The ‘Activist Identity’ and Activism Across Domains: A Multiple Identities Analysis

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Abstract

The present research examines the extent to which activist networks and activist identification are associated with intentions to engage in future activism (Study 1) as well as longitudinal self-report collective action (Study 2). The idea that activist identification plays a generic facilitating role for cross-domain activism, akin to a behavioural or self-identity, is reconsidered, in Study 2, in favour of a more contextual approach such that specific identities (e.g., national, political, and as supporters of specific cross-domain activism) may play facilitating but also inhibitory roles. The organizing principles for these intersectionalities are discussed in terms of ideological conflict and normative fit.
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When we think of activism it is perhaps the image of a young person confronting police that springs most readily to mind. But activism -- or the willingness to step forward and work for the interests of our group or community -- is more commonplace. We observe it in school p & c campaigns for healthy lunches; workplace struggles over health and safety; and competition over the leadership and vision shaping our clubs and churches. Moreover, in many instances we can observe the same people stepping forward. For traditional collective action research the empirical reality of activists operating across domains and social issues presents a theoretical challenge. Central to this research is the role of identity. Some approaches consider identification with each social movement as the proximal predictor, with other identities irrelevant or perhaps even functionally antagonistic (e.g., Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009a, 2009b; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Other approaches position an activist identity as the core driver of politicisation, mediating between distal predictors such as social category identification and intentions to engage in specific activism (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Yet how generic the activist identity is, is open to question.

The present research tests two mechanisms by which generic activist social network size (Study 1) and peace activist social network size (Study 2) might influence generic activist identification and peace activist intentions, as well as how cross-domain activism (e.g., involvement in other social movements or forms of community organization) is related (Study 2).

Should activism in one domain be related to higher activism in another?
In principle, there are many reasons to expect that activism in one domain would be positively correlated with activism in another. For example, age, gender, income, wealth, and occupational prestige have been consistently associated with community activism (e.g., Kinder, 1998). These stable socio-economic differences should produce third-factor correlations between activism intentions in one domain and activism intentions in another, because parts of the sample (e.g., wealthier, more educated, retired) might be expected to have higher intentions across the board. But is there a true, causal link between activism in one domain and activism in another, beyond such third-factor associations?

Drawing on Putnam’s (1995, 2000) notion of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, we can think of many paths through which engagement in activism in one domain could facilitate further cross-domain activism. For instance, engagement in activism can expand one’s networks and so increase future recruitment opportunities and mobilization potential; promote trust and solidarity within and across social networks; expand one’s political knowledge and shape understanding of power structures and community relationships; and increase skills and self-efficacy beliefs about political behaviours. Moreover, with networks of activists involved in multiple community organizations, important knowledge e.g. of successful tactics can pass rapidly from group to group.

There is empirical support for Putnam’s argument that engagement in one domain can facilitate engagement in another (e.g., Boeckman and Tyler, 2002; Tossutti, 2003). There is also some indirect evidence for some of the mechanisms involved. For instance, collective action participation has been shown to transform relationships and identity which can facilitate future collective actions (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2005). Indeed Baillie, Broughton, Bassett-Smith, Aasen, Oostindie, et al. (2004: p. 218) described the new relationships and political processes that developed from a cancer prevention initiative as “in many ways, more beneficial than the
implementation of the resulting [cancer prevention] initiative itself”. Political engagement has been shown to increase political knowledge and interest in wider issues; and to raise awareness about why one’s contribution matters (e.g., Galston 2001; Kinder 1998). Finally, research on ‘self-identity’ (e.g., Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; see, Stryker, 1980) has shown that individuals may develop a ‘behavioural’ identity as the kind of person who engages in a particular action (Armitage & Conner, 2001). We reason that an activist identity which is defined at the generic, behavioural level might well lead to groups of “the usual suspects” (from the authorities’ point of view) who engage in consistent, oppositional politics across a range of domains.

The present research operationalises the social capital approach by suggesting that activist social networks (being associated with activist groups) should promote future activism intentions. In addition, two specific mechanisms of political knowledge and activist identity are explored.

**Should activism in one domain be related to lower activism in another?**

While the above argument seems intuitive, it is at odds with theoretical models that propose more context-specific definitions of activist identities. For example, in Simon and Klandermans’ (2001) influential model, the activist identity is thought to comprise three core aspects: shared grievances; awareness of third parties; and a politicised collective identity. Both shared grievances and awareness of third parties are relatively context-specific, while politicised collective identity implies some sort of shared social category identity (e.g., women) with whom activists identify, which has been taken to a more agentic (e.g., feminist) behavioural identity as activists for that category. There is no reason to expect that identification with one such category (such as women) or political identity (such as feminists)
would flow on to identification with a second social category (such as immigrants) or political cause (such as refugee activism).

