DOCTOR OF EDUCATION (EDD)

The subject beyond culture: An examination of change in educator subjectivity(s) on becoming ‘international’

House, Kevin

Award date:
2017

Awarding institution:
University of Bath

Link to publication
The subject beyond culture: An examination of change in educator subjectivity(s) on becoming ‘international.’

Kevin Eugene Lawrence House

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Education

University of Bath
Department of Education
July 2017

COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation with effect from 10.07.2017

Signed on behalf of the School of Education…………………………………………
Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 4
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6
The ‘classic’ international school, a personal connection ............................................ 9
In International Baccalaureate and its curriculum ....................................................... 11
The enquiry’s structure ................................................................................................. 13
Chapter 1 – The ‘classic’ international IB continuum school as heterotopia .......... 17
On heuristics .................................................................................................................. 21
The classic international school as heterotopia ......................................................... 21
Neoliberal emotivism .................................................................................................... 23
Governmentality .......................................................................................................... 26
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 28
Chapter 2 - Extrinsic governmentality in neoliberal international education .......... 30
Globalisation ................................................................................................................ 31
Knowledge economy .................................................................................................... 33
Lifelong learning .......................................................................................................... 36
Educational standardisation as a process of normalisation .......................................... 39
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 42
Chapter 3 – The cosmopolitan condition as intrinsic governmentality ............... 43
On terminology ............................................................................................................ 43
On genealogy ............................................................................................................... 46
On difference ............................................................................................................... 53
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 57
Chapter 4 – The challenge to emotivism: phronēsis and a care of the self .......... 58
The scientification of ethics ......................................................................................... 58
Virtue theory as a challenge to emotivism ................................................................. 63
*Phronēsis* as a care of the self ................................................................................ 68
Moral reflexivity in the classroom .............................................................................. 71
Care of the self for the cosmopolitan teacher ............................................................. 72
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 75
Chapter 5 – Social ontology and moral intelligence ................................................. 77
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr Michael Donnelly and Dr Mary Hayden for their support and guidance throughout the development of this work. I also would like to thank my wife Kirsty, and my children Isabel and Felix without whose wonderful love and support this would never have been achieved.
Abstract
The central premise of this enquiry is that the International Baccalaureate (IB) model of education fails to deliver the humanitarian values that its literature claims describe. Its curriculum lacks the moral authority of a coherent philosophical foundation, and this promotes ‘emotivism,’ which reinforces contradictory ‘neoliberal’ values. Accordingly, this undermines the basic aim of an IB education and leaves its teachers prone to the subjectivism of emotivist morality. The proposal is that a process of reflexive practice can create an Aristotelian alternative to emotivism that revitalises the IB’s values-based model. Furthermore, it will argue that technology can build this practice into a ‘social ontology’ that challenges the ‘governmentality’ of contemporary international education. To test the premise, an isolated ‘classic’ type of international IB school is considered because it reveals how a teacher’s cultural displacement shows the ontological significance of difference. This is followed by an evaluation of the ontological impact of international education’s governmentality. Subsequently, Alasdair MacIntyre's virtue theory is combined with Michel Foucault's ‘care of the self,’ to build a framework for reflective teacher practice. Then, an argument is made to use technology to connect these individuals and form a reflexive social ontology. To conclude, the enquiry argues that technology represents an objective rationality that challenges emotivism by removing subjectivism from the moral issues of difference facing an IB teacher.
Introduction

This enquiry is based upon a set of assumptions, which are central to its argument. Firstly, there is the assumption that an important social function of an International Baccalaureate (IB) education, and its curriculum, is to construct moral reasoning that guides the values of its students. It is argued that this requires teachers to have a well-developed understanding of their responsibility in this pedagogical work, and that this subsequently has an impact on their ‘ontology.’ In other words, the specific reality of their professional life has a significant influence on the nature of their being. Moreover, another assumption of this enquiry is that geographical location and culture both have substantial impacts on a certain type of international school and its teachers. Consequently, the material reality of the teacher in such contexts is suggested to be markedly different from their nation-based counterparts. The simple premise is that an IB curriculum, delivered by a teacher in a specific kind of international school, presents an interesting philosophical and sociological phenomenon that has, to date, been little discussed in the academic literature of international education. Therefore, it is from such assumptions that this enquiry sets out to argue that an international teacher has their ontology determined by the expectations of a values-based model of education. In other words, teaching in such environments goes beyond professional identity because its values, in the context of these schools, means that difference takes on an ontological significance for the teacher. Furthermore, the argument is that IB values are currently compromised by the lack of an appropriate moral philosophy to challenge the political and economic values of neoliberal education. The suggestion is that these attitudes, in fact, represent what Alasdair MacIntyre identifies as ‘emotivism’ (2007), a form of moral reasoning where ethics and value judgements are aligned to general expressions of feeling or attitude. In this enquiry, it is a core argument that emotivism epitomizes the moral reasoning underpinning contemporary neoliberal politics and economics. Furthermore, it is proposed that emotivism plays an integral role in the neoliberal governmentality determining the work of the schools examined in this enquiry. Consequently, it is claimed the values and attitudes of emotivism found in these schools run counter to those promoted in an IB education.

‘Planetarity’ of such emotivism is the act of turning predilections and feelings into a moral view of humanitarianism in IB continuum international schools. Evidence of this would be the way many of these schools somewhat uncritically blend styles of international mindedness and altruism together in service learning projects. For example, high school
students, as part of their creativity, action and service (CAS) component of the IB Diploma may organise events around one or more the five ‘f’s of internationalism (flags, fashion, festivals, food and famous people). In turn, these activities raise funds for a community approved ‘humanitarian’ project. This might, for example, be the establishment and funding of a ‘micro-school’ for socially and economically disadvantaged children near to the international school (Barratt Hacking, et al., 2016). There are many instances of such projects amongst these types of international IB school, and while the transformative value of such philanthropy must not be underestimated, such learning events also add an emotive moral dimension.

On the one hand, the fundraisers develop an understanding of internationalism that sees difference as an externalized, performative navigation between one’s own passport-given identity and the national characteristics of others. Then, with the creation of a ‘micro-school,’ the economics of altruism becomes part of the moral legacy of these internationally educated students. Therefore, the suggestion here is that such IB learning experiences are emotivist because they often do not critically reflect on the moral challenges of such activities. The argument being that emotivism ‘removes the possibility of treating people as ends, as rational beings; moral debate, from this perspective, is fundamentally manipulative’ (Mangham, 1995). In other words, assumptions and opinions about internationalism and altruism become the moral lens through which the community understands humanitarianism in these schools.

As mentioned, one motive for examining this premise is to occupy a relatively empty space in the theory of this expansive field of study because, to date, little has been written about the moral philosophy underpinning the values of an international education, or the teacher’s role in this. However, given the plethora of definitions, understandings and models of international education, and international school itself becoming an ‘umbrella term’ (Hayden, 2011, p. 214), a narrowing of focus is necessary before redressing this imbalance in the literature. Therefore, this analysis will consider several questions to determine a specific context, validate the thesis and propose a solution, as follows;

- What are the features of the international IB school scrutinised in this enquiry?
- How does its distinctive approach to values-based pedagogy affect the teacher?
- What factors influence these schools and their teachers?
- How does the school’s cultural isolation influence its values-based education?
- In what ways can moral philosophy provide support for the values in these schools?
• What would an alternative philosophical approach to values-based education mean for the teacher’s practice?
• In what ways could technology be used to build a moral community with shared values?
• What does using technology in this way suggest about the location of moral intelligence?

To consider these questions, this ontological analysis will focus on the expatriate teacher delivering the well-established International Baccalaureate (IB) curriculum in what Ian Hill’s ‘typology of schools’ defines as a ‘classic’ international school (2016, p. 13), namely an independent school serving an exclusively expatriate population. Elsewhere, these international schools are identified by Hayden and Thompson as ‘a combination of the ideological and the market driven,’ (1995, p. 337), that nonetheless form an important part of the historical legacy of the concept, ‘international school.’ Additionally, it should be noted from the start that these schools use English, French or Spanish as their language of instruction, and subsequently their IB values generally represent a Western attempt to embrace internationalism and cultural difference. Indeed, this is a bias the IB itself recognizes, but is yet to satisfactorily address (Walker, 2010); (Cambridge, 2011). Almost every school that meets Hill’s definition of a classic international school would reflect this cultural bias. Nevertheless, it is argued that this reality adds credence to this enquiry’s proposal because the philosophical framework suggested later has a recognizable cultural connection with these schools and their teachers. In other words, by returning to Greek moral philosophy there is a tangible link to the humanitarian values of the IB’s educational model and a cultural connection that resonates with the educators in these schools.

Furthermore, the organization states that ‘at the centre of international education in the IB are students aged 3 to 19’ (2015, p. 3). In other words, there is the suggestion that the fullest IB experience is one that covers this whole age range. Internally, the organization refers to single campus examples of this as ‘continuum’ schools, where effectively one campus offers one IB curriculum to children from kindergarten to high school. However, from the considerable number of IB schools very few represent examples of this. Currently, there are less than three hundred and fifty ‘continuum’ schools in existence and of these, only around half make up the ‘classic’ international schools studied in this enquiry. The reason for this narrow focus is an assumption that these schools represent examples of the IB continuum experience ‘isolated’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 160) from the economic, political and cultural realities of their locale. Therefore, it appears logical that if ‘the inculcation of humanitarian values was,
and still is, a major objective of an IB education’ (Hill, 2007, p. 25), these schools represent sites where the teacher and student realities live out these values in interesting ways. The contention in this enquiry is that IB literature does not explicitly link these values to a moral philosophy, which is a failing that limits teachers’ efforts to achieve the IB’s objectives. In fact, without a clear moral philosophy, the suggestion is that these international schools run the risk of promoting an ‘emotivism,’ which reinforces a set of ‘neoliberal’ values that contradict those articulated in the IB’s education model. Therefore, this enquiry later posits a moral framework to support teachers tasked with modelling the integral values of an IB ‘continuum’ education in the context of a classical international school. In other words, to anchor the IB’s ‘humanitarian values’ to a moral philosophy that provides a more coherent ethical position for teachers guiding these learning communities. However, it is first necessary to define a ‘classic’ international school and the structure of an IB ‘continuum’ education before explaining why this specific topic of enquiry interests me.

The ‘classic’ international school, a personal connection

The notion of internationalism has a long history in Western thought. Diogenes famously advocated for cosmopolitanism, and Socrates declared himself to be a ‘citizen of the world.’ However, the virtues of such an internationalist stance took time to impact on formal education. A few commentators have traced the birth of international education back the beginning of the nineteenth-century (Hill, 2016); (Sylvester, 2003); (Sylvester, 2002), with early champions of international schooling being the literary figures of Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo (Hill & Ellwood, 2013). Moreover, it is not until the early twentieth-century that international schools became established in any numbers, and only after the Second World War that they began to form affiliations (Hill, 2007, p. 26). During this time, international schools were primarily designed to serve the needs of ‘internationally mobile families’ (Hill, 2007, p. 25) whose children required cohesion in the content of their curriculum as they moved between countries. This need led the teachers in these schools to form loose associations to develop the necessary cohesion, and it represents the moment when the concept ‘international teacher’ was born. Furthermore, the conversations at the gatherings organised by these affiliations went beyond curriculum design to consider the value of an international education. In the years following the Second World War there was an idealism in these discussions, and an argument to see a universalised set of specific humanitarian values as a moral imperative
began to form. As mentioned, even though the Western cultural bias of this idealism has been critiqued by several commentators, the fact remains that these values are still a driving force in the many articulations of international education that exist today.

This is not to assert the term ‘international school’ is clearly defined or understood. Much has been written about the range of possible interpretations and how the term is continuing to evolve (Hill, 2016); (Hayden & Thompson, 1995); (Bunnell, 2014). For example, there are many schools serving mobile expatriate populations by delivering a national curriculum in an international context. British, German, French, Canadian and Korean international schools are just a few of the national curricula successfully transplanted into an international context. These are not, however, the schools under scrutiny in this enquiry, because they largely tend to reinforce national perspectives and values alongside the knowledge and skills of their curriculum. Rather, what is examined here are those schools that have consciously chosen to offer the IB’s curriculum because they not only serve an international community, but collectively adhere to its set of humanitarian values. Furthermore, the suggestion is that the teachers in such schools also consciously seek out (for a variety of reasons) this type of school to build their careers. In other words, the world of international schooling encompasses a wide variety of contexts but it is a very particular one that is analysed in this enquiry.

The fact that this type of classic international school best frames the ontological questions driving this enquiry is not the only reason for this focus. Additionally, there are personal and professional reasons for undertaking this specific line of inquiry. Having been an international teacher and administrator for twenty-five years, I have had recourse during this time to reflect on my own ontological development, to the point where I am certain the experience has altered who I am. Therefore, on one level, this work is my attempt to understand this evolving ontology, and to question its validity in the context of these schools. Furthermore, in my current role as a leader in the IB, with the responsibility of ensuring effective curriculum implementation in these specific types of IB school, this study allows me to better understand the values underpinning an IB continuum education as part of my reflective professional learning.
The International Baccalaureate and its curriculum

As mentioned, the International Baccalaureate’s roots sprang from affiliations between a few international schools, and its values today continue to bear the hallmarks of post-war idealism and an emphasis on international understanding and a critical evaluation of the ideas of others (Hill, 2007, p. 26). Its first curriculum, the Diploma Programme (DP), began as a collaboration between several schools, most markedly the International School of Geneva and Atlantic College, in Wales. The DP is a high school programme, a hybrid of encyclopedic European curricula like the German Abitur and the French Baccalaureate, and the specialism of the British A level. But, what really marks it out in the domain of international education is its focus on what the IB calls the ‘core’ of the programme. These elements include a compulsory service component (Community, Action and Service) an individual student-designed research project (the Extended Essay), and a course in epistemology and critical thinking (Theory of Knowledge). These core elements guide a broadly constructivist philosophy of education with an additional emphasis on experiential components in the student learning journey.

In time, this programme was added to as the organization took over school-based curriculum development projects aimed at meeting the needs of international students in other age groups, but which struggled to sustain themselves in what was still very much a niche educational market. The Middle Years Programme (MYP) was picked up in 1992 and released to schools in 1994, and the Primary Years Programme (PYP) was eventually taken over by the IB in 1997 (Hill, 2007, pp. 29-30). Finally, what began as a piloted alternative to the DP in 2006, eventually evolved into the Career-related Programme (CP) in 2014, which incidentally represents the only programme fully conceived from within the organization. With certain core elements running through all programmes the IB represents a ‘coordinated curriculum with an international focus’ (Hill, 2007, p. 30).

Having said this, there are design characteristics that set each programme apart from the others. For example, there is a shift in the curriculum links between discrete subjects as a child progresses from one programme to the next. The transdisciplinary nature of the PYP changes to the interdisciplinary approach of the MYP, which then culminates with the disciplinary structure of DP and CP. However, providing cohesion to the whole continuum is
a commitment to inquiry based learning, an educational mission statement\(^1\) promoting international-mindedness, and a set of learning objectives known collectively as the learner profile (LP). This profile consists of ten ‘attributes’ (inquirers, knowledgeable, thinkers, communicators, principled, open-minded, caring, risk-takers, balanced, reflective), which are ‘applicable to all students and adults involved in the implementation of IB programmes’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2009, p. 1). Historically, the LP evolved from the earlier ‘PYP student profile’ because it was thought by ‘practitioners from all three [sic] programmes’ to be a set of qualities exemplifying the desired learner outcomes in each programme (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, in the context of this enquiry, what is interesting is the repeated mention in the learner profile guide of an expectation that everyone models its attitudes and values:

‘The values and attitudes of the school community that underpin the culture and ethos of a school are significant in shaping the future of its young people. In a school that has a commitment to the values inherent in the IB learner profile, these values will be readily apparent in classroom and assessment practices, the daily life, management and leadership of the school’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2009, p. 2).

And,

‘Successful implementation of the IB learner profile in a school will result in a learning environment in which the aims and values of the IB programmes are strongly evident and embraced by all members of the community. This is the challenge for both IB World Schools and the IB. We all must strive to put into practice what we believe’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2009, p. 4).

It is clear the values of the profile must be ‘lived’ by the adults as well as the children in an IB school. The suggestion here is that this represents a link to Aristotelian ethical education, one requiring the teacher to model the characteristics so that each ‘attribute’ becomes a student outcome through a process described as ‘habituation’ (Kristjansson, 2005, p. 470). If this is accepted as a plausible interpretation of the IB’s approach to values-based education, it raises interesting ontological questions about the teacher. If the IB teacher is to model the learner profile what kind of person should this teacher be? Indeed, what must be the moral philosophy guiding this teacher as she ‘inculcates’ the young people in her care?

This enquiry’s central thesis is that the values of this immersive IB continuum experience are challenged by its lack of philosophical grounding, which consequently has an impact on an IB teacher’s ethics. Furthermore, when this education model is considered in the context of the classic international school, with its culturally displaced expatriate community

\(^1\) The International Baccalaureate Organization aims to develop inquiring, knowledgeable and caring young people who help to create a better and more peaceful world through intercultural understanding and respect. To this end the IBO works with schools, governments and international organizations to develop challenging programmes of international education and rigorous assessment. These programmes encourage students across the world to become active, compassionate and lifelong learners who understand that other people, with their differences, can also be right (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015).
and faculty of teachers, there is a risk of the community endorsing emotivist values that are inconsistent with those of the IB curriculum. As mentioned earlier, these are schools in which I worked for many years, and now am tasked with guiding as they work through cycles of self-study and evaluation as part of the IB authorisation process. Therefore, it is of great personal interest to explore the questions thrown up by this unusual phenomenon. But, more importantly, perhaps this enquiry represents the start of a wider debate about the ontological questions surrounding international teaching; a debate that might encourage further philosophical examinations in a field currently dominated by empirical studies.

The enquiry’s structure

To begin, this enquiry identifies three heuristics (Chapter 1) that represent the conceptual framework for analyzing the material conditions of this type of international school, and critiquing the impact upon the teacher’s ontology. First, ‘heterotopia’ establishes a spatial and discursive understanding of the classic international IB continuum school, to show how a tension can exist between its values and geographical location. Then, ‘neoliberalism’ is used as a point of reference that describes an epistemology that appears to dominate both global education and the specific form of international education examined here. This is then combined with ‘emotivism’ to describe the morality of neoliberalism, wherein:

‘all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but [original italics] expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-12).

In other words, a morality that supports the absolutist and relativist values that appear to be pervasive in contemporary society. Finally, Michel Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ is adapted to describe the process by which a society governs, and its epistemology determines, the subject at any given point in history.

However, this enquiry does not intend to evaluate the validity of this framework using empirical methods, instead it aims to engage with certain moral problems raised by viewing international education through this lens. In a nutshell, the argument is that dominant neoliberal epistemology determines the professional and personal reality of the teachers found in classic international IB continuum schools. This reality is conditional to their ontology and challenges the values of an IB education. The teachers’ perpetual state of cultural otherness, in terms of the geographical context of the school, and a lack of coherent moral reasoning, reinforce a tendency to accept the emotivism underpinning the epistemology of neoliberalism. Therefore, this cosmopolitan, values-based teaching life, when considered in the context of neoliberal emotivism, appears to compromise the teacher’s moral authority because it lacks a philosophy
to support IB values. This, therefore, carries implications for the moral education in these schools if one accepts that teachers model values as part of an Aristotelian process of habituation.

Currently, there exist some materialist theoretical examinations of cosmopolitan ontology (Olssen, 2009), but none specifically focus on the international teacher. To address this, a critical review of contemporary education literature and cosmopolitan theory is carried out. This establishes four interrelated forms of governmentality that are then evaluated in terms of an IB continuum teacher working in a classic international school. The four strands of governmentality are an extension of Kleingeld and Brown’s (2014) taxonomy of cosmopolitanism, which argues economic, political, cultural and moral discourses articulate the cosmopolitan experience. The argument in this enquiry is that each of these taxonomies can be expanded to define forms of governmentality that exercise both extrinsic (chapter 2) and intrinsic (chapters 3 and 4) power over the IB teacher. The limitations of this material reality are important to grasp given the habituative processes of the values-based pedagogy found in classic international IB continuum schools. Then, (chapter 4) the suggestion is that this reality requires that the teacher develops Alasdair MacIntyre’s form of Aristotelian phronēsis (practical wisdom) and parrhesia (truth-giving). The first of these skills phronesis, develops a reflective awareness of the ethical inconsistencies found in the discourse of globalised neoliberal education, the cultural diversity of the school’s locale, and the values of an IB curriculum. The second, parrhesia, provides access to a virtues-based moral framework that enables the IB teacher to model consistent values in an IB classroom.

However, using MacIntyre to addresses the challenges facing an IB teacher is not without problems because his perspective accepts to some degree a Cartesian subjectivity, which has well-established epistemological connections with the rationality underpinning neoliberalism. Fundamentally, Cartesian rationality maintains the self as an immutable singularity that exists beyond the historical shifts of epistemology, and thus in accepting such a self MacIntyre’s materialism is to a degree undermined. This is addressed by approaching his reading of Aristotelian virtue from a more hermeneutic, or interpretive, position. In this way, the self is presented as a sophisticated ‘product’ of discourse, and is thus both (denotatively) determined by the epistemology dominating such discourse, and also being (connotatively) beyond it. More importantly, this view does not maintain the subject in some fixed state ‘beyond’ the materiality of discourse, it instead challenges this process of objectification and its harmonious relationship with neoliberal rationality.

Assuming there is validity in this materialist thesis, what are its advantages when
considering the ethical position of the IB teacher in a classic international continuum school? Does it provide an alternative way of comprehending the IB teacher’s ontology, one which has a moral authority that underpins IB values? Arguably, virtue theory provides a framework that eludes the moral contradictions of neoliberalism by balancing practical interpretive flexibility with a tangible set of principles. However, to be successful, a materialist Aristotelian morality must also circumvent MacIntyre’s assumption that the virtues define as a lexicon of idealised characteristics. For example, his approach assumes terms like ‘courage’ and ‘honesty’ to have denotative meanings that exist beyond historical shifts in the epistemology of these terms. Therefore, a more hermeneutic approach is adopted in this enquiry, which instead sees the virtues as a range of dispositions that are fundamentally interpretive in nature. MacIntyre’s historical materialist reading made a powerful case for virtue’s efficacy in addressing the emotivism of late twentieth-century industrial capitalism. However, it now requires a hermeneutic interpretation that does not underestimate critical theory’s impact on questions of subjectivity, emphasising as they do the discourses of multiplicity and difference. In other words, the late twentieth-century emotivism facing MacIntyre has evolved into an altogether more pervasive form; as capitalist rationality has developed into a neoliberal one, addressing the far-reaching consequences of this emotivism calls for a revitalised virtue theory.

Having established that Aristotelian moral theory can indicate a framework for underpinning the values of an IB education, this enquiry turns (Chapter 4) to consider how Michel Foucault’s theory of individual reflection can internalise ethical behaviour as part of an aesthetic of being. This process of self-interpretation, he argues, disperses the ontological power of governmentality by avoiding its ‘objectification’ of the self because it promotes a more authentic ‘care of the self.’ This care is then expanded to include phronēsis and parrhesia, as part of a philosophical framework that supports the IB teacher under consideration in this enquiry. The proposal is that this form of reflective practice enables the teacher to develop a coherent ethical position, which is grounded in a moral theory that underpins the humanitarian values promoted in IB literature.

However, it does not adequately address the ‘isolation’ of these culturally displaced teachers and their learning communities. In other words, the suggestion is that Foucault’s individualised ‘care of the self’ requires a broader network, if it is to exercise the moral agency required to challenge the homogenised moral and cultural rhetoric of globalised neoliberal emotivism. Therefore, the potential of communicative technology is explored (chapter 5) as a way of forming like-minded reflexive practioners into an ‘assemblage,’ which might overcome the geographical, and even ontological, isolation experienced in classic international IB
continuum schools. In other words, a ‘social ontology’ with the practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) to enable each teacher-subject to maintain an ethical voice (*parrhesia*) that more authentically supports the values of an IB curriculum. To conclude, the enquiry asks if this model, with its suggestion that technology connects educators in a reflexive community of practice, could possibly represent an alternative form of moral intelligence, with the aim being to provide both a moral framework that supports the humanitarian values of an IB education, as well as encourage more philosophical debate in this field of study. With the provocation that technology could offer an objective approach to moral reasoning, the space is created for an interesting dialogue about this form of teacher-ontology.
Chapter 1

The ‘classic’ international IB continuum school as heterotopia

One aspect of the thesis evaluated in this enquiry is that the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school has his or her ethical assumptions frequently challenged due to a cultural displacement caused by the necessary adoption of humanitarian values within the context of a country that is not the teacher’s own. As an extreme example, consider the ethical dilemmas facing the European teacher living an affluent expatriate existence in Bangladesh who must embody the values of the IB learner profile (inquiring, knowledgeable, thinkers, communicators, principled, open-minded, caring, risk-takers, balanced, reflective) and build a curriculum around global issues including topics exploring poverty and exploitation. The argument here is that a robust ethical self is necessary, one that is grounded on a firm moral foundation. Furthermore, cultural displacement is compounded by the fact the educator is living beyond the morality(s) of home, which, to a degree, ground the educator’s own ethical perspective. Even if such moral grounding is itself a site of conflict, I would argue that it is still a position with more ontological certainty than the one experienced in an expatriate existence. But, why is this important in the context of this enquiry? The reason offered here is that the values informing an IB education require the teacher to maintain an ethical consistency if his or her modelling of the IB’s values is to have authenticity. However, this necessity is challenged by a contradiction that exists when implementing an IB education. On the one hand, there is a moral emotivism underpinning the governmentalities defining contemporary international educators, and on the other, IB values with no grounding in a moral alternative to emotivism, one more in keeping with its humanitarian agenda. Therefore, the teacher is left wanting a complimentary morality that offers the consistent ethical sensibility necessary to understand the inequities and contradictions of the expatriate experience. Or seen more ontologically, as heterogeneous cultures come into conflict with globalisation’s homogenisation, the individual’s ongoing processes of self-making and sense-making call for a balance between ethical engagement with difference and a need for moral grounding in keeping with this difference.

