The role of social capital for post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction

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THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
FOR POST-ETHNIC-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

BY

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THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR POST-ETHNIC-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

(IN FOCUS: BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA)

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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDA</td>
<td>Accessible Information on Development Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARBiH</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Association of the United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community Driven Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHDCS</td>
<td>Committee on Human Development and Civil Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMFS</td>
<td>Community Small Mobilisation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoDE A</td>
<td>Community Development A</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Ethnicity Driven Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Ethnicity Related Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESI</td>
<td>European Stability Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMP</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia And Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Agency for Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croat Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOS</td>
<td>Croatian Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>(Balkan) Human Rights Network, Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HV (HVO)</td>
<td>Croatian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICB</td>
<td>International Crisis Behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Commission of Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Meta-Conflict Approach</td>
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Examining the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction, the research challenges the appropriateness of the uniform application of general policies and practices to any particular environment. As a context- and conflict-dependant practice, a post-conflict reconstruction that aims at achieving lasting peace and sustainable development should address specific needs through relevant mechanisms. This is especially relevant for post-ethnic-conflict cases.

The thesis argues that post-conflict reconstruction after an ethnic conflict should address as a matter of priority the problems related to the recovery or construction of societal micro-frameworks with respect to the macro-unit in focus. Based on the explored concepts of social capital, a model outlining its specific fragmentation after an ethnic conflict is elaborated and the research discusses the mechanisms that have the potential to contribute to the achievement of planned and desired reconstruction outcomes and levels of success.

To test the theory against empirical findings, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined, as it provides good examples for the negative impact of ethnic conflict on macro and micro socio-political levels and for the discrepancies between expected and achieved results. The reconstruction practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered in the context of policies and programmes designed and implemented by representatives of the international and local community, with a focus on the efforts directed towards social capital rebuilding.
INTRODUCTION

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War melted globally the frozen peace, but also heated up a number of suppressed local tensions in various spots of the world. Violence in particularly extreme forms spurred within and across state borders. In 1995, prolonged combats between the military forces of two or more governments, or between one government and at least one organised armed group with high number of battle-related deaths occurred within rather than between states (SIPRI 1996:16).

In the context of the raising awareness about the global economic, socio-political, and technological interdependence, the transition into the dynamics of the ‘unbalanced’ world emphasised the need for new framework of international relations and policies. The direct involvement in local affairs became regarded as a security measure with an important peace-building and peace-preventing role.

Promoted as defending the values of democracy, human rights, and socio-economic development, the new agenda appeared to contradict the key principles of the United Nations philosophy laid out by the United Nations (UN) Charter. The various perspectives, justifying the international interference with domestic issues, were still challenging the founding principles of the international order – sovereignty and territorial integrity of states (UN 1945, Chapter 1/articles 1(2) and 2(7) respectively). Nevertheless, following the leading example of the 1947 Marshall plan, the international post-conflict reconstruction agenda gained popularity in the Post-Cold War settings opening the floor for debates over the humanistic/humanitarian causes and the political-economic interests underlying the international engagement with local issues.

The assumption stemming from the late 18th century project of philosophy of history “that the economic progress will in some way secure social and moral progress, and thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy” established the axiom for the development programmes in the 20th century (Bernasconi 1997:189). Nevertheless, as early as in 1979, Willy Brandt criticised the uniform application of the Western model of development. People “must not surrender to the idea that the whole world should copy the models of highly industrialised countries”, because the imposition of alien values, regardless of their merit, might have a very destabilising effect on a culture (Brandt 1980:23). Without a common pattern for measuring and estimating development on the other hand, the whole concept dissolves (Bernasconi 1997:187).

Surely, the moral grounds of the post-conflict reconstruction practices as mechanisms for promoting peace and development in war-affected areas can be challenged; but the phenomenon cannot be ignored as playing a key role for shaping the world today. With a potential to change direction of events and developments in general, international intervention in local affairs goes beyond an isolated act of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, a set of well-planned and dutifully implemented programmes and activities are needed to meet the specific
demands of any post-war environment and to overcome the negative effects of an experienced conflict. In this light, reconstruction agents are accountable for both the local and the global future.

The intensified ethnic violence after the end of the Cold War pushed ahead the peace-development-democracy paradigm onto the international agenda and justified post-conflict reconstruction as the mechanism to ensure peace and stability. This point of intersection between the two phenomena – ethnic conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction process - provoked the interest in examining the specific reconstruction needs of societies fragmented along ethnic lines. With their high levels of violence, transformation of neighbours into enemies and relapse from civility into community membership, the intra-state wars have established particular conflict configurations and respectively, specific post-conflict conditions. Thus, focusing on post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction, the current research questions the implementation of ready-made successful models of policies and practices and their appropriateness with respect to the goals of achieving lasting peace and sustainable development.

Repairing destroyed infrastructures, damaged natural, physical, and human capital requires not only time and resources, but also consistent and dedicated efforts. When intensified hostile attitudes and societal tensions accompany the general devastation, the reconstruction process faces challenges that demand particular attention and measures. Will for co-operation and/or visions for common future are hardly attributes of a society, where innate identity markers have been affirmed as lines of us vs. them differentiation during a period of violence. Ceasefire could hardly appease former combatants, especially if there have been groups driven by unrealised secessionist ideas. Violent civil conflict destroys social capital, institutions of governance and civil society and such basic attitudes and behaviours as trust and participation (WB 1998:30). Cultural differences established or perceived as politically important challenge any civil foundations of a society. The relationships based on formal and overarching connections between people disappear, replaced by ethnic-membership affiliation.

To achieve its ‘universal’ goals, it is necessary that post-conflict reconstruction address particular problems through adequate mechanisms. Based on this conviction, the research starts with clarifying the concept of ‘ethnic’ conflict considering various theories and definitions in Chapter 1. In fact, the large number of approaches to the concept does not contribute to its clarification. Combining theory and empirical data (conflict statistics), the suggested ‘map’ for distinguishing ethnic conflicts attempts to outline better the field of interest. Considering the various conflict parameters in their interaction, it appears that the most prominent characteristic, upon which the conflict type can be distinguished as such, is ‘conflict consequences’ – namely, the fragmentation of societal fabric into closed and mutually hostile ethnically defined elements (communities).

Ethnic belonging is part of everybody’s personal identity. Whereas in a civil society it is subjected to inclusive civic affiliations, in societies undergoing transition, certain socio-economic and historical circumstances can contribute to its politicising and hence becoming a conflict factor (Rothschild 1981:1-2). The chapter reaches the conclusion that the destruction of civil bridging ties and the re-establishment of ethnic bonds is a specific feature of a post-ethnic conflict
situation, which requires particular attention when designing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

To outline why post-conflict reconstruction should take into account the type of experienced conflict already in the policy-designing and activities-planning stage, Chapter 2 examines the concept of post-conflict reconstruction as a point of intersection between universal values and local realities. As part of the conflict management cycle and a mechanism for conflict prevention, the ultimate goal of the process appears as achieving normalisation of life, enabling development, and introducing and promoting democratic principles and values. This stems from the underlying peace-development-democracy paradigm, which gained power during the Cold War period, but attracted even more attention after the collapse of the communist system in the late 1980s.

Without challenging the validity of any uniform and unquestionable application of a single perspective, the research points out that restoring life after an ethnic conflict cannot be limited to investments in physical recovery, or to establishment of principles and mechanisms of democratic governance and civil institutions, free market, civil society and human rights. As discussed in Chapter 1, an ethnic conflict destroys the very fabric of society. It damages the micro-level of the unit of reconstruction, affects negatively societal relationships, civil networks and trust among stakeholders. Under such circumstances, when a vivid constitutive micro-level is missing building a macro-framework equals to constructing a building with no foundations. Therefore, in order to achieve any sustainable positive results, post-conflict reconstruction after an ethnic conflict should address the problems related to the recovery or construction of respective micro-frameworks at a very early stage of the process – at least as a part of the strategic planning.

Rebuilding social capital at the level of the macro-unit of reconstruction and matching the elements of the other levels is of primary importance for the overall success of any post-ethnic-conflict recovery process. Without (re-)establishing integrative climate and enabling conditions for creating a coherent and stable civil structure of corresponding elements and levels, it is doubtful that activities aiming at achieving general change would be successful. With collapsed or weakened institutions of state that cannot provide minimum levels of security, civic loyalties replaced by ethnic-community loyalties and society fragmented into mutually hostile units, a post-ethnic-conflict situation requires the restoration of basic principles of citizenship, trust and co-operation among people as an inseparable part of the developmental efforts.

Before addressing the issues related to the mechanisms for reconstructing citizenship and social capital after an ethnic conflict, Chapter 3 attempts to clarify the notion of social capital. Looking at the various approaches presented in the theoretical literature, the text explores the notion and develops further the model introduced by Christian Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer (1998). The research defines social capital as a totality of horizontal and vertical, formal and informal relationships and networks within a given social unit (macro-framework) that: 1) determines the cost-benefit pattern of the achievement of common goals;

\[\text{In the context of the problems discussed, the current research defines ‘success’ as ‘achievement of planned objectives’}.\]
2) re-constitutes, updates and develops in the process of pursuing common goals. It is a dynamic system of all the four dimensions of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model. Social capital can be positive or negative but it always exists within a particular macro-framework, which determines its elements, the type of relationship between its members and constitutes the basis for co-operation (i.e. investment-output). The research has accepted that the macro-framework, within which the rebuilding of post-ethnic-conflict social capital should be examined, is ‘the state’. Although it has undergone a serious transformation in the context of the globalisation, ‘the state’ is still a basic political unit in the international relations today. It determines the actors in the international processes and delimits the space, within which activities and initiatives have been developed, performed, and coordinated.

To discuss post-conflict reconstruction practices and mechanisms connected to the accumulation of social capital, the terms ‘(re-)construction’ and ‘(re-)building’ are used throughout the research. Putting the (re-) in brackets has its particular reason. Reconstruction viewed as efforts towards ‘normalisation of life’, implies a restoration of previous status-quo. When a conflict transforms or even eradicates pre-conflict conditions (especially those enabling social co-operation, participation, and trust among society members), restoration of previously existing forms might not be possible at all. Thus the establishment of a new ‘normal’ environment over the ruins of the old one is in fact a ‘construction’. The term ‘(re-)construction’ is therefore used to denote this dual possibility of 1) ‘construction’ - building a new environment that would enable positive socio-economic and political development over the ruins of the old one - preserving some or none of the previously existing systems; 2) ‘re-’ as the building-up process is to take place within a previously existing political unit.

While the international community has some positive experience in (re-)building macro-level structures, institutions, and capacities with successful strategies and mechanisms developed throughout the years, the (re-)construction of a war-affected micro-level challenges the peace-building and developmental efforts after an ethnic conflict. The analysis of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model reveals that a positive (functioning) social capital needs mutually reinforcing and sustaining elements of a macro- and micro-levels of corresponding scope. Affecting dramatically the social structures and institutions at micro-level, ethnic conflict in fact destroys the balance between the components of social capital replacing the wider and encompassing macro-frameworks of the state with such of a smaller and ethnically determined unit. The bridging and linking social cohesion mechanisms (in Putnam’s terms) within state and between groups dissolve, while at the same time the bonding ties of the ethnically constituted communities get reinforced.

A specific consequence of an ethnic conflict is the eradication of any supra-ethnic integrative mechanisms. Instead of a ‘state-level-society’, closed ethnic groups with no or little overarching social capital emerge and social cohesion remains confined within their boundaries. Thus, Chapter 3 underlines that civil society building, reconstruction or strengthening would hardly be successful if in a post-ethnic-conflict environment there is no minimum level of positive social capital at the level of state and functioning bridging ties. The text emphasises that civil society is unfeasible without a minimum level of positive social capital, because it
is a configuration of elements of the latter, and without bridging ties, because they enable the interaction and interdependence between people, constituting a single yet heterogeneous community.

Examining the possibilities of transforming negative social capital into positive, Chapter 3 discusses mechanisms that can establish and/or rehabilitate inter-communal communication and integration at a state-level. The research emphasises that in order to enable the establishment of an integrative climate, the rehabilitation of inter-community communication and integration within the macro- socio-political framework of the state, (re-)construction after an ethnic conflict must address social cohesion issues as early in the process as possible.

To test the outlined theory, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine the case of the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The selection of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a case study is because it presents a good example both of a Post-Cold War ethnic conflict – having profound negative effects on macro- and micro- socio-political levels – and of a focal point for international reconstruction efforts with large amounts of material and non-material investments. The fact that post-conflict reconstruction in the country has been running for a number of years, enables it to be considered in a time perspective.

In December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from an extremely violent war with ruined infrastructures, collapsed economy, serious security challenges, continuous ethnic violence, human rights abuses, and sensitive social issues. The Dayton Agreement established a state of a very complex structure reflecting the fragmentation of the traumatised society along ethnic and religious lines of separation. Despite the heavy destructions and the overall devastation, the expectations of the international community were that the intensive assistance would contribute to the fast and efficient recovery of the new country. More than 14 years of international involvement and multi-sector support and 8 billions of US dollars of financial and non-financial aid, it is still debatable whether the country could survive without the foreign military and administrative presence, and the international financial and institutional help. Bosnia and Herzegovina appears as a ‘black hole’ (Derens 2008).

Following the theoretical model introduced in the first chapter, Chapter 4 identifies the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina\(^2\) as ethnic. Apart from the damaged economy and physical infrastructure, the country emerged with no citizens loyal to the state, with no trust among people from different ethnicities, and destroyed cross-ethnic relations. Two ethnically based social capital structures replaced the single political unit of the ex-Yugoslav republic with its (engineered) national level social capital. Dayton has institutionalised this division and the poor investment in cross-cutting horizontal initiatives has contributed to the further ‘ethnicisation’ of the society rather than to its integration. The subsequent fieldwork findings supported the conclusions reached through the analysis of the conflict-related data.

\(^{2}\) Bosnia and Herzegovina occasionally has been referred to as ‘BiH’ throughout the text. The name ‘Bosnia’ has been used for accurate referencing.
The fieldwork performed in Bosnia and Herzegovina also revealed that it is very difficult if not impossible to assess post-conflict reconstruction practices from within the field. The interviews indicated the existing perception about the overall failure of the international reconstruction efforts, at least as far as the reintegration of people from different ethnic communities was concerned. The personal observations of local and international respondents however could not offer an overall framework for evaluating the appropriateness of policies and practices with respect to the needs of the particular post-conflict environment. The fact, revealed by respondents from the NGO sector, that local organisations were largely dependent on donors, indicated the need for shifting the analysis to the policy platforms and approaches, implemented by key actors with a direct impact on the reconstruction process in general.

As suggested in Chapter 5, official information about the involvement and the support received by international agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina differs depending on the sources – both as figures and ranking. Therefore, the interest shifted to the examination of policies and activities carried out by representative organisations for the international community. The focus thus fell on the World Bank and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

The World Bank was selected because of the fact that in all of the analysed databases, presenting information about the financial assistance received by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the organisation was among the top donors. Furthermore, the Bank has established structures focused exclusively on post-conflict reconstruction work. The World Bank appeared as an important and active agent in the field of post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is among the leading donors supporting local initiatives and organisations3. It was deemed important to check whether the supported initiatives have had an impact upon the reconstruction policy and practice of the organisation in general.

As an official representative of the international community and the institution established to guide the state through the reconstruction process, the Office of the High Representative is by definition the organisation that guarantees that the country follows the international development prescriptions. Thanks to its power to regulate local politics by imposing political and policy decisions, the OHR is the organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that has a direct impact upon the future of the country.

The analysis of the particular efforts of the representatives of the international community - the OHR and the World Bank - directed towards establishing stability and ensuring sustainable progress, revealed that limited attention had been placed on inter-ethnic integration and social capital reconstruction. The international development efforts have focused primarily on the recovery of the macro-structure and its institutions.

The lack of programmes focused on establishing and developing of relations and initiatives to crosscut the ethnic boundaries and in this way to enable the (re-)

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3 The World Bank is also a leading donor for Mozaik Foundation, the Bosnian NGO, which has been an object of examination in the current research.
building of the state micro-level has resulted in large amounts of money being spent without achieving the expected positive results. The analysis of programmes and activities developed and implemented by the two representative organisations revealed that although recognised as an important issue, almost nothing has been done in the direction of the (re-)construction of social capital at the level of state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the fieldwork a local NGO - Mozaik Foundation (formerly known as NGO Development Foundation) was identified as an organisation that had adopted and applied a social capital approach to its reconstruction work with smaller communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Targeting social cohesion and promoting re-integration, the Foundation has a record of successfully implemented programmes. Nevertheless, working on a smaller, community-scale, the NGO appears as a positive example of existing local energies rather than as an organisation with potential to influence national policy-making or international donors.

By analysing the theoretical literature and testing the models upon the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study highlights the importance of the early addressing of societal reconstruction in a post-ethnic-conflict situation. To avoid wasting of foreign assistance and resources, transfer of ownership over the institutions and processes need to be strategically enabled, launched, and supported in the very early stages of the process. Success appears impossible if there are no local agents motivated to undertake and develop activities and initiatives promoting the establishment of lasting peace and sustainable development. The research established that a particular problem with the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ignoring or at least not taking into account societal development as an issue of primary importance. Elaborating upon these ideas, the text concludes with some key points for strategic planning of programmes and actions that could contribute to the processes of reconstruction or building of ethnically non-homogeneous societies.

If sustainable peace, political stability, and socio-economic progress are goals of any reconstruction efforts, then understanding the character of a conflict and its destructive impact on various aspects of life and society is a requirement for a strategic and demand-driven planning of projects and activities. Therefore, a uniform model of post-conflict intervention or developmental support by definition cannot be viable. Addressing the particular needs of the war-affected area and society is hence a precondition for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. When there is an ethnic conflict, the issues of primary importance appear the destruction of social capital and the fragmentation of society along ethnic lines of separation. These problems demand attention in the very early stage of the process, even if only as a part of the strategic planning.

Looking back at the international practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina and comparing them against the suggested model for strategic planning, significant gaps appear. Among the identified problems is the lack of a coherent strategy, limited focus of interest, waste of essential resources, ownership issues. By contrast, positive examples emerge within the local third sector. Proof for the existence of such energies is the above-mentioned Mozaik Foundation, which works on a limited local scale, but by addressing key issues and applying
appropriate mechanisms, comparatively has obtained greater success in the rebuilding of communities.

Finally, post-conflict reconstruction can benefit from taking into account not only local needs, but also local expertise and experience, yet the international community tends not to adopt and implement on a larger scale local initiatives, even those recognised as positive. Meeting local needs and channelling local energies in the ‘right’ direction in fact is the key to introducing desired changes and foster community (re-)building. An integrated society with a high degree of social cohesion is a pre-condition for the success of any development programmes and processes, for maintaining the sustainability of the progress, preserving democratic values, and the peace in general.

**METHODODOLOGY**

The increased interest in conflict prevention in the end of the 20th century has recognised post-conflict reconstruction as an essential part of the conflict management cycle with a key role for enabling peace and development. The large amounts of material and non-material resources, technical and financial assistance allocated for the recovery of different areas all over the world has established these processes as an important element of the international agenda and operations. Therefore, the fact that such complex (and to a certain extent controlled) processes with a direct impact upon millions of lives have been running at their own pace and not as a part of a strategically planned programme, is at least concerning.

The general purpose of this research is not to criticise intentions and achievements but to indicate issues and measures that can possibly contribute to better advancing towards desired objectives. When the goals of achieving lasting peace and establishing normal living conditions and prospect for future interfere with processes and genuine developments, failures should be reduced to a minimum.

By adopting a realist approach and exploratory perspective, the research focus on post-conflict reconstruction issues and on the need for advancing the studies within this field, not least because of the direct impact of international intervention upon human lives. It addresses the following initially defined aims:

- Further development of the theoretical perspective about of post-conflict-reconstruction, with a particular focus on the post-ethnic conflict situation
- Analysis of the features of ethnic conflicts in order to establish whether they require implementation of particular post-conflict approaches and mechanisms
- Identification of conflicts that result in a deep societal fragmentation along particular religious/ethnic/cultural lines of separation (referred to as ‘destruction of social capital’) as a particular sub-type
- Development of a model of destroyed state-social capital as a result of an experienced ethnic conflict
- Identification of a set of possible measures for reconstruction of social capital in a deeply fragmented society
- Development of a model of the destroyed state-social capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Development of a model of the state-structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Analysis of the involvement of the key international reconstruction players in Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on the financial contribution data)
- Presentation and analysis of the contribution of the local NGO “Mozaik Foundation”
- Overall evaluation of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Pointing at the importance of addressing the social capital (re-)construction issues as key components of any post-ethnic conflict development strategy, the text also attempts to identify mechanisms with potential to contribute for achieving of desired outcomes, as defined. Finally, the overall objective of the research is to provide insights for policies and practices that can be used when planning and implementing programmes at national, regional, or organisational levels.

Research design

The research design, the formulation of the research questions and the identification of appropriate mechanisms for collecting and analysing data were performed with reference to the appropriate theoretical literature. Among the works on research design and qualitative research used were those of Creswell (2003), Gschwend, Marshall & Rossman (2006), Schimmelfennig (2007), and Denscombe (2007); Olsen (2003 and 2004) was referred to on the topic of triangulation in social research and Yin (2002) on the applications of the case study research.

The thesis consists of two parts – a theoretical section and a case study. Acknowledging that post-conflicts reconstruction is a context-dependent concept (as are its results, respectively) the first section develops a theoretical framework encompassing the three most relevant approaches: ethnic conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and social capital. In order to test the validity of the conclusions reached and to explore the problems in their specific context, the second part examines the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Interested in the conditions that can predetermine success or failure of a reconstruction process and acknowledging that in order to achieve positive results post-conflict reconstruction should meet the particular needs of a post-conflict environment, the research focused on outlining the specific features of Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts. In light of the above, the main research question was defined as: ‘Are there specific post-ethnic-conflict conditions that can be considered factors underlying the success or failure of a reconstruction process in general?’

Two separate areas emerged within the identified macro-framework of observation, namely 1) the post-(ethnic-)conflict reconstruction practice, and 2) the reconstruction of macro and micro levels of social capital. Approaching the issues first theoretically and thereafter in the context of the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed the establishment of a clearer and wider perspective on these same issues.
Preliminary research was structured around the key concepts common to the specified areas: post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts and social capital. The established differences both in terms of quality and quantity of the available theoretical literature and empirical data related to each concept indicated that applying a uniform method for assessing and analysing events and processes within the areas of observation would not result in achieving accurate and valid results. Therefore a particular approach was developed for:

- Assessing and evaluating post-conflict-reconstruction as a type of policy and international practice
- Clarifying the concept of ethnic conflicts and identifying the specific features that would determine the post-conflict-reconstruction approach
- Assessing the role of social capital for the reconstruction of a society deeply fragmented along ethnic lines of separation

The lack of comprehensive critical studies on post-conflict reconstruction and of sufficient statistical data to show the interrelation between problems, selection and implementation of measures and levels of success achieved, indicated that a qualitative approach should be preferred when addressing the identified problems. The examination of the few theoretical studies and the number of field and mission reports led to the conclusion that the ultimate goal (at least the nominal one) of the reconstruction process in general is the normalisation of the environment and the prevention of future conflicts through the introduction of peace, democracy and development into the conflict-affected region. Reaching these conclusions at the first stage of the research was of particular importance, not only because the triad (peace-democracy-development) marked the limits of the macro-framework of observation, but also because it could be used as a ‘point-of-reference’ for the evaluation of the suitability of examined mechanisms and the levels of success of analysed activities and processes.

Comparing and analysing qualitative and quantitative data enabled the clarification of the concept of ethnic conflicts in the light of the numerous theoretical approaches and definitions. The need for determining precisely the focus of the study became clearly visible. The selected approach allowed a process of conflict mapping that was used to outline a particular sub-type of ethnic conflicts. According to the developed mechanism, an ethnic conflict (or at least a particular sub-type) could be assessed as such on the basis of the specific conflict consequences - the fragmentation of a society along powerful lines of separation. This conflict (sub-) type has been selected as the unit of analysis.

The assessment of the post-conflict reconstruction and ethnic conflicts relied on both theory and empirical data in a comparative and combined approach. The role of social capital in the outlined context (rather an unexploited area) had to be addressed in a more reflective and analytical manner. Existing literature and data were analysed in light of the empirical findings from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which enabled the development of some theoretical models. Elaborating upon the social capital model of Grootaert and van Bastelaer, the research established that ethnic conflict destroys the balance of the social capital components eradicating the level overarching divides. Formal social contract (the basis of civicness) becomes replaced by ethnic affiliation; in other words, social cohesion at micro level dominates (or suppresses) the social cohesion at macro (state) level.
Referring to the empirical evidences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initial hypothesis was formulated as follows: ‘An ethnic conflict destroys social capital at a supra-ethnic level, which results in loss of the basic grounds of civility and civicsness’. Aiming at ensuring peace by introducing democracy and development, the reconstruction practice needs to build over these civil foundations. Therefore, a post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction must address promptly the issue of social capital rebuilding in order to ensure emergence of success-enabling conditions.’

At a later stage, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also used to validate the theoretical conclusions and findings.

Based on the above, the unit of analysis was defined as the systematic efforts for overcoming existing (ethnic) divides. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina these were identified more precisely as the mechanisms that could enable the establishment or/and rehabilitation of inter-communal communication and integration (cohesion) within the macro socio-political framework of the state.

Acknowledging that a qualitative approach is more appropriate for addressing the research question and its key parts, among the primary techniques employed were:

- **Literature reviews** on the three main topics (ethnic conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and social capital), and about the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- **Analysis and evaluation** of primary and secondary sources of information (both publicly available and gathered during the fieldwork) – about Bosnia and Herzegovina, project and program documents, reports and assessments, political statements, news and media materials
- **Theoretical modelling** with respect to mapping of ethnic conflicts, identifying the ethnic conflicts mobilisation levels, structure of social capital, social capital in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and state-power structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A model for assessing the post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also outlined
- **Analysis of databases and statistical information** about ethnic conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction programs, and international assistance provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2008)
- **Fieldwork** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which enabled (among others) inclusive (participatory) observation and gathering of personal testimonies and comments from locals
- **Formal and informal interviews** with representatives from international organisations, local (BiH) public and NGO sector, academia, media, common public

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4 The two intervened concepts that underlie the notion of civil society are examined in details by Evers (2009)

5 The mutually contradictory databases about the post-conflict reconstruction programs, agents, their activities and financial and non-financial assistance, on one hand and the lack of a single official source of information, on the other, indicated again that quantitative data should be used as indicative point of reference to support the qualitative analysis, as well as for cross-verification of data, findings and conclusions.
- **Long-term monitoring** of processes and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003 - 2009), which enabled the
- **Critical analysis** based on the comparison between initial planning, experienced processes (in 2003), and achieved results (by 2009)
- **Testing and verification** of findings and theoretical modelling against the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- **Case-study on social capital reconstruction** in a comparative perspective (analysis of the social capital related activities of the World Bank, the Office of the High Representative and the local NGO ‘Mozaik Foundation’)

**Literature review, key concepts**

Accepting that any process of reconstruction can achieve positive results only if it meets the particular needs of a post-conflict environment, the research focused on exploring theoretical literature concerning: ethnic conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and social capital.

The literature review established that:

- The numerous studies on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have produced a number of definitions and actually contributed to a lack of clarity in the concepts. In the same time, a small number of statistical studies explore the impact of ethnicity on intrastate war (Carlsnaes, Simmons & Risse 2005:415).

- There is little theoretical literature on post-conflict reconstruction, and it appears mostly in the form of conclusions and analyses included in field-operations reports or case studies.

- The scope and application of the social capital concept and related issues are unclear. Often, under the title of ‘social capital’, problems related to social services, social safety nets or other social agendas are discussed.

The review of literature on post-conflict reconstruction revealed a lack of systematic theoretical studies and a prevalence of operations-based analyses and conclusions. Therefore, the focus was placed on establishing a theoretical framework though analysing field reports, programme documents, policy statements, and platforms of leading reconstruction agents.

The lack of differentiated approaches towards conflicts in the context of designing and implementing reconstruction policies and programmes, revealed a significant gap in the conflict studies. The limited in number and scope theoretical works and analyses provoked the interest in opening a discussion about the importance of developing specific instruments to meet particular post-ethnic-conflict demands.

The literature review showed that the numerous ethnicity-related theories have in fact obscured the concept. A reference to the quantitative data concerning the ethnic conflicts revealed that these various approaches have also resulted in different interpretations of quantitative data and respectively to mismatches in classification of conflicts. To outline the frameworks of the type of conflict, in
focus, an assessment matrix was developed. This enabled the identification of certain specific conflict-related features as type-markers. Fragmentation of social structure and relapse to closed ethnic communities appeared among the most distinctive markers for the conflict type selected as object of analysis for the research.

Approaching critically the wide range of studies on social capital concept and related issues, the research identified two comprehensive theoretical models. Analysed in the light of the post-conflict reconstruction agenda and the particular needs of the post-ethnic-conflict environment, these models were adapted and developed further for achieving better understanding of the problems. The visualisation of the complex structure of social capital was further developed to present a model of the fragmentation that an ethnic conflict is likely to bring about. This fragmentation represents the specific conditions before the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction.

The study and analysis of theoretical literature and the relevant additional sources of information enabled the research to adopt the following definitions of the key concepts in use:

- **Post-conflict reconstruction** is the process that starts with the signing of a *formal* peace agreement; and ends with the ‘normalisation of life’ within the conflict region. The goal of post-conflict reconstruction consists in achieving or at least enabling peace, democracy & development
- **‘Normalisation of life’** implies a restoration of previous status-quo. When a conflict transforms/eradicates pre-conflict conditions, then the normalisation of life is in fact a process of construction of new conditions/environment.
- **(Re-)construction** has been introduced as a term to denote this dual possibility of (1) ‘construction’ of a new environment that would enable positive socio-economic and political development over the ruins of the old one and (2) ‘re-’ when the process builds over/restores any previously existing structures
- **Ethnic conflict** has been addressed as a conflict, where violence is performed along ethnic lines and which establishes ethnic membership as a factor determining affiliations, relationships or other aspects of political, economic and social life. The most distinctive feature of the dynamic complex are ‘the consequences’: the fragmentation of a society into a puzzle of ethnically determined, closed, and hostile units. This has been selected as a basis for outlining of a distinct sub-category.
- **Social capital** has been understood as a totality of horizontal and vertical, formal and informal relationships and networks within a given social unit (macro-framework) that 1) determines the cost-benefit pattern of the achievement of common goals, and 2) re-constitutes, updates and develops in the process of pursuing common goals
- **International community**: According to the European Stability Initiative study of the international power in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ESI 2000), the key concept of ‘international community’ denotes the moral and legal foundations for foreign involvement in the peace process and thus it falsely implies a single actor. Nevertheless, under the term ‘international community’ the research refers to the foreign for the country actors that share the values and have legitimise their intervention goals in terms of peace, democracy & development.
Analysis of databases

Quantitative data was used throughout the research as a supplementary tool for the purposes of clarification of concepts and verification of the conclusions reached. Databases were analysed in the section discussing the ethnic conflict concept in an attempt to reach a more precise definition of the type. To avoid falling into the subjectivity of the particular conflict assessment and terminological classification, information from several sources was compared in a critical perspective. The detailed databases selected for analysis were indicated as reliable sources of information by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (Eck 2005); furthermore, the research analysed the information considering the entries over a longer period of time (from 1945 until the present) and attempted to outline the different conflict features by paying attention to the points of intersection in the databases. Thus, comparing the information from different sources and analysing them in the light of the theoretical approaches to ethnic conflicts, a ‘map’-model was developed for assessment of ethnic conflicts as a totality of interrelated factors.

In the second part of the research – within the frameworks of the case study – another set of databases was examined. The initial assumption was that the quantitative data would allow the objective identification of the most active post-conflict reconstruction agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the amounts of aid allocated to the country, the types of programmes developed and the number of projects addressing directly or indirectly social capital (re-)construction. It was expected that by measuring variables such as number of programmes targeting social capital (re-)construction, levels and amounts of financial and non-financial assistance allocated for these purposes, local involvement in these projects, etc., it will be possible to obtain objective quantitative data to check the validity of the theoretical findings.

The comparison between entries of several official databases of foreign assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed many discrepancies between the indicated amounts of contributions. This in turn resulted in different ranking of the most influential agents according to the sources used. The different databases held information about different periods, which also was an obstacle to an objective comparison. Furthermore, the information about the activities of the reconstruction agents in the general databases was only indicative of their field of involvement and support without presenting detailed information about different projects. This also obstructed the quantitative analysis of efforts directed towards the reconstruction of the state-level social capital in the country.

Under these circumstances, challenging the objectivity of the possible conclusions based upon the quantitative data, a qualitative approach was preferred. Through a judgment sampling, two key reconstruction players were selected for qualitative analysis of their work in Bosnia and Herzegovina with focus on the rebuilding of social capital.

Case study and fieldwork experience

The hypothesis formulated in the theoretical section constituted a field where the three core concepts – post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts, and social
The first part of the research established that among the most serious consequences of an ethnic conflict from a reconstruction point of view is the destruction of social capital at the level of a supra-ethnic political unit. To test the theoretical conclusions reached and validate the elaborated modules, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was examined in the second part.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was selected as a case study because it represented a good ‘platform’ for exploring a wide range of post-conflict reconstruction issues. Within the context of the Post-Cold War dynamics the newly established country emerged from war as a ‘product’ of the late 20th century international politics. Despite being recognised as independent political unit, Bosnia and Herzegovina could be viewed as an international project of forced coexistence. Projecting the Western model over the Balkan realities, the Dayton Agreement framed a melting pot of ethnic tensions, religious confrontations, and territorial separation of the ethnically fragmented population. Apart from the collapse of the political, economic and societal infrastructures, the post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been challenged by the war-trauma resulting from the experienced severe violence and crimes.

The case was also relevant because of the fact that the protracted intensive reconstruction work (not only in terms of years but also with respect to the allocated resources and the scale of international involvement) did not manage to achieve a stable and properly functioning multi-ethnic state structure. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been widely recognised as a ‘black hole’.

The existence of several, mutually contradictory, databases presenting information about the post-conflict reconstruction programmes, agents, their activities and financial and non-financial assistance, as well as the lack of a trusted source of information, indicated that qualitative methods are more appropriate for addressing the unit of analysis defined as ‘systematic efforts for overcoming existing ethnic divides’. To overcome the possible subjectivity of the data collected only from a single channel, the principle of triangulation was used. The case study was justified as belonging to the type of ‘ethnic conflicts’ (as defined in the theoretical chapters of the research). Then, the existence of ethnic divide, and the measures (needed and implemented) for overcoming this divide were assessed through several perspectives.

Various sources were used for building up a comprehensive picture of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Yin 2002:114). Information was gathered both during the period of theoretical study, during the in-country fieldwork in 2003 and subsequently during the period of monitoring and close cooperation with established local and international contacts. This provided the possibility to observe events and dynamics in their development and to legitimate the evaluation of measures against three markers: initial plans, experienced processes, achieved results (as of 2008/2009). The findings from the participatory observation, the interviews and the regular updates provided by the contacts were used alongside the analysis of documents, data, records and other materials. Adding the personal perspective of experienced reconstruction to the analysis of planed vs. achieved results was used as a supplementary method for evaluation of the success of processes. In summary, the fact that the data coming from primary sources of information (such as official documents and materials, journals and
newspapers, media releases, broadcast materials, statistical information and research) were supportive to the conclusions reached after the examination of secondary sources of information, confirmed the validity of the findings.

Figure 1: Triangulation
(Adapted from Denscombe (2007:137, Figure 4)

Observations

Interviews

Documents

'Systematic efforts for overcoming existing ethnic divides'

Another important reason underlying the selection of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a case study was its general ‘accessibility’ – not only in terms of physical access to the field, but also in terms of language and cultural particularities. The ability to communicate with locals and the understanding of attitudes, perceptions, and mentality in general ensured the fieldwork productivity despite the limited number of visits to the field due to the formerly existing visa restrictions.

The advantage of being able to understand the local language and to communicate back, allowed me not only to gather information from common people, who did not speak any foreign language, but also to immerse myself in the field and to obtain better understanding of the situation. As a Bulgarian I had the advantage of being recognised by the members of the local community as a ‘fellow’ and not as ‘one of the others’ (i.e. the international community), which made the respondents feel sufficiently comfortable to share openly their thoughts and experience. This added a particular value to the research since the official information and statements could be counterpoised with the subjective experience and views on the effects of the reconstruction activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in this way a more detailed picture of the situation could be elaborated.

While travelling around Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, it was interesting to note and experience the existing division along ethnic lines and to feel the feelings of animosity against ‘the others’. The calm surface might delude a foreigner that stability has been achieved. However, for a researcher from the Balkans, it was striking to see signs of war such as buildings in fire arms holes all around the country, to visit the empty Orthodox church in the centre of Sarajevo and to hear comments that before the war every other day there was a wedding there; or to note the vast majority of girls and women in the University premises with scarves around their heads and long sleeves despite the heat. A foreigner might not be
able to recognise that people travelling on the bus from Belgrade to Sarajevo cross the border between the two countries only by showing their local ID card, while Bosnian Serbs travelling from Banja Luka to Sarajevo had to show their international passports to be allowed to cross the border between Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And even very indicative was the sigh of relief of an approached person when they would hear that I was not a Serb/Bosniak but Bulgarian; and the change of attitude could be recognised only by looking at the person’s face. Being affiliated to the region and at the same time not affected directly or indirectly by the war, I could address the problems using my regional knowledge and experience but remaining critically distant in my analyses.

Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified as a case of a destroyed social capital at supra-ethnic state level. It needs acknowledging however that these were rather analytical conclusions since there can be found limited, if any, information and data about the inter-communal interactions at micro-level before 1992. References to the ‘common living in the past’ usually cover Sarajevo and some other larger urban area, while little work has been done on the topic with regard to the small villages in the country. These circumstances pushed the research in a direction not to focus too much on the past, but to analyse the processes with respect to the reconstruction objectives set.

After examining the constitutional structure of the country and its potential for negative impact on social re-integration, the interviews aimed at establishing whether these issues were recognised as an obstacle to reconstruction and whether there were any systematic efforts towards overcoming ethnic disintegration and fragmentation. Therefore, the interviews carried out during the fieldwork aimed at gathering various points of view from ordinary members of local society, intellectuals, representatives of local and international public sectors, governmental and non-governmental organisations, donors, and recipients of reconstruction assistance and financial aid. The primary criterion for selection of interview respondents was their direct or indirect involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, snowball sampling was used. Nevertheless, comments and testimonies gathered through participatory observation during the fieldwork from ordinary members of the public were also used since this provided genuine information about grass-root perceptions and experience of policies in place and their effects. Thanks to the support received by the members of Mozaik Foundation, the research was able to analyse the work of the Foundation over a period of several years and to identify it as a positive empirical example in support of the theoretical ideas developed throughout the text.

**Interviews**

The purpose of the interviews was to gather first-hand evidences about the reconstruction practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to test the conclusions reached during the first stage of the research process. During the interviews two areas were in focus. The first topic covered the problems of inter-ethnic divides and relations, their importance (as evaluated by the respondents), as well as the experience of reconstruction and the personal assessment of its
achievements or failures. The second topic focused on social capital - whether social capital related issues were considered / recognised as important for achieving ‘normalisation’ of life. Apart from collecting personal views and information about subjective experience of processes, another goal of the interviews was to establish whether there were any systematic efforts towards overcoming ethnic disintegration and fragmentation, which might not be reported in the literature.

Being a ‘field for research’ for years, Bosnia and Herzegovina gradually has limited its openness to newcomers. Indicators for such a process in 2003 were not only the lack of interest both of the local and international representatives to reply to invitations for interviews, but also the annoyance that could be felt even when people were giving their consent for a personal meeting. Sending a number of emails to representatives from various organisations in the country prior to the fieldwork (identified as leading structures based on their activities and on the published directory ICVA 2002), resulted only in several replies of kind refusal.

The identification of the institutions and organisations of interest at the same time, allowed to determine the target respondents and to attempt to reach them by activating personal informal contacts. Using the professional and personal network of a previously established contact, Ms Alida Vrapić who kindly offered her assistance in favour for the purposes of the research, some of the targeted interviews were performed. Using the snowballing sampling approach thereafter the circle of contacts was widened to cover a range of organisations of interest. As a result, a total of 31 interviews were taken, of which: 11 with people from international organisations, 10 with representatives of the NGO sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, five with people form the public state-level sector, and five with local intellectuals (people from the academia, media, and young activists).

Despite the snowballing sampling, the selection of respondents was performed in a way to enable the gathering of various points of views with a possibly critical perspective to the processes and the situation in the country. The primary criterion for selection of respondents however was their direct or indirect involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As it was mentioned earlier, the initial intention of the research was to examine the reconstruction policies and programmes of key international players in order to establish whether the rebuilding of social capital at state level has been recognised and addressed as an issue of primary importance. This intention was challenged by the fact that the databases indicating the financial contribution of different donors were mutually contradictory. The impossibility of applying objective criteria (based on statistical data) in order to identify the key agents of the reconstruction process, shifted the approach towards adopting judgment sampling and assessing two organisations, representative of the international community and its active involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the World Bank and the OHR. The evaluation of their programme documents and official data was supported by interviews carried out with high-ranking representatives from both organisations. Stratified sampling was used for the selection of interview respondents - officials were seen as possible sources of information not available for the general public. High-ranked representatives of the World Bank and the Office of the High Representative were identified as appropriate
respondents. The fact that the interviewed senior staff confirmed both explicitly and implicitly the conclusions made upon the analyses of the official documents, justified the validity of the findings and thus no further contacts were sought.

Nevertheless, there was awareness that people involved in these sectors in general have subjective views about the necessity and efficiency of the reconstruction activities. To introduce a more objective perspective, the information gathered through the interviews was compared with the analyses performed on documents, statistical information, or comments from random people from the local public. Ordinary members of society were addressed because they were considered valuable subjective indicators for the success of the official policies and practices. Comments and testimonies gathered on a random basis from ordinary members of the public were also used and included in the text since they provided genuine information about grass-root perceptions and experience of policies in place and their effects.

The list of the categories of respondents thus emerged as:

1. With respect to the financial aspects of reconstruction
   - Donors (or re-granting organisations) of reconstruction assistance and financial aid
   - Recipients of reconstruction assistance and financial aid

2. With respect to type of organisational affiliation
   - representatives of international organisations
   - local public officials
   - representatives from the local and international NGO sector
   - intellectuals
   - ordinary members of local society

Representatives of both international and local organisations were rather reluctant to participate in interviews. Due to the raising criticism about the involvement of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efficiency of the work of different structures, international staff was not very approachable and open to unknown researchers. In the same time, realising the zero-effect of talking about problems, locals were already rather annoyed of meeting foreign journalists, observers, experts, students, etcetera. Approaching the respondents through the activated network of personal contacts, it was not appropriate to ask people to fill in ‘questionnaires’ in order to perform a number of structured interviews. Discussing the problems of interest for the research in a more informal conversation, ‘semi-structured’ interviews were carried out. Depending on the institutional affiliation of the person approached, a number of initially defined questions would be addressed in the friendly conversation, such as:

- With official representatives of international organisations, public and the NGO sectors: ‘What are the goals/focus of activities of the particular organisation?’, ‘Are you successful in pursuing the goals?’, ‘How do you measure success?’, ‘What are the main problems encountered?’

- With representatives from academia, media, youth: ‘Are things different now (- from before the war? - from right after the end of the war?)’, ‘Does the international community help? How?’, ‘Are there any efforts to bring
With community representatives: gathering information through the personal testimonies was rather sensitive area. During the friendly conversations my goal was to guide the person into the desired direction of critical reflections and opinion sharing. Presenting the purpose of my visit to the country and the issues I was interested in: reconstruction, role of international community, integration, attitudes, was usually a good start since the people did not feel interrogated but they would start commenting on my work.

Measurement

It was already mentioned that in many aspects the research was examining problems not sufficiently covered by theoretical literature. Therefore, the goal of the study was not to measure degrees or intensity of processes and phenomena, but to establish whether they existed or not.

As the research hypothesis suggested, two main units required examination. The above presented principles were applied when measuring the ‘destroyed social capital at supra-ethnic level and loss of basic grounds of civility and civicness’. The research was not interested in the degree of destruction, but to establish whether it existed or not. Therefore, the analysis was based on the qualitative data and information obtained about instances of inter-ethnic issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported tensions between the ethnically defined Entities and other institutions and structures, individual perceptions of respondents. All of these confirmed that ethnic divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been and still is a crucial issue.

To outline measures for reconstruction of social capital in a deeply fragmented society (still an under-explored area), indicators for measuring social capital were used as points of reference and some possible mechanisms were suggested on their basis. The assumption was that these elements could be viewed as projections of the possible goals set by a social capital reconstruction programme.

The success of the conflict- and context-dependent post-conflict reconstruction is also a relative concept. Evidence suggests that regardless of specific local conditions, post-conflict reconstruction processes are quite often in pursuit of the same goals – to introduce democracy, free market, western-style development and ultimately peace. Achieving ‘normalisation’ however implies that a particular society requires particular settings. In this respect, measuring success of a post-conflict reconstruction is also context-dependent and largely subjective. Objective measuring of success is possible if achievements are evaluated against the objectives, timeframes, resources, etc., planned at the onset of the reconstruction process. Investigating individual and group perceptions, existing tendencies and trends can also address success qualitatively. Both of these approaches were used in the assessment of the reconstruction process of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reported developments, conditions, and problems in the different sectors in the country, the fact that mandates of international structures and programmes were
prolonged beyond their initially envisaged end, and the estimations of reconstruction costs as exceeding the preliminary expected levels, were used as points of reference for evaluation of success of the reconstruction process in general.

**Encountered obstacles and possible limitations of the methods used**

The complexity of the approach combining the critical reflection of the three central topics: post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts and social capital, with gathering and analysis of empirical data determined the character of the problems encountered throughout the research process.

The lack of sufficient theoretical literature or lack of clear definitions due to numerous theoretical interpretations, lack of uniform approach to classification of data or discrepancies between databases in terms of information related to similar entries were among the common challenges for all the three areas of study. Analysis of databases revealed that there is a lack of accurate data about post-conflict reconstruction activities and resources, that databases present different but sometimes matching entries and that it is rather challenging to identify a valid (single) point of reference. Combining qualitative methods with analyses of quantitative data and verification of findings through the case study allowed overcoming the limitations of either predominantly theoretical or predominantly empirical approach.

Some other issues challenged the gathering of empirical evidences and the fieldwork. Visa restrictions (removed only in 2008) prevented the possibility for regular visits to the field. Therefore, among the priority goals during the initial and prolonged stay in 2003 was the establishment of local contacts through intensive networking. Throughout the following years, the information about developments in the field has been updated thanks to the regular communication with some of the established contacts.

The attempts to reach the respondents identified as key figures during the preliminary study of the fields and sectors of interest were not as successful as expected. It was already mentioned that despite a high number of requests for interviews, only a few people responded. Especially difficult was to establish contacts with official representatives from the two organisations examined – the OHR and the World Bank. An additional problem was to convince both local and international experts to give interviews, because of the fact that the field has been ‘overexploited’ throughout the years. The reluctance of locals to discuss the issues of interest to the research stemmed from the annoyance of people from being explored as ‘objects’ by different researchers and the lack of any results from talking about their problems. On the other hand, international experts were apparently also displeased with researchers and as a result requests for interviews were largely ignored. To overcome this problem, some informal networking channels were activated, and adopting the snowball sampling approach the circle of contacts was widened and the information sought was gathered.

Acknowledging the limitations that this approach posed on gathering structured first-hand information about the field, and the probability of higher-level
subjectivity of respondents, findings reached on the basis of the interviews were subsequently compared against the analyses performed on documents, statistical information, or comments from random people from the local public. A very essential limitation that the field posed was the levels of still-existing but not communicated tensions within and across local communities. The war experience and the process of ethnic identification was a sensitive area, which constituted questions about the self-identification of respondents as “not particularly appropriate”. Nevertheless, it was relatively easy to establish the ethnic affiliation by noticing whom a person would refer to as ‘the others’.

With awareness of the high-probability of subjectivity of some of the employed methods, the research aimed at providing a variety of cross-references and at building up conclusions based on findings being points of intersection of several sources of information and analyses.

6 Very interesting was also the fact that discussing the current ethnic disintegration few of the respondents expressed their ‘nostalgia’ about the lost Yugoslav citizenship.
CHAPTER 1: THE POST-COLD WAR ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The collapse of Communism and the moral victory of the developed Western democracies over the rivaling block did not bring automatically peace; local conflicts\(^7\), previously suppressed by the system, challenged the perspectives for the future. The fact that violence occurred within underdeveloped states undergoing political and economic transition revoked ideas, drawn upon the successful Marshall plan of 1947, about providing international support for establishing and preserving peace. Within this contradictory and dynamic context the concept and practice of post-conflict reconstruction has been established and developed, grounded on an increasing awareness of the interdependency between processes and events regardless of the geographical distance.

Closely connected both with conflict related issues and with the peace practices and agendas, post-conflict reconstruction manifested itself as the transitional link from war to peace with potential to secure the future, prevent the spread of negative effects, and minimise the risks of new outbursts of violence. Despite the large amounts of financial and non-financial resources invested by national and international players, this peace-enabling mechanism did not prove as successful as expected\(^8\). The discrepancy between initial assumptions and achieved results became clearly visible in the cases of reconstruction following Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts, which became a kind of ‘markers’ of the period and in fact brought the ideas of aided peace and development back into the international agenda.

The lack of systematic studies on post-conflict reconstruction as a concept and practice obstacles a critical analysis of its role in the peace-management cycle as well as of the factors underlying its success or failure. Critical evaluations and conclusions drawn upon case studies and reports from the field could not compensate for the missing theoretical and analytical research. The post-conflict reconstruction practice has established an action-oriented environment with more or less no unified platform or mechanisms for assessment and evaluation of the need for international involvement and its appropriate models and mechanisms. No proper theoretical debate has addressed the goals of the overall process either.

Therefore, aiming at addressing critically the concept and the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction, the research will outline its key features and will focus on the identification of factors that play an essential role for the success or failure of the reconstruction processes. The increased level of violence and numerous cases of intrastate conflicts at the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century pushed the

\(^7\) Conflict, as it will be regarded further in the research, occurs when actual and/or perceived incompatibilities result in hostile violent actions (ref. SAIS Conflict Management Toolkit)

\(^8\) Paris (1997) gives an example with eight peace-building cases: Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
international community towards more active involvement in local affairs, in recognition of the interdependence of processes and events. In the light of this intersection, ethnic conflicts present a particular perspective for assessing post-conflict reconstruction approaches and for opening a discussion about the need for targeted and context-specific measures when aiming at enabling lasting peace and stability. The goal of the current chapter is to emphasise that post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction cannot apply solely ‘traditional’ measures. Any environment has specific problems and demands, which must be met in order to enable the achievement of positive results.

Defined as a ‘transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of the society’ (WB 1998:14), the concept of post-conflict reconstruction appears both dynamic and context-dependent. The general timeframes embrace the period starting with the termination of conflict and finishing with the establishment of peace. The direction of efforts during that period is towards overcoming the respective negative effects and consequences of the experienced conflict. These two parameters delimit content, which is dependent upon variables such as type of experienced conflict, underlying reasons and outcomes, conflict agents, timeframe and scope, global socio-political and economic environment, external interests and agendas, etc. In theory, this can impede the development of a common platform for approaching and understanding post-conflict reconstruction. In practice, post-conflict reconstruction actors apply a general approach to situations often without paying much attention to the particularities. As it will be discussed further, this discrepancy becomes a factor for the lack of expected levels of success of reconstruction programmes.

The current chapter will attempt to highlight the specific features distinguishing the 20th century ‘ethnic’ conflicts in order to show that they require particular post-conflict reconstruction measures. The theory of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts will outline the need for establishing clear frameworks. To delineate the scope of the problem however several conflict databases produced and designed to enable quantitative analyses will be considered below. Based on the period they cover and on the wide range of variables they take into account, the following databases were selected:


3. **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (1946–2007)** - collaborative project; Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University & Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRI0)

4. **VINC Database**: The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts project database (2004), W.Ayres, University of Indianapolis

It is necessary to note that the two databases released in 2003-2004 (namely the SFTFR and the VINC one) have been examined, because they cover the years of interest for the research and contain different details. Since the goal of the current chapter is to reveal the problems with classification of the late 20th century conflicts by comparing different studies, these earlier volumes were considered relevant. The *data tables* were adapted for the purposes of the research. The original databases are accessible through the provided links.

The *Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2008)* table, further referred to as ‘Warlist’, presents 302 episodes of armed conflict (including 27 ongoing cases) that according to its authors ‘comprise a comprehensive accounting of all forms of major armed conflicts in the world over the contemporary period 1946-2008’. Apart from the years of the conflict, the study takes into account 1) Episode type - distinguished as a) civil, ethnic or international and b) violence, war or struggle for independence; 2) Magnitude of societal-systemic impact; 3) States directly involved; 4) ‘Directly-related’ deaths; and 5) Reference (sources providing information on major episodes of armed conflict).

The distinction that the codebook establishes between civil, ethnic, and international conflicts is interesting. ‘Civil’ are the intrastate conflicts involving rival political groups. ‘Ethnic-intrastate’ conflicts are those between a state-agent and a distinct ethnic group. When two or more states are in confrontation or a distinct polity resists foreign domination, the struggles are considered international events and marked as ‘interstate conflicts’. In the cases where the sovereignty of a territory is ambiguous and contested by the parties in conflict, the episode is coded also as an international conflict until authority has either been successfully imposed or resisted, after which subsequent episodes are coded according to the established sovereignty. Further, a distinction is made between *violence* (use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals), *war* (violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention), and *independence attempts* (removal of existing foreign domination).

The *Warlist* identifies 78 conflicts as *civil violence*, 52 as *civil war*, 55 as *ethnic violence*, and 47 as *ethnic war*, 39 as *international violence*, 27 as *international war*, and 13 as *independence struggle*. Since the aim of the text is to address the issue of defining the *ethnic* conflict as a specific type, the analysis will focus particularly on the table entries identified as ‘ethnic’ violence or war.

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9 The ‘evolvement’ of the conflict classification can be noticed in the Peace and Conflict series (2001, 2003, 2005 and 2008 editions). In the 2001 edition the listed ‘major armed societal conflicts’ are classified under the categorised of ethnic, political, and/or international. In the 2003 edition however the category of ‘communal conflicts’ appears to denote armed conflicts that involve fighting between militants from local, often ethnic, communities without the direct involvement of the central state. In the other three categories the state emerges as a key-actor. Ethnic conflicts are considered clashes between a group(s) and the state (Gurr & Marshall 2003:51)
The **State Failure Task Force Project** (known also as the Task Force on Political Instability - Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003; and further referred to as the SFTFP Database), was established in 1994 at the request of the US Government. Its task was to collect and compile open source information, developing data-driven models to anticipate the outbreak, and facilitate the prevention and resolution, of ‘problem events’ in all countries of the world with populations greater than 500,000 in 2002. Thus, the studies examined a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those that occurred in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in the 1990s.

Among the types of conflicts related to the cases of state failure, the ethnic type has a particular place. **Ethnic wars** are seen as ‘episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status’ (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003:6). As stated further in the CIDCM State Failure Problem Set, ‘most ethnic wars since 1955 have been guerrilla or civil wars in which the challengers have sought independence or regional autonomy… Rioting and warfare between rival communal groups is NOT coded as ethnic warfare unless it involves conflict over political power or government policy’ (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003:6).

The concept of ‘wars’ covers political events characterised by the concerted tactical and strategic use of organised violence in an attempt by political and/or military leaders to gain a favourable outcome. ‘Ethnic wars’ are seen as civil, intrastate, or ‘societal’ wars, although they are often ‘internationalised’ to some extent. The concept of ‘societal wars’ is defined as paralleled to other types of clashes. The use of organised, lethal violence distinguishes it from the ‘normal conflict processes’. It differs from the ‘terrorist campaigns’ by the magnitude, intensity, and nature of the use of violence, and from ‘inter-communal violence’ by the active involvement of state authorities and the professed (or perceived) goal of the contending non-state group to change the established political structure or status quo. As major armed conflicts between state authorities and mobilised oppositional groups, societal and ethnic wars are hence synonyms according to the terminology established.

When examining the State Failure Project data (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003) it appears that out of the 135 examples of *Historical State Conflicts, Crises and Transitions* for the period 1955 – 1998 only 18 cases can be identified as ethnic. A further 46, where the ethnic elements characterise one or more episodes but are considered only an aspect of the multifaceted structure of the conflict, are presented as *complex*. Another 18 *complex* conflicts listed in the table cannot be related to ethnic issues at all.

**The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 1946–2007** is the output of a collaborative project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. It was first published in 2002 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and has been regularly updated since. Designed for academic use in statistical and macro-level
research, the database covers internal and external armed conflicts between 1946 and the present.

According to the UCDP/PRIO Codebook, an armed conflict is ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ (UCDP/PRIO Codebook 2008:1). In comparison with the other two databases, this one includes most of the entries, but applies a different classification of the types of conflicts. UCDP/PRIO Dataset distinguishes between: 1) extra-state armed conflict; 2) internationalised internal armed conflict; 3) internal armed conflict; and 4) internationalised internal armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO Codebook 2008:7)\(^{10}\). As it becomes obvious, the dataset does not apply the concept of ‘ethnic’ in respect to the conflicts at all. Instead of ‘ethnic’ or ‘communal’ here, the conflicts are viewed as ‘internal’ and ‘internationalised internal’ wars.

The **VINC project** of William Ayres (2004) is a research programme studying the processes, outcomes, and resolutions of *Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts* between 1945 and 2003. The stated aim of the project was to produce both a solid empirical base of observations about this class of conflicts, and a theoretical framework that can explain the occurrence, timing, and success or failure of conflict resolution. Apart from the basic data (region, groups involved, first and end year of conflict), a range of variable characteristic and independent invariables were included (*Appendix 1: Table 1*\(^{11}\)). Some variables outline the relationship of the conflicts to the Cold War period and its end. Others consider the stage of conflict, the number of deaths and the level of violence, ranging from 0 (no violence reported) to 7 (protracted civil war), whether the conflict ended and what agreement was reached. Among the independent variables considered are the highest estimate of population for the actors involved, highest estimate of men under arms, existence of allies as well as the proportion of population directly affected by conflict area. The comparison between the initial demands of the opposing actors at the start of a conflict episode is of a particular interest for the current research since this will clarify the appropriate perspective for identifying and considering the goals of the involved parties.

The table as suggested by the name of the project itself considers the *violent intrastate nationalist conflicts*. There is no indication as to whether the conflicts are to be addressed as political, ethnic, or international. It is also not clear whether these conflicts are examples of violence or war, and what exactly the difference between the two concepts is. The obvious emphasis however is on the self-determination nature of the conflicts and their occurrence within a particular state.

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\(^{10}\) According to the typology used, *extra-state armed conflict* is between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. The *internationalised internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states. *Internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states, and *internationalised internal armed conflict* - between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides (UCDP/PRIO Codebook 2008:7).

\(^{11}\) In a recent attempt to consult the table, it occurred that it is no longer available online. Being a well developed and very informative product that enables the clear overview of the conflict cases, a copy of the table was provided in the Appendix 1.
The 2009 edition of the *ICB Dataset (1918-2006)* is the updated version of the data originally published as part of *A Study of Crisis* by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, University of Michigan Press, 1997, 2000. The dataset covers all international and foreign policy crises for the period 1918-2006 and presents interactive data about 452 crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 994 state actors.

The interesting distinction that this dataset introduces is between *ethnicity related crises (ERC)* and *ethnicity driven conflicts (EDC)*. As the codebook clarifies, the first variable assesses ethnicity in terms of presence or absence of an ethnic component in a crisis, while the second identifies those where ethnicity was the dominant factor in causing or exacerbating a crisis. Both variables are divided further into: 1) Secessionist conflict – when ethnic group/s seek a reduction of control or autonomy from a central authority; 2) Irredentist conflict - a claim to the territory of an entity (state), wherein an ethnic in-group is in a numerical minority; 3) Non-ethnic conflict and under the second variable there is the fourth category; (4) Others. This emphasis on the level of the ethnic character of the conflict can be contested as not functional since when applied the two filters produce uneven results, some of which are unique, and some common. For example, four conflicts appear as both ‘ERC Secessionist and EDC Secessionist’, namely Nagorny-Karabakh (1991), Yugoslavia II: Bosnia (1992), Georgia-Abkhazia (1992), and Desert Strike (1996); while there are four other unique entries under both categories. Considering the groups of 87 EDC (both irredentist and secessionist) vs. the respective group of the 142 ERC cases, the number of the matching and unique entries suggests that this is not a functional classification.

The first question that emerges when comparing the conflict databases is why are there such differences? Are they methodological or terminological? If we accept that variations in categories and classification stem from the application of different methodologies, a question strikes: if we can ignore the ethnic component when examining a conflict (as the UCDP/PRIO Database does for example), then do we really need to address ethnicity to analyse it? Furthermore, if used, would this category enable a better understanding of a conflict? In attempt to outline clearer frameworks for identification of any particular post-conflict reconstruction needs, theories of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts will be addressed below.

1. **Defining Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts**

   1.1 Defining ‘ethnicity’

The above presented databases revealed that since 1945 civil/internal conflicts have been more common than international wars. Nevertheless, the theoretical literature before 1990 was predominantly concerned with studying international armed clashes (Smith, D. 2000:5). It was only with the end of the Cold War that their importance was recognised, provoking interest in detailed studies. Understanding ethnicity is a challenge for contemporary social and political studies. There are various interpretations of this ‘social construct’ (Hamilton 1964) but as yet no all-encompassing definition has been coined.
Deriving from the Greek word *ethnos* (*ethnikos*) meaning ‘race’, but also having implications of heathen or pagan (Williams, R. 1976:119), in the mid-19th century the notion began to refer to racial characteristics. According to the Oxford English Dictionary of 1972, the American sociologist David Riesman (1953) first used the term 'ethnicity' arguing that regional and religious pluralism was the factor that guaranteed the continued existence of liberty in America. In ‘Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance’ Andrew Greeley (1974) discussed that since ‘ethnicity’ refers to any differentiation based on nationality, race, religion, or language, there is not a clear conception of it. Part of the problem in his opinion was that some ‘ethnic’ groups are constituted by religion (Jews), some by nationality (Poles), some by religion and nationality (Irish Catholics), some by race (blacks)…some by language…and some by region. (Greeley 1974:291)

The term has also been used to describe the contradiction between modern and urbanised societies (and social groups) on one hand and parochial and regional identity on the other (Hacker 1976:17). While in everyday language today, the word ethnicity is rather connected with the ideas of ‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations’, in the social sciences it refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive. Although the modern ethnic discourse tends to focus on sub-national units of different types it is also relevant when describing the roots of origins of majorities and dominant peoples (A.D. Smith 1989). According to Novak, ethnic affiliation is a fundamental part of the contemporary personal identity, which is in part involuntary, in part by choice (Novak 1972:56).

The contemporary implications of the concept ‘ethnicity’ reflect social structures in terms of psychosocial networks, within which individuals are born and which largely determines their values, beliefs, and behaviour. While the term ‘race’ refers to physical/biological differences between people and communities, ‘ethnic group’ is primarily used to denote cultural differences associated with actual or perceived shared past, language and regional or national origin (Fenton 1999:4).

Even though widely discussed, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ still remains vague and burdened with divergent definitions and meanings. Problematic is the question regarding the criteria that constitute ethnicity. As the lowest common denomination, Manning Nash (1988) has proposed the metaphor of ‘bed, blood and cult’, implicating an ideology of endogamy, common origin and religion. However, some ethnic groups use the criteria of cultural competence rather than race or blood, while others allow inclusion of new members through assimilation. Although shared cultural traits do not always present a stable basis, the idea of a common culture is the one that is always present in the ethnic ideology and that distinguishes these social groupings from classes (Eriksen 1993:35).

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12 There is much empirical evidence that different ethnic groups share various cultural features. This problem is discussed in details in Eriksen 1993
13 The difficulties in identifying the implications that the concept of ethnicity bears arise also from the fact that first, the notion of culture has about three hundred different meanings (as discovered by A.L.Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) and second, that while there is a large number of definitions of the concept of ethnicity (Williams, B. 1989) many people who write about it use the notion without terminological clarification (Cohen, R. 1978).
traits often become strategies or weapons in competitions between groups over scarce social goods (Worsley 1984:249).

The primordialist approach (represented by authors like Harold Isaacs and Pierre van der Berghe) looks at the social network that individuals enter at birth as given and unaccountable. A powerful integrative mechanism, it provides an epistemological, cultural, and emotional base. Social relations that arise from kinship, neighbourhood, shared language, religion, and culture are contrasted to those based upon personal attraction, common interest, or moral obligation (Geertz 1963). The ethnic boundaries based on the primordial social unit of the kin have therefore a permanent significance and the tendency of favouring kin over non-kin is natural (referred to as ‘ethnic nepotism’) and can be extended to include large linguistic, national, racial, religious, and culturally defined groups.

The genetic similarity theory (Rushton 1995) complements the theories of kin selection and ethnic nepotism emphasising that ‘genetically similar people tend to seek one another out and to provide mutually supportive environments such as marriage, friendship, and social groups. This may represent a biological factor underlying ethnocentrism and group selection.’ (Rushton 1995:69) Another formative energy among all peoples that could function as a consolidating factor for larger groupings transcending elementary family structures is religion (McLean 1997), but in contrast to the myths of kinship and common origin, it is not inseparable from ethnic belonging. According to the primordialists, the strong semiotic connection with the concepts of land, youth, blood, and sacrifice is the basis for the establishment of a group identity and for the development of commonly accepted stereotypes and beliefs that bond the members of large-scale communities together (Connor 1994).

From a primordialist perspective ethnicities are organisational structures that might have various forms of content in different socio-cultural systems, implying that the ethnic categories are constant and might be called upon when the need arises (Barth 1969:14). Nationalist ideas, developed upon the primordial character of ethnicities, are ‘illiberal’ because the model of political citizenship fails when the state becomes the idealised embodiment of a ‘naturally formed community’.

Theorists, among whom Clifford Geertz, Edward Shils and Pierre Van den Berghe, have been criticised for defending the existence of clear-cut and sustainable boundaries between ethnic groups (based on culture, language, religion, physical traits) and for emphasising the overriding importance of identity when analysing ethnic conflicts. Problematic points in this approach are that there are many levels at which people can relate to each other and that identity formation can also involve personal choice (in the cases of mixed marriages or socialisation at birth within a non-native community for example). Ethnic groups are therefore never absolutely distinct and exclusive by definition. It depends on the situation as to which of the levels of ethnic nepotism would be politically relevant and thus activated.
The idea that the boundaries of ethnic groups are socially constructed is central for the modernist approaches to ethnicity. Sharing the primordialist view that group identities tend to be stable once created, modernists see ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some larger and in most of the cases material ends (Lake & Rothschild 1998:5). The role of the elites in creating or activating ethnic identity is emphasised - driven by pragmatic interests, the elites can manipulate symbols for gaining support of masses, for influencing the state or pushing towards secession. As a label or as a set of symbolic ties activated and used for political purposes, it is very difficult to distinguish ethnicity from other political affiliations. According to Abner Cohen (1974b), ethnicity is an organisational form that exploits the ethnic ideology in both its aspects of utility and meaning for particular ends. The agents themselves might even not acknowledge these ends; but in order to be viable an ethnicity must have a practical function. Since ethnicity is sensitive to changes in the social interactions patterns, and community formation results from developments in the socio-political environment (Barth, Yong and Brubaker, Anderson), then ethnic conflicts should be regarded as a part of a broader set of social relationships.

Instrumentalists and constructivists are generally criticised for neglecting the wider cultural environment in which the elites compete and for underplaying the affective dimensions of ethnicity. Defining interests in material terms and emphasising the role of the elites in the identity formation process, they fail to explain the strong bonds and the perceptions of a common past and future among the individuals within the group. The sociological discourse regards ethnicity as a social classification within relationships of identification with and differentiation from others (Fenton 1999:6). Language, culture, and ideas for common ancestry, are the ‘centres of gravity’ around which group identities form and are mobilised in social transactions. Subject to change, redefinition, and contestation, the elements that serve as a basis for articulation of identity suggest that ethnic groups are not fixed-entities. Fenton argues that ethnicity is a social process and that the context can activate one or another aspect of it. Hence, a basic mistake is to take ethnicity out of a context and examining it *sui generis* (Fenton 1999).

Apart from these two main theoretical conceptions, there are also other ‘alternative’ approaches to ethnicity. Combining primordialist and constructivist views the perennialists, as called by Brass (1991), recognise that a better understanding of ethnicity requires taking into consideration both its social and cultural aspects (F.Barth, D.Horowitz; J.Armstrong, A.D. Smith, S. Kaufman). Adopting the transactionalist approach, Frederik Barth (1969) argues against the idea that the cultural content enclosed within the ethnic boundaries establishes a community. In his view, the formative factors are the boundaries supported by the

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14 In the theoretical literature modernists are sometimes divided into different sub-categories such as instrumentalists/constructivists or structuralists/deconstructionists. A distinction between instrumentalists and constructivists or between structuralists and deconstructionists is very difficult to make since to some extend it depends on the language used by the classification and on the particular approach.

15 Ethnicity could well be activated as an instrument for competition over scarce resources (A. Cohen 1969, 1981). It is a particular form of informal political organisation where cultural boundaries are invoked to secure the group resources of ‘symbolic capital’; identities hence develop in response to functional organisational requirements. According to Roosens (1989:13), many people change their ethnic identity if they can profit by doing so.
‘boundaries guards’ of language, customs, food, which ensure the persistence of the group. Ethnicity is therefore nothing but a unit of ascription.

Examining the phenomenon through the social psychological perspective, Donald Horowitz (1985) recognises that ethnic affiliations are ultimately based on kinship myths and a sense of group belonging in relation to other communities, Horowitz emphasises the connection between group strategies (some of which are irredentist or secessionist) and the resources of the region they inhabit. Influenced by Tajfel’s group psychology, the approach allows the study of ethnicity to be considered in a historical perspective, taking into account factors like role of different social groups or classes, collective memories or persisting group antagonisms.

Based on the assumption that people are rational and motivated by self-interest in their everyday actions, the rational choice approach (applied by M. Olson, R. Hardin, M. Hechter, R. Brubaker and D. Laitin, Lake and Rothschild, etc.) looks at ethnic group membership as determined by an individual gain. According to this interpretation, certain situations can activate ethnic affiliations, while they can remain irrelevant in others. The expectations for material and/or non-material advantages can motivate individuals to choose membership of a particular ethnic group. In the view of Jeffrey Ross (1982), in this way a pressure could be put on a political system to allocate public goods for the benefit of the members of a self-identified group.

