Threat and norms: The context of union behavior

When believing in the union is (not) enough: The role of threat and norms in intentions to act on union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs

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Abstract

Three field studies conducted with academics and students examined the dynamic role of threat and normative support for a union in qualifying the relationship between union-related legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, and union intentions. There was evidence for interplay between threat and norms in facilitating people acting in accordance with their union beliefs, and in providing the conditions where those with weaker beliefs may be mobilized. In Study 1, students’ perception of threat to group interests facilitated their preparedness to act on pro-union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. In Study 2, among academics who perceived low threat, acting on union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs was contingent on a pro-union norm, while those who perceived high threat were prepared to act on their union legitimacy beliefs regardless of the normative environment. Finally, in Study 3, a pro-union norm again facilitated acting on union beliefs in a low threat condition and overcame the importance of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs in a high threat condition. In sum, this research makes a case for the importance of union strategies attending to both the framing of intergroup threat and the communication of ingroup normative support for the union.

Keywords: collective action, efficacy, legitimacy, norms, threat, unions
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Like all social movements, unions experience alternating periods of member apathy and fervent activity linked to the demands of the wider context. Two aspects of context are crucial to galvanize supporters and recruit new members: the presence of threat to group-based interests that creates a sense of us and them; and norms of solidarity that can promote shared understanding and agency (Gahan & Pekarek 2013; Klandermans, 1986). Social psychological research recognizes the importance of social context, yet models of collective action have typically been concerned with specifying the interrelationship between the psychological variables that mediate the influence of social context (e.g., injustice, identity and efficacy, Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008); and the role of identities in how people perceive and act on perceptions of social context (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Less attention has been paid to the dynamic role played by social context perceptions in whether and how people act on their beliefs.

In this paper we examine the combined role of intergroup threat and in-group norms in galvanizing support for a union via their moderating effects on people’s union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. We draw on the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to conceptualize legitimacy and efficacy beliefs as, in part, the constituent properties of a union identity. Support for this reasoning is found in research showing that social identity facilitates and bridges injustice and efficacy explanations for collective action (Van Zomeren et.al., 2008), and that group efficacy mediates the relationship between an activist identity and collective action intentions (Blackwood & Louis, 2012). Accordingly, our premise is that although union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs may serve separate functions (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001) they are each subject to group-based processes of activation in social contexts that render union beliefs salient and behaviourally meaningful (Blackwood et.al., 2003; Blackwood & Louis, 2012).
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**Threat**

Whether collective action is explained in terms of relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) or injustice (Peate, Platow & Eggins, 2008); at its core, it is a response to group-based threat. A review of strikes in the US showed both ‘realistic’ threat to employee interests and ‘symbolic’ threat to union legitimacy as critical (Martin & Dixon, 2010). Of course belief in union legitimacy is tied to the notion that employers will from time to time threaten workers’ interests; and the rallying call ‘the workers united will never be defeated’ captures an article of faith in union effectiveness. We would expect that for those who believe in union legitimacy and efficacy, there would be a readiness to read employment-related threat in union-related terms and so to self-categorise as a union member and act in accordance with one’s union beliefs.

There are also, however, grounds for arguing that when severe enough, threat may provide the conditions where those who are less convinced of union legitimacy and efficacy may be galvanized into action. This is well illustrated by Fosh’s (1993) longitudinal study where in the context of an industrial dispute over half of employees turned out for a branch meeting; and by Veenstra & Haslam’s (2000) study where low-union identifying members defied predictions by showing increased union support in an experimentally manipulated threat context. Such findings may point to people pursuing individualist strategies in defence of personal interests. But another reading that is not incommensurate with the first is that even for those with weaker union beliefs, threat to group interests produces a salient social identity resulting in ‘solidaristic’ group based strategies to protect collective interests (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). This latter explanation is one that Fosh (1993) and Veenstra and Haslam (2000) found most convincing and that implicates social influence processes.
Norms

A ‘critical mass’ of active union members is crucial for a union’s ability to sustain membership and mobilize around industrial disputes. This is supported by evidence for the importance of union presence (Dixon et al., 2004) and social networks in the workplace (Davis et al., 2005). Such evidence is typically explained in terms of coercion or ‘rational’ calculations of the likelihood of success. Although both explanations may account for some portion of people’s behaviour, they fail to account for heightened feelings of solidarity observed in industrial disputes such as the 12-month British miners’ strike where many long-term strikers thought that victory was unlikely (Winterton & Winterton, 1989).

