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THE IMPACT OF CULTURE IN CONSTRUCTING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: FACTORS AFFECTING MIDDLE MANAGERS BEHAVIOUR TOWARD TOP MANAGERS

A CASE OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY (IRAQ)

submitted by
Lamya Abdul-Jabbar Al-Zubaidi

for the degree of Ph.D. of the University of Bath

1985

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L. A. J. Al-Zubaidi
To the memory of my father.
To my mother, Muwafak, and
Saif-Alden
I am most grateful to those who provided me with information and publications, particularly to those Iraqi middle managers who answered the questionnaire.

I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Professor Iain Leslie Mangham, for his help, encouragement, and diligent supervision.

I would like to thank my friend Gail Ann Griffith for her help in the process of editing the thesis. Words simply cannot express my deep feeling of gratitude to my family, above all my mother, who gave me their financial and moral support throughout the preparation of this thesis.

I am particularly indebted and deeply grateful for my husband Muwafak for his help, support and encouragement. To him and to my son Saif-Alden who shared with me the trials and tribulations of the return to student life, and supported me with their unfailing love I would like to say thank you.
Two integrated themes are the concern of this thesis, which are of great theoretical and practical importance. The major and broader theme is to explore the impact of culture in constructing organizational behaviour, particularly in non-Western countries. The second theme, which was the initial concern of this research, is to provide deep, significant insights and understandings of middle managers' compliance in relation to top managers in work organizations, and to investigate the affecting factors, particularly in the public sector in a developing country (viz Iraq). The research was carried out based on a model which was developed through an elaboration between the researcher's previous work experience and observation, and the material found in the literature. The fieldwork study was launched in (11) companies within the 'Ministry of Trade' in Iraq.

The main contributions of this research are the following:

1) It explores and evidences the foundational impact of culture in constructing organizational behaviour.

2) It demonstrates the usefulness of adapting the "organization within society" approach in understanding organizational behaviour and the contributions that a socio-historical study of the evolution of society and its institutional development can make toward such an understanding.

3) It invalidates the notion of a single type of modern bureaucracy governed by universalistic standards, as it provides an example of a different type of bureaucracy that exists in a non-Western country.

4) It supports the notion that dysfunctional patterns of
'bureaupathology' take forms that are related to the culture where the sick bureaucracy is found.

5) It challenges the one-sided picture of the impact of formal organizations on individuals' characteristics and behaviour, as it shows the impact of individuals' characteristics and conceptual structure, brought with them from their socialization in wider society, on formal organizations.

6) It shows that organizational behaviour is a function of both individual and organization characteristics, and that middle manager's compliance in relation to organizational authority is not a simple subservience in response to a stimulus or a reflection of a personality disorder, but rather that their 'socialization' and 'powerlessness' both stand behind their compliance.

7) It supports the universal or 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture and, moreover, singles out this thesis of culture at the level of middle managers across different organizations in one country; furthermore this research distinguishes the affecting factors that could stand behind the middle managers' variations at the dominant level of their organizational behaviour.

In very general terms, the findings led us to conclude that there seems to be no universal or typical model which could explain human behaviour in all societies or in specific ones, but rather human behaviour "mirrors at all times an intricate blend of the universal and the variable" (Kluckhohn 1964; p. 345).
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM

I observed middle managers' behaviour in relation to the top manager while working for more than 10 years in many Iraqi organizations and in retrospect I asked myself why they comply with the top person (i.e. top manager) instructions and wishes as they do? If they respond to his coercion or authority which is imposed on them, or try to protect themselves from punishment, why do they in many cases comply with his order to a greater extent than is required, and even when there is no need for their compliance? why, despite the fact that they are, in their managerial position, supposed to be 'leaders', do they feel it is very normative and legitimate to be overly concerned with top people's wishes and expectations, rather than their subordinates needs and expectations? why are they eager to please the 'boss', even at the expense of their organizations needs and requirements? and why do they vary in their degree of compliance?. Thinking of the many sayings proverbs and metaphors which they use in conversations, defining situations and explaining some aspects of their behaviour in relation to top people, I then asked myself: In what way and to what extent is their behaviour influenced by the values or 'orientations' that those socialized adults have brought to the organization from their wider society? How and to what extent does the organizational culture and its characteristics influence their behaviour?

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study arises out of these questions in an attempt to answer them through wider and multi dimensional perspectives. It is hoped this would generate an understanding of middle management problems in contemporary work organizations in Iraq, in particular that it would
show the impact of 'culture' in constructing organizational behaviour in general.

The major objectives of this study are the following:

1 - To explore the impact of 'culture' of wider society and the organizational culture on employees' (here middle managers) organizational behaviour in relation to the organizations' authority figures (here top managers).

2 - To investigate middle managers' compliance in relation to top managers, and the affecting factors and the extent of their effect on this compliance.

AN OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

Part One of this thesis presents the conceptual and methodological foundation for this study. Chapters 1 and 2 attempt to put this research in a wider perspective, not only in relation to my previous work observations, but more in relation to the body of knowledge in the field of organizational behaviour. Chapter 1 concerns with middle managers' behavioural dilemmas in relation to top managers in work organizations. Chapter 2 presents a research model of studying organizational behaviour that is mainly based on the researcher's previous work observations and its conceptual perspective, which is the result of the research strategy in handling the data and providing modes of conceptualization for interpreting and explaining, rather than from a preconceived theoretical framework. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the research design. The discussion centres on the way the project was actually carried out, and the principles which guided the choices and strategy that were made in collecting and analyzing the data.
Part two consists of the 'reflection on culture' chapters among which Chapter 4 presents the identity and characteristics, particularly in relation to authority, of Iraqi culture that was found by this research through studying the socio-historical evolution of this society. In Chapter 5 the researcher focusses on the dominant value-orientations in contemporary Iraqi society that characterize individuals and organizations. Accordingly Chapter 6 will present the cultural setting of Iraqi bureaucratic-orientated organizations, and the identity and characteristics of Iraqi organizational culture.

Part Three consists of the research fieldwork findings in studying middle managers' behaviour in relation to top managers in Iraqi organization. The theme of Chapter 7 will be the nature and pattern of middle managers' orientations and behaviour as reflected by them. This will be followed in Chapter 8 with detailed examination and analysis of the middle managers' variations on the dominant pattern of orientation and behaviour in terms of their individuality difference factors. In Chapter 9, the focus will shift to study middle managers' variations in terms of the affecting organizational factors.

Throughout the thesis, 'his' refers to male and female, for convenience.
PART ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER (1)

MIDDLE MANAGEMENT AND ITS BEHAVIOURAL
DILEMMAS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH TOP MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION

Little has been written about the middle manager and the role's dilemmas have not yet received sufficient attention in the literature. The problems associated with his role within organizational life have been dealt with in a normative manner and very rarely empirically studied. The problem of power and the political interaction as experienced by the middle manager are seldom analysed, either sociologically and/or culturally.

Before moving to this research's attempt to make sociological and cultural sense of the middle manager's behaviour towards top management in Iraqi organizations, some conceptual considerations related to the definition of 'Middle Management', its role in organizational effectiveness and particularly its behavioural dilemmas in its relationship with top management, will be provided.

1. WHO ARE THE 'MIDDLE MANAGERS'?  

The concept of middle management is inevitably diffuse and its boundaries have not yet been precisely defined. The concept of "man in the middle" and its implications has been used in the literature to refer generally to those people who are somewhere in the intermediate organizational space between the top levels of managers and the bottom levels of subordinates. Writers use the term 'middle management' to talk about different intermediate organizational levels. While Niles (1949) employed the term to refer to junior administrators who in her case were immediately below top management, the same implications of being the "man in the middle" have been used by many writers (Roethlisberger 1945; Gardner and Whyte 1945; Wray 1949) to refer to the position of the "foreman". Uyterhoeven (1972) uses the same term of "man in the middle" and its implications to
describe the characteristics of the position of the "general managers" at the middle organizational level. Some writers, such as Kay (1974 a), call middle managers, "those who manage managers, supervisors, or professional and technical people and are not vice-presidents of functional or staff areas or general managers (that is, they have no profit and loss responsibilities)" (p.106). Other writers, such as Mann and Dent (1954) call the "supervisor" the man in the middle and present the implications of his membership in two organizational families.

At this point, it is clear that the 'middle' is composed of a vast area reaching from those just below top policy-makers to those with barely supervisory responsibilities over lowest-level subordinates. Within this broad level of middle management, there are many sub-levels of those people who, through their 'life in the middle', tend to share similar role implications in common and their roles have similar characteristics; they also face very similar kinds of problems and dilemmas.

Defining precisely who we do call the middle management is not easy because every organization and country has a different system for designating people's status and hierarchical position. For the purposes of this research, I am identifying "middle managers" as those who are considered in Iraqi organizations as the "middle management", that is:

The people in charge for departments as they are their heads, they are the first line to hold the title of 'manager' in Iraqi grading codes, and are accountable to the top management for their departments' activities and are managing staff subordinates accountable to them.

Within those organizations where the observations and field work of this research were carried out, the above people represent the 'middle' of Iraqi organizational hierarchy; those below them are
acting and viewed as subordinates, and those above them are considered by themselves and by others as the members of top management, (i.e. the D.G. and his aids in the companies, or the president and his aids and D.G's in the establishments).

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The importance of the middle management population arises from what they do and where they are situated in the organization. Members of this population have been called by different metonyms to indicate their important role in the organizational life; Kruger (1970) calls the middle managers, "the doers who enable the organization to reach out for its objectives. They are the backbone of the organization ...." (p.935). They are the "funnels" through which the intentions of top management flow down and information flows up (Kay 1977); they are the "hearts" and "lungs" of the organizations (Mossa 1978). They are the "arms of management"; "grass-roots level of management"; "front-line personnel men" (Roethlisberger 1945). If an organization is a car, say Kanter and Stein (1979), "the top would be the driver, the bottom would be the engine and the drive train, while the middle would constitute all of the electrical and mechanical connections between them". (p.80).

Such metonyms try to indicate that the middle manager is the 'key man of management' as he is the most important communication link between the top managers who formulate policy and deal with the organization as a whole, and workers who achieve policy.

But what do the middle managers do and what are their main duties and responsibilities? While it is difficult and perhaps even impossible to arrive at a complete and accurate description of the
duties and responsibilities of the job of 'middle manager' one could sample the broad domain of those duties and responsibilities which comprise his job as follows:

1. Interpret and implement organization goals and carry out the policies of top management and translate its intentions in terms of specific activities within his area of responsibility.

2. Aid the chief or top manager; make his (the middle manager) division function smoothly and deal with the day-to-day detail of the organization, leaving the top manager as free as possible for his responsibilities; in other words, make the boss look good.

3. Provide areas of expertise through his own knowledge and performance, and through the staff he manages, and he is expected to be a specialist in his own functional areas.

4. Cultivate a broad perspective, looking at persons in other parts of the organization as well as outside the organization.

5. Co-operate and co-ordinate his efforts with others in different parts of the organization and understand the interlocking of departments in major policy practices in order to create a smoothly functioning organization.

6. Keep communication channels open with subordinates and superiors, as well as with peers.

7. Exercise leadership and set the tone for the operations of his division and direct it properly.

8. Build up a contented and efficient staff, utilize them properly, motivate them and evoke in them the desire for high quality performance, and develop from them leaders for the future through training and experience.

9. Work on budget estimations, planning of assignments and workloads, office layout and make recommendations either to improve
performance or to accomplish operations not possible under the existing state of affairs.

It is quite clear from the above description that the job of middle manager commonly involves a range of managerial competences which would certainly embrace a wide variety of different sorts of activities.

To accomplish such a job, says Kruger (1970), the middle manager must have mainly three kinds of particular skills:

1. Human skills: because his job is essentially one which requires a great deal of decision-making about people as he achieves results primarily through the efforts of other people.

2. Technical skills: because he is managing a particular division with a particular function. Also, he needs to know the technical features surrounding his job.

3. Organizational conceptual skills: these relate to the process of administering in which the middle manager needs to relate his human and technical skills to particular situations in order to achieve maximum results.

Also Shepps (1971) notes, the responsibilities of the middle manager require an extensive application of behavioural science, and thus the middle manager is required to be skilled in applying behavioural knowledge to management problems.

Such skills are not very often obtained or effectively used by middle managers because of the conflict, pressures, frustrations, dissatisfactions, discontents and meaningless feelings which the literature suggests they suffer from.
3. **MIDDLE MANAGEMENT DILEMMAS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH TOP MANAGEMENT**

It has been said that for middle managers the daily facts of organizational life are having "a boss's responsibility without a boss's authority; functioning as a specialist and a generalist at the same time; meeting the conflicting demands of superiors, subordinates and peers while still getting the job done" (Uyterhoeven, 1972, p.75). This statement illustrates some of the main problems or dilemmas that the middle manager must handle in order to survive within the organization and which give the role of middle manager its peculiarity and its special characteristics. So, in order to understand this peculiarity, one needs to study the dilemmas especially in relationship to top management. One could categorize these dilemmas as:

A. **The dilemma of performing multiple organizational roles.**

B. **The dilemma of membership in two organizational families and the feeling of marginality.**

C. **The dilemma of lack of power and authority.**

A. **The Dilemma of Performing Multiple Organizational Roles**

From the previous description of the broad domain of duties and responsibilities, middle managers appear to have, as Broussine and Guerrier (1983) state, "the unenviable role of simultaneously both being influenced from above, and in turn influencing those below them, of being rewarded and in turn rewarding; or being controlled at the same time controlling; of being communicated to and having to communicate; and so on" (p.4). In order to fulfil his duties and responsibilities, the middle manager should play multiple roles and perform multiple activities. He has to be a follower and a leader, a
motivator and trainer of men, a communication specialist and a counsellor, a lawyer, a disciplinarian, a conflict resolver and also a manager who can provide a specialized and general knowledge. Mintzberg (1973) remarks that middle managers tend to view their activities as encompassing all the following roles which he identified as: "(sic) figurehead; liaison; leader; monitor; disseminator; spokesman; entrepreneur; disturbance handler; resource allocator, and the role of negotiator". The dilemma of the middle manager does not lie in handling multiple roles and activities alone, but also in the duality and conflict of those roles. This dilemma may appear through the following sets of roles that the manager has to play:

1 - Follower and Leader

The middle manager has the role both of being boss and bossed. Kanter and Stein (1979), pointed out that one of the critical characteristics of the roles of the 'man in the middle' is the need to identify with 'management' in the organization on the one hand, and on the other to gain the trust and respect of people for whom those images are either negative, meaningless or laden with different content. By definition, middle management personnel, claims Kruger (1970), are "followers". They carry out the policies of top management and their primary job is to make the 'boss' look good to the end that the mission of the organization is achieved effectively and efficiently. Playing the role of 'follower' means that the middle manager has to utilize his work force properly and make his division function smoothly, leaving top managers as free as possible for their other responsibilities.

If the middle manager is a 'follower', he is also, by being head of his department, a 'leader'. Playing the role of leader means that
the middle manager should be liked and trusted by his subordinates and
take account of their expectations of his behaviour. The middle
manager has to play, at the same time, the two roles of a 'follower'
and a 'leader' or, as Uyterhoeven (1972) analogises them, "coach" and
"player", when his superiors are usually coaches and his subordinates
are normally players. Therefore, the middle manager is, he says,
both a delegator and a doer, both a strategist and an operator.

In performing these dual roles of "player" and "coach", the
middle manager must balance the interests or the demands of his
subordinates whose commitment is essential, and the goals or demands
imposed by superiors whose approval he seeks. But he can often be
faced with the conflict between these two sets of demands or the
conflict between his role as 'follower' and as 'leader'. For
example, while his role as a follower or player may require him to
exercise more control and involvement in operating details and doing
things himself, acting as a leader of his subordinates demands less
control and the ability to generate more trust and confidence in
them. The middle managers, remarks Handy (1976), will often have to
face this crucial dilemma of how to balance trust and control,
especially because the degree of control is often dictated by top
managers. Added to this, the middle manager does not usually have
the opportunity to select his own men. Trust for the middle manager
can only survive one mistake, as he would not like to be seen by top
management as not doing his job properly. Thus, the middle manager
often finds himself being more controlling than he would like to be,
and when control is increased, trust is decreased. In balancing the
two roles, the middle manager is not entirely free (Uyterhoeven,
1972).
2 - Strategist and Operator

One of the main roles of the middle manager in his intermediate position within the organizational hierarchy is what Uyterhoeven (1972) terms as the "bilingual role" of translating the strategic language of his superiors into the operational language of his subordinates, thereby achieving the goals chosen by his superiors. The top manager provides his abstract guidance on what he wants in the form of goals, but not how these are to be accomplished. It is the responsibility of the middle manager to figure out how to perform the task and to formulate strategy enabling the translation of the abstract guidance or intentions of top management into specific activities or concrete action. Keeling (1972) notices that the job of middle manager is essentially that of implementing policies in accordance with guidance and decision rules, determined by his superiors. In assuming the role of "bilingual", states Uyterhoeven (1972), the middle manager must:

1. be a strategist rather than just an order-taker. He therefore needs to go beyond the formal definition of his job, and function broadly to fulfill the real scope of his responsibility. This is because he is provided with a much broader de facto responsibility than is usually codified in job descriptions or organizational charts;

2. assume full responsibility for translating the abstract goals into concrete action by making strategic decisions and planning;

3. communicate his decisions and plans effectively to both his superiors and subordinates.

On the other hand, the middle manager's success in accomplishing the required goals is measured by his superior in terms of 'results' rather than in terms of how these goals have been accomplished. Top
management appraise his performance by matching the goals or the abstract guidance that he has received with the abstract results of his action or strategies. Thus, the middle manager, as Uyterhoeven (1972) puts it, must be able to translate the concrete action into abstract measurement.

In fact, the middle manager's dilemma arises when top management believes that there is a contradiction between those signals from abstract measurement and those from abstract guidance. When such contradiction occurs, the translation process frequently gets reversed:

"Instead of starting with the abstract guidance (goals) to develop specific action, the middle manager starts with the abstract measurement (required results) and translates backward to his plan of action" (p.79).

If his superiors evaluate his performance in terms of abstract measurement on the basis of profit and loss, the middle manager has to evaluate his subordinates in terms of concrete action, in other words, using the operational language. Thus, he needs greater expertise and more intimate knowledge of specifics to employ different quantitative measures as well as qualitative judgements in his evaluation.

Translating action into abstract measurement, as pointed out by Uyterhoeven (1972), requires:

1. The ability to relate the two different languages; one is operational and involves many dimensions; the other is abstract and often in terms of a single dimension.

2. The ability to tread a thin line between the results and the goals when they are contradictory and sometimes to make trade-offs.
3 - **Specialist and Generalist**

Middle managers are basically specialists in their functional areas says Kay (1974 a). They are recruited for their knowledge of specialist or professional skills in their youth and they are appointed to the level of middle manager on the basis of outstanding achievements as a functional specialist. Thus, they are expected to provide areas of specialized knowledge. The middle manager's functional career depends very much on his specialization or an extensive involvement in a specific area. But this specialist, once he becomes caught up in the organizational hierarchy, is strongly required to be a "generalist" and to have a broad perspective of his role (Niles 1949). The transitional nature of being a middle manager presents him with new challenges (Uyterhoeven 1972; Torrington and Weightman 1982). Middle manager specialists often face, as individuals, the frustration of little visibility in a position that is not well understood. Yet, they may realize that to look for a bright future ahead and to rise very far in management requires them, somehow or other, to become more of a "generalist" (Martin 1979). The pressure of making this major transition arises, as Torrington and Weightman (1982) point out, out of the interest in promotion which is a *sine qua non* of being in management; in some cases its absence can be grounds for dismissal" (p.7). The social pressure on the middle manager as an individual is to achieve promotion which will demonstrate personal success. In managerial life, the orientation is toward what is to be rather than what is. Organizational regulation of salary system and performance appraisal usually create opportunities for some people to move a little higher up the ladder. Promotion or moving up in the organizational ladder involves the possibility of a better company car, a bigger and more
luxurious office, a variation in fringe benefits and likelihood of getting more authority and power. This situation, remark Torrington and Weightman (1982), has two inescapable effects:

"First the middle manager is very dependent on his superiors, as it is they who offer the promotion or the salary increase, who agree to the larger car or the change of office... everything depends on a superior saying "well done" and, perhaps, producing the bag of sweets.

Secondly, many middle managers will eventually be disappointed; if middle management is the training ground for senior management, as its transitional emphasis declares, then, most middle managers are not going to reach senior positions and will be categorised as failures" (p. 7-9).

Having no opportunity for upward mobility when the only position for which the middle manager is considered qualified is the job he currently holds leads to the "boxed-in feeling" among middle managers (Kay 1974 a). "They reach a point when they perceive no alternatives within their organization and they withdraw physically or psychologically, or they stay and tend to stagnate" (p. 128).

Making a transition from being mainly a specialist to becoming more of a generalist does not come easily to many middle managers, especially to those with specific technical qualifications. It is difficult for those who have remained heavily involved in their professional techniques and deeply imbued with its values to adjust to the new role which requires a change in attitude. Also, this transition represents a major risk, says Uyterhoeven (1972) instead of facing familiar challenges through the functional specialisation ladder and using their proven skills, the challenge as 'generalist' is new and the skills unproven.

The middle managers, in attempting to possess the required general management skills so that they can successfully meet the new challenge, are faced with another dilemma. This dilemma is described by Torrington and Weightman (1982) as follows:
"If they switch to management and allow their technical expertise to wither, they look for replacement management skills that are equally precise, substantial and enabling. What they find, however, is either a series of prosaic administrative clerical duties or that range of extremely imprecise - and some would say unsubstantial - management skills connected with commercial judgement, understanding people organizational politics and triggering sections of the administrative and communicative systems" (p. 6)

Uyterhoeven (1972) points out another aspect of this dilemma that is that the middle manager in making his major and risky transition is likely to face an unfriendly working environment and, moreover, he may find that his promotion has caused resentment and frustration to many of those who were hoping to be chosen for his position; some may consider themselves better qualified, because of age, seniority or experience; they may view the experience and capabilities of the new middle manager as insufficient for the job. Others may resent him because he represents the 'educated elite'. To overcome such possible handicaps of resentment, the middle manager needs strong administrative skills, but these skills, as noticed by Uyterhoeven (1972), "are typically the new middle manager's short suit; he is more often long on technical abilities and experience, which are obviously less relevant to the task" (p.81).

In coping with the dilemma of transition from 'specialist' to 'generalist' with its associated feelings of insecurity, the middle manager seeks to establish his new identity in the organization by creating and asserting a position of authority over others. In this position he uses his expertise or specialized knowledge and hierarchical position and, in addition, he tries to establish good personal relations with his subordinates in terms of "walking the job" (Torrington and Weightman 1982), and contain subordinates who are disposed to endanger his position: thus, he maintains compliance
with his authority. On the other hand, he sets out to strengthen his position upstairs by meeting the orders and demands of his superiors and satisfying their expectations about him, so that he can get promotion.

4 - Managing Multiple Relationships

Delton (1959) describes the middle manager as a "claims adjustor". He must get things done and achieve his goals through others; thus he needs the support and co-operation or approval of a large number of people. The middle manager, in terms of organizational relationships, is at the focal point which forces him to fulfil a "threefold task" of acting as subordinate, superior and equal:

" - Upward, he relates to his boss as a subordinate; he takes orders.
- Downward, he relates to his team as a superior; he gives orders.
- Laterally, he often relates to peers in the organization as an equal."

(Uyterhoeven 1972, p. 76)

In addition to the above three arms of relationships, Morris (1975) adds a fourth one, that is "people outside the organizations". The manager's dilemma is not only in managing these four directions of influence, but more in being able to shift quickly and frequently from one to another. Moreover, he must find ways, in Morris's view, to bring all his directions of relationships into "dynamic balance". But this balance is very hard to achieve when his multiple relationships consist of conflicting and changing demands. The middle manager may find that meeting what is expected of him by his superiors as a good subordinate would make him appear as unreasonable
and unresponsive to his subordinates and this may weaken his role as a boss. Equally, he may appear to his superiors as a disloyal subordinate when he ignores or fights their orders in favour of his subordinates. The middle manager, says Uyterhoeven (1972), may find himself torn between these two directions. He may also appear to his subordinates as inconclusive and indecisive, particularly when he holds sometimes prolonged negotiations with his peers about a certain problem in order to arrive at a mutual solution. Faced with the dilemma of managing multiple relationships, it is very hard to create a 'dynamic balance' between them, and the middle manager will tend to focus his attention on the most important direction for him and for his future career.

B. The Dilemma of Uncertain Belonging and Feeling of Marginality

The feeling of ambiguity or uncertainty of the organizational identification, as some writers remark (Roethlisberger 1945; Wary 1949), is one of the main behavioural dilemmas of the 'man in the middle'. People who occupy the top of the organizational hierarchy, are usually identified with the organization, by themselves as well as by others, and bear the label of 'management'. But those in the middle ranks are often uncertain about their identity as management or workers, although they are usually assured that they are members of management. Mann and Dent (1954) comment that whether the middle manager is a member of management is an unsettled question. Sometimes he seems to be and sometimes he seems not to be. Even when he is legally defined as a member of management, psychologically there still remains an ambiguity that disturbs him and the 'management' as well. The middle managers may express their lack of a sense of full belonging in words such as "They say we are part of
management but don't treat us that way" (Wray 1949), or as Roethlisberger (1945) notes, they feel that they are merely "stepchildren". Mant (1979) remarks that there is no particular identity to middle management work, "except that it stands in between those who matter at the top and those who matter at the bottom of the organization hierarchy" (p.38). The middle manager feels caught in a system where he is suspended somewhere in the organization between the prestigious, amply-rewarded top managers above him and the operating personnel below him.

By design, the middle manager is part of three groups; the first is his unit's workforce; the second, his peers; and the third, his and his peers superiors. The significant difference between the middle management level and other levels lies in the belonging by the 'man in the middle' to two "organizational families", one composed of his subordinates and the other of his superiors (Mann and Dent 1954). While the top level acts primarily as superior and the members of the bottom levels as subordinates, the middle manager is 'leader' in one group and 'subordinate' in the other one. Moreover, the middle manager does not have full membership of either management or workers families. He is not like his workers; he has a boss's responsibility as he guides, delegates, plans and assumes full responsibility for his unit. Also, he "is less than a full member of the management line, he shares with those higher up the responsibility for carrying out policies but does not share in the making of them" (Wray 1949, p. 301). This means that middle managers feel pressed to live up to the role of members of management, without being given the reward of full participation. Such a feeling, says Wray (1949), is common among people in "marginal positions" where they face a dilemma of coping with a good deal of personal conflict. This dilemma, explains
Roethlisberger (1945), makes the 'man in the middle' (in his case the foreman) "a master and victim of double talk".

Mann and Dent (1954) believe that the middle manager's problem is not his "dual membership" itself, but the failure of top management to recognise the dual membership character of his role. This failure, they say, has led Wray (1949) to see the foreman as a "marginal man", and Roethlisberger (1945) to see him as a "master and victim of double talk". Mann and Dent (1954) suggest that the middle manager should fully perform his "dual membership" and resolve the discrepancies in the expectations and objectives of those over him and those under him. Being a member of two organizational families, they emphasise, presents no special problem when there is no conflict of interest between the two groups or when it is possible for the person who has dual membership to isolate his activities in one group from his activities in the other. But, in fact, it is exceedingly difficult for the middle manager to isolate himself while his role is to be the link between management and workers who have a close relationship in time and space but not necessarily in point of view. He is expected to play the role of a mediator of conflict. Also conflict is most prevalent at middle management level (Kahn, et al, 1964). The middle manager, says Dalton (1959), "bears the most inconsistent burdens" (p. 248). It is so common, Katz and Kahn (1966) state, that the middle manager often finds himself in situations where compliance with one expectation would not only make compliance more difficult with the other, but in extreme conflict would completely exclude the possibility of compliance with the other. In opposition to Katz and Kahn (1966), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), in the same line as Mann and Dent (1954) suggest that the middle manager could successfully resolve the conflict better than
members of higher levels. In their view the members of intermediate levels are likely to play a more successful role in conflict resolution rather than their superiors because of their greater technical knowledge of the subject matter of the conflict and their neutral position between competing interests. In fact, while middle managers are typically labelled with role ambiguity and are heavily exposed to role conflict, a great deal is expected from them by way of conflict resolution, as suggest by Lawrence and Lorsch. Under conditions of contradictory expectations or extreme conflict, it becomes increasingly difficult for the middle manager to perform his role of dual representation.

As a way to protect himself or to avoid the conflicting demands, the middle manager, as Mann and Dent (1954) mention, in effect renounce both groups and seek protection by joining a union. (In fact, in Iraq, as in many Arabic and Middle Eastern countries, such protection does not exist because there is no union for the 'man in the middle' to join). The middle manager can also renounce both groups by staying aloof and not getting very involved, and playing the role of pure transmitter between his superiors and subordinates and seeking protection by presenting himself to his subordinates as if he has nothing to do with top managers orders and, at the same time, assuring his superiors that he is exactly transferring their orders to the workforce. By doing this he tries to adopt a safe and ultra-cautious posture in the organization and project conflict outwards from himself. But in doing this, he increasingly becomes a 'marginal man', as far as his workers and management are concerned.

