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Identity Maintenance & Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Quest for Ontological Security in the DPRK

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Identity Maintenance & Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Quest for Ontological Security in the DPRK

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies: September 2017

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“Let cowards flinch and traitors sneer. We’ll keep the red flag flying here.” – Kim Il Sung

Abstract

This thesis analyzes how the need for ontological security (OS), the ‘security of being’, impacts the foreign policy decision-making of states. Traditional security studies focus primarily on physical threats to the state. By contrast, an OS framework argues individuals feel secure when they are able to maintain communal narrative. This narrative in turn becomes the lens through which policymakers, and thus states, analyze events, while also becoming a potential source of conflict if challenged. Therefore, while physical security is still important, one is better positioned to account for perceptions of physical (and non-physical) threats, and subsequent policies seemingly contradictory to traditional security studies, by employing an OS framework. While this will be explored within the context of the DPRK, the applicability of such a framework is far greater, holding key insights for International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).

DPRK narrative formed out of the postcolonial nationalism of Japanese occupation, culminating into the hyper-nationalist ideology of Juche. North Korea’s seemingly ‘abnormal’ behavior might in turn be indicative of its unique national narrative and history of colonization and humiliation, leading to a different set of behavioral expectations than states whose narratives do not encompass such stories or reference points. While not all states are expected to act in the same manner as North Korea, the framework would expect them to defend and promote their respective national narratives. Moreover, while narratives can double as sources of legitimacy, as seen increasingly in the DPRK, this in no way detracts from, and merely compounds, the emphasis on narrative maintenance. Examining the historical record, it is argued the OS framework is consistently better at accounting for DPRK policies than traditional security studies. Therefore, more broadly in FPA, by taking seriously group narrative as a key component of OS, one can better account for perceptions and foreign policy decision-making.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an exceptionally interesting case study for scholars and practitioners of International Relations (IR). In addition to its topical relevance, with Pyongyang continuing to grip headlines through its bellicose rhetoric and nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the country also poses a thought-provoking theoretical question of how best to account for state behavior. Scholars and policymakers working on North Korea are almost uniform in their assessment that the regime is not ‘crazy’ or ‘irrational’, as is often portrayed in the media. At the same time, they have struggled to craft a holistic account of DPRK behavior. This is largely a result of mischaracterizations of the regime and problematized approaches to understanding Pyongyang’s perceptions and interests, all of which, it is argued, require a closer examination of DPRK identity. While recent shifts in analysis have made great strides towards this end, important gaps remain; in particular why and how does identity influence foreign policy in the DPRK, or, for that matter, states in general? Part of the problem is that the larger frameworks of IR theory within which works on the DPRK operate, suffer from similar shortcomings.

1. North Korea & International Security Theory: A Cursory Intro

Analogous to the works on North Korea explored below, there has been a historical emphasis in IR on factors that, by themselves, leave significant gaps in our understanding of state behavior. While more recent works have sought to incorporate ideational factors into the analytical picture, much remains to be done in exposing how and why they are important. Indeed, since the acceleration of constructivism, and calls by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to further examine perception, identity has taken a more central role. Yet despite this newfound enthusiasm, criticisms abound, in part due to the under-conceptualized relationship between identity and interests, usually addressed through offhanded references to how identity constitutes interests. Recent work on ontological security (OS) is therefore of great interest due to its reconceptualization of this relationship to one where states have an interest in maintaining identity. Building from these works, the thesis seeks to account for previously inexplicable state behavior by crafting an OS framework, strengthening our ability to conduct more robust analysis (Ch. 2 and 3).

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Outside of its topical relevance, selecting North Korea holds a number of important theoretical benefits. For one, the fact the DPRK is a relatively small state makes it a hard case study for an OS framework, since traditional security studies assert small states are even more at the whim of systemic forces than Great Powers (Ch. 4). Consequently, if OS is found to account for DPRK behavior, the framework will be even better placed to account for the actions of larger powers. Moreover, as a seemingly less ‘modern’ state than Western liberal democracies, studying North Korea also makes its possible to reformulate current approaches to OS and their emphasis on modernity, expanding the analytical focus to both pre and post modern states. It also allows for a broader challenge toward IR’s transatlantic focus in theory building. As former colonial states rise in prominence, it is vital that we have a framework that can adequately take into account their distinct national narratives and historical memories. As Johnston writes:

A review of the East Asia–related literature on three important clusters of theorizing—structural theories of conflict, institutional design and efficacy, and historical memory—suggests that this neglect of the region (and other regions) may come at a cost to transatlantic IR, not only in terms of data problems but also in terms of omitted or downplayed explanatory variables and theoretical arguments.4

This dissertation thus asks what is the relationship between the need for OS and foreign policy? More specifically, it asks how has the interest in maintaining national narrative influenced DPRK foreign policy decision-making?

The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed synopsis of the current status of work on the DPRK, outlining five analytical components required by any framework seeking to account for DPRK behavior. Section 3 then provides a brief overview of the OS framework and how it addresses shortcomings in literature on both IR and the DPRK. The Chapter concludes by touching on the implications of this framework for epistemology and ontology, situating itself within the internal debates of constructivism and the consequences this has for the empirical analysis that is conducted.

2. Evolutions & Gaps in Analysis on North Korea

While literature on North Korea has grown exponentially in recent years, Charles Armstrong warns “little of this can be considered "scholarship," if by this term we mean intellectually rigorous, evidence-based work grounded in original research and produced by professional academics or independent scholars.”5 While this claim may be somewhat exaggerated given the presence of important works by Oberdorfer, Carlin, Halberstam, and Suh6 on the North’s history, Portal, Harris and Cummings, Crane and Bonner, Springer, and Suk-Youg Kim’s7 exploration of art and culture,

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7 Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea (Reaktion Books, 2005); Chris Springer, Pyongyang: The Hidden History of the North Korean Capital (Entente Bt., 2003); Chris Springer, Encounters in Early North Korea: The Travel Diary of Ambassador Edwin Pauley (Sandra Books, 2009); Chris Springer, North Korea Caught in Time: Images of War and Reconstruction (Garnet,
Myer’s evaluation of literature, and the economic analysis of Woo-Cummings and Smith, there is little in the way of political science.

A majority of works, for example by Demick, Lankov, Hunter, Ryang, Martin, and Gause, aim to shed light on North Korea - the daily life of its citizens, its structure (Armstrong), regime (Hassig and Oh), caste system (Collins), and human rights and the work of NGO’s (Flake and Snyder). Others, such as Haggard and Noland, have sought to extrapolate empirical insights from refugees - one of the few instances where social science methodology is employed. Related works include accounts by refugees, such as Kang Chol-hwan, Kim Young, and Kang Hyok, as well as Demick’s accumulation of interviews with refugees. Still, one of the only true anthropological studies is that of Lee, with Ryang also providing and excellent ethnological study.

While helping to paint a picture of an elusive regime, these works do little in the way of providing elaborated insight into the processes behind DPRK foreign policy. Meanwhile those works that do elaborate on DPRK foreign policy have, as Jae-Jung Suh notes in his overview of the evolution of analytical approaches on the DPRK, been problematized by the growing realization it is necessary to focus on social and cultural factors. Suh in turn provides a strong indictment of the “consensual understanding of the North [which] is framed by perpetual Orientalistic failures to recognize the other’s agency or cultural parity, much less to understand the others history and contemporary mindset.” To this end, the authors in his work argue emphasis should be placed on the DPRK ideology of Juche. As North Korea’s ‘Eternal President’ Kim Il-sung wrote, Juche means:

being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one’s own country. This means holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one’s own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on one’s own responsibility under all circumstances.

2010); Mark Harris and Bruce Cummings, Inside North Korea (Chronicle Books, 2007); Charlie Crane and Nicholas Bonner, Charlie Crane: Welcome to Pyongyang (Chris Boot, 2009); Suk-Young Kim, Illusive Utopia, Theater, Film and Everyday Performance in North Korea (University of Michigan Press, 2010)

Brian Myers, Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK, (Cornell University East Asia Program, 1994); for a critique see Alzo David-West, “Marxism, Stalinism, and the Juche speech of 1955: on the theoretical de-Stalinization of North Korea” The Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2007)


Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee insights into North Korea (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011)


Man Woong Lee, Rural North Korea Under Communism (Texas A&M University Press, 1974)

Sonia Ryang, Reading North Korea: An Ethnological Inquiry (Harvard University Asia Center, 2012)


The authors thus advance a historical intuitionists account of Juche, which is viewed as a “a product of North Koreans experiences with colonialism, the Korean War, and economic development and that…[it] structures the way in which North Koreans behave and frames the way in which they see their world.”17 Before examining this approach further, its helps to outline the trajectory of DPRK analysis to date, as this underscores the necessity of examining ideational factors while also highlighting those facets of the DPRK that any framework must be able to account for.

2.1 Approaches to Explaining the DPRK:

Analysis on the DPRK was originally dominated by the ‘puppet-theory’, viewing North Korea within the prism of the Cold War and as subservient to Soviet whims.18 However, these approaches overlooked Pyongyang’s agency in advocating for the Korean War and USSR-DPRK friction throughout the 1950s over ideological and economic positions. It was not until the capture of the USS Pueblo, when it became apparent the North was acting independently, and the inability of the Soviets to assert any influence in the incident’s wake, that a new prism was called for.19 Any analysis must thus be able to account for this early agency and friction with patron powers.

Following the capture of the Pueblo, a new approach, exemplified by the works of Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee and Dae-Sook Suh, sought to account for DPRK behavior as interlinked with its domestic landscape and power struggles.20 This new literature laid the groundwork for what would become the totalitarian thesis, seen for example in the works of Hunter and demonstrated to be prevalent in U.S. strategic thinking by Robert Wampler,21 which focused on the control mechanism and idolization of Kim. Yet while these works could “explain the cohesiveness and independence of the North Korean state and society that the previous studies could not”22 they still placed North Korea almost exclusively within the context of the Cold War; the USSR was understood in the same manner.23

A central weakness to these approaches highlighted by Suh, and exemplified by the work of Eberstadt,24 is that their emphasis on leadership led to the conclusion that the state would collapse following the death of Kim. Not only did this not come to fruition, the North has weathered the collapse of its economy, famine, and the fall of the USSR around the same time as the succession of power to Kim Jong-il. While some, such as Sue and Lee and Becker, sought to place new emphasis on the totalitarian characteristics of Jong-il, Suh notes how others began to emphasize “social and cultural attributes to explain what seemed the North Korean peoples

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17 Suh, “Making Sense” pg. 2
19 “Kim Il Sung’s behaviour was so contradictory to the cold war puppet thesis that American officials – such as Walt Rostow and Dean Rusk…regarded the North Koreans as nuts.” Suh, “Making Sense”, pg. 5
22 Suh, “Making Sense”; pg. 5-6; See Hunter, Kim Il-songs
23 Young Chul Chung, “The Suryong System as the Center of Juche Intuition” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North Korea’s Juche, pg. 91; Chung also places works by Hassig and Oh, who emphasize elements of Confucianism in DPRK power structures, within this totalitarian approach.
24 See Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (AEI Press, 1999)
voluntarily participation in the social order". Consequently, any framework must also account for the importance of these wider social and cultural attributes.

None of this is to overlook the importance of the DPRK’s domestic power structure. A prominent factor in North Korea is *Suryong* (supreme leader). As Chung writes, the Kim dynasty “render[s] the world comprehensible to the members of society and makes their social reality seem superior to that of others...[they] bestow benevolence on the people and to whom they return his favor with their loyalty.” Divisions remain, however, over how and why this system formed. Contrary to the Cold War context of early works, Cummings was one of the first to shift analysis, emphasizing history and arguing DPRK structure is based off of a patriarchal family. Suh also cites the work of Park as a strong example of this new historical/cultural approach, while others such as Mansourov, Carlin and Wit, and McEachern have focused on pluralism in the DPRK. Chung, however, critiques these works for their continued emphasis on the power structures themselves with little regard for the factors that shaped them. Instead, he argues the system formed as a consequence of struggles that emerged over ideological disputes regarding economic development policies. Contemporary structures are thus the result of Kim’s faction combatting rival views to *Juche*, with each successive victory further institutionalizing and safeguarding its nationalist manifesto and leading progressively towards a centrally regulated government. Building from this analysis, any framework must thus be able to account for the formation of power structures in the DPRK.

More recent works on domestic power structures have also helped to showcase the centrality of *Juche* throughout the DPRK’s policy-making apparatus. Particularly important is McEachern’s work critiquing those who equate DPRK behavior to Kim’s personal rule, as this would suggest policies free from ideology or constraint. Contrary to personalist states, which focus purely on extracting personal wealth, the North has enormous social control, invests heavily in ideology, and has produced long-term, albeit flawed, development and national security goals. More apt then, according to McEachern, are works by scholars like Cummings (or defector Hwang Jang-yop), who claim “Kim is the head of an organic polity, where the body (Society and political institutions) send signals to the head, but where the head goes, the body follows.” At the same time, while adequately describing the structure under II-sung, McEachern suggests some revisions are needed to account for the bureaucratic competition that arose under Jong-il.

Following the 1998 constitution, Kim Jong II forged three separate autonomous and equal bureaucratic institutions; the National Defense Commission (NDC), Cabinet (formerly the Administrative Council) and the Party. McEachern argues this led to bureaucratic infighting and contradictory behavior. A few problems arise with this

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28 Chung, “The Suryong System”, pg. 93
29 Patrick McEachern, “North Korea’s Internal Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) Origins of North Korea’s Juche, pg. 147
analysis however. For one, it is inconsistent with recent works by high-level defectors Jang Jin-sung and Hwang Jang-yop, as well as analysis by Michael Madden, indicating the centrality of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), which was elevated by Jong-il in the 1980s to help solidify his succession, attaining a status where “not even the military…can hold power away from the OGD.” Contrary to McEachern then, even seemingly contradictory foreign policy positions would seem to have required OGD clearance. Secondly, while the three institutions may have slightly varied preferences, Juche appears to underscore each.

For example McEachern argues that while the NDC and Party generally promote similar lines, for example advocating against U.S. inspections of the Kumchangement nuclear facility in 1998, the Party did so on ideological principals of sovereignty, the NDC due to ‘pragmatic’ concerns over allowing access to military sites while also asserting its right to nuclear weapons. Yet Party concerns over sovereignty and military claims regarding their right to nuclear weapons are positions both seemingly indebted to Juche. Even the less ‘hardline’ cabinet seems to maintain comparable ideological positions, for example justifying the North’s 1998 missile launch as the “recognized rights of a sovereign state for independence”. While the cabinet may be more favorable towards engagement as a means of attaining aid, it would thus be hesitant of deals undermining the Juche discourse. And indeed McEachern does acknowledge this to some extent, writing “policy decisions are still framed within and justified by ideological terms” and that “[t]he range of policy alternatives is more restrained and predictable than previous analyses have allowed…a close reader of the North Korean press can delineate the type and scope of North Korea’s policy responses to external events.” Thus not only are all these institutions centrally directed, they are also embedded within similar ideological foundations.

There is also reason to question McEachern’s assertion that DPRK behavior after nuclear inspections in May 1999 was contradictory, especially since Michishita demonstrates how it followed a pattern of brinkmanship seen throughout the 1990s. To this end, Jang outlines how subsequent military clashes after 1999, rather than the result of a rogue bureaucratic institution, were actually a premeditated strategy developed within the OGD and United Front Department. Michishita also shows how this stance was a continuation of aggressiveness that has historically characterized DPRK behavior, suggesting the provocation–dialogue dichotomy surrounding nuclear talks throughout the 1990s was part of a larger ploy to attain policy objectives that had been in place for some time. All of this helps to reinforce Chung’s position that emphasis should be placed on the society within which DPRK structures operate. Any DPRK framework must therefore be able to account for the apparent continued emphasis the regime as a whole places on Juche.

Historians working on the DPRK have made great headway in addressing some of the analytical needs noted thus far. However they too have been undermined by their struggle to unravel mechanisms of process.

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30 Jang Jin-sung, Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee—A Look Inside North Korea (Atria, 2014), pg. 316
31 Patrick McEachern, Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics (Columbia University Press, 2011), pg. 105
32 McEachern, “Internal Politics”, pg. 138
33 McEachern, Inside, pg. 139
34 Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (Routledge, 2011), pg. 14
35 See for example Sue Mi Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea” International Journal of Korean Studies, Vo. XVII, No. 2 (Fall, 2013)
2.2 Historians & Historical Intuitionalists:

Historians were some of the first to begin emphasizing the importance of Juche and ideational factors in North Korea. Of particular importance is the work of Lerner, who was one of the first scholars to utilize declassified Soviet documents to garner a more nuanced understanding of the DPRK.\textsuperscript{36} Similar to the puppet theory, Lerner argues recent analysis has failed to try and unearth the motivation behind DPRK behavior, and argues more emphasize should be placed on Juche as well as on domestic economic and political considerations on foreign policy.

His conclusions come in contrast to Andrei Lankov, who has also explored archival records to examine the North’s formative years.\textsuperscript{37} Unfortunately Lankov’s analysis has failed to take into account more recent records, leading him to still portray Kim as a “little Stalin” even though new documents “highlights another, perhaps greater motivation...postcolonial revolutionary nationalism.” In turn Jin Woong Kang,\textsuperscript{38} much like Lerner, writes, “while the regime's anti-American mobilization has come from above, people's politics of hatred, patriotism, and emotion have been reproduced from below,” reinforcing the notion above that Juche must be taken seriously.

Additional overviews of Juche include works by Oh and Hassig, David-West, and Hale,\textsuperscript{40} while historical overviews include works by Cummings and Koo and Nahm on the national context of the Korean War, and Balazs Szalontai who utilized Hungarian archives to demonstrate Kim’s nationalism from 1953-1964.\textsuperscript{41} Kathryn Weathersby has also investigated Kim’s views on nationalism and the use of force following the Korean War, while Kwon and Chung have explored the use of “charismatic politics”.\textsuperscript{43} In an interrelated account Bleiker\textsuperscript{44} posits that competing forms of Korean identity is one of the fundamental issues driving tension between North and South Korea. A counterpoint to these works is Myers\textsuperscript{45} who has focused on race in the DPRK and its replication of Imperial Japan. However his work has faced great criticism, particularly by David-West who, for example, demonstrated that Kim

\textsuperscript{42} Kathryn Weathersby, “The Enigma of the North Korean Regime: Back to the Future?” in James M. Lister (ed.), Challenges Posed by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2005)
\textsuperscript{43} Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012)
\textsuperscript{44} Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea, Toward a Culture of Reconciliation (University of Minnesota Press, 2008)
Il Sung’s Juche speech of 1955 was “not only nationalist, but also grounded in the Stalinist political tradition inaugurated in the Soviet Union in 1924.” Unfortunately, despite this growing consensus regarding the importance of nationalism and Juche, these primarily historical accounts overlook mechanisms of process. One is thus left asking why and how ideology and nationalism inform DPRK policy and if this process is representative of a broader thought process.

The same situation arises with those works addressing the importance of history in North Korea. In the 1970’s Yong-Ho Ch’oc explored North Korean attempts to rewrite Korean historiography, which prior to 1945 had been dominated by (somewhat anti-Korean) Japanese scholars. In contrast to their Southern counterparts, who merely sought to rectify Japanese historical transgressions, Ch’oc demonstrates how the North attempted to rewrite history and stresses the importance history has played within nationalism and the regime, a sentiment reinforced through the work of Petrov. Again, while alluding to the relationship between history and policy, little is done to clarify what this relationship entails, focusing instead on analyzing the context of the history itself. Thus while many scholars, such as Cha note “[i]n order to understand North Korea, one must begin with a look at the way they view their own history”, they often never elaborate on why. Consequently, there is a need to further demonstrate the role of perception in the DPRK, investigating the history it propagates of itself and the mechanisms through which identity influences foreign policy.

To this end, one of the main contributions of Suh and his colleagues are how they begin to translate much of this fantastic historical work into the realm of political science. They argue that in order to explain the commonality shared amongst North Koreans and their difference vis-à-vis others, “requires more explicit attention to the “institutional landscape” in which political actors seek influence.” To this end, critical moments have feedback loops that impact current perceptions; because the USSR occupied the North, socialist and nationalist institutions were promoted, making room for Kim, while in the South nationalist and socialist forces were opposed by the U.S. Military Government.

While an excellent addition to the literature, there are problems with this approach. For one, the authors never truly apply this to specific case studies, focusing more on the formation of the Juche institution. While an important feat in its own right, like with much of the more general literature on institutions one is left wondering why there is such a connection between individuals and the group, and how it comes to actually impact decision-making and perceptions. There is a missing step between the seemingly emotional connection individuals have with these institutions and group behavior, which in turn could go a long way in explaining the relationship between

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46 David-West, “Juche speech of 1955”
49 Victor Cha, The Impossible State North Korea Past and Future (Vintage, 2013), pg. 17
50 Suh, “Making Sense”, pg. 8, 9
Juche and DPRK foreign policy. Accordingly, there is a need to further establish the relationship between Juche/national identity and foreign policy decision-making.

Given the preceding analysis, a new analytical framework is required to help account for various gaps in current DPRK literature. While some of these have been addressed in the literature piecemeal, there has yet to be a more holistic framework. In particular there are five general areas of concern:

1. Account for early DPRK agency and its friction with patron powers as seen, for example, during the Korean War, post-war reconstruction, and during the run up to and course of the Second Korean War;
2. Account for the DPRK’s wider social and cultural attributes and the seeming resonance between the narrative propagated by the regime with the DPRK populace;
3. Account for the formation of domestic power structures;
4. Account for the continued emphasis on Juche;
5. Explain How and Why Juche influences foreign policy decision-making.

It is argued OS helps to address these various concerns vis-à-vis North Korea. More generally, it also re-conceptualizes how we account for the relationship between national identity, perceptions and foreign policy, and helps to forge a new framework that can be applied to a wide range of case studies. The OS framework would in turn expect state (DPRK) foreign policy to be aimed at maintaining and asserting national identity (Juche), even if this means jeopardizing more traditional security goals.


The dissertation argues OS advances IR and FPA in two central ways; it addresses shortcomings in the theorized relationship between identity and interests and it helps to account for actor perceptions. Only once these two components can be accounted for can one even begin to talk about physical state security (Ch. 2). Following in line with recent shifts toward the individual level of security and the works of R.D. Laing and Anthony Giddens, it is argued individuals are motivated by their need for OS to maintain a perceived consistent self-narrative, which is linked to one’s community. In brief, Giddens writes “to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, “answers” to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses.” The most important is that of self-identity, meaning we must be able to provide a coherent and sustained narrative of the Self. Perceived discontinuity leads to ontological insecurity, what Laing terms an ‘inner deadness’. The dissertation argues that given the interconnectivity between self-identity and community, threats to the foundation of one’s community (e.g. nation) constitute an ideational threat to the self. Foreign policy is thus best understood within an OS framework, with policymakers, and thus states, responding to situations in different ways depending on if an ontological

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53 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 47
threat is perceived. This in turn generates distinct expectations from traditional security studies; rather than starting with states as the subject of security, it focuses on how individuals have an interest in maintaining national narrative.

Much of Giddens work on OS is entwined with modernity. This is because, according to Giddens, the Self is no longer an inherited static entity, but a biographical narrative interlinked with one's chosen 'lifestyles' that provide daily rituals and “material form to a particular narrative of self-identity.” This corresponds to Goffman’s Umwelt, “a core of (accomplished) normalcy with which individuals and groups surround themselves.” By safeguarding the Umwelt individuals can ensure the continuation of stability and trust necessitated for OS. Here the dissertation raises two arguments. First, that society has always constituted the means by which the Self is created meaning OS threats need not be limited to modernity, but to threats toward this more timeless relationship. The second is that even in modernity society has a structuring influence, indicating the continuation of this fundamental relationship.

Building from the work of Pagel, it is argued that communal narrative was part of mankind’s mechanisms for establishing the parameters of altruistic groups or “mutual aid societies”. In order to determine altruistic compatriots, Pagel asserts groups formed social cues that can be equated to Giddens lifestyles. One’s community thus structures and constitutes available lifestyles, meaning the Umwelt and OS has always been partially dependent on maintaining community – a relationship that continues today with the nation and nation state. Policymakers’ needs for OS thus leads to behavior aimed at safeguarding these rituals by maintaining the nation, a socially constructed entity that emerges out of discourse and shared myths. This means policymakers (and thus states), motivated by OS, have an interest in asserting and maintaining national narrative. Using this discursive approach we can see the DPRK as emerging out of Japanese colonization (a process undertaken in Ch. 4).

Viewing national narrative as a social representation helps to show how it might influence foreign policy (Ch. 3). Representations are the “collective elaboration of a social object by a community for the purpose of behaving and communicating, thereby turning into reality.” Society then is a sort of ‘consensual universe’ comprised of mutually shared representations where “everyone feels at home.” By taking this sense of home to be equivalent to the Umwelt, we begin to form a picture of how groups approach social interactions. Once forged, communal narratives, like all other representations, become the existing world into which new information enters and is then re-presented into something that becomes either socially acceptable or unacceptable. The later can lead to a ‘personal crisis’; “unexpected events that intrude into the Umwelt...punctu[ing] the protective mantle of ontological security and caus[ing] alarm”. It is here a state would attempt to counter the OS threat.

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55 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 81
56 See Erving Goffman’s Relations in Public
57 Mark Pagel, Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation (Penguin, 2013)
60 Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 24
61 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 131
It is not the existence of difference, or an Other, therefore that generates conflict as Summer, Mercer, Rousseau, Huntington or Neumann contend. Nor is conflict associated with the negative othering of Kant, Hegel and Foucault (applied in IR by Campbell, Klein, Connolly, Neumann) required in forming the Self. Instead as Gordon Allport found, in-group attachment is “psychologically primary” and while out-group hostility can aid in in-group cohesion, it is not required (see also Brewer, Lebow, Gries). Rather it is the contents of a group’s reflexive narrative that determines when and if conflict might arise depending on if OS is threatened and how that threat is responded to. This could in turn help account for DPRK behavior that contradicts previous theories. Finally, while work on OS has tended to focus on instances where identity is challenged, where it is reactive, for example Belgians decision to enter WWI, there is a need to also address its proactive elements; the role it plays in forming future action or what Giddens terms ‘life-planning’. Narratives let us know where we want to go, what Hopf views as the discursive practices of identity (see also Ringmar, Moscovici, Liu and Hilton). Narrative can thus be challenged, forcing one to react, but can also be proactive.

Having laid out the basic tenants of the OS argument – which will be examined in further detail over Chapters 2 and 3 – it now becomes important to elaborate on where the framework falls within the constructivist approach to IR, which in turn has epistemological and ontological implications that deserve clarification. This also helps to situate and inform the empirical portion of the dissertation.

4. Specifying Constructivism: Ontology & Epistemology

The foundation of constructivism is the belief that it is intersubjective rules that are of importance rather than some set of intrinsic laws. Importantly, as Guzzini notes, constructivism is not a form of “pure voluntarism…rules and norms guide the behavior of actors, and they are intersubjective, not individual.” A second element is the call to take seriously the “interpretivist and the sociological turn in the social sciences” which in turn has implications for the theoretical level of observation (ontology and epistemology), level of action (individual or intersubjective) and the relationship between the two. While constructivists tend to agree on the level of action, the extent to which they view social entities within their ontology and their epistemological claims, differ. From this, one can roughly divide constructivism into conventional, interpretive, and radical schools of thought.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue, “constructivism’s distinctiveness lies in its theoretical...
arguments, not in its empirical research strategies.” Therefore, while the dissertation does not argue one school is universally superior to others, the presence of debate makes it important to situate one’s work. The following therefore seeks to merely articulate the methodological implications of the above OS framework. It is argued this framework can, contrary to conventional constructivism, only discern constitutive, not causal, relationships (McSweeney, Hansen), moving more towards interpretive constructivism. Still, so long as one adheres to scientific rigor they can produce useful generalizations to help calculate the probability of an event within the confines of its time/space dependency. This follows the turn towards pragmatism, fusing constructivist ontology with the epistemological implications of the pragmatist philosophy of science, meaning researchers can make mid-level generalizations without succumbing to many of the epistemological debates that have plagued IR.

4.1 Level of Analysis & Observation:

To begin with the point of most consensus, constructivists focus on the intersubjective level of action, as drawn from constructivist social theory. In short, “there are no natural laws of society”, instead the social world “is an intersubjective domain: it is meaningful to people who made it and live in it.” Building from Weber, constructivists argue that in order to understand human action one must thus first understand the social setting they operate within and what knowledge they have. According to Tannenwald this means we should look at “ideologies or shared belief systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, and policy prescriptions.”

It helps here to turn to the work of Adler, who makes note of the scientific difference between being, a static concept, and becoming, a concept of everything as in flux. Realism and neorealism largely adhere to a picture of being; “[i]t looks for the recurrent, for stability, and tries to predict the future from past events”, treating the international system as independent from the units that constitute it. Yet this is a problematic view as, “the actors in politics have memories, they learn from experience. They have goals, aspirations, and calculative strategies. Memory, learning, goal seeking and problem solving intervene between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’.”

There are no universal social laws, only intersubjective ones, and this must be the focus of the social sciences. To this end, the dissertation focuses on intersubjective national narratives and the relationship these have with OS and decision-making.

Moving from the level of action, one must address the level of observation. This pertains to constructivism’s challenge of positivism (the meta-theoretical position that social science can generate causal statements) and empiricism (we have direct access to empirical data). Starting with empiricism, there are two points that need to be highlighted for they in turn have implications for one’s position on positivism. The first is a universally shared tenant of constructivism, that there is a difference between the natural and social world. Unlike a brute fact, money (a social or ‘institutional’

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69 Guzzini, “A Reconstruction”, pg. 155,161
70 Tannenwald 2005: 15, cited in Jackson, “Social Constructivism”, pg. 166
71 Emmanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (Psychology Press, 2005), pg. 65-66
72 Adler, Communitarian, pg. 67
fact) can only exist in the presence of intersubjective beliefs and practices that constitute it: “[h]uman relations, including international relations, consist of thoughts and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces.”

It is with the second point on empiricism that agreement in constructivism ends, and the fissure between ‘conventional’ and ‘interpretivist’ constructivists arises. Interpretivists, such as Guzzini, argue that while constructivism does not eliminate the presence of the natural world, we can only access this world through discursive practices, meaning there are no “language-independent observations.” Hansen stresses that discursive approaches do not discount material facts; they merely set out to “study how these are produced and prioritized”, while Jackson emphasizes that what is important are the “the ideas and understandings according to which those [physical] assets are conceived, organized and used.”

Conventional constructivists such as Wendt contend, however, that some social facts are objective, allowing for causal explanations and positivism. Positivism builds from a reflective ontology and epistemology wherein reality is separate from cognition and social construction, and as such can be accurately described and observed, resulting in universal truth statements. Conventional constructivists thus tend to bracket the actual construction of norms and identity, focusing instead on their causal implications. As Checkel quips, they merely want to ‘get on with research’ rather than remain hung up on epistemological debates. Given that part of the dissertation’s framework focuses on opening up the “state I”, epistemologically it follows the dissertation must shift away from conventional constructivism’s use of positivism.

Kratowhil and Ruggie’s work on institutions further bolsters this shift on epistemological grounds. Given the social creation of institutions they argue we lack an “external Archimedian point” from which to examine and assess them as they ‘really are’, meaning “the concept of regimes, like the concept of "power," or "state," or "revolution," will remain a "contestable concept". An institution’s ontology resides on the intersubjective beliefs and norms that constitute it, making it impossible to conduct positivist research where there is a separation between subject and object, where “objective” forces have causal relationships, and where intersubjective meaning is deduced from behavior. This leads to a situation where “epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology!” Similarly, while norms may “guide…inspire…rationalize or justify”

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73 Jackson, “Social Constructivism”, pg. 164
75 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Rutledge, 2006), pg. 23
76 Jackson, “Social Constructivism”, pg. 165
77 Emmanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground Constructivism in World Politics” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pg. 321
79 Emmanuel Adler, “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, Debates”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations (Sage, Second Edition, 2012), pg. 116
81 Peter Hass and Ernst Haas, “Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Relations” Millennium, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July, 2002), pg. 583
behavior, it is difficult to conceive of norms as “causing” a phenomenon “in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death.”

In their attempt to help forge a theoretical consensus, Haas and Haas thus suggest that positivism is no longer appropriate, with Ruggie and Kratochwil advocating for an interpretivist epistemology. Interpretivist constructivists thus argue for a social epistemology and a focus on ‘understanding’, following the linguistic turn based off the works of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. By asking “how possible” questions, scholars such as Kratochwil, Onuf, Liften, Crawford, and Weldes seek to “explore the role of language in mediating and constructing social reality.” Rather than looking for causal explanations, such as how a norm effects state interests, they examine the linguistic constructs and discourses that allowed for such an impact to begin with.

4.2 ‘Understanding’ in IR:

Interpretivism and understanding in IR has been underscored by Max Weber’s Verstehen, the notion that accounts of social reality are interpretations with meanings of their own, separate from the actions they wish to describe. Debates have raged between rationalists, who in their attempt to study meaning view interpretation as an epistemological problem overcome through “empathetic understanding and pattern recognition”, and relativists (primarily postmodernists) who argue interpretation is insurmountable and will remain just that, the investigator’s interpretations, which are themselves grounded in language and not objective reality.

There are largely three approaches to interpretation that follow an objective logic, where the interpreter ‘stands over’ their subject so as to “understand the subjective meaning of action (grasping the actor’s beliefs, desires and so on) yet do so in an objective manner”. This includes empathic identification (built from Dilthey), phenomenological sociology (built from Cicourel and Garfinkel and influenced by Schutz) and language games (built form Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations). These approaches, however, have faced severe criticism, particularly from Gadamer and Taylor, who (building from Heidegger) refute the argument of hermeneutics as a “methodological foundation for the human sciences.” Instead they assert, “understanding is not, in the first instance, a procedure – or rule governed undertaking; rather, it is a very condition of being human. Understanding is interpretation...we are always taking something as something.” Adler argues constructivists can overcome this by focusing on the ontological implications of Verstehen; the subject of social science research has already been interpreted within the social world. “Verstehen, in fact, is social reality.”

Vincent Pouliot has recently expanded on this while seeking to account for Maja Zehfuss’ critique of various strands of constructivism found under Wendt, Kratochwil

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82 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization”, pg.767
83 Ibid, pg.766
84 Adler, “Constructivism”, pg. 116
85 Jeffrey Checkel, “Constructivism and EU Politics” in Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark Pollack and Ben Osamond (eds.) A Handbook of European Union Politics (Sage, 2006), pg. 58
86 Checkel, “Constructivism”, pg. 58
87 Adler, “Seizing”, pg. 326
88 Thomas A. Schwandt, “Three Epistemological Stances For Qualitative Inquiry: Interpretivism, Hermeneutics, and Social Constructionism” in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage, 2000), pg. 193
89 Schwandt, “Three Epistemological Stances”, pg. 194
90 Adler, “Seizing”, pg. 326-327
and Onuf, noting how, respectively, “methodological shortcuts that lead the analyst to reify identities, norms or materiality run counter to constructivism’s core assumption that reality is socially constructed.” At the same time, while hailing the work of Francois Debrix – who sought to underline the linguistic overlap of constructivism and poststructuralism – he goes on to argue that emphasis should not be placed on language alone as this is but “one of several ‘stations’ on the bridge between the various mechanisms of the social construction of reality.”91 Championing the work of Taylor and Searle, Pouliot instead argues that social facts should be seen as the “essence of constructivism”, moving towards a “nonfoundationalist” approach.92

He argues there is a difference between “the act of essentialization [and] the observation of essentialization.”93 As analysts we must avoid undertaking acts of essentialization. However, it is possible to make observations regarding the essentializations or reifications94 that actors make daily. Continued reification eventually results in a social fact – individuals will treat it as if it were objective or ‘real’. Thus social facts are “ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective; their existence depends on collective meanings, though not necessarily on the individual agent’s particular beliefs.”95 It is here, Pouliot argues, constructivism can find common ground. Scholars should thus make observations in regards to reality as perceived by the agents at hand, not as it really is. While these observations are interpretations, for we cannot study intersubjective meanings objectively, Pouliot, employing Taylor, stresses:

some interpretations make more sense than others, and constructivists should strive to observe/interpret agents’ acts of essentialization as empathetically as possible. The impossibility of objective observation is no reason for not trying to pragmatically interpret social reality with as much detachment as possible.96

To this end Haas and Haas write, “while post-structuralists focus on the influence of political practice on social science…we tend to reject the notion that this influence is a general causal phenomenon.”97 Consequently, one need not journey all the way into the poststructuralist (radical constructivist) camp,98 while Pouliot’s de facto turn towards pragmatism (explored below) is of great use in buttressing against relativism.

Following this overview, one can formulate what essentially becomes a two-stage approach to research. For example, Pouliot notes how scholars working on security communities do not accept their existence a priori, instead they are determined to exist (or not) as a product of research. Only once a security community has been observed (phase 1), “can one study the social and political implications of such a social fact” (phase 2). Hopf provides a potentially fruitful example for such a two-

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93 “Wendt depoliticizes the construction of identities because he takes corporate identity as a methodological starting point; Kratochwil depoliticizes processes of communication because he conceives intersubjectivity as a neutral realm; and Onuf depoliticizes material conditions because he considers them to be natural limits to speech acts.” Pouliot, “The Essence”, pg. 328
94 Berger and Luckmann define a reified world wide as “a dehumanized world”, one which man has no control over for it has been granted ontological status independent of humans. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Random House, 1966), pg. 106
95 Pouliot, “The Essence”, pg. 329
96 Ibid
97 Ibid
98 While poststructuralists view consensus as suspect at best, pragmatic constructivism, outlined below, “regard(s) consensus as an instrumental step to political change and progress”. Haas and Haas, “Pragmatic Constructivism”, pg. 582
Employing linguistic techniques, he begins his work by recreating Russian identity through contextual and intertextual analysis. He then continued from this initial phase to explore the relationship this identity had with Russian foreign policy. In essence there is, to some extent, a fusion between the interpretivist focus on identity formation with a more conventional ethos of demonstrating the relationship between identity and behavior.

In a similar vein, the dissertation will first reconstruct DPRK national identity through discourse analysis and then apply this identity within the OS framework, generating behavioral expectations that are then placed against DPRK foreign policy (Ch.4). This allows one to circumvent problems of tautology, which Kowert notes has plagued works on identity – with scholars often inferring an identity type from sustained behavior and then using that identity to account for the behavior. All of this in turn allows for a “theoretically vibrant and rigorous research agenda that speaks to pertinent political issues”. But if not causal statements, what are we left with?

While some have sought to expand the use of the word “causal” to align more with its general usage, i.e. as having some sort of impact, this is of little help in scientific studies. To make the word too elastic is to lose its potency. Instead the dissertation seeks to adhere to calls for the adoption of a pragmatist philosophy of science, a sentiment best articulated by Hass and Haas, who write “[it is] capable of generating useful mid level truths without falling prey to the unresolvable philosophical, ontological and epistemological debates posed in unnecessarily dichotomous terms that currently bedevil the study of international relations.” Pragmatic constructivism builds from Pierce, Dewey, and James’ pragmatist philosophy of science, moving away from objectivism or relativism and towards a focus on rational persuasion.

### 4.3 Pragmatism & Midlevel Truth Claims:

Pragmatism can be viewed as emerging in light of centuries of work, from Vico and Kant to Wittgenstein, repeatedly demonstrating the shortcomings of ontological realism and a correspondence theory of truth. Pragmatism calls for a focus on practical problems rather than trying to forge an unattainable catchall epistemology, allowing one to move away from positivism while still applying “rigor and relevance.”

As James wrote, “‘no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but…any one of them may from some point of view be useful’.” In place of forging universal truth statements, the success of a theory is instead dependent on its ability to address the practical problem at hand. “‘Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest’…Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them

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99 Hopf, Social Construction
101 Hansen, Security, pg. 1
104 Hass and Haas, “Pragmatic” pg. 585
up and sets each one at work.”  

This concept led Franke and Weber to note an important rift between those who view pragmatism as a theory and those who view it as a philosophy, where all theories are viewed as potentially useful tools. Here, they turn to James who wrote pragmatism, “lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it...But they all are on the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms.” One realm of pragmatists scholarship is thus located within one of the rooms, avidly seeking to forge a superior pragmatist theory, while the second realm is the philosophical hallway itself, utilizing the various rooms (theories) as useful tools. These theoretical approaches must eventually enter the hallway, as too must the OS framework.

In order to successfully pass through this corridor of social practice a theory must be determined to be useful, thereby achieving the status of truth. While James views truth as verified through experience, a sentiment reminiscent of positivism, he goes on to note that direct and indirect verification is possible, stating the formers reliance on a correspondence theory of truth is too narrow. This is largely due to the fact that the background against which we test theories evolves and thus might come to contradict previous theories; “experience ‘has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas.’” We can, however, still develop useful generalizations and “mid level truth claims” useful for navigating life. As Kratowchil writes, “[I]logical empiricists have a derogatory name for such changing truths: relativism, but such truths are real, while the absolute fully axiomized truth is imaginary.”

James used specific criteria, including “usefulness for prediction, conservation of past doctrine [and] simplicity”, as attached to statements, to determine their expediency. Similarly, Dewey holds that truth verification resides on the ability of the hypothetical concept to generate dependent results, a notion built upon the sentiment, similar to Wittgenstein, that all science shares at least a fundamental activity that allows for a common ground. Objectivity is then to be found in experience; by placing doubt out of the purview of our mind, thereby eliminating the practical problem, it becomes objective so long as that doubt is kept at bay. In this sense “verification rests on...whether it yields dependable results to the practical problem concerned.”

Subsequently, there is a reliance on persuasion, where good reasons can help expedite persuasiveness, especially when debating with fellow practitioners. This approach has been dubbed a consensus theory of knowledge. Here truth “is a matter for deliberation within a community of inquirers...putting forth reasons and arguments which are evaluated on the basis of their fit with the evidence, the objective conditions of the

106 Franke and Weber “Papini hotel” pg. 670-671
109 Franke and Weber, “Papini hotel”, pg. 671
110 James, “Pragmatism”, pg. 583, Cited in Franke and Weber, “Papini hotel”, pg. 683
112 Franke and Weber, “Papini hotel”, pg. 684
113 Cochran, “Deweyan Pragmatism”; pg. 544
situation, and their ability to improve upon it in accordance with the purposes of the affected community”. Regarding the social sciences, this could include “policy relevance, simplicity (if that e.g. means an easy application of the theory), complexity (if that e.g. means comprehensiveness), context-sensitivity, context-independence, high degree of corroboration through past and present cases, potential to inspire further theories or new vocabularies and so on.”

Cheryl Misak surmises it is a “‘deflated’ theory of truth, which can only put forward the best notion of truth available given where inquiry has come to rest in light of the evidence and argument that is present at the time; it is a notion of truth that is objective in so far as it is independent of the impulses of individuals and is instead what a group of inquirers have collectively arrived at.” As Haas writes in his intimately related work on evolutionary epistemology, while we cannot ‘know’ reality for this is constantly changing, meaning we are “condemned to settle for successive approximations to reality”, understanding, while temporally bound, can still be consensual. Progress is thus possible on a modest scale either through theory development or by making complex problems more understandable.

The dissertation thus seeks to generate midlevel truth claims addressing shortcomings in current approaches to North Korea and IR, thereby entering the corridor of social practice. The framework will be seen as true if it helps to address these shortcomings by generating more accurate predictions and better accounts of the foreign policy of the DPRK compared to previous approaches, leading to an improved theory.

5. Outline

The preceding has established important gaps in literature on North Korea, in particular highlighting five issue areas that any framework on the DPRK must be able to account for. It also suggested that many of these gaps relate to larger theoretical shortcomings in IR and FPA. Chapter 2 thus seeks to examine in greater detail gaps in security studies and the need for an OS framework. This framework is then further refined in Chapter 3 within the context of FPA.

In line with this theoretical framework, Chapter 4 outlines the dissertation’s methodology and framework for examining North Korea. It then goes on to conduct the first portion of empirical research, employing discourse analysis on North Korean texts so as to reveal DPRK national identity. To this end, it examines the annual DPRK New Years Address (a ‘State of the Union’) housed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the four DPRK constitutions and ‘Ten Principles For Establishing the Monolithic Ideological System’, as well as the official biographies on, and selected works and speeches of, Kim Il Sung, all published by the Pyongyang Foreign Broadcasting House. These were all selected given their representation of general discourse in the DPRK. Conducting discourse analysis allows one to justify temporally bracketing narrative for the periods under review, as well as pinpointing potential internal conflicts that might arise due to domestic OS

114 Franke and Weber, “Papini hotel”; pg. 685
117 Hass and Haas, “Pragmatic”; pg. 592-593
118 Hansen, Security
concerns. Secondly, it allows one to develop behavioral expectations specific to North Korea, locating key components of narrative that, if challenged, will generate a response, and that will also help to guide proactive policies.

Having established DPRK narrative, the empirical analysis then goes on in Chapter 5 and 6 to verify if the behavioral expectations derived from the OS framework correspond with the DPK’s historical record better than alternative expectations routed in traditional security studies. All of this will then be cross-referenced against archival records of previously classified Soviet and DPRK documents. It then becomes possible to see if vocalized policy lines and narrative translate into ‘behind door’ stances and tangible policies, in a similar methodological approach as Hopf. Finally, Chapter 7 surmises the empirical findings and extrapolates the importance of an OS framework for other works.
Chapter 2
The Need for An Ontological Security Framework

I concentrate attention at the international level because the effects of structure are usually overlooked or misunderstood and because I am writing a theory of international politics, not of foreign policy. – Kenneth Waltz

Prior to Waltz, and the introduction of neorealism, work on international security was intimately tied with foreign policy and with the agency of individuals. The thesis argues the field should re- emphasize the importance of foreign policy, incorporating unit level factors to provide a more holistic account of state behavior. Specifically, it argues for the need to interject an OS framework, wherein actors have an interest in maintaining a perceived consistent self-identity. This argument progresses over two chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the need to interject OS into IR. Chapter 3 then outlines the mechanisms through which such a framework operates within the context of FPA, while also expanding upon the content and stability of narratives.

Chapter 2 progresses over three sections, demonstrating how the individual need for OS impacts inter-state relations. Section one examines how traditional security studies, by failing to focus on individual needs that lend meaning to the term security have led to inadequate analysis. Seeking to refocus the analytical lens, section two introduces work on OS, examining how one’s community has historically acted as the anchor for a stable sense of self-identity. Given this relationship, section three explores how communities are forged out of narrative, meaning individuals have an interest in maintaining communal narrative. The chapter concludes by placing this framework against similar ideational accounts of IR. Despite the newfound enthusiasm identity has enjoyed, criticisms abound, in part due to the under conceptualized relationship between identity and interests – usually addressed through offhanded references to how identity constitutes interests. OS re-conceptualizes this relationship into one where there is an interest in maintaining identity, meaning it is the perception of an OS threat, and not the existence of difference, that provides the space necessary for conflict to break out.

1. What is Security?

Within the modern conception of the term, the noun ‘security’ portrays a material image – e.g. as a gun. Security is a commodity we obtain and as such is a negative freedom, the freedom from some material threat. By contrast McSweeney suggests we must also address the positive form of freedom, ‘secure’, related more to “enabling, making something possible”. Such an approach focuses on the individual human sense of being secure, “embodied in the primal relationship.” The two forms are intertwined since the “subject who wants to be secure also needs to be defended.”

119 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979), pg. 175
121 For a critique see McSweeney, Security; Berenskoetter, “Parameters”; Steele, “Ontological Security”
122 E.G. the relationship between mother and child, “a quality making each secure in the other.” McSweeney, Security, pg. 14-15
Reviewing security we find that “etymologically…the freedom of security is related to the possession of knowledge, confidence in the predictability of things, in knowing the objective order.” The individual human is thus ‘secure’ when they have knowledge and confidence, allowing them to have a freedom from concern, a carelessness. As shown below, this reading is inline with that of the ontologically secure individual. Current security studies tend to overlook this reading however, focusing instead on the physical survival of the state.

Leaving aside the fact that, as Mitzen argues, the concept of state physical security is more convoluted than is often acknowledged, the real issue is how the positive freedom of security was eliminated from analysis in favor of focusing on freedom from material threat towards the state. Yet individuals must remain the subjects of security. “It is not just a question of the object which needs to be secured…but of where we must sit the ultimate ground and rationale for securing anything (the subject)”, leading McSweeney to advocate a shift towards human security. People are the main subject of security, with the human need to protect values lending meaning to the term ‘security’, yet little is done to conceive of this relationship at the state level. We cannot determine what security is, therefore, without looking at what makes the individual secure. “In effect the means have become the end; the object has become the subject of security when the state is made the ultimate referent.”

Contra traditional security studies, an OS framework therefore adds a focus on ideational threats to the individual’s sense of being secure. This follows the broader argument put forward by some constructivist; that conceptions of security vary with identity (Katzensein, Hopf, Ringmar, Krause and Williams, McSweeney, Farrell, Weldes et al., and Kowert), which in turn helps to formulate what is interpreted as a security threat. An OS framework therefore expects quite different policies than those employing a traditional security framework, whose sidelining of individual security, it is argued, leads to limitations in analysis.

1.1 Individuals in Security Studies:

Overall McSweeney notes four main periods of security work. The first period, or ‘political theory era’, came about during the formation of IR within academia in 1919 and largely revolved around concepts of common security. Scholars such as Wright, Herz, Brodie and Wolfers maintained an interdisciplinary approach to security, incorporating international law, organizations, and political theory to explore the “political, psychological and economic aspects of war and peace.” These works were still largely in the realm of foreign policy. For example Herz stressed the benefits of pursuing “a conscious balance-of-power policy” as opposed to more emotional, nationalist driven, policies, while Wolfers, emphasized how “any major

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123 ibid, pg.17
124 Are there essential physical elements the state must remain, or if merely an aggregate then what percentage of a population must die, or territory be conquered for the state to be dead? Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security”, pg. 351
126 McSweeney, Security, pg. 33-34
128 McSweeney, Security, pg. 32
psychological and cultural, or major social and political, or legal, or technological change in the world” must be balanced less war break out.130

Following the mid 1950s, security studies became a more privatized subsection of IR, leading to Walt’s “Golden age”131 and the adoption of a scientific approach and quantitative analysis. It was also during this period, and the advent of what Richard Ashley termed neorealism,132 that security became envisioned as the property of the state. The Golden Age thus overlooks analysis on what constitutes a threat to individuals – what makes them feel ‘non-secure’ – leading to a static view of interests.

Unlike the classical realism of Morgenthau or Carr,133 which called for a more contingent understanding of the state and international security premised around foreign policy, neorealism instead focuses primarily on structure,134 leading Kowert to surmise “they say nothing about who the actors are or how their interests were constituted.”135 Neorealists largely function in the same vein as neoclassical economics, where preferences are exogenously given to revolve around (the highly contested notion of) power.136 For example Waltz assumes that the processes determining the fundamental identity of states are “exogenous to the states' environments, global or domestic.”137 Yet as Ringmar notes, “It is only as some-one that we can want some-thing, and it is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want.”138 While Waltz does not necessarily discount unit level factors, by focusing solely on the systemic level he underestimates their level of importance. This all relates to Frederick Frey’s article outlining the need to specify who the actors are within a system.139 Yet both neorealism and neoliberalism embed in their theories a-priori assumptions regarding a state’s identification with other groups;140 “[t]hey do not recognize that rationality, goals, and what actors consider appropriate means of achieving them are culturally embedded and socially constructed.”141

Neorealism has subsequently faced both theoretical and empirical challenges. For example, given Crawford’s142 observation of the assumption of fear and hate and Lowenheim and Heimann’s143 demonstration of emotion in rational choice, it would seem impossible for neorealism to discount non-systemic factors.144 Empirically,
neorealism’s shortcomings are optimized in its difficulty in accounting for the ending of the Cold War, leading to a plethora of works addressing its failure to account for domestic initiatives in the USSR. Moreover, such criticisms can be levied across time, with Lebow commenting how it “cannot explain why the same material structures lead to different outcomes”, for example in 18th century Europe. Indeed by largely overlooking ideational motivations, it becomes difficult for them to classify rising powers (a central component of structural theories), let alone account for variations in, and thus the motivations behind, arms buildup. This structural dominance has subsequently forged a misrepresentation of classical realism, with Williams noting that given Morgenthau’s view of power his work is more aligned with that of Foucault and Bourdieu than the materialistic approaches of neorealism. Unfortunately, classical realism also does little to further conceptize ideational factors, instead imposing law like statements about human nature that do little to account for variation. Thus, while allowing for some agency, classic realists’ incorporation of unit level factors need further refinement and nuance.

All of this led Wendt to argue neorealism’s self-help system is not predetermined; it could easily be a collective security system, indicating the role of perceptions, not structure. While some neorealists have attempted to integrate ideational factors and perception, they fail to undertake the appropriate ontological shift, a critique often leveled against Walt’s theory on balance-of-threat. Relying on a reified vision of the state similarly hampers Morgenthau’s classical realism, which also moves dangerously close to relying on cultural variables, such as national character. Similarly, while some scholars such as Deutsch, Boulding, Holsti, and Jervis, began to touch on elements of identity, they never made “much use of the concept” itself.

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155 Lebow and Lindemann, “Symbolic”, pg. 241


158 Morgenthau, Politics, pg. 9

159 Michael Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2007)

160 Morgenthau, Politics, pg. 4


164 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987); for a critique see Katzenstein “Introduction” pg.14; Richard Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller, “Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: cognitive-strategic research after the cold war”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pg. 415


166 Berenskoetter, “Identity”, pg. 3596
In order to account for interest, which Keohane claims is essential to IR,\(^{159}\) we must turn towards the individual level, moving away from those conceptions where security can only be attained materially vis-à-vis other states; where the object of security (the state) has become the subject (rather than the individual). Instead we must seek to examine what makes individuals secure, which sheds light on interests.

