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Mechanism Design and Bounded Rationality: the Case of Type Misreporting*

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Abstract

In this paper we study the effects of bounded rationality in mechanism design problems. We model bounded rationality by assuming that in the presence of an incentive compatible mechanism, players behave as if their types were in a δ -neighborhood of their true types. In our results, we explore what are the effects of such bounded rationality in the outcomes of the mechanism design problem. To such end, we characterize the social choice functions that are robust to the δ -perturbations in the sense that the designers' loss is at most of order δ^k for a certain k . A notable finding is that in quasi-linear utilitarian environments the designer's loss is of order of δ^2 . We illustrate the applicability of our results by means of examples.

JEL Classification: D81, D82.

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Bounded Rationality.

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1 Introduction

Consider the classic mechanism design problem of providing a public good. In this problem, the designer wants to choose how much of a public good to provide without knowing the private valuations of the beneficiaries of the public good, i.e. the players. Depending on the specifics of the problem, a mechanism usually exists such that players have incentives to truthfully reveal their true valuations to the designer, so that the designer can then choose the optimal quantity of the public good to provide the players with. In the classic mechanism design literature, such mechanism relies on the ability of players to behave rationally, i.e. players reveal their true valuations because that is how they maximize their payoffs given their belief that all other players are rational and truthful.

However, in many real life situations players may not behave fully rational. This may be for a variety of reasons, like computational constraints, memory limitations or because players make mistakes. If it can be the case that players are not rational, the designer may want to have a measure on how such irrationalities could affect the alternatives implemented by a certain mechanism. The purpose of this paper is to study how are the outcomes of the mechanism design problem affected when players are not fully rational.

We model bounded rationality by assuming that if a mechanism is in place such that players have incentives to truthfully reveal their types when all other players reveal their types (a mechanism that is incentive compatible), players may misrepresent their types. For instance, in a public good problem a player may report a valuation that is different than his true valuation even if the mechanism in place is incentive compatible and he believes that all other players will be truthful. A player may misreport his true type if, for instance, he simply makes a mistake.¹

The way players misreport their types borrows from the ideas of robust control (see, for instance, Zhou et al (1995)).² We assume that for any given mechanism players behave in a rational way as if their types were somewhere in a δ -neighborhood with $\delta > 0$ of their true types. This captures the idea that the designer may be missing important information on how players behave because of their limited rationality. The designer would like to know how the alternatives implemented by each mechanism are affected by these δ -perturbations. To this end, the designer is endowed with a loss function that evaluates the differences between any two alternatives given the true types of players.

¹This has been shown to be experimentally the case in Moffatt and Peters (2001) among others. We elaborate on this literature later on.

²For references of robust control methods and its application to economics see Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen and Sargent (2007) or Williams (2008) for an overview. Also related is the literature on mechanism design and signal processing, see Serpedin et al (2012) among others.

Within this context, we say that a social choice function is k -robust if the maximum loss when players misreport their types is of order δ^k with $k \geq 1$. Evidently, higher k means that the social choice function is more robust to the δ -perturbations, as the loss vanishes quickly when the size of the perturbation δ becomes small. In this paper we characterize the social choice functions that are k -robust, and obtain two main results:

First (Theorem 1), we find that in quasi-linear utilitarian environments, i.e. environments where the role of the designer is to maximize the sum of the (quasi-linear) utility of players and where the loss function is given by the differences in sums of utilities, all social choice functions are 2-robust. This means that the maximum loss caused by the δ -perturbations is of order δ^2 . In a nutshell, the reason why social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian environments are 2-robust is that in these settings the alternative to be implemented by the social choice function is calculated with a first order condition. Hence, small changes in the alternative chosen do not affect the value of the objective function (first derivative equals zero). Therefore, the perturbations in players' type only have a second (and above) order effect.

Second (Theorem 2), we find that how robust a social choice function is is linked to the concept of local Hölder continuity, which is a generalization of local Lipschitz continuity. Not surprisingly, a robust social choice function is one where the alternatives implemented do not change dramatically when the types of players are misreported slightly. This idea of continuity is translated in terms of local Hölder continuity. The usefulness of this result lies in the fact that for understanding how robust a certain social choice function is one simply has to explore its degree of local Hölder continuity. A direct consequence of this is that the only social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness to perturbations (∞ -robust social choice functions) are those that are locally constant, i.e. the alternative implemented by the social choice function is constant in the neighborhood of players' true types. There are several examples of settings where the designer may use a locally constant social choice function, from auctions to school choice problems. In all these settings the irrationality of players modeled as δ -perturbations of their reported type does not have any impact on the alternatives implemented by a mechanism.

We illustrate the applicability of our results in two examples: the public good game in Bergemann and Morris (2009) and a single unit auction between two bidders. In the public good game in Bergemann and Morris (2009), the designer has to choose how much of a public good to provide the players with. Since the optimal size of public good investment is computed by a first order condition, the social choice function in this case is 2-robust for the reasons discussed above. In the single unit auction example, we show that bounded rationality modeled as perturbations to the bidders true valuations creates no loss for the

designer. Indeed, since the role of the designer in this case is to award the item to the bidder with the highest valuation, a positive but small enough perturbation in bidders' valuations has no effect on who the item should be allocated to.