The ethno-symbolic approach investigates the ethnic past(s) as a factor for shaping present cultural communities. Applying Barth’s general approach when studying pre-modern ethnic communities, John Armstrong (1982) focuses on the cultural forms neglected by Barth to explain the persistence, change and resurgence of ethnicities. Idealisation of the past, language modifications, and religious organisations are in his view some of the factors that play an important role in the creation or shifting of ethnic identities. Essential feature of the ethno-symbolic approach is the recognition of the importance of myths and symbols for unifying the population and ensuring its continuity over many generations and for associating the group with a particular territory. A.D. Smith (1986, 1991) suggests that these have provided the patterns for the rise to modern nations. The resurgence of ethnicity in the modern world is then a reaction to the impersonality of bureaucratic rationalism (Smith 1991).

Despite the historical approach of many ethnic studies, the concept of political ethnicity is modern and in its contemporary understanding is used by the studies focused on the development of new political cultures in contexts of social change (Cohen, A. 1974). The element of culture appears fundamental to any ethnic construction, but the social interaction and social organisation determines the formation and the existence of an ethnic group (Leach 1954, Barth 1969). Starting from this assumption, the modern anthropological approach presents a theoretical framework that emphasises the social and political responsibility that internal and external actors (in respect to the given community) can bear for its establishment and relevancy. Viewed as a ‘dynamic situation of variable contact and mutual accommodation between groups’ (Eriksen 1993:9), the concept of ethnicity returns to the realm of the phenomena that if not controlled can at least be influenced or guided by social and political actions.
The anthropological approach addresses ethnic affiliations not as primordial phenomena, but as a type of reaction to the processes of modernisation. In the words of Jonathan Friedman, cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenisation are two constitutive trends of global reality (Friedman 1990:311). Groups and identities have developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation and the maintained policies of cultural determination often bordering with hostility and violence are often present when there is also a goal of political differentiation. According to the theory of Thomas Eriksen it is not the cultural differences between two groups that should be considered the distinctive feature of ethnicity. Rather it is the existence of conditions for a minimum contact between the groups that would lead towards establishing and communicating the idea of being culturally different from each other (1993:10-12). Cultural differences become identity factors when they are socially relevant. Metaphors of fictive kinship (Yelvington 1991:168) supported by ideology encouraging endogamy, legitimise such social identities. When cultural differences structure interactions between members of groups on a regular basis, the ethnic element within social relationship becomes rather explicit. Hence, ethnicity appears a social organisation of communicated cultural differences (Eriksen 1993:80), a complex structure with political, organisational, and social aspects.

The ethnic construct establishes a systematic distinction between insiders and outsiders, confirming and strengthening group membership and loyalties through stereotyping, and articulation of conflict or competition (Eriksen 1993:27). Without this usually mutual demarcation (‘dichotomisation’) being activated, even in multiethnic societies where cultural differences are pervasive, ‘there are many situations where ethnicity does not matter… the ‘we’ category may expand and contract according to the situation’ (Eriksen 1993:30). It is empirically evident that individuals may have many statuses and many possible identities. The answer to the question of when and how a particular ethnic identity would become relevant lies in the social context: ethnicity would occur where and when ‘cultural differences make a difference’ (Eriksen 1993:32). To incorporate the ethnic element on a personal level, the affiliation should provide the individual with something ‘valuable’. When cultural differences are not a part of the everyday living, the affiliation with a culturally determined group could well remain dormant. In wholly mono-ethnic settings there is effectively no ethnicity since cultural difference could not be communicated (Eriksen 1993:35).

Social identities are relational and closely connected with social circumstances. Eriksen argues that, despite common assumptions that identities are ‘inner’ and immutable, they may change as society changes because they are constituted in

16 Eriksen defines ethnicity as an ‘aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum regular interaction’ (Eriksen 1993:12). Several categories introduce different ‘kinds’ of ethnic relations like urban ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, proto-nations, and ethnic groups in ‘plural societies’ (Eriksen 1993:13-14).

17 Anthropological studies however suggest that economic environment also plays an important role for the establishment of ethnic communities as interest groups organised on the basis of ethnic identity in the context of the imposed colonial capitalism (Epstein 1978, 1992, for the Copperbelt area (Zambia), Mauritius and Trinidad; Nash 1988, for Malaysia; Williams, B. 1991, for Guyana). In many of these societies ethnicity is still a major social preoccupation and a chief principle for political organisation (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992:54)
It is also possible that the ascriptions undertaken by the others contribute to the creation of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are flexible, constituted on unambiguous classification based on the principles of inclusion and exclusion (digital differences) or on more relative ones, where there are no clear-cut boundaries (analogical differences) (Eriksen 1993:65).

Ethnic identity formation based on the differentiation between groups needs a mechanism for bonding community members and constituting a sense of togetherness. Here the symbolic dimension plays an essential role. Notions of shared origin, fed by relevant interpretations of history, references to ancient language, religion, kinship system, or way of life are crucial elements for maintaining the ethnic identity through periods of social and cultural changes. Social identity becomes most important when it seems threatened. Respectively, when boundaries are under pressure all the symbolic bonds get activated in order to strengthen the community and emphasise its wholeness.

A key conclusion that this approach reaches is that encompassing supra-identities are compatible with other ‘smaller-scale’ definitions of the self. In the 1940s, Evans-Pritchard suggested that social identities are segmentary and it is not a problem for a person to be simultaneously a member of a family, of a local community and of an ethnic group. The point is that these encompassing identities would exist only if they are socially relevant and the targeted group (Eriksen 1993:76) perceives the material, political, or symbolic goods they deliver as valuable.

These findings offer a possible platform for appeasing problematic inter-group relationships in a multi-cultural (multi-ethnic) environment. Empirical examples reveal that multiple identities can coexist without clashing. Cultural theories and social studies have recognised their emergence in the context of the socio-economic and technological transformations of the contemporary world. In complex multi-level societies, it is logical to expect development of multi-level identities. As social constructs, they correspond to the social environment and to its changes. As part of that system, ethnic identities are a group-formating factor that would be called upon when and if needed. Thinking about ethnic identities that have clashed in an inter-group conflict and that could not reconcile, the logical conclusion is that in order to overcome the rigidity of the situation of active hatred or total negation of the others, alternative (supra-) identities need to be invoked.

It might be difficult to defend the concept of ethnicity as modern, but it is definitely a concept with ‘old’ and ‘modern’ meanings. This is to say that, despite the etymological equivalent, in its modern usage the term has rather different connotations than in the past. Apart from addressing ethnicity as ‘social

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18 The social identity theory emphasises that identities are complex and composed by various factors, which under certain circumstances can become salient. The process of active differentiation underlies the group formation providing the individuals with a sense of belonging within the collective by strengthening the relationships among its members (Tajfel & Turner 1986; Hogg & Abrams 1988).

19 In a complex multi-ethnic environment agents is likely to develop a number of standardised forms of behaviour to the members of each one of the other groups depending on whether they are perceived ‘almost like us’, ‘not exactly like us’, or ‘extremely different from us’.

organisation of cultural distinctiveness’ with activated political consciousness or elite-formulated aspirations (Eriksen 1993: 36), the anthropological discourse contributes to the clarification of the contemporary implications of the term, pointing out that:

- Ethnic identities are based on cultural differences. They can be activated in a given situation, but only when these differences matter and are communicated. The idea of shared culture distinguishes ethnicity from class.

- As a product of contrast (*us vs. them*) ethnicity does not develop in isolation; dichotomisation and complementarisation are necessary preconditions. Group membership and loyalties are confirmed and strengthened through stereotyping and articulation of conflict and competition. Hence, a shared culture cannot provide grounds for establishment of different ethnic identities (Eriksen 1993:36).

- There are certain (either real or imagined) elements that provide the necessary basis for articulating an ethnic identity: 1) biologically self-perpetuation and endogamy; 2) ideology of shared identity: based on race, blood, or cultural competence; 3) religion (Eriksen 1993:34). However, ethnic identity can allow the existence of an overarching supra-identity.

- Interethnic relations could be highly asymmetrical regarding access to political power and economic resources (Eriksen 1993:28)

- As a complex structure with political, organisational, and social aspect, ethnicity can be influenced by social, political, and economic changes of the environment.

The socio-political context plays an important role for ethnicity to become a salient identification issue. People can fall back on ethnic identity when other projects of loyalties become deficient (Hutchinson & Smith 1996:13, Hobsbawm 1990). In the context of the depersonalising bureaucratic structures of the late modernity, of syncretistic culture and inclusive identities, when the traditional authority structures and social units have broken-up, a need for distinctive cultural and psychological ethno-national conceptions to sustain interaction networks has emerged\(^20\) (Bell 1975, Hutchinson & Smith 1996:14).

Ethnic formation is sometimes used as a means of demanding group rights or providing a defence against other groups and in these terms, as a strategic choice made by individuals (for gaining power and privilege, for security purposes, etc). From this perspective, attachment to ethnicity can change depending on political and economic circumstances (Bell 1975:160-71). Power structure changes can become an important mobilisation factor (Cohen, A. 1969). While the privileged under a collapsing structure face the danger of losing power and mobilise in defence, the unprivileged would respectively align to gain power. Competition and conflict are likely to break out not only for political power, but also for economic benefits, social status, etc. (Brass 1991:18-26).

\(^{20}\) This need was exploited by the economic elites in advanced industrial societies (Kaufman 2001).
Analysing the various approaches to ethnicity, the research accepts that the collective concept of ethnicity emerges as a socio-political context-dependent variable constituted around active innate and/or culturally determined (but not necessarily unique) characteristics of the human being. There are two main implications that this definition makes. First, that various non-negotiable elements under particular circumstances can become a ‘difference-factor’, and second, these same elements will clash and become a mobilisation factor only if there are specific conditions present.

A provocative question that ensues from here is whether a change in the socio-political environment could transform ethnic identities or even eradicate them, if they are no longer of use. If ethnic identities get activated when differences matter, then a possible strategy for solving major problems in post-ethnic-conflict environment can be to identify mechanisms that can reduce the importance of cultural affiliations and practices where they would be irrelevant or subjected to inclusive formal principles. Such are the principles that the concept of civil society is based upon. These encompassing formal affiliations suffer severe damages in the course of an ethnic conflict.

1.2 Theories of ethnic conflicts

The number of theories examining ethnic conflicts is as large as the number of theories addressing the issues of ethnicity and the formation of ethnic groups. According to the rational choice approach, regarding ethnic groups as coalitions formed in a rational attempt to compete for scarce goods in the context of social changes brought about by modernisation, there are three general reasons for ethnic war, the most prominent being the security dilemma. The most important factors, according to the economic rivalry theory, are distribution issues, relative deprivation and declines in living standards. A problem that this theory faces is that it cannot explain ethnic mobilisation in general, or the patterns of violence. Analyses and statistical studies show that ethnic groups mobilise under all economic circumstances and economic discrimination not always has a significant effect on ethnic mobilisation or on demands for group autonomy (Kaufman 2001:18).

According to the soft rationalists, despite the rational calculated pursuit of any consistently defined goals, the core causes of ethnic violence are extremist group values (Rabushka & Shepsle 1972). The hard rationalists see ethnic war as a function of individuals’ rational pursuit not of material benefits but of personal security (Hardin 1997). In cases of emergent anarchy, when the state will not or cannot guarantee people’s safety from violence, and escalating preparations for violence and outbreak of fighting creates a security dilemma, it is rational for groups to start mobilising in pre-emptive self-defence. Mobilisation here is aided by a mass-led ‘tipping process’ and selective incentives provided by the elites like promised rewards for killing and entering into battle (Kaufman 2001:20). Critiques against this theory argue that it does not take into account that security

21 Looking at the conflicts in the dying Soviet union, Kaufman argues that it is not only the case that areas, which suffer more, are more prone to ethnic violence (2001:19; Table 2.1).
dilemmas result more often from openly stated pursuit of dominance than from overzealous self-defence under emergent anarchy - it is the security dilemma that causes anarchy to emerge and not vice versa. (Kaufman 2001: 21).

Despite not being able to explain ethnic violence, rationalist theories offer some important insights. By using ethnicity instrumentally in pursuit of their own personal interests, the (ethnic) elites can powerfully shape the course of ethnic conflict. The mass-led ‘tipping’ process and selective incentives have an important role for the mobilisation of population and the security dilemma can exacerbate due to information failures and problems of credible commitment (Lake & Rothschild 1998:24, 29). To attain support, leaders can also instil culturally defined groups with a mythical and heroic past, a sense of mission and messianism, or a belief that the group had intrinsic and unique rights to territory by virtue of its ethnic or religious identity (Crawford 1998: 20).

Stuart Kaufman (2001) suggests that the elite-mass relationships determine the general structure of an ethnic war (Figure 2). In a case of a mass-led ethnic movement, politicians seek support by making chauvinist symbolic appeals, goading mobilisation even if the government opposes. In a case of elite-led ethnic movement, a few powerful elites (typically government officials) would engage ethnic myths and symbols to provoke fear, hostility and a security dilemma and mobilise their group for violence.

The mass-led violence scenarios can take place in a society of existing and publicly articulated myths justifying ethnic hostility and fears, when an opportunity emerges (like a lifting of existing barriers to ethnic self-expression imposed by the coercive force of a state). Such an environment can easily spawn ethnic movements promoting mobilisation as a mechanism for improving safety. In an ethnically mixed settlement, the security dilemma follows naturally increasing fears, hostility, and extremist symbolic politics on both sides.

In the case of an elite-led violence scenario, leaders would mobilise their group in pursuit of their own goals. They would use the propaganda resources of modern political organisations and mass media to manipulate ethnic symbols and fan ethnic hostility. Having the power to define political agenda and control negotiations leaders can block any potential compromise, discredit opponents promoting moderate programmes, organise militias or armies to launch violent provocations in order that a cycle of violence begins. If the other side responds in

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22 Kaufman points out that in ethnically mixed settlements we can speak about security dilemma only if both communities are threatened. If the minority (e.g., Bombay’s Muslim community) is seriously threatened, but the majority (Bombay’s Hindus) are not, then it is a pogrom. If one side, usually the state, has an overwhelming military advantage, the result is ethnic cleansing, genocide, or more limited riots rather than war (Kaufman 2001:32).

23 Kaufman (2001) suggests that there is no single path, which all mass-led conflicts follow to ethnic war. Some masses with already established hostile attitudes towards other groups just ‘wait’ for the elites to offer chauvinist platforms (Georgia). In other cases, security dilemma occurs when masses engage in violence and leaders with extremist views on implementation of chauvinist policies take advantage of the situation (Karabagh).

24 Minor demographic changes can be redefined as mortal threats to group survival, ancient disasters recast as current threats, and violent methods promoted as the only alternative to group catastrophe (Kaufman 2001)
kind, a security dilemma spiral fed by violent propaganda takes off\textsuperscript{25} (Kaufman 2001:36-37).

*Figure 2: Processes of Ethnic Conflict Escalation (Source: Kaufman 2001)*

Ethnic mobilisation is a mechanism used by the ethnic elites for achieving their private political and/or economic goals. This mobilisation however would not occur if there were not particular conditions to enable the invoking and activating of shared symbols that would powerfully transform reality by interpreting it in the desired perspective. The emotional motivations in ethnic wars can fill in some of the gaps in the rationalist theory. If the issues at stake are defined not only by rational interests, but also as a status contest and fears of extinction then it is easy to see why groups would prefer to weaken or harm other groups even at some cost to their own material welfare. In the context of ethnic conflict, attitudes towards other groups become determined by negative feelings rather than by stereotypes (Young 1976, Horowitz 1985). According to the psychologists, at the core of ethnic conflicts are not economic, linguistic, or other specific benefits, but status issues. When a group wants to establish its superiority over the others, the ethnic conflict becomes a competition for group advantage and a contest for dominance of the state. Each group would try then to prove its legitimate rights to political dominance in the inhabited territories pre-exposing the value of its moral and

\textsuperscript{25} The examples that Kaufman (2001) gives are with the cases of government jingoism (Milosevic in Serbia) or elite conspiracy, in which low-level guerrilla leaders (aided from the outside) initiate a similar process (Moldova’s Transnistria conflict).
historical claims (Horowitz 1985:145-47). Beyond the contest for dominance, group violence can break out due to the rise of feelings of hostility stemming from anxiety-laden fears of group extinction, which on its turn increase group solidarity, encourage the groups to perceive events in ethnic terms, and promote misperceptions across group boundaries (Kaufman 2001:26).

Building upon the insights provided by rational choice theory and the psychological approach, the symbolist synthesis draws a more detailed and clearer picture of the upsurge of ethnic identity and the outburst of ethnic violence at the end of the 20th century. Combining the psychologists’ ideas that people often choose emotionally because they are reluctant decision makers26 and the fundamental rationalist assumptions that 1) people have stable, ordered preferences; and 2) in choosing they try to maximise their utility as defined by those preferences, the symbolic choice theory explains the emotionally charged ethnic mobilisation by the role of symbols. With both their cognitive and emotional charge27, symbols function as powerful integrative mechanisms because they address and exploit emotionally laden myths that give events and actions a particular meaning28. From this point of view, facts do not matter. Facts that confirm the myths are redundant, while those that contradict the myths are unimportant. Symbolic politics therefore refers to any sort of political activity focused on creating and charging emotions, on stimulating actions, rather than addressing interests29 (Kaufman 2001:29).

The central assumption of symbolic politics theory is that political choices based on emotions and in response to symbols fits closely with the psychologically driven understanding of ethnic war. If ethnicity is an emotional bond evoking kinship feelings, then in a case of a perceived threat of group extinction emotional appeals to that bond can lead to a mobilisation. If emotional appeals to ethnic issues simultaneously refer to blaming another group, it is likely that feelings of anger and aggression would arise and would motivate people on the individual level to fight (Kaufman 2001:29-30). In deeply divided societies, symbols have the potential to play crucial role for the outburst of violence (Horowitz 1985:216-24). Still, the settlement patterns are not a precondition for violence per se.30

According to symbolic politics theory, violence could break out if there are several conditions present. The first condition is the existence of at least two groups in opposition, one of which justifies the pursuit of ethnic dominance and

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26 Kaufman refers to the work of Janis & Mann (1977:7-17) developing the idea of people being reluctant decision makers (Kaufman 2001:27). ‘Emotion commits one to action more than does the cost-benefit calculation of intellective cognition’, ‘divert people from pursuing one goal and point them toward pursuing another goal that has meanwhile increased in importance’ (Fiske & Taylor 1991:433, 456 quoted by Kaufman 2001:27 and 28, respectively)
28 The web of myths-related symbols that collectively define meanings or national belonging forms a ‘myth-symbol complex’ (Kaufman 2001:16).
29 Since people chose by responding to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked, politicians manipulate symbols in order to induce people to make choices. Emotionally laden and symbolically constituted, ethnicity is a rich resource for politicians engaged in symbolic politics.
30 According to Brass, (Brass 1991:18-26) ethnic wars may occur even where ethnic groups are geographically separate – as in southern Sudan for example, but where ethnic symbols are widely known, a myth-symbol complex justifies hostility to the other group and cultural differences are associated with political cleavages.
thus ethnic hostility. Fear is another conflict trigger, especially when ethnic groups define their security in mutually incompatible ways (Kaufman 2001:34). The third condition for an ethnic war, as defined by Kaufman, is that the ethnic groups must have the opportunity to mobilise, arm themselves and fight. Within a political space opened to all sorts of political entrepreneurs – after the collapse of an oppressive power system such as a colonial rule, dictatorship, or totalitarianism - ethnic violence is more likely to occur. The last factor that can play a role is the involvement of third parties. External agents can be a factor for preventing a conflict but also for its escalation. By changing the opportunity structure, through supporting one of the sides or by providing money, advice, and guiding the propaganda foreign patrons can help extremist policies, promote ethnic hostility and thus to contribute indirectly for the escalation of tensions and violence (Kaufman 2001:34).

To sum up, according to symbolic politics theory, subjective preconditions (myths, fears) are as important for the outburst of an ethnic war as any objective ones (opportunity, resources, conflicts of interests, real threats to the group’s existence). Hostility and fear, symbolic events activating pre-existing myths, leaders explicitly manipulating symbols, changes of political power and power structures or even the emergence of new information indicating a threat to the ethnic group – all of these factors can lead to violence. When fears and hostility are already high, ethnic war might spur from a new political opportunity. While chauvinist political programmes can lead to armed mobilisation and violence, it is the violence itself that feeds back to make the chauvinist political programmes more popular.

While symbolic politics theory provides a rather comprehensive explanation of the specific factors that motivate people to engage in ethnic violence, it does not indicate why ethnic markers would provide such vital grounds for mass mobilisation and why some societies have experienced fragmentation along ethnic lines while others have managed to resolve peacefully any identity politics issues. The institutional approach attempts to offer answers to these questions. It takes into account three key areas: 1) the strength/weakness of state institutions; 2) the degree to which culture has been politicised; and 3) the role of political entrepreneurs in the context of both identity politics and economic conditions.

Determining the rules for political membership, institutions can provide the background conditions for the outburst or the sustaining of cultural violence (Crawford 1998b:517). When institutions are not preferential to any of the groups inhabiting the state, they can prevent cultural identity politics from becoming

31 This assumes that they would have enough freedom to mobilise politically without being stopped by state coercion. Kaufman (2001) argues that the effective state apparatus of repression suppresses the possibilities for ethnic mobilisation and thus for ethnic violence. On the opposite, under specific circumstances as the Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, or when leaders who want to start ethnic violence are in power (Rwanda’s Hutu government), ethnic clashes are quite likely to occur Kaufman (2001:32-33).
32 The concept of ‘political entrepreneur’ comes from rational choice theorists, who argue that only those individuals who can provide appropriate incentives to potential group members will be able to mobilise them as followers (Lipschutz 1998:69)
33 If violence occurs as a result from a power structure collapse and there are no strong ethnic mythologies and identities, then it is likely that non-ethnic coalitions are established (Kaufman 2001:36).
politically relevant, while institutional collapse in states of deeply politicised cultural identities is more likely to lead to cultural violence (Crawford 1998b:540-541, Table 2). When the weakened state cannot uphold the social contract, a good opportunity for political entrepreneurs to propose alternative platforms arises (Crawford 1998b:527).

The second factor for the outburst of cultural violence is a *politically relevant culture*. Through preferential policies (of colonial rulers in India), culturally based ‘nation-building’ process (Germany) or through the precepts of religious beliefs (Muslim-majority states), cultural identity can easily be transformed into political (Crawford 1998b:515). When a culturally defined community sees itself as politically relevant but excluded from political participation, or from access to resources and benefits – struggles for ‘compensating the deprivation’ are likely to occur. Claims based on cultural criteria are incompatible as cultural identities are non-negotiable. Thus, political entrepreneurs appear an engine-factor for the outburst of violence. When the central state weakens, economic hardship and perceived discrimination in distribution offer a better chance to ethnic leaders to attract followers, especially in the context of existing identity politics. Thus, the success of the political entrepreneurs depends on the institutional legacies – deeply politicised ethnic and religious cleavages provide resources needed for mobilisation (Crawford 1998b:540).

The critique against most of the theories of ethnic conflicts is that they adopt a narrow perspective for understanding and explaining the outburst of violence. As Dan Smith (2000) points out, social science aiming to offer a general explanatory mechanism appears more interested in the background conditions and long-range causes. Focusing on identifying the most important cause of an armed conflict in most of the cases is likely to be misleading. A better understanding of the problems can be achieved only if the attention is drawn upon the question of how the different causes interact (Smith, D. 2000:8). Developing further the idea of Dressler (1994), who suggests that causes of violence should be considered typologically, Dan Smith (2000) outlines four types of causes: background causes, mobilisation causes, triggers and catalysts. These refer respectively to 1) the basic elements of the social and political structure as characteristics of the group 2) the full range of political behaviour (including goals and strategies) and its legitimisation 3) the factors that affect the onset of the conflict; 4) the factors that affect the intensity and the duration of the conflict (Smith, D. 2000:9-10). Similar approach is used by Michael Brown (1996), who distinguishes between causes that underlie an internal conflict and the particular outbreak, defining them as underlying causes and proximate causes (triggers), presented in details in the table below. Thus a conflict escalation can be studied on the basis of clusters of variables.

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34 Not surprisingly, the role of the intermediary political entrepreneurs within a multi-culture society is also determined by the state. For instance, in pursuing loyalty, communist-style central institutions promoted ethnic identities through their transformation into a basis for cultural-administrative divisions. By offering a degree of autonomy and collective representation to the groups, the state legitimised ethnically distinct political elites having control over resources and distribution of privileges. This ‘ethnic machine’ was widely applied in ex-Yugoslavia (Crawford 1998b:523).
Table 1: Conflict Factors and Causes  
(Source: Brown 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Underlying Causes</th>
<th>Triggers/Proximate Causes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Structural Factors</td>
<td>Weak states</td>
<td>Collapsing states</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intrastate security concerns</td>
<td>Changing intrastate military balances</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethnic geography</td>
<td>Changing demographic patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Factors</td>
<td>Discriminatory political institutions</td>
<td>Political transitions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary national ideologies</td>
<td>Influential exclusionary ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-group politics</td>
<td>Growing inter-group competition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Elite politics</td>
<td>Intensifying leadership struggles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/Social Factors</td>
<td>Economic problems</td>
<td>Mounting economic problems</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discriminatory economic systems</td>
<td>Growing economic inequalities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic development and modernisation</td>
<td>Fast-paced development and modernisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural/Perceptual Factors</td>
<td>Patterns of cultural discrimination</td>
<td>Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problematic group histories</td>
<td>Ethnic bashing and propagandizing</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The proximate causes emerge from rapid and unexpected changes of any of the underlying causes. Changes hence play the role of a catalyst. The structural, economic, and cultural forces that influence shared perceptions and diffused hostility are defined also as mass-factors. The category of the triggers, or the elite-factors, refers to the behaviour of specific leaders, assigning precise political responsibilities to the promoters of policies that deliberately fuel conflict and thus become the ultimate proximate triggers of the outburst of ethnic violence (Brown 1996).

Part of the problem with misunderstanding ethnicity and ethnic conflicts is the tendency towards simplification arising from their populist depiction (Storey 1997:63). Myths about ‘deep-seated hatreds’ and ‘ancient animosities’ have often been promoted by media or governments presiding over communal violence. As a ‘natural phenomenon’, the source of violence appears beyond control and therefore a good excuse for inaction or preventing intervention (HRW 1995: vii). Addressing the mass murders in Rwanda, for example, as an ‘African tribal bloodletting’ implies that the aggression is not a political act but an event that nobody could have predicted or prevented. When ‘ancient hatreds’ (Calhoun 1997:61) or ‘hot blood’ arguments are used for explaining the reasons for a conflict - even not using the term ethnic directly, another implicit suggestion is that there is nothing to be done to resolve them. Thus the only logical solution can be the separation of the populations (Smith, D. 2000:12).

As it becomes clear from the theories presented above, ethnic conflicts can be considered a type of identity-based inter-communal conflicts. Although collective (cultural) identities not always give rise to politically active groups and conflict-related cleavages, identity can inspire political action if turned into a basis for mobilisation (Gurr 1993). Collective behaviour and group identification are key elements of group conflict, but they are often a function of perceptions, activated by particular circumstances such as the changes in the socio-political or economic context (SAIS, online).

Often emerging within states, identity-based conflicts can spread over political borders and become regional or international issues. Struggles might occur
between group and central authority with demands for autonomy or secession. If within a state there are geographically and/or culturally distinguished groups, conflicts could outburst over power and control of resources. When groups are intermixed throughout given territory and there are domination-subjugation patterns or religious confrontation the conflict might aim at overthrowing a regime (centralist) or at redesigning society by changing completely the way it operates (revolutionary wars) (SAIS, online).

The simultaneous rise of local and global at the end of the 20th century in fact is not mutually exclusive but represents two aspects of one single process (Friedman 1990, Hannerz 1990). Globalisation has stimulated the emergence of a reflexive consciousness about the global system and the place of the individual (and the smaller group) on its scale. Thus, the powerful waves of cultural homogenisation and tighter economic integration lead to the emergence of a ‘new localism’ of ethnic, religious, or regional nature that constituted the world as a single place but locally constructed (Eriksen 1993:150).

The idea that the current research defends is that many theoretical difficulties stem from the fact that studies discuss various aspects of ethnic conflicts without a clear conception of which conflicts are ‘ethnic’ and what are their distinctive features. The ‘new wars’-theory of Mary Kaldor (1999) offers some valuable insights about the specific characteristics of the ethnic conflicts that broke out after the end of the Cold War.

2. Mapping the Type

2.1 The ‘new wars’

The end of the Cold War was to usher in a world order where peace would reign and the United Nations would govern with effective power and supranational impartiality. This idealist dream disappeared with the wave of conflicts that the world witnessed at the end of the 20th century. The collapse of the communist system and the bipolar model preserving an artificial international stability released both discernible and hidden confrontations, sustained and frozen tensions. Identity-based and inter-communal struggles between culturally determined groups broke out in different parts of the world - in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Chechnya, former Yugoslavia, and Congo/Zaire. Together with the number of the persisting long-running conflicts (Turkey, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan) the picture of the world became anything but peaceful (van de Veen 1998, Gurr 2000, Deutsch 2006).

The conflicts between communities in the 1990s affected the political map of the world and the international agenda, respectively. The right for self-determination of peoples, defended by the UN Charter, provided the necessary legal grounds for the international community to support the disintegration of former political unions (as the USSR and the FRY) and to recognise the new formations as sovereign countries. The ethnic agenda, invoked as a formative principle for these new political structures, and the unwillingness of the central powers to loose territories and/or dominant functions within states, provoked the armed conflicts.
Characterised by a high degree of violence, ignoring national borders, threatening peace in neighbouring countries and creating possibilities for domino effect, these struggles widely referred to as ‘ethnic conflicts’, seemed to have an eroding effect upon local and international stability and security, proving to be far more savage and incomprehensible than traditional interstate wars (Baird 1999).

Intra-state violence appeared to have more devastating effect on the civilian population than interstate wars (Kaldor 1999; Crawford & Lipschutz 1998). It is characterised by a high level of material damages, destruction of infrastructure and housing facilities (van de Veen 1998). The figures of conflict-related deaths and the number of refugees are indicators for the associated higher human costs (Ropers 1998). The figures show that while in World War I and World War 2 the percentage of civilian deaths on the total was respectively 14 and 67, in the 1990s (where most wars were within rather than between states) the civilians deaths reached 90 percent (Crawford 1998a). Material damages, destruction of infrastructure and housing facilities in addition to the political, ecological, and social consequences have obstructed development for years ahead (Ropers 1998). The activated ethnic nepotism and psychological mechanisms of raising prejudices and discrimination resulted in subsequent higher rates of crime and violence (Alesina 1997), frequency of wars, military actions and casualties (Rummel 1997a; Haas 1974; Vanhanen 1999) and respectively low investments in public goods (Easterly & Levine 1997:112).

The conflicts of the 1990s are a product of the restructuring of the world power systems within the changed international context. Uncompleted historical processes and developments combined with new political ambitions have found propitious ground to flourish and explode. Political instability, anticipated economic and political benefits, and the lack of functioning international control framework enabled local elites to take advantage of the situation and to mobilise support on ethnic basis, exploiting the desire of the developed democracies to aid the transition of the formerly oppressed societies to new democratic political systems.

The conflicts that spread after the end of the Cold War are often defined as identity-based and ‘ethnic’. Racial, religious, and cultural clashes, those between language groups, indigenous inhabitants and immigrants, majorities and minorities are usually recognised as sub-types. Among the examples, given to illustrate the problematic area, are the tribal fighting in Somalia, the Kurd minority problems in Iraq, the civil war in Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

35 ‘By 1995 deaths in the war in the former Yugoslavia reached over 200,000; over half the population of Bosnia became refugees, and virtually all of the Serb population of Croatia was forced to flee. By 1993 civilian deaths in the war in Abkhazia were estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000’. (Crawford 1998a:3)

36 Western democracies assumed that by recognising the right of formerly oppressed communities to political independence will provide support the transition from communism and launching democratisation. However the lack of properly formulated standards for recognition of independence and the precedent set launched the domino effect in former Yugoslavia.
Identity conflicts are not a new phenomenon\textsuperscript{37}, but those of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century fall under the type, denoted by Kaldor as ‘new wars’. Kaldor (1999) takes into consideration the mode of warfare. The combination of mass production, mass politics, and mass communications has eventually established a war model beyond the Clausewitzian one\textsuperscript{38}, wiping out the distinction between public and private, military and civil, internal and external and even war and peace. From this derived the exterminist character of this type of conflict, which developed through the historical experience of the two world wars and the Cold War (Shaw 1988) and reached extremes in the inter-community clashes of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{39}.

Kaldor’s theory suggests that the conflicts of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century are a part of a new political economy of war, in which a range of new militaries (from remnants of state armies and paramilitary groups to international troops) engage in new forms of violence\textsuperscript{40}. Acts like the systematic murder of ‘others’ and ethnic cleansing are seen as ‘genocidal’\textsuperscript{41}. In Kaldor’s term, this war economy that emerged after the Cold War was not only demobilising and parasitic, but a ‘predatory social condition’ damaging economies of neighbouring regions as well as the zone of warfare itself, spreading refugees and identity-based politics (Kaldor 1999:113). Moreover, civilians were ultimately ‘transformed’ from accidental victims of war into strategic targets. Another important aspect of Kaldor’s approach is a warning against the widespread assumption that most of the 1990s wars were civil. The author emphasises that the Bosnian case together with some other conflicts of the period should be regarded as a political conflict, involving state power and ‘private’ forces, in which identity politics were used by which political elite to mobilise support and ensure their power.

Examining the ethnic conflict data from the last 50 years, scholars believe that competition over scarce resources such as property, jobs, language, and rights (Lake & Rothschild, 1996:44; Paul 1998:56) is only one of the factors. Violence between ethnically determined communities occurs due to low capacity of states and societies to adapt to changing environmental, social, political,\textsuperscript{42} and/or

\textsuperscript{37} Crawford point out that there is a large number of culturally-based struggles between 1945 and 1990 (Crawford 1998a:3)

\textsuperscript{38} The Clausewitzian approach articulates the Napoleonic-Wars experience – the trinity of state, army and people and a culmination in a decisive battle.

\textsuperscript{39} Martin Shaw (2000) criticises Kaldor for underemphasising the role of the conventional military forces in the ethnic conflicts, because when they are defined as new wars because state and leader responsibility for initiating wars and genocidal acts against civilian population are not taken into account. Russia (in Chechnya) and Israel (in the West Bank and Lebanon) are examples that states today ‘go to war because of uncertainty in their control over ‘their’ territory and these wars are directed largely against civilian populations’ (Shaw 2000:177).

\textsuperscript{40} Kaldor’s theory has been challenged by the fact that the aggression towards civilians has been established as a practice yet with the 30-years war (1618–1648). Acknowledging that such criticism has certain grounds, the author of the research believes that the problem with Kaldor’s theory is terminological and not conceptual (replacing the ‘new’ with ‘modern’, the 17th century war and the late 20th century conflicts could easily fall under the same category).

\textsuperscript{41} According to Kaldor (1999) the principal aim of Serbian or Croatian forces in the respectively controlled territories in Bosnia was ethnic ‘cleansing’. In Rwanda the war was double-edged as it was directed both against ethnic groups and plural urban communities.

\textsuperscript{42} Crawford emphasises that the experienced political transformation should also be taken into account to understand ‘the outbreak of cultural violence in industrial societies where central authority is relatively strong and social contracts are largely considered legitimate’ (Crawford 1998a:15). A conflict emerging as a product of the political system is the one in ex-Yugoslavia (Smith D. 2000:14).
economic conditions (Smith, D. 2000; Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). In post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic social transformations, ethnic communities came into being in the process of competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status both within and among different ethnic categories (Brass 1991:18-26.) Transition to democracy or any radical changes in the political systems can further affect different groups within society (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:477-8). The explanations of the phenomenon vary from marginalisation of old political structures and ideas to the ethnicity as the only stable basis for mobilisation, through lack of institutions to channel the emerging social conflicts, and to the usage of ethno-nationalism by certain political elites as a means for attracting mass support. In that light, the wave of local conflicts following the collapse of the communist system that has been regulating internal as well as international affairs seems understandable.

Adopting the Handelman’s terminology, the identity conflicts that occurred after the collapse of the communist system involved ethnic associations but predominantly ethnic communities (see Table 2). The examples from the 1990s suggest that violent conflicts occurred when non-dominant ethnic associations made open claims for their political recognition as communities, i.e. claimed political rights over a territory (Eriksen 1993:42).

Table 2: Degrees of Ethnic Incorporation
(Source: Eriksen 1993:44)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of ethnic incorporation (Source: Eriksen 1993:44)</th>
<th>Ethnic Category</th>
<th>Ethnic Network</th>
<th>Ethnic Association</th>
<th>Ethnic Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standardised ethnic ascriptions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction along ethnic lines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal-oriented corporate organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial base</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The changes of the socio-political context and the economic conditions opened up the political space after the end of the Cold War. Recalled myths and memories for past injustice legitimised new claims for political determination. Although involving the identity component, the ethnic conflicts of the late 20th century are in fact struggles for (state) power inspired by global processes and forces impinging on the specific domestic configurations (Lipschutz 1998:44; Storey 1997, Kaufman 2001:16). In these politically mobilised actions for the pursuit of particular goals and interests, ethnicity was a catalyst and not a cause of the conflicts. Ethnic conflicts after the Cold War occurred between politicised ethnic

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43 There are four types of association distinguished upon the degree of ethnic incorporation. The **ethnic category** is the least incorporated type of ethnic grouping. It activates in a context of political fragmentation and serves for identification of members on the bases of shared values and cultural assets. An **ethnic network** has the ability to distribute resources among its members and impose strong moral obligations for support to individuals on ethnic basis. The characteristic of an **ethnic association** is the organisational apparatus that channels the established relationships. Embodying presumed shared interests, it might take the form of political parties, youth clubs, or religious associations. The highest degree of ethnic incorporation is the **ethnic community**. Embracing ethnic categories, networks and associations, the group relates to a particular territory with more or less permanent physical boundaries – e.g. an ethnic group in command of a nation state (Handelman (1977) quoted by Eriksen (1993:43)).
groups and had a direct impact upon the international politics. The attempt to map the type below, aims at clarifying the differences from a post-conflict reconstruction perspective.

2.2 Ethnic conflicts – general features

To assess the typology of conflicts, it is necessary to look at the elements in their interrelation. This can be achieved through conflict mapping (Wehr 1979:19). Although there is no single approach adopted\textsuperscript{44}, many of the studies focus on a number of basic features that provide fundamental indicators.

Wehr’s conflict maps take into account information on the following points:

- **Conflict History and Context** (physical and organisational settings)
- **Parties** (fighting behaviour, direct and indirect stakes in the conflict outcome, third parties)
- **Causes and Consequences**
- **Issues** (contrasting beliefs and values)
- **Goals and Interests**
- **Dynamics**
- **Functions** (purposes; positive consequences)
- **Regulation Potential** (conflict-limiting elements)

Hocker & Wilmot (1994) introduce another guide to the conflict mapping to bring specific aspects of conflict into focus and serve as a check on gabs in information. Here the main points for consideration are:

- **Nature of Conflict** (trigger events, historical context, perceived incompatible goals by the parties)
- **Styles** (of each party and how they change)
- **Power** (attitudes, dependencies, sources of power)
- **Goals** (of each parties, content goals, and relational goals)
- **Tactics** (strategies, tactical options, interlocking of tactics and their role for pushing the conflict through phases of escalation, maintenance and reduction)
- **Assessment** (rules of repetitive patterns, possibility for quantitative analysis)
- **Self-regulation** (perceived options for change, techniques for self- and system-regulation)
- **Attempted Solutions**

Based on the above presented approaches as well as on the information, provided by the databases indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the text will attempt to assess the elements and to map the type of ‘ethnic conflicts’ in order to distinguish it from the other contemporary violent struggles.

\textsuperscript{44} As Wehr (1979) reveals the approaches can differ from general principles for analysis to micro-analytical or combined.
2.2.1 Conflict context

The widely used statement that ‘instead of the expected peace and stability the end of the Cold War brought ethnic tensions, violence, and wars worldwide’ is in fact misleading because it suggests that in the previous years the number of violent clashes and tensions was at least lower. The databases introduced can challenge the myth that in the late 20th century ethnic violence spread on an extremely large scale. The VINC database reveals that out of 83 conflicts in total identified as ethnic (1945-2003), only 22 started after 1989. The Warlist and the SFTRF tables reveal more or less the same picture. The numbers of ethnic conflicts between 1945 and 1989 against this since the end of the Cold War are respectively 56 against 35 (for the period until 2003, plus additional 12 for the period 2003-2009) and 54 against 22 (until 2003).

The data reveal that, although the overall number of Post-Cold War intrastate community struggles does not exceed this of the previous years, violence outbursts occurred in waves, following the collapse of the communist system and the changes in the international status-quo (Hewitt et al. 2008, Figure 3). While the frozen peace of the bipolar world could suppress or ‘hide’ the conflicts on ethnic grounds in the past, in the 1990s violence emerged in different spots of the globe and became widely visible.

Figure 3: Trends in Ongoing and New Conflicts 1946-2005
(Source: Hewitt et al. 2008)
The ‘contextual’ change offered the nationally emancipated communities a good chance to raise their claims and for local political entrepreneurs – an opportunity for pursuing power (Lipschutz 1998:51). As the UDCP/PRIO dataset reveal, the end of the Cold War system was a trigger for many old intra-state conflicts to reoccur. The ‘climate’ in the early 1990s was generally favourable, because the enthusiasm after the fall of communism to introduce democracy to all the states worldwide prevented the international community from objectively pre-assessing the negative consequences from opening the contest between power holders and power-contestants. Figure 5 demonstrates (Hewitt et al. 2008) an increase in the number of intrastate wars, but at the same time, the comparison between the conflicts of the Cold war and the Post-cold period, as presented in a table from the same Peace and Conflict edition (Appendix 1: Table 2) does not indicate any significant variation in figures.

*Figure 4: Ongoing Conflicts, New Onsets 1980-2005*
(Source: Hewitt et al. 2008)
Nevertheless, the increase in domestic tensions within the countries of collapsing ideologies and regimes did not occur overnight. The uneven development of different zones within a single state resulted from certain economic dynamics 20th century. In some democratic countries the ‘fault lines’ were perceived as administrative; in other cases these administrative differentiation overlapped the ethnic (cultural) division of societies (Lipschutz 1998:50). This ultimately enhanced any already existing division between culturally determined communities and their competition over resources or power.

### 2.2.2 Conflict agents

When defining the type, the very first assumption that comes to mind is that conflicts are ethnic because the opposing parties are ethnically determined. This is confirmed by the databases and the theoretical literature.

Considering the demographic aspect, the states that have suffered ethnic conflicts are of ethnically non-homogeneous population with (at least two) identity-determined groups. If separate communities are not yet established, certain factors can serve as grounds for such a differentiation. Among these are different religions and cultural formations, opposing beliefs and values, several actively spoken languages. Although cultural differences and non-homogeneity of population are not factors for an outburst of communal violence, these can become important catalysts for the mobilisation of supporters once the conflict erupts. In cases of a group(s) constituted as an irredentist community, the escalation of tensions would be dependent on the connections with the mother-state and -nation.
Ethnic conflicts are usually regarded as clashes occurring between two or more communities within the borders of a given state, defined along the lines of certain cultural or biological differences. The analysis of the databases suggests that the number of the cases of ethnic clashes between unranked groups\(^{45}\) is too small. The VINC database suggests that only 10 out of 83 cases of ethnic conflicts are between unranked groups. In the other 73 cases the opposing parties are ranked, i.e. these conflicts involve ethnically determined groups, one of which has dominant position over the others. The conflict agents in the ranked clashes can be divided further into dominant group, often represented by the central state institutions, and community(s) deprived from power, resources, or rights. This in the UCDP/PRIO Dataset for examples is coded as ‘Incompatibility: Government’.

### 2.2.3 Conflict frameworks

To map the ethnic type among the contemporary violent conflicts, it is important to look also at what and where is happening. The section of conflict frameworks will consider the specific features of the type as at the particularities about its dynamics, intensity, and duration.

As it was mentioned above, the concept of ethnic conflict implies that the cultural, socio-political, and/or economic affairs of the country become articulated in ethnic terms and in most of the cases, various aspects of the domestic status quo are challenged. These conflicts have disruptive effects on the stability and integrity of the state emerging as internal clashes and often causing an implosion of the political structure and fracturing of the unit. In case of territorially/politically defined communities claim autonomy or separation, the struggles can also interpreted as inter-entity.

Ethnic conflicts are considered implosive because of their potential to cause a collapse of the pre-conflict political unit, especially in cases when an ethnically determined community challenges the official state authorities by claiming a fundamental change of status. The fragmentation of states in this context is more or less explicable by the fact that the power of the central authorities appears initially weakened and thus grounds for contesting the legitimate (until that moment in time) structures emerge.

Another characteristic appears the scale of the conflicts - i.e., the area over which the violent actions take place and spread. The SFTFR table suggests that in 50 out of 75 cases of the violent struggles studied, the area affected directly or indirectly is between one quarter and more than the half of the country. The high level of mobilisation is also indicative. According to the SFTFR table, the number of combatants or activists involved in the struggles in most of the cases is greater than 15,000.

Analysing the intensity of the conflicts in focus, the data reveal that the level of violence reaches beyond sporadic isolated incidents and spreads among a large proportion of the population divided into identity-based groups. Ethnic conflicts

\(^{45}\) As defined by Horowitz (1985:22)
often known for the great number of civilian deaths as well as for the intensity and the brutality of war crimes against the population of the opposing ethnic group (Crawford 1998a:3). The second figure – victims as a total number - as estimated on the basis of the data in the Warlist, comes up to more than 900 000 (in 27 conflicts between 1990 and 2003).

The last aspect to be considered under this section is the duration of the conflicts discussed. The VINC database shows that out of 83 ethnic conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Second World War only 32 have ended by 2003. The UDCP/PRIO Dataset reveals that out of the total number of post-1989 hot spots – 61, in 30 of these conflicts reoccurred (in six of these 30 countries apart from the revival of ‘old’ struggles, new disputes appeared and led to outburst of violence). An indicator of the poor regulation potential of this type of struggles is represented by the figures referring to the number of cases where agreement between the combatants was reached and implemented – according to VINC database an agreement was reached in 26 of 83 cases only.

### 2.2.4 Conflict causes & goals

Competition is one of the most discussed causes of ethno-political mobilisation that can take a form from peaceful protests to violent war. Apart from political and economic competition, Wilkes and Okamoto (2002:3) identify three further types. Changes in ratios of relative seize between groups can increase fears about diminishing resources and can lead to ethnic (demographic) competition, which in ethnically disintegrated societies can result also from political or economic instability. Ethnic mobilisation can occur when land, territory, and related natural resources are at stake (ecologic competition) or because of competition over non-material issues such as identities and believes (cultural competition).

The recent historical situation of ‘wedding of status issues to political demands through ethnic groups’ (Bell 1975:160-71) enabled the association of cultural differences with political cleavages (Brass 1991:18-26) and thus provided the necessary grounds for the outburst of conflicts. Comparing and analysing the databases introduced earlier, it becomes clear that all the conflicts considered under the category of intra-state ethnic clash (either between ethnically defined communities or between a community and the state) have political goals (in the broader meaning of the term). These in the ICB Database are referred to ‘secessionist’ and ‘irredentist’. Although the conflict issues of incompatibility in the cases of intrastate wars UDCP/PRIO database codes as ‘territory’ or ‘government’ these are also easily recognised as power/political goals.

Further, the VINC table reveals that the initial demands in 65 out of the total number of 83 cases have been independence. The claims of 11 other cases are identified as political autonomy. Out of the last five examples, four fall under the categories of assimilation or cultural autonomy and only in one case (Rwanda) the genocide of minorities appears as violence ‘justification factor’. The same pattern appears from the data presented in the Peace and Conflict 2005 tables (Gurr & Marshall 2005). It is interesting to note here, that after the 1989 the number of political issues as a conflict cause/goal dominates the economic, status or cultural issues.
In the context of the opened international space after the end of Cold War, ‘the own state strategy’ became a model for acquiring power, and for achieving potential political and economic benefits\(^{46}\). This strategy appeared very attractive to groups, previously dominated by totalitarian rule. As Lipschutz (1998) discusses, this strategy proved successful with the democratic countries, which in their willingness to ‘repair cases of historical injustice’, viewed the claims for secession as a possibility for rapid change and an opportunity to support previously oppressed and underprivileged minorities.

In the light of the quantitative data, it is important to clarify the contradictory findings of different theoretical studies about the causes of ethnic conflicts - seen sometimes as rational and other times as irrational. As the datasets suggest, all of the intrastate conflicts before and after 1989 have formulated claims and goals. These first-level goals are rationally calculated political and economic advantages, as communicated by elites and leaders.

The second level, more emotional and open to manipulations, relates to the masses, experiencing ‘national emancipation’, security dilemmas, hostility, desire for revenge, etc. At this second level in fact ethnic mobilisation occurs through activating identity markers as language, religion, culture, etc. ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’, pointed out the American sociologist Thomas as early as 1928\(^{47}\) (Merton 1995:380). Once violence occurs, with the real physical damages and human losses, the grounds for anger, hatreds, and revenge are no longer fictional. Despite the economic costs a conflict is likely to entail, the ethnic activists would expect new opportunities and chances for political and economic gains to arise from it\(^{48}\) (Horowitz 1985:238). Violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is thus a result of policy decisions from the top rather than of a popular upsurge (Kaufman 2001:5).

At first glance, this statement might seem to contradict the above-introduced models for the two possible scenarios of conflict escalation and in particular the ‘mass-led’ process. It is important to note that, when opportunity arises, the existing tensions in society offer better chances for political entrepreneurs to ride

\(^{46}\) But when both the ruling regime and the state are threatened, the effects for a country and its population cannot be other but negative. Therefore, if economic factors are considered, this should be only in form of expected future advantages; which on the other hand should not be underestimated as a factor – a risky (and often bloody) investment for ensuring future benefits. Some places of violent conflicts ‘have fallen out of ‘history’ indeed. But places able to break away from the political grip of larger polities, as Slovenia escaped the competitive drag of Serbia’, have chance to participate in the global economy (Lipschutz 1998:50). This conclusion that Lipschutz makes introduces the idea that at least some of the conflicts, usually approached as ‘ethnic’, can be viewed as resulting from the efforts for achieving political and economic benefits under the changed circumstances.


\(^{48}\) The ‘rules’ for participation in international politics might also become an important factor. In the age of the inter-national politics, institutions and economic relations, a community deprived of a nation (or at least of a certain formal recognition) is underprivileged in terms of rights to participate equally in the global political and economic affairs. The idea of the world divided into nation states was fully established with the end of the World War II and the projection of this idea was in fact the UN. Thus, the nation state appears the structure that compensates this deficit and transforms ‘outsiders’ into players.
the wave of popular emotions and attitudes, manipulating them in a desired
direction. Therefore, the two scenarios should be regarded as variations of conflict
‘genesis’, whose escalation depends not only on the emergence of suitable
conditions, but also on the mobilisation of the negative dynamics by leaders and
on the lack of appropriate mechanisms for containment of the process. This idea
finds support in the views of Lipschutz who suggests that in the Post-Cold War
era ethnicity and religion operated as ‘instrumental means rather than ends’
(Lipschutz 1998:72). Once the causes for these conflicts, especially after 1989 are
recognised as going beyond the cultural differences, they can be understood
better, considered not only in the context of the ‘domestic configurations within
the countries where they occur but they are also the result of global processes and
forces impinging on those domestic configurations’ (Lipschutz 1998:44). In fact,
issues related to power, resources, or security dilemma are also causes for
international wars or for internal political (class) conflicts.

Looking at the conflict elements analysed above, it appears that the quantitative
data contributes to the terminological chaos. Considering the parties involved, the
theoretical literature and the quantitative analyses identify two or more ethnically
defined groups, ranked or unranked, in contest. The problem here is whether we
need to evaluate also the degree of ethnic incorporation, as Eriksen suggests
(1993), and then also to determine which would be the ‘ethnic conflicts’ – these
that occur between communities with higher or lower levels of ethnic
incorporation. Looking at the causes of the intra-state conflicts, it appears that
most are ‘political’ (‘secessionist’, ‘irredentist’, ‘power-contest (government)’),
but these might also be economic, ecological, cultural. Along the line intra- or
inter-state wars, it is also difficult to establish the type, because under the category
‘intra-state’, a range of conflicts can be placed.

The scope of the territory over which an ethnic conflict spills cannot be used
either as a clear parameter for distinguishing the type – civil violence or
international wars also can involve large part of the territories of the respective
countries. On the basis only of scope, ethnic conflicts can be distinguished from
local clashes, but not as a type. The same problem emerges with the levels of
violence. Even fewer in number, the international wars of the late 20th century
result in more than 1000 deaths (as the threshold used in the UDCP/PRIO
dataset), while the number of deaths in the internal wars vary – involving both
more and less than 1000 deaths. As the Warlist reveals, the top eleven conflicts
since 1945, where the number of deaths exceeds 1 000 000 people are as follows:

- **7 civil wars** (China 1946-1950, North Korea 1950-1953, North Vietnam
- **1 civil violence** (China 1950-1951)

All this indicates that using the quantitative data only cannot help clarifying the
conflict type referred to as ‘ethnic’. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature does
not provide a clear model either. Therefore, taking into account all of the above
discussed features and defining them as ‘general features’, the research would
focus on two specific parameters that can provide the necessary grounds for outlining the parameters of a possible clear definition of ethnic conflicts.

2.3 Ethnic conflicts – specific features

2.3.1 Mobilisation structure

To understand the specific features of the ethnic conflicts as a type, it is important to look at the mobilisation structure of combatants, the elite-masses relationships, and the role of the myth-symbol complex for organising and activating support. When analysing the mobilisation power structures in an ethnic conflict, several facts appear as common for the type. Among these are:

- (Forced) identification with one or the other side involved in the conflict
- Outburst of hatreds leading to mass involvement; instances of violence against members of the ‘other’ community, often interpreted as ‘punishment’ or revenge
- Lack of security and reliable legitimate forces to provide such (army, institutions)
- Former ‘neighbours’ transformed into enemies along the ethnic lines
- No respect for civilians - addressed aggression, forced involvement
- Central command hardly in control of paramilitary structures and their leaders (warlords); demoralisation of regular army, guerrilla war adopted; episodes of violence instead of strategically planned actions

The inclusion of civilians as targets in order to destroy the opponent’s ability to engage in war is one of the features of the ‘new wars’ that also appear in the cases of the 20th century ethnic conflicts. Other features are mass mobilisation, use of propaganda and the level of overall devastating effects.

The power structure is among the distinguishing characteristic of the type. The ‘classic’ warfare builds up a clear hierarchy between the levels. Power is concentrated in the hands of a central political authority, military structures lead wars in pursuit of the goals set at political level, and the civilian population is rarely (if at all) an active war agent. Together with the defeated territories, it is often the winner’s gain. Preserving the first two levels – the organisational (leaders, political elites, decision makers) and the operational (military/armed units under the command of a centralised leadership), the ethnic warfare converts the civilian level not only into a target (as the total war does), but into an inseparable part of the mobilisation structure. Furthermore, the political and military levels in an ethnic conflict are not exactly ranked. Due to the nature of the conflict based on contesting the political authority and its legitimacy by the means of open aggression, it is not rare that military leaders appoint themselves to political roles and become ‘independent’ from any central control.

Even if war started between clearly defined structures, the conflict dynamics can dissolve the initially formed units and shift the focus from the agendas at the outset, eventually constituting the conflict as personal for every member of the communities involved. From a clash between institutions (government,
community leaderships, etc.), the ethnic struggle transforms itself into a war between neighbours.

The personalisation of conflict results in mass involvement and ‘militarisation’ of population. Thus, the activities of the paramilitary gangs, led by local warlords, and the waves of armed struggles between civilians belonging to the rivalling ethnic groups are among the distinctive features of this type of warfare. Furthermore, there is no neutral (civilian) side of non-involvement. In the ‘us vs. them’ situation, a neutral party is quite likely to suffer an open aggression from both (all) sides. The high number of refugees associated with the ethnic conflicts results exactly from these dynamics.

The concept ‘civilians’ is thus not exactly appropriate to describe the third mobilisation level in the cases of ethnic conflicts. The mass-led ‘tipping process’ driven by peer pressure (the more people join, the more they can pressurise others into joining) and the selective incentives provided by the elites (promised rewards, threats or activation of the respective myth-symbol complexes) can explain why the mobilisation process snowballs (Kaufman 2001:16). Thus, the concept ‘avalanche’ appears much more illustrative and relevant to describe the third level that becomes involved on a large scale in the interpersonal violence.

Once the armed conflict breaks out, its energy level feeds on the acts of violence accumulating and increasing its destructive power. This also contributes to the enormous number of deaths, which corresponds to the idea, typical for the new wars, of ‘mass elimination’. Put provocatively, the civilians in a contemporary ethnic conflict eventually become fighters, victims, or refugees. Mass killings and forced migration can cleanse ethnically not only villages and cities but also whole regions.

One of the fundamental problems of ethnic conflicts theory, the need to explain the escalation of violence based on identity issues and the rebirth of kinship affiliations, can be approached through the third power level, which is often subjected to intensive, albeit not always formal, mobilisation and recruitment. When members of one group start engaging in ethnic activities the attention shifts to society’s ethnic division. Members of other ethnic groups are thus reminded of their status alongside the group that has initiated the process (Crawford 1998a:28).

The spread of uncontrolled and intentionally provoked violence appears a particular war strategy. Once launched, the ‘avalanche’ can hardly be contained and leaders rarely have as much control over the fighting, as they would like to think. Eventually brought to the negotiating table, commanders and leaders in fact do not represent the whole society and often have even no control over all the regiments. Thus, a total cease-fire cannot be commanded. Even in cases when certain control has been established over the organisational and the operational levels (often by a third party), the frameworks imposed has little if any effect on the mass (avalanche) level. In contrast to the other two goal-oriented levels, the leading principles here escape any pragmatic and rational definition. Of course, the security dilemma, the lack of trust, and the fears for the future have a rational explanation. They are however strongly complemented by activated symbolic perspectives and attitudes, hatreds based on imagined or real grounds, and the desire for revenge for the experienced personal losses, suffering or tortures.
This specific mobilisation structure explains the increased levels of ethnic-conflict related deaths, the scope of the conflicts (covering large parts of the territory of a state), the war intensity and dynamics (following not ‘an eye for an eye’ response, but rather the ‘tenfold' vengeance model), as well as their poor regulation potential.

2.3.2 Conflict outcomes and consequences

It might look odd as a statement, but the most specific element upon which an ethnic conflict can be distinguished from the other types of violence concerns the conflict outcomes and consequences. Similarly to the other types of violent armed conflicts, these wars have devastating effects on the states in terms of damaged physical capital, infrastructure and economy, destroyed stability and functionality of institutions, negative effects on the demographic factors. Beyond these common features, the post-ethnic-conflict environment is different because the experienced intra-state violence has severe negative effects on economic and political processes in transition countries (Bodewig 2002). The decreased state capacity, worsened social problems and continuing ethnic tensions complicate the social safety net reforms and can ‘rule out interethnic redistribution because different ethnic groups may refuse to share funds with a former enemy…[may be] left out and discriminated against the labour market’ (Bodewig 2002:ix). In a post-conflict situation of the type, all systems appear to be constrained by the political acceptability of interethnic redistribution. This social fracture eventually reflects upon the economic and political capacities of a country for recovery and development.

It is important to clarify here that approaching ‘outcomes and consequences’ as a distinctive feature of the types of conflicts discussed, the research looks not at the successful or unsuccessful fulfilment of any (initial) intentions of the parties involved, but the overall effects on society resulting from the experienced violence. This mapping element refers to the processes that occur in the conflict aftermaths, the understanding of which is of particular importance for the formulation of post-conflict reconstruction policies.

Intra-state conflicts along ethnic lines have specific negative effects on the social fabrics. Apart from the physical destructions, economic and institutional collapse, the post-ethnic-conflict environment is especially problematic because of the simple fact that the inter-ethnic struggles eradicate the very concept of citizenship (if it ever existed in the first place) with regard to the larger political unit, overarching the war-constituted or war-activated ethnic groups. In the course and in the aftermaths of an ethnic war a relapse into closed-community membership and disappearance of any overarching supra-identities can be observed. In societies where even before the ethnic clash the citizenship-platform has not been achieved or fully accepted, an ethnic conflict would hold back the societal development, preventing the establishment of possible civil identities.

This fundamental shift is one of the specific consequences and hence a prominent characteristic of the ethnic conflicts. Adapting Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms, this societal transformation resulting from an experienced violence along
ethnic lines can be explained as lost of formal (pragmatic) bonds of interdependence and interest and transferring all their functions to the symbolic bonds of the particular group. Religious and/or nationalist feelings are examples for very powerful cohesive factors establishing strong affiliation to an imagined community. The term ‘imagined communities’, introduced by Benedict Anderson precisely reflects the association of each member with other individuals beyond their physical proximity or immediate interests.

Functioning simultaneously, the pragmatic and symbolic ties transform individuals into community members. The principles of inclusive citizenship require that formal civil affiliations are dominant over the cultural, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other type of identity-based differences. A civil community is formed on the basis of the common recognition of the rule of law, of shared supra-ethnic values, respect for human rights, among which falls the right for self-determination and for preserving particular cultural practices, provided they respect the law and are tolerant of other society members. Peaceful co-existence of members of a non-homogeneous society is possible when shared civil principles become dominant within a particular political unit.

The ethnic conflict destroys these formal civil relations, making people perceive their cultural/identity differences as incompatible and/or hostile and hence as a threat to their personal security. Trust becomes limited only within the ethnic group, which closes inwards in order to provide security to its members and even to guarantee people’s lives. The symbolic ties become more important than any formerly existing functional (pragmatic) bonds. When a membership affiliation becomes defined on the basis of identity-characteristics, minority oppression, discrimination and aggression are logically to be expected.

Within an ethically defined community, symbolic factors become dominant and constitute the membership affiliations. Thus, the outburst of ethnic conflict in modern societies can be seen as resulting from the destruction of the balance between the two sets of bonds that constitute the larger civil (state) community. In fact, the disruption of the supra-ethnic grounds for loyalty and affiliation is what transforms the citizens into members of different ethnic groups.

Such a disruption is likely to happen in times of social instability, political or economic transition, or because of competition over resources. These are moments when everyday life suffers radical changes. When social order is disturbed, a community would re-organise itself into groups legitimised by relevant existing symbolic bonds or by newly invented ones. This compensatory mechanism to make up for the loss of pragmatic bonds creates new frameworks for re-distribution within the newly constituted community. Ethnic conflict might also break out when there is a direct aggression (or fear of aggression) against the

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A necessary explanation here is that the notion of the symbolic bonds implies the idea introduced by Ernst Cassirer. His study ‘Philosophy of Symbolic Forms’ (1923-1931) suggests that an essential part of human life is determined by the unique human capacity to symbolise (i.e. to imply meanings). Thus language, myths, religion, even science are all products of the various symbolising activities of man; the human world itself could be viewed as constituted by systems of symbols. Language has double nature – of ‘sign’ and of ‘symbol’ (using the semiotic categories). It is the first level (sign) that is the ‘pragmatic’ one, i.e. the necessary basis for communicating information.
symbolic forms, which are constitutive of the identity of certain group-members of the larger multiethnic community. Discrimination and oppression or fear they might occur can also provoke the re-establishment of smaller groups, where members are united by the challenged symbolic element.

In established democracies, cultural or ethnic identities are private and encompassed by the public symbolic bonds of the civil culture and the formal pragmatic distribution of social roles. However, when the institution of the state (as a bridging mechanism) and the respective pragmatic and symbolic ties collapse or weaken, there is nothing to hold the social puzzle together.

This can also be called a loss of social capital at the level of state. As it was mentioned earlier, ethnic communities can co-exist within a single space (defined in political, geographical or economic terms), in cases where there is an established and maintained social capital within the common (and commonly recognised!) macro-structure. A conflict between the components of a macro-structure - what in fact are intrastate ethnic wars – causes an implosion. When the macro-frameworks are contested and destroyed, units can be hold together only by external factors or forces. In this light, it appears logical that the most stable and in many cases desirable outcome of an ethnic conflict is the separation of the rivalling units.

The problem occurs when such a separation is either impossible, or undesirable. The most serious post-ethnic conflict problem is to ‘lock’ the established war enemies together and to expect that a state with a deeply fragmented society along non-negotiable ethnic lines would become a functioning unit. The lost affiliation with the state and the damaged communication channels and trust among the ethnically defined communities result in fragmentation of the societal structure of state and its ‘replacement’ by para-state structures. Therefore, from a post-conflict reconstruction point of view, the restoration of social capital at the level of a macro-framework, or the creation of a new one, is the factor that can enable or hamper the success of the process in general.

With the collapse of the communist system in the 1990s and its (non-democratic) institutions, the factor that had been suppressing local communities to strive for power and political recognition disappeared. The socio-cultural groups, tied-up by the coercive administrative mechanisms of the totalitarian machine, have challenged the dominance of the ruling ethnic groups and mobilised for a power-contest. The members of the particular communities claimed recognition of their symbolic bonds as nation-building factors. In Yugoslavia, the existing cultural-administrative division enabled communities to operationalise the political organisation of the republics and to claim independence. Thus, with the collapse of the oppressive regime, emancipated communities claimed for the right to replace the weakened institutions of the former dominant structure with their own.

In the context of a well-established and functioning democracy on the other hand, where cultural identity is only a part of a deeply rooted, internalised civil identity, even in cases of a weakening of institutions, the system would not collapse, and the society would hardly break down into smaller units. However, even in democratic settings, if cultural division becomes a basis for establishing administrative or political structures, if functional ties are defined along ethnic
lines, it is likely that under certain circumstances cultural communities become power-contestants; especially if political entrepreneurs take advantage of a possible institutional instability. The pragmatic ties and the symbolic bonds of citizenship function as supra-ethnic unifying factor ensuring stability of the system and the societal net, where cultural identity, citizenship affiliation and social roles are nested. Such an environment offers also a supra-ethnic basis for approaching and solving confrontations of any type.

Considering the fundamental principles of community living (presented yet in the Rousseau’s social compact theory), it becomes obvious that ethnic violence leads to a radical transformation and collapse of the societal structure at the level of state. With the collapse of the state institutions, political boundaries and the social compact, the citizens also disappear. Without a social compact recognised by all the individuals within given political boundaries, there could be no ground for a formal citizenship affiliation. The ethnic conflict establishes culturally defined communities closed and hostile to each other. In addition, this hostility is not only a result from the activated opposing symbolic affiliations and emphasised us-them perceptions but because of the real loses, the experienced violence and the war trauma.

Attempting to distinguish the type, a conclusion was reached that ethnic conflicts should be considered a dynamic complex of several components. The most distinctive feature, upon which the research defines a conflict as ethnic, is the fragmentation of the post-conflict society to a puzzle of ethnically determined, closed, and hostile to each other units. Thus, the conflicts where violence is performed along ethnic lines and which establish the ethnic membership as a factor determining affiliations, relationships or other aspects of political, economic and social life are considered ‘ethnic conflicts’ by the research.

3. **What is different about the Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts?**

From a post-conflict reconstruction perspective, ethnic conflicts differ from other types violent clashes upon the interaction of several parameters. Conflicts agents are defined along ethnic (cultural) lines, establishing horizontal or vertical identity-based groups. These groups define themselves as different from the ‘others’ or are constituted as such in the course of the events. One of the groups can have a dominant position, but apart from the vertical direction, the ethnic conflict has also a horizontal dimension – fights ‘among neighbours’ supplement fights between power-contestants. The clash is likely to occur (or at least to start) within the borders of a state with claims for secession, power or status demands. On the political map of the world, these conflicts are seen as local, but in fact they can have a direct affect on international politics and relations. Internally, armed struggles break out over large parts of the territory of the state involving mass mobilisation. The levels of violence go beyond sporadic isolated incidents. Spreading among large proportion of the population, these conflicts have poor potential for containment, regulation, or termination. Conflicts often reoccur after ceasefire. They can be referred to as implosion, because a subsequent
fragmentation (disintegration) of the state is a result not from external aggression but from the action of its population.

The mobilisation structure of these conflicts indicates a specific configuration of the hierarchy levels. Although the ‘traditional’ organisational and operational levels are present, there is also a third one constituted - the level of the ‘avalanche’. This in turn affects the mobilisation strategy and requires that the conflict goals and causes also be considered according to the separate levels.

Referring to shared symbols and/or interpreting events through a particular perspective, political entrepreneurs aim at introducing and activating a mythology to attract followers and to motivate community members for action. Once violence breaks out, the role of the symbols becomes complementary (albeit still important), because the violence transforms the war into personal for the members of the involved communities, many of whom at that stage are driven by feelings of aggression, lack of personal security and revenge. Thus, while the goals of the organisational and the operational levels can be spelled out as political power and/or economic benefits and advantages, the goals at the mass level can be identified as security, identity recognition, and access to resources. The same logic of differentiation of levels can be applied to the conflict causes (rationally calculated goals as opposed to the competition, security dilemma and identity struggles).

Another factor that has a direct effect on the type is the conflict context that establishes preconditions and triggers for the outburst of violence. Among the preconditions are previously existing lines of separation, history and practice of identity politics, non democratic and oppressive regimes, discriminatory to particular groups, as well as lack of cross-cutting policies and practices. The triggers in their turn can be divided into local and international. Under the first category are the radical political, economic or/and social changes, as well as the collapse of the (oppressive) institutions. International triggers are policies supportive of political changes (corresponding to the dominant ‘ideological’ values of the ethnic upsurge, e.g. self-determination, democracy and human rights) and of the emergence of new actors on the international stage.

New political and territorial structures can emerge from the disintegration of former multiethnic establishments. Among the conflict consequences can also be institutional collapse, destruction of the pre-conflict infrastructures, economy, and social nets. In cases where fighting communities fail to achieve political autonomy or independence and become constrained to remain within the political borders of a single state, the socio-political space is characterised by deep fragmentation, while the demographic geography of the country is likely to have established ethnically ‘pure’ and consolidated territories as a result of the forced displacement and refugee movements. The state loses its legitimacy in providing an overarching identity. A social contract bridging the ethnically determined inhabitants of an established political unit can hardly exist under such conditions; hence, it is likely that there is no social capital on the level of the state.