McSweeney notes how this renewed focus on the individual can partially be found in the third period, which emphasized complex interdependence\(^{160}\) by building from earlier forays into economic interdependence and Deutsch's conception of security communities.\(^{161}\) Here, democratic peace theory and Krasner's international regimes began to allow for the influence of domestic factors. While contingent upon the presence of a common enemy, these works did succeed in shifting from the 'golden age' by "locat[ting] security and insecurity firmly in the relationship between states, not in the independent capacities of each."\(^{162}\) However it was largely the work on North-South relations (seen in the Brandt and Palm Report) that began emphasizing the daily concerns of individuals. Yet theorization on this was left wanting.

Buzan’s work perhaps went the farthest in examining the relationship between foreign and domestic security.\(^{163}\) However as McSweeney argues, while acknowledging security is intertwined with human collectives, Buzan takes the state as the referent of security (so as to avoid the realm of psychology and sociology),\(^{164}\) and refuses to provide a definition for individual security on the basis it is a contested concept, meaning this can only be overcome at the state level by treating security as materialistic non-contested objects. Later attempts by Waever et al\(^{165}\) to address these shortcomings by incorporating society as a referent of security are similarly troubled in that they take society as an independent object (outside the agency of man), again overlooking individual security.\(^{166}\) Similar critiques are also drawn from the work of Ferguson and Mansbach, as well as Mohammed Ayoob, Amitav Acharya, Ken Booth and Peter Vale’s chapters in Krause and Williams’ *Critical Security Studies*.\(^{167}\)

From these criticisms, McSweeney argues a wider conception of security must have three central components. First individuals must remain the primary referent. In addition there must be an incorporation of the positive, relationship-based sources of human security in addition to the negative, objective materialistic security concerns. This requires we make judgments as to what constitutes a human concern, rather than assume they are predetermined within the context of the state. For McSweeney, focus should be on that which “presents itself, problematically in some measure, in every instance of interaction which goes to make up the social world.”\(^{168}\)

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\(^{161}\) Karl Deutsch, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Greenwood Press, 1955)

\(^{162}\) McSweeney, *Security*, pg. 48 (emphasis added)


\(^{164}\) Buzan, *People*, pg. 35

\(^{165}\) Ole Waever et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (Pinter, 1993)

\(^{166}\) "If they were truly concerned with the process of social construction, they could not regard society as ‘a social agent which has an independent reality’ (as they do) and they would have to conduct the analysis at the sub-societal level (which they emphatically reject)." McSweeney, *Security*, pg. 71


\(^{168}\) McSweeney, *Security*, pg. 99, 153-154
It is here we are ushered into the world of OS; the security of the self and the need for trust in others, that spans the entirety of one’s lifecycle. This relates specifically to the etymology of security seen above, wherein knowledge and predictability allow for a certain carelessness. Starting to incorporate the non-material needs of individuals gains further credence in light of the work by Hylland et al, which shows how often times they take precedence.\textsuperscript{169}

1.2 Levels of Analysis:

It is important to stipulate how the individual need for OS impacts group/state behavior. Many constructivist scholars continue to struggle with how to account for the “state as actor” approach.\textsuperscript{170} To address this conundrum the thesis adopts the same approach as McSweeney, Steele, Lang and various English School scholars; states are not people \textit{BUT} should be considered \textit{AS IF} they were.\textsuperscript{171} Of course states do not have brains “and, thus, the capacity to reflect on their spatio-temporal situatedness and direction of movement.”\textsuperscript{172} However, people effectively run states, they decide on policies and dictate the state’s behavior through these choices. In this sense “agentic action is implemented by leaders” who, regardless of their own sense of integrity, become the embodiment of the state in what Lang labels a moment of agency.\textsuperscript{173} “States are not gigantic calculating machines; they are hierarchically organized groups of emotional people.”\textsuperscript{174} Thus as Gries notes, “for most social psychologists today, groups do not act; individuals act.”\textsuperscript{175}

Since individuals run states they endow it with human characteristics, meaning states act \textit{as if} they have OS concerns, and (as will be argued) an interest in maintaining their community (i.e. the nation state) by maintaining communal narrative, meaning they are subject to both military and non-military (e.g. ideational) threats.

In addition to the state-as-actor debate, it also becomes important to address the levels-of-analysis.\textsuperscript{176} One of the main criticisms labeled against constructivism, the latest evolution in security studies, has been its continued focus on the international level of analysis, particularly by ‘conventional’ constructivists. According to Farrell, constructivism largely interprets states as undertaking “appropriate” action inline with international norms and structures derived from the identity of leading international actors.\textsuperscript{177} This has led to accusations of an overly systemic approach at the expense of the domestic level.\textsuperscript{178} As Hopf notes, this “systemic variant cannot, and does not,
claim to explain the identity relations [and thus subjective threat perceptions] between any two states.”

By contrast, an OS approach focuses on domestic sources behind state behavior. Relevant then is what has been deemed the constructivist-culturalist debate.

Both are concerned with the impact of norms or “inter-subjective beliefs” that provide meaning to both an actor and to action. Significantly, however, culturalists’ levy domestic systems as the source of social structures. Berger thus cites a disciplinary difference with constructivism while Duffield views the latter as a meta theoretical framework in contrast to culturalisms’ focus on the “nature, causes and consequences of culture”, leading Farrell to conclude that while “culturalists may draw on constructivism, [they] are also interested in “non-normative aspects of culture” and “non-ideational sources of social structure.”

Like culturalists, OS expects to find variety among states, as action required for maintaining OS will fluctuate inline with various national identities. While the domestic is in no way isolated from the international, it still acts as the lens through which international interaction is interpreted, establishing the need for a domestic-level analysis.

This corresponds to the larger division between FPA and IR noted above. When Wendt writes, “[l]ike Waltz I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy”, he is representative of those constructivists who bracket out such analysis. Yet as the overview of security literature has shown, this bracketing has resulted in serious gaps between theoretical expectations and actual state behavior. As Lebow writes, “[a] theory of IR embedded in a theory of society is also a theory of foreign policy.”

To this end Hymans’ provides a useful summation:

international politics is politics, politics is only possible in the context of society, and in society the micro and macro levels are inevitably mutually constituting. Of course, traditional constructivists also subscribe to this as a general principle; but they have typically failed to respect it in their actual theoretical models...By bringing psychology back in, we can start to fulfill constructivism’s original promise.

Literature on OS may provide one route for overcoming these current shortcomings and forging a more robust approach to our understanding of international security in general and North Korean behavior in particular.

2. Ontological Security

Much of the IR literature on OS (explored in Ch. 3) is built from Giddens and Laing. While the thesis agrees with much of Giddens’ work, it shifts away from the extent to


Farrell “Constructivist Security”, pg. 52


Richard Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pg. 11


Hymans, “The Arrival”, pg. 462
which he focuses on modernity. Instead the thesis argues the anchor of OS has always been partially constituted by one’s community, meaning individuals have historically been motivated by OS to maintain the community. While developing states and totalitarian regimes (like North Korea) might not be as ‘modern’ (in Giddens’ sense) as Western liberal states, they are still motivated by OS to maintain the community.

2.1 Defining Ontological Security:

Laing deliberately uses a varied version of ‘ontology’ from that conceived by Heidegger, Satre and Tillich noting, “I have used the term in its present empirical sense because it appears to be the best adverbial or adjectival derivative of being.” As Steele notes, OS then has to do with the “security of being.” According to Laing who first coined the term:

A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person. As such, he can live out into the world and meet others…Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity.185

Starting at childbirth the baby becomes “existentially born as real and alive.” From this phase onward the individual will have a sense of Self as being “real, alive and whole” with an identity that is separate from, and continuous in, the world. By contrast, the ontologically insecure feel ‘unreal’, with an identity and autonomy from the world that is consistently in question, a temporal consistency that appears in doubt, and a self that is “partially divorced from the body.”186 There is a low threshold for security; daily life can prove to be overwhelming, and a perceived threat. Ontological insecurity forms during infancy due to the caretaker’s failure to respond to the child’s needs, forcing the child to create a separate identity for external consumption. Here an adequate independent Self is never forged, meaning identity is fundamentally detached from any sense of ‘real self’.187

In contrast to the psychological accounts of Laing, Giddens sought to integrate his findings into a sociological approach, whereby the social world can lead to ontological insecurity. Giddens says to be human is to have answers to both what, and why, one is doing, supplied through the discursive interpretations associated with human monitoring of activity. Related to this is “practical consciousness”, the taken for granted ‘non-conscious’ bracketing of the infinite possibilities associated with social activity that allow us to focus on the present and undertake such monitoring. This practical consciousness is reproduced through everyday routines, becoming the “anchor” of OS and allowing us to function as social agents.188 Giddens concludes, “to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, “answers” to fundamental existential questions which all humans life

185 Laing, The Divided Self, pg. 39
186 Ibid, pg. 39
187 Ibid, pg. 41-42
188 Laing employs an insightful comparison to the literary overview by Lionel Trilling on Shakespeare and Kafka. Trilling’s argues the characters of Kafka are devoid of life, of any sense of being alive. By contrast the characters of Shakespeare “experience themselves as real and alive and complete however riddled by doubts or torn by conflicts they may be.” Ibid, pg. 40
189 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 36-37
The question of most relevance is that of self-identity, the stability of which requires the acceptance of reality. For Giddens, self-identity is “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his own biography”, or as Lynch and Laing demonstrate, the tales we tell of ourselves. In order to ‘be’ then, requires the ability to provide a coherent and sustained narrative of Self. "It is through narrative that we make sense of the world and create our own identities (Somers 1994:606)." As Kratochwil writes, “In order to be able to act, agents have to first recover their history through narrative. This focus on narrative has been seen in numerous works, including Taylor, MacIntyre, Sarbin, and White. For example, pulling from Taylor, Whitebrook writes “to have an identity, ‘we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going’; we grasp a sense of our lives in narrative”. Referencing Ricoeur, Ezzy similarly writes, identity “is a narrative construction that is the product of this reflective process...Narrative identity constructs a sense of self-sameness, continuity and character in the plot of the story a person tells about him or herself. The story becomes that person's actual history (Ricoeur 1988, p. 247).” To this end, “A person...is defined as a self-narrating organism” (Maines 1993, p.23). Kinnvall surmises, “[f]or Giddens then, like [Erik] Erikson, self-identity consists of the development of a consistent feeling of biographical continuity where the individual is able to sustain a narrative about the self and answer questions about doing, acting, and being.” Such perceived consistency is vital, for as Gergen and Gergen note, our view of self is “fundamentally nonsensical unless it can be linked in some fashion with one’s own past.” Practical consciousness and routines thus bracket the anxiety we all have over “self, others and the object world, all of which need to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity.” When practical consciousness and routines are undermined, so is our ability to maintain a consistent narrative. Giddens suggests this can not only lead to overwhelming anxiety, but to a breakdown in trust in the world and in those around us, making it difficult to act as we become fixated on existential questions. Reviewing situations where routines are threatened, it becomes possible to set the stage for how OS may come to impact perceptions, an important component of decision-making.

190 ibid, pg. 47
191 The first is that of existence, a question answered through ‘doing’ and the behavior of everyday life. The second relates to the knowledge of our eventual transition from being to non-being; death. The third relates to the existence of others. Here Giddens’ argues intersubjectivity leads to, and is not a derivative of, subjectivity, a somewhat similar sentiment to Berger and Luckmann’s “primary socialization.”
192 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 53
193 See Cecelia Lynch, Beyond Appeasement: interpreting interwar peace movements in world politics (Cornell University Press, 1999) and Laing, Self and Other
195 Subotic, “Narrative”; pg. 3
196 Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity”, pg. 15
198 Maureen Whitebrook, Identity, Narrative and Politics (Psychology Press, 2001), pg.10
199 Ezzy, “Theorizing”, pg. 245, 239
200 Kinnvall, “Globalization”, pg. 746-747
201 Gergen and Gergen, “Narrative” pg. 19; Whitebrook, Identity, pg. 9-10
202 Following Giddens’ this is defined as “unconsciously organized state of fear” not attached to any specific object.
203 This relates to Kierkegaard’s work on dread, which Giddens attributes to the possibility of freedom. Modernity, pg. 44, 47, 37
2.2 Fateful Moment & Personal Crisis:

The routines and rituals of everyday life and the basic trust they generate is viewed by Giddens as corresponding to Goffman’s Umwelt, “a core of (accomplished) normalcy with which individuals and groups surround themselves.”

This ‘protective cocoon’ provides the stability and trust that allows one to view the majority of the goings-on around them, and future anticipations, as non-consequential, allowing for normalcy and the sustainment of the Umwelt.

While normally risk can be kept at bay, some situations, deemed ‘fateful moments,’ are both highly consequential and problematic for an individual. Here one is at the “cross-roads of existence” or is confronted with new information with ‘fateful consequences’. It was at these moments that individuals in pre-modern societies were able to rely on fate to provide answers. Instead they are now faced with immense risk from an unknown situation where their actions will have significant consequences and, once made, will be difficult to return from. This can also occur at the group level, “where a given state of affairs is suddenly altered by a few key events.”

Fateful moments can stem from choices we face (such as the decision to marry), or from unsought events - the most difficult being those that coincide with fateful events, which in turn impede on self-identity. For the discussion at hand this could include the Japanese colonization of Korea. While Giddens suggests the individual can continue as if the new situation does not impede on already established routines, this is often not possible given the very nature of fateful moments. Instead, one is forced to undertake ‘homesteading’, a strategy whereby the threatened individual seeks out similar comforts within alternative forms, a process reminiscent to Berger and Luckmann’s ‘alternation’ or re-socialization. To be successful an alternative plausibility structure must be presented and re-socialization must take place within the context and setting of that world’s community. This could include religious conversion or political indoctrination. Biographical continuation is addressed by reinterpreting the past to allow for a perpetuation of the ‘story’, i.e. the past is reinterpreted as simply leading up to the point of re-socialization.

Of course not all unsought after events reach the level of a fateful moment. They could instead be “unexpected events that intrude into the Umwelt” whereby they “puncture the protective mantle of ontological security and cause alarm.” Here routines are not necessarily overwhelmed, as say during colonization, but there is an ideational challenge, a “personal crisis,” that threatens self-identity and OS. This far surpasses the momentary crises we face daily, but quickly adjust to given trust. Here, we are faced with a fundamental challenge that we instinctively reject; identity maintenance becomes an end in its own right. A community might then react to an event in a certain way depending on if it punctures the Umwelt. The argument is not that concerns over OS are always at the forefront of our minds, but that some situations threaten the norm and force us to become motivated by OS needs. To this

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204 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 127-128  
205 Ibid, pg. 113  
206 Ibid, pg. 142-143  
207 Kinnvall, “Globalization”  
208 Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pg. 177-179  
209 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 131, 185
end, gaps in the literature on North Korea could potentially be explained as periods when the North was driven by OS concerns due to a perceived personal crisis.

In order to expand on this, it is important to first elaborate on where routines/rituals are derived. For Giddens, this involves an examination of the impacts of modernity, which eroded traditional buttresses against OS threats leaving us more insecure. By contrast, the thesis argues OS threats are not necessarily unique to modernity, but pertain more to the fundamental relationship between individuals and communities, meaning analysis should focus on threats to this more timeless relationship.

2.3 Modernity & Self Identity:

Modernity, which emerged with European post-feudal institutions, is made distinct by its “dynamism”, marked by fast paced and widespread social changes that have forced the Self to become re-conceptualized. This includes globalization and technological advances that allow previously distant events to have a substantial impact on “proximate events, and on intimacies of the self”.210 This was accompanied by the growth of “abstract systems”, a combination of symbolic tokens - medias of exchange applicable across numerous contexts (e.g. money) – and expert systems – knowledge that is validated independently of its practitioners, meaning there are no certain truths. This allowed for the awareness of risk to “seep into the actions of almost everyone” leading to increased reflexivity, the “susceptibility of most aspects of social activity…to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge.”211

Bauman thus argues we now live in liquid, rather than heavy, modernity. Heavy modernity was characterized by a centrally organized and rigid community typified by the Ford plant; while oppressive in nature it provided predictability and rootedness. Then we knew the ends, if not the means, but in liquid modernity it is the reverse, we know the means but not the ends.212 There is always something more to move towards. While in heavy modernity there were leaders, individuals who espoused the ‘we’, now there are only counselors – the ‘we’ is replaced by a conglomeration of individuals.213

For Giddens modernity leads to possible radical doubt, stripping away previous sources of predictability and OS. Following such advances the biographical Self becomes a “reflexively organized endeavor”, taking place within a world where “tradition loses its hold” and daily life is “reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global.” Unlike traditional societies, the modern Self is thus faced with a plethora of ‘lifestyles’ that can be adopted; the “integrated set of practices which an individual embraces…[giving] material form to a particular narrative of self-identity.”214 As Bauman notes, identity is no longer given (I am born a bourgeois) but has become a task (I must live as a bourgeois).

Identity here still presumes continuity, but “continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent.”215 Perceived discontinuity leads to ontological insecurity, what Laing

210 ibid, pg. 4
211 ibid, pg. 112, 20
212 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity Press, 2000), pg. 59
213 ibid, pg. 30
214 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 4-5, 81
215 ibid, pg. 53
terms an “inner deadness”, and which he suggests can leave us paralyzed; we “become strangers in a world where we thought we were at home” and experience anxiety in becoming aware that we cannot trust our answers to the questions, “Who am I?”

It is here we find overlap with the etymology of security, wherein individuals feel secure when they have knowledge and predictability as provided by lifestyles. These consist of the reflexive mundane rituals of everyday life formed through the choices we make; “my decision on what to wear or eat is as much about my choice on how to act as it as on ‘who to be.’”

In association with these lifestyles we find ‘life-planning’ and together these form the “settings which help to shape their [agents] actions.” Unlike in the pre-modern era, the future is no longer left to fate. Instead we now have an appreciation that risk exists, generating a need to filter out new, more large-scale, risks (such as nuclear war). While we can make estimates as to the result of high-consequence risks (those outside of our direct ability to influence), we can never be certain. However the individual often meets these risks passively. Giddens argues this is due to the fact that life-planning takes into account “packages of risks” and thus some risks are seen as acceptable. Life-planning also involves attempts to colonize (plan for) the future, though “the degree to which the future round can be successfully invaded is partial, and subject to the various vagaries of risk assessment.”

Only the ontologically secure can thus undertake risk-assessment and plan for the future, as this requires both trust in the Self and the world, and the ability to bracket out overwhelming risk.

To surmise, according to Giddens, in modern society it is one’s lifestyles that form the core of self-identity, thereby helping to shelter one from existential questions, generate trust and bracket risk. The thesis now raises two arguments. One, that society has always constituted the means by which the Self is created and thus OS threats need not be limited to modernity per se, but to threats toward this relationship. And two, that even in modernity, society has a structuring influence, indicating the continuation of this fundamental relationship.

2.4 Individuals and Communities: Expanding the Relationship:

Bauman, by de-emphasizing the motivational role of norms, argues societies are now more attune to a cloak that can be easily removed. Citing Alain Touraine he concludes we have come to “the end of definition of the human being as a social being, defined by his or her place in society which determines his or her behavior or action’.” At the same time, he also cites the work of Elias and the reciprocal relationship between individuals and society, with “society shaping the individuality of its members, and individuals forming society out of their life actions.” Similarly Giddens rejects methodological individualism, arguing the Self can “only become coherent through the reflexive use of the broader social environment.” To explore this further it helps to elaborate on self-narrative.

Tompkins’ ‘script theory’ and McAdam’s ‘life-story model of identity’ were some of the first forays into narrative approaches of Self, “imagin[ing] human beings as

216 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 53, 66
217 Ibid, pg. 85
218 Ibid, pg. 125
219 Ibid, pg. 30
220 Bauman, Liquid, pg. 178-179
storytellers and human lives as stories told,” all of which gives some semblance of meaning and purpose.221 Their work provided an important retort to the ‘situationist critique’, the argument that “behavior is mainly a function of situational variation and environmental contingencies” by showing that “behavior and experience are guided as least as much by internal factors as they are by the vagaries of the situations.” By the 2000s, advances in the field by social constructionists came to show how these narratives had a situational component, demonstrating the “role of historical and cultural contexts in the expression and development of personality.”222

McAdam cites 3 levels of the individual. At Level 1 are dispositional traits (the “Big Five” personality traits) while at Level 2 are “characteristic adaptations… contextualized in time, place, or social role…[and] speak to what people want or do not want and how they go about [this].” It is only at Level 3 that we encounter how people make sense of their lives through ‘integrative life stories’, “those internalized and evolving self-narratives that people construct to make sense of their lives in time”. Importantly, these narratives are “co-authored by persons and the social words wherein their lives make sense.”223 As Andrews, Kinvall and Monroe write, “thinking [is] an inherently dialogical process, in which consciousness works upon internal arguments and discourses that are derived from public/social debate”,224 a sentiment Ezzy similarly finds in the works of Goffman and Ricoeur.225 Thus while Bauman acknowledges the ability to shop for identity depends on one’s locale in society, he seems to downplay the more general structuring impact of society as a whole;226 as Gergen and Gergen write “[o]ne is not free simply to have any form of history he or she wishes. Cultures invite certain identities and discourages others.”227

None of this is to deny that individuals have seemingly numerous and possibly contradictory subnarratives; “in fact there would appear to be no one story to tell.” However, given our tendency to “relate events within different temporal perspectives” we begin to nest these narratives. This is important because “to the extent that consistency among narratives is sought, macronarratives acquire preeminent importance. Such narratives seem to lay the foundations within which other narratives are constructed.”228 This tendency to nest narratives reinforces the importance of maintaining the macronarrative (such as national narratives) for OS. This is substantiated by the work of Donald Campbell and Hamilton et al. on entitativity,229 the perceived “groupness of groups”, with variations in cohesion associated to group type.230 Research indicates that decreasing levels of entitativity were statistically found to be relevant in distinguishing between intimacy groups (e.g. family), task-oriented groups (e.g. coworkers), social categories (e.g. American) and loose associations (e.g. students at a university).231 While human need for belonging is

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222 McAdams, “The Role”, pg. 13, 14
223 Ibid, pg. 15-16
224 Andrews et al, “Narratives “, pg. 142
225 Ezzy, “Theorizing”, pg. 247; see also Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity”, pg. 16; Whitebrook, Identity, pg.6
226 Subotic and Zarakoli’s work “Cultural” puts forward a similar argument vis-à-vis Bourdieu’s ‘habitus.’
227 Gergen and Gergen, “Narrative “, pg. 28
228 Ibid, pg. 34
231 Hamilton et al., “A Group”, pg. 143-145
satisfied at the intimacy group and need for achievement at the task group, “humans also have an important need to establish a stable and secure sense of self and social identity”, which is achieved at the level of social categories – i.e. the nation. As Ezzy surmises “[r]egular interaction with a network of others, the routines of everyday life, and the presence of physical props are also central to a person’s ability to maintain a consistent and satisfying narrative.” While the individual Self may be in flux, it is therefore comforted by the perceived continuity of the community it is embedded within; a community that structures lifestyles – and thus the formation of Self – while also providing a stable macronarrative, all of which becomes the foundation of OS.

The role of one’s community as a provider of OS could help explain why there continues to be such enforced differentiation between various communities. For example, evolutionary biologist Mark Pagel notes the remarkable amount of genetic variations that have emerged among mankind in a relatively short period of time and in our species unique use of language (in that as a species we often cannot understand one another), suggesting humans have a predisposition for separation derived from our “our most basic instincts to promote copies of our genes.” This enforced differentiation has led to a hindered adaption of outside cultures, which are “regarded with suspicion or even indignation”, allowing far more variance between neighbors in a cultural context then many might expect and further suggesting individuals are still structured by their communities.

Pagel’s work also reinforces the notion that this relationship has existied throughout the ages. Here Pagel questions why culture arose at a time man was still preoccupied with attaining basic necessities. He suggests this had to do with our distinct ability to undertake social learning; humans not only replicate and transfer behavior, but “know what they are copying and why”. Consequently, our ability to overcome our DNA-predisposition to cheat non-relatives and visually steal from them (i.e. learn from others without reciprocating knowledge) resided on our ability to distinguish altruistic compatriots through scale-free cultural mechanisms. In short, we developed cues through which to demarcate fellow members of socially constructed communities. Harrari argues that further compounding our need to cooperate was the fact that as Homo Sapiens evolved, they invested into brain power (not physical muscle that would allowed for more independence), while the ability to stand resulted in contracted birth canals and more premature babies, thereby generating a new social problem since lone mothers could not forage enough food.

Objects such as art, music and religion can thus be viewed as functioning as “cultural enhancers”, acting in much the same way genetic enhancers of DNA function within our bodies to make genes work more effectively. Biologically these enhancers do nothing to directly build security or reproduction, but are utilized to determine how much something is expressed. Early groups might then have developed their own distinct music or art to develop greater cohesion, reinforcing a community’s shared

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232 Ezzy, “Theorizing”, pg. 250
233 Indeed the statistician Robert Sokal has found that even within the perceived to be highly integrated region of Europe, genetics can place an individual within 100 miles of their birthplace. Pagel, Wired, pg. 54, 56
234 Pagel, Wired, pg. 57
235 Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens, A Brief History of Humankind (Vintage Books, 2011), pg. 9, 11
236 Much like DNA and RNA, once two replicators join together and find that their returns are greater due to a shared vehicle, their fates become intertwined, eliminating competition. The same holds true for individuals in society. Once their fates become intertwined, individuals sought to further improve their cooperation, and like DNA began to specialize and develop more complex organizations. Pagel, Wired, pg. 75
history and interests so as to better discern altruistic compatriots, thereby offsetting fears over visual theft. Following the cognitive revolution 70,000 years ago, our ability to imagine things collectively and develop common myths therefore allowed for cooperation amongst larger groups of individuals. From this overview, we can see communal identity forming around the abstract non-altruistic Other. This abstract Other, while not necessarily something negative, generated a need to define a community and create mechanism through which to demark fellow compatriots.

This is reminiscent to biological studies on the ‘social amoebae’, organisms that have fostered social cooperation to the point of self-sacrifice (much like humans) by forging mechanisms through which to discern altruistic members. Communities have similarly sought to emphasize their distinctness; for example in New Guinea “communities have purposely fostered linguistic diversity because they have seen language as a highly salient marker of group identity.” Emotions often associated with nationalism, patriotism, xenophobia and bigotry, are in turn not necessarily social features of man; they are “visceral in nature” and while helping to promote our cultural survival vehicles, they have also helped to maintain mankind in much the same way they have helped the social amoebae. However the mere presence of indicators does not always suffice and “this might be why as a species we are so sensitive to cues of a shared cultural history”. Pagel writes:

All of those shared beliefs, customs, religious systems, languages, accents, rituals, songs, styles of dress, and mannerisms are the cues we instinctively and subconsciously use to assess our cultural relatedness to others. Our societies’ tendency throughout history to restrict the movement of people and ideas, and to develop strong identities around their languages and cultures, make these cues more reliable.

We can instantly see how this relates to the lifestyles outlined by Giddens, from which we obtain the routines of daily life and forge self-identity. While personal identity in traditional societies would have been more socially determined (i.e. peasant or lord) it would still have been partially constructed by the lifestyles found in one’s community. As McAdams writes, “[c]ulture provides people with a menu of narrative forms and contents from which the person selectively draws in an effort to line up lived experiences with the kinds of stories available to organize and express it.” Disruptions to these indicators could in turn generate a threat. For example:

Wise has shown how the breaching of previously taken-for-granted behavioural standards in two local settings, a beach (2009) and a shopping precinct (2010) in Sydney, was used to label particular groups as un-Australian. Similarly, Blokland’s study of a housing estate in Rotterdam, the Netherlands (2003) examined the ways in which white residents discussed the ordinary activities of minority neighbours,
cooking ‘strange’ foods, playing loud ‘foreign’ music, wearing Islamic dress, as a challenge to Dutch culture and values (2003: 11–12).244

Following this overview, it is argued that OS is intimately linked to the timeless relationship between individuals and communities. It is not just for modern man that “maintaining community becomes an end in itself” as Bauman would have; this has been the case since the first communities were formed. Only through the ability to distinguish altruistic compatriots was man able to overcome our DNA predisposition not to form into communities and help non-related others. As explored in section 3, this was achieved by developing a myth of communal solidarity, in which were embedded a range of daily routines and rituals, removing the perception of difference. There are no a priori groups, only shared myths that in turn generate a sense of shared identity. To this end, OS concerns have been prevalent throughout history.

Indeed Bauman notes how questions of living in times of uncertainty (a focal point for postmodernists) dominated philosophy during the onset of Roman decline, and immediately before modernity. Dennis Smith thus seeks to build upon this pattern, arguing that rather than a unique and contemporary dilemma, we are in actuality experiencing a new Middle Ages. Here he references Zakharov’s commentary on post-Soviet life in Russia where “many had turned to Orthodox religion but, alas, not so much to spiritual, inner religion as the external ritual of the church…[and] all manner of magicians, astrologers and mystics. That is what it is like – a new Middle Ages.” Smith parallels the description of post-Soviet life to Blochs’ account of tenth-century Europe as marked by a life of perpetual insecurity, which was “one of the principle reasons for the emotional instability so characteristic of the feudal era.” Similarly, the introduction of medieval feudal warlords resembles local Russian power structures following the rejection of the ‘communist metanarrative’ as characterized in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, wherein Russians broke into various groups depending on what “makes sense or masters reality in their own particular neck of the woods.”245 Smith further argues this all correlates with the “millenarian fears of the 1990s”246 and concludes while the comparison should not be pushed too far, “if present-day Russia can be thought of as ‘premodern’ in some respects then feudal Europe had its ‘postmodern’ aspect.”247

Again this underscores how OS threats are intimately tied with disruptions to the fundamentally timeless relationship between individuals and communities. As established communities were eroded (fateful moments) there were periods of ontological insecurity until new communities could be formed, re-socializing individuals and replacing old foundations of the Umwelt. Consequently, not only are OS threats not unprecedented, they relate to communities that might not appear to be as ‘modern’ as the ideal democratic Western prototype that dominate post-modern accounts. Applying OS to a state such as the DPRK, which to many would appear as the antithesis of Giddens or Bauman’s modernity, helps further bolster this argument.

245 Dennis Smith “Modernity, Postmodernity and the New Middle Ages” in Christopher Bryant and David Jerry (eds.), Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments Vol. 4 (Rutledge, 1996), pg. 30, 31
246 Here he references how Barrington Moore mused about possible similarities between “critical rationalists” in the West with scholars during the decline of pax Romana who noted the corrupt and unfounded nature of the Empire. Ibid, pg. 32
247 Ibid, pg. 31
3. Communal Narrative & Nations

Having established the interconnectivity of individual OS and community, it becomes important to clarify what exactly a community is. To this end, examining debates over the characteristics and formation of nations helps to elucidate how communities have historically proved to be a source of OS, a relationship that is argued to continue under national communities today. In order to know how to maintain the nation we must first determine what constitutes it. Not only does OS help to further strengthen literature on the nation as an entity forged out of narrative, it helps to further clarify the relationship between individuals and the nation and why the latter is such a potent force in interstate relations. This in turn provides an ideational approach to IR that can account for conflict without referring to it in essentialized terms.

3.1 Imagined Communities and Nations:

Numerous works conducted by modernists (Gellner) and ethno-symbologists (Smith) have come to undermine the perenniast view that nations have existed continuously throughout history (Walek-Czerniecki, Levi) and the primordialist view of nations as organic entities formed along the natural divisions of humanity (Van den Berghe, Shils, Geertz); nations are indeed “imagined communities.” However this must be qualified, for as even Hobsbawm concedes, “the nation…is the most important of the lasting 'invented traditions”, leading Smith to conclude “invention' must be understood in its other sense of a novel recombination of existing elements and not as ‘imaginary’…and traditions as purely ‘invented.” While sympathetic to Smith’s critique of modernists (see also Hastings), who view the nation as originating only in the modern epoch - be it due to industrialization (Hobsbawm, Gellner), an invention of America (Anderson) or the Enlightenment (Kedourie), the thesis is less concerned with when nations formed and more in what constitutes the nation and earlier communities of man.

Smith disentangles nations and national identity from the modern political ideology of nationalism. From here he argues that prior to the formation of any ‘ideal’ nation, there were communities of ethnies. In defining the two he notes the following:

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnie</th>
<th>Ideal Nation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A named community</td>
<td>A named community (self-identification as distinct group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared origin myths, memories (ethnic origin and descent; “largest presumed kin-</td>
<td>Shared origin myths, memories (usually of more immediate memories and traditions e.g. ethnic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

248 In the contemporary era, social relations, representations and organisations continue to be defined in national terms, governed and institutionalised in accordance with national temporalities and located within the spaces of the nation, thereby contributing to a relatively consistent view of “reality”. Michael Skey, “A sense of where you belong in the world: national belonging, ontological security and the status of ethnic majority in England” Nations and Nationalism, Vol.16, No. 4 (2010), pg. 721
249 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford University Press, 1999), pg.5
250 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 1983)
251 Smith, Myths, pg. 46
252 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Place, kinship and the case for non-ethnic nations” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 10, No. 1 (2004), pg. 52
253 For example he notes how many pre-modern nations were stimulated by the ideal nation of Israel found in the Bible. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 1997)
254 See also Hastings, The Construction, pg. 3-4
He surmises, “nations and ethnie[s] are types of cultural community; but the type of the ethnie is broader, looser and closer to felt kinship ties, while the national type also incorporates territorial, legal and public elements lacking in ethnie[s].”256 Expanding on the work of Smith, Eriksen has come to provide a slightly revised interpretation. He argues that while Smith’s criteria of what constitutes an ethnie are mostly correct, they need not result in only ethnie[s]. Instead they can form a range of imagined communities that can become the foundation for nations (or other communities). For example, a shared past could pertain to a more spiritual myth, as in France, recent events, as shown by the centrality of the 1960s ethnic riots in Mauritius, or by nonbiological myths of origin, as in the case of postcolonial nations. Regarding culture he writes how “shared implicit conventions and notions, or taken-for-granteds, create a sense of community which is linked with space rather than time; sharing the same space rather than entertaining notions of shared origins.”257 Territory meanwhile can become a difficult subject, as often times cultural and territorial boundaries fail to align. At the same time, they are often metaphorically forged.

Consequently, what is actually central for the foundation of imagined communities is a sense of shared narrative and territorial belonging, neither of which presuppose the formation of an ethnie. Instead, building from the “more universal dimensions of human existence”, Eriksen notes, “[v]irtually all political identities known to political anthropology are based, in different ways and to varying degrees...on place and kinship.” He concludes the nation is a “metaphoric kin group” and a “metaphoric place” in that as physical entities nations “cannot be observed directly; the citizens have to infer their existence from abstractions such as maps.”258 Emphasis is thus placed on fictive kinship – determined by the relevant kin group’s “rules of inclusion and its founding myth”, not necessarily by a common myth of descent259 - and on “creating a fatherland through geographical abstraction.”260

As shown above, pre-national communities (including the earliest groups of man) forged ‘cultural cues’ or ‘lifestyles’ through which to demark altruistic compatriots. In doing so they constructed a social world within which individuals came to

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Based group”</th>
<th>A common public culture (language or religion must be part of an acknowledged distinctive culture that links various generations. In pre-modern times this was probably limited to elites, but in medieval Western Europe there were attempts to “broaden the culture and education base and give it a more public character as an expression of growing elite or middle-class national sentiments and goals”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One or more element(s) of common culture (e.g. language or religion, but “no conscious reference to or virtue of them”)</td>
<td>A historic territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with a specific territory</td>
<td>Common laws and customs (laws and rituals as opposed to ethnic customs and traditions, “though the line between them cannot be drawn in a hard and fast manner”)</td>
</tr>
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256 Smith, “When is”, pg. 16
257 Eriksen, “Place, kinship”, pg. 54
258 Ibid, pg. 58-59
260 Ibid, pg. 59; This reading still allows for Smith’s claim that the strength of nations is derived from their ability to tap into these pre-existing communities while simultaneously moving away from his focus on ethnie[s].
construct the Self, meaning OS is thus entwined with the preservation of one’s community by maintaining its fictive kinship and fictive place. For example, Gellner notes that, as a “nationalist humanity... cultures, even a shared number of symbols and communication, were important even in the pre-industrial age.” 261 Thus Smith writes, the desire to “know whence we came’ is not confined to particular civilizations or epochs” with examples seen in ancient Greece, the biblical genealogy of Abraham, ancestral myths in early Africa and Asia, and Roman and Frankish claims of decent from the Trojans. He goes on to elaborate, “behind the ever-changing needs and purposes of individuals, a more obstinate question obtrudes...[that] of individual identity, which is always a matter of social and spiritual location. For in that location lies a sense of security, so indispensable to the much-desired individuality and uniqueness of persons and families alike.” 262 To this end there is a clear link between community and OS prevalent in the modern and pre-modern era, resulting in the corresponding interest to maintain communal fictive kinship and fictive place. This sentiment is reinforced by Ringamr’s work on the correspondence between how society is represented and its conception of the individual:

An Athenian was only fully a human being when participating in the political community where he was regarded as an equal; medieval man was a member of a body, or a family, outside of which he could not be imagined; the ruling elite of the Absolutist era were actors who acted with each other on the stage of the court. 263

In each instance one finds an intimate relationship between Self and community. In Athens, if the public realm were threatened, so to would the individual’s potential to ‘be’. In the Middle Ages if the ‘head’ of the community was threatened then so was the ‘body’ and the Self. In the prince’s court, if foreign rules suddenly took hold, man would not know how to create the Self. This all reinforces the notion of a historical relationship between community and self-identity.

This is not to say that there were no discrepancies between educated elites and the masses. For example Smith notes an ethnie’s formation only required solidarity amongst the elites, and that in early ages, membership of a nation may have only included “upper and middle class adult males.” However, “these members may possess intense national awareness” 264 and were “repeatedly forced to take the cultures and interests of wider strata into account” leading to cultures that were “popular and ethnic in character; they assumed ties of affinity based on presumed common origins and shared customs, linked to regna or kingdoms, as Susan Reynolds has argued for early medieval Europe.” 265 OS, at least for elites, therefore became dependent on the maintenance of the ethnie and/or nation. For peasants their immediate local community would have initially played this role, but as they came to be integrated into/recognize the larger community as envisioned by elites (or due to “vernacular mobilization” by “indigenous intelligentsia”) 266 the ethnie/nation would have increasingly taken on this function.

262 “And when we speak of the ‘crisis of identity’ felt by so many marginal and powerless intellectuals, especially in the Third World, it is just this loss of security and location within a traditional milieu and its stable value-system that we have in mind (Shils 1960).” Smith, Myths, pg. 59
263 Ringmar, “Nationalism”, pg. 540
264 Smith, “When is”, pg. 10, 11
265 Smith, Myths, pg. 14
266 Smith, Myths, pg. 18
Following the advent of nationalism, nations increasingly took center stage as the main community for individuals. In the West, states now had to espouse a nation of likeminded citizens. Consequently, attachment to homeland and culture “became ideologised and politicized…through the theory of national self determination and the ideals of authenticity and autonomy.”267 This “formal political philosophy…[was] then next to canonised by President Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles peace settlement of 1920.”268 In other parts of the world that were less developed, and often had nationalism imposed on them by Western conquerors, it was premised less on “the ideals of mass citizenship [civic nationalism], and more on the selection of the contents of the myths, memories and traditions of earlier ethinies, and on communal attachments to the homeland and rituals of membership [ethnic nationalism].”269 Still, Eriksen notes, “[n]o functioning civic nationalism can be entirely divorced from cultural sharing…[or] a notion of relatedness, whether biological or not, in its collective imagery and ideology.”270 Thus even the modern western nation forged of equal individuals requires a sense of fictive kinship.

What we find then is that the historical relationship between individuals and their community has continued under nations and, following the advent of nationalism, the modern nation-state, be they civic or ethnic (discussions on the coherence of, and contestation within, national narratives is addressed in Ch. 3). Following the logic above, this means individuals will have an interest in maintaining their respective nation. Because communities are imagined, being comprised of a metaphorical foundation of fictive kinship and geographical abstraction, the communal self (much like the individual self), emerges out of, and is found in, narrative.

Ringmar writes the ability of man to make sense of things rests on the metaphorical (not literal) use of language, the shared “experiences and memories with which words are associated.”271 We then link these metaphors together to construct a narrative with a plot that gives direction and coherence to the story until the relevant problem is resolved (see also Gergen and Gergen; Ezzy).272 In this sense, storytelling is “a prerequisite of action.”273 Since actors exist only in narrative, Ringmar posits this need not be limited to individuals but can apply to nations, a view later adopted in the works of Bially Mattern, Brand, Hansen, Steele, Waever, and Weldes et al.274 Pulling from Hegel, Ringmar thus notes “[w]e start by telling stories about ourselves, which we go on to test on people around us… Stories are told about states in much the same fashion” indicating, “identity-creation is a profoundly theoretical process”, a sentiment he derives from Goffman, Butler, and Alexander.275

While a discursive entity, national identity still rests on the ability to differentiate

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267 Smith, “When is”, pg. 16
268 Hastings, The Construction, pg. 2-3
269 Smith, “When is”, pg. 27, 28
270 Eriksen, “Place, kinship”, pg. 60
271 Ringmar, Identity, pg. 69, 70
272 Gergen and Gergen, “Narrative”, pg. 20-22; Ezzy, “Theorizing”, pg. 245
273 As Ringmar notes, “all thinking demands a stop-and-think,” meaning something must be interjected that “restores the immediacy and urgency of action”; something that motivates us to “act on the basis of the interests that we have.” Ringmar, Identity, pg. 61-63
275 Erik Ringmar, “The international Politics of Recognition” in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, International Politics of Recognition (Routledge, 2011), pg. 6, 7
between “us” and “them”. The narrative approach therefore still accounts for the spatial and temporal components of the Other as necessitated by the Self, a sentiment reinforced by Prozorov in his rebuke of those focusing on temporal othering. It also compensates for shortcomings in conceptions of identity in IR to date. In particular, “systemic constructivists” focus on Meads “Me” thereby pushing national identity and the “I” out of the purview of discussion. Yet Zehfuss (see also Cederman) demonstrates how by bracketing the “I”, and taking states as given, one fails to address to account for domestic debates over identity, or, taking from Ringmar, the construction of accounts “which describe ourselves to ourselves” and are then tested with Others. Meanwhile Bially-Mattern, Steele, Zarakol, and Subotic and Zarakol have all questioned the impact international norms might have on the identity and action of states who had little say in their development.

This is why Inayatullah and Blaney reprove Wendt’s conception of “alter” and “ego” as “blank slates” prior to contact; “Wendt employs first contact, but perhaps without considering its significance or deeper heritage. What brings alter and ego to contact? Why do aliens bother to come to earth...Haven’t actors already constructed some sense of self and some understanding of others prior to contact?” Similarly, Kratochwil notes how during first encounters “if a common reference world is missing, the only strategy available is falling back on one’s own conventions and trying out their capacity to ‘translate’. But that means that we never start out with an empty ‘inter’”. For example, Lebow notes that in Homer’s Iliad, while the Greeks were the Trojan’s Other (and vice versa), each held a preconceived notion of Self prior to interaction. Of course, as noted above, other story telling entities – whom we tell stories about the Self to – play a role in narrative construction; “What we are as subjects...is thus neither more nor less than the total collection of stories that we tell and that are told about us.” At the same time, the intersubjective nature of narrative identity can also be understood as internal soliloquies with “phantom

276 This does not have to relate specifically to territorially sovereignty, which is a historical and contingent concept. See: John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”, International Organizations, Vol. 47 (1993); Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1997); Ferguson and Mansbach, Politics
277 Hopf, “Identity Relations” pg. 280
278 Prozorov built from Kojève, whose work showed that historical action is linked to our focus on the future; in planning for the future we seek to brake with the present and in doing so turn the present into the past. Consequently “what is necessary for any historical action is the existence of some spatial locus of given being that is nihilated into the past,” meaning the Other cannot simply be a temporal entity, it always has a spatial element. Sergi Prozorov, “The other as past and present: beyond the logic of ‘temporal othering’ in IR theory” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 2011), pg.1282; 1284
280 This includes Barnett, Finnemore, Cheekel, Katzenstein, Price, Reus-Smith, Tannenwald, Lynch, Risse-Kappen, and Wendt. Adler, “Constructivism” pg. 116
281 The same holds for members of the English school, where “the emphasis upon order...demonstrates how environment is essential to state behavior.” Steele, Ontological Security, pg. 27
282 Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), pg. 336-337; Cederman, Emergent Actors; Unfortunately much of Cederman’s work tends to focus strictly on the merits of CAS modeling, and moves towards neorealism in regards to many of the variables included in those models.
283 Ringmar, “The international”
284 Janice Bially Mattern, Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force, (Routledge, 2005), pg. 9-10; Steele, Ontological Security, pg. 28; Subotic and Zarakol, “Cultural intimacy” pg. 916; See also R.B.J Walker (ed.) Culture, Ideology and World Order, Studies on a Just World Order (Westview Press, 1984), pg. xi
285 David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, “Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory” in Yosef Lapid and Fredrich Kratochwil (eds.) The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Lynne Riener Publishers, 1996), pg. 72-73
286 Friedrich Kratochwil, “Re-thinking the “inter” in International Politics” Millennium, Vol.35, No. 3 (2007), pg. 501
288 Erik Ringmar “On the Ontological Status of the State” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1996), pg. 452; See also Whitebrook, Identity, pg. 4, 10
imagined others who inhabit our thoughts”, meaning through internal dialogue we can also form the Self.

Channeling Laing, Steele thus concludes, “the identities of states emerge from their own project of the self” and while “[w]e do need the other to know we are, it is true…the “self does not experience the experience of others directly. The facts about other available to self are actions of others experienced by self” (Laing 1969:5) all of which occurs through narrative. Zarakol similarly notes that while narratives might be impacted by past historical interactions and events, they still function as the prism through which nations view interaction. Relatedly, as states take on significantly new attributes (e.g. economic growth), or have new experiences, they will discuss what this means for Self-narrative. This is all part of the consistent unfolding of Self, “whereby the Self comes to know itself by continuously disclosing the world and itself within it”.

To this end, Ernest Renan argued the nation is the intersubjective beliefs, “a soul” that unite a group of individuals in the past and into a projected future. It requires the “possession in common of a rich legacy of memories…and present consent, the desire to live together.” There is thus no ‘nation’ without actors viewing themselves through the discursive framework of that national identity. No nation then is predetermined or secure, but rely upon the continuation of narrative and recognition of that narrative. In this sense OS is in many ways dependent upon maintaining communal identity, both before, and in, modernity. This is why even early interactions between hunter-gathers held the potential to breed ontological insecurity and conflict.

To this end it helps to place OS within the wider spectrum of works on identity in IR theory.

3.2 Identity, Difference & Conflict:

The philosophical debate on the Self and Other of groups has led to two main camps. In one are the works of Kant and Hegel who argue in order to form the state there must be a negative Other around which a collective Self forms. Opposed to this are the works of Nietzsche and Habermas who “hope to transcend this dangerous binary through dialogue.”

Carl Schmitt takes one of the more extreme formulations of Self-Other, suggesting war is the best means through which to forge group identity, a dichotomy first forged...
by Kant wherein “the price of order at home is conflict among societies.” Similarly Hegel argued the state was not a conglomeration of some primordial group, but consisted of individuals brought together for common defense against the Other. These concepts were soon expanded to inter-societal relations, when John Stuart Mill vehemently argued a common set of customs and law could never be forged between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations, which in part explains his defense of imperialism, while “Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations makes the same kind of invidious distinctions.”

The necessity of a negative Other in order to form a Self, often as derived from the work of Foucault, has more recently been codified in many poststructuralist accounts. As Connolly penned, “the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.” Weldes similarly writes “insecurity, rather than being external to the object to which it presents a threat, is both implicated in and an effect of the very process of establishing and reestablishing the object’s identity.” Thus Neumann argues it was the Ottoman Turk “as Europe's 'primarily military-political other' that allowed for a sense of European shared identity to emerge. However this relationship is always in flux. As Campbell writes, “identity…is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature” Because the Other is in no way a stable objective object, groups must constantly seek out new enemies to define the Self around.

Opposed to Kant and Hegel, Lebow cites the works of Herder, Nietzsche, Habermas and Rawls. These scholars argue difference relates to the lack of metaphysical truths, fostering an appreciation for the uniqueness of individuals and cultures. The Other is something that can be overcome through dialogue and understanding, allowing for plurality, rather than something that must be repressed. While Lebow remarks these works are not necessarily representative of reality, we can draw philosophical support elsewhere. Indeed Kant and Hegel do recognize the Self-Other dichotomy relates to a common humanity of man, which in turn provides the potential for eventual unification through a process of mutual recognition. This potential for positive identification is found in the work of Taylor who argued identity is partially shaped by recognition, or lack there of, while Berenskoetter has shown how a ‘friend’ can become one’s significant Other. Meanwhile Hommerth argues non or misrecognition

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301 This was first formulated in his critique of the contemporary German state. See G Hegel, G. W. F. “The German Constitution”, in Laurence Dickey (ed.), H.B Nisbet (Trans.) Political Writings, (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
302 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2005)
303 Lebow, “Identity”, pg. 476; see also Berenskoetter, “Identity”
304 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Cornell University Press, 1991), pg. 64
305 Weldes et al., Cultures, pg. 11
306 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: The “East” in European Identity Formation (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pg. 46
307 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (University of Minnesota Press, Revised Edition, 1999), pg. 9
308 See also Hansen, Security
309 Lebow, “Identity”, pg. 477
is the foundation of social conflict, a sentiment also found in Ringmar’s work and one with important implications regarding the relationship between OS and foreign policy (Ch.3).

Much like philosophy, psychology has historically focused on group cohesion being equated to out-group hostility, a concept that draws back to William Graham Summer’s work on ethnocentrism; “[t]he relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are correlative of each other.” Later Henri Tajfel and advocates of Social Identity Theory (SIT) noted the positive self-identification individuals hold with groups they are members of, leading not only to a sense of self-esteem but also a positive bias towards ones own group and a correlating prejudice toward others. SIT theory has been adopted in IR to provide an ideational cause of conflict, for example with Mercer utilizing it to support neorealism. However Creppell and Gries have been quick to highlight that, much as Tajfel argued, SIT cannot be seen as an explanation for social or political conflict. The human inclination towards group membership and the group need for positive identification does not in and of itself mean there will be conflict.

The preeminent work supporting this claim is by Gordon Allport, who found “in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and, sometimes, for them. Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required” The “familiar is preferred. What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less “good,” but there is not necessarily hostility against it.” Elaborating on Allport’s claims, Brewer notes that “[i]ndeed, results from both laboratory experiments and field studies indicate that variations in ingroup positivity and social identification do not systemically correlate with degrees of bias or negativity toward outgroups.” Seymour Feshbach meanwhile found that “individual aggression proved to be weakly correlated to the index of attitudes toward war” and was of little use in differentiating between a ‘hawk’ or ‘dove’ amongst decision-makers.

Brewer’s work similarly substantiates the claim made earlier that, employing the work of Pagel, communities could be seen as forming around the need to delineate altruistic compatriots. For one, she notes how “cross-cultural evidence documents the universality of social differentiation into ingroups and outgroups at some level beyond the family or social village,” all of which are not engaged in intense (or even mild) conflict with an Other. Instead, she remarks on how as a species we have come to rely on cooperation and social learning, rather than strength, for survival, which raised

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316 “The existence and functioning of societal stereotypes are one example (and by no means the most important one) of the way in which social psychological processes contribute to the texture of an objective intergroup social situation. They do not create such situations,” Tajfel, Human Groups, pg. 225
317 Allport, The Nature, pg. 42
318 Brewer, “The Psychology”, pg. 432
320 Brewer, “The Psychology”, pg. 432-433
the problem of trust for “altruism must be contingent on the probability that others will cooperate as well.” This could be overcome by constructing clear group boundaries, with ingroups defined as “bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and cooperation,” leading one to feel positive about fellow, altruistic, members while also adhering to “ingroup norms of appearance and behavior that assure that one will be recognized as a good or legitimate ingroup member.”

What we find then, is that the existence of nationalism or difference in and of itself tells us little about the likelihood for conflict; on both a philosophical and psychological level, we cannot a-priori expect difference or nepotism to generate conflict. Difference is merely conducive to conflict, providing space for potential challenges or non/misrecognition of narrative to arise.

4. An Ontological Security Argument

Traditional approaches to security studies have been faulted due to their truncated approach, beginning with the state rather than the individual as the subject of security. Meanwhile efforts to introduce the concept of identity into security studies, while a step in the right direction, have struggled to fully address questions of how and why it is important. Similarly, works on North Korea employing more traditional approaches are unable to account for behavior often at odds with theoretical expectations, while ideational explanations often overlook mechanisms of process. An OS framework helps to address these various shortcomings.

By refocusing security studies to start with the individual, we find one of the most basic principles behind feeling secure is the maintenance of OS; the security of the self that spans the entirety of one’s lifecycle. Rather than a theory of security that limits analysis solely to the physical realm, there is a need both theoretically, and within the context of North Korea, to incorporate the concept of OS. States will behave as if they have OS needs since policymakers, who effectively run states, are motivated by this basic need. Therefore, analysts employing OS must examine domestic, rather than international, institutions in order to form predictions on state behavior. In other words, there is a shift towards the culturist focus on domestic ideational factors driving state behavior as opposed to the oft-criticized systemic constructivist approach. This is not to say the international system has no bearing on foreign policy, but that states will react differently to the international system in accordance with their own diverse social institutions.