Similarly in the social identity approach more broadly, contextually salient identities are proposed to shape behaviour via meaningful, group-specific norms (e.g., for environmental activism, Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008). Membership in activist groups is thus plausibly linked to stronger ingroup identification (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury et al., 2005), responsiveness to ingroup norms (e.g., Amiot et al., 2012, 2013, 2014), and greater relevant, domain-specific activism (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; McFarlane & Hunt, 2006; Fielding et al., 2008) – but would not generalise, necessarily, to any and all other activism domains. Indeed, when multiple identities are salient, there is the potential for conflicting ingroup norms (McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013, 2014), and so it is conceivable that activism in one domain would actually inhibit the likelihood of activism in another. This inhibition hypothesis may also be derived from resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; see also, McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996), which proposes that social movements compete for activists’ resources (e.g., time, energy and money).

We return to the idea of inhibitory roles on cross-domain activism more directly in Study 2, however. In this paper, we provide an analysis of longitudinal and cross-sectional activism and political behaviour across two studies. In Study 1, we seek to relate social network size to future activism intentions and to test the role of two mediators, factual political knowledge and activist behavioural identity.

Study 1

Data from a cross-sectional sample of peace activists and students in May/June 2003 was analysed to examine peace activism as well as performance on a test measuring factual knowledge of international relations in relation to alternative social movement groups and
‘activist identity’. We tested the hypothesis that activist social network size (number of groups involved in) would facilitate peace activism, versus undermining or competing with it (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury et al., 2005; Putnam, 1995, 2000; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). More specifically, we tested the hypothesis that participation in other social movements would heighten peace activism by building activist identification (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stryker, 1968; Sparks & Shepherd, 1992) and by contributing to political knowledge (Galston, 2001; Kinder, 1998). That is, identification and political knowledge were put forward as possible mediators of a relationship between number of different social movements the participant was active in (the distal independent variable) and future activism intentions in the peace area.

**Method**

**Participants.** Respondents (N=45) were recruited to complete a study about media use and political attitudes and knowledge. The participants were a convenience sample comprised of students and peace activists: 97% of participants opposed the Iraq war and 93% had engaged in some form of pro-peace political behaviour in the previous month. Ages ranged from 17 to 75 with a median of 34. Most participants were female (65%), ethnically European (96%), non-religious (51%), and Australian (91%). Politically, respondents were disproportionately affiliated with the Green Party (49%), with 13% Democrat (a Centrist party of the time), 9% Australian Labor Party (left-wing), 4% Liberal (right-wing), and 16% unaffiliated or other.

**Procedure.** The recruiting period (May 20 – June 30, 2003) followed the invasion of Iraq in February and President Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech on May 1 at the end of the 1st phase of fighting. Participants completed measures of demographic variables, media usage, support for the war, peace identification and activism, activist identification, factual political knowledge regarding Australia, the US, Iraq, and the UN.
Materials.  

Activist social network size. The number of activist groups participants belonged to, other than their primary group, was used to measure the size of participants’ activist networks. The range was from 0 to 10 ($M = 2.80$; mode=0; median = 2).

Activist identification was measured with three items (“Contributing to the community is important in my daily life”; “The values that are important to me are expressed in my activism or community service” and “I feel similar to other people who are active in the community”). Items were averaged such that higher scores reflected greater activist identification, alpha = .87.

The measure of political knowledge was scored from zero to 10 with higher scores reflecting a greater proportion of correctly answered questions measuring political knowledge about Australia (five questions, e.g., “Who is the Prime Minister of Australia?” “What political parties are in power in Australia right now, at the Commonwealth level?”), the USA (five questions, e.g., “Who is the current president of the United States?” “Which political party is in power in the US at the federal level right now?”), Iraq (four questions, e.g., “Can you name the former president of Iraq before the war?” “Can you name three ethnic or religious groups that are important in Iraqi politics right now?”), and the UN (four questions, e.g., “Who is the Secretary General of the United Nations?” “What are six of the countries on the Security Council of the UN?”).

Activist intentions were measured with five items measuring intentions to engage in specific actions (signing a petition, donating to a group, attending a rally, volunteering my time, and ‘other actions for community service not listed’), on scales from 1 to 7. Items were averaged such that higher scores reflected more activist intentions, alpha = .63.