This paper contributes to the analysis of robust mechanism design problems. Previous literature has looked at robust mechanism design from the perspective of the knowledge players have about the type space (Bergemann and Morris (2005)), the relationship between dominant strategies and implementation (Bergemann and Morris (2009) and Yamashita (2012)) and the designers' use of almost optimal social choice functions (Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris (2011)). Other papers that have looked at the issue of robustness in mechanism design focus on the phenomenon of bounded rationality with adaptive players (see, for instance, Cabrales (1999) or Mathevet (2010)) or with "faulty" players (see Eliaz (2002)). Our paper differs from this strand of literature in that we look at the problem of robust mechanism design from a different angle; we study robust mechanism design when players are bounded rational in that they misreport their types even if an incentive compatible mechanism is in place.

Another related paper is that of Carroll (2012), in which players are constrained in how they can behave: a player can only report a type that is similar to his true type. The author then shows that in the presence of this limitation the designer can focus only on local incentive constraints. Our paper is different from Carroll (2012) in that players are not strategic in the way they misreport. On the contrary, misreports arise as mistakes. Thus, the designer must take into account all the possible deviations within a certain neighborhood of the players' true types.

We introduce misreports by assuming that players behave as if their types were in a δ -neighborhood of their true type. We argued that this had the interpretation of players making mistakes. The motivation for the way we introduce bounded rationality is that it has been shown experimentally that such mistakes (often referred to as trembles) are indeed observed with real life subjects, and that incorporating trembles into the econometric model improves its fit to experimental data (see, for instance, Bardsley and Moffatt (2007) or Bardsley et al (2009) Chapter 2.9).³

In the paper we deal mostly with small misreports (δ sufficiently small) as if the misreport is due to bounded rationality then small mistakes are more likely to be made than big mistakes. The designer considers all the possible small misreports and will like to know how a social choice function performs in the presence of them. If big misreports are allowed, then

³A difference between the experimental evidence and our model is that experimental papers consider trembles as a situation where the player randomizes over all possible actions where we consider trembles as randomizing in the neighborhood of their type, this is motivated by the fact that small mistakes are more likely than bigger ones.

a setting where the designer considers them all seems less appropriate than a setting where the designer considers some misreports more likely than others. If the designer considers the possibility of big misreports in a way that players choose their misreports strategically then we are back to the classical mechanism design problem, where the role of the designer is to set up the appropriate incentive compatibility constraint. Carroll (2012) deals with a setting where there can only be small misreports but these are strategic, players choose what they misreport but they are constrained to report something close to the truth. The present paper deals with a setting where misreports are small but, crucially, they are non-strategic and, thus, the designer has to consider all possible small misreports.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model while we present our main result in Section 3. In Section 4 we relax the assumptions needed for our main result and present a full characterization of k -robust social choice functions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 The Model

An environment is a tuple (N, X, Θ, u, P) where $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ is the set of players, X is the set of alternatives, $\Theta = \{\Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_n\}$ where Θ_i is the set of possible types of player $i \in N$, and $u = (u_1, \dots, u_n)$ where $u_i : X \times \Theta_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the utility function of player $i \in N$. The function $P : \Theta \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a probability measure on Θ and represents the common prior on the distribution of types: $P(\theta)$ is the probability that players' types are given by $\theta \in \Theta$. Each player knows his own type and player i of type $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ holds a probabilistic belief $P(\theta_{-i}|\theta_i)$ over the types of other players $\theta_{-i} \in \Theta_{-i} = \times_{j \in N \setminus \{i\}} \Theta_j$.

A social choice function $f : \Theta \rightarrow X$ associates with each profile of types $\theta \in \Theta$ an alternative $f(\theta) \in X$. Given a profile of types θ , a loss function $l_\theta : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is a mapping from a pair of alternatives to the positive reals with $l_\theta(x, x) = 0$ for all $x \in X$ and $l_\theta(x, y) = l_\theta(y, x) \geq 0$ for all $x, y \in X$. In mathematical terms, $\{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ is a collection of metrics on X where the properties of sub-additivity and the identity of indiscernibles need not be satisfied. The social choice function f represents what the designer wants to implement given the players' types while the loss functions $\{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ will be used to measure the designer's loss, given the players' true types, between what he wants to implement and what has been implemented instead.

A mechanism is a pair (M, g) with $M = \times_{i \in N} M_i$ where M_i is player's i set of messages and $g : \times_{i \in N} M_i \rightarrow X$ is the allocation rule.⁴ An environment together with a mechanism

⁴Notice that we only consider deterministic mechanisms. This is without loss of generality for the following

(M, g) induce a Bayesian game $G_{(M, g)}$. A strategy profile s is given by $s = \times_{i \in N} s_i$ where s_i is the strategy of player i and it is given by $s_i : \Theta_i \rightarrow M_i$.

