Offensive Intelligence: An Epistemic Community in the Transition from Cold War Liberalism to Neoconservatism

Tom Griffin

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Social & Policy Sciences

April 2017

COPYRIGHT

Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation with effect from ....................(date)

Signed on behalf of the Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences
Contents

List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 5

Introduction: Covert action in transnational class formation ................................................. 9

Chapter one: The origins of mass propaganda 1917-1939 ................................................... 11

Wilson’s Crusade for Democracy ....................................................................................... 32
Munzenburg’s Red Orchestra ............................................................................................ 33
Brandler’s International Communist Opposition .............................................................. 35
The Lovestoneites and the intellectuals: Corporatism and the ‘New Class’ ..................... 41
The Lovestoneites and covert action ................................................................................. 43

Chapter Two: World War Two ............................................................................................... 44

Dubinsky’s War within the War ......................................................................................... 50
The Lovestoneite afterlife: Transnational labour politics in World War Two ................... 54

Chapter Three: The Early Cold War ....................................................................................... 56

Post-war Interlude 1945-47 ............................................................................................... 56
The Political Warfare Coalition After World War Two .................................................. 56
The Two-Tier Dynamic - Eur-x and Ben Mandel ............................................................ 58
The Two-Tier Dynamic – Whittaker Chambers and HUAC ............................................ 60
The Non-Communist Left at home ................................................................................ 61
The World Federation of Trade Unions .......................................................................... 62
Lovestoneite activities in Post-war France .................................................................... 62
Lovestoneite activities in Post-war Germany ................................................................. 63
The International Rescue Committee ............................................................................ 66
Verdict on the Post-War interlude ................................................................................ 66

Containment 1947-1950 .................................................................................................... 66
The Central Intelligence Agency ....................................................................................... 67
The Information Research Department .......................................................................... 68
The Italian elections of 1948 ......................................................................................... 69
Germany ........................................................................................................................ 69
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ................................................ 70
The Cultural Cold War ................................................................................................... 71

1950-56 From containment to roll-back ............................................................................ 73
NSC-68 and the Committee on the Present Danger ...................................................... 73
The CIA in the early 1950s ............................................................................................. 74
McCarthyism and the non-communist left ................................................................. 75
The Angleton Era 1955-1960 ............................................................................................. 76
Angleton, Lovestone and Israel ..................................................................................... 76
Britain in the 1950s ........................................................................................................ 78
The AFL-CIO Merger ...................................................................................................... 80
Hungary and the end of rollback ................................................................................... 80
The Battle for the Third World ...................................................................................... 81

Chapter Four – The break-up of the post-war consensus ..................................................... 85
Cold War liberalism and Vietnam .................................................................................. 86
The Domestic Break-up of cold war liberalism .............................................................. 87
The Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy ................................................. 90
The Salt Treaty debate ................................................................................................... 90
The 1972 Presidential election ...................................................................................... 92
The Lovestone and Angleton purges ............................................................................. 93

Chapter Five: The Neoconservative Counteroffensive of the 1970s ..................................... 96
The Second Committee on the Present Danger ............................................................ 97
The American Security Council .................................................................................... 100
The National Strategy Information Center .................................................................. 101
Team B ......................................................................................................................... 101
The Carter Administration ........................................................................................... 103
The intelligence debate in the late 1970s ....................................................................... 104
The role of Roy Godson ............................................................................................... 104
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence ............................................................. 106
The CSI conferences: Elements of Intelligence ......................................................... 106
The CSI Conferences: Analysis and Estimates ........................................................... 110
April 1980 Colloquium on Counterintelligence ......................................................... 112
International parallels .................................................................................................. 114
Britain ............................................................................................................................ 114
Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism ..................................................... 114

Chapter Six: Neoconservatism in the Reagan era ............................................................... 116
The Reagan Administration ............................................................................................. 116
Democracy promotion in the 1980s ................................................................................ 117
Developing the neoconservative theory of intelligence ................................................. 118
The CSI conferences: 1980 Colloquium on Covert Action ........................................... 118
The October 1981 Colloquium on Clandestine Collection ........................................... 120
Acknowledgements
Professor David Miller provided inspirational support and wise advice. Dr William Dinan was also a supportive influence. Tom Mills, Hilary Aked, Idrees Ahmad, Rizwaan Sabir, Claire Harkins, and Jim Slaven provided stimulating debate and comradeship. David Habakkuk offered invaluable help in seeking out sources.

I am eternally indebted to the love and support of my parents and the love and support of my partner Liz McShane, whose infinite grace, patience and good humour was a vital source of encouragement.
Summary
This thesis examines the development of neoconservatism through the lens of the distinctive theory of intelligence associated with the movement. The key primary sources for this theory are the writings of the National Strategy Information Center, and its project, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. An analysis of this literature in its historical context shows it to reflect the development of an epistemic community theorising the practice of a cadre of activists experienced in political warfare - the covert intervention by one country in the internal politics of another.

The roots of this tradition are traced to the beginnings of modern mass propaganda in the context of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The Comintern developed as a centre of expertise in the field before fracturing in the 1930s. A group of activists associated with the Lovestoneite group gravitated towards the Western Allies at the outset of World War Two, marking the development of a political warfare coalition, an alliance of state intelligence agencies and sympathetic civil society groups committed to supporting covert political intervention in other societies.

This coalition was institutionalised in the early Cold War, but broke up as it lost state support in the era of detente in the 1970s. In the context of a counter-movement against detente, former intelligence officers and labour activists attempted to develop an epistemic community around a theory of intelligence that would provide a basis for renewed state support for political warfare. This theory informed the actions of neoconservatives in the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

The neoconservative theory explicitly defined itself against rival approaches to intelligence based on scientific values. As such, the neoconservative case has significant theoretical implications for the scope and assumptions involved in the concept of epistemic communities in general.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Americans for Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCABL</td>
<td>American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>British Security Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Congress for Cultural Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAAA</td>
<td>Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Coalition for a Democratic Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Covert Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Committee on the Present Danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPDP</td>
<td>Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Consortium for the Study of Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVT</td>
<td>Vietnamese Confederation of Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTUC</td>
<td>Free Trade Union Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTUI</td>
<td>Free Trade Union Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILGWU</td>
<td>International Ladies Garment Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLA</td>
<td>Independent Labor League of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>International Relief Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCFE</td>
<td>National Committee for a Free Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCL</td>
<td>Non Communist Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIC</td>
<td>National Strategy Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSP</td>
<td>Office of Special Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(P)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defence (Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCTEG</td>
<td>Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFIAB</td>
<td>President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Revolutionary Socialists of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDUSA</td>
<td>Social Democrats USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPSL</td>
<td>Young People’s Socialist League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction: From the Cultural Cold War to neoconservative intelligence

This thesis examines the development of neoconservatism through the lens of the distinctive theory of intelligence associated with the movement. The key primary sources which will be used to study this theory are the writings of the National Strategy Information Center and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) from the late 1970s onwards. An analysis of this literature and the historical context from which it emerged shows it to reflect the development of an epistemic community theorising the practice of a cadre of activists experienced in political warfare - the covert intervention by one country in the internal politics of another. These activists were drawn from elements of Cold War liberalism which had been allied to the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, and included elements such as the ‘Lovestoneites’ around AFL-CIO foreign policy chief Jay Lovestone, with experience of covert action extending back to the 1920s. The development of an overt theory of intelligence, which gave a privileged place to covert action, at the expense of intelligence analysis, was a reaction on the part of these groups to the breakdown in the 1970s of their alliance with the CIA, and of the Cold War consensus which sustained it.

The neoconservative intelligence theorists will be shown to meet all the classic criteria laid down by Haas (Haas, 1992) for constituting an epistemic community. Understanding the importance of an epistemic community focused on the theory of intelligence to the development of neoconservatism can help to illuminate debates about the nature of the Cold War liberalism from which the neoconservative movement emerged.

The Cultural Cold War and the roots of Neoconservatism

In recent years, a great deal of literature has examined the Cultural Cold War and the extent to which the political life of the west was shaped by the overt and covert sponsorship of intellectuals and of sections of the left in support of a US-centred Atlanticist order in the post-war period. Notable contributions have come from Francis Stonor Saunders, Hugh Wilford, Scott Lucas, Inderjeet Parmar and Giles Scott-Smith, among others.

This thesis will argue that these Atlanticist networks faced a crisis in the late 1960s and 1970s as many of the assumptions that had underpinned the Cultural Cold War were challenged, and that the emergence of neoconservatism as a distinctive political force in the US was a response to that crisis. A key element of this response took the form of an international campaign to re-establish new institutions of ideological warfare.

As in the earlier period of Cold War liberalism, this movement was transatlantic. In the 1980s, both the US and Europe witnessed efforts to create new institutions explicitly based on those of the Cold War. A central feature of this effort was the development of a new theory of intelligence, which sought to link intelligence collection and analysis more closely to covert political action and counterintelligence, in practice privileging the latter at the expense of the former.
This ideology received a number of setbacks in the late 1980s firstly with the Iran-Contra scandal, and secondly with the new era of detente that heralded the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, it experienced a resurgence in the Twenty-First Century, shaping the War on Terror and playing a key role in making the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Recent historians of neoconservatism have acknowledged the cold war liberal roots of the movement while challenging the significance attributed to the role of the CIA in some accounts of cold war liberal organisations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).

Thus Jacob Heilbrun writes:

> If the CCF had not existed the left would have had to invent it. To some extent, it did this by magnifying the amount of control the CIA had over the CCF. The purpose of the mythmaking about the CCF is to create a moral equivalence between East and West. But intellectuals, an ornery lot, can seldom be ordered around (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.376).

Heilbrun’s defence is in line with the argument of historians of the Cultural Cold War, such as Hugh Wilford, who have challenged the metaphor of control implied in the title of Francis Stonor Saunders study of the CCF, *Who Paid the Piper?*, arguing that “Anti-Stalinist intellectuals and unionists had been waging their own war on communism long before intelligence professionals appeared on the scene” (Wilford, 2003, p.3).

Recent scholarship on the cultural Cold War has recognised that the intellectuals of the CCF were never simply cyphers for the CIA, while taking works such as *Who Paid the Piper?* as the starting point for a deeper debate about the agency of state and private actors within the Cultural Cold War.

One contributor to this debate, Inderjeet Parmar, has argued that the state-private networks of the cultural Cold War can be theorised through “the concepts of establishment, organisational sector, parastates and epistemic/knowledge communities” but that each of these concepts is best used when subsumed within a wider Gramscian analysis (Parmar, 2006,p.18).

Parmar, following Diane Stone, identifies epistemic communities as “networks of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied” (quoted in Parmar, 2006, p.17). The full relevance of the concept of epistemic communities to the Cultural Cold War, and to its place within the Gramscian framework that Parmar suggests, is arguably clarified by a longer historical perspective which encompasses the later emergence of neoconservatism in the 1970s and 1980s.

One strikingly relevant aspect of the epistemic communities concept is a two-tier structural dynamic in which “both tiers share a common conceptual framework but operate within an agreed division of labour: government officials have access to policy-making and use the second tier to publicise their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and scientific’” (Parmar, 2006, p.17). We will show that this two-tier dynamic characterised the relationship between Cold War liberal intellectuals and the CIA from the early Cold War,
but that it was only in responding to the public scrutiny of the 1970s that the neoconservative intelligence theorists articulated the full theoretical basis that characterises an epistemic community.

Understanding this dynamic can help provide a more nuanced account of the relationship between the US government and the Cold War Liberals. It also highlights some of the inadequacies of the labour-management analogy which Wilford offers in place of Stonor Saunders’ *Who Paid the Piper* metaphor.

In discussing the trade union cold warriors of the American Federation of Labor’s Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), Wilford writes “labour–management relations are arguably a more appropriate paradigm for conceptualising relations between the FTUC and the CIA than the puppet-on-a-string image deployed by many earlier writers on the subject” (Wilford, 2003, p.101).

Yet Wilford himself notes that the FTUC displayed a militancy in defending their own position that they rarely displayed in actual industrial relations. Both US officials and American trade unionists offered European workers a “productivity gospel” that encompassed “non-political trade unionism, labour-management co-operation and modern working practices” (Wilford, 2003, p.158). Despite their own proletarian self-image, this prescription is in stark contrast to the status that FTUC leaders sought for themselves. They were jealous of their own “expertise in anti-communist warfare”, seeking to maintain operational autonomy, and to reduce the official role to one of financial support (Wilford, 2003, p.95).

Contrary to Wilford’s intentions, the labour-management analogy might be taken to imply greater control than the patron-client relationship captured in Stonor Saunders’ image of ‘paying the piper’. Indeed, it is arguable that the labour-management underplays a key aspect of Wilford’s own account, the insistence of the FTUC on their own expert status based on their own prior experience of covert operations (Wilford 2003, p.99).

As Wilford notes, this claim was founded on extensive experience of covert operations, predating the formation of the CIA (Wilford 2003, p.93). This tradition was never fully eclipsed by the institutionalisation of covert action within the CIA (Wilford 2003, p.101). This thesis will try to show that the neoconservative theory of intelligence was in large part a conscious defence of that tradition and the hegemonic relationships which sustained.

**Methodology**

This thesis seeks to account for the existence of a distinctive neoconservative theory of intelligence and to assess the extent to which that theory influenced the policies of successive US governments.

This twofold requirement suggests a need for an examination of the reflexive relationship between theory and reality, which seeks to understand both the factors that gave rise to the theory and how the theory in turn shaped reality.
For these purposes, the key sample is the texts in which the theory is stated. These were primarily the publications of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), particularly the series *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s*, beginning with *Elements of Intelligence* (Godson, 1979), and works published or supported by the CSI’s parent body, the National Strategy Information Center, notably *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards* (Godson, 2001) and *Silent Warfare* (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002). A critical reading of these texts provided the starting point for an investigation of the historical situation from within which the neoconservative theory of intelligence emerged. This sequence is then reversed in the presentation of this thesis, to provide a chronological account of the emergence of the theory.

As will be shown in chapters Five to Seven, These texts offer a relatively clear account of the authors’ perspectives on the situation that gave rise to them, and the problems to which they were intended to respond, and they give clear recommendations for the future. Roy Godson’s introduction to *Elements of Intelligence* presents *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s* as a response to a crisis within US intelligence which was at its peak in the 1970s, and which led to serious divisions within the US intelligence community (Godson, 1983, pp.3-18).

*Elements of Intelligence* and subsequent volumes in the series make it clear that a key issue in these divisions was the proper relationship between intelligence disciplines, with a majority of contributors arguing for a stronger role for the active intelligence disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence. Many contributors draw on their institutional experience in the course of making their argument. In other cases, however, their relevant experience and institutional interests are less obvious.

For example, Roy Godson strongly defends the Cold War activities of the American Federation of Labour as a model for future covert action (Godson, 2001, p.42). Yet his own family and professional connections to those activities are left unmentioned. While this is not necessarily unreasonable in context, drawing out such implicit connections is an important part of a critical account of the genesis of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. The narrative offered by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence needs to be examined in the context of the wider historical record.

This is in part a question of intelligence history, with all of the problems that affect that field. As Richard Aldrich has written; “All contemporary historians who study aspects of the state share a quite unique experience, that of being dependent upon their government for information’ (Aldrich, 2002, p.638). In his work *The Hidden Hand*, Aldrich nevertheless sought to ‘say it with documents’ in producing a history of cold war intelligence that relied on archival sources rather than oral testimony, despite the obvious limitations of this approach in the field of intelligence (ibid p.638).

The constraints posed by official secrecy posed a particular problem for the present study. It became clear early on that a number of related constituencies were strongly represented among the contributors to *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s*. One of these groups consisted of conservative social democrats close to the political tradition of the American Federation of Labour and its former international relations chief Jay Lovestone. Another
consisted of former CIA personnel who had served under the Agency’s former counterintelligence chief James Angleton.

It therefore seemed important to establish as much as possible about the agent-handler relationship known to have existed between Lovestone and Angleton between the 1950s and 1970s. According to Tom Mangold’s biography of Angleton, this relationship was broken off following the report of an internal CIA investigation (Mangold, 1991, p.292). A freedom of information request was made to the CIA for this report, but as noted in Chapter Four, this request was denied on the grounds that the existence or nonexistence of relevant records is still classified (Meeks, 2013).

This resulted in an unavoidable lacuna in our understanding of the relationship between the AFL and the CIA. However, the viability of freedom of information as a research tactic in this field has been demonstrated by Michael Best, who has recently uncovered a CIA report which informs our view of James Angleton’s relationship with the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Best, 2017). Declassified CIA documents held by the National Security Archive also provided relevant sources. These included a number of CIA internal histories and articles in the agency’s journal Studies in Intelligence, on issues such as Angleton’s approach to counterintelligence (Studies in Intelligence, 2011).

The difficulties of researching intelligence matters were somewhat mitigated by a focus on covert action offered that some countervailing advantages. As Abram Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt wrote in Silent Warfare, while some forms of covert action involve deep secrecy, ‘in other cases, the actions themselves are public knowledge, but governments conceal their involvement in them’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.75). Those public activities can be scrutinised even where information about the covert relationships is limited. Even autonomous open activities are likely to provide a clue to the goals of such relationships given Roy Godson’s injunction that ‘there is no need to control foreign assets’ but that ‘the best covert action campaigns help people to do what they want to do more effectively than they could do without such assistance’ (Godson, 2001, p.127).

This statement alerts us to the need to see such covert relationships as alliances within which both actors can have agency. However, as we attempt to place Godson’s statement in its historical context, we will attempt to show that his emphasis on this point reflects the ideological perspective and experiences of the non-governmental allies of US covert action, and their attempts to maximise their agency within covert alliances.

Even if much about the relationship between US intelligence agencies and civil society actors in the Cultural Cold War remains enigmatic, studying the cold war activities of organisations such as the American Federation of Labour and the International Rescue Committee is crucial to understanding the practises that the neoconservative theory of intelligence sought to theorise.

While this was in principle, an easier task than studying the activities of the CIA, the logistical realities of conducting research from the UK made it impossible to access some of the potentially promising archives in the US. It was, for example, not possible to consult the US labour movement archives at the Tamiment Library in New York, except insofar as
relevant materials were available electronically. Likewise, copies of *New America*, the official journal of the Social Democrats USA, were not available in the United Kingdom. However, creative use of the National Archives in the UK did produce an unexpectedly rich seam of relevant material.

Identifying such sources was made easier by the existence of an extensive secondary literature on the cultural Cold War. Key contributors to this literature such as Hugh Wilford have noted the continuity between the cultural cold war and neoconservatism (e.g. Wilford, 2008, p.253), but have rarely systematically pursued it. Conversely (Vaisse 2010, p.19) writing on neoconservatism, has noted that the role of labour in the Cold War is a neglected aspect of the movement’s history.

The present study seeks to address this lacuna in part by applying some of the theoretical tools developed in the literature on the cultural Cold War to the more recent period in which neoconservatism developed. This body of work, along with related literatures on intelligence history and labour history, was also useful in identifying relevant primary sources. (Mahl, 1998) was particularly useful in pointing to documentation in the British National Archives on wartime cooperation between British intelligence services and the American Federation of Labour. This helped to inspire further investigations which identified illuminating sources such as 1930s MI6 agent reports on the activities of the Lovestoneite movement, wartime reports on negotiations between the British TUC and the American Federation of Labour, and post-war surveillance reports on the activities of AFL activists in the British Empire.

All such sources require their own critical analysis, a fact which is perhaps most obvious in relation to the rather jaundiced views of British colonial officials on the activities of AFL trade unionists in Africa. Nevertheless, taken together, the disparate material from the National Archives provide useful insights on the evolution of the Lovestoneites over a period from the 1930s to the early 1960s which saw them make a complex transition from fellow travellers of the Comintern to allies of the CIA.

This provides a useful check on the secondary literature, much of which reflects the historical hindsight of scholars with strong commitments on either side of the political debates in which Cold War liberals were involved. Indeed for the purposes of this study a significant part of the secondary literature is also important as primary source material on the self-understanding of Cold War liberalism and its neoconservative offshoot. This will be shown to apply notably to (Godson, 1975) on the history of AFL foreign policy. Robert J. Alexander’s work on the Bukharinite right opposition might also be mentioned in this regard. The major scholarly work on the subject, it was inspired by Alexander’s curiosity about Jay Lovestone’s past after working with the AFL-CIO in Latin America (Alexander, 1981, p.ix).

This thesis will seek to navigate through these various interpretations by constructing a continuous historical narrative, relying on contemporary documents where possible, and noting the commitments of various sources where necessary.
This longer historical perspective allows us to bring a sociological perspective to bear on the relationship between the CIA and Cold War liberalism, to understand the circumstances under which some labour activists were willing to enter into an alliance with the intelligence community, and to identify the nature of their goals, aspirations and disappointments within that relationship.

In attempting to understand the various actors involved in these relationships, we are engaging in researching the powerful, what has sometimes been called ‘studying up’, and the experience has reinforced a view of power in line with the injunction of sociologist Kevin Williams:

> It is important to get away from the view of powerful organisations as homogeneous bodies, with a single ideology, directed, from the top, by a small, elite group. Rather such bodies are, as Mungham and Thomas note, “complex coalitions of competing interests, sometimes in harmony, sometimes not and where there is a constant negotiation for position, prestige and material advantage” (Mungham and Thomas 1981). Power is exercised in this environment of rivalry, tensions and conflicting interests (Williams, 1989, p.254).

Neither a simplified ‘puppet on a string’ theory of the CIA-Cold War liberal alliance, nor a straightforward dismissal of the significance of the CIA’s role can help us to understand the genesis of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. It is precisely in investigating the tensions and conflicts within the alliance that the historical roots of the theory are to be found.

**Outline of the work**

The substance of this thesis will attempt to substantiate this argument by tracing the history of the epistemic community based on the neoconservative theory of intelligence and the political warfare coalition from which it emerged.

Chapter One will explain the main theoretical concepts employed in the thesis, indicating their relevance and how they will be applied in the body of the work. It will look the Gramscian theory of hegemony and at concepts which can be used to theorise state-civil society relationships within a Gramscian framework, including those of state private networks and of epistemic communities. It will also consider the question of what constitutes a theory of intelligence.

Chapter Two will examine the emergence of a distinct cadre of labour activists with experience of political warfare in the pre-World War Two period, who would go on to shape the private side of the political warfare coalition, and whose experience would shape neoconservative ideas about covert action. It will look at the roots of modern mass propaganda in the First World War and the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. It will note the importance of the Comintern as a key incubator for a cadre of covert action specialists, many of whom would ultimately gravitate towards western state powers in response to the rise of Stalinism and fascism. It will note the importance of the
Lovestoneites as a group which maintained a degree of cohesion in the course of this transition.

Chapter Three will look at the role World War Two in cementing an Atlanticist alliance, within which covert action specialists drawn from the Non-Communist Left formed relationships with organisations like the British Political Warfare Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services, alliances which would provide a precedent for future iterations of the state-private network. The overlapping and sometimes contradictory roles of British and American state sponsorship underlined that this was an essentially transnational process.

Chapter Four will look at the role of the political warfare coalition which emerged from World War Two in re-orienting the United States towards confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, in a two-tier alliance between policy-makers and activists that was formalised in the CIA’s alliance with the Non-Communist Left. It will examine the shifting balance of power between state and private actors within a network that became increasingly institutionalised in the 1950s. It will note how AFL-CIO activists around Jay Lovestone responded to this shift by gravitating towards James Angleton’s CIA Counterintelligence Staff, in an alliance that would inform future neoconservative ideas about the relationship between covert action and counterintelligence as active intelligence disciplines.

Chapter Five will examine the growing crisis which faced this political warfare coalition in the 1960s and early 1970s, including unprecedented scrutiny of the CIA; the challenge to its domestic political base from the New Left, and the turn towards détente at an international level.

Chapter Six will look at the emergence of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in the late 1970s and the campaign by the political warfare coalition to challenge détente by asserting its status as an epistemic community in a new alliance with conservative political forces.

Chapter Seven will look at the revival and consolidation of the political warfare coalition as an epistemic community of renewed influence in its new neoconservative configuration in the early years of the Reagan administration and its subsequent displacement as a result of the Iran-Contra Affair and the renewal of détente with the Soviet Union.

Chapter Eight will look at the renewed bid for epistemic authority by writers from within the political warfare coalition in the 1990s, which gave further elaboration to a distinctive neoconservative theory of intelligence, receiving practical application in the campaign for war with Iraq following their return to influence in the George W. Bush administration. It will also consider how these ideas were recast in the post-Iraq War period to influence policy at a lower operational level.

In conclusion, Chapter Nine will review the significance of this epistemic community for the neoconservative movement as a whole and its impact on successive administrations.
Chapter One: Theorizing the neoconservative approach to intelligence.

This chapter will seek to outline the key concepts to be deployed in understanding the significance of the neoconservative theorists of intelligence, roughly in order of increasing specificity.

The Gramscian theory of hegemony provides the basic framework for understanding political action and the political role of intellectuals, while the concepts of state-private networks and epistemic communities will be used to examine in more detail the mechanisms by which intellectuals exercise political influence. In considering the neoconservative writers of intelligence as an epistemic community, we will need to examine the extent to which their ideas on the subject constituted a distinctive theory.

**Hegemony**

As it emerges in his essay on intellectuals in the *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony arises from a complex of problems around the Marxian distinction between structure and superstructure, and the application of that distinction to the Western European societies of his time.

For Marxist intellectuals of the 1930s, this issue had practical implications for their analysis of the Russian Revolution, an apparently advanced political development in an economically backward country, and the prospects for emulating it in Western Europe.

Gramsci distinguishes civil society and the state as two levels of the superstructure which sustain the power of the ruling economic class through consent and coercion respectively (Gramsci 1976, p.12). The term hegemony is applied particularly to the former category, which Gramsci elaborates as:

‘The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci 1976, p.12).

‘The intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government’ (Gramsci 1976, p.12). While the theoretical distinction between these two functions is clear, the complex relationship between them emerges from Gramsci’s remarks in an essay on education which posited a ‘necessary, organic development which tends to integrate the personnel specialised in the technique of politics with personnel specialised in the concrete problems of administering the essential practical activities of the great and complex national societies of today’ (Gramsci 1976, pp.27-28).

While for Gramsci, everyone is an intellectual, it is the exercise of these social functions that mark out intellectuals as a distinct group.
In characterising the relationship of the intellectuals to the ‘fundamental groups’ or economic classes, Gramsci distinguishes between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals. The former are those who emerge out of a particular economic class giving it ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields’ (Gramsci 1976, p.5). Traditional intellectuals, in contrast, are those whose existence predates the ascendancy of a given class and which seem to ‘to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms’ (Gramsci 1976. p.7). This continuity allows them to assert an autonomy in relation to the dominant social group which Gramsci sees as being reflected in idealist philosophy.

Despite this apparent autonomy, Gramsci sees traditional intellectuals as also having organic class relationships. This is reflected in his choice of ecclesiastics, a group he sees as being organically-linked to the landed aristocracy, as a representative example of the class of traditional intellectuals as a whole (Gramsci 1976, p.7). He nevertheless sees the traditional/organic distinction as important and relates it to problems concerning the role of political parties, which are seen as the vehicles in which intellectuals elaborate the political interests of their own class, but also as vehicles for the achievement of hegemony in civil society, through the fusion of traditional intellectuals with those of the leading class (Gramsci 1976, p.15).

This concept of hegemony implies that even in the course of representing the interests of their class, intellectuals are led to adopt political logics that go beyond the articulation of class interests. This is made explicit by distinguishing the role of political parties from the concept of economic-corporate activity seen as the province of professional associations (Gramsci 1976, p.16).

A class can only fully realise its autonomy by becoming the ruling class of the state. Other classes are ‘subaltern’ (Gramsci 1976, p.52). To the extent that this true their political organisations will tend to pursue goals of a ‘limited and partial character’ a formulation which is presumably intended to encompass Lenin’s concept of trade union consciousness’ (Gramsci 1976, p.52).

These limits are shaped by the hegemonic classes, as ‘Subalterm groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only "permanent" victory breaks their subordination, and that not immediately’ (Gramsci 1976 , p.55). Gramsci sees this pressure taking various forms which reproduce the basic dichotomy of hegemony and dictatorship: ‘A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power’ (Gramsci 1976, p.57).

The implication that classes achieve power only through wider political alliances is reflected in Gramsci’s concept of the ‘historical bloc’ in which ‘the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures.is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’ (Gramsci 1976, p.366) and in which ‘precisely material precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form’ (Gramsci 1976,
If formulae such as these appear opaque, it is clear that Gramsci wishes to emphasise that the historical bloc is not merely an epiphenomenon of the economic class. Indeed, Gramsci saw a belief in automaticity as itself the ideology of a subaltern group, which had to be superseded in order to take up the creative political tasks of hegemony (Gramsci 1976, p.396).

If the economic-corporate sphere of trade unions and similar associations is one where policies follow relatively clearly from economic interests, the hegemonic sphere is one in which the need to balance competing interests bring the situational logic of politics to the fore. The production of intellectuals is seen as crucial to this process.

Gramsci attributes the fall of the medieval communes in Italy to ‘the rule of an economic class which did not prove able to create its own category of intellectuals and thus exercise a hegemony as well as a dictatorship’ (Gramsci 1976, p.55, n.5). Likewise, the absorption of the intellectuals of subaltern groups is seen as an effective hegemonic strategy, exemplified by the role of the Moderates during the Risorgimento (Gramsci 1976, p.58).

This emphasis on the role of intellectuals has led Kees Van Der Pijl to argue that Gramscian thought, as well as that of earlier Italian elite theorists, is itself the ideological reflection of the distinctive class position of an intellectual/managerial ‘cadre stratum’ (Van Der Pijl, 2005).

Some modern thinkers, such as Laclau and Mouffe have seen a contradiction between the Gramscian theory of hegemony and the Marxian theory of class, arguing that ‘on the one hand the political centrality of the working class has a historical, contingent character: it requires the class to come out of itself, to transform its own identity by articulating to it a plurality of struggles and democratic demands. On the other hand, it would seem that this articulatory role is assigned to it by the economic base – hence that centrality has a necessary character’ (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p.70).

Laclau and Mouffe’s attempt to sever the theory of hegemony from class analysis has been characterised as rooted in a form of inter-subjective idealism by Jonathan Joseph, who argues that ‘hegemony is given a central role because of its ability to articulate discourse’ undetermined by pre-discursive reality (Joseph, 2004, p.111). The integration of the theory of hegemony into a wider framework founded on discourse theory is not necessarily an unnatural development given that Perry Anderson has suggested that ‘the most striking single trait of Western Marxism as a common tradition is thus perhaps the constant presence and influence on it of successive types of European idealism’ (Anderson, 1979, p.63).

This observation was prefigured by Gramsci himself in his comments on idealism in Some Problems in the Study of the Philosophy of Praxis, when he asked why Marxism has ‘had this fate of having served to form combinations between its principal elements and either idealism or philosophical materialism?’ (Gramsci 1976, p.390).

Gramsci was perhaps a self-aware example of Western Marxism’s tendency towards engagement with idealism. Nevertheless, while he sought to avoid what he saw as a pre-Marxist mechanical materialism, he also sought to overcome traditional idealism (Gramsci 1976, p.435). His particular position is reflected in the particular Marxian formulas to which he returns such as the theses on Feuerbach and the Preface to Critique of Political Economy, which point towards an active, reflective materialism.
For Marx ‘Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice’ (Marx, 2016). For Gramsci, theory that did not illuminate practice was mere scholasticism (Gramsci 1976, p.201). This led him towards an interpretation of political reality which stresses the role of creative action within material and non-material constraints. Consistent with this is his emphasis on the value of the individual error ‘which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it’ (Gramsci 1976, p.377).

It is not necessary to adopt an essentialist or teleological view of class, to understand the importance of material constraints, and of economics as an expression of them, in applying the concept of hegemony. In his own concrete analyses, Gramsci drew inspiration from Marx’s historical writings as a counterweight to mechanical interpretations of his more theoretical work. Gramsci’s own interpretation of contemporary events illustrate his distinctive conception of the relationship between the economic and the political.

Consider the following passage from the essay on Americanism and Fordism:

Recall here the experiments conducted by Ford and to the economies made by his firm through direct management of transport and distribution of the product. These economies affected production costs and permitted higher wages and lower selling prices. Since these preliminary conditions existed, already rendered rational by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalise production and labour by a skilful combination of force (destruction of working class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries (Gramsci 1976, p.285).

Given Gramsci’s analysis of American conditions, the emphasis here is on economics, but both an objective set of material possibilities, ‘preliminary conditions’, and creative action to make the most of those possibilities, ‘the skilful combination of force and persuasion’, are essential to the analysis.

The historical resonances acquired by Americanism and Fordism in later decades arguably illustrate the value of a Gramscian concept of hegemony that sensitises us to the political opportunities inherent in economic developments. Giles Scott-Smith has noted the prescience of Gramsci’s question ‘whether America, through the implacable weight of its economic production … will compel or is already compelling Europe to overturn its excessively antiquated economic and social basis’ in the wake of post-war developments such as the Marshall Plan (Scott-Smith 2002, p.12).

Scott-Smith employs the concept of hegemony to interpret the post-war Congress for Cultural Freedom as a ‘hegemonic institution in the Gramscian sense’ that ‘provided an ideology which connected to prime economic interests and which could claim normative status (Scott-Smith 2002, p.138). He shows that the Congress in part reflected a political response to the perception, notably held by Gramsci himself, that the United States lacked cultural weight commensurate with its economic power (Scott-Smith 2002, p.11).
Scott-Smith seeks to analyse the class dimension of the CCF’s hegemonic relationships while avoiding Laclau’s charge of essentialism by utilising ‘the valuable work of Kees van der Pijl in mapping the class alliances between groups in the USA and Western Europe in the twentieth century’ (Scott-Smith, 2002, p.7).

This research may help provide an empirical framework for neoconservative history in terms of the Gramscian analysis recommended by Parmar. Van der Pijl argues that trade union officials are part of a professional, managerial ‘cadre class’ that has developed over the course of the Twentieth Century:

Once the working class responds to the increasing scale of production by organising the sale of its labour power on a commensurate scale, it is faced with the same dynamic as capital itself: it must rely on a new, mediating executive stratum, the trade union bureaucrats. While representing the workers, they do so as labour market specialists committed by necessity to this specialism. Since the power of the trade union resides in its capacity to mediate, this presupposes its relative independence also from the workers (van der Pijl, 1998, p.140)

We may tentatively note here the possible application of this dynamic to Cold War labour activists, while adopting more definitely another insight of van der Pijl’s, that of the significance of covert action to transnational class relations:

States exploit the structural accessibility of integrated societies to state power other than their own, in order to influence the political process there...This includes transnational covert action, an aspect of relations among ‘allies’ that tends to be overlooked. This form of rivalry is obviously imbricated with transnational class relations, but necessarily involves competing state powers operating transnationally (van der Pijl, 2006, pp.16-17).

A full account of the emergence of neoconservatism must account for the movement’s links to cold war covert action, without over-simplifying its relationship to state power. We will argue that this can most appropriately done by recognising the emergence from within cold war state-private network of an epistemic community focussed precisely on the theory and practice of covert action, which reached a new level of formalisation with the transition to neoconservatism. We will call this epistemic community the political warfare coalition, adopting a British term which emphasises the role of propaganda, rather than the more paramilitary aspects of covert action, as best reflecting the areas which have been the primary, though not exclusive, subjects of neoconservative expertise.

The third way in which van der Pijl can assist us is by providing an account of the transnational class relationships within which this epistemic community was embedded. Van der Pijl has argued for the existence, in the post-war period, of a transatlantic hegemonic bloc based on corporate liberalism, an ideology that sought to accommodate socialist aspirations within the framework of capitalism. The crisis of the 1970s saw the displacement of corporate liberalism, and a transition to a new hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism (van der Pijl, 2006, pp.19-20).
In terms of this perspective, the political warfare coalition can be seen as a grouping which emerged within the American state-private network during the corporate liberal period, and whose formalisation as an epistemic community in the 1980s, with a full panoply of scholarly associations, conferences and literature, helped to anchor its status within the new hegemonic alignments which emerged after the break-up of the post-war liberal consensus. The emergence of neoconservatism in place of cold war liberalism as the dominant ideology of the political warfare coalition reflected these new alliances.

**State-private networks**

The idea of the ‘state-private network’ stands alongside that of hegemony as a key concept employed by a number of scholars seeking to understand the relationship between state and civil society in the Cultural Cold War. Scott-Smith notes that this framework was first put forward by Scott Lucas ‘not as a means to find the cause of Cold War political activity, but to enable a greater understanding of the cohesion of public–private interests and the effects this had on the conduct and outlook of political and civil society’ (Scott-Smith 2002, p.3).

In *Freedom’s War*, Scott Lucas introduces the concept to describe the relationship established between the American state and a range of private individuals and organisations in the early Cold War (Lucas 1999, p.2). The formulation reflects the perception that initiative was not confined to one side of the state-private dichotomy; ‘the CIA might be providing most of the finance but the impetus was coming from individuals with no Government position, individuals with their own interests in ensuring the triumph of freedom’ (Lucas 1999, p.2). This is one reason why US ideology was never ‘simple a “screen for geopolitical and economic objectives” and indeed sometimes over-rode more pragmatic considerations, as in the case of operations such as those focused on the liberation of Eastern Europe in the early 1950s (Lucas 1999, p.2).

Lucas illustrates the autonomy of the ideological with Eisenhower’s 1954 comment that ‘of course he was willing to go to any lengths to defend the vital interests of the US, but as soon as you attempted to define what these vital interests were, you got into an argument’ (Lucas 1999, p.277).

It is perhaps implicit in this remark that the very autonomy of ideology may be driven not so much by the absence of material interests as by the interplay of competing interests which are more easily reconciled at a higher level of abstraction. As Lucas has written elsewhere: ‘Government officials who drafted plans for the extension of US political, economic, military and cultural influence were able to hold visions of power and profits alongside the belief in an American exemplar of freedom. And private individuals and groups could work alongside those government officials, not necessarily because they shared that same vision of power and ideology, but because their own complex conceptions and interests were furthered by the relationship’ (Lucas 2006, p.11).
This conception of the state-private network, as a coalition formed from a plurality of official and private agencies, each with distinct interests which are not necessarily merely instrumental, has suggested a Gramscian interpretation to a number of scholars, including (Parmar 2006, p.20) and (Scott-Smith 2002, p.3).

As Parmar argues, such an approach implies that political conflicts ‘are not mere more automatic reflections of unequal economic or class relations: they are also sites of struggle between rival, ideas, values, policies, programmes and regimes.’ Winning hegemony means building cross-class coalitions that require ‘the mobilisation of public opinion to convince the masses – or at least a critical proportion of them – that they have a stake in current arrangements’ (Parmar 2006, pp.20-21).

The dynamic nature of this process of negotiation and renegotiation suggests there is value in a diachronic approach to the application of the concept of the state-private network. In his examination of one dimension of the US state-private network of the early Cold War, that of official support for international exchange programmes, Scott-Smith has warned that ‘an all-encompassing ideological interpretation tends to collapse the longue durée of cultural development into its Cold War moment’ eliding the extent to which ‘in the ideological struggle, different traditions, motives and methods worked in parallel, in combination, sometimes even in opposition’(Scott-Smith 2006, pp.85-86). The concept of the political warfare coalition is intended to reflect those elements of the state-private network whose intelligence dimension was a function not simply of covert support from the state side, but also of the traditions, motives and methods of the private side.

Lucas has highlighted the longevity of state-private network established in the early Cold War, through exposure in the 1960s, and successive regenerations in the 1980s, and early Twenty-First Century (Lucas 2006, pp.10-11).

The present work looks at a group of labour activists centred on Jay Lovestone whose participation in state-private networks is well-documented, but following Scott-Smith’s injunction, we will pursue a diachronic approach that will enable to understand the particular traditions, experiences and other intellectual and social resources that this group brought to the network.

This will enable us to observe how the reproduction of this strand’s place in the state-private network both shaped and was shaped by the emergence of the particular set of ideas which we have dubbed the neoconservative theory of intelligence, ultimately giving birth to a distinct epistemic community.

**Epistemic communities**

In considering the significance of intellectuals as functionaries of civil society and the state, Gramsci noted that ‘In the modern world the category of intellectuals, understood in this sense, has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a great mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci, p.13).
One field where the problem of the relative autonomy of such intellectuals has impressed itself on scholars is that of international relations, notably in a 1975 issue of *International Relations* co-edited by John Ruggie and Ernst Haas. Ruggie sought to examine the role of politics in international technical organisation, challenging approaches which could be said to tend towards technological determinism (Ruggie 1975, p.558).

Ruggie argued that the technological progress had led to an expansion of the scope for political decisions in relations to scientific and technical matters, in areas characterised by a degree of mutual interdependence between the policies of different states (Ruggie 1975, p.560). The examples given were manifold, stretching from arms control and communications, to shipping and marine resources (Ruggie 1975, p.567). Ruggie observed that the study of international organisations did not exhaust the forms which international responses to these responses could take (Ruggie 1975, p.568). He described two other possibilities: international regimes based on shared rules, and epistemic communities, in which institutionalisation takes a ‘purely cognitive’ form, consisting in a ‘dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and predictability of intention’ (Ruggie 1975, p.569-570).

The term epistemic communities had earlier been formulated by the sociologist Burkart Holzner (Davis Cross, 2013, p.141), whose usage was however seen by the international relations scholars as broader than their own, signifying a community united by commitment to the scientific method in general (Haas 1992, p.3, n.4). The narrower usage adopted by IR scholars reflected the influence of wider trends in epistemology such as Thomas Kuhn’s emphasis on the existence of rival paradigms within the scientific community (Davis Cross, 2013, p.141).

A definition later offered by Ernst Haas stated that ‘an epistemic community is composed of professionals (usually recruited from several disciplines) who share a commitment to a common causal model and a set of political values. They are united by a belief in the truth of their model and by a commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a result’ (Haas, E. 1990, p.).

If this emphasised the political side of concept, the epistemological side received more prominence in a formulation by Peter Haas of the epistemic community as a ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, P. 1992, p.3). This, however, was put forward alongside a set of more detailed diagnostic criteria which encompassed both aspects, including 'a shared set of normative and principled beliefs', 'shared causal beliefs', 'shared notions of validity', and 'a common policy enterprise' (Haas, 1992, p.3).

In Ruggie’s usage, the concept of *episteme* was that of Foucault’s *The Order of Things* (Ruggie 1979, p.569). Foucault would later formulate the concept as ‘ the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and, which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the
‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (Foucault 1980, p.197).

Haas and Adler root the concept of epistemic communities in ‘an ontology that embraces historical, interpretive factors, as well as structural forces, explaining change in a dynamic way’ (Adler & Haas 1992, p.370). This suggests a certain affinity with the concept of hegemony to the extent that the latter represents an attempt to find a middle way between voluntarism and economism.

There is also a congruity with Scott-Smith’s insistence on the importance of the longue-durée in relation to state private networks, given Haas and Adler’s view that ‘The most fruitful metaphor for thinking about epistemic communities is that of evolution’ conceived in terms of path dependent development in which an initial vision shapes subsequent institutionalisation (Adler & Haas 1992, p.373). They go on to suggest that this process can be analysed in sequential terms: ‘Such a process of policy evolution has four primary steps: policy innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence’ (Adler & Haas 1992, p.).

In the course of our narrative chapters we will examine the extent to which these steps apply to the epistemic community which we propose grew up around the neoconservative theory of intelligence.

Other pointers for the use of the epistemic communities concept can be seen in Ruggie’s original application of it to international relations, where he suggested that the dominant role is played by ‘the epistemic community that derives from the role of representing national public authority internationally’ but raised the issue of ‘the extent to which behavior rules from other more specialized or more universal epistemic communities are becoming institutionalized internationally’ (Ruggie 1975, p.570). He concluded:

First, it appears that scientific and technological images and roles inform patterns of institutionalization as long as a given issue remains at a relatively low level of political concern. With involvement by higher levels of government, the issue tends to become redefined in accordance with more traditional maxims. Second, in ongoing international collectivities the norm seems to be for the several epistemic communities to inform different activities, not to come into conflict with each other over the same ones (Ruggie 1975, p.570).

Ruggie’s suggestion of greater openness to technical input at lower levels of government is perhaps a precursor to the two-tier pattern identified by Drake and Nicolaidis in their study of an epistemic community focused on international trade policy. They argue:

The community’s membership has two tiers. The first includes personnel from governments, international agencies, and private firms-individuals who work for organizations with direct interests in alternative policy solutions. In contrast, the second tier includes academics, lawyers, industry specialists, and journalists-individuals whose stakes, if any, are more purely intellectual or a matter of professional entrepreneurship. But the members of the first and second tiers share a conceptual framework and agenda, and this, coupled with the latter’s
organizational independence, helps legitimate the former’s views in the eyes of cautious policymakers (Drake & Nicolaidis 1992, p39).

The two-tier framework might be said to be cognate with Gramsci’s state-civil society dichotomy given the extent to which juridical or other direct power and authority is a property of the first tier and relative intellectual autonomy of the second. For that reason, we shall sometimes apply the two-tier framework in the context of hegemonic relationships which do not necessarily fit all the criteria for epistemic communities.

Adler & Haas (1992, p.373) have warned that ‘epistemic communities should not be mistaken for a new hegemonic actor that is the source of political and moral direction in society.’ If, however, epistemic communities are not themselves a ‘ruling group’ this in itself raises the question of their relationship to wider social and economic pressures.

Parmar suggests that Haas’ approach suffers from a ‘lack of articulation of epistemic communities with other aspects of power, especially the power of the purse,’ but that this can be remedied by the application of the concept within a Gramscian framework (Parmar, 2012b, p.21). In particular, he has suggested that the two-tier aspect of epistemic communities makes it a useful lens for examining the role of intellectuals and think-tanks of Cold War state-private networks (Parmar 2006, pp.17-18).

The very name of the CIA’s International Organizations Division of the 1950s perhaps underlines the extent to which some of the transnational developments that the concept is intended to capture were a central concern of the Cultural Cold War.

If this suggests that influencing transnational epistemic communities might itself be a goal of Cold War actors, it is also possible to consider whether the diffusion of Cold War policies, such as the successive phases of containment and containment militarism, as described by (Sanders 1983, pp.11-12), could be analysed in terms of epistemic communities. Parmar’s account of the growth of a network based on a realist paradigm among US international relations theorists from the 1930s onwards arguably represents a cognate conclusion (Parmar, 2012b, pp.95-96).

The growth of realism might be seen as a movement within, or a more narrowly specified version of, ‘the epistemic community that derives from the role of representing national public authority internationally’ described by (Ruggie 1975, p.570).

However, we will suggest that the neoconservative intelligence theorists conformed more to Ruggie’s second type of epistemic community, gaining influence at lower levels of government through more specialised expertise. In order to understand the nature of that specialisation, we shall address the question of what constitutes a theory of intelligence, before considering what is required for the formation of an epistemic community around that theory.

**Theories of intelligence**

One of the most influential approaches to theorizing intelligence has been that of early CIA analyst Sherman Kent, covering ‘the three separate and distinct things that intelligence
devotees usually mean when they use the word'; these are: knowledge, the type of organisation which produces the knowledge, and the activity pursued by the intelligence organisation (Kent, 2015, p.ix).

Many theorists have followed Kent in seeing the acquisition of knowledge as central to intelligence. Loch Johnson offers an account of intelligence as traditionally defined which conforms to Kent’s characterisation:

Strategic intelligence may be defined broadly as a set of activities conducted by government agencies that operate largely in secret. These activities include, foremost, the collection and interpretation of information drawn from a mixture of open and clandestine sources to arrive at a product—knowledge—useful to illuminate foreign policy deliberations (Johnson 2010, p.1).

Similarly among those we shall describe as neoconservative intelligence theorists, Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt follow Kent in analysing intelligence in terms of certain kinds of information, activities and organisation (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002, p.1).

Both (Johnson 2010, p.1) and (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.3) note that a characterisation focused on information lacks an explicit role for aspects of intelligence such as counterintelligence and covert action. Johnson nevertheless takes it as the starting point for his own attempt to ‘provide a sense of the dimensions that a theoretical framework must encompass’ (Johnson 2010, p.1).

Any theory of strategic intelligence must be built around the so-called intelligence cycle, a model that describes the flow of activities necessary for the collection and the interpretation (“analysis”) of information. The cycle consists of five phases: planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination (Johnson 2010, p.2).

In this approach, counterintelligence and covert action are interpreted as distinct ‘core missions’, alongside the information-gathering activities which are the focus of the intelligence cycle (Johnson 2010, pp.13-14).

Where Johnson focuses on the intelligence cycle, neoconservatives writers such as (Godson 2001, p.xvii) and (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.8), tend to focus on four interdependent ‘elements of intelligence’, with information-gathering activities split into intelligence analysis and collection, the first two elements, the others being covert action and counterintelligence.

