Do 'big losses' in judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts affect experts' behaviour?

Fotios Petropoulos, Robert Fildes, Paul Goodwin

1. Introduction

Accurate product demand forecasting is important to companies as forecasts are used in decisions relating to inventory control, production planning, purchasing, logistics, cash flow planning and other aspects of the business. A typical forecasting process includes pre-processing and analysis of the data, which are usually in the form of time series, extrapolating the series with a suitable statistical method (Petropoulos, Makridakis, Assimakopoulos, & Nikolopoulos, 2014), post-processing the statistical forecasts and monitoring and evaluating the outputs. The latter acts as feedback to inform the calculation of subsequent sets of forecasts. Often, the forecasting process is implemented within specialised forecasting software. This paper focuses on the third, post-processing, stage of the forecasting process, and more specifically on the judgmental interventions on statistical forecasts that are typically performed by demand planners and managers (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007b). Such interventions are common, with Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, and Nikolopoulos (2009) reporting that 91 percent of the forecasts examined in one organisation were subject to judgmental adjustments. Franses and Legerstee (2009) reported similar findings.

Human adjustments of the outputs of standard forecasting methods, like exponential smoothing or ARIMA models, are primarily made for four reasons. First, managers attempt to incorporate into the forecasts the expected impact of forthcoming special events, such as promotional activities, strikes, or the launch of a competing new product (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007a). Arguably, more formal methods that include external regressors could sometimes be used for this purpose (Huang, Fildes, & Soopramanien, 2014). However, limitations in the available quantitative data and the complexity of the models often renders judgmental adjustment as the only practical approach. Second, demand planners may tend to change statistical forecasts in order to be in-line with budgeting or politically-related targets set by senior managers (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007b). For example, in a field study Lawrence, O’Connor, and Edmundson (2000) questioned whether forecast accuracy was the primary objective of their company-based forecasters and suggested that their forecasts were heavily influenced by political choices within the company framework. Despite this, a recent survey by Fildes and Petropoulos (2015) showed that accuracy is generally the most important driver in the forecasting process, confirming earlier studies (for example see: McCarthy, Davis, Golicic, & Mentzer, 2006). Third, managers may adjust in order to gain a sense of ownership of the forecasts, possibly as a result of a lack of trust in the statistical methods, which they may regard as “black-boxes” (Önkal & Gönül, 2005). Lastly, humans are liable to confuse the signal with the noise (Harvey, 1995) and
introduce unnecessary judgmental adjustments as the result of perceived systematic changes that were not captured by the statistical methods (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999).

Previous studies of demand forecasting have focused on the efficiency of judgmental adjustments and the circumstances under which judgmental manipulation of statistical forecasts might be useful. Some studies proposed actions and strategies to prevent unnecessary interventions or to optimally combine statistics with judgment. See Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, and Onkal (2006) and Leitner and Leopold-Wildburger (2011) for reviews of progress in judgmental forecasting. Recently, researchers in behavioural operational research (Hämäläinen, Luoma, & Saarinen, 2013) have focused on finding links between forecast performance and experts’ behaviour (for example see: de Bruijn & Franses, 2012). Similarly, research on corporate earnings forecasting has examined the behavioural determinants of observed biases (Ramnath, Rock, & Shane, 2008). However, while demand forecasters usually have many products to forecast and obtain rapid feedback on accuracy, earnings analysts in contrast tend to focus more intensively on particular companies and observe the outcomes of their forecasts less frequently.

While a number of factors may affect forecasters’ behaviour, the occurrence of a significant event or outcome in the previous period may be particularly influential. In an interesting study by Smith, Levere, and Kurtzman (2009), poker players were found to change their strategy after significant wins or losses. Big losses were followed by playing less cautiously, with players tending to be more aggressive compared to their behaviour after big wins. Similar behaviours have been found in sports gambling (Xu & Harvey, 2014) and in financial markets (Coval & Shumway, 2005; Garvey, Murphy, & Wu, 2007). Here we investigate whether forecasters’ behaviour in relation to judgmental adjustments is affected by the experience of previous poor interventions and, if the effect is damaging to accuracy, how this might be mitigated. Specifically, we address the following research questions:

RQ1 How do adjustments to statistical forecasts that lead to large losses affect experts’ behaviour in performing interventions for the very next period?

RQ2 If judgmental adjustments are unduly influenced by large losses in the previous period what corrective actions would be likely to result in improved forecasting performance?

In order to deal with these two questions, we have to define what a big loss in a judgmentally adjusted forecast is. So, after a review of the background literature in Section 2, in Section 3 we propose a new way for classifying and measuring the quality of judgmental adjustments. Sections 4 and 5 attempt to answer the research questions by analysing a large empirical data set of judgmental adjustments to demand forecasts made by managers in a multinational company. Finally, the last section summarises the findings, offering conclusions as to their managerial implications.

2. Background literature

A few decades ago, most researchers discouraged managers from making judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts because it was believed that they would generally damage accuracy (Armstrong, 1985; Carbone, Andersen, Corriveau, & Corson, 1983). These researchers found evidence that judgment was associated with a wide range of biases including over-optimism, anchoring (Eroglu & Croxton, 2010), overconfidence (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Kottemann, Davis, & Remus, 1994), inconsistency, and confusion of the signal with the noise (Eggleton, 1982; O’Connor, Remus, & Griggs, 1993).