The middle manager, says Dalton (1959), may manage the inconsistent interests of his superiors and subordinates by playing the "nebulous role of liaison semanticist: he translates the
irregularities below him into decorous reports for his chiefs ..., and liberally interprets their directives to his subordinates" (pp. 248-49). But under conditions of extreme conflict, say Mann and Dent (1954), the middle manager is more likely to "take sides" and risk the loss of effectiveness in dealing with the other group. The 'side' that the middle managers often take, as many writers suggest (Roethlisberger 1945; Katz and Kahn 1966; Mant 1979; Torrington and Weightman 1982) is the side of his superiors rather than his subordinates. In other words, he is more likely to define his role in terms of his superior's expectations and ignore the expectations of his subordinates. The middle manager, remarks Mant (1979) is over-dependent on his superior and his primary concern is career survival. This is especially true when the middle manager is seeking promotion and climbing up the ladder for a higher position, and when his superiors have the most control and influence over his promotion and advancement.

C. The Dilemma of Authority and Power Deficiency

This crucial middle manager's dilemma has been typically described in terms of "having the boss's responsibility but not the boss's authority". In complaining that they have high levels of responsibilities but little scope to use authority, the middle managers appear to be saying (Kay 1974 a) that while they are expected to produce results, they have little influence over the policies and events that determine these results. The responsibility and authority of middle managers do not overlap, says Uyterhoeven (1972), but rather the former exceeds the latter; while the middle manager typically assumes full responsibility for his department and is evaluated on the results of the total operation, he has only limited authority in the pursuit of his goals.
Although he is often assured that he is a member of 'management', his 'power deficiency' underlies his feeling of uncertainty or indefinite membership because he, unlike other members (i.e. top managers), has limited authority and influence. This lack of authority leads the middle manager to be more 'reactive' to the events imposed by others, rather than 'proactive', that is actively seeking opportunities to direct or influence events. His lack of authority and power do not allow him to play the role of strategist or "entrepreneur", who needs to go beyond the limits of his formal position (Kanter 1982). While he is supposed to be a 'leader', he lacks influence in making organizational decisions, which are now the prerogative of top management. The middle manager, argues Dickson (1977), does not contribute significantly to the decision-making process; he merely maintains the necessary procedures to provide standardised information for top management. He must put into effect organization policy, but often without sufficient authority or resources to carry it out. He has to get results through others and manage his multiple relationship, but he lacks the influence to make other organizational levels respond to his requests. He is expected to motivate his subordinates and value their good performance, but he does not have free access to such motivational resources as 'financial rewards' and 'authority to promote and advance his workers'. His access to such resources and consequently his 'power' is contingent upon the permission (implicit or explicit) and the backing of those in a position to over-rule him (i.e. his boss) (Strauss and Sayles 1960; Nundi 1975). While the middle manager needs to promote his personal influence among his subordinates, he appears to them, as Kay (1974 a) states, as having little weight with top managers and indecisive because he is not in a position to decide
but rather he needs to take matters elsewhere for approval. Such lack of influence and the need of other's (usually top manager's) approval, which involves time, gives his subordinates the impression that he is not capable of making up his mind and that he is acting in a bureaucratic manner. Concentration of power and influence at the top of the organizations and excluding middle managers from the process of setting up organizational policy and decision-making gives him the feelings of remoteness and organizational insignificance which in their turn produce alienation and a lack of responsibility (Dickson 1977). Weir (1976) found, among the middle managers that he studied, a widespread desire for greater involvement with the employing organization. What the middle managers want, says Berkwitt (1969), is more meaning to their corporate life. The middle manager stands in the organization not on the basis of 'telling' him that he is a part of 'management', but rather by what the top manager 'does' or by what the middle manager provided with in reality. Mann and Dent (1954) found that 74% of supervisors - the 'men in the middle' - judge their standing in the organization by the amount of responsibility and 'authority' they are given, rather than by what they are told about their standing.

If the middle manager in reaction to his 'powerlessness', adapts his organizational life to one based on low risk and playing-it-safe attitudes, this life is provoked by the fact that his powerlessness is coupled with accountability and with responsibility for results dependent on the actions of others. In response to his lack of authority and power, the middle manager tends to demand a ritualistic conformity from subordinates and creates a kind of influence by checking on what people are doing and trying to impress those above him by getting everything right and demanding that subordinates do
the same. Thus, middle managers often become controlling, coercive, demanding in relationships with subordinates, and supervise them too closely (Kanter and Stein (1979).

4. MIDDLE MANAGER BEHAVIOUR IN HIS POWER RELATIONSHIP WITH TOP MANAGEMENT

From what has been previously shown, it is clear that middle managers, in relation to top managers represent a pattern of power relationship where the former is 'powerless' and the latter is 'powerful'. In other words, they are unequal in terms of 'power' and there is a degree of "power Distance" (Hofstede 1980) between the top manager and the middle manager, despite the fact that they are both, as members of 'management' supposed to share the 'organizational leadership'.

In response to his powerlessness, the middle manager often tends to be bureaucratically-oriented or somehow a 'yes-man'. Hunt (1979, quoted by Torrington and Weightman 1892) points out that middle managers have become disenfranchised and even over bureaucratised; they are mostly concerned about decisions and the latest changes imposed by superiors. Kanter and Stein (1979) argue that "styles of handling responsibility that are often seen as pathologies of bureaucracy or of individuals, can be attributed to the problems of middleness" (p. 95). They continue to say that some aspects of the "bureaucratic personality" that Merton has described reflect responses to 'powerlessness' rather than to power delegated otherwise.

Powerlessness, as Nord (1976 b) states, produces feelings of dependence and servility. Thus, the middle manager as a consequence of his 'powerlessness' tends to be over-dependent on his superiors,
overly concerned about their demands and judgements and displaying a strong compliance behaviour toward them. He feels, as Roethlisberger (1945) describes, (in his case the supervisor), "a constant need to adjust himself to the demands of his superior and to seek the approval of his superior. Everything that he does he tries to evaluate in terms of his superior's reaction. Everything that his superior does he tries to evaluate in terms of what it means or implies about his superior's relation to him. Everything that his subordinates and workers do he immediately tries to evaluate in terms of criticism it may call forth from his superior" (p. 287). Thus, he often focuses his attention upward to his superiors and the logics of evaluation they represent, rather than downward to his subordinates and the feelings they have (Roethlisberger 1945; Ment 1979). As his values and ambitions are oriented toward 'management' (Fox 1971), he is highly concerned with attaining influence or 'power'. His standing in organization and his performance are strongly affected by his power position which in its turn depends on the support and backing of his superiors.

Through their bureaucratic manner of acting within the organization, middle managers often become rule-minded because rules, say Kanter and Stein (1979), can represent one of their few areas of personal discretion, and because they are often measured on the basis of how well the rules made by those above are carried out by those below. Bureaucratic rules also screen the superiority of the boss's power (Gouldner 1955) and can cover the limited and shaky foundations of middle manager's power (Nundi 1975), or at least let him feel and appear to be subject to the rules rather than to the boss. He also uses his inflexible application of bureaucratic rules as a defensive weapon against upward criticism. His strict adherence to the rules is one of his adaptative modes to his dilemma of powerlessness.
SUMMARY

The term 'middle management' is a diffuse one. The implications of the 'man in the middle' have been applied in the literature to many organizational levels that are located in the intermediate space between the top and bottom. The 'middleness' of the man in the middle and its requirements give his role many peculiarities in terms of the problems and dilemmas he encounters. He usually faces the dilemmas of performing multiple and often conflictual roles, and of having uncertain membership in the 'management', and being a member of two organizational families who are often in conflict. Above all, his major dilemma which is at the centre of his other dilemmas is that of 'power deficiency'. As his orientations are toward 'management' and thus he is concerned with attaining influence and power, his relationship with superiors is crucial to him because they could decide, to a great extent, his power position. As a consequence of his dilemmas, particularly of his 'powerlessness', the middle managers display a style of behaviour that consists of acting in a bureaucratic manner and showing compliance.
CHAPTER (2)

THE RESEARCH MODEL
INTRODUCTION

From the previous chapter, it is very clear that the middle-top manager's power relationship in work organizations requires a deep and broad perspective to be understandable, rather than using a normative approach (such as that of Niles, 1949), or even with a one-sided picture (such as that of Nundi 1975). In fact it is true that, as Nundi (1975) and Mant (1977) have pointed out, as middle managers feel powerless, they tend to play power politics in which their compliance is a tactic to increase power, but powerless middle managers present only one side of the picture. Even here, we still do not know why they choose compliance as their mode of adaptation to their problem of power deficiency and what the conceptualization is that stands behind such a choice. On the other side, we still do not know what the impact is of the 'culture' and 'socialization' of wider society and of work organizations in securing or constructing middle managers' compliant behaviour. In fact this latter question introduces the investigation to a broader perspective, that of exploring the impact of culture in constructing organizational behaviour. Here middle managers' compliant behaviour is very useful in guiding such an exploration. Out of such questioning and through a commitment to such broader exploration, the research 'model' presented in Figure (1) has emerged. What this shows is the 'logic' of the design only, as the relations between different aspects of the model were much more complicated and needed great efforts to develop and generate their conceptual framework, as will be shown throughout the thesis.
Figure 1

THE RESEARCH MODEL

Middle Management Behaviour towards Top Management

Individuality Factors
- Age
- Family Background and Childhood Socialization
  - geographical area of living
  - father's occupation
  - parent's level of education
  - childhood experiences
- Educational Background
  - level of formal education
  - nature of formal education (place of education)
- Work Experience
  - length of service
  - years in managerial job in the present organization

Organizational Factors
- Nature of the Relationship between Top and Middle Managers
  - top manager's leadership behaviour
  - middle manager's degree of participation in decision making
- Middle Manager's degree of Role Conflict and Ambiguity
- Middle Manager's degree of Job Satisfaction

Culture of Wider Society

Top Management

Behaviour of Middle Managers

Middle Management

Individuality Factors

Organizational Factors
1. **CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE**

In analyzing behaviour within an organization, we need to know the properties of the original basic components, the individual and the formal organization (Argyris 1957). Organizational behaviour is a function of the characteristics of both the individual and the organization (Nadler et al 1979). When individuals join an organization they bring many things with them to the organizational setting; they inevitably carry with them their cultural values which interact with structural and situational factors within the organization. As the characteristics of formal organizations have their impact upon individuals and their personality development (Argyris 1957, 1962, 1973), it is entirely possible that the organizational form may itself be a determinant of personality, where the actors themselves, through their independent relationships, create the environment to which they adapt (Weick 1969). Thus in a very structured bureaucracy, not only does the bureaucracy affect the individual personality (Merton 1940; Weber 1946; Blau and Scott 1962) and make him dependent or conformity-orientated, but the individual may already be predisposed toward these traits.

A. **Culture and Individuals Characteristics**

A basic understanding of personality characteristics is of direct importance to organizational behaviour, as those characteristics demonstrate the broad patterns of ways in which individuals tend to react and behave. One of the important determinants of personality and its development is the culture within which one is brought up (Herbert 1976). The linkage between 'culture' and 'personality' has been subject to heavy emphasis. Argyris states that "personality cannot be understood without taking
into account the culture in which the personality exists. Culture and personality are inseparable. It is actually not culture and personality but culture in personality and personality in culture" (1957, p.48). Hofstede (1980) remarks that culture and personality interact together and cultural traits can sometimes be measured by personality tests. In any society the attitudes and values that are encouraged within its culture are transmitted to the young. Culture, in order to exist and be transmitted to successive generations, requires acceptance and conformity from society's members. Socialization, which makes sure that members comply with the dictates of culture, usually takes place through the early training given to the young of a society, through teaching and requiring proper ways of behaviour, informal pressures to obey customs, and the enforcement of laws. Consequently, the basic qualities of the culture are preserved for generations. The shaping of personality in any culture, as Linton (1945) emphasizes, promotes the stability of social systems by developing individuals who are compatible with the demands made by the role requirements of that social system.

Many studies have demonstrated how culture makes a significant difference in personality and behaviour patterns in different groups (Benedict 1934; Klukhohn and Murray 1948; Berger 1962). The relationship between 'culture' and 'personality' has been dealt with by a multiple rather than a unified approach, from different view points of many fields which take a variety of positions. But all these positions have emphasized the strong relationship between 'culture' and 'personality', and gave rise to the concept of 'socialization' as a central analytical tool in studying and understanding this relationship (see LeVine 1973). Within the concept of socialization the emphasis has been placed either on the
individual or the society. While the psychological studies have concerned themselves with the individual and learning theory during the socialization process, the sociologists have stressed the role of society and considered the wider connections between family, school and other environmental influences and personality.

Through that strong linkage between 'culture' and 'personality', many concepts have been devised to explain how culture shapes many of the basic, shared characteristics of its members; such concepts as "basic personality" (Kardiner and Linton 1939), or "national character" (Inkeles and Levinson 1969) or "social character" (Fromm 1949; Riesman 1950) are all concerned with group similarities rather than individual differences.

'Basic personality' structure, which was developed through collaborative work by Kardiner and Linton in 1939 using data from primitive societies, is based on the uniformity in child-rearing practices (Kardiner 1945). Accordingly, this structure is a configuration which rests upon the following postulates:

1. Members of various families within any society or group employ similar techniques in child-rearing: although never identical, these techniques are culturally patterned.

2. The culturally-patterned techniques for the care and rearing of children differ from one society to another.

3. This similarity in early experiences which exerts a lasting effect upon an individual's personality will tend to produce similar personality configurations in the individuals who are subjected to them (Kardiner 1945).

'Basic personality' structure, for some investigators such as Inkeles and Levinson (1969), should be equated with 'national character' which was a popular term in the early 1950's. They state
that this character "should refer to the mode or modes of the distribution of personality variants within a given society" (p.425). Others such as Benedict (1934) do not directly link basic or modal personality with the term 'national character'; for them the latter term is a particular way to study culture and learned cultural behaviour. In fact Linton (1945) conceived national character as modal personality structure, which represent the common or standardized characteristics in a given society.

In the same way, Fromm (1949) and Riesman (1950) were concerned with the term of 'social character', which as Riesman sees it, is those character traits that are shared by a group of people living in the same society and exposed to a generally similar socialization process.

Basic personality constructs, like cultural construct patterns, represent the mode or modes of thinking of a society but within certain ranges of variation. Thus it is doubtful that the actual personality of any individual will ever agree at all points with all of these constructs; as Kluckhohn (1964) explains, 'basic personality' does not represent the total personality of the individual but rather corresponds to the value-attitude systems which are basic to the individual’s personality configuration. These basics may be reflected in many different forms of behaviour and could exist in totally different personality configurations.

Despite the fact that these concepts (basic personality and national or social character) have been subject to criticism (see for example Inkeles and Levinson 1969; Terhune 1970) and are now somewhat discredited (Child 1981) they have often been employed in many studies. Most researches on the contemporary Arab world are based on 'national character' analysis. Also, as Child (1981) pointed out,
some cultural historical perspectives which were used by some investigators (Dahrendorf 1965; Kohn 1960) gave the initial impression of accepting the notion of 'national character'. But these studies in fact provide a way to assess the identity of culture with a nation rather than the basic personality of its members. Culture determines the identity of human groups, and personality is the property of the individual which determines his identity, but we should not forget the strong interaction between the two to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish exceptional individuals from their cultural systems. If culture in any society guides behavioural tendencies and attitudes into paths consistent with its values, then it is accepted that members of a society will have similar tendencies, attitudes and norms. All this represents the collective level of their "mental programmes" (Hofstede 1980), and refers to the generalized shared meanings or values they hold in common. But it is also at that generalized value level that one can find the most significant differences (Kluckhohn 1964; Kluckhohn and Strodbeck 1961). Personality comes from three levels; the first is the cultural, external environment and those influences which exert pressures to incorporate attitudes, values, or behaviours of others, in other words, the collective level which is common to people belonging to a certain group; the second is the 'individual level', which is truly unique or internal to the person himself - no two people are exactly the same: this level consists of his biological, physiological, and inherent psychological processes; the third level is the adjustment process through which the individual relates to the external pressures (Herbert 1976). This level consists of the individual's interpretation of the social norms and the influences which surround him, and his feelings about them. The collective
level (culture) strongly influences an individual's interpretations and feelings about his culture's norms and values, and plays a very important and, I would say, the dominant role within the traditional society in forming the socializing institutions and personality structure. But even within this kind of society, where culture leaves little apparent room for individual interpretation, we cannot accept that the individual is completely moulded by his cultural norms and values (Mangham 1978). The individual receives the norms, values, and all that is required by his society through the socialization process, but not in an abstract form or by a specific mechanism, but through cumulative interpretations by his socialization agents, particularly by parents. So a mixture of societal norms and the cumulative interpretations of them are communicated to the next learning generation to be interpreted individually once more, and then this mixture is subjected once again to the individual's own views. Also, individuals have not in the past, despite all the basic similarities, been socialized by the social institutions, especially the family, in exactly the same way or through the same training and atmosphere. Although the institutional structure and the kind of training involved in the socialization process are basically the same for all members of one society or group, within this basic cultural framework there is a degree of variation between the individuals of one society. Because of this and other variations in many aspects in the individuals' past experiences, we can find, even in traditional culture, individuals who develop particular views of some of their societal norms and values in marked contrast to other's views of the same norms or values. Even in a traditional society, and despite the strong social pressure to conform with the established norms and values, people
vary in the degree of their conformity to the most critical norms or values, and sometimes the individual is able to step outside of some group of dominant norms and values, and stand up to criticize them, while another person will defend them because he considers such norms and values correct and useful. So individuals within the same society who went through basically the same socialization process and structure vary in the degree of their internalization of their cultural norms and values. This does not mean necessarily that, especially in traditional societies, individuals will behave absolutely differently and in accordance with their degree of internalization of their cultural norms, but rather it is more likely in such societies that individuals will conduct themselves or behave similarly. The individual's interpretation and behaviour, particularly in traditional society, has to be within the basic framework that is required by his societal norms if he wants to live and to be accepted. But individuals could vary in the degree of conforming to the same required action or behaviour, as well as in their motivation or strategy behind it, and in their readiness to change it.

In any society, as Kluckhohn (1951) stated, "each individual is different from, yet similar to, each other individual" (p.409). That differentiation is sometimes numerous and fundamental between members of one society with respect to their outlook, interests and philosophy, but above all they have, from their social interaction within their culture, shared meanings which refer to their general conceptual structure.

The majority of individuals in any given culture are characterized by some dominant profile of value-orientations similar to those which characterize their culture, but individuals hold a
degree of variations in that dominant pattern. All this constitutes, as Kluckhohn (1964) indicates, their 'dominant but variable value orientation'. This concept of 'dominant but variable' cultural orientation has a relationship with the 'basic personality' type as Kluckhohn acknowledges, and her analysis is in the realm of 'national character'. She gives a valuable conceptual scheme in permitting a systematic order of the variation of value-orientations for both cultures and individuals. The theory of universal or 'dominant but variable value-orientations' (Kluckhohn 1964) is based on the following assumptions; first, because there are "a limited number of basic human problems for which all people at all times and in all places must find some solution" (1964, p.346), those 'common human' problems constitute the universal features of all cultures; second, people resolve these fundamental life problems within a limited range of possible solutions, and from that stems the cultural variation; third, the variation in value orientation is distributed in a way that a dominant value system can be identified. Accordingly, cultural systems differ in orientation, as Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) suggest, along the following five 'life problems':

1. Human nature orientation - is it conceived as good, evil, or mixed?
2. Man-nature orientation - what is the relation of man to nature, is it master over nature; harmony with nature, or subjective to nature?
3. Time orientation - is it towards the future, present, or past?
4. Activity orientation - is this being, being-in—becoming, or doing?
5. Relational orientation - the modal of man's relationship with people: is it a hierarchically ordered position, or a team work relationship, or individualism?

Inkeles and Levison (1969) suggest a useful extension to Kluckhohn's approach by including more human problems to which all people at all times must find some solution and they describe some of those suggested problems such as 'relation to authority' or handling of aggression.
The 'dominant but variable' theory of culture (Kluckhohn 1964) could be and has already been singled out in different ways and from different perspectives. In the international level of different cultures, Hofstede (1980) in his "HERMES" study on forty different countries has indicated that while there are universal cultural dimensions in all these forty countries, each was ranked in varying degrees (high, medium, low) in each dimension. Also this theory can be seen on the level of organizational culture in different countries (Evan 1975; Child 1981). The same "universal but variable" theory of culture has been singled out on the organizational level within one country (Bate 1982).

The term 'value' is a "conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of actions" (Kluckhohn 1951, p.395). So values are a feature of individuals as well as cultures. Hofstede (1980) defined value as "a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others" (p.19). Beliefs and attitudes also carry a value component, and the mutual relationship between values forms the individual's 'value-system' (mental program).

Each person, Kluckhohn and Strodbeck say, "has within himself a rank of order of value orientations which usually is made apparent by a variable allocation of time and interest in the activities of several behavior spheres" (1961, p.31). When we talk about cultural values we are not talking about something out there existing in the abstract, but rather they are in the minds of people and form the basis of a person's 'commonsense' (Bate 1982). The cultural values can only be discovered in individuals and in collective attitudes and behaviours. The value systems of any culture are not directly
observable because they are not tangible, but rather they are internalized constructs and can be inferred from verbal statements, deeds and other behaviours (Hofstede 1980). They form the deeply-embedded world which Silverman (1970) describes as "a taken-for-granted-world governed by what we understand as the laws of nature" (p.133).

B. Socialization

Societal norms in any culture construct the social institutions (family, school, political system, organization, etc) in particular patterns and structures and ways of functioning in harmony with the context of these norms. These institutions, once they have become facts, build-up and reinforce the collectively shared societal norms, customary role patterns, and the broad areas of cultural values that led to them (Hofstede 1980). Consequently, each institution has its 'sub-culture', which reflects partly the national culture of wider society and partly the institution's peculiar setting and structure (e.g. family, school, organization etc), as well as its own modifications to the national dominant cultural value-orientations. Social institutions work together through the socialization process to conform to the pattern of national societal norms: They are rings in one chain, each ring supporting and linking with another one. Thus the collectively shared norms, values and orientations are built-up and learnt within social institutions through the socialization process, particularly in the primary socialization within the family, school, religion, community, etc, and reflected in and reinforced or/and modified through secondary socialization (adulthood) within the secondary institutions such as the work 'organization'.
Not only does the concept of 'culture' lead to great terminological difficulties because it covers such a great range (Child 1981), so does the concept of 'socialization' which suffers in the same way (White 1977). The major divide in views about 'socialization' is whether it is a 'mechanical' process by which culture is transmitted, as the traditional sociologists define it, or the major factor in the building and developing of an individual's personality (see Zigler and Child 1973). In fact the main concern of 'socialization' in all the above views is to fit individuals and society together. But socialization, as mentioned before, is not just a 'mechanism' by which the cultural content is transferred from one generation to the next, and the individual through his socialization process is not completely moulded by the norms and values of his culture. Socialization is not a dye-stamping programme aimed at producing individuals who are carbon copies of their parents (White 1977), but rather its effect is to raise up an active human being capable of taking decisions when he confronts various social situations, even if such actions are no more than an extreme conformity to societal norms. Socialization consists of not just passing on a range of knowledge, but also the characteristic behaviour of socialization's agents (typically the parents) and their cumulative interpretations of the content of their culture. Also it consists of individual interpretation of cultural norms, and experience of adaptations by which a person learns what is the appropriate behaviour when encountering different groups and situations, and develops, as Brim and Wheeler (1966) remark, the requisite orientation for a satisfactory functioning role. Socialization, as Mangham (1979) views it is:

"...a pervasive and essential societal process. Through this process ... each of us becomes a
'human' being learning the habits, skills, beliefs and moves of our particular class, ethnic group and nationality. We learn these things sometimes consciously ... and in many cases, unconsciously, simply through our association with fellow members of the community." (p.78)

So the individual is an active element in this learning process even when his cultural norms and values provide him with very limited choices. Socialization in this sense is not limited to a period of time or a specific stage through which individuals pass during their lifetime, but rather, it is, as Katz and Kahn (1966) remark, a continuous dynamic process. It is, as the symbolic interactionist perspective stresses, a cumulative life-long process whereby the individual from his learning experience is able to adapt existing knowledge and behaviour to new situations that he meets; he can draw on a bank of cultural cumulative social values, norms, attitudes and actions in combination to suit changing situations. Thus Socialization as White (1977) defines it:

"... is more than just formal education, for it includes the acquisition of attitudes and values, behaviours, habits and skills transmitted not only in school, but through the family, the peer group and the mass media. Moreover the contents of the various forms of socialisation are not mutually exclusive, nor are the agents of socialisation necessarily working in harmony, so the process actually experienced by the individual is exceedingly complex, and will vary markedly both within and between societies." (my emphasise)." (p.1)

Some theorists such as Brim and Wheeler (1966) and Moore (1974) have found it useful to distinguish between two stages of socialization, "primary" and "secondary" socialization. Primary socialization, from the traditional positivist sociological perspective, is concerned with pre-school children, thus making very little reference to adult socialization. Also the traditional category of the sociologist for secondary socialization is related to
education at school and college, or of other secondary groups. Symbolic interactionists as White (1977) states, usually define primary socialization as a process concerned with childhood, and secondary socialization with adulthood. Brim and Wheeler (1966) regard the phase of primary socialization as the process by which individuals develop their basic personality characteristics during which the family and school enable the child to learn the values, norms, and behaviours of his culture, while secondary socialization is defined as the process during which the individual acquires specific behaviour, attitudes, values and norms suited to a particular occupation or function in society. In this stage of socialization the individual explores a new area of experience, especially after the school career is over, and he continuously examines and re-examines as well as manipulates and modifies his cultural societal norms and values that were acquired during primary socialization in the light of experience and new situations. In fact primary and secondary socialization are continuations of one another, and a form of learning in one stage within any given culture necessarily follows from another. Thus, as White (1977) states:

"[in] childhood, as in adulthood, socialisation concentrates on the learning of skills of attitude and behaviour, enabling the individual to exist harmoniously within social groups and to balance harmoniously the experiences between social groups to enable him to live his life with as little aggravation as possible yet keep abreast of the various role requirements of his life career." (p.8)

But as Brim and Wheeler (1966) remark, because primary and secondary socialization processes are conducted within the same cultural context and framework, the setting and the process of secondary socialization depends to a large extent upon the societal norms, values, and behaviours learned during primary socialization; thus secondary socialization does not require a fundamental change
from individuals. Moore (1974) in his study of organizational
behaviour in relation to the whole culture, considered the family,
school, army and church as primary units, and the 'organization' as a
secondary unit.

C. Organizational Culture

Individuals bring with them when they join an organization their
cultural values, norms, and orientations which were learned through
their socialization process. So cultural influences enter the
organization with the organizational members. The dominant value-
orienations of the wider society which enter the organization
interact with the formal setting of the organization and its rules,
laws, regulations, experiences and other organizational factors.
During this interacting process, these orientations are subject to a
process of re-inforcement, modification, and manipulation to fit the
organizational requirements. Consequently, the organization produces
a sub-culture which is a result of the interaction between the
culture in wider society and the peculiarity of the organizational
setting through different historical realities. Thus the
organization's sub-culture reflects partly the culture of wider
society and partly the organization's peculiar setting and
experiences.

When we talk about "organizational culture" we mean to talk
about values and emotions. But what does organizational culture
consist of and what are its characteristics?

Organizational culture is "the real world" as experienced by
organization members, "the way things are, or the taken for granted
way of life" (Reason 1977). It is the deep structural
characteristics which reflect the organization's values and norms,
and the model of reality held by individuals in an organization.

Pettigrew (1979) regards organizational culture as:

"... the source of a family of concepts. The offsprings of the concepts of culture I have in mind are symbols, language, ideology, belief, ritual and myth." (p.574).

Also Dandridge et al (1980) emphasizes the term organizational symbolism, which refers to:

"...those aspects of an organization that its members use to reveal or make comprehensible the unconscious feelings, images and values that are inherent in that organization. Symbolism expresses the underlying character, ideology or value system of an organization." (p.77)

Thus, the underlying character of organization is revealed in different forms of symbols, myths, ritualized events or ceremonies, stories, jokes, legends, and vocabularies (Pettigrew 1979). These symbols with other aspects of the organization's surface structure - customary modes of dresses, physical appearances, the use of space and the dominant atmosphere - all provide some clue to the deep structure of organizations, and, as Bate (1982) points out, to the dominant social or organizational meanings.

Writers such as Berg (1982) see the world as essentially built up of meanings:

"One of the most important aspects of human life is the ability to make sense of experience, i.e. to reflect upon life, to transform these reflections into representations (symbols, images, phantasies, etc) and to store these representations in a 'collective' memory. Thus, the world in which we operate becomes loaded with such representations it becomes a "symbolic reality."(p.9)

Norms, values, and actions are constructed upon meanings. These meanings refer to a "conceptual structure" of generalizations which in the organizational context, as Bate (1982) states:

"will encompass one's own roles, the roles of others, rules and institutions, traditional
ways of acting, and specific issues such as the nature of authority."(p.7)

'Meaning' is an essential concept in the "symbolic interactionist" perspective (Mead 1964; Blumer 1969). The bases of this perspective are that human society is made up of individuals who have selves, thus they do not simply behave in response to a stimuli or as a result or enactment or activation of factors such as environmental pressures, roles, motives, and so forth. Rather, the individual symbolizes or attributes "meanings" to the world around him which derive from social interaction and a process of observation within human society. The individual behaviour or the way he acts arises out of these meanings things have for him. These meanings are subject to individual modification and interpretation processes through dealing and coping with different life situations and settings (Mangham 1978). Not only action arises out of 'meanings', but norms and values can be regarded as having the same derivative (Bate 1982).