The violence along ethnic lines results in the destruction of pre-conflict social structure and arrangements of the larger political unit. Destroying the pragmatic (rational) links between people, the ethnic conflicts affirm the bonding affiliations
as dominant. At the state level, *ethnic community members replace citizens*. The pre-conflict ‘national’ social capital disappears in favour to the *community social capital*. Societal fragmentation along ethnic lines of separation appears among the most serious negative consequences from the discussed conflicts, especially in cases when separation of communities is impossible and where ex-combatants have been forced to remain within the political frameworks of a single state.

A possible argument against the presented definition would be that it does not distinguish between ethnic and religious conflicts. When considering all of the parameters above, ethnic and religious conflicts are quite alike indeed. The main difference however is at the level of the mobilisation structure. Each party in the religious conflicts has a single power-core, supported by commonly recognised within the particular community values and morals. An ethnic conflict can have various power-centres each introducing and ‘promoting’ its own agendas. In contrast to the ethnic affiliation, the religious one is based on moral grounds, which enables religious leaders to be in better control of their followers. Furthermore, the poor regulation potential of an ethnic conflict is not necessarily based on non-negotiable issues, while religious beliefs are hardly conversable.

Finally, addressing the question whether the ethnic conflicts of the late 20th century are different from the earlier ethnic conflicts, the answer based on the introduced framework would be ‘yes and no’. According to the adopted definition, the Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts are not different as far as they are ethnic conflicts. However, the feature that distinguishes them from the armed clashes before 1989 emerges again at the level of the outcomes.

In comparison to the conflicts from the earlier decades, those of the 1990s were a direct result of global developments and on their turn had a specific impact on international relations and politics. The transformation of the established international status-quo and the agenda for aiding the process of democratisation and compensating for past injustice created incentives for political entrepreneurs that they can take an advantage of the situation. The lack of suppressive institutions enabled community leaders to mobilise supporters, activating ethnic identities and openly to put their claims with estimated better chances for success. The data from the quantitative studies reveal that proportionally the ethnic conflicts that started after 1989 were more successful in achieving their identified goals, than those of the pre-1989 period. The other aspect that makes the Post-Cold War conflicts different is their impact on the international politics and agenda. Apart from becoming international concerns and engagement, they influenced the development of human rights platforms, minority rights issues as well as issues of sovereignty and concepts of domestic/international affairs.

Although recognising the negative effects that such ‘local’ wars can have on global developments, the international community still needs to pay attention to the specific consequences of ethnic conflicts (and of identity politics in general). When non-negotiable differences become associated with political cleavages, and lines of separation deepen during armed conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction programmes must not ignore the social capital restoration issues. If conditions do not allow the immediate implementation of initiatives and practices, relevant policies need to provisioned and enabled as early in the reconstruction process as possible. The next section of the research will focus upon this problem.
Two interrelated aspects enable the understanding of post-conflict reconstruction as a concept and practice. The first one is the ‘ideologically’ charged agenda justifying the undertakings in general, and second, the ‘imported’ and sometimes ‘imposed’ character of the reconstruction goals and programmes. Following the conviction that un- and underdeveloped non-democratic societies are prone to conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction practice addresses democracy and development as factors for achieving sustainable peace. This is the first element binding the numerous activities within the frameworks of the concept. The second element stems from the conviction that a society emerging from a violent conflict lacks capacity and resources to move forward in the direction of (re)establishing stable and sustainable political, economic, and social environment. Achieving peace, democracy, and development is hence impossible without external assistance and financial aid. The question whether these values and practices are appropriate for implementation in a specific post-conflict environment, unfortunately often becomes undermined. Before examining these two aspects that could provide a better understanding of post-conflict reconstruction concept and practice, a general framework of the notion will be provided below.

1. Framing the Concept

1.1. When does a post-conflict reconstruction take place?

According to political scientists and practitioners, it is very difficult not only to draw the threshold between conflict and post-conflict, but also to identify with certainty the end of the period (WB 1998). While peace agreements or elections can be regarded as conflict closure points, they are not always markers for the commencing of a post-conflict phase. The cessation of fire in fact indicates the beginning of a period of transition, during which peace needs to be consolidated within the frameworks of the recovery process.51 As suggested in the literature, a post-conflict period starts with the signing of a formal peace agreement; and ends with the ‘normalisation of life’ (AUSA/CSIS 2002) within the conflict region.

50 The concept of ‘ideology’ here is used to emphasise the strong and undisputable convictions that underlie the concept of post-conflict reconstruction and that determine and justify its goals, approaches, and practices.

51 Despite the explicitly defined post-conflict objective of ‘supporting the transition to peace and the resumption of economic and social development’ (WB-OED 1998:9), it also appears complicated to distinguish between these operations and the ‘normal’ activities of some international actors. The World Bank post-conflict projects for example are usually developed within the frameworks of poverty alleviation programmes, public sector management, or decentralisation (WB-OED 1998)
research adopts this framework as delineating the boundaries of the period of post-conflict reconstruction.

Although implying that violent struggles have stopped at a certain moment in time, the \textit{cessation of fire} is not an indicator that conflict has come to an end. Restraining physical violence does not resolve problems or address the causes that have led to the armed clash. Hence, a post-conflict environment is prone to relapse into conflict. The effective prevention of reoccurrence of violence is hence also an important task during the transition to the normalisation period.

The emphasis on \textit{formal} peace agreements implies that the establishment of peace requires an official document between the conflicting parties in order to certify the end of war and to legitimise all subsequent actions. It is obvious that an official peace agreement could not change the conflict environment overnight, not it can solve or erase existing problems and tensions. Hence, a peace agreement marks the official end of the \textit{centrally controlled} violence and the readiness of the opposing parties to open a new page in their relationships and to address the existing problems by non-violent means. This general picture however describes mainly the attitudes and the actions taken by the elites. The implementation of the peace accords all over the region of the conflict takes time and focused efforts; sporadic instances of violence can are quite likely to occur.

According to the definition introduced above, a post-conflict period ends with a normalisation of life. This implies that (1) there would be no need for extraordinary outside intervention; (2) that governance and economic activity would largely function on a self-determinate and self-sustaining basis; and (3) that accepted norms of behaviour would regulate external relations (AUSA/CSIS 2002). Introducing the idea of resolving a conflict situation by achieving and successfully implementing standards of normal living, the concept challenges theorists and policy makers, because it does not define these standards\footnote{The concept of normalisation is rather sensitive area for theorists and policy makers, because of its relative character. ‘Normalisation’ might imply restoration of pre-war structures and practices, or construction of a new environment. The type of experienced conflict should be taken into consideration as a factor for identification of the most suitable reconstruction strategy and policies; in practice, it is most likely that a set of uniform procedures is implemented. Certainly a number of challenging questions emerges here. For example: is it possible that the ‘Western package’ create a normal environment in a country with no civil society or self-governing practices and where culture does not accept human equality? Is it appropriate to introduce market economy in a society where exchange systems are still in place? Is success feasible if post-conflict reconstruction is based on principles, contradictory to local norms and practices?}. The World Bank experts recognise that rebuilding socio-economic frameworks of a war-affected country does not necessarily mean restoring the particular conditions that existed before the onset of the conflict. This might not be possible or desirable (WB-OED 1998:5).

\subsection*{1.2. What does a post-conflict reconstruction aim at?}

Most of the agents of reconstruction, representing developed Western economies and democracies, connect peace with the fundamental values of their own cultures and its implementation – with their home policies. This explains why already
established patterns are widely applied for introducing lasting peace, stability, and development. Nevertheless, by no means the concept of normalisation of life (if accepted for an end of the reconstruction process) implies that values of democracy or human rights should be installed during a post-conflict reconstruction period.

Standards of normal living differ. In the light of post-conflict efforts, these might be interpreted as ‘restoration of pre-war structures and practices’, ‘establishment of new arrangements with respect to the specific local conditions’, or ‘creation of a completely new environment’. The character of the experienced conflict and its consequences would determine the most relevant strategy. The practice however reveals that the ‘Western package’ (democracy, market economy, secularisation and human rights) is largely applied with the expectation that it will start functioning once introduced. Logically, this raises a provocative question. If some or all of these values are foreign to the society emerging from conflict, shall the process be called ‘reconstruction’, in terms of rehabilitation of the previously existing norms and practices? Or shall it be regarded as ‘(re-)construction’, in the sense of construction of a new way of living, new standards and structures to replace the old ones that have suffered or been destroyed by the conflict?

As it was pointed out earlier, the idea of normalisation of life after a conflict is hence challenged by the lack of universal values to lean upon. At the same time, the process of globalisation closely linked with the technical progress has enabled the spread of ideas creating eventually a set of more or less ‘common principles’, such as the conviction that democracy and development are fundamental prerequisites for enabling lasting peace and stability. As a transition from the chaos of war to peaceful living structured and regulated by law and order, post-conflict reconstruction has its imminent goal in assisting the war-affected countries in the restoration of a functioning state and society, of the physical infrastructure, institutions, and human capital. (AUSA/CSIS 2002:2). The longer-term goal of the process is to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace and to create the enabling conditions to support the political, economic, and social development of a given region (WB-OED, 1998:5, CFR 2001, Bailey 2007).

Enabling faster and successful rebuilding of the socio-economic frameworks and the physical capital of a war-affected society does not imply that previously existing structures, which in many cases had contributed to the outburst of conflict, are to be restored. Reconstruction therefore should be regarded as ‘reconstruction’ of conditions that enable the existence of a functioning society and economy within the frameworks of liberal peacetime governance and rule of law. Facilitating the transition from war to a sustainable peace, rebuilding economy and restoring state-society relations at all levels is the platform that serves not only the international peace-making and peace-keeping operations, but also the involvement of development organisations, national and international agencies and governments (WB 2003:24-25).

53 Understood as ‘non repressive’.
54 These objectives, as discussed in a World Bank experts meeting, require that assistance is focused not only on support for macroeconomic stabilisation, for rebuilding viable financial institutions and appropriate legal frameworks, and for reconstruction of urgent transportation and communication infrastructure but also on measures to address conflict-related social transformations (displacement, vulnerable groups). War-affected changes in traditional social
Although recognised on a policy level as crucial for the success of a reconstruction process, the practice is still far from addressing all the needs by simultaneously and successfully implementing such a comprehensive package of assistance. The great variety of levels and areas demanding attention poses another requirement before the post-conflict reconstruction – the establishment of an analytical and practical tool assessing donor capacities and local post-conflict needs, which will contribute to more focused interventions based on specific political mandate and strategic choices to support particular processes of peaceful change (de Zeeuw 2001a and 2001b, WB 1998).

1.3. Who is involved in a post-conflict reconstruction?

Post-conflict reconstruction agents are easily distinguished along the line of local-to-external (international). Two other categories can clarify the role of the different actors in the process.

The first one – the subjects of reconstruction – embraces the actors playing a major role in the planning, implementation and co-ordination of the reconstruction programmes and activities. As the practice reveals, these agents are predominantly (but not exclusively) external to the conflict and the respective conflict-affected political units and structures. These agents are not individuals but political bodies representing countries, national and international organisations. The literature usually refers to them with the term the international community.

The role of the international actors and the international response to conflict situations in general can be considered within four fields of activity that to a certain extent are projections of the post-conflict phases (WB 1998:20). The key political-diplomatic actors of peace negotiations and conflict resolutions are the governments as a part of multilateral alliances and forums such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the EU, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These are the most active structures within the frameworks of the second area of security and peacekeeping operations. In the field of the provision of necessities during or after a violent conflict, the major contributors are donor states and organisations through agents such as the UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), local or international NGOs.

The interest of the present research is focused mainly in this direction - the support for reconstruction and development offered by the external actors. Among the promoted activities are rebuilding of economic and physical infrastructures, strengthening institutional capacity, and providing a basis for sustainable development. The main providers on the international scale are the European

safety nets and in family structures have a major impact on economic recovery. Supporting the civil society institutions and the private sector is hence essential so that commercial and productive activities can resume (WB 2003:24-25).

55 ‘External agents’ here implies players, who are not involved as a side at the conflict outbreak. Their eventual involvement in the conflict could occur at a later stage in the format of the peace missions.
Union (EU), the UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), donor states, NGOs, and international financial institutions, as regional development banks, the World Bank, and the IMF (WB 1998:19-20).

Having the capacities and motivation to undertake certain actions in order to bring and to maintain peace within the war-prone regions the reconstruction bodies often leave local actors out of the process. Despite the recognition that external agents should support and not directly implement changes (WB 1998), local actors are rarely treated as partners in the process of restoration of normal conditions of living and quite often as ‘objects’ of reconstruction (Kartas 2007, Englebert & Tull 2008, Muggah 2009).

As it is already clear, the second type of post-conflict reconstruction actors are the ‘objects’ of the reconstruction efforts. While under the first category there might be both foreign and local actors present, the second category embraces solely the conflict-affected community. Often ignored as partners in the implementation of the programmes at local level (Forman & Patrick 2000:56), local actors are constrained to follow policies imposed by foreign institutions and organisations even without a widely achieved consent. This passive participation in the reconstruction process subordinates internal agents to external agendas (Mckechnie 2003:2, Barakat 2005:20).

An approach that does not involve the members of the war-affected community and does not allow them to participate in the decision-making processes can hardly be successful. It would rather provoke mass discontent, hostile attitudes towards the foreign intervention in the internal affairs and resistance to any of the undertakings. Without support from the active structures of the local community and their elites, it is quite likely that the reconstruction process would be obstructed, slowed down, and possibly fail56.

In terms of key parties involved, the post-conflict reconstruction appears a space for joint and synchronised efforts of both local and external actors. Although recognised as a requirement for any successful war-peace transition, this cooperation is still a goal to be achieved in order to combine the reconstruction capacities and experience with the channels and mechanisms for their implementation (WB-OED 1998, Barakat 2005:8)

### 1.4. Which areas does post-conflict reconstruction address?

The burgeoning number of reconstruction agents with the range and scope of their interests, has established post-conflict reconstruction practice as a wide field of programmes and actions. As von Meijenfeldt reveals (2001), a peace-building agenda has four clusters of components: 1) security; 2) social cohesion; 3) governance (democracy level, legal and institutional framework and corruption);

56 The recognition that local leaders could be more successful in influencing society and promoting desired policies and programmes many of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, have incited the international community to direct efforts towards attracting and engaging the local elites in developmental programmes and democratic values. However, in certain cases – as for example with a post-ethnic-conflict situation – working solely with leaders could not enable the achievement of expected positive results.
and 4) economic performance. The Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank divides the elements along the lines of: 1) structural/institutional; 2) social/human; 3) physical/rural/urban; and 4) macro-economic/financial (von Meijenfeldt 2001).

The peace-building activities of the UN entities cover also four sectors. These are 1) security (military, police and mine actions assistance); 2) governance and democratisation (assistance to the political and civil affairs, administration, public information, judiciary and rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights); 3) humanitarian assistance (to refugees and internally displaces persons, to vulnerable groups; gender mainstreaming); and 4) recovery, development and sustainable peace (UN DPKO 2003). Among the most active agencies in the post-conflict reconstruction activities, the World Bank gets involved in post-conflict situations as soon as minimum-security conditions and a credible political authority have been established (WB-OED 1998; UN DPKO 2003:183-184). Aiming at breaking the cycle of conflict and help countries resume development, the Bank supports the establishment of security, good governance, economic recovery, and social stability (illustrated by the figure below (WB 1998:25-27). These examples demonstrate that post-conflict reconstruction assistance ranges from economic reconstruction to livelihoods support. Constituting different aspects of the ‘normal’ environment, these sectors are interrelated and require long-term commitment form both internal and external actors (de Zeeuw 2001a:5).

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework (AUSA/CSIS 2002) presents an attempt for classification of different reconstruction practices (among them those of Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and Sri Lanka) and for building up a model for assessing reconstruction efforts, analysing upcoming needs, challenges, and opportunities. Table 3 presents a summary of the model, indicating the pillars and the key areas of post-conflict reconstruction; a detailed breakdown of the reconstruction phases, areas and sectors are given in Appendix 2.

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57 Among the UN entities that often work closely with peacekeepers are: the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

58 As a UN specialised agency, the World Bank is made up of 184 member countries. The name ‘World Bank’ has come to be used for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).

59 Applying the ‘capital’-terminology, we would be discussing the rebuilding of

- **natural capital**: natural resources of the emerging form conflict state or region
- **physical capital**: infrastructure, transport, telecommunications, housing recovery
- **economic capital**: fiscal, industry, agriculture, energy, environment
- **institutional capital**: governance, democratisation
- **human capital**: health, education, social services, vulnerable groups
- **social capital**: institutions of governance and trust, civil society participation, reconciliation (OED 1998, WB 1998).
The four independent, yet mutually reinforcing pillars play a crucial role in supporting and consolidating peace. It is not only that the absence or deterioration of any of them might threaten and put under risk the entire peace process. Also of critical importance for achieving the targeted stabilisation is that the issues related to the different pillars are addressed simultaneously by the reconstruction programmes and projects. The highly idiosyncratic nature of conflicts challenges the feasibility of a general post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Nevertheless, although there could hardly be a universal formula devised, the identification of appropriate post-conflict policies is necessary on the way towards a sustainable peace and development within war-affected regions (Collier 2000:2).
1.5. What mechanisms does post-conflict reconstruction use?

Presenting programmes and their implementation, the literature on post-conflict reconstruction focuses predominantly on particular peace missions and practices. The critical perspective towards concepts, principles, strategies, and activities is still undeveloped (Hay 2001). A systematic normative theory of post-conflict reconstruction is still missing (Gheciu 2009).

The theoretical model of the reconstruction practice - the Task Framework (AUSA/CSIS 2002) - provides a good basis for analysing the mechanisms used by international actors. It classifies the mechanisms not only under the four pillars and the respective target areas and sectors, but also with respect to the post-conflict reconstruction stage: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. Without going into details about the mechanisms used at the three different stages, it is important to outline the character of the planned and undertaken tasks for each one of them. As we can see from the table below, presenting the main pillar-goals for each stage, the first phase is one of assessing the situation and the respective needs, of planning and laying the foundations for further actions. During the Initial Response stage, the mechanisms used aim at the establishment of frameworks, rules and procedures, as well as of the necessary institutions for carrying out the activities planned.

Table 4: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Stages and Respective Goals
(Task Framework, AUSA/CSIS 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Initial Response</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Fostering Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice &amp; Reconciliation</td>
<td>Establish a safe and secure environment</td>
<td>Develop legitimate and stable security institutions</td>
<td>Consolidate indigenous capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Economic Well-being</td>
<td>Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances</td>
<td>Build legal system and process for reconciliation</td>
<td>Functioning legal system based on international norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance &amp; Participation</td>
<td>Provide for emergency humanitarian needs</td>
<td>Establish foundation for development</td>
<td>Institutionalize long-term development program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation</td>
<td>Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes</td>
<td>Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second stage, identified in the Task framework as Transformation, all the identified mechanisms are put into work (or at least it is envisaged so). The reconstruction process moves from the emergency relief towards building up the basis for a future sustainable development with the launching of the designed projects and programmes. The success of their implementation, as well as of the Transformation in general, depend not only on the provided financial and technical assistance, training and organisational management, but also on the motivated involvement and active participation of the local actors in the process.

The final stage of the complex post-conflict reconstruction process is the one which engages mechanisms to enable a smooth and consistent transfer of powers to the local actors in all sectors. To foster sustainability, the efforts here are not
aimed at introducing new policies or structures, but at expanding those already established. The financial and technical assistance during this stage addresses predominantly the strengthening of local capacities, better performance and modernisation of structures and institutions. Approaching normalisation, the best-designed mechanisms of post-conflict reconstruction naturally phase out.

Apart from the above-mentioned mechanisms, the establishment of institutions with a special mandate is an alternative method that the international community applies to ensure the promotion and implementation of particular values and policies. Among the examples of such institutions are: the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), the UN, NATO and EU peace-keeping missions, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After framing the concept of post-conflict reconstruction by looking at its structural elements, it is important to address its conceptual platform, which will provide theoretical grounds for a critical analysis of the practice. This section will start with a historic overview to show how the idea of post-conflict reconstruction emerged and developed.

2. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT

2.1. Historic overview

Looking at the history of the concept, as presented by David Ekbladh (2003), reconstruction as a political, social and economic process, has been around at least since the mid-nineteenth century. During the period following the US civil war there were (rather unsuccessful) attempts to integrate African-Americans into the political system and to promote economic development. In the early 20th century, the application of reform ideas aiming at the transformation of inefficient social, political, and economic relationships, introduced a new meaning to the term, describing the diverse efforts to effect change within societies.

Following World War I, ‘reconstruction’ maintained this developmental aspect but it was also employed to describe the necessity of re-shaping Central Europe into smaller and viable states in accordance to the new realities. During the 1930s, the international debate on the future of China introduced another aspect to the notion denoting a general building up on modern economic lines (Hubbard 1930 in Ekbladh 2003). Referring to the reconstruction of a state’s viability, the term became connected more closely with the idea of broad transformation, expanding beyond the simple economic ‘recovery’ of any old methods of governance and organisation.

The unprecedented destruction brought by World War 2, provided unparalleled opportunities to engage the enormous levels of immediate relief into a ‘project’ for society transformation. Initially envisaged as engines to foster development, structures like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) evolved beyond the immediate recovery of war damages to long-term
modernisation projects. This also contributed to the conceptual shift of the term towards the meaning of general economic, social, and political development. (Belshaw 1947 in Ekbladh 2003)

Ekbladh discusses further that during the Cold War ‘modernisation’ aimed at demonstrating the supremacy of the Powers’ social systems to poorer nations and thus reconstruction preserved its developmental content. The focus was put on the well-being of people that was to be achieved through aid and support after intervention and war. The reconstruction plans of these years clearly indicate that development aid was bound to intervention and armed conflicts. These were not exactly humanitarian or recovery operations, nor simply development programmes. The aid offered to enhance the capacities of societies was used not only for creating stable (anti-communist) states, but also to justify military and political interventions both locally and internationally, especially during the period of ideological confrontation (Ekbladh 2003).

Reconstruction since the end of the Cold War preserved its role as an important part of the Western involvement in the local affairs worldwide. Considering the range of examples from the last decades, in all of the cases (from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq) the reconstruction plans clearly implied altering conditions and extending capacities beyond those that existed before the conflict (Byrd 2002 in Ekbladh 2003). The engagement with damage recovery has become a good opportunity for donors to design and lay down foundations of new economic, social, and political relations.

Many factors established post-conflict reconstruction as a tool of contemporary international politics. Although presented briefly, it becomes obvious that the development of the concept reflects the historical dynamics. The first significant shift in the model reflects the complex situation that the world faced with the end of the War in 1945. The global spread of the conflict, the scale of devastation even in the most ‘isolated’ places, and the power rivalry between former allies, had direct effects on international politics, structures, and processes. Assessing and evaluating the reasons for the war and the possible ways for preventing a reoccurrence of such, the goal of the post-war U.S. planners like John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White was to design an economic system that would ensure peace. The Soviet Union however countered as a direct power challenge the attempts for overcoming consequences and preventing re-emergence of the pre-war conditions by introducing liberal standards and development models. Communism and its institutions became perceived as the other threat to peace. Fears that popular discontent, group oppression, and mass poverty would provide good grounds for the spread of communist ideology made theories of economic development very influential with the designated role of enabling conflict prevention (Lipschutz 1998:46, Huntington 1996)

The goal of achieving normalisation of life by introducing stable and sustainable economic and social conditions entered the area of politics in the form of

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60 Based upon gradual lowering of tariff barriers to trade, convertibility of major currencies, the free flow of capital (but not labour); an international division of labour based on comparative advantage, the Bretton-Woods system was envisaged to prevent the re-emergence of pre-war conditions. This on its turn resulted enabled countries controlling currency, capital, and technology to obtain more advantaged positions than others (Lipschutz 1998).
‘containment of communism’ policies. In this respect, the Marshall plan is the first reconstruction programme that openly defined not only economic development as a tool for preventing new armed conflicts, but also democracy and liberalism as preconditions for success and a model for ‘adjusting’ the value systems of societies. With the Marshall plan, post-conflict reconstruction became viewed as a ‘moral obligation’ of the advanced countries to the rest of the world. It also acquired two clearly defined but interconnected areas of activities – the practical rebuilding of physical, economic, and institutional infrastructure and the (moral) engagement with directing the socio-political development of the post-conflict country in the ‘right’ way.

The second event with a direct impact on the transformation of not only perceptions and understandings was the end of the Cold War. The collapse of communism was a triumph of democracy and liberalism over the rival political and economic system. The fall of the Iron Curtain opened the ideologically stagnated borders and enabled the re-union of the bipolar world. Unfortunately, the removal of the nuclear deterrent created new conditions61, which led to a revival of old ethnic and cultural antagonisms and conflicts (Mearsheimer 1990, Huntington 1996).

After the collapse of the bipolar model, the growing interdependence between places and processes62 deepened the perception of the world as a single place, where local problems, socio-political or economic instability, and eventually conflicts, could easily spread beyond national or regional borders. Under these circumstances, the prevention of negative developments entered the international agenda and legitimised intervention in politically and economically unstable zones, regardless of whether these were sovereign states.

This new context logically shifted the post-conflict reconstruction concept and practice. Remaining closely connected with the peace-development paradigm, the ‘moral obligation’ became more or less a moral imperative. Supported by the conviction that a strong economic recovery is not viable in a fragile peace, nor a strong peace can be built on the basis of a fragile economy (OED 1998), post-conflict reconstruction became acknowledged as an important mechanism for conflict prevention. Thus, it became legitimate grounds for intervention in the local affairs aiming not only at assisting the war-recovery processes but also at redesigning and of re-making of societies.

2.2. Peace – Development – Democracy paradigm

Reflecting on historical developments, the ‘ideological’ charge of the concept of post-conflict reconstruction developed upon the conviction that peace is not

61 In 2004, an international survey presented at the World Economic Forum, revealed that people today feel ‘unsafe, powerless and gloomy’, fearing that the next generation would live in a world even less prosperous and safe, and more internationally insecure. In the 1920s and 1930s these same conditions bred civil and international conflicts, culminating thereafter in the Second World War! (Panić 2005:3).

62 The establishment of a global economic system and the intensification of the interconnectedness among processes in different spheres of life are often viewed as the ultimate extension of the Bretton-Woods project (Lipschutz 1998).
possible without development and democracy. This, in its turn, is projected in the reconstruction practices and the various programmes implemented by the international community worldwide.

On a theoretical level, the phenomenon can be viewed as ‘implementation of the peace-development-democracy paradigm’. Therefore, these two aspects – the underlying paradigm and its implementation – will be expanded in some more details below, opening a discussion for their role in the achieving the goals of post-conflict reconstruction of peace, stability and general ‘normalisation of life’.

2.2.1. Development

The core idea of the UN Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1995) that rapid economic growth and poverty reduction can contain and eliminate conflict, was acknowledged as early as 1880s when, under Bismarck, the foundations of the modern welfare state were laid (Panić 2005:21). Subsequently, the professed civilising mission of nineteenth and early twentieth century colonialism transformed it into delivering of ‘aid’ (Barbanti 2004). A particular role for the incorporation of the developmental ideas of the Western civilisation into the post-conflict reconstruction ‘project’, was played by the Inaugural Address of President Truman (January 1949). It established the link between democracy, material prosperity and the development of industrial and scientific techniques and expanded assumption that faster and successful development is achievable through a controlled change. Apart from the Marshall Plan, a direct implementation of these ideas in practice was the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, whose primary goal was to prevent another European war. The wave of conflicts in Europe that occurred after the collapse of the communist system emphasised once again the need for tools and mechanisms able to manage conflicts peacefully and to treat their consequences (OECD 1997).

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63 In fact, there is no ‘universal’ developmental idea. Within the European tradition, there are three different concepts: 1/ development as growth understood mathematically (through Locke - taking the Biblical injunction ‘increase and multiply’; in this context poverty is seen as a consequence of one’s failure to be ‘industrious and rational’); 2/ development as growth understood biologically (through Kant, Herder, Hegel, setting a grid against which advancement and correlative backwardness can be measured (the theories promoting the West as the standard have been discredited now); 3/ development as a projector task to be fulfilled (as a policy to be adopted – such as government initiatives in Australia to encourage settlement, for example) (Bernasconi 1997:196)

64 Delivering aid could hardly be seen as purely technical matter. The U.S. provision of aid during the Cold War was largely directed to countries that were, or could come, under Soviet influence (Barbanti 2004). The change of the political concerns after the end of the Cold War resulted in redefining the criteria for selection of recipients of developmental/reconstruction aid.

65 Signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the Treaty of Paris (1951) was intended to engage former enemies in a shared production and to achieve not only economic revitalisation of post-war Europe, but also an economic community that will unite peoples and bring together interests over historic rivalries (Treaty of Paris 1951)

66 In 2001, development policy and co-operation programmes were officially acknowledged as especially powerful in this respect. Among these programs are the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001a), the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European Council in December 2003, and the European Consensus on Development adopted by the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission in November 2005.
According to the development agenda, economic stability can contribute greatly to peace alongside politics and diplomacy. According to Dean Babst (1993), economic interdependence can be a force for peace, because it creates long-term and large-scale trade commitments. Supportive to this is the example that representatives of fighting ethnic and religious groups in various parts of the world manage to live together in more economically developed areas as North America, Western Europe, Australia, while most of the wars in the 20th century occurred in developing countries where population suffered poverty and economic depression. Therefore, internal conflicts (civil wars) are not only a core developmental issue but also a failure of development, which requires viable international measures to reduce their global incidence (Collier et al. 2003). When on the other hand, development succeeds, countries become safer. A rebuilt economy creates prosperity and employment for the population and so aids progress towards a viable political and security agreement (Balls and Cunliffe 2006).

In the dawn of the international developmental policies, it was believed that the methods and techniques of solving problems and delivering services would prove as successful in the developing nations as they were in the economically advanced countries. The direct transferability model of Western values onto non-Western cultures framed developmental assistance. Organisations such as the World Bank, and USAID not only promoted a dependent path to development, but also ignored the problems of power imbalances they created (Barbanti 2004; Rondinelli 1987:23). Economic decline and extreme poverty may reinforce conflict tendencies, but economic growth alone cannot prevent violent outbursts. The critics of the development ideas point to the fact that economic growth and foreign aid failed to bring the expected lasting peace and prosperity, as it was believed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Neither had it brought political stability (Bernasconi 1997:194). It has become apparent that economic growth increases inequality within societies and hence functions as a destabilising factor.

67 The concept of ‘development’ cuts across many levels. It refers not only to macro issues (as patterns of a nation's growth), to but also to meso- and micro problems (such as river-basin plans or local community development). The three interwoven levels and the dimensions at them – economic, cultural, religious, and gender have a direct impact on development and in the same time are affected by it (Barbanti 2004). The assumption that economic development is accompanied by social, political, and even moral progress brought about the understanding that social development serves both as a precondition and as a moral justification for economic growth (Wilkinson 1996:216).

68 ‘Sound economic development and strong trade relations can prove powerful ingredients of stability and antidotes to conflict. If the stability of your economy and the well-being of your population depend on trading with your neighbour, you will think twice about going to war with them’ Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon (CNIS 2004)

69 Another popular conception during the 1960s was that foreign aid directed to development was necessary for peace (developed in 1967 by William Gaud, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development in the United States in a lecture ‘The U.S. Foreign Aid Programme’). The growing unemployment and inequality, as well as the absolute poverty in the Third World, outlined the need for targeting basic human needs rather than economic growth. ‘Resource shortage, environmental destruction, rising protectionism in the industrial world, militarism in the Third World, the international arms race, and the structure of the world economy all made the design of development strategies a complex problem in political economy rather than a simple technical economic issue’ (Wilber 1994:135).
Changing access to resources or control over existing political, economic, and social systems, creating or exacerbating socio-economic tensions, a development project may reduce, create, or intensify violent conflicts (Shore 1998). Imposed forms and pace of development can be rather destructive. Destabilising might also imposition of alien values on a culture, regardless of the merit of those values (Bernasconi 1997:188). In the ‘North-South: A Programme for Survival’, Willy Brandt argued against the uniform application of the Western-style development model (Brandt 1980). He rejected the conception of progress as simply following the economic path set by the more advanced countries. If deployed in disregard of the overall political situation in developing countries, development assistance may have rather unwanted and negative effects (European Council 1998). Furthermore, critics of current development theory (Crush 1995, Escobar 1995) discuss development as a set of managerial prescriptions, through which industrialised nations have not only fostered their models onto the aid beneficiaries, but also promoted and forced cultural changes (Barbanti 2004).

Developmental thinking and practice have evolved throughout the years to recognise that they are means for achieving better and more equitable living conditions. Sustainable economic development nowadays appears as an aspect of the structural stability that should be enabled in countries at risk. Structural factors can affect development and conflict in society because they have an impact both on macro- and on micro-level. A reflection of these views and an appreciation of their importance is the UN Millennium Development Goals platform (UN MDG). The document defines development as an interdisciplinary field, implementing programmes in various areas and dealing with innumerable and highly intertwined variables – such as economic, social, political, gender, cultural, religious, and environmental issues.

Since the early 1990s reconstruction has become a subspecialty within the broader development agenda (Colletta et al. 1998:3, IDRC 2004), merging the short-term responsiveness of an emergency operation with the longer-term development schemes (WB 2003:14, Colletta et al. 1998:4). Facilitating the re-establishment of functioning institutions, minimum level of security, basic infrastructure and living standards, post conflict reconstruction has been recognised as a critical step in the continuum between humanitarian relief and longer-term development support (Colletta & Cullen 2000:119, Figure 2). This hybrid field, combining conflict

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70 The assumptions that economic progress will in some way secure social and moral progress, and thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy, is a result of deeply-seated assumptions resisting empirical refutation (Bernasconi 1997:188). Such ideas were formulated in Europe in 18th and 19th century history idea (Bernasconi 1997:185).

71 Structural stability requires a long-term and integrated approach to all of its components such as democracy, respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy environmental and social conditions (European Council 1998).

72 The illiteracy of population, fragility of educational system, long-standing social inequalities maintained by the elites, as well as strong patron-client relationships are among the structural factors that can have a direct impact on conflict management (e.g. on the attempts of empowering powerless groups, communicating a very basic information, or impeding the rational conflict resolution approaches).

73 In 2001, the UN Security Council statement introduced ‘peace-building’ as an umbrella term for the comprehensive efforts ‘aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and, therefore [encompassing] a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms’ (UNSC 2001).
prevention, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and traditional development, is a new form of developmental aid, which challenges the traditional boundaries. It is neither sustainable development mechanism, nor a humanitarian response (Mark Malloch Brown, Vice President of External Affairs, the World Bank, cited in Colletta et al. 1998:5).

2.2.2. Democracy

Apart from being directly connected to the idea of Western-style development, the concept and practice of post-conflict reconstruction also imply transformation of conflict affected societies. In the words of the former US President Bill Clinton (1994), Western-style democracy is the best strategy to ensure security and to build a durable peace.

In the 1970s, the recognition that economic growth could not automatically bring social stability shifted the focus towards the possibilities and prospects of democracy as a precondition for achieving a lasting peace. The interest was provoked not only by the conviction that democracy was a powerful mechanism in the ideological war, but also because of the evidence that democratic governments could successfully manage deep societal divisions. Thus, for the two decades thereafter, the ‘aided’ expansion of democratic governments resulted in threefold increase in their number around the world (Harris & Reilly 1998:135; Reynolds 2002:2). Of course, this did not happen without the persistent efforts of the developed countries in providing of economic aid to improve both the economic well-being and the human rights records, sharing political and institutional experience, introducing non-governmental/private organisations that have proven to be effective in helping countries develop democratic governments (Babst & Eckhardt 1992).

Democracy has been identified as a peace-factor as early as in the 18th century. Dean Babst however is considered the first researcher to have clearly delineated this relationship. In his view, democracy is a peace force number one because democratic countries have proven to be less violent and not to fight each other.

74 The late 18th century assumption that ‘economic progress will in some way secure social and moral progress, and thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy’, had a direct impact on the post-Second World War development programmes and the establishment of the integration of economic and social as an axiom (Bernasconi 1997:189).

75 This argument might appear a bit controversial, since under oppressive regimes societal divisions have no possibilities for expression. Nevertheless, the democracy indeed provides mechanisms for both articulation of such divisions and for peaceful settlement of disputes with regard to the protection of human rights.

76 Yet in 1795 Immanuel Kant suggested that democracy was as a necessary condition for achieving perpetual peace.

77 Other peace enabling forces identified by Babst and Eckhardt (1992) are: equitable commerce, worldwide communication, reducing militarism and cooperative security. Babst defines the concept of democracy upon four criteria: 1/ Democracy implies that the legislature controls finances, that there are at least two political parties, and that the decisions are made by majority vote; 2/ The executive branch is responsible to the legislature or directly to the citizens; 3/ The citizens have right to vote to the legislature, enjoy freedom of assembly and freedom of speech; 4/ A country must be independent of foreign rule at the outbreak of war

78 According to the democratic peace theory, democracies rarely if ever go to war against each other and that they tend to have less internal violence, which is considered a structural tendency,
Democracies also have the capacity to resolve disputes peacefully, without falling into the trap of military actions, which would eventually lead to outburst of conflict\(^{79}\). Democratic political structures on their turn place institutional constraints\(^{80}\) (Kant 1795) that create obstacles to manipulative leaders to mobilise resources for war without a general consent (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). It also has capacities to empower economic interest groups that may be opposed to disruptive wars (Russett & Oneal 2001, Lagazio & Russett 2004, Oneal & Russett 2005)\(^{81}\).

Since there is no uniform model of democracy\(^{82}\), the most important issue in the context of the post-conflict agenda should be the identification of the type to serve the particular local needs. In practice, reconstruction agents somehow omit to address the question about the institutional arrangements that are likely to secure stable and legitimate democratic government in divided or war-torn societies. The design of political institutions is a key factor in the process of introducing and consolidating democracy and achieving lasting peace and stability, but such are also the territorial structure of the state; the form of the state’s legislative and executive functions; and the nature and structure of a state’s rules of political representation (Harris & Reilly 1998:135).

Critics of the democratic peace theory argue that it is very difficult to draw conclusions about the peaceful nature\(^{83}\) of democratic regimes because of the lack of sufficient statistical data (Gowa 1999; Layne 1994, Mearsheimer 1990:50). According to Ostrowski (2002), on the scale of peacefulness democracies have too many similarities with dictatorships, because both impose their will by force (physical or constitution), use centralised power to control vast areas of social and

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\(^{79}\) Two approaches offer explanations, focusing respectively on the democratic norms and on the democratic political structures (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001).

\(^{80}\) “If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared … nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future’ (Kant 1795)

\(^{81}\) The connection between this theory, emphasising on the fact that increased trade, economic interdependence, and membership in intergovernmental organisations can reduce the risk of war, and the ideas expressed yet in Kant’s Perpetual peace (1795) has make it popular as Kantian peace theory. Higher economic development makes the effect of democracy stronger, while low economic development may hamper the establishment of liberal institutions and values (Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal 2003).

\(^{82}\) Approached structurally, democracy is defined through elements and practices such as free elections, possibility to vote, parliamentary control over the executive power (Small & Singer 1976), market, externally sovereign policies, juridical rights and representation (Doyle 1983), constitutional transfer of executive power (Ray 1995), freedom of speech, religion, and organisation; and a constitutional framework of law to guarantee equal rights (Rummel 1997b).

Apart from the binary definitions, there are also non-binary classifications, which score each state on two scales (for democracy and for autocracy) and evaluate the level of democracy each regime has achieved (Polity IV Project 1800-2003 - Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2003)

\(^{83}\) According to Layne (1994), there is no evidence that democratic powers have institutional or cultural constraints against war, but a pragmatic attitude for making the necessary concessions to avoid one.
economic life, actively cooperate to suppress impulses such as secession and the private ownership of arms. As critics of the theory argue, the empirical link between peace and democracy has been established based on the relations among democratic states (Spiro 1994). Although democracies hardly ever fight wars with each other, they get involved in conflicts with non-democracies \(^{84}\) (Newcombe 2001, 1997) in pursuit of their domestic political goals, special interest politics or messianic goals \(^{85}\).

Elaborating further his counter-arguments, Ostrowski asserts that there is evidence to indicate that democratic regimes, or at least the ‘immature’ ones, are unstable both politically and economically \(^{86}\); that they can provoke terrorism (especially when pursuing interventionist foreign policies) and enable ethnic and religious conflicts \(^{87}\) (Ostrowski 2002:25-26, Figure 11). A reason for this is the dynamics of the democratic process, where voting for representation can logically lead to providing support for candidates, who favour respective ethnic or religious group interests, views and values. Thus, in a case of an underrepresented minority that perceives itself controlled by a majority hostile to their interests, and under certain circumstances, members of ethnic minorities might prefer to fight wars of secession.

Presented as the best path to peace, when ‘the organising principles of the political system elevate tolerance and national unity above ethnic and religious domination and privilege’ (Crawford 1998a:15) democracy presents an effective system for handling conflicts (Pirages 1976, Harris & Reilly 1998). It is an important factor in the peace-building process because it offers some of the fundamental pillars of any sustainable settlement of a violent conflict. Apart from offering effective means for peaceful addressing of deep-rooted differences through inclusive, just, and accountable social frameworks, it has capacities to enable the process of building specific set of institutions and behaviour patterns, and to contain the exercise of power within limits regulated by the rule of law \(^{88}\) (Kumar 1998 in de

\(^{84}\) Defining war as any armed conflict, involving one or more governments, and causing the death of 1,000 or more people, Babst and Eckhardt (1992) found that only 23% of the democracies compared with 72% of the non-democracies have been involved in foreign wars. Domestically, while 90% of the non-democracies had experienced internal wars or violent military coups, for the period 1950 - 1991 no civil war has taken place in democratic states.

\(^{85}\) The messianic spirit is projected in the Woodrow Wilson words: ‘America is […] to stand for the assertion of the right of one nation to serve the other nations of the world’, pushed the United Stated not only into the World War I, but later in wars such as Viet Nam, the Gulf War, and the bombing of Serbia (Ostrowski 2002:40).

\(^{86}\) Ostrowski gives the example with Germany that went from democracy in 1918 to dictatorship in 1933 to launching the war of the millennium in 1939. In fact, the German democracy allowed for the rise of Hitler. Furthermore, a number of democracies have been overthrown by dictatorships: Pakistan (five times in fifty years), Spain (1936), Czechoslovakia (1948), Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), Greece (1967), the Philippines (1972), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) (Ostrowski 2002:37)

\(^{87}\) Out of the 32 intrastate conflicts, 25 were ethnic or religious, 22 of which outburst in democratic setting. In certain cases, ethnic/religious subgroups, feeling that their interests were not advanced by the democratic government, contributed for its overthrowing (Ostrowski 2002:25-26, Figure 11).

\(^{88}\) According to the liberal idea, the construction of democratic institutions and markets, and the decentralisation of political and economic power, ensure legal protection and political participation for the individual. Evidences however suggest that there are certain factors, such as perceived economic inequalities or decline, break down of established patterns provoking insecurities, etc. that can undermine liberal political practices and lead to illiberal policies and conflicts.
Zeeuw 2001b:19). Adhering to the ‘rule of law’ and to the protection of both the political actors and the wider civil society, democracy can provide all the required structures and mechanisms to introduce and maintain peace in a war-torn society as well as to manage peacefully any deep-rooted conflicts. It provides dialogue spaces and opportunities for collaborative work (McAfee 2008:109).

When democratic practices and values become internalised in the workings of society, democratic governance creates conditions for its own sustenance, laying the political relations between people and governments based on negotiation, compromise, and co-operation. It is not surprising then that the international community considers the assistance to and the involvement with the democratisation process as an investment in local and international security. However, critics of the universal imposition of Western values emphasise that the international interests in promoting democracy stem from the expectations of economic benefits resulting from enhanced political stability (de Zeeuw 2001b:19).

Discussing the process of democratisation from the post-conflict reconstruction point of view, it is necessary to point out that despite a common set of programme parameters89, their content, practical implementation and management is country-specific (de Zeeuw 2001b). Having in mind that intra-state violence usually results from weakened or collapsed structures, ensuring the appropriate governance institutions is crucial for the conflict reconstruction process and for the establishment of functioning democratic systems. Building an enduring and peaceful settlement requires the establishment of appropriate democratic institutions to suit the particular needs90 (Reilly 2001:6). Inappropriate and unsustainable institutional choices for deeply divided societies might lead to breakdown of post-conflict settlements and relapse into violence (Harris & Reilly 1998:17); they could systematically favour or disadvantage ethnic, national and religious groups (Reynolds 2002:3).

As it becomes clear, many issues need to be addressed and many factors to be taken into account to achieve a functioning and sustainable democratic system in post-conflict settings. Capacities of the democratic structures should not be overestimated91. Developing the idea of John Stuart Mill that democracy could not

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90 To prevent a relapse into violence, rebuilding of governmental structures to guarantee rule of law, separation of powers, fair representation, and involvement of all groups is necessary (de Zeeuw 2001b:23). ‘Different types of society require different types of institutions. Federalism, for example, may be irrelevant to small homogenous countries but a virtual necessity for large heterogeneous ones. Different types of electoral systems can ensure the proportionate representation of minority groups or single-handedly ensure their exclusion. Parliaments and executives can be structured in such a way as to give all groups a share of power or to enable one group to dominate over all others... Appropriately crafted democratic institutions are thus crucial to the sustainability of any negotiated settlement’ (Harris & Reilly 1998:19)

91 Although liberal democracy can settle down cultural conflict with institutions of inclusiveness, universal representation, and appropriate electoral systems, its establishment in not a panacea (Crawford 1998a:16). In times of transition, an illiberal democracy could provide fruitful grounds for the spread of ethnic and religious claims, promising power and welfare to those who feel powerless. Newcombe (2001) argues that contrary to the general assumptions, democracy and free
succeed unless its citizens share a common national identity. O’Flynn (2006:32) argues that sometimes the problem faced by divided societies might not be the lack of a strong sense of common nationhood. Rather, it might be the impossibility to balance the need to recognise competing ethnic identities with the need to create an overarching civic allegiance to the state. Ethnic nationalists typically seek to impose their identity on the institutions of the state and not to build a common political identity that can be distinguished from citizens’ more particular cultural or ethnic affiliations (O’Flynn 2006:56). This transition from a narrowly defined identity component to a more inclusive one (nation-state) is one of the major challenges to democratic transformation in a divided society.

Democracy can make people think of themselves as citizens. It can provide the sense of a common national identity or of a common political purpose (O’Flynn 2006:34, 142). It however is not always capable of supporting the process of building overarching identities (McAfee 2008:109). As a conflict management system without recourse to violence, democracy does not aim at suppressing or overcoming existing or emerging conflicts. When democracy is ‘transplanted’ to post-conflict societies without adapting its structures and mechanisms according to the particular realities, it is likely that it would not provide the expected peace and stability, nor it could last as a political system (Harris & Reilly 1998:19).

The critics against the universal application of the democratic model emphasise that poorly designed institutions can inflame communal conflicts rather than ameliorate them. In such a context, the introduction of ‘democratic’ politics can mobilise ethnicity, turning elections into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ conflicts. Other divisive democratic institutions (such as referendums for example) can also have negative effects in divided societies. In addition to that, some researchers fear that the democratic peace theory, justifying the ‘peace-bringing’ wars against non-democracies, might provide a justification of a democratic crusade (Chan 1997:59).

Urging democracy by coercion would hardly lead to the establishing of lasting peace (Newcombe 2001). To ensure that the system settles and starts functioning according to the expectations, democratic values need to be cultivated in place. Achieving and introducing a stable democratic system is feasible only after in-depth change of the political culture. Pluralism, tolerance, inclusiveness, negotiation, and compromise and their institutional embodiments (power sharing, autonomy, proportionality, forms of group recognition) are keys to building lasting settlements to conflicts (Harris & Reilly 1998:17).

Bonded to moments of international tension and often used as a means to justify interventions in local wars and crises, the ultimate aim of the reconstruction process is the establishment of new social, political, and economic structures (Ekbladh 2003), effective and accountable institutions, equitable access to political power by all citizens, and a free flow of information (Amoako 1996). In

markets confront on conceptual level: while democracy requires equality, capitalism produces inequality.

92 Burundi and Cambodia are examples for the negative effects stemming from imposing democracy with no respect to the particular circumstances. Inappropriate and unsustainable institutional choices for deeply divided societies can lead to conflict re-escalation and break down of the post-conflict settlements (e.g. Angola 1991-1992), (Harris & Reilly 1998:19).
this respect, post-conflict reconstruction often goes beyond the restoration of pre-war structures and conditions towards the fundamental remake of societies and the construction of new realities.

### 2.2.3. Implementation

Viewed as intervention in local affairs or as a provision of necessary support and assistance, post-conflict reconstruction is always lead by agents, external to the society emerging from conflict. Therefore, to clarify the concept further, the role of the ‘implementation agents’ of the peace-development-democracy platform is also taken into account. This is the second key aspect of the post-conflict reconstruction phenomenon.

A war-affected political entity is likely to lack capacities for overcoming the conflict consequences. This, together with the conviction that functioning democratic institutions and developed market economy minimise the risks of violence, have provided grounds for the legitimisation of the international involvement in local affairs through post-conflict reconstruction policies and practices. In the world of growing interdependence among states, and of local conflicts with global impact on politics, economics, and security, the importance of crisis management and conflict prevention has been widely recognised (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2005:125).

Establishing common principles and values for member-states, the UN Charter also justifies international involvement in the management of local conflicts. Driven partly by a humanist motivation and partly by their interests for establishing and maintaining a prosperous international environment (Eide 1996), the interests of the various states may stray considerably from the general goal to preserve peaceful international order. This logically results in attaining of ambivalent attitudes in response to specific conflicts, avoiding involvement, or transferring the responsibility for handling such issues to inclusive international organisations.

The character of the international post-conflict involvement projects particular historic developments and international agendas. The high number of conflicts around the world, the specific demands, and the scales of the rebuilding tasks, challenged the unilateral capacities to provide the required aid and full package of assistance (OED 1998). The raising awareness of the fundamental changes that had occurred in the international environment since the end of the Cold War demanded adoption of new approaches in the field of post-conflict

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93 The concept ‘international community’ here refers to the collective concept embracing the multiple forms of foreign governmental and non-governmental agencies, bilateral and multinational bodies and institutions that undertake various and not always coordinated actions in a post-conflict region/country.

94 According to Eide (1996), the international community is driven partly by a humanist motivation and partly by their interests for establishing and maintaining a prosperous international environment. Among the examples of interest-driven interventions are the one of Turkey in Cyprus (to ‘protect’ the Turkish minority), of India in Sri Lanka (concerned with the Tamils), as well as the war between Armenia (supporting the majority in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh) and Azerbaijani (Eide 1996).
reconstruction\textsuperscript{95}. The recognised interdependence between development, security, and human rights issues has lead to redefining international power relations. The adoption of a multilateral approach and the formation of respective alliances was a natural consequence of this process (Ocampo 2005).

Characterised by use of force in attempts to resolve conflicts, unilateral actions can contribute to local instability by deepening grievances and hardening societal divides. Multilateralism on the other hand, has a capacity to encourage non-violent means of conflict resolution grounded in international law\textsuperscript{96}, to introduce and promote abiding rules. By reaching collective decisions, devising and applying common standards, and accommodating legitimate interests and points of view of different countries, multilateralism helps laying a solid foundation for peace, security and development\textsuperscript{97}.

Looking at the mechanisms used by the reconstruction agents, there are two approaches of external conflict management assistance that can be distinguished on a theoretical basis - legal and diplomatic (Eide 1996). While the first one focuses on standards-setting, supervision of implementation, and settlement of disputes over the application of standards, the second one embraces the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building\textsuperscript{98}.

Since the late 1980s, the development co-operation policy of the international community acquired a specific normative and political dimension through the introduction of new aid criteria, aiming at promoting and establishing good governance and democracy (Harris & Reilly 1998). Thus, the core requirements\textsuperscript{99} for external development aid placed an emphasis upon the political context of development. The expansion of political aid as democracy-assistance and the promotion of participatory development and good governance in the 1990s are indicators of the strong political conditionality adopted by bilateral and multilateral donors in their developmental policies (promoting the interrelation

\textsuperscript{95} According to Ocampo (2005), an indicator for the changed perceptions is the fact that in 2003 the UN Secretary-General established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change with a mandate to evaluate the efficacy of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms. Internal wars are placed among the six clusters of threats, identified by the Panel. The original UN document can be found as: UN 2004 \textit{A more secure world: our shared responsibility}, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004(A/59/565)

\textsuperscript{96} Among the peaceful tools for resolving conflicts are: public awareness, education, respect for diversity, dialogue, mediation and diplomacy (Ocampo 2005)

\textsuperscript{97} Over the last 50 years, the single most influential democracy-promoting organisation that has contributed significantly to the adoption of new strategies for addressing the consequences of violent conflicts worldwide has been the United Nations. Evolving together with the changing global realities UN has expanded its scope of democracy-promotion activities, adopting a focused approach to the implementation of policies for promoting, sustaining and developing peace and institutionalising its conflict prevention structures through the establishment of number of Departments (since 1990s). The introduction of programme documents as An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992) and Agenda for Democratisation (1997) developed further the embedded in the Charter guiding principles of the organisation and the mechanisms for their implementation (UN Charter, article 33 - UN tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes).

\textsuperscript{98} While preventive diplomacy addresses inter-state disputes to ensure that they do not escalate into violent conflicts, peace-making aims at bringing the hostile parties to an agreement, which to be enforced even if local groups continue fighting despite the peace-keeping operations (Eide 1996).

\textsuperscript{99} These core requirements are: 1) reform of state; 2) strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law; 3) respect for human rights; 4) creation of an enabling environment for economic and political development (Harris & Reilly 1998).
between sustainable economic development and democracy). Positive (democratic conditionality) and negative measures (democratic sanctions) have been applied by the international community to foster the establishment of local social and political structures capable of managing and resolving disputes without resort to violence, thus contributing to conflict prevention and peace-building.

Threatening the recipient country with reduction, suspension, or withdrawal of foreign assistance in the event of interruptions to democratic development or reversals of democratic gains, the democratic conditionality approach is perhaps the hardest one used by international donors inspired by the democracy-development ideology (Harris & Reilly 1998:369). Under particular socio-political conditions the conviction that sustainable development can be fostered by enhancing participation, democratisation, good governance, respect for human rights and prevalence of the rule of law have been endorsed not by exerting pressure on recipient governments, but by effective stimulus for peace-building - by the approaches of democracy assistance and democratic requirement.

Thus, the focus of most technical co-operation has become the strengthening of democratic governance through enabling an environment for optimal development co-operation (Harris & Reilly 1998:376-377).

Apart from the political conditionality, membership criteria can also be an effective factor in underpinning the commitment to democratic structures. Regional frameworks for security dialogue and co-operation, which emerged in the second half of the 20th century because of the increasing development of a new form of regionalism based on a shared commitment to democratisation and the defence of democracy, play an important role as democracy and peace promoting systems. As Harris and Reilly point out, evidence suggest that the more a country engages in regional and international integration, the less likely it is to become embroiled in armed conflicts with another state (1998:370). Through regional organisations and initiatives, the international community adopts and institutionalises additional conflict prevention and management mechanisms.

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100 Harris & Reilly (1998:378) argue that sanctions can result from donor’s opposition to a particular political regime (such as in Haiti, Kenya and Malawi), or as a specific response to negative political developments (Guatemala, Zambia or Lesotho). In such circumstances - when donors work with internal opposition movements (Kenya or Malawi) or demand specific reforms before aid is resumed (Guatemala or Zambia), aid sanctions can induce change.

101 Democracy assistance - the promotion of democracy and democratisation processes in recipient countries as a main objective of foreign aid (Harris & Reilly 1998:369).

102 Democratic requirement - aid is conditional upon a democratic political system by the recipient country, or upon a commitment to democratic development (Harris & Reilly 1998:369).

103 The possibility of EU membership for example has strongly influenced the development of the Eastern and Central European countries applying the ‘membership conditionality’ to ensure that all candidate-members would subscribe to the institutional frameworks and the norms and procedures of the European Union (Copenhagen Summit 1993). By establishing the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994 NATO has also refined its structures and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, confidence building and reform support (Harris & Reilly 1998:372). The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also a particular contribution in this field providing a forum for discussion and co-operation, establishing the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); the High Commissioner on National Minorities; the European Pact on Stability in Europe (1995); and the Convention and Court on Conciliation and Arbitration (1994).
The power of international reconstruction agents to induce democratic change or reverse democratic regression through such measures is proportional not only to the dependence of the recipients upon aid, but also to the unity of the donor community. Well-planned and coordinated external assistance as well as institutions addressing real issues through creative structuring of incentives and constraints can further post-conflict transitions effectiveness beyond the technical and the financial assistance (Maiese 2003). Despite the international consensus on central issues, there is still a need for coordinated international commitment to peace-building, for a division of labour between the international development organisations and other members of the international community (Maiese 2003).

In general, the post-conflict reconstruction process lacks a unified and consistent approach to democracy building - in many post-conflict environments, the chaos on the ground is paralleled by the chaos of the international response (Harris & Reilly 1998:384). Uncoordinated or inconsistent conditionality policies may lead to abuse of foreign aid, which can have disruptive effects on the fragile situation. Inappropriate approaches to reconstruction and resources can distort the implementation of economic and social development plans, or they can eventually lead to restoring the policies that have contributed to the conflict in the first place (Pugh 1998). Together with the much needed resources, expertise, and energy the international organisations, governmental agencies and non-governmental structures involved in the reconstruction process can bring very different assumptions, working styles, and goals, which can eventually contribute to the complication of the reconstruction and aid co-ordination processes (CSIS 2003:7, WB-OED 1998).

Loaded with developmental ideas as well as with the policies and strategic plans of those who sponsor it, the practice of reconstruction is not straightforward (Ekbladh 2003). Sometimes it serves as a means to assure international public opinion that intervention, even if it requires armed force, will eventually provide benefits to those people exposed to violence or dislocation. It often provides the ‘investors’ with tools and mechanisms for influencing the political, economic, and social life of the recipient society. Hence, it is arguable whether the international engagement with local problems over the last 50 years has made the world a more peaceful place. Instead of enabling stability and prosperity, programmes launched to support transition to democracy and market economy often inspire contests for power and dominance (Trager 1995 quoted in Lipshchutz 1998:50).

Providing in this way grounds for political antagonism against neighbours and authorities, which have contributed to their competitive advantages (Lipshchutz 1998:50), it is not surprising that international activities sometimes are seen as contributing to the societal fragmentation along pre-existing social and political fault lines. Contextual and contingent, the manifestations of antagonisms determine the course of events. As Lipschutz reveals, ‘in some countries, these fault lines were intended to be administrative but were drawn up in ethnic or national terms; in other places, the fault lines are linguistic, religious, clan-based, ‘tribal,’ or even vaguely cultural’ (Lipschutz 1998:50). The irony of post-conflict reconstruction practice is that while aiming at decreasing the risks of conflicts, the international community imposes Western socio-political models on non-Western countries, which because of the poor overall management and strategic planning
of the process eventually lead to fragmentation, rather than integration of war-torn societies (Lipschutz 1998:45).

Although a signed peace agreement does not guarantee peace, the examples of Angola (1993) and Rwanda (1994) suggest that failed peace implementation can lead to more deaths than the conflict it was supposed to end (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002). Developing appropriate strategies and providing adequate resources is essential for securing peace. Despite that conflict resolution theory tended to treat all civil wars as more or less alike, the contemporary approach based on empirical examples recognises the importance of the context-specific dimensions \(^{104}\) (Coyne 2007).

Discussing the peace-implementation process and the issues associate with it, Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002) conclude that the degree to which a particular environment is amenable to peace corresponds to the difficulty of an environment, determined by the three variables – the nature of its spoilers, the neighbouring states, and valuable spoils \(^{105}\). Implementation hence needs a proper strategy developed upon the evaluation of the difficulties of the environment (spoilers, neighbours, spoils), their attributes (few-many, reconciled-hostile, coherent-fragmented), motivations and intent \(^{106}\). Implementation strategies need to be coordinated, clear, and coherent, accepted by the collective body of the international community.

Apart from asserting that peace-implementation must address the specific needs of the environment, the authors emphasise that success of the process also depends upon the international commitment. Using the economic term ‘incentive compatibility’, Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002) emphasise that strategies must directly related to the self-interest of both internal and external actors in the peace implementation process \(^{107}\). A heavy international commitment does not guarantee success, but the lack such guarantees failure.

Following the peace implementation process, post-conflict reconstruction eventually aims at the establishment of a normal environment, a lasting peace and

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\(^{104}\) The particular environment, the willingness of international actors to provide resources and troops, the type of conflict, its intensity, and the external conditions are among the variables that constitute the conflict context as amenable to peace or not. These variables should also determine the logic of any peace implementation strategy (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002)

\(^{105}\) The spoilers - hostile to a peace agreement leaders or factions, which are also willing to use violence to undermine it, and neighbouring states that oppose peace has a potential to create negative environment and to impede the peace implementation process. Potentially a major benefit to a peaceful society, valuable spoils or easily marketed commodities (gold, diamonds, oil, timber, etc) can also play a negative role by providing an economic wedge between parties, exacerbating problems and increasing the likelihood of third-party war profiteering (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002).

\(^{106}\) With its underling emphasis on confidence-building “traditional peace-keeping” is likely to be effective in environments with few “difficulties”, while in extremely “difficult” environments, a degree of coercion is often necessary (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002).

\(^{107}\) According to Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002), the most dramatic example is the Rwandan crisis, in which the international community pulled out, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. When there are strong regional or worldwide interests (as in the Middle East because of oil), commitment is likely to be quite high. This unfortunately cannot guarantee good results – sometimes, limited commitment can be enough to end violence (Cambodia against the Khmer Rouge).
sustainable development. However, by combining rebuilding of political, physical, and economic infrastructures, providing emergency relief, financial, technical, and/or humanitarian assistance, dealing with refugees and migration issues, focusing on the problems of justice and reconciliation, the reconstruction practice is often challenged as being a contemporary global business instead of a noble engagement and responsibility.

3. **POST-ETHNIC-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION SPECIFICS**

Discussing the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction, a paradox should be pointed out. As early as 2000, Reinfeldt (2000) noticed that in comparison to Slovenia, where there were limited international investments in grassroots-initiatives, the former Yugoslav republic had enjoyed remarkable investments of money and personnel. Yet, while Slovenia has become an example of a stable economy and consolidated democracy, Yugoslavia has been criticised for serious violations of human rights and protracted reforms and transition in general. Almost a decade later, Serbia is still undergoing a period of transition. In contrast to the achievements that the post-conflict reconstruction attained after the World War 2, at the end of the 20th century, despite the amounts of money and other resources invested, hardly any of the reconstruction projects could be viewed as particularly successful.

In fact, a range of interpretations have attempted to explain this situation. A factor impeding the achievement of expected levels of success of post-conflict reconstruction efforts and activities, for example, are the communication gaps between the parties involved in the reconstruction process. The lack of a coherent focus on transition and of a long-term approach to the implementation of the reconstruction and peace-building programmes also can have negative effects. Pursuing sometimes contradictory rather than complementary strategic objectives, different institutions with their strengths and priorities could not always achieve agreement on essential issues (Kumar 1997 in Pugh 1998). As Pugh (1998) points out, even the existence of peace agreements, such as the Dayton Accords, do not necessarily imply that a coordinated programme of funding and support for reconstruction activities is in place. Instead of strategic planning of impacts, of short-term measures being designed in accordance with longer-term macro-economic stability projects, civil society and social programmes incorporating mechanisms of local participation and a culture of multifaceted accountability (Pugh 1998), international intervention often leans on ad hoc activities, which

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108 While the World Bank focuses its reconstruction efforts on the establishment of conditions for resuming commercial and productive activities, priorities for OECD are the rule of law and the internal security, the legitimisation of state institutions and the establishment of a stable basis for economic growth. NGOs and humanitarian agencies are usually inclined to focus on social welfare and human rights, and local organisations deal with country-specific issues. Accelerating the transition to a market economy, increasing refugee returns, law and order, and developing central institutions were recognised by the Peace Implementation Council as priorities for the reconstruction of Bosnia (Pugh 1998). The above mentioned reconstruction priorities are defined in programme documents of the World Bank (1997:11); OECD - DAC (1997: para 191); Contact Group Chairman's Conclusions, US Department of State Press Release (1998)
provokes perceptions for their experimental character\textsuperscript{109}. Mr Dennis McNamara, a Director of the Division of International Protection of UNHCR: ‘The field agencies are not research organisations. We go wherever there is a need for our involvement and we start working. We do what we know is best to do’ (McNamara in interview with the Author, 04.04.2003).

The particular conditions under which states emerge from violence are usually contextual and related to the certain international developments and environment in general. Contemporary (ethnic) wars, occurring within states, have resulted from the resurfacing of old rivalries after the end of the Cold War stagnation or because of economic change-of growth/contraction. In certain cases factors like global information linkages, freedom of expression, spread of democratisation, or unsuccessful reconstruction attempts, could also stimulate conflicts (WB 1998:17). Global processes and forces impinging on domestic configurations might create situations, in which states and national economies are prone to fragmentation, rather than integration (Lipschutz 1998). Thus, taking into account the local dynamics and the inequities and schisms that have led to breakdown in the first place, post-conflict reconstruction programmes should opt for meeting the local needs that have arisen from an experienced conflict\textsuperscript{110} (WB 1998).

Problematic division of roles, powers, and responsibilities among external reconstruction agents and local actors is a factor that can impede the success of a reconstruction process. The establishment of institutions and initiatives independent from local political control but dependent on Western support in fact results in transferring the responsibility for their actions to the international community (Reinfeldt 2000). The process of democratisation often suffers a direct imposition of institutions of unproven effectiveness, not adapted to local realities and thus contributes to the aggravation of problems in divided societies. In many cases the dispositions for engineering war-torn societies into peace evolves as a continuation of emergency relief operations, in which external actors assume the power and moral authority to bring about change and to secure peace. Instead of assisting and supporting, the international community often takes a prescriptive role (Harris & Reilly 1998).

The destruction, disruption, dislocation and exhaustion in war-torn societies that call for a multi-dimensional restructuring and transformation, is not a tabula rasa environment (Pugh 1998). If introduced in a hegemonic discourse, even the most needed programmes and policies would not achieve the expected goals and in the end would not contribute to conflict resolution. When local actors do not have a stake in making adjustments, or in reforming relationships, then the process itself is likely to fail and the conflict to be renewed (Pugh 1998). Peace-building and standards setting can only be effective if there is a real agreement and a dialogue

\textsuperscript{109} In the last decades reconstruction has become somewhat a lab for social engineering, for experimenting with models and social standards not met even by western democracies (Pugh 1998), and for testing ground for different practices, such as the new co-operation of NGO partnerships (Reinfeldt 2000)

\textsuperscript{110} Recognising the importance of these issues, the international community has elaborated a post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) model to serve as a basis for the ensuing development process with regard to the specific country strategies (UNDG/UNDP/WB/GTZ 2004, UN/World Bank 2007). Identification of the weaknesses of potential spoilers and determining of the appropriate sequence of activities depends on the understanding of local context (Teuten 2007).
in search of common solutions to common problems (Eide 1996). Social engineering in unstable societies lacking institutional structures for resolving internal disputes appeared eventually to lead to the exacerbating of societal conflicts (Paris 1997:57).

To redeem the weaknesses of current reconstruction programmes, international intervention should aim at improving the strategic harmonisation of peace-building activities\textsuperscript{111}, at balancing short-term rebuilding efforts and the long-term qualitative change through social and civil development, at enhancing capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities. To achieve the desired stability, international community has also to work towards transferring the ownership of reconstruction and reforms to local citizens (Pugh 1998). By taking away the ownership and responsibility for success or failure, the international community provokes a situation of falling of local communities into a permanent condition of reconstruction. To break out of this 'non-recovery' cycle, societies emerging from violent conflict need to prioritise future goals beyond immediate survival, to support interaction between internal and external aid organisations and eventually to enable the development of social capital and civil society, which have the potential to inhibit a return to violence. Thus, an important component in strategic planning for reconstruction is to promote public participation and self-sustaining capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities - support for social development through systems of participation is more likely to have an effect than social engineering (Pugh 1998).

Sustainable development, political and macro-economic reforms, investments in institution of governance and education are crucial for the establishment and maintenance of peace, but so is the existence of a strong, viable, and assertive civil society (Amoako 1996). As early as the 1990s, analysts and post-conflict reconstruction practitioners emphasised the need of civil society development as a precondition for successful implementation of (post-)conflict management programmes and activities. Although recognised as important, this area of the reconstruction practice remained to some extent overlooked. Relying on the assumption that the financial and non-financial assistance provided for the reconstruction of civil society will contribute to ensuring positive results in this field, the international community focused on providing support for building-up the third sector in terms of increasing the numbers of local NGOs. Engaged with the formal aspects of the civil society, donors failed to take into account that a key precondition for the development of a civil society is the existence of civil relations among community members, of bridging and linking social capital. By omitting to address properly the issues related to the state-level civil relations in the societies emerging from conflict, post-conflict reconstruction might become trapped in building structures without foundations.

A post-ethnic-conflict environment is specific because of the deep socio-cultural separation and the eradication of civil inter-community ties at the level of state, resulting from the escalation of ethnic tensions and the experienced violence along these lines. Hence, the ‘traditional’ reconstruction tools and mechanisms do not appear appropriate or efficient because they do not treat some of the key

\textsuperscript{111} As Pugh (1998) indicates, a more explicit and consistent approach is needed when incorporating economic and political incentives and disincentives in peace agreements.
consequences of conflict. Direct violence has both visible and invisible effects (Galtung 1999: Table 1), which need to be addressed and managed properly in order that peace is enabled within the frameworks of a reconstruction programme.

Table 5: Negative Effects of Direct Violence
(Source: Galtung 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Material, visible effects</th>
<th>Nonmaterial, invisible effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Depletion and pollution; damage to diversity and symbiosis</td>
<td>Less respect for non-human nature; reinforcing &quot;man over nature&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humans</td>
<td>somatic effects: number killed, number wounded, number raped, number displaced, number in misery, widows, orphans, soldiers, unemployed</td>
<td>spiritual effects: number bereaved, number traumatized, general hatred, general depression, general apathy, revenge addiction, victory addiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>material damage to buildings; material damage to infra-structure: road, rail, mail, telecommunication, electricity, water, health, education</td>
<td>the damage to social structure: to institutions, to governance; the damage to social culture: to law and order, to human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>material damage to infra-structure: breakdown of trade, international exchange</td>
<td>the damage to world structure; the damage to world culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>delayed violence: land-mines, un-exploded ordnance; transmitted violence; genetic damage to offspring</td>
<td>structure transfer to next generation; culture transfer to next generation; points of trauma and glory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>irreversible damage to human cultural heritage, to sacred points in space</td>
<td>violence culture of trauma, glory; deterioration of conflict-resolving capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While post-conflict programmes usually take into account the visible effects of violence, the invisible effects are not only difficult to detect, but in many cases their importance is underestimated. In a post-ethnic-conflict situation, repairing the nonmaterial damages is crucial for achieving peace and stability, because if not managed properly, trauma, hatreds, broken social structure and institutions might impede any positive reconstruction efforts.