Research conducted from the social identity perspective presents an alternative hypothesis. According to the referent informational influence model (Turner et al., 1987), to the extent that people identify with a group, they expect to be in agreement. Where normative attitudes and behaviors are congruent with their own, the process of self-categorization should see an increase in attitude-behavior consistency (Terry, Hogg & Blackwood, 2001). Thus, in the context of the miner’s strike, solidarity is understood in terms of self-categorization with fellow strikers.

Although researchers investigating these processes have typically examined the moderating role of identity in rendering people responsive to group norms, some have offered a less linear and uni-directional analysis. For instance Thomas, McGarty and Mavor’s (2009) normative alignment model specifies a dynamic interrelationship between social identity and the sharing of (normative) group-based emotions, beliefs and actions; and Swaab and colleagues’ (2007) experimental research suggests that while social identity can
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lead to the production of shared systems of meaning, so too, awareness of shared systems of meaning can lead to social identity formation.

The implication of the above is that norms provide a context in which the constituent beliefs of a social identity might be more readily acted upon. But more than this, knowledge of a group norm may define an experience as shared, thereby activating group processes of self-categorisation. That is to say, a pro-union normative climate would be expected to make people’s union beliefs relevant guides to thinking and acting. Such perceptions would both validate union legitimacy as well as strengthen perceptions of group efficacy. Pointing to these processes, Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) found that knowledge that others shared one’s evaluations of an intergroup context and that others intended to act on their beliefs contributed to participation in collective action via group based anger rooted in legitimacy beliefs, as well as group efficacy.

**Threat and Norms**

Finally, based on this review there are grounds for considering the interrelationship between threat and norms in moderating people’s union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. This is something which, to the best of our knowledge, has not received explicit attention. We test the idea that threat creates the ‘us and them’ context where the normative environment may be clearer and where it is meaningful for people, regardless of their commitment to the union, to attend to what their colleagues think. In the absence of threat, even the most committed unionist may remain inactive where it is not normative to be so. By the same token, in the presence of threat even the most disillusioned unionist may be open to the influence of pro-union members. Moreover, in the presence of threat, whilst for the committed unionist a pro-union norm may facilitate behaviour that is congruent with one’s
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pro-union attitudes (Terry, Hogg & Blackwood, 2001), it does not follow that an attitudinally-incongruent norm will produce the opposite. Where there is perceived incongruency, people may challenge the group norm, or indeed, distance themselves from the group and self-categorise with those who share their values (e.g., fellow union members). Strike-related research provides evidence for this where, in a context of employment-related threat, those who believed in the union were seen to lift their effort in defiance of the workplace norm of not supporting the union (Oliver, 1984).

Present Research

Three studies were conducted with academic members and non-members of Australia’s National Tertiary Industry Education Union (NTEU) and members of a university student union. In agreement with current theorising around social movement unionism and the organising model of unionism (Frege & Kelly, 2004), we see unions and social movement organisations as similar in so far as they are engaged in mobilizing political activism in response to outgroup threats. Accordingly, we argue that both the NTEU and the student union are appropriate organisations for examining these specific processes and the implications for unions.

For the period of this research (2001-2003), the broad political context for both groups was framed by a conservative Federal Government that had placed reform of the Australian higher education sector high on its agenda. Included in its program of reforms were increased exposure of universities to market forces and competition, the devolution of responsibility for wages and conditions to the university level, and an increase in funding through student fees.

We examined the following hypotheses:
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H1 The perception of threat and a pro-union norm were each expected to be positively associated with intentions, independent of the contribution of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs.

H2 The perception of threat and norm, were each expected to moderate the relationship between legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, and intentions. Where people perceived strong threat or a pro-union norm, we expected a positive association between beliefs and intentions. Where people perceived weaker threat or norms, we expected a weaker association and for intentions to remain low.

