
Transactions

A tension for me in working with Long’s social actor approach centred on his approach to the concept of transaction. He explicitly rejects rational choice (Long and Long, 1992: 21) but accepts that actors have multiple rationalities which are locally constructed (ibid: 15). Although he uses the term ‘transaction’ infrequently, it is clear that he recognises interaction as a transactional process, with decision-making being based on the social actor’s lifeworld. When stressing heterogeneity and struggles with discontinuity at the social interface, what Long describes is not dissimilar to a transactions approach from institutional economics which regards “social life is a series of contracts” (Waterman and Meier, 1998: 174).

Long insists that the ‘local context’ dictates the form which discrepancies take, which reduces the spectrum of the interface to ‘the local’. In this research, I look at a spectrum of sequential interfaces within aid delivery. In the cross-cultural arena of the aid chain, multiple social and knowledge interfaces occur across a range of lifeworlds, national and international. In critiquing “the local”, Mohan and Stokke argue that spaces in which local interfaces take place “are constituted by economic, social, cultural and political relations and flows of commodities, information and people that extend far beyond a given locality” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 264).

Review of the discourse on the role of the professional as ‘participant’ (2.5.4) included discussion of the notion of ‘broker. Long recognises that those who work at the interface have to “respond to the demands of their own groups as well as to the expectations of those with whom they must negotiate”; describing these as ‘brokers’ (Long, 2001: 70), reflecting the ‘APAD’ use of broker as ‘entrepreneur’ (see 2.5.4). The other meaning of broker used by Long, ‘mediator’ (cf. Mosse and Lewis)”7 “entails the interplay or confrontation of ‘expert’ versus ‘lay’ forms of knowledge, beliefs and values, and struggles over their legitimation, segregation and communication” (Long, 2001: 71).

---

7 Mosse and Lewis revised the term ‘brokerage’ to include mediation towards a dominant ‘translation’ of a development project to justify, retrospectively, donors’ intervention (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). See 2.5.4.
It is important therefore, in ethnographic research of aid and its delivery, to conceive donor staff and government officials, as well as those in the ‘local’ context, as social actors. Donor staff also adopt strategic resistance or enrolment (see Eyben, 2005) and consultants have to strategise between their commercial, academic and normative interests in a complex pattern of resistance and enrolment in different power arenas (Wood, 1998; Mosse, 2005).

**Knowledge Construction**

Social scientists are concerned with “the contingent nature of knowledge and a desire to problematize the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’ become constituted as knowledge and, hence, the basis for action” (Gould, 2007: 288). The discourse on the ‘professional’ (2.5.4) raises the question of whose logic prevails in the formation of knowledge. In Long’s typology of knowledge construction, under a ‘systems model’, the ‘implementing’ actor is faced with the challenge of reconciling top-down planning with the interests and constraints of those with whom s/he interacts, re-interpreting the planned intervention in line with strategic relationships at the knowledge interface (Long, 2001: 174)\(^8\). Knowledge “is essentially a joint product of [social interaction] and fusion of horizons” and powerful actors will try and enrol others to accept their own interpretations and viewpoints (Long and Long, 1992: 27). Long suggests that such enrolment may result in ‘delegated’ power, but other discourses suggest that such delegation can result either from trust or from unacceptably high transaction costs. Long also describes circumstances in which knowledge enrolment is resisted in development interventions: by subverting resources to locals’ alternative preferences, and by internalising ‘external factors’ by deviating their meaning (*ibid*: 27, 33-35).

Long uses the term ‘knowledge interface’ to encapsulate this dynamic where knowledge is constructed by “everyday contingencies and struggles that constitute social life” (*ibid*: 170). He assumes that “the repertoire of ‘sense-making’ filters” will vary considerably in the local context, while accepting that they “are to a degree framed by ‘shared’ cultural perceptions (*ibid*: 51). However, he argues that it is unlikely that farmers will share “the same priorities and parameters of knowledge”, so that it is important to understanding the

---

\(^8\) This has parallels with ‘street level bureaucrats’. 
dissonance as well as the consonance of ideas and beliefs (ibid: 176). Being characterised by discontinuity rather than linkage; and by transformation rather than transfer, knowledge is therefore the product of dialogue and negotiation (ibid: 243). When interpretation is a group endeavour, actors have to work towards an accommodation of different viewpoints, retaining the possibility for dissent (ibid: 50). For Long, knowledge construction is therefore a process of continuous contention, in which knowledge can be ‘transformed’ at critical points of confrontation. In contrast to the fluidity of knowledge practice in Long’s approach, Mosse and Lewis argue that knowledge is ‘captured’ by dominant narratives through a process of translation (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 16). Half-way between the two approach, Gould sees knowledge as a series of elements consolidated into a “socio-epistemic assemblage”, which is not fixed but a continual process.

There are similarities between this trajectory and the one argued in the mental models literature (see 3.4.3), though the emphasis is greater there on accommodation rather than on contention. Wilson calls for ‘communities of practice’ of reflexive, multidisciplinary teams “driven by collective knowledge requirements for improving practice in relation to a defined problem domain” (Wilson, 2006: 515). In order to move beyond “simply extracting from each other to meet the strategic self-interests of different actors”, actors with different histories and assumptions within a community of practice need to feel motivated and empowered to challenge each others’ ideas and “to embrace disagreement where necessary”, by building trust through sharing values, assumptions and motives through an iterative process of joint engagement (ibid: 518).

**Heterogeneity, Disjunctures and ‘Accommodations’**

Long’s emphasis on discontinuity and conflict within heterogeneity appeared to sit uneasily with the ‘normative’ impulse in development management. Although he acknowledged that dense social networks may be valued strategically, his approach appeared to preclude cooperative action or shared multiple-period games in collectivities where homogeneity is valued. One of the criticisms of Long’s work is that it is restricted to experience in Latin America (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 13) where cultural norms differ to those in Africa (see 2.5.3). It

---

9 Etienne Wenger quoted in Wilson, 2006: 515.
10 Except in the work-place.
may be that there is a danger of reification of heterogeneity\textsuperscript{11}, whereas in the local narrative ‘difference’ may represent a threat to community cohesion and a risk to social and economic insecurity.\textsuperscript{12} Emphasis on discontinuity implies that commonality of lifeworlds, security of shared practice and shared belief systems are not valued by social actors. Rather than discontinuities at the interface, agency also allows actors to avoid conflict by adapting and thus assimilating dissonant views within their own rationality.

However, in the intervening years between \textit{Battlefields of Knowledge} (1992) and \textit{Development Sociology: Actors’ Perspectives} (2001), Long appears to have reduced the ‘oppositional’ element in ‘interface’. He recognises that cultural repertoires allow people to “improvise and experiment with ‘old’ and ‘new’ elements and experiences, and react situationally and imaginatively, consciously or otherwise, to the circumstances they encounter” (Long, 2001: 3). He also refers to ‘enabling’ as well as ‘constraining’ elements, in interfaces which occur in “arenas in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints” (\textit{ibid}: 65).

Long regards donor interventions as social processes which are “more likely to reflect and exacerbate cultural differences and conflicts between social groups than they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions and shared values”, and thus “it becomes unrealistic and foolhardy to imagine that facilitators can gently nudge or induce people and organisations towards more ‘participatory’ and equitable modes of integration and coordination” (\textit{ibid}: 88). Applied to the NAA, this clearly poses a challenge to the rhetoric of the NAA and the shift in attitudes it requires.

\textbf{3.3.2 Applying a Social Actor Perspective to Complementary Literatures}

In working out an analytical framework for analysing the Ethiopian donor-recipient context, I wanted to work within a social actor orientation to consider congruence and disjuncture at the knowledge interface. The challenge has been

\textsuperscript{11} Emphasis on agency, heterogeneity and discontinuity may represent a viewpoint grounded in Western individualism, so that, in development, “the individual agent has become the key political site” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 253).

\textsuperscript{12} Strategies may include “seek[ing] accommodation within the state apparatus rather than creating new political spaces outside it” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 260).
to find a way of analysing relationships in the aid chain which are influenced by a mixture of politics and normative values.

Commentaries on aid relationships are found in several disciplines. A commonly used approach is institutional economics, often in terms of information asymmetry and incentives. A smaller, anthropological, literature discusses how knowledge is constructed, brokered and valued in development policy (see 2.2.4 and 2.5.4). The development sociology literature tells us how resources, including knowledge, are constructed, brokered and valued by poor people, in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty which dominates their lives. Thinking about how knowledge and transactions are treated, it became apparent to me that there was considerable synergy between the different literatures in understanding the role of, and interrelationship between information, trust and motivation. Having spent time working in East Asia and South East Asia before researching in Ethiopia, I was also aware that different cultural patterns governed interactions between international and national staff, and between national staff of different social, political and geographical status.\(^{13}\)

Intending to combine these approaches with the specificity of Ethiopia and within the nature of the aid chain, I sought a model which permitted analysis of the interaction between culture, polity and information exchange, particularly in cross-cultural transactions. The underlying precepts of Denzau and North’s shared mental models (SMM) are that decision-making is governed by uncertainty rather than risk and that our mental models are formed from culture and belief systems (religion and/or ideology), and that sustained sharing of information permits mutual understanding and thus learning, though significant shifts in belief only occur in unusual circumstances (this brief outline is expanded fully in 3.4.4).

Although SMM comes from the institutional economics literature, a social actor approach recognises the formation of mental models and the sustaining of belief systems through repeated interaction with others. Rather than assuming, as donor discourse does, that Western concepts can be universally shared, and that values and norms are common to other country contexts, the cross-cultural literature addresses issues of comparative norms of participation and

\(^{13}\) See Grammig (2002).
accountability intra-nationally. In the next section, 3.4, I provide an overview of the institutional economics literature relating to trust, motivation and access to information, concluding with discussion of the shared mental models framework, before progressing to discussion of cross-cultural issues in the subsequent section.

3.4 TRANSACTIONS, MOTIVATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE

3.4.1 Information Asymmetry in Explaining Aid Relationships

There has been a reluctance to analyse aid relationships because “it makes people in the business nervous. That’s because it deals with messy stuff - behaviours, cultural norms, skills, motivations, and judgement calls” (Pomerantz, 2004: 10). The institutional economics literature on accountability in aid-funded development tends to argue that there is a principal-agent problem affecting policy formulation, performance and aid effectiveness. If a purely institutional economics approach is taken, “the aid industry emerges as a complex of principal-agent, collective action and game theory problems” (Copestake, 2002: 3). However, conventional principal-agent problems fail to provide an adequate explanation when faced with the complexity of aid, which can sometimes invert the principal-agent relationship, and the different objectives of its multiple actors.

The aid chain is distinguished from other forms of publicly-funded service because it is funded by taxpayers in one country for service provision to the inhabitants of another - where donors are “spending others’ money on others” (Copestake, 2005: 63). Because of the length of the chain and its conflicting objectives, “it appears hardly possible that voters in donor countries at the end of the pipe and without any direct contact with the final beneficiaries, are supplied with realistic information on aid effectiveness.” (Michaelowa and Borrmann, 2006: 314). In practice, information asymmetry is tolerated (in contrast with donor rhetoric about monitoring aid effectiveness and lesson learning), with the consequence that aid objectives are weakly formulated (Martens, 2002b: 176), the length of the aid chain providing a level of protection to both donor politicians and their agents (Easterly, 2002: 244).
Chapter 3: Methodology

A further peculiarity of aid is that all donors and all levels of the chain claim to have the same objective, that is the interest of the ultimate beneficiaries (Seabright, 2002: 42). The NAA in particular implies that donors and recipient governments have broadly similar goals, and that donors will abandon self-interest in the name of harmonisation. In theory, country ownership implies that the recipient government becomes the principal in the process, but the degree of ownership and its implications are far from clear: “[t]he responsibility and accountability that an owner has, in the conventional meaning of the word, is transformed to nearly unrecognisable forms by the system of development assistance” (Ostrom, 2002a: 243).

3.4.2 Analysing Trust and Motivation in Aid Relationships

Orthodox economics assumes an individual will respond to control by financial incentives, but studies have shown that use of such extrinsic control mechanisms “can be potentially counterproductive, because it undermines the pro-organizational behaviour of the steward, by lowering his or her motivation” (Davis et al., 1997: 25; cf. also Kunz and Pfaff, 2002: 275-6), ‘crowding out’ the individual’s sense of community in a shared purpose (Osterloh, 2001: 89).

Unlike other bureaucrats, development staff have the task of implementing development policy in different political and cultural environments, either interacting across a geographical divide supplemented by intermittent missions to the ‘field’ or, with increasing decentralisation of development cooperation offices, through interaction with the recipient government’s political and bureaucratic staff. In their roles as interpreters of international development policy, donor staff are guided by their own ‘mental models’ when interacting with others. Crewe and Harrison suggest that, rather than looking at one group of development actors in isolation, “it is more useful to look at the relationships surrounding intervention practices as they actually take place.” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 19); in other words, regarding them as social actors at the development interface.
When donor staff undertake operational work, they are moved between posts every three years or so to avoid moral hazard\textsuperscript{14}, resulting in a loss of institutional memory. Knowledge of past performance is a vital resource for insecure, poor citizens. To reduce uncertainty, they opt for the security of predictable institutions and relationships, sacrificing their long term interest in a ‘Faustian bargain’ which entails “a tradeoff between the freedom to act independently in the pursuit of improved livelihoods and the necessity of dependent security” (Wood, 2003: 455). Repeated transactions, or multiple period games, therefore reduce uncertainty by offering a degree of predictability on the basis of ‘past performance’.

3.4.3 Geopolitics, Information Asymmetry and Polity

Aid can be regarded as a “useful, if sometimes unreliable, service to the conduct of international politics and diplomacy”, but conditionality is rarely imposed because its costs to the principal include the risk of jeopardising an existing relationship which might be important for strategic reasons (Burnell, 1997: 121). Additionally, conditionality imposes a moral cost, “because more is at stake: the country’s entire aid programme is on the line” (Thomas, 2004: 490). As a result, “governments often see that they have little to fear if they do not keep their side of the policy-for-money bargain” (Killick, 1997: 493).\textsuperscript{15}

Under the NAA logic, donors rely on information provided by the government to monitor the policy matrix attached to the PRSP, but in practice are faced with a decision about whether to trust government information. Even though liberal democracy is a central plank of the NAA, there is little focus in the literature on the role of ideology in relation to development. Waterman and Meier’s adaptation of the principal-agent model links polity with information asymmetry (Figure 3.2 overleaf). This offers a way of analysing the polity of donor-government and government-community relations in circumstances such as those which occurred in Ethiopia in 2005 when, contrary to donors’ expectations, the government did not adopt multiparty pluralism.

\textsuperscript{14} These rotations are designed to deter donor staff from ‘going native’ (Pomerantz, 2005). It assumes that staff will be effective as soon as they arrive in post, and wherever they are posted.

\textsuperscript{15} After many years working in Africa, Pomerantz concludes that African countries know that donors have much to lose by cutting aid, and this, together with resentment at being told what to do, gives African governments a degree of power in the aid relationship (Pomerantz, 2004: 20-21).
Figure 3.2 Consensus, Information and Polity, adapted from Waterman and Meier (1998: 188)

The model suggests that, where both principal and agent have access to information, policies are likely to be evidence-based, regardless of whether or not principal and agent have shared objectives. Where there is goal conflict, a
situation where both principal and agent are well-informed will result in ‘advocacy coalitions’, built by combining ideas and information, leading to well-argued policies. Where there is goal consensus and both principal and agent have information, an evidenced-based “classic policy subsystem” will result. Although formulated to address information asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats, Waterman and Meiers’ model offers a useful tool for discussing the relationship between different ideological positions within the aid interface.

3.4.4 Shared Mental Models

Denzau and North define mental models as “the internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment” (Denzau and North, 1994: 4). The concept of shared mental models (SMM) was introduced briefly in 3.3.2. Retaining a social actor perspective, I was interested to identify an transactional analytical model to help analyse actors’ perceptions of the process of participation and evaluation of aid, itself made up of inter-national and intra-national economic, social, cultural and political transactions. The refinement of the concept of mental models which North developed with Denzau, ‘shared mental models’16, provides such an analytical framework. Rejecting “substantive rationality in which agents know what is in their self-interest and act accordingly” they argue that “uncertainty, not risk, characterizes choice-making” (ibid: 27, 3). The cruces of their argument are (i) that uncertainty is reduced when actors’ mental models are, if not shared, at least familiar to one another; and (ii) that mental models are derived from culture and belief systems. The model’s components are set out below.

**Uncertainty is reduced when mental models are familiar or shared**

North argues that uncertainty in decision-making forces actors to rely on past experience and on values which form their mental models. These are embedded in institutions, so that knowledge and belief are resistant to rapid change (North, 1995: 25). If individuals share a common cultural background and similar experiences, they are likely to share similar mental models (Denzau and North, 1994: 3). Denzau and North do not suggest that mental models are uniform, or that conflict, power asymmetries or divergent interests do not exist. Both

---

Hofstede, who uses a similar approach (mental programming)\textsuperscript{17}, and Denzau and North conceptualise mental models or programmes in interaction with an individual's environment, with which the person has both a reactive and a proactive relationship (Hofstede, 2001: 2). This conveys the agency of Long's social actor, particularly when engaged in 'bridging' the interface (Long, 2001: 65).

When faced with complex problems in the absence of information, “we must be employing some form of induction, enabling us to learn from the outcomes of our previous choices" (Denzau and North, 1994: 11). Not only do we rely on mental models for inductive processing, but our mental models determine what we learn. “The very spaces for actions, outcomes and reasonable strategies, as well as the mappings between them, may be objects of ignorance on the part of the individual." (\textit{ibid}: 11). Contrastied with Long’s argument, that social actors “possess the knowledgeability and capability to assess problematic situations and organise ‘appropriate’ responses” (Long, 2001: 241), ‘knowledgeability’ appears to equate with ‘inductive processing’.

Although ‘mental model’ and ‘worldview’ are sometimes used interchangeably, ‘worldview’ (\textit{Weltanschauung})\textsuperscript{18} has philosophical applications which are absent from North’s concept of mental models. It is the comparison between different mental models and the interactions within the intervening space that distinguishes ‘shared mental models’ from ‘worldview’, and also from ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘constrained preferences’, because Denzau and North are interested in analysing the pace of change.

Denzau and North suggest that classical economics tends to view learning as a regular, incremental process (Denzau and North, 1994: 22). They propose an alternative approach which considers learning as “slow, gradual change punctuated by relatively short periods of dramatic changes” (\textit{ibid}: 23). Dramatic changes\textsuperscript{19} are often induced by “the failures of a mental model to predict in situations when the individual is highly motivated, i.e., when the issue is one very important to the learner” (\textit{ibid}: 17, fn8]. During these periods of change, “new meanings [are absorbed] from related mental models” (\textit{ibid}: 25).

\textsuperscript{17} Hofstede links “collective programming of the mind” to Bourdieu’s concept of \textit{habitus} (Hofstede, 2001: 4).

\textsuperscript{18} There are other similar terms: for example, \textit{mentalité collective} (Bauman, 1999: 92).

\textsuperscript{19} Denzau and North call these changes “Episodes of representational redescription”
This raises an interesting paradox about the ‘familiarity’ of meanings. On the one hand, congruent mental models permit verbal ‘shorthand’ through tacit knowledge and understanding of the conceptual background to the idea expressed verbally, allowing “single terms to stand for substantial pieces of implicit analysis embodied” in the mental model (ibid: 20). The widespread use of proverbs in Ethiopia would be an example of this. On the other hand, a common language can be interpreted differently if mental models are not shared, because “[t]he reception of a message and its interpretation by the listener are strongly influenced by the categories and beliefs that the listener already has about the world” (ibid: 20). Denzau and North suggest that meanings will converge the more that they are discussed and used and that “[m]ental models are shared by communication, and communication allows the creation of ideologies and institutions in a co-evolutionary process” (ibid: 20).

**Mental models are derived from culture and belief systems**

Denzau and North maintain that any moderately sophisticated belief system, whether a religion or an ideology, is likely to contain a number of paradoxes, or logical inconsistencies (ibid: 26), and that, if these paradoxes become contentious, “the ideological entrepreneur could utilize this in order to help reinterpret the ideology in ways more suitable to the entrepreneur’s goals” (ibid: 26). For these authors, ideologies are defined as “the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured.” This approach is shared by the anthropologist, Geertz, for whom “the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve, for an individual or for a group, as a source of general, yet distinctive conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them, on the one hand … and of rooted, no less distinctive ‘mental dispositions’ … on the other (Geertz, 1966: 40). Geertz argues that one function of religion is to reduce a person’s uncertainty, because “even the remotest indication that they [religious symbols and systems] may prove unable to cope with one or other aspect of experience raises within him the gravest sort of anxiety” that his “creatural viability” may be threatened (ibid: 13).

---

20 This is another arena for brokerage.
Hofstede defines culture as “collective programming of the mind”, manifested in values, symbols, heroes and rituals (Hofstede, 2001: 1), passing on through inter-generational transfer “with an obstinacy that is often underestimated” (ibid: 3). For Hofstede, the “key constructs … for describing mental software are values and culture. Values are held by individuals as well as by collectivities; culture presupposes a collectivity.” (ibid: 5). Because, like culture (or perhaps as part of culture), “values are programmed early in our lives, they are nonrational (although we may subjectively feel our own to be perfectly rational!).” (ibid: 6). Denzau and North have very little to say about culture, as distinct from religion and other belief systems (particularly ideology), other than to say that culture “encapsulat[es] the experiences of past generations of any particular cultural group”, experiences which are transferred through a process of cultural learning which starts at birth (Denzau and North, 1994: 15). This captures the inter-generational transfer characteristic of culture, but using the umbrella phrase ‘shared mental model’ downplays the role which power asymmetries play in the manifestation and perpetuation of culture. However, such asymmetries would be an intrinsic part of their mental models, and their familiarity would reduce uncertainty.

**Shared Mental Models - subsequent discourse**

Reviewing subsequent interest in their paper on SMM twelve years after its publication, Denzau et al. re-emphasise the link between the evolution of SMMs and belief systems, but note that ideologies - they use neoliberalism as their example - are adopted differently depending on each country’s social, political, economic and institutional context (Denzau et al., 2006: 14, 21). Although the Kyklos paper has been cited in over 130 publications across a number of disciplines, it has been most usefully explored, as far as this research is concerned, in the comparative politics literature where there has been “renewed interest in the role of collectively held ideas and beliefs in politics” (Legro, 2000: 419).

Two relevant papers offer an adaption of SMM’s explanation of ideological/ideational change. Rothstein discusses the creation of ‘collective

---

21 Uphoff reminds us that ‘mental constructs’ are also constraining (Uphoff, 1996: vii).
memory’ as a tool used by political strategists/entrepreneurs (Rothstein, 2000). The other paper takes up Denzau and North’s patterns of learning; Legro is interested in why citizens’ mental models are sometimes resistant to ‘exogenous shocks’\textsuperscript{22}, suggesting that there are “powerful tendencies toward continuity”. He sees ‘ideational’ change as a two-stage process: disillusion with existing collective ideas, and subsequent identification of an alternative, preferable set of ideas. In the absence of these conditions, Legro suggests that the status quo will be maintained because the security of adhering to the existing, dominant orthodoxy is preferable to the risks associated with change (Legro, 2000).\textsuperscript{23}

Denzau and North note that one key issue in the Kyklos paper that had not been adequately addressed in subsequent research, namely “the interaction of learning with the pre-existing shared mental models in a person's head, and in the heads of the people of a society” (Denzau et al., 2006: 14). My research is concerned with the extent of congruence and disjuncture (and ambiguity) in the SMMs not only of Ethiopian actors, but all actors within the prevailing aid chain. Given that aid-funded development is currently aimed at sustainable institutional change, SMMs seem to be a useful way of exploring the dynamics of that change process. Hofstede’s advice below endorses a strategy of increased understanding of donors’ partners’ mental models:

“In these postcolonial days, foreigners who want to change something in another society will have to negotiate their interventions. Negotiation again is more likely to succeed when the parties concerned understand the reasons for the differences in viewpoints.” (Hofstede, 2001: 15).

3.5 CULTURAL ANALYSIS AND MENTAL MODELS

3.5.1 Cross-Cultural Research, Epistemology and Ontological Discussion

The purpose of this section is to explore issues in cross-cultural research, prompted by the Ethiopian context and the selection of SMMs as my core analytical focus. The exploration is done in two parts. In 3.5.1, I explore some

\textsuperscript{22} Legro’s use of ‘shocks’ mirrors Denzau and North’s ‘crisis’.
\textsuperscript{23} This provides an example of SMM from political science which resonates with the concept of the ‘Faustian bargain’ made by poor villagers in the face of insecurity Wood, 2003.
ontological and epistemological issues arising out of my concern to avoid ethnocentricity in researching culture, particularly in cross-cultural settings, being wary of “the indecency of speaking for others” (Escobar, 1995: 152). In 3.5.2, my focus shifts to discourses on topics identified as being of particular relevance to participation and evaluation in Ethiopia.

**Researching the ‘Other’**

Aid and development orthodoxies arise from Western normative, geopolitical and economic priorities, and there is a danger of donors assuming that ‘participation’ and ‘monitoring and evaluation’ are Western concepts which have to be ‘taught’ to the governments and citizens of developing countries. In exploring how these terms are conceptualised and practiced in cross-cultural situations, a potential ethical problem was how to discuss cultural norms and attitudes in relation to intrinsic motivation, trust and communication. The fact that I was doing research and using interpretive methods which are not culturally appropriate in the context of rural Ethiopia (‘inappropriate’ in that I was not an Ethiopian, but a European woman, accompanied by an interpreter, asking open-ended questions of a range of individuals), demonstrated a degree of ethnocentrism: I was engaged in a ‘Western project’ (Hofstede, 2001: 16). I was concerned to explore the implications of including cultural analysis in my conceptual framework.

Ethiopia has always fulfilled a role of ‘the other’ in Westerner’s perceptions (see section 4.2.4), including the representation of ‘famine’ to a global audience (a continuing representation which Ethiopians find humiliating). Notions of ‘Africa’ play a particular role for the West, as in Tony Blair’s 2001 description of Africa being “a ‘scar on the conscience of the world’” (Mercer et al., 2003: 420).

**Cultural Relativism**

The two meanings ascribed to cultural relativism in the Dictionary of Anthropology, one methodological, “while the anthropologist is in the field, he or she temporarily suspends … their own esthetic and moral judgements”, the other moral and political, to “respect other cultures and treat them as ‘as good

---

24 This refers to the analysis of the WIDE research data (Annex A). See 3.5.2.
as’ one’s own”, gloss over earlier discourse which viewed cultural relativism’s suspension of judgement as nihilist. More recently, “corrupt and corrupting appropriations of cultural relativism” have “inspire[d] critics from all points along the political spectrum” (Perusek, 2007: 827, 821). In rejecting “a [Talcot] Parsonian dichotomy between tradition and modernity”, researchers tended to avoid discussing ‘cultural themes’ during the 1980s/90s (Hanson, 2003: 355). Despite a renewed interest in issues of culture, particularly in comparative politics, there remains a danger that “the well-known methodological pathologies of cultural theory, reification, ethnocentrism, teleology and conceptual fuzziness will be resurrected as well” (ibid: 356).

From the cultural capital literature, Rao and Walton describe “culture is part of a set of capabilities that people have … There is no presumption that these processes are inherently “good”, or inherently “bad”.” (Rao and Walton, 2004: 4). From the cross-cultural psychology literature, Hofstede advocates ‘intersubjectivity’, that is, taking different viewpoints into account (Hofstede, 2001: 2) without being judgemental. Uphoff, a sociologist, describes such a non-judgemental cross-cultural encounter as maintaining a “‘binocular’ perspective ... [which] keeps apparently opposite objects or values in view and in focus, drawing insight and benefit from their different qualities and apparent contradictions”, and thus accepting the epistemological role of paradox (Uphoff, 1996: xii). For Gasper, legitimate cultural relativism does allow judgements provided that they are based on contextual knowledge and self-reflexivity (Gasper, 2004: 211). Long locates the renewed interest in culture to a post-globalisation shift from focus on the nation state to national (or ethnic) identity which celebrates a cultural distinctiveness linked with a (sometimes imagined) historical past (Long, 2001: 222).

Some of the literature on Ethiopia reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 contains reference to traits and behavioural norms which move close to discussion of ‘national character’. I was concerned that discussing the lifeworlds of respondents whose national identity is strongly linked to an historical past (see Chapter 4) risked essentialising customary norms and practice. My concern was mitigated by Hofstede, a cross-cultural psychologist, writing that ‘national character’ was formed by ‘learning from the past’ and through interaction with each other, even in heterogeneous societies (Hofstede, 2001: 13).
Gasper, who describes psychologist Hofstede’s concept of shared mental programming as ‘influential’, quotes anthropologists Crewe and Harrison’s description (1998: 152-3) of Hofstede’s 148 country study for IBM as a “management-studies simplification” one which ignores power relations (Gasper, 2004: 197). I argue this is a misreading of Hofstede, whose four analytical factors are all connected with power: one explicitly (high-low power distance), and three implicitly (individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity and uncertainty avoidance). Crewe and Harrison do accept the role of ‘mental models’: “Culture may be a ‘mental’ process, but it consists of active, creative rather than passive programming” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 152).26

**Cross-cultural analysis and methodological rigour**

Discussing the need for methodological rigour to avoid reducing the findings to discussion of ‘stereotypes’, Hofstede specifies that analysis must be descriptive rather than judgemental. He emphasises “the impossibility of escaping value judgements”, there being “no way out of this dilemma but to (1) expose oneself and one’s work to the work of others with different value systems and (2) try to be as explicit as possible about one’s own value system” (Hofstede, 2001: 14-15).27

Hofstede distinguishes between "a phenomenological study of values (which is the area of social science) and a deontological approach (which belongs to ethics, ideology, or theology)" (ibid: 15). I suggest that this dichotomy is problematic for researchers in international development, because they are normally exposed to both ontological approaches: trained (usually) in social science research methods, their choice of career and their field experience are likely to be normative in origin. Given that ethics, ideology and, in some instances, religious belief are endemic to development as practiced by both donors and recipients, a deontological exploration of the values of development actors, as well as the researcher, is justified.

---

26 Wood uses the term "cognitive mapping" in peasants’ institutional landscape (Wood, 2003: 468).
27 My own normative framework is discussed in 3.2.3.
Political relativism

Discussion of ‘values’ currently dominates the political agenda, domestically and internationally. The fieldwork for this research took place between 2004 and 2006, throughout which ‘Western values’ were juxtaposed with an ‘other’ which was simplified as fundamentalist Islam (Perusek, 2007: 826). This feeds into the idea of development as a ‘moral’ project underpinned by fear (Abrahamsen, 2000: 17).

In the NAA’s involvement of ‘civil society’ (a concept rarely precisely defined by donors), Abrahamsen detects a romanticised, unproblematised conception of civil society organisations within liberal democratic discourse (Abrahamsen, 2000: 53, 54). In the UK writing up my thesis, I looked afresh at how the familiar vocabulary of ‘participation’ (voice, empowerment, exclusion, partnership, ownership) was employed in my local district. Feedback from local associations, of which I was a member, local media and affected individuals identified concerns similar to those raised in development discourse, and, through contact with the local government services, I found that democratic representation was often sidelined by a managerialist view of civil society.

Politics and Culture

Recent literature demonstrates an upsurge in interest in culture among political scientists. Chabol and Daloz have developed “a cultural approach to comparative politics” (Chabal and Daloz, 2006: 198), adopting qualitative research methods. They state that “Rather than risk ‘false consciousness’ (misinterpretation), a cultural approach to politics uses how those involved account for their own lives” (ibid: 207-208). However, they describe analysis of values as ethnocentric, whereas they contend that the analysis of meaning avoids this pitfall; meanings can be shared even when values are not (ibid: 22, 86).

The relationship between politics and culture has been a two-way interest, as anthropologists have engaged with politics in ‘political anthropology’. Politics, together with history, had previously been treated as ‘context’ (Poluha and Rosendahl, 2002: 7), not as an integral part of the analysis. Using Bourdieu’s concept of doxa, the “taken-for-granted and thus never discussed or
questioned", and the *heterodoxa*, the ‘never questioned’ in relation to dominant ideology, Poluha and Rosendahl warn against assumptions of *doxa* in non-Western societies, with assumptions about the degree of political agency embedded in Western society (*ibid*: 9-10).

### 3.5.2 Selected Foci in Cross-Cultural Research

As part of the grounding for the research, I analysed primary data from Ethiopia collected in 2003 by Dr. Philippa Bevan, Dr. Alula Pankhurst and their Ethiopian research team in a series of village studies titled Wellbeing and Illbeing in Development, Ethiopia (WIDE). The analysis suggested that cultural values relating to identity, individualism, collectivism and religion, would be important for understanding cultural influences on participation and evaluation in Ethiopia. Discourse on these topics from the cross-cultural literature are reviewed below.

While there is broad congruence between sociology's and anthropology's definition of culture as “the repertoire of learned ideas, values, knowledge, aesthetic preferences, rules and customs shared by a particular collectivity of social actors” (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000: 376), the term ‘culture’ is highly contested within anthropology. This is because it is closely linked with “disciplinary identity” and is associated with anthropologists' perception that “the concerns of the non-anthropological world keep leaking into our own private disciplinary disputes, despite all our best attempts to establish boundaries around what we see as our intellectual property” (Barnard and Spencer, 2000: 136).

The working definition of culture for this thesis has been:

“*culture is the set of ideas, values, norms and communicative means that a group shares, has received from the previous generation and tries to convey to the next generation, transformed in varying degrees by internal innovation and cultural contact with other groups.*” (Klausen, quoted in Jerman (1998))

This definition includes the idea that culture is a dynamic process and, although susceptible to change (“a set of contested attributes, constantly in flux” (Rao and Walton, 2004: 4)), it is deeply embedded in individuals' interactions from an early stage in their lives.
The particularity of the development context is that transactions and interactions take place in a cross-cultural ‘space’. Pomerantz, writing about donor behaviour and cross-cultural confusion arising from the (dis)juncture between Western and ‘African’ cultures, echoes the SMM approach by suggesting that building trust, “the fundamental ingredient in relationships that lead to mutual influence” is done through shared purpose, reliability, familiarity, and open communication” (Pomerantz, 2004: 12). She notes that cross-cultural disconnects occur not only between international and national personnel but between metropolitan and rural Africans, and between donor staff who ‘go native’ and those who do the opposite because of the “minor irritants of everyday life” (ibid: 35, 37). For the most part, it is assumed that those in the development industry can work anywhere and be effective in short-term deployment and thus that the development industry is culturally neutral, although the industry has its own culture and institutions which exert control over individual behaviour (see Wood, 1998).

**Identity**

Triandis (1989: 507) argued that there are “three kinds of self-conceptions … private selves are the aspect of self conceptions that are shown and known to oneself; public selves are those aspects that are presented to others; and collective selves represent the self as members of various groups.” (Kashima, 2002: 213). In collectivist societies (see below), where deviation from social norms risks severe penalties, “the private and public selves are often different” (Triandis, 1989: 514). This suggests that there are nested layers of self-identity depending on whom one is interacting with. These identities may be conflicting and result in social tension, as in Crewe and Harrison’s example of national project staff who were both ‘developers’ and ‘locals’ (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 173). Our private selves construct the identity we want to present to others; others impose their own interpretation based on their own mental models.

In Grint’s view, group identity requires individuals to take a “leap of faith and imagination” to feel that they share the same ideas and values as other members of their group, and different values to members of other groups.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) Relevant to the discussion of in-group/out-group below.
Chapter 3: Methodology

(Grint, 1996: 181). This accords with the conventional approach to identity within development studies, which is to engage with Anderson’s notion of national identity. Putting aside his supposition of its Eurocentric origins\(^\text{29}\), which do not apply in the Ethiopian context, one can accept his definition of national identity as an ‘imagined political community’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). Given that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members” (*ibid*: 6) and therefore their mental models of national identity are not built up through repeated interaction, the importance of culture and ideology, both of which are influenced by history, becomes apparent. If, as Woodward suggests, “identities are forged through the cultural practices and symbols through which meanings are made”, interaction with out-group others “may result in a complete failure to share meanings” (Woodward, 2002: 74, 76).

**Individualism and Collectivism**

The cross-cultural literature on individualism-collectivism tends to present a bifurcated world, one half being ‘Western culture’ and the other usually ‘Eastern culture’, or ‘Asia and Africa’, indicating that there is clearly a geopolitical dimension to this. Using ‘East’ and ‘West’ as alternative labels for ‘collectivistic’ and ‘individualistic’ cultures, Triandis suggests that freedom is often seen as an unqualified good in individualistic cultures yet it is associated with “chaos” in vertical collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1999).

Individualists “define the self as autonomous and independent” (Chen *et al.*, 2002: 571; also Triandis, 1999). Individualist societies “sample mostly personal, internal attributes of persons” such as “personality, ability, attitude” (Triandis, 1999); all are assumed to be entitled to equal rights and equitable treatment (Moemeka, 1998: 122-123). Because “In individualist societies, it is permissible for individuals to put self-interest ahead of group interest” (Chen *et al.*, 2002: 572), “individualists’ contractual control preference may orient them toward proactively laying down specific legal protections characteristic of what collectivists consider a trustful ingroup relationship” (*ibid*: 579).

In collectivist communities, “joint effort is perceived as the only feasible way to bring about change. The corollary of this is that “in collectivistic cultures, the

\(^{29}\) Anderson identifies the Enlightenment, print media and the rejection of religious thought as the origins of national identity (1991: 4-7).
entire group may be held responsible for the actions of its individual members. Therefore, no one is allowed to make decisions alone without the approval of the entire group.” (Sagie and Aycan, 2003: 457); whereas “in individualistic cultures it is believed that individuals have the potential and power to change things.” (ibid: 457). Strict standards about social actions and forms of communication control ‘performance’: “Noncompliance provokes strict social, and often economic and psychological, sanctions”. Thus, “the community requires each of its members to be his or her neighbor’s keeper”, and proverbs or adages, reinforced by sanctions, are used to ensure “honesty and trust in interpersonal and group relationships” (ibid: 130-131). Fear of exclusion acts as a deterrent because “an individual expelled from the group does not have an identity” (Velayutham and Perera, 1996: 69). Triandis suggests that such exclusion is “emotionally draining” for in-group members, hence the rigid requirement for conforming to group norms (Triandis, 1989: 511).  

In “culturally-evolved” communities, where there is no choice but to belong (Moemeka, 1998: 122), “[n]othing done, no matter how important and useful it is to the individual, is considered good unless it has relevance for the community. No misfortune, no matter how distinctly personal, is left for the individual to bear alone. The community laughs together and also cries together.” (ibid: 124). Discussion of African ‘participation’ in 2.5.3 noted the importance ascribed to the unity of the community. “Collectivists define the self as interconnected and interdependent” (Chen et al., 2002: 571). Another way of saying this would be the African adage: ‘I am because we are’ (Mbiti, 1969, quoted in Moemeka, 1998). Whereas "individualist societies prescribe a universalistic norm of dealing with all others with ethical consistency", so that “strangers are simply individuals that the self does not know rather than representatives of any outgroup”, “collectivist societies … are more likely to prescribe particularistic norms and standards for treating people differently depending on whether they are ingroup or outgroup” (Chen et al., 2002: 573). The concept of in-group/out-group may have relevance to cross-cultural ‘partnership’, as “the collectivist self may have “negative

---

30 Weaker versions of in-group-out-group dynamics also occur in individualistic societies: second-guessing what the rest of the group want can cause anxiety as failure risks being made a scapegoat or being branded as a non-team player (Cooke, 2001: 109-110).

31 This expression was often found in the Ethiopian data reported in Annex A.
expectations of cooperation from anyone other than one's ingroups” (Chen et al., 2002: 579, 574). The identification of an oppositional ‘other(s)’ helps form the ‘collective memory’ of national identity (Rothstein, 2000), and the state becomes the ‘ingroup’ if the state is under threat (Triandis, 1989: 509), generating populist nationalism.

Summary

This section has explored some cultural variables which had been identified as relevant to the country context following analysis of the WIDE data and reading the literature in Chapters 4 and 5. Building on the social actor approach, I introduced Denzau and North’s SMMs; both argue that culture determines the way individuals interpret the world around them, their patterns of interaction, motivation and knowledge acquisition. Given the complexity of relationships occurring in the cross-cultural context of aid, and the introduction of new forms of relationship such as ‘harmonisation’ and ‘partnership’, there are clearly a myriad junctures where mental models might be shared, obscured or fractured. Because of the political nature of current aid orthodoxy and because a political crisis in 2005 challenged donors’ assumptions and induced them to alter their Ethiopian aid programmes, I also included a model analysing the relationship between information exchange and polity. Combining these forms of analysis permitted exploration of the ways different perceptions of participation and evaluation were formed and the extent to which the (rate of) attitudinal change, assumed under the NAA, had taken place.

3.6 RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK

This section provides detail about the organisation of the research. It starts with an overview (3.6.1) of examples of ethnography of aid which influenced my selection of the aid chain as a ‘unit of analysis’, and a description of the qualitative methods used (3.6.2). This is followed by a section on ethics (3.6.3), an explanation of the choice of Ethiopia as the country context (3.6.4), and a linked account of the support provided by the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Addis Ababa University (3.6.5). Turning to the organisation of the fieldwork, I describe how donors willing to take part in the research were identified (3.6.6) and how access to their programmes and to
respondents within those programmes was negotiated (3.6.7). Logistical constraints are described in 3.6.8 and, finally, I give details of the timing of the fieldwork, its locations and the numbers of those interviewed, in 3.6.9.

3.6.1 Ethnography of Aid

Although my research proposal indicated an ethnographic study of participation in M&E as a system, I kept coming up against the challenge of what ‘ethnography’ entailed, and whether it was possible to do an ethnography of such a wide ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, quoted in Marsden, 2003: 5), comprising different donors, different levels of government and villagers from different sites. The danger might be that, by doing “quick and dirty ethnography” rather than ‘deep’ ethnography in the Malinowski mould, my research would be insufficiently emic to draw out the multitude of factors involved.

In the period prior to the research, it seemed that there was an increasing interest in how development organisations work. This resulted in a number of ethnographical studies of development which provided useful insights into how such processes and the actors involved can be studied. Because development agencies regulate both policy and practice, a number of authors have used a similar combination of research methods and analytical techniques: a social-actor-approach combining participant observation, textual analysis, and organisational cultural analysis.

Examples of ethnography of development which I found particularly useful were:

Heginbotham’s anthropological study of a development intervention in India in which four different layers of management ‘model’ had to be negotiated by project staff and other actors from the community. His observation of encounters between the different historical and cultural cognitive models of organisation and how people responded to the conjunctures and disjunctures, led him to suggest “three major sources of cognitive models” which could be used to understand organisations - (i) cultural norms and institutions, (ii) historical experience, and (iii) ideologies (Heginbotham, 1975:10-11). This approach clearly has resonance with mental models.
Gould has sought to “establish aidnography as a specific kind of intellectual-political enterprise defined by specific tensions of a discursive and methodological nature”. This should include “how specific definitions compete in everyday social transactions - in speech and in texts, in ritual and performative settings.” He proposes two analytical strategies: firstly, “aid rhetoric can be and is studied for its ‘narrative’ structures” and, secondly, “the analysis of social relations; of encounters of patrons, brokers and clients; or bureaucratic roles and procedures” (Gould, 2004: 263, 269).

Wedel’s recommended method for aidnography was ‘studying through’ (following Shore and Wright (1995: 49), which enabled aidnography to be linked to policy, and thence to “institutions, ideology, power, rhetoric, and discourse, the global and the local”. Wedel recommends talking with “many people in different positions, to assess their moves, the influences upon them, and networks connecting them - and to return to them repeatedly.” (Wedel, 2004: 150, 160, 170).

Gasper provided methodological insights to investigate “concepts and arguments and for reflecting on moral and political assumptions” (Gasper, 2003: 1) and “to demystify the common discourse in development cooperation and international relations, through probing the meanings of ‘development’, ‘freedom’, ‘efficiency’, and so on.” (ibid: 225). Looking for “consensus or compromise across widely different perspectives and interest groups, trying to bridge ideals, interests and action”, Gasper recommends supplementing ethnography with deconstruction of logframes and policy/performance matrices, textual analysis and participant observation from within the aid community (ibid: 3, 24).

I was concerned that breaking the fieldwork up into periods would preclude sustaining research relationships. Fortunately, there were no changes of staff among donors or government respondents once fieldwork started. It also permitted a more longitudinal view in which delays and disjunctures became evident. Fetterman describes ethnography as frequently an iterative, episodic process, where contextual knowledge is built up over time, allowing for major themes to be elicited and for periods of reflection in between field visits, enabling him “to see patterns of behaviour over time” (Fetterman, 1998: 9). Ethnography permits an historical perspective to be taken, mapping how different
organisations were perceived and conducted and changed over time; and the interplay between culture, values, language and practice in power relationships in the development context (Lewis, (undated): 7).

3.6.2 Research Methods

The anthropological literature and my analysis of the WIDE data had shown that most activities at village level were communal and that there was some tension around the idea of individualism in Ethiopian culture. This might suggest Focus Group Discussion as the most suitable qualitative method, but there were three reasons why I chose not to use this technique. First, the emphasis on group cohesion and the hierarchical nature of group activities suggested that the desire for conformity to the ‘group view’ might inhibit expression of individual viewpoints. Second, I knew from the literature and from my initial visit to the field, that oratorical skills were much admired and that those displaying leadership would want to display those skills, at the expense of those who were less articulate and those afraid of expressing minority views. Third, and more practically, focus groups (needing instantaneous translation) seemed an unwieldy vehicle for drawing out the nuances of individual perception and practice.

For these reasons, I chose to use semi-structured interviews as the primary research method. In order to be able to compare the views of donors, government and community, similar questions were asked of each category of respondent. The questions were based on reading the development literature, the anthropological literature and the WIDE analysis, and were sufficiently open that different issues could be raised by/with the respondents. The original list had nineteen questions, but these were condensed and rewritten to be less abstract, more experiential, for community respondents, in order to reduce the risks of incorrect interpretation during the interview and re-interpretation during analysis. (Both sets of questions are attached in Annex B.)

Detailed notes were taken during the interviews. The interviews were not tape-recorded, because I anticipated that respondents would feel apprehensive about expressing views that were critical if their voices were recorded. I needed instantaneous translation in order to follow up unusual points or explore inconsistencies. (This point is pursued in 3.6.3.)
I also carried out a non-verbal exercise with respondents where it seemed appropriate. This involved respondents ordering, in terms of importance, of different factors (to do with government, religion, associational and family life) which affected, for good or bad, their ability to make a ‘success’ (whatever ‘success’ meant for them) of their lives. This exercise was designed to elicit perceptions of autonomy and agency within the structures and institutions which framed their daily lives. Because it was based on the anthropological literature and the WIDE analysis, it was most appropriate with community respondents, though it was tried with some woreda staff and a few European respondents. It used ‘flash cards’, with verbal help for non- or less literate from the translator/research assistant. Where it was not possible to do the full exercise (where the ground was too rough, or too windy - literally, in the field - or there was insufficient time), respondents were asked to rank four factors verbally: God, Government, Community, Self, factors identified from the historical and anthropological literature as being particularly influential.

The third research method employed was textual analysis. Gasper states “The aid world is heavy too on formal declarations and documents .. The abundant speeches and documents are legitimate foci for textual analysis (Gasper, 2003: 3). Rather than following Gasper’s recommendation to put forward “possible reformulations” of the text to make its meaning explicit, the intention here was solely to identify statements of intent and values, and to explore any disconnects or inconsistencies. This method was primarily used with documents issued by donor headquarters or by donor groups in Ethiopia. These were analysed for ‘corporate’ meanings around participation, monitoring and evaluation, and participatory monitoring and evaluation, and for internal logic. They were also used for comparison with individual staff’s perceptions and opinions about these issues.

It had seemed, at the planning stage, as though there would be opportunities for participant observation but this was not the case. Early possibilities of attending donors’ meetings with government were opposed by donors as being politically sensitive. During the fieldwork, none of the three donors undertook evaluations of the aid programmes being followed. I attended one project meeting between international and national consultants, and was later told that my presence had had an inhibiting effect. A white, female foreigner’s presence,
even in administrative centres let alone rural villages, was sufficiently disruptive that it would have been fruitless to expect my attendance would not have altered the dynamics of evaluations or meetings at village level. Although that could have provoked an ‘event’ for analysis, I would have regarded that as extractive. I hoped to be able to ‘tread lightly’.

Observation therefore had to be much more oblique, but could prove revealing nonetheless. During the course of interviews, attitudes to privacy, to transparency/opACITY, ways to maintain distance or to pose a challenge, mechanisms for avoiding engagement, could be juxtaposed against verbal responses or texts’ claims.

3.6.3 Ethics

Language - Translation

In Ethiopia, a multi-ethnic country with approximately 80 indigenous languages, language is particularly political in nature. Amharic is the language of government and a legacy of Amhara domination. English is the language of aid, of external influence and indicative of being educated (to 10th grade and above).

As all donors, key informants and most senior government officials were fluent in English, the majority of the fieldwork above the local government (woreda administrative level) was undertaken without translation. At woreda level, officials were offered the choice of speaking English or either Amharic or Tigrigna (the languages in the two regions in which the research took place). I was assisted by interpreter-research assistants from both regions who were graduates in sociology and social anthropology from the University of Addis Ababa (see 3.6.5). Both Amharic and Tigrigna, the language of the Tigray region, are rich in allegory and elaborate linguistic devices which preclude all but the very fluent foreigner from understanding the nuances and subtleties being conveyed.

Using a translator, I was open to criticism of being ‘complicit with wider political inequalities’ (Watson, 2004: 60). However, Grint provides an alternative perspective: even though “we need to construct a series of empathetic competencies”, and although cultural boundaries can be seen as “protection
from the ‘other’, Grint suggests that we need to accept “not passing as a local” (Grint, 1995: 172). Quite apart from the practical difficulties of cost, time and degree of linguistic complexity, I argue that the nature of the research itself justified the use of translation. As part of the aid process, government officials and national staff working for donor agencies are involved in frequent transliteration between Amharic or Tigrigna and English. The ‘political inequalities’ were already there. Equally, the process of M&E includes field visits by international and national staff who rely on English as a common language and who often rely on local staff to translate. As a researcher, I therefore experienced some of the same constraints of participation in M&E process which I was studying. Although English is favoured in Ethiopia, as being technocratic and precise, the ambiguities inherent in any language (ibid: 9), result in conflicting interpretations. Finally, the actual ‘language’ being studied is that of ‘participation’, one of Gasper’s ‘languages of aid’, an essential component of aid ethnography (Gasper, 2003: 24).

**Ethical Procedures**

Health service experience had instilled in me the medical ethics’ principles of ‘duty of care’, confidentiality and voluntarism, enshrined in medical research as ‘informed consent’. In the social science context ‘duty of care’ raises questions of power, the type, length and effect of the encounter; and the risk of confusion over the purpose, limitations and potential outcomes of the research. The researcher should take steps to minimise these risks as far as possible, without putting any responsibility for the ethical process on the research subject. The ESRC warns that social science research is most clearly shaped by social processes when the research involves different national cultures. The emphasis on the individual, enshrined in the concept of ‘informed consent’ “can seem inappropriate or meaningless” in more collectivist societies in developing countries (ESRC, 2005: 28, 24).

In a regime where party influence is manifest at sub-hamlet level, there was a possibility of putting the research subject at risk if attempting to seek them out without official permission. In a situation where there is very little privacy, either socially or administratively, conventional ethical standards promise little. In practice, each respondent was given written as well as verbal information about the research and asked to sign a consent form, or to give verbal assent if
illiterate. Talking through the consent form structured the translators’ verbal explanation, ensuring that the essential points were covered. The consent process may have done far more to soothe my normative concerns than to allay the practical concerns of the respondents, but some individuals opted not to take part. The WIDE data indicated that confidentiality was a contentious issue and, in practice, I found that an explicit guarantee of confidentiality was considered important by a number of government officials.

3.6.4 Country Selection

The original proposal was not formulated in relation to a specific developing country. The political and cultural context is fundamental to the research thesis, but the research was not predicated on the ‘peculiarity’ of Ethiopia. Rather, it was an exploration of a sub-system of aid (participation in evaluation) where donors interact within a single political and cultural context. The eventual country selection was based on two criteria: (i) the existence of strong research links with the country concerned, and (ii) the presence of significant donor-funding. The Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, which was funding my Studentship, had strong research networks with four countries participating in the Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) research programme. Of these, Ethiopia was the most aid-dependent.

3.6.5 Research Relationship with Addis Ababa University

At the start of my fieldwork, the University of Bath had an on-going research relationship with the SoSA at Addis Ababa University. In the time, the country coordinator for Ethiopia for the WeD research project was based in SoSA. In order to formalise research support from SoSA, I applied for Affiliate Research status. Vitally importantly, they assisted me with the identification of experienced and very able research assistants.

---

32 This was an extension of work by Dr. Philippa Bevan, undertaken at the Centre for African Studies, Oxford, in conjunction with Addis Ababa University (Ethiopian Village Studies, 1994-1996). The extensions were WIDE (2003), and WeD (2003-2007; www.wed-ethiopia.org).
3.6.6 Selection of Donors

I had originally intended to select one multilateral agency, one bilateral and one international NGO. Given the emerging complexity of the context, I decided to simplify the ‘variables’ and focus on three bilateral donors. As a preliminary step, I visited most of the donors with large programmes in Ethiopia. Some declined straight away. One (Ireland) expressed interest immediately, but with other donors it was a process of negotiation. As I was also relying on textual analysis as one of my research methods, it was important that I could access documents in English.

3.6.7 Negotiating Access

I assumed that, as a researcher, I would be able to gain access to donor staff easily but the process of negotiating access to their programmes took longer than I anticipated. In retrospect, the process with each agency involved many of the characteristics I later found in the research data, both in their documentation and their interview responses, reflecting the agency’s organisational culture. I describe below how access to their programmes was negotiated and, through them, to government officials, local leaders and community members.

