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The Campaign for Control
Immigration and Ideology in the UK Parliament 1961-2016

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The Campaign for Control

Immigration and Ideology in the UK Parliament 1961-2016

Michael Adam Jones

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies

February 2018
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Abstract

Unlike much previous scholarship, this thesis examines how parliamentary discourse plays a decisive role in shaping migration policy. For reasons not fully known, mainstream political ideology has been virtually ignored by both conventional and radical political science. The academic literature on migration politics is characteristically anti-parliamentarian and, in some cases, tends to treat establishment parties as “minor characters with undefined roles” (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006, p.176). To fill this gap in the academic literature, the thesis has undertaken a content analysis of speeches in the Commons Chamber. Using a range of case studies from 1961 to the present day, the dissertation shows how recent large-scale immigration is the result of a bipartisan ideological commitment: the attachment of the Conservative and Labour parties to ‘managed migration’, mapped on to selective Cabinet-level opposition to immigration quotas.
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BNA British Nationality Act
BNB British Nationality Bill
BNP British National Party
CIB Commonwealth Immigrants Bill
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CRE Commission for Racial Equality
CUKC Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
EC European Council
EEA European Economic Area
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
EC European Council
ECJ European Court of Justice
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
FM Foreign Minister
GE General Election
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
LPRAG Labour Party Race Action Group
MP Member of Parliament
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PM Prime Minister
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party
UN United Nations
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party


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PART I

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The Politics of Migration: Why (Mainstream)  
Political Parties Matter

“Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove that the other party is unfit to rule – and both commonly succeed, and are right.”  
- HL Mencken¹

“Parliamentary democracy and the party system have in recent years been criticised not only for their inability to solve some of our problems but also for the failure to reflect others adequately… Political debates concentrating on economic and other management issues between government and opposition (whether Labour or Conservative) sometimes appear to blank out everything else, while a number of issues are not sufficiently discussed because they have not been fitted into the current pattern of political debate”  
- Tony Benn²

1.1 Introduction

Few subjects arouse such widespread concern and strongly held views – for and against – as immigration. In contemporary British politics, loud and contradictory claims are often made for and against greater controls: according to some politicians, immigrants are rejuvenators of ageing populations, engines of economic growth, and saviours of social democracy; to others they are to blame for stagnant or declining wages, overcrowded commuter links, and exorbitant house prices. More often than not, politicians possess conflicting agendas on migration and are, to varying degrees, able to mobilise support behind these agendas. Looking ahead, the salience of the issue is likely to endure into the latter half of the 21st Century as net migration continues to rise, offering political space for pressure groups, dissident factions and new political parties.

¹ Quoted from Mencken (1956), ch.330  
² Quoted from Messina (1989), preface
Corresponding to these developments, there has been growing academic interest in the politics of migration and the campaigns for greater immigration control. For example:

- Researchers of national identity have explored the interaction of immigration and nation-building (Fitzgerald 1996; King 2000; Zolberg 2006);
- Public opinion scholars have examined the drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment (Citrin et al. 1997; Ivarsflaten 2005; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Sides and Citrin 2007; Ford 2011; McLaren 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2016);
- Post-nationalist scholars have studied transnational facilitators of migration such as the European Union, ECJ and ECHR. (Guiraudon 2000; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Guiraudon and Joppke 2001; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Ellermann 2009).
- Researchers of interest-group behaviour have focused on a broad array of groups positioned for or against immigration (Freeman 1995; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Haus 1995; Joppke 1998; Watts 2001; Balch 2010; Consterdine 2015; 2018); and
- Academic scholars specialising in British politics have analysed the institutional response to the dilemmas migration policy has raised for successive British governments since the early 1960s (Layton-Henry 1984; Messina 1989; Spencer 1997; Hansen 2000; 2003; 2009; Bale 2003; 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Bale et al. 2010).

There has, moreover, been growing attention to the ideological and political impacts of movements described variously as ‘populist’ or ‘anti-establishment’ (Carter 2005; Norris 2005; Williams 2006; Schain 2006; Mudde 2007; Akkerman 2012; Furedi 2018). Right across Europe and beyond, populist parties opposed to mass immigration are challenging political elites, and, in some cases, winning elections. British political scholarship on the UK Independence Party (UKIP), in particular, has become a small cottage industry, with dozens of book titles and articles added to the literature annually (Ford et al. 2012; Ford and Goodwin 2014a; 2014b; Goodwin and Milazzo 2015; Evans and Mellon 2016; Thrasher et al. 2018).
Yet, while this new research has contributed to our knowledge of the politics of migration, we still know relatively little about the ideologies of the two most dominant parties in Britain: Labour and the Conservatives. The absence of mainstream parties from the immigration ideologies literature, while perplexing in itself, is perhaps even more puzzling given the considerable evidence which points to the relative autonomy of political elites (Balch 2015). After all, the claim that governing parties ‘matter’ for migration politics is on one level tautological: dominant parties form governments; and governments dictate migration policy. Yet, despite this obvious and self-evident truth, mainstream political ideology has been virtually ignored by both conventional and radical political science. The academic literature on migration politics is characteristically anti-parliamentarian and, in some cases, tends to treat establishment parties as “minor characters with undefined roles” (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006, p.176).

Unlike much previous scholarship, this thesis focuses on the ideological dimensions of mainstream politics, and specifically the dilemmas this area of public policy has raised for the House of Commons since the early 1960s. There are, of course, exceptions: Ian Spencer’s (1997) *British Immigration Policy Since 1939*, and Randall Hansen’s (2000) *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain*, for example, offer some evidence of the importance of parliamentary discourse in reconfiguring and fine-tuning public policy. On the other hand, these monographs lack a quantitative framework and are now quite dated. Meanwhile, the voluminous literature on the UK Independence Party provides much useful historical material on the role UKIP has played in reshaping the political milieu. However, these volumes conspicuously fail to link the politics of migration in Britain to the broader political currents of which it is obviously part. As Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove (2006, p.171) put it, “[mainstream] political parties have received relatively short shrift among students of the politics of migration.”
1.1.2. Research strategy

Using a range of case studies from the 1960’s to the present day, the author will undertake a quantitative content analysis (QCA) to capture how immigration policies are debated in the Commons. This methodology will involve the classification of parts of a speech through the application of a structured coding scheme. As the above suggests, ideational scholars specialising in immigration ideology have been drawn predominately towards movements described variously as ‘populist’, ‘radical right’ or ‘anti-establishment’. Using a QCA, the author will redress what he regards as an anti-parliamentarian bias in migration policy research.

More broadly and ambitiously, however, the QCA will attempt to show how mainstream parties set the tone and define the parameters of public debate. In contrast to previous times, one needs to give greater consideration to the role of “depoliticisation” – a process that aims to restrict the scope of public debate and thereby to foreclose the electorate’s options/legitimate responses. By simply not discussing issues to the extent that they were discussed previously, political parties can effectively ‘remove’ those issues from the formal arena by preventing their full and open public deliberation. This was something that I learnt first-hand through my engagement with politics in the 2000s and 2010s, first as a parliamentary researcher and then as a political speechwriter. With this in mind, the following autobiographical statement sets out some brief background issues in preparation for the more detailed discussions that will come later.

1.1.3. Origin of the research topic

In recent years, I have become increasingly concerned about the politicisation of migration scholarship – and, in particular, scholarship related to individuals not wanting increased future immigration or who are sceptical about the benefits immigration may bring. Much research about attitudes to immigration, rather than embodying a commitment to objectivity and fairness, becomes a vehicle for some social scientists to express disapproval, in both academia and the wider world.
For example, over the past few years it has become common practice in academic circles to proclaim that

- mainstream political parties are trying to ‘out-UKIP UKIP’ on anti-immigrant rhetoric;
- the Conservatives have created a “hostile environment” for immigrants and asylum seekers; and
- the Labour party has become more ‘right wing’ on immigration restriction.

While not entirely incorrect, these arguments are nevertheless misleading. Party positions on immigration tend to be highly incoherent, and the need to consult ‘stakeholders’ often leads to more liberal policy outcomes. Governments have no a priori interest in creating a “hostile environment”, not least because restrictions on migration and asylum attract so much criticism from bien-pensant commentators.

Furthermore, although MPs have become more representative of the wider population in certain senses, the debate on immigration has become increasingly circumscribed, and what little inter-party competition remains has become focused on the ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ management of the state. Terms such as ‘managed migration’ were coined to avoid more traditional – and comprehensible – alternatives such as border control or national security. On what for many voters is actually a cultural question, the establishment’s rhetoric on immigration, and a whole host of other policies, has become straitjacketed.

In the years since I had this realisation, I have dedicated a lot of my academic work to exploring the idea of managed migration, leading to a sustained interest in the political rhetoric of politicians in both contemporary and historical contexts. Taking in a broader, diachronic view has allowed me to see that, contrary to popular claims, the anti-populist movement has won over fairly loyal support from MPs who share coherent, deeply felt and in many cases legitimate concerns about anti-immigrant racism. As shall be seen below, this chapter implicitly addresses this phenomenon by establishing a general model of immigration policymaking in liberal democracies.
1.1.4. Conspiracies of silence: toward a neo-elitist theory of migration politics

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theory of migration politics by combining two distinct streams of scholarship that are seldom discussed in unison:

- decision-making power; and
- nondecision-making power

Much of our conventional understanding of politics is what we may refer to as decision-making power, such as Acts of Parliament and annual budgetary spending. This is, indeed, a fundamental part of politics. However, this chapter, in seeking to provide a more nuanced understanding of political dynamics, addresses both its decision-making (section 1.2) and nondecision-making components (sections 1.3-1.4).

Nondecision-making power, to summarise briefly, is the ability to shape the political agenda by decontesting certain ideas, or, conversely, by ‘normalising’ previously illegitimate ones. Some modes of discourse may be ‘policed’ in a highly effective manner; other modes, though, may exist in a greyzone, condemned as ‘bad’ by civil society groups yet not so effectively policed as to prevent their use.

Seen through this lens, immigration policymaking in liberal democracies can be assessed through the prism of ‘politicisation’ and, more controversially, ‘depoliticisation’. In pursuing this analysis, the chapter stresses the ability of political parties

i. to impose normative limits on acceptable anti-immigration stances (*politicisation of anti-racism*);

ii. to keep immigration-related issues off the political agenda because they have not been fitted into the current pattern of political debate (*societal depoliticisation*); and
iii. to present controversial or contested issues as being matters of fate over which human beings can have little to no control (*discursive depoliticisation*)

Often labeled ‘neo-elitist’, this theoretical approach develops a vision of politics as a struggle over the *saliency* of issues (particularly for the phase of electoral breakthrough) and over *issue position ownership* (especially for the phase of electoral persistence) (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Shifts in the boundaries of legitimate discourse in liberal democracies occur in both directions: previously legitimate ideas may become marginalised or excluded, while previously unacceptable ideas may enter into the mainstream. As E.E. Schattschneider (1960, p.71) so eloquently put it: “Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.” Whether we like it or not, political movements always contain the potential for both opening up and shutting down discussion.

### 1.2 Decision-making power

At its simplest level, politics centers on the exercise of decision-making power. Robert Dahl (1957, p.207), a political theorist at the University of Yale, equated decision-making with the simple formula that A has power over B to the extent that A can “get B to do something that B would not do otherwise”. In politics, this perspective assumes the primacy of political institutions as policy-making communities and vehicles for popular representation (*‘governmental politicisation’*).

While this is doubtless true, as far as it goes, in my view it does not go far enough: crucial questions of variation arise not only between different political institutions but also from differing and deeply rooted historical narratives of immigration. This is, in my view, a conjunctural phenomenon, not a structural feature of policy-making in liberal democracies. Previously acceptable policy
proposals may become stigmatised and excluded, while previously illegitimate and effectively marginalised themes may gain a legitimate foothold in public debate. My contention here is that the contours of legitimate political discussion are one of the crucial stakes of the debate, and that these boundaries change over time.

This is a very different outlook on politics, cogently expressed by Dr Matt Wood and Professor Matthew Flinders (2014), where they suggest that some policies are purposefully left off the agenda (‘societal depoliticisation’) while other policy options are defined as inevitable, unstoppable or matters of human fate (‘discursive depoliticisation’). In other words, if you can control the mode of discourse within which decisions are made, then you can effectively shape the outcome of the decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, p.634). This reality highlights the importance and primacy of nondecision-making power.

1.2.1 Governmental politicisation
As far back as 1997, Gallya Lahav (1997) argued that immigration had become one of the broadest, deepest, and most intellectually challenging topics in all of public policy. The reasons for this, she argued, are twofold:

- **Absorption.** First, there is a ‘problem’ of immigration in terms of intake. Questions here focus on strategies for control and regulation: Should we encourage immigrants to join our societies, or try to keep them out? If we are going to take some in but refuse others, how should we decide which ones to accept?
- **Assimilation.** Second, there is a ‘problem’ of immigration in terms of incorporation. Questions here focus on strategies for assimilation: What can we ask of immigrants once they arrive? Should they be expected to assimilate, or can they properly demand that we make room for the different cultures they bring with them?

Some political scholars, such as Donley T. Studlar (1974), have argued that anti-immigration sentiment was so powerful in post-war Britain that the
major parties\(^3\) had to concede to the public’s demands for restriction by *politicising* a ‘campaign for control’. Indeed, for over three decades, Conservative and Labour governments managed to combine a liberal approach to flows of capital and trade with effective limits on the flow of immigrants. One explanation for this can be found in what political scientists call the *demand-side* of politics – the interplay of public policy with citizens’ moral values, concerns and preferences. As illustrated in Figure 1., voters’ immigration scepticism has changed remarkably little over time: citizens’ preferences and concerns have remained relatively stable.

\[\text{Figure 1. ‘Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this country’}\]

Source: Evans and Menon (2017) p.42

\(^3\) To speak of party responsibility for migration policy is, of course, to speak predominantly of the Conservative and Labour parties. The problem of duopoly in British politics, and specifically post-war British parties of government, is not a central concern of this thesis. Nevertheless, after surveying the post-1958 politics of migration, it is difficult not to conclude that the duopoly of Conservative and Labour is a serious impediment to both the Liberal Democrats and more radical movements such as UKIP. With regard to the latter, Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system (FPTP) penalises new entrants, by raising a formidable structural barrier to the acquisition of MPs.
Often labeled ‘governmental politicisation’, this theoretical approach develops a vision of politics as the confluence of elitist and popular elements in a well-ordered democratic state (Wood and Flinders 2014). In this view, the capacity of the immigrant-receiving states to execute rational, self-interested immigrant policies has remained fairly constant (Zolberg 2006). For example, state apparatus for the control of immigration has already developed to the stage where not only are tourists made to suffer inconvenience at ports of entry, but considerable expensive operations, involving dozens of police and immigration officers, are mounted to root out a handful of illegal entrants and over-stayers (Hampshire 2013).

Pushing the boundaries of this viewpoint, it can be inferred that a high degree of symmetry exists between public demands for restriction and government policies to control immigration. This is, for example, the view of Erica Consterdine (2018b), a migration scholar at Sussex University:

“Countless restrictive measures have been placed on almost every migration stream since 2010, when the coalition government set itself a flawed net migration target. This was driven by a Conservative Manifesto to reduce annual immigration from hundreds of thousands of people to tens of thousands. Behind the changes to the immigration rules has been an overarching policy to create a “hostile environment”. The public is now seeing the harsh and inhumane implications of this policy, with the Windrush Generation, who helped to rebuild post-war Britain, being denied their rights.”

While not entirely incorrect, Consterdine’s (2018b) argument is nevertheless misleading. In almost all cases since 1997, the responsiveness of political elites to public demands for restriction has been poor. Theresa May’s pledge in 2010 to reduce annual net migration to the “tens of thousands” has, for instance, been a complete failure. Although May first spoke about creating a “hostile environment” for illegal immigrants in 2012, only a tiny fraction of illegal immigrants are sent back to their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal procedures, it is decided that they have not got grounds to remain. In this context,
British MPs are represented – plausibly enough – as a ‘liberal elite’, and thus as favoring modes of decision-making that are insulated from the pressures and passions of democratic politics.

Moreover, almost all major parties of government are under constant pressure to adopt technocratic programmes and to avoid policy commitments which might conflict with the anticipated ‘responsibilities’ of office (Beck 1992; Crouch 2004; Balch 2010). For example, national elites have been happy to outsource decision-making to ‘arms-length’ institutions like the European Commission or ECHR (Zaiotti 2011). More than any other issue, immigration serves as a particularly powerful test case of claims that politicians are unduly influenced by special interests. Thus, an alternative view to governmental politicisation is what can be termed depoliticisation. This is not so much an antagonistic view of politics per se as an observation of where party-competitive elements do not, or should not, exist. Dr Matt Wood and Professor Matthew Flinders (2014), for example, identify three interrelated trends:

- Governmental depoliticisation
- Societal depoliticisation
- Discursive depoliticisation

Taking Wood and Flinders’ (2014) conceptual framework as a starting point, we need to assess how the Westminster model is applied and what limitations there may be to how it is exerted. Firstly, governmental depoliticisation refers to the delegation of political decisions away from ‘the centre’, so that that they are controlled by non/quasi-governmental organisations or instituted in transnational bodies like the European Commission. In addition, governments may depoliticise migration by bringing important commercial or social actors directly (or indirectly) into the decision-making process. The Westminster model, therefore, has lost power upwards to global and European bodies and downwards to interest groups and non/quasi-governmental organisations.
1.2.2. Governmental depoliticisation (i): pluralism

The claim that political parties matter for understanding migration policy is on one level tautological because the practice of inter-elite competition, as noted above, is a legitimate and necessary part of the liberal democratic process, and therefore of migration policy.

Paradoxically, however, policy outcomes are also dependent, not only on party-competitive elements, but also on consensus-seeking practices in complex social systems – practices that permit a certain amount of rigidity. Thus, while democratic states undoubtedly vary in terms of their social, human and cultural capital, they nevertheless share certain ‘consensual’ features which create similar political incentives (stakeholder consultation) and policy-making dynamics (technocratic governance) (Watts 2007).

The substantive conclusions, or findings of this literature, are usually labeled ‘pluralist’. Pluralist accounts, to summarise briefly, hold that public policy results form the accumulated pressure of the most powerful interest groups (see Eckstein and Apter 1963; Dahl 1961; 1976). Depoliticisation, here, is not defined by revolts against the political elite – for any revolt can only replace one ruling elite with another. Instead, depoliticisation requires that factions among the elite – representatives of different social forces or rival elements of the same one – should openly cooperate and seek to draw into their ranks the most talented negotiators, campaigners and public speakers. In such a system, mainstream politicians seek to build coalitions through compromise. For example, doctors’ professional associations can strongly influence decisions on health policy, environmental action groups can strongly influence planning decisions, and so on (Watts 2007).

It is important to note that, historically, interest groups played only a limited role in shaping migration policy. A few pro-immigrant and anti-racist organisations – the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), the Coloured Peoples’ Progressive Association (1958), the West Indian Workers’ Association (1961) and the Runnymede Trust – all campaigned against
restrictions on Commonwealth immigrants. According to migration scholar Randall Hansen (2000, p.7), however, these organisations were “weak” and provided “no significant check on any restrictionist impulse 1950s governments might have had”.

Today, however, the situation is vastly different. A panoply of new interest groups have emerged, ranging from CSOs and not-for-profit voluntary organisations (public-orientated interest groups), as well as trade unions and organised parts of the business community (policy-orientated interest groups) (see Table 1). Applying a model of client politics developed some years ago by Mancur Olson, migration scholar Gary Freeman (1995) argues that contrary to traditional concerns that democracy would tend towards majoritarian decision-making (populism) and preferences (ethnic homogeneity), in practice organised interest groups are likely to impose their niche concerns on to everyone else. Freeman (1995) shows that not only is collective action by majorities difficult to achieve, even when they have interests in common, but situations can occur where the minority, bound together by concentrated selective incentives, can dominate the majority.

| Table 1. Stakeholders in labour migration |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|
| **Policy-orientated** | **Trade/employer associations** | **Professional bodies/sectoral interest groups** | **Labour unions** |
| • Confederations of British Industries (CBI) | • National Farmers Union (NFU) | • Trade Union Congress (TUC) |
| • British Chamber of Commerce (BCC) | • Universities UK (UUK) | • Unison |
| **Public-orientated** | **Think tanks/pressure groups** | **NGOs/charities** | |
| • Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) | | • Migrants Rights Network |
| • Migration Watch | | • Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) |
| • Demos | | |
| • Statewatch | | |

*Source: Consterdine 2015, p.1438*
Depoliticisation, here, is reflected in the institutionalisation of stakeholder consultation, by establishing a plural network of asylum organisations, think tanks and professional bodies/sectoral interest groups. Because of this, party positions on immigration tend to be highly incoherent, and the need to consult stakeholders leads to more liberal policy outcomes (Balch 2015; Consterdine 2015). Parties on the political right, for example, have been naturally inclined to try to limit migration to control fiscal costs, but both pro-business and pro-Common Market inclinations push them in a more expansionist direction.² For instance, at the top end of the labour market, there is growing competition between large corporations to attract highly-skilled graduates in value-added sectors such as chemical and mechanical engineering, computer science and investment banking (Hollifeld 2000; 2004 Cerna 2009). As Goldman Sachs (2018) put it on their official Web site,

“We strive for excellence. To achieve it, we must have the best people, and the best people are drawn from the broadest pool of applicants. The people we need can be found only by looking across the full spectrum of race, color, religion, creed, sex, age, national origin, citizenship status, disability, qualified veteran status, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation and gender identity.”

Meanwhile, at the lower end of the labour market, unskilled migrant labourers are increasingly used to fill jobs that are considered dirty or degrading (Piore 1979). This is the notion that immigrants are needed to do “the jobs Britons won’t do”. As is typical of developed, capitalist economies, few people want to work unpleasant jobs that pay less than some combination of welfare and subjective-value-of-leisure-time. Consequently, the leading supporters of the pro-immigration camp may be found within the bourgeois and business elite, much of which considers a heavy, continuing flow of immigrants (legal or otherwise) as an important source of unskilled labour (Menz 2009). Table 2, for example,

---
² For more than half a century, the British Conservative party has been divided over solicitousness of the interests of pro-EU business organizations and attentiveness to grassroots immigration scepticism in their ranks (see Bale 2012; 2012).
provides a useful mnemonic for models of economic migration and its projected political consequences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Relevant actors</th>
<th>Economic effect</th>
<th>Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production/output model</td>
<td>Capital, labour</td>
<td>Profits increase, wages decrease</td>
<td>Class cleavages: capital +, labour -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heckscher-Ohlin model</td>
<td>Two factors (capital, labour) or skilled, unskilled labour</td>
<td>No wage effect (in long run), change in production</td>
<td>Model predicts none but expect short-run opposition from workers bearing cost of adjustment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific-factors model</td>
<td>Three factors (capital, land, labour) or unskilled labour, unskilled labour, capital</td>
<td>Wages decrease, profits increase contingent on assumptions</td>
<td>Sectoral cleavages: mobile factor +, specific factors -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal models</td>
<td>Young, middle aged, elderly; federal vs. state?</td>
<td>Greater participation in welfare programs; federal government benefits from tax revenues</td>
<td>Class cleavages: low-skilled workers -, skilled workers +/- (?); in high immigrant states -, federal governments +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Freeman and Kessler (2008)*

+ = wins; - = losses

More sophisticated versions of the pluralist model do often concede many of these points. For instance, a neo-pluralist school of thought has refined the traditional pluralist position by suggesting that not all groupings are equal, with businesses having disproportionate power and influence (Moloney 2006). As Freeman and others have recognised, organised parts of business community are a *concentrated constituency*, who are resource-rich and well-served to collectively organise and advocate their interests. This is in contrast to the diffuse and disadvantaged groups from the native population – the cost-bearers of immigration – who compete with immigrants for jobs and housing. To some extent, therefore, it can be argued that the concept of depoliticisation is indivisible from the structure of the political economy.

In contrast, parties on the social democratic left have been traditionally torn between fealty to the social conservatism of their working class ‘base’ and

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5 ‘Insider’ business groups can call on MPs to submit written and oral questions, lay the groundwork for MP-to-MP discussions, or relay information about important developments inside the Cabinet (Coxall 2011).
responding to their bourgeoisie supporters’ concern for migrant welfare. With regard to the latter, it is not uncommon for social democratic parties to bring important civil society organisations (CSOs) directly/indirectly into the decision-making process (Coxall 2011). Typically, CSOs include cultural, faith-based or humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam, Save The Children, Christian Aid, Shelter, Barnardos and Médecins Sans Frontières. In return for ‘insider’ access, CSOs will often provide MPs with organisational support, technical expertise and tools for political campaigning (Watts 2007, pp.10-13). According to data in Table 3, CSOs have disproportionate power and influence in the arena of immigration policy, contrary to the expectations of the neo-pluralist model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Civil society actors’ political claims-making over immigration, Britain, 1990-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of claims-making (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supra-, transnational and foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific pro-migrant rights and welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General solidarity, human rights and welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-racist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (incl. lawyers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British ethnic minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and ‘unknown’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme right and anti-immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-British immigrants (constituency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* -1 is ‘restrictionist’, +1 is ‘expansionist’

Depending on the issue and on the moment, CSOs may cooperate with governments, exercise pressure on governments, or even try to undermine
governments by aiding and abetting human traffickers. Whatever their individual strategies, however, all of them have responded to the ‘campaign for control’ in ways that are at odds – sometimes radically – with the popular restrictionist consensus. At a time when European governments are re-imposing the distinctions between legality and illegality, many of these human rights campaigners fulfill Oxfam’s definition of the ‘global citizen’ who is “aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen” and “is outraged by social injustice” (quoted from Carr 2012, p.218).

1.2.3. Governmental depoliticisation (ii): post-nationalism

Governmental depoliticisation is a process that comes primarily from forces resident within the nation state, but occasionally it can result from forces that transcend the national-political community. These ‘forces’ include important transnational institutions like the European Commission, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The emergence of “a new doctrine of international community” was first articulated in 1999 by Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, during an infamous speech in Chicago:

“Today the impulse towards interdependence is immeasurably greater. We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependent… Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can he solved without intense international co-operation.”

Among the most important guides in this inquiry is Saskia Sassen, a Dutch-American sociologist at the University of Columbia. Although much

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6 Since June 2016 many illegal migrant flotillas have been rescued near the Libyan coast by NGO vessels “without any prior distress call”, suggesting that the rendezvous had been pre-arranged. Frontex’s annual report in 2016 concluded that people traffickers prefer to call aid-agency vessels directly, rather than the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome (see Farrell 2017).
criticised on theoretical grounds (Messina 2007, pp.239-45), the terminology and approach adopted by Sassen (1996; 2006) and other post-nationalist scholars (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997) is still widely prevalent in empirical studies of Anglo-American politics. Unlike traditional political scholarship, which uses a vocabulary that assumes the primacy of the nation state (and political conflicts based upon producer interests), post-nationalist critics often stress the impact of globalisation in undermining these assumptions.

For Sassen (1996; 2006), liberal democracies face embedded constraints, which limit their prerogatives in the formulation of immigration policies. International migrants are ‘global citizens’ with human rights, and immigration policies are thereby constrained, particularly in democratic societies. To take the most obvious example, important elements of domestic migration policy have been shifted to the European Union (EU), a political and economic union with a ‘common market’\(^7\) and right to ‘freedom of movement’\(^8\) (Zaiotti 2011). Whether such reforms are judged good or bad is a separate issue not discussed in this thesis. The key point is that European integration had at least three major consequences for British public administration in the 1990s-2010s:

- the erosion of state sovereignty;
- the sectoralisation of policy-making; and
- the de-nationalisation of citizenship.

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\(^7\) EU integrationism strengthened considerably after the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. This revision of existing European treaties led to the creation of the single market; and the UK had been one of the main driving forces behind this, as the Thatcher government was keen to liberalise trade agreements between member states.

\(^8\) The SEA was followed by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which brought about a sea change in the nature of European integration, introducing the basis for the single currency as well as cooperation in areas such as defence and migration. John Major, who succeeded Margaret Thatcher as British Conservative Prime Minister, secured amendments to, and opt-outs from, those things which he objected – notably the Social Chapter, and Economic and Monetary Union, respectively. Nevertheless, the Treaty marked a shift in British relations with Europe.
Such reforms go hand in hand with an emerging body of international law – channeled through the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Ellermann 2005, 2009). This is most clear in the case of human rights, which by definition are rights *universally* held by humans *qua* humans (Guiraudon 2000; Gurowitz 1999). According to political sociologist Yasemin Soysal (1994), recent migrations have helped put into place a permanent, alternative post-national model of membership anchored in a world-level discourse of human rights. In Soysal’s view (*ibid.*), the incorporation of immigrants reveals a profound transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the way it is codified.

Soysal’s thesis is disputed, however, by German sociologist Christian Joppke (1998), who views such constraints as largely self-imposed by national legal systems or as a result of institutional path-dependency. Liberal state sovereignty, in Joppke’s view, is “*self-limited*”; and these limits become especially visible when the state attempts to deploy its coercive powers, as is often the case with detention centers and law-enforcement agencies (1998, pp.271-2).

A more nuanced interpretation of the post-nationalist thesis has been presented by the distinguished political scholar Rod Rhodes, who takes into account a more multileveled approach to present a holistic theory, one which reflects the growing importance of quasi-governmental organisations and the corresponding loss of hegemony by nation states. In a vastly influential article for *The Political Quarterly*, Rhodes (1994) argued that we should speak of a “hollowing out” of the British state: power is being given away from the core of government, so the capacity of the centre to steer the system is reduced. Depoliticisation, here, is seen as a mode of statecraft instituted by politicians to deflect accountability from governments as decision-making is placed at ‘arms-length’ from the centre. With this in mind, Rhodes (1994) identified four interrelated trends:
• Privatisation;
• The loss of functions through local government reform;
• European integration; and
• Managerial technocracy

Whilst much of the rhetoric around EU regulations and their impact on national sovereignty has been exaggerated, these rules do, nonetheless, act as a constraint: (i) first, by constraining policy choices, the EU limits competition between political parties; and (ii) by constraining policy choices, it limits the repertoire of national governmental institutions. As argued by Rhodes (1994; 1996; 1997), neoliberalism has led to the privatisation of many national industries, while Europeanisation has moved many policy fields upwards, to the supranational level, where they are often stored in technocratic institutions such as the European Commission.

1.2.4. Rethinking depoliticisation

To summarise briefly, governmental depoliticisation is one of the most interesting concepts for analysing contemporary patterns of governance. Applied to the politics of migration, post-nationalist scholars have shown how transnational norms, courts and bureaucracies facilitate asylum and family migration in the face of executive opposition (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Ellermann 2005, 2009; Gibney and Hansen 2003). In other words, the rights extended to certain categories of migrant – e.g., immigrant spouses, children, aged dependents, refugees and EU nationals – have placed greater constraints on the decision-making power of political elites (Soysal 1994; Rhodes 1994; 1996; 1997; Sassen 2006).

Yet, despite these self-imposed limits on national sovereignty, the recent political history of the EU accords only partially with Sassen’s thesis. Consider, for example, Angela Merkel’s decision in 2015 to invite over a million Syrian refugees into Germany. While there was a lot of rhetoric extruded about how Merkel was exemplifying “European values,” the German Chancellor was not
actually acting through the EU or in concert with other European governments. Instead, Merkel gave an executive order on migrant status – one that violated the rules of the Dublin convention – and it got implemented. According to Thomas de Maizière, a former Federal Minister for the Interior, the suspension of the Dublin convention was “not as such a legally binding act”, but more of a “guideline for management practice” (quoted from Oltermann and Kingsley 2016).

The implication of Merkel’s decision is clear: when EU governments sign up to international treaties they often do so without incorporating them into domestic legislation; others incorporate them with severely restraining caveats; and some governments ignore them altogether (Hansen 2009). Indeed, Christian Joppke himself commented that, under conditions of majority government, a single party commanding strong party loyalty faces little resistance from the supranational and transnational regime (Joppke 1998 p.269). This is especially true in Britain’s case: with no codified bill of rights and courts lacking political clout, human rights are largely “absent from the scene” (ibid, p.141).

Another problematic development for post-nationalist theory is the rise of Euroscepticism, culminating in the Brexit vote of 2016. Whatever their previous handicaps, Eurosceptic forces within the British government are currently ascendant (Clark at al. 2017). For example, in 2014 the leaderships of the Conservative and Labour parties were unanimously agreed on the importance of EU membership. Tribal, partisan loyalties, and fear of antagonising Europhile party leaders restrained intra-party, Eurosceptic factions from building bridges to like-minded counterparts. Since the 2016 referendum, however, inter-party discussion on supranationalism is no longer overtly suppressed, especially within the Conservatives. It is now clear that Prime Minister May shares the Eurosceptics’ view that the UK’s future lies outside of the EU Common Market, or indeed any system replicating a Common Market. This is in direct contrast to the position held by David Cameron, May’s predecessor as Prime Minister and an ardent Remainer. In short, party competition on supranationalism, as on several
other salient subjects previously avoided by the major parties during the post-Cold war era, has been renewed.

Alternatively, migration scholars from the pluralist tradition have attributed the era of mass migration to the accumulated pressure of the most powerful interest groups. Indeed, new sources of power such as pressure groups representing new social movements have increased in influence since the 1980s. At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that the real-world impact of pressure groups depends critically on the institutions that channel it (Olson 1971). Political institutions in the UK, for example, offer fewer access points to interest groups than their counterparts in the US, where a potent coalition of powerful economic and ethnic lobbies supporting open borders has emerged since the 1960s (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, pp.45-55; Joppke 1999, pp.60-61; DeLaet 2000, pp.95–98; Freeman and Birrell 2001, pp.65-68; Tichenor 2002, pp.242-246).

None of this of course means that British politicians no longer listen to big business; nor does it mean they no longer worry about being ‘pro-business’. What is does mean, however, is that politicians in the UK are freer to champion more restrictive policies than their counterparts in the US. Pro-immigration lobbies in the UK are directly integrated into an elaborate (if relatively formalistic) consultative process, but are largely reactive rather than aggressively pro-active (King 1992). As Professors Paul Stratham and Andrew Geddes (2006, p.254) discovered, “Rather than promoting client politics, the government appears as an active ‘entrepreneur’ dominating and influencing the political environment.”

Put simply: the pluralist and post-nationalist models of governmental depoliticisation have underestimated the autonomy of Britain’s major parties and their ability to implement migration policy at the national level. A striking feature of Table 4 for example is the dominance of national state actors, accounting for
six-tenths of “political claims-making” (60.0%). In comparison to other policy fields, such as unemployment (Statham 2003b) and racism and discrimination (Koopmans and Statham 2000b), immigration appears to be an especially national political elite-dominated field.

Table 4. Collective actors’ political claims-making over immigration, Britain, 1990-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective actors</th>
<th>Share of claims-making (%)</th>
<th>Average valance position (range -1 to +1)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supra-, transnational and foreign</strong></td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>+0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-European supra- and transnational</strong></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>+0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign national</strong></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>+0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European supra- and transnational</strong></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British state</strong></td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judiciary</strong></td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>+0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other state agencies</strong></td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>+0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative and political parties</strong></td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>+0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government and executive</strong></td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British civil society</strong></td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>+0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-British migrants (constituency)</strong></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>+0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All actors</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1438</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stratham and Geddes (2006), p.253
* -1 is 'restrictionist', +1 is 'expansionist'

1.2.5. Nondecision-making power

The argument presented here is that the pluralist and post-nationalist models of governmental depoliticisation have tended to approach the topic through a fairly narrow conceptual lens. Empirically, these models have underestimated the ability of the major parties, as a consequence of their duopoly over national

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*An instance of political claims-making is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals or criticisms (Koopmans and Statham 1999b; Koopmans et al. 2005).*
political power, to set the tone and define the parameters of public debate. As will be shown in sections 1.3-1.4, there is a range of cross-disciplinary literature that focuses attention on quite different, yet equally important manifestations of depoliticisation in the wider public and governmental spheres of society. These relate to

- the agenda-setting role played by politicians, spin doctors and the media in shifting issues off the agenda of public deliberation (‘societal depoliticisation’); and
- the ideological role of elites in making certain issues appear to be ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ (‘discursive depoliticisation’)

Societal depoliticisation refers to the “privatisation of issues”, not formally, but “in terms of their salience as topics in public debate” (Wood and Flinders 2014). There might be a lot of public concern over, say, the religiosity of (some) Muslim refugees from Syria and its impact on national security, but if that discussion does not suggest that Islam is a relevant factor, then it is effectively privatised.

Discursive depoliticisation, meanwhile, refers to the “normalisation of political issues”, in the sense that they are presented in political discourse as being matters of ‘fate’ over which humans can have little control (ibid.). As Tony Blair so memorably put it to the Labour party faithful at the 2005 Labour party conference, “I hear people say we have to stop globalisation. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer” (quoted from Evans and Menon 2017, p.31).

In accordance with Wood and Flinders’ (2014) framework, let us consider a more recent group of political scientists: the neo-elitists. These scholars have adopted an alternative approach which, instead of starting with the decision-making power of the executive, focuses on the non-decision-making power of individual political actors (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Depoliticisation, here, is enacted through a host of verbal constraints and clinamens, which are exogenous to the basic model of liberal policymaking. As a result, immigration policies
supported by large majorities of the British public, even if nominally adopted by governments (e.g., reducing net migration to “the tens of thousands”), may not be fully implemented by the machinery of government. This phenomenon raises both conceptual and empirical questions.

1.3 Nondecision-making power (pt.1): the role of elites in agenda-setting

The simplest paradigmatic idea of power is the notion of decision-making power. As elected representatives, it is MPs that compete for electoral support from voters; political parties that form governments; and governments which make immigration policy. Such an approach focuses on the overt decisions made by elites who hold key posts in governing bodies.

To sharpen the argument, however, let us consider an alternative (albeit complimentary) analysis, which takes the role of decision-makers a step further – arguing that the apparatus of state control is moving away from the past’s emphasis on governmentality and toward more contemporary techniques of diversion, bias and misconception (Lukes 2005, pp. 18-20). In this situation, power is not just about making decisions, but also about setting ‘the agenda’ that leads to those decisions.

Of particular interest for scholars is the ability of MPs vis-à-vis mainstream channels of communication – television, newspapers, radio and, increasingly, social media – to nudge the national conversation in a more favourable direction.\(^\text{10}\) Under these circumstances, power can be exercised, societally, by politicising certain issues while depoliticising others – leading to what E.E. Schattschneider (1960) called “the mobilization of bias”. This is essentially the process that analysts of the supply side of politics are concerned

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\(^{10}\) In this respect, political parties have been found to be more influential than any other group of news sources because they act as “guardians” of the formal agenda and often better understand journalists’ need for “mediasexy stories” (Brighton and Foy 2007).
with – to identify how particular elite discourses shift/shape the nature of decision-making. In such contexts, power is held not only by elected officials but also by the speechwriters, journalists and special advisors who draft briefings, set up meetings and shape itineraries. In other words, if you can control the ‘mode of discourse’ within which decisions are made, then you can shape the outcome of the decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, p.634).

1.3.1. Societal politicisation (i): racism

Historically, the study of agenda-setting power in the field of migration has focused on the role played by political parties in mainstreaming “racism”. Randall Hansen (2000, p.10) refers to this thesis as the “racialisation account”. According to it, the British state was not merely responding to racists; it played a central, perhaps the central, role in creating racism. As Paul Foot, a former investigative journalist, argued in 1965

“Commonwealth immigration in Britain, before they become playthings of party politics, and despite a total lack of government concern or planning, were greeted with general friendliness and hospitality. Of course there was a colour bar in some pubs. Of course there was some antagonism in some factories and bus garages. But these were exceptions. Overall, the reaction was kind, even helpful. A considerate and co-ordinated effort by politicians to assist assimilation and to isolate and punish the racialist minority would have been decisive.” (Foot 1965, pp.233-4)

The chief effect of racialisation, according to its critics, has been to stimulate popular concern over immigration and then to use manifestations of such concern to justify the introduction of immigration controls. This theory is related to the supply-side of politics, most notably in the struggles over the saliency of issues (particularly for the phase of electoral breakthrough) and over issue position ownership (especially for the phase of electoral persistence) (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). For example, in a passionate polemic on
elite discourse and ‘racism’, Teun van Dijk (1993) places the blame squarely on political elites whom he argues have allowed racists to set the terms of debate:

“[Since] the elites have most control over such public discourse and communication, they also are most responsible for the cognitive or ideological reproduction of racism. Recall that this special responsibility also holds by default, for instance, that when elites either condone or refrain from taking action against the discursive reproduction of racism – perhaps by allowing the use of racist media discourse, textbooks, or political propaganda… We shall see later that the white elites in Western countries usually self-servingly opt for freedom of speech, that is, for the rights of in-group members, and against the right of out-group members to be free from racism.” (van Dijk 1993, p.27)

A common perception which has informed virtually all racialisation scholarship is that political parties have consistently been at the centre of race-related conflict. Through a mixture of persuasion, manipulation and opportunism, Conservative and Labour leaders have politicised race and ‘nudged’ the national conversation in a more illiberal direction. Some racialisation scholars are more sophisticated than others – attending to the relationship between party-political competition and public opinion, for example (e.g., Miles 1982). That being said, almost all racialisation theorists embrace the central claim that political parties have been active participants in a process of normalising anti-immigrant racism. In the words of Aurelien Mondon (2016), “Racist discourse is no longer limited to the margins; it is mainstream and this needs to be widely acknowledged before it can be stopped”.

