Leader choice: out-group signals and collective action tactics

Choosing between conciliatory and oppositional leaders: The role of out-group signals and in-group leader candidates’ collective action tactics
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Abstract
In this paper we examine the role of out-group signals and in-group leader tactics in the choice and evaluation of rival in-group leader candidates. Study 1 found preference for a negotiating in-group leader over an oppositional leader, mediated by perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality. In Study 2 participants chose a leader who had received out-group endorsement and in Studies 3 and 4, participants chose a negotiating in-group leader where the out-group was prepared to negotiate and an oppositional leader where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate. In the latter three studies, there was evidence for participants being strategic in their choices: effects were mediated by effectiveness but not prototypicality. These findings suggest our understanding of collective action will be enriched through attention to the situational cues provided by out-groups, and to the context of competing voices of collective action leadership.

Keywords collective action, leadership, negotiation, social identity, group processes
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*Janus-like, the leader stands in one place, facing two different ways. In one direction he is the head of the movement – the embodiment of commitment to its values and program [ ]. In the other direction he functions as a negotiator and communicator between the external environment and the internal one. In one function, that of mobilization, he breathes the fire and brimstone of enthusiastic mission. In the other function, that of articulation, he pours the oil of bargaining, compromise, and the common culture* (Gusfield, 1966, p.141).

Leaders operate in complex environments; their success depends on being able to read the external and internal environment, pick the right strategies, and garner the support of followers. Gusfield (1966) notes the inherent tension this complexity creates for leaders who are at times required to mobilize their members in opposition to out-groups, and at others, to negotiate with out-groups on behalf of their members. Despite the intuitiveness of this point, social psychological interest in social movements focuses on explaining how people are mobilized to collective action, to the neglect of explaining how support is secured for the advancement of group interests through negotiation (cf. Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Klandermans, 2014; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Thomas, McGarty, & Louis, 2014). Moreover, although researchers note the importance of in-group leaders to providing collective action frames as part of the mobilization process (Benford & Snow, 2000; Steffens, Schuh, Haslam, Pérez, & van Dick, 2015), the potential for out-group signals to influence how followers evaluate leaders and their different proposals for action is likewise overlooked in the research.

In this paper we take the kind of context that is typically of interest to collective action researchers – one where a powerful out-group threatens the interests of an in-group -- and consider how the tactics advocated by rival in-group leader candidates (opposition vs negotiation), and out-group signaling of willingness to negotiate, are consequential for leader
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evaluation and choice. Our aims are simple. First, we hope to demonstrate the importance of considering how out-group signals of intent towards an in-group are consequential for in-group leader-follower relationships: a point on which there is supportive theory, but little social psychological data (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Second, our broader aim is to encourage cross-fertilization between the collective action, intergroup negotiation, and leadership research domains (see also Becker & Tausch, 2015; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Louis et al., 2016; Steffens et al., 2015; Stekelenburg, 2013).

Intergroup competition and choosing between oppositional and conciliatory leaders

Research informed by the social identity perspective (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) finds that contexts perceived in terms of group-based competition (or conflict) render people more likely to accentuate intergroup differences (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004), attend more to in-group sources of influence (Blackwood, Terry, & Duck, 2015), and display increased in-group cohesion and out-group hostility (Wright & Tropp, 2002). Such effects favour leaders whose objective is to mobilize support for confrontation with the out-group. For instance, there is evidence that in contexts of intergroup competition, group members will rally behind leaders who favour the in-group and distance their group from the out-group (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012); and they will downgrade in-group leaders who cooperate with out-groups whilst upgrading those who behave antagonistically (Lundgren, 1998). This would appear to present a problem for leaders who, instead of calling for collective action, urge restraint and support for more conciliatory approaches such as negotiation.

Social psychological interest in negotiation as an intergroup phenomenon has emerged only recently. What clearly distinguishes negotiation from archetypal forms of collective action (e.g., mass protest) is that there are limited opportunities for group members
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to be actively involved, and the focus of this research has typically been on those who prosecute negotiation on behalf of their groups (i.e., leaders and group representatives rather than followers; De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2015). Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the important question of when group members will support leaders advocating negotiation and how they evaluate conciliatory versus oppositional forms of leadership has not been directly investigated. There is, however, evidence to suggest that for negotiators, simply the knowledge that they are negotiating on behalf of their group rather than themselves, may engender more hostile behaviours (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003); and that the mere salience of group identity can render group representatives tasked with negotiation more competitive (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, & Loschelder, 2010). Moreover, the findings that these hostile behaviours occur more where negotiators have concerns about in-group status (Van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007) or accountability to the in-group (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2007), suggests that they may themselves perceive that this is what is required to secure the support of their group. Although negotiators and leaders are not always one and the same, as Pittinsky and Simon (2007) note, “history is replete with leaders who have exploited, or in some cases created, intergroup hostilities in order to secure their positions” (p.588).

This brief overview of the evidence presents a gloomy outlook for conciliatory over more oppositional forms of leadership; we would expect that given the choice between a leader advocating an oppositional tactic and one advocating negotiation, group members would tend to throw their support behind the former. Yet, when we turn to the wider literature on intergroup competition and conflict we find that oftentimes groups employ multiple tactics, sometimes in tandem and sometimes consecutively (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011); and that groups may be divided over whether more hawkish or dovish tactics are warranted (Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-Marín, 2009).
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Moreover, collective action research highlights the role of people’s legitimacy and stability beliefs in moderating support for more or less radical tactics. Indeed, there is some evidence that points to normative expectations—at least in liberal democracies—of cooperation and conciliation and suggests that more oppositional strategies will receive support only when more moderate strategies are seen to be ineffective (Schwartzmantel, 2010; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

The mediating role of leader prototypicality and efficacy

In accounting for the in-group biases associated with support for more oppositional forms of leadership, the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001), focuses particular attention on the degree to which follower appraisals of in-group leaders reflect concerns about whether the leader is seen as a prototypical group member (i.e., one of us). According to the meta-contrast principle (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998), who within a group is viewed as prototypical varies as a function of contextually salient inter-group and intra-group comparisons. Thus, in a context of intergroup competition, the prototypical position polarizes away from the out-group and so favours more oppositional leadership. A clear implication is that where groups are at loggerheads, any sign of closeness between an in-group leader and an out-group could compromise their representativeness and so their support (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001).