H3 The perception of threat was proposed to qualify the interaction between the perceived norm and beliefs. Where people perceived low threat, we expected a positive association between beliefs and intentions to be contingent on perceiving a pro-union norm. Where people perceived high threat, we expected a pro-union norm to be associated with strong intentions regardless of beliefs and a weaker union norm to be associated with intentions in accordance with beliefs.

Study 1

Study 1 was conducted in the first part of 2001. An Australian Government proposal to introduce unregulated fees and market rates of interest for student loans presented a context in which to examine a salient threat to a student union’s constituency.

Method

Participants. Respondents (N=303) were first-year university students (M_age=19). Most were women (62%; n=187); 39 did not give their sex.

Measures. A survey measured the dependent variable, intended behaviour and four independent variables (legitimacy, efficacy, threat, and norm). All items were on 7-point response scales and composite measures were created by averaging responses to component
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items. Means, standard deviations and correlations for the composite variables are reported in Table 1.

**Behavioural intention.** Students indicated willingness to engage in seven behaviours drawn from Veenstra and Haslam’s (2000) research (e.g., “be actively involved in the student union”; α=.91).

**Legitimacy.** Respondents rated four items capturing global beliefs about the legitimacy of unions, commonly used in industrial relations research (e.g., “Australia would be better off without unions”; α=.81).

**Efficacy.** Union efficacy was assessed in line with common operationalizations of Klandermans’ (1986) goal motive. Participants rated four student issues (i.e., representation, services, quality and funding of education) in terms of personal importance and union impact. The square root of the product of the two scores for each issue was calculated before averaging to create the composite measure (α=.80).

**Threat.** Three items tapped the belief that full-fee paying places posed a threat to higher education and student prospects (e.g., “Will fee-paying places damage the perceived quality of degrees?”; α=.79).

**Norm.** Two items measured perceptions of fellow students’ support for the student union (e.g., “Amongst my fellow students there is a culture of supporting the student union”; r=.66).

Table 1

**Results**

Two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted (Cohen & Cohen, 1983): one examining interaction effects for legitimacy and the other for efficacy (see Table 2). Legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were entered at Step 1 and threat and norm perceptions were
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entered at Step 2. At Step 3, the products of one of the union-related beliefs and the threat and norm variables were entered to test for two-way interaction effects. At Step 4, the product of the union-related belief and both threat and norm was entered to test the three-way interaction.

Scores on each of the predictors were centered (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). Two multivariate outliers with standardized residuals exceeding ±3.3 were removed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996), leaving 301 cases.

Table 2

As predicted, threat and norm perceptions were positively associated with intentions independent of the effects of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs; and the Threat x Legitimacy and Threat x Efficacy interactions were significant ($\beta_s = .11, .17, ps = .009, .001$ respectively).

Figure 1

Simple slope analyses for one standard deviation above and below the threat mean, and inspection of the two-way interactions revealed a similar pattern (see Figure 1). Although respondents’ legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were positively associated with intentions regardless of threat perceptions, consistent with our hypothesis, the effects were stronger where they perceived high threat ($\beta = .43, p < .001$ and $\beta = .44, p < .001$ respectively) compared to lower threat ($\beta = .22, p < .001$ and $\beta = .17, p = .004$ respectively).

Contrary to our hypotheses norm perceptions did not moderate the role of people’s beliefs, either alone or in combination with perceptions of threat. This initial study was
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carried out early in the academic year when first year students would have limited experience of the union and the normative environment. The second study was conducted with academics who we would expect to have stronger workplace identities and to be more knowledgeable about the normative environment.

Study 2

Study 2 was conducted in 2002 at the commencement of a new enterprise agreement. This was a period when industrial relations reforms and deregulation of higher education were on the government agenda.

Method

Participants. A survey was sent to a random sample of 1,200 university employees. In order to ensure some comparability with the student union sample where membership is compulsory, our respondents (N=215) included both members and non-members and we did not delineate between the two. The majority were members of the union (n=154) with an average 10 year membership. Slightly more men (54%) responded and ages ranged from 21 to 66 (M_age = 44).