OS deals with the security of being, meaning man must have answers to what and why he is doing, a reflexive process that requires bracketing the infinite possibilities associated with social activity. This is accomplished when one can maintain a perceived consistent self-identity, the stability of which is intertwined with the Umwelt, a protective cocoon of seeming normality maintained through daily routines and rituals. In most instances therefore, OS is an inconsequential factor because it is tied to normalcy, we are not forced to think of it in the mundane moments of life. However some situations, termed personal crises, pose a threat to the Umwelt and to our sense of being, and we in turn become driven by OS needs. These moments of

321 Ibid, pg. 433
personal crisis act as a trigger and force us to react in order to reassert normalcy. Contrary to Giddens, such OS threats need not necessarily be tied to modernity (or the ‘modern’ Western Liberal state) but pertain more to the fundamental relationship between individuals and communities.

Going back to the earliest communities of man, it was necessary for a society of individuals to form rituals and routines that would allow them to discern altruistic others, thereby overcoming our genetic predisposition not to work together. This relationship continues today, with one’s community still structuring acceptable lifestyles while also providing the metanarrative individuals seek to nest themselves within. Consequently, OS threats should be interpreted as threats to the foundation of community in pre and post modernity. This process can help explain current gaps in our understanding of North Korea specifically and security theory more broadly, with states acting in certain ways due to a perceived personal crisis.

The largest community of man today is, for the most part, the nation, a discursive entity emerging out of narrative. A ‘personal crisis’ will thereby emerge when there is a challenge to this narrative. It is not the presence of difference therefore, or the notion that we need an enemy in order to form a Self, that drives conflict. Instead when faced with a personal crisis states will react to try and counter the stimuli and preserve OS, undertaking policies that might in turn lead to conflict. This process is further refined in Chapter 3 by drawing on social representation theory and approaches to FPA.
Chapter 3
Ontological Security in Foreign Policy Decision-Making:
Forging a Framework

Chapter 2 established the need to examine OS and the interplay between national narrative and the individual Umwelt. Chapter 3 seeks to now specify the process through which OS impacts decision-making, and in doing so attempts to overcome gaps in FPA and current literature on OS. The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of the field to date. It then goes on to explore social representation theory (SRT), which is argued to be vital in further explaining how and why national narratives structure policymakers’ interpretations and images of others, as well as further elaborating on the emotional connection between individuals and their community. Following this brief overview, and the justification for temporarily bracketing national narratives, it becomes possible to further address gaps in FPA, developing the specific mechanisms through which OS impacts decision-making.

Works on OS that have been applied to the state level make a similar claim as the dissertation – that states are motivated by OS to maintain national narrative. However, the dissertation shifts away from these works on four points. 1, rather than treating states as the subject of OS, which they maintain through routinized relations with other states (Mitzen, Rumeleli), focus is shifted to the fundamental relationship between individuals and communities and how narratives underscoring the latter can become threatened, generating an OS threat. 2, this argument was created by critically analyzing Giddens’ focus on modernity, something most OS works have not done (with Zarakol’s recent work proving the exception). Thus while some have drawn on nationalism (Subotic, Kinnvall, Skey), they have not examined the historical relationship between communities and individuals noted by nationalist scholars, a sentiment Chapter 2 further explored in the context of evolutionary biology. In doing so, the dissertation was able to further elaborate on the relationship between OS and one’s community, arguing that individuals in both pre-modern and post-modern communities have an interest in maintaining communal narrative (not necessarily relationships with other states). 3, while Steele also focuses on how constructed national narratives can become threatened, he focuses on instances of ‘critical situations’ rather than what Chapter 2 termed a ‘personal crisis’; the former, it is argued, results in the re-articulation of narrative, the latter in the reassertion of narrative. 4, by integrating literature from FPA and SRT, it becomes possible to further theorize how perceived OS threats impact the images states form and the implications this has for foreign policy (Boulding, Holsti, Hurwitz, Hurwitz and Peffley), something current OS literature has failed to elaborate on (though Subotic and Zarakol touch on perceptions briefly).

1. Communal Narrative, Ontological Security, and FPA

Following WWII, FPA - especially in the U.S. - was influenced by two central tracks of thought. One was a call to improve the institutions designated to conduct foreign policy, and an interrelated “plea for the democratization of foreign policy.” Contrary

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to these heavily ideological approaches was Morgenthau’s realism, which sought to focus on how states seek to maximize power. Following this divide, the 1950’s and 1960’s saw the interjection of the behaviorist turn in social science, leading FPA to try and forge a “unified theory and a methodology based on aggregate analysis”, an initiative that ultimately failed and “had to be rejected as empirically impracticable and analytically unfruitful.” 323 Despite this behaviorist intrusion, other works continued to focus on the processes behind foreign policy decision-making.

Here, the focus was on foreign policy as “best understood as the product of a country’s internal dynamics.” 324 As argued in Chapter 2, there is a need for renewed focus on “Innenpolitik” (domestic factors) in foreign policy. In so doing, the thesis moves away from those focusing on organizational process, such as groupthink (Herrmann, Janis, Tetlock), bureaucratic politics (Graham Allison) and Steinbruner’s cybernetic processes,325 to focus instead on broader state interests and perceptions. An OS framework thus finds itself at the intersection of agency-based, social-institutional, and interpretive actor-based approaches to FPA, and could help strengthen sub approaches in these fields by fusing them into a more holistic approach. Unfortunately, current approaches to FPA remain underutilized within OS works despite the potential to provide further insight into how we might conceptualize the process through which OS influences foreign policy; while Subotic and Subotic and Zarakol do make some preliminary connections, they are never elaborated on.326 To this end, and in line with the theoretical arguments of Chapter 2, the OS framework presented here is distinguishable from, and reformulates, previous OS works on a number of points.

To begin, it challenges Steele’s assertion that work on OS should focus on instances of ‘critical situations’. This insistence, it is argued, problematizes his larger theoretical framework. Giddens writes, “[b]y ‘critical situations’ I mean circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affects substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten to destroy the certitude of institutionalized routines.”327 As an example, he presents the experience of Jews in concentration camps, or “being under fire on the battlefield for prolonged periods of time, [or] forced interrogation and torture.” Steele goes on to link critical situations to those instances when “agents, including states, are challenged by certain situations in their environment because those situations threatened their self-identities.”328 Steele references, for example, England’s decision to abstain from entering the American Civil War after the Emancipation Proclamation and U.S. intervention in Kosovo after failing to do so in Rwanda. Yet these examples seem at odds with those provided by Giddens; it is hard to conceptualize the impact of the Emancipation

326 Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 4; Subotic and Zarakol, “Cultural”
328 Steele, Ontological Security, pg. 49
Proclamation on England as related, to say, prolonged torture. Critical situations are those that overwhelm the Umwelt, forcing one to rearticulate narrative. At the state level this could include, for example, colonization. It would therefore appear as though theoretically, Steele is actually focused on a personal crisis, when the Umwelt is punctured, forcing one to reassert narrative (Ch. 2: 2.2). While both are of interest to OS, when attempting to account for state behavior the latter would appear the more fruitful focal point, encompassing problems faced by states on a more frequent basis. This has further implications for OS literature.

For one, it has some bearing on Subotic’s conceptualization of OS and policy change. Subotic’s work seems to come in response to Innes and Steele’s claim that some ‘critical situations’ can force and actor to rewrite their collective narrative; for example the 9/11 attacks “brought with it movement away from the multicultural US identity, and enforced policies that were illiberal and which held a particular perception of American identity.” In line with the above reading, however, this would again appear to be more a personal crisis rather than a ‘critical situation.’ Additionally, the extent to which these shifts represented a ‘re-articulation’ of narrative is questionable. Instead, it would seem – as Subotic argues – that policy changes can be made through the de/activation of derivative narratives while the metanarrative as a whole remains in tact. Importantly, however, this can only be seen as possible during a personal crisis, when there is, in Subotic’s words a “rupture” that needs to be addressed, and not when the Umwelt is overwhelmed (as occurs during a critical situation). States can thus adjust behavior in response to a personal crisis, with changes often justified by de/activating derivative narratives. This flows into the second point, that policymakers must reflexively determine what a situation means to national narrative and what behavior will offset possible negative implications.

This, in turn, challenges the theoretical foundation of Mitzen, who applies the work of Mercer and SIT to argue states obtain OS through routinized inter-state relations (a position similarly taken by Rumeleli). As Krolikowski demonstrates, this framework is dependent upon trust type. Giddens does not suggest that we blindly follow routines; to do so is suggestive of a neurotic compulsion derived from a failure to develop basic trust. Normally, we “act or think innovatively in relation to pre-established modes of activity.” Krolikowski concludes Mitzen must then presuppose that states have low trust. Given this reading, a number of problems arise.

To begin, the ontologically insecure, those who succumb to what Laing terms an inner deadness and compulsively focus on danger, are “people… who may seek to ‘blend with the environment’ so as to escape being the target of the dangers which haunt them.” This hardly sounds like the belligerent state engaged in constant conflict. Secondly, as argued earlier, communities are not founded upon relations with an Other, as Mitzen contends, but on reflexively forged narratives, which in turn

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329 “Such a sequence of heightened anxiety, regression, followed by a reconstruction of typical patterns of action, appears in the range of critical situations and otherwise very different contexts”. Giddens, The Constitution, pg. 63-64
330 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 131
331 Alexandria Innes and Brent Steele, “Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security” in Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte (eds.) Memory and Trauma in International Relations (Rutledge, 2013), pg. 23
332 Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 5
333 Rumeleli, Conflict
334 Krolikowski, “State Personhood”
335 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 40-41
336 Giddens, Modernity, pg. 54, emphasis added
337 For similar argument see Steele, Ontological Security, pg. 60
provide OS for individuals. While this narrative is often the result of previous interactions (Zarakol), building from past chosen traumas and glories (Kinnvall), it still becomes the lens through which policymakers, and thus states, reflexively interpret their environment. In terms of behavioral expectations then, states can learn from interaction and adjust – e.g. a friend can become an enemy. At the same time, as an institution tasked with mediating individuals’ relationship with death, Huysmans notes the state is required to guarantee “an acceptable degree of certainty.” Thus when faced with a personal crisis - when national narrative is challenged - individuals (and policymakers) will seek to reassert the narrative. This holds even for ontologically secure individuals since national narrative is more than a ritual, it is the foundation upon which rituals and lifestyles reside; it is the foundation of reality.

This helps to offset arguments that OS and the Self has become conflated with identity. The individual Self, it was noted, is far from a coherent entity. Importantly, however, it was argued that individuals nest narratives, with continuity sought at the communal (national) level. It is because the Self is in flux that we seek to place ourselves within larger and seemingly more stable entities; entities that also play a vital role in helping construct the Self. Thus while individuals can, and often do, deal with change, threats to the community pose a larger threat to Self (a personal crisis), since the community underscores the various routines and rituals we engage in (and reflexively create the Self through), while also providing the very narrative we expect to be continuous. Ideational threats to the community thus threaten the OS of its members because their ability to maintain stability is called into question. Importantly, this means that while some entities may become ‘securitized’ when they pose an ideational threat to the community, they can also become ‘desecuritized’ when this threat recedes. None of this is to say communal narratives never change (as discussed below they can and do), but that individuals seek out continuity at the communal level, with changes usually surrounding the de/activation of derivative narratives.

This argument emerged out of a larger reading of works on narrative approaches to the Self, evolutionary biology, and nationalist studies, that all indicate a historical relationship between community and OS. Unfortunately, a majority of OS work has failed to critically evaluate Giddens’ conception of OS vis-à-vis modernity. Zarakol is perhaps the exception here, having recently examined how, going back to pre-Axiel societies, both religious and political institutions have taken on the role of an institutionalized OS provider. The dissertation took a slightly different tact in Chapter 2, examining the more general relationship that has historically existed between communities and individuals. Consequently, while scholars have looked at the relationship between nationalism and OS (Subotic, Skey), particularly within

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338 Kinnvall, “Globalization”
339 Huysmans, “Security!” pg. 242
340 It is argued that while focusing on state behavior, the relationship developed over chapter 2 and 3 helps to reduce alterations to the Laing-Giddens framework. For a discussion see Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan Williams “Fir for purpose? Fitting ontological security studies ‘into’ the discipline of International Relations: Towards a vernacular turn” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No.1 (2017)
341 Importantly this in no way presupposes a violent response, and leaves open a variety of paths actors can reflexively choose in an effort to reassert communal narrative.
343 Ayse Zarakol, “States and ontological security: A historical rethinking” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No.1 (2017); It should be noted that Kinnvall has similarly come to questions Giddens’ focus on modernity. See Catarina Kinnvall, “Feeling ontologically (in)secure: States traumas and the governing of gendered space” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No.1 (2017)
344 Subotic, “Narrative”; Skey, “A sense”; Skey “Nations Matter”
modernity (Kinnvall, Krolikowski), they have not integrated the larger historical relationships many nationalist authors (Smith, Gellner) have noted exist between national/pre-national communities and individuals.

Zarakol’s work can be seen as still supporting this argument, while also interjecting a further focus on the organizational structure of said communities as either civic or religious. To this end, even when religious institutions are the dominant OS provider, political institutions would be expected to uphold the overarching narrative of that community, one that would undoubtedly have, in such instances, a greater religious component. Conversely, in modern times, where the state has taken the larger role of an OS provider, communal narratives have become far more civic in nature. The overall relationship between individual and community however, remains the same.

From this, we can argue there has been a historical interest in maintaining communal (national) narratives in order to maintain OS, a relationship that continues today. As will be argued, this in turn helps demonstrate the importance of cognition, schemas, perceptions and images (agency-based) in state foreign policy decision-making while expanding on the relationship between policy-makers and the social structures they function within (social institutional-based). At the same time, it reformulates the relationship between identity and interests often found in social institutional (constructivist) approaches, positing policymakers have an interest in maintaining national narrative. Inline with SRT, policymakers will thus re-present new information to determine if it is threatening or non-threatening to the norm (to national narrative). Those events seen as threatening can generate a personal crisis, and thus a negative image of the stimuli. This leads to appropriate schemas and postures aimed at reasserting national narrative.

This prism also becomes the lens through which policymakers’ device plans for the future, actively seeking to assert and gain recognition of national narrative, a sentiment that touches on the importance of national role conceptions (interpretive actor-based), and how states plan for the future. States will thus also seek to gain recognition of their narrative from Others and may embed “their particular narratives in a shared vision of international order with other states identified as friends…[meaning] states seek relationships with other states that recognize each other’s basic principles as valid parameters for normal behavior”. State behavior is therefore related to promoting and, when challenged, reasserting national narrative.

2. SRT & National Narratives: Structuring and Content

SRT helps to further elucidate the relationship between individuals and society and the process by which policymakers’ frame and react to external stimuli. It also begins to establish how narratives can be both manipulated through human agency while at

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345 Krolikowski does take a somewhat similar line. See “State Personhood”, pg. 126
348 Berenskoetter and Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP”, pg. 422
the same time structuring human agents. This is further explored in the context of Anthony Smith’s work on nations and Gordon Allport’s work on reference groups.

Moscovici was first to coin the term SRT in his attempts to move away from the main tenants of social psychology; that individuals understand and perceive the world as it is. Instead our world should be viewed as being comprised of representations, whose grips we can never entirely escape despite references to an outside world. They are the “collective elaboration ‘of a social object by a community for the purpose of behaving and communicating’, turning it into reality. As Jaspars and Fraser thus show, “attitudes” are usually defined as learned predispositions and as such are conceived as being social in origin”, and are often “shared by individuals belonging to the same social group.” Individual responses should thus be examined within the context of collective representations.

Social representations work to “conceptualize the objects, persons, and events we encounter”, providing them with form and categorizing them so that they become representative of a type; “even when a person or an object doesn’t conform precisely to the model, we constrain it…to enter a given category.” This process is called ‘representation’, wherein we make the unfamiliar familiar, allowing us to cope with new phenomena and avoid “a sense of incompleteness and randomness”. This is why the “people belonging to other cultures, are disturbing, because they are like us, and yet not like us; So we say they are ‘uncultured’, ‘barbarian’, ‘irrational’ and so on.” The need to transform the unknowable so as to maintain “predictability” relates directly to OS, as “[potentially] losing touch with what provides a sense of continuity, of mutual understanding is an unbearable dread.”

Society then is a “system of values, ideas and practices,” a sort of ‘consensual universe’ comprised of mutually shared representations where everyone feels at home. Smith similarly notes how the spatial and territorial components of nations helps to establish boundaries of a home while Kinnvall speaks to how home provides the “secure base on which identities are constructed.” By taking this sense of home to be equivalent to the Umwelt, we can begin to form a picture of how communities approach, and undertake, social interaction.

Drawing from Chapter 2, we can view communal (national) narrative as one of the most important social representations. This narrative thus becomes the lens through which policymakers interpret and respond to new information. As Moscovici writes

350 Moscovici, “The Phenomenon” pg. 4
351 Wagner et al., “Theory and Method” pg. 96
353 Here, Eagly and Chaiken employ an umbrella definition wherein it is “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor.” Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, “The Advantages of an Inclusive Definition of Attitude” Social Cognition, Vol. 25, Special Issue: What is an Attitude? (2007)
354 J. Jaspars and C. Fraser, “Attitudes and social representations” in Farr and Moscovici (eds.) Social Representations, pg. 105, 125
355 Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 7
356 Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 25
358 We turn the abnormal into the normal by relying on what we already deem to be normal, and in so doing neutralize any potential breach to normalcy. “Such a process reassures and comforts us; restores a sense of continuity in the group or individual threatened with discontinuity and meaninglessness.” Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 25-26, 28 emphasis added
359 See also Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction
360 Smith, Myths, pg. 64
361 “Homelessness is exactly the opposite…characterized by impermanence and discontinuity.” Kinnvall, “Globalization”, pg.747
of ‘home’, “all that is said and done there only confirms acquired beliefs and interpretations…memory prevails over deduction, the past over the present, response over stimuli and images over ‘reality’.” 362 A structuring effect Howarth views as analogues to ideologies; “representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our values are and what our relationships with others are.” 363 In short, new experiences enter into a preexisting reality of policymakers adopted during socialization, 364 leading Pagel to remark “it is difficult to escape the feeling that we seem to imprint our cultures, and in a way that is hard to shake off.” 365 Legro concludes, “cultural biases tend to produce conclusions that reinforce, not critically assess, existing beliefs”, biases that are “reminiscent of the cognitive and motivational distortions discussed in the psychological literature (Jervis 1976; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Khong 1992).” 366 National narratives are thus the prisms through which stimuli are perceived and OS threats detected.

Before further elaborating on this process (section 4), one must first address questions of agency and structure vis-à-vis representations. Despite their structuring effect, representations are formed, debated and revised by human agency. 367 However, it is argued that it is still possible to temporally bracket representation of national narrative, and by focusing on key components of these narratives one can still make useful generalizations in regards to state behavior in line with an OS framework, all of which helps to overcome current gaps in ideational approaches to FPA (section 3).

2.1 Agency in National Narratives:

Adopting a social representation approach means national narratives cannot be an independent object removed from human agency; national narratives can, and do, change. This is a result of the ongoing consensus-building project that representations rely upon, with often “multiple representations of the same social objects.” This potential plurality allows for possible “communication, negotiations, resistance, innovation and transformation.” 368 Narratives are thus formed as the result of, and are then maintained through, an inherently political process, all of which demonstrates individual agency.

For one, this has to due with the selective process of narrative formation. Memories of the past play a key component in national narratives. However history is not a static entity; individuals creatively evoke interpretations of the past to fashion a particular discourse. Here, Bell emphasizes the difference between myths and memory. Collective memory is a “socially-framed property of individual minds” formed through interaction between those who directly experienced the event. In this sense, much of what is usually associated with ‘collective memory’ is not mnemonic but “mythical.” 369 Tellingly, Renan writes, “forgetting, I would even say historical error,
is an essential factor in the creation of a nation.\(^{370}\) a sentiment also touched on by Berger and Luckmann.\(^{371}\) Communities such as the nation are therefore founded not upon memories, but upon a shared myth; a constructed “story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place in the world…that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past.”\(^{372}\)

Agency also arises given the overlap between legitimacy and being perceived as a guarantor of OS; as Ringmar writes, “the state can be understood as the political guardian of this [national] story-telling community.”\(^{373}\) Politicians thus actively work to maintain perceptions of continuity. To this end Marlow explores what he terms the “generalized, more mundane and everyday aspects” of governance and efforts “to create an inherently social, relatively stable and shared sense of being.”\(^{374}\) By looking at one of the four aspects of government found in work on ‘governmentality’,\(^{375}\) that as a “‘thoughtful and rational’ activity”, Marlow argues one of the underlying rationalities behind modern governance “is an implicit (if not explicit) recognition of, and attending to, forms of ontological insecurity…within general populaces.” Politics thus revolves around the anticipation of public emotional reactions in an attempt to act accordingly, thereby forging an emotional connection that “operates as part of an overall matrix of OS for the public at large.”\(^{376}\)

It is perhaps more fitting, however, to see a government’s legitimacy as intimately tied to its ability to appear as the guarantor, rather than primary source, of OS.\(^{377}\) As Liu and Hilton note, historical charters outline the “do’s and don’ts” of a community.\(^{378}\) By abiding these rules, politicians uphold the community and preempt public emotional reactions to perceived discontinuity. Consequently, the legitimacy of a community’s governing institutions is related to its ability to provide the populace with a sense that past events, present actions, and future plans are all in accordance with national narrative. This all requires creativity and agency, and can lead to political debates. As Berenskoetter writes:

> A master narrative is sufficiently vague to exist alongside more specific, derivative narratives that can be either layered or interwoven, and that can be strategically employed without hurting the coherence of the basic discourse. Maintaining such a narrative, or network of narratives, is a form of governance.\(^{379}\)

Politicians will seek to legitimize present and future actions in terms of either the metanarrative as a whole, or in regards to specific derivative narratives. Given the range of perspectives based on “ethnicity, class, gender and age”, Bell argues it is therefore more appropriate to refer to ‘national mythscapes’; a discursive realm “in which the myths of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and negotiated

\(^{370}\) “The essence of a nation is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common and also that they have forgotten many things.” Renan, “What is a Nation”; See also Liu and Hilton, “How the past”

\(^{371}\) Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pg. 180

\(^{372}\) Bell, Mythscapes” pg. 75

\(^{373}\) Ringmar, “International”, pg. 6


\(^{375}\) See M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Sage Publications, 1999)

\(^{376}\) Marlow, “Governmentality” pg. 244, 249-250

\(^{377}\) Policymakers are also engrained within the society they hope to maintain in order to preserve OS, meaning they are not ‘above’ the OS needs of the larger populace as Subotic perhaps contends. For discussion Mitzen and Larson, “Ontological Security”

\(^{378}\) Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 539

\(^{379}\) Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 279; see also Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 2
constantly.” This is not to say, however, that agents have complete free will to rewrite or rearticulate the narrative at hand. While recognizing the agency of individuals, especially in regards to the manipulation of derivative narratives, the metanarrative can not only takes on periods of relative stability, it also limits the extent to which manipulation and change can occur. This includes the extent to which debates over the past can successfully challenge the established narrative or an established narrative can be stretched to allow for new experiences or behavior to fit.

2.2 Structures of Metanarratives:

Like Bell, Anthony Smith suggests that internal diversity most likely prevents a "single, unified version of the communal past emerging in any relatively free society". While seemingly unified to the outside, ethnic (communal) myths reveal “divergent traditions from which different strata and groups within the ethnic community may draw strength, identity, and meaning,” which can lead to “quite distinct, even opposed courses of action.” A conservative upper-class will usually emphasize a genealogical pedigree (biological – alleged blood ties), while more “radical aspirants” trumpet “ideological affinity with a model of antique nobility” (cultural-ideological – spiritual kinship). Moreover, myths are consistently “being reinterpreted and revised by various social groups in response to internal differences and external stimuli…[meaning] national identity is never fixed or static”.

However two important qualifications must be made, which in turn reduces the potential for the level of manipulation or change seen in poststructuralist accounts. For one, Smith argues that reconstruction by subsequent generations is conducted with “certain limits” in place and that even instrumentalists “must come to terms with the basic myths and symbols which endow popular perceptions of ethnic boundaries and identities…and which mediate changes in those identities set in motion by external forces”. Smith further elaborates on how competing myths found along social divisions “are analogous to family feuds in which each branch or individual aims to achieve its due within the overall nexus of kin security and status.” Despite their differences, because these myths “refer to the selfsame community and its history, different sections of the community find themselves enclosed within one national circle…a clearly bounded social and territorial identity…[which] it becomes progressively more difficult to opt out.” Moreover, in the long term:

the rival definitions of national identity tend to merge; by provoking encounters with other national communities, by seeking title-deeds to disputed territories, they coalesce to form a community which, while still riven by social conflicts, has become more unified at the level of history and culture, and more sharply differentiated from other cultural communities.

380 Bell, “Mythscape”, pg. 75; see also Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 269
381 Smith, Myths, pg. 16, 71
382 Ibid, pg. 86, 17
383 Indeed only by examining the universal need for “meaning and inner consistency”– i.e. OS, a sentiment overlooked by instrumentalists, does the seeming need to legitimate action through references to the past make sense. Ibid, pg. 57, 61
384 Ibid, pg. 88
385 Ibid, pg. 87-88; For example, while the main political parties in Macedonia, the SDSM and the VMRO-DPMNE, have stressed different subaltern national narratives to offer “different explanations and solutions for the deep political and social rifts that arose during transformation…they are two sides of the same coin: they stress the national and ethnic individuality of the Macedonians.” Peter Atanasov, “Macedonian National Identity: Quantitative Differences Between Unitary and Subaltern National Myths and Narratives” The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Discussion Paper 32 (Dec. 2004) Accessed from: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23437/1/DP33_MacedonianNationalIdentity.pdf
Therefore, despite the presence of ‘mythscapes’, the manifestation of a community necessitates a common metanarrative; “no national movement and no persisting ethnic identity can emerge without a bedrock of shared meanings and ideals.”

Similarly Ringmar notes, “through public discussions and obsfucations, some dominant account usually emerge [within the community].” Once this occurs, those key elements of the metanarrative begin to take on more of a structuring effect, especially when allied to a state. Subotic and Zarakol thus write, individual habitus is greatly influenced by one’s nation as the latter becomes institutionalized and “responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same characteristics, possess the same national habitus’.”

This all provides a retort to postmodernists, for while nations are ‘contingent’ they are “nevertheless situated, ordered and bound.” This sentiment is reinforced by Liu and Hilton’s ‘historical affordances,’ the “elaborated repertoire of interrelated symbols and representations that not only constrains the extent to which new representations can be brought into play, but also contain agreed upon facts that may be exploited politically.” They are the stories and ‘facts’ that are presented in “media practices, monuments, educational textbooks, and the stories people are told as children and tell their grandchildren,” further solidifying their position and limiting debate.

This relates to the fact that, as Caughey asserts, we have come to place trust in ‘vicarious social experiences’ such as those we have with the media, television, and politicians. Because these ‘vicarious social experiences’ are constituted by ‘historical affordances’ there is further reluctance to challenge what has become accepted as ‘true’. Consequently, the “agencies of popular socialization – primarily the public system of education and the mass media – have been handed the task of ensuring a common public mass culture…an idea central to Ernest Gellner’s own theory of nationalism”.

Historical affordances further suggest that metanarratives not only limit the extent to which debates on the past occur, but also the extent to which new experiences, or plans for the future, can be placed within the context of the narrative, a sentiment similar to what has been coined the Overton Window. Here the “window” of politically acceptable options…shifts to include different policy options not when ideas change among politicians, but when ideas change in the society that elects them.” While societal ideas can change, such processes are much slower and allow for temporal bracketing, a sentiment found in Hurwitiz and Peffley’s work on the resiliency of ‘general beliefs.’

We can equate this metanarrative to Boulding’s national image. While the powerful are well placed to manipulate the images of the masses, Boulding and Ringmar

References:

386 Smith, Myths, pg. 57
387 Ringmar, “International”, pg. 7
389 Subotic and Zarakol, “Cultural”, pg. 918
390 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 264; see also Smith, Myths, pg. 9
391 Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 34
392 Marlow, “Governmentality”, pg. 251
396 Ringmar, Identity, pg. 2
warn against taking this position to the extreme, with Hopf noting how society has repeatedly proved less easy to move than postmodernists would expect. Rather than a constructed entity forced upon the masses, Boulding notes that most national images are transferred from parent to child; “the image is essentially a mass image...a "folk image.” Images can also be, and often are, linked to representations of the past; “[t]he more conscious a people is of its history, the stronger the national image is likely to be. To be an Englishman is to be conscious of "1066 and All That" rather than of "Constantine and All That," or "1776 and All That.”

Relatively new nations can thus still possess strong, largely encompassing, national images derived from a common historical representation of a shared past, for example colonization. Indeed as Lebow notes, this is the very foundation of nationalism for Hans Kohn, Carleton J.H. Hayes and Karl Deutch, while Holsti argues historical rather than value based national images might be stronger; in the U.S., for example, a moral traditionalist and a liberal progressive are united by their common ‘history’. He goes on to write:

The written word and public education contribute enormously to the stability and persistence of the national images. The Jews, for instance, are a creation of the Bible and the Talmud, but every nation has its bible...noble words like the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address - which crystallize the national image in a form that can be transmitted almost unchanged from generation to generation.

In new postcolonial states the ‘Bible’ could be seen as canonized revolutionary writings that emerged to combat the colonizers, much like the Declaration of Independence. Indeed Liu and Hilton note that across ethnic and regional groups “recent and foundational events [were] nominated by lay people more frequently than intermediate events in time” as paramount to national identity. While modern society has more “dynamic and fluid representational fields,” the very function of national images has been to provide a consistent foundation for the community, becoming more robust as they are fused into the lay knowledge of society, with intuitions “lend[ing] the narrative a material infrastructure that can sustain it across generations.” To this end even Hansen, a self-touted poststructuralist, concludes, “it is thus misleading to say...that identity is easily changed or that history does not matter.” Instead:

Foreign-policy problems are...not handled de novo as their solution is written into a discursive terrain that is already partially structured through previously articulated and institutionalized identities...policies that radically break with these constructions is not impossible, but it is a daunting task, and in particular when political opposition can mobilize these historically (re)produced constructions.

Therefore, as Krebs writes, “not all conceivable policies can be legitimated in the

397 Hopf, “Identity Relations”, pg. 282
399 Boulding, “National Images”, pg. 122
402 Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 539
403 Howarth, “Social representation”, pg. 71
404 Berenskotter, “Parameters”, pg. 279
405 Hansen, Security, pg. 223, FN 10
public sphere, and that which cannot be legitimated cannot be pursued over the long haul’, with legitimation derived from how well policies can be linked to dominant narratives. While his focus is on national security narratives, we can link this to narratives of national identity. Indeed, he later notes, “[e]ven in times of crisis, leaders cannot deploy just any story before public audiences. Those stories must be faithful to deeper identity narratives, which are fairly stable and only occasionally challenged.” For example, to challenge ‘American exceptionalism’ is “to relegate oneself to the margins” and while the idea is “sufficiently flexible to have sustained policies that are diametrically opposed” debates are still centered on how to “advance their national mission of spreading freedom and democracy…not whether they are so obligated.”

Thus, while politicians have agency to manipulate narratives to facilitate policy change – “emphasiz[ing] some parts of the story and conveniently forget[ing] others”, the change still “has the fit within the overall narrative schematic template to make sense to the public.”

The thesis concludes there are roughly three levels of social disruption to the metanarrative that provide varying room for debate, a sentiment similar to institutional views on change (Elman). The first is a fateful moment, when the metanarrative is overwhelmed, forcing its re-articulation. This provides room for more large-scale debates amongst social cleavages as to what the metanarrative ought to entail. The second is what was previously termed a personal crisis, wherein the metanarrative (or a particular derivative narrative) is not overwhelmed, but challenged, generating an OS threat. Here the community will seek to creatively reassert the metanarrative (or derivative narrative if it is in a position of power). The last pertains to instances when the metanarrative is not overwhelmed or challenged, but when there is a need to incorporate new realities. Smith thus notes how myths tend to emerge, “into the political daylights” during period of accelerated social and economic change, incipient secularization, and prolonged periods of warfare. In effect, the community must seek to determine what new realities mean the communal Self, with social cleavages potentially championing competing derivative narratives, but not necessarily challenging the metanarrative – part of the ‘consistent unfolding of self’ that was noted earlier.

Brand’s investigation into the extent to which states alter narratives when faced with a crisis helps justify these conclusion. She found that the largest transformations occurred during a contested transfer of power, while only small changes occurred following uncontested transfers, wars (be they a perceived victory or defeat) and social unrest. Most of these changes, including larger ones during contested power transformation, primarily involved the de/activation of derivative narratives or re-interpreting core components of the metanarrative. Indeed, despite her more

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407 Ibid, pg. 13-14
408 Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 2
410 Smith, Myths, pg. 83-84
412 To this end, Ronald Krebs comments on Brand’s theoretical opaqueness regarding what “constitutes a substantial narrative reshaping” as opposed to a “minor emendation.” Ronald Krebs, “Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2016), pg. 1167
“instrumentalized conception of narrative,” she writes, “[s]ome story lines may have such a long history in the official narrative that it would seem heretical – that is to say, be impossible – to remove them,” and later remarks on how “founding stories seem particularly resistant to change.” Consequently, while actors have more freedom to manipulate derivative narratives, it is really only when faced with a larger fateful moment that space is provided for a challenge to the metanarrative.

This still leaves questions regarding the disposition of subgroups towards the metanarrative. As Michael Skey, building from Ghassan Hage, has argued, “different groups are perceived to be (and made to feel) ‘more or less national than others’…those groups who possess greater ‘national cultural capital’…are able to position themselves (and are recognised) as unconditionally belonging to the nation” which in turn provides a greater degree of OS. Accordingly, “while, such frameworks are rightly scrutinized in terms of the inequalities they often generate and sustain” they also “underpin complex social systems that large numbers can rely on.” At the same time, while metanarratives may align more with a nation’s ‘core’ group – in Skey’s investigation this was England’s ‘ethnic majority’ – it is also possible to view metanarratives as capable of encompassing social divisions.

This finds resonance with Allport’s work on in-groups and reference groups. In-groups pertain to many of the social cleavages noted above, such as family, city, class and race; “members of an in-group all use the term we with the same essential significance.” Taking from Sherif and Sherif, Allport defines reference groups as those which “the individual relates himself as a part, or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically.” Importantly, he notes how many different in-groups are found within a larger society, meaning some minority in-groups will ultimately be marginalized. However, the larger society will still come to form the reference group for these minorities:

Every minority groups finds itself in a larger society where many customs, many values, many practices are prescribed. The minority group member is thus to some degree forced to make the dominant majority his reference group in respect to language, manners, morals and law. He may be entirely loyal to his minority in— group, but he is at the same time always under the necessity of relating himself to the standards and expectations of the majority.

E.S. Bogardus’ social experiments on ‘social distance’, investigating to what extent individuals in the U.S. would admit members of various ethnic and national groups, helps substantiate this point. Across the spectrum English and Canadians were consistently seen as acceptable candidates for becoming fellow citizens, neighbors, etc., while “Hindus, Turks, Negros” were not. Allport thus writes:

we are forced to conclude that the member of an ethnic minority tends to fashion his attitudes as does the dominant majority. In other words, the dominant majority is for

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413 Krebs, “Official Stories” pg. 1167
414 Brand, Official Stories, pg. 18
416 Skey “A Sense”, pg. 718
417 Skey, “Why do nations matter?”, pg. 85
418 Allport, The Nature, pg. 31, 37
419 Ibid, pg. 38
him a reference group. It exerts a strong pull on him, forcing attitudinal conformity. The conformity, however, rarely extends to the point of repudiating his own in-group. A Negro, or Jew, or Mexican will ordinarily assert the acceptability of his own in-group, but in other respects he will decide as does his larger reference group. \(^{420}\)

This correlates with the psychological principle that “*concentric loyalties need not clash*.” Reverting back to the concept of ‘mythscape’, this overview is important because, “the national orbit is the largest circle of loyalty that most children learn.” Already by the age of ten or eleven, most children have developed an “emotional evaluation of his national circle” learned from “teachers and parents, and adopted ready-made” and that “teaching ordinarily stops the process of enlargement at this point.” This is not to say that future circles can never be learned, but this “is not often achieved”. \(^{421}\) Consequently, for most individuals the nation has become the largest reference group, regardless of if the individual is also a member of a minority in-group, leading them to subscribe to many of the features of the nation. Such a view still allows for debates and contestation, especially in regards to derivative or subaltern narratives and/or competing myths, but it also allows for a more stable, albeit contingent, metanarrative.

Of course some institutions allow for more contestation than others; democracies will most likely possess and allow for more debate on derivative narratives than an authoritarian régime, especially as the latter are often more dependent on narratives given their fragile legitimacy (Brand; Boulding). But this does not erode the fact that *all nations* rely on metanarratives or founding ‘Bibles’ for their existence. As Park writes, “the role of ideology as the provider [one could add varying levels] of legitimacy can be witnessed in every form of government even including participatory democracy.” \(^{422}\) In both instances there is a broader metanarrative, the maintenance of which is vital to both the governing institution’s legitimacy and the populace’s OS.

Outside of institutional type, it is also important to touch on the difference between hegemonic, emancipated and polemical representations and their varying levels of contestation, recognizing that not all states align with nations. The former largely allow for “a people to think and act as one” due to a “resonance between historical representations, physical artifacts and mass media, and the current political agenda.” Hegemonic representations thus have a positive relationship with subgroups, what Cinnirella calls positive networking, as seen for example with postcolonial nationalism in Malaysia and Singapore. \(^{423}\) Emancipated representations arise when subgroups hold unique, but not incompatible, representations. Here some in-groups would be marginalized within the nation, but still view it as a reference group. \(^{424}\) In both instances, one can develop (based on the metanarrative at hand) the general postures a state will adapt, as described below. If an emancipated representation, one would then also construct various sub-expectations depending on which derivative narratives have been activated/ deactivated by those in power. \(^{425}\)

\(^{420}\) Ibid, pg. 39

\(^{421}\) Ibid, pg. 46


\(^{423}\) Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 542, 547

\(^{424}\) At the same time “in large-scale polities, even in a regime like Stalin's Soviet Union, there are always advocates and adherents of dissenting narratives. Some elements may even penetrate popular culture. But a dominant narrative, which excludes others from the zone of the respectable and legitimate, is compatible with diversity and dissent at the margins.” *Narratives*, pg. 21

\(^{425}\) Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 32, NO. 2 (June, 1988)
All of this is far removed from what one finds with a polemical representation; contradicting dominant and sub-group representations that undermine each other’s identity. Here it would prove infeasible for the dominant narrative to try and accommodate the sub counter-narrative as they are zero-sum. This can be an acute problem for states that emerged not out of some organic process but had borders imposed on them (e.g. Iraq), though as Brand notes emigration (e.g. Jordan) and diaspora communities, such as ethnic Russians in former Soviet states, could lead to similar issues. While in these instances one would still expect the governing institution to act in accordance with the dominant narrative, it is important to keep in mind this can have negative implications for sub groups, the focus for example of Croft’s work on the experience of British Muslims following 9/11. Consequently, it is vital to ascertain levels of congruence and contestation within the state under review. This not only helps to establish temporal bracketing and circumvent accusations of “gross generalizations [that] are untestable [and] unfalsifiable”, but also helps recognize those instances wherein dominant narratives might pose an internal OS threat. Still, so long as one acknowledges the rift, useful predictions regarding foreign policy can still be developed, as well as potential domestic conflict that might arise. It is therefore imperative to outline the content of national narrative so as to discern where threats might arise.

2.3 Content of National Narratives:

Given the framework developed so far, it becomes vital to distinguish the “key discursive elements...of a collective national identity” in order to shed light on what might be interpreted as an OS threat. As Berenskoetter writes, narratives provide OS “by meaningfully situating individuals in a community and, by extension, the world by defining the spatio-temporal parameters from and towards which they can act as a community.” Consequently, and in line with works by Bell, Ringmar, and Smith, one must elaborate on both temporal and spatial components of national narratives.

The temporal component allows a community to “not only creat[e] a present; it also makes sense of it by inserting it into the plot which is our individual or collective lives,” This temporal component will most likely entail an account of the nation’s origins (what was noted above as the “founding myth”) and its “subsequent

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427 See for example Brand, “National Narratives”
429 Moreover if/when these sub-groups are diaspora communities, their origin nation may feel compelled to intervene to maintain their own narratives. See Ferguson and Mansbch’s work Politics, on overlapping loyalties.
432 Johnston, “Strategic Culture Revisited”, pg. 522
433 This relates somewhat to Creppell’s work on normative orders and Gilbert’s plural subject, wherein entities become too disparate or become attracted to alternative orders then the group will split. Creppell, “normative threat”, pg. 469
434 Bell, “Mythscapes”, pg. 69
435 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 269-270
436 See also Krebs, Narratives, pg. 11
437 Ringmar, Identity, pg. 76-77
momentous events and heroic figures” establishing “perception of past and future in a linear historical timeline”.

Andrews et al surmise, they “trace the (constructed) genealogy of an identity group back to a specific place, time, and ancestor in order to derive an ideological lineage and to provide a guide for future actions.”

To this end Gustafsson notes how mythical representations of the past are an essential component for the “creation and preservation of collectives.” Mythology leads to a feeling of commonality amongst a disperse populace, letting them all know who they are and the stories to live by, often by referencing a heroic age; “[t]he future of the ethnic community can only derive meaning and achieve its form from the pristine 'golden age' when men were 'heroes'."

There is, in turn, a strong incentive to safeguard and promote the collective myth of one’s group, and the “infrastructure dedicated to keep[ing] the memory alive”...[such as] museums, memorials and school curricula.

For example, China sought to revamp school curriculums in the 1990s so as to counteract perceived external encroachments on identity, and have lashed out when Japanese official visit war museums or school textbooks are introduced that downplay Japanese atrocities during WWII.

Revealing the temporal component of a nation’s shared metanarrative will in turn help signify not just how a community conceives of its past, but how it defines itself; the traits and values that make it unique and separate it from others as enshrined in a ‘national bible’ and historical affordances. Actions seen as uncharacteristic of, or challenging the values derived from, this past, and relevant derivative narratives should they exist, will be interpreted as a threat to the foundation of the community.

The second dimension is spatial. It was noted earlier how nations establish boundaries, generating the spatial demarcations of a ‘home’. As Bell writes, “[t]he spatial dimension tends to be rooted in particular constructions of an often-idealized bounded territory, for example a romanticized national landscape” and as such “includes a powerful narrative of place, embodying the topophilic power of a ‘here-feeling’”. Berenskoetter, championing Heidegger, thus views the spatial as consisting of center, order and horizon. The center is a place that the Self most strongly associates with on an emotional level, leading to a sense of trust. As we come into the world:

we encounter a dynamic and living mass providing stimulus and opportunities for the creation of meaning structures...the disclosed world turns into a space around’ or ‘close to’ the Self, with closeness not understood in terms of physical proximity but in terms of knowledge and evaluation.

Consequently, by “insert[ing] our being into a location which is distinct from all other possible locations...‘we turn space into place.’” This ‘place’ is the interplay between experiences and a physical tangible location, generating a sense of ‘home’ that in turn becomes the center of the biographical narrative. Narratives we tell thus give special meaning to certain areas and “in this way places become our places, places to which

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438 Bell, “Mythscapes”, pg. 75-76
439 Andrews et al, “Narratives of”, pg. 144; See also Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 272
441 Smith, Myths and Memories, pg. 65
442 Gustafsson, “Memory Politics”, pg. 73-74
443 Bell, “Mythscapes”, pg. 76
444 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 275
we feel allegiance and loyalty."\textsuperscript{445} We can view this as the physical location of the \textit{Umwelt}. Indeed Kinnvall speaks to this when she writes how OS “is maintained when home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material environment…[it] constitutes a spatial context in which daily routines of human existence are performed.”\textsuperscript{446}

The second component is identification with an order, which is shaped by one’s visions of utopia\textsuperscript{447} and dystopia – “a utopia that has gone wrong.”\textsuperscript{448} Berenskoetter argues it is important to move beyond the conception of order as only constituted by norms, as this overlooks the emotionally charged role of values. Values tell us what is good and bad and as such we measure distance of a place by its value to being. As noted above, Liu and Hilton reference how national narratives provide do’s and don’ts.\textsuperscript{449} They speak of a ‘Golden Age’ and hero’s we should strive to replicate, as well as myths of decline wherein, because “the old virtues were forgotten…the barbarians burst through.”\textsuperscript{450} Places are therefore embedded within visions of utopia/dystopia, allowing us to envision what the place should/should not become, setting a horizon for what is possible; “Utopia, dystopia, chaos: these are not just ways of imagining the future (or the past) but can also be understood as concrete practices through which historically situated actors seek to reimagine their present and transform it into a plausible future.”\textsuperscript{451} Narratives therefore incorporate experiences that transform certain spaces into places that are familiar, and which can expand or contract as future experiences are taken into account. Challenges to these boundaries, and incursions into this physical ‘home’, especially by entities seeking to inject contradictory values, will thus be seen as a possible challenge to the narrative.

These various challenges can all be seen as connected with recognition – or in this case non/misrecognition. Importantly, Lindemann notes the “lack of recognition has a distinctive significance – it is a threat to our self-image and self-esteem”, depriving the emotional need to avoid “uncertainty and even existential anguish, which is born from the ‘fragilisation’ of an identity.”\textsuperscript{452} Actions that directly challenge national narrative, or the more generalized failure to adequately recognize this narrative, consequently pose an OS threat. We can conclude states will thus represent new information to see if it is deviating away from, or conforming with, the national narrative. Given the components of national narrative outlined here, a few preliminary assumptions can be made:

1. Competing historical representations of the past central to narrative, or actions that challenge/undermine key values derived from the national myth, will be represented as challenging national narrative.

\textsuperscript{445} Ringmar, \textit{Identity}, pg. 77, 78
\textsuperscript{446} Kinnvall, “Globalization”, pg.747
\textsuperscript{448} Alas dystopias are far more frequent, and often constitute lived experiences, with immediate action called for to help moves us towards a utopic future. Michael Gordin, Helen Tilley and Gyan Prakash “Introduction” in Michael Gordin, Helen Tilley, and Gyan Prakash (eds.) \textit{Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility} (Princeton University Press, 2010), pg. 1
\textsuperscript{449} See also B. Rime’, “How individual emotional episodes feed collective memory” In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Paez, & B. Rime’ (eds.) \textit{Collective memory of political events} (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997)
\textsuperscript{450} Smith, \textit{Myths}, pg. 67
\textsuperscript{451} Gordin, Tilley and Prakash “Introduction”, pg. 2
\textsuperscript{452} According to Lindemann, there are two aspects of misrecognition; when self-image is not confirmed (Ringmar 1996; Aoun 2003; Saurette 2006) and when social norms are violated (Doran 1991). The latter leads to a fight for dignity and to be recognized as equal, the former for self-identity. Lindemann, \textit{Causes of War}, pg. 12
2. Similarly, actions seen as blurring the distinction with the Other will be represented negatively.
3. On a spatial level, alterative narratives pertaining to a certain place and what that place should/should not be, leading to potentially deviant policies in regards to that territorial area, will be viewed as a threat to the ‘home’.
4. This all relates to a broader failure to adequately recognize national narrative, which is seen as tantamount to rejecting the Self, and thus an OS threat.

Following this analysis, it now becomes possible to further expand on how national narratives influence policymakers’ images and perceptions of other groups. In particular OS helps overcome gaps in current ideational approaches to FPA, including the cognitive function of identity and the role of national images in influencing state postures.

3. The Role of National Narrative in Perception

The role of identity in perception is a fairly well established concept. For example Hopf employed experimental psychology to show how identity functions as a cognitive economizing device, while Hurwitz used cognitive-psychology and social cognition, exemplified by Fiske and Taylor, to construct a schematic approach to FPA, with identity providing shortcuts or ‘cognitive heuristics’. The social characteristics of the group thus become inseparable from how phenomena are represented and made intelligible. This is a top-down approach with old information filling in gaps as complexity increases, with the international arena being a prime example.

In a similar vein Lasas outlines the role historical perceptions and memories play in decision-making; “In the context of uncertainty…these legacies can become crucial anchoring points that help in interpreting current events and making judgments about other actors’ motives and intentions.” Thus Liu and Hilton note how “a group can use its collective wisdom to manage present crises through its memory of past ones,” an argument similarly found in the work of Levy, while on a broader scale Patterson and Monroe argue narratives are how we uniquely make sense of reality. Similarly, groups can draw different lessons of the same event depending on their representation of the past. Lasas shows how this process impacted Baltic perceptions of the Russian intervention into Georgia, leading to a strong response when compared to the rest of Europe despite strategic or economic interests.

All of this corresponds with the works of Herbert Simon and James Voss, Terry

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456 Wagner et al., “Theory and Method”, pg. 100 ; Legro, “Culture”, pg. 121
458 Liu and Hilton, “How the past ”, pg. 549
Greene and Timothy Post on problem solving, providing a link between schemas, perceptions and action. In short, national narrative (identity) is the prism through which policymakers forge assumptions. These assumptions are in turn one of the most important factors underlying decisions, a concept fiercely employed by Jervis, Cottam, George and Spiegel. However, while cognitive functioning goes some way in explaining the importance of identity in state decision-making, there is a need to include the influence of OS and national narrative in this process. This allows one to more firmly explain the emotional connection between individual and group, and why the identity of the latter is of such importance.

For example, Hopf argues social structures and identities consist of three facets: consequence (will action be rewarded/punished), appropriateness (how we should act), and habit (we don't actively think since answers are engrained in us). Here, identities “emerge as shortcuts to bounding probable ideas, reactions, and practices toward categorized others. These are the human needs for ‘ontological security’.” Consequently he writes his is a “cognitive theory of identity because the presocial need for identity is psychological.” However, as seen earlier, OS has far more to do with the role rituals play in sustaining the Umwelt and self-identity. Hopf by contrast, despite referencing OS, focuses strictly on the cognitive implications of socialization (i.e. reading events through a certain identity terrain), examining the “natural, unquestioned, mundane daily practices that constitute everyday life and commonsense lived reality.” Again, while communal identity has cognitive implications, it is also the foundation of OS, meaning we have an interest in its maintenance. It is therefore not necessarily the daily taken for granted rituals that are of interest, but the larger narrative they are embedded within.

Hopf thus focuses on the shift under Khrushchev away from Stalin’s “New Soviet Man” (NSM) and towards acceptable “difference”, which aligned with the wider societal identity previously oppressed under Stalin. He argues this shift explains the 1957 Sino-Soviet split. What is left unclear, however, is why this would lead to conflict. By contrast, an OS framework would examine those elements fundamental to Soviet national narrative, which indeed Hopf places as an area of congruence under Stalin and Khrushchev; both held “the Soviet Union as a modern, developed vanguard for the world, Russia as the center and apex of the Soviet Union with premodern developing peripheries subordinate to it...an elder brother for other, non-Russian peoples.” Consequently, China’s increasingly assertive and independent position following Khrushchev’s rise challenged this narrative, generating an OS threat. Works on identity in FPA could in turn gain great insights by examining the relationship between metanarratives and OS and the impact this has on perceptions.

To this end, OS also helps to account for some of the shortcomings in Boulding’s work on national images; the notion policymakers “do not respond to the "objective"

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463 Herrmann, “The Power” pg. 842-843
464 See for example Denis Hilton et al. “Social representations of history and attitudes to European unification in Britain, France and Germany” In G. M. Breakwell & E. Lyons (eds.) Changing European identities: Social psychological analyses of social change. International series in social psychology (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996)
465 Hopf, “Identity Relations”, pg. 281
466 Ibid, pg. 283
467 Indeed this seems to be of greater ideational importance, for as Hopf notes, “Stalinist fear of difference did not extend to China because the Stalinist hierarchy of center and periphery, modernity and premodernity, were projected onto China.” Ibid, pg. 301-302, 304
facts…but to their "image" of the situation.” Images simplify and provide guidelines in foreign policy, as shown by Eldridge, Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Holsti, and Kelman.\textsuperscript{468} This is true for both the “ordinary citizen and the powerful statesman”.\textsuperscript{469} Behavior is therefore determined by decisions that are in turn comprised of the ordering and selection of perceived options, the structure and breadth of which are determined by images. However, outside of references to conceptions of friends, threats and perceived national strength, Boulding does little to conceive of what goes into framing these images. Indeed these characteristics need to be developed in their own right; what determines the image of a friend?

An OS framework helps refine how these images of others are constructed. In brief, negative (or positive) images are formed through re-presentation, wherein the entity/event is interpreted as contradicting (or supporting) national narrative. These images in turn underscore foreign policy schemas, which lead to more specific foreign policies. At the same, time national narrative hold prescriptive elements, constituting national role conceptions. The drive for OS then is not just reactive, as most works have focused on, but also proactive.\textsuperscript{470} These processes are laid out in Figure 1.

Figure 1:

4. Specifying an Ontological Security Framework

It was noted earlier that through the process of re-presentation, policymakers are able to discern threats to, and thus maintain, OS. This is a two-part process. First re-presentation “clarifies” a situation, transforming new information so as to maintain a sense of order and predictability. Once determined, our opinions of the category to which it is compared are transferred, with the phenomena taking on the characteristics of that category’s ideal prototype. The primary goal is ‘anchoring’, determining if the phenomenon conforms with, or deviates away from (threatens or non threatens) the norm.\textsuperscript{471} National narratives then are not only the lens through which policymakers make sense of interaction, they are also the referent point against which other groups or stimuli are juxta posed.