The suggestion in this enquiry, is that the moral extremes of absolutism and the relativism found in contemporary politics are evidence of the spread of the emotivism identified by Alasdair MacIntyre in the late twentieth-century and now accelerated by global diaspora. And, it is argued, this reality means teachers run the risk of reinforcing emotivism in the IB classroom and consequently in the moral views of the children they teach, which is at odds
with the values of the education found in a classic international IB continuum school. A type of schooling where the tensions between curricula values and the school’s geographical location accentuate the obligation to examine the morality behind these values. When viewed from the perspective of Aristotelian habituation, this means in these types of school that the teacher-subjects and their students are struggling to make moral sense of what Massey (2005) describes as the ‘otherworldliness’ of this space. Therefore, the proposal in this enquiry is to build a coherent moral framework that can help the IB’s educational model to more effectively ‘inculcate’ children with its humanitarian values, which fundamentally are still of value today. However, it must be noted here that this unapologetically materialist and dispositional view of moral education, assumes that moral subjects are both the product of, and party to, the powerful dynamics of social discourse, which is, of course, only one way of interpreting this phenomenon.

As described earlier, the International Baccalaureate (IB) is an organisation responsible for the research, development and monitoring of four curricula designs for educating students from kindergarten to high school. Its curricula are unfettered by the policy dictates of any single national government and are taught in almost five thousand schools, across more than one hundred and fifty countries. Its pedagogy is broadly constructivist, drawing on Vygotsky, Bruner, Dewey and Hahn amongst others, and is referred to as a 'philosophy' of education aimed at making the 'whole child' into a 'lifelong learner' (International Baccalaureate, 2015). To ensure its values remain cohesive across its four curriculums the IB uses ten character ‘attributes’ it calls the learner profile (LP) and demands that both students and adults model them throughout an IB education. The aim of the profile being to ensure each child develop into a lifelong example of the organisation’s educational mission. However, the argument here is that this dispositional philosophy of learning is undermined by a cultural displacement, which challenges the teacher’s ethical sensibility and requires a more grounded moral framework.

This is important because the educator is key to the success of this type of school’s habituative style of teaching and the demands of its values-based, dispositional curriculum. The ethics of this teacher directly impacts on how these learning communities make moral sense of themselves and their wider community. In other words, if the primary agent for truth-giving in these isolated learning communities is the teacher, he or she must not only model the values of the curriculum, but also be ethically consistent. Moreover, if it is accepted that the material reality of a classic international IB continuum school is driven by social discourses of
power, then any attempt to understand this being carries ontological significance. It becomes essential if the school’s educational discourse is to have any moral authority when faced with the diversity of its wider community experiences. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinise the discourses in which this teacher is situated so that an understanding emerges of what defines her ontology.

Given the direction of this thinking, with its emphasis on discourse defining not just identity but one’s sense of being or ontology, it is clear why a materialist approach is appropriate when seeking out alternative possible ways of being. At its most fundamental level materialism is concerned with power; how it is exercised, who it is exercised by, and whom it is exercised on. Building on classical Marxist theory, contemporary materialism identifies power’s significance on both epistemology and its subsequent ontological repercussions. Following on from here, this enquiry attaches a similar set of assumptions to the teacher in an international school, before going on to argue that Alasdair MacIntyre’s Marxist reinvention of Aristotelian virtue theory, and Michel Foucault’s ‘care of the self,’ indicate a potential way out of this determinism. This disruption of the knowledge-discourse-subject-knowledge cycle suggests an ontology that fully occupies a definitive moral position, one that escapes the popularist and relativist extremes of emotivism. In other words, this enquiry uses materialist philosophy as a methodology for identifying how teacher-subjects in classic international IB continuum schools are products of the discourse dominating contemporary education.

Before moving to examine this process of subject formation in more detail, it is worth briefly explaining one final advantage of the chosen approach. Materialism, in the context of this study, avoids the analytical dualisms dominating much of the ontological philosophical discourse in the English-speaking world. The advantage here being that it avoids being hamstrung by seeing core discursive objects (such as subjectivity) as axiomatic, which thus demonstrates an essentialist perspective. Whether relying on the mind-body separations of Cartesian dualism, or the unitary ontological idealisms of Kant, such philosophy, to varying degrees, relies on conceptual exclusivities that undermine analytical philosophy’s efficacy when exploring multiplicity and difference. Throughout this study, identifying such shortcomings underlines the methodological advantages of a materialist approach to examining the ontological veracity(s) of this style of teaching life and its moral relevance.

Since at least Descartes, investigating subjectivity has primarily involved scrutiny of the relationship between time and space. However, those such as Doreen Massey argue that
traditional approaches to subjectivity fixate on ‘interiorities’ and temporality, with the spaces inhabited by subjects being oppositional static ‘exteriorities,’ which limits opportunities to regard both space and subjectivity as multiplicities (Massey, 2005, p. 55). Therefore, to understand subjectivity in an international education context, requires a methodology that can place the importance of difference and multiplicity at an epistemological level. Making sense of the international educator means seeing space as integral to building an understanding of their subjectivity. ‘For, if experience is not an internalised succession of sensations (pure temporality) but a multiplicity of things and relations, then its spatiality [original italics] is as significant as its temporal dimension’ (Massey, 2005, p. 58). Indeed, this enquiry argues that the temporality of Cartesian rationality has led to a stagnation in moral thinking, which has accentuated emotivism. Furthermore, political articulations of emotivism have given rise to popularism on the Right and secular relativism on the Left, with both impacting on the ethics found in the schools under scrutiny here. This highlights a crisis of such rationality with its temporal emphasis of historical linearity. By instead adopting Massey’s spatial heuristic, the implicit forward momentum of Cartesian reason is significantly lessened by a focus on the interrelationships of space. This shift reinforces a methodological inclination to models of spatial connectivity rather than linear progressivism on the one hand, and movement over stagnation on the other. Furthermore, by focusing on spatial interconnectivity rather than the forward momentum of linearity, innovative ways of thinking morally are opened. In other words, a spatial heuristic avoids the traditional governmentalities of neoliberal epistemological discourse by allowing for other knowledge formations and alternatives to moral thinking.

Later in this study, Massey’s geographical space is combined with DeLanda’s biological space to help conceptualise a way of blending Foucault’s ethical subject with MacIntyre’s virtuous one. Together they become the theoretical foundation for a social ontology, ethically equipped to engage with the political agenda of neoliberal educational policy with its Cartesian epistemology. Moreover, this approach manages this without recourse to binaries such as popularism/relativism, time/space, interiority/exteriority, body/mind, self/other, and human/non-human, which so often hinder attempts to understand subjectivity. In other words, materialism goes beyond the binary discourses of neoliberal rationalisation that enclose individuals in a temporal linearity that denies ‘the necessary outwardlookingness of spatialised subjectivity’ (Massey, 2005, p. 69).
On heuristics

To view the phenomenon of these international schools spatially requires making a case for the usefulness of heuristics in this area of philosophy. Throughout this thesis several heuristics are used because they are, on the one hand, useful when making ‘creative contributions to philosophy’ (Hájek, 2014, p. 288), and on the other, memorable as cognitive building blocks in the argumentation of the enquiry. They do not serve as argumentative proof of the validity of the thesis but rather provide concise points of reference as its structural complexity develops. However, for this strategy to work every heuristic must be considered in detail before deployment so that its full utility is explicitly understood. This being the case, it is essential to begin this process of clarification by examining the three core heuristics in this enquiry. Firstly, ‘heterotopia’ (1984) is borrowed from Michel Foucault’s account of special ritualised spaces to describe the geographical reality of the classic international IB continuum school in a way that captures its ontological significance. Secondly, ‘neoliberal emotivism’ is a hybrid drawing on Wendy Brown’s treatment of neoliberalism (2015) and Alasdair MacIntyre’s description of emotive morality (2007), and used to define the epistemology dominating the wider context of this specific type of heterotopia. Thirdly, and again drawing from Foucault, ‘governmentality’ (1994) is used to describe the discourses of neoliberal emotivism and its impact upon the teacher-subject in a classic international IB continuum school.

The classic international school as heterotopia

In an essay, first published in 1968, entitled Of Other Spaces, Foucault suggests humans now live in ‘the epoch of space’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 1), a fact defining not only relationships between each other but also with the self. Since Galileo, he suggests, space has become less an extension of self and more the site of its definitive epistemological location and consequently a key element of identity. The connection between these sites raises problems of ‘propinquity’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 2) because each site struggles for its epistemological prominence amongst others, which causes diverse interactions and understandings. Largely this struggle plays out in institutional discourses, which build on pre-existing but malleable epistemologies determining the interrelationships between spaces. This he argues is driven by certain ‘oppositions’ between spaces that have been traditionally dominated by ‘the hidden presence of the sacred’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 2) and thus are axiomatic in nature, which subsequently inscribes behaviours and ways of being.
'These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of leisure and the space of work' (Foucault, 1984, p. 2).

However, there are spaces that exist outside the rationality of these ‘governed’ spaces, and these he calls ‘heterotopias.’ These spaces exist in the reality of all other lived spaces but also beyond them, like a looking glass

‘at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point that is over there’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 4).

In other words, a heterotopia is always more than what it seems to be at first glance, amidst the epistemologies that dominate spatial discourse and the beings within it. Therefore, in the context of this enquiry, each classic international IB continuum school, when regarded as a heterotopia, represents an enclosed educational space, which exists, to some degree, at odds with both the mainstream discourses of contemporary international education and the disparate cultural realities of its location. Or, as Foucault puts it, the heterotopia is a site of the ‘mythic and the real contestation of the space in which we live’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 4).

Furthermore, each classic international school in its ‘isolation’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 160) invokes parallels with Foucault’s suggestion that ‘the ship is the heterotopia par excellence’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 9). And, just as Foucault’s ship cannot escape the material determination of the ocean, individual schools have a limited capacity to significantly influence the neoliberal epistemology dominating their environment. As is argued later, some form of interconnectivity is required to influence discourse in ways that offer alternative moral perspectives that challenge neoliberal emotivism. When, with characteristic theatricality, Foucault suggested in 1967 that ‘in a civilisation without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 9), he was considering heterotopias before the advent of today’s sophisticated networks of communicative technology. Later, an argument is made to use technology to connect these isolated heterotopic sites, and form a communal space of reflexive practice. However, for now the suggestion is simply that Foucault’s heuristic aptly captures the challenges resulting from the spatial tensions facing a classic international IB continuum school. The possible criticism that Foucault’s heterotopia has a limited potential to move beyond the ‘espionage’ and ‘police’ of neoliberal epistemology because of each site’s relative remoteness will be returned to in the concluding chapter of this enquiry. However, having positioned this initial heuristic it is necessary to examine another that is central to this study.
Neoliberal emotivism

This section will examine neoliberalism and emotivism independently before arguing to combine them for the purposes of this study. Historically, the term ‘neoliberalism’ was coined by Alexander Rüstow in 1932 to describe a form of economic theory, which came to influence a small group of liberal theorists before the start of the second world war. It is interesting to note this simply because its original meaning, though still related, seems a far cry from the term’s pejorative use in theory today. Fundamentally, Rüstow advocates a ‘free economy, strong state’ (Hartwich, 2009, p. 14), a position at odds with many contemporary political and economic commentators’ usage. In current theory, is it mostly used to describe the intrusive proclivities of what Wendy Brown calls ‘capitalism on steroids’ (Brown, 2016), whereby laissez-faire economics seems to have been taken to its limits with the result that everything is governed by marketization. Neoliberalism has become the byword for a political and economic system that appears to endorse the sharing of an ever-larger amount of the world’s monetary wealth and material resources between an ever-smaller number of its population. A time when the welfare projects started after world war two are regarded, at least by liberal critics, as being ever more under-valued and under-funded. Everything from healthcare to education is being tailored to further commodify all aspects of life and increase the generation of capital. Subsequently, the term neoliberalism is not only a byword for today’s political and economic worldview, but:

‘an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every dimension of human life’ (Brown, 2015, pp. 324-5).

In contemporary education theory, neoliberalism is generally aligned with a politicised educational agenda that is geared to developing a pliable, international workforce (Brown, et al., 2011). ‘Globalisation,’ ‘knowledge economy,’ and ‘lifelong learning’ are all part of an educational lexicon that appears to have been appropriated by neoliberal epistemology, a phenomenon examined in more detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say, the term ‘neoliberal’ now describes a political doctrine that is quite distinct from Rüstow’s initial description of a collaborative relationship between laissez-faire markets and state stewardship. The point to be grasped here, is how the term fixes the subject as an object of knowledge with specific characteristics and limitations. By examining Wendy Brown’s use of Marx and Foucault in her critical examination of contemporary neoliberalism, the full power of its discourse and links to emotivist philosophy become apparent.
Both neoliberalism’s impact on knowledge formation, and its assault on core democratic principles, has led Wendy Brown to become one of its more vociferous critics. In her most recent book, she uses the critical lenses of Marx and Foucault to argue that neoliberalism goes beyond simply influencing political and intellectual institutions, it now frames contemporary rationality. Her critique utilises Foucault’s own explorations of neoliberalism’s normative reason to highlight both his divergence from Marx, and his advantages in understanding the neoliberal phenomena. However, in *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (2015), Brown argues the value of avoiding the temptation to blend Marx and Foucault, instead seeing each as a critical lens identifying distinct aspects of neoliberalism’s current influence and future trajectories. Even though critics argue her book has limitations due to its predominantly American view of neoliberalism (Gane, 2016), her use of Marx and Foucault to address the political questions she raises about it are useful to this enquiry. For her, the utility of Marx lies in his ability to demonstrate the ubiquity of human commodification and monetization in contemporary society, and expose the corrosive effect this has had on the democratic principles of classical liberal politics. In other words, Marxism identifies a power that significantly influences those contemporary societies dominated by neoliberal economics. Of course, many other commentators have adopted Marxism to examine this issue across a range of contexts, but Brown’s work is interesting in also using Foucault to add a kind of a ‘bifocal’ view of neoliberalism. In other words, if Marx’s historical materialism provides a macroscopic view, her use of Foucault’s analysis of bio-politics and its influence on teleology and ontology, represents a microscopic view of neoliberalism. Again, at first glance, this may not seem so new because many others have used both thinkers to examine neoliberalism. However, consciously keeping the two distinct avoids the idealism of classical Marxism by adopting Foucault’s assertion that subjects remain constantly scrutinised as ‘objects of knowledge.’ In Foucault’s neoliberalism subjectivity is not an idealised ontological state beyond epistemology, it is instead a formative process defined by the rational discourse of the epistemology. Therefore, as this discourse continues to evolve amidst the shifting axes of neoliberal power, the subject as its primary object of knowledge, is continually reanimated. Seen this way, the relationship between epistemology and subjectivity loses the two-dimensional dialectic of Marxist class-struggle, and instead becomes a description of the process of subjectivity’s reinvention.

Importantly, in the context of this enquiry, Brown’s argument describes the two main elements of contemporary neoliberal rationality that determine ‘homo economicus’ (Brown,
This term is used to capture the range of subjectivities available in a neoliberal context, but in this enquiry, it also links neoliberalism to a form of moral being Alasdair MacIntyre describes as dominating late-industrial society:

‘the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as antagonists. And it is in the cultural climate of this bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist self is naturally at home’ (2007, p. 35).

The suggestion here is that emotivism provides an accurate description of the moral philosophy underpinning neoliberal rationality. In After Virtue, MacIntyre sets himself the task of revising Aristotelian ethics, which he believes has not only fallen out of use since the Enlightenment, but also undergone a process of interpretive decay. This has advanced to the point where virtue’s true meaning is no longer accessible because of an ‘emotivism’ dominating contemporary moral philosophy (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-14). He plots the major points in this historical decay of traditional Greek virtue and the subsequent ascendance of emotivism, which he regards as virtues antithetical morality. For him, emotivism is a product of both an over assertion of individualism, and the ubiquity of modern life’s bureaucratization:

‘On the one side there appear the self-defined protagonists of individual liberty, on the other the self-defined protagonists of planning and regulation, of the goods which are available through bureaucratic organization. But in fact what is crucial is that on which the contending parties agree, namely that there are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals. Given this deep cultural agreement, it is unsurprising that the politics of modern societies oscillate between a freedom which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behaviour and forms of collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 34-35).

MacIntyre’s description of the ‘sovereignties’ at work in emotivism closely align with the political and economic discourses of neoliberalism, and hence this enquiry combines the terms to describe the morality that asserts itself in the absence of a philosophy underpinning the values in an IB education. Furthermore, the proposal is that neoliberal emotivism contradicts the humanitarian values expressed in such schools, with the philanthropic community service learning projects discussed earlier being just one example. And, the moral contradictions of emotivism and humanitarianism are exacerbated by the neoliberal governmentalties exerting both extrinsic and intrinsic pressure on the educator in classic international IB continuum schools, in ways that undermine the teacher’s ability to be ethically consistent. But, before considering this in more detail it is essential to have a more thorough understanding of the term ‘governmentality.’
Governmentality

‘Governmentality, then, consists of rationalities and practices – in and beyond the state – seeking to act on the action of others or on the self, and directed towards certain ends’ (Huxley, 2008, p. 1664).

Following Brown’s definition of neoliberalism, it is easy to grasp its pervasive power over subjectivity. However, given the complexity of neoliberalism’s maneuvers, understanding the actual machinations of such power requires another heuristic device. Michel Foucault argues that ‘governmentality’ best describes the overriding normative discourses of neoliberal power, which work themselves into all forms of knowledge consequently determining subjectivity. Nevertheless, governmentality is not to be viewed as wholly restrictive, but rather as the metanarrative within which a story of ontological freedom must be sustained. In some respects, his stance is designed to avoid the Marxist view of power offered by his contemporaries Althusser and Habermas. In other words, governmentality is an effort to escape the dialectics of social class, which he found simplistic and limiting in its preoccupation with political and socio-economic factors. Moreover, whilst acknowledging that the self must exist within the material realities of political and socio-economic hierarchies, he also wanted to emphasise the impact of these discourses on epistemology. This view of power is clearly influenced by Nietzschean determinism (Nietzsche, 2000), which informs Foucault’s avoidance of traditional dualistic approaches to institutional power. Instead, he uses governmentality as a heuristic to highlight power’s historical influence on patterns of knowledge formation. In this study, four inter-related governmentalities are presented as having regulatory power over the international teacher-subject. However, before examining each of these in subsequent chapters, it is necessary to briefly summarise the archaeology of Foucault’s governmentality to fully grasp the complexity of the relationship between epistemology and subjectivity.

Foucault most extensively elucidated his view of governmentality as part of a series of lectures collected under the title of, Security, Territory, and Population (1977-78). In one of these, entitled ‘Governmentality,’ he argued that a ‘scientification’ of politics followed a liberal period in which European culture was concerned with the ‘art of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 201). This, he suggests, occurred around the same time as a specialised understanding of economy entered the political discourse: ‘To govern a state will mean… to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of an entire state’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 207). This convergence plays a significant role in the evolutionary development of an epistemology that began in the sixteenth-century as one ‘form of government’ amongst many, but later emerged by the eighteenth-century to be the dominant ‘level of reality’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 208). Focusing on
the interdependencies between these emerging political and economic discourses, enables Foucault to identify three stages of ontological shift. First, the seventeenth-century subject is an object of knowledge in relation to sovereignty, then by the eighteenth-century the subject is determined by the external reality of the ascendant liberal politico-economic discourse, and finally the contemporary subject is defined by an internalization of neoliberal epistemology. Seen from this perspective, it is untenable to separate political and economic discourse from knowledge formation because knowledge and the knower are shaped by the governmentalities emerging from the hegemony of this epistemology. Moreover, it is this view of governmentality that allows Foucault to go on to examine its strategies for domination. For example, processes such as ‘bio-power’ and ‘technology of the self,’ are discursive mechanisms of epistemological internalization that determines the ethics of the subject.

The rise of this ‘episteme’ coincides with the demise of the ‘sovereign’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 210), with the result that today it is the dominant form of reason. The mediaeval chain of being gave way to a Darwinian worldview by the late nineteenth-century. Subsequently, this led to neoliberalism becoming the dominant form of normative rationality. In answer to Marx’s macro interpretation of power, Foucault’s politicization of knowledge instead reveals the micro-powers at work on the self. In other words, subjects do not simply experience being governed as an exteriority, they actively engage in a process self-government, which is dictated to by the discourse of neoliberalism. The extrinsic political hierarchies of this socio-economic rationality mirror internalized hierarchies, or technologies, which self-govern the subject as forms of bio-power. For example, in the context of international education an external reality such as ‘credential capitalism’ (Brown, et al., 2011), becomes the interiorized governmentality of lifelong learning. Interestingly, Foucault identifies such ‘mercantilism’ as ‘the first rationalization exercise of power as a process of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 214). Or, put another way, the insertion of economics into political discourse is the moment when it first becomes a ‘tactic of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 214). This occurs at the same time as the first efforts to segregate ‘populations’ of subjects by geographical region, a move that eventually solidifies into the democratic nation state, and the emergence of an inter-national awareness too (Foucault, 1994, p. 216). Furthermore, this concept can be expanded to define collections of subjects as other. Each country’s objectification of other groups of geographically located subjects begins an epistemological discourse that makes subjects other to themselves too because it formalizes a national self-identity. This self-objectification has relevance when considering the ontology of the international teacher-subject. However, it is worth noting that any notion of such inter-nationalism remained only an ‘emergent’
epistemology (savior) in Foucault’s archaeological examination of governmentality.

Liberalism’s efforts to govern its populations represents, for Foucault, a normative rationality in political and economic discourse (1994, pp. 216-7). Emerging institutions such as prisons, schools and hospitals affirm the need for a government of the self and by the mid-nineteenth-century have scientific disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology and psychoanalysis to reinforce this. For Foucault, the power of this governmentality contains three core elements:

1) ‘A complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy.’
2) A dominant power that has led to ‘the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and… the development of a whole complex of knowledges.’
3) A process by which the mediaeval ‘state of justice’ becomes ‘the administrative state’ of the Enlightenment, to a point wherein everything is governmentalized (Foucault, 1994, p. 220).

Indeed, in the context of education, and with echoes of Wendy Brown’s assessment of neoliberalism, Maarten Simons calls the governmentality lifelong learning the ‘politicization and economization of human life’ (Simons, 2006, p. 523). He argues that a Foucauldian view of education highlights the extent to which politics has shifted away from interactive relationships between subjects, to concentrate instead on the subject’s interaction with itself (Simons, 2006, p. 525). In the normative rationality of neoliberal society, the entrepreneurial learner has ‘a specific attitude towards and objectification of life and how this attitude is part of a governmental regime’ (Simons, 2006, p. 529). The subject as knowledge capital is a process of commodification determined by neoliberal epistemology:

‘The submission to a permanent economic tribunal therefore does not only condemn the entrepreneurial self to productive learning but also to a competitive process of lifelong learning’ (Simons, 2006, p. 537).

This, according to Simons, recalls Foucault’s relationship between sovereign and subject, but here the objectification of the dualism involves the entrepreneurial subject perpetually holding him or herself to account. Arguably, by using governmental mechanisms of standardization as a strategy of self-determination, neoliberal education remains trapped in the temporality discussed earlier, which leaves it unable to exploit new ethical possibilities.

Conclusion

In this chapter, three heuristics have been introduced, each with a distinct purpose. Heterotopia is used to describe the tension that exists in the spatial and discursive realities of a classic international IB continuum school. Neoliberal emotivism is introduced to capture the political and moral tenor of the discourses existing within and beyond the confines of these heterotopias. And, governmentality defines the impact of these discourses on the subjects living
and working in these types of international school. In the next two chapters, these governmentalities are examined in detail by drawing on the literatures of international education, cosmopolitan theory, and empirical efforts to explain ethics in an educational context. The aim being to show how these governmentalities hold both intrinsic and extrinsic power over the subjects in these learning communities, but, more importantly, also argue that they encourage the development of an emotivism that contradicts the humanitarian values of the IB’s curriculum.
Chapter 2

Extrinsic governmentality in neoliberal international education

Much current analysis of the phenomenon of international educational adopts political, economic and psychological theory to evaluate its impact upon the individual and society. Most frequently, neoliberal and neo-Marxist lenses are used to provide insight on the internationalisation of education, with the consequence being it is a field dominated by narratives that define the teacher-subject as a rational singularity. However, the self seen this way both limits ontological potentiality and promotes the hegemony of Cartesian rationality in international educational theory. Such epistemological domination of international educational discourse assumes this subjectivity as a priori, which limits theoretical efforts to untie the ontological knot of the international teacher’s identity. Even when Foucault’s post-structural theory is adopted to provide expansive critiques (Olssen, et al., 2004); (Hodgson, 2009); (Jazeel, 2009); (Masschelein, 2006); (Popkewitz, et al., 2006); (Simons & Masschelein, 2006); (Simons, 2006), the subject persists as a singularity. This emphasizes the extent neoliberal epistemology, as the evolved state of Cartesian rationality, defines the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school. This reality presents challenges for the subject because economic, political, cultural and moral forms of governmentality objectify the self in ways that limit agency and ethical being. Regarding the international teacher-subject as a unified singularity fixes it as an ‘object of knowledge’ in an epistemological tradition of ‘know thy self’ (Foucault, 2005). Before moving to consider the limitations of this in more detail, it is necessary to first define these governmentalities as experienced in the somewhat abstruse space of international education.