It is arguably the neoconservative approach to the relationship between these elements, and the principles underlying that approach, that justify the ascription to them of a distinctive theoretical model of intelligence.

A key principle enunciated by Shulsky and Schmitt in their chapter Towards a Theory of Intelligence is that ‘intelligence involves a real struggle with human opponents, carried on to gain some advantage over them’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). This adversarial emphasis is reflected in their definition of intelligence as seeking ‘access to information some other party is trying to deny’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). One advantage of this perspective is that shows why counterintelligence ‘is not an afterthought, but an integral
part’ of intelligence (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172). ‘Not only is it important to limit or distort what one’s opponent can learn about one,’ they argue ‘but one cannot even be sure of what one knows about an adversary without the counterintelligence capability to detect any deception effort he might have undertaken’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.172).

However, the adversarial perspective has broader implications than this. In Godson’s view, ‘the end product, the mission of counterintelligence, is action – action to protect against foreigners and action to manipulate foreigners in the service of national goals’ (Godson 2001, p.239).

In the context of Johnson’s model of the intelligence cycle, the neoconservative theory of intelligence might be products as a model of competing intelligence cycles, in which protecting and promoting one’s own intelligence cycle, and manipulating one’s opponent’s cycle via offensive intelligence are both parts of the fundamental struggle. Within this model, intelligence is seen as inevitably tending towards ‘a counterintelligence duel’ because ‘whatever else one wishes to know, one has to pay attention to the adversary’s intelligence services as well’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.175).

For Shulsky and Schmitt, this adversarial model helps to determine the kind of information and knowledge that is relevant to intelligence, ‘those factors that can be manipulated or changed’ rather than fundamental causes that might be of academic interest.

It perhaps here that the neoconservative theory of intelligence has the clearest claim to be an episteme in the Foucauldian sense, defined as ‘the 'apparatus' which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (Foucault 1980, p.197). If the word scientific sits uneasily given the neoconservative insistence on delimiting the domain of intelligence from social science of the kind attributed to Sherman Kent, it nevertheless remains the case that they see themselves as scholars contributing to making intelligence ‘a recognized field of academic study’ (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, xiii). It must therefore be considered to what extent their theory of intelligence was the product of an epistemic community.

**Neoconservative Intelligence: The elements of an epistemic community**

This thesis will argue that the neoconservative theory of intelligence developed as the product of such an epistemic community from the late 1970s onwards. This epistemic community provided a theoretical defence of the intelligence practices in which some Cold War liberal intellectuals had co-operated with the US intelligence community. This earlier Cold War community exhibited some of the features of an epistemic community, notably a two-tier dynamic between experts and policymakers. However, it was only in response to the challenge of public exposure and criticism in the 1970s, that it developed all of the four main criteria set out in (Haas, 1992, p.3): 'a shared set of normative and principled beliefs', 'shared causal beliefs', 'shared notions of validity', and 'a common policy enterprise'. This process will be considered in detail in chapters Six and Seven, but key recurring ideas relevant to Haas’ criteria are set out below.
Normative beliefs

The Consortium for the Study of intelligence was founded, according to (Godson 1979, p.4) to study intelligence to ensure that ‘that US performance would enhance American values.’ While acknowledging intelligence abuses uncovered in the 1970s, Godson criticised suggestions that covert action was either immoral or useless. Rather, the key question was whether the intelligence system was ‘capable of defending our open society effectively’ (Godson, 1979, p.3).

The basic legitimacy of and necessity for intelligence capabilities including counterintelligence and covert action, were thus key normative assumptions, alongside a belief that effectiveness required ‘a consensus encompassing objectives and the main contours of modus operandi’ (Godson, 1979, p.9).

Causal beliefs

In their approach to causal explanation, neoconservative intelligence theorists from (Godson, 1980a, p.2) to (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p.173) cast themselves in opposition to a school of thought based on empirical social science, attributed to the influential CIA analyst Sherman Kent. This was seen as the dominant paradigm in an existing intelligence analysis system that was vulnerable to surprise and deception (Godson, 1980a, p.2).

Godson advocated an alternative approach which he identifies with political theory, seen as necessary for ‘developing hypotheses about likely courses of action’ and for estimating ‘the possible effects of US foreign policy in terms of external events’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). Perhaps the starkest example of this approach was Richard Pipes’ argument that he did not need to know anything about anti-ballistic missiles to be able to testify that the Soviets would never accept strategic parity (Pipes, 1986, p.43). Pipes’ call for American analysts to emulate the Soviet understanding that ‘politics everywhere is the driving force and that to concentrate on military and economic figures is misleading’ underlined that this was an approach that prioritised explanation in terms of intentions rather than capabilities (Pipes, 1986, p.45).

Notions of validity

Pipes’ succinct definition of intelligence as ‘useful information’ provided the neoconservative intelligence theorists with a criterion of validity which later writers expanded on (Pipes, 1986, p.41). Shulsky and Schmitt argued that social science views the world as a passive object of inquiry, whereas for intelligence, knowledge is a means by which enemies compete to gain advantage in the human struggle (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p.172). In their view, intelligence must ‘emphasize those factors that can be manipulated or changed’ in contrast to social science which, they suggest, must ‘regard the future as already determined’ to the extent it seeks to predict it (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p.171).

A common policy enterprise

This activist view of the discipline informed a policy enterprise which sought to revive the offensive intelligence machinery of the Cold War. Godson reported general agreement at
the first colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence that the US needed to strengthen all four major elements of intelligence (Godson, 1979, p.9).

In the area of analysis, an increased emphasis on competitive analysis was seen as central to this (Godson, 1979, p.12). A renewal of the US clandestine intelligence apparatus was seen as vital for the other three disciplines of collection, counterintelligence and covert action (Godson, 1979, p.10). In the case of covert action, this was seen as requiring the reversal of key legislative restrictions imposed during the Carter administration (Godson, 1979, p.9). Counter-intelligence was seen as having a strategic function that required a centralised organisation with access to the full range of intelligence activities (Godson, 1980, p.5).

While many of these prescriptions represented a call for a return to the status quo ante of Cold War intelligence prior to détente, it was only in the course of the public debate of the 1970s that previously secretive practitioners of covert action articulated each of these elements with sufficient clarity to constitute an epistemic community.

There are precedents for identifying intelligence as the domain of an epistemic community. Fry and Hochstein have applied the concept to the discipline of intelligence studies as a whole, in the course of calling for international relations theorists to take account of intelligence activities as a ‘vast bureaucratic and intellectual exercise in international epistemology’ (Fry, 1993, p.25). Although this thesis will apply the concept more narrowly, Fry and Hochstein’s description should alert us to the possibility that intelligence practice as well as scholarship can be analysed in terms of its epistemic commitments.

Identifying the neoconservative intelligence theorists as an epistemic community has significant implications for debates about the concept, notably for disputes about the extent to which it reflects a certain normative evaluation of science. For example, Dave Toke has argued that the concept reflects ‘an acceptance of a broadly positivist position concerning the role of scientists as the legitimate bearers of truth which, in view of the evidence, is unjustified’ (Toke, 1999, p.101). Claire Dunlop has argued that this view is based on a misinterpretation of Haas’ approach, which does not necessarily involve a normative affirmation of epistemic communities (Dunlop, 2000, p.138). Instead, Dunlop argues that the distinguishing feature of epistemic communities is ‘an internally settled paradigm’, and that Haas’s second and third criteria of shared causal beliefs and a shared notion of validity are decisive (Dunlop, 2000, p.138). In the absence of these elements, Dunlop argues ‘the epistemic community ceases to function as an authoritative voice of advice in state decision-making’ and it can therefore be ‘undermined decisively by the discovery of technical anomalies which are irreconcilable with the received wisdom’ (Dunlop, 2000, p.138).

If Dunlop’s reading of Haas is taken to imply that a true epistemic community must be committed to seeking out such anomalies in a classically Popperian manner, then there is some force to Toke’s claim that the concept implies a normative commitment to positivism. However, as (Dunlop, 2000, p.140) notes, Haas himself saw the idea of
epistemic communities as influenced by the distinctly non-positivist concept of scientific paradigms introduced by Thomas Kuhn (Haas, 1992, p.3, n.4).

Dunlop goes on to argue:

Indeed, Haas’s own case study on CFCs, cited by Toke, provides a prime example of the centrality of agreed knowledge, rather than proven truths. In this case study, the atmospheric epistemic community bound itself to the ‘Rowland–Molina’ hypothesis, which focused upon CFC’s chlorine origins, linking them to the depletion process. Even though this had not been confirmed, the hypothesis was ‘sold’ to the decision-makers and to the public because the consensus was firm (Dunlop, 2000, p.140).

This example has distinct parallels with the case of the neoconservative intelligence theorists. In both cases a group of scholars made a theoretical case for a particular policy approach, which it was argued was too urgent to wait for empirical confirmation.

That such a situation can often arise is implicit in the suggestion by the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos that the evaluation of paradigms or scientific research programmes is often only possible with historical hindsight (Lakatos, 1978, p.92). Dunlop’s rejection of positivism implicitly recognises this.

This being the case, we will apply the concept of an epistemic community on the basis that such communities are distinguished by their elaboration of a unified theory rather than their empirical character. On this view, it is open to question whether epistemic communities could not encompass what (Lakatos, 1978, p.95) has called metaphysical research programmes as well as scientific research programmes. Indeed, if epistemologists can only differentiate the latter two categories with historical hindsight, it may not always be possible to assign epistemic communities to one or other category within the timescales that matter for political influence.

**Chapter Two: The origins of mass propaganda 1917-1939**

Scholars of the Cultural Cold War have long recognized the need to situate the period in a longer historical perspective, as a way to understand the extent to which ‘in the ideological struggle, different traditions, motives and methods worked in parallel, in combination, sometimes even in opposition’(Scott-Smith 2006, pp.85-86). Scholars such as (Wilford 2003, p.125) have turned to the pre-World War II activities of the Non-Communist left as a way of understanding the autonomy of the private side of the post-war state private network.

This chapter will examine the emergence of the Lovestoneites as an element within the pre-war Non-Communist Left whose pre-war political activism would shape the traditions, networks and institutional forms of the American state private network during the Cold War. This heritage would go on to provide a key intellectual resource for neoconservative intelligence theorists in seeking to reshape that state private network from the 1970s onwards.
Wilson’s Crusade for Democracy

In 1917, US President Woodrow Wilson entered the First World War on the side of Great Britain, intervening in a European continent riven by years of war and the shock of the Russian revolution. Kees Van Der Pijl has argued that this moment marked the first abortive attempt to establish an Atlanticist world order as a basis for economic expansion that would reconcile the free trade interests of finance capital with an emerging corporatist ideology associated with industrial capital.

The Wilson policy was a perceptive anticipation of the underlying social capacities of capitalism which would take the New Deal and World War Two to fully materialize in the corporate-liberal synthesis. The universalist concept of world order went beyond the deflationary liberalism of the financiers and already represented an attempt to combine a growing domestic industrial economy with commercial and financial expansion abroad. Lacking a firm basis in the contemporary class structure, Wilson’s strategy of progressive counter-revolution was supported by a bourgeoisie frightened by the spectre of Bolshevism – and was discarded as soon as that threat had subsided. (van der Pijl, 1984, pp.275-277)

Wilson’s Crusade for Democracy would nevertheless leave a lasting legacy. In the words of journalist George Creel, “It was in this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that the Great War differed most essentially from all previous conflicts” (Creel, 1920, p.3).

Creel headed the Committee on Public Information formed in the United States in 1917 (Cull, 2003, p.99). In Britain, the same year saw the establishment of the Ministry of Information under Lord Beaverbrook and a separate Enemy Propaganda Department formed at Crewe House under Lord Northcliffe (Cull, 2003, p.xvi). Although they were short-lived in themselves the propaganda organisations of the First World War proved to be significant precursors of the institutions established during World War Two and the Cold War.

One key precedent was the involvement of organised labour in the allied propaganda effort. In the United States, the American Federation of Labor was a close supporter Wilson’s interventionism. In October 1916, its leader Samuel Gompers was appointed to the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defence. In a speech to the AFL’s 1917 convention, Wilson invited its leaders to serve on the National Labor Conference and later on the National War Labor Board (van der Pijl, 1984, p.59).

War-time full employment helped to ensure that Wilson’s policy enjoyed strong support within the trade union bureaucracy and among skilled workers. However continuing economic insecurity meant that more radical anti-war socialist currents found a hearing among immigrant workers. This stratification of the labour force was reflected in an element of Anglo-Saxon chauvinism in the ideology of the Wilsonian offensive and in the segregationist policy of the AFL. At a 1917 meeting of the AFL Executive Council, Gompers rebuffed a delegation of black trade unionists for "somehow conveying the idea that they are to be petted or coddled and given special consideration and special privilege. Of course that can't be done." (van der Pijl, 1984, p.60.)
The AFL’s internationalism, like the broader Wilson Offensive, did not long outlast the war. Yet the period set a pattern that would endure. It marked the first emergence of an hegemonic bloc in which the British and American states and their propaganda institutions advanced an Atlanticist programme that drew support from a broad range of class interests, within which sections of organised labour had a significant, if subordinate and contested, role.

The nascent Atlanticist bloc broke down in the 1920s, amid sharpening conflict over the reconstruction of Europe between its liberal finance and corporatist industrial elements (van der Pijl, 1984, p.62). It would take another World War to spark its re-emergence.

**Munzenburg’s Red Orchestra**

The divisions within the American labour movement over the First World War were paralleled in Europe, where the outbreak of conflict shattered the Socialist International, as social democrats rallied to their rival national standards (Eley, 2002, p.123.).

The Second International was revived by the socialist parties that had supported the war in 1919, the same year that saw the Bolsheviks set up the rival Communist Third International. Although many socialists remained non-aligned, both extremes moved to cement the split. Across Europe the left split, as the Bolsheviks sponsored the foundation of Communist Parties (Eley, 2002, p.177).

The Communist International or Comintern soon developed its own mass propaganda organisation. At its centre was the brilliant young German communist, Willi Münzenberg. In 1921, Münzenberg established the Berlin-based Internationale Arbeiterhilfe to send famine relief to the Soviet Union (Koch, 1996, pp.23-26). This was the first major project in a vast propaganda network that would become known as the Münzenberg Trust.

Münzenberg pioneered many of the techniques of mass persuasion that would become familiar during the Twentieth Century. He arranged spectacular conferences, and set up front organisations which he called ‘innocent’s clubs’, ostensibly dedicated to causes with broad appeal, but in reality intended to defend the Bolshevik revolution (Wilford, 2008, p.12). A number of the key propagandists of the Cold War, for both West as well as the East, would learn their trade in the Comintern organisations of the inter-war period (Saunders, 1999, p.65).

One such figure was Jay Lovestone, born in 1897 into a Jewish-Lithuanian family which emigrated to the US ten years later (Morgan, 1999, p.5). In 1915, he entered the City College of New York, an institution which had a large working class Jewish student contingent at a time when Ivy League universities still practised discrimination (Morgan, 1999, p.10).

In 1919, Lovestone and his friend Bertram Wolfe became founder members of the Communist Party of America, led by Charles Ruthenberg, despite Lovestone’s doubts about the viability of a party that was dominated by non-English-speaking immigrant workers (Morgan, 1999, p.19). Lovestone was thrown into both overt and underground work for the Party. He produced a slew of pamphlets, one of which attacked the AFL as the ‘Labor Lieutenants of American Imperialism’ (Morgan, 1999, p.32). By the time he was sent to
Berlin in 1922, as a delegate to a Friends of the Soviet Union conference, he was under surveillance by the FBI (Morgan, 1999, pp.30-31). When Ruthenberg was prosecuted for ‘criminal syndicalism’ a year later, the Bureau took a close interest in Lovestone’s testimony for the defence, which included an admission that the Friends of Soviet Russia and the Federated Press news agency were party fronts (Morgan, 1999, p.38).

Lovestone made his first visit to Moscow in 1925, then in the midst of a succession battle following the death of Lenin. Joseph Stalin was allied to Nikolai Bukharin against Kamenev and Zinoviev in the power struggle (Morgan, 1999, pp.48-49). He formed a close friendship with Bukharin, who he had first met in New York in 1916-17 (Alexander, 1981, p.16).

This alliance was to prove fateful when Lovestone found himself engaged in his own succession battle as acting Secretary of the American Communist Party following the death of Ruthenberg in 1927 (Morgan, 1999, p.66). This internal struggle pitted the Ruthenberg-Lovestone faction against a rival group led by William Foster and James Cannon. According to Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, the Foster-Cannon group was closer to the American trade union movement and more domestically-oriented because of its strength in the Mid-West, while the Ruthenberg-Lovestone faction was more responsive to influences from Moscow (Alexander, 1981, p.14). According to the Cannonite Max Shachtman, “we had pretty well the view that the Lovestone group … was composed of intellectuals, of New York intellectuals, whereas the Foster-Cannon group represented the proletarian elements in the party, the native elements in the party, and to a large extent this was true” (Alexander, 1981, p.14).

Both sides took their differences to Moscow, where Lovestone still had support from Bukharin, though Foster found allies among supporters of Stalin. On their return, Lovestone won an apparently decisive victory in the August 1927 Party Convention (Morgan, 1999, p.69). During his short period of uncontested supremacy, he threw the party into the 1928 presidential election campaign, hiring thousands of professional canvassers and encouraging them to resort to tricks to get the signatures needed to place the Communist candidate, William Foster on the ballot. This approach earned him a rebuke from Bukharin, when his instructions were leaked by the Fosterites (Morgan, 1999, p.71).

As a supporter of Bukharin, Lovestone was part of a strong faction in the international Communist movement during this period, which included leading figures such as the Germans Arthur Ewert, Heinrich Brandler, and August Thalheimer and the Italian Palmiro Togliatti (Cohen, 1980, p.294). In the course of that year, however they faced a growing challenge from Stalinists advocating what would become the ‘Third Period’ policy, a shift to the left based on the expectation of imminent revolution in Western Europe (Cohen, 1980, p.292). Those like Bukharin who were sceptical about this prospect were accused of ‘right deviation.’ (Morgan, 1999, p.70) (Cohen, 1980, p.294). Lovestone’s belief in “the tremendous reserve powers of American capitalism,” marked him out as vulnerable (Morgan, 1999, p.68).

At the Sixth Comintern Congress in July 1928, Bukharin defended Lovestone’s view, arguing that ‘In no country is capitalism so strong as it is in the United States of America... Is it a terrible thing to say that there is little likelihood of an immediate revolutionary situation?’
Lovestone returned Bukharin’s loyalty, allowing Foster to outflank him by backing Stalin and the Third Period (Morgan, 1999, p.76). The third factional leader, James Cannon, threw in his lot with Trotsky on the delegation’s return to the United States (Morgan, 1999, p.76). This prompted Lovestone to launch a purge, which according to Howe and Coser, “surpassed anything before known in the American radical movement” with the Trotskyist leaders’ homes raided, their meetings disrupted and their newspaper sellers attacked (Alexander, 1981, p.19).

Ironically, this move came as Stalin was preparing to purge Bukharin’s supporters from the Comintern (Alexander, 1981, p.7). The February 1929 convention of the Communist Party USA was dominated by Lovestone’s supporters, yet his position was fatally undermined when a delegation from Moscow demanded he go to Russia to work for the Comintern (Alexander, 1981, p.20).

Lovestone responded by organising a delegation to Moscow, which found itself confronted by a special American Commission of the Comintern led by Stalin himself. In a speech to the commission on 6 May, Stalin insisted: “It would be wrong to ignore the specific peculiarities of American capitalism. The Communist Party in its work must take them into account. But it would be still more wrong to base the activities of the Communist Party on the specific features, since the foundation of the activities of every Communist Party, including the American Communist Party, on which it must base itself, must be the general features of capitalism, which are the same for all countries, and not its specific features in any given country” (quoted in Alexander, 1981, p.22).

On the 12 May, the Commission presented a draft address accusing Lovestone of American ‘exceptionalism’. In response the American delegation attempted to activate precautionary measures to take control of party property. However, after the delegation refused to accept the address, following a Comintern presidium meeting on 14 May, Lovestone’s support in the American Party collapsed (Alexander, 1981, p.26).

While officially awaiting reassignment from the Comintern, Lovestone escaped from Moscow on 11 June, with assistance from a Latvian contact in Soviet intelligence, Nicholas Dozenberg (Morgan, 1999, p.101). He was expelled from the American Communist Party within the month (Morgan, 1999, p.103). Several hundred loyalists were forced out with him, all that was left of his majority in the party a few months earlier (Morgan, 1999, p.105, Alexander, 1981, p.28).

**Brandler’s International Communist Opposition**

Events in America mirrored a wave of expulsions that had already begun in Europe. In Germany, a right-wing faction led by veteran Comintern activists Heinrich Brandler and August Thalheimer responded to their expulsion from the Communist Party in January 1929 with the formation of a new vehicle, the Communist Party of Germany (Opposition) (KPO) (Alexander, 1981, p.137). By late 1929, similar organisations had begun to emerge in a number of European countries, including France and Austria (Alexander, 1981, p.262).
In line with this trend, the Lovestoneite faction in the US formed the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (Majority Group) in October 1929, and launched their own newspaper, *Revolutionary Age*, the following month (Alexander, 1981, p.28).

The second conference of the KPO in November 1929, laid out what would become the official position of the right opposition groups. Their goal, in the words of *Revolutionary Age* correspondent M.N. Roy was to “save the Party and the International”, rejecting “even the slightest tendency in the direction of organization of a new party” (quoted in Alexander, 1981, p.140).

The first move towards uniting the various right opposition groups took place in March 1930, when a number of groups agreed to form an information centre based in Berlin. The first full conference of the International Communist Opposition (ICO) took place in the same city in December 1930, with delegates from Germany, Norway, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and the United States, and messages from Austria, Italy, Finland and Canada (Alexander, 1981, p.279).

The platform agreed in Berlin reiterated the ICO’s claim to be a part of the Communist International, but sharply criticised Stalin’s doctrine of the Third Period, emphasising the importance of united front tactics and of trade union unity (Alexander, 1981, pp.280-281).

As the American delegate, Jay Lovestone reported from the conference that “Our platform very correctly emphasizes the Leninist tactical attitude toward trade unions and the need for the militants and communists working in the mass unions. The necessity of united front tactics, the need of the Party’s winning the majority of working class are brought home very clearly” (Alexander, 1981, p.279).

The abandonment of the Stalinist dual-union policy was crucial in allowing the Lovestoneites to regain a foothold in the mainstream American labour movement. A key figure in this respect was Charles ‘Sasha’ Zimmerman, who had led the left wing opposition to the leadership of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) prior to his expulsion from the union in 1926, following a failed strike that had shut down the entire New York garment industry. He was expelled from the Communist Party along with the rest of the Lovestoneites three years later (Chester, 1995, p.9). In May 1931, Zimmerman was allowed to re-join the ILGWU and soon rose to head one of its key strongholds, Local 22. He became the second most powerful figure in the ILGWU after its leader David Dubinsky (Chester, 1995, p.9).

The position would become increasingly important to the ICO as a whole because of the deteriorating situation faced by its European affiliates in the course of the 1930s. In the summer of 1932, Lovestone travelled to Europe for the second ICO conference. He arrived in Berlin at a key moment in Hitler’s rise to power, as President von Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag for the elections which he realised would make the Nazis the largest party (Morgan, 1999, pp.108-109). During Lovestone’s visit, he was informed by Brandler and Thalheimer that the KPO had joined with another left-wing group, the Socialist Workers Party (SAP), to set up an organisation to help victims of the growing state repression, the International Relief Association (IRA) (Chester, 1995, p.8).

36
The IRA moved its headquarters to Paris the following year, as Hitler’s ascent to power forced the German left underground. In April 1933, Lovestone wrote to a number of potential sponsors, about a possible American Committee of the IRA (Chester, 1995, p.8). By the time of its launch in July 1933, a number of prominent liberals had joined the board, including the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, Roger Baldwin and the eminent theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, paralleling the endorsement of the German committee by prominent intellectuals such as Albert Einstein and Kathe Kollwitz (Chester, 1995, pp.8-9).

Although Lovestone himself remained in the background, other members of his group, notably Bertram Wolfe, joined the board, and another Lovestoneite, Sheba Strunsky was appointed as secretary (Chester, 1995, p.9). According to the Eric Chester’s history of the IRA, ‘Lovestone hoped to use the new formation as a conduit for aid to his comrades in the German underground, the Communist Party (Opposition), but he fully understood that only the endorsement of a wide range of prominent progressives could provide the IRA with the necessary credibility’ (Chester, 1995, p.9).

Given the Comintern roots of the ICO, Lovestone’s role invites comparisons with Willi Munzenberg’s ‘Innocent’s Clubs’. In his history of the ICO, Robert J. Alexander argues that the Lovestoneites did not try to dominate the IRA:

“The Communist Oppositionists did not organize “front groups” or “transmission belts” such as those the official Communist Party established and dominated for many decades. However, the Lovestoneite leaders and some of the rank and file did participate in organizations in which they collaborated with members of other radical factions and with independent leftist intellectuals” (Alexander, 1981, p.40).

This difference in approach may have reflected the Lovestoneites’ negative experience of Comintern discipline, but perhaps also owed something to the relative weakness of their position. If the IRA was not a rigid front organisation, the necessarily covert nature of its role in Nazi Germany exacerbated the tensions between the Lovestoneites and the IRA’s liberal backers.

Crucial among these was David Dubinsky, whose ILGWU was a key source of finance for the IRA (Chester, 1995, p.9).

The Lovestoneite position within the ILGWU had been consolidated in April 1933, with the election of Zimmerman as manager of Local 22 (Alexander, 1981, p.46). The passage of the National Industrial Recovery in June as part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal enabled a wave of union recruitment and Zimmerman led a successful strike in August (Alexander, 1981, p.47). The following year Dubinsky invited Lovestone to speak at the ILGWU convention, underlining a rapprochement that proceeded despite Lovestone’s use of the platform to attack the New Deal from a communist position (Morgan, 1999, p.111).

Roy Godson, who interviewed Dubinsky and other AFL leaders, writes of this period:

Before America became involved in World War II, David Dubinsky and Matthew Woll had feared that if the democratic leadership of Eastern and Western Europe were destroyed by the Nazis, the Russians and the well-organized Communist
underground might emerge from the ensuing political vacuum as the new rulers of the continent. With this in mind, Woll and Dubinsky enlisted the support of the AFL's president William Green and its secretary-treasurer George Meany in the Jewish Labor Committee's effort to rescue hundreds of democratic labor leaders, politicians, and intellectuals from the Nazis (Godson, 1975, pp.326-327).

Godson notes that Dubinsky, unlike Woll, did not possess the confidence of AFL leaders, who were suspicious of his contacts with the Lovestoneites and other socialists, and who sometimes made anti-Semitic remarks (Godson, 1975, p.329).

The response of the AFL to the plight of European refugees was significantly shaped by the strong nativist element in its craft union tradition. Although, its President William Green became chair of the Labor League for Human Rights in 1938, the union opposed the lifting of quotas on European refugees in the United States, instead endorsing a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Tichenor, 2002, p.163).

Despite these tensions, Dubinsky enjoyed a significant say in the AFL's foreign policy due to his control of the ILGWU and its finances (Godson, 1975, p.330). Dubinsky's own politics inclined more towards social democracy, and accordingly he sought to strengthen the social democratic element in the German resistance (Chester, 1995, p.7). However, the KPO and SAP initially proved more effective resistance groups than the Social Democrats and the Communists, because they were smaller and less open to Nazi penetration (Alexander, 1981, p.145).

If this made the IRA a natural conduit for Dubinsky's anti-fascist support, there nevertheless remained a significant difference between his agenda and that of the Lovestoneites. For one thing, the Lovestoneites had still not given up on their hopes of reuniting with the Comintern, and made attempts to re-open negotiations with US communist leaders in January 1932 and December 1934 (Alexander, 1981, pp.80-82).

An interesting, if jaundiced commentary on these tensions is preserved in the archives of the British Security Service, which maintained a file on Heinrich Brandler, including extensive reports on intercepted correspondence between Lovestone and the KPO leader (National Archives KV2/580).

In November 1934, the head of the Security Service, Sir Vernon Kell wrote to Ray Atherton of the US embassy about negotiations between the ICO and the Comintern, asking that the Americans monitor an expected attempt by Lovestone to travel to Europe under an assumed name in January 1935 (National Archives KV2/580, Kell to Atherton, 27 Nov. 1934).

A number of letter intercepts summarised by the Secret Intelligence Service testify to controversies over the Communist Opposition role in the IRA. In March 1935, Lovestone informed Thalheimer that Dubinsky's secretary had become suspicious after receiving two letters from Brandler, one of which was signed with an apparently false name (National Archives KV2/580, Subject: Heinrich Brandler, 16 Mar. 1935). In September 1936, Lovestone warned Thalheimer that American IRA comrades had protested against the
impression given in Paris that the IRA was strictly an organisation of the Communist Party Opposition. The SIS report quoted Lovestone as stating: “very likely it was a mistake to have told him (Dr. NATHAN) that Heinz uses the name of “Peters” but that he is actually directing the I.R.A. work. It is on this grounds that NATHAN now contends that the I.R.A. is too much a strictly BRANDLER organisation (National Archives KV2/580, Subject: Heinrich Brandler, 13 October 1936)”.

A December 1937 note on the activities of the Communist Opposition in the previous two years offered a strikingly cynical assessment of the relationship between the Lovestoneites and their union backers:

The Paris centre is run entirely by German refugees and is mainly supported by a monthly contribution from the American organisation and also by donations, some of which come out of the pockets of the Lovestone Group, but others which are secured by Lovestone from various Trade Unions in the United States, which are under the impression that their contributions are to be used for the underground fight for Trade Unionism in Germany, and which are kept very carefully in ignorance that these Paris comrades are Communists, albeit not of the brand recognised by Moscow. Incidentally, the Unions from which donations are secured are equally unaware of the extent to which they themselves are manipulated by Lovestone.

It is considered by Lovestone that great headway is being made by the Paris Centre and it is worthy of note that, more particularly since the Comintern has been victimising Germans in the course of its heresy hunts, something approaching an understanding, or at all events, a better understanding, has taken place between Heinz BRANDLER and Willi MUENZENBERG, though there has, or course, been no suggestion of open co-operation. Willi MUENZENBERG is at the moment by no means persona grata with Moscow (National Archives KV2/580, Notes on the Communist Opposition Movement, 6 Dec. 1937).

The ‘heresy hunts’ within the Comintern reached a fateful turning point for the right opposition with the arrest of Nikolai Bukharin in February 1937, and his execution the following year (Cohen, 1980, pp.372-4). For the first time Lovestone and other ICO leaders became openly critical of Stalin’s purges, forcing a reconsideration of their own attitude to the Comintern (Alexander, 1981, p.124). Bukharin’s death made it brutally clear that there was little prospect of a power-shift in Moscow that would bring his followers in from the cold. The impression was compounded by the Communist-led suppression of the ICO-aligned Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista in Republican Spain in 1937 (Alexander, 1981, p.229).

Stalinist repression combined with continuing fascist advances to ensure that the ICO was in retreat across continental Europe. Following the Revolutionary Socialist Congress in Paris in 1938, Lovestone, travelled to Vienna at the invitation of the Austrian group Der Funke, arriving in time to witness the Nazi occupation that preceded the Anschluss (Morgan, 1999, p.127). According to Robert Alexander, Lovestone brought with him eight false passports which were used to smuggle out Austrian opposition leaders (Alexander, 1981, p.269).
In 1936, Lovestone had sent American money to Brandler to extend the ICO’s work in Czechoslovakia (TNA KV2/580, Subject: Brandler, Heinz; 20 Jan. 1936). Here too, however, the ICO presence was destroyed by the Nazi occupation that followed the 1938 Munich Agreement.

As the ICO’s position in Europe weakened during the course of the 1930s, the Lovestoneites drew closer to their allies among US labour leaders. The growth in US union membership in the mid-1930s was seen by the Lovestoneites as justifying their turn away from communist dual union policies. The Lovestoneite paper *Workers’ Age* initially welcomed the formation of the Committee of Industrial Organisations (later the Congress of Industrial Organisations or CIO) in 1935 (Alexander, 1981, p.59).

In contrast to the conservative, craft-union traditions of the AFL, the CIO was committed to organising the new mass production industries and a number of its leaders were associated with the Socialist Party (Wilford, 2003, p.12). It was also more favourable to immigration than the older organisation, organising many workers of southern and eastern European origin (Tichenor, 2002, p.163).

In 1936 and 1937, the CIO led an unprecedented wave of sit-down strikes which won union recognition in a number of the new mass production industries (van der Pijl, 1984, p.96). However, the prominence of Communist organisers in the strikes prompted concern among some of the more conservative CIO leaders. Through the offices of David Dubinsky’s ILGWU leadership, Lovestone was deputed as chief of staff to Homer Martin, head of the United Auto Workers (UAW), with a brief to take on the Communists (Morgan, 1999, p.125).

A number of people close to the Lovestone group were appointed to UAW staff positions as a result, most notably, Francis Henson, who became an assistant to Martin, and Irving Brown (Alexander, 1981, p.57). In the preceding two years both had been involved in the Revolutionary Policy Committee, a left-wing caucus within the Socialist Party, where their closeness to Lovestone provoked widespread suspicion (Alexander, 1981, p.109). Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas was among those who regarded Brown in particular as a Lovestoneite plant (Alexander, 1981, p.110).

As well as the Communists, the struggle in the UAW brought the Lovestoneites into conflict with a Socialist group around Victor Reuther, sparking a feud that would later mark relations between the AFL and the CIO. Reuther would denounced Lovestone as “one of the most Machiavellian union-splitters ever to prey on the American Labor movement” (quoted in Morgan, 1999, p.125).

At the 1937 UAW convention, Lovestone’s plan to purge the union was frustrated by CIO leader John L. Lewis, and it split into pro and anti-Martin factions (Morgan, 1999, p.126). In the bitter struggle that followed the anti-Martin faction published some of Lovestone’s correspondence with Martin, apparently stolen from Lovestone’s flat by the communists (Alexander, 1981, p.59).
By 1939, the split had become permanent, with Martin’s faction leaving the CIO for the AFL. Within a year, Martin’s union had folded. Henry Ford took pity on the former UAW boss, setting him up with a house and car and a position buying paint (Morgan, 1999, p.131).

Despite, the CIO’s victory among the auto workers, the late 1930s saw a recovery for the AFL. The 1937 recession compounded pressure on the Roosevelt administration to moderate working class militancy, blunting the CIO advance, and enabling the AFL to make up some of the ground lost to its newer rival (van der Pijl, 1984, p.96). One such victory was the return of David Dubinsky’s ILGWU from the ranks of the CIO, a move supported by the Lovestoneites in 1940 (Alexander, 1981, p.48).

Kees van Der Pijl summarised the result of the period as follows:

If the overall outcome was heterogeneous (also due to the fact that the protracted struggle of the working class took place under changing legal and political conditions), the compromise, worked out on the national level, between high productivity industry and organized workers became its dominating feature. In the course of the Roosevelt offensive, organized labour first had to be cut down to size to make this compromise attractive to the capitalist class; but once this renewed subordination was achieved, the corporatist mechanism allowed for a relatively smooth interplay between the big unions’ economic demands and the expansion of American capital. The AFL and the CIO both supported labour-saving mechanization in exchange for pay rises for the stably employed workers forming their core constituencies (van der Pijl, 1984, p.97).

By the late 1930s, the Lovestoneites were increasingly playing a role in defending this corporatist settlement. If the Lovestoneite involvement in the UAW was the clearest example of this, it was also a factor in US trade union support for the group’s activities in Europe.

During this period, the ideological differences that separated the Lovestoneites from sponsors such as David Dubinsky were fast disappearing.

The Lovestoneite group went through successive changes of name from the Independent Communist Labor League to the Independent Labor League of America (ILLA), a process reflecting a gradual abandonment of communist ideology, and a shift towards social democracy. Internal debate amongst the Lovestoneites increasingly focused on the issues that were dividing American social democrats: attitudes towards the Roosevelt administration and towards the prospect of a European war (Alexander, 1981, p.133).

**The Lovestoneites and the intellectuals: Corporatism and the ‘New Class’**

Over the course of their existence, the Lovestoneites were involved in a number of significant cultural activities. These included their newspaper, initially the *Revolutionary Age* (later the *Workers Age*) and the educational activities organised by their New Workers School, which had become the Independent Labor Institute by the late 1930s (Alexander,
They were also prominently represented in the intellectual circles involved in two independent magazines, *The Modern Monthly* and the *Marxist Review*.

The emerging anti-Stalinism of the Lovestoneites placed them alongside their Trotskyite rivals in a wider current of non-communist ‘New York Intellectuals’ on the American left in the late 1930s (Wilford, 2003, pp.7-10).

The attempts by the New York intellectuals to rationalise the struggles within the Comintern and the rise of Stalinism were to have a lasting influence on ideas about the changing class structure of Twentieth Century society. Those theories may in turn offer a useful starting point for an analysis of the role of the ex-Communist intellectuals themselves. In the 1930s, it was the Trotskyites rather than the Lovestoneites who made the running in these debates, largely because the latter were much slower to become openly critical of the Soviet Union.

A resolution at the CPO conference in December 1933/January 1934 accused the Trotskyites of going to “a counter-revolutionary extreme” for propounding the view that “The Communist Party, the trade unions, the activists in the U.S.S.R. and all other organizations of the workers are declared to have been ‘destroyed’ by the ‘Stalinist bureaucracy’ [sic], which is supposed to represent the interests of elements alien to the proletariat” (Alexander, 1981, p.102).

Trotsky’s thesis of the ‘bureaucratic degeneration’ the Soviet Union was to have a profound impact on the New York Intellectuals. His *History of the Russian Revolution* was a key influence on James Burnham, who argued that in his 1941 book, *The Managerial Revolution* that a technocratic ‘new class’ was taking power both in the US and Russia (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.49). The theory of the new class would be taken up by other New York intellectuals, notably Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, and much later, Kristol would employ this concept as part of a neoconservative critique of post-war liberalism (Blumenthal, 2008, p.136).

It can fairly be asked whether the New York intellectuals themselves exemplified the New Class they described. This is particularly true of the Lovestoneites, who did not finally give up hope of regaining a place in the Comintern apparatus until well after they had won the patronage of US labour leaders.

One useful approach to that question is through Van Der Pijl’s concept of the state-monopoly tendency, an interpretation of early twentieth century corporatism, cognate in certain respects with that of the new class.

According to Van Der Pijl:

> The increasing bureaucratic complexity of large-scale industrial production, as well as its scientific management according to the supposedly ‘objective laws’ of optimal productivity prescribed by Taylor, Ford and others, tended to obscure or displace consciousness of exploitative relations on the shopfloor...
... The need to intervene in the self-regulating market dictated by large-scale production, reflected in the shift from ‘micro’ to ‘macro’ economics, further enhanced the apparently anti-capitalist, ‘socialist’ quality of the transformation (van der Pijl, 1984, p.21).

In contrast to the theorists of the new class, Van Der Pijl argues that this emerging corporatist stratum remained subordinate to productive capital except in the Soviet Union, “Therefore, we shall speak of a state-monopoly tendency to denote the class form of the hegemony of productive capital in its antinomy with money capital, in order to avoid the suggestion that capitalism actually has overcome its liberal basis: a full state monopoly would be equivalent to a planned economy of the Russian type” (van der Pijl, 1984, p.22).

Key aspects of the state monopoly tendency, exemplified in the ideas of Henry Ford, were the integration of mass production and mass consumption, and the extension of industrial management into the sphere of labour power (van der Pijl, 1984, p.19). Such requirements underline the extent to which the growth of mass propaganda in the interwar period was itself part of the corporatist trend.

Seen in this light, the Lovestoneites can be seen as a fraction of the emerging corporatist stratum which abandoned its initial support for a corporatist-led project, that of the Comintern, which, despite its incipient transnational nature, was always destined to be subordinated to Soviet state interests, to the detriment of their own position in the US labour movement. In exchange, the Lovestoneites gained a subaltern role in supporting the New Deal variant of corporatist capitalism via their alliance with the AFL.

The Lovestoneites and covert action

The AFL’s role in Europe in the 1930s would be cited in the 1970s by Roy Godson in a defence of the union’s post-war role which dismissed claims of CIA support as ‘unsubstantiated’ (Godson, 1975). Later writers such as Hugh Wilford who have documented the CIA’s post-war funding role have nevertheless accepted that Lovestone and the AFL were “entirely confident of their own ability to carry out covert operations, indeed, positively jealous of their independence in the field” (Wilford, 2003, p.99).

Noting the AFL’s pre-existing support for the European non-communist left, Wilford writes:

In part this reflected the intense anti-communism of such AFL leaders as Woll and David Dubinsky, not to mention the particularly bitter hatred of Stalinism felt by the Lovestoneites...

...Also significant, however, was the powerful tradition of internationalist labour solidarity most evident amongst members of the New York garment unions which earlier had found organisational expression in such bodies as the Jewish Labor Committee (Wilford, 2003, p.93).
While the latter point is valid, it should be borne in mind that, as we have seen, the necessarily covert nature of the Lovestoneite work in Europe in the 1930s enabled them to turn anti-fascist support to much narrower partisan purposes.

As Wilford notes, the Lovestoneites represented a tradition of covert action that both pre-dated and post-dated the CIA’s sponsorship of the AFL (Wilford, 2003, p.101). Indeed, the Lovestoneites arguably passed from Soviet state sponsorship in the 1920s to American state sponsorship in the late 1940s in part because of their own determination to retain their freedom of manoeuvre.

This degree of strategic autonomy in part reflected the transnational nature of the Lovestoneite networks. In this respect, Lovestoneite activities in this period support Van Der Pijl’s characterisation of the role of transnational rivalries in global political economy as one in which interstate competition overlaps with transnational class relations (van der Pijl, 2006, pp.16-17).

The extent to which state-sponsored covert operations reflect transnational class relations is further borne out by an examination of the role of the Lovestoneites during the Second World War.

**Chapter Three: World War Two**

Chapter Three will look at the role World War Two in cementing an Atlantic alliance, within which covert action specialists drawn from the Non-Communist Left were allied to organisations like the British Political Warfare Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services.

The Non-Communist left would play a distinctly subaltern role in this hegemonic relationship with Atlanticist elites. However, the dissolution of the Lovestoneites would facilitate the absorption of much of its cadre into a complex of organisations around the American Federation of Labor. This would allow them to play a distinctive role in the war-time state-private network, providing a model that would influence post-war developments and later neoconservative prescriptions.

**The Non Communist Left in the Early Years of World War Two**

The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 sealed the break between the Lovestoneites and Soviet Communism. In the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the ILLA declared that the Comintern had “pronounced its own death sentence” (Alexander, 1981, p.127). Opposition to the Soviet alliance with Germany did not, however, translate into immediate support for the western allies. The International Marxist Center called instead for “uncompromising opposition to this war and to the war makers” (Alexander, 1981, p.293)

Left anti-fascist networks grew increasingly critical of the conduct of the official Communists in the European underground. In February 1940, four groups, Neu Beginnen, the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria (RSO), the Socialist Workers Party (SAP) and the international Socialist Militant League (ISK), issued a joint response to German Communist
leader Walter Ulbricht after he attacked Social Democratic critics of the pact as lackeys of British imperialism. The statement charged that his defence amounted to a call for collaboration with the Gestapo. (The KPD and the Solidarity of the Illegals, 1941)

Under the pressure of such events, the left anti-fascist networks grew increasingly close to the western allies. From the late 1930s, Willi Münzenberg had attempted to build an independent position at the centre of anti-fascist networks in Paris as insurance against Stalinist purges. With the onset of the war, he began lunching allied intelligence officers, including his own former protégé, Paul Willert, now based at the British Information Office. (Koch, 1996, p.308).

During the Munich crisis, the British had noted the effectiveness of Munzenberg’s Deutsche Freiheitsender radio station, ostensibly broadcasting from within Germany, in reality from Paris. (Garnett, 2002, p.32)

After Munzenberg’s mysterious death during the fall of France, two broadcasters from his station, Ernst Adam and Alexander Mass, were recruited by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to work on a black propaganda station broadcasting to Germany from Britain, known as Gustav Seigfried Eins (GS1). SOE, formed in July 1940 under the chairmanship of Labour cabinet minister Hugh Dalton, was responsible for propaganda through its SO.1 section. (Garnett, 2002, p.36.) In addition, to the GS1 unit, SOE also controlled a “Neu-Beginn” research unit that broadcast left-wing propaganda to Germany from 1940. (Garnett, 2002, pp. 41-42)

In the US, a less official rapprochement between government and the anti-fascist left was manifested in the formation of the Emergency Rescue Committee. Key movers in the organisation included a number of veterans of the European underground left organisations including Karl Frank of Neu Beginnen and Joseph Buttinger of the RSO, alongside establishment liberals such as the theologian and former Socialist Party activist Reinhold Niebuhr. Their efforts had tacit backing from the Roosevelt administration through first lady Eleanor Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary of state Adolf Berle. (Chester, 1995, pp.11-15.)

The ERC also developed close links with British intelligence. Its key field operative was Varian Fry, a former activist in Dubinsky’s American Labor Party. As ERC representative in Marseilles from August 1940, Fry accepted covert British funding to help escaping allied servicemen. (Chester, 1995, pp.16-17.)

The growing links between the allies and the non-communist left were reflected in the evolution of the Lovestoneite movement in 1940. The ILLA’s periodical Workers Age published critiques of Lenin, marking a fundamental break with communist ideology. (Alexander, 1981, p.128). In his private correspondence with Bertram Wolfe, and Fenner Brockway of ILLA’s British ally, the Independent Labour Party, Lovestone himself grew increasingly impatient with their pacifism. (Morgan, 1999, p.134-135)

During this period, Lovestone’s patron David Dubinsky was engaged in a struggle which overcame intense communist opposition to secure the American Labour Party’s
presidential nomination for Roosevelt in September 1940 (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p. 272).

This domestic American conflict reflected the wider international backdrop of a deepening gulf between communists loyal to Moscow and a non-communist left increasingly close to the allies. It was in these circumstances, that Lovestone decided at the end of 1940 that there was no longer a distinctive role for the ILLA, and wound up the organisation (Morgan, 1999, p.136) (Alexander, 1981, p.132). David Dubinsky had long argued that his Lovestonite allies were held back by their association with communism. (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.241). With the ILLA consigned to history, the way was clear for Lovestone to acquire a higher profile role in the AFL’s international operations.

Shortly before the United States entered the war in 1941, Lovestone was appointed Labour secretary of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), the main pro-allied lobby group. Dubinsky recalled:

“He was supposed to be chairman, but I had a problem with that one. The Committee was made up of extremely distinguished people, and I wondered how the hell can Jay Lovestone, the man who used to run the American Communist Party, be in a committee with them. I suggested that he change his name, but he wouldn’t do that. So we made Sam Shore, one of our I.L.G. vice-presidents chairman of the Labor Division and Jay was Secretary, the guy who did all the work. We made him kosher, just as Matthew Woll had made me kosher in the A.F.L. leadership which had no great love for Jews” (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.243).

The AFL was also involved in a number of other interventionist groups. AFL President William Green served as honorary president of the American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor (ALCABL), founded in March 1941, while third Vice-President Matthew Woll served as chairman. Woll was also chairman during this period of a third group, the League for Human Rights (Mahl, 1998, p.32).

Woll’s role underlined the continuity of the AFL’s stance with its support for intervention in World War One, two decades earlier. Less obviously, it may also have represented a deepening of the alliance between British intelligence and the non-communist left.

By January 1941, all British intelligence agencies in the United States were brought together within British Security Co-ordination (BSC) based at the Rockefeller Center in New York under Sir William Stephenson (Mahl, 1998). In July 1941, agent Sydney Morrell wrote a report on the activities of Special Operations Executive SO.1 propaganda section within the BSC. He identified a number of AFL-linked organisations, including ALCABL and the League for Human Rights, as BSC fronts. Morrell noted that most of the BSC’s fronts were closely interlocked, but added; “none of the above organisations is aware of British influence, since this is maintained through a permanent official in each organisation, who in turn is in touch with a cut-out – and never with us directly” (Morrell, 1941).

BSC historian Thomas Mahl suggests that Matthew Woll was the permanent official in contact with the British in ALCABL (Mahl, 1998, p.32).
One person who is likely to have been witting as to the British role was one of Lovestone’s former men in the United Auto Workers, Francis Henson. From 1940, Henson worked as an assistant to the BSC agent Sandy Griffith at Market Analysts Inc., a firm based in the same building as the New York chapter of the CDAAA. His job was to use the company’s polls to encourage Congressional support for more aid to Britain (Mahl, 1998, pp.88-92). Griffith was himself a BSC agent, with the SOE codename G.112, who played a major role in co-ordinating British propaganda broadcasts to Europe by the American radio station WRUL under the cover of CDAAA sponsorship (Mahl, 1998, pp.44-45).

