PHD

'Exporting Paradise'? EU Development Policy Towards Africa Since the End of the Cold War

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Acronyms

ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
BIS – Bank for International Settlements
CARIFORUM – Caribbean Forum of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States
CCNM – Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members
CIDGE – Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DDA – Doha Development Agenda
DG – European Commission Directorate General
EAP – Environment Action Programme
ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council
EPAs – Economic Partnership Agreements
EU – European Union
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP – Gross National Product
GSP – Generalised System of Preferences
HIPC – Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IDGs – International Development Goals
IO – International Organisation
JEDH – Joint External Debt Hub
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
MS – European Union Member States
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO – New International Economic Order
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC – Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC – Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
POGAR – Program of Governance in the Arab Region
PRSPs - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
REPA – Regional Economic Partnership Agreement
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
SPA – Special Programme of Assistance for Africa
SWAC – Sahel & West Africa Club
TCBDB – Trade and Capacity Building Database
UN – United Nations
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF - United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRISD – United Nations Research Institute for Development
USA – United States of America
WB – World Bank
WTO – World Trade Organisation
Abstract

The central aim of the thesis is to define the approach of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. It focuses on the unexplored areas of the available literature on the subject, specifically the impact of EU development policy on the domain of international development and the objective of the EU to become a prominent international actor.

The thesis relies on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research. It concentrates on the dynamics maintained by the EU with the normative basis that characterises the structure and agents of international development, and assesses how it affected EU behaviour, as expressed through its development policy towards Africa in the considered timeframe. By doing so, the thesis exposes both the marked effect of EU development policy in the domain of international development, and the form of ‘paradise’ (model of development) the EU promoted in Africa. The empirical support in the thesis is comprised of archived data, official documents, press releases, published reports, speeches, and personally conducted interviews.

Following the method of research, the thesis focuses on tracing the norms that characterise EU development policy towards Africa over time. Therein, the thesis largely confirms the identified agents as the source of the norms that define the structure of international development, and the EU as its derivative. It argues that EU development policy is currently a general projection of the normative structure of international development, specifically regarding the policy orientation of its identified agents. As a result, it contends that the EU fell short of its efforts to export its form of ‘paradise’ to Africa in the proposed timeframe as a corollary of its limitations to stand as a distinct and leading actor in the domain of international development. Thus, the thesis makes a fresh contribution to the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa and the objective of the EU to become a prominent international actor in the twenty-first century.

1 The identified agents in the structure of international development consist of a set of international organisations, specifically the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations (through its numerous agencies), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Trade Organisation.
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“Fraternity has subtleties”
– Fernando Pessoa, Book of Disquiet
Introduction

‘Exporting Paradise’? EU Development Policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War

With its foundation in 1957, the European Union (EU) has progressed to become a significant regional organisation in the twenty-first century. Together with directing special care to its internal integration process, the Union maintains a clear ambition not to be an isolated entity in the international system. It aspires to gradually “assert its identity on the international scene” through the establishment of close relationships with a variety of political and economic partners worldwide.¹ The EU aims to carry out a leading yet benevolent role in the working of international relations based on the principles of liberalism, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The formulation of a capable policy of development cooperation is central to the Union’s project to become a prominent international actor, where Africa remains its long-standing preferred development partner.²

The following thesis aims to understand the contemporary character of EU development policy towards Africa at a time when the EU is gradually evolving into an increasingly prominent international actor. The Union’s close rapport with Africa results from the colonial legacy of some of its Member States (MS), progressing from an initial association agreement in 1957 to a development cooperation partnership in 1975 that was reformed periodically and strengthened up to the present day. As a result of the five decade-long relationship maintained between the two parties, the EU often claims that its development policy regarding Africa is both ‘unique’ in nature and vested with a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of development in the African continent. By doing so, the EU professes its development policy to be not only distinct (‘unique’) from the policy orientation of other actors in the domain of international development, but also a primary policy reference (‘leadership’) therein. In view of the stated EU claims, the following research aspires to assess the alleged ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ facets of EU development policy regarding Africa from

² In the current research, all references to ‘Africa’ point specifically to the Sub-Saharan Africa region, as well as to the countries of that region that entered a development cooperation agreement with the EU as part of the ‘African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States’ (ACP) in 1975 and thereafter.
the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008 and understand its character and expression in the
context of international development.

Departing from a colonial-based model formalised by the 1957 Treaty of Rome creating the
European Economic Community, Africa-EU relations evolved into development cooperation
agreements under the Yaoundé Conventions, the Lomé Conventions, and most recently the
Cotonou Agreement. Under the Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé Conventions, the EU and Africa
were the sole parties to the relationship. Nevertheless, in 1975 Africa-EU relations integrated the
new development partnership arrangement struck between the Union and the newly created African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) - the Lomé Convention. According to most critics
on the subject, and as the literature review in the following chapter demonstrates, the Lomé
Convention initiated a new era for Africa-EU relations resulting from its clear break with the alleged
colonial tag of the Yaoundé Conventions and support to the New International Economic Order
(NIEO) initiative launched by some developing countries at the time. Following a mandate
spanning twenty-five years and four periodic renewals, the Lomé Convention expired in 2000 and
gave way to the Cotonou Agreement. Most analysts of EU development policy hailed the beginning
of a new age for the Africa-EU relationship then, breaking with the Lomé tradition and setting a
distinct platform for future development cooperation between the two partners. With a life span of
twenty-years, the Cotonou Agreement is set to undergo revision every five-years to combine the
maintenance of the treaty’s original directives with its adaptation to potential new challenges
emerging in both the ACP states and in the international system.

The EU commitment to development cooperation in Africa over the past five decades
transformed it into a relevant actor in the continent’s existing international support structure for
development promotion. Following Africa’s decolonisation process in the 1960s, a number of

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3 Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Africa-EU relations rested upon the Yaoundé Conventions I
and II, signed in 1963 and 1969, the Lomé Conventions I, II, III, and IV, signed in 1974, 1979, 1984, and 1989, and the
Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000.
4 The creation of the ACP group of states results directly from the 1973 UK accession to the Community, which
brought all its former colonies under the umbrella of the EU policy of development cooperation. Accordingly, most
former colonies of EU Member States from the African, Pacific, and Caribbean regions established the ACP group of
states in 1975 under the Georgetown Agreement as a platform for development cooperation between the EU; The Courier,
5 In the early 1970s, a group of developing countries operating within the framework of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) proposed the creation of a new international economic order more considerate
of their needs through the reformation of international trade and development assistance. Many experts on EU
development policy sustain that the Lomé Convention was its most emblematic expression at the international level;
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international organisations (IOs) instituted what became an influential external structure to assist the future development of the continent. The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and most recently the World Trade Organisation (WTO) formed the nucleus of this international group of actors. They stood behind the foundation of international development, and have had a considerable impact on its practice and discourse up to the present day. They marked the evolution of international development in a variety of spheres – lending, assistance, and discourse – and established a set of norms that ultimately defined the evolution of its composing structure worldwide.

The stated IOs allocated most of their resources towards promoting development cooperation throughout the world, evolving across time as the leading paradigm-setters of international development. They conceived detailed development promotion strategies for the most impoverished countries and regions of the globe – with particular incidence on the African continent – with a view to improve the livelihoods of its citizens through extensive economic reform. The resulting development programmes launched by the IOs in question aimed to set in motion the economic development of their targeted countries and regions, as well as integrating them in the international system as a means to stimulate greater quality of life for their citizens and gradually eliminate poverty.

Concomitantly, and through the adoption of a multifaceted policy approach to development promotion in Africa encompassing aid, trade, and humanitarian assistance, the EU grew into a capable international development actor today. Under that capacity, it incorporated gradually the existing international support structure for development promotion over the recent decades.

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7 The reference to the UN in the current introductory section is overtly general, appearing accurately defined under the UN agencies and programmes relevant to international development promotion in the subsequent chapters. While there is a large variety of agencies and programmes identified in this research with a development portfolio, some of the most influential are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The WTO is not an international development IO per se. It is an institution founded in 1995 to replace the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and with the objective to supervise, manage, and support the liberalisation of international trade. However, as trade liberalisation and development strategies became increasingly indissociable in time, the WTO came to acquire a preeminent role in the dominion of international development today.


10 In 2008 the EU became collectively responsible for approximately 54 per cent of the world’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), with the European Commission alone disbursing the fourth biggest net contribution to worldwide ODA at USD13.527bn., and the second largest net contribution to ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa at USD4.719bn.; OECD, “OECD Annual Report 2009”, (Paris: OECD, 2009). Similarly, the EU remains Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest
An illustrative display of this progress began to materialise in the 1980s, subsequently gathering further momentum in the 1990s, when the Union sought to establish a close rapport with the stated IOs. Its main goal appeared to be to integrate the international initiatives launched by the stated IOs with a view to create greater policy coordination and cohesion amongst all actors active in international development cooperation. Following some years of significant progress, the current relationship between the EU and the aforementioned IOs reached unprecedented levels of collaboration concerning development promotion in Africa and in the developing world at large cementing the growing trend in EU development policy of the recent past.

The establishment of closer relations between the EU and the IOs in question regarding the promotion of international development pertains not only to the Union’s particular development policy vision, but also to its ambition to become a prominent international actor in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, in 2000, the EU joined the UN-sponsored global initiative for development promotion and poverty eradication – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – based on a set of eight specific policy targets to be met by 2015. As the MDGs evolved into one of the paradigms of contemporary international development, the EU professed its further commitment to multilateralism and cooperation with the UN in a 2003 European Commission communication. Consistently with its adopted approach, the Union went on to strike a recent partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which established a platform for collaboration in various activities in the field of human rights, good governance, food security, education, and crisis management. Similarly, it set up a concerted relationship with the WB during the past decade.

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11 The first most striking example of the stated trend took place during the 1990s, when the EU sought to integrate the proceedings of various international conferences organised by the UN with a view to revamp development cooperation across the world - United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (June 1992, Rio de Janeiro), World Conference on Human Rights (June 1993, Vienna), International Conference on Population and Development (September 1994, Cairo), World Summit for Social Development (March 1995, Copenhagen), Fourth World Conference on Women (September 1995, Beijing), Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (June 1996, Istanbul) – and it carried on into the new millennium, when the EU fostered closer relations with the WB, the IMF, the OECD, the UN (specifically the UNDP), and the WTO, as Chapter 5 demonstrates in further detail; Schechter, Michael, “United Nations Global Conferences”, (New York: Routledge, 2005)


through the alignment of policy assistance, the creation of common Trust Funds, and the joining of forces in several development initiatives around the world, including debt relief. Additionally, the EU fostered a closer understanding with the OECD since the turn of the century through a focus on the harmonisation, alignment, and management of aid under the guidelines of the OECD-sponsored Paris Declaration of 2005. Furthermore, the Union also sought to adopt a more participative stand in the workings of the WTO, specifically in its Doha Development Agenda (DDA) project launched in 2001, which aimed to protect developing states from the economic unbalances of the globalised international trading system and foment the implementation of more sustainable forms of development worldwide.

Progressively, the EU evolved into a capable actor in international development and arguably incorporated its existing structure through the promotion of a progressive rapprochement with its leading actors. Therein, the Union maintained a distinctive understanding of the nature and role of its development policy. As such, and in the form of its publications and public standing on the issue, the EU recurrently advanced its development policy as effectively ‘unique’ in comparison with that of other actors, and vested with the capacity to serve as a leveraging force (‘leadership’) in the discourse and practice of international development. The double claim sustained by the Union regarding its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa emerged for the first time in 1975 upon the signing of the Lomé Convention, and was subsequently kept and re-enforced up to the present day. Accordingly, and following the signing of the Lomé Convention in Lomé, Togo, on 28 February 1975, Claude Cheysson, the then European Commissioner for Development, asserted that it was an “agreement which, I say it with some pride, is unique in the world and in history. Never before has there been any attempt to do anything of this kind”. Speaking at a time when the EU and Africa were attempting to overcome the colonial shadow arguably still present in the preceding Yaoundé Conventions, Cheysson’s statement set the tone for the Union’s reading of the nature and role of its development policy in the context of international development in the decades to come.

Correspondingly, the European Commission went on to claim in a 1982 memorandum that “development policy is a cornerstone of European integration (…) because of the novel forms of international cooperation it has pioneered. Today it is a manifestation of Europe’s identity in the

17 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘WTO Doha Development Agenda: WTO Mid-point Agreement Paves the Way for Future Conclusion of Trade Round – a Stronger Multilateral Trading System’, IP/04/1011, 2 August 2004
world at large and a major plank in the Community’s external policies generally.”¹⁹ In that manner, the EU continued to maintain the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding the nature and role of its development policy towards Africa in the domain of international development, as confirmed subsequently at the signing ceremony of Lomé Convention IV on 15 December 1989. Thereupon, Michel Rocard, the then President of the Council of the European Community, voiced the recurring EU perception of its partnership with Africa and asserted that “no other instrument in the world has instituted such carefully-planned, concrete and positive ties” between developing and developed countries, which he eulogised for “its originality, its unique character, and its success”.²⁰ Similarly, a decade later and already following the conclusion of the Africa-EU development cooperation agreement that was to substitute the Lomé Convention – the Cotonou Agreement – the Union expressed a similar take on the nature and role of its development policy towards Africa at the turn of the century. In the words of Bernard Petit, then the Director of the European Commission Directorate General (DG) for Development, who had led the EU negotiation team in preparation for the new accord, “the Cotonou Agreement is the only one of its kind in the world. I know of no other agreement that is as global as this.”²¹

As the Cotonou Agreement introduced Africa-EU relations to the new millennium, the Union upheld the same understanding of the nature and role of its development policy vis-à-vis Africa. Louis Michel, then the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, maintained an identical perception of EU development policy regarding Africa in a 2007 essay entitled ‘Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance’.²² When addressing the renewed partnership between Africa and the Union, Michel asserted that “Europe is in a unique position in relation to Africa, geographically, historically, and economically, and also as regards to the role it has been playing for forty years with development aid”.²³ Moreover, Louis Michel went on to state that the partnership between Africa and the EU was distinct and consequential in the domain of African development insofar as “the EU’s approach is unique in that it is a ‘global soft power’ which relies on laws, rules, and example both in its approach to development and growth”.²⁴ According to Louis Michel, the EU’s ‘global soft power’ capacity gave it a leading role in the promotion of development in the African continent, because “Europe is better placed than anyone to help Africa. As to Africa, it can

¹⁹ European Commission, ‘Memorandum on the Community’s Development Policy,’ Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5 (82), 5 October 1982
²⁰ Rocard, Michel, ‘We Must Join Forces’, The Courier, Lomé IV, No. 120, March-April 1990, pp. 5
²¹ Petit, Bernard, ‘The Cotonou Agreement is the Only One of its Kind in the World’, The Courier, Special Issue Cotonou Agreement, September 2000, pp. 18
²³ Michel, Louis, “Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance”, pp. 28
²⁴ Michel, Louis, “Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance”, pp. 33
always count on a partner which, will not drag it into big power rivalries or push it into forms of development that do not correspond to its basic interests”.

As Africa-EU relations progressed over the decades, the Union arguably integrated the existing structure of international development through increasingly closer relations and policy alignment initiatives with its comprising leading agents. Therein, it maintained a distinct reading of the nature and role of its development policy. It claims that its policy of development cooperation regarding Africa is ‘unique’ in nature and plays a ‘leadership’ role in the dominion of international development. These claims are a feature of the Union’s perception of its development policy since the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975, which remained unaltered even after the significant changes that occurred in the international system after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual end of communism in most of Eastern Europe effectively instigated both the end of the Cold War and the bipolar international system in the period between 1989 and 1991, bringing about the most significant political, economic, and social event at the international level over the past two decades. Nevertheless, the EU perception of its development policy remained unchanged. It disregards not only the capacity of the long-established international support structure for the promotion of international development and the position of its composing agents (IOs) as leading paradigm-setters, but also the challenges posed by the post-Cold War international system.

**What is the Puzzle?**

Considering the established international support structure for the promotion of international development, inclusive of the position of the stated IOs as its paradigm-setters, can the EU effectively sustain its recurrent claims? Similarly, can the EU substantiate the ‘unique’ nature and the ‘leadership’ role of its development policy in the domain of international development? Additionally, did the EU’s ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ conditions and the disposition of its development policy towards Africa remain unaffected by the end of the Cold War?

In view of the reality described herein, the understanding of the contemporary character of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa remains a puzzle. The fundamental problem at hand is primarily analytical in nature, but also relevant from a public policy standpoint, which centres on the

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25 Michel, Louis, “Africa-Europe: The Indispensable Alliance”, pp. 34
apparent gap between the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims recurrently advanced by the EU concerning its development policy towards Africa, and its ability to establish the veracity of those claims. As demonstrated above, the EU habitually declares its development policy regarding Africa as ‘unique’ and playing a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development without effectively authenticating those claims. Therefore, the EU-suggested picture concerning the nature and role of its development policy concerning Africa in the domain of international development appears paradoxical, insofar as it openly disregards both the established position of the above-mentioned IOs in the discourse and practice of international development, and the Union’s endorsement of several development cooperation initiatives and projects launched by the same IOs. As a result, the Union clearly assumes its development policy towards Africa as intrinsically distinctive, thereby accrediting it with an inherently ‘unique’ nature and a ‘leadership’ role in the context of international development.

The following investigation on EU development policy towards Africa aims to capture its contemporary character by testing the recurrent EU claims in accordance with a particular framework of analysis that will be elaborated on in chapter one and chapter two of the thesis. The study covers a timeframe from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in international politics, with the ensuing research regarding it as a departure point and assessing EU development policy towards Africa during the following two-decades until the end of 2008.27 In that manner, it comprehends the latter period of Lomé Convention III (1984-1989), the entire Lomé Convention IV (1989-2000), and the initial eight years of the ongoing Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020).

Nevertheless, before embarking on the details of the analysis it is paramount to identify not only the EU’s own claims regarding its development policy towards Africa, but also the essence of those claims. In this perspective, the Union’s major claims are that its development policy is ‘unique’ in nature and displays a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development. Through its double claim, the EU suggests that its development policy towards Africa is therefore unparalleled in the context of international development (‘unique’) and capable of being a paradigm-setter in its discourse and practice (‘leadership’). This particular take on the partnership between Africa and the EU often features in statements by Union officials and several EU publications on the subject, as illustrated by Louis Michel’s foreword on the 2006 European Union Strategy for Africa.28 In the

words of Louis Michel, “Europe and Africa are bound together by common history, interlocking cultures and shared values. We share the same beliefs in working towards a more equitable, multilateral world order. Europe is therefore Africa’s natural ally and friend in the quest for stability and prosperity”. The essence of these unsubstantiated claims appears to have its origin in the EU norms of ‘responsibility’ for the well-being of its former colonies, which were used subsequently by the Union to construct a virtuous self-image as a benevolent actor in international relations in general, and in the broad relations between developing and developed countries in particular.

Following the identification of the essence of the EU’s recurrent claims concerning its development policy regarding Africa, it is fundamental to identify the main questions deriving from the advanced puzzle and subsequently suggest a capable methodological formula to examine them. Three broad research questions emerge regarding the analysis of EU development policy towards Africa: a) was there a shift in EU development policy orientation during the considered timeframe? b) was EU development policy distinct in nature (‘unique’) when compared with the policy promoted by the identified IOs as the leading agents in the structure of international development during the period under analysis? c) was EU development policy playing a ‘leadership’ role in the structure of international development as a central reference in the policy orientation of its comprising main agents (IOs)?

The policy shift question stems from the necessity to initiate the investigation on EU development policy towards Africa by mapping out how it evolved in the timeframe under consideration. Departing from a focus on the substance of a potential shift in EU development policy since the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008, the objective of this exercise is to uncover how it progressed in time in terms of its characterising ideas and norms. By doing so, it aims to unearth the general orientation of EU development policy during the period under analysis as a precondition to assess its nature and role in the domain of international development.

After uncovering the potential shift characterising EU development policy towards Africa in the proposed timeframe, it is possible to attend directly to the questions concerning its nature and role in the dominion of international development. Concerning the alleged ‘unique’ nature of EU development policy, and with a view to test the equivalent claim habitually advanced by the Union, the research aims to contrast EU development policy directly with the policy promoted by the principal IOs in the structure of international development. For that purpose, and in consideration

of the findings concerning the evolution of EU development policy in time, the analysis balances EU development policy against the policy orientation of the identified IOs with the objective to uncover what distinguishes them from each other. In that manner, it aspires to ascertain how distinctive and unparalleled EU development policy is in the domain of international development.

The addressing of the question regarding the alleged ‘leadership’ role of EU development policy in the field of international development aims to probe the EU standing in the structure of international development, specifically vis-à-vis its comprising agents (IOs). For that exercise, it aims to uncover the capacity of EU development policy to affect the policy orientation of the identified IOs as the principal agents in the structure of international development. Departing from the results of the assessment of the ‘unique’ nature of EU development policy, the analysis aims to concentrate on what distinguishes EU development policy from the policy orientation of the above-mentioned IOs, and assess the dynamics between them in the progress of the discourse and practice of international development. By concentrating on the dynamics between the EU and the aforementioned IOs in the structure of international development, the analysis aspires to uncover whether the EU performs a ‘leadership’ role as a paradigm-setter in the discourse and practice of international development.

Following the identification and analytical considerations of the identified three research questions deriving from the central puzzle of the current investigation on EU development policy, it is essential to consider a fitting method to analyse them. The ensuing research applies a Social Constructivist method to the understanding of the character of EU development policy towards Africa from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. As subsequently argued in closer detail in chapter one and chapter two of the thesis, the framework of analysis adopted for this study rests on a Social Constructivist design in line with the seminal academic research undertaken by Martha Finnemore on the interpretation of international political phenomena. Thus, the application of the proposed method to the scrutiny of EU development policy follows a systemic approach to the understanding of the EU and the expression of its development policy towards Africa in the domain of international development “by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value”.

As the Union progressed into a global player, it became embedded in dense networks of international social relations, which have the potential to shape its perceptions of the world and the

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role it performs in that world. Therefore, the integration of the EU in the international system emerges as fundamental in the definition of EU behaviour and policy orientation. International norms and their context assume a central role in this process as they can considerably affect the definition of an actor’s policy design. The proposed method focuses clearly on the liaison the EU maintains both with the structure of international development of which it is an integral part as an international development actor, and with the agents (IOs) that comprise that same structure. Using a Social Constructivist method built upon a structural-agentic fabric, the following research seeks to capture systematically the large norms characterising EU development policy and its design process inclusively of the Union’s progress into an increasingly prominent international actor. Hence, it aims to uncover the existing dynamics between the Union and the structure and agents of international development in the design of EU development policy towards Africa in the proposed timeframe. By doing so, the ensuing investigation on EU development policy regarding Africa aspires to expose how ‘unique’ it is in nature and how it affects other agents as a potential leader (‘leadership’) and paradigm-setter in the discourse and practice of international development.

Relevance of Study

In the period since the end of the Cold War, the EU has undergone major internal reforms initiated by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which have had a considerable impact on its foreign relations capacity.31 Whilst renewing its ambition to become a prominent international actor, the Union maintained development cooperation as one of its most emblematic external expressions, with Africa standing as its most traditional development partner. With the aim to understand the character of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa in the proposed timeframe, the ensuing research focuses on an analytical academic puzzle with additional public policy relevance, which results from the identified gap between the claims the EU makes for its development policy towards Africa and the ability it demonstrates to substantiate them. The ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims suggested by the Union concerning the nature and role of its development policy in the dominion of international development stand at the centre of the advanced puzzle. The ensuing investigation on EU development policy concerning Africa concentrates on three research questions that derive from the existing research puzzle and follows a particular methodological formula. Thus, the current research tests the stated EU claims and advances a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of

EU development policy towards Africa in time through a focus on its nature and role in the domain of international development.

The thesis’ contribution to knowledge on EU development policy concerning Africa rests upon three analytical considerations. Firstly, it proposes a distinct explanation for the observable phenomena emerging from the identified central puzzle and its deriving research questions. Secondly, it suggests a distinct methodological approach to the interpretation of EU development policy, which aims to stimulate further theoretical debate on an EU policy area that remains largely under-theorised. Thirdly, it contributes to the understanding of how the EU aspiration to become a preeminent international actor translated into its policy of development cooperation regarding Africa in the considered timeframe, by uncovering the rapport it maintains with the structure and agents of international development.

In accordance with the stated analytical considerations, the thesis’ first contribution to knowledge centres on the proposal of a distinct explanation for the observable phenomena emerging from the identified research puzzle and its deriving research questions compiled in the form of three workable hypotheses. First, the potential shift characterising EU development policy in the period in question was not dramatic in character. This particular inference requires further enquiry, which the subsequent chapter on the review of the available literature on the subject submits to further scrutiny. Second, EU development policy regarding Africa was not ‘unique’ in nature in the suggested timeframe when integrated in the structure of international development, inclusive of the policy orientation of its comprising agents (IOs). Third, EU development policy did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development in the period under analysis, specifically regarding the setting of new paradigms and exerting a lead over the identified IOs as a central ideological reference in their development policy drive.

The thesis’ second contribution to knowledge stems from the proposal of a distinct method of analysis to the interpretation of the character of EU development policy towards Africa in line with the principles of Social Constructivism, particularly the research undertaken by Martha Finnemore. As explained in close detail in chapter two, the following research aspires to unpack EU development policy concerning Africa in light of the Union’s condition as an actor within the existing structure of international development, comprehensive of the EU relations with its principal agents (the above-mentioned IOs). In that manner, the thesis addresses the puzzle and research questions, as well as tests the advanced hypotheses, guiding the following investigation on EU
development policy concerning Africa from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. As a result, it apprehends how EU development policy towards Africa evolved in time, and captures its nature and role in the domain of international development.

Conforming with the proposed methodological framework, the central puzzle, and the research questions that guide the analysis, the thesis’s third contribution to knowledge lies in its input to the understanding of the EU project to become a leading international actor expressed through its development policy towards Africa in the proposed timeframe. Development policy is an emblematic channel of EU external relations, which the Union draws on to both maintain good political and economic relations with the rest of the world and transmit its values. In this perspective, the following research aims to grasp how the EU fused its development policy orientation towards Africa with its purpose to become a prominent international actor. It seeks to capture how the EU enterprise to establish itself as a global player permeated through its policy of development cooperation in time and the impact it generated in the domain of international development. Hence, the analysis exposes the dynamics the Union maintains with the structure and agents of international development and assesses whether the EU realised its project to become an eminent international actor in the twenty-first century.

For that purpose, the thesis reflects on the form of ‘paradise’ the EU is trying to promote in Africa during the period under investigation. The concept of ‘paradise’ used in the current analysis relates to Robert Kagan’s perception of the EU as an international actor that seeks to “offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power”.32 As stated by the author, the EU is a postmodern enterprise in international relations characterised by successful multilateral governance to the detriment of the use of force, which has “produced an ambition to convert the world” accordingly.33 The ensuing research addresses the form of ‘paradise’ the EU has been promoting in Africa through its development policy, and assesses whether it rests on altruistic principles of common wellbeing distinct from classic notions of power in international relations. By doing so, the thesis captures the self-image the EU is attempting to ‘export’ to Africa as part of its development policy and elaborates further on the role and nature of EU development policy in the domain of international development.

What is EU Development Policy?

EU development policy is the thesis’ object of research, existing as an integral part of EU foreign policy and external relations activities. There is no definition of EU development policy, despite the Union’s recent attempt to define it as the EU action in the development cooperation field performed in accordance with the principles of aid effectiveness, coordination between MS and international players, and consistency of European policies with development objectives.34 Similarly to other policy competences, the EU development policy capacity underwent a long process of transformation since the foundation of the Union until the present. Departing from many MS’ colonial heritage and their subsequent influence in the mechanisms of EU development policy design, to the various enlargements of the Union and the several significant reformation procedures, EU development policy stands today as a complex capacity exercised by the Union in the field of international development cooperation.35 Whilst some countries and regions of the globe acquired a special status in the reach of EU development cooperation in time due to historical and geographical factors, currently the Union is intent on reaching all corners of the globe with the same urgency and commitment.36

EU development policy is the central focus of the following research, featuring as the expression of a coordinated position and action from the Union in the field of development cooperation represented by the European Commission at the international level. The European Commission is not a monolithic structure but a rather complex organ composed of MS and multiple institutional interests. Nonetheless, for the purpose of the proposed practical analysis, the characterisation of EU development policy matches that of the European Commission as the representative of the Union’s standing and enterprise in the field of international development. Without claiming that the Union is as a unitary actor in international development on a par with a state, the current research endorses the understanding of the EU as an increasingly prominent actor in the international system following its process of internal integration, and the concerted action taken by the European Commission in the international arena its ultimate expression.

The thesis’ argument is developed in six main chapters. The current chapter stands as the introduction to the ensuing investigation on EU development policy concerning Africa. It identifies the research puzzle and research questions, and defines the adopted analytical approach. Subsequently, chapter one focuses on the review of the available literature on EU development policy and demonstrates its strengths and weaknesses in view of the advanced research questions. Additionally, it sheds light on the research puzzle and research questions, and sets the foundations for the adopted methodological approach to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa in the proposed timeframe. Thereby, chapter one introduces the discussion on the Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist research agenda as a fitting method of analysis for the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa.

Chapter two concentrates on the methodological framework considered for the following research in line with Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist approach to the interpretation of international political phenomena. It demonstrates how to adapt the chosen framework of analysis to the interpretation of EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War. It departs from an in depth assessment of Social Constructivism as a meta-theory and its relevance to the study of international relations. Thereafter, it advances a detailed adaptation of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method of analysis to the interpretation of EU development policy in light of the research puzzle and research questions that guide the dissertation. Subsequently, it advances the refined workable hypotheses for the thesis and re-states its claims to knowledge in the analysis of EU development policy towards Africa.

Following the detailed description of how to apply Martha Finnemore’s method to the interpretation of EU development policy concerning Africa, chapter three marks the beginning of the thesis’ core and empirical chapters. Chapter three focuses on the structure and agency of international development to define the practical contours of the international system inclusive of the EU’s position as an increasingly prominent international actor. It concentrates on the discipline of international development and assesses the role of its identified principal agents (IOs) in the discourse and practice of international development through a focus on the evolution of its characterising norms and ideas. Furthermore, it draws attention to the integration of the EU in the structure of international development during the recent decades, comprehensive of the relations the Union maintained with its comprising main agents (IOs). Thus, chapter three demonstrates the
potential of structures and agents to affect EU preferences and interests in the design of its policy of development cooperation towards Africa.

Following the argument advanced in chapter three, chapter four and five proceed with the detailed testing of the proposed method of analysis to the current investigation on EU development policy. Both chapters depart from an assessment of the existing legislation concerning the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Chapter four addresses the period covering the mandate of the Lomé Convention IV (1989 – 2000), and chapter five concentrates on the period following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) until the end of 2008. The analysis identifies the large norms and equivalent policy pillars characterising each treaty. Subsequently, each chapter attempts to capture the origin of the identified large norms characterising the EU approach to development cooperation during their respective timeframe. On that account, the two chapters integrate the European Commission in the normative structure of international development inclusive of the role of its comprising agents. By doing so, both chapters address the research questions and formulated hypotheses guiding the research, and advance specific results regarding the evolution of EU development policy towards Africa in the considered timeframe comprehensive of its potential shift in time, as well as its nature and role in international development.

Chapter six closes the cycle of the proposed method of analysis, and discusses the contribution of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa. It assesses how the chosen framework of analysis assisted to address the research puzzle and research questions guiding the dissertation, and advanced the understanding of EU development policy concerning Africa. Furthermore, chapter six focuses on the formulated hypotheses and discusses their confirmation in the considered timeframe. It demonstrates the pertinence of the adopted method to stimulate further knowledge on EU development policy towards Africa, specifically regarding its progress in time, and its nature and role in the domain of international development.
Chapter I – Literature Review: Framing EU Development Policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War

“Here the ways of man divide: if you want to achieve peace of mind and happiness – have faith; if you want to be a disciple of truth – then search!”
– Friedrich Nietzsche, Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche

“People are free to make their own meaning: a freedom that is also a responsibility, because without that commitment there will be no meaning”
– Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea
Chapter I

Literature Review: Framing EU Development Policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War

EU relations with Africa date back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). They evolved progressively from the initial association agreement to the modern-day partnership model introduced by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. In accordance with the research puzzle and research questions considered in the previous chapter, the thesis aspires to capture the character of EU development policy in the period from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. On that account, the following chapter explores the available literature on EU development policy with a view to apprehend how other authors interpreted the subject in light of the thesis’ research puzzle and research questions. Accordingly, it organises the existing literature on EU development policy in line with its theoretical and thematic basis, which it categorises under three broad clusters – ‘State Interests’, ‘Means of Extensive Domination’, and ‘Significance and Character of the Partnership’. The chapter focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of each cluster and illustrates the relevance of additional scrutiny on EU development policy. Subsequently, it advances a discussion on the most suitable method for the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa, and proposes Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda as a fitting alternative for that purpose.

1. Review of the Literature on EU Development Policy

In contrast with most EU policy areas, development policy remains generally understudied and under-theorised despite its prolonged existence and economic and political significance in the external relations of the Union. African development cooperation was an EU concern since its foundation in 1957. Nevertheless, what later evolved into its development policy failed to gather the level of attention, which academic researchers attribute to other EU policy areas. This scenario was

particularly striking during the period covering the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the Yaoundé Conventions (1963 and 1969), and the early years of the Lomé Convention (1975, 1979, 1984). The first benchmark studies on the topic emerged only in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ensuing section focuses mostly on the literature from the period since the end of the Cold War, whilst still making some historical references to that of its preceding decades to contemplate other authors’ interpretation of EU development policy concerning Africa. The objective of the section is to situate the thesis in the existing literature on EU development policy and establish a claim for further research on the subject.

1.1 Clusters of Analysis

The following sub-section organises the available narratives on the analysis of EU development policy in three distinct clusters according to their thematic and theoretical basis, which the thesis labels ‘State Interests’, ‘Means of Extensive Domination’, and ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’. Whilst the accounts on ‘State Interests’ take a broad inspiration on Realism as their theoretical standpoint, those on the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ and on the ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’ follow a Marxist and Liberal orientation, respectively. Categorising the subject’s literature according to the stated clusters provides a comprehensive understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing contributions to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa.

1.1.1 State Interests

The available literature on EU development policy categorised under the label ‘State Interests’ focuses on the self-preservation of the Union and some of its Member States (MS) in the international system. ‘State Interests’ narratives engaged in a Realist-inspired take on the subject yet without adopting the orthodox notion of Realism as a theoretical tradition in International Relations (IR). Political Realism has been the dominating force in IR academic thinking since the emergence of the subject in the post-Word War I period. It regards the nation-state the principal actor in IR, whose main purpose is to secure national survival in a hostile environment. Realism contends the acquisition of power as the appropriate, rational, and predestined goal of a state’s foreign policy,
reducing international politics to a constant struggle for power. Accordingly, the translation of power takes the form of a means and an end in itself, insofar as it consists both in the capacity to influence or change the behaviour of others in a particular fashion, and in the ability to resist similar influences from other actors on account of one’s own behaviour. In contrast with orthodox Realist interpretations of EU development policy towards Africa, ‘State Interests’ narratives concentrate primarily on the interests of the Union and some of its MS in Africa-EU relations, and on how the functioning of the relationship expresses those same interests.

The existing ‘State Interests’ literature advanced some pertinent observations concerning the practical dynamics of EU development policy and its affinity with Union and MS interests, such as attesting the existence of a shift in orientation of EU development policy in time. However, it left unexplained the continuity of the Africa-EU partnership and the potential impact of the international system on the process of EU development policy design. By doing so, ‘State Interests’ accounts largely overlooked the interpretation of the nature and role of EU development policy in the domain of the international development, specifically the capacity of international organisations, and norms and ideas over the policy design process of a given actor therein. Instead, they favoured a clear focus on EU or certain MS interests in Africa-EU relations.

The early ‘State Interests’ narratives tended to concentrate particularly on France’s leading role in the design and management of EU development policy. France featured in these accounts as the major force behind the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa, which it manoeuvred according to its self-interest in the continent as a former colonial power. Marjorie Lister, Paule Bouvier, John Ravenhill, and Jeffrey Herbst emerged as the major voices behind this particular interpretation of the Africa-EU partnership, and largely discarded the significance of real development promotion within the Lomé Convention cooperation system. They advanced that the purpose of the Lomé Convention lay simply in its face value. For these authors, the Lomé Convention cooperation system existed as a simple instrument at the hands of the Union, which was chiefly under the control of France. In their view, the Lomé Convention was conceived to ensure the continuity of trade and market connections between Europe and its former colonies in Africa, as well as to guarantee the EU uninterrupted access to the continent’s raw materials.

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Whilst the interests of France captured the attention of some academics in the interpretation of the Africa-EU partnership, a distinct group of authors called upon the importance of EU interests therein. They focused on the apprehension of the political and economic dynamics behind both the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement. Marie-France Jarret and François-Regis Mahieu, Ismael Musah Montana, and Mary Farrel claimed that Africa-EU relations emerged as a EU tool to protect its own interests vis-à-vis the former colonies of some of its MS. They stressed that that the Lomé cooperation system suffered from an intrinsic anomaly of power that made it unable to contribute effectively to the promotion of development cooperation in Africa. These analyses concluded that the sole aim of the development partnership between Africa and the EU rested upon the protection of EU interests abroad. Thus, Africa-EU relations existed as a mechanism designed initially to protect the EU from the impact of decolonisation in Africa, and subsequently to maintain the political and commercial leverage of the Union over its formal colonies.

Others authors expressed their understanding of Africa-EU relations based on the protection of EU interests, but indicated historical and practical reasons therein. Enzo Grilli and Gorm Rye Olsen are the most prominent authors that express this particular understanding of EU development policy. They stress that the Lomé Convention emerged from the combination of a set of predominantly ad-hoc circumstances with the EU ambition to maintain access to African markets and raw materials as a means to preserve some influence in the international system. Hence, the Union created a development cooperation framework with Africa purely in order to secure its own interests in the international system. Thereby, the EU exerts its influence over the African continent through the control of the delivery of aid and the design of the pillars upon which the relationship rests. As the Africa-EU partnership progressed, these authors claimed that security and migration issues became the Union’s priority in its relations with Africa in a newly globalised world, which transformed the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement into inexpensive symbolic


arrangements capable of maintaining the status quo of the relationship and fundamentally protect EU interests.

The aforementioned accounts shared a focus on the interests of the EU and some MS and they proved relevant in capturing the existence of interests behind the Union orientation in Africa-EU relations. Nevertheless, they did not address the understanding of those interests. Comparatively to all actors in the international system, the Union developed its own interests vying to protect them in the relations it maintains with other actors. However, the simple identification of these interests overlooks the interpretation of the nature of those same interests, specifically how they incorporated in time the EU process of development policy design. There are multiple factors pertinent to the formulation of these interests and their relation to the functioning of the Africa-EU partnership left unaddressed by these narratives, such as the inclusion of the Union in the international system, and the impact of the international system upon the nature and role of EU development policy in the dominion of international development.

The EU featured in these accounts as an isolated actor in the international system whose main goal is simply to protect its interests against the interests of other state actors therein. Accordingly, EU and MS interests appear unproblematised, which suggests that either the MS in question or the EU always know what they want, and that the source of their interests always lies within its internal structures. The understanding of interests in the aforementioned narratives reduces a priori both the capacity of the international system over the formulation of EU interests and its potential impact upon the process of EU development policy design. Thus, these accounts leave the possibility of the EU learning from the international system unaddressed, specifically regarding the norms and ideas propagated therein. Additionally, the stated analyses exclude the capacity of non-state actors to influence the EU in the construction of its own interests. Thereby, they overlook the power of the leading IOs in the discourse and practice of international development over the EU formulation of its own development policy. Hence, these narratives do not account for the interpretation of the nature and role of EU development policy in international development, which they reduce to a simple enterprise of interests’ protection.

The theoretical and practical limitations of ‘State Interests’ accounts became increasingly apparent over time. For instance, they did identify the existence of a policy shift in EU development policy since the end of the Cold War. Yet, they did not clarify the policy changes that occurred during that period, and the potential source of those changes because they focused solely on EU
interests in isolation from the international system. Accordingly, they shared an inability to explain
the emergence of new policy initiatives within the framework of Africa-EU relations, such as the
adoption of poverty reduction as a key objective of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. In line with
these authors, the inclusion of poverty reduction as a leading component of EU development policy
since 2000 could only be the product of a novel EU strategy to protect its interests vis-à-vis Africa
that resulted from closed internal decisions independent from the potential impact of the
international system. However, poverty reduction was an increasingly prominent norm in the
discourse and practice of international development in the 1990s. At the time, the WB introduced
poverty reduction as a new paradigm in international development, which other actors quickly
endorsed across the international system, namely the UN and its various development agencies.
Article 19 of the Cotonou Agreement subsequently advanced poverty reduction as a new
component of EU development policy stating that its framework of “cooperation shall refer to the
conclusions of United Nations Conferences and to the objectives, targets and action programmes
agreed at international level and to their follow up as a basis for development principles”. The
article marks an important dimension of the contemporary evolution of EU development policy that
the ‘State Interests’ accounts could not address, which suggests that a distinct approach to the
subject can further the understanding of the nature and role of contemporary EU development
policy.

The ‘State Interests’ literature on EU development policy analysis focused exclusively on EU
or MS interests, and thereby it overlooked the nature of those interests, their formulation, and their
practical expression in the Union’s progress as an actor in the international system. The stated
accounts identified the existence of a shift in EU development policy. However, they did not
address the apprehension of its potential root causes. The focus on the impermeability and centrality
of MS and EU interests in the interpretation of Africa-EU relations prevented these analyses from
capturing the nature of the shift, especially as the Africa-EU partnership acquired a multi-
dimensional configuration in the evolution from the Lomé Convention to the Cotonou Agreement.
In that manner, the thematic and theoretical approach to the subject favoured by ‘State Interests’
narratives demonstrated that a pure focus on state interests restricts the comprehensive
understanding of contemporary EU development policy, as it leaves unaddressed both the
importance of norms and ideas existing at the international level, and the capacity and role of non-
state actors therein.

42 European Commission, “Cotonou Agreement”, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 2000)
1.1.2 **Means of Extensive Domination**

A particular faction of authors placed an equal focus on the nation-state and the zealous protection of its interests in the international system. Nevertheless, they followed a distinct approach to IR. They analysed EU development policy based on the concepts of exploitation and dominance, which they borrowed largely from dependency theory within the Marxist tradition. Dependency theory emerged intimately linked with the process of development promotion in Latin America, where great intellectual activity during the 1950s and 1960s produced a body of literature based on the inevitability of class warfare in an economic world divided in two separate factions, the advanced industrial core, and the commodity-producing periphery. According to this theoretical interpretation of IR, a system based on cooperation was effectively unattainable since the terms of the relations between the two sets of countries ensured the constant exploitation of the periphery by the core. The application of this approach to the interpretation of the development process of the newly independent African countries produced analogous results, leading ‘dependentists’ to claim that the level of subservience of the periphery to the core was to endure perpetually. Thus, African developing countries were to remain trapped in an inferior position of power in relation to their former colonial rulers, which barred them from protecting their own interests when integrated in the international economic system.

When translated to the interpretation of EU development policy analysis, ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ accounts relied mostly on dense theoretical narratives built upon the principles of dependency, paternalism, clientelism, and ultimately neo-colonialism. They sought to identify and assess a power structure of complex dependence between international actors. Marjorie Lister and John Revenhill (who also featured in the ‘State Interests’ narratives), presented some of the most pertinent accounts in the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ literature, by stressing that the Africa-EU relationship remained locked in an asymmetrical economic cooperation framework. As a result, African countries had limited bargaining power since the founding of the Africa-EU partnership, which allowed the Union to exert direct control over them and therefore ensure the protection of its own interests accordingly. In this regard, the cooperation between the two parties

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owed its existence to the EU ambition to maintain the status quo of its relations with Africa instituting what Lister then labelled a partnership of welfare neo-colonialism.46

Whilst advancing largely similar conclusions to Lister and Ravenhill, other authors presented a separate view of how Africa-EU relations evolved into a ‘dependency’ condition. They claimed that the Africa-EU partnership stemmed from the combination of certain circumstances with the openly protective economic policy of the Union vis-à-vis its developing partners. On that account, Oladeji Ojo and Malaifa Obadiah alerted that international events of the 1990s and the changes to the rules of international trade, following the WTO’s creation in 1995, safeguarded EU interests in its relations with Africa, and ultimately generated African dependence on the Union.47 In turn, the EU remained averse to stimulate change in the fate of Africa. Instead, it called upon its own interests and allowed the Africa-EU partnership to evolve into a paternalistic arrangement, whereby the EU guaranteed its economic progress to the detriment of development promotion in the African continent.

The most original narrative in the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ literature on EU development policy emerged under a neo-Gramscian approach to the subject proposed by Stephen Hurt.48 The author’s main objective was to capture the nature of the Cotonou Agreement in the international system. Stephen Hunt used the formulation and implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and Africa as the most symptomatic example of EU intent to use its power of coercion over Africa and establish its hegemony in the Africa-EU partnership. According to the author, the application of the principle of partnership to Africa-EU relations became impracticable under the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement because the Union had assumed already the position of the custodian of the relationship and broken its long-standing egalitarian heritage.

The narratives on the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ in the existing literature on EU development policy posed an initially commendable attempt to understand its evolution in time as well as its nature and role against the background of the international system. Nonetheless, in practice, they translated into a simplistic structural analysis of the subject. EU development policy featured as a rigid expression from the Union in its partnership with Africa, which progressed in

46 Lister, Marjorie, “The European Community and the Developing World: The Role of the Lomé Convention”, pp. 42
function of the EU change in tactics to secure its effective economic and political control over Africa. The discussion of the nature and role of EU development policy did not go beyond the perceived power dynamics of the core-periphery system of Africa-EU relations. Therein, the EU simply sought to maintain its position as the most powerful actor. The fixation with the perceived dynamics of the Africa-EU partnership left the relevance of norms and ideas in the formation of EU interests unaddressed, and contended that cooperation between different actors was unattainable. However, the Africa-EU partnership has prospered over a five-decade period, during which African countries have demonstrated no intention of breaking or abandoning the established development cooperation framework between the two parties. Instead, they have expressed often their appraisal of the relationship and have agreed recently to renew it under the tenets of the Cotonou Agreement. Accordingly, the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ accounts denoted theoretical limitations regarding the interpretation of the role and nature of EU development policy, as well as the evolution and continuity of the relationship between the two parties.

Moreover, the rigid structure upon which the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ narratives rested overlooked some of the contemporary trends behind EU development policy, such as the increasingly solid cooperation between the EU and some of the leading IOs in the domain of international development. One of the most illustrative examples of this dimension of contemporary EU development policy began to materialise in the 1990s, when the EU sought to participate in the various international conferences organised by the UN that aimed to establish a new international development agenda for the post-Cold War era. The process of rapprochement between the EU and the UN in the field of international development gathered increasing momentum throughout the 1990s, and culminated in the Union’s endorsement of the UN-sponsored Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed at the UN Millennium Summit in New York, USA in 2000.49 Progressively the MDGs integrated the EU policy of development cooperation with Africa after the turn of the century, and emerged in 2005 as one of the goals of the Africa-EU partnership for development that followed the renewal of the Cotonou Agreement. In its preamble, the treaty declares, “the Millennium Development Goals emanating from the Millennium Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, in particular the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, as well as the development targets and principles agreed in the United Nations Conferences, provide a clear vision and must underpin ACP-EU cooperation within this Agreement”.50 Despite becoming central to the Union’s current orientation in Africa-EU relations, the MDGs and its endorsement process as part of the Union’s development cooperation framework with Africa remained unaddressed in the ‘Means of

50 European Union, “Cotonou Agreement”
Extensive Domination’ accounts, illustrating some of their additional theoretical limitations regarding the understanding of the evolution, nature, and role of contemporary EU development policy.

The ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ narratives on EU development policy analysis concentrated on the apprehension of an actor’s interests through a focus on the structure of international economy largely under the lens of dependency theory. By doing so, they conferred a grasp of international politics based on the dynamics of asymmetry, conflict, dominance, and exploitation. The application of the suggested approach to the Africa-EU partnership left unanswered some key questions regarding the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy. Furthermore, stated accounts did not problematise EU interests, and assumed them as a by-product of the core-periphery dynamics of Africa-EU relations. As a result, they overlooked the potential impact of norms and ideas characterising the discourse and practice of international development upon the process of EU development policy design.

1.1.3 Character and Significance of the Partnership

In contrast with both previous clusters of analysis on EU development policy, the greatest bulk of research on the subject followed a markedly Liberal tendency that highlighted the interdependence of states and other actors in the international system. In its purest form, the Liberal theory of IR contains a number of propositions built upon the principles of democracy and peace, natural harmony of interests, global justice, and collective security. Despite the various tendencies within the Liberal tradition, the theoretical approach regards states as but one actor in world politics. It attributes states the capacity to cooperate through institutional mechanisms and bargaining, and thus undermines the propensity to base interests on simple equations of power.

The application of the Liberal IR theory to the interpretation of EU development policy produced two general currents in the understanding of the subject: the authors that focused on the character of the partnership, and those that concentrated on its significance, even if most accounts displayed a crosscutting angle between both. Accordingly, most of the literature available on the topic under a Liberal perspective endorsed the historical importance of Africa-EU relations for the two parties as its point of departure, and frequently embraced the moral duty of the Union over the promotion of development in Africa. A common feature of the ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’

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51 Viotti, Paul & Kauppi, Mark, “International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond”, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2004)
Partnership’ narratives consists in the inclusion of an econometric dimension to the interpretation of Africa-EU relations. The stated literature contributed significantly to the advancement of research on the subject since the 1970s. However, it displayed a mostly positive overview of the Africa-EU partnership despite the emergence of an opposite trend from the mid-1990s, when various authors progressively called for caution concerning the altering character of the relationship into a more political-based cooperation system. The Liberal perspective on the subject contended that international cooperation exists, because as it is in the interest of all actors in the international system to cooperate. Nevertheless, the ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’ accounts overlooked the problematisation of EU interests as an actor in the international system, and their potential relation with the norms and ideas propagated therein by its comprising principal agents.

Following the conclusion of the Lomé Agreement in 1975, the first interpretations of the renewed Africa-EU relationship centred on its relevance for Africa and the Union. The early research on the subject centred on the capacity of both parties to progress from the condition of a colonial arrangement to an ambitious development cooperation framework. William Zartman and Carole Cosgrove-Twitchett were the leading critics of the Lomé Convention at the time. They stressed that the accord contributed to the enhancement of North-South relations as well as to the promotion of development in Africa. Accordingly, both authors acknowledged the new Africa-EU development cooperation agreement as a springboard towards interdependence and development promotion in the continent, and a means to overcome the colonial heritage between the EU and Africa.52

On that account, Carole Cosgrove-Twitchett developed an understanding of the Africa-EU partnership based on its character, which she advanced as a symbol of EU external relations.53 In support to her continuing research on the subject, the author used technical empirical data on the trade and aid flows between the two parties. She claimed that Africa-EU relations had improved during the first mandate of the Lomé Convention, even if the relationship was gradually facing some challenges in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Whilst focusing on the character of the relationship between Africa and the Union, Carole Cosgrove-Twitchett pioneered an analytical approach to the interpretation of Africa-EU relations based on the inclusion of an econometric dimension in her research. The research undertaken by Cosgrove-Twitchett served later as an example to other authors interpreting EU development policy during the 1990s, namely Stefan Brune, Joachim Betz,

Winrich Kuhne, Olufemi Babarinde, and Paul Collier.\textsuperscript{54} They provided mostly policy-oriented analyses of the Africa-EU development cooperation framework that aimed at its enhancement as a pre-condition to promote effective development in the African continent.

A distinct group of critics opted for a strong political orientation in their analysis of the subject, whilst still concentrating on the character of Africa-EU relations. They drew inspiration from the postulates of Liberalism, and called for a focus on the principles of cooperation and interdependence in the creation of a development cooperation framework between independent and sovereign states. Most accounts focused on the expansion of the character of the Africa-EU partnership, and highlighted its multidimensional nature in opposition to the purely exploitative facet of the colonial past. Gordon Crawford, Charles Kwarteng, Marjorie Lister, and Joseph McMahon produced the most pragmatic narratives therein.\textsuperscript{55} They stressed the increasingly egalitarian quality of the Africa-EU relationship, which fostered the development of African economies, and stimulated their process of modernisation from a traditional to a modern society. Despite sharing the tendency to portray an overly positive analysis of Africa-EU relations, some of the narratives alerted for the future dangers for the Union and Africa. At the centre of their concerns was the growing Union’s intent to transform the Africa-EU partnership into a highly politicised development cooperation agreement at the eve of the twenty-first century.

In parallel with the narratives that focused on the character of the Africa-EU partnership, other accounts concentrated on its significance in the background of international political economy. Some authors attempted to address the process of policy change characterising the evolution of the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement by integrating both agreements in the context of relations between developing and developed countries. Matthew McQueen, William Brown, Karin Arts and Anna Dickson, Mary Farrell, Martin Holland, Christopher Stevens, and Maurizio Carbone compose this particular group of authors.\textsuperscript{56} They produced some of the most comprehensive studies


on the subject, and advanced an unprecedented grasp of the process of EU development policy design. Unlike most Liberal accounts on the topic, these authors shared a propensity to highlight the deficiencies of the Africa-EU partnership based on the assessment of its results on the ground, which illustrated its limited impact in the effective promotion of development in the African continent.

From within the stated set of authors, it is paramount to stress the research undertaken by Karin Arts and Anna Dickson, William Brown, and Mary Farrell for they produced timely analyses of EU development policy in the context of North-South relations. These authors argued that EU development policy progressed broadly from a model to a symbol over the past two decades. They shed light upon the apprehension of both the significance and character of EU development policy in international development by setting a straightforward analogy between EU development policy and the policy advanced by other international actors. They suggested a growing similarity between EU development policy and the policy advocated by other international actors, and argued that EU development policy had progressed from a model into a symbol in the dominion of African development during that period.

Whilst innovative, the analyses did not reveal what may have caused EU development policy to change in time, and how that change may have been caused by the synergy between EU development policy and the international system. As such, these accounts overlooked both the capacity of the structure and agents of international development over the process of EU development policy design, as well as the importance of norms and ideas characterising the discourse and practice of international development therein. Accordingly, the authors identified for instance a growing similarity between EU development policy and that of the World Bank (WB) over the past decade. However, they did not address what and how it was generated. The identification of a policy trend between the EU and an international actor such as the WB is as a commendable advancement in the understanding of contemporary EU development policy. Nonetheless, the analyses did not account for what might have caused the EU to adopt that distinct development policy course, assuming that the Union knew intrinsically where its interests and preferences lay in the dominion of development cooperation in Africa. By doing so, these authors left the formation of EU interests unproblematised, and delineated them as inherent to the Union

and independent from its relations with other actors in the international system. As a result, in this instance the stated narratives overlooked both the influence of the WB as a paradigm-setter in the discourse and practice of international development, and the impact of the increasingly stronger relationship between the EU and the WB over the recent past on the design of EU development policy.\(^{57}\) Despite capturing a policy shift in time and identifying a parallel between the policies advocated by the EU and the WB, the aforementioned authors left the comprehension of the nature and role of EU development policy in the international system largely unaddressed.

The body of literature available on EU development policy under a Liberal approach comprises the majority of research undertaken on the subject as well as its most inclusive interpretations. Two broad streams of analysis emerged according to their particular focus on either the character or significance of Africa-EU relations. Most of the accounts displayed a tendency to dwell on the positive aspects of the partnership by concentrating on the principles of interdependence and cooperation. The end of the colonial heritage between the two parties and the consequent beginning of a new era featured as the focal point of most investigations. They stress the historical relevance of Africa-EU relations not only to the parties involved but also to the general discourse on relations between developing and developed states.

The ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’ narratives fostered considerable progress in the understanding of EU development policy. However, some pertinent questions remain unanswered, mostly regarding its nature and role in international development today. Some authors, such as William Brown, Karin Arts and Anna Dickson, and Mary Farrel attempted to address this dimension of EU development policy. Nevertheless, their accounts did not provide a comprehensive interpretation of EU development policy, insofar as they left unproblematised the formation of EU interests and their expression through its policy of development cooperation in the context of international development. In spite of their laudable attempt to integrate their research on the subject in the context of relations between developing and developed countries, these authors proposed the understanding of EU development policy in the international system in isolation of the structures and agents that comprise it. By doing so, they advanced a comparative exercise to the detriment of an organic analysis of the subject. In addition, the analyses overlooked the power of norms and ideas in the formation of EU development policy, which ultimately left the scrutiny of the nature and role of EU development policy in international development broadly unaddressed. Following the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each identified cluster, the next sub-

section critically assesses the reviewed literature on the subject and suggests a distinct approach to the analysis of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

1.2 Evaluation of the Existing Literature

The central focus of the thesis is to understand the character of EU development policy towards Africa in accordance with the advanced research puzzle and its deriving research questions. The review of the available literature on EU development policy illustrated the existence of three main thematic clusters of analysis, which are supported by their respective particular theoretical dispositions and propose a plethora of interpretations of the subject. The explored works on EU development policy have fostered the discussion of a still under-theorised EU policy area. However, they also have demonstrated some theoretical and practical limitations regarding the comprehensive scrutiny of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. Central to these constraints is the treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas in the existing literature, which suggests that the application of a distinct approach to the study of the subject could advance a more inclusive grasp of its contemporary character. Despite the commendable contribution that the reviewed literature made to the analysis of EU development policy, it is paramount to attempt to answer the questions that it did not address. The questions concern the puzzle and research questions guiding this investigation, and a means to stimulate the further understanding of the subject. Hence, the following sub-section concentrates on the limitations of the existing accounts on EU development policy to set the basis from which to search for an alternative approach to the study of the subject.

The existing narratives offer seemingly distinct takes on EU development policy. However, many of their practical constraints overlapped all identified clusters of analysis regarding the treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas, which are central to the understanding of the puzzle and research questions leading the thesis. The accounts on ‘State Interests’ identified the existence of a shift in the evolution of EU development policy since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, they did not examine the nature of that shift, and they reduced it to a pure calculation of interests by the EU or some of its MS. In this manner, interests emerged unproblematised in these analyses having its source in pure strategic decisions made by the Union or some MS. The consequence was a disregard for the potential impact of other actors upon the process of EU development policy, specifically non-state actors. These works did not address the capacity of non-
state actors over the formulation of EU development policy. As a result, they overlooked how the discourse and practice of international development progressed intimately related with the policy promoted by a variety of IOs actively operating in the field. Similarly, these accounts did not consider the power of norms and ideas over the creation of EU interests and behaviour, which suggested that the EU could not learn from the international system, but simply extract its interests from its internal constitution. The ‘State Interests’ narratives provided an arguably pertinent assessment of the subject, yet they left unaddressed the nature of its shift in time, as well as the grasp of its nature and role in the international system.

Conversely, Marxist narratives attempted to address the character of EU development policy through a focus on the nature of EU interests in its relations with Africa. However, they posited an overly structural analysis that brought limited progress to the understanding of the subject. These contributions to the interpretation of EU development policy introduced a social dimension to the discussion of EU interests’ formation, however they also reduced its origins to the economic base of history. By doing so, they advanced the structure of international economy as the source of EU interests, and declared them perpetual due to the Union’s position at the core of the international system and Africa at its periphery. Under the stated perception of Africa-EU relations, Marxist analyses identified the existence of a shift in EU development policy orientation, but they did not account for its possible nature, because they regarded the structure of international economy immutable. As such, states are the only relevant actors participating in international life, which is to the detriment of non-state actors, such as IOs, whose interests and behaviour appear unproblematised and simply stem from the inflexible structure that they incorporate. Additionally, norms and ideas do not integrate these interpretations of EU development policy, which present EU interests and behaviour behind its policy formulation disconnected from the potential influence of the international system. Although Marxist accounts provided a distinct approach to the interpretation of EU development policy, they also proposed a similarly limited answer to the research questions guiding the thesis. They did not focus on the character of EU development policy in time, and they overlooked the role and nature of EU development policy in the international system.

In contrast with the two previous clusters of analysis, the Liberal analyses of EU development policy proposed a different take on the subject by attempting to integrate it in the realm of international relations. Nevertheless, and whilst demonstrating that international cooperation was possible in the context of North-South relations, these narratives shared the
oversight of the scrutiny of EU interests formation in the design of EU development policy, and thus left them largely unproblematised therein. Although they recognised the existence of non-state actors in international life, Liberal accounts suggested that the EU always knows what it wants when in relation with other actors. They suggested that interests are ultimately inherent to the EU, and not receptive to external influences outside of its composition such as the power of norms and ideas. While vying to suggest a different perspective on the understanding of EU development policy, these accounts reached a similar conclusion to those of the other clusters of analysis concerning the research questions at the centre of the thesis. In that perspective, Liberal analyses identified a shift in the evolution of EU development policy in time, but did not address its role and nature in the international system.

The review of the current literature on EU development policy demonstrated the existence of some gaps in the analysis of the discipline. The gaps in the literature originate specifically from: the non-integration of the Union in international system as an increasingly prominent international actor; and the disregard of the impact of that structure together with its comprising agents over the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy. In a break with the ‘State Interests’ and Liberal accounts shared tendency to dwell on the analysis of an actor’s preferences and interests in isolation from the potential impact of the international system, it appears that a focus on the social dimension of the EU presence in international life would further elucidate the research questions guiding the research. The chosen approach would equally differ largely from the Marxist grasp of the subject, which despite having a social dimension at its centre remained locked in the dynamics of the economic base of history. Accordingly, a distinct social-oriented approach to the subject could advance a new understanding of both the character of the shift of EU development policy in time, and the EU in the domain of international development by shedding new light on the role and nature of its contemporary development policy therein.

The thesis centres on the understanding of the character of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. The current section demonstrated how other authors perceived the matter in the past according to a thematic and theoretical standpoint. The review of the literature allowed for the identification of the strengths and weaknesses of the available works on the subject, and illustrated how the existing narratives address the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis. The section suggested that additional research on the treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas upon the process of EU development policy design inclusive of the EU condition as an integral part of the structure of international
development comprised by a variety of state and non-state actors, could advance the understanding of the subject further. Thus, the next section advances the case for additional research on EU development policy according to an alternative framework of analysis. It proposes to both re-assess the evolution of the subject since the end of the Cold War and provide a more comprehensive grasp of this still under-theorised EU policy area in view of its evolution, nature, and role in the domain of international development.

2. Remodelling the Interpretation of EU Development Policy

As stated previously, the thesis’ main objective is to understand the character of EU development policy towards Africa from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. For that purpose, and in light of the advanced research puzzle and research questions, as well as the identified gaps in the reviewed literature, the thesis aims to integrate the EU in the structure of international development and assess how the rapport with that structure and its composing agents affected its interests and preferences formation expressed through its development policy. The ensuing section departs from the existing gaps in the available literature and suggests an alternative approach to the understanding of contemporary EU development policy through a focus on the proposed research questions. It concentrates on what the reviewed narratives on EU development policy left unaddressed regarding the research puzzle and research questions central to the study, and proposes Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research as an alternative method to scrutinise the subject further.

2.1 The Search for an Alternative

The current sub-section seeks to identify an apt alternative to stimulate further discussion on the understanding of the character of EU development policy from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. The process of EU development policy design rests at the centre of the investigation, specifically regarding the comprehension of EU interests and preferences formation therein. Using the previously identified constraints of the three theoretical approaches applied to the interpretation of EU development policy as point of departure, the current sub-section endorses the inclusion of the Union in the international system as an essential element of analysis, which follows the current EU project to become a leading international actor. Accordingly, it proposes a distinct treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas, in line with the tenets of Social Constructivism in general and
the research undertaken by Martha Finnemore in particular as a fitting method for supplementary research on EU development policy.

The three clusters of analysis marking the interpretation of contemporary EU development policy matched broadly the classic contending perspectives in IR theory – Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism. As mentioned above, the cluster on ‘State Interests’ did not adopt the orthodox understanding of Realism, yet it shared some of the tenets of this IR tradition, specifically the focus on states as the primary actors in international life, the assumption of interests as material, and the rejection of the notion that states could learn from the international system. The clusters on the ‘Character and Significance of the Partnership’ and on the ‘Means of Extensive Domination’ demonstrated the adoption of a more unambiguous theoretical basis in their interpretation of the subject, which openly endorsed the principles of Liberalism and Marxism, respectively. Despite some variations within the same theoretical disposition of the reviewed narratives, each cluster proposed a particular take on the character of EU development policy. They suggested a distinct treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas in line with the major theoretical paradigms in IR.

The general understanding of an actor’s interests and preferences in international life posited by the three leading schools of thought in IR followed a common assumption, which was that both the interests and preferences of a given actor derived solely from objective conditions and a material origin. Under this premise, states, which are the immutable central focus of these analyses, always know what they want or need. When faced with a challenge in the international system, states promptly identify the best option to follow, finding the source for that decision inside themselves and their bureaucracies, which are independent from transnational influences. Under these theoretical approaches, interests and preferences are unproblematic and assume a self-evident nature, which result from the conception of the state as a static entity in the international system. The postulation of interests and preferences as inferable from the alleged objective conditions and material nature of states illustrated how classic IR theories attempted to interpret international political phenomena based on the same principles of the natural sciences. As such, this inference reduced a priori the possibility of identifying international systemic influences upon the preferences and interests formation of a given actor.

Resulting from this grasp of the nature of the state and the international system, all three theoretical traditions take the state as the primary actor in their understanding of international life. This common feature of the classic IR schools of thought appears expressed in distinct ways, yet converges in the regard of the state as the ultimate centre of their analyses. Realism conceives states as unitary, rational, and autonomous actors in an anarchic international system where there is no ultimate authority over them, which disregards all non-state actors, such as IOs. Liberalism departs from a seemingly divergent set of principles. It allows for organisational and bureaucratic models of state action, and therefore it endorses a multitude of actors as relevant in international politics. Under that premise, IOs may for instance appear as mediators of relations between all actors in the international system including states. However, they are still understood as creations of states, and are therefore servants to states’ interests. In a break from Realism and Liberalism, Marxism devised a radical conception of the state based on a particular grasp of the international system that owes its dynamics to the economic base of history, specifically capitalism as its most contemporary expression. In accordance with these parameters, Marxism perceived the state both as an instrument at the hands of its domestic bourgeois elite, and as an agent pertaining to the structure of an international capitalist system characterised by a metropolis-periphery configuration. In this perspective, all three classic IR theoretical traditions suggested a different way of understanding both the state, and its relation to the international system. Nevertheless, the three classic IR theories attributed states the role of primary actors in international life, and regarded other non-state actors such as IOs of little importance in the definition of state behaviour.

The treatment of states either as autonomous actors or as actors embedded in global structures is of central importance in the understanding of state behaviour insofar as it defines the potential source of state interests and preferences as inherent to states or as detectable from international systemic influences, respectively. The dichotomy concerning the theoretical framework regarding how states are treated in the international system mirrors one of the most disputed debates in social sciences for some years – agency versus structure – which is addressed in close detail in the chapter two of the thesis. What is crucial here to this discussion is that in general terms, the theoretical frameworks endorsing a focus on structure account for the importance of

norms and ideas in the apprehension of state behaviour whereas those focusing on agency leave these largely unaddressed. In this manner, and resulting from their theoretical nature, Realism and Liberalism overlook the power of norms and ideas upon state behaviour. According to this principle regarding structural and agentic theories, Marxism, as a structure-oriented approach in IR, should incorporate in its make-up the power of norms and ideas propagated in the international system. However, its radical theoretical make-up restricts itself from doing so. The Marxist conception of structure and its impact over states is locked in its perceived immutability of capitalism, where the synergy between structure and states appears reduced to the simple metropolis-periphery dynamics of the international system. By doing so, it leaves unaddressed all other aspects of a given social structure. As such, and despite the Marxist particular take on the potential of structure and norms and ideas over state behaviour, all three theories shared the oversight about how norms and ideas could effectively affect state behaviour in international life.⁶³

Before the limitations of the theoretical frameworks corresponding to each cluster of analysis that characterise the existing literature on EU development policy, it seems apparent that the application of a different approach to its interpretation would advance its understanding. Thus, the thesis proposes a distinct theoretical basis for the analysis of EU development policy. It challenges the perception of state behaviour advanced by the classic theoretical paradigms in IR by endorsing the treatment of interests, actors, and norms and ideas inclusive of the principle of the inseparability of domestic and international politics.⁶⁴ In this regard, states exist integrated in a multiplicity of social structures that make the environment in which they take action both social and material. The social and material setting in which they take action provides them with understandings about their interests and preferences. The stated concept of the state as part of the international system follows a distinct approach to the study of IR commonly known as Social Constructivism. The following research proposes Social Constructivism as a fitting alternative to the interpretation of the character of EU development policy towards Africa from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008.⁶⁵

2.1.1 Social Constructivism as an Alternative

While of complex definition, Social Constructivism is not an IR theory in the same fashion as Realism, Liberalism, or Marxism, but a meta-theory comprising a variety of possible approaches to

⁶⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, World Politics, Vol. 50(2), January 1998
the study of international political phenomena, which stresses the socially constructed character of international relations. Social Constructivism lays emphasis on social construction processes and their effects upon state behaviour in international life. With an unequivocal origin in Sociology, Social Constructivism translated into the study of international politics through a focus on the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values on political life, and rejects that state behaviour results from pure calculations of interest. Interests emerge as a construction by these social structures and not inherent to states. Departing from the human consciousness in international life, Constructivism contends that the interests and preferences of a given state are a product of their social construction vis-à-vis existing social norms, culturally determined roles and rules, and historically contingent discourse. Interests can then acquire an inter-subjective content that is distinct from the concept of interests as inherent to states, which results from material conditions and functional needs. In that perspective, interests can be adjustable, because as states are not always aware of what they want and stand open to external stimuli that mould their interests constantly.