\textsuperscript{469} Boulding, “National Images”, pg. 120, 131
\textsuperscript{470} This is touched on to some extent in Berenskoetter and Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP”
\textsuperscript{471} Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 34
While often times we will try and instinctively misrecognize, distorting reality so that an event confirms narrative, such distortions may prove impossible to achieve.\(^\text{472}\) In such instances we are faced with a ‘personal crisis’, when an event punctures the Umwelt leading to a sense of alarm. Above it was shown challenges could relate to our mythical representations of the past, the story we tell of a specific place, or failure to provide adequate recognition to our narrative overall. For example when comparing themselves to other Europeans “early-seventeenth-century Swedes came to suffer from what can only be described as an acute sense of inferiority.”\(^\text{473}\) In order to gain more favorable recognition, Sweden compiled narratives to bolster a more grandiose image based on references to the ‘ancient Goths’ and Sweden as a Protestant state. While this narrative was recognized by the Swedish masses, recognition from other princes proved less forthcoming, leading the Swedish King to surmise, “we have not shown ourselves as strong as other nations and our reputation has suffered as a result.”\(^\text{473}\) Consequently, Sweden entered the Thirty Year War, bent on forcing others to recognize its narrative.

It does not take much imagination to envision similar arguments arising in post-colonial states. Having achieved independence, these states were forced to address questions over the national “I”. The narratives formed as a response to this question in turn demanded recognition from others (a sentiment that relates to the proactive component of national narratives touched on below). This is especially true for states such as the DPRK, whose national narrative must be maintained not only for OS but also as the primary source of legitimacy, further compounding sensitivity.

Ringmar outlines three possible responses when narrative fails to be recognized. The first, identity abandonment, pertains to the “‘lost tribes’ that sometimes appear in the footnotes of our history books: the people of d’Oc, [and] the Gaels in Cornwall.” We could equate this to groups that underwent fateful moments and were, overtime, subsumed, and later generations socialized, within the new, larger, group. The second option, to accept the rejection and assume the externally placed description, “was the policy adopted by the Scots, the Welsh, the Norwegians, the Finns, the Estonians and the Lithuanians who remained as communities but under foreign domination.” Again we can equate this to a fateful moment, but one more attune to colonization, wherein narrative is re-articulated to account for the new setting but still remains distinct from the colonial entity. The last option is to take action to reassert narrative and prove it is indeed true and must be recognized.\(^\text{474}\) This pertains more to a personal crisis; rituals have not been overwhelmed and forgotten (abandonment) or rearticulated (acceptance), but are punctured, compelling one to reassert narrative.\(^\text{475}\)

Chernobrov, turning to Todorov’s work on the first meeting between the Spanish and American Indians, thus notes “[c]ollectives exist with a positive view of themselves and their behaviors...leading them to defend this conception when faced with alternative practices. Protecting, cherishing, and leaving self unquestioned becomes the essence of self’s existence”.\(^\text{476}\) Howarth similarly writes, “when others’ representations of us are negative...we find strategies that resist and reject such...
representations and so protect our sense of self.\footnote{Howarth “Social representation”, pg. 78-79} When recognition is not forthcoming we will thus try and make the Other recognize us\footnote{Ringman, Identity, pg. 185} while at the same time presenting the deviant stimuli as something negative. This is more likely to occur when entities outside the community are behind the challenge, rather than fellow members.\footnote{For example Switzerland’s hostile reaction to external pressure regarding the need to confront its actions during WWII. See Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu (eds.) The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Duke University Press, 2006)} In this way, representations of national narrative help to constitute the images policymakers form; entities and events seen as challenging or non/misrecognizing the narrative will become associated with negative categories, becoming negative in their own right.

This all holds insights for schematic approaches to FPA, as foreign policy postures are selected inline with these more general negative or positive assessments. As noted above, Hurwitz argues that since humans are “cognitive misers”, using old knowledge to deal with the present, “attitude structure centers primarily on the linkages between abstract and concrete idea elements, where the former are assumed to "constrain" the latter”, a sentiment that builds from findings in constraint research showing a “considerable consistency between policy positions and more general idea elements.”\footnote{Hurwitz, “Foreign Policy”, pg. 1100}

Encouraged by similar investigations by Conover and Feldman, Carbonell, and Jervis,\footnote{Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman, “Religion, Morality and Politics: Moral Traditionalism in the 1980’s.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (1986); Jaime G. Carbonell Jr., “Politics: Automated Ideological Reasoning” Cognitive Science Vol. 2 (1978); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976)} Hurwitz sought to further pursue vertical constraint theory in relation to FPA, developing a three-tiered diagram. At the bottom are specific foreign policies (such as deploying nuclear weapons in Europe) that are limited by the second tier – normative beliefs or “postures”, which convey more general interests, for example interest in an isolationist foreign policy. These postures are in turn informed by one’s core values, which on their own do not contain even generalized government policies but instead represent fundamental general beliefs (schemas), for example ethnocentrism. Given how biographical narratives were found to be the pillar stone of nations it would only make sense to view these as the most important ‘general belief’.

In their work on U.S.-USSR relations, Hurwitz and Peffley outlined three distinct postures within the U.S. - militarism, isolationism and containment – underwritten by more general views on the USSR as a threatening entity. This includes how we perceive intentions, which in turn frames response.\footnote{Moreover we often disregard actions that diverge from preexisting conceptions we have developed of the other’s assumed traits and goals in an effort to “understand, predict, and control [their] behavior”. Hurwitz and Peffley, “Public Images”, pg. 7} While varying levels of threat vis-à-vis the USSR were found, leading to different postures, there was still a consensual anti-Soviet sentiment. They argue this related to fundamental U.S. beliefs and values, concluding “the electorate’s views on national security issues are….strongly shaped by postures, that postures are dependent to some degree on perceptions of threat from the Eastern bloc, and that threat is tied closely to values of patriotism and moral traditionalism.”\footnote{Ibid, pg. 23} Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson replicated
these findings in Costa Rica where core beliefs played an even more crucial role, directly impacting policies.\textsuperscript{484}

From these findings we can argue that threat levels are proportional to perceived threats to narrative. Thus the USSR was even \textit{more} threatening to conservative Christian patriots who strongly aligned with the ‘American way of life’. Foreign policies might then vary to some extent depending on if these individuals (parties) are in power and/or, which derivative narratives are activated and deactivated. This helps to account for the four graduated change types in foreign policy outlined by Hermann. These are 1) adjustment – a change in level of effort, 2) program – a change in methods or means, 3) problem – a change in goals that policies were aimed to achieve, and 4) international orientation – a change in international role and activities.\textsuperscript{485} Here, adjustment and program change would be attributed to a shift in posture aimed at countering the same OS threat. By contrast, a change in goals would have to be accompanied by a change in perceived threat, leading to a different set of postures, while re-orientation would be equated to a shift in national narrative.

While unable to account for specific policies,\textsuperscript{486} one can still account for the general postures adopted by policymakers. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as negative, as threatening the norm of historical narrative, take on negative qualities - a negative image - leading to appropriate postures. While policymakers may then debate amongst each other in regards to specific policies that are based off of these postures, they will still be united by the fact the postures are underwritten by the same general beliefs and a similar re-presentation process. This helps explain why, as Rathburn and Chittick, Billingsly and Travis have all shown, foreign policy attitudes tend to be clustered.\textsuperscript{487} We can label this the \textit{reactive} process, which has been the focal point for much of the current literature on OS. The OS framework presented here also seeks to account for the \textit{proactive} component of identity maintenance, interpreted as intertwined with national role conceptions.

\section*{4.1 The Proactive Process of Ontological Security:}

Addressing the proactive component of narrative maintenance strengthens FPA by revealing not only how a group might react, but also the proactive steps it might take. “Narrative thus ‘connect[s] us with our past and links us via our political projects \textit{to the future} [emphasis added].”\textsuperscript{488} SRT is again of great use, for representations also hold a prescriptive element; “our manner of thinking, and what we think, depend on such representations.”\textsuperscript{489} This in turn helps with what Giddens termed ‘life-planning’ and ‘colonization of the future’. It also relates to Holsti’s work on national role

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{485} Correspondingly, this could include: 1) US decision to send military advisors to Vietnam, 2) US decision to send combat troops to Vietnam, 3) US decision to let Vietnam fall, and 4) (possibly) US hesitance to commit large scale forces after Vietnam. Charles Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy” \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar. 1990); pg. 5-6
\bibitem{486} Here, looking at a state’s "strategic culture" may provide further insights. See for example Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995); “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China”, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (Columbia University Press, 1996); see also Krebs, \textit{Narratives}
\bibitem{488} Kratochwil, “Re-Thinking”, pg. 508
\bibitem{489} Moscovici, “The Phenomenon”, pg. 10
\end{thebibliography}
conceptions, comprised of ‘policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis.\textsuperscript{490}

While Holsti was limited in the extent to which he developed the relationship between domestic variables and national role conceptions,\textsuperscript{491} the OS framework’s emphasis on national narratives helps to further elucidate this process. Berenskoetter perhaps outlines this best, arguing that by incorporating into our narrative what we want the future to be, we not only alleviate anxiety over the future but also allow the Self to be further known.\textsuperscript{492} Images of utopia at times coupled with dystopia therefore become important aspects of narrative and of the Self, and can come to play a critical role in decision-making, as seen in Carr, Boyle, and Williams.\textsuperscript{493} In order for these (dys)utopic images to become accepted, they must be embedded within familiar understandings of being in the world (which we can relate to a group’s field of social representations), entertain the possibility for the Self to become something it is currently not, and be simple or vague enough to allow for broad base adoption and flexibility. The interplay between past and future is thus a dialectical relationship. Significant experiences of the past are sorted in line with what we hope for in the future, but these myths also places limits on the range of futures we construct.\textsuperscript{494}

To this end Liu and Hilton note how the historical charter of a society is also “prescriptive”, defining the role of the group – for example as “‘defender of the free world’, ‘light of civilization’, or ‘beacon against militarism’, etc.”. They go on to conclude, “[h]istory provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going [emphasis added].”\textsuperscript{495} National narratives are not just the prisms for analyzing events; they also help device plans for the future. All of this becomes the basis for Holsti’s various national role conceptions.

Within the DPRK, as will be elaborated in the next chapter, this could include roles (as devised by Holsti) such as “Independent” (focused on one’s own interests), “Anti-imperialist” (agents against the evil of imperialism), and “Regional Sub-system Collaborator” (a commitment to fostering the communist movement). Acting in accordance with national narrative and appropriate postures in turn helps ensure perceived continuity. States will also seek to gain recognition of the roles they have devised for themselves. While the content of these ‘roles’ may be derived from larger intersubjective processes (for example being a sovereign state is derived from an international post-Westphalian understanding\textsuperscript{496}), and must take into account the external environment,\textsuperscript{497} they are still selected in line with a state’s own narrative.\textsuperscript{498}

\textsuperscript{490} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 245-246

\textsuperscript{491} He cites geography, access to resources and capabilities, local values, bureaucracy, government type, and ideologies.

\textsuperscript{492} As Mannheim noted, “The innermost structure of the mentality of a group can never be as clearly grasped as when we attempt to understand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings, and purposes.” Cited in Gordin, Tilley and Prakash “Introduction”, pg. 5


\textsuperscript{494} Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 273-274; This is markedly different from works on collective remembering or collective memory. Patrick Devine-Wright and Evanthis Lyons, “Remembering Past and Representing Places: The Construction of National Identities in Ireland” Journal of Environmental Psychology, Vol. 17, (March, 1997)

\textsuperscript{495} Liu and Hilton, “How the past”, pg. 538, 537; see also Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 3

\textsuperscript{496} For an expanded examination on the influence collective identities have on the international system and vice versa see Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems (Columbia University Press, 1999); see also Ringmar, “The International”, pg. 13

\textsuperscript{497} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 246

\textsuperscript{498} “The knowledge and the ‘recovery’ of one’s history is therefore, particularly in the case of collectivities, always the first step towards the formation of a capacity to act ‘together’ and thus ‘politically’...[and] allows us to conceive of roles and obligations
Moreover “a state’s role identity can exist without its recognition by other political entities and instead obtains its confirmation by actors on the domestic level.” Of course this still leaves the potential for misrecognition by other states, as in the case of Sweden noted above, which could in turn result in a perceived OS threat and an attempt by the state to force its narrative to be recognized.

Conclusions

To surmise, by integrating SRT with OS, it becomes possible to further elucidate the relationship between individuals and society, and the process by which policymakers’ frame and react to external stimuli, forging images and assumptions. Social representations constitute both the individual *Umwelt* and group identity, forging an emotional connection between individuals and their community and explaining why national identity is a critical factor in forming images of Others. Going back to the literature on North Korea, this seemingly critical element is missing in Suh’s historical intuitionalist account of DPRK policy, which has perhaps gone the furthest in pursing an ideational account of DPRK behavior. In line with SRT, policymakers thus perceive external stimuli through the social representation of national narrative, with new information forced to conform to preexisting categories associated with this narrative. While these narratives are not static entities, it is possible to temporally bracket them as shown in work on national images, historical affordances, and governmentality.

As policymakers’ re-present new information they seek to determine if it is conforming with, or deviating away from (threatening or non threatening) the norm – i.e. national narrative. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as negative, as threatening the norm of national narrative, take on negative qualities - a negative image - leading to appropriate schemas and postures. An OS threat will in turn be perceived when: 1) there is competing historical representations of the past central to national narrative, 2) there is alternative narratives pertaining to a certain place and what that place should/should not be, and 3) the failure of one narrative to adequately recognize another. This is a reflexive process, meaning states do not blindly follow routines but adjust behavior to accord with national narrative.

While unable to account for specific policies, the framework developed here does allow one to account for the general postures adopted by policymakers. While they may then debate amongst each other in regards to specific policies based off of these postures, seen earlier for example in McEacherns works on debates within the DPRK, they will still be united by the fact their postures are underwritten by the same general beliefs. At the same time, national narratives hold prescriptive elements, meaning the drive for OS is both reactive and proactive. This framework in turn allows one to generate different foreign policy expectations than those derived from traditional security studies, a process undertaken in the next chapter vis-a-via North Korea.

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499 Lindemann, *Causes of War*, pg. 30
500 See also Berenskoetter and Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP”
Chapter 4
North Korea – A Hard Case Study

The remainder of this thesis turns towards applying the OS framework developed over Chapters 2 and 3 to the case study of North Korea, a relatively hard case within the context of security studies. Because small states – defined by a “limited capacity to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power” – are viewed as even more susceptible to systemic influences, DPRK behavior should be even less driven by domestic factors than larger states; “[p]ut more formally, weak state foreign policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory.”

Section 1 thus outlines traditional security study behavioral expectations for the DPRK. Section 2 then goes on to outline the framework of the case study, establishing how discourse analysis can be applied to generate rival expectations for North Korean behavior in line with the OS framework. The section then goes on to outline the specific temporal components that the traditional and OS behavioral expectations will placed against in Chapters 5 and 6, allowing one to verify which framework provides the more holistic account of DPRK behavior. Section 3 consists of the first phase of empirical research, examining the results of discourse analysis conducted on the DPRK and then generating behavioral expectations.

1. North Korea: A Hard Case

When examining the current literature, it would appear as though the foreign policy of a small state, such as the DPRK, should be relatively straightforward to predict. As Thucydides famously penned, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” while Morgenthau focused predominately on Great Powers since small nations “have always owed their independence either to the balance of power…or to the preponderance of one protecting power…or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialist aspirations.”

Neorealism elaborates slightly more on the issues at hand. According to these studies, small states’ preoccupation with survival and their small room for error drastically increases the need to conduct analysis at this systemic level. Indeed, Elman shows how there is a general consensus within traditional security studies on the dominance of systemic factors in small state foreign policy; even U.S. policy was not seen as being dictated by domestic politics until it became a unipolar power. Walt thus writes small states “are more vulnerable to pressure, and they can do little to determine their own fates.” Rosenau meanwhile argues small states’ lack of

501 Elman, “Foreign Policies” pg.171 FN 1; see also Iver B Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl, Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?: Small States in International Relations (Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, Working Paper 1-2004)
502 Elman, “Foreign Policies” pg 172
503 Morgenthau 1948, pg. 196 cited in Neumann and Gstohl, Small States, pg. 18
504 Waltz, Theory
505 It should be noted that Waltz takes a somewhat indeterminat stance here. While he argues small states will be “more attentive to these external constraints due to their ‘narrower margin for error’” they will also take these “international constraints for granted, since nothing it does can significantly effect the international system.” Moreover because they usually pose less of a security threat, Great Powers will be “less interested in weak states” providing the latter with greater maneuverability. Elman, “Foreign Policies”, pg. 176 FN 6; See also Waltz, Theory, pg. 184-185, 195
507 Walt, Origins, pg. 173
security resigns them to focus almost exclusively on external demands, a sentiment similarly championed by Snyder and Wolfers.\(^{508}\) Schweller “concludes that ‘extreme systemic constraints’ can account for weak state foreign policy and military behavior”\(^{509}\) while Robert Rothstein surmises, “Great Powers and Small Powers in historical systems indicate that one of the basic differences between them rests on the degree to which their behavior is conditioned, even determined, by the nature of the system itself.”\(^{510}\) Overall, as Elman writes, “[i]n light of this scholarly consensus, small state foreign policy poses a hard case for domestic level theory while it is easy on alternative systemic/structural explanations.”\(^{511}\) What then does the international system tell us?

Waltz writes that in a bipolar world chain-ganging and buck-passing\(^{512}\) are non-issues. A Great Power will not intervene on the behalf of a reckless small state (whose continued support is less critical), while at the same time it cannot afford to buck-pass, as it is the only counter to its rival. This would seem to indicate that during the bipolarity of the Cold War, small states like North Korea would be more restrained due to diminished commitment from patron powers. Waltz also writes that in a bipolar world the Great Powers will seek to “perpetuate an international stalemate as a minimum basis for the security of each – even if this should mean that the two big states do the work while the small ones have the fun.”\(^{513}\) The burden sharing of small states would therefore be expected to diminish within a bi-polar world; the DPRK could free ride since its contribution to the security of the Soviet Union (upon which its own security was intertwined) would be trivial. Consequently, Christensen and Snyder conclude, “[t]he structural consequences of bipolarity, unlike those of multipolarity, do lead to a determinate prediction about alliance strategy, even though empirically the behavior of the superpowers sometimes falsifies that prediction.”\(^{514}\)

Meanwhile, the prospect of balancing or bandwagoning has led to some debate. Walt argues that while large states are more likely to balance, especially when they are close to the rising threat, the inverse holds for small states, which are more likely to (reluctantly) bandwagon - unless they could be the difference maker in the alliance in which case they would balance.\(^{515}\) Additionally, “weak states will be concerned primarily with events in their immediate vicinity and can be “expected to balance when threatened by states with roughly equal capabilities but they will be tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power.”\(^{516}\) Michael Handel, Jack Levy and Robert Rothstein also take this position while Annette Baker Fox argues small states try to remain neutral “but eventually tilt their allegiance to the winning side.”\(^{517}\)


\[^{509}\] Elman, “Foreign Policies,” pg. 177


\[^{511}\] Elman, “Foreign Policies” pg. 173


\[^{513}\] Waltz, Theory, pg. 184-185

\[^{514}\] Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks “Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pg. 142

\[^{515}\] Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past” World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jul., 1994), pg. 500

\[^{516}\] Walt, Origins, pg. 114

Therefore, because small states face an acute security dilemma and have a smaller margin of time and error, they are more apt to bandwagon. By contrast, Lab, citing the historical record, argues small states are more likely to balance against Great Powers. Lab lays out the ranking for small state policy options as found in most works:

1. Nonalignment – Great Powers will oppose the threat and can thus free-ride
2. Bandwagon – rather than free ride there is a hedging of bets
3. Balance and not fight – will contribute little but the threat from joining is high
4. Weak States Alliance – if no other Great Powers will fight then form an alliance with other small states
5. Balance and fight – join and contribute max resources
6. Fight Alone - decide to fight alone

Lab’s work shifts the order of these preferences to:

1. Nonalignment
2. Balance with a protecting Great Power for a free-ride
3. Balance with a protecting Great Power and fight
4. Seek an alliance of weak states
5. Fight alone
6. Bandwagon

Despite these internal debates, there is still a potential to draw out some main themes. Overall, 5 main expectations for DPRK foreign policy can be generated:

1. While non-alignment is as an ideal, it is often an unattainable position. During the onset of the Cold War, North Korea – geographically close to the USSR and faced with a divided country, had little option but to align with Moscow, a sentiment adopted by Rothstein. The division of the Peninsula has further implications, since the presence of a local threat “increase[s] the probability that the threatened minor would prefer an alliance with a great power”, or alliances with other regional powers. Unable to balance against the ROK/U.S. threat internally, North Korea should be predominately focused on external balancing. For all these works, fighting alone would be considered a last (or second to last) option.

2. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and parity between North and South Korea (only to increasingly shift in Seoul’s favor) should indicate a North Korea propensity to retain a defensive posture, fearing Moscow would not be chain-ganged into a larger conflict initiated by Pyongyang. Moreover, the fact “North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.-ROK alliance”, or matched ROK GNP, precludes attempts to employ preventive war and power transition theory to the Peninsula.

3. Given this security dependency, one would also expect the DPRK not to chastise or jeopardize its relationship with the Soviet bloc; “the status of great powerhood means

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518 Indeed as Reiter notes, Walt’s work seemingly eliminates the possibility for non-alignment since such a posture will be interpreted as bandwagoning.
521 Reiter, “Learning”, pg. 504
522 Though North Korea Per capita income was stronger until the 1960s, Kang remarks that in preventive war absolute size is what matters. Kang, “International Relations”, pg. 302, 303,
that other actors will take what they consider to be the great power’s interests into account, even in its absence.” As Waltz writes, “[a]lthough concessions to allies are sometimes made, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union alters its strategy or changes its military dispositions simply to accommodate associated states.” At the same time, it could also become a free-rider, since the comparatively small investment it could make into defense would do little to change the balancing equitation vis-à-vis the U.S. – USSR dyad; “[b]ecause of the vast differences in the capabilities of member states, the roughly equal sharing of burdens found in earlier alliance systems is no longer possible.” Fears of abandonment should then lead North Korea to show deference to the Soviets, or exaggerate a common threat, so as to solidify Moscow’s security commitments. While fear of abandonment will often lead states to hedge and acquire their own private security, the inability of North Korea to internally balance against an ROK supplemented by U.S. forces would have made alliances all the more important, and continued free-riding a practical path.

4. Rothstein also suggests small powers (both aligned and nonaligned) will be focused on maintaining the bipolar system and ensuing “that no crisis gets so out of hand that it leads to war. Thus DPRK efforts should be directed at “facilitating any settlement which appears to reduce tensions, irrespective of the quality of the settlement.”

5. Meanwhile the onset of the Sino-Soviet split poses a problem for traditional studies, since, as mentioned, they are fairly indeterminate on whether North Korea should seek to be nonaligned or balance against/bandwagon with China. If possible, they would most likely expect North Korea to remain nonaligned so as to reap rewards from both sides, and only bandwagon or balance if pressed to do so.

2. Setting Up the Case Study

Having outlined behavioral expectations derived from traditional security studies, it now becomes important to formulate a second set of behavioral expectations inline with the OS framework. This requires conducting discourse analysis so as to reveal key components of national narrative in North Korea. One must then go on to outline the specifics of the research design; that is how to verify which framework affords the more holistic account.

2.1 Phase 1: Generating Ontological Security Expectations:

Abdelal et al, providing perhaps one of the best accounts of how to employ identity as a variable, promote discourse analysis as one of the main investigative tools; “the qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena.” The purpose of such an endeavor is to capture, through the reading of related discourses (speech, written documents and

523 Neumann and Gstohl, Small States
524 Waltz, Theory of, pg. 170
525 Sara Beth Hower, Do Small States Make Bad Allies (ProQuest, 2008), pg. 31-32
526 Waltz, Theory of, pg. 169
528 Rothstein, “Small Powers”, pg. 410
social practices), the “intersubjective context of some social phenomenon—in our case, a collective identity—in order to account for an empirical outcome.”

When conducting discourse analysis one must rely upon the “explicit discursive articulations” regarding conceptions of the Other and the Self. While not a fixed independent entity, “it is possible to analyze the relative ability of a discourse to present a construction of identity which is not (seen as) highly internally unstable.” Similar signs found to be employed consistently throughout DPRK discourse is thus a strong indicator of a consistent national identity. All of this requires not simply taking one sign as indicative of these conceptions, but that one locates the larger system of linking and differentiation within which multiple symbols operate.

Figure 2: Example of System of Linking In DPRK Identity

This process helps to offset critics of discourse analysis who argue there is a seeming inability to evaluate results. Hansen counters this is not necessarily the case given that there are certain criteria; “one has to pay careful analytical attention on how signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize particular policies.” Failure to adequately undertakes these processes will thus lead to “weaker” readings, though she does admit it is impossible to “exhaust all others.”

Again, a pragmatist philosophy of science helps to further buttress discourse analysis against claims of relativism, as does Pouliot’s approach outlined in Chapter 1.

When “reading” political identity, one must locate the components of national narrative outlined in Chapter 3. This included the temporal - mythical representation of the past; the spatial - narratives pertain to a certain place and what that place should/should not be depending on images of utopia and dystopia; and lastly what Hansen terms ‘ethics’ and Berenskoetter ‘values’ - the notion of order that is forged in line with images of utopia and dystopia for a specific location. Again, these components overlap; stories and myths are directly related to a specific area, meaning the temporal and the spatial are intertwined.

One addition to this overview is drawn from White’s work on propaganda using ‘value-analysis’. Value analysis is a three-step process wherein one codes each goal and value-judgment found in a speech, tabulates these findings, and then “interprets

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529 Abdelal et al., “Identity” pg. 702
530 Hansen, Security, pg. 29
531 Hansen elaborates by making note of two competing systems that Spaniards held of the Indians. While both held a symbol of the Indian as savaged, one held additional symbols that indicated they could be saved and converted while the other held they were beyond repair and should be eliminated.
532 Adopted from Hansen, Figure 3.1, pg. 42
533 Hansen, Security, pg. 45
534 Berenskoetter, “Parameters”, pg. 275-276
535 Hansen also touches on this. See: Security, pg. 47-48
each numerical result in the light of the picture as a whole.” It then becomes possible to find “values which are mentioned most often and with most emphasis, the most frequent evaluative descriptions of a given person or group, the groups which are most often mentioned as “objects of concern,” etc.” In his work, White found the major difference in Roosevelt and Hitler was the latter’s “continual dwelling on exaggerated ideas of persecution”, allowing aggressive action to appear defensive in nature and “predetermines the way in which any ambiguous crisis-situation will be perceived.” A similar approach conducted in conjunction with discourse analysis could in turn provide further context regarding DPRK national identity.

As an example of these two processes, one can examine the following excerpt from Kim Il Sung’s “Report at the 20th Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the D.P.R.K”:

> With the foundation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, our people who had been deprived of their country by foreign imperialists and suffered every kind of humiliation and insult, became a mighty and dignified nation whom no one dares to flout, a sagacious people of a sovereign independent state who builds their country with their own efforts, firmly holding power in their own hands. The birth of the Republic enabled the Korean people to escape once and for all the bitter fate of being a ruined nation and enter a new stage of their history under the banner of a full fledged independent state. It enabled our country, which had long been eclipsed on the world map, to enter the international arena on par with all large and small countries.

From this passage, persecution and independence/self-reliance were recorded as the two main values. A number of signs of Self-Other were also recorded; Self: ‘independent’, ‘on par with other countries’, ‘power in own hands’, ‘mighty and dignified’ and ‘sagacious’; Temporal Self: ‘suffer every kind of insult’, ‘ruined nation’, ‘eclipsed on the map’; and Negative Other: ‘foreign imperialists’.

This same process is conducted for each paragraph of the document under review, allowing one to extract the values and signs of Self-Other the document creates. The results from each document are then compared against each other, allowing one to ascertain key components of, and degrees of change in, DPRK national narrative, highlighting its spatial, temporal and ethical components. This raises the question however of what documents one should focus on when conducting discourse analysis.

### 2.2 Textual Selection:

Of the three models provided by Hansen, this thesis works off of her model 1, examining official foreign policy discourse; that is on those in a position to make (e.g. political leaders) and enact (e.g. generals, diplomats) foreign policy. Within North Korea, official discourse is the only “politically and analytically pregnant” discourse - the only one of influence. This also follows a similar undertaking by Herrman and Fischerkeller who analyzed verbal behavior to empirically determine the images held.

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537 White, “War Propaganda,” pg. 169-171
by leaders, building from the works of George and White. Renshon’s work on public statements and private beliefs helps to further validate this emphasis on public discourse, as he was able to obtain the same results for the operational codes of JFK regardless of if he examined only public speeches or private transcripts.

Works on DPRK culture and literature help to outline those sources most important to DPRK national narrative. Particularly insightful is Sonia Ryang’s work Reading North Korea, which employed the anthropological process, developed during the limited movement of WWII, known as “culture at a distance.” Her aim was to “abstract the cultural logic that runs through North Korean society” by critically examining literature, treating these texts as sources of data. In the 1960s, Ryang found that North Korea began to establish hyeongmyeongjeontong (revolutionary tradition), which stressed the replication of Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla attributes as found in their memoirs and biographies. By the 1970s, as Kim’s “teachings became a sacrosanct form of Gospel”, there was a shift towards memorizing his works, “(including public speeches, committee reports, and so on) by heart”. After 1982 (and Kim’s 70th birthday) emphasis again shifted, this time towards novels and movies, both of which became “the major object of leisure consumption as well as voluntary self education.” The aim was no longer to understand his works, but to “sense or feel Kim Il Sung’s potency” and be able to “confidently perform songs from feature movies and reproduce catch call phrases and slogans.” Ryang suggests this was due to the aging of Kim (and subsequent decrease in his publications), the corresponding deaths of many former guerrillas, and the increasing influence of Kim Jong Il in the production and guidance of North Korean culture.

Meanwhile one of the main sources of official foreign policy discourse is the annual New Year Eves Address (NYEA) - the DPRK State of the Union. For example Hymans used the NYEA to ascertain DPRK national identity conceptions through content analysis. Fortunately, records of the NYEA date back to 1974, and therefore coincide with the transition away from an emphasis on the works of Kim Il Sung. There is then, for the most part, access to the key texts referenced by Ryang. The majority of these works have also been translated by the DPRK itself into English through the Pyongyang Foreign Language Publishing House in the 1960s and 1970s. This helps to overcome much of the uncertainty that can surround using translated material. Similarly, even though the Foreign Broadcast Information Service translated the NYEA documents, these materials have been accepted for use in similar investigations (White also used translated materials for his work), while their domestic and foreign focus for consumption satisfy Hansen’s criteria.

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539 Herrman and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the enemy image”, pg. 427
541 “The theoretical assumption behind operational code analysis is that “a leader’s public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will consistently match his public beliefs”…In other words, the speech of leaders (almost always) contains information that is indicative of their true beliefs.” Jonathan Renshon, “When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance” Political Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pg. 652
542 Ryang, Reading, pg. 13
543 Ibid, pg. 25
544 Ibid, pg. 27
546 White, “War Propaganda”, pg. 158
In line with the above guidelines, the following texts were selected. Starting in 1946 and going through to 1973 two speeches per year were selected from Kim Il Sung’s *Selected Works Volumes I-V*.

In going through these works, explicit articulations of Self and Other and the main values for each paragraph were recorded. By incorporating these earlier works, (Volumes 1-2 cover 1945-1960) it also becomes possible to place this initial discourse against later speeches. Moreover, these earlier works were published in 1965 before the introduction of Kim’s monolithic ideological system and adoption of religious overtures in 1967. This will help establish to what extent DPRK national narrative has remained consistent in light of these internal structural changes. Meanwhile, starting in 1974 and going through to 1995, the thesis conducted the same exercise but with a focus on the annual NYEA.

Analysis also incorporated some additional materials. The first was *Kim Il Sung Short Biography* Volumes I and II, published in 1972. Scholars such as Ryang and Myers have indicated the image of Kim generated through his biographies became an important component in defining North Korea. Given these two volumes are novels, not political speeches or writings similar to those found in *The Selected Works*, the focus here was more on, through a close reading of the two novels, extracting how Kim Il Sung, and through him the history of North Korea, is portrayed. Analysis also sought to extract images of Self-Other constructed in the three DPRK constitutions forged during the years under review, while also examining the “Ten Great Principles of the Establishment of the Unitary Ideology System” (1974), which Hwang stresses is “is the key to understanding North Korean society.”

These analytical results are then cross-referenced against works on the conceptual histories of key aspects of DPRK ideology. This is important since it allows one to more fully grasp, by examining formation and social context, the political vocabulary and “discursive codes” employed within DPRK discourse. As Hansen notes, this allows one to make note of their conceptual histories, revealing how the representations have been altered, how they were developed in the first place, and what other representations they managed to marginalize. It also becomes possible to further contextualize DPRK identity by examining works of high-level defectors involved in the creation and dissemination of DPRK ideology, as well as works on more low-level defectors that capture glimpses of daily life.

### 2.3 Phase 2: Verification:

Following the generation of behavioral expectations as derived from discourse analysis, Chapters 5 and 6 seek to verify which expectations provide a more holistic account of DPRK foreign policy. In addition to looking at specific behavior, behavioral expectations will be cross-referenced against archival records of previously classified DPRK allied documents. It then becomes possible to see if the recorded narrative translates into ‘behind door’ stances. These sources are primarily housed by the North Korean International Documentation Project and have been

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547 1947, 1949, 1952, and 1956 were unrepresented in these texts and only one speech was found for 1953, 1954 and 1971. Where possible, extra speeches were taken from the year immediately preceding or following these gaps and as close to the beginning/ending of the year as possible. A full list of texts used can be found in the bibliography.

548 Here 1987 was missing.


550 Silverstein, “Towards a Science”, pg. 56

551 See https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/north-korea-international-documentation-project
utilized in various capacities by leading scholars and been widely accepted by the academic community.

The dissertation focuses on the most important trans-historical events involving the DPRK as derived from multiple timelines of major incidents – such as the “CRS Report for Congress “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007”.”552 This was often done in conjunction with existing works on North Korea so as to eliminate potentially biased selection. These events also follow important structural changes, both internally and externally. This includes the decline of the DPRK economy, the rise of South Korea, the fall of the Soviet Union, normalization of relations between South Korea and China/Russia, and regime change in the DPRK. This is important for, if the OS framework developed here holds, the DPRK would be expected to undertake similar policies despite these structural changes (so long as the national narrative remained consistent). This would in turn further justify the framework while exposing the shortcomings of rival approaches. Roughly six periods of DPRK behavior will be reviewed over 2 chapters.

The first period, 1945-1953, revolves around the lead up to and prosecution of the Korean War. The second period, 1953-1958, was dominated by internal purges aimed at expunging Soviet and Chinese influence in the DPRK and the establishment of nationalist economic policies, all of which flew in the face of patron powers and led to extreme tension with Moscow and Beijing. The third period 1959-1969 witnessed the “2nd Korea War”, domestic anti Sino and Soviet propaganda campaigns, and overt aggression in the form of the Blue House raid and capturing of the USS Pueblo, all of which directly challenged the express wishes of the two superpowers.

The fourth period, 1971-1973 is of great interest for it contains the first diplomatic advance in DPRK-ROK relations, the 1972 Joint Communiqué. Following a breakdown in talks the North soon reverted to a renewed policy of brinkmanship. This leads into the fifth period of review, 1973-1979, characterized by DPRK aggression along the DMZ and the Northern Limit Line. The sixth period then looks at how the DPRK reacted to drastic changes to its international standing, the international system, and the DPRK-ROK dyad throughout the 1980s. The last section then seeks to contextualize the North’s nuclear program, which largely came to light in the 1990s. While often viewed as a response to structural and internal changes at that time (collapse of the USSR, famine, and the death of Kim Il Sung) the section explores the larger trajectory of the DPRK nuclear program back to the 1950s, and the implications this history has for current perceptions.

3. Empirical Results of Discourse Analysis

The first phase of empirical research was to conduct discourse analysis on the DPRK, thereby allowing one to generate behavioral expectations inline with the OS framework. Applying the guidelines noted above, the following results were found. First, drawing from discourse analysis on Kim Il Sung’s Selected Works Vol. 1-5 (1946-1973) and the annual NYEA address (1974-1995) images of Self and Other were recorded, in order of frequency, and presented in Table 2.

Table 3 shows the results from value analysis of the same documents. Two columns are found here. The first, “Frequency”, simply ranks values by the overall percentage of texts in which they are cited at least once (for example recording what percentage of overall texts cited ‘self-reliance’ at least once). The second column, “Weighted” ranks the values by their weighted frequency; that is which values the texts spent the greatest amount of time discussing overall. Here, values found in each text were scored depending on what percentage of the text it was discussed. This was done by placing values into one of 6 different categories, each with an assigned score:

Category 1: 0-9% of text (0 score)
Category 2: 10-19% of text (10 score)
Category 3: 20-29% of text (20 score)
Category 4: 30-39% of text (30 score)
Category 5: 40-49% of text (40 score)
Category 6: 50+% of text (50 score)

For example if ‘self reliance’ was found to be 10% of a text on 10 different occasions, and 20% of a text on 2 separate occasions, it would receive a total score of 140. Column 2 thus ranks the values by their overall score. Analysis then discusses the ‘stories’ that were told in these texts and changes that occurred over the years under review, before going on to further contextualize these findings.

Table 2: Images ranked by percentage of time found in all speeches
In terms of Self, North Korea has consistently stressed its independence, a sentiment found in almost every speech. It has also stressed its firm, independent economy, socialism, and its cohesion/unity along with being a mighty, modern, patriotic entity. Other characteristics found relatively frequently were self-defense, heroic struggle (though if combined with references to the anti-Japanese struggle, this moves up) and references to being brilliant/creative/cultured. This would all appear a marked increase from their temporal self, dictated by exploitation and backwardness. These descriptions parallel the South Korean Other, described as a fascist dictatorship and stooges of imperialists. Regarding positive Others, the North most frequently associated itself with “anti-imperialists” those seeking “world peace” and friendly socialist states. Later, Third World Countries, Non-Aligned States and the “World Progressive People” became increasingly referred to. By contrast, the USSR and China are not nearly as referenced, and while they appear somewhat frequently early on, after 1960 there is a significant drop. Finally, the North seems to cite both
imperialism (generally) and U.S. imperialism (specifically) as its main negative Other; U.S. imperialism in the context of South Korea was also referenced frequently. The Other was also shown as being overly aggressive, exploitative and colonial.

The DPRK is thus independent, with an independent economy, and is a unified, dignified, honorable, socialist, modern and advanced state capable of self-defense - the embodiment of the anti-colonial struggle and an ongoing heroic struggle. It is allied with the anti-imperialists, those seeking world peace, and the non-aligned and world progressive peoples. It has overcome the exploitation and backwardness that defined Korea of the past and continues to define the colonialism and stooges of imperialism that is South Korea. It opposes imperialism (generally) and U.S. imperialism (specifically) and those who are aggressive, exploitative or colonial.

Perhaps given this narrative it is not surprising that value analysis found a consistent reference to, and emphasis on, unity, self-reliance, heavy industry, and persecution. A few cursory notes should be made. For one, “Party” was used to account for talk of the Party in general. While in the latter stages this often referred primarily to unity or correct policy as a result of the Party, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s this was often matched with lengthy discussions on training party cadres, working on how to improve party organization and structure, the need for better processes, etc. This in turn accounts for the Party value at times being recorded as such a high percentage of some works. The second is that “Party” talk on a united front – mostly in the 1950s, was incorporated under the “Unification” value. Overall, the value analysis seems to correlate with much of the articulations of Self and Other found though discourse analysis, emphasizing an independent unified North Korea with an independent economy, intent on beating back aggression or imperialist incursions and forging a unified state.

This all supports what high-level DPRK defectors who either created or disseminated work on Juche have revealed. As Hwang Jang Yop (who in the 1960s was tasked with developing Juche for Kim Il Sung) writes:

To summarize Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology at that time, it was to oppose toadyism whereby the people unconditionally looked up to powerful countries and belittled their own country, and doctrinarism whereby the people imitated anything from powerful countries; and it required them to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively to their specific and practical situation…Opposition to toadyism, I thought, should be understood as opposition to interference by and the domination of powerful countries and persistence in seeking the benefits of the Chosun people, the Juche, rather than applying Marxism-Leninism creatively to us. Consequently, along with the opinion that Marxism should be creatively applied to practical situations, I also added opposition to toadyism and maintaining one’s independent stance to be the basic factors of the Juche ideology. Later on, Kim Il Sung chose independence and creativity as the fundamental policies and publicized them as the essential line: Juche in ideology; independence in politics; self-reliance in economics; and self-defense. These were the fundamentals of Juche ideology.

Again what we find is a strong emphasis on genuine nationalist sentiments and resentment regarding North Korea’s colonial past, resulting in a sensitivity towards

those who might impede independence. Providing a more in-depth account of three speeches in particular – selected given their in-depth account of DPRK history during commemorative celebrations across three decades (1948, 1958 and 1968) - helps to further showcase how the main ‘plot points’ of this narrative emphasize independence and self-reliance. They also underscore the presence of a consistent metanarrative, one that resonates with the biographies of Kim that gained prominence in the 1970s and with the three DPRK Constitutions drafted between 1948-1992.

In 1948, on the founding of the Korean Peoples Army, Kim stated:

the Korean people, who had been subjected to all sorts of persecution and suppression under the bayonets of the Japanese imperialists, took power into their own hands...we now have our own full-fledged army capable of defending the country and nation...[a] long cherished desire of the Korean people...Now all the people of the north and the south can take pride before the whole world in having their own modern, regular army to fight for the freedom and glory of their country. 554

Founding such an army in South Korea was “inconceivable...[since it] is under U.S. military administration and...pro-Japanese elements and traders to the nation”. 555 The DPRK army was founded to promote “complete independence of all Korea on a democratic basis” as this is the only way for a country “to become a completely independent state”. This was compounded by the fact Korea’s “unification and independence have been retarded...as a result of the vicious maneuvering by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to split our nation and turn our land once again into a colony.” 556 Consequently, while following liberation North Korea was able to take “advantage of the favorable conditions created by the Soviet army [allowing] our people...[to lay] the political, economic and cultural foundations for building a democratic independent state”, 557 this progress was now under threat. The Koreans could not “wait for anyone to give us independence...[but] must build a democratic, independent state entirely by their own efforts”. 558

In 1958 Kim again recounted the history of the DPRK, starting with the numerous “Korean patriots, headed by the Communists, [who] waged a long, bloody struggle solely for the liberation of the nation and the restoration of their country, never yielding to the brutal suppression of the Japanese imperialists.” 559 This allowed the people of Korea “who had lived through age old oppression, humiliation, darkness and suffering” to guide “their own destiny as masters of their country.” 560 While in 1948 war was forewarned due to U.S./ROK aggression, in1958 Kim remarked how “war [was] forced upon us by the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, the Syngman Rhee clique...[and] the invaders from 16 countries of the world...[and] brought untold distress and suffering to our people.” 561 This “three years of war played havoc

555 Ibid, pg. 60
556 Ibid, pg. 60
558 Kim Il Sung “On the Occasion”, pg. 60
559 Kim Il Sung “Report at the Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (September 8, 1958)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. II (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975), pg. 194
560 Ibid, pg. 195
561 Ibid, pg. 196
with our national economy and greatly deteriorated the living conditions of our people who had just managed (without reference to the Soviets) to overcome the “backward economy and culture left behind by the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism”. Following the War the “Party laid down the basic line of postwar economic construction...giving priority to the growth of heavy industry...This was the only correct way.” By relying upon “the indomitable fighting spirit and inexhaustible creative energy of our working people who had rallied around the Party...[and] the economic and technical aid of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and other fraternal counties”, the economy was rebuilt.

In 1968, Kim marked the 20th Anniversary by recounting how given the “colonial ruling machine of Japanese imperialism...Korean Communists and patriots organized the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army” carrying on a “heroic armed struggle” for national independence. Following liberation, North Korea “on the basis of Marxist-Leninist line of peoples power” and experiences “gained during the anti-Japanese armed struggle” set about rebuilding the country. The foundation of the DPRK, “the embodiment of the unanimous desire of our nation to attain the freedom and independence”, provided for the people who had “been deprived of their country by foreign imperialists and suffered every kind of humiliation and insult”, a “mighty and dignified nation whom no one dares to flout, a sagacious people of a sovereign independent state who built their country with their own efforts, firmly holding power in their own hands...to enter the international arena on par with all large and small countries.” These efforts for the transition to socialism were interrupted by the piratic armed invasion of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys leading to “a life-and-death struggle...However, the enemy could not subdue our heroic people who rose as one in the righteous war of resistance”. Given the “justice of our cause and the dynamic external activities of our party...the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries supported us materially and morally, and the Chinese people dispatched volunteers who shed their blood to help us in our righteous struggle”.

Following this “fierce anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle” North Korea was confronted with the pressing need to rapidly rehabilitate the devastated national economy. The subsequent focus on heavy industry was the only “correct line”, a “creative one based on the application of the Marxist-Leninist theory...to the specific realities of our country...[so as to] speedily build an independent national economy in the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.” It was at this time, “anti-Party factionalists within the Party betrayed our revolution and carried out conspiratorial activities to overthrow the leadership of our Party and Government.” These efforts were repulsed, and “upholding the revolutionary banner of Marxists-Leninism, our party and the government of the Republic confidently led our people towards a great surge in socialist construction.” This success was, in the mid 1960s, placed on hold, however, given U.S. aggression; “Only when we make the nation’s defense

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562 Ibid, pg. 197
563 Ibid, pg. 198
565 Ibid, pg. 142
566 Ibid, pg. 143, 144
567 Ibid, pg. 147
568 Ibid, pg. 152
impregnable, even though this may somewhat affect our economic development, can our socialist achievements be defended”. To this end, “a potent all-people defense system based on the monolithic political and ideological unity of the entire people [was formed]…The International prestige of our republic has been enhanced constantly thanks to the resolute anti-imperialist, anti-US position and the principled, independent foreign-policy of our party and government.”

The central components of national narrative and iterations of Self and Other found in these three speeches were similarly codified in the biographies of Kim Il Sung. On the first page of Volume I, it states “[h]is was a patriotic and revolutionary family which, since the 1860s, had fought for several generations against foreign invaders for the independence of the country and the freedom and liberation of the people.” His great grandfather “distinguished himself in the battle in which the U.S. pirate ship General Sherman…prob[ing] the possibility of invading Korea, was sunk.” His father, “a man of exceptionally strong anti-Japanese patriotic spirit”, championed self-reliance when he “repudiated the futile attempt of the bourgeois nationalists to achieve national independence by “petitioning” the Japanese imperialists or with the “help” of other imperialist powers.” He subsequently developed Chiwon, “the unshakable spirit of national independence”, by the “the broad anti-Japanese patriotic forces themselves”, a struggle Kim’s mother also dedicated herself to. During the “great national suffering” of Japanese imperialism, a young Kim, while drawing from socialism, also understood he could only achieve his goals of independence through “independent development”. In the 1930s, “in accordance with the great Juche idea…[he] put forward an independent line and policy”, premised on fighting “imperialists by our own strength” and ensuring political cohesion.

It was around this time Kim Song Ju’s comrades renamed him Kim Il Sung, for he was seen as the “future sun” for the nation. During the war against Japan it was Kim who proposed “cementing militant solidarity with the communists and other revolutionary people of China”. It was also Kim who, in 1932, “made the obstinate and ferocious Chinese commander bow his head” after ethnic purges against Korean forces. Following this, the Anti-Japanese Guerilla Army become “an invincible armed force”, educating and strengthening the Chinese and other anti-imperialist forces, while making sure “opportunists’ attempts to set up a Soviet form of government were smashed and a people’s revolutionary government was established” in guerilla zones. Given these experiences, and “holding fast to the Juche idea” allowed North Korea “to overcome all difficulties after liberation”, forging “a new path to national liberation for the colonial countries”.

Throughout the War sparked by the ROK surprise attack, Kim “held fast to the independent stand of solving all problems…by the Korean people themselves”, demonstrating the strength of those fighting for independence. The same principles guided the transition to socialism following liberation, during postwar economic construction, and “through the struggle
to establish *Juche*” thereby allowing “political independence [to be] better maintained and an independent national economy and self-defense capability” established.580

The overt nationalist sentiments found in the *Selected Works* and Kim’s biographies can similarly be found in DPRK institutions. While the 1948 Constitution in many respects reads like a traditional constitution, establishing basic rights and laws and a fairly centralized power structure under the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (Article 32, 47), Cabinet (Article 52, 54), and Premier (Article 59), in terms of Self-Other images, a few interesting points stand out. For one, unlike most socialist states it contained no direct references to either socialism or communism, (though it did abolish the tenancy system). Instead, it largely focused on defining itself against the Japanese and Japanese sympathizers in Korea (Article 5, 12, 85).581 In terms of a positive Other, focus fell predominantly on fellow revolutionaries, granting asylum to “foreign nationals persecuted for fighting for democratic principles or national liberation movements” (Article 26). This resonated with its stance outlining “the duty of every citizen of the D.P.R.K. to defend the homeland…the highest duty and honor of every citizen” while betraying the homeland was “the most heinous of crimes” (Article 28). The KPA was thus “to safeguard the sovereignty of the fatherland and freedom of the people” (Article 100), a major aim of the state budget (Article 95). The Premier, Vice-Premiers and ministers were also required to take an oath, which included a promise to “dedicate all my power and ability to the safeguarding of the sovereignty” of the DPRK (Article 61).

The 1972 Constitution compounded these nationalist sentiments, placing them firmly under the ideology of *Juche*. As Jeongwon Park writes, it was a “kind of declaration of independence, and the word “independent” appeared in the constitution with unusual frequency.”582 It stated the DPRK is “an independent socialist state representing the interests of all the Korean people” (Article 1), with an independent economy (Article 2), and imbued with the “brilliant traditions” of the anti-Japanese guerillas (Article 3). Foreign relations were to be based on equality and independence and the principle of non-interference (Article 16). The document also implemented ideological sentiments like *Chollima* and the *Taen Work System* (Article 12, 13, 30) and stated the DPRK “is guided in its activity by the Juche idea…a creative application of Marxism–Leninism to the conditions of our country” (Article 4). Indeed *Juche* was referenced so systemically throughout that it has been dubbed the *Juche* constitution.583 This increased emphasis on *Juche* would seem to compund the nationalist sentiments noticeable in 1948, while the elimination of references to protecting minorities was seen as a sign of purging elements potentially adopted from foreign entities. However a few key differences stick out.

Socialism and Marxism became far more prevalent, in both iteration and practice (Article 12, 13, 33, 49, 68). Pyongyang, not Seoul, was also noted as the capital of the DPRK. At the same time, it was stated the DPRK “strives to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half, drive out foreign forces on a national scale, reunify the country peacefully on a democratic basis and attain compete national

580 ibid, pg. 123
581 It should be noted however that some elements were seen as replications of other (particularly Soviet) documents; for example a clause protecting the rights of minorities.
583 Hale, “Multifunctional Juche”, pg. 296
independence” (Article 5). Meanwhile, new structures were forged (including the Office of the President) to reflect power transitions that had occurred within the state (article 91, 93, 100, 101), representing a further consolidation of the centralized power structure already present in 1948. This coincided with the introduction of the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System in 1967 (and officially adopted in 1974). Throughout this text, major emphasis was placed on the absolute authority of the Great Leader. Only through endless loyalty and becoming a single unified body under his absolute authority could the revolution go on. He gave the Korean people their political will and their life and thus they “must never compromise our political belief and revolutionary principles.” Instead they must learn from the Great Leader and accept his revolutionary ideas and adopt them as their own creed, thereby allowing them to become “juche communist revolutionaries.”

The 1992 constitution sought to make further organizational changes necessary to facilitate the transfer of power to Kim Jong Il, allowing him, and not the President, to be head of the military, while the National Defense Council (headed by Jong Il) was promoted. The 1992 constitution also responded to international events such as the fall of the USSR. While still referring to itself as a socialist state, references to Marxism were eliminated and further emphasis was placed on Juche as a departure (not a creative interpretation of) Marxism; “The DPRK is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people. A revolutionary ideology for achieving independence of the masses of the people” (Article 3). It also called for “joint ventures and cooperation in enterprise with foreign corporations and individuals” (Article 37), though the state remained in control of the means of production and all foreign trade, which was to be conducted on the basis of complete equality, indicating affinities with similar calls in the 1960s/70s.

Despite these structural changes, the crux of Self-Other conceptions largely remained in tact. The DPRK was “an independent socialist state” (Article 1), a “revolutionary power which has inherited brilliant traditions formed during the glorious revolutionary struggle against the imperialist aggressors, in the struggle to achieve the liberation of the homeland and the freedom and well-being of the people” (Article 2). It has an “independent national economy” (Article 19, 26, 38) and a stated goal to “reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity” (Article 9). “Independence, peace, and solidarity” underscored foreign policy, with relations dictated by “principles of complete equality, independence, mutual respect, noninterference in each other's affairs and mutual benefit” (Article 17), while “self-reliant defense” (Article 60) focused on protecting the “socialist system and the gains of the revolution from aggression and…the freedom, independence and peace of the country” (Article 59). It favorably viewed individuals “persecuted for struggling or peace and democracy, national independence and socialism” (Article 79) while opposing “infiltration of imperialism and any tendency to return to the past” (Article 41).