There is now a substantial body of evidence to support the role of prototypicality in people’s appraisals of their leaders (see van Knippenberg, van Knippenber, Cremer, & Hogg, 2004 for an overview). However, in recent years, researchers working from a social identity perspective have shown a renewed interest in explaining people’s instrumental (as well as identity) motives in both the collective action (e.g., van Zomeren & Klandermans, 2011) and leadership domains (e.g, Haslam et al., 2011). Specifically, it is argued that in addition to
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wanting to express identity and select leaders who embody who we are, followers also care about achieving group goals and whether a leader will be effective in doing so (i.e., delivering for us).

From this perspective, research on leader effectiveness frequently treats effectiveness as an outcome of prototypicality (e.g., Cicero, Pierro, & van Knippenberg, 2009; van Knippenberg, 2011) and there are both theoretical and empirical grounds for arguing that they are interdependent (Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, & Kessler, 2013). However, it has been shown that there are instances where concerns about the effectiveness of leaders may be considered independently and may even override considerations of how prototypical or representative leaders are (Haslam et al., 2011; Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007). For example, Teixeira, Demoulin, and Yzerbyt (2011, 2013) have shown preference for pro-out-group deviants (i.e., representatives who deviate from the in-group prototype in the direction of the out-group) when the goal of negotiation is short-term, and there is an expectation of some success. Thus, we might expect that an out-group’s positive overtures towards an in-group leader might render them more acceptable (not less) by virtue of their greater potential effectiveness in negotiating a deal.

The notion that group members are often strategic in how they respond to intergroup competition or conflict is well established. For instance, there is a wealth of research informed by interdependence theory and behavioural economics that attests to the role of cost-benefit appraisals in people’s calculations (De Dreu et al., 2015; Demoulin & De Dreu, 2010). There is also a large body of research using the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm that highlights the importance of people’s expectations of other players’ actions in their calculations. Certainly, it has been shown that at the individual-level, partners who defect elicit less cooperation; whereas when cooperation is expected, cooperative behaviour is more likely (Rapoport & Guyer, 1966). Moreover, the first mover in setting the agenda establishes
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this principle; if the first mover signals cooperation, the subsequent negotiation is, at least initially, likely to be guided by this frame (Clark & Sefton, 2001; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004).

At the group level, there is also evidence that members of low status groups are sensitive to the responsiveness (Wright, 2001) or repressiveness of powerful out-groups (Drury & Reicher, 2005) and will sometimes calibrate their responses in accordance with how they expect out-groups to respond (e.g., Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005). Of note, there is research on the role of out-groups in bolstering responses to minority influence (David & Turner, 1999); and suggestions that the illegitimate actions of out-groups may undermine moderate voices of leadership (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2012, 2013, 2015). Finally, there is evidence that out-groups are themselves aware of this. Out-groups have been shown to strategically bolster support for conciliatory leaders through tactics such as helping the other leader to meet their internal challenges (Sebenius, 2013); expressions of empathy (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006); and conciliatory actions (Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006).

In sum, there are theoretical and empirical grounds for arguing that both identity and instrumental motives may be implicated in support for group leaders in intergroup contexts of competition or conflict. There are also grounds for arguing that through their actions, out-groups can shape group members’ understandings of the intergroup relationship and their support for rival forms of leadership. Positive out-group signals, in the context of intergroup conflict, have the potential to undermine the prototypicality of an in-group leader. However, they also have the potential to shift perceptions of the intergroup context and so the prototypical position of the group, as well as to enhance perceptions of leader effectiveness.
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Present research

The present studies aim to examine a gap in the social psychological literatures on collective action, negotiation, and leadership. Across the four studies we examine choice of one of two in-group leader candidates in a context where a powerful (high status) out-group has announced a decision that will harm their group. Study 1 examines choice between an in-group leader candidate who advocates either a negotiation tactic or an opposition tactic and an in-group leader candidate for whom no information is given. Study 2 examines choice between an in-group leader candidate with whom the out-group has signaled preference to negotiate or not-negotiate, and an in-group leader candidate for whom no information is given. Study 3 examines choice between two in-group leader candidates where one advocates a negotiation tactic and the other advocates an opposition tactic; and where the out-group has signaled either willingness to negotiate or refusal to negotiate. Study 4 replicates Study 3 with a sample recruited on the basis of interest or involvement in activist groups.

In Study 1 we begin from the premise that in a context of out-group threat, support for an oppositional leader candidate or a negotiating leader candidate is not a given. Rather, it will depend on whether the leader is seen as effective for the group (i.e., delivering for us: H1a) and as prototypical of the group (i.e., one of us: H1b). In Studies 2, 3 and 4 we further propose that an out-group’s signaling of (un)willingness to negotiate will influence people’s choice of leader. Specifically, in Study 2, an out-group signaling preference for a particular leader will strengthen support for that leader (H2). In Studies 3 and 4, an out-group signaling willingness to negotiate will strengthen support for a negotiating in-group leader over an oppositional in-group leader (H3). The mediating effects of perceptions of leader effectiveness and leader prototypicality are again investigated.

STUDY 1
Leader choice: out-group signals and collective action tactics

In Study1, our interest was in the role of effectiveness and prototypicality in how people choose when presented with a leader who proposes an oppositional tactic or one who proposes a negotiation tactic, in the context of threat from a powerful out-group. In terms of who should receive most support, the literature is not clear and so we make no prediction. On the one hand, intergroup threat produces the conditions for accentuating intergroup differences (Jetten et al., 2004; Wright & Tropp, 2002), and increasing support for leaders who distance themselves from the out-group (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). Conversely, there is a wider literature that points to normative expectations—at least in liberal democracies--of cooperation and conciliation and suggests that more oppositional strategies will receive support only when more moderate strategies have failed (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011). According to both lines of argument, the choice of leader (oppositional or negotiating) will be mediated by believing the leader to be effective in advancing the group’s goals (H1a) as well as being prototypical or representative of the group (H1b).

Method

Participants and design. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to recruit 116 adults to participate in an on-line survey on leadership. Seventeen participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded leaving 99 participants (female = 44; male = 56) aged 18 to 70 (\( M=34; SD=11.77 \)). All participants resided in the US and although they ranged across the full left-right political spectrum most placed themselves on the centre-left (Mdn=41 on a 100 point scale).