Therefore, the international context can hold paramount significance in the definition of state interests and preferences, which results from its condition as a means for the diffusion of norms and ideas. In line with the sociological heritage of Social Constructivism, norms feature as a set of shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors. As an integral element of social structures, norms can directly affect state behaviour through the impact of international regimes, interstate interactions, and transnational epistemic communities upon the formation of state interests and preferences. In a Social Constructivist analysis, the understanding of the power of norms assumes a central role, as norms come to hold an intersubjective character and a distinct capacity to create patterns of behaviour in accordance to their own prescriptions.

However, this is not to say that Social Constructivism focuses solely on structure to the detriment of agency. The initial concentration on structure emerges as a way to distinguish itself from the purely agentic theories of IR in that it demonstrates how those structures can influence states, as well as how they influence states. As such, Social Constructivism gives emphasis to the

particular dynamics between structure and agency in the understanding of state behaviour positing that “as long as actions are explained with reference to structure, or vice versa, the independent variable in each case remains unavailable for problematisation in its own right”. Accordingly, a Social Constructivist approach to IR emphasises the process of interaction between structures and agents, where neither unit of analysis is reduced to the other, but instead, they become mutually constitutive. Social Constructivism aims to uncover the link between structural and agentic forces as a means to problematise state interests and preferences formation, and demonstrate that these emerge from and are endogenous to states’ interaction with the structures they comprise.

Social Constructivism stands as an alternative theoretical approach to the classic IR theories that support the existing research on the interpretation of EU development policy. It proposes a distinct treatment of actors, interests, and norms and ideas that were previously identified as the gaps in the available literature in view of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the ensuing investigation. Therein, international life features as social and constructed, which contrasts with its perception as simply material and pre-given. Therefore, Social Constructivism offers a setting where different social phenomena such as institutions, and norms and ideas “mediate, enable, mutually reproduce, and co-construct agency and structure”. Social Constructivism’s social context comprises a multitude of actors such as IOs, and vests them with the capacity to affect an actors’ behaviour. Hence, norms and the social context emerge as the crucial explanatory variable in the understanding of an actor’s preferences and interests’ formation, which sheds new light on the interpretation of an actor’s behaviour in international life.

Despite its analytical potential to interpret international political phenomena, Social Constructivism has thus remained thus far of minor interest to researchers on EU development policy. Its best expression appeared in two studies undertaken by Ole Elgstrom, firstly, on the negotiation of gender and development norms behind EU foreign aid policy, and secondly, on the impact of norms in the negotiation process leading up to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement (2000). Ole Elgstrom aimed to capture how gender and development norms changed as part of EU foreign aid policy, for which he combined a largely Social Constructivist agenda with a

71 Kubalkova, Vendulka, ‘Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism’, in Kubalkova, Vendulka (Eds.), *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 21
negotiation perspective. The author’s central concern in his research rested in the understanding of the negotiation process of gender and development norms in EU foreign aid policy through a focus on both text and implementation negotiations. In this commendable and highly technical assessment of norm negotiations at the EU level, the author concluded that the spread of gender and development norms as part of EU foreign aid policy was the result of communicative action and strategic interaction within the EU organisational setting. Ole Elgstrom concentrated on the workings of the European Council’s relevant committees and working groups to demonstrate how the gender and development norms were introduced, propagated, and finally integrated in EU foreign aid policy.

In another study on norms and EU development policy, Ole Elgstrom focused on the impact of norms in the negotiations prior to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, and demonstrated how shared and competing norms influence negotiation processes. With the aim to assess the Cotonou Agreement and the processes leading up to it, the author employed a negotiation perspective to his analysis, which highlighted both the dynamics of the bargaining between the EU and the ACP states, as well as how it evolved over time. Ole Elgstrom author engaged in a detailed scrutiny of the EU internal negotiation procedures and the negotiation rounds between the EU and the ACP states. He concluded that new norms had permeated the ACP-EU partnership making the relationship between the EU and the ACP states asymmetrical, which left the latter with little or no bargaining power over the general negotiation process of the Cotonou Agreement.

In parallel to Ole Elgstrom’s innovative attempt to interpret EU development policy under a Social Constructivist approach, other authors have attempted recently to scrutinise the subject through a focus on the power of norms therein. Accordingly, Andy Storey and Vicki Birchfield suggested a take on EU development policy in line with the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), newly developed by Ian Manners. The NPE approach focuses on the understanding of the character of the EU in international politics, and suggests that the Union is an actor characterised by an identity that is based on normative and ideational values that transcend narrow national interests,
and thus make it a singular entity in the international system. According to Ian Manners, “the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system”. Following these theoretical premises, Andy Storey analysed the expression of NPE in the EPAs negotiations between the EU and the ACP states. The author concluded that the way in which the EU used its norms and values in the EPAs negotiations confirmed its capacity as a normative power therein. Nevertheless, Andy Storey alerted to the kind of norms the EU is promoting currently in its relationship with Africa, and argued that these should be more considerate of the development needs of African states. Similarly, Vicki Birchfield sought to apply the same theoretical approach to the assessment of EU development policy in the new millennium. Her aim was to determine whether NPE was consistent with EU values and norms, and whether it was effective and beneficial to the goals of development and global poverty reduction. With the exception of aid delivery and new trade measures, the author concluded that her assembled empirical evidence demonstrated that there was congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the execution of its development policies vis-à-vis its partners.

The research undertaken by Ole Elgstrom, Andy Storey, and Vicki Birchfield stand as commendable exercises in the assessment of EU development policy, and posit a laudable alternative to the subject’s existing narratives. Ole Elgstrom explained the diffusion process of certain norms in the framework of EU foreign aid policy design and in the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, whilst Andy Storey and Vicky Birchfield used the NPE concept to demonstrate the power of norms in the definition of the EU’s character and identity vis-à-vis its development partners. Nonetheless, the approaches proposed by the cited authors revealed some practical and theoretical weaknesses in the analysis of EU development policy, which make them inadequate to address the thesis’ research puzzle and research questions.

Accordingly, Ole Elgstrom adopted a Social Constructivist framework of analysis to capture the diffusion process of certain norms both in the design of EU foreign aid policy, and in the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement. In that exercise, the author isolated the Union from the international system, and focused specifically on the EU internal dynamics to explain how certain norms were diffused therein. As a result, Ole Elgstrom concentrated on the internalisation of certain

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78 Manners, Ian, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp. 252
norms by the EU without addressing all the phases of a norm’s cycle – origin, diffusion, and internalisation. The author drew a strong focus on the internalisation phase of certain norms, yet he did not address both the origin of those norms and a significant part of their diffusion process. He took existing norms in international development, and assessed how these were internalised by the EU based solely on its internal negotiation procedures. By doing so, the author excluded from the analysis the international system of which the EU is an integral part, and the agents that comprise it, such as IOs. Thus, the author overlooked the debate on the EU as an actor in the international system. Ole Elgstrom’s Social Constructivist approach to EU foreign aid policy and the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement appeared as a fresh take on the subject, yet it left unaddressed part of a norm’s cycle and the importance of the international system and its comprising agents therein.

Whilst focusing on an equally normative base, Andy Storey and Vicki Birchfield applied a NPE approach to the analysis of EU development policy. Both authors presented an innovative account of EU development policy that challenged theoretically the existing narratives on the subject. In contrast with the classic IR theories that characterise the available literature on EU development policy, Andy Storey and Vicki Birchfield proposed an understanding of the subject through a focus on the power of norms. Nevertheless, their analyses concentrated on “the EU as a normative power [that] has an ontological quality to it”, and advanced an agency-based approach to the understanding of the character of the EU as an actor in the international system. Thus, their narratives omitted the power of structures in the definition of EU behaviour. The theoretical contours of NPE lend it a focus on agency to the detriment of the power of structures, which reduces the possibility of identifying international systemic influences in the formation of EU preferences and interests. Notwithstanding, the EU is currently a global actor integrated in social structures of norms and rules, which have the potential to affect its behaviour therein. In this perspective, Andy Storey and Vicky Birchfield proposed a distinct analysis of EU development policy, albeit without considering the power of the structures of which the EU is an integral part (specifically the structure of international development), upon its preferences and interests formation. The works by the two authors advanced the understanding of contemporary EU development policy, yet they overlooked the power of social structures in the definition of EU behaviour.

The alternative accounts of EU development policy advanced by Ole Elgstrom, Andy Storey, and Vicki Birchfield stand as commendable interpretations of the subject. Nonetheless, they

79 Manners, Ian, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp. 252
demonstrated some practical and theoretical weaknesses regarding the interpretation of EU development policy in light of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis. The aim of the ensuing research is to capture the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy towards Africa, inclusive of the EU dimension as an actor in the domain of international development. The structure of international development is a means for the diffusion of norms and ideas, which can affect significantly the definition of EU behaviour therein. Accordingly, the thesis aspires to concentrate on the power of the structure of international development and its comprising agents upon the definition of EU interests and preferences formation, and therefore shed new light on the understanding of EU behaviour. For that purpose, it seeks to focus on the norms characterising the structure of international development and apprehend their origin, diffusion process, and subsequent internalisation by the EU. By doing so, the thesis aims to address the advanced research puzzle and research questions, and uncover the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008.

Conforming to the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, as well as the identified gaps and weaknesses in the reviewed literature, the ensuing investigation of EU development policy proposes Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis as a pertinent method of research. Social Constructivism is not a definite or exact method of political research, which is a result of the various social structural elements it sustains relevant in the apprehension of an actor’s interests and preferences formation. Different authors advance distinct social elements for analytical consideration depending on the issue areas they choose to focus their investigations upon, which leaves Social Constructivist interpretations of political phenomena open to a variety of strains. Martha Finnemore has developed a particular Social Constructivist research agenda that both draws a focus on structures and agents, and concentrates on the full cycle of a given norm, to capture the behaviour of a given actor in the international system. Hence, the thesis proposes the author’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis as a pertinent method for the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa.

Within the plethora of authors advocating Social Constructivism as a suitable approach to the study of international politics, Martha Finnemore developed her theoretical archetype through a focus on ideational concerns and on what she calls ‘logic of appropriateness’ in state behaviour. The author emphasises the importance of analysing state behaviour distinctly from the theoretical

approach proposed by purely agentic accounts that concentrate on a ‘logic of consequences’ where actors make means-ends calculations and establish strategies to maximise utilities. Instead, Martha Finnemore suggests a focus on a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which is driven by social structure. As such, social structures of norms and rules define the types of action that will be contemplated and taken, delineating responsibilities and duties, and therefore, determining who will contemplate and take action. The author’s objective is to predict similar behaviour from dissimilar actors, as rules and norms make similar behavioural claims upon dissimilar actors. Accordingly, Martha Finnemore calls on the systemic norms propagated by IOs as the possible source of those logics, and attempts to demonstrate that they provide states with direction and goals for action.

In this perspective, Martha Finnemore suggests an analysis of state behaviour through a focus on how the international system and certain IOs (as its comprising agents) can reconstitute state interests. In her research, she demonstrated various instances when IOs directly influenced state interests and preferences, most notably the cases of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the promotion of science; the Red Cross and the evolution of the rules of war; and the World Bank (WB) and the concept of poverty eradication. The author’s accounts of political phenomena explain state behaviour by concentrating on the normative changes in an IO, and on the relationship between that IO and a given state within a fixed structure. By doing so, Martha Finnemore combines structure and agency in her analyses, which uncovers the dynamics between actors and the structures they integrate. As a result, she illustrates that actors can create structures that take a life of their own, and that structures can create and empower actors, who may in turn react to those structures for reasons of their own. Martha Finnemore’s particular orientation within the Social Constructivist tradition demonstrates that in certain cases the causal variable of state interests and preferences lay within the structure of international regimes, in which IOs operate as the norm diffusers to states in that process.

Accordingly, it appears that Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis is a fitting alternative method to stimulate further research in EU development policy towards Africa. The framework of analysis proposed by the author seems capable of addressing both the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, as well as the gaps identified in the reviewed literature. The EU is an increasingly preeminent actor in the international system, which

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integrates an international development structure comprised by a variety of actors. Thus, an examination of the dynamics the EU maintains with the structure of international development and its comprising agents appears to be an adequate means to capture the large norms characterising EU development policy towards Africa, and advance the understanding of their evolution, nature, and role. Therein, Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda seems capable of overcoming the identified gaps in the subject’s existing literature characterised by the three major theoretical traditions in IR, and contribute to further knowledge on this still under-theorised EU policy area.

The current section searched for an alternative approach to the interpretation of the character of EU development policy towards Africa in consideration of both the thesis’ research puzzle and research questions, and the identified gaps in the available literature on the subject. It proposed Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis as an appropriate method to address the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development, and thereby advance the understanding of the subject. The section served to review the existing narratives of EU development policy, and introduce the thesis’ alternative methodological base. In support of the proposed method of analysis, chapter two concentrates on the contours of Social Constructivism and Martha Finnemore’s particular approach to the study of international political phenomena, and demonstrates in close detail how it can be applied suitably to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa.

**Conclusions**

In view of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, the current chapter focused on the review of the literature available on EU development policy. It catalogued it in specific clusters of analysis and demonstrated their strengths in advancing the understanding of the subject, but it also identified their limitations and weaknesses. The review of the literature according to the identified three clusters of analysis and their respective theoretical basis, illustrated what the existing literature on the subject ‘cannot do’ regarding the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis.
Subsequently, the chapter proposed to search for an alternative approach to the interpretation of EU development policy in light of the identified practical and theoretical weaknesses of the subject’s existing literature. It advanced a method of analysis distinct from the three major IR theories, and based on a sociological theory of knowledge – Social Constructivism. Social Constructivism is an approach to the study of international politics through a focus on the international system as a set of ideas and a system of norms that was arranged by its comprising agents, which has the potential to affect an actor’s behaviour therein. The understanding of EU development policy under a normative perspective drew also the attention of a small number of authors, yet their analyses demonstrated some practical and theoretical weaknesses concerning the research puzzle and the research questions leading the research. As a result, the chapter proposed Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis as a fitting alternative method for the interpretation of EU development policy. The author’s research agenda combines a focus on both structure and agency, and appears capable of addressing the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy inclusive of the Union’s progress into an increasingly prominent actor in the international system. Therefore, the current chapter established an introduction to what Social Constructivism and Martha Finnemore’s seminal work ‘can do’ regarding the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis.

Correspondingly, the following chapter expands both on what Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis ‘can do’ to advance the understanding of EU development policy, and how it translates into the practical analysis of the subject. Therein, it demonstrates the thesis’ added value in the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War.
Chapter II – Theory and Methodology:
Capturing EU Development Policy towards
Africa since the end of the Cold War

“When there is a change in the being of the knower, there is a corresponding change in the nature and amount of knowing”
– Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy

“Every school of thought is like a man who has talked to himself for a hundred years and is delighted with his own mind, however stupid it may be”
– Johann von Goethe, Principles of Natural Science
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, and the identified gaps in the available literature on EU development policy illustrated the relevance for additional research on the subject. The existing narratives on EU development policy advanced the study of this EU policy area over time. Nevertheless, they demonstrated some theoretical and practical limitations regarding the interpretation of its evolution, nature, and role in the domain of international development inclusive of the EU progress into a prominent international actor. In that regard, the thesis proposes an alternative method of analysis to the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa in the form of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda.

Accordingly, the following chapter aims to expand on the framework of analysis proposed for the thesis in the preceding chapter, and demonstrate what it ‘can do’ in the interpretation of EU development policy. For that purpose, it focuses on the principles of Social Constructivism and Martha Finnemore’s study of international political phenomena, and describes how the suggested method can be applied to the analysis of EU development policy. By doing so, the chapter illustrates the ‘added value’ of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda in the understanding of EU development policy. The particularity of the author’s framework of analysis lies in her systemic approach to the understanding of an actor’s behaviour by investigating an international structure not of power but of meaning and social value. She argues that to capture an actor’s behaviour, it is crucial to develop an insight into the international structure of which the actors is an integral part. The author considers that the dense networks of international social relations of which an actor is part, can shape its behaviour in consistent ways. Therein, Martha Finnemore draws a focus on International Organisations (IOs) as a vital component of the social structure in her analysis, and investigates the ways which they can redefine an actor’s behaviour. The author demonstrates how IOs can ‘socialise’ a given actor to accept new political goals and social values in ways that have a lasting impact in its behaviour. In this perspective, the ensuing chapter proposes to
interpret EU development policy by: integrating the EU in the structure of international
development comprehensive of the role played by its principal IOs; and, assessing how it affected
EU behaviour expressed through its policy of development cooperation. Thereby, it suggests that a
Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist interpretation of EU development policy can adequately
address the thesis’ research puzzle and research questions, and stimulate further knowledge on the
subject.

The chapter begins from the examination of Social Constructivism and its approach to the
study of IR. Subsequently, it concentrates on the Social Constructivist research undertaken by
Martha Finnemore on the interpretation of international political phenomena, and illustrates how it
can be applied in detail to the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa. Lastly, it
focuses on refining the thesis’ workable hypothesis, and demonstrates the claims to knowledge of
the following investigation on EU development policy towards Africa.

1. Social Constructivism as a Method of Research - A Framework

The interpretation of EU development policy was object of various methodological approaches in
the subject’s available literature. Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism were the most commonly used
theoretical foundations in the existing narratives. Despite their significant input to research on EU
development policy, chapter one exposed some of their practical and theoretical limitations to
address the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis. Most importantly, the existing
accounts on the subject overlooked both the inclusion of the EU in the international system as an
increasingly prominent actor, and the comprehensive understanding of the evolution, nature, and
role of EU development policy therein. Without refuting the results of prior scientific research
reviewed in the previous chapter, the following investigation endorses Social Constructivism as a
method with the capacity to ponder aspects of EU development policy that other accounts have
disregarded. In that manner, the thesis aspires to foster additional debate on the subject, and render
a fresh understanding of EU development policy towards Africa in light of its guiding research
puzzle and research questions.

The following subsection advances an assessment of Social Constructivism’s theoretical
tradition as a means to accommodate the ensuing investigation therein. Social Constructivism is a
complex theory of knowledge devised within the domain of Sociology that recently filtered through
to the field of IR, and which posits a distinct approach to the study of international politics. The next subsection discusses the emergence of Social Constructivism as a theory of knowledge in the field of IR, and explains its various strains based on distinct epistemological and ontological standings proposed by different Social Constructivist authors. Within the range of Social Constructivist approaches to the understanding of international political phenomena, the subsection argues that Martha Finnemore’s version is an adequate method to interpret EU development policy towards Africa.

1.1 Social Constructivism

In a break with the past, social features of political life became a growing concern to political scientists during the 1980s and 1990s decades marking the beginning of new research currents in political science. Although the social dimension of political analysis received increasing recognition in political science circles at the time, the social dimension was already a long established component in other research programmes especially in the fields of international law, history, anthropology, and sociology. Political science scholars began to incorporate the social dimension of political life in their analyses, and gradually exposed the theoretical limitations of the classic Realist and Liberal accounts of political phenomena. Both schools of thought devised a particular stand on international political life, and they left little or no space to theorise about the growing concern for social elements in political science research.

Progressively, new theoretical investigations materialised in the IR branch of political science that endorsed the broad heritage of various celebrated sociologists, most notably Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Max Weber focused both on the significance conferred by social actors to actions and shared meanings, and the causal explanation of that process. Émile Durkheim examined the role of ideational factors in social life and how ideas are potentially socially-causative. The embracing of the sociological tradition of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim became emblematic of a new line of investigation in IR. However, most of these narratives illustrated the development of a particular theoretical outline that was distinct from those identified in other fields of research. Without categorically importing an outside theory, IR scholars conceived a distinctive theoretical

84 A suitable introduction to the work developed by both authors is provided by Hughes, John, “Understanding Classical Sociology: Marx, Weber, Durkheim”, (London: SAGE Publications, 1995).
fabric for the analysis of political phenomena denoting Constructivism. Despite sharing certain characteristics with Neofunctionalism, the English School, and Sociological Institutionalism, Constructivism became itself a substantive IR theoretical approach over the past three decades with Nicolas Onuf commonly referred to as the author credited with coining the term Constructivist in 1989.

As an innovative theoretical challenge to classical thinking in IR theory, Constructivism, commonly known in political science as Social Constructivism, met initial scholarly resistance in the IR field, which provoked a compelling debate amongst academics. Departing from a specific concept of knowledge, and how knowledge may be gathered, Social Constructivism remained temporarily in the confines of the discipline of IR. The 1990s decade marked the gradual inverting of the trend, which resulted from the increasing number of Social Constructivist narratives in the field of IR. Social Constructivism is today an accessible and established method of research in the political sciences even though its empirical application still endures debate.

While complex to define, Social Constructivism stands as a meta-theory, or theory of knowledge, that emerged in the field of IR at the end of the 20th Century. Alexander Wendt engaged in the early research on the social dimension of political phenomena. He produced one of the leading articles on early Constructivist thought, and followed it up with what became one of the seminal works of not only the Social Constructivist research manifesto, but also, of contemporary political science. Alexander Wendt elaborated on Social Constructivism and its relations with distinct IR approaches, asserting that the classic theories in IR tend to be “undersocialised in the sense that they pay insufficient attention to the ways in which actors in world politics are socially constructed.”

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87 One of the most influential early works in this process was that undertaken by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who endorsed the Max Weber and Émile Durkheim’s heritage in their research; Berger, Peter & Luckmann, Thomas, “The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”, (New York: Doubleday, 1996)
89 Checkel, Jeffrey, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, Vol. 50(2), January 1998
92 Wendt, Alexander, “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp. 4
John Ruggie was an equally instrumental author in the establishment of Social Constructivism as an alternative theoretical approach in IR studies. He endorsed a similar understanding of Social Constructivism, and advanced it as an abstraction “about human consciousness and its role in international life”.93 Considering Alexander Wendt’s and John Ruggie’s claims, it is possible to state that the central focus of a Social Constructivist analysis is the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values on political life, while renouncing the notion that these may derive from pure calculations of interest. Social Constructivist analyses “rest on an irreducibly inter-subjective dimension of human action”, and they structure the ways that actors understand what kind of actions are valuable, appropriate, and necessary.94 The identities and interests of actors appear as constructed by social structures and not exogenously given to the system by human nature or domestic politics.95 Preferences appear strongly influenced and often constituted by social norms, culturally determined roles and rules, and a historically contingent discourse.96 Accordingly, Social Constructivism concerns the human consciousness in international life, and therein Social Constructivists contend “that not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity and will”.97

The theoretical evolution from the early investigations of the social dimension in political life to the subsequent establishment of Social Constructivism as a concrete method of IR research arose from a Reflectivist approach to the study of political phenomena. Reflectivism is a particular interpretative theoretical abstraction of how knowledge may be gathered, which stands in direct opposition to Rationalism.98 The dispute between Reflectivist and Rationalist theories, and meta-theories, in the IR branch of political science, introduced what some authors commonly refer to as the Third Debate in IR.99 At the centre of the scientific dispute is the concept of positivism, which purports that “reason can reach perfect knowledge and truth including within the realm of the social sciences”.100 The central difference between both approaches rests upon their epistemological and

methodological footing, with Reflectivism rejecting the classical positivist approach to IR, and emphasising instead reflexivity and the non-neutral nature of political and social explanation.101

While the Realist and the Liberal schools of thought embraced the positivist proposition, some of the theoretical modern strands in IR posit an alternative post-positivist agenda in their approach. Invoking often the French Poststructuralists Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, but in fact incorporating the heritage of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Karl Popper, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche, many contemporary IR researchers maintain that a post-positivist analysis of political phenomena is not only commendable but also an accurate exercise.102 The aforementioned Reflectivist overture to research methods marked the birth of a new era in social sciences, which is commonly referred to as post-modernism. In the words of Pauline Rosenau, the emergence of post-modernism in the social sciences denotes that “a radically new and different cultural movement is coalescing in a broad-gauged re-conceptualisation of how we experience and explain the world around us. In its most extreme formulations, post-modernism is revolutionary; it goes to the very core of what constitutes social science and radically dismisses it. In its more moderate proclamations, post-modernism encourages substantive re-definition and innovation.”103 The Reflectivist turn in the social sciences marked the beginning of the discipline’s post-modernist era, and established distinct research methods to interpret the world around us.

Social Constructivism is a theory of knowledge that emerged in the post-modernist era of the social sciences as a particular approach to political research based on social inquiry. It attempts to capture the nature of a culturally and historically contingent discourse that depends on social interaction, and therefore, it rejects the notion of an objectively ‘knowable’ world. Distinctively from power-laden methods of political research, a Social Constructivist analysis denotes concern with social facts in international political life.104 Accordingly, it can integrate other elements that other theoretical approaches have previously neglected, which demonstrates its theoretical utility in the

study of international politics, such as EU development policy. A Social Constructivist approach can complement existing forms of analysis of a given phenomenon because its theoretical composition does not stand in opposition to either of the classic IR schools of thought (Realism and Liberalism), but rather, it simply illustrates their incompleteness. Thus, Social Constructivist accounts aim to develop an inclusive interpretation of political phenomena. By doing so, they retain notable strengths, especially regarding their contribution to a holistic grasp of an actor’s behaviour and interest formation vis-à-vis the international context in which it exists.

Herein, Martha Finnemore developed her social inquiry within the Social Constructivist research domain, and focused on how the international system – in the form of IOs – changes and reconstitutes states. The author identified the international system as an engine for change in state action, not by constraining states with a specific set of preferences from acting, but by changing their preferences. With the aim to establish a platform for empirical investigation, she stressed the central focus of structures and its composing agents in her analysis in combination with a particular treatment of state preferences. Martha Finnemore challenged classic IR theories and schools of thought by stressing the impact of both structure and agents on an actor’s behaviour and interest formation, which demonstrates the aptitude of Social Constructivism to interpret international political phenomena.

Social Constructivism is as an established method of research in the social sciences today, yet contention endures amongst both its advocates and critics. Social Constructivism is primarily not a theory itself but a meta-theory, or a theory of knowledge. As a method of social research, Social Constructivism developed in complex and variant currents. At the core of these variations, lies the epistemology and ontology of Social Constructivism. The different tangents regarding the epistemology and ontology of Social Constructivism illustrate the potential of rich and alternative methodological frameworks in the study of political phenomena. The following parts of the current subsection contend that a positivist epistemology and a ‘social construct’ ontology make a sound scientific basis for the analysis of EU development policy towards Africa.

1.1.1 Epistemology

Over the past two decades the Social Constructivist approach has been progressively recognised as an innovative contribution to the study of international politics in that it “not only enables critical theorists to mount a more powerful challenge to the dominant rationalist theories, but one that also promises to advance critical international theory itself”. One of Social Constructivism’s primary departure points from the then prominent international political theories is its epistemological origin. Under a Constructivist lens, scientific knowledge is effectively a social construct, which results from the belief that social reality is itself the product of a construction that is constituted by inter-subjective knowledge, meaning and social practices.

Social Constructivists introduced the previous claim to contend that interpretations of social reality stem from within the same reality that scientists are trying to analyse. In opposition to Realist and Liberal theories, Constructivist approaches maintain that the analysis of social reality does not advance from the outside of that reality because knowledge itself is based on a social construction. The premise illustrates Constructivism’s tendency to refute the objectivism of knowledge verification endorsed by theories of a purely positivistic foundation. Social Constructivism predicts an element of inter-subjectivity at the level of observation resulting from the lack of an external reference point to validate objectively knowledge claims. Conversely, positivistic theories assert that scientific observation can be determined independently from a scientist’s perspective, and thus be objectively attested.

Within the contours of Social Constructivism different authors opted for distinct and complex epistemological standings that generated considerable levels of disagreement amongst its enthusiasts. The Reflectivist and Rationalist element of a Social Constructivist account lies at the centre of the dispute. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie provided an early assessment of the state of the art of Social Constructivism and its epistemological and ontological variants, yet the debate evolved on to a progressively intricate dimension thereafter. The main theoretical divergence to emerge amongst Constructivists, concerns the dialectics between the possible

108 Checkel, Jeffrey, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations’
109 Manning, Philip, ‘Procedure, Reflexivity and Social Constructionism’
employment of a positivistic epistemology on a Social Constructivist ontology, and therefore endorse social reality as a construct.\footnote{Guzzini, Stefano, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6(2), June 2000}

The incorporation of a positivist approach to a Social Constructivist analysis became gradually accepted in time, specifically through the work of Alexander Wendt. He claimed that a positivistic epistemology and a Constructivist ontology are not only theoretically compatible but also of legitimate scientific value.\footnote{Wendt, Alexander, “Social Theory of International Politics”} The author’s proposition affected deeply the Social Constructivist scientific community. As a result, two distinct epistemological positions started to emerge within the Social Constructivist theory of knowledge, opening a rift between those who advocated a positivistic epistemology on the one hand, and those who proposed a Reflectivist epistemology on the other hand.

In light of the aforementioned growing debate in Social Constructivist circles, a distinct set of authors, namely Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener, created a theoretical diagram of Social Constructivism. They illustrated the disparate possible trends of Social Constructivist analyses within a Rationalist-Reflectivist spectrum.\footnote{Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, & Antje Wiener, ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Special Issue, Vol. 6(4), 1999} Similarly, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner had already alerted for the complex nature of Social Constructivism, claiming that Constructivists had self-consciously placed themselves between Rationalist and post-modernist orientations.\footnote{Katzenstein, Peter, Robert Keohane, & Stephen Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 52(4), Autumn 1998} In this manner, some authors, such as Alexander Wendt, defend the use of a positivist epistemology in Social Constructivist accounts, whilst several others denote a preference for the opposite end of the spectrum – Reflectivism. For instance, Steve Smith asserted that Reflectivist approaches have a much wider notion of politics.\footnote{Smith, Steve, ‘Social Constructivism and European Studies: A Reflectivist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, Special Issue, Vol. 6(4), 1999} He contended that if Constructivist analyses of social phenomena were to adopt a Rationalist epistemology, Social Constructivism would then become very close to the neo-liberal wing of the Rationalist paradigm. Thus, the rationalist character of a Social Constructivist analysis would ultimately result in a conflicting contradiction between the epistemology and ontology of Social Constructivism itself.

An apparent solution to the debate emerged with Emmanuel Adler’s theoretical abstraction of Social Constructivism. He proposed a ‘middle ground’ formula in the practical articulation of
Social Constructivism. Emmanuel Adler strongly advocated a Social Constructivist agenda in the study of international politics, and suggested that the optimum target for a Social Constructivist argument rests upon a middle ground between Rationalism and Reflectivism. Nonetheless, he refrained from advocating that Social Constructivists should aim at seizing the exact middle ground in that spectrum, but rather, they should share a practice of distancing themselves from the Rationalist and the Reflectivist poles. In that manner, the author suggested that an ideal Social Constructivist account should aspire to rest upon a Rationalist epistemology, and a Reflectivist ontology.

Nevertheless, the Reflectivist-Rationalist debate failed to provide a solution for Social Constructivist researchers, and as a result Social Constructivist accounts drew a closer affinity to more conventional theories of international politics. Consequently, the proposition of a positivistic epistemology on a Social Constructivist ontology grew increasingly strong over the recent years lending itself to the emergence of a kind of mainstream level of Social Constructivist narratives today. As a result, Reflectivist epistemological narratives progressed on to a subsidiary level of Social Constructivism. Therefore, what emerged initially as one of the axioms of Social Constructivism gradually progressed on to a subdued position therein, because the analysis of social phenomena became scientifically acceptable only when attached to an empirical element. However, the inclination towards the positivist end of the Rationalist-Reflectivist spectrum is variable, as different authors still argue for different standings.

Additional discussion on the topic emerged amongst political scientists concerning the scientific validity of Reflectivist Social Constructivist narratives. In spite of the fact that positivist Social Constructivists opted for what could be called a ‘neo-classical’ take on Social Constructivism, that alone does not void Reflectivist accounts of scientific value. Reflectivist approaches still follow methodological norms regarding observation and explanation of social phenomena, which effectively dismiss its reduction to a status of relativism. Reflectivism simply takes a distinct epistemological position within the Social Constructivist discussion, and places emphasis on the

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117 Adler, Emmanuel, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3(3), September 1997
118 Adler, Emmanuel, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’
interpretation of events, rather than on raw empirical data. Since analyses of social reality depart from within that same reality, Reflectivists sustain that positivist authors cannot attain objective knowledge verification in their accounts. In that perspective, Reflectivists strongly support the principle that knowledge of social reality is innately of an interpretative basis.\textsuperscript{123}

In regard to the Social Constructivist epistemological debate, the thesis follows its ever-growing positivist orientation. It endorses a positivist-based investigation of social reality as the most pertinent approach to the analysis of international political phenomena, and specifically the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. While some authors reject the alleged contradictory character of an analysis based on a positivist epistemology and a Social Constructivist ontology, the current research contends that method should serve theory and not the contrary. Therefore, it sustains that in scientific research method is paramount in the applicability of theory to understand reality. Following the identification of the thesis’s epistemological standing, the chapter now turns to the ontological dimension of Social Constructivism.

\subsection*{1.1.2 Ontology}

Despite some variations amongst scholars, the ontological character of Social Constructivism gathered considerable agreement amongst Social Constructivists if contrasted with its epistemological dimension. Social Constructivists advanced their conception of reality as a broad social construct. The ensuing part of the current subsection introduces the debate on the ontology of Social Constructivism. Therein, it proposes the adoption of Martha Finnemore’s narrative on interests and preferences formation in the international system as a sound method to interpret contemporary EU development policy. Martha Finnemore’s research is a central reference in the thesis due to its theoretically cogent and empirically applicable methodological framework of analysis, which demonstrates the powerful impact of social structures on the formation of an actor’s preferences and interests. The author illustrated the potential of her research design on the interpretation of an actor’s behaviour as an integral element of the international system, which the thesis aspires to emulate concerning the understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy towards Africa.

\textsuperscript{123} Fearon, James \& Wendt, Alexander, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: a Skeptical View’
In her study of international political phenomena, Martha Finnemore developed her Social Constructivist archetype through a focus on ideational concerns and on what she called a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in state behaviour.\footnote{Finnemore, Martha, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’} She concentrated on the process of a state’s interests and preferences formation inclusive of its integration in the international system, as one of its comprising units.\footnote{Finnemore, Martha, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’} By doing so, Martha Finnemore aimed to distance her analysis from the ‘logic of consequences’ that characterises purely agentic accounts where states make means-ends calculations and establish strategies to maximise utilities. Inversely, she proposed to concentrate on a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in state behaviour, which is driven by social structure. According to the author, social structures of norms and rules define the types of action that will be contemplated and taken, which delineates responsibilities and duties, and thus, determines who will contemplate and take action. Under her proposed approach, Martha Finnemore aimed to predict similar behaviour from distinct actors based on the principle that rules and norms make similar behavioural claims upon distinct actors.\footnote{Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996)} For that purpose, she called on the systemic norms propagated by the IOs that integrate an international structure as the potential source of those ‘logics’, and demonstrated that IOs can provide actors with direction and goals for action.

Martha Finnemore undertook substantial research on the Social Constructivist interpretation of international politics based on the premise that the international system – in the form of IOs – can change and reconstitute actors due to the dynamic and malleable character of their preferences and interests. In one of her first accounts of international political phenomena, she suggested the study of IOs as social entities partly shaped by international social action.\footnote{Finnemore, Martha, ‘International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Science Policy’, International Organization, Vol. 47(4), Autumn 1993} Using the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as an example, the author demonstrated how external forces to states could shape choices about internal state structure. Her theoretical proposition represented an advancement on the study of the impact of the international context on the formation of state interests and preferences. Martha Finnemore’s theoretical assumption contrasted with the then conventional state-centric approaches to IR, and called for further research on the role played by IOs in that process.

Subsequently, Martha Finnemore maintained and developed her proposal for an alternative research agenda in IR based on a Social Constructivist methodology.\footnote{Finnemore, Martha ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, International Organization, Vol. 50(2), Spring 1996} Therein, she assumed the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item[124] Finnemore, Martha, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’
  \item[125] Finnemore, Martha, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’
  \item[128] Finnemore, Martha ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, International Organization, Vol. 50(2), Spring 1996
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Weberian heritage of Social Constructivism, and focused on the social and cognitive features of sociological institutionalism to illustrate the power of structures in the analysis of political phenomena. The concentration on structure emerged as a feature of the author’s research method, specifically the cultural structure of a subject of analysis. As a critic of purely agency-oriented narratives, Martha Finnemore sustained that a focus on structure could uncover new elements in the analysis of political and social realities, even if “no theory explains everything”.  

In her first manuscript, and arguably her mostly widely acclaimed publication to date, Martha Finnemore developed a highly coherent argument for the promotion of Social Constructivism as a rigorous method of research, which is capable of unveiling a new dimension in the interpretation of international politics. According to the author, most IR theories deem state interests and preferences as unproblematic, and assume that states and other actors know what they want and that those objectives are readily discernible to researchers. Furthermore, she asserted that the majority of IR theories tend to determine – directly or indirectly – that the source of state interests and preferences rests within the state. Unlike Realist or Liberal paradigms that specify actors exogenously and assume their interests and preferences, Martha Finnemore contended that interests and preferences are not inherent to states and not attached to material conditions. States are part of the international system, which is an environment full of uncertainty wherein states and other actors suffer from bounded rationality. As an integral part of such system, states are embedded in a strong social structure making their interests and preferences a product of their socialisation within that structure. Martha Finnemore’s position contrasts with more self-contained and materialistic conceptions of the state, which expresses her objective “to challenge beyond the limits of realism” in the understanding of state interests and preferences formation, and thus demonstrate that these interests are of an intersubjective nature.

In combination with treating state preferences as ‘social’, the author proposed a structure-oriented interpretation of international political phenomena. Her research agenda regarded structures and not agents as the departure point of a given analysis. She considered social structures the variables that derive actors and interests from them, and exert additional constitutive and/or regulative effects on behaviour. From this premise, Martha Finnemore contended that socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behaviour, and shared beliefs might provide states and other actors with understandings of what is important or valuable to them and what are effective and/or

129 Finnemore, Martha ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, pp. 19
130 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”
131 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, pp. 14
132 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, pp. 15
legitimate means of obtaining those ‘valued goods’. Therefore, social structures may supply states with both preferences and strategies for pursuing those preferences.

Accordingly, Martha Finnemore suggested an analysis of state behaviour through a focus on how IOs could reconstitute state interests using the examples of: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the promotion of science; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the evolution of the rules of war; and, the World Bank (WB) and the eradication of poverty. In her accounts, the author proposed two strands of analysis – structural and agency. The structural strand represents the starting point of her analysis, and therein, she examines shifts in state behaviour and traces them to the IOs’ normative claims. Conversely, the agency strand, concentrates on how the IOs came to hold the normative views in question, and on the mechanisms through which they ‘taught’ those views to states. The aim of the method is to explain state behaviour, by addressing the normative changes within an IO and the relationship between that IO and states. The combination of structure and agency contemplates the dynamics between actors and structures, and illustrates that actors create structures that take a life of their own, and that structures create and empower actors who may in turn react to those structures for reasons of their own. As a result, Martha Finnemore demonstrated that in certain cases the causal variable of state interests and preferences lay within the structure of international regimes, where IOs operate as the norm diffusers to states in that process.

Jointly with Michael Barnett, Martha Finnemore expanded further on the link between structure and agency in her research on international politics by focusing on the study of IOs as bureaucracies. Both authors understood IOs as agents vested with authority to make rules and exercise power that afforded IOs additional autonomy and allowed them to evolve and expand in ways unintended initially by their creators. Martha Finnemore’s interpretation demonstrated a concern for the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values on political life. Moreover, it rejected the notion that preferences can be derived from pure calculations of interest. Similarly, and in a later article co-written with Kathryn Sikkink, the author maintained an analogous assertion suggesting that international norms, shared beliefs, discourse, culture, and other social structures may make uniform behavioural claims upon dissimilar actors. Therefore, the

133 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”
aforementioned elements identified by the author may shape and define the preferences of actors in ways not related to their internal conditions, characteristics, or functional and material needs.

While acknowledging the relevance of discourse and culture in the definition of state preferences, Finnemore concentrated on norms of behaviour and their potential impact therein. The author asserted that norms consist of shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors, which confirm their shared and social character. Thus, ideas may or may not have behavioural implications, whereas norms by definition concern behaviour. According to Finnemore norms may be regarded as collectively held ideas about behaviour that create patterns of behaviour in accordance to their disposition, and which may be articulated in discourse.\textsuperscript{136} In line with her understanding of the power of norms, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink produced a detailed account of the cycle of norms.\textsuperscript{137} Whilst acknowledging that “the processes of social construction and strategic bargaining are deeply intertwined”, the authors called for a focus on ideational concerns in their analysis, and sustained that norms matter in the understanding of change in state behaviour.\textsuperscript{138} For that exercise, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink made an outline of the ‘life cycle’ of norms, which are classified in a range from emergence, to cascade (diffusion), to internalisation, that demonstrate how norms affect state behaviour. Herein, they identified IOs as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, which create new norms that emerge as part of the social structure in which states are integrated. Subsequently, the norms cascade into states resulting from international pressures, and finally they integrate state behaviour through codification and universal adherence.

Martha Finnemore’s proposition aimed to demonstrate the utility of social structural approaches against generally more conventional agent-oriented theories, which work with the notion that rational interests inform strategic behaviour independent of societal or cultural factors. However, that is not to say that the author neglected agency in her analysis. One of the aims of Martha Finnemore’s research agenda is to expound the power of social structures, while in fact attempting to bring agency back into social-structural analysis. The author argues that agents and structures are mutually constitutive, as agents may construct social structures and those same structures may also influence and reconstruct agents. Therefore, Martha Finnemore claims that the analysis of state behaviour and interest formation should focus first on the interpretation of the structure, and then, on the role played by the agents within that structure. Actors may create structures, which can take a life of their own, and in turn shape subsequent action. As such, social

\textsuperscript{136} Finnemore, Martha, “The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force”, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)
\textsuperscript{137} Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’
\textsuperscript{138} Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, pp. 911
structures create and empower actors who may then act to overturn those structures for reasons of their own. As a result, Martha Finnemore asserted that in the analysis of any given political phenomenon both agency and structure play a defining role.\textsuperscript{139}

The latest major contribution by Martha Finnemore to the promotion of a Social Constructivist agenda in the study of social sciences was co-designed with Michael Barnett, and focused on international bureaucracies and their autonomous character in the international system.\textsuperscript{140} The authors proposed a Social Constructivist approach to the understanding of the behaviour of IOs in the international system, with a view to assess the role they perform therein. They focused on the role played in the international system by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Secretariat over the recent decades as compact bureaucracies that represent a distinctive social type of authority in accordance with its own internal logic and behavioural predisposition. Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett concluded that the aforementioned IOs use their authority in the international system to express their autonomy and ability to change the world around them by formulating impersonal rules. Those rules are used subsequently not only to regulate but also to constitute and construct the social world in which they exist. Hence, the rules created by the IOs have the capacity to create new categories of actors, form new interests for actors, define shared international tasks, and determine new models of social organisation around the globe. Furthermore, the authors drew attention to the fact that IOs change over time, and adapt to new circumstances and challenges drawn from experience encoded in their rules and embedded in their organisational culture. By doing so, IOs may often expand their role in international system by taking on new missions, mandates, and responsibilities in ways not imagined by their founders.

In her academic endeavours, Martha Finnemore designed a theoretically coherent and empirically applicable methodological framework of analysis to the understanding of state behaviour. Progressively, it drew the attention of various researchers in the field of IR. Some of the best examples of the application of Martha Finnemore's research outline to the interpretation of international political phenomena emerged through the work undertaken by Simon Reich, Kali Wright, and Luke Glanville.\textsuperscript{141} Simon Reich sought to explain the conditions under which global

\textsuperscript{139} Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics’
norms become part of the agenda of global governance, and thus, consequential to the actions of all actors in the international system, including states. Referring to Martha Finnemore’s research on norms and their diffusion in the international system, Simon Reich tested the development of the norm of ‘preventative intervention’ in intrastate conflicts. He concluded that the model of analysis in question allowed for an accurate assessment of the cycle of the stated norm, even if its phase of internalisation was still incomplete and required further research.

Similarly, Kali Wright endorsed the Martha Finnemore concept of norm diffusion to assess the impact of the norm of ‘prohibition of torture’ on US behaviour. In line with Martha Finnemore’s conception of IOs as norms diffusers, Kali Wright traced the origin of the ‘prohibition of torture’ norm to the ICRC and the United Nations (UN), and he examined how it permeated into US behaviour. Whilst acknowledging the relevance of Martha Finnemore’s approach to the analysis of the cycle of norms, he concluded that it fell short in explaining how the ‘prohibition of torture’ norm appeared to be internalised by the US in light of its discourse on the matter, but not of its behaviour.

Following a distinct take from both Simon Reich and Kali Wright, Luke Glanville investigated the extent to which humanitarian intervention is allowed and legitimised, in accordance with what he calls the ‘liberal world society of state and non-state actors’. Therein, Luke Glanville advanced two distinct views of the subject – ideational (whereby he referenced Martha Finnemore and Jeffrey Checkel) versus material – testing them against each other in the interpretation of US behaviour in the context of its military campaign in Somalia. He recognised the relevance of Martha Finnemore’s research on the understanding of how norms can affect state behaviour with IOs as the source of those norms in the international system. Nevertheless, Luke Glanville concluded that in the case of US intervention in Somalia there was an ideational retreat in the grasp of US behaviour due to strong US strategic and economic interests.

The analysis of Martha Finnemore’s research agenda and its practical application to the work undertaken by different authors in the field of IR, demonstrated its pertinence in the interpretation of international political phenomena. It advanced the understanding of state behaviour by illustrating how states come to define their interests in view of the systemic norms propagated by certain IOs. With the examples of the UNESCO, the ICRC, and the WB, Martha Finnemore demonstrated that certain interests and preferences developed by states can originate independently from domestic

constituencies or powerful states favouring them, and stand in direct relation with the norms promoted by certain IOs. The understanding of the value and behavioural change behind state action emerged from an intersubjective perspective on state interests and preferences formation, which materialist and Rationalist approaches to IR could not capture.

Concomitantly, Martha Finnemore’s understanding of social structures revealed that IOs are not empty vessels in the international system, as commonly understood by Rationalists. In order to demonstrate what IOs do after their creation, Martha Finnemore overcame the material concern of Rationalists, who concentrate on why IOs are created, and rather, advanced a different perspective on the power of IOs through a focus on whether and how they matter. Therein, she provided a theoretical basis for the treatment of IOs as autonomous actors in international politics thereby presenting a challenge to the statist ontology still prevalent in IR theory and so favoured by Rationalist accounts.

However, Martha Finnemore’s framework of analysis is not without weaknesses. Her research was invaluable in advancing the understanding of state behaviour in international life through the provision of a distinct treatment of actors, interests, and norms and ideas. Nevertheless, Martha Finnemore’s emphasis on systemic social structures directly results in the neglect of domestic politics in her analyses. Whilst illustrating that norms permeate into states and change their interests and preferences formation, and therefore, behaviour, Martha Finnemore does not account for how some norms appear to have a greater impact in some states over others, and how the norms at the centre of her accounts affect the workings of a given state domestically.

Correspondingly, Martha Finnemore overlooks part of the process of internalisation of norms by states, specifically how a state can react to a norm following its initial internalisation. Norms are malleable and the ‘teaching’ of norms to states might not be a singly static event. There might be some cases when a norm is internalised at first, but then, in time, it encounters domestic challenges that can cause the reversal of its acceptance. In light of that potential scenario, it seems important to address how an IO could fill its role as a norm diffuser, and the tactics and methods it would employ to possibly ‘re-teach’ those same norms to states.

Nonetheless, and in light of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, Martha Finnemore’s methodology appears fitting to the interpretation of contemporary EU development policy. Despite the weaknesses identified above, Martha Finnemore’s approach can
confer an innovative understanding of EU development policy towards Africa while integrating the Union in the international system. The application of Martha Finnemore’s research design to the scrutiny of EU development policy remains thus far untested. However, there is a growing interest within political science circles about the combination of Martha Finnemore’s research agenda with the study of the EU as an increasingly prominent international actor. Knud Erik Jorgensen, one of the current leading experts on the EU in IR, stated in a recent publication that “Finnemore’s approach and general findings suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of IOs teaching the EU”.142 Knud Erik Jorgensen’s suggestion appeared in the format of a simple proposal regarding new possibilities of conducting research on the understanding of the EU in the international system. The thesis takes on that challenge and applies the suggested method to the analysis of EU development policy. By doing so, it proposes to guide the current investigation on EU development policy according to a distinct methodology that aims to challenge the limits of the theoretical approaches of the existing literature on the subject. The dissertation’s framework of analysis relies on a Social Constructivist approach to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa that combines a positivist-oriented epistemology with a ‘Social Construct’ ontology that takes inspiration from Martha Finnemore’s study of international political phenomena. Thus, the thesis adopts a theoretical foundation that is vested with the capacity to advance the interpretation of EU development policy, and make a contribution to knowledge on this still under-theorised EU policy area. The following section concentrates on the detailed application of the proposed framework of analysis to the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa.

2. Application of Social Constructivism as a Method of Research on EU Development Policy Analysis

In contrast with the available literature on the analysis of EU development policy, the thesis proposes to interpret the subject through a focus on the norms and ideas that characterise it and on the origin of those norms and ideas, by integrating the EU in the international system. The aim of the current investigation on EU development policy is to capture its character in time through the understanding of what, how, and who caused it to evolve according to a particular pattern from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. At the centre of the analysis is the understanding of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy towards Africa. Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda is a fitting a method for that purpose because it addresses the research puzzle

and research questions guiding the thesis, as well as the identified gaps characterising the existing theoretical accounts on the interpretation of EU development policy. Thereby, the thesis demonstrates its ‘added-value’ on the subject of EU development policy, as the ensuing section explains in close detail.

Nevertheless, before concentrating on adapting the Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist design to the current investigation on EU development policy, it is pertinent to draw some considerations on the status of the EU as an actor in the international system. Martha Finnemore’s narratives scrutinise state preferences and interest formation making the state its main subject. Rooted in Western culture and political philosophy, most theories of IR emerged essentially as a means to assess the complex functioning of the state as a political unit in itself, as well as a constituent element of the international system. Progressively, and in parallel to the state, other actors such as IOs rose to dispute with the state for supremacy in the international system, and established a distinct and intricate dynamics between themselves and the system. Thus, it is essential to scrutinise all influential agents within the system – states and otherwise – because they form an integral part of an international structure that stimulates and is stimulated by all its major agents. The focus of the current research is not a state, but the EU, which the thesis does not claim to be a state. It contends that the EU is presently an increasingly influential actor in international politics, including in the field of international development.\(^143\) The categorising of the EU is a complex task because on the one hand, it is capable of generating international relations, but on the other hand, it remains a subsystem of those very same international relations. However, the EU holds a manifest capacity to participate in international development matters, and it does so mostly through the European Commission as its proxy. The EU has established itself as a progressively prominent international development actor that maintains a distinct synergy with both the structure of international development and the main agents that comprise it.\(^144\)

Presently the EU and its Member States (MS) stand as the world’s biggest aid donor responsible for 54 per cent of all development aid.\(^145\) Additionally, they are world’s largest trading partner for developing countries, and the greatest provider of trade related assistance in the world.\(^146\) Regardless of how the EU managed to translate those figures into real impact on the ground, these

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\(^{146}\) OECD, “OECD Annual Report 2009”
facts express the extensive volume of the EU development input, which demands attention regarding its position within the structure of international development.\textsuperscript{147} On that account, the thesis proposes to capture the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy in the structure of international development by focusing on the position of the European Commission as the EU representative at the international level in that same structure, and vis-à-vis its comprising agents.

In her seminal research on the Social Constructivist explanation of international political phenomena, Martha Finnemore developed a systemic approach to the understanding of state behaviour, where she investigated an international structure of meaning and value.\textsuperscript{148} The ensuing investigation on EU development policy aspires to reproduce an analogous exercise, but with the EU as its main subject. However, and in accordance with the principles of international law, the EU is not a state. The EU is a supranational body composed by twenty-seven independent MS, characterised by a system of pooled sovereignty with many features resembling a federal state, such as its own flag, its own currency and central bank, its own executive, legislature, and court.\textsuperscript{149} Nevertheless, the EU is not a federal entity either. The EU is a union of independent states with an international status with no parallel in modern history. As such, and mostly through the European Commission as its representative at the international level, the EU progressed into a dynamic force in the international system arguably achieving degrees of ‘actorness’ in various domains comparable to that of a state.\textsuperscript{150} In an adaptation of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method, the thesis’ main subject is the EU, with the European Commission standing as the EU representative at the international level.

Accordingly, the thesis treats the European Commission as the representative of the EU in the dominion of international development, handling its preferences and interests therein as the expression of a coordinated position and action from the Union as whole. By doing so, the thesis does not endorse the European Commission as a monolithic establishment, but as an extremely complex organ composed by MS and multiple institutional interests. However, and for the practical purpose of the research, the characterisation of EU development policy matches that of the European Commission as the representative of the Union’s standing and enterprise in the field of international development. This is not to say that the current investigation on EU development

\begin{footnotesize}
148 Finnemore, Martha, \textit{“National Interests in International Society”}
150 Keukeleire, Stephen & MacNaughtan, Jennifer, \textit{“The Foreign Policy of the European Union”}, (London: Palgrave, 2007)
\end{footnotesize}
policy claims that the Union stands today as a unitary actor in international development on a par with a state. Instead, what the study endorses is the understanding of the EU as an increasingly prominent international actor, with the concerted action taken by the European Commission in the international system as its ultimate expression.

As the EU gained additional presence and expression in the international system through the European Commission over the past two decades, the following research is an attempt to interpret the character of its development policy inclusive of the dynamics it maintains with the structure and agents of international development. The progressive EU incorporation in the structure of international development caused it to establish a specific rapport with that structure and its integral primary agents, specifically the WB, the IMF, the UN (through its various agencies), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and most recently the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Therefore, the thesis aims to understand whether its integration in the structure of international development, inclusive of the role played by the aforementioned IOs therein, affected its preferences and interests accordingly. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU gained additional ‘actorness’ in the international system, and the thesis aims to interpret the character of its development policy comprehensive of the dynamics it maintains with the structure and agents of international development.

The translation of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method of analysis to the interpretation of EU interests and preferences formation regarding its development policy, departs from understanding how does the EU ‘know what it wants’. Whilst power, security, and wealth may be regarded as its paramount objectives, it is vital to apprehend their dynamics and ethos within EU development policy. In this regard, the research is an attempt to develop a systemic approach to the understanding of EU behaviour through a focus on an international structure of meaning and value. Instead of assuming EU interests and preferences, the thesis argues that they can be constructed through social interaction with the agents comprising the structure of international development. Thus, EU interests and preferences are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. The normative context in which the EU is integrated influences the behaviour of its decision-makers and consequently the behaviour of the EU as an actor in the international system. As a result, as internationally held norms and values change across time, so do the interests and preferences of all actors in the international system, including the EU.151

151 Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’
According to Martha Finnemore, Social Constructivism is capable of making claims about the nature of social life and social change. It suggests ways of doing research that aim to uncover the links between what the author identifies as structural and agentic forces.\textsuperscript{152} Therein, the dynamics between the EU and the agents and structure of international development stand at the centre of the analysis. From that premise, the author contends that a Social Constructivist analysis must start from an assessment of power of social structures to identify which are the social structures that influence actors (agents), and how they influence those actors. As a result, the examination of political phenomenon must undergo two strands of analysis: structural and agency. The structural strand, examines coordinated system-wide shifts in a given actor’s behaviour, while tracing the cause of those shifts to the normative claims promoted by an IO. The agency strand, examines how an IO came to hold those normative views, and the mechanisms by which it was able to ‘teach’ those views to the actors in question. Accordingly, the interpretation of EU development policy results from an assessment of the normative changes within the IOs comprising the structure of international development, and the relationships between those IOs and the EU.\textsuperscript{153}

The thesis’ fundamental aspiration is to construe EU interests and preferences as an actor that is part of a concrete international structure. Therein, the thesis aims to analyse EU shifts in behaviour in relation to the international structure it comprises. Accordingly, it focuses on how the WB, the IMF, the UN, the OECD, and the WTO came to develop their normative outlook on development promotion and helped defining the structure of international development. Subsequently, it concentrates on how the aforementioned IOs persuaded the EU to incorporate their normative outlook in its development policy. By doing so, the analysis covers the ‘life cycle’ of the norms characterising EU development policy in time, by focusing on their origin, cascade (diffusion), and internalisation processes. It traces the large norms and ideas behind EU development policy in a specific timeframe to the structure of international development, specifically to its comprising IOs. Thereafter, it concentrates on how those large norms were diffused to the EU, and how the EU integrated them in its behaviour expressed through its development policy towards Africa.

For that purpose, the analysis of EU development policy begins by identifying the origin of its characterising norms. As illustrated by Figure 1, it focuses on the identification of EU development policy shifts in time. It concentrates on the evolution of EU development policy in the

\textsuperscript{152} Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, pp. 22
\textsuperscript{153} Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, pp. 26
considered timeframe and identifies its concrete shifts in orientation. Subsequently, it draws attention to both the structure and agents of international development. By doing so, it proceeds to jujuxtapose the process leading up to the identified EU development policy shifts, with the evolutionary process of the equivalent large norms in the structure of international development. The policy orientation of its constituent agents (WB, IMF, OECD, UN, and WTO) is at the centre of the exercise. By doing so, the analysis evaluates the evolution of both processes against each other in time, and defines the origin (where/when) of the large norms characterising the identified EU development policy shifts.

Following the identification of the origin of the large norms characterising EU development policy, the research concentrates on the cascade (diffusion) of those norms from the aforementioned IOs to the EU. For that purpose, the analysis focuses on the juxtaposition of EU development policy and the normative claims promoted by the above-mentioned IOs, and assesses whether there is a pattern in the way the two processes evolved in the considered timeframe. If the exercise demonstrates EU development policy shifts to be analogous to the policy orientation of the stated IOs, and to have materialised subsequently to the IOs’ policy initiatives in time, then EU development policy shifts stand traceable to the norms promoted by the IOs in the structure of international development. Thereby, the analysis confirms the traceability of the shift in EU development policy to the normative claims advanced by the IOs. Subsequently, it concentrates on the mechanisms whereby the normative claims promoted by the IOs may have been diffused into the designing process of EU development policy. For that purpose, it focuses on the channels and mechanisms through which the IOs diffused the norms to the EU in the considered timeframe. Of central relevance in this procedure is the potential European Commission membership of the aforementioned IOs; the relationship maintained by the European Commission with those IOs following its renewed ambition to become a global player in the post-Maastricht era; and the existence of development accords and partnerships between the European Commission and the stated IOs in the period under analysis. The focus on the mechanisms and channels of norm diffusion between the above-mentioned IOs and the EU demonstrates whether the large norms under analysis were ‘taught’ to the EU by the IOs under consideration. If the exercise confirms the process of norm diffusion between the IOs and the EU, it substantiates the ‘socialisation’ of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy towards Africa in the considered timeframe.

The potential ‘socialisation’ of EU behaviour by the aforementioned IOs confirms the internalisation process of new large norms in EU development policy. It shows the causality of the
1. EU development policy shifted in time

2. What/How/Who caused the shift: focus on the regime of international development (Structure) & the policy orientation of the identified IOs (Agency) as its comprising agents

3. Juxtaposition of the evolutionary timeline of EU development policy with the normative basis of international development in the equivalent period in time, which was shaped by the policy orientation endorsed by WB, the IMF, the UN, the OECD, and the WTO

4. Pattern identification: EU development policy initiatives are analogous to the policy orientation of the IOs under analysis; EU development policy initiatives emerged subsequently (in time) to those promoted by the IOs under consideration; pattern confirms EU development policy shifts traceable to the norms promoted by the IOs under investigation

5. Confirmation of the ‘socialisation’ process: the norms characterising EU development in the period under analysis were ‘taught’ to the EU by the stated IOs. Focus on the process of norm diffusion as a means to confirm how the new norms incorporated in EU development policy were ‘taught’ to the EU by the IOs in question. When confirmed, causality is achieved in the ‘socialisation’ of EU behaviour

6. Understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy
IOs’ action in the structure of international development upon the interests and preferences formation of the EU. Thus, it demonstrates how the stated IOs affected EU development policy orientation in the period under investigation. As a result, the analysis comes to a full cycle, whereby it reverts to the initially identified policy shift, and demonstrates what, how, who caused EU development policy to evolve in a particular fashion from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2008. In view of the corresponding results obtained by the investigation on EU development policy, the thesis adopts the nomenclature ‘norm-taker’, or its opposite ‘norm-maker’, as references to the confirmed EU position in the structure of international development. If the analysis demonstrates new EU development policy initiatives to result from the Union’s ‘socialisation’ by the stated IOs, the EU will stand as a ‘norm-taker’ in the domain of international development. Inversely, if the research reveals new EU development policy initiatives to depart from its own legislature and affect the structure and agents of international development accordingly, the Union will stand as a ‘norm-maker’ in the domain of international development. The use of the proposed nomenclature aims to capture the EU’s position in the domain of international development in the considered timeframe, and thus help to elucidate the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy therein.

In conformity with the proposed framework of analysis, and considering the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, the main objective of the study is to capture the character of EU development policy regarding Africa in the post-Cold War period. At the centre of that exercise, is the understanding of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy towards Africa in the domain of international development. For that purpose, and considering the identified gaps in the existing theoretical approaches to the subject, the thesis proposes a Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist framework of analysis to stimulate scientific knowledge in this still under-theorised EU policy area.

2.1 Practical Research Support

Conforming to its methodological fabric, the following investigation on EU development policy employed specific research techniques in the gathering of relevant supporting data. Central to the research was the extensive fieldwork undertaken in Brussels. Its aim was to access primary source

154 The nomenclature ‘norm-taker’ and ‘norm-maker’ are not part of the original method of analysis advanced by Martha Finnemore. They are included here as a label to catalogue the position of the EU in the structure of international development, specifically regarding the power of its constituent IOs.
materials in the form of relevant documentation from the EU and some of the stated IOs. Furthermore, the fieldwork concentrated equally on conducting interviews with officials from the European Commission and the aforementioned IOs with offices in Brussels, as well as with some expert analysts on EU development policy.

The thesis focuses on the impact of social structures, specifically norms, discourse, and shared beliefs on the definition of EU behaviour. Therefore, and for the purpose of the analysis, it focuses on the interpretation of public documentation produced by both the above-mentioned IOs and the EU on their policies of development cooperation. At the centre of the exercise is the tracing of the ideas and norms that came to characterise EU development policy in the proposed timeframe. In what concerns the identification of the policy orientation of the IOs under analysis, the thesis concentrates on various documents produced by their governing bodies. Therein, it draws attention to their official declarations, statements, research papers, and reports. Inversely, and in what regards the EU, the research concentrates on the official texts of the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement, as well as on the European Commission’s public expression regarding the designing process of EU development policy towards Africa. Accordingly, it draws attention to specific European Commission communications, memoranda, resolutions, press releases, research papers, and speeches by Directorate General (DG) for Development officials, in combination with references to the Official Journal of the European Union, the Bulletin of the European Union, and The Courier (a joint official publication by the EU and its African partners dating back to 1970). Moreover, and when pertinent, the analysis focuses on the position sustained by the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the ACP Secretariat on the evolution and character of the norms and ideas that defined EU development policy in the period between the end of the Cold War and the end of 2008.

Correspondingly, the thesis’ fieldwork translated in long spells at the European Commission Archives, the Library of the European Commission DG Development, the Library of the European Commission DG Trade, and the European Commission Central Library. The direct access to these extensive EU data storage centres facilitated the gathering of invaluable primary source materials such as treaties, working papers, communications, memoranda, reports, press releases, research papers, and public speeches by relevant EU officials. Additionally, the use of the online library resources of the WB, the IMF, the OECD, the UN and the WTO, combined with the access to the documentation centres of the WB and the UN offices in Brussels, provided a wealth of additional primary source materials concerning the IOs under investigation in the form of official texts,
declarations, statements, research papers, and reports. In conformity with the proposed research design, the thesis employed document analysis as its principal research method to capture the evolution and character of the norms and ideas that defined EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War.

In combination with document analysis of primary source materials, the thesis’ practical research support relied on a pool of interviews conducted in Brussels with officials from the EU and some of the stated IOs. The interviews served as supporting research material for the investigation, and were used to assist the thesis’ general findings. The data gathered from the interviews was not considered as the foundation of the study’s cardinal conclusions. Instead, it was used as additional research material. The results of the interviews often cross-checked with those obtained from the document analysis and conferred consistency to the thesis’ general findings.

In light of the suggested framework of analysis and the research questions guiding the thesis, the chosen interviewees were in most cases long-serving officials at the institutions they represented. They were mostly senior officials that had been in their positions for many years or decades, and they provided their own accounts regarding the research questions guiding the thesis. The interviewees did not feature in the current investigation as fully representative of the institutions they were serving, but as individuals who had been engaged directly and indirectly in the processes of EU development policy design, and the drawing of the development policy orientation of the aforementioned IOs. In the capacity of senior officials with a long history at the institutions they were serving, the selected interviewees shared their impressions concerning the understanding of the evolution and character of the norms and ideas that characterised EU development policy in the proposed timeframe. By doing so, they provided invaluable supporting data regarding the comprehension of the evolution, nature and role of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War.

Twenty interviews were conducted in total, which included officials from the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the WB, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as well as Dieter Frisch, the former Commissioner for Development between 1982 and 1993. As an additional source of information on the procedures and workings of EU development policy, two directors of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) were interviewed and provided important information about the negotiation process leading up to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, as well as its revision in
2005. The opportunity to interview the stated officials and experts in light of the current investigation proved extremely insightful as it provided additional supporting material to address the research questions guiding the thesis.

The officials from the European Commission constituted the majority of the interviewees, and were mostly senior in their positions having spent many years, and in some cases decades, in their posts at the various DGs with a development portfolio within the institution. The officials from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament consisted equally of senior figures within both institutions, who had been working on EU development policy issues for many years. The officials from the WB and the UNDP were long-term practitioners in the activities of both IOs and were based in the Brussels offices of their institutions. The best part of the interviewees opted for strict identity confidentiality due to the nature of their professional engagements, apart from James Mackie and Geert Laporte of ECDPM, and Dieter Frisch, the former Commissioner for Development, who is currently retired but still lends his expertise as a consultant to the European Commission, the ECDPM, and other organisations focusing on EU development policy.

The interviews were largely informal and with an average duration of one hour according to a semi-structured method. In line with the semi-structured method of interviewing, a set of basic questions was put forward to all interviewees to validate the general findings of the conducted interviews and ensure their consistency. Additionally, different questions were added to each individual interview in light of the position held by the interviewee, and the institution that she/he represented. By doing so, the chosen method of interviewing avoided the generalistic, inflexible, and undynamic character of structured interviewing that is characterised by the coding of schemes that place interviewees’ responses into broad categories.

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155 The ECDPM is an independent foundation, legally constituted in the Netherlands, which began operations in 1986. Its focus is to help build an effective partnership between the EU and the ACP countries, particularly related to development cooperation. The organisation advertises itself not as a lobby group but as a non-partisan institution that aims to ‘level the playing field’ in EU-ACP relations. It seeks to improve the quality of the policy making process concerning the partnership between the EU and the ACP states through a focus on three areas of concern: trade, governance, and development/international relations. In that capacity, the ECDPM claims to aim to help policymakers from both the EU and the ACP countries do their work and build consensus, without committing itself to any result, as its main objective is primarily to improve the quality of the process. As a result, ECDPM has worked and continues to work closely together with top officials from both the EU (European Commission, Council of the European Union, and European Parliament) and the ACP states (Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ambassadors) on the most topical issues regarding ACP-EU relations.


The adopted method of interviewing supported the framework of analysis proposed for the thesis, as it targeted the gathering of supporting data to assist the comprehension of the evolution and character of the norms and ideas that defined EU development policy towards Africa. Accordingly, the conducted interviews assisted in the understanding of the thesis’ research puzzle and research questions. They helped to pick out themes regarding the tracing of the ideas and norms that characterised EU development policy in the proposed timeframe, and thereby fostered a more inclusive understanding of the evolution, nature and role of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa since the end of the Cold War.