Although the original thesis’ research was limited to the 1960s-80s, these arguments have broadly coloured academic judgments of migration policy in the post-Cold war era. Conservative leaders, in particular, have been accused of racism for proposing a tougher line on immigration in their 2001 and 2005 manifestos, variously warning Britons that their country was turning into a “foreign land” (Ford and Goodwin 2014, p.135) Since then, both Conservative and Labour Home Secretaries have introduced tougher regulations for foreign
students, immigrant spouses and unskilled migrant workers; they have also resisted calls for a one-off amnesty for irregular migrants, endorsed suggestions that immigrants are a burden on public services, and pushed to curb migrants’ access to welfare benefits and the NHS (ibid, p.275). In short, the current political establishment is seemingly offering racists most of what they want on their core issue.

Of course, any understanding of agenda-setting power in the 21st Century must also consider of the role of mass communications – television, newspapers, radio and, increasingly, social media. Empirically, the role of mass communications in shaping political attitudes has been documented, among others, by Stromberg (2004), Gentzkow (2006), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), Gerber et al. (2009), and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), among others. Against this background, pro-immigration campaigners distressed by the negative portrayal of migrants in Britain have often accused the media and its individual allies of being under the control of powerful oligopolistic forces allied with the populist position. Consonant with classic and contemporary ‘news values’, immigration issues are “mediasexy” as well as dovetailing nicely with the ‘racist’ agendas of some media owners (see Brighton and Foy 2007). Here, racialisation scholars identify two distinct and interrelated trends in the coverage of immigration-related issues:

• **Quantitative shift.** First, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of immigration-related newspaper articles (van Dijk 2007)

• **Qualitative shift.** Second, there has been a significant shift in the nature of the coverage. According to Balch and Balabanova (2016), media coverage of asylum and immigration policy narrowed considerably in the 2006-2013 period and became much more communitarian across all of the newspapers.

In this view, the anti-immigration lobby is better organised than its pro-immigration opponent, and political elites respond to such mobilised demands, leading to the normalisation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment.
Moreover, the existence of a powerful right-wing lobby in the British media has allowed mainstream figures to couch their restrictionist arguments in racist ‘tabloid’ language (Khiabany and Williamson 2011). Metaphorically, refugees are often depicted as a “flood”, whereas asylum seekers are typically represented as coming in “swamps”. This rhetoric is used not only by right-wing populists who claim to be speak for ‘ordinary people’; it is also accepted by migration liberals who concede the political agenda to those who are opposed to immigration (Wodak 2015). To paraphrase the former leader of the Green Party, Natalie Bennett (2013), there has been a rhetorical “race to the bottom” on the issue of migration. Whoever talks toughest, therefore, will be most likely to connect with voters.

1.3.2. Societal politicisation (ii): anti-racism

At this point it must be stressed that the arguments set out by van Djik (1993; 2007) and others flatly contradict the more orthodox view that official anti-racism is now a lot more powerful than racism itself. While Western European politics have not historically centered on racial cleavages in the way that US politics have, the extreme racism manifest in European colonialism and WWII may have given rise (belatedly) to a broad social norm against racism (Bowser 1995; Mendelberg 2001; Art 2006). This counter-thesis, for lack of a better term, is referred to here as the deracialisation account. In the words of demographer Eric Kaufmann (2017, p.6),

“The immigration debate takes place in a public square alive to charges of racism. When voicing conservative views on immigration, many in the West feel a ‘cultural cringe’. They worry about violating social norms against racism, not just in front of others, but even in their private thoughts, where their ‘generalised other,’ in the words of psychologist George Herbert Mead, stands in judgment.”

The relationship between anti-racist norms and desired immigration levels has been investigated by (among others) Rob Ford, Scott Blinder, Pierre-André Taguieff and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. These scholars have argued, implicitly or
explicitly, that some modes of restrictionist discourse are ‘policed’ in a highly
effective manner. Indeed, high among the reasons why non-EU citizens migrate
to Europe is the belief that Europe is more tolerant and welcoming than most
parts of the world.

Going further, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and colleagues (2010) speculate that
the anti-racism norm might be a crucial “missing piece of the puzzle” in
explaining variations in the successes of the radical right. According to this view,

norms against racism exist broadly in Western Europe, and can be mobilised by
political elites to counteract populist, anti-establishment efforts to reshape the
agenda. Pierre-André Taguieff (2013 p.1528) describes this norm in the following
terms:

‘[O]ver the last thirty years of the 20th century, the word “racism” became an
insult in everyday language (“racist!” “dirty racist!”), an insult derived from the
racist insult par excellence (“dirty nigger!”, “dirty Jew!”), and given a symbolic
illegitimating power as strong as the political insult “fascist!” or “dirty fascist!”.

To say an individual is “racist” is to stigmatize him, to assign him to a heinous
category, and to abuse him verbally […] The “racist” individual is thus expelled
from the realm of common humanity and excluded from the circle of humans who
are deemed respectable by virtue of their intrinsic worth. Through a symbolic act
that antiracist sociologists denounce as a way of “racializing” the Other, the
“racist” is in turn and in return categorized as an “unworthy” being, indeed as an
“unworthy” being par excellence. For, as people say, what can be worse than
racism?”

In this regard, several observers have commented that racism has become
less prominent in recent years. Specifically, it has been argued that the rise in
interethic contact has diminished the public’s interest in race-related questions.
In one survey, 75% of British respondents supported a law sanctioning racial
discrimination and 51% went further, supporting a law imposing special
punishments for racially-motivated attacks (Blinder et al. 2013). Anecdotally,
prejudiced acts by public figures are often severely criticised and even met with
formal sanctions, including sacking from public positions. Some recent examples include:

- the sacking of Conservative MP Anne Winterton in 2002 for telling a racist joke at a private function;
- the 2007 resignation of Tory candidate Nigel Hastilow after declaring that Enoch Powell was “right”;
- the 2011 sacking of Patrick Mercer, a former Conservative shadow minister, following Mercer’s claim that being called a “black bastard” was part-and-parcel of life in the army; and
- the expulsion of Labour activist Marc Wadsworth in 2018 for heckling a Jewish Labour MP at the launch of a report on anti-Semitism.

The evidence, though hardly sufficient, seems to support the view that the anti-immigration policies demanded by some tabloids are strongly opposed, for example, by the BBC (West 2013b) – the world’s largest public broadcasting organisation – and big Internet monopolies such as Google and Facebook (Murray 2017). Ironically, big business, once considered a bête noire of the radical Left, is now an open advocate of anti-racism as a world-organising principle. One could see this in Starbucks’ recent decision to hire 10,000 refugees, over a 5-year period, in response to President Trump’s ‘Islamophobic’ executive order temporarily barring Muslim refugees. Many other leading conglomerates and multinationals, including Amazon, Ford, Goldman Sachs and Microsoft, came out against the Trump policy.

One might also add that the British authorities exercise considerable self-censorship over reports that might implicate members of the black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) community. This was borne out, to a large extent, in the northern town of Rotherham when organised gangs of British-Pakistani men raped more than a thousand young girls over a thirty-year period. The inquiry into the abuse found that although the perpetrators were almost all men of Pakistani origin, operating in gangs, staff of the local council described their “nervousness
about identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought as racist” (quoted from Murray 2017).

It is important to note that, historically, the anti-racist movement was focused on fighting discrimination in employment and housing. For most of this period the political elite assumed that problems arising from non-white immigration would be resolved by existing racial QUANGOS or by voluntary immigrant advisory services then emerging locally (see Messina 1989 for a book-length treatment).

Over time, however, anti-racist policy-makers embarked on a steady process of *mission creep*. Once they had established certain ideals, the geocenter of the movement shifted away from fighting discrimination in employment and housing, and towards the criminal prosecution of people for so-called ‘hate speech’. This trend was reflected in the impact of race-relations policies introduced by the government after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in 1999, headed by Sir William Macpherson. A series of institutional and legal reforms were introduced to combat ‘institutional racism’ – the most significant of which was the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000.

In addition to this, racism has undergone a number of semantic shifts in recent decades. Traditionally, the noun was used to describe the extreme arguments being made for genetic determinism: its usage began in the social sciences, especially through the efforts of John B. Watson in psychology and Franz Boas in anthropology – together with Boas’ students Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead (Barkan 1992). At that time racism referred to the blood-and-soil nationalism so prevalent in Nazi Germany and in other countries that looked to Germany as a model (Taguieff, 2013, p.1528).

Over time, however, anti-racism grew more radical, seeking not only to extirpate racial prejudice but also to stigmatise non-racial opinions, words and statements-of-fact: “…a racism which has as its dominant theme not the

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11 ‘Mission creep’ is a term used in the military to describe a migration away from the original purpose to an entirely new direction.
biological heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural differences” (quoted from Balibar 1997, p.33). Among other things, anti-racist campaigners began to insist that all cultures are of equal rank and value, and that the political, intellectual and artistic achievements of the West should not enjoy any preference. Those who think differently are guilty of “Eurocentrism”. According to Professor Nick Haslam (2016), this increased sensitivity to presumed expressions of prejudice represents a form of concept creep. In Haslam’s (2016) view, “concept creep runs the risk of pathologizing everyday experience and encouraging a sense of virtuous but impotent victimhood”.

1.3.3. Economism, migration and societal depoliticisation

Explanations for the politicisation of the race issue vary considerably. On one side of the debate, racialisation scholars argue that successive British governments have allowed racists to set the terms of debate and have then inflamed the situation even further by introducing racist immigration policies. On the other side, decracticalisation scholars argue that while Britain has an elitist political system where policy-making is usually determined in an autonomous fashion, on this issue anti-racist norms have been so pervasive and hostile that policy-makers have had to ignore popular demands for greater immigration controls.

There is, however, a third agenda-setting hypothesis: the societal depoliticisation argument. This concept has been posited by Wood and Flinders (2014) to describe the transfer of issues from the public to the private sphere: by simply not discussing political issues to the extent that they were discussed previously, political actors can effectively ‘remove’ those issues from the formal agenda (e.g., by preventing their full and open public deliberation). This thesis has been deftly articulated by the political commentator Douglas Murray in his polemic The Strange Death of Europe. Politicians, he argues, are colluding with big social media monopolies like Facebook to curb debate online:
“[Even] in 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, it was speech and thought that was constricted. At the peak of the crisis in September 2015 Chancellor Merkel of Germany asked the Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, what would be done to stop European citizens writing criticisms of her migration policy on Facebook. ‘Are you working on this?’ she asked him. He assured her that he was. In fact the criticism, thought and discussion ought to have been boundless. Looking back, it is remarkable how restricted we made our discussion even whilst we opened our home to the world.” (Murray 2017, p.3)

One thing this demonstrates is that whereas the benefits of mass immigration undoubtedly exist and everybody is made aware of them, the disadvantages of importing huge numbers of people from outside the EU are withdrawn from aspects of the public sphere (in this case, the Internet) via underhand practices such as shadow banning, de-monetisation and the rigging of autocompletes.

Also facilitating the efforts of the major parties in keeping migration off the agenda are the difficulties anti-immigration groups experience in articulating their views through mainstream *modes of discourse*, that is, the conventions of language-based communication. For example, according to Eric Kaufmann (2017), Europe’s increased sensitivity to presumed expressions of ‘hate’ has compelled migration sceptics whose true motivations are ethnocultural to couch their grievances in *economic terms*:

“Divides over immigration force liberals to confront the question of whether diversity is a moral imperative or a matter of taste. In Europe, conservative white pressure has steered the political conversation toward reducing immigration. But immigration skeptics, most of whom affirm liberal antiracism norms, are generally unwilling to couch their position in ethnocultural terms, pretending instead that they are concerned about pressure on public services or jobs.”

There is, to be sure, a widespread assumption in the UK – at least among the political commentariat – that the debate around migration continues to be
dominated by the language of economics (Williams 2006; Goodhart 2013; Skey 2014; Bennett 2014; Embery 2016; Cobley 2018). To take a small but suggestive example from Kaufmann (2017): in one focus group study of migration attitudes, a female participant complained of the Croydon tramlink in London, saying that “I might have been the only English person on that tram... I didn’t like it... I could have been in a foreign country.” This lady was challenged by another participant who asked, “Why should that affect you that there’s minorities on the [tram]?” In response, the woman re-framed her argument:

“It doesn’t affect me. It, um... I’ve got grandchildren and children... I don’t think things are going to get any better or easier for them, to get work.”

Though there are many issues that motivate citizens to support movements variously described as ‘populist’, their estrangement from technocratic discourse is surely one of them (Fitzgerald 1996; Canovan 1999; Lucardie 2000; Mudde 2007). During his national conference speech in 2013, former UKIP leader Nigel Farage described parts of the UK as increasingly “unrecognisable”, thanks to recent years of large-scale immigration. Unlike the female participant in Kauffman’s focus group, however, Farage was unequivocal and unapologetic:

“In scores of our cities and market towns, this country, in a short space of time, has, frankly, become unrecognisable. Whether it is the impact on local schools and hospitals, whether it is the fact that in many parts of England you don’t hear English spoken any more, this is not the kind of community we want to leave to our children and grandchildren.”

The political outlook of UKIP is best described as national populist\(^\text{12}\). Insofar as it seeks to address the people of Britain, its rhetoric contains an important communitarian element. During an interview in 2015 on the subject of EU migration, for example, Farage was asked about the fiscal arguments in

\(^{12}\) Populism has been defined as an ideology that separates society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups – ordinary people and a corrupt elite – and that believes that politics should be an expression of volonté générale (general will) (Mudde 2007).
favour of freedom of movement. According to Farage’s interlocutor, EU migrants are net contributors, in terms of the taxes they pay and the new jobs they create. Rather than offer a rebuttal, however, Farage chose to reject the premise of the interviewer’s question, arguing instead that politics was not just about economic growth. He argued that, for many people, the issue of migration was not reducible to economic self-interest; rather, it was the social consequences of mass immigration that concerned voters. This, he said, is a lot more important than “pure market economics” (quoted from Harris 2014):

“If you said to me, would I like to see over the next ten years a further five million people come in to Britain and if that happened we’d all be slightly richer, I’d say, I’d rather we weren’t slightly richer, and I’d rather we had communities that were united and where young unemployed British people had a realistic chance of getting a job. I think the social side of this matters more than pure market economics.”

The resonance of what Farage says is recognised even by some supporters of liberal immigration policy; Labour party activist Sunny Hundal (2014), for example, states:

I actually agree with Nigel Farage that the social side of immigration matters more than pure economics. In fact, what I find it frustrating when people talk about immigration solely in economic terms because it dehumanises people and reduces them to their economic value.

According to political commentator John Harris (2014), UKIP’s re-appropriation of cultural themes offers a huge political advantage to the national populist movement:

“One of the biggest political openings for Farage is easily explained. Both main parties do not think to question the supremacy of supposed growth and the idea that national "prosperity" must be king. Labour politicians have either bought this idea, or dare not depart from it for fear of being called out as anti-business. The
Tories, who might once have sounded a more nuanced voice on the basis of conservatism (remember that?), now talk maniacally about the necessity of Britain giving its all in what they call the “global race.”

It could be argued that party competition on immigration, although considerably circumscribed, was not deliberately restricted. However, this perspective does not explain the deliberate strategies that the major parties pursued to depoliticise migration. For example, in his newspaper column for the *Evening Standard*, former government advisor Andrew Neather (2009) revealed that government ministers frequently talked about immigration and its social consequences, but only along *pre-approved economic lines*. During the publication of a government white paper in 2001, Home Office officials focused exclusively on the economic benefits of migration: arguments about job creation, employment and the delivery of public services. In contrast, arguments made for the benefits of ethnic diversity (included in earlier drafts) did not make it to the final copy. Neather (2009) offers an explanation for this editorial decision:

“Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for immigration boom. But ministers wouldn’t talk about it. In part they probably realised the conservatism of their core voters: while ministers might have been passionately in favour of a more diverse society, it wasn’t necessarily a debate they wanted to have in working men’s clubs in Sheffield or Sunderland.”

The central argument presented here is that the persistence of strong illiberal public opinion on the subject of diversity convinced many New Labour strategists to *circumnavigate* public opinion. They did this by framing their immigration policy as a technical response to the ‘needs’ of the UK economy. Controversial discussions – about the increasing ethnocultural diversity of the UK – were all but effectively shut down. In short, what Schattschneider (1960, p.71) calls a “mobilization of bias” was built into the system.
1.3.4. Ideology

Up until now, my analysis has been guided by three implicit assumptions which I now wish to elaborate and make explicit: (a) since the 1950s the two major parties have been at the centre of Britain’s race-related problems (section 1.3.1); (b) the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ immigration discourse have shifted over time, but at any given time there are struggles over their location and over their ‘enforcement’ (section 1.3.2); and (c) political elites choose the issues they discuss or ignore and the decisions and constituencies they represent (section 1.3.3).

Following on from this general analysis, a fourth assumption will be added: (d) whilst parties are office-seeking organisations that try to maximise votes, they are also fundamentally configured by a set of defining ideas (e.g., an ‘ideology’) which provides a coherent package of principles and beliefs. This ideology, in theory, reflects both the party’s tenets and their core constituents concerns and thus acts as blueprint to guide political action.

1.4 Nondecision-making power (pt.2): the role of ideology

“Ideology”, according to political philosopher Michael Freeden (2003), “evokes strong emotional responses”. It suggests a doctrinaire mode of thinking, somewhat removed from everyday life, that purports to hold answers for every conceivable human problem. Those who have studied the relationship between parties and immigration policy have thus tended to focus on political strategy – on the assumption that parties are above all office-seeking organisations, committed to a view of politics as vote maximization and competency in the art of ‘statecraft’ (Bulpitt 1996).

My argument here is that political elites do not passively acquiesce to public demands to restrict immigration. As Freeman and Kessler (1998) convincingly argue, “domestic politics, rather than constituting a powerful and uniform stimulus for restrictionism, is a much more complex force that actually
undermines such efforts.” The values contained in Table 5, for example, show considerable differences between elite and non-elite opinion on what Thomas Raines and colleagues (2017) describe as the identity axis.

Table 5. Comparing elite and public attitudes towards immigration (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived effects of immigration on</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has been good for the country</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral – neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has been bad for country</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural life</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants enhance cultural life</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral – neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants have not enriched cultural life</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has made crime worse</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not made crime worse</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a strain on the welfare state</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral – neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is not a strain on the welfare state</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Raines et. al. (2017), p.20

In effect, Wood and Flinders’ (2014, p.165) more extensive category of ‘discursive (de)politicisation’ performs much the same role as ideology does in mainstream political science. On the one hand, ideology provides a coherent package of principles and beliefs, and in doing so they act as devices for mobilising mass political activity (discursive politicisation). Ideology is thus deserving of comprehension on its own terms, as a primary endogenous (internal) device for organising ideas and other cognitions. On the other hand, ideologies can be used to manipulate a person’s perception of legitimate options, by framing certain policies as ‘unchangeable’, ‘inevitable’ or ‘natural’ (discursive depoliticisation).

1.4.1. Discursive politicisation (i): globalism

In the setting of Britain, political debate is often described as a clash between the ‘right-wing’ government of Theresa May and her ‘left-wing’ Labour opponent. Indeed, a long-standing truism of political sociology, since the classic work of
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), is that working class voters tend to support the parties of ‘the left’, and middle class voters those of ‘the right’, throughout Western society. Ideologically, a right-wing government places the business entrepreneur at the center of the economy and emphasises her role in social development, while a left-wing government elevates the worker to this status and places labour at the foundation of society.

In the course of researching and writing this thesis, however, the author found reliance on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) vocabulary more of a hindrance than a help. To begin with, many MPs in the parliamentary Labour party have adopted policies and practices that, in the British context, could be described as ‘centrist’ or managerial. Some of these policies included

- the contracting out of public services to the private sector;
- the development of internal markets in the NHS; and
- the ‘incentivisation’ of highly publicised targets and performance league figures

According to New Labour’s academic critics, these managerial policies represented a betrayal of ‘Old’ Labour values such as workers’ rights and the implementation of a mixed economy. One academic proponent of this view has been Professor Colin Hay of Sheffield University, who has argued that “the Labour government conceived neither of the need for, nor indeed the possibility of… an alternative to the ascendant neoliberalism of the times” (cited from Dillow 2007, p.8). Although perhaps overstated, Hay’s conclusion reflects a certain reality: that during the 1990s and 2000s the parties pursued a remarkably

\(^{13}\) Hay exaggerates the shift in two crucial respects. First, New Labour’s commitment to prudent macroeconomic policies – low inflation and balanced budgets – is not a departure from Old Labour, but a reaffirmation of it. Hugh Dalton, for example, argued for a stable cost of living index, while Gordon Brown’s ‘golden rule’ (that governments should only borrow to invest rather than to finance current spending) can be seen as a return to the public finance principles of Old Labour Chancellor Stafford Cripps (Fielding 2002). Second, Hay’s thesis hugely understates New Labour’s commitment to social justice. Many policies – such as the pensioners’ Minimum Income Guarantee, the Working Families Tax Credit and the National Minimum Wage – helped to raise the incomes of the lowest quintile (Toynbee and Walker 2011).
similar course. To be sure, when he took over as Labour leader in 1995, Tony Blair talked about breaking through old left-right barriers, stating that

“New Labour is neither old left or new right. We understand and welcome the new global market. We reject go-it-alone policies on inflation and the macro-economy. We stand for a new partnership between government and industry” (quoted from Appleton 2005)

New Labour’s willingness to break with traditional political convention became clear when Gordon Brown, Blair’s successor as Prime Minister, revealed that he wanted to include cabinet members from outside the Labour Party in a proposed “government of all the talents”.

Corresponding to this development, many left-wing politicians have abandoned their normal suspicions of big business and embraced free market assumptions about internationally competitive labour markets (Hay 2007). According to author Ben Cobley (2018), market-based solutions are preferred in this instance because “the market is favouring the right people – those of non-British, non-English ethnicity over the ethnic British and English, thereby aligning ‘free’ markets with the system of diversity.” The essence of this globalist ideology was perhaps best summarised by former Labour leader Ed Miliband, who claimed that

“Setting an annual [immigration] limit is a dirigiste system where the state decides on the number of people to be let in each year. What the Government are proposing is a system led by employers, which is flexible and can respond to the needs they identify.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.436, cols.188-272, 5 July 2005) [emphasis added]

Many of the ideas associated with New Labour – its commitment to European federalism, its embrace of human rights and belief in the free market economy – are ones that one classically associates with globalism, not social democracy. Underpinning the globalist worldview is belief in world-systems (Steger et al. 2013).
1.4.2. ‘First-order’ versus ‘second-order’ ideologies

Over the past 2-3 years it has become fashionable in journalistic circles to proclaim the ‘death of Blairism’ following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader in 2015. While Blair stood for free market capitalism, Corbyn champions a mixed economy; while the former encouraged private enterprise, the latter stands for renationalisation. Corbynism is couched in that diffuse, yet potent, pledge to defend “the many against the few.”

Few pause to think that this narrative, while appealing to large numbers of people across political divides, is unintentionally misleading in that it covers New Labour only from the perspective of public sector management. A defining feature of those who self-identify as ‘left-wing’ in Britain today, however, is their ideological commitment to post-national norms, transnational identities and supranational institutions (Furedi 2018). Corbyn, like Blair, has sincere commitments to overseas aid, international development and human rights. For example:

“Refugees are not migrants. They have been forced from their homes, by war, famine or other disasters. Unlike the Tories, we will uphold the proud British tradition of honouring the spirit of international law and our moral obligations by taking our fair share of refugees.” (Labour 2017, p.29)

In addition to this, Corbyn has been keen to promote global civil society which, indeed, became a symbol of New Labour’s commitment to moral cosmopolitanism:

“We will work with our international partners to build support for UN reform and make its institutions more effective and responsive. We will appoint dedicated global ambassadors for women’s rights, LGBT rights and religious freedom to fight discrimination and promote equality globally.” (Labour 2017, p.118)
Seen through a non-economic lens, one could legitimately argue that the New Labour government promoted its left-wing ideology under a new globalist\(^\text{14}\) banner: all those ‘Old’ Labour principles and values were still there, but they had to be channelled through a postmaterial policy agenda, which had an exiguous relationship at best to questions of political economy. As Blair himself admitted back in 2006,

“There is a debate going on which, confusingly for the politicians, often crosses traditional left/right lines and the debate is: open v closed. Do we embrace the challenge of more open societies or build defences against it?” (Guardian 2006)

From this perspective, globalism can be classified as a *first-order ideology*, since it relates to the status of transnational bodies, a macro-political issue. Managerialism, on the other hand, can be classified as a *second-order ideology*, since it relates to the imposition of competitive behaviour on the public sector, a meso-political issue. Occasionally, these first- and second-order ideologies dovetail, as in the case of economic migration; in other cases, however, they do not.

Moreover, while the center-right may have won the argument about the economy in the 1980s it has *not* won the argument on a wide range ‘first order’ issues, with the result being that the parameters of debate have shifted steadily outwards – towards transnational norms (‘diversity’), institutions (the EU) and non-governmental organisations (global civil society). This perspective is consistent with the work of Ronald Inglehart and his “postmaterialism” hypothesis. Drawing on large attitudinal surveys, Inglehart (1977) showed how people were moving away from traditional materialist concerns over economic redistribution and the management of scarce resources. Instead, after 30 years of

\(^{14}\) Globalism, like every other ideology, is heterogeneous in its internal architecture, and differences between rival factions can be very significant. Blair, for example, is a champion of humanitarian warfare and the Trident nuclear defence system; Corbyn, on the other hand, is a champion of non-interventionism and unilateral nuclear disarmament.

\(^{15}\) Author’s term
macroeconomic growth and the rapid expansion of higher education, citizens were adopting new *postmaterial priorities* such as human rights, environmental sustainability and ‘diversity’. With regard to the latter, Professor Frank Furedi (2016) claims that animosity towards borders is inspired less by free market economics than by a loathing of ethnic homogeneity:

“Today, arguments in favour of mass migration don’t focus on the virtues of free movement; they focus on what are seen as the positive effects of mass migration on a host society. These positive effects are frequently communicated in the language of economics. But, increasingly, immigration is valued on the basis that it has a transformative effect on national culture, too. […] In the British context, immigration is sometimes argued for on the basis that it will turn Britain into a more enlightened, less British, society.”

The discursive politicisation of diversity, in Furedi’s (2016) view, “inevitably encourages more diversity, to the point where society becomes increasingly segmented along the lines of lifestyles and subcultures”. Indeed, New Labour’s policy of relaxing immigration controls from 1997 onwards reflected a common desire to make Britain more open, international and diverse. As recalled by former New Labour adviser Andrew Neather (2009), one of the key arguments for relaxing border controls was that it would make Britain more multicultural:

“I remember coming away from some discussions with the clear sense that the policy was intended – even if this wasn’t its main purpose – to rub the right’s nose in diversity and render their arguments out of date. That seemed to me to be a manoeuvre too far.”

None of this entails a complete rejection of the left-right continuum. Labour’s appeal in many traditional working-class strongholds was evident at the 2017 GE, where the party polled over 60 per cent in constituencies such as Liverpool Wavertree, St Helens North, Norwich South and Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney. It is these kinds of results that are leading some Labour activists to talk ambitiously about a “post-Brexit socialist revolution”. That being said,
postmaterial values such as ethnic diversity, human rights and ‘global civil society’ are likely to move to centre stage. The key issue that underlies all of these different controversies is a conflict over the status of national sovereignty and of the nation state. Indeed, Corbyn’s appeal with the post-nationalist elite was evident at the 2017 GE, where the party won seats in the affluent constituencies of Kensington and Canterbury. As discovered by psephologist Paula Surridge (2017) in a constituency-by-constituency analysis of the 2017 general election, the more working class voters there are in a constituency, the more it tended to swing Conservative; the fewer there are, the more it tended to swing Labour.

1.4.3. Discursive politicisation (iii): new public management

To summarise, a defining feature of those who self-identify as ‘left-wing’ in Britain today is their commitment to transnational norms, institutions and non-governmental organisations. Thus, the old paradigm of a ‘left-wing’ arguing for municipal socialism or a mixed-market economy has been replaced, to a large extent, by a globalist ethos that defies traditional left-right categories.

Similarly, the application of the term ‘right-wing’ to capture the outlook of today’s British Conservatives is even more confusing. In the early 1990s Tory MPs still self-consciously promoted traditional conservative values and frequently argued for ‘faith, flag, and family’ – meaning to uphold religious morality, loyalty to nation and the traditional nuclear family (Bale 2010; 2012). For reasons that have still not been fully examined by scholars, the British Conservative party abandoned ‘faith, flag and family’ in the latter part of the 20th century (see Wheatcroft 2005 for a book-length treatment). As Theresa May herself admitted, traditional Conservative values are “just plain unattractive”:

“never forget that this fact. Twice we went to the country unchanged, unrepentant, just plain unattractive. And twice we got slaughtered. Soldiering on to the next election without radical, fundamental change is simply not an option.” (quoted from Scholefield and Frost 2011)
Some of the reformers, like Francis Maude and George Osborne, were neoliberals animated most obviously by the ambition to emulate Tony Blair and New Labour. For others, like David Willets and Oliver Letwin, social and economic forces seem to have been the primary spur. Many of the ideas associated with modern-day Conservatism – worship of the state, its dislike of traditional values and embrace of diversity – are ones that one classically associates with managerialism, not Conservatism (Dillow 2007). This is especially true for a postmodern leader like May who, free from substantive commitments and ideological constraints, has perfected the art of staying in power by means of unpredictable changes of course.

Conceptually, managerialism can be defined so broadly that it covers many of the topics discussed here in this chapter. Some precision is necessary, however, and is provided by Christopher Hood’s (1991) discussion of the seven components in the new public management (NPM) doctrine:

- hands-on professional management;
- explicit standards and measures of performance;
- greater emphasis on output controls;
- disaggregation of public sector units;
- greater competition in the public sector;
- stress on private sector styles of management; and
- greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.

One of the most significant manifestations of NPM has been the rise of a pan-European policy of managed migration, culminating in the introduction of a points-based immigration system in 2006 (Hampshire 2013). This doctrine stands for both a passionate rhetorical defence of large-scale economic and student migration as well as for a schematic, coldly rational conceptual system which
seeks to deter illegal immigration. Discursive politicisation, here, has involved the invocation of managerial competence, as articulated by Theresa May in 2010:

“The benefits of well-managed migration are deeply rooted in British values, reflecting our openness as an economy and society, our liberalism and our tolerance.

So managed well, immigration is something that can bring great benefits. But managed poorly, it is something that can cause great economic and social pressure.” (Home Office 2010)

The key question concerning managed migration would seem to be whether or not it can legitimately be termed restrictionist. The answer depends to large extent on upon what is meant by ‘restrictionism’. On the one hand, managerial elites have emphasised the negative distributional consequences of illegal entrants and overstayers, such as bogus asylum seekers, unauthorised migrant workers, undocumented tourists on expired visas, and immigrant spouses in sham marriages (Balch 2016; Consterdine 2018a).

Yet, while this stance is designed to assuage the growing opposition to immigration and perhaps to deter some of the would-be immigrants, core supporters of globalism can still pin their hopes on the fact that in Britain large-scale economic migration is normally granted, and only a tiny number of illegal immigrants are sent back to their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal procedures, it is decided that they have not got grounds to remain.

Underpinning the managerial worldview is a commitment to technocratic governance and pursuit of the political ‘centre ground’. From this standpoint, political order must be intentionally produced through expert managerial technique, as opposed to parliamentary skill or political affiliation. Applied to the politics of migration:

\[16\] Maurice Duverger (1972, p.9) argued that “two-faced god, Janus, is the true image of power.” In other words, both politicisation and depoliticisation are essential elements in the creation of a political situation.
- Thesis: Migrants promote economic growth, staff public services and boost the public finances (globalism)
- Antithesis: Migrants take British jobs, burden the public services and cost the British taxpayer (national populism)
- Synthesis: Migrants enrich us economically and culturally, but the benefits do not rise in proportion to the numbers settling whereas the problems/externalities do (managerialism)

Pursuit of the political middle ground motivated the Conservatives, and particularly David Cameron, to avoid all policy commitments which might unnecessarily polarize public opinion. Thus, when dealing with a divisive issue which had to be addressed in order to demonstrate the party’s competence, these had to be given an upbeat tone (e.g., “migration has enriched our culture and strengthened our economy”). Such a course was part of the Conservatives strategy to project a more caring and cosmopolitan image than in the past. As David Cameron explained in his speech at the launch of the Demos Progressive Conservatism project, the fundamental thesis of a centre-right government would be that “progressive ends can best be achieved by Conservative means” (quoted from Letwin 2010).

1.4.4. Discursive depoliticisation

Though the public is often told that Conservative and Labour are ‘in opposition’, that is not always the case. Some of the most bitter rivalries in Parliament have involved factional conflicts within individual parties rather than collisions of ideology and belief. In terms of substantive policy offerings, the two major parties have become increasingly convergent around three axioms:

- New public management
- Postmaterial values
- Managerial technocracy
Among the most important guides in this inquiry is the Comparative Manifesto Project, a collaborative resource that provides a QCA\textsuperscript{17} of parties’ electoral manifestos. Figure 1.4 summarises the ideological location of the Conservative and Labour parties, for example, across a broad range of issues. The manifestos for each election are scored on a scale of 0 to 100 according to how left- or right-wing they are. Low scores are left-wing. Figure 2 indicates that the distance between the major parties after 1997 is considerably less than between 1983 and 1990.

![Figure 2. The converging positions of the parties’ manifestos](image)

*Source: Evans and Menon (2017) p.27*

Figure 2 yields two interesting insights. First, as the Butskellist era\textsuperscript{18} came to a close, divisions between the government and opposition were unambiguous. The Thatcher premiership preserved ideological distinctions in Britain during a period when they were collapsing elsewhere in Europe. Second, trends in the ideological locations of the Conservative and Labour parties converged, with a predictable

\textsuperscript{17} Quantitative content analysis

\textsuperscript{18} Coined from the names of the prominent Tory Minister R.A. Butler and the former Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, the term ‘Butskellism’ described post-war consensus between the Conservative and Labour parties on most economic, political and social questions.
agglomeration between 2000 and 2005. This cross-party consensus was composed of several elements:

(a) In the first place – and perhaps most strikingly – Labour embraced a ‘new public management’ (NPM) approach to public service delivery. This was accompanied by a parallel rejection of government ownership and state intervention (Hay 2007).

(b) Second, there was broad if not unquestioning support for postmaterial values, especially when it came to global issues such as gender equality, the environment, gay rights, intra-European cooperation, humanitarian aid and, of course, “diversity” (Fielding 2002).

(c) Finally, this consensus also included an uncompromising belief in managerial technocracy (Hay 2007) – a manifestation of elite rule that has sprung up into existence only over the last three decades, and amounts to a fundamental denial of democracy. The essence of managerial technocracy was perhaps best summarised by former Labour leader Gordon Brown, who claimed that

“These are global problems that need global solutions; these can't be solved as problems without building capable and effective global institutions for the future. The institutions we built in the 1940s won't solve the next crisis.”

As political priorities have changed, so, too, has what politicians aspire to do in government. From the Bank of England to the European Commission and Council of Ministers, public policy is increasingly farmed out to bureaucrats at ‘arms-length’ institutions.

A further consequence of technocratic governance is that policy debates came to be couched in increasingly hazy jargon: words such as ‘sustainable’, ‘holistic’, ‘joined-up’, ‘collaborative’, ‘modernise’, ‘citizen-centered’ and ‘dynamic’ (Hood 1998). Terms such as ‘efficiency savings’ and ‘streamlining’ were coined to avoid more inflammatory – and comprehensible – alternatives such as ‘cutting wages’ or ‘sacking people’.

This phenomenon may be encapsulated in Wood and Flinders’ (2014) concept of discursive depoliticisation. This appears in the crafting of speeches
that are deliberately designed to manipulate a person’s perception of legitimate responses, by framing certain policies as ‘unchangeable’, ‘inevitable’ or ‘natural’.

For example, according to Tony Blair

“In the field of politics… ideas are becoming globalised. As problems become global – competitiveness, changes in technology, crime, drugs, family breakdown – so the search for solutions becomes global too. What amazes me, talking to other countries’ leaders, is not the differences but the points in common.”

Here, depoliticisation is part of a “two-stage shift” (Wood and Flinders 2014), whereby the hollowing out of the public sphere leads, in turn, to a sense of diminished interest in public affairs (see, also, Beck 1992). Faced with the allegedly uncontrollable exogenous constraint of globalisation, Blair claimed in 1999 that

“We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.”

The combination of broad convergence between the major parties, the trend towards the depoliticisation of key administrative functions, and the discursive constraints imposed by managerial technocracy fostered the impression that political parties could do less and less: this was the era of ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). Applied to the politics of migration, TINA could be considered the defining reason why immigration policy shifted under Labour. After all, according to the government “Migration is driven by globalization”, and thus states must respond to the imminent flows of people and make it work in their favour (quoted from Consterdine 2015).
1.5. Research questions

The choice of research questions (RQ) addressed in this thesis reflects the key themes in Britain’s growing immigration debate as well as the key arguments made by MPs over the past 60 years. With regards to the ability of politicians to influence the dominant values and perceptions of a society (e.g., ideological power), the key question is:

*RQ1.* To what extent have the ideological orientations of MPs evolved over time, and does the direction of change support Christopher Hood’s claim that elite-level orientations have gradually yielded to a managerial consensus?

There is, moreover, an additional matter which comes back to the quotations from Eric Kaufman (2015; 2017). It is here that the thesis engages with the ability of politicians to influence the salience of topics on the political and public agenda:

*RQ2.* To what extent have MPs politicised the racial, religious and/or cultural characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?

*RQ2.* To what extent have MPs depoliticised the racial, religious and/or cultural characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?

By looking at how mainstream parties have talked about immigration, we can see if they left the non-economic field wide open for groups such as *Leave.EU* to campaign on – a clear explanation (if not the only one) for why national populist movements can be so effective. As explained in section 1.3, this is a particular problem for those on the centre-left who have tended to dismiss immigration sceptics as ‘racist’, rather than thinking more seriously about what these broader cultural issues are telling us about the way people view the world and their place in it.
Ideally, the findings of this thesis can be placed in what has been called *Pasteur’s Quadrant*: an argument that the study is important for both advancing a body of knowledge and research and also important for solving some practical problem or meeting some political challenge (Stokes 1997). For example, if the depoliticisation thesis is proven to be valid, then the political establishment could easily speak, act, and legislate in ways that drain support away from national populist parties. Yet, to do so would require some deep rethinking about the value of national identities and cohesive moral communities. Indeed, one could argue that the great question for European policymakers after the Brexit vote of 2016 is this: How do you reap the gains of immigration (economic and social) while respecting – rather than suppressing – Europe’s parochial identities?

1.6. Summary

The central argument presented in this chapter is that the racial conflicts engendered after the 1950s motivated both major parties to extricate a number of ethnocultural issues from the electoral arena. On top of this, the political elite’s commitment to globalist ideology impacted upon a number of key policies, including immigration. Many of these decisions were taken by democratically elected governments, although not always with much public debate and input. Furthermore, once these expansionist policies had been implemented, they became depoliticised, as national politicians no longer wanted to debate or discuss them.

This, of course, raises an important methodological question: How is the researcher to investigate the role of ideology in structuring elite discourse on immigration? Furthermore, how is the researcher to investigate the ability of politicians to delimit the range of apparent policy choices? To answer these questions, chapter two sets out the relevant context in terms of research strategy. Using a range of case studies from the 1960’s to the present day, the author will undertake a QCA to capture how immigration policies are debated in the
This research strategy will involve the classification of parts of a speech through the application of a structured ‘coding framework’ from which conclusions can be drawn about the politicisation/ depoliticisation of contentious issues.

Once this coding framework has been put in place, the author can begin to cover in detail the instances in which the phenomena under discussion are most clearly demonstrated, leaving as implicit the fact that similar courses of development may have occurred elsewhere. Chapters 3-5 will be organised into a series of divisions based around the aforementioned case studies, while Chapter 6 will discuss the main findings from the research project, as well as providing answers to the research questions. If the story of the Conservative and Labour parties’ consensus on immigration offers any lessons, it is that the convergence of party policies and elite political consensus without popular consent are not without cost. The cost to political parties may or may not be diminished electoral support; the cost to the nation is certainly the fallout which results from neglected public problems.
Conceptual and Analytical Framework

“All men needed to hear their stories told. He was a man, but if he died without telling the story he would be something less than that, an albino cockroach, a louse.”

– Salman Rushdie\textsuperscript{19}

“We tell ourselves stories in order to live… We look for the sermon in the suicide, for the social or moral lesion in the murder of five. We interpret what we see, select the most workable of the multiple choices. We live entirely, especially if we are writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the “ideas” with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is our actual experience”

– Joan Didion\textsuperscript{20}

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the dissertation’s conceptual and analytical framework – one based on the importance of ‘narrative’ in the production of ideology. The central assumption underpinning this thesis is that ideologies possess an elaborate, narrative-based structure – a three-tier distinction between individual policy narratives (PN), their micro-components (setting, plot, characters, moral) and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the ‘metanarrative’ (M)). Forged through my own research as a principal investigator, I have developed a coding framework to classify and manage these bits of information. Once assembled, these units of analysis will be presented in line graph form, with the x-axis representing the measure of time, and the y-axis representing the percentage of M/PN. In this way, the thesis will provide a visual representation of how the immigration debate has evolved over time. In academic parlance, this research strategy is known as a quantitative content analysis (QCA).

\textsuperscript{19} Rushdie (2008)

\textsuperscript{20} Dideon (1979)
2.1. Research strategy

The three main contemporary academic approaches to ideological analysis can be described as ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA), ‘morphological theory’ and ‘quantitative content analysis’ (QCA). Table 6 offers an overview of these major approaches and schools. Typically, two writers within a ‘school’ generally have more in common, and are more likely to agree on what has already been established and perhaps refer to each other, than two writers in different schools. On the other hand, all three approaches are concerned with processes of politicisation (contestation) and depoliticisation (decontestation).