In different cultures the same or similar events, phrases and actions can be perceived differently or similarly depending on the meanings they have for individuals in each culture. Often there is marked 'cultural differences' in values, norms, perceptions and actions. Findings of Segall et al (1966) suggest that different environmental factors in different cultures may produce experiences and expectations which generate certain distortions in perception. Although a common experience of people within one culture enables them to have common or shared cultural meanings and to make similar interpretations of most essential everyday situations, no two people have identical experience. Thus individuals vary in their attachments to dominant cultural meanings as well as in their interpretations or at least their feelings about them, depending on their own individual experiences.
So, in terms of organization culture, individuals have dominant social or organizational shared meanings, and shared orientations inclining them to behave in a similar way, but in varying degrees depending on their individual difference and organizational environmental factors. These shared orientations are the consequences of the interaction between dominant value-orientations in wider society and the organization's peculiar formal settings and requirements.

Such sentiments in defining organizational culture are expressed by McNeill (1979 –cited by Bate 1982); he states that organization culture:

"...consists of patterns for organizational behaviour that are learned, transmitted, and symbolically derived. These patterns for behaviour constitute a group's characteristic way of perceiving its organizational environment—a group's shared orientations to organizational stimuli. Organizational culture is neither an organizational attribute nor an individual attribute; rather, it is a system of shared orientations to organizational attributes, a 'consensus of perceptions' regarding organizational stimuli." (my emphasis) (p.8)

Similarly, Bate (1982) defines organization culture as:

"... the meanings or aspects of the conceptual structures which people hold in common and which define the social or organizational 'reality'." (p.7)

From these two definitions of organization culture we can recognize that this culture has the same characteristics as any other kind of culture as being shared, transmitted and having a deeply-embedded nature. Organizational culture is a complex socio-historical product which obtains through the evolution of organization within the wider society. So in order to understand an organization's present setting and culture— as well as the pattern of shared orientations it's members are likely to have—it is essential to go back to the history of the organization, that is the
emergence of the organization, its original initiators, the purposes for which the organization was once created, etc. Such a historical review will indicate what pattern of norms, values and orientations which in particular the older "elite" or "dominant coalition" (Child 1972) brought to the organization from the outside culture, and what kind of organizational structure they have established. This in turn will show the pattern of socialization process and the context the individuals are likely to receive within the organization.

D. Organizational Socialization

Preparing individuals for functioning in work organizations is not only the major aspect of socialization (Nord 1976a), but the organization itself too, as Mangham (1978) remarks, engages in the process of socializing its members, "sometimes consciously as in induction and training programmes, more often unconsciously by passing on to novitiates 'this is the way we do things around here'" (pp.78-79). Socialization within organization is a process which involves learning and becoming a part of an organization's culture.

There has been increasing research concerned with socialization as it is accomplished by and affects formal organizations (Schein 1968; Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Schein (1968) in his investigations of socialization in organizations defines this concept as:

"... the process by which a new member learns the value system, the norms and the required behaviour patterns of the society, organization or group which he is entering." (p.3)

Van Maanen and Schein (1979) define 'organizational socialization' in its most general sense as:

"...the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an organizational role." (p.211)
Organizational socialization entails the learning of a cultural perspective for interpreting one's experiences in a given sphere of the work, which would allow a person to come to know an organizational situation and act within it.

As was argued before, as individuals move from childhood to adulthood, 'socialization' would differ in its content rather than in its form (Brim 1966; Schein 1971). Undoubtedly, 'socialization' is a cumulative life-long process in which work organizations participate too. But, what is more, organizational socialization is, as Van Maanen (1976) notes, a special case of 'adult socialization' that may produce 'personal changes'. These changes as Brim (1966) and Schein (1971) assert, are very unlikely to be permanent or fundamental, or at the level of basic personality structure. Rather these changes are the consequences of a process of cognitive learning with which the social actor engages and through which he adjusts himself to role demands that are considered to be necessary for participating in organizational social situations. In other words, these changes occur at the level of what Schein (1971) terms "constructed social selves" (p.409) rather than at the level of more enduring underlying qualities or basic self-image. In explaining the nature and extent of these 'changes', Schein (1971) states:

"The changes which occur in a person during the course of his career as a result of adult socialization or acculturation are changes in the nature and integration of his social selves. It is highly unlikely that he will change substantially in his basic personality structure and his pattern of psychological defences, but he may change drastically in his social selves in the sense of developing new attitudes and values, new competencies, new images of himself and new ways of entering and conducting himself in social situations. As he faces new roles which bring new demands, it is from his repertoire of attributes and skills that he constructs or reconstructs himself to meet these demands."(p.412)
Thus, 'organizational socialization' may confirm and reinforce or modify the 'orientations' and the basic expectations of self-other relationships that the individuals have already acquired from their social interaction in wider society. Equally, this socialization may reject certain aspects of the new comers' orientations and behaviour which are considered inadequate for the role requirements of the organization, and thus the individual may become subject to coercive persuasion through which he will be forced to relinquish these values, attitudes and behaviours as the price of membership (Schein 1968; 1971). However, at this point, one may argue that in any given society, work organizations are deeply embedded within larger society and they are one of its social institutions. The structures and ways of functioning of those organizations have been constructed by cultural societal norms of the wider society (Hofstede 1980). Thus, organizational socialization, particularly in traditional societies, will reinforce the value-orientation or the conceptual structure and ways of engaging with others that new comers have acquired from their socialization in wider society. In fact, although such arguments are quite correct, we must keep in mind that firstly, as has been suggested before, organizational sub-culture is not simply a piece of national culture, and a work organization as a social institution is not merely one of a series of identical links in one chain. But rather organizational 'sub-culture' is the socio-historical product of the interaction between culture of wider society and the peculiarities of the organization. Thus, this sub-culture reflects partly the culture of wider society and partly the organization's own settings, experiences and history. Secondly, although organizations belonging to one national culture would have a universal or dominant pattern of culture, it is also at this dominant level that they perpetuate a degree of variation (Bate 1982).
The efforts to assess an organization's variations in the socialization process have utilized different bases or criteria but with major emphasis upon types of organization and organizational structure. One of these efforts is the typology suggested by Etzioni (1969) which implies that organizations do not demand the same nature of 'compliance' from its participants but, rather, across different types of organizations. Organizational socialization would stress various forms of compliance which depend upon the goals of each particular organization. Along the same line Blau and Scott (1962) have studied organizations' variations based on the criteria of who benefits from the organization's output or 'cui bono'(p. 43). While Etzioni's work postulates three types of organization - i.e. normative, utilitarian and coercive, each of which requires a different kind of compliance relationship - Blau and Scott for their part, derive four basic organization types - i.e. "mutual-benefit association, business concern, service organization, and commonwealth organization" (p. 43). In fact, Etzioni's typology and the Blau-Scott formulation have received many criticisms (Hall 1972). Based on empirical data, Hall concludes that the two typologies, "aside from the rather simple differentiation concerning the compliance system and the nature of the prime beneficiary, have only a limited application insofar as total organizational analysis is concerned. Neither typology differentiates clearly between organizations in terms of the variables considered important in structural characteristics; e.g. complexity, activities and formalization. Furthermore, there is not clear differentiation in terms of the factors related to change" (p.51).

In the hopes of finding broader dimensions with which to study organization variations in the socialization process, Goffman's
(1961) concept of "total institutions", as quoted by Van Maanen (1976), tries to classify organizational settings not in terms of which types of organizations are total (i.e. having close or absolute control over their members) but how much totality does each display. Also Van Maanen (1976) has tried to turn attention to some of the structural characteristics affecting the socialization process along which organizations may be expected to differ. These characteristics include those such as the formality of the organizational setting, the individual-versus-collective nature of the setting, the serial or disjunctive patterns of organizational socialization, etc.

Apparently, there is very little recognition of the influence of organizational soft factors in the variation of organizational socialization. Such factors as 'leadership style or behaviour' may stand, to a great extent, behind the variation of organizational socialization among organizations belonging to one national culture or those which have similar goals or functions and very similar structures and relatively similar in age, e.g. the Iraqi organizations that we are investigating in this research.

E. The Impact of Culture on Organizational Behaviour

In the field of organizational behaviour, the context of organizational culture which is concerned with the institutionalized social relationships within the organizational functioning and its structure and ideology, is the missing half of the analysis of organizational behaviour (O'Tool 1979). Organizational culture for different reasons has failed until recently to capture the serious attention of researchers.

Despite this failure in pointing the researchers attention towards organizational culture in analyzing organizational behaviour,
a good deal of effort has been spent in introducing the culture of wider society into understanding why organizational behaviour varies in different cultures under apparently similar structural circumstances. In fact the 1950's and 1960's did see some attempts in linking cultural factors with organizational bureaucratic behaviour, especially in some developing countries (Berger 1957; Riggs 1962; 1964; Whyte 1969). Most of these efforts were not followed up by a good number of empirical studies. One of the earliest and most ambitious attempts was that of Riggs (1964) in idealytic models in industrial and traditional societies, and a third one of "prismatic" society. He attempts through his three models to relate organizational behaviour to what he sees as some cultural parameters of different levels of social and economic complexity.

Recently, the studies of Moore 1974; Evan 1975; Brossard and Maurice 1976; Nord 1976 a; Hofstede 1980; Child 1981; Tayeb 1981; Bate 1982, have all, with other efforts, given support to the view that culture can shape patterns of organizational behaviour. In fact the effects of culture of wider society on the organization that various studies have indicated have been categorized by Hofstede (1978) as:

1. Effects on the organization's 'soft' aspect, i.e. the philosophies, values and behaviour of organizational members.

2. Effects on the organization's 'hard' aspect, i.e. the distribution of power and structuring of activities.

As the two aspects - the members of organization (the 'soft' aspect) and the structure (the 'hard' aspect) - are strongly
interrelated and interact together, so it would be meaningless, especially when studying organizational behaviour, to talk about one without discussing the other.

Despite the importance of introducing 'culture' to understand and study organizational behaviour, the approach of the 'organization within society', which focuses upon cultural and institutional explanatory variables, still lacks a substantial body of supporting research. Also some significant theoretical problems are still not dealt with (Child 1981). One of the main concerns of this approach is the exercise of power within organizations and its relation with the cultural values and social institutions which sustain and put into operation those values.

In some studies dealing with the impact of culture on organizations we can distinguish the efforts to study and analyse the relation between culture and the patterns of exercising authority and power relationships within the organization. Such efforts appear in the studies of Abegglen 1958; Whyte 1969; Levinson 1968; Crozier 1964; Kakar 1971; Hofstede 1980; Child 1981 and Tayeb 1981.

One clear example of the impact of culture on the way authority is perceived and exercised, is the Japanese organization. Abegglen (1958) states, that patterns of authority and compliance within Japanese organizations relate strongly to the Japanese perception of the role of authority figures in traditional Japanese family institutions. McClelland (1969) indicates that patterns of Japanese family and factory paternalism (with other values) parallel one another. So in Japanese organizations the members of management who have been traditionally guided and organized by the tendency of paternalistic familialism, are expected to play an active role in the personal life of employees, such as planning family budgets,
providing housing, recreation facilities and even arranging marriages for employees. This way of perceiving and exercising authority within Japanese organizations is in contrast to the case of French and American organizations. Americans, as McClelland states, perceive their role in specific bureaucratic terms and have a narrower definition of appropriate behaviour for their superiors. Also in French organizations the distance between superordinates and subordinates tends to be large and associated with low trust (Crozier 1964). French groups tend to function as autonomously as possible in order to mitigate conflict (McClelland 1969).

Whyte (1969) in his comparative study between the United States and Peru, relates the autocratic management of Peruvian organizations to the authoritarianism and low interpersonal trust in the wider Peruvian society. In the same way Tayeb (1981) in Iran and Child (1981) in Britain and Germany, attribute the subordination to authority that they encountered within the organizations they studied to authoritarianism in wider society.

Levinson (1968) and Kakar (1971) relate features of subordinate organizational behaviour to parental authority relations in the family. Levinson demonstrates his observation about national commonalities between patterns of parental behaviour and the boss-subordinate relationship by comparing the child-rearing practices and typical managerial behaviour in Germany, England and the United States.

One of the four cultural dimensions that are identified by Hofstede (1980) at the level of different culture is "Power Distance" which reveals the degree of power inequality between bosses and subordinates and the pattern of relationship to authority, as well as the way authority and power are perceived and exercised in wider
society and consequently in organizations. In fact Hofstede (1980) has been strongly criticized by Child (1981) for the absence of any analysis of institutional development in the countries that he surveyed. In the absence of such analysis and of a socio-historical background or evolution of each nation sampled, "we are left with very little basis for judging whether perceived power distance is actually a culturally derived phenomenon"(p.332).

In particular, the work of Crozier (1964) is one of the most successful efforts in relating cultural patterns to organizational behaviour. His attempt to understand the special nature of French bureaucracy was in 'terms of its relations with the social and cultural system of which it is part'. Crozier's way of studying organizational behaviour is one of the earliest studies based on the perspective of 'organizations within society' which was followed by others such as Brossard and Maurice (1976). Crozier shows how cultural phenomena can be employed to lend greater explanatory power to a body of empirical theory. He gives 'culture' a central place in his analysis and justifies this by examining relevant evidence in some depth. Organizational behaviour for Crozier (1973) is "culture bound" and organizational systems are "cultural answers to the problems encountered by human beings in achieving their collective ends. Although there are objective rational constraints that limit possibilities, there is no one best way in this matter"(p.219)

Crozier describes the pattern of organizational behaviour and certain characteristics of French bureaucracy in comparison with other countries, in particular with American organizations. He finds that within French bureaucracies, there are dysfunctional aspects such as: an unusual amount of centralization; a predominance of formal over informal relations; a tendency toward the isolation of
the individual; unemotionality, rigidity between levels and a concern for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege. Crozier uses the cultural approach depending on the anthropological evidence to find the roots of such traits in French culture. He claims that the above "bureaucratic traits" are uniquely French, on which point the researcher would, as well as Melcher (1973), Boddewyn (1973), and Bate (1982), take issue and criticize him.

Crozier (1973) generalizes one of these traits as "rigidity" and relates it to cultural meanings as following:

"An organization becomes bureaucratic (in the pejorative sense of the word) when it becomes too rigid to correct its behavior by learning from its errors. But why does it become too rigid? If the consequences of rigidity and its mechanisms are similar, its latent functions seem quite different. Even if one takes into account different idiosyncrasies of different researchers, it seems clear that bureaucratic dysfunctions have different origins and carry different meanings within the American and the French environments." (p. 221)

The general fear of "face-to-face relationships" is also observed by Crozier in French organization, which he relates to French culture:

"Face-to-face dependence relationships are difficult to bear in the French cultural setting because Frenchmen have a very absolutist conception of authority. While they cannot bear omnipotent authority, they feel it is indispensable if any kind of cooperative activity is to succeed. (1973, p. 227)

He makes links between bureaucratic patterns of French organizations and the nature of major established institutions of French society, since he found similar bureaucratic patterns within the educational system, labour movement, and political and national administrative systems.

Crozier (1973) tries to show "how differences in models of organizational behaviour help to clarify the latent function of
apparently dysfunctional activities" (p.227). His thesis of a bureaucratic model is that there are cultural differences among countries in the dysfunctional aspect of bureaucracies. He suggests that comparing the mechanisms of social control and the specific kinds of dysfunctions emerging from the functioning of formal organizations in different cultural contexts is an effective means in the sociological analysis of national values and cultural patterns.

Crozier's work, as Mouzells (1975) remarks, is an important step in the analysis of power and conflict in organizations. Crozier shows how important to the study of bureaucratic structure and change the study of power relations between groups and the wider cultural and historical context within which such relations are articulated. He states that:

"Power relationships develop necessarily from the differential ways in which individuals can master the different sources of uncertainty relevant for their collective action. The structure of an organizational system (formal and informal) can be viewed not only as an institutional answer to handle these power relationships, but also as the rules of the game members have to play. With the limit of the game, the players' strategies are rational; but the game itself is a man-made construct which is heavily dependent on the cultural capacities and aptitudes of the people concerned." (1973, pp.219-220)

Crozier's model is in contrast to the universalistic models which link attitudes and beliefs to organizational structure and patterns of action, such as those of Merton, Selznick, Gouldner, Blau and others. Crozier states that his experience within French organizations has convinced him that organizational structure and patterns of action are still to a large extent culture-bound. In fact Crozier seriously challenged the theory of Merton (1940) about the impact of the bureaucratic structure on the individual personality.
In fact Crozier's work is a very valuable contribution in relating cultural patterns to organizational behaviour, and his model of bureaucratic organizational behaviour gives us an excellent picture of bureaucratic structures in France. Also he gives a valuable thesis of cultural differences among countries in the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies. But one could take issues and argue with him on some aspects of his work:

1. What he claims as uniquely French traits such as unemotionality, subordination, isolationism, rigidity and concern for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege, and a predominance of formality over informality could be totally or partly found (to varying degrees) in other organizations in different countries. In fact it has already been found in English organizations (Bate 1982), Iran (Tayeb 1981) and Saudi Arabia (Basi 1973). This does not suggest that there is no relation between culture in wider society and such traits in organizations, but rather the opposite, as Tayeb (1981) has demonstrated in the case of Iran. Thus such traits are culturally bound, but they are not uniquely French and can be found in varying degrees within many other organizations in different countries. This will occur where those cultural components have similar dimensions to those which in French culture, stand behind the existence of such traits within organizations, and where socio-historical realities and socialization process have similar implications to that of French culture. Thus the latent functions or meanings of those dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy may be similar to and quite likely different from those found by Crozier in France.

2. Patterns of organizational structure and behaviour within organizations in any country are not the result of the impact of
culture on organization only (Crozier 1964), or the result of the impact of bureaucratic structure on individuals' personalities (Merton 1940; Blau and Scott 1962) but they are the consequence of both interacting together rather than a single, direct cause and effect. So the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies are the result of continuous interaction between culture and its value-orientations in wider society and the formal bureaucracy through different historical periods. This is at least the case of many developing countries, such as Iraq, where modern bureaucratic organizations were set up by foreign colonial rulers during their occupation of those countries, e.g. the British occupation of Iraq.

In fact this view of looking at the linkage between individuals and their cultural value-system and organization is emphasized by Silverman (1970) who states:

"[It] is not to say that the attachment of people to an organization is given for all time by the initial orientations which they bring from their experience of the social world. The involvement of the actors is also clearly influenced by their experience of the organization itself, in particular the way in which it may invalidate prior expectations and generate new ones .... Attachments to an organization thus reflect the meanings which those concerned bring in from the wider society [and] the finite provinces of meaning specific to the organization."(pp. 183-184)

3. Crozier, when he gives 'culture' the central place in his analysis, ignores the contingency or contextual variables such as technology, size, age, tasks, environment, ...etc. It is true that the contingency approach has been found only partially succesful in accounting for the nature of organizational structure and behaviour (Child 1981). But also the influence of national or regional culture has not yet accounted for all variations in organizational behaviour by itself (Tayeb 1981). In my view, the dominant pattern of value orientation and consequently the dominant pattern of behaviour and
structure that can be recognized in the organizations of one country, will exist in small or large organizations, new or old, with high or low technology, but with degrees of variation according to those contextual variables. At the level of different cultures the relationship between contextual and structural variables, as Child (1981) states, will be similar.

4. The bureaucratic dysfunctional traits of organizational behaviour which Crozier claims are well-established French cultural traits, construct the dominant level of French organizational culture, as it would do so in other organizations in different countries. But the universal or dominant pattern of organizational culture would vary (a) with different organizations belonging to one country (as Bate found in England 1982), (b) with different organizational levels within one organization; and (c) with different individuals in one organizational level, as the researcher observed in Iraqi organizations. Once again we are in the realm of the 'Universal but variable' theory of culture.

F. Individual Variation in the Dominant Conceptual Structure

Although individuals belonging to any given group would hold a general or dominant conceptual structure in common, it is also at this dominant level that they hold a degree of variation. At the level of superior-subordinate relationship within organizations belonging to one national culture, writers such as Stewart (1970) not only pointed out the 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture (Kluckhohn 1964), but also to some effecting factors that could be behind individuals' variations in the general or dominant conceptual structure of such relationships. She states that national culture:

"... sets the general expectations that people have
of the relationships between superiors and subordinates; within this there can be variations caused by the traditions that have grown up in the organization, the nature of the formal organization and the personalities of the individuals."(p.76)

In studying the affecting factors that could be behind the middle managers variation in the dominant pattern of orientation and behaviour toward top management in Iraq, two sets of factors have been put forward; 'Individual difference factors' and 'organizational factors'.

1 - Individual Difference Factors

The cultural differences between groups belonging to one given nation - such as those based on age, regions, families, occupations, social classes, etc. - have received little recognition in the literature. From the researcher's previous work observation and the material found in some relevant studies, the following individuality factors are assumed to affect middle managers behaviour toward top management in Iraq. In fact the affect, or rather the correlation between a number of these individuality factors, and organizational attitudes and behaviour, have been recognized and studied at various levels by writers such as Stogdill (1965), Cummings et al. (1971), Nord (1976 a) and Lee (1981), including a very few studies conducted in the Arab world, such as those of Berger (1957) in Egypt and Ali (1977) and Al-Atiyyah (1977) in Iraq.

a. Age

This factor has been dealt with in the literature from different perspectives. While in some studies the main concern is with 'age' as 'maturation' or its physical and psychological effects (see Levinson 1969; Kagon and Moss 1962; Whohlwill 1970) other studies are concerned with 'age' in cultural or socializational terms. Along
this latter line, we find Nord (1976 a) studying age in terms of the "generation gap"; Berger (1957) in terms of "the length of being exposed to Western culture"; Vroom and Pahl (1971) in terms of "developmental and socio-cultural mechanisms"; Ali (1977) in terms of its effect in modifying the relationship between socialization (urban versus rural) and bureaucratic behaviour in Iraq.

Kagon and Moss (1962) have indicated how ageing is correlated with systematic shifts in levels of dominance, aggressiveness, conformity and independence. One distinction between older and younger employees is that the older ones tend to have a more conservative attitude (Tannenbaum et al 1977; Hofstede 1980) as older people usually inhibit change in social life, while younger people tend to encourage innovation, scientific discovery, and economic, social and political development. In all the countries they surveyed, Tannenbaum et al (1977) found that the way older persons viewed plant leadership "is consistent with the notion that older persons are more conservative than younger persons, even if older persons earn the same salary and are at the same level as younger associates" (pp.140-141). Hofstede (1980) finds that a preference for an autocratic or persuasive boss increases with age, which points to a relationship between age and conservatism. He also pointed to the effect of ageing in decreasing interest in 'challenge'. So older people, as other studies have suggested, tend to do what is required of them and be more conformist (Schein 1968; Al-Rubaie 1983). One of the studies surveyed by Melzer (1981) shows that older more than younger employees tend to identify with management and their policies. One of the suggested reasons for older people being more conformist is that they are likely to be anchored in 'security', that is, they are willing to maintain job security, a decent income and a
good retirement pension (Schein 1968). Younger employees are said to be less afraid of economic insecurity than older employees (Strauss 1974). But in contrast to the above view Hampton et al (1978) suggest that those who are aged 30-45 become anxious and receptive to motivation through fear because it is unlikely that they can move to new positions with equivalent pay, and because usually their lifestyle depends on substantial income. But those who are over 45 probably have accumulated enough capital to be able to work elsewhere for less money. The findings of Hofstede (1980) as well as of some other studies surveyed by him, indicate that age very strongly effects the increasing importance of security and decreasing importance of developing abilities and advancement.

The literature also suggest a distinction between older and young employees on issues such as 'initiative', risk-taking, participation, freedom and equality. Handy (1976) states one of the "trait theory" arguments, which says that initiative or the capacity to perceive a need for action and the urge to do it appears to correlate quite well with age; it drops after 40. Vroom and Pahl (1971) indicate a significant negative relationship between age and both risk-taking and the value placed upon risk. They show that developmental and socio-cultural mechanisms may underlie such relationships. Across countries, Hofstede (1980) has found that preference for a participative manager related partly to the respondent's age: 37 percent of those between 25 and 30 chose a participative manager, but only 25 percent of those between 40 and 50 chose a participative manager. Hampton et al (1978) remark that 'age' seems to weaken the ability to work jointly with others; younger managers appear to be more effective in utilizing groups for decision-making than older managers. This, they state, could be
because the younger managers come through an educational system that places greater emphasis on group activity, or they are less sensitive to status, more flexible and have a greater willingness to express opinions. Such a notion about older managers also appears in O'Toole's statement "that observation has taught us that 50-year old authoritarian managers never become open and democratic" (p.8). Also, in the same direction, Rokeach (1973) in the U.S.A. and Feather (1977) in Australia (cited in Hofstede 1980) have found that in both countries 'freedom' and 'equality' appeal less to older than to younger people. But quite in contrast with the above view, Berger (1957) in his study of Egyptian bureaucracy, has given a different notion of older managers. By conceiving that bureaucratic rules permit great use of 'discretion power', which for him is one of the characteristics of Western bureaucracy, he remarks that older respondents in his study indicated a high bureaucratic orientation in terms of being willing to use greater personal initiative. To take account of such findings, one should consider the following:

1. Berger's study, as well as some others such as that of Ali (1977) on Iraqi bureaucracy, do not allow us to distinguish between the effect of age as 'maturation' and the effect of 'seniority' or the length of service. Berger's older respondents have had, as he stated, more years of service in the government than the younger ones and most of them hold positions in the top grades. As he found that 'age' and 'grade' tend to exert influence in the same direction and that bureaucratic orientation is more a characteristic of older respondents and those in the higher grades, such findings could be the effect of 'seniority' or the length of service, rather than the effect of 'maturation'.
2. When Berger dealt with each one of the three components that constituted his 'bureaucratic orientation scale' separately, rather than with the total scale, he found that in the first component: "rationality and efficiency", the older respondents scored higher than the younger ones. On the second: "hierarchy", the reverse result was obtained, and on the third component: "discretion and initiative", the evidence was inconclusive.

For some writers, the dependence, conformity and psychological withdrawal that characterizes the middle manager's lot are connected with middle-age or mid-career crises (Kay 1974 b). While many theories appear about the causes of such mid-career problems, Levinson (1969) suggests that it is an effect of age. In fact, the middle manager's crisis, as Hunt (1982) argues, is far more than just an age effect, but no doubt 'age' itself effects the degree of the middle manager's disillusionment.

b. Family background and childhood socialization experiences

In the field of socialization, sociologists and psychoanalysts through various viewpoints have all recognized the key role of the family in childhood socialization. While sociologists are concerned with the family as the first and the foremost agent of socialization, psychoanalysts focus on its early child-rearing activities through which they believe the major outlines of individual personality are crystalized. Anthropologists engaged with studying 'culture' and 'personality' were among those who were most highly influenced by psychoanalytic ideas, particularly Freudian theory. Thus, we find that students of "basic personality" and "national character" (Kardiner 1939; Erikson 1950; Fromm 1949) have considered the culturally standardized child-rearing practices within the family during the child's first five or six years of life as the primary and
the most crucial influences in personality structuration. They follow a sequential causal chain to link between early childhood experience and adult personality. This causal chain has received many criticisms, not only because it designated only one modal personality pattern for any given group (which seems hardly justified) but also for its many shortcomings (see Inkeles and Levinson 1969; Schaffer 1980).

In fact, the belief that early experience, particularly the physical-care experiences such as toilet training, orality, feeding and weaning, etc., have such a great impact in determining adult behaviour is far from understanding socialization as a cumulative life-long process through which the notion of oneself becomes enhanced. Early learning experience "will bring about long-term effects only if it is repeatedly reinforced throughout subsequent childhood" (Schaffer 1980, p. 89, in reference to Clarke 1968). Also the child, during his socialization process, is not passive but rather, active; "his behaviour is organized, not 'absent', and even to the earliest social interactions he brings certain characteristics which will affect the behaviour of other people towards him" (Schaffer 1980). As we are interested in the long term effects of childhood experience, we need to go back to the basic cultural argument which was presented by Hofstede (1980). It says that societal norms in any given society construct the social institutions, such as the 'family' and 'school', in particular patterns and ways of functioning in harmony with the context of these norms. In these institutions the individual, during his socialization process, learns "the ways of a given society or social group well enough so that he can function within it" (Elkin 1960, p.4). The family provides the individual with his primary learning
and his first social training in appropriate responses to his societal requirements. In these basic learning and training activities, the family builds up and reinforces the societal norms or the dominant conceptual structure on which its setting and way of functioning have been based. Such cultural conceptual structures will continue to be built up and reinforced by other institutions such as the 'school'. Recognizing the influence of childhood experience, at the same time as conceiving 'socialization' as a continuous dynamic process, is clear in the following statement by White (1977):

"(in) childhood, patterns of attitudes and action are established which suit the need for people to interact meaningfully and harmoniously. Later in life after some view of 'himself' has become well-established, mechanisms of socialization can still operate to dispose the individual to behave in appropriate ways, and to help him either to select the right attitudes and actions from his mental bank, or to learn new appropriate responses." (p. 16)

As has been argued before, individuals who belong to one national culture or one given group have not experienced exactly the same familial socialization through the same training and atmosphere, especially since such socialization takes place within predominately informal and personal social relationships. Socializing the child is not constructed in an abstract form or by a specific mechanism, but rather by the socialization agents (e.g. the parents) who are not necessarily working in harmony and who vary in their personalities, ways of thinking, and interpretations of their societal norms. So family structure and its ways of child-rearing and the degree and quality of constructing and reinforcing the dominant conceptual structure are to a great extent reflections of the personalities and characteristic behaviours of the parents and their own notion of culture, as well as their own childhood and adult experiences. This
could be partly behind the variation in child socialization between families belonging to one culture or group. In fact, some writers have tried to assess such national internal variation in child-rearing behaviour in terms of "social classes" (Kohn 1962-1963, 1969; White 1977) or in terms of "father's occupation" (Aberle and Naegele 1952; Miller and Swanson 1960).