In this chapter, political and economic governmentality is explored by examining a range of academic narratives describing international education. These show neoliberalism’s impact on the ontology of the teacher, and provides an understanding of the normative function of their discourses. Following on from this in the next chapter, a case is made to see this type of international educator as a ‘cosmopolitan’ teacher-subject, who is also defined by cultural governmentality. Before this, however, concepts of ‘globalisation,’ (Brown & Lauder, 2009); (Brown & Lauder, 2011); (Wylie, 2011); (Agbaria, 2011), ‘knowledge economy,’ (Marshall, 2008); (Young, 2009), and ‘lifelong learning’ (Fejes & Nicholl, 2008); (Hinchliffe, 2006); (Kress, 2008); (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006); (Uggl, 2008), are summarised to show how dominant they are as themes in international education theory (Cambridge, 2011); (Cambridge & Thompson, 2004); (Hayden & Thompson, 1995); (Stagg, 2013); (Sylvester, 2005),
curriculum design (Cambridge, 2010), policy generation (Young, 2009), and assessment models. The argument being these themes both extrinsically and intrinsically reinforce economic and political discourses of governmentality, which see the IB teacher-subject in the neoliberalism of the continuum school as a form of homo economicus. The ramifications of such governmentality being the determination of ontology and the promotion of emotivism.

There have been international schools for well over half-century, with the International Baccalaureate’s Diploma Programme reaching its 50th anniversary in 2018, and the phenomenon has well documented qualitative and quantitative efforts to understand it (Sylvester, 2002; 2003; 2005) dating back to at least the early 1960s (Bereday, et al., 1964); (Leach, 1969). The development of its academic narrative reveals an epistemological shift from the descriptive to the theoretical. Much of the work from the 1960s to the 1980s (Sylvester 2003, 2005); (Hill, 2002) was preoccupied with telling the ‘story’ of international education and the international school, whereas from the 1990s (Cambridge 2010, 2011) the literature is typified by efforts to apply a theoretical lens to both. Predominantly, sociology (Cambridge, 2010), economics (Bunnell, 2005) and psychology (Caffyn, 2011) have been used for sense-making in this field of educational research. From the 1990s, the narrative of international education is one of a continuum on which neo-liberal, materialist and post-structural analyses are situated (Tooley, 1996); (Brown, et al., 2011); (Olssen, 2006). Even though these represent different political positions, their methodological foundations rely on an epistemology that assumes a singular international teacher identity. Even when anti-rational and post-structuralist approaches to international education emphasise the multiplicities offered by exploring difference, a singular subject remains. This interpretation limits the efficacy of multiplicity because it maintains the illusory cohesion of the Cartesian ontology at the heart of neoliberal rationality. In the following section, the neoliberal discourses of ‘globalisation,’ ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘lifelong learning’ are presented as dominant influences in international education’s curriculum, policy and assessment. As such, they represent economic and political governmentalities that consign Cartesian homo economicus to emotivism.

**Globalisation**

In parallel with the growth of neoliberal rationality, patterns of economic development have changed radically as traditional trade relationships between post-colonial powers were replaced by a growing awareness of the ‘global’ phenomena (Resnik, 2008, pp. 147-167).
Surveying the literature that evaluates the impacts of globalisation turns up consistent references to technology and connectivity. This has led some to view the process of globalisation as actually restricting freedom of movement as society becomes more interconnected, to the extent that ‘education is being exploited by governments to forward economical advantage in developing knowledge based economies’ (Wylie, 2011, p. 23). Wylie argues that international education now plays this role in its global socialisation of students (Wylie, 2011, p. 24). Arguably, technology has added another dimension to this socialisation because it proliferates the transmission of specific cultural messages, which when placed in the networked reality of international schooling, forms a powerful ideology that reinforces the neoliberal values found in economically dominant countries.

In academic literature, neoliberal interpretations of globalisation highlight the positive values of enhanced connectivity (Friedman, 1999); (Fukuyama, 1992), humanists suggest a rapid erosion of cultural diversity (Prakash & Esteva, 1998); (Roy, 2001), and neo-Marxists argue the phenomenon commodifies knowledge and learners to create a transnational elite (Brown & Lauder, 2009); (Marshall, 2008). Just as the examination of cultural governmentality in the next chapter shows, globalisation brings into relief ideological narratives underpinning a regime of neoliberal rationality. For example, in a curriculum such as social studies, the range of topics studied gives a view of globalisation that reinforces neoliberal economics and a Eurocentric perspective of cultures. This has led some to argue that globalisation is ‘discourse driven’ and thus indicative of a complex ideological position, which emphasises particular normative practices: ‘the vocabulary used to frame and render globalization is endowed with the performative power to bring into being the global realities it claims to inform (Agbaria, 2011, p. 67). Furthermore, the globalised learner is expected to combine ‘cross-cultural skills’ and problem-solving competencies (Agbaria, 2011, pp. 63-64) with the study of additional languages, which thus adds a credentialed awareness of difference to economic and political governmentality.

An example of globalisation lived as political and economic governmentality is global citizenship. This specific type of citizenship largely comes as a response to neoliberal economics and its requirement for the workforce that is aware of global expectations and responsibilities. Currently, various national and international curriculum models articulate global citizenship as part of a strategy to move the learner beyond a nation’s borders (examples being the Australian Victoria State curriculum; Fieldworks International Primary Years and Middle Years curricula; Cambridge IGCSE and GCE syllabi; and the IB’s programmes). This
is not, however, without challenges and tensions. For example, a recent research commissioned by the IB (2016) identified that schools implementing one of its curricula, face difficulties articulating what it means to be internationally minded in a localised context because there is a tension between the economic imperative to internationalise and a need to fashion specific, localised identities. This tension gives rise to a need for better understandings of global citizenship and the core values it encompasses (Marshall, 2011, pp. 412-414). Some argue there is potential in building a non-economic understanding of global citizenship, one that distinguishes between educating about global citizenship, and educating for global citizenship. The former requiring a pragmatic reflection on the material realities of the term whereas the latter identifies universal criteria for being a global citizen. These are indicative of what Marshall calls the ‘technical-economic and the global social justice agendas’ (2011, p. 420), where the economic rather than the social is ascendant in the epistemology. In other words, global citizenship needs more theoretical complexity if it is to access any transformative potential over and above its current normative function. Achieving such complexity calls for a deeper epistemological acceptance of the view that knowledge is ‘relational and historically situated’ (Marshall, 2011, p. 424), and requires the learner to be continually aware, and perpetually reflective, about shifts in epistemology. It would appear, therefore, that global citizenship, by largely existing as an example of the prevalent meta-narrative of technocratic neoliberalism, faces challenges to its reinvention.

**Knowledge economy**

To begin, it is worth briefly considering the term ‘knowledge’ in an economic context because it shows that the democratisation of access to knowledge is largely driven by a financial imperative to proliferate early learning facilities and tertiary institutions and thus increasing the duration of formal education. This reality represents an increasing commodification of knowledge, which some argue means an ‘emptying’ of its content because it is now as much a material asset as it is an epistemological product. Subsequently, its power has been altered by ‘the increasing tendency to blur distinctions between the production of knowledge and its acquisition and between knowledge and skills – the latter unlike the former being something measurable and targetable – becomes a way of denying a distinct “voice” for knowledge in education’ (Young, 2009, p. 195). Such a complex view of knowledge shows how it too becomes a process of political and economic governmentality.
The concept of knowledge economics has been adapted across a range inter-related and inter-changeable terms such as: ‘transnational corporations’ (TNCs), ‘third culture kids’ (TCKs), ‘international curricula,’ ‘credential capitalism’ and ‘exclusivity.’ Furthermore, each of these plays a part in framing the discourses informing what international teachers prioritise in their practice. For example, TNCs value, more than mere academic qualifications, softer skills and an ability to blend in with cultures in ways more meaningful than a ‘tourist.’ (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 49). Evidence suggests (Zilber, 2009) that TCK’s experiential knowledge, and the international curricula they engage with, encourage the development of social intelligences. This means expatriate graduates of international schools are a comfortable fit for TNCs. In turn, more and more TNCs are targeting investment in higher education as a mechanism for developing such talent prior to recruitment (Brown, et al., 2011). Furthermore, the significance of the knowledge economy is not lost on the university system as it too enhances the prospects of international students in admissions policies. Overall, the advantages of international mindedness and related softer skills are attractive across a broad range of institutions (Brown, et al., 2011), and the knowledge economy has led to an enormous growth in schools marketing international curricula that fall into three categories:

‘First, fee-paying schools teaching to an international curriculum and comprising a predominantly expatriate composition where students are not usually citizens of the country in which the school is situated. Second, fee-paying schools teaching to an international curriculum comprising a mix of international students and those who are national citizens; and last, state schools teaching to an international curriculum based upon the international baccalaureate but with students who are national citizens’ (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 44).

Furthermore, parents are investing heavily in internationalised private education, even in the poorest countries (Tooley, 2009). According to Brown, Lauder and Ashton this growth in access has led to a ‘credential capitalism,’ whereby the marketable value of international qualifications and the financial cost of acquiring them have risen steadily over the past decade. However, this internationalisation has also created examples of educational protectionism whereby some governments or university systems attempt to limit the impact of international schooling on the national curriculum. For example, some governments impose strict quotas for local students attending international school (Korea and Thailand), or deny access to them for home nation citizens (Singapore, China). Some even go so far as to ban private schools serving the local community from using the term ‘international’ in their names and on their websites (Indonesia and China). Furthermore, certain university systems publish qualification equivalency tables that demand higher levels of performance from students presenting
international qualifications (the IB Diploma in Germany and Australia).\(^2\) As Brown, Lauder and Ashton note, where this relatively new aspect of the international education phenomena will lead remains a matter of conjecture because non-Western educational systems are becoming more nationalistic in response to educational globalisation than their Western counterparts (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 54). Therefore, the rise of the knowledge economy and the formation of a transnational class may not, according to neo-Marxist theory, be limited by education systems maintaining a nationalist agenda. Instead, knowledge economics could see the beginning of a new imperialism, built around an exclusive cadre of internationally educated leaders, equipped to assimilate across cultures but reluctant to improve the lot of a global workforce.

In considering the identity of the transnational student ‘much is said about the knowledge required by young people and about how institutions, businesses, activities and people are to be structured or ordered in accordance with certain views of knowledge, IT and new Management theories’ (Marshall, 2008, p. 150). Again, as with globalisation, technology is integral to developing curricula that serves a normative function, such as the ‘IT knowledge entrepreneur’ in Marshall. The advance of such curricula, and in the wider context educational policy, further ‘blurs the distinctions’ between content and skills and the ‘voice’ of knowledge (Marshall, 2008, p. 150). In other words, knowledge economics informs a governmentality that objectifies both knowledge and the knower, and asks the question of how to articulate ethical values when developing educational policy and curriculum. Whatever the future holds, the question remains as to ‘how different types of international student, whether national or transnational, may construe issues of identity and citizenship, on local and global levels’ (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 56). The uncertainty around this emphasises the need for classic international IB continuum schools, for example, to have ethical foundations when nurturing identity through its process of habituation.

Indeed, Marshall (2008) argues that contemporary educational discourse is dominated by epistemological claims that centre round the objectification of knowledge and the learner, which consequently reinforce the commodification of both. This negates the capacity for knowledge building and knowledge transfer to move beyond neoliberal epistemology in the process of knowledge production. Emphasising this specific rationality places social values and self-formation within knowledge economics. For Marshall, if there is freedom to be

---

\(^2\) This data is known to me in my current role as an IB administrator.
achieved it is through the humanist existentialism of Simone de Beauvoir, but acknowledges Foucault’s care for the self in arguing that

‘teachers should be more attuned to the formation of the self, which requires more than learning how to think about one’s self. Formation requires one to act well [original italics]’ (Marshall, 2008, p. 157).

This idea of acting well via a care of the self is later examined in more detail as a possible route out of the determining governmentality of knowledge economics. However, it is first necessary to identify another discourse in the governmentalities currently defining the teacher-subject in a classic international IB continuum school.

Lifelong learning

As with globalisation and knowledge economy, lifelong learning has been used for over thirty years as a catchall for multifarious concepts, often serving contradictory ideological goals. However, what is important to note when considering lifelong learning, in the context of international education, is its synchronicity with these other normative discourses, even though lifelong learning has a more intrinsic control over the subject because it is ‘constructed by and is constructing of a neoliberal governmentality’ (Fejes & Nicholl, 2008, p. 87). A brief survey of lifelong learning shows familiar tensions between humanist rationalism, emancipatory universalism, and post-structuralism. What connects these diverse perspectives is a recognition that ‘the key driver of lifelong learning is… the emergence of the knowledge economy in an era of globalisation’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, p. 94). Knowledge has become operationalized and commodified and ‘thus emerges as a crucial condition for the production of knowledge in a post-modern era’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, p. 96). This process limits ontological authenticity in the learning experience because the learner only accumulates knowledge as and when it is appropriate for a material end. The act of learning becomes solely performative, representing a crossover between the commodification of Lyotard and the governmentality of Foucault. The result of such extrinsic force limits the subject’s potential to experience emancipatory freedom in acts of learning. Furthermore, even the pluralisation of the learning imperatives does not offer potential for multiple subjectivities (Arthur, 2009); (Hinchliffe, 2006) because the knowledge economy necessitates a process of self-assessment in its regulatory marketization. The lifelong learning discourse ‘has become so complex that it defies theorization; suffice to say that in policy terms it is perceived as having become part of the neoliberal agenda’ (Arthur, 2009, pp. 819-820). However, some do try to argue that its dominance can offer an ‘emancipatory’ autonomy, which might go some way to diminishing the economisation of learning by creating an ‘auto-pedagogy’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, pp. 96-97).
However, such emancipatory potential is still jeopardized because lifelong learning is internalized as a governmentality Foucault called a ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988).

Even when lifelong learning is traced back to Dewey’s emancipatory pragmatism, where ‘humanistic ideas of a free and holistic human development’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 454) dominate pedagogy there are problems, which are returned to in this enquiry in chapter four. Furthermore, others argue the ascendancy of lifelong learning coincides with the emergence of neoliberal educational policy (Popkewitz, et al., 2006) to form ‘a privileged narrative identity communicated and strongly supported by the OECD, EU and UN together with almost all policy makers and governments.’ (Uggla, 2008, p. 212). Consider, for example, the following policy statement:

‘Lifelong learning is an overarching strategy of European co-operation in education and training policies and for the individual. The lifelong learning approach is an essential policy strategy for the development of citizenship, social cohesion, employment and for individual fulfillment’ (European Commission, 2001, p. 4).

This combines basic elements of neoliberalism and emancipatory humanism with lifelong learning to both totalize the experience of knowledge and individualize the subject’s relationship to it. Furthermore, by the turn of this century the global acceptance of such policy positions means that:

‘The borders of (vocational) training and professional life are vanishing alongside the borders between work and recreation. A boundlessness of learning that is an integral part to the flexibilization of work in post-Fordist organizations, where lifelong learning takes the place of lifelong employment’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 457).

Building on Dewey’s notion of experiential learning, Tuschling and Engemann argue we are witnessing the ‘totalization of learning’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 456), wherein learning spaces have moved beyond the traditional confines of formal schools and colleges and into all lived space. However, what may seem like an emancipatory move carries regulatory power because the ‘subject itself has to formalize the non-formal and informal by self-reporting skills and by self-describing its own condition (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 464). In other words, reflective lifelong learning becomes a disciplinary strategy that ensures the workforce meets the shifting requirements of the global economy. Indeed, Uggla goes further and suggests lifelong learning is ‘the most important strategy—the Solution—to cope with the challenges from the globalization process by supporting a rapid transition to a knowledge-based economy’ (2008, p. 213). Furthermore, such globalization is dominated by economic deregulation and the growth of digital connectivity, which reinforce the necessity to commodify both knowledge and the knower (Uggla, 2008, p. 214).

Lifelong learning also finds its way into policies governing the professional development of teachers. Simmons and Masschelein cite the Ministry of Flemish Community as suggesting:
teachers should regard their learning and the competencies generated during self-directed learning processes as a kind of capital or added value for their professionalism as well as for the productivity of the school and the educational system in general’ (Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 52).

This, they argue, has led to an ‘entrepreneurial self’ who carries out a ‘particular form of self-government or a way to practice freedom that implies the formation of a particular subjectivity’ (Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 54). Such an ontological dimension is also identified by Popkewitz when aligning lifelong learning with Kantian cosmopolitanism to challenge the commodification of knowledge and the knower (Popkewitz, 2008, pp. 75-76). However, simply repositioning the learner as entrepreneurial, or even cosmopolitan, does not do enough to move the subject beyond the strictures of governmentality because educational theory continues to draw on neoliberal rationality.

An advocate of exploring the potential of cosmopolitanism is Naomi Hodgson who blends globalization, knowledge economics and cosmopolitanism to consider how together these provide a narrative of citizenship education (Hodgson, 2009, p. 180). She aligns cosmopolitanism’s popularization with the growing urbanization of a globalized populace living in cities that are multicultural hubs.

‘The construction of cosmopolitanism in this context corresponds to a desire for a particular standard of urban living, involving not only particular leisure pursuits and consumption activities but also proximity to work’ (Hodgson, 2009, p. 184).

This highlights the depth of governmentality in modern urban existence. Political and economic processes normalise behaviours and ways of being, which in turn determine the subjectivities found in these cities. Many see globalization, knowledge economics and lifelong learning as key meta-narratives in the epistemology of neoliberalism, with each meeting the criteria of Foucault’s governmentality, which further reinforces an epistemology determined by liberal political science and economics. This governmentality not only represents the scientification of education but also describes its development as a bio power and technology of the self. Moreover, it reveals the role formal education plays in the commodification of knowledge and the knower. Institutional learning builds systematized economic principles into both what is learned, and how it is learned, which thus determines the scope of rationality in an increasingly homogenised global cityscape. An urban cosmopolitan existence requires the subject maintain a desire to continually acquire new skills and competencies, and an awareness that their accumulation brings market value, social recognition and wellbeing because it represents a mastery of the self (as an object of knowledge). Or put it another way, totalizing governmentality provides access to a ‘stable’ model of subjectification. This Cartesian extension is examined in the final chapter of this enquiry as part of an argument to replace subjectification with the notion of subjectivation, which offers scope for an alternative moral
being for the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school. However, here it is worth noting that some commentators have examined the psychological pressures of this governmentality in the context of the international school, and argued that it represents a microcosm of the power discourses found more widely in today’s globally connected world (Caffyn, 2011, p. 66). A biopolitics of disciplinary normalization enacted by a mobile international faculty and leading to values being compromised by ‘transnational agendas and self-interest’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 68), which, it is argued in this enquiry, align with an emotivist subjectivism.

*Educational standardization as a process of normalisation*

Considering two examples from evaluative frameworks in international education offers further concrete examples of emotivist morality, this time embedded in the governmentality of such education’s standardization of both teacher and student practice. In his essay on the standardisation in educational practice (2015) Noah Sobe states that ‘educational accountability’ is a form of governmentality that has rapidly moved beyond national borders, and into the policies and practices governing international schools (2015, p. 137); (Sobe, 2012, p. 84). With the growth of authorising organisations and accrediting agencies (International Baccalaureate, Council of International Schools, Western Association of Schools and Colleges and New England Association of Schools and Colleges, to name a few), the monitoring of schools has become a transnational enterprise. Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2011), argue that the pressure to offer an international learning experience has led to an explosion in the number of schools either importing international curricula or accreditation methods (examples from the IB being Malaysia, Australia, Ecuador). Each authorising or accrediting body uses evaluative standards and practices when assessing a variety of practices including internationalism. Furthermore, each capture core accountabilities that define a similar aspirational identity centred round lifelong learning, global citizenship and international mindedness. All use accountability measures that include cycles of internal community self-reflection and external evaluation by teams of visiting educators (usually every five to eight years).

This is indicative of:

‘a global trend towards increased self-organising reflexivity in the self-description and self-observation that schools’ systems are required to engage with accountability as a ’monitoring of

---

3 Again, the data here is drawn from my current role with the IB.

4 This view is supported by research commissioned by the IB for internal use only.
monitoring’ [author’s italics], which normalises particular ‘behaviours, preferences, habits, representations and forms of reflection’ (Sobe, 2012, p. 83), but also runs the danger of developing cultures of ‘audit complicity.’ In other words, building performative environments where educators play certain roles, which are guided and endorsed by evaluative standards and practices that embody principles that reinforce neoliberal rationality and market values. Being a classic international IB continuum school, for example, requires that ‘the school community demonstrates an understanding of, and commitment to, the programme(s)’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2014, p. 3) as part of its evaluation cycle every five years. This process of gathering accreditations means whole school communities engage in an accumulation of ‘credential capital’ in ways not so dissimilar to that of the students they teach. In other words, to marketize the learning environment, school communities self-assess against a set of global standards that articulate and value practices drawn from neoliberal rationality. Recently, many of these accrediting bodies have begun working together to ensure alignment between each other’s standards and practices as more and more become partners in framing what a school must value.⁵ A primary driver in such collaborations is a desire to limit the frequency of self-evaluation and external scrutiny, but this also to some degree homogenises these bodies evaluative practices. Such behavioural homogenisation produces what Stichweh calls ‘eigencultures,’ wherein a globalised culture evolves, ‘which can in no way be reduced to the traditional regional cultures of the world’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 137). In other words, these accreditation systems reinforce normative practice in schools across a wide range of cultural contexts. Or seen another way, common sets of definitive standards and practices guide schools seeking to internationalise by focusing on globalisation, knowledge economics and lifelong learning in ways that reinforce the governmentality of neoliberalism. This process of standardisation determines teacher values drawn from a specific epistemology, which prioritises certain political and economic rationalities. However, the notion of eigencultures also offers a tool for escaping this, which is returned to in the last chapter of this enquiry. With eigencultures in mind, it is argued here that accreditation standards and practices develop as a set of universalisms in the truth-making of a school. Consequently, the governmentality of international school standards and practices have an emotive ontological impact on the educator-subject because their defined preferences potentially limit understandings of being international, which in turn influences professional and personal values.

⁵ Again, as part of my work I am the IB’s representative developing on such agreements.
The second example of governmentality’s influence on the international teacher-subject, is the growth of international testing and global benchmarking (examples include ACER International Schools Assessment and OECD PISA). Kamens and McKeely argue such assessments are the result of incorporating normative management models that ‘fuel the belief that there are standard solutions to education problems’ (Kamens & McNeely, 2010, p. 14), and identify two elements which are worth considering here. Firstly, global testing and benchmarking ‘legitimates international efforts to make mass education more accountable to society’ (Kamens & McNeely, 2010, p. 11) in ways that are relational to accreditation standards and practices. Secondly, international testing and benchmarking represent a scientification of student performance, which ‘contributes to the sense of a rationalised global world’ (Kamens & McNeely, 2010, p. 11). Seen together, accreditation standards and practices and international testing and benchmarking reinforce a governmentality that regards ‘best practices’ and ‘desired outcomes’ as powerful mechanisms for validating knowledge and the knower. Sobe adds to this by declaring that ‘the focus on monitoring performance, self-description, self-observation and the translation of such to other domains suggest a form of global governmentality that is itself mobile and heterogeneous’ (Sobe, 2015, p. 146). Consequently, this raises the question of what the learning repercussions are for communities ‘where individuals rub up against ascribed identities, where behaviours and competencies deemed meritorious are rewarded and where structures of oppression and/or liberation might be produced and reproduced’ (Sobe, 2015, p. 135). To explore this a return Caffyn’s insights into the day to day realities of teaching in this environment is useful.

In *International Schools and Micropolitics* (2011), Caffyn draws upon a theory of psychodynamics in school management (James, et al., 2006), to argue that the reality of international schools is a micro political one. His suggestion is that psychodynamics and micropolitics are enacted in the individual teacher through a mixture of ‘emotions and politics’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) that become intensified in these schools’ rarefied environments. ‘International schools and their communities can become isolated from their immediate locality and from their homelands. This can, in turn, intensify relationships due to limited social possibilities and both psychological and linguistic isolation’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 73). This reality creates specific identities for the educators because of the tensions between expatriate, international and local narratives and a sense of cultural displacement (Caffyn, 2011, p. 72). It is possible to argue that this means performing multiple identities becomes an ontological
imperative for the teacher-subject. In other words, the educator must be many people to navigate the multifarious, and often contradictory, values found in each international posting. As Caffyn asserts:

‘Each school and its cultures are a unique maze of power relationships, environmental pressure, personal histories and significant events. When assessing the concerns of an international school, these factors can take on a much stronger significance. Fragmentation, personality, national culture, isolation and market pressure add to this. Within this are formal and informal group structures; formal groups based on departments and divisions, informal groups based on variables such as culture, socialisation, nationality, interest, family structure and job-position’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71).

Conclusion

While not in disagreement with this summary of the micro-political reality of these heterotopias, Caffyn’s analysis is limited by a psychological methodology and its focus on identity. The approach does not fully grasp the ontological significance of this cultural displacement, nor the extent to which neoliberal rationality governs the values of these teachers. In other words, seeing only the psycho-political self means that Caffyn’s view does not identify the extent to which extrinsic governmentality influences the ontological and moral dimensions of the teacher in such schools. A focus on ‘fragmentation’ uncritically accepts a singularity for the self that remains unaffected by discourse, and thus maintains a Cartesian dualism that reinforces neoliberal emotivism and the subject’s objectification. The limitations of this view support the need for a more philosophical consideration of the international teacher-subject and her ontological formation. Doing so will reveal that this specific ontology is governed by both a neoliberal discursive reality and an emotivist morality, which challenge the general values of the education model under examination. However, before fully evaluating the impact of this normative reality on the international teacher-subject, it is necessary to consider some more fundamental forms governmentality. While appreciating that the separation of governmentality into epistemological strands can appear an over-simplification, the suggestion is that the extrinsic political and economic governmentalities examined in this chapter are largely concerned with the teacher’s professional self. In the next chapter, the focus shifts to consider governmentalities that are interpreted as having more of an intrinsic influence on the personal life of the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school.
Chapter 3
The cosmopolitan condition as an intrinsic governmentality

‘Cosmopolitanism serves as a name for the ever-shifting, ever-vibrant space in which persons fuse openness to the new with loyalty to the known in an educationally transactive manner’ (Hansen, et al., 2009, p. 592).