Before I explore each of these three approaches in more depth, however, I offer a note of precaution. One of the frustrations of the study of politics is the variety of approaches to the subject adopted by academic writers. In contrast to physical sciences like biology or chemistry, where there is broad agreement on the nature of reality and how we should study it, in the social sciences there is no such consensus. This is true even in economics, where despite improved statistical techniques for analysing inflation and markets, vigorous heterodoxies survive. The international relations scholar, Alexander Wendt, noted with justified hyperbole that “social scientific theories rarely die, and if they do, like zombies they inevitably come back to life later” (2015, ch.1).

The reason for this state of affairs is that social phenomena are mind-dependent in a way that chemical elements and rocks are not, and as such they do not present themselves directly to the senses. For this reason, the experimental method is largely closed off to political scientists since they do not possess the power to ‘see’ into people’s minds. In any case, experiments require identical control groups for comparison which, it is arguable, cannot be created. That being said, scholars committed to a scientific approach to politics have sought to

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21 I have not included Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (DA) because it does not carry out a systematic, empirical study of language use.
overcome this problem by collecting *quantitative* and *qualitative* data about political behaviour, institutions and (in this case) ideas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>Morphological theory</th>
<th>QCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Marxist</td>
<td>Non-aligned</td>
<td>Non-aligned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociocognitive (van Djik)</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Computational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical concepts</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Unitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transitivity</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominalisation</td>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>Coding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

### 2.1.1 Critical discourse analysis

The first, and most popular, of these approaches is critical discourse analysis (abbreviated CDA). CDA is sometimes mistaken to be a method of data analysis, just like QCA, since it assigns significance to forms of linguistic structure – such as syntax and word frequency. Yet, more than only a method, CDA is above all a methodology (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). It does not only comprise methods of data collection and analysis but integrates them with a set of *ontological assumptions* concerning the societal effects of language. These assumptions range from the highly charged, “to explain existing conventions as the outcome of power relations and power struggle” (Fairclough 1989, p.2), to the highly politicised, “[explaining] the role of elites in the reproduction of ethnic dominance” (van Djik 1993, ix), depending on the stance of the CDA scholar. However, the general consensus is that CDA contains two essential philosophical elements:
• A belief in the ‘oppressors-oppressed’ dichotomy: that society is fundamentally divided between dominant elites and marginalized groups or identities; and
• A specific interest in how language conditions these asymmetries in power.

More explicit definitions of CDA all emphasise the relationship between language (text, discourse) and power (social, inequality, dominance).

Since a large part of its claim to legitimacy rests on these assertions, CDA specialists have rarely been slow to defend their own political standpoint, their own belief that research must be “critical”. In Fairclough’s words, “critical implies showing connections and causes that are hidden” (1992, p.9), which means decoding the operations of ideology.

Methodologically, CDA owes much to the work of British linguist Michael Halliday and his systemic functional linguistic (SFL) model. The general structure used in CDA is thus consistent with Halliday’s three-level framework. According to SFL, language operates on

• an ideational level (construction and representation of experience in the world);
• a relational level (enactment of social relations); and
• a textual level (production of texts).

Using SFL as a starting point, CDA scholars see language as a key battleground, since social reality is constructed by language and language is at the heart of social relations, to such an extent that “the social is built into the grammatical tissue of language” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, p.140). Thus, by focusing on the semantic and/or syntactical features of a text (passives, nominalisations), it is possible to reach certain conclusions about the ideology of the text – with supposed ‘truths’ defined in the interests of the powerful (indeed, control of language is power).

Two points should be made here. First, CDA’s scholarly edifice is heavily conditioned by political bias, rather than scientific criteria, which might be thought to take on a secondary role. This has led some critics to accuse CDA of operating somewhat haphazardly, moved by personal whim rather than a well-
grounded analytical framework (Widdowson 1998; Rogers et al. 2005). As a result, CDA scholars may routinely (and purposefully) engage in confirmation bias, interpreting the data in any way s/he chooses for some political purpose. As Michael Stubbs (1997, p.7) points out, “there is very little discussion of whether it is adequate to restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and whether the sample is representative”. In other words, there is a danger in CDA that fragments of text can be presented as representative, without any explanation as to how relevant recording units are distinguished for inclusion in, or exclusion from, an analysis. Indeed, when some CDA samples are closely examined, it turns out that much of the analysis hinges on a just few words – such as the word “enterprise” in Norman Fairclough’s 1995 article on neoliberalism (Verschueren 2001).

Second, the fact that CDA’s adherents treat language as a repository of ‘oppressive power’ does not absolve from the need for epistemic humility in their research. Unfortunately, in various types of CDA framework, it is common for writers to try to circumvent serious epistemological difficulties by taking an explicitly moralistic stance vis-à-vis the subject matter. This is particularly common in CDA approaches to migration where the usual justification given is that a critical perspective is needed to redress “racism”. Accordingly, CDA scholars may engage in disconfirmation bias when they leave out important aspects of the text that do not fit with the interpretive framework. A review of the work of Norman Fairclough, for example, led Jef Verschueren (2001, p.65) to conclude that many of the supposed findings are “the product of conviction rather than the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own observations and conclusions”.
2.1.2 Morphological theory

A second, more evaluative, approach to the interpretation of ideology is Michael Freedén’s morphological analysis. Freedén (1996; 2003; 2013) has put immense erudition at the service of political scholars looking for a roadmap to help them navigate the semantic fields of ideology. Unlike many conventional treatments of political thinking, however, Freedén has rejected what he terms the ‘one-size-fits-all’ definition of ideologies, which sees the latter as static belief systems, and instead bases his approach on a ‘bottom-up’ analysis. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by Freedén (2003, ch.6) in Ideology: A Very Short Introduction:

“Ideologies are rarely formulated by political parties. The function of parties in relation to ideologies is to present them in immediately consumable form and to disseminate them with optimal efficiency. Parties operate at the mass production end of the long ideological production line. Ideologies emerge among groups within a party or outside of it. Those groups may consist of intellectuals or skilled rhetoricians, who themselves are frequently articulating more popular or inchoate beliefs or, conversely, watering down complex philosophical positions.”

From this standpoint, each ideology may be seen as having both ‘core’ concepts (that is, those of the highest importance, e.g. the principle of organic unity in Conservatism or dialectical materialism in Marxism) and ‘peripheral’ concepts (that is, those of secondary importance, e.g. civil associationism in Conservatism or commodity fetishism in Marxism). Some ideologies are ‘thin-centered’ – that is, the core addresses only part of the political agenda: for instance, it may have no opinion on what the best distributional or constitutional system is. Other ideologies, however, are ‘thick-centered’ (comprehensive). According to Freedén (2013), ideologies are to be distinguished not by the presence or absence of a concept, but by the proximity, permeability, proportionality and priority attributed to several concepts within an ideological core:
• **Proximity** draws attention to “the interrelationship of the conceptual meanings that ideologies contain”.

• **Permeability** identifies “the intersecting of ideological positions, indicating that ideologies are by no means mutually exclusive in their substantive stances, nor are they separated by clear ideational boundaries”.

• **Proportionality** refers to “the relative weight that the conceptual components of an ideology possess”; and

• **Priority**, accorded to core over adjacent and adjacent over peripheral concepts, “emphasizes the major political role of ideologies as ranking devices for socially valued or urgent goods” (quoted from Freeden 2015, p.21)

By studying the morphological evolution of ideologies, Freeden observes that the relative political success of an ideology depends on its ability to normalise conceptual components as ‘obvious’ and ‘self-evident’ without the accompanying need for evidence or argumentation. This, in turn, gives rise to a form of discursive depoliticisation, in which each ideology performs a continuous “decontestation” of its concepts – that is, it tries to eliminate any and all possible counter-narratives, thereby rejecting competing definitions. Concepts may gain or lose importance over time, just as new concepts may emerge or fall out of use entirely.

What are we to make of Freeden’s analysis? On the face of it, Freeden provides an immensely illuminating analysis of ideological thinking, redefining the field of ideological studies as it presently stands. In the interest of pressing my critique, however, I am going to resort to stipulation: In the author’s view, the claims being made by Freeden on the basis of such analyses are not testable, because the analysis is often simply impressionistic, and because the sample of texts is small. Freeden provides no quantitative evidence for his morphological analysis, and particularly, no quantitative diachronic evidence that the degree of permeability/priority has changed over time. In fact, although Freeden’s concepts have initiated fruitful lines of research, the methods he uses to obtain his data are not explained, and his findings are not set out in such a way that anyone else
could refute them. He tends to proceed by accretion rather than classification, taking the reader down many historical byways. However fascinating some of those byways may be in themselves, they do not always yield a quantifiable view of the investigated ideology.

2.1.3 Quantitative content analysis

It should be made clear at the outset that this thesis takes the viewpoint that morphological and other interpretivist methods that are empirical are typically extremely useful. They are capable of providing a highly valid source of ‘deep’ information about a text. Such an analysis may illuminate the semantic fields of a speech, or it may allow us to view the speech through the lens of power by examining whose interests it serves.

Having said this, the goal of my thesis is to produce quantifiable categories, and measurements of the amounts of other variables. In either case, this is a diachronic analysis. Although some authors maintain that a nonquantitative content analysis is preferable, I will undertake a different approach: the quantitative content analysis (QCA). Put simply, QCA is a research method that classifies textual material, reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of information. This process involves the classification of parts of a text through the application of a structured, step-by-step process from which conclusions can be drawn about the semantic fields of the text. This process involves:

- Sampling
- Unitization
- Coding/recording of data

1) Sampling is the selection of useful data-points from within a larger data set. A political speech, for example, may serve as a sample. Whereas ordinary listeners may well respond to the speech as a performative act, being impressed or unimpressed by the speaker’s oratory, political analysts may see the speech as addressing several distinct public policy issues. Scholars may thus divide the
speech into different parts and, ignoring the rhetorical techniques and rituals, probe how these public policy issues are defined, what solutions the politician offers.

2) **Unitization.** To adequately reflect the purpose of the research, the analyst must then define the basic units of observation. For example, in the operation of counting, the units that are counted must be distinct – conceptually or logically – otherwise the numerical outcome will not make sense. Thus we can count dollars or sterling but not water; we can count words or sentences, but not cadence. This creates a multiplicity of information-bearing instances that readies the researcher for subsequent analysis.

3) **Coding/recording of data.** A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text can be classified into much fewer content categories. Depending on the purposes of the investigator, this generalization may be based on the precise structure of the text (such as grouping together similar plot-lines), or may be based on texts sharing similar ideological connotations. Consequently, a central idea in QCA is that the units of analysis can be classified into much fewer content categories.

Empirical inquiries into the meanings of mass communication date back to newspaper analyses in the late 1800s, when Speed (1893) found the printing of newspapers had dropped their coverage of religious, scientific and literary matters in favor of gossip, sports and scandals. Such inquiries have since mushroomed, moving into numerous areas and becoming the backbone of social scientific research (see Krippendorff 2018, pp.10-17). Here, the advantages of QCA are twofold: (i) First, it allows for longitudinal studies using archived material that may outlive the communicators or the events described in text/speeches (Riffe et al. 2014, p.29). Armed with a robust and exhaustive coding framework, the analyst can draw conclusions from content evidence without having to gain access to politicians who may be unwilling or unable to be examined directly. (ii) Second, QCA is a scientific approach to ideological analysis, that is to say, it is theoretically deductive, tests hypotheses, is cognisant of reliability and falsification, and embraces quantitative methods. In this respect,
QCA remains faithful to the professional concerns of scholars in identifying ideas as a fundamental unit of quantitative analysis, and consequently analysing ideologies as particular combinations of ideas, whose saliency is not always immediately transparent but decipherable through a systematic coding scheme.

2.2 Data Collection

With these basic introductory issues in place, section 2.2 provides a more explicit and detailed account of the kind of text classification described in section 2.1.

2.2.1 Sampling

As the above suggests, almost all content analyses will need to determine the data sample most relevant for achieving its research goals.22 Most QCAs sample large texts: books, speeches, video recordings, transcripts of interviews, streams of messages or websites.

Among the most widely used sources for enumerating text in a British parliamentary context is The Hansard – a substantially verbatim report of what is said in Parliament. MPs’ words are recorded, and then edited to remove repetitions and obvious mistakes, albeit without taking away from the meaning of what is said.23 These transcripts can be conceived of as ‘finite continua’ (Krippendorff 2018, p. 337), and will be utilized as my primary information resource.

The timeframe for this analysis will begin with to the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 1961 and will cover more than five decades of parliamentary debate up until 2015 (see below). Due to time constraints, only raw

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22 Many institutions keep accounts of texts in various forms, including library catalogs; books in print; professional guides to scholarly journals; records of legal transactions; variously kept logs, diaries, chronicles, histories and almanacs.

23 Hansard also reports on proceedings in the Commons Chamber and Westminster Hall, as well as written ministerial statements, petitions and ministerial corrections, with separate reports produced of proceedings in Commons General and Public Bill Committees.
data will be included for the 2015 Immigration Bill (see APPENDIX A for the full data set).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Transcript word count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill;</td>
<td>46,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 Immigration Bill</td>
<td>46,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 British Nationality Bill</td>
<td>62,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Asylum and Immigration Bill</td>
<td>53,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill</td>
<td>51,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill</td>
<td>47,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Immigration Bill</td>
<td>46,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>354,015</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though this is an artificial boundary to draw, a case study protocol has been adopted to keep the research within manageable bounds. The thesis cannot possibly engage with the totality of debates surrounding immigration, asylum and nationality law – any serious attempt to engage in dialogue with even a small proportion of it would result in a hopeless morass of footnotes. For this reason, I have also excluded other arenas for examining government policy, such as all-party groups, backbench committees, written and oral questions, political campaigns and press releases.

To ensure proper coverage, the case studies have been selected using a critical case sample (CCS). This is a method where a small number of cases are selected and then examined – cases that are likely to “yield the most information and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge” (Patton 2001, p.236). To identify ‘critical cases’, I have consulted Kevin Browne’s (2015) *Immigration Law CLP Legal Practice Guide* and Margaret Phelan and James Gillespie’s (2015) *Immigration Law Handbook*. In using this form of sampling, I
follow a conceptual hierarchy, systematically lowering the number of Bills that are needed to be considered for analysis.\footnote{As a sampling technique, CCS has gained in popularity with the increasing use of very large electronic text databases and the Internet, where irrelevant texts are vast in number. The resulting case studies are not meant to be representative of a population of texts; rather, they are the population of relevant texts.}

2.2.2. Unitization (tier i): policy narrative

After an analyst decides on a sampling plan, the question that naturally follows concerns the unit of analysis – what or whom is studied. For example, what type of unit is needed to examine, say, ideological bias in the popular press? Do we examine words, tropes, themes, or frames?

However put, this is a rather significant question and one whose answer may determine, to a considerable extent, the content of the analysis we are likely to engage in and, indeed, what we regard as an adequate explanation. Following Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes in Interpreting British Governance (2003) and Governance Stories (2006), I have chosen the policy narrative as the unit of analysis.

This approach starts with the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp how relevant meanings, beliefs, and preferences are ‘narrativised’. To explain political choices, therefore, we must identify the latticework of stories that led to a particular action; and to understand an institution and its processes, we must understand the narratives that inform those beliefs and practices. Bevir and Rhodes (2003; 2006) summarise this approach as ‘situated agency’.

The importance of interpreting governance by examining a diverse set of narratives about authority and power, which are constructed differently in contending traditions, is underscored by the following socio-psychological research:
i. **Information processing.** First, narrative cognition is the primary means by which human beings organise, process, and convey *information* (Gerrig and Egidi 2003; Klein, 2003; Berinsky and Kinder 2006). One can crosscheck facts and ideas more readily, and the ‘facts’ are a lot easier to remember if they function as elements of a story rather than disconnected pieces of data (Troiani et al. 2006).

ii. **Self-identity.** Second, narrative cognition is fundamental to the maintenance of *self-identity* and autobiographical memory (Walker 2012). Neuroscience research has approximated the neural network in the human brain responsible for narrative cognition (Troiani et al. 2006) and determined that brain injuries resulting in the loss of narration are more severe than the loss of other cognitive functions such as linguistic, mathematical and kinesthetic functions (Young and Saver 2001).

iii. **Collective action.** Third, stories play an important role for groups of individuals and the collective actions in which these groups engage, such as those present in the design and implementation of public policy (Tetlock 2005; Schneider and Ingram 1988). This is consistent with Thomas Theorem, which states that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, p.572).

Seen through this sociolinguistic and cognitive lens, narrative has both an internal and external face. On the one hand, narrative serves as the primary ‘exogenous’ (external) device for undertaking collective tasks within and between social groups and networks. On the other, it serves as the primary ‘endogenous’ (internal) device for organising thoughts, memories and other cognitions.
2.2.3. Unitization (tier ii): micro-components

Proceeding from the policy narrative (PN) as a fundamental unit of political analysis, an important question arises: how does one distinguish between a policy narrative and other linguistic structures such as lists, chronologies, questions, frames, descriptions, memes and so on?

Here, my focus shifts to the boundaries between narrative and non-narrative forms of communication. Although Hansard, being ultimately composed of speeches/interventions/oral questions, would seem to be naturally unitizable, the unitizing of text is potentially problematic. These difficulties emerge in the process of interpretation and thus implicate the experience of the analyst as a competent reader: e.g., the act of interpretation depends on the analyst’s ability to see meaningful conceptual breaks in the continuity of his or her reading experiences.

Among the most important guides in this inquiry is the work of Michael D. Jones, Mark K. McBeth and Elizabeth A Shanahan. Together, these scholars have furnished a new empirical framework known as The Narrative Policy Framework (abbreviated NPF\(^{25}\)). The NPF began to develop its ideas in the late 2000s, in a series of publications which initially set out to bring many interpretivist\(^{26}\) accounts of narrative into a more positivist framework capable of testing hypotheses.\(^{27}\) At its most basic level, the NPF is an attempt to apply objective methodological approaches to the generalisable structural elements of a

\(^{25}\) The term NPF appears to have first been used by Jones and McBeth (2010) in an article published for the Policy Studies Journal, and was then popularised in Paul Sabatier and Christopher Weible’s (2014) influential Theories of The Policy Process (3rd volume).

\(^{26}\) Narrative theorizing was pioneered by scholars such as Emery Roe (1994), Deborah Stone (1989), Frank Fischer and J Forrester (1993), and Maarten Hajer (1995). However, this brand of narrative scholarship – termed in the policy field “interpretivist” – is highly descriptive and impressionistic. It generally rejects scientific standards of hypothesis testing and falsifiability, and thus lacking the clarity to be replicated and allow for generalization.

\(^{27}\) “Public Opinion for Sale”, by McBeth and Shanahan (2004), and “The Science of Storytelling: Measuring Policy Beliefs in Greater Yellowstone”, by McBeth et al. (2005), were important works which laid many of the foundations for NPF without using the term itself.
narrative. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will adopt the basic NPF typology of

- Setting
- Plot
- Characters
- Moral

Together, these structural elements will allow the coder to identify meaningful conceptual breaks in the Hansard – thus identifying a policy narrative from other linguistic structures such as oral questions, epideictic rhetoric and legal-political analysis:

(i) **Setting** is the context of a narrative in which a local/national/transnational problem or issue resides. It consists of the low-contestation ‘facts’ that are generally agreed upon by actors in the policy arena, various forms of evidence and indicators, unquestioned legal parameters, geographic and environmental characteristics, demographics and any other policy consequential element that most parties agree on (Ney and Thompson 2000; Ney 2006; Verweij and Thompson 2006; Verweij et al. 2006; Shanahan et al. 2008; 2013; Jones 2013).

(ii) **Plot** introduces a temporal element (beginning, middle and end), providing both the relationships between the setting and characters, and structuring causal mechanisms (Roe 1994; Stone 2002; McBeth et al. 2005). The plot often contains causal relations such as “x happened because of y” or “if we do/don’t do y, then x will happen.”

To add drama, some plots may contain a doomsday scenario showing just how bad things can get if one does not choose a certain policy solution.

(iii) **Characters.** To date, the NPF defines three general categories of socially constructed characters: fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the

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28 Of particular interest to NPF scholars is Debra Stone’s work on political reasoning and storytelling: Stone’s (2012, pp.159-168) typology includes the ‘story of decline’, the ‘story of stymied progress’, and the ‘story of helplessness-and-control’.
problem (villains), and those harmed by the problem (victims) (Stone 2002; McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Jones 2013). A characters in a story will consist of individual actors, but they can also consist of anthromorphised abstractions such as “the 1%”, “the Military-Industrial Complex”, or “the silent majority”.

(iv) Moral is the takeaway of a narrative and often refers to the ethical aspects of a policy solution (Ney 2006; Ney and Thompson, 2000; Stone, 2002; Verweij and Thompson 2006; Verweij et al., 2006). For example, a policy narrative about the destructiveness of global warming might offer the introduction of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a strategy for cutting emissions. In other cases, the moral of the story is quite simply to maintain the status quo. The goals of such policy narratives might include focusing on, say, the uncertainty of a piece of evidence or the specification a problem to which a solution is needed (Jones et al. 2005).

2.2.4. Unitization (tier iii): metadata applications

Another application of QCA is the common method of coding metadata. The prefix ‘meta’, for example, means “beyond” and is used here to denote a concept which is an abstraction behind another concept – a story about a story, encompassing and explaining all the smaller segments (see Neuendorf 2002, p.82).

Applied to the study of narrative, metadata analysis is possible with the coding of ‘metanarrative’ – a concept first brought into prominence by French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. According to Lyotard (1984), every enduring community, including those formed in the zeal of a revolutionary spirit, must meta-narrativise its life to preserve its initial foundations; to guard against corruption; to define the structure of the state, the role of leadership, and the scope of freedom. Such grand narratives are not only descriptions of ‘things’ but also expressions of the determination to act: they are capable of inspiring mass political movements. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised
by French President Emmanuel Macron, during a recent interview for *Der Spiegel*:

“I am a strong believer that modern political life must rediscover a sense for symbolism. We need to develop a kind of political heroism. I don't mean that I want to play the hero. But we need to be amenable once again to creating grand narratives. If you like, post-modernism was the worst thing that could have happened to our democracy. The idea that you have to deconstruct and destroy all grand narratives is not a good one. Since then, trust has evaporated in everything and everyone. I am sometimes surprised that it is the media that are the first ones to exhibit a lack of trust in grand narratives. They believe that destroying something is part of their journalistic purpose because something grand must inevitably contain an element of evil. Critique is necessary, but where does this hate for the so-called grand narrative come from?” (quoted from Brinkbaumer 2017)

In this context, metanarrative is a ‘grand’ story that functions to legitimise power, authority and social customs. Notable historical examples of include: the doctrine of the Holy Trinity (Christianity), penal substitutionary atonement (Calvinism), the divine right of Kings (monarchism), free market capitalism (classical liberalism), emancipation of self-conscious spirit through history (Hegelianism), and, linked to this, liberating revolutionary praxis (Marxism) (see Eagleton 1996). Against this background, an ideology can be defined as “a patterned cluster of metanarratives”. In epistemological terms, metanarrative is the preferred heuristic employed by all for the purpose of making sense of the world.

This, however, raises a question of considerable importance: how will the coder recognise the metanarrative when he or she sees it? Categorising whether a legislator is discussing, say, a specific immigration problem (e.g., migration’s downward pressure on wages) or commenting on some more general political topic (e.g., the lack of enforcement of the minimum wage) may require more complex judgment and thereby affect coder reliability. Provision must be made,
therefore, for a sufficiently comprehensive coding framework, accounting for all the meta (M) and policy narrative (PN) units.

2.2.5. Coding of data

Sceptics have often accused QCA practitioners of doing “nothing more than what everyone does when reading a newspaper, except on a larger scale” (quoted from Krippendorff 2018, p.1). Content analysis may have been that way in its early, journalistic stage, and its methodology does not rule out such misapplications, but this narrow definition is no longer sufficient today. Regardless of whether the text is coded by humans or by computers, all QCAs develop a coding framework that assesses the degree of attention devoted to certain words, phrases, themes or categories.

In this respect, QCA is consistent with the nomothetic approach to scientific investigation (i.e., seeking to generate generalisable conclusions), rather than the idiographic approach (i.e., focusing on a full and precise conclusion about a particular case). As described in sections 2.2.1-4, ideologies possess a generalisable structure: there is a three-tier distinction between individual policy narratives (the middle tier), their micro-components (setting, plot, characters, moral) and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the metanarrative). Using a combination of snowball sampling and document analysis, the following metanarratives were identified as being active in the debate on migration policy in Europe and thus constitute the thesis’ coding framework:

- Moral cosmopolitanism
- Internationalism
- Market globalism
- Economic patriotism
- Cultural protectionism
- Security
- Public administration.
The purpose of the above classification system is didactic rather than dogmatic: no one ideology is a slave to any single set of metanarratives. As described in Tables 8-10 (see below), globalism, populism and managerialism contain a number of metanarratives that may be accorded different proportional weight in each particular manifestation. Occasionally, distinct metanarrative formations are carved out of an area that straddles two already existing ideologies. In other cases, a full ideological family may act as host to a less developed one. At any rate, ideologies are very rarely defined by the presence or absence of concepts, but rather by clusters of associated features which have a greater tendency to co-occur (Freeden 1996; 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. GLOBALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metanarrative (M)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a): Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b): Internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c): Market globalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g): Public administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

Recent examples include: “progressive Conservatism” (David Cameron), “One Nation Labour” (Ed Miliband) and “British jobs for British workers” (Gordon Brown). In this respect, the aforementioned classification system is a ‘fuzzy set’, not a Platonic essence. It distances itself from more absolutist accounts of ideological distinctiveness (e.g., the notion of clear/fixed boundaries among ideologies).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metanarrative (M)</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Policy narratives (PN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a): Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>“We need to say all the time that immigrants make a substantial contribution to this country – and not simply in economic terms. We will always cherish both our responsibilities and our record on being party to the 1951 convention and our treatment of refugees.” – Tony McNulty</td>
<td>• Racial equality&lt;br&gt;• Human development (soft interpretation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Market globalism</td>
<td>“Managed migration allows those throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people.” – David Blunkett</td>
<td>• Skilled migration&lt;br&gt;• Unskilled migration&lt;br&gt;• Ethnic innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Economic patriotism</td>
<td>“Some of the most rapid changes have been felt in the poorest areas and former industrial areas away from the big urban centres. In my constituency, immigration has had an impact on job security, wages, access to housing and public services, but Parliament has been far too slow to acknowledge and act on those concerns.” – Andy Burnham</td>
<td>• Impact on public services and housing (soft interpretation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Public administration</td>
<td>“The Immigration Act 2014 put the law firmly on the side of those who respect it, not of those who break it. We made it easier and faster to remove those with no right to be here, streamlined the appeals process in order to curb abuse, and restricted access to bank accounts and rental properties for people here illegally.” – Theresa May</td>
<td>• Efficiency in administration&lt;br&gt;• Rationalisation of law&lt;br&gt;• Law enforcement&lt;br&gt;• Legislative scrutiny&lt;br&gt;• Forecasting of immigration flows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10. NATIONAL POPULISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metanarrative (M)</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Policy narratives (PN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (d): Economic patriotism  | “[A] country that protects itself from migratory invasions is much better equipped, eventually, in the globalized economy. Homogeneity, not wild heterogeneity, is a strength.” – Guillaume Faye | • Job displacement  
• Wage compression  
• Impact on public services and housing  
• Impact on public spending  
• Transaction costs  
• Opportunity costs |
| (e): Cultural protectionism | “The immigrationist religion is an insult for human beings, whose integrity is always bound to one national community, one language, one culture.” – Marine Le Pen | • Preservation of language  
• Preservation of social norms  
• Spatial management  
• Racial self-interest |
| (f) Security               | “I think perhaps one of the reasons the polls show an increasing level of concern is because people do see a fifth column living within our country, who hate us and want to kill us.” – Nigel Farage | • National unity  
• Immigrant crime  
• Terrorism  
• Public health  
• Assimilation |
| (g) Public administration  | “Malta takes in nobody. France pushes people back at the border, Spain defends its frontier with weapons. From today, Italy will also start to say no to human trafficking, no to the business of illegal immigration.” – Matteo Salvini | • Efficiency in administration  
• Rationalisation of law  
• Law enforcement |

Source: author

To summarise Tables 8-10 briefly: ideologies do not necessarily contain mutually exclusive metanarratives; what differentiates one ideology from another is the relative weight and significance assigned to common metanarrative families. In some of their notable variants, globalism and managerialism have shared components historically (a commitment to human rights and the globalised economy), as have managerialism and national populism (economic patriotism) or, for that matter, as have globalism, managerialism, and national populism (the relative importance of efficiency in public administration). On the other hand, average statistical differences do exist; and the search for these differences is a
valid aim of the social sciences. The purpose of the above classification system, therefore, to create *heuristic order* without which meaning cannot be bestowed on, or extracted from, the raw material of speaking and acting.

### 2.2.6. Sample coding form

In common with much of the bibliography on QCA, one can legitimately ask: *what does this coding look like in practice?* For the purposes of illustration, Table 11 provides a brief sample of such an analysis focusing on the concepts of ‘policy narrative’, ‘metanarrative’, ‘setting’, ‘plot’, ‘characters’ and ‘moral’ as analytical tools. The coding form consists of speeches from the 1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill (Hansard, 16 November 1961). A good reason for choosing recording units that are significantly smaller than the sampling unit (Hansard) is that sampling units are often too rich or too complex to be described reliably.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metanarrative (M)</td>
<td>Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy narrative (PN)</td>
<td>PN3: Human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>European imperialism imposed a long period of social, political and economic domination by whites over peoples of other races.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>Britain has benefited greatly from Commonwealth immigration and has profited vastly from its connections with the Colonial territories, which it exploited economically for more than 200 years. We cannot cut off our links and dismiss our responsibilities in a purely selfish way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Commonwealth citizens (narrative victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>The Government need to recognise that we have responsibilities for people overseas and that this is a multiracial society. Without that recognition, the Bill will remain unacceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>C. Davies (Lib) c.728-34; Royle (Lab) c.746-50; Fisher (Con) c.784-85; Gaitskell (Lab) c.800-01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961*
2.2.7. Inter-coder reliability

To be clear, this form of coding is labour-intensive, but also leads to much more detailed and sophisticated comparisons (Krippendorf 2018). Once assembled, the recording units (M/PN) will be presented in line graph form\textsuperscript{30}, with the x-axis representing the measure of time, and the y-axis representing the percentage of M/PN. In this way, the thesis can provide a visual representation of how the immigration debate has evolved over time.

At this point, however, it is important to deal with a potential flaw in the QCA – namely, that the assembling of data involves selection, and this brings with it, even at the numeric level, an element of subjectivity. Arguments about the trustworthiness of the social scientific method seem to depend on the trustworthiness of objective human reason – a conviction that, by proceeding cautiously, we are capable of knowing the world in which we ‘find’ ourselves.

Unfortunately, this idealised view of human rationality has been thoroughly rejected in the vast collection of studies on the psychology of decision-making (Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan et al. 2007), as well as in studies of organisational action and change (Jones 2001). Put simply, the ‘facts’ of experience do not present themselves to us in a direct and unmediated fashion: all information from the real world is interpreted though a grid of stories, memories, expectations and cognitive biases. For example, researchers may engage in confirmation bias when they treat congruent evidence as being more ‘plausible’ than incongruent evidence, while processing congruent stimuli quicker than incongruent stimuli (Lodge and Taber 2005). Similarly, researchers may engage in disconfirmation bias when evidence that is incongruent with their priors is counter-argued and/or takes longer to process than congruent evidence (Lodge and Taber 2005).

\textsuperscript{30} Unlike a comparable ‘grouped bar graph’, multiple line graphs have space-saving characteristics, since the data values are identified by small marks (points); these marks can both be colour-coded and shape-coded with symbols.
To guard against both of these biases, the author has conducted a reliability assessment with an academic colleague, Dr Magdalena Nasieniak, at the University of Bath. In this assessment, the degree of reliability that applies to each individual PN/metanarrative was reported with a reliability coefficient – or what is commonly known as Holsti’s coefficient. This is a summary statistic for how often the coders agree with one another on the classification of content units. The formula is

\[ PA_o = \frac{2A}{N_1+N_2} \]

where \( PA_o \) represents percentage of agreement between two coders, \( A \) is the number of two coders’ consensus decisions, and \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) are numbers of decisions coders have made respectively.

Readers who must make decisions concerning whether or not to trust the findings of this thesis will find the coding instructions (see below) useful as they need to weigh the quality of findings and make informed recommendations for improvements. Dr Nasieniak was thoroughly trained on this codebook, and adjustments were made in the coding scheme before final coding commenced.

### 2.3 Coding instructions

Using a combination of snowball sampling and document analysis, the following metanarratives were identified as being active in the debate on migration policy in Europe and thus constitute the thesis’ coding framework:

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31 Dr Nasieniak’s primary academic research is in the work of the European Council and the role of the Council President. She was thoroughly trained on the codebook, and adjustments were made in the coding scheme before final coding commenced.

32 Compared to percentage agreement \( PA_o = \frac{A}{n} \), Holsti’s method (1969) is applicable to situations in which two coders code different units of the sample.
2.3.1 MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM

The most basic definition of MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is provided by late political philosopher Brian Barry (2001), who breaks it down into three constituent elements:

- that individual human beings have (ultimate) value;
- that each human being has equal moral value; and
- that the first two clauses apply to all human beings.

In most past and present societies, foreigners were routinely considered to be moral outsiders: they could not be full members of the national community (Carr 2012 p.16). Over the past couple of centuries, however, we have seen a dramatic reversal of this rule. Nineteenth century Britain was well known for accepting political dissidents such as Karl Marx and Giuseppe Mazzini; and larger groups of refugees have also been accepted at different times: Huguenots in the 17th century, Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 19th century, and then again in the 1930s from Germany. As a result, Western European morality has moved some distance away from particularist idea of the ethno-national state and towards the universalist idea of a cosmopolitan society (Bowser 1995).

The significance of this can best be appreciated by seeing what MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM entails, when expressed as a policy narrative (PN). For example, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is consistent with a policy of social justice that tells us to not weigh the value of migrants differently according to features such as race or gender. It is also consistent with a doctrine of human development that tells us simply that the preferences of the host population are of little consequence as long as there are global economic and social gains from migration. Thirdly, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is consistent with the idea of the ‘rule of law’. According to this doctrine, immigrants’ applications should be judged by objective legal standards, not the arbitrary decisions of government officials. With these basic introductory issues in place, the specific PNs can be stated:
PN 1) RACIAL EQUALITY. Human history is filled with examples in which certain categories of migrant have been excluded from the moral community because they were seen as racially ‘unfit’. From a MORAL COSMOPOLITAN perspective, however, it is both unjust and immoral to weigh the value of migrants differently according to racial characteristics (e.g., the morphological markers of a phenotype such as skin colour).

PN 2) GENDER EQUALITY. In addition to race, the principle of equality applies *mutatis mutandis* to other features of human diversity such as gender. In contemporary migration politics, the influence of sexism can be seen in immigration rules which still treat men as the ‘principal’ agents and women as mere ‘dependents’ (Castles et al. 2014, p.61).

PN 3) HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. Another key issue for MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is whether immigration facilitates global human development. Moving to a richer/safer country may be the only way for an individual to escape poverty\(^\text{33}\), to avoid persecution, or to obtain necessary medical care\(^\text{34}\). As economist Greg Mankiw (2006) puts it, “[socioeconomic systems] often fail to provide people the ability to adequately insure themselves against the vicissitudes of life and accidents of birth.” The argument being made here is *not* that immigration will lead to perfectly equal outcomes, or even that perfectly equal outcomes are desirable. Rather, the PN3 case for freedom of movement rectifies a ‘morally problematic’ *inequality of opportunity* based on birthplace.

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\(^{33}\) According to Ruhs (2013), economic migrants from low-income countries can reap huge material benefits from employment in higher-income countries, even after all the initial costs have been deducted. For example, the increase in migrants’ net earnings will often lead to increases in the economic welfare of migrants’ families, either directly (if they are with the migrant in the host country) or indirectly (via remittances).

\(^{34}\) Based on an in-depth analysis of the impact of migration on human development, in 2009 the Human Development Report concluded “[…] outcomes in all aspects human development, not only income but also education and health, are for the most part positive – some immensely so, with people from the poorest places gaining the most” (quoted from Ruhs 2013).
PN 4) **INTEGRATION.** Once an immigrant community is settled, MORAL COSMOPOLITANS will often extol policies to promote economic mobility among migrant communities and social inclusion for their children. Accordingly, **INTEGRATION** touches upon the institutions and mechanisms that promote development and growth within society, including early childhood care, workforce development, and provision of government services to communities with linguistic diversity (Castles et al. 2014 p.269). From this perspective, migrants from poorer, less-developed countries can reasonably demand that taxpayers in richer, less-developed countries share in bearing the costs of accommodation.

PN 5) **RULE OF LAW.** Another feature of MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is the way in which migrants (economic or otherwise) are treated by the authorities. According to PN5, immigrants’ applications should be judged by objective legal standards rather than the arbitrary decisions of government officials. Typically, these objective legal standards include the right of appeal when an application is rejected; or, more generally, a right to seek asylum from a dangerous regime or militia. In particular, the idea of universal “human rights” has become central, and among these rights is the “the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries” (1951 UN Refugee Convention).

PN 6) **MULTICULTURALISM.** Finally, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM may sometimes move in a more radical direction, seeking not only to extirpate racial prejudice and the arbitrary abuse of state power but also to make Britain more “open”, “tolerant” and “diverse”. As David Goodhart (2013) and others have pointed out in the case of Britain, immigrants were often encouraged to retain the culture of their home country, even occasionally encouraged to keep their language.

MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, as the author describes it here, is a metanarrative about global values, or about what is sometimes called ‘the humanitarian imperative.’ It says that the fate of human beings everywhere should in some sense count equally with us. Politically, this requires that we should establish
norms, institutions, and welfare systems that provide people everywhere with equal amounts of access – to resources, culture and opportunity.

2.3.2 INTERNATIONALISM

In addition to MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, globalism in post-war Britain is also the product of an interlocking relationship between the feudal basis of British nationality and the post-war experience of decolonization. According to political commentator Ben Sixsmith (2017):

“Imperialism helped to make us cosmopolitan. Most obviously, it exposed us to different cultures. We absorbed them into our cuisine, our literature, our cinema and, above all, our history. Our shared experiences with Commonwealth troops in World War II is the most prominent example of our experiences being stitched together with those of other peoples. Countries to the East have fewer such memories.”

The history of Empire determined in many important ways the attitude of the political elite to the non-white denizens of the New Commonwealth. As Hansen (2000, p.17) put it, “Migration controls were… checked by a temporal inter-section of ideology and power: the attachment of the Conservative Party to the Old Commonwealth mapped on to selective Cabinet-level opposition to racist migration control.” Indeed, many of the hesitations ascribed to British governments in curbing freedom of movement have been attributed to INTERNATIONALISM. Both Randall Hansen (2000) and Frank Furedi (1998) have chosen to stress this geopolitical context; the latter arguing that border controls, particularly if seen to be racist, would have threatened Britain's status as the “mother country”.

In the face of these geopolitical challenges, post-war Britain came under intense pressure from foreign leaders (especially from Indian Prime Ministers Nehru and Menon) to tackle racial discrimination – and British diplomats, in turn, wanted to secure the loyalty of these newly independent countries. What this meant, above all, is that the impact of post-colonial migration could be not be
considered solely as a domestic matter, especially if the British government was to depend on more than symbolic gestures to maintain Her alliances. Conservative ministers during the 1950s, such as Home Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe and Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, asserted that freedom of movement was essential for the maintenance Britain’s ‘soft power’, and that small amounts of colonial migration were part of the great tradition of *Civis Britannicus sum* (‘I am a British citizen’):

**SOFT POWER.** The vast global Empire which Britain accumulated over 200 years was sustained not only by British technological superiority and military power, especially sea power; it also rested on a ‘softer’ cultural power (Layton-Henry 1984). A whole class of soldiers, administrators and officials encouraged beliefs in the greatness of British law, language, religion and recreation while stationed abroad. Consequently, a belief existed on the part of British establishment that the UK possessed a unique obligation, as the centre of the Empire and Commonwealth, to maintain an open door for all British subjects. The result was a veto throughout the 1950s of restrictions on a Commonwealth migration.

INTERNATIONALISM provides a snapshot of what Andrew Geddes (2003, p.2) has called the “conceptual and geopolitical widening of the migration issue”. In conceptual terms, there are new types of migration and new forms of governmental response to this movement. In geopolitical terms, the impact of migration has widened from Western Europe to include newer immigration countries in South East Asia and the Asia Pacific. This explanation speaks most directly, but not exclusively, to the examples of historical ties between the former colonial powers of Western Europe (most notably Britain, France, and the Netherlands) and their respective former Colonies.

Admittedly, Britain’s geopolitical ties to and trading relationship with its former Colonies declined in favour of the European Union; and so, too, did support within the Conservative party for a relatively open immigration policy. Having said this, INTERNATIONALISM has had a profound impact on British millennials studying at UK higher education (HE) institutions. Not only does HE
provide a ‘pathway’ into transnational institutions and NGOs; it also confirms a kind of ideological bias in which INTERNATIONALISM is part-and-parcel of the student experience:

PN 8) CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL CAPITAL. Under globalization, international students embedded within an ethnic community are an important channel for ‘cross-border social capital’ – improving awareness of new technologies and passing on tacit knowledge, both within and across countries (Kerr 2008). International students may also provide ‘network externalities’ that accelerate ideas transmission as they move between their country of origin and that of their new home (Docquier and Lodigiano; Docquier and Rapoport 2012).

Against this backdrop, the international activities of universities have dramatically expanded in scope and scale. Specific initiatives such as branch campuses, cross-border collaborative arrangements, English-language programs for international students and other initiatives have put into place a process of “internationalisation” (Altbach and Knight 2007). More importantly, however, the number of foreign students in British universities has increased significantly, which means that regardless of starting point most graduates of elite universities are likely to have many overseas friends and acquaintances. As a result, British millennials studying in HE are less likely than other social groups to favour reducing immigration.