We employed a one-way design comparing the effect of the independent variable (in-group leader tactic) at three levels (negotiate; organize opposition; control) on the dependent variable, choice of leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were investigated as potential mediators.
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Materials and procedure. A questionnaire on leadership was completed on-line. All participants were first asked to think about a hypothetical situation in which they are a member of a group and another group is considering a decision that would harm their group’s interests. In order to manipulate in-group leader tactic, participants were then told that there were two potential leaders for their group: Leader X and Leader Y, and were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions where they were told: “Leader Y thinks the best strategy is to negotiate with the out-group” (negotiate condition); “Leader Y thinks the best strategy is to organize opposition to the out-group” (organize opposition condition); or they were given no additional information for Leader Y (control condition). All conditions were randomized and throughout the questionnaire, so too was the order of presenting Leaders X (about whom no information was ever given) and Leader Y (see Appendix A for scenarios and manipulations).

Manipulation check. A two-item manipulation check was also included at the conclusion of the study. Participants were asked “Which leader has the strategy of negotiation?” and “Which leader has the strategy of organizing opposition?” and were given the option of answering Leader X, Leader Y, or Neither / don’t know.

Choose leader Y was measured using a single dichotomous item: “If forced to choose, which leader would you choose (Leader X [coded -1] or Leader Y [coded +1])?”

Leader effectiveness was measured using four items. Two items tapped overall effectiveness, “Which leader do you think would be better for your group?” and “Which leader would be the least effective leader?” (reverse scored); and two items assessed effectiveness in influencing the out-group, “Which leader do you think would be most likely to influence the other group’s decision?” and “Which leader would be less influential with the other group?” (reverse scored). Items were measured on a 1 (Leader X) to 7 (Leader Y) scale and were averaged to form the scale (α=.86).
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*Leader prototypicality* was measured using four items based on van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg’s (2005) research: “Which leader is less typical of members of your group?” (reverse scored); “Which leader is less likely to embody the values and beliefs of your group?” (reverse scored); “Which leader represents what is characteristic of your group?”; and “Which leader is more representative of the values and beliefs of your group?” The four items were averaged, with higher scores indicating Leader Y was seen as more prototypical ($\alpha=.89$).

The two mediators, leader effectiveness and prototypicality, were strongly intercorrelated, $r=.67$. This is consistent with research showing that prototypical leaders tend to be regarded as more effective leaders and effective leaders tend to be seen as more prototypical (Steffens et al., 2013). However, given the strong theoretical grounds to differentiate between the two (van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005; van Knippenberg, 2011), we retained these measures as distinct.

**Results**

A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader Y differed across the three tactic conditions (negotiation: 92%; opposition: 44%; and control: 29%), $\chi^2(2, N=99) = 12.38, p=.002$. One-way ANOVAs on effectiveness and prototypicality in the three leader tactic conditions found the same pattern of results. Specifically, the negotiating leader was more effective ($M=4.93, SD=1.07$) and prototypical ($M=4.67, SD=1.28$) than the oppositional leader ($Ms=4.03, 3.86, SDs=1.52, 1.47$) and the leader where no information was given ($Ms=3.55, 3.49, SDs=1.59, 1.47; Fs=8.61, 6.38, ps<.001, .003$ respectively). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 here
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In order to examine the indirect effects of leader tactic (negotiate or organize opposition) on choice of Leader Y via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Choice of Leader Y (+1, compared to Leader X, -1) was used as the criterion. Two contrast codes were used as predictors: the focal variable of in-group leader tactic (a manipulated variable coded +1 = negotiation tactic, -1 = opposition tactic, and 0 = no information condition); and the orthogonal covariate of no information (a variable contrasting the two in-group tactic conditions, coded -1, with the control condition, coded +2). Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of leader tactic on leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the significance of the indirect effects.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the total effect of leader tactic on leader choice was significant. Participants showed stronger support for Leader Y in the condition where the leader’s tactic preference was to negotiate with the other group compared to where their preference was to organise opposition. This effect became non-significant when the mediators were included in the model.

Analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that both effectiveness and prototypicality were predicted by in-group leader tactic. In the condition where leader Y preferred to negotiate, leader Y was rated as more effective and prototypical. In addition, both effectiveness and prototypicality were associated with leader choice: the perception that Leader Y was more effective and prototypical than Leader X was associated with the choice of Leader Y over Leader X.
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Finally, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of tactic on leader choice via both effectiveness ($IE = .64$, $SE = .40$, 95% CI .14, 1.59), and prototypicality ($IE = .75$, $SE = .57$, 95% CI .03, 1.86).

Discussion

In Study 1, participants were placed in one of two conditions: one where they had the option of choosing between a leader with a negotiation tactic vs a leader for whom no information was given; and one where they had the option of choosing between a leader with an oppositional tactic vs a leader for whom, again, no information was given. We assumed that a leader with any strategy would be better than a leader with none, but made no prediction regarding this, nor regarding differential support across the two leader tactic conditions. Rather, our interest was in what would mediate preference across the two conditions. We found evidence for stronger support for the leader whose strategic response to a threatening out-group is negotiation; and this preference for an in-group negotiator rather than a more oppositional figure was via perceiving the negotiating leader as both effective and prototypical (H1a and H1b supported).

Much intergroup research confirms that out-group threats can evoke more aggressive and discriminatory responding (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002; Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). But, consistent with our findings, research also shows normative support for intergroup cooperation and conciliation (Louis, 2014; Tausch et al., 2011) and that low-status groups may be loath to display in-group bias (Scheepers et al., 2006). Of course, such responses would make strategic sense to the extent that there was an expectation of being able to influence the intergroup relationship (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright & Tropp, 2002) or to deliver a negotiated solution (Teixeira et al., 2011). An obvious factor in such appraisals would be the stance taken by the out-group.
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STUDY 2

In Study 2 our interest turned to how, in the context of intergroup threat, an out-group’s signaling preparedness to negotiate (or not negotiate) with one particular in-group leader affects support for that leader. We test the hypothesis that there should be stronger support for an in-group leader candidate with whom the out-group is happy to negotiate compared with a leader with whom the out-group is not prepared to negotiate or one for whom there is no information (H2). We make this prediction on the premise that an out-group’s preference to negotiate with a particular candidate would be perceived as reflecting positively on that leader’s ability to deliver for the group (Haslam et al., 2011). In making this prediction, however, we note that there are potentially competing processes; an in-group leader who receives some form of endorsement by the out-group may be perceived as less prototypical of the group (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) and accordingly receive less support. In the present study, we therefore explore a suppression model in which both leader effectiveness and prototypicality are expected to be positively associated with candidate endorsement (H2a), and in which we test the hypothesis that a threatening out-group’s signaling of support for one of two rival leadership candidates will heighten perceived effectiveness and lower prototypicality (H2b).