Donors

Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI) 33

DCI showed immediate interest in the research because they were developing an M&E framework with the Tigray Regional Government for their recently established regional budget support programme. After an initial meeting with a senior specialist, I was asked to submit a research description to be discussed by the development cooperation team at the embassy. The negotiation was concluded with a verbal agreement that my research should not be ‘extractive’. This stemmed from previous research which had not provided DCI with any feedback. It was agreed that I should offer conceptual support around participation in monitoring and evaluation to embassy and local staff, who were being encouraged to undertake qualitative monitoring to support DCI’s

---

33 Ireland Aid was renamed ‘Development Cooperation Ireland’ just before the research period. Its name then changed again in 2006, to Irish Aid.
programme in Tigray. The embassy arranged for me to visit the programme, during which staff introduced me to woreda officials.

**Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)**

Just as DCI professed lack of experience in monitoring and evaluation at regional level and lack of an integrated system between the field and headquarters, CIDA claimed to have a coherent RBM system. Negotiation took place during a period when there were several changes of staff. One individual took the initiative to get colleagues' agreement to take part in the research. CIDA differed from the other two donors because it had created a structure within the embassy with responsibility for M&E, with a focal person at the apex, an adviser and two senior embassy staff responsible for overseeing M&E in different sectors. None of these staff had any formal training in M&E apart from an introduction to RBM.

Unlike the other two donors, CIDA did not have regional offices. Although its preferred modality was federal DBS, it had two technical assistance projects managed from CIDA headquarters. Access to both projects was arranged via the embassy. Attempts to interview headquarters staff, either by telephone or on missions to Ethiopia, were unsuccessful.

**Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)**

Access to SIDA was initiated through an informal contact and it took me some time to work out how to get formal access. Eventually, I realised that the formality I was anticipating was not required and, in retrospect, this probably reflected Sida's more equalitarian organisational culture. Embassy staff arranged an introduction to Sida's programme in Amhara. Staff at SIDA headquarters were open to direct contact and the interviews were easily set up. They also referred me to colleagues with relevant responsibilities.

**Government**

Contact with Regional government staff, in each case, was made through the donors' embassy or regional staff. The choice of senior government staff interviewed were determined by the individual donor's aid modality. Access to
district (woreda) staff was negotiated either through the donor’s local staff or via the project or programme director, and thence via the chairman of the woreda. Because of the difficulty of arranging appointments, selection of woreda respondents was opportunistic but nevertheless provided respondents from the different bureaux: finance and economic development, capacity building (health and education) and natural resources (agriculture). The Development Agents (DAs) work at kebele level, but organisationally they fall under the woreda Bureaux of Agriculture. I therefore categorised DAs as part of the government structure. Typically, the agriculture sector head would allocate DAs to accompany us to the villages.

The *de facto* administrative structure in Ethiopia extends beyond that of the formal administration and it is difficult to establish the boundary between government and community. For the purposes of writing up this research, I have categorised the formal administrative structure as ‘government’ and the administrative network below this as ‘local leaders’.

A simple representation of the multi-tiered structure of government is:

Formal government structure:
- Regional government
- *Woreda*
- *Kebele*
- *Got*

Informal structure:
- Leader of 30 households
- Leader of 5 households.

A diagrammatic representation is included in Chapter 6 (6.2.1).

**Community**

As government administration reaches down into the community, a central ethical question was the feasibility of obtaining direct, unsupervised contact with individual members of rural communities, to get their voluntary cooperation without putting them under some form of duress.

My first fieldwork visits were to Tigray. The strength of support for the government from the Tigreans I met, combined with the impressions that I had
formed of the widespread control exercised by the federal government, led me to assume that my itinerary and the identities of my respondents would be known. For ethical reasons I would, in any case, be explicit about the nature (and limitations) of the research but, with the growing realisation of government influence and the insights which I had gained from analysing the WIDE data, I concluded that I should use the existing structures in order to approach community members. Not to do so, might have caused community respondents unnecessary anxiety. DAs would be known to the majority of the local population, worked closely with both local officials and with local leaders, were part of the woreda structure, and therefore made appropriate ‘gatekeepers’.

In practice, there were regional differences. In Tigray, the interpreter and I went with the DA out into the fields or walked through villages where we were allowed to identify possible respondents apparently independently. The practice in Amhara was for the DAs to collect a group of potential respondents, from whom I could select individuals. Tigrean community respondents were mostly interviewed in the field where they were working. In Amhara, respondents were interviewed either in their own homes or in the DAs’ office (without the DAs being present).

3.6.8 Logistical Constraints

I was unprepared in a number of ways; firstly, for the poor communication and transport infrastructure and secondary for the local political economy, and the pervasiveness of government influence. I had assumed that the conditions described in the anthropology and history literature which I had read in the UK, most of which were written before the current regime came to power, would no longer be current. This proved to be incorrect, and caused me to modify my ambitions for the fieldwork.

Because some of the woreda towns and nearly all the kebeles had no electricity or telephone connection, it was difficult to arrange appointments in advance with government staff. To visit communities in Amhara, our practice, agreed with government officers, was to visit the site and try and make appointments for the following day. In Tigray, visits were more spontaneous. However, the lack of rural roads, the roughness of the terrain (and for me, the altitude), meant that
the choice of sites was further limited to those on or reasonably close to a rural road.

The second ‘logistical’ problem related to delays incurred by the government’s response to political unrest following the disputed elections of May 2005. Research with donors in June 2005 was briefly curtailed by the violent suppression of demonstrations. The start of the community-level research, which had already been delayed for logistical reasons, was further delayed in November 2005 (4.3.6). Community fieldwork in one of the research sites had to be cancelled because of concurrent tension on the Eritrean border.

3.6.9 Pattern of Fieldwork: numerical data on interviews

I undertook the fieldwork in separate blocks. Six visits to Ethiopia were made in total, three in 2004 (total five months), three in 2005 (total six months) and a short visit in 2006 to present the findings to the donors. These periodic visits enabled me, while back in the UK, to keep abreast of the fast-changing aid dialogue and agendas of the international donor community, to reflect on the research process and the findings to date and to expand my reading as a result.

Key informants included multilateral agency staff, academics and NGOs. At the embassies, the key contact - a senior specialist in each case - was interviewed on every field visit. National staff were interviewed only once, unless they were responsible for M&E. In Tigray and Amhara, the pattern was to interview one or two key individuals at Regional level, and then to interview program staff at regional and (if applicable) at sub-regional level. After the initial visit to all four sentinel woredas in Tigray, research was undertaken in the three woredas in the north and west. The last piece of Tigray fieldwork coincided with a build-up of troops on the Eritrean border, and was therefore limited to just two woredas. In Amhara, two visits were made to the regional capital, where the SIDA area based programme’s PCU is based, and two visits to programme woredas in the East Gojjam zone.

Interviews were held with senior programme staff and with up to three sector heads at woreda level. Community interviews were held in five kebele in Tigray (two in one woreda, three in another), and in nine kebele (three in three different woreda in Amhara. The plan was to interview one or two formal (kebele, got)
leaders, one or two informal leaders, with a female household head and two to three farmers in each kebele, usually within one got.

Table 3.1: Number of Interviews Held

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donors (and their employees)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (incl. DAs)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (incl. sub-kebele leaders)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other key informants</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maps, showing the regions’ locations within Ethiopia, are provided in Annex C. The precise fieldwork locations are not identified, to preserve respondent anonymity.
CHAPTER 4
ETHIOPIA: HISTORY, GEOPOLITICS AND AID RELATIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This is the first of two chapters which provide background information about Ethiopia, supplemented by commentary from the literature which identifies issues within Ethiopia’s history, political economy and communal life which have relevance for understanding relations within the aid chain, between donors and government, and between layers of government and communities. Chapter 4 outlines the national and international context behind Ethiopia’s aid relations, and Chapter 5 describes inter-community relationships and structures in rural Ethiopia.

Chapter 4 comprises two parts. The first, 4.2, provides an overview of the geopolitical and historical context of Ethiopia, necessary to understand the formation of national identity and policy, Ethiopia’s international significance in the Horn of Africa and the pattern of aid which it has attracted. Having set out the political arena for Ethiopia’s relations with the ‘international community’, the second part, 4.3, includes an historical overview of aid relations, before focusing in on the aid programmes of the three bilateral donors who took part in this research. The organisational frameworks underpinning these programmes are assessed via documentary analysis. (Their normative frameworks are explored in Chapter 7, together with the findings and subsequent analysis.) This is followed by a description of the structure of donor-government relations current at the time of fieldwork, 2004-2005, when Ethiopia had been identified as a pilot country for harmonisation under the NAA, and a brief account of events surrounding the general election of 2005 which provoked some donors’ to change their aid modality. The section concludes by drawing out some issues from the chapter which appear to challenge some donor assumptions about aid relations with Ethiopia.
4.2 THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS

4.2.1 Ethiopian History and Identity

Ethiopia’s prehistory and its Christian narrative have importance both for its peoples’ sense of national identity and its international relations. Palaeontological excavations, in particular the discovery in 1974 of human remains dating back 4-6 million years and man-made artefacts such as the stelae at Axum (10th century BC), are sources of national pride. More influentially, the Solomonic foundation myth, written down in the fourteenth century as the *Kebre Negast* (“The Glory of the Kings”), “defines the secular and religious foundation of Ethiopian nationhood” (Mulatu and Yohannis, 1988: 1), and links Ethiopia with the world of the Old Testament. The legend claims that Menelik, the son of the Queen of Sheba (here an Ethiopian) and the Biblical King Solomon of Israel, returned to Ethiopia with the Ark of the Covenant (Bahru, 1971: 7). While these legends are formative for Ethiopian internal identity, its external identity was being constructed by the West as a mythical realm at the boundaries of Christendom (Levine, 1974: 89). The earliest of the Western Christian accounts, dating from the 12th century (Mulatu and Yohannis, 1988: 1) echoed descriptions from Ancient Greece that Ethiopia was a land of piety, rich in natural resources\(^1\).

Historically, Christianity arrived in northern Ethiopia (‘Abyssinia’, widely assumed to be equivalent to the current Amhara and Tigray regions\(^2\)) in the 4th century. With the exceptions of the Zagwe dynasty (10th-13th centuries) and a period of warlordism (the Era of the Princes, 1769-1855), their shared Solomonic heritage allowed both Tigreans\(^3\) or Amharas to hold the throne until 1974. Succession was never hereditary and rulers gained power most frequently by military conquest. In the nineteenth century, Menelik II (1889-1913) repelled the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, and incorporated territories to the south west, approximating to

---

\(^1\) In Homer’s Iliad, Ethiopia was visited by Zeus and other gods (Levine, 1974: 3-4).

\(^2\) ‘Abyssinia’ is a derivation of ‘Habesh’, which originally described people with a common linguistic heritage, living in an area equivalent to modern day Eritrea and Tigray. ‘Habesha’ is in current usage, mainly in Amhara and Tigray, as a local term for ‘Ethiopian’.

\(^3\) Its spelling may be Tigrean or Tigrayan.
present day national boundaries, within which Amhara culture (essentially, the adoption of Amhara ‘behaviour’) was broadly assimilated (Clapham, 1988: 24)\(^4\).

Haile Selassie, installed initially as Regent from 1913, and then as Emperor from 1930, employed absolutism to ‘modernise’ Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991: 140). Ethnically Amhara, he achieved a level of national unity which his predecessors had been unable to do, limiting the power of the nobility by appointing ministers and senior officials ostensibly on the basis of merit. In compensation, the nobility were “granted hereditary rights over tributary land”\(^5\) (ibid: 140). The Constitution of 1931 reinforced Haile Selassie’s power, allowing him to appoint, or control selection of, representatives to the two parliamentary chambers, one of several measures intended to impress the international community with Ethiopia’s political modernity (ibid: 141). Despite Haile Selassie’s growing international prestige, Britain and France initially took no action when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Bahru\(^6\) suggests that resistance to the Italian occupation was hampered by antagonism between the Ethiopian military leaders and indecision by Haile Selassie (ibid: 154-157, 174). Although it was the British who expelled the Italians in 1941, following Mussolini’s alliance with Hitler, Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian occupation for the second time (cf. 1896) helped consolidate its pride as an African country which has never been colonised.

Haile Selassie’s personal authority grew until he acquired an “almost supernatural aura” and (interestingly for this research) instituted a mechanism whereby “The humblest of his subjects could appeal to him, incriminating the highest ... the emperor could pose as an impartial arbiter between the wrongdoer and the wronged.” (ibid, 1991: 201-202). Despite a revised constitution of 1955 introducing universal suffrage and an elected second chamber (ibid: 207), opposition to the emperor’s absolute power increased and an attempted coup in 1960 marked the

---

\(^4\) Clapham’s critics argue that adoption of the Amharic language and norms of behaviour was strategic, in order to access resources. Lewis refers to the absorption of these ethnic groups as “this expanding African ‘Hapsburg empire’ ... with literacy in the mother tongue of the Amhara elite being the final signature of full citizenship.” (Lewis, 2004: 70 - 71)

\(^5\) Historians are divided as to whether imperial Ethiopian society was ‘feudal’. Bahru suggests that 19th century feudalism was weakened by ‘modernisation’ under Haile Selassie’s reign (Bahru, 1991: 159).

\(^6\) Much historiography of modern Ethiopia is influenced by ideological positioning in relation to Ethiopia’s transition from the Derg to post-Derg political economy.
beginning of an alliance between radicalized soldiers and young intellectuals (Teshale, 2008: 346). The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), formed in 1950s, became increasingly active in opposing the imperial regime (Bahru: 222-223). Teshale describes the ESM, which drew together students from both impoverished rural areas as well as urban elites, as “one of the most radical in the world”, and the source of Marxist radicalisation within the military (Teshale, 2008: 347).

Weakened by opposition from within the military establishment and widespread accusations of covering up the famines of 1972-1974, Haile Selassie was deposed in September 1974 by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (‘the committee’ or Derg in Amharic). The Derg proclaimed itself the nation's ruling body, introduced a programme of sovietisation and sent students out into the countryside to implement land nationalization and villagisation. In 1977, internal power struggles within the Derg culminated with Mengistu Haile Mariam, by then Chairman of the Derg and Head of State, conducting a ‘Red Terror’ campaign against opponents of the Derg, in which thousands were killed.

Many of the leaders of resistance movements which developed in the 1980s against the Derg had been students in the 1960s. These ethnic, regionally-based opposition groups, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989, which eventually ousted Mengistu in 1991. The EPRDF, which led the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 1991-1995, has continued in power through subsequent elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 under the leadership of Meles Zenawi of the TPLF. Although the EPRDF arose from a Marxist movement “and its Marxist core, the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray”, it downplayed its public adherence to Marxism in 1991 in “its eagerness to be embraced by the West” (Teshale, 2008: 346).

Toggia comments that “Ethiopia’s history has always been a totalizing narrative” in which historians have written selectively in favour of dominant groups, in which

---

7 Teshale Tibebu describes these as being “merciless campaigns of mutual defamation, recrimination and dehumanization” (Teshale, 2008: 349)
8 Estimates vary from 2,000 to 250,000.
periods of non-Solomonic hegemony such as the ‘Era of the Princes’ are glossed over (Toggia, 2008: 322). However, the ‘totalising narrative’ continues to be politically relevant, exemplified by the federal Constitution, Tigrean domination of the current regime, its structure and institutions: “Ethiopia survived because throughout its history the national ideology was stronger than ethnic sentiments” (Messay, 1999: 258). This is reinforced by the term habesha, a derivation of ‘Abyssinia’ (see 4.2.1), to denote anyone or anything Ethiopian, in apposition to ferengi, a derivation of ‘French’, or foreign). Poluha describes habesha as a strong sense of allegiance to ‘Ethiopia’, not clearly defined except as in opposition to European countries (Poluha, 2004: 189).

4.2.2 Religion, Socio-Economy and Ethnicity

Religion

An overview of religion is inserted here, between sections on history and geopolitics, because it is a major linking factor between the two topics. In both, Ethiopia is presented as a predominantly Christian nation. There is a regional element, with EOC predominant in Amhara and Tigray. In the first part of the 20th century, the EOC forbid Protestant missionaries from working in these northern regions. Nationally, estimates of current religious adherence suggest that Orthodox Christians account for approximately 40-45%, Muslims 40-45%, evangelical protestants (‘Pente’) 10% (and increasing, according to recent estimates), traditional believers 5%. Conversion to evangelical Protestantism is a greater threat to the Orthodox church than Islam, despite a rapid increase in mosque, and church, building (Vaughan, 2004: 20-21).

---

9 Estimates in the rural areas differ: the Participatory Poverty Assessment 2005 gave the distribution as 30%EOC, 40% Muslim, 25% other Christian denominations (PPA 2005: xvi)
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), established in the 4th century AD, ceded from the rest of the Christian church at the Council of Chalcedon in AD 451 because of its adherence to monophysitism, the refusal to accept that Christ had two ‘natures’, human and divine. The EOC has a primarily monastic tradition, with strong, in some cases extreme, elements of asceticism. Doctrinal dispute ‘ended’ in 1855, when the Patriarch decreed the current (Tewahedo) doctrine as the sole doctrine. Those who failed to accept it were punished and theological disputation gradually died out; the EOC (“the institution incarnating Ethiopian personality”, (Messay, 1999: 219)) retains its doctrinal orthodoxy. As a result, “Ethiopia has never known a period of religious purification and reform” (ibid: 255). Aspen notes that there is no preaching and “only a minimal importance is attached to an intellectualization of the Holy Word in the EOC” (Aspen, 2001: 78). Under EOC doctrine, the individual has no direct relationship with God. Divine intervention will only occur through the intercession of one’s patron saint on one’s behalf (Hoben, 1970: 196).

The EOC obtained independence (‘autocephaly’) from the patriarchate of Alexandria in 1959. In the early years of the Derg, church property was nationalised, the Patriarch was executed and clergy imprisoned (Chaillot, 2002: 37-39). The Derg’s campaign against the EOC was deeply unpopular with rural Orthodox communities and was subsequently relaxed. The EOC re-established dialogue with the other Orthodox churches in 1989, and it retains close links with the current government, for whom it remains an additional channel of communication with the rural population.

Islam

Islam arrived in Ethiopia in the 7th Century (Abbink, 1998: 113). Mohammed reportedly advised his followers that Abyssinia was “a land of righteousness where

---

10 Braukamper suggests that, with the exception of the confiscation of church land, the Derg “did not threaten the strong position of the Orthodox Christian Church, because it was an outstanding guarantor of Habasa (Ethiopian) national superiority” (Braukamper, 2003: 5).
God will give you relief from what you are suffering” (Erlich, 1994: 6). Arabic literature extols the ‘tolerance’ of the Ethiopians. Islam and the Ethiopian form of Orthodox Christianity have shared certain characteristics, such as seclusion and self-sufficiency, which may account for the extent of tolerance, albeit as a secondary religion (Abbink, 1998: 112-113). Islam was proscribed for a period during the second half of the 19th century, with little effect, and was subsequently tolerated provided that Orthodox Christianity enjoyed political and cultural dominance (ibid: 115). The Italians supported Muslims in preference to Orthodox Christians during the 1936-41 occupation (ibid: 117). Muslims have only been able to hold official posts since the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, even though the constitution of 1931 allowed them to do so (Trimingham, 1952: 136). The current regime has a policy of religious ‘co-existence and cooperation” (Abbink, 1998: 117) but Orthodox Christianity is dominant in political terms, not least because of TPLF domination of the EPRDF. Ahmed argues that this narrative of harmonious relations is overplayed, and that there has been an undercurrent of tension over religious practice and mosque-building (Ahmed, 2006).

There were other, secular, reasons which enabled toleration of Islam. First, being a universal religion rather than a national one, unlike the EOC, Islam is not bound up with - or threatening to - national identity. Second, Muslim groups were widely scattered and had little intergroup communication or institutions (Markakis, 1974, quoted in Messay, 1999: 104). Third, traditionally Muslims were engaged in trade, an occupation which was thought inferior to agriculture, and therefore there was no socio-economic rivalry attached to religion (Pankhurst, quoted in Messay, 1999: 146).

International interest in Islam in Ethiopia increased in the 1960s because of the Iranian revolution “and the subsequent breakthrough of what is generally called Islamic fundamentalism” (Braukamper, 2003: 1). Although Ethiopia is portrayed (and portrayed itself to the superpowers, Makinda, 1987: 32) as a “Christian island

---

11 Abuna Paulos, patriarch at the time of the research, comes from the same area of Tigray as Meles Zenawi, and is widely regarded as closely connected with the TPLF.

in a sea of pagans” (Clapham, 1988: 25), in practice there has been relatively little religious, as opposed to political, conflict within Ethiopia or with its neighbours.

**Socio-Economy**

Eighty-five per cent of Ethiopia’s population (estimated at 75 million\(^{13}\)) depend on subsistence agriculture, mainly grains and livestock. In 2006, Ethiopia’s per capita GDP of US$130 was “only about a fifth of the Sub-Saharan African average”\(^{14}\). Life expectancy is 42.5 years\(^{15}\) and 8.6 million people are estimated to be chronically food insecure\(^{16}\).

Socio-economic indicators vary across the regions, partly for topographical and therefore geographic reasons. Rain-fed cereal-culture is practiced in the northern highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. The private sector in Ethiopia is relatively small: private investment comes from a small base, often with links overseas. Small-scale private enterprises are predominantly concerned with petty trading: craft-workers are traditionally despised in Ethiopian culture (Korten and Korten, 1972: 67). The government’s vehicle for economic growth is Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI), which, “pursued since the mid 1990s has had poor results” (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004b: 9). ADLI is rolled out via DAs under Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES), ‘informing’ the most innovative farmers to adopt (uniform) extension packages, and then ‘persuade’ the remainder to follow (Kassa and Abebaw, 2004: 143).

Ethiopia has had repeated famine, the worst being 1888-92, which killed 50% of the population (Pankhurst, R., ?1985). The 1984 famine, which received worldwide attention, resulted in increased numbers of aid interventions, particularly from NGOs, but also from Western governments which had previously been ‘unable’ to provide aid to a Marxist country. Commentators (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 96,

---

\(^{13}\) Source: DFID, 2006. Population statistics were being calculated by the Central Statistical Authority at 2.9% p.a. increase since the last census in 1994. The 2007 census figure was 76m.


\(^{15}\) Source; DFID, 2006, from World Development Indicators Database April 2006.

\(^{16}\) Source: DFID, 2006, from EC Diagnostic Survey 2006.
(Hoben, 1995: 1013-1016) suggest that a form of “Malthusian narrative” for Ethiopia, which includes population growth, traditional farming practices and environmental degradation, informs government environmental policy (soil and water conservation through food for work). Ethiopia’s topography thus synthesised international and national political priorities around the participation of the rural population.

**Ethnicity**

Nineteenth century expansion to the south (4.2.1) incorporated the Oromia, Gambella and Beneshangul regions and what has now become the Southern Nations National Peoples (SNNP) region. Ethiopia has more than 85 ethnic groups, speaking approximately 82 languages. Regional topographies has resulted in distinct livelihood systems based around different forms of agriculture: pastoralism, cereals and ensete (false banana), and livestock. Religious lines do not coincide with ethnic ones; for example, an Oromo can be either Christian or Muslim. (Clapham, 1988: 25-26).

Modern views of ethnicity at the supra-regional level, particularly in the political system, are contested. Bahru ascribes Ethiopia’s apparently successful multi-ethnic society to a large extent due to “long-distance trade between them [south and north, which] tempered … political and cultural heterogeneity” (Bahru, 1971: 21). A more influential argument suggests that the “plasticity” of Amhara culture\(^{17}\) permits its incorporation by other ethnic groups (Clapham, 1988: 24; Messay, 1999: 107). At the regional level, there are diverse liberation movements within the larger regions of the south, but in SNNP it is widely accepted that ethnic federalism allows them a degree of influence in central government which would not otherwise be available. There is very little opposition in Tigray, the ruling heartland of “the party”, the TPLF-led EPRDF.

\(^{17}\) Amhara culture, transmitted administratively through the Amhara representatives sent to the new territories by Menelik to collect taxes - and culturally by the church - was sufficiently flexible and tolerant of alternative religious expression to allow it to be easily absorbed by the new members of the empire.
Ethiopia’s adoption of national federalism arose from ultra-leftist or Stalinist ideas (Young, 1998: 193; Aregawi Berhe, 2004: 592). The EPRDF “holds that ethnonationalism cannot be restricted to the cultural sphere, and that ethnic federalism was the only way of avoiding secessionism” (Young, 1997a: 214). A pivot between two dyads occurs here; ethnicity as threat and ethnicity as cultural harmony. Under the current Ethiopian Constitution, every nationality [ethnic group] has the right to secede. Those that disagreed with this ethno-nationalist approach were accused of “undermining the already initiated democratic process through espousing chauvinism and war mongering” (Kassahun, 2003: 120), and were subject to arbitrary arrest and coercion during elections (Berhanu and Vogel, 2006: 211).\textsuperscript{18} As a result, “the basis of participation for all the other [political] groups was founded in their adherence to the EPRDF’s sacrosanct principal of national self-determination” (Kassahun, 2003: 119).

### 4.2.3 Political Systems

**‘Abyssinian’ Political Skills**

Section 4.2.1 noted that Amhara and Tigray shared a religious, political and hegemonic history. Bridging the gap between discussion of ethnicity and of the Ethiopian political system, this subsection sets out the relative “indigenous” political skills which are prized in Amhara and Tigray.

There is a suggestion that Tigray is both more ‘modern’ and a truer inheritor of the Ethiopian form of authority than Amhara: “The Amhara and Tigrayans are closely related peoples ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. However, according to Markakis, Tigray alone represented purity and continuity in the Ethiopian culture” (Young, 1997a: 46). Writing before the revolution, Korten notes that Tigreans pride themselves on being “more direct and, thereby, more ‘honest’ in their speech” (Korten and Korten, 1972: 64). Others attribute Tigrean confidence to the revolution itself: Tigray has “a certain self-confidence” combined with the “political space” to undertake regionally-determined initiatives, both due to the pride of the Tigrean role

\textsuperscript{18} Meles Zenawi used the same argument to justify imprisoning 100 leaders of the opposition coalition following the 2005 elections.
in the liberation from the Derg, and to the continued primacy of Tigreans in the ruling party (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 113).

These skills are interwoven with political practice. Under the current regime, Tigrean officials’ understanding of the participatory approach “does not take a liberal, populist form; there are greater resonances with the early Maoist ‘mass line’ approach, a connection which dates back to the ideological beginnings of the TPLF in the 1970s. … Informants describe such a participatory model as a process whereby the government listens through the baito19 system, ‘takes a consensus’, makes a decision and then conscientises and mobilises the people around the issue.” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 115). The TPLF worked with traditional norms around religion and oral culture to gain peasants’ loyalty, synthesising these with more ‘modern’ techniques such as meetings, majority voting, public debates, elections at local levels and public evaluations (Young, 1997a: 173-192).

**The Current Political Economy and its System of Government**

The EPRDF, the coalition of ethnically-based liberation groups led by the TPLF which overthrew the Derg, has remained in power since 1991. Bahru describes the origins of the TPLF as a movement “leading a predominantly peasant guerrilla army”, being so influenced by Maoism that it had the reputation of being “more Albanian than the Albanians themselves, who in turn had the distinction of being more Chinese than the Chinese themselves” (Bahru, 2003: 9). Ideological drift between Meles Zenawi’s leadership of the TPLF in Addis and its core constituency in Tigray led to a split in the party in 2001, from which Meles emerged dominant having purged his rivals (Medhane and Young, 2003).

Although the EPRDF ostensibly rejected Marxism in 1991 in order to appeal to the international community, commentators agree that it retains strong Marxist-Leninist characteristics. These include the party acting as “vanguard political force”, mobilising the peasantry as “an undifferentiated class” and, somewhat paradoxically, self-determination of nationalities (Gilkes, 1999: 37; Abbink, 2006: 19

---

19 The *baito* was an administrative level, now replaced by *kebele* (see below, in Amharic, and *tabia* in Tigrignia).
Relatively little academic attention has been paid outside Ethiopia to analysis of revolutionary democracy ideology. The EPRDF produced a 700 page document on party ideology in 2001, which few Westerners have read\(^{20}\). Vaughan’s work, *Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia* (2003), describes the form of ‘revolutionary democracy’ embraced by the EPRDF as seeking “to exploit the performative power of the unified and mobilised participation and will of the community - of the ethnic group.” (Vaughan, 2003: 182). Party doctrine is based on Marxist-Leninist understanding of democracy which has two, contradictory perspectives: the first is that communities can be mobilised and engaged through using its (national) language, cultural traditions and knowledge systems; the second is that “a vanguard party may legitimately grant self-determination to a community from the outside” (*ibid*: 170). In Vaughan’s analysis, revolutionary democracy “is based on communal collective participation, and representation based on consensus, indicating that the party’s “perception of democracy is shaped partly by ideological conditioning, and partly by historical experience, fusing class theory with ethnicity” (*ibid*: 171).

EPRDF influence reaches down into rural communities, where it is indistinguishable from local administration (Pausewang *et al*., 2002a: 38; Kassahun, 2003: 144), with the passivity of peasants attributed to fear of retribution (Pausewang *et al*., 2002a: 39). As a result, “beneath democratic institutions, the TPLF has established an administration and a power structure that perpetuates its rule” (Pausewang *et al*., 2002b: 242). The number of meetings organised within government and by government for local communities is a continuation of practice developed by the TPLF during resistance to the Derg, when political instruction was delivered through “an enormous number of seminars, meetings, discussion forums and the like in all government institutions”, although “the degree of ideological penetration achieved by hours of conscious political education appear[ed] to be slight” (Clapham, 1988: 97, 153-154).

---

\(^{20}\) Its title, translated from Amharic, is ‘Revolutionary Democracy: Directions and Strategies for Development’, but the document does not contain a definition of revolutionary democracy (Notes of a talk by Tekalign Gedamu, Addis Ababa, 2001)
Despite the primacy given to nationalities in revolutionary democracy ideology, the regional state governments have no representation in the Federal government and, despite decentralisation (started in 1996), the federal government maintains close control over policies and systems of implementation. The formal regional structure comprises: the regional government, districts (woredas), villages (kebeles), and sub-villages (gots).21 Under decentralisation, woredas became centres for planning and spending, though in practice, planning remains top-down and party officials are active down to the smallest administrative units. While the formal government structure stops at kebele level, below kebele administration which is “the lowest official level of the government hierarchy, a network of mengistawi buden … operates below this”22 (Harrison, 2002: 600).

Conception of ‘government’ under both the imperial and Derg regimes is described as “the embodiment of the national will, the overseer of the destiny of the people”, in which the individual is a subject with duties rather than a citizen, characterised by ignorance and laziness (Amare Tekle, 1990: 36-38). With its long history of strong, centralised rule, “Government in Ethiopia is a matter for experts who know what to do; the ignorant peasant, by contrast, is there to be … governed”. (Clapham, 1991: 260, 263).

While essentially critical, Young’s view is that the form of rural administration which the TPLF23 established through a combination of two apparently contradictory initiatives (mobilisation and allowing peasants’ participation in decision-making) “may well prove to be the movement’s most enduring accomplishment” (Young, 1997b: 195). This presents another dyad: the EPRDF’s assertion that the peasantry are the driving force behind Revolutionary Democracy (“it is not a question of magnanimity … the peasants … can choose based on an understanding of the facts” (Chairman of the EPRDF, quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 185) and its conception of the peasantry as “illiterate, uneducated”, needing to be ‘taught’ (Abbink, 1991, quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 202). Rural people participate in local government

---

21 The equivalent terms in Tigrigna are tabia (for kebele) and kushet (for got). A diagram of the structure is provided in Chapter 5 (Findings).
22 Mengistawi buden is the Amharic term (‘government team’) used for ‘Development Group’ for 30 households.
23 Initially during the Derg regime, but continued under the EPRDF.
meetings for a variety of reasons: to get information, to receive propaganda, to be subject to mobilisation, to receive benefits (or to avoid being denied benefits), to be involved in communal work (Aalen, 2002: 91). “The party rhetoric reaches all the way down to the grassroots, and peasants in the countryside who do not read newspapers or listen to the radio are well versed in the political vocabulary of the national political leadership”, so that party influence is “a naturalised part of everyday life” (ibid: 92).

By the late 1990s, “Ethiopia ha[d] acquired virtually all the forms of democracy but little of its substance”; and that this ‘façade’ of democracy masked “an essentially bureaucratic-authoritarian regime dependent upon the EPRDF’s superior military muscle” (Harbeson, 1998: 63, 66). Most Western governments approved the 1995 elections as free and fair, even though the EPRDF won more than 95% of the vote (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 112). Despite the EPRDF’s hegemony, the persistence of other dissident factions in Ethiopia “gave Western governments hope that the democratisation could develop” (Pausewang et al., 2002a: 26). Vaughan describes the “dominant view within the EPRDF …that disagreements in policy and perspective should generate political competition rather than dialogue. This has contributed to polarized political landscape, in which the ruling party has benefited little from the constructive criticism of outsiders” (Vaughan, 2004: 16; also Gilkes, 1999: 38). This implies that multiparty elections per se are not unacceptable to the EPRDF, but challenge - let alone defeat - is regarded as intolerable. Commentary on the 2005 elections and subsequent violence (see 4.3.6) suggest this was the case; the EPRDF appeared to welcome the elections, probably as “a means to sustain the incumbent regime’s own power” (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 112), or, as in previous elections, “as referenda to validate its policies and reaffirm consensus” (Vaughan, 2004: 20), but the party reacted aggressively when the opposition coalition appeared to be gaining widespread support (Abbink, 2006: 184; Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 112). In contrast to the state’s monolithic structure, opposition groups have historically been weakened by fissuring of coalitions, attributed to traditional traits of inability to compromise, intolerance of diverging views, mistrust and hostility (Kassahun, 2003: 122, 141).

24 The purge of rivals to the TPLF leadership in 2001 would appear to conform to this concept of political competition in which ‘winner takes all’.
Ethiopia shares a recent political history of ‘African socialism’ with ex-colonies such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. Common features include: revolutionary enthusiasm for persuasion disintegrating into coercion (physical, psychological, financial); the use of quasi-government community organisations (farmers, women’s and youth associations) as an additional vehicle for implementing government policy; enforced labour; the use of decentralisation to extend the power of central government, and ethnicity used instrumentally in the name of national unity (Mamdani, 1996: 173-178, 187). However, Clapham suggests that Ethiopia cannot be regarded as typical of Africa, as its polities cannot be replicated elsewhere (Clapham, 1988: 243). Ethiopia’s long history of leadership from the top is fertile ground for the establishment of an instrumental state. Dessalegn argues that, in contrast to the rest of Africa where the state is ‘in retreat’, the Ethiopian state has been expanding since the 1960s, by reaching down into every locality (Dessalegn, 1999: 8).

4.2.4 Geopolitical Context Within The Horn of Africa

The tradition that Ethiopia’s first emperor, Menelik, was the son of the Queen of Sheba and the Israelite King Solomon plays a role in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, as well as being Ethiopia’s foundation myth. This sentimental link with Israel accounts, according to Makinda, for Ethiopia’s support for United States (US) policies regarding Israel, and in turn the US has used Ethiopia as a base from which to monitor activity in the Middle East. In consequence, Ethiopia has difficult relationships with its Arabic neighbours which drives it closer to Israel. In return, Israel lobbied the US to give aid to Ethiopia during the Derg period (1974-1991), hoping that pro-US elements within the regime would gain dominance (Makinda, 1987: 61, 39, 98-99). Although active in Ethiopia from 1940, the USSR never gained ascendancy (ibid: 74, 91; Bahru, 2003: 9).

 Presumably greater for Ethiopian Orthodox Christians (which predominate in the dominant, highland population)
Ethiopia was regarded internationally as an example of modernity within Africa when Emperor Haile Selassie applied for Ethiopia to join the League of Nations. Lipsky, writing in 1962, was able to say that Ethiopia “has a special role in World affairs” as “an ardent champion of collective security” (Lipsky, 1962: 2-3). In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity was founded with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. Western powers appeared sympathetic to the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 (Clapham, 1988: 239). Clapham suggests that they took a ‘soft’ line despite Ethiopia’s “public commitment to Marxism-Leninism” from 1974, because of the political consequences of risking destabilisation of the region (ibid: 236). The international community regarded the EPRDF as “better than the military dictatorship of Mengistu and, having started from scratch, needed time to develop a more democratic society” (Pausewang et al., 2002a: 43). The present regime, the “lynchpin state of the Horn” (Vaughan, 2003: 36), has received the support of the international community because of its expressed willingness to adopt economic and political reform and, more latterly, because of the increased importance of its role in the geo-politics of the Horn of Africa; Ethiopia is now regarded as “a ‘frontline state’ in the war against terrorism” (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004: 12).

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an on-going issue in the politics of the Horn of Africa. In the 19th and early 20th century Eritrea was subject to the Western powers’ ‘scramble for Africa’ then, having been annexed by Ethiopia in 1952, Eritrea ceded from Ethiopia in 1993 following a referendum (in accordance with revolutionary democracy ideology), but war erupted in 1998 after a minor border incident (Healy, Chatham House, 2008: 12). Peace was brokered in 2000, but a disputed border required UN adjudication which was made in 2003, awarding the territory (Badme) to Eritrea, a decision which Ethiopia still rejects. A Chatham House analysis suggests that “the impact of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was not confined to the two countries, but profoundly altered the alliance structure of the entire region” including the Sudanese conflict and the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, its effects rippling outwards to Uganda, North Africa and the Middle East (ibid: 11, 20, 39).

Despite the US and its closest allies having maintained a significant presence in Ethiopia, this has not resulted in greater depth of understanding about the political
and cultural processes in Ethiopia (Makinda, 1987: 218; Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004: 103). Rather, the West’s conception of Ethiopia is as a negative/positive dyad: as a result of its famines, Ethiopia is typically ‘African’ in the sense of “creating their own problems” and it is regarded as ‘a special case’ because of its Christian heritage and its ability to avoid being colonised (Sorenson, 1993: 2). Even at the height of Ethiopian dependence on Western aid during the 1984 famine, Ethiopia managed to dictate the terms of the engagement with the international community (Clapham, 1988: 238).

Healy argues that “outsiders need to understand the limitations of their own role” in the Horn, but they are hampered by their lack of understanding of its militaristic history, misunderstanding local conceptions of power in their analysis of strong/fragile states, failing to notice that “local actors generally operate on a much longer time frame than their own” (Healy: 41, 43). International interest in the politics of the Horn has increased since the 9/11 2001 attacks but Healy warns that “Outside actors need to respond judiciously to the allegations of terrorism levelled against various parties to conflict in the Horn. The underlying conflicts in the region are older than the contemporary war on terrorism and will probably outlast it.” (ibid: 45).

Donors’ hesitation in responding to the post-electoral violence in 2005, and the speed with which they replaced budget support with a new modality using block grants (see 4.3.6), is ascribed, in part, to Ethiopia’s role in the ‘war on terror’, which political scientists expected, correctly, to continue despite the anticipated change in US administration (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 119); under Obama’s Democratic administration, “Today, Ethiopia is a strategic partner of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism”.

___________________________
26 US State Department June 2009 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm [accessed 09.06.09]
4.3 AID RELATIONS

4.3.1 History and Pattern of Foreign Aid

The history and pattern of overseas development aid (ODA) to Ethiopia reflects the geo-politics of the Horn of Africa, the politics of the three different regimes in Ethiopia in the past 50 years, and the political economies of its bilateral donors. Despite its geopolitical importance, Ethiopia has received lower per capita levels of aid than most low-income countries. In FY 2004/2005, "Ethiopia received US$15 per capita in development assistance, compared to US$49 per capita for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole" (Furtado and Smith, 2007: 1). It was, however, "one of the earliest developing countries to receive aid in the modern sense, starting in the late 1940s" (ibid:3).

Changes in the pattern of aid are clearly linked to national and geo-politics (ibid: 22). ODA was given on an even trajectory from 1960, during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie and through his overthrow by the Derg in 1974. Geo-politically, this period coincided with the Cold War, but the pattern of ODA changed dramatically before it ended, the catalyst being the famine of 1984, which drew worldwide concern. A second sharp rise in ODA occurred following the 9/11 attacks on the US in 2001. US military support was already being provided (and US bases accommodated), but the US Centre for Defense Information reported in 2007 that, during the five years after 2001, US military assistance to Ethiopia increased by approximately 250% and arms sales had roughly doubled, compared with the previous five years.27

During the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000), a number of bilateral donors withdrew aid, but later had difficulty re-establishing relations with the Ethiopian government. A few donors, the Netherlands and Norway, for example, have limited their aid since 2003 because of Ethiopia’s failure to recognise the UN’s decision on the Eritrean border issue. Figure 4.1 overleaf provides a timeline for total ODA to Ethiopia from DAC countries for the period 1960-1975, with the political events superimposed.

---

Figure 4.1: ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005

Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements. (Political events added to the timeline.)
Chapter 4: Ethiopia: History, Geopolitics and Aid Relations

Figure 4.2. ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005, disaggregated by donor

Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements
Figure 4.1 indicates that major increases in aid occurred in response to the 1984 famine, and the sharp rise in 2001 and subsequent years suggests that the rise in aid was linked to a political event, the ‘war on terrorism’.

Figure 4.2 disaggregates the data in Figure 4.1 to identify the ODA trajectories of the three donors studied (Canada, Ireland and Sweden) against other leading donors. Read in conjunction with Figure 4.1, it shows that the overall volatility of aid to Ethiopia, with very different trajectories between, for example, the US and Europe. Aid given by the three selected donors was comparatively consistent, although Ireland’s is relatively recent.

4.3.2 Donors: Canada

*Overview*

Canada’s ODA to Ethiopia dates from 1967. Figure 4.3 shows that its trajectory has largely followed the general pattern of aid across DAC donors (shown in Figure 4.1). Ethiopia currently ranks fourth in the top ten recipients of Canadian gross ODA.

![Canada](Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements)

Figure 4.3. Canadian ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005
Organisational Structure and Development Objectives

CIDA is one of four ministries within the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade which has responsibility to ensure coherence across Canada’s international activities across four departments: CIDA, Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Finance (OECD, 2003a: 44). CIDA disburses 80 per cent of total Canadian aid funding (ibid: 21). It successfully decentralised its offices prior to the 1980s, its local knowledge contributing to CIDA’s “ability to take quick, informed and relevant decisions” (CIDA, 2002a: 18). Despite this, it recentralised to headquarters in the early 1990s on the grounds of cost but, with the shift to programme approaches, CIDA again decentralised because it required deeper in-country knowledge (OECD, 2003a: 69). CIDA expected its field offices to cover policy and programming, as well as administrative functions; and to employ local staff who “have the advantage of in-depth country and experience which Canadians often do not have” but “at lower cost” (CIDA, 2002a: 18).

Although Pratt suggests that CIDA’s organisational relationship to Foreign Affairs is responsible for policy incoherence (Pratt, 1999), two issues feature persistently and transparently in international policy, suggesting a strong degree of coherence. Firstly, Canada’s multicultural population is a significant driver of policy. The DAC noted that Canada “has always been a country of immigrants, with currently one in six citizens born abroad” (OECD, 2003a: 47), suggesting this was a potential source of strength for Canada’s international influence: “The interaction between developing countries and their diaspora in advanced countries can be a new dynamic for development.” (ibid: 47).

The second major issue is security, with an increased emphasis after 1989 (Pratt, 1999: 91) and, after September 2001, Canada sought to strengthen its partnership with the USA (GoC, 2005b: 7). This emphasis meant that CIDA’s role was guided not just by Foreign Affairs, but also the ministries of Defence, Justice, the mounted police and by civil society organisations, subordinating poverty reduction to CIDA’s trade and security interests (Pratt, 1999: 94, 99). The OECD-DAC also suggested that “poverty reduction is not necessarily treated as an overarching goal.” (OECD, 2003a: 33).
Chapter 4: Ethiopia: History, Geopolitics and Aid Relations

The 2003 Peer Review found that CIDA’s analytical capacity was weak (ibid: 56), and Noel et al. argued that policy coherence was weak, with assumptions about Canada’s internationalism and its role in world politics used to formulate a national consensus, masking “the political divisions that underpin public opinion on foreign policy” (Noel et al., 2004: 30, 39). However, Clark et al. argue that Canadian aid is highly structured: (Clark et al., 1997: 155). Implementation occurs at the bottom of a whole series of nested policies which can be traced up a hierarchy back to Canadian foreign policy but, because of this top-down nature, delivery is often unresponsive to local conditions or recipients’ priorities (ibid: 155, 162).

Canadian development cooperation did appear to be relatively bureaucratic. It employed comparatively more people than other donor agencies (OECD, 2003a: 54), and CIDA’s administrative costs were nearly twice as high as the DAC average (ibid: 17). The Peer Review noted that “CIDA is fully aware that too much of operational staff’s time is spent on processes and procedures and has launched a process of work simplification. One of the first achievements has been to rationalise project cycle management from 32 to three different systems across the agency.” (ibid: 57). Public management reform is a key plank of CIDA’s development policy, but the Peer Review warned CIDA that “capacity development of institutions should not become an end in itself and fail to provide benefits to the citizens whom they are ultimately meant to serve.” (ibid: 38).

Preferred Modalities

In 2003, an estimated 70% of ODA was being disbursed through Canadian NGOs, consultants and academic institutions (ibid: 27). By 2005, 61% of CIDA aid was either budget support or programme modality (OECD, 2006b). The move to programme aid was to be conditional on countries having “a reasonably sound policy and management environment” (OECD, 2003a: 68), and on careful risk analysis before commitment to funding. The risks would be managed by continuous monitoring, prompt remedial action and by invoking a pre-establish[ed] exit strategy which had been communicated clearly “to all parties involved”. (ibid: 68).
Canada’s foreign policy statement (1995) set out six development priorities: basic human needs; gender equality; infrastructure services; human rights, democracy and good governance (CIDA, 2002a: 13). In 2003, the DAC peer review noted that, “Although not part of the six programme priorities, the areas of security and conflict prevention are categorised under human rights, democracy and governance, and have become one of the major features in Canadian aid.” (OECD, 2003a: 38).

Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005

Canada’s aid funding was previously more widely dispersed than any other DAC country (OECD, 2003a: 28). This was attributed to the absence of its own colonial history, its links with both Anglophone and Francophone countries, and the dispersed origins of its immigrants (OECD, 2003a: 21). Canadian aid is now more focused on Africa (OECD, 2003a: 28). Its investment in Ethiopia rose significantly in the financial year 2003-2004 (from Can$ 8.4 million to Can$ 30.2 million) (CIDA, 2005: 1). It used a variety of modalities: DBS (approaching 50% in 2005); multilateral initiatives such as the Safety Net programme; and supporting NGOs working in the field of governance.

CIDA’s emphasis on the importance of capacity building was evident in its Country Development Programming Framework (2004-2009) (CIDA, 2004). In accord with its strategy of preferring to work with multilaterals, CIDA worked jointly with other donors and with the World Bank on initiatives such as the Safety Net programme. The Framework talks little about its relationship with the Ethiopian government as ‘partnership’; this term is reserved for its support for Canadian NGOs (ibid: 18). Improved coordination with other donors did not extend to delegated cooperation, an arrangement by which one donor acts on behalf of another, but Canada preferred to act in concert with other agencies, so that a greater proportion of its missions to Ethiopia were carried out jointly, compared to other donors (OECD, 2005b: 60).
4.3.3 Donors: Ireland

Overview

Ireland’s ODA to Ethiopia is influenced by its own history of poverty and religion. Irish catholic missionaries were working in Ethiopia during the Imperial regime, but Ireland’s formal aid programme is relatively recent. Figure 4.4 shows that Irish ODA has a smoother trajectory than Canada’s, with a significant increase in aid occurring in 2000, and therefore preceding the geopolitical effect of the 9/11 attacks, though increasing in 2003. Ethiopia currently ranks third in top ten recipients of Ireland’s gross ODA.

![Graph showing Irish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005](source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements)

**Figure 4.4. Irish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005**

Organisational Structure and Development Objectives

At the time of the research, Ireland’s overseas development agency had been recently renamed Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI). DCI was run as a directorate within Ireland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). MFA’s primary goals included making “a substantial and effective contribution to lasting poverty reduction and sustainable growth in developing countries through the policy and programmes of Ireland Aid, and by

---

28 DCI was previously called Ireland Aid; since 2007, it has been called Irish Aid.
working for a just and stable international economic system” (DCI, 2004b); “Our aid philosophy is rooted in our foreign policy, in particular its objectives of peace and justice. Our development cooperation policy and programme reflect our longstanding commitment to human rights and fairness in international relations and are inseparable from Irish foreign policy as a whole” (ibid).

The OECD-DAC criticised MFA’s policy of rotating diplomatic staff temporarily into development cooperation posts without providing any specialist training (OECD, 2003b: 60), and resulting in loss of institutional memory (Ireland Aid, 2003: 86). Other weaknesses identified included shortage of staff, lack of incentives or career structure for specialist staff, many of whom were on short-term contracts (ibid: 82; OECD, 2003b: 59). A new Technical Section had been given an “ambitious range of responsibilities including technical support, policy formulation, developing guidelines on good practice” but, as a result, DCI had “no full-time dedicated in-house expertise in some key priority areas, including health, gender, governance, environment and water” (ibid: 60).

An Advisory Board, comprising a politician, four NGO representatives, a priest, a management academic and a representative of the business community, was established in 2002 (DCI, 2004e). Its mission was to “oversee the expanding programme; advise on strategic direction; support development research; work closely with Development Cooperation Ireland to maximise quality, effectiveness and accountability” (DCI, 2004b). DCI’s funding of NGOs was above-average for the DAC (OECD, 2003b: 62) and Irish missionaries also received DCI funding. There was a ready supply of volunteers wanting to work with Irish NGOs (DCI, 2004a).

**Preferred Modalities**

In 2003, Ireland’s preferred modalities were area-based programmes (ABPs), sector wide approaches (SWAps) and DBS. It saw them as “complementary and mutually reinforcing”, but the choice of modality “ultimately depends on specific conditions in each country” (OECD, 2003b: 70). The Committee on Aid Effectiveness noted ABPs enabled Ireland to feed knowledge gained from experience at local and community levels into national level policy dialogue (ibid: 18). It was also felt that ABPs supported decentralisation processes and built local capacity (Ireland Aid, 2003: 34). SWAps
respond to DCI’s key objectives of education and health, and “can provide … an avenue for donors to respond more effectively to fiduciary risks through their regular monitoring and reviewing of sectoral programmes as a complement to their on-going support for strengthening partners’ financial systems” (OECD, 2003b: 73).

DCI framed its discussion of budget support in terms of risk management rather than the partnership agenda. To counteract perceived fiduciary risks, DCI intended to rely on improvements in financial accountability and governance (ibid: 74) plus “a rigorous collective system of accountability and oversight is implemented by the donors, with the World Bank frequently playing a coordinating role” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 58). For Ireland, it was important that donors “impose strict limits in relation to any area of expenditure which falls outside this [poverty reduction] (e.g. military spending)” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 58). Even then, it was felt that “arrangements should be sought which would ‘ring-fence’ the Irish contribution in some way and ensure that this funding is linked to specific reform objectives in, say, the health and education sectors which are of importance to Ireland Aid.” (ibid: 58).

**Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005**

Ireland focuses its ODA programme on Sub-Saharan Africa, “the poorest region of the world”, with which the Committee on Aid Effectiveness saw “a continued demonstration of Irish solidarity with Africa.” (ibid: 8, 43). The main objective of the Country Strategy Paper (2002-2004) was poverty reduction, with support to social sectors; partnership was the second most important strategy.29 DCI had SWAps in health and education, gave indirect support via Irish NGOs and made a major commitment to food security programmes, such as the Productive Safety Net Programme30. Ireland’s decision about budget support was based on qualitative judgement on the APR on the PRSP, and seven indicators from the PRSP policy matrix; it monitored these ‘with interest’ but did not regard them as conditions to disbursement (OECD, 2005b: 57).

---

29 The 2005-2007 CSP was being drafted during the period of fieldwork. It included greater emphasis on political engagement around democratisation, though this was still framed in terms of humanitarian concern, and greater emphasis on harmonisation with other donors.

30 The PSNP has been funded by the World Bank, CIDA, DCI, DFID, EU, USAID and WFP
Tigray Regional Support Programme

Ireland had funded ABPs in Tigray from 1994 but decentralisation effectively fragmented them by eliminating the supra-district zones. DCI credited their change in modality to block grant support, based on “mutually agreed targets” from the PRSP, to their “long and trusted” relationship with Tigray. Anticipated benefits from budget support were skills transfer, capacity building, enhanced policy dialogue and harmonisation with government systems and plans, thus strengthening local ownership. The anticipated benefits for Tigray included reduction in transaction costs and improvement in Regional government systems, driven by demand for accountability from the people. DCI was in the process of developing a joint M&E framework with the Tigray Regional Government, to monitor four sentinel woredas intensively (DCI, 2005, DCI, undated).

4.3.4 Donors: Sweden

Overview

Figure 4.5 overleaf indicates that Sweden has been relatively consistent in providing aid to Ethiopia. Its engagement with Ethiopia grew out of missionary work since before the Second World War. Public support for aid to Ethiopia continued despite disquiet about Emperor Haile Selassie’s domestic policies, because “political interference [was] prescribed by Swedish aid legislation”. Ethiopia was one of Sweden’s six main aid recipients from the mid-1960s to the 1990s (Hook, 1995: 98-100). Between 1998-2001, however, Swedish assistance was curtailed because of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. The Country Strategy for 2003-2007 warned that, “If Ethiopia is drawn into armed conflict, the entire development cooperation must be reviewed” (Sida, 2003b: 11, 17).

Organisational Structure and Development Objectives

Sida has been a central government agency operating via an annual mandate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). A parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs lays down the overall political goals and the budget for international cooperation and international development cooperation (Sida, 2005b: 29). The MFA is responsible
for policy formulation and for multilateral funding; bilateral funding, which Sida disburses, accounted for 55.8% of the aid budget in 2005.

Sweden’s aid programme originally had four objectives: economic growth, economic and social equality, economic and political independence, and democratic development (Hook, 1995: 101). During the 1990s, explicit objectives about aid effectiveness and the development of a market economy were added. These changes came under fire from both the political left and right; liberals were concerned that the changes “would undermine the normative values that had been a source of Swedish pride and prestige in previous years” and the right criticised aid effectiveness (ibid: 113-114). Swedish aid policy had previously been determined, in large part, by Swedish values: “being a small power with no ambitions to control any other country or region of the world, Sweden had often acted quite altruistically in the global arena” with ideas of solidarity with people from less developed countries emanating from Sweden’s “social welfare legacy” (Elgstrom, 1999: 146).