2.3.3 MARKET GLOBALISM

The globalist shift on immigration after 1945 was also facilitated by structural changes to the global economy. For many, immigration is an inevitable and irreversible consequence of globalisation; and the domestic labour market is no longer the optimal unit for organising economic activity. Manfred Steger (2002; 2005) uses the term MARKET GLOBALISM to describe this schema. It is, according to Steger, “the dominant ideology of our time” – codified and disseminated worldwide by “global power elites” that include corporate managers, state bureaucrats, academic economists, journalists and politicians. According to
Steger’s (2002; 2005) typology, market globalism has six core claims that are increasingly taken-for-granted as the true meaning of globalization. They include:

- Globalisation is about the liberalization and global integration of markets
- Globalisation is inevitable and irreversible
- Nobody is in charge of globalization
- Globalisation benefits everyone in the long run
- Globalisation furthers the spread of democracy in the world

MARKET GLOBALISM asserts that the traditional self-governing nation-state is now unnecessary because the important economic decisions are taken at the level of the multinational city. Such cities have the ability to ‘plug in’ to the global economy in order to source the necessary capital, labour and resources that they need to prosper (Glaeser 2011). In effect, such cities are economically independent of the nation-states in which they reside. As Labour MP David Lammy put it, in an article for the Evening Standard

“If Scotland can have another referendum on independence, then why can’t we have a well-overdue debate about London becoming autonomous and independent from the rest of the country? If Brexit was a victory of smalltown conservatism, resurgent nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, then London’s status as the financial and cultural capital of Europe depends on resisting these shifts” (quoted from Powell 2007)

Lammy’s assertion that the state is losing control of economic activity is backed up by a more contentious claim: that the domestic labour market has reached a point of diminishing marginal returns (Legrain 2006). On the one hand, labour can now be outsourced to countries where wages are much lower: increasing numbers of businesses in high-cost countries are looking to relocate their manufacturing plants and R&D activities into lower-cost countries (Nathan and Lee 2011). On the other hand, employers have the option of insourcing labour from outside of the UK. In certain fields such as accounting, finance, law and engineering, the number of people recruited is limited but their economic impact
may be significant. With these basic introductory issues in place, the specific PNs can be stated:

PN 9) **SKILLED MIGRATION.** At the higher end of the labour market, the skill level of successive migrant workers admitted to the UK has increased precipitously in the past two decades (Nathan 2013). The city of London in particular (with its unrivalled aggregation of related financial businesses) benefits from a large number of talented people who could not realistically have been recruited from the pool of domestic British talent (Nathan and Lee 2011). Unlike with other forms of capital, there are no diminishing returns for elite migration: The higher the cognitive ability, (and the more immigrants at higher cognitive levels), the better.

PN 10) **UNSKILLED MIGRATION.** A further common argument in favour of migration is that the native population are too ‘demanding’ when it comes to low-skill jobs and wages. This is the notion that unskilled migrants are needed to do the ‘dirty jobs’ that locals will not accept. One recent study estimates that the migrant population as a whole generated a fiscal surplus of between -0.5% and +0.2% of GDP over the period 2001-2011 (Dustmann and Frattini 2013). Additionally, unskilled migrants may possess characteristics that complement the labour of the indigenous workforce. These ‘skill complementarities’ may increase the productivity and the wages that Britons command (Dustmann et al. 2012).

PN 11) **BUSINESS EFFICIENCY.** A less obvious argument in favour of open migration is the attendant reduction of red tape. Some businesses may have to spend more money on administrative functions, particularly in relation to the checking of documentation, in order to establish that all its employees are compliant with visa regulations.

PN 12) **MULTIPLIER EFFECTS.** Government policy towards non-EU migrants is becoming more selective, making it difficult for unskilled workers to enter, but encouraging the entry of ‘star performers’ (Martin 2006; Menz 2009). This policy has been criticised by globalists, however, because it excludes the
possibility of a ‘multiplier effect’ that may arise from, for example, having a higher population density (e.g. Glaeser 2011). For example, the creation of economies of scale (which happens when cost of per-unit production declines as volume increases) can be more easily achieved within a large domestic labour market. Moreover, the multiplier effect may be even more pronounced in economically-independent cities like London because of the spatial clustering of agglomeration economies and a higher demand for new goods and services, especially in non-tradable sectors (Nathan 2011; 2013; Glaeser 2011).

PN 13) ETHNIC INNOVATION. Finally, increasing ethnic heterogeneity may provide the impetus for experimentation in industry, creativity in art and literature, achievement in sports, and innovation in cuisine (Nathan and Lee 2011). A commonly cited figure from the United States is that immigrants account for a disproportionate number of patented inventions (Chellaraj et al. 2008; Wadhwa et al. 2008). The proposition is that migrants are sufficiently different that they ‘think outside of the box’, and so accelerate the overall pace of innovation.

Such strictly economic considerations will surely continue to play a prominent role in migration politics, but they may not constitute the principal source of contention. As we shall see in section 2.3.4, a possibly even larger concern is the distributional impact of such massive immigration on the social fabric of the UK, especially when migrants possess similar competencies to native workers. For much of the twentieth century, the demand for UK labour grew faster than its supply. This, however, was reversed in the 1960’s.

2.3.4 ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM
Critics of MARKET GLOBALISM argue that the emergence globalised labour markets has damaged the economic status of the native population, and that steadily rising immigration levels may have led to permanent socioeconomic division. In the words of trade unionist Doug Nicholls (2017), chair of Trade Unionists Against the EU (TUAEU)
“No nation has ever prospered by allowing its workforce to become nomads to suit the short-term needs of others. A central right of any worker is to be able to prosper and grow in the land of his or her birth and to have meaningful, gainful and enjoyable employment. When Norman Tebbit told workers to get on their bikes, there was outrage. And yet so-called free movement is now demanded by some on the ‘left’.”

Due to the concentration of migrants in particular regions, locations and occupations in the UK, their public service and labour market impacts are likely to be concentrated in specific areas of the country. Largely, this is because these areas offer greater employment opportunities to migrants, but it can also be explained, at least in part, by the fact that immigrant diasporas act as “bridgeheads” for new arrivals (Collier 2013). The actual labour market impacts of migration are, therefore, an empirical issue and are likely to vary over space and time.

With this in mind, ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM holds that each nation should have its own sovereign government and, although this is often left implicit, that each state should put the welfare of its own citizens first and foremost, above the welfare of non-citizens. The main PNs to consider in assessing ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM include:

PN 14) JOB DISPLACEMENT. The claim that immigrants take jobs from local workers may be exaggerated, but it is not always false. In a meta-analysis Longhi et al. (2008) collated the results of 45 empirical studies on the job displacement impacts of migrant workers. On average most of these effects were fairly small but there was quite strong evidence that immigration discourages workless natives from entering or remaining in the labour market. As a broad generalisation, native workers lose from the inflow of workers who are like themselves and against whom they must compete (Rowthorn 2008).

PN 15) WAGE COMPRESSION. In addition to the impact of migration on native unemployment, there is also a downward pressure on wages at the lower end of
the labour market (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Recent studies – notably those that allow for differences between gradations of skill and expertise in the resident labour force – have found that immigration depresses pay for the lower quintile (Nickell and Saleheen 2008; Dustmann et al. 2008; Reed and Latorre 2009). As a result, immigration’s main effect has been to redistribute wealth away from low-income British citizens to the migrants themselves and to the wealthy businessmen who employ them.\textsuperscript{35}

**PN 16) IMPACT ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND HOUSING.** In terms of population size, large-scale immigration may have benefited sparsely populated countries when they needed a certain size of population to develop their resources and achieve economies of scale (Corden 2003). However, the reverse is the case in a densely populated country like Britain: current levels of migration generate diseconomies of congestion (Collier 2013) and increase the cost of land and housing (Whitehead et al. 2011). The British taxpayer will often have to bear the cost: either by providing tied housing (as the NHS does for nurses) or by hidden subsides to make houses more affordable for key workers.\textsuperscript{36}

**PN 17) IMPACT ON PUBLIC SPENDING.** Another important fiscal issue is the possible impact of immigration on public spending – and, by extension, the link between public perceptions of immigrant use of public benefits and support for the welfare state. Governments have sometimes taken aggressive steps to cut off immigrant consumption of public benefits, as in the case of the UK (Geddes 2000). Ironically, some of the most serious efforts to limit migrant access to

\textsuperscript{35} It must be borne in mind, however, that the impact of migration on the wages of the least-skilled is generally small compared to other factors (Dustmann et al. 2005; Manacorda et al. 2006; Lemos and Portes 2008; Nathan 2011). Wages have been depressed by many things other than immigration, such as austerity, declining trade unions, financialisation, power-biased technical change, secular stagnation, and the effects of the 2008 sub-prime crisis.

\textsuperscript{36} The efficacy of a large population depends primarily upon “[…] whether the country was under- or overpopulated relative to its usable geographic area” (quoted from Collier 2013). Due to diminishing marginal returns, a successful policy philosophy in one era can run out of momentum in another.
public largesse have come from the British Labour Party, and have been targeted against asylum policies seen as too generous or poorly enforced.

PN 18) **TRANSACTION COSTS.** The overall empirical evidence on the benefits of cultural diversity is generally positive, though not uniformly so. Ethnic heterogeneity may have a negative effect on the economy if it leads to lower trust and poor communication between individuals – for example, because of language barriers, ethnocentrism and/or cultural differences (Alesina and La Ferrara 2004).

PN 19) **OPPORUNITY COSTS.** A further common argument against open borders is that it disincentivises companies from investing in more *capital-intensive* technologies (or, conversely, from switching to the production of less labour-intensive commodities) (House of Lords 2008, p.38). This was precisely the experience of the US tomato-processing industry in the 1950s where growers argued that the industry could not survive without illegal immigration. As it turned out, the mechanization of tomato-processing plants in the 1960s increased productivity and reduced consumer prices (Martin 2006, pp.126-127).

Together, PNs 14-19 are so prevalent in the migration debate that some authors even speak of a *methodological nationalism* underlying the dominant contemporary view on society. Symptomatic of this trend has been the tightening of restrictions on foreign spouses and unskilled immigrant workers (Ford and Goodwin 2013, p.275). At the same time, however, many countries have maintained the generous refugee, asylum and family reunification policies typical of cosmopolitan societies. Clearly, in some countries, political rhetoric has changed more than political reality.

### 2.3.5 CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM

While the distributional consequences of immigration are among the most important issues facing the world today, it is also important to know what migration means for the cultural substratum of the receiving country. Immigration, after all, is not just a movement from one place to another; it is also
a movement from one *culture* to another. Admittedly, many of these cultural differences are minor and statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, even small differences, when added up over many individuals and many generations, can greatly influence the way a society grows and develops.

One may try to counter this by pointing out how people are increasingly caught up in free trade agreements that are global in scale, economic interactions that spill across national borders, and transnational institutions that increasingly regulate the laws of nations. In other words, cultural difference should be treated as morally irrelevant because the world has become increasingly interconnected and interdependent. As Philippe Legrain (2006) put it in *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them*, “Why can computers be imported from China duty-free but Chinese people not freely come to make computers here?”

Despite the advances in transportation and communication technology, the view espoused by Legrain (2006) is a gross simplification. When we import a manufactured good from China, we import only the materials used to make the commodity, such as polymers, metals, dyes or fabrics. These goods are allocated a monetary value in a global marketplace to reflect the scarcity of the product *vis-à-vis* consumer demand. In contrast, when we import a Chinese worker, we import a class of goods that cannot be priced and which economists like to bury in appendices under the label *non-pecuniary*. ‘Non-pecuniary’ goods, like a feeling of historical rootedness or a sense of religiosity, cannot be priced in a global marketplace. Consequently, the free movement of labour is not in any way comparable to the free movement of goods and services.

This leads on to issue of cultural pluralism. On the positive side, post-war immigration to the UK has introduced many positive interactions among workers and firms, and exposed Britons to a variety of new products, such as a rich variety of ethnic cuisine (Nathan and Lee 2011). The now-familiar political nostrum “In diversity is strength” highlights this bold optimism. On the other hand, the benefits of post-war immigration have been partly, or perhaps substantially, offset by socio-psychological losses to the host population (Collier 2013; Skey 2014). Thus, while there is an obvious economic case for elite
migration, there is also a strong, non-pecuniary case for immigration control. Against this background, CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM can be mapped-out in four distinct but interconnected areas of public policy:

PN 20) **PRESERVATION OF LANGUAGE.** First, many cultural issues in which the electorate is unambiguously interested in have a strong immigration dimension. Take, for example, the issue of language. As the Tory MP for Monmouthshire, David Davies, articulated it during the 2013 Immigration Bill: “[Anti-immigration] concern is too often dismissed as narrow-minded racism when that is not the case. It is reasonable for people who live in established communities to get nervous when they suddenly find that English – or, indeed, in some parts of north Wales, Welsh – is no longer the language they hear on the streets from day to day” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, cols.195-227, 13 October 2015). From this perspective, it is natural to sympathise with people with whom you can converse with than with other people with whom you cannot as readily interchange thoughts.

PN 21) **PRESERVATION OF SOCIAL NORMS.** Second, there is an internal relationship between a nation’s demography and its social norms – e.g., political values such as gender equality, freedom of speech, liberty of association and religious pluralism. One unexpected side-effect of the growth of the Muslim diaspora in Western Europe, for example, has been a growth in “ritualized sexual violence” against young girls and women (Zizek 2017, pp.32-33). According to Samuel P. Huntington (1993), a former political advisor and academic, the introduction of different cultural groups into an existing milieu may well cause a condition of unpredictability and a kind of resistance to toleration that ends in a ‘clash of civilizations’.

PN 22) **SPATIAL MANAGEMENT.** In addition to the impact of demography on social norms, there is also an internal relationship between a nation’s demography and its physical shape – its public and religious buildings; the way its towns and villages are laid out; and the topography of the physical environment. From this
perspective, the campaign for immigration control is tightly linked to claims about territory or what sociologist Michael Skey (2013) describes as “spatial management”: the importance of allowing a self-identified ethnic group to secure and manage a given territory.

PN 23) RACIAL SELF-INTEREST. While few people from the white majority think explicitly in racial terms, many feel discomfort about losing their ethnic majority status to another ethnic group (Kaufmann 2017). The psychological motivations for this are well established in such predispositions as ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘ethnic nepotism’ (Salter 2006). To quote the late Conservative MP John Stokes, during the second reading of the 1981 British Nationality Bill: “The ordinary Englishman still clings obstinately to his Englishness and to the old, known ways. He knows only too well that if immigration continues at the present rate the indigenous population will in time be supplanted by aliens and British people will gradually disappear from these islands. It has already started to happen in certain areas” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.988, 28 January 1981).

Given the histories of racism in both Continental Europe and the United Kingdom it is both unsurprising and fully warranted that opposition to ‘majority rights’ is so impassioned. The challenge here, however, is to distinguish between white supremacism on the one hand, and white identity politics on the other. The latter may be misanthropic and insular, but it is not the same as irrational fear or hatred for another racial group. As distinguished liberal philosopher David Miller (2005) argues, “[people] feel at home in a place in part because they can see that their surroundings bear the imprint of past generations whose values were recognisably their own.” In this sense, immigration sceptics are deeply concerned about the scale and pace of social change; they are worried about whether their town still feels ‘authentically’ British or whether immigrants share the same values as them. Metaphorically, a nation-state may thus be described as a “home” – a site of constancy in the social and material environment, and a spatial context in which daily routines of human existence are performed (Giddens 1999).
2.3.6 SECURITY

Another important development over the last few decades has been the attempt to bring refugee and asylum policy under the remit of military, security, and policing policy. Recent literature is replete with arguments that states have ‘criminalized’, ‘securitized’ and ‘militarized’ asylum and undocumented migration. There is a common belief, especially among national populist movements, that greater global economic integration has made the world more vulnerable to the “dark side of globalization” – namely, that some immigrants constitute potential a security threat comparable to floods or epidemics. As a recent review put it,

“prisons or immigration removal centres are singularly useful in the management of non-citizens because they enable society not only physically to exclude this population, but also, symbolically to mark these figures out as threatening and dangerous.” (Bosworth 2008, pp.207–8)

Such real/perceived threats underline just how important it is to think clearly, and long-term, about the issue of SECURITY. Several cross-national studies suggest that, as immigration becomes ever more psychologically linked to physical security, attitudes towards migration tend to coalesce around a more restrictive and assimilationist metanarrative (Castles at al. 2014, pp.198-214). Securitisation can be mapped-out in four distinct but interconnected areas of public policy:

PN 24) COUNTER-TERRORISM. In recent years, radicalized Muslims have come to be regarded as a major security threat by MI5. Recent terrorist attacks, carried out on the streets of Woolwich, Westminster, Southwark and Manchester, have made it impossible to gloss-over the very real threat posed by radical Islamic ideology. Cosmopolitans, such as London Mayor Sadiq Khan, see this as the negative part of a trade-off for a more open, equal and diverse society; national populists, on the other hand, believe it is a self-inflicted wound. As Enoch Powell put it in 1968: “The supreme function of
statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human nature” (quoted from Hansen 2000).

PN 25) **CRIME PREVENTION.** Opponents of globalist ideology argue that, under a liberal border regime, the number of migrants arriving from failed states will increase substantially, leading to higher levels of organised and disorganized crime: fraud, murder, smuggling, racketeering, human trafficking and bonded labour. From this perspective, globalism endangers the physical safety of native-born British citizens.

PN 26) **NATIONAL UNITY.** At the national level, ethnic diversity has been associated with slowed economic growth, falling social cohesion and foreign aid, as well as rising corruption and risk of civil conflict (as discussed in a meta-analysis by Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Indeed, one of the main themes of the Cantle report, commissioned in 2001 in response to a series of violent ethnic clashes in the north of England, is that damaging racial polarisation is likely to occur when there are no points of contact between different communities.

PN 27) **PUBLIC HEALTH.** In terms of infectious disease epidemiology, some critics of open borders argue that increased global interactions among populations will lead to the rapid spread of infectious diseases currently prevalent in developing countries. Tuberculosis is a paradigmatic example of this situation.

In contrast to the socioeconomic threats posed by immigration, which often polarise public and elite opinion because they spring from prior ‘moral foundations’, concern for physical safety is a unifying threat that often results in a cross-party consensus (Feldman and Stenner 1997). Moreover, countries that have experienced attacks by foreign terrorists are those most likely to impose new border restrictions (with regard to the case of Israel, see Bartram 1998, pp. 303–
When confronted with this reality, some of the more nuanced proponents of national populism have extolled cultural assimilation as the solution. For example PN 28) **ASSIMILATION.** Assimilation focuses on “the political and public spheres and disregards religious and cultural differences in the private sphere, so long as these private practices do not conflict with the ideals of liberal democracy” (cited from Holbrook 2017). In this vision, all the myriad problems of a multiethnic society can be overcome through citizenship tests, education in civics theories, monolingualism, and the promotion of so-called ‘British values’. This citizen-centered policy framework does not rule out cultural change, but it does give a reason for wanting to stay in control of the process (Miller 2005).

According to PN28, successful societies are based on habits of trust and reciprocity, underpinned by a common language, common history and common culture. As philosopher Samuel Scheffler (2007, p.111) argues, the government “cannot avoid coercing citizens into preserving a national culture of some kind”.

### 2.3.7 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The real/perceived threats of migration to national security are important aspects of the challenges posed by globalisation to the nation state. Another important factor, however, is the ability of the state to achieve domestic policy objectives through bureaucratic and administrative organs. To this end, **PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION** is a metanarrative embedded within the institutions that frame, shape and transform elite preferences into policy outcomes:

PN 29) **LAW ENFORCEMENT.** Home Office and border agency officials often talk of their determination to ‘protect the border’ from illicit or illegal people. This is what is meant by ‘law enforcement’ – the action or activity of compelling observance of and compliance with the law.

PN 30) **EFFICIENCY IN ADMINISTRATION.** Another important aspect of public administration is the avoidance of inter-agency conflict and bureaucratic inefficiency (Rosenblum 2004). Anecdotally, one finds a continual reappearance
of the following issues related to efficiency in public administration: inadequacies of staffing and budget; mismanagement of time and resources; over-centralization; and slow and confusing decision-making vis-à-vis the appeals process.

PN 31) RATIONALISATION OF LAW. The problem of administrative torpor may also emerge out of conflicts between central executives concerned about border controls and specific organisations responsible for adherence and compliance to the rule of law. According to PN31, the only way to resolve this conflict is through a ‘rationalisation process’ aimed at restricting the ability of judges/civil servants to direct policy toward any particular outcome.

PN 32) LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY. A similar tension between equity and efficiency characterises the role of the House of Commons. Proponents of PN32 claim the scrutinizing role of the legislature (including parliamentary committees) should take precedence over the efficacy of the executive if it results in more robust and watertight legislation.

PN 33) FORECASTING OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS. Having accurate forecasts of predicted future migratory inflows are essential for the design and implementation of public policy. There are, however, many social, economic and political drivers which can impact migration flows, making forecasting of inflows an extremely arduous task. In particular, migration is very susceptible to exogenous ‘shock events’ which are, by their very nature, hard to predict, such as economic depression and internecine conflict.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION is a central concept in the social sciences, but it did not appear in the migration literature until the late 1990s: Zolberg (1999) was among the first to trace the sources of migration to the activities of central bureaucracies. In some models, the state is thought to arbitrate among competing economic interests (which requires ‘managed migration’) and obligations to the rule of law (Hollifield 2004). In later models (e.g. Rudolph 2003), the state is thought to approach the prospect of migration from the point of view of
diplomatic and security issues, as well as specific ministries responsible for labour and industry. Political scientists such as Hammar (1985), Brochmann and Hammar (1999), and Massey (1999) on the other hand view the politics of migration as issues of performance management, regulation and compliance, directed at both controls over the composition of, and interactions between, citizens and noncitizens.

2.4 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the dissertation’s conceptual and analytical framework – one based on a three-tier distinction between individual policy narratives (PN), their micro-components (setting, plot, characters, moral) and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the ‘metanarrative’ (M)). (While the first two dimensions are commonly used in interpreting political thought, the addition of the third dimension of ideology is a special aspect of the approach offered in the following chapters.) The analysis of ideologies is not, on this understanding, most usefully pursued by projecting a one-size-fits-all model – but rather, through locating them within the patterns in which they actually appear. Such patterns are most conveniently expressed in metanarratives, those systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they inhabit. The purpose of the above classification system, therefore, to create heuristic order without which meaning cannot be bestowed on, or extracted from, the raw material of speaking and acting.
PART II

EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS
The Politicisation of Migration

“The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human nature.”

– Enoch Powell

“Citizenship and immigration in post-war UK are the result of an interlocking, and poorly understood, relationship between the feudal basis of British nationality, the post-war experience of decolonisation, and the policy instruments to chosen to restrict immigration. British migration and nationality legislation has depended on a series of measures that appear alternatively bizarre and sinister, and the politics of immigration have been punctuated by an exceptional series of crises”.

– Randall Hansen

The aim of this chapter is to provide a content analysis of parliamentary discourse during the 1960s-70s period. It aims to account for the transformation, since 1945, of the UK from a Commonwealth of Nations into a prototypical nation state. It focuses on three features of British and immigration and nationality policy since 1945: (i) its exceptional liberality and expansiveness between 1948 and 1961; (ii) its rapid reversal after 1961, resulting in one of the most restrictive immigration regimes in Western Europe; and (iii) the removal in 1971 of Commonwealth citizens’ automatic right to remain in the UK. The focus of this chapter is on the deliberative processes involved in policy formation; it is not a social history of Commonwealth migrants and their experiences in British society. It is also not a chapter about the institutional apparatus of the British state, or the content of Britons’ attitudes on questions of race. Rather, the chapter is about the “narrativisation” of one of the most divisive and partisan issues in post-war British politics.

37 Quoted from Hansen (2000), p.183
38 Hansen (2000), p.29
3.1. Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 1961 (Case Study 1)

3.1.1. CITIZENSHIP AND POSTWAR IMMIGRATION

The story of Britain’s early post-war experience with immigration occurred in three distinct waves:

*Aliens.* The first wave of post-war immigration, which unfolded from the end of World War II, was defined and dominated by the mass movement of surplus workers from Eastern Europe. The primary catalyst of this wave was the onset of the post-WWII economic boom, the greatest economic boom in history, which created an acute shortage in the domestic labour market. Government initiatives to recruit workers included encouraging Polish former servicemen who had served under British command during the war to settle in Britain. European volunteer workers were also recruited under a number of government schemes, and there was some immigration from Italy.

*Irish immigrants.* The second wave of early post-war immigration in Britain unfolded after the passage of the British Nationality Act (BNA) in 1948, a far-reaching piece of legislation that, among other things, recognised the special status of the Republic of Ireland – a status that confirmed the right of Irish citizens to enter the UK without restriction. Thus, an important consequence of the 1948 BNA was to precipitate an influx of Irish workers into the post-war British economy.

*British subjects.* Although the BNA’s origins were almost entirely unrelated to immigration, its consequences undoubtedly were so related. The right to enter Britain – a logical corollary of the status of British subject – led to a third wave of immigration from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean. Unlike the first two waves, however, the third began spontaneously in 1948 and “gathered momentum during the 1950s without the official sanction of or formal assistance from the British government” (quoted from Messina 2007, ch.4). This wave of unanticipated post-war migration was symbolised by the infamous
arrival of the *Empire Windrush* in 1948, and the British government stood by as chain migration from the Commonwealth unfolded.

Counterintuitive though it may sound, the category of British citizen did not exist in British law after the passing of the 1945 BNA. Rather, most inhabitants of the UK were regarded as *Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies* (abbreviated `CUKC`), although most people in the Colonies had no connection, at any stage in their lives, with the socio-political entity of the United Kingdom.

In retrospect, the 1945 BNA was one of the most extraordinary pieces of legislation in modern political history: a country of 50 million people remained completely open to 400 million citizens from Dhaka to Durban. Although the establishment of a multiracial society was neither planned nor anticipated by policymakers, a major factor leading to its emergence was the quasi-imperial mindset of the British establishment, which manifested itself in the great tradition of *Civis Britannicus sum*. A Conservative policy document published in 1949 stated:

“There must be freedom of movement among its members within the British Empire and Commonwealth. New opportunities will present themselves not only in the countries overseas but in the mother country and must be open to all citizens” (quoted from Layton-Henry 1984, p.14)

Incredibly, during some eight years of intra-imperial migration, the Conservative government managed to resist demands for restriction, largely because of an unusual alliance between Tory liberals and the Traditional Right (Foot 1965, pp.156-57). Even Sir Thomas Moore, a hard-right Conservative MP, abstained on the immigration question because he regarded it as discriminating against the Commonwealth (Foot 1965, p.155). As a consequence of this bipartisan consensus, there was substantial colonial migration during the 1950s. There was also unrestricted immigration from Ireland, which left the Commonwealth in 1948 but was a traditional source of blue-collar labour to Britain. The immigration of non-British subjects (i.e., Poles, Italians) was
controlled, but the acute post-war labour shortage meant that ‘alien’ immigration was encouraged immediately following the war.

3.1.2. THE ORIGINS OF MIGRATION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE

This pre-political state of affairs was eventually disturbed by the violent racial clashes which occurred in the cities of Nottingham and Notting Hill (London) in the summer of 1958. These were not, of course, the first incidents of inter-racial violence in post-war Britain (for a book-length treatment see Layton-Henry 1984). However, the scale of the violence in 1958 forcibly brought the issue of non-white immigration to the attention of the national press, politicians and the wider public. As British journalist and author David Goodhart (2013, ch.3) observed:

“[For] ordinary white Britons the riots underlined the racial anxiety that black meant trouble. Historic European racial stereotypes of the childlike, animalistic African man fused with more contemporary fears about pressure on jobs and housing and a sense of losing control of historic working-class neighbourhoods. Newspaper stories about the immigrants that had started out friendly and curious quickly came to focus on black people as a source of disruption or criminality.”

In both Nottingham and Notting Hill the disturbances lasted several days and involved many hundreds of people. Hostile crowds of 1,500 and 4,000 were reported to be involved in the Nottingham disturbances and crowds of 200, 400 and 700 participated in some of the Notting Hill attacks (Layton-Henry 1984, p.35). A political outcry ensued, not just in Britain but across the New Commonwealth. For example, in the immediate aftermath Jamaican Prime Minister Norman Manley flew to London for consultations and a tour of the riot areas.

The effect of the riots was paradoxical. On the one hand, the liberal wing of the Conservative Party would not accept a knee-jerk response to racist violence, and Colonial Secretary Alex Lennox-Boyd remained strongly opposed to restrictions.
On the other hand, press coverage of the riots propelled the issue to the forefront of the national political conversation. This had two important consequences:

Political realignment. First, the riots provided political ammunition for a handful of Conservative MPs then campaigning for immigration controls. The campaign, initiated by Louth MP Sir Cyril Osborne, attempted to galvanise public opinion by achieving maximum publicity for his views and the views of other Tory nationalists such as Harold Gurden (Sell Oak), Martin Lindsey (Solihull) and Norman Pannell (Kirkdale). Articulating the concerns of the Tory professional middle-class, this group was poorly represented in Parliament and, until the early 1960s, not very influential. The political base of the neo-nationalist Right was located in constituencies with immigrant diasporas; and, through its efforts, numerous anti-immigration resolutions were forwarded to the 1961 and 1965 Conservative Party Conferences (Foot 1965).

Economic protectionism. Second, public anxiety over colonial migration contributed to a climate of scepticism within the Ministry of Labour (MoL). As documented by the writer and historian of immigration Randall Hansen, senior civil servants in the MoL believed that the post-WWII economic boom had come to an end. Three developments, in particular, were believed to bode poorly for the economic prospects of immigrant workers: the process of automation; the abolition of National Service; and the continued arrival of unskilled workers from the Irish Republic, estimated at 60,000 per annum (Hansen 2000, p.93).

Taken together, these centrifugal forces become overwhelming by the early 1960s – both from ordinary citizens as channelled through MPs and from party activists (especially Tory) and from within Whitehall itself. As a consequence of these events, a decision to restrict colonial migration was announced on 31 October 1961, and Conservative Home Secretary R.A. Butler moved the second reading of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill (CIB) on 16 November. The purpose of this legislation was to distinguish between citizens of the UK/Ireland and citizens of the Commonwealth. The latter became subject to
immigration controls via the issue of employment vouchers. These vouchers were divided into three categories

- Category A for people promised a specific job by a specific employer
- Category B for individuals with training, skill, or educational attainments deemed to useful to Britain; and
- Category C for all unskilled workers without a job in the UK. These vouchers were subject to a variable limit and administrated on a “first-come first-serve” basis.

When immigrant policies are considered, the key point is the centrality of ideas surrounding social cohesion and the supply of housing. As argued in sections 3.1.2-3, policy responses to issues understood in terms of SECURITY and ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM became a paradigmatic feature of the politics of migration. During the first six months after the CIB was passed (in 1962), immigration from the Commonwealth dropped below 10,000 – from approximately 86,700 (Foot 1965, p.141).

Yet, whatever credit the Tories may have taken for the Act later in the decade, the legislation was viewed by Butler as a “distasteful necessity” of which he was not proud (Hansen 2000, p.111). To make matters worse, Labour’s opposition to the CIB was powerful and persuasive, both at the Second Reading and through the early part of the Committee stage, which was held on the floor of the House. Throughout the period before the Christmas recess, both Hugh Gaitskell (Labour Party leader) and Patrick Gordon Walker (Shadow Foreign Secretary) made devastating speeches against the CIB. The Opposition argued that the Bill’s application gave preference to some races over others.

39 The first quota for Category C was set at 10,000 vouchers per year, while the quota for A and B together was 20,000. Initially vouchers were available for both skilled and unskilled workers, but after 1965 only qualified workers could apply, which mostly consisted of doctors (Salt and Kitchling 1990, 267).
3.1.3. NATIONAL UNITY

Few phenomena affecting the United Kingdom as a whole have been more far-reaching than the accumulative effects of post-WWII immigration. As the above suggests, the introduction of the CIB was in large measure a response to the Ministry of Labour’s anti-immigration stance, and this opposition was canalised in some measure by public anti-immigrant sentiment (see Table 12). One Conservative MP referred to a division in the parliamentary party between ‘restrictionists’ (who accepted the need for controls in practice), ‘last ditchers’ (who opposed any control of Commonwealth immigration) and ‘hedgers’ (who agreed with the last ditchers in principle, but were swayed to the restrictionist cause because of numbers) (see Hansen 2000, p.106).

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<tr>
<th>Table 12. Coding form #1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<td>Metanarrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961

The Conservative Home Secretary of the time, R.A. Butler, claimed in his opening speech that the 1961 bill had been introduced as a method of dealing with “an intensified social problem”. In Butler’s words,
“It cannot be denied that the immigrants who have come to this country in such large numbers have presented the country with an intensified social problem. They tend to settle in communities of their own, with their own mode of life, in big cities. The greater the numbers coming into this country the larger will these communities become and the more difficult will it be to integrate them into our national life.” (Butler c.694)

A less charitable interpretation of Butler’s position was provided by liberal Tory MP Mark Fisher:

“The first [reason for this Immigration Bill] is “the social strains and stresses.” In simpler and rather cruder language, that phrase really means colour prejudice. It is strange, that if one accuses someone of not having a sense of humour he is furious, and regards it as the most insulting thing of which one can accuse him. It is the same if he is accused of having a colour prejudice; he will vehemently deny it. But, I fear, in fact, that is the state of mind of many of our fellow countrymen.” (Fisher col.780)

From 1961 to 1997, discussions of migration policy in the UK were often tied to discussions of NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). There was a communalist assumption, derived from the experience of colonialism, that minorities would want to live in their own areas – much as Britain’s social classes did – with a sense of what the economist Amartya Sen (2006) calls “plural monoculturalism”. The Labour MP George Pargiter, for example, compared unassimilated migrant communities in Britain to the unassimilated English diasporas of continental Europe. The tendency to cluster, in Pargiter’s view, is inscribed in our nature as human beings, rooted in a deep affection for both friends and family, as well as a commitment to social norms that transcend the particularities of time and place (Pargiter, col.789).
The political and policy origins of the aforementioned phenomena are generally not in dispute. First, there was the issue of institutional ‘path dependency’. Neither political nor intellectual elites foresaw the long-term repercussions of imperial citizenship – as formalised by the 1945 BNA (Hansen 2000). Second, when mass immigration commenced in the 1950s, there was a tacit assumption that this surge was temporary and could be efficiently regulated by the impersonal mechanisms of the labour market. This assumption was misplaced, however, since the vast majority of migrants chose to stay (Geddes 2005). The immigrant population, as such, remained spatially concentrated in parts of London, the industrial Midlands, and the Pennine towns of the North West. Over time, this pattern of settlement triggered a series of racial disturbances that prompted demands from sections of the British electorate that restrictions be applied to Commonwealth citizens. This point was articulated by Conservative MP Harold Gurden:

“[Racial] prejudice has existed for as far back as we can trace—community prejudice, national and international prejudice between peoples. In our civilisation we expect it slowly to disappear, and it is disappearing. This process cannot be hurried. The situation in the affected areas was all right even eight or ten years ago, but this setback is due to the vast numbers who have suddenly come in.” (Gurden c.738)

PN26 emphasises the unexpected difficulties immigrant-receiving states encounter in preventing the permanent settlement of migrants in their societies, as well as the difficulties that grow and continue to result from uneven geographical settlement.

40 Path dependency advances the view that the contemporary state's inadequate control of immigration and immigrant policy is a consequence of long-established policy decisions, decisions that have precluded the pursuit of some policy options while making other alternatives especially unattractive (Hansen 2002, p.271).
3.1.4. HOUSING

In addition to concerns about the impact of the immigrant population on NATIONAL UNITY (PN26), discussions of immigration restriction in 1961 were almost always tied to concerns about HOUSING (PN16). Such problems were linked primarily to the physical decaying of inner city areas, wherein environmental degradation was increasingly regarded as a process accelerated by the presence of new arrivals (Hansen 2000, ch.3). In particular, the cause of greatest concern was overcrowded accommodation, combined with the unscrupulous actions of slum landlords such as Peter Rachman. Rachman, a Notting Hill landlord and part-time brothel-keeper, was notorious for subdividing his properties into several smaller flats so as to gradually increase the number of tenancies without rent controls (hence the term “Rachmanism”). Those native residents that remained in these areas associated its continued decay with Afro-Caribbean tenants, while the conditions in which the latter group was forced to live (most houses had a single toilet and bathroom) intensified racist assumptions about foreigners and poor living standards. According to Selly Oak MP Harold Gurden:

“Opponents of the Bill say that the housing problem was with us before the immigrants arrived, but Birmingham's problem has been aggravated to an extent never before known. Slums now exist in hundreds, or perhaps even thousands, where previously they could be measured in dozens. Never was there such filth and such obscenity. The humiliation and degradation of these people are dreadful. That is why I say that it is not only socially but morally right to have this Bill.”

Depicted as a problematic corollary of racism, the clustering of Commonwealth immigrants in overcrowded accommodation provided an important rationale for restrictionist legislation (Hansen 2000, p.81). As Table 13 suggests, the political and social tensions post-WWII immigration precipitated were founded not simply in the size of the immigrant population but also in its uneven geographical distribution. Slum landlords were accused of using
immigrants to push out older white residents, in order to achieve higher rents and property values (Deakin 1965). This problem was exacerbated, in turn, by the failure of central government to provide local authorities with additional funds to alleviate the shortage of housing and accommodation in areas of immigrant settlement.

**Table 13. Coding form #2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Economic patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN16: Impact on housing and public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Urban decay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>There is a practical limit to the number of people the UK can comfortably absorb, and the speed with which local authorities can accommodate them. Furthermore, unrestricted migration fuels the activities of slum landlords, who subdivide their properties into smaller flats, which gradually increase the number of tenancies without rent controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Slum landlords (narrative villains)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>“Given a too rapid rise in the size of the immigrant population, there is a real risk that the drive for improved housing conditions will be defeated by the sheer weight of numbers.” Butler (cols.694-95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Osborne (Con) cols.721-28; Gurden (Con) cols.741-42; Lucas-Tooth (Con) cols.769-71; Fisher (Con) cols.782-83; Hare (Con) cols.807-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961

Negative reaction to New Commonwealth immigration was originally confined to the employment sector, where there were attempts to exclude black workers from certain occupations or to restrict them to the lowest grades (Beetham 1970). Over time, however, many of these early inter-racial difficulties were overcome as the labour shortage continued and as employers and workers grew accustomed to working with black colleagues. Outside of the work situation there was considerable resentment towards black immigrants, often associated with housing problems (Glass 1960; Patterson 1965; Deakin 1965). As Butler explained in his opening speech

“Given a too rapid increase in the number of immigrants, there is a real risk that the drive for improved conditions will be defeated by the sheer weight of numbers,
and the immigrants will be among those to benefit most if the new powers in fact prove, as we hope, to be effective. (Butler cols.694-95)

This narrative exemplifies a pattern that is widely observed in the politics of migration, namely, that there is a perceived limit to the number of people the UK can comfortably absorb. Framed through a metanarrative of ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM, immigration policy is relatively uncontroversial when the population density is low and increased building brings amenities like parks, restaurants, boutique shops and well-integrated public transport. Beyond a certain point, however, a tipping point is surpassed, when more population density is increasingly seen as a corollary of more traffic, more noise, and other undesirable side effects.

3.1.5. DISCURSIVE DEPOLITICISATION AND ‘THE GLOBAL ECONOMY’

While the government felt that the CIB would command general support in Parliament, Butler was astonished at the level of opposition the Bill received. In concluding the Opposition’s case, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell drew on the full power of his rhetorical skill in a hostile rebuke of government policy, leading to what Paul Foot described as Gaitskell’s “finest moment” (1965, p.175). This opposition brought the Labour Party its rewards, both in votes and concessions throughout the length of the Bill’s passage:

“It has been said that the test of a civilised country is how it treats its Jews. I would extend that and say that the test of a civilised country is how it behaves to all its citizens of different race, religion and colour. By that test this Bill fails, and that is fundamentally why we deplore it.” (Gaitskell, col.802)

Three features in Gaitskell’s political make-up had combined to drive him into opposition to the CIB. The first had been a personal loathing of racial prejudice. The Opposition argued that the Bill’s application, which favoured (skilled) Old Commonwealth citizens and exempted Irish immigrants, was itself discriminatory.
In addition to this, Gaitskell was a firm believer in the British Commonwealth, partly through a desire to see a “world-wide multi-racial community network” (Foot 1965, p.175). The CIB’s damage to the British Commonwealth was said to result from the fact of control itself, and it was believed by Labour to be exacerbated by the failure to ensure proper intergovernmental consultation.

Thirdly, Gaitskell understood much better than his colleagues the general principles behind international migration of labour. The crucial dynamic initiating migration to Britain was the level of poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunities abroad (‘push’ factors) and the high number of vacancies in Britain’s post-war economy (‘pull’ factors) (see Table 14).