Method

Participants and design. We recruited 105 participants, again via MTurk. Following removal of cases where participants failed to complete the survey, our sample comprised 102 adults (female: 48; male: 53) between the ages of 18 and 66 (M=32; SD = 11.03).

We employed a one-way design comparing the effect of the independent variable (out-group preference) at three levels (out-group prefers to negotiate with Leader A; not...
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negotiate with Leader A; no information control) on the dependent variable, choice of Leader A (coded +1, vs B, coded -1). Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were investigated as potential mediators.

*Materials and procedure.* A questionnaire on leadership was completed on-line. In order to manipulate out-group preference, participants were asked to think about a hypothetical situation in which they are a member of a group and where another group is considering a decision that would harm their group’s interests. They were told that there were two potential leaders for their group: Leader A and Leader B. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions where they were told: “The other group has indicated that it is happy to negotiate with Leader A from your group” (negotiate condition); “The other group has indicated that it would prefer not to negotiate with Leader A from your group” (not negotiate condition); or were provided no further information (control condition). See Appendix B for scenario and manipulations.

*Choose leader A* was measured using a single dichotomous item: If forced to choose, which leader would you choose: Leader A (coded +1) or Leader B (coded -1).

*Leader effectiveness* was measured using three items: two items from Study 1, reverse scored (“Which leader do you think would be worse for your group?” and “Which leader do you think would be least likely to influence the other group?”) and one item tapping in-group support (“Which leader will other group members be more willing to follow?”). Items were measured on a 1 (Leader A) to 7 (Leader B) scale and averaged to form the scale (α=.58).

*Leader prototypicality* was measured using two items from Study 1: “Which leader is less typical of members of your group?” reverse scored; and “Which leader is more likely to embody the values and beliefs of your group?” The same 7-point scale was used as above and the items were averaged to form the scale (r=.66).
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The inter-correlation between the two composite scales, was again high $r=.60$. We retained the two variables as distinct on theoretical grounds (van Knippenberg, 2011).

**Results**

A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader A differed across the three out-group preference conditions (negotiate: 89%; not negotiate: 55%; and control: 74%), $\chi^2(2, N=101) = 6.03, p=.003$. A one-way ANOVA on effectiveness across the three conditions found that the leader who the out-group was happy to negotiate with was more effective ($M=4.98, SD=1.20$) than the leader who the out-group preferred not to negotiate with ($M=4.11, SD=1.55$) and the leader where no information was given ($M=4.04, SD=1.20; F=5.75, ps<.004$). A one-way ANOVA on prototypicality found little difference across the three conditions ($Ms=4.50, 4.27, 4.33; SDs=1.57, 1.70, 1.33; F=0.18, p=.835$). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 here

In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group signaling of preference on choice of leader A via leader effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Choice of Leader A was used as the criterion, and two contrast codes were used as predictors: out-group preference (a manipulated variable coded +1 = out-group negotiate with Leader A, -1 = out-group not negotiate with Leader A, and zero = no information condition); and no information (a variable contrasting the two out-group preference conditions, coded -1, with the control condition, coded +2) entered as a covariate. Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group preference on leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the significance of the indirect effects.
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preference on choose leader A was significant. Participants were more likely to choose leader A in the condition where the out-group preferred to negotiate with Leader A (87%) compared with the condition where the out-group preferred not to negotiate with Leader A (53%). This effect decreased substantially when the mediators were in the model (although remaining marginally significant). Both effectiveness and prototypicality were positively associated with leader choice: evaluation of Leader A as more effective and prototypical than Leader B, was associated with the choice of Leader A over Leader B.

Analysis of leader effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that in the condition where the out-group signalled its preference to negotiate with Leader A, Leader A was rated as more effective than Leader B; but that out-group preference had no effect on perceived prototypicality. Consistent with the results above, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on leader choice via effectiveness ($IE = .95, SE = 1.13, 95\% CI .10, 3.66$), but not via prototypicality ($IE = .14, SE = .40, 95\% CI -.69, .93$; see Figure 2).

Discussion

Study 2 contributes a number of novel findings to the scholarly literature. First, differential out-group signaling of preference was shown to shape leadership support: participants were far more likely to choose Leader A when the other group was happy to negotiate with them than when not (H2 supported). Second, whilst both perceived effectiveness and prototypicality independently predicted support for a leadership candidate (H2a supported), only the former mediated the out-group preference effect (H2b partially
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supported). That is to say, in the present data, out-group preference boosted perceived
effectiveness but had no effect on prototypicality, and certainly did not undermine it.

In light of the strong inter-correlation between the two proposed mediators, we do not
wish to overstate the differential effects of leader effectiveness and prototypicality. What is
more important, we suggest, is the demonstration that people are attentive to out-group cues
in their evaluation and choice of a leader: minimal information suggesting that the out-group
preferred to negotiate with leader A was sufficient for people to evaluate leader A as more
effective than leader B and to choose leader A over leader B. This resonates with the research
on intergroup reconciliation where it is argued that out-group leaders can and do influence in-
group support for conciliatory action (e.g., Bar Tal, 2000; Nadler & Leviatan, 2006).

STUDY 3

Our aim in Study 3 was to examine how the interplay between an out-group and in-
group leader’s tactical approach to dealing with an intergroup conflict affects leader choice.
Specifically, we focus on the interaction between out-group willingness versus unwillingness
to negotiate and rival in-group leaders with tactics of negotiation versus opposition. Whereas
in Study 2, the out-group signal communicated preference for a particular candidate, here the
out-group signal was of general openness to negotiation and so our theorizing was somewhat
different. According to theory, an out-group signaling (un)willingness to negotiate should be
an important factor affecting stability and hence, where the prototypical position within a
group lies: there should be greater polarization from an out-group that expresses
intransigence, and less from a group which is more conciliatory (Oakes et al., 1998). Out-
group signaling should also be an important factor in determining the likely effectiveness of
conciliatory versus oppositional tactics in influencing the outcome—whilst conciliation might
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appear feasible where the out-group is open to negotiation, it is decidedly less so where the
out-group is not. Thus, we make the following predictions:

H3. An out-group leader signaling willingness to negotiate will strengthen support
for an in-group leader candidate with a tactic of negotiation (compared with an out-group
leader signaling un-willingness to negotiate.