There is a plethora of debate surrounding wider use of the term ‘cosmopolitan,’ this chapter limits itself to reviewing how it is used in the literature of international education. On the one hand, doing this summarises some of the contemporary problematisations of the term, but more importantly identifies the interrelationship between cosmopolitanism and this enquiry’s core heuristics of heterotopia, governmentality and neoliberalism. Additionally, an overview of the literature shows the extent to which the ontology of the international educator is determined by a neoliberal rationality and emotivism, which is at odds with the multiplicitous nature of cosmopolitanism. However, before examining cosmopolitanism in international education literature, a case needs to be made to accept it as the most valid term for describing cultural governmentality as lived by the international educator. Doing this means considering the alternative terminologies used to describe the international, as opposed to national, educational reality. For example, ‘internationalism,’ ‘multiculturalism,’ and to a lesser extent, ‘globalisation’ are all common terms used to capture the specificities of the international education experience. Therefore, instead of discriminating between terminologies, the aim here is to argue that cosmopolitanism best encapsulates relevant elements from all the terms used as well as emphasising the importance of difference as a way of being. In other words, utilising cosmopolitanism as a generic term for the being of the international teacher-subject is not a move to replace the other terminology, it is simply to argue that its conceptual flexibility means it is better suited to considering the ontological impact of cultural governmentality.

On terminology

The notion of a cosmopolitan self has been posited in international education theory for several years. For example, Konrad Gunesch, in an early edition of IB Research Notes (2004), attempted to expand the ‘typology’ of educational internationalism by drafting a set of criteria, which identifies cosmopolitan elements in international education. From his criteria, ‘the global and the local’ and ‘metacultural position’ (Gunesch, 2013, p. 3) are particularly interesting because they position cosmopolitanism as being a more expansive concept than ‘internationalism.’ Furthermore, his emphasis on the tension between global and local implies a spatiality reminiscent of Massey and this enquiry’s earlier use of heterotopia. This ‘straddling’ of global and local means ‘the cosmopolitan consciously values, seeks out and tries
to access local cultural diversity’ (Gunesch, 2013, p. 175). Gunesch envisages cosmopolitanism as a continuum of experience that different people occupy at different points in their lives, which in turn develops their local and global ‘meta-cultural’ awareness as international individuals. This ‘open-minded engagement with cultural diversity could be described as “attitude”, a subjective characteristic of a cosmopolitan person’ (Gunesch, 2013, p. 175). He argues it is this ‘glocal’ reality that situates the values and judgments formed during an international teaching experience. In other words, the material reality of the experience has a normative effect upon the teacher and is thus a form of cultural governmentality.

Gunesch’s argument for adopting of the term in international education theory relies on emphasising the cultural impact of being a cosmopolitan who is ‘rooted’ to a national identity, the discursive tension of which creates a special critical self-awareness (Gunesch, 2013, p. 178). Unlike, for example, internationalism with its semantic connections to ‘national,’ which limits any critical examination of new cultural experiences and values it may develop (Gunesch, 2013, p. 178). From a hermeneutic perspective, using ‘internationalism’ to describe the particularities of the international educator’s experience is restrictive because of its connotative relationship with ‘national.’ This historical semantic legacy undermines its efficacy when trying to critically engage with the tensions and differences characterising this style of life. Whereas, cosmopolitanism allows for a more flexible conceptual framework for understanding the educator’s reality than the static institutional hegemony offered by ‘internationalism.’ Furthermore, the discourse of internationalism more obviously reinforces the economic governmentality of ‘globalisation,’ which also restricts its critical use (Cambridge & Thompson, 2004).

Another common term encountered in this field of study, and one often misrepresented as interchangeable with cosmopolitanism, is ‘multiculturalism.’ However, it too demonstrates conceptual limitations because its connotative genealogy implies a specific epistemology. James Donald (2007) makes a similar argument to Gunesch when considering theoretical applications of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. He argues for combining the connotations attached to each concept:

‘Cosmopolitanism laced with multiculturalism may... offer a way of thinking beyond the opposition between ‘local’ and ‘global’, or between ‘particular’ and ‘universal’. Multicultural cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitan multiculturalism) makes it possible to conceptualise each term as simultaneously constitutive and disruptive of the other’ (Donald, 2007, p. 292).

To reinforce this view, he recalls Stuart Hall’s definition of a multicultural society in which people can have differing group identities but remain appreciative of the difference of others (Donald, 2007, p. 292). Moreover, this also echoes Modood’s ‘mode of integration’ (Modood,
2015), which sees the multicultural individual situated in the governmentality of traditional political and economic institutions. However, as with internationalism, it arguably still constricts the individual’s ontological potential to adapt to diversity in an international context. Instead, it is better to see multiculturalism, and its politicising effects, as a ‘sub-set’ of cosmopolitanism rather than a way of sharpening the meaning of the latter. Furthermore, any tendency to jump between internationalism, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism must be resisted because this perpetuates the semantic confusion that appears to define so much of the academic discourse of international education. Put simply, whatever term is used to define the experience of international education reinforces, to some extent, narratives of governmentality. Cosmopolitanism, however, has the advantage of capturing most of the diverse strands of governmentality defining the cultural experiences of the international teacher.

Of course, the literature of cosmopolitanism is itself characterised by wide-ranging and multifarious definitions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine some of these in detail as a way of aligning it with a valid definition of cultural governmentality in an international context. However, it should be borne in mind that cosmopolitanism, seen as a unifying term for this experience, means it becomes all things to all people. As David Hansen (2010) suggests, cosmopolitanism has ‘the capacity to fuse reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known’ (2010, p. 153). But, he remains sceptical that a wholesale adoption of cosmopolitanism will mean a ‘trajectory’ that provides a conceptual unity. Instead, it must represent the post-structural and post-modern ‘fact’ that as a term, it remains in a perpetual state of flux because of processes of criticism and re-evaluation:

‘These facts help account for why scholars deploy so many different qualifiers to capture their foci and questions. The distinctions range from “actually existing” and “rooted” cosmopolitanism to “discrepant,” “environmental,” “layered,” “realistic,” “aesthetic,” “embedded,” “postcolonial,” “situated,” “banal,” “abject,” and “vernacular” cosmopolitanism’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 152).

Furthermore, he argues that cosmopolitanism’s pluralism ‘provides the non-ideological precision that Aristotle long ago advocated with respect to concepts and their relation to the objects of inquiry’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 153). In other words, any unifying value cosmopolitanism has rests in its interpretive pluralism, and not in using it as a discursive strategy to reinforce a specific epistemology.

Hansen provides an excellent summary of the many contemporary adaptations of the term and suggests there is a cultural movement from East to West in its philosophical usage (Hansen, 2010, p. 153). As does this enquiry, he develops Kleingeld and Brown’s four taxonomies of cosmopolitanism (political, moral, cultural, and economic) because they ‘serve
heuristic functions rather than constituting rigid theoretical or practical boundaries’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 156). As argued in the introduction to this enquiry, these seemingly indiscriminate taxonomies can be expanded to offer a more critical evaluation of the main governmentalities exercising normative influence on the ontology of teachers in a classic international IB continuum school.

In the previous chapter, the argument was that economic and political governmentalities generally exercise extrinsic influence on the professional life of the subject. Here, however, the aim is to suggest that cultural governmentalities has a more intrinsic influence on the personal life of the international teacher-subject. Or, to put it another way, cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988) in the context of these classic international schools. To better grasp the ontological implications of such a technology in the context of the international teacher-subject, it is necessary to examine cosmopolitanism’s genealogy because it highlights certain philosophical assumptions regarding difference and otherness, which it is necessary to highlight in scrutinising this ontology.

On genealogy

By drawing out both analytical and critical philosophical interpretations it is possible to appreciate the distinctive influences each has had on the concept of cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, the essentialism of analytical thought maintains the self as a conceptual singularity, whereas critical theory emphasises a self, defined by the pluralities of discourse. Therefore, looking at cosmopolitanism in a critical rather than analytical way opens wider understandings of difference, and thus improves cosmopolitanism’s scope as a heuristic model describing the cultural governmentalities found in international education. This supports the argument that experience of difference, in the form of cultural displacement, is a determining factor in the ontological life of an international teacher-subject. Before going on to expand on this, however, it is necessary to briefly identify the two philosophical positions round which most contemporary cosmopolitanism theory gathers. One is Diogenes’s kosmo politês, which is commonly translated as ‘citizen of the world,’ and the other is a position outlined in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (2006). By examining the use of each in contemporary analytical and critical cosmopolitan theory, the extent of their influence on moral and cultural thinking becomes clear.

The vibrancy of the concept kosmo politês is reflected in the diversity of its use across both schools of philosophy. An interpretation most pertinent to this enquiry, however, is Torill Strand’s description of cosmopolitanism as being;
'on the one hand, a way of the world, a condition, an evolving and extremely complex social reality, and, on the other hand, a way of seeing the world, a form of consciousness, an emerging paradigm of social and political analysis’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 231).

She goes on to identify the four discourses in cosmopolitan theory as moral, political, legal and cultural (Strand, 2010b, p. 233), before using these heuristics to plot a theoretical lineage from Arendt, to Lyotard, to Beck. This brings her to what she calls ‘the cosmopolitan condition,’ which combines ‘society’ and ‘a way of life’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 230). However, because each of these terms evoke universalising metanarratives, she remains cognisant of their normalising effects, which to a degree maintain cosmopolitanism as a form of neoliberal governmentality (Koczaniwicz, 2010); (Todd, 2010).

This reveals the struggle between traditional understandings of cosmopolitanism and emergent ones, and Strand argues this can be used as a strategy to escape their normative functions (Strand, 2010b, p. 230). Of the two, it is her definition of the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ as a ‘way of life’ that is of most interest here because it focuses on being-in-the-world (self-identity) rather than the-world-of-beings (social identity). In other words, Strand’s cosmopolitanism as a ‘way of life’ recalls both Foucault’s ‘technology of the self’ and a ‘care of the self,’ which is examined later in this enquiry. Strand’s argument that ‘way of life’ can positively impact on the cosmopolitan condition does not, however, have the expansive hermeneutic characteristics of Foucault’s care of the self. Indeed, she acknowledges the problem with using it as an emancipatory strategy for the cosmopolitan condition is that it remains trapped, by its linguistic connections to an epistemology that reinforces the hegemony of a Cartesian ontology. Later, a form of reflexive practice is discussed as a strategy that helps the concept ‘way of life’ escape such determinism. In other words, use of a reflexive practice, situated in a virtues-based moral framework, as a way of building a cosmopolitan way of life that is more resilient to the governmentalities of neoliberal rationality than that presented by Strand.

However, Strand makes one other distinction of the cosmopolitan condition that is worth briefly considering. She suggests there are both ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ motivations behind becoming cosmopolitan, and cites a traveller’s blog in a vivid attempt to argue that reflective text production reinforces such motivations (Strand, 2010b, p. 231). Her point being that while some may voluntarily choose a cosmopolitan life others have it forced upon them by economic or political necessity. While less extreme than Strand’s political refugee example, similar motivations do factor in the decision making of an IB teacher. Many become cosmopolitan teachers for economic (and occasionally political) reasons and their experiences, when placed in the values-based heterotopia of an international IB continuum school, indicate
a need to actively reflect with their students on ethical dilemmas caused by the increase in
global migration. Interestingly, Strand also cites research that suggests parents of children in
an international education regard cosmopolitanism as an important social capital (Strand,
2010b, p. 232), which aligns with the previous chapter’s emphasis on ‘credential capital’
(Brown, et al., 2011); (Ossewaarde, 2007). The research identifies two attitudinal parent
groups: “‘dedicated cosmopolitans’” who value the moral implications of such a learning
environment, and “‘pragmatic cosmopolitans’” who merely see the social utility of an
international education for their children (Weenink cited in Strand, 2010b, p. 232). These
distinctions, however, are more accurately represented as two ends of a continuum of
motivational drivers to be ‘international.’ This continuum is applicable to teachers because
some seek international school teaching positions as a form of reputational capital providing
access to an economically privileged expatriate existence, while others seek an affirmation of
core humanitarian values through its life-enriching experience.

Before moving to consider Kantian cosmopolitanism, there is one final element of
governmentality attached to Diogenes, and it centres on the etymology of the term kosmo
politēs and its relationship with space. ‘The “cosmos” of cosmopolitanism is no geographically
innocent signifier’ because its Greek heritage and ‘planetary yearnings [that] normalize
universality as an extension of Eurocentric modernity’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 80). Tariq Jazeel argues
our ‘Apollonian’ worldview means that imperialist narratives are inherent in cosmopolitanism,
which surface in the moral and cultural values to be found in international education. As with
Strand, Jazeel sees kosmo politēs as a struggle to assert a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ (Strand,
2010a). However, unlike Strand Jazeel believes the struggle is a semantic one drawn from the
colonial heritage of geography, and argues for ways to rejuvenate cosmopolitanism by drawing
on non-Western traditions of spatiality (Strand, 2010b); (Jazeel, 2011, pp. 86-87).

Both Strand and Jazeel consciously use metaphor to develop multiple understandings
of cosmopolitanism as a strategy to avoid universalising its meaning. Interestingly, such fluid
definitions of cosmpolitanism offer innovative ways of ‘naming and reading the world,’ and
new conceptualisations of the term itself (Strand, 2010b, p. 235). This follows on from
Aristotle’s definition of ‘metaphor’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 235), in that cosmopolitanism includes
what it is not alongside any analogous assumptions of what it is. It is a semantic strategy that
allows conceptual flexibility and forces difference to the forefront of any consideration of
otherness at the ontological level. ‘The metaphor of cosmopolitanism concurrently emphasises
difference and resemblance’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 236). This relationship between name and
metaphor creates a ‘paradox’ that essentially forms
‘an argument where the premises are true and the reasoning appears to be correct, but the conclusions contradictory or mutually excluding’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 236).

Strand’s return to such Aristotelian paradoxes suggests new learning (Strand, 2010b, p. 237) and highlights the educative potential of cosmopolitanism, which can move it beyond cultural governmentality.

‘The education happens as the metaphor proposes an impossible image of the world as concurrently “cosmopolitan” and “not cosmopolitan”. The paradoxical attribution of the new cosmopolitanism therefore not only surprises and bewilders, it also opens possibilities of learning something radically new’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 239).

Cosmopolitanism, seen as name and metaphor, enables ‘symbolic representations with epistemic functions’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 240). This potentially has normative influence in the heterotopia of an international IB continuum school. If used reflectively by the teacher-subject such normativity has the power to influence the dominant neoliberal epistemology:

‘The vital work of cosmopolitanism is not in the ways in which it may contribute to a growth of knowledge; rather, the vital work is in the ways in which the new cosmopolitanism institutes radically new modes of learning, and thus completely new ways of experiencing, seeing and knowing a globalised world of change’ (Strand, 2010b, pp. 240-241).

Jazeel arrives at a similar interpretation of kosmopoliteús to Strand but from a very different trajectory. He employs geographical heuristics to reconfigure cosmopolitanism to escape a spatiality (planetary) that is genealogically European, colonial and universalizing (Jazeel, 2011, p. 77). To avoid this, he suggests,

‘creating conceptual space for the recognition of ontological diversity in the space-times of the here and now, as well as for forging trans-local relationalities’ (Jazeel, 2011, pp. 78-79).

The traditional Apollonian worldview, he argues, is problematic because it suggests ‘common humanity.’ Here, he aligns with Cosgrove who suggests traditional views of cosmopolitanism maintain universalising ethnocentric liberalism, which can only ever contextualise the difference of the other by using ‘imperialist’ terms of reference (Jazeel, 2011, p. 84). To subvert such discriminatory discourse, he posits strategic use of the term ‘planetarity’ as a semantic device that can reinterpret our cosmopolitan worldview:

‘The challenge planetarity poses is the work of grasping the aesthetics and actualities of incommensurable differences from their own insides out, because it is that hard and uncertain work without guarantees that decentres the “we” beholden to the cosmopolitan dream of a rationally knowable universality’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 89).

Therefore, using the term ‘planetarity’ allows for non-Apollonian conceptions of the world. In other words, by not seeing the planet and its peoples as a singular, harmonious totality, in the Nietzschean sense (Nietzsche, 1962), theory can ‘unlearn’ cosmopolitanism on the path to a more egalitarian version of it. This view, Jazeel attributes to Massey and her efforts to describe the governmentality regulating cosmopolitan space.

This view, Jazeel attributes to Massey’s and her efforts to describe the governmentality
regulating cosmopolitan space.

As briefly mentioned in the opening chapter, Doreen Massey (2005) critiques the ‘false counter position’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 91) of time-space, by arguing that it encloses spatial conceptions within determining rationalist temporality. Traditional counterpositioning theory reinforces a Cartesian dualism in which historical time is as perceived as dynamic and space as static. By extension, the self is also conceived of as an inert object of knowledge, which perpetuates a harmonious Western view of ontology seen through the eyes of the coloniser. Massey subverts this humanism by asserting the multiplicity of space, and consequently subjectivity itself. This view, and her notion of ‘throwntogetherness,’ represent for Jazeel an opportunity to rethink metaphors of the cosmopolitan space in ways that allow for multiple concepts of space, which form a matrix of ‘trajectories,’ each with their own temporality. Seen through Massey’s lens cosmopolitanism gains ‘alternative language and spatial imagination’ (Jazeel, 2011, pp. 91-92), meaning being-in-the-world (self-identity) and the-world-of-beings (social identity) can be regarded as reflective spaces within other spaces. In other words,

‘the point of a “global sense of place” is to live in the imagination of the knowledge that the unique characters of places are always constituted at, and as, the intersection of all these mobilities’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 92)

and integral to the formation of a reflective self. This view supports the earlier use of Massey to articulate Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, in the context of classic international schools under examination. They represent examples of reflective spaces within the ‘other spaces’ of their geographical location and culture. In the concluding chapter of this enquiry, this understanding of the reflective capacity of space is expanded to identify a specific community of practice, but for now it remains as a point of reference describing the cosmopolitan experience in an international IB continuum school.

Interestingly, when Martha Nussbaum employs a similar approach, Zelia Gregoriou uses Derrida to attack what she identifies as its universalising neo-Kantianism:

‘What cosmopolitanism needs to borrow from culture is not the natural sentiment of communal identification but the ethical passion of endurance, endurance of difference; not the familiarity with and mutual respect for the other’s difference but the difference of an impossible codification and representation of the other in our familiar categories’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 257).

In her essay, Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of Cosmopolitanism (2003), Gregoriou plots a genealogy for the term ‘hospitality,’ a core concept in most Kantian cosmopolitan theory. In doing so she shows how hospitality plays out in numerous efforts to universalise cosmopolitanism. By tracing a lineage from Diogenes and the Cynics, to the Stoics, to Christianity, to Kant and on to Nussbaum, she identifies the shifting meanings of hospitality within a narrative of theoretical universalism. She argues modifications of the term move
understanding from the Greco-Christian moral obligation to be hospitable, to Kant’s hospitable law, and finally to Nussbaum’s declaration that hospitality is a universal human right. Gregoriou counters such universalism by returning to Derrida’s (2000) argument to replace ‘hospitality’ with ‘home’ as a strategy that highlights the social nature of the tensions found in cosmopolitanism:

“I should respect the singularity of the Other and not ask him or her that he respect or keep intact my own space or my own culture… I have to accept if I offer unconditional hospitality that the Other may ruin my own space or impose his or her own culture or his or her own language” (Bennington, 1997).

Gregoriou suggests this repositions the self as a fundamentally social entity, thus highlighting the conflicts inherent in pre- and post-Kantian cosmopolitanism with its focus on ‘unconditional hospitality and the laws of hospitality’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 264). Additionally, Derrida recognises the fundamental importance of difference when considering both the social and ontological impacts of cosmopolitanism, a fact that is limited by maintaining Kantian understandings of hospitality. Seen this way, the genealogy of Kantian ‘hospitality’ is another example of cultural governmentality in the theoretical discourse of cosmopolitanism.

When considering the educational impacts of this universalised view of hospitality through the liberalizing strategies of Martha Nussbaum (1997), Gregoriou argues:

‘One cannot develop cosmopolitan thinking simply by cultivating ties of recognition and concern for other human beings or by inspiring sympathy for distant lives through narrative imagination. Territorializing cosmopolitan education to such a list of competences and inter-cultural experience to knowledge of the other, like “cosmopolitics,” remains oriented to the “challenges” of global connection but also faithful to its economical logic: it works within the logic of efficiency, advantage competitiveness, quantification; it preserves its alibi of humanitarianism’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 264).

This perspective clearly calls to mind the example given in the introduction of this enquiry, where the cultural normativity and altruism experienced by international students reinforce a neoliberal tendency towards emotivism by making humanitarian values a matter of opinion rather than a moral view informed by objective rationality. This enquiry suggests that the IB’s values-based model is an example of this because it has no explicit moral foundation. The argument is that it is imperative a values-based learning environment explore the moral conflicts found in idealisations such as ‘universal peace’ or ‘a common humanity’ with a coherent moral reasoning. Indeed, Gregoriou argues that education’s social function is to ‘cultivate respect for the Other and accept the possibility of a certain assimilation by the Other’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 264). This is a sentiment echoed in the IB’s mission statement, but nonetheless it should be recognised as a process of conflict recognition and not resolution. In
other words, cosmopolitanism is fundamentally an appreciation of the antagonistic reality of cultural difference. Later, this enquiry presents a form of Aristotelian virtue theory that can morally frame such an appreciation. However, before fully illustrating this, it is worth considering whether the genealogy of Kantian universalism can be used without recourse to cultural governmentality.

Returning to David Hansen, it is suggested that ‘cosmopolitanism presupposes rather than replaces cultural diversity’ (Hansen, 2008, p. 294). Moreover, cosmopolitanism recognizes the historic injustices of imperialism and colonialism that gave rise in the first place to the multicultural idea (Hansen, 2008, p. 291). Subsequently, multicultural awareness leads back to the universalisation of the term hospitality. Hansen employs Pascal Bruckner in his attempt to argue for replacing ‘hospitality’ with ‘home’ because the latter offers not only ‘multiple forms of place’ but also ‘a physical locale… or a dynamic place of mind, attitude, and conduct with its own interlaced traditions and inheritances’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 161). Consequently, therefore, Hansen’s spatial interpretation of home again suggests that cosmopolitanism is in fact an ontology of space. Or, considered in a broader sense home

‘is physical, economic, psychological, and moral; it is the whole physical earth and a specific neighbourhood; it is constraint and freedom-place, location, and space’ (Tuan, 1991).

In other words, for the international teacher ‘home’ is an ontological dimension, a place located in the malleable heterotopia of the classic international school, and in the multiplicitous identities of the professional and personal self. As argued already, this ontological ‘location’ is dictated to by the extrinsic governmentalities of neoliberal emotivism, but the suggestion here is that cultural displacement in a cosmopolitan existence intrinsically determine ontology as a technology of the self.

Hansen argues cosmopolitanism may be universal in its influence upon the subject but it is not ‘universalistic’ because it does not describe a rational self who consciously experiences the cosmopolitan life. However, even though cosmopolitanism is ‘a kind of ongoing transrationality at work’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 161), it still runs the risk of becoming just another normative process that perpetuates the Cartesian self experiencing difference through a detached relationship with ‘place’ rather than being. Furthermore, the subject’s ‘partiality’ for understanding differences in terms of ‘life experiences,’ can turn partiality into a form of exclusion (Hansen, 2010, p. 163). Hansen argues cosmopolitanism seen as ‘home’ nurtures an empathy that ‘allows a person to be hospitable to new people, ideas, and values, and this sense emerges through particularized social life’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 164). Although interpreting cosmopolitanism as a ‘good life’ is evidence of its moral potential, the universalising of the
term restricts its hermeneutic potential to fully explore difference. Therefore, even though the assumption that a cosmopolitan education can help children ‘discern why it matters to think about human values’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 164) has obvious validity, it also suggests such values remain constant and universal. In turn, the interpretative limitations of this reinforces essentialisms which idealise a range of moral virtues. This position is returned to in more detail in the next chapter, where an argument is made instead to regard virtue as discursive and open to hermeneutic interpretation, which means difference becomes the core of moral thinking.

Hansen’s summary of contemporary cosmopolitanism also recognises the social function of formal education as not just political and economic but moral too. Furthermore, he identifies moral flourishing as reliant on a reflective process, even though he goes on to base this on a universal understanding of being human, which is a recourse to the governmentality he challenges. Or, put another way, the diversity of teacher-subjects who embody cosmopolitanism undermines any effort to have a universal sense of humanness. Therefore, a need to expand the hermeneutic potential of difference must be realised if theoretical efforts to enclose humanness are to be eluded. Later, using Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral theory, an argument is made to regard the practice of teaching as a type of virtuous being that uses reflection as a strategy to challenge the universality and determinism of neoliberal epistemology and its emotivism. However, so far, difference has emerged at the core of any effort to see the cultural governmentality of cosmopolitanism and its potential to be a strategy for overcoming the ontological parameters of the international educator. Interpretations of Diogenes and Kant reveal both humanist epistemology and the more expansive approaches of critical theory. But, even when critical theory establishes difference as a core principle, there remains an element of Cartesian rationality in the dogged singularity of the subject, and this requires further discussion before moving on to posit a moral framework that can build an alternative rationality.