Table 14. Coding form #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Market globalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN10: Unskilled migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Unfilled vacancies; dualities in the global economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>There is a direct relationship between labour demand in the UK and current levels of international migration. Freedom of movement promotes economic growth by filling labour shortages, staffing public services and boosting the public finances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Economic migrants (heroes), protectionist Tory politicians (villains)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>The large rise in recorded met migration is almost precisely correlated with the number of unfulfilled vacancies in the UK labour market. If the Conservatives try to cut off that labour, the public and private sectors will face considerable difficulty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Walker (Lab) cols.709-711; Royle (Lab) cols.750-51; Turton (Con) cols.754-55; Howell (Lab) cols.761-64; MacColl (Lab) cols.774-76; Fisher (Con) cols.780-81; Pargiter (Lab) cols.788-91; Gaitskell (Lab) cols.793-99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961

Gaitskell’s attack on the Bill, which he described the “most crazy kind” of economic planning (col.799), stunned the government. The Labour opposition at this time appeared demoralised and divided after their 1959 electoral defeat and racked by internal difficulties over NATO and unilateral nuclear disarmament. Butler had failed to anticipate the extent to which the CIB presented the
Opposition with a great moral issue with which Gaitskell could unite the PLP. The West Indian economy, in particular, had been shaped to serve Britain’s convenience and controls would seriously worsen unemployment there. As Patrick Gordon Walker (col.710), the shadow Foreign Secretary, remarked, global economic conditions played an important part in mediating the relationship between migrants and the receiving country:

“[An] expanding economy, even one expanding at the rate laid down by this Government, produces labour scarcity. We have to accept this as a fact of life. There is a direct relation between labour demand and immigration.”

The above excerpt is a classic example of what Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders (2014) term *discursive depoliticisation*. Words such as “scarce”, “expanding” and “the economy” were a big part of the pro-migrant vernacular, framing debates about international migration, and prompting the perception of international migration as a “fact of life”. Gordon Walker’s economic argument, in a nutshell, was that the flow of immigration had already been regulated by the invisible hand of the global economy:

“Many people talk about millions of people coming here; he talked about a quarter of the population of the world coming here. But a limit is set on the numbers coming here by the economy itself, by the need of the economy for labour. It is the net figure that matters whether of immigration or migration. I think that the figure is not very great. Some years it is negative; some years it is positive.” (Gordon Walker col.710)

It is important to note that, historically, the recruitment of foreign workers was relatively disorganised rather than the result of structured relations between government and business (Geddes 2003). Unlike France and Germany, the UK did not actively encourage large-scale immigration.41 On the other hand, strong

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41 The reasons for this were twofold: first, British economic performance was lacklustre compared to continental Europe and labour shortages were never so severe; and second, Ireland served as an industrial reserve army within easy reach of the UK.
‘pull’ factors were at work in the 1950s with the active recruitment of migrant labour in the textile and construction industries. Furthermore, some forms of labour migration were often encouraged in a bid to overcome bottlenecks in the public sector and to counter the effects of ‘militant’ trade unionism. As Gaitskell put it

“As the number of unfilled vacancies goes down, the immigration figures go down, and as the number of unfilled vacancies rises, the immigration figures go up.” (Gaitskell col.794)

The term “unfilled vacancy” loomed large in this narrative. It suggested strong associations between the politics of migration, on the one hand, and the exigencies of the British economy on the other. Put another way, these “unfilled vacancies” – while obviously not static and unchanging – depersonalised the debate over SOCIAL COHESION. The ideal of technocratic government emerged from this mindset, based, as it is, on the conviction that economic growth can lead the way to peace.

3.1.6. INTEGRATION

Another contentious issue was the policy of INTEGRATION (PN4). According to Labour, the governmental response to colonial migration was hesitant and ambiguous and little positive was done to assist their settlement, integration and acceptance. There were, for example, no government arrangements for meeting the immigrants and dispersing them to their destinations in Britain. There were also no arrangements made for health inspection on arrival or on departure; and no Government arrangements were made for the teaching of English. In the words of Gordon Walker,

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42 In the early 1960s (1960-63), Conservative Health Minister Enoch Powell recruited nurses from the Caribbean to work in the NHS. According to Edward Heath (cited from Hansen 2000), Powell told the Macmillan Cabinet that it could face down British nurses in a pay dispute “because I can bring in all the nurses we need from the West Indies”.

43 See Walker (Lab) cols.714-16; Royle (Lab) cols.748-49; Howell (Lab) cols.759-65; McColl (Lab) cols. 771-76.
“The Government are to blame for this situation. The Government have totally failed to relate the increase in the number of jobs to housing. They have totally failed to disperse industry. They have contributed to homelessness and over-crowding by their Rent Act and by cutting back local authority house building.” (Walker, col.715)

Accordingly, no government encouragement was made given to voluntary organisations struggling to solve the numerous social problems caused inevitably by a large influx of men and women of different cultures. Worst of all, no provision was made by the central government for housing and accommodation. All these problems were left to the local authorities. Charles Royle, a British businessman and Labour MP for Salford West, argued that residential over-crowding could only be solved by constant dedication on the part of central government:

“The immigrants are not responsible for it. The Government are responsible for it because they have failed to provide sufficient housing for the people. If the people from the Commonwealth are assisting us—as they are—in our economic situation and by the places they occupy in our economy, they have a right to expect from the Government that they will be properly housed and accommodated in this country.” (Royle, col.749)

Those who held this view pointed to a ‘shopping list’ of big changes in public policy that could have the potential to radically overturn the status quo. For example, Labour politicians urged the British Government to make much greater efforts to disperse the immigrant population; they were also encouraged to support local authorities in their use of anti-over-crowding measures. Similarly, in his speech to House Gordon Walker mentioned the possibility of using public funds to improve the living conditions of immigrants already resident in Britain. According to Labour MP Denis Howell (cols.764-65), a more positive early lead by the government and political leaders might have done much to assuage public anxieties:
“When one meets constituents and argues with them, one finds time and time again that they do not object to people coming because of their colour. Their objection is that the immigrants have preference in getting houses, which, of course, is not the case. Most of the immigrants buy the houses. The problem of bad landlordism, too, applies just as much to immigrants as to the native British population.”

Influenced by a materialist conception of ideology, a number of MPs remained wedded to the view that interracial conflict is a by-product of competition over scarce economic resources.

3.1.7. POLITICISATION OF ANTI-RACISM

Behind the many ideological differences between the two major parties lay a fundamental agreement: both Conservative and Labour MPs acknowledged the existence of “stresses” and “strains” arising from the uneven geographical settlement of immigrant populations. For Conservative ‘realists’ such as R.A. Butler (col.688), restricting numbers was the obvious and self-evident solution. For Gaitskell and Walker, on the other hand, the Government was responsible for the race ‘problem’ because it had failed to provide sufficient housing, amenities and infrastructure. Beyond that, the numbers themselves were a technical question to be worked out efficiently and dispassionately by the push-pull of the global economy.

In parallel and intersecting with the above argument, Gaitskell and Gordon Walker made devastating speeches against the alleged racialism of the Bill. That the Irish were exempt from the CIB was considered by many to reflect the racist motives behind this legislation (Hampshire 2005). In the words of Patrick Gordon Walker

“The net effect of the Bill is that a negligible number of white people will be kept out and almost all those kept out by the Bill will be coloured people. That is why I say that this is a hypothetical Bill, because that is the intention of it. The exclusion of the Irish makes all this blatant, obvious and undeniable” (Walker, col.709)
The reasons for this departure from the proposed CIB rules were that the Irish were useful workers who spoke the language, and that no one wanted to antagonize the strong pro-Irish element in Northern Ireland. Still, this legal anomaly provoked many Conservatives to speak out against the Bill in its various stages. These included: Nigel Fisher, Humphrey Berkeley, Sir Thomas Moore, Robin Turton, Lord Balniel, Lord Colyton (in the Lords) and John Biggs-Davidson.

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<th>Table 15. Coding form #4</th>
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<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
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<td>Frequency</td>
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Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961

In academia, the debate on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was quickly lumped together in scholarly debates about the ‘normalisation’ of racism. But a closer look at the evidence, as we will see in this chapter, reveals how these simplistic conclusions are wide of the mark, ignoring numerous contradicting instances in which a principled stand was made against racism (see Table 15). Consider, for example, the speech of Widnes MP James MacColl. After warning the House about the already fragile state of the Commonwealth, MacColl speculated about the impact of the Bill in Africa:
“Dr. Verwoerd [Leader of South Africa’s National Party] and Sir Roy Welensky [2nd Prime Minister of Rhodesia] must be laughing their heads off. We preach to them about the monstrousness of discrimination against coloured people. But we have 1 per cent. coloured people in our population and they have perhaps 75 million to 2 million. We have the impertinence to point the finger at them and say, "You should learn to live with your brown brothers."

(MacColl, col.777)

More damningly still, Sir Cyril Osborne (a Tory nationalist) was alleged by some MPs to be a ‘fascist’ – a harbinger of a dangerous revival of white supremacism. Labour MP Sydney Scholefield Allen, for example, compared Osborne’s choreographed campaign to that of Oswald Moseley (cols.716-17). Similarly, Charles Roylce, ruthless in opposition to growing nationalist sentiment, asked the Home Secretary whether “[he] is proud that he has been moved by this combination of Tory reactionaries and Fascist thugs” (col.744). Note, too, the way in which – rather than announcing a simple defence of his policy position, effectively taking a passive role – Osborne defended himself and his ideological allies against the claim that their rhetoric bore any responsibility for racial prejudice:

“I say with certainty, and I do not apologise for saying it, that this control which I think is inevitable, and I think ought to have come much earlier, has nothing to do with coloured skin at all. It is due entirely to poverty and to numbers… In my opinion, had they faces as white as snow, their great numbers and their great poverty would have made control of their coming into this country inevitable.”

(Osborne col.721)

This does not mean to say that racism was absent from the Second Reading. On the contrary, there are a few examples in which racism reared its head in the Commons – most notably in the 1961 speech of Selly Oak MP Harold Gurden. Gurden’s main arguments were that Britain should not import the criminals, the sick or the feckless of the underdeveloped countries; that the
Welfare State was a ‘honey pot’ to people of poorer lands; and that Britain should not turn itself into a multiracial society. For example:

“This flood of immigrants has set us back considerably. We hear all sorts of stories about how, in the coloured countries, the white man is told to go home, but we here are not allowed to tell the black man to go home… Crimes are not committed only by coloured immigrants, but those that are out of all proportion to the number of immigrants, and are of the worst kind—murder, rape, bloodshed, theft, dope peddling, sex crimes, and so on.” (Gurden, col.739)

In view of this sort of comment, it is difficult to accept Sir Cyril Osborne’s assertion that race never entered into the equation. Despite all protests to the contrary, Gurden could never disguise his bias against black immigrants. Having said this, Gurden was fairly isolated in his campaign, shunned by the modernising Tories on his own side of the House, and snubbed by own Front Bench (Hansen 2000). Osborne received similar treatment from the two Ministers of the Colonial Office: Henry Hopkinson and Alan Lennox-Boyd (Foot 1965, p.130)

The 1960s had a definite transformational effect on race-relations in Britain. First, there was the geopolitical context: as documented by Frank Furedi (1998) in *The Silent War*, post-war Britain came under intense pressure from its former Colonies to tackle racism – and British diplomats, in turn, wanted to secure the allegiances of the newly independent Commonwealth countries. With the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union renewed its long dormant interest in the revolutionary potential of the developing world. Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the USSR from 1953, was determined to mobilise the newly emerging and decolonialising nations against the West, intending to exploit the end of colonial empires. In the face of this geostrategic challenge, the West had to respond by suppressing its anti-immigration critics – even as a hegemonic pro-white identity and consciousness remained underneath. This point was made with pellucid clarity by Gaitskell (col.801),
“Perhaps the main reason why we hope [that the Commonwealth will survive] is that it is a multi-racial society and its first principle is non-discrimination in race relations. We think that is important, because when we look back for a moment it is fair to say that the whole of the future of the world will probably depend on whether people of different colours can live in harmony with each other. Therefore, this Measure as now put forward strikes at the very root of this principle.”

Charles Royle (col.747) went even further than Gaitskell, arguing that “world peace will not be assured until everybody in the world is coffee-coloured”.

In addition to the geopolitical context, there was the ideological context: the legacy of European fascism convinced many Church leaders of the need to fight racism in all its forms (Taguieff 2015). Ecumenists on both sides of the Atlantic were consistent in their demands for RACIAL EQUALITY (PN1). It is noteworthy that many Labour MPs in 1961 were influenced by ecumenical Protestantism of the Pauline “there is neither Jew nor Greek” variety. The statement of James MacColl (col.772) is typical in this respect:

“I am not criticising the Bill from an ivory tower. I am not thinking that all immigrants are good, virtuous people and all the people who have difficulty with immigrants are bad, intolerant and racially prejudiced. I think that the present situation creates a challenge which in a Christian country should be taken up in a Christian way, by welcoming people who are coming into the area and bringing together all members of the community in one body. One's duty is not to try to keep them out but to make some effort to try to bring them together in harmony.”

The term “universal brotherhood” loomed large in this narrative. Christian universalism dovetailed with the progressive desire for people to shed their national identities and unite in a pan-European or universal civilization. As Howell (co.765) explained,
“The question that was asked 2,000 years ago, which has been ignored on the benches opposite, is as relevant in this context today as when it was asked—"Am I my brother's keeper?"

Similarly:

“In a Christian country… it is not the job of political leadership to decide its first priority on the basis of electoral advantage. The only decent basis for decisions by the Government is that of ethics and morality.”

Stepping back and taking in the broader view allows us to see that, contrary to popular claims, the anti-racist movement won over fairly loyal support from MPs who shared coherent, deeply felt and in many cases legitimate concerns about how their governments and the West more generally had marginalised ethnic minority groups.

3.1.8 POLITICS OF DECOLONISATION

Given the histories of racism in both continental Europe and the British Empire it is perhaps unsurprising that opposition to the CIB was so impassioned. Most migrants from the former Colonies were racially distinct from the native population of the UK, and so opposition to immigration skated precariously close to racism. In Parliament, Gaitskell (cols.801-02) declared that the Bill was “a plain anti-Commonwealth Measure in theory and … a plain anti-colour Measure in practice”.

Another major factor was the broader geopolitical and foreign policy interest. Attachment to Commonwealth, and a belief in Britain’s unique obligation as head of the largest Empire in the world, exercised a considerable influence on Tory and Labour thinking in the 1960s (PN7: SOFT POWER). As explained by Gordon Walker (cols.707-714), the essence of the Commonwealth was that the UK did not terminate its ties to her former Colonies but translated them into a continuing partnership. It was said in various speeches, for example, that Great Britain was the “mother country”, and that her position within the
Commonwealth was a matter of immense strategic importance. For example, the old Dominions were central to the UK’s economic and foreign policy; they contributed to its international prestige and influence; and they ensured the flourishing of the English language in an international arena (see Layton-Henry 1984). The robustness of these privileged historical relationships is clearly evident in Table 16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 16. Coding form #5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
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<td>Policy narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961*

Against this backdrop, Labour vigorously exploited the mishandling of the Irish provisions and the lack of consultation with Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and accused the government of capitulating to racial prejudice. At first the Irish were to be subject to controls so the government would be able to claim that the provisions of the Bill were colourblind. However, in the Second Reading debate the Home Secretary said that it was not practicable to include the Irish in the Bill and the Opposition gleefully argued that this undermined the “life-blood” of the Commonwealth.
Closely connected to this was the creeping Europeanisation of British politics, and the potential for similar distinctions among members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and citizens of the UK and Commonwealth (CUKC). According to Gordon Walker (col.711), “Australians, Canadians, West Indians and Indians will find that for the first time they are being investigated, detained and having to get vouchers under the discretion of the immigration officers”. The net effect of all this, Walker (col.711) hypothesised, would be the introduction of a “two-tier” immigration system:

“When we shall have to have new notices at our parts. One will say: "British, Irish, German, Italian and French—this way"; and the other will say: "All other aliens and Commonwealth citizens this way."

In retrospect, Labour’s fury at the betrayal of a hitherto sacred principle seems largely symbolic, although it was extremely damaging to the government at the time. Labour’s amendment to the CIB criticised the government for giving excessive discretionary powers to the executive without adequate intergovernmental consultation. According to Randall Hansen (2000, pp.112-113), Labour’s criticism was a legitimate one: “the colonies were not informed until early October, a few weeks before the bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech, and the government was not prepared to countenance changes.” On this matter, Walker (col.708) accused the Colonial Secretary of reducing the doctrine of Commonwealth consultation to “a nullity”:

“I say this to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. This is an extraordinary and dangerous doctrine about Commonwealth consultation. The doctrine is, "If you are frightened of criticism, do not consult. Just inform, and give them no time to comment". It is the same thing as was done over Suez. This reduces Commonwealth consultation to a nullity. Yet it is the life-blood of the Commonwealth.”

In other cases, MPs spoke of the UK’s moral responsibility, as a rich industrialised nation and former Colonial power, to protect and harbour those
fleeing from poverty (PN: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT). In Parliament, Hugh Gaitskell (col.800) declared that “[t]hey are still our Colonies. We are responsible for them”. Clement Davies, a Welsh politician and former Liberal Party leader, sought to corral the Commons into understanding what followed as being of the utmost gravity:

“That has been said at the Dispatch Box by a representative of the "mother" of all these Commonwealth countries. It has been our proud claim that we have been in the position of the "mother country" towards all these others. Now that their people are driven from their homes because they cannot earn a decent living, the "mother" is prepared for the first time to close the door in their faces.” (Clement Davies col.729)

The above excerpt is a classic example of a “redress for historical injustice” argument. According to this view, a generous immigration policy on behalf of persons from former Colonies is an appropriate means for the European nations and former colonial powers to compensate for colonial injustices. Accordingly, then, the UK has a moral obligation to try to do what it can to help Commonwealth citizens rather than to trying to restrict their entry.

3.1.9. THE END OF AN IDEAL

The Third Reading in the Commons took place on 27 February, and became law on 1 June 1962. Although the Bill commended itself to the rank and file in the consistency parties, the strange bungling of the Irish question caused grave misgivings among the Conservatives in Parliament. Such anomalies played havoc with a group of liberal Tory MPs, who told Iain McLeod (the Leader of the House) that they would vote against the Bill on its Third Reading unless the Irish were included in the control provisions. Because of this, the Government eventually came up with a compromise: the Irish would be allowed in free, but Irish criminals would be subject to deportation procedure.

44 C. Davies (Lib) c.729-34; Royle (Lab) c.746-50; Fisher (Con) c.784-85; Gaitskell (Lab) c.800-01
3.2. Immigration Bill 1971 (Case study 2)

3.2.1. BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS 1965-77

Politically, the impact of Gaitskell’s intervention was enormous: the Labour Party was united for the first time since 1959 and this moved the party onto the front foot. The ferocity of the Opposition attack on the Second Reading, combined with the hard work of a few Labour MPs at the Committee stage, succeeded in achieving substantial concessions.\footnote{For example, to placate the pro-Commonwealth lobby in Parliament, the 1962 Act permitted the entry of the dependents of workers, hence unintentionally transforming a migration pattern of mostly temporary workers into a permanent settlement of families.}

By the mid-1960s, however, the leaders of the Labour party did not sustain their opposition to immigration controls. In August 1965 the Labour government abandoned its commitment to MARKET GLOBALISM by abolishing ‘Category C’ vouchers and imposing a quota of 8,500 a year on the recruitment of immigrant workers (Layton-Henry 1984, p.302). This cap was then followed by the introduction of a Second Commonwealth Immigrants Act in February 1968, which placed British immigration policy on an overtly racial footing. The Act enabled a quota system to be imposed on Asian immigrants from East Africa who had retained British citizenship when Kenya became independent and were migrating to Britain as a result of racist attacks by the Kenyatta government.

Although this policy reversal was tempered by manifesto commitments to legislate against racial discrimination, there is little doubt that the Labour party had effectively endorsed the entry restrictions it opposed so vigorously less than three years earlier. The two policies – a moratorium on further immigration and measures to combat racism – although logically distinct, can be seen as elements of a “twin-track strategy”. For every piece of anti-racist legislation adopted between 1965 and 1976, an accompanying immigration act either preceded or shortly followed its passage (see Table 17).
Table 17. Immigration and race-relations record of both major parties, 1962-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour (in power)</th>
<th>Conservatives (in power)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration White Paper 1965*</td>
<td>Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Relations Act 1965</td>
<td>Immigration Act 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968</td>
<td>Ugandan Asian Act 1972**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Relations Act 1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Relations Act 1976</td>
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*Proposed both immigration controls and integrative measures.

**Allowed the entry of British passport holding Asians who had been expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin.

3.2.2. THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR THOUGHT ON IMMIGRATION

Why, then, did the Labour party suddenly reverse its stance on Commonwealth free entry? Why, with so few exceptions, did Labour candidates, many of them not averse to mentioning the issue in the past, abandon the globalist ideology so forcefully articulated in 1961?

The reasons for this about-face are twofold. First, there was the unexpected death of Hugh Gaitskell in January 1963, which had a fundamental impact on Labour’s perception of the issue (Katznelson 1973, p.144). Gaitskell had been Labour’s principal advocate of unfettered immigration, and, with his death, the “main driving force of the Labour opposition to immigration controls disappeared”, creating the opportunity for a shift in policy under the new ‘pragmatic’ leadership of Harold Wilson (Deakin 1965).46

The second reason, however, is probably more relevant: political self-preservation. Labour’s enthusiasm for Commonwealth free entry diminished after the traumatic events which occurred in the Midlands borough of Smethwick in 1964. During the General Election campaign, Labour’s shadow foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker MP, lost his seat to Peter Griffiths, a

46 Wilson, like Gaitskell, had sincere commitments to the Commonwealth and to overseas aid. He had always been keen to promote international development which, indeed, became a token of Labour’s commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, Wilson’s ideological allies – led by MPs Richard Crossman, Roy Hattersley and Frank Soskice – supported entry restrictions to allay the fears of the indigenous majority.
Conservative candidate who explicitly courted racist voters by raising the spectre of “voters in their turbans and saris” deciding the future of Smethwick (quoted from Telegraph 2013). With 7,000 immigrants out of a population of 68,000 and a worsening housing shortage, Smethwick was one of the first towns in Britain to come under strain through immigration. Sensing that a sharp turn to the “right” could win him the seat, Griffiths gained a political advantage by highlighting Gordon Walker’s outspoken opposition to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and his apparent indifference to the impact of immigration on Swethwick’s local economy. In the words of one political commentator (Telegraph 2013):

“With a tight outcome expected nationally and locally, Smethwick attracted a media circus. As the scholarly Gordon Walker endeavoured to make up for having neglected his constituency, Griffiths exploited his own ability to galvanise an audience. While his campaigning embarrassed some Conservatives, embattled Tory MPs across the West Midlands saw it as a lifeline. On the day Griffiths ousted Gordon Walker by 1,774 votes. The “white backlash” also won the Conservatives Perry Barr and held several marginals, but a national swing to Labour installed Wilson with a majority of six.”

The extent to which the outcome at Swethwick altered the Labour party’s perception of the immigration issue cannot be overstated. Opening the debate on the Queen’s Speech on November 3 1964, Wilson accused Griffiths of an “utterly squalid” campaign and castigated Sir Alec Douglas-Home for refusing to disown him. Then he provoked uproar by declaring:

“If Sir Alec does not take what I am sure is the right course, and what the country will regard as the right course, Smethwick Conservatives can have the satisfaction of having sent a Member who, until another election returns him to oblivion, will serve his time here as a parliamentary leper.”

The determination of the Labour government to avoid ‘another Smethwick’ grew as it became apparent that anti-immigration sentiment was growing in various parts of the country, notably the West Midlands, the West
Riding of Yorkshire and the Home Counties (Crossman, 1975 pp.270-1). Although Wilson had sincere commitments to the Commonwealth and to overseas aid, immigration restrictionism was accepted by him as a reasonable principle – and Labour identified itself more closely with the Tories’ basic position. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by the Labour politician Roy Hattersley who declared in a 1965 parliamentary address:

“We are all in favour of some sort of limitation. We all wholeheartedly oppose any sort of discrimination. We all wholeheartedly agree that there should be assimilation or adjustment, whichever word one prefers to use. Those three points of view characterise the view and principles of both major parties” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.38)

The apotheosis of this bipartisan consensus was the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968. The legislation prevented Kenyan refugees of Asian descent, who had been persecuted and expelled by a racist Kenyatta government, from entering Britain. Labour’s then-Home Secretary, James Callaghan, argued that it was “both urgent and essential” to extend controls to those who

“did not belong to this country in the sense of having any direct family connection with it or having been naturalized or adopted here” (quoted from Consterdine 2018a, ch.3)

To his critics, Callaghan was clearly a racist who had ruthlessly exploited the issue for his own self-advancement. The London Times called it "probably the most shameful measure that Labour members have ever been asked by their whips to support". To his admirers, however, Callaghan took on a British establishment dominated by an ‘out of touch’ elite who had contempt for the volonté générale (general will) of the people. His cabinet colleague Richard Crossman recorded in his diaries: “Jim arrived with the air of a man whose mind was made up. He wasn’t going to tolerate any of this bloody liberalism.” Having achieved success in its strategy of creating a bipartisan consensus on immigration, the Labour government then proceeded to build on this in the sphere
of family reunification. Callaghan introduced a measure preventing British women living with their foreign or Commonwealth-born husbands in the UK.

### 3.2.3. THE IMPACT OF POWELLISM

Another highly significant development was the intervention of Conservative MP Enoch Powell, when he infamously made his ‘rivers of blood’ speech. Through apocalyptic warnings of interracial conflict, Powell tapped into and channelled powerful anti-immigrant sentiment which had not previously been given expression in mainstream politics. In April 1968 Powell declared:

> “Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.” (quoted from Hansen 2000, pp.183-85)

A particular feature of Powell’s statements in 1968 was the use of personal anecdotes which suggested that the rate of immigration was out of control. He famously spoke about an elderly woman living on a Wolverhampton street where she was the only white resident. According to Powell, this constituent faced racial abuse from the predominant black community: she complained about ‘piccaninnies’ pushing excrement through her letterbox. The explicit language employed by Powell, in many ways more extreme than other speeches made by him in later years, served as a catalyst for a more wide-ranging attack on the political consensus. Even making allowances for the different time period and different historical context, Powell’s rhetoric was clearly designed to alarm and, when combined with his warning that there would be interracial conflict, became explosive:

> “As I look ahead I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’” (quoted from Hansen 2000, p.185)
A common misconception about Powell’s attitudes towards immigration is that he picked up the issue when it appeared to be electorally profitable, and used it to his advantage, although he, personally, had no racial prejudice. In particular, Powell is accused of using his speeches to settle scores with Conservative leader Ted Heath, who won the 1965 leadership contest with Powell finishing a poor third. There is, however, a difficulty with this assumption: although he had a long-standing, hostile personal relationship with Heath, Powell instinctively favoured strict immigration control long before the issue ever dominated the agenda. The real source of the ‘rivers of blood’ came in Powell’s Walsall speech when he warned against ‘communalism’, describing it as ‘the curse of India’. As documented by Powell biographer Robert Shephard (2008):

“Powell’s wartime military service had taken him to India in 1943, and there he developed a burning ambition to be viceroy. The word ‘communalism’ often sprang from the lips of British sahibs in justification of the Raj. Peter Brooke’s research finds Powell echoing this imperialist rationale in Delhi in 1945, when he noted that each Indian party was dominated by a communal group – Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Untouchable and other minorities. Powell concluded that ‘communalism’ ruled out self-government for India in the foreseeable future because individuals would not behave as rational voters or accept majority decisions if they were in a minority.”

Although Powell abandoned imperialism, he never discarded his fear that immigration would introduce communalism, thereby undermining the UK’s commitment to constitutional order and liberty on which, he believed, its parliamentary system depended. For Powell, India’s caste system confirmed where communalism led.

Politically, the effect of the speech was paradoxical. Overnight Powell was transformed into a folk-hero for many and a hate-figure for others. The

47 The charge that Powell himself was racist cannot be reconciled with his parliamentary onslaught against a Conservative government in 1959 for having failed the Africans beaten and murdered at the Hola detention camp in British-ruled Kenya.
Conservative Party disassociated itself from Powell’s rhetoric while simultaneously identifying itself more closely with Powell’s basic position, pledging in their manifesto to give the Home Secretary “complete control over the entry of individuals into Britain”, promising that “there will be no further large scale permanent immigration” (Craig 1990, p.127).

3.2.4. 1970 GENERAL ELECTION

On the whole, Powell’s intervention hurt the Labour Party. The public rewarded the Conservatives at the 1970 General Election with an unexpected victory, gaining an estimated increment of 6.7 per cent in votes because many “perceived them to be the party more likely to keep immigrants out” (Studlar 1978, p.46). Despite his celebrity status, Powell spent the rest of his career as a back-bench MP – having been dismissed by Heath from the Shadow Cabinet. Nevertheless, Heath proceeded to fulfil the above manifesto commitment by introducing the Immigration Bill of 1971, which came into force as an Act on 1 January 1973. The extension of control over Commonwealth citizens applied to those who were seeking permanent admission on a working basis, as well as those who were already subject to some form of control. The main provisions of the Bill can be summarised as follows:

i. First, work permits replaced employment vouchers, and ‘patrials’ (that is, people with close connections with the UK through birth or descent) were freed from all controls.

ii. Second, the Bill repealed an automatic right for family dependents to join their husbands and fathers in the UK.

iii. Third, family dependants could only be admitted if the husband/father was able to satisfy a ‘means test’ about his ability to provide accommodation and financial support.

iv. Fourth, Commonwealth immigrants who had been resident in the UK for five or more years were liable to deportation if they committed a crime
v. Finally, the Bill included a number of modest provisions for voluntary repatriation.

As shall be seen below, the motion was supported by Reginald Maudling (Home Secretary), John Hunt (Bromley), Harold Gurden (Selly Oak), W.F. Deedes (Ashford) and Patricia Hornsby-Smith (Chislehurst). Eight MPs spoke powerfully against the motion – including David Steel (Peebles), Roy Jenkins (Birmingham Stechford) and Renée Short (Wolverhampton North-East) The Shadow Home Secretary, James Callaghan (col.57), seemed to agree with the mover’s basic argument: “I am still of the opinion that we should avoid as far as possible political controversy between the parties on this issue”. What worried Callaghan was whether this single new system of immigration control was an improvement on existing arrangements.

3.2.5. PATRIALITY

Shortly after their victory in the 1970 General Election, the Conservative government sought to avoid a repeat of the Kenyan Asians crisis by placing migration control on a firmer, more circumscribed footing. The 1970 Conservative manifesto, *A Better Tomorrow* (narrative setting), stated that

“We will establish a new single system of control over all immigration from overseas. The Home Secretary of the day will have complete control, subject to the machinery of appeal, over the entry of individuals into Britain (quoted from Hansen 2000, p.192).

Although the obsolescence of the British Nationality Act was recognised, the government felt unable to replace it with a new definition of British nationality. As Hansen (2000, p.193) discovered: “the legal complexities involved in the massive redefinition of the various citizenships created by the 1948 scheme would incur the hostility of the Commonwealth governments”. Instead, the principle of *patriality* (right of abode) eventually provided the foundation for additional immigration controls. ‘Patrials’ – that is, people with
close connections with the UK through birth or descent – fell into one of three categories:

i. citizens of the UK and Colonies whose parents or grandparents were born in the UK;
ii. citizens of the UK and Colonies who, at any time, had been settled in Britain for a minimum of five years; and
iii. any Commonwealth citizen who had a father or mother or grandparent born in Britain (the so-called ‘grandfather clause’)

In the debate on the new rules, held on 8 March 1971, some MPs declined to support the Bill on the grounds that it secured more access for Old Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand while denying it to New Commonwealth countries such as India, Pakistan and Jamaica. Because of this, the ‘grandfather clause’ was knocked out of the Bill at its Commons committee stage by the combined opposition of the Labour party – which said it was ‘racist’ – and Enoch Powell who likened it to a Nazi law disqualifying Germans with a Jewish grandparent (‘Grossmutter nicht in Ordnung,’ ‘Grandmother not in order’). Still, the political incentives for supporting additional control (combined with the anticipated political and electoral costs associated with the failure to do so) impelled a majority of MPs to back the motion.
Table 18. Coding form #6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN26: National unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>The 1971 Immigration Bill had its origins in the 1970 Conservative party manifesto, A Better Tomorrow, which promised a new conditional entry system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>Commonwealth immigrants who want to settle permanently in the UK come overwhelmingly from a different cultural background. The main motive behind this Bill is to avoid the risk of renewed racial tensions; and that such a resurgence would inflame community relations in Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Conservative Party (hero), racism (villain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>The Immigration Bill will make a positive contribution to race relations by allaying the fears of the white majority and thereby contributing to the acceptance and settlement of immigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Maudling (Con) cols.42-44; Powell (Con) cols.83-85; Hunt (Con) cols.92-96; Clarke (Con) cols.126-28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971

In future, the control of people coming to the UK for permanent settlement would be in the hands of the Department of Employment, as it had been for anyone not from the Commonwealth. The Department would continue to administer control on the basis of giving work permits to those people who, by and large, “can be seen to be making a contribution to the economic and social life of the country” (quoted from Maudling, col.56). The Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, had made it clear that the main motive behind the Bill was to avoid the risk of interracial conflict (PN26: NATIONAL UNITY); and that such a resurgence would inflame community relations in Britain:

“I should start by stating that as a matter of general principle I believe that the most important problem that any Government have to face in this whole context is the problem of community relations and that the question of immigration policy in a sense is secondary or ancillary to that basic problem. We have a problem of community relations, as everyone knows. I believe that we in this country have
handled it as an example to the rest of the world, and I believe that we can and shall continue to do so.” (Maudling, col.42)

A similar view was expressed by Enoch Powell, who framed the government’s policy as one of ‘responsible issue management’:

“I wish to conclude precisely on that word "responsibility". Violent, bitter and personal though the differences of judgment may be in this House both about the nature and the future of the underlying problem, in this at any rate I believe we are at one, in recognising that what we do in legislation of this sort, in what we do on this whole matter, we are responsible not just for a Parliament, not just to the present, but to future generations.” (Powell, col.85)

The previous bulwark against immigration control – a bipartisan commitment to the *Civis Britannicus Sum* – was no longer sufficient to resist the logic and force of the restrictionist argument. Frequently, NATIONAL UNITY was explicitly related to other problems such as a JOB DISPLACEMENT (PN14)\(^{48}\) and the impact of population growth on PUBLIC SERVICES AND HOUSING (PN16)\(^{49}\). According to John Hunt, a longstanding MP for the constituency of Bromley, the UK government was forced by a hostile and frightened public to impose immigration controls on citizens of colour:

“My final and fervent hope... is that this Bill will be the last of its kind to be placed before the House for many years. I believe that it will succeed in its aim of controlling and containing the problem of coloured immigrants. I hope that from now on Parliament and politicians alike will devote their energies to more constructive tasks, to the building of bridges rather than to the construction of check-points and control posts. There is no doubt in my mind that the poison of race hatred can undermine and infect the very fabric of our national life and of our nation. (Hunt cols.95-96)”

\(^{48}\) See Gurden (Con) cols.109-112;
\(^{49}\) See Deedes (Con) cols.101-04; Hornsby-Smith (Con) col.118
Piecing some of these speeches together equips the student of migration politics with two valuable insights. First, ideologies are importantly attached to social groups, not necessarily classes – and the vast majority of immigrants who wanted to settle in the UK came from different cultural backgrounds, so the task of assimilation was predicated on a collective right to shape the resident population. Second, British nationality law is generally based on a mix of *ius soli* (citizenship by territory) and *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by descent), and the right to pass one’s citizenship to descendents born abroad is generally accepted.

### 3.2.6. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

A secondary consideration was the policy of voluntary repatriation. This commitment was dealt with in Clause 29 of the Immigration Bill, which allowed the British government to contribute toward the expenses of people returning abroad. Reginald Maudling (cols. 53-54) went on the record as stating quite clearly that voluntary repatriation would not be encouraged on a “large scale” and that any attempt to do so might in itself be damaging to race-relations:

“Let me make clear what the Government intend to do. I do not believe in large-scale repatriation. It is wrong because it would not work and the attempt to make it work would be enormously damaging to what I see as the real objective of our policy, namely, to improve community relations among people already here. That is why we do not intend to embark on a large scale programme of repatriation… How can we reconcile that with our desire to make one single community in this country?” (Maudling, cols 53-54)

Maudling reiterated this point during a press conference accompanying the presentation of the Bill, and repeated it substantially during the debate: that the disposition to administer Clause 29 would be severely restricted; it would not apply to the overwhelming proportion of migrants in Britain. Maudling’s approach to the policy of repatriation had been a humanitarian one – that there may be instances of immigrant families who wanted to go home but could not
afford to do so (Maudling, col.54). That, essentially, was the government's thinking behind Clause 29.

Arguing against the Home Secretary’s watered-down interpretation of assisted repatriation, Enoch Powell told the House that without a fully funded repatriation scheme whole areas of Britain would be taken over by an alien population. Like many of Powell’s interventions, he skilfully exploited each of Heath’s speeches on immigration with a further (and more restrictionist) intervention chastising Heath for his betrayal of a serious manifesto commitment. In so doing, Powell could claim that he was simply articulating and explaining official policy. For example:

“My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said at Ipswich in 1967: Those immigrants and their families who wish to return home should be given every assistance to do so’.

At Walsall in January, 1969, describing problems of immigrants disappointed in their expectations of life in Britain, he said: ‘They will wish to return to their countries of origin. We promise them generous assistance if they wish to do so.’

Nobody who listened to what the Conservative Party has said on this subject… could have supposed that there was any intention to limit the availability of assistance for any immigrant who voluntarily applied for it.” (Powell, col.84)

In sum, Powell regarded the restricted application of voluntary repatriation as a serious breach of what was understood to be a serious manifesto commitment. It was Powell’s belief that this aspect of government policy contained “a seed and germ of hope for the future” (Powell, col.85). Taking this metaphor a step further, Powell urged Maudling “not to tread down that seed and not to extinguish that hope” (Powell, ibid).
3.2.7. ANTI-RACISM

The apparent absence of overt partisan conflict did not mean, of course, that there were no differences between the parties on immigration between 1964 and 1971. On the contrary, as we shall see below, it was precisely the persistence of these differences – albeit beneath the surface of electoral politics – which eventually guided the parties into a more adversarial position on issues of race and immigration.

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<th>Table 19. Coding form #7</th>
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*Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971*

The Bill, as promised, placed Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as aliens. Non-patrial Commonwealth citizens were only allowed to enter the UK for six months and could only work with permission. The Bill would have *no* effect, however, on visitors to the UK; *no* effect on those who could support themselves financially; and *no* effect on Commonwealth students. The only effect would be on those who came to work permanently – immigrants who were already subject to some form of control.

Yet, despite this liberality the Bill none the less contained a racial element. By sharpening the distinction between patrials and nonpatrials, for
example – and by tearing down the barrier between categories of alien and Commonwealth citizen – the 1971 Bill eliminated all preferential treatment for the latter group. It also further distanced Britain from the normative principles of the 1948 BNA – the attachment to the traditional rights of British subjects. At the same time, however, the patrial clause was also criticised for its excessive generosity, particularly the possibility that one million Anglo-Indians could legitimately apply for British citizenship vis-à-vis the grandfather Clause (Callaghan, col.64).

Put another way, the provisions of the Bill did not restrict numbers in an absolute sense; rather, it greatly extended the number of potential migrants by at least one million, but it did so in a highly discriminatory fashion. One could legitimately argue that the patriality provisions were designed to secure access for Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders while denying it to the rest of the Commonwealth. This underlying antithesis was captured well in the speech of John Fraser, a Labour MP for the London constituency of Norwood from 1966 to 1997:

“[The Home Secretary] must realise that race relations are very much a matter of confidence, understanding, trust and psychology. If he allows the Bill to proceed with these blatantly racial provisions, even though they are not intended to be racial, if he disregards the feelings of ordinary men and women, he will do a great disservice to race relations.” (J. Fraser, col.124)

Although the provisions of the ‘grandfather clause’ would apply equally to all Commonwealth immigrant groups, the internationalist element in the party instilled in Labour a powerful opposition to anything suggesting racial prejudice; immigration control was associated, though briefly with such sentiment. This phenomenon – the stigmatisation, exclusion and marginalisation of certain themes as ‘racist’ – was an important part of the political process. Consider, for example, the speech of Sydney Bidwell, a former MP for the constituency of Southall:
“I paid rapt attention throughout [Enoch Powell’s] speech, but it was only in his concluding remarks that he turned, in a fundamental way, to the theme which he first expressed in demagogic speeches outside the House but seldom expresses in speeches inside the House. Whatever we might say about this quaint old place, we cannot get away with demagogy, or lurid stories about wide-grinning piccanninies or human excreta through the letter boxes, because that is now old hat and racialist folk-lore piffle, and the whole nation realises it.” (Bidwell, col.96)

The tone and language of Bidwell’s speech was exceptional, and the anger behind it reflected a general distaste on part for racial prejudice, one that was widely held within the party. If Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech signalled the potential for right-wing populists to exploit latent (and not so latent) public hostility to non-white immigration, it equally affirmed in Labour minds the necessity of stigmatizing a certain narrower (or broader) range of anti-immigration arguments. Put simply, the boundaries of legitimate discussion were one of the crucial stakes of the debate, and that these boundaries changed over time in response to broader developments in the environing culture.