H3a. Moreover, the relationship between the manipulated variable (out-group
willingness to negotiate) and the choice of a negotiating leader over an oppositional leader
will be mediated by positive evaluations of the negotiating leader’s effectiveness and
prototypicality.

Method

Participants and design. We recruited 101 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Eleven participants failed the manipulation checks and were excluded, leaving 90
participants (female: 37; male: 53) who were aged 18 to 62 (M=35). All participants resided
in the US and although they ranged across the full left-right political spectrum, most placed
themselves on the left (Mdn=33 on a 100 point scale).

Study 3 employed a between groups design comparing the effect of the independent
variable (out-group negotiate) at two levels (negotiate; not negotiate) on the dependent
variable, choice of in-group leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were again
investigated as potential mediators in the relationship between out-group willingness to
negotiate and choice of leader.

Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to imagine they were a member of a
group that was threatened by another group and that there were two potential leaders
appealing for their support. All participants were told “Leader N’s strategy to stop the other
group’s threatening decision is to negotiate with the other group” and “Leader O’s strategy to
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stop the other group’s threatening decision is to organize opposition to the other group”.

Participants were then told either “The leader of the other group has issued a statement saying they are prepared to negotiate” (out-group negotiate) or “The leader of the other group has issued a statement saying they are not prepared to negotiate” (out-group not negotiate). All conditions were randomized and so too was the order of presenting information about Leaders N and O (See Appendix C for scenario and manipulation).

Comprehension and manipulation checks. In order to reinforce the information and ensure it was understood, two questions immediately followed the manipulation: “Which leader has the strategy of negotiation?” and “Is the other group prepared to negotiate?” If incorrect, participants were provided with the correct information and were asked to try again. A final manipulation check was provided at the conclusion of the survey: participants were presented with statements regarding Leader N and Leader O’s preferred strategies and were again asked whether the other group was prepared to negotiate.

Choose Leader N: Participants were asked “If forced to choose, which leader would you choose to support (Leader O [coded -1]; Leader N [coded +1])?” The same items used in Study 1 were used to measure effectiveness (α=.88) and prototypicality (α=.79), with higher scores indicating that leader N was seen as more effective and prototypical. The inter-correlation between the two composite scales was \( r=.48 \).

Results

A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader N (negotiate) was significantly stronger in the condition where the out-group signaled willingness to negotiate (90%) compared to the un-willingness to negotiate condition (49%), \( \chi^2(1, N=90) = 17.41, p<.001 \). One sample t-tests compared the overall means for relative effectiveness (\( M=4.47, SD=1.53 \)) and prototypicality (\( M=4.54, SD=1.25 \)) ratings of Leader N vs Leader O against the
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mid-point of the scales. Consistent with Study 1, there was an overall perception that Leader N (negotiate) was more effective and prototypical than Leader O (opposition: ts=27.63, 34.24, ps < .001). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 here

In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group preparedness to negotiate on choice of leader N via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Out-group negotiate (coded +1 = out-group prepared to negotiate, or -1 = not prepared to negotiate) was entered as the predictor, and leader choice as the criterion. Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group negotiate on leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the significance of the indirect effects.

As Figure 3 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preparedness to negotiate on choice of Leader N was significant. Most participants supported Leader N (negotiate) in the condition where the out-group was prepared to negotiate (90%); and most supported Leader O (opposition) where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate (51%). This effect remained significant but decreased when the mediators were included in the model.

Insert Figure 3 here

Specifically, analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that the out-group’s preparedness to negotiate affected effectiveness but not prototypicality. When the out-group was prepared to negotiate, the negotiating leader candidate was rated as relatively more effective, but not more prototypical than when the out-
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The group was not prepared to negotiate. Moreover, overall effectiveness but not prototypicality was associated with leader choice: only the perception that Leader N was relatively more effective than Leader O was associated with the choice of Leader N over Leader O.

Consistent with the above, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on leader choice via effectiveness ($IE = .93, SE = .59, 95\% CI .32, 2.06$), but not prototypicality ($IE = .01, SE = .10, 95\% CI - .12, .30$).

Discussion

In Study 3, we found that out-group signalling shaped people’s choice of leader (H3 supported) and that this was mediated by evaluations of leader effectiveness (H3a partially supported). Specifically, an out-group signalling willingness to negotiate resulted in a negotiating in-group leader being judged more effective and this in turn resulted in their being chosen by 90 percent of participants. When the out-group signalled it was not willing to negotiate, there was a dramatic reversal in this result with just over half (51%) opting for the oppositional leader, who was now judged to be more effective. Thus, where the out-group’s intransigence closed off the possibility of a negotiated solution, we observed a shift from the ‘dove’ model of leader preference observed in Studies 1 and 2 to a ‘hawk’ model of leader preference. Contrary to our predictions, prototypicality did not mediate people’s shift in decision-making (inconsistent with H3a); it appeared that strategic concerns rather than representativeness dominated the decision.

STUDY 4

In the first three studies, participants were asked to respond to scenarios affecting groups with which there was no basis for identity and so of psychological investment, and
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where there was minimal information about the context and the rival in-group leaders. This raises questions about the interpretation of our results in terms of group processes. In Study 4 we sought to address this through recruiting participants who belonged to or could imagine themselves belonging to political or community activist groups and linking the scenarios with these groups. We retained the same hypotheses as for Study 3.

Method

Participants and design. We recruited 408 participants via Pureprofile, an on-line survey company. After screening out participants who did not nominate an activist group and removal of two participants who failed the manipulation checks, we were left with 136 participants (female: 71; male: 65) aged 20 to 79 (M=48). Participants were mainly British (n=134); with a median household income of between £30,000 and £39,000 (above the national median of £27,000); and political views across the left-right spectrum, with the median close to the center of the scale (Mdn=48 on a 100 point scale).

Study 4 employed a between groups design comparing the effect of the independent variable (out-group willingness to negotiate) at two levels (negotiate; not negotiate) on the dependent variable, choice of in-group leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were again investigated as potential mediators in the relationship between out-group willingness to negotiate and choice of leader.