![Graph: Sweden's ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005](image)

*Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements*

**Figure 4.5. Sweden’s ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005**
Increased levels of migration, particularly from Eastern Europe and later from the Middle East, and alignment with the growing ‘international consensus’ around aid, influenced a major shift in Sweden’s development policy. In 2003, new legislation Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development introduced a government-wide policy, “an overarching goal of equitable and sustainable global development, which is to be achieved via a more coherent policy and increased collaboration and co-ordination with other countries and actors” (OECD, 2005a: 20).

Prior to the Policy, “Swedish aid objectives [were] on a high level of abstraction” and did not place stringent limitations on Sida’s ‘substantial’ freedom of action (Elgstrom, 1999: 119). Sweden’s Policy for Global Development identified terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other concerns relating to security as “key challenges of our time” (GoS, 2002: 11, 34-36) and emphasised the importance of multilateral cooperation in protecting ‘global public goods’ (GoS, 2002: 61-62).

The DAC peer review (2005) concurred with the findings of the internal performance management report that, despite the number and depth of Sida’s internal and commissioned evaluations and studies, this resource was not adequately used for analysis, either to inform or to interrogate government policy (Sida, 2005b, 34). Ostrom notes that: “Sida, both as an organization and as a collection of talented individuals, can boast of a deep reservoir of knowledge and expertise in development cooperation. Even so, Sida’s institutions have not employed this knowledge to its best effect.” (Sida, 2002b: 44).

The Policy for Global Development proposed three changes to Sida’s practice. It established Sida’s Policy & Methods Unit, which describes itself as “a guarantor for coherence”, “linking together analysis, methods development, human resource development and guidance. We combine steering, coordination, dialogue, support, follow-up and feedback.” (Sida, 2005c). However, an internal study noted staff’s concern that, rather than promoting coherence, “the policy and methods documents contain too many unclear requirements that are presented as being equally important.” (Sida, 2005b, 38). The second change proposed the establishment of an independent institution to evaluate the policy’s effectiveness. The DAC suggested this would duplicate the work of the existing, well-respected evaluation and audit unit within Sida,
and, as of 2005, the locus and form of evaluation remained resolved. The third change was greater decentralisation to improve aid quality. Labelled ‘Vision from the Field’, it involved recruiting local programme officers, as well as moving staff from Stockholm to the embassies (Sida (undated-b): 1). Sida headquarters were to provide support to the field offices “through guidance, policies, advice and methodological and subject matter expertise” (ibid. 1) and Sida’s field staff were expected to “take on an active role in highlighting conflicting objectives within Swedish policy.” (Sida, 2005f, 12-13).

_Sida at Work: a guide to principles, procedures and working methods_ (2005) emphasises the role of analysis in an environment characterised by “complexity, interdependence and dynamism” (SIDA, 2005d: 36). The DAC Peer Review commented on the complexity in Sida’s conceptual framework for development cooperation. The apex of Sida’s framework, poverty reduction, is followed by two ‘perspectives’: a rights perspective and the perspectives of the poor, then eight ‘central component elements and three cross-cutting themes. Sida’s website included a “remarkable array” of policy statements:” two ‘over-arching policies’; 17 thematic and specific “sector policies”; 19 “position papers” and many more “guidelines”; research documents and other papers (OECD, 2005a: 21, 51). The Review warned against confusion of responsibilities between MFA and Sida and against the effect of Sida’s policy complexity (organisationally and conceptually) on the workloads of staff in Sida’s field offices (ibid: 51, 65). The precedence of ‘urgent’ documentation from Sida headquarters over local material and the high turnover of expatriate staff meant that Sida was dependent on the national programme officers at the embassies for its institutional memory (King and McGrath, 2004: 149-150).

**Preferred Modalities**

In 2003, Sweden devoted marginally more funding to social sectors (education, health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, water, sanitation, and culture and media) than to human rights and governance. Only 11% was devoted to agriculture and natural resources (OECD, 2005a: 33). In 2003, 90% of Sweden’s aid to low income countries was untied, but, as the 2003 Bill pointed out, “unilateral untying by individual countries is liable to distort competition, which is not the purpose of untying aid” (GoS, 2002: 71).
Chapter 4: Ethiopia: History, Geopolitics and Aid Relations

The values associated with Swedish aid, international solidarity, autonomous role for the recipient government, long-term commitment and weak levels of donor self-interest (Hook, 1995: 102, 103) appeared to be synergistic with budget support. However, an internal review of the budget support literature expressed concern about fungibility if local officials “misperceive[d] the intentions of the policy makers” (Sida, 2004c: 15). The 2003 ‘global’ policy allowed Sida indicated a shift from solidarity to conditionality, so that “The parties’ respective obligations and the possibility of continuing, changing, terminating or suspending cooperation must also be clearly specified”. (GoS, 2002: 63).

Sweden has used ABP modality for many years. Evaluation in 2002 noted that Sida failed to use the opportunity to use ABP data to improve programme performance, to learn as an organisation or to build local capacity (Farrington et al., 2002: x). Arguing for evidence-based modality decisions, the evaluation suggested that ABPs had an important role in providing contextual information to assess PRSP effectiveness (ibid: 72-73).

**Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005**

With a policy of focusing its aid on countries with low per capita incomes, Sweden allocates 50% of its ODA to Africa (Sida, 2005a: 26). Sweden’s approach to development cooperation in Africa is based on its political and social structures, hence public support for Nyerere’s Ujamaa programme in Tanzania during the 1970s, which regarded Sweden as “a friendly, benevolent donor” (Elgstrom, 1999: 117).

Characteristically, Sida has produced studies on Ethiopia’s political and cultural structures. The *Country Strategy Paper (2003-2007)* contained a detailed analysis of Ethiopian politics, both current and historical. Its *Country Analysis* (2003) surmised that the EPRDF would continue “to use repressive mechanisms to clamp down on opposition” and that “wide-scale human rights violations will occur”. At the same time, it noted that, in the “international fight against terrorism”, the country played a “crucial role in the stability of the Horn of Africa”. As regards capacity, the Country Analysis noted that, on the one hand, “Ethiopia has demonstrated a high capacity for regular accounting, expenditure control and reporting”, but, on the other, decentralisation “is at
present causing chaos”, because the government was implementing it at an ‘unrealistic’ pace (Sida, 2003a: 11-13, 28).

Sida’s ABP, the Sida-Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP), started in 1997. Its objectives were increased agricultural productivity and economic diversification (Phase I) and good governance and equitable development (Phase II) (Farrington et al., 2002: 12). The programme is managed by a Programme Coordination Unit under a National Director; the PCU contracts technical assistance from a Swedish consulting company. At the time of fieldwork, the Programme was negotiating funding for Phase III.

4.3.5 The Framework for NAA Adoption

Harmonisation

In 2002, a Consultative Group meeting in Ethiopia “led to a striking level of agreement with the government and donors about the need for enhanced dialogue structures” (DAG, 2005a: 10). At the High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (2003), the Ethiopian State Minister of Economic Cooperation, MOFED31, requested that donors harmonised with Ethiopian systems for “procurement, disbursement, monitoring and evaluation and reporting. More aid as budget support, multi-year funding and aligning policy dialogue with government cycles were also highlighted.” (DAG, 2004a: 5). In 2004, the Government reiterated that alignment was necessary “If Ethiopia is to conduct effective planning, aid coordination and management” (OECD, 2005b: 58).

The OECD-DAC’s 2004 review of harmonisation in Ethiopia found that “many donors (especially non-budget-support donors) have done little in practice to harmonise their own country programmes”, despite the fact that “95% of donors support the government of Ethiopia’s agenda” (OECD, 2005b: 53)32. The international donor community were not prepared to align their systems precipitately: “The development of appropriate systems in Ethiopia will take time. In recognition of this, the OECD-DAC Guidelines recommended that donors simplify and harmonize their systems until they can rely on

31 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
32 The donors providing DBS in 2005 were limited to the AfDB, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, UK, and WB.
Chapter 4: Ethiopia: History, Geopolitics and Aid Relations

the government systems.” (DAG, 2004a: 8), although “the government openly challenges donors to abide by its policies” (OECD, 2005b: 54). In 2006, the OECD-DAC noted that donors were still not providing the government with information about planned disbursements and that this affected setting the budget (OECD, 2006b: 13-3). The government was also limited in its openness with donors; it insisted that “only those agencies providing [general budget support] should participate in these discussions”, thus excluding other donors which had significant sectoral programmes and experience from policy discussions (Furtado and Smith, 2007: 18).

Ownership required that “the developing country should be the co-ordinator of development co-operation wherever possible” (OECD, 1996: 17, my italics). This caveat meant that “where local interest or capability is weak, it remains for donors to encourage regular fora for co-ordination, and to assure that their own local representatives participate” (ibid: 17). In Ethiopia, fora established by the donor community included a High Level Forum and the Development Assistance Group. The High Level Forum, a subset of the Ambassadors’ Group, was established in 2002 as “the key structure for enabling mutual accountability and better policy dialogue” and “to act as one link between in-country actors” and donors’ headquarters. It was co-chaired by the Minister, MOFED, and the DAG, and its quarterly meetings focused on SDPRP (PRSP) implementation, harmonisation and policy dialogue (DAG, 2003).

**Donors Assistance Group (DAG)**

The DAG, originally established in 2001 to engage in weekly dialogue with the Ethiopian government, was restructured in 2004 to strengthen dialogue with the government over the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP, the first full PRSP); to build links with civil society organisations; and to feed information to the High Level Forum and the Ambassadors’ Group. It also set up technical working groups (thematic: sectoral and ‘process’) and a pooled fund for DAG action on harmonisation and the PRSP. Jointly chaired by the World Bank and UNDP, meetings were held monthly, participants being the heads of development cooperation from the donor embassies.
During 2004, the monitoring and evaluation thematic working group and the government tried to establish a joint government-donor monitoring and evaluation framework (see below) and jointly agreed a Harmonization Action Plan for the period 2004-2006; this had ambitious targets, some to be implemented before the end of 2004 (DAG, 2004a). The same DAG paper noted that monitoring and evaluation systems had increased “the transaction costs for Government and reduce[d] the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of externally funded projects and programs.” (DAG, 2004a: 8). By May 2005, the monitoring and evaluation framework appeared to have stalled, possibly because the UNDP representative who had led the initiative had moved to another post.

**Donors’ Engagement with Civil Society**

Donors had at their disposal several analyses of the structure of civil society in Ethiopia. These included research commissioned by Sida (Culture and Power in Ethiopia, Vaughan and Tronvoll) and by DfID (the Marena studies, IDS), and there is large body of knowledge about power relations within civil society in academic analyses of Imperial, Derg and post-Derg regimes. More recently, the British Council/European Community had commissioned a survey of Non-State Actors (2004); this included commentaries by historians and political scientists which qualified the apparent breadth and independence of civil society which the survey suggested (EU/MCB, 2004).

One of the actions which the DAG took during 2004 was to support the establishment of an umbrella group of NGOs that had participated as a ‘task force’ in SDPRP discussions. Renamed the Poverty Action Network/Ethiopia (PAN/E), this group was supported by DAG pooled funds, part of which were being used to contract an expatriate advisor. As the government had allowed little space for civil society, PAN/E lacked experience in making its voice heard, and its involvement in the SDPRP process was driven by the DAG. The DAG also funded PAN/E to undertake a monitoring exercise, Citizen Report Card (CRC), to gauge public satisfaction with public services.

Key informants among civil society practitioners and academics thought that lack of skills, not lack of funding, accounted for NGOs’ difficulties in monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP (R1, R2). They expressed reservation about donors’ categorisation of civil society. Terms such as ‘civil society’, ‘actors’ and ‘participation’ were considered too
imprecise to be useful, and donors’ rhetoric about partnership with civil society failed to acknowledge the greater power, knowledge and resources which donors held. Some donors (the US in particular) were perceived to be closer to the government than others; there was concern that budget support strengthened the hand of government and that donors failed to apply conditionalities. One view was that donors did not use the leverage available to them because they feared the consequences of exerting pressure on the government, particularly as “the fight against terror has changed the agenda; now donors say ‘give the government time’” (R3). It was thought that lack of agreement among donors might be the reason for this, although it was noted that donors had taken concerted action during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998).

There was some scepticism among these key informants about donors’ commitment to the participation of ‘poor farmers’ in monitoring and evaluating the provision of pro-poor services. It was thought this would require donors to undertake “a paradigm shift”. Donors set the timetable, but it was too rushed and there were too many ‘initiatives’ on Africa, with insufficient critique and analysis; the Commission for Africa was an example of this. The agenda was set by donors’ priorities, not by the needs of poor people (R4).

**Joint DAG-GoE Monitoring and Evaluation Framework**

Government statistical work had institutionalised in the 1960s, establishing the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), with the Welfare Monitoring Unit and the Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Surveys established in the mid-1990s (GoE, 2004b). DAG noted that the Government M&E system “functions well”, although it needed strengthening (GoE, 2004a: 8).  

In 2004, DAG began establishing a joint M&E framework with the government. The Action Plan focused on capacity building and institutional strengthening aimed at supporting the PRSP policy matrix; tracking progress towards the MDGs and towards harmonisation and direct budget support; and monitoring the nature and distribution of poverty (DAG, 2004b). With 200 indicators, the PRSP policy matrix risked becoming unwieldy (OECD, 2005b: 56), and the DAG recorded that there were “numerous gaps in

---

33 “A culture of discipline and performance pervades government and the civil service” (Furtado and Smith, 2007: 2).
reporting of indicators against the SDPRP policy matrix” in the APR 2003/04 (DAG, 2005b). The number of indicators was subsequently reduced.

The World Bank attempted to involve other donors in its ‘diagnostic reviews’ such as CFFA, PER, CPAR and HIPC\(^\text{34}\), but the number of donor representatives resulted in “extremely large and unwieldy teams”; membership was then reduced, but the non-participating donors felt excluded from access to information (OECD, 2003c: 38). Despite this, the reviews were supported by donors because few had the resources to undertake similar studies themselves (OECD, 2005b: 61, 54).

4.3.6 The 2005 General Election and Aid Relations

Donors had been encouraged by what they interpreted as the government’s acceptance of multiparty democracy in the lead-up to the May 2005 general election. Although European election observers\(^\text{35}\) reported cases of harassment and intimidation, the international community took no overt action as a result of the suppression (by force) of demonstrations in June following the government’s announcement of delayed release of the results while at the same time claiming victory. When the National Elections Board of Ethiopia released the results in July, they were disputed by the opposition coalition led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). As expected, the main urban centres had been won by the CUD, including all seats in Addis Ababa, and all seats in Tigray were won by the TPLF/EPRDF. The CUD made significant inroads in Amhara constituencies. The contentious results were primarily in rural areas, particularly in the southern regions. Under pressure from the international community which, led by the European Union (EU), attempted to mediate between the government and the opposition coalition, the government re-ran elections in 39 constituencies. The second round results, published in September, returned to power some senior government ministers who had lost their seats in the first round.

In response to the second round results, the CUD leadership advised its elected members not to take up their seats in parliament and the EPRDF reacted on 1st

\(^{34}\) CFAA (Country Financial Accountability Assessment), Public Expenditure Review (PER), Country Procurement Assessment (CPAR), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

\(^{35}\) Ethiopia had also invited the Carter Foundation to send observers. Ex-President Carter was less critical than the EU of the government’s handling of the elections.
November by arresting approximately 100 CUD leaders, charging them with treason, and, over the ensuing week, rounding up approximately 40,000 people, imprisoning the majority in detention camps. In urban areas, predominantly in Addis Ababa and the capital of Amhara region, 193 people were killed by EPRDF forces. The violence against protesters in November was carried out by the mainly Tigrean army (Abbink, 2006).

In 2005, the donors providing DBS to the federal government were the African Development Bank, Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the UK and the World Bank. In December 2005, the EU and World Bank withheld a total of $374 million in budget support to Ethiopia; in January 2006, the UK cut its $88 million aid programme (ibid: 189-190). Other donors followed or reduced their other programmes. Canada, for example, concerned to ensure that aid continued to get to the poor, told the government that it intended to stop DBS but, if the government cooperated, it would introduce, in concert with other donors, a new mechanism of block grants to sub-regional districts (woredas), ‘Protection of Basic Services’ (PBS). Donors, led by World Bank, designed PBS because of the risk that “unconstrained budget support could be vulnerable to political capture” (World Bank, PBS PID). By bypassing Ministry of Finance ‘control’, PBS aid was to be channelled through pro-poor sector ministries for earmarked spending at woreda level, backed up by more stringent financial monitoring.

4.2.7 Key Issues for Aid Relations

Ethiopia’s historic and religious past has provided the West and its own people with the image of an ‘imagined’ Christian kingdom “in a sea if Islam”. This image continues to play a role in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. The country’s Christian heritage, its avoidance of colonisation and the strength and longevity of its institutions, particularly the EOC and militaristic leadership, form the bedrock of Ethiopia’s habesha identity. Potentially fragmentary structures have been absorbed by this identity, so that religious difference is turned into largely syncretistic practice and ethnic diversity is managed in dynamic tension by federalism.

As the aid trajectory in Figure 4.1 indicates, the story of aid relations is affected by both humanitarian concerns and geopolitical priorities. Despite the famines of 1973 and 1984,
the dramatic shift in aid in 2001 suggests that the latter priority is the stronger impulse, even though Ethiopia had the second lowest per capita GDP in the world.

Donors which had imposed retrospective conditionality by withdrawing aid during the Ethio-Eritrean war found that this sharpened rather than dented the Ethiopian government’s resolve, and they had difficulty re-establishing relations with the government subsequently. When the OECD-DAC selected Ethiopia as a pilot country for harmonisation, the agreement in 2003 was in response to ‘demands’ for alignment by the government, which subsequently criticised donors for failing to align sufficiently. The history of aid relations, therefore, suggested that Ethiopia was relatively resistant to donor pressure and was prepared to act independently when it perceived that it was in its own interests to do so. The current regime, which has been in power for 18 years, follows a Marxist-Leninist inspired ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, which includes the tenet of “communal collective participation and representation based on consensus” (Vaughan, 2003: 171). This vocabulary clearly indicates a research opportunity to juxtapose Revolutionary Democracy and Liberal Democracy concepts of participation and representation.

The NAA assumes attitudinal change on the part of recipient governments, who are expected to accept policy reform (and influence, via the PRSPs), and adopt the principles of liberal democracy, by allowing ‘civil society’ to hold it to account through critique, dialogue and multiparty elections. Chapter 7 explores the values which donors ascribe to ‘participation’, and individual staff’s perceptions and practice of participation, particularly in evaluation, which will be analysed in relation to NAA and Revolutionary Democracy rhetoric and practice. The next two chapters continue to describe the Ethiopian context. Chapter 5 describes local associational institutions, their forms of participation and regulation.
CHAPTER 5
ETHIOPIA: CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter forms the second part of the literature review on the Ethiopian context. Having set out the historical and political context in Chapter 4, this literature explores the culture and institutions of rural Ethiopia, focusing on the highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. The intention is to review commentary on aspects of rural, highland culture and institutions apparent in communal life in order gain a discursive understanding of how participation and evaluation are conceived and practiced in rural communities. Particular attention has been paid to aspects of participation identified in analysis of the WIDE data (Annex A). These are various modes of verbal expression, individualism-collectivism, entitlement and accountability, the characteristics of leadership and its legitimacy.

It is important to note that this chapter focuses on ‘highland culture’. Much of the literature argues that highland culture pervades the rest of the country through a process of ‘Amharisation’ (see 4.2.1). Other ethnically-based customary governance mechanisms, which are more horizontal in nature, have attracted considerable attention from Western donors and researchers. The Gurage, for example, have a “collective consciousness” rather than a governing central authority, which results in a strong sense of connection with other Gurage. They are also more engaged in the commercial economy, developing rural-urban linkages with cooperative institutions of social and economic support (Baker, 1992; Henry, 2004). The traditional rotating, age-related ‘gada’ system of government among the Oromo, which was based on a revolving system of leadership, has also been contrasted favourably with the hierarchical systems found in the northern highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. Tirfe Mammo suggests that the emphasis placed on diversity in the southern regions suggests, incorrectly, that the northern regions of Amhara and Tigray live in

---

1 The cross-cultural literature in subsection 3.5.2 was also selected from the same analysis.
2 The WIDE data indicated that there was greater variety of institutions of, for example, labour sharing and consequent mechanisms governing inclusion and exclusion, in communities living in other regions such as Oromia or SNNP. However, the PPA (2005) commented on the homogeneity of institutions.
“harmony and prosperity”. Not only is poverty greater in the north, but there is constant political tension in those regions also (Tirfe, 1999: 86).

Section 5.2 draws on a wide literature, from international and national sources, and from older and contemporary analyses. Section 5.3 comments on local religious practice (expanding 4.2.2). Concepts of leadership, legitimacy and opposition are surveyed in 5.4 and specific forms of communication are set out in 5.5. Throughout the chapter, it is apparent that government and community institutions are intertwined. Formal examples of government-community structures are provided in 5.6, and non-state associational structures, described locally as ‘private’, are described in 5.7. Section 5.8 discusses some mores of participation, and 5.9 explores types of informal and formal evaluation which are practised locally. The chapter concludes with a review of local perception and practice of participation and evaluation, for comparison with how donors have conceived and structured participation and evaluation under the NAA (5.10).

5.2 KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL DISCOURSE

5.2.1 Synthesising National and International Literatures

Much of the international anthropological and historical literature on Ethiopia was written in the 1960s⁴, and contemporary literatures continues to draw on this. Given the influence of the anthropological literature from the 1960s-70s, there was potentially a risk of over-dependence on such sources as Donald Levine’s Wax and Gold (1965a), Greater Ethiopia (first published in 1974) and Korten and Korten’s Planned Change in a Traditional Society: Psychological Problems of Modernization in Ethiopia (1972). Levine’s description of the pervasiveness of Amhara culture has been described as “anachronistic in many ways [but] also prescient” in view of current debates over nationalism and ethnicity (Barnes, 2003: 509).

---

⁴ There is an earlier literature stretching back to the 1930s. Alula Hidaru and Dessalegn Rahmato (1976), A Short Guide to the Study of Ethiopia, provides a useful bibliography.
Chapter 5: Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions

In *Greater Ethiopia*¹, Levine rejects the emphasis in much of the literature on Ethiopian ethnic diversity; rather, he observes “what these peoples have in common, how they interact, and the nature of Ethiopian society as a whole” (Levine, 1974: 21). Critics cite the tension of ethnic ‘nationalities’ built into the ethnic-federalist Constitution and the government’s crackdown on liberation movements in the west and south east of the country as reasons for rejecting Levine’s argument (cf. Vaughan, 2003). Despite regarding Levine’s work as “influenced by the more discredited aspects of modernization theory”, Harrison acknowledges that his analysis is accepted by Ethiopian authors studying the Amhara and Tigray dominated government (Harrison, 2002: 598). Clapham ascribes the pervasiveness of ‘Amhara culture’ in other regions to its ‘plasticity’, meaning that it was easily assimilated (Clapham, 1988). Amhara culture is “much more a matter of how one behaves than of who one’s parents are” (Clapham, quoted in Messay Kebede, 1999: 107). Poluha prefers to call it ‘Ethiopian culture’ because other areas have been dominated by this culture for so long that it has been adopted nation-wide (Poluha, 2004: 166).

I deliberately sought out different interpretations by more contemporary Ethiopian authors as a form of ‘triangulation’ of perspectives. I suspected that there could also be an ontological tension between the work of Ethiopian social scientists based overseas, working within a different political and cultural *milieu*, and those who have remained in Ethiopia. I was also interested to find out the extent to which ‘African’ discourses were considered useful in the Ethiopian context. Although there are strongly diverging international views on the particularity of Ethiopian culture, Messay suggests that national discourse is limited, because “Ethiopians have little taste for philosophy, even for psychological analysis” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 179). In contrast, there is considerable literature about the application of mainstream discourses to discussion of the Ethiopian ‘case’, so that Messay states previous studies have relied on “alien” Eurocentric concepts such as feudalism and class struggle (Messay Kebede, 1999: xvii). Markakis, for example, believed that Ethiopia was showing “a path towards class formation which is quite definite and more advanced … than in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa” (Markakis, 1973: 380). This (1973) interpretation puts Markakis at odds with other international observers, such as Clapham, who identify a synchronicity of vision in which

---

¹ Originally published in 1974, a second edition was produced in 2000.
Chapter 5: Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions

Ethiopian national identity supersedes such divisions. Indeed, Markakis recognises that traditional norms "diminish … social distance and inhibit the growth of class consciousness" (Markakis, 1973: 377).

In order to include a number of different perspectives from the Ethiopian literature, I reviewed work from a range of academic disciplines. Two authors who write about Ethiopian 'values' are Messay Kebede, a philosopher from the diaspora, and Habtamu Wandemu, a psychologist working in Ethiopia. By comparing values held by different Ethiopian socio-economic groups, work by these authors can be balanced against the anthropological work of 1960s-1970s. Similar issues were addressed by the multidisciplinary team of Ethiopian researchers reviewing the role of culture in Finnish development cooperation (Vasko et al., 1998: 3). Other scholars whose work I have used include Bahru Zewde, an historian, Dessalegn Rahmato, a sociologist, Teferi Abate Adem, an anthropologist, and Kassahun Berhanu, a political scientist.

5.2.2 Recurring Themes: Continuity, Duality, Synchronicity

Continuity

The previous chapter outlined Ethiopian history and its role in political and national consciousness. Reference to ‘traditional’ is made here not merely because of the apparent sustainability of cultural patterns and institutions explained below, but because “Ethiopians have a tendency to trace back to ancient times and history” (ibid, 1998: 94). Levine’s comment that “received habit is tenaciously kept because of its association with the authority ‘of our fathers’ ” (Levine, 1965b: 261) is confirmed by responses within the WIDE data, where the start of institutions was often dated by respondents to “time immemorial” or associated with Biblical events; and their legitimacy to continuation of their forefathers’ practices. Hoben noted a “core narrative” of “long ago”, in a ‘past' which is seldom defined more precisely than ‘before the present century' (Hoben, 1995: 1013). The theme of ‘continuity’ in both the international and the national literature takes various forms: patterns of leadership, longevity of institutions and patterns of association, and lack of religious disputation. Although Poluha warns against associating this continuity with immutability, as “even continuity is actively created” (Poluha and Rosendahl, 2002: 32), Tirfe Mammo argues that traditional associational life in
Ethiopia has been unaffected by foreign intervention (Tirfe, 1999: 4), and the embeddedness of the narrative may account for the institutions’ resilience.

Markakis and Asmehash argued that the legitimacy of leadership accounted for the slow pace of change in Imperial Ethiopia (Markakis and Asmehash Beyene, 1967: 194), citing Weber’s description as “resting on established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them” (ibid: 194). Just as the Italian occupation of 1936 strengthened the role of traditional authority as ‘national’ (ibid: 197), so the abrupt changes which the Derg subsequently tried to enforce, unsuccessfully, had the effect of reinforcing traditional values and institutions (Messay Kebede, 1999; Bahru, 2003: 5). Ten years after the revolution, Helen Pankhurst had assumed “radical transformation was taking place where in fact there was none.” (Pankhurst, H. 1992: 174).

**Duality**

The literature suggests a number of dyads in Ethiopian culture and institutions. Ethiopians are both the recipients of God’s divine assignment and unworthy of it (Messay Kebede, 1999: 112). Ethiopia is presented as African/non-African, as modernising and traditional, as a land of plenty and of famine. Its ethnic diversity is seen as both a threat and a source of harmony; peasants are regarded as ‘backward’ and as the source of knowledge; relationships are both hierarchical and a matter of chance. This propensity to dualistic thinking may not be solely religious in origin, although doctrine may reinforce it. Writing about ethnic marginalisation in southern Ethiopia, Freeman and Pankhurst suggest that “deeply entrenched cultural values” concerning food taboos are pre-Christian and can be linked with “general symbolic interrelated frameworks” along the following dyads: wild/domesticated, nature/culture, chaos/order (Freeman and Pankhurst, 2003: 349).

**Indigenous Knowledge**

There is an enduring ‘Malthusian’ narrative of environmental degradation, in both the national and international literature, which precludes other explanations (Hoben, 1995: 1015). Hoben argues that this narrative results in local government officials’ holding negative views of peasant agriculture which
discredit indigenous resource management practices (ibid: 1018). This brings to
the fore another dyad: the EPRDF’s assertion that the peasantry are the driving
force behind Revolutionary Democracy (“it is not a question of magnanimity …
the peasants … can choose based on an understanding of the facts” (Chairman
of the EPRDF, quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 185) and its conception of the
peasantry as “illiterate, uneducated”, needing to be ‘taught’ (Abbink, 1991,

**Synchronicity**

Historically, there was also synchronicity, or at least a lack of differentiation,
between the ‘nobility’ and the peasants. Culture, religious practice and land
management were essentially the same (Hoben, 1970: 192); what differentiated
them was their status achieved through military prowess (Messay Kebede,
1999: 133). For Messay, syncretism is a defining characteristic of Ethiopia
institutions. This extends beyond the religious syncretism described in 5.3.2
below, to a “synchronization of the religious vision with the social order and
individual aspirations”. Their foundation myth gave Ethiopians the identity of
God’s ‘chosen people’, so that it was “small wonder the divisive forces of
regionalism and ethnicity were forged into forces of unity” (Messay Kebede,
1999: xxi).

**5.3 RELIGION**

**5.3.1 Orthodox Religious Practice**

Tigray and Amhara form the Christian heartlands of Ethiopia. Marcus provides
this snapshot of Christian highland culture: “The Tigray and Amhara … are the
inheritors and avatars of Orthodox Christianity and its political traditions. They
use ploughs to cultivate grains, and they also herd cattle, sheep and goats.
Their primary affiliation is to the Orthodox church, and they are loosely
organized into parishes. Priests and itinerant holy men keep the banner of
Christianity high and drill their audiences to believe in their moral and religious
sanctity.” (Marcus, 1986). Although there is a system of religious schools and
training for young deacons, priests themselves are often badly educated and
repeat the services in Ge’ez, the EOC’s ancient religious language, by rote;
there is no tradition of preaching and “only minimal importance is attached to intellectualization” (Aspen, 2001: 78). Changes in religious practice have been introduced as the result of government pressure, rather than changes in doctrine. Religious proscription of working on saints days and other holy days has been reduced in order to increase agricultural productivity.

Ascetism is a central plank of EOC belief and practice. Orthodox Christians expiate their unworthiness through prayer and fasting (Messay Kebede, 1999: 112). “Hardship, fasting and even torture are used as a means of training the body and releasing the soul for higher spiritual activities” (Bridges et al., 2004: 535). There are 186 fasting days in the year for ordinary people; for monks and nuns the number rises to 250 days. Some monks and hermits live lives of extreme asceticism. In the Eastern Church, disciplines such as fasting and almsgiving are not intended as penance or to incur merit, but “as a means of spiritual discipline to help reduce sin in the future, to exercise self control, and to avoid being enslaved to one’s passions and desires”.

The EOC conception of God is as all-powerful, but unknowable; “above all as mystery” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 183). Alongside this (or as part of the ‘mystery’) is the concept of idil (chance), which gives any Ethiopian, regardless of status or wealth, equal chance to improve his or her life. Levine describes idil as “the working of divine will” (Levine, 1965b: 261), but not in terms of reward for religious behaviour. Teshale is critical of Messay Kebede’s “romantic” view of idil, which he equates to suggesting that Ethiopia is “a land of equal opportunity”, and thus “a level playing field” (Teshale, 2008: 362). However, the availability of idil as a concept and the absence of a tradition of doctrinal disputation could perhaps be placed in juxtaposition to Western concepts of ‘agency’ arising from religious non-conformism which are dominant within aid discourse.

5.3.2 Religious Syncretism

Throughout Ethiopia there is a significant degree of religious syncretism, allowing shared practices between Orthodox Christian, Muslim and traditional practice (what Aspen calls “the knowledge buffet” (Aspen, 2001: 17)). Ethiopia’s
Christian heritage dates from 4th century BC, but Orthodox practice also links it to a Judaic heritage and, via synchronicity, to Islamic practice. It retains some similarities with Judaism such dietary rules and restrictions on women’s religious practice. Like the Orthodox Christians, Muslims incorporate the veneration of saints and pre-Islamic beliefs and practices into religious and social expression (Braukampner, 2003: 121-122). Islam shares with Orthodox Christianity and Jewish Falasha belief in “the oneness of God, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, the spiritual value of pilgrimage”, and shared practice such as dietary taboos and circumcision (Lipsky, 1962: 116, 119). Bliese describes examples of syncretism of EOC with traditional beliefs in Wollo, Amhara, as “continual awareness of divine activity - a world view foreign to many Westerners. In these and many other ways religion is an expression of reality beyond common sense as seen by the adherent - a reality which in many ways determines his life and gives it external meaning” (Bliese, 1972: 18).

5.4 CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP AND COMPETITION

5.4.1 Traditional Conceptions of Leadership

Levine’s earlier work, Wax and Gold (1965) was “violently criticised” for his description of Amhara culture as hierarchical and authoritarian, characteristics which he argued were transmitted in childhood through the style of upbringing, but his argument has recently been endorsed by Poluha, whose empirical evidence “makes the children’s reproduction of authoritarian values and behaviour visible and understandable” (Pausewang, 2006). Referring to problems in assessing the degree to which political arrangements can be explained by cultural factors, Clapham claims that, in the case of highland Ethiopia “some such reference is inescapable” (Clapham, 1988: 21). He sees the Ethiopian concept of the state as “firmly rooted in the structure of indigenous society, both through its economic base and through a distinctive set of values, myths and attitudes” (ibid: 21). As a result, the historical “tendency towards authoritarianism, hierarchy, centralised rule and lack of transparency” has

---

7 Some of the dietary rules and the concept of fasting as spiritual discipline are also common to Islam.
shaped policy formation and militated against real decentralisation of power (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 94).

Although the imperial highland land tenure system culture has been labelled ‘feudal’ by some because “it constituted a hierarchy of relationships ultimately resting on the control of arable land and peasant labour - it did not produce any hereditary ruling class or caste” (ibid: 22). Instead, respect and deference was ‘earned’ by leaders provided that, and as long as, they were able to ensure the welfare of their supporters. “The leader was required to be both omnipresent and omnicompetent, capable of intervening at will in the smallest details of any aspect of administration, and his personal involvement was essential where any innovation was involved” (ibid: 22-23). When the leader was weakened or died, “the absence of such a relationship evokes feelings of incompleteness and malaise” (Levine, quoted in Clapham, 1988: 21).

Messay describes the Ethiopian system of leadership as a constant struggle for power support coalesced around ‘able’, that is strong, leaders; support is quickly transferred to others if leaders display any form of weakness (Messay Kebede, 1999: 167). With nobody wanting to be seen to be ‘backing the wrong horse’, the focus of support tended to be consensual: as long as leadership was deserved, it was accepted and its authority obeyed (Messay Kebede, 1999: 213; Clapham, 1988: 22).

Leadership traditionally has two contractual aspects: a leader must “be an effective advocate for his clients with his own superiors, and must guard his own interests” in order to fulfil his role as advocate. He becomes powerless “if the community is allowed to unite against him”; part of his strategy is therefore to “divide and conquer” (Korten and Korten, 1972: 83). As power was exercised downwards through arbitrary promotion and demotion, the competition generated through clientalism served to weaken any pockets of opposition (Korten and Korten, 1972: 71). Mengistu’s rise to power mirrored that of Haile Selassie; it conformed to traditional concepts of leadership change and also reaffirmed the notion that leadership “was, in principle, open to anyone” if they

---

9 Similar mechanisms were observable with Meles Zenawi’s handling of a challenge to his leadership from within the TPLF in 2001.
10 Mengistu “emerged as undisputed leader of the Derg after eliminating all other contenders to central power, re-enacting more vividly and brutally all the power struggles of previous centuries” (Poluha, 2004: 179)
demonstrated a capacity for leadership in (usually military) competition (Clapham, 1988: 21-22).

5.4.2 Continuity of Governance Patterns

Reviewing Ethiopia’s political economy at the end of the Derg, Ottaway identified continuity between imperial and Marxist-Leninist concepts of power and organisation (Ottaway, 1990: 4). The Derg not only retained the old traditions of power patterns but strengthened them, increasing central control and expanding into “many new spheres of life, and people kept silent” (Poluha, 2004: 182). The use of violent oppression during the Derg was used to instil “obedience and accountability to those above you in the hierarchy”; new leaders were selected by political cadres to ensure loyalty (ibid: 182).

In his critique of the revolution and subsequent Derg, Clapham notes a continuity between the way power was exerted at local level by kebele officials, for example through the demand for contributions of labour and resources and the issuing of punishments for failure to attend meetings, and the power exerted by headmen under the Imperial regime (Clapham, 1988: 161). Poluha also remarks on similarities between the three regimes: “During the three different governments in Ethiopia, those of Haile Selassie, the Derg and the EPRDF, retaliation against those who criticise the powerholders has been swift” (Poluha, 2002: 129).

5.4.3 Opposition, Legitimacy and Conflict Resolution

Opposition

A general belief in hierarchy and specific relationships between superiors and inferiors is manifest in a form of government in which “strict super- and subordination with officials showing haughtiness and arrogance while the poor bow and scrape” has been apparent in the imperial, Derg and present regimes (Poluha, 2004: 166). Muir found “a submissive respect for hierarchical authority, which considers challenging public figures to be inappropriate” (Muir, 2004: 7), but does not identify the reason.
There are two streams in the literature concerning to opportunity for opposing power. Kassahun presents these in relation to the present regime. In the first argument, because the EPRDF’s administrative structure extends down to the smallest settlements so that the party is indistinguishable from the executive, little space is left in which opposition parties can develop (Kassahun, 2003: 144). In the second argument, rather than purely constrained by the ruling party’s monolithic structure, opposition groups have historically been weakened by fissuring of coalitions, attributed to traditional traits of inability to compromise, intolerance of diverging views, mistrust and hostility (ibid: 122, 141). Traditional Ethiopian political culture is hampered by the harbouring of “personal grudges against constructive criticism (internal and external), discouraging a culture that espouses divergent views in open debate and exchange, downplaying the active participation of the membership in deciding on important matters which affect the organisation, and so on.” (ibid: 145). Discussing the prospects for democracy in Ethiopia, a senior figure from civil society argued that its history of authoritarianism meant political dialogue and toleration of different points of view were ‘alien’, the traditional alternative being “if you can’t accept it, take up arms” (R5).

**Legitimacy**

Teferi suggests that all highland people in rural Ethiopia tend to regard the state favourably, because “they also recognise the legitimacy of local officials who bridge the gap between state and people, albeit in the way they also recognise the roles of a hierarchy of supernatural beings in mediating relations with God” (Teferi, 2004: 626-627). At the same time, the people understand that local government structures are intended to provide them with a measure of self-government and they expect a degree of autonomy from government interference (ibid: 626-627). The EPRDF understood local government to be part of a monolithic state structure, whereas farmers understood local government officials to be subject to a range of different interests and loyalties but became aware of those officials’ increasing power through ‘managed’ elections and control of resources (ibid: 628).

Because the institutions and communication structures of highland and political culture are so widespread, they are well-understood: “everybody knew how to behave and could read and interpret each other’s acts. Since the rules were so
clear within the collective where patrons and clients found themselves, it also
gave members a certain sense of security. At the same time everyone was
convinced that the hierarchy was flexible and that anyone, or at least any man,
could reach the top of it.” However, knowledge that people reached the top by
being devious induced a sense of insecurity, because no-one could be certain
who they could trust (Poluha, 2004: 189).

Conflict Resolution

Throughout the background provided about Ethiopia, leadership is framed as
being achieved through competition and maintained through a combination of
patronage, divide-and-rule and authoritarian control. The traits of suspicion, and
giving and taking offence mentioned above in relation to the fissuring of
opposition, are - the WIDE data demonstrates - also evident in intra-community
relations at village level. Yet, conforming to African modes of inclusion within the
group, at village level there are mechanisms to ensure that exclusion is avoided
where possible. ‘Shimageles’ (councils of elders) are chosen for their wisdom
and patience, but also for their discretion (in keeping ‘secrets’) and their ability to
persuade. The forms of ‘dispute’ requiring shimeleges’ arbitration range from
personal slight to murder12 (Giday, 2000). These traditional conflict management
mechanisms are used to keep all the parties within the in-group of the
community, as in the Amharic saying “a shimagele goes as far as telling lies to
befriend two persons who quarrelled” (Vasko et al., 1998: 118). Once
shimageles have arbitrated in a dispute, their decision is binding (Giday, 2000:
42).

5.5 COMMUNICATION AND ORAL SKILLS

5.5.1 Oratory

A further manifestation of dualism is the Ethiopian mode of oratory known as
‘wax and gold’ (sam-ennā warq): “The poetic form is “built on two semantic
layers. The apparent, figurative meaning of the words is called ‘wax’; their more

---

11 This suggests the concept of idil.
12 In murder cases, for example, they will negotiate ‘blood money’ with the bereaved
family.
or less hidden actual significance is the ‘gold’. “ (Levine, 1965a, quoted in Messay Kebede, 1999: 180). Levine describes it as comparable to rhetoric or paradox, but diametrically opposed to Western culture which “rests on a commitment to unambiguous communication” (Levine, 1965a: 10). In contrast, “[d]irectness of speech is considered to lack finesse” (Lipsky, 1962: 142). ‘Abyssinian’ culture “sees openness as akin to innocence and simplicity” (Young, 1997a: 211). Messay suggests that ‘wax and gold’ originates from “a method of approaching religious texts and mysteries” and “corresponds with the Ethiopian conception of the divine”, as all-knowing but unknowable (Messay Kebede, 1999: 181-182). Qene, the chants sung by cantors (dabteras) in the churches, also synthesise two meanings by using ‘wax and gold’: “People think that qene is a way of hiding, but in fact it is a way of clarifying two things in one concept” (theologian quoted in Chaillot, 2002: 88-89).

A concomitant of ‘wax and gold’ is that people “suspect that behind every protestation of admiration ... lurks some quest for personal advantage”; this ambivalence results in “stylised politeness among equals” (Levine, 1965a: 253), and in a mixture of cynicism and deference to social superiors, summed up in the expression “bow in front, and fart behind” (ibid: 93; Clapham, 1988: 153-4). Messay suggests that, rather than conceptualising ‘wax and gold’ as a tool of ambiguity for the purposes of duplicity, it should be perceived more constructively. With the idea of the wax covering, and therefore obscuring, the gold, comes the idea of brushing the wax away to reveal the gold underneath: “Far from being the cult of duplicity, wax and gold is then the art of discovering and reinstating the truth. ... The ontology affirms the dualism of reality, better still the existence of reality behind the visible appearance.” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 182). Messay suggests that Western ‘scientific’ knowledge is antithetical to Ethiopian (traditional) conception of knowledge: “The experimental attitude, which is intent on discovering phenomena concealed deliberately by God, will only result in punishment.” (ibid: 186, 191).

In everyday life, ‘wax and gold’ is manifest in the widespread and powerful use of proverbs, and in political debate among all sections of the community. Ethiopian conception of power includes the ability to influence, and this is done by charismatic speech, including repetition and exaggeration (Korten and

---

13 Dabteras are also associated with faith healing and other ‘magical’ powers.
Korten, 1972: 251). There are risks, however, from inappropriate speech which must surely be exacerbated by the demands of ‘wax and gold’ oratory. While using a quiet, low voice is seen as suitably deferential and ‘knowing one’s place’, “[a]n aggressive, clever tongue, capable of a wide repertoire of insults that will shatter the adversary’s composure” is indicative of strength and, those who can, “apply skill and subtlety in the use of insult” (ibid: 58). While “both Amharic and Tigrinya speakers love flowery oratory” (Vasko et al., 1998: 111), external observers found differences between them. Lipsky describes “distinctive qualities” in speech attributed to each group: “the Amharas feel the Tigrai are shrewd, fast in thought and action, light in tongue, impatient”, while they themselves are “noble, slow of speech, subtle, patient and slow to anger” (Lipsky, 1962: 39). When Amhara say that Tigreans “just say what they feel and do not know how to be ambiguous”, it is intended as a criticism (Levine, 1965a: 8).

5.5.2 Reticence

Ethiopian children are taught to self-censor, to listen and not to speak. Unmarried adult children are expected to defer to their father, and will become ‘adult’ when they get married and establish their own households. Alongside this definition of adulthood, there is also a conception of legitimacy related to age: in Amhara, someone may not be regarded as ‘adult’ until they are 40 years old (Giday, 2000: 38). Although the elderly are generally afforded respect due to their age and experience, those who are frail or of low status may be too shy or embarrassed to speak at meetings (Vasko et al., 1998: 104).

Reticence can indicate “carefulness, thoughtfulness, and, above all, as a mechanism for avoiding and escaping trouble”. It is a method of avoiding conflict and minimising the risks of appearing foolish, self-seeking or boastful (ibid: 103, 104). Messay notes that “[a] consequence of the ethics of legitimate place is the Ethiopian appalling fear of derision” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 215). According to Messay, the Ethiopian concept of yilungta “the excessive concern for public opinion” is related to the shame “when one does not behave according to one’s status” (ibid: 215). However, the Ethiopian team reviewing the role of culture in Finnish aid define yilungta as “a kind of politeness, or super-imposed modesty mixed with fear of societal values in which one goes to the extent of sacrificing one’s will, interest, belief, opinion, or even an outright advantage, for the sake of
Chapter 5: Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions

others” (Vasko et al., 1998: 98). Yilungta is thus also considered a virtue, so that worry about what people say is described as “community mindedness” (Bridges et al., 2004: 540).

However, silence in ordinary social situations is considered negatively. Silence may indicate the existence of a grudge or disagreement which is more likely to be ‘handled’ by the use of negative gossip (‘back-biting’) (Vasko et al., 1998: 103).

5.5.3 Discussion in Decision-Making

Discussion in meetings follows a particular pattern: when an individual who is “respected” on the grounds of age, heroism, religiosity or some other status, presents their “ideas”, the community tends to agree. If an individual presents a different opinion, “most people try to assimilate the new speaker with that of the previous speaker even if it is basically very different” (ibid: 84). In formal settings, such as government meetings or in the workplace, the opinions or decisions of superiors should not be challenged; this can only be done by somebody of a higher status (ibid: 88). Fear of others’ opinion and being seen as ‘against’ the group, results in considerable peer pressure, so that in meetings an idea will be supported rather than dissent expressed, resulting in “artificial group consensus”. Speaking up in support of the current idea brings recognition and self-confidence (Korten and Korten, 1972: 246). Korten’s Ethiopian students thought that artificial consensus was necessary as individualistic behaviour would preclude deliberative consensus, leading to their comment “democracy will not work here” (ibid: 248).

In 4.2.3, reference was made to the incorporation of traditional conception of leadership within the ruling party’s ideological base, Revolutionary Democracy. Within the TPLF, members have “the right and the duty to discuss all topics presented by the party. Once the discussions are finished, consensus proclaimed and decisions made, these have to be followed by all its members” (Poluha, 2004: 185). The party therefore “emphasises all of the factors thought desirable by most liberal democrats (decentralisation, participation, inclusiveness of discussion, etc)” though it uses the language of “participation” with quite different meanings (ibid: 187). In their rise to power, the TPLF worked with traditional norms around religion and oral culture to gain peasants’ loyalty,
synthesising these with more ‘modern’ techniques such as meetings, majority voting, public debates, elections at local levels and public evaluations (Young, 1997a: 173-192). Young’s view (in 1997) was that the form of rural administration which the TPLF established in Tigray through a combination of two apparently contradictory initiatives (mobilisation and allowing peasants’ participation in decision-making) “may well prove to be the movement’s most enduring accomplishment” (Young, 1997b: 195), although he doubted it could be implemented in other regions (Young, 1998: 196).

In practice, Tigrean officials’ understanding of the participatory approach “does not take a liberal, populist form; there are greater resonances with the early Maoist ‘mass line’ approach, a connection which dates back to the ideological beginnings of the TPLF in the 1970s. … Informants describe such a participatory model as a process whereby the government listens through the baito14 system, ‘takes a consensus’, makes a decision and then conscientises and mobilises the people around the issue.” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 115).

5.6 GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY STRUCTURES

5.6.1 State-Civil Society Relations: National NGOs

Nascent CSOs, such as trade unions, had emerged during the imperial regime, but these were crushed by the Derg (EU/MCB, 2004: 24, 27). During the 1984 famine, “aristocrats charities” from the 1960s re-emerged as NGOs to deliver international humanitarian relief.15 By the mid 1990s, they were mainly providing welfare programmes (72%), to a lesser extent development activities (22%), and relief programmes (6%); human rights, advocacy and democracy programmes were negligible (Kassahun, 2000: 13).

The ERPDF’s Revolutionary Democracy included a commitment to ethnic pluralism and the party introduced an ostensibly free press and permitted the establishment of CSOs “that are both autonomous and committed to public values such as human rights and the rule of law” (EU/MCB, 2004: 29).

14 The baito was an administrative level, now replaced by kebele or tabia (see 4.2.5).
15 Interview with civil society leader.
Government rhetoric on participation permits civil society to challenge
government performance in the interests of good governance, but this is not
articulated in the same way at some sub-regional levels, where NGO
involvement is limited to service delivery (ibid: 60).

National NGOs in Ethiopia have a number of structural weaknesses. There is a
weak tradition of giving funds to NGOs, so they are largely dependent on
external donor funding and thus owe their existence to external voices, rather
than evolving from grassroots demands (Clark, 2000: 13-14; also Pratten,
1997: 14). Ethiopian organisations working with international NGOs describe
mistrust, misunderstandings; and lack of cultural awareness on both sides
(Mebrahtu, 2002); Ethiopians could not understand the INGO’s concern for
confidentiality, or for consulting grassroots staff (Tegegne, 2000). National
NGOs tend to be organised by educated professionals, based in the capital, and
therefore not deeply rooted in rural communities because they tend not to
operate in more remote areas, whereas there are no areas to which government
does not have outreach (Dessalegn, 1999: 8-13). Commentators have noted
NGOs' apparent inability to accept divergent views, particularly within their own
organisations and their fear of antagonising those in power and consequent
reluctance to promote democratic values (Kassahun, 2000: 16-17). Clark notes
that “traditional divisions and suspicions reflective of the larger society initially
hampered the emergence of [NGO] networks” (Clark, 2000: 10); the rivalry of
NGOs and their reluctance to communicate with each other has limited their
ability to speak with the ‘collective voice’ that advocacy work requires (EU/MCB,

National NGOs are required to register with the government, thereby allowing
government some control of civil society organisations by, for example, requiring
found that the criteria for CSOs were generally understood to be independence
from the government, to be non-profit making, and to promote their members’
interests (which might include advocacy). In contrast, the government regarded
the role of CSOs to be the provision of development activities (EU/MCB, 2004:
58-59), yet Watson found that local people thought that NGOs were operating as
part of the state (Watson, 2003: 306).
Two NGOs established by the TPLF in Tigray, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and the Tigray Development Association, retain close links with the party (Young, 1997b: 86; Hyden and Haile Mariam: 11) and are not regarded as independent by other Ethiopian CSOs although presented as such by the government (EU/MCB, 2004: 57). REST was started as the ‘humanitarian’ wing of the TPLF and now claims to be independent, although it is still clearly linked to the TPLF through political affiliation and through funding (Clark, 2000: 8-9).

5.6.2 State-Civil Society Relations: Community-Level Mechanisms

The government structure reaches down to rural communities via three routes: mass organisations, village-level government structures and agricultural extension programmes.

Mass organisations

The EPRDF has continued the structure of mass organisations created under the Derg: farmers associations, women’s associations and youth associations are closely linked with government. Sometimes referred to as GONGOs (government-organised non-government organisations), these associations “have been established as fronts for government activities or the manufacture of an appearance of popular support” (EU/MCB, 2004: 30). They are described as membership organisations “whose origin stem from the government’s wish to mobilise various community group members, and which exist in every woreda (district) and kebele (village) (ibid: 90-91). The role of Women’s Associations, for example, is ambiguous; as described by one representative, the government told them that they should be a CSO, so they were acting as an NGO while still a partner of the regional government but not part of the government institution” (ibid: 57).

Village-Level Government-Community Meetings

Government-community relations are also structured through community meetings. Poluha describes the process thus: “The meetings take place at the

---

16 Such structures were adopted elsewhere in Africa. Mamdani describes them as part of “the local state resurfaced as the true locus of on-the-ground coercion” (Mamdani, 1996: 176).
Chapter 5: Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions

Service Cooperative or at the church after the Sunday service, when women will also be present. What is most conspicuous about these meetings is that the officials talk and the peasants listen. There is almost no exchange of ideas or even words” (Poluha, 2002: 105). Although community members said nothing, the government representative recognised that “nobody will go against what comes from above, but inside themselves they are against many things” (ibid: 124, 125). However, Aalen believes that people do participate in local government meetings for a variety of reasons: to get information, to receive propaganda, to be ‘mobilised’, to receive benefits (or avoid being denied benefits), to be involved in communal work. Because the party/government structure reaches down into the community, party rhetoric is equally well dispersed, so that “peasants in the countryside who do not read newspapers or listen to the radio are well versed in the political vocabulary of the national political leadership”, and party influence is thus “a naturalised part of everyday life” (Aalen, 2002: 91, 92).

Agricultural Extension

All government’s agricultural policies, ADLI, PADETES and other policies, “ultimately rely on the motivation, willingness and ability of the DAs” (Harrison 2002: 604). For the past fifty years, national agricultural policy has consisted of “promoting uniform packages throughout the country and for all groups of farmers” (Kassa Belay and Degnet Abebaw, 2004: 143). DAs have quotas for the number of farmers who are to accept the extension packages. Other responsibilities include tax collection, mobilisation, and collecting loan repayments (ibid: 154, 159). “Local officials were (and still are) uniquely placed at the interface between salaried officials at the district, zonal and regional levels of government from above and different categories of fellow farmers from below.” (Teferi Abate Adem, 2004: 625).