Mathews and Diamantopoulos were the first to show empirically through a series of company-based studies (Mathews & Diamantopoulos, 1986; 1989; 1990) that “forecast manipulation” can lead to improvements in accuracy. Interestingly, they showed that forecasters are more likely to adjust the forecasts that would have produced the largest forecast errors had the statistical forecasts remained unreviewed. Other researchers have provided further evidence on the efficacy of judgmentally adjusted forecasts in macroeconomics (Donihue, 1993; McNees, 1990; Turner, 1990), accounting earnings (Brown, 1988) and business forecasting (Vere & Griffiths, 1995; Wolfe & Flores, 1990). Syntetos, Nikolopoulos, and Boylan (2010) showed that in addition to the improvements in performance as measured by traditional error metrics, judgmental adjustments of demand forecasts also result in significant reductions in inventory costs. The common factor in these studies is that when important domain knowledge is missing from the statistical forecasts, this can be integrated efficiently into the operational forecasts by applying judgmental adjustments to improve performance. However, two key elements affecting the success of an intervention are the reliability and importance of the missing information (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999) and the requirement that humans should not discount reliable statistical forecasts (Donihue, 1993).

Despite these findings, there is considerable evidence from both field and laboratory studies that relatively accurate statistical forecasts are frequently judgmentally adjusted without reference to domain knowledge or its reliability (Fildes et al., 2009; Goodwin, 2000). A particularly salient cue that the forecasters are likely to be prompted with is the latest error and this raises the question: to what extent are such adjustments a behavioural response to an error resulting from a judgmental adjustment in the previous period, and in particular, a large error, as this is likely to be especially prominent? For example, do forecasters have a propensity to make a large adjustment after a previous adjustment has led to a large error, even when they have no reliable domain knowledge to justify such an intervention?

The literature suggests a number of possible behavioural reactions to an adjustment in the previous period that has led to a large error. There are two reasons why the subsequent adjustment might be large: a) greater risk taking behaviour by the forecaster and b) overreaction to outcome feedback. Smith et al. (2009) found that, after large losses in games of poker, players engaged in more aggressive and riskier gambles (see also Xu & Harvey, 2014). They largely attributed this to the break-even hypothesis whereby, after sustaining a large loss, the players were prepared to take risks in an attempt to cancel out the loss. In demand forecasting a large adjustment may be a sign of risk taking behaviour. To make a large adjustment following a previous damaging intervention may be a brave action that risks further compounding both financial costs and damage to the forecaster’s reputation. Significantly, it involves an act of commission. While, not making an adjustment when it was warranted would risk one being guilty of an act of omission, there is evidence that an erroneous act of commission is seen as worse than an erroneous act of omission (Spranca, Minsky, & Baron, 1991).

However, decisions in poker games differ from forecasting judgments in several ways so the break-even hypothesis might not apply in the forecasting context. First, the concept of losses and gains differs between the two concepts. In the context of demand forecasting we define a gain as an improvement in accuracy as a result of an adjustment, while a loss is a reduction in accuracy. Thus large losses are to be distinguished from large forecast errors. A forecaster’s adjustment may actually lead to a gain in accuracy compared to the statistical forecast, but a large error may still result. Second, the outcomes of poker games are independent while observations in time series are usually dependent. Intervals between poker games are likely to be shorter than the periods between successive demand forecasts so that immediate emotional reactions to poor judgments are likely to be less prevalent in demand forecasting. Also, traditional poker players are likely to be engaged in one game at a time while most demand forecasters will have the task of forecasting many series (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007b) over long periods so that a large forecast error in
one series at one point in time will be less prominent than the consequences of a poor judgment in poker.

In particular, errors in forecasts differ from financial losses and gains so that adjustment significantly improves accuracy will not necessarily compensate for a preceding intervention that reduced accuracy. For example, experts’ reputations are more easily lost than gained (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). While prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) suggests that people do tend to risk even further losses to try to negate current loss, the idea of forecasters making a large reckless adjustment to a forecast for an individual product in order to recover their reputation, because their previous adjustment had significantly damaged accuracy, seems less plausible. Hence, demand forecasting seems unlikely to be associated with the break-even hypothesis.

Nevertheless, there are still reasons to believe that forecasters may tend to make large adjustments following large errors and these reasons are related to the direction of adjustment. First, it is known that forecasters have a tendency to overreact to outcome feedback, which will, in part, reflect the noise in a time series (Lawrence et al., 2006). For example, an outcome that is significantly higher than a forecast may be interpreted as a sign that an upward movement in the signal has occurred even when much of the error can be attributed to noise. As a consequence, the subsequent forecast may be subject to considerable upwards adjustment. This causes it to be too high and a large error in one direction is followed by a large error in the opposite direction. Where the initial large error largely results from the forecaster’s adjustment then the forecaster will incur a loss (as defined above). Assuming that forecasters receive outcome feedback on the success or otherwise of their adjustments then large adjustments following large losses would be manifested in a tendency for large adjustments to be made in the same direction as the previous large error so that a positive adjustment will follow a positive error (where error = actual – forecast) and vice versa.