Materials and procedure.

Participants were first asked to list activist groups to which they belonged or could imagine themselves belonging; and then to nominate one group that was particularly meaningful to them, and write about its values and goals. A diverse range of groups were nominated including political parties of all persuasions (39), environment, conservation and
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animal welfare groups (38), social justice and identity-based groups (21), trade unions (17), and an assortment of church and local community groups (20).

Participants were next asked to describe a scenario where a powerful out-group had announced a decision that was particularly harmful to their group, such as loss of political or legal status, loss of funding, or support for an opposing group’s interests. Responses varied in detail from merely re-stating one of the examples given (e.g., loss of funding) to elaborating on the kind of threat their organization might experience and the implications.

Leader manipulation: Participants were presented in a randomized order with information about two leader candidates, who were both described in terms suggesting they were plausible, experienced candidates. For the ease of the reader we will refer to these leaders as Leader N (negotiate) and Leader O (opposition). Participants read:

Imagine there are two people who have worked hard for your group over the years and have at various times taken on positions of leadership. They each have different strengths and ways of doing things; and in the current crisis they are proposing very different strategies. This has created a division in your group and a meeting has been called to choose between these two potential leaders.

Leader N is a good lobbyist and has been successful in securing the support of others to your group’s cause. Leader N believes that through careful negotiation with this powerful group, a satisfactory resolution can be achieved.

Leader O is an active campaigner and has been successful in mobilizing people to defeat proposals harmful to the goals of your group. Leader O believes that what is required is the organization of strong collective action against this powerful group.
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Out-group manipulation: Participants were then told that the day of the meeting has arrived and members of the group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has publicly announced either: “whilst it is unlikely that they will change their decision, they are prepared to discuss their decision with your group and to negotiate” (willingness to negotiate); or “their decision is final and they are not prepared to negotiate or even discuss their decision with your group” (unwillingness to negotiate: See Appendix D for scenarios and manipulations).

Manipulation checks. The manipulations of leader tactic and out-group willingness to negotiate were each followed immediately with a manipulation check. Participants were asked which leader had the tactic of negotiation and whether the out-group was prepared to negotiate. Where participants gave the incorrect answer they were presented with the correct information and asked to answer again. Only those who answered correctly were able to continue.

The same items as in Study 3 were used to measure leader choice, effectiveness ($\alpha=.73$), and prototypicality ($\alpha=.81$). Once again, higher scores indicated choice of leader N and that leader N was seen as more effective and prototypical than leader O. The inter-correlation between the effectiveness and prototypicality composite scales was $r = .34$, $p<.001$.

Results

A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader N (negotiate) was significantly stronger in the condition where the out-group signaled willingness to negotiate (72%) compared to the un-willingness to negotiate condition (46%), $\chi^2(1, N=136) = 9.29$, $p=.002$. One sample T-tests compared the overall means for relative effectiveness ($M=4.18$, $SD=1.31$) and prototypicality ($M=4.09$, $SD=1.34$) ratings of Leader N vs Leader O against the
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mid-point of the scales. Consistent with the previous studies, there was an overall perception that Leader N (negotiate) was more effective and prototypical than Leader O (opposition: $t_{37.11, 35.14, ps < .001}$). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 4.

Insert Table 4 here

In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group preparedness to negotiate on the choice of Leader N via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Out-group negotiate (coded +1, out-group willing to negotiate, or -1, not willing to negotiate) was entered as the predictor, and leader choice as the criterion. Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group negotiate on leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the significance of the indirect effects.

As Figure 4 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preparedness to negotiate on the choice of Leader N was significant. In line with H3, most participants supported Leader N (negotiate) in the condition where the out-group was prepared to negotiate (73%); most however supported Leader O (opposition) where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate (54%). This effect remained significant but decreased when the mediators were included in the model.

Insert Figure 4 here
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Analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that once again, effectiveness but not prototypicality was associated with the out-group’s preparedness to negotiate. When the out-group was prepared to negotiate, the negotiating leader candidate (Leader N) was rated as relatively more effective ($M=4.58$, $SD=1.31$), but not more prototypical ($M=4.04$, $SD=1.42$) than when the out-group was not prepared to negotiate ($Ms=3.73, 4.16; SDs=1.18, 1.26$ and $t=-3.94, .051, ps < .001, .616$). Both effectiveness and prototypicality were associated with leader choice: those who chose Leader N perceived this leader to be more effective than those who chose Leader O ($Ms=4.87, 3.19; SDs=.97, 1.20$; $t=-9.30, p<.001$), and more prototypical than those who chose Leader O ($Ms=4.87, 3.48; SDs=.97, 1.31; t=-4.72, p<.001$).

Consistent with the above, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on leader choice via effectiveness ($IE = .76, SE = .30, 95\% CI \ .31, 1.43$), but not prototypicality ($IE = -.04 SE = .09, 95\% CI - .25, .13$).

Discussion

Once again, the out-group’s willingness to negotiate did affect leader support as predicted (H3 supported). Indeed, in this study conducted with activist group members or sympathizers, and involving more meaningful scenarios, the pattern of results closely mirrored those observed in Study 3 (73% support for the negotiator where the out-group was prepared to negotiate; and 54% support for the oppositional candidate where they were not). Once again, this shift was related to people’s perceptions of who in this context would be the more effective leader and whilst prototypicality predicted leader choice, it was not found to play a mediating role (H3a partially supported). Thus, participants were responding to the differing contexts in a strategic manner where what was affected by the manipulation was beliefs about the leader’s ability to deliver for the group.
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General Discussion

This research extends research on collective action, negotiation, and leadership by addressing the role of out-groups in the intra-group struggles over leadership that may occur in contexts of intergroup conflict. Whereas collective action research has focussed on how intergroup conflict enhances support for oppositional forms of collective action, this research proceeds from the notion that within groups there may be competition between potential leaders with each presenting their own vision of what forms of collective action are needed to advance the groups interests. Included in these, is the possibility of negotiation with an out-group.