In light of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, the current section advanced a detailed account of how Martha Finnemore’s research agenda can be adequately applied to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa. Therein, it provided a comprehensive outline of the proposed analysis of EU development policy, and explained how Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method of research can elucidate the understanding of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development. Furthermore, it elaborated on the dissertation’s practical research support, and clarified its use for the purpose of the current investigation on EU development policy. Following the description of how the research aspires to interpret EU development policy towards Africa and stimulate further knowledge on the subject, the next section concentrates on refining the thesis’ workable hypotheses.

3. Hypotheses

The scrutiny of the subject’s available literature in light of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis demonstrated the existence of inconclusive evidence regarding the evolution of the subject in time, as well as the nature and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development. Accordingly, it illustrated how the existing theoretical narratives on EU development policy overlooked a comprehensive analysis of its evolution, nature, and role in the dominion of international development. Considering the identified theoretical and analytical weaknesses of the existing literature on EU development policy, the thesis suggested Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda as a fitting method of research. Therefore, it proposed a particular understanding of EU development policy through a focus on the norms and ideas that caused it to evolve in time, and on the structure and agents of international development as ‘engines’ of change. By doing so, the thesis aspires to stimulate knowledge in the understanding of
EU development policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period by testing the following hypotheses:

1. The orientation of EU development policy shifted in time in an evolutionary manner.

2. EU development policy was not ‘unique’ in nature when compared with the policy of development cooperation promoted by the identified IOs (agents) in the structure of international development during the proposed timeframe.

3. EU development policy did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the progress of the discourse and practice of international development during the suggested timeframe.

The three stated hypotheses form a coherent scientific proposal that aims to go beyond the subject’s known facts, and logically anticipate the substance of new knowledge on the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa. Hypothesis one contends that EU development policy underwent a shift in time, but that the shift was evolutionary and not dramatic. The concept of shift used in the analysis refers to a considerable change in policy orientation. EU development policy has changed progressively since the founding of the Union in 1957, and the analysis suggests that it has followed a similarly evolutionary trend since the end of the Cold War, and not a sudden or striking reform. Hypothesis one is a proposed explanation of the evolution of EU development policy in the post-Cold War period that follows its historical progress over the past five decades, and is also related with the proposed method of analysis.

Subsequently, the research hypothetically suggests that EU development policy was not ‘unique’ in nature in the post-Cold War era, as it is recurrently claimed by the EU and its officials. The notion of ‘unique’ refers to the distinctiveness of EU development policy in the domain of international development. The structure of international development is comprised by a set of leading agents (IOs), and hypothesis two contends that EU development policy was not ‘unique’ when compared to their policy of development cooperation during the proposed timeframe. Departing from the ‘unique’ claims made by the EU and its officials regarding EU development policy, hypothesis two rests largely on the thesis’ method of research. Therein, it aspires to contrast
EU development policy with the policy of development cooperation advocated by the identified IOs, and apprehend its distinctiveness in the structure of international development.

Similarly, and in connection with hypothesis two, the analysis suggests that EU development policy did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the evolution of the discourse and practice of international development in the period after the end of the Cold War. The concept of ‘leadership’ refers to the extent to which EU development policy affected the discourse and practice of international development in time. More concretely, it refers to the extent to which EU development policy became a leading policy reference for the other agents (IOs) in the structure of international development in the period considered by the investigation. Hypothesis three is closely linked with hypothesis two, insofar as it departs from the (‘leadership’) claims made by the EU and its officials regarding EU development policy, and rests broadly on the thesis’ framework of analysis. As a result, hypothesis three aims to test EU development policy as a normative reference for the identified IOs, and capture its ‘leadership’ capacity in the structure of international development.

Departing from the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, and considering the identified weaknesses of the existing literature on the subject, the current investigation on EU development policy proposed Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis as a fitting method of research. As a result, it suggested a particular understanding of the subject through a focus on the dynamics the EU maintains with the structure and agents of international development. Accordingly, the currently section advanced three main hypotheses for the thesis, which will be empirically tested in the subsequent chapters. The aim of the thesis is to stimulate knowledge in the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa, to which the next section now turns in close detail.

4. Claims to Knowledge

In the period since the end of the Cold War, the EU has undergone major internal reforms initiated by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which have had a considerable impact on its foreign relations capacity. Whilst renewing its ambition to become a prominent international actor, the Union maintained development cooperation as one of its most emblematic external expressions. Therein, Africa remained its most traditional development partner. With the aim to understand the character

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of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa in the proposed timeframe, the current research focuses on the previously identified research puzzle and research questions according to a particular framework of analysis. Thus, it seeks to understand the evolution of EU development policy in the post-Cold War period through a focus on its nature and role in the domain of international development. For that purpose, the thesis proposes a theoretically and analytically distinct analysis of EU development policy, as a means to stimulate additional debate on the subject, and contribute to knowledge on this under-theorised EU policy area.

The thesis’ contribution to knowledge centres on the proposal of a distinct explanation for the puzzle and research questions characterising the current investigation on EU development policy, which were compiled in the aforementioned hypotheses. Firstly, the research contributes to the analysis of the evolution of EU development policy since the end of the Cold War. Most existing narratives on the subject address the recent changes in EU development policy, and argue that they caused an abrupt and striking policy shift in the passage from the Lomé Convention to the Cotonou Agreement. The thesis scrutinises the EU development policy shift in the considered timeframe, and sheds new light on the understanding of the progress of EU development policy in time. By doing so, the research examines a commonly held postulate in the subject’s available literature, and confirms whether EU development policy underwent a dramatic or an evolutionary shift in the post-Cold War era.

Secondly, the thesis contributes to the understanding of the nature of EU development policy in the domain of international development. Departing from the aim to assess the ‘unique’ claims recurrently advanced by the EU and its officials regarding the EU policy of development cooperation, the research ascertains the distinctiveness of EU development policy vis-à-vis the development policy orientation of the leading agents (IOs) in international development. Furthermore, it captures EU relations with the identified IOs in the promotion of development cooperation worldwide, and addresses the Union’s integration in the structure of international development. As a result, the thesis helps to understand how the EU project to become a global actor materialised in the dominion of international development in the post-Cold War period.

Thirdly, and in close relation with the previous point, the thesis makes a contribution to knowledge regarding the role of EU development policy in the field of international development. The EU has had an active development policy since its inception in 1957. Nevertheless, the existing narratives on the subject have largely overlooked its expression in the context of international
development. Accordingly, the research assesses the role played by the EU in the advancement of the discourse and practice of international development. Thereby, it assesses the ‘leadership’ claims often put forward by the EU and its officials concerning EU development policy, and stimulates additional understanding of the EU project to become a global player in the dominion of international development.

Fourthly, and resulting from the two previous points, the research contributes to the understanding of the EU project to become a global player in the field of international development. The EU enterprise to establish itself as a prominent international actor affects all its external relations activities. Therein, development cooperation with Africa remains historically emblematic for the Union. In that regard, the thesis captures the EU integration in the field of international development, and its position vis-à-vis the leading agents (IOs) of international development. As a result, the analysis sheds new light on how the EU project to become a global player translated to its development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War.

The thesis’ proposal of a distinct analytic explanation for the research puzzle and research questions guiding the investigation on EU development policy is closely related with the suggested method of research. The adoption of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda to interpret EU development policy is an innovation in the subject, which determines the understanding of its character since the end of the Cold War. The research addresses the character of EU development policy by integrating the Union in the structure of international development, and assessing its relations with the leading agents (IOs) therein. Hence, the understanding of the nature and role of EU development policy is directly related with the proposed method of analysis because it determines the position of the Union in the structure of international development, inclusive of the relations maintained with its leading agents (IOs). Correspondingly, the understanding of the evolution of EU development policy in time is equally linked with the proposed method of research. The analysis searches for the origin of norms characterising EU development policy in the period after the end of the Cold War, and traces their progress in time. By doing so, it captures the evolution of the normative basis of EU development policy in the considered timeframe. As a result, the research’s contribution to knowledge results from a distinct analytic and theoretical approach to the explanation of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the current investigation on EU development policy towards Africa.
In light of the research puzzle and research questions guiding the thesis, and the identified practical and theoretical weaknesses of the existing literature on the subject, the chapter argued for a Social Constructivist analysis of EU development policy that relies on Martha Finnemore’s method of research. Accordingly, it drew considerations about the pertinence of Social Constructivism for the study of international political phenomena, and demonstrated its ‘added value’ in the interpretation of EU development policy. It argued that a Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist framework of analysis could shed new light on the understanding of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development in the post-Cold War era. Subsequently, it advanced the refined hypothesis for the thesis, and explained its contribution to knowledge in EU development policy analysis. In that manner, the chapter established the foundations of the thesis’ proposed method of research.

In line with the suggested framework of analysis, the following chapter launches the practical interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. Therein, it concentrates on the structure and agents of international development, and demonstrates their potential upon the definition of an actor’s behaviour, such as the EU.
Chapter III – International Development & the EU: The Role of Structure and Agency

“All the forces in the world are not so powerful as an idea whose time has come”
– Victor Hugo, The History of a Crime

“Unaware of the absurdity of it, we introduce our own petty household rules into the economy of the universe for which the life of generations, peoples, of entire planets, has no importance in relation to the general development.”
– Alexander Herzen, Who is to Blame?
Chapter III

*International Development & the EU: The Role of Structure and Agency*

In conformity with the proposed framework of analysis, the ensuing chapter aims to adapt the Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist method of research to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. Its central aim is to set the basis for the understanding of what, how, and who caused EU development policy to shift during the considered timeframe. For that purpose, it integrates the investigation on EU development policy into the structure of international development and contemplates the large norms characterising it in time. The objective of the exercise is to demonstrate that the emergence and promulgation of new norms in the structure of international development matter, and can affect an actor’s behaviour accordingly. Thus, the following chapter concentrates on the norms that characterise the structure of international development, and on the agents that promote new norms therein. The chapter illustrates that certain international organisations (IOs) are the key agents in the process of introducing new norms in the structure of international development. Therein, it evaluates the policies of the concerned IOs and assesses how they affected the discourse and practice of international development in time. Additionally, the chapter draws attention to the increasing participation of the European Commission (as the representative of the EU at the international level) in the activities of the IOs under consideration. By doing so, it illustrates that the European Commission’s cooperation with these IOs stands as a potential channel for its ‘learning’ of new norms regarding its development policy towards Africa. Therefore, the chapter sets up the foundation for the understanding of what, how, and who caused EU development policy towards Africa to shift in the considered timeframe; and, contends that the understanding of the social structures and agents of which the European Commission is an integral part is fundamental to capture the shift in EU development policy towards Africa.
1. International Development – The Role of Structure

As suggested above, the chapter’s central aim is to set the practical basis for the interpretation of EU development policy concerning Africa since the end of the Cold War in conformity with Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method. Accordingly, the analysis of EU development policy presupposes an understanding of the norms defining the structure it comprises, as well as, the role of its constituent agents therein. Hence, the ensuing section concentrates on the structure of international development and on its defining norms, and demonstrates how they evolved in time with a particular focus on the period following the end of the Cold War. The section aims to address some of the practical and theoretical contours of the ensuing investigation on EU development policy towards Africa.

The notion of ‘development’ emerged in the post-Second World War period as an intricate and multi-dimensional concept about the broad process of providing and acquiring a greater quality of life for human beings through the gradual reduction and elimination of poverty, inequality, and unemployment within a growing economy.159 ‘International development’ originated from the promotion of the same complex process to better human life in a given country or community through the assistance of the governments of outside states, IOs, or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).160 The progressive establishment of an international development apparatus in the period after the Second World War stimulated the creation of a specific international development structure that integrates multiple agents. Therein, international development evolved around the axis of certain norms and ideas that its constitutive agents conceived over the past six decades as a response to the alleviation of poverty and inequality between human beings across the world.161

As a dynamic process, international development emerged in the late 1940s intimately related with some of the newly established international institutions of the time. In a period of post-war reconstruction and growing decolonisation worldwide, Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural speech as President of the United States of America served as a central reference in the establishment of ‘development’ as a discipline. It followed his expressed concern to rebuild rapidly the

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“underdeveloped areas” of the globe. Thereafter, the classification of the world’s states and regions changed in accordance with their level of perceived development. The West in general, and the United States of America (USA) in particular (as the then undisputed superpower – economically, militarily, and ideologically) appeared as the preferred standard reference for evaluation or comparison in most of the emerging classifications of the time. It was in this context that the French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the term Third World (Tier Monde) in a 1952 article for L’Observateur. The author created the term to refer to countries inhabited by non-Europeans with considerably lower levels of economic development than the West, and which remained equally not aligned with either the capitalist West or the Communist East. The definition acquired widespread use during the Cold War era, and its emergence generated two equally related terms, First World and Second World, which alluded to Western countries and Communist states, respectively.

Currently, in a post-Cold War environment, the tripartite division of the world’s states based on their economic development is arguably theoretically obsolete despite its continuous use. Academics and practitioners attempted to create new definitions to describe a country’s development status that gradually entered the discipline of international development, despite resistance from certain traditional circles. The most widely used terms that emerged to replace that of “Third World”, were ‘the South’, ‘developing countries’, and ‘under-developed countries’. Despite the lack of theoretical consensus amongst researchers, academics, and practitioners, the thesis endorses ‘developing countries’ as the preferred nomenclature to refer to the most deprived countries and regions of the globe under analysis.

In combination with the evolution of terminology in the discipline of international development, the notion of ‘development’ evolved in time across the decades. While of complex definition, the concept of development subscribes to a general process of betterment of human life. International development consists of the promotion of an analogous process in a country or community through the support and external assistance from the governments of some states, IOs, or NGOs. International development is dynamic as a discipline, which results from the acknowledgement of previous misjudgements and the attempt to design the most adequate means to face future challenges. The theoretical thrust for innovation in international development resulted primarily from initiatives undertaken by some of the newly founded IOs following the end of

Second World War to the detriment of state-led programmes.\textsuperscript{165} The triumph of the European reconstruction operation in the post-Second World War period conferred international repute to some of the IOs in question, and demonstrated their aptitude to achieve collective objectives successfully, which were otherwise unattainable through unilateralist means.\textsuperscript{166}

A particular group of IOs, specifically the United Nations (through its numerous agencies) (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and most recently the World Trade Organisation WTO, affected directly the notion and structure of international development. With a distinctive focus on the principles of lending, assistance, and discourse, the aforementioned IOs created new sets of norms and ideas regarding the most suitable way to promote the betterment of human life, which progressively integrated and defined the evolution and structure of international development.\textsuperscript{167} As new challenges arose from the most deprived regions of the world, the agents and the structure of international development readapted to the emerging new realities. Thus, new approaches emerged to the promotion of more equitable development worldwide, which set novel paradigms for the discipline in the course of the past six decades.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, international development programmes emerged hand in hand with the concept of industrialisation. The source of inspiration for the industrialisation trend in international development during the 1950s followed the development theory coined by Paul Rosenstein-Rodin – the ‘Big Push’ – who would later serve at the WB and help bringing the institution to the forefront of international development discourse and practice.\textsuperscript{168} In a decade marked by the Algerian War, Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, Mao’s Great Leap Forward, and the Korean War, international development discourse and practice arose from the concept of industrialisation to the detriment of agriculture-based economics. Most foreign aid disbursed worldwide followed the understanding of development based on strong industrialisation schemes. At the time, lending actors shared a belief in the innate capacity of recipients to plan and manage

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Werksman, Jacob (Eds), “Greening International Institutions”, (London: Earthscan, 1996)}
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Allen, Tim & Thomas, Alan (Eds), “Poverty and Development in the 21st Century”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)}
their economies at the macro-economic level, and thereby assumed that their approach would result in economic success, and thus, effectively curb poverty.\textsuperscript{169}

However, the shortcomings of the industrialisation approach to international development were soon apparent producing new alternatives in the 1960s. The clash between the West and the largely communist East brought significant tension to international politics in the 1960s, most visibly through the Cuban Missile Crisis but also through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China and the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. Progress in the discipline of international development ascribed to ‘Balanced Development’ as its new paradigm, introducing economic dualism as a more viable take on development in opposition to the uni-sectoral planning practised during the previous decade.\textsuperscript{170} Agriculture moved from being a merely passive to an active sector in a country’s development process, thereby establishing direct links with modern industry as a means to alleviate poverty. Additionally, most projects adopted an inter-sectoral linkage promoting a blend of traditional labour-intensive activities with modern capital-intensive activities, both in agriculture and services.\textsuperscript{171} As the structure of international development evolved, programme lending and technical assistance became the defined targets of foreign aid. As a result, the paradigm shift of the 1960s originated in the leading IOs’ reactive policy approach to international development, specifically the WB and the UN (with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) taking the lead, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) following suit). The maldistribution of wealth led the stated IOs to draw a closer focus on poverty alleviation to the detriment of uni-sectoral projects based on the concept of industrialisation as the panacea for development promotion at the time. Industrialisation had failed to improve the lives of the destitute in developing countries in the preceding decade, which caused the aid programmes of the time to concentrate on agriculture and education as the most favourable sectors for foreign investment.

Despite the international development community’s two-decade long intense planning and programming of how best to curb poverty, the first cases of severe famine emerged across parts of Africa in the 1970s, namely in Ethiopia. The world economy faced then one of its most challenging tests attributed to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis. It called for a thorough re-examination of the methods and processes of economic and social

\textsuperscript{169} Tarp, Finn & Hjertholm, Peter, “Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future”, (London: Routledge, 2000)


\textsuperscript{171} Fei, John & Ranis, Gustav, ‘Economic Development in Historical Perspective’, \textit{American Economic Review}, Vol. 59(2), May 1969
development previously promoted to stimulate developing economies. From the unequal expansion of income distribution and raising unemployment, to foreign indebtedness and ultimately famine, the 1970s illustrated some of the limitations endured by the international development initiatives to foster effective and equitable development across the most disadvantaged areas of the world.¹⁷²

In reaction to the political and economic international conjuncture at the time, many academics coined somewhat radical approaches to development promotion that later characterised much of the subject’s discourse in the 1970s – dependency theories.¹⁷³ The UN (through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)) participated actively in the campaign, and gave a voice to developing countries within the UN system and the international community in a process aimed at establishing a new world order, which was known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The concept of ‘Redistribution with Growth’ was at the centre of the emergent approach to development promotion.¹⁷⁴ Whilst growth was paramount to a country’s development process, it was insufficient to stabilise an economy and resolutely reduce poverty accordingly. As a result, a new focus emerged in aid trends to address the failure of channelling the allocation of foreign aid to specific projects and technical assistance programmes.¹⁷⁵ The WB (especially during Robert McNamara’s tenure) took an equally relevant role in the process pushing for international development initiatives to focus on genuine poverty reduction schemes. Progressively, the normative root of international development changed. Agriculture and rural development programmes resurfaced as a means to promote development under a new rationale, which favoured bottom-up approaches as the most adequate in the attempt to place people and not macro-economic policies at its base.

Following the first real crisis in international development in the 1970s, the international development community failed to anticipate the events of the ensuing decade. Further famine spread to other areas of Africa, communism progressively collapsed in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe, and aid disbursement programmes failed to bear conclusive effects. As a result, the 1980s soon became the ‘lost decade’ for international development.¹⁷⁶ The cumulative effects of

¹⁷⁴ Redistribution with Growth’ was the title of a book co-authored by Hollies Chenery, the chief economist of the World Bank at the time, who suggested then that growth policies cannot solve poverty by themselves, and poverty-oriented development strategies cannot be achieved with the traditional conceptual tools of development theory; Lera St Clair, Assuncion, ‘The Role of Ideas in the United Nations Development Programme’, in Morten, Boas & McNeill, Desmond (Eds), “Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World?”, (London: Routledge, 2004)
decades of borrowing, high interest rates, and a recession in creditor countries generated unprecedented volumes of foreign debt and brought into question the actual survival of the international financial system. Before the resulting scenario of near-economic depression, the IMF and the WB contrived a set of principles for economic reform around the concept of structural adjustment, which considerably altered the course of international development.\textsuperscript{177}

Under the newly designed approach to development promotion, developing countries underwent painful stabilisation and structural adjustment reforms before resuming the path of development and poverty alleviation. The WB and the IMF promoted an approach to development based on the liberalisation of the economy and free trade rules, with the intention to transform developing countries into export-oriented economies, as well as accelerate their technological progress and economic growth.\textsuperscript{178} The novel method targeted the implementation of strong anti-corruption measures together with macro-economic stability, under a set of policies designed to reduce the balance of payments deficits and budget deficits. The WB and the IMF’s main objective was to establish a trade balance measure and allow developing countries to service at least part of their public and private debt in order to keep their creditors afloat. Additionally, conditionality clauses emerged attached to these pro-market and anti-government lending programmes. As a result, the WB and the IMF prompted the adjustment of foreign aid to meet the needs of the international financial system, and converted the normative basis of international development in general, and foreign aid in particular.\textsuperscript{179} The approach to development promotion based on liberal ideas and free trade marked a turn in the discourse and practice of international development in the 1980s, which was to continue in the subsequent decade.

The end of the Cold War and the consequent collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe marked the beginning of a new era in the international system. The end of decades of USA-Soviet Union tension raised a new wave of optimism allowing for the renaissance of the principles of multilateralism.\textsuperscript{180} In the second half of the 20th century, multilateralism appeared mostly associated with international institutions, namely the UN and the role envisaged for it by the international community at the end of the Second World War. Standing in opposition to unilateralism, multilateralism was arguably the focus of a renewed brief new impetus following the end of the Cold War as the bipolar super-powers ceased to use the UN and

\textsuperscript{177} Rapley, John, “Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World”, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002)
other IOs purely as political platforms of interest. \textsuperscript{181} Whilst not making any claims regarding the success of multilateralism then or thereafter, it is relevant to consider that the end of the Cold War revived the principles of international cooperation and spread the belief that IOs could provide new forms of leadership in the international system.

A new balance of power progressed in the international system, and therein, IOs took on a novel or modified role. Since the end of the Second World War, the international community sought to design IOs that were capable of regulating and governing aspects of international life, and adhere to universal principles of equality of all human beings. Whilst the Cold War was an impediment to the expression of those values and the development of global structures to sustain them, the international conjuncture of the early 1990s brought fresh changes to the international system.\textsuperscript{182} Cooperation and consensus improved amongst states under the UN framework, with an equally positive mood emerging in the international political economy that generated increasing worldwide accord on the rules of world trade and macroeconomic reform. During the same period, the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of negotiations provoked a small revolution in international commerce. It set a new regulatory platform for world trade effectively binding the majority of existing states under its jurisdiction – the WTO.\textsuperscript{183} As the IMF and the WB saw their membership expanded, the recent creation of the WTO completed the Bretton Woods system as the de facto formal framework for the management of international commercial and financial relations, and in effect, formally established a new international monetary order.

Therefore, the end of the Cold War marked the closure of a four-decade-long bipolar balance of power in the international system allowing for the restoration of the values of multilateralism that opened the international system to the potential of IOs as guiding agents for change.\textsuperscript{184} Subsequently, numerous IOs attempted to contribute to the emergent political, economic, social, and ideological debate concerning a new global order. Therein, the UN sought to take a strong stance attempting to establish a more sustained and uniform equilibrium in the international system. The UN’s strategy aimed at forging the promotion of distinct norms in the international system that it encoded in a variety of treaties to improve international cooperation and promote the

\textsuperscript{182} Kha\-\textit{ler}, Miles, ‘Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers’, \textit{International Organization}, Vol. 46(3), Summer 1992
\textsuperscript{183} Phillip Ruttley, Iain Mac\-\textit{vay} & Carol George (Eds), \textit{“The WTO and International Trade Regulation”}, (London: Cameron May, 1998)
principles of multilateralism. The UN organised and hosted a series of conferences throughout the 1990s that aimed at establishing a new balance of power in the post-Cold War era. Together with a variety of UN agencies, the UN General Assembly organised the Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the Conference on Human Settlements (Istanbul, 1996), and the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto, 1997)\(^{185}\). Thereby, the UN endorsed a new agenda for change in the international system, which had the support of the majority of world states, and promoted distinct international norms in the period following the end of the Cold War. The unprecedented series of UN conferences at the time yielded a long-term impact on the international system and raised complex problems such as poverty and environmental degradation to the top of the global agenda. The participation of hundreds heads of State, NGOs, citizens, academics, and business representatives set the tone to these new truly global fora that created an innovative platform for a more equitable and sustainable world.\(^{186}\) It marked a turn away from the bipolar international system of the Cold War period and into a new era that revived the principles of international cooperation. Therein, the UN attempted to assume its global ethos and steer the international system on to a new course.\(^{187}\) As a result, the norms characterising the structure of international development changed potentially affecting all actors therein, such as the EU.

As East-West antagonism subsided in the early 1990s, new concerns emerged regarding the economic and political stability of the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe.\(^{188}\) Living conditions deteriorated significantly in parts of Asia and the former Soviet Union, which converted the concept of poverty alleviation in its broadest sense – including improvements in health, nutrition, education, access to information and public goods, and participation in decision-making – into the major objective of development assistance.\(^{189}\) As a follow up to the 1980s liberal trend in international development and as a reaction to the emerging crisis, the WB, the IMF, and the USA Treasury

\(^{187}\) As an introduction to the international conjuncture of the post-Cold War period, the reference to the UN is holistic in nature. Subsequently, the analysis concentrates on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as integral components of the UN system that are vested with agency in the structure of international development.
formalised a new approach to international development. They targeted countries emerging from crisis and regime change, and therein designed a liberal reform package that came to characterise much of the development discourse and practice of the 1990s – the Washington Consensus.190 The new norms characterising the discipline of international development focused largely on the expansion of the role of market forces, whilst constraining that of the state through a set of adjustment and stabilisation policies with the aim to restore macro-economic equilibrium and contribute to economic growth and poverty alleviation in the short-run. Nevertheless, later into the decade pressure mounted on the rationale and practice of the Washington Consensus leading to the emergence of a complementary paradigm commonly known as ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’.191 It centred in the relevance and consequent investment on human capital as a means to reach the people on the ground and support small producers and enterprises, and the promotion of good governance and institution building. However, and despite the attempts to confer it a ‘human face’ at the end of the decade, international development acquired a strong liberal orientation in the course of the 1990s.

Concomitantly, a growing ‘aid fatigue’ materialised amongst the international development community at the time.192 The large net disbursements for development assistance failed to translate into effective development across the developing world, causing the international donor community to reduce their development aid contributions. Furthermore, most donors grew to believe that foreign aid was then causing aid dependency that provoked negative investment incentives, and as a consequence a strain upon long-term development schemes. The Asian Crisis of 1997 brought additional concern to the international development community. It led to a focus on social and economic infrastructure as the preferred targets for investment to the detriment of the general production sectors.193 Human welfare and poverty alleviation were again at the centre of the new foreign aid initiatives, which were combined with a focus on the provision of the required support to developing countries in their effort to build institutions capable of reducing their vulnerability to external economic shocks. Additionally, the UN attempted to assume leadership in the field of international development through the organisation and hosting of a series of world summits and conferences to foster international consensus concerning a new approach to development for the new millennium. As a result, the transformation of the international system in the early 1990s

resulted in the emergence of a complex development paradigm by the end of the decade. With the consideration that the Washington Consensus was the first pillar upon which development programmes rested, the international community destined to reform it with a ‘human face’, and thereby established an intricate normative base for the subject at the dawn of the new millennium. Therein, international development combined macroeconomic reform and people-centred development approaches.

In this perspective, the end of the Cold War marked the birth of a new era in the international system that opened it to new tendencies and currents that culminated with the conclusion of the Millennium Declaration (2000) under the auspices of the UN. At the corresponding UN summit, the international community agreed on the principles behind the most comprehensive and ambitious agreement so far in the domain of international development, and launched the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs had a considerable impact in the discourse and practice of international development, and became a central reference to the contemporary policy of development cooperation of most actors therein, such as the EU. Whilst borrowing from the trends of previous decades, the MDGs formalised the orientation and essence of international development at the beginning of the twenty-first century setting a considerable challenge to the international community by proposing to meet a set of development goals by 2015. The MDGs were composed of eight specific development targets: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and, develop a global partnership for development.

The concept of global partnership for development was of central relevance under the MDGs initiative, which presupposed the creation of fair trade agreements, the promotion of good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the inclusion of the private sector and civil society in a country’s development process. In that manner, the MDGs concentrated the emerging 1990s international development paradigms under a single ambitious initiative establishing one of the pillars of international development in the new millennium.

Following a decade characterised by a growing concern regarding the long-term prospects of international development after the end of the Cold War, various IOs proposed new development

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197 United Nations, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’
agendas for the future and constructively collaborated with each other. The MDGs emerged from the 1990s debate concerning the construction of a future code for international development, which resulted in the assimilation of the major trends and policy choices proposed by some influential international development IOs, specifically the UN, the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the WTO. Acting mostly as a conductor rather than an ideational guide, the UN gathered new momentum during the 1990s as the bastion of world peace and international cooperation, and introduced the MDGs. Progressively, the MDGs evolved into one the main pillars of contemporary international development, and serve as both a target, and a challenge to the development policy of all signatory parties.

As a result, and since the end of Cold War, the discourse and practice of international development moved from a Washington Consensus ideology to a post-Washington Consensus basis, and beyond. Currently, the normative structure of international development rests upon numerous pillars with the MDGs standing as its broad foundation. The MDGs provided not only a set of targets and challenges for international development in the new century, but also an instrument to further policy coordination and coherence within the international development community. Therein, the stated IOs took a prominent role in the domain of international development. They ascribed to higher levels of international coordination and coherence to homogenise international development cooperation and deliver assistance more effectively on the ground. The UN and the OECD assumed particular relevance when they attempted to mobilise the international development community under two ambitious global initiatives. The UN took the lead in 2002, when its Department of Economic and Social Affairs hosted the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. It produced new commitments from most of the international development community concerning aid, debt relief, fighting corruption, and policy coherence, which established what became known as the Monterrey Consensus. In 2005, the OECD promoted further harmonisation, alignment, and management of aid disbursements based on a specific set of auditable actions and indicators – the 2005 Paris Declaration. The majority of international development actors endorsed both the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris

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Declaration, which form two of the main pillars of the contemporary structure of international development.

The foundation of the WTO in the mid-1990s significantly altered the management of world trade, which considerably affected the discourse and practice of international development. Whilst the link between aid and trade was not an innovation of the time, the creation of the WTO gave it a new impulse that generated a deep impact in international development cooperation. A new trade agenda emerged under the auspices of the WTO with the objective to set a new platform for international trade that was more considerate of the needs of developing countries. Under the proposed approach, and during a round of negotiations in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, the WTO introduced the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The DDA emerged as a plan to transform international trade into a more uniform and egalitarian framework through the lowering of trade barriers and the promotion of free trade as a means to empower developing states to develop their own economies effectively. The initiative received general acclaim from most signatory states and organisations, yet its implementation is still in progress resulting from a stall in the negotiation process in 2006 followed by an alarming negotiation deadlock in 2008. By the end of 2008, the WTO’s aid for trade paradigm had affected the discourse and practice of international development considerably. Its aim was to integrate developing countries into the world economy, promote the safeguard of developing economies in world trade, and foster sustainable development worldwide. Hence, the WTO formalised the inclusion of the principles of free trade as integral to the current structure of international development.

In this perspective, the general trend characterising international development in the post-Cold War era consisted in the increasing promotion of a more holistic form of development cooperation. International development discourse and practice embraced a pluri-dimensional take on issues.

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205 The run-up to the agreement on the DDA reached a negotiation stall in 2006 with developed and developing countries failing to reach consensus on the practicality and applicability of the agreement. New hopes were raised, when on 21 July 2008, the WTO launched a fresh round of negotiations in Geneva. However, the meeting failed to improve on the 2006 deadlock bringing the DDA process to a standstill in negotiations. By the end of 2008, there was widespread concern amongst most WTO members regarding the future of negotiations with the closure of the DDA initiative standing as a firm possibility. Collier, Paul, ‘Why the WTO is Deadlocked: And What can be Done about It’, The World Economy, Vol. 29(10), October 2006; European Commission, ‘Remarks by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’, Press Conference, Geneva - 29 July 2008, (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm214_en.htm, 12/08/08)
on the subject to the detriment of uni-dimensional economics-based approaches favoured in the previous decades. It underwent a thorough politicisation process integrating the principles of good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and the curbing of corruption as additional normative pillars of its current structure.\textsuperscript{207} Furthermore, the notion of conditionality started to feature prominently in most recent development assistance programmes as a means to improve its practical effectiveness. Conditionality describes the use of conditions attached to a development programme, whereby the donor requires the recipient to meet strictly the clauses of their agreement in order to guarantee its continuity. Apart from its practical results, conditionality evolved into a fundamental tool of contemporary international development.\textsuperscript{208}

Conforming to the emerging model of development in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the principles of country-specific programming, ownership, and subsidiarity are some of the latest ideological trends emerging in the discourse and practice of international development.\textsuperscript{209} As international development evolved into an increasingly holistic model, it endorsed the progressive devolution of power over a given country’s development process. It meant that the ownership of a country’s development agenda was to be transferred to its government and local authorities. Development initiatives were to rest under the control of recipient countries and their local actors to ensure that they have the command over their domestic development policy, to the detriment of externally imposed development agendas. The marriage of the principles of country-specific programming, ownership, and subsidiarity marked a considerable turn in the discourse and practice of international development. It steered it into an orientation that is sensitive to a country’s local needs and not just to the political and economic agendas of the international development community.

The latest advance in international development discourse and practice concerns the issue of security. Since the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, USA on 11 September 2001, as well as the following terrorist attacks across the globe, security matters moved to the top of the foreign policy concerns of most leading states in the international system.\textsuperscript{210} Accordingly, security issues gradually spilled-over to the subject of international development becoming an increasingly prominent feature in most contemporary international aid and assistance programmes. Security

progressed into an important dimension of international development discourse and practice in the 21st century and is likely to gather further prominence in the future.\textsuperscript{211}

As illustrated above, the dynamic character of international development stimulated the emergence of a flow of trends and approaches to the subject that routinely redefined its central normative basis. From pro-industrialisation programmes, to inter-sectoral strategies, re-distribution of growth, structural adjustment initiatives, and ownership, the norms and ideas characterising the structure of international development continued to change over the decades as the needs of developing countries evolved and the subject progressed in time.\textsuperscript{212} As a result, the structure of international development appears to have the potential to affect the behaviour of the actors that comprise it, such as the EU. The ideological and normative evolution of the structure of international development emerged and was related specifically with the role played by a variety of IOs, namely the UN, the WB, the IMF, the WTO, and the OECD.\textsuperscript{213} The stated IOs took the initiative to steer international development into a new direction defining its discourse and practice in time, to which the next section now turns.

2. International Development – The Role of Agency

As argued in the previous section, there is a direct relation between the structure of international development and the role played by certain IOs as its constituent agents.\textsuperscript{214} Since the inception of the subject in the post-Second World War era, the IOs in question exerted significant influence over the evolution of international development. The WB, the IMF, the WTO, the OECD, and the UN (through its various agencies) helped to establish the normative basis of international development and shaped its practice and discourse over the past six decades. The current section concentrates on the role of the previously mentioned IOs in the construction of the normative basis of the structure of international development in time.

Conforming to the thesis’ framework of analysis, the interpretation of an actor’s behaviour lies in the understanding of the synergy between the international structure of which the actor is an

\textsuperscript{213} Marshall, Katherine, “The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity”, (London: Routledge, 2007)
\textsuperscript{214} Haas, Ernst, “When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations”, (Berkeley: University of California, 1991)
integral part, and the comprising agents within that structure. Following the above section’s detailed focus on the structure of international development, the current section focuses on the role of certain IOs in the construction of the normative basis characterising the structure of international development. It concentrates on the promulgation of new norms in the structure of international development by its identified agents (IOs), with the objective to interpret what they did and how their goals changed over time. The section aims to confirm that certain IOs are the drivers of change in the discourse and practice of international development, and that they institutionalise new norms and ideas in its supporting structure.

As demonstrated in the previous section, the structure of international development evolved in direct synergy with its leading agents, specifically certain IOs such as the WB, the IMF, the UN (through its numerous agencies), the WTO, and the OECD. These IOs influenced the international development discipline in distinct dominions – lending, assistance, and discourse – establishing a set of norms that defined the evolution of its structure. Both the agents (IOs) and the structure of international development changed in time as illustrated by the different paradigms that characterised the subject through the decades. The end of the Cold War and East-West antagonism brought new attention to the economic and developmental disparities in the international system and restored hope in curbing the North-South division over economic development. The following sub-sections focus on the identified IOs as the most prominent agents in the structure of international development, with a view to capture their role in the promulgation of new norms therein.

2.1 The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund

In July 1944, before the end of the Second World War, the UN hosted the Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, USA in preparation for the rebuilding of the international economic system in a post-war scenario. The main aim of the conference was to construct a structure of rules, procedures, and institutions vested with capacity to regulate the international monetary system. As a result, two institutions were founded autonomously from the UN framework – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known today as the WB) and the IMF. However, by 1947, the UN incorporated both the WB and the IMF into its structure as

215 Allen, Tim & Thomas, Alan (Eds), “Poverty and Development in the 21st Century”
independent and specialised agencies with a specifically accredited observer status.\textsuperscript{218} As a result, the WB and the IMF emerged as two fundamental pillars of the international financial and monetary system of the post-Second World War era.

The foundation of the WB and IMF illustrated the intent from Western powers to defend against the possible re-emergence of the economic depression that dominated the 1930s. Their aim was to refuse to embrace protectionism as an adequate tool for economic development and growth in modern times. The foundational principles of both institutions rested upon the economic theories of Harry Dexter White and Maynard Keynes, whose ultimate objective was to prevent the rise and manifestation of vast fluctuations in the world economy and to establish a stable trading platform between the five continents.\textsuperscript{219} In the years that followed the end of the Second World War, European countries were at the forefront of the planning behind both institutions. Their objective was to bring further stability to the continent through large-scale reconstruction projects and the reinvigoration of its own economies.

The focus on developing countries and the creation of development-oriented policies emerged later, and mostly in line with the decolonisation process of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{220} The WB’s fourth President, George Woods (1963-1968), promoted a distinct policy orientation regarding developing countries, yet it was only under the leadership of its following President, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), that the WB pursued a particularly innovative policy in the domain. While maintaining economic growth and progress as the WB’s policy backbone, McNamara instituted the concept of world poverty and its elimination as an additional fundamental policy objective of the bank that perpetually reshaped its character and activities.\textsuperscript{221} McNamara steered the WB onto a novel direction in the 1970s, despite borrowing many ideas from some UN declarations, specifically the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition adopted in 1974 by the World Food Conference.\textsuperscript{222} Until then, WB policies were simply concerned with a country’s infrastructure, macroeconomic foundations, and Gross National Product (GNP) indicators. Under McNamara’s mandate, poverty, education, and numerous social matters acquired equal relevance to economic indicators, which transformed the WB into a de facto international bank and development agency combined.

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As the WB acquired an increasingly pro-active conduct, it attached conditionality clauses to its lending programmes, which progressively set a trend that is common in international development today.\textsuperscript{223} McNamara had a new vision for the WB based on the creation of country specific mandates, whereby it would assist a given borrower government to plan a broad development strategy that would cover all sections of its economy and every relevant aspect of its social framework. Following his approach and as a response to the international financial crisis of the 1970s – the oil crisis, the debt crisis, and the high levels of inflation and economic stagnation – both the WB and the IMF blueprinted their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 1970s as the most viable plan for the future of development.\textsuperscript{224} Developing countries were the main targets of this new economic and social strategy, which openly endorsed conditional clauses whereby borrower states had to reduce government spending, cut subsidies, lower exchange rates, and weaken trade barriers in exchange for loans. In addition to these conditions, both the WB and the IMF encouraged the privatisation of a country’s assets stressing their support for the creation of market-based economic systems in the future to come.\textsuperscript{225}

The adaptation of WB policies to world poverty concerns owes much to McNamara and his team of staff. Under his leadership, the WB established all-encompassing loaning programmes that were oriented towards development and poverty alleviation of borrowing developing nations. Regardless of the effectiveness of the approach, both the WB and the IMF adhered to SAPs as the most adequate means to promote sustainable development, while re-enforcing the concept of free trade as an integral part of their loaning strategies. Research by the economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who maintained considerable influence over the governments of Great Britain and the USA at the time, inspired the promotion of the concept of free trade used by the WB and the IMF.\textsuperscript{226} The economic principles promoted by both economists centred on the maxim that optimum profits can only emerge where the private sector is extensive and free to operate without the burden of protectionist policy constraints. Thus, tariff barriers were an obstacle necessary to overcome because exports form a vital source of wealth attainable only through the creation of an export-led industry and agriculture.\textsuperscript{227} Accordingly, governments were to intervene in the management of a country’s economy to the least possible degree, which would cut down on their

\textsuperscript{223} Haynes, Jeff (Eds), “Palgrave Advances in Development Studies”, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
\textsuperscript{224} Rapley, John, “Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World”
\textsuperscript{226} At the time, Margaret Thatcher was the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Ronald Reagan was the President of the USA; Khan, Shahrukh, “Do World Bank and IMF Policies Work?”, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999)
\textsuperscript{227} Ritzen, Jozef, “A Chance for the World Bank”
human resources and produce absolute efficiency. Thereafter, foreign capital would flow through the world’s markets with maximum ease. These principles set the ground for the subsequent establishment of Neoliberalism as the new political, economic, and social code for development across the international system.\textsuperscript{228}

The WB progressed into the world’s foremost development lending institution, and its policies had considerable influence over all agents in the field of international development. Its lending policies carried demanding conditions setting the volume and type of reforms it expected from recipient states in exchange for its loans. In this process, the WB enjoyed the support of what is often considered its sister institution, the IMF, drawing complementary development plans for developing countries.\textsuperscript{229} The activities of the two institutions differ but both are profit-making institutions that have a preference to deal most of their loans at market rates expecting no defaults from its debtors. The loans provided have developing countries as their target, yet each institution has a distinct purpose. The IMF provides credit to governments for general budgetary projects, whereas the WB lends money to specific development projects focusing both on physical and human infrastructure. In this perspective, the IMF has a tendency to focus on macroeconomic stability whilst the WB concentrates its activities on economic growth.\textsuperscript{230}

The IMF describes its three main activities as lending, technical assistance, and surveillance. Lending consists on providing financial assistance to low-income countries experiencing prolonged difficulties with their balance of payments or dealing with external financial shocks to their economies. Technical assistance is a policy of extensive training promoted by the IMF to strengthen the capacity of the institutions and officials of recipient countries to manage their economic and financial policies. Surveillance concerns the creation of a platform for dialogue between the IMF and the lending countries concerning the national and international repercussions of their economic and financial policies.\textsuperscript{231} In practice, the combination of the three activities establishes a framework for the adoption of a broad conditionality clause that the IMF imposes on its operations with developing countries. The IMF provides loans to countries that accept the requirements that it previously established relying on a set of macroeconomic conditions, which usually involve Neoliberal reforms on national fiscal and regulatory policy. The objective of its proposed reforms is

\textsuperscript{231} Woods, Ngaire, “The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers”
to make governments and economies more efficient, and to stabilise the currency of the recipient states.

In the span of almost six decades, both the WB and the IMF grew to become some of the leading institutions in the structure of international development. The normative structure of international development evolved through time partly based on some of these two lending institution’s policies, which affected all actors within that structure.\textsuperscript{232} The advance of the concept of poverty alleviation, contrary to a pure industrialisation approach to development, that significantly altered the international development discourse, is traceable to the WB activities in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{233} Similarly, the WB and the IMF gave impetus to the drive to development through a model based on structural adjustments, which was popularised in the 1980s. Integral to the policy of structural adjustment, the use of conditionality clauses attached to financial assistance became an internationally accepted practice that today integrates the agendas of the leading actors in international development. Regardless of the arguably controversial results that such policies generate, the WB and IMF are the architects of that approach to development, which left a heavy imprint on the normative evolution of contemporary international development.\textsuperscript{234}

In line with the concept of structural adjustment, and illustrating their intent to remain at the forefront of international lending, both institutions helped design and promote the Washington Consensus.\textsuperscript{235} The initiative advanced a specific set of policies and conditionalities as a pre-requisite for the promotion of development worldwide. In effect, it directed international development into the favoured mould of these Washington-based institutions.\textsuperscript{236} The WB and the IMF’s endorsement and implementation of the Washington Consensus had a significant impact on international development in the 1990s and established the principles of macro-stability, liberalisation, and privatisation as the main pillars for development promotion across the deprived regions of the globe. The WB and IMF sustained approach established economic growth and market-friendly policies as the core international development paradigm of the 1990s.


\textsuperscript{234} Thomas, Mellissa, ‘Can the World Bank Enforce its Own Conditions?’, \textit{Development and Change}, Vol. 35(3), 2004

\textsuperscript{235} The Washington Consensus is a term coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson referring to a set of ten economic policy directives endorsed by the Washington-based financial institutions (WB, IMF, as well as the United States Treasure Department) as a means to promote international development through macroeconomic adjustments. Williamson, John, “Washington Consensus Revisited”, in Emmerij, Louis (Eds), \textit{“Economic and Social Development into the XXI Century”}, (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1997)

Despite mounting criticism of the Washington Consensus and its impact on international development theory and practice, the WB and the IMF launched a novel procedure in 1999 that maintained a similar approach to development, yet with a focus on poverty alleviation. In the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), both institutions designed a development scheme that outlined the national programme for poverty reduction of a given developing state based on a combination of macroeconomic, structural, and social policies. The main objective of the method was to ensure effective lending through efficient investment in poverty reduction projects while promoting an active participation of the civil society, which allowed the WB and the IMF to be closely involved in the process. PRSPs became central to any lending project that the two institutions approved both before and during the implementation procedure, which ultimately transformed PRSPs into a blueprint of international development at the turn of the century.

Following their foundation in 1944, both the WB and the IMF progressed into some of the leading agents of international development. As demonstrated above, both IOs generated considerable impact in the structure of international development promulgating new norms and ideas in response to their agendas and the perceived needs of developing countries throughout the past decades. By doing so, the two institutions progressed into integral agents of the structure of international development, demonstrating their potential to affect the behaviour of comprising international development actors, such as the EU.

2.2 The World Trade Organisation

The WTO was founded in 1995 with the aim to regulate and monitor international trade operations. It completed the Bretton Woods original project of 1944, which had foreseen the creation of an international trade organisation to support its envisaged international monetary and financial system. At the time, it established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947 as a fundamental agreement between all signatory states to integrate the future structure of the International Trade Organisation (ITO). The ITO was to stand in parity with the WB and the IMF, and complete the establishment of the pioneering international system of monetary management devised at the Bretton Woods conference. The Havana Charter of 1948 drafted a constitutional code for the ITO, which the USA Congress never ratified despite repeated

attempts. The USA Congress claimed that it would interfere with the country’s internal economic issues. Due to the unexpected political impasse instigated by the Congress of the USA, the ITO never materialised. Thus, GATT became the only multilateral agreement covering the issue area of global trade by default. This entirely unforeseen development in the administration of the Bretton Woods system transformed GATT into both an international trade convention and a de facto intergovernmental organisation.

GATT’s main mandate was to govern closely international trade operations in tune with the Bretton Woods ideology that supported the creation and management of an international monetary system. The principle of international tariff reductions and the ‘principle of unconditional most favoured nation’ stood at the basis of the agreement. During its first years, and in pursuit of an international free trade agenda, GATT organised a variety of meetings under its auspices. They produced limited results despite the intense debates they often generated between different states. These bargaining rounds openly split GATT’s members in two distinct groupings, developed and developing countries, which gradually illustrated the need to replace GATT with an institution more in line with the unborn ITO. It was only in 1986 during a fresh round of negotiations at Punta del Este, Uruguay, that all signatory countries reached a consensus regarding the creation of an adequate institution to govern international trade. In a process commonly known as the Uruguay Round (1986 – 1993), GATT formally ceased its activities giving way to an institutional body resembling the ITO, yet under a distinct nomenclature – the WTO. The foundation of the WTO in 1995 advanced some of the most comprehensive reforms of the Bretton Woods system, which generated a deep impact at the international level. The WTO adopted all GATT agreements signed during the previous negotiation rounds since 1947, and it enhanced the bureaucracy available to monitor adherence to the principles of multilateralism at the core of the Bretton Woods philosophy.

Following an initial adjustment period, the WTO swiftly defined the parameters of international trade at the end of the 20th century. It delineated the international trading system under a specific and all-encompassing set of rules that set the foundations for the creation of an

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241 Under the ‘principle of unconditional most favoured nation’, the conditions to be applied to the most favoured trading nation would also apply to all trading nations; Crowley, Meredith, ‘Introduction to the WTO and GATT’


institutionalised forum with its origins in GATT.\textsuperscript{244} Considering the policy orientation of the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO promptly adopted the concept of development promotion as one of its cardinal policy objectives. In previous decades, GATT attempted to advance similar initiatives, but they had little effect. Whilst not being a radically innovative approach, the incorporation of development concerns in the activities of the WTO accentuated the purpose of the organisation to align its development promotion approach with the objectives favoured by its sister institutions that composed the Bretton Woods system.

The WTO’s new objectives were revealed openly in 2001 at the launch of a new round of negotiations in Doha, Qatar, where it unveiled the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).\textsuperscript{245} According to the WTO, the DDA consisted of a thorough programme aimed at protecting the world’s poor from the unbalances of the contemporary process of globalisation. The DDA proposed to assist developing countries in their quest to achieve increasingly equitable and sustainable development through trade liberalisation strategies based on large cuttings of trade barriers and subsidies in farming.\textsuperscript{246} The deadline set for the agreement on DDA was 1 January 2005, but the emergence of constant deadlocks in negotiations resulted in its open disregard, which also placed the DDA initiative under serious consideration. Pascal Lamy, the then WTO Director-General, suspended the DDA negotiations in July 2006, and they failed to achieve any significant progress thereafter.\textsuperscript{247} The outcome of the DDA negotiations became subject to a large degree of speculation, and by the end of 2008, all scenarios remained possible. Despite the DDA negotiations debate, the WTO mandate confirmed the organisation’s intension to address the deficiencies of the existing GATT-inspired international trading system through what appeared to be a concrete attempt to focus on the needs of developing nations.\textsuperscript{248} Thus, the WTO attempted to override the obstacles posed by the complex status of the DDA negotiations, and set up mechanisms with the capacity to assist developing countries facing supply-side constraints that limit considerably their ability to benefit from the current multilateral trading system.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{244} Bossche, Peter van den, "The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization", (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
\textsuperscript{245} Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb (Eds), "The WTO, Developing Countries and the Doha Development Agenda: Prospects and Challenges for Trade-led Growth", (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004)
\textsuperscript{246} World Trade Organisation, "Doha Development Agenda", (Geneva: WTO, 2003)
\textsuperscript{247} Beattie, Alan, ‘Doha Set for Backburner as Trade Talks Near a Halt’, Financial Times (Tuesday, 25 September, 2007)
\textsuperscript{249} Kinnman, Susanna & Lodefalk, Magnus, ‘What is at Stake in the Doha Round?’, The World Economy, Vol. 30(8), August 2007
The system of international trade underwent major reforms in the 1990s following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the foundation of the WTO in 1995. The arbitration of world trade was previously under direct rule from GATT, as a legally binding international agreement, yet the creation of the WTO formally institutionalised the management of world trade. The WTO Charter instituted it as an international organisation with legal personality, and it established a legislative framework for international trade with over 150 members that accounted for 97% of global trade. The organisation aimed to serve and safeguard five core principles - non-discrimination, reciprocity, binding commitments, transparency, and safety valves. These principles attempted to address the limitations of GATT and construct a more equitable trading system providing distinct assistance mechanisms to developing countries.

The objective of the WTO’s novel approach to manage international trade targeted the opening of the economies of developing countries, while reducing the social costs of their economic adjustment to the world economy through the provision of adequate financial instruments and technical assistance. The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference represented a turning point for the WTO’s new development-oriented approach to trade, which set new international guidelines for trade with developing countries. The vast majority of states and actors in the international system became signatory parties to the principles and agreements of the organisation, such as the EU. Thus, the WTO in general and the DDA initiative in particular determined a new standard for trade arrangements vis-à-vis developing states. They shaped the current discourse and orientation of international development, affecting the trade policy of all actors in the international system. Since its inception, the WTO had a considerable impact on the structure of international development through the design of a new set of norms that linked trade and development, and potentially affected the development policy orientation of its all its signatory parties, such as the EU.

2.3 The United Nations

In contrast with the other leading IOs in the structure of international development, the UN maintained a particular approach to international development that reflected its character and

configuration. Due to its wide membership composition, the UN is institutionally organised in a complex framework of numerous administrative bodies and agencies, in alliance with a network of international organisations, treaties, and conventions known as the UN System.\footnote{Krasno, Jean, 'Founding the United Nations: An Evolutionary Process', in Krasno, Jean (Eds), “The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of Global Society”, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004)} Its foundation dates back to 1945, when the governments of fifty independent states met in San Francisco, USA to address the future of the international system in the post-Second World era.\footnote{Lawrence Ziring, Robert Riggs, & Jack Plano, “The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics”, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1994)} Therein, its principles were set under the UN Charter whose goal was ultimately to avoid the mistakes of its predecessor, the League of Nations, and set out the post-war plans for peace and security in light of a new international order. Unlike the then defunct League of Nations, the UN aimed to maintain international peace and security, address economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, and promote respect for universal human rights.

Most basically, the UN refers to a group of one-hundred-and-ninety-two states, the Charter of the UN as its constitutional document, and six main organs – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council.\footnote{Idris, Kamil & Bartolo, Michael, “A Better United Nations for the New Millennium: How It is Now and How It Should Be in the Future”, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000)} Together with the subsidiary agencies created by some of the aforementioned organs, there are a number of autonomous agencies comprising the UN system, which are not administratively subsidiary to the central organs of the UN. Additionally, there are regional organisations generally not administratively subsidiary to the central organs, which were designed to perform some of the central organs’ functions on regional issues.\footnote{Idris, Kamil & Bartolo, Michael, “A Better United Nations for the New Millennium: How It is Now and How It Should Be in the Future”}

Due to the complexity of the UN’s organisational structure, it is problematic to advance it as an actor in the international system per se. Even if the UN may have some power as a unitary actor, its specific organs have a broader agency capacity in the international system. Distinct organs emerged in relation to different thematic concerns, and therein, the UN developed a limited agency capacity as a unitary actor when compared to its individual organs in their specific domains. Unlike the UN itself, most of its organs speak with one voice and maintain considerable authority in the international system.\footnote{Keohane, Robert, ‘The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism’, GARNET Working Paper, No. 09/06, September 2006} In the realm of international development, the UN organs that assumed the most leadership in the structure of international development were the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nevertheless, and as detailed in the subsequent chapters, other UN agencies played an equally important role in the promotion of certain norms in the structure of international development during specific periods in time.

The influence of the UN organs with a development portfolio in the structure of international development was progressive and rooted in contemporary history. In the post-Second World War period, the UN Secretariat received various *ad hoc* requests for assistance in various fields, which prompted it to send staff members or consultants to provide technical assistance to the states that required UN assistance. Despite the limited number of missions and their general concern with social welfare, UN foreign missions expanded gradually in both number and character, and by 1948, the first UN multidisciplinary development mission took place in Haiti. Nevertheless, by the late 1950s, developing countries were still bargaining for a more suitable approach to UN international assistance. In contrast to the developing countries’ position at the time, developed states expressed their preference to channel their capital through the WB and the IMF, which caused the emergence of a one of the first rifts within the UN order between developed and developing states.

The creation of the UN Special Fund was the immediate compromise found within the organisation regarding the emerging North-South dispute. A dynamic group of highly efficient staff ran the Special Fund, which was headed by Paul Hoffman, who was an elder member of the USA Republican Party and the former head of the Marshall Plan and the Ford Foundation. By the early 1960s and under the initiative of the Special Fund, UN programmes consisted no longer of a simple promotion of technical assistance, as seen in the previous decade, but of larger, longer, and more ambitious projects targeting at large the economies and societies of recipient countries. Nonetheless, the limitations of the emerging UN development projects were still evident at the time. The projects in question were not only under intense pressure from the in-house fighting between the various UN agencies with a development portfolio, but were also focus of a technical approach from the UN that often snubbed the development plans and priorities of recipient states.

The overlapping roles of UN agencies and the regular conflicts therein, caused it to merge its two most emblematic development-oriented programs in 1965 – the Special Fund and the Technical

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261 Tarp, Finn & Hjertholm, Peter, “Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future”
Assistance Board – and thereby establish the UNDP. 262 The UNDP became a General Assembly subsidiary organ, which voluntary contributions from UN member states funded entirely. The groundbreaking systematic programme of assistance allocation was one of the UNDP’s first measures. For the first time in the history of international development, an assistance programme focused exclusively on the needs of recipients, which contrasted with the vast majority of bilateral programmes of the time and the policies of other multilateral institutions. 263 As a result, the UNDP’s new approach to development focused on politics, commercial links, past colonial ties, religion, and ideology as guidelines for its cooperation programmes with developing states. The UNDP approach had a considerable impact on the practice and discourse of international development. It contrasted openly with the lack of systematic criteria, and/or with the requirement of adherence to market oriented policies and other forms of conditionality, that were common practice by the WB and the IMF at the time. 264

Following the innovative promotion of aid allocation based on the needs of recipients, the UNDP proceeded with the introduction of further innovations in the discourse and practice of international development. It introduced geographically oriented programmes as part of its development cooperation policy. As a result, the UNDP reformed its bureaucratic structure thoroughly, and started to operate under the control of a central secretariat that was combined with a number of regional offices and a vast number of country offices. Hence, the UNDP endorsed a distinctive approach to the promotion of development across the world that was characterised by an emphasis on in loco implementation and efficiency maximisation. 265 The UNDP’s approach to international development at the time planted the seed of the principles of ownership and subsidiarity, which would progress later into a leading paradigm of international development, and of the EU policy of development cooperation.

As a knowledge-based institution, the UNDP affected the structure of international development through the allocation of aid based on need and geographically sensitive programmes, but additionally through the creation of the presently universally endorsed concept of Sustainable Human Development. 266 The 1990 UNDP Human Development Report established a distinct

265 Klingebiel, Stephan, “Effectiveness and Reform of the United Nations Development Programme”
mechanism to explore the notion and measurement of global human development based on the
Human Development Index (HDI). A team of experts working for the UNDP conceptualised the
HDI, however both Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen made the most significant contributions to its
design. Mahbub ul Haq was previously instrumental in the poverty eradication plan endorsed by
the WB during Robert McNamara’s tenure. Following McNamara’s departure from the WB, William
Draper, the then Administrator of the UNDP, invited Mahbub ul Haq to join the UNDP. Amartya Sen
served as a consultant to the UNDP lending his ideas and expertise on the field to the
preparation of the first Human Development Report. Borrowing from the input of both Mahbub ul
Haq and Amartya Sen, the UNDP established the HDI as a development measurement tool that
measures life expectancy, literacy, education, standard of living, and Gross National Product (GDP)
per capita together in one equation. Its aim was to reform the concept of development promotion in
correlation with the principles of well-being and quality of life. The HDI demonstrated the
limitations of the reliance on the GDP per capita as a sacrosanct indicator of development in the
world. Thus, it proposed a new alternative and stimulated further debate in international
development discourse and practice. Subsequently, the HDI featured in the programmes of all major
actors in the field of international development, and therefore brought the international community
closer in a global effort to improve the human condition through the promotion of more equitable
and sustainable development.

As the North-South dispute surfaced within UN circles around the late 1950s and early
1960s, numerous developing countries called for a high-profile conference to address their growing
concerns regarding international trade. At the time, the rapid increase of developing countries as
UN members created an unforeseen voting majority at the General Assembly, which conferred
developing countries considerable bargaining power within the organisation. In reaction to the new
balance of power in the UN General Assembly, the UN responded by establishing UNCTAD in
1964. Its objective was to assist developing countries with issues of trade and development, and to
counterweight the Northern-dominated system of international trade and development. UNCTAD
became a strikingly distinct UN organ, which acquired a centralised structure based in

272 Benn, Denis, ‘Development Policy: Changing Perspectives and Emerging Paradigms’
Geneva and functioned primarily as a forum for developing countries to discuss development issues. In support to the creation of UNCTAD, UN developing countries founded the Group of 77 to voice their concerns within the UN System at the time, which progressively exerted considerable influence in the workings of UNCTAD.\textsuperscript{273}

Raul Prebisch was a central figure in both the foundation of the Group of 77 and the definition of UNCTAD’s policy orientation.\textsuperscript{274} He was a prominent Argentine economist and former head of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and he became UNCTAD’s first Secretary-General. During his mandate, UN developing countries designed one of the paradigms of international development in the 1970s and 1980s – the New International Economic Order (NIEO).\textsuperscript{275} The aim of NIEO was to change the international terms of trade in favour of exporters of primary products to establish a progressively egalitarian international trade system. Despite its relative success at the time, the NIEO initiative waned significantly thereafter.\textsuperscript{276} Nevertheless, UNCTAD remained a staunch supporter of developing countries in the international system. UNCTAD is a UN subsidiary organ that draws its budget from the general UN budget, but which has a large degree of autonomy in comparison to other UN organs.\textsuperscript{277} Based on a particular internal make-up and history, UNCTAD developed its authority in international development mostly as a discussion forum with legitimacy to influence the discourse of international development. It did so through the proposal of economic and trade alternatives to the existing Western-influenced framework of trade and development promotion.

In this manner, the UNDP and UNCTAD acquired considerable agency in the structure of international development since the mid-1960s through the introduction of new norms and ideas in the discourse and practice of international development. Concomitantly, the UN as an institution – mostly through the General Assembly – attempted to increase its influence in international development following the end of the Cold War. In consideration of the particular moment in history, and the support it gathered then from the WB, the IMF, and the OECD, the UN seemed intent on assuming leadership in the promotion of a new orientation for international development

\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Williams, Marc}, “\textit{Third World Cooperation: The Group of 77 in UNCTAD}”, (London: Printer Publishers Ltd., 1991)
\textsuperscript{275} \textit{Krasner, Stephen}, “\textit{Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism}”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)
\textsuperscript{276} \textit{Koul, Autar Krishan}, “\textit{The Legal Framework of UNCTAD in World Trade}”
during the 1990s. Therein, it organised a plethora of world conferences on a variety of development-related issues with the aim to develop international consensus on a global poverty reduction strategy.

Progressively, the UN’s initiative gathered momentum, as each of its conferences assisted in identifying objective goals and targets for a global poverty reduction scheme that culminated with the creation of the MDGs in 2000. The OECD’s report ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’ represented an important turning point. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD produced a core set of seven target goals, identified as International Development Goals (IDGs). Subsequently, the UN relied on the 2000 UN Millennium Summit to present a reviewed version of the IDGs under the title of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and push for their universal acceptance. Following days of negotiations at the UN Millennium Summit, one-hundred-and-eighty-nine nations signed the MDGs as broad policy targets to achieve by 2015. They represented a global partnership formed in response to the world’s most fundamental development challenges and to the growing appeals from civil society at the time. After the Millennium Summit, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan asked the UNDP to act as the MDGs’ gatekeeper. Kofi Annan referred to the UNDP as the organ vested with the adequate agency and capacity to orchestrate the coherent and effective inclusion of the MDGs in the UN System, while using these as a platform to set a new global agenda for international development in the twenty-first century. The MDGs progressed into a central pillar of the normative basis of international development thereafter, potentially affecting the policy orientation of all international development actors, such as the EU.

Through the policies and activities of the UNDP and UNCTAD together with fundamental support from UNGA, the UN generated considerable influence over the structure of international development since the 1960s mostly regarding theory and discourse. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the UN called for a renewed global partnership for development. It introduced the ambitious MDGs as an initiative currently endorsed by all leading international organisations, the

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279 Ziring, Lawrence, “The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics”
vast majority of nations across the world, and the EU. The UN’s objective was to both free humanity from abject poverty and set a comprehensible future model for international development.

2.4 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Operating outside of the UN system and presently comprising a limited membership of thirty countries, the OECD emerged as a particular multilateral organisation in the late 1940s. It gradually evolved from a regional to an international institution endorsing the values of democracy, free market economy, and sustainable development. The OECD’s origins date back to 1948 during the post-Second World War European reconstruction effort when eighteen European states founded the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) with the aim to manage and administer the Marshall Plan. The broad guidelines of the organisation resembled those of the Bretton Woods institutions. Its main objectives rested upon the promotion of economic cooperation amongst its members and centred on the management of aid disbursements and the implementation of a free market economy.

Following the OEEC’s success in the reconstruction of Europe and the boosting of its member states’ economies in the post-Second World War era, it launched a broad policy and orientation review in 1961. The process resulted in the eventual conversion of the OEEC into a new organisation vested with a distinct policy agenda and membership make-up under the denomination of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). With membership enlargement to the USA and Canada in 1961, Japan in 1964, and to other relatively wealthy states in the following decades, the OECD acquired an extra-European reach and a set of guidelines distinct from those enshrined in the OEEC statutory code. Analogous to the policy evolution of the WB and the IMF during the 1960s, the OECD progressively took development as its novel central concern. Correlating with the Bretton Woods institutions, it adopted a Keynesian economic philosophy as its main theoretical reference. Therein, it aimed to promote international economic growth, trade liberalisation, and development, while rejecting protectionism as a viable means to achieve global welfare.

286 Kerstin Martens, Carolin Balzer, Reinhold Sackmann & Ansgar Weymann, ‘Comparing Governance of International Organisations: The EU, the OECD and Educational Policy’, TranState Working Papers, No. 7, Transformations of the State – Collaborative Research Centre 597, 2004
The metamorphosis of the OEEC into the OECD, modelled the organisation into a powerful interest group in global bargaining on a variety of development-related issues. The OECD established itself as an international forum composed by some of the best experts from its member states, who enjoyed full independence from their home bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{288} Thus, they retained considerable room for manoeuvre in the design of new policies and ideas. The OECD evolved into a distinct IO in the international system allowing the organisation to be separate from any national controversies. Therefore, the OECD was independent to formulate, refine, and diffuse new policy ideas. Its high degree of scientific authority combined with an acquired reputation for political neutrality, conferred considerable effectiveness and reach to its policies and ideas in the international system.\textsuperscript{289}

The reach and effectiveness of the OECD’s policies and ideas were particularly striking in the field of international development, specifically through its partnership with the WB, the IMF, the WTO, and the UN. Through the setting of a plethora of committees and agencies, the OECD aimed to contribute to the stimulation of development in both its member states and non-members states. The DAC plays a central role in this dominion, together with the Development Centre, the Sahel and West Africa Club, and the Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members, which maintain a similar capacity in the organisation. Despite sustaining an independent policy and agenda, the OECD soon established strong links with the main international development IOs based on the construction of solid partnerships and the alignment of policy orientation.\textsuperscript{290} In 1999, jointly with the WB, the IMF, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the OECD assisted to found the Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH) as a forum that brings together data on countries’ external debt and international reserve assets. The JEDH’s main objective was to facilitate appropriate and frequent access to a single data set to a broad range of users from both the public and private sectors.\textsuperscript{291} As a result, the OECD reinforced its status in the structure of international development through increased cooperation with some of its leading agents, and by introducing new instruments and tools to use in preparation of development reforms in a given recipient country.

\textsuperscript{288} Marcussen, Martin, ‘The OECD in Search of a Role: Playing the Idea Game’, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 29th Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, France, 6-11 April 2001
\textsuperscript{289} Sharman, Jason, ‘OECD Reputation as OECD Effectiveness’, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, Honolulu, 1-5 March 2005
Furthermore, the OECD has observer status at the WTO and is particularly active in its campaign to link aid and trade as an effective means to promote sustainable development.\(^\text{292}\) In the framework of the DDA, both the WTO and OECD launched the joint Trade and Capacity Building Database (TCBDB) in 2002 “to assist international development and trade communities to achieve higher degrees of coordination and coherence, avoid duplication, share information, and monitor the implementation of commitments registered in the Doha Ministerial Declaration”.\(^\text{293}\) Through a strategic partnership with the WTO, the OECD integrated the promotion of the trade and development norm in the discourse and practice of international development.

Similarly, the OECD and the UN have a long established partnership in international development matters. Several UN agencies participate in some of the OECD’s activities, and vice-versa. The OECD’s partnership with the UNDP established the most comprehensive international development network responsible for the largest development assistance in the world. The most emblematic programmes in the UNDP-OECD cooperation include: curbing international corruption, the joint Program of Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), and various development-oriented initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.\(^\text{294}\) In addition, the OECD obtained observer status at both the UN General Assembly and some UN specialised agencies, namely the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and UNCTAD. The aforementioned UN specialised agencies promote international social and economic cooperation, and development, based on equitable trade and foreign investment initiatives.\(^\text{295}\) Through the establishment of close partnerships with various UN organs, the OECD became increasingly active in the field of international development, and therein, assisted in the diffusion of new ideas and norms.

The creation of partnerships and cooperation agreements with all major IOs in the field of international development transformed the OECD into a prominent driving force in the promotion of a particular international development model affecting the discourse and structure of international development. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness represents the latest illustration of


\(^{295}\) McMichael, Philip, “Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective”
the OECD agency and impact on the structure of international development. OECD bodies, namely the DAC, developed the background preparation to Paris agreement, which was endorsed subsequently by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies, and other Senior Officials. They thereby committed their countries and organisations to maintain and improve their efforts in the harmonisation, alignment, and management of aid. The Paris Declaration soon achieved global reach becoming one of the foundational pillars of the contemporary international development paradigm affecting all international development actors, such as the EU.