DAs therefore had two ‘principals’, their superiors at the woreda (district) administration and local farmers. The woreda expected them to act “with a certain disengagement from the social expectations of fellow farmers. Yet farmers expected them to be zealous advocates of local concerns and interests as their relatives, friends, neighbours and clients.” (ibid: 625). The DAs resolved this by “wielding the power vested in them in translating stated programme objectives to meaningful local concepts for accommodating irreconcilable
interests”, distributing land to their supporters (friends, relatives and clients) and denying it to their adversaries” (ibid: 625). On the basis of this quotation from Teferi, DAs appear to act as both street level bureaucrats and as broker-entrepreneurs, but not as broker-translators.

5.6.3 Mobilisation for ‘Partipation’

Farmers, organised via mengistawi buden or ‘development groups’, ‘contribute’ up to 20 days free labour per annum as “community participation” (Marena Briefing ET07). This is a further example of continuity across the three regimes, as under the Imperial regime, farmers had to provide corvée labour, and were organised into work groups by the Derg.

The literature suggests that methods to induce ‘participation’ takes a variety of forms, and often involved DAs who, because they were members of communities, representatives of government, potential distributors of benefits, could “play a controlling or even coercive role” (Marena Briefing ET07). In Tigray, farmers joined extension programmes because they feared being excluded from “food-for-work programs and other benefits from the government’. DAs could also apply moral punishment by describing non-participants in meetings as “backward, weak and unable to distinguish good from bad” (Mamusha Lemma and Hoffman, 2005: 2).

Harrison notes that the Ethiopian government can claim that the emphasis that it places on ‘participation’ is independent of any influence or ideas claimed by the donor community. In the government’s conception of participation, which incorporates elements of tesatto (mass mobilisation) and limat (development), participation is interpreted by local government officials as “people working together to help their community”, which has a greater a priority than satisfying individual needs (Harrison, 2002: 600).

5.7 COMMUNITY STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS

Farmers and their families differentiate between government associations, such as Women’s and Farmers’ Associations (yemengist) and their local associational institutions, which they describe as ‘private’ (yegil) (Poluha, 2002: 107), and are
wary of government interference and thus incorporation (Muir, 2004: 29). Just as NGOs have to register with the government, local burial associations (iddir) are required to register with the kebele. Dessalegn suggests that traditional associations are resilient to state influence (Dessalegn, 1999: 8) but in Tigray, during the revolution, the TPLF were able to gain support even in the most rural areas by working with traditional associations (Dia, 1996: 247). In the early years after the overthrow of the Derg, the EPRDF approved of the informal associations because their practices conformed to the party’s ideals of self-governance and participatory democracy. More recently, Harrison reported government officials’ comments that the associations were undemocratic because they “have no properly elected officials, they operate without rules, and they are embedded in ‘traditional’ (‘backward’) belief systems.” (Harrison, 2002: 604). However, traditional associations are formalised by having elected officials and strict, written rules of conduct; the descriptions below confirm that these are widespread and considered legitimate.

The following three sub-sections describe different types of local association.

5.7.1 Reciprocal Labour-Sharing

There are two main types of labour sharing in northern Ethiopia, labour for food (debo) and reciprocal labour (wonfel). These include a number of ‘performance control’ mechanisms. In debo, the farmer requesting assistance provides food to the best of his resources, and may be subject to criticism if it is not of an acceptable standard; if it is not, physical or social retribution may be sought (the latter may take the form of derision, or even ostracism). In wonfel, the quality of labour is the main criterion. There are sanctions on those who arrive late or who do not work effectively. Someone with a reputation for hard work and impartiality may be appointed as organiser, but his role is limited to encouragement and arbitration (Korten and Korten, 1972: 90-92).

5.7.2 Religious Associations

The two main religious associations are maheber and senbete. Maheber, formed in honour of a patron saint, involves monthly feasts held on the saint’s

17 Respondents suggested that these were now less common.
holy day, at each member’s house in turn. Membership is usually restricted to close relationships based on trust; prestige is gained through the quality of the feast and there are strict rules of behaviour about avoiding conflict, such as forbidding gossip (ibid: 94-95). The nature of membership offers a private forum for discussion and problem-solving (Tirfe, 1999: 184).

Because maheber is the smallest group, usually a maximum of twelve, entry to membership is the most stringent (not least because of the cost, and therefore the level of individual’s investment). Even so, “If the patron saint fails to grant the expected support, a member can leave the society to join another one” (Teferi, 2004: 618). This reaction, despite the importance supposedly attached to the religious affiliation, is reminiscent of the action of a follower whose leader fails to provide for them (cf. 5.4.1).

Senbete is also based around food, but is held weekly on Sundays outside the church. Food may be provided for the destitute, so senbete is not based on reciprocity but includes a strong element of alms-giving (Aspen, 2001: 101).

5.7.3 Non-Religious Associations

Two important forms of non-religious association are iddir, the primarily vehicle for mutual assistance, and equb, a rotating credit scheme. There is an extensive literature about both these mechanisms, probably generated because of their self-help nature which accords with Western (development) agendas.

Iddir

Most commonly, the purpose of iddir is to provide mutual assistance at burials, the replacement of lost resources such as a house following fire, or death of an animal (Korten and Korten, 1972: 95), although they may be formed for other religious, kinship or development purposes. Pankhurst describes iddirs as “a vital forum for expression of belonging” (Pankhurst, A. 2003: 74). Membership may be religious, or based on proximity and therefore may include both Orthodox Christians and Muslims. An iddir is “strictly governed”, with a written constitution and appointed officials, who, when necessary, will apply a range of sanctions (Korten and Korten, 1972: 97). The ultimate sanction is expulsion (Henry, 2004: 150; Pratten, 1997: 145). Someone who does not belong to an
“iddir “is completely cut off from social contact with the other members of the community” (Korten and Korten, 1972: 98). Poluha’s respondents told her that “To be without an Idir is to be without a family”, that is totally isolated (Poluha, 2002: 108). Pratten found that other members of the iddir are themselves fined if they associated with those expelled. In practice, either fear of expulsion prevents the rules being broken or the shimageles intervenes and bring about resolution (Pratten 1997: 145-6).

Equb

Equb, a rotating savings scheme, is a recent institution, more common in urban than rural areas. It takes the form of a local lottery into which carefully-vetted members contribute a fixed sum each week or fortnight. Strict rules relating to consistency and timeliness of payment are enforced by elected officials, and guarantors are required to ensure that those who receive their ‘lot’ early continue paying throughout the cycle of the equb. Sanctions include fines and exclusion through expulsion or self-censorship. Membership is based on “strong ties” such as kinship or friendship, to increase trust. It is appreciated as a method of regulating (lack of) self-control (Tirfe, 2000: 186-7).

5.7.4 External Perceptions of Ethiopian Associational Structures

External observers of Ethiopian local associations have been interested in their longevity, particularly whether or not they pre-date the Derg or emerged from it. Pratten states that “Associative life in Ethiopia before the revolution in 1974 is poorly documented” (Pratten 1997: 140). Iddir, for instance, are often assumed to have been formed at the time of the Italian invasion in 1936. However, maheber are much older; they were described by the Portuguese mission to Ethiopia in the 16th century (Alvarez, 1540: 85-86). One of the current NGO umbrella organisations describe iddir and maheber as being present since “time immemorial” (CRDA, 2006: 6)

Harrison observed that donors found it difficult to interpret the role of traditional associations. They saw associations both as a route to development (Watson, 2003: 288), and as “self-help groups [which] should be left basically alone” (Pratten, 1997: 7). Dejene describes iddir as a form of social capital, because they included reciprocity, flexibility and adaptability (Dejene, 2003: 44, 49, 51).
Description of the traditional associations suggested that membership did largely depend on trust, but that regulation was used to ensure that expected levels of performance were achieved and that trust was not abused. Membership of associations such as *iddir* and *equb* provide experience of “democratic working methods through elections of [officers], voting on issues and abiding by the rule of the majority, teaching techniques of running meetings, introduce the use of bookkeeping, time discipline, etc. In short, they may [be a] way to integrate modernity into traditional sectors” (Tirfe, 2000: 192; also Pankhurst, 2003b: 21).

5.8 **MORES OF PARTICIPATION**

This sections draws out some aspects of social interaction in associational life which were originally identified in the WIDE data as significant for understanding local forms of participation. These aspects also prompted the focus in the conceptual framework on transactions (motivation and trust) and cultural analysis in 3.5.

5.8.1 **Individualism/Collectivism**

*Individualism*

Levine suggests that the self-interest inherent in Amhara patron-client system results in ‘hierarchical individualism’ (Levine, 1974: 146). Aspen also emphasises the importance of individualism in Amhara culture, in which “individuality, self-assertion and personal strength are constantly challenged by equally strong tendencies of domination, authoritarian control, and patron-client relationships” (Aspen, 2001: 21).

The range of forms which individualistic behaviour include, *inter alia*: an individualistic person is someone who does not conform, who cannot be relied upon because they are “unstable and impermanent”, or someone who invades other people’s privacy and cannot keep secrets (Korten and Korten, 1972: 53 54). This highlights the dilemma: on the one hand, the consequence of individualistic behaviour is detrimental to the welfare of the community (personal individualism is associated with common-pool resource problems); on the other, lack of trust requires one to think individualistically. Because of the severity of
Chapter 5: Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions

the consequences, particularly ostracism, disputes are settled by arbitration and misdemeanours rarely occur, thus “enhance[ing] social cohesion” rather than trust (Pratten, 1997: 146).

Collectivism

Rather than “hierarchical individuals”, in Messay’s view “vertical relationships have undoubtedly the upper hand as [regards] the possibility of social mobility and to increasing one’s possessions, [but] horizontal, communal connections are activated where matters of common interests are at stake... These factors must not be neglected, for a society based on clientship cannot wholly adhere to an unbridled individualism” (Messay, 1999: 154). This supports Korten’s view that lateral relationships are instrumental rather than affective, with social and cultural norms being formalised through the ‘cooperative institutions’ (Korten and Korten, 1972: 87) described in 4.3.3.

Hoben suggests that farmers’ commitment to lateral institutions is weak because of the number of different associations to which they belong (Hoben, 1970: 201-202), but this implies that the brittleness of the relationships indicates lack of personal investment. The rules and regulations of the associations which tie members into strict forms of behaviour indicate that there are social as well as financial investments in belonging. Ethiopian researchers describe attendance of associations as “a social commitment” amounting to an obligation (Vasko et al., 1998: 24). They describe collective thinking as being highly significant in daily life; it occurs in communities “rigidly tied together with socio-economic and cultural cohesion”. “To preserve this oneness and togetherness … people do not like to voice differing opinions”. As a result, there is no tradition of assimilating or tolerating different ideas: “Everything is ‘either black or white with no grey zones’. Collective thinking usually results in either accepting or rejecting, loving or hating, helping or not helping and so on” (ibid: 84-85).

Discussion in 3.5.2 noted the use of shame as a self-regulatory mechanism in collectivist cultures. Levine records that, in order to avoid shame, Amhara culture means that obligations to people outside one’s immediate circle are kept to a minimum, so that the ideal neighbour does not “touch another’s land, wife, money, or personal feelings”; but, within the circle, there is unstinting support in times of sickness or death and sharing in happy events (Levine, 1965a: 82).
A final explanatory twist to this pattern, is the admiration given to those who become *shifta* (bandits). When people (usually younger) break local conventions and refuse to conform (behaving ‘individualistically’), they are ostracized, denied access to resources and leave the community to become *shiftas* (Giday, 2000: 46-7). Although the term is used as a negative political label by government supporters to describe opponents, shiftas are respected (Erlich, 1994: 181).

### 5.8.2 Mutuality, Reciprocity and Trust

There appears to be a pivot around inclusion/exclusion of local associations, a constant tension between the individual and the collectivity. Attendance offers membership of an in-group, validation of cultural norms, a means of support and a forum for discussion outside state structures. Non-attendance incurs “punishment” in the form of degrees of social exclusion ranging from “social black-listing”, through ostracism to “outright alienation from social life” (Vasco et al., 1998: 24). A further term used to express this level of exclusion is ‘ex-communication’ (cf. Tirfe, 2000: 184; Giday, 2000: 47). An excluded individual would be cut off from the supporting mechanisms which govern religious, economic and social practice, hence exclusion has to be avoided.

Associations such as *iddir* and *equb* and labour-sharing mechanisms were described by Ethiopian ‘cultural’ researchers as “based on mutual commitment” (Vasko et al., 1998: 84). The commitment, being based on strict reciprocity and trust, rather than affectivity, appears to be transactional, in the form of an investment in a ‘multi-period game’ designed to ensure future support (see Wood, 2003). The tension generated by competition, rivalry and the threat of sanctions implies that the game is being continuously replayed. The oratory/reticence dyad is a further source of tension and a further game ‘ploy’. In meetings, the risk-averse individual would opt for the ambiguous reticence of *yilungta*, in which silence could also indicate wisdom.

Muir suggests that the reciprocity of associational life is actually ‘mutuality’, based on trust, shared identity, and high levels of participation, the result of “internally driven peer pressure, social, moral and emotional support, and the presence of penalties and leadership with the authority to apply them” (Muir, 2004: 6). However, other researchers offer a different perspective, that
associational life with its strict reciprocity is based on individualism rather than cooperative behaviour (Korten and Korten, 1972: 11). Rather than uniting around common interests within their community, “individuals seem to think of each other as members of different and largely autonomous household units and interpersonal relations assume a patron-client nature.” (Teferei, 2004: 618). Because of this, Levine describes labour-sharing mechanisms such as wonfel, as “a temporary coincidence of individual interests” (Levine, 1965a: 247), more likely to be shown in times of crisis, for example, death or a house fire (Levine, 1965a: 248; also Teferi, 2004: 616). This may explain the success of iddir, not just in terms of popularity but also their extension into other forms of cooperation.

Further towards the contractual end of the transactions spectrum, the literature suggests that there is a lack of trust within the in-group, let alone out-group ascriptions associated with collectivist societies. “We are sceptical and suspicious of each other, leave alone outsiders”, Ethiopian cultural researchers remarked (Vasko et al., 1998: 35). Clapham notes “a pronounced lack of interpersonal trust. Ethiopian suspicion is proverbial, and brings with it a secretiveness, a reserve and a tendency to intrigue” (Clapham, 1988: 22). Outsiders are considered ‘fair game’ and those who are too trusting or who fail to take advantage of outsiders are considered foolish (Korten and Korten, 1972: 62; Young, 1998: 202).

5.9 EVALUATIVE MECHANISMS

This chapter has already noted that traditional associational structures strictly regulate the ‘performance’ of their members, and that psycho-social mechanisms regulate patterns of speech, and maintain consensus. Dissensus is politically and socially risky. This sub-section provides examples from the literature of more specific evaluative mechanisms.

5.9.1 Informal Evaluatory Mechanisms

Pratten describes iddir leaders (called ‘judges’) being elected on the basis of their popularity and being respected by the community, but still being accountable to the membership who are “entitled to replace any judge who
behaves improperly” (Pratten, 1997: 145). Leaders have to face iddir members on a daily basis, since they are neighbours (Poluha, 2002: 109). Members' contributions are monitored and careful records kept, to ensure reciprocity is strictly observed (Korten and Korten, 1972: 100). Although ‘traditional’, the associations’ regulatory mechanisms have been described as evidence of ‘modernity’ (Tirfe Mammo, 1999: 192)\(^\text{18}\), and Pratten regards it as a system which engenders trust so that the poor “can talk openly” (Pratten 1997: 145).

The practice of accountability is not ‘modern’. Even during the imperial regime, local people were able to dismiss the local headman (chiqă shum) from office in cases of “flagrant misbehavior” (Levine, 1965a: 57-58), and peasants could appeal direct to Haile Selassie (Zewde,1991: 200). Although the literature suggests that customary practice offers only three options for dealing with authoritarian relationships: complete deference; covert criticism or rebellion (Korten and Korten, 1972: 81; Levine, 1965b: 280), discussion of leadership in 5.4.1 suggests there were limits to deference. The combination of idil and mistrust may explain the apparent anomaly of publicly challenging the performance of authority figures.

5.9.2 Formal Evaluatory Mechanisms

The form of public examination was expanded during the Derg period, incorporating Maoist practice. The Derg itself organised Working People’s Control Committees to investigate economic malpractice and maladministration, publishing their reports in the press (Clapham, 1988: 113). Those among the Derg who disagreed with the leadership were “identified as ‘misguided’ [and] were required to confess their activities in public” (Mulatu and Yohannis, 1988: 200). Public examination was further developed by the TPLF in Tigray and is continued under the EPRDF. The term used for this evaluative mechanism, ‘gemgamma\(^\text{19}\), translates as ‘evaluation’. After Tigray was liberated from the Derg, even judges’ decisions could be reviewed by the people and, if the judges were found negligent, they could be dismissed (Young, 1997a: 189-190). Young describes gemgamma as “potentially a powerful means of accountability” derived from various sources “including Maoism and the traditional means of

---

\(^{18}\) Muir refers to the penalties imposed by peers for non-compliance as “disciplinary support” (Muir, 2004: 21).

\(^{19}\) Spelling varies, but usually gemgamma in Amharic, gemgam in Tigrigna.
evaluation employed by Tigrayan elders\textsuperscript{20,21} (Young, 1997b: 95). Ambivalence towards the practice is found elsewhere: “Advocates of the system argue that it encourages openness, reduces corruption and increases people’s motivation and performance. Critics point to the political control of the system and the way hearings are far from transparent, and often involve serious intimidation.” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 113-114). Pausewang describes gemgamma as “a regular ‘evaluation’ or critique/self-critique exercise, of office holders by those over whom they had administrative powers, [which] is again in theory a powerful tool of democratic accountability,” but more generally a tool of control used by party cadres (Pausewang et al., 2002b: 232). According to Gilkes, gemgamma “provides accountability and, in theory, offers democratic decision making, but often succumbs to the obvious danger of political control and manipulation and frequently becomes an abuse of human rights as in China under Mao.” (Gilkes, 1999: 39).

5.10 LOCAL v. INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS OF PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION

Under the NAA, donors expect that citizens of poor countries will want (and be able) to hold their governments to account by using CSOs as proxies to influence government policies and to monitor governments’ performance, and by voting in general elections. The literature presented here highlights the gap between this conception of the nature and role of participation and the reality of participation and evaluation in government-community, and inter-community, relations as described in the literature. Ethiopian institutions appear more stringent and demanding than those that donors advocate (and assume to be superior).

The literature suggests that formal civil society organisations (CSOs or NGOs) in Ethiopia are not widely regarded as legitimate representatives by rural

\textsuperscript{20} Ethiopian researchers described gemgamma as culturally alien, because the subject “proclaimed his guilt voluntarily and in a ‘self-flagellatory manner’” (Vasko et al. (1998: 35).  
\textsuperscript{21} According to Gilkes, gemgamma: “provides accountability and, in theory, offers democratic decision making, but often succumbs to the obvious danger of political control and manipulation and frequently becomes an abuse of human rights as in China under Mao.” (Gilkes, 1999: 39).
communities. Rather, they regard the mass organisations and regional
development associations as part of the government structure (and the
organisations may regard themselves as attached to the government, either by
structure, funding or allegiance). These CSOs have an outreach which extends
down to the kebele level (village/sub-district). The other type, NGOs providing
mainly welfare and rural development services, lack legitimacy because their
outreach is low and they are unfamiliar to many rural communities. Key
informant interviewees from civil society umbrella groups\(^{22}\) recognised both the
weaknesses in Ethiopian civil society and the gap between donor rhetoric and
likely outcomes. In-depth analyses by anthropologists and political scientists,
which describe how government power is structured down to each kebele, were
available to donors. These make clear the extent and embeddedness of
government-community power relations but, without applying those analyses,
donors risk overlooking the conceptual differences in the meaning and structure
of civil society and rendering CSO participation as tokenistic.

Donors’ assumptions of ‘agency’, taken for granted in advocacy of liberal
democracy, appear in stark contrast to conceptions of leadership set out in this
chapter. Strong, even authoritarian, leadership is regarded as valid but can be
justifiably challenged if it fails to provide what it claims. However, the risk of
failure of a challenge include humiliation, exclusion and sometimes retribution.
These mechanisms are described in the literatures about each of the three
regimes (Imperial, Derg and the EPRDF), and the political science and
anthropological literatures describe the same mechanisms in local government-
community and inter-community relations. These mechanisms control individual
agency, performance, behaviour and speech. Agency can be asserted through
the use of, *inter alia*, reticence, excessive deference and veiled insult.

Membership of a range of village-level associational structures is described in
the literature as a ‘social obligation’ rather than a purely practical necessity to
meet the religious and socio-economic demands of daily life. Membership
cannot therefore be regarded as voluntaristic, in contrast to Western concepts of
agency in civil society and voluntary organisations. Whereas in the West the
level of participation in membership associations is assumed to be optional,
participation is closely regulated by fellow members with the intention of keeping

\(^{22}\) See 4.3.5.
the individual included within the collectivity. This is done through the clear setting-out of rules and regulations and the sanctions imposed if they are not kept. Participation levels are thus maintained by both self-regulation and peer pressure.

Farmers and their families are therefore subject to constant informal and semi-formal monitoring by their peers via ‘obligatory’ associational membership. The gemgamma process also subjects local government officials to public examination, ostensibly by farmers as well as their superiors, on a regular basis. While there are some superficial similarities between the critiques of both gemgamma and donor evaluation methods, for example that they are both tools of control, that participation by local people is tokenistic, and that there is an over-reliance on quantitative measures of performance, there are some stark differences which highlight the nature of governance in Ethiopia and the fluidity of the concept of evaluation in aid discourse.

One marked difference is that Ethiopian forms of evaluation are very regular, whereas donor evaluation is sporadic. Formerly linked to (usually) two milestones in a project’s lifecycle, evaluation of programme modality is likely to be episodic and thematic, if it is done at all. Under the NAA, donor assessment of government performance is based on PRSP targets. In Ethiopia, evaluation of government officials is linked to quotas fulfilled, rather than targets, and is therefore based on individual performance. This concept of accountability holds the individual responsible, whereas accountability in donor evaluation is linked to the effectiveness of a policy or process. A further significant difference in the two forms of evaluation are that the Ethiopian form is carried out in public, in front of peers as well as supervisors. The results are announced immediately and publicly. This confirms the cross-cultural literature which suggests that public shame is used as a regulatory mechanism in collectivist societies. Evaluation of performance in aid, and more generally in the West, individual responsibility is rarely ascribed, and certainly not publically. The results of aid evaluations, though largely available via the internet, are not disseminated widely and rarely to the targeted population.
CHAPTER 6
PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION IN GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Following the description of Ethiopian history, identity and political systems in Chapter 4, and an exploration of cooperative activity and regulation in association life in Chapter 5, this chapter presents the findings from semi-structured interviews\(^1\) with respondents in Tigray and Amhara, held to elicit their perceptions and practice of participation, particularly in evaluation. My respondents included farmers, local leaders, professional government employees and government officials working within the regional structure. I made no attempt to ‘sample’ respondents formally, nor to select rigorously on specific criteria but, in each got/kushet visited, I aimed to interview five people, hoping to include a female household-head, a leader and at least two farmers categorised as ‘poor’ by the DAs. In practice, the differentiation between the categories of ‘leader’ and ‘poor farmer’ was often unclear, as farmers can fall into both categories. I also interviewed the DAs, other young professionals and more senior government officials.

Access to community respondents was gained via DAs and therefore the majority of the responses relate to government-community participation and evaluation in the rural development sector which, in Ethiopia, covers agriculture and natural resource management.\(^2\) Respondents’ anonymity is preserved by not identifying specific locations, names or job titles. From the Methodology chapter, it is transparent that the woredas selected in Tigray were three (of four) designated for detailed monitoring and evaluation under DCI’s regional programme. Border tension with Eritrea later restricted community fieldwork to two woredas. Sida’s programme in Amhara covered two zones, and the research was undertaken in East Gojjam; the three woredas visited are not identified here. CIDA did not have regional programmes but findings from their technical assistance projects are included in Chapter 7. The semi-structured

---

\(^{1}\) See Annex B.

\(^{2}\) Chapter 3 (Methodology) explained how regions, woredas, kebeles and sub-kebele units were selected, how access was negotiated and how individual respondents were identified.
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

Interview questions around which the interviews were constructed are provided in Annex B. Maps of the regions can be found in Annex C.

The data is organised in three sections. In 6.2, I explain the administrative micro-structure which organises households into small groups, and then present brief ‘portraits’ of my respondents, which provide some contextual background both to 6.3 and 6.4, which summarise respondents’ comments about participation and evaluation respectively. Reference is also made to two qualitative surveys completed in 2005: the Ethiopian Government’s Participatory Poverty Assessment and the CRC survey carried out on behalf of the NGO umbrella group, Poverty Action Network, Ethiopia (PAN/E).

For comparative purposes, 6.5 offers a very brief overview of some of the similarities noted between political and social institutions in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam; these other two multi-ethnic countries have a political history of socialist, one-party government, in which donors are applying the NAA. I pursue the analysis to locate recurring themes which are identified later, in Chapter 7, as areas of congruence, ambiguity and disjuncture between Ethiopian and donor respondents.

6.2 RESPONDENTS

6.2.1 The Government/Community Nexus

It was not possible to draw a clear contrast between government and community structures, because of the overlap and integration between them. Donor documentation tends to describe the formal administrative structure down to the level of kebele, but, under the EPRDF, government extends beyond the formal structure: below the kebele and its sub-division, the got, there is an extensive network organising households into small groups. The extent of this structure only became apparent to me during community interviews. The lowest level (a ‘cell’, consisting of five households) is a recent administrative introduction, although the EPRDF has always had an extensive network of political cadres. One householder is selected from each cell, as its leader. Six cells are grouped
together as a ‘development group’ (or mengistawi buden, in Amhara), each with a total of 30 households. One of the six cell leaders is selected as leader of the development group. I was told that the leaders were chosen by election but that the selection had to be approved by the DA. The structure is set out diagrammatically in Figure 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Federal government</strong></th>
<th>EPRDF since 1991.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional government</strong></td>
<td>Decentralisation since 1996. Eight regions, three autonomous cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Woreda</strong></td>
<td>Districts, led by Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kebele</strong></td>
<td>Large village/collection of hamlets, led by Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Got</strong></td>
<td>Village/hamlet, with a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development group</strong></td>
<td>Group of 30 households (with 6 cells) led by one of the cell leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cell</strong></td>
<td>Group of 5 households led by one of the household heads</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6.1: Formal and Informal Administrative Structure**

In parallel with the administrative and party structures, mass organisations are a further layer of influence operating at the government-community nexus. Attitudes towards, and membership of, the Farmers’ and Women’s Associations varied within and across the two regions. In Tigray, membership of the Farmers’ Association was widespread: one farmer said that he could not even consider not belonging (T25), another said ‘everyone does’. While individuals would not experience any problems if they did not belong (T24), there were reports that non-membership of the Farmers’ Association could prevent access to Food for...

---

3 The PPA uses the terms gare for 30 household groups, and dado for five household groups (PPA, 2005: 45).
4 The introduction of the ‘cell’ structure was not consistent. In Tigray, model farmers were effectively cell leaders. One development group in Tigray was structured more like an association, with a head, vice-head, a secretary and three model farmers.
Work\textsuperscript{5}. Membership could also be a conduit to resources: a landless farmer belonged because he hoped that it would mean that his application would be considered more favourably when the woreda next distributed land (T5). Most of the local leaders belonged to the Farmers Association, though this was less consistent in Amhara, and the Association did not have branches in all kebeles.

\textbf{6.2.2 Female Heads of Household}

I interviewed seven women in Tigray\textsuperscript{6} and six in Amhara\textsuperscript{7}. Although the ‘category’ was supposed to be ‘female heads of households’, in practice it included four married women as well as two divorcees, six widows and one woman who had never married but had three children. There was no straightforward ‘gendered’ or status-linked explication of women’s ability to make their opinions known. Two of the women from Amhara told me that they have been ordered to come and speak to me; one was escorted by a local official and a member of the militia (A3, A20). The two professional women interviewed felt their opinions were not listened to in community meetings, despite being well-educated (to diploma level). They thought this was either because their audience were male farmers (T16), or because community norms meant the opinions of educated women were not valued (A9).

Other women did feel empowered to speak up. Age and lack of education did not deter any of the Tigrean women from discussing with me their views about participation in public meetings and evaluations, but some Amhara respondents expressed reluctance to answer questions saying: “I don’t know what it [participation] is, because I’m just an illiterate farmer” (A11); “I know nothing, there’s no point in asking me any questions” (A3, elderly woman). She preferred not to participate in anything, did not belong to any community associations but only went to the church to pray. She suffered stigma as a result of having been an official under the Derg, but this was not applied to her daughter, who had a responsible role demonstrating water point management (A3).

\textsuperscript{5} The WIDE data provided an example of a female household head who said she was denied Food For Work because she was not a member of the Association.
\textsuperscript{6} T3, T8, T9, T13, T18, T20, T23.
\textsuperscript{7} A3, A11, A15, A20, A24, A30
There was very little variation in the ranking of the ‘factors of influence’ among female respondents. The most important influence in their lives was God. Only one woman thought she herself had more control over her life than the government hierarchy and she also thought that community life was more influential in her life than the government. The response of a young professional suggested she had a weaker sense of agency than the other respondents. She ranked community as more influential in her life than herself. As a single person and not part of a household, she was unable to join any community associations. Among the community respondents, Tigrean women were more likely to belong to one or more mahebers, whereas Amhara women were more likely to belong to an iddir.

6.2.3 Priests

Although I did not seek out to interview priests as a category, fortuitously I was introduced to two priests, one in Tigray (T4) and one in Amhara (A7). Their responses were remarkably similar. Because the villages had been selected by the DAs, the priests’ responses cannot be assumed to be representative of priests in either region but may be indicative of priest-community-government relations in villages which are geographically and strategically close to local government centres.

Both priests were party members, but the one in Tigray was more actively involved in government activities than his Amhara counterpart. The Tigrean priest belonged to the Farmers Association, was a member of the militia, a model farmer responsible for 15 others, and was currently recruiting soldiers to meet the ‘political crisis’ in Addis (the post-election violence) and the concurrent border crisis with Eritrea. The only community association he belonged to was a maheber. The Amhara priest belonged to a maheber and a senebete and took his turn preparing feasts for both. He was also a member of the shimageles. He had previously been a member of the kebele but was now more involved in the church administrative hierarchy, representing the kebele at the woreda church committee. As a member of the kebele church committee, he could be

---

8 See Methodology, 3.4.5, for a description of ‘factors of influence’ ranking exercise.
9 Unlike her male single colleagues, she could not travel into town to eat in restaurants so she cooked and ate alone.
10 Council of Elders.
asked to deal with issues at got level on behalf of the woreda. He was also engaged in training against harmful traditional practices and HIV/AIDS; he had been trained in irrigation and was now training model farmers himself.

In these (and other) locations, government meetings were held outside the church on Sundays and the local form of evaluation (gemgamma) were held on holy days - Selassie on 7th of the month, Marriam (St. Mary) on the 21st, or Bääl Egziabher (Holy Day of God) on the 29th of the month, Ethiopian calendar\(^\text{11}\). Both priests gave the same reason for the reduction in the number of non-working holy days: “under pressure from the government” (A7), government meetings take precedence over religious commitments because “you can’t live without the government here” (T4). Both gave poverty as the justification for this but, whereas the Tigrean priest said that government was teaching them that they could not rely on aid and should produce their own food (T4), the Amharan rationalised the reduction by saying that “gemgamma is not considered work” and that, in any case, “all the days in the year are holy days in the EOC”. He also qualified it by saying that, if gemgamma were not held on holy days, farmers would not come (A7).

6.2.4 Farmers

It became clear during the interviews that local leaders were not a separate category from poor farmers; nearly all of them were categorised as ‘poor’, whether leaders or not. Wealth classification was a matter of perception: a farmer classified as ‘poor’ by the DA described himself as a ‘middle’ and another farmer, classified as ‘rich’, described himself as ‘middle’. Most farmers had one ox and had a reciprocal arrangement with another to get a pair of oxen for ploughing. In Tigray the majority of farmers interviewed held 0.5 ha of land, and in Amhara the range was greater, from 0.75 ha to 2 ha. Not all farmers interviewed had land; some who had worked for the Derg had had land taken away when the EPRDF came to power.

In contrast to the female respondents who could withdraw by claiming lack of education, marriage or religious commitments, the male farmers had fewer opportunities not to ‘participate’. In Tigray in particular, their forums were directly

\(^{11}\) Ethiopia follows a 13 month Julian calendar.
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

or indirectly political. The community-level fieldwork coincided with the second period when opposition in the main urban centres was suppressed by government forces after the election. There was more overt tension in Amhara, and a reported recent increase in beatings and harassment was linked by respondents to peri-electoral conflict (A27). My questions were intended to elicit usual practice, rather than recent political events, and farmers’ responses in both Tigray and Amhara (see 6.3 and 6.4) revealed an apparently structural tension related to the political hierarchy.

When asked to rank a range of factors affecting their lives, for better or worse, in terms of influence, most - but not all - farmers in both Tigray and Amhara said that God was the most influential factor for their future success. Marginally more ranked government (second) above their own agency. Community was ranked fourth, although a minority ranked idil (chance) as more influential than the community. The PPA also included a ranking exercise of the importance of “institutions”, which appear to be a list of physical or technical resources theoretically available to citizens (EPPA, 2005: 40). While there was some overlap between the list of institutions and the list of factors ranked by my respondents, there was little correlation: non-religious associations and sub-kebele structures were ranked highly in the PPA exercise, but were not rated highly in terms of influence by my respondents.

In Tigray, iddir were discouraged by the government as the cause of unnecessary expense. Perhaps because of this, Tigrean farmers tended to belong to several mahebers; some respondents ‘had’ three. Mourning arrangements there were now more informal and no longer standardised. The pattern in Amhara was for farmers to belong to an iddir and a maheber, and often a senbete. Some farmers in both Tigray and Amhara also had a ‘lot’ in an equb.

6.2.5 Local Leaders

As a result of the overlap in status and identity between ‘farmer’ and ‘local leader’, I interviewed more local leaders that I had planned: one cell leader, six

---

12 The exercise which I carried out asked respondents to rank factors according to their importance in affecting respondents’ ability to make a success of their lives, however they defined ‘success’. The list is included in Annex B.
mengistawi buden (development group) leaders and three cell leaders in Amhara; in Tigray, three model farmers were interviewed and two development group leaders. In Tigray, model farmers have the ‘full’ extension package, which might include tree seedlings, fertiliser, ponds, bees, poultry and vegetables. In Amhara, a demonstration farmer might grow vegetables and have bees, but leaders were not necessarily demonstration farmers. Some of the Tigrean leaders described themselves as ‘ex-fighters’ from the overthrow of the Derg.

Apart from administrative duties such as collecting statistics and taxes, local leaders in Amhara appeared to have a parental and authoritarian role. Their responsibilities included: listening to and solving problems, settling quarrels, making announcements, controlling security (A1), including ordering the arrest of miscreants (A29, A8). In Tigray, development group leaders were described by one respondent as the lowest level of government (T15), but they did not appear to have the same importance in the community structure as mengistawi buden leaders in Amhara. One senior official interviewed later said that development group leaders’ role had been downplayed in the Safety Net programme because they tended to influence the distribution of the household packages by misrepresenting the needs of the group members.

The criterion for selection of model farmers in Tigray was their adoption of ‘the full package’ of innovations recommended by the DA (T10, T17, T22). Influential, or ‘big’, model farmers, were distinguished as those who could express their ideas and who were enthusiastic about the Government (T10). In Amhara, selection of local leaders was more explicitly to do with personal qualities and interpersonal skills. Cell leaders were expected to be reliable, have a good relationship with the kebele, be willing to work for the community, physically able, and have a good rapport with his five fellow farmers (A14, A22); to be honest, hardworking and have some education (A22). Leaders were not necessarily political (A14), and in Amhara there had been considerable support for the opposition CUD in the election. One mengistawi buden leader said that political affiliation was not important, and it was better not to be affiliated to a party (A13). Personal qualities required included being recognised as being peaceable and knowledgeable by other householders; being a good organiser,

---

13 It should be remembered that the fieldwork was carried out in the summer and autumn of 2005, when there was post-election violence in urban areas.
being of good behaviour (A23), being willing to work with the people, to lead by doing (A25). Gaining people’s cooperation, however, was linked to the organisation of communal work. What appeared to be paternal interest was linked to firm control. One of the *mengistawi buden* leaders said: “I am also strict to control people and I know who attends and who doesn’t” (A4). If they are going to be absent without good reason, he expects them to make up their contribution by undertaking additional development activities (A4).

Some leaders also belonged to the Party, and most, but not all, said that they supported it. Membership of several traditional associations was commonplace, with *mahebers* being the most popular. In the ‘factors of influence’ exercise, all those who took part ranked God as their greatest influence. The majority ranked government second, themselves third, *idil* fourth and the community fifth.

6.2.6 Young Professionals

Ethiopia’s development strategies include a rapid increase in the training and installation of young professionals in civil service posts across the country. In Amhara and Tigray, government policy was to install at least two DAs and two teachers in each *kebele/tabia*. Fourteen young professionals were interviewed: five DAs and two junior government officials in Tigray, and six DAs and a teacher in Amhara. Minimum educational standards are being upgraded for new appointments to government posts, in accordance with civil service reform programmes, so that most are diploma holders and some appointees to government posts are young graduates. In contrast to *woreda* officials already in post, many of whom were appointed for their political skills (though who may now be offered formal qualifications through distance learning), most of the young professionals I interviewed had either received training in urban centres away from their rural placements, thus being exposed to urban lifestyles, or had been born and educated in urban centres and appointed to work in rural *woredas*.

Remoteness made their postings difficult. The road network is more extensive in Amhara than in Tigray, but not all *woreda* towns are linked to metalled roads, and few *kebele/tabia* can be accessed by road\(^{14}\). One day I met two teachers

\(^{14}\) Equally, some *woreda* towns had no telephone or electricity.
who had walked for 12 and 15 hours to reach the woreda town, hoping to hitch a 

lift (there being no regular transport) to the nearest town which had electricity, 

for a night out. They joked that, for them, this trip was ‘like going to Paris’. One 

young government official (T38), raised and educated to diploma level in the 

regional capital, could not afford to go to such a town very often. His 

entertainment was limited to listening to the radio or paying three birr\(^{15}\) an hour 

to watch television in a house where there was a generator. As a single man, he 

was unable to join any of the community associations such as a maheber or an 

iddir\(^{16}\). He feared getting so lonely that he would resort to marrying a local 

girl and then have to remain in the woreda indefinitely. Social restrictions on young 

professionals seconded to rural woredas, from homes and colleges in the main 

urban centres, meant that there were few people to whom they could express 

their personal opinions. The existence of road links, and hence the opportunity 

to visit one’s family on a regular basis, made life tolerable (A8, T36).

Many of the young professionals interviewed said that they wanted to leave their 

jobs but were unable to do so. Firstly, without access to telephone, electricity 

and a road network, it was very difficult to find out what vacancies existed. One 

young graduate (T45) intended to spend his annual holiday trying to find out 

which woredas had good infrastructure before applying for a new job. If they left 

their jobs without consent, young professionals would be barred from 

employment elsewhere within the woreda and, without a letter of 

recommendation from their sectoral head, there would be no opportunities for 

employment in other woredas. Two DAs told me that, if they had refused to take 

up posts they had been assigned by the woreda, then they would have been 

liable for a heavy fine which would have been deducted from any salary they 

subsequently obtained (A18).

One way of changing jobs is via training, but there were few opportunities. 

Though each DA is trained in a different specialism, it is government policy for 

them to work as generalists and they have little access to post-qualification 

training (A10). Funding for distance learning was formerly allocated to political 

appointees, but it is now open to competition by applicants who are less than 33 

years old (T45). However, competition was tough (only 4% of DAs are funded 

\(^{15}\) His monthly salary was 600 birr (US$1 = ETB 8.6) 

\(^{16}\) In contrast, married officials had greater social status as head of their own 

households and therefore able to join community associations.
for degrees by distance learning), and training is expensive (the cost of degrees was the equivalent of approximately three and a half year’s salary (A18).

Several respondents were critical of donors, believing they concentrated on their own priorities, not on the problems experienced by Ethiopian society (T36). Young professionals also thought donors took too much at face-value, relying uncritically on information provided by the woreda officials. There were comments about the use of ‘showcase’ kebeles, accessible by four-wheel drive vehicles. A senior woreda official, questioning his juniors in front of me about which kebele I should visit, several times included the English phrase “creating the right impression”.

The literature on Ethiopia and decentralisation provides examples of the use of DAs to carry out political tasks at the expense of their extension work. Because local administration is so intertwined with political (party) structures, it is difficult to disentangle professional from political duties. Political duties appeared to be more contentious in Amhara. I heard that two DAs had been ‘punished’ for having supported the opposition coalition during the recent elections by being transferred from a semi-urban location to a remote rural kebele. Elsewhere in Amhara I was told that ‘political’ duties were a matter of personal conviction; the DAs said they could choose to get involved in political work or they could confine themselves to their professional work. In one kebele, the DAs said that they had successfully convinced the local community that the mengistawi buden and cell leaders were not political appointees. Whether they were active supporters of the government or not, the young professionals remained dependent on party support for the advancement of their careers; the more senior the job, the greater the political influence. Being critical of the government did not necessarily mean that young professionals were critical of its institutions and structures; one DA, the son of a mengistawi buden leader, was confident of his own role and his ability to control the leaders for which he was responsible (A10).

In the ‘factors of influence’ ranking, there was no consistent pattern in the young professionals’ responses. Of those who completed the ranking, there were marginally more who said God had greater influence on their lives than
themselves\textsuperscript{17}. They ranked the government as less or least influential. Despite their unhappiness with their career trajectory, DAs’ ‘factors of influence’ ranking and their comments in discussion suggest they attach far greater value to autonomy than that suggested by the farmers’ ranking exercise.

\subsection*{6.2.7 Older Government Officials}

Senior government staff, particularly those working at regional level, had different layers of understanding ‘participation’ and ‘evaluation’ depending on the mode of discussion. This would depend on degree of formality or discursiveness, whether they were speaking as a politician, a government officer, as an individual or as a donor partner. Sometimes the layers were enmeshed by internal contradictions or were peeled away by deepening discussion. The discussions showed that these government officials were clearly aware that participation was interpreted differently by the community, and understood the reasons for this. Despite this, senior officials’ descriptions of the current practice of participation and evaluation were broadly similar to those of junior government staff and farmers.

The respondents\textsuperscript{18} who answered questions more confidently tended to be those who had been in post for many years, had witnessed changes of administrative approach and had a degree of professional specialisation. These respondents talked more openly with me about the political and cultural influences which affected participation. A few described their positions as political appointees; others were described as ‘ex-fighters’ by junior colleagues, and any appointment was assumed by junior colleagues to be restricted to those who supported the EPRDF. Among the senior officials, those who worked in the health and education sectors gave far more discursive answers in the discussion of different forms of participation, describing the catalysts and barriers to communication among different sections of the community.

Despite recent emphasis on educational qualifications as criteria for appointment, most older government officials were ‘qualified’ in more traditionally acceptable ways, in formal and informal political skills. One recently

\textsuperscript{17} Two had been street children and described the NGO which had rescued them as the most influential factor in their lives.

\textsuperscript{18} Twenty-two government officials were interviewed.
appointed man felt unable to answer any questions, despite being a graduate, and deferred to his (retired) predecessor who had been an experienced fighter in the overthrow of the Derg and had been rewarded for his oratorical (mobilising) skills. Another, despite being better qualified than his colleagues and his seniors, spoke very quietly and deferentially. Political status appeared contentious in the current process of civil service reform. On the one hand, lack of educational qualifications meant senior officials could be required to go back to the classroom in order to continue their careers (as was the case with a number of the respondents in this category). On the other, political appointees could have no security of tenure if there was a change of government (A37)\(^\text{19}\).

Among the more senior staff I interviewed, two additional, related issues came out in discussion. High turnover, with loss of staff to the private and NGO sectors\(^\text{20}\), was a great concern; loss of trained staff and lack of stability meant that it was difficult to introduce systems such as [Western-style] M&E. High turnover was ascribed to the inadequate infrastructure and to organisational change through decentralisation (A34, A35, T41). Poor infrastructure meant that government officials were unwilling to work in woredas without regular transport links, electricity or telephones, let alone to visit remote kebeles, likely to entail walking or travelling by donkey for many hours and then to stay overnight in one of the village houses. Decentralisation had increased the problem of understaffing; instead of technical experts being based at the zonal administrative level, decentralisation required replication of technical expertise in every woreda. Frequent restructuring also contributed to high turnover through promotion.

For several very senior staff, all of whom I was told had been ‘fighters’ in the overthrow of the Derg, the problem of high turnover was associated with lack of dedication. They thought that a good nationalist was prepared to make sacrifices, rather than regard a government job as a stepping stone to getting a Masters degree. A senior government official saw the government’s role in development as promoting the idea of “save your country”, a role in which “some

\(^{19}\) This statement made by a regional official which took place soon after the election, when his responses were discursive and reflective. He declined to meet me again during my second visit five months later, the week after the government reasserted its control by force.

\(^{20}\) Higher education also played a role in high turnover; after three years’ employment, government staff became eligible for funded university degrees.
of us have to lead” (T41). This required self-denial and setting an example to government colleagues (T41, T44).21

The small number with whom I had the opportunity22 to do the exercise ranking ‘factors of influence’, affecting their lives for better or worse, indicated that the government was relatively less influential in their lives: the average ranking was God, themselves, idil, community and then government. The older government officials seem to experience a sense of autonomy from the government, despite their apparent dependence on it for their career.

Senior government staff were the one category of respondents to have contact with donor staff. The experience had shown them that different nationalities within the donor community had varying approaches to work, and this affected the way that donors and government worked together. The World Bank was considered more legalistic in its approach than others (A34). The Germans are “aggressive” but thorough (A37): GTZ would ‘look into every detail’ (A34). SIDA was admired because it allowed the government to ‘own the programme’, although it was ‘not owned by the people’ (A34). Some government officials thought donors had a responsibility to intervene to “identify bottlenecks” in the government’s system (A35).

6.3 PERCEPTION AND PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATION

6.3.1 Introduction

The semi-structured interview questions were designed to elicit what respondents understood by ‘participation’, and also to explore the opportunities for participation as conceptualised in development discourse, particularly empowerment through the exercise of ‘voice’ and ‘agency’. The analysis identifies themes of congruence and disjuncture which are followed through in Chapter 7, the responses from donor interviews.

21 Messay writes that Leninism, like Calvinism, emphasises strict discipline, so that in Leninism “the members of the vanguard party … form an elite with a high moral calibre” (Messay, 1994: 205).
22 This technique was only used where circumstances (suitable location, sufficient time) allowed.
Respondents described two types of participation: participating through the ‘contribution’ of labour, and participating in meetings directly or indirectly organised by the government, and this section follows that pattern. Sub-section 6.3.2 sets out respondents’ comments about contribution of labour, the risks associated with non-participation and the sanctions used to ensure participation, and discusses these in terms of individual and collective activity; participation as common-pool resource and the role of voluntarism. Turning to participation in meetings, 6.3.3 focuses on the social and political ascriptions given to this form of participation, on patterns of communication, methods of resistance and sanctions for non-participation.

6.3.2 Participation as “Contribution of Labour”

For all respondents, the primary meaning of participation was the provision or ‘contribution’ of unpaid labour (and sometimes materials). They viewed the contribution of labour as compulsory (although the well-off could contribute money instead). The amount of contribution required was precisely defined: in Tigray it was 21 or 22 days a year, and a similar amount was required in Amhara, although expressed differently as one day in fifteen, or two days per month. Contribution of labour for ‘development activities’ was most likely to be announced to the community at meetings after church services on Sundays, by the DA or someone from woreda headquarters, and then put into practice by the DA giving instructions to the leaders of 30 households, who then gave instructions to the leaders of five households to mobilise the able-bodied in their cell or group. Labour would be used for soil and water conservation, building bunds and planting trees, but might also be used rural road construction, building water points or constructing buildings such as a health clinic or school. The contributions would be ‘managed’ through (i) implementation via this hierarchical structure, (ii) the use or threat of sanctions, and (iii) evaluation.

The descriptions, both of participation and the sanctions for non-participation, were remarkably consistent. Participation means doing what they are told by local leaders (A15, A4, A6, T22). In some interviews, doing exactly what was ordered by local leaders was proclaimed with pride, as evidence of the individual’s support for the government (A15). Farmers said that everyone

---

23 The division of the groups was less structured in Tigray than in Amhara.
participates otherwise they would be fined, or, expressed differently, because people know sanctions would be forthcoming, everyone participates. The possibility of non-participation was clearly real, however, because of the explicitness of the sanctions.

At the time of the fieldwork, punishments for non-participation in development activities in Amhara appeared to be suffused with political tension: “If they refuse [to participate] repeatedly, we assume they have other missions, for example against the government, so we follow them to see what they do and who they talk to. If they continue we take them to the social court and they may get three months’ imprisonment” (A16). This statement was made by a farmer classified by the DA as ‘poor’, not a local leader, although he may have been part of the party cadre.

Even though a Party supporter who had been an ‘election observer’ said “It is bad if people are unwilling to take orders” (A16), a broad range of farmers, including those who supported the opposition coalition, were also critical of those who did not participate. Although a few farmers said that non-participation was due to engagement in other activities such as ‘thieving or killing people’ (A27), or engaging in anti-government activities (A31), the majority of respondents attributed non-participation to lack of knowledge, labels ranging from ‘being uneducated’ (A26), ‘being against new ideas’ (A33), to failing to respond to ‘persuasion’ (T24). Persuasion seemed to be the more common tool to effect participation in Tigray than in Amhara, where more of the respondents talked about fines and imprisonment. Reports of a two-tier system of punishments for failure to participate were common: first a fine, then, for repeated offences, imprisonment (A16, A26, A27, A31, A32).

Local leaders’ interventions also appeared to differ, with withdrawal of resources more common in Tigray:

---

24 The PPA also notes that respondents feared that being critical of the administration would result in being labelled a supporter of the Opposition (PPA, 2005: 44).
25 The range of sanctions described by ordinary farmers included fines of between three and five birr, additional labour, and imprisonment.
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

“Someone who does not participate is assumed ‘not to be ours’ and is denied Food for Work and other development activities by the government” (model farmer, T10⁴⁶).

In Amhara, the intervention appears to be more personal:

“The cell leaders give me the names of people who do not participate. I go and ask their neighbours whether the person has a good reason not to attend.” He described himself as “strict to control people and I know who attends and who doesn’t.” He had never known anyone miss more than one day. (mengistawi buden, A4).

Some local leaders were anxious to emphasise that no force or punishment was applied to those who did not participate in contribution of labour. Examples of comments they made include:

“We have nothing to do with them, only teach them until they do respond. If they still do not participate, now there’s no punishment; before they were fined.” (A1).

“No force is used to make them participate but we teach them repeatedly and after that we leave them alone. These days we are emphasising on people’s rights and don’t force them.” (A6).

“We always try to raise their awareness, we don’t pressure them or fine them or order other people to erase them, we just teach them.” (A8).

Although these comments are clearly framed by those respondents as evidence of a ‘modern’ approach, these texts reveal the continuation of traditional forms of influence - persuasion, the threat of social exclusion, or even violence. The comments below demonstrate how government-organised activities can overlap with, and impinge on, informal associational structures, with failure to participate ultimately being enforced via the individual’s exclusion from their burial association (iddir) or religious association (maheber):

⁴⁶ The WIDE data also provided an example of a female household head who said she was denied Food For Work because she was not a member of the Women’s Association.
“Non-participation is rare; they may be punished by a fine of three birr by the iddir; if they repeatedly do not participate they may be excluded from the iddir for a period.” (A13).

“The leaders will repeatedly try to convince them, and if they still don’t participate they will be sent to the social court for advice, or eventually excommunicated from the iddir and the maheber.” (A14).

A further form of ‘punishment’ was the withdrawal of support from the DAs, the conveyors of new agricultural technologies to ‘progressive’ farmers who teach others by example.27 DAs considered participation crucial: “if they won’t participate, there won’t be any development” (T12). Most model farmers accept his advice, a DA told me; a few do not, and “cause trouble” (T21). Other DAs described participation is ‘voluntary’ but the other farmers will try and influence non-participants; if they still refuse, “there is no punishment, but visits by the DA would cease” (A18).

While government officials thought participation could take a number of forms, they acknowledged that the community level understanding of ‘participation’ was the contribution of labour, though some said labour and ‘ideas’. The officials knew that penalties were imposed: someone who does not participate will “lose his economic and social rights” (T31), but another said that the sanctions (a fine, and additional labour for repeat non-attendance) were rarely applied, unlike the iddirs where punishment is “absolute” (A38). The officials tended to have a more cynical view of participation than the local leaders. One explained that people knew the recent pond campaign29 was impractical but were coerced into participating (T32), but with development activities which were considered useful, such as water points and roads, farmers were more likely to participate willingly (A38). Government officials were now also being asked to make contributions, but a senior official could contribute money in lieu of labour (A37). Another laughed incredulously at the idea of his making a contribution; he agreed with the rural community, that ‘participation’ meant labour, money and

27 “Extension agents pay little attention to farmers who do not participate in PADETES” (Kassa and Degnet, 2004: 155)
28 The social implications of exclusion from iddir are described in 5.7.3.
29 This was a central government campaign to build 70,000 ponds across the country, regardless of the suitability of location or design.
contribution of ideas, but his own contribution was to do budget planning with colleagues (T43).

Participation is built into the formal administrative structure through the Bureaux of Popular Participation. When I asked a government official whether this was used for mobilisation for development and for political purposes, he initially said that the community could distinguish them apart, but then said there was no clear demarcation between the two (A36).

The Tigrean Regional Government’s Manual for Community Participation provides an insight into how participation is presented under Revolutionary Democratic ideology, as a voluntary synthesis between state and citizens. The manual is primarily a list of exhortatory statements from members of rural communities extolling the benefits of participating in government-directed development and extension activities. These small ‘stories of success’ describe how tabia leaders go to the kushets to convince the communities of the benefits of participation: “The peasants from individual up to group have decided together and are implementing that are made on development [digging wells] with full ownership spirit of the peasants, to eradicate poverty” (Box 7), but “those who transgress the collective decisions” are sent to the social court to ensure that they abide by the community rules (Box 8); “The leadership bodies are beneficiaries of the irrigation like the community so what they express in the community’s ideas and interests. The community has self-confidence so they express their ideas to their leaders freely and openly. They do not irrigate with leadership bodies pressure rather they explain that it is within their own good will” (Box 8).