Results
Descriptive analyses. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations. As expected, activist social network size was associated with greater activist identification, $r = .48, p < .001$, which was in turn associated with intentions to engage in peace activism, $r = .54, p < .001$. Unexpectedly, activist social network size was not associated with greater political knowledge ($r = .15, p = .312$), perhaps because participants were not exclusively or even primarily active in political affairs. We return to this point below.

Predicting Intentions. A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which intentions to engage in peace activism were regressed on activist social network size in Block 1 ($R^2$ change $= .30, p < .001$). As expected, the more other groups participants belonged to, the higher participants’ intentions to engage in future peace activism ($\beta = .54, p < .001$). When entered jointly in Block 2, moreover, both activist identification ($\beta = .28, p = .047$) and political knowledge ($\beta = .29, p = .022$) were uniquely, positively associated with greater activism intentions ($R^2$ change $= .17, p = .005$).

However, despite an apparent partial mediation of the effect of social movement participation in Block 2 (which dropped from .54 to $\beta = .37, p = .008$), tests of the indirect effects using bootstrapping with 5000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) showed that the indirect effect of social network size on intentions via activist identification was not reliable (LL= -.02, UL = .20), and nor was the indirect effect via political knowledge (LL= -.03, UL = .09). In the final model, activist social movement size, activist identification, and political knowledge were each independent predictors of future activist intentions, $R^2 = .47, p < .001$.

Discussion

Study 1 examined the activist identity in relation to activist social network size, political knowledge, and future activist intentions. The findings are certainly consistent with a
facilitative role for cross-domain activism (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury et al., 2005; Putnam, 1995, 2000), with activist social network size (the number of groups participants belonged to) linked positively to activist identity, and with both activist social network size and activist identification independently linked positively to future activist intentions. The role of activist identification in predicting intentions directly is consistent with the idea that activist identities can be ‘behavioural’ or self-identities (see also, Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; Fielding et al., 2008). Although there was no significant association between activist social network size and political knowledge, consistent with previous research (e.g., Galston, 2001; Kinder, 1998) political knowledge was independently positively associated with future intentions to engage in activism.

The present study makes a contribution in being among very few to explore cross-domain activism from a collective action perspective, and in testing specific paths by which activist social networks might facilitate activism. In this study, neither of the indirect effects were reliable (confidence intervals spanned zero), even when assessed via bootstrapping with 5000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). However, it must be acknowledged that in Study 1, the low sample size is a concern in terms of possible power problems, and the size of the correlations reported in Table 1 suggest that larger samples could bring those indirect paths to significance.

A more substantive and theoretically interesting limitation to Study 1 is the operationalization of cross-domain activism using a quantitative measure of activist social network size (absolute number of additional groups the participant is active in) without considering the specific normative content of the groups’ agendas. That is to say, a network of three diverse charitably-oriented groups (e.g., Victorian State Emergency Service, Anti-cancer Ball committee, and Coastcare) was considered equally to a network of three more aligned political groups (e.g., Amnesty International, Reconciliation Australia, Psychologists
for Peace). Failure to find an association between activist social network size and political knowledge highlights the diversity of groups and the fact that not all were oriented to national or international politics. It is intuitive to propose that a person who reports membership from more aligned and politically-oriented groups may experience a greater degree of mutual facilitation for future peace movement activism whereas membership of ideologically misaligned social networks might be paralysing or inhibitory for cross-domain activism (see also, McDonald et al., 2013, 2014). This hypothesis is explored further in Study 2.

Study 2

Study 2 built on the idea that specific rather than generic activist identities might facilitate each other, and that some identities might be mutually inhibitory while others might be neutral, and others mutually facilitating. Data from a longitudinal study of peace activists (see also, Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Louis, Terry, & Fielding, 2005) were re-analysed to examine the degree to which identification with peace activism, behaviour, and attrition from the survey could be predicted in relation to specific alternative identities and activism, including the Australian national identity and a variety of alternative social movements.

In earlier analyses of this data, Blackwood and Louis (2012) also drew on this data in publication, and addressed the role of changing instrumental evaluations of activist behaviour in the inter-relationship of activist identity and intentions to engage in future activism, using the Time 1 and the Time 2 data which addressed participation in anti-war protests in February and March, 2003, before and after the invasion of Iraq. Blackwood and Louis (2012) found that activist identification at Time 1 was associated directly with stronger intentions to protest the Iraq war, and also indirectly via perceptions of the efficacy of these behaviours for achieving group goals, as well as perceptions of individual-level benefits. At Time 2, when the peace movement was confronting its failure to prevent the outbreak of the war, and
inability to promote the withdrawal of troops, peace activists with stronger activist identity at
Time 1 changed the dimensions on which they evaluated the success of the peace movement.
Specifically, they placed less importance on influencing government decision making, and
this change partially buffered against a drop in the perceived effectiveness of the peace
movement which was observed at Time 2 among participants who had been lower in activist
identification at Time 1.