Familial factors, such as the parents' notion of culture, and their personality characteristics and experiences, are not the only influences behind the variation in child socialization but there are also many extrafamilial influences, such as ecological, economic and social-structural factors. These extrafamilial factors not only exert a significant influence on family patterning and affect the socialization experience through the mediation of the family, but also enter this experience in more direct ways (Inkeles and Levinson 1969). Child-rearing, as Karrby (1971) finds, reflects the social and cultural conditions in which the family lives:

"Parents who live and work under closely controlled social conditions may teach their children authoritarian ways of social interaction. Parents who live under conditions in which they are allowed to express themselves freely, to take responsibility and to decide for themselves, may teach their children more democratic and responsible ways of interacting." (p.169)

In order to understand the variation of this study's adults' (i.e. middle managers) orientation and behaviour in relation to authority within the organization in terms of their individual differences, the researcher will study a set of extrafamilial and familial factors. These factors interact together to shape these adults' social background and their childhood experiences.
(1) Geographical area of living (i.e. regional subcultural differences)

In any country, one may find that different geographical locations have different subcultures and individuals in their outlook and actions reflect their regional subcultural value-orientations. The prevailing way of recognizing these regional cultural differences, which are used by many writers such as Nord (1976a), is in terms of rural versus urban backgrounds, which have been linked to important consequences for the type of orientation and behaviour of organizational members. Ecological and economic differences between rural and urban regions construct the dimension through which many writers try to study the socializational differences between these two types of societies. Many studies try to investigate the ecological and economic systems in different types of societies (e.g. hunting, agricultural, modern industrial and urbanized society) and their effects on the individual's degree of dependence-versus-autonomy and self-reliance. Barry and his associates (1973) show that in societies with "low food-accumulating (mainly hunting and gathering) societies" adults are socialized to be individualistic, assertive and self-reliant. By parallel reasoning, they said that adults in "high food accumulating (e.g. pastoral and agricultural) societies" are socialized to be compliant, conscientious and conservative. In comparing agricultural with modern urban society, Marsh (1978) by referring to many relative studies, argues that agricultural societies, because of their environment's requirements, are characterized by social tightness, harsh child-rearing practices, and an emphasis on compliance. Thus, such societies tend to exercise a cognitive style marked by dependency. In contrast, a modern industrial urban environment requires the individual to be more
independent (Gruenfeld and MacEachron 1975, cited in Marsh 1978). Kohn (1969) found that self-direction is somewhat more highly valued by fathers who grew up in urban places, and conformity is more highly valued by those who spent their childhoods in non-urban places, whether on a farm or in a village or small town. Swope (1970) provides quite a different line of thinking about rural versus urban socialization. In discussing the impact of the geographical background on the American executive's style, outlook and actions, he states that the executive whose background is rural may be a little ingenuous, less sophisticated, but more open, more ready to take on responsibilities, and more self-reliant than the one with the urban background. This is because, he says:

"Urban upbringing is a more regulated one. Social, athletic, and other activities are more organized, more directed than in rural areas. Instead of creatively working out their own activities, children are used to having these scheduled for them; they come to expect this to be done. Such a life, obviously, tends to make the individual more dependent on others to provide many things for him. .......... (p.123). A rural childhood is quite different in many ways from its urban counterpart. The family itself is more self-contained. ...... The rural upbringing may include participation in the work activities of the family farm if there is one. As a result, children learn at an earlier age to organize and carry out more adult chores of manual type than urbanites do. They come to expect that work duties will be assigned to them. They are depended upon and must develop some self-reliance." (p.124)

Ali (1977) in his study about rural versus urban socialization (which did not look at the peculiarity of Iraqi regional subcultural settings) followed the first direction of Western writers in arguing that rural socialization results in more compliance and dependency. But it also results in less initiative and self-autonomy than urban socialization. For him this is because of the rural authoritarian child socialization practices on the one hand, and on the other, the
exposure of urban society to Western modernity and industrial technology which has led to the improvement of urban education, health care, communications, etc. In order to justify such a view in the case of Iraq, one needs to examine the implications more deeply, in the light of the peculiarity of Iraqi culture (which will be done later).

(2) Father's occupation

The father's occupation not only influences the familial socialization in terms of its determination of the family socio-economic status, but also in terms of the mode of child-rearing and parent-child relationship. Hall (1969) states that the occupation of the father or the family's man has an important impact on the family in that his position in the occupational system is apparently related to his position in family relationships. The more the family's man earns and the higher his occupational status is, the more is his power within the family. Aberle and Naegele (1952) argue that the father's occupation strongly influences his long-range expectations and evaluation of his child's behaviour at various age levels. It also enters intimately into the father's relationship with his child (particularly the son). While the father attempts to leave the office behind him, at home "he represents the occupational world to his family" (p. 370), and evaluates his children's behaviour in terms of his occupational role. Miller and Swanson (1960) found massive differences in child-rearing methods between parents, depending on whether the father's type of occupation was classified as "entrepreneurial" or "bureaucratic" (i.e. an organizational occupation). Kohn (1962-1963, 1969) found a congruency between occupational requirements and parental values which have important consequences for their relationships with their children and the type
of values they display to them. He states that men "who work under occupational conditions that facilitate the exercise of self-direction are likely to value self-direction for their children; men who work under occupational conditions that inhibit or preclude the exercise of self-direction are likely to value conformity" (1969, p.151). He argues that class differences in parent-child relationships are a product of differences in parental values which in their turn stem particularly from occupational differences. While middle-class occupations, he says, require a greater degree of self-direction and initiative, the working conditions of working class occupations, in large measure, stress conformity - in terms of obeying authority - to supervisors and to explicit rules set down by someone in authority, as well as valuing respect for and subordination to authority. So "working-class parents want their children to conform to external authority because the parents themselves are willing to accord respect to authority, in return for security and respectability" (1962-1963, p.477). Consequently, working-class parents put greater stress on obedience to parental comments and respect for grown-ups than do middle-class parents who put their emphasis on self-direction and reliance. Hulin and Triandis (1981) support the same direction of thought by arguing that fathers with bureaucratic occupations work in large, highly differentiated organizations where progress depends on being a good organizational person and on specialization. Entrepreneurial fathers work in small organizations with little division of labour, where progress depends on risk-taking. Thus parents with bureaucratic occupations teach their children to conform, and to help others, while entrepreneurial parents socialize their children to take risks and to be enterprising in business.
(3) **Parental levels of education**

Parental levels of education are one of the familial factors that contribute significantly to the differences in parental values (Kohn 1969) and to socialization practices. Karrby (1971) found that better educated parents are significantly less controlling, more lenient and have a more nurturant attitude than parents with less education. She pointed out that "parents who are better educated are more able to reason with their children about social and moral behaviour, thus giving them more opportunities to judge their own actions and intentions than children who have less verbal interaction with their parents" (p.169). Kohn (1969), in his study of "class and conformity" shows that less-educated parents hold more "authoritarian conservatism" (p.132) than parents of higher education, so they put higher value on children's conformity to authority rather than on self-direction. He remarks that it is not only the educational status of the father that affects parental values toward children, but the mother's own educational attainments also matter; the more educated mothers are more likely to value self-control and self-direction, and the less-educated are more likely to value obedience. Also, Karrby (1971) pointed out that mothers who had completed secondary school had significantly less controlling, more lenient and more nurturant attitudes than mothers with elementary education.

(4) **Childhood experiences during family socialization**

If societal norms in any given society construct the family pattern and its ways of functioning in harmony with their context, so it is logical to find a culturally standardized child-socialization ideology that parents follow consciously and more often unconsciously in raising their children. But culture only sets up the framework of the required family structure and way of functioning, and within this
framework one finds a wide variation depending on many familial and extrafamilial factors. Although national culture exercises a very powerful constraint upon family socialization, particularly in traditional societies, ways of family functioning also reflect what can be called 'home culture' or, rather, 'subculture', which is a combination of national culture and the peculiar setting of the family as an institution and all the influencing familial and extrafamilial factors. Despite all the similarities, each family can be viewed as a distinct social unit that has its own version of right and proper orientations and behaviours, and values things not exactly valued by other families and sanctions behaviours not necessarily given the same view by other families. In fact, in studying internal national variations, 'home culture' provides an important factor, particularly in societies that lack the Western type of 'class culture' phenomenon, as is the case in Arabic societies. The individual does not receive his 'home culture' in an abstract form but through his actual experiences. He does not only acquire it through conscious learning, but, more, through his interaction and association with parents and other members of the family, and by observing and imitating adult behaviour connected with their roles, so, if through our experiences we become "mentally programmed" to interpret new experiences in certain ways (Hofstede 1980), our childhood experiences in our home cultures would partly condition our way of thinking and influence the meanings we hold for the world around us today.

One of the basic cultural arguments is that the power-distance norm spills over from one sphere of life into others and thus people can be expected to carry over values and norms from their childhood experiences (Hofstede 1980). Thus, parent-child authority
relationships develop attitudes and expectations about a person's future interaction with authority figures in work organizations. This argument is supported by many studies which investigate the linkage between patterns of authority relationship within work organizations (i.e. superior-subordinate relationship) and that of parent-child relationships (Abegglen 1958; McClelland 1969; Levinson 1968; Kakar 1971; Tayeb 1981). Levinson (1968) for example, as quoted by Nord (1976 a), from a psychoanalytical perspective, has suggested that the boss-subordinate relationship bears resemblance to the more fundamental relationship of parent-child. He states that in England, where the mother plays a more important role in child socialization, we find management practices are "feminine", but in Germany, the authoritarian and directive management practices parallel the German's child-rearing practices, where the father, who is the primary source of socialization, is viewed as being authoritative and directive. In the United States, despite that fact that one can distinguish many cultures rather than one identical culture, Levinson claims that the socialization practices are highly child-centred, where the child enjoys a great amount of freedom, and parents often play somewhat the role of 'servant' to the child and help him to be independent. This American parental relationship, he says, characterizes people's views and attitudes towards government in general, which is expected to help the people help themselves. Also in work organizations, the pattern of superior-subordinate relationship parallels the American parent-child relationship: in these organizations, the value of the individual is stressed and executives are expected to help the individual grow.

McClelland (1969) found that factory workers' cooperation, obedience, and performance in a work unit depend upon the congruence
between the authority patterns that they have experienced in the family and school, and the pattern they found in work organizations.

Hofstede (1980) recognizes that in high PDI (i.e. Power Distance Index) countries, parents put great value on children's obedience, as is the case in Italy (Kohn 1969), while in low PDI countries, parents put less value on children's obedience to authority.

Tayeb (1981) demonstrates how Iranian hierarchical family structure and authoritarian child-rearing ideology and practices participate in building up authoritarian attitudes in relation to authority, which manifest themselves later in Iranian work organizations. She describes Iranian family pattern and child socialization as follows:

"[The] power structure of the family is hierarchical with a father at the top position who maintains order and discipline in the household. Parent-child relationship is the earthly model of God-man relationship. Here too, the authority relationship is that of powerful and powerless and the child's obedience is maintained through both love and punishment. Submission and respect to the seniors are the roles which the children are expected to play in the family 'game', whereas the role of the elders is that of giving orders and making decisions and seeing to it that the decisions and orders are carried out."(p.13).

c. Educational background

(1) Level of formal education

The degree of Power-distance between two individuals in power relationships is said to be affected by the level of formal education (Hofstede 1976; 1977; 1980). Less-educated employees are likely to hold more 'authoritarian' values than those with higher education (Crozier 1964). Also, Tannenbaum et al (1977) have found that employees with less education tend to be less challenging to superiors. The less educated the employee is, the more hesitant he will be to behave in ways that imply he understands more about the
work than his superior does: "Having less education than his superior he may feel that he does not know enough to introduce improvements that his superior has not already though of ... " (p.154). Kay (1974) pointed to other effects of the levels of education in remarking that mid-life crises tend to occur more frequently among middle-managers with higher levels of education because they tend to have higher expectations. In fact, the influences of the level of formal education on the degree of power-distance seem to be highly dependent, as Hofstede (1980) notes, on the educational system in the society under study. He recognizes that although in higher PDI countries employees in managerial occupations tend to have more years of formal education than in low PDI countries, low PDI values occur only in highly educated occupations in low power-distance countries. Education, as Hofstede says, is not only a matter of numbers - numbers of years at school or numbers of students, it is very important what is taught and how, and what kind of socialization the school has provided the individual with. This last remark would require us to look at the nature of the educational system of the society under study.

(2) Nature of formal educational socialization

School, as a social institution, builds up and reinforces the customary role patterns and the collectively shared societal norms that lead to them. It has its vital role in teaching individuals their dominant cultural pattern. We can enter a country's schoolrooms, say Whyte and Braun (1966) to see "the culture pattern of tomorrow being shaped before our eyes"(p.53). In high PDI countries, Hofstede (1980) states, where children are more dependent on parents, we find more frequently that students are dependent on teachers: "There is more rote learning and the asking of questions
by the student is seldom encouraged; teachers are more often supposed to be omniscient, even if they do not like it" (p.126). Lee (1981) finds that the educational primary socialization, in terms of the achievement versus discipline school of value-orientation to which the individuals concerned were subject, has its influence on the individual's adoption of subsequent work roles. The influence of the nature of the French educational system on the maintenance of large power-distance within French organizations has been recognized by Crozier (1964) also. In several developing countries, Whyte and Braun (1966) demonstrate how cultural patterns learned at school pose problems for industrialization in these societies. They recognize that the educational system in these countries display authoritarian patterns of teacher-pupil relationships, with submissive children and autocratic teachers. Also, this system lacks independence training: children were required to memorize the teacher's solutions to problems they had been set and passages assigned to them by him; they did not participate in class discussion, where everything was entirely in response to the teacher's initiative. Also a risk-taking capacity was neither rewarded nor encouraged, and above all, the heroes in the school texts were not men who had contributed to the economic development of their country but instead, military men whose behaviour did not illustrate a model of achievement to long-range goals, but rather, only took a few minutes or even a few seconds to become heroes. Such socialization is not incompatible with the industrial growth and development requirements which these societies need. Tayeb (1981) demonstrated how the nature of the Iranian formal educational system contributes to the building of authoritarian collectively shared learned values that exist in society in general and manifest themselves clearly in work organizations. She states that in this educational system:
"The teacher-pupil relationship is an authoritarian one which perpetuates the dominant-submissive role pattern to which the child has already been exposed at home. Loyalty to leaders and belief in good intentions of rulers and full obedience to them are reinforced through the contents of textbooks and other features of the educational system such as centralization of the system, selecting loyal teachers, and conducting special morning ceremonies. The learning process is based on memorizing theories and facts as lectured by the teachers and written in the books rather than on experiments and trial and error. This has resulted in lack of training of the mind for logical and analytical thinking and hence docile acceptance of the views of the teacher. Conflict with and challenge to the superior (teacher in this case) are concepts alien to the Iranian in general. Fear of punishment and inexperience in active discussion and participation in classrooms and blind obedience have contributed to a strong unwillingness to accept responsibility and to make significant decisions independently." (pp. 14-15)

d. Work experience

Work experience is also an important factor which contributes to the degree of power-distance between two actors. Knowledge, information and experience gained by an individual through handling work responsibilities during his service within work organizations all participate in determining what Hall (1972) terms: "the ease of replacement" (p. 233). Thus one could assume that the longer the length of service of an actor, the greater his experience and capacity to handle the job will be, and consequently the lower the ease of replacement. In fact, work experience or the length of service reflects different stages in the organizational career process through which individuals and organizations are linked in different kinds of relationships over time. Schein (1971) distinguishes between two main stages of an individual's movement through an organization during his 'career': first, "acculturation or adult socialization" (p. 402) which normally occurs in the early periods of an individual's career. During this time, the individual learns the ropes, figures out how to make headway in the
organization, how to get along, and how to work (Van Maanen 1976). At this stage, the organization engages intensively with the basic training and socializing of the individual so that he will acquire its norms, values and expected patterns of behaviour. At this stage of the individual's career, he lacks influence in the organization and thus tends to be more dependent or influenced by his organization. In other words, at this point the organization has its maximum influence on the individual. Thus the individual in his early stages or periods of service within the organization tends to be more concerned with exploring the organizational world around him and with proving himself. He must be accepted by others in the organization, particularly those who hold the authority or power to influence his organizational position or career. And hence only after handling the problem of establishing a somewhat stable situational identity can he turn to other matters such as achievement, challenge, and innovation (Van Maanen 1976). If we take the case of being a 'middle manager', during the early years of holding his managerial position, the individual has to meet the organization's social tests and demonstrate his loyalty, particularly to those who run the organization. So, he is unlikely in this stage to be concerned with nonconformist behaviour or innovation; he is likely to be or to show a dependence on his superiors, especially if he was selected by them to be a middle manager from the bottom organizational rank.

Acculturation or adult socialization, indicates Schein (1971), is followed by the second basic stage which is called "innovation" (p.402). If the individual in the former stage is influenced, in this stage he influences (innovates). In this innovation stage, the individual has already gained a "mutual acceptance" (Schein 1978)
which includes "the various processes of formally and informally
granting full membership to the new employee through initiation
rites, the conferring of special status or privileges, more
challenging and important job assignments, and the working out of a
viable psychological contract" (p.82). The individual here has his
maximum influence on the organization as he develops its dependence
on him. But if we agree that managerial life is orientated toward
what is to be, rather than what is and thus one of the big
expectations of the middle manager is that middle management is the
training ground for senior and top management, then this stage of
innovation is likely to be a short one in the middle manager's
career. This is because when the middle manager comes to realize his
failure to move a little higher up the ladder and that the only job
he is considered to be qualified for is his current one, then as Kay
(1974 a) says, he will withdraw physically or, more likely,
psychologically, or tend to stagnate and become dependent and
conformist. These are known as the characteristics of middle manager
mid-career crises.

2 - Organizational Factors
The research puts forward the following set of organizational
factors that are assumed to affect middle managers orientation and
behaviour toward top management and would explain part of their
variation. In fact, while one can find a voluminous body of
literature studying many of these organizational factors, there is
very little and, at that, indirect evidence regarding the influence
of these factors in organizational socialization and the consequent
effects on employees' orientations and behaviours, particularly in
relation to authority.
a. Nature of the relationship between top and middle managers

The nature of managers' relationships with their bosses are important factors influencing them at work. Much of the vertical power relationships between upper and lower participants in organizations, as Hall (1982) remarks, involve the way in which a superior interacts with his subordinates. Although, particularly in a rigidly bureaucratic hierarchical structure, power relationships are usually specified in advance, such relationships can develop as the nature of the relationship itself develops. Such development in the nature of the relationship may occur not only because of the personalities and background of the lower participants or because they may develop some bases of power that allow them to extend power or influence over those further up the organizational hierarchy but, more, because of the managing style or personality characteristics of the person in the upper position. Organizational rules and norms draw the framework of the expected superior-subordinate relationship, but within this framework different individuals in upper and lower organizational positions may develop and experience various types of superior-subordinate relationships. These types would present us with various modes or patterns of 'leader socialization' that different formal leaders could utilize in work organizations. In order to find out the likely effects of the nature of top-middle managers relationship on middle managers' orientation and behaviour, we will study this relationship from two aspects, i.e. the top manager's leadership behaviour and the degree of middle manager's participation in decision-making. These two aspects are assumed to exert their influences by increasing or decreasing the degree of power-distance between top and middle managers and, consequently, affecting middle manager's orientation and behaviour in relation to authority (i.e. top management).
(1) **Top managers' leadership behaviour in relation to middle managers**

The study of leaders' behaviour has resulted in an abundance of literature which consists of a number of theories and models seeking to most clearly identify and best explain the presumably powerful effects of leader behaviour upon the satisfaction, attitudes and performance of hierarchical subordinates. Through these theories and models, 'leadership' may appear to a student in organizational behaviour as a highly complex and confused phenomenon. A part of this confusing and rather surprising fact in the development of leadership theory is that, as Hall (1982) notes, most studies have been concerned with lower or first-line leadership. That is, with "little evidence regarding the effect that top leaders have on organizations, simply because there has been very little research on top organizational leadership. Organization researchers have not gotten access to top business and government leaders" (Hall 1982, p.163). So most leadership studies simply ignored the fact that the "supervisor" to whom they usually refer - implicitly and explicitly - when they talk about 'leaders' is a 'man-in-the-middle' who lacks any real power. Although he is in a leadership position, in reality he is a powerless leader and, being a 'leader' or merely a 'follower' is highly contingent upon the degree that top leaders allow him to share power and decision-making with them. Leadership at the top of the organization is vastly different from that at the first-line supervisory level. The top is different, says Kanter and Stein (1979), in a variety of ways: "One of these is that the top of an organization is much more personalized than the supposedly rational and impersonal bureaucracy below. The leader's self, his or her character, is more critical and viewed more critically" (p.12). Top
management, Hall (1982) emphasizes, has the greatest impact on the organization, and these top level leaders have the potential for real effects on the behaviour and attitudes of subordinates, even for the high-level administrators. Such impact is even greater in organizations such as those of Iraq where the 'person' at the top is expected to have a great deal to do with what goes on in the organization. The personality of the top manager or the head in these organizations is superimposed on the organization which tends to follow his personal tendencies and to adapt itself to his characteristics and leadership style. The effects of top level leaders on the orientations and behaviours of those at the middle management level would be more than any other organizational levels. This is so because middle manager's peculiar dilemmas have led him to be over-dependent on those in a position to overrule (i.e. top management) and highly concerned about their judgements and relationship with them. Stogdill (1974), for example, cites Brower and Seashore's (1966) findings in that the pattern of leader behaviour exhibited by top managers was reflected in similar behaviour in subordinate managers. Also he reports that Fleishman et al. (1955) has found that the leadership behaviour of a subordinate manager is more conditioned by the behaviour of those in top management than by the training they received.

Researchers in leadership who are concerned with studying the effects of the actual behaviour of leaders on followers' attitudes and behaviour have categorized leaders according to their ways or styles of leading. One most common classification which can be found in every major research programme on leadership is based on the extent to which a 'manager' is concerned with people or 'employees' he leads, or with production or 'tasks'. One of the crucial issues
In leadership theory, says Schein (1980), is "whether task concern and people concern are two ends of a single continuum or two independent dimensions such that one could be high or low on both." (p.131)

In fact it seems that we need to distinguish between the leader's orientation (i.e. toward task or people) and his approach in dealing with both areas. In work organization and particularly at top levels it is very important for effective leaders to be highly concerned with both 'task' and 'people'. But when the situation requires the leader to be more concerned with getting results or output, this does not necessarily mean that he will or should be directive and not considerate towards his subordinates. But, rather he may, and should if he wants, be an effective leader, following a supportive approach of leadership which would serve both his concerns with task and people. Thus, getting results could be accomplished through such an approach, which means the leader builds a shared trust and understanding rather than imposing tight control on every step, assisting their growth and development and supporting and training them, being interested enough to listen to their work and non-work problems, ... etc. When a manager has to be more concerned with work or output, by following a supportive approach to leadership he would allow each of his individual subordinates to feel that he was being treated as a 'person' and not just another 'cog in the wheel'. And such a feeling would motivate subordinates to support and assist their leader in accomplishing the task required. In fact many researchers on leadership, notably Likert (1967), have reported that supportive leadership is more effective in achieving high productivity and morale, and that effective managers usually are task and people orientated. Thus, in studying leadership behaviour, the
central issue is not whether the manager is task-orientated or people-orientated, but the approach that the manager takes in dealing with both areas. And it may be more realistic to talk about people- and task-orientated situations than about people- and task-orientated managers.

In fact the above line of thought can be found in McClelland's (1970) concept of "the two faces of power" (pp.29-47) which is particularly valuable in studying leadership in vertical power relationships in organizations. McClelland and Burnham (1980) emphasize that power is essential to good management, as it was found that the better and most effective managers were high in 'power motivation'. But power has two faces, i.e. "socialized" and "personal" which present two fundamentally different approaches of leadership, as Yukl (1981) has described:

First - A supportive approach: - which reflects the 'socialized' face of power. This approach seeks to build the skills and self-confidence of subordinates rather than making them weaker. A socialized manager is more 'institution-minded' in terms of encouraging subordinates to be loyal to the organization and its ideals rather than to himself. He exercises power in a cautious and responsible manner and creates an effective work climate where subordinates feel that they have more responsibility. Also, "authority is delegated to a considerable extent, information is shared openly, and participation in decision-making is encouraged". (Yukl 1981). The manager who follows such an approach to leadership, says McClelland and Burnham (1980), also "creates high morale because he produces the greatest sense of organizational clarity and team spirit" (p.289).
Second - An autocratic or authoritarian approach: which reflects the "personal" face of power. Managers motivated by this type of power seek to dominate and subjugate subordinates by making them feel powerless and keeping them dependent. Through this approach to leadership, Yukl (1981) states that:

"Rewards and punishments are used to manipulate and control subordinates. Authority is used as an excuse to command obedience by subordinates and it is highly centralized in the leader, with little delegation or participation. Expert power is maximised by skillful impression management designed to maintain an image of infallibility, as well as by preventing subordinates from gaining access to vital information. Referent power is accumulated by using public relations tactics and media management to glorify the leader and make him appear benevolent." (p59)

Since such an approach which subordinates commitment is often generated by the leader or manager personally rather than by the institution they both serve, disorganization often follows when a personal power manager leaves. His subordinates' strong group spirit, which the manager has personally inspired, deflates, and subordinates do not know what to do for themselves (McClelland and Burnham 1980).

The above two approaches of leadership correspond to many characteristics constituted in the common classification of "supportive versus autocratic" leadership styles that researchers of leadership have focused around, as has been presented by Hall (1982). But these two approaches do not take the common position of conceiving the 'supportive leader' as employee-oriented and 'autocratic leader' as task-oriented. Thus the presentation by Hall (1982) of the classical contrasting styles of leaders behaviour could provide a better perspective to study leaders behaviour when we remove the issue of employee and task orientations. Hall (1982) states that the 'supportive leader' utilizes socio-emotional appeals
to his subordinates which involve "consideration for subordinates", "consultative decision-making" and "general supervision". Such a leadership approach consists of different behavioural characteristics that have been found convergently by different studies (see Yukl 1981). These behavioural characteristics are:

- Consideration for subordinates: the leader creates an environment of psychological support, mutual trust and confidence, openness, respect, friendship and warmth, and understanding.

- Consultative decision-making: the leader encourages a two-way communication with subordinates, keeping them informed, asking for their opinions and showing his appreciation for their ideas and suggestions. Such a leader deals with decision-making in a consultative, or democratic way, rather than an autocratic or arbitrary way.

- General supervision: the leader supervises in a general rather than a very close way. Instead of imposing tight control and giving specific instructions in terms of 'Do this', 'Don't do that', he provides subordinates with autonomy in getting things done. He gives them a freedom to exercise discretion in their work, and delegates authority to them. Also, a supportive manager helps his subordinates to further their careers, motivates and assists them in achieving high-standards in task-performance, and provides his praise and recognition for their accomplishments.

The two leadership approaches that derive from McClelland's concept of "the two faces of power" are more realistic for studying organizational behaviour as they recognize the influence game of management and that people are motivated, particularly in top managerial positions, to gain power and influence over others in work organization. But at the same time they distinguish between authoritarian and democratic exercises of 'power'.

The literature on leadership behaviour has traditionally focussed on identifying the behavioural characteristics of the 'effective supervisor' in terms of task performance and employee satisfaction. Thus we have very little evidence concerning the relationship between leadership behaviour and the power-distance between upper and lower participants in organizations. But, implicitly or indirectly the literature has defined the authoritarian or autocratic leader (who is classically referred to as task-oriented) as someone who generates a large social distance. On the other hand, a supportive leader is more likely to develop favourable relations with subordinates and thus generate a low social distance with them. In fact, one of the earliest studies in management style, that of White and Lippitt (1956), provides direct evidence of the effects of a leader's behaviour on subordinate behaviour. They investigated the effects of three different styles of leadership - democratic, autocratic and laissez-faire - upon the behaviour of group members. They report that group members' behaviour differed markedly under the three different styles; members under authoritarian leadership evidenced more submissive and dependent behaviour in relation to their autocratic leader. They treated him less as an equal, demanding his attention and approval, and talked back less to him. While White and Lippitt's study was on youth groups (10-year old boys), some studies have undertaken subsequent investigations on adult work-groups and they reported similar results. Yukl (1981) states that under autocratic leadership, subordinates will be less innovative and creative, more dependent on the leader, and their loyalty will be to the leader personally rather than to the organization.
Hence, we can assume that the top manager's supportive leadership behaviour in relation to the middle manager, would have the effect of reducing formality and power-distance between the two actors. Also it would provide the middle manager with a sense of leadership and power-sharing rather than only being in a leadership position without being able to perform as a leader. Considerate and supportive behaviour by a leader would also provide individuals (e.g. middle managers) in Iraqi organization with the culturally favoured paternalistic attitude from authority figures (e.g. the father).