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585 Elements of this had already occurred in the 1980s. Baek Jong-Chun, “North Korea’s Military Policy and the Peace process on the Korean Peninsula” The Journal on East Asian Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1990), pg. 314
The three constitutions, coupled with the analysis on Kim’s speeches and biographies, reveal the DPRK metanarrative and Self-Other conceptions have remained fairly consistent, with two exceptions. The first pertains to the varying levels of acknowledgment regarding the roles played by the Soviets, socialist allies, and China, as well as potential relations with capitalist states and the prospect for peace with the US. This would appear to be a derivative narrative that has been activated/deactivated at various times. Of course even when reference has been made to these external actors, their role has been consistently played down or justified. Similarly, the constitutions showcase fluctuations regarding iterations of Marxism, again suggesting it is a more flexible component of DPRK identity. For its part, while Juche only became directly codified in the 1972 constitution, its nationalist sentiments had already been codified in 1948, suggesting more of a refinement rather than change.

The largest difference to emerge then appears to be the increasing fusion between a seemingly genuine hyper-nationalism with the personality of Kim. Consequently, while DPRK narrative remained the same, it was slowly grafted onto Kim, securing his legitimacy, as he became both the very embodiment of what it meant to be ‘Korean’ and the leading figure in DPRK national ‘history’. To this end, the constitutions clearly demonstrate how power structures came to be legitimated through national narrative, in a further shift towards Weber’s “charismatic” model of legitimacy and establishment of what Wada Haruki, taking from Clifford Geertz, termed a “theater state”, with centralized power structures and, importantly, “public art and mass spectacles” imbued with the ideology of Juche. Juche thus became emblematic of DPRK identity; by embodying Juche Kim simultaneously came to embody the Korean nation, securing his position. This in no way detracts from the genuine nationalist sentiment or continuities in Self-Other images, but it does represent the grafting onto this nationalism a distinct hierarchical structure of governance, a sentiment reinforced by further examining the evolution of Juche.

3.2 Contextualizing Results:

First introduced in 1955, during a speech in which Kim stressed the need to “eliminate dogmatism and formalism”, Juche has been defined as ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-reliance’, though “the actual meaning of the word ‘Juche’ itself does in fact mean “subject,” or “principal body.” Overtime it would be argued that “Juche “unites” the people of North Korea and the Party into one body to be led by the leader” with Kim Il Sung “the father of a blood-united “family state.”” It is therefore argued that while Juche eventually developed into a legitimating pseudo philosophical-religious entity, its most important characteristic, and founding principle, is its nationalist-infused narrative. To focus solely on its legitimizing characteristics is therefore imprudent, overlooking the widespread nationalism its foundation embodies and distinct versions of Self and Other it propagates. Moreover, all political ideologies maintain some legitimizing characteristics, including in democracies. In order to

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587 Though it also surpassed this given its, contrary to Webers’ expectations, historical continuity. Kown and Chung, North Korea; see also Kim, Illusive Utopia
588 For a cursory overview see Lee, “The Political Philosophy”
589 The “formal term Juche Sasang (Juche ideology or subject ideology) was first used in 1962”. David-West, “the Juche Speech”, pg. 143
590 Hale, “Multifunctional Juche”, pg. 301
591 Park, North Korea, pg. 10
be successful, however, and as Lerner notes, requires conformity “to the nation's heritage and already existing beliefs”. Consequently, *Juche*’s appeal:

> also reflected the population's fierce sense of nationalism…strengthened by Korean history, since most of the nation had come to resent decisions made by the nation's leadership under the Yi Dynasty to become essentially a vassal state of China for hundreds of years.\(^{592}\)

Accordingly, Cha cautions against those who presume *Juche* “is merely a name plate”, with power premised only upon oppression. Instead, its dominance was achieved by tapping into postcolonial nationalism, juxtaposing self-determination against the South’s “sadaejuui”…being a slave or servant to another big power” (the U.S.). Consequently, the North view themselves as the true authentic Koreans; the “emphasis on Korean uniqueness, homogeneity, and pure bloodedness …[and the] theme of independence from predation by outside great powers was [a] mandate that all Koreans believe in.”\(^{593}\) There is also reason to believe that a large plethora of North Koreans ascribe to this national narrative. During the height of the famine in the 1990s, Jang Jinsung (a high-ranking defector) wrote how “the towns people continue to be concerned more for their leader’s well-being then for their own, although they were in a wretched state.”\(^{594}\) Demick’s work *Nothing to Envy*, looking at various North Korean defectors, also provides a trove of analogies demonstrating support for the regime up to, and during, the famine. For example:

> Well past the point when it should’ve been obvious that the system had failed her…[Mrs. Song] remained unwavering in her faith. “I lived only for Marshall Kim Il-sung and for the fatherland. I never had a thought otherwise”.\(^ {595}\)

Similarly, a large majority of DPRK refuges have cited economic conditions, and not political freedom or fear, as their main impetus for leaving. This of course has changed in more recent years, as seen in the South Korean survey in Table 4, but still suggests congruence regarding national narrative for the period under review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear (afraid of doing anything wrong)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this end, it is fruitful to delve into the tenants of *Juche*. While *Juche* has taken from Marxist-Leninism Maoism, Confucianism, and in more recent years elements of religious doctrine, it is a wholly distinct entity. It holds man, not class struggle, as the mover of history, with politics guided by national, not class, consciousness. It

\(^{592}\) Lerner, “Mostly Propaganda”, pg. 14  
\(^{593}\) Cha, *Impossible State*, pg. 39, 45  
\(^{594}\) Jang, *Dear Leader*, pg. 50  
\(^{595}\) Demick, *Nothing to Envy*, pg. 39  
\(^{596}\) Cited in Haggard and Noland, *Witness to Transformation*, pg. 30; 1346 refugees partook in the China survey, 300 in the South Korean survey.
advocates for the mass line and centralized decision-making at all levels, but also espouses the role of intellectuals in its threefold class alliance; Maoism primarily emphasized peasants. Cha thus nicely surmises it main tenants as “(1) man is the master of his fate; (2) the master of the Revolution is the people; (3) the Revolution must be pursued in the self-reliant manner; (4) the key to revolution is loyalty to the supreme leader”.

Meanwhile, noting Kim’s warning against the "negation of Korean history" with foreign ideas, David-West argues the most substantial influence on Juche were Korean works by Pak Yŏnām and Ch'ông Tasan, and the “indigenous sirhk (practical learning) school of Reformed Confucianism.”

Because Tasan’s works were never enacted, it was possible to highlight him as “something of a proto-socialist”, while his hostile view of tributary relations with China fit well with post-colonial nationalism. Moreover, his elitist background meant he favored feudalism, monarchy and social division, as well “the practice of moral ideas and moral cultivation in government as a remedy for social ills.” This had growing importance following the introduction of the monolithic ideological system in 1967, which Kim claimed was necessary for ideological unity and the revolution, and the cultivation of Kimilsungism by Kim Jong Il following his promotion to head of the OGD in 1969, culminating in the Ten Principles.

From this point on, Juche was presented more as a philosophy. This was, in actuality “a political religion in the sociological sense, [operating] in a premodern and prescientific conceptual mode.” There were no philosophical arguments or reasoning, but assertions “composed of an elementary and recursive set of axioms, slogans, and syllogisms.” Here, man is a material and a social being composed of three essential features. The first is independence (cha'jusong), the “life and soul” of man, which relates to his essential desire to shape both the world and his own destiny. Second is creativity (cha'josong), which pertains to mans’ ability to enact these desires. Finally there is consciousness (ui'shiksong), a prerequisite for man to have “desire, will and ability.” This centrality of man is argued to define Juche as a distinct philosophy, but it leads to “subjective idealism and indeterminism” becoming “a "cult of abstract man" that inevitably leads back to idealism and religion.”

The religious connotations of Juche grew in 1982 when Kim Jong-il began to expand on its philosophical underpinnings. Man, it was argued, is composed of both a physical life and of social and political integrity. “The physical life is what keeps a man alive as biological organism; social and political integrity is what keeps him alive as social being.” In the same treatise, Kim was also elevated as the only true interpreter of Juche, further underscoring its growing religious connotations.

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597 Cha, The Impossible, pg. 37
598 David-West, “Between Confucianism” pg. 94
599 David-West, “Between Confucianism” pg. 98
600 Cha, Exit Emperor, pg. 27
601 Jang, Dear Leader, pg. 131; Kim Jong II also utilized Kimilsungism to advance the position the OGD and PAD – his bases of power – and by 1980 most power rested with him.
602 David-West, “Between Confucianism”, pg. 105, 106
603 See Park, “The Nature”, pg. 14-17
605 This culminated into the 1998 constitution, which equated to “a religious eulogy to Kim Il Sung…attribute[ing] altruistic saintly qualities to Kim that Christians and Muslims usually reserve for Jesus and Mohammed.” Hale, “Multifunctional Juche”, pg. 303
The evolution of *Juche*, in conjunction with changes to the constitution, demonstrates how the legitimization of the Supreme Leader was grafted onto existing post-colonial nationalism. Still, as the scholars above warn, we should not take an overly instrumentalist view, even as North Korea has taken this further than many other states. Kang argues such a utilitarian view is representative of larger problems with literature on totalitarian systems in general. Nationalism has not merely been propagated by the government (macro), but has become integral to, and replicated in, the daily lives of (borrowing from Bourdieu) the ‘habitus’ of North Korean citizens (micro). In pursuing this logic he reverts to Giddens who argued, in “modern nation-states’ “totalitarian” rule had an elective affinity with nationalism, and this state power depended upon the ability to penetrate citizens’ daily activities and change them from below.” Thus Stalinism, let alone the mass movement of Nazism, was not simply a political system, but rather “a set of values, a social identity, and a way of life.” This is not to overlook these regimes employed force to further instill and maintain their message, but merely to highlight that often the message was reciprocated from below as it was integral to individuals’ habitus in a “marriage between macro and micro politics.”

His argument is accompanied by qualitative in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors, which found that prior to its ability to inoculate its population from outside information, many had already developed anti-imperialist and American sentiment as a result of colonization and the Korean War. As the DPRK’s ability to control society grew it sought to further emphasize this collective memory and militant nationalism within daily life. In turn, there was further fusion between the macro and the micro, from education and commonly invoked phrases (American imperialist bastard is among the worst insults), to children’s games and active participation in military or pseudo-military organizations. This socialization has transcended North Korea’s rigid social classification hierarchy as well its generations, and while there was some discrepancy found in those with ‘bad’ family backgrounds, “political perceptions and behaviors of extreme enmity against America were held by ordinary people and commonly found in most defectors’ testimonies.” Again, it was not as if the regime fabricated this nationalism, much of it had grown organically, allowing for a genuine fusion between the macro and micro as *Juche* took on a more legitimizing role.

Part of this resonance could also relate to the relative harmony between DPRK narrative and Koreans’ historical views of their nation, which has traditionally

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606 See Park, “The Nature”, pg. 11
607 Kang, “North Korea’s Militant” pg. 2, 4, 5
608 Further emphasizing this relationship, Kang turns toward Deleuze and Guattari’s work exploring how fascism “employs the social mechanism of the “war machine” that integrates the state and individuals through a micro-politics of diffusion.” Kang, “North Korea’s Militant”, pg. 6, 7
611 “[A] militant game of “beating American scarecrows with a stick” was commonly conducted in kindergartens and primary schools. Defector interviewee K. Yi (male, 45, defected in 2006) and his classmates enjoyed this militant game when they were seven or eight years old.” Kang, “North Korea’s Militant”, pg. 15
613 Kang, “North Korea’s Militant” pg. 17
surrounded the notion of shared blood.\textsuperscript{614} This stemmed from a “sense of external threats as well as specific Korean historical experiences (for example, colonization)”, forging the “rise and continued dominance of an ethnic, organic conception of nation, which stressed internal solidarity and submission to collectivist goals.” To this end, “careful examination reveals a great deal of similarity in terms of their [North and South’s] view of the Korea nation, their use of nationalism in politics, and their appropriation of transnational forces for nationalist agendas.”\textsuperscript{615} There are, of course, important differences that stem from the unique experiences of each. Seoul’s “incorporation into a world capitalist system…constrained the South from developing xenophobic nationalism as seen the North.”\textsuperscript{616} By contrast, the experiences of the eventual guerrilla leadership of the DPRK prior to liberation resulted in an even more fervent interpretation of traditional Korean nationalism.\textsuperscript{617}

A defining moment for the guerrillas was betrayal by their Chinese Communist allies during the war against Japan. This was optimized by the Minsaengdan massacre, when the Chinese, perturbed with the overly nationalist views of Korean guerrillas, undertook mass ethnic purges over feigned accusations of spying. While the guerrillas were originally some of the firmest advocates of the purge, angered by the prospect of betrayal, as the ethnic component was revealed support quickly diminished. The purges decimated the guerilla leadership, leaving Kim the de facto head and helping him gain prestige as he played an intricate role in bringing about their end. Most importantly, however, the purges generated a ‘do it alone’ mindset, as ethnic segregation was imposed.\textsuperscript{618} This mindset was reinforced following Moscow’s call for CCP and Korean forces to retreat into Manchuria, allowing the Japanese to crush what infrastructure the guerrillas had managed to build, further impressing on the guerrillas the need “to count the interest invested in the Korean revolution first and foremost” and avoid Great Power subservience. All of this provides a “historical backdrop” as to why the DPRK prize “not only juridical sovereignty but also substantial independence from China and other big powers.”\textsuperscript{619}

This mindset led to, as Gwang-Oon Kim argues, a tug of war between former guerrillas seeking to preserve autonomy, and external powers seeking to influence post-independent North Korea. From the outset of Soviet occupation following the end of WWII, there was a great amount of animosity due to the presence of foreign troops and large Soviet expropriations and investment to try and solidify extractive economic interests. This in turn helped to generate a fervent nationalist sentiment in the populace; “[i]n opposition to the Soviet other, the northern Korean nation was born” and the \textit{Juche} institution emerged.\textsuperscript{620} This was spurred on by Kim’s political success and dissemination of nationalist policies. The former was largely attributable

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{614} Kim Il Sung also focused on language; “Even though a people are all of the same stock and live on the same territory, they cannot be called a nation if they speak different languages.” “Some Problems Related to the Development of the Korean Language (Talk With the Linguists, January 3, 1964)” in \textit{Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. IV} (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1968)
  \item \textsuperscript{615} Gi-Wook Shima, \textit{Ethnic Nationalism in Korea} (Stanford University Press, 2006) pg. 8-9, 79; see also Ingeborg Gothel, “Juche and the Issue of National Identity in the DPRK of the 1960s” in Han S. Park (ed.) \textit{North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy} (Prentice-Hall, 1996), pg. 20
  \item \textsuperscript{616} Shin, \textit{Ethnic Nationalism}, pg. 23, 24
  \item \textsuperscript{617} Park, “The Nature”, pg. 11
  \item \textsuperscript{619} Han, “Colonial Origins” pg. 56, 35
  \item \textsuperscript{620} Gwang-Oon Kim “The Making of the \textit{Juche} State in Postcolonial North Korea” in Jae-Jung Suh (ed.) \textit{Origins of North Korea’s Juche} pg. 67, 68
\end{itemize}
to his relative notoriety thanks to high-profile exploits during the war.\textsuperscript{621} Soviet
directives after 1940, forcing Kim’s guerillas to focus on party building, also helped
lay the groundwork for grassroots support and a “united democratic national front.”
Meanwhile, the experience of the guerillas helped them form a distinct, appealing,
and coherent identity that was elevated as the ideal for all groups, again underscoring
the genuine national sentiment of the populace at this time. Kim’s earlier experiences
also taught him how best to ‘tacitly maneuver’ around other factions while always
making sure to maintain control of the military, espousing Mao’s later dictum
“‘power comes from the barrel of the gun.’”\textsuperscript{622}

Given this dominant position, Kim’s guerillas were able to quickly influence post-war
life. Following the collapse of Japanese control mechanisms in 1945, local peoples
committees took the initiative and immediately began to fill the void, with the Soviets
only ex post facto calling for their direct participation.\textsuperscript{623} After the first elections
in 1946, and the establishment of the North Korean People’s Committee in 1947, there
was an active movement to diminish Soviet influence. This included initiatives that
decreased translation of Soviet material into Korean at a time when the Soviets were
actively seeking to disseminate these works abroad. This nationalist agenda was then
codified in the state’s founding constitution in 1948, as explored above.

\textbf{Conclusions}

From the very outset, one finds Kim’s guerilla group championing a distinctly
nationalist, quasi anti-foreign line focused on overcoming the legacies of colonialism
and perceived duplicity by Great Powers (China and Russia) during, and immediately
after, the resistance period, a line mirrored by a receptive populace. The discourse
analysis indicates this early narrative, and its distinct versions of Self and Other, has
remained, for the most part, fairly consistent; North Korea is independent, with an
independent economy, and is a unified, dignified, honorable, socialist, modern and
advanced state capable of self-defense - the embodiment of the anti-colonial struggle.
It has persevered through hardships to continue an ongoing heroic struggle and strives
to achieve the independent unification of the nation. This narrative soon became
embodied in the ideology of \textit{Juche}. While in the 1970’s legitimating components in
the form of religious cultivation for the leadership were grafted onto \textit{Juche}, its
foundation and tenants of postcolonial nationalism still persists and remains in tact.

All of this provides insights into what might be interpreted as an ideational threat by
North Korea; i.e. what discourses or actions might be perceived as invalidating,
questioning or threatening key components of Self or eroding its differentiation from
the Other, triggering a personal crisis. To this end, North Korea will be expected to:

1. Maintain a hypersensitivity to foreign influence, exploitation and Great Power
   chauvinism in an effort to uphold independence, ‘dignity’ and ‘pride’;

\textsuperscript{621} Kee Kwang-seo “The Historical Origins and Formation of the Monolithic Political System in North Korea” in Han Jong-Woo
and Jung Tae-Hern (eds.) \textit{Understanding North Korea: Indigenous Perspectives} (Lexington Books, 2014)
\textsuperscript{622} The \textit{songun} concept espoused under Kim Jong-il, can be traced to this period. Kim “The Making of the \textit{Juche} State”, pg. 72
\textsuperscript{623} Kim “The Making of the \textit{Juche} State”, pg. 75
2. Maintain an independent economy. This is not to say it will abstain from engaging in trade or receiving aid, but instead, will not allow a foreign entity to influence North Korea as a result of economic considerations;
3. Where possible it will seek to ‘go it alone’ and rely on its own forces;
4. Distance itself from the ‘colonial’ South Korean Other, and from Korea’s own past as an exploited colony with backward ideas;
5. Assert independence and anti-imperialism while also working to become a modern and advanced state;
6. Unify the nation to forge an independent unified Korea, though the emphasis on ‘independent’ indicates these efforts will not sacrifice the principles of sovereignty to achieve their aims.

Having established behavioral expectations for North Korea form both a traditional and an OS perspective, it now become possible to verify which of these frameworks provides the most holistic account.

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624 Kim himself stated, “It is impossible to make a revolution by depending on other countries...We are not the people to reject aid...Nobody will refuse to accept an offer of aid. But what should we do when nobody offers us aid?” Kim Il Sung “Let us Develop Local Industry and Bring about A Fresh Upswing in the Production of Mass Consumer Goods (Speech at the National Conference of Workers in Local Industry, February 27, 1970)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. V (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975), pg. 380; “On Improving and Strengthening the Work of Commodity Circulation (Speech Delivered at a National Conference of Activists in Trade, February 14, 1957)” in Kim Il Sung Selected Works Vol. II (Foreign Languages Publishing House Pyongyang, 1975) pg. 328, 329
Chapter 5
DPRK Foreign Policy: 1950-1969

From the planning of the Korean War in the 1950s through the end of the Second Korean War in 1969, Pyongyang seemingly pursued ideational interests at the expense of material ones, forging policies often contradictory to the expectations of traditional security approaches. Consequently, one must question why Kim advocated for war despite inhospitable systemic factors and why during the course of the war he repeatedly rejected Chinese military assistance, instead wanting to rely on his own forces. Following the war, Kim’s guerilla factions’ adherence to a nationalist economic line led to fractious relationships with key allies. This defiance continued throughout the Sino-Soviet split, during which Pyongyang didn’t remain neutral so much as pursue ideational policies that carried economic and security implications. Pyongyang was also reluctant to fully balance against these threats over fears of sacrificing an independent foreign stance, while simultaneously conducting the Second Korean War, much to the displeasure of Moscow and despite being on the verge of armed conflict with China.

1. “Through Our Own Forces”: The Korean War

The Korean War was in many ways unavoidable. Prior to the North’s invasion, there was already a de-facto war and mutual guerilla campaigns underway. Combined with frequent ROK calls for a “northern advance”, forcing the U.S. to refrain from providing offensive weapons, the North’s invasion was in many ways believed to be preemptive. Given the geopolitical landscape at that time, however, the timeline of events pose some important problems for traditional security studies.

For one, Kim pushed for an invasion long before it was strategically feasible and when the more sensible action was to defensively balance. Second, throughout the war Kim sought to “fight alone” against a Great Power and later hindered cooperation in the war fighting effort over issues of sovereignty, only acquiescing to allied demands after great personal loss. Third, the war itself demonstrates the agency of small states. Stalin’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula from 1945, when partition was introduced, until 1950, was limited to preventing it from becoming a future springboard for invasion by Japan. It was Pyongyang who began in 1947, following South Korea’s failed 1946 autumn uprising, to encourage reunification. North Korea, while dependent on the Soviets, was in this sense no puppet; it pushed its own line and in doing so brought Great Powers into direct conflict.

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628 AVP RF, Fond 1 DVO, Opis 7, Delo 2, Papka 3; AVP RF, Fond 1 DVO, Opis 7, Delo 14, Papka 5; Fond 07, Opis 12, Delo 327, Papka 25, l. 9. Cited in Weathersby, “Soviet Aims”, pg. 23-24
629 “Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky,” March 09, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive (HPPPDA), APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Opis not given and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150; “Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky,” March 16, 1950, HPPPDA, APRF, Listy 133-140, fond and opis not given; “Telegram from Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky,” February 07, 1950, HPPPDA, APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and Opis not given and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146
1.1 Onset of the War:

A 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the history of the Korean War indicates that as early as 1948 the North sought to “unify the country by military means, without devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for peaceful reunification”. Kim himself told Stalin in March 1949 “we believe that this situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means” and the Koreans “are very anxious to be together again to cast off the yoke of the reactionary regime and their American masters.” The timing is important since the situation on the Peninsula at that time was anything but conducive for invasion; most observers, ironically, discussed preventing a southern invasion.

For one, North Korea was relatively weak, with Pyongyang itself admitting that without Soviet aid it would be ‘difficult to grow’. From a strategic standpoint Kim himself reported there were approximately 20,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and, while the North had infantry units, he requested support in creating naval defenses. His position was further undermined by a February report from Soviet Ambassador Shhykov complaining the North “did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South.” Stalin thus rejected Kim’s invasion request given the undeveloped DPRK forces, China’s ongoing civil war, which Mao had informed Kim would preclude assistance, and the almost certain intervention of the U.S. given its force presence. Withdrawal had already been pushed back and it was not until April 1949, that Rhee announced final withdrawal was underway.

In September 1949, Kim requested a more limited incursion into the southern controlled portion of the Ongjin Peninsula to preempt a reportedly planned attack. The growth in DPRK capabilities and U.S. withdrawal (though military advisors remained) seemed to somewhat justify the call, but certainly not Kim’s claim the South could be seized “in the course of two weeks, maximum 2 months.” Still, given the changes, a reserved Stalin seemed to grow at least somewhat interested in the operation.

Despite his bravado, Kim seems to have been aware of his strategic terrain, calling for a more minimal incursion given fears a “larger invasion was “politically disadvantageous” and “under present conditions it is impossible to count on a rapid victory.” Importantly, however, he seems to have been undeterred by these realities, admitting there was a strong potential for even the limited action he sought to lead to

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632 Bajanov, “Assessing”, pg. 54; Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America” CWIHP, Working Paper No. 39 (July 2002), pg. 4
633 Ibid
634 Ibid
635 Bajanov, “Assessing”, pg. 54
636 Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea 1949-50”, CWIHP, Issue 5 (Spring, 1995), pg. 2
637 “Telegram from Tunkin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Reply to 11 September Telegram,” September 14, 1949, HPPDDA, AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 46-53; Bajanov, “Assessing”, pg. 87
639 AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, papka 11, listy 136-138 presented in Weathersby, “To Attack”
640 AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 45 presented in Ibid
such a war, in the event of which Seoul would most likely benefit from the U.S. who can “send Japanese and Chinese [soldiers] to the aid of the southerners; support [the South Koreans] from the sea and air with their own means; American instructors will take immediate part in organizing military actions.” It also appears Kim was uncertain of Southern support, stating “they should not count on substantial help from the partisans” and more minimal partisan activity “will not be able...at the beginning of the campaign, maybe later.” Despite these factors, Soviet Ambassador Shtykov later recounted how Kim questioned “why don’t I allow him to attack the Ongjin peninsula, which the People’s Army could take in three days, and with a general attack the People’s Army could be in Seoul in several days.” One is thus left to wonder if Kim’s call for the attack on Ongjin might indeed have been intended to instigate a larger conflict aimed at unification despite the strategic landscape.

Again then, Pyongyang seems to have been working against its strategic setting, which was inhospitable to Northern aggression. For their part the Soviets decided the “northern army is insufficiently strong to carry out successful and rapid operations against the south,” which would result in a prolonged war with American intervention, and concluded effort should be placed on strengthening Southern partisans. It was not until 1950 the North benefitted from the return of 14,000 guerillas fighting for Mao. This was somewhat counteracted however by the fact pro-North guerilla forces in the South were largely destroyed during the winter of 1949-50. Despite this, the end of the Chinese Civil War seems to have given new urgency to Kim; the Chinese victory had “made it intolerable to Kim that Korean communists were not allowed similarly to liberate the rest of their country.” In a January meeting Kim pressed Moscow on the need for Korean unification following success in China, noting Mao’s pledged support after the Civil War’s conclusion. Finally, on January 30, 1950, Stalin informed Kim of his support for invasion, seemingly swayed by Soviet nuclear developments and U.S. preoccupation with NATO following a January speech by Dean Acheson, leading Stalin to conclude the U.S. would most likely not intervene.

Up to this point one could argue that, despite the North’s seeming willingness to dismiss its strategic setting, DPRK actions were still constrained by Great Powers – i.e. the USSR. However, Kim’s actions immediately prior to invasion bring up additional questions that seem to indicate continuity in this seemingly principled approach to foreign policy. Importantly, Stalin had conditioned his support on assurances the U.S. would not interfere and that China would support the invasion. Kim stated the U.S. would not interfere given Soviet-Chinese backing and that:

Mao Zedong said on a number of occasions that after the Chinese revolution is

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641 AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 46-53 presented in Ibid
642 AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 87-91 presented in Ibid
643 Gromyko and Bulganin stated more bluntly that "the Americans will certainly move their troops into South Korea, and you [Kim Il Sung] cannot stop this, you cannot even defeat the South Korean army." Weathersby, “Fear This”, pg. 8
644 AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 75-77 presented in Weathersby, “To Attack”
645 Armstrong, Tyranny; pg. 21
646 Weathersby, “To Attack”, pg. 3
647 Ciphered telegram, Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov) transmitting a Message to Kim Il Sung," March 12, 1950, HPPPDA, APRF, page 141, fond and opis not given
648 However there were signs of increasing American commitment including increased military and economic aid and high-level delegations. Weathersby, “Fear This?”, pg. 13
649 Mao similarly questioned U.S. intervention. Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinski regarding meeting with Kim Il Sung," May 12, 1950, HPPPDA, APRF, Listy 151-154, Fond and Opis not given and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100-103
completed, China will help us, if necessary, it will provide troops. However, *we want to rely on our own forces* to unify Korea. We believe that we can do it.  

In his subsequent meeting with Mao, Kim was promised Chinese support should Washington intervene, and asked if China should already deploy troops on the border and send the Koreans military supplies. Kim, declined, as support was being provided by the Soviets (even though Stalin had explicitly stated only Chinese, not Soviet, forces would intervene) and that for Kim the meeting was a mere formality to inform the Chinese of his decision. When Mao warned the U.S. might send Japanese troops to South Korea, Kim agreed, but added, this “could hardly change the situation in a serious way, because Koreans would be fighting in such a case even tougher.”

The eagerness for invasion by the DPRK *despite* favorable conditions, and its refusal to allow for allied assistance, would seem to bring into question DPRK rationale. If, as realists suggest, actors are focused on the attainment of power/security through rational calculations, then Kim should have been primarily focused on defensively balancing against the stronger ROK-U.S. forces. Turning towards DPRK national narrative is helpful here, as it would have found the re-occupation of the South to be intolerable from a strategic and, perhaps more forcibly, an ideational viewpoint. For Kim, the aim of the war was the formation of a unified, sovereign, and independent Korean nation. Only when narrative is taken into account can the risk of invasion be viewed as more favorable than the status quo. This hyper nationalism was thrown into sharp relief during the immediate run up to the invasion, explaining why, contrary traditional studies, Kim opted to “fight alone”. The importance of the independent narrative would continue to play an important role throughout the course of the war.

**1.2 Course of the War:**

While relations between Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing’s were plagued by mistrust, the Sino-DPRK relationship proved particularly turbulent, hindered by North Korea’s sensitivity towards their historical “big brother little brother relationship” both in the historical context of Chinese domination and more recent purges against Korean guerillas in Manchuria; “the North Koreans chafed at being junior partners to the Chinese (Mao liked to call Kim Il Sung, affectionately but condescendingly, *Xiao Jin* – “Little Kim”).”

Troubles flared from the outset, with DPRK forces launching their offensive across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 having failed to inform the Chinese of the specifics beforehand (Beijing learned of the invasion through the press). Following U.S. intervention in July, the Chinese sought to provide strategic advice and stationed troops on the border, but their support was rebuffed. The Korean’s also sought to maintain an operational distance form the Chinese, with access to high-ranking North Korean officials remaining intermittent, military intelligence not shared, and requests to send observational staff officers refused. This all had dire consequences. As Zhou complained to the Soviets, “the North Korean leaders had ignored Mao’s

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650 Report on Kim Il Sung’s visit to the USSR, March 30-April 25, 1950. Prepared by the International Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), APRF presented in Weathersby, “Fear This?” (emphasis added)
651 *Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin*, 15 May 1950, APRF, cited in Weathersby, “Fear This?” pg. 12
652 Armstrong, *Tyranny*, pg. 19
654 Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean”, pg.10
repeated warnings that US military intervention was imminent” and attempts by Mao in August and September to convince the KPA to fortify Inchon (the eventual landing site of U.S. forces) and other strategic locations, given the possibility of invasion, unheeded. Kim himself felt the war could still be swiftly won (even after U.S. intervention). While throughout 1950 “China still behaved generously”, North Korea still refused to cooperate for mutual defense planning. By July, North Korea was thus engaged in a war with a Great Power (U.S.), yet continued to rebuff allied assistance.

This continued even after U.S. forces successfully managed to land behind DPRK frontlines through the Inchon landing in September, with Beijing complaining about the lack of information they were being provided. Moreover, despite the rapidly deteriorating strategic position, Kim delayed in seeking China’s aid despite the CVA stating its readiness to intervene on September 21; “except for being told by Kim that, “the Korean people were prepared for a long war,” Beijing had received no further information from Pyongyang,” despite Soviet instructions to ask China for assistance. It was not until September 28 that an emergency meeting of the KWP Politburo was called to discuss the issue. On the 29th Kim:

reiterated [to Stalin] his earlier stated desire to unify the country by his own means, he stated that he wanted to form 15 divisions and to continue the struggle, but it was not clear for him whether the adversary would cross the 38th parallel or not.

In the same telegram Kim also stated that should the enemy seek to cross the 38th parallel (a prospect Kim was uncertain of) the North, “would be unable to form new troops and they would have no means to render any serious resistance to the enemy.” The following day Kim sent a telegram reaffirming his commitment to ensure “Korea will not be a colony and a military springboard” and requested Soviet, and if unable (which Kim would have foreseen given Stalin’s previously explicit statements), Chinese intervention, should the 38th parallel be crossed.

While originally Mao delayed in committing to Stalin on October 8, Kim was informed separately by both Stalin and Mao of Beijing’s commitment to send, “after some time”, nine divisions. The situation again changed, however, when, during follow-up negotiations between China and Russia, Zhou Biao (perhaps due to personal opposition) expressed hesitancy. In response, Stalin proposed Kim retreat to Northeast China, and suggested as such in a wire sent October 13. Upon hearing this Kim “stated that it was very hard for them, but since there is such advice they will fulfill it,” informing colleagues they would have to wage a guerilla war from China.

655 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000, cited in Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean”, pg.11
656 This included, for example, the coordination of supply lines and storage, and a continuation of the return of ethnic Koreans as a source of manpower. Charles Kraus, “Zhou Enlai And China’s Response to the Korean War” NKIDP, E-Dossier #9 (June, 2012), pg. 1
658 It should be noted that Kim does appear to have requested more limited aid in August. See “Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhijiang”, 23 August 1950, presented in Kraus, “China’s Response”, pg. 9
659 Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean”, pg.11
660 APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49 presented in Mansourou, “Stalin, Mao, Kim”
661 APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 41-45 presented in Ibid
662 APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106 presented in Ibid
663 APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65-67 presented in Ibid
664 Mansourou, “Stalin, Mao, Kim”, pg. 103
665 APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, list 3 presented in Mansourou, “Stalin, Mao, Kim”
The following day however, Kim was informed of Mao’s renewed pledge for support. Importantly then, there was a 24hr period during which Kim believed he had been abandoned. Mansourov concludes it was then Kim began “distancing himself from his Soviet handlers.” 666 Two points should be made here. For one, Stalin had repeatedly told Kim there would be no intervention. While most likely discontent with Moscow, the blame was therefore still at the feet of Beijing. Secondly, the incident would have only reinforced Pyongyang’s preexisting distaste for (and distrust of) Great Power chauvinism, developed during the anti-Japanese campaign and showcased through efforts to reduce Soviet influence in the 1940s (Ch. 4).

Following the introduction of Chinese forces, additional problems arose. The fact these forces were not placed under DPRK, or mutual, command, as requested by Kim, was interpreted as an insult. 667 This had been a point of contention from the outset, and while waiting to be resolved resulted in a serious (and as times deadly) lack of coordination, with Peng Dehuai, the head of the CVA, noting “the CVA’s ability to fight has been hindered.” 668 Kim even refused requests in November to relocate his headquarters to form a more centralized command, or allow for KPA troops to be integrated with larger CVA divisions. It was not until December 3, after a failed attempt by Mao to establish a unified command in November that Kim finally yielded to Soviet directives supporting the proposal. Zhihua concludes,

The Koreans were concerned about national sovereignty. Korea’s long-standing relationship with China as a subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the command of their army very difficult for them to accept. For the Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military power and in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage. 669

While the North would have thus benefited from a Joint command, the war effort was for some time undermined given DPRK concerns of pride. A second problem revolved around the launch of the third campaign, during which Kim pressed for a more aggressive line aimed at forcing U.S. withdrawal. By contrast, Peng advocated a more tactical - and realistic – advance, as U.S. forces had managed to remain intact following the first phase of the offensive. On January 11, during a heated exchange, Peng told Kim, “You are just hoping for a quick victory and are not making concrete preparations, and this is only going to prolong the war.” 670 Armstrong notes how the North later interpreted this reluctance as the cause of the eventual stalemate and repartition of the county. A large disagreement also arose when, in an attempt to increase the efficiency of the railway system, Peng sought to forge joint control. The ensuing protests by Pyongyang led to sustained inefficiency in delivering sorely needed supplies. Despite this, Kim backtracked from the first negotiation of a joint command in December 1950, following concerns over the potential infringement on Korean sovereignty. This led to a series of negotiations during which Pyongyang repeatedly undermined a joint organization.

Follow-up negotiations in which concessions were made to the Koreans faced further problems. The Chinese argument that, given most of the trains, maintenance and

666 Mansourouv, “Stalin, Mao, Kim” pg. 105
669 Zhihua, “Sino-North Korean”, pg.14
670 Ibid, pg. 15
transportation troops and train crews were Chinese, Beijing should control the Joint Transportation Command, was repeatedly rebuffed; “the management of railroad transportation involved questions of national sovereignty, and therefore must be controlled by the Koreans.” While Zhou at first believed the position to be a result of the Soviets, a telegram from Stalin demonstrated it to be a solely Korean stance: “From the consul’s report, it is clear that Prime Minister Kim supports this idea, but the Korean ministers seem opposed to it. They believe this plan is detrimental to Korean sovereignty.” While it is unclear if Kim himself was also opposed, either way, Pyongyang’s stance was constrained by the sovereignty issue. This was again only resolved when, following drawn out debates and combined Sino-Soviet pressure matched with demands of the war effort, Kim was finally compelled to acquiesce.

Again what we find are repeated instances of DPRK national narrative influencing foreign policy and leading to outcomes seemingly unexplainable by other frameworks. From Kim’s reluctance to allow China’s entry into the war, to issues of sovereignty hindering the North’s war fighting capability, Kim repeatedly deferred to ideational rather than purely traditional strategic considerations and limited the extent to which it could balance against the U.S. and the ROK by taking advantage of a Great Power alliance. While Kim did eventually allow for China’s entry into the war, and later acquiesced to organizational structures, he did so only after a considerable degree of damage had been inflicted and the North’s very survival was at stake.

1.3 Ending The War:

Despite the tremendous destruction of the War, the Koreans seem to have been reluctant to finally enter negotiations. In June 1951 the Chinese and Koreans decided to begin pursuing negotiations, though only from a position of strength. By 1952, Weathersby argues the DPRK appeared to be advocating for an end to conflict, citing a meeting wherein North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong informed Peng the Korean people “demand peace” but would “overcome any difficulties and hold to their position” if requested to do so. However Pak clarified this was his personal opinion, “not the opinion of the CC of the Labor party and the Korean government.” By contrast, in an April telegram to Stalin, Kim wrote “Korea, which has suffered from American aggression but is prepared to defend to the end its freedom and independence.” Similarly a Romanian report in March on the DPRK domestic situation noted how “Vice-Premier Pak Heon-yeong said, “the war in Korea will be a long war,” all of which suggests Pyongyang was prepared to carry on.
Mao wrote to Kim in July stating, “to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.” At the same time, Mao justified past and prospective Korean and Chinese losses; North Korea and China had been defended, their might strengthened, American imperialism confronted, and they had become an inspiration for others. On July 16, Kim concurred with Mao’s position and suggested undertaking “aggressive military operations” as opposed to a continued passive defense, telegraphing Stalin on the 17th to request “cover for the most important sites and to go over to active operations.”

Overall, while Kim was certainly pushing for a quick end to negotiations given ongoing losses, and there appears to have been some disagreement over the speed of concluding negotiations, he also appears to have been prepared to renew offensive measures. By 1953, however, China was eager to end hostilities, as was the post-Stalin leadership of Russia. In response to the 1953 Soviet directive to move towards an armistice, Kim stated “It is necessary…either actively to carry out military operations or to end the war; a further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interests of the DPRK and PRC.” Mao meanwhile justified the move, stipulating the American’s military position was “not in a condition to advance on land…[and] not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front.”

2. “An Independent National Economy”

While North Korea suffered tremendously during the war, it received immense aid from the Soviets, East Europe and, despite Kim’s reluctance, China. For Kim’s guerilla faction, the aim was now to forge a nationalist oriented economy focused on heavy industry. This was opposed both by domestic elements, supporting short-term economic gain, and external powers seeking to cajole Pyongyang to capitulate and reverse nationalist policies. The result of these feuds was a more centralized power structure in Pyongyang and deteriorated relations with allies that risked alienation and potential régime change. Pyongyang’s subsequent “slide into economic disaster [was also] due in no small part to [this] insistence…on “self-reliance”.”

Unfortunately, much of the analysis on the immediate post war period has focused strictly on the internal struggles between the Soviet faction (ethnic Koreans from Russia), Yan’an faction (Koreans who fled to Chia during Japanese occupation) and Kim’s Gaspan faction. However these “factions”, more akin to “lose social groups,”

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677 APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 72-75 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 90-93 presented in Weathersby, “New Documents”
678 APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65-68 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43 presented in Ibid.
680 Weathersby, “New Documents”, pg. 34
681 AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122 presented in Weathersby, “New Documents”
682 APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158 presented in Ibid
684 Zhuhua, “Sino-North Korean”
686 Armstrong, *Tyranny*, pg. 53
687 For a traditional reading of these events see Scalapino and Chong-sik, *Communism in Korea*
were only termed post hoc by Kim to justify purges.\textsuperscript{688} Person thus perhaps more aptly refers to the dissenters as the “consumer goods group” (CGG) given their oppositional development plans; the DPRK at this time still adhered to Leninist “democratic centralism, allowing debate before policy directives.

When events came to a head in August 1956 it was not, as Lankov previously argued, a full-blown coup. Instead as Szalontai and Person show, opponents “made a final, desperate attempt to convince the North Korean leader to adopt post-Stalin Soviet-style reform...[and] to rid the party of nationalist elements hostile to foreign influences, and place limits on the growing personality cult in North Korea.”\textsuperscript{689} In the words of his detractors, issues surrounded “improving the material situation of the population, overcoming the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung...the elimination of sycophants and careerists, the history of our party, and party propaganda.”\textsuperscript{690} Internal KWP frictions were thus threefold: economic, ideological (cult of personality and Kim’s nationalist line), and procedural (reasserted influence of the CGG).\textsuperscript{691} Kim’s steadfast determination to maintain his economic and nationalist line, and corresponding power moves to safeguard it, were the basis of the problem.\textsuperscript{692} In this sense, the economic debates were entwined with a larger struggle over the identity and narrative of North Korea; the success of Kim’s guerilla faction in turn enshrined their interpretation of DPRK national identity.

The implications of Kim’s determination bring to bare important questions that traditional approaches struggle to account for. Unable to balance internally against the ROK and U.S., the DPRK should have sought to underscore its relations with Beijing and Moscow while also extracting as much aid as possible. Instead, by adhering to an independent line derived from the above nationalist economic policies, Pyongyang seemingly championed ideational rather than material interests. In doing so it jeopardized key relationships that, while resulting in decreased aid, also risked the potential isolation of North Korea and generated at least some discussion of Kim’s possible removal by Moscow and Beijing.

2.1 The Course of Economic Debates:

Kim introduced his postwar reconstruction plan during the August 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee (CC). The CGG favored a focus on light industry, further alignment with post-Stalinist modernization policies, and integration into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). By contrast, Kim’s faction argued only through industrialization could the North increase independence and power, offsetting South Korea and forgoing the colonial-esque relationship of COMECON; “he would not willingly subjugate his country by entering into a new suzerain system of “serving the great” (sadae) with the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{693} Person thus notes, “the issue

\textsuperscript{688} James Person, ““We Need help from the Outside”: The North Korean Opposition Movement of1956” CWIHP Working Paper No. 52 (August 2006), pg. 7


\textsuperscript{690} “Letter from Li Sangjo to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party”, 5 October 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 233-295 presented in Person, “New Evidence”; See also “Memorandum of Conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Nam Il,” July 24, 1956, HPPPDA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 301-303

\textsuperscript{691} “Conversation with the Delegation of the Korean Worker's Party at the 8th CCP Congress,” September 17, 1956, HPPPDA, GARF, Fond 5446, Opis 98c, Delo 718, Listy 49-57

\textsuperscript{692} “Letter from Li Sangjo” 5 October 1956

\textsuperscript{693} Person, “New Evidence”, pg. 448
was Soviet hegemony versus national economic self-determination”, a nationalist/independent position that became the main source of criticism for his dissenters.

The CGG felt its position was emboldened following a food crisis that emerged as a result of the Three-Year-Plan’s (1954–1956) emphasis on heavy industry and local self-reliance at the expense of agriculture. Breaking with democratic centralism, they began to criticize Kim’s economic policies while championing those of China and Russia. Kim perceived that the CGG was thus seeking to replicate foreign policies and trying to undermine the nationalist economic line; given the onset of famine, the Soviets had already compelled Pyongyang to make minimal policy concessions in an effort to avoid the social unrest seen in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, and foreshadowing events to come, the Soviets, “well aware of North Korea’s extreme sensitivity to any perceived interference…[were] wary of pushing too hard or appearing to scold or lecture the Koreans for their “errors.”

Kim sought to reassert his position and warn his would be critics to “refrain from factional struggle” during the April 1955 CC Plenum. He also emphasized how his economic policies allowed North Korea to promote “independence and socialist construction by overcoming the old ideological remnants that hinder the forward march of the Korean people.” For example, talking with the Hungarians, Kim complained of the need to import cement and the shortcomings, due to legacies of colonialism, of rushed initiatives to domestically increase its production. Meanwhile during the April Plenum, Kim claimed the grain failures were the result of those seeking to dogmatically copy foreign techniques to the unique Korean position, a seeming rebuke of the Soviets and those seeking to inject foreign influence.

To further preempt dissenters taking advantage of Moscow’s growing anti-Stalinist line to promote economic and political reforms, Kim began to attack Soviet-Koreans in 1955. This was a calculated move premised on Khrushchev’s relaxation in domestic interference and China’s unease over de-Stalinization, limiting possible retaliation. Kim would thus seek to “eliminate foreign influences from the KWP leadership” and demonstrate the cost of criticizing nationalist economic policies. His line of attack was accusations of dogmatism within Soviet-Korean propaganda work, a position that culminated in his December 1955 speech introducing Juche and the following party decree entitled ‘About the Future Struggle against Reactionary Bourgeois Ideology in Literature and Art’. The implications were immediately clear; it formed the basis for accusations of anti-party behavior (and for Kim’s post hoc ‘factional’ labeling).

694 Person, “We Need Help”, pg. 14; see also Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 61
695 “Letter from Li Sangjo” 5 October 1956
698 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 87
699 Nodong shinmun, 9 April 1955, Cited in Person, “We Need Help”, pg. 14
701 Memorandum of Conversation with the DPRK Vice Premier of the Cabinet of Ministers and Member of the KWP CC Presidium, Bak Changok, 12 March 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 73-85 presented in Person, “New Evidence”
702 Person, “We Need Help”, pg. 15-16
703 Memorandum of Conversation with Pak Ui-wan,” June 05, 1956, HPPPDA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 203-205
Person surmises, “[w]hen first introduced, Juche served as an anti-foreign or anti-hegemonic slogan designed to discredit those who sought to mechanically import Soviet and Chinese practices to North Korea.”\textsuperscript{704} It was a “development strategy that emphasized the primacy of ideological power in the construction of utopian society”\textsuperscript{705} and “did not exclude seeking economic aid, so long as North Korea did not become economically over-dependent and lose its freedom of action.”\textsuperscript{706} Armstrong perhaps surmises best, writing, “[i]t was also more than an attack on Kim’s political opponents…Kim’s speech marked in retrospect the beginning of North Korea’s divergence from the Moscow-dominated international Socialist community.”\textsuperscript{707}

The situation became more problematic for Kim following Khrushchev’s launch of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence in February 1956. In response, KWP leaders argued the problems cited by Khrushchev were inapplicable to the North. Meanwhile Kim, still “uneasy over the power of Soviet influence…”\textsuperscript{708} and published ‘For the good of understanding of Juche!’ His defiance continued at the April KWP Third Congress where Soviet representative Leonid Brezhnev urged the Koreans to import Soviet consumer goods rather than focus on heavy industry. By contrast, Kim introduced a new Five-Year-Plan emphasizing heavy industry (and thus a nationalist economy) and continued his anti-American bravado - foregoing peaceful coexistence.\textsuperscript{709} He also began an intensive Koreanization process, eliminating foreign cultural influences,\textsuperscript{710} while quarrelling with the Soviets over perceived interference in Korean affairs.\textsuperscript{711}

CGG members soon began to express their displeasure over Kim’s refusal to embrace the new international communist line\textsuperscript{712} and the country’s ongoing economic struggles.\textsuperscript{713} For example, Vice Premier Pak Ui-wan “expressed the hope that Kim II Sung’s [upcoming] trip would bring changes in economic policy and with regard to the people.”\textsuperscript{714} They also complained Kim was reinforcing his position through nepotism\textsuperscript{715} and historical revisionism,\textsuperscript{716} and opposed North Korea’s increasingly nationalist stances and attempts to limit “Soviet culture.”\textsuperscript{717}

\textsuperscript{704} James F. Person, “From Anti-Foreignism to Self-Reliance: The Evolution of North Korea’s Juche Ideology” (paper presented at “Northeast Asia in the Cold War: New Evidence and Perspectives” Hokkaido University, Summer 2008)
\textsuperscript{705} Chung, “The Suryong System,” pg. 99
\textsuperscript{706} Shen and Xia, “Post-War” pg. 11
\textsuperscript{707} Armstrong, \textit{Tyranny}, pg. 89, 90
\textsuperscript{708} Person, “We Need Help”, pg. 22
\textsuperscript{709} Remarks on the Draft Statutes of the KWP,” March 05, 1956, HPPPDPA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 22-25
\textsuperscript{710} Armstrong, \textit{Tyranny}, pg. pg.96
\textsuperscript{711} Memorandum of Conversation with Kim II Sung, 19 April 1956 AVPRF, Opis 12, Papka 68, Delo 5, Listy 64-65 presented in Person, “New Evidence”
\textsuperscript{712} Memorandum of Conversation with Gi Seok-bok,” May 31, 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 222-223; Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Chang-ik,” June 05, 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 206-207 presented in Person, “New Evidence”
\textsuperscript{713} Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a Meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Li Sangjo, 29 May 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 190-196 presented in Person, “New Evidence”; Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Chang-ik,” June 05, 1956, HPPPDPA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 206-207
\textsuperscript{714} Memorandum of Conversation with Pak Ui-wan,” June 05, 1956, HPPPDPA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 203-205; Memorandum of Conversation with the head of the department of construction materials under the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, Li Pil-gyu.,” July 20, 1956, HPPPDPA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 304-308
\textsuperscript{715} Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Chang-ik,” June 08, 1956, HPPPDPA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 210-214
\textsuperscript{716} Letter from Li Sangjo to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, 5 October 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 233-295 presented in Person “New Evidence”; Conversation with the head of the department” July 20, 1956
\textsuperscript{717} Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Chang-ik,” June 08, 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 210-214 presented in Person, “New Evidence”
Following the failure of Kim’s foreign counterparts (at the behest of the CGG) to convince him to “restore proper ideological and economic policies, as well as the influence of the two foreign supported groups,” a confrontation was planned for the August Plenum of the CC. Kim, aware of these moves, thwarted their attempts, with opposition members either expelled from the Party or demoted. Problematically, the harsh penalties were in contrast to the more lenient lines of Beijing and Moscow who viewed the moves as the result of DPRK “nationalism”, and as creating an “unhealthy situation”.

2.2 Implications of Nationalist Economics:

The recent release of Anastas Mikoyan’s papers has helped to showcase the extent to which Moscow and Beijing were angered by Kim’s policies, revealing the risk associated with his ardent nationalist line. In particular, it now appears as though at least nominal conversations were held on possibly removing Kim; indeed the fact Mikoyan had at this time recently unseated Mátýás Rákosi in Hungary should have proved a stark warning to Kim. While Beijing and Moscow agreed they “trusted” Kim, and Mao stated “it would be incorrect right now for one group to overthrow another in Korea since the group which had been overthrown might begin the struggle all over again” they also concluded they could not “regard the unacceptable methods in the work of the KWP leadership with approval.” Mao also stated the KWP “has a feeling of hostility” toward Moscow and Beijing, believing “that our Parties are acting with respect to the KWP the same way as they acted with respect to Yugoslavia at one time” (Mao believed Stalin was to blame for the earlier Soviet-Yugoslav split). Seemingly showcasing DPRK propensity to respond to ideational threats (and in so doing disregard strategic considerations) Mao also noted that while Kim:

understood that we do not want to overthrow him [indicating China would not support a Soviet proposition to overthrow Kim]…It is necessary to let [him] know all the same that he cannot remain in the leadership without correction of the mistakes. But…it is necessary to be prepared for extreme steps from Kim Il Sung. He might even raise the issue of the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers from Korea. Of course, the Chinese units want to return home, but we know that the Americans are

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719 “Memorandum of Conversation with Choe Chang-dik,” June 08, 1956; “Report by N. T. Fedorenko 29 May 1956”;
Memorandum of a Conversation with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Li Sangjo, 16 June 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 238-241 presented in Person, “New Evidence”
720 “Memorandum of Conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung,” September 01, 1956, HPPPDA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 317; Conversation with the head of the department” July 20, 1956
721 “Conversation with the Delegation of the Korean Worker’s Party Central Committee,” September 15, 1956, HPPPDA, GARF, Fond 5446, Opis 98c, Delo 718, Listy 35-38
722 “Memo to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 19, 1956, HPPPDA, GARF, Fond 5446, Opis 98c, Delo 718, List 35-38
724 See for example “Cable from Cde. Mikoyan from Beijing concerning the 8th CCP Congress and Conversations with the Chinese Comrades,” September 16, 1956, HPPPDA, State Archive of the Russian Federation, fond 5446, opis 98c, delo 717; Conversation with the Delegation of the Korean Worker’s Party
725 “Telegram from A. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 19, 1956, HPPPDA, GARF, Fond 5446, Opis 98c, Delo 718, Listy 35-38
strengthening their positions in South Korea and we consider it necessary to leave our volunteers in Korea.\textsuperscript{727}

It was decided that a joint Sino-Soviet delegation headed by Mikoyan and Peng would travel to Pyongyang in September. While reassuring Kim of his position and seeking to maneuver around “difficult positions” for DPRK “prestige”, they explained “mistakes [that] had been committed” would have to be corrected. Kim was asked to cease his political attacks and reinstate expelled members.\textsuperscript{728} His reaction was little more than lip service; attacks ceased only temporarily, Sino-Soviet demands were soon reversed, and the intervention was never publicly discussed.\textsuperscript{729} In short, Kim would not bend to even joint Sino-Soviet pressure,\textsuperscript{730} which served only to increase his resentment towards these patron powers.\textsuperscript{731} Even before the intervention, it was noted:

the Koreans do not listen to the advice of the Communist Party of China. In connection with this we [Mikoyan] said that, as is well known, Kim Il Sung agreed with the advice of the CPSU CC, but acted otherwise.\textsuperscript{732}

Rachenko notes how this was a “remarkable admission of the limits of Beijing’s political influence on North Korea, all the more remarkable, in fact, in view of the continued presence of more than 400,000 Chinese troops on the Korean soil”,\textsuperscript{733} a presence that further underscored the risk of Kim’s continued defiance. Somewhat ironically, he also notes that Kim was most likely saved from being removed due to China’s own growing disdain of Soviet chauvinism. Consequently, having weathered the storm, Kim’s development policies and power were further institutionalized and there was further integration between the Party and the masses, with former guerillas’ “ideological commitments” emphasized as “Korean traditionalism.”\textsuperscript{734}

While Kim was fortunate to have avoided a potentially more severe foreign intervention, there were further consequences to his factions’ nationalist economic policies, in particular to foreign trade/aid. Given the bi-polar system of the time, the DPRK was aware it would not be able to extract aid elsewhere, while Hungary and Bulgaria represented contemporary reminders regarding the consequence of dissent. When combined with Khrushchev’s openly critical stance of DPRK policies until 1957, one would have expected a more affable Pyongyang. Instead, Kim remained focused on asserting a nationalist position. As a result, the Soviets dropped their aid in...