Louis, Terry, and Fielding (2005) also drew on the Time 1 and Time 2 data to report
that among those who completed the Time 2 questionnaire, people who were lower in
identification as an activist at Time 1, and who engaged in more pro-peace activism in the
intervening period, reported higher levels of identification as an activist at Time 2: their
peace activism had consolidated their identification as a peace activist, consistent with a
social identity perspective (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury et al., 2005). Louis et al. (2005)
also analysed the declining number of respondents and the declining average number of
reported actions among the activists, however, in an attempt to predict failure to sustain
engagement from Time 1 to Time 2. The present paper extends the analyses to Time 3, as
elaborated below, and re-analyses the data to include activists’ social network size at Time 1,
along with self-report activism and attitudinal support for a wide variety of other causes
reported at Time 3.

Method

Participants. Participants had performed at least one pro-peace political action in the
last month at Time 1 (N=155). The Time 1 survey was conducted in February 2003, at the
height of the protests against the invasion of Iraq and in attempts to keep Australia out of the
war and the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (the US term for the partner countries in the invasion).
Participants ranged in age from 16 to 75 (with a median of 35) and were disproportionately
(62%) women, highly educated (93% having some form of higher education), and affiliated
with the more left-wing Green Party (63%) or the centrist Democratic Party (19%) rather than the centre-right Liberal-National coalition (1%) or the left-wing Australian Labor Party (9%). Most participants were affiliated with at least one organised group that was participating in the peace movement (63%). The majority of participants were Australian citizens (n = 135, 87%).

A subsample of participants (n=71) who had indicated willingness to participate in future research completed the Time 2 survey, one month later. This was the month of the invasion of Iraq (March 2003). Finally, a further subsample (n=35) participated in a Time 3 survey, one month later in April 2003. At this point active fighting was ongoing, but the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ seemed to be winning (e.g., fall of Baghdad, April 9).

Procedure. Activists were recruited to participate in an on-line survey through snowball sampling from speaking at peace group meetings, disseminating the survey through e-lists, and word of mouth. Participants who indicated willingness to participate in future research at Time 1 were e-mailed a link to the Time 2 survey four weeks after their Time 1 participation: the response rate was 71/155, or 46% (i.e., 54% attrition). Time 2 participants who indicated willingness to participate in future research were e-mailed a link to the Time 3 survey four weeks after their participation at Time 2: the response rate was 35/71, or 49% (i.e., 51% attrition from Time 2). Comparing Time 1 to Time 3, the retention rate was 35/155 or 23% (77% attrition overall).

Measures. At Time 1, participants completed a survey measuring peace activist social network size, activist identity, political party identity, national identity, and intentions to engage in future collective action. At Time 2, activist identity was again measured, in addition to self-reported activist behaviour over the previous month. At Time 3, the measures of activist identification, and self-report activist behaviour over the previous month were repeated. In addition two new measures of cross-domain activism were included: attitudinal
support for twelve specific social movements; and behavioural engagement with those other movements.

Retention. A variable was created measuring retention (low attrition) which was scored 3 if participants completed Time 3, 2 if participants dropped out after Time 2, and 1 if participants only completed Time 1.

Peace activist social network size. Participants’ network of activist groups was measured at Time 1 with an open-ended question (“Are you a member of any peace groups? If so which ones?”). The range was from 0 to 5 ($M = 1.13$; median = 1). More than 40 groups were represented in the sample.

National identity. Participants indicated their citizenship at Time 1 (as noted above, 87% were Australian citizens) and rated the importance of their national identity with a single item, “How important is being Australian in your everyday life?”, on a scale from 1, Not at all important, to 7, Very important.

Political party identity. Participants indicated the political party that they would vote for if an election were to be held the following day, at Time 1. As noted above, the majority were affiliated with left wing parties (63% supported the Green Party). Participants rated the importance of their political party to themselves with a single item, “How important is being a supporter of this party in your everyday life?”, on a scale from 1, Not at all important, to 7, Very important.