(2) Middle managers' participation in decision-making

One of the basic reasons for middle managers' feelings of lack of influence is, as Kay (1974 a) points out, their lack of access to the decision-making process which makes them feel that their input is not solicited and perhaps not valued. In fact one of the usual assumptions found in the literature is that 'participation' is a communication between equals. And thus 'participation' is an important method or strategy which can reduce differences in power and status between superiors and subordinates. Leavitt (1965) states that the theories of McGregor (1960), Likert (1961) and Argris (1962) have all identified participation with some form of 'power equalization'. Also Bartolke et al (1982) remarks, although 'power equalization' may not be stated explicitly as a consequence of participation, it is nonetheless implicit in the thinking of many social scientists. Notably Strauss (1963) has directly addressed the issue of 'power equalization' through participation in its broad sense as a process in which subordinates in an organization have some say or influence in the decision-making process. He states that "participation, however defined, is well accepted as a form of power equalization" (p.60). In contrast, some writers, such as Hall
assert that participation in decision-making appears to have very little effect on the individuals' power in power positions. Also Mulder and Wilke (1970) and Mulder (1971) have criticized the assumption that participation by the less powerful in the decision-making process results in a reduction of the differences in power between the more powerful and the less powerful. They assert that "under certain conditions participation does not promote power equalization, but on the contrary, participation leads to a widening of the power gap" (Mulder and Wilke 1970, p.444). On the other hand, Tannenbaum et al (1977) and Kavčič and Tannenbaum (1981) remark that participation gives to lower-ranking persons some influence they might not otherwise have. And thus participation reduces, if not eliminates, the large power differential that ordinarily exists between employees at the bottom and top levels of the hierarchy. But, they say, participation "does not equalize power - it may in some cases actually increase the power of 'top' personnel ... Authority and influence are, therefore, inevitably hierarchical in the work organization, equalitarian ideology notwithstanding" (Tannenbaum et al 1977, p.209).

The above statements of Tannenbaum et al (1977) and Kavčič and Tannenbaum (1981) suggest to us that the role of 'participation' in applying an equalitarian ideology in organizational hierarchy should be conceived in more specific ways than as a general concept of 'power equalization':--

First: It seems that 'power equalization through participation' has been thought to imply a reduction in the influence of the powerful (i.e. superiors), rather than an increase in the influence of the powerless (i.e. subordinates), or as taking power from managers and giving it to subordinates. When Rosner et al (1973)
(cited by Hall 1982) found that greater workers' 'participation' had led them to feel that they had more personal influence, trust and responsibility but it did not reduce the influence of the manager, this, in fact, does not mean that participation does not affect the power differential between the two parties as Hall (1982) claims. But rather, such findings suggest that participation has reduced the power-distance between the manager and his workers by increasing the influence of workers rather than reducing the influence of the manager. In other words, this finding clearly suggests that participation has not taken power or influence from the manager and given it to the workers as has often been thought.

Second: The term 'equality' has been conceived using a more mathematical rather than an moral or symbolic meaning. Participation, as Tannenbaum et al (1974) remarks, would not equalize power between superiors and subordinates in terms of making them have the same amount of authority and influence. But participation would generate a feeling of symbolic equality, particularly from the subordinates point of view because it "mitigates some of the effects of hierarchy by adding qualities of the managerial role to non-managerial jobs....., [and] brings workers into management" (Tannenbaum 1974, p.128).

Third: The findings of writers such as Mulder and Wilke (1970) do not generate an assumption that participation does not reduce power-distance between superiors and subordinates, but, rather, these writers were very concerned to prevent such incorrect generalizations from their study. What they have demonstrated is that under certain conditions participation increases the power of the powerful (i.e. superiors) and specifically this occurs when the more powerful have considerably greater expert power than the less powerful. But when a
subordinate acquires more expert power than his superior, more participation would lead to more effective influence by the subordinate on his superior. Thus, they say, persons who aspire to participate with people from higher levels in the decision-making process of their organizations must attain and maintain to some extent an equality in expertness with these 'superiors'. So, if participation actually increases the power of the expert power holder, as Mulder and Wilke (1970) emphasize, one can assume that participation would increase the power of middle managers as they are more likely than top management individuals to hold expert power due to their specialization in their functional areas and their extensive involvement in a wide range of different responsibilities and activities.

So it seems that if all forms of organizational democracy are "ways of reducing power distance" (Hofstede 1980, p.388) then, all the forms of democratic leadership approaches which top level managers may follow, would provide the middle manager with a greater sense of influence and participation in organizational leadership, which would decrease compliant behaviour and increase initiatives.

One may argue that such a democratic approach is unlikely to be favoured and even effective in reducing power-distance between superiors and subordinates in authoritarian organizations. But a democratic or supportive leadership approach, as Hall (1982) remarks, has its positive impact even in organizations which are thought to favour more authoritarian leadership styles. Also in authoritarian organizations in large power-distance countries, Hofstede (1980) states, there is strong ideological support for employee participation, which is "a compensation for what happens on the pragmatic level"(p.388). This means that people in these
organizations feel the need for organizational democracy but they are not able to achieve it in reality because of the de facto resistance against it. Also when we talk about the unfavourableness and ineffectiveness of the democratic leadership in authoritarian organizations, we need to specify which form of democracy. Some forms may be unfavourable because they are incongruent with employees' cultural value-orientations, but others could be quite culturally acceptable. For example, Muna (1980) has found that a consultative decision-making style is highly favoured by Arab executives and employees as it has strong roots in Arabic culture. But joint decision-making is unlikely to be widely adopted by Arab managements because "subordinates might view it as a sign of weakness on the part of the executive; they expect to be consulted, but not to make the final decision". Also because Arab executives seem to prefer and feel more at ease with individual-to-individual consultation, and because they and their subordinates tend to dislike team-work (Muna 1980, p.118).

b. Middle managers' role conflict and ambiguity

A major source of 'stress' associated with managerial organizational roles which has been the concern of a great deal of research is role conflict and ambiguity. Role conflict is defined by Kahn et al (1964) as "the simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that compliance with one would make more difficult compliance with the other" (p.19). The terms introduced in the above definition are usually referred to by many writers as the stress experienced by a manager in a particular work role when he receives contradictory demands from his role senders. Such demands concern what he is to do such that they cannot be met by any compatible course of action, or doing things that he really does not
want to do or does not think are part of the job requirements. The most frequent manifestation of role conflict, say Smith et al (1982) is "when a manager is caught between two groups of people who demand different kinds of behaviour or expect that the job should entail different functions" (p.77), which is the typical case of middle managers. From many studies of middle managers' behavioural dilemmas that have previously been reviewed (such as Roethlisberger 1945; Gardner and Whyte 1945; Wary 1949; Mann and Dent 1954; Katz and Kahn 1966), it is clear that middle managers are heavily exposed to role conflict. Also Kahn et al (1964) have suggested that role conflict is likely to be greater at the middle manager's level than at any other organizational level. The suggested effect of role conflict on middle manager's behaviour, as has been demonstrated before, is that in order to protect himself and his career he tends either to project conflict outwards from himself by playing the role of pure transmitter between his superior and subordinates, or, which is more likely, to take the side of his superiors. In playing the role of pure transmitter and thus isolating himself, he increasingly becomes a 'marginal man'. In taking the side of his superiors he consequently becomes over-dependent on them and becomes more compliant in his behaviour toward them.

On the other hand role ambiguity results "when a manager has inadequate information about his work role, that is, where there is lack of clarity about his work objectives associated with his role", about other's expectations of his work role particularly his role senders, and about the scope of authority and responsibilities of his job (Smith et al 1982, p.77). While House and Rizzo (1972) assert that role conflict and ambiguity are critical variables for organizational behaviour, their findings suggest that role ambiguity
is a more powerful variable than role conflict. Although the literature more often concerns itself with role conflict than role ambiguity, studies on role ambiguity have reported that middle managers or those who occupy a middle organizational position experience more role ambiguity than top managers. Kahn et al (1964) suggests that role ambiguity is likely to be greater at middle manager level than at any other organizational level. Miller (1968, cited by Stogdill 1974) reports that middle managers frequently state they are unclear of the scope of their responsibilities as well as of the feelings and expectations of the people with whom they work. Also Stogdill (1974) reported Mullen's (1954) statement in that the predominant feeling among 'foremen', who are often described as being in the position of the "man-in-the-middle", is that they did not know the company policy on many important matters of their concern and thus they had to work in the dark. The lack of clear policy-making coupled with strengthening of the hierarchy, produces, as Dickson (1977) states, "a situation in which there is a lack of tangible objectives for middle managers. Where there is no clear link between an action and its value or ultimate end, pressures can arise for formal rules to help individuals decide their behaviour" (p.68).

Role ambiguity results in uncertainty and insecurity, feelings which would lead to a preference for clear requirements and instructions, and consequently for more formality. In fact House and Rizzo (1972) support the hypothesis that the major contribution of "formalization" practices concerns that of reducing role ambiguity. Kahn et al (1964) found that role ambiguity results in lower job satisfaction, high job-related tension, greater futility, and lower self-confidence. Lower self-confidence would result in more conformity (Handy 1976). Role ambiguity and lack of clear task definition, says Stogdill
(1974), are associated with reluctance to initiate action. Many writers have pointed out the value of having clear, unequivocal definitions of roles for reducing role ambiguity. In contrast other writers, such as Stewart (1970), have argued that role clarity or closely defined roles inhibits innovation and autonomy, encourages rigid behaviour and decreases utilization of human resources and professional growth. Broussine and Guerrier (1983) remark that "much of the writing on organization theory may be seen as a dialogue between those writers who believe that the way to effective organization is through building up a system of clearly defined roles and those who believe that, sometimes at least, roles should be left fluid and only broadly defined" (p.26).

In fact the effects of role ambiguity on individual behaviour depends to a great extent on his tolerance for ambiguity which influences his perception for the degree of uncertainty involved, and his behaviour to cope with it. Thus as Marshall and Cooper (1979) conceptualize it, "stress is not a characteristic of either environment or individual, but is the outcome of the interaction of the two" (p.82). If the perception of the focal person "of his role is unclear, or if his conception of his role differs from that of the others in his role set, there will be a degree of role ambiguity" (Handy 1976, p.56). In fact Kahn et al (1964) have considered the influence of personality factors such as anxiety, flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity on the degree and ways role ambiguity was experienced, and on individuals coping behaviour. A tolerant person interprets an ambiguous situation as being a situation of certainty or minimum uncertainty, and would be more capable of handling uncertainty and more challenging in his coping behaviour. but individuals with low tolerance for ambiguity percieve (i.e.}
interpret) ambiguous situations as "sources of threat" (Budner 1962, p.29). Such individuals would experience ambiguous situations as disturbing, and consequently would deny ambiguity by resorting to a fixed explanation and stereotyped behaviour, or escape from the uncertainty involved by using a buffering mechanism such as 'authoritarianism' (Fromm 1941). Marsh (1978) has found a positive relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and 'field dependence'.

Tolerance of ambiguity is a learned capacity which relates to a great extent to the individual socialization experience at different stages of life. While the literature suggests the child-rearing experiences such as 'harshness' and 'dogmatism' are the critical antecedents of intolerance or ambiguity, Marsh (1978) has found that ecology, education and social structure also have their effects. Hofstede (1980) found that different societies possessed different degrees of 'uncertainty avoidance', which suggests that the individual degree of tolerance of ambiguity is heavily influenced by the collectively shared value-orientation and characteristics of people among whom he has been brought up. So one can argue, as Tayeb (1981) did, that in "Societies with a high tolerance for ambiguity, members of organizations are assumed to have a lower fear of uncertainty and can cope better with it". Also organizational structures will reflect the "relative freedom offered to and tolerated by the members" by loosening the structure (p.5).

But as individuals belonging to one given society vary in their socialization experiences, they would also hold various degrees of tolerance of ambiguity. And organizations also would maintain a degree of variation in tightening or loosening their structure.

At this point, we can assume that role ambiguity coupled with low tolerance for uncertainty will increase the middle manager's
dependency and compliance in relation to authority in his work organization. This is so because his dependency and compliance will take away the middle manager's uncertainty for him, which he would otherwise have to carry himself.

c. Middle managers' job satisfaction

Job satisfaction is an attitudinal outcome of great interest in studying managerial behaviour. It relates to the meaning of work as it is perceived by the individual concerned, and depends on expectations and goals. Job satisfaction as an attitude intervenes between work requirements and work responses; thus the way people feel about their jobs can be quite useful in predicting their response (Herbert 1976).

In studying 'job satisfaction', one may find that this concept is, as Smith et al (1982) have noticed, "probably the most confused, confusing and poorly developed concept in organization psychology" (p.29). However, this concept has been viewed both as an 'overall dimension' and as a series of 'specific variables' which correspond to different aspects of work roles. Herzberg et al (1959) not only studied the job content or specific variables, but more, suggested that these variables constitute two dimensions, one related to variables associated with the job itself (intrinsic), and the other one to variables associated with the environment surrounding the job (extrinsic). Accordingly, Herzberg et al (1959) developed a two-factor theory based on the assumption that 'intrinsic' variables are involved in producing satisfaction but not dissatisfaction, while 'extrinsic' variables lead to dissatisfaction but not satisfaction. So this theory suggests that 'satisfaction' depends on the job-content factors or the "motivators", e.g. achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility and advancement. But 'dissatisfaction'
results from the absence of sufficient "hygienic" factors, e.g. company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions. It is clear that Herzberg's "motivators" correspond to the higher needs of Maslow's Needs Hierarchy: self-esteem and actualization, while "hygienic" factors relate to Maslow's lower needs: security and social.

Although Herzberg's two factors theory or what has been called the 'motivator-hygiene theory' has had a substantial impact on management thinking and on organizations, research on this theory, as Sashkin and Morris (1984) state, has found almost no evidence to support it. In fact this theory has been open to some serious criticisms which Smith et al (1982) have put under two headings: first: the "methodological" issues which include Herzberg's use of two different questions to obtain his responses, a question for satisfiers and a question for dissatisfiers. So, it is not surprising that he obtained two categories of replies, some as motivators and the other as hygiene factors. Second: criticism concerning the "interpretation" that Herzberg has placed upon the results. Having two sets of factors could be an expression of the defensive forces within an individual (i.e. employee); people like to have a good image of themselves and thus they tend to attribute the causes of dissatisfaction or failure to external objects or factors in the work situation which are not their own fault, and not due to personal incapacities. In other words Herzberg's two factors could be merely a "reflection of this tendency to attribute success to ourselves and to attribute failure to our environment" (Smith et al 1982, p.40). In fact much evidence directly contradicts Herzberg's view that 'hygiene' variables do not motivate, and showed that both 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables may act as satisfiers and
dissatisfiers. For example, Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) have studied job variables that contribute to the feeling of satisfaction and dissatisfaction among 'middle management' personnel. They found that both intrinsic and extrinsic job factors were determinants of satisfied and dissatisfied feelings toward the job, but that intrinsic variables act more as satisfiers and extrinsic variables act more as dissatisfiers which they attributed to the effect of occupational variables. The findings of Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) also did not support Maslow's need-hierarchy theory. According to this theory, they say, one would expect that middle managers would find 'motivators' as the only sources of satisfaction, but their findings have shown that extrinsic variables also act as satisfiers for middle managers. So when middle managers find that they have little chance of gratifying higher needs, i.e. self actualization, through the motivators, they tend to choose the hygiene factors, thinking that these factors can provide at least some satisfaction. However, although Herzberg's two-factors theory has been heavily criticized, the factors generated from his studies have been used by different studies as valid specific variables of job satisfaction (see Vroom 1964).

The fact that the above study of Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) was carried out in a different culture (India) means that their findings would reflect cultural and social differences in the relative importance that individuals in different cultures place on job items. This cultural difference in job satisfaction or motivation is also reported by Tayeb (1981) in Iran; Iranian employees' needs hierarchy, she says, demonstrated three main Iranian cultural characteristics; low tolerance for ambiguity (high uncertainty avoidance), large power-distance (low interest in having autonomy) and low interest in
belonging to a group. These cultural differences give support to Hofstede's (1980) argument with the motivation theories of Maslow, Herzberg, McClelland and Vroom, who are the popular theorists in the U.S. management literature. He argues that each of these theories reflect the culture of its author, and that individuals in different countries, rather than having a universal order of needs, held different motivation patterns which are highly related to their cultural value-orientations.

Up to this point, it is clear that job satisfaction is determined by a combination of forces in the individual and forces in the environment. Thus job satisfaction should be treated as a function of the relation between the characteristics of the actor and the characteristics of the work role, both the job content and context. Consequently, in any given society one must take into account the individual's active needs related both to their work and non-work roles which they bring from their socialization in wider society to their work organizations. In other words if job satisfaction and its effect is to be understood it is critical that an accurate picture of the goals and needs of individuals be developed in terms of knowing what is important to people. Also we should consider the effect of the 'organizational occupational level' in placing different importance on different needs and on the degree of perceived need satisfaction. Porter (1961; 1963) suggests that the vertical level of position within management has a strong relation to the degree of perceived job satisfaction and the importance placed on different needs. The higher the organizational level of an individual, the greater the degree of his job satisfaction. And the satisfaction of esteem and the need of self-actualization is greater in higher than lower level positions. So
when we consider the level of 'middle manager', we find that Porter
and Lawler (1965, cited in Stogdill 1974) report the above notion of
the effect of occupational level by saying that from the bottom level
of personnel up to the level of top managers, each higher level is
more satisfied than the next lower level. Obviously this notion is
also a reflection of Maslow's hierarchy of needs whose validity with
regard to middle managers in different cultures has now been
questioned. In fact the picture that emerges from the previous
chapter on middle managers' dilemmas is that middle managers are
dissatisfied and their dissatisfaction, as Kay (1974 a) states,
arises from both 'hygiene' factors and 'motivators'. Also they are
dissatisfied because they are, more than at any other level, working
under stress; by their cross-relationships, by being heavily exposed
to role conflict and ambiguity, by feeling 'boxed-in' and above all,
by having little real authority at high levels of responsibility.

Although 'dissatisfaction' is suggested to be dominant among
individuals holding middle managerial work roles, we cannot expect
the same degrees of dissatisfaction among different middle managers
in one organization, or in different organizations in one country or
across different countries. It is likely for example to find that
some Iraqi middle managers are quite satisfied, and not necessarily
because they have gratified the needs underlying the motivators. But
their satisfaction could also arise from gratifying the needs that
underly the hygiene factors, particularly if such needs, rather than
the needs for autonomy or self-actualization, are their culturally
active needs. They may simply feel that it is not stressful to have
little authority, or to be dependent on superiors and highly
concerned with their expectations rather than with subordinates'
expectations. Moreover, their compliance to superiors' expectations
and maintaining a good relationship with them could be the source of satisfying one of their most active needs, e.g. need for power and influence. But Iraqi middle managers, even in one organization, would vary in their perceived degree of job satisfaction. Such variation results from a combination of middle managers' individual variation in their 'active needs' and the experience of various organizational environmental characteristics.

Thus a middle manager's job satisfaction is a function of both:
- His level of 'active needs', that is a combination of his 'cultural needs' and his 'role's needs' as a middle manager.
- The characteristics of his work organizational environment which determine the degree and the source of satisfying his 'active needs'.

Knowing the middle manager's active needs and the characteristics of his work organization would allow us to assume the likely effect of job satisfaction on his behaviour. When we consider the Iraqi middle manager, part of his most active needs are such things as safety, security, dependence, personal power and influence. If his organization is characterized by personalization and authoritarianism where satisfying such needs depends on the person at the top, one can assume that in such organizations the middle manager would try to satisfy his active needs by satisfying those at the top. In other words 'compliance' may be the price of satisfying one's active needs when in exchange for compliance, one can get such advantages as retaining the position, security, status, influence, ... etc (Simon 1957 a). Consequently, the more satisfied middle manager is likely to be the more orientated to comply and satisfy those at the top than the less satisfied one, so that he can keep the satisfaction of his active needs which depends highly on his compliance.
In fact for the above latter assumption we have very little, and at that, indirect evidence in the literature, as most studies have been mainly concerned with studying the causes of job satisfaction rather than its consequences or effects. And the greatest effects of job satisfaction that have been proposed are usually on issues of performance and productivity. However, some studies, although indirectly, provide some support for the above assumption. Pelz (1952) in studying the job satisfaction of those who hold the position of 'the-man-in-the-middle' (i.e. supervisors), finds that successful (and thus satisfied) supervisors have influence through good relationships with superiors. The implications of these findings may produce a reverse direction, in that the more satisfied manager would be more oriented to having good relationships with superiors which would provide him with influence and effectiveness. Stogdill (1974) cites findings of different studies (Eran 1966; Grunfeld and Faltman 1967; Mordechai 1966; Myers 1966) where managers who identify themselves with their superiors are more satisfied and more effective in their jobs than managers who do not identify with superiors. Again, these findings may also have the same reverse implications; the more satisfied managers tending to identify themselves with superiors in exchange for and in order to maintain the satisfaction of their active needs, mainly the need to have influence and be effective, which depends highly on having good relationships with superiors.

2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This research's conceptual perspectives in studying middle managers behaviour toward top management have put forward four basic arguments:
First: Culture has an enormous fundamental impact in constructing organizational behaviour.

Second: Middle managers' behaviour toward top management is a function of the characteristics of both the individual and the organization.

Third: Middle managers' behaviour is not simply a reaction to, or activation of, environmental pressures but one may infer from their actions a shared meaning or conceptual structure that they may hold in common upon which they construct their behaviour in relation with top managers.

Fourth: Although one may distinguish a shared pattern of orientation and behaviour among middle managers working in different organizations within one country, at this dominant level they hold a degree of variation. This variation could be affected by individual differences and by organizational factors.

Working Hypotheses:

With respect to studying the impact of 'culture' on organizational behaviour, no hypotheses were directly formed. This so, because the tendency in this research is not to follow the old game of "tell me what you think and I'll tell you what you are" and thus start with a definition of Iraqi values from which can be hypothesized the typical pattern of behaviour that will be found in Iraqi organization. Rather, cultural effects are inferred from first, observing and studying the behaviour within Iraqi organizations, and then studying the cultural values in wider society, with the aim of discovering the impact on organizational behaviour.
In studying middle managers' behaviour toward top management in Iraqi organizations, two hypotheses were formulated to guide the exploration of this study. These two hypotheses derived basically from the researcher's previous work observation within some Iraqi organizations:

**Hypothesis No. 1**

While working within some Iraqi organizations for more than 10 years—observing numerous joint actions, meetings through the hierarchy, having the curiosity of following specific issues and critical events, and witness many conversations and cases—I have been able to identify many of the dominant patterns of behaviour and infer the recurring meanings within them. The first research hypothesis describes the dominant pattern of behaviour and meaning that Iraqi middle managers seem to hold in their conceptual structure about authority figures in their organizations (i.e., top managers):

"Middle managers' orientation and behaviour toward the top manager tends to comply with and conform to his expectations as a person who possesses the authority and power rather than as a leader with whom they share the organizational leadership and responsibilities."

**Hypothesis No. 2**

The second hypothesis puts forward two sets of factors—individual differences factors and organizational factors—which, from the researcher's previous work observations and material initially found in some relevant studies, are assumed to affect middle managers' behaviour toward top management in Iraq:

"The orientation and behaviour of middle managers toward top management will vary according to the variation in the following individuality and organizational interacting factors:

**Individuality factors:**

**A - Age**
B - Family background and childhood socialization

1) geographical area of living
2) father's occupation
3) parents' level of education
4) childhood experiences

C - Educational background

1) level of formal education
2) nature of formal education (place of education)

D - Work experience

1) length of service
2) years in managerial job in the present organization

Organizational factors:

A - Nature of the relationship between top and middle Managers:

1) top manager's leadership behaviour in relation with middle managers
2) the degree of middle manager's participation in decision-making

B - Middle manager's degree of role conflict and ambiguity

C - Middle manager's degree of job satisfaction.
CHAPTER (3)

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION

In the issue of methodology one can find a maze of terms, definitions and philosophical arguments given by different writers. Out of this maze no agreement has been reached on the best research method and one could conclude that there is no single adequate approach to all problems. Such conclusion is clearly stated by Sterling (1972) when he says that "Since the research methods depend upon the questions and since I am unwilling to place restrictions on methods, - this rather sweeping conclusion is likely to be disappointing to those who had expected me to label some research methods as 'unscientific' and endorse others. I am sorry to disappoint, but this is precisely the attitude to which I am opposed" (page 3). Thus research methods should suite the problem under study and its circumstances.

As the idea behind this research emerged from the researcher's cummulative observations during more than 10 years working in many Iraqi organizations, the researcher has tried, in designing this research and its methodology, to utilize these observations, and with great flexibility to advance the knowledge about the problem at hand. The investigation in this research has followed two main methods, conducted at different times and through different strategies:

1 - Field work study
2 - Desk work study.

The field work study has preceeded the desk work study as later one was not initially within the design of this research. Although the researcher had many long-term observations and prior experience, these observations and later thoughts and initial discovery of theory were in the beginning just a puzzle, but an interesting and stimulating one. Out of the field work, which produced data, observations and strategies followed by analyzing these data, it
became clear that many bits and pieces in this puzzle were in reality one large whole. Thus the basis to solving this puzzle was provided, to a large extent by the concept of 'culture'. So the 'desk work study' emerged to provide this part, which has been the basis of linking all the pieces together in one clear and interesting picture. In fact many aspects of the initial research model referred to or reflected this thing called 'culture' but implicitly and without a clear and systematic foundation.

In this chapter the researcher will explain the research design and methodology which was employed in the 'field work' and 'desk work' studies, aggregated to understand and analyze middle manager's behaviour toward top managers in Iraqi organizations.

1. **FIELD WORK STUDY**

A field study was carried out for three months in Iraq in order to collect the necessary information to verify the research hypotheses concerning middle managers behaviour toward top management in Iraqi organizations.

A. **Field Work Population and Samples** :

Due to the fact that most means of production in Iraq are controlled and owned by the state, apart from very isolated cases, the general form of this research has dealt with the public sector (state companies). These public sector companies, establishments and ministries are governed by uniform rules, instructions and regulations with some variations. This and the fact that the resources available (time, money and access) to this study were limited meant that I decided to take the ministry of trade as the research population.
The choice of the ministry of trade was for the following reasons:

i. The ministry of trade, together with its four establishments, have a direct relationship with peoples' daily lives and a vital influence on their standard of living. Thus, this ministry demands good planning, wise decision-making and good work-relationships and co-operation among all levels; all this is necessary to ensure that it can execute its job in providing the goods for the people and avoiding any shortages. It is also concerned with finding new markets for Iraqi products.

ii. Due to the above and for political reasons, all the ministry's establishments have many times received great attention from the government and higher levels in the ministry. These establishments were dominated by the political ideological emphasis for the right atmosphere at work, good personnel relationships, a higher job performance and a call for open and frank discussions. Thus it was assumed that the organizational behaviour within the establishments of this ministry would be more advanced in some aspects than other ministries.

iii. The establishments of ministry of trade are rather newly formed, so they were formed at a stage more advanced than those in earlier surrounding circumstances, beliefs, thoughts, experiences and methods. So it was assumed that these establishments would be more advanced as far as organizational environment and work relationships were concerned. One would expect people's behaviour would vary somewhat from other ministries.
iv. I have been working for the ministry of trade and its establishments for more than 10 years. It was presumed that for the questionnaire to be answered objectively I needed to win the confidence and co-operation of the people involved. The fact that I worked in a similar and sometimes identical environment made me aware of the laws and regulations governing the work of these establishments, and the fact that they knew that helped to ensure that the questionnaire was satisfactorily completed.

After deciding that the ministry of trade and its establishments represented the best choice for the research population for the above reasons, I decided to select two of the ministry establishments. These two were:

1. The State Trade Establishment For Capital Goods (which includes '6' companies in addition to the establishment central office)

2. The State Establishment for Exporting (which includes '3' companies in addition to the central office).

This was done for the following reasons:

i. The ministry of trade has four establishments; three of these deal with importing and marketing activities and the fourth establishment deals with exporting. Thus I selected one of the ministry establishments dealing with importing and marketing, and the other establishment that was chosen was the state establishment for exporting. These two establishments together represent a major and important part of the ministry's activities.

ii. I worked in the state trade establishment for capital goods and some of its companies for a long period and happened to have many friends and colleagues in both establishments who could help me in gathering the necessary information.
Although "no sample will fully represent its population in all respects" (Emory 1980), a researcher must try to provide a representative sample in proportion to its numbers in the population. Because of the research limitations imposed by time, lack of resources and difficulty of travelling, only departments which were located in Baghdad were considered. To provide greater representation and thereby diminish potential bias, a sample of '100 out of 160' middle managers were chosen based on the number of departments appearing in the organizational charts of both establishments. As this research is concerned with personnel who are in charge of departments, the ones chosen were department heads and were the first set of people to hold the title of 'manager' in the Iraqi grading codes. 15 departments initially included in the sample were, after the first interviews, found not to be eligible for inclusion for the following reasons:

a. The non-existence of some departments which appear on the organizational charts since they were in reality small units.

b. Some departments had no original managers, but instead, it was run by a manager from another section who was already included in the study population.

c. Some managers were not available at the time, i.e., they were on leave, thus other members were managing their department temporarily.

d. Some managers had been transferred to other ministries before their second interview.

e. Certain departments were managed by aids to top managers temporarily until a permanent manager was selected.
B. Field Work Design:

This study is concerned with a wide range of variables and aspects which required a great deal of information. As Iraq suffers extremely from a lack of empirical and exploratory studies able to provide essential ground information relevant to this research, data on a wide variety of subjects had to be collected within a limited period of time and under difficult field work conditions. Thus in designing the research methodology it was necessary to balance between the research requirements and the reality of availability of research resources, access to research sites, restrictions on using some methods and the availability of time. Consequently, the following methodology was chosen for this field work:

1 - Field work instruments:

a - Questionnaire:

Appendix No. 2 presents the questionnaire that was used as the main instrument in the field work study. In designing this questionnaire the researcher's previous work observations were used widely as a basis from which many questions were constructed or generated. Before printing and distributing the final form of the questionnaire, a pilot survey was conducted in order to become aware of biases which may have been concealed within the questionnaire's words, phrases or grouping of particular questions and the method of subject response. In this survey eight middle managers from the general office of the state trade establishment participated. In fact this survey helped in validating some questions and in re-structuring, clarifying and amending the tone of others. Also as the questionnaire was first constructed in English and then translated into Arabic, the researcher, after the pilot survey, re-translated all the questions that were subject to changes in order to ensure
that the concepts of the questionnaire remained the same. After that, the questionnaire was finalized, typed and prepared with the required copies before moving to distribution to the research subjects.

b - Supplementary interview method:

The purpose of the first interview with the middle managers was mainly to give them the questionnaire personally and to seek clarifications and real-life examples of the situation he or she depicts in his or her responses to the questionnaire items. It was also important to convince them to be very frank in answering the questionnaire, and that there would be no consequences based on their answers; also to inform them that there was no one correct answer as such. The purpose of the second interview was to check that the questionnaire was answered completely and adequately. Sometimes some questions were not answered properly. So clarifications were sought, especially concerning common facts and action procedures.