\textsuperscript{727} “Telegram from A. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 19, 1956
\textsuperscript{729} Indeed Moscow and Beijing had feared this would occur. “Telegram from A. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 19, 1956; see also “Telegram from Ponomarev to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 26, 1956, HPPPDA, GARF, Fond 5446, Opis 98c, Delo 718
\textsuperscript{730} Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 99; See also CPSU CC Report on 8 October Conversation between Ambassador Ivanov and Kim Il Sung, 15 October 1956 HPPPDA, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 296; Memorandum of Conversation with the Charge d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in the DPRK, Chao Kaelyan, 26 October 1956 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 344-346 presented in Person,” New Evidence”; Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang, 5 November 1956 HPPPDA RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy 367-369
\textsuperscript{731} Memorandum of Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Manush [Myftiu] composed by Albanian Ambassador to the DPRK, Hasan Almezko, 4 October 1961, AOPSH, MPP Korese, V. 1961, D4, presented in Person, “New Evidence”
\textsuperscript{732} “Telegram from A. Mikoyan to the CPSU Central Committee,” September 19, 1956
\textsuperscript{733} Rachenko, “We do not want”
\textsuperscript{734} Chung, “The Suryong System”, pg. 98
1956 due to “Soviet parsimony and because of North Korean insistence on self-reliance”, meaning Pyongyang effectively helped sabotage its main source of income. In December Kim stated the Five-Year-Plan would subsequently be funded primarily through domestic means, indicating a willingness to sacrifice in order to maintain the nationalist line. While able to gain some aid from China, Kim subsequently undermined this relationship through the reinstitution of purges in 1957, infuriating Mao and leading to further aid being denied. Following Kim’s proposition for UN intervention on the peninsula and removal of foreign forces, Mao reprimanded Kim stating he “wants to drive the CPV army out of Korea. He might follow J. B. Tito’s road, or even Imre Nagy’s steps.”

The domestic strain was somewhat reduced by a new Soviet trade pact in 1957, the result not of DPRK flexibility but of Soviet perceptions that, while still pursuing incorrect economic and ideological lines, Kim was changing for the better. Tellingly, Kim’s response was to ratchet up efforts to forge cultural purity. “To the chagrin of the diplomatic corps, in 1957 hardly any foreign plays, operas, or musical compositions were performed in the DPRK.” When the Deputy Minister of Education and Culture attempted to ease these moves he was purged and in 1957 extended aid was again rejected by the disgruntled Soviets; even after aid was renewed in 1959 the Soviets still complained how Pyongyang took “no account of the possibility of cooperation…and for wanting to produce everything by themselves.”

Importantly, this continued defiance was launched under the belief Beijing would be unable to offset the Soviets, undermining the notion Kim was merely playing sides off one another, or even balancing against Moscow. Fortunately for Kim, Mao – who was at growing odds with Khrushchev and ideologically inline with Kim – endorsed the Five-Year-Plan and agreed to assist Pyongyang. Mao also apologized to Kim for the 1956 interference into domestic affairs and said Chinese forces, which Pyongyang had come to view as a quasi-occupational force, would be withdrawn. Furthermore, Mao stated Korean aid during WWII was far greater than what China contributed to the Korean War. This line of thought, already championed in Pyongyang, would become part of the official narrative, justifying China’s role as a debt repayment.

Kim’s response to the fortunate turn of events, however, was to again showcase independence, this time from China. In December he introduced cha'ju - self-determination in foreign affairs and “complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence, and non-intervention” In 1958 he went further,
introducing the *Chollima* movement, a mass mobilization campaign in an effort to complete the Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule (completed May 1958) and make each province (and thus the nation) self-sufficient; a program heavily criticized by Khrushchev.\(^{747}\) In a rebuff towards Beijing, it was also touted as a uniquely Korean approach to economic construction geared towards the fulfillment of *Juche*, emphasizing “the domestic production of machine tools, use of Korean anthracite rather then imported coal for fuel, and even self-sufficiency in food.” Then, in October 1960, criticism against the practice of *sadaejuui* or “flunkeyism” was raised. As Armstrong notes, in traditional Korean “sadae” referred to “Korea’s subordinate relationship to China,”\(^ {748}\) the implication being the DPRK was not only rejecting Soviet (the *Juche* speech) but also Chinese encroachment.

Throughout the economic debates of the early 1950s and subsequent traversing of foreign relations, one recurrent theme seems to have dominated the calculations of Kim’s guerillas. In the words of Soviet Comrade Yulin “most of the mistakes noticeable in the DPRK are attributable to one thing, namely, the exaggerated national pride of the Korean people.”\(^ {749}\) Domestically, Kim eliminated rival narratives (though again not necessary rivals to his power), cementing economic development policies that correlated with his interpretation of DPRK independence. This was done at the partial expense of jeopardizing more cordial relations with important economic benefactors. Kim’s handling of external ideational threats further jeopardized these relationships as he sought to eliminate foreign influence and strike a distinctly independent path economically, culturally and politically. This not only undermined the North’s ability to perhaps extract higher levels of external aid, it also partially resulted in the reduction of aid as a portion of GDP from 33.4% in 1954 to 2.6% in 1960 (ROK dependency remained at 50%). Kim was thus forced to declare 1960 a “buffer year” to prepare for the next Five-Year-Plan, and because “the last three years had been exhausting for the workers.”\(^ {750}\)

The geopolitical landscape at the time makes such maneuvers hard to account for from a traditional perspective. The DPRK, far from a neutral state in the Cold War context, was unable to internally balance against the ROK and U.S., was in need of external aid, and had witnessed in Hungary and Bulgaria the fate of small state deviance. Arguments Pyongyang may have been trying to play Moscow and Beijing off one another are undercut by behavior undermining the extent to which aid was extracted. As Armstrong writes, “[s]elf-reliance was only partially of virtue born of the necessity of getting by without foreign assistance. It was also a conscious choice made by leaders who wanted their country to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union, China, or any Great Power”.\(^ {751}\) Consequently, the influence of “national pride” referenced by the Soviets, and the championing of ideational over material interests, again demonstrates the influence of ideational rather than systemic considerations. To this end Kim was responding to genuine ideational threats that can only be accounted for by taking into account national narrative. As the Soviet-Sino divide deepened, this pattern would continue in a more extreme fashion.

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\(^{748}\) Armstrong, *Tyranny*, pg. 108, 122

\(^{749}\) The report went on to cite DPRK sensitivity to presumptions of ‘borrowing ideas’ from other powers. “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea,” December 16, 1959

\(^{750}\) Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 14 May 1959, KA, 3. doboz, 4/bc, (no reference number)/1959 cited in Szalontai, “No Political Line”, pg. 94

\(^{751}\) Armstrong, *Tyranny*, pg. 135-136

In the midst of the Sino-Soviet divide Kim remarked to the Hungarians “that while certain people claimed that he would fall between two stools, Korea actually had its own stool, on which it sat firmly.”752 While the quote is insightful for its encapsulation of the North’s fiercely independent position, it would have been more accurate to describe the stool as wobbly. It is argued that far from remaining neutral - extracting aid and balancing when needed - Pyongyang’s behavior was more the result of responding to ideational threats while simultaneously pursuing offensive strategies aimed at unification, despite high-risk consequences and friction with allies.

3.1 Reunification V Peaceful Coexistence:

Throughout the 1950s, Kim had feuded with the Soviets over the DPRK’s nationalist economic policies and cult of personality. While not as prominent, he had also disagreed with Khrushchev’s introduction of peaceful coexistence;753 indeed Szalontai notes how Kim’s economic polices were representative of his aggressive views on reunification.754 Additionally, as the Hungarians noted, it would have meant “peaceful coexistence with US imperialism, which for any Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese is at least difficult to understand, given that for them the US represents their fiercest national enemy”.755 Pyongyang’s renewed focus on unification – having addressed economic redevelopment – and Khrushchev’s repeated emphasis on peaceful coexistence, thus laid the groundwork for a new clash.

Tensions had already emerged when Kim adopted a more aggressive unification policy following the failure of the Geneva Talks; in October 1959 the KWP CC reportedly “considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country.”756 A slight reprieve did emerge in 1960 following the ouster of Syngman Rhee,757 leading Kim to view negotiations, and Khrushchev’s Korean confederation proposal,758 as a viable option. However the increasingly repressive Park Chung-hee government soon dashed these hopes,759 leading Kim to scrap proposed policy changes,760 much to the displeasure of Khrushchev. Kim was careful though to maintain a neutral stance between the two powers,761 both due to China’s inability to match Soviet aid762 and to

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758 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea”, 2 July 1960
759 “Some Problems of North Korea,” August 11, 1961, HPPDA, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136
761 “Some Problems of North Korea,” August 11, 1961

avoid overdependence on China. However this changed when, during the October 1961 CPSU Congress, Khrushchev accelerated attacks on Mao, reemphasized peaceful coexistence and escalated his attacks on Albanian insubordination (critiquing Soviet-Yugoslavian rapprochement and de-Stalinization).

As with the economic debates of the 1950s, Kim’s ideological commitments again came to undermine his relationship with the Soviets. Pyongyang suspended Soviet radio and newspapers and provided tacit support for the Albanians, who were seen as seeking to protect their independence. While Khrushchev sought to mend relations and proposed to visit Pyongyang, Kim stalled, most likely to seek out Beijing’s opinion, subsequently undermining the Soviet overtures. By October 1963, Pyongyang had sharpened its attack in an editorial entitled ‘Let us Defend the Socialist Camp’, condemning interference into domestic affairs, which assertions of a cult-of-personality had merely been a pretext for, and labeling COMECON a threat to economic independence.

In a further rebuke to Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, and in support of a more aggressive unification policy, Pyongyang also heightened its militaristic rhetoric. In March 1962 DPRK officials told GDR counterparts that unlike peaceful coexistence in Germany, “other methods were needed [in Korea], “we cannot wait until the population of South Korea starves to death!” In September a DPRK official while in Berlin, criticized the Berlin Wall, suggesting East Germans should take the offensive, and later sought to “confuse” the East German ambassador in North Korea with Kim calling for restraint while his colleagues “expressed the opinion that one cannot do without a war.” In February 1963 the Hungarians reported an anecdote given by the Czechoslovak ambassador to North Korea:

Major General Ch’ang Chonghwan, the Korean representative on the Panmunjom Armistice Commission, approached him after dinner and put the following question to him: “What would you do if some day the enemy took one of the two rooms of your flat?” Comrade Moravec replied, “Whatever happens, I would resort to methods that did not run the risk of destroying the whole building or the whole city […]”. Thereupon [Major] General Ch’ang threw a cigarette-box he had in his hand on the...
table, and left him standing.\(^{771}\)

This rhetoric was matched by an intensified militarization campaign beginning in May 1961, as soon as it was realized Pak was not the revolutionary they had hoped, with the KWP calling for measures to “drastically militarize the state.” The Seven-Year-Plan was also put off until 1963, allowing the North to “concentrate forces on strengthening national defense”\(^{772}\) and in April militarization was accelerated under the new concept “arming the whole people.” During a secret meeting at the Party Center in June, it was also decided “the two focal points of the next year’s plan [would be] the development of agriculture and the development of the defense industry,” a policy termed “equal emphasis.”\(^{773}\)

DPRK rhetoric and behaviour forced the East Germans to conclude that by 1961 Pyongyang had shifted from a neutral position to one markedly closer to China\(^ {774}\) and it was soon commonly held that the DPRK had “taken sides” with the Chinese.\(^ {775}\) Questions therefore arise over what drove the DPRK to such ends. One could argue Pyongyang still acted as some traditional approaches might expect; as interests diverged from Moscow it sought to shift towards Beijing. However such an argument is problematized by their struggle to account for the very DPRK interests that led to a break; militarization and an aggressive unification strategy makes little sense at that time from a traditional viewpoint.

The largest obstacle facing Pyongyang was the continued presence of U.S. forces, meaning any conflict risked escalation. Conversely, only by threatening its relationship with Moscow could the North undermine its relative state of security. Indeed the recent excommunication of Albania provided a tacit example of this risk, one not lost on Kim who, according to East European reports in spring 1962, instructed the KWP to prepare itself for a similar outcome.\(^ {776}\) It should also be highlighted that DPRK military investment predated perceptions of reduced Soviet reliability as a result of appeasement during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October.\(^ {777}\) Prior this, Pyongyang should have been focused on cementing its lucrative relationship with Moscow. After the crisis, it would then have wanted to extract various internal deterrence capabilities against future ROK aggression, while seeking to reaffirm its alliance. However, again showing deference towards a nationalist line, Pyongyang instead ramped up criticism of the Soviet’s Cuba policy and later publicly advocated (against Moscow) for China’s position in its border dispute with India. As


\(^{773}\) “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North”, August 1962


\(^{777}\) Szalontai, “No Political Line”, pg. 98; See for example "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Czechoslovakia, 'The North Korean Charge d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia Discussed the Sino-Indian Border Issue and the Situation in Cuba,'" November 19, 1962, HPPPDA, PRC FMA 111-00439-04, 1-2; “Record of a Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky,” February 16, 1965, HPPPDA, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Fund 02/1, folder 96/101, pgs. 1-26
a result, the Soviets “deferred” their decision on DPRK requests for military equipment and modern anti-aircraft systems, with Khrushchev cutting Soviet aid from 1962-1964.

Additionally, while China’s anti-imperialist stance made it the perfect ideational ally, its ability to provide material support was wanting; tellingly, reports in 1967 noted how as a result of siding with China, “the standard of the People’s Army was approximately 10-12 years behind modern requirements.” At the same time, Pyongyang also limited the degree to which it was willing to shift towards China. Part of this was political, wanting to maintain some semblance, albeit questionable, of neutrality. It also had to do self-reliance, with the Korean’s emphasizing their non-conformity; for example the Albanians noted there was never a full congruence between Pyongyang and Beijing and that “[t]he Koreans have shown much reservation for the publishing of Chinese articles” as well as embracing China’s role during the War. Pyongyang also came to resent its growing dependency on China, which it believed Beijing was attempting to augment.

Taken together, the DPRK should have been resigned to defensively balance against the ROK with the more affluent Soviet Union, a posture that required little investment given the lack of ostensible threat. Indeed the Soviets and East Europeans viewed DPRK mobilization as “a rather unusual measure in peacetime” especially given Pyongyang’s “difficult” economic situation, with the GDR concluding, “[t]he decision on arming the people is not based on any military need whatsoever.” Even after renewed Soviet military assistance, military operations seemed questionable, with reports in 1967 surmising it would be “inappropriate to conclude...the essential militarization of the country, would render it possible for the DPRK to carry out successful military actions.” Last but not least the Soviets had already proven unreliable supporting actions that might lead to a larger conflict, with the 24hr period of seeming abandonment by allies during the Korean War certainly in the back of the DPRK leaders’ mind.

The early onset of militarization coupled with behavior after the Cuban Crisis would therefore seem to support Czech accounts that, despite the strategic environment, DPRK militarization was the “result of increasing efforts to achieve unification of the

780 “Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Chargé d’Affaires Counselor from the Embassy of North Korea in China Jeong Pung-gye,” October 24, 1962, HPPPDA, PRC FMA 106-00642-02, 2-6
783 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, August 1962
786 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1963
787 ibid
788 “The Influence of the Chinese Communist Party,” April 08, 1963
country by avanturistic means,” replicating a broader Vietnamese style war. This stance can be seen as derived from Pyongyang’s desire to “struggle against imperialism...in all areas” and which, given the “fascist regime” established by the U.S. in Seoul, precluded a “policy of peaceful coexistence with respect to the American occupiers.” Further highlighting Pyongyang’s seemingly ideational motivations, a Hungarian report noted “there is an undeniable identity of Korean and Chinese views in the line of foreign policy, which manifests itself primarily in that both regard the anti-imperialist struggle and the colonial-national [sic] liberation movement as the most important task of our time” while the Czechs later concluded Pyongyang shifted toward Beijing due to “the special geographical location of Korea and her whole history, from the fact that it is a divided country, from strong nationalism, and...from low theoretical level of party cadres.”

Therefore, despite signs of domestic unrest in 1960, Pyongyang’s shift was not “the self-defense of the regime of personality cult” as some East Europeans originally indicated. For one, Kim had already secured his position in the KWP and was able to again downplay CPSU remarks on cults of personality as solely a Soviet problem. Secondly, the Soviets assurances of non-interference into DPRK domestic affairs, coupled with overtures to mend relations in 1963 and 1964 (both of which Pyongyang turned down), indicate Moscow was inclined to continue working with Kim. Pyongyang’s negative perception of the renewed emphasis on peaceful coexistence is thus best explained by looking at the ideational threats it generated.

For one, it hindered the ability of the North to maintain an aggressive diplomatic and unification stance vis-à-vis South Korea. Given the North’s narrative as staunchly opposed to U.S. occupation, and history of sustaining revolution in adverse circumstances, maintaining a firm foreign policy and domestically developing military capabilities at the expense of foreign aid was a justified calculation. This not only allowed Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for the “Second Korean War” of the late 1960s, but to also publicly assert its rejection of peaceful coexistence’s capitulation to imperialism. Khrushchev’s chauvinism was also distasteful. Pyongyang’s subsequent policies were thus not only a rebuke of Khrushchev’s seeming ambivalence to imperialism, but also an expression of their independent line.

Importantly, this ideational commitment and criticism of Khrushchev’s “revisionist
point of view regarding peaceful coexistence was unwavering in the face of material consequences. As DPRK officials exclaimed in December 1962, “The Soviet Union is pressuring, but no matter how much pressure, we will never go down on our knees and beg…Self-reliance is very important, and the Soviet Union is opposed to this…no matter how they shout, we will still march down our own path.”

Pyongyang was thus forced to contend with both Soviet blowback and limited Chinese compensation while simultaneously increasing military spending in an effort to prepare for future engagements. 1963 thus witnessed the formal introduction of chawi (self-defense in national defense) and “equal emphasis”, with military investment, rising from 6% to 30% between 1964 and 1967. This further augmented pressure on the economy and hastened the onset of economic decline. As Kim would later claim, “no country had suffered as much from the Sino-Soviet rivalry…North Korea had been unable to develop economically, and instead had been forced to endure four years of stagnation since 1961.” Yet this was largely the result of DPRK refusal to be swayed from its policies (derived from national narrative) - as Kim would later tell Kosygin, Khrushchev “wanted to force his will upon the smaller parties…[the KWP] pursued an independent policy, one could not make them go out of their way by putting pressure on them.”

In the end, DPRK military investment constituted a “very heavy burden for the national economy…[and] played a role in the fact that they had to prolong the Seven-year Plan.” What we find then, is Pyongyang sacrificing its main source of external revenue, limiting potential (though reduced) compensation, and foregoing domestic investment into economic growth, so as to pursue a more militarized policy towards an ROK that, at the time, posed no imminent threat. From a DPRK standpoint, however, it had once again asserted its independence, continuing to stand up against imperialism and Great Power chauvinism, while refusing to be cowed into adopting policies contradictory to national narrative. To this end, it was willing to begin investing a substantial portion of domestic resources into defense in an almost natural progression towards further self-reliance, and while Pyongyang was “not rejecting” aid from fraternal countries, the more important task was “mobilizing [their] own resources.” To this end, DPRK military investment continued after the reintroduction of Soviet military aid, something allies viewed as “partly unnecessary,” and “one of the major causes of the Korean economic difficulties.”

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801 “Cable from Hao Deqing, ‘On The Talks between Pak Geum-cheol and Ambassador Hao’,” December 08, 1962, HPPDA, PRC FMA 106-00645-04, 118-119
802 Shen and Xia, “Post-War”, pg. 36
804 “Memorandum on a Meeting with a Delegation from the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on 3 July 1967,” July 18, 1967, HPPPPDA, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035
805 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea” 15 February 1963
806 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 136
807 Schaefer, “Weathering”, pg. 31
808 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” January 08, 1965, HPPPPDA, National Archives of Hungary (MOL), XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965
809 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” May 08, 1967
810 “Record of a Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky,” February 16, 1965, HPPPPDA, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Fund 02/1, folder 96/101, pgs. 1-26
Korea’s militarization in the early-mid 1960s was therefore a precursor to the onset of the Second Korean War, with renewed Soviet military assistance in 1965 providing further resources for the prearranged military campaign.

4. “Unification” & “Respect”: The Second Korean War

By 1964 Kim had decided to increase attacks against the ROK and in October 1966 “defined the “liberation of South Korea” as a “national duty” that could not be delayed. Military engagements instigated by the DPRK followed shortly after, leading to what has been dubbed the Second Korean War, a series of sustained low level military engagements across the DMZ and along the coastlines from 1966-1970 purported by the North to be the result of Southern partisans in the hope of sparking a popular rising.

Figure 1: Second Korean War Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># DMZ Attacks</th>
<th>US Deaths</th>
<th>ROK Deaths</th>
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<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>115</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

The War confounded policymakers in both the East and West. Subsequent debates, Lerner notes, have mainly focused on immediate variables, in particular the Vietnam War. Other arguments include Kim’s desire to exploit the Cultural Revolution (CR) to forge more of a leadership role in the socialist bloc while also feeling unfettered by allies whom he had successfully played off one another. Still others cite growing ROK stability as the main trigger, with Kim seeking to spark a rebellion or, knowing this was not possible, trying to tip the scales himself. Finally there are those who champion domestic factors, including an attempt to ratchet up tensions so as to justify DPRK domestic woes. By contrast, Lerner emphasizes the importance of Juche in framing these variables, suggesting domestic troubles coupled with uncertainty following the CR encouraged “Kim to behave in ways that demonstrated that he could still act to defend Korean nationalism and independence.”

This view, however, is problematized by the fact that DPRK preparations for war predate these variables. Moreover, it is argued domestic woes and deteriorated

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813 Lerner, “A Failure”, pg. 663
815 Figures drawn from Michischita, Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, pg. 26-27
817 Schaefer, “Adventurism”
820 Lerner, “Propaganda”, pg. 25, 10
relations with China were the result of, not a threat to, Juche. Instead, the war was the culmination of Pyongyang’s post-1961 unification policy.

4.1 Juche And The Run Up To War:

Lerner suggests the DPRK had stable economic and political relations in the 1950s and early 1960s and held a correspondingly benign view towards unification. As shown however, this is not true, the North had turbulent relations with the Soviets throughout the 1950s (and for briefs stints of time with the Chinese) given ideological disputes. Pyongyang’s post-1961 militarization and unification policy then led to a second split with Moscow. Despite economic hardships, it was only after Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 that relations began to mend, when Kim perceived renewed “signs of a very correct course, of an anti-imperialist course” and Kosygin ensured Kim he would not force a discussion on peaceful coexistence, and that they “share[d] a mission to fight with imperialism for peace and socialism”. A series of meetings in November 1964 and February 1965 subsequently renewed “mutual assistance and co-operation” as Kim reasserted a more centrist (rather than pro-Soviet) line; indeed Pyongyang maintained its criticism of previous Soviet policy regarding Cuba, Vietnam, Albania, and for “what [they] did to Stalin” as well as Soviet attacks on Korea’s (correct) policy of “regeneration through one’s own efforts.”

Secondly, in contrast to Lerner’s characterization of Pyongyang’s deteriorated relationship with Beijing forcing Kim to re-assert Juche, it is more useful to view Juche as partially to blame for the breakdown. By 1965 China was seeking to cajole Vietnam and Cuba into rejecting Soviet aid in an attempt to increase its own clout, a position Pyongyang interpreted as undermining the unified battle against imperialism. Moreover, “[a]ttempts were made by the Chinese leaders to pressure the Korean leadership [to adopt the CR]. This forced it to make changes to relations with China”, with a 1967 Hungarian report noting DPRK anger over attempts by Beijing to introduce a “feudalistic” relationship; “when a weak man, if slapped by a strong one, was required to turn the other cheek so as to get a second slap.” Given that it was DPRK efforts to push back against these incursions that led to the split, it is perhaps best to view the deteriorated relationship as the very expression of Juche.

Of course ideational threats did arise from China’s rebuttal to Pyongyang, challenging its anti-imperialist credentials and its growing leadership role as the
only “party that follows a right Marxist-Leninist road.”\textsuperscript{833} Kim’s heightened efforts to spread the teachings of \textit{Juche} in the late 1960s were thus partially in response to his growing competition with China. Indeed Soviet officials (seemingly highlighting the importance of ideational variables) noted, “Anti-Chinese actions in the DPRK [were] of a retaliatory nature. It is supposed that the Korean leaders will act that way in the future when it is a matter of DPRK prestige in the international arena.”\textsuperscript{834} They were also an expression, however, of Pyongyang’s historical role in championing anti-imperialism and the non-aligned movement.\textsuperscript{835}

Pyongyang’s inroads with the Third World dated back to KWP participation in the 1955 Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension. Pyongyang’s place among these states grew in 1961 with a flurry of new trade relations\textsuperscript{836} and in 1963, during celebrations of its founding. Pyongyang claimed to be the “model of self-reliant development and anti-imperialist independence for the entire Third World” as it boasted the presence of 22 foreign (many non-socialist) delegations. In April 1965, Kim sought to further solidify his internationalist independent stance at the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian solidarity, reaffirming the tenants of \textit{Juche} and pledging to strengthen the independent, anti-imperialist movements of the Third World, much to the unease of allies.\textsuperscript{837} Pyongyang thus doubled these efforts partially to counter Chinese questioning of its revolutionary credentials.

Kim’s split from China resulted in a far more volatile relationship than had ever occurred with Russia, leading to an acute security problem.\textsuperscript{838} Restricted DPRK propaganda began accusing “the CPSU of displaying "weakness" toward the U.S., of "colluding" with the U.S. to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons” and of “interference in the affairs of fraternal Parties.”\textsuperscript{839} However Kim restricted direct attacks\textsuperscript{840} over fears of Chinese efforts to sow domestic unrest and challenge his leadership.\textsuperscript{841} Still, the situation quickly grew volatile, with border skirmishes, loud speakers blasting anti-Korean propaganda, and, as Kim would later claim, the two countries coming close to war in 1969.\textsuperscript{842} Importantly, despite these tangible threats, Kim refused to fully balance with the socialist camp,\textsuperscript{843} while 1967 saw increased Chinese aggression, the same year Moscow complained of Pyongyang’s continued public advocacy \textit{against} Soviet policies.\textsuperscript{844} Much as in the early 1960s, the split with

\textsuperscript{833} Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union," October 20
\textsuperscript{834} “The DPRK Attitude Toward the So-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China,” March 07, 1967, HPPPA, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13-23
\textsuperscript{835} “Information about Development of Politics” 1967; see also "Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” November 25, 1967, HPPPA
\textsuperscript{836} States included Indonesia, India, Burma, Guinea, Malí and Ghana.
\textsuperscript{837} Armstrong, \textit{Tyranny}, pg. 145
\textsuperscript{838} See for example "Note on a Conversation with the Acting Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Padisz, on 9 October 1967 between 1000 and 1130 hours in the Polish Embassy” October 20, 1967, HPPPA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 149/75
\textsuperscript{837} See for example "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” March 09, 1967, HPPPA, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1967, 61, doboz, 1, 002130/1967
\textsuperscript{840} “The DPRK Attitude Toward the So-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China,” March 07, 1967
\textsuperscript{842} “Information about Development of Politics” 1967; “Letter from GDR Embassy in the DPRK to State Secretary Hegen” December 12, 1966
\textsuperscript{843} Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union” November 25, 1967; Similarly, in December 1966 (after the onset of conflict) while requesting military supplies, Kim told Brezhnev the KWP would “neither participate with you, nor with the
Beijing, and subsequent refusal to balance with the Soviets despite security concerns, were both expressions of *Juche*.

This still leaves questions regarding the influence of the Vietnam War in DPRK policy. While certainly reducing the chance for U.S. retaliation (though Pyongyang admitted this was still a possibility), 845 it is unlikely the provocations were aimed solely at aiding the Vietnamese struggle. A 1965 treaty between Japan and South Korea meant the ROK would continue to grow given its relations with an increasingly militarized Japan, regardless of Vietnam’s outcome. The North would therefore have been far more intent on facilitating U.S. withdrawal from Korea, thereby “creating the main prerequisite for unification of the country,” 846 rather than disrupting collusion on Vietnam. This is not to say Kim was disinterested in Vietnam. Following the ROK’s entry into the War in 1965, Kim successfully advocated for the deployment of a DPRK contingent of fighter pilots 847 and continued the shipment of supplies (started in 1963). Moreover, this aid was voluntary, and while the ROK received vast economic payments for its support, Kim would later admit the diversion of resources had partially contributed to the North’s economic collapse. 848

This flows into the notion that Kim engaged in conflict to divert attention from domestic shortcomings. However these shortcomings were a direct result of DPRK foreign policy (resulting in reduced foreign aid) and policy of ‘equal emphasis’, initiated in conjunction the post-1961 unification policy. It would therefore seem odd to use conflict to offset domestic hardships that were the result of policies aimed at facilitating just such a campaign.

There is no denying that Kim certainly played up the conflict 849 for a domestic audience that had grown restless. 850 Indeed, the North’s low living standards forced Kim to contend with yet another internal challenge following the KWP Second Congress, when some officials questioned equal emphasis 851 and the grooming of Kim’s (unqualified) brother, Kim Yeongjoo, as a possible successor. 852 While little threat to his rule, efforts were made to backtrack on equal emphasis, reduce Kim’s cult of personality, and portray Pak Geumcheol as the more suitable successor. 853 Kim’s response was the establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System, which would “suppress policy debates within the KWP, particularly when Kim Il Sung believed the alternative — reducing expenditures on national defense…would have left

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the country in a weakened and dependent position.” By April 1967, the dissenting officials had been purged and a monolithic dictatorship established. Kim’s response to the challenge, just as before, was thus a further centralization of power, not military operations – which had commenced prior to the incident coming to a head.

The Second Korean War thus appears to have been the product of North Korea’s more militarized unification policy in effect since 1961 when it began to heavily increase domestic military spending, indicating the North was prepared to go it alone. It was only by happenstance that Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and Moscow reinstated military aid. At the same time, the Second Korean War was initiated just as relations with China were becoming an acute security concern. Refusing to balance with the Soviets in the face of this threat in turn made the War an even riskier endeavor, especially as Moscow remained opposed to actions that risked a broader conflict. Within the context of DPRK national narrative however, the rewards far outweighed the risks, demonstrating non-subservience to Great Powers and countering Chinese questioning of DPRK identity while seeking to finally attain unification. The risks associated with the strategy, and Kim’s commitment to Juche, are best exemplified by the DPRK decision to capture the USS Pueblo in 1968 and shoot down a U.S. EC-121 in 1969.

4.2 Sovereignty: The USS Pueblo & EC-121:

As noted above, the Soviets were already disgruntled with DRPK behavior vis-à-vis the second Korean War. Capturing a U.S. ship was sure to enrage them further, especially as it contradicted vital Soviet interests by setting a dangerous precedent regarding naval spy operations. Szalontai also notes how “Pyongyang’s most provocative acts were closely followed by particularly virulent manifestations of Chinese hostility”, further compounding risks associated with the operation. Moreover, this was a period of time when, as Kim himself admitted, open war with China was a real possibility, raising further concerns should a conflict with the U.S. arise, a prospect compounded by Washington’s implementation in September 1967 of a new rotation system that “placed four maneuver battalions on the DMZ and a fifth in reserve as a quick reaction force.” All combined, capturing the Pueblo was immensely risky and posed to greatly irritate Moscow at time of immense DPRK hostility with China.

This leaves questions regarding motivation. Some have suggested the Pueblo was intended to support the Tet Offensive 8 days later. However Lerner argues the capture brought unwanted attention to Asia just as the NVA was hoping for U.S. ambivalence to events in the region outside of the real diversion at Khe Sahn. He also notes how the incident actually sparked the U.S. to increase force levels in the region, including a number of B52 bombers subsequently deployed during Tet. Incidents like the

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855 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union” November 25, 1967; see also “Information about the Situation in Korea”, February 04, 1968, HPPPDA, Czech Foreign Ministry Archives
857 Szalontai, “Whose War Plan”
859 Lerner, “A Failure”, pg. 653
Pueblo also played into Washington’s hand, justifying their hardline stance in the region and potentially undermining Giap’s grand political design.

Instead, the Pueblo appears to have been a response to two factors. The first was frustration over the failed assassination attempt of President Park on January 21\textsuperscript{st}. The second appears to have been the U.S. failure to heed multiple warnings issued by Pyongyang regarding U.S. naval incursions violating DPRK sovereignty. Specific warnings were also raised against the Pueblo during the DPRK’s 8-day observance period, the last coming on January 20.\textsuperscript{860} While the DPRK was thus frustrated with the failed assassination, and potentially looking for a diversion following its failure, it was perhaps more incensed (and motivated) by U.S. chauvinism. For example in 1971 DPRK officials stated:

The Americans let us know that it’s not their intention to fight the Koreans again…[we told] the Americans that we didn’t want it either, but to be careful and keep away from us, because if they create situations like Pueblo and E.C. 121, then we are entitled to capturing them or to shooting them down. We keep our business to our territory, we don’t do it in the waters of the United States of America.\textsuperscript{861}

On January 23, the DPRK made its move and seized the boat, seemingly ready to risk disruptions to its relationship with Moscow and engender ROK and U.S. reactions. In response, the U.S. public, and various lawmakers, called for immediate retaliations,\textsuperscript{862} and many of Kim’s allies believed he was on the precipice of war,\textsuperscript{863} or at least a serious conflict, while also noting difficulties resulting from Soviet hesitancy to provide military assistance.\textsuperscript{864} Pyongyang, however, had yet again asserted its independent nationalist position while forcing the U.S. to finally capitulate, given the North’s “firm stance”;\textsuperscript{865} after a year of negotiations the crew was finally returned in exchange for a written apology (that was publicly repudiated). The subsequent use of the boat for mainly propaganda purposes, as outlined by Lerner, justifies the ideational rationale behind its capture.

This interpretation gains further credence in light of new evidence regarding the DPRK shoot down of a U.S. EC-121 plane the following year (killing all 31 servicemen). While the conventional wisdom has been, following the work of Hersh, that the downing of the plane was an accident, Jackson argues it was a “deliberate act” which stemmed from the fact that North Korea “if attacked, will automatically reciprocate…[since Pyongyang believes] to do otherwise would bring on war anyway.”\textsuperscript{866} Much as with the Pueblo, DPRK official Pak Seong told the Soviets:

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\textsuperscript{860} Ibid, pg. 652
\textsuperscript{861} “Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” June 10, 1971, HPPPDA, Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 43/1971
\textsuperscript{863} “Note on a Conversation with the Polish Ambassador, Comrade Naperei, on 26 January 1968 in the Polish Embassy,” January 27, 1968, HPPPDA, SAPMO
\textsuperscript{864} “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” June 03, 1968, HPPPDA, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 57. doboz, 1, 002815/1968
\textsuperscript{865} “Record of Conversation between N.G. Sudarikov and Ri In-gyu, the Head of the Department of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK,” December 21, 1968, HPPPDA, RGANI, fond 5, opis 61, delo 466, listy 57-59
\textsuperscript{866} Van Jackson, “The EC-121 Shoot Down and North Korea’s Coercive Theory of Victory” Wilson Center Sources and Methods (April 13, 2017)
This time the aircraft violated DPRK airspace, and therefore it was shot down by DPRK aircraft. Our forces are in constant readiness to rebuff any aggressor who intrudes across the boundaries of our territory on land, sea, or air…If the enemy fires on us in this region with machine guns we respond with machine guns; when he uses artillery, we also use artillery…If they try something, then we will also act. We have nowhere to go from our country. This incident is somewhat reminiscent of the Pueblo. If the Americans had decided to fight then, we would have fought.  

In a separate meeting, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Heo Dam similarly told the Soviets “our government has repeatedly warned the US imperialists that aggressors who dare to infringe on our sovereignty will be vigorously halted” and that as “Kim Il Sung pointed out, our country is completely ready to respond to retaliation with retaliation, and to total war with total war.  Perhaps even more insightful is the fact that when pressed on the possible consequences, Pak declared:

> When our pilots shot down the aggressor’s aircraft which intruded into DPRK airspace they were not thinking of the further course of events. We also have not been thinking about it. [Translator’s note: “?!?” was written in the left margin next to the underlined portion]. If we had started to think then we would have to ask, the aircraft would have flown away further.

This all helps to underscore the DPRK rationale, derived from the hypersensitivity to independence enshrined in national narrative, that violations to sovereignty must be responded to. This also seems to have been connected to lessons garnered from past Self’s (i.e. the seeming weakness of the Yi Dynasty that led to colonization). Thus:

> If the US imperialists continue to violate our border this means that they want to find some pretext to attack us. It’s good for them to know that we won’t sit with folded arms…If we sit with folded arms when a violator intrudes into our spaces, two planes will appear tomorrow, then four, five, etc. This would lead to an increase of the danger of war. But if a firm rebuff is given, then this will diminish the danger of an outbreak of war.

To this end there appears to be an overlap between DPRK efforts to maintain national identity and efforts to also establish a form of conventional deterrence. However, views on the latter seem to be framed by of the former. While the Soviets stressed the need to refrain from a larger conflict, Pak countered “[w]hy do we…speak only of the fact that socialism will be damaged, that socialism might perish, and we are not considering the consequences of war for capitalism” and, as with earlier critiques of peaceful coexistence, reiterated how the maxim “don’t touch imperialism, wait until it perishes by itself” was “an illusion”. When told the Soviets believed “the Americans might launch a strike on the DPRK” Pak responded, “such a strike would mean the start of a war, inasmuch as the DPRK would launch a retaliatory strike.”

One must thus look at DPRK narrative to understand this openness to larger conflict with a
Great Power and related views on deterrence. Of course, such a strike by the U.S. never came, and by 1970 the situation on the Peninsula began to tame down. This stemmed from the realization that DPRK efforts to destabilize the South had failed, coupled with the fact that diplomatic avenues towards unification began to open, culminating in the 1972 Joint Communiqué (examined in Ch. 6).

Conclusions:

Upon review, it becomes possible to conclude that during this period, the DPRK consistently championed ideational goals over material or systemic considerations. For one, the planning for and conduct of the Korean War contradicted notions of balancing and freeriding while postwar nationalist economic policies undermined DPRK relationships with its most important allies. Meanwhile Kim’s navigating of the Sino-Soviet split can only truly be accounted for when one takes into account ideational variables into threat perceptions (resulting in friction with Moscow and later Beijing) and for DPRK interests vis-à-vis unification. This culminated in DPRK actions during the Second Korean War, the result again of domestic rather than international variables. Consequently one must take into account DPRK national narrative in order to account for behavior between 1950-1969.
Chapter 6
DPRK Foreign Policy: 1970-1994

The Second Korean War began to tail off in 1969, though there were still 144 known infiltrations conducted that year (decreasing to 86 in 1970 and 52 in 1971). Actions along the DMZ had proved costly for the North, resulting in the loss of 715 servicemen (twice that suffered by the ROK) and further economic stagnation, all while failing to incite a Southern uprising.\(^{873}\) Meanwhile, drastic changes to the North’s strategic landscape at both the regional and global levels began to unfold, making the 1970s a particularly turbulent (and thus interesting) period of study.

For one, following China’s Party Congress in April 1969, the rhetoric of the CR was tamed down and Sino-DPRK relations began to mend. In 1970 Pyongyang subsequently rejected Soviet advances to join a new collective security alliance due to its continued negative view of peaceful coexistence and its desire not to become entangled in Soviet posturing against China.\(^{874}\) The Soviets for their part continued to provide aid as a means of balancing Chinese influence, sending a high-ranking delegation to Pyongyang shortly after Zhou Enlai’s trip in April (the first high-ranking Chinese official to visit since the CR), and in September signed a new agreement on economic cooperation.

The second important change was the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine in July. This emphasized local actors as primarily responsible for their own defense (a response to the situation in Vietnam), undermining ROK deterrence.\(^{875}\) Nixon also ordered the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops by June 1971, though he did provide a lucrative military aid package in return. This was followed by the onset of Détente between the U.S. and China. The ROK in turn felt their position to be further eroded, while the North felt momentum to be on their side. Yet what started as a promising decade for Pyongyang ended on a low note, as the economic and military discrepancy between North and South began to tilt, and then rapidly shift, in Seoul’s favor. Internationally, the North faced increasingly insurmountable hurdles, as growing debt and repeated defaults began to curtail any hope for future investment, and by the end of the decade North Korea was seen as an economic pariah. The 1970s were thus a turning point both in the North-South dyad as well as the North’s position internationally.

Despite this, DPRK foreign policy remained markedly similar to the 1950s and 1960s. It emphasized reunification and the assertion of DPRK independence while fluctuating between diplomatic and military postures depending on which was perceived as most promising for unification. As before, this often led to friction with key allies. Despite its deteriorating position, Pyongyang not only continued to ostracize allies, it also dedicated valuable resources to trumpeting its own nationalist and independent image, providing aid and support to third world countries and seeking to compete with - and undermine through terrorism - South Korea’s growing prestige in the 1980s. By the 1990s North Korea’s nuclear program had become the focus of international condemnation. The first nuclear crisis, however, was merely the fruition of efforts dating back to the 1950s and 1960s to acquire nuclear weapons for both strategic and ideational reasons. Overall, one again finds North Korea seemingly

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\(^{873}\) Michishita, Military-Diplomatic, pg. 10, 9


\(^{875}\) Cha, The Impossible, pg. 31
less motivated by traditional security interests and instead more focused on asserting its national narrative, regardless of drastic changes to its strategic environment.


In July 1971, at the same time an unknowing North Korean delegation was in Beijing, Henry Kissinger secretly visited China to arrange for a visit by President Nixon. Shortly thereafter Zhou travelled to Pyongyang, one day before news would break of Nixon’s upcoming trip, to inform Kim of the secret talks. South Korea, by contrast, was given no prior warning. When combined with the Nixon doctrine and the reduction of U.S. forces both in South Korea and along the DMZ, Seoul feared it might very well be abandoned in the same manner as South Vietnam. This was the background in which both North and South Korea began to call for bilateral talks.

Lee Dongbok, a member of the North-South Red Cross Talks and instrumental in the Joint Communiqué, suggests Pyongyang was acting proactively while Seoul was reactive; “Kim Il Sung thought that this dialogue would help North Korea to pursue unification, while South Korea was concerned about security.”876 Kim Dasool, head of inter-Korean dialogue for the South Korean Red Cross, similarly noted the ROK, fearing abandonment, felt it was important to, “on its own, find a way to have an assurance of security.”877 Conversely Pyongyang was seeking to tone down its efforts and to “pat the U.S. out of South Korea” through dialogue.878

It should be noted that Pyongyang’s diplomatic turn predated Détente, with the North viewing dialogue as a viable path towards unification as early as November 1970, when DPRK officials in Tokyo began approaching South Koreans. Pyongyang also sought to find channels of communication with Washington throughout the 1970s, for example by having socialist allies convey messages on their behalf.879 This new diplomatic approach took on a more concrete form on April 12, 1971, when an Eight-Point Declaration on peaceful unification was issued. Stipulations included the withdrawal of U.S. troops and a new government formed in the South after which a Confederation would be formed. Kim elaborated on his views during a conversation with Nicolae Ceausescu in June, during which he referenced domestic unrest in the South, his belief Park would soon be overthrown, and his positive views of the head of the Progressive Party, Kim Baegyu, whose slogans “resembled our position regarding the unification of the country.” However, he also noted if Washington “continue[s] to stay in South Korea, victory through elections is not possible… unification of the country is linked to this issue.”880 The aim was to therefore use diplomacy to create circumstances under which U.S. forces would vacate the peninsula while also curtailing the influence of rising Japanese militarism in the ROK.

Consequently, while the North’s diplomatic campaign certainty gained further incentive following Détente, it is perhaps better viewed as the next phase of its ongoing efforts to achieve unification, similar to its diplomatic thaw prior to the

877 Ibid, pg. 13-14
878 Ibid, pg. 32
879 Ibid, pg. 36-37
880 “Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” June 10, 1971, HPPDA, Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 43/1971
Second Korean War. This stance was further buoyed in July, when Pyongyang was informed that China, in talks with Washington, had suggested the withdrawal of U.S. troops and that Kissinger had stated “after the Indochina war ends...most, if not all, American troops will be withdrawn from Korea,”^881^ a point reiterated in October. With Pyongyang’s dreams of U.S. troop withdrawal now on the horizon, there was further impetus to enter talks. Subsequently, while many socialist states were plagued with unease over Détente, as traditional security studies might expect, North Korea was, by contrast, highly optimistic, viewing its goal of unification to finally be within reach. To this end, Soviet and GDR officials complained Pyongyang “is pursuing its nationalist course and fails to notice the anti-Soviet aspect of rapprochement.”^883^

Kim’s announcement on August 6, 1971, that he was willing to enter into talks with the ROK should therefore be viewed not so much as a response to systemic shifts, but as a continuation in unification policy, with the international environment compounding this diplomatic turn. Further examining the trajectory of the talks bolsters this point.

1.1 Unification & The Joint Communiqué:

The first round of North-South talks were conducted secretly under the guise of Humanitarian Red Cross meetings, culminating in the head of the ROK’s Intelligence Agency, Yi Hurak, secretly traveling to Pyongyang in May 1972. A reciprocal meeting in Seoul between Deputy Premier Pak Song-chol and President Park followed shortly thereafter. Both Kim and Park expressed their desire for the peaceful unification and independence of the Korean nation, though Park was more cautious over when this might occur. The secret negotiations finally gave way to the Joint Communiqué released July 4, 1972, which for the most part encapsulated Kim’s Three Principles of National Unification:

1. Unification should be achieved independently, without reliance on or interference from outside forces;
2. Unification should be achieved through peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side;
3. Korea being a homogenous nation, great national unity should transcend differences of ideas, ideologies and systems.^886^

Of course, the true purpose of the talks for North Korea surpassed these stated aims. In a telegram dated June 9, Comrade Ri Manseok informed GDR officials how Pyongyang “wants to start the content negotiation as soon as possible “to...serve as a springboard to unification.”” The DPRK thus sought throughout the talks to have

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882 Schäfer, “Overconfidence”, pg. 8

883 “Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy,” March 13, 1972, HPPDDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 1080/78

884 “Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Economic Delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” September 22, 1972, HPPDDA, Romanian Foreign Ministry Archive

885 Armstrong, _Tyranny_, pg. 162

886 Ibid pg. 163; “Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim Yong-taek, on 3 July 1972 for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, and the GDR,” July 04, 1972, HPPDDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76
“free visits and free reunions”, a position seemingly linked to Kim’s statement “[w]hite is easily colored over red, yet it is much harder to color red on white.” By pushing for representatives with unfettered access and the right of free speech, Pyongyang hoped to infiltrate South Korean society and establish a more robust pro-North Korean front, allowing South Koreans “to travel, to listen to DPRK radio, to exclaim “Long Live Kim Il Sung,” and other things.”

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kim Ryong Taek thus noted that by entering talks South Korea had adopted “the correct course of the DPRK government…since it represents the path to [DPRK] victory.” In September he again emphasized bluntly how the “peace offensive was started last year to create favorable conditions for the realization of South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland.” There was also a high degree of optimism within Pyongyang at this time, optimized by the fact DPRK officials suggested revoking its treaties with China and Russia in the hopes South Korea would do the same with the U.S. and Japan. While Soviet officials balked at the idea, and Pyongyang did not press further, the fact it was willing to even suggest sacrificing its two main alliances showcases the importance the regime placed on attaining a unified nation.

This all reinforces how Détente was viewed through the prism of national narrative, reinforcing and accelerating DPRK diplomatic efforts to bring about unification. Accordingly, it was reported how throughout the “negotiations the DPRK was eager to solve the entire problem according to the ideas of “juche” and how the North continued to work independently of Great Powers. For example Georgi Mitov, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry officer at the time, stated how neither Moscow nor socialist states, “could exert the necessary influence, or conduct a coordinated policy with the DPRK to help direct the “Korean issue” towards one resolution or another. Pyongyang’s position remained unchanged in their asserted isolationism towards all countries.” This is perhaps best emphasized by the seeming willingness of Pyongyang to cut its alliance with China, helping to devise Beijing’s position on Korea for talks with Kissinger and keeping it abreast of DPRK-ROK negotiations, this only lasted as long as their interests aligned. As will be shown below, as soon as Pyongyang no longer viewed diplomacy as viable, relations with China quickly cooled.

In conjunction with diplomatic overtures to the South, Pyongyang began to engage more with the international community. This was conducted through a two-pronged approach; one focused on trade relations with capitalist states, in part to offset economic difficulties springing from increased military investment in the 1960s, and the other on further asserting its position amongst the NAM. When placed against the North’s economic position in the 1970s, the costs associated with the latter, and restraints placed on the former, make little sense outside the purview of national

887 “Note: On Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Ri Man-seok, on 8 June 1972 for the Ambassadors of the European Socialist Countries (except Albania),” June 09, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76
888 “Note on Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Ri Man-seok, on 17 July 1972 between 16:40 and 18:00 hours in the Foreign Ministry,” July 20, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76
889 “Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim Yong-taek”
890 “Note on Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kim Jae-suk, about 1st Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees from DPRK and South Korea on 12 September 1972,” September 15, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76
891 Schaefler, “Overconfidence”, pg. 10
892 “Note on Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry”
893 Ostermann and Person, Rise and Fall, pg. 56
narrative. Pyongyang therefore seems to have been more focused on championing international respect and prestige rather than economic or military goals, often to the displeasure of allies.

1.2 “Anti-Imperialists”, “Non-Aligned States” & Pyongyang’s Internationalism:

Despite the new flexibility provided by Détente to procure an influx of sorely needed capital, Pyongyang set self-imposed parameters derived from national narrative. Accordingly, while turning to capitalist states for investment was the next logical option, only those wishing to “request friendly relations with the DPRK” were approached while “certain Western countries (e.g. Britain, Greece, Canada, etc.) [that] maintained an “aggressive” policy toward the DPRK and supported the south” were overlooked. Armstrong notes this is less paradoxical than it may seem; “Japan’s proximity, its wealth and technological sophistication, and the presence of a large community of ethnic Korean sympathizers to act as intermediaries, made Japan a more desirable economic partner than any other capitalist state.”

Pyongyang also saw potential support in Japan for its position, leading DPRK officials to note “Japanese militarism cannot be mistaken for the entire Japanese people,” how “influential circles in Japan have come out in favor of recognizing the DPRK,” and that “public opinion circles in the world, including in Japan, are on our side and are supporting us.” This gained further credence in 1975 when Prime Minister Takeo Miki began to push for peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas and for direct U.S.-DPRK talks to secure a peace agreement.

North Korea was also careful not to compromise its ideational position. Following its failure to persuade Japan to adopt a more neutral stance between North and South Korea in 1973, Pyongyang refused to take positive steps towards Tokyo. When in 1975 a Japanese delegation told Pyongyang that while recognition would be difficult, expanded relations and exchanges were possible, the North Koreans, holding firm, responded “the separation of politics and economy in Japan-North Korean relations is

894 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 175
897 “Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”
899 “Minutes of Conversation Taken on the Occasion of the Audience Granted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” March 08, 1973, HPPPDA, National Historical and Central Archives, Bucharest, Collection: Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee, Foreign Relations Department, Folder 23/1973
900 “Prime Minister Miki – President Ford Meeting Discussion Outline,” July 25, 1975, HPPPDA, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; “Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa – Secretary of State Kissinger Meeting Discussion Outline,” October 15, 1975, HPPPDA, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
unlikely”.

Armstrong concludes, “as much as North Korea desired economic ties and diplomatic normalization with Japan, it would not engage in “beggar diplomacy.”” All of this again helps to further highlight the continued prominence of DPRK national narrative in framing acceptable policies, impeding on Pyongyang’s ability to pursue more traditional security goals (such as economic development); in short “economic benefit was secondary to mutual respect.”