It seems unlikely that Lovestone himself, as experienced as he already was in the ways of covert action, can have been entirely unwitting about the covert British role in organising the interventionist network. Whatever formally recruited agents may have underpinned that role, its true foundation lay in the community of interests between the British and their American supporters, a fact which would be demonstrated when those interests began to drift apart with the Soviet entry into the war.

Anti-communism had proved a powerful bulwark for the AFL’s alliance with Britain during the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Following the Nazi invasion of Russia, the policy of the CDAAA was to support the Soviets but make no favourable mention of communism (Morgan, 1999, p.137). If the latter instruction was congenial to the AFL internationalists like Dubinsky and Lovestone, less welcome was a renewed wave of popular front sentiment, both domestically and internationally. This was reflected in Dubinsky’s claim that the AFL was engaged in a struggle with the British TUC throughout the war over policy towards the Soviets (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.245).

Dubinsky’s involvement in the CDAAA has been interpreted by (van der Pijl, 1984, p.112) as reflecting ‘a larger process of gearing working class opinion to interventionism’ within the context of a ‘Roosevelt offensive’ aimed at achieving a new Atlanticist order based on the expansion of New Deal corporate liberalism.

Dubinsky’s remark about the need to make Jay Lovestone ‘kosher’ to the WASP elites of the CDAAA underlines that AFL internationalists were distinctly subaltern players in this hegemonic bloc. Nevertheless, their roles were significant in a number of ways.

Economically, Dubinsky and his post-Lovestoneite allies supported a corporatist brand of unionism that was more congenial to the New Deal expansionism of the Atlanticist bloc than either the conservatism of the old-line AFL leaders or the radicalism of some in the CIO. Politically, they were also staunch supporters of Roosevelt in domestic Democratic politics through vehicles such as the American Labor Party and the Union for Democratic Action.

This domestic activism took on an international dimension through their involvement in the BSC’s political warfare campaign. A second international dimension was provided by their long-standing support for the non-communist left within the European anti-fascist underground.
Each of these dimensions is best understood as a partial perspective on the Lovestoneite role as a corporatist stratum within an essentially transnational hegemonic bloc, which would emerge more fully when the United States entered the war after Pearl Harbour.

The passage of hegemonic leadership from Britain to the US was symbolised by the construction of a US intelligence apparatus modelled on, and strongly encouraged by the BSC.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) had been established in 1941 on British prompting, and many of its personnel had been involved in BSC networks (Mahl, 1998, p.19). In June 1942 it was split into the Office of War Information (OWI) covering open propaganda, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) responsible for secret intelligence and covert action.

Like the BSC, the new American intelligence network quickly established links with the non-communist left. In April 1942, the Neu Beginnen activist Karl Frank sent a memo to Allen Dulles, outlining a potential programme of political warfare with strong echoes of the activities of the pre-war Paris-based anti-Fascist left.

He argued that the first step would be a careful study of the existing German underground networks. “That could be done through a special agency in cooperation with such people experienced in underground work, carefully selected as trustworthy to the cause of an allied victory and the defeat of Nazism. This agency would have to make out a plan how to make contacts; first in the few border places in Europe where inside contacts can still be reached; in consequence with the inside groups themselves.” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.18) For this purpose he suggested, “In Sweden as well as in Switzerland contacts may be reorganized from reliable elements of the labour organisations like the Swiss Social Democratic Party or the Swedish Social Democratic Party.” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.19)

He suggested a number of other roles for the same agency. One section “could train trustworthy refugees for investigation, help in questioning war prisoners and similar people.” Another could include “a research office in America, to analyse and study carefully German newspapers, and above all, all of the available local newspapers, reviews, books, etc.” He added that this section could have “an official research institute affiliated with it, which would be able to co-ordinate knowledge and expert experience of many things; emigrations from Germany, Jewish refugee knowledge, technical and economic facts, etc. It might even be possible to get additional military information through such a careful digest of this material. It would certainly produce important political information.” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.18)

Dulles recommended these proposals in a letter to William Donovan, the head of the COI, and subsequently passed on the memo to Arthur Goldberg, who founded the OSS Labor Section in June 1942. (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.17)

The formation of this section reflected the high priority attached to labour by the OSS. In a July 1942 memo, OSS officer Heber Blankenhorn called labour “the most important factor
in the psychological warfare situation in Western Europe.” He argued that “In Occupied France, Czecchia [sic], the Lowlands [Low Countries], etc., it is the factory workers, railwaymen, miners, etc, whose activities against the enemy have been important. In many areas they keep their unions intact or maintain underground their union habits and connections. It is their principle form of cohesion. Their unions moreover had accustomed them to international labor relationships, to which they still look, especially to affiliated types such as the American and British union federations” (Heideking and Mauch, 1996, p.25)

The make-up of the OSS Labor Section reflected this imperative. Arthur Goldberg had been a labour lawyer with close connections with the CIO before the war. He was recruited into the OSS by George Bowden, who had himself been an organiser for the Industrial Workers of the World before entering the legal profession (Smith, 2005, p.10).

The OSS’s willingness to recruit socialists and even communists co-existed with a tendency to assign senior positions to scions of the moneyed WASP elite (Smith, 2005, p.13). A number of OSS veterans, Arthur Goldberg among them, would later suggest that this led to significant tensions between front-line officers and their more patrician superiors (Smith, 2005, p.15). This class divide was perhaps an element of continuity with the BSC-allied pressure groups from which many OSS officers were drawn (Mahl, 1998, p.182).

Jay Lovestone was in many ways a natural recruit for the OSS. Like Goldberg, he had close links with US labour leaders, and like Karl Frank, he had significant experience of the European anti-fascist underground. Like Dulles, he had been close to the interventionist groups around the BSC before US entry into the war. Yet the concerns which had given Dubinsky pause about Lovestone’s suitability for the CDAAA, were to resurface in relation to the OSS.

Lovestone applied to the organisation on 24 August 1942, writing to Bowden, that ‘I have made a first-hand study of the Nazi movement and I have had practical experience in underground as well as open work in nearly fifteen countries’ (Morgan, 1999, P.137).

In the event, however, Lovestone’s past caught up with him. An OSS memo of 31 August 1942, stated “Lovestone is engaged not only in a number of intrigues involving the Communist Party, from which he ostensibly broke in 1929 when he formed the Communist Party Opposition, but also in other activities which may render him useless as an impartial source of information” (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.138). This rejection was repeated when Lovestone applied for a Department of Labor job a month later, prompting a memo from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, which pronounced: “It is positively shocking that this man is even being considered for a government job” (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.138).

Lovestone’s position was a particularly delicate one during 1942. In February, his associates Nathan and Esther Mendelssohn were arrested during a customs check (Morgan, 1999, p.138). The subsequent investigation uncovered links to the forged passport activities which had been central to Lovestone’s activities over the years (Morgan, 1999, p.139).
The hostile attentions of Hoover’s FBI were to be a continuing feature of Lovestone’s career (Morgan, 1999, p.237). So too would ongoing class tensions between US intelligence chiefs and their labour operatives (Wilford, 2003, p.99).

**Dubinsky’s War within the War**

Lovestone’s rejection by the OSS did not prevent him playing a role in allied labour operations, in part because some of his AFL colleagues were to enjoy a closer relationship with the organisation. Irving Brown was hired as a consultant under cover of his formal job at the War Production Board, working closely with OSS London chief William Casey and Arthur Goldberg (Rathbun, 1996, p.92-93). During late 1944, he visited Norway to meet German Social Democrat Willy Brandt, Copenhagen to meet officials of the International Transport Workers Federation, and Paris to meet anti-Communist trade unionists from Force Ouvriere (Rathbun, 1996, p.94-95).

Serafino Romualdi, an Italian socialist exile and former staffer in Dubinsky’s ILGWU, also joined the OSS in 1944. In October that year, he was sent to the Franco-Swiss border, supposedly to deliver arms, but in reality on a mission, “planned outside normal channels” to smuggle the socialist writer Ignazio Silone into Italy to combat communist influence (Smith, 2005, pp.97-98).

In his autobiography, Dubinsky emphasised the autonomous role of the CDAAA’s Lovestone-run Labor Division in these operations:

> “The Labor Division of the Committee to Defend America worked closely with the International Transport Workers Federation, particularly with J.H. Oldenbroek and Omer Bécu, who did exceptionally fine work against the Nazis. We gave them money for their underground operations. They also established contact with the European labor desk of the Office of Strategic Services, operating out of London with Arthur J. Goldberg as its chief.

> “Money raised by American workers provided a lot of help to Norwegian underground forces headed by Haakon Lie. We also helped Léon Jouhaux, the great French trade-unionist, and the French resistance movement. The Germans got only limited assistance, mostly in the form of aid to Social Democratic refugee leaders outside Germany” (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.245).

The anti-communist focus of Brown and Romualdi’s activities reflected an AFL agenda that was distinctly out of sympathy with wartime popular front sentiment. Dubinsky bitterly denounced what he saw as British government pressure for closer relations with the Soviets:

> “A largely unseen war behind the war was being waged between us and the British trade unions over relations with the Soviet trade unions. We stood fast in the belief that it would be a betrayal of a war against totalitarianism to make partnership in that war an excuse for letting organizations that were an instrument of a dictatorial government take on the aspect of legitimate trade unions; we had no doubt that their only goal on the labor front would be to subvert the unions of
That this suspicion was to some extent mutual is shown by a report by professor RH Tawney for the British Embassy in Washington following a visit to the United States by Sir Walter Citrine of the TUC, seeking Allied cooperation between British, American and Soviet trade unions. Tawney outlined three distinct reasons for the strength of anti-communism within the AFL. Firstly, it was an assertion of patriotism in a country which was still suspicious of trade unionism as an institution. 'The pose – often half-hearted – of European Labour Movements is internationalism’ Tawney suggested, ‘The pose – normally a sincere one – of the American Labour Movement, and particularly of the A.F. of L., has hitherto been a fervent nationalism’ (Tawney, 1942, p.16).

Secondly while American trade unionism was far more political than it sometimes claimed to be, that politics was, in Tawney’s view, strongly individualist: ‘The A.F. of L., in particular, is not only anti-Communist but anti-Socialist, believes in Capitalism more whole-heartedly than many European capitalists; and, while accepting such favours as governments may bestow, is antagonistic to all policies which, by magnifying the province of public authorities, might encroach on its own” (Tawney, 1942, p.16)

Thirdly, Tawney pointed to the ‘peculiar composition’ of the AFL leadership which he likened to ‘that of the directors of a combine or the bosses of a political machine rather than the leaders of a Labour Movement’, and which represented ‘a type of “business trade unionism” which has its place in Labour Movements, but which is mischievous when exaggerated and which, in the case of the A.F. of L., reigns almost alone’ (Tawney, 1942, p.17)

In Tawney’s view, the AFL retained the mentality ‘of a nation not wholly at war’ (Tawney, 1942, p.14). He saw their reaction to Citrine’s mission as short term thinking which prioritised fear of press and public reaction over the Allied cause, and perhaps hinted at corruption in his description of the conservativism of AFL leaders who he saw as ‘suspicious of new policies, contemptuous of all ideas which look beyond the moment, preoccupied to excess with the defence of the vested interests of their own organisations, perpetually on the defensive, and apprehensive, sometimes with good reason, of the lightest breath of public criticism’ (Tawney, 1942, p.17).

A similar view of the AFL was reflected in a report compiled for the British Political Warfare Executive in February 1943, on Citrine’s continuing attempts to persuade the AFL and the CIO to support fraternal links with the Soviet trade unions.

The British official, codenamed G.400, reported of a meeting with the AFL:

The negative attitude of the A. F. of L. towards Citrine’s proposal (see clipping attached) was to be expected. Nothing worries the leaders of the Federation more than the growth of left-wing tendencies in the rank and file. The fight in the American Federation of Labour is that of right-wing leaders against growing leftist minorities of the rank and file. The victory over the left-wing constitutes a
paramount interest of the leaders, which overrides any other considerations of a
more general character.

Sir Walter Citrine’s arguments which of course he did not express in public but
which he stressed with great energy in the course of his conversations were that it
was precisely in order to fight communism among the rank and file that it was
necessary to come to terms with the Russian movement; he implied that the
Russians carried out strictly the letter and spirit of their agreement not to give any
encouragement to the British Communist Party, and that if the Trade Union
Leaders have the Russians on their side the Communist danger in England becomes
less. These arguments made no impression on the “diehards” of the A.F. of L. led
by Mr Woll (G.400, Political Warfare Executive, 25 February 1943).

The British view of short-termism on the part of the AFL can also be reversed. If the need
for Allied solidarity in the struggle with Germany had greater immediacy for the British, the
Americans were better placed to look towards the post-war order.

As the prospect of German defeat grew closer, the anti-communist focus of the AFL’s
foreign policy grew more intense. The campaign was formalised in the autumn of 1944,
when the AFL voted to create the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), to aid free unions
abroad. The resolution was drafted by Lovestone, who became the Committee’s Executive
Secretary (Morgan, 1999, p.144). The AFL’s priorities were shared by many of their allies in the interventionist community
which had emerged prior to Pearl Harbour. Writing to David Dubinsky on 6 April 1945,
Varian Fry of the International Relief and Rescue Committee (IRRC) predicted that the
European labour movement would split along ideological and geographic lines: “The
Communists will be represented in the governments of the individual countries. With the
help of the Russian state and a powerful propaganda machine they will strive for the
domination of the labor movement in every country” (cited in Morgan, 1999, pp.152-153.).

The IRRC had been formed in February 1942 with the merger of the Emergency Rescue
Committee and the international Relief Association, with the Lovestoneite Sheba Strunsky
as director of the united organisation. The IRRC was even more closely aligned with
government than its predecessors. Between 1943 and 1946, it was primarily funded
through the National War Fund (NWF), the only body allowed to raise funds for the relief
of war victims abroad. It was represented at the NWF by David Seiferheld, a senior OSS
officer (Chester, 1995, pp.18-19).

Within the OSS itself, Labor Desk chief Arthur Goldberg was working with Irving Brown on
post-war plans to help the underground in Eastern Europe, according to Brown’s
biographer, Ben Rathbun (Rathbun, 1996, p.93).

This did not however necessarily reflect a settled government policy of anticommunism.
Roosevelt himself was the most personally committed of the allied leaders to a post-war
continuation of the grand alliance, with the Soviet Union as one of the four guarantors of
the United Nations (Aldrich, 2002, p.57). Within the US, war-time allied co-operation
provided a backdrop that allowed Earl Browder’s Communist Party to achieve a new level of respectability and growing public tolerance (Levenstein, 1981, p.186).

Domestic political rivalry was a crucial factor in the AFL’s hostility to communism internationally. Since the 1930s, the AFL and the Lovestoneites had worked through a variety of vehicles to support Roosevelt and his new deal electoral coalition. Charles Zimmerman and the Lovestoneites in the ILGWU had cemented their relationship with Dubinsky in part through common work in support of Roosevelt’s re-election in the American Labor Party (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.117). This party had been founded by Dubinsky and fellow garment union leader Sydney Hillman in 1936. According to Richard Schifter, the intention was to provide a way for New York voters to support Roosevelt without supporting the Tammany Hall-tainted Democratic Party in the state. (Schifter, New York Times, 3 June 1992) According to Paul Buhle, the key aim was to win left-wing voters away from Norman Thomas’s Socialist Party candidacy, which it was feared would hand the state to the republicans (Buhle, 1999, p.112).

Hillman was much more open than Dubinsky to tactical alliances with the communists, a position which was to prove problematic in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, when Dubinsky and Hillman fought off an attempt by the communist faction in the CIO to deny Roosevelt the American Labor Party’s nomination for the 1940 presidential election. The subsequent communist volte-face following Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union only confirmed Dubinsky in his conviction of their duplicity. For Hillman, who became head of the CIO Political Action Committee in 1943, the turnaround created a new opportunity for a united front (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.272).

Dubinsky’s attempts to force a showdown came to nothing when he failed to win the support of Roosevelt or of the republican New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, a prominent ALP supporter. Ultimately, Dubinsky formed a separate Liberal Party of New York, which delivered 305,000 votes for Roosevelt in 1944, while Hillman’s American Labor Party delivered 500,000 (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, pp.275-277).

Hillman’s committee was credited with a key role in shoring up the New Deal coalition which secured Roosevelt’s re-election, a fact which contributed to the prestige of his communist allies. This emboldened Browder in his policy of strengthening links with what he viewed as the progressive bourgeoisie, a stance which had led the Communist Party to dissolve itself into the Communist Political Association in May 1944 (Levenstein, 1981, pp.184-187).

In April 1945, the French Communist publication Cahiers du Communisme published an article by the former Comintern official Jacques Duclos attacking Browder’s uncritical stance towards the Roosevelt administration and American capitalism. The article was noted by Ben Mandel, a consultant to Eur-X, a small anti-communist unit in the US State Department, who interpreted it as evidence that Soviet policy towards the west would harden after the war. He passed the article on to Eur-X head Ray Murphy, who sought outlets for the information. One of the few interested parties was the Free Trade Union Committee under Jay Lovestone, who was familiar with Duclos from his time in the Communist Party (Godson, 2001, pp.204-205).
Such is the account of the Duclos episode from intelligence theorist Roy Godson. According to Lovestone’s biographer Ted Morgan, Murphy wrote an analysis of the Duclos article entitled “Possible Resurrection of the Communist International, Resumption of Extreme Leftist Activities, Possible Effect on United States”, which was largely ignored in the State Department. Morgan makes no mention of Mandel’s role in relation to the Duclos article or Eur-X (Morgan, 1999, p.148). He does however note that Mandel was also known as Bert Miller, and that he was one of a circle of ex-communists including Ben Gitlow and Whittaker Chambers, in Lovestone’s ‘entourage’ at around this time (Morgan, 1999, p.139.).

Mandel/Miller had in fact been head of the New York district of the Communist Party when he was purged along with Lovestone in 1929 (Alexander, 1981, p.28). He had subsequently broken with the Lovestoneite organisation in the early 1930s over his support for an alliance with non-communist socialists (Alexander, 1981, pp.63-64).

In the light of Mandel’s connections, the Duclos episode takes on a slightly different significance, as an example of the anti-communist circles around Lovestone lobbying the State Department rather than doing its bidding.

In forecasting the downfall of Browder and its policy, the Lovestoneites were proved correct, yet some have questioned the broader conclusions they drew about Soviet foreign policy. In his history of communism and anti-communism in the CIO, Harvey Levenstein challenged the picture of the article as a “kind of opening shot in the cold war”

... Duclos did not object to the CPUSA’s alliance with bourgeois progressive forces. Indeed, he applauded the party’s fervent support for Roosevelt. He called for a policy of preserving the unity forged with progressive bourgeois forces into the post-war era. But Browder had gone too far. In effect, Duclos said, for Communists alliances with the bourgeoisie were short-run or medium-run ones. French and other Communists throughout the world had been busily constructing fruitful alliances of that sort (Levenstein, 1981, p.187).

It was precisely these alliances, in France and elsewhere in Europe that were the targets of the Free Trade Union Committee. The emerging Lovestoneite strategy in Europe was intimately bound up with the AFL’s struggle with American Communists and their tactical allies in the CIO for political and industrial influence in the United States.

The Lovestoneite afterlife: Transnational labour politics in World War Two

The dissolution of the Independent Labor League of America in 1940 marked the end of the Lovestoneites as a political organisation. However, as Robert Alexander noted, Lovestone continued to work with former Lovestoneites such as Irving Brown and Harry Greenberg in the AFL’s Free Trade Union Committee (Alexander, 1981, p.133). Charles Zimmerman and Israel Breslow would remain influential in the International Garment Workers Union into the 1970s. Although Alexander suggested that few former Lovestoneites remained active in radical politics, he noted that Breslow and Jack Cypin would become senior figures in the Socialist Party, and Ben Davidson would serve as head of the Liberal Party of New York. Other struck out in different directions, Bertram Wolfe became a scholar at the Hoover

If anything, Alexander understates the degree of continuing cohesion among many of the former Lovestoneites, and the organisations in which they were involved. David Dubinsky’s ILGWU was a key powerbase for both the Free Trade Union Committee and the Liberal Party of New York. The same was true of the International Rescue Committee, with its Lovestoneite executive director Sheba Strunsky (Chester, 1995, p.246). Francis Henson, Lovestone’s former auto union operative, played a key role in the war-time British front network linked to the AFL (Mahl, 1998, 92). Former Lovestoneites Ben Gitlow and Ben Mandel played a key role in Lovestone’s dealings with the House Un-American Activities Committee (Morgan, 1999, p.139). Despite moving towards Conservatism, Bertram Wolfe could still unite with his former colleagues in the cause of anti-communism, as demonstrated by his post-war membership of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Saunders, 1999, p.198). European Members of the Congress would include old allies from the pre-war Communist Right Opposition such as Richard Lowenthal (Wilford, 2003, p.196).

In a sense, David Dubinsky was the ultimate heir of Nikolai Bukharin. He found in the Lovestoneites a valuable instrument of the ILGWU’s foreign policy, a cadre of activists with transatlantic networks and long experience of covert action, assets that were at a premium in the late 1930s and 1940s. For their part, the Lovestoneites embrace of Dubinsky reflected the fact that they were no more inclined to Trotskyite isolation than to Stalinist obedience. Over the course of little more than a decade they moved from the patronage of the Soviet Union and the Comintern to an alliance first with Britain’s BSC and then with the United States’ OSS. If they were frequently active in groups that would later be regarded as front organisations, they were never mere ciphers.

Their fervent anti-communism often surpassed that of intelligence officials, and remained a consistent driving force, whether they were working with British intelligence in New York or American agents in London. That antipathy reflected bitter experience of Stalinism from third period sectarianism to the Moscow purges and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but it was also shaped by a rivalry that was at its sharpest in those popular front periods when popular front policies suggested that communists could earn a place in the New Deal hegemonic bloc, threatening the role that Dubinsky and his supporters had carved out for themselves.

If the former Lovestoneites around Dubinsky were a channel for British influence in America, and later for American influence in Europe, their role was ultimately reducible to neither. They represented a distinct tradition of transnational covert action, which could trace its roots via the US Government sponsored International Rescue Committee to the International Relief Association of the Right Opposition, and ultimately to Comintern organisations like Willi Munzenberg’s Workers’ International Relief.
Chapter Four: The Early Cold War

Chapter Four will examine the emergence of the state-private network of the early Cold War. This was a dynamic process with several phases. The immediate post-war period was a significant moment in the emergence of a political warfare coalition, in which non-state actors and former intelligence officers stepped into the gap left by official retrenchment and lobbied for a renewal of state-sponsorship.

The emergence of the CIA would see a renewed expansion of state-support and ultimately a degree of institutionalisation that would cause tensions with private actors. For the AFL networks centred on Jay Lovestone, a new equilibrium would be found in an alliance with James Angleton's CIA Counterintelligence Staff, a relationship which would provide a model and a constituency for later neoconservative ideas about the relationship between covert action, counterintelligence, and other intelligence disciplines.

Post-war Interlude 1945-47

The Political Warfare Coalition after World War Two

The tradition established in the 1930s and the 1940s would lay the groundwork for AFL labour diplomacy as a key feature of US covert action in the Cold War. In the years immediately after World War Two however, with wartime intelligence agencies retrenching, the AFL would come to the fore as an independent actor in a renewed interventionist coalition.

With the return of peace there was initially a retrenchment from wartime exigencies. In Britain, MI6 took over what was left of the functions of the wartime Special Operations Executive, with Prime Minister Clement Attlee declaring in August 1945 that he saw no need for an organisation of the ‘Comintern’ kind (Aldrich, 2002, p.79). A month later, US President Harry Truman signed an executive order abolishing the Office of Strategic Services (Aldrich, 2002, p.81).

As a result of this winding down of government capacity for transnational political warfare the immediate post-war years have been seen as something of a heroic period of independent labour diplomacy.

Hugh Wilford has argued that “In 1945, with the disbanding of the wartime secret service, the U.S. government effectively abolished its political warfare capability in the labour field. The Lovestoneites filled this vacuum with a foreign policy of their own geared to exporting the principles of AFL-style “free trade unionism” – in particular, workers’ freedom from any form of political control – and thwarting communist attempts to win the allegiance of European labour” (Wilford, 2008, p.53).

In his trenchant 1975 defence of the AFL’s foreign policy record, Roy Godson concluded that the Free Trade Union Committee did not receive any government funding in this period:
There were no indications in the AFL’s archives that the AFL was offered or accepted government money during the first few years after the war. In fact, Tom Braden—a former Central Intelligence Agency official—in a controversial and unsubstantiated *Saturday Evening Post* article which alleged that the CIA subsequently financed some AFL overseas activities, maintains that the Federation operated with its own funds until at least December, 1947 (Godson, 1975, p.332).

Godson acknowledged that the AFL remained in contact with a number of government officials throughout the post-war period (Godson, 1975, 328). However, he argues that “in the very early post-war period when the dominant group in the U.S. government and the AFL leaders did not share similar perspectives about Russian objectives and the danger of communist control of organized labor in Western Europe and elsewhere, the AFL went its own way” (Godson, 1975, p.333).

As Godson’s reference to a ‘dominant group’ implies, the continuation of war-time ‘popular frontism’ was not uncontested within the US government itself. In many ways, the situation paralleled that of five years earlier. Public passivity masked the support of many state managers for a more interventionist policy, and private covert action abroad was intimately bound up with domestic lobbying in an essentially transnational struggle.

Even in the immediate post-war period, the US Government never entirely withdrew from clandestine intelligence, despite President Truman’s order abolishing the Office of Strategic Services as of 1 October 1945 (Aldrich, 2002, p.81.) Key OSS operations were preserved in the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), thanks to an order secured by William Donovan’s Deputy, General John Magruder from Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy (Weiner, 2007, p.10.). There were still 73 people working at the SSU in London, successor to the OSS station which had run wartime labour operations, as late as December 1945 (Aldrich, 2002, p.83).

In January 1946, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was placed in charge of the SSU’s successor, the Central Intelligence Group, with responsibility for nearly two thousand intelligence officers. Although Souers had no written authority to run a clandestine intelligence service, General Magruder claimed that this was the President’s intention (Aldrich, 2002, pp. 14-15).

In July 1946, the Central Intelligence Group was authorised to create a new intelligence unit, the Office of Strategic Operations (OSO) (CIA, 2010). The OSO quickly established links with Jay Lovestone and the FTUC, in a relationship which Olmsted Hughes describes as ‘clear-cut and cooperative: the CIA provided monetary support in exchange for information, the use of the labor organization’s name and access to the FTUC’s contact networks’ (Hughes, 2011, p.66).

It would seem therefore that the threads of the AFL’s informal intelligence links, established first with BSC and later with the OSS, were picked up fairly quickly after the war. The post-war interlude, in which the reorganisation of intelligence left the initiative with the AFL, was a brief one.
The Two-Tier Dynamic - Eur-x and Ben Mandel

In fact, one of the AFL’s most important roles during this period was as a domestic ally of those forces within the American state working for a post-war covert action capability.

Roy Godson has identified the Eur-X unit, headed by Ray Murphy at the State Department, as “a promising nucleus for covert action” during this period:

> It specialized in the international Communist movement and encouraged sophisticated Foreign Service officers to do all they could to help anti-Stalinist elements. But Eur-X had a limited budget and no influence outside the State Department. What little influence it had was overshadowed by Stalin’s wartime abolition of the Comintern (Godson, 2001, p.29).

Within the State Department, Murphy’s closest allies were among diplomats who had reported on the Soviet Union from postings in Latvia before the war, such as George Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen. Another member of this group, Elbridge Durbrow was one of the ‘sophisticated’ diplomats who provided Murphy with a small foreign intelligence network after the war. Along with Durbrow in Rome, this group included Brewster Morris in Germany and Norris Chipman in France (Morgan, 1999, p.149).

Lovestone received reports from these circles via Murphy, who in return received material from Lovestone’s Canadian connection with Nathan Mendelssohn, the very connection which had got Lovestone into trouble with the FBI during the war (Godson, 2001, p.139).

Ray Murphy’s June 1945 analysis forecasting a resumption of communist political warfare, discussed in the last chapter, was effectively an opening shot in this struggle within the State Department itself. Murphy’s cooperation with Ben Mandel and the AFL in interpreting and publicising the Duclos letter, underlines that the challenge to the dominant State Department view came from a network of anti-communists both inside and outside the Government. One way of conceptualising such state-private networks is through the concept of epistemic communities, which have been defined by Diane Stone as “networks of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of values to which they should be applied” (quoted in Parmar, 2006, p.17).

Within the wider American state-private network, there were a range of motives for witting and unwitting cooperation. The concept of a ‘political warfare coalition’ attempts to distinguish those political activists and intelligence professionals who saw themselves as experts in and lobbyists for covert action in their own right, as well as potential allies of the US Government in carrying it out. Such a designation would reflect the common view its members took of the threat from Soviet political warfare and the need to counter it in kind. It would also reflect the experience of political warfare which some had acquired in the pre-war Comintern, European anti-fascist networks, the British-supported interventionist organisations, or the Office of Strategic Services.
Inderjeet Parmar has argued that epistemic communities can be characterised by a ‘two-tier’ dynamic:

The first tier consists of government officials, international agencies and corporate executives; the second comprises academics, lawyers, and journalists. Both tiers share a common conceptual framework but operate within an agreed division of labour: government officials have access to policy-making and use the second tier to publicise/disseminate their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and scientific’, as well as to elaborate on public officials’ ideas (Parmar, 2006, pp.17-18).

Parmar argues that war-time interventionist groups like the CDAAA and Fight for Freedom played such a second-tier role for the Roosevelt administration prior to American entry into World War Two (Parmar, 2006, p.22, n.27). They were also, as we have seen, playing a similar role for British intelligence. Indeed in calling for the creation of the Office of Strategic Services, they were at once demanding American political warfare and carrying out British political warfare. This suggests that the two-tier dynamic is potentially complex and transnational.

The latter property is often typical of epistemic communities, as described by Peter M. Haas (Haas, 1992, p.4). Perhaps the biggest obstacle to seeing the political warfare coalition as an epistemic community at this period is the issue of the shared set of causal beliefs which Haas sees as one of the diagnostic features of the concept (Haas, 1992, p.18). A commitment to the importance of the ‘Non-communist Left’ as a counterweight to communism was one common element that would emerge among diplomats, intelligence officers and ex-communist intellectuals in the early post-war period (Wilford, 2003, p.88). However, the activist approach to intelligence that these groups sought to preserve from the wartime period rarely received full theoretical articulation. Roy Godson notes Wilmoore Kendall’s argument for opportunity-oriented activist intelligence analysis in the July 1949 edition of *World Politics* precisely because it was exceptional in providing a clear theoretical statement of views that ‘have held a certain currency in the intelligence community’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). In terms of Haas’s typology, groups bound by shared principled beliefs but not shared causal beliefs are interpreted as interest groups or social movements. From this point of view, the political warfare coalition can be seen as an interest group on the threshold of becoming an epistemic community but for the largely tacit nature of the theoretical assumptions underpinning its world view (Haas, 1992, p.18).

Parmar’s survey of state-private networks in American foreign policy concludes that the concepts such as that of the epistemic community should be subsumed within a wider neo-Gramscian analysis (Parmar, 2006, p.14). Indeed, Gramsci’s dichotomy of dictatorship and hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, p.239) provides a broader framework for analysing the two-tier dynamic in broader contexts than the concept of epistemic communities allows.

In these terms, it can be argued that the political warfare coalition played a key role in reshaping the New Deal hegemonic bloc after the war, contributing to the end of the wartime grand alliance and the onset of the Cold War. The proactive role of the political
The Two-Tier Dynamic – Whittaker Chambers and HUAC

The role of Ben Mandel in passing on the Duclos Letter to Raymond Murphy was a clear example of the two-tier dynamic at work. At the same time, however, another member of the ex-Communist circle around Lovestone was playing the second-tier role in a way which was to have much more dramatic consequences for the first tier in the State Department.

In March 1945, Murphy interviewed Whittaker Chambers for two hours at his home in Maryland. Chambers’ testimony at this meeting and a second interview in August 1946 encouraged Murphy to pursue his suspicion that State Department official Alger Hiss was a covert Communist (Morgan, 1999, p.148). Hiss resigned from the Department in the wake of a November 1946 security investigation partly initiated by a report from Murphy. In February 1947, Murphy passed Chambers’ material to Richard Nixon, then a Congressman on the House un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). He would later help prepare Chambers for his sensational testimony before the committee in August 1948 (Morgan, 1999, pp.149).

Under the chairmanship of Martin Dies, HUAC had been targeting communist subversion since the late 1930s, when testimony from John Frey, a senior AFL figure, about infiltration of the CIO, had caused a sensation (Levenstein, 1981, p.133). Nevertheless, CIO historian Harvey Levenstein concludes that HUAC was ahead of its time in this period:

> It was too obviously a part of the conservative Democratic revolt in Congress against the liberal New Dealers, and thus aroused suspicion, rather than cooperation, from the administration and liberal Democrats, who had no compunctions about cavorting with those the committee was denouncing (Levenstein, 1981, p.134).

By the late 1940s, HUAC’s time had come. Sidney Blumenthal cites the Hiss case as one of a number of key events of the time favouring the Conservative cause, writing of Chambers “by casting clouds of doubt over the patriotism and integrity of the New Deal, he had created an opening for the right” (Blumenthal, 2008, p.15).

The Hiss case arguably provides support for Parmar’s view that the concept of epistemic communities can be integrated into a wider Gramscian analysis. Through the second-tier expert Whittaker Chambers, first-tier officials like Raymond Murphy were able to reshape the hegemonic bloc that had emerged from the New Deal to the exclusion of communists and those that were open to working with them.

Yet within the constituencies that made up the political warfare coalition as it emerged from World War Two, the Hiss case was a double-edged sword. In this instance, the two-tier structure partially overlapped with a social distinction between what might be called the patrician and plebeian wings.
This distinction had been visible in the wartime interventionist organisations where ILGWU leader David Dubinsky marveled at finding himself in the exalted company of Winthrop Aldrich and John D. Rockefeller (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.244). It had caused tensions within the Office of Strategic Services, according to Labor Branch officer Arthur Goldberg, who lamented the unsuitable background of the wealthy young men who were appointed to senior positions in the organisation (Smith, 2005, p.17).

The challenge which the Hiss case presented to the liberal establishment wing of the political warfare lobby is well summed up in a comment by the biographer of Willi Münzenberg, Stephen Koch, on the ‘Wise Men’, a group of Democrat foreign policy luminaries who overlapped with Raymond Murphy’s Riga Group allies through the inclusion of Charles Bohlen and George Kennan:

...the Wise Men owed their political position to Roosevelt’s coalition and to the ascendency it gave the Democratic party, even though to a man they regarded the Soviet policy of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins as the work of dangerously incompetent dilettantes. Like their chief, President Truman himself, they could neither endorse not repudiate Roosevelt’s approach. Meanwhile, any very public housecleaning of the Washington penetrations would have handed the populist right an all-too-useful blunt instrument for attacking Yalta, containment, and their own position in power (Koch, 1996, p.368).

For the members of the plebeian wing of the political warfare coalition the threat was even more acute. For the non-communist left, made up of socialists or ex-communists, many of them European immigrants, the very background that underpinned their expertise exposed them to suspicion, as Lovestone’s wartime brush with the FBI indicated.

Conservative opponents of the New Deal were not necessarily anxious to make fine distinctions on the left between communists and pro-British interventionists. Indeed, during the war, HUAC had sought to investigate British covert operations in the United States directly but found the political climate unpropitious. Some of those involved with the BSC believed they had been smeared as communists because of their role in campaigning against US companies involved in trading with the Axis. The British were ultimately persuaded to drop the campaign by Allen Dulles, a former Standard Oil attorney and one of the centrist republicans brought into Roosevelt’s wartime intelligence apparatus by William Donovan (Mahl, 1998, p.100-101). The recruitment of such figures may have been partly intended to protect the right flank of the New Deal hegemonic bloc. They would come to play a crucial role when McCarthyism turned the anti-communist spotlight on the political warfare coalition itself.

The Non-Communist Left at home
In the immediate post-war period, however, the advance of the State Department anti-communists presented new opportunities for their counterparts in groups such as the AFL. Indeed, it was at this period that the concept of the Non-Communist Left (NCL) as a natural ally of US foreign policy emerged in the circles around diplomats George Kennan and Charles Bohlen (Wilford, 2003, p.88). Although initially driven by the need to find allies in
Europe not discredited by fascism, the idea soon found a domestic application describing organisations like Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which stood in opposition to former vice-president Henry Wallace, who was then emerging as the standard-bearer of the spirit of the Popular Front (Wilford, 2003, p.88).

Americans for Democratic Action was a reformation of the wartime Union for Democratic Action (UDA), in response to the emergence of Wallace’s Progressive Citizens of America in late 1946, backed by key leaders of the CIO (Hemingway, 2002, p.197). This was only one instance of a more general phenomenon, in which interventionist organisations formed during the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, many of them linked to the AFL, played a leading role in challenging attempts to accommodate Communists within the post-war order.

**The World Federation of Trade Unions**

The domestic struggle between the AFL and the CIO was linked to similar conflicts around the world in a transnational struggle over nature of post-war international labour organisation.

The founding conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) took place in Paris in 1945. Louis Saillant of the French Communist CGT was elected as Secretary-General of the new organisation, which was to be based in Prague. Walter Citrine of the TUC was elected as President, while CIO delegate John Brophy defied CIO president Phil Murray by refusing to take a position as WFTU vice-president (Rathbun, 1996, pp.126-127.).

The AFL stayed out of the WFTU and the Free Trade Union Committee firmly opposed it as a bastion of Soviet influence (Wilford, 2003, p.39). In the first flush of post-war optimism, the American and British governments had an open mind about the new federation. However, it soon became a key concern for those officials who saw a new political struggle between east and west emerging. In February 1946, US diplomat George Kennan described the WFTU as an ‘instrument of Soviet foreign policy’ in a cable from Moscow (Morgan, 1999, p.153).

Both the AFL and the CIO sought official patronage in the struggle over international labour organisation, by seeking to have their members appointed as US labour attaches and in other positions abroad (Morgan 1999, 144-145). In effect, both federations were trying to shape an emerging transnational state-private network in the labour sphere; the CIO towards a continuation of wartime popular-frontism, the AFL towards what would soon become the Cold War. It was a struggle that would play out across the globe, and crucially in newly liberated Western Europe.

**Lovestoneite activities in Post-war France**

Irving Brown arrived in Paris shortly after his wartime ally Leon Jouhaux was ousted as President of the CGT by the Communists in September 1945 (Rathbun, 1996, p.177.). Brown supported Jouhaux and his erstwhile Secretary-General Robert Bothereau in their attempts to regain control of the confederation, but did not expect them to succeed. In a letter to Lovestone on 5 December, he predicted a split at the next convention, and requested $100,000 to help bolster Jouhaux’s Force Ouvriere faction. (Morgan, 1999,
According to Irwin M. Wall, little money was available until after the April 1946 convention, which was dominated by the Communists (Wall, 1991, p.99).

Brown was aided by the fact that, influenced by their strong position in the French Government, the Communists were advocating wage restraint, a position he mocked during a debate with Benoit Frachon, the key Communist figure in the CGT, at a congress in Lille in February 1946 (Rathbun, 1996, p.178).

He was, however, hampered by Jouhaux’s unwillingness to split the CGT despite his differences with the Communists. The split Brown predicted did not ripen until 1947, when an acute crisis was sparked by the sacking of Communist Ministers from the Government in May, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June. The Communists now reversed their policy and launched a wave of strikes prompting an open break with the Force Ouvriére group, which emerged as a separate union in December (Morgan, 1999, pp.181-182).

This outcome clearly owes something to Irving Brown’s plans of two years previously, but there were also limits to the Free Trade Union Committee’s capabilities as an independent force. Morgan’s account suggests that Brown’s $100,000 request for support for Force Ouvriére had been approved by the Free Trade Union Committee in January 1946 (Morgan, 1999, 179). However, Wall reports that this level of funding was not available in 1945-46 and it was 1947 before sums of $20,000 each were made available from the AFL and the ILGWU (Wall, 1991, p.101).

It is also notable that Force Ouvriére did not finally break with the CGT until six months after the inauguration of the Marshall Plan, which led to a stronger anti-Communist emphasis to US Government policy. In November 1947, acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett authorised Ambassador Caffery to help Brown and to extend secret funding to Force Ouvriére. After the CGT split Jouhaux called on Caffery, seeking to ensure that Brown’s role remained in the background (Morgan, 1999, pp.181-182).

The FTUC’s ‘heroic period’ was perhaps more of an interlude. Lovestone and Brown brought to the French situation long experience of intra-union conflict, which in Lovestone’s case had ironically been honed in the union-splitting days of the third period Comintern. Nevertheless, their plan to split the CGT only came to fruition when the State Department had entered the lists.

The covert alliance between the US Government, the Lovestoneites and Force Ouvriére was effectively a continuation of wartime resistance relationships with a new anti-Communist focus. Dubinsky’s ‘war within the war’ had become the central front, and the FTUC’s French intervention provided a model of political warfare that would be applied in a number of other countries.

Lovestoneite activities in Post-war Germany

American trade unionists had a more direct influence over the post-war reconstruction of their German counterparts as a result of the allied military occupation. The Labour
Relations Branch of the Office of Military Government, US (OMGUS), was marked by the rivalry between the CIO and the AFL.

The CIO members were initially more strategically placed, including Labour Relations head Mortimer Wolf, while the AFL were more numerous. Mortimer favoured a bottom-up process of reconstruction through the elections of shop stewards and works councils, a plan which chimed with emerging demands for economic democracy from German workers, many of whose employers had been discredited by support for the Nazi regime (Eisenberg, 1996, p.153). This process was welcomed by CIO chief Sidney Hillman, who believed a new generation was needed to replace discredited pre-war leaders (Eisenberg, 1996, p. 156).

Such aspirations were at odds with the more narrowly-focused ‘business unionism’ tradition of the AFL, whose supporters feared the Mortimer plan would create an opening for the German Communists, at the expense of the AFL’s allies amongst exiled pre-war socialist leaders. Their suspicions were shared by Louis Wiesner, the labour attaché under Robert Murphy, the political advisor to the Military Governor General Lucius Clay (Eisenberg, 1996, p.155).

The AFL also had access to Clay through Joe Keenan, an AFL vice president and brigadier-general on Clay’s staff. When Irving Brown visited Berlin in July 1945, Keenan introduced him to Clay (Rathbun, 1996, p.225). According to biographer Ben Rathbun, Brown quickly built up a rapport with Clay and was instrumental in persuading him against the dismantling of German industry envisaged in the wartime Morgenthau plan (Rathbun, 1996, p.232).

On this issue, the AFL’s position largely chimed with that of leading business figures such as the former OSS chief and corporate lawyer Allen Dulles, who recognised the value of labour support in making the case for reconstruction (Eisenberg, 1996, p.138).

Nevertheless, on the trade union question, the AFL and CIO partisans were left to fight it at the lower levels of OMGUS for some time (Eisenberg, 1996, p.152). Wiesner and Keenan succeeded in having Wolf replaced with Newman Jeffrey, whose subordinates began recognising Social Democratic unions. By the autumn of 1945, however, Wolf had been reinstated by Manpower Division chief General Frank McSherry (Eisenberg, 1996 pp.159-160).

Seeking to reverse the emergence of a top-down pattern of union organisation, Wolf appointed Captain Joseph Gould to investigate developments in the Baden-Wurttemberg area (Eisenberg, 1996 p.161.). Gould had previously been an operative in the OSS Labor Division, recruiting socialist exiles to be parachuted into Germany, in an operation that, apparently unbeknownst to him, was later judged to have been infiltrated by Soviet intelligence (Gould, 2002). Another of Wolfe’s subordinates, George Shaw Wheeler, had been accused of communism in an October 1945 Washington hearing, but retained his post thanks to the intervention of Hillman aide David Morse (Morgan, 1999, p.161)
Gould sent Wheeler to the Stuttgart office of labour field officer Major Alfred Bingham, in an action which Lovestone biographer Morgan described as a break-in. Wheeler uncovered evidence that Bingham had colluded with the Social Democrats to exclude Communists from the local labour league (Morgan, 1999, p.163). Wolf, however, found himself unable to discipline Bingham, and losing support from higher authority, in part because of lobbying in Washington by Newman Jeffrey (Eisenberg, 1996, p.161). He resigned in January 1946 (Morgan, 1999, p.163).

In March, following lobbying from the AFL’s George Meany, the State Department announced that trade unions would be allowed to organise in the American zone. A conference on 12 April in Frankfurt led to the formation of what would eventually become the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), a West German labour federation countering the Soviet-backed FDGB (Morgan, 1999, pp.165-166)

On 13 April 1946, Brown attacked one of the last survivors of the CIO faction in the *New York Herald Tribune*, labelling Wheeler a communist who was working to the same line as World Federation of Trade Unions. According to Brown, this episode soured his relations with General Clay for some months, until Wheeler’s defection to Czechoslovakia some months later allowed him to claim vindication (Rathbun, 1996, pp.238-239). In October 1946, Henry Rutz was demobilised but remained in Germany as an AFL representative funded by the FTUC (Morgan, 1999, p.166).

In early 1947, the focus of the anti-communist struggle moved to Berlin, where Irving Brown was involved in the formation of the Unabhängige Gewerkschaftsopposition (UGO), a group of dissident trade unionists opposed to the communist-led union in the city. This strategy would pay off handsomely when the Communists attempted to launch a general strike in Berlin the following year (Rathbun, 1996, p.239).

Lovestone was also working on establishing an underground labour network across East Germany with the help of transport officials (Morgan, 1999, p.169). This idea may have been inspired by the then-recent war-time resistance activities of the International Transport Workers’ Federation.

Lovestone sought to use this project to gain the support of US Defense Secretary James Forrestal, during a visit to the United States by German Social Democrat leader Kurt Schumacher. The AFL’s support for Schumacher was a source of tension with some of the more conservative US officials, such as Kennan, who favoured his Christian Democrat rival Conrad Adenauer (Morgan, 1999, p.168). Against that backdrop Forrestal’s support was a valuable asset to Lovestone as he sought to pressure General Clay’s military government into providing scarce post-war resources to the German trade unions (Morgan, 1999, p.169). In occupied Germany, wartime patterns of official patronage prevailed more than in liberated France.

The immediate post-war activities of the Free Trade Union Committee, can be seen as a return to the pattern established prior to US entry into World War Two, in which AFL interventionists cooperated closely but informally with sympathetic officials. Much the
The International Rescue Committee

The post-war environment presented significant challenges for the International Rescue Committee. It’s main funder, the National War Fund, was dissolved in December 1946 (Chester, 1995, p.20). The Committee sought to secure its future by building on its wartime relationships with US labor leaders and the intelligence community. In 1945, the IRC appointed to its board Victor Reuther as a representative of the CIO and Matthew Woll, the Chairman of the Free Trade Union Committee, as a representative of the AFL (Chester, 1995, p.60).

Like the FTUC, the International Rescue Committee was closely involved in supporting European Social Democrats in the immediate post-war period, particularly in Germany, where it was one of eleven US relief agencies licensed to operate (Chester, 1995, p.58). The IRC’s European director, the Austrian Socialist Joseph Buttinger visited Germany from October 1945 to February 1946, and from October 1946 to March 1947 (Chester, 1995, p.59). Buttinger worked closely with Irving Brown, both in Germany and in Washington, where he lobbied key decision-makers in an attempt to overcome General Clay’s indifference to the German trade unions (Chester, 1995, p.60).

The IRC’s Executive Director, the former Lovestoneite Sheba Strunsky, cultivated links with the intelligence community in this period by recruiting former OSS officer Albert Jolis to the board. He in turn recruited fellow OSS veteran Arthur Schlesinger to the board in 1947. Schlesinger then recruited former Treasury Secretary Sumner Welles, a signal that the IRC was increasingly well-placed as the Truman Administration renewed its interest in political warfare abroad. (Chester, 1995, p.61).

Verdict on the Post-War interlude

In November 1947, Jay Lovestone reported to George Meany and Matthew Woll on the Free Trade Union Committee, stating that "our trade union programs have penetrated every country of Europe" (Morgan, 1999, p.169).

The complex of organisations centred on the AFL pursued a vigorously anti-communist policy that was largely an extension of its ‘war within the war’ going back to the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Although often at odds with official policy in the immediate post-war period organisations such as the FTUC and the IRC continued to enjoy significant official patronage. If the AFL took the initiative in attempting to influence the European labour scene during this period, it was significant less for its direct impact than in pioneering and lobbying for approaches that would become official US policy.

Containment 1947-1950

The period 1947-1950 saw the institutionalisation of a new apparatus for the prosecution of cold war political warfare. This created new opportunities for the AFL anti-communists, but ultimately created new tensions in their relationship with the American Government.
The Central Intelligence Agency

Key building blocks of the official Cold War were put in place in the course of 1947. In response to the crisis in Greece, the US President set out what would become known as the Truman Doctrine in March, when he told Congress: ‘I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’" (quoted in Gaddis, 2005, p.31).