Activist Identification. A three-item scale with two positive items (“I think of myself as an activist” and “I am committed to being an activist”) and one reverse-scored item (“Being an activist is NOT important to who I am”) assessed activist identity at each point in time ($as=.70, .73, .77$ for Times 1-3). Items were measured on Likert scales from 1, Strongly
Disagree, to 5, Strongly Agree and averaged so that higher scores measured stronger activist identity.

Activist Intentions. At each time point, intentions to engage in each of five forms of collective action in the next four weeks was assessed on a scale from 1, Not at all, to 7, Definitely intend to, using the stem question “In the next four weeks, how much do you intend to engage in each of these behaviours?”. The five actions were signing a pro-peace petition, attending a pro-peace rally, attending a meeting of a pro-peace group, donating money to a pro-peace group, and volunteering my time to a pro-peace group. The ratings were averaged such that higher scores reflected stronger collective action intentions, α=.78. (αs=.78, .76, .78).

Self-reported collective action. At each time point, participants were asked, “In the last month, have you engaged in pro-peace / anti-war behaviours? Please tick all that apply.” The five behaviours listed in the intentions were included and participants were invited to list up to three others. The total number of behaviours indicated formed the score for this variable. The range was from 0 to 8 at Time 1 (M = 4.11, median = 4), and at Time 2 (M = 2.47, median=2); at Time 3 the range was from 0 to 6 (M = 1.46, median=1).

Cross-domain activism was measured by asking respondents the extent to which they supported the goals of twelve movements attitudinally, on a scale from 1 to 7, and behaviourally, on a scale from 1 to 7 (being active in the last year). Participants were asked about the peace movement, organised labour unions, the environmental green movement, the international human rights movement, anti-globalisation / anti-World Trade Organisation, third world poverty / debt relief, Christian values / church, feminism / women’s movement, Reconciliation / Aboriginal rights’ movement, refugee support / anti-detention centres, queer / LGBT rights’ movement, and the youth student movement.
Results

Descriptive summary. Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for the identity and activism variables using all available respondents (pairwise N). As can be seen in Table 2, participants were only moderately identified as Australian, with their political party, or as peace activists, but they sustained this moderate psychological identification as activists until Time 3. In contrast the number of peace actions undertaken in the past month trended downward.

Time 1 peace network size was associated with greater Time 1 and 2 self-report past actions, and with a non-significant trend towards more action at Time 3. Time 1 to 3 activist identity and actions were strongly positively inter-correlated, as one would expect. In contrast, greater Australian identification and political party identification were associated with trends towards lower Time 2 and Time 3 actions.

Analyses of attrition. In Table 2, it may also be seen that greater retention (lower likelihood of attrition) is correlated positively with Time 1 peace network size, Time 1 activist identification, and Time 1 self-report past actions. Table 4 compares the means and standard deviations for the identity and activism variables as a function of retention (i.e., allowing for non-linear differences to be tested, versus linear correlation analyses). As can be seen in Table 3, significant differences are observed for peace network size and for Time 1 past action only, such that those with smaller peace networks at Time 1 and fewer self-report Time 1 past actions were more likely to drop out. Put simply, more committed peace activists at Time 1 were more likely to be retained in the survey. Whether that is a proxy for retention in the peace movement is open to dispute, as we elaborate below.

Returning to correlational analyses, if Time 1 variables (national identification, political identification, activist identification, and peace activist social network size) are
jointly considered as predictors, significant variance is accounted for in retention, $R^2 = .10$, $F(4, 132) = 3.78, p = .006$, and Time 2 self-report actions, $R^2 = .19, F(4, 60) = 3.62, p = .010$, with the Time3 model not reliable, $R^2 = .19, F(4, 20) = 1.18, p = .349$. Inspection of the coefficients, which are reported in Table 3, reveals that national identification and political party identification are consistently associated with trends to lower peace activism; peace activist social network size is consistently positively associated with peace activism; while activist identity per se has an inconsistent association.

**Cross-domain activism.** The identity and activism variables were then examined in relation to cross-domain activism for the committed peace activists sampled at Time 3.

*Correlational analyses* suggested that, considering the non-peace identities, Australian identification was only associated significantly with lower attitudinal support for the anti-Globalisation / anti-WTO movement ($r = -.61$) and with greater attitudinal support for Christian values / church ($r = .46$), $ps < .05$.

Political party identification was only associated significantly with greater support for the environmental movement attitudinally ($r = .40$) and behaviourally ($r = .53$), $ps < .05$. A majority of the sample identified that they supported the Green Party, as reported in the method section, so this association is not surprising.