Alternatively, forecasters may persist in making large adjustments in the opposite direction to the previous large error. For example, a significant upwards adjustment, resulting in a negative error and a large loss may still be followed by a large upwards adjustment. This behaviour is likely to incur similarly large errors in the same direction. This may in part relate to the gambler’s fallacy where chance events are perceived to be self-correcting (Smith et al., 2009). For example, a forecaster might expect that a run of lower than expected sales figures that are judged to be due to random factors will be balanced in the future by higher sales because ‘on average half the sales are lower and half are higher than expected’. The probable result would be a persistent tendency to over-forecast as the ‘compensating’ higher-than-expected sales are awaited.

However, there may be other reasons for the persistency of large errors of the same sign after big losses including an unforeseen delay in an expected special event and, when decisions are associated with asymmetric loss, a confusion of forecasts with decisions. For example, this may occur when, in order to meet customer service targets, decisions are made to hold inventory at two standard deviations above expected sales but these decisions are represented as forecasts of expected demand (Fildes et al., 2009). There is also evidence that people are reluctant to modify a previous act of commission and persist in pursuing the same action (Staw, 1976). This can occur despite evidence that continuing the action is counterproductive (Lim & O’Connor, 1995). Persistent errors of the same sign represent a rejection of outcome feedback and can result from a belief that what happened in the last period is irrelevant.

Of course, there are reasons why big losses might tend to be followed by relatively small adjustments. Following the poker analogy (Smith et al., 2009), a large loss may have negative effects on a forecaster’s confidence in his or her ability to contribute to forecast accuracy for a given product. This would also lead to a propensity to avoid a large adjustment in the subsequent period. In other cases a big loss in the previous period may have been associated with an inability to forecast the effects of a special event. In the subsequent period, when no special event is anticipated, an adjustment might not be considered to be necessary.

On balance, the literature suggests the following hypothesis:

H1 Experts are more likely to make large judgmental adjustments to forecasts in periods following big losses.

H1 implies that forecasters are likely to pay attention to the latest loss and this is also fairly supported by responses to a questionnaire administered by Boulaksil and Franses (2009). Here the experts of the pharmaceutical company (on which our later analysis is based) indicated that they review their past forecasting performance when making new forecasts. Also, there is some evidence that these experts compare the performance of the statistical forecasts with that of their own forecasts. As we have seen, outcome feedback will be expected to cause forecasters to adjust in the direction suggested by their previous error. Hence, we have:

H2 Following a big loss, experts are more likely to make adjustments in same direction as the previous large error.

The preceding hypotheses suggest that, following a large loss, large adjustments will be made based largely on the basis of outcome feedback. Since, this feedback relates only to the latest period and is contaminated by noise it is an unreliable basis for these large adjustments which are therefore likely to be seriously detrimental to forecast accuracy. Hence we hypothesise:

H3 Big losses are more likely in the period following a big loss.

3. A new measure for understanding judgmental adjustments

3.1. Types of judgmental adjustments and their effects on accuracy

Generally, the effects of judgmental adjustments can be divided into three types, graphically depicted in Fig. 1. Wrong direction adjustments are interventions in the opposite direction compared to the sign of the deviation between real outcome and statistical forecast. These adjustments always lead to inferior accuracy in the final
forecast compared to the statistical forecast. Undershoots refer to re-
victions that are to the correct direction, but not enough to fully ex-
plain the true outcome. Despite that, undershoots always improve forecast accuracy, as adjustments of this type decrease the differ-
ence between statistics and reality. Lastly, overshoots are interven-
tions to the correct direction, but of magnitude larger than the ‘op-
timal’. Overshoots may lead to either improvements or deteriora-
tion in forecasting performance, depending on the magnitude of the adjustment.

3.2. The β coefficient in judgmental adjustments

In this study we are interested in analysing the behaviour of ex-
erts in performing adjustments directly after revisions that resulted in big losses. So, we have to first answer the question ‘what is a big loss?’. However, to the best of our knowledge the definition of ‘big losses’ is absent from the literature. Arguably, it could be linked to wrong direction and overshoot adjustments, but a non-arbitrary quantitative measure of the type, quality and magnitude of a sin-
gle judgmental adjustment is needed. In this section, we define a new measure for understanding judgmental revisions of statistical forecasts. This new measure enables us to analyse the behaviour of experts when performing judgmental adjustments, focusing on the cases after big losses.

Let us assume that the statistical output of a forecasting method is unbiased. This means that the cumulative signed forecast error over a large number of periods is zero. In other words, any optimistic statisti-
cal point forecasts are balanced off by other pessimistic ones, and vice versa. Let us also assume that there is a deviation between the true outcome and the statistical prediction. In essence, this deviation, or statistical forecast error, is to be reconciled by an ideal judgmen-
tal adjustment. In other words, the aim of a judgmental adjustment is to alter the statistical output by the construction of an expert forecast which will be closer or even equal to the actual value. Given the aforementioned assumptions, we can regard the quality of a judgmental adjustment as a percentage of the deviation between the statistical forecast and the actual outcome.