The post-ethnic conflict situation is specific, because apart from all the problems common for an after-war environment there are additional factors that aggravate the situation and obstruct the transition to peace. Economic and political processes are affected not only by the negative effects of war, but also the reluctance of ethnically divided population of a country to work for the restoration or for the construction of new ones (Bodewig 2002). The social protection system in a transition country emerging from ethnic conflict is both in need of reform and needs to deal with the social effects of war at the same time (Bodewig 2002). The post-war unemployment crisis and the difficult situation that the vulnerable groups fall in are likely to be aggravated due to the increased ethnic tensions, which may lead to labour market segmentation along ethnic lines.

Ethnic struggles also have a direct impact on social assistance like pension schemes and other social funds. Certain post-war institutional constraints may eventually lead to the re-distribution of services and funds within particular (ethnically defined) groups of population. Therefore, in a post-ethnic-conflict situation, the main long-term goal should be the creation of a transparent social safety net system, which would also raise the level of trust in the institutions.
The special requirements of a post-ethnic-conflict situation demand that the destroyed infrastructure is rehabilitated, employment generated and economic development stimulated on a grassroots level. To achieve these goals however it is essential that bridges between different ethnic groups and former opponents are built and that a minimum of interethnic tolerance is achieved to allow different ethnic groups to communicate at least over such non controversial issues (Bodewig 2002).

In an ethnic conflict, cease-fire is only the first step towards achieving peace. Continuing ethnic tensions within a deeply divided society (along at least two lines of separation) would perpetuate the extremely negative attitudes towards former ‘enemies’. The unwillingness of a traumatised population to participate in any integrative activities is logical, but definitely problematic, because this complicates further the post-war situation and obstructs the reforms in any of the sectors; especially if there are expectations for sharing of funds or interethnic redistribution (Bodewig 2002).

The post-ethnic-conflict situation is different from the post-conflict one because the reconstruction faces challenges of a polarised society (CHDCS 2003); furthermore, in such a society the destroyed bridging and linking social capital at the level of state challenge the possibility for (re-)construction of any civil relations. The (re-)emergence of civil consciousness, which would eventually lead to the overcoming of the communities division and would enable the transformation of the members of ethnic groups into citizens, could hardly occur on its own pace. Serious efforts are needed to rebuild bridges of communication between social groups and to promote participation in politics. Challenges relating to continuing ethnic tensions render many interventions difficult to implement and thus they hold back the reconstruction process as well as the ‘normalisation’ of life (Bodewig 2002).

Without questioning the appropriateness of the universal application of the peace-democracy-development paradigm and the need of international intervention in local affairs, the current research aims at identifying the factors that can contribute to the success or failure of a post-conflict reconstruction programme. However, this identification can be made only at a structural level, because in the context of post-conflict reconstruction success should be measured against the goals set at the onset of the process. Achieving the initially expected results within the respective (provisioned) timeframes is an objective indicator for success.

The peace-democracy-development paradigm is a projection of the ultimate ‘universal’ goals of the post-conflict reconstruction idea, but universal units of measurement would not produce commensurable results if used under different conditions. In practice, managing strategically the process of transition to ‘normalisation’ requires that context-dependent benchmarks be put along the way. In the context of the Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts, the focus is placed on the particular needs of a post-ethnic-conflict environment that must be met if the ultimate goal of the international community is the establishment of lasting peace and stability worldwide. Therefore, the following chapter will look at the specific issues that post-conflict programmes must address in order to achieve the desired levels of success in societies and countries emerging from ethnic violence.
The previous chapters revealed that the violent ethnic conflicts of the late 20th century have had negative effects not only on the natural, physical, and human capital, but also on the societal structure of the war-affected political units. Beyond the visibly demolished economic and political infrastructures, social fractures and destroyed basic human interactions can further impede the reconstruction process. Fragmentation along ethnic, cultural and/or religious lines of separation and war trauma lead to loss of social cohesion, will for co-operation and of any citizenship affiliations with a national state.

A ceasefire or a formal agreement does not put an end to a violent ethnic conflict, but only marks the beginning of the next, post-military phase when post-conflict reconstruction could take place. Countries emerge from conflicts within specific international environments and under unique conditions. Identity-based, political or class conflicts are often determined by the dynamic relationship between social, political and economic interests, which explains its non-static nature. Achieving the ultimate goal - normalisation of life\textsuperscript{112}, is hence impossible without addressing the specific conflict outcomes and consequences.\textsuperscript{113}

The evaluations of the international aid practice since the end of the Cold War has shown that conventional aid mechanisms, aiming at rapid ‘normalisation’ can hardly enable success. Developmental efforts directed towards economic reconstruction and delivery of basic social services tend to leave aside problems related to human rights abuses, social dislocation and tearing of social fabric. As Simpson points out, economic reconstruction alone could not end an identity-conflict or heal social fractures (Simpson 1997:475). Economic growth and development can even generate their own forms of social conflict, especially if resources ‘injected’ into a context of deprivation become distributed along established lines of separation and confrontation\textsuperscript{114}. Economic reconstruction is vital to the process of rebuilding social capital, but it alone has no capacity to deal with the problems of reconciliation after war crimes, human rights, gender abuses, or inequality. Often economic growth and wealth have limited capacities to

\textsuperscript{112} To remind, the concept of normalisation implies that 1) there would be no need for extraordinary outside intervention; 2) governance and economic activity would largely function on a self-determinate and self-sustaining basis; 3) internal and external relations would be conducted according to generally accepted norms of behaviour (AUSA/CSIS 2002).

\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore, it is not only that nature of the experienced conflict should be taken into account, but any concrete coping mechanisms that have emerged or have functioned during the period of hostilities are also to be integrated in the structures of peace-building interventions (Colletta & Cullen 2000:85)

\textsuperscript{114} Simpson (1997) points out that the lack of social compact, i.e. agreement on the criteria to be applied in allocating new houses, seriously impeded a building project in Alexandra township, north of Johannesburg
address properly the ‘destruction of social capital, particularly institutions of governance and civil society and such basic attitudes and behaviours as trust and participation’ (WB 1998:30). Therefore reconstruction of seriously damaged societies should adopt an integrated approach and besides economic development should address not only the problems of providing security, establishing appropriate legal and institutional frameworks, of recovery or (re-)building of physical and human capital (WB-OED 1998:5), but also focus on the areas of politics, justice, institution building, and civil society (Simpson 1997). Rebuilding of social fabric requires a bottom-up approach that breaks down barriers and prejudices and brings people together. Peace brokering\textsuperscript{115} or putting up military shields to keep warring fractions apart (Simpson 1997) would hardly have a positive effect on developments in the long-term.

As a basis for development of social capital, social contract is a determinant for its character and structure. Hence, a transformation of the system and its frameworks (social contract) eventually leads to the establishment of new forms of social capital. Therefore, before addressing the concept of social capital, the grounds for enabling reconstruction of a fragmented social space, where identity differences are voluntarily subjected to overarching formal rules, will be approached through the social contract theory.

1. Framing the concept of social capital

1.1 From a social contract to social capital

Viewed as an actual or hypothetical compact between ruled and their rulers (Encyclopaedia Britannica), or as an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for mutual benefit (Oxford English Dictionary), the social contract regulates all social relations including political, religious, and economic ones. It also sets the parameters of any social order, which as a discursive practice, has to be formally introduced and recognised by all community members. As such, it is valid only within the limits of the community that has established and accepted the conventions. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction of deeply divided societies, the social contract theory can help understand why it is essential that the association of individuals into a single social organism needs to be promoted at the level of the macro-political unit as soon as there are minimum enabling conditions in place.

Beverly Crawford ascertains that social contracts were constructed during the process of nation-building, embedding and forging the terms of citizenship and political community inclusion into state constitutions, legal systems, and political practices (Crawford 1998b:517).\textsuperscript{116} Social contract provided grounds for building

\textsuperscript{115} In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the peace-brokered agreement in fact consolidated the gains made through war. It ‘approved’ ethnicity as the \textit{organising principle} of politics in the Balkans (better than even the war itself); federalism did not bring integration but consolidation of regional power bases. (Simpson 1997:475)

\textsuperscript{116} ‘Nationalism’ has developed on the basis of the dominant identity markers and has become ideological justification for the terms of inclusion in/exclusion from the political community.
identities and relationships contrasting to those of the traditional societies, which were fixed both along the lines of family and lineage, and along the cultural and economic division of labour. In the form of written constitutions or projected by the political and social institutions of a state, the social contract established the ‘internal’ configuration of societies, structuring:

- the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country’s political community
- the rules of political participation
- the political relationship between a central state and its various regions
- the distribution of material resources within the country
- the roles of the individuals within the country/society and the relationships between these roles (Lipschutz 1998:62)

In contrast to Lipschutz, Crawford asserts that it is the institution of the state that sets the terms of social contract and structures the terms of membership in the political community, the rules of political participation and accountability, as well as the criteria for production and distribution of material resources (Crawford 1998a:28). The institution of the state has the capacity to determine whether or not a politicised cultural identity would be cemented in social and political practice and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, separatism, or the right to participate with others in the political arena.

When political membership and resource distribution are structured according to ascriptive criteria, politicised cultural divisions become legitimate in the political arena. Preferential policies and political institutions are another factor that can intensify or even create political groups, foster identity-based political struggles or introduce biased principles for allocation of benefits. When identity politics dominate political competition, grounds for conflicting claims on resources based on cultural criteria emerge. It is likely that tensions between groups intensify, which would eventually reinforce the importance of ascription as a principle of choice in allocating benefits (Crawford 1998a:29). If institutions that support the social contract weaken, cultural conflict and violence is likely to occur and eventually affect community structure and function.

Crawford (1998a) outlines that the state is the institution that sets and maintains a social contract. While political entrepreneurs can attempt to legitimise cultural divisions and to mobilise groups for political action, institutions that disregard cultural differences as politically relevant or as criteria for allocation of resources or for participation, can attenuate politicisation of cultural identities. Institutions can structure the rules of a fair political competition and thus maintain social

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117 While in the Soviet Union the institutions created new cultural divisions, in post-war federal Yugoslavia the new institutions reinforced cultural divisions created by the historical interpretations of successful political entrepreneurs (Crawford 1998a:28?).

118 Such claims are more prone to intense conflict than disputes between interest groups, because while interests are malleable and multiple, cultural identity is fixed and non-negotiable. (Crawford 1998a:5).
stability\textsuperscript{119} even in societies, where cultural identities have been already politicised.

It is the citizenship rules in place that determine whether cultural differences would become politically relevant or not. Inclusive citizenship constitutes individual civic behaviour, regardless of any cultural attributes, as membership criteria. Exclusive membership rules, in contrast, have the capacity to strengthen the political relevance of cultural differences, activating the barriers of cultural origin, language, or religion (Crawford 1998a:29). Therefore, a social contract that is to ensure the inclusive citizenship and to reduce the likelihood of outburst of tensions among different cultural groups needs to provide for a political system that represent the interests of all citizens and is supported by a system of justice and policing that bolster citizenship rights and protect cultural groups against hate crimes.

Institutions play a key role for the maintenance of social contracts\textsuperscript{120}. Therefore, any transformations they undergo would have a direct impact on the social arrangements. It is at these points of instability that social contracts are most likely to break out (Lipschutz 1998:63). Political and economic changes are also likely to challenge the distributions of power and wealth established and institutionalised over time by the social contracts\textsuperscript{121} (Lipschutz 1998:60). Transition hence enables political entrepreneurs to take advantages of the situation and to gain access to institutional power (Lipschutz 1998:63).

Apart from the internal or external transformations, the constitution of new identities or opportunities (for acquiring power and wealth) can also challenge the foundations of an existing social contract\textsuperscript{122}. According to Crawford (1998a:4), the outburst of ethnic violence in the last decades is linked to the Post-Cold War economic globalisation and institutional transformation that enabled the opening of new markets and the construction of new democracies\textsuperscript{123}. These factors contributed to the disruption of the old social contracts, i.e. of the old rules and norms determining access to political and economic resources. In the cases where these shifts in political power were experienced as ethnic and/or religious

\textsuperscript{119} Universal suffrage and citizenship rights can weaken the political relevance of race and gender divisions, in the same way that secular institutions weaken religious differences.

\textsuperscript{120} Social contracts are not by definition just, equitable and fair. When recognised by all members of society, they function as a constitutive source of social and political stability within countries. Even not necessarily respectful of human rights or economically efficient, social contracts have the capacity to maintain a relative degree of social stability and cohesion (Lipschutz 1998:58), because they regulate not only state-society relations, but also the relations between the various groups within societies.

\textsuperscript{121} As a result of the Industrial Revolution, states became intervening in the workings of the economy to secure and protect their populations. From the middle of the twentieth century the welfare function of the state came to dominate, reaching its apogee in the countries of Western Europe (Lipschutz 1998:65).

\textsuperscript{122} If levers of economic and political power are in the hands of a dominant group that is better placed and able to take advantage of the new conditions created under economic liberalisation, this can provoke disaffection among disadvantaged groups. When their identity is defined in ethnic or sectarian terms, such a situation could inspire ‘state of their own’ ideas (Lipschutz 1998:68).

\textsuperscript{123} Globalisation and liberalisation are thus ‘triggers’ for cultural conflict, but definitely not ‘the only triggers’, and not the ‘underlying causes’.
discrimination, opportunities for political entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{124} emerged (Crawford 1998a:5).

When shifts in political power have been experienced or perceived as discriminatory, it is very important that post-conflict policies avoid politicising cultural identities and distributing resources or power on such a basis. Nevertheless, even if there are regulatory mechanisms for preventing the spread of identity politics, the association of individuals into a single social organism at macro-level would not occur, if people were not motivated to (re-) integrate. If, in the aftermaths of a conflict, the ‘general will’ that constitutes civil liberty is replaced by a number of contesting general wills, the building-up of a new overarching political identity is a requirement for a (re)construction of state-citizenship and state-social capital.

As it was shown in the previous chapter, the ethnic conflicts of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century destroy pre-war social cohesion\textsuperscript{125}, i.e. the ‘extend to which people respond collectively to achieved their valued outcomes and to deal with the economic, social, political or environmental stress (positive or negative) that affects them’ (Reimer 2002:14). Therefore, social integration understood in terms of targeted social cohesion, togetherness, and solidarity among the members of a territorially defined political unit, is an important precondition for achieving lasting peace, sustainable development and prosperity in divided societies. Shared responsibility, will for co-operation and common living, social integration, and social cohesion, appear constitutive factors for the rebuilding of social capital. A precondition for the identification of appropriate mechanisms for its (re-)construction and for the elaboration of adequate programs is the clear definition of the macro-framework, which will determine all the components of the social relationships and structures.

\textbf{1.2 Theoretical approaches to social capital}

A great variety of definitions reflecting complementary or even opposing ideas, tries to capture and explain the elusive notion of \textit{social capital}. Burdened with different meanings, the concept appears rather vague and unclear - a fashionable buzzword in the socio-political and economic literature or ‘a black hole’ with more or less defined limits and all-absorbing content. Outlining a conceptual framework that will provide a basis for approaching the notion of social capital and its role in the reconstruction of divided societies is therefore needed.

The concept of social capital can be easily recognised as a product of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century socio-political thought. It appears for the first time as early as 1916 in the

\textsuperscript{124} Similarly to the economic counterparts, the political entrepreneurs seek to maximise their individual interests. In pursuit of maximising political power, political entrepreneurs engaging in risk-taking behaviour, which in the end impacts the collective interests. (Crawford 1998a)

\textsuperscript{125} According to Berkman and Kawachi (2000) social cohesion refers to two intertwined features of society. First, it is the absence of any type of a latent conflict and second - the presence of strong social bonds - measured by trust and norms of reciprocity, the abundance of associations that bridge social divisions, and the presence of institutions of conflict management, e.g. responsive democracy, an independent judiciary, and independent media (Berkman & Kawachi 2000:175).
Lyda Judson Hanifan’s work on the rural school community centres (Woolcock 1998), but it was not until the 1990s when the concept came into widespread usage and became a focal point of research and policy discussions. Over a span of 10 years the number of journal articles listing social capital as a key word rose from 109 (1991-1995) to 1003 in March 1999 (Baum 2000 quoted in UKONS 2001:6). The subsequent application of the concept in a range of social issues has dissolved its empirical specificity into a fashionable word meaning all things to all people (UKONS 2001:6, Woolcock 2001).

Nevertheless, it is still important that social capital be examined on a broad basis and not narrowed down to a single-aspect definition. Limiting the focus only to one aspect can deform perceptions and thus lead to biased or specific conclusions. A similar problem concerning the validity of the findings can be spotted in the fact that despite social capital being considered a community attribute, it is usually assessed through interviewing individuals, while collective social capital cannot be simply the sum of the individual projections (UKONS 2001:14).

Social capital is often associated with trust, even though there is no common view concerning the relationship between these two concepts. Woolcock (2001) for example considers trust as an outcome of social capital, whereas Cote and Healy (2001) view it also a component of shared values. According to Fukuyama, social capital and trust integrate within an economic framework - trust emerges as a key measure of social capital (Fukuyama 1995). Accumulated through norms of reciprocity and successful co-operation in networks of civil engagement, trust within society is the primary factor for its prosperity, inherent competitiveness, and tendency towards democracy. A successful and stable society could be built only over a shared set of moral values, which will create expectations of regular and honest behaviour (Fukuyama 1995:151-153) as well as foster engagement with civic duties.

While Fukuyama (2001) reflects on the ‘radius of trust’ (i.e. the circle of people where co-operative norms are fully functional) and Putnam distinguishes two different types of trust - thick and thin (Putnam 2000:136-137), other studies emphasise the multi-dimensionality of this social phenomenon challenging the dichotomy introduced (Sixsmith et al., 2001). Putnam's definition of social capital as ‘features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam et al. 1993:36; Putnam 1993) clearly outlines the horizontal level that creates externalities for the community as a whole. According to this definition, developed within the political science context, the efficiency of society is improved due to the facilitated coordinated actions (Putnam et al. 1993:167). By supporting government, the functioning networks of civil engagement linked by solidarity, integrity, and participation determine positive economic development. The civic networks improve the effectiveness of communications and social organisation building up and fostering the trust within society (Colletta & Cullen 2000:7). Thus, the efficiency of the institutions depends on trust, communications, and flows of information (Putnam et al. 1993:36-37). A public, not a private good, social capital performs as a ‘resource whose supply increases...through use’ and, in contrast to physical capital, it becomes depleted if not used (Putnam et al. 1993:37-38).
A number of theorists explore the active connections among people as formative for the fabric of social capital. According to Cohen and Prusak (2001:4), trust between individuals and in a broad fabric of social institutions ultimately promotes a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole. Cooperative action can become possible however only if it is supported by mutual understanding and binding behaviours of the community members.

Examining social capital, Putnam distinguishes two types and defines them as bonding and bridging. In Putnam's terminology bonding social capital performs both as a 'sociological super glue' (Putnam 2000:19) and as a mechanism for exclusion. The term refers to relations amongst relatively homogeneous groups characterised by strong interpersonal ties, such as ethical fraternal organisations and church based women's reading groups (Putnam 2000). The social capital that is crucial for development Putnam defines as bridging - the examples given here are relations with distant friends, associates, and colleagues. These inclusive ties, rather diverse and weaker than the former type, bring together people to establish for example civil rights movements and ecumenical religious organisations. In addition, Cote and Healy (2001:42) suggest that the relationships between individuals and groups in different social strata stemming from the distribution of power and wealth among different groups constitute the 'linking social capital'.

The more complex theoretical model of Michael Woolcock (1998) also remains at the level of social relationships. His comprehensive framework regards social capital as incorporating four dimensions of inter-community relationships: strong ties between family members and neighbours; weak ties with the outside community and between communities; formal institutions (including laws and norms); and state-community interaction. The relations based predominantly on kinship, ethnicity, and religion are integration determinants, denoted with the term 'strong ties'. These basic social mechanisms build survival safety nets and are formative for a community. In this light, the connections with people outside the constituted community are weak ties. These mostly formal rather than innate linkages constitute different social networks and associations and underlie any civic engagement and economic enterprise. The civil society and its institutions, no matter whether complementary or substitute for state services and functions, have a direct impact upon state's integrity. The forth dimension synergy reflects the state-community relations and in particular the interaction between community and leaders and government institutions.

An instrumental approach, looking at social capital through a pragmatic prism, derives from the works of Pierre Bourdieu in the early 1980s. Bourdieu has produced the first contemporary systematic analysis of the phenomenon, although his conceptions were not very popular at the time (Portes 1998). In his view, social capital encompasses not only the social relationships that would provide the individuals with the access to resources, but also the amount and quality of the latter. Actual or potential resources and the respective profits result from membership in a group and therefore they become basis for solidarity (Bourdieu 1986:249). Then, a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition would provide more benefits to the members (Bourdieu 1986:248-249). On the other hand, individuals possessing high levels of other forms of capital can enter or establish networks more easily, because the others view them as carriers of social capital (Bourdieu 1986:250).
'The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent… depends on the size of network connections he can effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected’ (Bourdieu 1986:249). As a product of investment strategies, aiming at the institutionalisation of group relations, social networks require deliberate investment of both economic and cultural resources in order that social capital is acquired (Portes 1998).

Identifying social capital based on social relationships appears controversial. The problem that the above presented references disclose is that most of the relationship-based theories on social capital seem to coin a notion that overlaps with other social phenomena. Therefore, definitions that concentrate on the structure that social capital constitutes will be examined below.

Certain definitions of social capital consider the vertical relationships. From a sociological perspective Coleman (1988, 1990) examines social capital in three forms – as obligations and expectations, flow of information and presence of norms. Focusing on the hierarchy and the unequal distribution of power among the members of associations (Coleman 1990:598) and among groups, he suggests that the structure facilitates not only the individuals, but also the corporate actors and therefore the inter-group relationships should not be ignored in favour of the interpersonal ones. Depending on its characteristics and its applications, social capital might appear beneficial to some and useless or harmful to others. Social capital has a complex character and a capacity to enable the achievement of goals ‘that in its absence would not be possible’ (Coleman 1988:S98).

According to Uphoff social capital is an ‘accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount of probability of mutual beneficial co-operative behaviour that is productive for others, not just one's self’ (Uphoff 2000:216). The relationships, networks, and associations or the institutional structures that exist among members, Uphoff identifies as structural social capital. It refers both to horizontal - existing among equals - and to vertical relationships, stemming from hierarchical or unequal relations due to differences in power or resource bases. The second type, the cognitive social capital, which underlies the visible, ‘material’ forms, reflects the values, norms, civic responsibility, expected reciprocity, charity, altruism, and trust.

The above presented definitions encompass the horizontal and vertical networks of the social structure as well as the norms and relationships that build their fabrics. It is thus important to recognise that social capital does not exist per se. As a social phenomenon, it is not isolated from processes in the human world, determined by the respective macro-framework within which they have been developing. The horizontal and vertical relationships are a projection of the particular socio-political context and economic environment. Therefore, to understand and define social capital it is necessary to take into account parameters as government, legislation, markets, and development actors (Colletta & Cullen 2000:11). Another factor that has a definite impact over social capital development is culture, both at micro- and macro-level – establishing values, determining and justifying the general socio-political perspective at the latter.
Civil and political liberties play an important role for social capital development. Therefore, according to Douglas North (1990) and Mancur Olson (1982) the institutional environment – which in many cases would be the state (Narayan 1999) – should also be considered. The effectiveness of the state appears an important factor for understanding social capital as civic engagement, characterised by cross-cutting ties that link individuals and groups. A strong civil society operating within a weak state environment would not promote growth since it would substitute for the state inadequacies. In contrast, a well-functioning state complemented by a high level of civil engagement enables social and economic development.

To summarise, the micro-approach to social capital focuses on the value of collective action and on the subjective factors that can motivate individuals to cooperate formally (by joining associations) or informally in order to attain certain objectives (Franke 2005:2). The other elements considered important within this discourse are the behaviour of the actors involved and their perception of collective issues (cultural beliefs and influences, etc.)

While micro-level social capital appears as ‘cognitive’ or as ‘the potential of the co-operative strategies (groups, associations, etc.) to strengthen collective capacities’ (Franke 2005:2), on meso-level it can be referred to as ‘structural’ (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001), taking into account the potential of social networks to produce resources such as information and support (Portes 1998). Examining the structures that enable co-operation, the meso-approach endues instrumental value to social capital and takes for its determinants the social networks and the types of interactions within and among them. As a resource/product emerging from the horizontal and vertical social ties, social capital is neither an individual nor a collective property (benefit), but both.

With the focus on the value of integration and social cohesion, the macro-approach to social capital emphasises the environmental, social, and political structures that enable or impede social engagement and civic and political participation (Franke 2005:2). As a product of these structures and thus a collective benefit (Putnam 2001), social capital is seen as dependant upon the willingness of the individuals to get involved in civic life and on the trust and reciprocity inspired by the institutions.

To complete the theoretical frameworks of the social capital concept and to put it in the perspective of post-conflict reconstruction practice, it is important to look at the definitions adopted by some of the major reconstruction players for their operational purposes. In its theoretical and practical work, the World Bank refers to social capital as a combination of cognitive (micro), structural (meso) and institutional (macro) elements. As one of the most active reconstruction agencies in the field, the Bank explores the ways social capital operates in specific development situations through a number of small-scale case studies. Therefore, ‘given the variety of political, organisational, cultural and other contexts in the countries of intervention, the World Bank preferred model for addressing social capital has been based in the importance of the contextual variables as a determining factor for collective action’ (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses social capital as a marker of well-being, measured in turn through four major indicators: social participation, social support, social networks, and civic participation (Franke 2005). According to the OECD, the concept refers to networks together with shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups (Cote & Healy 2001:47). This definition also presupposes that social capital can manifest differently depending on the context and the issues involved.

Emphasising the practical aspect of theory, research initiatives in UK, Canada, and Australia have also focused their efforts on studying the concept of social capital (Franke 2005). The Office of National Statistics in UK has adopted a pragmatic macro-approach to the concept, based on its social integration value in five major dimensions: 1) participation, social engagement and commitment; 2) control, self efficacy, 3) perception of community; 4) social interaction, social networks and social support; 5) trust, reciprocity and social cohesion. Aiming at making the concept operational and thus more useful for public policy, the Australian initiative addresses social capital as based on social networks, distinguishing between the concept itself and its effects. This approach builds upon the four interrelated types of capital: natural, economic, human, and social.

The empirical analysis in the public sector performed by these statistical agencies, reveals that social capital is widely documented, but understood as an end-result rather than as an explanatory variable for socio-economic outcomes. By contrast, the goal of the current research is to establish the role of social capital in the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction process as a factor for achieving better socio-economic outcomes. Therefore, in the following section the text will attempt to consider the micro-, meso-, and macro-approaches and their objects of analysis in their interaction, in order to achieve a more comprehensive view of social capital.

1.3 Towards a comprehensive model of social capital

The lack of theoretical and methodological clarity has motivated researchers to attempt to produce a model of social capital that encompasses its different dimensions and manifestations. The Social Capital Assessment Tool, or SCAT (Krishna & Shrader 1999; Figure 7), was developed after studying a number of methodological approaches drawing upon empirical studies. This analytical framework does not neglect the need for contextualisation of social capital. Identifying some broad but constant categories for establishing the general framework, it accepts that the precise selection of sub-categories would be context-specific. For example, if horizontal or vertical organisations, types of networks, as well as norms and values determine the fields of analysis, their underlying elements, and specific features will be determined by the respective cultural domain. As the authors emphasise, what constitutes social capital in one context, might be unsocial in another (Krishna & Shrader 1999:6).

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126 The micro-, meso- and macro-approaches to social capital are interested respectively in the nature and forms of co-operative behaviour, the structures that enable co-operation and the favourable or unfavourable conditions for co-operation (Franke 2005:1).
As a field-tested set of indicators and methodologies, measuring the levels of structural and cognitive social capital, SCAT is, in the words of its designers, a step towards the development of a uniform measure for social capital. Developed from qualitative and quantitative data and research instruments derived from 26 studies in 15 countries worldwide, it helps determine certain baseline levels of social capital, observe the progress of project implementation, and analyse the relationship between development indicators and social capital accumulation.

Elaborated upon data collected from communities – the designated beneficiaries of development projects - the assessment tool is only partially relevant to the field of interest of the current research defined as reconstruction of post-ethnic-conflict societies. Limiting its focus only to the structural and cognitive social capital at the micro-level, and the ways that they interact within the community, the SCAT leaves aside the macro-level indicators and thus the possibility to understand the role of social capital in development (Krishna & Shrader 1999:10).

*Figure 7: SCAT Conceptual Framework: Levels and Types of Social Capital (Source: Krishna & Shrader 1999)*
Similarly to the SCAT conceptual framework for assessing social capital, the one designed by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001) incorporates the findings of different studies. The complex model of social capital built reveals its simultaneous manifestation at the different levels and in variety of forms. While the SCAT figure presents the macro-institutional context of formal relationships and structures as encompassing the micro-level of cognitive and structural social capital, Grootaert and van Bastelaer’s is developed as a four-dimensional coordination system, where levels and forms of social capital intersect.

In comparison to the SCAT model, which examines structural and cognitive forms of social capital only at micro-level, Grootaert and van Bastelaer develop the framework further and identify the manifestations of the two forms at macro-level. Engaging with Uphoff’s theory, Grootaert argues that the *structural social capital* appears a relatively objective and observable construct based on established roles, social networks and other social structures supplemented by rules, procedures, and precedents. The *cognitive social capital* in comparison, referring to shared norms and values, appears a more subjective and intangible concept (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001:6).

Furthermore, Grootaert and van Bastelaer suggest that even in interaction, the two forms of social capital can be complementary but are not necessarily interdependent. Personal cognitive bonds might not develop into structural social capital, as well as the existence of community associations does not imply strong interpersonal relations among its members. Social interaction however could

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promote a basis for constitution of social capital through the persistence of its effects at either or both levels (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001:7).

In contrast to the majority of the definitions, the two discussed here adopt a rather comprehensive approach to social capital, addressing simultaneously various elements of its manifestation. Critics may argue that such a multi-dimensional perspective creates a rather broad and vague concept. The interconnected levels and elements of social capital however need to be examined, as a change in a component would affect the entire system, either positively or negatively.

All the elements of the social capital system, as introduced by the two models, should correspond to the macro-level. The macro-unit determines the scope of the matrix and all of the elements it encompasses. In a post-conflict reconstruction context, this implies that the macro-unit of reconstruction will pre-set the scope and the types of the areas of interest. Referring to the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model of social capital, if the goal of the reconstruction process is to (re-)create a stable and prosperous state, then the elements presented in the matrix would also refer to the institution of the state. The macro-cognitive element of governance would imply ‘state governance’, the micro-structural element of local institutions and networks would be congruent with those existing at the national (state) level, and the micro-cognitive trust and local norms and values should sustain an understanding of the people as citizens, i.e. state-members. The same principle also applies if the SCAT matrix is used.

The situation after a violent ethnic conflict appears rather interesting if projected through the above-introduced models (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 below). Considering first the four-dimensional matrix (Figure 9), at the macro-structural level there would be the political unit, recognised by the international community. This might be the pre-conflict state with all or most of its territories, a new political entity, formed during the struggles and recognised as independent by the international community, or a secessionist region with a special after-war status. The macro-cognitive level of governance however can have two dimensions. The first one is the state, where usually during the process of post-conflict reconstruction certain national structures exist, whose efficiency is often doubtful, supported by, and in certain cases subject to a degree to, the institutionalised international presence. Although national governance might be present in the post-ethnic-conflict environment, it is quite likely that it remains only a concept – structures with no real capacities and power to move the process in a desired direction.

Real governance in the case of a fragmented and war-traumatised society rests with local networks and institutions, i.e. at the micro-structural level. These local structures however are limited to the particular community formed during or after the conflict along one or another line of separation and constituted upon exclusive bonding ties they are likely to restrict membership. The different local (ethnic) networks and institutions do not seek interaction and quite often are hostile to each other. In this context, trust and norms at the micro-cognitive level are present only among the members of each ‘community’ and not across the members of the different groups. The state becomes an abstract and ‘hostile’ entity, run by foreigners through their local ‘puppets’. This lack of trust in the institutions of the state prevents the emergence of any affiliations with the state. A counterpoint of
the state appears the super-ethnic structure – the dream of a homogeneous national state, powered by the governance of myths and ethnic ideologies that political entrepreneurs use for their purposes.

The situation one could observe in a post-ethnic-conflict environment is a ‘mirrored’ model, as presented in Figure 10. The number of (politically) determined communities can multiply the mirrored section. In the figure below the model has been simplified for clarity, presenting only one mirrored structure.

*Figure 9: Social Capital of a Divided Society (model 1) (Grootaert & van Bastelaer model adapted)*

The number of the existing politically determined ethnic groups within the post-ethnic-conflict society would multiply the model accordingly.

The same reflections are valid also for the SCAT model. Graphically, the distorted levels can be presented as follows:
While the macro-level has been disconnected from its core, the micro-level has been embraced by a para-macro ethnic structure. In the case of a heterogeneous society, the number of these micro-levels would again correspond to the number of the existing politically defined ethnic groups.

All of this is to say, that the most common mistake of the international involvement in the process of reconstruction is the presumption that once the formal state institutions are restored, the state-machine eventually will start functioning. In a ‘traditional’ post-conflict situation, such expectations would be realistic, because the micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels would have been preserved, and not fragmented into closed and hostile units. The war-traumatised citizens would still be citizens! In the case of the ethnic conflict however, the war and/or the survival mechanisms have forced the majority of citizens to become members of ethnic communities.

In the case of artificially supported statehood, the latter simply reinforces existing ethnic identities and motivates people to get rid of the imposed but not internalised affiliations. Since there is no micro-level affiliated with the macro-level of the state emerging from an ethnic conflict, it means that the state has no citizens, but only inhabitants. Therefore, immediately after an ethnic conflict, any efforts that require the involvement of citizens and civil society at the level of state are more likely to fail. Before launching programmes to support and enhance civil society, it is necessary that bridging ties are restored, social cohesion (re-) enabled and investments in linking state-level social capital made. Only then, it is likely that ethnic members become willing to identify themselves not only as belonging to a certain ethnic, cultural, or religious group, but also with the larger political unit as citizens.

This is where the importance of addressing social capital rebuilding in the early stages of the reconstruction process lies, especially if the ultimate aim is the establishment of a stable and prosperous (heterogeneous) state. For a programme
to be successful, it is essential that the elements addressed in all of the four quadrants (Figure 9) are of respective scope\textsuperscript{128}. If the ethnically (culturally, or religiously) determined micro-level becomes a foundation of a new construction, the political unit built over is likely to emerge upon non-civil principles, rather than as based upon a civil social contract. When the reconstruction goal is the establishment of a civil and democratic state, then the micro-level demands rather focussed attention, while the macro-level would serve as a point of reference. Reconstructing social capital in this context means enabling co-operation among people and development in general, by creating an environment within which tolerance, will for co-operation and integration, interest in the common future and the common good and social cohesion can re-emerge. To summarise, the macro-unit chosen as a unit of reconstruction would determine the appropriate strategies and action and would serve as a point of reference for their effectiveness. Supportive of the ideas expressed above appears one of the research recommendations made by Colletta and Cullen that the model of social capital employed should match the desired outcomes. ‘For instance, if the goal is to produce recommendations for government action, the social capital paradigm should include aspects of organisational integrity and synergy, with a focus of all four dimensions on the degree of social cohesiveness and subsequent management of conflict’ (Colletta & Cullen 2000:132).

2. BUILDING AN INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENT

2.1 The role of social capital

Different studies attribute different functions to social capital. Some forms may contribute to social cohesion, while others are more likely to spur social fragmentation; some can be a source of mutual aid and protection, others simply enable the mobilisation for violence (Colletta & Cullen 2000:93). By bridging and mitigating exclusive relations, social capital can prevent conflicts, but it has also a potential to reinforce exclusionary bonds (like those within gangs and extremist ethnic groups). Social capital can complement provisions of basic protection or safety nets, bring about greater safety, social inclusion, and economic participation, or substitute for state and market failures (Colletta & Cullen 2000:93), but it is by no means a panacea and not necessarily a societal good (Woolcock 2001).

Social capital is a change-generating mechanism (Bayat 2005:2). It can mobilise resources and distribute them within society, but agents of reconstruction have to be sensitive to the particular context as well as to the complexity and the multidimensionality of the task, in order to achieve positive economic, political, and social outcomes.

\textsuperscript{128} Looking at the SCAT model (Figure 10), then the elements of the disconnected core (micro-level) and periphery (macro-level) should also be of a corresponding scope.
Performing in various fields, social capital has the capacity to generate beneficial externalities (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001) and facilitate collective action. Trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity play an essential role in forming people’s opportunities and choices and hence influence their behaviour and development (Putnam 2000:296-306). Underlying social relations, they enable the flow of information within networks, facilitating in this way the achieving of goals. Norms and their enforcing networks provide institutional mechanisms for ensuring compliance of individuals with community. Within an environment that facilitates investments in beneficial kinds of social capital, collective problems can be resolved more easily (Putnam 2000) and members can use their social resources for addressing their own needs.

Social cohesion is another characteristic of community life, which is directly dependant on social capital. Projecting the extent to which people work together to achieve various objectives (Reimer 2002:14), it is an attribute of society only when people interact regardless of their origin or status. A cohesive society is highly conducive for economic growth and development, because different groups cooperate in pursuit of common goals. Inter-group bonds, intra-community ties and the links that connect the communities with the state are the determinants of social cohesion. Domination or scarcity of any of these manifestations of social capital may lead to the exclusion of groups, often along ethnic or caste lines (Putnam 2000). While the bonding social capital can reinforce closed identities and homogeneous groups and thus under-gird specific reciprocity and mobilise solidarity, the bridging networks function as a kind of sociological superglue, generating broader identities and reciprocity, and providing better linkage to external assets and information diffusion (Putnam 2000:22-23).

The development of social capital can bring about specific advantages and instruments for achieving policy-related objectives, such as increasing stocks of human and financial capital (Schuller 2001). Well-functioning local networks and attitudes of mutual trust enable group decisions and implementation of collective actions. Thus, civic engagement resulting from strong and functioning social capital can strengthen state institutions. The latter, in turn, create an environment in which civic engagement is likely to thrive (Feldman & Assaf 1999:4) Weak, hostile, or indifferent governments have a different effect on community life, than do governments that respect civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, and resist corruption (Woolcock & Narayan 2000:226). A strong social capital can compensate for absent or weak institutions by the creation of informal organisations (Narayan 1999).

Increasing the levels of interpersonal trust and enabling participation of individuals in social networks and labour market, social capital may have positive effects on economic performance and development (Fafchamps and Minten 2002, Woolcock & Narayan (2000) identify nine primary fields of social capital ‘performance’. These are families and youth behaviour, schooling and education, community life (virtual and civic), work and organisations, democracy and governance, collective action, public health and environment, crime and violence, and economic development.

Social pressures and fear of exclusion are among the mechanisms that control behaviour of individuals for meeting established standards.

Studies suggest that social capital also has the potential to improve quality of individuals’ life, income and welfare, to lower crime, and to provide better child or health care (Putnam 2000:331)
Knack and Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 2000:319-325). Trust enables co-operation, reduces transaction costs between people, and liberates resources. The obligations created on mutually agreed rules, norms, and sanctions, supports reciprocity and exchange, generate confidence to invest in collective or group activities. High levels of social capital ensure that group interests will be placed above individual ones, but with respect for individual rights.132

Until the 1990s, the theoretical approaches held rather narrow, even contradictory, views about the role of social relationships in economic development133 (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). The traditional developmental policy-making changed with the understanding that a society could generate mechanisms to reduce transaction and to control costs within productive systems (Montaes et al. 2004). Density of voluntarily associations (Putnam 1993), nature and extent of social interactions, became recognised as key factors for shaping economic performance134 (Woolcock & Narayan 2000).

Natural, physical, and human capital, determine economic growth, but the different patterns of development depend on the social capital. Countries with similar structures of natural, physical, and human capital can have different levels of economic performance depending on the variations of the existing social capital with its respective components135 (Grootaert 1998:1). Social capital shapes the quality and quantity of social interactions, enables people to build communities and to cooperate (WB 1999, Cohen & Prusak 2001:4). The improved co-ordination among people has a direct impact upon functioning of markets (Putnam et al. 1993, Grootaert 1998:7). Networks can even substitute for rule of law and formal court system (Grootaert 1998:12), while hierarchical associations based on clan or intergenerational relationships can ensure local stability and security, which in its turn would improve economic activity.

The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, leading to a collapse in trust and forcing people to rely on local networks and informal associations is a good illustration of the importance of macro-level social capital. In a context of ethnic diversity, increased civil strife and political instability can lead to social disintegration that eventually dissolves social capital. As Grootaert points out: 'ethnically fragmented societies are prone to competitive rent-seeking behaviour by the different ethnic groups and have difficulty agreeing on public

132 It also implies multiple membership, high organisational density, and cross-organisational links (Pretty & Ward 2001). Organisational stability and shared understanding in their turn lead to greater coherence of action (Cohen & Prusak 2001:10) and to better and just allocation of resources among groups and individuals (Smith, M.K. 2007).

133 Whole in the 1950s and 1960s the traditional social relationships and ways of life were considered impediments to development, in the 1970s these were regarded as primary mechanism of capitalist exploitation, which resulted in overestimating the virtues of isolationism and self-sufficiency of local communities (Woolcock & Narayan 2000:227). In the 1980s and early 1990s neoclassical and public choice theorists focused on the strategic choices of rational individuals interacting under various time and constraints, held that groups existed primarily to lower the transaction costs of exchange.

134 Education, training, and health as well as the possibility to cooperate are among the determinants for the successful utilisation of resources (Woolcock 2001:3).

135 Economic performance might differ depending on government policies enabling efficiency, exchange of information and cooperation with industry, density of voluntarily associations, security force, council of clan elders, and joint management (Grootaert 1998:1).
goods like education, infrastructure and good policies’ (Grootaert 1998:17). Woolcock however argues that ethnic fractionalisation per se is not a problem and diversity sometimes can be even an asset (like for example in US, Canada, and Australia). A situation of ripping conflict might appear when large ethnic groups become competitive in an environment of weak public institutions (Woolcock 2001:7).

There are beneficial and harmful types of social capital\textsuperscript{136} (Carroll 2001:11-13). The bonding type of social capital for example can also exclude or divide people\textsuperscript{137}. Sometimes groups constrain their own members, but sometimes, when membership promotes self or group interests, social capital takes the form of a restricted, rather than a public good. Strong bonding ties can reduce contacts between communities and even enable potential adverse consequences by restricting the access to the labour market and other opportunities. Actions of groups, based on strong internal bonds, can have socially negative outcomes\textsuperscript{138}. The asymmetries in access to power lead to monopolies, oppressions, and exclusions by highly organized groups. Community members usually do not benefit as much from this considerable social capital (Kerns & Forrest 2000) and the effects for the broader society are usually negative (Carroll 2001:11-13). Weak or indifferent governments have also negative effects on community life and development (Woolcock 2001:5). They can even contribute to the social conflict, not being able to compensate for the unequal distribution of benefits\textsuperscript{139} (Woolcock 1998, Carroll 2001:11-13).

Although it might not lead to ‘public bads’ social capital will not necessarily bring societal good. Putnam (2000) acknowledges the tyranny of social capital in the form of social control\textsuperscript{140}, the effects of which are not always positive. Portes (1998:15-18) identified four further examples of negative consequences. The exclusion of outsiders (1) results from the same strong ties that bring benefits to members of a group and commonly enable it to bar others from access (Waldinger 1995; Portes 1998). Under certain circumstances, group or community closure may prevent the success of business initiatives by individuals. As early as in the 1920s Weber ([1922] 1965) points out that the successful entrepreneurial requires impersonal economic transactions guided by the principle of universalism as opposed to the excess claims on group members. (2) Closed traditional communities might have negative implications for initiative and entrepreneurship.

\textsuperscript{136} On this issue, the works of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam bear most criticism, because they have failed to consider the negative potential of social capital and the respective consequences or effects (Portes 1998).

\textsuperscript{137} Bridging, i.e. ‘cross-cutting ties’ can counteract the adverse effects of certain bonding relationships (Carroll 2001: xii).

\textsuperscript{138} Intolerance, hatred, and violence toward others characterise closed groups like street gangs, mafias, or the Ku Klux Klan, for example (Carroll 2001:11-13; Harper 2001:12). Organised crime also possesses strong bonding ‘criminal capital’.

\textsuperscript{139} The social value of associations is not static. Immigrants can benefit from the support of the ethnic community, advancing economically they would need access to new networks beyond the original community. Social capital will then expand to extra-ethnic networks. As a result from an inadequate social integration, the Chinese ethnic immigrants in Indonesia have successfully established networks highly beneficial to members, which have become a source of serious social tensions and conflicts in the society at large (Woolcock 1998).

\textsuperscript{140} Social capital in the forms of social norms and beliefs can encourage compliance with local rules and customs and thus reduce the need for formal controls (Portes 1998).
(Geertz 1963). (3) Community or group participation creates demands for conformity, which can be quite restrictive of personal freedoms, individual initiative, and human capital accumulation (Woolcock 1998 11-13, Carroll 2001:11-13). In such situations, activated downward levelling norms (4) keep members of a downtrodden group in place and force the more ambitious to escape from it.

Among the most specific problematic outcomes of an ethnic conflict is that productive social interactions occur mostly within closed groups and not across them. Established macro-frameworks lack respective functioning micro-levels – a post-ethnic-conflict state appears as a puzzle of units and relationships of different ‘calibres’ and sometimes of opposing principles and values. Therefore, in contrast to ‘traditional’ post-war settings, where investments in the macro-level would have positive effects, after an ethnic conflict it is essential that the micro-level is properly addressed. Micro- and macro-levels require separate, but ‘synchronised’ efforts. Therefore, among the conflict resolution mechanisms, the development assistance must focus on the establishment and support of civil institutions that cut across traditional bonding ties (Colletta & Cullen 2000:94).

The number of civil society organisations per se is not an indicator for the existence of integrative social capital (Colletta & Cullen 2002). If relations created by the different types of organisations forming a civil society were exclusionary, they would not have the potential to prevent violent acts of hate-politics. Social cohesion is therefore critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable (WB 1999).

If social cohesion is the ‘extent to which people act collectively to achieve their valued outcomes’, the question then is how to create grounds for such a collective action, overcoming the boundaries of the closed ethnic group, how to create or introduce common pragmatic bonds that would become dominant over the ethnic divides. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, among the most important features of social capital is that it presents a basis of ‘civicness’.

Reflecting upon the model by Grootaert and van Bastelaer, if the goal of reconstruction is to (re-)constructed the macro-level of a (democratic) state, the efforts at the micro-level should be directed towards bringing back the ‘citizens’ to the socio-political scene. Having the national state as a macro-level component, at micro-level there should be the component of ‘citizens’. Alternatively, if the ethnic identity appears as the largest unit at the micro-level, then at the respective macro-level would be the element of ‘ethnic community’.

Therefore, if the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction is to stabilise and develop a state, then the reconstruction of the state-citizenship and social capital must be among the first elements to address. To (re-)build a social capital at a state level, grounds for motivated integration, new social contract, and citizenship rules should be established and promoted. Only later, the (re)building of a civil society can be feasible and hopefully successful.
2.2 Identification of elements/sectors for reconstruction

A state emerging from an ethnic conflict might emerge as a political unit, which is predominantly homogeneous in terms of ethnic, religious, or cultural affiliation of the population\textsuperscript{141}. When it is not possible to constitute such a homogeneous (national) community, ex-combatants and/or hostile groups have to find grounds for coexistence. Reconstruction strategies should take into account these two different types of macro-frameworks when developing their programmes. While in the first case, the degree of integration among people might be even higher than before the conflict, in the second case it is likely that efforts to bring back people together face strong resistance and suspicion. (Re-)building a multi-ethnic state after an ethnic conflict is a challenging task because it is quite likely that any pre-existing formal social contract establishing a supra-ethnic citizenship, has been lost in the course of the ethnic struggles.

The first type of macro-framework allows implementation of established post-conflict practices, because the state would need support mostly for building or repairing the political and economic infrastructures. In the second case, the fragmented and ‘resized’ micro-levels within the boundaries of the larger political unit need to be reconnected to the macro-level of reconstruction (the multi-ethnic state) and eventually integrated. This does not imply that people have to discard their identities and their ethnic, cultural or any other affiliations. Nested identities can even contribute to the establishment of a formal social contract that respects diversity and prevents their transformation into grounds for discrimination. Only such a formal social contract can become a proper basis for promoting democratic values and principles and for ensuring their further accumulation.

A balanced socio-political structure is a precondition for enabling the achievement of lasting peace and stable development. The scope of the social order, or the above-introduced ‘macro-framework’, depends on the scope or validity of its founding conventions - local, regional, or international. Therefore, it is necessary that any conventions set be accepted as fundamental principles throughout the respective political unit. If the reconstruction unit is a ‘state’, then the overall compact should be at ‘state’ level enabling connections among people based on shared values and ideas. As it was shown earlier in the text, the problem that the post-conflict reconstruction of fragmented societies faces is that at state level there are different (often opposing) social compacts of established ethnic, cultural, religious or other units. The situation becomes even more complex when, despite no suitable conditions being present at grass-root level, reconstruction actors attempt to impose democratic values. When local understandings and traditions contradict international norms and values, a cultural clash can be expected. This would eventually impede co-operation between the sides and reduce the chances for successful implementation of planned programmes.

Given that peace and development are among the ultimate goals of post-conflict reconstruction, it is a necessity that local communities are involved in the processes designed and implemented by the external (international) actors. Clash between local and international interests, visions for the future, and chosen

\textsuperscript{141} It can emerge as a result of actions of non-democratic power-institutions, of successful local separatist actions (Kosovo), or formally constituted by external forces (Israel).
approaches will definitely have negative effects on the entire process. A society united by force and not by rights, would fracture in the very first moment when the unification factor weakens or disappears. The post-conflict social contract has to be built on conventions accepted by local communities and not imported and imposed from outside. Political leaders can also contribute to the process by activating ignored, forgotten, or neglected possibilities and links that exist among people. In an appropriate context, they can mobilise public activity as well as social integration around an idea or against a common threat. When none of these conditions are present however, the reconstruction process is likely to fail because the external agents would not have a counterpart in their efforts aimed at establishing lasting peace and economic stability.

The formulation of a new social contract and the recognition of its principles by all members of the political unit emerging from a violent conflict, can take place only if there are conditions creating an integrative environment and enabling the post-conflict reconstruction of social cohesion and capital. One of the most important preconditions in this respect is the containment of any identity politics based on exclusion or on different rules from the agreed. De-politicisation of cultural identities can occur if there are conditions that motivate and support the identity transformation. Strong state institutions promoting inclusive national affiliation and universal citizenship laws are also crucial for diminishing the political relevance of any cultural background. In other words, the rules of political participation and allocation of resources are underlying any demographic and economic stability, as well as the power-balance (Crawford 1998b).

Strong state institutions can counteract any possible efforts by political entrepreneurs to use cultural origin as a resource for developing forms of exclusive nationalism and for inciting communal conflicts, by promising benefits in exchange for supporters’ ‘loyalty’. In addition to the institutional factors that can weaken the political relevance of cultural identities, an integrative political system can foster national allegiances through welfare programmes, upholding of legal equality and equal economic opportunities. Political will, justice and human rights, and media support are among the most important success factors for achieving an integrative post-conflict environment. This perspective emphasises that social capital can be fostered by focusing on socially owned forms, such as education, health, or technology-transfer services (Colletta et al. 1998:9). On the other hand, a lack of such factors can seriously hamper the efforts to rebuild trust among civil society and other institutions.

Co-operation between state and civil society actors in building and maintaining synergetic relations, and between the local and international organisations provide

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142 In Germany the Constitution obliges the state to protect individual rights of residents regardless to their citizenship (Crawford 1998b)

143 Development intervention is not likely to be efficient if it is not supported by respective political processes. Examples for this interconnectedness can be spotted in the cases of the reoccurrence of violence in 1994 in the West Bank and Gaza, after the launch of the peace process in 1993; the complication of the rebuilding of civil society due to the human rights and justice issues in Post-genocide Rwanda (1994); the negative role that media can play during a reconstruction period, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even after the Dayton Peace Accord, the media continued to operate as it had during the conflict, fuelling tensions and posed a potential threat to rehabilitation and the restoration of social capital (Colletta, Cullen & Forman 1998:10)
fruitful grounds for social capital accumulation. Building and reinforcing the capacity of local membership groups and organisations along with building support linkages beyond and above the community are crucial for the process of restoring the war-damaged societal structure (Carroll 2001).

Developing further these conceptions, Reychler (1999) explains the differences in the peace-development processes with differences in the installation of the peace-building blocks. The prevailing conceptual framework of the peace-building practice of the international community tends to neglect ‘subjective’ issues such as reconciliation, political commitment, and trust building and to put the emphasis on the installing of peace structures and institutions (Reychler 2002:3). To establish an integrative post-conflict environment, reconstruction efforts should be directed six different areas (Reychler 2002). These are:

1. Human security – subjective feelings of security as opposed of the objective threats or feelings of insecurity
2. Reconciliation
3. Political commitment – promoting multiple loyalties and inclusiveness as opposed to the exclusive loyalties and ‘we’ versus ‘they’ structures
4. Senti-mental walls – identified, lowered or dismantled, which enables mindsets to open up
5. Social capital – feelings that one can trust others, willingness to cooperate as opposed to the distrust and lack of will for co-operation
6. Future perspectives – hope and expectations for common future as opposed to defeatism and despair

An important factor for the establishment of integrative post-conflict environment is the political commitment to promote the idea of ‘unity in diversity’, i.e. tolerance towards views, opinions, and convictions, which after ethnic conflict is particularly low. Promoting multiple loyalties and instrumental attachments that differ at the different levels can eventually enable the development of an overall feeling of togetherness and of inclusive membership and hence it can have a positive effects on the peace process (Reychler 2002). Overcoming the exclusive affiliations and any negative stereotypes that inhibit the development of overlapping loyalties is therefore crucial for enabling (re)integration. The reconstruction process should therefore aim at promoting mutually compatible and reinforcing identities and fostering the development of an overarching common identity despite the limited interethnic interaction. Reychler (2002) identifies education, sport, and culture as crucial factors for enabling and aiding a nation building process. The most important however are the legislative and political structures that can entail collective rights and freedoms, and cultivate respect for different religious, linguistic, social, and political identities.

The establishment of an integrative environment is also dependant on the ability of individuals to overcome negative stereotypes and prejudices related to ‘the others’, reconcile with the past and coexist with the former enemies. The process of demolishing the senti-mental walls, using Reychler’s terminology, is not an

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144 According to Reychler, peace-building block are for example: quality of negotiation, consolidation of democracy, security arrangements, external support, focusing his attention on the integrative nature of the political psychological climate (Reychler 2002).
easy task, because such exist not only in victims and offenders, but also in actors like third parties or analysts. According to Reychler, the concept of senti-mental walls ranges from perceptions and expectations to strategic analyses, values, and social psychological pressures. Despite their variety and the differences, they all have the same negative effect, impeding the sustainable peace-building.

Overcoming mental barriers is a prerequisite for re-constructing trust and reciprocity of material and non-material exchanges, which is crucial for enabling coexistence and co-operation among members of the war-traumatised society. Hope-rising mechanisms are vital for achieving a positive change. Activating the ‘anticipatory principle’ could enable the emergence of this affirmative basis of organising (Reychler 2002:8).

Among the most important resource for generating constructive organisational change or improvement however is the individuals’ vision and expectations about the future. The prospects for an attractive common future can guide persons and organisations, as well as mobilise support and/or action. The establishment of an integrative environment could not happen if individuals do not perceive themselves as members of a single society with compatible visions and interest in the common living.

Bringing people together after experienced violence and making them interact and cooperate for achieving a better future is a difficult task and quite often an impediment to many reconstruction efforts. The process of (re-)establishing social cohesion and generating social capital is a challenge, but ignoring its importance may have many negative consequences, especially in the context of post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction. The next section will attempt to sketch the areas, which should be addressed by reconstruction programmes for societies divided along ethnic, cultural, or other non-disputable lines of separation. These areas have been identified on the basis of the indicators that theorists use for measuring social capital because having the capacity to reveal the quantity or quality of accumulated social capital they provide a solid basis for identification of the respective programme goals.

While some authors believe that social capital, determined by historical factors and a by-product of other activities, cannot increase in the short term (Putnam et al. 1993, Schmid 2000, Dekker & Uslaner 2001), others insist that governmental, non-governmental organisations and other local and external civil society actors can contribute to its accumulation (Cernea 1993; Huntoon 2001; Mondal 2000). In pursuit of the latter opinion, some possible social capital building mechanisms are outlined below. The dimensions of social capital reveal several focal areas.

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145 Reychler (2002:13) points out that different actors is likely to be burdened by different ‘senti-mental’ walls, as for example: ‘Victims’ (despair, pluralistic ignorance, political ineffectacy), ‘Offenders’ (historical falsification, stereotyping, indifference, preference falsification and pluralistic ignorance), ‘Third parties’ (neutralism, passivity, non-intervention, cultural arrogance), ‘Analysts’ (one-dimensional approach, elitist/biased analysis, wrong assessment of future developments)

146 While Woolcock (1998) distinguishes four dimensions within his conceptual framework of social capital, Onyx and Bullen (2001) identify eight. Approaching the problem from another perspective, Dekker & Uslaner (2001) stress that social capital components need to be treated as multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional.
### Table 6: Institutional Manifestations of Social Capital

(ADB 2001, adapted from Carroll 2001:32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Social Capital Entity</th>
<th>Post-ethnic-conflict measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projects &amp; programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Common Property Resource Management</td>
<td>Irrigation associations, Water user groups, Forest protection committees</td>
<td>Objective and transparent management of resources based on formal (non-ethnic) principles for distribution of resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micro-enterprise credit programs</td>
<td>Association of producers, village committees</td>
<td>Stimulation of multi-ethnic enterprises and initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal sector support</td>
<td>Association of vendors and merchants</td>
<td>Support for supra-ethnic or cross-cutting initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational programs</td>
<td>Community organisations, parents associations, religious groups, family groups</td>
<td>Unified curriculum: to develop a common knowledge base, promote tolerance, reconciliation, overarching civil identities and principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child care and nutrition</td>
<td>Mother groups, Women groups</td>
<td>Policies avoiding any differentiation on ethnic basis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban development</td>
<td>Urban neighbourhood groups</td>
<td>Interest and civil groups to crosscut ethnic communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural/rural development</td>
<td>Cooperatives, farmers producers associations, women groups, tribal groups</td>
<td>Support to interest –based cooperation; promotion of larger inclusive associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Environmental groups</td>
<td>Protection of the ‘common’ goods and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial market, information networks</td>
<td>Trust, honour code, watch dog groups, board of traders/financial planners</td>
<td>Formal &amp; transparent rules, objectivity of information, enabling inter-communal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity market</td>
<td>Trust, honour code, ‘watch dog’ and consumer groups</td>
<td>Enabling of single market; customers protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Trust, honour code</td>
<td>Guaranteed common trade rules, free access to markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-political action</td>
<td>Socio-political organisations in the non-profit sector</td>
<td>Enabling and stimulating cross-cutting and inter-community cooperation and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional groupings</td>
<td>Political party groupings</td>
<td>Support for non-ethnic parties, formal associations with overarching platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency through information</td>
<td>Disclosure groupings, press overseeing groups</td>
<td>Enabling reconciliation and trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>Association of lawyers, self-regulating boards</td>
<td>Non-discriminative legal system with emphasis on the civil rights; punish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identifying the different dimensions of social capital and their main components is a precondition for proper designing of policies and programmes that correspond to specific societal conditions and needs. Table 6 (adapted from ADB 2001) lists the areas considered essential for social capital building and the respective social entities at micro-, meso- and macro-level, functioning as sources of social capital. Furthermore, it reveals that social capital has direct implications not only at
micro-level, but also for the market and governance macro-frameworks\textsuperscript{147}. Capacity building efforts however are likely to be more successful if local social capital entities are engaged not only to support the processes, but also to take over the ownership of any planned initiatives. The last column presents some measures and basic principles that could contribute to reconstruction of social capital in a post-ethnic conflict context.

Although developed within a different context, the Policy Research Initiative project (PRI 2003), provides an example for approaching social capital building at the targeted levels defined here as \textit{individual}, \textit{community} or \textit{national}. While on the first level the programmes provide supports directly the individuals, at the community level the focus is placed on the establishment of various information networks, and on the national level – on civic education programmes, citizen forums, national volunteering or civic engagement initiatives.

The great number of existing approaches and measures obstructs the possibility for a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of policies in place. However, projects that fail to consider the importance of building links among people and among communities, and focus only on meeting certain imminent needs, can easily reinforce societal exclusion and deprivation (PRI 2003, Campbell & McLean 2001).

\textbf{2.3 Including social capital into public policy - strategies for integration}

When shaping the structure of peace-building interventions, the nature of conflict that needs to become a basis for designing the relief, reconstruction, and reconciliation policies and programmes. The analysis of conflict and the related coping mechanisms map extant social capital relations and the types of social capital that may need to be encouraged or discouraged (Colletta & Cullen 2000:85)

Promoting and increasing civic participation, relationship between civil society and government, and evolution of democratic institutions, depend on the efforts to help people re-connect and/or to remain bonded by formal or informal social contracts. The PRI findings (2003) once again emphasise that there is an explicit need for policies to encourage a right balance of bonding with bridging and linking forms of social capital and for activities that at least do not harm any functioning social networks and norms. Building programmes and projects over existing forms of social capital can maximise the expected positive outcomes. The PRI (2003) identifies several dimensions that intervention programmes usually address. These are:

- Development or mobilisation of social networks, social support structures, and local associations
- Strengthening of ties among existing communities and social institutions/organisations
- Promotion of civic engagement (volunteering, civic participation)

\textsuperscript{147} Trust and honour code can play a significant role in number of market operations, while groups with high levels of social capital can easily make impact on governance.
Development or access to information channels and links with political or economic power brokers and institutions

Apart from these areas, seen as fruitful grounds for establishing and launching mechanisms for social integration, pillars of common living are also the institutions of media, education, sport, culture. Politics and economy can also play a positive role for social capital building, especially when they address shared problems and raise interest in the common future.

Essential in post-war reconstruction are the collaborative efforts of international and local actors targeting the specific needs of a war-torn society. Reconstruction of economic, governmental, legal, and business structures should support the rebuilding of socially owned forms of capital like education, health, and technology-transfer services. Strengthening of social institutions and civil society and increasing citizen participation in reconstruction processes appear as important as the existence of a strong and legitimate government. Furthermore, any reconstruction of the judicial system must ensure the legal rights of the citizens, while investments in community should support the development of strong local ownership. To prevent tensions within a society emerging from conflict, it is necessary that all groups (especially the vulnerable ones) are included in the distribution of the emergency assistance (Colletta, Cullen & Mendelson-Forman 1998).

The process of incorporating the concept of social capital into developmental policies and interventions also requires particular attention. Woolcock & Narayan (2000:242-243) make explicit recommendations that emphasise the key steps in this process. First, it is the identification of the range of stakeholders and their interrelations. Proposed policy interventions and the way they affect power and political interests as well as the potential for dominant groups to mobilise, also require attention. The information disclosure policies can encourage informed citizenship and accountability of both private and public actors who purport to serve the public good. Then, it is crucial that improvements in physical access and modern communications technology complement social face-to-face interaction, because they can foster information exchange across social groups. Lastly, social capital should be seen as a component of conventional development projects. Where communities have direct input into the design, implementation, and management of projects, returns on investments and the sustainability of processes are enhanced (Woolcock 2000).

As it was emphasised already, in the light of the context-dependent reconstruction programmes, a universal success-formula appears unfeasible. However, there are certain key elements and processes that can serve as pillars of any plan for reconstruction of a war-torn society. To design a strategy-construct, first it is essential to look at the mechanisms that can enable the creation of social capital. According to Soubeyran & Weber 2002, repeated exchange and face-to-face contacts, facilitated by geographic proximity, are a precondition for (re-)building of social capital. Active and willing engagement of citizens within a participative community and the outsourcing by government are considered crucial factors respectively by Onyx & Bullen (2000a, 2001), by Lowndes & Wilson (2001). Warner (1999, 2001) points out that local government can create local social capital through community-based interventions. Non-intimate and non-exclusive
groups enable the key social dynamics for building social capital to occur (Cox & Caldwell 2000).

Durston presents five key hypotheses about building social capital (Durston 1998:22), according to which:

1. ‘Reciprocity norms and practices exist in small groups everywhere. Co-operation and accountable leadership are part of most modern human cultures; iteration of trustful practices usually leads to co-operation.

2. Cultures contain contradictory repertoires; systemic change can come from culture or from social structure; removal or reduction of repression allows social capital to re-emerge; complex systems do not tend toward equilibrium but change constantly through co-evolution; path dependence lasts only until a new shock produces a transition phase.

3. Changes in national elites produce windows of opportunity for the emergence of local social capital; alliances with reformists in government open the way to social capital building.

4. Trust, co-operation, shared identity and reciprocity can be replicated among leaders to ‘scale up’ local social capital from small communities to the regional level.

5. Methodology and techniques for building social capital now exist that make possible the construction of social capital intentionally, rather than as a side-product or spontaneous experience.

Social capital is not a static construct, but a living system, open to changes and transformations, and to ‘interventions from outside’. Engineering of social capital can be successful, only if the process is planned and implemented with respect to cultural, social, and other specificities, and provided that submerged norms and practices of trust are engaged in the process (Durston 1998). According to Durston, favourable conditions of the changing environment should be used to promote and enable the resurgence of social capital. This also includes an awareness of any negative factors that might obstacle the process.

Analysing the various definitions of social capital and the respective units of measurement, theoretically deducted and/or empirically tested, there are certain elements that recur systematically in the process of social development, enabling social integration. These features are logically a basis for modelling the construct of a reconstruction strategy of social-capital, which must be limited only to the areas within which particular activities need to be planned and implemented.

Table 7: Target areas for Social Capital Development

(See next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENTS</th>
<th>MECHANISMS TO ENABLE SOCIAL CAPITAL (RE-)CONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>SOCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MACRO-STRUCTURAL (NATIONAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutions of state</td>
<td>• Transparent, accessible, and accountable national institutions</td>
<td>• Inter-ethnic relations regulated by formal/civil principles and rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule of law</td>
<td>• External assistance and support with respect to local needs</td>
<td>• Law and institutions safeguarding equality and non-discrimination; Civil rights and freedoms ensured; suppressed identity politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Justice and security for all</td>
<td>• Fair distribution of resources on formal (non-ethnic) principles</td>
<td>• Enabled economic &amp; social development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fair distribution of resources on formal (non-ethnic) principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MACRO-COGNITIVE (NATIONAL LEVEL BONDING TIES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Governance</td>
<td>• Implementation of democratic practices and values - equal access to power &amp; services, fair distribution of resources, political representation; development of state-community relationships</td>
<td>• Trust in state institutions and support for governmental policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democratic institutions: inclusive citizenship, participation rules, etc.</td>
<td>• De-politisation of ethnic/cultural differences</td>
<td>• Active participation in elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inclusive politics</td>
<td>• National educational policy (common curriculum); National communication, media &amp; information policy; 'National' sport events</td>
<td>• Objective &amp; supportive to integration media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Common knowledge base &amp; value system</td>
<td>• National reconciliation policy</td>
<td>• Common knowledge &amp; value base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Overcoming of prejudices and hatreds, opening of mindsets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconciling with the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Visions for common future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MICRO-STRUCTURAL (LOCAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local institutions</td>
<td>• Community development in line with inclusive national agenda - non-discriminatory politics, integrative practices, non-discriminatory policies, transparent &amp; accessible institutions; equal distribution of resources</td>
<td>• Raising trust in local institutions &amp; in the state in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local level networks &amp; associations</td>
<td>• Participation in local governance open to all communities</td>
<td>• Interaction and communication within &amp; between communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for local, supra-ethnic initiatives solving community problems</td>
<td>• Development of supra-ethnic bridging ties &amp; cross-cutting relations &amp; interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for inter-communal cooperation &amp; interaction</td>
<td>• Community problems becoming individual concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to formal associations, interest groups, inter-community networks and groupings</td>
<td>• Transfer of ownership of processes, activities, and responsibilities - active citizenship enabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of nested identities &amp; multiple loyalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MICRO-COGNITIVE (LOCAL LEVEL BONDING TIES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trust, values &amp; norms</td>
<td>• Civil social contract recognised by all (equality &amp; rights) - new values &amp; norms introduced through existing networks; promotion of inclusive national identities (supportive media)</td>
<td>• (Re)construction of citizenship and civil affiliations; empowerment of individuals as citizens – feeling for control over the institutions &amp; of security; motivated participation in public processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relations, attitudes, stereotypes &amp; prejudices</td>
<td>• Interaction between groups; inter-group &amp; inter-cultural communication</td>
<td>• Community feelings developed (affiliation with larger/national community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Will for cooperation</td>
<td>• Identification of common interests and problems; involvement into reconstruction practices; transfer of ownership of processes; incentives for common future – e.g. membership in international organisations,</td>
<td>• (Re-)emergence of trust &amp; will for cooperation, of tolerance and respect for diversity; overcoming of negative stereotypes &amp; prejudices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual self-perception: affiliation with a supra-ethnic national community, active citizenship, Multiple nested identities</td>
<td>• Reconciliation programs</td>
<td>• Creation of ‘nested’ identities &amp; multiple loyalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “shaping the future”</td>
<td>• Creation of community (nation) feelings through sport/culture/others</td>
<td>• Will for integration and cooperation, personal involvement with common problems &amp; future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Education – common knowledge base, overcome prejudices, open mindsets</td>
<td>• Individual appeasement with the past; overcoming trauma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration and networking programs for youngsters</td>
<td>• Interaction and development of trust among the youngsters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developing a strategic model for post-conflict reconstruction of social cohesion and social capital within a fragmented society requires a relevant definition. Table 6 presents the areas, within which the post-conflict policies and programmes (aiming at creating enabling conditions for social integration) should plan, design, and eventually complete their activities. Following the prescription that social capital building can be more successful if the efforts are directed at improving its structure (Stone 2001), the first column presents the elements that constitute the very grid of the concept within each of the identified dimensions (macro-structural, macro-cognitive, micro-structural, and micro-cognitive). The second column looks at the mechanisms that can contribute to the reconstruction of the respective elements, while in the third column are given some provisional outcomes resulting from the implementation of the prescribed activities.