In June, Secretary of State George Marshall announced a major programme of aid for Europe. Although the Soviets initially entertained the possibility of participating, they soon withdrew from negotiations (Gaddis, 2005, p.32). In May 1947, George Marshall appointed George Kennan head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Two months later Foreign Affairs published Kennan’s famous ‘long telegram’, calling for the United States to engage in the long-term containment of the Soviet Union, which was to be seen as a rival and not a partner (Chester, 1995, p. 24). On the crucial issue that separated the CIO from the AFL, it was the latter’s viewpoint that was gaining ascendancy within the Truman administration.

July 1947 also saw the passage of the National Security Act, which put in place much of the apparatus of the Cold War, including the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Despite its name, the CIA was initially bedevilled by departmental rivalries. Kennan at the State Department insisted on a key role in covert operations for his Policy Planning Staff. This was accommodated in December 1947 by the creation of a unit within the CIA, the Special Procedures Group (SPG). Its first task, at Kennan’s behest, was a covert anti-communist intervention in the Italian elections scheduled for April 1948 (Chester, 1995, p.27). Kennan’s enthusiasm for further intelligence operations, was however not shared by the CIA Director, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who wished to concentrate on intelligence-gathering (Chester, 1995, p 28).

The perennially difficult relationship between intelligence and covert action was examined during this period by a study group whose members included Allen Dulles. They argued that the two activities were interconnected and should be brought together, emulating Britain’s post-war merger of the Special Operations Executive into MI6 (Aldrich, 2002, 86).

Although Kennan accepted the force of this argument, he nevertheless successfully resisted a merger of the CIA’s intelligence and covert operations (Aldrich, 2002, p.87). June 1948 saw the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), nominally part of the CIA, but in practice under the control of Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff. The initial plan for a small central unit, was adapted on Dulles’ advice to allow for a larger field organisation (Chester, 1995, p.26).

The AFL’s Irving Brown made the shortlist for the position of OPC Director, a fact which powerfully testified to the respect in which the AFL’s anti-communist efforts were held, even if Kennan acknowledged the problems of appointing an external candidate. His first choice, again following consultation with Dulles, went to former OSS officer Frank Wisner (Chester, 1995, p.25).
The OPC soon won control of CIA operations involving the FTUC from the OSO, establishing a relationship that was more formal, and therefore ultimately more fractious as a result (Hughes, 2011, p.66). Lovestone was introduced to Wisner by Matthew Woll in December 1948, and OPC cash began flowing to the FTUC with a $35,000 payment a few weeks later (Wilford, 2008, p.54).

In the course of 1949, Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff developed extensive plans for political warfare. A high premium was placed on securing defectors, partly because of their propaganda and intelligence value, but also in order to maximise psychological pressure on Soviet elites (Chester, 1995, p.76).

Despite its role in these plans, the AFL continued to maintain links with the other elements of the CIA. In 1949, Lovestone agreed to provide a cover position for Pagie Morris, an off-the-books agent run by the head of foreign intelligence, James Angleton, who was suspicious of the OPC’s burgeoning plans (Morgan, 1999, p.266).

**The Information Research Department**

Britain was also active in institutionalising a political warfare apparatus to fight the Cold War in the late 1940s.

In January 1948, the Cabinet secretly approved the formation of the Information Research Department (IRD) within the Foreign Office to conduct anti-communist propaganda. Although the IRD was in large part a reflection of Britain’s commitment to the American-led Marshall Plan, the Foreign Office sought to win the support of left-wing ministers, by presenting it in terms of a ‘third force’ role for Britain as a social democratic force power independent of the United States and the Soviet Union (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, pp.27-28).

Like the CIA, the IRD was very much a revival of wartime techniques and networks, particularly those of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its offshoot the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.31). Labour politicians with wartime experience of both organisations, notably Christopher Mayhew and Richard Crossman, were an important source of support for IRD (Wilford, 2003, p.55). These relationships facilitated the early establishment of links between the IRD and the Trade Union Congress, which was already working with the Foreign Office to combat communist domination of the World Federation of Trade Unions (Wilford, 2003, pp.64-65).

The IRD was more wary of working with literary intellectuals (Wilford, 2003, p.64). There was, however, some unofficial Anglo-American co-operation in promoting the non-communist left. A key figure in this was Richard Crossman, the wartime head of the German section of the PWE. In August 1948, Crossman approached the American C.D. Jackson for advice on behalf of his publisher Hamish Hamilton, which was planning a volume of essay by ex-communists, which eventually became the book *The God That Failed*. Like the early PWE, *The God That Failed* owed much to the pre-war anti-fascist networks run by Willi Münzenberg. Three of the contributors, Arthur Koestler, Louis Fischer and Ignazio Silone, had worked with Münzenberg (Saunders, 1999, pp. 64-65).
The Italian elections of 1948
The CIA’s new covert action machinery saw its first major use in the campaign to prevent a communist victory in the April 1948 Italian elections. Tactics included the distribution of anti-communist literature, the provision of newsprint to friendly publications, and a black propaganda campaign run by former OSS officer James Angleton (Wilford, 2008, p.24)

At the same time, the Free Trade Union Committee were running their own campaign to fight communist influence in the Italian trade unions. As in France, Lovestone and Brown sought to split the main union confederation, the CGIL, in order to isolate the communists. In the Italian case, Lovestone’s and Brown’s low estimate of the Italian socialists led them to put their faith in Catholic trade union leader Giulio Pastore (Morgan, 1999, p.190).

Brown’s biographer Ben Rathbun emphasises that Brown ‘thought of himself as a Socialist and was quite at home in that stance’, but that ‘in this live-or-die climate, the most impressive and acceptable allies were De Gasperi, the Christian Democratic Prime Minister’ and his party’ (Rathbun, 1996, p.207). According to Rathbun, Lovestone and Brown worked closely with US ambassador to Italy, James Clement Dunn and with William Colby of the CIA (Rathbun, 1996, p.205). In the run-up to the elections, Dunn was active in soliciting funds from American corporations with interests in Italy, as well as from US labour (Rathbun, 1996, p.210).

In the event, the elections proved to be a decisive victory for De Gasperi, one which Lovestone and Brown quickly moved to exploit. In June, Lovestone and Dubinsky visited Rome to support Pastore’s Catholic faction within CGIL. The following month, when the CGIL called a general strike, the Catholic workers’ refused to join them and were expelled. Pastore created a new federation, the LCGIL, in October (Morgan, 1999, p. 192).

Lovestone and Brown hoped to quickly line-up other non-communist factions behind Pastore, in order to create an Italian federation that would play a part in their fight against the World Federation of Trade Unions. However, it was not until 1950 that these plans came to fruition with the creation of the Italian Federation of Trade Unions (Morgan, 1999, p.193).

Germany
Following their visit to Italy, Lovestone and Dubinsky visited Germany in August 1948, in the midst of the Berlin blockade (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.257). At a meeting with Lucius Clay in the American zone they pleaded for the restoration of trade union property. The AFL’s Henry Rutz and German labour leaders complained bitterly against what they saw as the anti-labour policies pursued by Clay, who was emboldened both by his success against the blockade, and by the expectation that the Republican Thomas Dewey would win the 1948 US presidential election (Morgan, 1999, p.170).

Relations descended to mutual espionage, with Clay tapping the phones of German labour leaders like Willi Richter, and Lovestone spying on Clay through an employee in his office, John Meskimen. The conflict ultimately resolved itself when the re-elected President Truman appointed John J. McCloy as Clay’s successor in 1949 (Morgan, 1999, p.171).
Despite the stormy relationship between Clay and the AFL, the non-communist left began to play a role in American political warfare in Germany during his tenure. In October 1947, the Berlin correspondent of the New Leader and Partisan Review, Melvin Lasky disrupted the Communist-backed East Berlin Writers Congress, a move which initially disturbed the American authorities. (Saunders, 1999, p.27).

However, Lasky lobbied determinedly for a campaign ‘to win the educated and cultured classes’ to support of the Marshall Plan, in a paper submitted to General Clay’s office in December 1947 (Saunders, 1999). He followed up with a proposal for a monthly magazine that would support US foreign-policy in Europe. This eventually came to fruition in October 1948, when Lasky launched Der Monat with backing from the US military government (Saunders, 1999, p.30). Essays originally published in Der Monat would provide much of the material for The God that Failed, the anti-communist tract that was extensively distributed by the US Government and the British Information Research Department as the Cold War intensified (Saunders, 1999, p.65).

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Internal tensions within the WFTU increased in 1947, in the wake of the American announcement of the Marshall Plan, and of Soviet opposition to it. While both American labour federations backed the plan, they followed contrasting strategies in seeking international support for it.

During a November 1947 trip to London, the AFL’s Irving Brown tried and failed to persuade the British TUC to leave the WFTU altogether (Wilford, 2003, p.39). The AFL’s James Carey, on the other hand, initially sought to achieve WFTU participation within the Marshall Plan, in the hopes of isolating the Soviets within the organisation (Buhle, 1999, p.141).

Deepening Cold War tensions, however, meant that the British and American governments increasingly began to share the AFL’s longstanding opposition to the WFTU. This shift, described by Hugh Wilford as a ‘pivotal moment in the emerging public-private axis’ of western labour diplomacy, was a key motive for the flow of subsidies from the CIA to the FTUC from 1948 (Wilford, 2003, p.41).

By the late 1940s, a number of other factors were beginning to work in favour of the AFL’s campaign. Communists were becoming increasingly isolated in the CIO, in an internal battle that mirrored the defeat of the progressive George Wallace by the Cold War liberal Truman in the 1948 US presidential election (Wilford, 2003, p.39). The TUC, like the CIO, was also becoming increasingly disillusioned with communist conduct in the WFTU (Wilford, 2003, p.40).

The divisions came to a head in 1949, when the CIO and the TUC left the WFTU to join the AFL in a new organisation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (Wilford, 2003, p.38). This was the logical culmination of the Free Trade Union Committee’s transnational campaign of union-splitting, but the victory was a bittersweet one. Some AFL leaders, notably William Green, baulked at a development which meant giving unprecedented international recognition to their domestic rival, the CIO, whose
involvement the TUC insisted on (Rathbun, 1996, p.129). The FTUC itself would soon face the re-emergence of the CIO as a competitor for official patronage in the sphere of labour diplomacy.

The Cultural Cold War

As well as supporting the FTUC’s labour operations, the CIA also involved key players such as Irving Brown in its cultural operations. These activities in any case were often based on existing initiatives of the non-communist left, of which the Lovestoneites had been a part since their alliance in the 1930s with the social democratic circles around ILGWU leader David Dubinsky.

The New Leader was an important institution of the latter group, and the initiatives of its German correspondent Melvin Lasky, were an early post-war example of official American support for the Non-Communist Left abroad. This relationship was attacked early on in Soviet-backed publications in Germany. In May 1948, the Tagliche Rundschau attacked the New Leader and the Partisan Review as organs of the ‘American secret police’, and attacked Lasky and an American cultural official, Michael Josselson, who it described as a ‘secret service officer’ (Caute, 2003, pp.254-255).

Josselson had worked in psychological warfare in the US army during the war before joining OMGUS and later the US High Commission (Saunders, 1999, p.12). Some months after the Tagliche Rundschau’s attack, in the autumn of 1948, he joined the CIA’s new covert action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) (Saunders, 1999, p.42).

Josselson’s work would soon involve him in countering communist propaganda in the United States itself. On 25 March 1949, he was in New York for the Cominform’s Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace, where with the help of David Dubinsky, he funded a group of intellectuals who sought to subvert the conference at the Waldorf Astoria, and who subsequently held a rally at Freedom House (Saunders, 1999, pp.54-55).

Calling itself Americans for Intellectual Freedom, this group was led by the philosopher Sydney Hook, who had founded the Committee for Cultural Freedom in the late 1930s. It also included the writers Dwight MacDonald, Mary McCarthy, and Max Eastman, the composer Nicolas Nabokov and the labour reporter Arnold Beichman (Warner, 1995).

In the month following the Waldorf-Astoria event, the OPC funded a similar effort to counter the World Peace Conference in Paris. This time Irving Brown was the conduit through which the French socialist newspaper Franc-Tireur was financed to hold an alternative International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War, with delegates including Ignazio Silone, Franz Borkenau, Fenner Brockway, the writer James T. Farrell, and Sidney Hook (Saunders, 1999, pp. 68-69). Brockway, it will be recalled, had been a key figure in the Independent Labour Party, during its involvement in the pre-war Paris Bureau alongside the Lovestoneites. The event as a whole had too much of a radical tone for Frank Wisner, who objected to what he saw as the anti-Americanism of the Franc-Tireur group (Warner, 1995).
Wisner was nevertheless interested in a continuing organisation, which he called ‘a little DEMINFORM’. Similar ideas has been discussed by Hook and Lasky in Paris. In August 1949, Lasky met with two prominent former communists, Ruth Fischer and Franz Borkenau, and discussed the possibility of an anti-Stalinist conference in Berlin. Although the proposal soon reached the OPC in Washington, it languished for several months despite the support of Wisner’s assistant Carmel Offie (Warner, 1995).

Renewed momentum came in the early months of 1950, when it was taken up by Michael Josselson, who recast Fischer’s proposal for a political conference into a ‘congress for cultural freedom’. In April Wisner agreed to covertly fund the project on condition that Lasky kept a low profile to avoid becoming a target of Communist propaganda. However, this proviso largely went by the board as Lasky had already assumed a prominent role in organising the conference (Warner, 1995).

The Congress opened in Berlin on 26 June 1950, in the opening days of the Korean War (Warner, 1995) In its wake, the OPC agreed to the establishment of a permanent organisation in November 1950 (Warner, 1995). Josselson was placed in charge and Irving Brown was made a member of the steering committee (Saunders, 1999, p.87). As Giles Scott-Smith notes, Brown’s role in the CCF made him a ‘key link man’ between the economic/political and cultural sides of the CIA-sponsored anti-communist offensive (Scott-Smith, 2002, p.76).

The Congress was the most important example of a Cold War operation aimed at intellectuals by intellectuals. In this it was true to the Comintern heritage of many of its principals, employing the Willi Münzenberg strategy of seeking to shape public opinion by cultivating the opinion-formers. Its focus on cultural freedom appealed to the specific interests of intellectuals in professional autonomy.

Frances Stonor Saunders has drawn attention to the pre-occupation of James Burnham, a key player in the formation of the Congress, with elitist political theories from Machiavelli onwards (Saunders, 1999, p.88). Burnham was also a key theorist of the idea of the ‘new class’, a stratum of experts, emerging to challenge previous elites such as the nineteenth century bourgeoisie (Hacker, 1979, p.156). The CCF can perhaps be understood by seeing the function of this new class as analogous to that of the second tier within an epistemic community. In this way, the Congress can be understood as the product of a stratum of intellectuals playing a second-tier role in transnational politics, sponsored by a first tier of Cold War policymakers.

Stonor Saunders has observed that the Congress’s proclaimed commitment to intellectual freedom was in stark contrast to the CIA’s high-handed treatment of its principals, exemplified by the removal of Arthur Koestler, one of the most high profile speakers at the Berlin conference from any further involvement (Saunders, 1999, p.90). Such conflicts arguably reflects a tension that is identified in Van der Pijl’s conception of the new class as a ‘cadre stratum’ whose role implies a ‘necessary functional autonomy’ (van der Pijl, 1998, p.155). The advisory role of the second tier requires an intellectual credibility that depends on a degree of operational independence. Yet too much autonomy threatens the second tier’s utility for first-tier policymakers.
In the 1950s, this tension between the CIA and its allies in the Non-Communist Left would become more marked, as the agency sought more control over relationships established in the more freewheeling days of World War Two and its immediate aftermath. Lasky, Burnham, Koestler, and to a lesser extent Brown, were among a number of figures associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom who steadily lost influence as the organisation’s overt concerns took a more narrowly cultural turn (Scott-Smith, 2002). The defeat of Brown’s candidate for General Secretary, Louis Fischer, was another sign of a shift away from ex-communist side of the organisation’s heritage, a trend that probably owed something to the CCF’s covert sponsor (Scott-Smith, 2002, p.121).

From containment to roll-back 1950-56

Despite these tensions, the two-tier relationship between the AFL anti-communists and US policy-makers continued to be a reflexive one, shaping US policies at home, as well implementing them abroad. They were amongst the foremost advocates of military expansion following the outbreak of the Korean War, as they had been in the face of the Nazi threat ten years earlier.

NSC-68 and the Committee on the Present Danger

As in the early 1940s, private groups were the vehicle for advocacy of a policy which the US government was not yet ready to advocate publicly, in a process which consciously emulated the World War Two precedent.

In this case the relevant policy was the one set out in NSC-68, a report to the US Secretaries of State and Defense in April 1970. NSC-68 reoriented the containment policy established by George Kennan, originally focused on the Soviet political threat to Western Europe, into a programme for a global struggle to roll back a Soviet challenge which was seen in increasingly military terms (Sanders, 1983, p.29). This Manichean view went hand in hand with a subtler appreciation of the threat that failure to sustain American economic support to Western Europe might lead its nations to seek an independent ‘neutralist’ solution (Sanders, 1983, p.37). NSC-68 therefore recommended closer co-ordination of economic and military aid to Western Europe (Sanders, 1983, p.41). Sanders account of the development of this new doctrine of ‘containment militarism’ suggests that it was actually this perceived need to bolster American economic leadership in Europe that drove NSC-68’s focus on the Soviet military threat rather than the reverse (Sanders, 1983, p.44).

The members of the State-Defense Policy Review Committee which drew up the report were keenly aware of the limitations of the Truman Administration’s political capital, and felt the strategy need a the support of a group of ‘worthy citizens’ who were seen to be independent of the government, if it were to win public approval (Sanders, 1983, p.45).

In September 1950, one of the consultants who had helped to draw up NSC-68, the Harvard President James Conant, suggested the creation of a body along the lines of the wartime Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. He was encouraged to take up the task himself by Tracy Voorhees, one of the National Security Council’s NSC-68 planners (Sanders, 1983, pp.61-62).
The resulting organisation, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), was launched on 12 December 1950 (Sanders, 1983, p.54). Its membership was largely drawn from the same foreign policy establishment that had lobbied for American support for Britain in 1940-41. No less than twelve CPD members had also been members of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (Sanders, 1983, p.75). Among these were some, such as Roosevelt’s former speechwriter Robert Sherwood, who had worked closely with British intelligence in the campaign to win American support for the allied war effort (Mahl, 1998, p.58). This history was not lost on Congressional opponents of an increased commitment to Europe, themselves largely conservative Republicans, in a debate that broke along isolationist/internationalist lines familiar from a decade earlier. The continuity with the CDAAA was highlighted on the floor of the Senate by Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who denounced the CPD as “the same old business, the same old salesmanship” (Sanders, 1983, p.60).

David Dubinsky joined the CPD in the spring of 1951 (Sanders, 1983, p.77). The labour interest was otherwise not prominent in the CPD membership, with the exception of the OSS veteran and CIO legal counsel Arthur Goldberg (Sanders, 1983, p.87). Nevertheless, the presence of both men signalled the extent to which the leaderships of both major labour federations were now integrated into Atlanticist anticommunism.

With the election of a sympathetic republican nominee to the presidency the following year the bipartisan dominance of containment militarism support was assured, and several key CPD members secured posts in the new Eisenhower administration (Sanders, 1983, p.15). Nevertheless, the advent of a Republican administration meant new constraints on liberal anti-communists from Republican officials, while attacks from Republicans in Congress only intensified.

The CIA in the early 1950s

Even before the election of Eisenhower, a significant shift in the relationship between the CIA and the non-communist left was under way. In October 1950, the new head of the CIA, General Walter Bedell Smith froze funding for Lovestone and Brown’s labour operations (Morgan, 1999, p.214). Smith agreed to release the funds at a meeting with Lovestone and AFL leaders on 24 November 1950, but he would continue to seek greater control of the operations that had mushroomed in Frank Wisner’s OPC (Morgan, 1999, p.216). In January 1951, Smith appointed the Republican OSS veteran Allen Dulles as his Deputy Director for Plans, with overall responsibility for covert action (Wilford, 2003, p.98). The following March Lovestone approached Dulles in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of the Free Trade Union Committee’s relationship with the CIA but was rebuffed (Wilford, 2003, p.98). In April, Dulles brought in another OSS veteran, Thomas Braden, to handle labour operations (Morgan, 1999, p.220). After a tip-off that Braden was planning to circumvent Lovestone, the FTUC leaders sought another meeting with Bedell Smith on 9 April (Morgan, 1999, p.220). The meeting degenerated into a row that marked the beginning of a steady decline of CIA support for the FTUC (Wilford, 2003, p.101).

The effects of the changed relationship between the CIA and the FTUC would be apparent across a number of covert operations. By May 1952, new arrangements were in place to
fund the Congress for Cultural Freedom through dummy foundations, and Irving Brown’s role as a conduit for CIA funds started to diminish (Saunders, 1999, p.125).

The vagaries of the relationship between the CIA and the FTUC also undermined the latter’s efforts to build links between the Paris-based Free Trade Union Center-in-Exile and the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), one of the CIA’s largest front operations (Hughes, 2011, p.135). In August 1950, an NCFE representative with links to the AFL, Henry Kirsch, had travelled to Europe to meet leaders of the Center-in-Exile (Hughes, 2011, p.135). Within a few months, however, the NCFE President Dewitt Poole, was seeking to cut Kirsch out, telling the Centre’s leadership to keep in touch with a Paris-based representative of the organisation instead (Hughes, 2011, p.136). Concerns about the NCFE were among the issues that contributed to the FTUC’s showdown meeting with Bedell Smith in April 1951 (Hughes, 2011, p.137). They were compounded by complaints from East European trade unionists that the exile national committees being set up by the NCFE were dominated by right-wingers and wartime collaborators (Hughes, 2011, p.137). The NFCE’s Radio Free Europe also became a source of tension in August 1951 when a contract with the ILGWU broadcasting station was cancelled (Hughes, 2011, p.139). By May 1952, the irreconcilable differences over control of the Center-in-Exile had led the FTUC’s Matthew Woll to resign from the NCFE (Hughes, 2011, p.152).

**McCarthyism and the non-communist left**

Diminishing patronage was not, however, the biggest problem that the CIA’s allies on the left would face in the early 1950s. By 1952, Senator Joe McCarthy was targeting the agency, which had become something of a haven for liberals in government (Smith, 2005, p.369). Bedell Smith’s successor as head of the CIA, Allen Dulles was able to avoid a public investigation only by agreeing to an internal purge (Smith, 2005, p.371). Tom Braden’s International Organizations Division, responsible for labour operations, was a particular target (Smith, 2005, p.371).

Jay Lovestone’s past made him an obvious target for right-wing attacks in this political atmosphere, not least from old foes. In 1954, he came under investigation from J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI (Morgan, 1999, p.237). There were renewed attacks in the press from conservative journalist Westbrook Pegler, underlining the extent to which the McCarthyite era brought up old faultlines from the struggle between isolationists and interventionists in the early 1940s (Morgan, 1999, p.238). It is noteworthy in the light of his later relationship with Lovestone, that the man responsible for keeping an eye on the episode for the CIA was the agency’s liaison officer with the FBI, James Angleton (Morgan, 1999, p.239).

Other Cold War liberal groups were facing similar challenges in the early 1950s. The International Rescue Committee’s support for left-wing European refugees exposed it to attacks from Vadim Makaroff, a white Russian exile with links to a rival conservative organisation, The Tolstoy Foundation (Chester, 1995, p.99). The pressure on the IRC became such that it was on the brink of collapse in 1952, when it was forced to remove its executive director, David Martin and moved vice-chairman Leo Cherne into the key leadership role (Chester, 1995, p.112).
Despite such episodes, some Cold War liberals were prepared to defend McCarthyism, notably Sidney Hook and Irving Kristol of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) (Saunders, 1999, p.207). This was something of an embarrassment for the wider Congress for Cultural Freedom, whose credibility as front operation depended on being seen to defend the very values which seemed to many observers to be under threat from McCarthy (Saunders, 1999, p.205).

The Angleton Era 1955-1960

The clashes between the CIA and the AFL in the early 1950s were ultimately less an ideological struggle between Republicans and Democrats, and more a struggle between government officials seeking increased control on the one hand and professionals defending their autonomy on the other. Perhaps the best evidence for this is the fact that Jay Lovestone subsequently settled into a close collaboration with one of the CIA’s arch-conservatives.

From 1955, Lovestone was run as an agent by CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton, through an aide, Stephen Millett, who also headed the agency’s Israeli desk. Payments to Lovestone were handled by New York lawyer Mario Brod (Mangold, 1991, p.291).

Angleton had been appointed by Allen Dulles in December 1954 to head an enlarged counterintelligence staff focused on detecting penetrations of the CIA itself (Mangold, 1991, p.29). As a veteran of X-2, the counterintelligence branch of the OSS, Angleton had enjoyed privileged access to Britain’s successful wartime operations to counter and deceive German espionage (Mangold, 1991, p.18-19). The necessarily compartmentalised nature of the counterintelligence role enabled Angleton to carve out a high degree of autonomy from the CIA’s bureaucracy, with an un-audited budget and direct access to CIA directors (Mangold, 1991, p.31)

This modus operandi was to prove far more congenial to Jay Lovestone than the managerial approach of Wisner’s OPC and he developed a close friendship with Angleton (Morgan, 1999, p. 247).

Angleton, Lovestone and Israel

The two cover operations Angleton ran through Stephen Millet, the Lovestone agent network, and liaison with Israel seem to have been interconnected.

Lovestone’s biographer Ted Morgan records that ‘Lovestone did not share Angleton’s fondness for the Israelis. He thought they were too friendly to the Soviet Union’ a view reflected in his correspondence with Pagie Morris in the early 1950s (Morgan, 1999, p.271). In fact, Angleton himself viewed Israel, to which many Eastern European Jews had emigrated, as a security risk, but also as a potentially valuable source of intelligence on the Soviets (Raviv and Melman, 1991, p.79). He was well-placed to exploit this opportunity having worked with key figures in the intelligence apparatus of the Jewish Agency that preceded the Israeli state during World War Two (Raviv and Melman, 1991, p.78)
Lovestone and his key AFL patron David Dubinsky had also had contacts with Zionist organisations in the European anti-fascist resistance in the same period. A number of Palestinian Zionist groups had been active in International Workers Front Against War formed immediately before the war, alongside the Lovestoneites and other groups such as Neue Weg and Die Funke which became central to the non-communist left of the wartime resistance (Alexander, 1981, pp.292-3)

Dubinsky had worked with American Zionists as part of the coalition of forces that sought to combat the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe since the early 1930s. This collaboration was not always harmonious, however. At its foundation in 1934, the Jewish Labor Committee, of which Dubinsky was appointed treasurer stated that ‘the Jewish question must be solved in the countries in which the Jews live’, a position which met with objections from the labour Zionist Poale Zion group (Parmet, 2005, p.41)

This episode would seem to be at odds with the claim of historian Harvey Levenstein that Dubinsky’s anti-Communism was informed by Zionism (Levenstein, 1981, p.108). According to Dubinsky’s biographer Robert Parmet, it was only after World War Two and the Holocaust’s destruction of the European Jewish culture of his Bundist roots, that Dubinsky became more sympathetic to the idea of a state in Palestine (Parmet, 2005, p.236).

Parmet’s view is supported by Dubinsky’s own account of his position at the time of his first meeting with Israeli David Ben Gurion in the late 1940s, around the time Israel achieved statehood:

> We first met at a meeting of the Jewish Labor Committee, and I told him that even though I was sympathetic to the creation of Israel, I was not a Zionist and I did not care much for the way some former Communists were now rallying to the Zionist cause because it was the fashionable thing for American Jews to do. "Now listen Dubinsky," he said to me. "Why should we fight? If I had come to the United States in 1911 when you did and you had come to Palestine when I did, you would be the Prime Minister and I would be the president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union" (Dubinsky and Raskin, 1977, p.331).

Like Lovestone, Dubinsky appears to have maintained a critical distance from Zionism, rooted in his own political background, and reinforced by the ambiguous position of Israel in the early Cold War.

Dubinsky’s ILGWU was nevertheless a significant supporter of the emerging Israeli state. In the early post-war years the union lobbied Britain to allow greater Jewish migration to Palestine (Parmet, 2005, p.239). Shortly after the foundation of the State of Israel, Foreign Minister Golda Meir met Dubinsky in New York and requested a $1 million dollar loan, which was paid on 25 June 1948. The ILGWU also donated $220,000 to the Histadrut and $150,000 to the United Jewish Appeal (Parmet, 2005, p.241).

Peter L. Hahn’s study of the relationship between Israel and US organised labour found that Dubinsky became a key supporter for Israeli bond drives in the US, routinely visited by
Israeli leaders, for whom he became “one of a select group of US Jewish leaders called upon to provide expert advice about Israel’s financial problems” (Hahn, 2001, p.158).

After US diplomat James G. McDonald asked Dubinsky to investigate the status of communism in Israel, he sent the former Lovestoneite Charles Zimmerman on a visit to the new state. Zimmerman identified a communist problem but downplayed its seriousness (Parmet, 2005, p. 241). Lovestone’s own view during this period was that Israel was a diversion from the central issue of the fate of Western Europe, and although he was already providing some financial support to the Histadrut, he resisted the urgings of the OPC’s Frank Wisner, inspired by warnings from Israeli president Chaim Weizmann, to send an agent under AFL cover (Morgan, 1999, p.200).

Lovestone’s judgement in this was arguably vindicated as the challenge to Ben Gurion’s Mapai Party from the left-wing Mapam faded in the early 1950s. The dominance of Mapai supporters in the Histadrut led to its withdrawal from the WFTU in 1950 (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1950). Mapam and the Communists were again outvoted when the Histadrut voted to join the ICFTU three years later, confirming the western orientation of Israeli organised labour (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1953).

Lovestone was not an entirely passive observer, during this period. In 1953, he provided $15,000 to fund Beteram, a magazine run by Eliezer Livneh, a member of the Knesset he was running as a CIA agent (Morgan, 1999, p.332). Ultimately, however, the AFL’s part in bringing the cultural cold war to Israel may have been less significant than its role in the US-Israel intelligence relationship. Liaison assignments with Israeli intelligence were part of the work which Pagie Morris carried out for James Angleton while under FTUC cover (Morgan, 1999, p. 271). The most significant fruits of this relationship would emerge later in the 1950s, when the CIA and the AFL-CIO supported Israeli technical experts in Africa to prevent newly independent nations turning to the Eastern Bloc advisors (Melman and Raviv, 1994, p.90).

**Britain in the 1950s**

Increased American covert activity in the third world was in part a reflection of the uncertain position of the European colonial powers in the post-war order. In the case of Britain, conflicts over foreign policy came to a head in 1951 following the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to support British participation in the war, Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell, introduced an austerity budget which prompted a wave of ministerial resignations, led by Health Secretary Aneurin Bevan (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.10).

Lovestone’s interest in Britain, of course, long predated this. One of his most long-standing correspondents on British conditions was the Irish socialist Jack Carney, whose reports in 1940 had helped to persuade him to support the Allies in World War Two (Morgan, 1999, p.136).

In the late 1940s, Lovestone’s and Irving Brown worked closely with the US labour attaché in Britain Samuel Berger. Berger nevertheless regarded Lovestone as ‘a man who could be utterly unscrupulous, so that one had to be cautious and guarded in working with him even when pursuing the same ends’ (Morgan, 1999, p.174).
Lovestone’s relationship with Joseph Godson, posted to London as Labour attaché from 1953 to 1959, was less ambiguous. Godson was himself a pre-war Lovestoneite who joined the Jewish Labor Committee in 1943, a shift into labour diplomacy which paralleled Lovestone’s own trajectory (The Times, 1986). He had subsequently been among the beneficiaries of Lovestone’s influence at the State Department in the late 1940s, winning an appointment as labour attaché to Canada (Morgan, 1999, p.144).

In London, Godson threw himself into the midst of the struggle within the Labour Party. In 1955, he took part in a series of secret meetings held by Gaitskell to plan a campaign of expulsions against the Bevanites (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.14). This incident has been a source of enduring controversy. In their biography of Harold Wilson, Stephen Dorril and Robin Ramsay conclude that: ‘one of the most important post-war events in the Labour Party’s internal affairs was overseen by an American spook’ (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.14). Hugh Wilford’s examination of CIA influence on the British Left in this period finds no evidence that either Godson or his predecessor Samuel Berger were CIA agents, although both men had connections to the agency, and ‘the boundaries between the realms of overt labor diplomacy and private covert operations were frequently blurred’ (Wilford, 2003, p.182).

In Godson’s case, this judgement reflects the fact that he was reporting to Lovestone as well as to the State Department (Wilford, 2003, p.182). Lovestone’s biographer reports at least one incident when his British correspondence made its way to the CIA during the mid-1950s. A report from Jack Carney on a Trade Union Congress meeting was circulated in James Angleton’s JX reports, causing consternation when it reached MI6, who assumed that the CIA had an agent in the TUC (Morgan, 1999, p.247).

If commentators such as Ramsay and Dorril are justified in seeing the activities of the Lovestone network as an example of covert American influence in Britain, it should be recalled that, as we saw in Chapter Three, the AFL played a significant role in British Security Co-ordination’s (BSC) campaign of covert action in America in the early years of World War Two. Ramsay and Dorril’s observation that Godson’s British ally, Hugh Gaitskell, worked for the Special Operations Executive during the war, is significant in this light (Dorril and Ramsay, 1991, p.14). SOE was one of a number of British intelligence organisations represented in the US by the BSC (Mahl, 1998, p.12).

That the networks promoting American Atlanticism in Britain in the 1950s had evolved out of those promoting British Atlanticism in the United States should alert us to the possibility that we are dealing with an essentially transnational phenomenon, which is not reducible to British influence in America or vice-versa, but needs to be understood in terms of specific interest groups working across national boundaries.

Hugh Wilford provides significant evidence for this by showing that there were conflicting strands within Anglo-American labour diplomacy. During the same period that Godson was reporting to Lovestone, William Gaussman of the Marshall Plan’s European Cooperation Agency (ECA) was reporting back to Victor Reuther of the CIO. Together with another ECA officer, Maurice Goldblum, Gaussman drafted a report for Reuther which attacked the Lovestoneites’ conspiratorial tactics, and called for a more positive brand of anti-
communism to counter the impression that American labour organisations were simply apologists for the US Government (Wilford, 2003, p.170).

Conversely, Godson’s reporting to Lovestone kept a close eye on the British activities of the CIO, notably Walter Reuther’s triumphant visit to the TUC conference in 1957 (Wilford, 2003, p.180).

The AFL-CIO Merger
This conflict between the two competing strands of American labour diplomacy was however attenuated by the merger between the AFL and CIO in 1955. As union membership began to decline in the 1950s, competition became a luxury that neither federation could afford (Buhle, 1999, p.131).

The merger would eventually lead to the end of the Free Trade Union Committee in 1957 (Wilford, 2008). In the hierarchy of the new AFL-CIO’s International Department, Lovestone initially found himself behind AFL veteran George Brown and the CIO’s Mike Ross, although Lovestone remained the most dynamic figure in the department which he would eventually head in the 1960s (Morgan, 1999, p.286).

The continuing links between American labour and the world of intelligence were symbolised by the prominent role in the merger of labour lawyer and OSS veteran Arthur Goldberg (Buhle, 1999, p.149). The focus of those links was however already shifting with the changing landscape of the Cold War itself.

Hungary and the end of rollback

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a watershed for the western aspiration to ‘rollback’ communism in Eastern Europe. During the crisis, the public-private networks of cold war liberalism were highly active.

In later October, Leo Cherne and Angier Biddle Duke of the International Rescue Committee arrived in Budapest with Marcel Faust, An Austrian IRC staffer who had worked with the OSS during World War Two (Chester, 1995, p.130). They distributed large quantities of aid to the conservative opposition led by Cardinal Mindszenty, avoiding any contact with the Communist-led Government of Imre Nagy, by then a multi-party coalition (Chester, 1995, p.134).

The ex-Communist Lovestone seems to have had fewer qualms about dealing with the circles around Nagy, at least after his government was overthrown by the Soviets. He brought one of the deposed ministers, Anna Kethly, to the United States (Morgan, 1999, p.283). In conversations tapped by the FBI, Lovestone and Pagie Morris criticised the CIA’s Frank Wisner and Radio Free Europe (RFE) for inciting the revolution and then failing to support it (Morgan, 1999, p.284).

If this criticism reflected long-standing tensions between the Lovestonite brand of anti-communism and that of the Eisenhower administration, it was also in line with much of the soul-searching within the administration itself. CIA Director Allen Dulles told the President...
that RFE had not incited the uprising or promised American support, but had attempted to provide tactical advice at times once the uprising was underway (Aldrich, 2002, p.339).

The failure of the Hungarian Uprising helped to bring an end to attempts to rollback communism in Eastern Europe through the most aggressive forms of covert action (Aldrich, 2002, p.337). C.D. Jackson, a key advisor to the Eisenhower administration on covert action, nevertheless advised Dulles to make the maximum propaganda advantage of Soviet repression.

Lovestone’s highly public lobbying on behalf of Kethly might have been congenial to such an agenda, even as it was resisted by the State Department. If this was not necessarily a reflection of Lovestone’s status as a paid CIA agent, it suggests that status might have been underpinned by a community of interests even when Lovestone was publicly at odds with other arms of the government. Though this is speculative, Lovestone’s role in what amounted to a parallel CIA foreign policy emerges more clearly from an examination of the new battlefields of the Cold War, which came to the forefront as the focus of covert action moved away from an increasingly static Europe.

**The Battle for the Third World**

By the late 1950s, the attention of the superpowers was moving towards Africa and Asia, where the first waves of decolonisation were creating a newly fluid situation. This created particular problems for the United States, which the AFL’s labour diplomats were well-placed to help solve.

During this period, Lovestone’s intelligence network of overseas contacts was, according to Ted Morgan ‘financed by Angleton in part in order to enable the CIA to penetrate independence movements, overcoming the problems presented in these parts of the world by the State Department’s close relationship with the British and French colonial powers’ (Morgan, 1999).

The FTUC’s focus on these areas represented a shift of emphasis rather than a development de novo. Lovestone’s anti-colonial credentials, like so much else about his transnational activities, had roots in the era of the Comintern and the Right Opposition, the latter of which had retained anti-imperialism as a key part of its platform in the late 1930s (Alexander, 1981, p.289).

The FTUC had operated in Asia from its early years. Its Far East Office in Tokyo was manned from 1949 by Richard Deverall, who had previously worked in for the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP), which he had left under a cloud after spying on his colleagues for Army Intelligence (Morgan, 1999). In 1953, US diplomats intimated to the British authorities that Deverall was considering moving the FTUC’s Asian headquarters to Hong Kong, a move which was met with consternation because of reports that Deverall was ‘somewhat anti-British’ and had been in touch with ‘the right wing TUC in Hong Kong’ (Scott, 1953). At a meeting with Deverall, E.H. Scott of the Foreign Office emphasised ‘the harm it would do to independent trade unionism in the Colony if at the present early stage in its growth it could be attacked by its enemies as being openly supported for political
motives by outside organisations’ (Scott, 1953). Similar tensions between the FTUC and the British authorities would emerge in the records of other colonies later in the 1950s.

A number of other FTUC officers were active in Asia in the early 1950s. Willard Etter was subsidised by the CIA to run paramilitary operations in China from Taiwan (Wilford, 2008, p.56). In the same period, the old Lovestoneite Harry Goldberg was posted to Indonesia (Morgan, 1999, p.218). Indian trade unionist Mohan Das represented the FTUC in Bombay (Morgan, 1999, p.302).

Irving Brown and Pagie Morris played prominent roles in FTUC activities in the Africa and the Middle East. In the early 1950s, Brown sought to support trade unionists in French North Africa from his Paris base, prompting complaints to US Ambassador David Bruce from the French Foreign Office (Rathbun, 1996, p.33). Brown believed that French repression reinforced communist dominance over colonial labour movements, which he sought to weaken by supporting the 1952 split of the Algerian UGTA from the French Communist-led CGT (Rathbun, 1996, p.287). Four years later, Brown was barred from Algeria by the French authorities, along with Guy Gomis, a French businessman who was accused of collaborating with the ‘special services of a foreign power’ (Rathbun, 1996, 289).

In the mid-1950s, Pagie Morris was involved in attempts to mediate between Egypt and Israel by arranging a meeting of trade union leaders from the two countries in New York, an initiative which broke down with the outbreak of the 1956 Suez crisis (Morgan, 1999, p.273).

The situation in North Africa featured on several occasions in Lovestone’s correspondence with Angleton. In August 1956, Lovestone warned Angleton that the French were playing into the hands of the Soviets by linking the Algerian situation to the Suez crisis (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.256). The following year, he told Angleton that Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba would turn to the Soviets if the Tunisians did not get ‘certain types of military assistance to enable them to maintain order at home’ (cited in Morgan, 1999, p.256).

Sub-Saharan Africa became an increasing priority for the Lovestone network in the late 1950s. Lovestone’s key operative on the continent was Maida Springer, an African-American woman who had come up through the ranks of the ILGWU (Morgan, 1999, p.304). After joining Local 22 in 1933, Springer had quickly won the confidence of its Lovestoneite manager Charles Zimmerman, and of David Dubinsky, through whom she developed contacts with leading black socialists like A. Philip Randolph (Richards, 2000, pp.36-37).

In 1945, as an AFL delegate on a trade union mission to Europe, Springer established links with pan-African leaders such as George Padmore and Jomo Kenyatta (Richards, 2004, p.134). During a scholarship to Oxford’s Ruskin College in 1951, she deepened her relationship with a generation of young African intellectuals on the cusp of independence (Richards, 2004, p.155). On her return to the United States, she became an important point of contact for emerging African leaders such as Kenyan trade unionist Tom Mboya,
who stayed with her during a 1956 visit to New York which secured funding and scholarships from the AFL-CIO (Morgan, 1999, p.305).

Mboya was also being courted during the mid-1950s by the British who had secured a scholarship for him through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), in order to get him out of Kenya during the state of emergency prompted by the Mau-Mau Rebellion (Bloch, 1983, p.144). Although Britain and the US had a common interest in supporting non-communist leaders, there was a strong element of competition for post-independence influence. So concerned were the British about the AFL-CIO’s scholarship program that they secured a ICFTU ban on independent AFL-CIO activity in Africa (Richards, 2004, p.14). British records confirm that Springer was carefully watched by local Special Branches during her visits to British colonies in Africa. During her trip to East Africa in February 1957 reference was made to the local Security Liaison Officer who reported that Springer had come to the attention of the Security Service but was ‘security clear’ (National Archives FCO 141/17746, 1957). On Springer’s arrival in Entebbe later that year a thorough search of her baggage turned up a copy of Milovan Djilas’ *The New Class – An Analysis of The Communist System*, a work which was destined to become a key influence on the non-communist left, but which was regarded by the British authorities as an item of security interest (National Archives, FCO 141/17746, 1957). In November 1957, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the governors of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda that he was ‘most reluctant to see Springer stay in East Africa a moment longer than necessary’ and warned that ‘she may be assuming the role of a political go between among African Nationalist leaders in East Africa and even beyond’ (National Archives FCO 141/17746, 1957). He went on to set out the possibilities for intervention with the Americans:

> From what I have heard on my return I realise that a fuss over Springer’s expulsion now might have a wholly disproportionate effect on Anglo-American relations and there are signs of differing views within A.F.L/C.I.O. on the subject of her visit. Early action against her might counteract this development which we would wish to encourage. There may also be something to be done through T.U.C. (Tewson is expected to visit America in December) although I am not too hopeful (1957).

The Americans, however, continued to fear that British attitudes risked driving African labour leaders into the arms of the Soviets. As a result of such concerns, Irving Brown recommended in 1958 that a number of black American trade unionists including Springer, the CIO’s George McCray and the veteran Lovestoneite Ed Welsh should spend more time in Africa (Richards, 1998, p.317). In later life, Springer denied accusations she had been working for the CIA in Africa (Richards, 2004, p.202). She nevertheless declined to revise her view of her relationship with Lovestone when his proven connection to the agency was put to her (Richards, 2004, p.16). The AFL-CIO’s black American operatives in Africa generally shared the liberal anti-communism of their colleagues. Springer had acquired a critical view of the Communist Party’s proselytising among black Americans as an ILGWU activist in the 1930s (Richards, 2004, p.85). Welsh had defied overtures from Stalin as part of the American Communist leadership that accompanied Lovestone to Moscow in 1929 (Morgan, 1999, p.97). They were however driven by genuine support for pan-Africanism, and sought to correct what they saw as their colleagues’ exaggerated view of the potential
for communist influence on the independence movement (Richards, 2004, p.16). It is tempting to see in their anti-colonialism a parallel with the organic anti-totalitarianism of the European émigrés who were drawn into Anglo-American covert action in the 1940s.

Their positions as correspondents of the Lovestone network were valuable sources of an American perspective on Africa independent of the European powers. An analogous role was played by Israel through its Histadrut labour federation, which co-founded the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation with the AFL-CIO in 1959.

The AFL-CIO’s labour diplomacy in the Third World were often hamstrung by the AFL tradition of ‘free trade unionism’ with its insistence on an arms-length relationship with the state, something that was sometimes resisted by trade unionists in newly independent countries, who saw the state as a necessary ally in the process of national development. The AFL-CIO officials most closely involved in Africa, such as Springer and Irving Brown, came to accept the need for flexibility on this point (Richards, 1998, p.309).

Histadrut’s history of central involvement in the movement for Israeli statehood, made it in a more congenial model in this respect, and some in the United States were quick to recognise this potential. In 1959, Arthur Rivkin, then director of the Africa Research Project of the Center for International Studies at MIT, argued that 'The Israeli model might well prove to be a sort of economic "third force"--an alternative differing from the Western pattern but certainly far more compatible with free-world interests than any Communist model' (Rivkin, 1959). The Israeli intelligence journalist Yossi Melman has claimed the AFL-CIO funding for the Afro-Asian Institute came ultimately from the CIA, and was used to post Mossad officers in Africa (Melman, 2009). Israel’s combination of socialist developmentalism and alignment with the West made it, in effect, a sort of geopolitical equivalent of the Non-Communist Left.

The Covert Action Coalition in the Early Cold War

During the Early Cold War the American covert action capability developed during World War Two was revived and institutionalised for the long term. The political warfare coalition that lobbied for the creation of the CIA and provided its cadre, was largely a development from the earlier interventionist movement which had allied itself to British Security Coordination, and later to the Office of Strategic Services.

If the dominant force within this coalition was the East Coast establishment represented by figures like Allen Dulles, the AFL anti-communists were nevertheless always a valuable component. Just as the Lovestoneites had fought against the Stalinization of the Comintern, they resisted the bureaucratization of Franks Wisner’s Office of Special Plans. Lovestone’s cultivation of a more congenial relationship with James Angleton would assist the AFL-CIO in remaining key allies of the official US covert action apparatus for decades after the peak of activity in the early 1950s.
Chapter Five – The break-up of the post-war consensus

This chapter examines the crisis which faced the political warfare coalition in the 1960s and early 1970s, including unprecedented scrutiny of the CIA; the challenge to its domestic political base from the New Left, and the turn towards détente at an international level. By the mid-1970s, key actors in the alliance between the CIA and the AFL-CIO were losing their institutional positions in the course of bureaucratic struggles over détente.

The CIA and the AFL-CIO in the Kennedy years

During the 1950s the journalist Westbrook Pegler had attempted to draw attention to Jay Lovestone’s covert activities and to his Communist past, but conservative critics like Pegler made little impact in the face of a bipartisan consensus in support of labour anti-communism.

The potential vulnerability of the CIA to exposure was highlighted by the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation, which led to the departure of the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and his Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, key advocates of aggressive covert action (Jeffreys-Jones, 2002. P.180).

The debacle prompted a short-lived effort by the incoming Kennedy administration to tighten control of operations (Johnson, 1989, p.90). Kennedy was nevertheless not above using the CIA’s connections to attempt to manage domestic labour rivalries, a tactic which itself carried significant risk of publicity.

In January 1961, sources close to Victor Reuther were responsible for a Washington Post story claiming that Irving Brown was a CIA operative (Morgan, 1999, p.330). The potential for the exposure of CIA operations may have been one factor in the decision of the incoming Kennedy Administration recorded by the CIA’s so-called ‘Family Jewels’ document a decade later:

At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McConie injected the Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer, into the US labor situation and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skilful course in this connection, but the agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany’s back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany’s wishes (Elder, 1973, p.461).