Let $s^*(\theta)$ be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of $G_{(M, g)}$ when players' types are given by $\theta \in \Theta$.⁵ The profile of strategies $s^*(\theta)$ summarizes the players' behavior that the designer considers as salient. Acknowledging that players may not be fully rational in several dimensions, the designer conjectures that each player chooses a strategy misrepresenting his type. In particular, the designer believes that players' strategies belong to the set $s^*(B_\delta(\theta))$ where $B_\delta(\theta) \subset \Theta$ is the ball of radius $\delta > 0$ around θ given some metric d . That is, according to the designer, players behave as if their types were in a δ -neighborhood of their true types. This is how the designer acknowledges that players may not be fully rational. Players are not aware of these perturbations, they simply choose a strategy in $s^*(B_\delta(\theta))$. Similarly, players do not anticipate that other players also suffer from the δ -perturbations.⁶

This paper uses mainly two sets of metrics: one set is singleton and given by the metric d on Θ and another set is given by the metrics $\{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ on X . The former set of metrics is meant to specify how distances in players types are measured while the latter set of metrics specifies how differences in alternatives are evaluated by the designer. Both of these two sets of metrics are given exogenously.

An obvious alternative to the way we model players' bounded rationality is to assume that the strategies players choose lie in $B_\delta(s^*(\theta))$, i.e. players choose their strategies in the δ -neighborhood of the equilibrium strategies. Such representation of limited rationality has several conceptual problems that arise from the fact that the designer is the one that chooses the mechanism (M, g) . Given that the designer is the one that chooses (M, g) , he is in effect choosing the space of messages M and also its metric. Hence, the designer is indirectly choosing the set $B_\delta(s^*(\theta))$ and, thus, he can choose a metric such that $B_\delta(s^*(\theta)) = s^*(\theta)$ (which can be achieved with the discrete metric, for instance). This would mean that in effect the designer is eliminating his acknowledgment of the limited rationality of players. Given that we want to model the designers' problem when he accepts that players may be not be fully rational, he should not be allowed to ignore the inherent uncertainty that comes

reason: a requirement for k -robustness will be that a mechanism exists that implements the social choice function f . Since f is deterministic, such mechanism must also be deterministic.

⁵That is, s^* is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of $G_{(M, g)}$, which prescribes what each player plays in equilibrium depending on his type, and $s^*(\theta)$ are the strategies actually played in such equilibrium when the realization of players' types is given by $\theta \in \Theta$. This abuse of notation should lead to no confusion.

⁶Note that we implicitly assume that players are able to "calculate" the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies s^* . In this paper, players' bounded rationality implies that they unknowingly may mistake their own types. However, they behave rationally given their possibly mistaken types and their potentially wrong belief that other players do not mistake their types. This is to keep the setting as close as possible to the classical rational setting while still being able to study the effects of bounded rationality as introduced in this paper.

from such bounded rationality. In our definition of how the designer introduces the possibility of not fully rational players, the designer believes that players choose strategies as if their types were somewhere in $B_\delta(\theta)$, which is a set that follows from the set of players' types Θ and its metric d , both of which are given exogenously.⁷

If players follow strategies s in the game $G_{(M,g)}$ and the social choice function is f , the maximum loss for a given $\theta \in \Theta$ and $\delta > 0$ is given by $\max_{\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)} l_\theta(g(s(\theta')), f(\theta))$. Classical mechanism design sets $\delta = 0$ (i.e. $B_\delta(\theta) = \theta$) and requires that there exists a mechanism (M, g) and an equilibrium $s^*(\theta)$ of $G_{(M,g)}$ such that $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all $\theta \in \Theta$, i.e. maximum loss is zero.

We are now ready to introduce the measure of robustness used in this paper:

Definition 1. *A social choice function f is k -robustly implementable (or simply k -robust) if there exists a mechanism (M, g) such that:*

- (i) *The mechanism (M, g) implements f in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium $s^*(\theta)$ of $G_{(M,g)}$ such that $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$.*
- (ii) *The mechanism (M, g) bounds the maximum loss by a factor of δ^k : for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exist a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$,*

$$l_\theta(g(s^*(\theta')), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k$$

with $k \geq 1$.

Requirement (i) of Definition 1 requires f to be implementable in the classical sense, and it implies that the social choice function is Bayesian incentive compatible: for each player i and for each type θ_i we have that

$$\int_{\theta_{-i} \in \Theta_{-i}} u_i(f(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) dP(\theta_{-i} | \theta_i) \geq \int_{\theta_{-i} \in \Theta_{-i}} u_i(f(\theta'_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) dP(\theta_{-i} | \theta_i),$$

for all $\theta'_i \in \Theta_i$. In particular, truth-telling is an equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism (Θ, f) .

Requirement (ii) states that if a social choice function is k -robust then the loss due to the bounded rationality of players cannot be of a factor greater than δ^k . That is, for a given θ there exists a $\hat{\delta}$ such that for all $\delta < \hat{\delta}$ the loss is proportional to δ^k . The role of $\hat{\delta}$ is to

⁷Another alternative to model bounded rationality would be to perturb the utility function of players. This is equivalent to our formulation by which players' types are perturbed under some assumptions on the utility function. Furthermore, note that the designer's loss function is given exogenously, i.e. he has no control over it. Thus, choosing the message space and its metric is not equivalent to choosing a loss function.

limit the maximum δ , i.e. the loss may not be proportional to δ^k when δ is too large. Since the target of this paper is to deal with small mistakes it makes sense to focus on situations where δ is sufficiently small. The role of c is that the loss needs to be (at most) proportional to δ^k , but could be anything as long as it is less than $c\delta^k$ for fixed c . This means that, for instance, for a k -robust social choice function and a given θ , we have $\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{c\delta^k}{l_\theta(f(\theta), f(\theta'))} \leq 1$ and $\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{c\delta^{k+n}}{l_\theta(f(\theta), f(\theta'))} = 0$ for any $n = 1, 2, \dots$

Note that effectively the designer is following a maxmin approach. In particular, k -robustness implies that

$$\max_{\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)} l_\theta(g(s^*(\theta')), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k,$$

and the designer would like to know what is the minimum δ^k (maximum k) such the inequality above is true. The maxmin approach is in line with previous economic models using the robust control framework (see Hansen and Sargent (2001) and the reference to Gilboa and David Schmeidler (1989) herein).