On difference

Why does Cartesian essentialism seem unavoidable? The answer lies in a focus on kosmo politês, and a willingness to employ universalisms, which indicates the discursive power of Cartesian rationality. Some thinkers manage to problematise kosmo politês or our conceptions of space, while others even provide fertile grounds for identifying difference in the context of Otherness. However, even when acknowledging that the self experiences multiplicity, it is as an exteriority because at a fundamental level the subject is still objectified. This results in the self remaining at its core an immutable singularity beyond discourse. But,
there are a few critical theorists of cosmopolitanism who do open-up more multiplicitous interpretations of selfhood by adopting materialist views of the nature of difference.

For example, James Donald argues for a cosmopolitan approach to education by adapting Nietzsche’s (2001) concept of ‘homelessness’ to describe modern subjectivity (Donald, 2007, p. 294). Nietzsche uses homelessness to not only critique nationalism but also those ‘universal’ human values and rights, attributed to Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Homelessness opens the possibility of moving beyond temptations to seek a universal understanding of culture’s influence on subjectivity.

‘A cosmopolitan homelessness suggests that the texture of those affective social relationships is not given and fixed but is always experienced as an oscillation between belonging and disorientation’ (Donald, 2007, p. 294).

Nietzsche offers a route beyond Stuart Hall’s earlier suggestion that the self is fixed and localized amidst the diverse interplay of identities in a multicultural society, and thus avoids the need to define identity by continually referencing hegemonic cultural discourses. He goes on to argue that ‘diaspora’ is a defining characteristic in what William Connolly describes as the ‘agonistic respect’ of our core state of being. Thus, ‘culture is a process of ‘meaning-production and naming that always and inevitably entails — or simply is — the negotiation of differences’ (Donald, 2007, p. 296).

Donald compares Jeremy Waldron with Martha Nussbaum to find a strategy that can enable our ‘negotiation’ of difference in this context. Waldron, in recanting his earlier position on cosmopolitanism, argues that ‘cultural engagement’ is identity’s external dialectic with the Other (Waldron, 2000, p. 242). This recognition of discourse helps identify metanarratives of the ‘liberal self’ and the ‘communitarian self’ but falls short of suggesting a discursive agency in being. In his eyes, culture has a normative function at the social level but not at the ontological one. In other words, Donald’s reliance on Kant is clear in the fact the subject has a duty to engage with other cultures and a right to live her own culture, but this holding of culture at arm’s length suggests a self that is immune to the governmentality of culture. In other words, emphasizing social dialectics limits his interpretation of the discursive multiplicity of difference in this context.

To an extent, Donald appears to recognise this failing by arguing that ‘selfhood, like community, is always unsettled and in the process of conflicted negotiation’ (Donald, 2007, p. 299). To address this, he turns to Nussbaum’s definition of identity in a cosmopolitan world. He believes her return to Seneca captures ‘the oscillation between belonging and disorientation’ (Donald, 2007, p. 300), which in the broadest sense returns to Derrida’s ‘home’ and Nietzsche’s ‘homelessness.’ Cosmopolitan ontology seen from this perspective represents
at least two forms of being that Nussbaum defines as ‘two communities:’ the place of our birth and where we live now (Donald, 2007, p. 300). This is an interesting distinction when considering the international teacher and the impact of her experiences. The teacher may begin her international journey being rooted in those values assigned by birth but over time becomes aware of the contradictions these raise as she assimilates more with the values of her host culture. In the context of this enquiry, for example, the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school might begin to appreciate the contradictions that exist between the humanitarian values of the IB and the practical reality of living as an affluent expatriate in Dhaka. This realisation creates significant ethical dilemmas, which require a more coherent morality than that offered by neoliberal emotivism.

Donald’s view of communities leads to Nussbaum’s ‘human capabilities’ that effectively combine Socrates’ ‘examined life’ with Kant’s universal moral positioning, which in turn informs Nussbaum’s ‘narrative imagination’ (Donald, 2007, pp. 299-300). Donald argues that such ‘transcultural empathy’ universalises the Other, and offers instead Mikail Bakhtin’s notion of ‘creative understanding’ (Donald, 2007, p. 305) as a better way of visualising the Other because it does not attempt to ‘be’ the Other. Therefore, creative understanding shifts the theoretical emphasis away from the empathetic to the sympathetic and brings us nearer to a Nietzschean ‘homelessness’ by avoiding Nussbaum’s tendency towards universalisms.

‘In place of her cartography of a located observer getting the measure of other people and other cultures, it offers a map of interacting cultures with real but porous boundaries in which ‘our’ culture is not necessarily at the centre of the world’ (Donald, 2007, p. 305).

This has clear advantages when envisaging the cosmopolitan self as a reflexive consciousness that uses its relationship with the Other as a route to ethical being in the heterotopia of a classic international IB continuum school. Overall, Donald’s thesis drifts between cosmopolitanism being an integral determinant of selfhood and a set of external social requirements lived out by individual agents. Although he summarises several debates surrounding these views, he fails to clearly articulate how such perspectives interact with one another in the ongoing development of cosmopolitanism’s epistemology. Such a shortcoming suggests that an oscillation between belonging and disorientation determines cosmopolitan theory to such an extent that it colours attempts to comprehend the self and the other in ways beyond neoliberal rationality. To avoid this, it is worth returning to examine how pluralist approaches understand cosmopolitan subjectivity.

In her paper, Living in a Dissonant World: Toward an Agonistic Cosmopolitics for Education (2010), Sharon Todd highlights the challenges of considering cosmopolitanism in
the context of political pluralism by examining ‘agonistic cosmopolitanism.’ She identifies ‘a relative consistency’ for cosmopolitanism when supported ‘by the Kantian pillars of universal human rights and intercultural understanding’ (Todd, 2010, p. 215). Her point, incidentally, strengthening the fact that international models of education have a political ancestry going back to Foucault’s scientification of democracy. In other words,

’a dominating trend in cosmopolitan education has been to formulate the universal conditions (political, legal, and/or moral) through which co-existence can be made both more democratic and more harmonious’ (Todd, 2010, p. 215).

This aptly describes the emancipatory intent of organisations such as the International Baccalaureate, which places concepts such as ‘world peace’ and an ‘acceptance of others’ at the heart of its mission. However, Todd points out that such a universalising approach must be viewed with scepticism because the ‘agonistic’ nature of political discourse means cosmopolitanism cannot be ‘peaceful forms of living,’ rather the term that heightens awareness of ‘living in a dissonant world’ (Todd, 2010, p. 216).

She goes on to criticise contemporary cosmopolitan theories that argue for the eradication of conflict on the road to achieving a truly cosmopolitan existence. Instead, following Chantel Mouffe (2005), Todd argues this is an impossible project and rather a theoretical stratagem should be sought for embracing the contingency of conflict (Todd, 2010, p. 217). Moreover, she attacks the modernist heritage of universalising narratives of political homogeneity and liberal acceptance of difference because they represent the biggest threats facing cosmopolitanism. To counter this, she combines Amanda Anderson’s ‘intersubjective competence’ (Todd, 2010, p. 221) with Judith Butler’s suggestion that cultures are ‘complex processes of signification and articulation’ (Todd, 2010, p. 222). The result is a cosmopolitan self that is a wholly discursive construction, epistemological in shape but ontological in function. However, this self should not be understood in terms of universalized economic, cultural and political governmentalities, but rather use difference and all its implications as a theoretical starting point. This means ‘translation’ becomes the conceptual strategy (Todd, 2010, p. 223), which returns her to the hermeneutics of Derrida. To this Todd adds Bonnie Honig’s (2006) assertion that cosmopolitanism be structured around a self-reflective form of ‘hospitality’ (Todd, 2010, p. 224), which creates ‘agonistic cosmopolitics’ that effectively repudiates the political universalisms attached to traditional cosmopolitanism. In other words, Todd argues for a radicalisation of the cosmopolitan self in the face of current political and moral universalisms. However, even such a fundamental effort to emphasise the freedom of the self, must accept that identity is, to some extent, determined by rationalist governmentality. This raises questions about the extent to which such efforts to assert a cosmopolitan
Conclusion

It must be acknowledged that cosmopolitanism is a voluminous area of theory that goes beyond political, economic, moral and cultural discourses, and this chapter has only summarised arguments pertinent to the direction of this enquiry. Firstly, analysis of a denotative, criteria based approach to cosmopolitanism highlighted its relationship with the political and economic governmentalities examined in the previous chapter. Secondly, by examining the theoretical uses of Diogenes the governmentality of culture and its impact on the cosmopolitan subject were articulated. Thirdly, a genealogy of Kantian cosmopolitanism problematises its universalisms because they cannot adequately encompass difference. Finally, a summary of materialist approaches support cosmopolitanism’s repositioning as a discourse of difference, which makes a case for seeing it as a cultural governmentality determining the international educator. Consequently, the experience of cultural displacement, dominated as it is by neoliberal rationality, creates an ontological displacement that means the educator’s values can easily veer between the emotivist extremes of absolutism and relativism. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how this teacher can develop a self with values that both determine an alternative ‘education for cosmopolitanism’ and provide tools ‘to train young people for ethical and cultural lives in both local and global spheres’ (Lallo & Resnik, 2008, p. 173).

Thus far, this enquiry has made a case to regard international teaching as a specific form of living in a heterotopic space, determined by extrinsic and intrinsic discourses that have ontological consequences. This view of a specific type of international education, suggests that a normative neoliberal governmentality and emotivist morality significantly influence values-based teaching and learning in these schools. Furthermore, the intention in this chapter has been to argue that the teacher’s cosmopolitan existence represents a cultural governmentality, that reinforces the Cartesian epistemology underpinning neoliberal rationality. Even when ontological multiplicity is asserted by some cosmopolitan theory, there remains the seemingly unassailable singularity of the rational subject. Next, it is necessary to study empirical examples of ethics development that support the emotivism of neoliberal rationality, before moving on to propose an alternative moral framework that can revitalise the ethical contradictions facing the educator in these international schools.
Chapter 4

The challenge to emotivism: *phronēsis* and a care of the self

So far, the focus of this enquiry has been on forms of governmentality that inform moral behaviour without necessarily defining it. In this chapter, however, the analysis shifts its focus to moral governmentality, and making the case that current empirical efforts to describe ethical development represent both a reinforcement of neoliberal epistemology and emotivism. This process is described here as a ‘scientification’ of ethics wherein ‘moral judgments are nothing but [original italics] expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-12). It is proposed that this scientific approach to ethics widens the gap between subjectivity and moral being because it elevates governmentality’s process of objectification to the point where it externalises moral reasoning. In other words, establishing a process for ethical development using an empirical methodology represents a moral governmentality because the individual organises his or her ethical reasoning around moral behaviours determined by society. This encourages ethical being to be regarded as *only* behavioural and thus strengthening what MacIntyre identifies as the relationship between bureaucratic and individual sovereignty in contemporary society, which has led to the dominance of an emotivist morality.

On having established this view, and its impact upon the types of teacher, school and education model under scrutiny here, the chapter moves to propose that there is an alternative approach available, which uses the same reflexive pedagogy. By building an Aristotelian moral framework around teaching as a ‘virtuous’ practice, the argument is made that a style of teacher reflection is a route to a form of moral being that can avoid the subjective and governmental rationality of emotivism. The suggestion is that the reflective practice involved in a ‘care of the self’ develops the practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) necessary for a virtuous existence. In this way, reflective wisdom can guide the ethics of the IB teacher away from the emotivism that justifies contradictory attitudes and actions when faced with the incongruence of their existence in an affluent heterotopia. In other words, *phronēsis* offers a more coherent support for the humanitarian values in the curriculum they teach. However, this is only one part of the moral framework proposed as a strategy to revitalise these values and what they mean morally. In the concluding chapter, the model of *phronēsis* presented in this enquiry is linked to an Aristotelian description of ‘truth-giving’ (*parrhesia*) as a pedagogical strategy. The reason for adopting this strategy is twofold: First, *parrhesia* aligns with the IB’s habituative pedagogy and revitalises its humanitarian values. Second, by using technology *parrhesia* can extend its scope beyond
the individual school, and thus provide a way of connecting IB teachers across classic international schools. The suggestion being that this would develop reflexivity as a teaching strategy that becomes a way of ethical being in the sense Foucault intended in his description of care of the self (Foucault, 2005).

*The scientification of ethics*

‘Only if the individual is habituated, exercised, practiced in good ends so as to take delight in them, while he is still so immature as to be incapable of really knowing how and why they are good, will he be capable of knowing the good when he is mature’ (Dewey, et al., 1932, p. 201).

Arguably, in the English-speaking world at least, progressivist educational literature in the last fifty years has been hugely influenced by the empirical methodology informing John Dewey’s moral philosophy. His pragmatic view of morality foreshadows the developmental and cognitive psychology so prominent in education today. However, in some respects Dewey’s early writings are reminiscent of Aristotle in their assertion that moral education is a process of habituation, a strategy also found, for example, in the IB’s learner profile. As Dewey’s thinking evolved over the course of thirty years, he had recourse to revise his educational principles to also recognise the importance of reflective practice in his process of moral habituation (Bergman, 2005, pp. 81-89). This is important to note for two reasons: First, Dewey’s view of reflexivity has had a marked influence on the constructivism of the IB’s education model (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015), and is therefore part and parcel of an IB teacher and student’s practice. Second, this being the case, there are clear advantages in using reflective practice as a pedagogical tool when challenging emotivism.

Of Dewey’s principles (Bergman, 2005, p. 89), there are three that are of interest to this enquiry because each informs the two examples of empirical ethical reasoning considered here. His focus on ‘social intelligence’ highlights emotivism’s influence on the empiricism of psychological and biological attempts to describe moral flourishing. One example of a psychological approach is a recent collaboration between Daniel Goleman and Peter Senge, in which they suggest that organized social and emotional learning in the contemporary classroom can facilitate the construction of a moral self. They argue that the brain’s innate neuroplasticity can be manipulated to develop ‘cognitive control,’ which leads to better moral decision making.

---

6 ‘The school develops and promotes international-mindedness and all attributes of the IB learner profile across the school community’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2014)
Fundamentally, morality is a psychological skill that is exercised and refined through structured experiential knowledge, until an ‘ethical dimension’ of ontology is achieved so that ‘as we go through life, the sense that we are on course with our own values becomes an inner rudder’ (Goleman & Senge, 2014, pp. 96-97). Furthermore, in the context of school and the life beyond it is asserted that ‘good work requires enthusiasm, ethics, and excellence’ (Goleman & Senge, 2014, pp. 98-100). The links between education, lifelong learning and moral growth are strong throughout their argument and theoretically rely heavily on Dewey’s social intelligence. However, the suggestion here is this approach to moral education represents a governmentality in which:

‘The bifurcation of the contemporary social world into a realm of the organizational in which ends are taken to be given and are not available for rational scrutiny and a realm of the personal in which judgment and debate about values are central factors, but in which no rational social resolution of issues is available, finds its internalization, its inner representation in the relation of the individual self to the roles and characters of social life’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 34).

In other words, Goleman and Senge’s ethical education becomes a process of subjectification, or ‘technology of the self,’ which denies access to an objective moral rationality. It is an emotivism that undermines moral agency by, on the one hand, suggesting that ethics are constructed by individuals ‘cognitively’, while on the other, arguing that they are part of a collective intelligence. Or, as MacIntyre puts it, a process that constructs moral reason by internalising the organizational and the personal, which lacks access to an objective rationality.

It is suggested that Goleman and Senge’s strategy for moral flourishing represents one example of scientification, which albeit inadvertently, implies that moral education’s purpose is to develop compliant individuals through a process of cognitive self-management. A biological example that bears similar empirical traits is Narvaez’s ‘Triune’ approach to ethical development, which weaves neurobiology, affective neuroscience and cognitive psychology into a Darwinian map of ethical behaviourism (2008). In her essay, she argues that three ethical traits are physiologically determined. They are ‘the ethic of security;’ ‘the ethic of engagement’ and ‘the ethic of imagination,’ which together ‘arise out of biological propensities’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 96). The paper uses neuroscience and psychology to support the assertion that ethical development is empirical. The claim being that thought is embedded in both emotional and physical responses as a process of architectural brain development, which is particularly evident in children. As with Goleman and Senge, her argument is that adults are part of a process of habituation whereby desirable behaviours are modelled to ‘optimise’ ethical development in children (Narvaez, 2008, p. 98).
Narvaez embeds ethical processes in specific neurological functions and then reinforces her position by referencing Piaget’s educational psychology, which incidentally also influences the IB’s pedagogical model (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015). The ‘ethic of security’ is described as ‘revolving around physical survival and thriving in context, instincts shared with all animals and present from birth’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 99). This ethic evokes Walter Cannon’s famous fight or flight principle to argue that moral engagement relates to physical wellbeing, which is why when in physical danger humans swiftly defer moral agency and move towards a herd mentality. Furthermore, instinctiveness is complimented by the notion of ‘thriving in context,’ which can mean disastrous moral decisions are made to fit in with the wider social group (Narvaez, 2008, p. 99). Interestingly, both dispositions she situates in that most primeval area of the brain, the amygdala, and as such beyond conscious control:

‘The virtues or principles highly prized under the Security ethic are allegiance ingroup [sic] loyalty (not the loyalty of love), obedience, and self-control of soft emotion. There is nobleness in submitting to an authority figure and “completing the mission,” or accomplishing whatever goal is deemed valuable’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 100).

The discourse of Cartesian rationality runs through this empirical perspective, which uses behaviourism and biology for the scientification of ethics. It continues in Narvaez’s ‘ethic of engagement,’ which evolved in early humanity because of ‘the evolutionary demands required of Pleistocene adaptation’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 103). The neurobiological driver here is ‘attachment,’ which is said to be responsible for ‘brain development,’ ‘emotion regulation’ and ‘social and moral behaviour’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 104). For this ethic to mature successfully

‘proper care during development is required for normal formation of brain circuitries necessary for successful social engagement, cultural membership and moral functioning’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 106).

The autonomy attributed to the self, and its ability to transcend discourse through biological determinism, suggest empiricism suffers the same hermeneutic limitations as analytical philosophy. Both epistemologies maintain a singularity and autonomy for the subject that not only fails to break free of neoliberal rationality of neoliberal, but worse, continues to reinforce its hegemony.

Narvaez’s final ‘ethic of imagination,’ is situated in the frontal lobes of the brain and responsible for compassion and empathy.

‘Of most importance to morality are the frontal lobes and especially the prefrontal cortex. The frontal lobes are critical in situations of free choice or situations of ambiguity’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 107).

This ethic is a reflective mechanism employed to govern the other two and described as the ‘left brain interpreter,’ which enables the maintenance of emotional detachment when making rational and moral decisions. Furthermore, it is said to be powerfully influenced by cultural
context and the individual’s personal experiential knowledge. An example of this ethic at work would be a subject ignoring rules governing an expected behaviour or situation because a personal attachment to a set of higher principles ‘provides a means for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate relations (Narvaez, 2008, p. 111). Moreover, Narvaez’s scientification relies not only on invocations of Darwinian biology, but also calls on cognitive psychology to further its appeal to truth by linking Piaget’s ‘heteronomous and autonomous moralities’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 114) with Kohlberg’s ‘stages of morality’ (Narvaez, 2008, pp. 115-117). Consequently, ‘morality is not based on learning rules, per se. Rather, it is a matter of building physiological activation patterns’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 119).

These efforts at a scientification of ethics have been summarised to emphasise how both rely on Dewey’s assertion of the importance of the adult as guide in the process of habituation. However, the suggestion in this chapter is that this relationship can perpetuate emotivism because the empirical approach to ethical development asserts the individual rather than an objective moral reasoning. However, the proposal is that this inter-relationship might also be used to strategically build an alternative moral framework that challenges the moral governmentality of emotivism by removing its contradictions with the humanitarian values promoted in IB schools. However, before moving to draw out an alternative moral framework, a clear articulation of how emotivist morality influences the teaching and learning (and teacher and learner) found in classic international IB continuum schools is necessary. In doing so, the suggestion is that this moral governmentality undermines both teacher and student attempts to be ethically consistent. The argument is made to regard psychological and neurological attempts to understand ethical development as examples of a scientification of ethics, which reflect an emotivist approach where:

‘all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-12).

On establishing this position, the attention of this chapter turns to proposing a framework in which virtue theory and a ‘care of the self’ combine into a style of reflective practice that moves both the teacher and ethics beyond the scientification of ethics and moral governmentality.
Virtue theory as a challenge to emotivism

Moral education, as presented in this chapter so far, represents a scientification of ethical reasoning that reinforces the Cartesian subject of neoliberal rationality, and emotivism as a form of moral governmentality. MacIntyre identifies this morality as the space between the bureaucratic and the individual, where ‘all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling’ (2007, pp. 11-12). In After Virtue, MacIntyre attacks the prevalence of this emotivism by presenting a materialist view of Western moral history as the foundation of his argument to find a more valid form of moral reasoning. This is because he believed it is impossible to critique one’s own cultural epoch with only a contemporary lens, a position comparable to Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the subject considered later in this chapter. Indeed, both thinkers argue that a return to Greek philosophy is necessary to construct a reliable ethics for modern life. And, arguably like Foucault, MacIntyre sees history as providing the best lens for both scrutinising the present and suggesting the future:

‘What there is is an insistence on our need to learn from some aspects of the past, by understanding our contemporary selves and our contemporary moral relationships in the light afforded by tradition that enables us to overcome the constraints on such self-knowledge that modernity, especially advanced modernity imposes’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. ix).

MacIntyre’s Marxist view is reminiscent of Brown’s Marxist definition of neoliberal rationality, where conflict is the dynamic state of power played out through class struggle, commodification and exploitation. Whereas Foucault’s power is a dynamic energy, transcendent of any individual or social attempt to control it for political or economic purposes, power is simply the discursive energy produced by human interaction. Thus, Foucault and MacIntyre understand power differently even when they share the conviction that a history of conflict reveals the epistemological dimensions of truth.

‘What historical enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what are taken to be standards of truth and of rational justification in the contexts of practice vary from one time and place to another’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. x).

This view allows for shifts in moral understanding that are not dissimilar to Foucault’s theory of truth and its epistemological fluctuations. However, MacIntyre’s view privileges some terminology. For example, there is an assumption that the term ‘subject’ is axiomatic and this betrays an analytical reductionism that accepts subjectivity to be a rational, autonomous singularity. As already discussed, this position is untenable because all linguistic definitions are denotative and connotative, and thus contain rich networks of inherited epistemological meaning, which compete for dominance in the discourse of any historical period.
Again, like Foucault, MacIntyre returns to antiquity to find a moral worldview to construct an ethical model for living in an increasingly multiplicitous and unpredictable world. MacIntyre finds this in virtue theory with its focus on forms of practice that promote ethical being:

‘When Aristotle speaks of excellence in human activity, he sometimes though not always, refers to some well-defined type of human practice: flute-playing, or war, or geometry. I am going to suggest that this notion of a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues are exhibited and in terms of which they are to receive their primary, if incomplete, definition is crucial to the whole enterprise of identifying a core concept of the virtues’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 187).

The subject must exercise a practice to achieve particular ‘goods’ that in turn can only be attained through the pursuit of that practice. There has been much debate about MacIntyre’s definitions of practice and goods, in part because he did not regard teaching as having the goods necessary to elevate it to the status of virtuous practice. However, before examining this debate, it is necessary to more fully understand his definition of practice:

‘Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 187-188).

MacIntyre goes on to list several activities he regards as practices including many traditional academic disciplines but controversially excluding teaching itself. Furthermore, he suggests many activities that were practices in the ancient or medieval worlds, are no longer such in the late-industrial environment.

Is it the case that his reluctance to accept teaching as a practice is linked to a view that industrialised education systems with their processes of standardisation, do not allow one access to ‘goods internal to that form?’ After all, teaching in the ancient or medieval worlds with their broader definitions of scholarship as a way of being appears to meet his requisites of a practice. Therefore, is it possible to understand MacIntyre’s concept of goods a little better by considering his definition of learning? For example, in examining a child’s motivation in learning to play chess, he argues that if some external incentive, such as money, is offered there can be no ‘intrinsic’ value in learning to play well. Indeed, this strategy might even encourage a child to consider cheating as the most successful way to winning chess games. However, without extrinsic motivation the child may over time begin to realise the intrinsic values in becoming a skilful player because it allows him to exercise logic and strategic thinking as part of the ‘goods specific to chess’ and thus provides ‘a new set of reasons… for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 187). This view of goods in relation to learning resonates in the values-based educational narrative of lifelong learning that
dominates the expectations placed on the teacher in international schools. In the context of neoliberal rationality, lifelong learning is only defined by external goods like curriculum requirements or appraisal standards. However, MacIntyre’s concept of internal goods challenges the commodification of this rationality because it provides a core reason for being a teacher. Moreover, the reflexivity that is part of a values-based education encourages teachers to habituate their students to share the same virtuous relationship with learning. In other words, learning becomes more than simply grade chasing as part of a strategy for the accumulation of credential capital, it takes on an intrinsic value that challenges a neoliberal view of education.

Learning as a practice seems quite clear in MacIntyre’s chess player example, but is the chess teacher also engaging in a practice? To answer this question a consideration of what MacIntyre means by the term ‘goods’ is necessary. He breaks his definition of goods into two categories: those extrinsic to an action (money, reward, status) and those intrinsic to it. The higher the volume of intrinsic goods an activity offers, the more chance it has of meeting MacIntyre’s criteria for being a practice because such goods create a feedback loop wherein the value of the activity becomes incrementally more meaningful to one's being as one continues to practice it.