The concern expressed in the Family Jewels document highlight the difficulty in separating the AFL-CIO’s international alliance with the CIA from its role in domestic politics. At the 1960 election, Meany, Reuther and Dubinsky had all supported Kennedy, whose labour support was marshalled by Arthur Goldberg (Parmet, 2005, p.284). Ironically, it was Dubinsky who had persuaded Reuther not to speak out against the vice-presidential nomination of Lyndon Johnson, a southern Democrat viewed with suspicion by AFL-CIO leaders who initially favoured Hubert Humphrey or Henry Jackson (Parmet, 2005, p.285).
Dubinsky and the ILGWU were able to claim significant credit for Kennedy's victory through their ongoing involvement in the Liberal Party of New York, which followed its traditional practice of nominating Kennedy independently of the Democrats on the New York presidential ballot, gaining enough votes to account for his margin of victory in the state (Parmet, 2005, p.291). During the campaign, the Trade Union Council of the Liberal Party was addressed by Lyndon Johnson, who was developing a particularly close relationship with Dubinsky (Parmet, 2005, p.291.).

The close identification of the leaders of organised labour with Democratic presidents, and with American foreign policy was to prove fateful when the establishment consensus in favour of that policy broke down under the pressure of the Vietnam War later in the 1960s.

**Cold War liberalism and Vietnam**

As elsewhere in the post-war world, the state-private networks of cold war liberalism were key allies of American foreign policy in Vietnam. In 1955, Joseph Buttinger of the International Rescue Committee founded the American Friends of Vietnam which grew into an unofficial lobby for the South Vietnamese government (Chester, 1995, p.163).

For its part, the AFL-CIO was heavily involved in cultivating anti-communist trade union leaders. Irving Brown visited the country in 1961 and established links with Tran Buc Quo, the Catholic trade unionist who led the Vietnamese Confederation of Workers (CVT) (Morgan, 1999, p.336). The AFL-CIO subsequently provided the CVT with funding and lobbying support in Washington, a task that was complicated by South Vietnamese repression of trade unionists. A continuing overlap between AFL-CIO and CIA activities was demonstrated in late 1964, when an AFL-CIO delegation to South Vietnam included an undercover CIA officer, Tom Altaffer (Morgan, 1999, p.336.).

As American involvement in the Vietnam War deepened, the risks of exposure of such activities grew. The American Friends of Vietnam was wound up after its links to the South Vietnamese regime were exposed in the July 1965 edition of the New Left magazine Ramparts (Chester, 1995, p.178). An unofficial replacement emerged two years later with the formation of the Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam (Chester, 1995, p.178).

By the mid-1960s, the extent of the CIA’s sponsorship of private organisations was beginning to be exposed. In April 1966, the New York Times reported claims that the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s British Encounter magazine was funded by the CIA (Saunders, 1999, p.371). In May, Victor Reuther gave an interview hinting at CIA involvement in foreign labour operations, to the consternation of Cord Meyer, the head of the CIA’s International Organizations Division (Wilford, 2008, p.238). In February 1967, another Reuther-inspired story from columnist Drew Pearson, revealed Jay Lovestone’s central role in CIA labour operations around the world (Morgan, 1999, p.338). In April 1967, Ramparts published a wide-ranging exposé of CIA front organisations, despite CIA attempts to derail a long-running investigation (Saunders, 1999, p.382).

In May 1967, Meyer’s predecessor as head of the International Organizations Division, Tom Braden went public with his own version of events in an article which revealed the extent
of CIA collusion with labour leaders, pointedly including Victor Reuther (Saunders, 1999, p.398). Some former CIA officers suspected that Braden’s revelations had been sanctioned as a way to break off the CIA’s relationship with the non-communist left, although Braden himself maintained that initiative came from journalist Stewart Alsop. It may be significant that Alsop, like Braden, was a former OSS officer (Smith, 2005, p.190). Pearson too had intelligence links, having been a key contact of the British Security Coordination in the early years of World War Two (Mahl, 1998, p.49). In the face of the escalating conflict in Vietnam, a generational consensus was being shattered.

Braden’s animosity towards CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton, whose influence on Cord Meyer he distrusted, may also have been a factor (Saunders, 1999, p.342). By the mid-1960s Angleton was engaged in an increasingly paranoid and destructive search for moles within the CIA (Mangold, 1991, p.222). In this, he was encouraged by Soviet defector Anatoly Golitsyn, who Angleton ran through New York lawyer Mario Brod, also a key intermediary in Angleton’s relationship with Lovestone (Mangold, 1991, p.291).

Angleton continued to run Lovestone as an agent after the revelations of 1966-67, a fact which was apparently unknown to the AFL-CIO leadership, who believed the relationship had ended after the report of the Katzenbach Committee in March 1967 (Morgan, 1999, p.340). This committee, appointed by President Johnson, and including CIA Director Richard Helms among its three members, had recommended that the US Government end any covert support for private educational or voluntary organisations by December 1967 (Saunders, 1999, p.405). However, while this was adopted as government policy, it never acquired any legal sanction, and only applied to US-based organizations (Saunders, 1999, p.406). Likewise, the Committee’s recommendation that a public-private mechanism should be created to provide overt public funding for American organisations abroad was never acted on (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). In April 1967, Dante Fascell, a Democratic Congressman from Florida, tried and failed to pass a bill establishing an Institute of International Affairs to fulfil this role (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). Some CIA support for the international activities of domestic organizations was transferred to overt government agencies, such as the Agency for International Development (AID) in the case of the AFL-CIO (Morgan, 1999, p.340). Other former CIA operations found private sponsors to fill the void. Millionaire Richard Mellon Scaife was notable in this regard, providing grants to Encounter magazine and to Forum World Features, a news agency offshoot of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Chinoy and Kaiser, 1999).

The Domestic Break-up of cold war liberalism

The controversy over CIA activities was one facet of widening political divisions over Vietnam, which began to have a dramatic impact on the domestic political base of cold war liberalism by the late 1960s.

In February 1968, David Dubinsky’s successor as head of the ILGWU, Louis Stulberg, resigned from Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), after the paradigmatic cold war liberal organisation supported peace candidate Eugene McCarthy for that year’s Democratic presidential nomination (Parmet, 2005, p.335). The AFL-CIO remained staunchly behind Lyndon Johnson until his withdrawal from the race, subsequently
supporting Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who won the nomination at a traumatic
convention in Chicago (Buhle, 1999, p.185). Humphrey eventually softened his position on
the war enough to win back the support of the ADA before losing the election to Richard

Vietnam also caused ructions within the more rarefied ranks of the Socialist Party. In the
mid-1950s, the party’s leader Norman Thomas had been drawn into support for the Diem
regime by the American Friends of Vietnam and the International Rescue Committee
(Chester, 1995, p.143). This was in part a reflection of the IRC’s longstanding links with
American social democrats since its formation during World War Two (Chester, 1995, p.
60). However, Thomas resigned from the AFVN in 1958, as a result of misgivings over
Diem’s authoritarian conduct (Chester, 1995, p.170).

Interventionist sentiment within the Socialist Party nevertheless received a powerful boost
in the late 1950s from mergers with the Social Democratic Federation and with the
followers of ex-Trotskyist Max Shachtman (Alexander, 1991, p.899). For Shachtman, this
was part of a journey that saw him move from a ‘third camp’ critique of capitalism and
Stalinism, towards an alliance with what he came to see as progressive forces within the

The Shachtmanites have widely been seen as precursors of the neoconservative movement
(King, 2004). Less often noted is the extent to which their trajectory was prefigured by that
of the Lovestoneites, their one time rivals on the Old Left. Like the Lovestoneites before
them, Shachtman’s supporters moved into the bureaucracy of the AFL-CIO, notably in the
United Federation of Teachers (Buhle, 1999, p.156). Shachtman’s foreign policy views
increasingly converged with those of Lovestone, leading him to support the Bay of Pigs
landing in Cuba in 1961, and to oppose American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1965
(Isserman, 2000, p.268).

After the Six Day War in 1967, the Middle East increasingly became part of the complex of
foreign policy issues dividing the American left, in part because Soviet support for the Arab
powers gave the conflict a clearer Cold War significance than in earlier years. Many new
left critics of Israel, such as Noam Chomsky and I.F. Stone were themselves Jewish
(Ehrman, 1995, p.39). Nevertheless, Middle East issues became bound up with domestic
racial and political tensions, as support for the Palestinians came from black activists who
were challenging older civil rights leaders (Ehrman, 1995, p.39).

The ideological struggles on the American left only intensified following Hubert
Humphrey’s defeat by Richard Nixon in 1968. The Democrats embarked on a series of
reforms driven by the ‘New Politics’ movement on the left of the party, which weakened
the hold of the traditional party establishment (Ehrman, 1995, p.57). On the right of the
party, Washington Senator Henry Jackson emerged as a key standard-bearer, gaining
influence in part because he was cultivated as an ally by President Nixon (Ognibene, 1975,
p.217). Jackson had strong ties to the AFL-CIO, having been George Meany’s preferred
choice as John F. Kennedy’s running mate in 1960 (Parmet, 2005, p.285). He was also a
close friend of Jay Lovestone, who contributed to his speeches and pamphlets (Morgan,
Nixon, Kissinger, and the rise of détente

At the time he took office in early 1969, Richard Nixon had a well-earned reputation as a ‘the quintessential cold warrior’ (Litwak, 1984, p.51). He had also acquired significant foreign policy experience as vice-president under President Eisenhower (Hanhimaki 2004, p.19). During Nixon’s 1962 presidential campaign that experience informed a significantly more pragmatic approach to the Cold War than that of the eventual victor John F. Kennedy (Hanhimaki 2004, p.19).

By 1969, such pragmatism was at a premium. President’s Johnson had announced American willingness to seek a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War a year earlier, under intense domestic pressure in the wake of the Tet Offensive (Sanders 1983, p.140). While that decision was broadly supported by the foreign policy establishment, new divisions emerged over the strategy to be pursued for de-escalation (Sanders 1983, p.140). Within Johnson’s Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze saw a narrow problem of over-commitment, while Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke began to raise much wider questions about the value of the policy of containment as a whole (Sanders 1983, p.140). Their emerging rivalry would mark a key faultline in the foreign policy debates of the 1970s.

As (Sanders 1983, p.144) notes, the fallout from containment militarism in Vietnam, was now threatening the very goals which the original doctrine of containment had been designed to protect.

The war was undermining America’s position in Europe, and imposing significant economic costs, at the very time when Europe was re-emerging as a significant economic competitor to the United States (Hanhimaki 2004, p.29). US military pre-eminence was also threatened as the Soviet Union moved towards parity in nuclear weapons (Hanhimaki 2004, p.28).

Nixon’s national security advisor Henry Kissinger would emerge as his key strategist in dealing with these manifold problems (Hanhimaki 2004, p.31). Kissinger would later state: “Simultaneously we had to end a war, manage a global rivalry with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear weapons, reinvigorate our alliance with industrial democracies, and integrate the new nations into a new world equilibrium” (cited in Hanhimaki 2004, p.30).

Kissinger was already a noted scholar of the realist approach to international relations, having gained his doctorate for research on Metternich and Castlereagh and the Nineteenth Century Concert of Europe (Hanhimaki 2004, p.7). Perhaps because of his association with the republican Nelson Rockefeller, he had nevertheless remained on the fringes of the circle of foreign policy intellectuals drawn into the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as the Vietnam War escalated (Hanhimaki 2004, p.12).

While seeking to rejuvenate America’s position by high-level diplomacy, both Nixon and Kissinger believed that diplomacy could only succeed from a position of relative strength. This resulted in an emphasis on ‘linkage’ (Hanhimaki 2004, p.28). The Soviets “should be brought to understand that they cannot expect to reap the benefits of co-operation in one
area while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation elsewhere”, as Nixon put it in a memorandum drafted by Kissinger’s NSC (cited in Hanhimaki 2004, p.28).

In negotiations, Nixon particularly stressed the interdependence between nuclear issues and the resolution of regional conflicts (Hanhimaki 2004, p.38). Kissinger sought to take advantage of Soviet nuclear fears, advising that: ‘we should seek to utilize this Soviet interest to induce them to come to grips with the real sources of tension, notably in the Middle East, but also in Vietnam” (Hanhimaki 2004, p.39). This led the Nixon administration to pursue an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) programme in the face of Congressional opposition (Hanhimaki 2004, p.50). For Nixon, the approval of ABM preserved a useful bargaining chip with the Soviets (Mann, 2004, p.33). Events would show, however, that the programme’s supporters in Congress did not necessarily see it in the same light.

This was one instance of what some have seen as the greatest weakness in Nixon and Kissinger’s approach. Their belief in charismatic back-channel diplomacy, unhindered by bureaucracy, risked leaving them without sufficient domestic support without to pursue their foreign agenda (Litwak, 1984, p.87).

**The Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy**

A key vehicle supporting Nixon’s ABM plans was the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy (CMPDP) a campaign launched in 1969, which lobbied Congress in favour of continued support for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The committee was founded by Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze to fend off liberal opposition to the ABM, the most expensive item in a defence budget facing growing scrutiny as a result of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War (Mann, 2004, p.32)

A number of graduate students were recruited to work in the Committee’s office by scientist Albert Wohlstetter; including two of his own students at the University of Chicago, Paul Wolfowitz and Peter Wilson, and Richard Perle from Princeton (Mann, 2004, p.32). As part of their work at the CMPDP they drafted material for Senator Jackson, the leading ABM supporter in the Senate (Mann, 2004, p.32). In late summer 1969, the Senate approved the system by 51 votes to 50, the closest vote on a major national defence program since 1941 (Mann, 2004, p.32).

**The SALT Treaty debate**

Having won the Congressional battle for the ABM programme in 1969, Jackson opposed the inclusion of an ABM treaty in the SALT accords in May 1972 (Kaufman, 2000, p.254). (Kaufman, 2000, p.253). However, he knew that he could not launch a frontal assault on the accords given the bipartisan support for Nixon on the issue (Kaufman, 2000, p.254).

Instead, Jackson sought to throw grit into the gears of détente with amendments in the Senate. The first of these, the Jackson Amendment, calling for a future SALT Treaty to guarantee US equality in strategic nuclear forces, was passed in September 1972, significantly limiting US negotiators room for manoeuvre (Kaufman, 2000, p.257).
This was followed with an attack on the wider economic détente in the form of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act, proposed in October 1972, which made the extension of Most Favoured Nation status to non-market economies conditional on the right of their citizens to emigrate (Kaufman, 2000, p.266). Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger feared that the application of this rule to the Soviet Union would unravel agreements central to the whole structure of the détente (Kaufman, 2000, Ibid).

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was ultimately passed by Congress in late 1974 (Kaufman, 2000, 279). Kissinger’s attempts to reach a compromise arrangement soon unravelled, and the prospective Soviet trade deal collapsed in consequence (Kaufman, 2000, p.280). Critics of the Israel lobby in American politics have seen the campaign in support of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as a key milestone in its development (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008, p.126). During that campaign, however, it was Jackson who was often pushing for more radical positions from American supporters of Soviet Jewry who were wary of being saddled with the blame for the collapse of détente (Kaufman, 2000, p.269). His willingness to do so reflected the wider roots of his own opposition to détente.

Jackson was a classic cold war liberal with a record of hawkishness going back to the 1940s (Ognibene, 1975, p.153). Throughout that time, he was a staunch supporter of the defence industry, notably of Boeing in his home state, a vocal believer in the existence of a ‘missile gap’ with the Soviet Union, and an advocate for strategic weapons programmes larger than anything that was ever ultimately constructed (Ognibene, 1975, p.160).

Jackson had been a member of the Armed Service Committee since 1954, and had soon begun receiving clandestine briefings from the Air Force, which informed his pessimistic public statements about Soviet missile developments (Prados, 1986, p.59). In 1958, he had been prominent among Senators pressurising the Eisenhower administration over the Gaither Report, which has called for a major increase in US nuclear deterrent capabilities (Prados, 1986, p.74).

There was nevertheless, a germ of truth in the charge from critics in the press that Jackson-Vanik was a product of Jackson’s presidential ambitions (Kaufman, 2000, p.280). Despite Jackson’s decades long political career, he had little record as a supporter of Israel even as late as the Six Day War (Ognibene, 1975, p.193). However, once his presidential ambitions emerged in late 1960s, there is little doubt that he needed to win support among key ethnic groups in the eastern United States (Ognibene, 1975, p.195). By the time of his 1976 campaign for example, he was willing to court Irish-Americans by expressing support for IRA hunger strikers (McManus, 2011, p.122).

Nevertheless, Jackson’s shift on Israel was not simply electoral opportunism. In the months leading up to the Six Day War in 1967, Jackson had described the Near East as ‘one area in which the major powers are not directly involved’ (quoted in Ognibene, 1975, p.195). By the 1970s, he had come to see the situation in Cold War terms, arguing that ‘if there no Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would invent one’ (quoted in Ognibene, 1975, p.195).

The Cold War prism had come to seem a more natural one given Soviet support for the Arabs during and after the Six-Day War. It was strongly reinforced during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, when the Soviet Union had threatened unilateral intervention and the superpowers had subsequently co-operated to pressure Israel into a ceasefire, raising the prospect that détente would lead to pressure on Israel for a wider political settlement (Cahn, 1998, p.31). For AFL-CIO president George Meany, Soviet arms supplies to the Arab states during the war demonstrated that détente was a fraud (Cahn, 1998, p.36).

Ultimately the significance of Jackson-Vanik was that it marked the evolution of a natural coalition of forces opposed to détente including cold war ideologues, defence interests, and supporters of Israel, which would be central to the emergence of neoconservatism.

**The 1972 Presidential election**

If the early 1970s marked the point when neoconservatism cohered as a movement, that cohesion was in part a defensive reaction to weakening of the political base which the movement’s cold war liberal precursors had enjoyed.

Alienated by the success of the New Politics movement within the party, Democratic hawks increasingly began to look beyond its ranks. By 1970, Lovestone felt that the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy was closer to that of President Nixon, who had made a significant effort to woo organised Labour (Morgan, 1999, p.342). Lovestone gave advice on labour issues to Nixon’s special counsel, Charles Colson, who in turn furnished him with FBI material on communist activities in the labour movement (Morgan, 1999, p.343).

The hawks were nevertheless still fighting for control of the Democratic Party. In 1970, Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon published *The Real Majority* which argued that the New Politics approach was losing touch with a mainstream electorate which they described as ‘unyoung, unpoor, unblack’ (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970, p.57). Wattenberg had been a speechwriter for Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey. By 1972, he was on Jackson’s staff supporting Jackson’s opposition to what he called ‘artificial bussing’ to achieve integrated education, a stance which dismayed many Democrats (Ognibene, 1975, p.19).

Jackson’s campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination that year enjoyed strong support from the AFL-CIO (Buhle, 1999, p.194). It was nevertheless a failure, with the nomination going to Senator George McGovern from the New Politics wing of the party. Many conservative Democrats felt unable to support McGovern, who became the first Democratic candidate since 1955 not to receive the endorsement of the AFL-CIO (Morgan, 1999, p.344). A significant movement developed of Democrats for Nixon, which offered a qualified endorsement to the republican president (Vaisse, 2010, p.86). The IRC chairman Leo Cherne served as vice-chair of this group, earning an appointment to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as a result (Chester, 1995, p.202). Others who took this course included some influential socialists of the old left, such as Sidney Hook (Hook and Shapiro, 1995, p.262).

Most conservative social democrats however, kept their powder dry until after Nixon had defeated McGovern. They following month, in December 1972, they created the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) to contest what they saw as the New Politics movement’s dominance in the party (Vaisse, 2010, p.86).
Similar divisions were playing out in the much smaller Socialist party, which split in 1972-3 amid the continuing fallout from Vietnam. Of the two successor organisations, the Social Democrats USA (SDUSA) broadly represented the conservative AFL tradition, while the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC) reflected the more liberal heritage associated with the CIO and its leaders such as the Reuther brothers (Battista, 2008, p.74).

In its account of the split, the SDUSA accused the leader of the opposing faction, Michael Harrington, of breaking with what it considered key social democratic principles:

The dispute within the SDUSA has been fundamentally over two issues: 1) labor role and influence within the liberal coalition, and the related question of the role and influence of the affluent, educated elite making up the so-called New Politics movement: and 2) the attitude of socialists toward Communist totalitarianism (Social Democrats USA 1973, p.ii).

The SDUSA cited Harrington’s criticisms of the AFL-CIO and George Meany as evidence of his weakness on the former point, his criticism of the opponents of détente as evidence of his weakness on the latter (Social Democrats USA, , 1973, ibid). Harrington was among the first to apply the label neoconservative to those he called ‘disappointed liberals’ in the Fall 1973 issue of *Dissent*, singling out Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Harrington, 1973).

Although the split involved a small number of people, less than a thousand activists in the case of the Social Democrats USA, it retained a wider political significance because of the involvement of social democratic activists in the Democratic Party through the CDM, and in the labour movement, through the AFL-CIO and its affiliates (Battista, 2008, p.74).

Their links to the AFL tradition also made the Social Democrats USA the heirs of the wing of the labour movement most heavily involved in the Cold War CIA-NCL alliance, an alliance which was facing a new round of challenges as the post-Vietnam scrutiny of the secret state reached a climax in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.

**The Lovestone and Angleton purges**

Throughout this period, Jay Lovestone was still being run as a CIA agent by James Angleton as he had been since the 1950s. In 1973, however, this relationship began to come under pressure from a new CIA director, William Colby.

During the 17-week tenure of the previous director, James Schlesinger, Colby had implemented a purge of CIA ‘old boys’ in which the clandestine service, responsible for covert action and intelligence collection, was hit particularly hard, losing over a thousand officers (Weiner, 2008, p.376). He had failed however, to persuade Schlesinger to remove Angleton. (Weiner, 2007, pp.377). The seeds of Angleton’s downfall were nevertheless sown by Schlesinger’s authorisation of the so-called ‘Family Jewels’ document, which listed all of the potentially illegal activities that might embarrass the CIA in the midst of the emerging Watergate scandal (Wise, 1992, p. 267).
Once Colby succeeded Schlesinger, he was determined to break up Angleton’s counterintelligence empire. Angleton’s responsibilities were removed one by one, beginning with his control of the CIA’s liaison with the FBI (Wise, 1992, pp.263-4). Colby later claimed, perhaps disingenuously, that his cautious approach was prompted by fears that Angleton might commit suicide (Wise, 1992, pp.263-64).

It was in this context, according to Angleton biographer Tom Mangold, that Colby ordered an internal investigation of the Lovestone operation, which he feared was unconstitutional (Mangold, 1991, p.292). The officer reported that the operation had little remaining value and posed risks to the CIA if it was exposed. Colby then informed a furious Angleton that it was to be terminated and all funds to Lovestone cut off (Mangold, 1991, 292). Lovestone biographer Ted Morgan, who gives a similar account, cites Colby as stating that the officer who carried out the investigation was Horace Feldman (Morgan, 1999, p.349).

In response to a Freedom of Information Request from the author, the CIA refused to confirm or deny any information about the Feldman investigation, on the grounds that any relevant records remained classified (Meeks, 2013). If such material were ever released, it might well shed considerable light on the relationship between the CIA and the non-communist left from the late 1950s onwards. It may yet modify the existing picture which appears to be one of Lovestone’s close cooperation with Angleton on the one hand, and his longstanding resistance to control by the agency bureaucracy on the other.

In this respect, it is intriguing that Lovestone’s own position in the AFL-CIO came under attack at the same time as Angleton’s downfall. According to Morgan, the proximate cause was a letter from Angleton containing a check for Lovestone’s subagent Pagie Morris, which was mislaid by Lovestone’s secretary Miriam Welsh, wife of the old Lovestoneite Eddy Welsh (Morgan, 1999, p.345). The letter turned up at the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington. The evidence of Lovestone’s ongoing relationship with Angleton, seven years after the AFL’s CIA connection was supposed to have been terminated in the wake of Tom Braden’s revelations, gave George Meany ammunition which he used to replace Lovestone as AFL-CIO International Director, effective from 1 July 1974 (Morgan, 1999, pp.350-351).

Given the timing of Lovestone’s departure in the midst of Colby’s campaign to isolate Angleton, there must be at least a suspicion that the two events were connected. In any case, that campaign came to a climax a few months later when Angleton’s own counterintelligence staff was purged.

The final denouement came when Colby was approached by the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, who had learned of the so-called ‘family jewels’, an internal report which detailed all of the CIA’s potentially illegal activities. Colby gave Hersh an interview, and demanded Angleton’s resignation in anticipation of the resulting story, which ran in the New York Times on 22 December 1974 (Wise, 1992, p.270). Within a few days, Angleton had resigned along with his top counterintelligence officers; Raymond Rocca, Scotty Miller and William J. Hood (Wise, 1992, pp.271). In Angleton’s place as counterintelligence chief, Colby appointed George Kalaris, a former Labour Department lawyer, who had joined the CIA in 1952 (Mangold, 1991, p.300). Although familiar with counterintelligence as an
aspect of his work in the CIA’s Operations Division, he did not share Angleton’s esoteric view of its status as a discipline (Mangold, 1991, p.301).

Kalaris discovered that the counterintelligence staff had created a vast archive inaccessible from the CIA’s central filing system (Mangold, 1991, p.305). Tom Mangold characterises this as evidence that ‘Angleton had been quietly building an alternative CIA, subscribing only to his rules, beyond peer review or executive supervision’ (Mangold, 1991, p.306). It is arguably precisely this autonomy that made working for Angleton attractive to Lovestone in the 1950s, after the Office of Special Plans had attempted to bring the AFL-CIO’s operations under bureaucratic control. In the new era of scrutiny however, it was a liability to the CIA.

So great was Angleton’s autonomy that the Directorate of Operations’ own labour division was unaware of Lovestone’s role as an agent until informed by Kalaris, who found his JX reports (Mangold, 1991, p.306).

Angleton’s supporters believed that Colby had deliberately engineered the leak of the CIA ‘family jewels’, a charge that Colby strongly denied (Mangold, 1991, p.293). He had, however, been trying to get rid of Angleton for several years. Both Colby himself and Angleton’s supporters agree on one key reason for this animosity. Colby told Mangold that the mission of the CIA’s Soviet Bloc Division was to recruit Soviets – ‘But here was Jim Angleton, whose staff spent all their time blocking those recruitments’ (Mangold, 1991, p.289). Angleton’s lieutenant, Scotty Miler, said of Colby ‘He felt CI [counterintelligence] approval for each operation was inhibiting ops. It got rid of people looking over the operators’ shoulders’ (Wise, 1992, p.265).

The dispute between Colby and Angleton over the correct approach to intelligence had a political significance. Angleton beliefs about strategic deception led him to reject the reality of the Sino-Soviet split, putting him at odds with the Nixon Administration’s support for detente with China, and alienating even supporters like former CIA director Richard Helms (Epstein, 1989, p.98). Colby’s vision was arguably more compatible with the pursuit of detente. He was sceptical of Angleton’s theories and the strategic role he claimed for counterintelligence. Instead, he saw the primary role of the CIA as collecting and analysing information for policymakers (Mangold, 1991, p.290).

Détente promised a valuable monitoring role for this kind of work. By contrast, it undermined the case for aggressive covert operations, and was at odds with the assumptions that underpinned Angleton’s approach to counterintelligence. As a result, the evolution of the political warfare coalition had become closely bound up with the campaign against détente.
Chapter Six: The Neoconservative Counteroffensive of the 1970s

This chapter examines the late 1970s and the campaign against the détente, which provided the context for the political warfare coalition to assert a new status as an epistemic community.

The Struggle against Detente

Henry Jackson was the leading figure in the campaign against détente. At hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on arms control in June 1974, he succeeded in raising doubts about the administration’s policy on strategic arms negotiations by forensic questioning of Government officials such as Paul Nitze, who subsequently resigned as a SALT negotiator in opposition to Kissinger’s approach (Kaufman, 2000, p.278). Nitze accused Nixon and Kissinger of promoting a ‘myth of détente’ (Sanders, 1983, p.152).

The theme was quickly taken up by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, which was to be among the most significant of a number of overlapping vehicles that emerged to support the anti-détente campaign. In July 1974, the CDM’s Foreign Policy Task Force published a pamphlet arguing that détente was a result of Soviet strength, claiming that: ‘The current "structure of peace", based on fluctuating pressures involving China, the US and the USSR, has come about precisely because of the growing potency of Soviet arms. The inherent instability of this triangle is increased by the relative decline in American strength’ (Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.7).

The Quest for Detente concluded with a call for strengthened deterrence and a warning that: ‘if, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to be deceived by a myth of détente, reduce our military strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer irreversible defeats, which could imperil the safety of democracy in America’ (Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.15).

The chairman of the Foreign Policy Task Force was Eugene Rostow, a Yale Law Professor and former Under Secretary of State under President Johnson (Cahn, 1998, p.26). He was supported by a 17-strong drafting committee that included several other veterans of the Johnson administration, along with the preeminent literary neoconservative, Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz, academic neoconservatives Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel Huntington and Paul Seabury, and AFL-CIO trade unionists J.C. Turner and Albert Shanker (Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.2). The Task Force’s secretary was Roy Godson, director of the International Labor Program at Georgetown University, and son of the former Lovestoneite labour diplomat Joseph Godson (Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1974, p.2).

The CDM’s argument was roundly rejected by Kissinger, who told Rostow in a letter of 19 August 1974, that ‘we have sought to rely on a balance of mutual interest rather than on Soviet intentions as expressed by ideological dogma’ (cited in Sanders, 1983, p.151). Rostow wrote back on 4 September insisting that ‘Soviet policy never changes’ (cited in
Sanders, 1983, p.150). The exchange only served to underline that Kissingerian realism and neoconservatism were incompatible paradigms. In January 1975, Kissinger blamed Jackson’s sponsorship of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for the collapse of the projected Soviet trade deal, stoking press murmurings about Jackson’s presidential ambitions (Kaufman, 2000, p. 280).

Yet Jackson’s success failed to translate into political capital in the 1976 Democratic primaries. A scathing report on Jackson’s record by Americans for Democratic Action, once the home of anti-communist Truman Democrats, was symptomatic of the enduring nature of the New Politics shift in the party (Kaufman, 2000, p.313).

Jackson did attempt to reach out to Liberal Democrats by capitalising on a leak from Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, which showed that the Nixon Administration had made promises of renewed intervention to the South Vietnamese if North Vietnam breached the 1973 Paris Peace Accords (Kaufman, 2000, p.291). Within his own natural constituency, Jackson was undermined by support for a Hubert Humphrey candidacy within the AFL-CIO, whose President, George Meany, was also alienated by Jackson’s support for détente with China (Kaufman, 2000, p.315).

The Jackson campaign also made strategic missteps, concentrating resources on the larger states while conceding early momentum to Jimmy Carter, that contributed to defeat (Kaufman, 2000, p.325). It was a failing that reflected Jackson’s political style as backroom negotiator, rather than a mass communicator.

The Second Committee on the Present Danger

As the 1976 presidential election loomed, the opponents of détente began to feel the need for a broader bipartisan campaign vehicle to influence the eventual victor. The exit of a key supporter, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, from the Ford administration for speaking out too strongly on the issue, deprived them of a key ally in government and prompted discussions to begin in earnest among a small group of former Republican and Democratic Cabinet officials (Sanders, 1983, p.152).

As well as Rostow, Nitze and Schlesinger himself, these included former Treasury Secretary H. H. Fowler, former Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles E. Walker and former Deputy Defence Secretary David Packard (Sanders, 1983, p.152). In March 1976, the group offered the role of Director of the new organisation to Charles Tyroler II (Sanders, 1983, p.152).

Tyroler had been the Defense Department’s director of manpower supply in the early 1950s, before becoming a Washington business consultant (Washington Post, 15 March, 1995). He had worked in the democratic presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, and had been a director of the Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam in the 1960s (Ibid).

The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) was publicly launched on 11 November 1976, within days of Jimmy Carter’s election victory (Cahn, 1998, p.28). Like its namesake of the early 1950s, the CPD was dominated by experienced Cold war planners. Eugene Rostow served as chair of the Executive Committee, while Paul Nitze, the original architect of NSC-
68, and a veteran of the earlier committee, was chair of policy studies (Sanders, 1983, p.154).

The presence of Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, as one of three co-chairs signalled a greatly enlarged role for cold war social democrats in the 1976 committee compared to its predecessor (Sanders, 1983, p.212). In the 1950 committee, labour had been represented by David Dubinsky of the ILGWU and arguably by the CIO-connected labour lawyer Arthur Goldberg (Sanders, 1983, p.87).

In the (much larger) membership of the 1976 CPD, The AFL-CIO was represented by Kirkland, Sol Chaikin and Evelyn DuBrow of the ILGWU, Rachelle Horowitz and Albert Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers, Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and by Jay Lovestone himself (Sanders 1983, 154-160). Also on the committee was Bertram Wolfe, who had been second-in-command of the Lovestoneite group for most of the 1930s, before becoming an adviser to the State Department in the 1950s and later a professor at the Hoover Institution (Alexander 1981, 134).

Of the 141 initial members of the CPD, 20 had also been among the signatories of the founding appeal of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. There was a significant overlap between this group and that of members of the CPD who were at one time or another members of the Social Democrats USA: a group which included Chaikin, DuBrow, Horowitz, Shanker, Rustin, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John P. Roche, Paul Seabury, and Midge Decter (Institute for Policy Studies, 2014).

This section of the CPD’s support base effectively represented the Dubinsky-Lovestone tradition of labour anti-communism. The other wing of the Cold War alliance between the CIA and the non-communist left was represented by a number of former intelligence officers, including William Casey, Ray Cline, and the recently retired CIA director William Colby (Sanders, 1983, p.156).

As an OSS officer in London during the Second World War, Casey had headed attempts to use German-speaking workers recruited through the ILGWU for operations into occupied Europe (Smith, 2005, p.225). More recently, in the early 1970s, he had served as head of the International Rescue Committee (Chester, 1995, p.241). Cline was another OSS officer who later joined the CIA, where he served as station chief in Taiwan and Germany and Deputy Director for Intelligence before leaving in 1969 to become director of intelligence at the State Department (Smith, 2005, p.14).

Colby was likewise an OSS veteran who had served as CIA Station Chief and as head of the American pacification program in South Vietnam, and as head of the CIA Far Eastern Division (Smith, 2005, p.202). Colby had been fired as CIA director a year earlier in November 1975, in part because of administration resentment at his candid approach to Congressional investigations of his agency (Wise, 1992, p.292). During his tenure Colby had resisted pressure from the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) for a competitive analysis that would challenge the CIA estimates that the Soviet Union was not close to nuclear superiority (Ford, 1993, p.188). This being the case, Colby’s membership of the CPD presents something of a challenge for our analysis. He was a defender of the CIA’s
intelligence and covert action work, but one who had a more circumscribed view of its role than some of his colleagues. This was to give him an ambiguous place in the ranks of the political warfare coalition, as will become clearer when we examine its development in the 1980s.

In opposing détente and the constraints on American strategy that this involved, the CPD was at least in part an expression of the political warfare coalition that had underpinned support for American political intervention overseas since the 1940s.

Jerry Sanders has described the CPD as conducting a two-tier ‘insider-outsider strategy’:

> A pincer operation of sorts designed to squeeze an incoming president between a reassertion of hardline doctrine within the national security bureaucracy and from the outside by means of pressure by an interest-backed Cold War ideology led by hawkish Congressmen and groups associated with the military-industrial complex and the grassroots right-wing (Sanders, 1983, p.197)

Boies and Pichardo have suggested that the CPD can best be characterised as an elite social movement organisation (ESMO) (Boies, 1993-1994, p.79). In making this argument, they suggest that elites form social movements when their regular channels of authority are constrained or insufficient to pursue their interests (Boies, 1993-1994, p.62). Their application of this concept to the CPD is persuasive given the marginalisation of its members by the Carter administration. Nevertheless, it is important to note the continuing access of CPD to ‘insider’ sources of power in the bureaucracy and in Congress.

It is worth considering how closely Sanders’ insider-outsider strategy corresponds with the two-tier dynamic identified by Inderjeet Parmar as a feature of epistemic communities, within which ‘government officials have access to policy-making and use the second tier to publicise/disseminate their ideas and to legitimate them as ‘objective and scientific’ as well as to elaborate on public officials ideas’ (Parmar, 2006, pp. 17-18).

If the CPD’s role in the struggle over détente arguably exemplified this process, two related episodes identified by Sanders illustrated its ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ aspects; the first within the US Government over the ‘Team B’ challenge to the CIA’s intelligence estimates; the second within the US Congress over the nomination of Paul Warnke to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Sanders, 1983, p.197).

While the CPD may itself be best be characterised as an elite social movement organisation, the existence of the two-tier dynamic, reflecting continuing access to some ‘insider’ decision-makers, arguably opened up the possibility that a true epistemic community could emerge from the movement.

In interpreting these conflicts, it is useful to recall Parmar’s injunction that an understanding of the state-private networks of the Cold War as epistemic communities should be ‘subsumed within a more comprehensive Gramscian analysis’ (Parmar, 2006, p.18).
A comparison of the makeup of the 1976 CPD and allied organisations with earlier interventionist organisations such as the CDAAA and the CPD is one way of interrogating the evolution of the hegemonic coalition that shaped American foreign policy over the course of the Cold War.

In this respect, there were important differences between the 1950 CPD, largely a movement of the bipartisan centre and the foreign policy establishment against the Republican right, and its successor, which was confronted by the break-up of Cold War liberalism and by divisions within the foreign policy establishment itself over détente (Sanders, 1983, p.192).

By the 1970s, the dominant strands of the Republican right were largely reconciled to the ‘containment militarism’ espoused by both iterations of the CPD. Among the organisations that played a significant role in opposition to détente, the National Strategy Information Center and the American Security Council both had roots in conservative republicanism.

**The American Security Council**
The American Security Council (ASC) was founded in 1955 by a group of former FBI agents to provide anti-communist intelligence to private enterprise (Diamond, 1995, p.46). It was a product of a post-McCarthyite era when the conservative attacks on alleged domestic communist subversion could still threaten even anti-communist liberals (Sanders, 1983, p.211). Several of its early principals had close links to the isolationist right, which had opposed US participation in World War Two. These included William Regnery and General Robert E. Wood, two former members of the America First Committee, wartime antagonists of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (Diamond, 1995, p.47). In the early 1960s, the ASC’s educational subsidiary, the Institute for American Strategy was attacked by the Chair of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, for excessive influence on the military and for using a broad definition of communism that could have been taken to cover the Kennedy administration’s own policies (Diamond, 1995, p.48).

The ASC nevertheless continued to enjoy significant influence. James Angleton joined the organisation in the summer of 1976, some eighteen months after leaving the CIA. According to the ASC’s account of Angleton’s time there, he told one early meeting that ‘the CIA’s counterintelligence division was effectively disbanded, and for all practical purposes covert operations were also shut down’ (American Security Council, 2003c).

In 1977, Angleton became chairman of the ASC’s Security and Intelligence Fund, set up to assist CIA and FBI officers facing prosecution as a result of the wave of investigations into the intelligence community (Gentry, 1977). By that time, the ASC had become an affiliate of the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, an umbrella group for the anti-détente movement based at the Washington offices of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.208). In effect, the most conservative sections of the old CIA-Non Communist Left alliance had come together again to oppose the policy of détente. The political warfare coalition was rearticulating itself to contest the hegemony that it had lost in the post-Vietnam era.
The National Strategy Information Center
The National Strategy Information Center was founded in 1962 under the leadership of Frank R. Barnett to provide information on defence and security issues. Barnett was a Russian-speaking veteran of the post-war US Military Government in Germany (Saxon, 1993). He described himself as a ‘Robert Taft Republican’, alluding to a leading figure on the conservative wing of the party that had been at odds with the original CPD in the early 1950s (quoted in Sanders, 1983, p.210).

From 1955 to 1962, Barnett served as vice-president and research director of the anti-Communist Smith Richardson Foundation (Saxon, 1993). From 1958, he was also research director of the Institute for American Strategy, a Smith Richardson funded offshoot of the American Security Council, which played a key role in the latter’s educational outreach to the military (Diamond, 1995, p.47).

As head of the NSIC, Barnett continued to attract significant funding from Conservative donors, notably Richard Mellon Scaife (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.190). The son of an OSS officer, Scaife controlled the news agency Forum World Features for a period in the 1970s before its previous relationship with the CIA was exposed (Reed, 2014). The NSIC’s own activities themselves often overlapped with the CIA’s alliances. In the 1970s, it sponsored the establishment of Georgetown University’s International Labor Program alongside the AFL-CIO (National Strategy Information Center, 2011).

Both Barnett and Scaife were founder sponsors of the CPD in 1976 (Sanders, 1983, pp.155-159). CPD chairman Rostow agreed to join the NSIC board in June 1976 in order to facilitate cooperation on a large scale anti-détente persuasion campaign (Sanders, 1983, p.197).

To facilitate this alliance the NSIC opened a Washington office, working initially from the address of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a location which was shared by the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament (Sanders, 1983, p.212). The NSIC representative was Roy Godson, the CDM member who also headed Georgetown’s International Labor Program (Sanders, 1983, p.213).

Godson was thus at the centre of the emerging alliance between the neoconservatives and the New Right. The NSIC would play a significant role in the development of that alliance in the 1980s, and Godson would play a central one in the deepening of the political warfare coalition into a fully-fledged epistemic community focused on intelligence and covert action. The nature of that epistemic community would be profoundly shaped by battles over intelligence fought during the struggle over détente.

Team B
Challenging the intelligence estimates on which administration policy was based was a central plank of the ‘insider’ wing of anti-détente coalition’s activity, already well under way before the launch of the CPD in late 1976. Within the government, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), provided a key foothold for sceptics about détente.
PFIAB had originally been formed as the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956, with a largely conservative membership recommended by then CIA director Allen Dulles (Cahn, 1998, p.101). The ideological cast of the board was largely unchanged by the mid-1970s. Members such as IRC President Leo Cherne, former ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, and former chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board Gordon Gray had a record of support for offensive covert action going back decades, and were correspondingly sceptical about détente (Cahn, 1998, p.104).

Debates within the PFIAB about CIA intelligence estimates produced the idea of an alternative threat assessment carried out by a group of outside experts (Cahn, 1998, p.112). CIA director William Colby rejected this proposal in a November 1975 letter to President Ford, which argued that outside experts would be unable to replicate the CIA’s expertise (Cahn, 1998, p.119). By this time, however, it had already been announced that Colby was due to be replaced by George H.W. Bush (Cahn, 1998, p.124).

In May 1975, Bush agreed to a ‘competitive analysis’ of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (Cahn, 1998, p.139). His deputy at the time E. Henry Knoche, felt such a study would vindicate the CIA, but said later that ‘it just did not occur to me that there would be those with a vested interest in the public impugning of our national estimates’ (quoted in Cahn, 1998, p.138). The nature of the proposed process was set out in a letter to Bush from Leo Cherne the following month, which specified that a ‘Team B’ of outside experts would be given the same access to the information as a ‘Team A’ of CIA analysts to examine three chosen intelligence issues (Cahn, 1998, p.139).

Initially, it was expected that the all the issues chosen would be technical in nature. However, objections from the US Navy meant that a panel on anti-submarine warfare was replaced at the last minute by one on strategic objectives, despite objections about the open-ended nature of the subject (Cahn, 1998, p.147).


These members were predominantly rooted in the defence establishment. General Graham had been successively a senior figure in Army intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency before becoming Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community in 1974, and Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency from 1974 to 1976 (Godson, 1983, p.12). In later years, Graham was a strong advocate of removing oversight of the intelligence community as a whole from the CIA (Godson, 1983, Ibid).

Nitze had been the author of the NSC-68 policy paper of 1950, and of the Gaither report of 1957, both of them influential maximalist interpretations of the Soviet threat (Cahn, 1998, p.4). Prior to his resignation as a member of the SALT negotiation team in 1974, he had been a key ‘insider’ ally of Senator Henry Jackson’s anti-détente campaign in Congress (Kaufman, 2000, p.278).
In 1969, Jackson and Nitze had worked together in support of missile defence on the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defence Policy (CPDM), where Wolfowitz had been a staffer (Mann, 2004, p.32). Richard Pipes had subsequently been recruited as a consultant to Jackson by Wolfowitz’s CPDM colleague Richard Perle (Blumenthal, 1987). Pipes was also a founder member of the pro-Jackson Coalition For A Democratic Majority (New York Times, 7 December 1972).

Team B thus included strategically placed representation from the circle of conservative Democrats around Jackson within a broader composition drawn from the defence establishment. In this it could be said to represent in microcosm, a similar balance of forces to that in the Committee on the Present Danger, with which it had a significant overlapping membership including Nitze, Pipes, Kohler and Van Cleave (Sanders, 1983, pp.154-159).

Team B’s conclusions would prove to be congenial to the CPD and the opponents of détente. The report on strategic objectives drafted by Pipes argued that the CIA had consistently under-estimated the Soviet threat by focusing on ‘the adversary’s capabilities rather than his intentions, his weapons, rather than his ideas, motives and aspirations’ (Cahn, 1998, p.163). It went on to make the prediction, startling in historical hindsight, that ‘within the ten year period of the National Estimate the Soviets may well expect to achieve a degree of military superiority which would permit a dramatically more aggressive pursuit of their hegemonial objectives’ (quoted in Cahn, 1998, p.169).

Even before these conclusions were finalised, the ‘insider’ struggle over intelligence estimates was moving into the public arena. A leak of Team B’s existence to the Boston Globe on 20 November 1976, led CIA Director George Bush to complain to PFIAB chairman Leo Cherne (Cahn, 1998, p.177). The resulting controversy ran throughout the November presidential election and the early weeks of Jimmy Carter’s presidency (Cahn, 1998, p.179).

The Carter Administration

Neither the launch of the Committee on the Present Danger, nor the leaks about Team B had an immediate impact on Carter’s foreign or defence policies. A list of 53 names put forward for security and foreign policy posts by the CPD, the CDM and the AFL-CIO was rebuffed by the incoming administration (Sanders, 1983, p.180).

Unable to influence the executive directly, the anti-détente campaign returned to Congress, where it found a lightning-rod for its discontent in the confirmation hearings for Paul Warnke, Carter’s nominee as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Sanders, 1983, p.204). An anonymous memorandum was circulated on Capitol Hill, accusing Warnke of advocating the unilateral disarmament of US weapons systems (Sanders, 1983, p.204). Its authors were subsequently revealed to be Penn Kemble and Joshua Muravchik of the CDM (Sanders, 1983, p.205). Kemble and Muravchik were both former activists of the Shachtmanite Young People’s Socialist League and members of the Social Democrats USA as well as the CDM (Democracy Digest, 2005). Their report leaned heavily on the results of Team B to suggest an imminent threat of Soviet nuclear superiority, as did Nitze in testimony to the Senate (Sanders, 1983, p.206).
Although Warnke was ultimately confirmed, the umbrella group produced by the campaign against him, the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, would prove to be a landmark in the rapprochement between neoconservatism and the New Right (Sanders, 1983, p.209). The failure to influence Carter’s approach would lead the neoconservatives to reassess what they had considered to be a temporary challenge from the New Politics movement as a fundamental challenge to their position in the Democratic Party (Ehrman, 1995, p.98).

Late in his term of office, Carter attempt to repair relations with the neoconservatives by meeting the CDM leadership in January, 1980, but the event proved to be a disaster (Kaufman 2000, p.397). In the absence of a primary challenge to Carter from Daniel Patrick Moynihan, many neoconservatives moved to support Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party (Ehrman, 1995, p.99).

**The intelligence debate in the late 1970s**

Many of the neoconservatives involved in the anti-détente campaign of the mid-1970s had political roots in the cadres of the Cold War alliance of the CIA and the non-communist left. If the campaign had provided them with a vehicle to contest the political defeats of the post-Vietnam era, it had failed to regain them their previous political influence.

One response was to build on the approach pioneered by Team B, and to develop a new epistemic community focused on intelligence. Like their cold war liberal precursors, the neoconservatives would aspire to official patronage while resisting bureaucratization. The crucial difference was that they acted against a post-Vietnam and post-Watergate climate of increased public criticism of the intelligence community. The need to influence that public debate would shape the emergence of the formal apparatus of an epistemic community, through which its members acquired the status to advocate a reinvigorated role for the intelligence community and for its erstwhile allies in civil society.

**The role of Roy Godson**

A key figure in this development was Roy Godson, the son of Joseph Godson, the former Lovestoneite Labour attaché in Britain (New York Times, 12 September 1986). From as early as 1969 when he was an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University, Godson was working with Frank Barnett of the NSIC and involved in contacts between the AFL-CIO and European anti-communist networks (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.165).