3 - Additional data from available records and written sources had been collected to be used mainly as background material.

4 - During the interview, notes were taken concerning my observations and discussions with these people. This was done to assist my analysis of the people's attitudes and actions.

2. Data collection:

Before moving to the stage of collecting data from the research population I had to obtain the formal agreement from my organization to commence the field work. Also it was necessary to get formal approval from the top management of each company in both establishments and have it relayed to the people concerned in the field work to induce them to co-operate.
In collecting data for this research every possible step was taken to eliminate or at least minimize 'bias', mainly arising from the fear of giving the right answer and of "social desirability" which can distort questionnaire data (Phillips 1973), particularly when it deals with sensitive aspects of the respondent's life. In this matter Maccoby and Maccoby (1954) state that "When people are being interviewed or are filling out questionnaires directly "concerning behaviour about which there is a strong expectation of social approval or disapproval and in which there is considerable ego-involvement, they tend to err in the direction of idealizing their behavior", (p. 482). In fact in administering the final form of the questionnaire, the researcher followed the two techniques of spacing related questions when it is possible and inclusion of items that could be checked against one another in some parts of this instrument. Also a vacant space was left at the end of some questions for additional answers and comments. But above all the researcher, during the stage of collecting the data, followed different strategies to eliminate, or at least minimize, such 'bias':

a – Distributing the questionnaire personally: this was done during the first interview with each middle manager included in the field work sample. Through such face-to-face interaction, the researcher tried to create rapport and trust, to stress the importance of honest answers and emphasize that there were no right or wrong answers and thus there was no reason for them to discuss or check their answers with other subjects. Also dealing with the questionnaire personally gave me the opportunity to ensure that the sample population understood the objective of the questionnaire and the reasons behind it.
b - During the first and the second interviews the researcher tried to generate a friendly, informal atmosphere with the subjects and to motivate them (in a typical Iraqi way) to give their honest answers. This was done particularly to minimize the emotional fear and suspicions that the sending of formal instructions by top management to answer the questionnaire might have generated. In fact these instructions were aimed at facilitating the researcher's task and obtaining the sanction of the middle managers under study and gaining their assistance.

c - To assure the anonymity of the subjects, they were not asked to state their names or mention the names of their departments in the questionnaire. Also they were requested to place the completed questionnaire in an ordinary unidentifiable envelope that was personally handed to each one of them. This was done so that they had the feeling that they need not fear or hesitate when answering the questions because nobody would know their individual identity.

d - Assurance was given that each individual subjects' responses would be treated privately and in confidence, and the researcher was not bound to submit it or show them to any authority inside or outside the organizations concerned. They were told that their responses were for research purposes only, and only generalized data would be reported on without any kind of reference to their identities.

e - In each company I visited I tried to bypass some people whom I knew personally or who were my colleagues in the University or in organizations that I had worked in. I found that an introduction by one of them to the research subjects helped to gain their trust and generate a feeling of informality and shared understanding. Luckily, some of the subjects themselves were my old colleagues. Also the
fact that I am a woman and a post-graduate student in a Western University helped me or gave me a green light in many cases.

At the end of each first interview, during which I distributed the questionnaire to the research sample population, they were informed that they could take the questionnaire home if need be, so as to have sufficient time to complete them; also that I would interview them again after a period of 3-6 days to answer any questions or discuss issues that may arise from their answering the questionnaire. Once the first interviews were held at a certain company I moved to the next one, then after approximately five days I returned to the first company for the second interviews during which I received the completed questionnaires, and so on for the rest of the companies. This was done to utilize my time efficiently.

Although the questionnaire was the basic instrument for providing primary data for verifying the research hypotheses, due to the nature of this research it was essential to explore the more subtle information that provides special insight into middle managers' behaviour. The researcher, in the second interviews, tried to overcome another problem usually associated with answering a questionnaire - that of some respondents checking alternatives in a careless manner - through reviewing each subject's answers and stimulating a free conversation and an exchange of point of views. Through such conversations the researcher took notes regarding all the important comments, explanations, and remarks that they provided. Also knowing from experience the value of observing behaviour as it occurs in the natural order of events, I tried, during the second interviews, to observe and analyze the subjects' actions in answering the questionnaire, being disturbed by subordinates seeking some advice and having to communicate with them, replying to a telephone...
call with superiors...etc. Even the time that I had to wait for a subject to return from a meeting or finish something at hand, I used to observe the surrounding atmosphere and relevant issues. In other words I tried to go beyond the obvious, to explore the meaning of a statement rather than just simply record it. In fact I found that these observations and the notes I took provided me with first-hand data which was free from factors that usually influenced other types of data gathering, and which was of great value in exploring their unanticipated responses. These observations and notes increasingly put me in the position of discovering more, which later enriched my previous work observations and became the occasion for extending the research outlook.

The researcher also followed the method of gathering relevant written sources from documents, articles, books, working papers and dissertations. These written sources were collected from documentation centers and libraries, including Baghdad University Library; the National Library; the Central Library and the Libraries of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Planning.

C. Operational Measures of Variables :

1 - Measures of bureaucratic-feudal orientation :

In this research, 'compliance' was studied as suggested by Etzioni (1969) to refer to "both to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with directive supported by another actor's power, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied" (p. 59). In other words, middle managers' compliance in relation to top managers was not only studies in terms of their 'actions' but also in terms of their 'orientation' (i.e. 'shoulds' and 'beliefs in').
Bureaucratic-feudal orientation refers to the commitment to the set of values, norms, and attitudes that characterize the relevant environment. To this end, two scales including ten items were aggregated to measure middle manager's bureaucratic-feudal orientation:

a - bureaucratic orientation scale: this scale was constructed and used by Gorden (1970) according to a schema of five categories, parallel to those of Weber (1946), but describing individual rather than organizational characteristics:

**Self-subordination:**
.....a willingness to comply fully with the stated wishes of superior and to have decisions made for one by higher authority.

**Compartmentalization:**
.....complete confidence in expert judgement and a need to restrict one's concern to one's own area of specialization.

**Impersonalization:**
.....a preference for impersonal or formal relationships with others on the job, particularly with individuals at different organizational levels.

**Rule conformity:**
.....a desire for the security that the following of rules, regulations and standard operating procedures affords.

**Traditionalism:**
.....a need for the security provided by organizational identification and conformity to the in-group norm.

The above schema served as a guide for developing the scale's five items presented in question No. 1 of the questionnaire (Appendix 2). A sample representative items are:
"A superior should expect subordinates to carry out his orders without question or deviation".

"A person should not volunteer opinions to his superior outside his own area of specialization".

b - Feudal orientation scale: This scale was constructed by the researcher according to a set of five main concepts derived from the work of very few writers and the researcher's observations about the nature and characteristics of feudal structure in Iraqi Society:

**Respect for authority**:.....a great amount of respect for an individual in a position of highest authority within the organization, and acceptance of his domination and reliance on his orders and direct intervention.

**Personal loyalty**:.....an obligation to superiors personally within the organization, and staying loyal to meet their expectations.

**Discipline conformity**:.....a need for the security provided by conforming to work discipline, established through superiors' orders and instructions.

**Dependent action**:.....a tendency not to take independent action and responsibility, without specific approval from higher authority.

**Consideration of social norms and values**:.....an obligation to social norms and values and a need to conform to their implications within the organization.

According to the above concepts, the five scale items presented in question No. 2 of the research questionnaire were developed. An example of these items is:
"A top person in an organization should be respected and followed as a representative of higher authority".

"Subordinates in an organization should be loyal towards superiors and always act to meet their expectations and orders".

Each item of the above two scales was worded so that agreement would reflect acceptance of the bureaucratic-feudal norms. Responses to both scales were to be made on a five-choice Likert scale: 'Strongly agree - Agree - Very slightly agree - Disagree - Strongly disagree'. The 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' was scored by assigning a weight of '5' for 'Strongly agree' and downwards to '1' for 'Strongly disagree'.

2 - Measures of compliant behaviour:

A behaviour is 'compliant' "if it conforms to an expectation held or enunciated by another" (Biddle 1979, p. 384). Two 'imaginary situations were employed to measure middle manager's compliant behaviour'action' in relation to authority (i.e. top management) in Iraqi organizations:

a - The first imaginary situation:

This situation, as it appears in question No. 3, Appendix 2, was originally constructed and used by Berger (1957) in Egypt. It was adopted in this research because its context was similar to many real cases observed formerly by the researcher in Iraqi organizations. In phases 'A' and 'B' of this imaginary situation, respondents were asked in each phase to indicate their own opinion by choosing between two alternatives of action.

b - The second imaginary situation:

This situation, as it appears in question No. 4, Appendix 2, was in reality an illustration of many real cases witnessed and experienced by the researcher while working within Iraqi
organizations. In this situation the respondents became more involved and they had in phase 'A' to state the action they would take in facing with such a situation from three alternatives. In phase 'B' they had to choose between two types of actions.

The alternative actions that the respondent's were provided with in the above two imaginary situations were constructed in a way to permit significant qualitative discriminations.

- **Measures of individuality factors**:

  a - **Age**: this factor was measured by 'Q.5' - 
  "What is your date of birth"?

  a - **Geographical area of living**: by 'Q.6' - 
  "Where did you live most of the time: a) up to the age of 10 years, b) up to the age of 20 years"?

  c - **Father's occupation**: by 'Q.7' -
  "What was/were your father's (or guardian) main job occupations"?

  d - **Level of father's formal education**: by 'Q.8' -
  "How much formal education did your father (or guardian) complete"?

  e - **Level of mother's formal education**: by 'Q.9' -
  "How much formal education did your mother complete"?

Fathers' and mothers' educational levels were assessed by responses to the following six alternatives:

- Primary School Level
- Medium (equivalent to 'O' Level)
- Secondary (equivalent to 'A' Level)
- Certificate Diploma Level
- University Level
- Post-Graduate Level
f - Childhood experiences: Five questions (Qs.10-14) were constructed to measure childhood experiences. Three questions (Qs. 10-12) refer to the degree of authoritarianism in the father-child relationship with its connected familial values. These questions were generated by referring to the researcher's experiences and observations as an Iraqi person and to the relevant study about Iraqi and Arabic societies. Two questions (Qs. 10 & 11) consisted of two alternatives, each one designed to reveal different types of father-child relationship. Question '12' consisted of five statements describing many Iraqi familial values, and respondents were asked to indicate if they received such values in their childhood using 'No' or 'Yes' alternatives, I being for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes'. Examples of these statements are:

"It is not acceptable to inform our father that he is wrong in his actions".

"The father has the right to teach his children manners the way he likes".

The second aspect of childhood experiences refer to the 'Constant vs. Intermittent' use of punishment and reasoning. Two questions (Qs. 13 & 14) were generated with reference to Harvey et al (1961). In each of these two questions respondents were provided with three, worded alternatives reflecting the frequency of using punishment vs. reward (Q. 13) and reasoning (Q. 14).

g - Level and place of formal education: by 'Q.15' -

"What is your level and place of formal education"?

Possible responses are:
Level of Education                      Place of Education
- Primary School Level                   Name of the place
- Medium (equivalent to 'O' Level)       (i.e., Country) of
- Secondary (equivalent to 'A' Level)    formal education
- Certificate Diploma Level              
- University Level
- Post-Graduate Level

h - Work experience: this factor refers to -

1 - length of service: it was measured by 'Q.16' -
"How many years have you spent as a governmental official
and what positions have you held prior to your present
one"?
Possible responses were:
'Title of position; title of organization and the years
spent'.

2 - Years in managerial positions in present organization: this
was measured by 'Q.17' -
"How many years have you spent in middle management
position in your present organization"?
Possible responses are:
- Less than 4 years
- 4 - less than 8 years
- 8 and more years

4 - Measures of organizational factors:

a - Nature of the relationship between top and middle
managers:

Questions assigned to measure this factor aimed to discover the
nature of such a relationship as it was perceived by middle managers.
Although their answers represent a subjective description of boss
(top manager) behaviour, as Hofstede (1980) states, "In order to understand the boss' impact on subordinate behaviour, a subjective description by the subordinate is probably more relevant than would be any objective description" (p. 101). This factor was measured from two aspects:

1 - Top manager leadership behaviour in relation with middle managers:

This behaviour was measured on the dimension of 'supportive - autocratic' Leadership. As such behaviour can be gauged by a number of questions designed to measure the degree of consideration, trust and supportiveness of the respondent boss, '12' questions were aggregated to indicate the style of a top manager's leadership behaviour as it was perceived by middle managers. These '12' questions (Qs. 18-29) were adopted with reference to the literature (e.g. Likert 1961, 1967; Read 1962; Tannenbaum et al. 1977). Examples of these questions are:

"To what extent does the top manager in your organization try to understand your work problems and do something about them"?

"To what extent does your top manager seem interested in listening to your suggestions and ideas"?

"To what extent do you feel that your top manager is backing and supporting you with your responsibilities"?

Items were scored on a Likert scale from 'None' (1) to 'Very great' (6). The higher the score, the more supportive was the style of top management, or the lower the score, the more autocratic was the top manager's leadership behaviour.

2 - Middle managers participation in decision-making:

Thirteen questions were adopted with reference to the literature (e.g. Likert 1961, 1967; Vroom 1960; Tannenbaum et al. 1977). Two
questions (Qs. 30 & 31) were employed to provide Iraqi middle managers under study with equipment to draw on to profile the decision-making style of their organizations. This in turn would indicate what the term 'participation' refers to in their minds when these respondents state 'Yes, we do participate'. In each of these questions, respondents had four alternatives with which to indicate significant qualitative distinctions.

The degree of middle manager's 'participation' in decision-making will reflect how participatively-oriented the top management ideology and style are - such degrees were measured using three terms: 'formal participation'; 'psychological participation'; and 'delegation'.

Three questions (Qs. 32-34) were employed to measure the degree of 'formal participation' that middle managers felt their organizations provided them with. Examples of these questions are:

"Do you participate in making important decisions related to general organizational problems"?

Two of these questions (Qs. 32, 34) were scored on a scale from 'Not at all' (1) to 'Always' (6), and in the other question (Q. 33) respondents were provided with a dichotomous alternative, 1 being coded for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes'.

'Psychological participation or influence' was measured by six questions: two were generated with reference to literature on this concept and the other questions (Qs. 37-40) used the four-item subscale constructed and used by Vroom (1960) for this purpose, but with slight changes in the wording of some of the items to fit the job situation of the managers in the sample. Examples of these items were:
"In general, how much say or influence do you feel you have on what goes on in your office"?

"To what degree do you think you can influence the decisions of your top manager regarding things about which you are concerned"?

Three questions (Qs. 41-43) were employed to measure participation in terms of 'delegation' (Vroom and Yetton 1973). An examples of these questions is:

"Do you take the important decisions related to your job"?

Respondents in all these questions were given a scale of six alternatives but with slightly different wording to suit each question.

b - Middle managers role conflict and ambiguity:

Question 44 was aggregated with phrases 'C' and 'D' of the second imaginary situation (Q. 4) to measure middle managers' feelings of role conflict. In Q. 44, respondents had to indicate the frequency of being subject to conflictual demands, scoring one of six alternatives. A dichotomous alternative was provided in phase 'C' of the first imaginary situation, 1 being for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes', and each item in phase 'D' of the same situation was scored on a scale from 'Under very little stress' (1), to 'Under very great stress' (5).

Eight questions (Qs. 45-52) were either adapted from Kahn et al. & Legge (1964) or generated with reference to the literature (Gowler 1975) to measure middle managers' feelings of role ambiguity. Q. 45 was employed to indicate the extent to which middle managers' jobs are clearly defined. Respondents were provided with four alternatives stating different degrees of job definition, and each respondent had
to choose one to show his own case. Q. 46 consisted of 4 statements aimed to measure the degree of ambiguity that respondents have about work objectives and was done by giving their agreements or disagreements to statements which describe what exists in their organizations. An example of these statements is:

"No one is really clear where we are going"

Each item or statement was scored on a Likert scale from 'Strongly disagree' (1) to 'Strongly agree' (5). In addition to this question, six other questions were used to reveal the degree of ambiguity that each respondent had about different aspects of his role as a middle manager. A sample item is:

"How clear are you about the limits of your authority in your present position?"

Items from these six questions were scored on a scale from 'Very clear' (1) to 'Not at all clear' (6).

c - Middle managers job satisfaction:

The measures of job satisfaction in the present study consisted of '13' items (Qs. 53-65) related to satisfaction on a variety of dimensions, mainly those suggested by Herzberg (1966). These items included the following aspects of the job:

- Security
- Pay
- Company policy
- Relationship with superior
- Relationship with colleagues
- Sense of belonging
- Responsibility
- Authority
- Advancement
- Achievement
- Work itself
- Participation

A sample item is:

"To what extent are you satisfied with the amount of security in your position"?

Each item was scored on a Likert scale from 'Not satisfied' (1) to 'Extremely satisfied' (5). The higher the overall score, the more satisfied the respondent was. In addition, one item (Q. 66) was used to measure overall job satisfaction:

"All things considered, how satisfied are you with your job"?

This item was scored in the same way as the other satisfaction items.

D - Processing and Classifying the Data:

Although the researcher distributed 85 copies of the questionnaire during the first interviews, four of them were not received, and one respondent refused to answer most of its questions. Thus only 80 middle managers have been the subjects of this study.

After the field work, the next step was processing, classifying and tabulating the collected data. The researcher gave each of the 80 copies of the questionnaire a 'code number' which referred to the respondent (i.e. middle manager). This enabled the researcher to follow each individual case when analyzing and presenting the field work results. Although the collection of field work data had followed a clear pattern, the overall picture was distorted by a great deal of material, marginal comments, notes and observations. Thus before starting to analyze the collected data, classifying and sorting this data was necessary.
2 - DESK WORK STUDY

After the research field work study, the researcher conducted an extensive 'desk work study' on the socio-historical evolution and the contemporary settings of Iraqi Society and its social institutions. The Holy Quran, books and articles in many various fields of the knowledge, written documents, old sayings, proverbs, the researcher's observations and experiences as a member of Iraqi society and as a former governmental official in Iraqi organizations and the field work study were all employed in providing data for this study. As the aim of this study was to discover the 'identity' of Iraqi culture and consequently to provide a 'reflection on culture', the historical method that was used in this study, marked by an emphasis on the 'meaning' of historical activities and events in a social context, more than on historical 'facts' themselves.

3 - DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis in this research was a continuous process of problem-solving and developing strategies of handling and interpreting the data, because of the nature of the research and the development in the research outlook over time. However, I do not intend in the following pages, to describe the evolution of this stage of the research but to present the method and the basic principles of interpretation.

As will be noted in the following chapters, data analysis and interpretation has benefited from both 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' methods but with an essential role being given to the qualitative methods. By nature, the 'desk work study' of 'culture' was based on exploratory qualitative analysis. With respect to the fieldwork data, quantitative methods were used as tools to provide
regularity or a dimensional framework to the questionnaire material, while qualitative methods were employed to go beyond this framework to search out meanings, concepts and implications. Regarding the use of the quantitative methods in analyzing the affect of individual and organizational factors on middle managers' behaviour, the researcher followed an extensive series of 'Elaborated Cross-Tabulations' (i.e., introducing a third factor into the association between two other variables through cross-classifying the three variables) (Emory 1980). Statistical analysis to find 'significant statistical correlations' between middle managers' orientation and behaviour and the assumed affecting factors was excluded from the analysis. This is partly because in societies such as Iraq, Hofstede (1980) emphasizes that "where the culture imposes strong behavioral norms, certain attitudes and behaviors show such small variance that they do not correlate with other attitudes and behaviors; this is the case for some of the F-scale items in Turkey" (pp. 28-29). This could mean that within-society variations would hold very small or no statistical significance. Thus, in these countries, the reliance of statistical analysis in studying various types of correlations between certain attitudes or behaviours and individuality or organizational factors, may lead, as it did in the case of Al-Atiyyah's (1975) study of top management in Iraq, to a false and unrealistic conclusion. She found no statistical significance to these correlations and concluded that the above factors do not affect top managers leadership behaviour. Within-society variations do exist and they are significant in themselves and in their influence on society's members, even if this influence has not been found to be statistically significant. Thus the researcher decided to go beyond the numbers and try to explore such variations through a descriptive
analysis of the association of variables. The researcher used 'percentages' to simplify the data and to translate it into standard form, with a base of 100 for relative comparisons (Emory 1980), which helped the researcher in displaying comparisons between variables and in describing the tendencies of the factors under study. In fact, although going beyond the numbers was a long exhausting journey, it enabled the researcher to trace general tendencies within the association of factors under study. Also such a journey allowed the researcher to live with the data and follow specific cases and implications, which has supported the generation of concepts used to explain the phenomenon under study.

Collection of data, and more the interpretation of research findings have benefited from the fact that the researcher was dealing with her own native culture and from drawing upon her experiences, both in wider society and in work organizations. Also acquiring another version of culture through living in a Western country provided the researcher with a degree of detachment or alienation from her native culture, which has the advantage of reducing the subjectivity of seeing the world through the glasses of the native culture. Having these two versions of culture has enabled the researcher to identify and explain, through getting 'inside the subject's head', the behavioural differences between what the Western theories have assumed and what the reality is in non-Western countries (e.g. Iraq).

Instead of imposing a preconceived theoretical framework upon the data, the concepts that were used in describing and interpreting the phenomenon under study were mostly derived from the data. Thus the research's conceptual framework was mainly generated, as suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967), through the research
strategies of handling the data by "providing modes of conceptualization for describing and explaining" (p.3). But one cannot deny the value of the basic initial discovery of theoretical concepts derived from existing frameworks, or the researcher's previous work experience in building the research model and forming working hypotheses.

Although specific data was devoted to describing and explaining an aspect of the phenomenon under study, any necessary data in any chapter was used to justify the researcher's point of view when dealing with a specific subject, when the need arose.
PART TWO

REFLECTION ON CULTURE
CHAPTER (4)

THE CUMULATIVE SOCIETAL NORMS AND PERCEPTIONS
OF POWER AND AUTHORITY THROUGH THE
EVOLUTION OF IRAQI CULTURE
**INTRODUCTION**

In the Arab world, history and the present are intimately related. So if it is true that a proper assessment of the present will help us to understand the past, it is even more true that to understand the present it is helpful to understand the past, tradition and early societal experiences. All these must have had a lasting impact on today’s culture in a manner which is similar to the impact of childhood experiences on the individual personality.

Iraq is known as one of the most ancient cradles of civilization. From the very earliest time Iraq has been a fusion pot for successive cultures; the Sumerians, the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Arabs, the Turks, and recently the British have all made their impression on the country ((Main 1935).

A number of forces have contributed to the crystallization of Iraq’s cultural traits. The most important of these forces is the ‘value’ system of the nomadic Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula. Many of today’s Arabic cultural traits have their roots in Bedouin origin. So in order to understand the Iraqi cultural traits, it is fundamental to go back to Bedouin culture, which stems from the following:

1) - Bedouinism (means inhabitants of the desert. In Arabia, it has come to be applied only to those tribesmen whose decent is recognized as pure) has affected Iraqi history, its social structure, values and norms. Iraq’s position on the border of one abundant source of nomadism - the Arabian peninsula and its topography, which offers easy access to all ambitious conquerors, along with the richness of the land, has made it attractive to many nomadic waves, who one by one since prehistory have entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants and have participated in forming the Iraqi
community (Alwardi 1965). Naturally, that nomadic expansion had its effect on the cultural traits of the settled areas through a wide and frequent diffusion of Bedouin values and norms.

The society of Iraq had to follow two contradictory directions at the same time, Bedouinism and existing civilization, hovering between their conflicting values. It is true to say that Iraqi society, during the struggle between the two directions, was suffering from the "ebb and flow" phenomenon between Bedouinism and the values of the existing civilization. When Bedouinism flowed, its values dominated social life (e.g. during the Ottoman Empire), while in the ebb period civilization values started to flow (e.g. during the Abbasid period when Baghdad was a great centre of civilization). The society, after any ebb of Bedouinism, held onto its values for long or short periods depending on many environmental factors. As society's members got accustomed to certain values it became difficult to relinquish those values but, no doubt, they weaken gradually although they need quite a long time during which the struggle between the old and new values occurs, leading to a situation where a lot of social problems can potentially arise (Alwardi 1965).

The effect of Bedouin values has never been limited to Bedouin society alone, but extended to the settled rural inhabitants who had been living in a similar social setting to that of the Bedouins, especially as many thousands of Bedouins settled on the land and were in time, economically involved with agricultural life. With the advent of the oil industry and other industries, and the improvement in communications, Bedouins have had an increasing number of direct relations with urban areas; many nomads in the process of becoming sedentary were bypassing agricultural life and going directly from nomadic to urban industrial communities (Al-Dahirie 1969).
So the population of towns, by their frequent contact with the Bedouins and rural tribes, were also affected by the nomadic values and norms to a great extent. Particularly, the Bedouins' tendency to revolt against the idea of settlement and to look down on settled people and their way of life disappeared in time, and gradually most of them became part of the settled population, breaking away from their nomadic life by adapting themselves to the city way of life. In fact, as Jamali stated, "many of the culture traits of the town dwellers of Iraq today cannot be well understood without tracing it back to desert life, for many of the town dwellers of Iraq are of tribal descent. They still retain vestiges of desert cultural traits. They take pride in the fact that they descend from a well-known tribe" (Jamali 1934, p. 15).

It is interesting to note that Iraq's population in 1867 consisted of the following groups:

1 - Bedouin tribes 35%
2 - Rural tribes 41%
3 - Town Population (Urban) 24%

If we realize that the rural tribes were originally Bedouins, we could say that the Bedouins formed 76% of the whole population of Iraq at that time (950,000 out of 1,250,000) (Alwardi 1965).

The influence of Bedouinism was increased by the continuous immigration from the rural areas to the towns and cities (particularly Baghdad). While in 1947 the rural population was 64% of the total population the figure dropped to become 36.3% in 1975 (Alnassar 1977), showing that 27.7% of them immigrated to the towns and cities whilst still holding to their norms and values. Originally these values were Bedouin in nature, but were gradually diluted.
2) - The Arabs before Islam were mostly Bedouins in the desert (O'Leary 1927) and it was in the seventh century under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors that a unified and growing Islamic community was established.

Islamic values and principles clashes often with Bedouinism. Those clashes led to a sort of social struggle between the two values, implicitly or explicitly (Alwardi 1954, pp. 45-6). Although Islam became the most important basic theme of the Arab community's life, and Bedouin society played a declining role in the modernizing Arab world, certain Bedouin values have persisted through the changes but in a modified form, which affected the way of practising the principles of Islam.

I will attempt in the following pages to outline the evolution of the Iraqi culture, but the main concern will be on societal norms and perceptions of power and authority, and societal experiences in relation to authority and power. For this purpose the following socio-historical stages have been devised:

1 - Power and authority and their societal norms in Bedouin culture.
2 - Power and authority and their societal norms in Islamic culture.
3 - Power and authority and their societal norms during the Ottoman Empire (1534-1917).
4 - Power and authority and their societal norms during the British influence (1920-1958).

1. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR SOCIETAL NORMS IN BEDOUIN CULTURE

In order to understand the influences of Bedouin culture, we need to study the social life of the Bedouin tribes in Iraq and the
changes which have taken place in their life under the conditions existing in the settled areas in Iraq, and the consequences of that on Iraqi society. However, it is necessary to first present the outstanding features and some sociological facts about Bedouin culture in Arabia. For after all, it is from Arabia that all the Arabic Bedouins of Iraq have originated.

Bedouin culture affords a typical example of the fact that the local cultures in the past were greatly dependent upon the geographical environment. Arabia had been subjected to prolonged periods of drought but before that there were many towns and cities which flourished (Jamali 1934). As a result of the gradual climatic changes and drought, Arabia has turned into a dry country which could hardly support its population: "The people of Arabia have had to resort to the nomadic mode of life, with all its hardships and precariousness and to struggle for existence". (Jamali 1934, pp. 18-19). The Bedouin is no gypsy roaming aimlessly but, as Hitti states: "...represents the best adaptation of human life to desert conditions. Wherever verdant land is found, there he goes seeking pasture. Nomadism is as much a scientific mode of living in the Nufud as industrialism is in Detroit or Manchester." (Hitti 1970, p. 33).