We define a scale-free measure for identifying the type, quality, and magnitude of a judgmental adjustment:

$$\beta_t = \frac{EF_t - SF_t}{Y_t - SF_t} = \frac{FD_t}{RD_t}$$ (1)

where:

- \(Y_t\): actual value at time \(t\).
- \(SF_t\): statistical forecast at time \(t\).
- \(EF_t\): expert forecast at time \(t\) produced given the statistical baseline \((SF_t)\). It may be equal to \(SF_t\). Most usually, this is used as the final (operational) forecast.
- \(RD_t\): real difference that needs to be reconciled or difference between actual and statistical forecast \((Y_t - SF_t)\).
- \(FD_t\): forecasts’ difference or difference between expert forecast and statistical forecast \((EF_t - SF_t)\). This is the actual judgmental adjustment.

This measure gives the signed ratio of the judgmental adjustment to the error in the statistical forecast. A positive sign denotes an ad-
njustment in the correct direction, while negative \(\beta\) values refer to wrong direction adjustments. The interpretation of this measure is very intuitive. For example, \(\beta = 0.5\) means that only 50 percent of the statistical forecast error has been removed by the judgmental ad-
njustment, \(\beta = 1\) refers to a perfect adjustment (100 percent of the statistical forecast error is removed by judgment), while \(\beta = 1.5\) in-
dicates that judgment is over-compensating (by 50 percent) for the statistical forecast’s error. A linkage of \(\beta\) values with different types of adjustments is provided in Table 1. We also provide a translation of the different values of \(\beta\) with the effect of the adjustment on forecast accuracy, when compared to no adjustment.

While some of the critical values derive directly from the definition of this new measure, the values of \(\beta\) for which an adjustment is translated to a ‘big loss’ rather than just a loss may differ in various applications. However, we opt for retaining the symmetry of the critical values and therefore propose that a big loss may be regarded as the result of an adjustment that deviates by more than 200 percent from a perfect adjustment (i.e. has a \(\beta\) value of less than –1 or greater than 3).

A limitation of this measure is that it does not distinguish be-
 tween upwards and downwards adjustments, which proved to be of some importance in other studies (Fildes et al., 2009, Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes, & Kourentzes, 2013). A further limitation is that \(\beta\) is undefined in the extreme case that the statistical forecast coincides with the actual value (the error of the statistical forecast is zero). In this case, we argue that a no-adjustment is the optimal behaviour (maximum gain), resulting in a \(\beta\) coefficient of 1. If an adjustment has been made, then the \(\beta\) coefficient will be infinite, denoting that this adjustment significantly deteriorates the accuracy (compared to the statistical forecast), so it is a big loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of adjustment</th>
<th>Value of (\beta)</th>
<th>Effect on accuracy, compared to no adjustment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XL overshoot</td>
<td>(\beta &gt; 3)</td>
<td>Big loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L overshoot</td>
<td>(2 &lt; \beta \leq 3)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overshoot</td>
<td>(\beta = 2)</td>
<td>No gain nor loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overshoot</td>
<td>(1 &lt; \beta &lt; 2)</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot-on</td>
<td>(\beta = 1)</td>
<td>Maximum gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undershoot</td>
<td>(0 &lt; \beta &lt; 1)</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No adjustment</td>
<td>(\beta = 0)</td>
<td>No gain nor loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong direction</td>
<td>(-1 \leq \beta &lt; 0)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L wrong direction</td>
<td>(\beta &lt; -1)</td>
<td>Big loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. Links to the literature

Let us now see how this new measure links to the existing litera-
ture on judgmental adjustments. Franses and Legerstee (2011a) ex-
amine the effectiveness of linearly combining the statistical and ex-
pert forecasts. So, they suggest that a final forecast at time \(t\) \((FF_t)\) may be derived as:

$$FF_t = \alpha_t EF_t + (1 - \alpha_t) SF_t \leftrightarrow$$ (2)

$$FF_t = SF_t + \alpha_t (EF_t - SF_t) \leftrightarrow$$ (3)

$$FF_t = SF_t + \alpha_t FD_t \leftrightarrow$$ (4)

$$Y_t - FF_t = Y_t - SF_t - \alpha_t FD_t$$ (5)

where \(\alpha_t\) is the weight to be assigned on the expert forecast at time \(t\). Obviously, the weight to be assigned on the statistical forecast should be \(1 - \alpha_t\), so that the summation of the two weights is unity.

Letting \(Y_t - FF_t\) being the forecast error at time \(t\) \((e_t)\), Eq. (5) gives:

$$e_t = RD_t - \alpha_t FD_t$$ (6)

From Eq. (6), for \(e_t = 0\):

$$\alpha_t = \frac{RD_t}{FD_t} = \frac{1}{\beta_t}$$ (7)

So, the optimal weights for combining the statistical forecast \((SF_t)\) and the expert forecast \((EF_t)\) in order to end up with a zero forecast error are \(1 - \frac{1}{\beta_t}\) and \(\frac{1}{\beta_t}\), respectively. For example, if \(\beta_t\) reflects a sit-
uation where only \(0.4\) of a required upwards adjustment has been

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made, a weighted average of the statistical and expert forecast using respective weights of $-1.5$ and $2.5$ would yield a perfectly accurate forecast. It is worth mentioning that the optimal weights, along with the $\beta$ values, are likely to change over time.