As the nature of the CIA’s alliance with organised labour began to come under public scrutiny in the wake of the Vietnam War, Godson mounted an academic defence of the AFL’s record. Writing in *Labor History* in 1975, he attacked accounts of the AFL’s post-war role produced by New Left historians (Godson, 1975, p.325). He singled out Ronald Radosh who ‘has maintained that the government played a decisive role in AFL policy making’ and Gabriel Kolko, who ‘although less explicit, has maintained (without supporting evidence) that key AFL officials worked with and for American intelligence in post-war Europe and, by implication at least, that the U.S. government played a role in the making of AFL foreign policy’ (Godson, 1975, ibid).
It was of course true that the AFL had worked with and for the CIA in post-war Europe and Godson's own later writings would acknowledge this. By the 1990s, he would go so far as to criticise Tom Braden, the CIA officer who had first revealed the extent of the AFL's CIA sponsorship, for blowing operations that were still running at the time of his revelations (Godson, 2001, p.43).

Even in 1975, Godson did not attempt deny the CIA-AFL connection outright. This could have been informed by the fact that some of the interviewees for his article, such as George Meany, David Dubinsky and Jay Lovestone were involved in the CIA relationship, and indeed Lovestone had been a CIA agent until a year or two earlier (Godson, 1975, p.330). Without accepting Braden's allegations, he sought to turn them around, using Braden’s dissatisfaction with the AFL as evidence of its independence. ‘Even if one accepts Braden's basically unsubstantiated version, that at some point after 1947 the AFL used CIA funds, it appears that the AFL policy makers still retailed (sic) their autonomy’, he argued (Godson, 1975, pp.332-333).

The picture put forward by Godson in Labor History thus has much in common with that of more recent historians of the Cultural Cold War, such as Hugh Wilford, who has argued that the AFL brought to their relationship with the CIA ‘a definite agenda of their own’ (Wilford, 2008, p.69). However, Godson's account does show why Wilford's labour-management metaphor may not be the best way of understanding the CIA-AFL alliance, since it fails to capture the relative autonomy of AFL leaders from their own grassroots, which Godson acknowledges:

> Most rank and file, as well as middle and upper level union leaders appeared to be relatively uninterested in and ill-informed about international affairs. Even the convention proceedings and labor press of the ILGWU, one of the most internationally minded unions, contain little discussion of foreign policy alternatives. Although the ILGWU "establishment" was occasionally challenged, its resolutions were carried with only two or three dissenting votes (Godson, 1975, p.335).

One attempt to reflect this reality might be the term 'corporate unionism' which Godson attributes to Radosh without directly attempting to challenge it (Godson, 1975, p.325). Another might be through Kees van der Pijl's concept of a distinct cadre stratum emerging out of the centralisation of capital in modern industrial economies, with a mediating role between and on behalf of wider social classes (van der Pijl, 2005, p.501).

Indeed, Godson’s own career at this juncture might be seen as an example of the way the transition from cold war liberalism to neoconservatism reflected the evolution of a fraction of this cadre stratum with a shifting social base. The mid-1970s was the very period when Godson was a key figure in the anti-détente campaign as a staffer at the NSIC and a member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.212). This campaign would prove to be a key milestone in the fusion of neoconservatives with the new right into a new conservative coalition (Sanders, 1983, p.228).
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence

In the late 1970s, Godson was at the centre of a group of scholars who sought shift the terms of the debate on intelligence from the post-Watergate era. In 1979, this group founded the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) under the aegis of the NSIC (Godson, 1983, p.4).

Godson outlined the Consortium’s approach in the introduction to its first volume of essays, *Elements of Intelligence*:

> To achieve their objectives, the group, calling itself the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, planned to assemble scholars, intelligence specialists and other organizations and individuals interested in the subject. Papers were to be commissioned in various areas, and discussed in a series of meetings over a four year period. The results of their deliberations were to be published and made available to concerned governmental and non-governmental entities, and to academics teaching intelligence in the context of diplomacy and foreign operations (Godson, 1983, p.4).

This programme arguably represents an attempt to form an epistemic community as defined by Peter Haas, ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p.3). Haas identified four key features of epistemic communities, including a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992, p.3).

The Consortium’s early work developed all of these features in the course of a policy enterprise rooted in the previous work of the Committee on the Present Danger and of the Team B analysts, groups from which a number of the scholars in the Consortium were drawn. Of eighteen founders, four had been founder members of the Committee on the Present Danger: Robert Pfaltzgraff, Adda Bozeman, Paul Seabury, and the former CIA officer Ray Cline (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 2007a). A fifth, Richard Pipes, had been the driving force of Team B’s Strategic Objectives Panel. The Consortium’s initial series of conferences would address many of the issues that had been raised by the Team B exercise.

The CSI conferences: Elements of Intelligence

The first CSI conference took place in Washington DC on 27-28 April 1979, and brought together some fifty to sixty scholars, congressional staffers, and current and former intelligence officers (Godson, 1983, p.4). Their discussion focused on a series of papers organised around four major intelligence disciplines: clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, covert action and counterintelligence (Godson, 1983, p.5). The structure of the resulting book, *Elements on Intelligence* itself arguably sheds some light on the crisis of the 1970s, and how it affected different elements of the intelligence community devoted to each of these disciplines.

In his introduction to the volume, Godson noted that ‘in the 1970s, in the US an unprecedented public debate was initiated about the role of foreign intelligence in an open
society’ (Godson, 1983, p.3). However, he argued that the debate did not go far enough, focusing on abuses rather than effectiveness.

'Thus a reading of the congressional investigation reports would leave the impression that US covert action was either entirely immoral (promoting assassinations and interfering unilaterally in democratic politics of other countries) or of no utility. Intelligence analysis and estimates fared little better. The Pike Committee found only inadequacy; the Church Committee ignored the subject altogether' (Godson, 1983, p.3).

He went on to suggest that the public debate had moved on to the question of ‘existing intelligence capabilities matched against present and future needs’ (Godson, 1983, p.3). If this true it was least in part due to the efforts of the Committee on the Present Danger and of Team B.

*Elements of intelligence* built directly on those precedents. The paper on intelligence analysis was written by a key member of Team B, the former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency General Daniel O. Graham (Godson ed. 1983, 11-12). Graham had been described as the “most pungent and persistent single critic of the CIA’s estimating – analyzing hierarchy” by *Washington Post* journalist Joseph Alsop in 1973 (quoted in Cahn, 1998, p.83). The truth of this judgement was very apparent in Graham’s contribution to *Elements of Intelligence*, which accused the CIA of dominating the national estimates process and causing institutional friction with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Graham, 1983, p.24).

Graham went on to argue that the impact of Team B on subsequent CIA estimates suggested that there was a case for institutionalising competitive analysis (Graham, 1983, pp.26-27). He acknowledged that this ‘might lead to the dismemberment of the CIA’, but argued that there was a case for ‘disentangling the CIA’s various functions’ (Graham, 1983, p.27). The CIA’s analysts ‘have often been unfairly critical of the military services on the premise that the latter produce self-serving intelligence’, despite their own ‘remarkable record of under-estimation of the Soviet armed forces’, they were nonetheless gaining support for ‘even greater centralization of the intelligence community’ with the appointment of the CIA director as Director of National Intelligence (Graham, 1983, p.27). Graham’s own proposals included a Director of National Intelligence separate from the CIA, a stronger DIA and the possible break-up of the CIA’s analytical side, the Directorate of Intelligence (Graham, 1983, p.28).

The *Elements of Intelligence* essay on clandestine intelligence collection was written by Samuel Halpern, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services and the Strategic Services Unit who served as executive assistant to the head of the CIA’s clandestine service, the Deputy Director for Plans, before retiring in December 1974 (Graham, 1983, p.13). His retirement thus came at the climax of the purges during William Colby’s tenure as director of the CIA.

In his contribution, Halpern pointedly argued that ‘there is some question now, following up on the heavy attrition through retirement and resignation during the 1970s, as to whether there are enough experienced officers on duty to meet current requirements’
He also queried a number of other developments over the same period. The Freedom of Information Act, he suggested, had led to a decline in cooperation from American businesses and foreign intelligence services (Halpern, 1983, p.36). Proscriptions on intelligence officers operating as journalists or academics had narrowed the options for working undercover (Halpern, 1983, p.37). As for Congressional oversight, Halpern concluded, ‘Obviously, the fewer restrictions on clandestine collection the better, lest we end up with a service so hobbled as to be ineffective’ (Halpern, 1983, p.38). In institutional terms, Halpern’s recommendations were conservative, arguing for the continued centralisation of the inter-related disciplines of intelligence collection, covert action and counterintelligence in the CIA (Halpern, 1983, p.35).

The chapter on counterintelligence by Newton S. Miler also emphasised the need for centralisation within its sphere. Miler had been a senior CIA counterintelligence officer until his retirement, which came, like Halpern’s, in December 1974 (Godson, 1983, p.14). Along with Raymond Rocca and William Hood, he was a one of a small group of senior counterintelligence officers who resigned together following the dismissal of their chief, James Angleton (Wise, 1992, p.271).

In *Elements of Intelligence*, Miler argued that ‘US intelligence was devastated in the mid to late 1970s, and is still in disarray’ (Miler, 1983, p.47). However, he went on to state that problems in counterintelligence were rooted in an internal CIA decision to dismantle its centralised counterintelligence program in 1973, ‘some 18 months before the concerted media and congressional attacks on the intelligence community began’ (Miler, 1983, p.48). He called for the restoration of a counterintelligence system that was ‘monolithically centralized and apolitical’, with extensive authority to conduct double agent and deception operations, to carry out counterintelligence liaison with foreign intelligence services, to review the CIA’s other clandestine operations, and to maintain a compartmented counterintelligence record system (Miler, 1983, p.54).

All this was clearly based on the precedents of the Angleton era. ‘Beginning in 1954, and for some 19 years thereafter, the US had within the CIA a centralized counterintelligence component, the CI Staff, which saw a national counterintelligence program as its goal and attempted to attain the objectives, enforce the disciplines, and perform the functions outlined above,’ Miler noted, arguing that ‘the US needs to restore, and then increase, the central counterintelligence capabilities lost in 1973’ (Miler, 1983, p.56). One potential obstacle was opposition to the collection of ‘domestic intelligence’, a term which Miler argued should be restricted to information about threats ‘which are not instigated or supported by foreign powers’ (Miler, 1983, p.63). This was a key issue given that domestic intelligence activities, including the relationship with Lovestone, had helped to bring about Angleton’s downfall.

Evidence that Miler’s perspective enjoyed significant support from his former boss is provided by a declassified memo reporting a 1983 meeting between Angleton and serving CIA officers involved in the CIA Director’s Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary Counterintelligence Analysis (Best, 2017). The report stated:
Angleton gave us his copy of an article on counterintelligence and the future authored by [REDACTED] the former Chief of Operations of the CI Staff. Angleton noted that while he would not subscribe to everything [REDACTED] has written in the article, he agrees with the positions it takes on the future. This article has been submitted for publication to Roy Godson and his Georgetown University group (cited in Best, 2017).

The Chief of Operations seems likely to have been Miler, and the article in question may even have been Miler’s Elements of Intelligence chapter, Counterintelligence at the Crossroads. Miler’s argument is certainly consistent with the views attributed to Angleton in the 1983 memo: ‘Give the present CI Staff all the powers and responsibilities the pre-1973 staff had and add powers that Angleton has always believed a properly constituted CI Staff should have, but which DCIs beginning with Dulles down to Helms were never willing to grant him’ (Best, 2017).

The Elements of Intelligence chapter on covert action was written by Hugh Tovar, a CIA officer who retired in 1978 (Godson, 1983, p.15). Tovar was a veteran of the OSS, the Strategic Services and the Office of Special Operations, who had become head of the CIA’s covert action staff in the late 1960s (Godson, 2001, p.275). During his career, Tovar had been involved in covert operations in Laos, and had served as CIA station chief in Indonesia, where his role during the 1965 coup remains a subject of controversy (Prados, 2003, p.150).

In Elements of intelligence, Tovar argued that ‘covert action no longer seems to figure significantly in the operational posture of CIA (Tovar, 1983, p.72). In contrast, covert action had succeeded in the past when the three key ingredients of ‘policy, leadership and continuity’ had been in place (Tovar, 1983, p.73). He cited material assistance and professional guidance to the Italian trade unions, press and political parties, as an example of the major programs which had been conducted in Western Europe during the Truman era, and which he argued ‘were positive efforts to enable our allies to cope with their own problems’ (Tovar, 1983, p.73). He nevertheless went on to warn that covert action success often carried the seeds of its own failure, and that continuity, though desirable, was double-edged as successful operations involving international organisations representing labour, veterans, women, youth and students had become more insecure over time, leading to their exposure in the 1960s (Tovar, 1983, p.78).

In arguing for a revived covert action infrastructure, Tovar shed significant light on how state actors conceptualised the relationships involved in covert action:

> As a rule – and in fact almost invariably – the action is believed by those who are carrying it out to be compatible also with their interests. We are thus taking sides in local issues, i.e., intervening in a manner which infringes host country sovereignty. In such circumstances it is not likely that a covert action asset would be asked or induced, certainly not forced, to do something he did not wish to do (Tovar, 1983, p.80).
He went on to emphasise that such covert action may or may not involve material assistance and formal agent relationships: ‘the association may be discreet without being clandestine, and may devolve on the exchange of ideas and guidance, or advice’ (Tovar, 1983, p.80). This picture conforms closely to that presented in Roy Godson’s earlier defence of the AFL’s relationship with the CIA (Godson, 1975). It also in line with the view of that relationship in the recent academic literature on the Cultural Cold War (Wilford, 2003, p.99).

Taken together, the contributors to Elements of Intelligence were consistent in their opposition to developments in the CIA during the mid-1970s, when the agency had reined in its clandestine activities and presented analysis that supported détente. General Graham’s call for competitive intelligence was compatible with the agenda of the CIA contributors because their call for centralisation was largely focused on the clandestine disciplines of intelligence collection, covert action and counterintelligence. This convergence between military analysts such as Graham and CIA clandestine ‘old boys’ such as Halpern, Miler and Tovar, demonstrated the shared beliefs of an incipient epistemic community.

The CSI Conferences: Analysis and Estimates
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence held a second conference from 30 December to 1 November 1979, attended once again by some sixty intelligence professionals, Congressional staffers, policymakers and scholars (Godson, 1980a, p.3). The Colloquium on Analysis and Estimates was the first of several devoted to each of the individual intelligence disciplines identified at the previous meeting (Godson, 1980a, p.3).

The quality of the CIA’s estimates had been a key issue in the battle against détente in the preceding years, and many of those present had played central roles in the struggle. Some, such as the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Iklé and the former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, had been key allies of Senator Henry Jackson inside the executive branch of Government (Godson, 1980a, pp.221-223). Others were drawn from the incipient neoconservative movement, including CDM director Joshua Muravchik and Team B members Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Pipes (Godson, 1980a, pp.221-223). In his introduction to the volume of papers produced for the conference Analysis and Estimates, Roy Godson identified two major philosophical approaches to intelligence analysis. The first of these, associated with the CIA analyst Sherman Kent, saw intelligence as an empirical discipline focused on factual evidence, which should retain sufficient distance from policymakers to maintain its objectivity (Godson, 1980a, p.2). The second school, associated with the political theorist Wilmoore Kendall, argued that analysts should ‘affirmatively articulate and evaluate alternative policies’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2). On this view, analysis must be informed by political theory: ‘by clarifying the ends sought by political actors, and the dynamics of the process, the course of events may become comprehensible as well’ (Godson, 1980a, p.2).
A similar framework was adopted in the chapter by Angelo Codevilla, a former congressional staffer who had been a key supporter of Team B during the deliberations of the Senate Select Committee on intelligence in 1977 (Cahn, 1998, p181). In his contribution to Analysis and Estimates, Codevilla argued that ‘as Wilmoore Kendall warned in 1949, empiricism substantially affects broader judgements’ (Codevilla, 1980pp.32-33). Codevilla’s description of the problems raised by such an approach underlined the significance of the issue for the struggle over détente:

For example, the current rule with regard to counting Soviet strategic forces seems to be, ‘what we’ve not seen doesn’t exist’. If we have not seen something we have no other way of knowing its existence. This is textbook empiricism (Codevilla, 1980, p.33).

Estimates of Soviet strategic forces were also at the centre of the chapter by David Sullivan, a CIA Soviet analyst from 1971 to 1978 (Godson, 1980a, p.5). Sullivan’s agency career had come to an end after he was found to have leaked a classified report on Soviet missiles to Senator Henry Jackson’s aide Richard Perle (Prados, 1986, p.243).

Sullivan argued that the SALT process of the 1970s had been driven by mistaken estimates (Sullivan, 1980, p.62). Reiterating arguments he had previously made in classified CIA studies, Sullivan suggested that the SALT I treaty had not constrained Soviet strategic arms programmes and predictions that the 1979 SALT Treaty would do so were based on ‘misuse of intelligence to support predetermined policy positions’ (Sullivan, 1980, p.63).

The discussants of Sullivan’s paper included Admiral George W. Anderson, Leo Cherne’s predecessor as chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the body that had recommended the Team B exercise; and the former CIA analyst Ray Cline (Sullivan, 1980, p.75). Anderson said that he did not disagree with the paper, but argued that the fault lay fundamentally with policy-makers ‘who decided wrongly about the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War’ (Sullivan, 1980, p.74). Cline pushed back against the criticism of the Sherman Kent tradition of analysis, and agreed with Anderson that political leaders had created problems in intelligence: ‘Its distribution was used as a tool to create power and create public opinion, and in particular to impress the media in this country with certain points of view, whether or not it had had anything to do with the outside world’(Sullivan, 1980, p.79).

However, the most highly-charged section of Analysis and Estimates was arguably the chapter on analyst recruitment, which featured papers from former CIA Director William Colby, and from Team B member Richard Pipes. Colby’s contribution accepted key elements of the Team B critique of CIA analysis, arguing that analysts had been too remote from both policymakers and intelligence collectors (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.167). He noted that ‘Congressional praise for "objective" CIA comment reducing the Pentagon’s threat projections was reversed by Albert Wohlstetter’s article demonstrating its underestimates of the pace of Soviet strategic growth’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.167). There were nevertheless important differences in the approaches to analyst training recommended by Colby and Pipes. Colby emphasised that a range of disciplines would be required to process the growing amount of information available (Colby and Pipes, 1980,
Pipes, in contrast, emphasised the particular value of the humanities whose tradition of source criticism enables a scholar to ‘look at a book in an entirely alien field and be able to tell very rapidly whether it is a good book or a bad book’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.173). On this basis, he said he was struck by the faultiness of CIA estimates during the Team B exercise before he became expert in their substantive subject matter (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.175). He suggested that Soviet scholars should focus on Lenin’s writings, arguing that ‘Lenin’s contribution to political strategy is comparable to Napoleon’s contribution to military strategy. Lenin militarized politics’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.175).

Other chapters focused on themes such as surprise or deception, which emphasised the importance of analysis based on intentions rather than capabilities. In a chapter on deception by foreign governments, journalist Edward J. Epstein argued that forms of deception focused on disguising intentions could not be detected by analysis focused on capabilities (Epstein and Feer, 1980, p.128). Epstein was James Angleton’s principal supporter in the media, and his views about deception owed much to the influence of the former CIA counterintelligence chief and his supporters (Mangold, 1991, p.213). Among the respondents to the chapter was Angleton’s former deputy, Raymond Rocca, who complained that there was no treatment of the question of ‘how to do deception from our point of view’ (Epstein and Feer, 1980, p.154).

Taken together, the broad thrust of the papers in Analysis and Estimates were clearly in support of the Wilmoore Kendall tradition rather than that associated with Sherman Kent. The epistemic community being curated by the CSI was therefore emerging as one which emphasised the limits of a scientific approach to intelligence analysis in favour of more intuitive methods.

April 1980 Colloquium on Counterintelligence

The third colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, focusing on counterintelligence, took place in 1980 (Godson, 1980b, p.1). Some 13 current and former CIA officers took part alongside others with backgrounds in the DIA, the FBI, and the armed services intelligence agencies, as well as foreign intelligence veterans included John Bruce Lockhart of Britain, Schlomo Gazit of Israel, Thyraud de Vosjoli of France and the Czech defector Ladislav Bittman (Godson, 1980b, pp.336-339). The balance of some sixty participants included academics and congressional staffers specialising in intelligence (Godson, 1980b, p.1).

The colloquium identified a similar dichotomy of approaches to counterintelligence to the one the previous meeting had posited in the field of intelligence analysis. A paper by Arthur Zuehlke criticised Sherman Kent’s description of counterintelligence as essentially defensive ‘security intelligence’ because it under-emphasized the potential offensive role for the discipline (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.14). Zuehlke argued that counterintelligence can not only detect and neutralise enemy activity but also manipulate it: ‘If CI [counterintelligence] has a capability for thorough detection (and is confident in its ability to detect enemy agents), it may opt to “double” these agents, controlling them as a valuable deception channel’ (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p.30).
Zuehlke pointed to a 1978 executive order on counterintelligence as evidence that the discipline was no longer seen as a narrow security function within the US Government (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p. 25). His optimism on this point was, however, challenged by Newton Miler, the veteran of James Angleton’s counterintelligence staff, who stated that ‘from the perspective of the attempt to establish a centralized counterintelligence program, such as the CI effort from 1955 to 1973, it is inadequate’ (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p. 43). Miler outlined requirements for an effective counterintelligence system, arguing for a ‘monolithically centralised’ and ‘apolitical’ approach that resembled an idealized picture of Angleton’s former staff (Zuehlke Jr., 1980, p. 42). Two other veterans of Angleton’s staff, Norman Smith and Donovan Pratt, also presented papers which called for a revival of centralised counterintelligence (Godson, 1980b, p. 8). A paper by Roy Godson and Arnold Beichman argued that a return to counterintelligence as it had been practised before the mid-1970s was impossible without a change in the legal framework that had been established in the intervening period (Godson and Beichman, 1980, p. 300).

A contribution by William R. Harris of the Rand Corporation underlined that an Angletonian approach to counterintelligence might actually have profound political implications in an era of détente. Harris argued that the Soviets had enough agents in the West in the 1960s to provide feedback to a hypothetical programme of technical deception on Soviet missile capabilities (Harris, 1980, p. 73). As he noted, the channels for such deception would have been precisely the technical means on which verification of the SALT Treaties was based (Harris, 1980, p. 53). He therefore argued for increased counterintelligence control over technical collection, because ‘the premises of counterintelligence training conflict with the scientific training and expectations of openness nurtured in the scientific community. The enemy is not nature but man’ (Harris, 1980, p. 58).

Another paper with implications for détente was congressional staffer Herbert Romerstein’s essay on domestic counterintelligence, which charged that Soviet successes come from ideological spies in periods of relaxed relations (Romerstein, 1980, p. 162).

Other papers pointed to a range of counterintelligence threats. A chapter by John Dziak of the DIA pointed to the covert action role of Soviet Spetsnaz special forces as a key factor in a strategic balance that had shifted significantly towards the Soviets (Dziak, 1980, p. 109). In response to a paper by Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, a number of un-named participants, including a former counterintelligence officer, suggested that the Soviets exercised significant control over international terrorism (Gazit and Handel, 1980, p. 157).

Perhaps the clearest picture of the scope of counterintelligence threats seen by the colloquium’s participants was provided by a curious appendix to the volume of conference proceedings. This was a ‘deliberately overstated’ fictional instruction to the KGB’s London Station, actually written by former MI6 officer John Bruce Lockhart which praised “the steadily increasing influence of the militant left in Britain, in Parliament, in the Trade Unions, in education circles, and the increasing undermining of the central patriotic will of the British people” (Lockhart, 1980, p. 324). If this was partly tongue-in-cheek it nevertheless underlined the scope of the concerns that could be brought within the rubric of counterintelligence.
It was perhaps an appropriate postscript to a colloquium which underlined how much the Consortium’s agonistic view of intelligence owed to the legacy of James Angleton’s Counterintelligence Staff.

**International parallels**

The neoconservative counter-offensive against détente in the United States was linked to a number of related developments internationally. In Britain, events surrounding the demise of the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department had significant parallels with institutional battles over intelligence in the US. In Israel, the 1979 Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism brought together a range of actors sympathetic to the neoconservative critique of détente from around the world.

**Britain**

As in the United States, the debate over détente in Britain proved to be divisive for the intelligence establishment. This emerges most clearly from the fate of the Foreign Office propaganda arm, the Information Research Department.

Like the CIA, the Information Research Department had established significant links with the anti-communist left in the early Cold War (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.119). By the early 1970s, a number of IRD intellectuals had established links to the anti-détente movement in the US. Henry Jackson and his staff made annual visits to Britain in the 1970s, during which they consulted with figures such as Robert Conquest, Leopold Labedz and Leonard Schapiro (Kaufman, 2000, p.259). These were all members of the circle of anti-communist academics cultivated by the IRD (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.123).

In November 1975, an IRD briefing paper, Two Standards on Détente, argued that Soviet bloc countries were ‘continuing to interpret détente and peaceful coexistence as allowing, and even assisting, the promotion of Communist revolutions throughout the world’ (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.170). Such views were at odds with the British Government’s policy, a factor which contributed to Foreign Secretary David Owen’s decision to abolish the IRD in May 1977 (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.171).

Like their fellow cold warriors in the US, former IRD cadres would respond to the loss of official patronage by moving into the private sector and lobbying for a renewal of Cold War intelligence structures. In the case of IRD, the main vehicle for this was the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) founded in 1970 and funded by Richard Mellon Scaife, also a key financier of the anti-détente movement in the US (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, p.164). The ISCs director, Brian Crozier, would devote much fruitless effort in the late 1970s to lobbying Margaret Thatcher to create a new ‘Counter Subversion Executive’, possibly with the same relationship to the Foreign Office as the IRD (Crozier, 1994, p.143).

**Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism**

The Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism took place in Israel on 2-5 July 1979 (Netanyahu, 1981, p.ix.). It was in effect a major international forum for the movement against détente, and many of those present had been central to the struggles of the preceding years. Speakers from the US included Senator Henry Jackson and prominent
members of the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority such as Ben Wattenberg and Bayard Rustin. In the closing statement of the conference, Jackson charged that there was now a ‘terrorist international’ which shared a common interest with the Soviet Union ‘in destroying the fabric of democratic, lawful societies all over the world’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.361).

This central theme had been reiterated in various ways by a number of other speakers. Ray Cline, the former CIA officer and co-founder of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, told the conference that the KGB had persuaded the Soviet Politburo to accept the PLO ‘as a major political instrument in the Mideast and to subsidise its terrorist policies’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.91). This he regarded as consistent with détente, ‘a Soviet recipe for ideological warfare’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.95).

From Britain, ISC Director Brian Crozier supported the thesis of Soviet backing for terrorism, arguing that if there were gaps in the evidence ‘the contrary would be surprising in a field in which clandestinity is essential to success’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.64). Former Team B analyst Richard Pipes expanded on this argument by claiming that Soviet support for terrorism was kept secret because the Soviet Union was itself vulnerable to similar tactics from its own national minorities (Netanyahu, 1981, p.61).

For the Israelis, the recently retired head of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Schlomo Gazit charged that Soviet military assistance enabled the PLO to function as a clearing house for international terrorism (Netanyahu, 1981, p.348).

The conference’s relentless focus on the theory of Soviet sponsorship of Arab terrorism arguably reflected a powerful community of interests among its participants. If the Israelis benefitted from portraying their struggle with the Palestinians as a dimension of the Cold War, American and European Cold Warriors would benefit from portraying Middle Eastern terrorism as evidence of Soviet duplicity. This was shown most clearly by Republican Congressman Jack Kemp who told the conference that ‘an examination of the Soviet role in promoting international terrorism casts grave doubt on the assumptions about Soviet policy upon which the American, and Western, policy toward the Soviet Union is based, particularly those policies which relate to SALT, Helsinki and Détente itself,’ (Netanyahu, 1981, p.190).

As in the early Cold War the political warfare coalition of the late 1970s was a transnational one in which a range of actors could advance their local interests within a common hegemonic strategy.
Chapter Seven: Neoconservatism in the Reagan era

Chapter Seven will look at how the creation of an epistemic community focused on intelligence assisted the rise of the neoconservatives to a position of influence within the Reagan administration, and their subsequent displacement as a result of the Iran-Contra Affair and the renewal of détente with the Soviet Union.

The Reagan Administration

From the outset, the neoconservatives enjoyed a success in obtaining appointments in the Reagan Administration that was in stark contrast to their treatment under Carter. Reagan’s foreign policy advisor, Richard Allen, a founder member of the Committee on the Present Danger, was central to efforts to reach out to neoconservative Democrats and ensured that many of his CPD colleagues played a role in the Reagan transition team (Sanders, 1983, p.286). Allen’s role in sustaining this emerging alliance on national security issues was exemplified by his attendance at the 1979 CSI conference on analysis and estimates as chairman of the intelligence subcommittee of the Republican National Committee (Godson, 1980a, p.220).


Founder members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority who made the partisan leap into the Reagan Administration included Max Kampelman, as US Delegate to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Jeane Kirkpatrick, as US Representative to the United Nations; Michael Novak; Richard Pipes, who joined the staff of the National Security Council; Eugene Rostow, who became the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Paul Seabury, who became one of eight CPD members recruited to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Sanders, 1983, pp.287-288).

All these were members of the CPD as was the incoming head of the CIA, William Casey (Sanders, 1983, p.287). As a wartime OSS officer and a longstanding official of the International Rescue Committee, Casey had played a key role over decades in the alliance between the US state and the non-communist left (Chester, 1995, p.199). The 1980s would see renewed official support for intervention abroad by conservative social democrats and their neoconservative offshoots. This time, however, much of the effort would take place in the open.
Democracy promotion in the 1980s

The genealogy of Reagan-era neoconservatism in the earlier alliance between the American state and cold war liberalism has been widely recognised. A number of scholars see the administration’s foreign policy focus on democracy and human rights as the primary expression of this. For Nicholas Guilhot ‘this alliance between political networks embodying a very ideological understanding of “democracy” or “human rights” and the state apparatus itself was similar to the one that had existed in the 1950s between the non-Communist left and the State Department or the CIA; it actually reproduced it under another form, albeit with different actors’ (Guilhot, 2005, p.69). Similarly, Justin Vaisse argues that support for democratic forces around the world was the main distinctive contribution of the neoconservatives to Reagan’s foreign policy (Vaïsse, 2010, p.191). In Vaisse’s view, other aspects of Reagan’s anti-Soviet strategy, including his expansion of covert action, ‘might have been approved by any hawk’ (Vaïsse, 2010, pp.190-191).

The key vehicle for this democracy promotion agenda was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) established in 1983 (Guilhot, 2005, p.83). Although defined in law as a non-governmental organisation, The NED was financed by Congress and the US Government and disbursed the majority of its funds to four organisations, the AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) of the US Chamber of Commerce, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute (Guilhot, 2005, p.85). It thus replicated in overt form the covert support that the state had provided to the international operations of American civil society organisations during the early Cold War. Indeed, the combination of state patronage and operational autonomy arguably represented the achievement of the position that the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) had sought to achieve in its struggles with the Office of Policy Coordination in the 1950s.

An examination of the NED can therefore perhaps shed some retrospective light on the debate about the nature of the relationship between the CIA and the FTUC. Hugh Wilford has argued that this can be understood in terms of a metaphor of labour-management relations (Wilford, 2003, p.101). In chapter Four, we argued that this failed to fully capture the significance of FTUC leaders’ insistence on their independent professional status. The emergence from the non-communist left milieu a generation later of what Guilhot calls ‘professional “democracy experts”’ blurring the lines between state power and civil society is consistent with this interpretation of the AFL-CIO’s role as that of a cadre stratum distinct from their own mass base in the labour movement (Guilhot, 2005, p.83).

The political roots of the NED leadership are recognised by Guilhot, who notes that the NED’s founding president Carl Gershman, research council members Joshua Muravchik and Seymour Lipset and the Free Trade Union Institute’s Eugenia Kemble all had backgrounds in the Shachtmanite wing of American social democracy (Guilhot, 2005, p.84). Vaisse also emphasises the neoconservative roots of the NED and particularly the Free Trade Union Institute (Vaïsse, 2010, p.192).
Developing the neoconservative theory of intelligence

The rise of overt democracy promotion did not, however, mean a diminution of neoconservative interest in covert action. Instead, the emergence of professional democracy promotion overlapped with the continuing development of an epistemic community focused on intelligence.

The CSI conferences: 1980 Colloquium on Covert Action

The fourth conference of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, the Colloquium on Covert Action took place on 5-6 December 1980, just over a month after the election of Ronald Reagan as President (Godson, 1981, p.239). Alongside a large contingent of intelligence officers, and the usual contingents of academics, journalists and congressional staffers, the meeting was notable for the attendance of Richard Wilson, of the AFL-CIO’s Department of Organisation (Godson, 1981, p.243).

In his introduction to the volume of conference proceedings, Roy Godson argued that most countries outside the United States made no clear distinction between covert action and wider foreign policy (Godson, 1981, p.2). He nevertheless argued that there were good reasons to link covert action to other intelligence disciplines, enabling covert action operators to benefit from the tradecraft and networks of intelligence collection and counterintelligence operators (Godson, 1981, p.3). Godson suggested that the Soviet Union had weaknesses that could be exploited by covert action, arguing that: ‘The US and other Western states could seek, for defensive reasons, to counter at the source Soviet efforts to shift the global balance in its favour. Or the West can more actively, assist in the non-military destruction of the Soviet empire’ (Godson, 1981, p.5). He insisted, however, that this would require strong policy leadership from the President downwards. It was also require the recreation of a covert action infrastructure, with possible expedients including ‘rehiring some of the best specialists who left in the 1970s’ (Godson, 1981, p.6).

Angelo Codevilla developed similar themes in his contribution to a chapter on covert action and foreign policy. He emphasised that covert action was a uniquely American term and that all political activity contains covert aspects (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, pp.81-82). He went on to argue that no attempt by one country to influence politics in another is ‘without some veneer of secrecy’, giving the example of the Federal Republic of Germany’s use of the Social Democratic Party to fund Portuguese socialists to forestall a communist takeover (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.93). ‘The veil was thin but proved sufficient’, he suggested, ‘The stronger and more wilful the country, the thinner the veil maybe’ (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.93). He criticised the lack of covert action against the Soviet Bloc itself since the 1950s, singling out the activities of the AFL-CIO as an exception (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.100). He concluded by placing covert action once again in the context of broader policy, warning that ‘covert activities are valuable servants of policy, they are not a substitute for policy’ (Bozeman and Codevilla, 1981, p.104).

A similar emphasis on the need for ‘will on the part of decision-makers’ was made by the former Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, in a chapter entitled: The Uses of Political and Propaganda Covert Action in the 1980s (Walters, 1981, p.124). Almost half of Walters’ paper was devoted to the deliberations of a hypothetical Soviet covert action
planning group, which Walters imagined would focus on attacking the American character ‘so that we will paralyse them through their own conscience when we move to advance our interests and help our friends’ (Walters, 1981, p.116). In a response to Walters’ paper, Senate Intelligence Committee Staffer Abram Shulsky supported calls for covert action in the Soviet Bloc, but warned that ‘I don’t believe this could possibly have the sort of success against totalitarian countries that General Walters was talking about for the Soviets’ hypothetical programs against us’ (Walters, 1981, p.129). He nevertheless called for the US to emulate the Soviets by pursuing foreign policy at an unofficial level, citing as an example the AFL-CIO ‘giving material support to the Polish unions in a way that the CIA cannot do, and without the dangers that would come about if the CIA did it’ (Walters, 1981, p.130).

The subsequent chapter by former senior CIA officer Ted Shackley argued that ‘probably the most effective form of covert action is the clandestine sponsorship of armed insurgency and its antidote, counterinsurgency’ (Shackley, 1981, p.137). Although he noted that insurgents in Afghanistan and Angola had sought American help, the main focus of his argument was the need to revive covert action as a defensive option against ‘Soviet-backed wars of national liberation’ (Shackley, 1981, p.137).

A chapter by Donald Jameson, a former covert action specialist in the CIA’s Soviet Division, examined current trends in Soviet covert action (Godson, 1981, p.9). Jameson identified key thematic campaigns ‘against the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons in NATO nations’ and towards ‘the destabilization of the racial situation in the Republic of South Africa’ (Jameson, 1981, p.173). In a response to Jameson’s paper, Herbert Romerstein, a staff of member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, argued that Soviet covert action included support for terrorism, carried out by ‘cutouts’ such as the PLO (Jameson, 1981, p.187).

In a section reviewing the past record of American covert action, former CIA officer Hugh Tovar pointed to successes in the Western Europe under the leadership of President Truman in the 1940s (Tovar, 1981, p.194). He nevertheless acknowledged the expansion of these operations to Eastern Europe in the 1950s had been a failure (Tovar, 1981, p.197). The effectiveness of even the Western European activities was questioned by former French intelligence officer Thyraud De Vosjoli, who recalled ‘at that time, I was in Paris and I would receive almost daily report of supposedly covert activity’ (Tovar, 1981, p.211). De Vosjoli went on to argue that covert action should not be run by the CIA or by agents under official cover because of its intrinsic visibility compared to other kinds of intelligence activity (Tovar, 1981, p.211).

The final chapter by the former chief of CIA Covert Action Staff, Donald Purcell, looked at the scope for covert action in the future (Godson, 1981, p.10). Reviewing the decline of covert action during the 1970s, Purcell lamented that ‘by 1978, CIA’s capabilities to respond to covert action tasking were minimal’ (Purcell, 1981, p.219).

He went on to suggest that it was unlikely that the CIA would be able to use private organisations in future, but that ‘it is worth considering alternative arrangements whereby non-governmental entities could be given overt government financing for foreign programs supporting United States foreign policy goals’ (Purcell, 1981, p.225). He argued that a
number of American non-governmental organisations ‘may be willing to accept an overt
government subsidy which would free them from concerns with intelligence contamination
and possible embarrassment or loss of profit stemming from covert relationships’ (Purcell,

Suggestions along these lines were well received in the conference discussion of Purcell’s
paper:

Two former intelligence officers spoke favourably of a proposal to create an
American counterpart of the British Council, or of the “foundations” run by West
Germany’s political parties but financed by the West German government. These
semi-private, wholly overt entities channel money, advice and support to a variety
of political causes around the world. The AFL-CIO has also done this sort of thing
on a small scale for years, but there is now no way for Congress to provide it with
support except through cumbersome grants through AID. They urged that an
American bipartisan “board” be created, financed from both public and private
sources, and that political action be done openly if at all possible (Purcell, 1981,
pp.234-235).

In their general outline, these proposals clearly foreshadowed the emergence of the
National Endowment for Democracy two years later. Taken as a whole, the Colloquium on
Covert Action, demonstrated that at least some professional intelligence officers saw
covert action primarily in terms of cooperation with sympathetic elements in civil society,
sometimes with a minimum of plausible deniability which shaded into open political action,
but which nevertheless always maintained a strategic, adversarial, character. The American
state’s co-operation with the AFL-CIO was the most frequently cited example of this. It
makes sense therefore to think of the advocates of and practitioners of this activity as a
political warfare coalition, rather than a covert action coalition. In the Colloquium on
Covert Action the participants in that coalition were seeking to reproduce it by making the
case for the reconstruction of its apparatus in a modernised form.

The October 1981 Colloquium on Clandestine Collection

The fifth colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, on clandestine
collection, took place in October 1981 (Godson, 1982b, p.2). With the previous meeting
having taken place during a presidential transition, the 1981 colloquium was the first to
happen while the Reagan administration was in office. While it was notable that several
regular participants, including former Team B chairman Richard Pipes, Kenneth de
Graffenreid and Carnes Lord, had joined the staff of the National Security Council since the
previous meeting, the mix of attendees was broadly the same as before (Godson, 1982b,
p.227-231). The presence of David Dorn, Director of International Affairs for the American
Federation of Teachers, underlined the ongoing relationship between the AFL-CIO and the
intelligence community, while the attendance of Roger Kaplan as a program officer of the
Smith Richardson Foundation represented a link to one of the most significant New Right
donor organisations (Godson, 1982b, p.227-228).
In his preface to the volume of conference proceedings, Frank Barnett made it clear that the Consortium saw intelligence collection as intimately linked to covert action. ‘Is the threat of sowing “revolt in the rear” part of a realistic deterrent or romantic folklore from the era of Eisenhower and Dulles?’ he asked, making it clear that only high quality intelligence could answer such questions (Godson, 1982b, p.vii).

Roy Godson’s introduction challenged the view that covert action and intelligence collection networks should be kept apart, arguing that they often needed the same foreign interlocutors (Godson, 1982b, p.1). Echoing Barnett, he called for a more comprehensive campaign of intelligence collection against the Soviet Union, which he claimed was ‘waging political warfare, particularly in Europe, on a truly strategic scale’ (Godson, 1982b, p.13). Godson expanded on this demand in a chapter devoted to intelligence collection against the Soviet Bloc, which he claimed had become too focused on monitoring Soviet compliance with the SALT Treaty (Godson, 1982a, p.18). He was also critical of attempts by Kremlinologists to distinguish hawkish and dovish elements in the Soviet leadership (Godson, 1982a, p.19). Instead, he argued for a focus on Soviet vulnerabilities, while warning that ‘Since the Russian Revolution, Westerners have foretold of the Soviet Union’s impending collapse’ (Godson, 1982a, p.20). Despite manifest weaknesses, the Soviet economy might well be meeting the distinctive purposes of the Communist Party quite well (Godson, 1982a, p.20). The key issue for intelligence collection, he suggested, was how economic difficulties impacted cleavages between workers and managers, and relationships between different ethnic and religious groups (Godson, 1982a). Godson concluded by calling for a renewal of cooperation with liaison services such as Israel’s Mossad on the Soviet target, and for a re-emphasis on counterintelligence as a means of understanding the Soviet leadership (Godson, 1982a, pp.29-30). As with much of Godson’s work, these last two recommendations carried a strong sense of a return to the status quo ante, and in particular of the kind of anti-Soviet liaison carried out by James Angleton’s CIA Counterintelligence Staff. This subtext may perhaps explain the rather hostile reaction Godson’s paper received in a response by George Kalaris, the CIA officer who had been placed in charge of dismantling Angleton’s empire. Dismissing Godson’s recommendations as ‘more of the same old and overused techniques’, Kalaris stated that ‘the human effort can only go so far in my view, and I see that the breakthrough is going to come primarily in the technical field’ (Godson, 1982a, p.33).

In a chapter on intelligence collection in more accessible parts of the world, former CIA station chief Robert Chapman argued for a shift of resources away from Europe, towards the developing world (Godson, 1982b, p.11-12). Like Godson, he criticised US policies that had alienated allies, in this case Latin American governments who Chapman saw as the key source of intelligence on local insurgencies (Chapman, 1982, p.44). In his view, terrorist organisations from the Puerto Rican FALN to the Provisional IRA were communist and supported by the Soviets through proxies (Chapman, 1982, p.48). In his conclusion, Chapman asked whether the American people were ready for the struggle that his analysis implied. ‘Do they want collectors to penetrate peace groups, anti-nuclear protest movements, environmentalists and left-of-center political parties’ he asked pointedly (Chapman, 1982, p.61). Chapman’s contribution was arguably most instructive in demonstrating the operational implications of a Manichean Cold War interpretation of
international terrorism, of the kind previously canvassed at the 1979 Jerusalem conference.

In a chapter on human intelligence collection another former CIA officer, Eugene Burgstaller addressed the question of what motivates collection agents, arguing that are not usually driven primarily by venality (Burgstaller, 1982, p.74). As an example, he presented the scenario of a Palestinian agent who accepts recruitment because he hopes to influence US policy in the Middle East (Burgstaller, 1982, p.75). In this respect, his picture of collection agents as ideologically motivated allies was largely in accord with the description of covert action agents previously put forward in earlier Consortium publications, notably by Hugh Tovar (Tovar, 1983, p.80).

Like his co-authors, Burgstaller lamented the developments of recent decades. He warned that past publicity about CIA activities, particularly disclosures from official sources, had dented the confidence of foreign allies in its intelligence collection effort (Burgstaller, 1982, p.76). However, his suggestion that the CIA had suffered from enemy penetration was criticised in a response by William Hood, who argued that this had been a bigger problem for other allied services (Burgstaller, 1982, p.93). Hood was himself a veteran of Angleton’s Counterintelligence Staff (Mangold, 1991, p.297). His presence, like that of his former colleagues Raymond Rocca and Newton Miler at several of the previous colloquia, underlined the extent to which Angleton’s supporters were a significant constituency within the Consortium.

Technical intelligence collection was the subject of a chapter by Amrom Katz, a former assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Godson, 1982b, p.12). Katz argued that US successes in collecting technical intelligence from the Soviet Union may have owed less to American prowess than to a Soviet need for disclosure to ensure deterrence (Katz, 1982, p.113). There could, he suggested, be other weapons systems that the Soviets had more incentive to hide (Katz, 1982, p.113). The presence of an intelligent adversary meant that this could not be reduced to a technical, scientific problem (Katz, 1982, p.113). In a remark that prefigured the language of ‘unknown unknowns’ two decades later, he warned that ‘we have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden’ (Katz, 1982, p.116). Katz’s arguments were strongly challenged in a response by signals intelligence (SIGINT) expert David Kahn, who suggested that SIGINT was the most timely and reliable form of intelligence, and that its scale made attempts at deception easy to detect (Katz, 1982, p.119). At the colloquium, this view was reportedly challenged by several un-named speakers, one of whom suggested that the SALT II negotiations, had allowed the Soviets a channel for deception by permitting partially encrypted missile telemetry (Katz, 1982, p.124). The debate about Katz’s paper underlined a number of related themes which the dominant discourse of the Consortium had inherited from Team B: suspicion of a scientific ‘Sherman Kent’ view of intelligence was linked to opposition to a focus on intelligence as a means of monitoring détente.

The opposing agonistic view of intelligence was taken to its logical conclusion in a chapter by Angelo Codevilla, which focused on planning for the role of intelligence in a general war against the Soviet Union (Codevilla, 1982, p.132). He called for a renewal of early Cold War
‘stay-behind’ networks, agents recruited in areas expected to be over-run in the event of a future conflict (Codevilla, 1982, p.143). In insisting that Soviet planning was already focused on war, he spelt out what arguably a fundamental assumption of the neoconservative theory of intelligence: ‘Conflict is their regime’s raison d’etre. It is not our regime’s raison d’etre’ (Codevilla, 1982, p.146).

In the final chapter, William Harris of the Rand Corporation looked at resource allocation for intelligence (Godson, 1982b, p.13). Harris argued that centralised intelligence services have an incentive for bureaucratic growth that is denied to those which must compete for resources within individual government departments, resulting in what he called subsidised intelligence (Harris, 1982, 162). His solution was an internal market for intelligence, which would require other intelligence providers to be given the same Congressional authorisations as the CIA (Harris, 1982, p.178). As the former head of a rival agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency, Daniel O. Graham might have been expected to be favourable to Harris’s proposals. In fact, while sympathetic, he concluded they were unrealistic (Harris, 1982, p.189). Former CIA officer Theodore Shackley gave a similar verdict, arguing instead for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the CIA (Harris, 1982, p.191).

Like much of the Consortium’s previous output, Clandestine Collection gave some scope to exploring opposing views within the intelligence community, but nevertheless reflected a dominant perspective, one which was suspicious of attempts to use intelligence to monitor détente and instead saw its true value in its contribution to political warfare.

The 1982 Colloquium on Domestic Intelligence

With the CSI’s original program of looking at the four main intelligence disciplines now complete, later meetings turned to related issues. The sixth colloquium on 29-30 October 1982 focused on domestic intelligence (Godson, 1986b, p.269). Public controversy over this issue had contributed to the exposure of the relationship between the CIA and the American labour movement in the 1960s and 1970s, and this background was reflected in some of contributions. Four delegates linked to the AFL-CIO were among the attendees: Eugenia Kemble of the American Federation of Teachers and her husband Penn Kemble, and David Jessup and Richard Wilson of the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (Godson, 1986b, pp.273-279).

Roy Godson’s introduction underlined the domestic implications of the Cold War. “Waging a complex worldwide struggle with a military and ideological superpower and its allies sometimes sets different elements of country’s complex society at odds with one another” he argued (Godson, 1986b, p.1). He nevertheless saw a broad consensus over US domestic security intelligence arrangements from the 1940s, which had broken down in the 1970s (Godson, 1986b, pp.6-7).

A contribution from Professor Allen Weinstein defended the record of liberal anti-communists during this period (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.16). Organisations such as Americans for Democratic Action had, he suggested, been instrumental in reining in the excesses of McCarthyism (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.20). He nevertheless accepted
that the liberal ‘vital center’ of the 1950s was not ‘immune to some of the conspiratorial fantasies then prevalent on the political right (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.21).