Turning to peace identities and actions, peace network size was associated with greater likelihood of having acted to support international human rights in the last year ($r = .56$) and Christian values / churches ($r = .45$), $ps < .05$. Time 1 peace actions were also associated with greater behavioural support for the peace movement in the past year ($r = .42$), and Time 3 peace actions were associated with greater support for the peace movement ($r = .40$), feminism ($r = .38$), reconciliation ($r = .43$), and refugees ($r = .41$), $ps < .05$.

*Non-parametric analyses.* These correlational analyses under-estimate the associations, however, in that the range was severely restricted for most of the social
movement support variables (restriction of range depresses correlations; e.g., Louis et al., 2003). For example, 100% of the Time 3 respondents scored at or above the midpoint on attitudinal and behavioural support for the peace movement. If support for other social movements might in theory be equally likely to be low or high (i.e., 50% supporters vs non-supporters), we can employ a non-parametric test such as chi-square to test the deviation from equal high and low support across the social movements sampled. Such an analysis reveals disproportionately high attitudinal support for the environmental/green movement (100% approved; $X^2 = 66.67, p < .001$) as well as for human rights (100% approved), refugee support (100% approved), Reconciliation (100% approved), third world poverty / debt relief (96% approved, $X^2 = 53.68, p < .001$), anti-globalisation / anti-WTO (89% approved, $X^2 = 35.86, p < .001$), organised labour unions (89% approved), queer/LGBT rights (89% approved), the youth/student movement (82% approved, $X^2 = 22.82, p < .001$) and feminism (79% approved, $X^2 = 18.36, p < .001$). Disproportionately low attitudinal support for Christian values / the church movement was observed (33% approved, $X^2 = 5.27, p < .015$).

Behavioural support in the last year for cross-domain causes was less consistently disproportionate, if 50% is the appropriate baseline to consider (we will return to the question of appropriate baseline in the discussion). Only international human rights were endorsed above this baseline (79% active in the last year, $X^2 = 18.36, p < .001$). Among the movements endorsed at baseline, in the environmental movement in the last year, 61% were active; 57% in the human rights movement; 44% in the anti-globalisation / anti-WTO movement; and 39% each in third world poverty / debt relief and Reconciliation ($ps > .05$). Only 25% of the sample had engaged in Christian activism in the last year, or in queer / LGBT rights activism, feminism, or the youth/student movement, and these were significantly below the 50% baseline ($X^2 = 13.33, p < .001$), along with union/labour movement participation at 29% ($X^2 = 9.227, p = .002$). Individual respondents also generated
other causes, including animal liberation, health care, housing, disability rights, anti-nuclear campaigns, as well as political parties and specific Christian denominations, that they had supported recently.

Discussion

Study 2 strongly supports the argument for variability in the facilitating and inhibitory associations between specific identities and activism domains, rather than the argument for a generic facilitating role. For example, among Time 2 respondents, those who identified more strongly as Australian at Time 1 (before the invasion of Iraq) were less likely to report having engaged in pro-peace activism at Time 2 (after Australia joined the invasion as part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’; see also, Louis et al., 2005). Political party identification also seemed associated with trends to lower activism. In contrast, peace movement social network size (affiliation with more groups involved in the peace movement) was associated with greater Time 2 activism, as well as greater likelihood of retention in the survey to Time 3. And clear patterns of disproportionate attitudinal and behavioural support for other domains of activism were observed among the Time 3 activists, with stronger positive associations from peace activism to international human rights activism, and weaker associations with domains such as Christian activism, or LGBT activism. To us, the data highlight the importance of considering higher-order patterns (ideologies, political structures) that link identities both positively and negatively; we return to this point in the general discussion.

Several limitations must be acknowledged. Retention in the survey was used as a proxy for social movement participation, but it must be acknowledged that some participants may have dropped out of the survey and not of the peace movement. While some of the attrition is substantive, as the associations of identity variables with attrition highlight in
Tables 2-4, these links might be even stronger if measures such as incentives had been used to lower the attrition across waves.