‘We call them internal for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can only specify them in terms of chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples from such games (otherwise the meagreness of our vocabulary for speaking of such goods forces us into such devices as my own resort to writing of “a certain highly particular kind”); and secondly, because they can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who lack experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 188-189).

It is interesting to note that MacIntyre sees language as inadequate for describing internal goods, hinting at the analytical heritage of his thinking and indicative of its semiotic shortcomings. Seen from the perspective of critical theory, however, such a static, denotative assumption of language is unsustainable because discourse encompasses all meaning and interpretation.

In addition to this, MacIntyre’s extrinsic goods seem only determined by competitive economic principles and thus emphasising a Marxist understanding of power and conflict. Whereas from a Foucauldian perspective, for example, the power of extrinsic goods forms part of a much larger normative discourse that defines the potential subjectivities available at any one point in time. Viewed critically, MacIntyre’s definition of intrinsic goods looks like Foucault’s ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). In other words, MacIntyre’s intrinsic and extrinsic goods, when examined through Foucault’s critical lens, become discourses of governmentality to be navigated by the subject as she searches out a route to virtue. Of course,
such a view also suggests ethical ontologies at the mercy of normative discourses that restrict moral agency, a point examined later in this chapter where it is argued that ontological freedom, and a route to alternative ethical being, are possible by means of a reflective ‘care of the self.’ However, for now it is sufficient to say Foucault’s more hermeneutic approach avoids what MacIntyre saw as the ‘meagreness’ of language because it situates practice in a post-structural framework of discursive epistemology. For MacIntyre a virtuous practice, such as architecture, combines external goods (material incentives, laws or the affirmation of others) with internal goods (the inherent values to be had by doing that practice) to develop virtue over time. Following on from this, the argument is made that values-based teaching, even though embedded in the neoliberalism of lifelong learning, globalisation and cosmopolitanism, does mean that teaching meets MacIntyre’s criteria for virtuous practice. Finally, if goods occupy a discursive function in relation to practices and consequently have a powerful normative effect on the individual subject, how does this effect the relationship between the subject and others? MacIntyre argues that ‘goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 191). However, a Foucauldian approach to this interrelationship goes further by making explicit the ways semantics determine ontology. In other words, by emphasising the interpretive and discursive reality of all goods is to argue that both the self and the practice are a dynamic socio-linguistic process.

Viewed post-structurally, MacIntyre’s theory of practice has some alignment with the epistemology of Foucault, even though each thinker comes from different philosophical traditions. For MacIntyre, it is the social nature of knowledge that leads the subject to have both explicit and implicit cultural understandings of a virtue because ‘each of these cultural codes embodies an acknowledgement of the virtue’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 193). In other words, all discourses surrounding a practice both denote cultural truths and connote a sphere of metaphor surrounding a virtue. For example, MacIntyre at one point explains how diverse cultures can have contradictory notions of what a lie is whilst having collective understanding of truthfulness as a virtue (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 192-193). Furthermore, such understanding may change over time because ‘practices never have a goal or goals fixed in time… but goals themselves are transmuted by the history of activity. It therefore turns out not to be accidental that every practice has its own history and a history which is more and other than of the improvement of the relevant technical skills’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 193-194).

This historical awareness of ‘tradition,’ he suggests, is fundamental to accessing the goods of a practice because
‘learning and the relationship to the past which it [sic] embodies the virtues of justice, courage and truthfulness are prerequisite in precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they are in sustaining present relationships within practices’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194).

This position is reminiscent of Foucault’s description of the ‘episteme’ in *Archaeology of Knowledge*⁷ wherein epistemology reveals the historical journey of institutional knowledge and society’s shifting discourses of truth.

However, before linking MacIntyre’s virtuous practice with Foucault’s care of the self to argue for an ethically reliable form of reflection, in it necessary to first consider why MacIntyre, somewhat unpopularly, denies that teaching can be a ‘virtuous’ practice. Indeed, a collection of essays was published (2004) to critique the foundations of his contentious suggestion from a variety of philosophical perspectives. The vigour with which his remark is attacked pays testament to the strength of feeling in educational philosophy that MacIntyre is wide of the mark when he declares that ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices’ (Dunne, 2004, p. 5). Furthermore, in an interview in the same work MacIntyre defends his position by suggesting that teaching is simply a ‘means to an end’ and only ever ‘for the sake of something else and so teaching does not have its own goods’ (Dunne, 2004, p. 8). This not only echoes his description of the emotivist subject, but also reinforces a view that teaching values in a neoliberal context lacks the appropriate moral foundation to ‘inculcate’ values in students.

As mentioned, there are various analytical arguments against MacIntyre’s refusal to consider teaching as a practice. However, the claim in this enquiry is that his reluctance is in fact due to his Marxist interpretation of the bureaucratization of contemporary education, which means he cannot see any aesthetic dimension to modern teaching. For MacIntyre, certain disciplines (architecture, painting and medicine), are ‘virtuous’ forms of practice because they remain resistant to the governmentality of what Foucault would call their ‘institutional practices,’ which restrict the subject’s access to the ‘intrinsic goods’ and aestheticism of the profession. Fundamentally, MacIntyre’s Marxist lens sees industrialised teaching as trapped by the general commodification of labour, a position closely aligned with Wendy Brown’s view of education in an era of neoliberal rationality (2016). According to MacIntyre, however, there are certain forms of labour with intrinsic goods and aesthetic value, and these can provide access to a virtuous existence. But, for MacIntyre, teaching is not one of these professions because modern pedagogy’s empirically standardised methodologies are a barrier to the ‘pre-

---

⁷ ‘The episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that men of a particular period cannot escape’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 191).
modern’ aesthetic principles of the profession. For him contemporary teaching is trapped beneath a glass ceiling separating instructional skills from virtues. To address this aesthetic impoverishment this enquiry, therefore, turns to Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ to argue that the contemporary teacher can have an aesthetic sensibility and authentic ethical being and thus teaching becomes a virtuous practice.

Phronēsis as a ‘care of the self’

As mentioned, both MacIntyre and Foucault return to early Greek philosophy at around the same time (early 1980s), in search of a way to revitalise contemporary morality. But, MacIntyre and Foucault return there for distinct reasons. For MacIntyre, it is to establish the relevance of the Aristotelian virtues and identify just how far contemporary culture is removed from understanding them. Whereas for Foucault, the pre-Christian era in Greek thought is the point in time when the ‘bifurcation’ of the subject took place (Foucault, 2005, p. 12). The significance of this divergence should not be underestimated, as it represents the moment when an ‘aesthetic’ of being became detached from subjectivity, subsequently causing selfhood to become the primary object for knowledge in Western culture. This, in turn, leads to the Cartesian subject and, in the context of this enquiry, the epistemology supporting neoliberal rationality.

This ‘bifurcation’ of the self was identified by Foucault in a series of lectures at the College de France between 1981 and 1982. In these hermeneutic explorations of subjectivity, he makes repeated reference to ‘care of the self’ and ‘knowledge of the self’ as being two distinct approaches to ontology (Foucault, 2005, pp. 25-39). The former he argues is a Greco, pre-Christian, process of internalised self-interpretation, whereas the latter rapidly became part of the ‘theatre’ of Christianity. Care of the self, he argues, was originally a process of reflection experienced through writing and an ongoing aesthetic of living, whilst knowledge of the self rapidly became a process that externalised the self as an object of knowledge. This objectification became internalised, and the resulting subject economised by society. Initially this process was carried out under the scrutiny of the Church, but later formed the post-Cartesian panoptic empiricism embodied by institutions such as law, medicine and psychiatry. In the process of know thy self, the subject initially was an object of guilt requiring mechanisms of punishment to govern it, however, in time this objectification was refined into a comprehensive epistemology framing an array of normative behaviours (Foucault, 2005, p. 14). The argument in this chapter is that the scientification of ethics found in Goleman and Senge, and Narvaez represent examples of such normative governmentality. In his final
lectures, Foucault argues that certain normative assumptions grew out the epistemology of the post-Cartesian Enlightenment, which is aligned with some of his earlier thinking. However, in contrast to his earlier conclusions, these lectures avoid ontological fatalism by arguing that a care of the self represents a ‘tekhne’ that escapes the corporeal/metaphysical separation of Christianity and the mind-body dualism of psychology. For him a return to a pre-Christian care for the self, enables the adoption of a proactive ontological stance as opposed to a passive one of objectification. In other words, it becomes ‘about existence’ (Fejes & Nicoll, 2015, p. 10) with an emphasis on developing an ethical aestheticism that gives its own meaning rather than the empty process of accumulating pre-determined credit for whatever comes after death.

As mentioned, Foucault identifies care of the self as a process of reflective, self-objectification though writing, but one that does not externalise the self as an object of knowledge. Instead pre-Christian care of the self, used an aesthetic stratagem:

‘Writing was not about knowing oneself and finding the truth about oneself as it was in the later Christian era. Rather, writing was about finding truths that one needed to develop good values and turn life into an art of existence’ (Fejes & Nicoll, 2015, p. 10).

What makes this strategy useful in this enquiry is that it maintains the subject’s state of flux, and so averts the scientification of moral thinking. This, however, does beg the question, what might this care of the self look like in the life of a teacher in a classic international IB continuum school? To answer this, the proposal is to elucidate Foucault’s theory by using two key concepts from Aristotelian moral philosophy. First, phronèsis (practical wisdom) is used to articulate the individual teacher’s reflexivity as a form of care of the self, and this adds a moral coherence to the ethics that evolve through its practice. Second, parrhesia (truth-giving) is developed into a method for both modelling behaviours in the classroom and within professional communities of practice.

As part of an overall analysis of Aristotelian moral theory in After Virtue, MacIntyre argues the self who is intent on attaining phronèsis (practical wisdom) must utilise reflection as a tool. And, it is worth remembering that reflection is also an attribute of the IB’s learner profile, which must be lived by the whole learning community. In other words, reflective practice is an essential part of Foucault’s care of the self, MacIntyre’s interpretation of virtue, and an IB education. The proposal here is to regard reflection as an integral element developing ‘ethical knowledge’ (Campbell, 2008) that ‘virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 149). Furthermore, reflexive practice reinforces the fact that ‘phronèsis is an intellectual virtue; but it is an intellectual virtue without which none of the virtues of character can be exercised’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 154). This distinction is significant because it supports the necessity to practice intellectual reflection
when exercising the virtues of character. In Aristotelian morality, each virtue is situated in the distinct groupings of *intelect* and *character*, and one must have both to be fully engaged in virtuous practice. However, according to MacIntyre,

‘the exercise of practical intelligence requires the presence of the virtues of character; otherwise it degenerates into or remains from the outset merely a certain cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for man’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 154).

Put in the context of this enquiry, teaching the values of an IB education without a firm moral foundation, and amidst the neoliberal rationality governing globalised learning, can lead to emotivism. Or seen another way,

‘to change the world for the better, agents need first and foremost to change themselves in respects that go beyond the internalisation or application of abstract cognitive rules or principles’ (Carr, 2004, p. 107).

This reality, Carr rightly notes, has meant that

‘educational philosophers and theorists have increasingly turned to Aristotle’s idea of *phronēsis* to ground the particularity of the judgements of teachers and other “reflective practitioners”’ (2004, p. 109).

However, Carr warns, such use of the concept does run the risk of failure if the profession cannot escape increasing pressures to standardise teachers’ practice with instrumental systems of appraisal, which interpret ‘*phronēsis* as the deliverances of more particularised skills’ (2004, p. 109). Carr’s view suggests a need to seriously value the reflective nature of teaching without trying to use traditional empirical methods to measure it because *phronēsis* must remain beyond such rationality. Moreover, his reading of MacIntyre is useful when justifying teaching’s ontological impact because he regards it as both a socio-political discourse and a moral practice in which *phronēsis* plays a key role in the determining the teacher-subject. Moreover, in a classic international IB continuum school, the teacher is nuanced by the cultural governmentality of her cosmopolitanism, whereby she internalises alternative cultural perspectives that become part of a multi-faceted, reflective self.

It should be noted, however, that Carr attacks the contemporary ‘sociology’ of educational theory, which he regards as part and parcel of critical philosophical approaches. He argues instead for a return to an earlier era when the waters of this philosophical debate were not yet muddied by semiotics. Although willing to concede that critical philosophy has established the social nature of *phronēsis*, Carr cannot acknowledge the extent to which discourse might also suggest a multiplicity for the subject. As Carr states, ‘good teachers should be widely knowledgeable, possess unassailable intellectual integrity, desire to engage the curiosity of the young in a lively and interesting way, and aspire to be the kind of moral examples to children the *anyone* should want to be’ (2004, p. 114). However, while this view is congruent with the general principles established in this enquiry for being an international
teacher, Carr’s analytical reluctance to accept that there are alternatives to Cartesian subjectivity means his ideas have distinct theoretical limitations. Instead, what is required is a model of phronēsis that allows for ontological multiplicity without falling prey to relativism. A model that can situate the international teacher amidst the governmentality of neoliberal discourse, but remain able to use phronēsis to navigate its challenges.

Moral reflexivity in the classroom

At this stage of the argument it is worth examining how such practice might look in the classroom by examining Elisabeth Campbell’s, Teaching ethically as a moral condition of professionalism. In the essay, she establishes a clear link between Aristotelian phronēsis and teaching as a practice. Moreover, she employs the phrase ‘ethical knowledge’ (2008, p. 601), to avoid the accusations of relativism that dog critical moral theory, and instead ask: ‘How can teachers conduct their work in schools virtuously?’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 603). She argues that they can do this by developing an ethical knowledge

‘rooted in the individual teacher’s moral sensibility and character, and augmented through experience by communities of professionals sharing and refining this virtue based knowledge as it is reflected daily in schools’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 603).

Her paper presents a highly practical interpretation of phronēsis that is useful when considering the contingencies of an international teacher who carries a genealogy of epistemological experiences that require a reflexivity that recognises localised cultural specificities. She suggests that heightened moral awareness should be the teacher’s perpetual state of being because of the nature of the work (Campbell, 2008, p. 603). Furthermore, she argues a teacher’s practice in the classroom and beyond is always scrutinised under a moral light and thus there is always a moral imperative in their praxis. One that requires a heightened sensibility of the self and ‘moves into the realm of practical moral wisdom, a kind of professional virtue in-action that could resemble “moral case law’’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 605).

Campbell goes on to assert that teaching has more difficulty in finding meaningful universalisms than professions such as medicine and law because of the immediacy of the classroom (Campbell, 2008, p. 604). Indeed, the educator she describes raises the question of whether the increased cultural diversity experienced in an international IB context provides more room to assert alternate ontologies than the more regulated disciplines of medicine, law or national teaching. If this were the case, is it because the heterotopic space of the international schooling continually anticipates the Other in the experience? Could it be the case that national teaching, medicine and law remain more embedded in well-defined taxonomies and
institutional governmentality? Although such a distinction between types of teaching is not noted by Campbell she recognises that ‘moral agency is a dual state’ combining a moral agent who conducts moral learning for, and with others (Campbell, 2008, p. 606). In other words, ethical knowledge is ‘reflected each time a teacher consciously reminds, admonishes, corrects, and instructs students on how their behavior affects others… it represents a sense of moral agency and moral purpose’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 607). This element of educative practice, she believes, is aspirational and unavoidable, and as such is a major part of the teacher’s moral role in society (Campbell, 2008, p. 609).

Of course, there are many examples of attempts, through policy or prescription, to impose moral curricula but this is not Campbell’s point, rather she suggests that the purpose of reflective practice is to ‘transcend normative social or cultural differences’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 609). This clearly aligns with some of the moral intentions found in the rhetoric of the IB. However, and more importantly, there are also clear links between Campbell’s ethical knowledge and Foucault’s ‘aesthetic life.’ Her argument for a critically reflexive practice, if seen as a form of care of the self, has an impact on the moral formation of the teacher’s students and thus becomes care for others too. In other words, care of the self as a form of phronësis means the teacher becomes identified with parrhesia (truth-giver) by providing care for students in the classroom. Such truth giving is not to be misconstrued as a dictatorial relationship but rather a moral gift from one free agent to another. Amidst the increasing governmentality of international education, this view of parrhesia suggests opportunities for the teacher to be someone other than the normatively determined practitioner. Even as the performative expectations of the profession increase year on year, this combination of Aristotelian virtues offers a critical approach to teaching that is transformative:

‘As a matter of professionalism, the measure of ethical teaching relies on the intentions of teachers, as much as on their influence. Their awareness of such intentions and their deliberative attention to the specificities of their daily practice as filtered through the lens of virtues and moral principles, attest to their ethical knowledge. And, ultimately, it is this ethical knowledge that is a defining characteristic of professionalism in teaching’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 613).

However, before moving to investigate the potential of parrhesia further, the chapter will close by considering how teaching as a form of care of the self might look in the specific environment of a classic international IB continuum school.

**Care of the self for the cosmopolitan IB teacher**

‘Identities are constructed within discourse, through difference and in the context of contingency and ambiguity. Whilst this may at first glance seem disconcerting, it opens up creative possibilities for political practices of ethical self-formation’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 196).
Identity, and attempts to understand it, are fundamental to any attempt to contextualise the role of the teacher (Clarke, 2009). Such work, however, encompasses three paradoxes of being. Firstly, identity, seen as a transformative journey, continues to remain a matter of becoming rather than being. Secondly, its objective reality is a matrix of discourses that constitute the shifting sands of semantic definition. Thirdly, identity automatically infers what it is not just as it becomes determined, and thus its perpetual state of difference is reminiscent of earlier considerations of cosmopolitanism.

‘Identity is at once a complex matter of the social and the individual, of discourse and practice, of reification and participation, of similarity and difference, of agency and structure, of fixity and transgression, of the singular and the multiple, and of the synoptic and the dynamic’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 189).

In considering this shifting reality, Clarke makes a convincing case for returning to Foucault’s late work on the ethical nature of being. He draws on Foucault, and Deleuze, to construct a ‘diagram’ of the narratives of identity developing in the self-reflective space of teacher education (2009, p. 191). This framework presents four ethico-political axes: the substantive; the authoritative; the reflective; and the goal-oriented. It is the third technique that is of interest here:

‘Practices commonly used in teacher education programs, like keeping a reflective journal, would fall under this aspect of ethical identity. For practicing teachers, these shaping practices will often occur outside the classroom through, for example, engaging in particular forms of ongoing professional learning’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 191).

Elsewhere, Britzman refers to such journals as ‘narrations of practice’ (Britzman, 1994, p. 72), that historicise the teacher’s reality. This process allows the teacher to reflect on actions taken and the reasons why, which enable him or her to identify the extrinsic determiners governing such actions. In other words, pinpoint forms of governmentality in the teacher’s life that influence both attitudes and understandings informing practice. This self-reflective narration recognises the fluidity of an ontology that continually moves beyond the point of reflection. Put another way, the self, once fixed in this documentary fashion, immediately becomes other to that being reflected upon, and as such is the externalisation that Foucault identifies as an aesthetic state. Following on from this, Clarke regards it as an ethico-political act that frees the self from paradoxes of being and on to an aesthetic and ethical state.

‘Of course this freedom can be daunting as it means letting go of the safe anchor of an unchanging, stable self or of striving for an attainable perfection that once attained can be maintained and held on to’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 194).

Moreover, in turning to a recent research paper commissioned by the International Baccalaureate, it appears there is evidence of similar paradoxes when summarising the personal attributes and skills of an IB educator:
‘Teachers bring with them their own ideas of what is valuable in teaching, and what their role is as teachers. Their knowledge and understanding of teaching is a unique pot pourri of their own cultural, religious, ethical and personal values, their experience of being taught, what they may have found meaningful in their initial teacher education, their observations of other teachers, their own practical experience with students’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 7).

Furthermore, this research recognises that reflective practice highlights normative tensions that exist when trying to determine and measure good IB teaching and excellent IB teachers. In contemporary international education, notions of quality in practice encompass a range of contradictions borne of formal education’s historical legacy of being both a process of social engineering and emancipation. Bergeron and Dean argue this has led to numerous theoretical attempts to understand these contradictions in both the practice and the values of IB pedagogy (2013, p. 8). Moreover, in their review they note the importance of reflexive practice:

‘The use of personal and professional portfolios has emerged as a means of reflecting this excellence. The importance of a reflective diary as part of the portfolio is used in various branches of education - it is a requirement, for example, in Steiner-Waldorf schools that all teachers complete a daily log of reflections on their teaching and the achievement of the students’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 25).

Evidently, reflective writing is widely regarded as core strategy for developing an IB teacher who can maintain exacting standards of classroom delivery. But, does it also enhance moral values, or even allow access to an ethical aesthetic? Bergerson and Dean’s research is not tasked with examining this but it does identify that the IB teacher specifically values ‘international mindedness,’ ‘open-mindedness’ and education’s potential to create ‘caring young people that will make a positive impact on the world’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 63). Furthermore, they conclude that IB teachers deeply value inquiry and a global outlook, they remain cognisant of whole student, emphasise social responsibility and are ‘models of the learner profile’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 64). Generally, throughout the paper the centrality of reflection in the working life of an IB teacher remains clear. It shows the importance of values and hints at the potential of using narrative strategies to realise an aesthetic state of ethical being. However, it can also be argued that reflection is in fact a self-monitoring practice in international education’s processes of standardisation and evaluation, which is recognisable as a form of governmentality. Therefore, the IB teacher is situated in a matrix of contradictions that has grown out of the tensions due to formal education being both a strategy of social control and emancipation. This raises the immediate question: How does the IB teacher use such a practical, professional mechanism to craft a form of being that moves beyond the determinisms of governmentality to allow an ethical agency into the international classroom that is free of emotivism? To answer this, requires a hermeneutic ‘tying together’ of critical theory, Aristotelian phronêsis and reflexive practice to enable the development of ethical aesthetics,
practical wisdom and truth-telling in the classroom. By employing this strategy, the subject can avoid being determined by the contradictions identified in Bergerson and Dean.

To understand the centrality of reflective practice in any attempt to work beyond the spaces of governmentality and the ‘regime of linear planning and management’ (McPherson, 2005, p. 708), requires a hermeneutic approach to the aesthetics of teaching. An example of this is McPherson’s examination of Herbert Dreyfus’s addendum to his original five stages of learning, which suggests ‘mastery’ and ‘practical wisdom’ enhance a hermeneutic cycle of ‘unity in difference and difference in unity’ (2005, p. 715). This relates directly to the earlier examination of cultural governmentality, which made the point that understanding both difference and localised context carries strategic importance for the international educator. Reflexivity, experienced as a continual narrative practice, allows the IB educator to remain acutely aware of difference in two ways: As being other from herself at the point of reflective writing and of being different from others because of perpetual objectification of the teacher in the classroom. However, it is important to recall that this is a process of subjectivation and not subjectification, because rather than being morally determined by the narratives of governmentality, the teacher maintains difference as her principal defining aesthetic. Additionally, this aesthetic position emphasises the centrality of a hermeneutic cycle of care of the self and the care of others in the being of the IB teacher.

‘Reflection on forms of human interdependence, and on longer-term reflexive learning, suggests the salience of phronēsis [original italics], interpreted as an emergent shareable quality, both gift and task, needed for learning, knowing and understanding how to live well with one another, in fair and reasonable relationships, with our common human powers and vulnerabilities, and in similar as well as different situations, both shaping us and shaped by us’ (McPherson, 2005, p. 715).

Elsewhere, this interpretation of reflexivity is referred to as ‘phronetic truth’ (Pickup, 2016, p. 189) because it not only requires practical wisdom but pedagogical truth-telling to be firmly embedded in the ontology of the IB teacher.

Conclusion

To conclude, therefore, Aristotle’s overarching virtue theory, later reinvented by MacIntyre, can create an educational philosophy that identifies the importance of both phronēsis and parrhesia when considering practical ways to build an aesthetic of ethical being. Moral governmentality when placed alongside the political, economic and cultural forms appears to determine the hermeneutic possibilities for this ontology. However, it is in the moral governmentality discussed in this chapter that reflexivity is identified as the key to opening the door to a more authentic state of being for the international IB teacher working in the
heterotopic continuum school. By incorporating ‘ethical knowledge’ the teacher can build a powerful form of reflective self-learning that enables a care of the self that is acutely aware of difference. Then, by adopting *parrhesia* the teacher can position such practical wisdom into the social space of the classroom and allow IB students the opportunity to be either habituated by the ethical values of the teacher, or more importantly, be different from them. This truth-telling represents a care of others in the practice of an IB teacher and shows the potential for ethico-political agency in the classroom. However, it also brings up one of the dangers facing reflection as moral inquiry; namely the need to contemplate the wider social responsibilities of an IB teacher. Or, as Judith Butler succinctly puts it:

> ‘If certain versions of self-preoccupied moral inquiry return us to a narcissism that is supported through socially enforced modes of individualism, and if that narcissism also leads to an ethical violence that knows no grace of self-acceptance or forgiveness, then it would seem obligatory, if not urgent, to return the question of responsibility to the question “How are we formed within social life, and at what cost?”’ (2005, pp. 135-136).

In other words, how can *phronēsis* and *parrhesia*, as a model of care of the self and care of others, be fully realised while avoiding narcissism? The cost of not answering this question is high, and thus the next chapter examines how IB teachers might build ethical communities of practice that allow a range of moral subjectivities, which remain aware of the social nature of moral being.
Chapter 5

Social ontology and moral intelligence

This enquiry began with the assertion that the classic international IB continuum school, serving predominantly expatriate learners, represents a specific type of a heterotopia. Moreover, each of these schools are sites where a teacher’s ontology is being defined by a neoliberal epistemology and moral emotivism that is at odds with the values advocated in its educational model. To begin, this enquiry suggested (chapter 1) that these sites represent heterotopias with their own discursive dynamics but largely determined by neoliberal governmentalities. Then, there was an examination of these governmentalities (chapters two and three) and an assessment made of their ontological significance. Finally, the preceding chapter assessed the moral limitations these governmentalities place on each teacher-subject before offering a moral framework using reflection as a strategy for care of the self that emphasises the aesthetic dimension teaching must occupy in these types of school. The argument is that phronësis and parrhesia are methods by which teaching becomes a virtuous practice, but one that must avoid narcissism. This chapter, therefore, begins by arguing that parrhesia, as a form of truth-giving, need not be limited to individual schools, the isolation of which leaves the strategy open to accusations of narcissism. By extending the process of habituation in the IB education model beyond the individual heterotopia and towards a collective environment, an understanding of the other remains a core element of this process and this counters narcissism.