Measures. A survey measured the same variables as in Study 1 (Table 3). The intentions measure comprised a subset of 4 items assessing intentions to keep abreast of union matters, volunteer, attend meetings and vote (α=.91); and the legitimacy (α=.88) and norm (r=.66) measures comprised the same items from Study 1. The efficacy and threat measures were modified to reflect the issues for this union.

Efficacy. Respondents’ rated the impact they believed the union could have on seven employment-related issues (e.g., salary; employment conditions; employment security). This was weighted by issue importance (α=.92).
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Threat. Two items measured perceived threat to employment conditions and the quality of teaching (e.g., the government’s industrial relations policy threatens employment conditions; \( r = .55 \)).

Tables 3 and 4

Results

We conducted the same hierarchical regression analyses as for Study 1 (see Table 4). One multivariate outlier was removed from the analyses leaving 214 cases. Once again, threat and norm perceptions were positively associated with intentions independent of people’s beliefs. This time the Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy interactions were each significant, (\( \beta s = .14, .21, ps = .027, <.001 \)); and these interactions were qualified by a Threat x Norm x Legitimacy (\( \beta = -.14, p = .082 \)) and a Threat x Norm x Efficacy interaction (\( \beta s = -.17, p = .013 \)).

Figures 2 and 3

Simple slope analyses and inspection of the Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy interactions at low and high threat revealed a similar overall pattern (see Figures 2 and 3 for the Norm x Legitimacy interactions). The interactions were significant for those who perceived low threat, (\( \beta s = .23, .27, ps < .001, .005 \)), but not for those who perceived high threat, (\( \beta s = .07, .04, ps = .692, .398 \)).

As predicted, where respondents perceived low threat, a pro-union norm was associated with a significant positive effect of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs on intentions, \( \beta s = .53, .65, ps < .001 \). By contrast, where low threat was combined with a weaker norm,
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intentions were low and there was only a marginal effect of legitimacy and no effect of efficacy beliefs, ($\beta = 14, .10, ps = .094, .253$ respectively). Thus, in the absence of salient threat it was apparent that legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were not sufficient for people’s intentions to act. What was also required was a pro-union norm.

Where respondents perceived high threat, we found mixed support for our predictions. Consistent with our predictions, the effect of legitimacy on intentions was significant regardless of perceived norm strength ($\beta = .36, .30, ps = .008, .008$). Contrary to our predictions, high threat did not overcome the importance of norms in qualifying the relationship between efficacy beliefs and intentions. That is to say, people intended to act on their efficacy beliefs where they perceived a strong pro-union norm, $t (\beta = .30, p = .006)$; but not where they perceived a weaker norm ($\beta = .17, p = .111$).

The strength of Studies 1 and 2 is that they were conducted in the field with real groups operating in different social contexts. The corollary to this is the difficulty in teasing apart cause and effect where perceptions of context and beliefs are necessarily correlated. This was addressed in Study 3.

Study 3

Study 3 was conducted with students in 2003 when the Government was proposing the introduction of domestic up-front fees (DUFF) and voluntary student unionism (VSU).

Method

Participants. Respondents ($N=237$) were first year students enrolled in second semester, between the ages of 16 and 60 ($M_{age}=20$). The majority were women (61%, $n=143$).
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**Procedure and measures.** Respondents completed a survey in which threat to student interests was manipulated. This was followed by a manipulation check and measures of the dependent variable (i.e., intentions) and the remaining independent variables (i.e., legitimacy, efficacy, and norm).

**Threat manipulation.** Participants read a passage in which attention was drawn to either the likely increase in tuition fees by up to $10,000 (high threat); or the expected benefit of an expanded sector (low threat).

High Threat: The Federal government has announced a package of policy changes to higher education. An important change allows each university to set its own fees. This University has set its fees at 30% above the HECS charges. In addition to creating more full-fee places for domestic undergraduate students, the HECS debt for students is expected to rise by up to $10,000.

OR

Low Threat: The Federal government has announced a package of policy changes to higher education. These policy changes are designed to make universities more globally competitive and bring resources into the sector. The Government has signalled its commitment to an expanded, well-resourced sector that can tailor programs to meet the diverse interests and circumstances of future students.