Hyndman and Koehler (2006) define the relative error as the ratio of the forecast error deriving from a method whose performance is to be measured divided by the error of a benchmark method. For example, the relative absolute error (RAE) incurred for a statistical forecast, $SF_t$, for time $t$ can be defined as:

$$RAE_t = \frac{|Y_t - SF_t|}{|SF_t - SF^{b}_t|}$$

(8)

where $SF^{b}_t$ and $e^t$ refer to the statistical forecast and the respective forecast error of the benchmark method. Following Davydenko and Fildes (2013), we can replace the benchmark method in Eq. (8) with the pure statistical forecast and the method in the numerator with the expert forecast (the one containing the judgmental adjustment). By doing this, we can directly compare the performance of the expert forecast relatively to the statistical forecast:

$$RAE_t = \frac{|e^{SF}_t|}{|Y_t - SF_t|} = \left| Y_t - EF_t \right|$$

(9)

However, Eq. (9) can be rewritten as:

$$RAE_t = \frac{|Y_t - SF_t - (EF_t - SF_t)|}{|Y_t - SF_t|} = 1 - \frac{FD_t}{RD_t} = |1 - \beta_t|$$

(10)

So, the $\beta$ is also linked with the relative absolute error of the expert forecast, using the statistical forecast as the benchmark. This is an important property which provides a direct relationship of the $\beta$ with a recently introduced error measure (Average Relative Mean Absolute Error or AvgRelMAE, Davydenko & Fildes, 2013) for evaluating judgmentally adjusted forecasts across different periods and multiple time series.

4. Analysing expert forecasts

4.1. The data

In order to examine the behaviour of experts in performing judgmental adjustments after big losses, we consider a database that was initially introduced in a study by Franses and Legerstee (2009) and was afterwards used in other studies by the same researchers (for example see Franses & Legerstee, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2013; Legerstee & Franses, 2014). This database contains the monthly sales of 1,101 pharmaceutical stock keeping units (SKUs). The SKUs come from 37 countries and were the responsibility of 50 different managers.

The length of each series is 25 months, spanning from October 2004 to October 2006. Besides the actual sales ($Y_t$) in each period the database also contains the statistical ($SF_t$) and expert forecast ($EF_t$).

However, missing values exist for some periods in specific SKUs. We focus on the 774 time series where the triplet $Y, SF$, and $EF$ is available for all periods. $SF$ is automatically provided by some forecasting software which utilises historical information (lagged sales) and individually (per series) select an optimal method from a set of alternatives (such as Box-Jenkins or Holt-Winters). The method itself and the optimised parameters may change across origins. For more details, please see Franses and Legerstee (2009, 2013).

A typical time series from the database is presented in Fig. 2. This shows all different types of judgmental adjustments. For example, undershoots occurred at periods 7 and 17, overshoots are observed at periods 4 and 6, while wrong-direction adjustments are recorded for periods 3 and 5.

4.2. Analysis of all judgmental adjustments

As the target is to identify the effect of big losses in the very next judgmental adjustment, we first calculate the percentage of judgmental adjustments of each type identified in Table 1. The analysis is performed for the periods $t = 2, 3, \ldots, 25$, leaving out of the observations for the very first period. This is because periods with lag one will be used later to identify periods where judgmental adjustments occurred after big losses. To simplify the analysis, we excluded the limited number of cases where $\beta = 0$ (2 percent of the total cases), indicating that no adjustments were made despite deviations between the actual values and statistical forecasts. So, the effective sample for the current analysis contains more than 18,000 judgmental adjustments (774 time series × 24 periods – 384 cases where $\beta = 0$). The cases where $\beta \in [0, 1]$ are pooled together, creating the “undershoot or spot-on” group. Similarly, for $\beta \in [1, 2]$ in the case of small overshoots.

The relative frequency (percentage of cases) of each type of adjustment is depicted in Fig. 3. Undershoots (and spot-on) are the most common type of adjustments (36 percent of the cases), with small wrong direction adjustments being the second most common. These two categories together constitute 57 percent of the adjustments. Thus, managers have a tendency to perform relatively small adjustments. So, in the majority of cases, the absolute magnitude of the interventions is not enough to remove the difference between the

![Fig. 2. Example of a time series and the respective information contained in the database.](image)

![Fig. 3. Analysis of all judgmental adjustments.](image)
actual outcome and the statistical forecast. This is a result that is consistent with findings in other studies (Fildes et al., 2009).

Only 49 percent of the adjustments lead to improvements in accuracy (i.e. they are undershoots, spot-on adjustments or small overshoots). This is in line with previous studies on the same database, where it was found that, when averaged across countries and categories of products, only in 43 percent of the cases expert forecasts were better than statistical ones (Franses & Legerstee, 2010). Hence, for more than half of the cases adjustments to the statistical forecasts result in deterioration in accuracy. On top of that, in 25.4 percent of cases the adjustments led to big losses (i.e. βs had values lower than −1 or greater than 3).