The Ethiopian government was able to present development to farmers as a ‘national project’, “so that we no longer have to be dependent on foreigners”30, a coherent message which resonates with the concept of habesha as the in-group, and foreigners as the out-group. There also appeared, in the way that non-participation was discussed, to be a sense that failure of one person to participate impacted negatively on the rest of the community. This was not expressed as annoyance that one person was able to avoid contributing any labour, as might be the Western reaction, rather that the community suffered

30 Quotation from an interview with a farmer.
from the lack of that person’s contribution. “Working together for development, everybody participates” (T24). This positions labour contribution as a group activity contributing to development as a common-pool resource. In the recurring theme of suppressing individualistic behaviour for the ‘greater good’ of the community, this concurs with the argument that, in collectivist societies, joint effort is regarded as “the only feasible way to bring about change” (Sagie and Aycan, 2003: 457).

Evidence of scepticism among (some) government officers about the role of coercion, placed alongside the apparent acceptance of labour contribution by poor farmers as well as local leaders, suggests that a simplistic interpretation that poses a coercive state in opposition to a suppressed rural population would be incorrect. Firstly, the ‘contribution’ of labour is accepted legally: Prohibition against Inhuman Treatment, Article 18 of the Ethiopian Constitution 1995, precludes forced or compulsory labour except “any economic and social development activity voluntarily performed by a community within its locality”. Secondly, given that corvée labour was required under the Imperial regime, and forced labour was a characteristic of the Derg, the reinterpretation of labour contribution as public spiritedness or community or - pace Putnam - social capital under the EPRDF regime demonstrates both continuity with the previous regimes and change in rhetoric.

The use of forced labour is alien to Western values, although development strategies other than the NAA encourage ‘voluntary’ labour contribution\(^{31}\) to community development and thus enabled customary coercion to continue under a different, Westernised vocabulary of ‘self-help’. A World Bank roads project in Ethiopia seeks “to make rural communities the lead program implementers of the community initiated components”\(^{32}\). Reading this without knowing the existing context of development activities, one would assume that the World Bank project offers communities a previously-denied opportunity to take responsibility for their own development. This rhetorical stance is ideologically consistent with that of Revolutionary Democracy which seeks ‘to exploit the performative power of the unified and mobilised participation and will

---

\(^{31}\) The modern English meaning of ‘contribution’ implies voluntarism, although there is an archaic meaning of contribution as ‘levy’.

\(^{32}\) [www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/.../rttp_countryReport02_ethiopia.pdf](http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/.../rttp_countryReport02_ethiopia.pdf) [accessed 05.08.09]
of the community” (Vaughan, 2003: 182). More broadly, understanding the Ethiopian context questions the role of ‘community’ as service providers proposed by donors.

6.3.3 Participation as “Involvement in Community Meetings”

The secondary use of participation, as ‘contribution of ideas’ through involvement in meetings, is structured around themes which emerged from the literature, from the fieldwork responses and from the WIDE data, and uses analytical concepts set out in Chapter 3.

**The role of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church**

The interviews demonstrated that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church also structures secular ‘participation’ via the religious calendar. Its obligations and timetables were co-opted by the administration as the schedule by which community participation was organised, with development activities being announced at meetings in the church compound on Sundays and evaluations being held on holy days. The priests and some other respondents said that the number of non-working days prescribed by the church had been significantly reduced as a result of government influence. However, the PPA sites in Tigray and Amhara “reported strict adherence to traditional prohibitions on farm work on fasting and saints days, although the number of prohibited days per month varied between 10 and 20 in different places” (PPA: xvi, 16). In one PPA site in Tigray, the respondent described the penalties for non-observance as incurring God’s wrath in the form of “snowfall or other form of calamity”, being “outcast by the community”; or having to give a quantity of cereal crop to the church. The cost was so high that it acted as a deterrent (EPPA, 2005: 16-17).

My respondents described how the time and venue of community administrative, even political, meetings was structured round the church. Meetings between the community and local officials (from the *got* or *kebele* and sometimes from *woreda*) are held on Sundays or Holy Days, outside the church. Meetings inside

---

33 Priests could also theoretically proscribe ploughing as a penance.

34 Although the church structured community life to a great extent, through obligations often enforced through local informal associations, one’s *idil* also proffered the hope of improved fortune.
the church were exclusively religious but, after the services, meetings were held by DAs or by the local administration to convey information, to arrange development activities, and to discuss security (A1, A4, A6, A14, A29).

**The meaning of ‘participation’ in meetings**

Many farmers (more in Tigray than in Amhara) understood participation to mean involvement in meetings, in addition to the provision of labour. Meetings were for “getting the support of all the people to do what activities are ordered by the government” (A16). Involvement meant speaking up in meetings and “saying what you feel” (T5), “giving your ideas” (T8, T9, T18); and “bringing farmers and officials together to solve problems” (A26). Younger government professionals talked about the importance of the meetings for farmers to contribute ideas and to agree objectives (T27, A28, T38), although the inclusiveness of such meetings varied considerably in different locations. In some of the sites, the community were rarely involved; only elderly churchgoers attended the meetings (A9), and only the *woreda*, not the *kebele*, invited the whole community, and then rarely (A2). Attendance was more widespread in Tigray: “Nothing [happens to someone who doesn’t participate] but he will be criticised in *gemgams* in order to make him attend in future.” (T15).

Government officials seemed generally uncritical of community meetings; the advantage of the whole community attending was that it gave those who wanted to complain an opportunity to do so. Asked about monitoring male and female attendance at meetings, one senior Tigrean government official said that good governance was not just about attendance figures, it was about solving differences in order to reach a consensus (T44). However, a Tigrean official lower in the government hierarchy said that development group leaders do monitor attendance at monthly community/*tabia gemgam*, and will persuade/convince people to attend (T19). In a remark which repeats a pattern previously noticed in monitoring provision of labour in Amhara, a senior official said that, if farmers do not attend meetings, the cadres will ask them/pressure them to attend; if they still refuse, it may become a court case and be sent to the *shimağles* (A38).
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

Speaking up in meetings

The descriptions of who spoke at meetings, who did not speak and why, were broadly the same, whether provided by male or female farmers, or by Tigrean or Amhara respondents: speakers were DAs, tabia/kebele leaders and Agricultural Bureau staff (A1, A27, A33) and local leaders, model farmers and ex-fighters (T3, T8, T9, T13). Although some said that “anyone can say whatever they want” (A27, A15) and “no-one is afraid nowadays” (T2, T3, T9, A3), ordinary farmers said that leaders did not listen to them, only to party affiliates (A32). The elderly and sick said that they were ignored (T14, T23, A5). Whereas the elderly had dominated meetings in the past, now ‘educated’ people dominated meetings (A21, A26, A25, T3, T8, T9, T13). Being ‘educated’ was not necessarily linked to education, rather it meant accepting advice from DAs, being a ‘risk taker’, or being a leader. ‘Risk takers’ spoke to persuade others (A1). The extent of voluntary participation is demonstrated by the explanation: “All the leaders first inform participants to express their views and so everyone participates” (T24). Local leaders said “The majority don’t speak because they don’t follow what’s being said, let alone have something to say” (A13) and that “The kebele and the megistawi buden leaders will show the people the direction so that all people can participate; some knowledgeable people who speak will eventually convince the people” (A14).

Government officials thought ‘conservative’ culture meant elders and ‘outspoken rich people’, whom they described as highly influential in the community, tended to dominate meetings (A34, A36, T11) but young professionals were clear that less knowledgeable people who talked a lot through habit no longer dominated meetings; rather, those farmers who “are advanced in their ideas”, “are innovative” and “risk takers” were the ones who spoke up; that the majority did not speak up because they were shy, and afraid of criticism (T27, A2, A10, A19, T36).

Age, marital status and ‘education’ affected participation in meetings, even in Tigray with its participatory rhetoric. Although older people were respected, particularly if they were a member of the shimageles, declining faculties, such as poor sight, terminated participation (A5). One older woman had stopped attending gemgams because she was no longer “an ideas-maker”, although she still attended other meetings (T8), another had stopped attending all meetings.
because of her age, even though she was working in the fields when I interviewed her (T18). Officially, the age range for membership of the Youth Association is 18-35 years, but one woman thought her 19 year old daughter was ‘too little to speak’ in meetings, and her son would not be old enough until he was 25 years old (T18). A 35-year-old, single man said he could not speak to us without his father’s permission. On the one hand, it was said that the elderly talked a lot in meetings through habit and experience (A21, T11) and, on the other, the trend was moving away from dominance by the elderly to those who were “educated”, “knowledgeable” and “who understood new things” (A21, A26). Women were encouraged to speak up under gender equality policies, with younger, educated women being regarded as far more vocal and knowledgeable by their mothers (T3, T8, T9, T13). In Amhara, married women were not invited to meetings organised by the kebele or by the PTA and did not expect to be, because their husbands represented the household (A20). There was some scepticism about the value of formal education for girls; one woman thought her granddaughter was too young to go to school at 7 years old, and another, with school age children, thought that learning in school was ‘meaningless’ (A30).

Membership of the Women’s Association in Amhara was small, even though the kebele put pressure on women to join (A24). One Tigrean woman’s daughters, who were active in the Women’s Association, now called out ‘here I am to speak’ in public meetings (T8), but another woman attended its meetings because she would otherwise be “called and criticised for not attending and told to participate next time” (T9). A younger woman was given an official position in the Association because “she works peacefully, is sociable and is better educated” (A24), corroborating other responses which indicate that ‘good behaviour’ and education are important criteria for selection in Amhara. Even in Tigray, some Tigrean women did not belong because they understood there to be an informal criterion that “you had to have better awareness and knowledge” (T18) of government policy.

Several government respondents said that the Derg had been influential in changing the pattern of participation in meetings, by teaching people to ‘speak up’ (T31), and one elderly farmer said there was less discrimination and corruption under the Derg (T11). More negatively, a Regional government officer said that the Derg meetings were purely political and people were told what to do (T42). Respondents who had been officials under the Derg complained that
they continued to be pejoratively labelled as ‘bureaucrats’ and were not invited to attend meetings (A5, A31, A32). A successful farmer, classified locally as ‘rich’, felt doubly politically stigmatised, as a former Derg official and as a supporter of the opposition coalition. However, this did not affect his social relationships, either in friendship or in traditional associations (A31).

Some EPRDF supporters among male and female farmers claimed there had been an increase in democracy under the current government (T1, A15), and people could now “talk freely” (T.32, A15). Several farmers had won prizes for their oratory and their ability to persuade others (A16, T22, T0), and to mobilise others for development work. Skill in public speaking is one of the criteria of selection as a leader (T1, T2). Good communication skills included “being able to read the audience” (A36); in turn, farmers will “read” the response that is wanted from them (A34).

**Not speaking up in meetings**

The emphasis placed in oral skills clearly caused considerable tension. The risk of not saying the right thing or saying it clumsily are considerable. A government official’s comment that people might want to avoid speaking publicly for lack of ability to speak ‘effectively’ or if they had been ignored on a previous occasion (T32) was confirmed by an Ethiopian colleague’s comment, “one mistake and you (and maybe your family) could be ignored thereafter”. Objecting to the majority view could result in “being outcast from the community” (A34). There was therefore a practical reason to avoid speaking up, in addition to the cultural reticence induced by *yilungta*. Health officials, whose monitoring repertoire included surveys and interviews, thought that in public meetings people felt *yilungta* even when men and women were consulted separately or in small focus groups. Some topics, such as family planning, were culturally difficult to discuss even within women-only groups (T32, A40). A different facet of *yilungta* was expressed by one government official: it was not just the fear of looking foolish, but also the fear of appearing ‘greedy’ (A36).

---

35 This farmer rented additional land and was said to be wealthier than his neighbours.
36 Prizes included a spade for one farmer, and a clock for a government official.
37 This form of reticence is discussed in 5.5.2.
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

The cultural ambivalence between the reticence of *yilungta* and the respect for the powers of oratory was reinforced by the ideological demand for ‘participation’ in meetings. An alternative description of not speaking up in meetings was ‘failure to participate’. If farmers did not speak, they were described by the leaders as ‘deaf’ (T25). *Yilungta* is regarded by progressive farmers as old-fashioned, as “now everyone has to express their views” (T24). One development group leader described failure to speak as a personal weakness which one had to overcome through practice (T15). While the majority do not speak because of fear of expressing their opinions (A12, A21, A25, A26, A33, T5, T25, T36), other farmers thought that not speaking up was suspicious: maybe the non-speakers had bad intentions. There are therefore a number of other reasons why the majority avoid speaking up: lack of experience, fear their ideas will conflict with the *kebele*’s, or because their comments are ignored (A29). The PPA noted that some respondents feared that being critical of the administration would result in “revenge” (EPPA, 2005: 44).

While oratory and reticence might be assumed to be expressions of powerfulness or powerlessness respectively, the literature on Ethiopia offers a third option, reticence as wisdom (Vasko et al., 1998: 108). Moderating speech, by using a quiet, low voice or certain linguistic constructions, is also a sign of deference (Levine, 1965b: 251). There is little in development discourse to draw on, in terms of analysis of expression, but African cross-cultural literature notes the importance of adhering to communication rules, which will include “specific nonverbal codes (i.e. eye behavior, body movements, signs, silence), and through the use of idioms, proverbs, and wise sayings. This high-context communication environment … produces situations in which very little is said to imply much.” (Moemeka, 1998: 124-125). The reticence which Moemeka describes, that "If what a person has to say is not in the best interest of the community, he or she is bound by custom to ‘swallow his or her words'" (ibid: 129), is reminiscent of *yilungta*.

**Consensus**

Respondents emphasised the importance of consensus. Despite the political tension which coincided with the fieldwork, which may account for the links

---

38 Pejorative public labelling of farmers is used as ‘moral punishment’ (Mamumsha and Hoffman, 2005: 2).
drawn between (not) speaking in meetings and security, the following account from a poor farmer, emphasising the route to consensus, reflects the traditional pattern of village meetings:

“If I raise an idea against the majority, I’m allowed to express my ideas and I try to convince them. If I’m unable to, everybody else will try and convince me to adopt their ideas until we reach a consensus. … If there’s no consensus, it won’t work well.” (T25).

This process was confirmed by others. DAs said that discussions were aimed at convincing others that government policy is right: “agreement is the result of influence, not decision” (T36), so if there is no agreement, officials intervene to bring consensus about (T37). More senior government officials, however, had a different view, saying that majority voting was becoming the norm, and that consensus was no longer considered feasible. At one location I was told that a record was kept of who had supported a decision and who had not; at another I was told that only the totals of those for and against were recorded, not names. One government official said that consensus will be reached before work starts, developed from a majority decision, that this was the procedure the government wanted; individual non-participants impede development (T42).

Revolutionary Democracy involves, according to TPLF ideology, “the right and the duty to discuss all topics presented by the party. Once the discussions are finished, consensus proclaimed and decisions made, these have to be followed by all its members.” (Poluha, 2004: 185). Describing this process as “democratic centralism in the vein of Lenin”, Poluha notes that, “in a hierarchical society it is difficult to say whether consensus has really been reached, because it is usually the opinions of those high up in the hierarchy that are interpreted as the consensus and translated as the general decision.” (ibid: 185).

**Individualism**

Responses to enquiries about the meaning of ‘individualistic’ confirmed the tension surrounding non-participation found in the historical and anthropological literature. In line with farmers' comments on the contribution of labour, participation was described by ordinary farmers as “working for a common goal, not as an individual” (A33); individualistic behaviour was described as not taking
part in community works (A26), not participating in communal life, and “during the night getting up to bad activities, such as stealing” (A16).

Examples provided of individualistic behaviour were centred more strongly on social life than on development activities. Individualistic people were:

- “very poor people who are out of social contact” (A12)
- “outcast from social gatherings or other activities” (A22)
- “not willing to accept good advice and doing the opposite” (A24)
- “those who don’t take part in local associations, or in labour exchange, and don’t drink coffee” (A13)
- “a bad person because they are greedy, not supporting other people” (T10).
- “not paying for drinks for others; having personal belief” (T15).
- people who do not participate in *maheber* or funeral ceremonies, or who work alone: “not good people” (T17).
- “someone who is greedy, and has problems with his ideas, thinking negatively” (T26).

One young farmer, who had little schooling and whose other responses had not appeared particularly independent, said that ‘individualistic’ meant trying to be self-sufficient, rather than being supported by the family (A27). When this was being translated for me, I was surprised at what I interpreted as a ‘positive’ meaning. However, my research assistant told me that the meaning of ‘self-sufficiency’ here was negative. He said that most respondents had used the word *gileneguet*, meaning not joining in activities for a common good, which could be regarded as ‘greedy’, that is denying others the benefit of your participation, whereas in this case the farmer had used the word *gilentenaguet*, that is outcast from social networks, having social stigma. Despite the apparent uniform negativity about individualism, there were suggestions that it could have merits as well as threats. One local leader said that individualistic behaviour had two meanings: it has a positive meaning (working hard for yourself) and a negative meaning (spreading bad ideas about participation) (T19).

Tensions around the perpetual threat of individualistic behaviour was evident in discussions with senior government officials. In Amhara, the comment was made that Ethiopians, particularly the Amhara, are individualistic; they like to
work alone, not cooperatively: “Participation is still not the free-will of the community, because they are illiterate, they don’t understand ‘development’”; communal life was deteriorating, debo and wonfer⁴⁹ were dying out because people are behaving less communally (A37). A government official whose job involved liaison with international donors contrasted participation during the Derg, which had been compulsory, with the current regime: “now there is orientation at kebele towards the community, not the individual”; he stressed the need to shift from individualistic behaviour towards ‘the good of the community’ (A39). Communal effort for development (a ‘national’ project) and reciprocal labour mechanisms were conjoined in these answers. Another senior official with many years’ experience of working with different international agencies, comparing Western individualism with Ethiopian values: humans are social animals; social rules are mandatory and breaking them was considered individualistic. He illustrated this with a story about an acquaintance who had used his money for education rather than for memorial feasts, in line with religious and social practice, had been labelled individualistic and as a result was “outcasted, people wouldn’t collaborate with him” (A34).

6.3.4 Bridging Conceptions of Participation

Some officials thought that the government policy of teaching the community to contribute their ideas via the administrative hierarchy had resulted in the “emerging phenomenon” of “ideas coming via the tabia and the DA in every kushef” (T35). Others were more cynical: one said that the only reason people wanted to participate in woreda meetings was to get the per diem.

Another senior official had a more differentiated opinion: For him, participation meant people being involved directly in their own development. The government had a responsibility to change from top-down to bottom-up planning. For the community, participation meant the contribution of labour and money. Asked about the difference between participation and mobilisation, he said that mobilisation also meant involving people in development activities, and it could be political. If people believe in it, it was no problem - Ethiopia has a military history with a culture of mobilisation as the motivating factor. However, if people were forced to comply, there would be problems (T42).

---

⁴⁹ Labour-sharing mechanisms (see 5.7.1).
Statements such as these which contain ‘Third way’ elements recognisable as ‘citizen responsibility’ and ‘social capital’ alongside expressions of control and coercion, demonstrate the importance of deconstructing the concepts of ‘social liberalism’ contained in the NAA (cf. Craig and Porter, 2004). Elements of Western democracy, such as majority voting, were also being absorbed, apparently gradually replacing traditional methods of consensus.

Government rhetoric about empowerment through ‘speaking up’ and ‘contributing ideas’ places local practice on a continuum between participation as conceptualised under Habermasian ‘deliberative democracy’, customary mechanisms of discussion and consensus, designed to be inclusive, and some of the tenets, including the role of leadership, of revolutionary democracy. The gap between the rhetoric of participation as conceptualised by donors, and the reality of its local perception and practice was discussed by some senior officials. For reporting purposes, participation defined as community-based planning “has taken place but in reality it hasn’t” (A34). Differential descriptions of voice and agency were also blurred. Some officials realised that donors also conceived participation as contribution of labour and money towards development activities in order to engender a sense of ownership (A34, A37). Two other views expressed were that donors believed participation meant cooperation with donors (T33), and that donors thought participation meant attending meetings, contributing ideas, building consensus (as did he) (T35).

The pattern of discussion in meetings described in the Ethiopian literature and in the fieldwork can be situated in a wider, African, historical context. “In most societies, Africans could attend the meetings of the Council of Elders if they so wished. They could raise objections to proposals or offer alternative ideas. The councillors would then debate and assess their merits” for as long as it took to reach consensus: “Unanimity was not the objective.” (Ayittey, 2006: 76, 139)40. It is also possible to link the EPRDF’s requirement to ‘contribute ideas’ as a (potentially risky) form of participation, to Ayittey’s comment that, in the African context, “If a dissident made an intelligent argument, he was praised for having

40 The same point has been made in relation to traditional Ethiopian politics (Pausewang, 1994: 528).
offered an idea that could help the community. If he made a silly remark, he set himself up for ridicule.” (Ayittey, 2006: 139).

Farmers therefore have to gauge their participation in meetings in terms of self-expression (via oratory or reticence), with their peers as a critical audience and DAs and officials as sources of patronage. Triandis’ presents identity as being tri-partite: self-identity, immediate social identity and public identity. An Ethiopian farmer could simultaneously hold multiple, largely concentric roles: as well as being a leader of his household, he could be a cell leader, a model farmer and a development group or mengistawi buden leader; or he could be a local administrative official. He (and particularly she) would also have a separate, religious identity, his/her social and administrative life being structured by the Orthodox Christianity calendar and its rituals\(^{41}\). Beyond their local identity, farmers were either Tigrean or Amhara, but above all they were habesha\(^{42}\), and the state was able to capitalise on farmers’ sense of national identity by presenting development as a national project. The marginalising identity\(^{43}\) found in this research was political: previous membership of the Derg, or current support for the opposition coalition, resulted in discrimination.

The projection by government of development as a national project may be a stronger message than the projection of development in donor rhetoric as an individual, rational choice, particularly in contexts such as Ethiopia where individualism has such negative connotations.

A social actor approach allows us to begin to understand the ways in which participation in the Ethiopian context has considerable overlap with donor rhetoric about participation. When Long’s argument of heterogeneity and disjuncture is brought into the analysis, along with concepts of Western individualism and deliberative democracy, it is necessary – particularly in the light of Ethiopian historical memory, identity and culture - to critique some of the claims made for ‘voice and agency’ within the development project. Heterogeneity and disjuncture, assumed in the West to be constructive for a

\(^{41}\) Even Muslim respondents absorbed Orthodox Christianity into their self-identity. One of the reasons a senior official who was Muslim felt proud to be Ethiopian was that it was where the ‘true cross’ had been found (this is celebrated at the main annual festival, Meskel).

\(^{42}\) Skilled oratory/reticence was regarded as a habesha skill.

\(^{43}\) The fieldwork sites were ethnically homogenous.
'healthy' polity, as well as for knowledge formation, may also be destructive of community structures and customary norms, as well as posing a deliberate challenge to existing political power relations. In Ethiopia, “the strength of the system was emphasized by the fact that everybody knew how to behave and could read and interpret each other’s acts. Since the rules were so clear within the collective where patrons and clients found themselves, it also gave members a certain sense of security.” (Poluha, 2004: 189).

In parallel with the projection by donors of Western concepts of participation, via the NAA, the contribution of ideas was also being promoted by the government via Revolutionary Democracy ideology. Developed by the TPLF from Marxist-Leninist ideology, it incorporated customary mechanisms of oratory and consensus in public meetings. One of the main planks of donors’ strategy for increased participation along NAA lines was the World Bank’s PSCAP project, which intended to institutionalise ‘participation’ throughout the government structure from ministry to kebeles through a programme of capacity building. Given the strength of habesha identity and culture, it is likely that the government’s approach will be more successful in influencing people to ‘speak out’ than the donors’.

### 6.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

#### 6.4.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Collection

**Quantitative data**

Donor-driven changes in reporting formats were described as problematic by government officials, not only because it made time comparisons difficult but because the socio-economic categorisation of respondents changed, divided into subgroups which did not accord with local structures (A36). Under the NAA, donors and the government both rely on quantitative data for the management of their development programmes in Ethiopia. For donors, this is largely done via the policy matrix attached to the PRSP. Although the ‘civil society’ PAN/E CRC report stated that there was little evidence “that hard data is monitored on a routine basis for decision-making” (PAN/E, 2005: 20), the Ethiopian
government already had a reputation for advanced statistical work, led by the CSA since the 1960s (GoE, 2004b).44

Despite donor/government congruence over the importance of quantitative data, the methods used differed in two significant ways: between the use of sampling in Western data collection in contrast to the comprehensiveness of data collection in Ethiopia, and the use of anonymity in Western methods contrasts with the lack of privacy in Ethiopian data collection. Indeed, the comments in 6.3 indicate that attempts at maintaining privacy were regarded with mistrust by local leaders and fellow farmers. The PPA recognised that the administrative microstructure meant that “everyone knows everyone else’s business”, with the likelihood that householders were impelled to conform to “normal” behaviour (EPPA, 2005: 45).

Descriptions of quantitative data collection were similar in the Amhara and Tigray woredas. Cell leaders and model farmers collected data on the households under their supervision45. They argued that, because they know the households very well, the data was reliable. The leaders of 30 households passed the data to the DA, who tabulated it, giving one copy to the tabia/kebele and, either directly or after approval by the tabia/kebele, another copy to the woreda Bureau of Agriculture. The statistics were then passed up the administrative and the sectoral hierarchies, to be reviewed by the woreda cabinet. Health and HIV/AIDS data were collected via a different route to rural development data, because many kebele/tabia lacked health workers (although the community may have built a health post). Peripatetic health workers took the information direct to the health bureaux.

**Understanding the reasons for monitoring**

Respondents provided varied reasons for the use of monitoring, shifting - as with the meaning of participation - with the respondents’ status in the administrative hierarchy. One government official had learnt from an INGO (World Vision) that the role of data collection was to increase a local sense of ownership (T33).

44 See 4.3.5.
45 In some kebele, DAs collected data on farmers receiving the full extension package, leaving the remainder for collection by local leaders. Distance was also a factor; some DAs collected information from the kebele/tabia village, leaving local leaders to collect information from households in outlying areas.
Another said it was useful to identify problems such as animals trampling crops, or the need to fence ponds (A39). A more widespread common understanding of the reason for collecting statistics was to assist the government to organise development activities, through the collection of data relating to the number of able-bodied people available to contribute labour and their ‘capacity’, and confirmation that development activities have been done according to plan.

**Types of statistical data collected**

The types of statistics collected were linked to the form of development activity and the type of extension package. Agricultural data included: crop yield, livestock (breeding, vaccination requirements and animal health), use of fertilisers, adoption of new technologies such as irrigation, vegetable production and composting. Land use statistics were collected for calculation of production targets, and the requirement for new technologies. Wealth monitoring included household assets (furniture, construction, household innovations) as well as livestock numbers. Population statistics related to gender (number of male/female headed households) and to the number of able-bodied per household for calculation of labour contribution and thereby the targets for each development group. Development activities included: terracing, construction of dams, water points and sanitation, road building and afforestation.

In addition to data collection, local leaders were responsible for tax collection and for monitoring births, deaths and temporary and long-term migration. Several local leaders said that they had also been responsible for monitoring the number of voters in the recent elections.

**Qualitative data collection**

Government health officials interviewed used a broader range of data collection methods than their rural development counterparts, talked more openly about the part that fear, shame and the need for privacy play in data collection and had a more nuanced understanding of the problems of analysis and interpretation. This effect was observed to a lesser extent among education officials. Generally, the directors of schools provide attendance statistics direct to the kebele/tabia

46 I use the word ‘statistics’ here to imply quantitative data.
leader; Parent/Teacher Associations played a major role in monitoring and evaluating school activities.

Health sector heads put much greater emphasis on the involvement of the community in public fora than other government colleagues, conceptualising participation as training, sharing ideas, getting feedback (T32, T34) but they acknowledged that cultural and religious beliefs made this extremely difficult. They had found that, even in same-sex focus groups, participants were reluctant to discuss health topics in public. In data collection, there was mixed success with surveys: one-to-one interviews had proved successful in Tigray (T32), but not in Amhara (A40).

**Quality of data collection**

The responses from senior government officials reveal the effect of donors’ and government’s differing styles of data collection and management. It is clear that at regional level, at least, government MIS and M&E systems are influenced by a range of donors, either directly by provision of systems or more indirectly through the provision of different models and training courses from which the government can draw. Since donors’ concepts of M&E vary, and their strategies and systems change over quite a short time span, government officials working directly with donors experienced frequent change (almost a state of flux) so that M&E manuals were perpetually in draft form. It was difficult to link the fluctuating M&E system back to the programme logframe. ‘Partnership’ and ‘ownership’ brought a wider number of people into the M&E process which is now “the responsibility of all people involved in implementation” whereas previously programme reporting had been direct “from the grassroots to the top” (A35).

Although the government data collection system was constantly changing, the changes were to targets rather than in the structure and methods of data collection. Targets were “improved” rather than updated (T43). A tabia leader said all the data was carefully collected and he never needed to make corrections (T26). DAs said annual work plans were divided into monthly targets; if implementation fell below the target, the DA and/or the local leaders would be
Apart from the health officials, who wanted to use a wider range of methods and analysis, senior government officers expressed satisfaction with the system of data collection, although in Tigray there was some concern about the level of education of tabia/kebele leaders. There also appeared to be tension around the accuracy of data relating to the target for labour contribution set by the woreda: a tabia leader complained this was not based on the figure for able-bodied he had provided (T19).

Most respondents said that they had no way of providing information or giving their opinion about development, other than via the local administration. In a few sites, respondents had been regularly ‘sampled’ by donors and were familiar with donor data collection techniques. In one site which was part of a longitudinal study, I was asked whether my research would be any different, because they kept answering questions but “nothing changed”. In another site, a model farmer from a village at the end of a rural road close to a town with an airport, said that he was used to answering questions from ferenjis - they arrived in white four-wheeled drive vehicles and held ‘surgeries’. An ordinary farmer said that the authorities always picked the best model farmers for donors to interview. An Ethiopian team researching intercultural practice noted that project ‘beneficiaries’ learn “selective speaking”, in other words they learn what donors want them to say (Vasko et al., 1998: 57). Similarly, the PPA noted that their respondents tended to say what they thought the Ethiopian researchers wanted to hear, particularly if there were kebele officials present (EPPA, 2005: 39).

### 6.4.2 Evaluation in Rural Development

**Gemgamma**

The practice of evaluation in Ethiopia, *gemgamma* in Amharic, *gemgam* in Tigrigna, involves a process of public self-evaluation of individual performance, followed by group assessment (see 5.9.2). It has its roots in “traditional Tigrean culture as well as Maoism” (Gilkes, 1999: 39). Introduced by the TPLF during its struggle against the Derg, the EPRDF has extended its use throughout the

---

47 Data was recorded in exercise books or on sheets of paper issued by the Bureau of Agriculture. On several occasions I was shown completed sheets, with monthly quotas (an annual figure divided by 12) and identical figures for performance rates.
government structure. It nominally involves the examination of performance against work plan but the workplan or design and methods are rarely called into question, it being assumed that individuals are responsible for success or failure of implementation. Implementation is usually limited to completion of targets, and targets are often inputs (primarily based on labour). The subject of the gemgamma, or his/her superior, will present a report; this will be followed by public examination of the subject. The vocabulary used by senior government officials to describe gemgamma’s purpose (planning, implementation and evaluation (A39) was common to Western development concepts. Discussion elicited a more critical assessment of the gemgamma process for some officials, but not all.

Tigrean farmers said that gemgam are dominated by officials and by those who are ‘knowledgeable’ about government policy, such as local leaders and demonstration farmers. Some respondents attending the woreda for a gemgam said “everyone participates, persuaded by the group leader” (T1); if people did not participate, they would “lose out” in decision-making (T2). The extent to which ordinary members of the community are involved varies by kebele/tabia. In Tigray, ordinary farmers are involved in gemgam of their local administration on a monthly basis (T19, T22). In Amhara, ordinary farmers were less likely to be involved in gemgamma (A1, A12, A23, A26, A27, A33), but there might be occasional community gemgamma in the event of security problems (A22) or one could be called by the woreda (A31). Most farmers in Amhara said that attendance at gemgamma was restricted to kebele officials “and other party members”, militia and mengistawi buden leaders (A12, A16, A33); they were not invited to attend and had no forum for expressing their opinion (A5, A12, A16, A26, A27, A33). One female farmer in Amhara said that, as with the community meetings, the Farmers Association briefed its members in advance of gemgamma, telling the farmers what questions to ask (A15).

Gemgamma for development activities were separate from the party cadres’ gemgamma, but were still infused by political issues. A gemgamma of the wider community occurs if there are ‘security problems’ (A22), and the current

---

48 Only rural development/agriculture gengamma were discussed; gengamma could also be political.
49 “Some people from the woreda who serve the kebele as policemen have a gemgamma every six months” (A8).
political crisis had disrupted the usual schedule, making them more frequent in Tigray (T10, T18) and less so in Amhara (A31). A mengistawi buden leader in Amhara was not invited to agricultural gemgamma because he was not a party member (A13).

**The logistics of evaluation**

Orthodox Christian religious days are chosen for gemgamma because farmers will not be working in the fields on holy days and will be gathered around the church on Sundays. The exact pattern of gemgamma varied from kebele/tabia, but they could be as often as weekly at the lower levels, for example got leaders and mengistawi buden leaders evaluating each other every week (A8). In some kebele/tabia, gemgamma were held “every 15 days”, for example “mutual evaluation of DAs/mengistawi buden leaders every two weeks” (A18). More commonly, gemgamma were held monthly. However, there are gemgamma at every level, so that a DA could report that:

> “the DAs evaluate each other, the DAs are evaluated by the kebele. DAs are evaluated by the mengistawi buden leaders and ordinary people at any meeting. The DAs are formally evaluated once a week. We evaluate the kebele when the woreda calls a gemgamma and evaluate the mengistawi buden leaders every 15 days” (A2).

Both the PPA and the PAN/E CRC report devote considerable attention to the role of DAs, the PPA noting that DAs are “widely respected in most communities” (EPPA, 2005: xiv). The CRC records that, while DAs were rated highly in terms of availability (approximately half the respondents in Tigray were visited by a DA once a week, and 82% were visited at least once a month), dissatisfaction was registered across the regions surveyed about “weak monitoring and supervision by the extension agent” (PAN/E 2005: 82, 88). Although this implies that farmers want DAs to keep closer watch on their activities, farmers also expect to evaluate DAs, who should be prepared to be “criticised and corrected” by farmers (Mamumsha and Hoffman, 2005: 4).

A common pattern was for mengistawi buden leaders to evaluate each other. They evaluate their cell leaders and are in turn evaluated by the kebele (A25). A tabia leader said that the tabia officials hold a gemgam weekly, and the kushet
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

officials evaluate each other weekly; the tabia/kushet evaluate each other every two weeks and there is a community gemgam monthly to evaluate the tabia, and the tabia to evaluate the community. He expects the majority to attend (T19). Other types of evaluation reported include teachers evaluating each other and teachers being evaluated by their students (A9, T37), and by the Parent Teacher Association whose “membership includes people known for their ability to mobilise, who are trustworthy and knowledgeable about the school” (T26).

Figure 6.2 below illustrates the frequency of gemgamma within the nested administrative hierarchy from woreda to household.

The use of gemgamma extends throughout the government and reaches down into the community to level of cell leader, who is judged on his ability to mobilise his neighbours’ contribution of labour. Poor quality of work is the result of insufficient mobilisation, but the ‘mobilised’ theoretically can take part in the evaluation. The ‘ideal’ in gemgamma, however, is for the subject to accept criticism and “learn from their mistakes” (A10), and to improve his or her performance as a result, thus demonstrating the benefits of self-correction. A young DA said “There is nothing risky in gemgamma for those who are willing to accept suggestions; they have to accept or they lose their positions” (A2).

Figure 6.2 - Local Evaluation Framework
While the persuasive powers of ‘knowledgeable’ farmers are a risk to the subject of the gemgamma, the subject’s own powers of persuasion can be used to his/her own advantage and a negative performance report may be rejected. Oratorical skills were thus also useful as protection: an articulate person could get round any accusation in a gemgam (T34). If a government official’s persuasive powers fail to achieve this or they refuse to accept the criticism (or, if given a warning, they subsequently fail to improve performance), they may be sent to the Discipline Committee and/or dismissed. A local leader who failed to respond to criticism could be sent to the social court for advice” (A14).

There were – in theory - other, formal avenues for ordinary farmers to express an opinion about the performance of local officials. At the Peasants’ Conference, held annually or quarterly, official reports are read out, prepared by the DA (A13) or the kebele (A23), but a local leader described these as “top down, there’s no possibility of getting the community’s ideas and opinions” (A23). The other avenue is the House of 100 Representatives, which was considered by one local leader to be a substitute for community participation in gemgamma (A18), because dealing with 100 people was more practical than “calling all 1,000 people in the kebele repeatedly for meetings” (A6). In places, the 100 Representatives evaluate the kebele every month (A4, A8). Their governing regulations included the evaluation of the Representatives by the community but this has never been put into practice (A6). One farmer, who had been an official under the Derg, understood the 100 Representatives all to be party supporters (A32).

Perceived purpose, benefits and disadvantages of gemgamma

The purpose and benefits of gemgamma were described by some village-level respondents thus: The purpose of gemgamma is “to correct a person’s mistakes about getting government work done on time, and to ensure the person is treating the community honestly” (A14); the purpose is “to know the status of work, it helps implementation, identifies whether the community is working, and to find out whether the kushet is pressurising the community unfairly” (T19). Female household heads also saw gemgamma as having benefits: their purpose is “to criticise those who work badly, and encourage those who work well” (T18); “the people who are not working properly are given warnings” (A15).
One DA said that being criticised for failing to meet targets made one work harder (T21); another said gemgamma was an opportunity to make sure that local leaders did not ‘cheat’ the kebele administration (A10).

Ethiopian farmers understood the purpose and the practice of evaluation to be the checking of implementation of development activities against quotas. Failure to meet these meant the work had to be repeated. The official purposes of monitoring and evaluation were understood to be threefold: (i) to ensure that work was done according to plan and on time; (ii) to use the information for future planning; and (iii) to make sure that local leaders and officials were not treating the people unfairly.

Young professionals tended to be wary of the gemgamma process, perhaps because they had more to lose. The group which expressed the most negative view of gemgamma were farmers. “Gemgams are about conflict with others, that’s why I’m not interested. Poor farmers know it’s better to keep quiet.” (T11). A few government officials also thought that ordinary farmers might not want to participate because “they are afraid of quarrels” but at the same time would want to participate as they would be afraid of criticism for not doing so (A33). Although gemgamma is open to abuse, through victimisation both of and by government officials and local leaders (some government officials suggested, by ‘ill-informed’ local people), few of the local leaders and ordinary farmers interviewed were particularly hostile to its use, despite farmers having described lack of agency and voice. Rather, it was presented as a process of accountability embedded into the administrative structure, mediated by cultural practice.

Some government officials framed gemgamma in ‘management’ language: it was an opportunity to identify the root causes of problems, discuss possible solutions and to provide follow-up. One young government official described gemgamma being used as a form of performance management, instead of supervision and discussion. Anecdotal accounts from those working in federal government departments describe regular self-assessment in front of colleagues suggesting that it is practised throughout the government system. A report produced by the Ethiopian Management Institute compares the Civil

---

50 As frequently as weekly.
Service’s performance management systems favourably to those of public enterprises and private organisations because of its continuous monitoring of employees’ performance\textsuperscript{51}. A senior official noted that, unlike ‘project evaluation’, gemgamma “concentrates on the person, the government is telling us to do it” (A35).

\subsection*{6.4.3 Reflection on Ethiopian and Donor Concepts of Evaluation}

These responses support the literature in 5.9.2 describing formal and informal evaluatory mechanisms. Although a few government officials thought gemgamma were an opportunity for learning, the literature suggests that it is either an act of coercion or it is a management tool, depending on the writer’s perspective. The sense of purpose, clarity and regularity of gemgamma contrasts sharply with evaluation in Western development discourse as a fragile concept, contested in its purpose, practice and interpretation. One of the more frequent criticisms is that evaluators do not include intended beneficiaries in the evaluation process. Under gemgamma, those being evaluated meet their evaluators face-to-face. While they may risk unfair or implied criticism, gemgamma offers a degree of transparency which is not available within current donor evaluation practice because it takes place in public.\textsuperscript{52} The use of public shame as a method of inducing ‘improved performance’, and the evaluatee’s acceptance of the need to improve, in an act of penitence and absolution towards the evaluators/beneficiaries, contrasts sharply with Western evaluation methods which evaluate the project or programme, nor the performance of the individuals responsible, who are usually anonymised in the evaluation report, itself rarely available to the beneficiaries, either in format or in language.

Under the NAA, and particularly when budget support rather than SWAp modality is used, evaluation is not a systematic part of assessing efficiency and performance of donor intervention or of government performance. Although joint

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} The Institute’s handbook, \textit{Performance Management for Ethiopian Civil Service Institutions}, refers to international literature about accepting criticism and the danger of loss of ‘face’, about the role of high context (implicit) communication and about the necessity of a shared vision and of transformational leadership which “inspires followers to transcend their own self” (EMI (2003):16-20).
\item \textsuperscript{52} Performance targets or standards are set in Western NPM practice but, in the UK at least, individual performance appraisal is a confidential process between employees and their line managers. While there was interest in ‘360\textdegree’ appraisal’ when NPM was first introduced, its adoption has been limited because its anonymity was found to encourage unwarranted negative comment.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
donor evaluations are encouraged, few had been done in Ethiopia. Under NAA logic, donors rely on the government’s own M&E systems to monitor performance without, as the next chapter will show, understanding how these systems function or, in fact, having trust in those systems whether they understand them or not.

6.5 CONGRUENCE, AMBIGUITY AND DISJUNCTURE: CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON

6.5.1 Introduction

Within Amhara and Tigrean respondents’ descriptions of their perceptions and experience of participation, monitoring and evaluation and local processes of accountability, the themes of strong leadership, individualism-collectivism and communicative skill which emerge resonate with the historical, anthropological and political science literatures reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. This section explores the extent to which these themes are ‘peculiar’ to the Ethiopian case, or whether comparative analysis with other country contexts indicates areas of congruence, disjuncture or ambiguity. The secondary purpose of this section is to set up themes of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity arising from the data which will be compared with responses from the donor interviews presented in Chapter 7.

6.5.2 Comparative Analysis: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam

Assumptions of its universal applicability contained within the NAA suggest that, despite initiatives such as Drivers of Change, the ‘international community’ largely disregard local history, culture and political systems. Part of my initial motivation to explore such a wide background literature on Ethiopia was that I found little in my experience from East and South East Asia which prepared me for the social, communicative and political patterns which were apparent on my first visit to Ethiopia. Comments from Ethiopian colleagues and respondents indicated that they resented cross-country comparisons which I tried to draw rhetorically, but comparison is a useful aid to sharpening our contextual knowledge (de Vries, 1992).
Table 6.1 below presents a very abbreviated comparison of Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam. It is designed to identify whether there are any similarities or contrasts between these three multi-ethnic countries, each of which has a history of Marxist-Leninist inspired government, each still effectively a one-party state. The table is effectively a checklist of factors considered in the Ethiopian fieldwork, to see whether those factors are present in the cases of Tanzania and Vietnam.

Table 6.1. Comparative Overview: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-ethnic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-language</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Historic’ past is important</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying belief system</td>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Confucianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong national identity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-south cultural “divide”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One party state (effective)</td>
<td>Yes (EPRDF)</td>
<td>Semi (CCM)</td>
<td>Yes (VCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political renewal by ‘purge’</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership - authoritarian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership - patronage</td>
<td>? political</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>? political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial past</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(brief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past ‘Sovietisation’</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist ideology</td>
<td>Yes (residual)</td>
<td>Yes (+ market)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government microstructure</td>
<td>Yes (5 hh, 30 hh)</td>
<td>Yes (10hh, 100 hh)</td>
<td>Yes (25-30 hh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation as contribution of labour (+ sanctions)</td>
<td>Yes, allocated by hh groups</td>
<td>Yes, but not enforced</td>
<td>Yes, allocated by hh groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation as contribution of ideas</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of oratory for exhortation and ridicule</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant-based rhetoric</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Ujamaa, former)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass organisations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of associational life</td>
<td>Membership restricted and regulated</td>
<td>Fluid membership, value on social harmony</td>
<td>Re-emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community resource ‘management’ with sanctions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public self-criticism and evaluation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture of ‘critique’ of authority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value to social obligation</td>
<td>Weak (rather, strict reciprocity)</td>
<td>Weak (obligation is kinship-based)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value to ‘consensus’</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(heterogeneity accepted)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value to individualism</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value to collectivism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value to self-help</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship-based structure</td>
<td>No (south only)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Tanzania is sometimes used by donors as a comparator with Ethiopia, it appears that the Ethiopian context has more parallels with Vietnam than with Tanzania. One marked contrast with Tanzania was the nature of leadership: leadership in Tanzania is patronage-based rather than authoritarian. As in Ethiopia, disgruntled clients could change their allegiance if a better patron was available (Kelsall, 2008: 632-634), although there was little opportunity for local people to hold leaders to account (Lange, 2008: 1139-40). Civil society in Tanzania also appears markedly different, with wide ranging (often leisure based) associational life, with open membership and little regulation (Tadasu, 2006; de Weerdt et al., 2007: 24-25). Mass organisations are far more powerful in Vietnam, where the Vietnam Fatherland Front is “the overarching political alliance of all the mass organizations” (UNDP, 2006: 7). Many Vietnamese CSOs are former government agencies. What Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam all share is a government micro-structure organising households into small groups. Even though in Tanzania, cell leaders (of ten households) have no development, data or tax collection responsibilities, this level of organisation challenges donor assumptions of government-community relations.

I found fewer differences between Vietnamese and Ethiopian practice of participation and evaluation. One was the value placed in Vietnam on technological innovation and on self-help through hard work (Duikers, 1995: 192). Unlike the Ethiopian concept of the individual as intrinsically evil, battling with self-control, the Vietnamese individual tries to master their “inner selves” as a root to self-improvement and harmony (McCloud, 1995: 789). However, as in Ethiopia, individualistic behaviour is regarded as selfish, short-sighted and risks
jeopardising the good of the community; individualism is a pejorative term linked to self-indulgence (Marr, 2000: 769, 789, 794). Another difference was the importance attributed to (non-reciprocal) social obligation (Malanney, 1997: 912). Far more marked were the similarities, including Marxist-Leninist conceptions of leadership of a peasantry which was both knowledgeable/ignorant. I was surprised to read a description of Vietnamese oratory, which sounded similar to Ethiopian style: “The rhetoric is nearly poetry, that lovely, lilting oral culture thing, seeing it this way and then that, space for inflection, nuance …” (Craig and Porter, 2006: 138). The Vietnamese form of public self-criticism, kiem thao, has many similarities with gemgemma.

Participatory monitoring is a key part of the 1998 Vietnamese legislation, Grassroots Democracy Decree, but the concept is well-entrenched. One of Ho Chi Minh’s slogans was “The people know, the people discuss, the people do, the people evaluate and check up” (Craig and Porter, 2006: 134), a rhetoric found in the EPRDF’s Revolutionary Democracy. However, there appear to be greater opportunities for expressing resistance to local government performance, particularly when contribution of labour was unequally enforced (Malanney, 1997: 402-403). Widespread “everyday forms of resistance” to unpopular policies were acknowledged, and responded to, by the “Party-state” (Conway, 2004: vii).

Craig and Porter argue that it is difficult for Vietnamese to see the benefits of “liberal openness” over their traditional structures and institutions (Craig and Porter, 2006: 126). Cultural and polity patterns were sufficiently embedded to withstand, indeed to reject, the Western model of representative democracy (Duiker, 1995: 80). In South East Asia, Western democracy is sometimes referred to as “50%+1” indicating that one vote can alter an election. They prefer a consensus model, “communal democracy which relies on discussion and consensus building and in which the vote - often unanimous - is not taken until after a consensus has been established.” While Western social scientists have ‘romanticised’ this in the village context and been highly critical at state level, the pressure to conform is regarded locally as an expression of “community will, bringing errant individuals into line for the greater community good” (McCloud, 1995: 273).
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations

The logic of the NAA suggests developing countries are susceptible to persuasion to adopt Western democratic and administrative patterns. Their own experience has shown, however, that countries such as Ethiopia and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent highly-colonialised Tanzania, accept donor “influence” at their own pace. In both Ethiopia and Vietnam, Marxist-Leninist ideology appears to have been synthesised with customary practices, and the strength of their cultural and belief systems provide a counterweight to donors’ influence.

6.5.3 Information-Sharing: Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity

Joints sources of information

Under the NAA, donors who use ‘up-stream’ modalities no longer have access to contextualised information against which to analyse indicators contained within the PRSP policy matrix. PPAs offer an alternative source. While the first generation of PPAs was designed to elicit contextual information on the “realities of the poor” to inform donors’ programmes, the second generation are designed to “create new relationships within the policy process” and to influence recipient government’s policy-making processes (Norton, ODI, 2001: 11). Although the PPA process is supposed to be ‘owned’ by the government, it is clear from review of 1st and 2nd generation PPAs in Vietnam and Tanzania that both donors and government had difficulty identifying local partners with sufficient capacity to conduct and analyse the PPA and resorted to using INGOs (World Bank Hanoi, undated: 5).

In 2005, two participatory assessments were conducted in Ethiopia, to which donors had access: a PPA and a Citizens Report Card survey. The authors of the Ethiopian PPA were international economists (one British, one Ethiopian) with extensive experience in Ethiopia, and the survey was conducted by the government’s MWU, with support from the CSA. Although its authors are critical of labour contribution, the PPA does not capture the ubiquity and extent of labour contribution, presenting it as voluntaristic rather than obligatory. They describe the sub-kebele administrative structure as ‘social’, when it clearly carries out administrative functions such as tax collection and mobilisation for public works; the descriptive ‘social’ masks the power relations between the
kebele, local leaders and ordinary citizens. The PAN/E (CRC)\textsuperscript{53} was funded by the DAG donor group and contracted to the Public Affairs Foundation of India. The analysis appears weakly contextualised, with statements being made which seem at odds with the regional or country context. Its statements that “there is little evidence in the meetings that hard data is monitored on a routine basis for decision-making” and that there is no participation in local “assessments of performance” (PAN/E, 2005: 20) appears to ignore local practice.

Both surveys employed focus group discussion (FDG) methods. When the Ethiopian PPA used “a representative community discussion group” to elicit perceptions about aspects of rural life (EPPA, 2005: 12), it would be useful to know what proportion were leaders of five-household cells or 30-household development groups. The same clarification would be useful in relation to “key informants” within the community (ibid: 14). Describing a “diagnostic" FDG as “quite untried in the Ethiopian context”, the CRC expressed surprise to find that “communities are open to giving objective and honest feedback” (PAN/E, 2005: 19).

Without contextual analysis, it is difficult to estimate how powerful such surveys as the CRC can be in donors’ discussion with the government. The CSA described the CRC somewhat dismissively as an “independent small survey”, but it was also equivocal about the qualitative methods used in the government-commissioned PPA: “The PPA survey was anchored to the WMS to be able to link qualitative outcomes with quantitative ones and at the same time enable analysts gauge whether the outcomes from the qualitative surveys are reliable or not with in a reasonable margin of error. This helped reasonably avoid common pitfalls of qualitative surveys.” (MOFaED, APR 2006/07: 122). It is also not clear how much value donors attributed to them. The CRC’s importance seemed largely rhetorical, as few donors claimed to have read it.

\textbf{Elements of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity}

My respondents’ explanations of their conception of development, participation, evaluation and accountability showed a broad degree of internal congruence,

\textsuperscript{53} Amhara Region refused to take part in the CRC; the Afar region data was dropped from the report because it was considered unreliable.
except at higher levels in the administrative structures where conceptions of participation from Western discourse were discursively included. In the interviews, I found a broader range of views expressed among respondents living in villages near the main roads than in the more remote villages visited\textsuperscript{54}. In Amhara and Tigray, only some of the (few) main roads were metalled, there were very few rural roads, and many woredas had no electricity or telephone. This meant that there were many villages which were rarely visited by woreda officials, only by young DAs and junior agricultural experts able to walk to them\textsuperscript{55}. The meetings held by local leaders outside the church on Sundays would be the only source of ‘official’ information in remote villages, and government information delivered in a manner consistent with existing knowledge and cultural patterns would be easily assimilated\textsuperscript{56}

The sources of information available to rural communities (limited largely to the EOC and Party/Government sources) are consistent with Denzau and North’s concept of mental models being formed by culture and belief systems. Initiatives such as Drivers of Change suggest that, despite individuals’ in-country knowledge, experience and value-framework, the international ‘community’ largely disregard local history, culture and political systems. The data presented here suggests that, particularly under NAA orthodoxy with its assumptions of attitudinal change, these factors should to be taken into account in order to understand the trajectory of change.

The social actor approach presupposes heterogeneity at the interface. I had deliberately chosen to carry out the fieldwork in a variety of sites across both regions in order to get a range of responses, but the responses themselves showed a greater degree of consistency than I anticipated\textsuperscript{57}. This does not mean that disjunctures were not present, nor that there was no evidence of

\textsuperscript{54} In the 2005 election, opposition support was strongest in the urban areas and, discounting Tigray as the TPLF/EPRDF stronghold, support for the government was strongest in remote villages.

\textsuperscript{55} More than half the population lives more than 10 kms from the nearest road (World Bank report No. 29468-ET)

\textsuperscript{56} A federal government official told me that he thought donors had no understanding of the psychological world view of most Ethiopians.