An alternative to requirement (ii) is that the constant c and degree of robustness k are independent on θ . The consequences of adding this extra requirement are no trivial.⁸ It turns out that adding such “uniform” requirement is too restrictive; indeed, it can be shown that in this case the only social choice functions that would be k -robust with $k > 1$ are those that are constant everywhere. Thus, having the constant c and the degree of robustness k independent on θ would reduce significantly our ability to classify social choice functions into different categories according to how robust they are.

Note that as opposed to previous work on robust mechanism design (see Bergemann and Morris (2005) and (2008) among others), we are not concerned with the knowledge players have about the type space. In our paper, the designer is the one who is concerned with the type space of players and, in particular, with the δ -perturbations around the true types.

Given that the purpose of this paper is to study mechanism design in the presence of bounded rational players, we focus on social choice functions that are implementable in the classical sense. That is, we only consider social choice functions that satisfy condition (i) in Definition 1. There are several assumptions that could be made on f that guarantee that the social choice function can be implemented. Here we do not assume any conditions in particular but simply that f is implementable by some mechanism.

⁸As one would expect when comparing the definition of continuity versus uniform continuity, for instance.

2.1 Example: Provision of a Public Good

In order to illustrate the definition of k -robustness and how it applies to a particular problem consider the public good example in Bergemann and Morris (2009) with no interdependent utility functions.⁹

The set of players is $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and the set of possible allocations in this setting is given by $X = \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}^3$ where if $x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$ then x_0 units of the public good are provided and the contribution of agent $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ is given by x_i . The cost of providing an amount x_0 of the public good is given by $\frac{1}{2}x_0^2$. The objective of the designer is to choose $x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$ such that the sum of the utility of all players is maximized. The player's types are given by $\Theta = \times_{i=1}^3 \Theta_i$ where for $i = \{1, 2\}$ we have that $\Theta_i = \mathbb{R}$ is endowed with the Euclidean distance and $\Theta_3 = \{0\}$. Note that for any $\theta \in \Theta$, any $\delta > 0$ and any $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ it is true that $\theta'_3 = \theta_3$.

Player's $i \in \{1, 2\}$ utility function is given by

$$u_i(x, \theta_i) = \theta_i x_0 - x_i$$

and player's 3 utility function is given by

$$u_3(x, \theta_3) = -\frac{1}{2}x_0^2 + x_1 + x_2.$$

Note that player 3 simply represents the designer's wealth.¹⁰

The designer chooses

$$x_0 = \arg \max_{x_0} (\theta_1 + \theta_2)x_0 - \frac{1}{2}x_0^2$$

and, hence, we have that $x_0 = \theta_1 + \theta_2$. As argued in Bergemann and Morris (2009), this amount of public good is implementable by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfers given by $x_i = -\frac{1}{2}\theta_i^2$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$. Thus, the social choice function is given by $f(\theta) = (\theta_1 + \theta_2, \frac{1}{2}\theta_1^2, \frac{1}{2}\theta_2^2, \frac{1}{2}\theta_1^2 + \frac{1}{2}\theta_2^2)$.

As the target of the designer is to maximize the utility of agents net of the cost of the public good, one reasonable assumption about how he compares two different levels of provision of the public good x_0 and y_0 is that the designer uses the expression

$$\left| (\theta_1 + \theta_2)x_0 - \frac{1}{2}x_0^2 - \left((\theta_1 + \theta_2)y_0 - \frac{1}{2}y_0^2 \right) \right|,$$

⁹This means that the parameter γ in Bergemann and Morris (2009) is set to 0.

¹⁰In Bergemann and Morris (2009) player 3 is not needed. We introduce player 3 so that we can apply the results presented later on to this example but player 3 plays no role in the strategic incentives of the other players nor in those of the designer: player 3 does not affect the social choice function nor the transfers, and his reported type has no effect on the alternative that is implemented.

which we shall refer to as $l_\theta(x, y)$, the loss function.¹¹

The social choice function f is k -robust if there exists a mechanism (M, g) and an equilibrium s^* of $G_{(M, g)}$ such that for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exist a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ for which if $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ with $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ then

- (i) $l_\theta(f(\theta), g(s^*(\theta))) = 0$, and
- (ii) $l_\theta(f(\theta), g(s^*(\theta'))) < c\delta^k$.

Requirement (i) states that if players do indeed behave according to their true types then the mechanism (M, g) implements $f(\theta)$. Requirement (ii) states that if players behave as if their types were in a δ -neighborhood of their true type then the loss for the designer is less than $c\delta^k$.