### 4.3. Analysis of judgmental adjustments after big losses

We first test H1 and investigate whether there is an association between the size of adjustment in a given period and whether or not a big loss occurred in the previous period. To control for different levels of volatility in the series we divided each absolute adjustment by the standard deviation of the statistical forecasts. We then categorised these normalised adjustments as being small if they were below the median of all adjustments in the database, large if they were between the median and 75th percentile and very large if they were above the 75th percentile. We next examine the consequences of this behaviour on losses by examining the association between β_t and β_{t-1}. When the chi-squared test of independence was applied to Table 3, there appeared to be a dependence between losses and where the adjustment is large or very large. It suggests that H2 should be rejected and indicates that after a large loss forecasters are more likely to persist in adjusting forecasts in the opposite direction to that suggested by the error.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Size of adjustment following different values of β.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment size at t</td>
<td>L wrong direction ( \beta_{t-1} &lt; -1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>1331 (−10.3 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>736 (0.2 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>870 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Transition matrix for previous and current β values.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β_t (type of adjustment at t)</td>
<td>L wrong direction ( \beta_{t-1} &lt; -1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L wrong direction ( \beta_{t-1} &lt; -1 )</td>
<td>621 (23.3 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate loss or gain (-1 \leq \beta_{t-1} \leq 3)</td>
<td>1978 (−10.7 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL overshoot ( \beta_{t-1} &gt; 3 )</td>
<td>337 (20.0 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentage differences of the realised frequencies compared to the expected ones, assuming independence, are in brackets.

1 Largest contributions to chi-squared statistic.
The results presented in the previous subsection indicate that after a big loss forecasters have a tendency to make an adjustment for the following period that is large and in a direction that is opposite to that suggested by their previous error. For example, if they have incurred a big loss by forecasting too high in the previous period they are still more likely to make a large upwards adjustment in the following period, even though this behaviour increases the probability of a second big loss. Thus, rather than overreacting to outcome feedback, the experts appear to be ignoring it. There are a number of possible explanations for this.

The first possibility is that the forecasts are subject to asymmetric loss. In the pharmaceutical industry being out-of-stock is more serious than having surplus stocks, as holding costs of drugs are relatively low so the forecasters may have an incentive to persist in making upwards adjustments to statistical forecasts. An analysis of this data set by Franses, Legerstee, and Paap (2011) concluded that there was evidence that the experts’ forecasts were subject to asymmetric loss. However, overall 57.8 percent of the adjustments to the statistical forecasts were in the upwards direction so forecasts were frequently lowered. Moreover, it seems unlikely that relatively rare very large changes to the statistical forecasts would be made because of asymmetric loss. Given that the same loss function would be likely to apply to a series for long periods, asymmetric loss would be more likely to lead to a pattern of consistent changes rather than the occasional very large adjustment. Indeed, the loss functions identified by Franses et al. (2011) would be consistent with moderate adjustments.

A second possibility is that the forecasters were suffering from the gambler’s fallacy and expecting that a chance event that produced unforeseen and exceptional sales in the previous period would be ‘balanced out’ by an exceptional sales movement in the opposite direction in the next period. If this is the case we would expect that the statistical forecast error in the period preceding a big loss would be exceptionally high. In fact, the statistical forecast errors tended to be slightly lower than average in the period preceding a big loss. The mean absolute statistical forecast error, normalised by dividing by the standard deviation of the statistical forecasts for each series, was 1.31 for all periods and 1.23 in the periods immediately preceding a big loss.

A third possibility is that a special event that would have a large impact on sales was known to be occurring in the future but the timing of its effects was misjudged. If the effect of the event failed to materialise in one period then it might be expected to occur in the subsequent period instead or in the period after that. If this was the case then in the period after two consecutive periods of big losses we might expect the statistical forecast error to be higher as it failed to forecast the special event when it finally occurred. Again there was no support for this. In the periods after two big losses the normalised mean absolute statistical forecast error was lower than the norm at 1.11.

This leaves the possibility that the forecasters were prepared to make bold interventions on the basis of unreliable information or a misinterpretation of information and that they were prepared to persist in making large adjustments on this basis even when there was evidence from the previous period that this had reduced forecast accuracy and they had incurred a big loss. Their persistence in making a large wrong direction adjustment following an earlier such adjustment suggests a resistance to recognising a step change in sales. This could indicate that information pointing to such a change was either not available or was discounted. Such behaviour might occur when the initial large loss is simply attributed to a transient shock to the system. Their persistence in making an adjustment that resulted in a large overshoot, following an earlier such adjustment, is consistent with an expectation of a step change in sales that is not forthcoming. Again, this may reflect a lack of availability of reliable information or the misinterpretation of such information.

If the forecasters’ judgments were being distorted by unreliable information this would not be consistent with the results of a laboratory study by Remus, O’Connor, and Griggs (1998) which found that judgmental forecasters were not necessarily misled by incorrect information. However, in the Remus study people were supplied with rumours that suggested particular future movements in time series, but no reasons or arguments to support these possible movements were provided. In the field there is likely to be a richer variety of information and misinformation available to forecasters who have the difficult task of assessing its reliability, relevance and importance. Motivational and political factors may contribute to the misinterpretation of information. For example, wishful thinking may lead to the discounting of negative information if an increase in sales is desired (Tyebjee, 1987). A desire to produce forecasts that are politically acceptable to senior managers may have a similar effect on how information is interpreted and whether it is discounted (Fildes & Hastings, 1994).