So the Bedouin character and tradition are a faithful reflection of the aridity of their desert habitat. Their values, norms and institutions are deeply rooted in their social structure which has evolved out of long experiences and inherited tradition.

Alwardi, by studying the nature of Iraqi society, particularly his study of Bedouin culture, has distinguished the 'superiority propensity' in the complexes of that culture. The Bedouin, as he notes, likes himself and his tribe to be powerful and not powerless;
he wants his tribe to be strong and powerful among other tribes, and to glorify its power to vanquish others; he also wants to impress others by his chivalry, bravery and defiance, and to prevail over others through his **muruwwa** (manliness, virtue) which consists mainly of generosity and hospitality (Alwardi 1965).

This 'superiority propensity' became embedded in the Bedouin's cultural complexes, as we will see in the following analysis of the main complexes.

A. **'Asabiyah'** *(tribalism, or zealotry of the tribe)*

Asabiyah as Hitti says, "Is the spirit of the clan. It implies boundless and unconditional loyalty to follow clansmen and corresponds in general to patriotism of the passionate, chauvinistic type," (Hitti 1970, p. 27).

The tribe or **qabilah** of a Bedouin is more or less analogous to the 'nation' of the modern world. Essentially the tribal unit is supposed to have its basis in a blood relationship which is the essential element of group feeling. In fact the blood ties, fictious or real, furnish the adhesive element of the tribal organization. The tribe is composed of homogeneous groups linked together.

The Bedouin finds his safety and security in his tribe. Without belonging to a tribe in the desert he would feel jeopardized, whatever his bravery and defiance, and thus his identity is through his tribe identity. Hitti says: "No worse calamity could befall a Bedouin than to lose his tribal affiliation. A tribeless man, in a land where stranger and enemy are synonymous, like a landless man in feudal England, is practically helpless. His status is that of an outlaw, one beyond the pale of protection and safety" (Hitti 1970, pp. 26-27).
The requirements of nomadic life make the person and family dependent upon clan and tribe. Berger (1962) remarks that: "one of the basic features of Bedouin society is the assumption by family and tribe of responsibility for the conduct of its individual members", (p. 65). The tribe secures its members in any place they go to in the desert through the desert law of "an eye for an eye" and by "blood-vengeance". Punishment for wrongs is imposed by a tribe upon its own members. Punishment is retributive and equalitarian, that is, it aims to inflict upon the offender the same damage he inflicted upon his victim to avoid further crime. Crimes, insults and wrongs place a heavy burden upon the group to which the offender belongs (Berger 1962). Thus the individual is subject to close supervision and discipline from his group, because his behaviour so seriously involves his whole community. This way of dealing with offenders in desert communities enables such a social order to maintain the balance necessary for survival in the desert, where the rules are easy to break and where there are no institutional means to treat offenders, such as jails, courts and others.

For the Bedouin, the victim of a wrong must be satisfied, and the community is concerned largely with the feelings of the victim and his kin, before any consideration may be shown to the person who wronged him; it is a matter of honour to them: "It is honour and not any feeling of friendship, which bids a Bedouin to undertake a blood feud against enemies" (Almaney 1981, p. 14). In fact honour plays an important part in the Bedouins' life to the extent that is related to almost all of their daily activities. Honour in Bedouin society is not derived from wealth or power over others only, but it can exist independently due to the fact that Bedouins can manage without any of these things (Almaney 1981).
Thus the Bedouin wants to belong to a strong tribe, and as his tribe gets stronger, he will be more secure, and his status in the desert society will be enhanced. His relationship with his tribe is an interdependent one - his tribe gives him a wide protection, security and defence; in return he gives the tribe unconditional loyalty and the willingness to fight for its defence. Thus the Bedouin is strengthened by his tribe's power, and his tribe is in turn strengthened by him.

In Bedouin tribalism, the descent nasab plays an important role. Nasab is of tremendous importance in Bedouins life. Hitti (1970) quoted that: "No people, other than the Arabians, have ever raised genealogy to the dignity of a science" (p. 28). By the nasab the Bedouin could distinguish his tribe members from the other tribes and be aware of whom to revenge. A Bedouin with unknown ancestry in the desert is like one without tribe. He is also proud of his purity of blood and his noble ancestry; Bedouin women disdain to marry cowardly men and Bedouin men disdain to marry women without a well-known nasab (Alwardi 1965).

B. *Ghazwa* (or raiding)

Bedouins, in their adaptation to the economic and social conditions of desert life, have resorted to raiding one another for water and pasture to support their livelihood.

The Bedouin, through his struggle with the harsh nomadic life, was trained to raid, and it became a part of his mentality. Hitti wrote: "In a desert land, whose inhabitants were normally in a condition of semi-starvation and [where] the fighting mood is a chronic mental condition, raiding is one of the few manly occupations" (Hitti 1970, p. 89).
Raiding is a legitimate behaviour from the viewpoint of the Bedouins, and it is: "a recognized institution among the desert tribes and whatever is thus gained is a legitimate possession of the raider" (Jamali 1934, p. 29).

For Bedouins raiding is something quite different from stealing or theiving: very often it happens that the Bedouin gives much more of his wealth than he gains, so as to enhance his reputation for courage and chivalry in society. Raiding, as Hitti (1970) notes, is not a productive method of acquiring wealth, it does not actually increase the sum total of available supplies but it does help, to a certain extent, to keep down the number of mouths to feed.

The Bedouin, because of his 'superiority propensity', likes to surpass other tribes with his own tribe's power. Also he likes to be supreme over others personally, to surpass his peers by his defiance, bravery and chivalry when his tribe is at war or is raiding. Such personal characteristics are Bedouin ideals and are glorified in their society. For the Bedouin these characteristics are things to boast about: in his view life in the desert cannot tolerate the weak and the cowardly, the one who stays behind his group when they fight. He disdains to attack or raid weak people, but instead protects and defends them when they have recourse to him - it is a part of his generosity (Alwardi 1965). Thus, through meeting his society's ideals the Bedouin finds his respect and status, and he will be highly honoured in his society when he acquires a good reputation by having one of the above characteristics. He has as much infinite pride in his courage, his horse, his sword and his generosity as he does in his noble ancestry, and in the purity of his blood.

His 'superiority propensity' dominates all his activities; he respects keeping promises, and he considers his words as a debt he
should pay, but he will not keep his promise if that makes him indulge in weakness or subordination. He likes to do that of his own free will, not because he is forced or pushed to do so (Alwardi 1965).

C. 'Muruwax' (manliness, virtues)

In any social life in all its kinds and evolution, the two sides, that of 'struggle' and 'cooperation', must be in equilibrium. There is no difference between Bedouin culture or any other culture in this respect; the difference is in the nature of that equilibrium.

As we have seen in the previous pages the Bedouin likes to raid, defeat and revenge. But he also likes to protect others, to be very generous, and to give his hospitality to any who may seek it. He is characterized by excessive politeness. He offers his protection 'dakhala' to any one who seeks such a relationship as a protégé (dakhil) (Hitti 1970) (p. 27).

Muruwwa, the Arab's idea of morality, consists mainly of courage and generosity. The Bedouin's courage is shown not only by defending his tribe, and his bravery and defiance, but also by the chivalrous treatment of his foes very much akin to that of the mediaeval knight. His generosity manifests itself in being always ready to join in the fray than to share in the spoil; in his readiness to slaughter his camels for his guest and for the poor and the helpless; and in being generally more willing to give rather than to receive (Almaney 1981).

Hospitality or diyafah is considered one of the greatest virtues of the Bedouin (Berger 1962). However poor he is, or scant his food may be, he must feed his guest. However dreadful an enemy may be, the Bedouin is also within the laws of friendship, a loyal and generous friend. As hosts, Bedouins are entirely charming and the generosity of their hospitality is almost unlimited. Hospitality does not mean food to the guest and a place to stay for a while, but it is an
establishment of a life long friendship. It also means giving protection to his guest and not allowing anybody to molest him.

If any harm befalls the guest after declaring that he has been a certain person's guest, the aggressor will invite the challenge of the host, and might lead the whole tribe if necessary to war (Jamali 1934). The guest, Berger (1962) says: "is considered almost a sacred trust, to be treated, if he is friendly or from one's own tribe, as well as or better than one's own immediate family" (p. 67).

There is no doubt that hospitality is the result of adaptation to the physical environment. A traveller's life would be in constant peril without such institutions. In desert society where there are no inns or hotels for the travellers, hospitality is connected with personal safety and the established mores and honour, but even more with the protection of God (Hitti 1970). A Bedouin who may be known for not extending his guest a hearty welcome, will be infamous and news of him will be carried from camp to camp and he will have a hard time dealing with other tribes. Hospitality is granted not only to travellers but also to those in need of protection or dakhala from an avenger or an oppressor. The Bedouin, during the protection period which usually lasts three days, tries to settle the dispute, and no one can harm the pursued while he is under his protection (Jamali 1934).

Muruwwa (manliness, virtues), as Alwardi asserts, also indicates the Bedouin 'superiority propensity' as he is always willing to give but not to be given to; he is the host and the protector, but not the one who seeks the protection and hospitality. It is very difficult for the Bedouin to ask others for anything, but it is his pleasure to be asked by others. For him to ask for others protection and hospitality will indicate his subordination, but to give protection and hospitality to others reflects his superiority (Alwardi 1965). In
fact this 'superiority propensity' dominates Bedouin life, and we can find it in most of their social activities and in their mental traits.

**Equality, individuality, sheikhdom:**

In Bedouin social organization, each tribe is subdivided into clans, and there is a sheikh at the head of each clan. At the head of the whole tribe there is a great sheikh, who is usually the head of one of the powerful clans. Theoretically, the sheikh of the tribe is the one to whom all the lesser sheikhs submit, but it is not always true that all clans' sheikhs yield to the great sheikh. Jamali (1934) stated that the: "Sheikh in a clan or a tribe is the head of the legislative, judicial, and executive affairs of the tribal government; he is the commander-general in war; he is the spokesman and the guardian of the honour and prestige of the tribe" (p. 27).

The sheikh is chosen for his capacity, seniority in age, personal qualities such as courage tempered by caution and wisdom, wealth (which will enable him to be generous) and a fatherly attitude in dealing with his people; in other words a sheikh should be firm but just and kind (Berger 1962). Usually, the eldest son of the sheikh succeeds him, if he is acceptable to members of the tribe; if not, someone else in the sheikh's family (brother or uncle) will occupy the post. But if the sheikh or one unacceptable to the members of the tribe cannot continue to hold his post for a long time, he is sometimes overpowered by another person who occupies the post. So for the sheikh to be worthy of his post as a leader of his tribe, he needs to have a strong personality, and to show a great capacity for leadership (Jamali 1934). The sheikh has been described by Hitti (1970) as follows:
"the senior member of the tribe whose leadership asserts itself in sober counsel, in generosity and in course" (p. 28).

The tribal sheikh is not an autocrat; theoretically he has considerable power, but his actions and decisions are always guided by the public opinion of the tribe. In exercising his power and authority, he must do so within the bounds of tribal custom, and in accordance with the tribe's traditional interpretation of its interests (Jamali 1934; Berger 1962). In judicial, military and other affairs of common concern, the sheikh is not the absolute authority; before embarking upon any course of action he must consult the tribal council, which expresses tribal opinion. The tribe's council is composed of elders from the various clans and heads of the component families. All matters of tribal policy are discussed during the council meeting in the sheikh's great reception tent (majlis). In some tribes, as Jamali notes: "judicial matters are not dealt with by the sheikh himself but by a man whose honesty and good judgement is well known" (Jamali 1934, pp. 27-28).

From the above, it is obvious that the apparent absolutism of the sheikh's power is only relative since it is always checked and balanced by the opinion of members of the tribe. Furthermore, if they believe that the sheikh had violated justice or broken the code of honour of the tribe, or even shown poor leadership in a raid or a move, they would either exile or assassinate him, and a new sheikh would take his place (Jamali 1934). The sheikh's tenure of office lasts while the good-will of his constituency exists. He is therefore, as Ibn Khaldun asserted: "forced to rule them kindly and to avoid antagonizing them. Otherwise, he would have trouble with the group spirit, and (such trouble) would be his undoing and theirs" (Ibn-Khaldun 1958, p. 306). On the other hand, the sheikh as a
leader must be able to exercise a restraining influence by force, but he: "must at the same time 'humour' them and avoid a show of force, which might cause so much rebellion as to destroy the power of the leaders and unity of the group itself." (Berger 1962, p. 63).

"Discipline, respect for order and authority are no idols in desert life" Hitti quotes (Hitti 1970, p. 24). The Arab in general and the Bedouin in particular has been described by Berger (1962) as a "strong individualist and believer in equality" (p.63). Also Hitti (1970) describes them as "born democrats": Bedouins are not obedient subjects, the humblest Bedouin meets his sheikh on an equal footing. He has free access to the sheikh's council tent or majlis. He argues and sits with his sheikh without any heed of the sheikh's power; he does not flatter him (Main 1935). Very often the Bedouins treat their sheikh to sharp criticism and harsh words. In describing some of the traits of their mentality, Jamali (1934) states: "[in] passing a judgement or making a decision the Bedouin is quick and frank" (p. 53). Philby (1922) remarks: "Simple and direct are the arguments of the Arab..." (p. 239) In others words the Bedouin's impulsiveness, intelligence, courage and individuality all play their role in making a decision or passing a judgement. In fact, the Bedouin is characterized by plainness, frankness, pride and dignity. They disdain lying or deceit, as they consider these manners as the characteristics of the civilized people. It is, as Ibn Khaldun says: "Very difficult for them to subordinate themselves to each other" (Ibn Khaldun 1958, p. 150). Their tendency toward power is to be the commander but not the commanded, to overrule others but not to subject to others overruling, in other words to be superior but not subordinate. They love power, but to be in power not subject to it (Alwardi 1965) and that is what Ibn Khaldun (1958) describes as:
"Competition for superiority" (p. 150). The Bedouin is full of a strong sense of his own dignity, and he has, as O'Leary (1927) notes: "a passionate urge towards personal freedom which impedes his individual liberty, and he does so regardless of his own interests" (p. 21). Therefore the Bedouin revolts against any power which seeks to control his freedom; thus he does not take easily to the restraints of government. When Fr. Lammens describes the Arab as the "typical democrat", O'Leary comments on that description, and says that: "We must recognise that in this character are some of the salient characteristics of democracy in a somewhat exaggerated form" (O'Leary 1927, p. 20).

In fact, the type of democracy within the Bedouins society differs from that of modern democracy; it stems from the nature of their life and culture. For them it is a very familiar phenomenon, and they practice it as naturally as any other activity in their life.

Despite the Bedouin's feeling of individualism and equalitarianism, he is loyal and obedient to the ancient traditions of his tribe; their society hardly recognizes the individual but subordinates him to the family, clan and tribe, and the Bedouin, as Berger (1962) notes: "sees no coercion in following their ways. He begins to balk and to display his recalcitrance only at those efforts to control him which come from beyond the tribe, from states and empires" (p. 64). Individuality within the Bedouin society has a special characteristic, it has become a tendency concerning the group (tribe) interactions with others from outside the tribe, exemplified by the Bedouin usage of the term "we" instead of "I". But the Bedouin also indicates his individuality very strongly when he interacts with other men within the tribe.
Although the Bedouins are democratic by nature, they have an aristocratic attitude in their communications with others (Alwardi 1965). The Bedouin is a very proud person, and is unwilling to acknowledge another's superiority. The Bedouin, as described by Hitti (1970) : "Looks upon himself as the embodiment of a consummate pattern of creation. To him the Arabian nation is the noblest of all nations (afkar-al-uman)" (p. 28). There is democracy among the Bedouin societies in the desert, but they have an aristocratic attitude toward others such as certain nomadic tribes like the sulumba who are not considered Bedouins. Also they have the same attitude toward the civilized man, as they view him as being less happy and far more inferior (Hitti 1970).

They are very loyal to their tribe and their accepted sheikhs, but they are not loyal to strange powers or authority from outside their tribes.

From the preceding, we can now reach a conclusion about the nature of the social norms, and the perception of power and authority in Bedouin culture. Power in their society is the basic element and it is the backbone of its structure. Their social norms lead them strongly to be the powerful but not the powerless: to exercise the power but not to be subject to that power, or more precisely to be the superior but not the subordinate. The power-distance in Bedouin society is very small, and there is a great amount of equality in their social life. Their social structure is based on the tribe and not on social class; there is no inequality in wealth and the Bedouins have no private ownership of the land, since most of their property is owned by the whole tribe (Jamali 1934). Their qualities of fearlessness, chivalry, self-reliance, love of freedom, individuality, and independence make them irrepressible in their attitudes. Although
they are democrats, they have an aristocratic tendency. Even their personal names reflect their belief in power, such as Gazy (invader), Fatik (Assassin), Tariq (nightcomer),...etc. Or the names of wild animals such as tiger, lion, leopard,...etc.

2. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR SOCIETAL NORMS IN ISLAMIC CULTURE

Islam is the second basis for the societal norms and values and feelings of identity and commonality in Iraq. Socially even the non-muslim Arab who lives in an Islamic environment has been influenced by Islamic tradition for more than 1400 years.

Islamic philosophy stems from the fact that Islam is not simply a religion, 'It is a way of life'. Islamic teachings and laws cover the relationship with man and God, men's relationships with each other, as well as man's perception of himself. The principles, values, rights and duties of man towards the community and those of the community towards man, are described and prescribed by Islamic teachings.

A. Pre-Islamic Society:

In the seventh century (in 610) Islam arose in Mecca in Hejaz. In that area of the desert the Oasis provided a more permanent version of the Arabs' tribal life to those who settled there. Mecca during the jahiliyah (pre-Islamic) period was the halt on the trade route which had been chosen by the Arabs as their business headquarters (O'Leary 1927).

The sedentary population of al-Hijaz allowed commercial relations with their civilized neighbours. By such trade Mecca became a wealthy merchant city. The leading tribe to which the Prophet himself belonged was that of the Quraysh so called "from trading and getting profit". The Quraysh held the powerful and supreme position in Mecca as it was the only merchant tribe and the _kaaba_ keepers (Alwardi 1954).
In Mecca's society, each tribe retained its tribal constitution and was self-governing in the same way as a desert tribe, so Mecca was rather a collection of tribal camps than a city in the ordinary sense, but all joined together in a confederacy for the entertainment of visitors. Although the sedentary population in Mecca were originally a part of Arab Bedouin society they were, at the same time, citizens (O'Leary 1927; Hitti 1970). Many aspects of their way of life, social structure and values and norms developed differently than that of Bedouins in the desert. While this society was based upon tribalism, there was a large amount of inequality, social constraints and superordination in different areas and in appropriation and wealth. There were very rich and poor; in status there were master classes and slaves; in family structure the man was despotic and had the powerful supreme position, while women in general were oppressed and had no rights but were regarded as chattels (Shalabi 1963). They were, as Ibn Khaldun explained, much concerned with all kinds of pleasures, and accustomed to luxury and success in worldly occupations and to indulgence in worldly desires (Ibn-Khaldun 1958). The basic element in that society was power: it was their law as Shalabi (1963) indicates.

B. Islam and Islamic Society:

Islam, when it arose in Mecca, cancelled the past at one stroke; it cut the most vital bond of Arab relationship, that of tribal kinship and replaced it by a new bond, that of faith. All the contrasts between the old order and the new were vividly drawn. Prophet Mohammed has attacked the traditional basis of the class system and inequality among the Arabs, by depreciating noble birth and considering it of no value before God, and by asserting the equality of all the faithful in view of the new religion, which did not allow
the existence of any distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab or between a free man and a slave who adopted Islam. Also, it rejected the tribalism and class belongingness. Islam refers to pre-Islamic society as the age of 'ignorance'; ignorance as opposed, not to knowledge but, basically, to justice. Fundamentally Islam came to apply the word Jahiliyah (or injustice) to racial discrimination in all its manifestations including excessive deference of lineage, tribal convention and economic situation. Thus Islam changed the focus of belongingness from those of tribal and social classes to the belongingness to the whole of mankind as it appears in the Quran in the following words:

"O Mankind, we have created you from a single male and female and made you nations and tribes so that you may get to know one another. Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you..." (The Holy Quran, Surat Al-Hujurat, Ayah No. 13).

This concept has been affirmed by the Prophet Mohammed, who says:

"He is not from us, who propagates the 'ignorance' concept".

Also Islam has rejected the idea of classes and wealth supremacy, and the racial discrimination based on nationality, race or colour. Islam regards all people as equal, except for the degree of piety and righteousness.

The Prophet Mohammed says:

"People are equal like the prongs of the comb".

He also says:

"O Mankind, you are the children of Adam. And Adam is from soil. There is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab or a Non-Arab over an Arab, or a white over a black or a black over a white person except through righteousness and piety" (Shalabi 1963, p. 43).

Also Islam stipulated that exercising authority must be paralleled with the consultative principle:

"Consult them in the affairs of the moment, then,
when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in God" (The Holy Quran, Surat Al-Imran, Ayah No. 159).

At the beginning of the Islamic religion, Mohammed won little support, mainly from some of his family members, but very few of the Arabs in Mecca except among the poor and slaves. But he and his followers were subject to great oppression and animosity from in particular the Quraysh, the powerful tribe with representatives of the aristocratic and influential Umayyad branch, who opposed them. This was because for them Islam seemed, as Hitti (1970) explained, to run counter to the best economic interests of the Quraysh as custodians of al-kaabah, the pantheon of multitudinous deities and centre of a pan-Arabian pilgrimage. They did not wish to abandon their old goals, their ancient customs and their powerful and glorious position, as they were holding the reins of authority, power and wealth in pre-Islamic days. They disliked the idea of being equal with their poor slaves and the lower classes, and being subordinate to one spiritual God. Also they disliked the ideas of Islam because it does not recognize the idea of a chosen people (Alwardi 1954). Under the oppression the Prophet with his followers had to flee Hijra to Medina in 622, which was the starting point of the Moslem calendar. In Medina, Mohammed became the ruler, able to practice the religion and develop the Islamic community. Then in 630 Moslems were able to enter Mecca again, and defeat the Quraysh and destroy the pagan Gods. This led all the aristocratic and powerful members of the Quraysh such as Ibo-sofuan and his clan Umayya to join Islam (Hitti 1970). And then Mohammed was able to found a state and nation upon the basis of religious faith.

During these events, most of the nomadic Arab tribes in the desert around Mecca were not believers in the Prophet and the new religion, but as it was growing in strength among the Moslems, under
Mohammed's leadership, they were impressed, especially after he had entered Mecca. They converted to Islam in large numbers; those nomadic tribes looked upon these events as a sign that God was on the side of Mohammed and the new religion. Also it is in their nature, as already explained, not to join a weak and powerless group, because they love power and they are strong believers in it (Alwardi 1954). At the start of Islam, many of those nomadic Arab tribes who joined Islam were not real believers in Islam, and the Quran shows scepticism of them, as follows:

"The Arabs of the desert declare: 'We are true believers' say you are not? Rather say: 'we profess Islam,' for faith has not yet found its way into your hearts" (The Holy Quran, Surat Al-Hujurat, Ayah No. 14).

Some of those tribes, after the death of the Prophet, fell away from the faith of Islam, and had to be converted to Islam again, because they assumed that their previous adherence was only in accordance with a contract with the Prophet which expired upon his death (Berger 1962; Hitti 1970).

The Bedouin has been observed as being hardly affected by Islam's purely religious precepts, and Islam as a religion for the Bedouin has flown over their heads (Berger 1962). But Ibn Khaldun insisted that the Bedouins, because of their simple, uncorrupted ways, are the "quickest of peoples to follow the call to truth and righteousness" (Ibn-Khaldun 1958, p. 306). Berger (1962) states that: "the desert is believed to be the natural home of religion" (p. 68). The uncertainty of desert life and its hardships leads the Bedouin to "put his trust in the one God who alone can protect him from the enemy, hunger, sickness and death. Who can order the seasons, who can grant him water and rain" (Dickson 1949, p. 45).

In fact, we need to realize that the way the Bedouins perceive and practise Islam is different than in any other society. Recently,
observations in this matter (as Berger 1962 quoted) show that Bedouins believe deeply in the one God whose messenger is Mohammed; to the Bedouin, Allah is the one supernatural power who rules the world by His will, and all events which he cannot explain are referred to Allah, for he designs everything.

Bedouins "do not allow religion to come to rest on earth, upon the shoulders of other men"; as Berger puts it, "the Bedouin does not take to rules of religion as prescribed by formal religious agencies" (Berger 1962, p. 69). They rarely bother with philosophizing about the nature or the existence of Allah. Religion to them is more a matter of feeling and passion than a matter of argument and philosophy. How much their feeling of reverence and awe for Allah affects their daily conduct is a personal matter, as there are those who commit the most atrocious cruelties without being thus influenced. Although Bedouins are deep believers, this does not prevent many of them from blood-revenge, raiding, tribalism, pride...etc. (Jamali 1934); they may never bother to recognize the clashes between these activities and their beliefs in Islam.

In the Islamic society under the leadership of the Prophet Mohammed, there was a closeness between the Islamic ideal and reality and there was a very small power-distance between the ruler and the ruled. Mohammed and his family lived a very simple life; he abstained from and was indifferent to all aspects of privilege, prestige or luxurious life; Hitti describes him as follows:

"He was often seen mending his own clothes and was at all times within the reach of his people. The little he left, he regarded as state property" (p. 102).

Islam for Mohammed is a message of mercy, equality, social justice, virtue and benevolence. He did not consider himself a king or emperor and he "was never in the position of an arbitrary, patrimonial
leader" (Turner 1974, p. 83); his leadership was mainly based on consultative methods. So he was not an autocratic ruler over his people, and he exhorted them not to obey such a ruler. One of his teachings is the following:

"The best way to strive (Jihad) towards God is a truthful word given to an arbitrary sultan or prince (i.e. ruler)"

The psychological closeness between rulers and ruled continued under Mohammed's successors (Abu-Baker and Umar) (Alwardi 1954). The ideal Moslem state was actually realized or very nearly so, by Mohammed's immediate successors. In fact for many Moslems this period of the four Orthodox (rashidun) Caliphs was the period in which the lustre of the Prophet's life had not ceased to shed its light and influence over the thoughts and acts of the Caliphs.

The first psychological gap between ruler and ruled that arose within Islamic society and manifested itself clearly was during the last part of the lifetime of the third Caliph Uthman. That was because he gave to certain persons of his clan grants of land in Iraq, also some of the most important governorships to men of his family or his clan Umayya (Watt 1973; Alwardi 1954), who had failed to acknowledge Mohammed until the entering of Mecca and whose Islam was therefore considered to be of convenience rather than conviction. They became more wealthy and they imposed themselves on the others. In fact a wealthy aristocratic class arose in the society at that time, and the inequality in different areas started to get larger (Alwardi 1954). For the ordinary Moslem this was against the principles of equality and justice in Islam, and led them to an increased struggle but with the help of another underlying factor, the conflict between Islamic values and that of Bedouinism. That conflict did not appear clearly during the leadership of the first two orthodox
Caliphs because the Bedouins were engaged in the Holy war with Byzantine and Persia which finished during the lifetime of Uthman (Alwardi 1954). The conflict between the old life in the desert with its nature of freedom and values, and the new life under the Islamic values with all the new discipline and control, led support to the first factor and led in the end to revolt against Uthman and his being put to death (Watt 1973). This meant that the struggles of Umayya clan for power were brought to a head, specially after Ali was proclaimed fourth Caliph, "who inaugurated his regime by dismissing most of the provincial governors appointed by his predecessor" (Hitti 1970, p. 180). Also he tried strongly to practise the Islamic principles of equality and social justice until his death after a civil war with Muawiya ibn-abi-Sufyan, the head of the Umayya family, (Hitti 1970; Alwardi 1954).

Politically, the death of the fourth Caliph marked the end of what may be termed the republican period of the Caliphate (632-661), and the beginning of the Umayyad dynasty when Muawiya became the first Umayyad Caliph.

While the first four Orthodox Caliphates were all chosen or 'elected' by notables, following the triple principles of taking counsel, designation, and acclamation (bay'a) (Turner 1974) without any regard to the issue of hereditary succession, the hereditary principle was introduced into Caliphal succession by the first Umayyad Caliph. This hereditary principle was followed after the Umayyads by other Moslem dynasties, including the Abbasids (Berger 1962), thus preserving the myth of genuine election. So, an extraordinary gulf between fact and doctrine developed in the matter of reaching authority. Berger quoted the following from Emile Tyan: "The hereditary and dynastic principle spread throughout the Moslem world.
Every autonomous authority which established itself, in whichever part of the vast empire, tended immediately to become settled in dynasty" (Berger 1962, p. 303).

The Umayyad not only marked the foundation of dynasties (mulk) and bureaucratic domination (Turner 1974) but more, their rule was a relapse which constituted a setback for the Moslem nation. Many aspects of social life, values and norms of this period were close to that of the Jahiliyah age (pre-Islamic) (Nicholson 1941; Hitti 1970). Power-distance and inequality got larger and larger in Islamic society. From the Umayya's aristocratic attitude arose class discrimination between the Arab and Mawali (non-Arab Moslim). The first class consisted naturally of the wealthy ruling aristocrats, headed by the Caliphal household and the Mawali, who were in Islamic theory equal, were mostly treated as second class (Alwardi 1954). The aristocratic attitude was strong among those who were still inspired by the pre-Islamic spirit. Taha Housen indicates, as mentioned by Alwardi (1954), that the Arabs in general returned during the Umayyad period to their Bedouin tribal pride and rivalry more than they did in pre-Islamic times. Life became more luxurious for the ruling aristocracy, "the old connections with the goddesses of wine, song and poetry were re-established, the palaces arose in the cities, swarming with servants and slaves to provide their occupants with every variety of luxury" (Hitti 1970, pp. 250 and 267).