3 Results

Before we dwell into the characterization of k -robust social choice functions, the following lemma, which follows from the revelation principle type of result presented in Proposition 1 in the Appendix, allows us to focus only on direct mechanism where players truthfully report their types.¹²

Lemma 1. *A social choice function f is k -robust if and only if and for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$,*

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k.$$

Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that if a certain mechanism allows f to satisfy the definition of k -robustness for a given k then the direct mechanism (Θ, f) also allows the loss to be bounded by a factor of δ^k (with the same constant c). An implication of this is that the designer does not choose a different mechanism than the one he would choose if he ignored the limited rationality of players. This is an implication of the condition (i) in the definition of k -robustness. Relaxing condition (i) in the definition of k -robustness could allow the designer to choose mechanism that, although not being incentive compatible, may create a smaller loss for some values of δ than an incentive compatible mechanism. We believe that incentive compatibility must be a requirement on the social choice function because players may still

¹¹Note that the the loss function is defined as a mapping from the allocations x and y although in this example it only depends on the level of provision of public good x_0 and y_0 as the other components of x and y cancel out.

¹²Note that players truthfully reporting types simply means that $s(\theta) = \theta$, yet in general $s(B_\delta(\theta)) \neq s(\theta)$.

behave according to their true types (this is a possibility with the δ -perturbations), and as such the mechanism must be able to implement the same alternatives it was first set out to implement in the absence of bounded rationality.

Once we have established that the presence players' limited rationality does not make the designer to change the mechanism he chooses, a question that arises is that of the characterization of the loss induced by the δ -perturbations, i.e. the characterization of k -robust social choice functions for all k . Our analysis continues by exploring this issue.

3.1 Quasi-linear Utilitarian Environments

We continue the study of k -robust social choice functions by generalizing the public good example presented in the previous section. In particular, in this section we focus on quasi-linear utilitarian environments: environments where the goal of the designer is to choose an allocation that maximizes the aggregate sum of the utility of all players, and where the utility of players is linear in wealth. Specifically, we assume the following:

Assumption 1. *Alternatives are of the form $x = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_n) \in X = \mathbb{R}^{n+1}$ where x_0 represents a certain choice of the designer and x_i with $i \in N$ are the transfers of each player. Moreover,*

$$u_i(x, \theta_i) = v_i(x_0, \theta_i) - \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij} x_j$$

with $v_i : \mathbb{R} \times \Theta_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $a_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$ for all $i, j \in N$.¹³

The next assumption specifies how the social choice function selects among different alternatives and how the designer evaluates losses.

Assumption 2. *Define $e = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$. For all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $x, y \in X$:*

- $ef(\theta) = \arg \max_{x_0 \in \mathbb{R}} \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i)$,
- $l_\theta(x, y) = |\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i) - \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(y_0, \theta_i)|$.

That is, the designer would like to choose x_0 in order to maximize the sum of the utilities of all players ignoring the transfers.¹⁴ On top of that, the loss function measures the welfare

¹³Note that the utility of a player can depend on the transfers of another player, yet a possibility is also $a_{ii} \neq 0$ and $a_{ij} = 0$ for $i \neq j$.

¹⁴Transfers are only used to allow the mechanism employed by the designer to be incentive compatible. For instance, in the public good example we present in Section 2.1 transfers are used to finance the public good.

difference between two alternatives, quantified as the difference in the sum of the utility of x_0 for each player.¹⁵

We also impose some structure on the utility functions and the social choice functions. Firstly, we assume that for all players' types $\theta \in \Theta$ the term $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i$ coincides with its analytic form (Taylor expansion) around $ef(\theta)$. In particular:

Assumption 3. *For all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ the term $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i$ is such that:*

$$\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{(x_0 - ef(\theta))^j}{j!}.$$

Assumption 3 is satisfied if, for instance, the function $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i$ is a polynomial in x_0 where the coefficients can be any finite function of the types of players Θ .

Finally, we assume that the choice of the designer, ef , is Lipschitz continuous:

Assumption 4. *There exists a $k > 0$ such that for any $\theta, \theta' \in \Theta$ we have that*

$$|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)| \leq kd(\theta', \theta).$$

The fact that ef is Lipschitz continuous does not impose any assumption on the other components of f , i.e. Assumption 4 only deals with the first component of f . Moreover, Assumption 4 does not impose any restriction on how the designer evaluates loses. For utilitarian environments, the only assumption we make about how the designer evaluates loses is Assumption 2.

The structure imposed by Assumptions 1-4 is in line with settings commonly found in the literature. We prove later on that the public good example presented in section 2.1 satisfies Assumptions 1-4.

Note that Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that the designer selects the optimal x_0 using a first order condition, i.e. ef maximizes the sum of utilities by differentiating and setting the derivative equal to zero: for all $\theta \in \Theta$,

$$\frac{\partial \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial ef(\theta)} = 0. \quad (1)$$

Moreover, as by Assumption 2 it is true that $ef(\theta) = \arg \max_{x_0 \in \mathbb{R}} \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i)$, then $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i)$ must be bounded for all θ . Hence, for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ there exists an upper bound $r > 0$ such that

$$r > \sup_{\theta \in \Theta, j \in \mathbb{N}^+} \left| \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{1}{j!} \right|. \quad (2)$$

¹⁵We assume that $ef(\theta)$ is unique in order to simplify the exposition but our results still follow if the maximization problem $\arg \max_{x_0 \in \mathbb{R}} \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i)$ has several solutions.