In this manner, the OECD progressed into a distinct IO in the structure of international development, whilst gathering growing agency in the promotion of new norms and ideas. As a knowledge-based organisation, the OECD became increasingly active in the design of new approaches to development promotion across the world. As a result, it exerted considerable impact on the discourse and practice of international development over the recent decades, and potentially affected the policy orientation of its constituent actors, such as the EU.

As demonstrated in the current section, the promulgation of new ideas and norms in the structure of international development stands in direct relation with the role that certain IOs played as its integral agents therein. Through an historical analysis of the activities and policy orientation of the IOs in question, this section concentrated on the norms promoted by the WB, the IMF, the UN, the OECD, and the WTO in the structure of international development. Its objective was to capture how the discourse and practice of international development evolved in time. Accordingly, it illustrated that in combination with structure, the agents pertaining that structure are equally fundamental in the definition of the discourse and practice of international development. The aforementioned IOs possess a determining agency capacity in the structure of international development, which confirms them as the drivers of change and the engine for the promulgation of new norms therein. Therefore, the structure and agents of international development matter and affect an actor’s behaviour in the domain of international development, which is the focus of the next section.

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296 OECD, “Harmonisation, Alignment, Results: Progress Report on Aid Effectiveness”
3. International Development and the European Union

Following the argument in the above sections that the emergence of new norms and ideas in the structure of international development stands in direct relation with the role that certain agents (IOs) played, it appears pertinent to reflect on the position of the European Commission (as the EU representative at the international level) in the structure in question. The objective is to consider the inclusion of the European Commission in the structure of international development, and understand how it related with both the structure and the identified leading agents of international development in time. The analysis aims to complement the previous two sections of the current chapter, and assist to set the theoretical and practical foundations for the understanding of what, how, and who caused EU development policy towards Africa to shift in the considered timeframe.

The social relations between the EU and the identified leading IOs in the structure of international development date back a few decades in some cases. Nonetheless, they became particularly close during the 1990s in line with the EU increased ‘actorness’ in international affairs. The expression of the expanded process of EU ‘actorness’ in the period following the end of the Cold War, became symptomatic through the EU’s progressively more dynamic participation in the activities of the stated IOs. The EU underwent considerable reform, which stimulated the European integration process, and established the basis for the Union to develop as an international actor. Hence, it appears relevant to concentrate on how the EU related with the structure and agents of international development in time, as a means to understand subsequently how it may have affected the evolution of EU development policy concerning Africa since the end of the Cold War.

As the external delegate of the EU at the international level, the European Commission established increasingly close relations with a plethora of IOs across the international system. In that process, the UN became an early reference for the European Commission. As soon as 1974, the European Commission struck a groundbreaking cooperation deal with the UN granted by Resolution 3208. In what was then a challenge to the UN strict admission procedures – limited to states – the European Commission initiated negotiations with the UN in the early 1970s obtaining observer status at the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) by 1974. Subsequently its observer status was extended to most UN specialised agencies. The first UN agency that broke this mould and agreed to grant the European Commission full membership status,
including voting rights, was the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1991, which followed one of the most progressive reforms to date undertaken by an IO.299

Whilst cooperation between the two institutions advanced since 1974, the end of the Cold War saw a renewed EU in international affairs. The European integration process produced an EU with a stronger and more unitary voice in the international system. Accordingly, the European Commission became increasingly active in most UN fora and established close relationships with numerous UN agencies. As the European Commission obtained a special full participant status at most major UN conferences of the 1990s, it also established partnerships with a plethora of UN agencies, specifically the UNDP and UNCTAD. The rapprochement between the EU and the UNDP was based on a 1997 agreement that allowed the EU to participate in various UNDP activities including the financing of certain development schemes.300 Similarly, the link between the EU and the UNCTAD resulted from a remarkable accord between the two parties in 1995. It culminated with the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences granting the European Commission full participatory status in its activities, nevertheless, with no voting capacity. Most recently, relations between the European Commission and the UNDP covered issues of governance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction, including the broader post-conflict agenda such as relief, rehabilitation and development and transition issues. An equally close rapport emerged between the EU and UNCTAD through cooperation in the negotiation rounds of one of the organisation’s most influential programmes – the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities.301 The programme integrated the European Commission in the organisation’s latest agreements on international trade and development issues. Cooperation between the European Commission and both the UNDP and UNCTAD is a striking example of multilateral collaboration between various distinct agents in the domain of international development. It established an increasingly close development policy alignment amongst all parties through the creation of active partnerships in the promotion of international development.

Furthermore, the European Commission endorsed the MDGs at the centre of its development policy in the twenty-first century, and therein, reaffirmed its close relationship with the UN System. The European Commission signed up to the MDGs as the universal platform for

development in the twenty-first century, and progressively integrated the MDGs principles in its policy of development cooperation. Additionally, the European Commission expressed its intent to strengthen the relationship with the UN System through two communications – ‘Building an Effective Partnership with the UN’ (2001), and ‘EU-UN Relations: The Choice of Multilateralism’ (2003). Following decades of EU ad hoc initiatives regarding cooperation and coordination activities with the UN, both communications established the formal basis of the current relationship between the European Commission and the UN System.

Similarly, the European Commission swiftly established close relations with other multilateral institutions linked with the UN system, specifically the IMF and the WB. Following its foundation in 1957, the Union established an institutional link with the IMF and strengthened it further in 1972 through a closer consultative arrangement. However, the European Commission only obtained observer status at the IMF some decades later following the Union’s attempt to speak with one voice in the international system. At the EU Summit in Vienna, Austria in December 1998, the European Commission expressed the will to implement its capacities in international monetary and economic policy cooperation at the international level, by formally applying to participate in the activities of the IMF. The subsequent deal with the IMF materialised through a complex arrangement, whereby the European Commission sent a representation to the Fund, commonly known as EURIMF. The liaison between EURIMF and the IMF allowed the European Commission representatives to contribute to the work program of the Fund, and thereby confer the European Commission a more participatory presence in international financial affairs.

In parallel to its increasingly closer relations with the IMF, the European Commission expanded its relationship with the WB on numerous of international development issues. Despite having its origins in the Cold War period, the European Commission only intensified its cooperation with the WB in the early 1990s. The WB granted observer status to the European Commission during the period, and opened a WB office in Brussels in 1996. As a result, the two institutions


cooperated on a various development matters, specifically international debt strategies, and the creation of trust funds and co-financing arrangements, whereby the European Commission and the WB shared the management of numerous operations in both Africa and other regions of the globe.\footnote{Carole Garnier, Daniel Daco & Francesca Di Mauro, ‘UN-EU Cooperation on Financial Issues: The Role of the European Union at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’} As cooperation progressed between the European Commission and the WB, further policy coordination materialised with other IOs in the domain of international development, which they illustrated through their commitment to support African development in light of the MDGs initiative.\footnote{Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Louis Michel Emphasizes the Importance of the Partnership between the EC and the World Bank for Development in his Meeting with Paul Wolfowitz’, IP/05/440, 18 April 2005}

As a UN related organisation and an integral part of the Bretton Woods project, the WTO became an equally strategic partner for the EU in the period following the end of the Cold War. With its origins in GATT, the WTO was founded in 1995, and it generated a swift impact in the international system. As a multilateral institution, the WTO came to define the guidelines for global trade at the end of the twentieth century.\footnote{Bossche, Peter van den, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization”, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)} The European Commission made unprecedented developments regarding its participation in the activities of various IOs in the field of international development, and obtained full membership status at the WTO as one of its founding members. Thus, the European Commission speaks with one voice on behalf of the EU at almost all WTO meetings. The WTO is not an international development organisation per se, but it adopted development promotion as one of its policy priorities.\footnote{Bossche, Peter van den, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization”} Resulting from the global reach of its activities, the WTO established a new forum for dialogue between developing and developed countries. On that account, it launched a new international trading programme in 2001 – the DDA – with the aim to protect developing states from the economic unbalances of the globalised international system, and promote sustainable development worldwide.\footnote{Conway, Tim, ‘Trade Liberalisation and Poverty Reduction’, ODI Briefing Papers – The Doha Development Agenda: Impacts on Trade and Poverty, October 2004} The European Commission became a strong WTO partner in the DDA initiative, yet by the end of 2008, the DDA scheme remained blocked within the WTO’s internal structures, which resulted from lack of agreement between developing and developed states regarding the DDA’s practical application on the framework of world trade.

The relations between the European Commission and the stated IOs followed an evolutionary path that gained momentum after the end of the Cold War following the increased EU
‘actorness’ in the international system. Nonetheless, its relationship with the OECD proved to be rather distinct. The founding treaties of both the EU and the OECD included specific clauses regarding their relations. Article 231 of the Treaty of Rome, stated that the “Community shall establish close co-operation with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the details to be determined by common accord”. The Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development included in its Article 13 and Supplementary Protocol Number 1, that “representation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development of the European Communities established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome of 18th April, 1951, and 25th March, 1957, shall be determined in accordance with the institutional provisions of those Treaties”. Despite the close rapprochement between both entities on a variety of development matters, the European Commission is not yet a full member of the OECD. As a result, the European Commission participates under its observer status capacity in the activities of all groups and agencies within the OECD structure, and in practice, performs an extremely similar role to that of a full member. In the realm of development, it participates primarily in the work of the DAC, the Development Centre, the Sahel & West Africa Club (SWAC), and the Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members (CCNM). In that capacity, the European Commission participated actively in the activities of the OECD over the past decades, as the organisation progressed into a prominent knowledge-based IO in the structure of international development.

As illustrated in the above analysis, the European Commission, as the international representative of the EU, is an integral contemporary element of the structure of international development. As the structure of international development evolved in time in direct relation with the role that certain IOs performed therein, the European Commission integrated that structure through the rapprochement with those IOs. By doing so, the European Commission incorporated a social structure of meaning and value, which appears to stand as a fundamental element in the understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy regarding Africa. The section demonstrated that both the structure of international development and its integral agents have the potential to affect EU behaviour as an international development actor. Therefore, it confirmed that the understanding of EU development policy could not be fully understood without taking into consideration the structure of international development that the Union integrates, as well as, the role of the agents that comprise it. In that manner, and complementarily to the previous

312 OECD, ‘Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’, (http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_34483_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html, 25/08/08)
two sections, this section assisted in further demonstrating the practical and theoretical contours of the current research on EU development policy towards Africa.

**Conclusions**

Following the proposed method of research, as well as the practical analysis detailed in the three previous sections, the grasp of the structure and agents of international development is as a prerequisite for the understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy regarding Africa. The chapter focused on the structure and agents of international development to demonstrate their potential in the definition of an actor’s interests and preference formation. It concentrated on the interpretation of international development as a dynamic structure characterised by certain norms and ideas that changed in time in relation with the events taking place in the international system, as well as the role played by certain IOs as its comprising agents. Subsequently, it expanded further on the role of the IOs that made a mark in the structure of international development – the WB, the IMF, the WTO, the UN (through numerous agencies), and the OECD – demonstrating that they functioned as norm diffusers. The chapter illustrated that the aforementioned IOs diffused a specific set of norms in the structure of international development, which can potentially affect the behaviour of the other actors integrating that structure, such as the European Commission. The focus on the stated IOs showed their importance within the structure of international development, and illustrated that the understanding of an international structure in which the European Commission is embedded, cannot be fully understood without considering the role of its leading agents therein. Accordingly, the grasp of both structure and agents of international development stands as of paramount relevance in the assessment of the dynamics between the international system and the EU behaviour expressed through its policy of development cooperation regarding Africa.

The current chapter defined the theoretical and practical contours of the investigation on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War, which the following two chapters will test empirically in close detail. The international system features herein as an element that can play a decisive role in changing the action of an actor, not by constraining it with a particular set of preferences from acting, but by changing its preferences. Accordingly, shifts in action and behaviour by the EU should be traceable to the normative basis of the structure in which
the EU is embedded, which is in turn, defined by the role of its comprising IOs as the drivers of change. Based on the stated premise, the following two chapters concentrate on the European Commission as the EU proxy in international development with a view to interpret EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War in light of the impact caused by the structure and agents of international development over its evolution in time.
Chapter IV – Normative Liaisons between the EU & International Organisations in the Structure of International Development: Lomé Convention IV

“If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with a conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life (...) for fear that I should get some of his good done to me”
– Henry David Thoreau, *Walden, or, Life in the Woods*

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past”
– Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*
The ensuing chapter surveys EU development policy towards Africa in the period between 1989 and 2000. The Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist method of research is the theoretical basis for the analysis. The chapter aims to capture and understand the evolution of EU development policy in the proposed timeframe in light of its nature and role in the domain of international development. Contrary to previous research on the subject, the following analysis attempts to address what, how, and who caused EU development policy to shift by incorporating the EU in the structure of international development comprehensive of the role of its comprising leading agents (International Organisations (IOs)). Therein, it assesses the shift operated in EU development policy in the considered period inclusive of the social structures the Union integrates and the normative basis that characterises them.

Central to the analysis is the understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy towards Africa. Thus, it is essential to consider the process of EU development policy design, specifically the way in which certain large norms and ideas may have permeated it in time, and reconstituted EU interests and preferences in its framework of development cooperation with Africa. In accordance with the adopted analytical framework, the causal variable of EU interests and preferences formation in the design of its development policy towards Africa may lie within the structure of the regime of international development it integrates, where its principal IOs operate as the norm diffusers. Departing from a focus on the European Commission as the Union’s international representative, the ensuing chapter concentrates on its liaisons with the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN) (through numerous agencies, as specified below), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organisations (WTO) in the structure of international development. The objective of the investigation is to both understand further the EU development policy shift in
the period between 1989 and 2000, and test empirically the Union’s ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims concerning its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

Following the proposed approach to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa, the analysis advances a double-stranded take on the subject – structural and agency. The structural strand examines the shifts in EU behaviour and traces them to the normative claims that the aforementioned IOs promoted. The agency strand concentrates on both how these IOs came to hold the normative views in question, and the mechanisms by which they ‘taught’ those views to the European Commission. In this perspective, the capturing of the norm cycle (origin, diffusion, and internalisation) occupies an important role in the analysis. It focuses on how the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ certain norms from the IOs in question and subsequently translated them into its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Therefore, the analysis concentrates on how actors can create structures that take a life of their own, and how those structures can create and empower actors, who, in turn, may react to those structures for their own reasons.

The fourth renewal of the Lomé Convention on 15 December 1989 incorporated new large norms at the basis of the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa at the end of the twentieth century. According to Manuel Marin, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, the new large norms and ideas that integrated EU development policy translated in the adoption of four new major policy pillars under Lomé Convention IV – Structural Adjustment, Human Rights, the Environment, and Political Dimension. In line with the thesis’ adopted method of research, the analysis departs from a focus on the identified shifts in EU development policy, and subsequently it traces the shifts to the IOs’ normative claims. Thereafter, it establishes how the IOs acquired their normative views. For that exercise, the chapter juxtaposes the evolutionary process of each normative claim promoted by the aforementioned IOs in the domain of international development, with the European Commission adoption of an equivalent policy directive in its development policy towards Africa. Hence, it evaluates the evolution of both processes against each other in time to define where and when the norm in question originated. Following the juxtaposition of the progress of the above-mentioned four new major EU development policy pillars and the normative claims promoted by the stated IOs, the chapter emphasises the existence of a pattern in the way the two processes evolved in relation to each other in the considered timeframe. The pattern in question emerged from the dynamics of the evolution

314 The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’, Special Issue, Nr. 120, March-April 1990
of both processes, which illustrates how the EU seems to follow systematically the aforementioned IOs in the attempt to promote new paradigms in the discourse and practice of international development.

Following the identified pattern, the analysis proceeds to confirm the traceability of the shift in EU development policy to the stated IOs’ normative claims. The chapter assesses the mechanisms whereby the IOs’ normative claims may have been diffused into the design of EU development policy. It advances that the diffusion of norms between the IOs and the European Commission appears to have materialised through numerous channels and mechanisms. Of central relevance in that procedure was: a) the European Commission membership of the IOs in question; b) the expanding European Commission rapprochement with the activities of these IOs following its renewed ambition to become a global player in the post-Maastricht era; c) and, the growing number of development accords and partnerships struck between the European Commission and the stated IOs in recent years. Hence, the chapter suggests that the shift in EU development policy appears to results from the European Commission’s ‘learning’ of new norms and ideas that the aforementioned IOs previously promoted in the field of international development. Therefore, the chapter openly challenges the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims that the EU recurrently makes regarding its development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

The next section and subsections present a detailed examination of the large norms characterising the four major new policy pillars introduced by Lomé Convention IV – Structural Adjustment, Human Rights, the Environment, and Political Dimension – following the proposed framework of analysis. A final section discusses the results of the empirical examination of the character of EU development policy in the period between 1989 and 2000, in light of the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims that the Union recurrently professes regarding its policy of development cooperation towards Africa.


In accordance with the guidelines of the Lomé Convention of 28 February 1975, the development promotion accord between the ACP states and the EU was to be renewed every five years. Both parties agreed and signed its fourth mandate on 15 December 1989. In contrast with its two previous revisions, Lomé Convention IV introduced new changes to the EU policy of development
cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. Those changes started from the conclusion of the agreement for an unprecedented period of ten years, while still including a mid-term review scheduled for 1995. Furthermore, and in regards to the rulings of the treaty, Lomé Convention IV fomented a shift in the general orientation of EU development policy that translated in the introduction of new policy directives that centred on the concepts of Structural Adjustment, Human Rights, the Environment, and Political Dimension.

The four new policy pillars of Lomé Convention IV represented a shift in EU development policy towards Africa. Hence, the following subsections concentrate on what, how, and who may have caused the shift, following Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist framework of analysis. Each subsection corresponds to a policy pillar of Lomé Convention IV, and reproduces an identical theoretical and empirical exercise. Therein, the analysis incorporates the European Commission in the structure of international development comprehensive of the role performed by its comprising agents – the WB, the IMF, the UN (through its numerous agencies), the OECD, and the WTO. Its aim is to comprehend the process of EU development policy design. Central to the analysis is the apprehension of the way in which certain norms and ideas may have permeated the process of EU development policy design in time, and therefore, reconstituted EU interests and preferences in its development cooperation with Africa. Thus, the analysis attempts to understand the cause and origin of the EU development policy shift during the proposed timeframe, and test the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ EU claims regarding its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

1.1 Structural Adjustment

Lomé Convention IV introduced Structural Adjustment Support (SAS) as a new economic development mechanism in the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation. The Union presented the SAS initiative as an innovative instrument in the promotion of development in Africa that would transform the future of the region. Nevertheless, the WB and the IMF were already implementing their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) across Africa by then in an attempt to revert the impact of the 1980s debt crisis that had swept through the entire continent. Contrary to the EU claim regarding the significance of its SAS in the promotion of development in Africa, the argument advanced in the ensuing subsection is two-fold. Firstly, it demonstrates that structural adjustment was an original creation by the WB and the IMF. Secondly, it explains how it was the WB and the IMF structural adjustment model that stood as a reference in the EU inclusion of
structural adjustment planning as part of its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. At that time, structural adjustment progressed to integrate the normative basis of the structure of international development, in which the WB and the IMF stood as the norm architects and diffusers therein. Then, and through a process of increasingly close cooperation between the EU and the WB and the IMF on the issue of structural adjustment, the Union ‘learnt’ this new development norm, which subsequently it incorporated into its development policy towards Africa.

Throughout the late 1980s, the European Commission gathered momentum for the inclusion of structural adjustment guidelines in the EU framework for development cooperation with Africa. The European Commission maintained that “support for structural adjustment is undoubtedly the most striking innovation of Lomé IV”. The endorsement of structural adjustment policies in its partnership with Africa aimed to implement crucial economic reforms with the objective to reduce the debt burden that was then increasingly weighing down many states in the continent and in the ACP region at large. Through reinvigorated financial support, the European Commission advanced the SAS initiative as a concerted attempt to introduce a set of specific economic reforms necessary to stimulate African and ACP economies and foster their future development, as stipulated by Articles 243-250 of Lomé Convention IV. Accordingly, both the European Commission and the ACP states agreed on the “need for urgent action”, insofar as “short and medium-term policies must reinforce the long-term development efforts and goals” of the partnership, with the adoption of SAS programmes as the most viable solution for that purpose (Article 243 - Lomé Convention IV). The goal of the initiative was to provide ACP states with means to stimulate economic growth, generate employment, improve the management of the public sector, create incentives for the private sector, diversify the economy, and improve the balance of payments and foreign exchange performance, meanwhile ensuring it remained “economically viable and socially and politically bearable” (Article 243 - Lomé Convention IV).

Therefore, the SAS scheme emerged as a collection of sectoral and macro-economic profound reforms (Article 246 - Lomé Convention IV) with the objective to generate development. The particularity of the initiative concentrated on the fact that it was now “the ACP States [who had to] bear the primary responsibility for the analysis of the problems to be solved and the preparation of the reform programmes” (Article 244 - Lomé Convention IV). By conferring the ACP countries a seemingly central role in the SAS procedure, the Union committed itself to the provision of financial

317 The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’, Special Issue, Nr. 120, March-April 1990
assistance in the form of grants (Article 245 - Lomé Convention IV) conceding particular attention
to the least-developed ACP states (Article 246 - Lomé Convention IV). However, the eligibility of a
SAS programme remained dependent on the scope, effectiveness, and impact of the proposed
reforms in accordance with the assessment analysis of the EU. The exception to the rule appeared in
the form of the programmes acknowledged and supported by the principle multilateral donors (the
WB and the IMF), which were to be accepted as “having automatically satisfied the requirements for
adjustment assistance” (Article 246 - Lomé Convention IV).

Despite the direct reference to the WB and the IMF as the ‘gatekeepers’ of structural
adjustment in the text of Lomé Convention IV, the Union still maintained that its SAS initiative was
an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development. The European
Commission advanced that “it was the first time, in such a sensitive, perhaps even controversial,
matter, specific provisions laying down objectives, guidelines and implementation methods for
adjustment support had been freely negotiated between the developing countries and their external
partners”.318 Thereby, it argued that “with its role as a major player in the economic adjustment
process acknowledged, the Commission concentrated on developing its expertise by focusing its
efforts on the factors regarded as essential in the light of the Convention”.319 Similarly, Manuel
Marin claimed that it was “the first time there has been a ‘North-South Agreement’ on the
philosophy underlying structural adjustment”. Thus, the European Commission and some of its
officials advanced Lomé Convention IV as particularly distinct in the subject of structural
adjustment in the domain of international development.320

Nevertheless, structural adjustment was integral to the normative basis of the structure of
international development since the late 1970s. The WB devised a viable plan for the economic
ailing affecting developing countries at the time that centred on the structural reform of their
economies. In 1979, the WB introduced the Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) and Sectoral
Adjustment Lending (SECAL) schemes.321 These programmes emerged as technical instruments
created “to help countries experiencing difficulties in adapting to external shocks, while

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318 European Commission, ‘Community Support for Structural Adjustment in the ACP Countries: Towards the
Consolidation and Strengthening if a Realistic and Concerted Approach’, Communication from the Commission, COM
(94) 447 final, 27 October 1994, pp. 3
319 European Commission, ‘Community Support for Structural Adjustment in the ACP Countries: Towards the
Consolidation and Strengthening if a Realistic and Concerted Approach’, pp.4
320 Marin, Manuel, ‘The Convention is of Paramount Political Importance for the Community’, The Courier, No. 120,
March-April 1990, pp. 9
321 The introduction of structural adjustment in the WB policy orientation featured first in the institution’s annual report
of 1980. In the report’s Chapter 4 (pp. 67) – “Bank Policies and Activities, Fiscal 1980” - it clearly states the objectives
of the SAL and SECAL procedures, as well as the details of its technical application on the ground. World Bank,
implementing appropriate policy and institutional reforms aimed at making the economy more flexible, and strengthening its capacity for adjusting relatively more efficiently and easily to future shocks”.322 The objective of these programmes was “to provide quick disbursing finance to support measures designed to strengthen recipient countries balance of payments within five to ten years without severely constraining demand in a manner that unnecessarily sets back economic and social development”.323 As sub-Saharan Africa was undergoing a period of serious financial crisis caused by a growing external indebtedness, it gradually became the region of central focus for the WB’s SAL and SECAL projects of economic reform.324 Through an outward-oriented development strategy based on export expansion, WB reforms aimed at eliminating a country’s balance of payments and debt problems within a pre-established timeframe. The WB’s innovative approach to development rested upon the principle that countries should move away from self-directed models of national development that focus on the domestic market, and instead, move towards the direction of outward-looking development models that lead to its complete integration into the global structures of trade, finance, and production.325

A typical adjustment package in a given country consisted of measures such as removal of import quotas, tariff reductions, budget reform, interest rate policy reform, revision of agricultural prices, reduction of the powers of state marketing boards, reduction or elimination of some agricultural input subsidies, revision of industry incentive systems, and strengthening capacity to formulate and implement public investment programmes.326 The WB stressed that it did not aim to impose a standard package of policy reforms on all recipients, but instead, to adjust each programme to the socio-economic conditions of each country. In practice, its objectives failed to materialise because the WB’s conditions rested upon a fixed standard mix of market-oriented policies geared at reducing state control over the economy.

By 1980, and following an IMF Interim Committee internal agreement, the WB acquired a new partner in the IMF that acted for the promotion of its newly launched programmes of structural

323 Landell-Mills, Peter, ‘Structural Adjustment Lending: Early Experience’, Finance and Development (International Monetary Fund), January 18, 1981, pp. 18
324 The supporting WB policy focus on sub-Saharan Africa drew inspiration from the commonly known Berg Report (Elliot Berg was the coordinator of the African Strategy Review Group that produced the study). The paper centred on the promotion of an efficient use of scarce resources – human and capital, managerial and technical, domestic and foreign – as an essential means for the improvement of the economic conditions in most sub-Saharan African countries; World Bank, “Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action”, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981)
adjustment reforms in the developing world. The WB and IMF partnership retained control over the structural adjustment process throughout the 1980s. As the decade unfolded, and the WB and the IMF assumed their leadership in the promotion of structural adjustment as a new paradigm in international development, both IOs started to develop particular synergies with other international actors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The formalisation of the interrelation between the UNDP and the Bretton Woods institutions occurred in 1986, when both parties launched the Africa Project Development Facility, which also benefited from the participation of the African Development Bank. The partnership became representative of the evolutionary character of structural adjustment policies at the time, and promoted a focus on the alleviation of the social impact of structural adjustment on the economies of developing countries.

Accordingly, the WB and the IMF became the established architects of a new paradigm in international development in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The inclusion of structural adjustment as a new norm in the structure of international development caused a significant impact in the development models that were promoted across the developing world thereafter, noting that structural adjustment forms one the pillars of the discourse and practice of international development still today. An interviewed WB official shared the same impression when asked about the role of the WB in the design of structural adjustment as a new paradigm in international development, noting:

“The World Bank has made a strong impact by provoking a different discourse to emerge when it came to structural adjustment. We came to realise that development is not just about money. It seems to be more of a battle of ideas. So we continue to put emphasis on that.”

The WB official supported the argument that the WB established itself as a norm-setter concerning the subject of structural adjustment in international development. In that capacity, the WB subsequently expanded its structural adjustment programmes to most developing regions across the

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331 Interview, World Bank, Brussels, 11 March 2008
world, where Africa remained of central focus.\(^{332}\) As the WB evolved into the leading lending international development institution by volume, structural adjustment progressed into not only a fundamental aspect of its supported programmes, but also a primary paradigm of international development discourse and practice.\(^{333}\)

Concomitantly, the European Commission launched a discussion on the economic crisis in Africa in the mid-to-late 1980s. The discussion’s basis was the assessment of EU development policy towards Africa, and the European Commission’s ambition to rally for a capable reaction from the international community to the crisis in the continent. The European Commission’s self-assessment procedure illustrated its intent to reform the EU approach to development cooperation with Africa. Therein, it began to establish a close cooperation with some of the leading actors in international development, such as the WB and the IMF. As a result, the structural adjustment concept that characterised the normative basis of international development gradually permeated the process of EU development policy design and caused it to change accordingly.

In a memorandum from 1 April 1986, the European Commission expressed concern regarding the economic and social conjuncture in sub-Saharan Africa calling for a conformed and rigorous response to the crisis from the international community.\(^{334}\) Furthermore, later in the same year it called for a “concerted approach by the international community and Africa to help the latter emerge from its difficulties and guide it towards a more self-reliant pattern of development”.\(^{335}\) As the European Commission campaigned for a determined reaction from the international community to the African crisis, it equally considered a revision of its development policy regarding Africa. Therein, it acknowledged some of the practical limitations of Lomé Convention III. With a view to address the identified limitations of EU development policy, the European Commission argued that “the first prerequisites for the revival of the African economies are the reforms of national macroeconomic and sectoral policies and a change in methods of political and administrative


\(^{333}\) A study produced by the OECD in 1988 confirmed this leading position attained by the WB and the IMF in the promotion of structural adjustment reforms across the developing world, with particular relevance in the sub-Saharan African region; OECD, “Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee”, 1988 Report, (Paris: OECD, 1988)

\(^{334}\) European Commission, ‘Memorandum - Towards a Community Position on Trade and Raw Materials, Financing and Debt and the Adjustment of Aid Systems’, MEMO/86/40, 01 April 1986

\(^{335}\) European Commission, ‘Development Problems in Africa: Medium and Long-Term View’, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (86) 179 final, 10 April 1986, pp. 1
management”. Thereby, it alluded to structural adjustment as a potential instrument for the reformation of the EU approach to development promotion in Africa.

Subsequently, Dieter Frisch, the then European Commission Director-General of DG VIII (Development), and his colleague at DG VIII Jean-Claude Boidin, proposed a development agenda for the EU based on the principles of structural adjustment as the most adequate means to stimulate development in Africa. Both officials noted that “adjustment has become the daily bread of the vast majority of the countries of Africa and a sine qua non of their dialogue with the outside world”, and thus structural adjustment posed the most suitable answer to the African crisis and to the future EU policy of development cooperation with the continent. Accordingly, Dieter Frisch and Jean-Claude Boidin confirmed that structural adjustment was an already existing concept in the domain of international development that could assist the EU in its development cooperation with Africa, and promote the sustainable development of the region. Nevertheless, the two European Commission officials alerted for the necessity to refine the existing orthodox models of structural adjustment put in place by the WB and the IMF, which in their opinion were not delivering on its proposed results due to their lack of pragmatism and failure to adapt to each individual country.

Mirroring the position sustained by Dieter Frisch and Jean-Claude Bodin on the matter, the Council of the European Communities confirmed in a resolution of 31 May 1988 the EU endorsement of structural adjustment as part of its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Structural adjustment integrated EU development policy at the time, and was regarded as the most adequate means to address the identified limitations of Lomé Convention III and assist Africa to overcome its economic crisis. Furthermore, the Council expressed the importance for the Union to follow a more pragmatic approach to structural adjustment than that undertaken by other international agents. It suggested the EU implemented a version of structural adjustment that paid “due respect to economic policy options and [took] account of the peculiarities and constraints of each country”. Correspondingly, it argued that the EU approach to structural adjustment had “to take into account the social dimension, particularly in order to reduce any negative effects it may

336 European Commission, ‘Development Problems in Africa: Medium and Long-Term View’, pp. 10
have on the most vulnerable sections of the population, and to promote simultaneously the objectives of economic growth and social justice”. Hence, the European Commission confirmed the origin of the concept of structural adjustment as external to the Union, and attempted to confer it a more socially progressive character than the structural adjustment approach of other international agents.

Nevertheless, the European Commission confirmed the WB and the IMF as central references in the adoption of structural adjustment as part of its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. The closing lines of the aforementioned Council of the European Communities resolution of 31 May 1988 emphasised “the need for effective coordination between the Community on the one hand and the World Bank and the IMF, which play a de facto leading role in the dialogue on structural adjustment, on the other”. The statement from the Council illustrated the EU position vis-à-vis the WB and the IMF concerning structural adjustment. It confirmed the European Commission acknowledgement of the two IOs as the ‘gatekeepers’ of structural adjustment in the discourse and practice of international development. Furthermore, and on a press release from 20 June 1988, the European Commission conveyed an identical view on the EU’s position on structural adjustment in the domain of international development. Therein, it stated that “it has no intention of proposing a separate approach alongside that of the World Bank and the IMF. It intends rather to represent to those institutions its own understanding of structural adjustment so that the two approaches may converge and ensure a viable, sustainable, and socially bearable restructuring of African economies”. Therefore, the European Commission confirmed that the WB and the IMF were the designers of the structural adjustment concept in the domain of international development. Additionally, it illustrated that the two IOs remained the ‘gatekeepers’ of structural adjustment in the discourse and practice of international development, with whom the European Commission aimed to cooperate in the promotion of structural economic reform in Africa.

A new Council of the European Communities resolution of 16 May 1989, reiterated the EU endorsement of structural adjustment as part of its policy of development cooperation towards

542 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Response of the European Community to Indebtedness and Structural Adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’ DOC/88/6, 20 June 1988
543 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Response of the European Community to Indebtedness and Structural Adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’
Africa, and the WB and the IMF as its central reference therein.\textsuperscript{345} It stated that the adoption of structural adjustment as part of EU development policy had to “give practical effect to coordination at the level of both the Community and the other donors, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions”.\textsuperscript{346} Additionally, it confirmed the European Commission ambition to endorse a socially progressive approach to structural adjustment, yet it stressed that “this [does] not mean opening paths parallel to those followed by the World Bank or the IMF”.\textsuperscript{347} Hence, the European Commission accepted the leadership of the WB and the IMF on the subject of structural adjustment, and confirmed the two IOs as its central reference in the inclusion of structural adjustment in EU development policy.

However, the incorporation of structural adjustment in EU development policy was not without practical constraints. As suggested by an interviewed former European Commission official:

“At that time, the Commission realised that it didn’t have the required personnel or the necessary capacity to implement its own structural adjustment programmes. So what Bernard Petit [then the Director General of the Directorate General (DG) for Development] did was to strike a very close relationship with the World Bank and the IMF. Bernard Petit and DG Development held regular meetings with the World Bank and the IMF, and he managed to find a way to send some of his staff to Washington for some time to get the required training and expertise to help the Community with structural adjustment”.\textsuperscript{348}

As the interviewee noted, the European Commission lacked adequately qualified personnel, experience, and skills to support its structural adjustment agenda. Thus, the European Commission saw no alternative but to reinforce its close alliance on the matter with both the WB and the IMF. As a result, the model of structural adjustment that integrated the EU policy of development cooperation was in the end identical in character to that of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Correspondingly, a European Commission progress report on the EU’s involvement in the structural adjustment process in the ACP States of 1991 suggested that “cooperation with the IMF and the WB, the prime movers in this field, is imperative. As a result, relations between the Commission and the World Bank in particular may be described as exemplary. In this way the World


\textsuperscript{346} Council of the European Communities, ‘Resolution of 16 May 1989 on Coordination in Support of Structural Adjustment’, Council of the European Communities, pp. 56

\textsuperscript{347} Council of the European Communities, ‘Resolution of 16 May 1989 on Coordination in Support of Structural Adjustment’, Council of the European Communities, pp. 57

\textsuperscript{348} Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 11 February 2010
Bank involved the Commission more closely in the formulation of economic policy in addition to sectoral policy”. Therefore, the inclusion of structural adjustment as a policy pillar of EU development policy under Lomé Convention IV confirmed the WB and the IMF as central policy references for the European Commission. The European Commission recognised the leadership of the two IOs on the matter, and sought to establish a close relationship with them in the implementation of structural adjustment as part of EU development policy towards Africa.

Therefore, the process of integration of structural adjustment as a new paradigm at the centre of Lomé Convention IV materialised through a growing rapport between the Union and the Washington-based institutions throughout the 1980s. At the time, the WB and the IMF had already established themselves as the architects of structural adjustment as a new norm in the structure of international development, and progressively diffused it therein. As an inclusive actor of the structure of international development, the EU ‘learnt’ this new norm from the WB and the IMF as it developed an increasingly closer relationship with them on a variety of economic issues. Thereby, the norm of structural adjustment permeated the EU process of development policy design, which caused it to change in time accordingly. Dieter Frisch, an interviewee who was the European Commission Director-General of DG VIII (Development) between 1982 and 1993, shared a similar stance on the relation between the EU and the WB and the IMF on the issue of structural adjustment:

“When it came to structural adjustment it is true that we accepted that we needed to take on structural adjustment as part of our development policy towards Africa. But we wanted to minimise the impact it had created. I once said something at a Council of Ministers meeting that became a good summary of how the EU came to deal with structural adjustment, and that is that structural adjustment should be not only economically and financially effective but also socially and politically bearable. So it is true that we have taken the concept of structural adjustment from the Bretton Woods institutions, but then we tried to adapt it in light of what we had observed as the negative elements of it.”

Similarly, an interviewed European Commission official noted:

“In the late 1980s and early 1990s, policy coordination and cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF intensified. And it was the World Bank and the IMF who made the basis of the structural adjustment model. The IMF put out some macroeconomic indicators, and the World Bank went into policy indicators. Then we took that model on ‘lock, stock, and

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350 Interview – Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 12 March 2009
barrel’. So there is no doubt that the World Bank and the IMF were the leaders in this model of development”.

As suggested by the two interviewees, the incorporation of structural adjustment as a policy pillar of Lomé Convention IV followed the WB and IMF’s leadership on the matter in international development. The European Commission was derivative in the taking up of structural adjustment as part of its policy of development cooperation towards Africa, and had the WB and the IMF as its main references therein. Central in the inclusion of structural adjustment in EU development policy were the increasingly close relations between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF. They created a channel through which the European Commission ‘learnt’ new development norms from the WB and the IMF, which it integrated subsequently in its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

The European Commission initiated an open dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions in the late 1980s, which established a channel for the diffusion of structural adjustment into the EU process of development policy design. The first significant official episode took place at the G-7 Venice Summit of 1987, when the European Commission endorsed a joint WB and IMF proposal for highly indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Following their economic policies of the time, the WB and the IMF devised the Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) to support highly indebted sub-Saharan African countries to improve their balance of payments and foreign exchange shortages through broad macro-economic and structural adjustment procedures. The programme was open to all interested donors, and the European Commission promptly became a member of the SPA multi-donor team. Thus, the European Commission and the Council joined forces to make an EU contribution of ECU 60 Million to the SPA project in 1987. By doing so, the European Commission extended EU development cooperation with Africa beyond the realm of the Lomé Convention, and integrated it in the structure of international development. Structural adjustment was the central focus of the SPA initiative, which opened a channel of policy

351 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 26 February 2010
353 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘The Commission Proposes a Special Programme of 100 Million ECU in Favour of the Poor and Heavily Indebted Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa’, P/87/59, 10 September 1987
cooperation between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF on the subject of structural adjustment.

Concomitantly, both the WB and the IMF endorsed a strategic approach towards all other actors in the field of international development, whereby they diffused the concept of structural adjustment as the most adequate means to stimulate development worldwide. They began to draw comprehensive agreements with most international development actors on numerous economic issues, including structural adjustment programmes. The Bretton Woods institutions’ dynamic action plan bore rapid practical results. It brought the policy of all major actors in the domain of international development in coordination and alignment with theirs, including the European Commission. As a result, the WB and the IMF confirmed their position as the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of structural adjustment in the domain of international development. Furthermore, and through the establishing of increasingly close relations, the Bretton Woods institutions diffused and ‘taught’ the structural adjustment norm to other international development actors.

Correspondingly, the European Commission confirmed in a communication from 1993, that “coordination at the international level is particularly important in the field of structural adjustment, which is more and more becoming a key factor to be taken into account in all donor interventions in the developing countries. In this respect, more systemic alignment with the decision-making bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions is more necessary than ever. The time has now come, in particular, to organise regular coordination meetings between the European Executive Directors in the IMF and of the World Bank whenever the Boards of these institutions are due to discuss long term strategy or adjustment programmes for given countries”. Hence, the process that led to the inclusion of structural adjustment in EU development policy towards Africa evolved in direct relation with the role of the WB and the IMF as the diffusers of the structural adjustment norm in the domain of international development. An interviewed European Commission official advanced an analogous understanding of the subject, and noted:

“The inspiration for our structural adjustment came from the World Bank and the IMF. Once could say that maybe we tried to make our own assessment too at the time, but there is no doubt that the World Bank and the IMF were the two main references for us in the integration of our structural adjustment programmes in the framework of Lomé IV”.

357 European Commission, ‘Parliament on Procedures for Coordination Between the Community and its Member States at Policy and Operational Levels’, pp. 10
358 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 2010
Thus, and as corroborated by the interviewee, the WB and the IMF were the architects of the structural adjustment paradigm in the dominion of international development and remained its ‘gatekeepers’. Therein, they diffused the norm into other comprising actors such as the European Commission, which took the Bretton Woods institutions as direct references in the incorporation of structural adjustment in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa.

Following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, the European Commission maintained close relations with the WB and the IMF on the subject of structural adjustment. At the centre of the relationship between the European Commission and the Bretton Woods institutions was the increasing policy alignment concerning structural adjustment, which was reinforced in 1996 when the two parties launched a programme of enhanced economic collaboration in sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of the agreement was to stimulate development across Africa based on the promotion of structural reform of the targeted economies. In support of its strong cooperative links with the Bretton Woods on the subject of structural adjustment, the European Commission produced two communications. They reinforced the European Commission commitment to align and coordinate its structural adjustment programmes with those implemented by the WB and the IMF. Therefore, the relationship between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF on the issue of structural adjustment remained close during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV. The parties launched a joint economic development programme, and the European Commission displayed intent to cooperate with the Bretton Woods institutions on the matter of structural adjustment.

In this manner, structural adjustment progressed gradually into one of the large norms that characterised EU development policy towards Africa under Lomé Convention IV. The process that led to the inclusion of structural adjustment as part of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa evolved in direct relation with the structure of international development, specifically with the role

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359 The joint European Commission and WB initiative was launched in 1996, and was reinforced subsequently in 1997 at a two day-seminar in Brussels, where two high level teams from each institution met under the leadership of the European Commissioner for Development and External Relations with ACP countries, João de Deus Pinheiro, and the World Bank Regional Vice-President for Africa, Jean-Louis Sarbib, respectively; Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘World Bank / Commission Partnership Delivers Results’, IP/96/1033, 19 November 1996; Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘European Commission and World Bank Co-operation in Africa Moves into a Higher Gear’, IP/97/153, 25 February 1997

of the WB and the IMF therein. An interviewed European Parliament Delegate to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly advanced an analogous opinion on the subject:

“It seems fair to say that structural adjustment in Lomé IV followed the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF. They created that approach to development and then in the end the EU took that idea from them and attached it to Lomé IV. After that the EU also kept a good level of cooperation with them”.

The interviewee confirmed the importance of the link between the European Commission and the Bretton Woods institutions in the inclusion of structural adjustment in EU development policy. Correspondingly, Manuel Marin, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, shared a similar understanding regarding the evolution of structural adjustment as part of EU development policy. He alluded to a dynamic process between the European Commission and the Bretton Woods institutions, whereby the incorporation of structural adjustment in EU development policy at the end of the 1980s “confirmed the international trend of the time and was a logical development of our cooperation”. Thus, the inclusion of structural adjustment in EU development policy towards Africa followed a process whereby the increasing rapprochement between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF established a channel for the diffusion of the structural adjustment norm to the European Commission. Subsequently, the European Commission incorporated the norm in its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

Following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, EU development policy integrated structural adjustment as integral to its partnership of development cooperation with Africa. The analysis demonstrated that its incorporation in EU development policy towards Africa evolved in direct relation with the structure of international development, specifically the role of the WB and the IMF therein. The European Commission initiated a collaboration process with the stated IOs, which allowed the structural adjustment norm to be diffused from the Bretton Woods institutions to the European Commission. As a result, the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norm and integrated it in EU development policy towards Africa. Therefore, the analysis challenges the EU claims concerning the innovative and distinctive character of its structural adjustment approach to development promotion in Africa, and illustrates that it is neither ‘unique’ nor plays a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development.

361 Interview, European Parliament, Brussels, 05 June 2006
1.2 Human Rights

The integration of human rights clauses in EU development policy towards Africa under the guidelines of Lomé Convention IV followed a similar pattern to that of structural adjustment planning. The Union advanced human rights as not only a novel dimension of its policy of development cooperation regarding Africa but also as an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development. However, the concept of human rights pertained to the normative basis of international development prior to the signing of Lomé Convention IV following the lead taken on the matter by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Hence, the following subsection illustrates how the link between human rights and development originated in the UNGA’s discourse on international development. Subsequently, it demonstrates how the UNGA model of human rights and development may have served as a reference for the European Commission in the inclusion of the human rights norm in its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. In the years prior to the signing of Lomé Convention IV, the EU and the UN were stepping up their coordination on a number of issues. The ensuing subsection suggests that the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ this new development norm from the UNGA initiative on human rights, and then incorporated it in its development policy towards Africa.

The disposition of human rights at the centre of the Lomé Convention IV conferred a new dimension to the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation, which extended the Union’s concept of development beyond the promotion of economic growth. From the same premise, the European Commission advanced, in the words of Manuel Marin, that Lomé Convention IV established a novel model for international development, where “human rights and respect for human dignity feature at the centre of the body of the Convention”.363 To conceptualise the EU’s policy change, the analysis suggests that the structure of international development and its comprising agents are the causal variables. It argues that the relation between human rights and development was part of the normative basis of international development prior to its inclusion in Lomé Convention IV. The UN stands as the international bastion in the protection and promotion of human rights since its foundation in 1945. Therein, in the late 1960s UNGA produced an official declaration that linked human rights and development. Subsequent to the UNGA initiative, human rights and development incorporated into the normative structure of international development, which progressively affected the policy orientation of all its major actors, including that of the

European Commission. The juxtaposition of how human rights and development evolved as a norm in the structure of international development, vis-à-vis its integration in EU development policy regarding Africa, illustrates the existence of a synergy in their progress, which culminated with the integration of human rights in EU development policy towards Africa.

The subject of human rights in international affairs evolved in close relation with the foundation of the UN in 1945. Since then, the UN created a global structure for the protection of human rights based largely on its Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the main UN covenants on human rights. Concomitantly, the need for reconstruction in the aftermath of the Second World War produced the concept of development in international politics, urging the international community to promote the development of greater quality of life for all human beings. Following the 1960s decolonisation period, the notions of human rights and development openly merged and progressively entered the discourse of international development.

The UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development of 1969 marked the major turning point in the promotion of the direct link between human rights and development at the international level. The EU made the same connection in its policy of development cooperation concerning Africa following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV in 1989. Accordingly, the issue of human rights featured as an innovation in the text of Lomé Convention IV with its first reference appearing in the agreement’s preamble. With the Charter of the UN as its first reference, the accord endorsed “faith in fundamental human rights, in all aspects of human dignity and in the worth of the human person, as the central agent and beneficiary of development, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations, large and small” (Preamble, Lomé Convention IV). Subsequently, the treaty confirmed its adherence to more specific international legislative human rights structures, specifically

364 The main UN human rights covenants are: Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The UN system of human rights protection has three main components: first, it establishes international standards through its Charter, legally binding treaties, non-binding declarations, agreements, and documents; second, it mandates special rapporteurs and experts, and groups, such as working groups, committees and treaty bodies, to work in various manners for the promotion and protection of human rights; finally, it offers technical assistance through the Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance in the field of Human Rights. The UN human rights bodies are as follows: a) Charter-based: Human Rights Council (previously Commission on Human Rights), Universal Periodic Review, and Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council; b) Treaty-based: Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Committee against Torture, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on Migrant Workers, and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Normand, Roger & Zaidi, Sarah, “Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice”, United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007)

365 United Nations, ‘Declaration on Social Progress and Development’, General Assembly Resolution 2542 (XXIV), 1969
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Additionally, it called on the “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights as positive regional contributions to the respect of human rights in the Community and in the ACP States” (Preamble, Lomé Convention IV).

In this manner, the preamble of Lomé Convention IV alluded to the UN and its human rights system as a first reference in the EU inclusion of human rights in its development policy towards Africa. From the introduction of the agreement’s general policy guidelines in the preamble, the accord comprehensively stipulated in its Article 5 how the concept of human rights integrated the functioning of EU development policy. It established that “cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights” (Article 5.1 – Lomé Convention IV). With man as a pivotal point, Lomé Convention IV called on the need to “abolish the obstacles preventing individuals and peoples from actually enjoying to the full their economic, social and cultural rights” suggesting that “this must be achieved through the development which is essential to their dignity, their well-being and their self-fulfilment” (Article 5.2 – Lomé Convention IV). For that purpose, the treaty maintained that EU development policy should be implemented inclusive of the objective “to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on ethnic group, origin, race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion, or any other situation” (Article 5.2 – Lomé Convention IV).

Complementary to the general provisions on human rights introduced by Lomé Convention IV, the treatment of certain groups of nationals from both the EU and the ACP states was focus of particular attention in the treaty. Migrant workers, students, and other foreign nationals were granted protection from any form of “discrimination on the basis of racial, religious, cultural or social differences, notably in respect of housing, education, health care, other social services and employment” (Article 5.2 – Lomé Convention IV). Furthermore, the stated special recommendations received additional consideration in the annexes of the convention. Annex IV covered the parties’ determination to contribute to the eradication of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and Annexes V and VI safeguarded further the rights of students, migrant workers, and other foreign nationals when under the jurisdiction of any of the comprising parties.
Despite the novel aspect of human rights concerns as part of Lomé Convention IV, the association between development and human rights was an increasingly prominent feature of the discourse of international development since the late 1960s. Considering that the concepts of human rights and development were arguably indissociable from a philosophical point of view, the UN global structure for the protection of human rights emerged as the first reference in the promotion of a greater quality of life for all human beings worldwide. UNGA relied on the Charter of the UN, the UDHR, and the main UN human rights covenants as a basis, and soon assumed leadership in the discussion of the link between human rights and development at the international level. As a result, UNGA became the architect the human rights and development norm in international development, which affected its discourse and practice thereafter. The Declaration on Social Progress and Development of 1969 and the Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 emerged as the two landmark UNGA initiatives on the issue in the domain of international development and provided evidence of its role as a norm-maker therein.

The precise connection between human rights and development emerged from an evolutionary enterprise undertaken by UNGA. The Charter of the UN, the UDHR, and the main UN human rights covenants laid the first stone of the edifice of international legislation on human rights providing a solid platform for the promotion of more specific human rights in the future.\textsuperscript{366} From that basis, UNGA produced the ‘UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development’ in 1969, which officially bound the concepts of human rights and development for the first time.\textsuperscript{367} The central tenet of the declaration lay on the principle that “social progress and development shall be founded on respect for the dignity and value of the human person, and shall ensure the promotion of rights and social justice” (Article 2 – Declaration on Social Progress and Development). Therefore, it required “the recognition and effective implementation of civil and political rights as well as of economic, social and cultural rights without any discrimination” (Article 2.b – Declaration on Social Progress and Development). Moreover, it stipulated that “social progress and development require the full utilization of human resources, including, in particular: the active participation of all elements of society, individually or through associations, in defining and in achieving the common goals of development” (Article 5.c – Declaration on Social Progress and Development). By connecting social progress and development with the dignity of the human

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\textsuperscript{367} United Nations, ‘Declaration on Social Progress and Development’, General Assembly Resolution 2542 (XXIV), 1969
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person, the UNGA declaration of 1969 became a milestone in the reconciliation of the concepts of human rights and development.

The UNGA declaration of 1969 gathered increasing consensus within the broad structures of the UN at large, and paved the way to its following major initiative on the subject almost two decades later.\textsuperscript{368} Accordingly, the 1986 ‘UN Declaration on the Right to Development’ (UNDRD) became an international breakthrough on the indivisibility of the principles of human rights and development. Central to the declaration was the notion that “the right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised” (Article 1 – UNDRD). Furthermore, the declaration stipulated that “the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development” (Article 2.1 – UNDRD). The UNDRD provides evidence that UNGA reinforced the conception of development as an inalienable human right, which it established as an increasingly prominent norm in the discourse of international development.

The UNGA initiatives of 1969 and 1986 on the connection between human rights and development had an impact, not only on the discourse of international development, but also, on the UN system as a whole. Still under the leadership of UNGA, the UN launched the ‘Fourth UN Development Decade’ in 1991 setting a dynamic platform for the continuing promotion of development and human rights at the international level.\textsuperscript{369} Therein, UNGA’s major achievement was the UN organisation of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria on 25 June 1993.\textsuperscript{370} The conference addressed the broad subject of human rights following the end of the Cold War, where the interdependence of human rights and development featured prominently on the conference’s agenda. It produced the ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’, which “reaffirms the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights” (Part I (10) - Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action). The inclusion of the above statement in the final declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 strengthened the UN framework of

human rights and development, and also the human rights and development norm as a pillar of the discourse of international development.

Since its inception in 1945, the UN maintained its position as the international guardian of human rights. UNGA took the UN Charter, the UDHR, and the main UN human rights covenants as a broad foundation, and constructed a comprehensive universal framework for the promotion and protection of the interdependence of the concepts of human rights and development. Therein, it initiated a long road in the establishment of the connection between human rights and development with the first international breakthrough materialising in a 1969 declaration. A 1986 declaration marked the second milestone in the stated process, which culminated with the inclusion of the link between human rights and development as a central directive of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria. In the span of just over two decades, UNGA established itself as the architect of a new development norm that it diffused progressively in the structure of international development and affected the behaviour of its comprising actors.

Against the described background, the European Commission initiated its discussion on the integration of human rights in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Respect for human rights was one of the keystones of the Union since its foundation in 1957, and it became of central concern for the European Commission in Africa-EU relations since the 1970s. Nevertheless, the integration of human rights as part of EU development policy regarding Africa only materialised in 1989 with the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV. At the time, the human rights and development concept was an integral part of the normative basis of international development following UNGA’s leading role therein. Accordingly, in light of the European Commission endorsement of the UN as the bastion of human rights at the international level, it appears that the UNGA human rights and development model stood as a reference for the European Commission in the incorporation of human rights in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. The European Commission made no reference to the UNGA initiative in the inclusion of human rights in its development policy towards Africa. However, the European Commission became increasingly active in its participation in the workings of UNGA as an observer since 1974, which demonstrates a potential channel for the diffusion and ‘learning’ of a new norm.

Since the its foundation in 1957, the EU endorsed the canons of both the UN Charter and the UDHR as one of its main ideological pillars, which illustrates its commitment to the principles of liberty and democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for the rule of law.
Throughout the process of European integration, every major EU treaty included a reference to either, or both, human rights codes. It demonstrated the Union’s firm standing on the issue as well as its advocacy of the UN as the international ‘gatekeeper’ of human rights. As the EU developed concerns regarding the disrespect for human rights by some of its African partners in the 1970s, it sought to integrate the concept of human rights in its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

The first time that human rights featured in EU development policy was in Lomé Convention III in the early 1980s. It appeared translated into a simple mention to ‘human dignity’ in the preamble of the convention, and a reference to economic, social and cultural rights in its Annex I.371 Departing from the marginal provisions in Lomé Convention III, the Union proceeded with the discussion on the inclusion of human rights in its development policy through a Council statement on human rights and EU external relations. The Council expressed its intent to promote a human rights-oriented external policy for the Union by advancing that “respect for human rights is an important element in relations between third countries and the Europe of Twelve”.372 Whilst not making a direct reference to EU development policy, the Council’s statement kept the discussion that linked human rights and development alive in EU circles, which paved the way for its subsequent integration in Lomé Convention IV.

By the time the negotiations for the renewal of Lomé Convention IV began in Luxembourg on 12 October 1988, the subject of human rights and development featured prominently on the EU agenda.373 The official EU position on the matter at the launching of the negotiations rested on “the importance and scope of the beneficial link between the development effort that places man at the centre of cooperation, and the promotion of human dignity”.374 Referring to the UN Charter, the UDHR, and the main UN human rights covenants, Lomé Convention IV formalised the link between human rights and development as one of the main innovations of the new EU development policy orientation. As previously illustrated, Article 5 and the Annexes IV, V, and VI formed the basis of the new EU approach to its development policy “centred on man, the main

protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights” (Article 5.1 - Lomé Convention IV).

The formal inclusion of human rights as an integral part of Lomé Convention IV transformed the human rights and development norm into an EU policy objective. Nevertheless, Lomé Convention IV did not provide the means to implement the new EU policy in practice. It was only in 1995 following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV (bis) that the EU created the necessary instruments to transform human rights into an objective of EU development policy. The creation of the supporting mechanism for the implementation of EU development policy’s new capacity had as its foundations a declaration and a resolution from the Union of 1991 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992. Subsequently, the European Commission formalised the incorporation of human rights as an integral part of EU development policy towards Africa under the tenets of Lomé Convention IV (bis) of 1995.

The Union’s first step towards the creation of a capable instrument for the implementation of its new approach to human rights and development materialised at the Luxembourg European Council meeting on 28/29 June 1991.375 The resulting ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ maintained that “through their policy of cooperation and by including clauses on human rights in economic cooperation agreements with third countries, the Community and its Member States actively promote human rights and the participation, without discrimination, of all individuals or groups in the life of society, bearing in mind particularly the role of women”.376 The inclusion of the principle of ‘actively promoting’ human rights in economic cooperation agreements with third countries set a distinct tone to the subject of human rights, and in turn, transformed it into a primary aspiration of EU development policy.377

On 28 November of the same year, and in a complementary capacity to the European Council ‘Declaration on Human Rights’, the Council announced its ‘Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy, and Development’.378 The resolution centred on the notion that “the Community and its Member States should have a common approach aimed at promoting human rights and

democracy in developing countries”. The importance of the resolution became twofold. Firstly, it reconfirmed the relationship between human rights and development. Secondly, it comprehensively defined the relationship to include both proactive and reactive measures that together tackle the problems associated with EU development cooperation. The inclusion of proactive and reactive measures at the centre of EU development policy emerged first as a proposal by the Commission on 25 March 1991, appearing in this Council resolution as a new and concerted approach to development cooperation endorsed by the EU.

The introduction of the TEU in 1992 represented the following step in the implementation of human rights as part of EU development policy. The TEU codified for the first time development cooperation into European Community law, which established it as an autonomous policy field with specific objectives. In accordance to the treaty, “Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Title XVIII, Article 130 u (2) – Treaty on European Union). The transformation of EU development policy into a general principle of European Community law with human rights as one of its main goals, confirmed the interdependence of human rights and development in EU development policy, and additionally, it provided a new legal basis for its future implementation in EU development cooperation.

With the TEU’s legal basis, the European Commission acquired the means to implement human rights as part of the EU policy of development cooperation. Whilst the directives of Lomé Convention IV “did not of course give the Community the legal power to intervene in the event of human rights violations” perpetrated by its ACP partners, Lomé Convention IV (bis) of 1995 conferred the Union the capacity to suspend the convention in such eventuality for the first time. Article 5 was its main provision on human rights, and therein, a new amendment emerged in the accord’s final text that advanced “human rights, democratic principles, and the consolidation of the rule of law as essential elements” of EU development policy. Hence, Lomé Convention IV (bis) stipulated that “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpins relations between the ACP States and the Community and all the provisions of the Convention, and

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governs the domestic and international policies of the Contracting Parties, shall constitute an element of this Convention” (Article 5 (1) - Lomé Convention IV 1995). In support to the stated provisions on human rights as part of EU development policy, the Union acquired the capacity to suspend the application of the convention regarding any concerned party if it “failed to fulfil an obligation in respect of one of the essential elements referred to in Article 5” (Article 366a - Lomé Convention IV 1995). This became a major development in the evolution of human rights as part of EU development cooperation, since it allowed it to be implemented through an established legal support mechanism.

Following the creation of a human rights implementation mechanism under Lomé Convention IV (bis), the European Commission sought to extend the same treatment of human rights to the agreements it maintained with all its partners. The first initiative on the matter materialised under a European Commission communication from 23 May 1995 that called for “a commitment to respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles in the European Community’s relations with third countries”. Subsequently, and on 22 November of the same year, the European Commission produced a new communication endorsing the principles of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence between human rights, democracy, and development. Based on the principles endorsed in the stated communications, the European Commission attempted to harmonise further the treatment of human rights in EU external relations further. As a result, it included provisions on human rights in EU development cooperation agreements and accords with all third parties.

As the issue of human rights gained increasing prominence in EU development policy throughout the 1990s, the Commission initiated the preparations of a document on the future of the Lomé Convention. At the time, the most likely scenario was for Africa-EU relations to follow a political turn. Therein, the issue of human rights assumed central stage in the design of the future agreement of Africa-EU development cooperation as it was highlighted in the European Commission’s 1996 green paper on the future of the ACP-EU partnership. The green paper suggested that a vast reform was necessary, and that the Lomé Convention was due to be substituted.

385 European Commission, ‘On the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements Between the Community and Third Countries’, Communication from the Commission, COM (95) 216 final, 23 May 1995, pp. 1
by a distinct development cooperation agreement. Additionally, it confirmed that one of the major innovations of the reformed future accord was to lie at the political level, specifically on the construction of a legal structure for the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

The subject of human rights and development underwent considerable change as part of EU development cooperation in the considered timeframe. From a brief mention under Lomé Convention III, the human rights and development norm progressed into a major pillar of EU development policy at the end of the 1990s. Before the introduction of the new development cooperation agreement that formalised Africa-EU relations, as advanced by the 1996 green paper, the Council produced a statement on its future policy strategy for the region. The Council maintained that “the objective of the Union is to work in partnership with African countries to promote respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance. The aim of this common position is to contribute to the coherence of external Union activities in Africa, including appropriate policy responses.” Thus, the Council confirmed human rights as central to EU external relations, where development policy occupies a prominent position. The Council’s initiative completed the standardisation of the EU treatment of human rights as part of its development policy, and set the ground for a new and distinct partnership between Africa and the EU in following century.

At the turn of the millennium, EU development policy towards Africa incorporated the concept of human rights as one of its main ideological pillars. The integration of human rights in the EU policy of development cooperation followed a complex process that had started sixteen years earlier with the reference to ‘human dignity’ in Lomé Convention III. Whilst an innovation at the EU level, the link between human rights and development was already a feature of the structure of international development since the late 1960s following UNGA’s initiative on the subject. Therein, the European Commission demonstrated its official commitment and full support to the UN in all human rights matters. Furthermore, it increased its active participation in the workings of UNGA.


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since 1974. Therefore, it appears that the European Commission ‘learnt’ the human rights and development norm from UNGA and subsequently endorsed it in its development policy regarding Africa, which challenges the ‘unique’ and leadership’ claims recurrently advanced by the EU regarding its development policy towards Africa.

The identification of UNGA as the precise source of the new human rights norm characterising EU development policy is not openly evident due to the lack of explicitly direct links between UNGA and the European Commission on the issue. However, the combination of UNGA as the identified architect of the human rights and development norm, with the progressively closer relations between the European Commission and UNGA on a variety of issues since 1974, suggests that the UNGA is a potential channel for the EU ‘learning’ of the new norm. As demonstrated above, the European Commission inclusion of the concept of human rights and development in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa materialised in the years following the UNGA initiative, which suggests the existence of a relational pattern in their evolution.

When interviewed, Dieter Frisch lent a similar take on the subject of integration of human rights in the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa.

“I consider that human rights are the ultimate objective of any development policy. With EU development policy, we wanted all human beings to have decent living conditions because human rights and development go hand in hand. In fact, EU development policy became essentially about the promotion of human rights. Now of course we participated in the international debate. Of course we didn’t invent the concept of human rights in development. We took the concept from elsewhere, but because it was so unclearly defined, we introduced it to discussion in the Commission and the Council, and then produced our position on it. After this long period of political neutrality we produced our first paper on human rights and development in 1991 through a resolution from the Council of development ministers, which became a milestone in EU development policy.”\(^{389}\)

Accordingly, the former European Commission Director-General of DG VIII (Development) noted that the concept of human rights and development was not an EU innovation in the field of international development. Instead, it was a norm that pertained to the discourse of international development of the time that permeated progressively into the EU process of development policy design. Subsequently, the EU integrated the norm in its development policy regarding Africa under Lomé Convention IV and created its implementation mechanisms through the Council declaration of 1991.

\(^{389}\) Interview – Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 12 March 2009
Correspondingly, an interviewed European Commission official shared an analogous opinion regarding the incorporation of the human rights and development norm in EU development policy towards Africa, noting that:

“In the issue of human rights, we can say that we were inspired by the UN system. They were the first to make the bridge between human rights and development, and then we did the same. What we also did was to try to be innovative in the way we implemented human rights in our development cooperation with Africa and the other ACP partners, with Lomé IV establishing a good basis for it”.390

Additionally, an interviewed official from the Council of the European Union, stated:

“It is true that we took this idea of human rights and development from external sources. Now it is a fundamental dimension of EU development policy and an extremely important aspect of the development model that we are selling to Africa”.391

The two interviewees confirmed the external origin of the human rights and development norm characterising EU development policy towards Africa under the Lomé Convention IV. They suggested that the European Commission took inspiration from the UN System, and subsequently incorporated it in the EU policy of development cooperation. Additionally, the two officials emphasised the importance of human rights in the development partnership the EU maintains with Africa, and sustained that human rights became a central feature in the development model the Union promotes in Africa.

As demonstrated in the analysis above, the interdependence of human rights and development was integral to the normative basis of international development since the late 1960s following UNGA’s lead on the subject. The EU formal commitment to the UN system of human rights in the opening of its development treaties and agreements, combined with the European Commission active participation in the workings of UNGA since 1974 appear to have established a potential channel whereby the Union ‘learnt’ the human rights and development norm. The formal rapport between the European Commission and the UN dates from 1974, when the European Commission was granted observer status at UNGA.392 Under that capacity, the European Commission guaranteed its participation in all the proceedings of UNGA and most of its comprising agencies. Therein, it established an increasingly close relationship between the two

390 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 2010
391 Interview, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 25 February 2010
Dieter Frisch confirmed the close character of the relationship between the European Commission and UN since the mid-1970s, and suggested that their cooperation had equally extended from policy coordination issues to the European Commission funding of certain UN projects and agencies:

“During my time as Director-General [1982/1993], our relations have become very close to the UN and their agencies. They are huge bureaucracies, like we are becoming, and some comparisons have been made between us. In any case, those relations have become stronger and stronger, and now we even finance a lot of these UN agencies with large sums of money.”

The relationship between the European Commission and UN continued to improve in the 1990s, particularly concerning the issue of human rights, when the EU initiated joint activities with the UN General Assembly Third Committee and the Commission on Human Rights. The levels of cooperation between the European Commission and the stated UN bodies expanded considerably with the European Commission actively participating in the general activities of the Third Committee and the Commission on Human Rights both in Geneva, and in New York.

The human rights and development norm integrated the structure of international development in the late 1960s following the UNGA initiative and lead. The EU endorsed a similar approach to its relations with Africa since the late 1980s. The Lomé Convention IV marked the beginning of a new development policy orientation for the EU, which exposed its broad alignment with UNGA involving human rights and development. The European Commission advanced that “human rights: the basic reference in law is the United Nations with all these rights being considered interdependent and indivisible”. However, the identification of the precise source of the human rights and development norm ‘learnt’ by the European Commission from one of the leading agents of international development is ‘less observable’ in the described case when compared with others.

394 Interview – Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 12 March 2009
On the case of the structural adjustment norm, it became apparent that the source of that norm was the WB and IMF, and that the Bretton Woods institutions ‘taught’ that norm to the European Commission through direct close cooperation on structural adjustment issues. The European Commission’s ‘learning’ process of the human rights and development norm from UNGA appears ‘less observable’ than the ‘learning’ of the structural adjustment norm from the WB and the IMF.

Nevertheless, an identical pattern is still present when analysing the evolution of the human rights and development norm. The analysis illustrated that the human rights and development norm has its origins not in the European Commission but in the normative basis of international development, following UNGA’s lead on the issue. The juxtaposition of the evolution of UNGA’s position on human rights and development, with the European Commission incorporation of human rights in EU development policy is illustrative of the European Commission’s derivative standing on the matter. The identification of the exact channels of the norm’s diffusion from UNGA to the European Commission appeared less precise when compared with the diffusion of the structural adjustment norm from the WB and IMF to the EU. However, the invariable support of the European Commission to the UN System in human rights issues, and the European Commission active participation in the workings of UNGA since 1974, stand as plausible ‘learning’ channels of the human rights and development norm by the European Commission. As a result, the analysis challenges the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims recurrently advanced by the European Commission concerning the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa in the domain of international development.

1.3 The Environment

Correlating with the innovative provisions adopted on structural adjustment and human rights, Lomé Convention IV brought environmental concerns to the forefront of Africa-EU relations. Environmental protection clauses featured in the Lomé cooperation framework since its inception in 1975. However, they remained a marginal subject in the EU development cooperation framework with Africa until the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV. The fourth renewal of the Lomé Convention in 1989 marked a turning point for the subject of the environment in EU development policy. The European Commission confirmed its “determination to treat environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources as an integral part of economic development in the ACP
states”. Departing from the stated premise, the European Commission advanced the environment as an integral element of its recurrently claimed distinctive development policy regarding Africa, which set a new paradigm in the discourse and practice of international development.