\textsuperscript{57} As a result of cross-regional similarities identified during the PPA, its authors noted that “it is possible to treat all rural PPA sites as variations on particular themes that have wide application across the whole of rural Ethiopia” (PPA, 2005: 10). They further concluded that “Ethiopia presents itself as relatively equal, manifested by the narrow ranges of farm size and livestock ownership” (ibid: xviii).
change. There was evidence of conflict and exclusion, and concepts of participation were, to a limited extent, adjusted across the administrative hierarchy so that customary and newer meanings could both be incorporated. Despite this accommodation, there were recurring themes (Table 6.2) in the Ethiopian interviews. What had become clear following analysis was that discussion of participation and evaluation necessarily included discussion about the nature of development itself, within the context of rural development administration.

Table 6.2. List of Emerging Themes from the Ethiopian data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Concepts</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development as ideological project</td>
<td>Contribution: labour</td>
<td>Public evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-community structure interwoven</td>
<td>Contribution: ideas</td>
<td>Evaluation linked to individual performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable/ignorant peasantry ideological dyad</td>
<td>Knowledgeable/ignorant peasantry</td>
<td>Uncertainty about the use of quantitative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour 'contribution'</td>
<td>Communication skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exhortation/persuasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus/majority voting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associational 'capital'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following chapter (Chapter 7) analyses the responses of donor staff when asked about their understanding of participation and evaluation, as individuals and as donor representatives, and their understanding of how participation in evaluation is perceived and practiced in Ethiopia. Analysis identified a number of synchronicities with the themes in Table 6.2. The interviews also deflected, undirected by me, into discussion about the nature of development, where individual donor staff juggled their own development values against those of their donor agency and those with whom they interacted ‘in the field’. 
CHAPTER 7
PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION: DONORS’ PERCEPTION AND PRACTICE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores how three bilateral agencies, CIDA, DCI\(^1\) and Sida, conceptualised participation and evaluation, and how their staff perceived it to be practised in Ethiopia. It is the counterpart to Chapter 6 which analysed the findings from similar semi-structured interviews with Ethiopian respondents affected by the donors’ aid programmes (described in 4.3). The chapter structures the findings under the three broad headings used in Chapter 6: national concepts of the ‘development project’, participation and evaluation. Long’s social actor approach argues for a recognition of heterogeneity amongst actors, here those working at the development interface of ‘harmonisation’ in Ethiopia. The underlying approach is to consider individual donor staff as social actors, noting how they respond to the development narratives and policies adopted by their own employing agency and those of the international community. The analysis explores how concepts, experience and values discussed by individual staff accord or differ within and across donor agencies, and how anomalies are handled. In doing so, it identifies areas of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity which allow sharing information, learning and influencing through shared mental models.

As 3.6.6 explains, the ‘selection’ of donors occurred fortuitously through their willingness to take part in their research.\(^2\) The textual analysis of donors’ (publicly available) documentation, section 7.2, was undertaken after the fieldwork was complete. In what I see retrospectively to be a form of othering, I looked for the antecedents of each donors’ values of participation and evaluation after the interviews were completed (having read academic discourse on participation, evaluation and development management before the fieldwork). The significance of ‘national’ values and patterns of association and communication, which I had gleaned from the literature on Ethiopia prior to fieldwork, only became apparent following analysis of the donor interviews. The

---

\(^1\) The acronym being used by Ireland’s aid programme in 2004-2005.

\(^2\)
documentary analysis located each donor agency’s value framework within the
documents they presented for consumption by their domestic audiences. The
analysis draws on DAC peer reviews, with commentaries from the literature on
donors’ programmes and their country’s social capital. A caveat here is the
disparity in the quantity of literature available about each donor’s practice. There
is comparatively little analysis of Irish aid practice in the public domain; there is
rather more literature on the Canadian aid programme; and there is a very large
literature about Swedish overseas assistance, from internal and external
sources. Despite this disparity, there is a demonstrable consistency within the
documentation for each donor.

Section 7.3 analyses the findings from interviews with donor staff. It uses the
sub-themes identified in the Ethiopian data (Table 6.2) to explore the values,
underlying belief systems and practice expressed by respondents during
discussion centring around the three main themes: the nature of development,
participation and evaluation.

7.2 DEVELOPMENT VALUES, PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION:
DOCUMENTARY REVIEW

7.2.1 Development Values

CIDA

Canadian aid promotes Canadian values, specified as global citizenship, equity
and environmental sustainability (GoC, 2005a: 2). Of these, global citizenship
seems to be given greatest priority. Canada positions itself as a leading member
of the international donor community, committed to multilateralism, and thus to
the MDGs and to harmonisation. It describes multilateral organisations as “a
forum to promote values important to Canada, including democracy, human
development and social justice” (ibid: 27). Berger describes Canada as “a multi-
cultural country where diversity is celebrated and immigration is a constant
reality”; and “because of diversity in culturally based traditions, religions, and
histories, different cultures hold culturally distinct sets of values and beliefs”

2 A criticism of my research ‘mental model’ could well be that I did not include interviews
with staff from DFID, my own country’s agency, but DFID declined to take part.
Chapter 7: Donors’ Perceptions and Practice

(Berger, 2006: 116, 117). The challenges associated with such cultural diversity causes Canadians continually to “examine the accessibility, inclusiveness, and equity of their institutions and processes” (Berger, 2006: 117).

This need to promote domestic cohesion (Noel et al., 2004: 31) is reflected in three foreign policy objectives: “jobs and prosperity; common security; and Canadian values and culture. It is categorical that Canadian development assistance is an integral component of foreign policy and an instrument serving these three integrating national interests.” (Pratt, 1999: 89). As a multicultural society, “Canada has learned how to make effective and principled compromises, bringing disparate groups and interests together in the service of a common purpose” (GoC, 2005b: 4). Noting that “Canadian aid is an instrument serving foreign policy objectives”, the DAC Peer Review of Canadian aid (2003), warns that Canada risks placing “socio-economic interests ahead of responding to the needs of developing countries.” (OECD, 2003a: 43-44).

DCI

The key principles which drive Ireland’s development programme are effectiveness, value for money, transparency and accountability, “a holistic approach to the struggle against poverty”, “policy coherence with other aspects of Irish foreign policy”; together with rigorous monitoring and evaluation (Ireland Aid, 2003: 5). “These guiding principles … place Ireland at the cutting edge of international development policy. Ireland consequently continues to set the high standards for its official development co-operation programme” (OECD, 2003b: 24).

Ireland sees its aid programme as rooted in its historical past and its Roman Catholicism, with the missionary work effectively providing a “template” for Irish aid (Ireland Aid, 2003: 68). “Ireland’s own experience of colonisation, poverty, famine and mass emigration has provided a basis for a long tradition of solidarity with the poor and dispossessed.” (OECD, 2003b: 11). This is evident in the language in its Aid Effectiveness report: “Never has there been a more exciting opportunity for Ireland to express its solidarity with the struggle of developing countries against poverty and inequality and its determination that these evils will be overcome.” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 92). There is considerable public support for NGOs working in developing countries, because “The Irish take pride in
these direct and personal efforts to reduce suffering in the world” (OECD, 2003b: 19). NGOs “have shown exemplary compassion and commitment in the help which they have provided over many years for the poorest people of the world”, and “have helped to shape a clear sense of … the moral leadership which Ireland can exercise in this area” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 62). The DAC review agreed that “Ireland aims to implement a high-quality official development cooperation programme in line with international good practice and, increasingly, to set an example for other donors” (OECD, 2003b: 19).

Edmondson’s description of community life in the West of Ireland suggest parallels with Ethiopian mores: “neighbourliness is counted a phenomenon which is more important than individuals, not a contractual relationship between them.” Strict rules about social actions, such as attendance at funerals, “are followed, without exception”; the opinions or wishes of the individual are not important. “It was the impersonal nature of the action which was felt to be admirable” (Edmondson, 2001: 62). Failure to comply with interactional ‘rules’ invoked a “judicious silence” of disapproval or the use of gossip and ridicule. The importance of consensus was apparent: “In joint political activities, voting on committees, which underlines the possible existence of different opinions, is considered divisive; attempts are made to bring round dissenters to the general view without making them feel isolated.” (Edmondson, 2001: 67-68).

**Sida**

Swedish aid is an expression of Swedish social values, in which “solidarity with the underprivileged is regarded as a moral responsibility” (Hook, 1995: 104). Discussion of values permeates Sida’s documentation, whether in relation to participation, to partnership, to management style or to evaluation and this subsection explores values in wider Swedish society and on the role of values within Sida.

**Social values**

Traditionally, Swedish society has been marked by “high levels of trust, both vertically (between citizens and the elite) and horizontally (between individuals). Concepts such as consensus, collaboration, and cooperation were important ideological markers of Swedish society” (Rothstein, 2002: 292). The tenets of
**jantelagen**, the ‘law’ of humility, include: “thou shalt not believe thou art as good as we”; “thou shalt not believe thou knowest more than we”; “thou shalt not believe thou canst teach us anything”. This appears in Sida policy: “no party can claim superior knowledge that should be superimposed on other parties” (Sida, 2005d: 49; King and McGrath, 2004: 29). The adjunct of **jantelagen** is **lagom**: appropriateness, moderation; “not too much, not too little” (Arora-Jonsson and Cornwall, 2006: 84). These concepts have connotations of fairness, gender equality, and subsidiary values include patience, avoidance of both praise and competitiveness.

Commentary on social capital suggests that Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries continue to be “high-trust societies”, but trust is horizontal in nature and linked to high levels of voluntary activity (Rothstein, 2002: 324), with “92 per cent of all Swedish adult citizens belong to at least one voluntary organization” (Rothstein, 2002: 299). While strong associational life explains the adoption of Third Way social inclusion, parts of Swedish society consider that “neo-liberalism simply is un-Swedish” (Eliaeson and Jedrzejewska, 2004: 2, 9).

**Expression of values within Sida**

Swedish values permit a greater degree of openness and transparency within Sida than the other two donors and its self-reflexivity provides a spotlight on its values as an organisation and as a collection of individuals. Sida recognised that its staff had “normative driving forces” with individual staff setting up unrealistic personal goals (Sida, 2005b: 24). Staff “considered it was not possible to speak of orientation of results, openness, insight and transparency in decision-making processes in programmes of development cooperation and then not do these things at home” (ibid: 24). King and McGrath note the self-critical nature of documents written by Sida’s own staff (King and McGrath, 2004: 153), who together with Swedish politicians and development workers talk about the “historic inadequacies of Swedish development professionals” (King and McGrath, 2004: 150), even though Sida is widely considered an exemplar of good aid practice. A recurring complaint among staff was that Sida as an organisation failed to learn from its experience; that insufficient time and effort

---

was devoted to monitoring and evaluation, with lack of coherence in reporting structures and lack of analysis (Sida, 2005b: 22, 34, 36). On the management side, Sida expressed concern about attitudinal ‘problems’. Its approach was to allow “elements of sub-cultures” to exist within Sida, giving individual staff a degree of freedom (Sida, 2005b, 24).

### 7.2.2 Concepts of Participation and Agency

As all three donors were advocates of the NAA, this sub-section reviews donors’ documentation for statements about different facets of participation: harmonisation, partnership, civil society, democratic participation and empowerment.

**CIDA**

CIDA played a major role within the OECD-DAC in promoting harmonisation (CIDA, 2002a: 8), and has used *Shaping the 21st Century* as a basis for its current policies (R6). In accord with its global security agenda, CIDA prefers to work with the multilateral agencies and its contributions to the IFIs are above DAC average. The DAC peer review noted that “CIDA is currently modifying the role played by field staff in order to increase their involvement with multilateral organisations” (OECD, 2003a: 52).

“Partnerships with civil society4 and the private sector in Canada and overseas have been distinctive elements of Canada’s approach” (GoC, 2005a: 29). As a result, much of CIDA’s support has taken the form of tied aid, thought to provide greater domestic support and a “positive image” of Canadian values and interests conveyed internationally by Canadian organisations (CIDA, 2002a: 20). Clark *et al.* suggest that Canadian businesses, academics and NGOs have more influence with CIDA than recipients “because they are more strategic political allies and supporters of CIDA than actual aid recipients” (Clark *et al.*, 1997: 156). In aid relationships, CIDA has adopted the policy, backed up by the Office of the Auditor General, of ‘enhanced partnership’ with selected developing countries which “have demonstrated they can use aid effectively.” (GoC, 2005a:

---

4 CIDA’s Partnership Branch is responsible for programme delivery by NGOs (CIDA, 2002a: 22-23)
22), based on governance issues, including supporting for human rights, gender equality, democratic development, and the rule of law” (CIDA, 2002a: 7). Canada’s geo-political concerns are acknowledged in the eligibility criteria for partnership: “Special consideration may also be given to countries with the potential to exercise regional leadership.” (ibid: 12).

Although “CIDA considers that fostering local civil society organisations is an important element in building a democratic society.” (OECD, 2003a: 38), discussion of civil society in its documentation is dominated by the multicultural nature of Canadian society. ODA policy focuses on building security through good governance; “Our future is intertwined with that of people around the globe struggling to secure democracy and human rights”, because “[s]ecurity and development are inextricably linked” (GoC, 2005a: 1). Human rights abuse was a key concern (reflecting perhaps its immigrant population), but Canada would not take corrective action unilaterally, only in concert with other donors and multilateral institutions (CIDA, 1996: 16).

CIDA defines democratic participation as “strengthening popular participation in the exercise of power, building democratic institutions and practices, and deepening democratic values in society”. In addition to elections, democratic participation “also takes place” through civil society which serves “to articulate and channel people’s concern”. CIDA’s definition of a strong democratic society includes the rights of freedom of opinion, expression and association; tolerance for dissent and opposition and “a high level of public understanding of and participation in the political process” (CIDA, 1996: 21).

Empowerment is only discussed in CIDA’s policy documents in terms of gender empowerment (Scrutton and Luttrell, 2007: 1, 3). Although it supports civil society organisations which provide advocacy for democratic participation, the concept of empowerment as ‘voice’ or ‘agency’ is only discussed within its gender equality policy (CIDA, 1999: 8).

**DCI**

Ireland expressed interest in harmonisation “due to the expected benefits in terms of improving aid effectiveness and reducing transaction costs” (OECD, 2003b: 69). The DAC thought Ireland would be ready to adopt flexible
approaches and adjust its procedures in order to harmonise" (OECD, 2003b: 69). However, Ireland showed ambivalence about working with multilateral agencies, expressing concern about the effectiveness of some UN agencies and disquiet about the power of the World Bank (Ireland Aid, 2003: 72, 75). While acknowledging donors’ dependence on the World Bank for producing the statistical and economic data used to monitor progress in developing countries, the Committee on Aid Effectiveness wanted the Bank to recognise Ireland’s comparative advantage in local knowledge (Ireland Aid, 2003: 74-75).

Partnership is one of DCI’s key aid principles and should be “built on mutual respect and parity of esteem” (DCI, 2004d). Partnership is achieved through mutual understanding, because “Ireland’s objective in preparing country strategies is to reach a shared definition of the partner’s needs and an agreed programme of action by Ireland for addressing these which complements the partner’s own [PRSP]” (OECD, 2003b: 67). Its concept of partnership is based on defined responsibilities and transparent dialogue, setting out “a clearly in a structured framework for cooperation”, but this was conditional on “frank dialogue…. but if more serious difficulties arise, such as a manifest lack of political will on the part of the recipient country to take action required for its development, there will be a need for reassessment.” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 19). Dialogue plays a key role: programme approaches facilitate “regular, open dialogue and encourages the partner to take the lead in the formulation of development strategies, thereby contributing to the strengthening of capacity in programme countries” (OECD, 2003b: 67).

DCI had a distinct view of civil society based on its domestic policy. Aid “should be mirrored in a strong sense of partnership domestically” with social partners, defined as trade unions and employers, and the voluntary sector (Ireland Aid, 2003: 14). Ireland was one of the first European countries to develop ‘partnership governance’ with its own civil society and voluntary organisations (Geoghegan and Powell, 2005: 846).

While it provides support to Irish NGOs, who focus primarily on health and livelihoods issues, relatively little focus is given to citizen advocacy work or to the role of CSOs, possibly reflecting the primary role of social welfare in DCI’s development strategy. The DAC review advised DCI to increase its support for
advocacy and the private sector (OECD, 2003b: 13); this accords with the DAC agenda, but is at variance with DCI’s key priorities.

Democratic participation is defined in terms of values: “Central to our value system is a belief in the equal rights and dignity of all human beings” (OECD, 2003b: 18), but it is seen in terms of individual agency, “an integral element in human development” (OECD, 2003b: 18). Review (by Scandinavian consultants) of DCI’s Human Rights and Democratisation scheme noted the importance it gave to grassroots community empowerment (CMI, 2002: 1) but concluded that the scheme lacked focus may be due to an indigenous desire ‘to help’. In Ireland’s domestic experience, volunteers have been ‘mobilised’ by “notions of ‘care’; a response to an experience of poverty; religion” and class-based politics (Geoghegan and Powell, 2005: 854).

**Sida**

The DAC Peer Review states that “Sweden is at the forefront of the international agenda on harmonisation and alignment”, and that Sweden was influential in the formulation of the DAC’s *Strategy for the 21st Century* (Sida, 2005a: 19). An internal review concluded that Sida had the requisite “flexibility and mandate” to harmonise its programmes, based on Sida’s long-standing partnership approach to development cooperation (OECD, 2005a: 88), and harmonisation offered the opportunity to “exert an influence on the partner countries and other donors” (Sida, 2005b: 510).

Sida has been one of the more effective countries at implementing delegated partnerships with like-minded donors, particularly with Norway and the Netherlands (OECD, 2005a: 15). Sweden has a series of concentric circles of common interest; the original ‘Nordic’ group of Scandinavian countries is expanded under the principle of ‘good neighbourhood’ to include the Baltic States; its immediate Nordic donor partners may be expanded as the Nordic Plus group to include, depending on the circumstances, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Canada. Sweden has a European identity (“Sweden in Europe”) and a global identity (“Sweden in the World”), the latter based on a vision of joint security through multilateral and bilateral partnerships (OECD, 2005a: 19).
Dahl suggests that the ‘relative neutrality’ of the term ‘partnership’ in Swedish allows it to be used ambiguously in Swedish aid discourse (Dahl, 2001: 15). As well as retaining its links with solidarity, partnership is presented as ‘modern’ because, unlike “the ‘old-fashioned’ policies where recipients were not held accountable because of naïve, leftist idealism”, partners now have responsibilities (Dahl, 2001: 24). During the 1970s and early 1980s “Sida was mesmerized by the idea that aid must be given on the terms set by the recipient, and that Swedish aid was an act of solidarity” (Elgstrom, 1999: 153). By the late 1990s, there was much greater emphasis on partners’ responsibilities, linked to prudent stewardship (Molund, 2000: 3, 23). King and McGrath found a tension in Sida thinking: on the one hand its partners “already have the requisite knowledge and that Sida can simply facilitate”; at the same time Sida increasingly felt that its partners should understand Sida’s philosophy (King and McGrath, 2004: 142).

*Participation in Democratic Governance* (2002) demonstrates that Sida was experiencing difficulty synthesising its previous ‘knowledge’ about participation as empowerment, which drew on the language of power and social exclusion, with the newer global agenda around good governance. In discussing representative democracy, decentralisation and civil society organisations as vehicles of improved participation, the description of each is followed by a list of risks or impediments which are often rooted in the local political and cultural context. Sida ‘makes a bi-causal link between democracy and poverty reduction, but frames representative democracy as ‘indirect participation’, offering “very few opportunities for direct participation in decision-making”. Although decentralisation offered an alternative opportunity for citizens to hold government to account, it would not necessarily lead to increased democracy, participation or poverty reduction (Sida, 2002c: 4-7, 16, 19).

Despite the strength of Swedish civil society structures, Sida describes civil society as an amalgam of competing interests and values, influenced by history and culture, with varying degrees of dependence on the state, with institutions which may perpetuate conflict and authoritarianism (Sida, 2004c: 9-10, 14-15, 23). Sida advises its staff, including those who expect recipient governments to consult civil society about PRSPs, of the necessity to analyse “how the dividing lines in civil society run”, and to be conscious that CSOs themselves may be undemocratic (Sida, 2004c: 16, 14).
Chapter 7: Donors’ Perceptions and Practice

The language of social capital links this agenda with Sweden’s own associational experience so that, while the possibilities of people exerting “an influence on their lives are generally greater if they organise themselves together with others than if they are alone” (Sida, 2004c: 11-13), the benefits include “networks of trust, norms and informal rules” (ibid: 12). At the same time, Sida cautions its staff against making assumptions about CSOs based on Sweden’s own context (ibid: 24).

Sweden’s Policy for Global Development emphasises that the need to “contribute to an environment supportive of poor people’s own efforts to improve their quality of life” (OECD, 2005a: 31), but empowerment other than via membership of civil society organisations receives little attention. Participation of the poor within traditional forms of association is understood to be restricted by shortage of time, lack of skills and resources, ethnic and religious division, and may be constrained by hierarchical and ‘unresponsive’ local mechanisms (Sida, 2002c: 12).

7.2.3 Approaches to Monitoring and Evaluation

**CIDA**

When CIDA undertook extensive public opinion surveys in 2002, it found widespread support for development cooperation but scepticism about aid effectiveness. CIDA clearly places the Canadian public as principles, defining accountability as ‘stewardship’ (CIDA, 1998: para 1.2). It is here that the language of personal values, which permeate DCI’s and Sida’s documents, is found: “Accountability starts with the commitment of individual staff members to CIDA’s values, which include respect for others, integrity, equity and transparency; full expression of staff potential; and quality service” (CIDA, 1998a: para 3). CIDA recognises a challenge between meeting its obligations for accountability to Canadian citizens and “its commitment to OECD DAC Principles of Donor Harmonization” (OECD, 2006a: 135). Alignment is an “exception” to standard hierarchical accountability because the recipient government also shares responsibility for development results, although CIDA has the greater accountability (CIDA, 1998a).
CIDA prides itself in its implementation of RBM; its documentation links monitoring more directly to performance, “refining as we go”, resulting in “continuous learning” (RBM Handbook on Developing Results Chains, 2000: 5, 6). In accord with DAC comments about its bureaucratic nature, CIDA has a complex series of measurement frameworks. “CIDA’S corporate logic model” is based on Key Agency Results which “operate at three levels of outcomes” and “form the core of CIDA’s Results-Based Management Accountability Framework”: “development results (impact on developing countries)” (OECD, 2006a: 135); “enabling results (effective programs and strategies)”; “management results (the right tools, internal to the agency)” (OECD, 2006a: 135-136). The DAC Peer Review suggested that, if poverty reduction was an overarching objective, it would need a clearer message within CIDA’s mandate and (surprisingly) “a more rigorous monitoring system” (OECD, 2003a: 34).

DCI

Unlike CIDA and Sida, DCI has little documentation in the public domain about its approach to evaluation, although Ireland’s value-driven development programme recognised that it needed to promote an evaluation culture within DCI in order to increase institutional learning (OECD, 2003b: 64). Its Evaluation and Audit Unit was given the mission to do so (DCI, 2004c: 1).

DCI did, however, have a comprehensive reporting system, but the DAC review recommended that the frequency of reporting be reduced ('streamlined’) (OECD, 2003b: 64). It also suggested that DCI had failed to embrace the principles of alignment, such as joint monitoring and relying on evaluations and audits commissioned by partner governments and other organisations (OECD, 2003b: 65).

Sida

Sida’s characteristically self-critical review of its own performance management concluded that there were “no clear linkages between the overall goals of development cooperation and the activities for which Sida is responsible” (Sida, 2005b: 7). Internal reviews criticised delays in evaluation and lack of analysis (Sida, 2005b: 12). Sida studies also criticised the quality of reporting. A balance had to be struck between performance analysis reports that were too detailed,
with the result that they were not read in their entirety, and the use of summaries which were too brief to be useful (Sida, 2004b: 9, 22). Overall, monitoring and evaluation is considered a difficult process (Sida, 2003a: 5) and is problematised in the Evaluation Manual (Sida, 2004a: 11). The Learning and Skills Unit described Sida as “a knowledge organisation” in which knowledge development is ‘a social process’, involving dialogue, networking and reflection and finding “ways to tell other people about your work” (Sida, 2005e: 5-6, 11, 14). It was also noted that dialogue taking place as part of harmonisation and as a feedback mechanism following evaluations was usually not documented and the information gained was lost; institutional memory was also lost with turnover of staff (Sida, 2005b: 43, 45). At the same time, there was concern about the adoption of the NAA. PRSPs would necessitate additional analyses by Sida to ensure they represented the interests of the poor (Sida (undated-a): 1), and there was apprehension that emphasis on “processes for creating alliances … and creating good relations” would weaken the ‘orientation on results’ (Sida, 2005b: 22).

The Global Development Policy (2003) also changed the M&E balance within Sida and with partner governments. It posed problems of attribution due to ill-defined borders of responsibility between the different Swedish government agencies responsible for its implementation (Sida, 2005f: 12-13). The new Policy & Methods Unit would be “responsible for stringent quality assurance of country strategies” (ibid: 10), and that “Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs must have an active role in requesting performance information, or must at least have an idea of how to use it.” (Sida, 2004b: 22).

7.2.4 Indications for Harmonisation and Alignment

Analysing the development values which donors present in the documentation written for their domestic voting and tax-paying audiences, indicates that donors' development strategies are strongly influenced by cultural norms and social structures, and are tied in with concern for public opinion and therefore domestic political and foreign policy. Patterns are discernible between each donor’s development values and the country’s domestic values, influencing each agency’s development ‘identity’ and the forms of their engagement with others.
Harmonisation requires that donors’ values and practices are sufficiently congruent that they can coordinate their programmes of aid delivery. As 4.3 demonstrated, the donors did not share geopolitical objectives and their documentation indicates that their values and priorities differ. Each donor claimed to have a particular advantage over other donors, in the form and degree of ‘empathy’ - CIDA claiming its multicultural immigration, DCI its empathy borne of colonial history and religion, and Sida its length of engagement and its historical solidarity. Their domestic social structures, the status accorded to civil society and communication patterns also differed.

As regards alignment, CIDA placed emphasis on civil service reform, capacity building and governance issues and therefore more likely to be interventionist in government management systems, rather than receptive to the adoption of the recipient’s systems. DCI and Sida, on the other hand, were more likely to invest in social sectors and to approach partnership according to the empathy and the mixture of solidarity and reservation indicated in their documentation.

7.3 FINDINGS FROM DONOR INTERVIEWS

7.3.1 Introduction

Respondents included headquarters and embassy expatriate staff, embassy- and regionally-based national staff and contract staff. Most embassy and regionally-based staff were interviewed two or three times, with four-six month gaps between interviews. I have also included comments from key informants within Ethiopian universities and civil society. The interviews took place between October 2004 - November 2005.

As ‘political development’ featured so strongly in many of their responses, I have presented their comments about the political economy of development first (7.3.2), followed by an exploration of donors’ access to local knowledge (7.3.3). This provides the context in which to consider their views about participation (7.3.4) and evaluation (7.3.5). This order corresponds with the Ethiopian concepts of development discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, in 7.3.6, the interviewees’ own agency is considered in relation to policy and practice.
7.3.2 Aid, Politics and Development

Development as a Political Process

Politics featured in donors’ responses in two ways: geopolitics and ‘politics as development’. All three agencies were keen advocates of the NAA and the influence of the new orthodoxy was evident in discussion of technical monitoring with donor interviewees. “Development is no longer technical or specific, it is now concerned with global issues” (R7). “The global political process was always there but donors have decided - or allowed themselves - to blur the lines” between development and politics; “everything now is ‘dialogue’” (R8). The responses below accorded with the characteristics of each of the donors in terms of development values and organisational cultures described earlier.

Within Sida, policy had become focussed on partnership/ownership since 1998, with ‘methods’ being driven by the global political situation and the requirement for information from M&E was now “overtaken by global issues such as harmonisation.” (R9). This “creates tension”, because some within the agency say that the new modalities are an “empty shell” (R10). Although there had been concern whether global issues were reflected in changes ‘on the ground’, there was no debate among policy makers about the effectiveness of the NAA; instead, discussion within the agency focused on “how change takes place”, through structures or institutions or local agency (R11).

Within CIDA, the new modalities were described as "very political programmes" (R12). Because development was understood to be political in CIDA (R13), political channels of communication between embassy and headquarters were now stronger than technical channels: the Country Director reviews "every piece of paper" of politically sensitive material. Staff thought that M&E was less important than previously, because “maybe donor attribution doesn't matter nowadays, because politicians have signed up to a political agenda”. In contradiction to Canadian government rhetoric, in “Results for Canadians”, staff doubted whether the Canadian public has much interest in attribution. (R14)

---

5 Sida’s use of the word ‘methods’ is equivalent to ‘approach’ (R15).
Responses from DCI staff revealed a range of opinions about the role of politics in development: one respondent was adamant that development is political, “Because Africa has such fragile states, development can't be technical”. (R16). On the other hand, because Ireland did not have a geopolitical 'agenda', Ireland had no specific 'rights based' foreign policy, which therefore “fits round development cooperation, rather than the other way around” (R17). Both headquarters and embassy staff also acknowledged that DBS was controversial in Dublin, because of its political nature (R18, R19). Staff at Embassy level also thought that DCI's Advisory Board “don't understand the pressures from foreign affairs, the political imperatives” (R20).

The increased political role of development was influencing recruitment. Previously, CIDA had been staffed by “lifelong development specialists” but “now that development is more political”, CIDA staff were expected to have had previous experience in other government departments (R21). Sida also previously had long-term specialist staff, but was having recruitment difficulties, now recruiting NGO employees, postgraduates without previous experience and academics who had not necessarily had any field experience (R22). The Irish government seconded diplomatic staff (described somewhat dismissively as “career civil servants”) to work in development cooperation (R23). The reduced role for technical expertise created tension in DCI and particularly so in Sida. The shift from technical to political was not recognised as a problem in CIDA, which had more specifically (geo)political objectives.

**Programme Modalities**

Some respondents from each agency thought that NAA modalities were 'more efficient' because they reduced transaction costs for donors (R24, R25, R26), avoided the problem of fungibility with projects, and avoided fragmentation of donor effort (R27). Benefits of DBS included greater influence (“a bigger stick”), greater transparency of the national budget and more effective (joint) donor missions (R28). Reducing transaction costs for the government, the main argument underpinning the new orthodoxy, was mentioned by one respondent: “anything which reduced the burden on government staff, leaving them to get on

---

6 The Advisory Board’s membership was drawn from NGOs, the Catholic church, among others.
with development, would be of benefit” (R29). Transaction costs were often linked to project modality: “the drawback of projects is that the government doesn’t know what money is sloshing around”; “TA distorts the incentive structure within government” (R30).

Sida’s decision to move away from projects followed internal debate in 1998, and it was “now moving towards the new modalities very fast” (R31). Within a range of opinion among CIDA staff, one respondent who supported arguments for ‘scaling up’ modalities recognised, after the election, that they needed to keep a ‘balanced portfolio’ (R32). Aware of debates with HQ about the relationship between DBS and governance, DCI also recognised the need to retain a range of modalities and regions, “so that we don’t have all our eggs in one basket” (R33).

**Donor Harmonisation**

Within the rhetoric of harmonisation, differences of approach were apparent, with exclusionary language sometimes used in relation to those who questioned the current orthodoxy. Although DAG was described by one respondent as ‘unanimous’ (R34), there was no unanimity, for example, about DBS. The US for example believed it to be ‘illegal’ (R35), the Netherlands did not use DBS because of Ethiopia’s failure to comply with the international ruling on the Eritrean border issue, and felt it had greater freedom of action by not being a DBS donor. GTZ also had doubts that DBS was a worthwhile modality. Asked the extent of unanimity within the DAG, given Norway’s different strategy, one DAG member was rather dismissive: “Oh Norway, well, they just do their own thing - we don’t really take any notice” (R36). Another thought that small groups within DAG with different ideas “shouldn't challenge harmonisation” (R37).

Donors also had different objectives and strategies for governance. CIDA’s approach was civil service reform, particularly a World Bank initiative, PSCAP7, to support the Ministry of Capacity Building. DCI had reservations about PSCAP, particularly “its institutional aspects”, and thought other donors had similar concerns (R38). The Dutch described PSCAP as “too big, too complex”. The
differences of approach was encapsulated by the importance different donors ascribed to governance performance indicators. A small group of donors (including DCI and Sida, but not CIDA) worked together to compel the World Bank and the other donors to accept the need for governance indicators in the PASDEP\(^8\) policy performance matrix; “we insisted that they were included, even if it meant forcing a delay” (R39).\(^9\) The split reflected each donor agency’s development values (see 7.2.2). In DCI’s case, this resistance confirmed Ireland’s equivocal approach to the power of the World Bank; CIDA demonstrated its unequivocal support for the multilateral agencies. There were different opinions about conditionality, with one donor who thought governance indicators were unnecessary describing these donors as “less transparent about conditions, especially on governance issues”, suggesting that interest in conditionality was more for the donors’ benefit than for the Ethiopian people (R40). The opposing view was that most donors, except DCI, the Netherlands and Sweden, “ignored politics prior to the election” (R41).

Within the DAG, therefore, there were different groupings of donors, depending on their interests and objectives. CIDA considered their ‘like-minded donors’ were “generally” the Dutch, EU, WB, USAID, DFID, Sida. On PSCAP, their current supporter was DCI. On DBS, their like-minded donor was Sweden (R42). DCI’s like-minded donors were Nordic+2 (the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and DFID). On the Productive Safety Nets programme, DCI recognised which donors were 'like-minded' by the language they used; it was important to know who had the same viewpoint as them (R43). DCI singled out the Netherlands as having particular synergy: neither country had “political baggage”, and so could “join together to be voices against those with other agendas” (R44). Working out these relationships seemed to be less important to Sida staff, but in practice Sweden’s relationship with Norway was important. Although Sida had moved from its traditional welfarist approach closer to a global security approach, and had surprised its traditional partner Norway by its adoption of DBS, despite both the Eritrean question and Ethiopia’s poor human

---

\(^7\) Public Sector Capacity Building Programme ($397m), based in the Ministry of Capacity Building and designed to trickle down through government departments and woreda bureaux to kebele level.

\(^8\) The PASDEP was Ethiopia’s second full PRSP.

\(^9\) As a Tigrean government official discussed with me, sub-national quantitative measures of attendance at meetings, or even speaking at meetings, represent at best a limited and ethnocentric indicator of empowerment in the Ethiopian context.
rights record, the two countries enjoyed continued trust by ‘delegated cooperation’ of their health and education programmes.

Donor staff recognised that the NAA altered the nature of their own ‘participation’. The complexity of interests and relationships within the DAG meant that presentation and influencing skills were more useful for working with other donors than with government (R45). Each individual agency had to create credibility and acceptance of its role by other donors (R46). CIDA thought that the government conceived the donor community as a hierarchy, with the World Bank at the top, followed by the European Union, DFID and then CIDA (R47). The government restricted dialogue with non-DBS donors (R48) so some felt it necessary to contribute a small amount to a pool-funded activity, despite reservations, in order to have “a seat at the table” (R49, R50).

Donors therefore spent more time interacting with each other in different groupings and, with the adoption of the NAA and its modalities, less time with government or with their intended beneficiaries. Figure 7.1 sets out the ‘dialogue architecture’ between donors, and between donors and different levels of government. It shows that choice of modality dictated the opportunities for donors to gain feedback from ‘the field’.

![Figure 7.1. The ‘Dialogue Architecture’](image)
Chapter 7: Donors’ Perceptions and Practice

‘Development as Politics’: Congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity

In congruence with Ethiopian officials and leaders, staff from all three donors stated that development was largely ideological. Donors’ individual normative frameworks had to be adapted to the prevailing orthodoxy, differences in national priorities and values being accommodated and compromises made where possible. Although senior government officers were aware of donors’ ideological concepts, references to Revolutionary Democracy were ‘filed away’, either conceptually or physically, by donors so that the government’s ideology was not discussed, merely its openness to pluralism. By not discussing ideology, it appeared that the government was prepared to accept liberal democracy by allowing multiparty elections.

Both donors and government exhibited the ability to label Ethiopian citizens as both ‘knowledgeable’ (their participation being regarded as valuable for effectiveness) and, at the same time, ‘not knowledgeable’ (needing to be educated or led)\(^\text{10}\). There was an element of this in the relationship between donor headquarters and the field offices: HQ provided policy and assumed that the field offices would implement it; the field offices provided data but HQ did not have the ‘capacity’ to use it. The NAA rhetoric requires recipient governments to work with donors both as equal partners (partnership) progressing to senior partners (ownership), but donors lacked confidence in the government’s technical capacity and, where it was important for donors, such as in ‘humanitarian’ circumstances or in reaction to political violence, donors reasserted a degree of control.

7.3.3 Understanding the Local Context

Acquiring Local Knowledge

As all three donors’ documentation had emphasised the importance of local knowledge (CIDA through decentralisation to country offices, Sida via its ‘Field

\(^{10}\) This ‘capacity’ labelling was particularly apparent in government officials’ descriptions of farmers. Revolutionary Democracy assigns peasants a role as the engine of change. Officials would say “farmers know all there is to know” but a few minutes later would describe them as backward and illiterate, requiring instruction and firm leadership.
Vision’ which was designed to inform policy formulation, and DCI as a source of ‘reality checks’), it was useful to find out how this local knowledge was gained.

Staff from all three agencies said that they relied on information from Ethiopian staff working for their embassies; some also relied on other donors whom they met at meetings or socially, on the press and some undertook field visits. CIDA expressly did not seek or use information from their regional projects; DCI gained information from the TRSP and from its activities in SNNP; Sida’s local information was built up over a long period of engagement in Ethiopia and therefore was not dependent on its SARDP programme alone. All three donors could access information from INGOs, particularly those from their own countries. Only one member of staff, on a short-term contract, mentioned academic research as a source of information. Despite the harmonisation rhetoric around sharing reports, there was mixed evidence of this. It seemed to be important to be on the circulation list: recent reports were frequently referred to in passing but most respondents had not had time to read them.11

Within CIDA, there were highly contrasting views about the relevance of acquiring information about the local context. These ranged from confidence in the data provided by the government so that acquiring additional information from alternative sources was unnecessary, to concern about the agency’s lack of local knowledge: “Why does CIDA know so little?” (R51) There was openness about discussing local issues between international and national staff at the Swedish embassy but, although Sida staff claimed to be reasonably confident in their level of local knowledge, they expressed frustration at not being able to use it at the local level. DCI’s staff felt that the TRSP gave them a better understanding of local institutions and cultures than was available to most other donors, and that they had a responsibility to share this ‘reality check’ with their colleagues in the DAG. Sometimes these colleagues rejected this assistance on the grounds that DCI’s Tigray knowledge could not be generalised across the country (R52). DCI was aware from its other activities, for example in the SNNP Region, that “It’s a country of such diversity that [we] are not sure insights are transferable” (R53) Staff from all three donors cited high staff turnover as a

11 Despite donors’ claims for the value of monitoring by civil society, they claimed not to have read the PAN/E Citizens Report Card report.
waste of institutional knowledge, leaving national staff employed in the embassies as holders of institutional memory.

International staff who had worked elsewhere in Africa found the contrast in working relationships most clearly apparent in the ‘determination’ of Ethiopians to pursue their own objectives. For some, the consequence of this was a tendency for the Ethiopian partners to be ‘less compliant’ (R54), to exhibit an “inability to accept compromise” (R55), and reluctance to consider lessons learned from other African countries (R56). Opacity in Ethiopian communication patterns meant that it was difficult to gather genuine opinion (R57). Other respondents admired “the way that the Government states what it wants and how it wants to do it, and will stick to its guns” (R59); “they ‘drive the train’, but it means that they do have opinions” and have a strong sense of group identity (R59). This lack of deference to the international community reflected a “sense of equality”; “maybe [the donors] are arrogant, thinking that they are being ‘useful’” (R60).

Donors noted evidence of honesty and self-criticism among government staff, but, at the same time, the government was “too ambitious” and “monolithic” in its planning; its refusal to undertake pilot projects resulted in roll-out of inappropriate technologies and lost opportunities for capacity-building (R61, R62, R63, R64). It was thought that the Government’s development strategy over-estimated the possibility of behavioural change: “think how difficult it is for Westerners, let alone those with restricted choice” (R65).

**Concepts of Local Power**

Within CIDA, understanding of local structures and institutions of government/community relations ranged from lack of concern about the absence of information, based on the assumption that CSOs were an adequate counterweight to the government, through to some perceptive inferences based on broader political knowledge - despite a lack of knowledge of local structures. CIDA had chosen not to use their projects as sources of information about the local context, although long-term international TA staff could have provided a useful understanding of local structures and local patterns of communication,

---

12 There was interest in learning from Chinese experience (R73).
such as the role of persuasion and of gengamma. (Newly-arrived international TA had to find their own way through cultural and political complexities and it was evident from their responses that each expatriate relied on a conceptual lens from their own culture and experience.) One expatriate noticed that disagreements in internal project meetings often resulted in heated discussion but then eventually everyone “caves in” (R66). He thought this was probably cultural but he was worried that there may be “tension further down the line”. On the other hand, meetings went on for a long time so that everyone could “have their say”, even if “it’s the same as the previous person said”. (R67).

In both DCI and Sida, there was a degree of tension between staffs’ comments on the structures of power around which their programmes were constructed, what they actually understood to be happening in reality and concern about the perceived gaps in their knowledge. For DCI, the ‘process’ was of greater significance than the current status of power relations, with ‘process’ appearing to be more or less a substitute for ‘goal’, an end in itself\(^\text{13}\). Although they had identified working in the ruling party’s home region (Tigray) as ‘high risk’ for DCI’s credibility, international staff were content with information received via the joint steering committee meetings with Tigray government staff, even though (or perhaps because) they themselves had sketchy knowledge of local organisation below kebele level. They had noticed in recent evaluations that the views of the community had been represented by kebele leaders and intended to insist on community access for a forthcoming study (R68). More probing questioning subsequently revealed a greater degree of understanding of local structures and processes than originally apparent, but it was qualified by comments about it being ‘anecdotal evidence’. It seemed as though labelling it in that way distanced the respondent from the unpalatable possibility that their Tigrean partners could be packaging public opinion for donor consumption.

‘Process' also seemed important in the Sida programme: decentralisation, as a ‘process of change’ at woreda level “allowed Sida to compromise” (R69). Sida had a dilemma: it had information from its own staff, from evaluations, monitoring visits and from formal reports, that government structures controlled their SARDP programme to the exclusion of Swedish concepts of community

\(^{13}\) Process approaches require active management with regular monitoring and evaluation to facilitate iterative learning and thus modification (Bond and Hulme, 1999).
participation, and yet their commitment to ownership prevented them from intervening (R70, R71). Although the SARDP programme was thought to empower local farmers through provision of information at local workshops, some international staff were unable to discuss participation with farmers themselves, both because they were not allowed unmonitored access but also because they were anxious not to put farmers at risk. Others thought that farmers feared to show their increased empowerment because of political reprisal. An expatriate thought the didactical nature of professional inputs from DAs and local experts was cultural in origin (R72). It appeared to another that local political influence was extensive; it explained why there was a lack of transparency about the way decisions were made (R73).

**Ethiopian staff**

National staff were able to contrast local concepts and practice with donors’ concepts, saying that participation was understood uniformly through the levels of government to the community as the contribution of labour and materials. For the government, giving people the right to decide was “incomprehensible”, ‘true participation’ was “threatening”, though a few officials were more “enlightened”. For presentation purposes, contribution was described as ‘participation’ but “everyone knows it’s coercion”. At the same time, contribution “is seen as a good thing by farmers, as well as by government”. (R74). One respondent separated ‘political participation’ conceptually into ‘civil society’ and ‘grassroots' (R75), but another said that EPRDF influence, reaching down into the community via the Women’s, Farmers’ and Youth Associations, linked the two (R76). There were people who represented the Party down to “the groups of seven households” so that no-one was unaware of Party influence. For people who disagreed with the Party line, the possibilities were either to ‘agree’ with the Party, or to be ignored or “be threatened”. (R77). National staff were adamant that *yilungta* was political in nature, not cultural, and thus farmers only offered positive comments in *gengam*(*ma*). It was clear from comments made by Embassy staff with experience at field level and by national staff who had experience of working in different regions that there were regional variations in the nature of local political institutions and the degree of agency these afforded both donor staff and local people. In SNNP, for example, “society is more open, but less controlled by the Party” (R78). In Tigray, despite Party dominance, local people were given more opportunity to debate and challenge government
interventions. In Amhara, there was comparatively less opportunity for local people to express their opinions.

National staff were concerned at the gap between donor rhetoric on ‘good governance’, and the actual nature of ‘participation’ and the depth of government influence down to household level. The government had learnt to use donors' participatory jargon in order to “bless” their own activities as ‘community participation’ while in practice setting and enforcing quotas for compulsory labour (R79). Another comment was that “donors are soft on government, they’ll only react strongly if there's an extreme issue” (R80).

My suggestion that they had a challenging role ‘interpreting’ the local context for their international colleagues was rejected, each of them claiming that they were able to discuss issues openly with their international colleagues. Interviews with embassy national staff and some of their regional colleagues were sometimes quite tense, with respondents showing reluctance to answer questions. It was easier for them to discuss tensions that existed with regional counterparts, because the new modalities had damaged their ‘legitimacy’ beyond the embassy. The extent to which they could be considered as a form of broker (see 2.5.4) was unclear. As technical specialists, there was less demand for their expertise under the NAA modalities. Their contextual knowledge would have made them sceptical about the likely impact of the liberal democratic narrative, and its value outside the embassy. Embassy employment did offer the possibility of training outside the country, including postgraduate study, and access to the ‘international’ job market, including work with multilateral agencies. Rather than using the gap in rhetoric and understanding between donors and government opportunistically, these respondents seemed to me to regard the gap as a source of contention and frustration, particularly with the high turnover of international colleagues.

Local Knowledge: congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity

How international staff handled that information accorded closely with the development values expressed in their agency’s documentation and with independent commentaries reviewed in 7.2. Staff within CIDA did not collect local information, but recognised retrospectively that it had political value as regards their own strategy was concerned. Both DCI and Sida collected local
information but were restricted by their own values in the ways that they could apply it. Their values of ‘empathy’ and ‘non-interference’ respectively appeared to restrict them from delving more deeply into local power structures.\textsuperscript{14} The local knowledge provided by national and programme level staff accorded with the responses provided during community-level fieldwork in Amhara and Tigray, even though the description of power structures and their effects were interpreted differently according to the respondents’ political perspective. International TA was another source of information untapped by CIDA and Sida, ostensibly because of different reporting structures. Newly arrived consultants had difficulty interpreting the local context accurately, and filled the gap by drawing on their own mental models. The gap in local knowledge between international and national staff at the embassies, rhetorically small, was either unapparent to international staff or experienced as unexplored tension by national staff.

Donor staffs’ own understanding of ‘participation’ and their knowledge of local perception and practice is discussed in the next sub-section.

### 7.3.4 Participation

**Concepts of Participation**

Donor staff interpreted the term ‘participation’ in three different ways: as a vehicle for aid effectiveness, as political space and as embodied by civil society. Synthesising their views has been difficult because the term was used in an undifferentiated way, allowing different donors to conceive it differently, staff within the same agency to understand it differently and for individuals to use the term to express conflicting meanings, depending on the context.

At Sida HQ, participation was understood both as part of ‘good governance’, as a right, and instrumentally, as a tool for aid effectiveness. In-country staff shared this understanding of what role participation should play in SARDP activities ("community participation is the basis of Sida’s interaction with the Region"), but

\textsuperscript{14} When this research data was presented to each of the three donors, DCI’s reaction was shocked surprise, CIDA’s reaction was focused on political issues (a desire for political, rather than a development management, analysis; and confirmation of the existence of opposition to the TPLF in Tigray), and Sida’s reaction was lack of surprise.
their equivocal explanation of local power structures belied this role for community participation. Having said that communities understood participation to be the compulsory provision of labour, Sida “doesn’t demand contributions [of labour], it is included by the government who demand that the community contribute, but Sida is neutral on this” (R81). Sida national staff suspected that contributions are not voluntary as the government claims, but found it difficult to prove otherwise: “There probably are enforcement methods but Sida doesn’t know about them” (R82). For some national staff and regional colleagues, discussing questions of voluntarism or punishment for non-participation was difficult to tolerate, and cut short their interviews.

DCI’s international staff had difficulty reconciling their own ideas about what participation meant, how the Government viewed participation and finally how donors practiced participation. One normative view incorporated both participation as political space and as a tool in aid effectiveness: participation should be an inclusive process, consulting the community, allowing it to have a say. Participation leads to a sense of ownership and greater outputs, everyone has a part to play in shaping the agenda, ensuring its relevance; participation should be included in processes, by consultation. The Government lacks belief in the utility/relevance of the community’s involvement. The Ethiopian government says "We will participate the people", i.e. they are told what to do. The government is unconvinced by participation in the Western sense, they’re still talking about political mobilisation. It views real participation with distrust, as potentially threatening. On the other hand, from their previous experience, staff thought that participation at woreda level was less ‘top-down’; the community may not participate in the western sense because they are not asked in the first place - the process is only extractive, there’s no incentive for people to participate. (R83). A question about the possibility of risks being attached to participation resulted in a reflection on the nature of local participation: a surmise that “fear of punishment is not truly participatory. Can the community be objective if they have ownership? Whose voices are heard? Local government might dominate in meetings, so it can’t be objective.” (R84).

This hesitation about the nature of local participation conflicted with that given by DCI’s regional employees, who were confident that in local meetings the community spoke out voluntarily; “if people don’t want to give information, they can say no”, but people have “nothing to hide” (R85); and if some people spoke
too much, and what they were saying was wrong, they were shouted down by others (R86). Despite this, the government only involved people in implementation. It depended on the *woreda* and on the “mobiliser” whether participation was compulsory, but the *tabia* (*kebele*) could turn down *woreda* requests if they did not agree with the priorities set. Feedback from the community had suggested that 20 days’ labour per annum was ‘welcome contribution’.\(^{15}\) Any reluctance to participate meant “they do not really understand the concepts of commitment and ownership” (R87). Local donor staff believed that community involvement leads to sustainability, that communities are responsible for development so they need to ‘invest’ (through their effort). The communities might see failures in implementation but would not understand the link between ‘participation’ and change (R88). Local donor staff thus partially synthesised international donor concepts of voluntary participation and empowerment with government strategy of development and empowerment through ‘contribution’. Their expression of surprise when the community challenged government officials during a joint monitoring visit was unexpected, given that they were Tigrean and would be fully familiar with TPLF rhetoric and culture of public criticism. However, it was said with a sense of pride and perhaps illuminates the overlap between the Western concept of ‘voice and agency’ and local concepts of participation via the contribution of ideas.

Within CIDA, very different ideas about the meaning of participation were expressed. For one individual, participation was understood as solely the engagement of civil society in policy dialogue (R89), but several others described it as ‘political space’. Not using information from its projects or NGOs to inform its thinking about participation, CIDA staff had no contextual experience to draw on when questioned about the meaning of participation at community level, so said that they would have to ask a colleague for that information (R90, R91). They did not know how community representatives were chosen; they thought that there were citizen representatives at *woreda* level but did not know the mechanisms (R92).

Observing one of CIDA’s ‘old-fashioned’ projects would have provided them with some understanding of local mechanisms. The views of the project co-directors,

---

\(^{15}\) Embassy staff also said that, in circumstances such as border tension with Eritrea, people would contribute labour voluntarily because it was ‘in the national interest’.
collectedly separately, illustrate the difference in interpretation when local knowledge is accessed. National consultants, together with local government officials and leaders, had selected farmers to take part in the project at a meeting of 200 farmers fortuitously called by the kebele, before selection criteria had been defined by the project. The newly-arrived international TA described this method of selection as "efficient" but unscientific (R93). In his interview, his national counterpart explained that the government’s practice was to discuss an issue with church or community leaders a minimum of three times before they started planning an activity. Communities sometimes said ‘no’, and the project had to accept that but, at the least, community contributions of labour and materials were necessary (R94). He thought that “100% participation results in empowerment”. Food aid had led to dependency, "So we tell farmers, either use your land productively or you'll lose food aid. If they say that their land is insufficiently productive, then they are resettled." (R95)\textsuperscript{16}

**Civil Society**

Those donor staff who included a third meaning for participation, embodied as ‘civil society’, talked about it more in terms of instrumental use, than as a political right. Civil society was described as an counterbalance to the Government, and as an alternative source of information (R96). Asked to define civil society, one response was "all those affected but, as it's too hard to get to the villages, we need to use CSOs". (R97). Other definitions included professional associations, the media and the private sector but generally ‘civil society’ was used interchangeably with ‘NGOs’ as claimants to political space. Advocacy was therefore one instrumental use; another was as an adjunct to local government, whereby Regional government should involve civil society in governance; in this view, CSOs were not expected to be the voice of local people, it was thought the responsibility of woredas to ensure that “community voices were heard” (R98).

Among civil society leaders, the nature of CSOs at community level was problematic: while in theory the concept of civil society should include traditional associations, in practice local CSOs were drawn from Women’s, Farmers’ and

\textsuperscript{16} Land tenure is largely hereditary, but can be reassigned by the woreda. Resettlement is rarely voluntary.
Youth Associations and from cooperatives. These were thought by some donors to be ‘too politicised’, and lacking independence from the Party, so that donors preferred to work with national NGOs which had a ‘specific focus’ indirectly, via international NGOs. Other donor staff did not know whether there were any organisations which represented the community apart from NGOs and, possibly, cooperatives; they were unaware of Women’s, Farmers’ or Youth Associations (R99).

There was general (though not unanimous) concern about the capacity of Ethiopian CSOs. Within a single agency, one respondent thought that CSOs lacked capacity and “political nouse” (R100), another thought that existing civil society mechanisms were adequate (R101). A third thought that, unlike the Government, the NGO umbrella group, PAN/E, “can accept compromise” (R102). Comments from national staff included CSOs’ lack of local knowledge because they rarely travelled from their Addis base; and that donors “protected” NGOs too much, and “should give them a different kind of support. African and Asian rights-based NGOs will confront the government, at some cost to themselves” (R103).