Second, the results from Time 3 specifically highlight inter-relationships among social movements as well as the differences in degree of mutual facilitation, and the significant variability in the likelihood that participants’ attitudinal support had been translated recently into action. Ideological positioning within the Australian political context appears to explain some of the stronger vs weaker inter-relationships, and windows of political opportunity or issue salience some of the variance in likelihood of action. Yet, it must be acknowledged that whether a 50% baseline is the right standard against which to judge the significance of disproportionate attitudinal and behavioural support for cross-domain activism is open to question. It would be a much sounder test of the deviation from population norms if these could be established by pilot testing in a community sample. If the community is disproportionately conservative and non-activist, the threshold for the associations observed among activists would be much lower, potentially revealing an even stronger role of cross-domain activism in facilitating attitudinal and behavioural transfer of support across causes. The list of cross-domain issues in Study 2 is also ad hoc unfortunately neglects right-wing causes (see, Louis et al., in press). Pilot testing with a community sample to establish an appropriate set of conservative causes would be more informative and diagnostic of the extent to which ideology alignment moderates the association between greater activism in one domain and increased activism in a second.

Finally it is a strength of Study 2 to examine activism across three time points and at a highly interesting moment in the peace movement (Feb-April 2003). We know of very little similar work that has been published and as such the simple descriptive statistics are of great interest. However, the low sample size at Time 3 raises concerns about power analysis, even despite the utility of statistical methods such as bootstrapping that partially address them
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To us, the attrition from Time 1 to 3 itself is meaningful and reflects the steep decline in the peace movement during that time, which is why variables such as Time 1 peace activist social network size are associated with retention (see also, Louis et al., 2005; Blackwood & Louis, 2012). However to the extent that the Time 3 sample of activists is small and potentially unrepresentative, caution in generalising from the present findings is clearly warranted, and replication in future research is needed.

General Discussion

In two studies, positive associations are found between activist social network size, activist identification, and intentions to engage in future activism. In Study 1, activism in the peace movement was predicted by generic activist identification, and independently by activist social network size (the sheer number of community groups with which participants were associated). Political knowledge was an independent predictor of activist intentions, although contrary to hypotheses no indirect effects were observed. In Study 2, peace activist social network size and activist identification were associated with future intentions and, longitudinally, with greater Time 2 and Time 3 self-report peace actions. In addition, at Time 3, patterns of attitudinal and behavioural support for cross-domain activism were clearly observed and non-random: for example, not only did 100% of the Time 3 activists support the goals of the peace movement, 100% also supported the environmental movement, international human rights, refugee rights, Reconciliation with Indigenous Australians, and support for a number of other causes was equally disproportionate. However, national identification and political party identification were associated with less sustained engagement with the peace movement, and some domains of activism (such as Christian activism and LGBT/queer activism) were not consistently facilitated in the same way. The findings provide support for both of our competing hypotheses, in other words: activism does
apparently have a facilitating role for cross-domain activism, but equally clearly there are moderating variables such that null or inhibitory relationships can also be observed.

**Facilitating effects for cross-domain activism**

We highlighted four reasons to expect that activism in one domain would be positively correlated with activism in another in the introduction: third factors such as demographics (e.g., Kinder, 1998), social capital (Putnam, 1995, 2000), political knowledge (e.g., Galston, 2001), and activist identification (Fielding et al., 2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; Stryker, 1980). We did not engage with third factors, and that is a limitation of the studies and a direction of future research. However, if activist social network size is taken as a measure of social capital, we find support for this variable and for activist identification clearly emerge in both studies. Political knowledge also was associated with greater activist intentions in Study 1, but we did not demonstrate mediation of social capital effects by either knowledge or identification. Thus future research must examine the inter-relationships among the variables listed, test whether activist social network size effects hold up when demographic variables are controlled, and in particular, explore the underlying mechanisms that explain their effects. For example, activism could facilitate cross-domain activism by increasing activists’ awareness of their privilege and power (e.g., Case, 2012; Montgomery & Stewart, 2012), or by teaching or consolidating particular appraisals of authorities or intergroup relations as illegitimate (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury et al., 2005). Directly exploring such mediators in future research would be theoretically interesting and important.

**Inhibitory effects for cross-domain activism**
Traditional approaches to collective action consider identification with each social movement as the proximal predictor, with other identities possibly functionally antagonistic (e.g., Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009a, 2009b; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Particularly if multiple identity salience makes salient conflicting norms from different ingroups (McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013, 2014), it is possible to imagine that activism in one domain would actually inhibit the likelihood of activism in (some) other domains. Further, resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; see also, McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) also specifically proposes that social movements compete for activists’ time, energy, money, and so on. Consistent with these perspectives, in Study 2, we found evidence of inhibition from national and political party identities to longer term peace activism. There also was some evidence that attitudinal and behavioural support for Christian activism was disproportionately low among the long-term peace activists, as was behavioural support for queer / LGBT rights activism, feminism, the youth/student movement, and union/labour movement. Failure to find strong roles for facilitating cross-domain activism in these domains highlights the important moderators which need to be explored in future research.