Nevertheless, the concept of the environment and development was a feature of the normative basis of international development since the early 1970s. The architects of the environment and development norm were UNGA following the organisation of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972, and the WB following its 1970 innovative initiative regarding the integration of environmental concerns in the development projects it financed across the developing world. Additionally, the subject gained further relevance in the discourse and practice of international development since 1980, when the Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment (CIDIE), which was largely controlled by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), became the international bastion for the promotion of the link between the environment and development.

The ensuing subsection attempts to capture the process whereby the environment became a central pillar of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa under Lomé Convention IV. It suggests the structure of international development and its comprising agents as a potential source from where the European Commission ‘learnt’ the environment and development norm and then integrated it in EU development policy towards Africa. The juxtaposition of the evolution of the environment and development norm in the discourse and practice of international development with the inclusion of the environment in EU development policy, confirms the existence of a dynamic pattern between both processes. The European Commission made a clear reference to UNGA in the first mention of the environment in EU development policy. However, it was mostly through CIDIE, and the control of that institution by UNEP, that the norm of the environment and development appears to have permeated EU development policy. As a member of CIDIE, the European Commission established a close cooperation with the institution on the subject of the environment and development, and subsequently incorporated it in its development policy under an identical model.

By the late 1980s, environmental protection was at the top of the international development agenda. The European Commission progressively incorporated the environment and development norm into the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Under Lomé Convention

398 The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’
IV, the environment assumed a preeminent position as illustrated by its inclusion in the agreement’s Title I, which featured before agriculture, secure food supplies, and rural development. At the signing ceremony, Manuel Marin, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, confirmed the importance of the subject in Africa-EU relations. He asserted that “the environment has been given special attention in the new Convention, both in the context of developing programmes, and with respect to the more specific issue of banning international movements of toxic and radioactive wastes”.

Accordingly, the European Commission translated the environment and development norm into a central pillar of Lomé Convention IV.

Although Title I (Articles 33 – 41) covered the general provisions on the environment in Lomé Convention IV, the subject appeared as a reference throughout the text, which reinforced the European Commission’s attempt to promote an environmentally sensitive EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. The European Commission’s general aim was to promote development “based on a sustainable balance between its economic objectives, the rational management of the environment and the enhancement of natural and human resources” (Article 4 – Lomé Convention IV). It sustained that “priority must be given to environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources, which are essential conditions for sustainable and balanced development from both the economic and human viewpoints” (Article 6 – Lomé Convention IV).

From the perspective of EU development policy, the described new facet of the Lomé partnership aimed at “the protection and the enhancement of the environment and natural resources, the halting of the deterioration of land and forests, the restoration of ecological balances, the preservation of natural resources and their rational exploitation” in view to improve the living conditions of African populations and their future generations (Article 33 – Lomé Convention IV). While recognising that “the existence of some ACP States is under threat as a result of a rapid deterioration of the environment that hinders any development efforts” (Article 34 - Lomé Convention IV), the agreement also proposed a viable solution for the future. The answer was to create a “preventive approach aimed at avoiding harmful effects on the environment as a result of any programme or operation; a systematic approach that will ensure ecological viability at all stages, from identification to implementation”; and “a trans-sectoral approach that takes into account not only the direct but also the indirect consequences of the operations undertaken” (Article 35 - Lomé Convention IV). As a complement to the proposal, the convention pledged to launch environmental

399 Marin, Manuel, ‘The Convention is of Paramount Political Importance for the Community’, pp. 8
400 There are various references to the environment in the agreement aside from Title I: Articles 4, 6, 14, 16, 22, 42, 54-57, 59, 60, 77, 90, 99, 102, 106, 110, 117, 122, 143, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 159, 226, 229, 243, 244, 258, and 287; Annexes VIII, X, and XIII. The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’
impact assessments for all large-scale projects, and those likely to have a serious effect on the environment (Article 37 - Lomé Convention IV).

The creation of new projects under the auspices of the treaty had to be environmentally sensitive, as well as inclusive of social and cultural dimensions, to be promoted subsequently through education and training programmes (Article 36 - Lomé Convention IV). Concomitantly, the agreement promised support to international and regional efforts to address environmental issues, alongside its backing of NGOs and intergovernmental organisations that furthered similar aims (Article 38 - Lomé Convention IV). In parallel to Title I’s general clauses on the environment, Lomé Convention IV included a plethora of references to the subject in the fields of regional cooperation, mining and energy, drought and desertification, agriculture and fisheries, hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, and tourism.\footnote{European Commission, “Environment Manual: Environmental Procedures and Methodology Governing Lomé IV Development Projects”, (Brussels: European Commission, 1993)}

Following the signing of Lomé Convention IV, environmental issues assumed central focus in the Africa-EU partnership establishing a new foundation for future cooperation between all parties. Environmental regulation evolved from a rather peripheral topic under Lomé Convention I, to one of the principal features of the agreement at the turn of the 1980s according to a preventive, systematic, and crosscutting approach to the subject.\footnote{European Commission, “Ecology in ACP Countries: The Environmental Approach: From Lomé I to Lomé IV”, (Brussels: European Commission, 1992)} The inclusion of environmental provisions at the centre of Lomé Convention IV was a new feature in Africa-EU relations that marked a shift in orientation of the development cooperation framework between both parties.

Despite the novel character of the Africa-EU partnership concerning the protection of the environment at the end of the 1980s, the environment and development norm was part of the normative structure of international development prior to the signing of Lomé Convention IV. Environmental concerns started to acquire a global constituency and a political platform throughout the 1970s and 1980s decades, which culminated with their progressive incorporation in the framework of various international organisations, such as the UN, the WB, and the CIDIE. The WB became the first multilateral or bilateral agency to secure an environmental adviser in its ranks (1970), but the UN assumed early leadership on the subject. It endorsed the existence of a direct link between development promotion and environmental protection at the UNGA-sponsored 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm. Its endorsement had worldwide impact, which
caused various countries to create their first ministries of the environment or related cabinets, and the European Commission to announce the creation of an environment policy for the EU.\footnote{European Commission, ‘European Communities’ Programme Concerning the Environment’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, SEC (72) 666 final, 22 March 1972 / Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/72}

As the environment progressed into a central feature of EU development policy in general and Africa-EU relations in particular, the original driving force behind environmental protection and its connection with development promotion lay with UNGA and some UN agencies with an environment portfolio. From the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment to the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the UNGA became a pioneer for international environmental causes that rallied most countries behind its initiatives, and thus, generated worldwide consensus on the subject. As a result, the UNGA assumed its authority as a paradigm-setter and a norm-diffuser in the subject of the environment in the domain of international development.

Nevertheless, the first discussions on the link between the environment and development took place at the WB. The WB underwent major policy reforms during the tenure of Robert McNamara (1968 – 1981), and soon after he took office, he suggested the inclusion of the environment as a new dimension of future WB development assistance programmes. Despite McNamara’s enthusiasm about the potential role of the environment in the bank’s future development activities, other officials displayed indifference to his proposal, and transformed the environment into a low profile subject matter in the WB agenda for some years.\footnote{World Bank, “Environmental Assessment Sourcebook”, World Bank Environment Department, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1991)} Despite its weak initial character, the WB still nominated an environmental adviser in 1970, in what became an unprecedented enhancement of the planning activities of a bilateral or multilateral donor agency. Subsequently, in 1979, the WB finally adopted an environmental policy of its own, and in 1983, it created the high level Environmental Committee to deal with development projects that were considered of potential significant environmental impact.\footnote{World Bank, “Environmental Assessment Sourcebook”} Since January 1990, the WB strengthened its concerns on the environment and development promotion by requiring that all projects submitted to the WB for financing, without exception, must be screened concerning their environmental impact. Thus, the WB assisted UNGA in the promotion of the environment and development norm since the 1970s, and thereby both IOs became the norm’s architects and ‘gatekeepers’ in the dominion of international development.
Whilst Robert McNamara’s tenure at the WB marked the dawn of a new environmental-based approach to the discourse and practice of international development, UNGA set the foundation for change in the discipline with the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment.\textsuperscript{406} The UN international forum produced an action plan agreed by one-hundred and thirteen nations, as well as a declaration of common principles on global responsibilities regarding the world environment. The most significant achievement of the conference was to recognise for the first time that “environmental deficiencies generated by conditions of underdevelopment and natural disasters can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technical assistance”.\textsuperscript{407} Herein, environmental protection and development promotion appeared integrated for the first time with all signatories to the convention, who endorsed the principle that “the environmental policies of all states should enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development potential of developing countries”.\textsuperscript{408} With a view to manage the new task that the UN called upon itself, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was founded shortly after the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, which became the \textit{de facto} environmental conscience of the organisation thereafter.\textsuperscript{409}

As the alliance between the environment and development matured, the early 1970s witnessed a sudden increase of drought crises in the developing world causing widespread concern in the international development community. The UNGA soon made use of its acquired leadership in international environmental protection and launched the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification under the auspices of United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1977.\textsuperscript{410} In spite of the intent of UNCCD, the plan brought limited immediate results. Nevertheless, the plan to combat desertification and its resulting impact on the livelihood of the affected communities was revived subsequently in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. By doing so, the UNGA confirmed its commitment to protect the environment as an essential dimension of development promotion.

The next step on the interdependence between the environment and development emerged in 1980 with the foundation of CIDIE.\textsuperscript{411} CIDIE was founded as an inter-institutional mechanism composed by seventeen multinational organisations active in the field of economic development. Its objective was to promote dialogue amongst its members, pool knowledge and information, facilitate discussion of common environmental issues, identify cooperative strategies, and improve communication with other interested agencies and organisations.\textsuperscript{412} Following the trend initiated by the UN Conference on Human Environment, CIDIE emerged as a forum of exclusive membership that campaigned for the integration of the environment and development based on the principle that development should account for the environment and natural resources as a means to preserve the base upon which economic development is dependent. CIDIE effectively operated as an international pressure group dealing with the inclusion of environmental concerns in the development operations of all actors in the field of international development. It endorsed an identical approach to that of UNEP, and therein, it approved its guidance on the subject.

Accordingly, the environment and development norm became progressively integrated in the structure of international development. In 1983, the foundation of the World Commission on Environment and Development established an additional basis for the promotion of the concept of the environment in development promotion.\textsuperscript{413} The World Commission on Environment and


\textsuperscript{412} The agencies were as follows: African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Commission of the European Communities, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1992), European Investment Bank, UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, Inter-American Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Nordic Investment Bank, Organisation of American States, UNDP, UNEP, WB, and UN World Food Programme;

\textsuperscript{413} A 1983 UNGA resolution set the creation of the World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland Commission after the name of its Chairman – Gro Harlem Brundtland) as a means to: (a) propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 and beyond; (b) recommend ways in which concern for the environment may be translated into greater co-operation among developing countries and between countries at different stages of economic and social development and lead to the achievement of common and mutually supportive objectives which take account of the interrelationships between people, resources, environment and development; (c) consider ways and means by which the international community can deal more effectively with environmental concerns, in the light of the other recommendations in its report; (d) help to define shared perceptions of long-term environmental issues and of the appropriate efforts needed to deal successfully with the problems of protecting and enhancing the environment, a long-term agenda for action during the coming decades, and aspirational goals for the world community, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the session of a special character of the Governing Council in 1982; (e) maintain an exchange of views with the scientific community, environmentalists and all other sections of public opinion, particularly youth, concerned with the environment, and those concerned with the relationship between development and environment; (f) receive the views of Governments, principally through the Governing Council and its intergovernmental intersessional preparatory committee, and through contacts with national leaders, opinion makers and concerned international figures; (g) maintain links with other intergovernmental bodies within and outside the United Nations system, while however using the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination and the designated officials for environmental matters as the channels of communication with the United Nations system; the willingness of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to assist should be communicated to the Commission; (h) take account of the scope of environmental issues as defined by the United Nations system-wide
Development emerged as a response to the increasing international environmental concerns of the time, and it was charged with the responsibility to design a new environmental agenda for the future that was to be met by the year 2000. Subsequently, the World Commission on Environment and Development published in 1987 what became a seminal environmental protection document in the twentieth century – ‘Our Common Future’. It followed a lengthy process of consultation with governments, businesses, international organisations, and civil society, and earned its chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland, a prominent role in the integration of the environment and development in the discourse and practice of international development.

The commonly known Brundtland Report emphasised that in developing countries environmental degradation and pollution go hand in hand with underdevelopment. It called for a new approach to development and the use of technology as a means to promote social equity, economic growth, and environmental protection and conservation. Following an all-encompassing perspective, the report advanced the promotion of the environment and development as a world challenge that is only manageable through collective multilateral action to the detriment of national interests. The Bruntland Report’s novel procedure produced the term ‘sustainable development’, which it defined as “development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The concept supported strong social and economic development combined with the urgency to ensure the protection of the environment and natural resources at all times.

Concomitantly, a new international agreement came into being in 1987 under the auspices of UNEP as a response to the various industrial accidents that took place throughout the 1980s (particularly at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986) – the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The accord’s main objective was to minimise the risk of industrial activity and its potential impact on the environment. The successful conclusion of the agreement became a promising model for North and South cooperation regarding global environmental matters, most notably climate change. The implementation of the protocol improved significantly

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415 United Nations, ‘World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’, Part I, Chapter 2, Point 1, pp. 54

over the years, following the new amendments attached to the original text agreed at the subsequent meetings in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Montreal (1997), and Beijing (1999).\textsuperscript{417} Hence, UNEP gathered increasing importance in the promotion of the environment and development norm in the domain of international development.

Furthermore, the 1989 UNEP initiative on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, commonly referred to as the Basel Convention, was equally relevant in the growing integration of the environment and development, and in the increasing environmental cooperation between North and South.\textsuperscript{418} The agreement’s objective was to reduce transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, minimize the creation of such wastes, and prohibit their shipment to countries lacking the capacity to dispose of hazardous wastes in an environmentally sound manner. At the time there was mounting concern regarding shipments of waste from developed to developing nations, namely to sub-Saharan Africa with the convention emerging as a concrete framework for cooperation between all one-hundred and seventy signatory parties. Therefore, the Basel Convention introduced new legislation on the movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, and assisted to establish the environment as a significant aspect of North/South development cooperation.

As the environment and development norm progressed into a pillar of the structure of international development in the 1970s and 1980s under the command of the UN and its specialised agencies, the UNGA announced on 20 December 1988 the convening of a UN conference on the subject no later than 1992.\textsuperscript{419} The UN was intent on using the then favourable momentum for the environment in the discourse and practice of international development to organise a high-profile meeting. Its objective was to assist the international community to rethink the concept of development, and to find the most adequate plan to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the planet.

On 3 June 1992, UNCED started its activities with an unprecedented number of participants, which included representatives from one-hundred and seventy-six states, ten thousand delegates, one thousand four-hundred NGOs, and about nine thousand journalists. The UNEP


organised the convention to effectively review the international community’s progress on the Brundtland Report, and to propose a renewed environmental agenda for the future. It concentrated on the political, scientific, and organisational connections between environmental degradation and economic development as a key to promote sustainable development. In just under two weeks, UNCED produced comprehensive pledges to promote sustainable development in the form of six particular instruments: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Convention on Biological Diversity, Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests, Framework Convention on Climate Change, and Commission on Sustainable Development. Apart from the twenty-seven principles of the Rio Declaration, the most important achievement of the convention was Agenda 21, which transformed UNCED into a continuing process.\textsuperscript{420} Departing from the principles agreed upon at the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, UNCED provided an inclusive forum to address issues of both the environment and development, as well as to highlight North and South’s distinct understanding of the subject that outlined the actions to be taken at various levels in order to promote global sustainability.

UNCED became a landmark instrument of international cooperation that established the environment and development as indissociable. The conference left a significant legacy, with further international consensus emerging post-UNCED, principally in the activities of the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification, and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Moreover, the Framework Convention on Climate Change produced the Kyoto Protocol, which established ambitious legally binding commitments from industrialised states as well as all remaining signatories, for the reduction of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{421} Thus, UNCED emerged as a milestone in the association of the concepts of environment and development, which assisted the UNGA and the identified UN agencies with an environment portfolio to become the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of the environment and development norm in the structure of international development.

The inclusion of environmental directives in EU development policy followed a particular design that resulted from the Union’s lack of an environmental policy before 1973. The environment was initially overlooked in the Treaty of Rome, but the link between the environment and development received particular attention from the European Commission following the first


UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. The UN conference corresponded with the public and scientific alarm on the impact of economic development on the environment and represented the first international blueprint on the direct link between development and the environment. The UNGA initiative generated worldwide momentum in environmental planning. Accordingly, the European Council of 1972 advanced the Union’s commitment to establish an EU environmental policy, which translated in the creation of the EU Environment Action Programme (EAP) in 1973. At the centre of the EAP was the principle that economic development, prosperity and the protection of the environment are mutually interdependent. Thereby, the EU established its first legislative structure for the protection of the environment.

Subsequently, the EU and Africa (integrated in the newly created framework of the ACP group of states) entered negotiations in 1974 that aimed to establish a comprehensive framework for development cooperation. The resulting agreement – the Lomé Convention – became a landmark in EU development policy, covering a variety of topics including the environment. Whilst the environment remained a marginal topic under Lomé Convention I, the accord set a new platform for future cooperation on the issue between all parties. Lomé Convention II maintained a similar approach to the subject, despite including a larger number of provisions on the conservation of natural resources and the protection of the environment. The trend further expanded under Lomé Convention III, namely following the effects of desertification in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, which generated wide concerns regarding the securing of sustainable agricultural production and combating deforestation and soil erosion in Africa.

The inclusion of environmental provisions in EU development policy reflected the international evolution of the environment and development norm in international development. Its first reference appeared under Lomé Convention I in 1975, which followed the European Commission’s first attempt to create a distinctive environment policy for the Union in 1973 with a focus “on the well-being of man, on his living conditions, and on the surroundings in which he

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The stated initiative marked the beginning of the evolutionary process concerning the inclusion of the environment in the EU policy of development cooperation with the Africa. Lomé Convention I demonstrated some intent in establishing a link between the environment and development promotion, yet it was only in the 1980s that some relevant initiatives were introduced by the accord. Lomé Convention II and III included some concrete remarks on the environment, namely regarding the securing of sustainable agricultural production and combating deforestation and soil erosion. Nevertheless, the European Commission suggested in a communication from 1984 that “nor has the Community policy, in the past at any rate, taken sufficient account of the environmental impact of the development projects it has financed”. Accordingly, it was only from the mid-to-late 1980s that a more concerted effort started to materialise regarding the inclusion of environmental issues as an integral part of EU development policy.

Before the described scenario, the European Commission announced that “the principal aim of development policy will therefore be to manage the living and non-living resources of the planet so they may yield the greatest benefit to the present generation while maintaining their potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations”. As a result, the European Commission initiated the process of incorporating the environment in the EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. It announced that the environment was a fundamental requisite for the promotion of sustainable development. As a result, the European Commission proceeded with the reform of EU development policy towards Africa by starting to establish the necessary mechanisms to incorporate the environment as one of its central policy pillars.

Therein, the Council of the European Communities relied on the ‘Council Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment’ from 27 June 1985 as a catalyst. In 1988, the Council announced that coordinated “efforts are actively being pursued at various levels and in different forums with a view to responding to the ever-increasing concern over the threats to the environment”. The Council directive appeared as a tool to complement the rolling five-year EAPs that focused on the internal environment policy of the

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425 European Commission, ‘European Communities’ Programme Concerning the Environment’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, pp. 11
427 Frisch, Dieter, ‘We Have Not Inherited the Land from Our Parents, We are Borrowing it From Our Children’, The Courier, No. 133, May-June 1992
Union. Additionally, it contributed significantly to the discussion on how to integrate provisions on
the environment in all dimensions of EU policy. A Council resolution of 1986 made a similar
contribution regarding the issue of desertification in Africa, which was growing into a significant
environmental concern for the international development community.

Correspondingly, the 1988 European Council confirmed the EU attempt to harmonise its
environment policy sustaining that “protection of the environment is a matter of vital significance to
the Community and to the rest of the world”. Thus, it called on “the Community and the Member
States to take every initiative and all essential steps including at international level”. The drive to
ensure that “sustainable development must be one of the overriding objectives of all Community
policies”, which was endorsed by the European Council, generated some impact in EU circles and
paved the way to the incorporation of environmental concerns in the EU policy of development
cooperation regarding Africa. Furthermore, the European Council confirmed the EU ambition to
progress as an increasingly prominent actor in the domain of international development. It asserted
that “the Community and the Member States are determined to play a leading role in the action
needed to protect the world's environment and will continue to strive for an effective international
response”. Hence, the European Council illustrated how EU development policy was
fundamental in the expansion of the EU as an actor in international development, where the
environment and development norm were evolving progressively into a leading paradigm.

When negotiations started for the fourth renewal of the Lomé Convention, the environment
emerged as one of the main topics under discussion. The EU and the ACP states agreed to create
eight negotiation groups under a thematic arrangement, with the environment falling under the
command of the ACP-EEC Negotiation Group 1. Soon after the launching of negotiations, both
parties reached consensus on “the extreme importance of protecting the environment and natural

430 Environment Action Programmes (EAPs) became the bedrock of the internal environment policy for the
Community, launched initially in 1973 and renewed every five years up to the signing of the TEU - 1977, 1982, 1987;
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995)
431 Council of the European Communities, ‘Resolution of 17 April 1986 on Conservation of Natural Resources and
Countering Desertification in Africa’, Council of the European Communities, Compilation of Texts Adopted by the
Council (Ministers for Development Cooperation) – 1 January 1981/31 December 1988, (Brussels: Office for the
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988)
436 ACP-EEC Negotiation Group 1 – Agricultural cooperation, food security and rural development; Environment and
protection of natural resources; Fisheries; European Commission, ‘Nature of the Agreement and of the Negotiating
resources both for the development of the ACP countries and for the common future of both parties and humanity as a whole”. Thereafter, the concept of sustainability became central in the negotiation debates of the ACP-EEC Negotiation Group 1, which progressively endorsed a preventive, systematic, and trans-sectoral approach to the environment as an integral part of EU development policy. The objectives, approaches, and concerns of both the ACP states and the Union converged significantly during negotiations, which facilitated the agreement between both parties in September 1989 regarding the inclusion of environmental clauses in a revised Lomé Convention.

The signing of Lomé Convention IV confirmed the inclusion of the environment in the agreement, which conferred a new dimension to the Africa-EU partnership. Although Title I (Articles 33 – 41) covered the general provisions on the environment in Lomé Convention IV, the subject appeared as a reference throughout the text, which reinforced the European Commission’s attempt to promote an environmentally sound EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. The European Commission advanced that the “protection of the environment has been promoted in the new Convention, where it has a title to itself at the head of Part Two. The reason for this meteoric promotion is the belief that (…) [the European Commission] must think of the effects on the environment before, and not after, approving development projects.” Accordingly, the environment and development norm incorporated the framework of development cooperation between the EU and Africa, and became one of the main policy pillars of Lomé Convention IV.

Following the signing of Lomé Convention IV, the Union proceeded with its ambition to integrate the environment in all its development activities, as demonstrated by the Council Resolution on Environment and Development of 29 May 1990. The Council initiative confirmed that “all projects and programmes financed by the Community and the Member States in whatever sector should take into account at all stages their effect on the environment”. Therefore, it called for the Union to focus “on the need to integrate environment and development and on the means

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441 Council of the European Communities, ‘1407th Council Meeting – Environment and Development’, pp. 4
to be used to this end”. Similarly, the European Council of 18 June 1990 produced a new public statement from the EU confirming its position on the matter - the Declaration on the Environmental Imperative. Under the initiative, the European Council recognised the Union’s “special responsibility for the environment”, which should aim to intensify its “efforts to protect and enhance the natural environment of the Community itself and of the wider world of which it is part” based on a “co-ordinated basis and on the principles of sustainable development and preventative and precautionary action”. In this perspective, the EU continued to establish the environment in its development policy towards Africa, whilst stimulating its further coordination in the general activities of the Union.

The EU’s undertakings furthered the integration of its policy on the environment with other policies ahead of the formalisation of the general principle of policy coordination and coherence under the TEU. Accordingly, Manuel Marin, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, used a high-profile conference organised by the Dutch government in Maastricht in 1990 – Conference on Africa – to make additional pledges to environmental protection. In the presence of most bilateral and multilateral donors, Manuel Marin affirmed the European Commission’s objective to renew its commitment to support development in Africa with the environment as one of its main concerns. The conference raised awareness concerning Africa’s real development needs, which brought most of the parties present at the event to make new vows to development promotion in the African region.

Concomitantly, the international community initiated the preparatory process to attend the UNCED in 1992. The UN hailed the conference as the most marking international event on the subject of development and the environment. The European Commission launched a strong campaign before the UN that aimed at obtaining participant status at UNCED to support its standing as an actor in the international system in general, and particularly in the field of international environmental politics. Whilst the European Commission established its position on an

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442 Council of the European Communities, ‘1407th Council Meeting – Environment and Development’, pp. 4
444 European Commission, ‘Declaration on the Environmental Imperative’, 6-1990, Annex II, pp. 18
446 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Discours du Vice-President Marin a la Conference de Maastricht sur L’Afrique Sub-Saharienne’, SPEECH/90/56, 03 July 1990
447 One of the most striking examples of the new international drive to support development in Africa following the Conference on Africa was the creation of the Global Coalition for Africa - a joint coalition of African states and international donors. The project emerged with the objective to deepen dialogue and build consensus on Africa’s priority development issues. Its agenda focuses on three broad themes: peace and security; governance and transition to democracy; and, sustainable growth and integration into the global economy; World Bank, “Annual Report 1996”
eventual participation in UNCED, it finally attained full participant status based in the principle that it applied only to the forthcoming conference, and not beyond. As a result, a footnote in the preamble of the official text of Agenda 21 stated that “when the term Governments is used, it will be deemed to include the European Economic Community within its areas of competence”. The stated outcome became a reference for the European Commission at the international level, conferring it, even if temporarily, a special status in the framework of the UN, and in the domain of international development.

The presence of the European Commission at UNCED under full participant status confirmed its intent both to harmonise its policy on the environment with its policy of development cooperation, and to enhance its profile at the international level. The Union participated actively in the proceedings of the conference following its previously set agenda on all issues on the negotiation table. The conference was a major success in international environmental politics because it produced various memoranda for change based on the principle that development and the environment are indissociable. As a result, the Union fully endorsed the decisions achieved at UNCED, as confirmed by a Council resolution of 1993. The resolution divulged that the “Community and its Member States committed themselves to the rapid implementation of the principal measures agreed at UNCED… aimed at achieving sustainable patterns of development worldwide”. Accordingly, the Council expressed its intention to follow the provisions agreed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, specifically the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. An interviewed European Commission official shared a similar understanding of the subject, and noted:

449 Agenda 21 – comprehensive programme of sustainable development launched by the UN at the UNCED on 14 June 1992, and adopted by all UN members; United Nations, “Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio”, pp. 1
451 Agreements under UNCED: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Agenda 21; Convention on Biological Diversity; Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests; Framework Convention on Climate Change; Commission on Sustainable Development; United Nations, “Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio”
“It is true that the environment became a strong part of our discourse in development cooperation under Lomé IV. The UN was promoting the link between the environment and development for some time, and then we did the same. The Rio Summit was very important for us in that regard”.454

As confirmed by the interviewee, the UN System in general, and in particular UNCED became central references for the European Commission in the incorporation of the environment and development norm into the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa.

Considering Lomé Convention IV as the formal framework of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa, the European Commission proceeded with safeguarding and harmonising its policy on the environment with all its policy areas. New progress was made in that regard, although the revision of Lomé Convention IV in 1995 and the 1996 Green Paper failed to propose substantial changes to the EU environmental concerns regarding its policy of development cooperation towards Africa.455 UNCED and its related acts remained a reference throughout, which confirmed the European Commission’s association with the prime policy undertakings in international environmental politics. Prior to the review of Agenda 21 and its related statutes at the UN General Assembly Special Session in June 1997, the European Commission pledged to a renewed political support of Agenda 21 to promote sustainable development globally and respond to the emerging and growing environmental problems of the time.456 In this manner, the European Commission demonstrated that its central reference in the inclusion of the environment as an integral part of EU development policy was external in origin and based on the existing normative basis of international development.

A similar commitment emerged from the European Commission regarding the UNCCD. The UNCCD was not a product of UNCED but it underwent considerable reform during the conference intended to support a new and integrated approach to the matter of desertification.457

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454 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 2010
The Council confirmed publicly the European Commission’s support to UNCCD advancing that “desertification and drought are problems of global dimension in that they affect all regions of the world and that joint action of the international community is needed to combat desertification and/or mitigate the effects of drought”. By doing so, the Council expressed the European Commission’s objective to integrate the structure of international development and the activities of its leading agents, which affected the orientation of the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa.

As the 1990s unfolded, the EU announced the creation of a novel future framework for development cooperation with the ACP states that expanded on the trends of Lomé Convention IV and conferred a new vision for EU development policy. The environment had assumed a leading position in the Union’s activities both internally and externally, including in its policy of development cooperation with Africa. Similar to other policy areas, the EU policy on the environment was progressively coordinated and harmonised with its development policy, which followed the impetus generated under Lomé Convention IV and the subsequent resolutions produced by the Council and the European Commission on the subject. In 2000, when the new structure for development cooperation with Africa states was unveiled, the Union reiterated the ultimate importance of the articulation between the environment and development in all its development projects, which confirmed the environment as a symbol of EU development policy regarding Africa.

The evolution of the environment and development norm in international development emerged closely related with the role played by the UN agencies with an environment portfolio over the past decades, specifically since the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment. The 1972 conference introduced a new norm in international development, which integrated environmental concerns in the concept of development. The activities of the WB in 1970, CIDIE in 1980 (under the control of UNEP), the Brundtland Report in 1987, and the UNCED in 1992 assisted to establish the environment and development as a constitutive part of the normative basis of international development thereafter. Under the leadership of UNGA, the WB, and CIDIE/UNEP, the environment and development norm incorporated the discourse and practice of international

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development, which progressively affected the policy orientation of its comprising actors, such as the EU.

As an international development actor represented by the European Commission, the EU appears to have ‘learnt’ the new environment and development norm that was diffused by UNGA, the WB, and CIDIE/UNEP through its increasingly closer cooperation with the stated institutions, which subsequently permeated the EU process of development policy design. At the time of the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, the Union was still without an environmental policy, and it took the necessary measures to address that matter immediately following the UN event. As the EU put into practice its first EAP into practice in 1973, it also introduced the environment in the negotiations of the new development cooperation agreement with its former colonies in 1974. Nevertheless, the subject remained marginal in the ensuing Lomé Convention of 1975. The environment gained central status in the agreement only in 1989, following the progress of the environment and development norm into a central feature in the discourse and practice of international development since the mid-1980s. An interviewed European Commission official advanced an analogous grasp of the subject, and suggested:

“Back then, the UN started to raise international awareness about the environment and development, and then we slowly took that up. It was a natural evolution of our development policy in line with what was happening in the world back then”.

Accordingly, the incorporation of the environment and development in EU development policy towards Africa in the process leading up to the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV progressed in direct relation with the structure of international development, specifically the activities of some of its comprising agents.

Whilst the UNGA initiative of 1972 and the WB enterprise of 1970 marked the emergence of the environment and development norm in international development, the foundation CIDIE in 1980 marked the beginning of a close cooperation on the issue between the EU and all its signatory members. At once, CIDIE endorsed an identical approach to environment and development to that of UNEP approving its almost *de facto* guidance of the workings of the organisation. As a member of CIDIE, the European Commission participated in the activities of the group, whereby it endorsed the environment and development norm, and gradually integrated it in the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa. As a result, most official documents of the time from the

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*460 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 2010*
European Commission or Council on the environment make direct mention to CIDIE it in their preambles.461

By the end of the 1980s, the EU was an integrated actor in the field of international development and held the environment as one of its development cooperation policy pillars.462 The Brundtland Report became a landmark in the process, which confirmed the paramount importance of the environment in development planning, and effectively established it as one of the characterising norms of the structure of international development. In a Council resolution of 1987, the Union confirmed to adopt a new position on the environment regarding its development cooperation. Therein, it endorsed the Bruntland Report as a reference in the definition of its position on the issue.463 Similarly, in a 1989 resolution, the Council maintained that in line “with the statement by the Presidency on behalf of the Community at the United Nations, the Community was ready to join internationally coordinated efforts to combat global threats to the environment”.464 Thus, the incorporation of the environment and development norm in EU development policy towards Africa evolved in direct relation with the discourse and practice of international development, specifically the activities of certain IOs.

As Lomé Convention IV established the environment as one of its main policy pillars, the European Commission maintained its policy coordination on the environment and development at the international level. The most significant case in the 1990s took place under the initiatives promoted under the auspices of UNCED.465 As a participant at the conference, the European Commission endorsed all its resolutions and confirmed its intent to reinforce the provisions on the environment in its development cooperation. Coordination between the European Commission and the UN System on environmental issues became a trend in the 1990s. As a result, it culminated with

the European Commission signing of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 on behalf of the Union, of which the environment is Goal 7.\textsuperscript{466}

Following a two-decade process, the European Commission introduced environmental concerns at the centre of the EU framework for development cooperation with Africa under the guidelines of Lomé Convention IV. Despite being an innovation at the EU level, the link between the environment and development was an integral part of the normative structure of international development since the 1970s. As UNGA and the WB emerged as the architects of this norm, CIDIE and UNEP assisted to diffuse the environment and development norm, which transformed it into a leading paradigm in the discourse and practice of international development in the mid-1980s. Following initial references to the UNGA leadership on the diffusion of the environment and development norm, the European Commission became a founding member of CIDIE, which worked under the effective control of UNEP. Through an increasingly close cooperation with CIDIE and the identified UN agencies with an environment portfolio, the European Commission ‘learnt’ the environment and development norm, and progressively incorporated it in its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. The diffusion of the environment and development norm from the stated IOs to the European Commission was distinct when compared with the subjects of structural adjustment and human rights. The diffusion was not as observable as on the subject of structural adjustment, but it was not as complex to demonstrate as in the issue of human rights. Thus, the causality process was not fully explicit in the integration of the environment in the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa. However, the analysis confirmed CIDIE, UNEP, and UNGA as the potential ‘teachers’ of the environment and development norm to the European Commission, which subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy towards Africa. As a result, the analysis challenges the ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims recurrently advanced by the Union concerning its development policy vis-à-vis Africa, and demonstrates that EU development policy was neither distinctive nor played a leading role in the domain of international development in the considered timeframe.

1.4 Political Dimension

Following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, EU development policy towards Africa incorporated a strong political dimension, which marked a shift in orientation for Africa-EU

relations. The issue of human rights emerged as a concrete illustration of the trend, but the politicisation of EU development policy regarding Africa extended equally to other dominions. Similarly to the subjects of structural adjustment, human rights, and the environment, the European Commission advanced the political turn in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa as an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development. However, the integration of political concerns in development promotion was an integral feature of the normative structure of international development before the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV. The architects of the norm that linked political concerns with development were the WB and the IMF in 1981. Thereafter, the stated IOs diffused the norm in the structure of international development, which affected the policy orientation of its constituent actors. Through a process of increasingly close cooperation with the WB and the IMF on the political dimension of development cooperation, the European Commission appears to have ‘learnt’ the aforementioned norm and subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy towards Africa.

The Lomé Convention of 1975 established political neutrality as one of the accord’s ideological foundations. It proved pioneering in the relations between the Union and its former colonies from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions since it contrasted with the arguably paternalistic character of the Yaoundé conventions of 1963 and 1969 that characterised Africa-EU relations. The stated limitation of the Yaoundé conventions became a priority amendment in the run-up to a new development cooperation agreement between the EU and the then newly founded group of ACP countries in the early 1970s. Both parties expressed their intent to overcome the colonial legacy of their relations and agreed to set a framework for development cooperation between two equal partners. By doing so, the Lomé Convention integrated the treaty in the discourse and practice of international development at the time, specifically regarding the promotion of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was a movement launched by developing countries within the UN framework that used the agenda of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to propose a broad reform of international trade structures to make them more favourable to countries in the infancy of their development process. Thus, the Lomé Convention emerged as a development cooperation accord between the EU and its former colonies that aimed to overcome the colonial legacy of their relationship, and which integrated Africa-EU relations in the NIEO movement of the 1970s.


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Nevertheless, the Cold War bipolar international system was still in place and the African continent remained an eminent stage for East-West political confrontation. Therein, the Union opted to extend its neutral position in the Cold War to the relations with its African partners. As a result, Lomé Convention I and II focused on economic and technical assistance to build a new framework for development cooperation between the two parties, which underwrote its political neutrality and non-involvement in the political decisions of any signatory state. The Lomé Convention I and II were characterised by overt political neutrality, whereby the EU would not interfere in the political life of its developing partners. At the time, the focus of the development cooperation partnership between Africa and the Union centred solely on economic and technical assistance issues.

From the early 1980s, there was an increasing degree of political instability behind the Iron Curtain and new paradigms emerged in the discourse and practice of international development. The reaction from the European Commission materialised progressively and it produced a memorandum in 1982 that called for the gradual inclusion of a political dimension in EU development policy towards Africa. Edgar Pisani, the then European Commissioner for Development, assisted in the drawing of the European Commission document, which proposed “to extend the political dialogue beyond the mere negotiations on projects to be financed (…) to the effectiveness of policies it is supporting”. The commonly known Pisani Memorandum marked a turning point in the politicisation of EU development policy towards Africa insofar as it established the basis for effective policy change.

Nevertheless, when the ACP states and the EU met in the capital of Togo to sign the Lomé Convention IV, it was apparent that a broad reform of the Africa-EU development cooperation framework was imminent. The confirmation of the change in orientation of Africa-EU relations was patent in the opening sections of the new agreement. It stated that “cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights” (Article 5 - Lomé Convention IV). From a mention to ‘human dignity’ in the previous accord, Lomé Convention IV endorsed the protection of all human rights and placed man at the centre of the agreement. Thereby,

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470 European Commission, ‘The Community’s Development Policy’
471 The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’
the inclusion of human rights clauses as integral to EU development policy towards Africa conferred Africa-EU relations an overtly political character.

Furthermore, the programming of aid under Lomé Convention IV required a joint management between both parties. It extended the issue of aid beyond technical and economic assistance and transformed political cooperation into a requirement in the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation. The European Commission had to inform African states about the amount of aid available, which in turn had to “draw up and submit to the Community a draft indicative programme on the basis of and consistent with its development objectives and priorities” (Article 281 – Lomé Convention IV). The new approach required that an “indicative programme shall be the subject of an exchange of views between the ACP State concerned and the Community” (Article 282 - Lomé Convention IV). As a result, “the Community and the ACP State concerned shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the indicative programme is adopted in the shortest possible time” (Article 283 - Lomé Convention IV). Moreover, Annex V and VI advanced the means for complementary cooperation between the two parties on migration issues, and Annex IV addressed the rejection of South Africa’s apartheid regime by all signatory states.472

At the end of the 1980s, the European Commission stimulated the reform of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa and veered it into a political orientation based on the promotion of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. It marked a significant turn in EU development policy, which was characterised thus far by a strong commitment to political neutrality. Whilst the inclusion of a political dimension in EU development policy was an innovation in Africa-EU relations, the political dimension and development norm was an integral mark of the structure of international development, following the activities of some of its comprising IOs. The WB, the IMF, and later the OECD were the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of the norm in the structure of international development, which they subsequently diffused to all its constituent actors. Therein, the European Commission appears to have ‘learnt’ the political dimension and development norm from the stated IOs and then incorporated it in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa.

The politicisation of international development occurred in direct relation with the activities of the WB and the IMF. In the prospect of the devastating crises in various developing countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, both the WB and the IMF concluded

472 The Courier, ‘Lomé Convention IV’
that a purely economic response would to fail to deliver long-term results to their policies of development promotion, recognising that a new solution was necessary. For that purpose, the Bretton Woods institutions needed to circumvent one of its foundational principles – not to interfere in the domestic affairs of member countries – and effectively foster economic growth together with pushing for comprehensive institutional reforms in recipient countries. The first time the Bretton Woods institutions referred to governance as a requisite for development promotion was in a 1981 WB report on the promotion of development in Africa. The report was the result of a long consultation and discussion process within the internal circles of the Bretton Woods institutions, which established their new approach to development promotion based on a strong political dimension. Accordingly, the WB and the IMF produced the concept of ‘governance’ based on a real matter of policy application and coherence, which led them to opt for the label ‘administrative governance’ to the detriment of ‘political governance’. The stated IOs defined governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes how governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. Departing from the premise that development is a process where stakeholders equally determine the direction and form of development initiatives and resources that affect their well-being, the Bretton Woods institutions called for a more direct participation of recipient governments in a country’s development project. The WB and IMF’s new approach to the promotion of development was based largely on the concept of governance, which progressively transformed international development into a politically charged activity.

As the 1980s unfolded, famine spread across Africa, communism gradually collapsed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and aid disbursement programmes failed to bear conclusive effects. Before the mounting development challenges in the developing world, the OECD (through its DAC) assumed distinction in the definition of a new approach to development promotion. A milestone in the OECD’s activities took place at one of its high-level meetings in 1987. It produced the notion that development aid is directly dependent from the internal policy and structure of a

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474 World Bank, “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action”
recipient country. The OECD’s proposal had a significant impact on the subject of governance in international development. In practice, the OECD’s standing on governance was an expansion of the concept of ‘participatory development’ coined by the United Nations Research Institute for Development (UNRISD) in 1985. The UNRISD had stressed the link between economics and politics in the promotion of development cooperation, which the OECD took up and expanded into its concept of governance. According to the OECD, development promotion had to go hand in hand with political concerns, where democracy, respect for human rights, competitive markets, and private enterprise had to be safeguarded. Therefore, the OECD marked the political turn in international development discourse by advancing a number of political elements that were essential for the effective promotion of development.

However, the politicisation of international development was championed first by the WB and the IMF, which established strong forms of governance as a requisite for sustainable development. It resulted from the Bretton Woods institutions’ reaction to the poverty crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, when it imported the principles of its economic policy onto the political dimension of a country’s development process. At the time, the WB and IMF’s development programmes centred mostly on structural adjustment reform, which integrated conditionality clauses. The conditions included in their programmes were introduced as tools to revitalise a country’s economy in accordance with the Bretton Woods’ liberal agenda and understanding of development. Their concept of governance consisted in importing the same conditionalities in use in their structural adjustment programmes, and vesting them with a wider and deeper scope with a view to accommodate a political and social element. In that manner, the expansion of the Bretton Woods’ economic agenda into a politically charged enterprise assisted to reform both its general approach to development, and progressively, the discourse and practice of international development.

In this perspective, the Bretton Woods institutions and the OECD contributed to the redesign of international development during the 1980s. They readapted international development to the changing realities of the time, specifically the international political and economic conjuncture of the post-Cold War era. Therein, the WB and the IMF played a significant role resulting from their position as the architects of the political dimension and development norm in the domain of international development.

international development. Progressively, the Bretton Woods institutions reinforced their political focus on development promotion, whilst other IOs active in the domain of international development acquired an equally political take in their understanding of development. As a result, the WB, the IMF, the UN (mostly through the UNDP), and the OECD developed their particular version of governance, which caused some initial friction amongst all. Nevertheless, the stated IOs soon overcame their differences regarding the concept of governance, and turned their political drive in the promotion of development into a positive cooperative enterprise. By the end of the 1980s, there was broad consensus amongst the aforementioned IOs regarding the concept of governance and development, which they gradually diffused in the domain of international development and progressively affected the behaviour of its comprising actors.

Accordingly, the changing normative basis of international development and the looming end of the Cold War stimulated the European Commission to readjust the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. One of its first decisions was to abandon the previously fundamental principle of political neutrality established by the Lomé Convention in 1975. As argued previously, the Pisani Memorandum of 1982 was a milestone in the politicisation of EU development policy regarding Africa. It noted that “the countries of the Third World are also partly responsible for these disappointing results”, which set the basis to the inclusion of the concept of governance in EU development policy towards Africa. As a result, the negotiations of Lomé Convention III were marked by the principle of ‘policy dialogue’ that featured in the Pisani Memorandum. The ‘policy dialogue’ idea presupposed that the European Commission would engage in a dialogue with the Lomé Convention signatory governments about “the effectiveness of the policies which they ask the Community to support and the relevance of such policies in terms of the general objectives if EC development policy”. Therefore, the European Commission plan concentrated on establishing genuine dialogue channels between both parties as a means to enhance the use of cooperation instruments based on mutual undertakings and shared responsibilities. By doing so, the European Commission endorsed an approach to development promotion that reflected the WB and the IMF take on structural adjustment, which included numerous conditionalities with a political dimension.

The European Commission’s aim to extend the ‘policy dialogue’ procedure to most areas of ACP-EU cooperation failed to materialise under Lomé Convention III, yet the accord acquired a

481 World Bank, “Governance: The World Bank Experience”
482 European Commission, ‘The Community’s Development Policy’, pp. 16
484 Frisch, Dieter, ‘The Political Dimension of Lomé’
political dimension via the detailed aid programming process it set in place. The Lomé Convention III advanced that “in order to enable the two parties to ensure that optimum use is made of the different instruments and resources provided under this Convention, the Community and the ACP States shall carry out in the light of their common experience exchanges of views” (Article 215 – Lomé Convention III). Furthermore, Lomé Convention III contained equally a mention to the protection of human rights, which, as illustrated above, represented a subject that was gaining momentum in the discourse and practice of international development. Whilst there was no direct reference to human rights *per se* in the final text of Lomé Convention III, it still called for the respect of ‘human dignity’ in its preamble, and the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights in its Annex I.485 Thus, Lomé Convention III lent Africa-EU relations an imprint of change and marked the beginning of a new orientation in EU development policy towards Africa.

By the late 1980s, international development discourse and practice had evolved into a new mould following the impact caused by structural adjustment programmes promoted by the WB and the IMF. Attached to the stated programmes, the WB and IMF introduced numerous conditionalities, which had a markedly political dimension. Progressively, they expanded on the conditionalities of structural adjustment and devised the concept of governance, which became a leading paradigm of international development at the time. As the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of the political dimension and development norm in the domain of international development, the WB and the IMF affected the behaviour of its constituent actors, such as the European Commission. As argued in the subsection on structural adjustment, the European Commission initiated a process of increasing rapprochement with the WB and the IMF on the subject of structural adjustment. As a result, it ‘learnt’ the political dimension and development norm and subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy. The Council resolution of 31 May 1988 illustrates the dynamics between the Bretton Woods institutions and the European Commission, and confirms the WB and the IMF as central references for the European Commission in the politicisation of EU development policy towards Africa. It stated that there was the “need for effective coordination between the Community and the World Bank and the IMF, which play a de facto leading role in the dialogue on structural adjustment. Such coordination must develop at operational level, but also upstream”.486 Hence, the increasing politicisation of EU development policy in the run-up to Lomé Convention IV evolved in direct relation with the rapprochement between the European Commission and the

485 Frisch, Dieter, ‘The political dimension of Lomé’
Bretton Woods institutions on the issue of structural adjustment, which had conferred a political dimension to their development cooperation activities.

The Lomé Convention’s original political neutrality formula began to dissolve thereafter and gave way to a new approach to development promotion in the framework of Africa-EU relations. Upon the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, political dimension became one of the agreement’s main policy pillars. The accord provided the first legislative basis for the political dimension of EU development policy, and stimulated the European Commission to integrate political aspects in its relations with third countries. In 1991, the European Commission produced a communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the issue of human rights, development, and democracy.\(^487\) The initiative passed swiftly into a resolution by the Council - ‘Resolution on Democracy and Development’\(^488\). It gave the Union a specific mandate for the inclusion of provisions on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in its relations with third countries. Whilst advancing a positive approach to human rights, the Council advocated the use of systematic dialogue with third countries and a turn to negative measures only as last resort. The option to rely on negative measures as a real possibility within the framework of EU development policy became a landmark in its politicisation process since opened the window of conditionality as a potential policy choice, which altered the balance and the character of EU relations with third parties.

Nevertheless, Manuel Marin, the then Vice-President of the European Commission, suggested that the European Commission was to rely on negative measures only in extreme cases. He stated that “the idea was to trigger thinking and come up with coherent general lines of conduct for the relationships to be established between development cooperation policies, respecting and promoting human rights, and supporting the democratisation process in the developing countries”.\(^489\) Furthermore, Manuel Marin sustained that EU development policy “should help establish genuine democracy in the developing world and make these countries work more transparently, more openly, and more efficiently.”\(^490\) As a result, the political dimension provisions of Lomé Convention IV acquired additional support from the Council and the European Commission, which assisted to transform EU development policy towards Africa into an increasingly openly political enterprise based on the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

\(^{487}\) European Commission, ‘Human Rights, Democracy and Development Cooperation Policy’
\(^{489}\) Marin, Manuel, ‘Democracy Cannot be Imposed From the Outside’, The Courier, No. 128, July-August 1991, pp. 50
\(^{490}\) Marin, Manuel, ‘Democracy Cannot be Imposed From the Outside’, pp. 51
In 1992, the European Commission released a document restating the Union’s objectives in its relations with developing countries in the post-Cold War international system, which is commonly known as ‘Horizon 2000’. The European Commission’s communication served to identify the new role of the Union in a rapidly changing world, especially vis-à-vis developing countries, whereby it advocated the principle of conditionality as an applicable policy option for the future. While calling on the EU to define its role and priorities in the international system, it attempted to redraw the terms and principles of EU development cooperation, trade relations, aid disbursements, and geographical focus of its relations with developing countries. The embryonic self-perception of the EU as a potential global player served to substantiate the capacity of conditionality as a valuable instrument in future Africa-EU relations. Thus, the European Commission was to request its developing partners to fulfil specific criteria in their development cooperation programmes with a view to install what it regarded as truly democratic political systems across the developing world.

Horizon 2000 set the political tone of EU development policy towards Africa in the early 1990s. It represented the emergence of a distinct European Commission agenda concerning the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa. The Council declaration of 18 November 1992 substantiated the new vision for EU development policy. It maintained that EU development policy should ensure the promotion of sustainable economic and social development, support the integration of developing countries into the world economy, and focus on poverty reduction. For that purpose, “the Council favoured a differentiated approach reflecting the effectiveness of the countries’ own development efforts” that was to be combined with strong policy coordination within the Union and with other bilateral or multilateral donors. Thereby, Horizon 2000 combined with the aforementioned European Commission communication of 1991, and the Council declaration of 1992, to reinforce the political dimension of EU development policy towards Africa established under Lomé Convention IV.

Against the described background, the European Commission proceeded with the mid-term review of Lomé Convention IV in 1995. Article 5 and its related acts that covered the subjects of human rights, democracy, governance, and the rule of law were at the centre of the new changes.

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introduced by Lomé Convention IV (bis).\textsuperscript{493} The original Article 5 of Lomé Convention IV called for “respect and enjoyment of fundamental human rights”, and following its amendment in 1995, it added “the recognition and application of democratic principles, the consolidation of the rule of law, and governance” (Article 5 – Lomé Convention IV (bis)). Accordingly, and “with a view to supporting institutional and administrative reform, the resources provided for in the Financial Protocol for this purpose can be used to complement the measures taken by the ACP states concerned, in particular at the preparatory and start-up stage of the relevant projects and programmes” (Article 5 – Lomé Convention IV (bis)). In case of violation of the stated provisions, the new Article 366a stipulated the formal procedures to follow. It noted that “if one Party considers that another Party has failed to fulfil an obligation in respect to one of the essential elements referred to in Article 5, it shall invite the Party concerned, unless there is special urgency, to hold consultations with a view to assessing the situation in detail and, if necessary, remedying it” (Article 366a - Lomé Convention IV (bis)). At the end of the consultation period, “if in spite of all efforts no solution has been found (...) the Party which invoked the failure to fulfil an obligation may take appropriate steps, including, where necessary, the partial or full suspension of application of this Convention to the party concerned” (Article 366a - Lomé Convention IV bis). The new amendments to Article 5 lent a stronger political dimension to EU development policy towards Africa by adding conditionalities to the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation, which included the possible suspension of the agreement based on political matters. The political provisions of Lomé Convention IV (bis) marked a shift in EU development policy orientation that rendered it increasingly similar to the policy of development cooperation promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions.

The 1995 review of Lomé Convention IV concentrated largely on Article 5 and Article 366a regarding the political aspects of the agreement. However, the accord also produced provisions on the policy dialogue procedure between African states and the Union.\textsuperscript{494} It stated that both parties should establish “an enlarged policy dialogue (...) [which] may also take place outside this framework” (Article 30 - Lomé Convention IV bis). Hence, Article 30 provided additional support to the provisions introduced by Article 5 and Article 366a, and thereby assisted to both reinforce the politicisation of the Lomé cooperation system and refine a trend with its origins in the early-to-mid 1980s that conferred a new vision for the Africa-EU partnership.

\textsuperscript{493} \textbf{The Courier}, ‘Lomé Convention IV: As Revised by the Agreement Signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995’

Following the changes brought by Lomé Convention IV (bis), the prospect for Africa-EU relations was to alter significantly, and the end of the Lomé system was the most likely outcome. João de Deus Pinheiro, the then European Commissioner for Development, used a conference held by the European Commission in 1996 to announce officially that a new framework for development cooperation between Africa and the EU was a necessity resulting from the rapidly changing international political and economic conjuncture of the late 1980s and early 1990s. João de Deus Pinheiro considered that developing countries were under significant pressure due to the new challenges posed by the international system, and stated that “for the developing world they entail risks and opportunities (...) [and] in order to limit these risks and maximise the opportunities, wherever possible, we need to prepare ourselves. I consider a thorough preparation, of our relationship with the ACP countries in the 21st Century, crucial”.495 As a result, he advanced that following a period of consultation with all interested parties, he intended “to present in October of this year a green paper providing an early assessment”.496

In 1996, João de Deus Pinheiro presented the final version of the ‘Green Paper on Relations between the European Community and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century’, which set the foundations for the future of the Africa-EU partnership. Starting from the acknowledgement that ACP-EU relations were in the imminence of entering a new phase, the green paper alerted for the need to consider the new global environment and learn from the lessons of four decades of cooperation between the two parties. From that premise, the document suggested the strengthening of the political relationship between the EU and the ACP states, the integration of the ACP states into the world economy, the promotion of coordination mechanisms within the EU and vis-à-vis the ACP countries, the protection of the environment, and the participation of the Union in improving the ACP states’ institutional capacities.497 While not groundbreaking in terms of policy orientation, the green paper compiled in one document the European Commission’s progressive reforms of ACP-EU relations over the previous decade, which attested to its absolute politicisation and the endorsement of the principle of conditionality.

Thereafter, the Union proceeded with the further release of documents and statements that confirmed the setting of a new path for EU development policy towards Africa. In 1996, João de Deus Pinheiro asserted in a speech at the London School of Economics, that the “concept of good

497 European Commission, “Green Paper on Relations Between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century”
governance is back in favour as a chapeau covering a spectrum of desirable political, administrative and legal practices. As the basis of Article 5 of the Lomé Convention, it is the cornerstone of European development cooperation”. 498 Similarly, the European Commission and the Council issued two official notifications upholding the concepts of democratisation, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and good governance as the future pillars of EU development policy. 499 As a result, the framework for development cooperation between Africa and the EU became an increasingly political accord during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV.

From the concept of political neutrality under Lomé Convention I, Africa-EU relations evolved into an openly political agreement under Lomé Convention IV. Dieter Frisch, the former European Commissioner for Development, provided an accurate interpretation of the described policy evolution when confronted with a question from a journalist from The Courier regarding the political dimension of Lomé. He responded that “ten years on, my reply to that question is unhesitatingly positive: Lomé’s policy is obviously political!” 500 His perspective is illustrative of the evolutionary path of the Lomé Convention, which progressed from a technical economic development cooperation agreement based on political neutrality, to a treaty that acquired a political dimension as one of its central pillars.

The politicisation of EU development policy towards Africa evolved in relation with the changes in the international system and the progress of the discourse and practice of international development. Therein, the WB, the IMF, and OECD emerged as the architects of the political dimension and development norm, which they diffused subsequently to all international development actors. As an increasingly prominent international development actor, the European Commission established a close rapprochement with the stated IOs and used them as a reference in the inclusion of a political dimension to EU development policy towards Africa. An interviewed European Parliament Delegate to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly shared a similar opinion on the subject:

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500 Frisch, Dieter, ‘The Political Dimension of Lomé’, pp. 82
“Lomé became more and more political. It reflected the changes in the international system caused by the end of the Cold War. Then the big multilateral organisations adapted to it, and gradually we followed too. So one can say that the push for change was external”.501

As confirmed by the interviewee, the political turn in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa materialised in relation with the international structure of international development, especially the role played by its leading IOs. A respondent from the European Commission sustained an analogous perspective on the politicisation of EU development policy, noting that:

“Political dimension was only possible to deal with after the end of the Cold War. And what the EU did was to change its development policy according to the changes in the world context. So, yes, we can say that the EU was not a leader in that process”.502

Accordingly, and as corroborated by the interviewees, the incorporation of a political dimension in EU development policy followed the initiative taken by certain IOs in the structure of international development. The European Commission used the stated IOs as references in the politicisation of EU development policy, which confirmed their position as the architect and ‘gatekeepers’ of the political dimension and development norm in the domain of international development.

The inclusion of a political dimension in the discourse and practice of international development appeared directly related with the activities of some IOs in the field, especially the WB, the IMF, and the OECD. While the OECD provided an invaluable forum for debate on the politicisation of international development, the WB and the IMF assumed leadership in the subject resulting from their pressing needs to make development promotion increasingly effective. Under their particular agenda, both IOs (with prevalence for the WB) took on the challenge to restructure their policy approach that culminated with the launching of a broad policy reform that caused unparalleled impact in the structure of international development at the time. The evolution of a political dimension in the WB and the IMF’s development policy coincided with their proposed changes at the economic level following their pioneering structural adjustment programmes. The WB and the IMF became the principal agents for economic change and swiftly managed to translate their leadership onto the political sphere as well. Thereby, they confirmed their commanding status in the discourse and practice of international development.

In accordance with a similar diffusion and internalisation pattern to that observed in the interpretation of the integration of the structural adjustment norm in the EU policy of development

501 Interview, European Parliament, Brussels, 05 June 2006
502 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 2010
cooperation towards Africa, political dimension appeared as one of the leading features of Lomé Convention IV. The WB and the IMF devised the political dimension norm in 1981, and the OECD later joined them in campaigning for the integration of a political dimension in the promotion of development worldwide. Concomitantly, the European Commission established a close rapport with the WB and the IMF on numerous matters, including the political dimension of development promotion. As a result, and prior to the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, the Council publicly endorsed in a 1988 resolution the WB and the IMF as the European Commission’s central references in the incorporation of the political dimension and development norm in EU development policy towards Africa. The increasingly close relations between the European Commission and the Bretton Woods institutions established a direct channel for the diffusion of the political dimension and development norm. Therein, the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norm and subsequently integrated it in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

In the period before the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, the European Commission endorsed the progressive politicisation of its development cooperation partnership with Africa. The European Commission publicly acknowledged the WB and the IMF as the architects of the existing political dimension and development norm in the structure of international development, and confirmed the Bretton Woods institutions as its main reference in the integration of the political dimension norm in the Lomé Convention IV. The norm diffusion and internalisation processes appeared clearly observable in the analysis of the incorporation of the political dimension norm in EU development policy. Therefore, the analysis challenges the EU ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding its policy of development cooperation with Africa, and demonstrates that its approach was neither distinctive, nor leading in the domain of international development.

**Conclusions**

“It is true that in the course of the decades we have looked around at what others did, and so, we have taken ideas from elsewhere.”

The above observation by Dieter Frisch stands as a pertinent summary of the chapter’s findings. The chapter aimed to capture the shift of EU development policy in time and understand the process of its policy evolution in the period between 1989 and 2000. For that purpose, it proposed

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503 Interview – Dieter Frisch, Brussels, 12 March 2009
to capture what, how, and who caused that shift by incorporating the EU in the structure of international development comprehensive of the role performed by its comprising agents therein. As such, it assessed the shift of EU development policy during the proposed timeframe, comprehensive of the social structures that the Union integrates and the normative base that characterises them. The analysis’ ultimate objective was to test empirically the hypotheses of this thesis, which suggest that EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa is not ‘unique’ and does not play a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development, which the Union continually professes.

The chapter advanced that the new large norms characterising Lomé Convention IV – Structural Adjustment, Human Rights, the Environment, and Political Dimension – did not make EU development policy ‘unique’ and capable of performing a ‘leadership’ role in international development, insofar as the stated large norms pertained to the normative structure of international development prior to the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV. With a view to demonstrate the origin of the large norms in question, the chapter traced them to the structure of international development, specifically to certain IOs, which varied depending on the norm under consideration. Accordingly, the chapter illustrated that the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of the large norms under analysis were always certain IOs, most notably the WB, the IMF, the UN (through its various agencies), and the OECD, to the detriment of the European Commission. Subsequently, the chapter suggested that the aforementioned IOs diffused those norms in the structure of international development, which progressively affected the policy orientation of its comprising agents, such as the European Commission. In that manner, it argued that the European Commission ‘learnt’ those large norms from the above-mentioned IOs through a process of close cooperation and coordination that allowed those norms to permeate the EU process of development policy design and make EU development policy shift in time accordingly.

The traceability of the diffusion process of the norms under analysis appeared ‘more observable’ in certain cases than others. Nevertheless, the analysis confirmed the existence of a dynamic pattern between the evolution of a certain norm and the integration of that norm in EU development policy. The typical characteristic of the stated pattern was that the European Commission always followed the above-mentioned IOs in the inclusion of a certain norm as part of its development policy. Furthermore, the pattern also demonstrated that in the vast majority of cases the European Commission established an increasingly close relationship with the IOs that had assumed leadership in the promotion of a certain norm. Their close relationship confirmed the
existence of an information channel between the European Commission and the IOs, through which certain norms were diffused to the European Commission.

Recalling Frisch’s above observation, the chapter confirmed that EU development policy towards Africa in the period between 1989 and 2000 was not ‘unique’ and did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development. The chapter confirmed the existence of a shift in EU development policy during the suggested timeframe, and it also confirmed that the nature of the shift was not an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development. Instead, EU development policy emerged as a compilation of existing large development norms ‘learnt’ from certain IOs that comprised the structure of international development. With a view to test whether the identified trend continued thereafter, the next chapter focuses on the analysis of EU development policy towards Africa according to the same parameters and covers the initial mandate of the Cotonou Agreement, specifically the period between 2000 and 2008.
Chapter V – Normative Liaisons between the EU & International Organisations in the Structure of International Development: The Cotonou Agreement

“If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change”
– Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard

“Many men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be, pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin”
– Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
By endorsing the Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist framework of analysis, the ensuing chapter aims to proceed with the scrutiny of EU development policy since the end of the Cold War advanced in chapter four. Its objective is to complement the analysis of the subject by relying on the proposed approach and focusing on the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to capture the policy shift implemented by the accord and understand its evolution in the period between 2000 and 2008. For that purpose, it attempts to address what, how, and who caused the agreement’s policy orientation to shift by incorporating the EU in the structure of international development comprehensive of the role that its comprising agents performed therein. By doing so, it assesses the shift operated in EU development policy in the proposed time period inclusive of the social structures the Union integrates and the normative base that characterises them.

The understanding of EU behaviour expressed through its development policy towards Africa is at the centre of the analysis. The chapter focuses on the way certain large norms may have permeated the process of EU development policy design in time and reconstituted EU interests and preferences in its fabric of development cooperation with Africa. Therefore, it argues that the causal variable of EU interests and preferences formation in the design of its development policy regarding Africa may lie within the structure of the regime of international development it integrates, with its principal IOs operating as the norm diffusers therein. Through a focus on the European Commission features as the Union’s international representative, the chapter concentrates on its liaisons with the WB, the IMF, the UN (through various agencies, as specified below), the OECD, and the WTO in the structure of international development, and on how it affected EU development policy in the proposed timeframe. The chapter’s objective is to shed additional light on the understanding of the EU development policy shift in the period between 2000 and 2008, and
uncover its character by empirically testing the Union’s ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims concerning its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

The proposed approach to the interpretation of EU development policy advances a double-stranded take on the topic – structural and agency. The structural strand examines the shifts in EU behaviour and traces them to the stated IOs’ normative claims. The agency strand focuses on both how these IOs came to hold the normative views in question, and the mechanisms they relied on to ‘teach’ those views to the European Commission. As such, the conceptualisation of the norm cycle assumes an important role in the analysis. It focuses on how the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ certain norms from the IOs in question, and how it translated them subsequently into the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on how actors can create structures that take a life of their own, and how those structures can create and empower actors, who in turn may react to those structures for reasons of their own.

The introduction of the Cotonou Agreement on 23 June 2000 brought some changes to the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa at the turn of the twentieth century. The Cotonou Agreement’s major policy innovations were compiled in the treaty’s three main pillars – Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation. With the aim to understand the evolution of EU development policy in the suggested time period by relying on the proposed framework of analysis, the chapter begins from the analysis of the policy shifts in EU development policy encoded in the three main pillars of the Cotonou Agreement. Thereafter, it traces the shifts to the stated IOs normative claims and establishes how the IOs acquired their normative views.

For that purpose, the chapter juxtaposes the evolutionary process of each of the IOs’ normative claims in the domain of international development with the EU adoption of an identical norm in its development policy vis-à-vis Africa. Therein, it evaluates the evolution of both processes against each other in time with a view to define where and when the norm in question originated. Following the comparison between the progress of the normative basis of EU development policy encoded in the three pillars of the Cotonou Agreement and the aforementioned IOs’ normative claims, the chapter draws attention to the existence of a pattern in the way the two processes evolved in relation to each other during the considered timeframe. The resulting pattern regarding

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the evolution of both processes illustrated how the EU seemed to systematically follow the stated IOs in the promotion of new paradigms in the discourse and practice of international development.

In consideration of the identified pattern, the analysis proceeds with the traceability of the shift in EU development policy to the normative claims advanced by the above-mentioned IOs. It assesses the mechanisms whereby the IO’s normative claims may have been diffused to the European Commission and thereby affected the design of EU development policy. Accordingly, it observes that the norm diffusion between the stated IOs and the European Commission seems to have materialised through a variety of channels and mechanisms. Central to that procedure was: a) the European Commission membership of the IOs; b) the expanding European Commission rapprochement with the activities of the IOs following its renewed ambition to become a global player in the post-Maastricht era; c) and, the growing number of development accords and partnerships struck between the European Commission and the IOs in the recent past. As a result, the chapter confirms that the EU development policy shift in the period in question originated from the Union’s ‘learning’ of new development norms promoted previously by the IOs in the field of international development. Hence, it openly challenges the EU’s recurrent ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding its development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

In line with the proposed analytical framework, the following section presents a detailed examination of the Cotonou Agreement and the three new policy pillars it implemented as the basis of contemporary Africa-EU relations – Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation. Subsequently, a brief final section discusses the results of the empirical analysis of the evolutionary character of EU development policy in the period between 2000 and 2008 regarding the Union’s recurrent ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims concerning its policy of development cooperation towards Africa.


The introduction of the Cotonou Agreement on 23 June 2000 marked the beginning of a new era for the Africa-EU development cooperation partnership. Following four renewals of the Lomé Convention in the twenty-five year period spanning from 1975 to 2000, the Cotonou Agreement brought a fresh change to EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa at the turn of the century. However, the treaty was not a clear break with the past, but rather, the formalisation of the re-
orientation process of EU development policy implemented in the 1990s under the mandate of Lomé Convention IV. Through a mixture of elements of continuity and change, the Cotonou Agreement endorsed the Lomé Convention IV’s innovative policy directives and instituted further reform of the Africa-EU partnership regarding its terms of trade, aid, and political conditions. The Cotonou Agreement’s framework for development cooperation appeared compiled in three new complementary policy pillars – Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation – setting a distinct tone to Africa-EU relations in the 21st century. Formally concluded for a period of twenty years, the accord was to undergo revision every five years. The main aim of the Cotonou Agreement was to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, which was consistent with the objectives of sustainable development, and then gradually integrate the ACP countries into the world economy.

The conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 reflected the EU’s attempt to adapt its development policy regarding Africa to a rapidly changing world following the end of the Cold War. In combination with the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht and some significant internal reforms, the Union attempted to adjust to the post-Cold War international system by reforming its external relations capacities. It sought to accommodate its development cooperation partnership with Africa to the remodelling character of international development at the time. Whilst Lomé Convention IV echoed some of the leading international development paradigms of the late 1980s, the Cotonou Agreement emerged as an EU attempt to integrate the changing discourse and practice of international development in its development partnership with Africa in the twenty-first century. Poul Nielson, the Commissioner for Development during the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, sustained an identical position on what prompted change in EU development policy. He asserted that the objective of the European Commission with the new accord was to make “Community development policy part of this broader framework of international cooperation”.505

The first indication of the post-Lomé orientation of EU development policy began to materialise in early 1995 through the activities of a European Commission reflection group. In that year, and prior to the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV (bis), the European Commission set up a reflection group called ‘Partnership 2000’ under the direction of Bernard Petit, then the Director-General for Development of DG VIII, with the objective to evaluate the future trends of EU

development policy. The findings of ‘Partnership 2000’ came to set the basis for a new EU approach to its relations with Africa. In a report from a meeting held on 21-22 February 1995 in Maastricht, Netherlands, ‘Partnership 2000’ advanced three major concerns in the definition of the future of EU development policy. First, the impact caused by the end of the Cold War on the international system. Second, the success of the Uruguay Round’s on the future of international trade. Finally, the significance of the emerging paradigms in international development practice and discourse that centred both on economic reform beyond classic structural adjustment programmes, and on the management of the democratisation process in the developing world. The reflection exercise undertaken by ‘Partnership 2000’ culminated with the publication of the 1996 green paper on the future of Africa-EU relations, which formally set a new horizon for EU development policy in the 21st century. Its principal proposition was that EU development policy should promote the “integration of the poor into the economic and social life and the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy”. It advocated a thorough reformation of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa, and it emphasised the need to make it “extensible to fresh areas of cooperation”.

Subsequently, at a conference held at the Society for International Development in Amsterdam, Netherlands on 27 March 2000, Poul Nielson presented the new EU vision for the future of its development policy towards Africa in the new century. In a speech entitled ‘How to Join the Mainstream’, Poul Nielson stated that the Union aimed to “get it right this time”, and for that effect it would “be relating to what donors do” because “the Community must bring its specific competence to the service of the internationally agreed strategy”. Moreover, Poul Nielson drew attention to how “all donors have reviewed, or are in the process of reviewing, their policies in line with the new major texts adopted in UN conferences and their follow-up and in line with the OECD”. Therefore, he suggested that the Union was to undergo a similar exercise in the reformation of its partnership with Africa. Therein, it became increasingly apparent that the

512 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – European Development Policy: How to Join the Mainstream’
513 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – European Development Policy: How to Join the Mainstream’
pressures of the post-Cold War international system and the changing discourse and practice of international development were to play a crucial role in the EU design of its development policy regarding Africa.

Finally, on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, the Union announced the launching of the new development cooperation agreement with Africa. At the opening ceremony, Poul Nielsen confirmed that it represented the conclusion of “a long process which started with the publication of the Green Paper by the Commission”.\(^\text{514}\) He asserted that the process had been a success, which illustrated the existence of “a true and deep relationship between the North and the South” in the form of the Africa-EU partnership.\(^\text{515}\) As a result, the new Africa-EU partnership symbolised “the beginning of a new era (…) based on a profound reform of its spirit, objectives, and practice”.\(^\text{516}\) Furthermore, and when addressing the discourse and practice of international development at the time, Poul Nielsen stressed that “the strategy adopted by the DAC of the OECD, the World Bank Comprehensive Development Framework, and the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers play a key role” therein. He flagged these IOs & some of their initiatives as potential policy references in the EU reformation of its framework for development cooperation with Africa.\(^\text{517}\)

The newly established Cotonou Agreement introduced considerable changes in Africa-EU relations, which adapted it to the emerging international development agenda of the twenty-first century. It aimed to “promote and expedite the economic, cultural, and social development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promote a stable and democratic political environment” (Article 1 – Cotonou Agreement). It advanced that the “partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (Article 1 – Cotonou Agreement). Consistently with the stated goals, the treaty established a set of fundamental objectives that were to guide the new Africa-EU partnership – equality of partners and ownership of development strategies, participation, dialogue and mutual obligations, and differentiation and regionalisation (Article 2 – Cotonou Agreement). Moreover, the concepts of gender, the environment, and institutional development and capacity

\(^{514}\) *Europa - Press Releases (RAPID)*, ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Signing Ceremony, Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000’, SPEECH/00/241, 26 June 2000

\(^{515}\) *Europa - Press Releases (RAPID)*, ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Signing Ceremony, Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000’

\(^{516}\) *Europa - Press Releases (RAPID)*, ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Signing Ceremony, Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000’

\(^{517}\) *Europa - Press Releases (RAPID)*, ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – Development Policy Priorities of the European Commission’
building emerged as thematic and crosscutting issues that were to “be applied and integrated at every level of the partnership” (Article 1 – Cotonou Agreement).

The agreement conformed to the new set of objectives and principles that characterised Africa-EU relations. It introduced a new structure for the partnership based on three complementary policy pillars – Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation. These pillars formed the foundation of the accord, and thus, compiled a distinct policy orientation for the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa. As the pillars of the new Africa-EU framework for development cooperation, they were to stand interrelated and in harmony with each other as a means to foment a coherent and multidimensional development approach from the Union towards its African partners in the new century.

The reformation process of the EU development cooperation partnership with Africa in 2000 converted the end of the Cold War and the altering discourse and practice of international development into primary references therein, as confirmed by ‘Partnership 2000’ and Poul Nielson. Despite the acknowledgment of the external references in the design of its new partnership with Africa in the new century, the Union recurrently maintains that its development policy is ‘unique’ and plays a ‘leadership’ role in the practice and discourse of international development. Accordingly, and some years following the publication of the findings of ‘Partnership 2000’, Bernard Petit attested in 2000 that the “Cotonou Agreement is the only one of its kind in the world”. Similarly, Poul Nielson went on to state at a conference held on 11 November 2002 at the Prague University of Economics in Prague, Czech Republic on the challenges of international development in the 21st century, that “the European Union is now the major actor in international cooperation and development”. The EU’s position, often publicly upheld by some of its top officials, openly assumes that EU development policy is ‘unique’ and plays a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development in disregard of the normative basis of its development cooperation apparatus, and the origin of the norms that characterise it.

As illustrated above, the impetus for change in EU development policy regarding Africa at the turn of the century appears to have come from external sources, namely the end of the Cold War and the changing discourse and practice of international development. Contrary to the Union’s common public standing on the character and role of its development policy towards Africa under

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518 Petit, Bernard, ‘The Cotonou Agreement is the Only One of Its Kind in the World’, The Courier (Special Issue on the Cotonou Agreement), September 2000, pp. 18
519 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – World Solidarity and Global Stability: The Role of the EU Development Policy’, SPEECH/02/564, 11 November 2002
the Cotonou Agreement, an interviewed European Commission official concurred that the source for change of EU development policy in the new century was of external origin.

“Yes, I have no doubt about that! We cannot pretend that an agreement is changing the world, but it is the world that it is changing an agreement. That is clear to me. I was involved in negotiating Cotonou and also its revision and this was obvious throughout”.  

Accordingly, the ensuing chapter takes into consideration the potential impact of the external environment and its constituent agents in shaping the EU framework for development cooperation with Africa under the principles of the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, the ensuing sub-sections concentrate on the interpretation of the evolution of EU development policy during the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement with the aim to capture what, how, and who may have caused it to shift in time. By relying on Martha Finnemore framework of analysis, each sub-section corresponds to one of the three new policy pillars and examines the innovations of the new Africa-EU partnership. For that purpose, the analysis incorporates the EU (represented by the European Commission) in the structure of international development comprehensive of the role performed by its comprising agents therein (the WB, the IMF, the UN (through its various agencies), the OECD, and the WTO). By doing so, it attempts to comprehend the process of EU development policy design, especially regarding how certain large norms may have permeated it in time and affected EU interests and preferences in its development cooperation with Africa. The analysis assesses the shift in EU development policy in the period between 2000 and 2008, and tests the EU’s ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding its policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

1.1 Political Dimension

The introduction of the Political Dimension as one of the three pillars of the Cotonou Agreement became one of the standard innovations of the renewed Africa-EU framework for development cooperation. Lomé Convention IV instigated the politicisation process of the development partnership between Africa and the Union, with the Cotonou Agreement subsequently instituting political elements as integral to the reformed EU development policy towards Africa. The new agreement placed political issues at the centre of the Africa-EU partnership and established specific mechanisms to maintain and improve a continuous political dialogue between both parties.

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520 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 02 December 2008
Similar to the position assumed on the matter during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV, the Union advanced the expanded political breadth of the Cotonou Agreement as an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development. Louis Michel, the then European Commissioner for Development, advanced a similar understanding of the EU’s position on the matter. In a speech in 2005, he announced that “the European Union is committed to do more, better, faster… We have taken the political lead in development to make poverty history”. However, the integration of political concerns in development as a concept was a feature of the normative structure of international development prior to the introduction of the Cotonou Agreement. As demonstrated in chapter four’s Political Dimension sub-section, the architects of the norm were the WB and the IMF in 1981. Thereafter, they progressively diffused it in the structure of international development and affected the policy orientation of its constituent actors. The norm underwent further reinvigoration in the discourse and practice of international development in the 1990s and into the new century under the leadership on the issue by the OECD as well as the UN system following the launching of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative. Accordingly, the ensuing sub-section suggests that the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norm in question from the structure of international development through a process of increasingly close cooperation with the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN, and subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy regarding Africa in the twenty-first century.

The reach of the political dimension ascribed to the Cotonou Agreement was unprecedented in the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation. Nevertheless, it followed the increasingly stronger politicisation of the partnership set in motion during the Lomé Conventions, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. The political formula ascribed to Africa-EU relations underwent an evolutionary transformation and culminated with the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. The milestones of the politicisation process of EU development policy are: the principle of political neutrality under Lomé Convention I, the Pisani Memorandum of 1982, the ‘policy dialogue’ initiative of Lomé Convention III, and Article 5 of Lomé Convention IV (inclusive of its revision in 1995). With the reformed EU development policy towards Africa based upon three major policy pillars, Political Dimension became one of the foundations of the new Africa-EU development partnership in the twenty-first century.

In line with the legacy of the Lomé Conventions regarding the political breath of Africa-EU relations, the Cotonou Agreement set the basis for its Political Dimension policy pillar in the Title II

521 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Are Developed Countries Hitting the Millennium Development Goals’, SPEECH/05/534, Brussels, 22 September 2005
(Articles 8-13) of the accord. In accordance with its provisions, political dialogue was the central precept to the functioning of the partnership allowing both parties “to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas” (Article 8(2) – Cotonou Agreement). Thus, the two parties were to cooperate closely on a variety of issues with a view to “contribute to peace, security, and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment” (Article 8(3) – Cotonou Agreement).

Political dialogue assumed a crucial footing in the Cotonou Agreement. However, not all political elements acquired the same degree of significance in Africa-EU relations. Political elements appeared arranged under a fundamental and essential classification that established an elaborate hierarchy of the political aspects of the relationship. With the Africa-EU development cooperation framework “directed towards sustainable development centred on the human person”, the Cotonou Agreement instituted “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rules of law (…) [as] essential elements”, and “good governance (…) [as] a fundamental element” of the partnership (Article 9 – Cotonou Agreement). The separation of certain political elements into fundamental and essential categories was not the product of the Union’s mere linguistic considerations, but rather, from the necessity to make the Cotonou Agreement compatible with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\footnote{United Nations, ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 23 May 1969} Under Article 60(3.a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty” constitutes “a material breach of the treaty”. Under Article 60(1) of the same agreement, “a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part”. Therefore, the breach of any essential element of the Cotonou Agreement could incur in the suspension of the accord whereas the same principle would not be directly applicable in case of breach of any fundamental element.

Lomé Convention IV (bis) already comprised the conditionality clause in an embryonic format, yet the Cotonou Agreement integrated it comprehensively into the Africa-EU partnership, specifically under the formulations of Article 96. Before proceeding to the potential suspension of the agreement, either partially or fully, both parties were to cooperate in joint consultation operations, and only when “consultation[s] do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties (…) appropriate measures may be taken” (Article 96(2.b) – Cotonou Agreement). By appropriate
measures, the agreement refers to “measures taken in accordance with international law and proportional to the violation” in cause (Article 96(2.c) – Cotonou Agreement).

Unlike the subjects of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, good governance appeared in the treaty as a fundamental element that warranted distinct procedures in case of breach. The driving force behind the division of the political dimension of the partnership into fundamental and essential elements came mainly from the ACP states’ resolute position concerning the subject of good governance during the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement. While accepting it as a core issue in the political formula of the new accord, ACP countries expressed their overt opposition to the inclusion of good governance as an essential element of the partnership in light of its legal weight in international law. Despite making sure that good governance did not incorporate the Cotonou Agreement as an essential element, ACP states still accepted the Union’s proposal to apply ‘appropriate measures’ in extreme cases of serious corruption, as subsequently stipulated by Article 97.

Security and migration issues became of equal and significant importance in Africa-EU relations as features of the Political Dimension pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. Security concerns appeared integrated in the political dialogue initiative, and they instituted a bridge between the two parties, as a means “to promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts” as well as “take full account of the objective of peace and democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of cooperation” (Article 8(5) – Cotonou Agreement). The attachment of the provision to the agreement was vastly consensual amongst all parties, nonetheless, the same level of accord failed to emerge on migration matters. Similar to the debate on good governance, the ACP states took a firm standing on the subject of migration during negotiations, which limited the breath of its provisions under the Cotonou Agreement. Nevertheless, both parties still agreed on a variety of topics of a highly sensitive nature, specifically “the return of and readmission of nationals who are illegally present on the territory of an ACP State (…) [or] of a Member State of the European Union, at [either’s] request and without further formalities” (Article 13(5.c) – Cotonou Agreement).

The Political Dimension pillar of the Cotonou Agreement conferred an innovative character to the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. However, the link between political concerns and development was part of the normative structure of international development for some time prior to the conclusion of the treaty. The integration of the political concerns and development norm in international development evolved in close relation with the WB and the
IMF’s approach to development during the 1980s, and the OECD and the UN System towards the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, the integration of political concerns in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa appears to have progressed in direct relation with one of the leading paradigms of international development of the time.

As the Political Dimension sub-section of the preceding chapter demonstrated, the politicisation of international development dates back to the early 1980s. It followed the approach to development promotion advocated then by the WB and the IMF. Subsequently, the OECD and the UN System generated a new momentum in the integration of political issues in the discourse and practice of international development, which culminated with the creation of a global partnership for development under the auspices of the UN – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs emerged as an unprecedented international initiative, launched by the UN in 2000. They comprised eight specific development goals to be achieved by 2015, and endorsed by one-hundred and ninety two UN member states and twenty-three international organisations.

In the run up to the MDGs initiative, and the increasing politicisation of international development, the OECD became of particular relevance since it guided much of the debate on the issue during the 1990s. From the beginning of the 1990s, the OECD became instrumental in the incorporation of a political code in the paradigm of international development with its 1991 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) High-Level Meeting standing as a the first solid platform in that process. At the 1991 meeting, all DAC members endorsed democratic values, policy dialogue, respect for human rights, government’s accountability to its citizens, and good governance as crucial elements in the promotion of international development. Support for the creation of democratic structures in developing countries was to exclude the single model approach to development practised thus far and embrace a model capable of legitimising the political, economic, social, and cultural specificities of each country instead. In accordance with an OECD publication from 1993, respect for the rule of law, public sector management, corruption control, and reducing excessive military expenditure were the new basis of a balanced approach to development promotion.

In support of its already leading role in the campaign for the inclusion of political concerns in international development assistance, the OECD issued in 1996 a new report that soon became a

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525 OECD, ‘DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance’, OECD/GD (93) 191, 1993
landmark in the subject’s discourse and practice - ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’. The OECD’s initiative resulted in the launching of a set of procedures known as International Development Goals (IDGs), to set a new agenda for international development cooperation. “Good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law” featured as the primary goals of this novel approach to sustainable development worldwide. The stated outline for development promotion soon gathered consensus amongst the international development community, and the UN relied on it as the normative platform of its MDGs initiative in 2000.

Concomitantly, and just before the end of the 1990s, the WB started to devise a new development planning method to secure support for the principles of ownership, partnership, good governance, and the close control of technical results in a country’s development process. Following a period of numerous consultations in multiple countries across the five continents, the WB published the final version of its innovative take on development promotion. Its report became one of the flagships of international development assistance at the time. Under the label ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’, the WB plan aimed to guarantee the promotion of sustainable development according to an approach that was sensitive to economic and financial matters as well as structural and social issues. The principles of country-ownership and partnership were at the centre of its strategy. Whilst proposing the creation of country-specific models as the most adequate means of development cooperation, the WB approach called for all internal and external donors to work closely together in the implementation of development projects.

As the WB, the IMF, and the OECD generated new momentum in the politicisation of international development, the UN and its relevant agencies maintained the subject at the top of the international agenda gathered universal consensus in the drawing of a novel take on the concept of development for the twenty-first Century. On 6-8 September 2000, the world’s leaders and various

530 The stated initiatives prepared the ground for the introduction of the WB and IMF-sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in September 1999. The PRSPs drew inspiration from the Comprehensive Development Framework principles integrating poverty reducing policies into a coherent, growth oriented macroeconomic framework. As with the Comprehensive Development Framework, national governments are responsible for the preparation of PRSPs with the participation of domestic and external partners. External partners are encouraged to assist governments in preparing PRSPs, and to link their development efforts to them. A PRSP must be broadly endorsed by the boards of the WB and the IMF in order to provide a basis for both institutions’ programs in low income countries, and for countries to obtain debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative; World Bank, “Comprehensive Development Framework: Meeting the Promise”, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2001)
international organisations met in New York City, USA at the UN Millennium Summit, and agreed
then on the formulation of a new and ambitious global development programme.\textsuperscript{531} Under the
pennant of the UN Millennium Declaration, all signatory parties agreed to establish a new worldwide
partnership, with the aim to reduce poverty according to eight specific development targets to be
achieved by 2015 that were presented as the MDGs.\textsuperscript{532} Comprising most of the commitments made
by the international community at the UN conferences of the 1990s, the eight MDGs embodied the
interdependence between growth, poverty reduction, and sustainable development, and proclaimed
development indissociable from democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights,
and peace and security.\textsuperscript{533} The MDGs came to symbolise both the completion of a cycle in the
evolution of the discourse and practice of international development in the post-Cold War period,
and the beginning of a new era for the discipline at the eve of the twenty-first Century.

The MDGs initiative produced unprecedented international consensus and brought one-
hundred and eighty-nine states together under a common objective. Furthermore, and it equally
stimulated the fine-tuning of the policy orientation of the leading agents of international
development, namely the WB, the IMF, the OECD, the UN (and its agencies), and later the WTO.
Despite the already broad policy alignment of the stated IOs during the 1990s, the MDGs soon
became their major policy reference, and infiltrated all their respective agendas. As a result, the
MDGs initiative advanced closer levels of cooperation amongst all international development actors,
and set international development discourse and practice into a particular course at the beginning of
the new millennium.

Concomitantly, the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement conferred an unprecedented
political reach to Africa-EU relations. The previous chapter demonstrated how there was an
increasingly stronger politicisation of the Lomé Conventions in time. Therein, it emphasised the
importance of political matters in the design of a future development partnership between Africa
and the Union. Correspondingly, and before the launching of negotiations of the Cotonou
Agreement, João de Deus Pinheiro, then the Commissioner for Development, sustained that the
international political environment of the late 1990s created the conditions “to rethink and

\textsuperscript{531} \textit{United Nations Press Briefing}, ‘Millennium Summit First Round Table Press Conference Chaired by the President
of Singapore’, Document Number - 20000906, 06 September 2000
\textsuperscript{533} Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2. Achieve universal primary
for development; \textit{United Nations}, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’
fundamentally adapt our [development] policy”.\textsuperscript{534} For that purpose, he stressed that EU development policy “must be seen as an essential feature of the EU’s presence in the world (...) promoting a stable and democratic political environment conducive to fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and good governance.”\textsuperscript{535} Accordingly, political aspects became a central concern in the negotiations of the new Africa-EU partnership, which culminated with their integration in the Cotonou Agreement as one of its main policy pillars.

Gradually, the European Commission’s redrawing of EU development policy orientation vis-à-vis Africa acquired a more robust political dimension and lent it an element of innovation in itself. Nevertheless, and as demonstrated above, the politicisation of EU development was also a reflection of one of the then growing trends in international development discourse and practice. A new paradigm was emerging in international development in line with the policy drive of some of the leading actors in the field – the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN – suggesting the existence of a possible dynamics between the two processes. João de Deus Pinheiro advanced a similar understanding of the matter and confirmed that the European Commission’s endorsement of a political approach in its development policy was largely a manifestation of its integration in the structure of international development. According to João de Deus Pinheiro, the politicisation of EU development policy was “not a new idea and all the members of the DAC of the OECD [were] committed to a specific target in this regard”.\textsuperscript{536} Furthermore, the European Commission asserted that “Community development policy is part of an international strategy where a comprehensive view is emerging. The strategy adopted by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, in which the Community takes part, has a key role in international coordination efforts. Other initiatives go in the same direction – such as the World Bank Comprehensive Development Framework or the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.”\textsuperscript{537} Accordingly, the European Commission’s endorsement of a political approach in EU development policy emerged as an expression of its integration in the structure of international development, and in the international policy coordination initiatives undertaken by the WB, the IMF, and the OECD. By doing so, it reformulated the Africa-EU partnership and conferred it a markedly political dimension following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement.


\textsuperscript{535} Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by João de Deus Pinheiro - The Future of the European Union’s Development Programme’

\textsuperscript{536} Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by João de Deus Pinheiro - The Future of the European Union’s Development Programme’

Subsequently, the European Commission announced its aspiration to bolster the political formula of its policy of development assistance in a statement of intent in November 2000.\textsuperscript{538} Departing from the premise that “the Community [had] become a major player in development”, it stressed the necessity to define a clear and consistent future strategy for EU development policy. Therein, it considered that “the international development aims, as defined in particular in the DAC of the OECD, the results of major international conferences and the principles enshrined in the Treaty establishing the Community form the basis of that strategy, which is designed to cover all developing countries which have cooperation and partnership links with the Community.”\textsuperscript{539} By maintaining a direct reference to the structure of international development and the policy advocated by its leading agents, the European Commission progressed with the politicisation of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement.

In line with the policy statement of November 2000, the European Commission continued to reinforce the political aspects of EU development policy, which set the subject of governance as one of its major flagships. The subjects of human rights, democracy and the rule law were enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement as essential elements and thus included in every ACP-EU cooperation initiative. However, good governance underwent a scrupulous renovation thereafter, and assumed an increasingly central standing in the political dimension of the partnership. The first concerted measure emerged in the form of a European Commission white paper on ‘European Governance’ on 27 July 2001. With the aim to address governance in all aspects of EU policy, the paper proposed the EU should “look beyond Europe and contribute to the debate on global governance” with a view to “apply the principles of good governance to its global responsibilities”.\textsuperscript{540} Accordingly, the European Commission was to “improve the dialogue with governmental and non-governmental actors of third countries when developing policy proposals with an international dimension” as well as review “the Union’s international representation in order to allow it to speak more often with a single voice”.\textsuperscript{541} In support of the 2001 European Commission white paper, and following a similar tone, the European Council used the European Council Meeting in Laeken, Belgium on 14-15 December 2001 to make a further commitment to the promotion of good governance at the level of EU external relations. At the event, the European Council produced a document on ‘The Future of the European Union’, where it advanced that the Union was to “play a stabilising role worldwide, to

\textsuperscript{538} European Commission, “The European Community’s Development Policy: Statement by the Council and the Commission”
\textsuperscript{539} European Commission, “The European Community’s Development Policy: Statement by the Council and the Commission”, pp. 6
\textsuperscript{541} European Commission, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’
shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation and to seek to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development”.542

The increasingly bolder EU pledge to the promotion of governance worldwide soon translated into all its external relations activities including development assistance. Following the mentioned directives, the European Commission reinforced the incorporation of good governance in the EU policy of development cooperation according to a comprehensive formula for which there was no internationally agreed definition. In a communication entitled ‘Governance and Development’ of 20 October 2003, the European Commission attempted to define governance as “the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context”.543 The definition of governance illustrated its broad character and provided essentially a practical terminology “used as a basic measure of quality and performance of any political/administrative system”.544 Under the proposed guidelines, “achieving good governance [became] a process. Therefore, as long as good governance [had] not been achieved, pragmatic approaches [had to] be pursued to support progress”.545 In the implementation of the governance process in EU development policy, the European Commission reiterated the number of key areas on which to direct its support: poverty reduction, ownership, policy dialogue, security, human rights, corruption, migration, budget support, trade, and the business sector. The focus on the stated topics within the framework of good governance fitted a country-owned approach to development assistance endorsed by the European Commission since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in recognition of the primary responsibility of national authorities and the role of domestic policies.

Whilst EU development policy acquired a progressively stronger political angle, the European Commission attempted to extend the same drive to the relations it maintained with all specific regional groupings, including Africa. In this perspective, the European Commission established for the first time in its history an EU policy strategy for Africa alone.546 Similar to the

544 European Commission, ‘Governance and Development’
545 European Commission, ‘Governance and Development’
then emerging trend in EU external relations, the EU Strategy for Africa acquired an openly political breath. The basis of its strategy rested upon establishing a close rapport with the African Union (AU) with a view to promote peace and security, and human rights and governance because “without peace there can be no lasting development” and “successful development requires adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law”.\(^{547}\) Departing from the stated postulate, the EU Strategy for Africa called for a close cooperation between the EU and the AU based on the canons of equality, partnership, ownership, subsidiarity, solidarity, and dialogue. The strategy’s political angle remained crucial to its success as “security [had] become a top priority worldwide since 11 September 2001” and good governance and human rights a prerequisite for sustainable development.\(^{548}\)

As a result, the concept of governance acquired a pivotal role in EU development policy in general, and vis-à-vis Africa, and the ACP states in particular. Accordingly, on 30 August 2006 the European Commission launched a new initiative in the attempt to harmonise the inclusion of governance matters at all levels of EU external relations with a special focus on Africa.\(^{549}\) The proposal’s objective was to develop gradually a coherent approach to the promotion of all aspects of democratic governance, which made the concept of governance per se one of the cornerstones of EU development policy. The initiative confirmed the European Commission’s pledge to support good governance programmes as a means to “build the capacities of the African Union and of regional and national institutions in Africa and to support African efforts to improve and monitor governance through dialogue and consultation with its African partners”.\(^{550}\) The focus on the African region acquired a three-level approach – pan-African, regional, and national – in the attempt to extend it to all development cooperation activities between the two parties.

The Strategy for Africa was the primary focus of the new framework for cooperation between the EU and the AU, and marked a new momentum in EU-Africa relations. From the beginning of 2007, the EU and the AU agreed to start negotiations on a future joint policy strategy to establish a platform for cooperation based on a shared political vision and practical approach to development promotion. The EU and the AU called on the principles of mutual respect, common interests, and ownership through their announcement to adopt a new policy strategy at the EU-

\(^{547}\) European Commission, ‘EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development’


\(^{550}\) European Commission, ‘Governance in the European Consensus on Development - Towards a Harmonised Approach within the European Union’
Africa Summit in Lisbon on 8-9 December 2007 – The Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (JAES). At the event, both parties to the agreement announced an action plan for 2008-2010 based on eight thematic partnerships: a) peace and security; b) democratic governance and human rights; c) trade, regional integration and infrastructure; d) millennium development goals; e) energy; f) climate change; g) migration, mobility, and employment; and, h) science, information society and space. Following an equally political orientation, the JAES proposed the strengthening of democratic governance and human rights as a means to ensure the promotion of equitable and sustainable development. The main goal was to enable a “comprehensive continent-to-continent dialogue and cooperation on aspects and concepts such as local capacity strengthening, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, democratic principles, the rule of law and equitable access to legal systems, management of natural resources, the fight against corruption and fraud, accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, global governance, and security sector reform”. The partnership represented a multi-level approach to governance and human rights promotion within the new Africa-EU strategy. Therein, both parties pledged to incorporate civil society as an integral element of the partnership as a means to ensure a high level of transparency and accountability.

Building on the foundations of the Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement set a new basis for Africa-EU relations that attributed it with a comprehensive political dimension. The turn of the century marked the beginning of a new era for the Africa-EU partnership according to a format built upon a strong political formula. With the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law enshrined in the agreement as essential elements, the European Commission directed its focus thereafter on the prescript of governance in the Africa-EU partnership. Progressively, governance acquired a central role in the relations between the two parties. The various policy initiatives launched since 2000 by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union are pertinent examples of governance’s central role in EU development policy, which political breath of the Africa-EU cooperation framework expanded exponentially. Therein, the European Commission drew a broad strategy for Africa and attempted for the first time to have a clear policy orientation towards the region based on a partnership of equals between the EU and the AU. The JAES became a landmark in the relations between the EU and Africa, and it acquired a wide political angle by setting governance one of its main pillars.

As the 1990s unfolded, the European Commission announced the creation of a new future framework for development cooperation with Africa. It expanded on the trends of Lomé Convention IV and incorporated a new global vision for EU development policy. By then, political concerns had assumed a leading position in the relations between Africa and the EU, as illustrated in the Political Dimension sub-section in the chapter four of the thesis. Upon the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the Africa-EU development partnership acquired a three-pillar structure, with Political Dimension becoming one of its integral parts. As the Africa-EU relationship progressed in time, it incorporated an increasingly stronger political breath in line with the evolution of a link between political concerns and development as part of the normative structure of international development. The principal references for the European Commission in that process were the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN System under the MDGs initiative. The sub-section on Political Dimension in chapter four suggested that the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ the political concerns and development norm from the WB, the IMF, and the OECD, and subsequently integrated it in EU developing policy regarding Africa under Lomé Convention IV. The current sub-section expands on that argument by contending that the same trend persisted thereafter. It argues that the European Commission drew a close rapport with the leading IOs in international development on the subject and maintained an increasingly closer policy alignment with them through a more active participation in their activities as well as the conclusion of development joint accords and partnerships. Hence, it challenges the EU’s recurrent ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. It demonstrates that its character is neither ‘unique’, nor plays a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of political concerns and development in the dominion of international development.

The Political Dimension sub-section of chapter four illustrated that the EU and WB joint programme of cooperation in the sub-Saharan Africa region, and the European Commission’s membership of the OECD were the main references in the rapprochement between the politicisation of EU development policy and the normative structure of international development in the 1990s. Similarly, a distinct set of agreements, meetings, and partnerships with some UN agencies and the WB maintained the same trend into the new century. A milestone in the process was the European Commission’s rapprochement with the UN System after 2001. The European Commission attempted to strengthen the Union’s international status by establishing close relations with the UN and its agencies with a development portfolio. As a result, the European Commission

stimulated the improvement of the policy coordination levels on development assistance between the two institutions. An interviewed United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) official lent an analogous take on the impact of the 2001 EU initiative on EU-UN relations:

“The EU and the UN became much closer entities after the 2001 communication published by the European Commission. The sharing of resources, vision, and policy coherence became the most important issues in our cooperation. Since then one can say that our cooperation has increased dramatically”.

As confirmed by the interviewee, EU-UN relations improved considerably after 2001 based on a common vision regarding the promotion of development worldwide.

As a result, a new platform for closer relations was established between the two institutions in 2001. Therein, Poul Nielson vowed to renew the European Commission’s commitment to the relationship with the UN System in the same year at a Joint Meeting of the Executive Boards of UNDP, UNFPA, and UNICEF in New York on 26 January. He affirmed that the European Commission places “high priority upon intensifying and enhancing its relations with the United Nations in the field of development”. Furthermore, Poul Nielson acknowledged that the new character of the Africa-EU partnership drew direct inspiration from the UN’s “past experiences and reflects an evolution of the political dimension”. Cooperation with the UN became a priority for the European Commission at all levels at the time. In the words of Poul Nielson, the European Commission’s objective was to create a balance between “the added value and the core capabilities of the UN bodies in relation to the development priorities of the European Community”.

EU-UN relations developed further in 2003 with the European Commission’s adoption of a communication with the title ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice for Multilateralism’. Calling upon one of the underlying ideological foundations of both the EU and the UN, the European Commission proposed to strengthen and mainstream relations between the

555 Interview, United Nations Development Programme, Brussels, 03 April 2009
557 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – The UN and Europe: Active Multilateral Partners’
558 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – The UN and Europe: Active Multilateral Partners’
559 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – The UN and Europe: Active Multilateral Partners’
two organisations at all levels including development assistance. The European Commission’s public pledge became the steppingstone it needed in order to join the main agents of international development. Accordingly, the European Commission attempted to give itself larger visibility in the domain of international development. An interviewed European Commission official sustained a similar view on the progress of EU-UN relations following the 2003 European Commission communication.

“By launching that initiative we were creating our capacity to behave collectively, and we were also demonstrating our belief in effective multilateralism. We saw that with the new threats and challenges of globalisation it was important to cooperate with the UN in peace and security issues, global governance, and the integration of our developing partners in the global structures. So this is all part of the politicisation process of the EU as an institution and also our development policy because we are becoming more and more part of the global system”.

As confirmed by the interviewee, the cooperation trend between the two institutions advanced considerably since the turn of the century. The adoption of the 2003 European Commission communication became a landmark in the process to build an effective partnership with the UN on a variety of issues, of which global governance became of central importance.

The European Commission established a closer rapport with UN in the twenty-first Century, and it developed equally strong links with the WB and its field procedures. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the WB and the European Commission were close partners in technical development assistance since the 1980s. 2003 saw the considerable upgrading of their relationship based on the creation of a partnership of choice to improve working relations at the field level in Africa – the Limelette Partnership. Under this banner, the WB and the European Commission created a joint plan for their activities in Africa, which focused particularly on aid delivery and its effectiveness. Additionally, it adopted good governance and capacity building as some of the underlying principles guiding the new partnership. With a clear political dimension attached to their agendas, both institutions sought to capitalise on each other’s expertise as a means to improve the effectiveness of their aid support activities in the African continent.

Concomitantly, the ever-closer general relations between the European Commission and the UN were strengthened further during the same period. The European Commission proceeded with

561 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 02 December 2008
establishing particular links with some specific UN agencies, specifically in the dominion of international development where it reinforced its commitment to the MDGs and the political dimension of development cooperation. A respondent European Commission official alerted for the increasingly close link between the European Commission and UNDP at the time on the issue of political dimension of development cooperation:

“The cooperation between the EU and the UNDP grew considerably in recent years, and is today very important in how we understand the political component of development as it is also determined by the MDGs”.563

Accordingly, on 28 June 2004, Poul Nielson and the UNDP Administrator, Mark Malloch-Brown signed a memorandum of understanding between the two bodies to cooperate in the fight against poverty, conflict resolution, and the promotion of the MDGs.564 The signing of the resulting Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Commission and the UNDP, placed democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, poverty reduction, and environment and energy at the centre of their joint development planning. Under the accord, the European Commission and the UNDP launched a cooperation programme that saw a dramatic increase in the transfer of resources from the EU to the UNDP, which reached its peak in 2005 at the value of five hundred million Euros per annum. The UNDP’s 2006 report issued from its office in Brussels – “Improving Lives: Results of EU/UN Partnership” – attested the unprecedented levels of cooperation between the two institutions with particular reference to development assistance, which confirmed the trend initiated at the turn of the century.565 Human rights protection, the strengthening of governance, democracy, and the rule of law in the countries where both the EU and the UN cooperated were some of the main objectives of the partnership. By jointly building on the MDGs commitment, the two organisations knew “each other better than ever before” with the results in the field suggesting that “the partnership clearly added value and that each party benefited from the strengths of the other”.566

By the end of 2008, the relationship between the European Commission and the UNDP remained stable and with solid bases for future cooperation following the revision of their

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563 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 06 November 2008
partnership in 2007. The newly set goals for EU-UNDP relations centred more specifically on Africa, namely on the sharing of information about their activities in the continent, on the reflection of the challenges Africa is facing, and on the convergence of their activities in areas where there is already some common ground. As a follow-up to this revision, the latest development took place in late 2008, when officials from both institutions met in Brussels. They confirmed their intent to maintain their strong partnership based on the promotion of democratic governance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict construction in all countries where the two institutions cooperate.

The analysis of the politicisation process of EU development policy during the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement, illustrated the continuing existence of a particular dynamics between the EU process of development policy design and the policy orientation of the leading actors of international development, specifically the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN System (and most notably the UNDP). Similar to the pattern identified in the analysis of the same issue in the preceding chapter, the inclusion of an increasingly bolder political dimension in EU development policy is linked with the EU project to become an influential international actor and its consequent exposure to the structure and agents of international development. With the aforementioned IOs taking renewed initiatives in the incorporation of political concerns at the centre of their approaches to development, the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norm in question from its rapport with them and subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy. The confirmation of the norm diffusion emerged progressively in the form of both declarations by various European Commission officials, and the agreements between the European Commission and the stated IOs. As a result, the causality process appeared clearly observable in the incorporation of the political dimension in EU development policy under the Cotonou Agreement, which confirms that the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norm from the above-mentioned IOs. Thus, the analysis demonstrates that EU development policy was neither ‘unique’ nor played a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of a political dimension in the discourse and practice of international development.

1.2 Economic and Trade Cooperation

The Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar making up the Cotonou Agreement conferred a distinct orientation to EU development policy regarding Africa at the beginning of the 21st century.

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In a break with the legacy of the Lomé Convention, the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar instituted the principle of trade liberalisation as a new tool for development promotion in the Africa-EU partnership. Its principal tenet was the necessity to conform EU trade relations with its African partners to the rules of the newly established WTO. Accordingly, the EU framework for development cooperation with Africa shifted from the promotion of a non-reciprocal and differential trade arrangement under the Lomé Conventions to a reciprocal trade configuration combined with a regional implementation under the Cotonou Agreement. Despite steering Africa-EU relations into a new direction, the link between trade liberalisation and development pertained to the normative basis of international development since the early 1980s following the lead taken on the matter by the WB and the IMF. Subsequently, the creation of the WTO in 1995 reinforced the trade liberalisation and development norm in the discourse and practice of international development, which became one of its leading paradigms at the turn of the century.

Chapter four and the previous sub-section of the current chapter argued that the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ new norms integral to the reformed EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa from the synergy it maintains with the structure and agents of international development. It appears unfeasible to advance an identical claim regarding the trade liberalisation and development norm under consideration in the following subsection. That is so, because the European Commission is a founding member of the WTO with direct participation in the organisation’s original design, and the Cotonou Agreement refers openly to the WTO statutes as the guidelines of the new EU trade arrangements with its African partners.

However, the manner in which the Union refers to the WTO rules as the unconditional trade parameters of its development cooperation framework under the Cotonou Agreement, demonstrates the existence of a shift in EU development policy that is external in origin. The external environment shaped in the form of the WTO stood as the main reference for the European Commission in the inclusion of the trade liberalisation and development norm as part of its reformed policy of development cooperation concerning Africa. Therefore, the ensuing sub-section illustrates how the link between trade liberalisation and development originated in the WB and IMF development policies of the 1980s, and became later enshrined in the rules of the WTO following its foundation in 1995. Subsequently, it demonstrates how the WTO, as the missing link of the original Bretton Woods institutional set-up, became the de facto reference for the European Commission in the inclusion of the trade liberalisation and development norm as part of the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. While the European Commission may not have ‘learnt’
the norm in question from the WTO when it incorporated it at the centre of its development policy vis-à-vis Africa, the origin of the norm was external to the European Commission. As such, the trade liberalisation and development norm integral to the new EU policy of development cooperation concerning Africa emerged as a direct ‘import’ from the WTO, which stood as the norm’s gatekeeper in the discourse and practice of international development since its foundation in 1995.

The confirmation of the origin of the trade liberalisation and development norm as external to the European Commission demonstrates that its approach to trade under the Cotonou Agreement is not ‘unique’ in the domain of international development. Instead, it is a reflection of one of the leading paradigms in the contemporary discourse and practice of international development. Nevertheless, and as argued next, the European Commission displayed some concerted attempts to assume ‘leadership’ in the promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm since 2000 in two concrete stances. Firstly, through the introduction of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the trade basis of its development policy towards Africa; secondly, through committed support to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) launched under the auspices of the WTO to make international trade more favourable to developing countries. Despite the two initiative’s arguable impact in the dominion of international development, by the end of 2008 both enterprises stood not only far from concluded but also on the verge of collapse. Accordingly, the current analysis partially confirms the thesis’s hypotheses because it demonstrates that the trade aspect of EU development policy concerning Africa in the new century is not ‘unique’ in the discourse and practice of international development, but is potentially capable of assuming some ‘leadership’ if the EPAs and DDA initiatives reach a successful conclusion.

In 2000, the Union introduced a new trade regime as part of its development policy regarding Africa, under the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. Considering the 1996 green paper’s considerations on the issue of trade regarding the post-Lomé era of the Africa-EU development partnership, the Cotonou Agreement confirmed trade liberalisation as one of its major innovations. Following a long heritage of a non-reciprocal and differential trade arrangement under the Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement instituted a reciprocal trade configuration with a regional implementation between the EU and its African partners in conformity with the rules of the WTO.
Accordingly, the new EU approach to trade vis-à-vis Africa aimed at “fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy (...) thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication” (Article 34(1) – Cotonou Agreement). For that purpose, “economic and trade cooperation [was to] be implemented in full conformity with the provisions of the WTO” (Article 34(4) – Cotonou Agreement), “thereby facilitating their transition to the liberalised global economy” (Article 34(2) – Cotonou Agreement). Furthermore, the liberalisation of trade between the EU and Africa was to follow “regional integration initiatives (...) bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy” (Article 35(2) – Cotonou Agreement). Therein, the accord referred to the importance to “take account of the different needs and levels of development of the ACP countries and regions (...) maintaining special treatment for ACP Least Developed Countries and taking due account of the vulnerability of small, landlocked and island countries” (Article 35(3) – Cotonou Agreement).

The modality conceived by the European Commission for that purpose centred upon a trade liberalisation and development framework called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs consisted of reciprocal Free Trade Areas (FTAs) set up between the European Commission and regional groupings of ACP countries in accordance with the principles of partnership, regional integration, development, and WTO compatibility. They aimed at “establishing the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules”, whilst building on the ingrained Lomé acquis of Africa-EU relations (Article 37(7) – Cotonou Agreement). Therein, the EU pledged to be “as flexible as possible in establishing the duration of a sufficient transitional period taking into account sensitive sectors, and the degree of asymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement, while remaining in conformity with WTO rules then prevailing” (Article 37(7) – Cotonou Agreement). Additionally, the accord stipulated that “formal negotiations of the new trading arrangements shall start in September 2002 and the new trading arrangements shall enter into force by 1 January 2008, unless earlier dates are agreed between the Parties” (Article 37(1) – Cotonou Agreement). During the negotiation process, and “in order to facilitate the transition to the new trading arrangements, the nonreciprocal trade preferences applied under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention shall be maintained” (Article 36(3) – Cotonou Agreement).

The European Commission promoted a distinct trade policy as part of the EU development cooperation partnership with Africa at the turn of the century. It integrated a direct link between trade liberalisation and development introduced under the EPAs initiative. By joining the precepts
of partnership, regional integration, development, and WTO compatibility, the European Commission reformed thoroughly the trade dimension of EU development policy towards Africa. Under the tenets of the Cotonou Agreement, the first step towards establishing the new trade framework between the Union and Africa consisted in identifying which African countries qualified as either Least Developed Countries (LDCs), or non-LDCs.\(^{569}\) In regards of status, LDCs could maintain a non-reciprocal trade arrangement with the EU under specific guidelines provided by the Cotonou Agreement, whereas all non-LDCs had to negotiate an EPA with the Union. Through a waiver agreed at the WTO, the Lomé trade preferences were to temporarily stand during the arranged negotiation period of the EPAs, 1 January 2008 was the set deadline by which the new Africa-EU trade deal was due to come into force. With the WTO functioning as a direct reference in the reformation process of the trade aspects of EU development policy towards Africa in the twenty-first century, the Cotonou Agreement-sponsored EPAs marked the beginning of a new era for Africa-EU relations in line with one of the leading paradigms of international development of the time.

The link between trade liberalisation and development gained particular prominence in the discourse and practice of international development following the WTO’s foundation in 1995. However, it was a feature of the discipline’s normative structure since the late 1970s. Its origin lies with the emergence of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) firstly designed by the WB in 1979 as technical instruments created “to help countries experiencing difficulties in adapting to external shocks (…) implementing appropriate policy and institutional reforms aimed at making the economy more flexible, and strengthening its capacity for adjusting relatively more efficiently and easily to future shocks”.\(^{570}\) The objective of SAPs was “to provide quick disbursing finance to support measures designed to strengthen recipient countries balance of payments within five to ten years without severely constraining demand in a manner that unnecessarily sets back economic and

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\(^{569}\) The qualification of a country as an LDC stems from a set of criteria created by UN General Assembly to identify the weakest and poorest countries across the world that require support from the international community to achieve further development. The criteria used to identify a country as LDC has changed in time, and today it stands as follows: 1 – A low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $905 for inclusion, above $ 1,086 for graduation); 2 – A human capital status criterion, involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition: percentage of population undernourished; (b) health: mortality rate for children aged five years or under; (c) education: the gross secondary school enrolment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate; 3 – An economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; (c) merchandise export concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross domestic product; (e) homelessness owing to natural disasters; (f) instability of agricultural production; and (g) instability of imports of goods and services.; United Nations Development Programme, “Making Globalization Work for the Least Developed Countries”, (New York: United Nations, 2008)

social development”. Trade liberalisation was central to the SAPs development model, through an outward-oriented development strategy based on export expansion aimed to eliminate a country’s balance of payments and debt problems within a pre-established timeframe. In that manner, developing countries were to move away from self-directed models of national development that focused on the domestic market. Instead, they were to move towards outward-looking development models capable of fostering their complete integration into the global structures of trade, finance, and production.

A serious financial crisis caused by a growing external indebtedness engulfed sub-Saharan Africa at the time. As a result, the region became gradually the central focus of the WB’s projects of economic reform under the SAPs approach. In some of its reports of the time, the WB emphasised the importance of thorough economic reform across Africa according to a set of prescriptions that rested upon a fixed standard mix of liberal market-oriented policies to reduce state control over the economy. The SAPs rose into a symbol of the 1980s international development discourse and practice under the WB’s leadership. Therein, the link between trade liberalisation and development progressed to become one of its established integral pillars.

In the mid-1990s, the interrelation between trade liberalisation and development gained further prominence following the foundation of the WTO. As the missing link of the original Bretton Woods system outlined in 1944, the WTO had the mandate to supervise and liberalise international trade through the institution of a set of legal ground-rules in the form of contracts that bound the signatory parties to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. The European Commission pertained to the group of founding members of the organisation. The WTO’s main goal was to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers, conduct their business in an equitable, transparent, and predictable manner in accordance with the principles of liberalism and multilateralism. The connection between trade liberalisation and development became formalised at the international level following the establishment of the WTO, and evolved subsequently into a dominant paradigm in the discourse and practice of international development at the turn of the century.

571 Landell-Mills, Peter, ‘Structural Adjustment Lending: Early Experience’, Finance and Development (International Monetary Fund), January 18, 1981, pp. 18
The link between trade liberalisation and development was inherent to the principles of the WTO. The organisation took further action to set up a special framework for the protection of developing countries in the liberalising process of their trade regimes. From its foundation, the WTO created the Committee on Trade and Development as an affiliate to its General Council with the aim to campaign for trade liberalisation and development as an integral part of the organisation’s activities.\(^{574}\) From that basis, the WTO proposed to confer an additional special treatment to developing countries with a view to soften their integration into the world economy. Given that the large majority of WTO members were developing countries or LDCs, all WTO agreements started to add special provisions for their protection. They included larger periods to implement agreements and commitments, measures to increase their trading opportunities and support to help them build the infrastructure for WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards.\(^{575}\)

The WTO’s first concrete measure to confer special protection to developing countries in the new world trade system materialised in 1997 with the call for a high-level meeting on trade initiatives and technical assistance for LDCs. The WTO Director-General at the time, Renato Ruggiero, called the meeting a landmark in the promotion of trade liberalisation and development. According to him it was “the first time we are bringing all the energy of the multilateral system to bear on the problem of economic marginalization. It is important because without the full integration of the least-developed countries we can never have a truly global trading system. And it is important because it represents a tangible sign of the extent to which these countries have embraced openness, integration, and trade as the keys to economic development”.\(^{576}\) The meeting was a success, and resulted in the immediate creation of a platform to help LDCs increase their ability to trade while maintaining some preferential market access in their transition to a free trade system. With support from the Committee on Trade and Development, the LDCs gained additional assistance in the implementation of trade agreements and the access to technical cooperation aimed to increase their participation in global trade.\(^{577}\)

The foundation of the WTO in 1995 formalised the link between trade liberalisation and development as integral to the discourse and practice of international development. Thereafter, it integrated the UN’s international development initiative at the turn of the century – the MDGs. Expanding on a crucial dimension of the WB-sponsored SAPs designed in the late 1970s, the WTO

\(^{574}\) World Trade Organisation, “Committee on Trade and Development - Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries - Note by the Secretariat”, WT/COMTD/W/12, 15 November 1995

\(^{575}\) World Trade Organisation, “Understanding the WTO”, (Geneva: WTO, 2008)


emerged to supervise and liberalise international trade, and it endorsed equally a development-minded orientation from its foundation. Furthermore, it undertook specific measures to protect developing countries in their transition into a free trade economy through the creation of special platforms and programmes of support assisted by its Committee on Trade and Development. The WTO progressed into the ‘gatekeeper’ of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development by the end of the 1990s. The trade liberalisation and development norm integrated the ambitious UN initiative for the sustainable promotion of international development in 2000, the MDGs.\textsuperscript{578} As an enterprise agreed by the one-hundred and ninety-two UN member states and some twenty-three international organisations, the MDGs comprised eight specific development goals to be achieved by 2015. MDG 8 (Develop a Global Partnership for Development) assumed particular relevance in the continuing promotion of the principle of trade liberalisation and development at the international level, as one of its targets was to “develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system”.\textsuperscript{579} Accordingly, through the mandate and activities of the WTO, as well as the MDGs initiative, trade liberalisation and development became one of the leading paradigms of international development in the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Trade liberalisation and development progressed as integral norm of international development following the activities of the WTO in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the European Commission sought to reform the trade dimension of its development policy towards Africa, and it drew inspiration from the international development trends of the time. An interviewed European Commission official sustained:

“\textquote{The idea behind EU development policy in the course of the 1990s was to normalise it with the international trends of the time. This meant that we wanted to include it in the large international framework of development and adapt it to the new topics that had become fashionable and relevant at the time.}”\textsuperscript{580}

In accordance with the interviewee, the European Commission drew a direct inspiration from the external environment when reforming the trade aspects of its framework of development cooperation with Africa. Similarly, another interviewed European Commission official announced:


\textsuperscript{580} Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2008
“It is obvious that external factors had a major influence in the way we rearranged our trade policy with the ACP states. The thinking about development theory had evolved a lot, and one of the new paradigms was centred in the role that trade could play in the development of a state or a region. The creation of the WTO was extremely important in that process in the change from the 1990s to the new millennium, and it was a major reference for us.”  

In that manner, the EU called upon the principle of trade liberalisation and development championed by the WTO at the international level. The 1996 green paper marked the beginning of a potential shift in EU development policy orientation towards the liberalisation of its trade with Africa. The conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 confirmed the WTO rules as the European Commission’s undisputable guidelines for its future trade relations with its African partners.

The European Commission’s first steps in the reformation of the trade dimension of EU development policy came with the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992, a communication by the European Commission in 1994, and the green paper on the future of ACP-EU relations in 1996. Accordingly, the TEU paved the way for future reform maintaining that EU development policy should foster “sustainable economic and social development, the gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy and the alleviation of poverty” (Article 130u – Treaty on European Union). The stated goals matched the international development trends of the time, and marked the first turn in reformation of the privileged status of the African countries in the EU policy of development cooperation. On that note, a European Commission communication from 1994 announced further changes based on the premise that future “trade preferences will be granted to ACPs if the need arises, and withdrawn when the need is sorted out”. The European Commission’s progressive reorientation regarding the future of its trade relations with its African partners became further explicit in the 1996 green paper, which proposed the thorough overhauling of the rules of trade of the Africa-EU development partnership. The green paper proposed a selection of alternatives all WTO-compatible that pointed at trade liberalisation as the future of Africa-EU relations to the detriment of the preferential trade arrangement practised under the Lomé Conventions. The above-mentioned three initiatives confirmed the European Commission ambition to restructure the orientation of EU trade policy regarding Africa. Herein, it broke away from the Lomé tradition and embraced the

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581 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 19 July 2006
WTO principles of free trade to stimulate the integration of African economies into the world trading system.

When preparing for the negotiation rounds of the new Africa-EU partnership, the European Commission issued a set of guidelines that emphasised its ambition to promote the liberalisation of trade in line with the rules of the WTO. The basis of the new EU orientation to trade rested on its understanding that “it will not be possible to enhance the EU-ACP economic partnership without abandoning the traditional approach to trade in favour of a more balanced approach”. Accordingly, it proposed the “gradual and harmonious integration of the ACP countries into the world economy”, to guarantee that “the EU future trade arrangements were perfectly in line with WTO provisions and require no exceptions”. As a result, the Union introduced regional FTAs as its favoured option, as confirmed by João de Deus Pinheiro, who maintained that “FTAs are the best option primarily because they offer more than just market access (...) and are also the best and simplest way to reconcile the need to ensure WTO compatibility”. Thus, the European Commission endorsed the regional FTAs initiative as the basis of future EU trade relations with Africa, which matched with the existing trade framework at the WTO under the label of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs). In conformity with the REPAs rules, the European Commission started to assess the application of a similar model to the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. The process culminated with the adoption of a REPA-inspired model as the foundation of the future trade dimension of the Africa-EU partnership, which subsequently took the EPA nomenclature following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000.

At the end of an eighteen-month period of negotiations between the European Commission and its African partners, the signing of the Cotonou Agreement confirmed the introduction of a free trade platform for Africa-EU relations. Due to the complexity and challenging character of the trade reform proposed, the treaty accorded both parties a transition period to implement the required alterations in their trade framework, with 1 January 2008 as the closing date for that purpose. In

587 European Commission, ‘Guidelines for the Negotiation of New Cooperation Agreements with the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries’
order to maintain WTO-compatibility, the European Commission obtained a special waiver from
the WTO that guaranteed permission to keep the existing preferential trade arrangement with Africa
during the period of transition. In this manner, the European Commission reformed thoroughly
the trade dimension of the EU policy of development cooperation with Africa, introducing EPAs as
its main foundation. Through the marriage of trace reciprocity and a regional implementation, EPAs
were to introduce a distinct trade arrangement between Africa and the Union in line with the rules
of the WTO by 1 January 2008, which conferred a break with the past to the Africa-EU partnership
under the auspices of the Cotonou Agreement.

During the 1990s, the European Commission announced the creation of a novel framework
for development cooperation with Africa. It endorsed the principle of trade liberalisation and
development as fundamental to its future. In line with a decidedly outward approach to the
reformation of the Africa-EU partnership, the European Commission endorsed the trade
liberalisation and development norm integral to the discourse and practice of international
development as part of its new development policy. The evolution of the trade liberalisation and
development norm in international development emerged closely related with the WB’s role since
the late 1970s when it campaigned for SAPs as an optimal tool for economic reform in developing
countries. Subsequently, the foundation of the WTO in 1995, inscribed the link between trade
liberalisation and development in the newly established global trading system, which transformed the
organisation into the norm’s ‘gatekeeper’. Trade liberalisation and development progressed into a
leading paradigm of international development in the 1990s, and therein the European Commission
integrated it in EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa under an identical mould with the WTO
standing as its main reference in the process.

Therefore, the shift in the trade dimension of EU development policy towards Africa
introduced by the Cotonou Agreement was openly external in origin. The external environment
shaped in the form of the WTO stood as the main reference for the European Commission in the
inclusion of the trade liberalisation and development norm as part of its reformed policy of
development cooperation towards Africa. The process of incorporation of the trade liberalisation
and development norm as part of the new EU development policy does not suggest that the
European Commission may have ‘learnt’ the norm from the WTO given that it was one of the
organisation’s founding members. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the incorporation of the norm
under analysis in the new EU policy of development cooperation with Africa was a direct ‘import’

590 European Commission, ‘EU-ACP Negotiation: Conclusions of the Brussels Ministerial Conference, 29-30 July
1999’, Information Memo 8, (Brussels: European Commission, 1999)
from the WTO. In the words of Poul Nielson, the process took place at a time when the European Commission sought to “bring its specific competence to the service of the internationally agreed strategy”, thus adopting the WTO rules as the unconditional guidelines for the EU trade relations with its developing partners. For that purpose, the European Commission broke with the heritage of the Lomé Conventions and adhered to the common trends in the discourse and practice of international development at the time. By doing so, it endorsed the liberal approach to development championed by the WB since the late 1970s, and reinforced by the WTO following its foundation in 1995. Therefore, the ‘unique’ claim recurrently sustained by the EU regarding its development policy vis-à-vis Africa appears largely unfounded when it comes to trade matters, because it is an ‘import’ and reproduction of the trade liberalisation and development principle previously devised by the Bretton Woods institutions in their approach to international development.

Nonetheless, the European Commission sought to expand on the Union’s position in the global trading system since 2000 through some concerted attempts to assume ‘leadership’ in the continuing promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development. It attempted to do so in the way it campaigned for regionalism and inter-regionalism under its EPAs agenda regarding Africa, and through its committed support to the DDA initiative launched by the WTO. However, and despite the arguable impact caused by the two initiatives in the dominion of international development, by the end of 2008 both enterprises stood not only far from concluded but also on the verge of collapse.

The introduction of EPAs as the proposed framework for trade of the reformed Africa-EU partnership denoted full compatibility with the REPAs model devised by the WTO, yet the European Commission attempted to innovate on its precepts by conferring them a strong regional focus. Through the combination of multilateralism with regionalism, the European Commission aspired to develop a distinct approach to trade with its African partners. The European Commission saw no clash between the two concepts as sustained by an interviewed European Commission official:

“The EPAs issue came up because we knew that the Lomé system of preferences would not be sustainable any longer after the WTO was established. It is our belief that regional integration can be a steppingstone for integration into the world economy, which would also

591 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – European Development Policy: How to Join the Mainstream’
592 European Commission, “The European Community’s Development Policy: Statement by the Council and the Commission”
Accordingly, the European Commission sought to combine multilateralism with both regionalism and inter-regionalism as a means to stimulate the creation of capable trade groupings within Africa with the capacity to trade amongst each other, and with other countries, or regions from across the globe. Under the stated approach to trade, the European Commission sought to stimulate trade as a means to promote development.

With the principles of regionalism and reciprocity as the driving references, the European Commission structured the EPAs negotiations in two phases. Phase 1 comprised the period between September 2002 and September 2003, and conferred both parties time to define their positions on the negotiation rounds due to start subsequently. Phase 2 was to start from October 2003 and terminate at the end of December 2007, and aimed to cover the negotiations proper (Article 37 – Cotonou Agreement). With negotiations starting in earnest later than predicted into the second phase, vast divergences emerged between the two parties concerning a variety of issues, namely the development and regional aspects of EPAs. When asked about the ACP states resistance to regionalism as part of the EPAs package, an interviewed European Commission official maintained:

“I can understand that we might have a problem on the rationalisation issue because we know that EPAs do not match the current regional configuration in Africa provoking many overlaps and so on. But at the end of the day we believe that this is the way that we can help Africa helping itself.”

The regional configuration advanced by EPAs entered in clash with the existing regional groupings in Africa, raising an extra obstacle to the implementation of EPAs. Before the described scenario, both parties agreed to launch a review of the EPAs in 2004, however that review suffered a new delay due to bureaucratic reasons it took place only in 2006. Following a redrawing of their positions, both parties gradually achieved some accord concerning the contentious subjects of regionalism and development with some progress emerging thereafter.

However, out of the six regional groups created from the broad ACP group, only one respected the deadline of December 2007 – CARIFORUM (Caribbean Forum of African,

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593 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 20 July 2006
594 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 20 July 2006
Caribbean, and Pacific States) – with all other five regions having to proceed with negotiations after the set deadline, which generated further concern amongst European Commission and ACP circles. Moreover, the European Commission announced in September 2007 that there was no alternative to the EPAs, even if the details of their implementation could still undergo renegotiation. When interviewed in light of the evolution of the EPAs negotiation process, a European Commission official lent a similar take on the subject sustaining that:

“For a trade agreement to be WTO-compatible you have to liberalise more than what was the case previously – those are the rules of the game. But there is room for flexibility and the timeframe can always be extended. In exceptional cases, there are always safeguard clauses for special circumstances that could not be anticipated. This is a normal component of any trade agreement such as the EPAs, but we always try not to use it even if the possibility is there.”

In that manner, and equally in line with views expressed by the ACP Council of Ministers on 13 December 2007 on the matter, a new arrangement regarding the implementation of the EPAs was necessary if negotiations were to proceed successfully. The agreed solution between all parties for the negotiation impasse was to adopt an interim country approach. The new negotiation model was to break with the previously agreed regional format in a first phase of negotiations, yet simply as a steppingstone into the regional phase of negotiations that was to follow after once the interim country negotiations reached a successful conclusion.

Despite the growing breakdown in negotiations by the end of 2008 as a result of the continuous resistance from the ACP states to the implementation of the EPAs, the European Commission maintained its position on the matter and advanced the EPAs as the most adequate vehicles for trade between both partners. Correspondingly, an interviewed European Commission official presented an analogous standing on the issue, asserting that:

“We believe that EPAs are indeed a great solution for everyone. The ACP states have not yet understood that they will be at a loss if they opt out from using this window of opportunity to renew our trade agreements under this mould. We have already made similar agreements with some partners in the Mediterranean region and they worked really well because the loss of income from custom duties was eventually offset by the increase in trade volume. This is why EPAs are a good solution for trade with the ACP states as it they would promote

598 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 19 July 2006

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development in the long run. Moreover, we are simply complying with the principles of the WTO”.

Furthermore, the same European Commission official raised the point that the European Commission enjoyed full support from the WB and the IMF in its EPAs campaign. It resulted from the fact that the Bretton Woods institutions had already endorsed an equally regional approach to trade with Africa in line with the rules of the WTO.

“It is true that the WB and IMF are now very close partners of ours and we are following their activities just like they are following ours. They are supportive of our approach to trade with African states as it was confirmed in their new report from October 2008. The WB has also a regional approach to trade in Africa under their African Regional Integration programme, confirming that they also believe that regional integration is the best solution for everyone.”

The EPAs negotiations reached a near-standstill by the end of 2008, and the European Commission maintained its position unchanged. Therein, it continued to have the full support from the WB and the IMF, which already endorsed a similar orientation to the promotion of trade liberalisation and development in Africa.

As the above analysis illustrated, the European Commission attempted to assume ‘leadership’ in the further promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development through its WTO-compatible EPAs. It conferred EPAs an innovative and strong regional focus, yet it achieved little practical success within the set deadlines. The process of transition from a preferential trade arrangement to a free and reciprocal trading system between Africa and the Union under the EPAs initiative proved extremely complex due to open resistance from the ACP states on the negotiation table. By the end of 2008, already one year ahead of the initial closing date for negotiations, the EPAs were not completed and the conclusion of the agreements remained an openly distant reality. Therefore, the European Commission’s attempt to assume a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of trade liberalisation and development in the domain of international development through the EPAs remained in a gridlock by the end of 2008.

Concomitantly, the trade liberalisation and development norm was further integrated in the discourse and practice of international development following the UN-sponsored MDGs global

600 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2008
602 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2008
initiative. The conclusion of the MDGs rallied most of the international community together in 2000, including the European Commission, under a set of eight development objectives to be achieved by 2015. Of particular relevance to the continuing promotion of trade liberalisation and development at the international level was MDG 8 (Develop a Global Partnership for Development), which campaigned for the need to “develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system”. The European Commission endorsed the MDGs initiative in its development policy and by doing so “the Community and most Member States have adapted or shifted their development aid policies to focus on achieving the MDGs and/or the Millennium Declaration’s somewhat broader objectives”. In this perspective, the MDGs evolved to become one of the growing references for the European Commission in the design of EU development policy in the new century. As a result, the UN development agencies also progressed into some of the European Commission’s increasingly close partners in the dominion of international development.

As an integral part of the international support structure for the MDGs, the WTO endorsed MDG 8 as one of its goals for the future, which amplified its concern for developing countries in their transition into the global free trade system. Therein, the WTO sought to establish a distinct trade arrangement for developing countries in line with a new proposal tabled at the Doha WTO Round on 14 November 2001. Following a period of complex negotiations, the representatives of the parties present at the meeting produced a Ministerial Declaration that marked the emergence of the DDA development promotion plan. The DDA initiative rested upon the principle that “international trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation of poverty”. It emphasised that developing countries should “benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates”. For that purpose, the WTO aimed to place developing countries’ “needs and interests at the heart of the

608 World Trade Organisation, ‘Ministerial Declaration’
609 World Trade Organisation, ‘Ministerial Declaration’
work programme adopted in this declaration” by promoting a new international trade agenda, whereby all signatory countries were to open their agricultural and manufacturing markets as well as their trade in services, and expand their intellectual property regulation. The main goal of the DDA plan was to make world trade fairer to developing countries in line with the principles of the MDGs programme.

As a founding member of the WTO, the European Commission participated in the activities of the organisation through its representation, where it spoke with a single voice. Under that capacity, the European Commission attempted to assume a leading position in the conclusion of the DDA development programme. Nevertheless, by the end of 2008 negotiations had collapsed with little prospect of resuming. With the DDA plan launched in earnest following the Doha WTO Round in 2001, the period until the end of 2008 saw a ‘stop-and-go’ negotiation pattern that resulted from the vast divergences on the technical issues at hand between developing and developed countries. The European Commission attempted to steer negotiations in line with the DDA precepts, and therein it achieved some results in bridging between the group of developing and developed states. However, the issues on the negotiation table were excessively contentious to generate agreement amongst all parties in time, which caused the DDA initiative to grind to a halt by the end of 2008.

In the period between the launching of the DDA and the end of 2008, the European Commission tried to push for the successful conclusion of the proposed agenda. It adopted a flexible standing on the issues under negotiation. Furthermore, it attempted to create a bridge between developing and developed countries in the negotiation rounds. With a set of proposals that concerned the rules of competition, investment, trade facilitation, and government procurement, the European Commission achieved limited success at the following WTO Round in Cancun, Mexico on 10-14 September 2003. Despite the European Commission’s prominent position from the start of negotiations, a wide rift opened up subsequently between developing and developed countries, which brought negotiations to a total collapse.

In face of the events at the WTO Round in Cancun, negotiations resumed at a slower pace and with a focus on less contentious issues generating some positive results, specifically concerning

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610 World Trade Organisation, ‘Ministerial Declaration’
611 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Pascal Lamy – The EU Trade & Development Agenda From Doha via Johannesburg to Cancun’, SPEECH/02/309, 1 July 2002
agricultural export subsidies and lowering tariffs.\textsuperscript{612} These were the main topics at the negotiation table in the following two WTO meetings – Geneva (2004) and Paris (2005) – and at the ensuing WTO Round in Hong Kong, China on 13-18 December, 2005, where the European Commission contributed to the successful sequence of productive negotiation rounds.\textsuperscript{613} However, the issues of agricultural subsidies and import taxes generated broad disagreement amongst all parties at the following WTO meeting in Geneva (2006), which caused negotiations to collapse again. On that day, Pascal Lamy, then the Director-General of the WTO, maintained that “today there are only losers. In practical terms, this means that all work in all negotiating groups should now be suspended (...) and that the progress made to date on the various elements of the negotiating agenda is put on hold”.\textsuperscript{614}

Thereafter, the European Commission attempted to find common ground between all parties, and negotiations resumed one year later in Potsdam, Germany. They focused on farm subsidies and protection of industries, and despite some progress a new collapse in negotiations took place in the 2008 WTO meeting in Geneva. At the centre of the new disagreement were issues related to the protection of specific domestic industries tabled under the label ‘specific safeguard mechanism’ that caused developed and developing countries to fail to come together in their positions and demands. The new collapse in negotiations at the 2008 WTO meeting in Geneva, led Peter Mandelson, then the EU Commissioner for Trade, to opine that “the situation we face in the DDA is one of uncertainty. This concerns us all, because the benefits of a DDA outcome - for the developing world, for the EU, and for the world economy – would, I believe, be positive, and their loss would be profound. If Doha fails, the international trading system would be powerless to withstand this negative trend, which is already emerging”.\textsuperscript{615} Despite some concerted efforts from the European Commission to find common ground between all parties and avoid the collapse in negotiations, the 2008 WTO meeting in Geneva opened a new rift between developing and developed countries, which generated bleak prospects for the future of the DDA initiative.\textsuperscript{616}

The DDA initiative emerged as a WTO plan in 2001 to support developing countries in their integration into the global free trade system, which reached a standstill in its progress by the end of


\textsuperscript{613} European Commission, ‘EU Pushing Ahead the Doha Development Agenda’, EC05-416EN, 09 December 2005


\textsuperscript{615} European Commission, ‘WTO Round: Remarks by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’, EC08-165EN, 29 July 2008

2008. As an integral member of the WTO, the European Commission attempted to assume leadership in the DDA process by endorsing a flexible position in the negotiations and trying to build bridges between developing and developed nations. At various moments, the European Commission showed some capacity to push the DDA negotiations ahead, yet it became ultimately powerless to prevent negotiations from collapsing at the end of 2008. In this manner, the European Commission’s ambition to play a ‘leadership’ role in the further promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development remained gridlocked by the end of 2008 as the DDA development programme fell into an open impasse.