‘Shaping the future’ is the symbolic title of a very important component of social capital that is difficult to be defined as a ‘proper’ element. It refers to the capacity of society to enable the transfer of values and norms, of processes and practices to the future generations and to ensure their sustainability. This long-term process does not allow that immediate results are observed; ensuring sustainability of processes however, requires building up of structures that will provide environment and conditions for positive developments and practices.

The table above does not claim to present the full and only set of elements and strategies for generating social capital in the course of a post-conflict reconstruction process. It should rather be approached as a map for policy designers, who work towards developing of reconstruction programmes with focus on social integration and de-fragmentation. Although the models are not empirically tested as a set, they have been identified based on the field-reports, analyses and theoretical literature considered throughout this research.

Setting up a comprehensive post-conflict strategy for (re-)construction of social capital does not necessarily mean designing and implementing programmes that address simultaneously all of the identified elements. It is however important that there is awareness that the levels and processes are interdependent and that an element cannot exist in isolation. Therefore, a strategy needs not only to focus on a particular issue, but also to consider how it can be supported at the different levels and how it would affect them.

To achieve success reconstruction requires that minimum conditions form a more or less balanced structure of all the levels (micro/macro, cognitive/structural). As it becomes obvious, the most challenging level that has failed many programmes, is the micro-cognitive one. Although the existence/establishment of (minimum) supportive macro-structures and principles is a condition sine qua non, this is not enough. The very finest structures would collapse; the best political and social norms and practices would meet strong resistance and would degenerate into vicious forms, unless supported by motivated individuals, willing to participate and to cooperate for a better common future.

Focusing on the micro-cognitive dimension is an important strategic step, which unfortunately is often ‘left for later’ or performed in the format of complementary activity. A strategy for (re-)construction of social cohesion and capital should not
only make it a priority, but also should follow the logical sequence of actions, starting with:

1. Acquiring an understanding about the particular society and the conflict (so that policies, programmes and projects be designed and/or adapted accordingly)
2. Identifying the sectors/actors that are willing to cooperating and assess the possibilities for mobilisation of social networks, social support structures, and local associations
3. Identifying local (still existing or recently developed) mechanisms for generating social capital and integrating them into the programme-design
4. Motivating people to cooperate, to integrate, and to work for a better common future

The final requirement is crucial. Mechanisms for motivating people to reconcile with the past and forgive former enemies, to cope with trauma and to overcome hatreds would vary from one case to another. An essential role in the process of the development of the particular instruments to meet the identified needs play the international community. Its role for the (re-)construction of social capital will be briefly examined in the conclusion of this chapter.

3. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

Social capital reflects the goal-oriented will for co-operation that emerges within a social structure with recognised common rules, norms, and authority. This will stems from the relationships among the members of the social unit and thus it comes to existence mainly in action. Social capital in this perspective is a function of the totality of horizontal and vertical, formal and informal relationships and networks within a given social unit (macro-framework) which: 1/ determines the cost-benefit pattern of the achievement of common goals, and 2/ re-constitutes, updates and develops in the process of pursuing common goals. Social capital has no value per se, but as a tool, it enables people to achieve their common goals at minimal costs. Similarly to the other types of capital, the output (i.e. the effect of the common activities) serves as a basis for evaluation. These can be positive (societal good) or negative (the latter not necessarily being societal bads). Beneficiaries of social capital are both the individual community members and the social unit as a whole. Social capital requires investments, but it in contrast to the other types of capital it accumulates only when used.

Despite the numerous approaches to social capital, there is a common understanding that this social phenomenon facilitates collective action and achievement of desired outcomes. It has the capacity to motivate individuals to work together, because the end-result is seen not only as a ‘common good’, but also as a ‘personal benefit’. Having the potential to enable development and to assist in overcoming problems, social capital improves the quality of life. Social relations however do not exist in a political vacuum. Therefore, the nature and extent of the interactions between communities and institutions are determinants of the prospects for development in a given society and for the opportunities for
mobilising growth-enhancing resources, provided by the social relations discussed (Woolcock & Narayan 2000:243).

The lack of agreement on concepts, terminology, and measures, impedes the assessment of the effectiveness of social capital policies. On the other hand, theorists agree that social capital is the factor that determines the success of interventions aiming at improving social and economic outcomes for individuals and communities (PRI 2003). Addressing social capital from diverse perspectives, all the approaches outline the importance of social engagement and social ties. Examining the problem of co-operation through collective action, participation, or social networks, however has direct implications for public policy.

Policy designers need to be aware that not all forms of social capital are beneficial. This implies that the possible effects should be considered prior to undertaking any actions to maximising them. Instead of bridging people and improving their lives, ill-planed community development programmes might result in reinforced exclusion and deprivation by isolating participants. Among the examples are labour market and social security policies that fail to recognise the importance of informal networks, or policies that does not provide the right balance between bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital (Levesque & White 2001).

In the context of the post-ethnic-conflict, the reconstruction of social capital is the engine that has the capacity to power all the other processes of physical, economic, or human capital rebuilding. Within a war-traumatised and ethnically fractured society however, setting the principles of a new social contract is a crucial point, but definitely not enough for achieving social cohesion and for accumulating social capital. After recognising the importance of early addressing the problem of de-fragmentation of society and supra-ethnic integration, reconstruction agents need to address the imbalanced social capital structure. Development programmes and projects have to pay attention to the possibilities for bringing people back and for motivating them to be willing to cooperate for the common good. Social capital can be accumulated at different levels and in various forms. Positive effects on society could be achieved only if the micro-, meso- and macro-levels are in dynamic and coherent interaction and of a matching scope. Existing institutional arrangements should also be considered when designing interventions (PRI 2003). ‘Well-directed efforts to help people remain connected are likely to become more important than ever, particularly in light of the potential implications for civic participation, the relationship between civil society and government, and the evolution of democratic institutions’ (PRI 2003:51).

Outlining the basic requirements for a post-conflict social capital reconstruction, the role of the external support appears essential for the success of the process in general. Unfortunately, the international community has approached this key role mostly in the form of financial contribution to the reconstruction of different types of physical and social infrastructures and have left the issue of societal integration aside. In the few cases of demonstrated interest in fostering integration and inter-group dialogue, the adopted approaches have not been very different from placing conditions on societies or threatening them with sanctions.
The conflict-prevention agenda has recognised that economic sanctions and embargoes are not always the best solution to the political problems. It affirms that reconciliation is not possible without justice, that institution building is an important element both within government and civil society, and that the media has enormous potential to influence attitudes and behaviour and thus to play a positive or negative role in civil society building (Colletta, Cullen & Forman 1998). Despite outlining the importance of addressing these areas, it seems that there is no consent about the post-conflict reconstruction of the societal links that have been damaged during the experienced violent (ethnic) struggles.

Building up structures on meso- and macro-level is a necessary action in the reconstruction process, but it cannot be successful if it lacks the stable basis of a respective micro-level. The micro-level of shared values, attitudes, relationships, trust, etc. cannot be imported, nor transformed instantly or imposed from outside. It should be nourished and enabled to emerge and develop. In a post-ethnic-conflict situation, it is quite likely that it is impossible to rehabilitate a previously existing social capital; hence, a new one needs to be constructed. In support of the statement that reconstruction appears dependent on the micro-level, are the evidences indicating that the size and density of social networks and institutions, and the nature of interpersonal interactions, significantly affects the efficiency and sustainability of development programmes (IRIS, Social Capital Initiative).

Unfortunately, as the authors point out, donors’ ‘resources are usually allocated to large scale reconstruction efforts and only fewer to developing new models for rebuilding institutions or providing for community rehabilitation’ (Colletta, Cullen & Forman 1998:13). The same negative effects on development might have any involvement, which has not been planned with respect to the needs of the particular environment. Yet in 1997, Simpson criticised the UN involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of ‘how NOT to reconstruct a society’ (Simpson 1997).

Contrary to the declared aims of the UN involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, defined in terms of bringing the people together and ensuring a decent level of welfare on all sides, an effective dividing wall was put up by the military shield to keep warring factions apart. People were forced to survive on the external aid, rather than on their own productive labour. According to the author, hardly anywhere the ‘assistance in the process of rebuilding social relations, bringing people together, breaking down the barriers and prejudice which had played such a part in generating social conflict in the first place’ (Simpson 1997). The internationally brokered peace agreement has in fact effectively consolidated the gains made through war. As a result, the constitutional arrangements cemented ethnicity as the organising principle of the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Balkans in general. No war had achieved this before. Instead of bringing integration, federalism consolidated the regional power bases and opened the route to ethnic segregation.

As it has been emphasised by the text above, a successful reconstruction of a post-conflict state that aims at introducing lasting peace and sustainable development,

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148 Simpson gives the absurd example that in one village the ‘shield’ had separated the saw-mill from the woods: the result was that both sides were unemployed (Simpson 1997)
must recognise in the first place that societal (re-)construction is as important as any other area for rebuilding. Then the involvement should follow the same steps as of any project-management cycle:

- Needs assessment of the situation
- Strategic planning and designing of programmes and actions
- Implementation of the planned activities
- Monitoring and adjustment of the programmes
- Managing the processes directly and gradually shifting to a control from a distance in order to enable the transfer of ownership
- Motivating local participation and support through promoting reconciliation and developing the pragmatic solidarity (in Bourdieu’s terms)
During the 20th century, post-conflict reconstruction evolved as a concept, merging the international (moral) obligation to the war-affected societies with the conflict-prevention mechanisms. Arguing that a precondition for the successful achievement of the reconstruction goals is an adequate response to country-specific conditions, the research focused on the context that an ethnic conflict creates. In the attempt to establish clearer frameworks for the post-ethnic-conflict environment, a model for assessment was developed upon existing theories of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. Destruction of social capital at the level of state, fragmentation of society along ethnic lines and ‘replacement’ of citizens with ethnic-community members, were identified as some of the most distinctive outcomes of the armed ethnic struggles. Therefore, focusing on the phenomenon of social capital, its role, and its potential to contribute for positive changes, the first part of the research outlined several areas and mechanisms that could enable the (re-)construction of social capital.

The next two chapters will address the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict that emerged in 1995 is widely known as ‘ethnic’. Nevertheless, in order to verify that the reconstruction, running in the country since 1996, has faced the challenges of a post-ethnic-conflict environment, the conflict will be assessed through the model developed in Chapter 2. Thereafter, the focus will fall on the reconstruction practices and achievements with special attention to the programmes and projects targeting the rebuilding of social capital at the level of state, i.e. on a multi-ethnic basis. In an attempt to identify and study the post-conflict reconstruction of social capital, a fieldwork was carried out. The findings presented at the end of this chapter reveal not only the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, but also the levels of success of the reconstruction process and programmes in general.


The goal of this research, as stated in the initial chapter, is to open a discussion about the key factors that can enable success of post-conflict and post-ethnic conflict reconstruction. Therefore, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was assessed in order to verify and to illustrate the theoretical model introduced.

Several factors determined the selection of the case study. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has experienced one of the most devastating wars in the recent (Post-Cold War) history of the world. After the military NATO intervention and political pressure from the international community, the country emerged from a three-year war, with heavily damaged physical and human capital, ruined
economy and infrastructures and a population divided into three mutually hostile communities. From the first day of its existence as an independent country (after the end of the war in 1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina was dependent on foreign assistance and for the years since, it has become a testing ground for policies and practices (McMahon 2004, Chandler 2007).

Thus, this is a case of a reconstruction process that started after the ceasefire and the signing of the formal peace agreement in Dayton. Furthermore, various organisations, institutions, international and national structures and countries have taken part and still are playing a role in the rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The great number of programmes and initiatives and the substantial financial support should have contributed to the fast recovery of the country, yet this has not been the case. Before attempting to assess the situation and to explore the reconstruction policies of the international community through some of its representative structures, it is necessary to verify that the 1992-1995 conflict qualifies as ethnic in terms of the definition adopted by the research. For this purpose, the empirical data will be considered in the light of the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2.

1.1 Conflict context

To understand the developments that have led to the outburst of the Bosnian conflict, it is necessary to look at the preconditions as well as the local and international triggers. In its history of existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been an independent state only for about 150 years (1377-1527). Since the Middle ages, it has been a part of the territories of Serbia, the Byzantine Empire, Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Yugoslavia; as such, it has grown as a multicultural political unit. Thus the multicultural and multi-religious society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite its long-standing traditions for peaceful existence, has provided a fruitful ground for political entrepreneurs to exploit the ethnic and religious differences for their own purposes.

Referring to Bosnia as “multicultural” requires outlining that this widely used notion should not be applied directly in its Western-style format, emerging from the theoretical frameworks of Taylor (1994), May (1999), Kimlicka (1995; 2002). Pointing at the historically, socio-politically and culturally determined differences between the East and the West ideas underlying multiculturalism, Kimlicka argues that countries of post-communist Europe “have been pressured to adopt Western standards or models of multiculturalism and minority rights” (2002:1). The two main principles of the Western multiculturalism 1/accommodating sub-state nationalisms through regional autonomy and official language rights and 2/ ensuring that indigenous peoples would be able to sustain themselves as distinct societies, emerged as challenging the nature of the state-group relations in Eastern and Central Europe, where state-minorities have been regarded as ‘disloyal’ and a risk to the state and to the security. Therefore they have been ‘securitised’ over the course of the years (2002:20).

Taking into account the differences in the underlying principles, the legal implications and the political charge of the term, it is important to point out that although Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a multi-ethnic unit, it should
not be referred to as ‘multicultural’ without first defining the term. The vision of a future ‘multicultural Bosnia’ corresponds more closely to the Western standards, despite the arguments and the evidences that this might not be an achievable goal due to the same regional characteristics.

The research has accepted that the despite being widely accepted, the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ has a dual nature and that a degree of attention is needed when used. Since the leading agents of the reconstruction process are the Western democracies, the plans for a future ‘multicultural Bosnia’ build over the Western perspective. ‘Multicultural Bosnia from before the war’ however has not been a country of minorities enjoying equal rights, but of people (individuals) of different identity backgrounds, accustomed to the diversity to a degree of ignoring it and even of projecting it over one’s self. Evidences for this emerge both from the literature (the switching identities ‘Spaho-case’ (Purivatra 1974:399-400)) and from the fieldwork interviews (Puljić in interview with the Author, 08.04.2009). Nevertheless, the existence of multicultural society in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the 1992-war, should be addressed carefully due to the lack of studies and data about the intensity and the quality of inter-ethnic relations.

As it was discussed in the previous chapters, identity differences become politically relevant only when they are associated with possibilities for acquisition of political and/or economic gains. In this context, the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution that divided the country into six Republics, each given the possibility for self-determination, the unequal economic development and the mechanisms for distribution of resources, wealth and power, should be taken into account when discussing the preconditions for the accumulation of pre-war ethnic charge. In the early 1990s, however, some immediate local and international triggers played an important role for raising the tensions to the extremes.

The collapse of the communist system and the end of the Cold War opened the possibility for a number of nations to overthrow the imposed political, economic and cultural dominance. This wave of change in the late 1980s and early 1990s was unconditionally supported by the liberal-democratic nation states, advocating peoples’ right to self-determination, liberal market, democracy and human rights. The western ‘democracy and free market’ ideology that justified the intervention in local affairs, in the case of Yugoslavia clashed with some nationalistic and other perspectives (Treanor 2002).

Pursuing their geopolitical goals and in support of the vision that democracy and a free market were the greatest benefits that the previously oppressed nations could now enjoy, the NATO countries supported the separatist movements in Slovenia and Croatia, setting in this way a precedent. The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia probably could have been avoided, if the mosaic ethnic and religious structure of the region and the existing strong nationalist feelings had been taken into account. The international community blinded by the opened possibility to support these socio-economic and political transformations, omitted to recognise

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149 In addition to the six Republics there were also two autonomous regions established

150 The WB report of 1997 emphases that the focus should fall on the establishment of a ‘viable institutional structure for effective and countrywide governance, as outlined in the Dayton Agreement, and on undertaking the key structural reforms for transforming the old socialist economic structure into a new, market-based economy.’ (WB 1997:xii)
the complexity of the issue. The lack of appropriate (re-)actions during the initial years of war over the territories of ex-Yugoslavia supports such conclusions. While the view that the re-make of the world was a moral crusade of the liberal market-democracies (Treanor 2002) is provocative, the fact is that the international politics of the early 1990s contributed significantly to the development of the processes in Yugoslavia.

As far as the local triggers were concerned, the termination of the war in Croatia without actually resolving the problems that had provoked it in the first place appears an immediate factor. In addition, plenty of weapons remained in the hands of the locals. Thus, the transfer of warfare to another territory of concentrated Serbian and Croatian population, not controlled by external forces, was a rather logical consequence. Factors such as emerging secessionist movements, economic crisis, power struggles between the Republics and their leaders, or intensified security dilemmas, also contributed to the outburst of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.

**1.2 Conflict agents**

Indicators for the occurring ethnic disintegration in pre-war Bosnia could have been spotted as early as in the autumn of 1990, when after the collapse of communism, the multi-party system was restored and the first parliamentary elections took place. The Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union - the three largest nationalist parties in the country won the elections. The three highest positions of power in the country – the President (of the ex-Yugoslav Bosnian Republic), the Chairman of the Parliament and the Prime minister - were respectively divided between the Bosniak Alija Izetbegović, the Serb Momčilo Krajišnik, and the Croat Jure Pelivan. In the context of the collapse of the communist system, the rise of nationalist parties, and the power contest between the leaders of the (former socialist) republics, the activation of the ethnically based political cleavages contributed to a rise of tensions among communities. Fears and political ambitions additionally charged the situation, and even international efforts to provide solutions acceptable to all sides, such as the Carrington-Cutileiro plan for example, also remained void.

In October 1991, the Bosnian Serb representatives abandoned the central parliament in Sarajevo and formed the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In November, the Bosnian Croatian Democratic Union, a branch of the ruling party in the Republic of Croatia, proclaimed the existence of the

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151 The meeting between Milošević and Tudman in Karadordevo in March 1991 provoked fears that the two leaders plan a redistribution of the territory of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. The declarations for independence proclaimed by Slovenia and Croatia on 25th June 1991 and by the Republic of Macedonia in October 1991, provided incentives for the possibilities that the new realities could offer.

152 The Carrington-Cutileiro plan of the international community resulted from a conference held in September 1991. It proposed ethnic power sharing on all administrative levels and the devolution of central government to local ethnic communities. All the three sides accepted the plan and Alija Izetbegović signed it for the Bosniaks, Radovan Karadžić for the Serbs and Mate Boban for the Croats. However, the plan did not prevent the war from occurring.
territorial and political Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. In response, the Bosnian Serbs held a referendum and in January 1992 the Assembly announced the establishment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Declaring this referendum illegal and invalid, the central Bosnian government held another referendum in March 1992 on Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia. This referendum was largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade in turn declared the referendum unconstitutional and illegal.

‘The war was in the air...the elections were not the reason for the war, but a projection of the tensions at the time,’ was the comment on the pre-war situation offered by Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Law Faculty of the University of Sarajevo (Grebo 2003, personal discussion). Despite that there are different interpretations about which events should be considered the ‘the beginning' of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the spring of 1992, intensive attacks were taking place in the eastern and the northwest part of the country.

Table 8: Ethnic Composition of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Census 1991
(Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Yugoslavs</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>4,377,033</td>
<td>1,902,956</td>
<td>1,366,104</td>
<td>760,852</td>
<td>242,682</td>
<td>104,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures of the official census carried out in 1991 (Table 8), indicate that the pre-war composition of the population in the former socialist republic was 43.5% Muslims, 31.5% Serbs, 17.4% Croats, 5.5% Yugoslavs and 2.4% others. The religious affiliation of the largest group became a basis for ethnic self-determination exactly during the war of 1992-1995, when the community took the name Bosniak. Before the constitutional changes of 1974, when this population was given the official ‘national’ name Muslims, this community had been defined according to the activated context. The population was addressed as either Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith; during the World War 2, the Ustasha movement considered them exclusively Croats.

Discussing the conflict agents, it is important to mention another existing point of view, expressed by a British historian of Yugoslav origins, Marko Atila Hoare, commenting on the Research Documentary Centre – Sarajevo findings related to the deaths in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period 1991-1995 (published in 2007 and known as ‘Bosnia's Book of the Dead’). Hoare (Hoare 2008) emphasised that the presented figures of civilian casualties suggest that the war should not be considered as three-sided, but two-sided (Bosniaks vs. Serbs), within which there were some smaller-scale conflicts among the ranks of one of the two sides. Especially having in mind that the Bosnian Croat military (HVO) remained throughout the war, formally, a constituent part of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some forces (in the areas of Tuzla and Bihać for example) remained loyal to Sarajevo. Even if approaching the war as two-sided, the parameters elaborated in Chapter 2 suggest that the conflict agents would be
‘at least two parties determined along ethnic lines’, which indeed applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵³

1.3 Conflict frameworks

The outburst of conflict between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a logical stage step in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in the course of which ethnic communities were re-discovered and affirmed. The distribution of the Bosnian territory among the ethnic groups had become a conflict catalyst.

As it was pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of ethnic conflict implies that the cultural, socio-political, and/or economic affairs of a society become articulated in ethnic terms and in many cases, various aspects of the domestic status quo are challenged. In the case of the war in Bosnia, the proclamation of independence by the Bosnian Serbs in January 1992 put at risk the territorial integrity of the republic. From the point of view of Belgrade, the referendum held by the Bosnian government in March 1992 was also illegal and the proclaimed independence in its turn challenged the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The impossibility to achieve consensus on the power distribution within Yugoslavia and within the former republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to the implosion of both structures. Yugoslavia lost another part of its body, but Bosnia and Herzegovina also fell apart into two rather autonomous ethnically determined Entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska

Table 9: Casualty Figures According to the RDC Project Findings
(Source: RDC 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total 97,207</th>
<th>Civilians 39,684</th>
<th>Soldiers 57,523</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>64,036</td>
<td>65.88%</td>
<td>33,071</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>24,906</td>
<td>25.62%</td>
<td>4,075</td>
<td>10.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>7,788</td>
<td>8.01%</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The international dynamics and climate after the end of the Cold War contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but the fragmentation of the country, and later of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political entity, resulted from the actions of its citizens. The policy of ethnic cleansing applied throughout the country by the Serbian forces, and the responses from the opposite sides, resulted in large number of refugees and internally displaced people, estimated as exceeding 1.8 million people (RDC 2007). The findings of the project, completed in 2007 by the Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, also suggest that the real total

¹⁵³ The RDC (2007) figures indicate that the number of Croat victims is far behind the number of Bosniak and Serb victims, which allows that the war is considered two-sided. Furthermore, there are also evidences that in some areas the Croat-Bosniak union was preserved during the period of war. This however in fact emphasises that there were other (politically and rationally calculated) interests underlying the constituency of the parties in the conflict and not only the ethnic identification.
number of casualties is *minimum* 97,207 people (the breakdown by ethnicity is given in the table below).

As a result, the formation of large predominantly ethnically homogeneous regions changed the ethnic distribution within the country. The maps provided in *Figure 11* illustrate the ethnic composition and the ethnic distribution in Bosnia and Herzegovina before and after the war. It is important to mention that despite these maps being published officially by the Office of the High Representative, the estimates for the period after the end of the war, as well as those of today, are based exclusively on reports and surveys, carried out by various institutions and organisations. Vedrana Rebić, an officer from the National Statistical Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, confirmed in an interview that since 1991 (until July 2009), no official census has been carried out and the 1991 data are the only official data about the ethnic structure of the country (Rebić in interview with the Author; 21.05.2009).

*Figure 11: Ethnic Distribution in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1991 (census) and 1998 (estimates)*  
(Source: Office of the High Representative - OHR)

In 1993, the armed struggles occurring all over the territory of the country, forced the international intervention and the establishment of six ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Žepa and Bihać. Nevertheless, this did not prevent violence from happening, e.g. the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica. Apart from taking over more than 70% of the territory of the country, the Serbian forces performed some of the worst atrocities since the end of the World War 2. Ethnic cleansing, aiming at producing ‘clear’ ethnic areas, became the most prominent feature of the Bosnian war. Intimidation, forced expulsion and/or killing of undesired ethnic group, as well as destruction or
removal of places of worship, cemeteries and cultural and historical buildings were among the methods used for purifying the different parts of the country.

The main target of the ethnic cleansing, mass rape, psychological oppression, and genocide, was the Muslim (Bosniak) civil population. Nevertheless, during the three years of war, people from all three ethnic groups suffered violence and hostilities. No part of the country was spared from damages to the infrastructure, land, and properties. Even the areas with relatively homogeneous ethnic composition saw people from minority groups fleeing in fear for their lives (Kaufman 2001). According to the RDC findings (2007) more than 40% of the victims during the 1992-1995 war were civilians. These figures qualifies the Bosnian war as a ‘new war’ in Kaldor’s terms (1999).

Continuing exploring the parameters introduced by the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, throughout the years of conflict, armed struggles occurred over more than half the territory of the country (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The number of combatants or activists involved exceeds the suggested 15,000. As Massimo Moratti, a Legal Advisor for OSCE, revealed in an interview, the official data upon which the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war, indicate that about 264,500 soldiers fought on the side of the Bosnian Army while another 154,500 fought with Serbian forces (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). An UNDP survey from 2004 (Chapman, D. 2007), indicates that there were 353,000 legally registered weapons and half a million more estimated to be illegally held by 16% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The number of the potential or occasional combatants therefore should be considered much higher. Finally, the violence gradually transformed from isolated incidents in 1991 and clashes mostly between Serbs and Croats –which in the words of Alija Izetbegović was ‘not our war’ (Magaš, Žanić & Noel 2001:204) – into a series of heavy battles between Bosniak and Serbs, Bosniak and Croats and finally Bosniak and Croats forces vs. Serbs forces.

The outburst of systematic violence is usually seen as dating from the referendum on the proclaimed independence of the Bosnian state in 1992. As it was mentioned above, initially the clashes occurred between the local Serb and Croat population supported by the respective national armies. Yet for the first months of the war, the Serbs supported by the Yugoslav army occupied large territories in the eastern and in the north-western part of the former republic. Territories that were more ethnically homogeneous were spared from the armed clashes, but the non-Serb population was expelled; similarly, the Serb population of central Bosnia and Herzegovina migrated to the Serb-held areas. Although the Serbian National Army (SNA) and the Croatian Army (HVO) were actively involved in the struggles during the Bosnian war, the military actions did not spill over the other ex-Yugoslav territories.

After the failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan in 1993, which practically intended to divide the country into three ethnic parts, Bosniaks and Croats found themselves involved in struggles over the 30 percent of the territory they held at the time. Until February 1994, the Croat-Bosniak clashes dominated the warfare. With the signature of the cease-fire agreement in Zagreb, followed by the peace
agreement signed in March 1994, the war between the two ethnic groups ended officially and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established.

The peace agreement of 1994 reduced the conflicting parties to two. The allied Bosniak-Croat forces managed to take much of western Bosnia and Herzegovina and threatened the Serb positions, which provoked more hostilities from Serbian side. Eventually, after the massacres in Srebrenica and Markale, NATO took definitive actions towards putting an end to the war. After three years of armed struggles, only the international military intervention forced an official ceasefire. Pressured by the international community, Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Paris on 14 December 1995, which was finalised a week later in Dayton, Ohio.

Tensions however did not end and stability remained dependant on the presence and the actions of the international forces in the country. Incidents, cases of assaults and discrimination were reported even in 2003, as confirmed by Snejana Ivandić from the HRC: Balkan Human Rights Network, Sarajevo (Ivandić in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003). Despite the NATO-led mission of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina officially ended in December 2005, the NATO presence is still there – with Headquarters (HQ) in Sarajevo. Following the NATO decision to conclude its SFOR mission, on 2 December 2004 the European Union launched a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – Operation ALTHEA). The official Mission statement of EUFOR is that ‘Operation ALTHEA’s purpose is to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and thereby allow all EU and international community actors to carry out their responsibilities’ (EUFOR; http://www.euforbih.org). In summary, even if the international community does not it considers a ‘protracted conflict’, apparently it has taken into account the potential for reoccurrence of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1.4 Mobilisation structure and strategy

Examining the different levels of the mobilisation structure in their interaction can enable the outlining of a clearer picture of the processes and the events within the context of an ethnic conflict. The goal of this section is to look at the organisational, operational and at the ‘avalanche’ levels in order to reveal some of their major characteristics, without focusing on a detailed description.

Discussing the conflict agents and the frameworks of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several actors appear at the organisational (political) level. First, there is the Bosnian government, represented by Alija Izetbegović. Then, it would be logical to expect that the two other actors at this organisational level should be prominent politicians and leaders of respectively the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian Serb communities (especially having in mind that the Republica Srpska had been organised politically even before the outbreak of the violence in 1992).
However, the very fact that the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace, which put the end of the Bosnian war, was signed by the three leaders Milošević, Tudman and Izetbegović, indicates that the Serbian and the Croatian government were in fact the other two actors at the political level in the ethnic conflict in Bosnia.

At the operational (military) level, the situation was slightly different. Although the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) officially left Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1992, most of the people in command and high ranked officers joined the Army of Republica Srpska. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was organised with the proclamation of Herzeg-Bosnia for a Croatian territory. In the attempt to justify the largest group as the true Bosnian side in the conflict and to assemble a multi-ethnic pro-Bosnian defence front, President Izetbegović appointed a number of non-Bosniaks among the staff in command of the formed Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). In fact, around 25% of the army were non-Bosniaks. Apart from the armies under the direct command of the political leaders, various paramilitary units have taken part in the war. Nationalist parties of the neighbouring countries also provided support; number of volunteers joined these units (Table 10).

The religious element in the war activated additional international support for the fighting parties in the conflict. It is difficult to make a conclusion concerning the extent to which the Serb-supportive Slavic fighters from countries like Russia and Greece, or radical and Neo-Nazi Western fighters joining the Croatian forces, or the Islamic volunteers supporting the Bosniaks, were under the command of the respective political and military centres. The sole fact that these are known as paramilitary and not joining the regular armed forces of the opposing sides suggests the units were not exactly viewed as officially ‘belonging’ to sides. The fact that many war crime trials after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been held against members of different paramilitary units, gives a hint about the nature of the activities of these structures.

In order to explain better the emergence of the ‘avalanche’ effect as well as to outline the mobilisation strategy that in the views of researchers (Crawford 1998, Kaufman 2001) is typical of the process of gathering support in an ethnic conflict, it is necessary to look at the leader-mass relationships and in particular, at some of the mobilisation mechanisms used.

The Bosnian conflict can be viewed as the point of escalation of the accumulated ethnic myths and fears, hostilities, and security issues, especially during the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the myths are not harmful by themselves, but when employed by people (Duijzings 2007:142). Perceptions of the past played a great role in the interpretation of events during the war in Bosnia; historical allusions to explain and justify actions were largely used by politicians and military leaders. Duijzings (2007:143) points out that during a speech near the town of Bijeljina, just days before the attack on Srebrenica, General Ratko Mladić referred to the Battle of Kosovo of 1389. Later, when his troops entered Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, the event was presented as an act of revenge for the defeat suffered at the hands of the Turks during the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813). Revived myths fed into the living local memories of attacks or massacres carried out during 1992 and 1993 resulted in a desire for
vengeance, which in the views of Duijzings (2007) was one of the key factors contributing to the participation of local Serbs in the massacre of Srebrenica.

*Table 10: Mobilisation Structure of Combatants*

**Main source: Nation 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaders &amp; Commanders</th>
<th>Bosniaks</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alija Izetbegović</td>
<td>Dobrica Ćosić</td>
<td>Franjo Tudman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(President of BiH)</td>
<td>(President of FRY 1992-1993)</td>
<td>(President of Croatia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sefer Halilović</td>
<td>Zoran Lilić</td>
<td>Mate Boban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasim Delić</td>
<td>Slobodan Milošević</td>
<td>Mladen Petković</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Army chief of Staff 1993-1995)</td>
<td>(President of Serbia 1989-1997)</td>
<td>(HVO Chief of staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Jovan Divjak, Serb</td>
<td>Radovan Karadžić</td>
<td>Dario Kordić</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deputy commander of the BiH Army’s HQ)</td>
<td>(President of the Republika Srpska)</td>
<td>(political leader of Croats in Central Bosnia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Stjepan Šiber, Croat (Second deputy commander)</td>
<td>Ratko Mladić</td>
<td>Valentín Ćorić</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Blaž Kraljević, (Commander of the Croatian Defence Forces in Herzegovina, member of BiH Army’s HQ)</td>
<td>(Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska)</td>
<td>(commander of the military police in the HVO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobrica Ćosić</td>
<td>General Pereljakin</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(President of FRY 1992-1993)</td>
<td>(ex-commander of the UNPROFOR Russian contingent; adviser to the Serbian Army commander)</td>
<td>Serbian secret police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Forces</th>
<th>Army of the Republic of BiH (ARBiH)</th>
<th>Army of Republika Srpska</th>
<th>Croatian Defense Council (HVO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Corps in Sarajevo - non-Bosniaks; around 25% of the total number of the soldiers</td>
<td>Serb Herzegovina Corps Division in the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina</td>
<td>Croatian Army (HV)</td>
<td>Croatian Defence Forces (HOS; paramilitary group, organized by the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Corps - operating in Bosanska Krajina; cooperated with the HVO units in and around the city of Bihać</td>
<td>Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)</td>
<td>Croatian secret police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary &amp; civil defence groups:</td>
<td>Serbian secret police (not proven officially)</td>
<td>(not proven officially)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Patriotic League</td>
<td>Fighters, mercenaries &amp; volunteers from FRY and Russia (“Tsarist Wolves”, the Cossacks), Ukraine, Romania, Greece, Armenia, &amp; Bulgaria</td>
<td>Croatian 103rd (International) Infantry Brigade – British, Dutch, American, British, Polish, French, German, and Canadian volunteers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Territorial Defence</td>
<td>Paramilitary units from FRY</td>
<td>Garibaldi battalion (Italian unit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Zelene Beretke (Green Berets)</td>
<td>• White Eagles (Beli Orlovi)</td>
<td>Radical Western fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crni Labudovi (Black Swans)</td>
<td>• Arkan’s “Tigers”</td>
<td>Neo-Nazi volunteers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police formations</td>
<td>• Serbian Volunteer Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>from Germany and Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Volunteers: Mujahedins; citizens from Algeria, Egypt, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey</td>
<td>International brigade (in eastern Bosnia) - mostly of ex-Russian veteran soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporters from Al-Qaeda - not confirmed</td>
<td>Greek Volunteer Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Volunteers: Mujahedins; citizens from Algeria, Egypt, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporters from Al-Qaeda - not confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Revolutionary Guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While moving toward independence, Croats revived their World War 2-era symbols, which in turn provoked the reoccurrence of violence carried upon the Serbs under those banners. The mobilisation of the Serbs against the Muslim population was supported by stories about Jihad threat and killing lists (Kaufman 2001:3). The Serbian martyrdom in the name of defending the state and Christianity were re-evoked on different occasions. The emergence of armed Serb extremists on the other hand helped motivate the Bosnian Muslims also to push for independence. The vocabulary used to describe the enemy or the events was also symbolically charged and introduced to serve the propaganda goals (O'Shaughnessy 2004:139).

A special role for spreading these myths and fears was played by the media. Many of these propaganda mechanisms were revealed in the course of the Milošević trial. Covering the process in 2003, Judith Armatta reports the words of Nenad Pejić, a former Sarajevo TV programme controller that ‘without the media, and especially without television, war in the former Yugoslavia is inconceivable’ (Armatta 2003, online). Testimonies at the Milošević trial revealed that part of the propaganda campaign were clandestine actions like mining a soccer field or a water tower, which were then blamed on Croats. According to the expert report presented at the trial, official Serbian propaganda reached more than 3.5 million people every night, broadcasting fabricated conversations of Croat authorities addressing the Serb population or showing corpses and presenting them as if these were Serb victims of aggression (Armatta 2003).

Radio and television played a key role for spreading nationalism, for gathering support and maintaining the conflict. Recognising that fact, taking the electronic media in the country from the hands of the nationalists was among the first priorities of the OHR after the end of the war. Until the late 1990s, this was still an issue, evidence for which is provided by various reports on the media fuelling tensions and spurring propaganda (Hedges 1996).

Although without the potential to reach such a high number of people as the television or the radio, an essential feature of the printed media is that it can remain active for a longer period. Furthermore, it offers the possibility for different interpretations depending on the context. An interesting case is the first cover of a satirical magazine Novi Vox of the alternative youth movement in pre-war Sarajevo (Hoare 2008). The front-cover illustration of its issue No 3 from October 1991 shows a Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS officer of the ill-famous Handzar Division stepping on the decapitated and bloody heads of Serbian leaders, including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. The text says ‘The Handzar Division is ready!’ and ‘The Fourth Reich is coming – Welcome!’ (Figure 12)

More than a decade after the end of the conflict in Bosnia, two historians of ex-Yugoslav origins entered a tense discussion about the meaning of this

illustration and the purposes for its publication in 1991. This fact per se indicated that even an innocent or humouristic image, as this one is said to be, could be interpreted to serve a nationalist cause. In an environment of rising tensions and fears, things can acquire unexpected meaning or can be used for specific purposes and goals. Yet, if people today can re-invent the past based on an illustration, and if today such an illustration can provoke strong emotions, then it certainly could have played the same role in the past, especially if seen by eyes full of real fear. Not to mention that during the Bosnian war, real pictures from 1943 of the Yugoslavian Muslim ‘Handzar’ (Sword) division were used by the propaganda to recall them vs. us divisions established in the past.

Figure 12: Front Cover of the Satirical Magazine Novi Vox (Issue 3/Oct 1991)

By interpreting events through particular perspectives that inspire the rebirth of myths of ancient conflicts and stories of past injustice, the ‘initial mobilisation’ can fuel hostilities and raise the level of negative charge and hostile attitudes. Kaufman argues that even though applicable to a certain extent to the Yugoslav wars, the theory about the manipulative leaders that provoke ethnic conflicts is not overarching, because the manipulation tools would work only if there was a real or perceived conflict of interests and without this people have no reason to mobilise (Kaufman 2001:6).

During the Bosnian war, insecurity and extremist politics mutually reinforced each other in an escalatory spiral. In a conflict-charged environment, the first victims of violence already can transform the war into personal acts, releasing the ‘avalanche’. When people do not feel safe, when they realise that there is nobody to protect them but themselves, when they believe that justice is in their own hands a single spark could inflame the charge.

Hatred and desire for revenge are very difficult to overcome or suppress, especially in a no-control armed situation. In his book ‘Not my turn to die’, Savo Heleta (2007) reveals that it took him years to overcome the fury he felt against the Bosniaks as a people after the end of the war. Heleta also confessed that when a couple of months after the Dayton agreement he came face to face with the man who had terrorised his family in Goražde during the war: ‘I was 17, no longer the little boy who had to be a victim. Now I could fight back. I didn’t care about the consequences ... [my friend] understood my rage and wanted revenge too. His father had been killed in Goražde during the war’ (Heleta 2007:4). In a video testimony, Heleta adds: ‘I was 17 and I had a gun in my hands. I just wanted to kill the monster. Somehow my dad showed up. He said that I would go to jail and that he didn’t want to lose me. In the end I didn’t pull the trigger...’ (www.savoheleta.com). Imagine the ending of this story without the jail in focus.

1.5 Conflict goals and causes

Conflict mobilisation levels have different goals and are driven by different causes. From an organisational level, the conflict goals are more or less clear. In the Bosniak point of view, this was the right for self-determination and for the pursuing of a state, independent from Belgrade. The Serbian standpoint however is two-fold. On one hand, there was the Bosnian Serb community, claiming in its turn a right for self-determination. On the other hand, there was Belgrade that did not want to lose another part of the ex-Yugoslav territory. The Bosnian Croat leadership had also declared its power ambitions. These stands constituted the different views on the war, as the OSCE Legal advisor Massimo Moratti revealed in an interview (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). For the Serbs, it was a ‘civil war’, for the Croats a ‘liberation war’, and for the Bosniaks – an ‘act of aggression’. When the leadership did not manage to resolve the power disputes by peaceful means, the outburst of war became the logical development of the events.

Throughout the years of conflict the international community has made several attempts to resolve the disputes and to put an end to violence. After Alija Izetbegović rejected the initially accepted Carrington-Cutileiro plan (1992), none of the three other peace plans – of Vance-Owen (1993), Owen-Stoltenberg (1993) and the Contact Group (1994) – could make the three parties lay down arms, since in each one of them, at least one of the fighting parties felt underprivileged. The first plan apparently challenged Izetbegović to accept the power-sharing system. The rejection of the other peace plans is explicable – hardly any party would give up voluntarily the gains obtained through warfare, or would accept a loss. The political goals did not take into account the human suffering.

Supported by the respective military structures, the political leadership pursued the identified political goals. Approaching the conflict from the operational level, the situation appears slightly different. On one hand, the armies were formed to serve the political leadership. The appointed commandship of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) is an example of a political statement. The presence of ethnic Serbs and Croats in the headquarters and in the senior commanding staff of the ARBiH signified that this was the true Army of
the multicultural Bosnia, fighting to defend the Bosnian population and territory. Political reasons can be also detected behind the involvement of the armies of the neighbouring states of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

The activation of the religious element in the war and the support offered to all of the parties in the conflict by volunteers and paramilitary structures, some of which organised along the Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim lines, indicates another level of the power struggle. The inclusion of nationalist and extremist elements further complicates the picture. While ethnic cleansing in terms of ethnic redistribution of the territory can be put in political terms, the massacres, genocide, assaults, rapes, and extreme forms of violence can have a type of explanation (if any) only at this operational level, when Kaldor’s theory of the total war is applied. Humiliation, de-humanisation, extermination, and proofs of dominance of the powerful over the powerless are the tools used in the new-wars strategy to transform civilians into targets of violence that hardly any rationally calculated political goals of expected future benefits can justify.

In terms of the ‘avalanche’ effect, the ‘deserved punishment’ element could be considered the strongest one. In the words of Robert Block, describing how Bijelovac was put in flames by Muslims in December 1992, ‘the Serbs were suffering from a post-ethnic cleansing hangover: a violent backlash of revenge killings by Muslims which reflects the changing balance of the war’ (Block 1992). Exactly at this level, the security issues discussed by various theories of ethnic conflicts can be considered relevant. The collapse of the central institutions providing security to people and the immediate threat to their properties and lives, urged many to arm themselves and to organise the informal defence of their homes and families. In the words of the Muslim engineer Mirsad: ‘The army came to our homes in the night, shooting… My family fled the house but I stayed to try and protect it’ (Fisk 1992, online). In his book, Chuck Sudetic reveals that the authorities also exploited hatred, desire for revenge and hunger of refugees (Sudetic 1998). When Bosnian forces attacked surrounding Serb villages, the Muslim leaders left the impoverished refugees to fan out, killing Serb civilians and wounded soldiers and pillaging whatever food and supplies they could find.

The high number of small arms and light weapons in possession of civilians, years after the end of the war in Bosnia, was also indicative for the fact that people felt threatened and that they had to protect themselves. In an audio-testimony for the Imperial War Museum, Peter Caddick-Adams describes the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 when he joined the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). In his words weapons were easily available: ‘...Two or three machine guns (for ‘game-hunting’ only) per household is the norm, and hand grenades are five Deutschmarks each in the local market, next to the egg and watermelon stall’ (Caddick-Adams, P., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes - Online Exhibition: Bosnia, 2008). A pilot weapons collection project run by the UNDP in December 2006, offering rewards to civilians who handed over weapons collected 332 weapons and 4,900 rounds of ammunition (Chapman 2007).

The fear for personal life and the imminent threat that provokes hostile feelings and aggression emerges from the memories of Denis Abdić, who had grown up in a Bosnian town on the Border between Croatia and Bosnia. ‘…I never had any problems with Serbs or Croats…I only had problems with my next door neighbour
who decided to burn my house…’ (Abdić, D., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes - Online Exhibition: Bosnia, 2008). For Denis and many others, the war was not a war between institutions, but between neighbours, not for independence, but and for survival.

His statement suggests that the political reasons for war did not mean much to the common people. ‘There were about 100,000 people in the region [Bihać], whereas maybe 30,000... [didn’t] agree with the central government... ’ Forced to join the army, he had no idea what he was doing on the battle field. ‘I didn’t have a clue...somebody gave you a gun and you were supposed to shoot... ’ (Filipović, Z., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes - Online Exhibition: Bosnia, 2008).

Similar views – that ethnic problems had not existed on personal level before the outburst of war – appear from the memories of Savo Heleta about his childhood in the multiethnic Goražde (Heleta 2008). Supportive are also the comments from Zlata Filipović’s diary (Filipović 1994) about the sound of church bells intermingling with the muezzin coming from the mosques in pre-war Sarajevo. Recalling her experience from the siege of Sarajevo, Negra Arnautović shares: ‘We would all hide in the shelter to wait for the fire to stop... we all suffered without water, electricity, food...then the Serbs had to leave, because they were afraid of staying in Sarajevo...’ (Arnautović in interview with the Author, 17.07.2003)

1.6 Conflict outcomes and consequences

As it was introduced in the theoretical model, the most distinctive feature of the ethnic conflict as a type is the conflict outcomes and consequences. Namely, these are:

- radical transformation of the social and political environment (including the formation of new political units and/or states),
- collapse of central institutions and of pre-conflict political and economic infrastructures
- fragmentation of society with a relapse from citizenship to ethnic communities
- destruction of any previously existed social contract and hence of the state-level social capital

With the forced ceasefire agreement in Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina came out from the violent conflict united only in name. Allocating 51% of the country’s territory to the Muslim-Croat federation, and putting 49% under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, the peace agreement gave the fighting parties something that they could not secure during the warfare – the institutionalisation of the ethnic division. The governmental framework composed of a state presidency of three presidents with one chair and a bicameral ‘parliamentary assembly’ with each ethnic group getting about a third of the representatives, is further complicated by each Entity having their institutions of president, Assembly, Army (united since 2006), customs and tax systems.\(^{156}\)

\(^{156}\) The law to merge the country’s three separate customs administrations and create a single, state-wide value-added tax (VAT) system was passed by the Bosnian state parliament on 29 December 2003 (Alić 2004)
**Figure 13** below presents the structure of the country as designed by the Dayton Agreement. The organisational chart is deliberately provocative. The state-element appears not only on par with the Entities, but also in between them; on the top of the structure is the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The visualisation aims at emphasising the fact that the Dayton state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is more or less a structure with no content. As a set of institutions, it functions to regulate the relations between the two Entities and to represent the imaginary nation before the international community. The powers of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Constitution are limited exclusively to the fields of the foreign and inter-Entity relations. Thus, the state apparatus appears something like a channel for communication between the two Entities and hardly an overarching body. A regulative organ with limited executive powers (especially before the unification of the army and the police forces), the state in fact does not have much control over the Entities, while the Entities can boycott the functioning of the state by simply withdrawing their representatives from the state institutions. The Entities maintain independently direct relations with the OHR and the vice versa; by Constitution they also have powers to establish and maintain separately international relations.

**Figure 13: Bosnia and Herzegovina Power Structures Under Dayton Constitution**

![Diagram of Bosnia and Herzegovina Power Structures Under Dayton Constitution]

**Legend:**
- Bosniak population
- Mixed Bosniak-Croat population
- Croat population
- Serb population
- Mixed Serb-Bosniak population
The limited role of the state became explicitly clear in the presentation of Nikola Špirić before the Woodrow Wilson centre in April 2009. In his words, it was the OHR to influence local politicians and to make officials from the two Entities discuss common problems, but not the state (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009). In fact, by 2009, the Office of the High Representative has been the real overarching structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and still is the guarantor for the country's relative stability and the progress achieved so far (ICG 2009).

The figure also represents the complex organisation of the Entities with regard to the distribution of the population. The different shadings indicate the ethnic composition of the respective administrative units. The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has no direct jurisdiction over the territories of the Entities, but only over the Brčko District. Thus, since the population of the District nominally belongs both to FBiH and the RS, while governed by the state institutions, it can be viewed as the population ‘belonging’ to the state.

Table 11 below presents in details and in a comparative perspective the major power institutions of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republica Srpska. The Table reveals that while the state institutions are a puzzle of multi-ethnic representation, the two Entities in fact are structured as vivid para-states. From both Figure 13 and Table 11, it becomes clear that the consolidation of Republica Srpska has been enabled by Constitution, while the stability of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been ensured. Furthermore, the administrative organisation of every canton as a projection of a para-(micro-)state, complicates additionally the situation.

This power structure and the administrative organisation established with the Dayton Constitution have become a foundation for the development of the sub-macro-frameworks of social capital, presented in Figure 14. The possibility ‘to ignore’ the central state and its institutions and the lack of functioning structure to enable productive communication and interaction between the two Entities constitutes the problem with the lack of established bridging relations between the communities that are addressed below.

Based on the assumption that separation of conflicting parties would end violence and leaving any integration related issues aside, Dayton has in fact created and legitimised institutional separatism (McWhirter 1996). The structure does not enable the emergence of a viable institutional framework to create a unified state based on ethnic autonomy (WWICS 2007). The forced union between the two Entities under the Dayton pact and the lack of any strategic and organised attempts to re-integrate people resulted in the lack of stability of the political formation of the Bosnian state, that can be observed even after all the years of reconstruction. The international community is not eager to withdraw the military presence yet.
Table 11: Major Power Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENTS</th>
<th>REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</th>
<th>FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</th>
<th>REPUBLICA SRPSKA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>SARAJEVO</td>
<td>SARAJEVO</td>
<td>BANJA LUKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Constitution</td>
<td>Constitution of BiH</td>
<td>Constitution of FBiH</td>
<td>Constitution of RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>Triple Rotational Presidency (Bosniak + Croat + Serb)</td>
<td>President FBiH</td>
<td>President RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Prime Minister BiH</td>
<td>Prime Minister FBiH</td>
<td>Prime Minister RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Ministers BiH</td>
<td>Council of Ministers FBiH</td>
<td>Council of Ministers RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly:</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly:</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• House of Peoples: 15 delegates (5 Bosniaks + 5 Croats + 5 Serbs)</td>
<td>• House of Peoples – representatives from the cantonal parliaments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• House of Representatives: 42 delegates (28 from FBiH; 14 – from RS)</td>
<td>• House of Representatives: 98 delegates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory under direct jurisdiction</td>
<td>Brcko District</td>
<td>10 cantons with own parliament, court and police structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Bosnian' cantons: Una-Sana (Canton 1), Tuzla (Canton 3), Zenica-Doboj (Canton 4), Bosnian Podrinje (Canton 5), Sarajevo (Canton 9)

'Croatian' cantons: Posavina (Canton 2), West Herzegovina (Canton 8), Canton 10 (Canton 10)

'Mixed': Central Bosnia (Canton 6), Herzegovina-Neretva (Canton 7)

The structure has reaffirmed the ethnic division established throughout the years of war and it can hardly enable the de-fragmentation and the restoration of the pre-war Bosnian multicultural society. Throughout the period of war, people relapsed from citizens to members of ethnic groups. It would have been interesting to know how people, who had determined themselves as ‘Yugoslav’ in the 1991 census, would determine themselves now. Unfortunately, this is something that we might never know. Fear, distrust and war trauma have affected the very essence of the social structure – the relationship between people from different origins or religions, enabling them to coexist, to cooperate and to build a common future. The pre-war social contract has disappeared at large. Leaving aside interpersonal relations, social cohesion at the level of state is non-existent.
Evidence for this emerges not only from testimonies of people about the difficulties to reconcile with the past and with the experienced violence and trauma (Heleta 2008), or from the comments of intellectuals, provided in the next section of the chapter. Events like the 2006 referendum in Montenegro or the proclaimed Kosovo independence in 2008 appear as catalysts for local tensions charged by nationalist organisations and leaders (Ninkovic 2006, Stanic 2008). In April 2009, the High Representative Valentin Inzko stated before the UN Security Council that Republica Srpska was driving for secession; unplanned developments and lack of expected progress postponed once again the closure of the OHR (lastly scheduled for 30th June 2009).

Projecting the conflict outcomes through the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model of social capital introduced in Chapter 3, the macro-structural level represents the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Dayton Accord and recognised by the international community in 1995, and its central institutions. It is obvious that immediately after ceasefire these central institutions were not functioning. They had been established mostly on a formal level. The state also did not acquire immediate control over key structures like customs and tax system. The whole country was put in fact under the control of the Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative. Nevertheless, one can argue that the macro-structural level was set up at least formally. Referring to Figure 3 and Table 4 (presenting the constitutional arrangements of the country), it could be argued that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially established as a parallel and not as an overarching structure (Figure 13). Nevertheless, looking for the grounds of a common non-ethnically based political identity; this level appears as the macro-level of the structure.

The principles of governance are projected at the macro-cognitive level. According to the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary democracy, organised as a union between the two Entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska. Leaving aside the complexity of the constitutional arrangements and the success (or lack of) of the pursued (i.e. imposed by the international community) policy of integration through separation, one can accept that the macro-cognitive level is also present.

The most problematic area in a post-ethnic-conflict situation is the (re-)building of a micro-level that corresponds to the macro-perspectives as defined by the reconstruction agents. While the macro-framework is a ‘product’ that can be designed and implemented by external actors either with the consent of the local leaders, or by putting them under pressure, the micro-level requires much more attention exactly because of the discussed fragmentation resulting from the struggles between different communities. The reconstruction model can be built up starting from any of the four quadrants of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model of social capital. The stages of the process and the expected developments can be

157 Following the Montenegro referendum for independence, the Bosnian Serbs NGO ‘Choice is ours’ organised signing of petition for secession RS from Bosnia and Herzegovina in several towns of Republica Srpska. The Media Round-up provided by the OHR for 23 May 2006 reveals that there was a good coverage of the events (OHR BiH Media Round-up 23/05/2006).
determined more easily, if taking as a starting point the largest or the smallest structural unit that will be targeted. The whole strategy should then be designed with respect to the chosen unit.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reconstruction process led by the external powers started with the setting up of the macro-political framework. Establishing central institutions and relying upon them to be the driving force for progress in the direction towards achieving peace and stabilisation, proved not to be a very well calculated step. In the case of this fragmented and war-traumatised society and following the institutionalised and officially recognised division along ethnic lines, true power remained in the hands of each Entity’s structures and players, networks and institutions. Instead of identifying themselves as ‘belonging’ to the macro-framework of the Bosnian state (i.e. as micro-structural units), these local institutions and structures of Republica Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively took over the role of macro-units and became recognised as such by their members. Constituted on the basis of exclusive bonding ties, defined during the three years of struggles, the two Entities did not seek any co-operation or interaction; and their members remained to a large extend hostile to the people from the other community. In this context, trust, shared values, and norms remained limited only within the closed community. The state was largely perceived as an abstraction, a hostile entity, run by foreigners through their local ‘puppets’. This lack of trust in the institutions of the state prevented the emergence of cross-ethnic relationships (not speaking about the exceptions) and affiliations with the central state. The counterpoint of the imposed status-quo was the dream for a super-ethnic structure, a homogeneous national state. These feelings and perceptions about the international community and the political elites in the country are presented in details in the next section of this chapter, discussing the findings of the 2003 fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure 14 presents a graphic illustration of the specific social capital structure developed in post-ethnic-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Constitution. Fragmenting the multiethnic social contract of the former socialist republic and constituting three rather closed and hostile ethnic communities, the war destroyed the overarching social capital at the level of the former political entity of Bosnia. Evidence for its existence appear in published memories about the pre-war situation (as in Filipovic 1994, Heleta 2008, etc.) and in the testimonies of local citizens gathered during the conducted fieldwork (interviews with S.Turulja, H.Batinić, Z.Grebo - quotations follow).

Critics of the Dayton Constitution point out that it managed to achieve what the war could not. Institutionally and functionally, the country was divided into two ethnically determined Entities. Thus, the ethnic consolidation processes that began during the course of war was reaffirmed and enhanced. The establishment of the central state as a bridging element between the two separate political units could not contribute per se to the (re-)construction of a national-level social capital. Focused on developing the macro-framework, the international community somehow assumed that the micro-level would develop per se.
The political and institutional organisation of the new state however did not contribute to this development. Instead, it pushed the processes in a very different direction. The two Entities obtained their own sub-macro-structures (as presented in Table 11), which allowed the interested parties to work for the consolidation of their own community, for the development of social capital within the Entities and not between them. The initial lack of will for constructive interaction and co-operation was later ‘supported’ by the lack of institutions, programmes and initiatives to stimulate such.

Thus, at the micro-level of the state social capital, two ethnically determined micro-levels emerged. Each one reproduced a projected model of its ‘own’ social capital with no or very limited bridging structures and mechanisms between them. Underestimating or ignoring this problem, the efforts of the international community since the signing of the Dayton Agreements could hardly be defined as planned and systematically directed towards eliminating the sub-macro-frameworks discussed. This on its turn impeded the emergence of a supra-ethnic micro-level within the political unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a precondition for the establishment of proper civil community, citizenship affiliation and a ‘national’ social contract.
Supporting evidences to the above claims emerge from different sources. Such can be found in the comments of the interviewed local representatives about lack of trust and co-operation between people from the different communities (as of 2003), or in the International Crisis Group (ICG 2009) article about the fragile stability of the country. Indicative of the gravity of the processes is the concern of Mr Špirić (‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009) for when the OHR would close down: ‘Now when politicians form the Federation and Republica Srpska have problems they contact the OHR to seek solutions. They are not used to discuss things among themselves and to work together. And this would create a problem in itself.’ On the other hand, the fact that co-operation and bridging ties have emerged at the level of NGOs in the two Entities, suggests that positive energies exist and they could become an important constructive factor, if properly directed and supported.

The adapted model of social capital (as introduced in Chapter 3), illustrates the importance of the problem with the fractured societal structure in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and the relapse from civil platform into ethnic communities. With the imposed macro-framework and the two quite autonomous Entities, and without established grounds for reconciliation and integration of the population based on non-ethnic and civil local structures, the micro-state-level simply does not exist, nor its development is enabled. Instead of a micro-level corresponding to the macro-framework of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two parallel micro-levels have been constituted reaffirming the ethnic divide.

Having in mind that there were three warring parties, one can argue that the mirrored structures should be more than two. In fact, the model allows more than two projections to be examined (in contrast to the SCAT model, where for visual clarity there should not be more than two projections presented). The reason for looking only at the two mirrored models is that Republica Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent political units with quasi-state structures (not exactly the case of the autonomous regions for example). As such, the mirrored macro-levels of the Entities with their presidents, assemblies, and armies are clearly recognisable.

In 2003, Sead Turulja, a hostel owner from Sarajevo, observed, reflecting widespread views among ordinary people: ‘The government is not responsive very much to the local citizens, sometimes because they don't know, sometimes because they don’t want to, sometimes because they don’t have the money for it. Usually they do not do much for the citizens because of different reasons. The two government systems are too complicated and most of the funds go for government structures, the military, the police’ (Turulja in interview with the Author; 06.05.2003).

The most common mistake of the international involvement is the presumption that by restoring political institutions and economic infrastructure, the functioning of the state machine is only a matter of time. In the case of a post-conflict situation, where there were no inter-ethnic, cultural, and religious clashes, this would be possible, because the micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels would not have been fractured into closed and hostile units. The war-traumatised citizens would still remain citizens. During an ethnic conflict, survival mechanisms are likely to push people to (re)construct and (re)emphasise their ethnic identities. In
the case of any artificially supported statehood before the conflict, the latter simply reinforces the existing ethnic identities and motivates people to get rid of the imposed, yet not internalised, affiliations.

In the post-ethnic-conflict situation, the citizens, i.e. the people bridged by their common acceptance of formal principles and supra-ethnic/cultural/religious identities, are missing. Therefore, immediately after an ethnic conflict, any efforts that require the involvement of citizens and civil society are doomed to failure. Before launching programmes for supporting and enhancing civil society, it is necessary that bridging ties are restored, social cohesion enabled and investments in social capital made. Only then, it is likely that ethnic members become willing to identify themselves not only as belonging to a certain ethnic, cultural, or religious group, but also with the larger political unit as citizens.

According to Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Faculty of Law at the University of Sarajevo, the only way to overcome the ethnic separatism and division in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to establish a civil society, but for this are needed citizens and a common political platform for their formation – a concept of a supra-ethnic political Bosnian nation. At the same time, as Zoran Puljić from the Mozaik Foundation (formerly NGO Development Foundation) argued, in 2003 the economic problems and the collapse of state services in the cities where the organisation was involved (of population up to 35 000), ‘reflect on people's minds that they ARE LOSING HOPE, THEY ARE FRUSTRATED. They have this large sense of apathy and there is a feeling of hopelessness and such little initiative for action, because they believe they cannot change anything’ (Grebo in interview with the Author, 16.07.2003).

As it was discussed in Chapter 3, for a reconstruction programme to be successful, it is essential that the elements of the four quadrants of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model be synchronised and of corresponding scope. The identification of the highest macro-structural level would determine the character of the elements in the other three quadrants, as the appropriate strategies and actions for creating a balanced and synchronised structure and would serve as a point of reference for their efficiency. When the goal is to (re-)construct a modern state, with citizens respecting their nested identities, then the development of a supportive micro-level should be considered and planned carefully. Reconstructing social capital in this context means enabling co-operation among people, by creating an environment within which tolerance, will for co-operation and integration, interest in the common future and the common good and social cohesion can re-emerge.

To sum up, instead of a micro-structural level of local institutions developed on the basis of civil relationships and cross-ethnic networks and a micro-cognitive level constituted on the basis of trust, local norms and values that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina share, Dayton has established two separate micro-levels framed by the macro-levels of the Entities. It is difficult to assess retrospectively whether in 1995 there would have been any other option than enforcing the Dayton Agreement. It is difficult to evaluate whether attempts to establish such a state-level micro-structure would have been successful without addressing first the security issues, the war trauma and the lack of willingness to co-exist, even less to cooperate for building up a common future. The current text does not
intend to discuss who is to blame for Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming a ‘black hole’ and swallowing foreign aid without achieving the expected levels of success. By many, especially people from Bosnia and Herzegovina (among which the interviewed respondents Professor Zdravko Grebo, Hrvoe Batinić, Professor Dragoljub Stojanov), the Dayton Accords are seen as a mechanism that has institutionalised the fragmentation of social relations, with cohesion limited to the specific framework of the ethnic group. Although there are good arguments and evidence in support of this thesis, the current research is interested in the international efforts for reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina planned and implemented in the light of the Dayton arrangements.

The described situation reveals that under the existing circumstances, the sole reconstruction of the macro-framework would not enable the micro-level to develop naturally or with minimum interference. The positive results that the research performed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) & Oxford Research International (ORI) presents are that in 2006 about 43% of the respondents to the survey identified themselves as ‘Bosnians’ above all (i.e. citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and not only as belonging to the respective ethnic group (UNDP/ORI 2007). The question however is whether this is a good result or a bad one, especially when these figures are projected in the light of the 12 years of reconstruction, numerous projects and programmes that have been or still are running in the country and the billions of foreign financial and material aid, of technical, economic, political and social assistance. The donor-driven approach relies on directing and channelling the societal powers and energies in the desired way only by setting up frameworks and limiting the processes within them, therefore it is more likely to be doomed to failure.

Dayton constructed the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federation. In order to work, federalism requires a balance between the centre and the constituent parts of government. Such a balance is still non-existent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The powers of the central government are still rather limited. Apart from being neglected by the governments of the Republica Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it earns little loyalty from the citizens. Despite the early- established democratic electoral structure, there were no frameworks in place to give moderate political forces a chance to cohere and organise (WWICS 2007).

Another essential mechanism that has the potential to compel political co-operation between ethnic regions are the shared economic interests, demanding co-operation between institutions and in this way enabling the success of a federated state. Reports also suggest (WWICS 2007) that in an ethnically fractured state aiming at (re-)integration, the coalescence of non-ethnically defined political groups (defined by mutual social, economic, or political interest) should be enabled and supported. The ethnic factor however is still a determinant for many aspects of the life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton did not manage to foster reconciliation between ethnic groups, nor did the international community for all these years of active reconstruction work, because the structure of the state

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158 Unfortunately, the figures cannot be compared against such from previous years, because of the lack of official surveys.
itself provides little incentive for national progress or a national interest (WWICS 2007).

Exploring the 1992-1995 Bosnian war through the model developed in Chapter 3 it appears that it bears all the characteristics of an ethnic conflict as defined by the research. The ethnic violence, involving more than involved more that 15,000 people, spread due to the impossibility to address peacefully the claims for independence. With ethnicity and religion used as “instrumental means rather than ends” and with a complex and dispersed commandership, the conflict had poor regulation potential; thus, the efforts of the international community to help the fighting parties to reach an agreement remained void. Furthermore, the militarisation of the civil population (refugees or common citizens) created obstacles before the stabilisation of the environment years after the end of the conflict. Applying the evaluation structure suggested in Chapter 3, Table 12 (next page) summarises the particular features of the Bosnian case.


The findings from a fieldwork, carried out in Sarajevo and Konjić in 2003, frame the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of the period between the end of the war and today. This is an interesting point of time because after seven years of reconstruction, in 2003 weaknesses and essential problems were already identified and until the present moment (almost seven years later), there have been time for approaching their solution.

With focus on the issues concerning inter-ethnic integration and any consistent policies targeting the reconstruction of social capital at the level of state, a range of people was approached. Carried were interviews with representatives of the public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the academia, the third sector – both local and international NGOs and structures, as well as with representatives of the international institutions as agents enabling, supporting, and in general running the process of reconstruction of the state. The list of the approached institutions and persons appears in Appendix 3.

The reason for the focus on Sarajevo was that the head offices of almost all of the major ‘players’ in the field were and still are located there. The initial assumption was that before examining implementation practices related to social capital reconstruction, it was necessary to find out information about existing structured policies in this direction. Furthermore, the research was interested in the parameters of social capital at the level of state. Paradoxically, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also ‘located’ in Sarajevo.

Table 12: Summary of the Suggested Ethnic-Conflict Assessment-Model

(See next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Theoretical description</th>
<th>The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict context &amp; history</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preconditions</strong> – identity politics; oppressive &amp; discriminatory regimes</td>
<td>Tito’s “multi-national” state was based on administrative and institutional division along ‘ethnic’ lines; Internal power and economic challenges; Political ‘opening’ after 1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Triggers</strong> – experienced changes, collapse of institutions</td>
<td>Collapse of the system, secession of other Yugoslav republics; BiH - good grounds for development of radical ethnic politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Triggers</strong> - support for political changes</td>
<td>End of the Cold War; group rights agenda, support for political change and democratisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict agents</strong></td>
<td>Identity-based groups along ethnic lines</td>
<td>Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox), Bosnian Croats (Roman-Catholics), Bosniaks (Muslim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frameworks</strong></td>
<td>Conflict occurs as internal for a state</td>
<td>Over the territory of the former Yugoslav republic Bosnia and Herzegovina - claiming independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td>‘Local’ from international perspective</td>
<td>Conflict between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks closed within the borders of the ex-Yugoslav republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Mass involvement</td>
<td>Mass mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale</strong></td>
<td>Violence over large parts of the territory</td>
<td>By August 1992 the Serbs had conquered about 60%, but struggles all over the territory of BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dynamics, intensity, duration</strong></td>
<td>Violence beyond sporadic isolated incidents</td>
<td>Over 100 000 deaths (most of which civilian population), more than 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced people. Massacres of civilians (from each side), ethnic cleansing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor potential for containment, regulation or termination</td>
<td>War terminated only after the NATO intervention. Tensions and violent incidents continued long after ceasefire</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reoccurrence rather than peace after ceasefire</td>
<td>Continued tensions after formal cease-fire, stability remained dependant on the presence and the actions of the international forces in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation structure</strong></td>
<td>Specific configuration: organisational, operational and ‘avalanche’ levels; civilians as ‘targets’</td>
<td>Regular army supported by paramilitary structures, Local warlords – own ‘agenda’; revenge; ethnic cleansing and war-crimes perpetrated by all parties - massacres, rape, assaults; continued tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation strategy</strong></td>
<td>Activation of shared symbols &amp; myths for gathering support and followers</td>
<td>Historical examples used to justify actions against another ethnic group – reborn myths of ancient conflicts, of delayed revenge for past injustice, of historical events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real threats and personal loses</td>
<td>Real threats and lack of personal security motivated people to arm themselves and to fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict causes &amp; goals</strong></td>
<td>Different for the different conflict mobilisation levels</td>
<td><strong>By ethnic group:</strong> Serbs - against the secessionist and for their right to remain part of the Serbian nation; Croats –against the aggressors as well as against the religious enemies, Bosniaks –community rights and independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>By level:</strong> Political (organisational) level - war for independence, power-shift and expectations for (possible future) benefits; Operational level - demonstrations of power and domination; Personal level – symbolically justified war, lack of personal security and desire for revenge for human and material loses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict consequences</strong></td>
<td>Political re-organisation of territories/ new states</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina became internationally recognised as a new state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political and economic problems</td>
<td>Destroyed infrastructure, collapsed economy, no adequate institutional organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fragmented society – previously existing civil affiliations (bridging and linking ties) replaced with bonding ethnic relations</td>
<td>Three ethnically closed communities but no ‘national Bosnian’ society. Destroyed pre-war societal relations and networks. “Ethnic-community members” replaced former Yugoslav citizens. No social contract binding the inhabitants of the established state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. No social capital on the level of the state.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Another aspect that needs to be mentioned, because this can be considered a projection of the then existing attitudes within Bosnian society (to be discussed in details below), is the fact that both locals and foreigners (whose presence in the streets of Sarajevo was rather visible), were not very open for interviews. Over the years, the international people working for NGOs or other structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina have become suspicious about ‘researchers’ and annoyed of the constant interest in their work. Locals have also become tired of being ‘examined’ by foreigners. Despite these obstacles, the informal channels activated on personal and networking levels were functioning and allowed me to gather substantial information on the ground. The findings are summarised in the sections below.

2.1 Inter-ethnic relations

In 2003, the existing lines of separation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had various manifestations. Regardless the 7 years of reconstruction, by 2003 the border between the constitutionally divided Entities was stronger than the borders with the neighbouring countries. Yet these were and still are the ‘two sides of the same medal’, as the current Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Nikola Špirić referred to FBiH and RS. The movement of people between Serbia and Republica Srpska was visibly more intensive than that between the two Entities. Even in the limited space of the city of Sarajevo, the lines of separation between the communities, invisible to the foreign visitors, were in fact very clear for the locals. In the words of the taxi driver Reuf Bojrović, not all ‘colleagues would take clients to the Serbian part, but I don’t mind, I don’t feel threatened’ (Bojrović in interview with the Author, 04.07.2009).