Respondents then described the changes in their own words. Following examination of these descriptions, ten cases where the low threat condition had unintentionally made threat of fees salient were removed from the data. An independent *t*-test conducted on a one-item measure of perceived threat (i.e., “To what extent do you see the proposed changes as a threat?”) confirmed a significant difference, *t*(225) = -4.52, *p* < .001, between low threat and high threat conditions (*Ms* = 3.75, 4.72).

**Measures.** Intentions was assessed using three items from Study 1, tapping how much students intended to be actively involved, vote, and explain the benefits to another student (*α*=.84). The measures of efficacy (*α*=.79) and norm (*ρ*=.71) were as per Study 1,
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and the measure of legitimacy comprised three of the four items used in the previous studies ($\alpha=.81$; see Table 5).

Results

Following removal of four multivariate outliers, 223 cases were retained for the final analyses. The same hierarchical regression analyses were conducted as before (see Table 6).

Tables 5 and 6

As predicted the perceived norm was positively associated with union intentions independent of the effects of union beliefs. The threat manipulation did not have a direct effect on intentions and neither manipulated threat nor perceived norm moderated the role of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. However, support was found for significant Threat x Norm x Legitimacy ($\beta = -.13, p = .054$) and Threat x Norm x Efficacy ($\beta = -.16, p = .006$) interactions. The Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy interactions were again significant in the low threat condition, $\beta$s = .20, .25, $ps = .020, .005$, but not the high threat condition, $\beta$s = -.02, -.06, $ps = .831, .371$ (see Figures 4 and 5 for the Norm x Efficacy interactions).

Figures 4 and 5

As predicted, in the low threat condition a strong pro-union norm facilitated people acting in accordance with their legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, $\beta$s = .65, $ps < .001$. When the perceived norm was weak, there was a smaller, albeit significant effect of legitimacy, and no effect of efficacy beliefs, $\beta$s = .24, .14, $ps = .040, .236$.

In the high threat condition, where people perceived weaker normative support there was a positive relationship between legitimacy and intentions ($\beta = .25, ps = .013$) and between efficacy and intentions ($\beta = .25, p = .006$). That is to say, we found support for our
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prediction that high threat would provide the condition where those who believe in the union would disregard an attitudinally incongruent norm of weak support. Where people perceived stronger normative support, the relationship between legitimacy and intentions was only marginally significant ($\beta = .21, ps = .084$) and the relationship between efficacy and intention was non-significant ($\beta = .13, p = .297$). Inspection of the interactions suggested that those with weaker beliefs were lifting their intentions to be more commensurate with those who held strong beliefs. This is in accordance our prediction and with the notion that in times of threat, there are conditions such as awareness of others’ willingness to act which may mobilize less committed members.

**Discussion**

Across all three-studies, support was found for the proposition that whilst belief in the legitimate role of unions in the employment relationship and belief that one’s union can be effective in advancing employees’ interests are important to union intentions, one’s perceptions of the social context also matter. In support of H1, the perception of threat to group interests and of a normative environment supporting union behaviour made a direct and unique contribution to the models investigated. In support of H2, perceived threat facilitated students’ intentions to act on their legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, (Studies 1 and 3), and perceived pro-union norm facilitated academics’ intentions to act on these beliefs (Study 2). Finally, in support of H3, in the absence of threat there was evidence for pro-union norms facilitating intentions to act in accordance with one’s beliefs (Studies 2 & 3). In the presence of threat, people were intending to act in defiance of a weak norm of support for the union where they held strong legitimacy beliefs (Studies 2 & 3) and efficacy beliefs (Study 3). Moreover, a pro-union norm lifted the intentions of people with weaker legitimacy and efficacy beliefs (Study 3).
The focus of our research was how social context provides the conditions where people may be more or less likely to act in accordance with their union beliefs. In accordance with the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) our theoretical premise was that perceptions of intergroup threat and in-group norms are critical to the activation of group processes that may render group-related beliefs salient and meaningful guides to behaviour. In keeping with this premise, what was most clear across the studies was that in low threat contexts intentions were low and the more committed were prepared to be active only where it was normative to be so. That is to say in the absence of both threat and a pro-union normative environment ‘true-believers’ may remain inactive. This is consistent with activists’ understandings about the importance of visible union presence to the ongoing ‘maintenance’ behaviours that are so critical between periods of conflict. Further research on the intra-group processes involved in the day-to-day behaviours of core activists who maintain, build and shape collective action is thus sorely needed (see Louis, 2009).