Donors regarded their support to PAN/E as a capacity building exercise; civil society was getting stronger because “PAN/E spoke up well against the Government at a recent meeting” (R104). Asking whether the CSOs were representative of rural Ethiopian interests provoked some reflection: “I’m not sure whether NGOs think of themselves as representative. Umbrella groups may see themselves as representative, but they are already selective, aggregated” (R105). Given the rhetoric about the importance of civil society, one donor thought it surprising that donors did not invite CSOs to sit on their M&E groups (R106). The DAG had considerable interaction with PAN/E during 2004 but, in early 2005, this virtually ceased. When asked in December 2005 about PAN/E’s involvement in PASDEP (the new PRSP) consultation, one of the donors directly involved did not know whether the DAG had contacted civil society groups but assumed that “they must have contacted PAN/E” (R107).
Chapter 7: Donors’ Perceptions and Practice

**Communication skills**

Effective verbal skills were important for donors as well as for Ethiopians. Good communication skills were vital for negotiating with and influencing other donors and establishing their agency’s role and status within the DAG, for those acting as representatives of DAG thematic working groups in meetings with Ethiopian government staff and for development cooperation staff who had diplomatic duties. Poor communicators were thought to hinder progress. ‘Influencing’ had become a recognised modality, and an OECD-DAC paper suggested that donors should recruit staff on the basis of their communication and influencing skills, rather than their technical experience (OECD, 2005c). Just as Ethiopian communities were encouraged to participate through the use of persuasion and exhortation, persuasive skill was also important for ‘influencing’ and for promoting each donor agency’s comparative advantage, whether in development values, experience or evaluation methods. Each country had distinctive communication patterns. The social capital and cross-cultural literature suggests that Swedish conversational style is ‘economical’ and Sida had established a learning centre to teach staff communicative skills to enable ‘learning’. The communication patterns of Canadians and Irish were described in the social capital literature in terms of social cohesion, the Canadian style influenced by its multicultural population and Irish communication structured according to conversational rules designed to maintain consensus.

**Consensus and collectivity**

The literature on social capital in these three donors’ societies suggests that consensus has also been important. It was important to minimise conflict in Canada’s multicultural society; in rural Ireland expressing different opinions in public meetings was considered divisive; and in Sweden, social mechanisms existed to avoid confrontation.

Despite the rhetoric about harmonisation and the DAG as a representation of donor convergence, heard more strongly in CIDA than the other two agencies, consensus within the donor ‘community’ was problematic because agencies held different views, had different strategies, and formed different subgroups according to shared priorities and levels of concord. Donors formed different patterns of association, depending on the subject-matter and the importance
they ascribed to it. Disagreeing with one donor on one topic, did not preclude working with them on another. Where consensus was required, for the PRSP matrix, for example, compromises had to be made. However, while some aspects of the matrix were negotiable, governance indicators - for some donors - were not.

Despite being members of ‘the donor community’, staff were aware of the differing objectives and organisational cultures. An agency might be a member of ‘Nordic+’ group, belong to a ‘common foreign policy’ grouping or switch between them, depending on the circumstances. Individual staff’s values were largely congruent with their agency’s stated objectives, but their responses indicated that individual identities were important: differentiation as a technical or a policy expert, or as someone with an NGO background rather than being a ‘bureaucrat’ or civil servant. An individual could bring different identities to the fore depending on the context, presenting themselves as a member of the donor community when talking about harmonisation, and as a ‘coalface’ development worker when discussing empowerment. Their national staff had several identities: as habesha, as ‘donor staff’, as well-educated expert, as metropolitan visitor to the regions.

Review of the literature on identity in 3.5.2 suggested that individuals hold multiple self-conceptions. Figure 7.2 overleaf sets out, very schematically, the different identities which my respondents revealed in interviews. As discussed in 6.3.5, a local Ethiopian leader could hold multiple identities. In proposing this schema, I stress that it relates to ‘social actors’ roles within aid-funded development, not to their social lives and relationships. While national and international donor staff also held multiple, overlapping identities, unlike the local leaders, their identities were not (loosely) concentric. National donor staff were ‘national experts’ in the embassy, but, when they went to the field, they were metropolitan, expert, donor staff but also habesha (and might have a defined ethnic identity as well). When I raised the question of these possible identities, national staff did not find the question tolerable and dismissed it without discussion. In contrast, the different backgrounds of the international donor staff affected their sense of identity quite precisely; technical specialists tended to make a clear distinction between themselves and staff who had a civil service background, who they sometimes labelled ‘bureaucrats’. If they had an NGO background, this was often mentioned in discussion as giving them a privileged
viewpoint. National identity was a further complication; they had to identify the skills and experience which each brought to the donor forum and allied themselves with other, like-minded donors. Gender was a further ‘identity’ for some of the female staff, who felt their opinions were disregarded.

Figure 7.2. Conception of congruence/disjuncture in identities within the local aid chain
Chapter 7: Donors’ Perceptions and Practice

7.3 Concepts of Participation: Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity

Donors’ conception of participation in meetings clearly had some resonance with the government’s expectation that ‘innovative risk-takers’ within the community should ‘contribute ideas’. Participation in implementation of development activities was also couched in positive terms. However, no overt recognition by donors that contribution was compulsory. Compared with the clarity about concepts and practice of participation in Ethiopian government-community relations, donors’ perceptions were confused, malleable and susceptible to different interpretations, depending on the respondents’ and their agency’s values and political priorities. However, there was significant congruence in the importance of some of the skills required to facilitate participation: persuasion, exhortation, and communicative facility to enable imprecision/ambiguity in the use of language.

7.3.5 Evaluation

Section 7.2.3 briefly outlined the different approaches to evaluation in donors’ literature. This section explores respondents’ views about evaluation and its role in aid effectiveness and performance management. The responses covered a number of aspects which fell into two main themes: vertical relations (the aid chain) and horizontal relations (the NAA). Within the vertical thread, there was discussion of evaluation as an aspect of hierarchy and as a manifestation of spatial distance. Evaluation was also an area of contestation in horizontal relations, as the various ‘partners’ negotiated how to work together, whom to trust, and what could legitimately be done or said.

M&E within the aid chain

- Spatial-hierarchical relations

Both Sida and CIDA staff referred to ‘Paris’, to denote the OECD-DAC, when discussing aid policy and strategy ¹⁷ (R108, R109). For CIDA, the agency most committed to harmonisation, this relationship was clearly important. When Sida

¹⁷ “The global development agenda essentially gets fashioned in Paris” (King and McGrath, 2004: 14).
staff mentioned Paris, it seemed sardonic: “this type of information” (technical knowledge) has been “overtaken by global issues such as harmonisation” (R110). While CIDA welcomed working with the IFIs, Sida staff felt IFIs tended to dominate joint evaluations meaning that Sida’s years of experience in evaluation were ignored (R111).

There was general concern about the power which superior capacity in handling quantitative data afforded the World Bank (R112, R113), perhaps at the expense of the recipient country’s objectives and ownership (R114). Although it was recognised that detailed discussion of performance indicators was “too difficult” for bilateral donors, particularly those without a technical background (R168), the need for consensus meant that donors had “gone for the highest level of aggregation - nothing below output”, because the Bank used ‘policy actions’ rather than specific performance indicators (R115).

- **Donors’ evaluation structures**

CIDA staff in Ethiopia spontaneously described evaluation in terms of nested hierarchies of procedure. CIDA was developing a ‘Performance Activity Structure’, into which a Strategic Results Assessment Framework (SRAF) would feed, and the Performance Activity Structure fed back into the Management Results structure (R116). Some of CIDA’s staff talked about this structure very easily, others appeared to find it unnecessarily complex, but their comments confirmed the literature in 7.2.3, that CIDA places great emphasis on its bureaucratic systems.

The responses from Sida staff also conformed to analysis and commentary on Sida’s approach to evaluation: an emphasis on self-criticism. All staff queried the effectiveness of Sida’s ability to analyse and utilise the information it collected. The complexity lay in the administrative structure rather than the processes. Different facts of monitoring, analysis and evaluation were covered by sectoral staff headquarters, by the Evaluation and Audit (UTV) unit or by embassy staff. There was also potential confusion between the Policy & Methods Unit, UTV and the proposed new, independent, evaluation unit.

DCI headquarters thought that field staff were reluctant to agree to evaluations and hoped that, by involving embassies in designing the evaluations, field staff
would come to view evaluations more positively (R117). Embassy staff said that M&E was vitally important to learn lessons, particularly with the new modalities (R118, R119) but local staff had a far clearer concept of evaluation than their international colleagues. Staff in Tigray thought that the purpose of evaluations was for donors to confirm that “the money is being wisely spent, objectives being met”. The only possible explanation for not doing evaluations could be that donors trusted the government (R120).

- **Performance management**

Only CIDA had a system of performance management, though not all its staff were clear about it. A new performance measurement tool, the SRAF, would replace the APPR which was “too anecdotal” (R121). The SRAF was being linked to the PRSP matrix but, as one respondent wryly commented, since the matrix for PASDEP had not yet been agreed and as the SRAF is based on indicators from the matrix, “It’s a bit difficult!” (R122). Staff at DCI said there was no link between programme evaluation and individual performance appraisal (R123). Although Sida had commissioned a study on incentives, staff said the idea of performance-related pay was “taboo”; rather, Sida staff have “a strong inner drive to produce good results” (R124).

- **Reporting**

Technical reporting in all three embassies was either being reduced or refocused on political issues. This accorded with the NAA, but reduced opportunities for on-going analysis and iterative learning and contrasted markedly with the frequency built into government reporting systems. SARDP programme’s quarterly reporting was considered “too frequent” by Sida headquarters, even though there was unease about the quality of reporting (R125). DCI’s regular reporting system of monthly ‘snapshots’, two monthly monitoring reports and an annual report no longer included six monthly sectoral reports, in response to Dublin’s request “to reduce their workload” (R126). Staff from Sida and DCI were both concerned that most reports went to the political rather than technical desk. Political rather than technical reporting was the norm at CIDA; notes on every meeting attended by CIDA staff were routinely circulated but most paperwork was channelled via CIDA’s Country Director because “it’s political” (R127, R128).
Because DCI staff regretted the institutional memory lost by the reduction in sectoral reporting, they intended to carry on producing the reports for embassy use (R129). In Dublin, staff thought knowledge was fragmented because different reports went to the country desk, finance and sector specialists, with no-one taking an overview; they agreed with embassy staff that coordination of information within DCI was poor (R130). Sida staff at HQ and embassy were equally concerned at the lack of coherence: there was “no functioning M&E system”, no feedback to beneficiaries, no “joined-up thinking” (R131). Sida was trying to “systematise collection of data from the field” formally via UTV and informally through the Policy & Methods Unit, but there was no link to ‘knowledge management’ (R132). Both Sida and DCI worried about loss of institutional memory through staff turnover. An enquiry whether information from the field informed Sida’s policy received the sardonic reply “most of Sida’s intellectual platform comes from IDS, ODI, and ISS”18 (R133). In contrast, CIDA staff expressed satisfaction with its systems. Asked how project reports contributed to improved effectiveness in Canada’s Ethiopian programme, since reports went to Ottawa rather than the embassy, one respondent was confident the information fed back into the RBM system, but could not explain how. Another respondent said all the information was available on the internet19, although in practice it does not appear to be publicly available.

There was general agreement among donor staff that communication and networking skills were very important for knowledge management. Although Sida describes itself as “a knowledge organisation”, learning was defined as the acquisition of skills to meet the new modalities: dialogue, negotiation, influencing, relevant communication patterns. Sida had established a Division for Learning and Competence Development to effect this; asked how knowledge from the field was incorporated into Sida’s learning, the Division’s head stated

---

18 Referring to academic centres in the UK and the Netherlands.
19 The only reports I was able to find on CIDA’s website had been written by the World Bank and Sida.
that there was no formal mechanism, and suggested that it could be distributed by word of mouth (R134)\(^\text{20}\).

- **M&E Technical Knowledge**

DCI’s conception of M&E as a process was evident in its understanding of learning. While “development ideas and praxis change frequently and this forces learning” (R135), “learning takes time and should based on lessons learned via monitoring and evaluation” (R136). Staff at the embassy explained that they had had no training in M&E; they “all had to learn as we go along - it’s a struggle, even for us” (R137). They relied on consultants for evaluation skills (R138, R139). Regional staff were being encouraged to use qualitative techniques in joint evaluations with government staff; one person was due to receive training in Tanzania. At the embassy, it was thought that external consultants would need to be particularly skilled in qualitative techniques to circumvent local power structures and to elicit the community’s view (R140).

CIDA M&E staff wondered whether M&E consultants were value for money (R141). Several respondents were dismissive of M&E expertise: “it’s just common sense”, “it’s not brain surgery!” If necessary, they could do M&E themselves with advice from CIDA HQ (R142, R143). However, CIDA placed special emphasis on building Ethiopian statistical capacity, funding TA to the CSA. Although staff thought project methodology “old-fashioned”, CIDA was funding two major projects, both using Canadian TA and CIDA project management systems. One was described as a “model project” by embassy staff but, when the Canadian agency pointed out that no mid-term evaluation had taken place, they were told that it need not be done because progress appeared satisfactory from the paperwork (R144, R145).

Oversight of the reporting and organising evaluation of SARDP was the responsibility of Sida’s national staff, who followed the agency’s guidelines on M&E and received guidance from Sida’s Evaluation Unit (R146). Reporting ‘upwards’ was diffused through both the political and the thematic desks at Sida HQ. There were Sida ‘resource groups’ elsewhere in Africa which could advise

\(^{20}\) *Sida’s Learning* (SIDA, 2005E) advises staff to “find ways to tell other people about your work and create opportunities for dialogue and exchange of experience”.

---

266
staff in Ethiopia about evaluating multidisciplinary programmes. International staff were concerned at the structural complexity of reporting within Sida, and lost opportunities for learning, but had no direct responsibility for reporting on SARDP activities.

- **Embassy knowledge of government monitoring systems**

Sida’s policy of non-interference meant that contact between Sida international staff and SARDP, their ABP, was limited. A national programme officer visited regularly, but feedback from the programme via reporting was weak (R147); contact between the international TA advisers and Sida was restricted to attendance at one joint review meeting per year.

SARDP had employed a number of evaluation advisers over the length of the programme, but had not implemented the advice given because it was considered inappropriate for the local context (R148). Reports from SARDP’s *woredas* lacked analysis (R149), and international TAs found analysis difficult because the information was ‘thin’ and there was “no participatory data” (R150). TA staff assumed that reluctance to use PRA techniques was due to the government’s belief that qualitative methods were inferior (R151) but embassy staff thought that, although the government tried to appear open, it had difficulty accepting transparent monitoring because it feared criticism and exposure (R155).

Although CIDA did not collect information from their regional projects, and they had little knowledge about local structures and forms of participation, their international staff understood data collection: “DAs are being expected to collect data on a weekly or monthly basis, whereas donors only expect data to be collected annually” (R152). Donors were more concerned about local analytical ability at *woreda* level. When asked what level of analysis was expected, embassy staff said consolidation or compilation (R153, R154); in fact, data was compiled at *kebele* level and consolidated at *woreda* level. Asked whether there could be reasons why monitoring might be easier in Ethiopia, one expatriate

---

21 Evaluation of SARDP in 2002 noted “a curious disconnect between partnership dialogue at technical level and partnership level, suggesting that Sida interpreted government ownership as an injunction against intervention at policy level, even when policy threatened the success of a major project” (Farrington et al., 2001: 8)
could not initially think of any reasons but, on reflection, suggested that centralisation of power provided a conduit for information and that there was an established discipline of collecting detailed information, though ‘not necessarily effective’ (R155). It was through discussion of M&E, therefore, that a connection between government ideology and local structures began to be made.

Although DCI international staff expressed surprise at the amount of data collected at community level (R156, R157), they were not concerned that the performance matrix for the TRSP joint M&E framework continued to be a ‘work in progress’: “the indicators are secondary to the process” (R158). DCI regarded targets “pragmatically”, their approach was “not mechanistic, but mediated by an understanding of effort and achievement” (R159). In the first year of TRSP there had been no attempt at conditionality, but “some degree of conceptual linkage to PIs should be possible in the current funding year” (R160). The idea of M&E as process as opposed to measurement was also found at DCI in Dublin: “‘Monitoring’ suggests that development is rational, that it can be quantified, but it can’t - it’s a messy business” (R161). Unlike the other two donors, DCI did not favour the use of LFA, believing ‘logframes’ to be too rigid and unable to reflect real change (R162).

Evaluation, when it did take place, exposed donors to government accusations of being ‘overly critical’. Sida found the regional government reluctant to accept evaluators selected by Sida because they were expected them to be ‘critical’ (R163). During evaluation of a DCI-funded agricultural research programme, DCI understood local opinion to be that DCI critique was unwelcome, that DCI should “just provide funding” (R164). As a result, DCI thought that local processes meant people “weren’t open to criticism”, perhaps because of the unfamiliarity of working in partnership, vested interests, or being fearful for one’s reputation or even losing one’s job (R165).

- Local evaluation practice

Although international donor staff said they were unaware of any ‘Ethiopian’ form of evaluation, national staff were fully aware of gengemma. For them, discussion of gengamma was contentious for different reasons. Discussing ‘real’ participation with SARDP was sensitive and needed to be done diplomatically, and “Sida raises the issue of gengamma all the time” (R166). This information
had clearly not reached an M&E specialist who thought that there was “no such thing as a separate ‘Ethiopian’ system of evaluation” (R167). DCI national staff considered *gengamma* “a crude political tactic”, one that was widespread across government but that should be kept within the Party (R168). My question whether *gengamma* was discussed in donor meetings caused some amusement.

Local staff in Tigray considered *gemgam(ma)* structurally useful, because it linked the *kushet (go detrimental to the *tabia (kebele)*, to the *woreda* and then to the Region: “having the four levels linked is a strength” (R169); a problem which could not be resolved by the *tabia* could be referred to the *woreda*. M&E was thought “not difficult in Tigray” because “the TPLF make people more aware and well-organised” (R170). Local staff said that there were no risks attached to *‘gengam for development’* because it was not “personalised”; eight to ten years previously, personal criticism would have led to demotion but nowadays it was “understood better”, although a negative evaluation could result in loss of promotion (R171). Strong personalities often won support, so the weak were at greater risk (R177). “Participants in evaluation are chosen by the DAs and the *tabia* administration and possibly also by the teachers. Farmers are chosen if they have a good record of participation, are innovators and have good personal qualities.” (R178). The question ‘why would people want - or not want - to participate’ elicited the response that participants might participate through fear of losing food aid or through political fear that “emotional” officials would cause problems for them (R179). There was no risk to the government in undertaking M&E because the people were not aware of their rights (R180).

**Monitoring and evaluation in donors’ horizontal relationships**

The NAA introduced new horizontal relationships into which evaluation could be fitted, if donors wanted to undertake them. Their potential partners were civil society, the government and other donors.

- **Civil society**

None of the donors suggested that joint evaluations might be held with civil society representatives. The only performative role they ascribed to civil society was as ‘independent’ monitors of PRSP implementation, a role for which they
provided technical assistance and funding. As reported earlier, donor staff described civil society as ‘weak’, lacking in ‘political nouse’ and evaluatory skills. PAN/E assumed, and some donor respondents confirmed, that donors had not read the report of the CRC evaluatory exercise which the DAG had chosen and funded. The CRC, developed, implemented and analysed by an Indian organisation, ‘captured’ citizens’ levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with public services. It was claimed to be a diagnostic and accountability tool which would stimulate reform, ‘activating stakeholder responsiveness’ and ‘mobilizing state-public partnerships’ (PAN/E, 2005: 10-13). PAN/E received no feedback other than from the World Bank and the IMF, and assumed that, at 97 pages, the report was too lengthy to engage bilateral donors’ interest.

- **Government**

The DAG had set up a joint M&E working group with the government in 2004, but it appeared to stall early in 2005, probably because its instigator was transferred to another posting. Although monitoring the effectiveness of DBS was thought to be very important, donors had mixed opinions about the possibility of effective monitoring: “with DBS, performance indicators can be used to ascribe responsibility” (R181) but, for a number of respondents, monitoring the effectiveness of the new modalities was more contentious. PRSPs were considered a ‘top-down’ exercise, and the performance indicators were “a crude measure” of effectiveness (R182), even though the DAG group had spent “a whole day” working out the indicators (R183).

Having regional modalities afforded DCI and Sida the opportunity to undertake field-level evaluations jointly with government. Both donors expressed commitment to the principles of ownership, but experienced difficulty negotiating access to their programmes. For Sida, this became more urgent after the 2005 election conflict but, when international staff visited the project the following month, government staff were unavailable to meet them (R184).

Although they considered M&E an important component of budget support, DCI staff believed that developing the TRSP joint monitoring framework involved a “trade-off”; they had to “give up some control” over their reporting systems in order to work out a mechanism for M&E (R185). Delays included unavailability of government counterparts, difficulty agreeing performance indicators and
embassy sector advisers experiencing difficulty negotiating access to make field visits to verify the Region’s data. Although DCI was satisfied with the regional government’s financial accounting reporting, Embassy staff were disappointed that some sector heads did not attend their regular Joint Steering Committee meetings with the Regional government (R186). Embassy staff put the delays in establishing the joint evaluation structures down to government staff’s lack of capacity, rather than lack of political will (R187).

The focus of CIDA’s interest in government M&E was monitoring the PRSP. They were concerned that the latest PRSP (PASDEP) was going ahead in 2005 despite not having had the agreed monitoring reports on SDPRP, the previous PRSP (R188). They did, however, volunteer that there were occasions when donors failed to supply reports or comments on time, causing the government to miss deadlines which the donors had set (R189). Until the post-election crisis, one view from within CIDA was that it could rely on the APR and on the Government’s data (“there’s no point in reinventing the wheel”) (R190). For this respondent, the main problem with M&E was aligning CIDA’s RBM systems with the government’s timetable, because they followed a different cycle (R191). Others within CIDA regarded the APR as a limited source of information, and had doubts about the usefulness of the PRSP policy matrix (R192, R193). After the political crisis of 2005, CIDA thought it necessary to improve their local knowledge, and were looking for suitable cross-checks, including PAN/E, Human Rights Watch, and possibly data from their own projects. (R194); they were also considering going back to using NGO data ‘because of the situation’ (R194).

**Other donors**

Enthusiasm for harmonised procedures was mixed within Sida, both at HQ and in the field; technical staff appeared less enthusiastic than policy staff. One view at Sida HQ was that joint evaluations risked “watering down” the evaluation criteria in order to accommodate different donors’ perspectives; individual agencies were thought more likely to do thorough, analytical evaluations (R195). However, Sweden was the only donor to achieve the fullest form of harmonisation - delegating cooperation in health and education to its long-term development partner, Norway.
**Monitoring and Evaluation: Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity**

Throughout this section, respondents’ comments have shown that participation, monitoring and evaluation under the harmonisation agenda is in practice challenging for donors because of differences in their values, objectives, levels of expertise and styles of communication. Success in the donor-donor arena rests on political skills rather than on technical expertise. Donors retain a range of modalities, although during the fieldwork period these donors placed more emphasis on programme modalities than on projects and other forms of intervention.

M&E in a pooled-funded initiative, the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), encapsulates some of the difficulties donors experience in harmonisation and ownership. Donors had “been trying to harmonise the different indicators and outputs but different donors have different M&E logframes” (R196, R197). Asked why donors appeared to be investing so much effort into M&E of the PSNP and not to other modalities, I was told that the PSNP was "humanitarian - the donors can’t sit back and let the government do or not do it". Development was supposed to be ‘government-led’, but “was it a case of having a blind man in the lead?”. Despite the ownership agenda, “donors are now realising that it can’t be left to government and consequently donors are funding TA.” (R198).

The PSNP also drew donors into considering how local power structures might be affecting access and targeting; and to discussing possible political interference from the government at *kebele* level (R199). Subsequent evaluation revealed that not only were there differences of opinion among donors but also conceptual differences between donors and government about entitlement to cash transfers. Under the PSNP agreement, transfers to beneficiaries were supposed to be linked to activity, but “some donors felt that this agreement was being diluted and that conditional transfers in return for public works were being over emphasised”; donors had “heated disagreements” about how to proceed.\(^{22}\)

7.4 SHARED MENTAL MODELS

7.4.1 Actors’ Agency

The NAA, as previous development orthodoxies have done, presumes that the international donor community shares the same development values and will act in concert. Although the three donors were sufficiently like-minded to work together in various, fluctuating groupings, depending on common interests, the differing perceptions and practices described by these donor respondents indicate contrasting development values which require them to negotiate, compromise or - sometimes - disagree with their donor colleagues, as well as with their development partner, the Ethiopian government.

The comments which donor staff made about the politicisation of development and the modalities they were using indicated that, while some opinions about participation and about M&E were strongly held, others appeared to be not well-established as an individual’s responses were either contradictory or evolved into reflective detours around the topic. Cumulatively, these demonstrated different normative stances within and between donor agencies, revealed uncertainty about what information was available and what staff were able or prepared to use. The following paragraphs explore individual agency within the participatory space available to staff within the ‘dialogue architecture’.

Most international respondents expressed concern about their own and their agency’s effectiveness, wondering whether donors are listened to, questioning whether donors should really be recommending what the electorate should do, “maybe Europeans are being arrogant thinking that they’re being ‘useful’”, “not sure we have insights” (R200). Tools for expressing this concern included irony, cynicism, and emphasising their personal values and technical skills. Doubt about their role was expressed in phrases describing the change of relationship: “advocate, not impose”, “facilitate only”, “keep comments to a minimum”, “can’t interfere” (R201, R2023, R203, R204). Other comments suggested that donors felt inhibited by the government’s political skills: the government was “good at donor discourse, donors don’t know what to do”; “lack of donor understanding gives the government room for manoeuvre” (R205). After the post-election
violence, donors were uncertain how to respond: “it shouldn’t be ‘business as usual’ but what can donors do?” (R206).

Respondents emphasised that individuals or ‘personalities’ were very important. As individuals, they were representatives of their donor agency, in an arena which each donor had “to create credibility and acceptance of roles by other donors” (R207). Key individuals could act as catalysts, mobilise other donors and work effectively with government officers, but someone with poor interpersonal or political skills could stall progress.

Individual staff’s values and objectives closely reflected their career trajectories. Sida respondents were all senior technical specialists with many years’ experience, though one had transferred to a policy post. CIDA respondents reflected Canada’s multicultural profile; some were development specialists, but others had a background in the civil service. The international respondents from DCI were all development specialists from NGO backgrounds, who had joined DCI in order to continue working in an operational environment. These findings support the work of Kaufman, who found the values and career trajectories of DFID staff influenced their concepts of development (Kaufman, 1997). However, these could also be linked to the values identified in each donor’s own documentation (see 7.2.1). One individual, working on another country’s embassy, described values and forms of agency closely aligned to those of her compatriots’, and dissimilar to colleagues’ at the embassy where she worked. These responses support the earlier analysis that forms of social capital in donors’ documentation could be linked to characteristics described in their ‘national’ social capital literature.

A body of discourse on the agency of individual actors working at the development interface was reviewed in 2.5.4. A key thread concerns the possibility of considering them as broker-entrepreneurs, broker-translators or street level bureaucrats. Olivier de Sardan’s description of DA brokers may be applicable: interaction with their clients requires them to negotiate various logics and tactics but, while doing so, they have to “defend their own personal interests; defend the interests of their institution; [and] mediate between various actors’ interests and those of local factions” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 172). Donor staff may be keen to defend their own interests in terms of peer respect and recognition, and their own value framework from the demands from their
organisation. The responses of DCI and Sida staff indicate that they did not accept agency policy unquestioningly, but manoeuvred around it. Their self-identity as technical specialists helped them to do this. In contrast, only one individual within CIDA staff, who tend to be civil servants, was prepared to critique practice, if not policy, discursively.

**7.4.2 The Arena for Sharing Mental Models**

Denzau and North argue that mental models are formed by culture and belief systems and, given their different political, religious and social histories, patterns of association and communication, it is unsurprising that donors’ perceptions and practice of participation should differ, and that they had chosen different modalities and ways of interacting with different levels of government. If day-to-day donor experiences are regarded as “interface encounters” (Long, 2001: 190), we expect the emergence of a variety of strategies, reflecting individual social actors’ values, experience and interests. However, Long rejects the argument that “cognitive maps or cultural understandings provide for the ground rules for social life that remain the same for members of the same ‘epistemic community’” (ibid: 189). In this research, however, the responses provided by donor staff showed that actors’ “goals, perceptions, values, interests and relationships” were not malleable at the donor interface (ibid: 191); rather, they demonstrated ‘patterns of resistance’ based on their culture and belief systems, largely shared by members of their national ‘community’. This was particularly evident in the case of DCI and Sida, but was also demonstrable among CIDA staff whose heterogeneity reflected the diversity which domestic Canadian policy aims to meld via an emphasis on multiculturalism, civic harmony and bureaucratic systems - transformed in development policy as support for multilateralism, harmonisation and civil service reform. This research has shown that the amount of contextual information available to donors was limited by their adoption of the NAA, which also reduced face-to-face contact with Ethiopian counterparts. Even when opportunities existed to collect local information, they were often not taken up: by CIDA because projects were considered unfashionable and their reporting systems did not allow it; by DCI, because they were empathetic and prepared to wait for ‘process’ to develop the mechanisms; and by Sida, because they were solidaristic and did not want to interfere.
Rather than representing the “crisis” which, under SMM, would demonstrate to the Ethiopian government or electorate that their present system of government had ‘failed’ and that liberal democracy provided the answer, the events of 2005 re-enforced the traditional concept of strong leadership defeating rivals to power. Instead, it was donors who “learnt” that they had misread the extent to which the EPRDF had accepted democratic pluralism, that there were limits to their trust in the Government and that DBS was not the appropriate modality.

7.4.3 Polity, Information and Mental Models

The 2005 Elections

Donors who had thought that Meles Zenawi supported democratic change by “struggling to get the Party to agree to elections”, felt wrong-footed by the events of 2005, one suggesting that the events were causing a “tectonic shift” in donor attitudes (R208). They initially viewed the post-election violence in the summer as positive, an indication of society ‘opening up’ (R209); “people thinking for themselves” (R210). Many activities were put on hold while waiting for the election results to be released, but the violence in November 2005\(^{23}\) caused donors to reassess their Ethiopia programmes. Led by World Bank, donors designed a new modality, Protection of Basic Services, intended to bypass the Ministry of Finance and channel aid through individual ministries for earmarked spending at woreda level, as “woreda block grants are the only way to get money direct to the poor” (R211). It was to be backed up by more stringent financial monitoring.

In contrast, the outcome of the elections was logically consistent with citizens’ perception and experience of traditional power relations in which the traditional components of leadership challenge (see 4.3.4) were played out. Lefort found that the concept of democratic parliamentary elections was ‘incomprehensible’ to rural communities in Amhara (Lefort, 2007: 254). The rural population interpreted holding elections as an expression of weakness by the EPRDF, but they were not sure whether the challenged or the challenger was more powerful. There were serious risks attached to supporting the wrong party; there was

\(^{23}\) Nearly 200 people were killed and 30,000 - 40,000 people imprisoned (Abbink, 2006: 192) and opposition CUD party leaders were arrested and accused with treason.
coercion before the election and violent retribution afterwards \((ibid: 254, 270)\). Conforming to the historical pattern of challenge/defeat, opposition CUD leaders were charged with treason following the election and the CUD was subsequently "plagued by internal divisions" (Abbink, 2006: 191).

**Polity Analysis**

In 2005, development orthodoxy was not only considered 'political', but political events challenged the assumption that the ideology of the NAA, liberal democracy, was being adopted by the Ethiopian government. Waterman and Meier's polity framework (see 3.4.3, summarised in Figure 7.3 overleaf) offers an explanation of why donors may not consider it necessary to use 'information' as evidence in policy formulation. Designed to address different types of transactional relationship between politicians and civil servants, the framework can also be used to consider the relationship between donors (aid principals) or citizens (political principals) and the Ethiopian government (agent for aid delivery and development management).

Waterman and Meier's matrix structures 'little' and 'much' information into the principal-agent relationship of polity. With the government's monitoring structure reaching down to groups of five households, there is very little information which the government could not collect, should it choose to do so; in the matrix, the government possessed 'much' information. The three donors had 'little' information in comparison, because their access to primary data was eroded by moving to up-stream modalities or because their value system precluded them from actively retrieving information.\(^{24}\) Differences in foreign policy and aid objectives indicated that goal consensus among donors was not particularly strong and there was no substantive, as opposed to rhetorical, goal consensus between donors, or donors and government, despite a PRSP.

\(^{24}\) None of the donor respondents mentioned financial cost as a deterrent.
Figure 7.3. Principal-Agent expansion to consider polity
(Waterman and Meier, 1998: 188)

When Ethiopian citizens are also considered as principals, shared culture and belief systems could indicate internal goal consensus and Revolutionary Democracy rhetoric suggests their relationship is one of ‘stewardship’. As there was information asymmetry between the government and its citizens, the matrix offers two options: patronage systems, where there is goal conflict, or Plato’s Republic, where there is goal consensus. The literature on the nature of leadership in Ethiopia suggests that power has been the currency of patronage whichever regime has been in place: “Government in Ethiopia … is a matter for experts who know what to do; the ignorant peasant, by contrast, is there to be … governed” (Clapham, 1990: 227) through “a pattern of patron-client relations
where state officials act as patrons and peasants or poor townspeople as clients” (Poluha, 2004: 116). Whether there was goal conflict, for example over the extractive nature of participation, or goal consensus, as over the Eritrean question or in identification as habesha, it would make little difference to the rural population whether the polity was ‘patronage systems’ or ‘Plato’s Republic’.25

Where government has much information and donors have little information, Waterman and Meier provide two options: ‘principal-agent’ and ‘bottom-line’. Donors explained that the ‘moral’ risks of conditionality-induced exit from their aid programmes included potentially increased poverty and the difficulty of regaining access (as happened after the Ethiopian-Eritrean war). Donor staff believed that the government assumed donors avoided imposing conditionalities because of these risks (R212). On the other hand, the NAA, with its assumption of shared objectives, emphasis on country ownership and reduced access to contextualised and localised information, has more parallels with ‘bottom line’ polity. Under ‘bottom line’ polity, “principals require regular reports, and if nothing is out of line they do nothing. Only if some major problem occurs do the principals intervene and try to take corrective action” (Waterman and Meier, 1998: 191). This appears to reflect most accurately donor-government relations in 2005. When principals’ trust is broken by the steward, “the principal is likely to feel betrayed and angry and may increase controls” (Davis et al., 1997: 33, 40, 41). The shift in modality from DBS to PBS, with its increased monitoring, suggests that betrayal of trust occurred in 2005.

7.4.3 Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity

It is a central argument in this thesis that development management research should engage constructively with practice. As Long argues that the social actor does not lack agency, but has the power to strategise (even if that strategy is resistance or withdrawal), the final section of this chapter focuses on issues of congruence and disjuncture in order to identify opportunities for improved knowledge and dialogue.

25 The markedly different levels of electoral support for the government in Amhara and Tigray might reflect the two different polities.
Rather than sharply divergent perceptions and practices between donors and the state, recurring themes selected from the findings suggested that there was a considerable overlap in modes of communication, in approach and in sources of confusion. As Denzau and North state, “where mental models are shared, tacit understanding and the use of cultural ‘shorthand’ reduce the need for explicit exchange of information.” (Denzau and North, 1994: 20). This held true in government-community relations, but mental models between donors and government were not shared. The ubiquity of buzzwords (cf. Cornwall, 2005) such as participation, partnership and ownership suggests that they are used as development ‘shorthand’, and their meanings shared. Differential meanings emerged during discussion but, even so, ambiguity offers room for manoeuvre. Table 7.1 lists the themes identified in Chapters 6 and 7 by congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity.

**Table 7.1. List of themes by degree of congruence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congruence</th>
<th>Disjuncture</th>
<th>Ambiguity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation:</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>The project of development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Skilled speech</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Participation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Exhortation</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>▪ ‘contribution’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Consensus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable/weak capacity dyad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency and voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on quantitative data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Congruence**

In proposing these themes of congruence, I do not suggest that there was synchronicity of understanding, but that both donors and government used the same mechanisms, and could recognise this in each other’s strategies.
Participation: speech skills, exhortation and consensus

Effective verbal skills were important both for donors and for Ethiopians. For donor respondents, good communication skills were vital for negotiating with and influencing other donors and establishing their agency’s role and status within the DAG. All four countries had distinctive patterns of communication and social institutions but oratory was culturally embedded and highly valued in Ethiopia, whereas in contrast to donor countries, communication skills sometimes had to be taught. Donors thought that poor communicators could hinder progress; in Ethiopia it could mean being out-of-step with the rest of the group, and prejudicing one’s future ability to influence decision-making. At the same time, reticence is valued in Ethiopia, because it can imply modesty and wisdom. Swedish culture also values reticence in the sense of economic speech and humility.

Donors’ influencing, of each other and government, and the government’s use of persuasion are both forms of exhortation. Donors’ claims that reports go unread, reducing their local knowledge, is an indication that influencing was seen as a more useful strategy. Exhortation not only plays a specific role in the Ethiopian Government’s ADLI programme and the organisation of rural development, but is a cultural tool, applied throughout government-community relations.

Another form of exhortation used by both donors and government was through the use of exemplars. The Tigray Government’s community participation manual (6.3.2) uses examples of change arising from both individual and community effort as a form of exhortation to ‘participate’. The format of these stories is very similar to that employed in the qualitative evaluation method, Stories of Change, which has a specifically transformative agenda because it seeks to identify significant changes in people’s lives. Local evaluations by SARDP and Tigray/DCI both called the methodology ‘stories of success’. CIDA staff, too, said there was need for analysis “that will enable stories to be told” (R180).  

---

26 Donor headquarters also look for positive stories of change to display, often via their websites, their effectiveness to their domestic populations.
According to Ayittey, public meetings in Africa are traditionally geared towards consensus, in order to ‘keep the person in the community’ (Ayittey, 1992). The findings support this pattern in Ethiopia, the underlying institution being the maintenance of the community as a unit. The literature on social capital suggests that consensus has also been important in these donors’ societies. It was important to minimise conflict in Canada’s multicultural society; in rural Ireland expressing different opinions in public meetings was considered divisive; and in Sweden, social mechanisms existed to avoid confrontation. Despite the rhetoric of harmonisation, consensus within the donor ‘community’ was more problematic, because agencies held different views, had different strategies, and formed different subgroups according to shared priorities and levels of concord. Where consensus was required, for the PRSP matrix, for example, compromises had to be made.

- A ‘knowledgeable’ - ‘weak capacity’ dyad

Donors and government both exhibited the ability to label groups as simultaneously both ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘not knowledgeable’ (needing to be educated). Officials would, on the one hand, say that “farmers know all there is to know” but a few minutes later would describe farmers as backward and illiterate, requiring instruction and firm leadership. Donors were unsure of their own effectiveness while at the same time claiming superior expertise. The NAA rhetoric requires recipient governments to work with donors both as equal partners (partnership) progressing to senior partners (ownership), but donors lacked confidence in the government’s technical capacity and, where it was important for donors, such as in ‘humanitarian’ circumstances or in reaction to political violence, donors reasserted a degree of control.

- Reliance on quantitative data

The NAA meant donors were theoretically dependent on government quantitative data for monitoring their aid effectiveness (with as yet weak monitoring capacity within civil society, the use of alternative sources of data was a matter of donor choice). Donors expressed surprise at the volume, frequency and (federal) management of local statistical collection. Both government and donor staff identified the lack of local analytical capacity as a problem (some donor staff as well as government officials interpreting ‘analytical
capacity’ as ‘consolidating data’). Donors were critical of the Ethiopian government’s tendency to roll out development strategies across the country without piloting or establishing baseline data. However, in humanitarian situations such as the Safety Net Programme where M&E ‘mattered’, donor staff turned a critical eye on their own practice, regretting their own failure to establish baseline data.

**Disjuncture**

The clearest disjunctures between donor and local conceptions of participation in evaluation related to (i) the purpose of evaluation, and consequently its practice, and (ii) the role of process.

- **Evaluation**

Donors’ uncertainty about the form and purpose of evaluation contrasted sharply with the certainty and regularity of evaluation, at every level in the government-community structure. Although the literature describes two purposes attached to donor evaluation, ‘accounting for’ and ‘effectiveness’, it is generally critical about the evidence for the use of evaluation in aid effectiveness, organisational learning or policy formulation. Instead, it is sometimes considered a political device, to present a display of consensus and effectiveness to the general public. DCI and Sida both displayed this uncertainty; only CIDA expressed confidence in its concepts and practice. The only form of performance management structure was CIDA’s SRAF, but this was linked to the PRSP policy matrix, thus measuring government performance rather than demonstrating causality between donor intervention and service provision. However, it fitted with OECD-DAC procedures which require monitoring the extent of harmonisation, not its effectiveness.

The purposes of monitoring and evaluation were understood by Ethiopian respondents to be: (i) to ensure that work was done according to plan and on time; (ii) to use the information for future planning; and (iii) to prevent local leaders and officials treating the people unfairly. This clarity of purpose is grounded in culture and belief systems (see 3.5.2), just as Western concepts of evaluation are grounded in Protestantism and the Enlightenment. Gemgamma was clearly used as an accountability and performance management tool. Its
immediacy meant that it measured quantity and quality of work rather than
impact or effectiveness. Kebede writes that Leninism, like Calvinism,
emphasises strict discipline, so that in Leninism “the members of the vanguard
party … form an elite with a high moral calibre” (Kebede, 1994: 205). Senior
officials complained that their juniors were unwilling to make sufficient sacrifices
for the good of the people; they claimed to lead by example.

- **Process**

The second major area where there was unequivocal disjuncture between
government and donor strategies was in the concept of ‘process’. Despite
claiming that M&E was important as a regulatory mechanism where DBS was
used, some donor staff felt that ensuring the internal logic of performance
indicators within a policy matrix was ‘mechanistic’; for them, the process was
more important (R213). Of the five elements of process approaches identified by
Bond and Hulme, the first - that implementation should be flexible and phased -
accords most directly with this perspective. The other four elements are more
challenging in the NAA context: systematic, iterative learning; understanding
“the complex social realities of local situations”; institution building, including
political support; and well-qualified and motivated leadership (Johnson and

NPM has some congruence with Ethiopian concepts of accountability systems,
with its use of targets and assumption of moral hazard. Targets are alien to
process approaches, which require intensive management (Bond and Hulme,
1999: 1354), including continuous M&E so that mistakes are uncovered and
corrected quickly (Rondinelli, 1993: 183). Current development orthodoxy does
not allow for such double-loop learning. Crucially, process approaches, or
adaptive administration, necessitate the freedom to experiment using culturally
acceptable practice and behaviour: this requires contextual knowledge (ibid:
172-176). The assumption of universality within the NAA orthodoxy therefore
conflicts with the ‘process’ approach these harmonising donors claimed to be
using. Equally importantly, donors were unable to provide the active
management, flexibility and iterative learning that process approaches require.
The reworking of the concept of process as ‘work in progress’, as opposed to
‘mechanistic’ active management, allowed an optimistic assessment of
progress, for example towards democratic pluralism, until this optimism was
dashed by the post-election violence27.

Process approaches also challenge donors' uncertainty about the nature of
leadership, and preference for ‘facilitation’. The ‘process’ literature argues that
adaptive administration requires people who “view themselves as leaders rather
than as bureaucrats” (ibid: 187). Independently, several embassy staff had
remarked on the importance of individuals among the international community
whose levels of commitment and leadership skills made them effective change
agents. The contestation surrounding the role of leadership in Western polity
and in development discourse contrasts with Ethiopia, where strong leadership
has been historically important, and leadership skills are admired at village level.
The Tigray Region’s participation manual says that the leaders ‘know’ what
beneficiaries want or at least what they should want. Donors also claim to know
what beneficiaries want. Following the 2005 elections, the former British
Ambassador, then Secretary of the Commission for Africa, was quoted as
saying that “the international community in some ways acts as a lever, as a
proxy for the wishes of the people within countries.” (interview published in The
Reporter, 04.06.05, Addis Ababa).

**Mixed Messages and Ambiguity of Approach**

- *The project of ‘development’*

Both donors and government respondents described development as a ‘political’
project, relating this to the NAA and to geopolitics. Both the donor community’s
development strategy, as set out in *Shaping the 21st Century* (OECD DAC
1996), and the Ethiopian government’s development strategy are positioned
within specific ideologies, both of which are born from particular cultural,
historical and intellectual roots. It may be that, if development strategy is
ideologically-based, tests of adoption (monitoring) may be considered useful; but
tests of effectiveness (evaluation) are thought to be unnecessary. Although
poverty reduction is described as an ‘overarching’ objective in most donors
programmes (here, DCI and Sida, but not CIDA), the methods used in current

---

27 The ‘work in progress’ interpretation may also fit well with the qualitative technique,
‘stories of change’, discussed earlier in relation to ‘exhortation’.
orthodoxy - democratic pluralism, private sector development, a strong civil society and civil service reform - are drawn from a Western political trajectory.

The Ethiopian government was able to present development to farmers as a national project, “so that we no longer have to be dependent on foreigners”\(^{28}\), a coherent message which resonated with the concept of *habesha* as the in-group, foreigners as the out-group. *Shaping the 21st Century* also presents development to donors as “enlightened self-interest”, offering geopolitical stability, increased markets and reduced migration and terrorism (OECD, 1996: 6); donors, their national staff and advisers identified this agenda in relation to aid to Ethiopia. Global security was a significant component of both CIDA’s and Sida’s aid programmes. In 2005, donors had to calculate the risks of enforcing their good governance agenda at the risk of jeopardising their future engagement with the Ethiopian government, a risk which many believed they had miscalculated by withdrawing aid in 1998, during the Ethio-Eritrean war. Juxtaposing donors’ (eventually) firm reaction to the post-election violence of 2005, on the one hand, with US support for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia 12 months later, on the other, demonstrates the normative challenge presented by donors’ geopolitical interests.

- **Participation: Social capital**

The social capital literature, discussed in 2.4, argues that civic ethics are enhanced by associational membership. Under the communitarian politics, this approach is manifest in evolving policies for CSO engagement in local planning, service delivery and monitoring local government performance in the countries with ‘Third Way’ governments such as the UK. In Ethiopia, government assigned the latter two roles to rural communities via contribution of labour and *gemgamm*.

Traditional forms of association, which include informal cooperative activities and faith-based membership, are more closely aligned with evolving Western conceptions of social capital, although explicit or implicit sanctions for non-

---

\(^{28}\) Quotation from an interview with a farmer, see 5.4.3.
participation conflict with Western assumptions of voluntary participation. Even so, descriptions of regulatory social mechanisms within Irish and Swedish associational life suggest that greater reflexivity in the assessment of social capital in developing countries, at least when framed politically, would allow a more grounded critique of development orthodoxy and its practices.

- Participation: Agency and Voice

Both liberal democracy and revolutionary democracy encompass the idea of popular participation by means of public expressions of opinion. A form of local participation (secondary to labour contribution) in Ethiopia is ‘sharing ideas’, framed as being more ‘modern’ in the rhetoric of participation transmitted by both government officials and local leaders who link it to the current regime: “now everyone can speak”. Government rhetoric about empowerment through ‘speaking up’ and ‘contributing ideas’ places local practice on a continuum between participation as conceptualised under Habermasian ‘deliberative democracy’, traditional Ethiopian cultural mechanisms of discussion and consensus and some of the tenets of revolutionary democracy. Lack of precision in specifying types and standards of participation allows donors and government to interpret the term in very different ways, depending on the arena. Responses indicated that donors either appear not to understand local practice, or interpreted it through their own mental models, avoiding the necessity of questioning the normative assumptions of voluntarism within civil society as framed within the NAA.

The descriptions from Ethiopian farmers of the raising and discussion of ideas, the opportunity for as many people as wished to, to speak and the aim of inclusion within the group by means of consensus offers a public participatory space that is not always available in Western public forums. When donors were asked to reflect on local concepts and practice of participation in evaluative forums in Ethiopia, they had little or no information to draw on and had difficulty

---

29 In Tony Blair’s statement in 1998 that “rights and opportunity without responsibilities are engines of selfishness and greed” (Craig and Porter, 2004: 393), the sentiment and even words such as ‘greed’ are congruent with Revolutionary Democracy rhetoric but, in rural development administration in Ethiopia, responsibilities mean compulsory, not voluntary, labour.

30 Religious associations, for example, may offer respite from political pressure.
explaining what participation meant in any meaningful way, even in terms of Western discourse.
CHAPTER 8
REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF MENTAL MODELS
IN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

8.1 OVERVIEW

This thesis has explored the perceptions and practice of participation in evaluation among social actors in the aid chain of three bilateral donors working in Ethiopia. The development orthodoxy in place at the time of the fieldwork, the NAA, rhetorically required donors to harmonise their own programmes to reduce transaction costs on recipient governments, to align their management systems with those of the government and to work in partnership with the government so that it would take on ‘ownership’ of the (aid-funded) development process. On the government’s part, it was expected to adopt multiparty political pluralism, a Western style of public sector management (NPM), and to allow an empowered civil society to monitor its progress, and its citizens to hold the government to account via the ballot box. The short time-span between the agreement on harmonisation (December 2002) and the cancellation of DBS (December 2005) afforded an opportunity to study the practice of harmonisation and other components of the NAA listed above.

The methods which donors use to effect the attitudinal change required by the NAA are dialogue, influencing, cash transfers (DBS) and voluntary secession of power. In Ethiopian polity and culture, these ‘components’ translate as follows. Oratory and persuasion are skills characteristic of habesha identity. Cash or any other resource transfers are couched in notions of entitlement, and controlled by reciprocity and sanctions. In traditional Ethiopian concepts of leadership, power, once claimed through competition, is maintained against future competition by expressions of strength; defeat results in marginalisation.

In 2005, there was a clash between habesha and ferengi political systems, when the government failed to adopt multiparty pluralism, contrary to donor expectations, and dealt with the challenge to its leadership according to customary patterns. It cracked down violently on opposition to disputed election results, killing 200 protestors and imprisoning 30-40,000 members of the public, including approximately 100 leaders of the opposition coalition who were
charged with treason. This accords with the historical trajectory and with rural communities’ expectations (cf. Lefort, 2007, and Abbink, 2006).

The SMM approach suggests that the rate of learning takes two forms. Either learning takes place over a long period of time, during which mental models A and B move closer together through repeated interaction and exchange of information, or it takes place after a crisis which is unexplained by A’s mental model, but is explicable by B’s mental model; therefore, logically, A adopts B’s model. The NAA assumes that A will adopt B’s mental model if provided with an ‘enabling environment’. The envisaged enabling environment of multiparty elections did not shift the Ethiopian government to accept pluralism. Rather, the crisis shocked donors’ mental models and induced them to change aid modalities. How much donors’ learned from the experience is not yet clear, as the structure of the replacement modality, PBS, suggests that its design was not grounded in the knowledge provided by power analyses or the literature on Ethiopian political systems. By replacing DBS with local block grants, the PBS structure implies that sectoral ministries, regional government and woreda administrations operate independently of the EPRDF, and that power structures are not hierarchical and authoritarian.

Donor discourse also assumes (presumes) that their concepts and practice of participation and evaluation, based on Western values and patterns of knowledge, will be adopted by recipient countries because they are recognised as superior. The literature reviewed describes NPM as an Anglo-Saxon structure, employed under the NAA to support the adoption of the Third Way strain of liberal democracy which is also Anglo-Saxon by adoption (Craig and Porter, 2006). The findings from the Ethiopian interviews support Ayittey’s argument that indigenous African forms of participation, which allow wide-ranging discussion designed to include all participants via consensus, is more inclusive and equitable (Ayittey, 2006). The form of public evaluation practiced in Ethiopia - and Vietnam, for comparison - grafted Maoist practices onto indigenous forms of informal evaluation, which are far more exacting in terms of performance management and accountability than the evaluations (now less frequently) carried out by donors.

The underlying guide to this research has been Long’s social actor approach, which conceives the knowledge interface as the site of struggle within
heterogeneous communities, where ‘knowledge’ is fluid, and used strategically and inductively. Employing SMM as an analytical tool, it was apparent that ‘knowledge’ in this research context took three forms: culture, belief and information. Donors tend to be somewhat tentative in their claims to undertake ‘knowledge management’, what information they can collect and how they process it to effect improved policy and delivery. The findings make clear that their development values, communication styles and political frameworks dictate how, or whether, this happens. It was also clear that, in compiling their ‘knowledge’ of the local context, and indeed their understanding of participation, the donors who took part in this research relied on other donors for information and analysis, disregarding academic literature on Ethiopia.¹ Because the World Bank had the capacity to provide (mainly quantitative) data and analysis, donors were largely dependent on the Bank for information. The OECD-DAC provided the intellectual platform for donor policies, by configuring the NAA. The delineation of specific development ‘orthodoxies’ to which, rhetorically, members of the donor community adhere suggests that donor ‘knowledge’ is relatively structured. The episodic ‘shifts’ in orthodoxy might, in SMM terms, be described as conceptual crises. If Denzau and North’s model of learning is applied, we would expect donors to be faced with firm evidence showing that the existing orthodoxy lacked “logical consistency” before concluding that a proposed orthodoxy provided a more logical explanation. The NAA provides an example; its core document, *Shaping the 21st Century*, dismissed “sceptical analyses” of aid effectiveness and cited (only) two unpublished papers, describing them as “some new work has pointed to more positive assumptions” of aid’s impact (OECD, 1996: 8).

The strength of Ethiopian identity, formed by its specific history and orthodox religion (Chapters 4 and 5), together with confirmation of the customary patterns of communication, collectivist institutions, religious belief and polity provided by the responses from Ethiopian government and community actors (Chapter 6), suggest that their ‘knowledge’ is significantly less fluid. Applying SMM analysis would suggest donors’ concepts of participation and evaluation offer no incentive for Ethiopian rural communities to shift their mental model. Leaving aside political mental models, it may be that cultural mental models also offer a useful perspective. From conversations and from observation, I understood that

¹ Even Sida’s power analyses (e.g. Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2002) were not read by some of the donors.
ferengi appearance, communicative ‘skill’ and behaviour were widely regarded with derision. While this could be regarded as ‘ingroup-outgroup’ behaviour, other international influence was regarded more positively. Efficiency in Chinese technical assistance in infrastructure and reports of Chinese agricultural productivity are widely admired, irrespective of ideological links. Although donors complain about cheap Chinese products flooding African markets, from observation I suspect these may have greater transformative power than donor ‘influence’. In the northern highlands where asceticism pervades religious practice and cultural norms mean that people dress uniformly\(^2\), my eye was caught by flashes of colour seeing a woman walking home from market with a brightly decorated Chinese platter, rather than a plain metal or earthenware one. I may be opening myself up to the criticism of Ethiopian colleagues of making unwarranted comparison, but I will argue later for the greater use of cross-country comparison and reflexivity.