‘What makes a Bosnian Serb is that he is a bit Croat and a bit Bosniak; what makes a Bosnian Croat is that he is a bit Serb and a bit Bosniak; what makes a Bosnian Bosniak is that he is a bit Croat and a bit Serb’, the hostel owner from Sarajevo, Sead Turulja, quoted his favourite author Ivo Andrić (Turulja in interview with the Author, 06.05.2003). The war however has transformed the former multicultural society of the Bosnian Republic into an ethnic puzzle. In the views of the former politician Stipe Suvar, expressed during the Sixth international seminar ‘Democracy and Human Rights in Multiethnic Societies’, held in July 2003 in Konjić, the Bosnian society was divided into three ‘nations, each behaving with the other two as landlords behave with tenants’ (Suvar 2003, conference presentation). In addition, the feeling of equality, promoted during Yugoslav times, had also disappeared. The paradoxical fact noted by intellectuals like Stipe Suvar was that all the communities developed a perception of their status as that of a minority. Without such a feeling for equality, a Swiss-style political structure was rather impossible to achieve.

The pre-war multiethnic Sarajevo (with population of 44% Bosniak, 30% Serb, 15% Croats, and 11% others) emerged from the conflict rather homogeneous – with about 80% of Bosniak population. At least that was the perception of the local people, expressed by Sead Turulja. ‘Now the situation is worse than the one in Ottoman times. Communities were mixed then, while today every valley has its own master’ (Turulja in interview with the Author, 06.05.2003).
‘In the 1970s and 1980s the Bosnian spirit existed without being politically articulated’, commented Hrvoe Batinić, Programme Director at the Open Society Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003). In 2003, as the words of another intellectual, professor Dragoljub Stojanov from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Sarajevo revealed, people felt forced to identify themselves as ‘Bosnians’ (Stojanov in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003).

Religious and ethno-confessional identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have always been much more political than spiritual. The war has also resulted in a revival of religious practices. ‘Years ago one could hardly see young girls wearing long sleeves and scarves and teenagers with heavy beards; at least not in Sarajevo’, explained Snejana Brkić, a teaching assistant in the Faculty of Economics. ‘Many of my students visibly expose their religion now. Before we never knew who was who’ (Brkić in interview with the Author, 23.02.2002). The respondents from the public sector and the academia emphasised that the religious factor was an obstacle to the (re-)integration of the people from different communities not because of the religious practices per se, but exactly in the sociological aspect of the manifestation of religious affiliation and its requirements.

Another interesting point addressed by Hrvoe Batinić, a Programme Director at the Open Society Foundation – Sarajevo, was that social relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina today (2003), had to be considered at two levels (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003). The first one was the level of interpersonal relations. On an informal daily level, there was intercultural communication. Perhaps not always cooperative in their actions, people from different groups talked to each other. The problem was that people were tied to their groups and that the war reinforced the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ division. This in turn was not a communication-enabling factor, because inter-groups relations are all about power, especially after having played ‘their imperative role and ethnicities having been promoted into nations’ (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003).

The opinion that the problems with the troubled and non-existing inter-ethnic relations, owed in fact to the political class, was expressed in various conversations during the conducted fieldwork. In the view of the OSCE officer Massimo Moratti, people were afraid to promote reconciliation, because there were still many unresolved problems and nationalist parties still interpreted everything through the ethnic prism (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). The lack of political awareness and democratic traditions were recognised as factors, enabling the politics of fear to flourish. Phrases like ‘if you don’t come with us, if we are not unified as a community, THEY will kill us; the others will be unified and you will have no choice’, according to Sead Turulja, could easily be heard all around Bosnia and Herzegovina (Turulja in interview with the Author, 06.05.2003). The assertion of the OSF Programme Director, that national organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina still enjoyed strong support, was confirmed by the words of a common citizen from Sarajevo. Reuf Bojrović commented that the nationalist charge in the neighbouring Serbia and Croatia had a direct effect upon the dynamics of the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bojrović in interview with the Author, 04.07.2003). An example for some
emerging positive processes was the fact that in Sarajevo and many parts of the Federation, for the first time after a decade the Social-Democratic party won the elections. Far away from an ideal multicultural party, the victory of the social-democrats was nonetheless encouraging as a ‘step towards more democratic development, given that the members of this party are members of different communities and not 100% one party-one nation’ (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003).

The ethnic fragmentation of Bosnia, which was a consequence of the collapse of Yugoslavia, in the words of Hrvoe Batinić resulted from Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming diasporas opened to political manipulations and from fears that ‘the others are consolidating’. ‘The war was in the air even before the referendum in 1992; the referendum was a result of the processes of ethnic consolidation; and to this contributed also the fact that Alija Izetbegović was a religious person, not a politician. It was unfortunate for the Bosniaks, because Tudman and Miloshević played with him’ (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003).

A widespread critical perspective from within Bosnian society identified the inter-ethnic fragmentation and the lack of efforts and progress towards consolidation as stemming from the frameworks imposed on the country by the Dayton Constitution. More problematic however were considered the lack of a critical mass to enable the civil processes and the lack of support from the international community for such a critical mass to emerge. A strong civil society would be able to limit political manipulations and make politicians serve the public, not their own goals, only if supported to come (back) into being.

Statements by public officials and international officers in connection to the particular parameters of their work appeared supportive of these personal views about the high degree of ethnic fragmentation of the Bosnian society and the lack of interest towards integration of the different communities. Dzenana Deljić, working for the Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, revealed that many of the complaints received were about discrimination practices or related to minority issues (Deljić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2003). It is necessary to emphasise that the Ombudsman institutions have also been multiplied in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, apart from the Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are also an Ombudsman of RS and an Ombudsman of FBiH – three different independent institutions.

Representatives from the UNHCR and the OSCE also confirmed the information about complaints for discrimination against minorities (with respect to the particular community). The UNHCR officer Lisa Kirkengen pointed out that such discrimination issues sometimes are not directly visible. In the context of the refugees returning home, for example, people were not prohibited to return to their pre-war homes, but discrimination appears in the social and the economic field, as well as in respect to the lack of security (Kirkengen in interview with the Author, 25.06.2003). OSCE officer Massimo Moratti indicated employment issues as a particularly sensitive area. Although sometimes discrimination towards people from the returning minority community might be intentional, there were also cases when the local business and public institutions could not offer jobs to
returnees, because over the years, the positions had been filled and overstaffing was not an option (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003).

Another fact established during the 2003 fieldwork concerning the ethnic separation, was the phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’: one director, one administration, and one building, within which the children are divided according to their ethnic origin and study separately following different curricula. As Jo-Anne Bishop, an OSCE officer in the Department of Education, emphasised, the solution to this problem was largely political (Bishop in interview with the Author, 14.07.2003). In 2003 the first post-war state-level Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted, ‘providing the principles for a more cohesive education system which respects the rights of all – if the political will exists to implement it both in letter and spirit’ (OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina official website). The second part of the OSCE statement and the fact that there are still schools of this type in FBiH suggests that there has not been such a good political will over these years. Nevertheless, in April 2009, Prime Minister Nikola Špirić confirmed during the Director’s Forum held at the Woodrow Wilson Centre that the reforming of these schools was still an issue (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

2.2 Challenges to integration

Apart from viewing the politicians as contributing largely to the lack of progress and sometimes even hampering the efforts towards achieving inter-ethnic co-operation and integration, the interviewed actors in the field identified some additional factors challenging or impeding the process.

The media was a very serious factor that could not only maintain, but also deepen the fragmentation of society. By 2002, the legislative framework on the public broadcasting media and the regulating structure were already in place. Nevertheless, for media people like Melissa Dedović from the Media Plan Institute there was no national media space. The national public television was perceived as an umbrella over the Entities’ media, not least because it had to use their broadcasting infrastructure (Dedović in interview with the Author, 23.07.2003).

The framework for language representation in media was seen as another issue of crucial importance for the integration/disintegration of the communities. The proportional use of ‘national’ languages with respect to the number of speakers within the particular area, not only constituted three different languages, but also enabled the process of their development as such. This also contributes to the affirmation and maintaining of the established division between the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Education was also indicated as one of the crucial factors for enabling integration of the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of a national legislative framework on education, was overcome in 2003 with the above-mentioned state-level Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education. Apart from the existing problems due to lack of political will or of sufficient efforts to implement the provisions of the adopted law, it is important here to note that the ‘much-
needed state-level legislation’ on Higher education, Pre-school Education, Vocational and Educational Training was finally passed in 2007 – 2008.

Police reform has been also a sensitive issue for quite a few years. On 16 April 2008, the Bosnian upper house of the Parliament voted in favour of reform and ended years of dispute among the leaders of the Bosnian Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities about the extent to which they should integrate the country's ethnically-separated police forces.

The separated (Entity’s) police forces had been established for ensuring better protection of the respective communities and because of the lack of trust across them. In an interview Snejana Ivandić, a programme coordinator at the Balkan HR Network, pointed out that people ‘would not trust a police officer from another community. If a woman has been raped during the war for example, which has not been an isolated case, or if a relative has been killed by the others, how would you approach a police officer for help when associating them with the former enemies?’ (Ivandić in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003).

Over the years, the separated police has transformed from a security issue, into a power/status issue. This can be spotted in an OHR announcement of 2005, which ‘exposes some myths related to the police reform’ and emphasises that the reform does not imply abolishment of the Entities (OHR, online).

Return of refugees – in the course of our conversation the OSCE legal advisor, Massimo Moratti, revealed some of the problems that the very successful process of return of refugees has been facing. The most serious in his opinion was that it was not enough to build houses for the returnees. Unemployment and lack of places in the schools for their children were also serious issues. In addition, many of the returning refugees were returning to villages and towns that were not their original home places. Thus, they faced also problems socialisation within the new communities. In addition, there were people returning to their homes, where other refugee families had settled during the war. ‘Should you evict one family to give the house back to the old owner or ask the old owner to forget about their house and go and live somewhere else and if so where... and can you then expect that a community is established when there are these tensions among its members’ (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). In the context of the returnees-agenda, the existing ethnic prejudices formed a serious impediment to integration. Unemployment, lack of transparency of hiring practices, problems with enrolment of children in schools, have been additional challenges to the process.

From a legal perspective, the steps taken to resolve the property issues of refugees and to enable them either to return to their former homes or to be able to sell them, was considered a success. In the eyes of some people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as professor Dragoljub Stojanov stated, this continued the policy of ethnic cleansing in peaceful times (Stojanov in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003). Enabling the refugees and displaced people to sell their properties in fact created a mechanism for encouraging a new ethnic distribution within the country. Massimo Moratti also confirmed that the policy concept of the refugee return excluded any forced migration ((Stojanov in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003). There were even organisations established – as the Serbian
‘Ostanak’ (meaning ‘staying’), for example, that began claiming the same rights as the returnees.

A priority agenda for many international organisations, the work for the refugees and the internally displaced people quite often stops once they are provided with a roof over their heads. UNHCR officer Lisa Kirkengen confirmed that housing issues were only part of the problems faced by the returnees, yet a lack of resources and capacities did not allow any single reconstruction agent to address all the needs of these people. Thus, despite physically returning, people still had to recover socially, economically and mentally – and these were in fact preconditions for achieving real integration (Kirkengen in interview with the Author, 25.06.2003).

**Economic recovery**, according to Professor Dragoljub Stojanov, was also a key factor for achieving proper integration between people from different communities. In his view, labour or income related problems can contribute to ethnic competition and thus to the further raising of tensions.

**The need for a common platform for addressing the war** emerged in several conversations as another important prerequisite for integration. The contrasting war discourses (of a ‘civil war’, created by the Serbs, as a ‘liberation war’ – by the Croats and as an ‘act of aggression’, by the Bosniaks) could not enable a common understanding, unless they are embraced by a shared narrative. This could start with the acknowledgement by each side that **they did wrong**, instead of accusing the others. In the views of Massimo Moratti, in a situation of such war trauma, there should be a high-level decision whether to talk or **not to talk** about the past. Surely, when signs of war are still present even after years of peace, when demolished houses in the middle of nowhere recall of heavy armed battles, when in the centre of the capital one could see buildings with holes of fire arms, and when the yellow ribbon still warns about land mines, war would not be forget easily. However, ‘official days’ in the calendar of local municipalities linked to war events such as the day when ‘the Serbs were expelled’ or ‘Bosniaks kept the city’ do not contribute for the consolidation of society.

Finally, a challenge for integration of the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as seen from within the field, was the lack of a legal framework for integration. According to Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Faculty of Law at the University of Sarajevo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a ‘unique thing imposed – ethnic representation in all spheres! The ethnic origin has become the factor; and furthermore, this ethnically divided society has been established as an international protectorate’. This ethnic division and the re-affirmation of the identity politics prevent civil society from developing. ‘**There has been no improvement for these seven years, but only buying time for a final dissolution**’ (Grebo in interview with the Author, 16.07.2003).

The most important thing, in the views of the intellectuals interviewed during the fieldwork, was that the reconstruction mechanism established in the country unfortunately did not support citizenship, but only ethnic representation. There were limitations on affiliation, as well as many obstacles on governmental level. Collective identities prevailed, the ethnic agenda was underpinning the political debate, and the leaders of all three groups were sending messages to their
communities emphasising the ‘need’ to stick together. This created a situation of ‘controlled frustration’.

The prospects for integration and for the future in general were viewed as connected to the idea of transforming the ethnically separated community members into citizens. As professor Zdravko Grebo suggested, this could happen ‘if we manage to establish the Bosnian nation as a political nation’ (Grebo in interview with the Author, 16.07.2003). Only then a genuine co-operation, rather different from the existing artificial forms, could have been possible. Expanding on this, the OSF Programme Director Hrvoje Batinić identified the priorities for any reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina as:

‘Development (creation) of a civil society with citizens and not members of three different groups as the basic political unit; ethnic identities have to accept the overarching national identity; rationality must overcome ethnic and religious identities; establishment of a national state’ (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003).

The emergence of youth organisations such as the Alumni Association at the Law Faculty or the Bosporus Network (presented further in the text) proved in his view that there are energies among the young people that can forward the process. EU integration and membership in international institutions were considered both by members of the public and by officials as the engines for advancing integration. In the words of Valida Repovac, a representative from the Directorate for EU Integration, Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘EU integration – the single and unique goal for which there is consensus among people of different ethnic groups. EU integration is the strongest integrative point – a precondition for the establishment of a strong state’ (Repovac in interview with the Author, 18.06.2003). Unlike some intellectuals, like Professor Grebo, considering the impulse towards the EU a paradoxical situation – ‘the destroyed country (Yugoslavia) unites again in the EU!’ – most agreed that this might be the last chance for social integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.3 The views on the international community

The findings of the fieldwork revealed that within the Bosnian society there were at least three different stands towards the international community, its representatives, and its role in the country.

In the first group, there were people who had great expectations as regards the support and the assistance received by the foreign organisations and donors. These were seen as a regulatory mechanism that would not only set up certain structures, programmes and practices, but that would also solve all the existing problems. According to this view, expressed by Reuf Bojrović (in interview with the Author, 04.07.2003), the international community had to help ‘to build a professional and not nationalistic local administration, provide know-how, create a tax system and economic space, suppress extremist forces and punish them by seising their assets, which then the EU could use to rebuild the country. It should of course help Bosnia and Herzegovina to integrate within EU and not treat the people from this country as a refugee danger that has to be kept away as far as possible’. In
the context of the reconstruction practice, this group of people, adopting the attitude that nothing depends on them, that they are passive aid receivers, could hardly become partners in the process.

The second group shared an opinion that can be described with the words ‘conspiracy theory’. According to these views, the international community in fact did not support the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It just wanted to close off the people within the country and thus to ‘protect’ itself from an invasion of refugees. Helping with money, but not providing sufficient amounts, was in fact a way to bring the state/society to a particular stage at which they can be used, i.e. exploited. The interesting aspect here was that various people, like the hostel owner Sead Turulja, shared both opinions – apparently the dissatisfaction with the achievements of the international community in the field of reconstruction and normalisation of life transformed itself into a type of self-victimisation. In none of the interviews, there was any open expression of hostility towards the international community; people were rather taking the stance of victims. Feeling frustrated and powerless, this group could hardly be seen as an active agent of change.

It is interesting to note that among intellectuals and civil society activists there were also people who shared the opinion that Bosnia and Herzegovina had intentionally been transformed into a zone of ‘controlled instability’ through the implementation of a ‘colonial recipe for solving a problem: ‘Divide et impera’’. The international community had no interest in the establishment of a strong state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it could profit from the transfer of all the dirty industries to such regions. The aluminium production near Mostar was such an example (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003).

The third group identified within during fieldwork, was the group of people critically addressing the policies and the work of the different institutions and representatives of the international community. Apart from their criticism towards the constitutional frameworks established by the Dayton Agreement, representatives from academia and the NGO sector argued that the international community had adopted a generic approach to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, instead of developing a specific one after taking into account all the particularities of the field. The top-down approach widely used by reconstruction agents and especially of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was not helping the reconstruction processes to develop in the right direction. Furthermore, the whole reconstruction policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina lacked transparency.

A very important issue that emerged from the comments of this particular group was that the relationship established between the representatives of the international community and the local actors had enabled the development of ‘parasitism’, in the words of Professor Grebo (in interview with the Author, 16.07.2003). Bosnian citizens working for donor organisation shared the same opinion. They acknowledged that the work of the local NGOs was donor-oriented and not programme-oriented. Unfortunately, this status quo was acceptable to the donors, because in this way they were obtaining cheap service delivery for their own agendas.
Alida Vracić, a Project Coordinator at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Sarajevo agreed that quite often representatives of different local NGOs, despite having certain ideas for projects and activities, would concur with donor’s agendas in order to obtain funding; the common trend was that donors would support only projects that corresponded to their priorities. This patron-client dependency had also enabled the teaming of the third sector with a number of NGOs, but only a few projects actively pursued concrete strategies and goals (Vracić in interview with the Author, 20.05.2003).

As it became clear from the various conversations, the international community appeared not to have established a practice of ‘listening’ to any constructive criticisms but instead to follow a donor-driven approach to reconstruction.

### 2.4 Efforts in the direction of social capital reconstruction

The final issue of interest within the framework of my fieldwork was the identification of policies and practices related to the reconstruction of social capital, with an emphasis on any strategic and coherent approaches and programmes existing in this area. The information gathered revealed that in the various fields there were different activities that targeted integration, rising of trust among people, development of civil relationships, etc. The spotted problem was that in most of the cases these were isolated projects, pilot activities, or plans still to be implemented in practice. Nevertheless, it is important that some of these initiatives be mentioned in order to outline better the context and to acknowledge that there have been positive examples on the ground.

Private associations ran various initiatives that aimed at enabling communication and integration between people from different backgrounds based on shared professional interests. Such was the organisation ‘Media Plan’, consisting of: Media Plan Institute Sarajevo, Media Plan Prima Sarajevo, Media Plan Banja Luka, and the news agency Safax. The Media Plan Institute, Sarajevo, was the first organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina founded to promote media development towards democratisation and technological modernisation, to perform media research and to educate journalists. In pursue of the goal of forming a single media community in the country, Media Plan covered all of Bosnia and Herzegovina with offices in both the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.

The Bosporus Network and the Alumni Association at the Faculty of Law were two examples for the existence of positive integrative energies among the young generation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Opened to the future and ready to leave the past behind, these young people had quite realistic and pragmatic attitudes towards the processes and problems, even though some of them had quite vivid memories of the war. Registered in 2000, the Bosnian branch of the international non-governmental youth organisation operating in the Balkans – the Bosporus Network, only for three years has managed to attract over 150 active members, willing to support, promote and participate in multilateral initiatives aiming at bringing people back together and overcoming prejudices. Its first project focused on the issues of common culture and the EU identity was launched in co-operation with Belgrade; another series of workshops were organised under the project...
‘Religion connects Europe’. The Alumni Association of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies at the University of Sarajevo was also registered as NGO. Targeting not only maintaining relationships with former students, but also achieving regional co-operation, by 2003 it had already organised series of 6-7 debates discussing society reforms. Believing that the new generation has to become opinion makers, they have had also started issuing a monthly magazine.

A striking example of the willingness of people to reunite and to restore their normal living is the one of the Prijedor community159, where people gathered and put pressure upon the local authorities to enable the return of refugees and displaced persons. Prijedor is also an example that, despite the negative war experience, it is possible for integrative initiatives to emerge at a grass-root level (not defined as such in fact, but definitely having an effect of the type), in this case leading to ‘people from different communities rebuilding the houses of their expelled fellow citizens’ (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003)

By 2003, the Open Society Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had also adopted an approach not to ‘launch’ programmes, but to announce open calls for proposals and to support the needs of local organisation, considering each case individually.

The OSCE support to inter-school activities, organisation of training seminars and various cross-cutting events like the ‘Children’s movement for creative education’, as called by the officer from the Department of Education Jo-Anne Bishop, which brought together in one exhibition the art-works of children from separate schools, also needs to be mentioned (Bishop in interview with the Author, 14.07.2003).

An interesting (pilot) project in relation to social capital reconstruction was implemented by the UNHCR in 2001. The project, called ‘Imagine coexistence’, was run simultaneously in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Rwanda with the aim of establishing grounds for co-operation between people from different origins based on their pragmatic interest in (mainly) income-generation activities. Aiming at rebuilding trust among people involved in common work the project has achieved certain levels of success (UNHCR 2002). An important conclusion made in the report was that ‘Small project work, even if done excellently, is NOT by itself a bulwark against future violence. Broader structural change is needed in both countries to ensure the safety and security of their citizens -- returnees and others alike.’ (UNHCR 2002:38)

The general perception about the work related to social capital reconstruction was of a fragmented field, where different organisations targeting various issues have

159 From about 112 000 people before the war (44% of which Bosniaks), at the end of the war the municipality estimated their figures to be around 37,000. More than 50,000 persons were expelled from the municipality and a few thousands more had been killed. The Bosniaks have remained only couple of thousand. In a meeting in February 1998, displaced persons from Prijedor and Sanski Most, Bosniaks and Serbs respectively, joined their forces and stated clearly their intention to return to their homes, asking for the support of the local authorities and of the International Community. The event, known as the ‘Prijedor-Sanski Most Declaration’ marked the beginning of the return process in the area.
been running a number of projects. The only structure identified as having a systematic and coherent approach to social capital reconstruction, was a local institution called Mozaik Foundation (by that time known as ‘NGO Development Foundation’). However, in 2003, it has just started its projects on social capital reconstruction and it was impossible to evaluate its work apart from the statements of intention.

Acknowledging these circumstances, the evaluation of the contribution of Mozaik Foundation to social capital (re-)building was intentionally postponed. The value of their efforts, regardless the limited capacities, becomes clearer when compared to the large players in the reconstruction field. Therefore, the following chapter will present the work undertaken by the Foundation in the light of the policies and activities of key international organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In summary, in 2003 any questions about the war and about ethnic identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were rather sensitive topic. In many conversations held, the interviewed persons were not revealing directly their ethnic affiliation and there was a feeling of inappropriateness to ask about it. However, in most of the interviews, the concept of ‘others’ was present; especially when people from the Federation were discussing issues connected to Republica Srpska, or when citizens of Republica Srpska were talking about Sarajevo. Without using a particular vocabulary, the distant attitudes were tacitly acknowledged.

Examining whether there were any measures taken for the reconstruction of social capital by international and local key agents, several general conclusions were reached during the fieldwork. First, it became apparent that the intellectual circles of the Bosnian society acknowledged the problems resulting from the still-existing fragmentation along ethnic lines. The need for more serious efforts for reintegration and for enabling the building of Bosnian citizenship was also well articulated. Bringing back people together, reconciliation, overcoming prejudices and hatreds, as well as nationalist politics, were areas within which local, foreign and international organisations were performing different activities. However, due to the lack of co-ordination and communication between the various actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was very difficult (if not impossible) to spot from within the field any existing and strategically implemented policies for social capital reconstruction.

Discussing various aspects of reconstruction, policies, and practices with interviewees, one expression recurred very often: ‘the international community’. The fieldwork findings identified it as an important agent and a factor in the Bosnian post-conflict reality. Both in terms of direct involvement and of securing the financial support needed, the international community has been and still is the driving force behind the reconstruction, development, and democratisation processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996. Therefore, it is important to clarify the concept of ‘international community’ and its constituents.
According to the ESI study of the international power in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ESI 2000), the key concept of ‘international community’ denotes the moral and legal foundations for foreign involvement in the peace process and thus it falsely implies a single actor. Great variety of power centres with their own sources of authority and answerable to different constituencies, multiple and substantially autonomous, actors with their individual goals and separate activities, international NGOs and organisations, foreign national and development agencies, and other multinational structures, depict the great institutional diversity present in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The ad-hoc institutional arrangements made immediately after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina established a pattern of horizontally rather than hierarchically organised peace missions. Different areas of the peace process, divided into the two major fields of civilian and military operations, were taken over by different institutional actors. The humanitarian and refugee issues remained a task of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The elections, human rights monitoring and regional stabilisation became the focus of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in its first major field mission. Institution building and economic reform issues (such as payment system reform, private sector reform and privatisation) were taken by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), while the World Bank and the European Commission engaged themselves in a range of other economic initiatives, as well as in the co-ordination of the reconstruction programme. The police-monitoring mission stayed with the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). This allocation of fields among the institutions followed to a certain degree the model used in earlier peace missions under UN authority (ESI 2000:22). Thus at the end of 1995, the 55 countries and agencies engaged with the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina formed the Peace Implementation Council. To provide a mechanism for co-ordination and efficient implementation of the peace and reconstruction activities with respect to the civilian affairs, the Dayton Agreement (Annex 10) established the figure of the High Representative, institutionalising in this way the international governance of, and control over, the country.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was successful in its role of mechanism for coordinating the international peace implementation activities only to a certain degree. The institutional proliferation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued, inspiring the establishment of a whole series of coordinating structures.160 During the years of reconstruction, the rationalisation of

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160 By the year 2000 in Bosnia there is a whole series of structures involved in the reconstruction process and several bodies exercising an overview function. The PIC created a Steering Board made up of the states most directly involved in the peace process. UNHCR continued to operate the Humanitarian Issues Working Group. The EU and the World Bank operated the forum of periodic donors’ conferences. The inter-agency Human Rights Steering Board, a forum for declaring human rights priorities, established working groups on issues such as judicial reform, property rights and human rights institutions. The Economic Task Force is nominally responsible for everything from coordinating reconstruction projects to recommending economic conditionality to developing economic reform strategy. The Return and Reconstruction Task Force
international efforts and the co-ordination of resources and priorities have been constantly discussed. A contribution to the deepening of the problem can be ascribed also to the shift in the mandate of OHR and the change of its powers.

The persistence of the Serbs and Croats in refusing to participate in state level institutions and resisting reintegration in the late 1990s was a factor obstructing the international community in its efforts to implement the reconstruction programmes and to secure refugee returns. To overcome this situation, the High Representative used quasi-legal mechanisms blocking the promotion of hatreds and hostilities in the media in 1997 and firing the board of the Serb radio and television. His actions were not sanctioned by the Peace Implementation Council (the group of civil servants from interested countries overseeing the reconstruction process in Bosnia), but institutionalised through an interpretation of the Annex 10 to the DPA during the PIC meeting in Bonn, Germany in December 1997 (Parish 2007:13). The ‘Bonn powers’ established the High Representative as an institution empowered to make ‘binding decisions’ and to undertake any necessary measures to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement (Parish 2007). With the ‘unlimited legal authority to overrule domestic institutions, unilaterally impose legislation without the consent of Bosnia’s various democratically elected parliaments, and dismiss public officials’ (Parish 2007:11), the role of the High Representative gradually transformed from a manager of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts and mediator between the domestic parties, into an international legal authoritarian (Parish 2007).

The unlimited authority of the international mission to overrule all of the local institutions, the lack of control mechanisms over the OHR actions and of accountability of its powers, enabled the creation of ‘European Raj’ rather than conditions for strengthening the rule of law and the transition to a consolidated democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Knaus & Martin 2003). The criticism against the abuse of the Bonn powers, conceived as an emergency measure to confront concrete threats to the implementation of the peace accords, is that the OHR has been following a 19th century-style liberal imperialist philosophy. This has been in contradiction to the constitutional and legal manner of resolving problems and thus against the principles justifying the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The concept of the ‘international community’ with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina hence has two different aspects that are both present and active simultaneously. The first aspect is the one of the numerous institutions, working in pursuit of their particular objectives with no coherent organisation or proper co-ordination of programmes and goals. On the other hand, there is the institution of the OHR, which was not very successful as a coordinator of the international involvement and aid, but has successfully established itself as an independent and powerful institution. This centralised structure has developed its own agenda, which at certain instances - as with the enforced judicial reform in 2000 – has

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161 Which according to Knaus & Martin is a definition of tyranny (Knaus & Martin 2003:73)

162 Knaus & Martin (2003) refer to J.S.Mill and his idea that in certain circumstances the dominion of foreigners might be better able than that of all but the most exceptional indigenous rulers.
been contested and argued against by other international structures, like the Council of Europe, for example (Knaus & Martin 2003:65).

Apart from this dual agency, the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has some other specific features that have contributed to the current state of affairs. First, a direct result of the misbalanced structure of the international control, with the OHR having accumulated unlimited powers and taking on the state-building and democratisation processes, leaving aside the task to monitor, coordinate and support the international activities, is the problematic organisation of the various missions and programmes in the field. Furthermore, the lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the different actors in the field and the lack of strategic plan for reconstruction has provoked disagreements among the different international actors with respect to policies and measures applied in Bosnia.

Among the features that distinguish the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the financial support received over the years of reconstruction (1996-2008). The total amount exceeding 8 billions of US dollars is the largest aid per capita received by a country. Unfortunately, although obtaining more than 50% over and above the initially calculated sum of 5 billions of US dollars required for rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina and transforming it into a democratic country with stable social, economic, and political life, the project still has not been completed. There are even no clear indications that it will be finished successfully in the near future. The discrepancies between the amounts spent and the achieved results have discredited the positive aspect of the financial support and have contributed to the image of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a ‘black hole’ instead.

Another specific issue, concerning the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the question about the balance between the imposition of coercive powers guaranteeing the state-building process and the natural evolution and incorporation of the democratic principles and structures. One of the most serious failures of the international community was the lack of a clear plan for handing over the ownership of the processes to the local constituents. When the internationally and locally supported Alliance for Change won the elections in 2000, this was a success for the OHR policy against the ‘nationalist’ parties. The OHR however did not withdraw from direct execution of power and thus the international community missed a good chance to transfer the responsibility for the future of the country into the hands of its legitimate constituents. Together with the fact that there was no mechanism for exercising local control over the actions of the international structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this contributed to the negative tendency of seeing the responsibility for reconstruction as ‘belonging to the others’. At the highest political level, the problems with the stabilisation and democratisation of the country and the unfruitful partnership were not seen as a responsibility of the local authorities, but as a failure of the international community to achieve results (Knaus & Martin 2003:68). Along the other line of the international involvement, the power shifted from the United Nations and the United States to the European Union. External control has even grown greater as the European Union now subjects Bosnia-Herzegovina to direct regulation and the country has still little ability to build its own capacity as a functioning state (Mertus 2005).
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis. The first one is that the international community has established itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina not only as a regulator and as supervisor of the processes, but as a true ruler. This situation of course becomes even further complicated, because of the dual aspect of the international agency, the lack of co-ordination among the different players in the field, the lack of an overall strategic planning for development, as well as the moving goalposts.

Another point that becomes clearly visible is that the international actors spotted at a very early stage that the measures adopted during these first years of reconstruction (1995–1997) did not achieve any success in overcoming the hostilities and the hatreds among peoples and individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although this issue has been recognised as a serious problem, the only measure taken to deal with it was taking away the ownership of the political decisions from the constituent peoples in favour of the appointed foreign institution. The strategy drafted for resolving the issues with the civil (in this case this could be called ‘ethnic’) unrest was that the High Representative was to take unilaterally decisions when the parties were unable to reach an agreement, but not only then. The constitutionally divided population along ethnic lines was further put in a situation not to trust its central institutions and public officials, since it was only the will of the international powers in the figure of the High Representative to decide whether they have a say at all.  

From this point of view, the democratic vote of people during elections appeared meaningless (Parish 2007).

Being directly involved in the processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international actors are therefore responsible for the progress (or the lack of such) that the country has made since 1996 and the direction that the socio-political, economic, and cultural life has been developing within. Supported financially and technically by foreign governments and international organisations, run by the international community through the figure of the High Representative, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be taken as an illustrative example of the contemporary post-conflict reconstruction agenda and practice. The specific ethnic element here makes the case more interesting, because, as it was discussed in the previous chapters, the ethnic conflict destroys the very structure of the affected society, suppressing citizenship affiliations and enhancing ethnic belongings. This fragmentation along ethnic lines underlies the ruptures in all the other aspects of life in addition to the material and non-material damages caused by war.

The international community has played and is still playing an essential role for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become the country of today. Therefore, the research will assess how the major reconstruction players have addressed the issues identified as crucial for overcoming the effects of ethnic conflicts and for achieving the envisaged positive results. The focus will fall on the efforts in the direction of reconstruction of social capital with respect to interethnic integration and the restoration of citizenship affiliation. The number of international actors involved in the field does not allow all of them to be considered. Therefore, the

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163 Between 1998 and 2005 inclusive, successive High Representatives issued 757 decisions, removing 119 people from public office and imposing 286 laws or amendments to the laws (Parish 2007:15).
research will focus on the efforts of two types of agents – the OHR as a ‘consolidated’ international actor (as the mechanism-in-place of the Peace Implementation Council - PIC), and key representatives of the multifaceted community of donors and organisations that have been actively involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the years. The tricky aspect here is that the representatives of the so-defined second group are more or less the same countries and organisations that are members of the PIC. As such, their involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is mediated by the OHR. On the other hand, the same actors have engaged themselves directly in the reconstruction process, developing and implementing their own programmes and projects that in a way appear alternative, or in the best cases complementary, to the actions of the OHR. Despite the possible arguments about the contradiction that emerges here, with the same key players acting both independently and as part of the consolidated international involvement, this approach is necessary exactly because this internal contradiction affects the results. This assessment would allow certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the connection between the investments in money, time, and efforts made for social capital reconstruction and the levels of success of the reconstruction process in general.

The assessment of the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the theoretical literature and the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2 revealed that it qualifies as ‘ethnic’ in terms of the definitions adopted by the research. A closer consideration of the constitutional power-arrangements within the country and the findings from the fieldwork performed in 2003 indicated that the ethnic divide has been institutionalised in 1996 and ‘well maintained’ over the subsequent years of reconstruction. In 2003 both local actors and representatives from the international structures in the country recognised that serious efforts were needed to enable the emergence of a common (overarching the ethnic divide) platform for state-level citizenship. Despite the different perspectives, the point of intersection of the views from the field was that there is no single (national) society of Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore – no social capital at the level of state. Addressed by various organisations, in different forms and through a number of measures, no strategy was adopted to solve this problem. The lack of co-ordination of reconstruction programmes and activities and the lack of structured co-operation in this field, resulted in dispersed efforts and a puzzle of initiatives concerning social capital reconstruction, most of which with rather limited or little overall effect.

The fieldwork findings confirmed that there were persisting problems concerning inter-ethnic integration and that civil society rebuilding was seen as crucial for enabling the common future of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The findings also revealed that the local organisations were largely dependant on the policies pursued by the international donors. Therefore, instead of continuing to assemble pieces of the social capital reconstruction puzzle from within the field, the interest of the research shifted to the policy frameworks of the ‘engines’ of reconstruction – the international community and its representatives.
The previous chapter emphasised that from within the field it is rather impossible to obtain a holistic perspective about the reconstruction of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking into account the conclusion that a single positive initiative cannot bring about changes, unless being part of a broader agenda (UNHCR 2002:38), the analysis shifted to the reconstruction policies implemented by some key actors in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, in an attempt to identify whether such a broader agenda existed.

In a number of interviews carried out during the fieldwork and later in the course of the research, it became clear that both donors and beneficiaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived their donor-recipient relationship more as a patron-client connection and not as an active partnership. The limited control or the lack of such in the decision-making processes, in setting up of agendas, direction of work, or priorities contributed to the development of dominating passive attitudes towards the processes in general. Nevertheless, it is still arguable whether positive results are achievable at all without the critical involvement of the local community – in terms of support and corrective-factor.

Focusing on the role of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process of social capital (re-)construction after the experienced ethnic conflict, the current chapter will examine the reconstruction policies of some of the key agents in the field. After assessing the work of the local Mozaik Foundation in the context of the two examples of international contribution, the overall achievements of the reconstruction policies will be addressed by providing a snapshot of the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Some examples of reconstruction policies (1996 – 2008)

In 1997, two years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as an international protectorate. According to estimates made at the time, the rebuilding of the devastated country was expected to require about $5 billions (McWhirter 1996). In 2007, the international community recognised that the aid of $8 billions and more had not achieved the results envisaged 12 years earlier (Appendix 4).

Despite the view of some reconstruction agents, including the World Bank, that the post-conflict period in Bosnia and Herzegovina was contained between 1996 and 2000 (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina), it could well be argued that the Bosnian reconstruction project is still undergoing. The
specific local context, the enduring war trauma, persisting hostile and obstructive attitudes and historic legacies, and lack of developmental capacities highlight the resulting discrepancy between expectations and reality. Problems can also be spotted at the level of implementation of international reconstruction agendas and activities.

Without undermining the interrelation of different factors and the complexity of the issue, the research puts an emphasis on the role of social capital for enabling or obstructing success of post-conflict reconstruction practices (established in Chapter 3). Attempting to identify whether the broader and structured support needed for the achievement of positive changes (UNHCR 2002:38) existed, the section below will look at the reconstruction policy frameworks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Addressing the international community as the ‘designer’, ‘manager’ and ‘investor’ in the process, the interest was directed towards agendas and efforts related to social capital reconstruction and de-fragmentation of the ethnically divided society. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the large number of organisations and structures that the concept of international community encompasses and the fact that they rarely function in co-ordination, make it difficult either to consider the activities of each single agent, or to approach these as part of a single and coherent programme. Therefore, the field was approached as provisionally consisting of both consolidated and dispersed players. As the most prominent international organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OHR was chosen as an example of the former category.

1.1 Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative

Co-ordination and implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement have been the central elements of the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, deriving from the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace. The ad hoc international organisation has been provisioned both as a ‘coordinator’ and as a ‘mediator’ between the local and the international community. As the official statement reveals, it was envisaged to work simultaneously with the local people and institutions and with the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The High Representative subsequently was appointed also as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Despite the numerous attempts to establish a contact with representatives from the OHR during the fieldwork in 2003 as well as over a period in 2008 and in 2009, the OHR remained formally unapproachable. It appeared that a view from inside could be obtained only by activating personal contacts. Nevertheless, the information gathering was not essentially impeded, because, as Mr Damir Gnjidić, a Legal Advisor in OHR pointed out, the official information about the goals and the activities of the organisation were available through the official communication channels, such as the web-pages of the OHR and the EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina164 (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 12.05.2009).

164 Respectively at http://www.ohr.int and at http://www.eusrbih.eu/
The assessment of the OHR policies was based on programme documents, official reports, and public statements. Two main reasons validated the approach adopted. First, OHR appeared as a non-approachable and non-transparent institution. Formal and informal attempts to establish contacts with representatives from the organisation and to obtain detailed information about their policies, possibly with a focus on social capital reconstruction, were not very successful. Second, the interest in the publicly available documents can be justified by the conviction that as an institution established to coordinate the international support to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to provide assistance to the processes for achieving a positive change, the OHR should apply the principles of transparency, approachability and open communication both on a national and international level. If involvement and support from society are expected, the broad policy framework used as a basis of a strategically developed agenda cannot be less than a public platform.

Since 2003, the document that outlines the priorities for the OHR is the annual Mission Implementation Plan, which points out the core tasks identified by the OHR as essential for its mission. To assess the activities over the years between 1996 and 2003, various PIC declarations, conference outcomes, and statements were analysed. Valuable sources of information for the priorities as identified by the OHR were the Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and the EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2001 – 2006.

The very first conference of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), held in London in December 1995, just after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, outlined the direction that the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina was envisaged to follow (PIC 1995, London Conclusions). The Conclusions revealed that the aim of the post-conflict activities by local peoples and international actors was the achievement of peace and prosperity through ‘creating a state which will bring the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina together within a social and political framework which will enable the country to take its rightful place in Europe’ (PIC 1995:§1). Paragraph 3 revealed that the purpose of the London Peace Implementation Conference was to mobilise the international community in order to:

- create a climate of stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the achievement of a durable and lasting political settlement
- establish new political and constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina that will bring the country together within a framework of democracy and the rule of law

A contact was established with two representatives from the OHR – the Legal advisor Mr Damir Gnjidic and Mr Christopher Harland, responsible for human rights institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998-2000), Head of the Human Rights Department (2000-2002), and subsequently a member of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (2002-2004). While Mr Gnjidic confirmed the conclusions reached through the analysis of the documents, as a former high ranked official in the organisation Mr Harland provided valuable information about the OHR policies.

Rather than revealing of the character of the organisation and its communication strategy, the reluctance to reply to general public queries was seen as resulting from the enormous interest in the work of the OHR.

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\[166\] Rather than revealing of the character of the organisation and its communication strategy, the reluctance to reply to general public queries was seen as resulting from the enormous interest in the work of the OHR.
➢ protect and promote human rights and the early return of refugees and displaced persons

The need for urgent actions and immediate efforts to promote confidence and reconciliation were also identified as priorities by the authorities on both sides (PIC 1995:§14). Recognising the complexity of the tasks, the conference concluded that a new structure was required to manage peace implementation. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), composed of all those states, international organisations and agencies attending the Conference subsumed the International Commission of Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) (PIC 1995:§20 & §21). The monitoring of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, the mobilisation and the co-ordination of activities of the civilian organisations and agencies, was given to a designated High Representative (Mr. Carl Bildt, at the time) (PIC 1995: §17).

In November 1996, the PIC Paris Conclusions outlined the ‘Guiding principles of the Civilian consolidation plan’ of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (PIC 1996). The two-year consolidation period, divided into two 12-months action plans, was envisaged to cover several priority areas. The First Action Programme, introduced at the London Peace Implementation Conference in December 1996, largely repeated the conclusions of the Paris meeting.

Assessing and comparing the Paris Guidelines and the London Action Plan, it becomes apparent that there are no clear indications of how exactly the identified goals would be achieved and what measures would be taken in that respect. In the action plan presented at the London conference in 1996, the elements that can be regarded as contributing to social capital (re)building are also defined rather generally. There were no specifications of the required conditions, or what measures should have been taken for achieving the goals set in the fields of ‘Democratisation’, ‘Refugees and displaced persons’, ‘Reconstruction’, ‘Reconciliation’ and ‘Education’.

Yet at the end of 1997, the PIC meeting in Bonn came up with the conclusions the progress could have been greater ‘had the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed their full share to the construction of a civil and democratic society in the country’ (PIC 1997). Despite achievements in the following areas: ‘elections, arms control and confidence’; security-building measures; restructuring and reform of police; beginning of minority refugee returns; economic revival; development of non-partisan professional media, the Council recognised that peace and the institutions of civil society to uphold it remained fragile. It also highlighted some matters of concern, among which were the still existing illegal structures of government in the Federation and the lack of functioning common institutions, the lack of strong multi-ethnic political parties, and a structured civil society. Citizenship was not legally defined, there was no national Bosnian passport, nor jointly agreed flag.

In addition to the property and housing legislation that blocked the return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes, there were no comprehensive plans to facilitate the process. The police was not always supportive to the implementation of election results, and it did not deal effectively with politically or ethnically motivated crimes, contributing in such a way to the
widespread human rights violations. There were ongoing discriminations between Entities’ citizens with regard to visa regulations and free movement.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had failed to finance its common institutions, to implement common policies on foreign trade, apply a common customs tariff, issue common bank notes, and achieve transparency and good governance in the use of public funds. Effective institutions to curb corruption and revenue evasion were also missing. The lack of an economic policy framework was preventing an IMF Standby Arrangement and World Bank adjustment lending and rendered the country vulnerable to financial crisis.

As it becomes obvious, the expressed concerns were in contradiction to the statement that ‘essential progress was made in the respective areas’. At the same time, the highlighted issues can easily be recognised as consequences of the destroyed social capital and citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic factor, underlying the social and political divide, has constituted the local (ethnic) authorities as more important and trusted than those of the central state. Without trust among the members of the different groups, the formation of multi-ethnic association (a political party for example) is impossible. This in turn explains the lack of any multi-ethnic agenda. The lack of shared ‘symbols’ and identity markers like a national passport or a flag indicates precisely that there is no single national-level community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although most of these 1997 problems were overcome during the subsequent years of reconstruction, it still can be argued that (by 2009) the ethnic factor underlies national affiliation. ‘In order to be citizens of the State of BiH, all are conditionally citizens of one of the Entities. There are still some legal problems concerning possibility to change entity citizenship, but this is to be solved in the coming time’, revealed the OHR Legal advisor Damir Gnijidić in the interview carried in June 2009 (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 30.06.2009).

At the meeting in Brussels on 15 June 1999, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council again expressed concerns about the lack of progress in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Madrid Conclusions of 1998 (PIC 1998), specifically concerning:

- inadequate functioning of the common institutions and parallel institutions
- lack of functioning of the institutions in the Federation
- security conditions
- ethnic chains of command within the Federation institutions (whose existence after five years of reconstruction was seen as embarrassing)
- shortcomings in economic reforms in the Federation and the extent of corruption

The dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina became a central issue of the Declaration that the PIC issued following the meeting in Brussels in May 2000 (PIC 2000). Obstructionist political parties and their allies, narrow nationalistic and sectarian political interest were identified as the factors that impeded the reconstruction process in general.

The 2001 and 2002 Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, reveal that PIC identified
several strategic areas for the acceleration of peace implementation. These were the consolidation of the State institutions, economic reform, and refugee return (OHR/EUSR 2001) and the establishment of the rule of law, with a focus on a wide array of activities, including judicial reform and the fight against corruption, the speeding up of the Stabilisation and Association process and the constitutional reform in both entities (OHR/EUSR 2002a). During the discussed period, the major success of Bosnia and Herzegovina was that it joined the Council of Europe.

Slightly different appears the situation from 2003 onwards. With Lord Paddy Ashdown replacing Wolfgang Petritsch as High Representative and EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nature of the OHR role changed together with the approach to the reconstruction activities. The goal of strengthening the central institutions and of establishing a strong and functioning central state became a priority in the agenda of the High Representative Paddy Ashdown (May 2002 and January 2006). According to his strategy, the transfer of monopoly of force and control of taxation\(^\text{167}\) was expected to undermine the role of the Entities as sub-sovereign political units of the country and to build Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state with a central government (Parish 2007).

In 2003, the OHR began work on a comprehensive Mission Implementation Plan to define the core tasks that needed to ‘be completed if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to become a peaceful, viable state on course to European integration, allowing the OHR to phase out its activities’ (OHR/EUSR 2002a). As stated in the same report, the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) was intended to enable the better management of the shrinking resources available to the country, pursuing the goal of making peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina truly self-sustaining. Although reasonable, this was an interesting justification – apparently over the previous eight years, the sufficiency of resources substituted for the need to elaborate a strategic and detailed action plan for the reconstruction.

The first Mission Implementation Plan of 2003 (OHR 2003) outlined 21 programmes grouped within six ‘core tasks’ for the OHR. If strategically planned and pursued, any of the MIP programmes could contribute to social capital rebuilding. Apart from the two programmes that nominally can be regarded as directly corresponding to the problem of social capital reconstruction, Programme 4.4 - BiH State management of identity documents, and Programme 6.2 - Sustainability of returns, reconstruction of social capital does not appear in focus within the OHR Mission Implementation Plan (OHR 2003).

While the identity documents programme has been reported as successfully completed, ‘despite the politically motivated attempts to undermine it’ (OHR/EUSR 2004a), there is no detailed information about whether and how exactly the sustainability of returns has been achieved. The Human Rights and the Reconstruction and Return Task Force Departments within OHR, responsible for implementing and managing the refugee-related issues, ‘successfully closed down in 2002-2003’. No overall report or final assessment of their work and achievements was published, as confirmed by Mr Damir Gnjidić during the

\(^{167}\) The reforms he focused hence were on the judiciary, the army, the police and the taxation (Parish 2007:17)
interview carried out in June 2009 (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 30.06.2009).

As the OHR/EUSR Report for the period July-December 2004 (OHR/EUSR 2004b) reveals, the 2004 MIP contained four core tasks, made up of 26 programmes. Of the 26 programmes, 4 were completed in full: Reinforcement of the Rule of Law by Dislodging Obstructionist Networks from Key Institutions; BiH State Management of Identity Documents; BiH Parliamentary Oversight over the Armed Forces; and BiH Security Policy. Approximately 50% of all items contained in the 26 programmes were completed at the end of 2004, within the set deadlines. Within the subsequent OHR Mission Implementation Plans – of 2005 and of 2006-2007, the programmes that appear connected to the social capital rebuilding are 3.6 Programme (2005) - Reform of Mostar, and 3.9 Programme (2005, 2006-2007) - Reform of the Public Broadcasting System.

From both the OHR/EUSR Reports and the PIC Steering Committee’s meetings until 2007, it becomes obvious that the international community had not identified social capital rebuilding as a core issue and it had not been the focus of the reconstruction activities. The reform of the Public Broadcasting System certainly has been important for the accumulation of new social capital of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this in a way has stood alone, not being supported by other complementary activities within the different reconstruction sectors.

The reform of the city of Mostar (MIP Programme 3.9 of 2005, OHR 2005) appeared the only comprehensive activity of OHR, albeit on a small scale. In the context of the unification of Mostar, it has addressed the problem of social capital rebuilding and the process of joining ethnically divided institutions. On 23 July 2004, Mostar’s Stari Most, or Old Bridge – a symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina's multi-ethnic society that was destroyed during the war - was re-opened after it had been rebuilt using the same methods and materials employed nearly 500 years ago. A degree of co-operation between the moderate-leaning majorities of the main political parties was achieved as a result (OHR/EUSR 2004b).

The aims of the Mostar programme was the (re-)building of the core of a genuinely multi-ethnic professional city administration (OHR/EUSR 2005), to engage in the rebuilding of public and commercial sites, to improve the transport infrastructure and to provide accommodation for returning displaced persons, were met with varying degrees of success. Despite the previous reports indicating that significant progress had been made, in 2006 the PIC Steering Board recognised the slowdown of the unification of the Mostar city administration. This resulted from a political intransigence (PIC 2006) and welcomed the decision of the City Council to invite arbitration on some of the disputed issues and to refer the issues to the High Representative, if needed.

Another measure taken by the OHR with a direct impact on social capital reconstruction (although not clearly identified as such) concerned the education system. In its 2005 Sarajevo Communiqué, the PIC Steering Board expressed its concerns with the attempts to divide schools along ethnic lines and ‘strongly and unconditionally opposed segregation and discrimination in schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ as ‘a retrograde step...harmful to the citizens of BiH and BiH's future (PIC 2005b). Here it is interesting to note that this statement was made
three years after the official launch of the OSCE educational reform programme, aiming at overcoming the disintegration and the discrimination in the field of education and at eliminating the ‘two schools under one roof’ phenomenon. The responsible Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities were called to ‘urgently establish an effective co-ordination mechanism at the state level in order to properly coordinate education reform priorities and activities as pledged in 2002, and honour BiH’s international commitments’, the important step in which direction was the establishment of the state-level education agency (PIC 2005b).

The OHR structure, whose activities could be related to the social capital reconstruction work, was the Human Rights/Rule of Law Department. It was closed down in 2002 and its responsibilities were transferred to the OSCE as a part of the streamlining process. It is clear that by 2002 the Department did not complete the goals that had underlain its establishment in the first place, namely the implementation of the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP) and the establishment of a lasting and just peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which challenges the adequacy of the general OHR policy.

The Department was active in a wide range of areas within the field of Human Rights. ‘It supported and coordinated international and local institutions in Bosnia, worked for the establishment of legislative frameworks, was engaged in the ensuring of equal access to employment and social benefits, as well as in the enabling of sustainable minority and majority returns’, indicated Mr Harland, Head of Department in 2000-2002 (Harland in interview with the Author, 03.08.2009). In most of the sectors, social capital reconstruction was not addressed directly, but the focus of activities can be seen as corresponding to the macro-structural framework of social capital. Attention to the micro-level of social capital could be observed in the fields of ‘Education’ and ‘Economic and Social rights’, where the priorities had been defined in terms of promoting and achieving tolerance, reconciliation, and sustainable minority return.

In conclusion, although the OHR and the PIC Steering Board ‘agreed that the priorities now must be overcoming residual inter-ethnic prejudices in favour of a Bosnia and Herzegovina which is home to all its citizens’ (PIC 2005a), a comprehensive strategy, or even a clear view of how exactly to achieve this goal were missing. In other words, for the 12 years of reconstruction the OHR (as a consolidated player and a representative of the international community) has not contributed in accordance with its capacities to the (re)construction of the national Bosnia-and-Herzegovina social capital.

Assessing the OHR work through the four-dimensional model of social capital (presented in Figure 8), it appears that the focus of the organisation was placed mainly on the re-construction of the macro- and micro-levels of structural social capital, while the cognitive dimension (with some exceptions) was in a way left to

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168 Until 2002 the Department was active on a wide range of Human Rights Issues, including Human Rights Coordination Centre, Rule of Law Unit and the Independent Judicial Commission, Support for Human Rights Institutions, Civil Society and NGOs, Education, Economic and Social Rights, Gender Equality, Property Rights/Right to Return, Domestic War Crimes and Exhumations. Further information about the activities of the Department can be obtained from the official website of the OHR, at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/more.asp
self-generate from the structural adjustments. The lack of indicators for any efforts in the direction to ensure the development of a national macro-cognitive framework, as well as micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels social capital, also appears problematic.

1.2 The World Bank

The second group of international players which have been involved in the reconstruction activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1996 and the present is the group of the ‘dispersed’ players. Governmental, non-governmental, and multinational agencies of different scales and structures have been developing programmes and projects, addressing a number of issues and focusing on the local, regional, or even national level. Working independently of each other, these international actors have tended to develop and implement overlapping instead of complementary activities. The explanation of this lies in the lack of co-ordination among the reconstruction agents and of a general and comprehensive strategy for rebuilding the country.

Attempting to outline the ‘major players’ of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the research encountered certain conceptual problems. The initial assumption was that ‘key players’ should be considered those countries, agencies and/or organisations that had donated the highest amounts of money/aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that have been among the most active in the field. The information needed for performing this analysis was respectively statistical data showing the contributions over the years of reconstruction (1996-2008) and data, revealing how many of the programmes and projects run by the identified international players, had been focused on the rebuilding of state-level social capital or of some of its elements. Four different (comprehensive) sources of information, presenting statistical information about the financial contributions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, were found, as follows:

1) **Financial Tracking Service of the Relief Web database** - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/);
2) **AIDA database** - Accessible Information on Development Activities, Development Gateway (http://aida.developmentgateway.org);
4) **OECD.StatExtracts**, databases included in Source OECD Statistics; Dataset: Creditor Reporting System (http://stats.oecd.org/).

The detailed description of the sources of information used for setting up the databases, suggests that each one can be viewed as reliable on its own. In the same time, comparing the data considerable discrepancies emerge among the entries in the lists, which impedes the objective identification of the main donors and reconstruction players in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 1996 - 2008. Apart from differences in the ranking of the key donors, the amounts that the particular country or organisation had contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in mismatch (see Appendix 5). Identifying the focus of the completed projects is also a challenging task. First, public information shown in the cited databases, as well as by donors, often covers only the title, the field of
action or the targeted sector. Second, some of the entries in the examined databases cover not only projects implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but whole programmes, a part of which concerned activities carried out in the country. Third, there was no publicly available detailed information about the projects and the approached organisations did not appear willing to assist in providing details about activities performed many years ago.

Having established that the publicly available information cannot provide the necessary grounds for identifying objectively the major players in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an alternative approach was chosen. As two of the lists indicated that the International Development Agency (IDA), which is a part of the World Bank (WB) group, was among the leading donors to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The World Bank, on the other hand, is an organisation that encompasses policies and views of its members (national states), which in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also present among the top donors. Therefore, it could be argued that the policies and strategies applied by the WB were implicitly those of the member states. Being a part of the UN system, this ‘specialised agency’ appeared as a mechanism, integrating the views and policies of the 184 member countries, as well as an embodiment of the international community per se. The multiple partners, with whom the World Bank cooperated and received support from, have been an additional factor that justified its legitimacy as an important player in the international scene.

Furthermore, over the years, the World Bank has evolved into an organisation directly engaged with the issues and the problems of post-conflict reconstruction in the context of the ‘peace through development agenda’. Being the largest provider of development assistance in the world (in the form of loans, aid, technical assistance and other commitments amounting to tens of billions of dollars per year), offering also policy advise, the World Bank has an important indirect effect on local developments and ethnic relations within states (van Houten 2008:97). All the above makes the examination of the World Bank donor policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina representative of the trends within the international community concerning their involvement in the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Operating since 1945, the World Bank traditionally was engaged in promoting economic development and poverty reduction. In the 1990s, in the context of the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the World Bank shifted its attention to ethno-political and civil conflicts, developing policies for conflict-

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169 The WB in Bosnia has been cooperating with institutions such as the European Union (EU) and in particular the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), bilateral donors, such as USAID and the development agencies and departments of other countries.

170 The World Bank was established in 1944 as a part of the Bretton Woods agreement, and opened in 1945 under the official name of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Apart from IBRD, still one of its components, the World Bank Group added four more: the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association (IDA), the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The term ‘World Bank’ here refers to the organisation as a whole, but it is important to take into account the differences between its components - IBRD and IDA, for example, interact with states, while the OED played a role in shaping the World Bank’s post-conflict policies (van Houten 2007:98)
affected societies (van Houten 2008:110). This change of perspective affected its policies, programmes, and research activities. In the Operational Policy (OP) 8.5 that replaced the Operational Directive in 1995, the definition of emergency expanded to cover ‘an extraordinary event of limited duration such as a war, civil disturbance, or natural disaster’ (WB-OED 1998:5).

Recognising the need to move away from addressing the special post-conflict requirements in an ad hoc manner, and in order to guide work in post-conflict countries, in 1997 ‘A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction’ was endorsed and subsequently the Post-conflict Unit (PCU) was created. The World Bank evaluation, performed in the late 1990s on its work (WB-OED 1998), showed that it has been progressively increasing its involvement in countries engaged in or recently emerged from civil conflicts. It also indicated the ‘areas of comparative advantages’ for the Bank and those that needed improvement, especially with respect to efforts to rebuild social and human capital. The 2001 Operational Policy on Development Co-operation and Conflict outlined the World Bank actions and strategies in the various stages of conflicts (van Houten 2008:99). Acknowledging that priorities in development policies may have to be distinct for post-conflict countries, the World Bank began developing case-specific Transition Support Strategies followed by a Country Assistance Strategy (WB 2003). Established in 1997, the focus of the Post-Conflict Fund became the development of Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular of the Balkans. Between 2002 and 2005, 13.4 million US dollars were awarded to the region in the form of grants (WB 2005b).

The World Bank became involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as October 1995, establishing a representation in Sarajevo and taking part in drafting the economic management articles of the Dayton agreement (van Houten 2008:110). After a series of ‘emergency’ reconstruction programmes and projects, covering some of the most urgent recovery and reconstruction needs of a country coming out of a devastating civil war, it focused on a wider range of issues. The strengthening of the Bosnian institutions of governance, economic policy reforms, tax system, and financial sector reforms, and the improvement of social services and social welfare provision were among the objectives of these programmes.

Throughout the years, the WB country partnership strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina has evolved to reach its current organisation around two pillars. During the already mentioned interview, Mr Goran Tinjić, Senior Operations Officer at the WB office in Sarajevo, explained that, apart from the traditional

171 In addition, the Bank provided $8 million to fund a Post-conflict Programme to support and impart lessons from the Bank’s consultative and technical work in the early, preparatory stages of post-conflict reconstruction (OED 1998)
172 With the exception of the grant to Georgia, all these grants are related to conflicts in former Yugoslavia: the war in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995, the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and the ethnic riots in Kosovo in 2004. Several grants are for projects focused on refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and their host communities. Recipients of the grants vary widely, including governments, UNICEF, non-governmental organisations (e.g., the Bosnian refugee programme in Tuzla), think tanks (the policy study in Bosnia, the consensus-building programme in Serbia), and the Harvard Programme for Refugee Trauma (the mental health programmes in Bosnia) (van Houten 2008:106).
173 For further descriptions of these programmes, see OED, 2004: Chapter 2
interest of the Bank in strengthening public services, the issue in focus now is support for the EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This includes improvement of the infrastructure, general development, but also support for the enhancement of the institutional capacity in areas that relevant for EU integration. To overcome the effects of the global economic crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the WB revised its programme and envisaged an additional budget support (up to 185 million Euros) over the next two years. The identified primary objective was to help the country develop an equitable, efficient safety system and social safety net. In an attempt to address challenges related to creating an enabling environment for private sector growth and development, a small and medium enterprises line of credit – about 90 million US dollars – was envisaged.

The World Bank policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina have endured various criticisms with regard to the poor co-ordination between donors in different task forces and specific projects (WB-OED 2000). The Bank’s economic policies (Donais 2005) and achievements in the privatisation process (WB-OED 2004), the limited success in creating an effective regulatory environment and the disregarding of some specific Bosnian circumstances and problems also incurred disapproval (Pugh 2005, WB 2005d). On the other hand, the Operations and Evaluations Department (OED) 2004 report acknowledged the positive role of the World Bank in the economic transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its financial sector, tax harmonisation, and the restoration of health and education services (WB-OED 2004). Although the World Bank evaluates its involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as rather successful – as a ‘model’ for the development of its general (post-) conflict policies (WB-OED 2004; van Houten 2008:110) –, it is interesting to approach critically the statement from another point of view. Prior to examining the activities of the World Bank through the prism of the social capital reconstruction, it is important to outline its approach to ethnic conflicts in general.

Even though A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (WB 1997) acknowledged the connection between ethnic/regional conflicts and state erosion, their effect is seen as ambiguous and the ethnic issues as political and secondary to the economic factors. For a number of years the failure of economic development was considered the underlying issue, because in its absence ‘neither good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defences against large-scale violence’ (WB 2003:53). This approach to conflict has influenced the World Bank’s policies and the focus of its activities on the improvement of economic and general institutional conditions and poverty reduction (WB 2003).

Examining the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), developed by the World Bank’s Social Development Department to enhance conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention potential, it appears that ethnic issues have been included in the nine risk screening indicators (No 6 – Ethnic dominance) and in the six conflict categories (No 1 - Social and ethnic relations). A brief summary of the CAF structure, as presented in the Special report 197 of the USIP, is given in the Appendix 6.

As early as in 1998, the OED acknowledged that despite the expanded support for demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants, and the policy support for
re-establishing institutions of governance and trust, and participation by civil
society, restoring human and social capital had not been a priority in the post-
conflict programmes of the Bank (WB-OED 1998). A serious study on local level
institutions and social capital revealed the low levels of trust among people and
institutions throughout the country (Bougarel 2002). Nevertheless, this piece of
analytic work did not lead directly to any (large-scale) operation, as confirmed by
Mr Tinjić, a Senior Officer in the WB in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tinjić in
interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). He also explained:

‘We do not think that by having a project that is particularly tailored to address
reconciliation and issues of trust you will achieve the right objective. If you want
to have trust, it is better to build it around issues that are of common concern and
that are of everybody’s interest, on issues about how to build up a sustainable
economy, how to care for the most vulnerable, how to attract foreign investments
and have a dialogue about that. We promoted this dialogue and it worked
perfectly well. When we have this dialogue, representatives from different
political affiliations do not have any problems cooperating and working in close
partnership that you will find in any other country. But when it reaches the high
political agenda, then there is a problem. That’s why we are addressing these
issues on a specific and perhaps on a more limited level’ (Tinjić in interview with
the Author, 03.07.2009).

Nevertheless, in the 1990s the World Bank began undertaking systematic
measures in this direction such as introducing corruption-related conditions for
continued lending174, supporting pilot projects to instil key components of good
governance and civil society involvement, making specific operational efforts to
address the particular needs of women, and examining their role in rebuilding
social capital. In the views of Goran Tinjić, the approach adopted by the WB to
social capital reconstruction is strategically integrated in the operations and the
various programmes of the organisation. ‘Do we have a programme called
‘Reconciliation’ or ‘Reintegration’? No! But everything we do has this implicit
target’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

An example for the World Bank activities in this direction is the ‘Youth voices
group’, which gathers 18 people from throughout the country, from different
ethnic groups, regions, type of settlements (both rural and urban). Discussing
issues of concern to youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, these boys and girls help
the WB to formulate their country partnership strategy and find the most
appropriate ways of integrating the youth agenda into the programmes and
implementation plans. As Goran Tinjić stated (in interview with the Author,
03.07.2009), ‘And basically without calling it ‘reconciliation’, we have achieved
that objective. They would organise presentations in different cities, go all
together, start discussing issues that are bread and butter issues for youth. And as
a result we are now about to support a national youth strategy and we have

174 Initially reluctant, on several occasions the World Bank has used conditionality to achieve its
objectives and support the peace process. Early in the reconstruction process, the World Bank has
undermined EU attempts to use the reconstruction of the electricity grid in Mostar to improve the
integration of the Bosniak and Croat communities in the city (Boyce 2002, Mallaby 2004), but
later, in cooperation with other organisations and states, it has been declaring the intention to
withhold assistance from the Serb Republic until they were willing to politically participate in the
state (Boyce, 2002).
secured Italian funding in terms of a grant – trust fund. This is the way we would like to continue work without waving flags of ‘reintegration’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘building trust’ – we are doing it on a more technical level’.

Since 2001, the Bank has been running community driven development (CDD) projects in the poorest municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unable to invest in their own physical and social infrastructure (Cliffe., Guggenheim & Kostner 2003). Co-financed by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this project aimed at empowering the public through participation in the decision-making processes and supporting the reconstruction efforts in the country. Apart from deciding upon their development priorities, citizens were encouraged to take part in the implementation of the project, usually by providing direct labour. CDD operations aim to strengthen local governance, local service delivery, and social capital. The success of the pilot programme motivated the World Bank to apply the approach in other conflict-affected countries and by 2005 it had 86 active CDD projects in areas impacted by armed conflict (Owen, Bannon, Kuehnast, de Berry & Ahmed 2006).

Equality is another problematic issue that the WB recognises and addresses as a part of its developmental policy, but also as a part of the social capital reconstruction agenda. As revealed by the OED report of 2000 (WB-OED 2000:61) the World Bank programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the early and balanced inclusion of social sectors in the social projects. As Mr Tinjić revealed, a survey undertaken by the WB has shown that Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the highest spenders on social benefits in Europe. It spends about 4% of its GDP – and yet less than 80% of poor people receive such benefits (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). These social expenditures apparently were not well targeted.

In the views of the WB officer, the current system is very unaffordable. It is a huge burden on the economy: it has led to a budget deficit in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also it creates negative incentives on the labour market, and has a negative impact on capital investment. The well targeting of social expenditures and the development of adequate programmes for people, who are really in need, are areas that the WB envisages to concentrate their efforts in the near future. As Goran Tinjić explained (Interview with the Author, 03.07.2009), ‘At the moment society is differentiated and polarised between different groups. On one hand, you have a lobby of demobilised soldiers and veterans who were promised benefits and who do not tend to work much and earn for living. On the other hand, there are the others that are essentially paying this bill and are increasingly nervous about it. This does not contribute to building really a strong social capital in the country’.

The WB has also identified the investments in human capital (education, health, community services, etc.) as an important component of its post-conflict work (WB-OED 2004, WB-OED 2000). The first to be disrupted by a conflict, these

175 Out of 16 emergency projects one provided support for the social fund, 2 ‘social projects’ focused on education and war-victim rehabilitation; 4 could be classified as having a primarily social emphasis (war victims, education, hospital services, and demobilisation and reintegration) and with including the employment generation, microcredit, and housing repair projects could be included, the number would increase to 7 (WB-OED 2000:61)
sectors could have extremely negative effects on a society. Understanding the interrelation between these issues and the aimed economic progress, the WB has set up a large portfolio for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the Emergency Recovery Project and the Emergency Education Reconstruction Programme did not bring the expected results. In the year 2000, the Emergency Recovery Project was evaluated as having been too widely dispersed and not sufficiently means-tested (WB-OED 2000:61). Despite the education reconstruction programme having some positive results in rebuilding the educational infrastructure, the OED report revealed that promising initiatives in reconciliation and tolerance education by 2000 were isolated cases – there were continuing sensitivities on the language issue, resistance from the authorities resulting in a policy vacuum, etc (WB-OED 2000:61). In April 2009, during his presentation at the Director’s Forum at Woodrow Wilson Centre, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Nikola Špirić confirmed that the educational reform in the Federation was still an issue (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

Another approach for assessing the WB policy towards social capital reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina is through the financial support allocated to this sector. According to the WB project database for Bosnia and Herzegovina (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina), since 1996, the Bank has committed more than 1,644,059,224 of USD in the form of loans, credits and grants. The tables in Appendix 7 indicate that although the money flows to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the ‘post-reconstruction period’ (2000-2009) has diminished, it has been as substantial as during the reconstruction period (1996-2000). The 2004 OED Report revealed that assistance in these first years was committed to the rebuilding of the country and the sectors, identified as vital for its future development (OED 2004, Table A4b); the overall performance of the projects closed by the end of December 2003 is seen as satisfactory (WB-OED 2004:8). The Bank’s emergency reconstruction projects in the period 1996-2000 involved rehabilitation of industries, infrastructure, housing, schools, and hospitals; establishment of micro-credit institutions; landmine

176 Emergency Social Fund focused on providing the necessary social infrastructure and services
177 Loss of teachers, destruction of schools (about 70 percent were damaged, destroyed, or requisitioned for military use), and the lack of safe access during the hostilities were among the factors that affected severely the education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore these issues have underlie the Emergency Education Reconstruction Programme (WB-OED 2000:61)
178 58 projects were completed between 1996 and 2009; and 15 more are envisaged to end in the upcoming years - until 2014 (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina). The $150 million Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina (TFBH) was established in early 1996 to enable loans and grants for emergency projects to be made prior to the in the Bank. In addition to establishing the $150 million TFBH, the Bank made an exceptional IDA allocation to Bosnia and Herzegovina of $400 million for the period financial year (FY) 96–99. In 2000, Bank management proposed continuing exceptional IDA support of $300 million for FY00–02, approximately three times the norm, no longer justified for reconstruction, but by the need to continue Bank leadership on policy reform. In 2002, the Bank allocated IDA support of SDR 128 million for the financial years (FY) 03–05 and subsequently the management affirmed IDA allocation of SDR 25 million yearly in FY05 (WB-OED 2004:65)
179 It should be noted that considering the WB support to Bosnia and Herzegovina using the AIDA database the number of projects entries and the respective amounts and totals differ from the entries in the WB database. Since the evaluation and the analysis of the discrepancies can be the object of analysis of a separate study, this research has focused on the WB database as an immediate source of information and reference.
clearance; and support for war victims and demobilised combatants; as well as the establishment of Project Management Units (PMUs)\textsuperscript{180} for every project. The underlying idea was that the PMU’s would compensate for weaknesses in government structures and staffing.