This prioritization of international respect flows into its second diplomatic offensive during this period, developing more of a leadership role within the NAM and amongst developing countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, by the end of the 1960s Pyongyang had managed to acquire a leading position within the NAM. Its aims in the 1970s were now twofold. For one, as part of its competition with Seoul for legitimacy, it wanted to expand its state-to-state relations and join more international organizations while simultaneously forcing allies and other countries to isolate the ROK. The North thus stunned the ROK in 1973 by joining the WHO, and by the mid-1970s was recognized globally by over 90 states, coming close to rivaling Seoul. In August 1975, the DPRK officially gained NAM admittance while the ROK application was denied. This was a particularly important victory since, in addition to competing with Seoul, Pyongyang was also continuing to try and become the de facto head of the NAM and leader of the Third World, positioning itself as the quintessential archetype for nationalist-minded independent states.

This would not only demonstrate the North’s revolutionary and independent credentials, but also validate its national narrative of non-subservience. Indeed, it would be seen as leading a new bloc of likeminded nationalists opposed to Great Power chauvinism. In nice summation, Kim exclaimed to a Japanese delegation in 1975 how the “US, China, the Soviets, and Japan should not meddle in our affairs. Leave the issue of unification to the Korean race. In the future, North Korea will stand ascendant in the international community with the backing of the Third World. This is particularly interesting as it would seem to indicate the DPRK was seeking to challenge – and perhaps change – the international system by introducing a new bloc of nationalist states, opening itself to possible retaliation by Great Powers. And indeed East European diplomats lamented how Pyongyang did “not act jointly with the other Socialist states, but proceeds in parallel to them,” leaving Moscow disgruntled over Pyongyang’s overly independent stance.

The North’s Third World diplomacy was therefore crafted primarily within the construct of ideological interests, with Japanese delegates concluding Kim was a nationalist, not a communist. As Kim told Ceausescu in 1971:

We are surrounded by three great powers and their influence can be felt…we have a principle-based system, that of our own policies, irrespective of the influence exerted by one party or another…You support the principle of autonomy. So do we. Juche is exactly the same thing.

The primary sources used in this text are:

901 “Voluntary Liberal Democratic Party MP North Korea Visit,” August 11, 1975, HPPPDA, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
902 Armstrong, “Juche”, pg. 7
903 “Note on Information from DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Ri Man-seok, on 17 July 1972”
904 “Voluntary Liberal Democratic Party MP North Korea Visit”
905 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 181
906 “Voluntary Liberal Democratic Party MP North Korea Visit”
907 “Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”
Highlighting the detached nature of DPRK diplomacy at this time, Pyongyang soon began to promote and spread *Juche* (going so far as to establish overseas *Juche* research centers), and further championing the DPRK’s fiercely independent stance as one that should be emulated. The Soviets thus complained in early 1972 how:

> Apparently he [Kim] sees the path to socialism in the DPRK as the “only correct and exemplary one for other countries”...the KWP leadership does not focus on the unity of the communist world movement but...tries to gain increasing ground through ideological infiltration into the international communist and anti-imperialist movement.\(^{908}\)

Overall the North’s internationalist turn in the early-mid 1970s was shaped by DPRK national narrative. Despite economic incentive, the North constrained the extent to which it would pursue new trade relations while at the same time spending more resources on exporting its *Juche* ideology. These efforts were linked to the North’s desire to become the leading prototype for other nationalist minded states, thereby legitimizing its national narrative while also forming a new bloc of likeminded states from which to further push back against all forms of Great Power chauvinism. Still, with the prospect of unification on the horizon, Pyongyang seems to have felt confident in its position, a sentiment that would soon change.


While North Korea hoped the Communiqué and follow up negotiations under the North-South Coordination Committee and Red Cross would incite a southern uprising, their efforts proved futile at best. “At the outset North Korea appeared to really believe that the North Korean economy was way ahead of us, but in the course of the dialogue, they realized that that situation was already upside down.”\(^{909}\) This disparity was matched by a far more stable ROK society than had been expected, a problem compounded by the political maneuverings of Park. Stipulating that in order to ensure a restive ROK populace would follow the government’s lead in talks, Park assumed dictatorial powers through the Yushin Reform on October 17, 1972.\(^{910}\) This further dampened hope for instigating an uprising, as fears grew that Park would “exploit the principles of the Joint Declaration for his own purposes”,\(^{911}\) securing his “hold on power for a long time, to repress the political parties”.\(^{912}\)

Pyongyang’s outlook was further dampened following Kim’s second meeting with Lee Hurak in November 1972, during which Kim proposed tangible policies for momentum. These included: sending South Korean workers to the North, joint resource development projects, unifying the Korean language by eliminating Japanese and American terms that had permeated into the South, mutual troop reduction, and

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908 “Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972”

909 Ostermann and Person, *Rise and Fall*, pg. 33

910 “Note On Information Given by the 1st Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Jae-bong, on 19 October 1972 in the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the Embassies of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, and the GDR,” October 23, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 6855

911 “Note On a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 18 October 1972 in the GDR Embassy,” October 24, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 1080/78

912 “Note on Information by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister Comrade Ri Man-seok on 8 November 1972 for the Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Acting Ambassadors of the GDR in the Foreign Ministry,” November 09, 1972, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76
the formation of a Confederation. Lee, for his part, remained non-committal and followed up negotiations proved to further underscore DPRK views of a disingenuous ROK. DPRK officials in turn began to take a far more negative outlook of the ROK, again referred to as the “adversary” and “puppets,” while referring to the new ROK constitution as “a reactionary document to solidify the dictatorship and the power of one single person...the entire constitution is an evil deception” that showed Seoul had “no interest in the country’s unification whatsoever.” By January 1973, reports began to increasingly focus on how the ROK was further solidifying its security apparatus and defense, “labeling and disseminating “danger” from the Northern side”, while Pyongyang was again pressing for the isolation of Seoul so that “in the end it will be cast aside or it will have to kneel down before us.”

The main concern for Pyongyang, however, was the continued presence of U.S. forces, still seen as the main hindrance to unification. The reluctance of the ROK to broaden the scope of engagement had in turn made addressing this problematic. The North’s response was to raise tensions along the DMZ in March, hoping this would motivate Seoul to finally address measures through which to alleviate tensions, such as mutual disarmament, while also testing “the loyalty of the South Korean puppets toward the cause of unification” and hopefully motivating “the leftist trends in South Korea.” It was to little avail.

Pyongyang therefore shifted its focus towards efforts to have China further broach withdrawal in its talks with Washington with the Romanians concluding it “is...
obvious that the DPRK is attempting, with the help of P.R. China or by itself, to gain the time necessary for obtaining the disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula”. 924

The North, however, was growing concerned with China. Soviet officials reported in April how Pyongyang was “manifesting certain fears and suspicions towards the honesty with which Beijing acted to determine the Americans to pull out of South Korea”. 925 Further problems then arose following Park’s June 23 Declaration, calling for North and South Korea’s simultaneous admittance to the UN, which Pyongyang viewed as an effort to “enshrine the division of Korea.” 926

Consequently, by mid 1973 Pyongyang was forced to contend with the fact the ROK was economically stronger, was domestically becoming unified, and was now seeking to solidify the status quo through UN admittance of two separate states, coupled with increasing unease over Chinese support for U.S. withdrawal. All the while, the North’s economic situation began to further deteriorate. While increased trade relations had succeeded in attaining an influx in capital, it also exposed the North to global economic trends. The 1973 OPEC oil crisis sent the world economy into a tailspin and by 1974 North Korea was starting to default on its debts; in 1975 it was $200-300 million in arrears and was soon viewed as an economic pariah. 927 To make matters worse, Pyongyang’s economic decline and unifications struggles were juxtaposed to the success of Vietnamese unification, compelling Kim to justify the North’s delayed unification. 928

DPRK national narrative can therefore be seen as under threat in three distinct ways; the rather shocking realization regarding just how advanced South Korea had become, the failure to bring about unification, and Pyongyang’s rather public economic humiliation. This resulted in a desperate need to try and forcefully reverse current trends. It is argued Pyongyang thus shifted toward a hybrid military-diplomatic campaign aimed at opening up direct negotiations with Washington in an effort to bring about troop withdrawal and unification. It congruently sought to further provide economic support to recently independent states as a means of bolstering its image, maintaining earlier efforts to showcase independence and forge a bloc of likeminded nationalist states, again much to the anger of allies.

2.1 The NLL Dispute & Axe Murder Incident:

As noted above, Pyongyang began to lay the groundwork for trying to reach out directly to the U.S. in the early 1970s through East European allies. Then in May/June 1972, Kim conducted his first interview with the New York Times and Washington Post, stating his openness to dialogue so long as Washington ceased its hostile attitude and obstruction of unification. He also reiterated his support for independent

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK’s relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973 presented in Jong-Dae Shin, “DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqué” NKIDP, e-Dossier, No. 10 (July 2012)

924 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084, 17 March 1973”
927 Armstrong, “Juche”, pg. 8
928 “Information on the Talks between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov,” June 18, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MiAA, C 294/78
and peaceful unification, including non-interference from allies. Building from these same principles, in April 1973, the KWP CC penned a letter to Congress calling for troop withdrawal and a cessation of military aid and joint war games.  

Before Pyongyang could further press for direct talks however, it would first need to justify ending dialogue with Seoul. The abduction of Kim Dae-Jung by KCIA officials in August 1973 provided just such a pretext. Shortly thereafter, on October 23, DPRK naval craft began crossing the Northern Limit Line (NLL), an extension of the DMZ into the Yellow Sea (and would do so 43 times that year alone). These incursions were accompanied by assaults on UNC personnel in the JSA and along the DMZ. In December, the North went on to reject the NLL and claim ownership of five Northwest Islands, asserting ROK ships traveling to the islands were in violation of the armistice. The aim, it appears, was to heighten tensions and prod Washington into direct talks under the guise of ROK instigations. Tellingly, while Kim rejected a January proposition by Park for a North-South non-aggression pact, on March 25, 1974, DPRK Foreign Minister Heo Dam proposed a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement.

These moves were orchestrated in response to both the failure of North-South talks to achieve DPRK objectives, as well as the November 1973 UN General Assembly consensus on the Korea Question that while seen a “success”, given it was an alternative to the ROK proposal, had still failed to deal with U.S. withdrawal. U.S. officials therefore noted how “provocative action over the islands…has the quality of an effort by Pyongyang to assert its case for further action against the U.N. and U.S. presence in Korea.” While China had most likely gained Kim’s support for the UN resolution by revealing the U.S. had “privately indicated a willingness to reconsider the future of the UNC after this session of the GA,” Kim, “not fully trusting Peking…appears to want to force our hand”, with the NLL conflict an attempt to “act somewhat independently of Peking in calling attention to the remaining issues where it seeks U.N. and U.S. action.” This may have also had the dual success of quelling anger within the military, which had been opposed to talks in the first place and felt justified in their stance following their collapse in 1973.

The North’s military adventurism in the mid-1970s was therefore categorically different from the 1960s. While previously the aim had been to use military

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531 Michishita, Military-Diplomatic, pg. 10
operations to directly facilitate a Southern uprising, in the 1970s they were coordinated with diplomatic overtures to Washington in the hope negotiations would generate troop withdrawal. Analogous to the 1960s however, Pyongyang was acting in defiance of Soviet and Chinese interests. China, for one, was focused on Détente and did not wish to see hostilities flare on the Peninsula. Moreover, retrospective analysis by the GDR in 1977 noted it had been rumored China actually professed support for Washington’s ongoing deployment to counter the Soviets, a position Pyongyang seems to have been aware of since 1973, as seen above. North Korea was therefore directly contradicting calls for restraint and what it knew to be Beijing’s objectives. The Socialist bloc meanwhile also held a negative view given what they saw to be the adverse consequences of the North’s actions.

While the North did have some limited success – in March 1974, UN Command was replaced with U.S. and Korean military personal, the aim being to allow for direct talks with Pyongyang through the Military Armistice Commission – Washington appears to have never seriously considered an agreement outside of the ROK. Increased tensions following another failed assassination on President Park in 1974 further dampened these talks, despite the fact the would-be assassin, Mun Segwang, had acted independently. Seoul’s admonishment of Pyongyang, coupled with the discovery of elaborate DPRK infiltration tunnels under the DMZ a few weeks later, only heightened tensions.

It is within this backdrop that one must view the August 1976 Axe Murder incident as well as Kim’s trip to Beijing in April 1975. Both events, it is argued, were last-ditch ploys to finally force the U.S. into direct talks while also representing a broader split in Sino-DPRK relations. They also showcase how North Korea, while responding to material realities, did so through the context of national narrative.

Kim’s trip to Beijing was aimed at “coordinat[ing] future policy towards South Korea with the PRC.” While the specifics of these meetings are unverified, GDR analysis from 1977 stated that during the trip, China denied Kim’s request for a “military solution to the problem of Korean unification”, dampening DPRK-PRC relations. While the official communiqué noted a “complete congruence of opinion”, there was, in actuality, a large disagreement. As relations with Moscow were cool throughout the 1970s, the GDR concluded Kim had little alternative but to acquiesce. When looking at the larger context of DPRK policy at this time, however, the extent to which the North desired an actual invasion seems questionable.

Original GDR analysis noted only that Kim “made extremely aggressive
statements”946 during his opening speech:

If revolution breaks out in South Korea we...will energetically support the South Korean population. If the enemy recklessly launches a war, we will decisively respond with war...In this struggle we will only lose the military demarcation line but gain the reunification of the fatherland...Peace or war in today’s Korea ultimately depends on the position of the United States...If the U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea and a democratic individual with national conscience comes to power...we will have a firm guarantee for a permanent peace in Korea.947

Opposed to this stance, Beijing called for diplomatic initiatives aimed at removing the UN mandate,948 leading the GDR to conclude Beijing was “not interested in the DPRK’s policy of confrontation”. Given Kim’s “posturing during the end of the visit was much more moderate”,949 and the final communiqué only contained China’s position, they concluded Pyongyang had been tamed by Beijing.950 This would seem to indicate, however, that Pyongyang suddenly believed there was a genuine possibility Beijing might support an invasion, a questionable position given DPRK officials noted throughout the 1970s that China and Russia would not support renewed conflict,951 thereby limiting access to the external support that was recognized as being required for the adoption of a Vietnam-inspired campaign.952 The North had also told allies it had little intention of invading the South.953

Recognition of these material hindrances in no way detracts from expectations derived from national narrative; one does not expect the regime to be suicidal. Instead North Korea was interpreting these realities through the prism of national narrative. While refraining from a full invasion, Pyongyang was independently engaged in high-risk brinksmanship along the NLL, a policy that not only displeased Great Power allies (this certainly comes through in GDR reports), but also held the potential to quickly escalate into a broader conflict, in the event of which there were serious questions regarding the support Pyongyang would receive from the allies it was actively working against.954 It would therefore seem that Pyongyang, unable to press for an invasion itself, was working against allied interests to pursue brinksmanship despite the very real risk of generating a larger conflict it might be left alone to fight (and as will be seen below, this almost occurred following the Axe Murder Incident). Rather than changing Pyongyang’s stance, the Beijing meeting

947 “Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung's Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975),” May 06, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 6857
948 “Note concerning a Conversation between Ambassador Everhartz with the Head of Department II in the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Choe Sang-muk, about the Visit by Comrade Kim Il Sung to the PR China,” May 12, 1975, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, C 6857
949 “On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975”
950 “Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung's Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975)”
951 See for example: "Minutes of Conversation on the Occasion of the Party and Government Delegation on behalf of the Romanian Socialist Republic to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," June 10, 1971; Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and the Economic Delegation
952 “The South Korean army (760,000 men) is stronger than the DPRK forces (500,000). The number of American forces was increased by 4,000, and now amounts to 42,000 troops. With only 16 million people and a shortage of workers in the DPRK, it will be very difficult to recruit and mobilize even more young people for the army. Also the U.S. forces have equipment superior to North Korea's army.” “Information for the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov”
953 “Minutes of Conversation Taken on the Occasion of the Audience Granted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” March 08, 1973
954 “Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 058.014,” September 01, 1976, HPPPDA, RMFAA, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976
seems to have been a continuation of this brinkmanship, with Kim using the platform to raise tensions in an effort to compel Washington into talks. It also represented a widening of Pyongyang’s post-1973 rift with Beijing.955

Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that throughout this period Kim repeatedly emphasized how “he was looking forward to seeing a revolutionary upheaval in South Korea, at which time North Korea was not going to be idly standing by.”956 Kim reiterated a similar stance after the Beijing meeting, telling Zhivkov “if they attack us, we are ready to fight them” but also that the West falsely reports the “DPRK will attack South Korea inspired by the Vietnamese victory” so as to justify their repression.957 In May, DPRK Ambassador Gwon Hui-geyong similarly stated, given “the obstacles generated by the presence of American troops” focus would be on “carry[ing] out an active fight at the United Nations and in other international organizations, as well as in its bilateral relations strategy, to compel the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea.”958 So long as the “peaceful path” remained closed due to President Park, the North was thus forced to focus on the “military” (war) or revolutionary (southern uprising) paths to unification.959

While traditional security studies struggle to account for the ease with which Kim seemed willing to dampen important alliance partners while simultaneously risking a potentially larger conflict, especially at a time the North was already weaker vis-à-vis Seoul, one would expect such policies in light of DPRK national narrative – especially in light of the three ideational threats noted above. The situation was thus reminiscent of Kim’s renewed clash with Khrushchev over peaceful coexistence in 1961. In 1973 the North was again diverging from a strategic ally (China) to pursue policies it believed to be best positioned for achieving its own goals (unification), and countering ideational threats (ROK prosperity), through more aggressive means. This defiance culminated with the Axe Murder incident, when an argument in the JSA over a tree trimming by U.S. and ROK forces ended with DPRK officers with axes;960 generating the exact type of confrontation Beijing and Moscow were opposed to.

Tensions soared as both sides accused one another of premeditating the incident.961 In addition to infuriating Washington - Kissinger considered aerial bombardment, highlighting the risk of brinkmanship -962 and DPRK relations with Beijing and Moscow further soured.963 Beijing, while standing behind Pyongyang’s official line,

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955 They also clashed on a number of other points. See: “On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975,” April 29, 1975, HPPDA, PolA AA, MfAA, 300/78
956 Ostermann and Person, Rise and Fall, pg. 71
957 “Information on the Talks between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov,” June 18, 1975
958 “Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572,” May 19, 1975, HPPDA, RMFAA, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: South Korea, Folder 1632, Secret, Concerning the Sessions of the North-South Coordination Committee. Problems Discussed by the Co-Presidents of the Committee. Assessments regarding the Prospects for Korea’s Unification. Some Incidents Occurring between the Two Koreas, etc., Filing: Permanent
959 “Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572”
962 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 172
noted, “the North Korean comrades let themselves be caught in this provocation” which “did not bring any political benefits.” Others concluded the incident was most likely “an over-reaction” by DPRK personnel involved…whose background probably lies in fanatical feelings of hate. Despite the DPRK’s initial response, “declar[ing] a state of emergency…and practically defy[ing] the United States to attack, vowing to “crush the aggressor” the North’s subsequent actions were more docile. Following the incident, U.S. forces massed a military operation into the JSA and cut down the tree. “The lack of military reaction by the DPRK…was surprising” indicating the North “did not desire any further aggravation.”

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In talks with the U.S., Kim also called the incident “regrettable,” representing a “certain concession they want to keep secret from their people for matters of prestige.” This may have been the result of Chinese intervention, as Beijing sought to moderate responses to safeguard Détente.

While at first this sequence of events seems contradictory to national narrative, upon closer examination it appears to have been a final calculated gambit. With inter-Korean dialogue frozen, China viewed as an oppositional party, and the NLL policy failing to incite enough impetus in Washington, fostering an incident directly involving U.S. soldiers, albeit in a poorly devised manner (leading some to believe it was the recently promoted Kim Jong Il who orchestrated the attack), was a means of forcing Washington into talks. Linked to this is the fact Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter had espoused a favorable position on withdrawal, leading the GDR to conclude Pyongyang “is obviously interested in fomenting the slogan “not our boys” in the United States…The DPRK wants to prove that the threat to peace in Korea…emanates from the presence of U.S. troops…and support the demand to negotiate and solve current problems in direct talks with the United States.”

The Romanians also reported many diplomats “are not ruling out the hypothesis that the North Korean action was partly aimed at checking the reactions of China, the USSR and other friendly countries…and to prepare a condemnation of the United States at the forthcoming session of the United Nations.”

Pyongyang therefore never had an interest in further provoking a larger conflict against the U.S. and ROK, especially since, as the Soviets reported, Pyongyang would “not benefit from the agreement and support of the USSR, of China or of other socialist countries if it is the initiator of a regional conflagration.” The aim was always to reduce tensions through negotiations aimed at securing broader armistice talks. Regarding the apology, while even the somewhat lackluster reference to the incident as “regrettable” represented a concession within the context of DPRK

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965 “Report on the ‘Axe Murder Incident’ from the GDR Embassy in North Korea,” August 31, 1976, HPPPDA, PoIA AA, MfAA
966 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 172
967 Report on the ‘Axe Murder Incident’ from the GDR Embassy in North Korea,” August 31, 1976
968 Memorandum for President Ford from William G. Hyland, “Revision of the Korean DMZ Agreement,” 5 September 1976 presented in Ostermann and Person, After Détente, pg. 737
969 “Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 066.252,” August 25, 1976
970 Indeed in 1975 the East Germans reported “Kim Il Sung’s eldest son is systematically groomed to become his successor.”
971 GDR Ambassador Pyongyang to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Berlin,” April 14, 1975, HPPPDA, PA AA, MfAA, C 6862
972 Ria Chae, “Korea Foundation Junior Scholars Research Reports” Woodrow Wilson Center For Scholars (February 23, 2012)
973 “Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 058.014,” September 01, 1976, HPPPDA, RMFAA, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1976
‘dignity’, Kim also publicly called the DPRK soldiers involved, “national heroes.”

In short, there was a balancing act between seeking to manipulate the incident as the first step towards U.S. negotiations and unification (an important component of national narrative) while at the same time maintaining North Korean pride.

Pyongyang’s gambit failed to pay off, and perhaps further undermined its position by emboldening hawks in the U.S. and justifying ROK modernization and crackdowns on dissent. Fortunately for the North, Carter would be elected in 1977 and announced the gradual but total withdrawal of U.S. troops. The North, for its part, quickly toned down anti-U.S. rhetoric and Kim went so far as to express to President Honecker that the North would soon triumph on the peninsula. This would be short lived however, as increased global tensions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and revolution in Iran resulted in mounting pressure on Carter to backtrack on withdrawal. The 1970s was thus to end on a bleak note for Pyongyang.

Before turning to the 1980s however, one last element DPRK foreign policy in the late 1970s is worth exploring; the fact that, in conjunction with its campaign of brinkmanship, Pyongyang maintained, and indeed increased, provisions of aid to developing countries in an effort to showcase independence from great powers despite its own domestic woes and high stakes diplomacy.

### 2.2 International Aid & Combating Great Power Chauvinism:

The Axe Murder incident not only damaged Pyongyang’s relations with Moscow and Beijing, it also undercut the success it had enjoyed with the NAM and Third World. The incident, combined with Pyongyang’s use of “high pressure tactics” within the NAM, led to a new disenchantment with the North and the “loss [of] many friends.”

Despite this setback, the North saw the rapid introduction of newly independent states in the 1970s as a new opportunity to assert itself as the representative of nationalist movements, seeking in 1977 “to establish special relations with those fraternal parties and socialist states that also emphasize in particular “independence” and “self-reliance.”

The GDR thus remarked on “DPRK tendencies to become evasive in openly supporting the PRC foreign policy course” noting it “follows its own interests in the Non-Aligned Movement”, proping up régimes, regardless of their ideology, to maintain its image as a leader of Third World nationalism. Armstrong concludes, “North Korea had become, relative to the size of its own economy, a rather substantial contributor to African development,” seen for example in the wide-ranging assistance provided to Guyana and Mozambique.

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979 “Notes on a conversation of the Ambassador of the GDR in the DPRK, comrade Franz Everhartz, with the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, comrade Le Tung Nam, on 22 September 1976 in residence of the Ambassador of the GDR,” 2 MFIAA C 6854 Cited in Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 182
980 On Relations between DPRK and PRC,” November 17, 1977, HPPPDA, PolA AA, MFIAA C 6857
981 Ibid
982 Armstrong, “Juche”, pg. 17; On Guyana and Mozambique see Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 185, 193
This of course makes even less sense for traditional security studies than DPRK aid at the start of the decade; the North was struggling economically, losing parity with the South, and was faced with an increased ROK-U.S. military presence, all while having undermined relations with Beijing and Moscow. To spend critical resources on states of little strategic importance seems strange. However the moves make sense within the context of DPRK national narrative, forming relations with similarly nationalist independent states to reassert identity at a time its image was suffering. It was also a way to further rebuke Great Powers (Moscow and Beijing) seeking influence amongst these states; the GDR noted that while both China and North Korea “tout the “great-powers-theory” and stress the need for struggle against “hegemonism” (PRC) and “dominationism” (DPRK)” Pyongyang considered China to be just such a “great power”. The DPRK therefore seems to have been interested in continuing its efforts to forge a new bloc of nationalist independent states from which to further challenge superpowers, seemingly in an attempt to challenge the international system.

Taken as a whole, ROK-DPRK rapprochement, operations along the NLL, the Axe Murder Incident and DPRK Third World aid, are best explained as efforts to achieve and assert DPRK national narrative, signaling a continuation in foreign policy from the 1950s and 1960s. This consistency was maintained despite the multitude of changes Pyongyang was forced to contend with by mid-1975, including Détente, rising animosity with China, continuously cool relations with Moscow, growing economic difficulties, and an increasingly developed and unified ROK. Despite these global and regional shifts, North Korea’s ultimate objectives and stance remained the same: unification under Pyongyang’s terms and an independent foreign policy championing non-subservience to Great Powers. Much as in the early 1960s (peaceful coexistence), Pyongyang’s response to systemic shifts in the 1970s (Détente) was not to fundamentally alter its position, but to continue with policies aimed at achieving the same set of objectives - often at the expense of relations with key allies.

3. Challenge to “Prestige”: Terrorism & The 1980s

North Korea, despite its deteriorating position, entered the 1980s with the same unwavering determination it had decades of the past. Rather than engage in market reforms like other socialist states, Pyongyang continued to rely on nationalist zeal to try and economically rebound, introducing a new slogan, “The Speed of the ‘80s.” At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had introduced a new phase of the Cold War, one with renewed tensions between Moscow and Washington, the latter who was increasingly aligned with a reforming Beijing under the new leadership of Deng. The unity of the Third World and NAM was increasingly starting to fragment and by the mid 1980s many members were seeking to replicate rapidly growing Asian market economies.

Regionally, following the KCIA-backed assassination of President Park in 1979, Chun Doo-hwan had launched a military coup and established himself firmly in charge of the ROK. Chun’s grip on power was bolstered not only by Carter’s backtracking on withdrawal, but also increased military investment under Reagan. For

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983 “On Relations between DPRK and PRC,” November 17, 1977
984 Armstrong, Tyranny, pg. 241
985 Ibid, pg. 220-221
its part, Pyongyang, unnerved\textsuperscript{986} by China’s overly friendly attitude towards the U.S., began to lean more towards Moscow, who was seen as finally taking a more acceptable U.S. posture. While this resulted in increased military and economic assistance, Kim was again sure to refrain from diverging too far from a middle line. Pyongyang was aided by the fact China sought to compete with Russia by providing increased military and economic assistance as well. Still, even with these influxes of assistance the ROK was continuing to quickly pull ahead economically and militarily.

The North appears to have viewed these changes as merely altering their calculus on the best methods through which to pursue the same policy objectives of independence and unification. Regarding the latter, the ROK’s growing success and stability made the potential for unification under Pyongyang a distant hope. The North therefore began to emphasize an interim plan aimed at helping lay the groundwork for unification in the future, pushing for the formation of the “Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo” (DCRK), which would not “participate in any political-military alliance or bloc”. In contradiction to traditional security studies, Kim also proposed, as he had during talks around the Joint Communiqué, that North and South Korea “repeal all treaties and agreements with other countries detrimental to national amity, including military treaties concluded separately by the north and south prior to reunification.”\textsuperscript{987} While this did not come about, Pyongyang did push for trilateral talks with the U.S. and ROK, holding ten ‘preliminary’ talks with the ROK in 1980 and high-level talks in 1981. In 1984 the North provided Seoul aid following floods and in 1985 members of the respective national assemblies met for the first time.

Unfortunately for Pyongyang, the 1980s held further challenges. Two events in particular would force them to adopt more extreme measures as they desperately sought to safeguard national narrative; the September 1981 announcement that Seoul would host the 1988 Summer Olympics and the announcement just two months later that it would host the 1986 Asian Games. The ideational threats of these events go some way in accounting for the DPRK’s turn to acts of terrorism.

The first was the October 1983 bombing in Rangoon in a failed assassination attempt on Chun. The move was very much in line with previous DPRK assassination programs and appears to have been a response to the increasingly threatening military posture of the U.S. and ROK; Washington had recently introduced an Airline Battle doctrine on the Korean Peninsula in conjunction with an influx in military (and nuclear) armaments. The incident significantly damaged Pyongyang’s already tarnished image (Burma severed relations) and undermined U.S.-ROK talks, which were not to be renewed until 1985.\textsuperscript{988} It was DPRK attempts to counteract the Asian Games and Summer Olympics, however, that led Pyongyang to be listed as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Exploring these events proves to be a particularly insightful exercise in revealing DPRK motivations at this time.

\textsuperscript{986} See for example “Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung,” May 31, 1984
\textsuperscript{987} Kim Il Sung, Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980) Cited in Tsuneo Akaha (ed.) The Future of North Korea (Routledge, 2001), pg. 59
\textsuperscript{988} “Cable from Ambassador Katori to the Foreign Minister, ‘Prime Minster Visit to China (Foreign Ministers’ Discussion – The State of the Korean Peninsula),’” March 26, 1984, HPPPDA, 2002-113, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Of prime importance is the level of prestige attached to holding international events like the Olympics.\textsuperscript{989} When placed within the context of DPRK national narrative, this would have been interpreted as a fundamental challenge. The North’s reaction was first and foremost to protest, in coordination with Cuba.\textsuperscript{990} The IOC’s representative determined this to be a method through which Pyongyang could showcase its “peaceful intentions and at the same time give a face-saving opportunity…it would then be able to tell the world that they were really for participation but their just cause had been rejected…purely on legalistic grounds.”\textsuperscript{992}

While the IOC and ROK rejected the DPRK offer, they did agree for some sports to be held north of the border.\textsuperscript{993} The North iterated tentative support for this in June 1986, but retreated to its earlier position by July 1987.\textsuperscript{994}

During the talks, North Korea had somewhat forebodingly indicated, “the course of events would definitely take a violent turn in case the situation was not diffused…by holding common unified Games”.\textsuperscript{995} Realizing its hopes of capturing the prestige associated with co-hosting had most likely been dashed, combined with the fact Pyongyang’s socialist allies were not only going to attend the Olympics but were also starting to grow relations with the South,\textsuperscript{996} the North became resolute in its determination to undermine both the Asian Games and the Olympics. North Korea, now under the de facto run of Kim Jong Il, thus staged two bombings targeting civilians for the first time. The first was at Gimpo International Airport days before the Asian Games were due to start. The second was the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 on November 29, 1987.

In addition to terrorism, North Korea also decided to throw what limited resources it had left at the problem, investing heavily in domestic status projects. These projects, several of them left unfinished, had the effect of hollowing out the economy and, in conjunction with the cut off of Soviet and Chinese aid at the end of the decade, laid the groundwork for economic collapse in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{997}

The North also sought to directly compete with the Olympics by hosting the World Festival of Youth and Students (WFYS), investing $4-9 billion dollars into the event.

The notion North Korea would invest such tremendous resources in this strategic setting for domestic propaganda alone seems suspect, especially when cheaper alternatives were available; agreeing to have the 3-4 Olympic games offered by the

\textsuperscript{990} “Letter from Fidel Castro to the President of the International Olympic Committee Juan Antonio Samaranch,” November 29, 1984, HPPPDA, International Olympic Committee Archives (Switzerland), SEOUL 88 / POLITICAL MATTERS DE 1982 A MAI 1986
\textsuperscript{991} For outline see: “The Proposal by the Olympic Committee of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” September 30, 1985, HPPPDA, International Olympic Committee Archives (Switzerland), SEOUL 88/ 1ERE REUNION DES 2 COREES (EQUIPE UNIFIE) 1985; SEOUL 88/ JOINT TEAM (+JOINT MEETING, LAUSANNE/ 8-9 oct. 85) (1RE REUNION DES 2 COREES); “Meeting between the National Olympic Committees of the ROK and of the DPRK held under the Aegis of the International Olympic Committee,” October 08, 1985, HPPPDA, International Olympic Committee Archives (Switzerland), SEOUL’ 88, POLITICAL MATTERS, DE 1982 A MAI 86
\textsuperscript{992}"Report by International Olympic Committee Vice President on his Trip to North Korea," July 16, 1985, HPPPDA, International Olympic Committee Archives (Switzerland), SEOUL’ 88/ 1ERE REUNION DES 2 COREES (EQUIPE UNIFIE) 1985; SEOUL 88/ JOINT TEAM (+JOINT MEETING, LAUSANNE/ 8-9 oct. 85) (1RE REUNION DES 2 COREES)
\textsuperscript{993} "Report by International Olympic Committee Vice President on his Trip to North Korea," July 16, 1985
\textsuperscript{994} Ha, “Korean Sports”, pg. 12
\textsuperscript{995} "Report by International Olympic Committee Vice President on his Trip to North Korea," July 16, 1985
\textsuperscript{997} Cha, The Impossible, pg. 117
IOC in North Korea or merely citing the IOC and ROK rejection of its ground
breaking proposal to jointly host the Olympics as being indicative of Seoul’s hostile
stance towards peace and unification would both have sufficed for the North’s
isolated community. While hosting the WFYS was played up for the domestic
audience, it was also certainly aimed at the international community; an attempt to
demonstrate it too was a great country capable of hosting prestigious events. This
attempt to assert DPRK strength and prestige would also begin to culminate in
another form at this time; a nuclear weapons program.

4. “Modern”, “Independent” & “Self-Reliant”: The DPRK Nuclear Program

Questions over the North’s nuclear weapons program have largely dominated its
foreign policy since the 1990s. However the program itself has much deeper routes.
While it remains inconclusive when specifically Pyongyang decided to pursue nuclear
weapons, a few points can be drawn. For one, North Korea’s interest in at least a civil
nuclear program dates back to the mid-1950s. Secondly, the North often cited prestige
as embedded in its desire to acquire and develop nuclear technology; indeed
somewhat ironically Krige shows how during this time “the Americans pitched a
nuclear future as a ready alternative to the Marxist utopia.”

Third, North Korea expressed at least an interest in a nuclear weapons program as early as the 1960s, a
period of time its strategic position was relatively more secure. Subsequent actions
inline with these professed interests did little to assuage outside concerns,
undermining efforts to receive nuclear assistance despite economic incentives.
Undeterred, North Korea maintained a ‘do it alone’ mentality early on in its nuclear
program, seemingly due to the fact that it wanted to secure nuclear self-reliance,
resulting in a further economic drain. All of this in turn holds key insights into
possible rationales behind its decision to go nuclear.

4.1 Origins:

Pyongyang’s relationship with nuclear technology dates back to the early discovery of
uranium deposits in North Korea, the result of Soviets efforts to try and locate fuel for
its own nuclear weapons program in the 1940s. For its part, Pyongyang knew it
would require technical assistance should it ever wish to utilize these resources. Luckily,
in the early 1950s, Moscow and Washington each sought to assert their
prowess relative to one another through the provision of nuclear technology
assistance. Washington’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ program, which led to nuclear
technology transfers to Taiwan in 1955 and South Korea in 1956, was therefore
matched by Soviet aid to allies through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. This
included North Korea, with whom it signed an additional agreement on nuclear
cooperation in 1956 and a 1959 agreement to establish a nuclear research facility.
Despite this, the North’s program lagged behind both South Korea, which completed
an experimental reactor in 1960 (Pyongyang only began construction in 1962), and

998 Gordin, Tilley and Prakash “Introduction”, pg. 10; See John Krige, “Techno-utopian dreams, techno-political realities: The
education of desire for the peaceful atom” in Gordin, Tilley and Prakash (eds.) Utopia/Dystopia
999 “Protocol No. 18 of a Meeting of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Excerpt),” April 02,
1000 “Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 20 January 1956,” January 20, 1956, HPPPDA, RGANI Fond 5,
Opis 28, Delo 412
other socialist states that were given preferential treatment from Moscow.  

There appear to have been two motivations behind Moscow’s apprehension to fully support the DPRK civilian nuclear program. The first related to fears of Sino-DPRK collusion and the belief that aiding Pyongyang would indirectly facilitate China. Consequently, expanded DPRK operations to “develop the mining of uranium ore on a broad scale” as reported in 1963, outside the purview of what was required for its own program, was interpreted as indicative of its intentions to send fuel to China. However, there is no evidence such shipments took place and the fact that “mining and processing of such ore [was] extremely expensive” and they “insistently trie[d] to obtain information about the deposits and quality of the uranium ore mined in the Soviet Union”, could indicate these efforts were geared toward facilitating a domestic nuclear program aimed at nuclear self-reliance. To this end, the second hindrance to cooperation was Soviet unease over DPRK nuclear intentions. Consequently, while the Soviets were worried about facilitating Chinese nuclear weapons endeavors, there is evidence that, despite a lack of technical knowhow, Pyongyang also had a genuine interest in nuclear weapons at this time.

In the late 1950s, DPRK requests for Soviet nuclear assistance employed Soviet rhetoric, emphasizing its “peaceful purpose.” However Soviet apprehension grew when Pyongyang refused to adopt Khrushchev’s support for nuclear arms treaties in 1962 and the eventual Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As Pak Song Ch’ol told the Soviets:

who can impose such a treaty on countries that do not have nuclear weapons, but are perhaps successfully working in that direction?...[the US] possession of nuclear weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them, therefore, to eternalize their rule. They have a large stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons? I think that in such case the advantage will be on the Americans’ side.

The DPRK also “approached other socialist ambassadors with inquiries as to where they could “obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and atomic industry” and forced Soviet experts working on Pyongyang’s experimental reactor to give fingerprint scans and information on “their circle of relatives and friends...A Korean “colleague” told one of the technical experts, “if we cannot get you for some reason, we will get your relatives; this is why it [the questionnaire] is needed!” In April 1963, DPRK officials stated to their Czechoslovak counterparts

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1003 “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Soviet Specialists in North Korea,” September 27, 1963, HPPPDA, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 5, listy 161-162.

1004 “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea” September 27, 1963.


1006 “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-choul,” August 24, 1962, HPPPDA, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 18, papka 93, delo 5, listy 22-23.

1007 Radchenko, “Nuclear Cooperation” pg. 27.

that it would be better if the Soviets just gave Pyongyang nuclear missiles,
and in August “apparently on Chinese instructions [asked the GDR] whether they could obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry.” It was also recounted in October how a DPRK engineer had approached a Soviet uranium specialist to inquire about the feasibility of Pyongyang constructing a nuclear bomb:

Upon hearing the reply to the effect that the economy of the DPRK cannot cope with the creation of nuclear weapons, the Korean said that it would cost much less in the DPRK than in other countries. If we tell our workers, he declared, that we are taking up such a task, they will agree to work free of charge for several years.

In 1966 Colonel Latyshev, a subordinate to the Soviet military attaché in North Korea, therefore concluded that while initially the DPRK military was “influenced by the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare” in 1966 they “introduced the study of military experiences involving missiles and nuclear weapons, under the circumstances of both offensive and defensive struggles.” In March 1967 it was also reported Pyongyang “did not agree with [the Soviet standpoint concerning the agreement on nuclear non-proliferation], but would not attack and criticize it openly,” and in December that the DPRK held negative attitude towards “disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” the result of “their general negative attitude toward the problem of the relaxation of international tensions” and policy “they adopted back in 1962…of "arming the entire people and turning the entire country into a fortress".” On top of this, the Hungarian’s noted the same year that request from Pyongyang for nuclear power plants was declined by Moscow because of the former’s refusal to provide operational data on the “experimental nuclear reactor that had been established with Soviet assistance” in 1965, raising questions over its use.

DPRK efforts remained undeterred following unsuccessful efforts to acquire an “agreement on nuclear assistance” and acquisition of nuclear equipment from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Pyongyang thus began to associate itself more with Bucharest, whose nuclear ambitions were also being curtailed by Moscow and who was subsequently seeking nuclear assistance from the West. In 1968, the two signed a joint communiqué seemingly condemning Moscow for its failure to support their nuclear endeavors. While Romania would eventually sign onto the NPT later that year, North Korea would not do so until 1985, disregarding direct Soviet efforts to have Pyongyang change course. For example, the Soviets:

1009 “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Czechoslovak Ambassador Moravec,” April 15, 1963, HPPPDA, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 4, list 140
1010 “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and the German Ambassador,” August 26, 1963, HPPPDA, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 5, list 93
1014 “A 20 December 1967 DVO Memo about the Attitude of the Korean Leadership toward the Issues of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” December 20, 1967, HPPPDA, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 113-114
1016 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.121, TOP SECRET, April 08, 1967,” April 08, 1967, HPPPDA, RMFAA
asked the Korean comrades whether they thought that it would be a good thing if, for instance, Japan – which possesses the required industrial and technical capacity – obtained nuclear weapons. In this concrete case the Korean comrades naturally acknowledged that nuclear nonproliferation was justified, but in general they did not (by which they actually give veiled support to the Chinese position).

The divergence from Great Power allies is interesting in its own right, but the context and implications of this move are perhaps more telling. For one Pyongyang, by not only expressing an interest in nuclear weapons technology but also acting in a manner that was a cause for concern to allies - only to then take a more belligerent stance following Soviets efforts to discourage such behavior, effectively undermined its ability to extract nuclear support despite a growing need for energy assistance by 1968. Indeed, North Korea had failed to invest in (and did not possess even in the 1990s) a power grid capable of handling nuclear energy, further suggesting the entire program was intended to boast of nuclear energy and/or to use in military programs.

Secondly, while Pyongyang’s stance towards the NPT aligned with China, Sino-DPRK relations were at this time on the brink of armed conflict (Ch. 5), suggesting the North should have remained closer to the Soviets. Refusing to adopt a more docile nuclear stance, Pyongyang instead focused on investing in domestic nuclear initiatives, despite costs associated with such a program and questionable strategic needs for such a weapons system (the North still enjoyed parity with South Korea and indeed may have felt superior as the above overview on the Joint Communiqué demonstrates). While the argument could be made there was an interest in nuclear deterrence given turbulent relationships with Moscow (early 1960s) and Beijing (late 1960s), the deterioration of these relationships is best understood as the result of DPRK narrative maintenance. Subsequent nuclear policies were therefore either an offshoot (responding to their security implications) and/or also linked to narrative assertion of a modern, advanced, self-reliant state. Given the deterrence credibility of a few nuclear weapons with no delivery mechanism is highly suspect (as explored below), the ideational factors become even more persuasive.

To this end, Szalontai suggests Pyongyang seems to have been inspired by Beijing’s domestic nuclear weapons program initiated in the early 1960s and the construction of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, all of which demonstrated the potential for “nuclear self-reliance”. It was reported in 1967 how “[a]fter each experimental nuclear test in China the Korean leadership sent Peking a congratulatory telegram.” Nuclear energy and, perhaps more importantly, weapons, were therefore viewed as showcasing the North as an advanced, modern, independent nation; in a conversation in December 1969 between the GDR and DPRK ambassador the latter, “stressing the need to ‘hack off the US imperialists’ dick,’” had muttered

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1021 Clemens, “North Korea’s Quest”, pg. 148
1022 Radchenko, “Nuclear Cooperation” pg. 27
1023 Again with a possible link to the ‘nuclear utopia’ outlined by Krige.
1024 Szalontai, “The International”, pg. 4
1025 “A 20 December 1967 DVO Memo”
"We must prove that our atomic bombs are the better ones."

It would therefore appear as though Pyongyang had a genuine interest in, and was attempting to make inroads towards, a nuclear weapons program throughout the 1960s. This was linked to its desire to both boost its international image and prestige while also acquiring nuclear self-reliance. Events in the 1970s should therefore be viewed as compounding Pyongyang’s preexisting interests in (if not efforts at) nuclear weapons and domestic nuclear research.

4.2 1970s–1980s:

The 1970s witnessed growing fears over possible Japanese and ROK nuclear weapons program, both of which would have spurred on DPRK interest in nuclear weapons. Szalontai suggests this might have led Kim to express to his ROK counterparts during talks in 1972 that “the two Koreas ought to work together to develop nuclear weapons”\(^{1027}\); a ploy to feel out ROK nuclear progress following construction of its first nuclear plant in 1971.\(^ {1028}\) The DPRK subsequently began to repeatedly raise concerns over Seoul from 1975 onwards.\(^ {1029}\) However ROK nuclear weapons ambitions seemingly ended that year when the U.S. pressured France to halt delivery of a reprocessing plant and forced ROK ratification of the NPT, potentially dampening the impact this may have had on DPRK nuclear aspirations. While Pyongyang did call on states to cease providing Seoul with assistance that could allow it to “increase its armament capacity and create a military nuclear potential” during the 1977 World Conference for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, it is unclear if this was done out of genuine concern or for posturing.\(^ {1030}\)

In addition to regional concerns, some have argued DPRK nuclear rhetoric throughout the 1970s was partially aimed at brinkmanship, an attempt to push the U.S., China, and Russia to finally deal with the Korea problem. Szalontai thus notes how 6 months before the Axe Murder Incident the DPRK claimed, indirectly to Moscow through the Hungarians, that they had already “manufactured by themselves” nuclear weapons and carrier missiles “targeted at the big cities of South Korea and Japan”.\(^ {1031}\) Then, in January 1977, another declaration was made describing the Peninsula as on the brink of nuclear war and that the “DPRK is equipping itself with nuclear weapons”, a statement the Hungarians linked to “sound[ing] out the Carter administration’s plans for Korea.”\(^ {1032}\) Szalontai further links these statements as an effort to ensure U.S. troop withdrawal would be discussed during the Carter-Gromyko talks in September; the Korean’s also temporally halted pestering the Soviets for nuclear assistance in the immediate run up to the talks\(^ {1033}\) “because they knew all too well how much it

\(^{1024}\) Hymans, “Assessing”, pg. 270 FN 37

\(^{1027}\) “Memorandum, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27 January 1970”, presented in Szalontai and Radchenko, “North Korea’s Efforts”

\(^{1028}\) Szalontai, “The International”, pg. 7


\(^{1031}\) “Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” February 16, 1976, HPPPA, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 83. doboz, 6, 00234/1976


irritated Moscow.”

While potentially using the prospect of nuclear war to force talks on the Korean question, a sentiment that aligns with much of the above analysis, this in no way suggests DPRK nuclear interests/efforts were only a diplomatic guise or pawn. They were a continuation of its 1960s nuclear policy, with the North demanding access to nuclear technology and support while remaining indignant towards any forms of oversight and firmly opposed to nonproliferation treaties, a position Clemens suggests was buoyed by India’s nuclear weapons success (and recognition as a de facto nuclear power) in the early 1970s. Seoul thus reported in 1976 how Pyongyang was “having talks about this issue [acquiring nuclear reactors] in order to become capable of producing atomic weapons in the future,” while Soviet intelligence reported in the late 1970s that Kim “instructed the Ministry of Public Security to initiate a nuclear weapons program at expanded Yongbyon facilities (Oberdorfer 1997, 253).”

Tellingly, in January 1976, a DPRK trade delegation was again refused nuclear assistance for “various reasons – primarily military considerations and the amount of the investment” [emphasis added]. Further requests for nuclear power plants in June were also rebuffed while Pyongyang maintained “less than harmonious” relations with Moscow in the IAEA following its admittance in 1974.

DPRK nuclear policy at this time is again especially interesting given the larger framework it took place in. In particular, there was an increasingly dire need for electricity, with the 1973 oil crisis and “scantiness of rainfall [in 1975 and 1976] produc[ing] a substantial effect on the production of electrical energy”. This further compounded energy concerns and stunted Pyongyang’s ability to uphold its trade balance with Moscow. North Korea was also concerned with Seoul, whose economic woes. While Soviet intelligence reported in 1976 how Pyongyang was further requests for nuclear power plants in June were also rebuffed while Pyongyang maintained “less than harmonious” relations with Moscow in the IAEA following its admittance in 1974.

Consequently, while North Korea could have benefitted immensely from an influx in nuclear assistance and investment into a nuclear-compatible electric grid, its refusal to adjust its stances/rhetoric ensured repeated calls for nuclear aid were rebuffed by both Moscow and socialist states. As its economic woes deteriorated throughout the
1970s, the consequences of self-reliance also became further apparent, with the Soviets taking “every possible opportunity to make the Korean side understand that it is the COMECON countries that have priority when [the Soviets] decide on unexpected demands.” On one hand you thus had the North’s dire economic problem and need for energy assistance, on the other, its commitment to leaving room for the pursuit of nuclear weapons and nuclear self-reliance, as well as its ongoing fixation with prestige and image vis-à-vis South Korea. A 1979 Hungarian report best sums up the DPRK position:

If we compare the output of electric power generation that South Korea plans to reach by the end of 1986 with that of the DPRK…[it] is about three times that of the DPRK. This may explain why, from this year on, but also earlier, the DPRK strongly urged the socialist countries…to provide it with equipment for nuclear power plants or even to build a nuclear power plant. It tries to make up for its lag behind South Korea in this way, with the hidden intention that later it may become capable of producing an atomic bomb.\footnote{1047}

In short, DPRK interests in nuclear weapons technology, first pursued in the 1960s, were compounded by its growing disparity with South Korea, and most likely by concerns over the possible military applications of Seoul’s nuclear achievements\footnote{1048} (though this was most likely tempered in 1975). The DPRK was thus pushing, at times belligerently, for assistance in its civilian nuclear program so as to maintain face vis-à-vis South Korea, while at the same time actively working towards a nuclear weapons program. Efforts towards the latter ultimately undermined the former, forcing the North to further divert domestic resources towards its nuclear goals while further sacrificing economic benefits that would have accompanied a more docile nuclear stance;\footnote{1049} for example while planning for the 22\textsuperscript{nd} IAEA conference, socialist state delegates “generally agreed that… the countries committed to the exclusively peaceful use [of nuclear energy], should be given preference in technical assistance [emphasis in the original].”\footnote{1050}

Having failed to acquire assistance, but aided by years of domestic research, Pyongyang finally managed to begin construction on its own twenty-to thirty-megawatt research reactor.\footnote{1051} The weapons component of this program was made clear by the use of an RBMK reactor. As Szalontai notes, the Soviet’s had provided allies only with Light Water Reactors, from which it was difficult to procure weapons grade plutonium. By contrast, most states that had pursued nuclear weapons did so by using high-grade plutonium acquired from RBMK reactors.\footnote{1052} Additionally, by using

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1045} “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry 8 December 1976” XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00854/6/1976, presented in Szalontai “North Korean Attitudes”
\item \footnote{1046} “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry 23 February 1979” XIX-J-1-j Dél-Korea, 1979, 81. doboz, 82-5, 002289/1979, presented in Szalontai and Radchenko, “North Korea's Efforts”; “While it is not known whether the North Koreans were aware of Tito’s nuclear weapons project, this possibility cannot be excluded” with the DPRK receiving military assistance from Yugoslavia and nuclear technology from Belgrade. Szalontai, “The International”, pg. 19
\item \footnote{1047} “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry 22 May 1979” XIX-J-1-j Dél-Korea, 1979, 81. doboz, 82-5, 003675/1979, presented in Szalontai “North Korean Attitudes”
\item \footnote{1048} On the importance of such technical cooperation for economics see “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 30 April 1981”
\item \footnote{1050} Clemens “North Korea’s Quest”, pg. 145
\item \footnote{1051} Szalontai, “The International”; pg. 10
\end{itemize}
RBMK reactors, Pyongyang avoided becoming dependent on external fuel sources; light water reactors require enriched uranium to function (RBMK reactors do not) meaning the DPRK would have been forced to rely on imported uranium from Moscow.

With the new reactor, Pyongyang could, with “each core load…produce thirty kilograms of plutonium—sufficient to make five nuclear warheads. When U.S. intelligence spotted this operation in the mid-1980s, North Korea was already working on a much larger reactor.”1053 Following this success, the Soviets finally came around to providing broader nuclear assistance and agreed to help construct a nuclear power plant, which Pyongyang believed would help “to offset the fact that a nuclear power plant is already in operation in South Korea...[and to] enhance the DPRK’s economic prestige in foreign eyes.”1054

Soviet support had little to do with reformed DPRK behavior; Pyongyang still “evaded giving an unequivocal and final answer” regarding ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1983.1055 Moreover, this support came prior to North Korea joining the NPT, suggesting this was not a precondition to Soviet assistance.1056 Instead, the Soviets, feeling increasingly isolated and pressured by the U.S., saw the strategic value of placating DPRK interests. Additionally, Szalontai suggests Moscow “may have concluded that Pyongyang was determined to go ahead with its nuclear project anyway, and if they got involved in it, they would have more leverage over North Korea” (Moscow had adopted similar policies towards Romania following its nuclear advances in the 1980s).1057 Either way, the North now had further access to nuclear technology, propelling it towards the first nuclear crisis.