**Ideological conflict and normative fit**

The findings in Study 2 suggest a hidden role of ideological alignment and normative fit, which can be articulated from a number of different theoretical positions. For example, social capital scholars now distinguish between bonding social capital (which promotes ingroup cohesion), bridging social capital (which promotes intergroup cooperation and shared resources) and linking social capital (which promotes cooperation between a group and authorities; Putnam, 1998; Woolcock, 1998). It is easy to imagine that different forms of activism might create a greater pool of one of these types of social capital than the others, and
that this would impact on the likelihood of one domain of activism facilitating another. For example, one way of interpreting the Study 2 data is that activism to promote specific minority group’s rights (Christian activism, queer / LGBT rights activism, feminism, the youth/student movement, and union/labour movement) were generally not positively linked with peace activism, perhaps because these causes generate more bonding capital that might reinforce other ingroup-oriented collective action, but would not necessarily generalise across domains. Specifically measuring the types of capital generated and required in each domain as moderators of the association between activism in one domain and a second seems like a fruitful direction of future research.

To us, however, an exciting direction of future research would be in pursuing the question of higher-order normative fit, or ideological alignment, which is suggested by an intergroup perspective (e.g., Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009a, 2009b; McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013, 2014). If we revisit Simon and Klandermans’ (2001) model of politicised collective identity, for example, it may be that social movements which overlap in terms of their shared grievances, or awareness of third parties, are more likely to facilitate cross-domain activism. Perhaps more simply, social movements which invoke the same political orientation or values (Kinder, 1998) may have more potential for cross-domain activism. At the same time, this is not to be taken for granted, because the greater ideological alignment of two movements the greater the likelihood that the social movements might also compete for the time and energy of activists, in the resource mobilisation sense (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Explicitly addressing the limits of activists’ time and energy commitments in relation to movement demands and ideologies is an exciting direction for future activist research. Similarly, explicitly measuring norms will be important. It is possible to interpret the association of peace activism with national identity in terms of a changing normative context (with Australia’s entry into the war, at Time 2 and 3,
creating the negative association between national identification and peace activism which was not apparent at Time 1). However, without explicit measures of normative consensus within a movement or group with regard to other movements or groups, such inferences are speculative.

**Conclusions.** The present data invite consideration by scholars of collective action concerning the constellation of identities which define actors as multi-beings (Gergen, 2009; Louis, Mavor, La Macchia, & Amiot, 2013). If some identities reinforce each other, while some conflict, issues of norm and identity consistency vs diversity, and empowerment versus marginalisation, are of strong theoretical and social interest. The present data contribute to such a discussion, and are among very few studies in the social psychology of collective action that directly speak to cross-domain activism. The findings highlight the possibility of strong facilitatory as well as inhibitory roles, suggesting that future research in this area will find much of interest to explore.

**End Notes**

1. As well as the materials described here, participants completed a number of other measures related to political and social attitudes around the Iraq war and activism. Please contact the author for the full questionnaire and dataset. Summaries of the studies’ results were also distributed to the participants. These are available on the first author’s web site.
References


[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2013.11.005](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2013.11.005).


### Table 1.

*Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations (Study 1).*

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Table 2.

Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations (Study 2).

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Note. Correlations significant at $p < .05$ are bolded. Variables were measured on the following scales: Wave (1-3), Peace network (0-5), ID (1-7), Past Actions (0-8).
Table 3.

Retention, Time 2 self-report collective actions, and Time 3 self-report collective actions as a function of identities and social network size (Study 2).

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<td>T1 political party identification</td>
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<td>T1 activist identification</td>
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<td>-.16</td>
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<td>T1 social network size</td>
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<td>.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.19</td>
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† $p < .10$  * $p < .05$  ** $p < .01$
Table 4.

*Means (standard deviations) as a function of retention (Study 2).*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Eta2</th>
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<td>1.27 (1.23)</td>
<td>1.63 (1.60)</td>
<td>4.310</td>
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<td>Australian ID</td>
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<td>3.83 (1.86)</td>
<td>3.76 (2.28)</td>
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<td>.683</td>
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<td>3.79 (2.16)</td>
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<td>2.85 (0.92)</td>
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<tr>
<td>T3 Intentions</td>
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<td>2.71 (1.46)</td>
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<td>1.46 (1.60)</td>
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*Note.* Variables were measured on the following scales: peace activist network (0-5), ID, intentions (1-7), Past Actions (0-8).