We have the following result:

Theorem 1. *Social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian environments (Assumptions 1-4) are 2-robust.*

Proof. We have that in a quasi-linear utilitarian environment for all $\theta', \theta \in \Theta$:

$$\begin{aligned} l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) &= \left| \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i(ef(\theta'), \theta_i) - v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)) \right| \\ &= \left| \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{(ef(\theta') - ef(\theta))^j}{j!} - \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i) \right| \\ &= \left| \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{(ef(\theta') - ef(\theta))^j}{j!} \right|. \end{aligned}$$

Using the equality in equation (1) with the upper bound r in equation (2) gives:

$$\begin{aligned} l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) &= \left| \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{(ef(\theta') - ef(\theta))^j}{j!} \right| \\ &\leq r \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} |ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)|^j. \end{aligned}$$

By Assumption 4 there exists a $k > 0$ such that for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $\delta > 0$ we have that for all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$

$$\begin{aligned} |ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)| &\leq kd(\theta', \theta) \\ &< k\delta. \end{aligned}$$

Choose some $\hat{\delta} \in (0, \frac{1}{k})$ such that $(k\delta)^2 > \sum_{j=3}^{\infty} (k\delta)^j$ for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ (for example, $\hat{\delta} < \frac{1}{2k}$). We have that for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ with $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$:

$$\begin{aligned} l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) &< r \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} (k\delta)^j \\ &< 2rk^2\delta^2. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, f is 2-robust. □

Theorem 1 shows that all social choice function in quasi-linear utilitarian environments are 2-robust. The intuition for this result is that if the alternative to be implemented by the social choice function is calculated with a first order condition, then infinitesimal changes in the alternative chosen do not change the value of the objective function (derivative equals

zero). Hence, if the types of players are perturbed slightly and the alternative implemented does not change much as a result (ef is Lipschitz continuous), the first order effect of this perturbation (the term of order δ) is zero, and only the second order effect (the term of order δ^2) matters.

3.2 Example Revisited: Provision of a Public Good

We now show that the public good example presented in 2.1 satisfies Assumptions 1-4. If we define $v_i(x, \theta_i) = \theta_i x_0$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $v_3(x, \theta_3) = -\frac{1}{2}x_0^2$, and set $a_{11} = a_{22} = 1$, $a_{12} = a_{13} = a_{21} = a_{23} = 0$ and $a_{31} = a_{32} = -1$ then Assumption 1 is satisfied.

We have that $x_0 = ef(\theta)$ maximizes $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i)$. Moreover, the designer evaluates losses according to the loss function $l_\theta(x, y) = |(\theta_1 + \theta_2)x_0 - \frac{1}{2}x_0^2 - ((\theta_1 + \theta_2)y_0 - \frac{1}{2}y_0^2)| = |\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(x_0, \theta_i) - \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(y_0, \theta_i)|$. Therefore, Assumption 2 is also satisfied.

Under mechanism (Θ, f) , if players report types θ then we have that $x_0 = ef(\theta)$ and, hence, we can write $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i) = (\theta_1 + \theta_2)ef(\theta) - \frac{1}{2}(ef(\theta))^2$. Moreover, it is true that

$$\frac{\partial^2 \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^2 ef(\theta)} = -1 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} = 0$$

for all $j \geq 3$. Hence, for all $\theta' \in \Theta$:

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)|^j}{j!} = (\theta_1 + \theta_2)ef(\theta) - \frac{1}{2}(ef(\theta))^2 - \frac{|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)|^2}{2}.$$

Since

$$|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)| = |(\theta'_1 + \theta'_2) - (\theta_1 + \theta_2)|,$$

we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\partial^j \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial^j ef(\theta)} \frac{|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)|^j}{j!} &= \frac{1}{2}(\theta_1 + \theta_2)^2 - \frac{|(\theta'_1 + \theta'_2) - (\theta_1 + \theta_2)|^2}{2} \\ &= (\theta_1 + \theta_2)(\theta'_1 + \theta'_2) - \frac{1}{2}(\theta'_1 + \theta'_2)^2 \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(ef(\theta'), \theta_i). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Assumption 3 is satisfied. Finally, since for all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ we have that $|ef(\theta') - ef(\theta)| \leq |\theta'_1 - \theta_1| + |\theta'_2 - \theta_2| \leq 2\delta$, the social choice function f is Lipschitz continuous. Hence, Assumption 4 is also satisfied. This implies that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied and by Theorem 1 we have that f is 2-robust.

Remark 1. *The setting in the Provision of a Public Good example (section 2.1) is quasi-linear utilitarian and, hence, by Theorem 1 the social choice function f is 2-robust.*

4 Other Environments

Next we ask the question of what social choice functions are k -robust when no particular assumption on structure of the environment is made, i.e. Assumptions 1-4 need not be satisfied.