In the present data we found that in a context of intergroup threat, a leader who advocated a within-system, negotiating tactic, was preferred over one who advocated the mobilization of opposition (Study 1). This is consistent with research showing that within-system forms of action are normative where the intergroup relationship is unstable and there appears to be some potential for resolution or a change in the relationship (Tausch & Becker, 2012; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, 2001). Studies 2, 3 and 4 provided novel findings in demonstrating that through signalling their intentions towards the in-group, out-groups can have a bearing on in-group processes of leader selection. In Study 2, an out-group’s expression of preference for a particular leader appeared to bolster support for that leader. In Studies 3 and 4 group members chose a negotiating leader only where the out-group was prepared to negotiate; but where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate, support for the negotiating leader was compromised and instead participants opted for an oppositional leader. Similar patterns were noted in Study 4 as in Study 3, replicating the previous findings in a different cultural context, and in the subset of respondents who were involved or interested in politics and thinking of specific activist groups.
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The potential for out-groups to affect internal influence processes is recognized in research on intergroup negotiation (Teixeira et al., 2011) and reconciliation (Bar Tal, 2000; Nadler & Leviatan, 2006), and informs understandings of effective counter-insurgency strategy (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). In the context of concerns about radicalisation and when people will heed oppositional voices of leadership, the understanding that the actions of powerful outgroups (such as governments) are key to these dynamics, is an important message (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2013, 2015). To date, however, the role of intergroup signalling has not received as much attention in the wider social-psychological collective action or leadership research; mainly this research focuses on perceptions of the intergroup relationship (e.g., stability; Wright, 2001), but rarely on the specifics of what out-groups do to shape those perceptions.

Whilst our main focus was on the role of out-groups in moderating in-group leader choice, we also tested the mediating effects of perceived leader effectiveness and leader prototypicality. Consistent with the central role afforded instrumental motives in dual-process models of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2014; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012), and in the wider literature on political leadership (Chemers, 2001) and negotiation (de Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2015), across all four studies, the perception of who would be the most effective leader in achieving the group’s goals mediated people’s leader choice. However, whilst leader protoypicality mediated the relationship between leader tactic and leader choice in Study 1, it did not mediate people’s decision-making in the other three studies (2, 3 and 4) where the intentions of the out-group were in play. That is to say, in the studies where people were presented with out-group signals about willingness to negotiate, people’s decision making appeared to reflect concerns about the leader’s ability to deliver for the group, but not the leader’s representativeness of the group.
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This is consistent with Texeira and colleagues’ (2011; see also Morton et al., 2007) argument that instrumental goals may take precedence over identity concerns when there is a likelihood of success. Given the inter-correlations between leader effectiveness and prototypicality in our data, and the theoretically complex relations between these constructs, we do not wish to over-play the importance of our findings. Based on the leadership research informed by the social identity perspective we would expect out-group signals affecting beliefs about the intergroup relationship (e.g., legitimacy and stability) to affect leader prototypicality judgements (Gleibs & Haslam, 2016). Moreover, we would expect this effect to be both independent of effects on leader effectiveness and in interaction (Steffens et al., 2013). Accordingly, we want to echo others’ calls for recognition of people’s strategic decision-making as reflected in the wider leadership literature, and the importance therefore of including leader effectiveness alongside leader prototypicality in research (Haslam et al., 2011).

Limitations and future research

The use of relatively abstract and minimalist scenarios allowed for clarity and rigor in the experimental manipulations. The effects we observed in the first three studies are noteworthy because they were found in relatively abstract contexts where we would not expect people to be strongly identified with the group or invested in its outcomes. And we are encouraged by the replication of our findings in the fourth study involving those with an interest in activism who were able to respond to the hypothetical scenarios in the context of their political interests and sympathies. But, by the same token, we need to be cautious in the claims we can make from this research. For example, the low ratio of respondents who self-report being interested in activism and politics in Study 4 (well under 1/3) highlights that the online panels used in all four studies may draw primarily on the politically disengaged or
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disaffected, representative perhaps of the community but not of fervent activists, who may have different norms or values.

Similarly, although including both British (Study 4) and American (Studies 1-3) respondents, the research was conducted with WEIRD (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) populations and we would not expect the normative expectations regarding negotiation that hold in a liberal democracy to hold everywhere. For instance, out-group signalling of conciliatory intentions may have a very different meaning in contexts where there is a history of powerful groups reneging on deals and brutally suppressing former allies. Second, there are inevitably demand characteristics entailed in experimental studies such as these where people are constrained in terms of the kind of information and the kinds of responses that are available to them. Third, and related to our second point, it could be argued that the minimal information contained in our manipulation was similar to a sequential prisoner dilemma study and that our findings simply reflect reciprocity motives (see Clark & Sefton, 2001). We note, however, that this explanation would need additional empirical justification as much research has shown that outgroups are not necessarily within our circle of concern and so are not entitled to reciprocity prima facie (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016).

Most crucially, in a real world context where there is a historical and temporal aspect to inter-group relations, the ‘first mover’ literature (Clark & Sefton, 2001; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004) is qualified by the realisation that there is always a historical precedent. Group members will be engaged in argument over the construal of the context and of what sort of leadership is required, and the behaviour of the out-group in the past will qualify the in-group’s reactions in the present. Put differently, context-specific trust in the out-group will moderate the impact of out-group statements on in-group members’ actions, making them more responsive or sceptical and reactive to out-group endorsements and affirmations of willingness to negotiate. Accordingly, future research needs to be conducted in particular
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real world contexts, where we can examine the complexity of the kinds of intergroup contexts that frame intragroup leadership contests.

For instance, Muslim communities in the West are experiencing considerable threat and there is currently disagreement among British Muslims about how leaders should respond to government overtures to cooperate in the counter-terrorism agenda. An understanding of how out-groups (e.g., government, religious and other civic organisations) can bolster or undermine these competing voices of leadership, is one important direction for future research. Specific questions about differences in how negotiators, spokespeople, and leaders are evaluated could form part of that research agenda, along with questions about whether actors themselves understand support as a strategic response to a set of circumstances (e.g., out-group actions), or whether it is accompanied by a re-evaluation of one’s own identity and indeed, of what constitutes appropriate forms of collective response (Blackwood et al., 2015).