Since 1996, the WB has launched more than 70 projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only few have been identified as directly targeting social capital reconstruction. As Mr Tinjić outlined, the philosophy of the WB efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to address the issues of integration and reconciliation through different mechanisms and within various developmental projects. The description of the project sectors and themes, as presented in the WB project database (see Appendix 7) implicitly confirms the suggestion about the ‘added value’ of social capital, and on the other hand indicates that there is no clear platform or practical framework for monitoring and assessing the projects’ achievements through this perspective.

The break down of the WB financial assistance by sectors also does not indicate the volume of resources allocated directly to social capital reconstruction. This lack of estimates is an indicator that social capital rebuilding has not been considered an area per se. During the interview in 2009, a question was posed to the WB in Sarajevo Senior Operations Officer Mr Tinjić concerning the existence of any official data on the amount/percentage of assistance provided for the rebuilding of social capital rebuilding. Having accepted the question as a direct attack on the institution, Mr Tinjić suggested that ‘the official break down of WB support to Bosnia and Herzegovina by sectors is available from our website. Of course you can always challenge that we have not done much in respect to social capital rebuilding but we are convinced that it has been a lot’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

Since the WB project database does not provide units or mechanisms for measuring this additional aspect of the project performance, the evaluations of the levels of success and the programme achievements could vary depending on the point of view for their interpretation. According to the WB officer, with its dedicated work, the organisation has contributed to the reconciliation and reintegration of the country. ‘We wanted to provide assistance to build the economy, to build a single economic space that will allow for free movement of goods, people, and capital. We have helped achieve this objective in many different ways – through supporting financial sector development, commercial banking reform and by adopting a harmonised set of legislation in the two Entities’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

After overcoming the reconstruction challenges of the first post-war years, the main objectives of the World Bank and the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina have become the strengthening of central state and the creation of a strong and unified economy and governance through reforms in the public administration, financial sector and the social provisions (van Houten 2008: 110).

\textsuperscript{180} While the Bank attempted to persuade other donors providing parallel funding for IDA projects to operate through the same PMU, this effort was not always successful. Some projects have been managed by two or more PMUs, and a number of issues have arisen over time regarding PMUs (WB-OED 2004:8)
Accepting the view that a well-established and healthy business environment does not recognise inter-Entity boundary lines and political differences, the World Bank has invested in supporting the business, enabling in this way the establishment of a single economic space that would support the interaction among people and the development of a community feeling ‘without even getting into high politics. That worked relatively well’ stated Mr Tinjić (in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

In this particular case, both the approach and the results could be challenged. In April 2009, giving a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Bosnian Prime Minister, Nikola Špirić pointed out that not only that a single economic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina was missing, but also that the economic development of the Entities has been unequal. This created tensions within society, but most importantly between the Entities (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009). The specific situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina required that initiatives be supported not only by the central state, but also at Entity level. Considering the model of the establishment of European Union, it becomes evident that success in conflict prevention can be achieved when political and economic agenda are integrated and not separated.

In the interview, the WB official maintained that the ‘strength of the WB is not in the political arena, but we believe that by helping the country sustain its economy, sustain the needs of the most vulnerable, there would be less incentives for high political agenda and more incentives for addressing current issues’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). Certainly, economic reforms that reach the most vulnerable can play an important role for re-integration and reconciliation in the country; they can hardly inspire trust among people. Single currency and single vehicle plates are also components of a community building process uniting people regardless of their ethnicity, of their social status or anything else and still they could not change attitudes or overcome prejudices. While pointing out the success achieved by the World Bank in these directions, Goran Tinjić confirmed that the constitutional debate in the country has been still running; still there have been tensions between different political (ethnic) groups, affecting to certain degree the WB operations, but not stopping them from moving forward.

The WB in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been regarding the ‘conflictual political environment’ and the ‘lack of trust, which shows on many levels’ as serious challenges to its involvement. Problems were encountered not exactly at the level of planning, but predominantly at the level of the programme implementation. As Mr Tinjić stated, ‘No matter that we are proposing and the government agrees to these sound measures, when it comes to the actual implementation, there are all sorts of problems’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

This lack of trust comes into play also when a process requires simultaneous but independent involvement of different (ethnic) groups. Mr Tinjić pointed at the Croat and Bosnian components within the Federation and at the two armies organised around these two ethnic groups. Despite at present enjoying the same level of benefits, the mistrust blocks the reforms, because people from each group are reluctant to give up receiving particular benefits, because they are not convinced that the other side would do the same. The approach of the World Bank...
in such cases is to identify the most rational and objective approach, to set up common assessment criteria and to implement the procedures in the most transparent way. Creating a database, integrating it in an information system and performing an independent medical assessment for identifying the beneficiaries, are among the mechanisms that are expected to convince the groups that there will be a fair and objective allocation of resources.

In the year 2000, the World Bank acknowledged that despite recognising the severity of the problem with the destruction of social capital, neither the Bank nor any other international donor had a comparative advantage in this area (WB-OED 2000:8). Regardless of positive donor and societal initiatives181 and the close contacts maintained with NGOs and agencies,182 rebuilding a pluralist civil society remained problematic. In 2009, Mr Tinjić concluded that ‘it was relatively easy to build road, bridges, hospitals, schools right after the war. It is much more difficult to implement structural reforms that touch upon these issues of trust, reconciliation, constitutional framework and of the very transition from one economic system to another, from central planning to a market economy’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).

Analysing the World Bank social capital rebuilding activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several conclusions have been reached. Social capital reconstruction has been included as an ‘added value’ to the different projects and programmes of the WB portfolio for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, this could have a positive impact because of the potential simultaneous approach to social capital reconstruction in many different fields. The lack of a clear strategy to social capital (re-)emergence however, has impeded the achievement of any envisaged levels of success. The support for the common (shared) interests of the groups could contribute to social capital emergence and accumulation. Beyond common practical interests, however, are the symbolic and emotional affiliations, which are highly sensitive to political agendas; ignoring politics in this respect would not help the process. Removing the material incentives for a political agenda is both a time- and resource-consuming task, which has an ‘ongoing potential’ since incentives change with society. Furthermore, changes in politics come from people’s votes and control over politicians. This in turn requires an active citizenship, which cannot be formed only based on shared economic interests.

Enabling formal affiliations with the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that overcome ethnic divides requires a clear policy. Such in fact is missing in the reconstruction programmes of the World Bank and of the international community in general. Integrated as an ‘added value’, the social capital element remains in the shadow of the priority programmes and activities of the World Bank. The research on social capital performed as early as in 2001 (Bougarel 2002) remained underexploited, i.e. not becoming programme documents for subsequent activities

181 The Office of Transition Initiatives in USAID is perhaps the largest supporter of media efforts to promote democracy.
182 The Soros Society had a ‘Civil Society Education Programme;’ the EU - a democracy programme(WB-OED 2000:62); Other areas that in which Bank-supported efforts expanded in the 1990s were the activities related to the demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian economy and society, as well as to the support of women as the productive basis for restarting the economy and have potential as strong community leaders who can facilitate the rebuilding of social capital
and programmes in the field. This fact, confirmed by Mr Tinjić during the interview conducted in 2009, can be explained exactly with the lack of a strategic policy towards the rebuilding of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Counter-arguments to statements about successful reconstruction achievements are the (recognised) mistrust, the missing single economic space, the political tensions, and the existing divisions along ethnic lines.

Projecting the WB programmes through the prism of the social capital model (see Figure 8) it appears that the most of the activities identified as contributing to the (re-)construction of social capital have addressed the macro- and micro-structural levels. In contrast to the OHR however, the Bank has focused more efforts in the dimension of cognitive social capital but again positive result were expected to derive from the other developmental efforts.

The analysis of documents and the personal testimonies revealed that social capital reconstruction was not targeted in pursuit of a particular plan and hence no specific programme was developed. The community driven development projects could be seen as contributing to both micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels. The fact that within their frameworks the accumulation of social capital was considered an ‘added value’ did not lead to the elaboration of measurement tools. Hence, success and achievements of these projects with respect to the social capital reconstruction can be evaluated only implicitly.

Another problem stems from the lack of co-ordination between the programmes focused on the reconstruction of elements at the macro- and micro-levels. The lack of an overall strategy and of a synchronised approach to the different sectors is a possible reason for performance results remaining away from the expected. A prove for this discrepancy is the difference between the estimated cost of the reconstruction process and the real expenditures (still running), or between the timeframes set and those needed in reality for achieving certain results.

As the theoretical chapters suggested, to avoid distortion of social capital a reconstruction policy should address all the macro- and micro-, structural and cognitive levels simultaneously and should aim at building a coherent overall structure. Social capital needs to be fed at the lowest level, but the macro-framework cannot be bypassed. In the case of the complex environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a clear understanding of the problem can help mobilise the grass-root level and the international community to combine efforts for influencing upon the divisive political level.

The assessment of the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to social capital reconstruction revealed that the OHR and the World Bank have implemented a number of initiatives with ‘added social capital value’. Nevertheless, the two of the most prominent and active organisations failed to develop and implement a coherent and consistent policy in the field of social capital rebuilding and the overcoming of the ethnically divisive politics and structures. The fieldwork and other interviews carried out with representatives from the field did not indicate the existence of any large donor that has been addressing strategically these issues. Even if there were such, a programme that has remained unpopular or unknown to the representatives of the local organisations certainly would not be of the scope and quality needed for achieving
essential positive changes. A broader policy framework for social capital reconstruction has not been identified.

1.3 Mozaik Foundation

In contrast to the large-scale and all-encompassing programmes implemented by the above-presented organisations, a small Bosnian NGO called ‘Mozaik’\(^\text{183}\) (formerly known as ‘NGO Development Foundation’) has focused its efforts on the social capital (re-)building throughout various communities in the country. The philosophy pursued by this organisation proves the validity of the theoretical conclusions reached by the research. The sole fact that the NGO representatives recognised issues related to the reconstruction of social capital in the post-ethnic-conflict environment as crucial, supports the focus adopted in this work.

Several reasons justified the selection of Mozaik Foundation for a case study. First, as it was mentioned above, a serious problem that the fieldwork faced was the reluctance on the part of both national and international organisations to discuss their work and achievements. Then, as emerged from the interviews, the actors involved in the field had no detailed information about what the other organisations were doing. Asked about programmes focused on social capital reconstruction, the representatives of the institutions addressed were able to make one or two suggestions but also indicated that these were rather tentative guesswork on their part. On the other hand, as it was shown above, projects and initiatives on social capital existed, but mostly within the frameworks of other programmes and agendas. Mozaik Foundation was identified as an organisation dedicated to social capital reconstruction and building civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also been and still is supported by a number of international organisations and foreign donors, which affirms the Foundation as an internationally recognised local actor.\(^\text{184}\)

The initial information about Mozaik Foundation and its work was gathered in 2003, through a series of interviews with Mr Zoran Puljić, Director of the organisation known at the time as NGO Development Foundation, Ms Ivana Goić and Mr Muhamed Durmić – Programme Coordinators. In 2008, additional information about the work of the foundation over the period between 2003 and 2008 was obtained again from Mr Zoran Puljić and Ms Eni Kurtović, Mozaik's Development Manager.

This indigenous non-governmental organisation was first established outside Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000) and only later (2002) was registered in the country. Mr Puljić explained that the organisation was initiated inspired by a research called ‘Service Delivery or Civil Society’ (done by a Canadian

\(^{183}\) ‘Mozaik’ is the Bosnian word for ‘mosaic’. The Bosnian name has been used throughout the text to prevent any confusion with other organisations bearing the name ‘Mosaic’, as for example the American ‘Mosaic Foundation’, a charitable and educational organisation dedicated to improving the lives of women and children with focus on the Arab world.

\(^{184}\) Among the main international donors of Mozaik Foundation are: the World Bank, King Baudouin Foundation, Open Society Fund, Dutch Government through CARE Intl., CARE International, C.S. Mott Foundation
researcher Ian Smillie\textsuperscript{185}, questioning whether, in the complex environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the focus of support should fall on delivering social services or on building civil society. Taking into account the recommendations made in the research, one of which was that there should be an indigenous body to support the local NGO sector after the international community leaves, the Canadian government promised to allocate funds. Establishing the organisation, the management of the NGO Development Foundation – the official name of Mozaik at the time – continued negotiating and waiting for the financial support for the two years between 2000 and 2002, instead of attempting to secure other funds. This made the boards of the foundation change the management as soon as the money arrived and the real work could start. As Mr Puljić stated, ‘Therefore we say that as an idea, the organisation has existed for the last four years, but it was over the last two years when we actually started working’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003).

The Director explained also that the goal of the foundation was to perform activities throughout the country – i.e. both in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republica Srpska. ‘However, before the changes of legislation in 2002, this was not possible. An NGO registered in one of the Entities was allowed to work only within the respective territorial boundaries. The removal of the legislative constraints in October 2002 enabled us to obtain a state-level registration’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003).

Mozaik Foundation has dedicated its efforts and work to the general improvement of different small communities throughout the territory of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As explained by the Programme Coordinator Ivana Goić (in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003), ‘the communities are completely divided along different lines - if we can call them such when there is no community sense at all – which prevents people from undertaking common activities’. As Muhamed Durmić revealed further, the Foundation supported various projects, infrastructural improvements, and repair of local roads, village water-supply systems, streetlights or building of access ramps and organising creative workshops for enabling the inclusion of disabled population (Durmić in interview with the Author, 25.06.2003). Among the primary objectives of Mozaik remain the facilitation of democratic processes and the participatory development of local communities based on shared interests and preservation of historical and cultural heritage.

Recognising that social capital is a very broad term, Zoran Puljić pointed out that through their projects as well as functioning as a re-granting organisation, the Foundation tries to stimulate local contribution, local involvement, local responsibility sharing, local governments, business, media, and citizens. ‘We work through local NGOs and what we try to make them do is to talk to each other, define problems that they think they could actually solve; prioritise those problems and then eventually with our assistants, but also with lots of community involvement, deal with the problem’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003).

\textsuperscript{185} The research mentioned is: Smillie, I. 1996, Service Delivery or Civil Society: Non-Governmental Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CARE Canada: Zagreb
Explaining the community-driven development approach that the organisation adopted in its work with community members, Mr Puljić revealed the philosophy of Mozaik activities. ‘We think that the right way is to give people we work with concrete purpose or goal, to make them our partners in the project. From our part, we focus on the process, on all the synergies that can be created within the local community. And the money we give is only in addition to what they should be doing anyway. So, this is kind of a kick-start - to put the existing local energy in motion’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003). Therefore, the Foundation did not prescribe which types of projects communities ought to work on, but instead it worked with their representatives to define community priorities, devise and support local solutions to community problems, and implement projects that benefit the community at large. It aimed at motivating the community members to identify and mobilise locally available human, financial and material resources.

Commenting about the field, the Programme Coordinator Ivana Goić said that the situation was bad. ‘We mainly work in cities with a population of up to 35 000. There is a collapse of all kind of state services; it is getting more and more difficult for people to provide for their living, which reflects on their minds. They have this large sense of apathy and there is a general feeling of hopelessness. This can also explain the little initiative for action, because people believe they can not change anything. The governments are not responsive very much to the local citizens, sometimes because they do not know about their problems, sometimes because they do not want to, and sometimes because they do not have the money for this’ (Goić in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003). In the views of the members of the organisation, most of the funds that the complicated government systems operated with have been allocated to institutional structures, military and police, but not to the citizens.

Working on a grass-roots level, Mozaik first would identify the areas where they would perform their activities. ‘Then we go there and talk to the different stakeholders. We try to identify the levels of energy and potential of these communities to do something. Based on that we organise meetings with representatives from local communities – as many as there are willing to attend our discussions – and the local community decides which NGOs they would like to work with. The principle we follow very strictly is that the community must identify their problems’ pointed out Mr Durmić (in interview with the Author, 25.06.2003). As a result, communities would build relationships (the intangible aspect of our work) and would mobilise to solve specific local problems (tangible aspect), increase the quality of life and obtain ‘control’ over community life.

Among the tools used by the Foundation to promote and facilitate local change, were grant making and advisory support. The achievement of concrete and tangible results was seen as a perfect basis for improving relations among community members at large. Building cohesive communities through facilitation of social cohesion and developing people’s abilities to mobilise local resources and to meet local needs; lessening the effects of the 1992-1995 war; building trust and confidence, and supporting reconciliation and nation-building processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were identified by Mozaik as the key elements of its mission. Their main goal (as officially stated on the foundation’s website) has been to contribute to the development of healthy and productive communities,
whose members share common values and goals and participate in the activities, which increase the common good, and in this way also increase social cohesion throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The words of Zoran Puljić also confirmed this:

‘We are trying to focus not on problems but on solutions. When you adopt such an approach, it is easy to work with the different ethnic groups. For example if there is a road in a horrible condition and the community recognises this as a problem for all of its members (no matter whether Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats), we grant money for improving the infrastructure, but by participating in the works and doing this together we believe that we enable the (re-)building of social capital. People might not like the fact that they have to work together, but they recognise the fact that they have to join because of this common problem. And this is the first step’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003).

Presenting the programmes that the Foundation was managing at the time, Ms Goić emphasised that the four programmes (and each of the 10 projects in total) were targeting the same goals, as explained above. Apart from the ‘Small community mobilisation fund’ and the ‘Community development’, in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina they were running the Living heritage programme and in several cities of Republica Srpska (Srebrenica, Bratunac, Jajce, and MrKonjić Grad) together with CARE International they were supporting the integration of the returnees.

In these programme areas, Mozaik has been applying the community-driven development methodology developed for pursuing the goals of the Foundation. **Living Heritage and Tourism** (3-year programme with total value of 570,000 Euros) was launched in 2002 to support preservation and active use of living heritage resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently transformed into a Programme Called Bosnian Kingdom Trail, the initiative supported community actions of 10 medieval Bosnian cities. In addition to the upgrading of local infrastructure and preparing it for tourist visits, Mozaik has assisted the communities in providing links to potential tourist markets. Furthermore, it has been providing support for resolving problems in the course of the project implementation.

‘The problems that local communities face depend on the particular work they have undertaken’ explained Ms Goić. ‘The Living Heritage programme is more or less anything that could promote local identity building. It could involve development of natural, historical, religious, whatever kind of resources that they have and make the local community proud of. Whatever they think is a priority for that community this is what we will provide support for - as long as the people meet and discuss, prioritise problems, and identify available or needed resources’ (Goić in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003).

As regards the challenges that Mozaik Foundation itself faced, Mr Puljić revealed that sometimes the most difficult thing was to bring people together to discuss their common problems. The lack of initiative and the lack of willingness to cooperate were additional problems. ‘We do not work with communities where people wait for us to suggest an activity, or where people do not want to do anything for themselves. If they cannot recognise their interest and put some effort
to pursue it, it is likely that they are interested in our presence only because of the possible financial benefits. And we do not want to support such trends’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003). In general, in the view of Mozaik representatives, the type of work they performed had started too late. These conclusions were reached while observing the situation of returnees, who going back to their pre-war ‘home’-communities, were suffering isolation and exclusion in various aspects of life, and this constituted a big social gab.

In 2004, the Foundation began awarding grants to any community in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was willing to mobilise its own existing resources to solve local problems. For Active Communities programme awarded 35 grants of up to 10,000 Euro to communities all across Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Civic Advocacy Partnership Programme, the communities received support for activities to involve citizens in initiatives of common interest. By strengthening the (inter-ethnic) communities, the intention was to develop capabilities for joint decision making and participatory planning of local development, as well as capacities for mobilisation of local resources and lobbying for the interests of rural communities at local government.

Larger grants (up to 20,000 Euros) were awarded to three multiethnic communities for solving infrastructural problems in ethnically divided communities and thereby helping reconciliation. Through working together on issues of infrastructure and increasing public readiness in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aim was to support the development of returning communities; contribute towards dialogue and mutual respect; solve infrastructural issues; improve the quality of life and to promote these activities as examples of good practices for the community development.

Apart from the Inclusion of Disabled Population and Philanthropy Promotion (corporate social responsibility award competition and bi-annual fundraising workshop), Mozaik has run also a programme called Youth Bank, which aimed to increase the participation of young people in the developmental processes of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s rural communities. Youth Bank created opportunities for youth-led groups to meet the needs of their communities – working on projects (cultural, sports etc.), participating as active citizens in their communities and developing professional governance and management skills through capacity building exercises and practical experience in operating a small grants programme that directly supports young people in rural areas.

As an intermediary Foundation, Mozaik faced challenges such as how effectively to translate the complex donor language into a language that can be understood in rural communities. The policy of Mozaik as a multi-ethnic organisation operating in the whole country, irrespective of political or administrative divisions, was to fund initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were not intended against other people, while mobilising community action and contribution.

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186 Integrating Rural Returning Communities was developed and implemented in partnership with CDD Network members, ‘DON’ (Prijedor), ‘Nature’ (Bratunac) and ‘Under the same sun’ (Jablanica)
The approach and nature of the activities performed by the Foundation, were considered to be representative for what this research views as a basic requirement, when or if reconstruction aims at building stability in a post-conflict environment of activated ethnic, religious, cultural or other non-negotiable lines of separation. This has been based on the assumption that if people are motivated to think rationally of their future and presented with opportunities to do something for themselves that would bring direct benefits and would improve their living conditions, they could eventually overcome the ‘senti-mental’ walls established during or as a result of the experienced conflict. Rebuilding connections and relationships of trust within smaller local communities should precede the attempts to connect various ‘trust-units’ into a larger network. The top-down approach, especially when the very idea of a nation does not exist or the basic unit of any civil society – the citizens – has disappeared and been replaced with ‘ethnic-community members’, could hardly be successful.

Mozaik has undertaken exactly this approach, implementing their programmes on a limited and local scale. Defining ‘community’ both geographically – as a group of people linked by a specific geographic location (i.e. village or small town) and ‘by interest’ – as a group of people that have a common interest, irrespective of their geographic location (i.e. artists), the Foundation has enabled the creation of a (initially virtual) environment, within which the ethnic differences between people did not matter. This approach also has been reflected by their understanding of social cohesion adopted as both starting and targeted point of their work. According to Mozaik ‘Social cohesion is a state of harmonious and productive social relations where community members, irrespective of differences in social and economic status, share common values and goals, have a sense of mutual commitment and belonging to the community, a sense of solidarity, responsibility and mutual recognition, and participate in activities for the common good’ (http://www.mozaik.ba).

The organisation has been monitoring and assessing several indicators in order to evaluate the progress and the levels of success of their work in building social cohesion. The first indicator taken into account was whether the respective project would be the first activity after the war that the community would undertake while applying a participatory approach in planning and implementing community development initiatives. Then Mozaik would consider the number and structure of people involved in the planning process, the level of community contribution (including various sources of funding), the number of volunteers and the number of institutions involved in planning and implementing the activities. In addition, the local benefits achieved would also be looked at, as they would play the role of multiplier for further community initiatives. As for the indirect positive effect on communities, this was measured by the Foundation through the number of successful projects in building capacities of NGOs to apply the participatory approach (community driven development approach) and in using new techniques to inform communities, to plan initiatives and to mobilise local resources.

‘It is really difficult to measure success in the field where we work’, acknowledged the Development manager Ms Eni Kurtović, approached in 2008 for updated information about the performance of Mozaik. ‘There are tangibles and intangibles. Tangibles are easy to evaluate. There are meetings, there are people coming together, there are a number of partnerships explored; there is so
much money coming from the local government, so much money from local business - so it's pretty easy. But in terms of building social capital, we have decided to evaluate changes within communities over the period of our work there. And we were particularly happy to see that there are some initiatives that have emerged without being pushed by us – we believe that is something that we have contributed to in the first place. However, we are still developing tools for better assessing the achievements of our goals’ (Kurtović in interview with the Author, 19.11.2008).

The number of initiatives supported has also been accepted as an indicator for success in respect to community development. The programmes that the Foundation has run over the years have addressed local community needs throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, over the period 2002 – 2005, the ‘Living Heritage’ programme has supported 26 projects in 22 communities of central and western Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘For active communities’ programme has covered 45 actions such as renovation of sport, children’s or community playgrounds and parks, planting trees, building water reservoir, walls, bus stops, etc., undertaken by 42 organisations. Targeting integration of marginalised groups, and especially disabled people, the ‘Small grants program’ (2007-2008) has supported 18 projects in 13 different municipalities.

The approach to mobilise community members to achieve positive changes, was first developed within the frameworks of a programme called ‘Fond of local initiatives’ (2003 – 2005). Initially, Mozaik sent letters to 50 different communities of 20 municipalities to invite them to submit project proposals to the foundation. The primary condition was that each community had to define together a problem that it would identify as essential for its members. Forty-nine communities replied to this invitation and 16 of the submitted project proposals were approved for financing.

It is important to point out that the grants distributed by Mozaik foundation for the individual projects within the frameworks of the different programmes were relatively small – for example between 250 - 750 USD (Living Heritage programme), or between 3500 – 6500 USD (Fond for Local Initiatives). Apart from managing to support larger number of communities, this can also be evaluated as a mechanism that has the potential to prevent abuse or misuse of larger resources, as well as it motivated people to submit concrete and realistic project proposals. Another interesting feature of the Mozaik approach was that they managed to involve many volunteers at the local level – for example 363 volunteers have participated in the ‘Small grants program’, covering 7686 working hours, while in the ‘For active communities’ programme 1463 volunteers have covered 18,236 working hours.

The other type of programmes, closely related to social capital rebuilding, that the Foundation has been developing involved citizenship and civil society development. Particularly interesting in this context was the project ‘101 answers of why to vote?’, which goal was to motivate people to participate in the elections. The ‘Community organisation for better environment’ focused on providing support for local non-governmental organisations (20 projects presented by 20 NGOs were granted between 1000 and 1700 Euro); and connecting them within a
viable network (‘Local NGOs network’ supported 17 NGOs in their efforts to promote actions, to deliver training, etc.).

To summarise, the work of Mozaik throughout the years has targeted in a comprehensive manner the most critical community needs, identified in terms of reconciliation, inter-cultural dialogue, and socio-economic development. To achieve these goals, the Foundation has attempted to develop and promote a clear mission, vision and values, relying on a highly participatory approach and spreading their initiatives and work throughout the whole country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, the organisation has acknowledged that its dependency on foreign support was a serious weakness, as was the attempt to cover with the (limited) available resources as much of the country as possible. ‘Nevertheless, we do not play a role of a mediator between the local NGOs and the state or the local authorities. If there is a problem – like obtaining certain permission for example - they should cope with it. The NGO we support financially should deal with the local governments and institutions. We are just observing the process. That is how we think social capital could be built. We would not be helpful if we say ‘OK, we have a friend in OHR, we'll do things faster’. Let it last longer, but let it be done by people themselves’, emphasised the Director, Mr Puljić (Puljić in interview with the Author, 08.04.2009).

Despite the limited funds Mozaik has been operating with (the total budgets of some of the programmes were as follows: ‘Living Heritage’ – 260,583 Euros, ‘For active communities’ – 70,000 USD, ‘Small grants program’ – 31,500 USD, and ‘Fond for local initiatives’ – 162,000 USD), the Foundation has assessed the impact of its work using two main indicators. Although rather difficult to measure the first indicator – increased social cohesion – the elements that Mozaik has been monitoring in order to evaluate their performance were evidences for: improved co-operation within local communities, integration contacts, new cross-community initiatives, improved local image, appreciation of heritage of others, networking with other communities, cross-sectoral links, development of shared spaces. The second indicator that the Foundation has taken into consideration for assessing the impact of their programmes has been the increased community participation in community development process. It was measured based on the increased awareness and appreciation of local resources, participation in planning, implementation and evaluation, replication, continuation and sustainability of project ideas, local community contribution.

The performance of the Mozaik Foundation with respect to social capital reconstruction can be assessed both subjectively and objectively, accepting that individual perceptions would correspond to the fist approach, whereas third party evaluation could provide an unbiased assessment. Although subjective, personal statements concerning the experienced changes in the surrounding environment as a result of the Mozaik activities are in fact evidence of positive achievements. The words of Ivana Goić about their personal experience as project implementers indicate that the Foundation managed to initiate processes within the communities where the organisation was active. ‘The first time we go to a community we try to make people (everybody willing to join) gather together in one room and to discuss common problem. It is never easy in the beginning. Then we present to them the idea of our support – that we will provide them a grant but only if they ménage to reach a common decision of what community good this money would
go for and how the local population would contribute to the project. One of the places we had to visit about three times before people started talking to each other, but eventually they came up with the idea to rebuild the main road in the village and everybody was happy about it’ (Goić in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003).

Figure 15: 2003 Rating of NGO Development Foundation (Now Mozaik Foundation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Development</td>
<td>BBB 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Efficiency and Growth</td>
<td>BBB 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Impact</td>
<td>A+ 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>A 6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>BBB 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>BBB+ 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the continued support from its own donors (such as the World Bank, or the King Baldwin Foundation), an example for the objective evaluation of the Mozaik contribution was the assessment evaluation performed by the Foreign Aid Ratings service\textsuperscript{187}. This social-value rating agency for non-profits, companies, and governments worldwide has evaluated the work of the NGO based on parameters such as institutional development, financial efficiency, social impact, transparency, and accountability and monitoring and evaluation scheme. The social impact of the Foundation was acknowledged yet in 2003 – the original chart is presented below: The NGO Development Foundation was awarded a Foreign Aid Rating of BBB+ for small-medium foundations (Foreign Aid Ratings LLC (2003) Rating Profile: NGO Development Foundation – Sarajevo, http://www.foreignaid.com/ratings2/NGODEVFoundation/)

To evaluate their own performance, Mozaik Foundation also developed their own system for measurement and evaluation (Kurtović in interview with the Author, 19.11.2008), using indicators such as:

- participatory approach in planning and implementing community development initiatives
- number and structure of people involved in planning process
- level of community contribution (raised from various sources of funding)
- number of volunteers involved
- number of institutions involved in planning and implementing the action
- local benefits achieved (as motivational factor for further community initiatives)
- building capacities of NGOs in applying participatory approach (community driven development approach) and using new techniques in informing community
- planning initiatives and mobilisation of local resources

By monitoring the type of involvement in their projects, the levels of participation and interest in the various locations the organisation worked, Mozaik managed to contribute to social capital accumulation in the respective communities. A closer examination of the evaluation and report documentation maintained by the NGO provides the necessary evidence for arguing that this local organisation has developed a coherent and evolving strategy and working methods, which enable their successful performance and essential contribution for social capital rebuilding at a small scale community level.

The table and the charts presented in Appendix 8, indicate that the Foundation has been actively providing guided assistance to communities rather than adopting a donor-approach. Now completed, the CoDE A project was a part of the Programme “For Active Communities”. The programme was primarily focused on building social cohesion in small rural communities (of less than 5 000 inhabitants), which received support for activities of common interest that actively involve citizens in its planning and implementation. The outcomes of the planning meetings held in 2006 listed in Appendix 8: Table 2 and Table 3 revealed that the Foundation was looking to involve local people in activities that community members recognise as priorities and beneficial to the community at large. Indicators were the account of people at the beginning of the planning meeting and in its end, but mostly - the calculated degree of satisfaction with the project idea and the degree of active participation in the project (scores ranging between 4.00 and the scale-maximum 5.00). The breakdown of the type of community representatives that participated in these planning meetings shows that targeted was the involvement of as many sectors of society as possible – from pupils, to business and media (Table 3). The chart in Figure 16 gives a graphic representation of the same statistics.

Figure 16 Mozaik CoDE A Project
(Source: Mozaik Foundation)

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188 The project title CoDE A is abbreviation from “community development”
The data concerning the types, sources, and amounts of contribution were also indicative of the philosophy of Mozaik and its goal to support social capital rebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Out of the total value of 114,447 convertible marks (KM) for these 20 grants allocated in 2006 within the CoDE A frameworks, the Foundation provided only 44% of it. The communities in the form of in-cash and in-kind (services) contribution, provided the remaining 56%. Contribution came from number of sources, by type: 23 public institutions, 70 public and private firms, 26 individuals, and 14 community-based organisations (CBOs). All of the above data is presented in the pie charts in Figure 17.

Appendix 8: Table 1 lists some of the outputs of the community initiatives (run in 2006). The detailed description of the grants allocated under the Code A, also demonstrated that the respective local communities owned the projects. Apart from the raised levels of trust, interaction, and co-operation, the visible material outcomes became an additional factor that motivated people to plan for future activities. All of these have been signs that projects achieved the goal of social capital rebuilding within the respective targeted settlements.

Evidence for the positive results achieved by Mozaik Foundation in their efforts to contribute for the accumulation of social capital in smaller local communities emerged also from other programmes run by the organisation. Targeting to preserve cultural and historic heritage, the Living Heritage Programme had an added goal/value focused on enabling the development and increase of levels of social capital within the respective communities. An example for how the organisation monitored the programme performance and the elements of social capital is presented in Appendix 9: Table 1, where some of the supported local initiatives are listed. It becomes obvious that the focus of the assessment has fallen on evaluation of social capital elements as community involvement and (self-) organisation, voluntary work, participation in decision making, plans for the future, increased cohesion, interest in and motivation for participation, taking of responsibility for the common benefits, etc.

Figure 17 Mozaik Code A Contribution
(Source: Mozaik Foundation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total value (KM)</td>
<td>114,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozaik (in KM)</td>
<td>49,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (in KM)</td>
<td>64,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cash</td>
<td>28,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-kind &amp; services</td>
<td>35,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 public institutions</td>
<td>26,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 public &amp; private firms</td>
<td>23,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 individuals</td>
<td>3,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 CBOs</td>
<td>11,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total value 114.447 KM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44% Mozaik (49.943 KM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56% Community contribution (64.504 KM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Listing some of the projects under the programme Fund for Local Initiatives, Appendix 9: Table 2 presents not only the material results from the common work that provide individual incentives for people to contribute to the common benefit, but also evaluation of the non-material outputs. ‘Promoting activism and volunteerism in communities’ and ‘Affirming NGO’s roots with local communities’ are the two Community small mobilisation funds (CMFS) objectives, which achievement has been assessed and evaluated as poor, fair, good or excellent. These objectives indicate the priorities for Mozaik Foundation, but their assessment reveals also the targeted social capital elements, as follows:

- Interest in voluntary work
- Grass-root level involved in planning process
- Inter-ethnic co-operation
- Common benefits - raised motivation & interest in output
- Visible results from common work - motivation for future activities
- Various community sectors and groups involved in project activities
- Interaction with & impact upon local institutions
- Activities to meet local needs
- NGO-community interaction;
- Mobilisation through personal contacts
- Raised trust in NGOs
- Responsibility for own future –influencing decision makers, need for raising funds due to limited financial assistance
- Vision for common future
- Involvement of various community sectors (public, business, youth, etc)
Appendix 9: Table 3 presents a detailed description of the assessment of the projects implementation with respect to the CSMF objectives.

An important indicator for the impartiality of the approach that Mozaik Foundation has adopted in its work has been the fact that the assessment of project achievements has not always been positive. Lack of interest within community, lack of skills and capacities of local organisations to mobilise support and volunteers, or to run participatory initiatives, problems with budgeting activities, or undeveloped community awareness and poor motivation were some of the factors that have had a negative impact upon the achievement of the objectives set. It is important here to note that the material results from the projects were considered incentives for the involvement of local communities. The Foundation was mostly concerned with the process of working towards the achievement of the defined goals and of completing the initiative launched. Thus the primary goal of the Foundation, social capital reconstruction, was vested in the process of working for obtaining material benefits for the local people.

Finally, considering the work of Mozaik with regard to the social capital model (see Figure 8) it appears that the Foundation has concentrated its efforts in the micro-level, both structural and cognitive, with respect to the officially accepted macro-level goals. The positive results achieved by Mozaik however remained limited in scope to the communities they worked within. This owed to the fact that the organisation had no capacity to address the elements of the macro-level or to develop national-level programmes. Therefore, the positive changes achieved in respect to social capital rebuilding could not affect the overall situation in the country.

The conclusion that emerges from the three case studies presented above is that positive reconstruction efforts in one or several dimensions of social capital cannot bring about an overall change. Only a comprehensive approach enabling simultaneous and synchronised actions in all the four dimensions of matching scope and complementary elements could contribute to the reconstruction of social capital, which is a vital requirement for achieving ‘normalisation’ in a post-ethnic-conflict environment. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the targeted scope of social capital frameworks cannot be other but:

- macro-structural level – the (national) state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- macro-cognitive level – the national institutions of the state
- micro-structural level – cross-cutting civil networks and associations (local institutions bridging the local communities with the state-level institutions)
- micro-cognitive level – ethnic identities subordinated to national citizenship affiliation

It is difficult to evaluate whether this particular gap in the process of building the modern Bosnian state is the one that has had the most negative impact on the reconstruction of the country. Nevertheless, the lack of state-level social capital, the lack of strong and intensive citizenship affiliations and the continuing political, institutional, administrative and cultural division along ethnic lines have held back the general development of the country. These factors have contributed to the status quo and to the perception of and Herzegovina as a failed experiment.
and as a ‘black hole’ where more than 8 billions of USD have disappeared without achieving the expected results. The next section will look at the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today, which will provide the necessary factual indicators for objective evaluation of the success of post-conflict reconstruction process in general, aiming at enabling lasting peace, stability, and development.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2008 – A Snapshot

The political crisis following the resignation of the Bosnia’s Prime minister Nikola Špirić on 1st November 2007, in protest against the imposed measures to reform the decision-making process in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central government and parliament, indicated once again the failure of the internationally-supervised state-building of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2007:1). After the years of internationally led reconstruction, focused on strengthening and legitimising the central state institutions, this political crisis (not the first one for the period) challenged the very framework of international regulation in the country. It brought into question the legitimacy and the authority of the international institutions involved in the state building process.

The contradictions between the international powers in the country, and in particular the Office of the High Representative, and the need that political institutions be developed in accordance with the democratically generated popular demands, reached their peak around the issue of the institutional reforms (Chandler 2007). In his resignation speech Nikola Špirić highlighted that after all the years of reconstruction Bosnia and Herzegovina could hardly be considered a sovereign state, when foreigners have exclusive rules over the country and locals are not in a position to take over responsibility (AFP 2007). The same was implicitly confirmed by Miroslav Lajčák, the current High Representative himself, arguing that he was the one having the mandate to interpret the European principles and the Dayton agreement, while the role of the local politicians was to ‘do their jobs, to go to work and fulfil their commitments and obligations’ (Lajčák 2007) – a view, supported also by the NATO Secretary General (OHR 2007)

For the years of reconstruction (1995-2009), Bosnia and Herzegovina received more than eight billions of USD as international financial assistance (Developmental Data; www.devdata.worldbank.org). This massive donor funding for reconstruction activities made the country look like experiencing an economic boom, with the economy growing at an average of 40% annually between 1995 and 1999. Nevertheless the aid did not lead to a sustainable growth of the economy and the labour market (Bodewig 2002:27). With GDP at just 70% of its pre-war levels, 30% of unemployment, slow privatisation and 13% of the population living below the poverty line, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of the poorest countries in the region (USAID 2007).

The Dayton Peace Agreement put an ‘official’ end to the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and marked the beginning of the transition to the normalisation

189 In December 2007 the parliament approved that Nikola Špirić returns as Prime Minister of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
period. It however did not manage to deal with the distrust remaining among the members of all three communities, who continue living in largely ethnically homogeneous areas. The country is still a patchwork of three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper. Fourteen years after Dayton it is difficult to say that the tensions among the different ethnic groups and the effects of war have been overcome and that the country has achieved a remarkable success in the stabilisation process.

### 2.1 Reconstruction achievements

Despite the overall physical rebuilding and the signs of economic growth, the development of the country (as of 2009), is still hindered. The signature of the cease-fire agreement did not transform the enemies into partners overnight. Neither did the international community manage to do so during the subsequent years of reconstruction, despite transfer of responsibilities, roles and approaches. Setting up institutions of a modern democratic state and holding largely free and fair elections, the process of reconstruction has achieved a certain level of peace and reduced inter-ethnic violence. Freedom of movement has been restored and many refugees and displaced persons have gone home. The country has also opened talks with the EU on stability and association agreement, the first step towards membership (Woehrel 2005; Steele 2005). The success in some areas however has not enabled the accomplishment of the overall goal of international efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the creation of a stable and united state, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions (Woehrel 2005). The progress on reforms continues to require direct or indirect foreign intervention because the ‘ownership’ of processes has not been transferred to the local institutions and actors (Woehrel 2005). The underlying reason for this was not only the resistance of some powerful nationalist players, but also the different visions for the future that the three communities have - Bosniaks favoured a united Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Serbs and Croats did not (Woehrel 2005). Among the reconstruction feats were also the establishment of a state-level intelligence service, a unified army, and border and customs authorities. Despite the lack of substantial economic gains, the country has managed to ensure monetary stability. Many refugees have returned home and the overwhelming majority of property issues have been resolved (WWICS 2007).

Supporters of international activism believe that to become self-sustaining, the reforms had to reach a critical mass, being moved forward by external agents (Woehrel 2005). According to critics, the dominant role in Bosnian affairs played by the international community since 1995 has been a type of modern, UN-sanctioned liberal imperialism, which was replicated later in East Timor and Kosovo (Steele 2005). The extensive political authority of the Office of the High Representative has also become increasingly controversial (Kim 2005). Although it had been necessary as a short-term post-conflict measure, in a long term it creates dependency, promotes irresponsibility among local elites, stifles civil

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190 Although sixty thousand NATO troops were to supervise its implementation, they proved to be a largely ineffective peace-keeping force; in December 2004 the European Union officially took over NATO's peace-keeping mission in Bosnia
society, and produces a highly visible financial apartheid (Steele 2005, Woehrel 2005). After these years and billions of dollar spent, the international security presence and the economic assistance (even if at reduced levels) are still essential for the country.

Looking at the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2008, it appears that on the sections upon which the survey ranks the country performance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not moved significantly ahead since 1997 (see Table 13). One could also argue that supporting the flourishing of numerous NGOs, the international community in fact has attributed to the high values under the Civil Society category. It is however another issue how many of these organisations can survive without being financed by the respective donors. Having in mind the amounts of financial aid received for the (re-)construction of the state, the lack of progress suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a ‘black hole’ rather than a showcase of the international ability to lead a country out of war into a sustainable economic and social development (Bodewig 2002). The above justifies the conclusions that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is more ‘stasis than stability’, that the country is still in a semi-colonial status with a significant international military and administrative presence (WWICS 2007). The following sections will briefly outline the current situation in the country by different sectors of reconstruction.

Table 13: Freedom House Performance Rating - Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Source: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2008)

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Governance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Process</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
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<td>4.00</td>
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<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Media</td>
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<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<td>Local Governance</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial Framework</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy Rating</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of democratic progress.

2.2 State and institutions

The complex and dysfunctional arrangements of the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina has predetermined weak central government and institutions. The Swiss-canton-style Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the unitary entity of Republica Srpska have established a political and administrative structure called ‘state of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (as presented in Chapter 4, Figure 3). With only several narrowly defined spheres of competence and subjected to complex power-sharing mechanisms (to ensure that even within those
spheres no ethnic group would be outvoted by the others), the central state created under the Dayton constitution did not satisfy any of the local communities. It has become, and to a great extent still is, the only glue sticking the fragmented units and groups of the country, which on its turn can hardly be defined as stable and sustainable (Parish 2007). Seeing themselves as the dominating ethnic group, the Bosniaks have been defending over the years a political agenda for strengthening the central government. The Croats have set up parallel political institutions that were integrated into neighbouring Croatia, and the Serbs have continued to struggle for their own independent Bosnian Serb state and against the formation of a central government (Parish 2007).

Establishing working government and institutions, rebuilding the economy and ensuring the returning of refugees and displaced people (estimated at more than 1 million) were identified among the crucial priorities for post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the progress remained rather poor. Far from being a blueprint for a functioning state, Dayton produced a constitution, which enshrined ethnic and group rights, created two self-governing Entities, and put an outsider, the High Representative, in ultimate charge (Steele 2005). The most complex multi-layered government structure of modern times (Mertus 2005) with its 140 ministries at three levels proved to be largely dysfunctional and expensive to support (CIDA 2007). The lack of consensus between the ethnic groups and the predisposition of officials and institutions to safe-guard the rights of the various ethnic groups (USAID 2007) still impede any efforts for strengthening the government at state level\textsuperscript{191}. The indifference in deregulating the economy and in carrying out a transparent privatisation, to a certain extent owes to the fact that nationalist parties still benefit from many public enterprises. Delayed structural reforms and limited investment are also challenges.

The central institutions that have been created to overarch the separate entities\textsuperscript{192}, are still largely dysfunctional, because of the obstructions to the reform efforts put up by the nationalist parties that controlled Bosnian governments at all levels (Woehrel 2005). In its recommendation 202 (of 2006) on local and regional democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council of Europe pointed out that ‘the central state has no rule in the field of the local administration’. The fact that the Entities’ governments on many occasions can ignore the central government was confirmed by Prime Minister Nikola Špirić (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009). He pointed out that a positive effect from the contrary to any expectations, the global financial crisis contributed to a more intensive dialogue with the governments of the Entities in attempt to find solutions to common problems. Even in a case of dispute, the established a practice would make Entities addressing the OHR and not to trying to solve problems in co-operation. This weakness of institutions provides an environment conducive to organised crime activities (Woehrel 2005). Therefore, strengthening the rule of law to break down the parallel structures connecting nationalist political parties,

\textsuperscript{191} Various proposals have been made for simplifying the structure, including eliminating the entities to create a unitary state, or a system of cantons within a more conventional federation (Woehrel 2005)

\textsuperscript{192} Institutions range from a common currency, customs service and tax regime, to the high court
certain enterprises and organised crime, has been a key issue of the international efforts in Bosnia.\(^{193}\)

The establishment of new central law enforcement institutions met with serious local resistance\(^{194}\). Evidence can be found even at high political level as for example the statement published in 2005 on the official web site of the OHR. Counter-arguing some widespread myths connected to the police reform, it aimed at assuring the public that undertaking the reform did not imply abolishment of Entities. Eventually, under international pressure and including these issues as a condition to the EU integration of the country, in the autumn of 2005 the political parties signed an agreement to support the police reform and to complete (in 2010) the process of merging the different police forces into a state level police structure under a single state-level Ministry of Interior. A successful step preceding the police reform was the abolishment of the Entities’ Armies and their transformation into a single state-level Army under the state-level Ministry of Defence on 1\(^{st}\) January 2006 (fully completed 6 months later).

Despite these positive examples of achieved unification, there are still areas that require serious efforts. As it was discussed earlier, education is the sphere, which could contribute to integration, overcoming of prejudices, development of tolerant attitudes and form the future citizens of the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina today there are 12 Ministries of Education (1 in Republika Srpska, 1 at the level of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 for each of the 10 Cantons) and a Department at the level of state. As Mr Špirić revealed during his presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, in the Federation there are still examples of the ‘2 schools under 1 roof’-phenomenon (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

Finally, commenting on the national citizenship issues, Mr Gnjidić from the OHR revealed that currently the legal framework implies that in order to be citizens of the State, all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are conditionally citizens of one of the Entities. In the context of the still existing legal problems concerning the possibility to change Entity citizenship, this requirement undermine the importance of the state citizenship and establish it as secondary to the affiliation with one of the Entities (and in most of the cases – with one of the ethnic groups).

### 2.3 Politics

Nationalist parties and unreconstructed nationalist forces still play a significant role on the political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have often reacted passively to reforms and state-building efforts, or even have engaged in overt or covert obstructionism, concentrating on political manoeuvring and securing resources for political patronage. The ethnic division of territory and powers in

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\(^{193}\) Bosnian State Court was created with special panels dealing with organised crime – with both Bosnian and international judges and prosecutors

\(^{194}\) These include a Ministry of Justice, a Ministry of Security, and a State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA), charged with dealing with issues such as money laundering and organised crime, and terrorism. Among the key issues was also the elimination of the Entity-based Interior Ministries in favour of Bosnian central government institutions taking over responsibility for all police matters.
fact appeals to some Bosnian Serb representatives, concerned about the viability of the Republica Srpska (Kim 2005), therefore they oppose any changes that would eliminate the Entity-structure enshrined in the Dayton Accord. Furthermore, some ethnic Croat parties have even promoted the idea of a third Croat Entity.

Employing minority rights conventions, the Dayton model separated institutionally the ethnic groups, while attempting to encourage co-operation at higher levels of government. This institutional structure has also created conditions for ‘abusing’ the traditional minority rights policies. Each one of the three ethnic groups claimed and protected as if being a minority within the larger state. Interpreting group interests according to their own agendas, ethnic leaders have been using the ‘ethnic rights’ platform as a means to preserve power. This in its turn excludes the true minorities (Roma, Jews, etc.) and the non-nationalists from politics, undermines the state-building project, and creates real threats to disrupt the minimal cohesion and stability of the country (WWICS 2007).

The political confrontation along ethnic lines and the impossibility of non-nationalist parties to come into power was an issue in 2003, as revealed by the comments of the people interviewed during the fieldwork. The general elections in October 2006 also reflected the ethnic divisions, with the Serb entity threatening to seek complete secession if the autonomy of Republica Srpska is threatened. In response to political discussions within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina about the possibility of abolishing the Entities in favour of the central state, demonstrations have been taking place in Republica Srpska since 2007.

Local elections in 2008 indicated once again that the nationalist agendas have not been overcome and that the ethnic element is still an important factor in politics and society in general. Disappointing for the international community, the 2008 elections confirmed deep ethnic divisions, with three ethnic nationalist parties consolidating power in the respective ethnic-majority territories (Alic 2008). Using the nationalist rhetoric in their campaigns, the three largest nationalist parties - the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and Bosnian Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) - have ‘taken over’ the majority of the country’s 149 municipalities, but only in the areas where their ethnic group prevailed.

The campaigns focused on the same ethnically based issues that were addressed during the first post-war elections in 1996 (Alic 2008). Only 2% of the public statements referred to concrete problems or measures suggested by party-candidates for improving life of communities, while the focus of the campaign (about 74% of the statements) was put on topics that had nothing to do with the municipal elections - such as the country's constitution, or the census or European integration. These facts indicate that the issues relevant for the first post-war years were (and most likely are) still valid after 12 years of reconstruction and that the local political agenda is much more involved with the ethnic divides than with the daily life within communities.

Seeking transfer of some state powers to the Entities and arguing against the idea of the abolishment of the Dayton state, the Prime minister of Republica Srpska
Milorad Dodik, activated the secessionist idea and claims. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationalist party HDZ-1990 called for further carving up of the country into a third, Bosnian Croat-dominated entity and for the creation of the public broadcaster in Croatian language. These radical claims however did not appeal as much to voters as expected, but still this does not imply that the calls appealed only to few supporters. As Alic reported, if this trend persists and nationalist parties continue to use their tried-and-tested ethnic-biased campaign rhetoric, focusing on the rural and uneducated voters, which in turn will lead to a stronger boycott by educated, urban voters, the parliamentary elections in 2010 will be an ethnic census of the population (Alic 2008).

This political rhetoric and the fact that nationalist parties still attract a number of supporters gave grounds for comments that the country is in danger of collapse, as expressed by the former High representative Paddy Ashdown (Ashdown & Holbrook 2008). The current High representative Valentin Inzko reported before the UN Security Council in April 2009 about tensions and secessionist talks (UNSC 2009); Bosnian Prime minister Nikola Špirić also confirmed the facts (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

The statement by Mr Špirić that his goal as a Prime minister was ‘to keep the integrity of the country’ indicates that this is considered a serious issue and not only political rhetoric (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009), yet this sometimes can make citizens go mad (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 30.06.2009). The abolishment of RS is desired in Sarajevo, but this is not good for the country… Would people want stronger institutions? Yes, but the problem is in the politicians who do not wish to abide the constitution of their own country. Political elites must ensure common interest for the future of BiH without denying the state and its internal arrangements’ pointed out Mr Špirić (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

With the outdated constitution that places emphasis on group rights and in this way directly violates the European standards, and under the ‘imperial’ powers of the High representative, the broad efforts to advance the country towards the establishment of a vivid and functioning democratic system has remained controversial (Kim 2005). The frequently exercised executive powers to break through political stalemates, push difficult reforms forward, and even remove obstructionist leaders, have put the institution of the High Representative under serious criticism for allegedly blocking the political development of the Bosnian leaders (Kim 2005). As Nikola Špirić commented ‘today there is no political will within the country and only from outside; and this is a guarantee for failure. Politicians in Bosnia communicate with the OHR, but not with each other. And the OHR does not push for improving the situation’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

As the 2008 local elections campaign and results revealed, the attempts of the international community to influence the domestic political scene by helping non-nationalist parties to win elections and form government coalitions, were not very successful. In addition, the widespread disillusionment with the political system and the general development of the country have been found among the causes

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195 Revealed through the UNDP/ORI survey published in July 2007
making two-thirds of people younger than 30 years willing to leave the country, if
given the opportunity (Grove-White 2007).

2.4 Economy

The collapse of the state-dominated Yugoslav economy and the wartime
destruictions, have ruined most of Bosnia's infrastructure and industry. The levels
of production plummet by 80% from 1992 to 1995, while these of unemployment
got and remained extremely high. According to the official rates (as of December
2004), there were 45.5% unemployed people in the country (CIA 2007). With an
uneasy peace in place, output rates have been growing slowly for the years of
reconstruction, but they still cannot reach the pre-war levels. Although almost in
private hands, agriculture is still scattered to small and inefficient farms. In
addition to that, an unusual new phenomenon of ‘re-ruralisation’ is observed –
city people are going back to live in the countryside and to grow food for their
families (Steele 2005).

Measures to streamline the registration of new businesses and to enable the
growing of the private sector took effect only recently. In spite of the excessive
bureaucracy and the many tiers of government, foreign investment is slowly
increasing, while government spending remains unreasonably high (CIA 2007).
Confidence in the banking sector and in the national currency is also increasing
after the acceleration of reforms in 2001 and after pegging the convertible mark to
the Euro (CIA 2007). The International Monetary Fund (Woehrel 2005) praised
Bosnia’s efforts in the direction of implementing economic reforms, reducing
poverty, and establishing of macro-economic stability. But to stimulate the
economic growth, to provide resources for the government institutions of the
central Bosnian state, and assist in the integration of the country to the various
international structures (including to the EU), rationalisation of the tax system and
accelerated privatisation process are still needed (Woehrel 2005, CIA 2007).

The Bosnian Prime minister made an interesting statement during his talk at the
Woodrow Wilson Centre (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009), contradicting the conviction expressed by the World Bank
representative Mr Goran Tinjić that the organisation has contributed to the
successful establishment of a single economic space,. Commenting the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 2009, Mr Špirić pointed out that a serious challenge
to the development of the country was the lack of a single economic space, which
in fact has a good potential for becoming an important integrative factor.

Furthermore, while the levels of public spending in Republica Srpska meet the EU
rates, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina these are still far behind. From
the words of the Prime minister, it also became apparent that the unequal
economic development of the two Entities creates additional political tensions
within the state. This emerged from his comment that ‘Republica Srpska can
become the engine for the development of the country; it is not a threat to the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the
2.5 Security

Moving from the initial plans for withdrawing in 1998, the 60,000 NATO mission handed over the mandate to safeguard the security in the country to the European forces in 2004. About 7,000 EUFOR troops and a small NATO headquarters presence in Sarajevo provide assistance to the Bosnian government in respect to counter-terrorism and intelligence operations and missions to detain indicted war criminals. In 2003 the EU also took over the U.N. police monitoring and advisory mission, deploying about 500 international police officers (Kim 2005).

The need to prolong the missions of the foreign troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been recognised by the international community, acknowledging the persistent internal problems resulting from different political factors. The Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 2005 identify these as follows:

- The remnants of political and social animosities as a result of the 1992-1995 conflict, supported by elements propagating various forms of nationalistic extremism
- Slow implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords
- Problems of political transition that have resulted in the slow development of effective and efficient executive, legislative and judicial authorities
- Problems of transition to a market economy that have resulted in a low level of domestic and foreign investment, the existence of the grey economy and black market, slow implementation of privatisation processes, technologically obsolete production facilities and uneven reconstruction of damaged infrastructure
- Porous borders that allow trafficking in narcotics and weapons and human trafficking, and that enable the concealment and transit of persons accused for war crimes, international criminals and terrorists
- Problems of unemployment that have caused a brain drain of highly educated and young people and contributed to increased general poverty, social differences and instability, particularly among pensioners and other groups requiring greater social assistance
- Excessive amounts of armaments and ammunition stored in inadequate facilities
- Large numbers of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country, posing a physical danger for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and an obstacle to the development of tourism and foreign investment; and
- A variety of environmental challenges, including natural and man-made disasters, management problems of solid waste and military waste, degradation of arable land and forest resources, water and air pollution, and
the slow development and implementation of acceptable environmental protection standards and conventions

Although security has improved in the last years, return-related incidents still occur in various part of the country; and there is still a certain reluctance on behalf of the police to investigate these and to bring perpetrators to court. Local authorities sometimes contribute to the rise of inter-ethnic tensions, fuelling them by allocating private land belonging to minorities to members of the dominant ethnicity. Cases of violence against minority returnees or their properties, religious buildings, and graves are still being reported (USDoS 2006:7, 14). Another important factor for the progress of the security measures, is the shift from ethnically based to a centralised police force. The efforts of the central state authorities supported by the international community have become a ground for serious confrontation between local, national and international powers. As a conclusion - if it seems unlikely that a conflict explode again, it is rather due to the changes of the geopolitical situation in the region, than to the success of the international reconstruction efforts196. Nevertheless, the fact that the international community has not withdrawn the military presence from Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests that there are considerations that underlie the decision of the reconstruction agents.

2.6 Justice and Reconciliation

Contrary to the popular explanations for ancient hatreds underlying the violence and the atrocities during the war in Bosnia, the hostile actions of the former ‘countrymen’ of different ethnic origin are to be viewed as a product of the nationalist policies aiming at ethnic separatism or domination of one ethnic group over the others. This return of nationalist parties was reported after the general elections in October 2002 (ICG 2003). Lippman (2003) saw this as a vengeance of ethnic hate, with ethnic crimes on the rise, and ordinary Bosnians waiting without much hope for their grim economic situation to improve. At the same time, the representatives of the international community tolerated the dishonest operators who held most of the political power in the country (Lippman 2003).

Fourteen years after Dayton, war criminals remain at large, living in the ethnically cleansed areas, formed during the war and controlled by the respective forces. Nationalist political parties connected to ethnic cleansers and nationalist extremists are in power even today (such as the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), founded by war criminal Radovan Karadžić, which received good support in the 2008 local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Criticism against these processes was expressed also by the European Union, concerned that the ‘rise in nationalism in Bosnia could undermine stability’ (EUbusiness 2008)

In the process of reconstruction, after providing the minimum levels of security by deploying military and police forces, the international community attempted to address the environment of anger, fear, and distrust, used sometimes by the local politicians to further their political agendas. As the ultimate goal of peace-

196 The war in Bosnia was in part the playing out of the designs of nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia on Bosnian territory (Woehrel 2005)
keeping, reconciliation occurs when the parties-in-conflict go beyond the past and (re-)establish functional relationships in the present based on apology, forgiveness, and newly established trust\textsuperscript{197}. A precondition for that is that population overcomes the war-trauma, which is a long and difficult process per se. In 2000, there were around 173 international and 365 local NGOs working in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focused on repairing the social and emotional damage caused by the war (Malek 2005).

The grave violations of human rights including mass killings, rapes, widespread destruction, and displacement of the population, called for justice. In 1993, to enable reconciliation, the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands. Since the beginning, the legitimacy of the ICTY has been contested but the Tribunal managed to bring in a number of high-ranking suspects. On different occasions however, its functioning has been viewed as ineffective (Malek 2005). In March 2005, as a joint initiative of the ICTY and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), War Crimes Chamber (WCC) was established within Bosnia’s State Court. It was envisaged to engage with cases of serious war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina that could not be prosecuted within the mandate or timeframe of the ICTY and of cases initiated locally (HRW 2006a). Containing a significant international component, but placed within the domestic justice system and having strong commitment to take ownership over the accountability, makes the WCC more accessible to the local population than the ICTY, offering a potential for impacting the rebuilding of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the UNDP/ORI 2007 research reveals, the establishment of a Reconciliation Commission may prove a significant formal step to address low social trust and cohesion and it may reduce the risk associated with constitutional changes. Such a measure would require support from other initiatives, which could help reduce the divisions between exclusive identifiers and mainstream Bosnian society (UNDP/ORI 2007).

Respect for the rule of law still needs to be enhanced. Furthermore, restoring the proper functioning of the judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires additional efforts. The loss of skilled professionals and judiciary throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the physical destruction and complexities in the legal framework and inappropriate procedural laws, have created additional obstacles that need to be overcome (HRW 2006a). Nevertheless, guaranteed stability, let alone post-war truth and reconciliation are still to come.

2.7 Society

Most of the people interviewed during the fieldwork referred to the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of a dynamic multicultural society\textsuperscript{198}. The war turned the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a patchwork of three largely mono-ethnic groups, occupying more or less ‘consolidated’

\textsuperscript{197} According to John Paul Lederach (1999), this difficult and slow process that aims to bring people together, requires that a balance between the four elements- truth, justice, mercy and peace – be found since they can often contradict each other.

\textsuperscript{198} The problem with the validity of these claims was discussed in Chapter 4.
territories. The return of refugees and internally displaced people has been a great challenge, not least because of the increased levels of hostility among former neighbours from different ethnic groups.

Dedicating its efforts to help refugees and internally displaced people return home, the international community achieved a certain degree of success, although about 180,200 people remain away from their homes and many returnees live in edgy enclaves, not feeling provided with the necessary levels of security. Thus, the return policies by themselves are not considered a priority for the displaced people (UNDP/ORI 2007). Community re-integration remains in many cases an open issue because interethnic reconciliation and a degree of interethnic tolerance have been among the key factors determining the success or failure of any community-driven development project (Bodewig 2002:20-28). Optimism is relatively weak and there is a sense of standstill. Social trust is virtually non-existent, and the dominant ethnic identity prevails the dual identity (combining the ethnic group membership and the state-citizenship affiliation) (UNDP/ORI 2007; Appendix 10). The fact pointed out by Mr Gnjidić during the interview taken in June 2009 that a Bosnian-state citizenship is conditional upon citizenship of one of the two Entities, explains the situation (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 30.06.2009)

Although the identity and religious affiliation do not affect the way people feel about themselves and about society, they affect the institutional, political, and constitutional views (UNDP/ORI 2007). In connection to the rise of nationalist parties and politics since 2002, it is important to point out that this rise would have been impossible without the support coming from the citizens/voters. Despite the NGOs attempts to persuade Bosnian voters to stray from the nationalist parties with no economic programme, which could reverse any potential progress that the country have made over the years, in 2008 the electorate proved once again that it preferred to vote for sure winners (Alic 2008). Rejecting the nationalist rhetoric, the better-educated voters largely boycotted the poll. The turnout in the four largest cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was less than 40 percent, helped the nationalists to win, supported by predominantly primary-level educated population of the rural areas (Alic 2008). Despite there being no official census since 1991 (as confirmed by Vedrana Rebić from the National Statistical Agency of and Herzegovina), the local election results of 2008 in fact projected the ethnic distribution in the country.

The respondents to the survey of 2007 (UNDP/ORI 2007) indicated that the Bosnian people recognise the need for constitutional changes and changes in the political structure of the country as long-term goals. Some Croat and Serb politicians however continue to support the idea of separation - they oppose the efforts for shifting the powers to the central government of and Herzegovina as well as for making any amendments to the terms of the Dayton Agreement.

The media also have played and still play a key role for maintaining of the ethnic divisions in the country. The international community has recognised the development of a pluralistic, independent media as an important long-term democratisation objective. Unfortunately, the Dayton Constitution did not place the media issues under the jurisdiction of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but of the two Entities. The development of independent media was thus impeded by the
impossibility to pass regulations that would function with equal standards in the whole country. The subsequent interpretation related to telecommunications and public radio and television, issued by the High Representative affirmed that a countrywide law must regulate this field (Udovičić 2004). This slowed down the development of a consistent strategy of utilising frequency resources and developing radio and television production and broadcasting as public services. The public service concept of one (TV and Radio) state broadcaster and two entity broadcasters is too complex and too costly for the limited economic, technical and creative resources of and Herzegovina (Udovičić 2004). The situation with the printed media is to a great extend alike – national and unbiased press is still to come.

Remnants of propaganda journalism, attempts by ruling political structures to put pressure on the media, and the ethnic division of the country that poses obstacles to the freedom of flow of information, determines the complexity of the media landscape of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, ears of dependency on foreign donations and the lack of serious interest of local and foreign capital for investing in this underdeveloped also have been among the negative effects on the development of the sector. As Prime Minister Špirić emphasised, ‘the international presence has produced parasitism’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).

Finally, the words of Prime Minister of Republica Srpska Milorad Dodik before the New York Times journalist Dan Bilefsky that ‘Bosnia is a divided country… There is not a single event or holiday, except for New Year’s or the First of May that we celebrate together’ speak for themselves (Bilefsky 2008)

3. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Among the positive facts that the UNDP/ORI survey of 2007 revealed was that more than eight in ten respondents would identify themselves as citizens of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless 14% still have exclusive identities that may pose a potential risk to future changes, like the EU membership for example.

It is arguable whether this shift towards national citizenship identification and the interest in the future prospective derive from the reconstruction activities implemented by the international community. Such doubts are based on the facts, revealed by the UNDP/ORI 2007 survey, that international institutions were not trusted in general; people know little about them and do not distinguish between the different structures. Although a small majority supports a continued UN presence, broadly its involvement in politics, education, and positive discrimination for disadvantaged groups is not wanted.

In general, the lure of EU membership is a powerful incentive for countries to change their ways (Kim 2005); it could also function as a engine for progress, especially when coincides with the long-term vision for and Herzegovina, recognised as such by its citizens (UNDP/ORI 2007). In 2003, the EU committed itself to integrate all of the countries of the western Balkans and created new
instruments, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Kim 2005). Among the indicators that the EU membership can function as a change-motivating factor are the reforms agreed by the Entities with regard to the police forces, defence and security, as well as the agreements reached on intelligence, information services, state prosecution offices, justice ministry, and border and customs services (Kim 2005).

According to the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the future of the ethnic reconciliation of Bosnia and Herzegovina today lies in putting the goals of the constitutional reform with focus on the EU and NATO integration (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009). An active internal dialogue among different political and social levels needs to replace the separate dialogues running nowadays. In his view the key for successful reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina is building trust and confidence, because ‘where there has been trust, the reforms were successful’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009)

The assessment of the work of the agents of the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina – the international community in general and the selected representative organisations (the OHR and the World Bank), showed that although the importance of social capital (re-) building was recognised, the consistent efforts put in this direction were not sufficient and sometimes were even missing. The lack of clear strategies and planned actions aiming at promoting integration across the closed ethnic communities placed various obstacles to the development of the state in general. The large amounts of financial, material and human resources invested in the country or granted in the form of aid did not manage to enable it. More than fourteen years after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is rather difficult to evaluate the situation within the country as one of achieved stable peace and advancing development.

Positive examples however exist. The focused approach of the local Bosnian NGO Mozaik Foundation proves that there exists an understanding that the issues of social capital reconstruction must be included in the post-conflict development agenda. Addressing the social cohesion at local community level but also at the macro-level of the state is an undertaking that requires many resources, time, and investments. Most of all, it requires an understanding of the situation, identification of the problematic areas, clear vision for future and the accurate and comprehensive strategic planning.

Combining the local expertise with the international capacities is the only formula that can effectively contribute to the achievement of positive results, especially in areas where culture, attitudes, and specific mentalities matter. Social capital rebuilding falls within this category, but in fact, it has the potential to affect the general development of a society and of a country. If the ultimate goal of the reconstruction process is indeed achieving lasting peace and sustainable development, then a post-conflict reconstruction cannot afford to neglect the above-presented issues.
A comprehensive approach to enable success in post-ethnic conflict societies

Considering that over the last decade there have been on average two new post-conflict cases per year (Barton 2004), that some conflicts are still running and the high number of prolonged and reoccurring conflicts, it is not difficult to conclude that the number of countries requiring reconstruction will not decrease in the nearest future. Analysing the strengths and weaknesses of reconstruction programmes and efforts in general should therefore aim at identifying best practices, developing a model-strategy for adequately addressing the needs of the war-affected societies and implementing frameworks that have the potential to contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace and stability.

Crucial issues in the context of post-conflict reconstruction are those of the political and economic factors that can produce it, of the mechanisms to promote dialogue and tolerance, equality and stability, fair living standards and good social administration (Nikitin 2000). As a complex web of positive relations within and between societies, peace is indivisible. Promoting equity and social justice, cultivating moral and ethical attitudes in international and local affairs, are only a few milestones on the road towards eliminating some of the major causes of war (Hillen 1994). However, post-conflict reconstruction needs to move towards a more pragmatic interest in conflict management, focusing on constructive peace-building approaches and on bringing opposing sides together in a co-operative process (Harris & Reilly 1998).

As the research revealed, the situation after a conflict is rather complex and even more problematic in cases of ethnically-divided societies, when the initial conflict causes are likely to be intensified by generated grievances (Collier 2000:8). The donors and other reconstruction agents themselves create additional complications sometimes. Donor preferences for programmes, sectors, types of expenditure, or geographic areas, could lead to fragmentation of assistance. The bureaucratic procedures that usually are an inseparable part of the provided support as well as the ad-hoc approach and the lack of in-country donor representation and co-ordination on the ground, contribute to delays in commitment and disbursements (WB 1998:21). Negative effects on a reconstruction process in general could have also gaps between ideas and actions, poor co-ordination of international assistance and relief activities, the impossibility to find the right balance of external assistance with local requirements or needs for control, responsibility (Hampson & Tschirgi 1998).