A counterpart essay by Angelo Codevilla sought to put a liberal spin on the issue of domestic security with an attack on American corporations doing business with the Soviet Union (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.34). He went on to cite AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland’s call for government and business to recognise the necessity for economic warfare against the Soviet Union (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.35). In what might have been another anti-détente barb, Codevilla contrasted the prosecution of former CIA officers who wrote about their work with more favourable treatment given to the memoirs of CIA director Bill Colby (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.41).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Codevilla’s essay was his discussion of foreign ‘agents-of-influence’, which provided a useful definition of this intelligence term of art. On the one hand, he argued that ‘the agent-of-influence who is paid by a foreign government to exercise influence in his own society is an exception’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.44). On the other, he dismissed as a totalitarian concept the idea of ‘objective enemies’ whose interests merely happened to coincide with those of a foreign power (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.44). ‘Often’, he suggested ‘agents-of-influence are more or less secret allies of foreign powers rather than covertly recruited agents in foreign camps’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.44). For this reason, Codevilla criticised the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, with its emphasis on foreign control as measured by payment, for failing to address the possibility that ‘political agents can be primarily allies, and that the alliance’s effect depends not on whether one party controls the other, but on whether both parties work together for common ends’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.45).

Although this discussion was focused on Soviet agents-of-influence, it could arguably be applied to the liberal anti-communists themselves, to the AFL-CIO relationship with British intelligence in the early 1940s, and to the AFL-CIO’s European allies in the 1950s and 1960s.

The extent to which the Western side of Cold War struggle was also driven by alliances between the state and sympathetic elements in civil society was considered in a response to Weinstein and Codevilla by Penn Kemble. Indeed, Kemble addressed the question of his own position with stark directness:

I started out in a current on the political left, which at times has found itself accused by unthinking people of being subversive. At other times, especially in more recent times, it has been accused of complicity in the military-industrial-imperialist conspiracy. I may perhaps have been called a CIA agent more than most of you. Because my anti-Communism is more strenuous than that of most US intelligence agencies, I am not proud to be accused of being a mere CIA agent (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.60).

He went on to argue, citing the philosopher Sidney Hook, that ‘unless people in various spheres of private life take up the problem of subversion, the Government will be forced to become too involved’ (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.60). For an example of this
philosophy in practice Kemble turned to the labour movement, citing the expulsion of communists from the CIO in the late 1940s (Weinstein and Codevilla, 1986, p.61).

Kemble’s proud anti-communism invites comparison with Hugh Wilford’s description of the 1950s AFL-CIO, ‘entirely confident of their own ability to carry out covert operations, indeed positively jealous of their independence in the field’ (Wilford, 2003, p.99). As a former executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Kemble was a leading figure among those former Shachtmanites who had become close to the AFL-CIO leadership (Isserman, 2000, p.300). His presence at the colloquium underlined that in the 1980s, as in the 1950s, the political heirs of labour anti-communism still held strong views on intelligence matters.

While other contributions to the colloquium largely focused on detailed proposals for domestic intelligence reform, these were perhaps were the most instructive for the purpose of understanding the roots of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. Perhaps the most significant lesson that emerges from the proceedings is the extent to which those involved saw intelligence as a transnational enterprise, in which the struggle against foreign intelligence agencies was inevitably bound up with cleavages between different parts of society at home.

1984 volume on Intelligence and Policy

The last colloquium in the original series sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence took place on 9-10 November 1984 (Godson, 1986a, p.175). This meeting focused on the role of national policy in integrating the various intelligence disciplines discussed at previous meetings (Godson, 1986a, pp.2-3).

In a chapter on Intelligence and the Oval Office, Kenneth deGraffenreid set out a dichotomy of approaches towards intelligence similar to that employed in previous Consortium publications on the various intelligence disciplines. The first of these defined intelligence as information gathered to inform policy, while the second focused instead on intelligence activities as a potential instrument for carrying out policy (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.12). The former ‘traditionalist’ approach was summed up with the statement that ‘the ethic of intelligence is independence from policy’, a quotation from Jimmy Carter’s CIA director Stansfield Turner (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.15). The identification of Sherman Kent as a representative of the traditionalist approach underlined that this was the same division between analytical and activist philosophies of intelligence which ran through much of the Consortium’s work (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.15). In the activist view defended by deGraffenreid ‘there is no such thing as “apolitical” intelligence policy’ (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.17). Based on his reading of the 1947 National Security Act, deGraffenreid argued that intelligence policy was the domain of the President acting through the National Security Council (NSC), to which the Director of the CIA was responsible (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.18). He saw presidential priorities as having shifted from oversight under Carter to effectiveness under Reagan (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.22). He predicted that presidential involvement in intelligence would increase during the late 1980s and 1990s, in part because of an expansion of low-intensity conflict and political warfare (deGraffenreid, 1986, pp.23-25).
Roy Godson noted in his introduction that deGraffenreid’s contribution to the literature of intelligence was unique because, at the time of writing, he was Director of Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council (Godson, 1986a, p.4). His argument for strong presidential leadership of an activist intelligence policy through the NSC was thus a clear indication of his aspirations in that role. In a response to deGraffenreid’s article, Leo Cherne, the chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, mounted a similarly robust defence of his own institutional interests, arguing that PFIAB was the only institution capable of offering the President independent advice on intelligence policy combined with relevant experience (deGraffenreid, 1986, p.33).

Another administration official who contributed to the volume was Mark Schneider, the director of Strategic Arms Control Policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy (Godson, 1986a, p.4). Schneider’s chapter was largely a précis of the neoconservative critique of the 1970s SALT negotiations, blaming national intelligence estimates for shaping decisions that led to a ‘vast change in the military balance’ leaving ‘a major element in the US deterrent vulnerable to attack’ (Schneider, 1986, p.71).

In a chapter on covert action and counterintelligence, Godson and Codevilla argued that while détente was flawed, it was an example of a coherent policy driven from the centre (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.89). The effective use of the active intelligence disciplines was only possible as part of a similarly overarching strategy (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.89).

A contribution on intelligence oversight by Senate Minority Staffer Gary Schmitt also touched on détente, arguing that it had been an attempt to rebuild a containment strategy after the Vietnam War, but in practice had only served to undermine it further (Schmitt, 1986, p.125).

A chapter on intelligence in foreign policy by Richard Pipes, argued for an increased focus on political intelligence on the Soviet Union (Pipes, 1986, p.42). In support of the potential of politically-focused analysis, Pipes offered an anecdote which underlined the extent to which the neoconservative approach to intelligence was a determinedly ideological one:

In 1971, I was asked by the late Sen. Henry M. Jackson to testify on the antiballistic missile question. I knew little about strategic missiles at the time, and even less about ABM. But when Senator Jackson asked whether the Russians would accept the concept of strategic parity, I was able to answer simply from my knowledge of Marxism-Leninism that this was inconceivable (Pipes, 1986, p.43).

He suggested that it was worth emulating the Soviet approach to analysis because ‘as Marxists, that is, sociologists, they look more deeply into American conditions’ (Pipes, 1986, p.44). In a supportive response to Pipes’ paper, Soviet defector Ilya Dzhirkelov argued that ‘the most important group in the Soviet Union, those who really make and conduct policy, is composed of the midlevel officials’ and that this group was relatively accessible to Western diplomats (Pipes, 1986, pp.46-47).
It is tempting to see these recommendations as a case of mirror-imaging given the extent to which the neoconservatives themselves were largely influential at the level of midlevel officials, as the contributors to *Intelligence and Policy* themselves exemplified.

**The CSI Conferences: An Assessment**

By the mid-1980s, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence had arguably fostered the emergence of an epistemic community which met all the criteria described by Peter Haass, in terms of a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992, p.3).

This epistemic community was however distinctive in refusing to base its claim to expertise on an appeal to value-free scientific knowledge, a view which was attributed to the rival school of thought associated with the CIA analyst Sherman Kent. Instead the dominant approach within the Consortium was clearly that identified with Wilmoore Kendall, a school that reflected the legacy of the Cold War alliance between the CIA and the non-communist left in attitude to intelligence as a whole and to each of its subordinate disciplines.

The Consortium’s strong emphasis on covert action looked back to the experience of the AFL’s activities in Western Europe during the Early Cold War. Its approach to counterintelligence was a substantial defence although not always an uncritical one, of the practice of James Angleton, the key CIA sponsor of Jay Lovestone’s agent network for two decades. The role of these two disciplines as an active instrument of policy was emphasised rather than of intelligence collection and analysis as a means of informing policy. The legacy of Team B was reflected in strong support for competing centres of analysis. All four disciplines were seen as requiring integration in a central, activist intelligence policy after the manner of early Cold War leaders such as Eisenhower and Truman.

This philosophy distilled the experience of the non-communist left in the Cold War and of emergent neoconservatism during the struggle over détente. It continued to shape and be shaped by neoconservative praxis in the 1980s.

**The neoconservative approach to intelligence in practice**

The AFL-CIO tradition of covert action continued into the 1980s, notably in response to the crisis in Poland. This episode sparked some tactical differences between the neoconservatives who had moved closer to the Reagan administration, and those right-wing social democrats who retained institutional ties to the labour movement, with the latter believing that short-term concessions to the Polish Government combined with the threat of sanctions could stave off a crackdown (Chenoweth, 2013, p.107).

These differences were reflected in a March 1981 debate between Norman Podhoretz of the Committee for the Free World and Tom Kahn of the League for Industrial Democracy (Chenoweth, 2013, p.117 n.23). Along with Irving Brown, Kahn was a key figure in the AFL-CIO’s overt and covert funding of Solidarity via European trade unions (Chenoweth, 2013, pp.105-106). Solidarity itself was sometimes wary of AFL-CIO money because of the
widespread belief that it ultimately came from the American Government (Misgeld, 2012, p.26). By the mid-1980s, much of the AFL-CIO funding for Solidarity came overtly from the US Congress through the new mechanism provided by the National Endowment for Democracy (Chenoweth, 2013, p.109).

In 1992, Carl Bernstein reported in *Time* magazine that some funds which reached Solidarity in the 1980s had ultimately come from the CIA but that CIA director Robert Casey chose to let the AFL-CIO take the lead (Bernstein, 1992). Former CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman told Bernstein ‘It was organization, and that was an infinitely better way to help them than through classic covert operations’ (cited in Bernstein, 1992). For a period during the early 1980s, the NSC staff member responsible for Eastern Europe was the co-founder of Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Richard Pipes, who told Bernstein: ‘sanctions were coordinated with Special Operations (the CIA division in charge of covert task forces), and the first objective was to keep Solidarity alive by supplying money, communications and equipment’ (cited in Bernstein, 1992). This approach, a throwback to the labour operations of the early Cold War, would certainly have been in line with the kind of covert action recommended in the Consortium’s publications.

Despite its tactical differences with the AFL-CIO, the Committee for the Free World, emerged as a key lobbying organisation for more aggressive forms of anti-communist covert action in the 1980s. It first came to prominence on 6 April 1981 with a statement in the New York Times that attributed the insurgency in El Salvador to Soviet expansionism backed by Cuba and El Salvador (Sanders, 1983, p.304). The signatories list included a strong overlap with organisations of the anti-détente movement: founder members of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence represented included Ray Cline, Roy Godson, and Paul Seabury; figures associated with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority during the 1970s included Arnold Beichman, Penn Kemble, Joshua Muravchik, Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, Ben Wattenberg, Philip Siegelman and Bayard Rustin as well as Godson and Seabury (cited in Diamond, 1995, p.379, n.60). The strong CDM representation suggests that despite the debate over Poland, many of the Committee’s members came from a milieu very close to the AFL-CIO leadership.

Central America would provide the clearest and most decisive example of neoconservative involvement in covert action during the 1980s in the shape of the Iran-Contra affair, a complex episode in which the US used the proceeds of an arms for hostages deal with Iran to fund the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1997, xv).

The problem represented by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was repeatedly canvassed at the colloquia organised by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. At the 1981 meeting on clandestine collection, the former CIA officer Robert Chapman had lamented that some in the agency had considered supporting the Sandinistas (Chapman, 1982, p.61). At the 1984 meeting on intelligence policy Godson and Codevilla had suggested that it was open to the US to support anti-communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.91). In response, former Ambassador Laurence Silberman attacked Congressional restrictions on support for the Contras, arguing that ‘even if one wanted, as a policy matter, to pressure the Sandinista regime in some kind of
pluralistic direction, is it not clear that the last thing one would do is prohibit publicly oneself from overturning the regime?’ (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.108). In fact by the time of this conference in November 1984, efforts to circumvent that prohibition were already underway (Walsh, 1997, p.19). A number of those involved had close links to the Consortium and to the wider neoconservative movement.

In July 1984, with CIA funding cut off under the terms of the Boland Amendment passed by Congress, CIA Director Bill Casey introduced the Contras to Col. Oliver North of the National Security Council, who assumed responsibility for raising money from third-country donors, while reporting back to Casey as well as National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane (Walsh, 1997, p.19).

Casey’s links to the intelligence community went back to the earliest days of its alliance with the non-communist left. His involvement in Iran-Contra was in many ways a return to the free-wheeling covert operations of the Second World War. As an OSS officer in London, he had worked with its labour division, despatching anti-fascist socialists as agents into occupied Europe (Smith, 2005, p.225). He had been a director of the National Strategy Information Center, the parent body of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, in the 1960s (Scott-Smith, 2012, p.190). In the early 1970s, he had served as of President of the International Rescue Committee, an organisation whose links to covert labour operations predated even the OSS (Chester, 1995, p.225). He had also been a member of the Committee on the Present Danger in 1976 (Sanders, 1983, p.156).

The Middle Eastern end of Iran-Contra began in November 1984 when an Iranian intermediary, Manucher Ghorbanifar contacted retired CIA officer Ted Shackley to suggest an arms for hostages deal (Walsh, 1997, p.36). Shackley was a regular participant at the colloquia of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, taking part in the meeting on intelligence policy in the same month he met Ghorbanifar (Godson, 1986a, p.182). Four years earlier at the 1980 meeting on covert action, Shackley’s paper on paramilitary operations had identified threats from Soviet-backed revolutionaries in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, and warned that failure ‘to combat expanding Soviet influence through political warfare, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare’ risked leading to a general nuclear confrontation (Shackley, 1981, p.137).

The Iran-Contra affair began to unravel in November 1986, when a Lebanese newspaper revealed the existence of the arms-for-hostages deal (Walsh, 1997, p.xv). As the investigation developed, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence would find its own coordinator, Roy Godson, embroiled in the controversy. This came as a result of Oliver North’s work with two private fundraisers, Carl R. ‘Spitz’ Channell and Richard R. Miller, to solicit donations from wealthy Americans to a tax-exempt foundation, the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL) (Walsh, 1993). On the basis of FBI interviews with Miller in 1987, the 1993 report of special prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh accused Godson of involvement in these efforts:

On two occasions, Roy Godson of the Heritage Foundation helped solicit funds from private donors. In the fall of 1985, Godson, at North’s direction, informed Miller that an anonymous donor wanted to make a large contribution to the
Catholic church in Nicaragua. Based on a plan agreed to by Godson and Miller, the
donor contributed $100,000 to the Heritage Foundation, which then forwarded the
money to a Miller-Gomez entity known as the Institute for North-South Issues
(INSI) (Walsh, 1993).

In testimony to Congress in 1987, Oliver North acknowledged that he and National Security
Advisor Robert McFarlane had met with Godson in order to seek funding for the Contras,
which he said was non-military (Beamish, 1987). According to Heritage executive vice
president Phil Truluck, Godson recommended in September 1985 that two donations be
awarded to the Institute for North-South Issues (INSI) (Beamish, 1987). The Heritage
Foundation expected this money, from investment consultant John Donahue, and from the
Sarah Scaife Foundation, to go on research on Central America, but requests for a report
had not received a reply, according to Truluck (Beamish, 1987).

Of the second occasion on which Godson was accused of soliciting funds, the Walsh report
stated:

In November 1985, North spoke with another private donor about the needs of the
contras and the Nicaraguan Catholic church. North informed Miller that Godson
had located the donor, who would be making a $60,000 contribution. The money
was deposited directly into the INSI account and then transferred to the Lake
Resources Account in Switzerland (Walsh, 1997).

In March 1987, Godson was accused of presiding over the diversion of funds from the
International Youth Year Commission to the Contras (O’Brien, 1987). This allegation must
be treated with some caution as it came from the head of a rival youth organisation,
William Treanor, of the American Youth Work Center (O’Brien, 1987). According to
Treanor, Godson had been appointed to head the Commission in 1981 by Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Elliott Abrams after a power
struggle (O’Brien, 1987). There was some independent evidence linking the Commission to
the Contras, in the form of a flow chart recovered by Congressional investigators from the
office of Oliver North, which appeared to show the Commission as a conduit for funds to
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main Contra army (O’Brien, 1987).

Given the testimony of North and Miller in particular, it seems clear that Godson had some
involvement with the public/private effort to support the Contras, though in the absence
of a prosecution it cannot be assumed that his actions would have been found to be illegal.

Others involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were found to have broken the law. Elliott
Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane were convicted of withholding evidence from Congress
but later pardoned by George H.W. Bush (Walsh, 1997, p.493). Oliver North was convicted
on three counts related to Iran-Contra which were overturned in a split decision in 1990,
with Laurence Silberman the leading judge in favour of acquittal (Walsh, 1997, p.256).
Special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh had been wary of Silberman’s links to the Reagan
administration, but did not feel he had a basis to seek his recusal until it was too late
(Walsh, 1997, p.250). It is not clear if Walsh was aware of Silberman’s comments at the
1984 CSI colloquium on intelligence and policy, when he attacked the Congressional ban on supports for actions to overthrow the Sandinista regime (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.108).

The 1987 Colloquium on intelligence requirements for the 1990s

The fallout from the Iran-Contra Affair raised profound questions for the neoconservative theory of intelligence, and its emphasis on strong policy support for covert action. Some of these questions would be addressed at the CSI colloquium on intelligence requirements for the 1990s, which took place in Washington on 4-5 December 1987 (Godson, 1989, p. 241).

The conference was heavily overshadowed by the controversy, which had embroiled a number of participants. Two of those who contributed papers had recently left the Government, Robert Gates, who had been acting Director of the CIA in early 1987, and Kenneth deGraffenreid who had been director of intelligence programs at the National Security Council, and was now an intelligence fellow at the NSIC (Godson, 1989, p.267).

In his introduction to the volume that resulted from the conference, Godson warned that Iran-Contra had strengthened bureaucratic resistance to reform of intelligence analysis, because ‘some senior officials, people in the media charged – with relatively little evidence- that the DCI and senior intelligence officials had politicized intelligence and “cooked” analysis to suit their policy initiatives’ (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.9). The affair had led to renewed calls for restraints on covert action, but according to Godson ‘most of the participants in the December 1987 colloquium favoured regularizing covert action in US statecraft’ (Godson, 1989, p.26).

In a contribution on intelligence analysis, Paul Seabury argued that ‘one person’s politicization is another person’s wish to have an institution serving as an arm of a very purposive foreign policy’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.102). He suggested that ‘activist intelligence work’ could be promoted by ‘the appointment to key CIA positions of outsiders whose views correspond to the strategic views of the presidential leadership’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.102). He nevertheless warned that in the wake of ‘Contragate’, ‘those disposed to respond eagerly to tasks of advancing, rather than cautiously protecting, national interests, might need to be brash in risking bureaucratic reputations and careers’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.103).

In a chapter on covert action, Richard Shultz suggested that Iran-Contra would lead to renewed pressure from within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations for such activities to be removed from its area of responsibility (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.196). Former CIA officer Hugh Tovar thought that ‘covert action has even less respectability in the public mind than ever before’, but that future presidents would not be deterred from resorting to it (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.208). He recommended that greater consideration should be given to the use of open alternatives such as the National Endowment for Democracy (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.209). He also called for a ‘period of quiescence’ to renew secrecy about covert action capabilities that had been compromised by disclosures from within the US government (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.210). Iran-Contra had he suggested made the use of private organisations for covert action less attractive, as ‘if the groups in question drift off course, the United States
is left holding the bag for actions undertaken at its behest if not in its name (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.217). In the discussion of Shultz and Tovar’s papers one unnamed government official argued that covert action could not be made consistent with policy because ‘policymakers often continue to use covert action not as a tool of, but as a substitute for policymaking when a consensus for action is not present’ (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.235).

If the tone of conference was somewhat chastened and reflective, contributions such as those of Godson and Seabury underlined that the dominant participants had not altered their fundamental beliefs. Old arguments about the inconsistent support of policymakers for covert action were ready to hand, given the extent to which Iran-Contra scrutiny represented a return to the atmosphere of the 1970s.

**The neoconservatives eclipsed**

Iran-Contra was however only one aspect of a conjuncture which was turning against the neoconservatives. The view that the Soviet Union remained an expansionist power, expressed in magazines like Norman Podhoretz’s *Commentary* seemed increasingly out of touch with Gorbachev’s reforms although other neoconservatives around Irving Kristol’s *National Interest* were quicker to see that Soviet weakness in the late 1980s would lead to fundamental change (Ehrman, 1995, pp.177-78). Over the course of 1987, a number of neoconservative officials aligned with the former view, including Richard Perle and Frank Gaffney at the Department of Defense, and Kenneth Adelman at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, left the Government as Reagan moved towards agreeing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union (Garthoff, 2000, p.325).

As Justin Vaisse has recognised in his *Neoconservatism: The Biography of A Movement*, an evaluation of the neoconservative role in the end of the Cold War is a key issue for any assessment of the movement as a whole (Vaïsse, 2010, pp.188-189). Vaisse argues that it was actually Reagan’s steady shift away from neoconservatism, decisively so by 1987, that enabled him to respond to changes in the Soviet Union in a way that brought about the end of the Cold War (Vaïsse, 2010, p.197). Like John Ehrman, Vaisse identifies ‘a lack of conceptual innovation’ amongst *Commentary* writers like Podhoretz, Richard Pipes, Edward Luttwak, Walter Laqueur, Angelo Codevilla and Patrick Glynn, which rendered them unable to assimilate the new international situation (Vaïsse, 2010, p.197).

Although Vaisse does not specifically address the role of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, most of these writers took part in its colloquia and Codevilla and Pipes in particular played central roles. The evidence of the Consortium’s deliberations largely supports the thesis that the neoconservatives were increasingly out of touch with developments in the Eastern Bloc.

An important exception perhaps was Poland where Richard Pipes had been a key administration supporter of the AFL-CIO’s backing for Solidarity in the early 1980s (Bernstein, 1992). In 1984, Pipes claimed at the Colloquium on Intelligence and Policy that it had been possible to predict that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland because of
the language which was used to refer to the Polish Government in open Soviet sources (Pipes, 1986, p.43). This was perhaps a genuine example of what Pipes called at a previous colloquium ‘fingerspitzengefühl, the feeling “on the tips of your fingers” for a given culture’ (Colby and Pipes, 1980, p.177). Even in the Polish case, other neoconservatives such as Norman Podhoretz, had assumed that Solidarity would be crushed by the Soviets (Chenoweth, 2013, p.117, n.23).

The more general pattern was for the Consortium’s writers to impose Manichean Cold War assumptions on evidence that might have pointed in another direction, even where they acknowledged it. It was in this spirit that Roy Godson wrote in 1981 that ‘Since the Russian Revolution, Westerners have foretold of the Soviet Union’s economic collapse’ (Godson, 1982a, p.20). Even as he rehearsed the Soviet Union’s economic weaknesses, he argued that ‘the economic system in particular is designed for Party purposes and not primarily to produce and distribute goods. Given its purposes, the Soviet economic system has worked quite well’ (Godson, 1982a, p.20).

A similar dichotomy was evident in the contribution of Soviet defector Ilya Dzhirkelov to the 1984 Colloquium on Intelligence and Policy. He acknowledged that many middle-ranking Soviet officials were attracted to the West, but insisted that Western reports of differences within the Politburo were false (Pipes, 1986, p.48).

It is impossible to say that there are two groups—one aggressive, one passive. Even if Gorbachev is Chernenko’s successor, he will not change the basic policy of the Soviet Union. Chernenko and Gorbachev are the same kind of human being. The same kind of communist (Pipes, 1986, p.48).


The thesis that the KGB was behind the shooting of John Paul II had been widely promoted in the early 1980s by a number of scholars, notably in a 1984 report by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (GCSIS) (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, p.245). Members of the working group responsible included Ray Cline of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence along with other veterans of the CIA and the Committee on the Present Danger (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, p.247). Some analysts have suggested this accusation was deliberate disinformation, and therefore itself an example for covert action (Herman and Brodhead, 1986, p.246). For Seabury, however, Woodward’s refutation was a reflection of the mindset of his CIA sources. He quoted Edward J. Epstein’s review of *Veil* which concluded that the agency ‘no longer sees the Soviets as a potential enemy’ (Cohen and Seabury, 1989, p.104).

Strikingly, the opening day of this colloquium coincided with a TV interview in which Ronald Reagan charged that ‘some of the people who are objecting the most and just refusing even to accede to the idea of ever getting any understanding, whether they realize
it or not, those people, basically, down in their deepest thoughts, have accepted that war is inevitable’ (cited in Vaisse, 2010, p.196).

The proposition that a genuine understanding with the Soviet leadership was possible, that the Soviets might not necessarily be an enemy, was a difficult one for neoconservatives to consider. In part this arguably reflected an error of which the neoconservatives often accused others. They saw the Soviets as like themselves, highly ideological cold warriors, committed to strategic covert action.

In part it reflected the fundamental assumptions of a neoconservative theory of intelligence that was at bottom a theory of political warfare. Soviet caution in Poland, Soviet economic weakness, or the disillusionment of Soviet cadres, did not represent a fundamental challenge to this world-view. The possibility of an accommodation with the Soviet leadership did. The former considerations could all be factored into an agonistic theory of intelligence. The latter one implied that there was no fundamental conflict.

The political warfare coalition in the 1980s

The link between praxis of political warfare and theory of intelligence underlines the limitations of seeing neoconservative influence on the Reagan Administration too narrowly in terms of democracy promotion.

Justin Vaisse has argued that while the Reagan administration pursued a range of strategies to limit Soviet power, from arming guerrillas in Afghanistan to manipulation of oil prices, ‘all these measures might have been approved by any hawk, but another aspect of Reagan’s foreign policy was without doubt to specific neoconservative influence, namely his support for democratic forces around the world’ (Vaisse, 2010, p.191). This meant primarily support for the work of institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy, whose priorities were based on Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s thesis that Soviet totalitarianism, not the authoritarianism of US some allies, was the real challenge to democracy (Vaisse, 2010, pp.191-192).

Vaisse’s argument is correct in identifying political intervention abroad as a key neoconservative specialty within wider American grand strategy. However, the counterfactual could be misleading if it is taken to suggest that democracy promotion could be abstracted from the wider strategy of contesting Soviet power, or that neoconservative influence could be abstracted from those of their wider alliances.

To address Vaisse’s counterfactual directly, any hawk intent on developing an anti-Soviet strategy would have had to consider the range of strategies employed in previous phases of the Cold War, with political intervention abroad among them, and considered the merits of consulting those with experience in such operations, such as former intelligence officers and their allies in civil society organisations operating abroad, the group that we have called the political warfare coalition. Indeed, this is arguably part of what happened in the integration of the neoconservatives into the wider anti-détente movement during the 1970s.
The deliberations of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence underlined the extent to which democracy promotion was intertwined with other strategies. In the 1980s, professional CIA covert action officers were strong advocates of the creation of state-sponsored organisations for overt political intervention (Purcell, 1981, p.225). They also continued to stress the extent to which covert action required the cooperation of experienced political experts, a skillset that had historically been provided by the Cold War liberal precursors of neoconservatism (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.221). Conversely, neoconservatives like Roy Godson and Angelo Codevilla remained among the most forceful advocates of the full range of covert action, from propaganda to paramilitary action, even after the creation of open instruments like the National Endowment for Democracy (Godson and Codevilla, 1986, p.90).

The neoconservative theory of intelligence provided the unifying paradigm within which covert and overt activity were seen as part of a single strategic enterprise. Understanding that theory enables us to see more clearly the connections between various phenomena identified by Vaisse, in particular between the neoconservative emphasis on democracy promotion, and their ‘lack of conceptual innovation’ in the late 1980s (Vaisse, 2010, p.197). Neoconservative support for political intervention abroad was of a piece with their emphasis on the active intelligence disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence, at the expense of analysis which was to be subordinated to policy, rendering it unable to challenge the agonistic hard-core assumptions of the theory.

In the 1980s, the elaboration of a neoconservative theory of intelligence assisted the political warfare coalition in regaining some of the influence that had been lost in the 1960s and 1970s, but its inadequacy to the events of the late 1980s contributed to the loss of much of that influence by the end of that decade.
Chapter Eight: Neoconservatism from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terror

Chapter Eight will look at the renewed bid for epistemic authority by writers from within the political warfare coalition in the 1990s, which gave further elaboration to a distinctive neoconservative theory of intelligence. This theory received practical application once again in the campaign for war with Iraq following their return to influence in the George W. Bush administration.

The American labour movement after the Cold War

By the 1990s, the ties that linked the neoconservatives to the labour movement powerbase of their Cold War predecessors had begun to atrophy. Key activists of the previous generation had left the stage. Irving Brown died on February 1989, some months after he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom (Rathbun, 1996, p.377). Jay Lovestone died a year later, on 7 March 1990 (Morgan, 1999, p.369).

By the time that Lane Kirkland stepped down as President of the AFL-CIO in 1995, the federation’s leadership was coming under grassroots pressure to devote more time to domestic organising rather than to state-supported international programmes (Buhle, 1999, p.246). The defeat of Kirkland’s chosen successor by John Sweeney’s New Voices slate showed that the weakened position of organised labour in the 1990s had created the conditions for a modest reformist challenge to conservative labour leaders (Buhle, 1999, p.249).

The Social Democrats USA remained active in the 1990s. Their leading figure Penn Kemble, served as deputy director and later acting director of the US Information Agency in the Clinton administration, before moving to the New Economy Information Service where he sought to build links between organized labour and the Democratic Party on a basis inspired by New Labour in Britain (Democracy Digest, 2005).

Despite the weakening of their historic relationship with the labour bureaucracy, links to Atlanticist social democrats, would remain a source of strength for neoconservatives. Nevertheless, neoconservatism was now firmly part of the wider conservative movement. This would be reflected in neoconservative writings on intelligence in the 1990s, which would begin to appeal to the ideas of the conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss (Schmitt, 1999).

The neoconservative literature of intelligence in the 1990s

Silent Warfare

The early 1990s witnessed the production of the most succinct account of the neoconservative theory of intelligence up to that point in the form of the primer *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*. The book’s authors Abram Shulsky and
Gary Schmitt had followed a classic neoconservative career path, serving as aides to Democratic Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan before moving into the Reagan administration in the 1980s (Remnick, 1986). In the early 1980s, as minority (Democratic) staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Shulsky had been a keen advocate of covert action at the colloquia of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Godson, 1981, p.8). Schmitt had served as Shulsky’s successor at the Senate Intelligence Committee and as Executive Director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.247).

Shulsky published the first edition of *Silent Warfare* in 1991, drawing on the course on intelligence which he taught at the John M. Olin Center for the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.vii). At that time, he was a fellow of the National Strategy Information Center (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.247). A revised edition was produced in 1993 by Gary Schmitt, partly in order to reflect developments since the demise of the Soviet Union (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.vii). A second revision which appeared in 2002, was by the authors’ own admission too early to respond to the effect of the 9/11 attacks on its subject matter (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.ix). Silent Warfare is therefore primarily a document of the period between the Cold War and the War on Terror.

The structure of *Silent Warfare* summarised much of the neoconservative theory of intelligence of the preceding decade, examining each of the four intelligence disciplines in turn, before considering the role of intelligence policy and positing two rival views of intelligence (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.v-vi). These two views largely coincided with the Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall schools previously identified by Roy Godson (Godson, 1980a, p.1-2). Shulsky and Schmitt saw the Sherman Kent school as a distinctively ‘American view’, rooted in the emergence of large analytical branches consisting of trained social scientists in the wartime Office of Strategic Services, and its successor, the CIA (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.161). Two Directors of Central Intelligence during the 1970s, William Colby and Stansfield, were identified as adherents of this view (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.167). An emphasis on technical intelligence and a denigration of counterintelligence were seen as characteristic. In contrast, for the rival perspective that Shulsky and Schmitt identify as the ‘traditional view’, counterintelligence is fundamental.

For the “traditional” view on the other hand, the fact that an adversary is trying to keep vital information secret is the very essence of the matter; if an adversary were not trying to hide his intentions, there would be no need for complicated analyses of the situation in the first place (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.166).

This formulation is striking in its implication that without enemy denial and deception, the problem of collection and analysis, of understanding the world, is a trivial one. This implication is repeated in the conclusion of the book, which closes by questioning the CIA motto, St Paul’s dictum that ‘Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free’:

But intelligence can never forget that the attainment of the truth involves a struggle with a human enemy who is fighting back—or that truth is not the goal, but only a means towards victory (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002, 176).
This was arguably the most concise formulation yet of the neoconservative theory of intelligence, and of the principles underlying its emphasis on the subordination of intelligence to policy, and on the subordination of the information-gathering disciplines of intelligence collection and analysis to the active disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence.

Given the Old Left heritage of the neoconservatives it is perhaps justified to see in this formulation an echo of Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.’ Shulsky and Schmitt’s formulation clearly shares Marx’s prioritisation of action over contemplation. There is nevertheless a crucial difference in the object of concern. It is the world that Marx is trying to change. It is the enemy that Shulsky and Schmitt are seeking victory over. In Shulsky and Schmitt’s view of intelligence, understanding the intentions of the enemy is the key problem that makes ‘complicated analyses’ necessary in understanding the world. For Shulsky and Schmitt ‘the concept of a struggle with nature is only a metaphor. In fact, nature, although sometimes complicated and difficult to understand, is indifferent to human efforts and not purposefully acting to obstruct them’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.172). They are correspondingly sceptical about Sherman Kent’s aspiration to use social science to infer future intentions which the enemy themselves have not yet decided (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.174). Whereas the tendency of Kent’s approach is materialistic, that of Shulsky and Schmitt is idealistic.

The practical implications of this philosophical division are reflected in the different preoccupations that Shulsky and Schmitt attribute to William Colby and James Angleton. Colby complained that Angleton ‘seemed to be putting more emphasis on the KGB as the CIA’s adversary than on the Soviet Union as the United States’ adversary’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.175). For Colby the priority was to understand the Soviets through understanding their place in the world. For Angleton it was understanding their intentions by seeing through their attempts to deceive and manipulate the US. Defending the latter procedure, Schmitt and Shulsky argue that an intelligence service that ignores its adversary ‘runs the risk of being deceived and of trying to misinterpret the world it is trying to understand’ (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.176).

Schmitt and Shulsky do acknowledge that dangers associated with the Angletonian view of intelligence, of ‘a wilderness of mirrors’ in which doubts about deception bring all progress to a halt (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.175). This had in fact happened in the 1960s, when Angleton’s counterintelligence investigations paralysed the work of the CIA’s Soviet Division, based on the deception theories of Soviet defector Anatoly Golitsyn (Wise, 1992, p.231).

For Shulsky and Schmitt, intelligence is ‘caught in a dilemma that reflects its dual nature’ between seeking the truth on the one hand, and struggle to manipulate and avoid manipulation on the other (Shulsky and Schmitt, 2002, p.176). However, in insisting, against Sherman Kent, on clandestinity as the fundamental distinction between social science and intelligence, they nevertheless lean towards the Angletonian approach. This
emphasis, common to most of the neoconservative scholars of intelligence, arguably led them into mistakes similar to those made by Angleton.

In the early 1960s, Angleton had been convinced that the Sino-Soviet split had been a fake, despite the impractical nature of such a deception. There were clear parallels with the response of some neoconservative theorists of intelligence to developments in the Soviet Union. At the 1987 colloquium of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Richard Shultz noted that sceptics viewed glasnost and perestroika as the ‘latest phase of a deception and active measures tradition that date back to the early days of the Bolshevik regime’. Shultz himself took a middle course, by arguing that Glasnost might nevertheless create expectations the Soviet leadership could not control (Shultz Jr., 1989, p.177). It is nevertheless clear that the idealist cast of the neoconservative theory of intelligence affected neoconservative analyses of the Soviet Union. Roy Godson’s argument that the weaknesses of the Soviet economy should be interpreted primarily in terms of the purposes the economy served for the regime, is an example of this (Godson, 1982a, p.20).

**Leo Strauss and the neoconservative theory of intelligence**

Understanding the idealist dimension to the neoconservative theory of intelligence most clearly expressed in *Silent Warfare* may enable us to address an issue that has bedevilled the historiography of neoconservatism: the question of the influence of German philosopher Leo Strauss on the tradition.

Shadia Drury has argued that ‘neoconservatism is the legacy of Leo Strauss’, a political perspective that echoes all the main features of his thought, including notably a ‘friend/foe mentality’ (Drury, 1997, p.178). She identifies a Straussian tradition among neoconservatives that includes Strauss’s students and their students in turn, embracing key figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, and William Kristol (Drury, 1997, p.3). A similar interpretation has been presented by Anne Norton, herself a student of Strauss’s student, Joseph Cropsey (Norton, 2004, p.ix). Norton, however, emphasises that the views of the political Straussians are distinct from and sometimes in conflict with those of Strauss himself (Norton, 2004, p.216).

The most prominent accounts of the history of neoconservatism are guarded on the significance of Strauss’s legacy. For Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘while Strauss has been wrongly used to tar the neoconservative movement as deceptive and dishonest, his influence on the movement is clear’ (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.90). This influence is, however is said to be restricted to a wing of the movement Heilbrunn identifies with Irving and William Kristol, while another wing associated with Norman Podhoretz is seen as uninterested in Straussian ideas (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.108). Justin Vaïsse argues that ‘for a small number of neoconservatives, Strauss was a meaningful influence, but not more important than others’ (Vaïsse, 2010, p.271).

The world of intelligence provides some of the most significant evidence of Straussian influence on neoconservatism. In their 1999 essay *Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence*, Shulsky and Schmitt argue that Strauss’s critique of the scientific approach to
the study of politics could be applied to Sherman Kent’s scientific approach to intelligence (Schmitt, 1999).

They also suggest an application for Strauss’s doctrine of ‘esoteric writing’, which held that most pre-modern authors had sought to conceal part of the meaning of their texts from some readers (Schmitt, 1999). Straussian political theory was therefore seen as potential counterweight to the neglect of deception as an aspect of intelligence by thinkers such as Sherman Kent (Schmitt, 1999).

Strauss’s view certainly alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely linked to deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope, to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the exception (Schmitt, 1999).

With these arguments, Shulsky and Schmitt gave a Straussian cast to ideas about intelligence that had been defended by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence for two decades. It is worth noting, however, that Roy Godson regarded a 1949 Wilmoore Kendall article as the earliest statement of the intelligence philosophy that animated the Consortium (Godson, 1980a. p.2). Kendall was one first thinkers to apply Straussian ideas to American politics (Drury, 1997, p.130). He was also a former Trotskyist, whose experiences during the Spanish Civil War led him to develop a strong anti-communism which would inform his work on psychological warfare for the US Army (Regnery, 2008, p.257).

Kendall’s philosophical journey from Marxism to Straussianism could perhaps be interpreted as one example of a wider phenomenon in the break-up of the Marxist left of the early Twentieth Century, one described by Perry Anderson in relation to the development of Western Marxism in Europe.

After 1920, according to Anderson, the development of Western European Marxism was shaped by the continuing dynamism of capitalism and the intellectual ossification of official Soviet communism, so that ‘In the absence of the magnetic pole of a revolutionary class movement, the needle of the whole tradition tended to swing increasingly away towards contemporary bourgeois culture’ (Anderson, 1979, p.55). Evidence for this was provided by the increasingly esoteric character of Western Marxist prose, ‘the sign of its divorce from any popular practice’ (Anderson, 1979, p.54). As a result of this situation ‘The most striking single trait of Western Marxism as a common tradition is thus perhaps the constant presence and influence on it of successive types of European idealism’ (Anderson, 1979, p.56).

The pressures that Anderson identifies applied a fortiori to the Old Left in the United States, the precursor of Cold War liberalism and neoconservatism. From this perspective Straussianism is perhaps less the source of neoconservative political practice than an index of its development beyond the theoretical resources of the Old Left and the Labour movement. In the case of Shulsky and Schmitt, the appeal to idealism in the form of Strauss, provided a theoretical grounding for an emphasis on intentions rather than capabilities. This stance had long characterised the intelligence approach of Team B and
the Consortium for the Study of intelligence, and arguably served to insulate neoconservative intelligence analyses from empirical refutation.

Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards
If the writings of Shulsky and Schmitt provided a new philosophical basis for the neoconservative theory of intelligence in the 1990s, the continuing work of Roy Godson illustrated the theory’s deep roots in intelligence practice. Along with Silent Warfare, Godson’s 1995 volume Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence, updated in 2001, is the major systematic statement of the neoconservative theory of intelligence (Godson, 2001).

Godson was well-placed for this task as the son of Joseph Godson, the former labour diplomat (The Times 1986). As an attaché in London in the 1950s, the elder Godson had been part of Lovestone’s international intelligence network at a time when its chief was reporting to Angleton (Wilford, 2003 p. 182). In the 1970s, the younger Godson had defended (and minimised) the American Federation of Labor’s relationship with the CIA, interviewing most of the key leaders of the Free Trade Union Committee in the process (Godson, 1975). He had been heavily involved in the struggles over détente as a member of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (Sanders, 1983, p.212), and as co-ordinator of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, he had presided over the development of the epistemic community that had created the neoconservative theory of intelligence (Godson, 1979). In the 1980s, he had become embroiled in the Iran-Contra affair as the Reagan administration’s attempt to revive covert action turned sour in America (Walsh, 1993).

The legacies of Lovestoneite covert action and Angletonian counterintelligence were both reflected in Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards. Godson’s central argument was that the United States was potentially at a disadvantage because these two active disciplines were ‘neglected elements’ of the American approach to intelligence (Godson, 2001, p.9). In making the case for their value as instruments of American foreign policy, he drew repeatedly on examples drawn from the Lovestoneite tradition.

American assistance to post-war Western Europe was cited as a prime example of success ‘in the halcyon days of US covert action’ when operations were backed by strong leadership and coordination (Godson, 2001, p.42). Godson attributed this in part to the Office of Policy Coordination’s recruitment of liberal case officers with sufficient knowledge of Marxism to recruit anti-communist agents from a variety of backgrounds on the left (Godson, 2001, p.42). He also highlighted the pre-war European activities of the American Federation of Labor and the ILGWU, as well as their cooperation with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War Two (Godson, 2001, p.42).

The activities of British Security Coordination (BSC) furnished Godson with another example of successful covert action (Godson, 2001, p.23). He noted that the British infiltrated the isolationist lobby, created their own front groups, and ‘worked closely with other major nongovernmental groups like the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and ethnic fraternal organisations’ (Godson, 2001, p.24). The intelligence advice given to President Roosevelt by BSC chief Sir William Stephenson provided an instance of another

141
form of covert influence (Godson, 2001, p.136). This included an important role in promoting both the creation of a new American intelligence service, which eventually became the OSS, and identifying William Donovan as the man to lead it (Godson, 2001, p.178).

Godson also turned to Lovestoneite history to demonstrate the advantages of coordination between covert action and counterintelligence. Jay Lovestone’s use of Ben Mandel’s analysis of the writings of French Communist Party, originally carried out for the State Department in 1945, was presented as a valuable example of the creative use of open sources (Godson, 2001, p.205).

In examining the history of counterintelligence, Godson sought to weigh the arguments of both sides in the dispute that had raged both inside and outside the CIA about the effectiveness of James Angleton’s methods. He noted that Angleton’s supporters within the CIA had written relatively little, with the exception of the former chief of operations of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Newton Miler, in his contributions to the literature of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Godson, 2001, p.286).

Godson’s judgement that ‘while far from ideal, the counterintelligence system was able to protect the CIA itself, if not all its operations, from serious penetration,’ was ultimately favourable to Angleton (Godson, 2001, p.94). While recognizing Angleton’s idiosyncrasies, Godson attributed such failures as there were to disinterest in counterintelligence amongst the CIA’s covert action operators. He regarded Angleton’s approach as a serious, if ambitious, attempt to recreate the wartime successes of the OSS X-2 counterintelligence branch, which were based largely on British exploitation of double-agents and decryption of German communications, advantages the CIA did not enjoy (Godson, 2001, p.91). One intriguing element of Angleton’s efforts was an attempt to recruit members of non-ruling communist parties around the world as a channel for influencing Soviet intelligence (Godson, 2001, p.87).

These efforts at creating an apparatus of offensive counterintelligence faced dramatic setbacks when US Government policy shifted in the 1970s (Godson, 2001, p.100). Godson’s account of the impact of détente is instructive:

> With this new policy, the political leadership sent a signal, intentional or not, to American intelligence managers: counterintelligence concerns were no longer the priority they had been during the height of the cold war. Furthermore, the actions intelligence and counterintelligence managers had taken for over ten years in response to White House requests to monitor and disrupt political groups were now repudiated by the nation’s political leadership (Godson, 2001, p.100).

This comment perhaps helps to illuminate why many of those involved with US covert action and counterintelligence were drawn into the anti-détente movement. The sense of betrayal which Godson evokes here underlines that *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards* is a document of a living tradition, a political warfare coalition that for fifty years had brought together US intelligence officers and their allies in civil society together in organised political intervention around the world.
The influence of this heritage, and particularly of the Lovestoneite tradition, emerges strongly from Godson’s positive recommendations. In setting out the principles of successful covert action, he argued ‘there is no need to control foreign assets – whether politicians or activists – as bureaucracies rooted in the Anglo-American tradition, favouring precision and efficiency, are tempted to do’ (Godson, 2001, p.127). Instead, he stressed the need for covert action operatives to be able to work independently, without precise instructions from the top, although he warned that ‘this kind of creativity, the ability to judge on the spot, to improvise, to act on that intangible blend of knowledge, conviction, and instinct, is not the stuff of modern, bureaucratic, organizational doctrine in authoritarian or democratic regimes’ (Godson 2001, 124).

This distrust of bureaucratic managers was also a recurring theme, reflected in Godson’s analysis of the 1970s, when ‘bureaucratic pressures within the agency, combined with the breakup of the foreign policy consensus and new CIA leadership, led to important changes in the relative power and relationships of its components’ strengthening the practitioners of analysis and technical collection at the expense of covert action counterintelligence (Godson, 2001, p.244). Godson did not go into the nature of the response by the supporters of covert action and counterintelligence in the late 1970s. He did argue that efforts were made to revive covert action and counterintelligence in the 1980s, but suggested that these had not got very far (Godson, 2001, p.245). The Iran-contra episode was put down to a lack of clear policy leadership (Godson, 2001, p.120).

Although Godson’s defence of covert action and counterintelligence wove together examples drawn from the history of the AFL with many others drawn from different places and times, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards ultimately emerges as the foremost defence of the Lovestoneite tradition of covert action. His repeated invocation of a dichotomy between the autonomous creative covert actor and the hidebound career bureaucrat strongly recalls many actual confrontations in Lovestoneite history, such as those between the AFL leadership and an expanding CIA in the early 1950s, and perhaps even that between the American Communist leadership and a Stalinizing Comintern in the late 1920s.

The Working Group on Intelligence Reform

If Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards was testimony to the neoconservative belief that intelligence reform had stalled in the 1980s, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence did not give up in the face of the setbacks at the end of that decade. In 1992, the Consortium established the Working Group on Intelligence Reform in an attempt to shift the terms of the post-Cold War debate about intelligence (Godson, 1995, p.vii). Chaired by Roy Godson and Ernest May of Harvard University, with the assistance of Gary Schmitt, the Working Group was intended to provide an open forum for intelligence officials and scholars (Godson, 1995, p.vii). A number of the papers presented were published in 1995 as US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas For Reform (Godson, 1995). While many of these papers reiterated positions long associated with the Consortium, several pointed to concerns that would shape the neoconservative theory of intelligence in the 21st Century.

An April 1992 paper by Abram Shulsky noted Iraq’s success in concealing its nuclear programme before the 1991 Gulf War, which he attributed to good Iraqi
counterintelligence (Shulsky, 1995b, p.21). However, that programme’s reliance on imports meant that much information could have been available in the West if the right mechanism had existed, a mechanism which Shulsky suggested ‘must be as sophisticated as the one now used for the more traditional types of intelligence information’ (Shulsky, 1995b, p.21). However, Shulsky resisted the inference that because this information might be considered intelligence, it should best be analysed by an intelligence organisation, still less a single, centralised one like the CIA (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22). Instead, he argued that existence of a multiplicity of analytical organisations enabled the intelligence community to exploit a broader range of knowledge (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22).

Within the government are many specialized staffs of various sorts – policy planning staffs, specialised analytical units in law enforcement agencies, the Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defence and so forth. These organizations deal with classified information if necessary, but they are not normally regarded as intelligence organisations (Shulsky, 1995b, p.22).

Shulsky’s suspicion of centralized intelligence perhaps reflected his awareness of what he called ‘the “aura” of intelligence within the policy world’, which he suggested often gave a spurious authority to the judgements of analysts (Shulsky, 1995b, p.27).