Future research also needs to consider the processes underpinning how people make decisions about leaders in these contexts; for instance, what identities and identity processes are entailed, and the role of theoretically important constructs such as effectiveness and prototypicality. Whilst our research found that leader effectiveness and not leader prototypicality was affected by our manipulations, it is arguable that all leaders in our study were effectively presented as prototypical. Accordingly, one avenue for future research could be to consider whether an effective leader would still be supported if they were not prototypical. Thus, as well as considering the independent effects, future research needs to consider the potential interactive effects between leader effectiveness and leader prototypicality. Research examining dual process explanations of collective action (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2012) may provide insights that could inform such a research agenda.
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Arguably, there is a clear need to sharpen our understanding of collective action leadership through closer attention to the specific situational cues out-groups provide through their actions; and the specific forms of response available to groups. But, more generally, it is our hope that collective action researchers will be inspired, if only by the limitations in our research, to dive into the rich vein of questions that are raised, once we begin to think of struggles over collective action leadership, and of negotiation as a collective action tactic.

Take-home messages

There are two take-home messages from this research. On an applied level, the first point we want to make with this research is that we need an understanding of leadership tactics in relation to the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict. Leaders must be sensitive to the exigencies of mobilizing an ‘us versus them’ sentiment whilst not closing the door on negotiation. The second related point is that we need a more nuanced understanding of the goals and forms that collective action may take. This has been highlighted by a number of commentators in recent debates about social change research (e.g., Blackwood, Livingstone, & Leach, 2013). For instance, Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Patto, & Saab (2013) propose that ‘collective’ mobilization whereby group interests are advanced within the system through strategies such as negotiation, has hitherto received scant attention. When we consider social movements, a range of tactics are typically employed and may be combined in an overarching strategy. Moreover, there is often division within movements over tactics, and these divisions can be a catalyst for leadership challenges.

In sum, intergroup conflict may present a context where group members accentuate intergroup differences and support for oppositional forms of leadership. But, the real world can provide ample examples of political contests (for instance, party pre-selection processes) where groups may be divided over whether what is needed is a leader who represents the
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group’s values or one who can secure political success. Research on collective action, negotiation, and leadership suggest a more nuanced picture where social change beliefs (e.g., the possibility of change within the system) and the nature of group goals (e.g., short term vs long term; incremental vs substantial) play a role. The realpolitik suggests that what out-groups do over the course of conflict should be critical to shaping these beliefs and goals.

End Note

1 The word ‘prepared’ has a number of meanings, including ‘willing to do something’ (see Merriam-Webster dictionary). This particular meaning might be idiomatic to native English speakers. Given the way in which the word is used and the fact that the respondents were from the US and the UK, we are confident that this meaning would have been understood.
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References


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*Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities* (pp. 291-310).


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Appendix A

Study 1: Scenario with manipulation of leader tactic

We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as it will be important to remember when answering questions.

Imagine you are a member of a group. There is another group that is considering a decision that threatens your group’s interests. There are two potential leaders in your group: we will call them Leader X and Leader Y.

Leader tactic conditions

Negotiate tactic condition: Leader Y thinks the best strategy to stop this threatening decision is to negotiate with the other group.

Opposition tactic: Leader Y thinks the best strategy to stop this threatening decision is to organize opposition to the other group.

Control condition: [no additional information provided].
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Appendix B

Study 2: Scenario with manipulation of out-group endorsement of Leader A

We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Imagine you are a member of a group. There is another group that is considering a decision that would harm your group’s interests. There are two potential leaders in your group: we will call them Leader A and Leader B.

Out-group signal conditions

Outgroup endorsement: The other group has indicated that it is happy to negotiate with Leader A from your group.

Outgroup non-endorsement: The other group has indicated that it would prefer not to negotiate with Leader A from your group.

Control condition: [no additional information provided].
Study 3: Scenario with in-group leader strategies and manipulation of out-group signal of willingness to negotiate

We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as it will be important to remember when answering questions.

Imagine you are a member of a group. There is another group that is considering a decision that threatens your group’s interests. There are two potential leaders in your group: we will call them Leader N and Leader O. Both potential leaders are appealing to members of your group to support them.

Leader N’s strategy to stop the other group's threatening decision is to negotiate with the other group. Leader O’s strategy to stop the other group’s threatening decision is to mobilize opposition to the other group.

**Out-group signal conditions**

Out-group willingness to negotiate condition: The leader of the other group has issued a statement saying they are prepared to negotiate.

Out-group unwillingness to negotiate condition: The leader of the other group has issued a statement saying they are not prepared to negotiate.
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Appendix D

Study 4: Scenario with in-group leader strategies and manipulation of out-group signal of willingness to negotiate

Selection of group

Later in this study we will ask you to imagine a scenario involving a group that is involved in political, social, economic, or environmental activism. Please list all the groups you belong to (or that you could imagine yourself belonging to). Note: if you don't want to name a group it is fine to give a general description (e.g., political party, trade union, social issues group, disability group, community action group, etc.) List as many as you can think of that matter to you.

Now please select one of these groups. This will be the group you will be asked to think about in the remainder of the survey. Which group have you selected?

Please tell us something about this group (e.g., its values and goals) and why it is important to you.

Out-group threat

Now imagine a scenario where a powerful group (e.g., government, non-government organisation, industry) has announced a decision that will have serious negative consequences for your group. Try to think of something that would be particularly harmful to your group and its goals (e.g., loss of funding; loss of political or legal status; support for an opposing group's interests). Below, we want you to describe the scenario you have imagined in as much detail as you can.

Out-group signal of willingness to negotiate
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We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as it will be important when answering the questions that follow.

Imagine there are two people (Jamie and Pat) who have worked hard for your group over the years and have at various times taken on positions of leadership. They each have different strengths and ways of doing things; and in the current crisis they are proposing very different strategies. This has created a division in your group and a meeting has been called to choose between these two potential leaders. Jamie is a good lobbyist and has been successful in securing the support of others to your group’s cause. Jamie believes that through careful negotiation with this powerful group, a satisfactory resolution can be achieved. Pat is an active campaigner and has been successful in mobilizing people to defeat proposals harmful to the goals of your group. Pat believes that what is required is the organization of strong collective action against this powerful group.

Out-group signal conditions

Out-group willingness to negotiate: Finally, the day of the meeting has arrived. You and other members of your group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has publicly stated that, whilst it is unlikely that they will change their decision, they are prepared to discuss their decision with your group and to negotiate.

Out-group unwillingness to negotiate: Finally, the day of the meeting has arrived. You and other members of your group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has publicly stated that their decision is final and they are not prepared to negotiate or even discuss their decision with your group.
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