The findings in Section 4.3 are insensitive to the values of the thresholds for defining big losses. A replication of the analysis using as a threshold for big losses an adjustment that deviated by more than 150 percent or 250 percent (instead of 200 percent) from a perfect adjustment produced practically the same results. However, some of the results differed when the threshold was set to 100 percent, which is equivalent to no separation between moderate losses and big losses. In this case, there is no change in experts’ behaviour with regards to the size of adjustment after a wrong direction adjustment (H1). This indicates that differentiating between moderate losses and big losses has enhanced our understanding of forecaster behaviour.

In addition, directional analysis has been performed in order to check if there are any differences in experts’ behaviour after a big
loss that was the result of a positive or a negative adjustment. While generally big losses are observed more frequently after positive adjustments (a result that corroborates with Fildes et al. (2009)), there are no significant differences in subsequent experts’ behaviour linked with the direction of the adjustment at the previous period. In both cases, positive and negative adjustments that resulted in big losses at period \( t - 1 \) are more likely to be followed by another big loss at period \( t \), as the result of a large or very large adjustment, contrary to the direction suggested by the previous error.

So, to address the first research question, following big losses, experts are more likely to make large judgmental adjustments in the opposite direction to the previous large error. Also, it is more likely that these adjustments will lead once again to another big loss.

### 4.5. Forecasting performance

Table 5 presents the performance of the experts forecasts (judgmentally adjusted statistical forecasts). This is provided for the different values of \( \beta \) at period \( t - 1 \) that refer to the various types of judgmental adjustments occurred in the previous period. Moreover, the results are presented separately for each group with regards to the size of adjustments at time \( t \). The forecasting performance is measured in terms of accuracy by the Average Relative Mean Absolute Error (AvgRelMAE). As mentioned in Section 3, this error measure benchmarks the performance of the expert forecasts comparing it directly to that of the statistical forecasts. Values lower than unity denote improvement in performance compared to the benchmark, while values greater than one indicate deterioration in forecast accuracy. The AvgRelMAE is applied after considering a symmetric trimming mean so that any extreme values are eliminated, as suggested by Davydenko and Fildes (2013). We opt for a 2 percent trimming level.

The first observation is that for this specific data set, judgmental adjustments are overall worse by 2.1 percent compared to the statistical benchmark. This result agrees with previous research by Franses and Legerstee (2010). A possible explanation for this is that managers may not always have domain knowledge that needs to be incorporated in the system forecasts but just interfere to take control and ownership of the forecasts. The “illusion of control” is a well-known disadvantage in management judgment (Kottemann et al., 1994). In order to have a more clear view about this statistic, let us focus on the different groups with regards to the type of adjustment made at time \( t - 1 \) as measured by the \( \beta \) coefficient.

We observe that after a moderate gain or loss \((-1 \leq \beta_{t - 1} \leq 3)\) experts’ interventions lead to improving the statistical forecasts by 1.7 percent on average. This improvement is even larger (5.1 percent) if we further analyse the data focusing on the cases where adjustments at time \( t \) follow a gain at \( t - 1 \) \((0 \leq \beta_{t - 1} \leq 2)\). On the other hand, the average value of AvgRelMAE is significantly higher than unity for the judgmental adjustments that follow big losses. In fact, these adjustments are on average 14.2 percent worse than the statistical forecasts. Also, while the deterioration occurs for any sizes of adjustments, the value of the AvgRelMAE increases together with the size of adjustment after a big loss. This indicates that very large adjustments after big losses resulted in significant losses in forecasting performance.

So, experts’ large-sized adjustments after big losses may significantly hurt forecast accuracy. As such, it is of critical importance that we try to reduce, eliminate or adjust the interventions made after big losses. We will try to address this in the next section by controlling and correcting the experts’ behaviour.

### 5. Supporting forecasters’ behaviour

So far we have shown through a very large database that big losses in judgmental adjustments negatively affect forecasters’ behaviour. The obvious next step is how can we limit these negative effects or even take advantage of them. In this section, we introduce some strategies as to support the forecasters’ behaviour with regards to judgmental interventions occurring after big losses.

We identify three simple strategies that could be potentially applied in such cases

- **Guidance.** Given that the judgmental adjustments are performed within a specialised computer software (Forecasting Support System or FSS), users could be exposed to information with regards to their past performance. In addition, they could be advised not to perform any correcting actions (interventions) when producing forecasts for periods that follow big losses as a result from experts’ adjustments, as these have empirically shown to lead to decreased forecasting performance. Decisional guidance for support systems has been previously suggested in the literature (for example see Silver, 1991; Sauter, 1997; Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2007).

- **Restrictiveness.** This strategy suggests that any judgmental interventions should be simply disregarded. In other words, the final forecast should be equal to the statistical forecast, \( \alpha = 0 \) in Eq. (2). This suggests that we assume the expert forecast does not provide any additional insights (\( \beta_t = \pm \infty \)). When implemented into a FSS, managers should (by default) not be able to intervene at all on the statistical outputs after big-losses periods.