To do this, schools should use technology to connect with one another as a community, which in turn offers the chance to become a form of ‘social ontology.’ The suggestion is that this ontology might be a feedback technology to enable teacher-subjects to synchronise an individual care of the self with a more socially dynamic care for others. Therefore, the chapter begins by exploring this possibility in more detail before shifting the discussion to consider how this symbiosis might be situated in the contemporary theoretical dialogue concerned with artificial and human moral intelligence. This reinforces the understanding that difference is an ontological prerequisite for the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school, and suggests that the interdependency between these moral intelligences represents an ‘assemblage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) with ‘emergent properties’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 357), which aid both the individual teacher and her community. Furthermore, this perspective raises intriguing questions post-Cartesian free will and a possible strategy for influencing neoliberal epistemology and emotivism. In other words, using technology to connect the process of
reflexive care of the self (*phronēsis*), brings the international IB teacher to a ‘social ontology’ (DeLanda, 2011) of truth-giving (*parrhesia*) that maintains its efficacy within the emotivism of the neoliberal classroom. However, before beginning this explorative journey there is a need to fully consider how *parrhesia* might be fully utilised by the teacher as a strategy for moving care of the self into a more socially dynamic form of care of others.

**Parrhesia as a care of others**

Campbell’s contemporising of *phronēsis* as ‘ethical knowledge’ is in some ways like Nancy Luxon’s use of ‘expressive subjectivity’ (2008, p. 378) as a modern rethinking of *parrhesia*. Both articulate some of the aesthetic principles surrounding Foucault’s care of the self and care of others. Campbell’s ethical knowledge and Luxon’s expressive subjectivity suggest an ontological freedom amidst the governmentalities determining the heterotopia and teacher-subjects of an international IB continuum school. In her essay, Luxon describes *parrhesia* as a body of practices rather than a body of knowledge, as suggested in the ‘knowledge of thyself’ identified by Foucault in *Hermeneutics of the Subject* (2005).

‘Foucault’s late lectures on the ancient ethical practices of “fearless speech” (*parrhesia*) offer a model of ethical self governance that educates individuals to ethical and political engagement’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 377).

She sees Foucault’s final lectures as moving beyond the pessimistic institutional governmentality of his earlier work, to ‘soften the edge of impossibility’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 378) facing the subject. In other words, *parrhesia* is a strategy by which the subject attains freedom by developing an aesthetic life that not only incorporates a care of the self but also a caring for others:

‘These lectures offer a model of “expressive subjectivity” composed of practices of ethical self-governance that would prepare individuals for ethical subjectivity, prompt them towards political action, and find them in their relations to others rather than founding them on claims to knowledge’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 378).

She goes on to make the distinction that ‘expressive subjectivity’ educates rather than produces individuals (Luxon, 2008, p. 379) and places Foucault’s later thinking at the crossroads of pedagogy and ethical being. Furthermore, expressive subjectivity emphasises Foucault’s later focus on practices rather than knowledge, which in turn connects with MacIntyre’s assertion that practices should provide the intrinsic goods necessary for an ethical life, not just extrinsic ones of materiality and commodification. In other words, Luxon’s use of *parrhesia* represents a confluence of Foucault and Aristotle, which recognises the importance of pedagogy in an aesthetic of ethical living. Therefore, *phronēsis* as care of the self and *parrhesia* as a care for
others signify 'concrete practices' that make a 'politically and ethically robust' (Luxon, 2008, p. 379) aesthetic life. For the teacher delivering values based curricula in a cosmopolitan context, the strength of this approach lies in its promotion of pedagogy and practice over and above production and knowledge. Furthermore, expressive subjectivity enables ‘individuals to discriminate between a multiplicity of ethical models and relationships’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 380), and therefore avoid both the unitary ontology of neoliberalism and recourse to moral relativism.

Luxon’s teacher, in ways reminiscent of MacIntyre’s virtuous professionals, becomes an expressive subject who lives an aesthetic of practice that supersedes ‘the disciplinary effects of governmentality,’ and tactically remains at the heart of an ethos of practice.

‘The initial challenge is simply to retain a sense of curiosity towards one’s suddenly unfamiliar experience, and to extend this curiosity into an understanding of different potential responses and their entailments’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 385).

This approach directly relates to a cosmopolitan educator whose broad range of material experiences form an ethos that is aesthetically guided towards becoming rather than embodying more traditional notions of being. Furthermore, this state offers the possibility of living up to the attributes contained in the IB’s learner profile, but in ways that run counter to the neoliberal universalisms attached to some of its attributes. Moreover, to counter arguments over the relativism of Foucault’s approach, Luxon introduces the disposition of ‘steadiness’ to argue a constancy for this aesthetic life, but she acknowledges ‘such a disposition to steadiness is tricky to situate as an ethical structure’ (2008, p. 388). It is worth noting that while Aristotle advocates a mean between extremes of a virtue and vice, Foucault’s parrhesia is not hegemonic. ‘Instead, practices gain ethical content from the manner by which individuals develop them into a “harmony of words and deeds.”’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 388). Put another way, parrhesia should not be a vice/virtue continuum but a constructive process of perpetual refinement through reflexivity; a writing and rewriting of the self through which certain moral validities evolve because of the narrative process. However, Luxon, asks how the individual maintains coherence amidst the competing narratives of governmentality, which appear to dominate the ethical space and determine agency. Importantly, the answer for her lies in ‘a subject able to undertake the hard work of judgment aided by guides not yet supplanted by rules’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 388). Or, what Gilles Deleuze has called Foucault’s search, for a ‘subjectivity derived from power and knowledge without being dependent on them.’ (Deleuze, 2006, p. 84). This aim is key if the subject is to avoid the hegemony of governmentality, and requires the self to be fully integrating phronēsis as a strategy for aesthetic being:

‘Parrhesia’s contribution as an educational practice, then, lies in its ability to school individuals in a common set of ethical practices; this body of practices both provides a measure of continuity and coherence to the practitioner’s development, and establishes a basic commonalty across
practitioners even as the content and effect of their practices looks distinctively different. Self-governance becomes less a matter of obeying grammatical criteria than achieving prosody in one’s manner of living’ (Luxon, 2008, pp. 389-390).

Reflexivity as a route to such practical wisdom in turn develops a social self that can engage with the political life in ways that have ethical coherence. The suggestion is that blending Luxon’s ‘expressive subjectivity’ with Campbell’s ‘ethical knowledge’ enables core Aristotelian pedagogical strategies for learning to be incorporated with MacIntyre’s materialist virtue theory and Foucault’s aesthetic of ethical being. As a model, it creates a way to bring agency to the ontological space inhabited by the cosmopolitan teacher in an international IB continuum school through practice that avoids the determinism of political, economic, cultural and moral governmentalities. This is not to say this model does not face significant challenges. As Luxon points out about parrhesia, ‘it is as much an education in sincere suspicion as in sincere trust (Luxon, 2008, p. 390), but it can lead to a shared moral obligation to build an ethical community answering to ‘its own internally generated norms rather than to an external order’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 391). Furthermore, as with phronēsis, the practices of parrhesia ‘provide a means to make individual resistance to broader processes of normalization differently productive through the introduction of reflexive distance into the process of self-formation’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 395). But, such a distancing is not to imply objectification of the self in a Cartesian sense, rather it is a self-awareness of the subject’s social and discursive reality. Moreover, it is not narcissism:

‘Foucault’s turn towards parrhesia reflects not a selfish interest in self-fashioning, but commitment to a set of ethical practices that would focus individuals squarely on their relations to others, and on their own words and deeds, as the necessary substance of ethical work’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 397).

Luxon believes this use of parrhesia represents a shift in Foucault’s thinking. A move away from ‘political governance’ to examining the ethical potential of ‘self-governance’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 397). However, it also highlights the importance of pedagogy in any effort to politicise the self in ways that might assert a more meaningful understanding of ontological agency in the international context. It represents a pedagogy that is reflective in practice and narrative by design. However, before considering in more detail how this looks in the heterotopia under examination here, it is worth briefly considering Judith Butler’s argument that the late Foucauldian shift from subjectification to subjectivation represents a form of ‘self-mastery,’ which again reinforces the argument for a return to a care of the self.

In Judith Butler’s discussion of later Foucault, she too identifies his move away from the politics of societal governance towards a focus on the self, suggesting ‘he turns to confession to show how the subject must relinquish itself in and through the manifestation of the self it makes’ (2005, p. 113). The suggestion being that Foucault’s earlier work is a narrative
of subjectification, by which forces external to the self objectify it, whereas his later work identifies subjectivation as the unavoidable and perpetual internal objectification of the self. However, this term is not used to imply existentialist alienation from the self, rather to emphasise forms of governmentality that remain always inescapable. Or as Butler puts it, ‘we can see that only within certain forms of rationality can the subject, in a certain way, be’ (2005, p. 116). This state of being highlights reflectivity as a contingent element of subjectivity and representative of the discursive space within which ontology must search out its freedoms. However, this is not essentialism because

‘the subject is no simple effect or function of a prior form of rationality, but neither does reflexivity assume a single structure. Moreover, when the subject becomes an object for itself, it also misses something of itself: this occlusion is constitutive of the process of reflexivity’ (Butler, 2005, p. 120).

This is a crucial distinction to note: the reflective process forces the subject to shift beyond its point of narrative departure, to become other than what it is describing. As argued earlier, reflection describes a perpetual state of becoming, which represents the shifting determiner of subjectivity.

The ontological shifting of Foucault’s subjectivation, with its capacity for rational self-objectification that casts the subject as a truth object, is determined by the pervasive discourses at any one point in time. In early Foucault, this is largely an extrinsically determined form of subjectification, but in his later work a process of reflection enables the subject to reach the ontologically freer state of subjectivation. In other words, the subject remains an indeterminable other to itself because of reflexivity, and this suggests a freedom beyond the confines of both extrinsic (political and economic) and intrinsic (cultural and moral) governmentality. But, as Butler points out, it requires an aesthetic attempt at self-mastery that is both social and pedagogical:

‘Self-mastery takes place in an address to an other or an exposition before the other, contextualized and facilitated by a pedagogical relationship’ (2005, pp. 128-129).

This reflexive arrangement is a form of parrhesia because the subject strives for a care of self and other (Butler, 2005, p. 130). A strategy that aligns Foucault with the critical tradition but at the price of ‘conditions of possibility,’ which determine the scope of our self-narratives. In other words, even in our efforts at subjectivation we remain framed by the dominant rationality of neoliberal governmentality, which leads to a problem for morality:

‘Whether as a deliberately reflexive attitude towards the self or as a mode of living what can never be fully known, the subject becomes a problem for moral philosophy precisely because it shows us how the human is constituted and deconstituted, the modes of its agentic self-making as well as its ways of living on’ (Butler, 2005, p. 134).

This social self raises the question of
As suggested, teaching, at its most fundamental levels of practice, requires the participant to have a heightened sense of ethical self-awareness because he or she is always in a space that is moral. As an activity and state of being, teaching occupies the social space defined by Butler. At all times in the classroom the teacher is a moral agent who not only has to make moral decisions for him or herself but also represents an authentic ethical standpoint for the students. Some of these students will be guided by the actions and utterances of the teacher while others will use them as the line in the sand by which they define and refine themselves. Furthermore, beyond the classroom the teacher must remain aware of the moral responsibility society attaches to the profession and its agents. The various forms of political, economic, cultural and moral governmentality examined so far demonstrate the weight of this expectation. Hence the crisis facing the role of teacher in many contemporary societies possibly lies in the fact that the discourses of moral governmentalties examined here create conflicting expectations of the teacher, which in turn makes it difficult to maintain a *becoming* that is ethically guided and aesthetically consistent.

The suggestion here is that guiding the process of reflection as part of the teacher’s subjectivation requires connecting them beyond their own discrete heterotopias. By forming a community of like-minded teachers with an established Aristotelian aesthetic approach to values-based education and practice, a social ontology might be possible that can challenge the emotivism of neoliberal rationality. This would also go some way to removing the geographical and ontological isolation of each heterotopic site and offer an objective moral reasoning that is coherent. The argument, therefore, is to use technology to connect classic international IB continuum schools in a way that promotes a common sense of moral community as an extension of *parrhesia* as a care of others.

*Technology and subjectivity*

One of the biggest recent changes in pedagogical practice is undoubtedly the advent of information technologies over the last twenty years. Particularly, the development of the Internet and the subsequent proliferation of social media applications, which together have revolutionised practice in ways that mature teachers would not have even guessed at earlier in their careers. In the context of truth-giving, such technology represents a proliferation of information that has now reinvented the role of the teacher. No more the ‘sage on the stage’...
the contemporary educator has moved from sole provider of one truth to the adult mediator and dominant evaluator of ubiquitous and alternate truths found in this unique environment. But this carries with it a moral expectation as well. The teacher must now have a keen sense of right and wrong and a sophisticated ability to scaffold evaluation of the ‘facts’ discovered in the virtuality of the wall-less classroom. For example, themes of multiplicity and difference explored earlier in this enquiry are now the learning realities of these classrooms, with the teacher positioned as the navigator of such virtual worlds:

‘Schools and teachers now need to pay more attention to the ways that youth construct themselves rather than to traditional academic discourses which retain “truths” that are becoming increasingly challenged and outdated’ (Belsey & Peters, 2007, p. 117).

In addition to this the monitoring strategies employed in education to ensure the teacher remains governed are becoming ever more stringent, and this creates a dilemma for the teacher-subject:

‘Parrhesia links truth-telling and education in ways that are still operative in shaping our contemporary subjectivities, thus they are relevant in understanding the exercise of power and control and of the contemporary citizenship especially in situations where there is some risk for a person in telling the truth to a superior’ (Belsey & Peters, 2007, p. 118).

However, this self-same technology brings with it an opportunity for care of the self to have ethical integrity in the privileged international classroom and avoid the narcissistic relativism of neoliberal governmentality. Technology can be used to fashion discursive environments beyond the normative confines of traditional educational space and its governmentalities. Just as with the earlier argument that the classic international IB continuum school is a heterotopic site, the virtuality of the contemporary international classroom displays similar characteristics. But, unlike the international school, this virtual heterotopia offers individual ethical subjects the chance to be part of a social ontology that challenges the regulatory power of neoliberal morality. In other words, whilst not beyond the cultural, political, economic and moral governmentalities discussed so far, such a space can connect reflexive subjects whose shared ethical experiences afford an additional collective layer of reflexivity. However, such possibilities suggest a liberation from neoliberal dogma but also perhaps a new form of governmentality. On the one hand, a virtual heterotopia provides the individual with a liberty at least one step removed from the corporeal realities of his or her physical world. The social basis of its narrativity balances the self’s experiences with online reflexive sharing that promotes exploration of ‘subjectivation’ instead of subjectification. Moreover, the medium, by turning utterances into algorithms, provides access to new probabilities because all reflections feed into an ever-expanding database of moral considerations across a potentially infinite range of contexts. Consequently, probabilities could
evolve as a form of feedback into a virtual, reflective heterotopia depicting moral trajectories that in turn influence individual reflexivity. For example, just as Google applications make suggestions to the user, an online community of reflexive practice might do something similar by drawing on the reflexive writing of others in the community. Of course, this proposition raises a series of interesting questions. Would such a heterotopia be just another regulatory space with its own, albeit novel, narrative of subjectification? Does such technology really have the potential to turn the subjectivation of virtue-based phronēsis into a social ontology that can challenge the authority of homo economicus? What challenges does this technology pose to traditional notions of free will? And, finally, is morality the limited domain of human intelligence?

The argument here is to see the technology of social media as presenting an opportunity to share reflexive ontologies in ways that emphasise the connective reality of being and emphasise the likelihood of probabilities in individual moral decision-making as a support in these isolated schools. Naturally, this supposition questions the location of morality and free will when subjects interact with technology in this way. Indeed, as will be seen later, several current discussions of artificial intelligence are considering this thesis, and rather than seeing it as an all-out assault on being human, argue that free will is simply another of the façades of the Cartesian self. This enquiry, in part, represents an attempt to ponder technology’s potential to both imprison and free ontology. In other words, understand online environments as the most sophisticated panopticon to date, or as a tool that connects humans in ways that subvert the divisive nature of Cartesian rationality with its exclusive ontological isolation. Indeed, the pessimism found in many contemporary critiques of social media indicates an anxiety possibly caused by its challenge to the unity of this rationality. Obviously, examples abound of current misuse of social media, but what if these are simply technology amplifying the economised rationality determining the moral subject? Is the current use of social media a shop window displaying only those subjectivities available in an episteme dominated by emotivism, where individual opinion becomes morality without recourse to an objective rationality?

On the other hand, what if an alternative aesthetics and ethical being used technology to proliferate itself? In other words, social media was being used to promote a more humanitarian morality by feeding this back as a valid way of being? The suggestion here is that rather than scrutinising the hazards of current technology usage, examine instead the construction of being in its virtual space, and consider how its connectivity and sharing might accentuate new forms of moral flourishing. Of course, the danger is if the dominant neoliberal
epistemology remains unchallenged in international IB continuum schools, any synergy with technology will only amplify forms of emotivism. Alternatively, a care of the self using this technology could bring a care of others as a form of social ontology. And, therefore, an epistemology may evolve from the governmentalities of homo economicus that is not defined by its current moral limitations. Such connectivity would give international IB continuum educators access to a form of being that has an authentic social morality, which in turn habituates students to become reflexive, ethical aesthetes who appreciate the probabilities accessible through connected, communal moral thinking. Consequently, this relationship with technology might alter traditional approaches to moral ontology and build new models for the understanding difference.

Before considering further, the implications this has for moral intelligence, however, it is necessary to revisit assumptions about the space of the international school and the cosmopolitanism of its educators. Once established, an examination of the structure of such a virtual environment is necessary to see how it enhances the building of a social ontology, which in turn challenges more traditional critical and analytical approaches to both ontology and moral philosophy. Finally, in returning to moral intelligence a case is made to see the potential of a moral theory using individual reflexive practice and technology to fashion an ethical social ontology. Once this has been established an assessment of the theory’s validity will reference the often-idealised teacher-subject found in a classic international IB continuum school.

Cosmopolitan moral communities

‘Eigenstructures of world society obviously are production machines of nonlocal diversity’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 147).

As discussed in chapter one, ‘eigenculture’ is a term used by sociologist Rudolf Stichweh to describe self-affirming forms of power that are a result of the cultural homogenisation of a globalised world. His heuristic describes new types of community that have the power to shift hegemonic epistemological assumptions and it plays a key part in his contribution to current sociological debate surrounding ‘small world theory’ (Stichweh, 2008). Borrowing from the logic of mathematics, Stichweh identifies three characteristic types of ‘eigenstructure’ that each contribute to the formation of eigencultures. First, there are arrangements described as ‘function systems’ that build global practices, which come to influence local systems; the world bank’s influence on local banking would be an example of this. Stichweh argues such eigenstructures give rise to ‘eigencultures’ that have a specific
unifying characteristic because each incorporates ‘binary distinctions such as truth/falsity (science), to pay/not to pay (economy), powerful/subject to power (polity), and other such codes that are universal mechanisms of information processing’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 137).

Second, he identifies the ‘formal organisation,’ which has a genealogical relationship with function systems. For example, Stichweh argues that the Jesuits, with their international network, represent an example of a functional system with historical organisational connectivity. A more contemporary example would be global international inter-governmental organisations such as the World Health Organisation. The distinctive features of such eigencultures are their movement of personnel across borders and trans-national connectivity, which develop new forms of knowledge within the worldview of its own community. Finally, Stichweh’s third form of eigenstructure, sees the term ‘network,’ as metaphor and argues that it has come to contemporary prominence because it is an extension of earlier functional systems and formal organisations. Networks have proliferated with the advance of human communication technologies but maintain most of the characteristics of traditional organisational structures, but with an added twist: ‘Eigenstructures reproduce pre-existent cultural diversity and push it back at the same time, creating new social and cultural patterns of their own’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 135). As such, he argues, networks represent eigencultures with their own discreet organisational functionalities and norms. Furthermore, many networked eigencultures develop ‘strong cognitive and normative commitments’ that become the building blocks for new forms of knowledge and therefore represent examples of ‘epistemic community’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 141).

This notion of an eigenculture has distinct structural parallels with the International Baccalaureate. With four global centres, over 4700 schools and representation in 150 countries, the IB advances a distinctive, global view of international education that transcends localised government outlooks. Added to this, there are other similarities between the IB World School community and the global organisations, cultures and knowledge systems identified by Stichweh, which show its potential to challenge dominant knowledge systems. For example, the global status of the IB’s operational model, international mission, profile of learner (whether student, teacher or leader), and mechanism for teacher training represents a pedagogical presence with its own systems of knowledge that can, to some degree, contest the dominance of neoliberal epistemology of international education. However, this enquiry argues that the organization’s ability to do this requires a better articulated moral philosophy to explain the humanitarian vision of international education it describes in its documentation (International Baccalaureate, 2015). Furthermore, the importance the IB places on ‘values’ and
‘philosophy’ means it currently comes up short in relation to its mission to promote difference and international mindedness and rather falls into the emotivism of neoliberal epistemology.

The reason for summarising Stichweh’s eigenstructure is that it adds organisational and functional detail to Foucault’s broad notion of the spatial and discursive function of the heterotopia. Particularly, Foucault’s suggestion that such space is the home to ‘rituals’ and behaviours (Foucault, 1984, pp. 7-9), which this enquiry suggest might impact upon the knowledge formation of the episteme in ways that begin to change it. Using Stichweh’s eigenstructure to detail how the heterotopia of a classic international IB Continuum school could connect into a community provides a way of realising the functional potential of these schools becoming a network with cultural and epistemological significance. According to Stichweh, eigenstructures are ‘global communication complexes,’ with examples of this discursive function being the ‘world economy’ or ‘world science’ or even ‘world literature’ (Stichweh, 2008, pp. 135-136), which parallels the IB’s own mission to be an education for the world. If Foucault’s suggestion that a ship represents the clearest example of a heterotopia’s distinction from surrounding environment, it also highlighted it isolation, and in the context of this enquiry suggests its limitations in terms of shifting the direction of the dominant epistemology. Stichweh’s eigenstructure, however, provides a way of understanding what a network of heterotopias might resemble. Furthermore, his emphasis on the ‘epistemic’ potential of globally dispersed communities anticipates, better than Foucault could in the 1960s, the role technology now has in influencing ways of working, interacting and living in heterotopias.

A useful example is Stichweh’s analysis of the Linux software development network because even while it was neither ‘conceived as an organization nor as a network’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 142), it nonetheless highlights the symbiotic relationship between epistemic communities and technology. As opposed to the organisational hierarchies of historical forms of eigenstructures, global, networked systems such as Linux avoid the discursive traditions of empirical epistemology (Stichweh, 2008, p. 142). Instead, such epistemic communities represent ‘the pluralization and diversification of knowledge in the process of the emergence of world society’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 143). Seen from this perspective, connected international IB continuum schools would represent a distinct epistemic community that challenges the governmentalities of homo economicus. These schools could develop into a networked community of practice that evolves an alternative to international education’s prevailing neoliberal morality. This amalgamation of Foucault’s and Stichweh’s understandings of space brings the discussion back again to Doreen Massey’s emphasis on the ‘throwntogetherness’ of
the cosmopolitan space, which offers the potential to escape the dogma of traditional spatial conceptions:

‘Reconceptualising place this way puts on the agenda a different set of political questions. There can be no assumption of pre-given coherence, or of community or collective identity. Rather the thrown-togetherness of place demands negotiation. In sharp contrast to the view of place as settled and pre-given, with a coherence only to be disturbed by ‘external’ forces, places as presented here in a sense necessitate invention; they pose a challenge…. They require that, in one way or another, we confront the challenge of the negotiation of multiplicity’ (Massey, 2005, p. 141).

The epistemological opportunities of using technology to connect international IB continuum schools ‘necessitates invention’ because the subsequent community cannot rely on the metanarratives of neoliberalism to inform each school’s understanding of itself or the group. Furthermore, such a network exemplifies a culture of ‘multiplicity’ that is specific to each school but also shared amongst a wider cosmopolitan epistemic community. This point means considering how technology (as in the Linux example), might impact on reflexive sharing between the teachers in these schools. For example, could the distribution of ethical practice encourage a ‘social ontology’ for the international IB teacher-subject?

Moral intelligence(s)

To take this further, it is necessary to consider how the functioning of individuals online might adjust behaviour and subsequently influence ontological development in this environment. In his 1995 essay, Virtual Environments, Manuel DeLanda argues that participant behaviour on the newly emerging online environment represents an example of Gilles Deleuze’s notion of ‘assemblage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) because the phenomenon represents ‘more than the sum of the parts’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 357), which he later describes as a ‘social ontology’ (DeLanda, 2011). For DeLanda, the synergistic nature of a ‘virtual’ assemblage means it displays ‘emergent properties,’ whereby ‘attractors’ in a community affect others to the extent that the whole community begins to behave in an equivalent way to the attractor. DeLanda argues that this ‘rhythmic behaviour’ takes place without direction or centralised coordination because each ‘component follows the same attractor’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 358). DeLanda takes the example of ‘swarm theory,’ used to explain ant colony behaviours, to visualise attractors in such networks. In other words, many individual ‘agents’ who appear guided by some centralised intelligence which logically cannot be the case. This, he argues, is how a computer network, as a ‘so-called artificial intelligence,’ enables the non-linear mathematical thinking necessary for understanding ‘just what it is that is [original italics] responsible for this emergent property’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 359).