As illustrated by the analysis above, the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement implemented a considerable shift in the trade dimension of EU development policy towards Africa at the turn of the century. An interviewed European Commission official shared a similar take on the subject, announcing that:

“In my eyes, the major changes introduced by the Cotonou Agreement were in the terms of trade and economic cooperation. Lomé IV promoted a smooth transition from the late 1990s as the EU had realised that the terms of trade with its traditional developing partners had to change. The main idea behind the new approach to trade was to put the house in order, and for that the EU had to follow the WTO rules. So we considered that the best solution was to introduce regional trade agreements with our developing partners, calling them Economic Partnership Agreements.”

Accordingly, the external environment shaped in the form of the WTO stood as the main reference for the European Commission in the reformation of the trade aspects of EU development policy. Therein, the European Commission incorporated the trade liberalisation and development norm as one of the main foundations of EU development policy.

Unlike what this thesis suggests in the previous sub-section as well as in chapter four, the process of incorporation of the trade liberalisation and development norm as part of the new EU development policy does not suggest that the European Commission may have ‘learnt’ the norm in question from the WTO given that it was one of the organisation’s founding members. However, it implies that the incorporation of the norm under analysis in the new EU policy of development cooperation with Africa was a direct ‘import’ from the WTO, as confirmed by an interviewed European Commission:

617 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2008
“It is obvious that external factors did have an influence in the way we rearranged our trade policy with the ACP states. The thinking about development theory had evolved and one of the new paradigms was centred in the role that trade could play in the development of a state or a region. The creation of the WTO was extremely important in that process in the change from the 1990s to the new millennium.” 618

In this manner, the European Commission broke with the heritage of the Lomé Conventions and adhered to the main trends in the discourse and practice of international development and endorsed the liberal approach to development championed by the WB since the late 1970s, and reinforced by the WTO since 1995. 619 Thus, the ‘unique’ claim recurrently sustained by the EU concerning its development policy vis-à-vis Africa stands largely unsubstantiated when it comes to trade matters, because it is an ‘import’ and reproduction of the trade liberalisation and development principle previously devised by the Bretton Woods institutions in their approach to international development.

Conversely, the European Commission attempted to expand on its position in the global trading system since 2000 by trying to assume some ‘leadership’ in the continuing promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development. To this end, it attempted to lend some innovation to its EPA’s initiative by conferring it a strong regional and inter-regional dimension and displaying a committed support to the DDA enterprise launched by the WTO. Despite the arguable impact generated by the European Commission in both procedures, the EPAs and the DDA initiatives suffered a similar fate and stood incomplete and immersed in controversy by the end of 2008.

Accordingly, the analysis above partially confirmed the hypotheses advanced by the thesis. On the one hand, it demonstrated that the trade aspect of EU development policy concerning Africa in the new century is not ‘unique’ in the discourse and practice of international development. On the other hand, it illustrated that the European Commission has displayed some capacity to play a ‘leadership’ role in the further promotion of the trade liberalisation and development norm in international development, specifically under the DDA and the EPA’s initiatives. Nevertheless, both of its flagship enterprises in the domain of trade liberalisation remained far from successful by the end of 2008.

618 Interview (II), European Commission, Brussels, 19 July 2006
1.3 Aid and Development Cooperation

The Aid and Development Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement proposed a thorough reform of the aid configuration of the Africa-EU partnership for development in the twenty-first century. The aid construct established by the Cotonou Agreement aimed to improve the viability and effectiveness of the aid projects and programmes the EU maintained with its developing partners. For that purpose, the treaty combined the principles of ownership and country-specific programming, with a focus on decentralised cooperation, and a renewed approach to the scope and nature of the financing of projects and programmes as the renewed guidelines of EU development aid policy. In that manner, the Cotonou Agreement reformed Africa-EU relations at the turn of the century through the adoption of a distinct financial and technical approach to aid and development cooperation.

In view of the extensive reform of the development aid framework between the Union and Africa instituted by the Cotonou Agreement, the Union went on to advance the tenets of the accord’s Aid and Development Cooperation pillar as an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development that transformed it into a leader therein. José Manuel Barroso, the then President of the European Commission, proffered an identical understanding regarding the position of the EU in the domain of international development aid in the new century at a press conference on the subject in 2008, when he stated that “we are doing well on aid”, and ought to “continue to lead at the global level”.

However, the development aid precepts characterising EU development policy following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement were already an integral feature of the normative structure of international development before the turn of the century. The architects of the norms in question were the OECD, the WB, and the IMF in the 1990s, which subsequently diffused them progressively in the structure of international development and affected the policy orientation of its comprising actors accordingly. Furthermore, the aforementioned IOs reinforced the same norms in the discourse and practice of international development in the following decade and maintained their leadership therein.

Therefore, the ensuing sub-section advances that the European Commission as an actor ‘learnt’ the norms under consideration from the structure of international development through a process of increasingly close cooperation with the OECD, the WB, and the IMF, which led to their posterior incorporation in EU development aid policy regarding Africa in the twenty-first century.

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620 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Commission: EU Must Stand by Its Promises and Deliver on Development Aid If We Are to Meet the Millennium Development Goals’, PRES/08/548, 09 April 2008
By doing so, the sub-section argues that the character of EU development aid policy towards Africa in the period under analysis is neither an innovation nor a leading force in the discourse and practice of international development. Instead, it posits that it is an expression of the development aid norms promoted by the OECD, the WB, and the IMF. However, and as argued next, the European Commission achieved momentary prominence in the domain of international development aid at the beginning of the new century, when it steered the international campaign for the expansion of aid volumes committed to development cooperation. The concerted action by the European Commission took place at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico on 18-22 March 2002. Nevertheless, and despite its impact at the Monterrey conference, the European Commission failed to replicate its performance on the issue of aid volumes thereafter. Thus, the following analysis largely confirms the hypothesis advanced by the thesis, as it demonstrates that EU development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa in the twenty-first century is neither ‘unique’ nor plays a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.

Following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, the EU introduced a new development aid configuration in its partnership with Africa under the tenets of the treaty’s Aid and Development Cooperation pillar. In line with the accord’s provisions, the objectives of the reformed EU development aid policy consisted of the administering of “adequate financial resources and appropriate technical assistance to support and promote [development] (...) on the basis of mutual interest and in a spirit of interdependence” (Article 55 – Cotonou Agreement). With a reinforced notion of partnership, the Cotonou Agreement established a new basis for the development aid framework between the Union and Africa in the new century.

At the centre of the reformed Africa-EU development aid model introduced by the Cotonou Agreement, were the concepts of ownership and country-specific programming. With a view to grant recipient countries larger control over the programming of aid disbursed by the EU, the treaty maintained that “development finance cooperation shall be implemented on the basis of and be consistent with the development objectives, strategies and priorities established by the ACP States, at both national and regional levels” (Article 56(1) – Cotonou Agreement). Accordingly, the promotion of “local ownership at all levels of the development process” became a central feature of the Africa-EU development aid construct, which was to take equally into consideration “the situation in each ACP State” inclusive of “the specific nature of the project or programme concerned” (Article 56(1) – Cotonou Agreement).
In combination with the principles of ownership and country-specific programming, the Cotonou Agreement instituted decentralised cooperation as a main target of EU development aid policy. For that purpose, it fostered cooperation in projects and programmes that “combine efforts and resources of decentralised agents from the ACP States and their counterparts from the Community” (Article 70(b) – Cotonou Agreement). Accordingly, the treaty attempted to “enable the mobilisation of capabilities, innovative operating methods, and resources of decentralised agents for the development of the ACP States”, and thereby remodel further EU development aid policy at the turn of the century (Article 70(b) – Cotonou Agreement).

The reformation process of the Africa-EU framework for development cooperation brought about by the Cotonou Agreement extended equally to the scope and nature of the financing of development aid projects and programmes covered by the accord. In accordance with its stipulations, the agreement called for a distinct approach to development aid financing “depending on the needs and the types of operation considered most appropriate” (Article 60 – Cotonou Agreement). In that regard, the Cotonou Agreement conferred particular emphasis to “measures which contribute to attenuate the debt burden and balance of payments problems of the ACP countries; macroeconomic and structural reforms and policies; mitigation of adverse effects of instability in export earnings; sectoral policies and reforms; institutional development and capacity building; and technical cooperation programmes” (Article 60 (a-f) – Cotonou Agreement). The implementation of the treaty’s proposed measures on a recipient’s economic structures was to emerge in the format of “projects and programmes; credit lines, guarantee schemes and equity participation; budgetary support; the human and material resources necessary for effective administration and supervision of projects and programmes; and sectoral and general import support programmes” (Article 61 (1a-e) – Cotonou Agreement). For that purpose, the agreement proposed “the preparation and development of a Country Support Strategy (CSS) based on the country’s own medium-term development objectives and strategies” (Article I – Annex IV –

621 In contrast with the reformed nature and scope of the financing of development aid projects and programmes under the precepts of the Cotonou Agreement, the aid delivery mechanism used by the Union in its development partnership with Africa – the European Development Fund (EDF) – remained unaltered following the conclusion of the treaty. With its origins in the Treaty of Rome, the EDF emerged as an instrument for the delivery of EU aid to the former colonies of its Member States. Originally created outside of the Union’s general budget, the EDF survived the duration of the Yaoundé Conventions, the Lomé Conventions, and the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement under the same format. The EDF stands as a fund directly financed by EU Member States and under the management of the European Commission. Under that status, the EDF is subject to its own financial rules and undergoes replenishment every five years through an intergovernmental agreement between EU Member States. Despite the recurring requests from the European Parliament to include the EDF in the EU general budget since 1993, the original EDF format persisted unaltered into the new century. Furthermore, EU Member States have approved already the tenth EDF (2008-2013) making its possible reform unfeasible at least until 2013. European Commission, “Budget Support: A Question of Mutual Trust”, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008)
Cotonou Agreement), which was to stand as “an instrument to prioritise activities and to build local ownership of cooperation programmes” (Article II – Annex IV – Cotonou Agreement). Thus, the reformation of the scope and nature of financing of development aid introduced by the Cotonou Agreement reinforced the changing nature of the Africa-EU development cooperation partnership at the beginning of the 21st century.

Through the endorsement of the principles of ownership and country-specific programming and a focus on decentralised cooperation and a renewed approach to the scope and nature of development aid financing, the Cotonou Agreement conferred a distinctive character to EU development aid policy towards Africa at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the then characterising principles of EU development aid policy were already an integral feature of the normative structure of international development prior to the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement. The integration of the aforementioned development aid norms in the structure of international development progressed in close relation with the approach to development aid promoted by the OECD, the WB, and the IMF in the 1990s. Accordingly, the incorporation of a distinct approach to development aid at the centre of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa at the turn of the century appears to have progressed in direct relation to the leading paradigms of international development of the time.

Following the end of the Cold War, international development aid fell gradually into a crisis as a result of the rapid decline of aid volumes and faltering international campaigns on aid effectiveness, which raised concerns amongst the international development community. The first concerted attempt to reverse the trend in international development aid came from the OECD in the early 1990s, by strengthening the volume and developmental effectiveness of international development aid. Subsequently, the WB and the IMF expanded on the proposals previously advanced by the OECD and stimulated further the reformation of international development aid in accordance with the principles of partnership, ownership, country-specific programming, debt relief, and poverty reduction. As a result, a distinct model of international development aid emerged progressively in the course of the 1990s.

The first advance towards the reformation of international development aid in the post-Cold War period materialised under the auspices of the OECD in the early 1990s. Departing from concerns regarding the decrease in aid volumes and the failing promotion of aid effectiveness at the time, the OECD proposed in a 1991 report a review of the programming and management of
international development aid. At the centre of the approach suggested by the OECD was the notion of reinforced partnership between donors and recipients. According to the stated report, development aid projects and programmes had to rest upon a “cooperative partnership exercise between donors and recipients”, in which “developing countries are responsible for their own development, and development assistance can only be subsidiary and complementary to the efforts of the developing countries themselves”. In that manner, the OECD introduced the concept of reinforced partnership between donors and recipients as a steppingstone towards the creation of a new approach to international development aid in the post-Cold War era.

Subsequently, as the 1990s unfolded, the OECD continued to expand on its campaign to reform the guidelines of international development aid by attaching the concept of ownership to that of reinforced partnership between donors and recipients. The combination of reinforced partnership with ownership as the basis of a new approach to international development aid emerged as the focal proposal of the 1995 OECD policy statement “Development Partnerships in the New Global Context”. In line with the OECD’s suggestion in the stated publication, “developing countries themselves are ultimately responsible for their own development (...) for development to succeed the people of the countries concerned must be the ‘owners’ of their development policies and programmes”. The proposition advanced by the OECD in its 1995 policy statement transformed the debate on international development aid at the time because it fostered the conversion of development aid into a locally-‘owned’ process of development promotion, to the detriment of an externally enforced development agenda thus far advocated by all international development aid actors.

In this perspective, the OECD assumed an increasingly central role in the reformation of international aid during the 1990s, and reinforced its position further following its 1996 publication of what became one of the seminal policy documents on the subject’s contemporary discourse and practice – “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation”. As argued previously in the Public Dimension sub-section of the current chapter, the aforementioned OECD document generated broad consensus amongst the international development community on a set of specific procedures for development promotion in the new century, and thereby established the platform for what became the MDGs enterprise in 2000. Departing from a reflection exercise on the

623 OECD, “DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance – Development Assistance Committee”, pp. 4
625 OECD, “Development Partnerships in the New Global Context”, pp. 2
identified weaknesses of development cooperation in the past, the OECD attempted to “propose some specific measures to help to achieve more effective development co-operation” in the upcoming century.\footnote{OECD, “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation”, pp. 15} For that purpose, and concerning the specific domain of international development aid, it recommended that “developing countries and their people must be at the centre of any effective [development aid] system” in the future.\footnote{OECD, “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation”, pp. 15} Accordingly, the OECD put forward a new approach to development aid for the new century based on the principles of locally-‘owned’ strategies, commitment of adequate resources, enhanced coordination in international fora and on the ground, and improved monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes. Thus, the OECD lent a significant imprint on the reformation of the discourse and practice of international development aid and helped to steer it on to a distinct direction during the 1990s.

Concomitantly, the WB and the IMF integrated progressively the reformation process of international development aid in the course of the 1990s through the launching of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiatives. Departing from the acknowledgment of the limitations of structural adjustment in the promotion of equitable development across the developing world, the WB and the IMF advanced an alternative approach to technical and financial development aid for the new century. The WB suggested in a 1994 study on the impact of its structural adjustment programmes in Africa that “the reforms undertaken to date are a good start, but more remains to be done to put in place the macroeconomic conditions necessary for broad-based, sustainable growth”.\footnote{Bouton Lawrence, Christine Jones & Miguel Kiguel, ‘Macroeconomic Reform and Growth in Africa: Adjustment in Africa Revisited’, World Bank – Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 1394, pp. 40} For that purpose, James Wolfensohn, then the President of the WB, argued at a 1997 WB annual meeting that “we must learn to let go (…) first and foremost, the government and the people of developing countries must be in the driver's seat — exercising choice and setting their own objectives for themselves. Development (…) cannot be donor-driven. But what we as a development community can do is help countries”.\footnote{Wolfensohn, James, ‘The Challenge of Inclusion: 1997 Annual Meetings Address’, President of the World Bank, Hong Kong, China, 23 September 1997} Thereafter, the WB and the IMF went on to endorse the principles of reinforced partnership and ownership as the basis of their new approach to technical and financial development aid for the new century, specifically through their HIPC and PRSP enterprises.

The HIPC initiative was the first to materialise in 1996, at a time when the Bretton Woods institutions were equally attempting to transform poverty reduction as the newly established...
overarching goal of their development policies. The goal of the HIPC scheme was to provide debt relief and low-interest loans to heavily indebted developing countries under a set of specific conditions to cancel or reduce their external debt repayments to sustainable levels. Despite having its origins in 1996, the HIPC only came into effect in 1999 following its enhancement and operationalisation. As a framework for development promotion, the implementation of the HIPC presupposed a country’s adherence to macroeconomic stability under IMF guidance, combined with the creation and implementation of programmes through which poverty reduction would be an achievable target. At the centre of the WB and IMF take on poverty reduction were the concepts of reinforced partnership with recipient countries, as well as the transfer of ownership of projects and programmes of development promotion to the local level.

The enhancement and operationalisation of the HIPC materialised following the creation of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) in 1999, under the aegis of the IMF and the WB, respectively. The CDF emerged as a mechanism created by the WB with the objective to reform its partnership with recipient countries by transferring to them the capacity to manage knowledge and resources in the design and implementation of effective strategies for economic development and poverty reduction. The PRGF appeared as an instrument devised by the IMF with the view to making the combination of poverty reduction and growth more central to its lending operations. For that purpose, the PRGF lent its support only to programmes and projects that were in tune with both the principles of reinforced partnership and ownership, as well as the macroeconomic reform directives established by both the IMF and the WB for a given country. By doing so, both the CDF and the PRGR accelerated the implementation of the HIPC enterprise by bringing the new development aid policy endorsed by both organisations closer together and thereby facilitating the management and effectiveness of their joint development aid initiatives.

Similarly, and in correlation with the HIPC scheme, the WB and the IMF launched the PRSP procedure in 1999 as an operational instrument with the capacity to translate a country’s poverty

reduction strategy into a focused action plan.\textsuperscript{635} The central predicament of the PRSP initiative was for it to be nationally-‘owned’ as well as reflect the outcome of an open participatory process involving governments, civil society, other relevant international institutions, and donors.\textsuperscript{636} The aim of the PRSP enterprise was to transfer to the recipients the capability to design their own poverty reduction strategy following a participatory process with their public and private partners before submitting their plan for approval before the relevant WB and IMF boards. By doing so, the WB and the IMF sought to make their development aid policy “country-driven, with the broad participation of civil society, elected institutions, key donors, and relevant international financial institutions; developed from an understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty and the links between public actions and poverty outcomes; and oriented to achieving outcome-related goals for poverty reduction”.\textsuperscript{637} Accordingly, the introduction of the PRSP scheme marked a significant turn in the financial and technical procedures of the WB and IMF development aid lending operations at the end of the 1990s and established the principles of local ownership and reinforced partnership as the crux of their development aid policy for the new century.

Thereby, the WB and the IMF helped reform international development aid in the course of the 1990s through the endorsement of the concepts of ownership and reinforced partnership as its main ideological pillars. In the words of James Wolfensohn, it became then progressively “clear to all of us that ownership is essential. Countries must be in the driver’s seat and set the course. They must determine goals and the phasing, timing and sequencing of programmes. Where there is not adequate capacity in the government to do this, we must support and help them to establish, own, and implement the strategy”.\textsuperscript{638} Therefore, and whilst maintaining their traditional roles in the domain of international development aid (WB – promotion of structural and social progress; IMF – management of macroeconomic stability), the two institutions sought to respond to the then apparent limitations of their structural adjustment programmes by adopting the principles of reinforced partnership and ownership as the new basis of their development aid policy. As a result, the WB and the IMF abandoned their development aid policy orientation based thus far on the postulates of conditionality and donor-driven lending (main pillars of structural adjustment programmes), and embraced a distinct approach to financial and technical development aid for the new century.

\textsuperscript{635} International Monetary Fund & World Bank, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Status and Next Steps’, Washington D.C., 28 October 1999
\textsuperscript{636} International Monetary Fund & World Bank, ‘Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing Countries’, DC/99-29, 22 September 1999
\textsuperscript{638} Wolfensohn, James, ‘A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework’, pp. 9
As the OECD, the WB, and the IMF created the impetus for the reformation of international development aid during the 1990s, the UN system added force to the aforementioned initiatives by generating universal consensus on a new take on the notion of development for the upcoming century under the MDGs initiative in 2000. At the centre of the MDGs enterprise, lay a set of eight specific development targets to be achieved by 2015, with MDG 8 being of particular relevance to the discourse and practice of international development aid. Integral to the implementation of MDG 8 was the objective to “deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term”. Accordingly, MDG 8 helped converting the addressing of the debt issue in developing countries into an underlying objective for the international development community, reinforcing the reformation of the tenets of international development aid on the eve of the twenty-first century.

In the course of the 1990s, and in reaction to the rapid decline of aid volumes and the failure of aid effectiveness campaigns, the OECD, the WB, and the IMF sought to reform international development aid as a means to address the resulting spread of poverty across much of the developing world at the time. Gradually, the innovative policy orientation endorsed by the organisations in question generated a distinct approach to international development aid based on the principles of poverty reduction, reinforced partnership, and ownership. Subsequently, the UN system used its MDGs initiative to confirm the emerging approach to international development aid as the most comprehensive answer to the challenges facing the subject in the new century. As a result, the discourse and practice of international development aid altered considerably during the 1990s, and confirmed the aforementioned organisations as the gatekeepers of the new norms characterising international development aid at the turn of the century.

In parallel to the evolutionary process of international development aid described herein, the European Commission initiated the reformation of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa with a view to replacing the Lomé Convention with a new development cooperation agreement with the continent. The introduction of the ensuing Cotonou Agreement in 2000 confirmed the revamped character of EU development aid policy in the new century. However, and as illustrated above, its innovations were a reflection of the emerging paradigms characterising the discourse and practice of

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international development aid at the time in accordance with the policy drive endorsed by some of its leading actors – the OECD, the WB, and the IMF – which suggested the existence of a dynamics between the two processes. Furthermore, the European Commission corroborated with the existence of a synergy between the evolutionary processes of international development aid and EU development aid policy, by stating that “Community development policy is part of an international strategy where a comprehensive view is emerging. The strategy adopted by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, in which the Community takes part, has a key role in international coordination efforts. Other initiatives go in the same direction – such as the World Bank Comprehensive Development Framework or the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.”

Accordingly, the changes implemented by the European Commission in the reformation of EU development aid policy towards Africa stood in relation to the evolutionary trends of international development aid in the run up to the turn of the century.

As the 1990s unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that a new development cooperation agreement between Africa and the EU was to replace the Lomé Convention in 2000. One of the first official expressions of the potential reform of EU development policy in the twenty-first century emerged in the form of João de Deus Pinheiro’s words in a 1996 interview for The Courier, in which he announced “I am not sure if we should keep the Lomé structure (…) in the third millennium”. On a similar tone, the European Commission published in the same year a green paper on the future of its development policy confirming that a distinct development cooperation agreement was due to replace the Lomé Convention following its expiration in 2000. For that purpose, and with the 1996 green paper formally launching the reformation of EU development policy, the European Commission maintained that “future ACP-EU relations must first take account of the new global environment” inclusive of the “changed political and economic conditions for development”. In that manner, the green paper not only attested that the preparations for a new development cooperation agreement between the Union and Africa were underway, but also that the new development agreement between the two parties had to reflect the changes occurred in the international system, as well as in the discourse and practice of international development.

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When it came to the particular subject of development aid, the European Commission made a series of proposals in the 1996 green paper that were a clear manifestation of the leading trends of international development aid discourse and practice at the time. In the opening statements of the green paper, the European Commission argued that the reformation of the allocation and management of its development aid had to take into consideration the fact that “apart from the need to improve results, development thinking itself has moved on (...) [which] led to important changes in the concepts of aid and its role in development”. Accordingly, and with a view to taking into account the evolving discourse and practice of international development, the European Commission advanced a series of policy proposals that were distinct from the existing development aid guidelines under the Lomé Convention. It proposed that “a phased and individualised approach should be adopted [in the new development aid partnership with Africa] in which the degree of responsibility for administrative and financial management of the aid grows as good governance improves in the recipient state”.

The aim of the stated take on development aid policy by the European Commission vis-à-vis Africa “would be to give beneficiaries steadily more responsibility for managing programmes, justifying and monitoring expenditure and assessing the economic and social impact of assistance”. Whilst making references to the concept of ownership, the European Commission went on to endorse equally the principle of reinforced partnership as a potential basis for its future development cooperation framework with Africa. The notion of reinforced partnership emerged encoded in the green paper under the proposal to provide country-based management of aid that “would depend upon the quality of ACP-EU dialogue, the willingness of recipient countries to match additional Community funds with a contribution of their own, and the existence of units or machinery for coordinating foreign aid”. By setting the general lines of its future development aid configuration with Africa on identical principals characterising the discourse and practice of international development aid at the time, the European Commission used its 1996 green paper to prepare the reformation of its partnership with Africa in the new century accordingly.

Negotiations for the post-Lomé development cooperation agreement started in earnest in 1998 as a result of the conclusion of an accord closely related to the precepts stipulated by the 1996 green paper. In that process, the European Commission maintained that “in addition to the general

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thought being given to the future relationship between the ACP and the EU, priority in development policy will be attached to (...) the ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of development aid”.

Departing from the premises of the green paper, the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 confirmed a turn in EU development aid policy in line with the evolutionary trends of international development aid of the time. In consonance with the accord, “cooperation shall refer to the conclusions of United Nations Conferences and to the objectives, targets, and action programmes agreed at international level and to their follow up as a basis for development principles. Cooperation shall also refer to the international development cooperation targets and shall pay particular attention to putting in place qualitative and quantitative indicators of progress” (Article 19(2) – Cotonou Agreement). Correspondingly, and under its Aid and Development Cooperation pillar, the Cotonou Agreement advanced an aid regime drawn in conformity with the objectives, strategies, and priorities of the ACP states at national and regional level, ensuring the promotion of the principles of local ownership as well as of reinforced partnership based on mutual rights and obligations by the two parties. Additionally, and as a means of maintaining aid cooperation country and programme-sensitive, it proposed to increase the levels of efficiency, coordination, and consistency between all aid mechanisms available as a means to secure resource flows.

As a result, EU development aid policy emerged thoroughly reformed at the beginning of the twenty-first century under the Cotonou Agreement. Whilst the new content of EU development aid policy centred on poverty reduction strategies combining macroeconomic stability with the principles of reinforced partnership and ownership, its process focused on the preparation of a Country Support Strategy (CSS) formula for the allocation of aid to a given recipient. The overall objective underpinning the CSS initiative was to reduce poverty through the provision of a comprehensive and coherent framework for cooperation between all parties and thereby combine all relevant development aid resources and instruments available. As the newly established main instrument for programming aid, the CSS was to be the product of a joint assignment between the European Commission and a given country with the aim to set the general guidelines regarding the use and application of EU development aid. Furthermore, an indicative operational programme was to support the CSS enterprise as a means to establish both its specific operations and a timetable for its implementation. Accordingly, the Cotonou Agreement reformed considerably the development aid procedures of the Africa-EU development partnership conferring it a distinct content and process at the turn of the century.

While the changes introduced by the Cotonou Agreement marked a new turn in EU development aid policy, the European Commission maintained its reforming drive into the twenty-first century. The statement from the European Commission and the Council on EU development policy, and the European Commission communication on the reform of the management of external assistance materialised as its first illustrations thereafter. The stated documents were of particular relevance in the reforming process of EU development aid because they outlined the detailed objectives of EU development policy in the new century, and proposed a series of administrative reforms of the Union’s development aid structure. At the centre of the suggested reform, was the intent to both decentralise decision-making and the allocation of resources to EU Delegations, strengthen the programming process and the enhancement of the evaluation function. The first concrete step taken by the European Commission regarding the proposed reformation of its development aid set-up consisted in the foundation of EuropeAid Cooperation Office in 2001. By doing so, the European Commission not only unified its development aid project cycle from identification through to implementation, but also placed it in the hands of a single implementing body. As a result, the EU development aid structure changed considerably in the beginning of the new millennium with EuropeAid emerging as the new coordination and implementation office of the European Commission’s development aid programmes and projects around the world.

Through the combination of its mandate with the precepts of the Cotonou Agreement, EuropeAid proceeded with the programming of the European Commission’s development aid assistance based on multi-annual Country Strategy Papers (CSP) established in accordance with the CSS initiative and rendered operational since 2001. Departing from the objective to set “a standard for horizontal/thematic programming documents equivalent to the CSP framework”, EuropeAid assumed control of the development aid cycle of European Commission projects or programmes, from identification, to preparation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The concentration of the stated capacities in the hands of EuropeAid simplified the management of the

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European Commission’s development aid cycle, and thereby facilitated its practical reach when it attempted to respond to the specific needs of each individual recipient country or region.653

Whilst the founding of EuropeAid and the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement implemented a thorough change upon EU development aid policy towards Africa, the European Commission maintained its reforming impetus further through the launching of the European Union Strategy for Africa and the European Consensus in 2005.654 In keeping with the paradigms characterising EU development aid policy following the turn of the century, the European Commission devised the EU’s first comprehensive, integrated, and long-term framework for its relations with Africa announcing that it “will further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most prominently equality, partnership, and ownership”.655 For that purpose, the European Commission pledged to increase its aid volumes to Africa, contribute to the initiatives on debt cancellation launched by the international financial institutions (the WB and the IMF) across the continent, help Africa reach the MDGs, and make aid more effective.

In support of the development aid commitments made to the African continent under the EU Strategy for Africa, the European Commission produced the European Consensus on development as an instrument to increase the harmonisation and coordination of EU development aid. With the concepts of ownership, partnership, participation of civil society, gender equality, and the promotion of political dialogue featuring as its main ideological pillars, the European Consensus set the delivery of more and better aid as its main practical objective. Together with supporting the initiatives on aid effectiveness and debt cancellation ongoing at the international level at the time, the European Commission advanced that “in the spirit of the Treaty, the Community and the Member States will improve coordination and complementarity” of its development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa.656 As a result, EU policy and the policies of the Member States had to complement and be consistent with each other in the domain of development aid, specifically regarding the programming of projects and programmes in line with the established guidelines for country, regional, and thematic strategy papers. In this manner, the EU Strategy for Africa and the European Commission’s development aid cycle, and thereby facilitated its practical reach when it attempted to respond to the specific needs of each individual recipient country or region.653

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656 **European Commission**, ‘The European Consensus’
Consensus helped consolidate EU development aid policy in the new century, and allowed the Union to respond more effectively to the perceived development aid needs of the African continent thereafter.

With the EU Strategy for Africa and the European Consensus standing as milestones in the evolution of EU development aid policy in the twenty-first century, the European Commission together with the Council of the European Union attempted to take a step further in its reformation process by launching the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (JAES) in 2007.\textsuperscript{657} In the period running up to the introduction of the JAES, the European Commission produced a series of communications addressing the subject of aid effectiveness, specifically the issues of strategic deliverables\textsuperscript{658}, the approach to monitoring Member States aid performance\textsuperscript{659}, and the future of joint programming.\textsuperscript{660} By doing so, the European Commission helped to pave the ground for the ensuing introduction of the JAES as the first inter-regional development cooperation partnership between the EU and the African Union (AU).

Accordingly, the JAES attempted “to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity, and human dignity”.\textsuperscript{661} At the centre of the agreement between the EU and the AU were “the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility, and respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development”.\textsuperscript{662} Whilst calling upon the norms guiding EU development policy regarding Africa since the turn of the century, the JAES confirmed that “both sides also commit themselves to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies, and instruments”.\textsuperscript{663} In regard to the specific subject of development aid, the JAES central proposition was that “partners should urgently work on more predictable and less volatile aid,\textsuperscript{664}
focusing on results”.

For that purpose, the JAES proposed to respect the recent international agreements on development aid (the 2002 UN International Conference on Financing for Development and the 2005 OECD Paris Declaration), support the debt cancelation initiatives launched by the international financial institutions, and manage and implement development aid projects and programmes in conformity with the MDGs. Thus, the JAES emerged as an attempt from the European Commission to expand on the precepts of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU Strategy for Africa, and the European Consensus and enhance Africa-EU relations through the creation of a comprehensive political, economic, and social platform for development cooperation between both partners in the twenty-first century.

Departing from the 1996 green paper, the European Commission initiated a thorough reform of its development aid policy regarding Africa culminating with the JAES in 2007. With the green paper pointing the way, the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement confirmed the distinct orientation of EU development aid policy in the new century. Subsequently, and with the Cotonou Agreement as a basis, the European Commission continued to reform EU development aid policy as a means to fine-tune its procedures, underline its commitment to development promotion in Africa, and align and harmonise EU development aid policy with the international initiatives undertaken by some of the leading actors on the subject at the time. Whilst the EU Strategy for Africa and the European Consensus emerged as crucial milestones in that process, the European Commission together with the Council of the European Union took a step further and devised the JAES as the most advanced framework for the future of development cooperation between Africa and the EU in the new century.

Accordingly, EU development aid policy towards Africa underwent a process of significant change since the mid-to-late 1990s and acquired a distinct character by the end of 2008. As it evolved over time, EU development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa incorporated a new set of principles as its base, specifically poverty reduction, reinforced partnership, ownership, and country-specific programming. From its embryonic format in the 1996 green paper, the set of principles in question progressively incorporated EU development aid policy and culminated as the foundation of the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement, as well as of the development aid initiatives undertaken by the European Commission thereafter. As demonstrated by the analysis above, the integration process of the aforementioned principles as integral to EU development aid

policy in the period between the late 1990s and the end of 2008 was a follow-up to, and a reflection of, the evolution of the normative structure of international development aid.

The prime references for the European Commission in the stated process were the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN system under the MDGs enterprise. On that account, the current sub-section advances that the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norms characterising its contemporary approach to development aid from its relations on the subject with the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN System, and subsequently integrated them in EU developing aid policy towards Africa accordingly. The diffusion of the norms under analysis materialised through the European Commission’s increasingly close rapport with the IOs in question concerning the matter of development aid illustrated through a more active participation in their activities and the conclusion of mutual accords and partnerships with them. As a result, the current sub-section contests the EU claim to be “the driving force of this global process” of international development aid in the considered timeframe, and inversely suggests that EU development aid policy is neither ‘unique’ nor plays a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development aid. Instead, it posits that EU development aid policy is a direct reflection of the normative structure of international development aid of its time.

The normative structure of international development aid in the period between the mid-to-late 1990s and the end of 2008 evolved in close relation with the development aid policy promoted at the time by the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN System. Concomitantly, and as the aforementioned IOs incorporated the principles of poverty reduction, reinforced partnership, ownership, and country-specific programming as integral components of the normative structure of international development aid, the EU was undergoing the reformation of its development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa. Gradually, the reforming process of EU development aid policy confirmed the norms characterising then the development aid policy of the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN System at the time as its new ideological inspiration and base. The progress of EU development aid policy in line with the development aid policy promoted by the IOs in question resulted from an increasingly close cooperation between the European Commission and the previously mentioned IOs through policy meetings, agreements, mutual accords, and partnerships. An interviewed European Commission official shared a similar opinion regarding the alignment of EU development aid policy with the development aid policy promoted by the IOs under consideration, by stating:

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“I agree that we are in good policy harmony with the main international organisations in the issue of aid today. We have a great cooperation with them. We have a great dialogue with all of them”.

Accordingly, and following the leadership of the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN system on the discourse and practice of international development aid at the time, the European Commission reformed EU development aid policy and endorsed a new development aid orientation in the twenty-first century distinct from its Lomé Convention heritage. Nevertheless, and whilst acknowledging the above-mentioned IOs as the origin and gatekeepers of the new norms characterising international development aid in the new century, the European Commission displayed in one instance the capacity to steer the debate on a fundamental aspect of international development aid – the volume of aid. With the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico on 18-22 March 2002 as stage, the European Commission played a central role in the debate on aid volumes and generated a considerable impact on the subject at the international level. However, the European Commission failed to replicate its performance thereafter with little progress taking place on the issue of aid volumes since 2002. Accordingly, and with the exception of the Monterrey conference, the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and UN system maintained their leading position in the discourse and practice of international development aid, and stood as a central reference in the progress of EU development aid policy in the proposed timeframe.

The first significant expression of the increasing rapprochement between the European Commission and the stated IOs in the domain of international development aid, took place in the mid-1990s when the OECD launched the International Development Goals (IDGs) initiative. As the international donor community adapted to the new political and economic conjuncture of the post-Cold War era, the OECD issued a report in 1996 aimed at establishing a new agenda for international development based on a set of specific procedures known as the IDGs. In regards to development aid, the OECD proposed a new approach for the new century based on the principles of locally-‘owned’ strategies, commitment of adequate resources, enhanced coordination in international fora and on the ground, as well as improved monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes. The OECD report in question progressed to become a landmark in the discourse and

666 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 19 July 2006
practice of international development in the 1990s and effectively became the basis of the MDGs in 2000. With the European Commission as a member of the OECD, but not on a par with the status conferred to a state, it stood directly exposed to the innovative enterprise launched by the OECD affecting its internal debate on the future of EU development aid policy as subsequently illustrated by its 1996 green paper. Accordingly, the 1996 green paper confirmed the OECD as a direct reference in the reformation of EU development aid policy by advancing that the potential development aid “evaluation criteria applied by the European Commission (…) correspond broadly to the criteria defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee”. Therefore, and as the reformation process of EU development aid policy gathered momentum in the mid-to-late 1990s, the OECD emerged as an increasingly prominent policy reference for the European Commission therein.

Similarly, and during the same period, the European Commission strengthened its cooperative links with the WB in the dominion of international development aid and gradually endorsed the WB’s changing orientation on the subject. In line with a European Commission press release of 19 November 1996, “co-operation between the Commission and the Bank is important and well developed”. Furthermore, “in Africa, collaboration has traditionally been very strong, and the Commission has been a key participant in the Bank-sponsored Special Program of Assistance (SPA)” that facilitated the agreement between both parties regarding the creation of a future “enhanced partnership with the objective of fostering greater effectiveness of assistance, under strongly owned government programs”. As a result, top representatives from the European Commission and the WB met in Brussels in the following year, and established an improved partnership between the two institutions with the objective “to improve the effectiveness of development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, at a time when aid flows are diminishing”. Following the creation of a reinforced partnership on the issue of development aid, “the European Commission and World Bank delegations also discussed the Commission’s Green Paper on the future of the EU

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671 The SPA was a development aid project created by the WB and the IMF in 1987 as a response to the economic crises that affected the debt-ridden countries of Sub-Saharan Africa at the time. Under the guidance of the WB and the IMF, a pool of donors participated in the programme, which could be broadly seen as the precursor of the HIPC in 1996. World Bank, ‘Partners in Reform: the Special Program of Assistance’, Findings (World Bank – African Region), Special Edition, October 1994
672 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘World Bank / Commission Partnership Delivers Results’

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Lomé Convention”. In that regard, “Vice President Sarbib [WB] congratulated the European Commission for producing a comprehensive and thought-provoking document, which confirms the importance of moving development assistance towards partnership and results, with enhanced collaboration between donors to leverage resources effectively. These priorities are also those of the World Bank’s strategic agenda for Africa”. Thus, and as confirmed by the 1996 green paper, the progressively closer partnership between the WB and the European Commission produced the alignment of the development aid policy promoted by both institutions. In the process of policy harmonisation between the two institutions at the time, the WB not only preceded the European Commission in its development aid policy initiatives but also stood as a central reference in the European Commission’s reformation of EU development aid policy.

In parallel to their enhanced partnership on the general subject of development aid, the European Commission and the WB strengthened their cooperation further before the end of the 1990s following the launching of the HIPC scheme by the WB and the IMF. As demonstrated above, the HIPC was a WB and IMF initiative from 1996 designed to provide debt relief and low-interest loans to heavily indebted developing countries under a set of specific conditions with a view to cancel or reduce their external debt repayments to sustainable levels. The HIPC scheme generated immediate consensus amongst the international donor community at the time, and the European Commission vowed to participate in it and extend it to the development aid framework it maintained with Africa. In a communication from 1998, the European Commission sustained that “from the outset the Community has strongly supported the HIPC initiative. It has been fully participating in it with regard to its claims to eligible ACP countries”. Furthermore, the European Commission suggested that the HIPC was essential for the future of international development aid at large, because it was “the first time a close relation has been stressed between poverty alleviation strategies, structural adjustment programmes, and a debt relief initiative. Both the IMF and the World Bank have been put at the heart of a set of more coherent, effective, and co-ordinated development instruments.” By doing so, the European Commission acknowledged the leadership of the WB and the IMF in the campaign to restructure international development aid in the run-up

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674 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘European Commission and World Bank Co-operation in Africa Moves Into a Higher Gear’
675 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘European Commission and World Bank Co-operation in Africa Moves Into a Higher Gear’
677 European Commission, ‘Community Participation in the Debt Relief Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, COM (99) 518 final, 26 October 1998
678 European Commission, ‘Community Participation in the Debt Relief Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)’
to the new century under a distinct paradigm promoted by the two IOs in question to soften the negative impact of structural adjustment programmes across the developing world.

To support the HIPC, the WB and the IMF designed the PRSP enterprise at the time, which generated an equally substantive impact upon the normative evolution of international development aid in the late 1990s. Similarly to the support it conferred on the HIPC, the European Commission quickly approved the PRSP as a reference in its development aid policy in the run-up to the twenty-first century. The PRSP emerged as an operational instrument created by the WB and the IMF in 1999 with the capacity to translate a country’s poverty reduction strategy into a focused action plan through an open participatory process involving governments, civil society, other relevant international institutions, and donors.679

Correspondingly, one of the innovations of EU development aid policy under the Cotonou Agreement consisted of the creation of the CSP scheme under the PRSP model devised previously by the WB and the IMF.680 The link between the CSP and the PRSP was apparent, as confirmed by the European Council recommendation to the European Commission in 2000, when it vowed to “take full account of the experience gained by other financial donors, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions (…) when preparing country strategy papers”.681 Concomitantly, the European Commission used its statement on the future of EU development policy in 2000 to stress that “PRSPs form an integral part of the Union’s support (…) in improving the macro-economic framework of partner countries”.682 By attaching its CSP enterprise to the PRSP initiative designed by the WB and the IMF, the European Commission enhanced its cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions and fostered further policy alignment with the latter. As a result, and with a view to manage the policy harmonisation process between the European Commission and the Bretton Woods institutions on the question of PRSPs, “each year [since 2001] the Commission and the Bank meet and agree how to align the assistance they provide to PRSPs in individual countries”.683 In that manner, the European Commission endorsed the PRSP in combination with the HIPC as one of the main targets of EU development aid policy in the new century confirming the WB and the IMF as central references in that process.

679 International Monetary Fund & World Bank, ‘Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing Countries’
682 European Commission, “The European Community’s Development Policy: Statement by the Council and the Commission”, pp. 8

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In light of the agreements formalised with the WB and the IMF under the PSRP and HIPC enterprises, the European Commission swiftly translated its commitments into practice by integrating them in EU development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa in the twenty-first century. By doing so, the European Commission started to contribute financially to the WB HIPC Trust Fund in line with the precepts of two separate financing agreements on the matter with the WB and IMF signed in 2000 and 2003. As a result, the first European Commission disbursement of aid for the HIPC Trust Fund materialised in 2001 and maintained a sustainable flow thereafter. At the same time, the implementation of the CSP under the PRSP model by the European Commission was underway following “a standard for horizontal/thematic programming documents” formerly designed by the WB and the IMF. Through the endorsement of the PRSP and the HIPC as two flagships of its new approach to development aid in the twenty-first century, the European Commission caused EU development aid policy towards Africa to shift in time, and progress in alignment with the development aid orientation of the WB and the IMF at the time.

In this perspective, the evolutionary character of EU development aid policy in the period under analysis illustrated its increasing harmonisation with the policy advocated by the WB and the IMF in the same period. An interviewed European Commission official shared analogous view regarding the progress of EU development aid policy then suggesting:

“There has been a lot of alignment on aid philosophy especially between the Commission and the World Bank/IMF in the last ten years. This has happened with the whole drive pushed by the World Bank/IMF towards results-based development, and the PRSPs. It all fits together now”.

Whilst confirming the increasingly close policy alignment between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF in the timeframe covered by the analysis, the European Commission official equally stressed the relevance of the PRSP enterprise therein. Similarly, another European Commission official interviewed in light of the thesis not only corroborated the opinion advanced by her colleague but also suggested that the PRSP initiative had evolved into a fundamental reference in contemporary EU development aid policy by stating:

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686 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 20 July 2006
“Cooperation between the European Commission and the WB/IMF grew remarkably from the 1990s onwards. One of the best examples of that was with the PRSPs. The PRSPs became the bible of the Commission in its country strategies”.

In that manner, the above European Commission official emphasised the relevance of the WB, the IMF, and the PRSP enterprise in the new take on development aid endorsed by the European Commission, and confirmed that “the Bretton Woods institutions are important partners in this endeavour”. Accordingly, the progressive rapprochement between the European Commission and the WB and IMF in the passage form the 1990s to the new century generated the increasing alignment of EU development aid policy with the development aid policy promoted at the time by the WB and the IMF.

With the PRSP and the HIPC initiatives as central references, the European Commission, and the WB and the IMF developed additional channels of collaboration on development aid matters in the new millennium through the launching of a technical cooperation agreement – the Limelette Partnership – and European Commission contributions to WB trust funds. Based on the “Trust Funds and Cofinancing Framework Agreement between the Commission and the World Bank”, the European Commission agreed on a financial programme with the WB in 2001, through which it was to transfer considerable sums into various WB trust funds that focused on development promotion mostly in Africa. By doing so, the European Commission sought to increase the effectiveness of its development aid disbursements at the time, and thereby acknowledged the WB’s wider technical expertise and knowledge of local environments in certain cases, as suggested by an interviewed WB official:

“The Commission gives the money to the World Bank in trust funds so that is money that the World Bank manages for the Commission. The EU has loads of money but much less staff, especially in developing countries, than other actors like us. The WB was set up just for that purpose so we have far more experience and expertise.”

Following the 2001 agreement with the WB to participate and contribute to some of its development aid trust funds at least up until the end of 2009, the European Commission enhanced its collaboration further with the WB through the conclusion of the Limelette Partnership in 2003. The Limelette Partnership emerged as a development promotion plan created by the WB and the

687 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 06 November 2008
688 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – The Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’, SPEECH/02/437, 28 September 2006
690 Interview, Brussels, World Bank, 11 March 2008
European Commission with the aim to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid delivered by both institutions, with a special focus on Africa, as suggested by an interviewed WB official:

“There is a lot of coordination between the Commission and us, especially on Africa. We have something called the Limelette Partnership process, which means that the Commission and the World Bank meet once a year and agree on policy and operation coordination”.

As a result, EU development aid policy underwent further harmonisation with that promoted by the WB, specifically regarding Africa and the issues of coordination of programme aid and predictability of aid. Moreover, and under the Limelette Partnership, the subject of the PRSPs also remained at the top of the cooperation agenda between the European Commission and the WB. Therefore, the conclusion of the Limelette Partnership and the participation of the European Commission in WB trust funds brought additional policy alignment between the two institutions and reinforced the WB as a central reference for the European Commission in the reformation of EU development aid policy in the timeframe covered by the research.

With a focus on the period from the end of the Lomé Convention to the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement and the subsequent development aid initiatives undertaken by the European Commission up to the end of 2008, the current sub-section demonstrated that EU development aid policy underwent a shift in orientation. Accordingly, and with the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement as a basis, poverty reduction, ownership, reinforced partnership, and country-specific programming emerged as the principles characterising EU development aid policy in the new millennium. Therein, European Commission cooperation with the OECD under the IDG scheme, and with the WB and the IMF under the HIPC and PRSP initiatives stood as major references in the evolutionary character of EU development aid policy in the timeline in question. Furthermore, the turn of the century brought the UN-sponsored MDGs as a complementary reference in the stated process. Following the launching of the MDGs, the UN system generated global consensus on the targets of international development in the period between 2000 and 2015, and integrated all major donors under one broad policy orientation. MDG 8 addressed specifically the matter of development aid, and solicited the international donor community to “deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through

691 Interview, Brussels, World Bank, 11 March 2008
693 Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Louis Michel Emphasizes the Importance of the Partnership between the EC and the World Bank for Development in his Meeting with Paul Wolfowitz’, IP/05/440, 18 April 2005
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term”. On that account, and according to a European Commission communication, “since September 2000 (…) the Community and most Member States have adapted or shifted their development aid policies to focus on achieving the MDGs and/or the Millennium Declaration’s somewhat broader objectives”. As a result, the MDGs progressed into an additional flagship of EU development aid policy in the twenty-first century and featured prominently in the European Commission’s policy initiatives on the subject.

The endorsement of the MDGs as one of the central references of EU development aid policy in the new millennium marked the policy rapprochement between the European Commission and the UN System at large in the domain of international development at the time. In line with a European Commission communication from 2001, “improving co-operation with the UN is a major priority to the EU, to its Member States and to the European Commission. (…) The European Commission considers that there is good reason to strengthen further relations with the UN and to improve efficiency and coherence in our co-operation. The Commission considers that a first step in the direction of a more effective partnership could be taken by enhancing collaboration in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs”. Thereafter, cooperation between the European Commission and the UN System increased considerably through a focus on achieving the MDGs, as subsequently confirmed by the 2003 ‘Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Community and the United Nations’. In consonance with the stated agreement in question, “both parties will endeavour to strengthen their mutual contacts with a view to improving the exchange of information on programming and content throughout the cycle of their operations”, inclusive of the fact that “the Commission acknowledges the mandated primacy of UN oversight and control systems”.

Therein, the European Commission and the UN system enhanced their relations significantly in the new millennium, where the 2005 European Consensus emerged as its ultimate expression. Accordingly, the European Consensus advanced that “the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals” 699. The European Commission’s endorsement of the MDGs combined with its strong rapprochement with the UN System in the domain of international development aid, transformed both the MDGs and the UN System into major references in the design of EU development aid policy in the twenty-first century.

As EU development aid policy progressed in the proposed timeframe, it underwent a process of harmonisation and alignment with the policy promoted by the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN System, which marked a shift in its orientation. The IOs in question stood as the norm diffusers in the structure of international development aid, and the European Commission appears to have ‘learnt’ the norms characterising international development aid from them, and subsequently incorporated the norms in EU development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa. Therein, the enhanced agreements and partnerships with the above-mentioned IOs were fundamental. The relations between the European Commission and the IOs under consideration were commendable during the 1990s, and then evolved into close partnerships and accords in the twenty-first century. According to Poul Nielsen, the progressive rapprochement between the European Commission and the aforementioned IOs in the passage from the 1990s to the twenty-first century mirrored the European Commission’s objective then to “increase cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors, in particular the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions”. 700 An interviewed European Commission official corroborated Poul Nielsen’s statement by drawing attention to the rapid increase in the volume of aid disbursed by the European Commission through the IOs in question in the recent past:

“We have now quadrupled our aid through international organisations over the past four years. That is the UN family at large and the WB”. 701

Accordingly, both Poul Nielsen and the above European Commission official attested the centrality of the stated IOs as references in the reformation of EU development aid policy. Moreover, Poul Nielsen affirmed that, by using the aforementioned IOs as references, “we have thus gone

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699 European Commission, ‘The European Consensus’, pp. 2
701 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2007

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mainstream in our development efforts, and are trying to make the best use of existing frameworks and processes, such as the PRSP\textsuperscript{702}. Thus, EU development aid policy evolved in increasing alignment and relation to the policy of development aid promoted at the time by the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN system.

Throughout the 1990s, the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN System readjusted their approach to international development aid in response both to the apparent limitations of their previous programmes and to the emerging economic and political conjuncture of the post-Cold War international system. In time, considerable policy convergence materialised between the stated IOs, which established a distinct normative basis for the structure of international development aid. With the MDGs standing as a flagship for international development aid at the turn to the twenty-first century, the international donor community sought to increase the growing consensus on the subject thereafter through the launching of a plethora of initiatives to reinforce what Poul Nielson called the ‘mainstream’ ‘existing frameworks and processes’ of international development aid. Whilst the IOs under analysis were behind the new enterprises on the subject of international development aid, the European Commission achieved some ‘leadership’ in the debate on aid volumes at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico on 18-22 March 2002.\textsuperscript{703} Nevertheless, it failed to replicate its performance subsequently with little progress materialising on the matter of aid volumes thereafter. Accordingly, and with the exception of the Monterrey Conference, the European Commission did not play a leading role in the normative evolution of international development aid in the period under analysis but became an adherent of the various initiatives launched by the previously mentioned IOs in the domain of international development aid instead. Therefore, the ensuing analysis largely confirms the thesis’ hypotheses as it illustrates that EU development aid policy towards Africa in the late 1990s and beginning of the twenty-first century is neither ‘unique’ nor plays a ‘leadership’ role therein.

One year on from the Millennium Declaration, the UN General Assembly initiated the preparations for the International Conference on Financing for Development to delineate an improved strategy to reach the MDGs.\textsuperscript{704} Concomitantly, the European Commission attempted to reach a common position with the EU Member States on the issues on the agenda of the Monterrey

\textsuperscript{702}Europa - Press Releases (RAPID), ‘Speech by Poul Nielson – The UN and Europe: Active Multilateral Partners’
\textsuperscript{703}From here on referred to as Monterrey Conference
Conference to “present a solid, argued and coherent position on the international scene”. On that account, the Barcelona European Council of 15 – 16 March 2002 generated the required consensus amongst the EU Member States and the European Commission on the target volume of EU aid as well as the EU input to the international campaign on aid effectiveness. At the centre of the adopted common EU position was the ambition to raise its official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015 as a firm contribution to reach the MDGs. Armed with a common strategy and representing the Union as a unitary actor at the international level, the European Commission tabled the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI proposal at the negotiation table in Monterrey. By proposing to make the highest contribution of ODA/GNI at the conference, the European Commission displayed intent not only to reach the MDGs targets but also to rally the rest of the world by example, which caused a considerable impact on the issue at the international stage. As a result, many participating donors committed to follow the European Commission proposal and match its 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI by 2015. The concerted action by the European Commission at the Monterrey Conference was unprecedented in the domain of international development aid and contributed to stronger cohesion within the EU on the subject, whilst it conferred the European Commission ‘leadership by example’ in the campaign to increase the volumes of international development aid.

Nevertheless, the success achieved at the Monterrey Conference was to be short-lived for the European Commission because no other donor maintained its pledge to follow the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI proposal from the European Commission thereafter. The first expression of the leadership break of the European Commission on the matter of aid volumes materialised at the UN World Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa on 26 August – 04 September 2002. At the UN World Summit in 2002, the European Commission saw the donors that had pledged to increase the volume of their aid gradually up to the value of 0.7 per cent of their ODA/GNI by 2015 retract significantly and adopt a less ambitious target for the future. Whilst maintaining its standing on the issue and advancing the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI goal as one of its objectives in international development aid, the European Commission saw the support from the international donor

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706 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions Barcelona European Council’, SN 100/1/02 REV 1
community for its proposal fade rapidly after the Monterrey Conference. An interviewed European Commission official lent a similar take on the role the European Commission in the subject of aid volumes surrounding the Monterrey Conference and its follow-up initiatives, suggesting:

“The Commission has tried to become very active in all of the big UN conferences on development aid, such as the Monterrey process, the MDGs, and so on. However, I can confidently say that we are still struggling a lot to have a strong voice in the UN system and therefore steer the debate on the big issues on the table.”

Accordingly, the ‘leadership by example’ experienced by the European Commission at the Monterrey Conference lasted for a short period of time with little progress taking place on the subject of aid volumes up to the end of 2008.

Despite the outcome of the Monterrey Conference for the European Commission, the event generated a new impetus amongst the international donor community on the enhancement of the effectiveness of international development aid in line with the MDGs targets. Shortly after the Monterrey Conference, the OECD launched an international campaign on aid effectiveness that culminated with the creation of one of the pillars of international development aid in the 21st century – the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The first concerted step taken by the OECD to establish a set of indicators of aid effectiveness for the new century, materialised in 2003, when it convened a meeting in Rome between the major IOs in the field of international development aid together with donor and recipient countries, including the European Commission. The OECD meeting in Rome produced the Declaration on Harmonisation, with all signatories pledging to take action to improve the management and effectiveness of aid whilst taking stock of concrete progress before the group’s subsequent meeting in 2005.

Subsequently, the OECD organised the following meeting on aid effectiveness in Paris 2005, and produced a set of concrete and definite indicators of aid effectiveness and a system to monitor the progress of the targets to put in place, under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. At the centre of the Paris Declaration were the principles of ownership, policy alignment, policy

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710 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 20 July 2006
harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. As one of the signatory parties of the accord, the European Commission swiftly incorporated the proposed guidelines for aid effectiveness in the EU policy of development aid and vowed to “play an active role in implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and (...) be one of the driving forces to promote EU delivery of its commitments made in Paris”. An interviewed European Commission official confirmed equally the Paris Declaration as a key external reference in the contemporary evolution of EU development aid policy, by suggesting:

“When it comes to aid effectiveness, the agenda was set by the OECD under the Paris Declaration in 2005 and these are the guidelines that we use today. So it is true that our source of policy inspiration is external”.

With the Paris Declaration soon progressing into a central pillar of international development aid in the new century, the OECD followed up on its agenda at a subsequent meeting in Accra, Ghana in 2008, where it reiterated the commitments of the Paris Declaration and proposed new provisions on strengthening the concepts of ownership and managing for results. Therein, and building on the legacy of the Monterrey Conference, the OECD promoted further policy alignment within the international donor community, and reinforced the normative basis of international development aid in the twenty-first century in accordance with the principles of ownership, country-specific programming, reinforced partnership, and poverty reduction.

As illustrated by the analysis above, the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement implemented a shift in the development aid orientation of EU development policy towards Africa at the turn of the century. External aspects shaped in the form of the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN system emerged as central references for the European Commission in the reformation of the aid dimension of EU development policy in the passage into the twenty-first century. Through increasingly close agreements, partnerships, and joint programmes with the stated IOs, the European Commission appears to have ‘learnt’ a new set of development aid norms championed by the latter, and subsequently incorporated them in EU development aid policy vis-à-vis Africa. As a result, the ‘unique’ claim recurrently sustained by the European Commission concerning EU development aid policy towards Africa stands largely unsubstantiated. EU development aid policy is a broad reproduction of the policy of development aid promoted by the previously mentioned IOs at the time. Similarly, the ‘leadership’ role often upheld by the European

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714 European Commission, ‘The European Consensus’, pp. 10
715 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 February 2010
716 OECD, “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action”
Commission in the domain of international development aid is unconfirmed by the current investigation, despite the European Commission’s temporary lead in the subject of international aid volumes during the Monterrey Conference in 2002. An interviewed European Commission official shared a similar take on the European Commission’s attempt to assume ‘leadership’ on the topic of development aid at the international level, proffering:

“After the Cotonou Agreement was in place we then attempted to play an important role in the way aid is implemented. While there were some isolated cases of success from our side, the OECD, the World Bank and other main donors still hold the biggest clout in the way things get done in terms of aid”.717

Accordingly, the scrutiny of the evolutionary process of EU development aid policy regarding Africa following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement largely confirms the hypotheses advanced by the thesis. The subsection demonstrated that EU development aid policy is neither ‘unique’ nor plays a ‘leadership’ role in the dominion of international development aid. Instead, it is a reflection of the development aid policy promoted by the OECD, the WB, the IMF, and the UN system in the same period over time.

Conclusions

As a follow-up to chapter four, the current chapter aimed to capture the shift in EU development policy over time and understand the process of its policy evolution in the period between the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement and the end of 2008. It attempted to apprehend how, who, and what caused the shift in EU development policy by integrating the EU (represented by the European Commission) in the structure of international development inclusive of the role performed by its comprising agents therein. To this end, it assessed the aforementioned policy shift vis-à-vis the social structures that the European Commission integrates and the normative base that characterises them. By doing so, the chapter attempted to test empirically the hypotheses advanced by the thesis, which consist on EU development policy regarding Africa in the period under analysis being neither ‘unique’ nor playing a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.

717 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 February 2010
Therein, the chapter suggested that the innovative aspects of the Cotonou Agreement that centred upon a new three-pillar structure – Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation – did not make EU development policy ‘unique’ or vested with a ‘leadership’ capacity in the domain of international development. Instead, it argued that the new principles characterising EU development policy pertained already to the normative structure of international development prior to the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement. For that purpose, the chapter traced the large norms defining EU development policy to the structure of international development, specifically to certain IOs and their role in the diffusion of the norm under consideration. By doing so, it demonstrated that the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of the norms under analysis were the OECD, the WB, the IMF, the WTO, and the UN System (through its various agencies), and not the European Commission. Subsequently, it suggested that the previously mentioned IOs diffused the norms under consideration in the structure of international development, and affected the policy orientation of its constituent agents, such as the European Commission. As a result, the chapter argued that progressively the European Commission ‘learnt’ the norms under analysis from the above-mentioned IOs through a process of increasingly close cooperation and coordination with them, which caused those norms to permeate the EU process of development policy design, and made EU development policy shift accordingly over time.

Whilst the traceability of the diffusion process of the norms under scrutiny was more evident in some cases, the analysis confirmed the existence of a broad dynamic pattern between the evolution of a particular norm and the integration of that norm in the EU policy of development cooperation. The standard feature of that pattern was that the European Commission always followed the IOs in the inclusion of a given norm as part of EU development policy. Moreover, the emergent pattern also demonstrated that in the majority of cases the European Commission went on to establish a progressively close relationship with the IO/IOs that had already designed or assumed leadership in the promotion of a given norm. Therefore, the rapprochement between the European Commission and the IO/IOs in question established a direct channel between both, whereby the latter diffused a new norm/norms to the European Commission, which it internalised subsequently as part of EU development policy.

Nevertheless, and as argued above, there were some exceptions to the rule in the diffusion process of the norms under analysis in the current chapter. The most explicit cases emerged in the analysis of the Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation pillars of the Cotonou Agreement. The sub-section on Economic and Trade Cooperation suggested that the
incorporation of the trade liberalisation and development norm as part of the new EU development policy was not the result of a ‘learning’ process by the European Commission vis-à-vis the WTO, because the EU (represented by the European Commission) was one of the organisation’s founding members. However, it argued equally that the incorporation of the trade liberalisation and development norm in the new EU policy of development cooperation with Africa was a direct ‘import’ from the WTO, which made its ideational origin external to the European Commission. Together with demonstrating a less apparent diffusion process between the European Commission and the WTO regarding the trade liberalisation and development norm, the analysis of the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar illustrated two instances when the European Commission attempted to take leadership in the promotion of the stated norm – the DDA and the EPAs processes. Nevertheless, and despite the potential of both initiatives in promoting a new dimension of trade liberalisation and development across the developing world in the future, by the end of 2008 their results remained rather limited. Similarly, and in the sub-section on Aid and Development Cooperation, the European Commission took an identical step in the attempt to assume leadership in the subject of aid volumes. Nonetheless, and despite some momentary success at the Monterrey Conference, the European Commission failed to maintain the momentum at the international level thereafter with little progress taking place on the issue of aid volumes until the end of 2008.

Accordingly, the current chapter confirmed that EU development policy towards Africa in the period between the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement and the end of 2008 was neither ‘unique’ nor played a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development. Furthermore, it confirmed that the shift in EU development policy in the timeframe under analysis was not an innovation in the discourse and practice of international development but rather a reflection of the large development norms of the time designed and promoted by a number of IOs integral to the structure of international development.
Chapter VI – The EU in International Development: Discussing Structure & Agency

“Advertising is the very essence of democracy”
– Anton Chekhov
“The ACP-EU relations were initially maybe unique vis-à-vis the other development arrangements in the world. Today that unique aspect disappeared and the EU development policy became a mirror of the policy of its major partners in the field of development”.

The above quotation from an interviewed European Commission official reveals the investigation’s findings on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. As argued in chapter one and two of the thesis, the analysis focused on the dynamics maintained by the EU with the normative basis that characterises the structure and agents of international development, and assessed how it affected EU behaviour as expressed through its development policy towards Africa in the considered timeframe. Correspondingly, chapters three, four, and five concentrated on the empirical application of the proposed Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist framework of analysis to the interpretation of EU development policy. Their main purpose was to address the thesis’ puzzle and research questions, and test the formulated hypotheses. The current chapter discusses the practical findings of the research, and the contribution it makes to the understanding of contemporary EU development policy. Therefore, it summarises and reassesses the argument posited in all previous chapters to contrast their themes and connect their messages. Furthermore, the chapter integrates the thesis in the wider academic debates on EU development policy, and considers some viable directions for future research on the subject.

1. Research Questions & Hypotheses Revisited

In line with the thesis’ puzzle and research questions raised and addressed in the introduction, chapter one, and chapter two, the research proposed to interpret EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War through a focus on:

- Its potential shift in time, and the character of the shift.

718 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 06 November 2008
- Its ‘unique’ nature, based on its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the policy promoted by the other agents in the structure of international development.

- Its ‘leadership’ role, based on the impact generated on the advancement of the discourse and practice of international development, specifically concerning the policy orientation of its integral agents.

The three-pronged topical challenge advanced in the opening chapters aimed to uncover EU behaviour and the process of EU development policy design regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War. Its objective was to comprehend the evolution of EU development policy in the post-Cold War period through a focus on its potential shift in time, and its ‘unique’ nature and ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development, as references of enquiry.

Considering the aforementioned research questions and the corresponding initial observations, the introduction and chapter two advanced three hypotheses as the departure point of the investigation on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War:

- The orientation of EU development policy shifted in time in an evolutionary manner.

- EU development policy was not ‘unique’ in nature when compared with the policy of development cooperation of other agents in the structure of international development.

- EU development policy did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the progress of the discourse and practice of international development.

The three hypotheses emerged from provisional assertions regarding the understanding of the character of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. The proposed hypotheses contended that EU development policy underwent a shift in time, but that the shift was evolutionary and not dramatic in nature. The concept of shift consists of a considerable change in policy orientation. Additionally, and whilst it progressed in the period under consideration, the thesis hypothetically proposed that EU development policy was not ‘unique’ in nature, which is contrary to EU officials’ and institutions’ reoccurring accounts. The notion of ‘unique’ is a means to measure the distinctiveness of EU development policy in relation to the policy of development cooperation.
promoted by the other agents in the structure of international development. Furthermore, the research suggested that EU development policy did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the evolution of the discourse and practice of international development during the timeframe under analysis. The concept of ‘leadership’ measures how EU development policy affected the discourse and practice of international development in time, and specifically, whether it progressed into a leading policy reference for the other agents in the structure of international development during the considered timeframe. Subsequently, the thesis advanced a Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist framework of analysis to either confirm or disprove the advanced hypotheses regarding the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War, which the current chapter discusses in the following sections.

2. The EU Development Policy in International Development: A Social Constructivist Perspective

After establishing the research questions and hypotheses guiding the investigation on EU development policy, the thesis advanced a distinct methodological fabric for the interpretation of the subject. The suggested framework of analysis centred on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda for the study of international political phenomena. As a result, chapter three, four, and five concentrated on the empirical application of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist design to the interpretation of EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War. In light of their findings the current section aims to assess how the adopted methodology helped to address the thesis’ research questions and hypotheses. By reflecting on each chapter’s argument regarding the proposed research questions and hypotheses, the ensuing sub-section integrates chapters three, four, and five together to capture the pertinence of the suggested methodology in advancing the understanding on contemporary EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

2.1 EU Development Policy Analysis & the Structure & Agency of International Development

Prior to the discussion of the research’s findings, it is crucial to recapitulate the substance and rationale of the proposed methodological design concerning the interpretation of EU development
policy. As the literature review in chapter one illustrated, the existing accounts on EU development policy followed a three-fold theoretical orientation – State Interests, Character and Significance of the Partnership, and Means of Extensive Domination. While theoretically distinct, most of the previous research displayed weak methodological foundations with a clear inclination to endorse comparative analysis approaches in their interpretations of the subject. Most existing studies on EU development policy shared a theoretical tendency to interpret the EU and its development policy evolution in isolation from the international system and its comprising agents. Therein, the accounts did not address the theoretical aspirations of the thesis in the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. The thesis’ theoretical goal was to capture the character of EU development policy as a system of norms and ideas that progressed in a specific timeframe. Unlike the existing analyses on the subject, the thesis aimed to understand how the ideological basis of EU development policy evolved, and what and who caused it to change vis-à-vis its integration in an international system comprised by a multitude of actors. For that purpose, the thesis considered the end of the Cold War as a departing point, since it marked the beginning of a new era in international affairs and the emergence of a new momentum in European integration.

The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) became the initial earmark of simultaneous further internal integration between all EU Member States (MS) and the expansion of the EU external dimension. The TEU created an official platform for the development of the Union’s external capacities that epitomised the emergence of a new EU vision for the future. As argued in chapter one, a restricted group of authors, most notably Karin Arts and Anne Dickson, William Brown, and Mary Farrel have attempted to incorporate the EU external dimension in their analyses of EU development policy, albeit without: a) considering the EU as an actor with an increasingly expansive international dimension; b) drawing a focus on norms and ideas; c) suggesting a strong methodological approach to their research. Hence, the thesis attempted to address the mentioned gaps in the literature on EU development policy and its theoretical aspirations by endorsing a distinct framework of analysis based on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda. Accordingly, the analysis concentrated on removing the EU from the analytical isolation of the international system, and on the importance of ideas and norms in the definition of an actor’s behaviour expressed through its development policy. By doing so, the thesis advanced a distinct and strong methodological basis for the interpretation of EU development policy.