One might guess that k -robust social choice functions should exhibit some type of continuity, so that a perturbation of order δ is not translated into losses of an order much greater than δ . This continuity is present in terms of local Hölder continuity, which is a generalization of local Lipschitz continuity:

Definition 2. *A social choice function f is locally Hölder continuous of degree k if for any $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$*

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) \leq cd(\theta', \theta)^k.$$

We have the following result:

Theorem 2. *A social choice function f is k -robust if and only if it is locally Hölder continuous of degree k .*

Proof. Take any $\theta \in \Theta$. If f is k -robust then there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k.$$

Assume that there exists a $\bar{\theta} \in B_\delta(\theta)$ such that

$$l_\theta(f(\bar{\theta}), f(\theta)) > cd(\bar{\theta}, \theta)^k.$$

Then, there exists a $\bar{\varepsilon} > 0$ such that for all $\varepsilon \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon})$ if we define $\bar{\delta} = d(\bar{\theta}, \theta) + \varepsilon$ we have that $\bar{\delta} < \hat{\delta}$ and, since $\bar{\delta} > d(\bar{\theta}, \theta)$, also that $\bar{\theta} \in B_{\bar{\delta}}(\theta)$. Thus, because f is k -robust we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} l_\theta(f(\bar{\theta}), f(\theta)) &< c\bar{\delta}^k \\ &< c(d(\bar{\theta}, \theta) + \varepsilon)^k. \end{aligned}$$

Since the inequality above is true for all $\varepsilon \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon})$:

$$l_\theta(f(\bar{\theta}), f(\theta)) \leq cd(\bar{\theta}, \theta)^k,$$

which represents a contradiction. Therefore, it is true that for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) \leq cd(\theta', \theta)^k.$$

This is the definition of local Hölder continuity of degree k .

Assume now that f is locally Hölder continuous of degree k . We have then that for any $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for any $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and any $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) \leq cd(\theta', \theta)^k.$$

Since $d(\theta', \theta) < \delta$ we have that

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k$$

as required. □

Note that the definition of local Hölder continuity is made with respect to the metrics $\{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$, i.e. taking f to be a function between the two metric spaces $(\Theta, d) \rightarrow (X, l_\theta)$ where $\theta \in \Theta$ is the true type of players. Thus, it could be that if, for instance, $X = \mathbb{R}$, then f is locally Hölder continuous as a mapping $(\Theta, d) \rightarrow (X, l_\theta)$ but not as a mapping $(\Theta, d) \rightarrow (X, E)$ where E is the euclidean distance. The metrics $\{l_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ measure how far apart in terms of losses for the designer two different alternatives are while the Euclidean distance measures how far apart in space two different alternatives are. Thus, if alternatives are compared using different metrics then the fact that f is Hölder continuous with respect to one metric does not imply that it is also Hölder continuous with respect to another metric. This situation arose in the example in Section 2.1.

Theorem 2 states a full characterization of social choice functions. For knowing whether a social choice function is k -robust or not it is sufficient to study its degree of Hölder continuity. As we already mentioned, the fact that the notion of k -robustness is linked with a certain type of continuity is not surprising, as by definition the concept of robustness incorporates the idea that small perturbations in the given parameters should not lead to big changes in the alternatives selected by the social choice function.

Next, we focus on social choice functions for which the limited rationality of players creates no loss (i.e. the set of ∞ -robust social choice functions). Before we do that, however, a new definition is in order:

Definition 3. *A social choice function f is locally constant if for all θ there exists a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ we have that $l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) = 0$.*

Remark 2. *A social choice function f is locally constant if and only if it is locally Hölder continuous of degree ∞ .*

A consequence of the remark above and Theorem 2 is the following result:

Corollary 1. *A social choice function f is ∞ -robust if and only if it is locally constant.*

Locally constant social choice functions are frequent in the social choice and mechanism design literature. As we see in Section 4.1 below, examples of locally constant social choice functions appear in settings where there is an indivisible object to share amongst some claimants (i.e. auctions, the Solomon's Dilemma, etc.). These settings are characterized by the fact that small perturbation in player's types do not lead to changes in who the social choice function allocates the object to. Corollary 1 implies that social choice functions in these environments are ∞ -robust.

4.1 Example: Single Unit Auction

In this section we present an application of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1. Consider an auction where two bidders $N = \{1, 2\}$ compete for an indivisible good. The set of alternatives is $X = N \times \mathbb{R}$ where the alternative $x = (i, p)$ represents the situation where player i takes the item paying a price of p . The player who wins the auction on each allocation x is referred to as x_W . Each bidder $i \in \{1, 2\}$ values the object at $\theta_i \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\theta_1 \neq \theta_2$ (where \mathbb{R} is endowed the euclidean distance) and has a utility is given by the valuation of the item minus the price he pays in case he wins the auction.¹⁶ That is, $u_i(x, \theta_i) = (\theta_i - p)\mathbb{1}_{x_W=i}$.

The social choice function is given by $f(\theta) = (1, p)$ if $\theta_1 > \theta_2$ and $f(\theta) = (2, p)$ if $\theta_2 > \theta_1$ for any $p \leq \max\{\theta_1, \theta_2\}$. This social choice function is implementable by, for instance, the second price auction.

The loss function is given by $l_\theta(x, y) = h(|\theta_1 - \theta_2|)\mathbb{1}_{x_W \neq y_W}$ where $h : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is weakly increasing with $h(0) = 0$. That is, if both $x, y \in X$ prescribe the same winner of the auction then the loss is zero, otherwise the loss is increasing in the differences in types.