- **50 percent statistics + 50 percent judgment.** This strategy is also known as the Blattberg–Hoch approach and is based on the argument that “any combinations of forecasts proves more accurate than the single inputs” (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). As such, this strategy suggests the use of unconditional 50–50 percent weights applied for linearly combining statistical and judgmental inputs. From Eq. (2), \( \alpha \) should be simply replaced with 0.5 for all periods \( t \); equivalently, as suggested by Eq. (7),
the ex-ante prediction for $\beta_1$ is 2 for any future period. The Blattberg–Hoch approach by definition works on sets of forecasts that have been independently produced. In the case of judgmental adjustments, though, it acts as a damper on the adjustments (Fildes et al., 2009). As such, it might be beneficial when managers tend to over-adjust, as it is the case after big losses. In any case, it has shown promising performance when applied for combining statistical and expert forecasts (Fildes et al., 2009; Franses & Legerstee, 2011a). While Franses and Legerstee (2011a) applied it unconditionally on the same database examined in this study, Fildes et al. (2009) identified positive adjustments as those benefiting from the 50–50 percent strategy. Here we focus on the application of this strategy strictly after big losses, which are found to be linked with large adjustments at the next period.

Table 6 presents the forecasting performance when each one of the aforementioned strategies (column 1) is applied to the judgmental adjustments following big losses. The performance of the current practice (no action in correcting adjustments after big losses) is provided as well. The forecasting performance is measured in terms of AvgRelMAE. Apart from providing the results generally after a big loss independently of its direction (column 2), we also distinguish between big losses as a result of a large wrong direction adjustment and extra-large overshoots (columns 3 and 4, respectively). Finally, the last column provides the overall accuracy, measured as the AvgRelMAE across all periods, when the proposed strategy is applied to the periods after a big loss. In other words, it presents the improvements in the overall forecasting performance when taking actions only after an expert adjustment that resulted in a very large forecast error compared to the statistical forecast.

Assuming that the judgmental adjustment was prevented by appropriate guidance and advice in 50 percent of the cases, the first strategy essentially halves the difference in the performance between expert forecasts and the benchmark (statistical forecasts). Generally, the improvement in the forecasting performance as a result of the guidance strategy can be regarded as a function of the percentage of managers that essentially follow the provided advice. At the same time, the guidance (after big losses) strategy leads to 1.5 percent improvement of the judgmental adjustments overall compared to the current practice.

Restrictiveness, as expected, results in values of 1 for the AvgRelMAE after a big loss. It is very interesting, however, that when this strategy is applied, the overall performance of experts’ interventions is for the first time positive (AvgRelMAE = 0.989), improving the relative performance of statistical forecasts by 1.1 percent overall.

Last but not least, the Blattberg–Hoch 50–50 percent approach seems to work best for this data set. By applying an equal weight combination of statistics and experts, we end up with final forecasts that are up to 16 percent better than the expert forecasts. The approach also delivers improvements over the statistical forecasts demonstrating there is value in the judgmental adjustments. Increases in accuracy are more substantial after an extra-large overshoot, where, as shown in Section 4.3, it is more probable that another extra-large overshoot will occur in the next period. The dampening of these overshoots most likely leads to final forecasts with $\beta < 2$, meaning gains in forecast accuracy. It is worth mentioning that this strategy improves almost 2/3 of the adjustments after big losses.

So, to address the second research question, by taking simple corrective actions for just the 1/4 of the judgmental interventions (the ones made after big losses), not only are we able to tackle the poor performance following such adjustments, but also to improve the overall forecasting performance by 4 percent compared to the current practice (from 1.021 to 0.981, according to Table 6). This translates into an improvement in the performance relative to statistical forecasts of 1.9 percent.

6. Concluding remarks

Judgmental adjustments of statistical forecasts are very common in companies and other organisations. However, the integration of field knowledge and soft data through judgment is not always performed in the most effective way. As a result, judgmental interventions do not always lead to improved accuracy and in some cases such adjustments lead to significant performance losses. Thus, it is important for organisations to understand the conditions under which judgmental adjustments are more likely to fail.

This paper focuses on the cases where judgmental adjustments are made after significant accuracy losses have resulted from adjustments made in the previous period. After defining a new measure for interpreting the type, magnitude and quality of judgmental adjustments, we examined, through a large empirical data set, the behaviour of forecasters after performing adjustments that led to big losses. We showed that the probability of performing an adjustment that leads to big loss increases in a period following one where a big loss has already occurred. Despite the earlier loss the probability of making a large adjustment in the opposite direction to the one suggested by the previous forecasts error also increases following a big loss. After a big loss forecasters have a propensity to persist in their belief that similar large changes to the statistical forecast are needed despite evidence from outcome feedback that the previous change led to lower accuracy. This appears to be because forecasters are prepared to make repeated bold adjustments based on inaccurate information. Explanations based on asymmetric loss, the gambler’s fallacy or misjudging the timing of the effects to special events were not supported by the data. In terms of forecast accuracy, these adjustments produced forecasts that were on average 14 percent worse than that of statistical methods alone.

Simple correction strategies, such as guidance, restrictiveness and unweighted combination of statistical and expert forecasts, can be applied to improve the forecasting performance after big losses. In fact, we recorded improvements of up to 16 percent for these periods. The overall gain in accuracy is 4 percent and this is coming from adjusting further just a quarter of the total number of adjustments. Given the simplicity of the proposed strategies, this result is of practical importance.

The phenomenon identified here potentially applies to other operational situations. Its essential feature is of experts misunderstanding...