While I have drawn on work from other disciplines, I place this thesis firmly within development management, specifically within a ‘normative’ framework. As made clear at the beginning of the thesis, I am interested in approaching development management from a purposeful perspective involving constructive engagement with ‘management’ within donor policy and practice. For the rest of this chapter, I use the research findings and analysis to propose future directions for praxis and research.

Section 8.2 explores possible ‘lessons’ to be ‘learnt’ from this research when analysed through a social actor lens, employing the SMM approach and elements of cross-cultural and polity analysis. Given the uncertainty and mixed meanings expressed by donor respondents, section 8.3 assesses the ‘agency’ of technical specialists in influencing and informing development policy and practice, expanding this to consider the ‘room for manoeuvre’ given to donor agencies to set development policy and practice, in relation to wider government political objectives. The final section, 8.4, discusses the implications of the research for development management discourse and argues for the inclusion of culture and ideology in assessing development policy and practice. It

\(^2\) It seemed to me that women in East Gojjam could express individual style through differently patterned edging on their natata (white stoles), and women in Tigray through the way that they plaited their hair.
Chapter 8: Mental Models in Development Management

recommends comparative assessment of the development approaches of differently-minded, as well as like-minded, donors.

8.2 ‘LESSONS LEARNT’ FROM THE RESEARCH

8.2.1 Consensus, Heterogeneity and Confusion

Liberal democracy, promoted by the NAA, values the autonomy of the individual. In common with African notions of community³, the Ethiopian interviews showed that the unity of the group was valued in terms of joint effort and social cohesion. The term ‘social capital’ in development discourse does not place sufficient value on Ethiopian notions, which effectively regards ‘the community’ or the informal association as a common-pool resource, which could be jeopardised by individualistic behaviour, were this not controlled by social and other sanctions. The label ‘greedy’ which highland farmers applied to individualistic behaviour encapsulates this. The conduct of community meetings and the judgements made by the Council of Elders were intended to keep all ‘participants’ within the community. For this reason, meetings were customarily structured so that all who chose to speak could have their say and those who chose to remain silent could do so. Although either strategy could be risky, persuasion was used to build consensus.

Two points arise from this. The first is well-known in development discourse, that familiarity, even in the face of adverse incorporation, reduces uncertainty and affords the social actor greater security than acting independently (cf. Wood, 2003). Consensus and staying within the community is therefore a legitimate strategy and should be respected. Within development discourse, however, the nature of ‘community’ and its benefits are ambiguous and contested. On the one hand it is presented as the site of struggle and the exercise of power by elites, on the other as the source of social capital. Development practice often urges the introduction of institutions and structures to ‘build’ communities and empower them to ‘participate’ according to the Western model, ignoring existing associational mechanisms and institutions for building trust and/or cooperative practices which have greater local legitimacy.

Chapter 8: Mental Models in Development Management

My second point is therefore to argue that caution needs to be taken in the value attributed to heterogeneity in Western discourse, which itself is influenced by democratic traditions which are not necessarily as consensual as Habermas’s label ‘deliberative’ implies but which incorporate adversarial techniques which underpin Western political systems. Development orthodoxy assumes that the citizens of developing countries will grasp opportunities to participate democratically, by implication enabled to do so as a result of aid influence. Whereas donor discourse focuses on the challenge of encouraging potential participants to ‘opt in’, for Ethiopian farmers, the challenge would have been ‘opting out’ of participation, because the penalties of doing so were social as well as political, and severe. Our tendency to apply ethnocentric, Western, interpretations of ‘participation as empowerment’ can therefore blind us to the idea that inclusion in the in-group, whether being a member of the community or being ‘habesha’, is also empowering. The simplistic binary formulation of ‘lacking agency’ versus ‘empowerment’ contrasts starkly with the complex web of transaction costs for members of rural communities of not participating (in local terms) and of participating (in Western terms).

Similar points about relative values can be made in relation to evaluation and accountability. The narrow gap between implementation, evaluation and holding someone to account described by the Ethiopian respondents is far more demanding in performance management terms than Western practice, and is accepted as legitimate because it is a mechanism which maintains the common-pool resource and because it employs existing cultural mechanisms. The structure whereby local leaders and government employees can be questioned by the public in community meetings involves a far wider proportion of the community than would participate in ‘evaluation’ in, for example, the UK with its increasing democratic deficit. The accountability structures in use in Ethiopian community life build on what could be described as a ‘culture of critique’, where ‘performance’ in associational life is monitored by social and written regulation. Even the system whereby local leaders and DAs evaluate each other (see Figure 6.3) could be regarded as a form of ‘peer review’. Even though gengemma is alien to Western practice, it should be acknowledged that the weakly-monitored process approaches, lapsed time-frames and lack of attribution in donor approaches to evaluation may well appear alien to Ethiopian notions of accountability.
The clarity of explanations of participation and evaluation provided by Ethiopian respondents contrasted sharply with those of donor international staff (with national staff negotiating between the two). The variable conception of ‘participation’ in development discourse is exemplified by the breadth of ways in which participation is discussed in 2.5 (academic discourse) and 7.2 (donor discourse). The ‘contribution of ideas’ which these discourses cover, one way or another, also forms a key plank of Revolutionary Democracy but government policy uses a different structure to effect the contribution, one based on familiar fora and customary practices and skills.

The main Ethiopian conception of participation, contribution of labour, is also confused in donor discourse. Under instrumental and Third Way agendas, donors advocate contributions of labour in community resource management assuming that this is a form of social capital - as it is presented in Revolutionary Democracy rhetoric - rather than taking into account the transaction costs discussed in academic development discourse. Gender empowerment was the key focus of CIDA’s policy on participation and, while I was in Ethiopia, they were discussing a rural road infrastructure programme; they were planning to insist that 50% of the workers were women, making no allowance for the transaction/opportunity costs to the female workers, let alone the real possibility of coercion to meet the 50% target. In their attempt at empathy with Ethiopian women, donors projected a model of empowerment based on their own notions and practice, which might well increase women's workload, possibly keeping young girls from school.

Authors writing about Ethiopia describe the authoritarianism of its structures but also the level of openness and transparency afforded by the conduct of local government in public, through its consensus-making fora and public evaluation. This is particularly so with Tigray, the heartland of the TPLF leadership of the EPRDF. Researchers have found, as I did, that these public mechanisms, combined with the strength and confidence of Tigrean identity, made fieldwork logistically easier, because of readier, more independent access to respondents, their willingness to discuss participation, evaluation and to critique the performance of government officials and other leaders. However, concurrently, the army, which is mainly Tigrean, was suppressing popular opposition to the election results in other regions with extreme force. Until the crisis, only some
donors - and then tentatively - would discuss the government’s authoritarianism. The Ethiopian public understood it as customary practice. Discourse suggests that donors compromise their standards for human rights and governance practices for both external reasons (geopolitical considerations) and internal (disbursement pressure, uncertainty about causal effect and conflicting values). While ambiguity is employed to gloss over these conceptual conflicts, the tension and linkages between ‘strong’, development states, donors’ values and local concepts of development need to be researched.

One of the routes by which the government exerted influence was through mass organisations (the Farmers’, Women’s and Youth Associations) which they had reclassified, for donors’ consumption, as CSOs. The role which NAA specifies for civil society is drawn from Third Way politics in (mainly) Anglo-Saxon countries. Based in part on Putnam’s work in northern Italy, identifying forms of civic engagement which can be traced back to the early Middle Ages (Francis, 2002: 79), Third Wayism is also being applied in the UK which has no similar history and where individualism was also evident in the mediaeval period (Grint, 1995: 169). Methods for restructuring civil society are therefore still being tried out in individualistic societies, while being imposed via the NAA on collectivist societies which already have associational mechanisms to effect cooperative practice, ensuring inclusion and accountability.

One particular outcome of the 2005 crisis was the effect of the diaspora on donors’ decision-making. While CIDA staff in Ethiopia were urging their headquarters not to react precipitously to the post-election violence, the Ethiopian diaspora in Canada were exerting influence on the Canadian government (R214). This political dynamic structures diaspora into the participatory space of development, which enables them to influence not only their ‘home’ governments and, in the Ethiopian case, the opposition, but also donor development policy. Migration, which donors regard as a threat to domestic social stability and therefore a justification for aid, had bridged the broken feedback loop between taxpayers in one country and the recipients of aid in another.

5 The new associational life being constructed under Third Way politics includes, as I found through experience, the familiar issues of voice, agency, social sanctions, transaction costs and incorporation into government structures.
8.3 AGENCY AND INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION

8.3.1 Agency in Development Agencies

Given that the NAA was designed and is monitored by the DAC and the World Bank, and that political priorities take precedence over technical expertise within bilateral donor practice (at least in these three donors), it is important to look critically at how development policy and practice are formulated within individual donor agencies. Staff at Sida headquarters and CIDA embassy staff referred frequently to ‘Paris’, referring to the OECD-DAC. In a critique of *Shaping the 21st Century*, Hulme notes that the DAC’s focus is on “making the case for increased foreign aid and demonstrate that aid will be used effectively”, rather than on tackling poverty, and that it based its approach on NPM which had already been adopted by many of the OECD donor countries (Hulme, 2009: 21).

Development discourse tends to focus on the shortcomings of particular agencies or on the power of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. In reflecting on donors as ‘social actors’, I argue that their agency in influencing policy - as an individual or as a department with a government mandate - is contingent on the degree of politicisation of development at national level. The concern expressed by donor technical staff about their own knowledge (and the use it is put to) mirrors the frustration articulated by recently retired donor staff, wanting to put in writing how development policy and practice ‘should’ be (Gould, 2004: 268).

After the 2005 crisis, staff from each of the three donors said they realised that it was necessary to have a ‘basked’ of different modalities to select from. This claim appears to put the ‘agency’ back into donor agencies’ ability to design and select forms of development intervention. In practice, the donors already had a range of modalities to employ, even though the dominant narrative of the NAA suggested that coherence to its principals was mandatory. In practice, other donors, particularly non-“Anglo-Saxon” ones, followed a different path. This suggests that development policy is decided at the ‘national’ level, by central government, rather than by the donor agency.
Individual agency

At the individual level, technical specialists reported a decline in their own agency as a result of the shift to political development. Because development "is now political", technical specialists felt less valued, particularly since receiving requests from headquarters to reduce technical reporting. They also noted that organisational change had put policy departments in charge of formulating practice as well as policy. King notes the trend among donors to reduce sectoral departments, centralising resources on policy departments and recruiting staff with 'political' skills (King, 2004: 28; see also OECD, 2005c).

Eyben recommends that aid agency staff get out into the field to connect or re-connect with the recipients of aid (Eyben, 2006: 10). Among the international staff interviewed, a number had chosen their posting deliberately in order to undertake operational work (as opposed to policy work) either in Ethiopia specifically, or within Africa. They tended to identify themselves as development workers as well as donor staff and regretted that compulsory rotation to other postings occurred just as they had acquired sufficient local knowledge to be able to work effectively. As well as congruent development values along national patterns, linkages were evident between the professional background of the individual respondent and their (desire for) knowledge about the local practice of participation. Those with a general civil service background were less well-informed about, and attributed less importance to understanding, local conceptions and practice than those with a technical background, who were more engaged with the issue and expressed greater normative intent7. Donor agencies rotate their staff to different postings to avoid the danger of their "losing perspective" by "going native" (Pomerantz, 2004: 37). Most donor respondents believed this was counter-productive: as well as causing the loss of institutional memory, it implies that contextual knowledge is a threat to policy and practice, rather than a valuable resource.8

---

7 Kaufman (1997) found that the rationale and career paths of individuals' entry into the professional arena of development affected their aims, objectives and the manner in which they worked.

8 Briefing staff fully on the local cultural and political context before they started their posting, would improve their analysis of local events and information. This could be achieved cost-effectively through linkages, as Bevan suggests, with academic institutions which already have specific country knowledge (Bevan, 2000: 756).
Although the SMM approach implies that length of engagement results in improved sharing of mental models, this research suggests that time is not a sufficient explanation. Sida had the longest engagement in Ethiopia, had compiled detailed information about its culture, institutions and power structures, and the Regional Government regarded Sida as a good and reliable donor. Despite this, Sida felt frustrated by SARDP’s limited progress yet unable to intervene (until the 2005 crisis). DCI had twelve years’ engagement in Tigray and recognised the political risk of supporting a region dominated by the ruling party. Its international staff’s identification with the needs of Tigrean farmers and its recognition of local attempts to build capacity led DCI to regard the TRSP as an effective model of donor:government relations, but international staff had difficulty explaining the nature of local participation, evaluation and political economy. Most CIDA staff interviewed rarely travelled outside Addis and had little understanding of local forms of participation or evaluation. The greater emphasis that CIDA put on political reporting gave them no advantage in predicting the post-election violence.

**Motivation to ‘help’**

I suggested in Chapter 2 that the choice of career of those working in development, and their decision to gain field experience, are likely to be normative in origin. How the term ‘normative’ is understood individually will vary according to different mental models, so that in arguing for a particular direction for development management, the values ascribed to ‘normative’ (and whose values they are) need to be made explicit.

Interviews with DCI and Sida staff elicited the same values of ‘empathy’ and ‘solidarity’ respectively described in their agency’s documentation. The research demonstrated, however, that values such as ‘empathy’ and ‘solidarity’ are part of mental models which are not necessarily shared. As a result, an interpretation is projected onto the ‘other’ context which reflects the empathiser’s mental model rather than specific contextual knowledge or familiarity. Evaluation of the TRSP in 2006 suggested that, in other countries as well as Ethiopia, DCI fails to communicate explicitly to its partners the importance it ascribes to transparency and accountability. The evaluation also noted DCI’s “repeated assertion” that its local knowledge gave it a comparative advantage but it suggested that ambiguity between DCI and the Tigray government resulted in DCI being “taken
too much for granted”. (DAI, 2007). Ostrom suggested that Sida (but it may also apply to DCI) suffered from the Samaritan’s Dilemma. To avoid this, she argued that donors need to retain a measure of control, even though this conflicts with the intention implied in ‘ownership’ (Sida, 2002b:12).

During the interviews, I noticed that a number of respondents found discussion of ‘participation’ uncomfortable. For international donor staff, the issue was the gap between their normative values and knowledge of the discourse, and their relative lack of detailed knowledge of the local context, or with what they knew or suspected about local political power structures. For national donor staff, the gap between the rhetoric of participation in donor discourse and policy, and the reality of participation seemed acute, particularly in Amhara, and for this reason, I did not pursue obviously contentious issues, to avoid causing my respondents further distress. For the international staff, employment with a donor agency meant that they had to rationalise their own identity as technical specialists, and the values and skills that went with it, with a ‘political’ form of development about which they were ambivalent. For some, the NAA was justifiable as a vehicle for empowerment, for others it detracted from more direct measures to aid poverty reduction.

For these reasons, I suggest that the process of interpretation they employed to turn policy into practice was closest to that of the street-level bureaucrat, or perhaps Olivier de Sardan’s ‘broker’ (see 2.5.4). Even so, this label does not accurately reflect that they were having to interpret policy to fit in with their own mental models, as much as interpreting for their national staff and others with whom they were in discussed. Values and the use of knowledge appeared to be the motivating factor, rather than any form of entrepreneurial ‘broker’ or client ‘translator’ bowing to a powerful donor patron. Discussions with senior donor staff clarified that policy was driven by organisations outside the agency, by central government’s (mostly foreign) policy and by ‘Paris’ (OECD-DAC) or ‘Washington’ (World Bank). Overall development policy is decided by parliaments and, as Sida had experienced, the shift to the right in Swedish politics had placed a requirement on them to adopt a more ‘political’ development than some of their staff felt comfortable delivering. From this

9 “Samaritans are faced with the puzzling problem that their best strategy is always to extend help, but reciprocating with high effort is not the best strategy for the recipient” (Sida, 2002b: 5).
research, it appears that the policy-makers in donor agencies are more likely to be placed in the broker/translator role described by Mosse and Lewis (2006) for their government’s political objectives.

8.3.2 Knowledge from ‘The Field’

Discussion with some operational staff showed that they had empathy with the target population of their aid programmes, but this was not sufficient in itself. Their values made DCI and Sida staff reluctant to interfere and constrained what they felt they could, and did, say to government counterparts, and on the depth of discursiveness which they were able to achieve. At an individual level, we clearly use our own mental models, with more or less knowledge, to interpret what we see and read and to ‘fill in’ the gaps in our knowledge, in what Denzau and North describe as a ‘process of induction’ and what Long describes as ‘knowledgeability’.

As Figure 7.1 demonstrates, the ‘partnership architecture’ meant that donors’ interaction was largely with each other, and modality restricted their interaction with government. This reduced the need to explore ambiguities of terminology and thus differing values and objectives; rather, ambiguity could be exploited to maintain consensus. Gould describes the process of using the ‘buzzword’ terms of harmonisation and partnership as ‘consensualism’, which papers over divergences of interest and subverts the meanings of words so that they are politically emollient (Gould, 2007: 291).

The literature reflects considerable concern about the potential pitfalls of development language; there is anxiety about using judgemental language, about getting swept along by current vogues or using outdated terminology. Authors note that it is constantly being renewed, and, with the NAA, at an unprecedented speed. The terms used in current aid orthodoxy, such as ‘good governance’ and ‘empowerment’ are “seductively positive” (Abrahamsen, 2000: 64), they are “feel good terms” which evoke “a comforting mutuality” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005: 2).

When donor staff explored the different meanings of the term ‘participation’ in some depth, it seemed that their differential meanings were related to particular contexts or modes of discussion, so that conflicting meanings sometimes appeared within the same interview. Filtering out information or rendering it ambiguous may therefore permit greater consistency with donor staff’s individual normative values around helping, or incorporating their agency’s political objectives. If the meaning of participation had migrated from one meaning to another, then the process would be that described by Denzau and North (1998) as plasticity; but because donor staff held different conceptions among their peers and individually, with conflicting internalised meanings, the process is more accurately described as ‘fluidity’.

**Congruence, ambiguity and disjuncture**

By presenting divergent mental models diagrammatically, Figure 8.1 indicates that comparative analysis helps identify areas of ambiguity which offer opportunities for clarification of intent or practice. They also offer ‘room for manoeuvre’, which may be constructive in that they become a tool for negotiation or an opportunity for improved dialogue. Alternatively, they may be used ‘passively’, to gloss over areas of disagreement, or negatively, to mislead. Set out diagrammatically, the gap between areas of disjuncture looks difficult to bridge but, by making disjunctures explicit, it alerts donors to specific areas of contestation.

![Figure 8.1. Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity in Mental Models](image-url)
Rather than accepting that “common discursive ground” is not possible because meanings are constantly manipulated (Salemink, 2006: 122), employing this approach identifies degrees of congruence or disjuncture. Juxtaposing recurring elements in both Ethiopian and donor interviews, it was possible to see whether synergies exist which could be recognised by others as fitting in with their own mental model. Even if they are not synchronous, their relative congruence makes identification easier. For example, recognising that they are relatively unskilled in the use of speech to ‘influence’ or ‘persuade’ compared with Ethiopian oratory could alert donors to look for signals which they might otherwise have missed, and thus indicate where alternative sources of feedback are required.

**SMM and Drivers of Change**

Knowledge of the local context offers donors the rhetorical opportunity for more effective interventions, but Craig and Porter suggest they may regard it as a political threat, because it illuminates sites of struggle and conflict which challenge bland notions of ‘community’ and may challenge the logic of current aid orthodoxy, built on consensus and pluralism (Craig and Porter, 2007). The Drivers of Change (DOC) approach, which recognises that the cultural and political context structures aid relationships and institutions (DFID, 2004), has considerable resonance with this research. Interestingly for this thesis, the catalyst for commissioning a DOC analysis has, on several occasions, been a political crisis in the recipient country (OECD-DAC, 2005d: 6). Donors had stated that DOC analysis was important to identify “the underlying causes of poor governance and lack of ‘political will’ for change” (*ibid*: 3), but this comment was often accompanied by donors’ “scepticism and uncertainty about how far it can contribute directly to operational work”, because the analysis offered little in the way of “concrete alternatives” (*ibid*: 13). This suggests that donors would avoid discussing areas of ‘disjuncture’ with recipient governments. However, the DOC review findings support the SMM approach by noting that these analyses can indicate commonalities as well as differences, and suggest that donors’ use of DOC analysis to improve their knowledge can assist harmonisation (*ibid*: 26).

However, interviews in Ethiopia in 2005 showed that most donor staff did not use the academic and commissioned analyses of power relations already available to inform their strategies. Disappointingly, they admitted that they often
did not read reports, even the one which the DAG funded on behalf of ‘civil society’\textsuperscript{11}. This may reflect the demands of the ‘dialogue architecture’ which meant that they relied on other donors as their source of information, or that it was not perceived to be necessary: the process was more important than the content. When they failed to use monitoring opportunities, donor staff chose to be ‘imperfectly informed’ except, as the case of the Productive Safety Net Programme illustrates, when it ‘mattered’. Donors considered it important to monitor the PSNP closely, because it was “humanitarian” (R215).\textsuperscript{12}

8.3.3 Shift from Technical to Political Imperatives

A theme that recurred in discussion with both Ethiopian government officials and local leaders, and with donor staff, was that development was a ‘national’ project, and that it was associated with a particular ideology: Revolutionary Democracy in Ethiopia, and Liberal Democracy combined with NPM for donors.

Analysis such as those in Chapters 6 and 7 provides an explanation of how power is exercised through forms of leadership consistent with local culture and belief systems. These forms of analysis, which “reveal how little is really known about how to promote progressive and sustainable change”, challenge the NAA with its assumptions of a causal link between multiparty democracy and poverty reduction (OECD-DAC, 2005d: 25). What differentiates the NAA from previous orthodoxies such as structural adjustment is its specifically political agenda. It has closer links with comprehensive planning, because the NAA’s ideological role, in regard to the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, replicates that of “aid as cold war patronage and ideological tool” under comprehensive planning (Copestake, 2005: 70). The MDGs, which developed from the targets set in \textit{Shaping the 21st Century} (1996), contain no reference to good governance, either as civil service reform or as the introduction of multiparty democracy.\textsuperscript{13} Rather, it has a sectoral focus, primarily on health and education. Because there is consensus among governments, and more importantly among their citizens, that sectoral inventions have more demonstrable impact on the lives of ordinary people, there is a strong argument that sectoral interventions, that is ‘technical

\textsuperscript{11} This refers to the CRC consultation (see 6.4.5).
\textsuperscript{12} There were differences of opinion later between donors and between donors and government relating to notions of entitlement ([http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/ethiopia-insights-psnp.pdf, accessed 14.12.07])
\textsuperscript{13} It does, however, identify terrorism as an external threat.
development’, have greater legitimacy than policy management focused on political reform. (Donors recognised that cooperation in the health and education sectors had been more successful, but were not sure why (R216). An SMM perspective, that the length of engagement in those sectors (from the days of the missionaries), congruence of objectives, clarity of performance indicators and continuing engagement between donors and government via SWAps, offers a plausible explanation.)

Gould recognises that the development industry “owes its existence to political fiat” (Gould, 2007: 274). He argues the necessity for analysis of “how the ‘idea’ of development is translated into policy via specific forms of human agency” (ibid: 281). Although the topic of ‘development’ is difficult to define because its breadth and diversity, the billions of dollars spent on it requires that donor practice is made transparent, particularly so, Gould argues, because “its main outcome is ‘policy’” (ibid: 277). Understanding how donors conceive development and the extent to which development policy is informed by contextual knowledge, requires the deconstruction of donors’ spoken and written statements (ibid: 290). However, to do this satisfactorily requires more differentiated use of the term ‘discourse’; donor discourse and academic discourse have different objectives and employ different mechanisms. In development management this is further complicated by the range of disciplines involved.14

8.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

8.4.1 Development Management Discourse

In arguing that donor agencies need to be more empathetic in policy, taking the local context into account, development management discourse needs to broaden its focus - vertically up the aid chain to politicians and wider government policy (and electoral support), and horizontally for comparative analysis with other donors’ approaches. These issues of policy, practice and

---

14 Development Studies “generates endless and competing versions of virtuous prescriptions for social betterment” and a race to the “normative high ground” (Gould, 2007: 271) and, sometimes, a “discursive one-upmanship” (ibid: 274).
context provide considerable potential for ‘normative’ development management research.

The example of Ethiopia in 2005 demonstrates that the precipitate introduction of ‘development’ based on external concepts and unshared values is likely to be unsustainable. Under pressure from their principals (politicians) to demonstrate results, donors’ political priorities require short-term returns on their ‘investment’, so development becomes ‘history in a hurry’\textsuperscript{15}. This results in the adoption of new development policies and modalities, so that aid effectiveness tends to be projected as a presupposed outcome (which is a political technique), rather than being analysed retrospectively, allowing for adaptation (process management) rather than the jettisoning of existing processes.

There is clearly a role for development management research to investigate the trajectory of policy formulation and the use made by donor agencies of contextual information, such as analyses of culture and belief systems and the power structures maintained by them. However, development management faces a number of arguably self-constructed cul-de-sac: its researchers claim ‘normative intent’, but are unsure how to effect this because of their concern about the legitimacy of development intervention, let alone their ability to influence policy. The anthropologist and CMS communities are both wary of incorporation, and subsequent complicity, as a result of engaging with management practice.

However, concurrent with these discourses in development management reviewed in 2.2 are moderating voices warning against insistently critical perspectives, calling for a more constructive engagement. Development management’s ‘uncertainty’ is also an opportunity for reflexivity “in a social and political sense, as a participatory, popular reflexivity, which can take the form of broad social debates and fora on development goals and methods” (Pieterse, 1998: 369, italics in the original). Bebbington also calls for a more constructive approach to development studies by re-grounding discourse in development practice (Bebbington, 2004). He singles out Cornwall’s “refreshing humanist edge” (Bebbington, 2004: 281) which provides a reminder (to donors and to ‘brokers’) that citizens “shape their own conditions of engagement and find and

\textsuperscript{15} Copestake, pers. comm.
use their own voice" outside the participatory spaces created for them (Cornwall, 2004: 85).

The review of development management discourse in 2.2 categorised Thomas’s concept - of *management for development* as an orientation rather than a task (Thomas, 1999) - as ‘normative’ development management. In later work Thomas concludes that values, being deeply-held, cannot be imposed on others, and are only one aspect of development management in which exchange of ideas, that is “influencing, steering, negotiation, looking for common ground, and so on, are of more importance than trying to force agreement for the implementation of a rationally defined programme of action” (Thomas, 2007: 387). This thesis concurs with this view. As noted in 2.2, Cooke and Dar and others working in CMS also accept Thomas’s ‘normative’ argument, but they recognise that it challenges their rejection of engagement with development management practice (Dar and Cooke, 2008).

No such disjuncture is found between Thomas and Brinkerhoff, who both call for the analysis of the role of values in development management. Brinkerhoff is arguably the lead US author in the public sector management stream of development management discourse. The paper written by Craig and Porter (2003) which describes the NAA system as ‘technical’ because it is based on NPM has been widely cited by other authors, so it is important to emphasise that this thesis has used Brinkerhoff’s *schema*. I follow Brinkerhoff in describing ‘conventional’ monitoring and evaluation practice as *technical*, and the NAA’s use of monitoring, via the PRSP policy matrix, critique by civil society and electoral accountability, as *political*. In a subsequent paper on ‘Thirdwayism’, Craig and Porter later described the enrolment of the citizen in NPM as “‘inclusive’ liberalism” (Craig and Porter, 2004), clearly a political - indeed, ideological - enterprise.

**8.4.2 Development Management and Ideology**

The thesis has explored actors’ perceptions and practice during a period when one ideology, liberal democracy, was being offered by donors as an alternative to another ideology, Revolutionary Democracy. In the event, Ethiopia’s meta-narrative was stronger than that of donors’.
In linking NPM and its inclusion within the NAA with a specific ideological framework, describing the Third Way as a Liberal project, Craig and Porter identify the antecedents of current development orthodoxy (2004: 390). Third Way ideology is associated with the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and is seen as an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, “distinguished from a more continental or redistributive mode of social inclusion” (ibid: 404). However, Australia and New Zealand’s aid programmes are more independent than those of the US, UK and Canada, for which there must be a non-ideological explanation.

A similar risk of ‘projection’ can be identified in universalising concepts of ‘transformatory’ participation. The development literature uses examples from Latin America, implying that its political culture is transferable to other countries (Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 162). National donor staff in Addis Ababa, for example, hoped that Ethiopian CSOs would take NGOs in South Asia or Africa as role models of activism (R217), ignoring the identified reasons for the ‘weakness’ of civil society in Ethiopia. An acknowledgement of others’ mental models would ground that idealism towards a more realistic analysis of the potential for civil society and citizen empowerment in other cultural and political contexts.

I argued in 8.3 that donor agencies’ room for manoeuvre is restricted by central government policy. This includes the choice of public management style which, as a government department or agency, donor agencies almost certainly have to adopt. NPM is regarded in Europe as an Anglo-American formulation, which European countries have adopted selectively and which they interpret and implement differently16. The bilateral donors in the forefront of the NAA in Ethiopia were the UK and Canada, with Ireland and Sweden in the second stream. Germany and The Netherlands were much more guarded towards the NAA, and Norway distanced itself even further. At home, these latter three countries have also been guarded in their adoption of NPM. A similar pattern occurs in relation to choice of modality: Germany and Italy, both of which gave more aid to Ethiopia than Canada, Ireland or Sweden, invested via projects providing technical assistance. There are clearly differences in development management which could usefully be explored. Escobar favourably compares

16 (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Noordhoek and Saner, 2004; Barzelay and Füchtner, 2003; Politt et al., 2007)
discourse about development studies in the UK, The Netherlands and Ireland and some Scandinavian countries with the paucity of debate in the United States (Escobar, 2008: 202), but closer engagement with other European donors’ approaches could usefully expand Anglo-Saxon development management’s framework of reference to include comparative political perspectives.

8.4.3 Development Management and Cross-Cultural Discourse

The SMM approach indicates the importance of analysing culture and belief systems in order to understand the process of change. Critique of donors’ failure to base policy and practice on context, as DOC analyses have demonstrated, requires development management to broaden its perspective and draw on other the expertise of other disciplines for its analysis of change and orthodoxy. This research indicates that applied development management could usefully draw on political science, cross-cultural psychology and history, as well as anthropology, sociology and institutional economics. Gould argues that ‘transdisciplinary’ research, rather than providing clarification, may render development ‘empirically irreducible’ because of definitional problems (Gould, 2007: 273). These prevent interdisciplinary dialogue and reinforce boundaries between different disciplines (ibid: 274). Review of the development management literature suggests that taking a range of different disciplinary perspectives into account could be easier for those taking a public sector management perspective than CMS or anthropology because they already work in a multidisciplinary environment.17

There may also be lessons to be learned from the business sector, not merely because successive development orthodoxies have included a role for the private sector, but also because much of the cross-cultural research stems from the international management sector. Eyben considered what development organisations could learn from transnational corporations who achieve efficiency in a complex world through being reflexive, absorbing and communicating different perspectives, and “embracing uncertainty and explicitly sharing values” (Eyben, 2000: 11). Gould identifies the difference between business and social science approaches to knowledge as social science’s concern with “the contingent nature of knowledge” and of its construction (Gould, 2007: 288). In

17 In my experience in NHS management, contributions from all disciplines were expected and their particular expertise respected.
international work, business people want to understand the context before they start work in a new country, and can access services which inform them about local cultural norms and patterns of communication. Not all sections of the development community presume superior knowledge on cross-cultural issues: Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway and Finland invest in intercultural competency research, suggesting an intellectual modesty not readily apparent in Anglo-Saxon encounters. I have used the term ‘Western’ to indicate the political, cultural and intellectual approaches of donors on a European-North American spectrum. With more East Asian countries becoming donors themselves, the analytical lens is being turned back on the West, with academic centres comparing Asian and Western values to development.

Under the NAA, ‘knowledge management’ is largely handled by the World Bank and a small number of bilateral donors making their existing knowledge better known to like-minded groups, with the focus on dissemination rather than knowledge generation (King, 2004: 27). Not only does this create a knowledge bank for ‘the West’, ignoring the South and East, but it means that knowledge among NAA donors is self-reverential.

8.4.4 A Schema for Normative Development Management

This thesis has pursued the role that culture and belief systems (religion or ideology) play in participation and evaluation. Because they form our mental models, culture and belief systems dictate the pace and manner in which information is handled and learning occurs (the SMM approach). Responses from the donor staff coalesced around the themes of ideology (the NAA), what they knew or were prepared to admit to knowing/not knowing, and the degree of empathy they expressed for their intended beneficiaries in Ethiopia. What was clear from the interviews was a tension around ‘information’: whether or not it was available, whether it was accessed, how or if it could be used and even whether it was necessary to have.

Normative development management, as described by Thomas, concerns the values associated with development, a value-framework based on the desire to ‘help’. It could thus be classed as ‘empathy’. As the responses from DCI staff showed, empathy was not sufficient to provide knowledge of, or accept the reality of, political structures of power which suffused government influence
down to the lowest community unit. The assumption that Ethiopia would accept democratic pluralism indicates the lack of use of (available) evidence. The ‘missing middle’ appears to be information, hence the decline in value ascribed to evaluation. I therefore conceive normative development management as the following schema (Figure 8.2).

Without being pegged to information, empathy, ‘knowledge’ and ideology (and its political manifestations), though interlinked, are relatively free-floating. Information grounds them to the reality of the development context.

![Figure 8.2. A Schema for Normative Development Management](image)

Donors’ policy formulation is dictated by the relative emphasis given to these values in national development policy. The three agencies’ development values (which were supported by staffs’ responses) showed that CIDA gave more weight to ideology, indicated by its support for the global security agenda and Third Wayism; DCI proclaimed that its aid programme was driven by empathy; and Sida’s values were based on empathy (solidarity) and knowledge, although their aid policy had recently changed following an ideological shift in the Swedish government.

As well as providing a framework for analysing donor policy formulation, the schema may also be a useful tool in analysing the relative weight that different strains in discourse give to these three components. As social actors in research, all three components combine to form our mental models, and are reflected in individual ontologies and epistemologies. Reflexivity in the research process aids this analysis, hence my inclusion of ‘discourse’ under the knowledge heading in the diagram.
Chapter 8: Mental Models in Development Management

**This thesis offers three contributions.** Firstly, it re-emphasises that donor countries' cultural and political context dictates their aid policy and relationships. Secondly, it provides a framework for conceptualising the participatory space between mental models and the opportunities it affords for exploring congruence, ambiguity and disjuncture. This reduces the tendency, despite the consensualist rhetoric, to regard the aid relationships as a duality: donor(s) and recipient because it reveals congruence/disjuncture between all actors, including harmonising donors. Thirdly, it recognises not only that sustainable development is a long-term process, but that mental models, whether shared or individual, are ‘logical’ to their owners because they are based on culture and belief systems. Acknowledging the logic and therefore validity of various actors' mental models then allows reflection on the degree to which development models and processes proposed by donors appear logical (or illogical) to aid recipients.

Thomas’s description of normative development as an unattainable ideal (Thomas, 2000) has to be challenged by Bebbington’s admonition that “you do what you can” (Bebbington, 2004: 278). Craig and Porter call on those working in development “to be frank and blunt about the limited political and economic outcomes of their own institutionalized doctrine and practice” and consequent accountabilities (Craig and Porter, 2006: 274). In development management, reflexivity has to be extended to the wider political environment so that we can be alert to other practices which may be superior to our own.
ANNEX A
ANALYSIS OF WIDE DATA (WED, 2003)

i. Background

The University of Bath had been researching in Ethiopia as part of a network with the Centre for the Study of African Economies and with the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa University (AAU), since the early 1990s. In the summer of 2003, the ESRC-funded research group at Bath, Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) and AAU undertook ‘grounding research’ in 20 rural sites. Fifteen of these sites had been studied in some depth in 1996 as part of the wider research network, Well-being and Ill-being Dynamics in Ethiopia (WIDE). Involvement in data-entry of the 2003 research (known as WIDE2) provided an opportunity for me to do two things. Firstly, it provided useful contextual background to supplement my historical and anthropological reading. Secondly, it enabled me to do a scoping study of cultural practices and institutions which might help or hinder local participation in monitoring and evaluation.

The WIDE2 research comprised ‘semi-structured questionnaires’ which teams of male and female researchers completed with male and female respondents respectively. The questionnaire was divided into a series of modules, one of which, entitled Social Structures and Dynamics, explored (i) currently important social networks, institutions and organisations and the ways in which different people use them; (ii) the mechanisms underlying their operation and (iii) the structuration of the networks and organisations. The researchers were asked to interview three different people from each network, institution or organisation: a leader or an ‘important person’, an ordinary member and someone who had either not been a member or who had been adversely affected or excluded. Up to four networks and four institutions (one of them to be a labour-sharing activity) and three organisations were explored with women and with men at each site.

---

1 WeD Ethiopia website [25.01.06]
2 Module 2
Survey of responses collected revealed a number of recurring themes which will be discussed below:

The role of associations in individual’s lives
Role of religion
Trust, mistrust, institutionalised checks on behaviour, on use of resources
Use of sanctions, including ostracism
Reciprocity, cooperation, cohesion
Power distance, leadership
Interlinkages between associational and government hierarchies
Communal life v. individualism.

ii. The role of associations in individual’s lives

The responses elicited strong associational life in the 20 sites. Provided that the respondent could afford the costs involved, and had not been excluded, he or she would be likely to a number of associations, many of them interlinked. In the responses, the networks, institutions and organisations were not clearly separated, in that one respondent might view a particular type of association or activity as a social network, an institution or an organisation. For the purposes of my research, it was more helpful the group them according to their primary purpose.

The networks, institutions and organisations can be grouped into five main categories:

(a) associations dealing with the practicalities of life, for example burial associations (iddir being the commonly used word, though shengo, .. were used in some locations); or savings/rotating credit groups (equb)

(b) religious associations and events, such as saint’s associations (maheber), Sunday or ‘church’ associations (senbete), memorial services (teskar, qurban) and some other Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), Muslim or traditional religious events.

(c) development activities organised by NGOs or quasi-government agencies (relatively few)
Annex A: Summary of WIDE Analysis

(d) labour-sharing activities, either labour for food (e.g. *debo*), labour reciprocity (e.g. *wonfel*), labour for oxen or share-cropping.

(e) social networks, such as kin groups, neighbours, friends.

Apart from friendship, which was described in terms of a very small group of people enjoying shared trust, loyalty and reciprocal secrecy, membership of the other associations and activities were often mutually dependent. For example, an invitation to join an *equb* might be extended to other members of a *maheber*, but someone falling foul of the regulations of an *iddir* may be precluded from membership of labour-sharing mechanisms.

Membership of an *iddir* is particularly important: “I joined to live within society” (S10). Not joining the *iddir* “is seen as not living peacefully with the community” (S9).

As explored below, the associations may sometimes be linked directly or indirectly to government administration, so that membership or exclusion of the different associations and institutions may affect an individual’s standing with administrative authorities.

If an individual either criticises or is criticised by his or her co-members of one association, that individual may be excluded from membership of other associations important to their well-being. As a result, it is to their advantage not to be critical.

iii. The role of religion

In the previous section, a number of religious-based associations were described. The proportion of Ethiopian Orthodox Christians to Muslims, Protestants and other denominations is estimated differently by different sources but, as mentioned earlier (in the History section) the presence of Muslims in Ethiopia predates the Muslim ‘invasion’ by Gragn in the mid-16th century.

Given the regional geo-political situation, it might be anticipated that there would be friction between EOC and Muslim followers. However, the responses showed
many ways in which EOC and Muslims particularly not only tolerated each
other’s religious practices but celebrated each other’s festivals. One woman
reported “My friend is a Moslem and I am a Christian. On holidays what we used
to do was to sleep over in the house of the person whose holiday it was.” As a
result of their friendship, her brother married her friend (S38, R1, O3). In the
same site, Muslims as well as Christians had a maheber in the name of St.
Mary. The researcher asked the respondent whether the EOC condemned the
adbar ceremony (a traditional religious ceremony celebrated under an ‘adbar’
tree). The respondent confirmed that “the priests condemn the adbar ceremony.
But it is a long-standing tradition, a custom that has come down from early
times.” Both Muslim and Christian respondents from the Highlands thought the
adbar ceremony kept their children and animals free from disease (S14 and
S30). Iddir membership maybe open to Christians and Muslims, or maybe
exclusively for one or the other. An iddir in one location which is open to both
Muslims and Christians and saves money throughout the year to buy meat to
celebrate Meskel (EOC ceremony of the Finding of the True Cross), will split the
money so that the two religious groups can slaughter the cattle in ways
appropriate to their respective religions (S37): yet another membership of
another iddir will be closed to Muslims for the same reason.

There was more likely to be tension between EOC and Muslims and the rising
number of Protestants and Pentecostalists. They were unlikely to allow
Pentecostalists or Protestants to join their iddir (S32) and, even if they were
willing, Pentecostalists were forbidden from belonging to associations that were
not connected with their church (S1). Yet, in another location, there was a
maheber of Orthodox and Protestant Christians (S.17). Pentecostalists were not
allowed to join in the after-work drinking which meant that the post-work
socialising terminated earlier than before (S9). Pentecostalists do not celebrate
Meskel, and they ‘condemn it [the adbar ceremony] as idolatry’ (S38).

In one site, greater religious diversity meant that religion had become a criterion
on which membership of non-religious associations, in this case an equb, was
based (S18). On the other hand, “Olla buna [coffee group] never exclude people
on the basis of religion because coffee is not meat” (S.9).

Re-examining the WIDE2 data after fieldwork in Highland (Tigray and Amhara)
communities, I found responses which reflected the way in which the church is
incorporated into government structures, e.g. a priest who had a role in kebele administration, he reported that “he controls the community’s access to inputs, credit and local justice.” (S.11). A maheber, rather than celebrating a particular saint, “raised money for the TPLF founding memorial ceremony.” (S.19).

The argument here is that religion is not necessarily a source of inter-community division. However, my fieldwork showed how much M&E practice is linked to the church. In retrospect it would have been interesting to have sought out mixed communities in Tigray and Amhara to see how Muslims were effected.

iv. Trust, mistrust, institutionalised checks on behaviour, on use of resources

Almost all associations and institutions described by WIDE2 respondents appear to be highly bureaucratised. This applied whether the institution was a quasi-government one, a religious association, or a kin group (S1) or a friendship group (S3). Even a coffee group3 had agreed codes of conduct, flaunting of which required explanation (S9). A typical structure would be: Chairman (sometimes ‘muse’ meaning judge), secretary, treasurer or cashier - and sometimes an auditor and storekeeper. There might also be ‘3 observers’ (S.17), or ‘4 people to make peace within members’ (S.10). One iddir official was described as the man who takes responsibility for “punishing members when they violate the rules” (S40). Decisions might be taken by the membership as a group, or might be taken by the leaders without reference to the members (S24).

In addition to recording payment of regular fees, officials record which iddir members visit or fail to visit a bereaved household; who supplied or failed to supply the required food and drink for funeral, maheber or senbete feasts (S2, S3)

In addition to a formal structure, the majority associations described had ‘rules, ‘regulations’ or ‘by-laws’. These would be “written on the paper under which all the members are governed” (S11), and the written rules would be registered with the kebele or the Woreda (S.13). In the case of people breaking the rules of an equb, for example, this could result in cases being taken to court (S13).

3 Traditionally, a coffee ceremony is held with neighbours and relatives three times a day.
There was a considerable degree of similarity between the rules as described. Foremost was the rule to pay the weekly, monthly or annual contribution, next to attend meetings punctually, and to obey the ‘rules’. Sometimes the rules included ‘active participation’ (S20). Misdemeanours might be very specific, e.g. 50 cents for arriving late for an equb meeting, or more general - ‘misconduct’ at a credit association meeting incurred a fine of 5 birr, and ‘misbehaving’ at a burial association meeting also warranted a 5 birr fine.

Transgressions warranting a fine were only the first of the penalties. In a maheber, “those who are breaking the rule will be given advice, warned, and finally dismissed or cancelled from membership of the maheber” (S1). Such a person may lose access to other communal institutions

Rather than resentment at the restrictions imposed by the rules, many respondents appeared to welcome the discipline that the rules imposed. In crop-sharing, “breaking the rules usually leads to serious conflict among the community” (S11), in another site members of an iddir who broke the rules were described as ‘evil’ (S29). The absence of rules might pose a threat: in a youth group [those aged 18-35 years are considered as ‘youth’], “since it has no specific rules and stronger regulations, there can be many individuals who can suffer” (S20). If people stopped following the rules of marriage, “God will punish us for what we did and there will be catastrophe”. Failure to keep clan rules may result in a fine, in being ‘insulted’ by the rest of the clan and possibly labour (S2).

A respondent in a Protestant women’s iddir, who declared that they have “no such thing as punishment. .. The only rule we follow is advising the members but not by punishing anyone.” Yet in another answer, “If one member is absent 2-3 times from participating to help another members, she may be punished 1-3 birr to continue being a member of the organisation” (S18).

The original survey of the WIDE2 data was taken before the research sites were identified. The institution of punishment by fines and subsequently by exclusion seems entrenched in Tigray and Amhara, and also prevalent in Oromia but was

---

4 The argument here is not that the rules of marriage are kept ‘religiously’, rather that the default stance is that obeying the rules in all aspects of life is good for society.
more mixed in SNNP, for instance it might include physical punishment there ("the one who is absent [from an equb] will be tied with rope and wood" (S.36).

With most associations requiring a regular contribution of money, there appears to be continual concern about the honesty of its officials. “Some committee members use the deposited money for themselves” (clan group, S1/2), “some equb judges are inclined to their kin group and friends” (S23)

Suspicion is not confined to financial irregularity. Performance is closely monitored in labour-sharing arrangements. In failure to comply with the requirements of labour-sharing (in this case, dugde), the poor worker may nowadays be taken to the Peasants Association leadership (i.e. the kebele administration); in the past he might have been beaten (to death, in one case cited by the responded) because “you never eat other’s labour”. In another site, if a person is “working below what is expected” in the labour-sharing activity (debo), he will be fined 5 birr; and if the person fails to take their turn in jointly herding cattle a fine of 10 birr is imposed(S.9).

Even suspicion of wrong-doing by association may result in exclusion: one respondent whose fugitive brother was suspected of stealing cows from his own community, was excluded from his own iddir on the advice of his brother’s iddir (S9). This meant that he was also excluded from dabare (joint cattle herding), meheber, olla buna “and any other social intercourse”. He stayed ‘outside’ for three months before going to the kebele to apologise, and paying a 100 birr fine.

There are further examples of one association or institution enforcing another’s rules. A man’s clan were asked by his equb officials to make him pay the remainder of his contributions when he stopped paying after winning his turn in the ‘lottery’ (S23). Members of the youth club who failed to pay their contribution are encouraged to do so through pressure from the iddir.

One way of ensuring members behave acceptably is by careful selection. For associations, e.g. iddir applicants may be scrutinised by the whole membership before acceptance (S3). For potential labour-sharing relationships, the instigators look for willingness to work hard, better skill (S15). As one responded advised, “If someone is lazy while working for others, they have to be open about him. This minimise the problem. Selection is in fact done on the basis of capability to work competitively” (S9). Careful selection is considered a
sound investment in, for example, an equb otherwise “you start with stupid individuals so that he/she cheat you, as you spare your time accusing these at court/kebele” (S31). Even membership of an HIV/AIDS club depends on “good personality of the applicants” (S33).

Applicants to join an equb require a guarantor (S23), but even when a member suspicion of the rest of the group demands that “winners have to bring witness from those who haven’t taken their money” (S33).

Even friends are carefully vetted: “Those who can join are persons who will not tell your secret to other people (i.e. outsiders) and also individual who is ready to share his secrets with the group” (S3).

Food plays a significant part in associational relationships and those that prepare it inadequately, e.g. for gige, labour-sharing for food, will be subject to ‘back-biting’ (S6). Poor effort in labour-sharing activities may result in that person being served last (S.9).

v. Sanctions, including ostracism

Ostracism is frequently used as punishment or as a threat, whichever institution is being challenged. If a member of the iddir “does not come to the burial .. no one will talk to the person” (S3). Breaking the rules of dala (inheritance of brother’s property and wife) “creates isolation”. Failure to comply with the rules of a religious association results in being “discharged from the church and his membership right. He is requested by law.” (S17).

In many cases, exclusion results from inability to pay the required contribution (S18)

vi. Reciprocity, cooperation and cohesion

It would be wrong to suggest that all respondents displayed the same attitudes of mistrust, the importance of institutional hierarchies and rules. For example, one respondent said her maheber had “no need of leader and officials. It is based on religious love and willingness” (S24).
Annex A: Summary of WIDE Analysis

There were examples of *iddir* which cross religious divide. Iddir have been adopted by Muslims and Christians, Oromos, Amharas, Tigreans, Wolaytas - the researcher noted that *iddir* has replaced kinship as an affective mechanism (S.37).

Other expressions of solidarity among the responses included:

- In neighbourhood networks (S15), craftworkers are integrated, “especially for coffee relations”.

- Several sites quoted the same proverb: “Instead of a neighbour’s death, let a relative who live in a distant area die!” (S15), and more compassionately, “A neighbour is better than a relative who lives far” (S37).

- “As far as I’m living in this community, it is a must to participate in such kinds of social life networks. At the time, when I need help for my work, no one will come to help me unless I help others” (S18)

- Friendship seemed a rare source of enjoyment: with friends “you will have fun” (S3)

Conflict seemed to be preset just below the surface. “If two members quarrelled, they will be asked to make peace. And if one of them aren’t agree to make peace, the person who did not agree will be out of the *maheber*” (S6).

As in labour-sharing mechanisms, it seemed that reciprocity was very important: The good thing about the three networks of friendship, youth clubhouse and kinship was that each network provided someone who would assist you when you needed help (S3).

WIDE2 researchers reported that they were unable to find candidates who had been adversely affected by their kimgroup, neighbourhood or kin *iddir* - “everybody has an equal share and everybody is equally responsible for everything” (S27). This statement of equality appears to conflict with other statements of mistrust listed above. Another possible explanation is that acknowledging discord was socially unacceptable.
ANNEX B
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

What does ‘participation’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? to Communities? What is for?

Have you ever been asked your opinion about development activities? What were the circumstances? Was your opinion collected, and if so, how? Were you unable to give your opinion, and if so, why?

How are people chosen to speak on behalf of the community? What are their characteristics?

Are there people whose opinions are not collected? If so, why?

Are there people who are reluctant to participate? What happens if people refuse to participate? What would people say about them? What does individualistic mean?

What evaluations do you attend? What are they for?

Are there any problems or potential dangers from ‘evaluation’?

How are participants selected, and why?

Why would they want - or not want - to participate?

If you were unable to participate in the evaluation yourself, who would you trust to put forward your point of view?

If there was a discussion about a development intervention and someone disagreed with the elders/leaders/heads of department/other donors, what would happen? How would a decision be made?

Are statistics collected about your community by the kebele or the woreda? If so, why? What statistics are collected and by whom?

Does the kebele or the woreda collect information from communities because they are (a) knowledgeable, or (b) unsure what is the best approach, or (c) powerful or (d) some other reason?

If you had the ability to influence what information was collected, what information do you think would be most useful?

What sort of information is justified for collection? Are there any topics which you think donors, government or your community are not entitled to ask?

If donor funding was given to your government, how would you know whether it was being spent wisely? How important is it for you to know?

Who is responsible for ‘good’ development, and who should be held accountable?
There could be a number of good or bad influences on your ability to “succeed” in life. Would you please put these in order of importance to you? (use of flash cards)

Has this discussion raised any other issues in your mind that you would like to mention?

Do you have any questions for me?

**Additional questions for donor and government staff**

What does ‘monitoring’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? To Communities? What is for?

What does ‘evaluation’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? To Communities? What is for?

Why do donors do M&E? What do they use the information for? Why might donors not do participatory M&E?

Why does Government do M&E? What do they use the information for? Why might Government not do participatory M&E?

What is the current PM&E system? What is the logic behind it?

In Ethiopia, what do you think might make M&E difficult for donors? for government?

In Ethiopia, what do you think might make M&E easy to implement?

If communities were involved in the design (method and content) of evaluations, what would the benefits be, if any? For donors? For Government? For communities?
QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Have you lived here for a long time?

How much land do you have?

What is your status in the kebele?

[If a local leader] What criteria does someone have to have to be chosen as a development group/cell leader?

Are statistics collected about your community by the kebele or the woreda? If so, why? What statistics are collected and by whom?

Are there people whose opinions are not collected? If so, why?

Are there people who are reluctant to participate? What happens if people refuse to participate? Would they be described as 'individualistic'? What does individualistic mean?

[If not a local leader] Have you ever been asked your opinion about development activities? What were the circumstances? Was your opinion collected, and if so, how? Were you unable to give your opinion, and if so, why?

How are people chosen to speak on behalf of the community? What are their characteristics?

Who is responsible for development?

FLASH CARDS

Do you have any questions for me?
ANNEX C
MAPS

1. Amhara Region

2. Tigray Region
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Alvarez, Father Francisco. (1540). Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia during the years 1520-1527. Translated from the Portuguese and edited, with notes and introduction, by Lord Stanley of Alderley for the Hakluyt Society, in 1881.


Hyden, G. and Haile Mariam, Mahlet. (undated). Voluntarism and Civil Society. [draft]


MARENA Research Project: reconstruction of natural resource management institutions in post-conflict countries. University of Sussex. [http://www.geog.sussex.ac.uk/research/development/marena/]


OECD-DAC (2005g). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Indicators of Progress.


Sida (2005a). How does Sida work with LFA? [www.sida.se; accessed 28.03.06]

Sida (2005c). Policy and Methodology (POM) in brief. [www.sida.se; accessed 03.04.06]


Sida (undated-b). The Field Vision: the field takes the lead. [www.sida.se; accessed 16.05.05]


Velayutham, S. Accountability and the Catholic Church. Are you surprised? Confession and the Protestant Reformation: The Foundation for Modern
Accountability?
[http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/critical/htm12/8085velayutham.html (accessed 05.05.04)]