The reason for introducing this example here is to consider whether an online
community of practice for individual teachers might produce individual ethical ‘attractors’ in classic international IB continuum schools who then lead to the group having emergent moral properties. As such, the community would represent more than the sum of its individual ethical agents, representing an example of a ‘social ontology’ that perpetuates a hermeneutic interpretation of Aristotelian virtues and a collective moral sensibility. This notion raises several intriguing questions. Can the logic of mathematics bring a new dimension to the problem of authentic moral decision-making, one that evades the subjective bias found in traditional methods? Put another way, could non-linear algorithmic thinking not only enable the development of a guided approach to ethical reflection, but also visualise how the network feeds back into the behaviours of its agents and itself as an object of knowledge? In other words, if technology can be harnessed to build reflexive pedagogical communities of practice that share, assert and inform moral reasoning, does this challenge traditional approaches to moral philosophy?

When considering the wider impacts of communication and information technologies, Luciano Floridi (2013) argues that such networks offer a ‘distributed morality’ because rapidly enhanced communications systems act as ‘moral enablers.’ He suggests that individual human values in such networks become qualified and refined by encountering the values of others:

‘Such enabling agents, when properly designed and regulated, can act as promoters and facilitators of the morally good. At worst, they can prevent, neutralise, or at least limit the paths to evil, that is, undesirable transitions from some PW [possible worlds] to other, morally worse PWs’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 740).

Furthermore, he posits ‘multi-agent systems’ (MAS) comprised of technological ‘moral enablers’ forming an ‘infraethics’ as a basis for a distributed morality (DM) that evolves into a ‘collective responsibility’ (Floridi, 2013, pp. 728-729). Fundamentally, this symbiotic relationship between technology and ‘hybrid multiagent systems’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 713), carries inherent structures and habits, be they discourses, epistemologies or coding. This MAS approach, Floridi argues, removes the ‘intentionality or motive-based analysis’ of traditional moral evaluation.

The examples of technologically distributed moralities that Floridi provides are platforms on which forms of ‘socially orientated capitalism’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 734) are being exercised by users. They involve giving people the power to use their money to do good works in an online context, but the crucial point to grasp here is that Floridi is arguing that the online space itself is a MAS that promotes ‘enablers’ and builds collective responsibility. In other words, the technology connects individuals to one another with an immediacy that develops an ‘infraethics,’ such that ‘actions that are morally negligible in themselves… become morally
significant, if properly aggregated’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 736), and offers distinct behavioural or attitudinal feedback opportunities. Of course, incentivising such an environment means challenges for its continued efficacy, and Floridi identifies ‘inertia,’ ‘environmental factors’ and the human ‘ability to tolerate faults’ in such platforms as evidence of such problems (2013, p. 736). To counter this, he argues that technology’s processes of ‘aggregation and ‘fragmentation’ present a powerful dispersal mechanism (moral enabler) that can increase ‘good actions’ to a positive tipping point, and disperse ‘evil actions’ to the extent that they become peripheral and largely negated (Floridi, 2013, p. 736). Most importantly in the context of this study, Floridi argues that the proliferation of digital interactions being experienced across human society means there is potential for a more ‘profound and detailed understanding of the logical dynamics of DM and hence new forms of civil education,’ which means a ‘better design of our technological moral aggregators’ and ‘improved ethical policies of incentives and disincentives’ (2013, p. 737). Transferring this approach to a reflexive pedagogical community of practice, indicates how the right kinds of ethical positioning could be incentivised as part of its process of reflexive care of self, and maintain the continued renewal of its truth-giving.

Arguably, this suggestion that technology has the power to alter an individual subject’s ethical will and moral development, introduces the question of how essential to moral reasoning is being human? After all, some argue that:

‘we have somewhat limited cognitive abilities: we find it difficult to follow long arguments or to keep track of lots of alternatives; we forget; we get tired and bored, and so make mistakes. In every case, biology seems more of a handicap than a requisite. Computationalism appears safe’ (Davenport, 2014, p. 57).

Indeed, perhaps this realisation is simply an evolutionary inevitability:

‘We have moved from a geocentric world to just another heliocentric planet, from human being to just another animal, and now from human-animal to just another machine… Humans are notoriously inconsistent when it comes to making moral decisions—indeed, machines may end up being better moral agents than we are. (Davenport, 2014, p. 58).

Besides Davenport, others have identified the advent of ever more sophisticated artificial intelligences as evidence of an end to Cartesian morality and its ‘obsession with keeping up distinctions between humans and machines’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 73). Instead, it is suggested that there is a need for contemporary hermeneutics to allow moral philosophy to move beyond humanist dualism and ‘turn to the phenomenology of concrete engagement with entities to acknowledge an epistemic range and an action repertoire that otherwise does not appear on the moral radar screen’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 73). Elsewhere, Latour adds weight to this view by arguing that the human symbiotic relationship with technology is an assemblage
that has created a ‘regime of mediation.’ Its ability to ‘fold’ time and space in new ways giving rise to a morality that is ‘no more human than technology.’ Instead, ‘it traverses the world and, like technology, that it engenders in its wake forms of humanity, choices of subjectivity, modes of objectification, various types of attachment’ (Latour, 2002, p. 251). In other words, contemporary reliance on communicative technology has decentralised the subject in moral thinking. Individual ontology is replaced by a social ontology, which open ways of refining Aristotelian virtue theory as technology indicates a need ‘to give up the illusion of invulnerable moral subjectivity’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 76). Such perspectives reinforce the idea that human interaction with technology is a process of ontological ‘folding,’ by dissolving the distinction between the Cartesian human and tools used to explore material reality. The traditional notion that ‘humanness’ should hold primacy when considering subjectivity limits the ontological richness of difference in ways that recall earlier discussions of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the cognitive leap required to move between technological and cultural understandings of difference is not a large one, and perhaps questions about technological and cosmopolitan morality benefit from an assemblage approach.

In his extensive review of the diverse literature in this area of moral theory, David Gunkel argues that technology has reinforced the crisis facing humanism. ‘The privileged place of the individual moral subject,’ is challenged by ‘a decentred and distributed understanding of moral subjectivity.’ (Gunkel, 2012, p. 165). Furthermore, his call for more ‘actor-network approaches’ to moral thinking supports the argument made here to see the advantages offered by a using technology to connect individual ethical agents in a way that indicates a realm of expansive moral probability. In this context, communities of reflexive practioners would have an accentuated awareness of human connectedness, that could highlight the illusory nature of the Cartesian autonomy and the emotivism reinforced by the governmentalities of homo economicus. Communicative technology does this by emphasising the distributive nature of contemporary moral agency:

‘Human agency does not disappear altogether from this zone of creative and contingent evolution, but it is distributed throughout a system of forces, institutions, bodies, and nodal points’ (Zylinska, 2009, p. 172).

This point recalls DeLanda by suggesting that distributive morality is an ‘agency of assemblage’ (Zylinska, 2009, p. 163), in which the morality resulting from such connectivity becomes more than a sum of each individual agent’s ethics and thus a perpetual site of emergent moral properties. In other words, individual pedagogical virtuous practice (reflexive care of the self), shared as an enclosed, technological environment constitutes an assemblage in which
emergent moral properties feedback to the teacher to enhance her ethical aesthetic. Drawing on Peter Singer’s utilitarian examination of moral agency to discuss the non-human, Gunkel suggests that traditional moral thinking appears distrustful of technology’s problematisation of a privileged, individual moral subject, which is ‘a product of Cartesian philosophy and the enlightenment’s obsession with the self.’ Nevertheless, he calls for its replacement ‘with a decentered and distributed understanding of moral subjectivity’ (Gunkel, 2012, p. 164). This denial of anthropocentrism is echoed by Erica L. Neely in *Machines and Moral Community* (2014), when she argues that the realities of modern technology mean the humanness of traditional morality has become relative. Her argument rests on an assumption that harm and pain have traditionally been the starting points for any material discussion of morality:

‘For humans, the harm generally involves some kind of pain. However, the ability to feel physical pain cannot be the only criterion for membership in the moral community’ (Neely, 2014, p. 99).

In other words, she believes there is need to consider a broader range of criteria for determining sentience, for example the Turing Test (Neely, 2014, p. 104). In simple terms, Neely’s view of morality in an era of technological acceleration is a two-sided problem that has relevance to this enquiry. It reinforces the argument that individual agents, connected through communicative technology, creates an assemblage model of moral reasoning as a new form of intelligence. This, not only addresses the opinions-based emotivism underpinning neoliberal governmentality but also challenges its epistemological dominance by questioning where moral reasoning is situated. In other words, it begins to affect this epistemology’s view that the subject is *the* central object of knowledge and the subsequent generation of moral knowledge. Before some concluding remarks on the relevance of technology in relation to this enquiry, it is worth considering a specific example of artificial intelligence that demonstrates how technology is challenging established knowledge in neoliberal epistemology.

**Blockchain theory**

When Satoshi Nakamoto published his definitive essay on Bitcoin in 2008 it arguably represented the beginning of a new phase in artificial intelligence (AI) theory. What began as an algorithm-based ‘electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust’ (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 16), rapidly went on to be a cryptocurrency ‘peer-to-peer ledger system’ (Davidson, et al., 2016), source of ‘smart contracts’ (Swan, 2015) and even the basis of ‘cryptonarratives’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015). At the basic level, Bitcoin relies on a ‘blockchain,’ which is a digitised double-entry ledger ‘technology’ dating back to at least the fifteenth century (Davidson, et al., 2016, p. 3). These dual entry ledgers of transactional data
are stored as ‘blocks’ on individual computers that the internet joins together into ‘chains’ and thus offering a decentralised form of protection against inadvertent double spending or fraudulent use of the cryptocurrency. Bitcoin represents a ‘cryptoeconomy’… unconstrained by geography and political and legal institutions in which blockchains rather than trusted third parties constrain behavior all transactions recorded on a decentralized public ledger’ (Davidson, et al., 2016, p. 4). It has been also referred to as a ‘machine for creating trust’ (The Economist, 2015) because rather than a requiring a third-party arbitrator like a bank, individuals rely on the integrity of one another and the decentralised system throughout any transaction.

However, blockchain has gone on to capture the imagination of thinkers beyond economics. For example, Coeckelbergh and Reijers argue that the transactional records of the various cryptocurrencies are evidence of an immediate and evolving cycle of feedback, which build’s not just a specific reality but also a collective ontology. They maintain that the collective records stored in a blockchain build the narrative of a shared reality, which has a hermeneutic dimension, and subsequently functions as a feedback mechanism (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015, p. 173). Their reading relies on emphasising that spatio-temporal aspects of the technology influence individual agents:

‘cryptocurrencies influence our narrative understanding both passively (as elements of our prefigured narrative understanding) and actively (as technologies that actively configure the understanding of characters they interact with). These processes are not normatively neutral. The notions of transaction and trust are central to the rationale of cryptocurrencies, and the way transactions and trust change through the new technology has ethical implications’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015, p. 175).

If they are correct and the narratives of blockchain have the potential to reconfigure individual ethical understandings of ‘trust and power’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015, p. 177), does this highlight such possibilities in the context of moral reasoning in an educational community? In other words, if by converting economic transactions into mathematical algorithms, blockchain can recalibrate traditional understandings of contractual law, might such a ‘cryptonarrative’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015) by written for virtue theory in the social ontology of a reflexive community of practice? Could a pedagogical approach to ethics that has been ‘dehumanised’ by mathematical algorithms, escape the behaviourism of Goleman and Senge, and the emotivism governmentalities of neoliberalism? However, it is only fair to consider at least one of the more critical voices in the debate about the innovative potential of this technology. After all, communicative technology’s ability to collect and store multifarious data has caused widespread anxiety about the use of such decentralised algorithm-based systems.
In her 2015 essay, Marcella Atzori acknowledges that blockchain is a distributed digital ledger that is highly resistant to fraudulent usage because ‘even if some nodes are unreliable, dishonest or malicious, the network can correctly verify the transactions a protect the ledger from tampering through a mathematical mechanism called proof of work, which makes human intervention or controlling authority unnecessary’ (2015, p. 2). However, she goes on to argue that the system is not infallible, and raises significant questions about the impact such decentralisation has upon social institutions because it could give rise to ‘political technopreneurs’ and possibly even ‘cryptonations’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 5). Her point being that the technology moves traditional institutional practices beyond the realities of the nation-state, and to a world of ‘technological determinism’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 5). Having established her reservations, she lays out principles for ‘blockchain governance’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 6) and a strategy for countering the rhetoric of blockchain’s more anarchistic or hyper-neoliberal advocates (Swan 2015). Whilst Atzori does not deny blockchains potential to revolutionise political processes and institutions, she argues that such a radical decentralisation of political decision-making will inevitably lead to economic ‘collusion and cartelization’ (2015, p. 16). Furthermore, she asks if such vested interests have not already created ‘genetic’ faults in blockchain code that will lead to inevitable ‘programmed decline and rapid self-destruction’ (Atzori, 2015, pp. 16-18).

To counter these shortcomings, Atzori suggests instead ‘permissioned blockchains,’ which are closed systems of shared data that exploit the technology’s advantages without the ‘speculative verification mechanisms’ of crypto-economic models (2015, p. 18). This would also mean there were fewer permissible nodes that could be fraudulently or malevolently ‘mined’ by individuals or groups. Furthermore, she questions whether blockchain might become a ‘hyper-political tool’ for creating a new society based on ‘technocratic reasoning,’ and technological determinism (Atzori, 2015, pp. 21-22). By emphasising ‘the efficiency of encryption,’ code developers and computer scientists overplay the power of encryption in human affairs because technology cannot account for ‘empathy and conscience’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 22). For her, open source blockchain will see ‘large scale automated procedures devoid of life’ and representing ‘the ultimate triumph of homo economicus’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 22).

---

8 ‘People are sending bitcoins to each other over the bitcoin network all the time, but unless someone keeps a record of all these transactions, no-one would be able to keep track of who had paid what. The bitcoin network deals with this by collecting all of the transactions made during a set period into a list, called a block. It’s the miners’ job to confirm those transactions, and write them into a general ledger’ (http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/).
Ultimately, Atzori asks, can blockchain really counter the ‘exogeneous preferences’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 24) of homo economicus’s ‘cosmopolitan elites’ and ‘technological oligarchs’ (Atzori, 2015, pp. 27-28) to provide a foundation for individual virtue and collective moral agency? In answer to this, she proposes an ‘enclosed’ blockchain that precedes political agency and cannot be determined by it because it remains governed by ‘the conscientious application of principles and rights enshrined in law that can really empower individuals’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 31). Or, put in the context of this enquiry, given the seeming predisposition of online environments to invite the lowest common denominator (in terms of opinion over reasoning), the suggestion would be for an enclosed reflexive community of practice, like a ‘permissioned blockchain,’ inside which like-minded phronēsis becomes a parrhesia that is more than the sum of its parts.

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter ends with the suggestion that artificial intelligence is beginning to offer vibrant ideas that are questioning certain axioms in moral philosophy. Many commentators in this field reference terms such as ‘extended agency, actor-network theory, distributed cognition and cyborg’ (Hanson, 2009, p. 93) as alternative ways of evaluating the scope of ‘the social’ in ontological thinking. For example, the ‘post-humanism’ of Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborg’ (Haraway, 1991) allows theory to go beyond the rigid boundaries defining human and non-human ontologies. This moves ontological investigation away from the assumptions of Cartesian subjectivity by suggesting the source of intelligence lies beyond traditional anthropocentric perspectives. Furthermore, such thinking establishes the view that new media is making intercession ‘an intrinsic condition of being-in, and becoming-with the technological world’ (Kember & Zylinska, 2012, p. 19). In other words, the ontological distinction between human and machine intelligences is becoming more and more difficult to identify as this new materialism attempts to reconcile the traditional separation between humanity and technology. The argument being that as we become more and more reliant on technology to communicate identity to ourselves and to others, the technology begins to impact upon this identity in quite fundamental ways. However, rather than approach this phenomenon with Orwellian pessimism, such theory tries to emphasise a very real human ability to gain richness from this new symbiosis. To some degree, this approach to technology is pragmatic and not idealistic because the technology is not going to disappear, and nor our interaction with it diminish. And, this brings up the point of why it is being examined for this enquiry.
Offering the example of blockchain is, to a degree, a playful attempt to show technology’s potential to question subjectivity, but it also serves to make the more serious point that we may be entering a period where the limits of what constitutes being human are being expanded by our interaction with technology. If this point can be accepted, then asking what impact this might have on ontology seems valid. Furthermore, in the context of this enquiry, asking how technology might influence ethical behaviour and moral reasoning in the context of cultural displacement does not seem so farfetched; it is perhaps simply a new empiricism, one that offers an escape, or at least a redesign, of post-Enlightenment ontology. There are historical precursors of such epistemological reinventions. For example, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the methodological journey of the social sciences reveals how its empiricism moved from under the epistemological shadow of preceding centuries’ Copernican physical science. In other words, perhaps the current explorations of subjectivity and morality in AI theory represent the next empirical shift, one driven by what is popularly termed ‘big data’ rather than the empiricism of Senge and Goleman’s behavioural psychology or Narvaez’s evolutionism. What is important to grasp here is the fact that AI provides a way to shift current hegemonic epistemology away from the humanism that underpins neoliberal rationality. A paradoxical epistemology that on the one hand reinforces a harmonious Cartesian subject, with its individual identity represented as a psychological totality, and on the other an emotivist morality that appears to strengthen the opinion that social and economic inequality represents humanity’s innate state. Consequently, a rationality that contradicts both the humanitarian values of the IB’s education model and a necessity to appreciate otherness in the ethics of its teachers.

The suggestion in this enquiry is that if technology can accentuate the cosmopolitan teacher’s ability to appreciate the otherness of being human, then connectivity becomes an important part of their ontological reality as truth-giver. In other words, individuals could use reflexivity to practice an Aristotelian care of the self that incorporates technology to create a social ontology. This could challenge emotivism by promoting a more grounded moral perspective in the individual agents and so avoid the contradictions in evidence in classic international IB continuum schools. This example of a technologically enhanced, reflexive community of practice potentially equips the international IB teacher with an approach to ethical living that has a consistent flexibility. An ‘assemblage’ approach that moves the ethical teacher-subject beyond traditionally static moral being into a heterotopia that nurtures communal moral becoming as a constant state of human flourishing.
Conclusion

To conclude this enquiry, it is worthwhile recalling the central thesis and how its consideration has added to both the knowledge in this field of study and to my own professional learning. Furthermore, a return to the original questions posed in the introduction would be advantageous to evaluate how effectively each has been addressed, consider what additional issues have been highlighted, and identify possible areas for further study. To do this, each question will be discussed in turn, after a summary of the knowledge this enquiry has added to the literature of international education.

The main thesis of this work suggests there exists a small group of international IB schools that serve a very specific community. It is argued that these schools experience a form of cultural displacement due to their relative isolation from the surrounding community. This remoteness, it is argued, has a distinct impact on the values that exist in them, and this is of importance because the curriculum offered in these schools is centred around a values-based model of education. Furthermore, the IB’s dispositional, habituative approach to pedagogy requires the teacher to model certain values so that students become habituated in these values as they develop. However, this enquiry suggests this project is challenged because the values of the IB do not have a clearly articulated moral philosophy underpinning them, which means that neoliberal values and emotivism are the dominant discursive reality for the subjects in these schools. Moreover, the argument is that this emotivism is contrary to the humanitarian values of the IB’s education model. Therefore, the suggestion is that an alternative philosophy is required to challenge emotivism and offer a moral alternative more closely aligned with the values of an IB education.

But, what does all this add to the literature of the field? The suggestion is that by examining this type of school, its education and its teachers, a conversation is started that appreciates the need for more philosophical work in this area of international education research. For too long, empirical considerations of the phenomenon of international schooling have been the only theoretical frames of reference. This is not to say this should change to any great degree, but rather that something has been missing in the richness of the discourse, and this enquiry in its quiet way is an effort to redress the imbalance. Of course, this thesis makes a series of assumptions that are not empirically evidenced but, I would argue, that in the context of critical theory and its philosophy, this is allowable in such an exploratory work as this. Furthermore, this enquiry points to a need to design an empirical study to assess the validity of its assumptions, which is perhaps a logical next step. In terms of my own personal and
professional learning, I think the study has enabled me to address some ontological questions that have developed alongside my career in international education. My initial critical response to the proposal I offer in this enquiry is to ask how might the leaders in these schools encourage the deep reflectivity required to achieve the moral community I illustrate; especially given the neoliberal processes of standardisation and statistical accountability governing the profession. This is an area I shall continue to explore in my professional life, with the intention being to develop leadership resources that encourage wider understanding of the need to build IB values on a firm philosophical foundation.

It is now essential that I return to the original questions asked at the start of this enquiry to ensure that the findings are made explicit in these closing remarks. The first questioned what are the defining features of the school and the teacher under examination in this enquiry. The argument is that a type of classic international school exists offering a specific form of IB education experience that encompasses a student’s whole school career. Furthermore, the values-based model of this education affects the teacher because it requires a dispositional approach to pedagogy, which means that being authentic to these values requires that they become part of one’s way of being, not just one’s way of teaching. In other words, the humanitarian values of the education in these schools has an ontological impact upon the teacher. Of course, this begs the question what factors are in play for these schools and their teachers that might challenge both the values and their ontology? In answering this, the general premise is that contemporary international education is largely governed by a neoliberal rationality. The enquiry identifies four specific governmentalities that support this rationality by extrinsically and intrinsically effecting both the school and the teacher. Firstly, forms of political and economic governmentalities are suggested as having an impact on the professional lives of the teachers and the school. Then, cultural and moral governmentalities are argued to influence the personal lives of the teachers, which in turn affects their approach to the values in an IB education.

Next, the enquiry turned to ask how a school’s cultural isolation might influence its values-based education. The answer suggested is that a school’s isolation and the disparity between its predominantly Western interpretation of humanitarian values and the geographical and economic realities beyond its school gates, means the intensity of certain governmentalities is amplified. It is argued that a combination of cultural context and neoliberal governmentalities frames the school’s values with an emotivism more aligned with the values of neoliberal rationality than the humanitarianism of the IB. Accordingly, this has a detrimental effect on the
teacher because it makes it difficult to access an ethical self more in line with this humanitarianism. Moreover, given the dispositional nature of the pedagogical model, this consequently impacts on the students being educated in such schools by running the risk of perpetuating emotivism and neoliberal values.

Following on from this, the enquiry asks in what ways can moral philosophy provide support for the values in these schools? To address this an examination of Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment of Aristotelian virtue theory is combined with Michel Foucault’s reinvention of a pre-Christian care of the self. This framework builds a model of reflective practice that facilitates the development of practical wisdom (phronēsis) for the teacher, which leads to them becoming a truth-giver (parrhesia) for the community. This allows for the virtues to offer an objective moral reasoning that challenges the opinion-based morality of emotivism. Furthermore, the argument is that virtue theory of both aligned to the humanitarianism of the IB’s values model and flexible enough to deal with the cultural displacement experienced by these communities.

However, the suggestion then is that such parrhesia needs to be much broader than just truth-giving in the context of an individual teacher or school, if it is to have the ability to fully challenge the power of emotivism. Therefore, an argument is made to incorporate technology to connect individual teachers and form a reflexive community, which becomes a form of social ontology beyond the individual educator. This has the advantage of reinforcing an objective rationality for virtue theory because technology feeds back into the reflective practice of the individual teacher in ways that could influence subsequent ethical behaviour. The premise being that just as existing social media is influencing individuals in various areas of their lives, so might a similar concept be utilised to address moral behaviour and ethical being.

Finally, this thesis queries the impact such a use of technology has on our understanding of moral intelligence. In other words, does using technology to influence ontology raise questions about the boundaries of moral intelligence? Is moral reasoning only the domain of human beings or can artificial intelligence be used to build a symbiotic relationship that offers a new form of objective moral rationality, one that questions the hegemony of Cartesian subject in traditional moral theory? If we can use technology to remove some of the subjectivism that appears to hamstring moral reasoning at a time when humans are tasked with making significant moral choices that will impact upon the whole of humanity, the environment and the other creatures of this world, it seems a topic worthy of further consideration.
Fundamentally, emotivism in an IB education represents a very human form of moral reasoning, which the objective rationality of technology challenges because it removes subjectivism from the moral issues of difference facing an IB education.

To close, it is necessary to consider what further areas of study this work indicates. As suggested, an obvious next step would be to carry out an empirical study to validate the initial assumptions of this philosophical enquiry. These assumptions are currently based only on my own professional and personal experiences and interpretation of some of the literature in the field, and although this has enabled me to explore certain moral questions it is not necessarily the experience of other educators. Furthermore, the proposal made to address the moral problems identified in this study require further consideration. Could such a deep form of Aristotelian reflexivity be effectively encouraged in schools driven by the governmentalities identified here? If such a grand plan were to take root it would need a clear strategy for building common understandings and a desire to be this kind of teacher. Finally, one other area of further study would be to go much deeper into the possibilities offered by technology when considering the construction of subjectivity and moral reasoning. The international schools identified in this enquiry offer an interesting heuristic for exploring the ontological significance of difference. These are just three areas of work that spring to mind; one would add to the rapidly expanding body of empirical studies of the international school, whereas the other two would go to reducing the dearth of research that exists in theoretical and philosophical examinations of international education and its teachers.
References