3.2.8. SELF-RESTRICTED SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-CONSENSUS FORCES

Tough immigration controls, as discussed in Chapter 1, command widespread popular support but strict enforcement of the immigration laws may generate opposition from organisations, pressure groups and politicians concerned with protecting civil liberties – and, in addition, from the press and public opinion who may be concerned with the treatment of individuals on compassionate grounds (see Table 20).
Table 20. Coding form #8

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<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN5: Rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>New powers of deportation; proposed system of police registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>The 1971 Bill will adversely affect the lives of people who are already here for permanent settlement. Such persons will become subject to the new deportation clauses of the legislation; the deportation clause affecting family members is particularly objectionable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Immigrant families (victims), race-relations (victim), excessive discretionary state power (villain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>“Any attempt, such as the attempt in the Bill, to take things out of the hands of the courts, is an attempt to give power to make secret decisions, and is against the essence of democracy and the strength of this Parliament.” (Fraser, cols.141-42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Callaghan (Lab) cols.66-72; Steele (Lib) cols.114-15; Short (Lab) cols.135-38; H. Fraser (Con) cols.140-42; Jenkins (Lab) cols.150-53</td>
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Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971

The political hazards of tough enforcement were made dramatically apparent by the parliamentary response to Clause 3, which removed the automatic right for family dependents to join their husbands/fathers in the UK. Clause 3(5)(c) was especially controversial because it allowed for the deportation of an immigrant’s family if this person committed a crime. Clause 3(5)(c) was contested by the trade unionist and former government Minister Roy Jenkins, who voiced concern that

“In the hands of a Home Secretary more ruthless or more energetic than himself, this procedure could be used most dangerously and most damagingly. It is a totally unacceptable provision as it stands.” (Jenkins, cols.150-53)

According to Hunt, such a power would fall most heavily on West Indian mothers:

“One aspect which disturbs me is the proposal to ensure that when a man is deported, his wife and children under 18 should go with him. I ask the Home
Secretary to be flexible with this provision. We should remember that with West Indian families it is often the mother who is the dominant figure in the household. She is likely to have a greater influence over the family than the father. If the father goes off the rails, it is unfair to deport mother and children when she may very well be capable of maintaining a home for herself and her children.” (Hunt, col.94)

In addition to this, the original Bill contained the requirement that Commonwealth citizens would have to register with the police. A number of backbenchers expressed reservations about the effect of registration on black-white relations. Sceptics argued that the requirement would make it harder for the police and the leaders of ethnic minority communities to overcome their mutual feelings of distrust. This, in turn, would hinder the basic crime prevention duties of the police. In the words of Wolverhampton North-East MP Renee Short

“[The registration proposal] will lead to some unpleasantness and some harassing and bullying of some immigrants in some areas by a minority of police. Some policemen will assume that any coloured person may well be here illegally, and in some areas a minority of the police may create difficulties for those who may have been here for 10, 15, or even 20 years…” (Short, cols.135)

Many of these provisions, particularly those relating to deportation, were far stronger than those encompassed by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act ten years earlier. The liberal wing of the Tory Party – represented by the Bow Group and Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism – had been unhappy with the Bill from the outset, particularly its failure to uphold the checks and balances of a liberal democracy. This position was summarised by Tory moderniser Hugh Fraser, who argued for “more open government” and “greater certainty of the individual’s rights” (cols.140-42). In Fraser’s assessment, the Bill was overly statist and authoritarian:

“It is impossible for a Minister, surrounded by millions of decisions taken by growing myriads of civil servants, to be certain that he is taking the right step… It
is nonsense for my right hon. Friend to say that abuses of this sort can be rectified by Parliament; they cannot. They cannot be rectified by the "Nonbudsman" who lives in some mysterious office, with no powers whatsoever.” (H. Fraser, col.141)

This was conjoined with the responsible exercise of power:

“Any attempt… to take things out of the hands of the courts, is an attempt to give power to make secret decisions, and is against the essence of democracy and the strength of this Parliament” (H. Fraser, cols.141-42).

This statement, in many ways more radical than others made by Fraser in later years, sought to address the complex balance between the centralisation of power and the decentralisation of competing checks and balances. That would be achieved by securing “the two lanterns that shine for democracy apart from this House – the lantern of the courts and the lantern of the Press” (H. Fraser, cols.141-42). Much of the argument in PN5 was therefore directed at constructing the institutional edifice required to counter the corrupting influence of undivided power.

3.3. Summary

The issues discussed so far have been rather diffuse, but there are certain facts that emerge from the discussion, and I want to make them fully explicit:

For many years after the introduction of the British Nationality Act in 1945, the UK maintained an open border, and both political parties were reluctant to bring that situation to an end. David Maxwell-Fyfe, a former Home Secretary and Solicitor General, had declaimed for the Conservatives that “we are proud that we impose no colour bar restrictions… we must maintain our great metropolitan tradition of hospitality to everyone from every part of the Empire” (quoted from Joppke 1998).
By the late 1950s, this bipartisan consensus began to unravel. A campaign for immigration control gathered considerable momentum, because of the scale at which immigration took place, and because of the powerful and hostile reaction it elicited. The ‘new’ politics of immigration, at least in the years since 1961, has produced fundamentally incremental, piecemeal policy changes to restrictionist legislation.

Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in this chapter supports the claim that the campaign for control was driven by a political logic – a logic that superseded economic, imperial and humanitarian imperatives whenever these imperatives conflicted with SECURITY or ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM. Furthermore, in the process of becoming politicised, a new bipartisan consensus was forged as early as 1964. This consensus not only included an increasingly restrictive, anti-New Commonwealth immigration policy, but also a series of progressively liberal race relations acts that accelerated the process of immigrant incorporation into British society.
Toward Adversarial Politics: Migration Policy in the 1980s and 1990s

“The real problem is numbers. The British people never wanted a multiracial society. The bitterness is caused because they were never consulted. It was imposed on them by the political establishment.”

– Anonymous MP

“It is one thing for a well-heeled politician to preach the merits of tolerance on a public platform before returning to a comfortable home in a tranquil road in one of the more respectable suburbs.... It is quite another for poorer people, who cannot afford to move, to watch their neighbourhoods changing and the value of their house falling.”

– Margaret Thatcher

Between 1964 and 1975 the Conservative and Labour leaders followed an informal twin-track strategy. On the one hand, successive parliaments enacted a small mountain of restrictive legislation in an effort to discourage the arrival of new immigrants. On the other, positive measures were taken to punish discrimination and incitement to racial hatred. While this agreement endured, the party in government – whether Conservative or Labour – could expect a level of cooperation rarely enjoyed on other issues. In this chapter, we will examine the collapse of that bipartisan consensus. By 1978, the twin-track strategy began to unravel on three fronts: (i) first, immigration emerged as a partisan electoral issue, attracting considerable media attention; (ii) second, ideological disagreements between the major parties widened, provoking vituperative attacks from MPs; and (iii) third, for the first time since 1961 the major parties staked out divergent positions on immigration when changing electoral circumstances coincided with pressures from within the parties themselves.

50 Quoted from Messina (1989) p.130
51 Thatcher (1995) pp.405-06
4.1. British Nationality Bill 1981 (Case Study 3)

4.1.1 CROSS-PARTY CONSENSUS 1971-77

The response of the major parties to the politicisation of migration in 1961 was to extricate the subject from the party-political arena. By the early-1970s the outline of a bipartisan consensus could be seen resting on two pillars:

- tight restriction of New Commonwealth immigrants; coupled with

This two-pronged approach was neatly encapsulated in Roy Hattersley’s formulation: “Without integration limitation is inexcusable, without limitation integration is impossible” (quoted from Hansen, 2000, p.26). First, there would be positive policies to aid in the assimilation and acceptance of migrant communities. Second, there were to be strict controls on entry, supposedly to match Britain’s capacity to absorb immigrants. This dual approach of restrictionism whilst challenging discrimination is what Shamit Saggar (1992) coined the ‘Hattersley equation’.

Yet, despite the ordering of Hattersley’s equation, the resultant policy mix flowed in the opposite direction: cultural assimilation was predicated on the tight control of immigration. In this view, greater public tolerance flowed more or less automatically from the secure knowledge that large-scale immigration had ended. As Richard Crossman explained in Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Labour feared a rebellion from its working class ‘base’ if it persisted in a strongly pro-immigrant policy:

“Ever since the Smethwick election it has been quite clear that immigration can be the greatest potential vote-loser for the Labour party if we are seen to be permitting a flood of immigrants to come in and blight the central areas in all our cities” (quoted from Messina, 1989 p.36).
On the Conservative side, party leaders appeared to be adopting a softer approach to race relations within Britain, recognising that ethnic minorities were an established part of Britain’s future. Edward Heath’s compassionate response to the Ugandan Asian crisis of 1972\(^52\), for example, compared well with the negative treatment of Kenyan Asians by James Callaghan in 1968. This was particularly so as the Heath government had substantially increased the number of vouchers available for Kenyan Asians (Hansard, 26 May 1971, cols 380-5). Meanwhile, the decision of the Conservatives not to oppose the Race Relations Act in 1976 showed an awareness of the extent of racial discrimination and the need for tough measures to combat it. The Shadow Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, personally gave strong support to the Federation of Conservative Students’ campaign against racism in the autumn of 1977 and this, in turn, was buttressed by the party’s involvement in the Joint Committee Against Racialism (JCAR).\(^53\)

4.1.2 Repoliticisation of Migration, 1978-1981

By 1978, the twin-track strategy began to unravel. The Conservatives’ more conciliatory approach toward ethnic minorities\(^54\) was accompanied by moves towards even tougher immigration restrictions than those envisaged in the 1971 Immigration Act. Demands for an immediate reduction in immigration, for a register of family dependents, and for a new Nationality Act were symptomatic of

\(^{52}\) Idi Amin, the President of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, expelled approximately 80,000 Gujarati Indians from Uganda. Most of the expellees were accused of disloyalty, non-integration and commercial malpractice.

\(^{53}\) The JCAR was formed in the autumn of 1977 and included the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the National Union of Students, the British Youth Council and leading immigrant organisations (Layton-Henry 1984. P.149).

\(^{54}\) On the party-activist side, Conservative Central Office established an Ethnic Minorities Unit whose role was to educate party members about the growing electoral importance of Asian and West Indian voters and to influence party policy so that a more favourable party image could be presented to these voters. One of the first initiatives of the new unit was to create an Anglo-Asian Conservative Society and an Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society in order to recruit Asians and West Indians directly into the party through specialist associations (Layton-Henry 1984, p.147).
this trend (Layton-Henry 1984, p.149). As discussed by Anthony Messina (1989) in *Race and Party Competition In Britain*, Conservative MPs began to abandon the bipartisan consensus around 1975 when Willie Whitelaw delivered a series of speeches over an eighteen-month period catapulting race to the forefront of British politics. In an address to the Conservative Party Annual Conference in 1976, Whitelaw declared:

“There will be those voices raised... condemning any rational discussion of immigration voices as racist... [However] no one is going to accuse us of any conspiracy of silence” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.127).

Fifteen months later, the Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, expanded upon Whitelaw’s remarks in 1978, saying:

“I think there is a feeling that the big political parties have not been talking about this [immigration] and sometimes... we are falsely accused of racial prejudice...

Now we are a big political party. If we do not want people to go to extremes – and I do not – we ourselves must talk about this problem and we must show we are prepared to deal with it” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.128).

Though she rarely spoke about the subject, Thatcher professed to be concerned that working-class voters might be attracted by the openly racist message of the National Front (NF) and that it was her duty to allay these voters’ concerns. Seen through this lens, Mrs. Thatcher’s reappropriation of Powellite themes could be construed as an attempt to reassert democratic political control over domains of life that were seen, plausibly enough, as having been depoliticized and de-democratized (that is, removed from the realm of democratic decision-making). As suggested in the above quotations, that may involve opposition to the stifling of debate – or what Willie Whitelaw called a “conspiracy of silence”. To be sure, Thatcher’s own views on immigration, as spelt out in her memoirs, appear to confirm this:
“It was part of my credo that individuals were worthy of respect as individuals, not as members of classes or races … I felt no sympathy for rabble rousers, like the National Front, who sought to exploit race … at the same time, large scale New Commonwealth immigration over the years had transformed large areas of Britain in a way which the indigenous population found hard to accept.” (Thatcher 1995, pp.405-06)

On its own, however, this explanation implies an unrealistic and highly magnanimous view of the political environment to which Thatcher was accustomed. The NF acquired some notoriety and a lot of publicity in the 1970s, but never won a seat on a local council never mind in the House of Commons. The UK’s ‘first past the post’ electoral system played a key part in this. Despite its massive increase in candidates from 90 to 303, the NF won only 0.6 percent of the total vote in 1979 compared with 0.4 percent in October 1974 (Layton-Henry 1984, p.106). Left-wing countermobilisations by the Anti-Nazi League were particularly effective in their use of popular protest to spread the anti-racist and anti-fascist message among young people.

Ultimately, Mrs. Thatcher was determined to impress the electorate that she was responsive to popular anxieties over immigration and that the Conservative Party would bring an end to Civis Britannicus sum. Moreover, Thatcher’s instinct on race relations was to reject existing policy consensuses. Whereas Labour MPs supported either reinforcing or more zealously enforcing the 1976 Race Relations Act, a majority of Conservatives advocated repeal or weakening of its implementation.

The efforts of the major parties to repoliticise the campaign for control were at least partly responsible for the renewed attention paid to the subject during the 1979 GE campaign.\textsuperscript{55} Although much of the increased political

\textsuperscript{55} In contrast to February 1974, for example, when only 6 per cent of all Conservative candidates cited immigration as a campaign issue in their election addresses, fully one-quarter mentioned the issue five years later. In the case of Labour, from a mere 2 per cent of prospective MPs establishing race-relations as a campaign theme in 1970, this number escalated to 27 per cent in 1979 and 28 per cent in 1983 (Messina 1989, p.128)
sensitivity of the candidates can be attributed to cues received from party
headquarters, there is little question that MPs had opted independently to
reconsider the migration issue both during and between election periods.

4.1.3 1979 GENERAL ELECTION
The Conservative victory in the General Election of May 1979 was won by a
party committed to tough policies on immigration and more anxious to appeal to
anti-immigrant voters. The number of work permits was reduced further (they
averaged 10,000 to 20,000 a year from 1973 to 1989), and even the automatic
right to bring in a foreign spouse was curtailed by the ‘primary purpose rule’, in
which the prospective husband or wife had to prove that the main purpose of the
marriage was not to gain access to Britain.

Another indication of the emergence of adversarial politics was the low
priority given by the government to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).
In April 1980, five CRE commissioners were replaced: four of the seven black
commissioners, and one of the eight white commissioners. No matter what the
merits of the individual cases, the impression was created that “something of a
purge of black commissioners was taking place and there were calls for potential
black nominees not to accept places on the Commission” (Layton-Henry 1984,
p.143).

Thatcher’s personal instincts on race, as on several other issues, were to
disavow existing policy consensuses. Her departure from the bipartisan consensus
on immigration was evident in a pre-election interview she granted to Granada
television in January 1978. Her reference to the ‘swamping’ of British culture by
Pakistani immigrants was, as her related comments during the interview clearly
demonstrated, a transparent effort to reappropriate Powellite themes:

“If we went on as we are then by the end of this century there would be four
million people of the New Commonwealth of Pakistan here… I think that is an
awful lot and I think it means that people are rather afraid that this country might
be rather swamped by people with a different culture… So if you want good race
relations, you have to allay people’s fears on numbers” (quoted from Goodhart 2013)

Allaying people’s fears meant, specifically, that the Conservatives would adopt a new Nationality Act – with the resultant Bill being published in 1981. Willie Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, hoped that by tying the right of abode and settlement in the UK to a clear definition of citizenship it would be able to make immigration control less arbitrary and less vulnerable to misinterpretation or legal challenge.

4.1.4 THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP: WHO BELONGS?

To its detractors, the 1945 British Nationality Act (BNA) had become unduly expansive in granting citizenship to hundreds of millions of people with no territorial links to the UK. According to this policy narrative (PN31: RATIONALISATION OF LAW) the 1945 BNA prevented the British government from basing its immigration policy on an objective legal standard (see Table 21).

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Under the new British Nationality Bill (BNB), a British citizen would be a person who had a close personal connection with the UK either because their parents or grandparents were born, adopted, naturalised or registered as citizens of the UK. One of the most powerful arguments for this reform had been a legal-rational one, and Sir Edward Gardner (Fylde South) had put it superbly in the 1981 Second Reading debate:

“One of the reasons why we must have a new nationality Bill lies in the extraordinary fact that there are so few people in this country, born here and living here, who would be capable of answering the simple question, "What is your nationality?" I suppose that most of us, because nationality depends upon citizenship, would be tempted to answer, "Well, we are British citizens, aren't we?" But we are not. We never have been.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981)

Seen through this lens, the privileges accorded to Commonwealth immigrants were a historic relic, an anachronism, which had lost their relevance in a world changed so dramatically by the fall of Empire. The remarks of one Conservative backbencher (Alexander Lyon) sum up the dissatisfaction of these MPs with the status quo:

“We have no duty – moral or legal – to the inhabitants of those countries that were formerly in the British Empire, and which threw off our sovereignty and repudiated their allegiance to the Queen. It was their choice. They were entitled to do so.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981)

Although the Labour government in 1977 had already proposed such changes in its Green Paper, *British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible Changes*, the Bill the government presented proved to be highly controversial. It proposed three categories of citizenship:
i. **Full British citizenship** for those with close ties, i.e., that were partial

ii. **British Dependent Territories Citizenship (BDTC)** for people living in dependent territories i.e., Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and Hong Kong.

iii. **British Overseas Citizenship**, a residual category to which almost no rights were attached. This category was designed to encourage East African Asians and Malaysians to acquire citizenship in their country of residence.

One controversial proposal was that as a general rule British citizenship would descend only to the *first generation* of children born abroad to British citizens born in the UK. The Bill also proposed that children born in Britain whose parents were of *uncertain* status – for example, because of illegal entry or overstaying their period of residence – should *not* automatically be entitled to citizenship. These proposals attracted considerable opprobrium from legal groups, the churches and civil rights organisations like the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI).

Yet, despite this liberal backlash the parliamentary Conservative party remained defiant. Tony Marlow’s remarks on the Nationality Bill were peppered with attacks on “socialist activists” and “woolly-minded clerics” (narrative villains), for example:

“Socialist activists—the minnows that follow the whale that opened the debate on behalf of the Opposition—will also misrepresent the Bill and use whatever distortion or inaccuracy comes to hand as they unscrupulously trawl for support and for votes among the ethnic minorities… We have [also] heard quite a lot about woolly minded clerics whose adherence to impractical posturing is inclined, on occasions, to overcome their powers of rational analysis.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981)

Similar sentiments were expressed by Conservative MP John Stokes, a longstanding member of the far-right Monday Club:
“Those of us who wish that this Bill were much stronger in defence of the nation's vital interests will not look to the intellectuals, nor to the media, and certainly not to the churches, for help—particularly not the churches, because they have failed or given up the idea of trying to convert the heathen immigrant to Christianity”


In language which may astonish readers 30 years on, Marlow accused “racial” politicians of undermining the political process:

“The racial politicians—I do not use the word pejoratively—of the community relations councils and, to a certain extent, of the [Commission for Racial Equality]—tend to make an enemy of the Government, no matter which Government are in power, in order to sustain their own interests and influence among those whom they seek to represent.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981)

Why, then, did the Conservatives move in a more populist direction? Were there any arguments – used so forcefully in 1961 and 1968 – which were over-taken by events in 1981? In Anthony Messina’s (1989, p.144) view, the populist drift on immigration after 1975 was facilitated by the “political eclipse or generational replacement of those most responsible for the bipartisan consensus on race.” Messina is referring here to that segment of the party, especially in Parliament, that had lived, worked, or governed in Britain’s former Colonies and whose opposition had moderated the Conservative party’s movement toward restrictive entry policies. As Messina (ibid) observed, “By 1981 only nine Conservative MPs remained in the House of Commons of the rebellious faction which had voted against Labour’s 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.”

4.1.5 INTERNAL PARTY DIVISIONS

To summarise briefly, the main purpose of the Nationality Bill was to remove many of the lingering ambiguities in British nationality law and immigration rules so that both became less vulnerable to misinterpretation or legal challenge. Even Roy Hattersley, who took a principled stand against the Bill, recognised the
absurdity of offering British nationality to a large minority of the world’s population:

“I do not suggest for one moment that a new nationality Act is not needed. The world has changed considerably since 1948, not least because of the wholly welcome process of colonies becoming independent nations. That process, as the Labour Government's Green Paper said, has left the law of nationality complicated and obscure.” (Hattersley, col.946)

Perhaps most interesting in this regard had been the disagreements among Conservative MPs about the essence of British citizenship – and its links to NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). As already mentioned, the BNA proposed three categories of citizenship: British citizenship, citizenship of the Dependent Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. The aforementioned categories retained what Enoch Powell called a “rag-bag principle”: he described these categories as “a residuum that has been lumped together for purposes of convenience and designated as a citizenship” (Powell, cols.963-98). Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke, a Tory MP for Darwen, concluded that:

“There can be loyalty to Anguilla. There can be loyalty to Hong Kong. There can be loyalty to Britain. But to create a second class of British citizenship over this amorphous area is to deprive people of the kind of loyalty to which they are entitled – the feeling that they belong (Fletcher-Cooke, col.977).

The issue of allegiance played an important role in intra-party debates about access to citizenship for immigrants and their descendants. The refusal to grant birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants was often justified on the grounds that these children will gain another citizenship at birth – citizenship in their parents’ country of origin. The statement of Enoch Powell is typical in this respect:
“[Allegiance] is the very essence of nationhood, there is no meaning in nationhood without allegiance. Nationhood means that a man stands to one nation, to one loyalty, against all others—that is what it is about.” (Powell, col.967)

Framed through a metanarrative of SECURITY, the plot of PN26 is consistent with the following statements:

- The duty of allegiance should be inherent in the notion of nationality, and no society can remain cohesive in the long-term unless that proposition is accepted;
- The BNB proposes three categories of citizenship that spread all over the world, and into countries which vary in size, structure and cultural makeup; and
- Such an amorphous area is not compatible with the inherent obligations of allegiance that lie at the foundation of national status.

As illustrated in Table 22, neo-nationalist MPs feared that a threefold definition of nationality would create divisions, even conflicts, in the UK. On this view, the state is entitled to the citizen’s complete loyalty, allegiance and emotional attachment.

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A secondary consideration was the right to dual citizenship. In Powell’s view, dual citizenship “erodes a sense of allegiance to a common sovereign”, and “enables people to travel on two passports and, thereby, to evade immigration controls” (cols.963-98). Discussions of dual citizenship were almost always tied to discussions about migrant workers from the Republic of Ireland. Irish immigrants were not regarded as British subjects but were nevertheless accorded the right of settlement. As noted in Chapter 3, the Irish exemption had powerful political and economic considerations on its side, chief of which was substantial support from the Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland. Some MPs on the Tory Right, however, demanded exclusivity and attachment to a single state, which was readily linked to a military context. “If we are to retain our cohesion”, Harvey Proctor warned, “…it would be unwise to create in the Army circumstances similar to those that existed at the time of the Curragh mutiny in 1914” (cols. 996-999). Proctor, a member of the right-wing Monday Club, took it as self-evident that the citizen-soldier should be committed to a single state.

4.1.6 CIVIC NATIONALISM

Throughout the twisting and turning over the allegiance issue, two aspects of the Conservative attitude to citizenship and race offered liberals some encouragement. The first was the party’s constant insistence on coordinated Government measures for assisting immigrants in the UK, and for special Government funds to further that purpose.

The second aspect concerned racial identity and national belonging. This theme was underlined in a speech from Sir Edward Gardner, the Conservative MP for Fylde South. ‘Britishness’, in Gardner’s view, is defined by a dense network of relationships and associations. What is at stake is a person’s ability to maintain and develop a rich and highly particular set of human ties. For Gardener, therefore, national identity is shaped by cultural traditions, not on concepts of common ancestry or race:
“Nationality and race are not two sides of the same coin. They are two different coins altogether. Those who try to introduce race into a debate on nationality are producing a dangerous mixture. They are like people who are prepared to risk pouring petrol into an oil stove. There is likely to be an explosion. Race is something that can be poisonous, harmful and damaging to a country. Nationality, with which we are now dealing, is a subject that can be of undoubted advantage to everyone living in this country.” (Gardner, col.961)

Although the very idea of nationality implies exclusion of those not entitled to it, there is no sense in which the British Nationality Bill, as entrenched in naturalisation policy, is an ethnically exclusivist one. All immigrants from the Colonies arrived with full citizenship rights; all immigrants from independent Commonwealth countries who arrived before 1962 acquired citizenship automatically after one year; and all immigrants since 1971 have been able to acquire it after five years. The underlying principle here is that British citizenship cannot be tied to ascribed characteristics like race and/or ethnicity.

Still, no political system is without its dissenters and this has been true for Britain as for any other political system despite her reputation as a stable parliamentary democracy with an emphasis on moderation and consensus. Sir John Stokes, who was MP for the Midlands seat of Oldbury and Halesowen, used his allotted speaking time to genuflect on the glories of bygone days. Stokes (his hero was Disraeli, and he was a prominent member of the Primrose League) entertained a vision of Britain in which “ordinary Englishman still clings obstinately to his Englishness and to the old, known ways” (col.988). Unlike Gardner, Stokes wanted a Nationality Bill nested in a discourse of blood, family, kith and kin (PN35: RACIAL SELF-INTEREST):

“The Bill seems to suppose that all or a large part of the human race is much the same in thoughts, habits, customs, religious beliefs and ideals as those who have lived here for centuries and have shaped their destiny on the world's stage. I do not believe that people are digits or are all the same to be dealt with in this way.
That great English Jew, Disraeli, said that race was everything, and he was right. But race and racial origin are not mentioned in the Bill, and John Bull becomes a very shadowy figure indeed” (Stokes col.989)

It must be borne in mind that, politically speaking, Stokes is an extreme example. Although he admired Mrs Thatcher personally, he had become increasingly disturbed by the new ‘meritocratic’ style of the modern Conservative Party. Among other things, Stokes urged Mrs Thatcher to start creating hereditary peerages ranging from dukes to barons “to remind the public of the glorious part the nobility has played in the history of England.” This rival thesis placed Stokes, unsurprisingly, in a small minority of MPs.

4.1.7 THE RE-EMERGENCE OF PARTISAN DIVISIONS
The British Nationality Bill marked a turning-point in another sense. Labour politicians and CSO organisations reacted, in the main, antagonistically to the Bill. Although the Labour party was itself committed to a revision of the nationality law, Hattersley gave the Bill a very hostile reception:

“[The Bill] has nothing to do with the principles of nationality. It has simply to do with numbers, with the size of the pool. We are even back to the same pathetic, watery metaphors, to "swamping", in the Prime Minister's phrase—talk about pools, about numbers, about size, about immigration control, and nothing to do with principle” (Hattersley, col.950)

The opening section of Hattersley’s speech also went on the attack, fulfilling Ad Herennium’s injunction to ‘make our adversaries unpopular’:

“I have spent the past 15 years telling my black constituents that they were equal before the law. I must now tell them that, if the Bill is passed, the law will discriminate against them.” (Hattersley, col.951)

Despite the fact that many of the Conservatives’ proposals were foreshadowed in Labour’s 1977 Green Paper, Hattersley’s response to the BNB
was one of condemnation of the Conservative government (narrative villain) and support for various civil society organisations, including legal groups, the churches, ethnic minority organisations and civil rights groups (narrative heroes). Hattersley had decided that an adversarial approach should be adopted by the Labour opposition against the Conservatives on all issues which related to race-relations and immigration.

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This was first major parliamentary test for Hattersley since becoming Shadow Home Secretary in 1980. Together with John Tilley, the opposition spokesman for race, immigration and nationality, Labour’s frontbench had considerable experience of the problems facing immigrant families, since both MPs represented inner city constituencies with substantial numbers of immigrant electors (Mr. Hattersley represented Birmingham Sparkbrook and Mr. Tilley Lambeth Central). In addition to being more liberal then their immediate predecessors, both men quickly evinced a predilection for speaking out against the “numbers game”. As Tilley articulated it:
“We must stop playing the numbers game. We believe that racial tension in this country is not caused by the number of black faces; it is caused by the number of racists.” (Tilley, col.1032)

Tilley’s verdict was echoed by Liberal Party leader David Steel, who claimed that the Nationality Bill was an attempt “to massage our nationality legislation to suit immigration policy” (cols.958-61). Similarly, David Marshall, a former MP for Glasgow East, claimed that despite assurances to the contrary “the Bill seeks to marry citizenship to the needs of immigration control” (Marshall, col.1013). In a pithy formulation that married pathos with Atticism, Steel put the nub of his argument in Biblical terms:

“The Prime Minister is fond of quoting St. Francis of Assisi and misrepresenting the parable of the Good Samaritan. I would commend to her an older text in the Book of Leviticus: When an alien settles with you in your land, you shall not oppress him. He shall be treated as a native born among you, and you shall love him as a man like yourself. Because the Bill falls far short of that standard, we shall oppose it.” (Steel, col.961)

Reginald Freeson, a former editor of the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight, went further than Steel, arguing that the new classification system would disadvantage the black community and give corresponding advantages to the indigenous white population:

“As the years go by, we seem to sink lower as we try to accommodate prejudice instead of standing foursquare against it, exposing it for what it is. Instead, racial discrimination is tolerated and legitimised by successive immigration laws and practices. We speak of good race relations but then proceed to damage them by such legislation as this.” (Freeson, col.974)

These verbal commitments were reinforced in Labour’s 1982 Programme and in its 1983 and 1987 election manifestos, which offered: (i) the repeal of the 1981 Nationality Act; (ii) the repeal of the 1971 Immigration Act; (iii) the
introduction of ‘contract compliance’; (iv) the establishment of independent and balanced adjudication panels to hear immigration appeals; and (v) extension of the investigatory powers of the CRE (Messina 1989, p.136). Such, indeed, was the level of dissensus that Whitelaw’s outline of a comparatively liberal Nationality Bill prompted David Marshall (col.1014) to reply that “the Bill represents the final victory for racists in this country.”

Taking in a broader, diachronic view allows us to see that, contrary to the popular claims of the racialisation scholars, the anti-racist movement had won over fairly loyal support from MPs who shared coherent, deeply felt and in many cases legitimate concerns about anti-immigrant racism. As summarised by McTaggart (col.1008): “The notion of belongers and non-belongers… has been seen throughout the world as an attempt to discriminate among British subjects who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, on thinly-disguised racial criteria.”

4.1.8 ANTI-STATISM
Another controversial area was the relationship of the BNB to the RULE OF LAW (PNS). From the beginning of the Thatcher administration in 1979 there was unanimous agreement in the House of Commons that British nationality law had become increasingly complicated and obscure, not least because of the process of decolonization.

Yet, despite this cross-party consensus, Labour attacked Whitelaw for increasing the powers of the state and for withdrawing the right of abode to would-be British citizens. As coded in Table 24, MPs on both sides of the House talked about the rights of British citizens, and whether or not all British citizens will have the same rights.
Table 24. Coding form #12

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<td>Marshall (Lab) cols.1014-15;</td>
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<td>Tilley (Lab) cols.1028-29;</td>
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Perhaps the most controversial proposal in the Bill was the so-called character test, which built in more discretionary powers for the Home Secretary. Despite the BNB’s comparative normalcy (the requirement of ‘good’ behaviour is interpreted essentially as obeying the law, and exists everywhere in Europe), defenders of automatic inclusion, such as Hattersley, spoke ominously about investigations into each immigrant’s ‘contribution’ and how well integrated they were into their local community. This process, Hattersley feared, would likely lead to the persecution of migrants from minority ethnic or religious backgrounds. Using a reductio ad absurdum, Hattersley argued that the ‘good character’ requirement was too vague and allowed far too much discretion, claiming
“For my part, I do not believe that a West Indian in my constituency, unemployed and poor, who has smashed open the gas meter is necessarily of worse character than the Minister of State, who stopped that man's family joining him in this country.” (Hattersley col.952)

Although much of the movement of the Labour party on immigration after 1979 was a consequence of the highly partisan, combative style of Thatcher’s leadership, there is little question that Labour headquarters had been under pressure for some time to break with the ‘Hattersley equation’. These pressures primarily emanated from party-linked pressure groups such as the Labour Party Race Action Group (LPRAG) (Messina 1989).

Important, too, was the rise of the belief that the Bill was racist and in reality an immigration control bill dressed up as a Nationality Bill. The latter critique was a legitimate one; the former, less so. Unlike in a majority of European states, the implementation of the BNB’s naturalisation process would not involve lengthy interviews or evidence-gathering procedures. Nevertheless, Labour’s opposition to the Bill was unrelenting, both at the Second Reading and through the early part of the Committee stage. Reginald Freeson accused the Government are seeking to confer massive executive powers on Ministers:

“The Government are supposed to be committed to reducing the power of the State, but the Bill gives the Home Secretary more power, not less, over the lives of individuals. It helps to destroy the myth. No doubt the Government, supported by their Back Benchers, will introduce other legislation to confer more executive powers on Ministers so that they will not have to refer their actions and decisions to Parliament. The myth has gone” (Freeson cols.972-73).

Other criticisms levelled at the Bill concerned the removal of the automatic right to citizenship by birth in the UK. Tilley was of the firm view – and it is one entirely in line with what legal philosophers call ius soli (‘the right
of the soil’) – that all individuals born in the UK to someone legally resident in the country should register automatically as a British citizen:

“The full horror of the measure is illustrated in clause 1(2)... It says that an abandoned new-born baby will be deemed to be a British citizen. That means that parents who have any doubt about the nationality of their new baby can resolve that doubt only by leaving the child in a basket on the doorstep of the registrar of births, marriages and deaths.” (Tilley, col.1027)

The Bill also proposed that children born in Britain whose parents were of uncertain status – for example, because of illegal entry or overstaying their period of residence – should not automatically be entitled to citizenship. Although the UK government had been a signatory to the UN Convention on the reduction of statelessness, the ever-widening definition by the courts of ‘illegal entry’ meant that a child who was eligible for citizenship at birth could later lose that citizenship if his or her parents were judged, retrospectively, to have entered illegally.

4.1.9 COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRATION AND LABOUR

Through the 1979 election the Labour Party kept scrupulously quiet over the immigration issue, and, after the election, occupied itself with arguments over defence and public ownership. It was not until Whitelaw’s motion in January 1981 that Labour re-thought its basic position and came to the same conclusions as Hugh Gaitskell in 1961. Against this backdrop of political re-alignment, Labour proposed five amendments to the Nationality Bill:

i. Use of objective criteria for the granting nationality and a right of appeal against refusal;

ii. A guarantee that no child could be born stateless as a result of the Bill;

iii. A commitment to continue the existing civic rights of Commonwealth and Irish citizens resident in the UK;

iv. A citizen’s right to a passport; and
v. A guarantee that all children born in Britain should automatically be British.

Outside of Parliament Hattersley promised that an elected Labour government would make amends for the ‘mistake’ of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act which restricted the immigration of British passport-holders resident in East Africa. In addition, Hattersley made a number of other commitments, including the repeal the 1971 Immigration Act. Taken together, these proposals were the most expansive posture either major political party had ever adopted on immigration since 1961 (Messina 1989).

There is no record of any explanation for this departure from the ‘Hattersley equation’. One might argue that the transition from government to Opposition had a dramatic effect on policy: e.g., gone are the practical constraints on policy implementation, such as the need to maintain a parliamentary majority. Furthermore, in Opposition, the mass Labour party (and especially the NEC) no longer had to compete with civil servants for the major influence on frontbench policy.

Having said this, the postulation of a one-to-one relationship between ideology and institution has produced considerable blindness to the relative autonomy of political actors. As briefly noted in section 4.1.8, the Labour Party Race Action Group (LPRAG) contributed to increased public visibility of race-related issues and placed these on the national agenda (Messina 1989, pp.141-42). Like the Conservative Monday Club, the LPRAG advocated throughout the 1970s that the bipartisan consensus on immigration had to be terminated. Opposition from this small caucus left its mark on the PLP.
4.2. Asylum and Immigration Bill 1995 (Case Study 4)

As with the disintegration of most policy consensuses, the breakup of the Conservative and Labour parties’ understanding on migration yielded political winners as well as losers. Perhaps the chief beneficiary of renewed party competition has been Labour’s ethnic minority constituency (Messina 1989). The political advantages gained by non-whites as a consequence of Labour’s commitment to implement less restrictive immigration rules are clear and require little further comment. Two less obvious consequences of party competition, the greater globalist ethos within the PLP and the political mobilisation of anti-asylum forces within the Conservatives, will be analysed in this section.

4.2.1. POLITICISATION OF ASYLUM

With the 1990s came a new dilemma for the political elite: the so-called ‘asylum crisis’. As a result of inter- and intra-state conflicts worldwide, people across many nations were fleeing their countries in fear of persecution, and subsequent asylum applications to Britain challenged the very system upon which it depended. It did so for three reasons:

i. first, because it is one of the few areas in which national sovereignty is still meaningfully restricted;

ii. second, because most Convention signatory states have articulated lengthy legal procedures that make subsequent appeals procedures time consuming and expensive; and

iii. third, because deportation is extremely difficult.

In a cycle that mirrored the experience of several other European countries, the British asylum system developed a huge backlog: displaced refugees were coming directly to Europe from conflict zones in Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and the Balkans. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees commented: “in our view, the rise in asylum claims may be more
rationally seen as a consequence of the unprecedented scale of global conflict which produces refugee flows” (quoted from Straw, col.717). Similarly, the Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw claimed that

“The end of the cold war was of huge importance in reducing the prospect of thermo-nuclear conflict, but since its end, the world has in many ways become a much more dangerous place. Let us look at the areas of internal disruption and civil war, and consider the trend in the figures. Look at Algeria, the Sudan, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and, of course, Nigeria. As conflicts develop, so the number of applications for asylum shoots up.” (Straw, col.717)

What can be called the ‘asylum crisis’ of the 1990s marked the collapse of the legal-bureaucratic reforms pursued by each party controlling the centre after the early 1960s. Only a minority of those whose asylum applications were rejected got deported; tracking down and deporting individuals was expensive (often, asylum seekers destroyed documentation in order to prevent their return); and source countries were reluctant to take individuals back without documentation. Furthermore, whatever difficulties asylum seekers may have had in reaching a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention, once they arrived and claimed asylum they were entitled to certain rights: to the processing of the claim and, in Britain, to housing, social support, and legal advice.

As the political saliency of asylum seeking increased, so, too, did the government’s efforts to restrict it. Three (major) parliamentary acts on asylum and immigration were established under British governments of the 1990s. These included:

i. Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993
ii. Asylum and Immigration Act 1996
iii. Immigration and Asylum Act 1999

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the major ideological themes of the 1995 Asylum and Immigration Bill, and some related boundary areas. To do full justice to the legislative framework would require an
investigation beyond the capacities of any one scholar. Unavoidably, the author's guiding hand in that selection is in quotations and, as with any scholarly interpretation, other viewings of the same transcript might well result in different examples.

4.2.2. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

The study of asylum policy is both simple and complex. It is simple because the 1951 Convention on Refugees is a pre-eminent treaty in International Relations, extensively articulated and amplified, and a familiar component within the legal framework of the UNHCR. It is complex because its permeation into binary categories, both ‘bogus’ and ‘legitimate’, ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, makes its unravelling difficult, and because its diffusion has led to an extraordinary range of policy tools.

Britain is perhaps the most complex and fascinating European case study in asylum policy. The core contradiction of the contemporary European asylum scene is nowhere more evident than in the Second Reading of the Asylum Bill: against the legal-humanitarian imperative for accepting refugees stood a political process under the sway of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION and SECURITY, which commanded increasingly tough and exclusive stances toward asylum applicants. The most controversial and far-reaching of the Clauses included:

• **Clause 1** permitted an accelerated appeals process if the grounds for a claim did not fall within the remit of the 1951 Refugees Convention.

• Provisions in **schedule 2** established a time-limited window for rejected to appeal against deportation.

• **Clause 8** disincenitive illegal economic migration to the UK. Employers had to ensure that their workers produced one of a range of documents before their employment could begin.

• **Clause 9** restricted entitlement to social housing.

• **Clause 10** restricted entitlements to child benefit if an asylum application was rejected.
Naturally, those distinctions between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ refugees are far from clear-cut. Economic migrants from poorer countries, in particular, may appear indistinguishable from their refugee counterparts. The permutations of distinguishing a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker from a bogus one in these philosophical terms are intriguing, but also legion, and there is insufficient space in this work to do so. Suffice it to say, however, the methodological adherence to dichotomous presentation is itself a common feature of the debate on asylum. As coded in Table 25, much of the discussion during the Second Reading bore upon the legislative proposals contained in Clauses 1, 9 and 10: the extension of the accelerated appeals procedure; removal of certain in-country appeal rights; and withdrawal of social security benefits.

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Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995

Accompanying the aforementioned measures, the Bill erected a wide variety of institutional and legal barriers designed to keep asylum seekers away from Britain’s labour market. These included: employer sanctions, the introduction of new immigration offences and the ‘fast-tracking’ of manifestly
unfounded applications (which included applications by people arriving from third-safe countries and applications based on forged or destroyed documents). For Michael Howard, the Conservative Home Secretary, traditional mechanisms distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate refugees were failing:

“[The AIB will] enable us to certify a claim openly based on poverty rather than persecution; or fraudulent claims, such as that by the Ethiopian teenager claiming that his mother had disappeared after arrest, but whose parents turned out to be living safely at home and in well-paid state employment; or that by the large group of Pakistanis who claimed asylum because of membership of the Pakistan People's party and who appealed against refusal of their applications even though that party had since become the Government of Pakistan.” (Howard, cols.699-71)

Many of the instances cited in the evidence above appear to be minor, but no doubt irritating, examples of asylum applicants ‘pushing their luck’ or ‘gaming the system’.