When we turn to perceptions of high threat, the picture becomes more complex. This was a context in which we expected that consistent with strike-related research (e.g., Oliver, 1984), ‘true believers’ would be prepared to stand in solidarity with the union in defiance of the local norm and potentially in the face of defeat. We found the clearest evidence for this from those who held strong legitimacy beliefs with intentions if anything strengthenend where normative support was perceived to be low. Those with strong efficacy beliefs were also undeterred by a weak norm, although only in Study 3. One explanation that could not be tested here is that in this context, committed union members were identifying with those who shared their beliefs. High threat is also a context where theory and research (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Fosh, 1993; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000) suggest that those who are
less committed may self-categorize and be influenced by an in-group norm. We found evidence for this too, although only in Study 3.

We are mindful of the inconsistencies and limitations in this research and the importance therefore of not overstating our findings. Most particularly, this research was conducted with two very different groups; it was correlational and conducted in singular contexts where the salience of threat was not always clear; and we were only able to approximate behavior through the measure of intentions. To overcome these limitations requires longitudinal field research where an effort is made to trace ‘objective’ contextual changes associated with actual mobilization and de-mobilization. In so doing, one question that warrants closer attention is how we disentangle people’s perceptions of the ‘objective’ context (e.g., the perception that people are indeed united and that there is a contextual norm of support for a campaign) from more enduring identity-based beliefs (e.g., “the workers united will never be defeated”).

Notwithstanding the above caveat, our research is consistent with models showing that social support plays an important role in collective action via affirming people’s beliefs (van Zomeren, 2004). What is novel is that our research also suggests that there are conditions where low social support may lead to greater exertion on the part of the committed and where high social support may see non-believers drawn into the fold. These differential effects suggest that some benefit might be derived from drawing on the wider literature on social influence. For instance, in keeping with recent research addressing the ‘moral’ dimensions of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011), one direction of enquiry might be the role played by injunctive as well as descriptive norms. Smith and Louis (2008) have shown in a study of student activism that where strongly held principles are concerned, an injunctive norm that is congruent with one’s attitude is particularly influential and may indeed overcome the effects of a contradictory, incongruent descriptive norm.
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Taken together our research demonstrates that the processes involved in collective action are more dynamic and nuanced than is currently captured in our models. We conclude with the observation that examining these more dynamic processes is not just of theoretical importance. Central to current debates within union movements is concern about the demobilizing consequences of neoliberal models of unionism with their emphasis on demonstrating union contribution to productivity; and servicing models of unionism which individualise members’ interests (e.g., Milkman & Voss, 2004). Our research is in agreement with proponents of social movement unionism and the organizing model in suggesting that critical to the success of unions is the collectivisation of members through strategies that emphasise structural inequalities of power and create visible cultures of solidarity in the workplace.
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References


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Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, Intercorrelations, and Scale Reliabilities for Study 1

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***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 2

*Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 1*

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R² | .435 | .514 | .531 | .536 | .531 | .536 |

Fch | 109.94*** | 23.22*** | 3.30* | 4.51** | .37 | .00 |

*p < .05, *p < .01, **p < .001, two-tailed.*
Threat and norms: The context of union behavior

Table 3

*Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 2*

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***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.***
Threat and norms: The context of union behavior

Table 4

_Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 2_

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$p < .05$, $^* p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$, two-tailed.
Table 5

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 3

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***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
## Threat and norms: The context of union behavior

### Table 6

*Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 3*

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* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed.
Figure 1. Interaction between perceived threat and union legitimacy on union intention.
Figure 2. Interaction between perceived norm and union legitimacy on union intention in context of perceived low threat.
Figure 3. Interaction between perceived norm and union legitimacy on union intention in context of perceived high threat.
Figure 4. Interaction between perceived norm and union efficacy on union intention in condition of manipulated low threat.
Figure 5. Interaction between perceived norm and union efficacy on union intention in condition of manipulated high threat.