4.3 1990s & First Nuclear Crisis:

The North’s nuclear program is often viewed as a post Cold War phenomenon and a response to the North’s drastically altered strategic landscape at the start of the 1990s. If its attendance of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul had not been bad enough, Pyongyang was informed in September 1990 that Moscow would be establishing relations with South Korea. This was followed by Moscow’s cessation of military assistance in 1991, the official collapse of the USSR that December, and Yeltsin’s decision in 1992 to rescind Russia’s “automatic intervention” stance vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing for its part also normalized relations with Seoul in 1991 and ceased providing “friendship prices” to the North, resulting in a dramatic drop in bilateral trade. As Cha notes, even though Pyongyang was more dependent than ever on Beijing following the collapse of the USSR, it was also “deeply offended by China’s decision to normalize relations” with Seoul, resulting in a period of “non-dialogue for almost 10 years.”1058 Then, in 1994, Kim Il Sung passed away.

It is abundantly clear, therefore, that North Korea’s strategic landscape was drastically altered in the 1990s. However it would be a mistake to view these changes as the

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1053 Clemens, “North Korea’s”, pg. 145
1056 “Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 9 March 1985”
1057 Szalontai, “The International”, FN 37
1058 Cha, The Impossible, pg. 311
ultimate motivation behind a nuclear program decades in the making, as many scholars and policymakers have.\textsuperscript{1059} The argument that DPRK insecurity forced it to seek out deterrence is also a problematized view. According to classic deterrence theory, North Korea would only be able to feel secure once it had acquired a second strike capability; a few nuclear weapons with questionable delivery methods does not cut the bill, leading to questions over the “‘deterrent” or “provocative” effect of small nuclear arsenals”.\textsuperscript{1060} It is also particularly insightful that Pyongyang pursued nuclear weapons while under the nuclear umbrella of Beijing and Moscow. If, in the 1970s:

There was probably little reason to fear that the USSR would not honor its defensive commitments. Rather, Pyongyang seemed to be dissatisfied by the unwillingness of Moscow to support its offensive ambitions [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{1061}

As noted above, Pyongyang has repeatedly pursued policies contradictory to strategic allies (the Second Korean War, the NLL and Axe Murder, and 1980s bombings) with questionable reassurance of allied support in the event of larger conflicts breaking out. While the early interest in nuclear weapons may have been viewed in conjunction with this offensive mindset – an attempt to secure nuclear self-reliance to counter allied reluctance to support an adventurist foreign policy – questions over the ability to acquire genuine deterrence would have still remained. Therefore, it seems as though the North was equally, if not more, motivated by prestige and a desire to showcase itself as a modern and advanced nation equal to other states.

This of course raises questions as to why the North only seems to have enjoyed significant progress on the nuclear front from the mid-1980s onwards. For one, Hyman’s argues that the form of patronage system prevalent in authoritarian states like North Korea makes it difficult to effectively manage and organize intricate work projects,\textsuperscript{1062} not to mention the vast discrepancies regarding available resources when compared to larger states’ nuclear programs. Hymans also notes how the emergence of the non-proliferation regime, coupled with concerted efforts by the U.S., Japan and ROK to curtail DPRK efforts going back to 1985, have similarly hindered its progress. Secondly, it was only after the success of Pyongyang’s domestic nuclear initiatives in 1984 that Moscow finally came around to providing significant nuclear aid. The influx in technology, coupled with its own initiatives, allowed the North to separate plutonium from spent fuel rods in 1989, 1990 and 1991, providing enough fissile material for a few nuclear bombs. This was discovered following Pyongyang’s ratification of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and subsequent IAEA inspections in 1992,\textsuperscript{1063} laying the groundwork for the first nuclear crisis.

Prior to this, President Bush announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the Peninsula in September 1991 while that November ROK President Roh Tae Woo announced the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, pledging South Korea would not pursue or store nuclear weapons and unilaterally forbade reprocessing and enrichment facilities. This was largely seen as satisfying “all of

\textsuperscript{1059} For an overview of the literature on the DPRK nuclear program see Andrew Scobell, “North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions,” in James M. Lister, ed., Challenges Posed by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region (Korea Economic Institute, 2005)
\textsuperscript{1060} Hymans, “Assessing”, pg. 263
\textsuperscript{1061} Clemens, “North Korea’s”, pg. 149
\textsuperscript{1062} Hymans, “Assessing”
\textsuperscript{1063} Ibid, pg. 272
North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. On December 31, both Koreas signed onto the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which they pledged not to produce or possess nuclear weapons or reprocessing facilities. However, following IAEA revelations regarding discrepancies in reported DPRK nuclear material, and Pyongyang’s rejection for additional inspections of facilities believed to be housing separated plutonium, the situation on the Peninsula grew tense, with Pyongyang threatening to leave the NPT and Washington drawing up plans for potential military strikes. Finally, in 1994, after a series of talks, both Pyongyang and Washington agreed to the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Frameworks. This froze North Korea’s reactors and reprocessing facilities while Washington pledged to provide light water reactors, oil shipments and a move towards normalized relations.

The Agreement, as we now know, was not to last. A Republican dominated Congress held up Washington’s ability to implement its side of the deal, leading to delays in oil shipments and construction of the light water reactors. However, there are also questions behind North Korean sincerity. In 1992 Pyongyang began to cooperate with Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, with Pakistani officials (in search of missile technology) travelling to North Korea to view prototypes of the No-dong missile. By 1995 the two sides had agreed for North Korea to transfer 12-15 missiles to Pakistan throughout 1996-1997. Fitzpatrick notes that it is assumed centrifuge technology was most likely provided by Pakistan in turn. Consequently, while the North did dismantle large portions of its plutonium nuclear infrastructure, by 1998, it had begun a secret Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Project, the discovery of which in 2002 led to the second nuclear crisis. Given the program seems to be linked to the agreement with Pakistan, a process started in 1992, DPRK intentions towards the Agreed Framework are questionable, though Washington’s default certainly played a role.

Conclusions:

Much as in the 1950s and 1960s, DPRK policies throughout the 1970s and 1980s consistently placed ideational goals over material or traditional security considerations. To this end there was continuity in DPRK policy despite drastic changes in its strategic environment and the international system. The North remained committed towards forcing unification, and later the creation of an independent Korean Confederation. Its subsequent policies of brinkmanship undermined alliances and posed the potential for a conflict with the U.S. at a time the North was economically collapsing, had lost parity with Seoul, and had little commitment of allied intervention. At the same time, Pyongyang continued to invest both internationally and domestically into endeavors to propagate itself as a leader of independent states and as equally prestigious as Seoul, while at the same time turning to terrorism in an effort to dampen the latter’s success. Endeavors to acquire nuclear technology, dating back to the 1950s/1960s, were also further accelerated and, much like its other investments, seem to have been focused on advancing the DPRK’s image. Overall, while the North was not ambivalent to geostrategic changes, its responses are best accounted for through the prism of national narrative.

1065 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), pg. 74
Chapter 7
Conclusions

From North Korea’s formative years in the 1940s, through to the nuclear crisis of the 1990s, the empirical record – both tangible policies and diplomatic correspondence – reveals how Pyongyang has consistently championed ideationally motivated policies often at the expense of more traditional security goals. Consequently, DPRK behavior is found to be best accounted for within the context of national narrative; that is as an effort to protect and promote narrative. This is not to say Pyongyang discounted the international system or balance of power, but that it perceived its strategic terrain through the prism of national narrative, often leading to behavior contradictory to traditional security study expectations. By contrast, the alignment between the behavioral expectations derived from Chapters 2 and 3 and discourse analysis in Chapter 4 with the analytical findings in Chapter 5 and 6 validates the thesis’ argument regarding the need for an OS framework in security studies. In short, the framework provided a more holistic account of DPRK foreign policy, one that could hold fruitful analytical insights into a range of other case studies. From this, a number of other key points can also be drawn out.

The first deals with possible limitations in the analysis, including North Korea’s seemingly unusual behavioral patterns and distinct domestic power structure. It is argued, however, that this is linked to North Korea’s unique national narrative. Consequently, states with seemingly more ‘conventional’ foreign policies, or ascribing to more democratic power structures, are still subject to the scope of the framework, with behavioral differences linked to variances in national narratives. Interesting questions do arise, however, regarding the extent to which debates on sub narratives in more democratic societies might allow for greater policy shifts than in the DPRK, as well as the prospect for DPRK narrative maintenance in the wake of its famine in the 1990s. This in turn raises questions over the important role of past humiliations in narrative and the possibility to export some of the findings to states with similar histories as North Korea, especially in light of recent work in postcolonial studies. Last but not least, the framework’s reconceptualization of state interest and perceptions holds important implications for literature on conflict resolution generally, and for policy debates on North Korea specifically.

1. Empirical Results & Ontological Security

Analysis on the DPRK’s historical record indicates a preference for ideational goals and objectives over those rooted in more traditional security studies. Tracing through the five principle expectations for North Korean behavior drawn out from traditional security studies (Ch. 4) helps to underscore this point.

1. Unable to balance against the ROK/U.S. internally, North Korea should predominately focus on external balancing, with fighting alone seen as a last option.

In contrast to this expectation, North Korea preferred to fight alone during the Korean War, delaying the intervention of Chinese forces and then undermining their ability to join the war effort due to concerns of sovereignty. Despite the war greatly weakening DPRK capabilities, Pyongyang quickly engaged in nationalist economic polices bent on ascertaining economic self-reliance, undermining support from the Soviet Union to
again ‘go it alone’. Efforts to safeguard these policies further strained DPRK relations with Moscow and Beijing whom had sought to curtail domestic crackdowns, leading to decreased aid and discussions of possible régime change. After solidifying their nationalist position, Kim’s faction subsequently turned their attention to unification, engaging in unilateral offensive policies throughout the 1960s and 1970s that repeatedly contradicted the strategic interests of Moscow and Beijing. This often threatened to leave North Korea either isolated (in a similar fashion to Albania), in a possible conflict with allies (China in the late 1960s), or fighting a Great Power adversary on its own (DPRK brinkmanship in the 1970s). The North’s nuclear program similarly had a ‘go it alone mindset’. To this end, undeterred by Soviet opposition to its rather bellicose nuclear postures, and willing to divert tremendous resources into a nuclear program that resulted in reduced (and sorely needed) economic and energy support, Pyongyang continued with a domestic program that finally made breakthroughs in the 1980s, only after which did Moscow come around to providing support.

2. Given the balance of power on the Peninsula and the international system, North Korea should have retained a defensive posture, fearing the Soviets would not be chain-ganged into a larger conflict initiated by Pyongyang, and sought to solidify its alliance with major powers as much as possible.

This was certainly not the case in the Korean War, when Kim pushed for invasion long before it was strategically feasible, and when the more sensible action was to defensively balance against U.S.-ROK forces. The subsequent Soviet refusal to join the war effort, coupled with the 24hr period Kim believed he had been completely abandoned by allies, would surely have stayed in the minds of the DPRK leadership, undermining the extent to which they could count on allied support for future adventurism. Despite this, Pyongyang sought to lay the groundwork in the early 1960s for a renewed offensive unification strategy despite the continued presence of U.S. forces, relative parity with ROK forces, and the fact these policies undermined relations with Moscow. This eventually culminated into the Second Korean War. While relations with Moscow had somewhat improved by this time, the Soviets remained opposed to open hostilities. Moreover, relations with China had at this time drastically deteriorated over perceived attempts by Beijing to establish ‘feudalistic’ relations. Consequently, at the same time North Korea was in the thralls of the Second Korean War, much to the displeasure of Moscow, it was also contending with a possible armed conflict with China. To this end, not only did Pyongyang allow ideational interest to trump relations with key alliance partners, it also pursued offensive policies while engaged in these disputes despite the inhospitable geopolitical landscape for such endeavors and the risk of escalation with the U.S. via the USS Pueblo and EC-121. The 1970s policy of brinkmanship was similarly undertaken despite questions over allied commitment to intervene should a wider conflict erupt, as it almost did in 1976. While by the 1980s ROK-DPRK disparity eliminated the potential for unification under Pyongyang’s terms, it was at this time the North’s nuclear weapons program finally made significant progress, culminating into the first nuclear crisis. The fact Pyongyang was far from capable of claiming a genuine nuclear deterrence raises significant questions over purely ‘defensive’ motivations, with the nuclear program instead partially linked to ideational incentives.
All of this would seem to indicate that North Korea did recognize, and to some extent respect, the balance of power; it did not undertake a full invasion during the Second Korean War in the 1960s or during its campaign of brinkmanship in the 1970s, and shifted to advocating for a Confederation by the 1980s. However, it is difficult to account for those actions the DPRK did undertake from a traditional security study perspective, suggesting a more nuanced view, as provided by the OS framework, is required. Pyongyang thus responded to material facts, but did so through the prism of national narrative, resulting in an aggressively independent stance.

3. Given this security dependency one would also expect the DPRK to, for its own survival, not chastise or jeopardize its relationship with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, North Korea could free-ride given its inability to independently alter strategic calculations in a meaningful way.

North Korea has repeatedly undermined relations with key allies and refrained from free-riding. In the 1950s it undermined economic assistance by pushing a nationalist economic line. In the early 1960s it increased defense expenditure despite questionable strategic rationale, while distancing itself from its largest benefactor, the USSR, and was reportedly prepared for excommunication much like Albania. The result was a stunted defensive infrastructure and reduced Soviet aid, both of which increased economic strain. This military investment continued after the reintroduction of Soviet military assistance (following the ouster of Khrushchev) something allies viewed as unnecessary and a major cause of its economic difficulties. Kim’s renewed neutrality was then short-lived, shifting towards Moscow given Beijing’s attempts to forge a ‘feudalistic’ relationship, a decision that almost resulted in armed conflict. In spite of this, Pyongyang not only continued to ratchet up tensions along the DMZ, much to the displeasure of the Soviets, it went so far as to directly contradict Soviet interests by capturing the USS Pueblo. Renewed DPRK aggression along the NLL and in the DMZ following the failure of diplomatic talks in the 1970s were similarly conducted against the interest of Beijing (in the midst of détente) and Moscow, with whom Pyongyang had cool relations with throughout the decade.

North Korea has not only undermined key alliances, it has propositioned dissolving them entirely, as seen during talks over the Joint Communiqué in the 1970s and in efforts to form a Confederation in the 1980s. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s it also took the unusual step of becoming a source of support for seemingly non-strategic states, particularly in Africa, while simultaneously placing ideological-based limits on the acquisition of sorely need capitol via international trade. This was linked to its efforts to cultivate more of a leadership role amongst the NAM and Third World, from which it seems to have hoped to challenge the influence of Great Powers. This not only angered allies, it would seem to indicate North Korea’s interest in altering the international system. In the backdrop to all of this was the DPRK nuclear program, which was a persistent concern for the Soviets. As early as the 1960s, the DPRK refusal to commit to non-proliferation, or allow for oversight of what nuclear aid it did receive, led to serious concerns over its intentions. Incessant requests for nuclear assistance, despite its refusal to adopt more amenable postures, perturbed and angered Moscow to no end, and it was only after North Korean domestic success that Moscow came around to providing substantial aid in the hopes of maintaining some influence.
4. Focused on maintaining the bipolar system and ensuing “that no crisis gets so out of hand that it leads to war.

The extent to which North Korea maintained this position as a main objective of its foreign policy is questionable. It certainly did oppose Soviet peaceful coexistence as might be expected. However, it also supported direct confrontations with the U.S. on all fronts, in particular in regards to Vietnam. Pyongyang contributed what little resources it could (Kim would later claim this had a negative impact on the economy) and chastised the Soviets, and later Chinese, for not doing more. The Koreans also originally supported Sino-U.S. Détente (as opposed to most other states), believing this provided a chance to push for U.S. withdrawal from the Peninsula. Last but not least, North Korea seems to have been intent on trying to formulate a bloc of like-minded nationalist states from which to further challenge great power chauvinism.

5. Regarding the Sino-Soviet split North Korea should seek to be nonaligned or balance against/bandwagon with China.

As seen above, North Korea was far from ‘neutral’ during the split. At the same time it never fully balanced or bandwagoned, despite the serious implications stemming from its responses to perceived ideational threats. North Korean shifts thus had little to do with efforts to extract aid or ‘play’ one side off the other. Instead, in the early 1960s Kim “shifted from a neutral position to one markedly closer to China” due to ideological disagreements with peaceful coexistence, knowing all too well Beijing would be unable to provide similar levels of support. This was also done in the purview of Albania’s excommunication from the socialist bloc, with Kim reportedly prepared for a similar outcome. While this did not happen, allies reported the North’s decision to shift from Moscow had retarded both its economic growth and its military forces. Positive relations only resumed following the ouster of Khrushchev and a return to what Kim deemed to be a more ‘acceptable’ posture by Moscow. Meanwhile following the CR, and the perception Beijing was trying to engage in ‘feudalistic’ relations, Kim again pushed back. However he also refused to fully balance against China so as to maintain independence, despite armed conflict almost breaking out; indeed Kim simultaneously continued to work against Soviet interests, as seen above.

1.1 Ontological Security & Return to Foreign Policy:

Following the above overview, one finds that traditional security studies failed to account for a number of key DPRK decisions and policies. Instead, DPRK behavior is best accounted for within the context of national narrative, indicating the importance of non-systemic factors and a need to return to a foreign-policy approach to security studies, though one rooted in more than blanket statements of human nature. Instead, by taking seriously unit level factors and individual agency, what would otherwise seem to be inexplicable behavior suddenly appears as a rational and concerted effort to assert and maintain DPRK national narrative. These findings substantiate the OS framework devised over Chapters 2 and 3, providing a more robust account than previous historical or historical-intuitionalist based works, and align with the behavioral expectations derived from discourse analysis outlined in Chapter 4.

As expected, North Korea maintained a hypersensitivity to foreign influence, exploitation and Great Power chauvinism, seeking to assert its independence and
pride. This was often done at great expense to traditional security goals, jeopardizing North Korean strategic alliances, undermining access to economic and military support, augmenting economic woes, and risking larger conflict with Great Powers. It sought to affirm economic independence, not letting international economic incentives hold undue sway over Pyongyang, and repeatedly sought to ‘go it alone’, in economics, military and nuclear power, despite an inability to internally balance against the U.S.-ROK alliance. This is not to say it never requested assistance in all these fields, but that it would not be cajoled into altering its behavior to reap rewards. To this end, perceived actions seen as reminiscent of, or possibly moving towards, feudal or colonial-esc relations, or that could be interpreted as resembling a return to its temporal Self or its South Korean Other, were determinedly rebuffed. Similarly, efforts to curtail DPRK labors to achieve unification were regarded as Great Power chauvinism and thus spurned, often resulting in negative consequences. North Korea also diverted tremendous resources into strategically questionable polices: militarization in 1962, a domestic nuclear program from the 1960s onwards, becoming a purveyor of international aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and launching world conferences and prestige projects in the 1980s.

Regarding the OS framework, it can be surmised that North Korea responded to perceived personal crises by seeking to reassert narrative. This included the U.S. occupation of South Korea (Korean War); the Inchon Landing (debates on sovereignty undermining the war effort); de-Stalinization (nationalist economics and purges); peaceful coexistence (split with Moscow); Cultural Revolution (split with Beijing; int. aid); ROK solidification (brinkmanship; int. aid); and the Asian Games/Olympics (terrorism; prestige projects). The DPRK also took proactive steps to forge unification, develop positive relations with the NAM, and construct a nuclear program in line with its self-image as an advanced, modern, and independent nation.

Again, these findings do not suggest North Korea was ambivalent to its geo-strategic position or to systemic shifts. Importantly, however, the lens through which North Korea perceived its strategic landscape and responded to events requires far more nuance than is found in traditional security studies. Consequently, while in no way suicidal, Pyongyang was willing to undertake policies otherwise inexplicable to purely systemic-based, or more classical realist, analysis. DPRK objectives also remained fairly consistent from the outset of the Korean War through to the early 1990s despite the drastic changes within the North-South dyad, regional geopolitical shifts, and drastic alterations to the international system; while North Korean foreign policies changed in terms of adjustment (level of effort) and program (methods or means) the problem (goals) and international orientation (international role and activities) stayed the same. Pyongyang remained focused on asserting independence and sovereignty, pushing back against Great Power chauvinism – ‘self-reliance’ – and forging a unified and independent Korea. While systemic shifts altered the means through which North Korea sought to obtain these objectives, at no point does the North seem to have drastically deviated from these goals (even the 1980s shift towards a Confederation adhered to these basic principles).

1066 Hermann, “Changing Course” pg. 5-6
While all of this greatly supports the OS framework, it also helps to address the five components that a work on North Korea foreign policy ought to be able to address/account for, as first outlined in Chapter 1.

1. **Account for early DPRK agency and its friction with patron powers**

As noted on numerous occasions, DPRK decisions during the run up to and course of the Korean War, as well as its post-war reconstruction plan, left puzzling questions for both traditional security studies and for some of the literature on North Korea. However this early agency, and readiness to both fight alone and challenge key allies from an early stage, aligns with DPRK national narrative propagated by Kim Il Sung and his guerillas from an early stage; both during the liberation movement against Japan and during North Korea’s formative years.

2. **Account for the DPRK’s wider social and cultural attributes**

This same narrative in turn encapsulated the wide set of social and cultural attributes that have been the focus of numerous works on North Korea. The narrative derived from discourse analysis corresponds with the nationalistic and militaristic children games, daily sayings, dress, songs, and literature of North Korea vividly depicted in the works of, for example, Barbara Demick or Jang Jin-sung. While a conglomeration of Marxist-Leninism, Maoism, and Confucianism, DPRK national narrative – eventually codified in Juche – was an entirely distinct entity, one emphasizing not only non-subservience, but also Korean uniqueness, homogeneity, and pure bloodedness. Importantly, not all of this was forced upon the North Korean populace by a small contingent of elites; many had already developed anti imperialist and American sentiment as a result of colonization and the Korean War. There was, as Kang remarked, a fusion between the macro (government) and micro (daily lives of North Koreans), with national narrative establishing (and mirroring) a set of routines and rituals – in other words, a range of lifestyles – for the populace. As the DPRK’s ability to control society grew, it sought to further emphasize this collective memory and militant nationalism within all facets of life.

3. **Account for the formation of domestic power structures**

It was internal challenges to this national narrative, first in 1956 and later in 1967, that led Kim Il Sung to further consolidate his position, leading to the North’s unique domestic structure. These shifts were not merely a jockeying for sheer power; they were the result of substantial policy debates that represented wider fissures regarding national narrative. Throughout North Korea’s early years, Kim’s guerilla faction was but one group, albeit the dominate one, in the post-independent period. As shown in Chapter 4, their experiences during the campaign for liberation helped them form a distinctly appealing and coherent narrative that was elevated as the ideal for all groups, underscoring the genuine national sentiment of the populace at that time.

In 1956 this dominant narrative was challenged by the CGG, a loose political affiliation of ethnic Koreans from Russia and Koreans who had fled to China during colonization. This group subsequently held a less strident form of nationalism and, given their background, viewed Great Powers in a far more favorable light. As North Koreans sought to forge who exactly they ‘were’, the CGG wanted to drastically alter
the North’s position to one markedly closer to Great Powers; strategically, economically, socially, and politically. Kim’s faction successfully fended off the CGG’s attempts to redirect North Korea’s course and refashion its identity, purging its members and further solidifying their power and narrative. To this end, during its formative years, there was still some sense of debate regarding what the North Korean narrative ought to entail. This debate, for the most part, became closed off following 1956. While there was a renewed challenge to Kim’s policies following the KWP Second Congress in 1967, with some officials questioning ‘equal emphasis’, these officials were duly purged and the Monolithic Ideological System established, closing off once and for all any acceptable future debate.

The challenge in 1956 was thus not only substantively more acute than in 1967, it was also conducted at a time DPRK narrative was still being crafted following liberation and the Korean War. By 1967, not only was a coherent narrative institutionalized, the scope of questioning was less of a threat. Still, in both instances, Kim’s faction responded to these internal ideational threats by removing from power those behind the counter narratives, and by seeking to further instill their position so as to safeguard against potential threats in the future. It should also be noted it is unknown the level of support these counter narratives might have received in broader public debate; in 1956 they were propagated by entities whose pasts – having lived in either Russia or China – were different than those of the wider North Korean populace that had rallied around Kim in the post liberation years given his ability to put forward a widely resonating narrative.

4. **Account for the continued emphasis on Juche and continuities in DPRK behavior over time and across different circumstances**

A combination of the fusion between the macro and micro, combined with the ability of Kim Il Sung’s faction to combat internal policy/narrative debates, allowed for the solidification of North Korean national narrative, eventually codified in *Juche*. While the term itself was not employed until 1955, and did not come into common usage until later – culminating into the 1972 *Juche* constitution – its foundational tenants corresponded with the narrative propagated by Kim from much earlier. *Juche* therefore became in many ways a catchall phrase for DPRK national narrative and, given the persistence of this narrative, it maintained an important function in DPRK policy deliberations. It therefore became the prism through which the North responded to events and planned for the future, resulting in consistent behavior.

5. **Explain How and Why Juche influences foreign policy decision-making**

While historical works on North Korea have started to reveal the importance of DPRK history and the ideology of *Juche* in explaining past events, their works did not grapple with questions of how and why. By contrast, the OS framework explicitly broke down why national narrative (and *Juche*) is so important and how specifically it comes to impact foreign policy decision-making. To this end, as policymakers’ represent new information they seek to determine if it is threatening or non-threatening to the norm – i.e. national narrative. Those events re-presented and then interpreted as negative take on negative qualities - a negative image - leading to appropriate schemas and postures. An OS threat will in turn be perceived when: 1) there is competing historical representations of the past central to national narrative, 2) there
is alternative narratives pertaining to a certain place and what that place should/should not be, and 3) the failure of one narrative to adequately recognize another. At the same time, North Korea would proactively try and gain recognition of its narrative.

The framework therefore provides a more holistic account of DPRK behavior than traditional security studies while also accounting for the five components necessitated by a work on DPRK foreign policy. North Korea’s position as the seeming antithesis of modernity also bolsters the claim that works on OS need not be focused solely on modernity. In doing so, however, it also highlights to some extent the peculiarity of North Korea as a case study. Consequently, a few limitations/implications stemming from the empirical findings should be elaborated on.

2 Limitations of Findings & Further Implications

There are roughly three sets of limitations/implications that stem out of the empirical analysis. The first relates to North Korea’s power structures and the impact this had on narrative stability. The second relates to more specific questions on the future of North Korea, in particular what impact the famine from 1994-1998 might have on narrative and the population of North Korea. The third relates to the relationship between DPRK behavior and the unique content of its national narrative and the potential to extrapolate the findings to other postcolonial or ‘humiliated’ states.

2.1 Power Structures:

North Korea is often characterized by its extreme centralization and firm grasp over the socialization of its populace. This power structure seems to have had two important implications for the case study. For one, it allowed for a rather continuous national narrative, possibly resulting in less policy flux than may have occurred had sub narratives been allowed to openly compete. In more democratic societies, one might then find some deviations in state policy depending on if one sub narrative is in power as opposed to another, for example the Neoconservative ideology of the George W. Bush administration. Secondly, the DPRK narrative became increasingly entangled – to a greater degree than other states – with the legitimacy of the regime. As Juche became a ‘philosophy’ in the 1970s, and took on religious qualities in the 1980s, it therefore became increasingly hard for the regime to deviate from the narrative, given its function in legitimatizing the leadership and its portrayal of the infallibility of the Kim regime, a sentiment linked to its ongoing “epic struggle against the impermanent nature of charismatic authority.”

This all leads to the first set of limitations and questions.

1. Given the structure of the DPRK, questions remain over to what extent derivative narratives championed by political parties in more democratic states result in behavioral deviations – i.e. to what extent do they expand or retract the scope of what might be perceived as an OS threat and/or goals the state should be working towards. For example, Holsti writes in regards to role conceptions how “[i]t is easy

1067 At the same time, “few Democrats today dispute his fundamental point that America has a responsibility to order the world, presumably for the benefit of all.” Boyle, “Utopianism”, pg.83; see also Krebs, Narrative, pg. 13-14

1068 Kown and Chung, North Korea, pg. 4

1069 Steele has begun to investigate the overlap between ontological security and organizational processes within sates, looking at discursive debates over the CIA’s use of torture in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Brent J. Steele, “Organizational processes and ontological (in)security: Torture, the CIA and the United States” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.52, No. 1 (2017)
to speculate that had Hubert Humphrey been elected president in 1968, some of his foreign policy decisions might have differed substantially from those taken by Richard Nixon. It is unlikely, however, that he would have changed the United States’ established national role conceptions, such as developer, defender of the faith, or regional protector. Thus as governments come and go, to what extent do they change the national narrative, and thus foreign policy.

Linked to this is are remaining questions over to what extent domestic questions/challenges to national narrative are more or less threatening than external challenges. In North Korea, Kim’s faction seems to have viewed both as equally threatening but it is not clear if this would be found in other case studies. In 1956 the CGG certainly did pose a threat to the very foundation of DPRK narrative, a threat that might have led to similar responses in other states still in their formative years and/or dealing with larger ideational debates; for example Huysmans has written how internal others that challenge norms and become threats to self-identity are ascribed to be the enemy. In 1967, however, the challenge was less narratively substantive, raising questions if it should be viewed as a policy debate comparable to what one finds in more democratic societies (for example surrounding neoconservative ideology) or if it was indeed a more substantial ideational threat. Questions also remain over the degree of narrative difference that might be found between political parties in democratic states and the potential for conflict should these become too divergent. Such questions are therefore best examined across a variety of case studies and varying power structures.

Building from this overview, one additional point must be examined specifically within the context of North Korea: the increasingly problematic relationships between legitimacy and narrative maintenance and how it might continue following North Korea’s famine from 1994-1998.

2.2 North Korea’s Famine:

One of the largest implications of the famine, outside of the countless lives lost, was the breakdown in North Korea’s social order. This could in some respects be interpreted as a fateful moment. Demick writes, before the famine “people knew what the rules were and which ones not to cross. Now the rules were in play-and life became disorderly and frightening.” Conversely, the fact that many elements of the state continued to function and many routines and rituals were still followed, albeit unenthusiastically, and then largely restored following the famine, raises questions over if indeed this should be classified a fateful moment or not. This all raises fruitful avenues for further investigation regarding the relationships between famine and OS. For the topic at hand, however, it also raises an important question regarding to what extent the preexisting DPRK narrative was able to remain intact and to what extent it remains a source of comfort for North Koreans post-1998, especially since fateful moments often result in re-articulation of narrative. Yook’s comparative analysis on North Korea’s two editions of Ryeoksa Sajeon, Dictionary of History, from 1971 and 1999-2004, helps shed light on changes that might have occurred.

1070 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”, pg. 298
1071 Huysmans, “Security”
1072 See for example Demick, Nothing, pg. 57, 67
1073 Demick, Nothing, pg. 184
In the latest edition, Western Europe is no longer vilified, Gorbachev is viewed as betraying Pyongyang’s former socialist allies, and Marxism-Leninism is seen as a flawed system. However, the U.S., while now talked about in “a sour but somewhat restrained tone”, is still seen as the “archetype of imperialism.” Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

It is also seen as affiliated with the continuing threat of ilchehwa (homogeneification), a “new reactionary vocabulary which was falsely invented by the United States in order to restrict the subjectivity of other nations, eliminate their own nationalities, and thus monopolize its world domination.” Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

Thus, while North Korea seems to have responded to the new globalized world (focus on world history doubled while Korean history decreased), it also sees homogeneification as something that must be overcome. Meanwhile both versions “have chronicled how bravely and desperately North Korea…has struggled for its own survival throughout the age of bloody civil/cold war and the horrible age of Pax Americana (or rather that of homogeneification).” Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

It would appear, therefore, that while some sub narratives have been changed, the metanarrative, as a whole, has remained intact.

Sticking to its narrative, the regime has certainly done its best to portray the famine as the result of imperialism and efforts – via sanctions – to finally crush the DPRK. Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

However problems abound. In surveys conducted by Haggard and Noland (see Table 4 in Ch. 4), 1.8% of refugee respondents claimed to be leaving for political reasons in their 2004-2005 survey; this number rose to 27% in the 2008 survey. The authors also note how the collapse of existing social structures allowed for a new ‘social space’ to develop in the form of unsanctioned private markets, which provided “a greater space for at least a limited forms of political communication.” Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

While the regime appears to have “cultivated a core base of supporters in the army, party, and state apparatus”, the authors could also “not rule out that mass support for the regime may be much weaker” than is frequently believed, though public dissent remains minimal. Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

They also note that while earlier refugees were “more willing to entertain the view that the country’s problems were due to foreigners”, later waves have increasingly come to blame the regime. All of this suggests a decline in the “hold of ideology and the regime’s particularly virulent nationalism.” Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

These results, however, need to be qualified. Kyung-Ae Park’s work on refugees has found “the primary motivation for leaving their homeland is a desire to survive and generally improve their living conditions.” In the 1990s it was survival, more recently it has been “economic betterment”, leading some to classify these refugees as more “migrating laborers.” The fact that a majority of refugees come from the poorest province in North Korea, and the fact that as “of January 2009, about 87 percent of the 15,271 refugees had been either unemployed back home or manual laborers” and contain only small numbers of the elite or middle class, indicates economic rather than political motivation. Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149

This point is further substituted by the apparent problems of sanctions and the collapse of social structures.

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1074 Yook, “Historiography”, pg. 148, 149
1075 Ibid, pg. 154, 156
1076 Idem, pg. 69
1077 Haggard and Noland, Witness, pg. 111
1078 Ibid, pg. 103
1079 Ibid, pg. 103
correlation between the large portion of refugees that are women and their increasing role as the primary bread earners in North Korea.

Levels of political disenchantment are also questionable; a 2008 survey of refugees living in Seoul “revealed that about 75 percent of them did not show any negative sentiment toward Kim Jong Il’s leadership” while a separate survey showed an overwhelming majority of refugees in South Korea did not hope “to become like South Koreans when they grow up…many refugees were found to suffer from post traumatic stress disorder” and some even wanted to return to North Korea or resettle elsewhere.” Of the 45 organizations established by North Koreans in the South, only 4 were established with the explicit aim of undertaking anti-North Korean activity, the rest were social organizations aimed at “promoting a bond amongst North Koreans.” Even for those scholars who have found a more negative view of Kim Jong Il amongst refugees, there might be some hope for the regime as a whole:

It didn’t take much prodding for people to admit their ambivalence toward Kim Jong-II, whom they blamed for the famine. “When Kim II-sung died, I cried desperately. I didn’t know how we could go on living. When Kim Jong-II died, I cried too, but not so much. Our lives are so hard. We are less loyal, honestly”…“He [Kim Jong-un] is so young. We think he will open up North Korea. He won’t do politics like the others.”

As Demick writes, Kim Il Sung, “picked a convenient time to die, one that would prevent his legacy from being tarnished…Had he lived a moment longer, North Koreans today would not be able to look back with nostalgia at the relative plenty they had enjoyed during his lifetime.” To this end, the régime seems to have gone through great lengths to mirror Kim Jong Un off his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, rather than his father, Kim Jong II. Relatedly, Park found a “sentimentality expressed for the leadership [amongst refugees] even as they expressed anger with the political system.” The regime, it seems, is therefore walking a thin line. On the one side there is a great deal of political discontentment and seemingly “zero” true believers left in terms of the political system; money, rather than political loyalty, has come to play an increasingly important role in North Korean life. At the same time, there seems to be a persistent level of embedded nationalist sentiment within the North Korean populace. This all brings up the second set of questions.

2. Given the increased focus on narrative maintenance for legitimation, one must ask whether North Korea can somehow produce a settlement with the international community that simultaneously conforms to DPRK narrative while allowing for an easing in domestic woes or if a revised narrative is ultimately required that allows for broader change while still embodying this nationalist sentiment and continuing to prop up the regime. For example, Barnet argues that it was Prime Minister “Rabin’s

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1081 Demick similarly depicts the insecurity and anxiety experienced by many North Korean refugees who have to, for the first time, make all sorts of decisions themselves, opening yet another potentially fruitful avenue for examination of OS.

1082 Park, “People’s Exit “, pg. 13, 7

1083 Ibid, pg. 14

1084 Demick, Nothing, pg. 287

1085 Ibid, pg. 115

1086 Cha, The Impossible, pg. 74

1087 Demick, Nothing, pg. 296

1088 There is also a possibility, taking from Croft and Vaughan-Williams, to explore how crisis conditions can become embedded within a narrative, becoming normal; i.e. consistently being under threat from imperialists, the US and South Korea. See Croft and Vaughan-Williams “Fire for purpose?; On crisis being embedded in DPRK narrative see Raing, Reading.
practices and policies – to create, however temporarily, a cultural space in Israeli politics...a construction of an Israeli identity [as Zionist and Liberal] and interests that were tied to a peace process”, that ultimately allowed for momentum on the Oslo Accords. All of this relates to the general question, noted above, regarding whether or not domestic challenges to narrative are more or less threatening than external ones. Moreover, within North Korea, the lack of free and open discourse and the level of focus the regime places on the infallible nature of the Kim dynasty to prop itself up, it is questionable if larger deviations from the narrative are conceivable; as Yook’s analysis above shows the changes we have seen appear minimal. This could in turn mean the real question is if the physical (i.e. hunger, medicine, economic.) concerns of the North Korean populace and the security concerns of the international community can somehow be solved within the context of existing DPRK narrative. To this end, it is important to look at some of the broader implications of North Korea’s distinct national narrative.

2.3 Colonialism/Humiliation:

North Korean behavior is often typified as being outside the norm. This, however, is a fairly shallow interpretation, and it is perhaps more accurate to view DPRK behavior as indicative of its distinct narrative, one built out of experiences of humiliation and colonization and, perhaps more importantly, the process through which it went on to gain independence. This in turn resonates with some of the work being done in postcolonial studies, helping to bridge the gulf between the “mountain of intellectual work done on the colonial relationship” and IR.

While there has been contestation over the term postcolonial, many accept it denotes not necessarily the end of colonialism but the implications colonialism had, and still has, in the “construction of contemporary relations of power, hierarchy, and domination.” Given its strong routes in postmodern and poststructuralist thought, a great deal of postcolonial studies has focused on deconstructing knowledge claims. Much of this takes from Said’s investigation into how the West (the Occident) created, through “academic, philosophical and other cultural expression” a set of accepted knowledge wherein the Occident was seen as culturally superior to the backward East (the Orient), thereby protecting European imperialism. Consequently, a large portion of Chowdhry and Nair’s work integrating postcolonial thought into IR, focuses on how “pseudoscientific racist and gendered constructions of the other…inscribe the cultural authority and dominance of the West under colonial rule and in the postcolonial present”, on how the non-European other was often seen as both primitive and “feminized in contrast to a masculinized European identity” and on the “relationship between culturalism and materialism.” Importantly, however, the fourth section of their work seeks to move beyond this focus on deconstruction to examine “material histories...[relating] these histories to questions of resistance and agency” and the “significance of colonizing practices, counter-narratives, and

1089 Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 5, No. 1 (1999), pg. 6
1090 Phillip Darby, “Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International” Millennium, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2004), pg. 6
1091 Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, “Introduction: Power in a postcolonial world: race, gender, and class in international relations” in Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (eds.) Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class (Routledge 2014), pg. 11
1092 Chowdhry and Nair, “Introduction”, pg. 12
1093 Ibid, pg. 15, 19, 23
struggles, and the marginalized’s “recovery of self”.\textsuperscript{1094}

Such a view stems from what Derby and Paolini label the ‘second movement’ of postcolonial studies; “Third World scholars such as Albert Memmi, Octavio Mannoni, and especially Frantz Fanon, who utilized Freudian and other psychoanalytic perspectives to focus on the colonizer-colonized relationship and posited the necessity of resistance and rejection” and the need “to recover precolonial culture, language, and identity in a process of resistance to colonization”.\textsuperscript{1095} These works focus on the “recovery of self...[which] often entails political struggle and liberation from colonial rule, and the search for, and realization of...an identity that has been systematically degraded and denied by the colonizers.” At the same time these works have been cautious about nationalism’s “potential hegemony and the exclusions that it engenders”, a position taken further by scholars, such as Chakrabarty, Guha, and Prakash, focusing on subaltern historiography.\textsuperscript{1096}

It is argued, however, that one should not be too quick to dismiss nationalism. Kim Il Sung’s ability to put forward a national narrative, one that resonated with a large plethora of the North Korean populace, played a key role in the aftermath of Japanese colonization. Of course this was, as noted, only one narrative – albeit a dominant one – and it certainly marginalized and, over time, silenced others. And such contestation should certainly be noted. However, as has been shown, one must not overlook the vital importance national narrative plays in the provision of individuals’ OS. This is especially true in the aftermath of colonization,\textsuperscript{1097} as individuals seek to construct a new narrative in which to become embedded. If these narratives, influenced by colonial experiences – what Volkan would term a chosen trauma – are focused on resistance, this could have profound influence on foreign policy. This might be especially true when the process of decolonization was less than positive.

As Jeronimo and Pinto write, the “ends of empire were plural and complex, and the imperial endgame was not an inexorable and inevitable process.” They go on to comment on the “diverse appropriation of idioms and repertoires of protest and resistance, and self-determination.”\textsuperscript{1098} North Korea is representative of those colonies forced to undertake violent resistance or, as in the case of former Soviet states, those who gained independence following domestic uprisings in the wake of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. In these instances, the transition to independence was a less than positive experience (for example the British Empire is often viewed as undertaking a “serene transfer of power”\textsuperscript{1099}), eliminating the potential for at least a minimal level of healing or reconciliation. What is important therefore, aligning with postcolonial studies, is “the relations of domination and resistance and the effect they have had on identity, in, through, and beyond the colonial encounter.”\textsuperscript{1100}

\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid, pg. 25
\textsuperscript{1095} Phillip Darby and A. J. Paolini “Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism” Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pg. 376
\textsuperscript{1096} Chowdhury and Nair, “Introduction”, pg. 26
\textsuperscript{1097} Gothel, “Juche”, pg. 20
\textsuperscript{1098} Miguel Bandeira Jeronimo and Antonio Costa Pinto, “Introduction” in Miguel Bandeira Jeronimo and Antonio Costa Pinto (eds.) The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pg. 3
\textsuperscript{1099} Jeronimo and Pinto, “Introduction”, pg. 7
\textsuperscript{1100} Darby and Paolini, “Bridging”, pg. 375
In short, there is a need for IR to take seriously the impact of “colonial violence and dispossession” on national narratives, which in turn have a profound relationship with foreign policy. Those states that, much like North Korea, hold narratives emanating from a negative decolonization experience might in turn be expected to have similar behavioral expectations. This leads to a somewhat revised interpretation of resistance than is often found in postcolonial studies, which often entails crafting a counter-narrative via postcolonial works. Here, the focus is instead on how colonial history impacted national identity and the influence this in turn has for contemporary foreign relations; in other words how those states continue to ‘resist’ perceived imperialist tendencies in foreign relations. States like North Korea, by purposefully resisting Great Power policies and remnants of/reminders of the past, are able to empower a distinct identity construct that emerged after liberation. It may be then that what we term as abnormal is merely a continuation of the “resistance and voices of rejection” of the “marginalized and dominated.” Indeed, flaunting international norms imposed by Great Powers may be a means of showcasing this resistance, especially given the difficulty faced by the “Third World…[in] implementing a new representational regime.” This can also partially be seen in North Korea’s call to overcome “homogeneification” – globalization.

3. There is, consequently, an important need for IR to no longer treat imperialism “as a “historical category” but to explore its “workings”, consequences, and mechanisms by which it declined.” OS could in turn help to showcase the importance of these experiences by examining how they have been codified in national narratives and the impact this in turn has on state behavior. It also broadens the analytical scope, expanding the postcolonial focus on “modernity critically received...[with its] disabling effects [presented] as a rationale for Third World doctrines of resistance”; it is not just North-South relations or modernity, but the importance of how historical events, such as colonization, are represented in national narrative and the impact this has on interests and perceptions.

In line with this overview, and given the empirical analysis, a few cursory points can be drawn out in regards to literature on conflict resolution.

3. Ontological Security & Conflict Resolution

Theoretical approaches to conflict resolution originally surrounded a classical interpretation of conflict, optimized by Peter Wallenstein’s definition, as “a social situation, in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.” Resource-based negotiations therefore focused on “maximizing predefined outcomes,” largely derived from realist thinking, and left little room for information processing and interactional learning.

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101 Darby, “Pursuing the Political”, pg. 3
102 It should also be noted that the study provides further evidence to Lindemann’s claim that Hubristic narratives are more exposed to “narcissistic wounds” and thus more likely to go to war. See Causes of War, pg. 31-34
103 Such a view allows for a “reflective engagement with the experience of colonization and its power to shape past and current realities at the local, national and global level” rather than limiting analysis to some geographic or temporal period. Chowdhry and Nair, “Introduction”, pg. 12
104 Ibid, pg. 25
105 Darby and Paolini “Bridging”, pg. 387, 388
106 Ibid, pg. 379-380
107 Ibid, pg. 390
While allowing for “short-term, material ‘fixes [the] underlying conflict causes [remain] untouched,”¹¹⁰ a problem Farneti shows also plagues works building from John Rawls focus on “a fair allocation of a limited set of available resources.”¹¹⁰ While the introduction of “Interest Based Bargaining” subsequently sought to move emphasis towards motivations, Rothman and Olson argue this maintained previously “uncritical attitude towards interests,” overlooking ideational variables.¹¹¹

The empirical record substantiates critiques of these traditional approaches (Licklider, Rothman & Olson), with Herbet Kelman arguing the failure to address “identity issues has the effect of further polarizing the [involved] parties.”¹¹² Since the 1990s, Rumeleli notes how “numerous scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution have underscored that identity-based and interest-based concerns are closely intertwined…and there is the need to also address the psycho-cultural dynamics of conflict.”¹¹³ The thesis’ OS framework can advance these works in a number of ways.

For one, it allows for broader applicability than current works by eliminating self-imposed restrictions to focus on intra-state conflicts given the belief that “identity issues [are] not central” to inter-state conflicts.¹¹⁴ As the thesis found, this has led to misdiagnosed analysis, with DPRK foreign policy best accounted for through the prism of national narrative. Secondly, Rumeleli notes that while “social psychological approaches to conflict resolution [have] stressed the necessity to reconstruct societal beliefs…insufficient attention has been paid to the processes whereby these alternative beliefs are formulated and become ingrained in self narratives and practice.”¹¹⁵ Therefore, she forges a framework wherein OS can hinder conflict resolution as groups come to feel anxious about disruptions to established identities of Self and Other. At the same time this can provide the necessitated room for a re-articulation of Self and Other.

Rumeleli’s framework is an important contribution and represents the first attempt to fuse OS and conflict resolution. However it largely builds from Mitzen’s application of Mercer and Social Identity Theory to argue states obtain OS through routinized relations, and in doing so can possibly become attached to conflict. Such a view was critiqued in Chapters 2 and 3; group identity is not founded upon relations with another group, but on a reflexively forged group narrative. While these narratives are largely the result of previous interactions, they still become the lens for interpreting interactions. Of course groups could maintain detrimental relationships if integral to self-narrative, in which case Rumeleli’s framework would be applicable, as attempts to refashion the relationship would pose an ideational threat. This is not a foregone conclusion though, but is dependent on the narrative at hand. Consequently, there is a need to shift the OS perspective on conflict resolution away from inter-group relations and towards the sources of ideational threats the belligerent sides are responding to.

One possibility comes from the work of Subotic who, as examined in Chapter 3, argues that while still coherent entities, narratives contain various layers and “inherent

¹¹¹ Farneti, “A Mimetic Perspective” pg. 536
¹¹² Rothman and Olson, “Interests to Identities” pg. 293
¹¹³ Ibid, pg. 291
¹¹⁴ Bahar Rumeleli, “Introduction” in Rumeleli (eds.), Conflict, pg. 19
¹¹⁶ Rumeleli, “Introduction” pg. 3
contradictions”¹¹¹⁶ that can be activated and deactivated while still maintaining the overarching structure. The central motifs of the metanarrative are ‘vague enough’ that they can allow for changes in more “specific, derivative narratives” (also Delehanty and Steele, Hopf¹¹¹⁷), adjusting behavior to mitigate a threat while at the same time maintaining perceived continuity. For example, Subotic notes how Serbia, when forced to adopt to changing circumstances, finally coped with the unavoidable loss of Kosovo (an area central to narrative) by agreeing to terms but refusing to grant recognition, thereby preserving Serbia’s metanarrative. Relatedly, Chernobrov has noted how OS can also be maintained so long as “evaluative continuity in the relationship – a positive self – is preserved.” This helps demonstrate the potential space that exists from which to formulate settlements that, by being interpreted as supporting a positive conception of the Self (and/or a more acceptable conception of the Other¹¹¹⁸), could allow for a cessation of hostilities while still upholding OS.¹¹¹⁹

When an inter-group relationship is fundamental to self-narrative, inducing an environment that the belligerents “intersubjectively interpret as necessitating change”¹¹²⁰ might therefore force them to adjust behavior in conjunction with the (de)/activation of derivative narratives. When the relationship is not vital to the narrative of the belligerents, the goal might then be to seek out a solution that resonates with specific derivative narratives, thereby allowing for a resolution that is ideationally acceptable. Thus, when a state aggressively responds to ideational threats, it becomes important to formulate policies that allow for the “containment of anxiety without securitization”,¹¹²¹ attempting to find resonance between what flexibility the pertinent narrative has (vis-à-vis its range of derivative narratives) and how these correlate with the array of possible resolutions at hand. In both instances, the focus shifts towards addressing what prompted the ideational threat, and not on inter-group relationships in and of themselves.

Within the context of North Korea, attempts to engage with Pyongyang that only focus on inducement/coercion through material incentives are missing a key part of the North’s strategic calculus. We must also begin to move away from the commonly held notion that “a knowingly false image—an incorrect description—would not hold and can be avoided.”¹¹²² In other words, we must recognize that North Korea’s image of Others and representations of events, even if divorced from objective knowledge, still holds resonance with its population precisely because it conforms with its own national narrative. Instead, it is vital to take into account DPRK narrative and how this resonates with the proposals at hand. As noted above, this is further complicated by the limited maneuverability the régime has given the extent to which its legitimacy is entwined with the existing narrative. Problems will thus arise when there is an impasse over ideationally acceptable policies. For example while policy X might be ideationally acceptable to Pyongyang, it might be ideationally unacceptable to others.

¹¹¹⁶ Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 2
¹¹¹⁷ Hopf, Social Construction; Will Delehanty and Brent J Steele, Engaging the Narrative in Ontological (in)security Theory: Insights from Feminist IR” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), pg. 523-540
¹¹¹⁸ For example the Italians reframed the Ethiopians as Caucasians, allowing for continuity in their Self-narrative despite being defeated at Adwa in 1896. Chernobrov, “Ontological Security“, pg. 587
¹¹²⁰ Subotic, “Narrative”, pg. 5, 7
¹¹²¹ Rumeleli, “Introduction” pg. 16
¹¹²² Chernobrov, “Ontological Security“, pg. 593
While only a cursory examination, it would appear as though OS could hold important insights into conflict resolution by helping policymakers and scholars better understand and account for the interests and perceptions of the belligerents. Only once such an understanding is attained will progress towards de-escalation be achieved.

4. Final Remarks

IR theory has been witnessing a burgeoning new subfield of literature surrounding the concept of OS. These work have already achieved great strides in reconfiguring how scholars conceptualize and employ identity in the field of IR. The aim of this thesis was to further clarify how OS might be best applied to interstate relations, creating a new analytical framework that could account for gaps in security studies by reintegrating foreign policy analysis and unit level factors.

To this end, the thesis examined the concept of OS, the security of being, and individuals’ desire for a (perceived) stable self-identity (self-narrative). It then sought to integrate complementary works on self-identity, nationalism, and evolutionary biology to further establish the historical relationship between individual self-identity and one’s community. Not only is self-narrative influenced by one’s community, individuals also seek to nest narratives, placing themselves within a larger, seemingly more stable, communal narrative. Consequently, individuals have an interest in maintaining their community as this provides OS. It was argued this has historically been the case for man, dating back to its earliest groups, and is a relationship that continues today under nations and nation states. The implications of these findings were then expanded on in regards to interstate relations, integrating elements of SRT and FPA to clearly establish how OS comes to impact state perceptions and interests.

Because nations are “imagined” individuals have an interest in maintaining communal narrative. Policymakers, and thus states, will therefore come to interpret events in terms of what they mean for the narrative. An entity or event seen as threatening the narrative, generating a personal crisis, will be re-presented as negative, leading to corresponding foreign policy postures. All of this helps to establish how OS can account for states perceptions and interests that would otherwise appear seemingly irrational to the outside observer/those employing a traditional security study lens. This was empirically verified by generating behavioral expectations derived from discourse analysis on the DPRK, and placing these expectations against DPRK foreign policy and archival records. These findings have raised numerous avenues for potentially fruitful investigation, in terms of North Korea empirically and theoretically in terms of work on OS, FPA, and conflict resolution.

To conclude, OS is an important new field of study and has already generated important new insights for IR, and it is believed the framework provided in the thesis will allow scholars to further pursue OS in regards to a range of case studies, (Vichy France and government in exile; China’s potential challenge to the Western/U.S. global order; Putin’s role in reformulating a post-Soviet identity for Russia), generating further breakthroughs in our understanding of interstate (and intrastate) relations.

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1123 Goddard argues the failure of powers to balance against Prussia in 1864 was the result of Prussia’s appeal “to shared rules and norms” and “rhetoric that would resonate with the great powers” thereby placating their OS. “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power” International Security, Vol. 33, No,3 (Winter 2008/09), pg. 112
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