Laid against these restrictions were measures designed to make life as a refugee in Britain less attractive: the Bill removed access to welfare benefits for ‘in-country’ asylum applicants, as opposed to applications made at the point of entry such as an airport. Under Howard’s leadership, the influence of communitarian thinking allowed greater emphasis on the moral relevance of communities and the rights and responsibilities of individuals within them – in comparison with Labour’s emphasis on MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM. In such terms, failed asylum seekers are ‘illegitimate’ members of the community of legitimate receivers of state benefits. As Howard put it:

“Some have suggested that this is an immoral Bill. I reject that utterly. It is not immoral to protect our asylum procedures against the current massive level of abuse. It is not immoral to declare that, in our judgment, the conditions in some countries do not give rise to a serious risk of persecution. It is not immoral to insist that people arriving from other safe countries should return to pursue their claims there. It is not immoral to seek to protect employment opportunities for those
entitled to live and work here, and it is not immoral to combat racketeering.”
(Howard, cols.699-71)

The most dominant political tendency by the Conservative government had been the pursuit of the political ‘centre ground’. When dealing with a divisive issue which had to be addressed in order to demonstrate the party’s responsiveness, these had to be given a positive, humanitarian spin. For example, the Howard administration’s response to the ‘asylum crisis’ was to adopt a more welcoming attitude to genuine refugees. As Carlisle (col.759) put it, “Having been granted UK passports, [refugees] see others waltzing in on an illegal ticket, overstaying their welcome and staying here for many years.” The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by Nirj Deva, the former Tory MP for Brentford and Isleworth:

“The Bill protects the interests of one particular group about whom we have heard not a word from Labour Members—those who are genuine asylum seekers. Genuine asylum seekers are stuck in a huge queue of people who are not genuine asylum seekers. They are in a state of limbo. They are left hanging around and no consideration is given to their prosperity or their prospects. That is the Bill’s first consideration.” (Deva col.768)

The administrative managerialism which had gained an important influence in Conservative discourse in the early 1990s thus acted as a considerable ideological brake on the emergence of a full-blown Tory organicism (see below) which, allied to a policy of economic protectionism, would have taken the party’s intellectual Right a good way towards national populism.

4.2.3. SOCIAL COHESION

In addition to concerns about the impact of asylum seekers on LAW ENFORCEMENT, discussions of asylum in 1996 were also tied to concerns about NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). As a ‘social justice’ doctrine, immigration restrictionism is by no means coherent or comprehensive. Nevertheless, in its
British context, and especially in the hands of Michael Howard, it could be approximated to a new Welfare State nationalism, stressing the necessity to be ‘firm but fair’.

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Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995

The assumptions underlying the government’s approach at this time were similar to those of previous Tory governments. The first assumption is that states have an absolute right to determine which noncitizens should be allowed to enter and remain within the state’s territory.

A second assumption is that Britain is relatively prosperous in world terms, so it is very attractive to asylum seekers, particularly those from the developing world.

A third assumption underlying immigration and asylum policy is the importance and effectiveness of border controls. Immigration restriction is thus necessary to manage ‘diversity’ in the national interest, and, in particular, to prevent the rise of popular opposition to immigration due to fears of threats to the hard-won benefits of the Welfare State. Nicholas Baker, a junior minister at the
Home Office, claimed that the failure to enforce these rules would have serious ‘repercussions’ for community relations in Britain:

“As means of communication, travel and information spread, more people seek to go to countries where there is stability, prosperity and the rule of law. The Government would be irresponsible not to address these issues and tackle the magnetic package of social security benefits, housing and jobs which is exerting a strong pull today on economic migrants from countries in east Europe, Africa and elsewhere in the third world.” (Baker col.740)

It was this dual dynamic – the activation of social security benefits by the liberal democratic polity, combined with severe constraints on deportation – that led Howard to impose restrictions on the “magnetic package of social security benefits”. As hypothesized by Baker, these measures would go some way toward improving community relations:

“Differences in race and colour matter a great deal less in Britain than they did, but numbers matter very much indeed. They matter regardless of race and colour; they matter because this is a relatively crowded island; they matter because of the pressure on the British taxpayer; they matter because of the importance of keeping our communities, diverse as they are, together as Britons.” (Baker col.740)

By seeing the ‘racial threat’ in more generalised *economistic* terms, however, the Tory philosophy of restrictionism became divorced from the more overt racism employed in the rhetoric of Enoch Powell:

“Changes in population put a strain on that task. There is no escaping the fact that those strains threaten good race relations. Any responsible politician who cares about our country and our people—of all ethnic groups—must accept that numbers have to be restrained, and firm and fair immigration controls are essential. Leaders of ethnic minorities understand that and, privately, say so.” (Baker col.740)

A more striking contribution to this discussion came from an unexpected source: Tony Marlow, a former Chairman of the UK Palestine All Party Group.
Marlow made the argument that good community relations are linked inexorably to policies that restrict immigrant numbers. Marlow went further than his colleagues, however, by arguing that politicians needed to revaluate their simple belief in human progress. Out of fear of adding fuel to anti-immigrant sentiment, politicians were refraining from mentioning the negative features of multiculturalism, singling out only the positive ones as if there was no connection between a culture and the assimilability of a diaspora. In Marlow’s (col.778) words,

“We may succeed in developing an adequately integrated coherent and tolerant society for 10 years or for 20 years, but in perpetuity? For our grandchildren's sake it is wise to assume that we may not succeed. The only safe course is to pursue today what will doubtless appear to be cruel and ruthless policies, otherwise there is a real risk that this country will face several urban Yugoslavias. The alternative, if we do not take strong action, could yet be undreamt of and unimaginable barbarism.”

Marlow’s awareness of this possible failure of the assimilationist model was linked thereafter to “dangerous divides in our cities”:

“I have one further point and I do not know how to describe it other than to say that it is racist. The dangerous divides in our cities will be between the white British and the Asians, not the West Indian community. The time must come to stop immigration from the sub-continent. Quite properly, families will wish to reunite but it must he done at the place of original family origin and not here because it is too dangerous for all of us. I know that that must sound monstrous and cruel, but sometimes it is necessary to take strong action. Sometimes it is necessary to be cruel in order to be kind. Frankly, the alternative is terrifying. (Marlow col.778)”

In the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, therefore, the Powellite warning of impending racial conflict appeared increasingly pertinent to populist MPs such as Marlow.
4.2.4 GLOBALISM

To develop a point already made in Chapter 2, Britain has a long and distinguished tradition of receiving refugees, which long pre-dates the 1951 Geneva Convention. Nineteenth century Britain was well known for accepting political dissidents such as Karl Marx and Giuseppe Mazzini; and larger groups of refugees have also been accepted at different times: Huguenots in the 17th century, Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 19th century, and then again in the 1930s from Germany.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, Britain’s tradition of hospitality and asylum fell victim to the zero-immigration imperative (see Table 27). As noted above, the Asylum and Immigration Bill 1995 set out to remove appeal rights for those deemed to have come through a ‘safe-third country’, and it expanded the number of cases that could be dealt with through fast-track procedures. In such cases, applicants have one opportunity to appeal to an adjudicator within ten days of the appeal’s filing.

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<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN3: Human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Internecine conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, the Balkans and Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>Long before the UN came into being, the UK had a proud and honourable tradition of asylum. Tragically, this Government has abandoned its special responsibility to the protection of human life. Britain must honour its own history and retain an asylum system that is just and humane.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Conservative Party (villain), failed asylum seekers (victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Restriction on the right to appeal, the removal of asylum seekers to safe-third countries, and the denial of social security benefits will cause incalculable hardship and destitution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Straw (Lab) cols.711-12; Alton (LD) cols.737-39; Lester (Lab) col.754; Grant (Lab) cols.755-56; Cunningham (SNP) cols.760-62; Abbott (Lab) col.766; Corbyn (Lab) cols.770-72; Henderson (Lab) cols.789</td>
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Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995
In view of the diffuse character of recent population displacements, one could legitimately argue that the introduction of the Bill was necessary. Yet, the removal of the automatic right of appeal was vehemently opposed by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Other criticisms of the Bill related to the removal of asylum seekers to safe-third countries; the denial of social security benefits; the introduction of new immigration offences; and employee sanctions. For Labour, a major dilemma of refugee policy was how to reconcile popular demands for restriction with a parallel, inherently unpopular, mandate to protect the human rights of refugees.

Accordingly, a key characteristic of the Second Reading debate was its rhetorical and structural conflation with immigration policy. In a demonstration of this, Islington MP Jeremy Corbyn rejected the distinction between “economic” and “political” asylum seekers, stating

“Conservative Members ask why so many people seek asylum here. They continually draw a distinction between economic and political asylum seekers, but that distinction is difficult to draw in many cases. Anyone who stands up against a regime that imposes a structural adjustment programme that means cutting education, health, social services and rural development in favour of export-led growth automatically becomes a target for political oppression by that regime and is often forced to seek asylum.” (Corbyn, col. 771)

Since the mid-1960s the Labour party, both in government and in Opposition, had generally espoused immigration policies as tough as those of the Conservatives. Between 1981 and 1996, however, there were influential voices pressing for a reassessment of immigration and asylum policy. Commenting on the ‘white list’ of third-safe countries, Corbyn argued that it is not always easy to differentiate between ‘migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’. Armed conflict, political instability and state persecution often overlap with, or may be provoked or aggravated by, economic marginalisation and cuts to public spending. In other words, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary population movements
is not always as clear and definite as it may appear to be. Surveying the development of British asylum discourse, Hackney MP Dianne Abbott accused Conservative Members of ‘sneering’ at economic migrants:

“People come here because they are driven by poverty and economic instability of a sort which, fortunately, no one in this country has to face. So let us take the issues seriously and not sneer at people for short-term political advantage.” (Abbott, col.766)

Another criticism levelled at the Bill concerned the withdrawal of social security benefits from failed asylum seekers. These benefits included child welfare, social housing, council tax relief and income support. In opposing the Measure, children’s rights campaigner Joan Lester raised the spectre of a new “sub-culture of dispossessed people” (Lester, co.754). Similarly, Labour MP Jack Cunningham opposed the Bill because it would lead to increased homelessness, insecurity and impoverishment: “In effect, it appears that the Government intend to starve people out of the country” (Cunningham, cols. 761-62). Attacking the political elite’s kowtow to illiberal opinion, David Alton, a devout Catholic, exclaimed:

“The Bill should be judged against those Judaeo-Christian principles, which were designed for the whole of humanity. It fails to uphold an ancient duty that stretches back 3,500 years. It looks tawdry and disreputable. It deserves not to succeed. I and my right hon. and hon. Friends will be in the Lobby tonight to vote against the Bill and in favour of the amendment.” (Alton, col.739)

Many asylum seekers who had arrived in Europe since the early 1990s had come not simply to escape poverty, but frequently to flee from danger. Notable examples included: political repression in Nigeria and Zimbabwe; civil war and insurgency in Sri Lanka; conflict and persecution in Iraq and Afghanistan; and, most vividly, the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 and subsequent civil war. There is therefore a deep-lying tension within the politics of asylum between a ‘Judeo-Christian’ logic, which seeks to transcend geography,
culture and political difference, and a more contingent, ‘communitarian’ logic that seeks to draw on the role of hierarchy, relationships and belonging.

4.2.5 PROBLEMATISING ASYLUM SEEKERS

A broader issue involved the relationship between the politicisation of asylum and racism. It is not possible in the last few pages to establish whether asylum legislation ‘normalised’ racism or, as the government claimed, improved race-relations. The issue is likely to be contestable. It is worth noting, however, that for all the arguments made about the State's role in legitimising racism, attitudes to ethnic minorities in Britain have improved considerably since restrictions were first applied in 1961. Having said this, the claim that the Asylum Bill is formally racist was taken as self-evidently true by a number of Labour back-benchers (see Table 28).

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*Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995*

The argument presented here is that the Bill has racial prejudice built right into it; there is discrimination in the social security provision; there is discrimination in the treatment of applicants; there is discrimination in the
consideration of documentation, and there is discrimination in the interviewing procedures. Attacking the Tories’ alleged opportunism, Jeremy Corbyn exclaimed:

“I oppose the Bill as a dreadful piece of legislation guided by xenophobia and appealing to some backward populism which the Conservatives think will win them an election in 15 months' time. It smacks of the classic Conservative approach—if there is a problem, blame the victim. The Bill blames people for seeking asylum in Britain.” (Corbyn col.770)

Accusations of “xenophobia” and “backward populism” revealed a dilemma at the heart of asylum-control policy: if controls are imposed, they have to be directed against the major sources of political instability and armed conflict, which happen to be (predominantly) in non-white and non-European countries. Jack Straw (cols.721-23) took a similar view when he argued that

“As the Prime Minister said, huge numbers—especially of Asian and Afro-Caribbean British citizens and residents—are bound to feel "unsettled" by this measure—by its gratuitous breadth and by the extravagance of its powers.”

References to asylum by Labour politicians were inescapably influenced by their reaction to the negative experience of World War II. Post-nationalist MPs interpreted this global catastrophe as an experience that finally, and irrevocably, morally negated the legitimacy of populist discourse and of exclusionary policies forged around national identity. The statement of British Labour politician Gerald Kaufman, who served as an MP from 1970 until his death in 2017, was paradigmatic in this respect:

“Let me also say to the hon. Gentleman [Michael Howard], in every good spirit, that he reminds me of the Germans in the late 1930s who believed that racial discrimination would never hit them… He is like the German Jews in Berlin who thought that they were all right, but in the end they came for all the Jews, and in the end they will come for everybody in ethnic minorities.” (Kaufman, col.749)
The above example is an instance of the ‘slippery-slope’ argument, in which a certain position is established, which through the inexorable application of logic will transform itself into another (often undesirable) position. From this Niemöllerian position, a moral emerges that interprets race relations in a particular idea-environment. By legislating policies against asylum seekers, it is argued, the government normalises racism and undermines community cohesion.

### 4.3. Summary

To summarise, the Conservative government of 1979-1996 was firmly in command of both its immigration and asylum policies. Even with respect to the latter, the government’s high rate of application refusals (see Messina 2007, ch.4) coupled with the fact that Britain accepted fewer asylum seekers than the European average, confirms Gary Freeman's (1994, p.97) argument that “the British experience demonstrates that it is possible to limit unwanted immigration.”

As discussed in chapter 3, the mixture of immigration control and anti-discrimination legislation (the so-called Hattersley equation) was maintained in the 1960s and 1970s so that the acts of controlling immigration in 1968 and 1971 were followed by anti-discrimination acts in 1965, 1968 and 1976. The restrictionist demands of opponents of multiculturalism were met by tough immigration control policies, and the demands of liberals and the Left for racial equality and the outlawing of racism were met by the anti-discrimination laws.

Ultimately, however, both sides were left dissatisfied. The Right’s opposition to Britain becoming a multicultural society was frustrated, as high total fertility rates, family reunion and the right of asylum led to rapid ethnocultural change despite tough immigration controls. This, in turn, led to a ‘populist moment’ in the parliamentary Conservative party, facilitated by the support of this stance among a majority of Conservative members and their newly elected leader, Margaret Thatcher.
In contrast, the liberal inclinations of the PLP influenced the party to adopt *globalist policies* on immigration, race and asylum – policies which often repudiated its past record. By 1981 the eclipse of the Conservative party’s liberal wing on immigration, combined with Labour’s interest in securing the ethnic minority vote, induced each party to recast its immigration policies in the light of these changed political circumstances. The major parties, for the first time since 1961, staked out divergent positions on immigration.
5

Consensus Without Consent: The Depoliticisation of Migration

“[The] 21st century will not be about the battle between capitalism and socialism but between the forces of progress and the forces of conservatism… The old prejudices, where foreign means bad. Where multi-culturalism is not something to celebrate, but a left-wing conspiracy to destroy their way of life.”

– Tony Blair56

“Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for immigration boom. But ministers wouldn’t talk about it. In part they probably realised the conservatism of their core voters: while ministers might have been passionately in favour of a more diverse society, it wasn’t necessarily a debate they wanted to have in working men’s clubs in Sheffield or Sunderland.”

– Andrew Neather57

The election of New Labour in 1997 marked a dramatic shift in British political discourse and policy practice relating to immigration. Historically for Britain, and comparatively across Europe, Labour’s reforms were an unprecedented policy reversal – moving from “severe restriction” in 1997 to active “encouragement” of immigration in 2002. Couched in a narrative of migration management, these policy reforms signified a new approach to immigration based on the supply and demand of skills, and above all embracing the value-added contribution of international students. Put simply, 1997-2010 was an unprecedented period of immigration policy-making, which both broke with the past and set the stage for a fully-fledged ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 2004). More tellingly, perhaps, the cooperation of the Conservative party and its acceptance of the general outlines of ‘managed migration’ visibly reflected a new bipartisan consensus.

56 Quoted from Guardian (1999)
57 Neather (2009)
5.2. Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill 2002 (Case Study 5)

5.2.1 POLICY AFTER 1997: THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE YEARS

Writing in 1994, Gary P. Freeman famously described Britain as a ‘deviant case’ in Western European migration policy. For over three decades, successive British governments had managed to combine a neoliberal approach to the flow of goods and capital with effective limits on the flow of migrants. As outlined in Chapter 3, policy-makers imposed increasingly restrictive controls on the movement of non-EU migrants while, on the other, creating a legislative framework to outlaw racism.

Since then, both policy and policy outcomes have reversed sharply. The Labour government of 1997-2010 increased the number of work permits issued (see Table 5.1), quintupled the number of international student visas, increased the uptake of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and changed the default position of many categories of applicant. More striking, asylum applications exploded, rising from 28,000 in 1993 to just under 100,000 in 2000 (Hansen 2004).

![Figure 3. Work permits issued per year 1947-2005](source: Balch (2010), p.115)
By the time Labour left office in 2010, a reluctant country of immigration had been transformed into a fully-fledged ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 2004). This was the defining breakpoint between Britain’s post-war bipartisan consensus of ‘zero immigration’ (Freeman 1994) and today’s political framework of managed migration.

In explaining the UK’s new openness to immigration, Professor James Hollifield (2004) emphasises the country’s economic strength in the 1990s, the emergence of sector-based skills shortages, and the fear of international competition from the US and the rest of Europe. This emphasis is important because it is a story about national ‘competitiveness’ rather than human rights. Notable policies included:

- The trebling of working permits from 47,000 in 1997 to 156,000 in 2004;
- Fast-tracking of work permits in 90% of cases – removing the possibility of any serious examination of the application;
- Allowing anyone with sufficient points to enter the UK to look for work without being sponsored by an employer under the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP);
- Increased uptake of the HSMP via a reduction in the points threshold;
- Introducing two new quotas for unskilled migrant workers: 9,000 for Hospitality and 6,000 for Food Processing;
- Extending the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) all year round, and changing the SAWS quota from 10,000 in the 1990s to 25,000 in 2003;
- Promoting the Holiday Workers Scheme, which was designed for the old Dominions, to New Commonwealth countries; and allowing participants to switch into work permit employment;
- Changing the default position for many categories of applicant from “refuse unless they can prove a good case” to “accept unless it can be shown that they are ineligible” (cited from Lilley 2005, pp.7-8).
Taking these factors in reverse order, the last is unquestionably relevant. While the British tendency to focus on the management of race relations has not disappeared, Labour’s commitment to “evidence-based policy” led to a decidedly technocratic turn and an attempt to depoliticise decisions over admissions. For example, the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) was set up in 1998; the Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS) was set up in 1999; and the Prime Minister’s Forward Strategy Unit (FSU) was set up in 2001 (see Balch 2005, p.111).

Eventually, all of these bodies were centralised within the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (SU) after it was given the dual responsibility for both innovation and management in 2002. However, the stress on applied social research as a ‘politics-free’ basis for enlightened policy-making has frequently recurred, for instance in the foundation of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) in 2007. The stress on what would now be called ‘governmental depoliticisation’, and on the importance of professional expertise in public management also links to themes which have come into prominence in the New Public Management era.

Having said this, even before Labour was returned to office in 1997, there were influential voices pressing for a reassessment of the ‘zero migration’ policy consensus. Inside the think tank community, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) was arguing for an approach to immigration that would maximize growth and economic competitiveness. Furthermore, PR campaigns were initiated by business groups such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Computing Services and Software Association (CSSA) and multinational companies via law firms such as Cameron McKenna (Balch 2010). Once in government, Labour Minister Barbara Roche made it clear in 2000 that the government were interested in linking immigration policy to the needs of the economy.
5.2.2 FROM IMMIGRATION CONTROL TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

In parallel and intersecting with the above policy, New Labour also claimed to be against open borders, and periodically announced crackdowns against illegal immigrants. The daily ritual of migrant men, women and even children from Sangatte camp near Calais in France, risking injury and death as they attempted to cross the channel by jumping from bridges onto passing trains (or hiding underneath them), propelled the issue to the forefront of the national political conversation.58

More striking, asylum applications grew rapidly in the mid 1990s and dramatically in the 2000s. The fact that these asylum seekers had come to Britain instead of remaining in the nearest safe country or refugee camp was sufficient proof for many that they must be economic migrants rather than genuine refugees.

The reaction of successive New Labour governments to the rise in applications was to reaffirm refugee rights to asylum while at the same time doing everything possible to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at the borders and registering a claim. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act removed access to benefits (with the exception of small stipends) from asylum seekers, giving them vouchers instead. The Act also replaced the entire appeals process with a ‘one-stop’ comprehensive appeal for those in the country lawfully. The Act constituted a significant restriction, and once again proved that policy evolution is rarely unidirectional.

Against this backdrop, a new policy framework was announced under the banner of ‘managed migration’ in November 2000, culminating in the introduction of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Case Study 5) (NAIB) on 12 April 2002. This doctrine stands for both a passionate rhetorical defence of large-scale economic and student migration as well as for a schematic, 58 A notable example of this occurred in 2001, more than 500 migrants broke through the wire fence at the Eurotunnel depot near Calais and ran into the tunnel before they were driven back (Carr 2015 p.116).
coldly rational conceptual system which seeks to deter illegal immigration. The most far-reaching proposals contained in the NAIB included:

i. Public housing for asylum seekers for up to six months while applications are being considered (the Accommodation Centre Scheme);

ii. Repeal of the provision for automatic bail hearings;

iii. Extension of the power to detain asylum seekers during the application process and not just prior to removal;

iv. Creation of a new ‘white list’ of safe countries. Rejected applicants cannot remain in Britain to launch an appeal if they have arrived from a white list country;

v. Denial of administrative/legal/financial support to asylum seekers unless they make their claim as soon as possible – at a port or airport – after their arrival in the UK.

Although business clearly played a role in terms of exerting pressure for change, it could be argued that it was more a case of the construction of a new bipartisan consensus. On the one hand, many MPs in the parliamentary Labour party had adopted policies and practices that, in the British context, could be described as ‘centrist’ or managerial. Underpinning this ideology is a belief in internationally competitive labour markets.

On the other hand, Conservative party Members and activists, increasingly drawn from the cosmopolitan professional class, felt at ease with the economic and social consequences of immigration. As documented by Tim Bale, recent Tory cabinets have largely been made up of “forty-something men and women for whom ‘traditional’ attitudes on race in particular are as unthinkable as they are unsayable” (Bale 2013, p.32). Some of the reformers, like Francis Maude and George Osborne, were free-marketers animated most obviously by the ambition to emulate Tony Blair.
5.1.3. MODERNISATION

In speeches and seminars to elite audiences, New Labour tentatively made the case for multiculturalism, but, aware of the unpopularity of this transformation with its working-class base, it adopted the language of economics. During the Second Reading debate, Home Secretary David Blunkett

“We need a balanced approach, and I believe that Members on both sides of the House are committed to achieving that. Managed migration allows those throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people.” (Blunkett col.341)

A “balanced approach” involved offering highly skilled foreign workers incentives such as permanent settlement and the right to bring family members, while ‘rotating’ low-skilled foreign workers in sector-specific visa programmes. As the labour economist Philip Martin puts it, the guiding aim of managed migration is to “welcome the skilled and rotate the unskilled” (Martin 2006).

On the other hand, Blunkett’s interest in economic migration was tempered by an expressed desire to ‘modernise’ procedures and deliver faster decisions, including new tougher arrangements for fraudulent asylum seekers. As illustrated in Table 17, the modernisation frame led to a commitment to undertake a fundamental review of the system – from initial applications through to permanent settlement. Angela Eagle, a junior Minister, described it in the following terms:

“[The NAIB] deals in a holistic and forward-looking way with those complex issues… We all know that there are no easy or simple answers. We must combine legislative change with sensible administrative change to achieve the improvements that we all seek.” (Eagle col.429)

A “holistic” and “forward-looking” approach involved the use of fast-track procedures for manifestly inappropriate or fraudulent claims. In addition, the
Labour government drew up a ‘white list’ of countries from which asylum seekers were assumed not to face serious risk of persecution (so that rejected applicants could not remain in the UK to launch an appeal if they had arrived from a white list country). Policy development has therefore been both expansionist and restrictionist. Towards some kinds of immigrant, the managerial state shows an open and inclusive face; towards many others, it reveals an exclusionary and sometimes hostile one.

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*Hansard DC Deb. Vol.384, cols.341-432, 24 April 2002*

The plot/moral of PN30, as described in Table 29, is consistent with the following statements:

- The Bill is concerned about a particular class of asylum seeker: “those who have not been refused appeal or lost an appeal, but who are in the course of appeal and are detained” (Letwin col.358);
- Under the current system, asylum seekers can make several different concurrent appeals. This perverse incentive has a number of consequences, none of them
foreseen by policy-makers. The whole system is “riddled with delay”, “prevarication” and, in some cases, “deliberate disruption of the appeals process” (Blunkett cols.355-37);

- The asylum system put in place by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act made great strides in improving the application process and reducing the number of illegitimate applications. However, the whole asylum appeals’ system needs be streamlined to improve decision-making and to ensure that it is speedy, expeditious and balanced.

Managerialists typically work within this more pessimistic tradition of public policy, and share the same idea of the ‘strong state’ as offering the a priori framework for freedom. Such a philosophy could be argued to reflect the view that, since people are assumed to be rational egotists (prone to shirking and malversation whenever they get the chance), the best way to limit rule violation is to shape the legal environment such that individuals have no option but to follow the rules.

5.1.4. THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY

The most frequently repeated justification – and probably the most important reason – for EFFICIENCY IN ADMINISTRATION (PN30) was fear of a public backlash. Blunkett’s speech, for example, clarified the basis for government policy on illegal migration as resting on economic protectionism:

“The service economy, especially in London and the south-east, relies on clandestine and illegal working. That is unacceptable, and it undermines the wages and conditions of work of those involved and of other workers. It also leads to bad employers undercutting good ones because they do not pay tax or national insurance. There are therefore two ways we can operate that gateway.” (Blunkett col.342)

The assumptions underlying the government’s approach at this time were similar to those of the previous Conservative administration: immigration controls are
necessary to manage immigration in the national interest, and, in particular, to prevent the rise of the far-right – due to fears of threats to the local economy or to the hard-won benefits of the Welfare State.

Consequently, discussions of managed migration were almost always tied to discussions of the British National Party (BNP), a neo-Nazi organisation founded by the far-right political activist John Tyndall. There was a lot of talk of ‘disillusioned’ English voters, for example, and of the BNP tapping into their ‘legitimate’ concerns and worries, winning them over with populist, anti-establishment rhetoric. The comments of Angela Eagle are paradigmatic in this respect:

“The spectre of a revival of fascism and the policies of race hatred now loom over Europe. We underestimate at our peril the uncertainty and resentment caused by illegal arrivals among our existing populations—the evidence is there for all to see in recent European election results. However, most of that uncertainty and resentment is not racism, but a genuine concern that needs to be addressed fairly, openly and transparently. We need to be inclusive and open about our anti-racist stance, but we need to acknowledge people's worries and concerns. For that reason I welcome the tone of the debate, which has differed from that of any other debate on this sensitive subject.” (Eagle, col.429)

The key question concerning managed migration would seem to be whether or not it can legitimately be termed ‘restrictionist’. The answer depends to large extent upon what is meant by restrictionism. On the one hand, the perception that migration is associated with economic growth and competitiveness has shaped the managed migration agenda, leading to an increasingly liberal and expansionist policy framework. Incredibly, more

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59 These policies include: (i) the abolition of the Primary Purpose Rule; (ii) the abolition of exit controls to non-EU destinations; (iii) the doubling of work permits for non-EU workers; (iv) the quintupling of student visas; (v) the expansion of the Post-Study Work route; and (vi) the decision not to impose transitional controls on EU accession states.
immigrants now arrive in a single year than they did in the entire period from 1066 to 1950 (excluding wartime flows and the Irish) (Goodhart 2005).

Nevertheless, managed migration does have some features which have been associated with restrictionism in a general sense, in particular, its intense opposition to fraudulent asylum seekers, undocumented tourists on expired visas, and immigrant spouses in sham marriages (Balch 2015; Consterdine 2018). For example, steady increases in the number of asylum applications have been met with legal-bureaucratic responses, including the importation of visa requirements on countries from which asylum seekers come and the imposition of carriers’ liability on airlines and shippers for improperly documented persons they bring to the UK.

5.1.4. OLIVER LETWIN AND THE CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE

On the whole, the Conservative Opposition supported Labour’s policy. Oliver Letwin, the Shadow Home Secretary, praised the Bill in the following terms:

“[The] great majority of the measures in the Bill are welcome. That is no surprise, because we welcomed the White Paper, which the Bill faithfully implements in almost all respects. We wholly applaud the naturalisation provisions. In fact, I think that they are long overdue. Neither the Home Secretary's Labour predecessor nor his Conservative predecessors moved as well in this direction as he has sought to do. This will be a bipartisan policy that I hope will last for many years.”

(Letwin, col.358)

We may reasonably speculate that this quotation is, in part, a product of Letwin’s idiosyncratic style, described by one journalist as “austere” and “academic” (cited from Oborne 2004). Unlike his predecessors, Letwin pioneered a less combative style in taking on Labour. Suffice it to say, however, the debate on immigration had become increasingly circumscribed, and what little inter-party competition remained became focused on the ‘effective’ management of the state. To a large extent, some of those measures – aimed at preventing and removing illegal migrants – went further than the laws introduced by Michael
Howard in 1996. Notably, this included the repeal of automatic bail hearings. In Blunkett’s words,

“I do not think that it is acceptable for an old lady of 78 to be mugged for £60, as happened in my city, and for the three people who mugged her to continue to claim that they require asylum in this country… I believe that people who are found guilty of committing crimes and are given a custodial sentence of more than two years forfeit their asylum rights, and I think that we should legislate to take them away.” (Blunkett cols.356-57)

Differences of opinion were largely related to the makeup of the detention centres. Letwin debated the merits of large-scale versus small-scale centers, and the advantages of comprehensive rather than piecemeal reform. Unlike his Labour counterpart, Letwin wanted to turn the accommodation centres into “one-stop shops” that included decision-makers through to the adjudicators, “with all the expertise required, and against the background of proper, independent risk assessments” (Letwin, col.361). This model would be combined by a reduction in size and scale. From this viewpoint, what is needed to tackle the public-management problem is to devise institutions that are “tailored to characteristics of the human beings with whom they are dealing” (Letwin, col.362) – and in that sense “economize on love” (quoted by Buchanan 1983, p.24)

Recognising the Sisyphean task of migration governance, Opposition MPs raised additional concerns about the ability of the British state to remove illegal immigrants. For example, the removal process can be highly complex and is often fraught with legal, administrative and empirical barriers. It can take a considerable period of time to decide a case, and there are usually various stages of appeal. On one level, the failure to prevent the complex of activities that lead to illegal immigration, including visa overstay, clandestine entry and working without authorisation, simply reflect the limits of governments’ control capacity.
A similar, if altogether more patchy, intensification of LAW \textit{ENROCREMENT} (PN29) was evident at the external borders of the European Union, though complicated by the introduction of the Dublin Convention on refugees in 1997. Notwithstanding the considerable efforts that states made to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants, the Dublin Convention created an important route for entry and provided a further example of how EU laws limit states’ room for manoeuvre. For example, between 1995 and 1997 there was a \textit{bilateral} agreement between Britain and France that allowed the swift removal of irregular migrants who had crossed the channel illegally. When it came into force, applications for asylum fell by 33 per cent (Wilkinson, col.401). Yet, 12 months after the replacement of the bilateral agreement with the Dublin convention, applications rose by 41 per cent. To quote Conservative MP Greg Barker:

“[The Dublin Convention] is complex, bureaucratic and burdensome, and those who attempt to operate it would concur with that description. However, in one sense, people understand it perfectly. All those resident at the Sangatte camp understand it. They understand that they can enter Britain and, de facto, not be
returned to France. That is making a mockery of the system. Until 1997, a bilateral agreement ensured that asylum seekers could be returned to France within 24 hours. Now, we have problems returning any of them at all.” (Barker. Col.392)

In general, EU cooperation since Dublin illustrated that, in the area of migration control, intergovernmental cooperation was easier to achieve on labour migration than on areas such as asylum or illegal entry.

5.1.4. UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN

The first Labour government did not reduce immigration through its legislative and administrative actions. On the contrary, Labour’s reforms were an unprecedented policy reversal – moving from “severe restriction” in 1997 to active “encouragement” of immigration in 2002. The government claimed, nevertheless, that it had an effective policy compared with its Conservative predecessor; that it had reduced unwanted immigration; and that it had reaffirmed human rights.

Concerning the treatment of asylum seekers, Labour could claim with some justification that a nationwide, ‘universal’ (though differentiated) system of provision had been established. Some of the most important Clauses are mentioned below:

- **Clause 43** allowed future Home Secretaries to establish a ‘refugee re-settlement programme’ (Singh, col.413)
- **Clauses 36** and **37** ensured (basic) economic and administrative support for failed asylum seekers awaiting removal (Singh, col.413).
- **Clause 36** removed the age distinction that previously meant that social security payments could not be made by the Home Secretary to asylum seekers under the age of 18.
- **Clause 113** established, for the first time in British law, the offence of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation (Woodward, cols.398-401). The maximum penalty imposed by the Bill was a sentence of 14 years.
Having said this, Labour’s commitment to **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (PN3)** was called into question by its willingness to impose a series of harsh post-entry measures that were designed to keep unaccompanied migrant children away from schools in the wider community. In many cases, young girls were passed on to residential care homes, often in the southeast of England, but simply disappeared after that. Often, the girls had been trafficked to other parts of the EU by gang-controlled sex traffickers.

The assumptions underpinning PN3 were threefold. The first assumption is that states do *not* have a right to prevent immigrants and asylum-seekers from becoming socially integrated into local communities, and thereby minimizing sources of support and networks.

A second assumption is that many of the problems stem from the fact that the system has not kept pace with the scale of the challenge, e.g., there is still no comprehensive database of unaccompanied minors. This is a particular problem in London and the South East of England.

A third assumption is that unaccompanied children should be educated in the wider community rather than in accommodation centres (Woodward, col.400). Thus, a key problem with the detention centre proposals was the level of secrecy that surrounded their implementation.

As illustrated in Table 31, the main body of evidence cited during the Second Reading was a 2001 report by *Save the Children*, ‘Cold Comfort’ (narrative setting). The charity had spoken to 125 unaccompanied child refugees and found that a significant number of them had experienced uncertainty and hardship since their arrival in the UK. Moreover, many of these children had received little to no support from local authorities.
### Table 31. Coding form #19

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Metanarrative</td>
<td>Moral cosmopolitanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy narrative</td>
<td>PN3: Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>(i) Recommendations of the Lord Rooker report (7 February 2002); (ii) Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; (iii) Labour Government report &quot;Setting the Boundaries&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>A key problem with the detention centre proposals is the secrecy that surrounds their implementation and the way in which it treats unaccompanied minors. This pattern of neglect continues in children’s contact with public services, including the NHS and primary/secondary education systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characters</td>
<td>Migrant children (victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>To reduce the numbers of children going missing, we need to consider a holistic, multi-agency approach involving social services, the police and LEAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Marshall (Lab) cols.365-67; Rooney (Lab) cols.394; Ewing (SNP) cols.397-98; Woodward (Lab) cols.398-401; Coaker (Lab) cols.408-09; Singh (Lab) cols.412-15; Morgan (Lab) cols.415-17; Sarwar (Lab) cols.418-20; Connarty (Lab) cols.421-23</td>
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Although the Labour Left welcomed Blunkett’s determination to reform a bureaucracy that had left thousands of asylum applications in limbo, there had also been a lot of talk about the need for compassion in the accommodation system. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by Labour’s Shaun Woodward:

“Children and young people who are asylum seekers present us with special problems and special responsibilities. Article 3 of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child makes it clear that the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration. We signed up to that convention because it is right, so in dealing with this group of young people we must be sure that we are acting in the best interests of the child. It is difficult to see a justification for distinguishing what is the best interest solely on the ground of whether a child is a UK citizen or a refugee and providing different standards of care, protection and services accordingly.” (Woodward, col.400)
Other criticisms levelled at the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill concerned the status of dependent relatives, the disabled and others who may have little enthusiasm or capacity to learn English, especially people who are in their twilight years (Marshall, cols.365-67).

At the core of this policy debate is the schism between ‘globalism’ and ‘managerialism’ as two rival philosophies or “rationalities” of politics. Globalist principles place constraints on the policy devices that Ministers may deploy in their ‘fight against illegal immigration’. This is because the kinds of measures that are needed to tackle irregularity require invasive powers and regulations that are at odds with MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, and which are therefore likely to encounter political challenges.

5.2. Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill 2005 (Case Study 6)

5.2.1. STORMY WATERS 2005-08

The 2005 General Election best marks the juncture when the Labour administration began to perform a volte-face on immigration. Although Labour won its third term in 2005, it was at the significant cost of a reduced majority: down to 66 from 167 in 2001. Although no state can expect to prevent all forms of clandestine or fraudulent entry, let alone identify everyone who overstays their visa or works without authorization, the government of the day is nonetheless implicated in the production of irregularity.

Alongside electoral losses, the second prong of Labour’s immigration strategy was a determined effort to compete and win against the Conservatives new elected leader, David Cameron, who was seen by many political commentators as a credible threat to a ‘lame duck’ Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had already announced that he would stand down before the next GE. Already by 2006, Labour strategist Philip Gould commented in his memoirs that,
“Concerns about immigration continued to heighten, and it was increasingly seen as a primary cause of other problems. People saw Labour as out of touch, not listening and dogged by sleaze and infighting” (Gould 2011, p.493).

Immigration, with all the socioeconomic consequence it brings, is an example of what technology entrepreneur George Gallati (2018) calls a “meta-issue” – individual migrants, in sufficient numbers, can add up to societal consequences that nobody consciously intended, and outcomes few people wanted. Mattinson (2010, p.133) similarly observed that,

“Immigration, perhaps more than any other issue, illustrates the disconnect between the voter and the Westminster Village...we described it [immigration] as a “vortex” issue, one which sucked all other issues in—the NHS is struggling? That’s because it’s crowded with immigrants. Can’t get a job? That’s because immigrants have undercut your rates...It became an issue that, in the focus groups, we always shut down and moved on from and the voters knew it.”

The development of policy on migration between 2005 and 2008 highlighted precisely this political vulnerability. Although the number of asylum applications fell in the wake of the closure of the Sangatte refugee camp in 2002, Labour dug itself a hole during the ‘big bang’ enlargement of the EU in 2004 and its decision not to impose transitional controls on the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe. No other major destination country in the EU followed this path. Indeed, all other EU member states except Ireland and Sweden applied some controls, notably a five-year transition period prior to opening borders – and labour markets – to nationals from the new member states. As illustrated in Figure 4, the resultant migratory inflow led to a growing link between Euroscepticism and immigration scepticism.

60 Sometimes referred to as the “A10” countries, these new member states included Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
One major consequence of this policy decision is that the discursive terrain shifted, with the battleground moving between questions of statistical forecasting; fears of future inflows of migrants from Eastern Europe; and then more recently, questions concerning the efficacy of the Home Office. For example, in anticipation of the enlargement of the EU, Blair’s government took the precaution of asking civil servants to assess the likely levels of immigration from countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on their calculations, the Home Office predicted that Britain would receive between 5,000 to 13,000 net immigrants per year averaged over a ten-year period from the new member states. The reality, however, turned out to be quite different. The Office for National Statistic (ONS) estimated that between 2004 and 2012, the net inflow of migrants from the new members was 423,000. In a memorable putdown, Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman Chris Huhne told the Commons in 2008:

Source: Evans and Menon (2017), p.19
“As we know, Christopher Columbus thought that he had discovered India, when in fact he was in America. By comparison with the Home Office, he was a practitioner of pinpoint navigation” (quoted from Watt and Wintour 2015).

5.2.1. LABOUR’S FIVE-YEAR STRATEGY

In response to what the Labour Party perceived as a major policy blunder, some aspects of public policy were tightened during Blair’s last two years as Prime Minister (2005–06). A new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, was appointed and with him came a boost in enforcement efforts via the introduction of a ‘five-year strategy’. This included:

• A new Australian-style points system for migrant workers.
• A new visa fingerprinting system to fingerprint all immigrants on visas at ports of entry by 2008.
• Identity cards for all non-EU migrants who will be in the country for more than three months.
• Only immediate family members of migrants will be allowed to enter the UK. This will mean restrictions on dependents of migrants bringing in further dependents.
• A plan to speed up the deportation of fraudulent asylum seekers, as well as extra powers to deal with people traffickers

The government continued to manage the ‘asylum crisis’ but began focusing their attention on tougher penalties for illegal immigration. Among the range of proposed measures were actions to reduce illegal migration flows through the crosschecking of data against biometrically enabled travel documents (the futuristically titled ‘e-Borders programme’).

More significantly, a central aspect of this overhaul was a points-based system (PBS) to replace all the existing schemes for labour migration (which had expanded to almost 80) and for a new Skills Advisory Board to bring together business representatives and experts to decide on admissions. Modeled on
Australia’s PBS for skilled professionals, it imported all the existing labour migration schemes and placed them in a typology of five ‘tiers’. As a consequence of these reforms, managed migration has at least five distinct components:

- **Tier 1** covers entry of entrepreneurs, investors, and those very few people who come under the ‘exceptional talent’ visa.
- **Tier 2** includes skilled workers who are transferred to the UK by an international company; skilled workers where there is a proven shortage in the UK; and ministers of religion and sportspeople.
- **Tier 3** is designed for low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages.
- **Tier 4** covers non-EEA students who wish to study in the UK.
- **Tier 5** contained six sub-tiers of temporary worker including creative and sporting, charity, religious workers and the youth mobility scheme.