Well coordinated and strategically planned international programmes focused on the reform of institutional frameworks, elimination of inefficient pre-war structures and establishment of transparent links between state administration and various private and political agents, could enable a gradual and controlled process
of democratisation, sustainable economic development or in other words – a successful reconstruction of a war-affected society. Through assembling interagency and interdisciplinary teams in all the key areas, the ad-hoc and fragmented response to local problems would be replaced by a comprehensive interagency process introducing mechanism for ensuring the best usage of the natural, human and financial resources for rebuilding the country; supporting civil administration capacity-building (AUSA/CSIS 2002).

Mari Fitzduff (2004) argues that the needs for a more comprehensive reconstruction practice could be met by the meta-conflict approach (MCA), which can address many facets of a conflict - both structural (political or constitutional arrangements, legislation, economic and aid factors, etc.) and psycho-cultural (e.g., attitudes, relationships, divided histories). Covering various areas, the MCA still needs to identify together with the conflict parties, which are the major problems to be addressed first. Although different views and favoured approaches might exist, the conflict reconstruction practitioners should ensure that they are complementary, and not competing. The Meta-Conflict Resolution Contextual Variables diagram below illustrates one possible variant of a meta-conflict approach.

Figure 18: Meta-Conflict Resolution Contextual Variables Example
(Source: Fitzduff 2004)

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199 Those who hold the power favour psycho-cultural approaches, while those who see themselves as having been excluded from power (e.g., Palestinians in the Middle East, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Albanians in Macedonia, and Tamils in Sri Lanka) prioritise structural approaches that deal with the equalisation of power within a territory, or with political secession that will hopefully supply a group with its own territory and power (Fitzduff 2004)
Variables will depend upon the conflict context, but there are certain constant elements to be considered as well. The structural problems of inequity, of deliberate or inadvertent exclusion of particular groups from participation in national or regional resources are significant conflict factors, which need to be reduced. Security forces (army, police) can play an important role in preventing or mitigating conflicts. Therefore, it is vital that they be inclusive of all groups, equally serve all sections of society, and be adequately trained to apply non-violent approaches especially when dealing with community tensions. Decentralisation of power is another way to engage groups in central participatory and decision-making processes. Cross-cutting incentives and systems that integrate power-sharing possibilities have the capacity to defuse political conflict by enabling the accommodation of collective identities within a state framework and by giving legitimate representation to minorities. All the constructive efforts towards developing effective strategies for countering conflict might be hampered by constitutions that favour certain sections of society.

Political development, community development and leadership, are also elements of the MCA. Political groups that favour particular ethnic, cultural, or religious communities might affect agreements and sustainable peace. Therefore, it is essential that the emergence of new (inclusionary) politics be assisted. The widening of perspectives by the existing parties and the possible adoption of new (best practices) approaches, can contribute significantly to bring together differing interest groups and hence to the conflict prevention and resolution. Vital to ensuring the creation of sustainable peace in divided societies is also the human rights work. Enshrining and implementing the principles safeguarding the rights at national and institutional levels would not be possible unless there are agreed norms. Inclusive community leadership should also be promoted and supported (Fitzduff 2004).

The MCA can address adequately different conflict contexts, where there are different priority issues and needs for major attention and assistance (e.g. environmental issues, natural resource ownership and management, urban planning, media work, weapons disposal). Its main goal is to stimulate reconstruction experts to facilitate a dialogue with a wider range of actors. This is the only way to ensure that the developmental and the conflict resolution activities are all directed towards bringing about a peaceful society. The integration of bridging and conflict resolution mechanisms in all the programmes of economic, social and security development is essential for preventing and mitigating tensions between communities. Encouraging a complementary and comprehensive MCA in the process of resolving a conflict in any society, is likely to be more successful and sustainable than many of the current approaches, concludes Fitzduff (2004).

Examining the existing literature on post-conflict reconstruction, it becomes apparent that most of the studies have been based on field-experience and thus they are predominantly descriptive. Although conflicts are highly idiosyncratic, Conflict resolution priorities are often interlinked. Equality between communities is not possible without economic development, or promoting trust for security forces without a military containment of paramilitaries. (Fitzduff 2004)
which pre-determines the appropriate post-conflict as context-specific (Collier 2000:2) there is still a need for an overall strategic approach – an algorithm of the reconstruction management cycle. Such a ‘strategy’ would enable not only the planning of comprehensive and coherent programmes, of appropriate activities and their successful implementation, but also will provide tools for critical assessment and evaluation of the success of the process in general. Adapting the general management theory to the needs of the post-conflict reconstruction practice, can provide the necessary frameworks for setting up the algorithm for managing the process. Combining the two fields, post-conflict reconstruction would appear as a process of implementation of a set of mechanisms for transforming the vision of stability, development, and democracy into reality and everyday practice.

The concept of strategy refers to the basic steps that define the process from the identification of goals to their realisation. As an overall plan of action that embodies certain principles and objectives, a strategy needs to be designed to achieve particular long-term aims. It is also a mechanism for identifying and applying the most suitable structures for deploying resources in the process of pursuing the established goals (Lasher 1999:6). As a systematic approach to addressing particular problems by making the best of the resources, while minimising the exposure in areas of weakness, strategic management is simply an organized way of thinking about situations, developing solutions to long-term problems, and implementing those solutions (Lasher 1999:32). The main elements of any strategic process are planning, implementation, and control. These elements are also the main sectors of activities projected by a strategic framework (Lasher 1999, McMahon 2004-05).

After having completed the research and analysed the existing situation, a vision for the future (change) needs to be formulated (Lasher 1999:7). The formulation of a vision takes into account the 1) identification of the problem that requires action and the 2) desired outcomes. The expected changes on the way towards the achievement of an ideal situation should be not only identified, but also justified as fair and needed – this is the basis for setting up the goals and respectively the mission.

The identified goals for future changes serve for setting objectives at different levels (Lasher 1999:31). The next strategic step, the elaboration of a plan for action, is the conceptual centre of the entire process. It formulates a strategy that corresponds simultaneously to the conditions of the existing environment, to the possibilities for achieving the desired changes, and to the capabilities of the actors involved to bring about these changes. Planning also includes communicating the results to the different subjects involved and interested in the process such as managers, performers or stakeholders.

With the aim to make the strategy happen through a series of events at, the implementation phase is perhaps the most difficult stage of the process. It also includes designing the organisational process, selecting key people and

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201 Pocket Fowler's Modern English Usage in English Language Reference; The Concise Oxford Dictionary in English Dictionaries & Thesauruses; Dictionary of Psychology in Politics & Social Sciences
institutions, managing competences, budgeting, and strategic support systems (Lasher 1999:31).

The final step is control, which entails monitoring the progress against the vision, goals, and plan set, and making relevant adjustments if needed. Evaluation and control require the establishment of a measurement system (of success) and a strategic feedback loop. The feedback and control process are performed on a regular basis throughout the entire life cycle of the process.

Table 14: The Strategic Process
(Adapted from Lasher 1999:26, Figure 3.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Classification</th>
<th>Process Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Analysis</td>
<td>Analysis of the Present Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Research, Study,</td>
<td>Developing a Vision and a Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis Phase)</td>
<td>identify problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>define goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>justify mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>Setting Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Creative, Conceptual</td>
<td>Developing a Strategy (identification of appropriate mechanisms and tools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase)</td>
<td>Developing a Strategic Plan for Action;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key figures/roles identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Implementing the Strategy (Problems → Actions → Solutions →</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Administrative Phase</td>
<td>Goals achieved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– most difficult)</td>
<td>Evaluation and Control has to happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring the efficiency of the strategy → adjustments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measuring Success against the goals → correcting strategy &amp; tools if needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above presents the stages and steps of the strategic process as defined by the general management theory. Applied to the post-conflict reconstruction, it offers the structure for the strategic planning of the stages in the process. Furthermore, this framework provides a tool for assessing the differences between the post-conflict and the post-ethnic conflict reconstruction models that should be taken into account when planning the respective programmes. Such differences were spotted in the fields of ‘Developing a Vision and a Mission’, ‘Setting Objectives’, ‘Developing a Strategy’, and ‘Implementing the Strategy’ (as marked in Table 15).

Any strategic approach to a problem that needs to be solved should start with an analysis of surrounding and underlying factors and aim at the identification of at least appropriate (if not the best) mechanisms to address and resolve the situation. In the context of both the post-conflict and post-ethnic conflict reconstruction, an analysis would determine the conflict causes and history, its dynamics, and possibly outcomes and consequences, the specific features of the parties involved in the conflict and the post-war situation in general. Studying the process of post-conflict rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no information about a comprehensive analysis of the situation, prepared before the beginning of the reconstruction activities, was found. No publicly available programme document was identified as a blueprint of the subsequent large-scale reconstruction activities.
Table 15: Strategic Planning Algorithm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management Strategy</th>
<th>Reconstruction after a conflict</th>
<th>Reconstruction after ETHNIC conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the present situation</td>
<td>Analysis of the conflict causes, parties, history, dynamics, outcomes, consequences, and of the post-war situation in general</td>
<td>Analysis of the conflict causes, parties, history, dynamics, outcomes and of the post-war situation in general; focus on the ethnic struggles and their consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting Objectives</td>
<td>Setting Objectives – achieving normalisation of live through ...</td>
<td>Setting Objectives – normalisation of live; DE-FRAGMENTATION OF ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Strategy (identification of appropriate mechanisms and tools with respect to the goals set)</td>
<td>Developing a Strategy: Mechanisms &amp; Tools – as a result there should be an elaborated and detailed Post-Conflict Reconstruct. (PCR) Program</td>
<td>Developing a Strategy: Mechanisms &amp; Tools – What are the specific post-ethnic-conflict (PEC) needs? (what is ‘ethnic conflict’?) - the elaborated PCR program must meet the particular needs of the PEC environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Strategic Action Plan; Identification of key figures &amp; roles: board, trainers, managers (capacity +knowledge); staff (motivation)</td>
<td>Developing a Strategic Action Plan; Identification of key figures &amp; roles IO – capacities – managers, trainers, experts Local actors – regional managers, stakeholders, implementers</td>
<td>Developing a Strategic Action Plan; Identification of key figures &amp; roles IO – capacities – managers, trainers, experts; Local actors – regional managers, stakeholders, implementers (all the involved sides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the Strategy: Problems ➔ Actions ➔ Solutions ➔ Goals achieved</td>
<td>Implementing the Strategy: Identified needs ➔ designed action plan to meet particular problems ➔ stabilisation</td>
<td>Implementing the Strategy: Specific features and post-conflict requirements - destroyed supra-ethnic social capital (no citizenship at state level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Control: Monitoring efficiency of the strategy ➔ adjustments Measuring Success against the goals ➔ correcting strategy &amp; tools if needed</td>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Control: Setting time frames; verifying the strategy and adjust if necessary Measuring Success against Goals and Time-frames, Critical analysis and objectiveness ➔ adjustments if needed</td>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Control: Setting time frames; verifying the strategy and adjust if necessary Measuring Success against Goals and Time-frames, Critical analysis and objectiveness ➔ adjustments if needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A strategic planning of any post-conflict reconstruction activities should then develop a vision and define the mission of the assistance in respect to the identified problems, goals to be achieved and justification for the selected mission and goals. As it was revealed in details in the previous chapters, in addition to the war damages that have destabilised the political unit, the post-ethnic-conflict
situation might be characterised also by a total destruction of the old political unit and formation of a new one, as well as by a multi-level disintegration.

The findings from the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Looking at the case of reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the prism of the strategic management, as introduced in Table 15, despite the ideological claims referring to examples of statehood with historical roots, in fact a new country emerged after a devastating war. The previously existing republic within the frameworks of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared independence, but it took three years, severe destructions of the physical, economic and social infrastructure of the territory, many human loses and in-depth damage of the former multi-cultural society, that came out of the war fragmented into three ethnically defined and hostile to each other communities.

Various programme documents of international organisations and donors have defined the goals of the post-conflict reconstruction activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as assisting the restoration of the country infrastructures, to enable its faster development, to promote and support democracy and its related systems. These were acknowledged as preconditions for the future establishment of lasting peace, sustainable progress, respect to the rule of law, protection of human rights and ultimately – national and regional stability. The goals and their justification coincided with the respective level of the theoretically defined matrix of the post-conflict and post-ethnic conflict management models.

However, when considering the field of ‘Objectives setting’ (Table 15) the two models differ in relation to the need for de-fragmentation of the ethnically divided population that have emerged from an ethnic conflict. In this respect, the aim of ‘achieving normalisation of life’ requires that some different mechanisms are applied, especially in the cases of a fragmented societal structure, active hostile attitudes, lack of trust and will for co-operation among the members of society that have become members of closed ethnic groups. In the case of the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a preliminary ‘setting objectives’ agenda was missing, at least with respect to the non-material spheres.

After setting the objectives, the strategic management model requires that an overall strategy, with the respective mechanisms and tools for its implementation, be developed. In the context of the post-conflict reconstruction, this implies that an overall detailed reconstruction programme be designed. The same is valid for the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction management model, but here the focus falls on the previously identified needs of the environment and the society.

In the post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, the supra-ethnic political identity was missing. The country emerged from the devastating intra-state war with no citizens, but a population divided along the three ethnic lines of separation. The establishment of the OHR was meant to be in favour of the idea of implementing coordinated reconstruction activities and programmes. However, the idea was not successfully realised in practice and apart from missing an overall strategic plan for the reconstruction and the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the social capital (re-)building issue was left aside, if not completely ignored. The
assessment of the international and some local post-conflict reconstruction programmes and practices during these years of intensive development work revealed that there were no programmes to promote and enable the creation of an overarching national identity.

This lack of co-operation among the various agents of reconstruction, the unclear management structure and the parallel activities of the donors and organisations, pursuing and implementing their own agendas in the absence of a single and comprehensive strategic action plan did not enable the achievement of the initially expected results with the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the international actors omitted to take on the role of experts, trainers, and general managers of the process and in this way to train the local people in how to run and eventually assume ownership of the process, becoming its main stakeholders and implementers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the local actors were willing to cooperate, but lacking capacities and power to influence, could not make themselves heard and thus could not provide their expertise and influence the direction of the reconstruction activities. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the ethnic division did not offer good grounds for motivating local actors to take over the reconstruction process and promote the integration of the ethnic groups. On the contrary, separatist ideas continued to be nourished and further developed.

Since there was no overall reconstruction strategy to address the specific needs of the post-conflict environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is meaningless to discuss issues relating to implementation. Apart from the lack of a general strategic approach to the problem, the reconstruction of the country was also characterised by a lack of time-frames (against which success could have been monitored and evaluated), slow and difficult adjustment of initially planned programmes, as well as lack of sensitivity towards vitally important local issues. In this context, it is also difficult to discuss the appropriateness of the mechanisms for ‘evaluation and control’ – not of the particular programmes and activities, implemented by the different agents of reconstruction, but of the process as a whole. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were arguably centralised post-conflict reconstruction policies but at the level of implementation, particular agendas were pursued. In short, the reconstruction experiment in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be evaluated as quite unsuccessful, if the results achieved are compared to the invested money, time, and efforts.

If we address the matrix as a theoretical problem to be solved, there are some conclusions that can be made based on the comparison between the general management strategy, the post- (ethnic-) conflict reconstruction activities, and the case of the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the theoretical model suggests, the post-conflict reconstruction practices suffer a lack of strategic (long-term) planning. Instead of introducing proactive solutions, the reconstruction activities are mostly reactive and not designed to fit each particular case. Reconstruction agents have ‘specialised’ in different fields and they tend to approach the various cases based on their levels of expertise and not on the particular needs of the environment. In addition to that, lack of co-ordination and co-operation among the various donors, their programmes, and objectives in the respective fields of action, results in the waste of large amounts of money, time, material, and human resources without achieving the expected levels of success.
In the context of the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction, the strategic management model reveals that there are certain issues that have to be addressed as early as possible in order that a successful implementation of the efforts is ensured. The key element is the recognition of the fact that after an ethnic conflict the war-affected unit is most likely to have lost the grounds for an overarching (national) identity and that a society has fragmented to ethnically defined and mutually hostile communities. Success in the rebuilding of a society depends on factors such as the establishment of a vision for common future or the existence of grounds for integration. People who have experienced the ethnic-war trauma need a motivation in order to co-operate with the ‘others’, to be willing to (re)construct a supra-ethnic identity and to become citizens, united by their common respect for the rule of law, shared values and norms. Without a grass roots support, without the will to take over the ownership of processes and to start working for their own future, no reconstruction Programme Can be successful and any foreign assistance would be looked at as interventionist politics. Furthermore, by underestimating the tensions existing in a society where the cultural, religious, or ethnic differences have become politically relevant, reconstruction programmes and activities risk contributing to a further deepening of the problems and their possible escalation in armed actions, rather than bringing peace and stability to the country or the region.

Evaluating the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the strategic management algorithm, as presented in Table 15 above, two opposing conclusions emerge. The first one is that the goals of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina were different from achieving ‘peace, stability, democracy, and development’. The second conclusion would be that despite the problems of the process and the failure to achieve the initially envisaged results, the goal of the international post-conflict reconstruction activities was indeed the re-construction of a functioning, viable, and stable democratic state.

If we assume that the first conclusion is the true one, then the programs and activities undertaken within the frameworks of the active international involvement in the country have been appropriate and well planned. If however the first conclusion is false, while the second one is true, then it becomes obvious that the reconstruction strategies, tools, and mechanisms were not appropriate and did not contribute to the achievement of the targeted goals. They should be adjusted to address the real problems and issues and to enable the establishment of a stable multi-ethnic state of Bosnian citizens. This requires, albeit delayed, that social capital (re-)construction be taken into account, that local expertise and initiatives be considered and integrated into the broader policies, that the emergence of political, economic, and social interests based on the recognition of a common and overarching political (national) identity be fostered.

**Re-building social capital**

Trust and confidence building are essential not only for the (re-)construction of social coherence and for social capital accumulation, but also as elements of any development strategy. Reconstruction agents however must be aware of the fact that any efforts that have not been recognised as needed at local level are likely to fail. This opens a very problematic question of how to motivate the ex-combatants

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to reconcile and start thinking of a common future. In post-ethnic-conflict settings the concept of citizenship, understood in terms of an affiliation with a formal social contract at a national level, might have disappeared. In this case, the suggestion that by increasing citizen participation in reconstruction processes, enforcing government accountability, and fostering creative avenues for peaceful change, the development of civil society will be bolstered, appears an inappropriate prescription, unless mechanisms of how to fill in the emerging gap have been identified.

A solution to this problem begins with the acknowledgement of the need to bring people back together as a precondition for a successful rebuilding process. It is clear that such initiatives would hardly emerge within the fragmented society and therefore they need not only financial resources, but also time, commitment and in-depth knowledge of the specific circumstances, and appropriate mechanisms for addressing those. This is the area where the international actors can play an important role not only as donors, but as direct bearers of positive values, norms, attitudes and practices. Of critical importance for developing and implementing programmes that could enable the achievement of social cohesion and that can eventually help accumulating social capital is an understanding of how conflict affects society, what factors increase group integration under unfavourable conditions, and which the most critical issues for the specific situation are.

A reconstruction process after an ethnic conflict needs to take into account that the social capital at the level of state has been destroyed, that the previously existing multi-ethnic society most likely has been fragmented into mono-ethnic communities. Without overestimating the factors such as ethnic grievance or economic inequality, violence could continue occurring and thrive in post-conflict settings, only if the non-negotiable differences, established as politically relevant continue to matter (de Soysa 2005). If post-conflict reconstruction does not manage to find an integrative platform for developing programmes and policies that promote and enable the restoration of citizenship and civicness, the process as a whole can be doomed to failure.

Of course, some other aspects can be associated with the preconditions for success of any post-conflict reconstruction programme. As Panic (1992:17-18) points out, positive effects can be expected only if the recipients’ needs and donors’ interests coincide. In this case, the situation is likely to be more beneficial to the donors and to solve the recipient’s problems. Only when both sides work together, the designed and implemented policies and strategies can bring the expected results. If the recipients do not participate in determining objectives and priorities, all the activities and efforts might be perceived as imposed from outside and therefore interventionist.

The lack of working social capital within the political unit undergoing reconstruction can impede the formulation of a common donor-recipient assistance strategy. The lack of consent between the local communities, the impossibility/ unwillingness to cooperate and to identify common problems, can result in unilateral donor’s decisions on where to direct and/or allocate the resources, which in turn results more in exacerbating tensions between the hostile groups than in helping them overcome the war consequences.
On the other hand, the demand-driven assistance would help the international organisations avoid wasting time and resources, as well as the ‘risk of failure caused by inconsistencies between the objectives and policies, duplication of effort and uncoordinated completion of projects’ (Panic 2006, online). The case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other examples from practice, has demonstrated that when such co-ordination is missing, donors pursue their own goals, which not always coincide with the real needs of the country and the society undergoing the process of reconstruction. Among the serious problems that might emerge as a result, is the implementation of discriminatory policies in favour of a particular group (supportive of the donor’s agendas), which is contrary to the idea of avoiding future conflicts. In addition to that, external donors have to be aware that they bear the responsibility to limit their own commercial interests. The impossibility of clearly identifying the most active reconstruction agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved right the assumption that acting independently and without a commonly defined strategy and mechanisms for co-ordination, donors can waste lots of resources without achieving the initially planned results.

Economic life determines the political discourse and actions, but if not managed well, such processes are hardly conducive to the rebuilding of social capital necessary for constraining opportunistic actors bent on violence (de Soysa 2005). In an environment of distrust – either between the people at the grass-root level, between majority and minorities, or between local actors and international reconstruction agents, the amounts of money spent in the form aid or assistance would hardly have the expected positive effects. The success or failure of the post-conflict reconstruction depends largely on how collective action is mobilised in the desired direction - towards ending the violence or towards building a common future. In a situation of a fragmented society, where people perceive ‘the other’ as a threat and not as a partner, where the various communities dream of independence or at least of not having to deal with the fellow-countrymen, the common future is rather an abstract notion and not a goal to be invested in.

Post-conflict reconstruction has been developed upon the donor-driven approach to development. The programmes and activities that aim at bringing development to people mirror the paternalistic, static policies that might have led to the conflict in the first place (de Soysa 2005). A strategically planned reconstruction programme should aim at building over the existing resources, at beginning to transfer the ownership of processes as early as possible, to engage the local population in the activities, and to attract their support being convinced that they are contributing to their better future. This however is possible only if there is a positive social capital within the unit under reconstruction, which corresponds to the macro-frameworks, within which the processes would take and are taking place. This is to say that if the macro-framework is defined as ‘a state’, the positive social capital that could enable the successful implementation of the planned activities should also be present at state level. Where people are not rationally interconnected through economic activity, where market linkages are weak, or where static economic policies dominate, there is little reason for civic engagement, which is the key element for generating a positive social capital (de Soysa 2005).

Although sharing certain features with the reconstruction process after a ‘traditional’ war, the post-ethnic conflict one requires that at a very early stage the
attention is drawn upon the issues of societal disruption, division along ethnic (or cultural, religious, etc.) lines, increased hatreds and social tensions, and the lack of will for co-operation between the former enemies. As it was presented earlier in the text, the ethnic conflict destroys any (pre)existing social contract, which had been possibly encompassing the members of the pre-conflict (multicultural) society, serving as a basis for distribution of the responsibilities and resources. Therefore, in order that a reconstruction after an ethnic conflict achieve the planned outcomes, its programmes should address not only the problems of providing security, establishing appropriate legal and institutional frameworks, of recovery (re-) or building of physical and human capital (WB-OED 1998:5) but also of the restoration of social capital. The key point is that all efforts should be directed towards the development of strategic frameworks (at programme, national or regional levels) that promote coherent, coordinated policy and action in support of peace-building or conflict reduction goals (Ardon 2002:8).

Developmental policies and practices can have negative or minimal effects if local dynamics are neglected. Certainly crucial, taking into account local developments remains only the first precondition. For a positive change to occur and to become a sustainable and lasting model, it is further necessary that post-conflict reconstruction adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach – not only in terms of programme design and implementation, but also as a strategic policy accepted by all key players in the field. Only when there are clearly defined objectives with a respective implementation plan, when there are agreed, coordinated efforts, the transition to normal living conditions would be enabled, and time and resources would not be wasted. Alternatively, despite the number of local actors with a vision for their future and willingness to work for it, despite the international support for the local initiatives, despite the amounts of resources invested, the sleeping volcano would be awaiting appropriate conditions to erupt.


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Interview with the Author: 23.02.2002, Split

Dedović, Melissa – Media Plan Centre, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 23.07.2003, Sarajevo

Deljić, Dzenana – State Ombudsman, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 03.07.2003, Sarajevo

Durmić, Muhamed – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 25.06.2003, Sarajevo

Gnidić, Damir – Legal Advisor, OHR, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 30.06.2009, phone interview

Goić, Ivana – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 12.06.2003, Sarajevo

Grebo, Zdravko – Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 16.07.2003, Sarajevo

Harland, Christopher – Head of Human Rights Department (2000-2002), OHR
Interview with the Author: 03.08.2009, phone interview

Imamović, Armin – Human Rights Chamber, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 15.05.2003, Sarajevo

Ivandić, Snejana – HRC: Balkan HR Network, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 23.06.2006, Sarajevo
Kirkenger, Lisa – Public Relations Officer UNHCR, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 25.06.2003, Sarajevo

Kurtović, Eni – Development Manager, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 19.11.2008, phone interview

Mcnamara, Dennis – Director, UNHCR Division of International Protection
Interview with the Author: 04.04.2003, Oxford

Mirić, Milan – ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 20.06.2003, Sarajevo

Moratti, Massimo – Legal Advisor OSCE, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 19.06.2003, Sarajevo

Mrđa, Milan – Centre for Promotion of Civil Society, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 27.06.2003, Sarajevo

Puljić, Zoran – Executive Director, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 11.06.2003, Sarajevo and 08.04.2009, phone interview

Rebić, Vedrana – National Statistical Agency BiH, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 21.05.2009, phone interview

Repowac, Valida – Directorate for EU Integration, Council of Ministers BiH
Interview with the Author: 18.06.2003, Sarajevo

Sirco, Armin – Program Coordinator UNDP, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 01.07.2003, Sarajevo

Sokolović, Dzemal – Director Institute for Strengthening Democracy in BiH
Interview with the Author: 08.07.2003, Konjić

Stojanov, Dragoljub – Professor in the Faculty of Economic, Centre for International Cooperation, University of Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 23.06.2003, Sarajevo

Tinjić, Goran – Senior Operations Officer, WB Office - Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 03.07.2009, phone interview

Trkulja, Ivana – Danish Refugee Council, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 28.05.2003, Sarajevo

Turulja, Sead – Hostel Owner, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 06.05.2003, Sarajevo

Vracić, Alida – Project Coordinator, European Stability Initiative, Sarajevo
Interview with the Author: 20.05.2003 and 13.06.2003, Sarajevo
### APPENDIX 1: Conflicts Data

#### TABLE 1: The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts Project Database (2004)

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<th>START YEAR</th>
<th>END YEAR</th>
<th>NAME</th>
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<th>ACTOR 2/3</th>
<th>BARGAIN1</th>
<th>BARGAIN 2/3</th>
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<th>END TYPE</th>
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**Table Codes**

- **Region**: where the conflict occurred: Advanced Industrial Democracies (AdvDem), Eastern Europe and the (former) USSR (EE/USSR), Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MidE/Naf), Black Africa (Black Afr), Latin America (L America)
- **Staryear / Endyear**: Year conflict episode started / Year conflict episode ended
- **Name**: Case name (indicating state and, usually, nationalist opposition); **Actor1, Actor2, Actor3**: Groups involved in conflict (government GVT)
- **Bargain1/2/3**: Initial Demands of Actor 1/2/3 at start of conflict episode: 1/ Genocide of Minority/Nationalist Group; 2/ Assimilation with Prejudice (ASSM+PRJ); 3/ Assimilation with Equality (ASSM+EQ); 4/ Cultural Autonomy (CLT ATNM); 5/ Political Autonomy (POL ATNM); 6/ Independence (INDP); 7/ Genocide of Majority/Non-Nation Group/Opposing Group (Min GNC)
- **Rebelx**: Highest level of violence reached during conflict episode: 0/ No violence reported; 1/ Political Banditry; 2/ Campaigns of Terrorism; 3/ Local Rebellion; 4/ Small-Scale Guerilla Activity; 5/ Intermediate Guerilla Activity; 6/ Large-Scale Guerilla Activity; 7/ Protracted Civil War
- **Ongoing**: - as of Dec. 1996 - whether episode is ongoing (ong) or not (end); or whether conflict recurs between same actors (rec)
- **Endtype**: Type of ending of conflict: Inaction (INACT); Defeat (DFT); CFlame (CF); Agreement (AGRM); None
- **Separat**: Outcome of Episode Ending: 1/Parties not separated (Not SPT) 2/Parties separated (SPT) - where “separated” refers to a situation where individuals in either group are not subject to attack with impunity by members of the other group
- **Agreetyp**: Type of Agreement reached: Assimilation (ASSM), Cultural Autonomy (CLT ATNM), Political Autonomy (POL ATNM), Separation (SPT), Unknown

**Source**: VINC Database: The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts project database (2004), W.Ayres, University of Indianapolis (http://facstaff.uindy.edu/~bayres/vinc.htm)
### VINC Table Summary

- Conflicts occurred during the Cold War: 61 cases
- Conflicts occurred in the Post-cold War period: 22 cases
- N of conflicts ended (by 2004): 32 cases
- N of ongoing conflicts (by 2004): 28 cases
- N of recurrent conflicts: 23 cases
- N of conflicts ended with separation: 17 cases
- N of conflicts ended with NO separation: 38 cases
- N/A: 28 cases
- Implementation of agreement started: 35 cases
- N of completed implementation: 30 cases
- N of continued implementation: 30 cases
- Implement not started: 53 cases

#### Initial demands Actor 1:
- Assimilation + Equality: 43 cases
- Assimilation + Prejudice: 32 cases
- Cultural Autonomy: 6 cases

#### Initial demands Actor 2:
- Independence: 65 cases
- Political Autonomy: 11 cases
- Cultural Autonomy: 1 cases
- Assimilation + Equality: 2 cases
- Assimilation + Prejudice: 1 cases
- Genocide of Minorities: 1 cases

#### Agreement Reached:
- Agreement: 26 cases
- Cease-fire: 5 cases
- Defeat: 22 cases
- Inaction: 2 cases
- None: 28 cases


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Source:
## APPENDIX 2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process

### TABLE 1: Pillars, Sectors, and Areas of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process
(adapted from AUSA/CSIS (2002) *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*)

<table>
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<td>Non-combatants</td>
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<td>Protection of Key Individuals, Infrastructure, and Institutions</td>
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<td>Professionalism/Ethics</td>
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APPENDIX 3: Fieldwork Contacts

LIST OF PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED DURING FIELDWORKS

People Interviewed

1. Armakolas, Ioannis – Officer at the USAID, Sarajevo
3. Balta, Kleljia – EU-QIF Head Office, Sarajevo
4. Barbalić, Ivan – ‘Alumni’ Organisation Representative, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo
5. Batić, Hrvoje – Program Director OSF, Sarajevo
6. Bishop, Jo-Anne – OSCE Education Department, Sarajevo
7. Bojrović, Reuf – Taxi-driver, Sarajevo
8. Brkić, Snejana – Assistant, Faculty of Economic, University of Sarajevo
9. Dedović, Melissa – Media Plan Centre, Sarajevo
10. DelJKić, Dzenana – State Ombudsman, Sarajevo
11. Durmić, Muhamed – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
12. Gnidić, Damir – Legal Advisor, OHR, Sarajevo
13. Goić, Ivana – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
14. Grebo, Zdravko – Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo
15. Harland, Christopher – Head of Human Rights Department (2000-2002), OHR
16. Imamović, Armin – Human Rights Chamber, Sarajevo
17. Ivandić, Snejana – HRC: Balkan HR Network, Sarajevo
18. Kirkenger, Lisa – Public Relations Officer UNHCR, Sarajevo
19. Kurtović, Eni – Development Manager, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
20. McNamara, Dennis – Director, UNHCR Division of International Protection
21. Mirić, Milan – ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Sarajevo
22. Moratti, Massimo – Legal Advisor OSCE, Sarajevo
23. Mrda, Milan – Centre for Promotion of Civil Society, Sarajevo
24. Puljić, Zoran – Executive Director, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo
26. Repovac, Valida – Directorate for EU Integration, Council of Ministers BiH
27. Sirco, Armin – Program Coordinator UNDP, Sarajevo
28. Sokolović, Dzemal – Director Institute for Strengthening Democracy in BiH
29. Stojanov, Dragoljub – Professor in the Faculty of Economic, Centre for International Cooperation, University of Sarajevo
30. Tinjić, Goran – Senior Operations Officer, WB Office - Sarajevo
31. Trkulja, Ivana – Danish Refugee Council, Sarajevo
32. Turulja, Sead – Hostel Owner, Sarajevo
33. Vratić, Alida – Project Coordinator, European Stability Initiative, Sarajevo

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Contacted/Visited Organisations

1. CARE International, BH office Sarajevo
2. Centre for promotion of civil society, Sarajevo
3. Danish Refugee Council, BH office Sarajevo
4. Department for EU Integration, Co
5. ESI – European Stability Initiative office Sarajevo
6. EU Integration office, Sarajevo
7. Institute for Strengthening Democracy in BiH, Konjic
8. ICVA International Council of voluntary agencies Sarajevo
9. Helsinki Committee
10. HRC: Balkan HR Network office Sarajevo
11. Media Plan Centre Sarajevo
12. Mozaik Foundation (NVO Fondazia), Sarajevo
13. OHR - Office of the High Representative, Head office Sarajevo
14. OHRO, Office of The Human Rights Ombudsperson, Sarajevo
15. OSCE, Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe, Sarajevo
16. OSF, Soros Foundation Open Society Fund BiH, Sarajevo
17. UNDP - United Nations Development Programme, BH office Sarajevo
18. UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, BH office Sarajevo
19. University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Law
20. University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Economics
21. WB, The World Bank Resident Mission Sarajevo
22. World Vision International, BH office Sarajevo
APPENDIX 4: Development Assistance to BiH

Net Official Development Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Period 1995 – 2006 as Reported by the World Bank

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<th>Series</th>
<th>Aid (% state expenditures)</th>
<th>Aid (% of GNI)</th>
<th>Aid (% gross capital)</th>
<th>Aid (% imports)</th>
<th>Aid per capita (current US$)</th>
<th>Official aid (current US$)</th>
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Series: Official development assistance and official aid (current US$)

Net official development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in part I of the DAC list of recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net official aid refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Data are in current U.S. dollars.

Information obtained: August 2008
Comparing the data of the examined databases it becomes obvious that the information they present differs in figures, sectors and areas in focus, years analysed, etc. The tables below present the synthesised information from the databases and the discrepancies between the entries. The mismatch and the relative equality in terms of objectiveness each source could claim, impeded the prioritisation of a database before the others and hence, the unambiguous identification of the key ‘agents’ of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**FTS Database (2000-2006)**

*Financial Tracking Service of the Relief Web database - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Available online from http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/)*

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<td>De-mining, health, reintegration/rehabilitation, humanitarian assistance, supply of wood, food, reconstruction of houses</td>
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### External assistance at the State level

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The amount indicated is the amount contracted - figures in Euros have been converted to US$ (1:1)
* Data used is from the EC Report - EC Assistance to BiH Technical Progress Report 1 July/Sept 2002
** Montreal Protocol is a multilateral fund

### AiDA Database (1996-2006)

*Accessible Information on Development Activities (AiDA) at the Development Gateway (Available online at [http://aida.developmentgateway.org/aida/](http://aida.developmentgateway.org/aida/))*

### Donor Breakdown for Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors (ranked)</th>
<th>Contribution (in USD)</th>
<th>10 Donors with the most activities</th>
<th>N of activities</th>
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**OECD.STATEXTRACTS (1996 – 2006)**


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<td>Government &amp; Civil Society</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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APPENDIX 6: WB Conflict Analysis Framework

The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)* is designed to help World Bank (WB) teams identify factors that affect a conflict and enable them to see how they can be best addressed through WB programs and policies. The analysis is designed to ensure that development interventions do not incite, exacerbate, or revive conflict. The CAF has four major components.

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<tr>
<th>Process phases</th>
<th>Relevant steps</th>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Screening Process:</td>
<td>Nine Risk Screening Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The screening process comprises a review of nine indicators. In general, the more indicators assessed as positive, the more need there is for conflict analysis.</td>
<td>1. Violent conflict in the past ten years</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Low per capita GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. High capacity on primary commodities exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Militarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ethnic dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Active regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. High youth unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Restricted civil and political rights</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Analysis:</th>
<th>Six Conflict Categories</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>The conflict analysis is based on a framework of six categories, each of which has a number of variables. Using the framework, WB teams are able to identify the key factors that affect conflict.</td>
<td>1. Social and ethnic relations</td>
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<td>2. Governance and political institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Human rights and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Economic structures and performance (including infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Environmental and natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. External factors</td>
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<table>
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<th>Methodology:</th>
<th>Analysis: As part of the analysis of each category, the approach suggests focusing on seven aspects for each category:</th>
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<td>Five-step process for teams to work through conflict-related issues.</td>
<td>1. Its history and how it developed over time</td>
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<td>2. Its dynamic and trends and what is determining the future path</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Public perceptions and biases of the issue</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. How the issue has been politicized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Extent to which the issue has led to organized interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. How it contributes to conflict and intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. How it contributes to poverty</td>
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WB Country Aggregated Report - Bosnia and Herzegovina
Summary Statement of Loans/Credits/Grants (1996-2006)

TABLE 1: WB Projects over the period 1996-2006 (summary)

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<th>Projects over the period 1996-2006</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
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<th>Money distribution by sector</th>
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<td>100%</td>
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TABLE 2: WB Projects over the period 1996-2006 (details)

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<td>Total for 1996-2006</td>
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<td>Project ID/Description</td>
<td>Amounts in USD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>P070146: Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project 20-Jun-00 / 30-Sep-04</td>
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<td>1760000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>P070995: Community Development 26-Jun-01 / 31-Aug-08 (considered because most of the project period falls between the period of interest)</td>
<td>15000000.00</td>
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<th>WB Project (All)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amounts in USD</th>
<th>Approval Date</th>
<th>Closing Date</th>
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<td>Emergency Natural Gas System Rehab</td>
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<td>30-07-96</td>
<td>30-06-98</td>
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<td>P044521</td>
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<td>8175000</td>
<td>30-07-96</td>
<td>30-09-99</td>
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<td>P044522</td>
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<td>Basic Health</td>
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<td>04-05-99</td>
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<td>P045134</td>
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<td>P045310</td>
<td>Emergency Public Works &amp; Employment (health &amp; social services)</td>
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<td>30-07-96</td>
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<td>P045311</td>
<td>Local Initiatives (micro credits)</td>
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<td>04-06-98</td>
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<td>27952652,38</td>
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<td>P050892</td>
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<td>19-05-98</td>
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<td>P055432</td>
<td>Public Finance SAC</td>
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<td>Local Development</td>
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<td>13-04-99</td>
<td>31-05-05</td>
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<tr>
<td>P057951</td>
<td>Mostar Water Supply &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>12367800</td>
<td>30-06-00</td>
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<td>P058052</td>
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<td>17-06-99</td>
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<td>P066169</td>
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<td>P067153</td>
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<td>450000</td>
<td>16-04-99</td>
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<tr>
<td>P070079</td>
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<td>P070146</td>
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<td>P071107</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 373 309 889</td>
<td>1 111 320 248,14</td>
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**TABLE 5: WB in AIDA (summary)**
(Source: AIDA Database (http://aida.developmentgateway.org/aida/))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WB Projects by sector 1996 - 2006</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Money distribution by sector (in %)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Banking and Financial Services</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69344793</td>
<td>2.18 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Services</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23950000</td>
<td>7.53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Administration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100300000</td>
<td>3.15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70600000</td>
<td>2.22 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2602820000</td>
<td>81.87 %</td>
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<td>Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
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<td>3 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total for the period 1996 - 2006</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3179151583</td>
<td>100 %</td>
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Projects possibly (potentially) related to social capital  6   173830000  6% out of sector “Multiple” / 5% out of total

**TABLE 6: WB ‘Multiple’ sector projects in AIDA - potential social capital impact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Group</th>
<th>Fund Org</th>
<th>Activity Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Essential Hospital Services Project</td>
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<td>War Victims Rehabilitation Project</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>880000000</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>Private Sector Credit Project</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>260000000</td>
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## APPENDIX 8: Mozaik Foundation Programme Support

### TABLE 1: Completed Programme „For Active Communities“(CoDE A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Local partner</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Čaplina</td>
<td>Ecological society „Lijepa naša“</td>
<td>Decoration of the beach Jaz</td>
<td>400 m² cultivated area: recreation &amp; sanitation facilities installed</td>
<td>Workgroup in charge of maintaining the space</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prijedor</td>
<td>Ecological society „Kozara“</td>
<td>Decoration of the excursion site Pašinac</td>
<td>3000 m² cultivated area: installed recreation &amp; sanitation facilities, information signs; playgrounds constructed</td>
<td>Utility firms, police, &amp; an elementary school placed in charge of the maintenance</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslić, Prijedor</td>
<td>UG Eco-oaza Podgrede / UG Eco-oaza Podgrede</td>
<td>Decoration of the excursion site Pašinac</td>
<td>1000 m² cultivated area; recreation &amp; sanitation facilities installed</td>
<td>CBO is responsible for space maintenance</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradiška</td>
<td>Forum Gradišćanaca</td>
<td>Decoration of excursion site at the bank of river Sava – Poloj</td>
<td>Beach construction plans; 2 km river banks cleaned &amp; cultivated; facilities constructed</td>
<td>The utility firm &amp; workgroup placed in charge of maintaining the space</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluč</td>
<td>UG “Kluč budućnosti”</td>
<td>Decoration of the city beach „Alina Luka 2006“</td>
<td>Beach construction plans; 2 km river banks cleaned &amp; cultivated; facilities constructed</td>
<td>Municipality assembly has decided that the site should be maintained by a youth organization involved since the beginning of the project</td>
<td>Municipality allocated funds; plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olovo</td>
<td>Hiking club “Smolin“</td>
<td>Decoration of the excursion site “Zeleni vir“</td>
<td>Illegal landfill in the Bioštice canyon cleaned; illegal garbage disposal was stopped</td>
<td>The disposal service has agreed to maintain the park; trees - maintained by the citizens of the local community</td>
<td>No further funds – community did not deliver proper documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalesija</td>
<td>UG “Eko zeleni Kalesija“</td>
<td>Decoration of the green areas</td>
<td>Cultivation of an area in the central park; garbage disposal facilities installed; two ecology workshops for elementary school group; a line of trees planted along the main street</td>
<td>The disposal service has agreed to maintain the park; trees - maintained by the citizens of the local community</td>
<td>No further funds – community did not deliver proper documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zavidovići</td>
<td>Sadnice Mira „Peace Trees“</td>
<td>Eco park “Durića gaj“</td>
<td>30800 m² of park area cleaned &amp; cultivated cleaned; constructed circular educational space with the “Peace Pillar” (with a peace-message in 8 languages)</td>
<td>Facilities became target of young vandals who have almost completely destroyed the installed equipment</td>
<td>Workgroup started an initiative with the local police &amp; activities to protect this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Petrovac</td>
<td>UG “Gracija”</td>
<td>Building of sport and recreation park for youth and adults</td>
<td>The park constructed is the only one in the city</td>
<td>The sanitation service and home for children without parents were assigned to take care of the space</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novi Grad / Bosanski Novi</td>
<td>“Dar prirode”</td>
<td>Decoration of the park in local community Mlakva</td>
<td>1000 m² of park cleaned &amp; decorated; access roads repaired; recreation facilities &amp; sewage drainage constructed</td>
<td>The home for children without parents has agreed to maintain the space</td>
<td>Plans for further decoration of the space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derventa</td>
<td>“Forum NVO”</td>
<td>Decoration of esplanade at the left side of river Ukrina</td>
<td>400 m of river bank cleaned and cultivated</td>
<td>The workgroup is now in charge of maintaining the space</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breza</td>
<td>UG “20 mart 1990”</td>
<td>“Clean town, healthy future”</td>
<td>Installed 35 trash bins in the city centre</td>
<td>The sanitation service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jablanica</td>
<td>EKO Neretva</td>
<td>Cleaned depot– better conditions for living in community D.Jablanica</td>
<td>landfill cleaned from hard waste; container installed; trees planted along the 100m access path</td>
<td>Jablanica sanitation service; citizens have taken the duty of paying for the communal bills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebinje</td>
<td>UG „OAZA“</td>
<td>For more purposeful and more beautiful school yard</td>
<td>Solved problems of accumulation of rain water; cleaned courtyard, cultivated lawn</td>
<td>The space is managed by ecology class of the elementary school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitez</td>
<td>“Kremenik”</td>
<td>Decoration of the orchard, botanical garden and sport playground</td>
<td>Plants &amp; botanic garden in a school yard – pupils participated in planting; sport &amp; events facilities constructed</td>
<td>The space is regularly maintained by the school and the ecology class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srebrenik, Eco-Green “Srebrenik”</td>
<td>Mulahmetovića brook &amp; school yard – ecological decoration</td>
<td>Cleaned and cultivated creek-area nearby a local school; sport facilities repaired</td>
<td>The space is maintained by the school and the eco-class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuzla</td>
<td>UG “Centar urbanih ideja”</td>
<td>Super Super-quart</td>
<td>Municipal authorities subject to lobbying, to determine a one-way traffic flow, to maintain properly the parking lot, and to determine a pedestrian zone; 7 green surfaces decorated</td>
<td>Citizens, the local communities apartment owners, sanitation service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostajnica</td>
<td>UG “Pounje Kostajnica”</td>
<td>Our Yard</td>
<td>Drainage opening for connection to city sewers built; decoration of green surfaces</td>
<td>Space maintained by the tenants’ assembly</td>
<td>Plans for future initiatives developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zavidovići,</td>
<td>UG “Atom”</td>
<td>Repair of depot of carcinogenic dross and turning the area into the park</td>
<td>In residential unit courtyard - 110 m3 of cancerogenic waste was gathered, and moved to the city landfill, drainage installation constructed, trees planted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostar</td>
<td>HO “Izvor”</td>
<td>The positive example</td>
<td>In residential block - sewage &amp; drainage systems constructed; sidewalks built; yard cleaned, cultivated; children’s playground constructed</td>
<td>Space is maintained by the tenants’ assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td>Total value (KM)</td>
<td>Mozaik (in KM)</td>
<td>Community (in KM)</td>
<td>In cash</td>
<td>In-kind &amp; services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>114 447</td>
<td>49 943</td>
<td>64 504</td>
<td>28 887</td>
<td>35 617</td>
<td>26 531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type of Contribution**

- 55% in cash
- 45% in-kind and services

**Sources of Contribution**

- Contribution of 23 public institutions: 17%
- Contribution of 70 public and private companies: 41%
- Contribution of 26 individuals: 37%
- Contribution of 14 CBOs: 5%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>No of participants in the beginning</th>
<th>at the end</th>
<th>Partnering organisation</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Satisfaction with idea</th>
<th>Active participation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breza</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>UG ‘20 mart 1990’, Clean town, healthy future</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
<td>4,6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zavidovići</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>UG ‘Atom’, Repair of depot of carcinogenic dross &amp; transforming the area into park</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
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<td>4,4</td>
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<td>UG ‘Atom’, Repair of depot of carcinogenic dross &amp; transforming the area into park</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
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<td>4,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.Petrovac</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>UG ‘Gracija’, Building of sport &amp; recreation park for youth &amp; adults</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
<td>4,8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Derventa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>UG ‘Forum NVO’, Decoration of esplanade at the left side of river Ukrina</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
<td>4,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teslić</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Vitez</td>
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<td>UG ‘Kremenik’, Decoration of the orchard, botanical garden and sport playground</td>
<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
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<td>4,3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Čapljina</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>UG ‘ključ bućnost’ , Decoration of the city beach ‘Alina Luka 2006’</td>
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<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trebinje</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>UG ‘OAZA', For more purposeful and more beautiful school yard</td>
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<td>'Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees', Eco park 'Đunića gaj'</td>
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TABLE 3: CoDE A Statistics of involvement in planning process

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Grantee</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>MZ</th>
<th>Media</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Involvement in planning process - Community planning meetings**

- Citizens: 30%
- Pupils: 9%
- Government: 7%
- Institutions: 17%
- Businesses: 1%
- NGOs: 23%
- Media: 4%
- MZ: 9%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>MZ</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>310</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>
APPENDIX 9: Mozaik Foundation Support to Social Capital Reconstruction

### Table 1: Living Heritage Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT NAME / LOCATION</th>
<th>MOSAÏK ASSESSMENT of achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconstruction of the old school in Rankovići (village near by Novi Travnik) - a 100 years old school and 1500 years old oak tree in the yard – both neglected and devastated</strong></td>
<td>The project was implemented by NGOs not based in the village of Rankovići, following their particular interests and not being accessible to the people in village. This caused problems. Community members were not involved in planning processes and mobilized to take active role in the project although activities were managed in participatory manner (joint decision-making, delegation of responsibilities). Intensive media coverage did not reach/inform people from local community - people did not have a feeling that this was “their” project. Registration of a local association to manage the school was delayed. Completed in 2005 it enabled the achievement of positive results and change of the way of running the project „Living Heritage School“. Additional problems in connection to further reconstruction works needed impeded the opening of the school. Big potential for local benefits for various groups (people from Rankovići, NGOs from Novi Travnik, and youth from this area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manifestation in Small street in Kakanj (a town of 52 000 citizens. In the 1960 the tradition of the Small street has been established - to ‘host’ the cultural, social, etc. happenings)</strong></td>
<td>The project influenced on increasing the readiness of community, especially local government, to preserve local heritage, and had positive impact on raising community awareness of own tradition. NGO administrator of the project partially managed to mobilize the community and to re-establish the symbol of traditional cultural event. Yong people, pensioners and local institutions became involved, but no full participation of the community (limited contribution from private sector and individuals); Need to increase transparency of the work and wider community participation. A local organisation - &quot;Days of trade and culture&quot; - was created with the launch of the project. The project achieved to organise the street as a pedestrian zone used for traditional celebrations. Viability of project can be ensured by NGOs engaged with organizing further cultural and sporting events or by new programs (as building a children's playground by the municipality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opening ethno house in Jablanica (a town on Neretva river, 10 000 citizens)</strong></td>
<td>Wide participation of various institutions and people in activities resulted in increase of awareness of cultural heritage and improving cultural life of Jablanica. Still, the involvement of people in creative activities not as expected. In the process of setting up the ethno house in Jablanica, a successful local partnership achieved, as well as other community contacts (with historical section of Bradina and Šćit, museum in Mostar and the National Museum of Sarajevo). Sustainability ensured through taking responsibility for the maintenance of the museum space. Necessary to carry out education of interested groups, to promote the old trade &amp; travel deals, to continue organizing events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Renovation of space for folklore group in Guča Gora (400 inhabitants, -Croats, returnees from the surrounding 7 Bošnjak and Croat villages; the work of the folklore group was interrupted during the war)</strong></td>
<td>The positive impact on social cohesion was indicated by increased contacts among individuals and groups, increased awareness of local tradition and capacities of community members in planning and conducting various activities for local good. The folklore group was revived (re-registered NGO; active membership is involved in preservation of local heritage). Activities managed in participatory manner (locals involved in planning and decision making, which influenced on their readiness to work as volunteers). Besides, the space is used by Local Community Office that covers 7 villages and a football club (members from all surrounding Bošnjak and Croat villages). Local benefit for various groups is a visible motivational factor for future activities. Through replication of similar participatory approach in planning and implementing community actions the Local Community Office has already cleaned playground, graveyard and park, installed benches and reconstructed two local roads. The project have increased community cohesion and motivated further actions (first participatory activities since 1996). The positive results acknowledged by community members: “Those who came with money didn’t do anything, and these without big money did everything&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Renovation of old Clock Tower in Donji Vakuf</strong></td>
<td>The project influenced on preservation of local heritage and had positive impact on raising community awareness of own tradition. Community is successfully mobilized to work on protection of local heritage. The biggest strength of this project is dedicated working group that have had clear vision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
about the project goal and was ready to work on a voluntary basis to achieve it. Working group succeeded to mobilize local resources and to involve institutions and business to support the project. Additionally, made efforts in lobbying and influenced decision makers to come with decisions to protect local heritage. The group is still active and have plans for future initiatives to ensure sustainability of the project idea and to replicate the participatory approach. The renovated space provides opportunities for creative expressions of local amateurs (folklore club, singers, there was poetry contest, etc. The project confirms that it is easier for volunteer support in smaller towns, while the financial support is more easily implemented in places with greater concentration of companies and government institutions.

<p>| Workshop for old techniques of making traditional clothes in Catići | There was a positive impact on raising community awareness of own tradition and increasing readiness of community members to work on protection of local heritage. Various groups participated in the project (concerning gender, age, nationality) and community was mobilized (indicated by the high level of voluntary support in various activities implemented through the project). Limited financial support, especially form institutions. Need to develop better partnerships and fundraising skills. Working group established contacts with other communities who participated in the organised display. Plans for new events; the group is involved in the third cycle of the Living Heritage project (handicrafts production) - no doubts about the sustainability of the project idea. |
| The Centre of Living Heritage in Bugojno (town of about 40 000 citizens) | There is NO impact on social cohesion achieved through this project – low level of mobilization of community members, no replication of the participatory model of community development. Working group did not succeed to ensure continuation of the activities of The Centre of Living Heritage, what was the project goal, neither had they implemented all activities planned (setting table, the more volunteer action). Activities started in a participatory manner, but the poor organisation and lack of leader had a negative impact on project. Lacking a clear vision and effective coordination, the group did not succeed to get financial support from community, nor were volunteers engaged. Consequently, the renovated through the project space was used for just few activities. The group produced lot of promotional materials (brochures, posters, calendars, TV reportages), but these did not contribute for mobilizing citizens of Bugojno. However, the materials increased awareness of citizens about the values of local cultural heritage (the youth was motivated to participate in School History Meetings). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE/PARTNER</th>
<th>PROJECT TITLE, MATERIAL OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED, BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>(EVALUATION) DESCRIPTION OF CSMF OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Teslić, NGO “Futura Plus”** | Ambulance in Village of Kamenica: Ensured basic conditions for health protection for citizen of Kamenica and 2 surrounding villages (about 2000 people) | **1. Excellent:** Voluntary work since 1991 but no full involvement in planning process; 3 institutions and groups involved in planning & implementation (total of 15 people involved in activities: 7 members of working group; young, men and women, including Serbs from neighbourhood village). High number of volunteers (22 people/721 hours); Plans for new community initiatives.  
**2. Excellent:** NGO informed citizens on regularly basis and involve them in planning process. Visible results and local benefit increased trust toward NGO. Based on needs assessment they develop plans for new activities in this community. They used only personal contacts for volunteers’ mobilization and for fundraising. Success in influencing decision makers (Municipality decided to ensure sustainable work of the ambulance). |
| **2. Petrovo, NGO “Ideja”** | Reconstruction of infrastructure in Kakmuž: Reconstructed street light in main street - enabled safety movement (2370 citizens), better conditions for activities of sport associations (2 sport clubs with 64 members; 350 school children) | **1. Good:** Local authorities - practice to support community initiatives, people used to voluntary actions; thus no significant improvement in applying CDD approach. 4 institutions, 4 NGOs and groups (young, men and women) involved in planning and implementation (4 members of working group, 20 others); High number of volunteers (18 people/500 hours); Significant amount of money raised from 3 sources (individuals, government institutions, business). Community benefits (lights on streets, space for 2 sport clubs, etc.) - visible motivation for future activities.  
**2. Good:** For the first time, NGO involved citizens in planning process and reported to them regularly. Successful partnerships established. New methods used for mobilization of local resources and for mobilization and management of volunteers. Plans for 5 new initiatives developed, but no concrete actions undertaken. |
| **3. Maglaj, NGO “RVI”** | Removing of Architectonic Barriers in Maglaj: Renovated 2 streets (total of 1.5 km) with pathways for disabled - enabled inclusion & access to public institutions (about 260 citizens) | **1. Fair:** Common benefit and involvement of different stakeholders in planning process (3 from institutions; 20 from community, 7 from working group) recognised as factors of success, but community did not succeed to mobilize volunteers. Citizens satisfied with participatory decision making; no interest in involvement with voluntary work (2 volunteers / 10 days). High level of local financial contribution, but only from two sources (municipality and NGO own resources). Plans for future activities to involve community members.  
**2. Fair:** Success in mobilisation of local government but still a need for use of wider set of info/promo methods in order to get community support. No new methods of fundraising applied. NGO succeed to make influence on local government to incorporate invalids’ needs in the urban plans. NGO members understand the need for applying participatory approach in their work, but no new plans developed in this direction. |
| **4. Petrovo, NGO “RVI”** | Road reparation in Petrovo: Economic development of local community, created better conditions for agriculture through improvement of infrastructure (about 3500 citizens from Petrovo & Kakmuž) | **1. Excellent:** First application of CDD approach in community since 1996. Citizens emphasized importance of involvement in the planning process – increased willingness to participate (4 institutions involved in planning and implementation, 15 citizens on planning meeting, 5 in working group, 2 additional public meetings during implementation). All groups involved recognised benefits for themselves. Significant number of volunteers (81 volunteer/1020 hours); Funds raised from numerous sources (citizens, two government institutions, 5 private companies). Plans to reconstruct 4 additional roads; reconstruction of a bridge over river Jadrina started.  
**2. Excellent:** NGO applied new methods for informing citizens, for their involvement in planning process and for volunteers’ mobilization and fundraising. Well organized management of volunteers; Successful partnership; The model is replicated in plans for 6 additional actions, developed based on the needs expressed by community |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breza</td>
<td>NGO “20 mart 1990”</td>
<td>Promotion of ecological awareness in Breza; Ecological awareness raised; facilities for children installed (beneficiaries: about 1000 pupils &amp; young people; place for creative educational activities for another 400 pre-school children)</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Community previously conducted participatory activities. Mostly involved in project was youth, with significant participation of institutions. Significant number of volunteers (510 volunteer/3811 hours, engaged in community actions and in organizing various events). Four types of sources (citizens, government institutions, private companies, and NGO). Model replicated through campaign against using plastic bags.</td>
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<td>Derventa</td>
<td>NGO “Ekologika”</td>
<td>Arranging the city park in Derventa: Renovated City park in Derventa. Organized cultural and sport activities. Cultural, sport and community value of the project (Beneficiaries: av. 50 persons daily)</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>First implementation of CDD process with involvement in planning process – variety of stakeholders: representatives of 3 NGOs, 1 sport club, 2 government institutions, pensioner and one youth in working group; Significant support: 180 volunteers worked 900 hours on cleaning, financial support raised from two sources (municipality &amp; private sector); Community – not fully supportive to the initiative (the park was subsequently ruined).</td>
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<td>Derventa</td>
<td>“Forum NVO”</td>
<td>Building and equipping first aid centre in Mala Sočanica: Ensured basic conditions for health protection for citizen of Mala Sočanica and surrounding villages (900 inhabitants)</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>12 people participated in planning process, working group (citizens, local community office, NGO, media) had 5 meetings; Visible local benefit motivated community to support initiative (25 volunteers worked 164 hours on reconstruction and cleaning, with involvement of women, men, young and middle age people; 50 people involved in preparation of opening event, including preparing the lunch); Local contribution from 3 sources: individuals, 2 institutions, and NGOs; Sustainability ensured – local community office is responsible for maintaining the space, hospital Derventa provided medical staff; Model replicated - repaired 2 km of local road</td>
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<td>Derventa</td>
<td>NGO “Zlatna pčela”</td>
<td>Sustainable rural development in Bosanski Lužani: Enabled sustainable rural development; improved access to properties for 100 people; 37 of them - knowledge of educational activities; removing waste disposal has improved the quality of life for community residents</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Elderly people were surprising active and mobilized community. Sustainable results; 10 people participated in the planning process; the working group (NGO members, citizens) had 7 meetings. Local benefit motivated people (22 volunteers worked 659 hours on road and bridge reconstruction and cleaning, with involvement of women, men, young and older people); Local contribution from 2 sources: institutions &amp; business.</td>
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<td>Petrovo</td>
<td>NGO “Soz”</td>
<td>Building a bus station in Petrovo: Created better conditions for transport of passengers;</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Community had previously experience with CDD approach – no improvement achieved. 10 people involved in planning process, 5 members of working group (representatives of 2 NGOs, citizens) had 10 meetings; 30 volunteers worked 488 hours on building the bus station; Local contribution from 2 sources: Institution &amp; Business. The visible local</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Beneficiaries:</strong></td>
<td>about 2000 people (20% locals using the bus service)</td>
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<td><strong>Benefit couldn’t bring about a strong community involvement in activities.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2. Good:</strong></td>
<td>Organization did not have skills and experiences to run participatory initiatives. Supported by the working group this project had impact on their organizational development—improved skills in working in partnership (support from local government), in informing community (article in local newspaper, meetings with community members, narrative and financial report sent to local government, poll conducted), new techniques in volunteers management (lists of volunteers). Plans for new voluntary initiatives developed. NGO needs practices for community mobilization.</td>
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<td><strong>Opening IT educational resource</strong></td>
<td>3 members of working group had regular meetings; 10 volunteers worked 150 hours to prepare the space. Due to the type of beneficiary group (only youth), there was less involvement of other citizens in voluntary actions. 2 institutions supported the activities (Municipality and local community office) and one private company. The project increased readiness of community to adopt participatory development approach; local benefits for youth are a motivational factor for conducting similar activities in the future.</td>
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<td><strong>1. Good:</strong></td>
<td>The youth organization had no experience and this project contributed to its organizational development—improved skills in working in partnership, volunteers’ mobilization, and fundraising. NGO still needs to develop practices for successful community mobilization (transparency, participatory planning, volunteers mobilization and management, etc). Model replicated - initiative for reconstruction of football playground.</td>
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<td><strong>11. Bratunac, Fisherman Association “Drina”</strong></td>
<td>Picnic place on Drina river renovated and equipped also for cultural and sport events; improved ecological awareness and ensured place for recreation, socializing, sport and cultural activities (about 30% of Bratunac citizens visit the picnic space (5100 people))</td>
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<td><strong>Manifestation summer on Drina river:</strong></td>
<td>Significant community involvement and support: Around 40 community members (representatives of 8 public institutions and 6 NGOs) involved in planning and coordination of the activities; 27 meetings held. 87 volunteers completed 1497 hours on project activities. Financial support from 4 sources: 3 individuals, public institutions, 13 private companies, and NGOs. Municipality offered a partial support for the manifestation for the next summer. Working group established a city committee for environmental protection – committee developed plan for future activities, partially financed by Municipality.</td>
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<td><strong>2. Excellent:</strong></td>
<td>Although newly established and inexperienced, NGO showed high level of dedication and professionalism. NGO used 5 methods to inform and mobilize citizens (meetings, media, letters, posters, direct contact) and collected recommendations for next manifestation. Improved experience in working with many partners, with clear delegation of responsibilities. NGO members improved skills in fundraising, project proposal writing, etc.</td>
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<td><strong>12. Kozarac, NGO “DON – field office Teledom”</strong></td>
<td>Cleaned 2 km of the Starenica river banks; increased awareness about the need for environmental protection - no further pollution of the cleared section of the river. (300 people living near to the river banks)</td>
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<td><strong>Cleaning the banks and trough of Starenica river:</strong></td>
<td>There was significant financial support from community (from business, individuals, and institutions), plans for further environmental activities and fundraising were developed. Awareness about the need for environmental protection rose. Participatory development model was adopted only partially – limited voluntary support from community (11 volunteers worked 980 hours). Working group succeed to achieve some unplanned results, but some planned activities were not implemented.</td>
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<td><strong>2. Good:</strong></td>
<td>NGOs have gained considerable experience in applying new methods of raising funds and monitoring the work of volunteers, which will help them in future activities. Further initiatives needed to maintain the area clean. The majority of activities conducted by NGOs (need to improve work in partnership and mobilization of volunteers)</td>
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<td><strong>13. Dragotinja, NGO “DON” in partnership with LC office of Dragotinja</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Dragotinja evenings&quot; improved quality of &quot;Dragotinja evenings&quot; manifestation. Beneficiaries: 700 citizens from Dragotinja and all people participating in the</td>
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<td><strong>Manifestation &quot;Dragotinja evenings&quot;</strong></td>
<td>25 people involved in planning meetings; working group (6 members –NGO, LC office, citizens) had 13 meetings.</td>
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<td><strong>1. Good:</strong></td>
<td>Significant financial support from 3 sources (2 institutions, 3 business, 1 individual). 27 volunteers from community - worked 428 hours to prepare the manifestation. Results encouraged community to initiate new activities.</td>
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<td><strong>2. Good:</strong></td>
<td>LC office gained experience in participatory projects planning (conducted poll about level of satisfaction, community and authorities informed with narrative and financial report). Increased volunteers’ management. Intensive media coverage</td>
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manifestation. Playground also used by the local football club. Space for exhibition of paintings, social & sporting activities

| 14. Odžak, NGO CGSA | Sanation of dropping dump in Odžak: Cleaned landfill. Prohibition of throwing waste. Maintenance of cleaned places. Enhanced ecological conditions of life (about 2000 of citizens of Odžak) | 1. **Good:** Two government institutions, 4 NGOs & 10 community members involved in project planning and implementation (3 meetings plus working group meetings); 75 volunteers (members of ecological NGOs: all ages, man and women) worked 974 hours on project implementation. Project financially supported by government institutions (2), by business (1) and by NGO; Local government was influenced - installed lights on the streets around the park. Model replicated in 2 neighboured villages; in Odžak - partnership with Municipality; New eco-initiatives planned; Questionable sustainability of results  
2. **Good:** NGO used 4 methods to inform and mobilize citizens - 3 meetings, media (national & local electronic and printed media), leaflets, and posters. Improved skills in working in partnership (with 3 NGOs and 2 local institutions) and in mobilisation & management of volunteers; NGO members improved skills in project proposal writing; Influenced local government |

| 15. Tešanj, NGO Forum žena Tešanj | Building sport field in Kraševo: Provided conditions for the start of project implementation: interviews with relevant representatives of the community, provided support for project services and work; conditions for sports & cultural events (100 school children) | 1. **Good:** 15 people (community members, NGO members, representatives of 2 institutions) involved in planning process (7 meetings). 12 volunteers worked 584 hours; Participation of various groups – man and women, different ages, representatives of two nations. There was significant financial support from community (in-kind & in-cash, from 2 businesses, local government; individuals). Plans for new community initiatives, but no financial support ensured.  
2. **Good:** Citizens are informed and mobilized through local radio station, meetings, and direct contact. No new methods for mobilization/management of volunteers applied. Various fundraising methods applied, especially toward individuals. No influence on decision makers |

| 16. Zavidovići, NGO Centar za mlade | Reconstruction of Central Park with Monument: Space for gathering and cultural activities of citizens. Monument area used for gathering of citizens, for young people and their cultural and social activities (1,000 users) | 1. **Fair:** 16 people (community members, members of 3 NGO, representative of 1 institution) involved in planning process (3 meetings). 16 volunteers worked 70 hours; There was significant financial support to the project, but only from one source (local government); The group developed plans for new community initiatives, but no financial support ensured.  
2. **Fair:** Citizens are informed and mobilized through media (local TV station, Radio Free Europe, newspaper articles), meetings and direct contact |
APPENDIX 10: BiH Visions for the Future

The following charts are taken from the study of the UNDP & Oxford Research International (2007) *The Silent Majority Speaks: Snapshots of Today and Visions of the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina* ([www.undp.ba](http://www.undp.ba)). They have been produced based on the data from the National Survey of BiH 2007 (valid N of respondents 3580).

The charts presented below visualise the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007) related to the self-identification of people, social trust and vision for the future.

As the first charts reveal, the self-identification of the population differs on ethno-religious basis. While most of the Bosniacs-Muslim identify themselves as citizens of BiH (about 65%), or as having a dual - BiH and ethno-religious identity (around 32 %), the Serb-Orthodox population that recognises the BiH (national) identity totals 60 %, of which only 15% recognises the citizenship as their primary identity. It emerges that the dominant identity for more than 50% of the population is their ethno-religious background; another 25% of the people do not recognise their Bosnian citizenship at all.

The “Social Trust” pie chart on its turn reveals the disturbing fact that the level of trust between the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than low – only 7% of the people that have taken part in the national survey of 2007 would trust most of the members of the society.

The opinions on the constitutional organisation of the country and its future also differ along the ethnic lines. The three graphs (Graph 1, 2 and 3) reveal that most satisfied with the current political structure and organisation of the country is the Serb-Orthodox population. Bosniacs-Muslim appear to have developed the strongest affiliations with the state and thus they stand behind the idea of the establishment of a strong centralised state, while the Serb-Orthodox population would rather preserve the status-quo.

Finally, it is interesting to note what do the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina consider policy priorities. The fact that “Growing BiH into one country” takes the second place in the rank list is rather positive with respect to the social capital recovery process. Nevertheless, it is concerning that despite all the support and financial, administrative and technical aid offered to the country, a policy priority number one is “Providing basis for decent living”.

In summary, in 2007 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still divided in three. On most of the issues the Serb-Orthodox and the Bosniacs-Muslim communities find themselves on the two extreme opinion (or even attitude) poles, while the position of the Croats-Catholic appears to be in the middle. The data from the survey reveals that the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still divided along ethnic lines and that the Bosnian citizenship is still an issue to be worked on.
**Pie-Chart 1: Self Identification**

Q: Which of the following best describes you?

Q: As well as thinking of yourself as [Bosniak, Croat, Serb] do you also think of yourself as being a citizen of the whole of the BiH?

This charts illustrate the breakdown by religion of Primary (BiH), Dual (BiH & ethno-religious) and Exclusive (ethno-religious) identities.

**Pie-Chart 2: Social Trust**

Q: Can most of people be trusted or not?
**GRAPH 1: HAS DPA WORKED?**

Q: Has DPA worked? - Based on ethnoreligious affiliation

**GRAPH 2: DESIRED FUTURE STRUCTURE OF BiH**

- Centralised State with strong regions: 19.4%
- Centralised state: 18.1%
- As it is: 7.6%
- Bring back Yugoslavia: -0.5%
- Three Entities: -5.3%
- Divide country and join neighbours: -16.8%
- Divide country: -22.5%
**GRAPH 3: FUTURE STRUCTURE OF BIH**

Q: How do you see the future structure of the country?

**GRAPH 4: POLICY PRIORITIES – TOP CHOICES**

Q: Which should be the policy priorities for the next 12 months?