Martha Finnemore designed a distinct theoretical approach to the interpretation of international political phenomena. Her work originates from a Social Constructivist tradition located
within the Rationalist-Reflectivist theoretical spectrum that evolved over the past three decades as a cogent alternative to the traditionally dominant Rationalist political theories - (Neo)Realism and (Neo)Liberalism.\textsuperscript{719} Resting upon a distinct premise from Rationalism, Martha Finnemore calls for a focus on the impact and place of human awareness and conscience in international affairs. The author rejects the rational materialism of (Neo)Realism and (Neo)Liberalism conveying that the most relevant aspect in the understanding of international affairs is social, and not material. She advocates that the study of international relations (IR) should concentrate on the ideas, beliefs, and shared understandings that inform all actors in the international system.\textsuperscript{720} Martha Finnemore’s position originates from the belief that the international system is a human creation that does not exist per se. It emerges from an intersubjective human awareness translated as a world of ideas, a body of thought, and a system of norms dependent on how it is arranged by certain people in time and space. Hence, change in thoughts and ideas in the realm of IR, provokes direct change in the system itself.\textsuperscript{721} Therein, Martha Finnemore’s theoretical premises established a distinct approach to the understanding of international political phenomena, which emerged as a viable alternative to the traditionally dominant political theories characterising EU development policy analysis.

In consonance with a particular Social Constructivist research agenda, Martha Finnemore draws her attention to the interpretation of an actor’s preferences and interests by focusing, not on the social interaction between different actors, but instead on the norms of the international system.\textsuperscript{722} The author advances that the preferences and interests of an actor may only be perceived through the analysis of the international social structure of which it is a constituent part, because they are defined by the norms of behaviour embedded in the international system.\textsuperscript{723} While calling for an analytical concentration on structure, she considers that structure can only be comprehensively understood when combined with a focus on agency, which in her theoretical fabric, consists of the international organisations (IOs) in the international system.\textsuperscript{724} Accordingly, structure and agency emerge as mutually constitutive in the author’s analyses, which make the preferences and interests of a given actor shaped by the international norms of behaviour in the international system that relevant IOs transmit and ‘teach’ to that actor. Hence, the particularity of

\textsuperscript{719} Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Taking Stock: the Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 2001


\textsuperscript{723} Finnemore, Martha ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, International Organization, Vol. 50(2), Spring 1996

Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivism resides in her concentration on both the international system, as structure, and its comprising IOs, as agency, to understand an actor’s behaviour. At the centre of her analyses are the norms and ideas characterising the international system at a given time, and how, what, and who ‘teaches’ those norms to a concerned actor, which affect its behaviour, and ultimately its process of policy design.\(^{725}\)

Based on her specific Social Constructivist framework of analysis, and starting with the principle that “method should serve theory, not the reverse”, Martha Finnemore demonstrated the application of her research agenda into various cases studies in the domain of international affairs.\(^{726}\) The author successfully illustrated the application of her Social Constructivist method of research into practice through: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and science bureaucracies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the rules of war, the World Bank (WB) and poverty, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and economic expertise, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and voluntary repatriation, the United Nations (UN) and peacekeeping, amongst other examples.\(^{727}\) By emphasising the importance of norms in the international system and the role of IOs in diffusing those norms therein, the author draws attention to both structure and agency in her accounts. Therein, she attests that the most relevant aspect in the understanding of international affairs is not material, but social.

The theoretical basis of Martha Finnemore’s method emerged as a suitable framework of analysis for the interpretation of EU development policy because: a) it agrees with the proposed theoretical aspirations of the research; b) advances an alternative answer to the identified analytical gap in the subject’s existing literature; c) and provides a strong methodological foundation for the thesis. Although the dissertation’s method of research is largely innovative, a small group of authors attempted to interpret EU development policy in line with a focus on the power of norms. Herein, chapter one demonstrated how Ole Elgstrom, Vicki Birchfield, and Andy Storey rely on the power of norms in their proposed narratives on the subject. Despite advancing the understanding of EU development policy through a distinct analysis of EU development policy, the aforementioned

\(^{725}\) Finnemore, Martha, “The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force”, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2004)


authors did not address: a) the origin of the norms in focus in their accounts; b) the relation of norms with the broader aspects of social structures, such as its comprising IOs; c) and, how norms progress in time. Conversely, Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda addresses the pronounced gaps in the existing normative research on EU development policy, and agrees with the theoretical aspirations of the thesis. Thus, Martha Finnemore’s framework of analysis provides the research with a strong methodological basis.

The proposal to adopt the Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist research agenda to the understanding of EU development policy stands thus far unprecedented. However, as further research emerges regarding especially the interpretation of the EU as an international actor, it appears that Martha Finnemore’s method of analysis of international political phenomena is gathering increasing interest amongst the concerned academic community. Knud Erik Jorgensen, provides the most striking example. In a recent book chapter he made a small reference to Martha Finnemore’s research. Knud Erik Jorgensen suggested that it could provide a pertinent method for the understanding of the EU in the international system, insofar as her “approach and general findings suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of international organisations teaching the European Union”. Nevertheless, Jorgensen did not expand on how to apply Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda to a particular EU case study, but rather, he made a simple suggestion regarding its potential for future research on the EU in IR. The thesis assumed the challenge of adopting Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda to the analysis of EU development policy. Thereby, it aspired to make an innovative theoretical contribution to the understanding of the EU in the international system at large.

2.1.1 Practical Application of the Proposed Method

In accordance with Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method of analysis, the research began by integrating the EU in the international system as a prerequisite for the interpretation of its development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War. It proceeded with a delicate transformation of Martha Finnemore’s original framework of analysis, specifically regarding the object of research. Whilst Martha Finnemore considers independent and sovereign states as the object of her research, the thesis focuses on the EU, which is not a state but a particular union of

states unprecedented in the international system. As argued in the introduction, and in more detail in chapter three, the thesis did not profess the EU as a state, and acknowledged the importance of its MS in the functioning of the Union. Instead, it endorsed the understanding of the EU as an increasingly prominent actor in the international system following its process of internal integration. Therein, EU development policy features as the expression of a coordinated position and action from the European Commission in the domain of development cooperation regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War. In light of Martha Finnemore’s research agenda, the dissertation consists of an attempt to capture the integration of the European Commission (representing the EU) in the structure international development, and understand its process of development policy design regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, the investigation on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War draws a focus on the EU, with the European Commission as its representative in the structure of international development. The aim is to capture the rapport it established with the structure of international development and the identified leading IOs in that structure, and assess how it affected its process of development policy design. Chapter three launched the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War by concentrating on the potential of the structure and agents of international development upon the definition of EU interests and preferences formation. Thus, it started assessing how the end of the Cold War left a considerable political, economic, and social void in the international system that prompted it and its constituent agents to adjust accordingly. The cessation of the US-Soviet Union stand-off at the end of the 1980s opened the international system to a new balance of power that allowed for the principles of multilateralism to re-emerge. As a “mode of coordinating relations between three or more states based on generalised principles of conduct, that imply indivisibility and defuse reciprocity”, multilateralism resurfaced as a reaction to the previous bipolar system conferring IOs a new window of opportunity to assume renewed authority in the international system.730 The thesis does not make any claims concerning the success of multilateralism then or thereafter, nevertheless, it contended that the end of the Cold War stimulated the emergence of new norms in the international system, and spread the belief that IOs could provide new forms of leadership therein.

Chapter three expanded further on the general role of the agents (IOs) that impacted the structure of international development – the WB, the IMF, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN) (through various agencies), and the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) – suggesting that they functioned as norm diffusers therein. Accordingly, it advanced that the aforementioned IOs diffused a specific set of norms in the structure of international development that potentially affected the preferences and interests formation of the other comprising actors in that structure, such as the European Commission. The focus on the above-mentioned IOs demonstrated their importance within the structure of international development. Moreover, it illustrated that the understanding of an international structure in which the European Commission is embedded cannot be fully understood without considering the role of its leading agents therein. Both structure and agency were paramount in assessing the dynamics between the international system and an actor’s behaviour and preference formation. Therefore, chapter three suggested that the international system plays a decisive role in changing the action of an actor, not by constraining it with a particular set of preferences from acting, but by changing its interests and preferences. Shifts in an actor’s action and behaviour are thus traceable to the normative construction of the structure it integrates. Therein, IOs are the drivers of change, and hence, they define the normative basis of an existing international structure.

Chapter three demonstrated the potential of norms, as well as the structure and agents of international development in the definition of EU development policy. Subsequently, chapters four and five proceeded with the empirical investigation of EU development policy regarding African since the end of the Cold War. Firstly, they concentrated on existing EU legislation on development cooperation with Africa in the post-Cold War period. The Lomé Convention IV (1989-2000) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000) were at centre of EU development policy then. Chapter four addressed the period covering the mandate of the Lomé Convention IV, and chapter five concentrated on the period following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement up to the end of 2008. Each chapter focused on the timeframe of a specific development cooperation agreement. Thereafter, the analysis identified the principal ideological and policy pillars characterising each treaty. Subsequently, each chapter sought to capture the origin of the large norms characterising the EU approach to development cooperation at the time. Both chapters integrated the European Commission in the normative structure of international development that included the role of its comprising agents therein. Hence, the two chapters addressed the research questions and formulated hypotheses, and advanced specific results regarding the evolution of EU development policy towards Africa in the considered timeframe. Therein, it considered EU development policy’s potential shift in time, as well as its ‘unique’ character and ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.
Chapters four and five applied the proposed Martha Finnemore framework of analysis, adopting what the author called a ‘double-stranded’ approach – structural strand, and agency strand – to understand an actor’s behaviour in the international system. Chapter two closely detailed the ‘double-stranded’ approach to understand a given actor’s behaviour in the international system. It aimed at uncovering the potential association of changes in its behaviour with the power of norms pertaining to an international structure. The structural strand related to the system-wide shifts in an actor’s behaviour. It assessed their traceability to the leading IOs’ normative claims in a particular international structure. Complementarily, the agency strand focused on both the stance of the concerned IOs in the international structure under consideration, and, the mechanisms through which they potentially persuaded other actors to assimilate their normative claims. The separation of agency and structure in the application of this method followed a simple analytical convenience, and was not a statement of reality.

In consonance with the proposed ‘double-stranded’ approach to the understanding of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War, chapters four and five focused on the cycle of the norms they addressed. They did so by juxtaposing the evolutionary narrative of EU development policy with the normative evolution of the discourse and practice of international development to determine the origin of the norms that characterised EU development policy at the time. Progressively, the exercise demonstrated the existence of an apparent synergetic pattern between the two narratives in time. The pattern referred to the way norms were diffused, and materialised in different degrees depending on the norm under consideration, which caused their internalisation process to be equally distinct. Therein, the analysis concentrated on the demonstration of the consequent causality and impact on the evolution of EU development policy in time. The processes of norm diffusion and internalisation were ‘more observable’ through: a) the partnership agreements between the European Commission and the relevant IOs in the domain of international development; b) and the European Commission public endorsements of some of these IOs as the gatekeepers of certain norms in the discourse and practice of international development. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the diffusion and internalisation processes appeared ‘more observable’ in certain cases, the research broadly confirmed that the European Commission’s adopted development policy orientation during the considered timeframe, in substance, followed the policy promoted previously by the leading IOs in the domain of international development. The ultimate confirmation of the synergy between the evolutionary character of EU development policy

731 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”, pp. 25
and the concerned IOs’ normative claims materialised through rhetorical shifts in the European Commission’s (and its officials) development discourse.

As ‘method should serve theory, and not the reverse’, the thesis’ practical objective was therefore, to both address the research questions, and test the formulated hypotheses advanced at the outset of this investigation on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. Considering the above observations on the norm cycles processes and the demonstration of causality, the research broadly confirmed the formulated hypotheses concerning the evolution of EU development policy in the considered timeframe. The majority of the large norms characterising the Lomé Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement were traceable to the normative claims promoted by the identified IOs in the structure of international development, most notably to the WB, the IMF, the OECD, the UN (through its various agencies), and the WTO. However, there were some instances when the traceability was not fully explicit, or when the European Commission itself diffused some normative claims in the structure of international development. The European Commission’s propagated norms never completely integrated into the structure of international development, and some even remain almost obsolescent therein. Nevertheless, the confirmation of the European Commission as the source of some of the norms under analysis disconfirms part of the hypotheses advanced in the opening chapters of the research. Therefore, the thesis broadly confirmed the formulated hypotheses, with some exceptions in certain dimensions of the large norms it addressed, as it is argued in the next sub-sections.

2.1.1.1 The Lomé Convention IV

As demonstrated in chapter four, the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV integrated four new large norms at the centre of the EU development cooperation agreement with Africa – Structural Adjustment, Human Rights, the Environment, and Political Dimension. The interpretation of the incorporation of the aforementioned large norms in the form of directives in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa relying on the proposed Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist method of research produced distinct results, and largely confirmed the hypotheses. The processes of norm diffusion and internalisation varied, and thus were ‘more observable’ in certain instances. Nevertheless, the Lomé Convention IV’s four new policy directives confirmed EU development policy, as neither ‘unique’, nor playing a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development in the considered timeframe.
The integration of structural adjustment as a policy pillar of Lomé Convention IV, consisted of one of the most explicit cases in which the diffusion and internalisation processes appeared the most observable. Thereby, the analysis demonstrated causality, and confirmed that structural adjustment was an ‘import’ from the normative structure of international development. Structural adjustment, as a norm, originated in the activities of the WB and the IMF in the mid-1980s, and integrated subsequently the normative structure of international development. As structural adjustment progressed into a leading norm in the discourse and practice of international development, the European Commission increased its cooperation with the WB and the IMF on a variety of macroeconomic issues concerning development promotion in Africa. Therein, and as illustrated in chapter four, the European Commission referred to both the WB and the IMF as the architects of the structural adjustment norm, and maintained that it was through their assistance and guidance that structural adjustment incorporated into EU development policy under Lomé Convention IV. Furthermore, the cooperative link between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF on the subject of structural adjustment expanded further following the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV. As a result, the European Commission alluded to the WB and the IMF position as its main reference on the integration of structural adjustment in the EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa.

The WB and the IMF stood as the designers and gatekeepers of the structural adjustment norm in international development. Following increasing rapprochement between the European Commission and the stated IOs on numerous macroeconomic issues, the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa incorporated structural adjustment as one of its central directives. The WB and IMF were the diffusers of the structural adjustment norm to the European Commission, which it acknowledged as its main inspiration and reference therein. Thus, the integration of structural adjustment in the EU policy of development cooperation illustrated the WB and the IMF as the ‘teachers’ of the norm in question to the European Commission. As a result, the analysis confirmed that the European Commission is a ‘norm-taker’ in the subject of structural adjustment, and disconfirmed EU development policy as ‘unique’ or capable of playing a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of structural adjustment as part of the normative basis of international development.

The application of the proposed research agenda to interpret the inclusion of human rights directives as a central feature of Lomé Convention IV produced distinct results from the subject of structural adjustment, specifically regarding the matter of causality. The interdependence of human
rights and development as a norm of international development originated from two UN General Assembly (UNGA) initiatives in 1969 and 1986. The EU endorsed a similar approach to its development cooperation with Africa only in 1989 under Lomé Convention IV. Whilst proving complex to demonstrate causality in the incorporation of human rights in EU development policy, the European Commission referred to the UN as the bastion of all human rights in the text of Lomé Convention IV and the subsequent development agreements with Africa. Therein, it confirmed the UN System as its primary reference on the issue of human rights. Moreover, the increasingly strong participation of the European Commission in the general workings of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) since 1974 suggests that their cooperation on a variety of development issues established a potential channel of norm diffusion between the two institutions. There, the causality regarding the integration of the human rights norm in EU development policy was not explicit. However, the European Commission followed the UN System’s authority on the issue and openly endorsed it as a reference in the internalisation of the human rights norm in its renewed policy of development cooperation with Africa.

The human rights and development norm has its origin in the structure of international development, specifically in the activities of the UNGA concerning the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. The UNGA established the human rights and development norm through two declarations on the subject in 1969 and 1986, which it propagated subsequently in the structure of international development. Concomitantly, the European Commission devised a new development cooperation agreement with Africa in which the issue of human rights gained increasing importance, and culminated as a central policy directive of Lomé Convention IV. Despite causality appearing ‘less observable’ than in other instances, the incorporation of human rights as a principal feature of Lomé Convention IV, confirmed the human rights aspect of EU development policy as neither ‘unique’ nor playing a ‘leadership’ role in the domain of international development. As a result, the European Commission exposed itself as a ‘norm-taker’ on the issue of human rights and development, even if the analysis was not explicit regarding its causality.

The incorporation of the environment as a main policy directive of Lomé Convention IV followed a distinct pattern from that observable on the subject of structural adjustment and human rights. Its causality was neither as complex to demonstrate as on the subject of human rights, nor as explicit as on the issue of structural adjustment. Chapter four argued that the WB and UNGA emerged as the architects of the environment norm in the structure of international development in the early 1970s, with its further promotion materialising subsequently under the auspices of the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment (CIDIE). In time, CIDIE progressed into the de facto international bastion for the promotion of the environment and development norm following its foundation in 1980, which was in turn largely under the control of UNEP. As the European Commission became a member of CIDIE, it created an open channel for the diffusion of the environment norm into its policy of development cooperation regarding Africa. The opening sections of European Commission and European Council documents concerning the environment and development, confirmed CIDIE as a direct reference in the environmental dimension of EU development policy. Additionally, the European Commission publicly endorsed the subsequent UNEP international campaigns on the integration of the environment in development, and reinforced the environment aspect of Lomé Convention IV accordingly.

Whilst a new and central feature of Lomé Convention IV, the environment and development norm was already an integral element of the normative structure of international development since the 1970s. The UNGA and the WB emerged as the norm’s designers. The CIDIE and the UNEP later diffused the environment and development norm in the structure of international development, and they transformed it into a leading paradigm therein from the mid-1980s onwards. The European Commission participated in the workings of CIDIE, which was under the effective control of UNEP. Thereby, the European Commission integrated an international structure for the promotion of the environment and development, and progressively translated the environment norm into the EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. In that process, the European Commission maintained an open reference to CIDIE, UNEP, and UNGA in the incorporation of the environment in EU development cooperation agreements with Africa. By doing so, it acknowledged the three IOs as the gatekeepers of the environment norm in the domain of international development. Despite the resulting unclear causality in the analysis, the integration of the environment norm in EU development policy pointed to CIDIE, UNEP, and UNGA as the ‘teachers’ of the environment and development norm to the European Commission. The European Commission subsequently incorporated it in EU development policy concerning Africa. As a result, the European Commission emerged as a ‘norm-taker’ on the subject environment and development, which disconfirms that the EU development policy was ‘unique’ or performed a ‘leadership’ role in international development during the considered timeframe.

Similarly to diffusion and internalisation pattern observed in the interpretation of the integration of the structural adjustment norm in the EU policy of development cooperation towards
Africa, the political dimension norm emerged as one of the leading features of Lomé Convention IV. The WB and the IMF devised the political dimension norm in 1981, and the OECD later joined them in campaigning for the integration of a political dimension in the promotion of development worldwide. Progressively, the OECD assumed a fundamental role in the promotion of the political dimension and development norm in the discourse and practice of international development. Under that capacity, it assisted the WB and the IMF in the design of what we know today as the concept of governance. Concomitantly, the European Commission established a close rapport with the WB and the IMF on numerous matters, including the political dimension of development promotion. As a result, and prior to the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, the European Commission publicly endorsed the WB and the IMF as its guides in the incorporation of the political dimension and development norm in EU development policy towards Africa. In that manner, political concerns progressed into a central policy directive of Lomé Convention IV, and culminated as one of the flagships of Africa-EU relations at the end of the twentieth century.

In the period before the conclusion of Lomé Convention IV, the European Commission endorsed the progressive politicisation of its development cooperation partnership with Africa. It publicly acknowledged the WB and the IMF as the architects of the existing political dimension and development norm in the structure of international development. Therein, the European Commission transformed the Bretton Woods institutions into its main reference in the integration of the political dimension norm in the Lomé Convention IV. Furthermore, relations between the European Commission and the WB and the IMF had become increasingly stronger at the time. Thus, it appears that the WB and the IMF ‘taught’ the political dimension and development norm to the European Commission, which it incorporated in the EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. As a result, causality appeared clearly observable in the analysis. Therefore, the European Commission emerged as a ‘norm-taker’ on the subject of political dimension and development, which disconfirmed the ‘unique’ nature and the ‘leadership’ role of EU development policy in the domain of international development at the time.

The application of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda to the interpretation of EU development policy during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV, illustrated the existence of a particular pattern in the evolution of EU development policy vis-à-vis the normative structure of international development, and the policy of its constitutive IOs. The chronological parallel analysis of the evolution of the policy promoted by the principal IOs in the dominion of international development and EU development policy, demonstrated the IOs were
both the norm’s architects and the plausible agents for change in EU behaviour expressed through its development policy. The demonstration of causality was more explicit and observable in some cases, specifically structural adjustment and political dimension, then the environment, and lastly, human rights. Despite the changes in conditions in the diffusion and internalisation processes of the four large norms that characterised Lomé Convention IV, the analysis largely confirmed the formulated hypotheses.

Causality appeared increasingly observable in certain instances regarding the incorporation of the stated large norms into the EU policy of development cooperation. The analysis of EU development policy relying on the proposed method confirmed the unequivocal existence of normative correspondence between EU development policy and the structure and agents of international development at the time. It demonstrated that the European Commission’s ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ claims regarding EU development policy stand unfounded, because its central normative basis is a reflection of the already existing norms in the structure of international development, which originate from the policy orientation of its leading constitutive agents. Accordingly, the ensuing analysis of Lomé Convention IV illustrated that its characterising large norms originated in the activities of the certain identified IOs in the structure of international development, which remained their gatekeepers to the detriment of the European Commission. The scrutiny of Lomé Convention IV relying on Martha Finnemore’s research agenda assisted to deconstruct the European Commission claims regarding the ‘unique’ nature and ‘leadership’ role of its development policy towards Africa in the proposed timeframe. The findings demonstrated that its claims are unfounded, and that EU development policy emerged as a projection of the already existing norms that characterise the structure of international development.

2.1.1.2 The Cotonou Agreement

Following a twenty-five year existence, the Lomé Convention gave way to the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Throughout the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that Lomé Convention IV was not to undergo revision at the end of its mandate, with a new development cooperation agreement between Africa and the EU due to replace it at the turn of the century. As illustrated in chapter five, the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement instituted three new policy pillars at the basis of EU development policy towards Africa, specifically Political Dimension, Economic and Trade Cooperation, and Aid and Development Cooperation. Chapter five considered the normative basis
of the above policy pillars characterising EU development policy regarding Africa relying on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda. It produced analogous results to the equivalent analysis of Lomé Convention IV, which largely confirmed the thesis’ hypotheses. The analysis of the Cotonou Agreement illustrated that the processes norm diffusion and internalisation appear ‘more observable’ in certain instances, which makes causality vary accordingly. However, the analysis of the large norms that characterise the Cotonou Agreement’s three policy pillars reconfirmed EU development policy as not ‘unique’ or performing a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development during the considered timeframe. Notwithstanding, and despite the rather limited impact it generated on the discourse and practice of international development, the European Commission attempted to take leadership in the promotion of certain norms during the considered timeframe.

With its origins in Lomé Convention IV, the political dimension of EU development policy regarding Africa gained increased centrality following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement. The integration of political concerns at the centre of EU development policy towards Africa under the Cotonou Agreement followed a similar pattern to that observed during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV. A particular dynamics persisted between the evolution of EU development policy and the policy orientation of the leading IOs in international development. Accordingly, the resulting change in EU development policy materialised in relation with the normative structure of international development, specifically regarding the role played by its constituent agents. The bolder political dimension in EU development policy under the Cotonou Agreement correlates both with the EU project to become an increasingly influential international actor, and its consequent exposure to the influence of the structure and agents of international development in that process.

Following their activities since the early 1980s, the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN system – especially through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – continued to advocate a strong political element in development promotion through the new century. Concomitantly, the European Commission expanded its cooperation with the stated IOs on political matters in development, which reinforced the diffusion of the political dimension norm from the IOs to the European Commission. The norms were integrated subsequently into the EU policy of development cooperation. Therein, and as argued in chapter five, declarations by various EU officials, as well as agreements between the Union and the previously mentioned IOs, confirmed the IOs as the main reference for the European Commission in the inclusion of the political dimension norm in the Cotonou Agreement. As a result, causality appeared clearly observable in the
incorporation of the political dimension in EU development policy under the Cotonou Agreement, which confirms the European Commission as a ‘norm-taker’. Furthermore, the analysis of the incorporation of a political dimension in EU development policy during the Cotonou Agreement mandate demonstrated that EU development policy was neither ‘unique’ nor played a ‘leadership’ role in the promotion of political concerns in the discourse and practice of international development.

Findings concerning the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar stand in contrast with all large norms characterising EU development policy towards Africa considered in the thesis. The analysis regarding the inclusion of the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar in the Cotonou Agreement generated the most distinctive results in the research posing the toughest practical challenge to the advanced hypotheses. Whilst not fully disconfirming the formulated hypotheses, the integration of the Economic and Trade Cooperation pillar in EU development policy under the Cotonou Agreement demonstrated the diffusion and internalisation processes to be virtually non-observable. The European Commission not only stood as a founding member of the newly formed IO responsible for the liberalisation of international trade and mediation of all international trade relations – the WTO – but it also attempted to play a central role in the definition of the WTO’s policy orientation. With the EU forming one of the largest blocs in world trade, the European Commission sought to assume equivalent political magnitude within the WTO. Therein, it attempted to steer the organisation’s policy orientation. Despite not having achieved its desired results during the research’s timeframe, the European Commission position within the WTO set-up makes the diffusion and internalisation processes in the integration of the large norms characterising the Trade and Economic Cooperation pillar in EU development policy practically non-observable, and causality impossible to demonstrate.

However, and as argued in chapter five, the analysis of the incorporation of the trade liberalisation norm characterising the Trade and Economic Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement confirmed the existence of norm correspondence between the WTO and the European Commission on the subject. The trade liberalisation norm at the centre of the WTO foundation and policy orientation became the basis of the Trade and Economic Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. The accord pointed to the WTO as its central reference in the inclusion of trade liberalisation as part of EU development policy regarding Africa. Thus, the analysis disconfirmed EU development policy as ‘unique’ in the promotion of trade liberalisation and development. Instead, it demonstrated that the EU integrated an emerging international structure on the subject of
trade liberalisation and development. Nevertheless, as an integral member of the WTO with ambition to translate the European volume of international trade into practical influence, the European Commission displayed some capacity to assume ‘leadership’ in the promotion of the liberalisation of trade and development. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) initiatives are clear examples of its capacity. Whilst the propagation process of the DDA and EPAs schemes stood largely unfinished in the considered timeframe, they illustrated potential from the European Commission to assume ‘leadership’ in the promotion of the trade liberalisation norm in the discourse and practice of international development. Therefore, the European Commission emerged as both a ‘norm-taker’ – norm correspondence – and a ‘norm-maker’ – the DDA and the EPA initiatives – on the incorporation of the trade liberalisation norm as part of the EU development policy towards Africa in the twenty-first century.

Clearly breaking with the pattern observed in the integration of the Trade and Economic Cooperation pillar in the Cotonou Agreement, the equivalent process regarding the large norms that define the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar demonstrated the diffusion and internalisation processes to be observable. Therein, the analysis largely confirmed the thesis’ formulated hypotheses. However, the European Commission still attempted to assume ‘leadership’ in the campaign for the increase of aid volumes following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement. Nevertheless, the European Commission’s initiatives on the subject had the same fate as the DDA and EPAs schemes in the domain of trade liberalisation. The European Commission’s attempt to promote the enhancement of aid at the international level remained incomplete during the research’s timeframe.

Throughout the 1990s, the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN System lent a considerable imprint on the reform of international development aid based on the principles of poverty reduction, ownership, reinforced partnership, and country-specific programming. Progressively, EU development policy incorporated an identical normative base in its framework of aid assistance vis-à-vis Africa. The European Commission endorsed the aforementioned IOs as its main policy reference, which was illustrated by its public support for the emerging international aid initiatives undertaken by the WB, the IMF, the OECD, and the UN System. Furthermore, the European Commission increased its cooperation with the stated IOs in international development aid matters. It became an active participant in some of their schemes, such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), and most recently the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The incorporation of the aforementioned large norms as
the foundation of the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement appeared to have originated from a synergy between the European Commission and the previously mentioned IOs in the domain of international development aid. Therein, the IOs ‘taught’ the large norms to the European Commission, and subsequently the European Commission integrated the norms in its policy of development cooperation towards Africa under the Cotonou Agreement. As a result, the norm diffusion and internalisation processes were observable, which demonstrated causality regarding the inclusion of the large norms characterising the Aid and Development Cooperation pillar in the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, the European Commission emerged as a ‘norm-taker’ in the domain of international development aid, which made its approach to aid neither ‘unique’, nor capable of performing a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.

There was as an exception to the evolutionary pattern of the aid dimension of EU development policy during the investigation’s timeframe. The European Commission managed to invert its position as a ‘norm-taker’ in the dominion of international development aid assuming temporary leadership at the international level on the issue of aid volumes, where it acted as a provisional ‘norm-maker’ on the subject. The European Commission acted as a unitary actor at the Monterrey Conference in 2002, and advanced the international debate on aid volumes through the promotion of an unparalleled financial commitment to aid within the international donor community. Therein, and following an act of exceptional internal coordination, the European Commission demonstrated a strong intent to become a leading reference. However, its ‘leadership’ was short-lived because the European Commission failed to both maintain its Monterrey Conference commitment, and to inspire the international donor community to endorse identical aid volume targets in their development aid policies. The ‘leadership by example’ achieved by the European Commission on the issue of aid volumes made it a temporary ‘norm-maker’ in the structure of international development aid. Thus, it confirmed EU development policy as temporarily ‘unique’ and performing a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development. Nevertheless, the European Commission failed to replicate the impact generated at the Monterrey Conference, and thereafter, reverted to a ‘norm-taker’ position in the structure of international development aid, with the aforementioned IOs standing as its principal policy references therein.

The analysis of the Cotonou Agreement relying on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda produced similar results to the equivalent exercise concerning the Lomé
Convention IV. It largely confirmed the thesis’ previously advanced hypotheses. Accordingly, the investigation regarding the integration of the large norms that define the three central policy pillars at the basis of the Cotonou Agreement suggested that EU development policy evolved in direct relation with the existing normative structure of international development, inclusive of the policy orientation of its constitutive agents (IOs). It demonstrated that the identified IOs – pertaining to the structure of international development – were the architects and ‘gatekeepers’ of its characterising norms. Subsequently, the European Commission incorporated the norms in question into the EU policy of development cooperation vis-à-vis Africa. The diffusion and internalisation processes appeared ‘more observable’ in some instances, with causality prevailing in the political dimension and aid norms of EU development policy in the considered timeframe. As a result, the analysis of the Cotonou Agreement under the proposed method of research largely confirmed the thesis’ hypotheses.

However, the scrutiny of the Cotonou Agreement relying on Martha Finnemore’s framework of analysis illustrated the existence of some exceptions concerning the incorporation of new norms in the EU policy of development cooperation towards Africa. The most striking case emerged with the trade liberalisation norm, because causality was non-observable resulting from the European Commission’s standing within the WTO. Nevertheless, the analysis of the incorporation of the trade liberalisation norm in EU development policy confirmed the existence of norm correspondence between the policy orientation of the WTO and EU development policy at the time. Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement and the following legislation on the trade aspects of EU development policy regarding Africa openly pointed to the WTO as its central ideological and policy reference regarding the inclusion of the trade liberalisation norm as part of the EU framework for development cooperation with Africa.

There were additional exceptions in the interpretation of EU development policy during the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement in accordance with the proposed method of analysis. Firstly, the two unsuccessful instances – the DDA and the EPAs schemes – when the European Commission attempted to take ‘leadership’ on the promotion of trade liberalisation norms in the structure of international development. Secondly, the short-lived successful case when the European Commission led the international donor community to make a commitment to the increase of aid volumes at the Monterrey Conference. In the first case, the DDA and the EPAs initiatives remained incomplete by the end of 2008. In the second case, the subject of aid volumes at the Monterrey Conference had an extremely limited lifespan, and stood obsolete equally by the end of 2008.
Despite the identified exceptions, the scrutiny of EU development policy during the considered period largely confirmed the thesis’ hypotheses, which demonstrates that EU development policy was neither ‘unique’ in nature, nor played a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.

2.1.1.3 General Findings & Theoretical Considerations

The scrutiny of Lomé Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement relying on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda assisted to address the thesis’ research questions whilst testing its formulated hypotheses. By doing so, the investigation on EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War helped understanding its shift in time, as well as its nature and role in the discourse and practice of international development. The research’s general findings suggest that EU development policy: a) shifted in an evolutionary manner during the considered timeframe; b) its nature was not ‘unique’ in the domain of international development; c) and, its role did not provide ‘leadership’ in the discourse and practice of international development. Instead, EU development policy emerged as a general projection of the existing normative structure of international development, specifically regarding the policy orientation of a set of specific IOs as its comprising leading agents. As argued above, the thesis largely confirmed the advanced hypotheses in the dissertation’s opening chapters. Additionally, it advanced Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method as a pertinent research tool to analyse EU development policy towards Africa, and foster further debate on the still under-theorised EU policy area.

Unlike most available literature on the interpretation of EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War, the research suggests that EU development policy shifted in time in an evolutionary manner. The existing literature on the topic normally isolates the Lomé Convention IV from the Cotonou Agreement, and vice-versa, which provides a comparative analysis of EU development policy during the considered timeframe. As a result, Lomé Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement appear effectively distinct as an accord, which leads most authors to affirm resolutely that the turn of the century brought dramatic changes to EU development policy towards Africa under the Cotonou Agreement. Inversely, the current analysis contends EU development policy progressed in an evolutionary manner in the passage from the Lomé Convention IV to the Cotonou Agreement, even if the foundations of the agreements are diverse.
The proposed method combined with the joint analysis of the Lomé Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement produced distinct results from previous studies. The analysis allowed the ‘retelling of the story’ of EU development policy in the suggested timeframe. Chapters four and five depicted the ideological basis of EU development policy under the Cotonou Agreement as not the product of a sudden and dramatic u-turn in policy orientation. Its primary normative innovations were traceable to policy initiatives taken either under Lomé Convention IV or during its mandate, most notably by the 1996 Green Paper and its related documents. The shift characterising EU development policy at end of the century had its seeds sown previously. Therein, the Cotonou Agreement essentially formalised the re-orientation of EU development policy initiated under Lomé Convention IV. Therefore, the observed policy shift in EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War was evolutionary. The evolutionary trend became increasingly stronger as the 1990s unfolded, and culminated with the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Subsequently, the same trend continued until the end of 2008, when the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and the Treaty of Lisbon started to emerge as the strongest indicators of potential future change in EU development policy towards Africa, to the detriment of the Cotonou Agreement itself.

As argued in chapter one, most of the available literature on the subject theoretically isolates the EU from the international system in the analysis of the identified shift in EU development policy regarding Africa in the post-Cold War period. Additionally, most existing accounts rest upon three theoretical approaches that neglect the importance of ideas and norms in the evolution of EU development policy, and instead, they favour comparative analyses. Conversely, the thesis surveys the evolutionary character of EU development policy as a body of ideas that progressed under a particular trend during a specific timeframe, inclusive of the EU integration in the international system for that exercise. Hence, the analysis of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War focused on how the ideological and normative basis of EU development policy evolved in time, and what and who caused its change vis-à-vis its integration in an international system comprised by a multitude of actors. Accordingly, the research proposed Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method as a means to attend to the theoretical aspirations of the thesis, address the identified analytical gaps in the available literature on the subject, and advance a strong methodological foundation for the interpretation of EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

The application of the advanced framework of analysis to the understanding of EU development policy regarding Africa in the post-Cold War period assisted to test equally the thesis’ hypotheses concerning the nature and role of EU development policy in international development.
The dissertation integrated the European Commission (as the representative of the EU at the international level) in the structure of international development, and demonstrated that EU development policy was neither ‘unique’ nor performed a ‘leadership’ role therein. Instead, EU development policy appeared to be a projection of the existing structure of international development, specifically the policy orientation of some IOs as its constituent leading agents.

Furthermore, and as chapter four and five illustrated, the identified IOs emerged in most cases as the ‘teachers’ of the new norms characterising EU development policy during the considered timeframe. The thesis relied on Martha Finnemore’s double-stranded analysis of international political phenomena to demonstrate how the IOs in question diffused new norms to the European Commission. Therein, they affected its preferences and interests, and ultimately its process of development policy design. The diffusion and internalisation processes appeared ‘more observable’ in certain instances, which affected the demonstration of causality accordingly. Nonetheless, the proposed method demonstrated that the processes in question were observable in the transmission of most norms considered. In the cases where the diffusion and internalisation processes were not observable, or ‘less observable’, the analysis demonstrated that the norms originated in the IOs, and that there was norm correspondence between EU development policy and the policy orientation of the IOs in question. As a result, the scrutiny of the subject relying on the suggested method largely confirmed the hypotheses concerning the nature and role of EU development policy in international development. Particularly, it proved that EU development policy was not ‘unique’ and did not play a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development.

On that account, the European Commission emerged largely as a ‘norm-taker’ in the structure of international development. The asserted status resulted from the fact that the large norms and ideas that characterised EU development policy regarding Africa in the post-Cold War era were not only sourced externally, but they were also primarily the result of the European Commission’s social learning process from the identified IOs in the field of international development. The increasingly close relations between the European Commission and the IOs established the channels for the norm diffusion. The practical expressions of the diffusion of norms into the EU development policy were agreements between the European Commission and the identified IOs in the field of international development. Additionally, the declarations of intent from the European Commission regarding the IOs under consideration were other expressions of

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diffusion. Therein, the European Commission often acknowledged the IOs as the architects and gatekeepers of the norms under analysis in the structure of international development. The research findings became apparent through the application of the proposed method to the interpretation of EU development policy concerning Africa since the end of the Cold War. They demonstrated that the European Commission was largely a ‘norm-taker’ in the structure of international development during the considered timeframe, which confirmed that EU development policy was neither ‘unique’ nor played a ‘leadership’ role therein.

Nevertheless, despite largely confirming the formulated hypotheses, the investigation produced exceptions that require consideration. The most striking case emerged with the analysis of the large norms characterising the Trade and Economic Cooperation pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. The interpretation of the inclusion of the trade liberalisation norm in EU development policy demonstrated that the diffusion and internalisation processes were not observable due to the European Commission’s standing in the WTO. The second most striking exception was through the European Commission’s attempt to assume some ‘leadership’ in the promotion of new norms in the structure of international development. It was visible through the DDA and EPAs initiatives in the realm of international trade, and the subject of aid volumes at the Monterrey Conference. Whilst not disconfirming the advanced hypotheses, these exceptions point to the emergence of a distinct pattern in European Commission behaviour in the structure of international development that merits further research.

The stated exceptions emerged following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement, and can be perceived as practical expressions from the European Commission regarding the advancement of the EU project to become an increasingly prominent international actor. The captured European Commission behaviour relying on the proposed method is that of ‘norm-taker’ in the discourse and practice of international development. However, the aforementioned exceptions represent the European Commission intent to progress into a ‘norm-maker’ therein. When considering the period covered by the analysis, the identified exceptions are not strong enough to challenge the thesis’ general findings. Nevertheless, their timing and substance indicate the European Commission’s capacity to revert its current position in the structure of international development, by challenging the leading position of the identified IOs as its comprising leading agents.
Whilst largely confirming the formulated hypotheses, the investigation’s general findings on EU development policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period demonstrated equally the pertinence of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda to scrutinise the subject. The existing accounts have a tendency to interpret EU development policy by isolating the EU from the international system and its constituent agents. Therein, the works neglect the power of ideas and norms in IR, and they advance weak methodological foundations in favour of comparative analyses. The proposed method of analysis addressed the literature’s aforementioned gaps, and provided a distinct insight into EU development policy. Thus, with the purpose to comprehend the evolutionary character of EU development policy as a body of ideas that progressed under a particular trend and in a specific timeframe, inclusive of the incorporation of the EU in the international system, the research fosters further debate on this still under-theorised EU policy area.

The thesis interpreted EU development policy relying on Martha Finnemore’s ‘logic of appropriateness’, which stands in opposition to the Rationalist’s ‘logic of consequences’, to predict an actor’s behaviour in the international system.733 The ‘logic of appropriateness’ in the current analysis of EU development policy originated in the systemic norms propagated by certain IOs in the structure of international development, which provided actors with direction and goals for action. Thereby, the research rejected the rational materialism of (Neo)-Realism and (Neo)-Liberalism, and suggested that social, as opposed to material, is the most important aspect in the understanding of international politics.734 Unlike the existing literature on the subject, the thesis focused on the ideas, beliefs, and shared understandings concerning the subject of international development that inform the EU (through the European Commission as its representative) in the international system. Therein, and relying on Martha Finnemore’s method of research, the thesis concentrated on how structure (international development system) affected EU behaviour and identity. It demonstrated that changes in thoughts, ideas, and norms in the domain of international development provoke direct change in both the structure of international development and in the European Commission’s orientation in its policy of development cooperation towards Africa during the considered timeframe.

The dissertation illustrated the utility of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda vis-à-vis the more dominant Rationalist theories characterising the available literature on EU development policy analysis. It demonstrated that norms affect an actor’s behaviour and identity, and that a focus on the politics and process of EU development policy regarding Africa can provide

733 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”
734 Finnemore, Martha, “National Interests in International Society”
a more comprehensive understanding of its evolution, nature, and role in the domain of
ternational development. In contrast to the dominant Rationalist accounts on the subject, the
dissertation suggested the understanding of EU development policy through the analysis of the
international structure that the European Commission integrates. Therein, it demonstrated that the
norms embedded in the structure of international development affect the definition of European
Commission’s behaviour and identity. In that process, the thesis illustrated the importance of the
agents within the structure of international development, by demonstrating how certain IOs are
responsible for the diffusion of its characterising norms. Thus, it highlighted the mutually
constitutive character of structure (international development system) and agency (IOs), which can
affect the identity and behaviour of the European Commission in equal measure.

Accordingly, Martha Finnemore’s method of analysis assisted to define EU behaviour and
identity through the expression of its development policy towards Africa. It demonstrated the origin
of the large norms characterising EU development policy in the period following the end of the
Cold War. It revealed that their origin was in the activities of the identified principal IOs in the
structure of international development. The large norms were traced to the structure of international
development, specifically to the activities of its comprising leading IOs – the WB, the IMF, the UN
(various agencies), the OECD, and the WTO. Thus, the adopted method of research confirmed that
the origin of the large norms characterising EU development policy in the considered timeframe was
external and diverse. Additionally, it illustrated how the EU integration in the structure of
international development, inclusive of its increasingly closer relations with the aforementioned IOs,
affect ed it policy of development cooperation towards Africa,

In this perspective, the dissertation’ framework of analysis demonstrated how the EU ‘learnt’
new norms from the structure of international development and its comprising principal agents, and
then incorporated them in its development policy towards Africa. During the mandate of the Lomé
Convention IV, the EU integrated structural adjustment, human rights, the environment, and
political dimension as the new policy pillars characterising its policy of development cooperation
towards Africa. With the exception of the environment, the remaining above-mentioned policy
pillars became central to the discourse and practice of EU development policy towards Africa. At
the turn of the century, the Cotonou Agreement introduced political dimension, economic and trade
cooperation, and aid and development cooperation as the new policy pillars of its development
policy regarding Africa. By the end of 2008, the normative basis of EU development policy towards

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Africa centred on all policy pillars of the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, the thesis’s method of research illustrated how new large norms incorporated EU development policy towards Africa, and affected the definition of the EU policy of development cooperation towards the African region.

The research addressed how, what, and who ‘taught’ the large norms characterising EU development policy in the post-Cold War period to the European Commission, and thereby assessed its behaviour and identity, and ultimately its process of development policy design. As a result, it included the EU in the international system inclusive of the role that its constituent agents perform. Additionally, it focused on EU development policy as a body of ideas that progresses in space and time, and provided the interpretation of EU development policy relying on a strong method of analysis. Therefore, the suggested Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist method of analysis addressed the identified gaps in the available literature and advanced the understanding of this still under-theorised EU policy area.

Nevertheless, the application of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist agenda to the interpretation of EU development policy has theoretical and practical constraints. The research demonstrated the existence of correlations between the emergence of new systemic norms in the structure of international development and changes in EU behaviour and identity expressed through its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. The evidence emerged from the analysis of EU development discourse to confirm whether EU actions were justifiably consistent with the values and rules embedded in the norms that characterise the structure of international development. Therein, the research concentrated on the interpretation of the norm cycle – origin, diffusion and internalisation. Although causality was observable in most cases, its levels varied. The incorporation of the trade liberalisation norm under the Cotonou Agreement proved to be the greatest exception, because it was non-observable. Thus, the analysis of the inclusion of the trade liberalisation norm in the EU policy of development cooperation regarding Africa posed one of the greatest practical and theoretical challenges to the thesis’ research method.

Furthermore, the proposed Martha Finnemore Social Constructivist method of analysis focused on IOs as the norm entrepreneurs, or the ‘norm-makers’, which ‘teach’ a given actor (the European Commission in this case) a certain norm. Whilst the approach proved to be largely adequate and consistent with the research results, there were two instances when it did not capture EU behaviour expressed through its policy of development cooperation towards Africa. Specifically,

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Finnemore, Martha, “The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force”
it failed to do so when the European Commission assumed a temporarily leading position in the DDA and EPAs initiatives in the domain of international trade, and in the subject of aid volumes at the Monterrey Conference in the domain of international development aid. Despite being exceptions to the rule, the dissertation’s method of research could not fully explain EU behaviour in the aforementioned cases. Whilst the exceptions proved unsuccessful in practice by the end of 2008, they demonstrated some potential from the European Commission to become a future ‘norm-maker’ in the structure of international development, which the adopted method of analysis could not comprehensively capture. As a result, Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist research agenda displayed some limitations concerning the interpretation of EU development policy, which could open prospective new avenues of research on EU development policy vis-à-vis Africa.

Despite the pertinence of Martha Finnemore’s framework of analysis to the study of EU development policy, there were some instances when it could not capture EU behaviour. Martha Finnemore’s approach to the interpretation of international political phenomena centres on the understanding of an actor’s behaviour through a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Therein, it traces the origins of actors’ behaviour to the systemic norms propagated by certain IOs in the international system, which provide actors with direction and goals for action. She uses it to distinguish her approach from the Rationalist’s ‘logic of consequences’, which reduces actors’ behaviour in the international system to their innate self-interest. Whilst Martha Finnemore’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ proved adequate to the study of EU development policy, there were some cases when it did not capture the formation of EU behaviour. The analysis suggested that, in certain cases, the forces that shape EU interests and preferences regarding its development policy are not just ideational and normative. There are distinct forces that, at times, can inhibit the understanding of EU behaviour as a normative social construction. Hence, the research illustrated that, in certain cases, power can still matter in the understanding of EU development policy, which Martha Finnemore’s method of analysis could not capture in the definition of EU behaviour.

Correspondingly, the thesis overcame the case selection bias that characterises Martha Finnemore’s narratives of international political phenomena. Her accounts concentrate on cases when an actor’s behaviour can be captured entirely as a normative social construction. The current investigation on EU development policy towards Africa relying on Martha Finnemore’s framework of analysis demonstrated that norms matter and affect EU behaviour in the domain of international development. However, it also showed that, in certain instances, EU behaviour could not be captured as a normative social construction. Therein, distinct forces inhibit the spread and diffusion
of norms in the international system, and make their impact on the definition of EU behaviour non-observable. Therefore, the dissertation demonstrated that there are some cases when the forces defining EU behaviour are not just ideational and normative, but power-based. By doing so, the analysis overcame the case selection bias of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist accounts, and illustrated that there are cases when it cannot interpret an actor’s behaviour in the international system.

The current section assessed how the adopted methodology helped to both address the research questions that guide the thesis, and test its hypotheses. It concentrated on the argument of each individual chapter and integrated it in the general and collective analysis of the evolution, nature, and role of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. The aim was to demonstrate the pertinence of the adopted method of analysis to understand EU development policy regarding Africa in the considered timeframe, and thus stimulate further debate in this still under-theorised EU policy area. Following the theoretical discussion of the research’s findings, it appears relevant to reflect on its practical implications, to which the next section now turns.

3. A Social Constructivist Understanding of the EU Development Policy Towards Africa Since the End of the Cold War – ‘Exporting Paradise’?

The employment of Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method to the interpretation of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War generated distinct results from the existing literature on the subject. The above section concentrated on the theoretical considerations of the research’s findings and the ensuing section focuses on its practical implications. Therein, it aims to discuss the dissertation’s practical achievements, particularly how it assisted to advance the discussion on EU development policy regarding Africa in the considered timeframe. It reflects on the concept of ‘paradise’ put forward in the opening of the thesis, as a means to capture the EU’s contemporary model of development in light of the standard development model stemming from the current discourse and practice of international development.

As argued above, the dissertation’s methodology allowed the retelling of the ‘story’ of EU development policy concerning Africa since the end of the Cold War. It considered EU development policy in the structure of international development to assess their potential correlation
in their normative evolution in time. The analysis juxtaposed EU development policy with the discourse and practice of international development in a defined timeframe. It focused on the evolution of EU development policy concentrating on its shift in time, and on its nature and role in the domain of international development. Hence, it shed light on the position of the European Commission (the representative of the EU at the international level) as an actor in the field of international development, which emerged largely as a ‘norm-taker’ therein.

The thesis’ retelling of the ‘story’ of EU development policy towards Africa clashed with the European Commission’s understanding of its development policy as ‘unique’ in nature and playing a ‘leadership’ role in the dominion of international development. Thus, the current section advances the European Commission’s evaluation of its development policy as not only fallacious but also based on a wishful self-perception regarding its current capacity as an actor in the field of international development. Accordingly, it argues that: a) EU development policy has thus far not conferred the European Commission its desired ‘actorness’ in the field of international development; b) the European Commission has thus far not managed to export successfully its model of ‘paradise’ through its policy of development cooperation towards Africa since the end of the Cold War.

One of the thesis’ central propositions is that the international system and its comprising agents matter and affect the definition of EU behaviour and identity, which it expresses through its development policy towards Africa. From this premise, the analysis considered the Union’s objective to progress into an increasingly influential international actor. Accordingly, it illustrated the emergence of a particular pattern in the way the European Commission related with both the structure of international development and the identified IOs as its constitutive leading agents. The research demonstrated the existence of a progressive rapprochement between the European Commission and the concerned IOs in the structure of international development during the considered timeframe, which generated a gradually closer policy harmonisation and alignment amongst all. Therein, the IOs emerged as the architects and gatekeepers of the norms characterising the discourse and practice of international development during the considered timeframe. Furthermore, the European Commission displayed a tendency to adhere to their leadership on the subject and reform its development policy accordingly. As a result, the analysis illustrated that the EU is a largely derivative actor in the domain of international development.
In that perspective, and despite the favourable academic research on other EU policies areas, it appears that the EU did not translate effectively its project to become a leading international actor into the field of international development.\(^{737}\) The EU ambition to evolve into a leading international actor has its origin in the 1970s European Policy Cooperation initiative. However, the conversion of that goal into the EU policy of development cooperation appeared only in 1982 following the publication of a European Commission memorandum. It advanced that “development policy is (…) today a manifestation of Europe’s external identity in the world at large and a major plank in the Community’s external policies generally”.\(^{738}\) Thus, EU development policy gained increasing importance in the Union’s external relations. The complete transformation of that objective into EU development policy materialised following the conclusion of the TEU in 1992. Therein, one of the Union’s new goals was “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy” (Title I, Common Provisions, Article B – TEU). Correspondingly, development policy emerged as a central element of a future common foreign and security policy. João de Deus Pinheiro, the then European Commissioner for Development, emphasised the growing prominence of EU development policy in the way the Union related with the rest of the world, noting that it “must be seen as an essential feature of the EU’s presence in the world”.\(^{739}\) In that manner, the intent to convert the EU into a preeminent international actor translated into EU development policy progressively during the mandate of Lomé Convention IV, nonetheless, by the end of 2008 the success of the stated EU enterprise remained nominal.

During the researched period, the European Commission displayed a tendency to ‘learn’ new norms and ideas from certain IOs with whom it cooperated in the domain of international development. Subsequently, the European Commission integrated them in the EU policy of development cooperation. As illustrated above, the aforementioned tendency was observable during Lomé Convention IV and subsequently reinforced until the end of 2008, with the 1996 Green Paper and the Cotonou Agreement as essential milestones in that process. Therein, the aspiration to transform the EU into a major international development actor did not have the desired results.


during the considered timeframe. Instead, EU development policy remained largely a projection of the normative structure of international development, specifically the policy that its comprising leading IOs advocated.

The identified shift in EU development policy in the post-Cold War period followed an evolutionary trend, and progressed in close relation with the policy orientation of the principal IOs in international development. Thus, the Cotonou Agreement did not deliver on its promises by the end of 2008. According to the 1996 green paper, the Cotonou Agreement was to represent the thorough reformation of EU development policy in preparation for the challenges of the 21st century, which included the EU objective to become a leading actor in the field of international development. The Cotonou Agreement brought change to EU development policy. Nevertheless, the change was not dramatic in orientation. It marked the simple formalisation of the reformation process of EU development policy ongoing since Lomé Convention IV. An interviewee, who was an official from the Council of the European Union, advanced a similar take on the evolution of EU development policy in the considered timeframe, advancing:

“'At the time of concluding Lomé Convention IV there was little reaction from the EU to the new outside pressures coming from the Bretton Woods institutions because by then the original Lomé Convention had lost some steam in the sense that our strategy hadn’t brought the results we had aimed for. Then suddenly, what was meant to work was not our strategy but this different approach crafted by the Bretton Woods institutions based on the principles of liberalism, which we then took into the Lomé framework. So when Lomé finally ended, Cotonou was surely the formalisation of this new liberal approach to development brought in from the outside.'”

Furthermore, an interviewed former European Commission official suggested:

“'The Cotonou Agreement is essentially the end of a process that started with the Lomé Convention. It’s the fine-tuning of the Lomé Convention. It is the perfecting or the update of the Lomé Convention. And as such, it is important to remember that is has a life expectancy too’.”

The interviewees revealed support for the hypotheses concerning the nature and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development, confirming that it was neither ‘unique’ nor played a ‘leadership’ role therein. Accordingly, the EU policy of development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement did not advance a particularly distinct approach to development promotion in Africa. Instead, it completed the evolutionary process of EU

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740 Interview, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 25 February 2010
741 Interview, Brussels, 11 February 2010 (former European Commission official)
development policy since the end of the Cold War, which displayed an increasing alignment with the normative basis that characterised the policy orientation of the major IOs pertaining to the structure of international development.

Correspondingly, the nature and role of EU development policy emerged largely as a projection of the existing discourse and practice of international development, which is contrary to a ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ approach to the subject that would transform the EU into a primary actor in international development. As argued above, although there were some exceptions, the European Commission tended to be a ‘norm-taker’ in the promotion of development in Africa. During the considered timeframe, EU development policy did not acquire a ‘unique’ nature or a ‘leadership’ role in the field of international development. It failed to expand the ‘actorness’ of the EU in the dominion of international development. The concern regarding EU ‘actorness’ in the domain of international development was particularly present during the term in office of Commissioner for Development Poul Nielson (1999-2004), which an interviewed European Commission official confirmed:

“One of Nielson’s ideas when he became Commissioner was to change dramatically the way the EU related with the UN. He was concerned with how the EU was perceived internationally in terms of development and his grand strategy was to push for an EU seat at all UN agencies dealing with development because he was convinced that the EU could make a difference from within. This didn’t work in the end, but it was an important step in the improvement of EU-UN relations in terms of development”.

Despite the intentions of the European Commission and some of its top officials, the desired EU ‘actorness’ in the field of international development did not materialise during the mandate of the Cotonou Agreement up until the end of 2008. The European Commission did not expand its presence in the dominion of international development, and thus remained a ‘participant’ actor. Therein, it participated mostly through the endorsement and association with the main international development initiatives in the considered time span, namely the 1990s UN Conferences, the MDGs, the PRSPs, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Therefore, the Cotonou Agreement and its supporting legislation did not assist the EU in expanding its ‘actorness’ in the dominion of international development up until the end of 2008. Moreover, the current composition and character of the Cotonou Agreement, and its supporting legislation, do not display the potential to stimulate further EU ‘actorness’ in the field of

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742 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 06 November 2008
international development. It appears that the Cotonou Agreement is not yet the medium through which EU ‘actorness’ will change in the short or medium-term, which suggests that its thorough revision or substitution through another development cooperation agreement may be the most viable solution. An interviewed European Commission official advanced an analogous understanding of the character and composition of the Cotonou Agreement regarding EU ‘actorness’ in international development, stating:

“The fact that an agreement like the Cotonou Agreement still exists is an aberration. This is so because the historical origin of this agreement lies in the European Development Fund (EDF) set up under the Treaty of Rome for countries that were colonies of the EU Member States at the time. After that, we have just expanded the membership of this group that we finance under the EDF, which is still financed not by the budgetary resources of the EU but by the extra-budgetary resources of the EU. So as for the principled basis of an agreement that is meant to show to the rest of the world how great we are in our development assistance, this alone is an aberration”.

Similarly, another European Commission official shared a comparable appreciation of the contemporary significance of the Cotonou Agreement in the background of international development, revealing:

“If we look at EU development policy since the end of the Cold War until today, we can see that the Cotonou Agreement makes no historical sense anymore. It became just a simple instrument of very little real use for both our developing partners and us”.

The two interviewees contended that the Cotonou Agreement did not deliver on its objective to make the EU a leading actor in international development. Thus, they supported the hypotheses concerning the nature and role of the EU policy of development cooperation in international development, noting that the Cotonou Agreement did not transform EU development policy into a ‘unique’ or ‘leading’ model in international development. Instead, it simply formalised the adaptation of EU development policy to the new economic and political conjuncture of the post-Cold War international system, without lending it distinctiveness or innovation therein. As a result, the Cotonou Agreement appears to have not met its major objectives. Specifically, it did not affect the subject of international development as an exemplary model of development promotion in Africa, and it did not expand the ‘actorness’ of the EU in domain of international development.

743 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 26 February 2010
744 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 February 2010
Despite the seemingly apparent limitations of the Cotonou Agreement, the European Commission and some of its officials recurrently publicly claim the EU development policy is ‘unique’ in nature and plays a ‘leadership’ role in the dominion of international development. As the current analysis demonstrated, the claims appeared to be fallacious. EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War was largely a projection of the existing normative structure of international development, based in particular on the policy orientation of its comprising leading IOs. As a result, the European Commission’s persistent ‘unique’ and ‘leadership’ public claims regarding EU development policy appear to be attempts to instrumentalise EU development policy vis-à-vis the EU ambition to become a preeminent actor in the field of international development. In contrast to the research findings, the European Commission and some of its officials seemed to take for granted the nature and role of EU development policy in the domain of international development. According to an interviewed European Commission official, the suggested instrumentalisation of EU development policy results from an EU obsession with its ‘actorness’ at the international level, to the detriment of the real nature and role of its development policy in the dominion of international development.

“In Brussels there is an obsession with the ‘actorness’ of the EU. From a psychological perspective this is massively important concerning how the EU sees itself, and how it projects itself abroad. When it comes to development policy, the story is precisely the same, as there is this focus on wanting to show to the world how distinctive EU development policy is. But, basically, this is just the expression of a feeling of self-preservation and protection of the European dream and vision that most EU officials have of the EU”.745

In opposition to the findings of the research, the aforementioned claims advanced by the European Commission and some of its officials are largely unsubstantiated, with their derivation pointing to a wishful self-perception regarding the nature and role of EU development policy in the field of international development seemingly ingrained in the European Commission as an institution.

The progress of the EU as an actor acquired a foreign policy dimension expressly since the 1970s, with the European Commission and some of its officials ostensibly assuming its successful conversion into all forms of EU external action thereafter. The end of the Cold War conferred a new impetus to the EU project to become an increasingly influential international actor, especially following the conclusion of the TEU. Subsequently, EU development policy underwent reform inclusive of the objective to transform the EU into a leading actor in the domain of international development. The thesis demonstrated that the European Commission achieved progress in that

745 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 06 November 2008
process. It also demonstrated that in reality the progress fell short of its set targets, and thus, did not match its recurrent discourse on the nature and role of EU development policy in the dominion of international development. Therefore, it appears that the origin of the European Commission’s claims, shared by some of its officials, regarding the nature and role of EU development policy lies in a deep self-perception that the Union possesses the intrinsic capacity to expand into an influential global actor, and not in reality per se.

Furthermore, the discourse used by the European Commission and some of its officials regarding the nature and role of EU development policy in the dominion of international development appears to correlate with the process of European internal integration. The enhancement of EU development policy into it being ‘unique’ in nature and playing a ‘leadership’ role in the field of international development, projects the idea of a gradually more unitary Union from within, thereby stimulating the European internal integration process. An interviewed European Commission official revealed a similar understanding regarding the subject, advancing:

“This thing that we call development policy since 1957 until now has always been more about us than them. It has always been about an integration process at the EU level rather than following a logic of working with them for their well-being. They, the others, are part of the game, but in the big picture, we are the main object in this process”.  

The respondent illustrates that EU development policy emerged largely as an instrument at the hands of the European Commission with the capacity to both stimulate the European internal integration process, and, support the EU project to expand into a prominent international actor. The European Commission and some of its officials endorsed a fitting discourse concerning the nature and role of EU development policy in the dominion of international development, which seems to stand in contrast with reality, as well as the findings of the research.

Considering the theoretical considerations and the practical implications of the current research, it is pertinent to reflect on which ‘paradise’ the European Commission promoted through its policy of development cooperation towards Africa since the end of the Cold War. It is a form of ‘paradise’ that was marginally different from the version of ‘paradise’ promoted by the identified leading agents in the field of international development. Accordingly, it is a form of ‘paradise’ more concerned with the EU itself as a viable political, economic, and social construct, rather than a model of ‘paradise’ built upon the needs of its developing partners, namely Africa. Moreover, it is a form of ‘paradise’ devised largely with the purpose to support the EU project to expand as an

746 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 February 2010
international actor through its integration in the existing structure of international development. Therein, the EU form of ‘paradise’ supports the Union’s wishful self-perception regarding the ‘unique’ nature and ‘leadership’ role of its development policy, and its current capacity as an actor in the field of international development.

As the current analysis demonstrated, the EU policy of development cooperation evolved in the considered timeframe in direct relation with the structure of international development, specifically the policy orientation of certain IOs as its integral leading agents. As a result, EU development policy did not emerge as ‘unique’ or playing a ‘leadership’ role in international development. Instead, it emerged as a reflection of the existing discourse and practice of international development. Hence, EU development policy in general, and the Cotonou Agreement in particular did not establish the EU as a leading actor in the field of international development, or advance a distinctive approach to development cooperation capable of promoting a new form of ‘paradise’ in Africa. An interviewed European Commission official shared a similar interpretation of EU development policy in the post-Cold War period, noting:

“The Cotonou Agreement is dead! For the moment it will stay there until 2020, and just die peacefully.” 747

In practice, the Cotonou Agreement did not establish an innovative or distinctive EU approach to development promotion in Africa. It packed and branded a similar model of development to that based on the existing discourse and practice of international development. Therein, it did not meet the objective to advance a pioneering version of ‘paradise’ that could transform EU development policy into a ‘unique’ model of development promotion in Africa with the capacity to inspire other actors to follow its ‘leadership’ on the subject.

In light of the dissertation’s findings, it appears most viable for the European Commission to either thoroughly reform the Cotonou Agreement, or design a new development cooperation accord with Africa that is innovative, distinctive, and based on a model that responds to the development needs of the African continent. An interviewed former European Commission official suggested that it is complex to speculate about the future of EU development policy. When asked about the future of EU development policy, he expressed some reservations concerning its possible overhaul in the short to medium-term, stating:

747 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 12 February 2010
“Currently EU development policy is at a big crossroads. The fact is that the Cotonou Agreement has not delivered in what it was meant to do and as a result it has left the EU limping on the international level when it comes to development. What will happen in the next ten years is anyone’s guess, but I can just see more of the same happening again”.

The respondent revealed that EU development policy did not meet its objectives and that reform is necessary to address its shortcomings. Therein, he drew attention to the magnitude of the necessary reform, and noted that its thorough conversion was improbable in the near future.

Nevertheless, and as confirmed by the thesis’ identified exceptions the European Commission appears to have the potential to improve on its record regarding EU development policy towards Africa and reform it accordingly. Geert Laporte, the Head of Institutional Relations at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), concurred with the stated assessment of EU development policy when interviewed concerning the research, asserting:

“If we look at how the EU has behaved and acted in international development circles over the past two decades, we can maybe say that it has done a good job in being always present in all main events and initiatives. But if it wants to grow as a serious actor in that milieu, then much has yet to be done”.

Despite being in its infancy, some trends appear to emerge progressively at the EU level regarding the possible re-orientation of its development policy. By the end of 2008, the JAES was at the centre of most concerted efforts to reform EU development policy with a view to adapt it to the challenges of the next decade and thereafter. The particularity of the JAES is its proposal for EU development policy reform based on a development cooperation partnership between regional blocs (the African Union (AU) and the EU), which reflected the almost intrinsic EU belief in regionalism and inter-regionalism. However, the interviewed Programme Coordinator for Development Policy and International Relations at ECDPM, James Mackie, alerted:

“The EU has made some progress in reforming its development policy in preparation for the future, but at the same time the practical workability of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy today, is still a dream”.

Accordingly, the JAES consisted of the main reference in the re-orientation of EU development policy towards Africa by the end of 2008, but its future workability remained uncertain. The

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748 Interview, Brussels, 11 February 2010 (former European Commission official)
749 Interview, Geert Laporte, Head of Institutional Relations, ECDPM, Brussels, 11 December 2010
750 Interview, James Mackie, Programme Coordinator for Development Policy and International Relations, ECDPM, Brussels, 25 March 2009
transformation of the EU potential to improve the record on its development policy towards Africa appears to be in progress. However, it remains distant from its effective materialisation.

In conclusion, the current research interpreted the character of EU development policy towards Africa since the end of the Cold War through a focus on its evolution, and on its nature and role in the domain of international development. It relied on Martha Finnemore’s Social Constructivist method of research, and concentrated on the understanding of EU development policy vis-à-vis the normative basis of the structure of international development, inclusive of the role performed by its comprising leading agents (IOs). Therein, it largely proved the formulated hypotheses, and confirmed that: a) EU development policy progressed in an evolutionary manner during the considered timeframe; b) EU development policy is not ‘unique’ in the domain of international development; c) EU development policy does not play a ‘leadership’ role in the discourse and practice of international development. Despite some exceptions, the adopted method of research largely confirmed the hypotheses in the interpretation of the Lomé Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement. As a result, the thesis demonstrated how the EU project to progress into a leading international actor has not yet materialised in the field of international development. Furthermore, it illustrated that the form of ‘paradise’ the Union exports to Africa through its development policy since the end of the Cold War is akin and derivative of that promoted by the identified leading agents in the dominion of international development.

Areas of Further Research

The identification of certain exceptions in the investigation on EU development policy regarding Africa since the end of the Cold War opened the path for wider debates and additional areas of research on the subject, which could not have been adequately addressed in a single thesis. As argued above, the uncovering of certain exceptions in the research’s findings, pointed to the emergence of a potential capacity from the European Commission to invert its identified position of ‘norm-taker’ in the dominion of international development. The exceptions were ‘more observable’ in the spheres of trade cooperation and development aid. Accordingly, the analysis of the European Commission behaviour and agenda in the fields of trade cooperation and development aid are interesting areas of future research. The current thesis focused on the understanding of the large norms characterising EU development policy, and traced them to a range of IOs that comprise the structure of international system. However, it appears that an exhaustive analysis of a single norm
characterising EU development policy could provide a more comprehensive understanding of its cycle – from emergence, to diffusion, to internalisation – and thus foster a more inclusive analysis of European Commission behaviour in a specific dimension of EU development policy towards Africa. Furthermore, the suggested areas of additional research could provide an in-depth understanding of EU development policy in the discourse and practice of international development, in consideration of the abating capacity of the Cotonou Agreement to stimulate change therein, and the emergence of new EU development cooperation initiatives such as the JAES. Therefore, the thesis provides a starting point to further research on EU development policy towards Africa, specifically regarding its future orientation, and the understanding of European Commission behaviour in the domain of international development.


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“Cheshire Puss, asked Alice. ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here’? ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to go’, said the Cat. ‘I don’t much care where’, said Alice.
‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go’, said the Cat”.
– Lewis Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*

“Didn't you know that manuscripts don't burn”?
– Mikhail Bulgakov, *The Master and Margarita*