A “points system” works through allocating different scores to each prospective citizen, based on their education, work experience, age and language proficiency. A certain number of points are then required to gain entry. The purpose of such a system is therefore to discriminate between rival migrants – to select human beings with desirable skill portfolios. In contrast, the management of unskilled migrant workers has generally followed a different trajectory: governments have tried to recruit low-skilled migrant labour through temporary and seasonal worker schemes, without extending the bundle of rights that are offered to the highly skilled (Martin 2006).

The political economist Georg Menz (2009) argues that the revaluation of labour migration since the mid 2000s is part of a political philosophy and policy agenda that has always looked to the state to reshape society around its ideals. As Christopher Hood went to great lengths to stress in *The Art of The State*, New Public Management (NPM) is *not* another form of laissez-faire and, instead, grants the state a key role in shaping how economic freedom is to be defined and instantiated. So, in the case of immigration, the globalist ideal of freedom of
movement would be resisted from a managerial perspective. It is entirely plausible, from a managerial perspective, that the state might seek to regulate something like labor flows, to serve certain strategic economic goals.

5.2.3. CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: THE LIMITS TO MANAGED MIGRATION

What can loosely be called ‘managerial’ approaches to skilled migration start from the assumption that the world is populated by rational, self-interested state actors who are bent on outcompeting one another. Rivalry and competition are central to the managerial view of what the world of migration management is and should be like. As illustrated in Table 5.4, British governments have increasingly responded to employer demand for human capital and at the same time sought a more active role in the selection or would-be citizens. These systems work by allocating points to would-be migrants on the basis of criteria such as the applicant's qualifications, linguistic ability, and work experience.

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Governments, of course, recruited migrant workers well before migration management became the term of choice around the turn of the millennium. Indeed, the government already operated a points-based system without a quota: the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme, introduced in 2002. What is new about contemporary migration management is the extent to which governments seek to regulate the composition of labour migration flows through selective and highly differentiated PBSs. To quote Charles Clarke, the Labour Home Secretary:

“The UK needs economic migration. We welcome people who migrate here to work and study—they are an essential part of our society and economy […] We need migration to fill the gaps in our labour market that cannot be filled from the domestic work force.” (Clarke, col.188)

At the top end of the labour market, firms compete to attract skilled workers while, at the tertiary end, many Higher Education institutions have come to depend upon a large and steady supply of foreign non-EEA students. Unsurprisingly, then, Universities lobby hard for liberalisation of economic immigration channels. This point was made ad nauseam during the Second Reading.

The apparent absence of overt partisan conflict did not mean, of course, that there were no differences between (or within) the parties on immigration between 2005 and 2008. On the contrary, as argued by the Shadow Home Secretary, the government’s promise of a “points based” system made little sense without a numerical limit.

Our system would ensure that we balanced the needs of Britain's economy with the needs of the population as a whole. The Government agree with the first, but not with the second; they want the points, but not the limit. A points system with no limit is futile.” (Davis, col.207)

Without a numerical limit, it was argued, the Labour government would manipulate the points threshold to increase the number of people coming to the UK – not, as they implied at the GE, to reduce the number of people arriving
Uncontrolled immigration, in Davis’ assessment, had had a negative impact on the economy by increasing the cost of scarce land and housing:

“Managed migration contributes to our economy and culture, and to many aspects of British society, but uncontrolled immigration can have the opposite effect… Here in London, there are pressures on housing. That housing stress has led to the Government crippling the right to buy, with the result that many people can no longer afford to buy the houses that they live in.” (Davis, cols.204-05)

Though Davis focused his analysis on Britain, the above narrative of diminishing marginal returns is a paradigmatic feature of immigration restrictionism more generally. To tease out the implications of this, Peter Lilley used the following metaphor:

“Immigration acts as a lubricant for the economy, rather than a fuel. If we do not put oil in the car, it will not work well. If there is more than sufficient oil, the car will not go any better and too much oil may cause problems. To stop all immigration would be bad for the economy, but beyond a certain point increasing the amount of immigration does not make an economy grow any better. Immigration is a lubricant, but unfortunately the Government have been under the mistaken apprehension that it is a fuel. They put their foot on the accelerator and think that the more people we take into this country, the more we will grow. As a result, net lawful immigration has trebled under the Government; over the last six years it has averaged three times the level that they inherited.” (Lilley, col.243)

What was curious about Lilley’s rhetoric was not the policy analysis itself, which has been known for some time, but the metaphor that he used to justify it. Ultimately, everything can be treated in mechanical terms (“fuel”, “lubricant”), including state, law, democracy, leadership, and civil society. This, in many ways, was more significant than the argument itself. On what for many voters is actually a cultural question, the establishment’s arguments on immigration, and a whole host of other policies, had become increasingly
straitjacketed. It is far safer, from a managerial perspective, to remodel all spheres of human conduct around the example of the market and, in this case, the metaphor of a car engine.

5.2.4. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY

Whether or not these beliefs are well founded, the perception that migration is associated with competitiveness has contributed to the growing influence of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). Indeed, the linkage of migration and “evidence-based policy” has become something of a mantra in official discourse, well captured in the speech of Liberal Democrat MP Vince Cable:

“I want to consider the economic aspect of the measure. Now that the right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden [Peter Lilley] has returned, perhaps I can compliment him on trying to introduce some rigour into the argument. He is right that many of the economic arguments for immigration are often spurious and superficial. It was important that the Home Secretary started his speech with the rather bold assertion that Britain needs economic migration. I happen to agree with him, but that case is often casually put and not properly argued.” (Cable, cols.256-57)

The stress on applied social science research as a ‘politics-free’ basis for enlightened policy-making has frequently recurred, for instance in the creation of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) and Migration Impacts Forum (MIF) in 2007. As hypothesised by Professor Alex Balch, much of current public management reform might be better interpreted as an attempt to depoliticise decision making over admissions:

“The creation of MAC and MIF, for example, can be seen as a potentially technocratic turn – de-politicising decision making over admissions – although this can only be ascertained over time and after they have been functioning in different kinds of economic and political conditions.” [emphasis added] (Balch 2008, pp.138-39)
Such ideas span different political programmes and policy areas. They are not the exclusive property of the political ‘left’ or ‘right’ as ordinarily conceived. In this debate, however, Labour’s administrative competence was called into question. In concluding the Opposition’s case, Shadow Home Secretary David Davis made a devastating speech against the Home Office’s culture of incompetence, drawing on the full power of his rhetorical skill in a hostile rebuke of officialdom:

“A whistleblower revealed that immigrants from eastern Europe were being waved into Britain without proper checks. The then Immigration Minister first denied that it had happened—until it was proven to be true. Then, she blamed junior civil servants—until it turned out to be the work of senior officials, with ministerial acquiescence. Next, she said that such cases were rare and untypical—until they were shown to be widespread. Then, the whistleblower was sacked, but the Minister stayed.” (Davis, cols.202-04)

The above excerpt is a reference to a breakdown in relations between the head of the Home Office and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). Similarly, Davis referred to “the scandal of the migrant scams” in Romania and Bulgaria, which were brought to light by the British consul in Bucharest:

“This incident revealed a complete lack of communication between the Home Office and the Foreign Office. Our consul warned the Government that groups in Romania and Bulgaria were making fraudulent claims, yet Home Office officials granted such people visas anyway, knowing their claims to be false. Again, the consul was sacked, the Minister stayed. The Minister was finally forced to go, but only because of the utter chaos and lack of communication in the Home Office itself. She claimed not to know of any of these scams; it turned out that she had been warned a year before by her own Home Office colleague.” (Davis, cols.202-04)

The reference to government officials brought into focus the ‘villains’ of the narrative (state bureaucrats) and ‘victims’ (refugees). Rejecting Weberian
notions of ‘status honour’ or *noblesse oblige* among public officials, Davis argued that the government bureaucracy is “not fair to anyone” – *not* to genuine asylum seekers, “lumped in with the fraudsters and forced to plead their case”; *not* to economic migrants “…who spend their life savings paying people smugglers for the chance to come to Britain”; and *not* to political dissidents who are “…caught up in this Government's public relations offensive and face torture or worse if they are sent back” (Davis, cols.202-04).

### 5.2.4. YARL’S WOOD DETENTION CENTRE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Another striking example of political dissensus concerned the way in which temporary migrants were treated by the authorities. The growing importance of the **RULE OF LAW** (PN5) for members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, in particular, could be seen in the extremely large number of matters raised in the House. Mostly, these matters concerned the removal of rights of appeal for students, working holidaymakers, ministers of religion and other miscellaneous categories (see Table 33).

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From this perspective, the right to appeal is axiomatic, and not just because of the importance of the process in its own right, but because it maintains pressure on the rest of the system to get it right. In other words, the removal of any check on current decisions by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) would lead to poorer decision-making. For example, Fiona Lindsley, the independent monitor of entry clearance refusals without the right of appeal, said in her report of February 2005 that “extrapolating from my file samples in 2002 and 2003 I calculate that 28,000 applicants have been wrongly denied rights of appeal in these two years” (quoted from Carmichael, col.215).

The most controversial aspect of the debate, however, had been the growing use of immigration detention centres. Allegations of violence and excessive force had often centred on the private security companies that provided the escorts for deportation flights (narrative villain). Some MPs had long campaigned on these issues; for example, Alistair Burt, the Conservative MP for North East Bedfordshire, was particularly active in criticising the Home Office over its handling of Yarl's Wood detention centre. Situated on the outskirts of Milton Ernest in Bedfordshire, Yarl's Wood consists of a number of enclosed residences for a predominantly female population. Most of the asylum seekers are from sub-Saharan Africa, who are waiting for a decision from the Home Office in London. Some had been waiting there for a year, Burt said, and few of their applications were likely to receive a positive decision:

“The reason that I have spoken out in such a way today is that when a woman from a far country, with a black skin, is shunted around the detention estate, having committed no crime, in a situation in which the system does not believe that it owes an explanation to her, to citizens or to representatives, all our civil liberties are at risk.” (Burt col.229)

On a visit to Yarl's Wood in 2004 Burt was shocked by the behaviour of the privately run escort service (Serco). Some of the detainees who Burt spoke to claimed to have been abused and humiliated by the predominantly male staff who
monitored them; they also claimed to have witnessed guards touching women inappropriately, and alleged that guards casually inflicted violence on others. In addition to this, one detainee was prevented from completing her undergraduate degree, while another was prevented from seeking an investigation into alleged assault. As Burt summarised it,

“[Escort services] cavalier treatment of the vulnerable people in their care is a scandal to our reputation as a decent nation. That was when my change of heart began in relation to this policy – when I found out that Yarl's Wood was built on fraud. (Burt, col.230)”

All of these developments are part of a ‘conveyor belt’ deportation machinery, designed to prevent migrants from absconding, both during the determination process and after a claim has been rejected. Given the controversies surrounding these centres, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this blunt instrument is primarily intended to reduce the supposed ‘pull factors’ that attract migrants to Britain – and to transmit a deterrent message to others by signaling a country's toughness (Hampshire 2013).

5.2.2. JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT
A common observation about the managerial approach to institutional design is that it may be better seen as a family of approaches rather than a single one (Martin 2006; Hampshire 2013). Clarke’s stress on what might be called “integrated” or “joined-up” government was an important part of this and the wider control and intelligence agenda. Recording, reporting and digitisation were central to Clarke’s vision of good public management:

i. Clause 23 brought together the provisions on detention and examination of passports;

ii. Clause 24 reduced the notice period given to asylum seekers who cannot be fingerprinted on application;
iii. **Clauses 26 to 34** enabled the capture of passenger, crew and freight details in advance of travel;

iv. **Clause 11** makes it illegal to employ a person if his leave to enter or remain in the UK: i) is invalid; ii) has expired, or; iii) is subject to a condition preventing him from accepting the employment.

Part of the control structure of this extraordinary system of public management comes from processes of internal interception. These controls take many forms, including random ID checks in public places, routine workplace inspections and raids, reporting requirements for providers of public services, and employer sanctions. That approach to organisation can be linked to a broader vision of ‘modern’ government, which aims to reduce irregular residence and work, developing internal controls to identify, intercept and remove migrants who are already in their territory.

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*Hansard HC Deb. vol.436, cols.188-272, 5 July 2005*

The plot of PN29, as outlined in Table 34, is consistent with the following statements:
(i) First, the Labour government have made great strides in rationalising the immigration system by speeding up the application process as well as improving control-points across the channel.

(ii) Yet, despite progress in these areas, the enforcement of immigration law remains very difficult, often for reasons outside of direct governmental control. There are, for example, several different ‘pathways’ to clandestine entry, including unauthorised entry at land and sea borders, entry through a port using forged documents, visa overstay or violation of visa terms.

(iii) Finally, the challenge for the government now is to build on those successes, and to create a technologically robust system that delivers the economic migration that Britain needs. Those checks will be supported, furthermore, by measures to clamp down on employers of illegal workers and by closer working with the airlines to deal with individuals who use forged documents or who destroy them en route. As Tony McNulty, the Minister of State for Immigration, summarised it:

“If the debate is shifting away from where we are at with the asylum system… to a substantive debate about where we are at with managed migration, it must deal in substance with illegal working and the employer's role […] By the time the law is introduced, there will be about 1,200 warranted immigration officers with full rights to employ the fixed penalties. That is where we want our staff, out in the community dealing with such matters.” (McNulty, col.271)

The most obvious instruments, which correspond to the popular rhetoric of “integrated government”, are control measures at the state’s territorial borders. A near universal trend across all Western European states over the last two decades has been the use biometric technologies and large-scale immigration databases to differentiate between various categories of passenger. As James Hampshire (2013) points out, such policies are part of a relatively coherent theory of management – which in many ways follows contemporary ideas of public management reform through hard-wired logic smartcards and individualised pay.
5.3. Summary

The overall policy trend since the early 2000s has been increased openness towards a few selective types of immigration combined with substantial efforts to control and limit other types. Managed migration, as such, is like the two-faced God Janus: it stands for both a passionate, rhetorical defence of legal migration and its social and economic benefits as well as for a schematic, coldly rational conceptual system which seeks to deter illegal aliens. These contrasting objectives mean that managerial states cannot be straightforwardly characterised as either restrictionist or expansionist. On the whole, political parties have become more interested in recruiting foreign workers to fill skills shortages in their economies, while at the same time strengthening their border controls to exclude irregular migrants. Recognising the Sisyphean nature of migration governance, MPs make extravagant promises to introduce tougher laws and better-funded agencies; but no government that is ‘managerial’ will ever fully control immigration.
Conclusion

“Populists challenge not just the specific policies but also the depoliticisation of the issues. Often correctly, they argue that what once was political can be political again, if the majority of the population wants it to be.”
– Cas Mudde⁶¹

“We are now in a period of social transition, a period characterised, that is, by an unusually rapid rate of change of the most important economic, social, political, and cultural institutions of society. This transition is from the type of society which we have called capitalist or bourgeois to a type of society which we shall call managerial.”
– James Burnham⁶²

The claim that political parties matter for understanding migration policy is on one level tautologica. As elected representatives, it is MPs that compete for electoral support from voters; political parties that form governments; and governments which make immigration policy. The practice of inter-elite competition, as we have seen, is a legitimate and necessary part of the democratic process, and therefore of migration policy. Yet, despite this truism, the practice of inter-elite competition is also influenced by consensus-seeking practices in complex social systems – practices that permit a certain amount of rigidity (i.e., depoliticisation). The purpose of this chapter therefore is to examine whether such consensuses shape the policy preferences of leading elites and the degree of autonomy the government has in implementing restrictionist policies. Notwithstanding the relative closeness of their electoral support and parliamentary representation – indeed perhaps because of these – the major parties’ contest for office restricted the range of policy options offered to voters and, in many areas of public policy, inter-party debate did not occur.

⁶¹ Mudde (2017)
⁶² Burnham (1941)
6.1 Ideology

Q1: “To what extent have the ideological orientations of MPs evolved over time and, if so, does the direction of change support Christopher Hood’s claim that elite-level orientations have gradually yielded to a managerial consensus?”

If there is a common perception which has informed virtually all debates on immigration in the post-Cold war era, including those in this study, it is that mainstream parties have begun to show signs of dealignment. For example, since the Brexit vote of 2016, it has become fashionable in journalistic circles to frame the post-Cold war era as a battle between ‘globalists’ and ‘nationalists’. To quote economic historian Michael Lind (2016),

“The culture war and partisan realignment are over; the policy realignment and “border war” — a clash between nationalists, mostly on the right, and multicultural globalists, mostly on the left — have just begun.”

While not entirely incorrect, this argument is nevertheless misleading. Within the House of Commons, the most salient political division today is not between globalists and nationalists, but between globalists and managerialists. As shall be seen below, the liberality of British migration policy during the 1997-2015 period resulted from the formation of a bipartisan ideological commitment: the attachment of the Conservative and Labour parties to ‘managed migration’, mapped on to selective Cabinet-level opposition to immigration quotas.

6.1.1. The Conservative party

Between 1961 and 1996 the Conservative party enacted a small mountain of restrictive legislation in an effort to stop Britain becoming a multicultural society. Branded ‘traitors’ to the Commonwealth by progressives, the party was aligned ideologically to civic nationalism. This belief-system not only included an increasingly restrictive, anti-New Commonwealth immigration policy, but also a
series of progressively liberal race relations acts that accelerated the process of immigrant incorporation into British society.

Ultimately, however, the Right’s opposition to Britain becoming a multicultural society was frustrated, as high total fertility rates, family reunification and the right of asylum led to rapid ethnocultural change despite tough immigration controls. This, in turn, led to a ‘populist moment’ in the parliamentary Conservative party, facilitated by the support of this stance among a majority of Conservative members and their newly elected leader, Margaret Thatcher. Demands for an immediate reduction in immigration, for a register of family dependents, and for a new British Nationality Act were symptomatic of this trend (Layton-Henry 1984, p.149).

Following 13 years in Opposition, however, the Tory party that entered office in 2010 was a very different creature from the one that had defeated James Callaghan in 1979. The Party had ideologically re-orientated to the centre ground, washing its hands of British nationalism in favour of embracing the apparently new ‘globalised world’ Britain found itself in. Such a course was part of the Conservatives strategy to project a more caring and cosmopolitan image than in the past. Thus, when dealing with a divisive issue which had to be addressed in order to demonstrate the party’s competence, these had to be given an upbeat tone (e.g., “migration has enriched our culture and strengthened our economy”).

At the heart of this political consensus was the adoption of managerial technocracy, an ideological alignment described by its guru Tony Blair as ‘a third way’ approach that sought to reconcile social justice (‘equity’) with economic competitiveness (‘efficiency’). The principal values of ‘managed migration’ include: (i) a commitment to evidence-based policy and a points-based immigration system; (ii) a desire to modernise procedures and deliver faster decisions; and (iii) a commitment to introducing new tougher arrangements on asylum seekers and undocumented workers. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Conservative strategy on immigration in the run-up to the 2008 GE was to try to retain the managed migration framework, by discursively politicising it and preserving a fairly neutral position.
The modernisation of the Conservatives is essential to understanding why policies supported by large majorities of the British public, even if nominally adopted by the governments (e.g., reducing net migration to “the tens of thousands”), will not be fully implemented by the machinery of government. Despite the government’s claim that it is creating a “hostile environment” for illegal immigrants, the policy framework of the mid-2010s was effectively the application of New Labour’s governing philosophy of managed migration. As illustrated above in Figure 5, the Conservative party is the party of, if not unambiguously for, managerial rule. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by Theresa May,

“When properly managed, immigration enriches this country, as we benefit from the skills, talent and entrepreneurial flair that people bring to our society. But, as I said in my recent speech, when net migration is too high, and the pace of change is too fast, it puts pressure on schools, hospitals, accommodation, transport and social services, and it can drive down wages for people on low incomes. So we must achieve the right balance, rejecting both extremes of the debate, from those who oppose immigration altogether to those who want entirely open borders.”

(Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, cols.195, 13 October 2015)

Although May first spoke about creating a “hostile environment” for illegal immigrants in 2012, only a tiny fraction of illegal immigrants are sent back to
their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal procedures, it is decided that they have not got grounds to remain. In this context, British MPs are represented – plausibly enough – as a ‘managerial elite’, and thus as favoring modes of decision-making that are insulated from the passions and pressures of democratic politics.

6.1.2. Labour

The situation within the parliamentary Labour Party is somewhat more diffuse than that of the Conservatives. Following 18 years in opposition, the New Labour government that entered office in 1997 was naturally inclined to try to limit migration to demonstrate ‘competence’, but both pro-business and pro-Common Market inclinations push them in a more expansionist direction. As is typical for parties on the mainstream centre-left, Labour has been internally torn between fealty to the ‘small-c’ conservatism of their working class base and responding to their bourgeoisie supporters’ concern for economic efficiency. Consequently, the leading supporters of the pro-immigration camp may be found within the cosmopolitan elite, much of which considers a heavy, continuing flow of immigrants (legal or otherwise) as an important source of innovation and enrichment (Menz 2009).
The Labour Party’s historical record on immigration demonstrates that left or centre-left parties do not necessarily mimic their opponents or chase the majority voter position in a ‘crude’ utilitarian fashion. On the contrary, Labour’s record illustrates that mainstream parties do not unequivocally favour restrictionist policies. Notable examples include:

i. the abolition of the Primary Purpose Rule;
ii. the abolition of exit controls to non-EU destinations;
iii. the doubling of work permits for non-EU workers;
iv. the quintupling of student visas; and
v. the expansion of the Post-Study Work route

One could legitimately argue, for example, that Tony Blair’s pro-Europeanism goes some way to explaining the A8 decision in 2004, as Labour’s enthusiasm towards greater EU integration was reflected in Britain being a champion for an enlarged EU. If Labour had maintained its 1960s Euroscepticism, it is likely that transitional controls would have been placed.

In parallel and intersecting with the above policy, New Labour also claimed to be against open borders, and periodically announced crackdowns against illegal immigrants. As discussed in Chapter 5, the overall policy trend since the early 2000s has been increased openness towards a few selective types of immigration combined with substantial efforts to control and limit other types. Managed migration, as such, is like the two-faced God Janus: it stands for both a passionate, rhetorical defence of legal migration and its social and economic benefits as well as for a schematic, coldly rational conceptual system which seeks to deter illegal aliens. Consider, for example, the reappropriation of Thatcherite themes (‘swamping’) by David Blunkett:

“Due to the continuing rapid rate of increase of patient numbers and in particular the increasing proportion of patients requiring an interpreter for consultation, we find the quality of service we are offering is falling and staff are under intolerable strain. That is what I meant when I used the word "swamped" this morning. I
could have used an equivalent word, "overburdened", but I think that people would have objected to the idea of a burden. I could have used the word "overwhelmed", and I will now, because overwhelmed is how GPs feel, as do some schools—I stress that it is only some—that are having to deal with language requirements that accommodation centres will be able to fulfill.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.384, col.348, 24 April 2002)

While immigration does not neatly divide the cosmopolitan Left from the managerial elite, it is opening up an important cleavage which bisects the PLP. A pro-immigration wing, braced by interventions from Diane Abbott and David Lammy (among others), urges Labour to hold the line as a resolutely pro-immigration party. Against this, managerialist voices such as that of Yvette Cooper and Hilary Benn urge the party not to lose touch with its patriotic working-class base. Ms Cooper, for example, has dismissed Ms Abbott’s suggestion that calling for immigration controls would turn Labour into “Ukip lite”. “Immigration is really important for Britain” Cooper said, “it just needs to be controlled and managed in a way that’s fair” (quoted from Schofield 2016).

6.2.Agenda-setting

Q2: “To what extent have MPs politicized the racial, religious and/or cultural characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?”

Q3: “To what extent have MPs depoliticized the racial, religious and/or cultural characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?”

The study of the politics of migration is exceptional in the amount of attention researchers have paid to the problem of agenda setting, beginning with studies of the initial legislation of the 1960s. Anthony Messina’s (1989) provocative study explored why race had lain dormant as a political issue until the early 1980s and
how British parties and leaders had acted to depoliticise it. Subsequent studies were similarly concerned with the problematic status of race and ethnicity as parts of the political agenda. However, unlike Messina (1989), the study of agenda-setting in the field of migration has tended to focus on the alleged role played by political parties in *normalising* racism. According to political sociologist Aurelien Mondon (2016), “[racist] discourse is no longer limited to the margins; it is mainstream and this needs to be widely acknowledged before it can be stopped”. Randall Hansen (2000, p.10) refers to this thesis as the “racialisation account”.

6.2.1. Depoliticisation of race

Despite the fact that the racialisation thesis commands broad support in the academic community, the argument is seriously flawed, supporting an argument about the ‘normalisation’ of racism with reference solely to unrepresentative quotations by often-marginal figures. Historically, racism played a much bigger role in the pre-war period. For example, in the early twentieth century Conservative MP Sir William Evans-Gordon expressed alarm at the number of Jewish refugees claiming asylum in Britain: “Ten grains of arsenic in a thousand loaves would be unnoticeable and perfectly harmless”, he told parliament, “but the same amount put into one loaf would kill the whole family that partook of it” (quoted from Malik 2013).

By way of contrast, both major political parties in the post-war era have sought to avoid a political debate that draws (too heavily) on British white identity (‘societal depoliticisation’). As illustrated in Figure 7, the vast majority of MPs no longer talk of traditional British values or the importance of a national culture:
To forestall any misunderstanding: this does not mean to say that race is wholly absent from the discursive terrain of elite-level parliamentary discourse. On the contrary, since the early 1960s, one of the key arguments made against immigration is that it has a corrosive impact on security. Anti-immigration groups mobilised against Commonwealth free entry on the basis that it represented a threat to race-relations and to national unity (PN26). Commenting on the ‘patrial clause’ in the 1971 Immigration Bill, Conservative MP Ken Clarke stated,

“In my view… a perfectly respectable case can be made out for this [partial] definition. In part, it recognises the somewhat different racial content of those people who are likely to want to come to this country under the grandfather Clause. It is intellectually dishonest for liberal opinion—as it is for illiberal opinion—to pretend that the debate about immigration control in this country at the moment centres on anything other than the racial problems which the country faces.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, col.126, 08 March 1971)

More recently, however, the terms of this debate have shifted. Both sides now acknowledge that the impact of immigration on society is likely to be positive: cultural diversity is celebrated as a fundamental value. For members of the political class, ‘diversity’ represents an enlightened alternative to an outdated
and allegedly monolithic national identity (Coble 2018). To quote Mims Davies, the Conservative MP for Eastleigh:

“We are fortunate to live in a country that has benefited enormously from being a true melting-pot nation, and we speak in a truly global and outward-looking country and a truly diverse city. Students across the world come to our universities seeking the finest education, global investors continue to put their faith in the economic security of the nation and our proud culture of arts boasts the positive values of immigration and true diversity. (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, col.255, 13 October 2015)

As discussed in Chapter 3, opponents of immigration only see immigration’s negative impacts on the economy: typically, the centre-right worries about the wage and property squeeze suffered by the urban poor, while the centre-left borrows free market assumptions to defend open borders. As a result, politicians have become accustomed, even desensitized, to the way in which complex human realities are economized. Writers and speakers in this mode of discourse hone in on the measurable and the quantitative, with a balancing fear of subjective value judgments. The comments of Tory back-bencher Simon Hoare are paradigmatic in this respect:

“The [2015 Immigration] Bill does not try to debate—because this is not the kernel of the argument—whether immigration is a good or bad thing, and it does not seek to further or foster racism or discrimination; it seeks purely to find better ways of defining the legal and the illegal. There is no qualitative judgment on an immigrant community the vast majority of whom play a full and active part in British life and are welcomed to our shores.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, col.258, 13 October 2015)

As Hoare himself confesses, there is no “qualitative judgment” on the assimilability of migrant communities: it does not “try to debate… whether immigration is a good or bad thing”. Depoliticisation, here, is most clear in the domain of metanarrative – the latticework of ideas, concepts and characters that
underpin government policy. The biggest ideological divide in contemporary migration politics, as illustrated in Figure 8, has been a battle between the forces of globalism (MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM) and the forces of managerialism (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION).

6.2.2. Deracialisation of public policy

Despite the claims of some MPs that there is a rhetorical “race to the bottom” or an attempt among party leaders to “out-UKIP UKIP”, the security-identity axis is less politically salient than it was during the 1961-1995 period. Politicians from across the political spectrum have liberalised entry rules and backed policies that generally expanded migrant visas. Against this background, the racialisation thesis fails on three fronts:

(1) First, the racialisation thesis is prone to confirmation bias, supporting a hypothesis about Parliament’s construction of racism with reference solely to unrepresentative quotations by often marginal figures;
(2) Second, the racialisation thesis is prone to *disconfirmation bias*, ignoring numerous contradicting instances in which a principled stand was made against racism;

(3) Third, the racialisation thesis is prone to *decontextualisation* by ignoring the broader complex of administrative (e.g. law enforcement) and non-administrative factors (e.g. impacts on public service delivery) that influenced policy.

Of course, many critical race theorists (CRT) insist that racism has mutated, adopting new ‘hidden’ guises. According to this view, racist assumptions about minorities pervade ‘our’ mind-set and are reinforced in the media and popular culture. The problem with such arguments, however, is that they are impressionistic, and, in many cases, unfalsifiable. This does not mean to say that racism is irrelevant to the history of the post-war period. On the contrary, there are several instances in which racism played a key role – most notably in the 1964 General Election victory of Peter Griffiths in Swethwick, whose supporters told voters that “If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour” (quoted from Hansen 2010). The explicit language employed by Enoch Powell also served as a catalyst for a more wide-ranging attack on the political consensus in race-relations.

On the other hand, the findings of this thesis show that there is a considerable gap between the tabloid-friendly rhetoric of some MPs and the reality of policymaking on both the centre-left and centre-right. A myopic focus on what politicians say to the public (‘swamping’, ‘flooding’, ‘hostile environment’, etc.) has led some migration scholars to underestimate the importance of official parliamentary discourses on immigration and assimilation policy.

In ending this study, it is worth considering the political implications of the bipartisan consensus. As explained in the opening chapter, the findings of this thesis can be placed in what has been called *Pasteur’s Quadrant*: an argument that the study is important for both advancing a body of knowledge and also important for meeting some political challenge (Stokes 1997). Arguably, one of
the biggest challenges for the UK government is this: how do you reap the benefits of immigration (economic and social) whilst respecting – rather than suppressing – Britain’s cultural identities? More than any other issue, immigration serves as a particularly powerful test case of claims that political parties are ‘out of touch’ and unduly influenced by special interests.

6.3. Pasteur’s Quadrant: political expression and representation through political parties

6.3.1. Crisis of legitimacy
Casting an eye across modern Britain, a wide range of social, economic and cultural issues are linked in one way or another to migration: its impact on schools, hospitals, housing, GDP, national security and community relations. Few subjects apart from the economy are consistently ranked in the top three challenges facing the country (Duffy 2014). In the words of Erica Consterdine (2018, preface), a Research Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research:

“A decade ago, one of my former lecturers told me that if you really want to understand any given society, you should take a look at their immigration system… It is one of the most divisive, contested and important issues of our time.”

Whatever the final outcome of Britain’s re-negotiation with the EU, the problems thrown up by the legacy of mass immigration will continue to shape migration politics for the foreseeable future. One leading authority on demography, Professor David Coleman, has estimated that the native white population will become an ethnic minority by 2066 (Coleman 2013). According to Professor Eric Kaufmann of Birkbeck College:

“Britain is changing, becoming increasingly diverse. The 2011 census shows that White British people are already a minority in four British cities, including
London. Over a quarter of births in England and Wales are to foreign-born mothers. Young Britons are also much more diverse than older Britons. Just 4.5 per cent of those older than 65 are nonwhite but more than 20 per cent of those under 25 are.”

One consequence of this demographic revolution is that the political class now finds itself in the grip of a crisis of legitimacy (McLaren 2012a; 2012b; 2012a; 2013b; 2014; 2016), and that crisis is growing inexorably stronger because of:

a) the depoliticisation of public policy (Crouch 2004; 2011)

b) asymmetric multiculturalism (Kaufmann 2017); and

c) the government’s continued policy of managed migration (McLaren 2015)

The early stages of this crisis have led to a populist backlash as neo-nationalist parties/protest movements tear a path through the usual politics of ‘left’ versus ‘right’. Already, in some western European countries, both pro- and anti-immigration movements run dueling demonstrations.

At the European level, EU politicians no longer speak of European integration, but of how to prevent the complete break-up of the Schengen zone. The so-called ‘migration crisis’ – sparked by Angela Merkel’s government in 2015 – has quickened the populist advance across the continent. The government of Hungary, for example, has responded to this crisis by building a fence to wall itself off from Serbia, while the governments of Austria and Slovakia have imposed frontier controls with other EU states.

The managerial elite’s reaction, in many cases, has been to deflect attention away from the issue by repudiating past immigration levels and pledging numerous crackdowns on ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Balch 2010; Consterdine 2018). Unfortunately for the British government, however, this Janus-faced populism has simply fuelled widespread cynicism about the two major parties. Unsurprisingly, voters point to a mismatch between what is promised and what is delivered (McLaren 2015). According to Professor Lauren
McLaren, this ‘rhetoric-reality’ gap has undermined trust in mainstream political institutions.

Figure 9. Immigration and political trust, interactive effects

Source: McLaren 2015 (p.137)

Figure 9 provides a graphical representation of the significant interactions between immigration concerns, perception of government handling of immigration, and political trust. Figure 6.6 indicates that the impact of perceptions of government handling of immigration on political trust is stronger for those who believe immigrants have not contributed to British culture, while for those who believe immigrants have contributed to culture, the impact of perceptions of government handling of immigration is very limited. These findings support the propositions outlined in Chapter 1: that opponents of a multicultural society generally perceive the parties “not as incompetent firemen,
unable to contain the blaze… but as arsonists” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.188).

6.3.2. The limits of managed migration

When confronted with this crisis of legitimacy, some of the more nuanced proponents of managed migration have extolled assimilation as the solution. In this vision, all the myriad problems of a multiethnic society can be overcome through

1. citizenship tests,
2. education in civics theories,
3. monolingualism, and
4. the promotion of ‘British’ values.

According to this view, newcomers need to adopt the UK’s common laws, rules, norms and institutions: the things that make people ‘British’. To take a recent example, in 2016 Communities Secretary Sajid Javid proposed an oath of allegiance63 for all public-office holders:

“If we are going to challenge such attitudes, civic and political leaders have to lead by example…We can’t expect new arrivals to embrace British values if those of us who are already here don’t do so ourselves, and such an oath would go a long way to making that happen.” (Javid 2016)

Every public office-holder, in Javid’s view, should swear an oath of allegiance to British values, such as “tolerating the views of others even if you disagree with them”, as well as “believing in freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from abuse… a belief in equality, democracy, and the democratic process” (ibid).

This proposal is effectively a continuation of Gordon Brown’s plan to produce a ‘formal statement of British values’. As Brown put it back in 2007

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63 Javid’s proposal came in response to a report on social cohesion by Dame Louise Casey, which found that in some communities women were the subject of abuse and unequal treatment.
“A strong sense of being British helps unite and unify us; it builds stronger social cohesion among communities. We know that other countries have a strong sense of national purpose, even a sense of their own destiny.

And so should we. And it helps us deal with issues as varied as what Britain does in Europe; to issues of managed migration and how we better integrate ethnic minorities. Today we have a citizenship test for newcomers wanting to be citizens - 24 questions on life in the UK that lasts for 45 minutes.”

The problem of managerialism in mainstream political parties, and specifically post-Cold war British parties of government, has not been a central concern of this thesis. Nevertheless, after surveying the post-1990s politics of migration, it is difficult not to conclude that managerialism in the Conservative and Labour parties is a serious impediment to meaningful party-political competition and, hence, to the scrutiny of government policy. As the above quotations show, political parties have become more active in promoting top-down assimilationist programs.

It is, of course, legitimate to argue that the advantages of UK immigration rules as they exist now outweigh the disadvantages. It is possible to say that the global benefits of large-scale economic migration mean we should not seek to limit it at all. It is also reasonable to believe that immigrants need to adopt the UK’s common laws, rules, norms and institutions. But it is not possible to implement all three of those positions. For example, at very low levels of migration, there are strong social and economic incentives for migrants to assimilate into the dominant culture. Human beings, after all, are social creatures: they do not want to be ostracised from the wider community or ‘left behind’ economically. At very high levels of migration, however, assimilation of migrants becomes harder, particularly if newcomers are able to assort solely with others from their own country and can get by with minimal interaction with the ethnic majority. Put simply, assimilation and large-scale immigration make a volatile mixture.
One of the central tasks for an adequate critique of managed migration is to give an account of *administrative limits* – currently a void at the heart of the subject. Each type of administrative limit discussed below represents a recognisable and frequently encountered family of phenomena, regularly appearing in different guises and contexts.

### 6.3.3 Clustering
First, immigrants (and their descendents) tend to cluster geographically in a small number of enclaves: they do not spread out evenly across the entire country.\(^{64}\) Initially, these clusters are the result of ‘push-pull’ dynamics in the global economy: immigrants tend to be more willing to move into crowded areas with a high concentration of interconnected businesses (Dustmann and Frattini 2013). Once a cluster is established, however, ethnic communities can have their own distinct shops, schools, restaurants, sports teams, religious buildings, and para-legal institutions. Thus, the larger the size of immigrant diaspora, the fewer social interactions there will be with the indigenous population, and therefore the slower the rate of assimilation (Collier 2013).\(^{65}\)

### 6.3.4 Chain migration
Second, immigration (as a phenomenon) starts small and builds up gradually, feeding upon itself along the way. It is a process that begins with an initial influx, followed by settlement, and then secondary migration through the reunification of families. Once sizeable immigrant families have settled, familial networks tend to

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\(^{64}\) Pakistani migrants, for example, have tended to settle in Birmingham and the old Pennine towns, whereas Bangladeshi migrants have tended to cluster in East London. People of Indian descent, in contrast, are generally more widely dispersed, living mainly in Wolverhampton and the West of London, as well as in Bradford, Slough, and Leicester. People of Afro-Caribbean descent are mostly in Birmingham, Manchester, and London, with Brixton, Peckham, and Hackney the leading residential zones.

\(^{65}\) One of the main themes of the Cantle report, commissioned in 2001 in response to a series of violent inter-ethnic clashes in the north of England, is that damaging racial polarisation is likely to occur when there are no points of contact between different communities.
reduce the incentives toward assimilation, with settled migrants frequently functioning as “bridgeheads” (Collier 2013). This, in turn, generates a slackening of people’s will and conviction to maintain an allegiance and belonging link to the nation-state.

6.3.5 Transnationalism

Third, rapid developments in information technology and transport (i.e., smartphones, social media, affordable flights, free international phone calls, etc.) have allowed migrants to remain psychologically close to their country of origin. Such people are thought to be living what might be called ‘transnational lives’, meaning they are not fixed in any one particular country though may have citizenship or a right to residence (Castles 2004a; 2004b). Moreover, when immigrants are admitted to liberal states, they benefit from the much wider scope of toleration that is now afforded to those whose lifestyles deviate from the mainstream. This is partly because Western cultures have become increasingly individualistic. As a result, the implementation of an assimilationist policy framework has to be administered in ways that are consistent with liberal-democratic principles – by encouragement rather than compulsion.

6.3.6 Identity politics

Finally, immigrants (and their descendents) may have problems assimilating emotionally with European society because of competing ethnocultural loyalties. The psychological motivations for this are well established in such predispositions as ‘ethnic nepotism’ and ‘ethnocentrism’ (Salter 2002; 2006). Thus, while successive generations of descendents from immigrant families may become more psychologically distant from their ancestral homeland, many other generations will choose to lead ‘parallel lives’ in ethnically defined enclaves.

As Macpharlane (1978a; 1978b; 1992; 2012) and others have argued, kinship has been weaker among the British – and individualism correspondingly stronger – since at least the 12th century.
According to Gary Freeman (2011, pp.1556-57), a Professor of migration studies at the University of Texas, some generations may even assimilate in reverse:

“Spectacular events like the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and riots over cartoons poking fun at the Prophet have made it impossible to gloss over the very real clash of value systems migration has introduced to the liberal democratic West. The success of radical right parties in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, Australia, and Italy suggests the importance of taking more seriously the tension between democracy and liberal, open immigration policy.”

Taken together, these social phenomena are pregnant with implications. Apart from the fact that they justify the central focus of this thesis, they also expose the limits of top-down government management. If uncontrolled immigration leads to strong patterns of self-segregation, then there is an obvious limit to the number of people a society can absorb and the speed with which it can assimilate them. The consequences of this, however, go far beyond the bailiwick of public policy. With the emergence of a globalist-managerial consensus, the goals of politics have become increasingly self-referential and technocratic, and what little inter-party competition remains has become focused on the ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ management of the state. On what for many voters is actually a cultural question, the establishment’s arguments on immigration, and a whole host of other policies, have become straitjacketed. The “redemptive feature” of democracy, to borrow Margaret Canovan’s (1999) phrase, is broken.

6.4 Concluding remarks

If the story of the Conservative and Labour parties’ consensus on managerial rule offers any lessons, it is that the convergence of party policies and elite political discourse without popular consent are not without cost. As Professor Cas Mudde observed in 2016: “Populists challenge not just the specific policies but also the depoliticisation of the issues. Often correctly, they argue that what once was
political can be political again, if the majority of the population wants it to be.” While emanating from different directions, what unites the various populist movements is a staunch criticism of managerial governance and an appeal to those who feel they have been betrayed by mainstream parties. Indeed, the close association of the major parties with managerial governance has undoubtedly motivated citizens to express their migration-related concerns elsewhere. The victory of the Leave campaign in 2016, for example, was underpinned by political and cultural grievances that transcended traditional ‘left-right’ ideological lines – and a rejection of mainstream parties that had too long ignored those concerns. The campaign for control has, in short, been superseded by a revolt of the masses.
## APPENDIX


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<th>Policy narrative</th>
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### TABLE A3: Ideological orientation of Labour Party MPs (1961-2015)

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