Note that in the environment just defined the social choice function is locally constant. Indeed, for all $\theta \in \Theta$ if we set $\hat{\delta} = \frac{|\theta_1 - \theta_2|}{2}$ then for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and for all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ we have that $\theta_1 - \theta_2 > 0$ implies $\theta'_1 - \theta'_2 > 0$: if $\theta_1 - \theta_2 > 0$ then $\theta'_1 - \theta'_2 > \theta_1 - \delta - (\theta_2 + \delta) = |\theta_1 - \theta_2| - 2\delta > 0$. Similarly, $\theta_1 - \theta_2 < 0$ implies $\theta'_1 - \theta'_2 < 0$: if $\theta_1 - \theta_2 < 0$ then $\theta'_1 - \theta'_2 < \theta_1 + \delta - (\theta_2 - \delta) = -|\theta_1 - \theta_2| + 2\delta < 0$. Hence, the allocation when players misreport their types to $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ is the same allocation as when they report their true types. Thus, for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $\delta \in \left(0, \frac{|\theta_1 - \theta_2|}{2}\right)$ we have that $l_\theta(f(\theta), f(\theta')) = 0$ for all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$.¹⁷

¹⁶We are ignoring the case where $\theta_1 = \theta_2$ as in this case it is irrelevant which bidder wins the auction. The paragraph at the end of this section presents a further discussion for the case where $\theta_1 = \theta_2$.

¹⁷Note that f is not defined for $\theta_1 \neq \theta_2$ as we have assumed that players' types are different. Hence f is locally constant for all its domain without the need for any specific assumptions on what happens around the

Remark 3. *The social choice function f in the Single Unit Auction is locally constant and, hence, by Corollary 1 it is ∞ -robust.*

In this example the fact that the optimal allocation is locally constant implies that slight changes in the types of players will not change the identity of the bidder who values the item the most amongst the two bidders. Hence, if the perturbations to players' types are insignificant enough, i.e. δ is small enough, then the second price auction still allocates the item to the bidder that values the item the most.

Note that in this example we deliberately ignored the case where $\theta_1 = \theta_2$. The social choice function is not locally constant at $\theta_1 = \theta_2$ but this does not represent an issue for the analysis since if $\theta_1 = \theta_2$ then it is irrelevant which bidder wins the auction and, hence, any allocation is desirable from the planners' point of view. That is, when $\theta_1 = \theta_2$ the fact that bidders misrepresent their types does not create any loss, as in the case where $\theta_1 \neq \theta_2$.

5 Conclusions

This paper investigates bounded rationality in mechanism design problems. Bounded rationality is modeled by assuming that for a given mechanism players behave as if their types were in a δ -neighborhood of their true types. The designer acknowledges this fact and would like to know how the alternatives chosen by each mechanism are affected by these δ -perturbations. To this end, he is endowed with a loss function that evaluates the differences between any two alternatives given the true types of players. We say that a social choice function is k -robust if the maximum loss when players misreport their types is of order δ^k .

In our results we obtain two main conclusions. First, we find that all social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian environments, environments where the role of the designer is to maximize the sum of the (quasi-linear) utility of players and where the loss function is given by the differences in sums of utilities, are 2-robust. Second, we find that a social choice function is k -robust if and only if it is locally Hölder continuous of degree k , and that the only social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness to perturbations are those that are locally constant.

Our results offer new insights on how small perturbations may affect the alternatives chosen by a given mechanism. We include two illustrations in the paper in order to highlight the applicability of our results. To our knowledge, our paper is the first one to study mechanism design when players, as the result of their bound rationality, misreport their types

points where $\theta_1 = \theta_2$.

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Appendix

The result in Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of the revelation principle result stated in Proposition 1 below.

Proposition 1. *A social choice function f is k -robust with mechanism (M, g) if and only if it is k -robust with mechanism (Θ, f) .*

Proof. If f is k -robust with mechanism (Θ, f) then it is trivially k -robust with some mechanism (M, g) , simply set $(M, g) = (\Theta, f)$.

To prove the other direction of the implication, first note that condition (i) of the definition of k -robust is always satisfied by any social choice function that is implementable.¹⁸ Thus, we are left to prove condition (ii) of the definition of k -robustness.

If f is k -robust with mechanism (M, g) then we have that for all $\theta \in \Theta$ there exists a $c > 0$ and a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \hat{\delta})$ and all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$

$$l_\theta(g(s^*(\theta')), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k$$

Given that f is k -robust with a mechanism (M, g) , using condition (i) of the definition of k -robustness it is true that for any $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ we have that $g(s^*(\theta')) = f(\theta')$ and, hence,

$$l_\theta(g(s^*(\theta')), f(\theta)) = l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)).$$

Therefore, combining the two expressions above:

$$l_\theta(f(\theta'), f(\theta)) < c\delta^k$$

for all $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$.

Thus, in the direct mechanism (Θ, f) where players truthfully report their types θ and these are perturbed to $\theta' \in B_\delta(\theta)$ the loss is bounded by $c\delta^k$. \square

¹⁸We assume that f is implementable, see the section 2.