Why fight it out on policy grounds if one can win by manipulating the intelligence product and arrogating its aura for one’s position? Yet this is the temptation one creates when one extends the sphere of intelligence to include virtually all policy-relevant information and its analysis (Shulsky, 1995b, p.27).

Shulsky returned to the same themes in another essay co-authored with Gary Schmitt and originally published in the Winter 1994/95 edition of The National Interest (Shulsky, 1995a). Iraq’s nuclear programme was once again cited, this time to show the effectiveness of denial and deception measures against modern means of technical collection, such as satellites, that had been relied on in the Cold War (Shulsky, 1995a, p.49).

There was a renewed attack on centralised intelligence, together with a call for more competitive analysis to bring to bear the perspectives of policymakers in the Departments of State and Defense (Shulsky, 1995a, p.51). Shulsky and Schmitt acknowledged that some of the impetus for centralization came from the particular biases attributed to various parts of the government, notably in the case of the Department of Defense, an incentive to exaggerate Soviet military expenditure and capabilities (Shulsky, 1995a, p.52). In response, they argued that the CIA had acquired its own incentives to defend its position as a corrective to other agencies, and its institutional role in the verification of arms control agreements (Shulsky, 1995a, p.52).

With these comments, Shulsky and Schmitt shed an interesting light on the bureaucratic rivalries that had been apparent in the struggle over détente. They also perhaps underline why policymakers at the Department of Defense might wish to challenge the CIA’s monopoly on the ‘aura of intelligence’. Shulsky and Schmitt’s positive recommendations were strongly favourable to the Pentagon. They called for an expansion of human
intelligence collection at the Department of Defence, while suggesting that the CIA’s human intelligence capability should be separated from the agency (Shulsky, 1995a, p.59).

In February 1994, the CIA official responsible for analysis, Deputy Director for Intelligence Doug MacEachin, delivered a paper to the Working Group that suggested the agency was taking on board some of the group’s concerns. The Directorate of Intelligence was being reformed to make the needs of policymakers ‘the driving factor in intelligence production’ (MacEachin, 1995, p.63). It would be down to the integrity of individual analysts and their supervisors to ensure the changed relationship did not lead to politicization of intelligence analysis (MacEachin, 1995, p.74)

This development was welcomed in a response by Paul Wolfowitz, then the Dean of the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (MacEachin, 1995, p.75). ‘Perhaps this is revealing a certain arrogance on my part, but I frequently think I am capable of coming up with an informed opinion about a matter as any number of people within the intelligence community who feel they have been uniquely anointed with this responsibility’, Wolfowitz stated (MacEachin, 1995, p.76). In an echo of Shulsky’s ‘aura of intelligence’ argument, he suggested that intelligence analysts claimed an authority that was largely spurious.

I think it actually encourages the manipulation of intelligence judgements for political policy purposes. If you can get the authority of the Intelligence Community on your side, you can appeal to authority without having to bother appealing to the evidence (MacEachin, 1995, p.76).

In another response to MacEachin, Abram Shulsky described politicization as ‘a very much overstated issue’ and argued that ‘as Paul Wolfowitz pointed out, politicization can also occur when intelligence and policy are kept quite separate’ (MacEachin, 1995, p.84).

Perhaps the crudest application of the neoconservative theory of analysis came in a December 1993 paper by Robert Kohler of defence form TRW which attacked what Kohler said were disproportionate budget cuts to the defence industrial base sustaining the intelligence community (Kohler, 1995, p.97). To address this, Kohler proposed a new Team B panel of non-governmental experts to review the defence budget (Kohler, 1995, p.108).

Analysis was not, however, the only focus of the Working Group. A September 1993 paper by the former executive director of CIA counterintelligence William Hood, accompanied by responses from former FBI officer James Nolan and former CIA covert action officer Samuel Halpern offered a strong defence of James Angleton’s legacy (Hood, 1995). Hood emphasised the formative nature of Angleton’s time in X-2, the heavily compartmentalised counterintelligence wing of OSS, which was entrusted with Britain’s most secret intelligence (Hood, 1995, p.129). He also emphasized the significance of Angleton’s relationship with Israel, contradicting authors who had dismissed it as extraneous (Hood, 1995, p.134-135). Hood was backed up on this point by Halpern, who also rejected suggestions that Angleton had been manipulated by the Israelis and argued that he had in fact produced valuable intelligence on the country (Hood, 1995, p.144). He also argued
that any involvement by Angleton in funding Israeli operations in Africa would have been approved by higher authority (Hood, 1995, p.144).

These accounts perhaps support the suggestion that the neoconservatism cannot be seen simply as an extension of the Israel lobby as is sometimes suggested, any more than the labour interventionists of the 1940s were simply a pro-British lobby. Instead, neoconservative support for Israel should be interpreted at least in part in the light of the transnational alliances of the wider political warfare coalition of which the movement was a part. Hood and Halpern’s accounts are consistent with the suggestion in Chapter Four that Angleton’s relationship with Israel was a kind of geopolitical expression of the CIA’s sponsorship of the non-communist left. In both cases, a degree of autonomy, and indeed conflict, was inseparable from the factors which made the covert alliance worthwhile.

Halpern noted that he himself had first met Angleton in the late 1940s, when he was reprimanded for cutting across Angleton’s labour operations in South East Asia (Hood, 1995, p.141). He stated that he was unaware of Angleton’s connection with Jay Lovestone at the time, although it is not clear if he meant to imply that the relationship existed before the mid-1950s (Hood, 1995, p.141).

If Hood and Halpern’s contribution shed a little light on the history of the political warfare coalition, others pointed toward the direction of its future development.

In May 1994, former chief UN weapons inspector David Kay delivered a paper on the lessons of Iraq for denial and deception (Kay, 1995). Kay emphasized Iraqi success in denial of information to US technical collection systems such as satellites (Kay, 1995, p.120). He suggested this presaged a new period in which both nuclear technology and the means of denial and deception would be widely available to middle-sized powers.

The 1990s mark the beginning of a period of virtual proliferation where capabilities are generally available and the real question becomes one of motivation and intentions. In such an environment the task of intelligence collection and analysis becomes harder as the requirements for denial and deception become easier (Kay, 1995, p.127).

Kay’s argument thus brought to a new field the traditional priorities of the neoconservative theory of intelligence from the days of Team B onwards, with its focus on intentions rather than capabilities and its corresponding downgrading of technical collection.

The definitive statement of the Working Group’s priorities on these issues came in a 1996 report by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *The Future of US Intelligence*. Shulsky and Schmitt argued that the proliferation of both information technology and post-Cold War intelligence requirements made aspirations for centralized intelligence obsolete, adding that ‘it is this report’s view that the failure of centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting the reasonable needs of the various components of the national security bureaucracy’ (Shulsky, 1996, p.xiv).

They recommended that analysis should be brought closer to policymakers and some of the dividing lines between analysis and policy deliberation removed (Shulsky, 1996, p.x).
The focus of the intelligence community should be on the clandestine disciplines of human collection, counterintelligence and covert action (Shulsky, 1996, p.xv). This would require an end to the phenomenon of ‘Angletonophobia’, a distrust of counterintelligence which Shulsky and Schmitt blamed for the 1994 Aldrich Ames spy case (Shulsky, 1996, p.xiv). The argued for a reinvigorated counterintelligence function ‘to guard the integrity of the government’s information collection and analysis process by penetrating, understanding, and possibly manipulating an adversary’s intelligence efforts against us’ (Shulsky, 1996, p.vii).

The Working group’s recommendations were thus the latest iteration of a philosophy of activist intelligence with roots going back through Angleton’s CIA Counterintelligence Staff to the wartime activities of X-2.

**Strategic Denial and Deception**

In *Silent Warfare* Shulsky and Schmitt had argued that victory not truth is the goal of intelligence. In *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, Roy Godson had made the case for the disciplines of covert action and counterintelligence as key instruments to this end though offensive counterintelligence designed to manipulate the enemy.

The details of how such manipulation could be carried out were the subject of *Strategic Denial and Deception* published by the National Strategy Information Center in 2002. In the opening chapter, originally published in the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Roy Godson and James Wirtz provided some basic definitions of the subject:

Denial refers to the attempt to block information that could be used by an opponent to learn some truth. Deception, by contrast, refers to a nation’s effort to cause an adversary to believe something that is not true (Godson, 2006, p.1).

A more extended discussion by Abram Shulsky argued that denial consisted in blocking the channels by which information reached the enemy, while deception consisted in sending false signals down those channels (Shulsky, 2006, p.19). Potential channels which Shulsky considered included espionage, diplomacy, propaganda, agents-of-influence and open sources (Shulsky, 2006, pp.20-26). In considering propaganda, Shulsky emphasised the role of non-state actors and reiterated the neoconservative call for operational autonomy in covert action:

Soviet front groups might have been more effective, but Stalinist paranoia made impossible the operational autonomy needed to succeed. To the extent that future practitioners of this type of propaganda have learned lessons from the Soviet experience we may expect that nonstate groups will be controlled in a more sophisticated manner and that their ties to a given state will be less obvious (Shulsky, 2006, p.23).

This comment is particularly evocative of the Lovestoneite roots of the neoconservative approach to covert action, given that Jay Lovestone himself learnt the lessons of the Soviet experience at first hand. It is intriguing, if nothing more, that it came in the context of a
discussion of the kind of co-ordinated deception operations to which Lovestone’s CIA
handler, James Angleton, aspired.

Despite Shulsky’s critique of the effectiveness Soviet covert action, Strategic Denial and
Deception took seriously the threat of deception by authoritarian states, notably in a
chapter on arms proliferation by the former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Lynn M. Hansen. Hansen not only noted the success of Iraqi
concealment of its weapons programme before the First Gulf War, but also implied that it
was continuing.

In the end, the problem of eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was not
resolved. Saddam Hussein remains capable of reconstituting all or any part of his
program to acquire such weapons (Hansen 2002, 173-174).

By the time that Strategic Denial and Deception appeared in 2002, the neoconservative
intelligence theorists were once more in a position to address such concerns. They were to
do so in a manner that underlined their commitment to the ideas articulated by the
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and the National Strategy Information Center.

The neoconservatives in the George W. Bush Administration
The position of the neoconservatives within the Bush Administration elected in 2000 was in
many ways analogous to that in Reagan Administration 20 years before. Neoconservatives
were largely concentrated in middle-ranking foreign and defence policy positions

Such influence as they wielded was largely dependent on the support of Cabinet–level
patrons such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, the latter a veteran of the 1976
Committee on the Present Danger and the Committee for the Free World (Vaisse, 2010,
p.242). Within Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense, the most powerful neoconservatives
were Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas
Feith (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.230). Feith had worked with Wolfowitz at the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, before joining the 1976 Senate Campaign of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
and later going to work at the Reagan-era National Security Council with Richard Pipes
(Heilbrunn, 2008, p.257-258). Feith would be a central figure in implementing the approach
to intelligence adopted by the Department of Defence in the period following the terrorist

Neoconservative intelligence in Donald Rumsfeld’s Department of Defence

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Feith created a small unit within the
Department of Defence to review intelligence on terrorist networks.

Feith told a press conference in June 2003:

The team began its work in October of 2001. It was not involved in intelligence
collection. Rather, it relied on reporting from the CIA and other parts of the
intelligence community. Its job was to review this intelligence to help digest it for
me and other policymakers, to help us develop Defense Department strategy for
the war on terrorism. And as I said, it looked at these interrelationships among
terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. It did not confine its review to Iraq
or al Qaeda. I mean, it was looking at global terrorist networks and the full range
of state sponsors and other sources of support for terrorist groups. Its main
conclusion was that groups and states were willing to cooperate across
philosophical, ideological lines (Feith, 2003).

In January 2002, this group was named the Policy Counter Terrorism Research Group
(PCTEG) (Edelman, 2007, p.13). In a memo on 22 January, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
asked for input from PCTEG on possible links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Edelman, 2007,
p.14).

Also in early 2002 a DIA analyst working for the Policy Support Office (PSO) of the Office of
the Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy (OSDP) unearthed a 1998 CIA report linking
Osama Bin Laden to Iraq and wrote a new assessment based upon it (Edelman, 2007, p.16).

In July 2002, Wolfowitz began preparation of a briefing for Secretary Rumsfeld on links
between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Edelman, 2007, p.18). This work was carried out by
Wolfowitz’s special assistant, along with PCTEG and the PSO (Edelman, 2007, p.18). On 25
July, the DIA officer at the PSO drafted a memo entitled ‘Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the
case’. This stated in part:

In fact, a body of intelligence reporting for over a decade from varied sources
reflects a pattern of Iraqi support for al-Qaida activities. The covert nature of the
relationship makes it difficult to know the extent of that support. Moreover,
intelligence gaps exist because of ... Iraq’s need to cloak its activities, thus
preventing collection of information on additional contacts between Iraq and Al-

The memo went on to challenge assertions that this intelligence was not ‘solid’ or
‘provable’:

Legal standards for prosecution needed in law enforcement do not obtain in
intelligence assessments, which look at trends, patterns, capabilities and
intentions. Based on these criteria, the following information clearly makes the
case for an Intelligence Finding –that Iraq has been complicit in supporting al-Qaida
terrorist activities (Edelman, 2007, p.20).

This formed the basis of a briefing given to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 8 August
2002, entitled ‘Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida’ (Edelman, 2007,
p.22). The briefing’s findings included references to ‘more than a decade of numerous
contacts’ between Iraq and al-Qaida, to ‘shared interest and pursuit of WMD’ and to

Rumsfeld then ordered that the briefing be given to CIA director George Tenet, which took
community’s approach to analysis was omitted from this version of the briefing (Edelman,
On 16 September, the briefing was given to the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Vice President’s Chief of Staff (Edelman, 2007, p.27). This version of the briefing included a new slide detailing a report by Czech intelligence of an alleged meeting in Prague between Iraqi intelligence and 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta (Edelman, 2007, p.28).

Yet another organisation within the OUSD(P), the Office of Special Plans (OSP), came into de facto existence in mid-August 2002, and was formalised the following October (Edelman, 2007, p.12). According to Feith ‘the Special Plans Office was called Special Plans, because at the time, calling it Iraq Planning Office might have undercut the -- our diplomatic efforts with regard to Iraq and the U.N. and elsewhere. We set up an office to address the whole range of issues regarding Iraq planning’ (Feith, 2003). In subsequent reporting, the name of the OSP tended to be used generically to refer to the overlapping activities of researchers from the PCTEG, the PSO and the OSP, all of which were responsible ultimately to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy – Douglas Feith (Edelman, 2007, p.10).

The Pentagon research on Iraq began to come to public attention in October 2002. In response to an article in the New York Times, Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed that intelligence was being reviewed in the OUSD(P), but denied that this constituted intelligence activity in itself, instead emphasising the positive nature of the nature of his relationship with the CIA (Defense Department Briefing Transcript, 2002).

There are always going to be people who have different intelligence views within the agency, and there's no question but that on some of these important terrorism issues, you're seeing differences of opinions out of the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency. There also are going to be people who will ask a lot of questions, and there's no question but that the people in the Department of Defense, General Myers or Rumsfeld and others, ask a lot of the questions of the intelligence community, and then they get - they come back with responses (Defense Department Briefing Transcript, 2002).

However, less positive views of this interaction were beginning to enter the public domain in late 2002. In a November 2002 article in the American Prospect journalist Robert Dreyfuss characterised the OUSD(P) research as part of the Pentagon’s ‘war against the CIA’:

The Pentagon is bringing relentless pressure to bear on the agency to produce intelligence reports more supportive of war with Iraq, according to former CIA officials. Key officials of the Department of Defense are also producing their own unverified intelligence reports to justify war. Much of the questionable information comes from Iraqi exiles long regarded with suspicion by CIA professionals. A parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation, in the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, collects the information from the exiles and scours other raw intelligence for useful titbits to make the case for pre-emptive war (Dreyfuss, 2002).
Dreyfuss claimed that the head of the un-named unit was Abram Shulsky, formerly of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Dreyfuss, 2002).

Roy Godson, the head of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and a colleague of Shulsky’s for many years, has high hopes for the success of the Pentagon’s Iraq intelligence unit, despite its small size when arrayed against the CIA’s might. ‘It might turn out to be a David against Goliath,’ says Godson (Dreyfuss, 2002).

Shulsky served as an advisor to the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy from 2001 to 2009, advising on issues related to Iraq and the War on Terror (Heritage Foundation, 2014). On 8 August 2002, he was among four recipients of an email from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz praising the briefing given to Secretary Rumsfeld on links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and asking for some ‘next possible steps to see if we can illuminate the differences between us and the CIA’ (Committee on Armed Services, 2008). The Department of Defense later confirmed that Shulsky served as head of the Office of Special Plans from August 2002 to April 2003, stating that the OSP was focused on policy planning and guidance related to the Northern Arabian Gulf and the war on terrorism (Office of Public Affairs, Department of Defense, 2003a). According to Karen Kwiatkowski, a DIA analyst employed at the OUSD(P) in 2002-03, the OSP’s main function under Shulsky was drafting talking points for senior officials: ‘This crafting and approval of the exact words to use when discussing Iraq, WMD, and terrorism were, for most of us, the only known functions of OSP and Mr. Shulsky’ (Kwiatkowski, 2003).

The OUSD(P)’s activities would come in for increasing scrutiny in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War. A 2004 report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that the research carried out by the PCTEG and others was referred to within the OUSD(P) as ‘the Iraqi intelligence cell’ (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.309). However, the Committee delayed substantive review of the analytical products produced by the OUSD(P) to a projected second-phase report (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.312).

In October 2004, the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin published a report on the alternative analysis of the issue of an Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship carried out within the OUSD(P) (Levin, 2004). Levin concluded the OUSD(P) analyses were carried out because assessments by the intelligence community had failed to support the preconceptions of senior policymakers at the Department of Defense (Levin, 2004, p.44).

An alternative intelligence assessment process was established in the office of Under Secretary for Policy Doug Feith to look at the evidence through a different lens, one that was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Drawing upon both reliable and unreliable reporting, they arrived at an “alternative” interpretation of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship that was much stronger than that assessed by the IC and more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the Administration (Levin, 2004, p.44).
Levin concluded that members of the Bush administration made a number of misleading statements in 2002-3 that reflected the views of the OUSD(P) analysts, rather than those of the intelligence community (Levin, 2004, p.45).

These assessments included, among others, allegations by the President that Iraq was an “ally” of al-Qaeda; assertions by National Security Advisor Rice and others that Iraq “had” provided training in WMD to al-Qaeda; and continued representations by Vice President Cheney that Mohammed Atta may have met with an Iraq intelligence officer before the 9/11 attacks when the CIA didn’t believe the meeting took place. (Levin, 2004, p.45)


The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorised, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community. This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy did not provide “the most accurate analysis of intelligence” to senior decision-makers (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2007b).

Seen in the light of the neoconservative literature of intelligence, what is most striking about the intelligence process within the OUSD(P) is the extent to which it conformed to the theoretical prescriptions of some of the participants. Perhaps the strongest precedents for the methodology adopted by the OUSD(P) are to be found in Wolfowitz and Shulsky’s responses to Douglas MacEachin’s paper on the tradecraft of analysis for the Working Group for Intelligence Reform. Wolfowitz had strongly insisted on the right of policymakers to a role in the intelligence production process (MacEachin, 1995, p.80). Likewise, Shulsky had insisted on the need for a close relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers at all levels in order to address the needs of intelligence consumers (MacEachin, 1995, pp.83-84). These were clear indications of the approach both men would take in the Bush-era Department of Defense. So too was Shulsky’s 1992 paper which praised the proliferation of analytic units throughout the Government and suggested that the real value of the intelligence community was in providing ‘nuggets of information’ rather than analytic judgements (Shulsky, 1995b, pp.24-25).
Similarly, the bureaucratic rivalries identified in Working Group papers prefigured the faultline that would develop within the US Government over Iraq. In their 1994/95 paper on intelligence reform Shulsky and Gary Schmitt had responded to claims that the Pentagon had a natural bias towards threat inflation, by arguing that the CIA had an institutional interest in promoting and monitoring détente arrangements (Shulsky, 1995a, p.53).

Neoconservative observers outside the Government were among those who interpreted the debate over Iraq in terms of this antagonism. Roy Godson’s remark to Robert Dreyfuss that the Pentagon analysts ‘might turn out to be a David against Goliath’ in their dispute with the CIA was an example of this (Dreyfuss, 2002). So too was a comment to Dreyfuss by James Woolsey of the Defense Policy Board that ‘the CIA has started saying things that the Defense Department has been saying all along’ about the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaida (Dreyfuss, 2002).

The relationship between the neoconservative theory of intelligence and neoconservative practise in the Bush administration meant that the internal debate over Iraq within the US Government became an extension of the struggle between competing conceptions of intelligence dating back to the mid-1970s.

This theory of intelligence also shaped neoconservative contributions to the debate about Iraq more broadly. In Britain in early 2003, the Telegraph defended the Government’s use of academic sources in a dossier on Iraq, arguing: ‘Open source materials have long given governments some of their best leads: for example, the earliest predictions of the emerging Cold War were derived by Ben Mandel of the EUR-X unit of the State Department in April 1945 from French Communist publications’ (‘Back to Spy School’, Telegraph, 8 February 2003) (2003b).

This example was precisely the one that Roy Godson had used in support of the integration of intelligence with open source information in Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Godson, 2001, p.204). It is possible that the Telegraph editorial was written by his brother Dean Godson, then a Telegraph leader writer (Beckett, 2008). If so, it underlines the extent to which the neoconservative theory of intelligence was shaped by heritage of the Lovestoneite movement to which their father Joseph Godson belonged (The Times, 1986).

The making of the case for war in Iraq was in significant measure an application of the neoconservative theory of intelligence developed since the 1970s in opposition to the rival ‘Sherman Kent’ school of thought attributed to the CIA’s analytical-estimating hierarchy. A longer historical perspective on the structure of the epistemic community that produced that theory can illuminate the specific role of the neoconservatives within the Bush administration.

As was shown in Chapter Seven, that epistemic community was an expression of a wider political coalition favouring an intensification of the Cold War and opposing détente, within which neoconservatives were allied to other strands of conservative American nationalism in organisations such as the Committee on the Present Danger. The patronage of neoconservatives by figures such as Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld in the Bush administration was essentially a continuation of this pattern. For this reason it could be argued that the role of neoconservatives in making the case for the Iraq War has been over-emphasized.

Nevertheless, the neoconservative role in what we have called the political warfare coalition was a distinctive one precisely because of the theory of intelligence the neoconservatives articulated. This role consistently exemplified the two-tier pattern which Inderjeet Parmar has characterised as distinctive of epistemic communities, in which a second-tier of intellectuals elaborates and publicises the ideas which provide the basis of decisions by policymakers (Parmar, 2006, p.17). In part the neoconservatives’ second-tier role may have reflected their outsider status within the wider conservative movement. More particularly, however, it reflected the particular experience of intelligence that the neoconservatives inherited from Cold War liberalism.

The Neoconservative intelligence theorists after Iraq

The Senate investigations of 2004 were part of a wider pattern of growing scrutiny of the neoconservative role in Iraq War intelligence. Indeed it has been suggested that criticisms such as those of Hersh (2005) had parallels with the ‘Who lost China’ debate of the 1950s (Fine and Xu 2011, p.593). Acknowledging that the analogy was imperfect though suggestive, Fine and Xu argued:

‘Neo-conservatives did not face the claims of subversion that China experts faced in the 1950s. However, both groups held diverse posts, inside and outside of government, both contained a mix of generalists and area specialists, and both were charged with slanting (or lying about) facts as they knew them (Fine and Xu 2011, p.597.n2).

They went on to argue that: “The reputation of experts justifies state policy and attacks on these experts constitute criticism of those institutions through which they have been sponsored” (Fine and Xu 2011, p.611). They offered a useful typology of attacks distinguishing the ‘smear’ and the ‘degradation ceremony’ (Fine and Xu 2011, p.593). It should be noted that despite their emotive resonance, these terms do not, in Fine and Xu’s usage, imply a moral judgement on the activities they describe.

The smear is defined as ‘broadcasting a set of linked and pejorative claims that tie the policy failure to moral deficiencies of the expert and her backers’ and is seen as the tactic of those lacking institutional power (Fine and Xu 2011, p.596). Such power is however essential to the degradation ceremony, which is defined as ‘formally assigning stigma to target’ (Fine and Xu 2011, p.596).

This dichotomy could be seen as yet another aspect of the two-tier dynamic seen in the broader literature on epistemic communities, and in Gramsci’s distinction between dictatorship and hegemony. Indeed, by focusing on the overlap between epistemic debates and political conflict, Fine and Xu arguably illustrate some of the mechanisms by which hegemonic struggles take place in practice.
Neoconservative intelligence theorists like Godson and Shulsky had long experience of this kind of struggle in both offensive and defensive roles. Both had careers stretching back to the anti-détente movement of the 1970s, in which the ‘two-tier strategy’ described by Sanders (1983, p.197) can clearly be understood in terms of Fine and Xu’s typology. In the campaign against Paul Warnke’s nomination as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the CDM memo accusing Warnke of unilateral disarmament (Sanders, 1983, p.204) clearly fits Fine and Xu’s definition of a smear. The bitterly contested confirmation hearings in the Senate, described as ‘venomous’ in the New York Times, (quoted Sanders 1983, p.208) could be identified as a nominally unsuccessful degradation ceremony, a role for which Fine and Xu observe Congressional hearings are well suited (Fine and Xu 2011, p.610).

In the wake of the Iraq War the key neoconservative theorists of intelligence did not respond with the vigorous and public campaign that they had mounted in defence of covert action and counterintelligence in the late 1970s and early 80s. Nor was there anything to compare to Dirty Tricks and Trump Cards, effectively Roy Godson’s apologia for the state-private network of the Iran-Contra Era.

Following the Iraq Survey Group’s announcement of its failure to find of weapons of mass destruction in early 2004, elements of the wider neoconservative movement sought to de-emphasise the significance of the intelligence case for war. Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard that ‘while his weapons were a key part of the case for removing Saddam, that case was always broader’ and that "the moral and humanitarian purpose provided a compelling reason for a war to remove Saddam" (Kagan & Kristol 2004). In seeking to deny that the public had been ‘fundamentally misled by American intelligence’ they pointed out that ‘In December 2002, according to USA Today, a team of U.S. intelligence analysts predicted it would be extremely difficult to find weapons of mass destruction in the aftermath of an invasion’ (Kagan & Kristol 2004). The relevant article stated:

The study by a team of U.S. intelligence analysts, military officers and civilian Pentagon officials warned that U.S. military tactics, guerrilla warfare, looting and lying by Iraqi officials would undermine the search for banned Iraqi weapons. Portions of the study were made available to USA TODAY. Three high-ranking U.S. intelligence officials described its purpose and conclusions.

"Locating a program that ... has been driven by denial and deception imperatives is no small task," the December 2002 report said. "Prolonged insecurity with factional violence and guerrilla forces still at large would be the worst outcome for finding Saddam's WMD arsenal” (Diamond 2004).

Given the article’s opaque sourcing the most that can be said is that the report’s mention of Pentagon civilians, and its emphasis on Iraqi denial and deception, is suggestive. There must be at least a suspicion that those at the Department of Defense who had been most aggressive in pushing the intelligence case for war were involved in the creation of a document that made their position impervious to empirical evidence.
We shall see that neoconservative intelligence theorists such as Roy Godson, Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky did not play a prominent role in the post-war debate on Iraq intelligence. Had they done so, it might well only have invited further scrutiny of the role of the Pentagon neoconservatives. That is not however, the only possible explanation for their relative quiescence.

Unlike the era of 1970s detente or in the immediate post-Cold War period in the early 1990s, America's commitment to an offensive intelligence posture was less open to doubt in the post-Iraq War period. Rather than debate the merits of the Iraq War, the neoconservative writers focused on winning it, and the other conflicts into which the administration was drawn in the name of counter-terrorism. The neoconservative literature of intelligence turned away from strategic intelligence at the national level to focus on these theatres. This may have owed something to the preoccupations of neoconservatives inside the administration.

As (Vaisse 2010, p.258) notes, neoconservative influence in government declining during the latter part of the George W. Bush administration, with Wolfowitz and Feith having departed by 2005, but remained significant in relation to the Middle East and the conduct of the Iraq war itself.

Abram Shulsky continued to serve as an advisor to the under-Secretary of Defence for Policy throughout the Bush administration, working on issues related to Iraq and the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (Hudson Institute, 2017). In 2006, it was reported that he was heading a Pentagon office on Iran. McClatchy newspapers cited unnamed officials as fearing that the office 'is being used to funnel intelligence from [Manucher] Ghorbanifar, the arms dealer, and an Iranian exile group known as the Mujahedeen Khalq' (Strobel & Walcott, 2016).

After leaving the administration, Shulsky co-authored a number of publications with Douglas Feith which touched on his record in government service, but the emphasis was on counter-propaganda rather than intelligence analysis. A 2010 paper defended the Office of Strategic Influence, and denied press reports that it had intended to use disinformation (Feith & Shulsky, 2010, p.8). The study for the Hudson Institute called for the creation of an international non-governmental organisation to promote moderate thought in Muslim societies, a concept influenced by the precedent of the National Endowment for Democracy (Feith & Shulsky, 2010, p.3). In a second paper in 2012, co-authored with William Galston, Feith and Shulsky suggested that political instability in the Arab world had increased the urgency of their call for specific efforts to counter Islamism as an ideology (Feith et al. 2012, p.1). They cited precedents for such ideological struggle by the US Government from the Office of Policy Coordination in the early Cold War to the National Endowment for Democracy in the Reagan era (Feith et al. 2012. P.41). They argued that ‘Of particular relevance to the current situation is the fact that, in World War II’s aftermath, there was an important European debate in which the U.S. government couldn’t intervene directly—a clash in leftist circles between communists and democratic socialists’(Feith et al. 2012, p.41).
The fact that neoconservative intelligence theorists returned once again to the Cultural Cold War and in particular to CIA cooperation with labour activists for inspiration is instructive. It underlines the extent to which the heritage of Cold War state private networks shaped an organic tradition of which those theorists formed part.

The deep historic memory which informed neoconservative prescriptions was in contrast to their sometimes perfunctory response to debates about recent events during this period. One of the few attempts to defend neoconservative prescriptions as they had been applied to Iraq intelligence came from Gary Schmitt in a 2005 essay which restated the longstanding critique of the Sherman Kent approach to intelligence analysis (Schmitt, 2005). It was limited to a single paragraph:

Indeed, one of the little-noted findings of the recent Senate Intelligence Committee, in its report on pre-war assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs and its ties to terrorism, was that “probing questions” on the part of Bush administration officials with respect to the issue of Iraq’s ties to terrorism “actually improved the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) products” (Schmitt, 2005, p.59).

The senate report did indeed make the point that analysts should expect robust questioning (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.34). However, its first and arguably most significant conclusion was that the pre-war intelligence analysis about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs was either over-stated or unsupported by underlying intelligence (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.14).

In reaching this judgment, the report did not systematically consider the role of the neoconservative analysts at the Department of Defence. Instead, consideration of intelligence analysis by the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy was largely left to a follow-up phase two report (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2004, p.2). The completion of phase two subsequently became the subject of partisan conflict on the committee. In 2008, the then chairman of the Committee, Democratic Senator Jay Rockefeller, suggested the pre-2007 Republican majority had regarded elements of the investigation as ‘a task too politically sensitive to handle’ (Senate Committee on Intelligence, 2008, p.89). The most substantive scrutiny would eventually come in (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2007b), which as we have seen concluded that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide the most accurate analysis possible.

Even allowing for the fact that such criticisms lay in the future, the brevity of Schmitt’s mention of pre-war Iraq intelligence is striking. One might have expected that a scholar of intelligence analysis would have dealt with the outstanding intelligence controversy of the day at greater length. One possibility is that Schmitt avoided doing so precisely so as not to give any ammunition to democratic senators seeking to organise a degradation ceremony.

As with Shulsky, Schmitt’s subsequent publications focused on areas that were tangential to the controversy, including domestic counter-terrorism, China and military resources. Roy Godson’s post-Iraq War publications likewise focused on areas related to the War on
Terror that did not necessarily raise the question uncomfortable questions about the recent record in relation to strategic intelligence analysis.

A key example of the new approach came in a 2006 *Weekly Standard* article co-authored by Godson and Richard Shultz, the research director of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Based on conversations with security officials in Israel, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, they argued for the pursuit of ‘a common set of measures--intelligence dominance was the summary term we came up with to describe the model--they had used to overcome bloody threats posed by armed groups’ (Shultz and Godson, 2006).

Some of their recommendations, such as an emphasis on ‘basic intelligence’ on the communities in which insurgents operate, reflected the specific problems of counterinsurgency. Others however, such as a call for integration of intelligence analysis with operations, reflected longstanding neoconservative doctrine.

The model of was described as ‘utilizing all the tools in the intelligence toolbox--integrating collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence instruments--to maximize effectiveness against targets,’ suggesting it was itself an application to counterinsurgency of the ‘offensive intelligence’ approach previously outlined by Godson in Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards.

Godson and Schultz returned to the subject of intelligence dominance in 'Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security Agenda', a volume published by the National Strategy Information Center in 2010.

The papers in the volume were prepared with the oversight an NSIC International Practitioner Working Group which included military, diplomatic and intelligence professionals, from the US, UK, Israel, India, Australia, Colombia, Mexico and the Netherlands (Godson & Shultz, 2010, p.30). Almost half of those included were generals.

This suggests that the new emphasis on counterinsurgency was shifting the balance of NSIC networking from political to professional policy-makers, conformant with Ruggie’s observation that more specialised epistemic communities tend to enjoy influence at lower levels of political concern (Ruggie 1975, p.570). The increased emphasis on the needs of operational commanders reflected in the intelligence dominance concept may therefore have been a natural response to increased political scrutiny.

The ideas canvassed in Adapting America’s Security Paradigm formed one of two major programs pursued by the NSIC as it entered the 2010s (National Strategy Information Center, 2016a). The other major program, the Culture of Lawfulness Project, manifested the same trend towards specialisation, emphasising ‘bottom-up’ approaches, defined as ‘formal and informal educational programs and training for government officials, civil society, and the private sector about the principles and benefits of the rule of law’ (National Strategy Information Center, 2016b).

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence now tended to become a vehicle for activities associated with these new priorities, such as a volume on intelligence for democratic security in the Americas (Godson & Vergara 2008).
In 2015, the NSIC was wound up with its assets being passed to the Institute for International Studies (IIS) of Bethesda, Maryland (NSIC & IIS Form 990s, 2014). Given that Godson was President of both the NSIC and the IIS, the significance of this was unclear, although a lower profile may have been dictated by the age of the principals as much as anything else.

Godson’s work in this period, and particularly his focus on the Northern Irish experience in counter-insurgency, may have reflected the influence of his brother Dean. As head of foreign policy and security at the British think-tank Policy Exchange, the younger Godson became an outspoken voice on counter-extremism policy in the first decade of the 21st Century (Mills et al., 2011). His writings on the Northern Ireland conflict were seen by a number of authors including (Griffin, 2009) and (Dixon, 2015) as reflecting a distinctive neoconservative critique of the peace process. This underlined the extent to which the neoconservative approach to intelligence predisposed its adherents to distrust situations of détente. Alistair Crooke, a former British intelligence officer involved in peace process contacts was among those strongly criticised by Dean Godson (Godson, 2006b). This was despite the fact that Crooke saw a significant role for human intelligence in informing peace negotiations (Lloyd, 2015). There was thus in Godson’s critique an echo of the earlier neoconservative hostility to the role of technical intelligence in verifying US-Soviet détente.

Godson’s prescriptions like those of his elder brother, were rooted in the tradition of cold war state-private networks. Writing in the Times, he stated:

> During the Cold War, organisations such as the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office would assert the superiority of the West over its totalitarian rivals. And magazines such as Encounter did hand-to-hand combat with Soviet fellow travellers. For any kind of truly moderate Islam to flourish, we need first to recapture our own self-confidence. At the moment, the extremists largely have the field to themselves (Godson, D. 2006).

Such concerns reflected wider neoconservative preoccupations at the time. If the NSIC’s direct influence was on the decline, many of those who had attended its conferences over the years remained active in ways which suggested continuing shared commitments on intelligence and related issues.

Godson’s worries about morale in Britain and Europe were shared by neoconservatives on the Defence Policy Board in Washington, one of whom, Devon Gaffney Cross, had travelled to London in 2003 to found a think tank addressing the issue, the Policy Forum on International Affairs (Lobe, 2008).

Gaffney Cross and her brother Frank Gaffney were both former attendees at the CSI’s 1984 Intelligence and Policy conference (Godson ed., 1986, p.179). By the 21st Century, Frank Gaffney had become one of the strongest critics of Islam in the US, espousing theories about the Muslim Brotherhood which reflected traditional neoconservative counterintelligence themes, in what was arguably their most extreme form (Beinart, 2017). Gaffney went on to become an early and vocal supporter of Donald Trump, whose candidacy for President was opposed equally vehemently by other neoconservatives such
as Eliot Cohen (Heilbrunn, 2016), another veteran of CSI colloquia (Godson ed., 1987, pp.71-96).

Trump’s first National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, had co-authored a book in Islam with prominent neoconservative Michael Ledeen (Heilbrunn, 2016). During his short tenure in the administration, Flynn hired as the NSC’s senior director for intelligence programs, Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a 30-year-old ex-DIA officer who was reported to be a close family friend of Frank Gaffney (Marshall, 2017). Cohen-Watnick subsequently became embroiled in controversy when he was accused of leaking information to support claims that Trump had been under surveillance during the Obama administration (Rosenberg et al. 2017).

The episode appeared as something of a reprise of the institutional conflicts in which neoconservatives had been embroiled in the Reagan and Bush administrations, with politically-appointed officials routing around the CIA in their handling of intelligence matters.

Yet the Trump administration also brought distinctive challenges for neoconservatives. More than any other modern Republican president, Trump’s politics were rooted in strands of paleoconservatism that their Cold War Liberal precursors had fought in the 1940s and the 1950s (Greenberg, 2016). Accusations of Russian support for Trump also raised counterintelligence questions of a kind that had long been the neoconservatives’ stock in trade. Some saw this as presaging a new alliance between neoconservatives and Democrats (Pomorski, 2017).

Any such alliance would likely have a much narrower social base than the Coalition for a Democratic Majority of the 1970s. At the time of the Iraq War, there was a brief revival of activity by the Social Democrats USA. At a 2003 conference of the party, Joshua Muravchik highlighted its hawkish credentials with the comment that ‘in every big conflict we reap some important new recruits. In the wars of Central America, we reaped the Radoshes and the Leikens. There were some more after Bosnia. Now the war against terrorism has brought us Hitchens and Berman’ (Social Democrats, 2003d). However, the organisation would subsequently be reduced to a state of ‘near collapse’ according to vice-president David Hacker, who attributed the situation to the neoconservative trajectory of its former leadership which ‘put the party at odds with the opposite tendency of most of the American left’ (Hacker, 2017).

The partisan politics of neoconservatives have never been straightforward, but in the early years of the Trump administration as in those of the Carter administration, the neoconservatives seemed positioned across a political faultline. The neoconservative intelligence theorists emerged as an epistemic community in the earlier conjuncture, but their ideas appeared open to competing interpretations in the later very different one. This may reflect an underlying weakness of the neoconservative theory of intelligence, for which the existence of enemies is more of a core theoretical principle than an empirical result. For the neoconservatives of the early Trump era, as for those of the immediate post-Cold War period, there were significant uncertainties about how to map that assumption on to reality. Ultimately, different views as to the key enemy to be targeted by
means of offensive intelligence may well reflect a range of possibilities for their incorporation into hegemonic coalitions.
Chapter Nine: Conclusion

It is widely understood that neoconservatism emerged out of the break-up of Cold War liberalism in the 1970s. The central role of the neoconservative theory of intelligence in this process is less often recognised. My contribution to knowledge has been to show that the creation of an epistemic community around a distinctive theory of intelligence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, theorised the experiences of key actors in the political warfare coalition that brought together the CIA and the non-communist left during the Cold War, and that this theory subsequently informed the actions of neoconservatives in subsequent US administrations.

The policy enterprise of this epistemic community were in large measure a defensive response by elements of the Cold War state-private network which we have called the political warfare coalition to the impact of détente on their previous hegemonic role. The case of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence therefore supports the contention of (Parmar, 2012, p.7) that a neo-Gramscian approach can usefully illuminate the role of epistemic communities.

These conclusions were reached by undertaking a critical analysis of the literature of the Consortium for the Study of intelligence, alongside a larger historical investigation that examined both the background to which Consortium authors appealed and the extent to which they subsequently sought to apply the theory in practise.

While elements of the latter task have been attempted by journalists such as Seymour Hersh (Hersh, 2003) and Tom Barry (Barry 2004), the major academic works on neoconservatism, which as will be seen below, have tended to underplay the role of intelligence as a distinct sphere within the neoconservative heritage. It is perhaps for this reason that the greatest lacuna in the existing literature relates to the origins of the neoconservative theory of intelligence. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the present work is to show how the theory’s emergence reflected the perspective of interest groups which had played a key role in the cultural cold war.

Notable among these was the Lovestoneite tradition of labor diplomacy, associated with the AFL. Labour historian Paul Buhle has called the Lovestoneite movement ‘a curiously ignored subject’, which would require the release of CIA files to ensure it enjoyed the attention it deserved (Buhle, 1999, p.280, n.71). Despite only limited access to CIA files, the current work has contributing to filling that lacuna by identifying a number of new archival sources, as well as by integrating the existing sources into a long-run historical account that can provide a critical perspective on the portrait of the Lovestoneite tradition that appears more episodically in the works of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Key sources which I have identified include: MI6 reports on the activities of the Lovestoneites in the late 1930s (National Archives, KV2 580), British reports on the activities of the AFL during the Second World War (National Archives, FO 371/30676), and on the post-war activities of AFL labor diplomats in Britain’s African (National Archives, FCO 141/17746) and Asian (National Archives, FO 371/105354) colonies.
In prioritising counterintelligence and covert action, neoconservative intelligence theory defended the relationship that had existed between the intelligence community and elements of Cold War liberalism during the early Cold War. In effect that alliance, exemplified most clearly in the relationship between James Angleton and Jay Lovestone, moved out of the Government and into the conservative movement. Questions of intelligence thereafter remained central to the development of neoconservatism at every major turning point from Team B to Iran-Contra to the War on Iraq.

The most important historians of neoconservatism have, however, played down the importance of this background. For example, Jacob Heilbrunn has written of the CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF):

> If the CCF had not existed, the left would have had to invent it. To some extent, it did this by magnifying the amount of control the CIA had over the CCF. The purpose of the mythmaking is to create a moral equivalence between East and West. But intellectuals, an ornery lot, can seldom be ordered around (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.53).

Heilbrunn is here concerned to reject what Hugh Wilford has called the ‘puppet-on-a-string’ theory of the relationship between Cold War liberals and the CIA (Wilford, 2003, p.101). Yet in doing so, he discounts the significance of that relationship entirely, ignoring the possibility of a more nuanced account of the kind which historians of the Cultural Cold War such as Wilford have provided for the earlier period, one which recognises the degree of initiative that the Cold War liberals enjoyed as well as the importance of CIA patronage.

One reason for this may be an understandable focus on the literary intellectuals who were among the most visible exponents of both Cold War liberalism and neoconservatism, and therefore on the CCF, and on the Office of Policy Coordination’s attempts to control it as a front organisation along bureaucratic lines (Wilford, 2008, p.80). Another factor may be that the rightward drift of neoconservatism has come to make the importance of labour precursors seem counter-intuitive. Yet CIA sponsorship of the CCF was arguably less important than the longstanding cooperation between the intelligence community and the AFL, a relationship which predated the CIA itself and even its precursor intelligence agency the OSS.

In this respect, Vaisse is correct to state that the history of neoconservatism was ‘linked to that of the unions, and this is a largely neglected aspect of the Cold War’ (Vaisse, 2010, p.19). An understanding of how that history shaped a distinctive theory of intelligence may provide some potentially unifying themes within the ‘discontinuity, heterogeneity, and contradiction’ which he sees as integral to the history of neoconservatism (Vaisse, 2010, p.5).

A fuller understanding of neoconservatism’s debt to cold war liberalism also supports Bill King’s defence of the movement from the paleoconservative charge that it represents an ‘inverted Trotskyism’ based on the politics of Max Shachtman (King, 2004, p.259). As King points out, Shachtman had long since left Trotskyism behind by the time he became an

It is an inability to distinguish between a specific form of revolutionary Marxism ("Shachtmanism") and a uniquely American version of right-wing socialism that can be traced back to the 1930s, that underlies the confused allegations hurled by paleoconservatives at today's neocons (King, 2004, p.259).

King's argument must be qualified, however. Firstly, as Hugh Wilford has suggested, the conflict between communists and Cold War liberals itself had ideological roots traceable back to the original split between socialists and communists in response to the October Revolution in 1917 (Wilford, 2003, p.148). This in itself implies a common root in second international Marxism that facilitated movement between the two groups. This Menshevik heritage actually reinforces the suggestion that the neoconservatives have an authentic claim to the heritage of Wilsonian democracy rather than Trotskyism, as does the AFL's active support for Wilson's foreign policy in 1917.

Secondly, as an ex-Leninist infusion into right-wing social democracy, the Shachtmanites were arguably less important than their precursors, the Lovestoneites, whose ideological shift came in the very period, the 1930s, that King identifies as formative.

Jacob Heilbrunn has argued that many of the intellectual precursors of neoconservatism treated the struggle against European fascism as a sideshow during this period (Heilbrunn, 2008, p.28). If this has charge some force against the Shachtmanites towards whom it is directed, it has none against the Lovestoneites.

Indeed, a key factor in establishing the relationship between the Lovestoneites and the AFL, and later Lovestone and the US Government, was Lovestoneite access to resistance networks across the Atlantic. In fascist Europe, small Leninist cadre parties were able to survive and operate when the larger Social Democrats and Communists could not (Alexander, 1981, p.145).

If this was in some sense the heroic period of Lovestoneite political warfare, it was also one that would have fateful consequences. The very qualities that would make the Lovestoneites effective in the Europe of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, their elitism and clandestinity, their reflexive rivalry with the Communists, and their openness to the patronage of intelligence services, would shape elements of Cold War liberalism, and more particularly, neoconservatism, for generations afterwards.

The World War Two alliance between social democratic elites and the American state for the purposes of transnational covert action, was institutionalised for the long term in the relationship between the CIA and the Cold War liberals. Alliances with the most conservative elements in the CIA, around James Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff, would prefigure the induction of the neoconservatives into the conservative movement itself when Cold War liberalism broke up in the 1970s. The neoconservative literature of intelligence, which emerged as the product of an epistemic community formed to defend and distil this Cold War experience, would provide the clearest intellectual basis for
neoconservative conduct in Government from the late 1970s, including their contributions to covert support for the Nicaraguan contras in the 1980s, and to the case for war in Iraq in 2003. In the face of growing scrutiny in the wake of the latter conflict, neoconservatives did not fundamentally alter their ideas about intelligence, but rather sought to reshape their arguments in a way that would facilitate their adoption at a lower operational level.
Bibliography


1957. Tanganyika: Maida Springer, special representative of the American Federation of Labor... National Archives FCO 141/17746.


1973. For the Record: The Report by the Social Democrats, USA on the Resignation of Michael Harrington and his Attempt to Split the American Socialist Movement. Social Democrats USA.


2008. Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by US Government Officials were Substantiated by Intelligence Information. Senate Committee on Intelligence.


BLUMENTHAL, S. 2008. The rise of the counter-establishment: the conservative ascent to political power, New York, Union Square; Lewes: GMC Distribution [distributor].


CREEL, G. 1920. How we advertised America; the first telling of the amazing story of the Committee on public information that carried the gospel of Americanism to every corner of the globe, New York, and London.


FORD, H. P. 1993. William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency: CIA History Staff.


GODSON, R. 1975. The AFL foreign policy making process from the end of World War II to the merger. *Labor History*, 16, 325-337.


HEILBRUNN, J. 2008. They knew they were right : the rise of the neocons, New York, Doubleday.


HUGHES, Q. O. 2011. In the interest of democracy: the rise and fall of the early Cold War alliance between the American Federation of Labor and the Central Intelligence Agency, Bern ; Oxford, Peter Lang.
KV2/580, T. National Archives (TNA) KV2/580.


MARX, K. 2016. Theses On Feuerbach by Karl Marx. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/.


MEEKS, M. 20 November 2013 2013. RE: Information and Privacy Commissioner, CIA. Type to GRIFFIN, T.


STROBEL, W; & WALCOTT, J. 2006. In a replay of Iraq, a battle is brewing over intelligence on Iran. McClatchy Newspapers. 15 September 2006.
WILFORD, H. 2003. The CIA, the British left, and the Cold War: calling the tune?, London ; Portland, OR, F. Cass.