During this period Iraq was the base for many leading opposition figures to Umayyad rule. These were people who had been associated with the Prophet and had suffered oppression or fought with him. They went around encouraging people to oppose the Umayyad's rule and fight for the Islamic teachings concerning equality and justice (Alwardi 1954). While the Umayyad rule was very stable and strong in Syria,
Iraq was in a great opposition which resulted in being ruled by aggressive Umayyad governors, such as Al-Hajjaj whose policy showed the "Iraqi's from the very start that his would be [a] no kid-glove method of dealing with a disloyal populace" (Hitti 1970, p. 307).

Alwardi indicates that Iraqis at that time were suffering strongly from a 'psychological contest' between the long established Bedouin values and the newly established Islamic ones; their practical day-to-day life came under the influence of the old values which conflicted with Islamic values and teachings which affected to a large extent and even shaped their mentality, and this presented a great contradiction between what they felt and what they actually did. This contradiction manifested itself clearly in the recurrent revolts against authority during Unayyad rule (Alwardi 1954). In fact in Islam there was no legislated formal function or committee to judge on actions of authority, thus that judgement was left to individuals themselves. While some of those individuals, in turn, left it to God, others believed that they should revolt against authority, and that is what happened in Iraq.

When the Unayyad state settled down, efforts were paid towards the administration of the provinces which came under its control. The people started to realize what benefits and advantages they would get from occupying posts in the administration of one of those provinces. In order to obtain such posts people gathered round the princes who had the power to appoint them and they tried their best to satisfy them (Al-Ali 1969).

The Abbāsid came to power (750-1258) after the Unayyad by their promise of a return to orthodoxy and the principles of Islam, and through the support of many dissatisfied parties, especially the non-Arabian Moslems (Alwardi 1954). They soon established, in Baghdad,
Islamic economic empire. At the time of its achievement the Abbasid victory was generally hailed as representing the substitution of the true conception of the Caliphate, the idea of a theocratic state. They tried to close the gulf that had arisen between the state and religion during Umayyad rule. The Caliph, Hitti remarks, marked his exalted office by its religious character and as such, surrounded himself with men versed in Canon law whom he patronized and whose advice on matters of state affairs he sought (Hitti 1970).

The change that happened in this period was marked with a religious character, and the Abbasids promoted this change in public in order to gain favour, but the fact is that "religious change was more apparent than real; although unlike his Umayyad predecessor he assumed piety and feigned religiosity, the Baghdad Caliph proved as worldly-minded as he of Damascus who he had displaced" (Hitti 1970, p. 289). A great amount of extensive authority was concentrated in the hands of the Caliph (Turner 1974, Hitti 1970). The Abbasid Caliph's life became more luxurious than ever before. In particular the city Baghdad reached its golden age where the arts and sciences flourished and it became at that time a great centre of learning and civilization to all students from all parts of the world.

The hereditary principle of succession instituted by the Umayyad Caliphs was followed throughout the Abbasid regime with the same bad results (Turner 1974). The Abbasid, like the Umayyad, gained supremacy over the opposing parties through the policy of the iron-hand, but the Abbasid now cleverly directed toward permanently entrenching themselves in public favour, precisely by being marked with religious character. In fact for the Moslems the post of the Caliphate is a spiritual centre. In later years, the Abbasid's emphasis on the Caliph's office as an imamate, increased their actual
power and they began to assume honorific titles compounded with Allah and their subjects started to shower on them extravagant titles, which persisted until the end of the Ottoman Caliphate (Hitti 1970).

The Abbasid was an empire of international races (neo-Moslems) of which the Arabs formed one of many. The Kurasannians formed the Caliphal bodyguard and Persians occupied the chief posts in the government (Hitti 1970). The Arabs suffered a lot from a kind of racial discrimination, which forced many of them to return to their nomadic life in the desert (Alwardi 1954).

The society in Iraq during that time instituted a period of strong adherence to religious ritual, which became one of its famous characteristics. But while the intellectual side of society was under the strong influence of the religious preachers, everyday life was under a contradictory influence, since the values and norms which dominated the reality of that society were to respect and honour power, influence, wealth, and all aspects of luxury. Thus Iraqi society from that time started to suffer from a "cultural ambivalent phenomenon" (Alwardi 1954).

The period of the Abbasid Caliphs ended when in A.D. 1258 Hulagu Kahn, at the head of his Mongol hordes, seized and sacked Baghdad and put to death the last Caliph. Sykes wrote that:

"No invasion in historical times can compare in its accumulated horrors or in its far reaching consequences with that of the Mongols" (Sykes 1930, p. 70).

Baghdad was given over to plunder and flames, the majority of its population were massacred. In one week one million of its inhabitants were wiped out of existence (Hitti 1970). The great irrigation systems were destroyed. The country became the abomination of desolation. Not until recently, says Main "did Baghdad begin to recover" (Main 1935, p. 15). "Moslem civilization was at that period the shining light in the world and it has never recovered from the
deadly blow" Sykes stated (Sykes 1930, p. 98).

3. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR SOCIETAL NORMS DURING
   THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1534–1917)

   After the Mongol invasion, which is considered as the great
turning point in the intellectual as well as in the political history
of Islam, "Iraq was long since habituated to disorders, to poverty,
to change and bloodshed, to alien rulers, ... for eight generations
each year had seen the country sink further back into tribalism,
insecurity, dependence. Each month had brought news of dynastic rise
and fall, to herald a fresh governor to Baghdad" (Longrigg 1968, p.
18).

   By 1508 Iraq had become a permanent part of the new Perisan
kingdom. But contemporary with the revival of Persia was the
establishment of the Ottoman Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. Iraq was
the borderland between the two powers. Their struggle for Iraq soon
ended in favour of the Turks, and the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman
occupied Baghdad in 1534. He announced to the Arabs that he came to
free them and to protect the Islamic world (Inalcik 1973). The sultan
was first welcomed by the inhabitants: "Many a flattering tongue
foretold that the sultan would revive and surpass the former glories.
The appeal to religion was yet more poignant" (Longrigg 1968, p. 24).
Succeeding Pashas of Baghdad maintained the appearance of religious
character and rituals to the public.

   In Iraq, after being for many centuries ruled by oppressive
governments, the sultan might well be greeted as delivering, as he
claimed, the sacred position of Caliph, vicar of the Prophet of God.
The scattered families of Turkish blood through the provinces were
elements of assured loyalty to the sultan (Longrigg 1968).
Gradually, Iraq's hopes of contented inclusion in the Ottoman Empire were to be disappointed. In anyway Ottoman rule was foreign and military. The very conception of Turkish dominion condemned the government to selfish and partial rule: the principle of government was that the people were *rayah* or cattle to be exploited, not by the sultan himself or to his ambitious governors, but the rule was for the benefit of the ruled. Longrigg (1968) writes: "As the government of the Empire was an autocratic monarchy with religious sanction, so the government of each province was absolute. In the remoter provinces especially there existed little to prevent the Pashas governing, as a traveller says, 'at their own will and pleasure' (pp. 48-49).

The *Daftardars* who were appointed from Istanbul to where they rendered their accounts in practice supported the *Pasha* who held their lives in his hand (Longrigg 1968, p. 49).

The Ottoman Empire was ruled by Turkish royalty, maintained by a military-administrative force. That empire was a bureaucratic state. Inalcik (1973) states that the :

"Ottomans administrative and bureaucratic practise originated from and continued the ancient traditions of pre-Islamic near eastern states" (pp. 100-102).

Under the Ottoman Empire rule (four centuries down to World War 1) Iraq made hardly any progress of mind and spirit. Its natural resources were much neglected, and its human resources even more so (Jamali 1934). Ottoman governors established a very rigid pattern of bureaucratic administration and contrived direct control over all Iraq. The control of the provinces was effected by the *Wilayet* system; each *Wilayet* or province was under a *Wali* or governor (known as *Pasha*) responsible direct to Istanbul (Hassen 1975). The sultan and his governors held the political power besides the centralized authority of the government administration, minute decisions were
constantly referred to the provincial governor and often to headquarters in Constantinople (Langley, 1961). The sultan had the full authority to appoint or remove from office any person according to his will, "his palace was the source of all power,...Government was conducted at gate and its officials were his slaves" (Inalcik 1973, p. 76). The important officials were appointed by the central authority in Istanbul, while the lesser one by the local provincial governor (Langley 1961), (p. 134). Inalcik explains that there were powerful factors working in favour of Ottoman centralized administration; he states that the "most potent factor was the ottoman kul-slave-system. In particular the Janissary Corps...(who) gave the Ottoman sultan an undisputed superiority over his rivals. In the provinces the Ottomans created a Corps of Military administrators of slave origins and an army of sipahis, who greatly strengthened the Central Authority which they represented and which guaranteed their own status.... A final factor was the immense prestige of the Ottoman sultan in the eyes of the Muslim [sic.] population" (Inalcik 1973, p. 18); he was the holder of the Islamic Caliphate post, which brought with it important moral and material advantages.

The Ottoman's aim of provincial administration was to provide central government with taxes for its treasury and manpower for its army, and to maintain internal provincial security. The administration system in general and the taxation system in particular offered fertile ground for abuse, corruption, dissensions and rebellion. Also capricious promotion of a favourite might bring to Baghdad a governor very unsuitable. Also in practice the highest officers sometimes could not be displaced, some of them were too loyal and valuable, while some had bought the post for a long term. Longrigg states: "[the] taxform, which was the government of the
province fell to the highest bidder. The costly presents necessary to retain a lucrative office must themselves be provided by the provincial victims, who thus not only suffered but paid for ill government" (Longrigg 1968, p. 28).

Furthermore, by the very remoteness of the provinces, the excesses of governors were less visible from Istanbul, and appeared more difficult, so the vast opportunities for self-enrichment offered by the distant provinces soon made them a marketable asset. For the Turkish officers banishment to Iraq [they called it "The Siberia of Turkey" (Alwardi 1965, p. 128) because of its bad inner situation and problems] was regarded as a hated duty or a rich opportunity (Longrigg 1968). The Turkish governors of Iraq were preoccupied with collecting heavy taxes from the population, as the higher the taxes collected the higher salaries they got, because there was no specific system to fix salaries of civil servants, but it depended mostly on the amount of taxation the officials and government could get from their subjects (Al-Shamsie 1979). In fact the first duty of the incoming governor, for more than three centuries, was to divide up the lands of his province into a number of farmable units, and lease the lands and taxes to the highest reasonable bidder who in his turn employed his own forces in stimulating payment, or hiring them out to the rapacious collectors.

The civil service under the Ottoman rule not only suffered from too much centralization of authority, but also from instability. The succession of many governors in short periods led the administrative body to undergo many alterations in compliance with the governor's will and style (Alhaidari 1963). The civil servants were also inefficient and poorly trained, while the civil code was slow and complicated and had little relevance to the realities of life in Iraq.
The civil service was no better; there was a lack of law or regulations to organize many functions related to the civil servants such as selection, recruitment, transfer, and the salary system. The greatest weakness was the inefficiency and corruption of government and administrative body. Nearly all officials, judicial or administrators, had their price. Also many serious problems emerged concerning the management of people, such as nepotism, favouritism, bribes and sale of government posts (Al-Shamsie 1979). The civil servants were raised firstly from the ranks of slaves or Mamluks from Georgia and organized in grades for different duties of household or state affairs, which were in turn arranged in chambers or companies (similar to departments). The trainees were provided with training and promotion prospects, and so it was also common for some sons of Turkish officials and famous Iraqis to be recruited as well. After qualifying they were appointed as civil servants (Longrigg 1968). The public officers emerged in Iraq as followers of the central Ottoman government in Turkey. This came about by 1750, when the Turkish governor of Iraq Sulaiman Pasha formed a small, reliable fighting force of two hundred boys who were trained under his supervision and then used widely in such public offices as writers, collectors, garrison-commanders, as well as in his own personal staff (Longrigg 1968, p. 170).

To consolidate their control over Iraq, the Ottoman rulers introduced the policy of Ottomanization. They applied the Turkish Civil Code or nizamiya and Turkish methods in addition to splitting the country into administrative divisions. In government, courts and schools Turkish was the main language, and every day correspondence and records were written in Turkish; consequently Iraqi's who could understand Turkish grew up unable to write their own tongue (Longrigg
In the government departments and administrative organs, significant positions were restricted to Ottoman people and relatives of governmental personnel without any regard to the merit or competence of applicants. Iraqis filled only the lower grades, as they were not allowed to occupy a top management position (Ireland 1937). The personnel who were recruited for different top management positions were selected to occupy vacant positions from those whom it was believed had the greatest influence in society (Al-Shamsie 1979).

The period after 1842 witnessed the growth of a new, influential bureaucratic class of regular officials, the Effendis, as a result of some administrative reforms (Longrigg 1953). The Effendis were complacently urban and from middle and secular classes; many of them were Jews and Christians with an increasing proportion of Moslems (Main 1935). They formed a great part of the social element which was receptive to Turkish culture as they spoke Turkish and acted as the main bridge between the Turk and Arab. Longrigg (1968) describes them as follows:

"Literate, but otherwise educated, backward but decorous in social habit,... exact and over-refined in the letter of officialdom, completely remote from a spirit of public service, identifying the body public with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator, persistent speakers of Turkish among Arabs, almost universally corrupt and venal." (pp. 281-282) "Ill-paid, and ambitious, they could not prudently rely on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or appeal neglected" (p. 36).

The Effendis were uniform in their travesty of European dress; they assumed that anyone who was well-dressed must be educated and so entitled to this form of dress; for them it was shameful to soil their hands or to engage in menial work (Main 1935). They were eager to characterize themselves with magnificent titles in their communications with others. They liked to enjoy the company of their fellows, to talk politics in their special coffee-shops. They had
their distinguished manners and accent, also they had their private meetings and clubs (Alwardi 1965).

The Effendis in city society ranked themselves above the ordinary people - they saw themselves as a high-ranking class. The people in turn tried to win the Effendis approval and be friendly to them in the hopes that this would increase their own respect and influence among others in society. Thus to accompany the Effendis or to associate with them, or even frequent the same governmental offices became a great source of pride for the individuals concerned, who were respected as such by other people (Alwardi 1965).

However, Alwardi (1965) sees the inhabitants of the cities as showing their rulers a kind of behaviour quite different from that concealed in their minds. They disliked those haughty rulers despite the exaggerated respect given to them. This kind of norm in dealing with the people who have the power in society became a part of many individuals' mentality, to the degree that they started to assume that the (respected) person is the one who exhibits pride and haughtiness and who seldom speaks to them, but if he behaves humbly this induces them to consider him as one of them or even to despise him. They used to view the Effendi as haughty, but they respected him in spite of that. By and large, to many people's perception, haughtiness and high-ranking posts or classes are coupled.

Indeed, the city inhabitants have inherited from Bedouin culture a contradictory value from what they were accustomed to displaying toward their rulers. They, like the Bedouins, dislike those who exhibit haughtiness; on the other hand their very long subordination and submission to their rulers has led them to respect the haughty man even though they dislike him. In their private meetings, for example, they criticized the arrogant one but whenever he was present they
stood respectfully, smiled and tried their best to satisfy him. In fact this kind of behaviour toward the powerful became a social phenomenon and people became accustomed to it. Consequently, the powerful person became a subject of respect and fear by the powerless, regardless of the merit, qualification and personality of the person in power: the concern of the powerless is to satisfy the powerful in order to protect or to obtain the benefits (Alwardi 1965).

During the Ottoman period, however, the cities witnessed a spreading of Bedouin values which were in conflict with urban values. This is mainly because the prime interest of the Ottoman governors was in taxation and in increasing the revenue, while they were unable to protect the people or to set up justice among them. This situation induced people to organize their cities according to tribal methods in order to protect themselves. So by adopting the tribal tradition, each city, especially at the end of the Ottoman period, began to elect its sheikh and demand blood revenge, ... and so forth (Alwardi 1865). Hence, each individual started to glorify power, to be ethnocentric or a zealot of his city, town and area of living, identically to Bedouin tribalism. What increased this state of affairs is that while the Bedouins love of power and 'superiority propensity' is satisfied by desert life, it is stifled in the life of the city, as the city inhabitants have lived under bondage and authoritarian rulers for generations.

Inhabitants of the cities during Ottoman rule suffered, as Alwardi says, from a "schizoid personality", their principles and ideals being derived from the religious teachings, while in their daily life they practised behaviours contradictory to those religious teachings. In fact people in the cities adopted many Bedouin values, but distorted and metamorphosed them, thus taking those values further
away from Islamic teachings than were originally (Alwardi 1965, p. 118 and p. 142).

The Ottoman government was very concerned about keeping its powerful position in the eyes of the people, so it did not care what the people did with themselves as long as they showed obedience, respect and flattery to that government. This kind of behaviour became a part of the social values and norms of dealing with people who have power in society.

**The growth of feudalism throughout changes in Bedouin culture under the Ottoman rule:**

The breakdown of government in the Mongol period had enabled the Bedouin tribes to encroach greatly upon the settled land and also permitted the entry of fresh tribes from Arabia to Iraq where the fertility of the land and availability of water was evident. This tribal immigration increased during Ottoman rule, especially when the government was not stable and strong enough to control the movement of the tribes (Alwardi 1965).

The Bedouins, on their arrival in Iraq, faced new conditions which affected their culture traits, and consequently this interaction had its influence on the culture traits of the settled areas. The Bedouin, as Jamali states: "came in direct contact with settled people whose material life was quite different from his own, and whose social and religious institutions were much more complex. Last but not least he came within the sphere of influence of a state" (Jamali 1934, p. 55).

Under the Ottoman rule, the Bedouin tribes - despite constituting a considerable proportion of the Iraqi population (as stated earlier in this chapter) - did not receive the attention and sympathy they deserved, and instead of being pacified and shown a better way of
living, they were treated as subversive elements. The Ottoman Pashas, states Longrigg (1968) "strove to crush life from the tribes by weight of arms" (Longrigg 1968, p. 290). They aimed to making the tribesmen obedient citizens, without showing them a hint of the respect which would evoke obedience. The leaders of the tribes saw the Turkish rulers as perfidious, weak and brutal. They also: "saw the oppressive treatment of the settled folk whom every tax-farmer robbed and every Dhabtiyyah bullied; they saw the contempt for themselves, the haughtiness, the scornful insolence of the Turk" (Longrigg 1968, p. 290). So they recoiled from the horrors of government and its threat to rob their freedom.

The Ottoman government had no definite policy regarding the development of tribal societies; their policy of coping with the tribal problem was by alliances, dividing tribe against tribe, supporting one tribal sheikh against his brother or uncle, and vigorous punitive expeditions. So it was not unusual to see these tribal units waging war against one another, or clashing with the established government, which was mainly because of the imposition of taxes for which the tribes saw no legitimate reason (Jamali 1934).

The Bedouin tribes were, during Ottoman rule, independent or nominal vassals; while the tribal chiefs maintained order in their own regions, the tribesmen were treated by Turkish Walis as fellahin (cultivators) and the Walis tried to compel them by force of arms to accept regular taxation and conscription. Land in Iraq were subject to many claims; the tribes, in their concept of public ownership of the areas which they occupied, considered the land on which they had settled in Iraq as their own property. This concept of public ownership came into direct conflict with the Ottoman government's view that most of the land in Iraq belonged to the Ottoman state, by the
right of conquest, according to which it could grant all non-owned lands to whomever it wished and for whatever purpose (Jamali 1934). In fact many Ottoman Walis bestowed lands in Iraq to many persons, so the descendants of the old landowners still clung to deeds of feudal title. The Walis also granted lands to those they preferred without regard to the claims of the occupants. On the other hand sale and purchase of state lands went on for generations without the knowledge or recognition of the government; some villagers and more so the sheikhs in tribal areas claimed their holding of the land through long possession of it. The denial of such claims by the government created many conflicts and much confusion. The result, as Longrigg says, was that: "all agrarian improvement was checked by the absence of definite rights; and the tribes perceived that to settle merely exposed them to easier exaction [sic] and punishment" (Longrigg 1968, p. 306).

Things remained much the same until the coming of Midhat Pasha in 1869. He saw that the tribesmen could only be brought within the framework of ordered civilization by settling them through landgrants, and through this the Bedouin would change his mode of life and become dependent upon the government. Midhat Pasha's land settlement policy was to sell by auction, on easy terms, the tenancy-right but not the ownership of the state lands to all the claimants; and most important to the sheikhs of tribes for their tribal areas (Longrigg 1968). In practice the land settlement policy was not successful; many tribes refused the bait, distrusting the change of status and fearing conscription. The tribes fully realized the dangers which would befall them once they were settled. But while the majority of tribal leaders feared and shunned the new status, many others accepted the new arrangements and began to settle, and obtained by the new
settlement policy a tenancy-right to state land. Also by the ignorance and venality of the Tapu officials and the prevailing corruption, many lands were sold to city speculators instead of to tribesmen. In certain areas, such as the Muntafiq, freehold titles over vague estates in the tribal area were bought by many members of Saduns family. So the tribesmen became the fellahin and saw sheikhs adopt rulers with Ottoman titles of office (Longrigg 1968; Jamali 1934; Pool 1980), and were now asked to pay not only the government's but the landlord's crop-share. In fact the hope of the new Tapu settlement was to fix tribal cultivating tenure, which would transform sheikhs into landlords, and make them politically dependant upon the government. At the same time Midhat Pasha had another policy of Ottomanizing the sheikhs. He gave some tribal sheikhs official titles, such as Pashas and Beys, recognizing them as civil administrative officials instead of tribal sheikhs; he also encouraged them to adopt Turkish manners and education (Jamali 1934; Pool 1980). The tribesmen were unwilling to see their sheikh turn into landlord and Pasha all at one, and divided into antagonistic sections. In fact the two lines of Ottoman tribal policy - settlement on the land and Ottomanization - had great effect on the Bedouin culture; tribalism itself weakened in the new environment of settled residence, and the many interests and relations of the new life began to overlay the old outlook of the tribe. By the end of Turkish rule the tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to government by a united tribe was always rare. The sheikhs became increasingly involved in town life and politics (Longrigg 1953).

The Bedouin, in coming from Arabia and settling down in Iraq, faced a very different environment which was conducive to a change in their mode of life and in their culture's traits.
By taking up agriculture as a result of Midhat Pasha's policy—many Bedouin tribes became more rural—the sheikhs turned into the chiefs of agricultural communities; they became: "accessible, because rooted; vulnerable, by reason of government's power of water-control; taxable, since crops cannot be driven off nor wholly concealed; dependent on government as landlords..." (Longrigg 1968, p. 306).

The sheikh under Ottoman rule was given official authority by the government, and he became the man responsible to that government for collecting and paying the taxes due. Although the basis of landownership was the tribal dirah, titled in the name of the tribe as a whole, this land was registered in the Sheikh's name, who became the holder of freehold titles, who in time came to consider themselves as the real owners of state land (Warriner 1962). In fact, the basis of landownership as tribal dirah had no legal basis or protection from the law or state as the tribal lands were regarded as state land and the tribal occupants as tenants-at-will; ownership of the land was questionable on any grounds. In fact the Ottoman government exploited the rivalry between brothers or relatives over sheikhood by selecting the person who showed himself more submissive to its policy. Also the government "by virtue of the land-tenancy law deprived certain sheikhs and favoured others according to their political inclinations and obedience to the central authority, a fact which has made many new sheikhs rise to power and has caused others to fall into oblivion" (Jamali 1934, p. 81).

In the desert, the mode of life led by a Bedouin sheikh is the same as that led by his tribesmen; the sheikh of a thousand tents has no carpet but the cheapest mat and no cushions but a camel-saddle; there is no economic overlordship between a sheikh and his fellow
tribesmen. The Bedouin tribe is described by Jamali (1934), especially from the economic point of view, as "'commonwealth of brethren' in the full sense of the word" (p. 82). But when the tribes settled on land in Iraq during recent generations, the economic distinction between the sheikhs and their tribesmen grew much sharper, and the relations of the sheikh with his tribesmen started to take on a feudal character (Warriner 1962). The Sheikh started to be more likely to live in luxury as a result of the increase in his income from tax collection, and he started to be more skilled at flattering the government, so he gradually ignored the Bedouin characteristics of frankness, honesty and inherent pride. Pretentious courtesy became prevalent among the sheikhs, and in communications with others who had a respected and influential position or power in the society. The sheikhs began to lose their ties with their Bedouin tradition; they built houses for themselves beside their reed-made guest-house or Medief. Some of them chose houses inside the cities. Although this new attitude happened only slowly during the Ottoman period, it was the start of further change in the nature of tribal sheikhdom, particularly after the land settlement law of 1932 (Alwardi 1965). The sheikh started to be seen as arbitrary and autocratic with his tribesmen, and in opposition to his ancestors. The Bedouin sheikh who was not able to be autocratic, insofar as his power was derived from the respect and cooperation of his tribesmen, had no force to impose his power on the tribesmen. But some of the sheikhs, starting from Ottoman times, were able to be brutal by depending on the brutal support of the government, which became by the middle of the eighteenth century able to depose a sheikh and replace him with one more sympathetic to government policy (Alwardi 1965). So the sheikh had to be obedient to the government of the day. The government did
not care about what the sheikh was doing within his tribes area, or how he treated his tribesmen, so long as he was collecting the taxes he promised to deliver, and showing his obedience and respect to its officials.

Despite changes in Bedouin culture, the tribesmen continued to show their loyalty to their sheikhs rather than to Turkish rulers. This was due to their strong attachment to tribal tradition, and their preferred way of life.

It has been explained previously that under the leadership of the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate successors, the four Orthodox Caliphs a unified and growing Islamic community was established, and the ideal Moslem state was actually realized or very nearly so by those Caliphs. Mohammed and his early elected successors, as explained by Berger (1962), were theoretically and practically the leaders of the faithful, but starting from the Unayyad rule the holders of the post of Caliph in general acquired their authority by force, and the elective system of the four earliest Caliphs became a hereditary succession. The Ottoman maintained the hereditary transmission of power but without a fixed mode of succession: the sultans were selected in the same manner as the Caliphs. Berger states that the "hereditary principle of government has had two strong supports in Islamic societies: the fear of dissension and consequent weakness in the political-military arm of the religion of Allah; and the desire of a ruling family to retain power" (Berger 1962, p. 305). Ibn Khaldun, in explaining why the elective system of the four earliest Caliphs became a dynastic one, pointed out that during the time of the four Orthodox Caliphs, the "royal authority" was not yet in existence to act as a "restraining influence" upon the
Islamic community. At that time, religion was still the "restraining influence" which each believer exercised upon himself. Consequently, the first four Caliphs could be confident that their decision would be accepted. But when Muawiya, the first Umayyad Caliph came to power by force after the first civil war in Islam, the "restraining influence" of religion had weakened, and in its place "royal authority" had developed, for Muawiya had taken command of Islam by force as the head of the powerful Umayya family. Then when the time came to think of a successor to Muawiya, the Umayya family was too strong to be denied; they would agree only to his son as successor, although there were others preferrable to him from the point of view of Islam (Ibn-Khaldun 1958, p. 284). Berger (1962) says that while the elective principle had the support to a certain degree of tradition in Bedouin society and even more so in Islamic principles, the elective principle was replaced by a 'dynasty' (mulk) that was founded by Muawiya and followed by his successors. So this principle was never genuinely followed in the Islamic community, and thus the community did not acquire the experience normally associated with that principle. The leadership in Islamic societies became more or less as expressed by popular saying: "To him who has power over you, obedience is due", and as long as that leadership maintained itself in power, it is legitimate for it to rule the community, (Berger 1962, p. 306).

On the other hand the orthodox theologians continued to teach the old view that Caliph was the commander of the Moslem community and thus the community must obey even the usuper who exercises power (Alwardi 1954). The political theory insisted (throughout the whole period of the Umayyad and Abbāsid dynasties) that the Caliphate was an elective office, inspite of the fact that the post had for centuries remained within the same family (the Abbāsid) who themselves were already designated by Turkish mercenary troops (Berger 1962).
The role of tradition has continued to be influential in making it difficult to introduce innovations for ijtihad in Islamic society. Islamic beliefs have been few and simple, placing no great burden of doctrine upon the faithful. The Holy Koran holds the possibility of varying interpretations which can be placed upon its holy scriptures (Alwardi 1954; Berger 1962), but traditionalists strongly sought the right to limit ijtihad (innovate) because this could lead to free interpretation, which may change accepted doctrines and practises (Shalabi 1963).

Iraqi society, particularly during the Ottoman period, started to become a fatalistic and static society, and with the prevalence of poverty and ignorance, many other concepts penetrated the life of that society, such as superstition, demonism and such like, arising from the sophisticated perception of many Islamic values. In fact Ottoman rule has resulted, to a great extent, in a misconception of Islamic principles among people in Iraqi society. Most people were not able to distinguish between the real principles of Islam, and the Ottoman interpretation of those principles and their adaptation of Islam as a means of upholding the rule and power of the sultan. (Munaf 1966).

From the evolution of Islamic society, it could be suggested that Islam became a religion which organizes the relationship with God much more than a political, economic and societal system which regulates the interrelationships within the society. Islamic law applies to the family, personal habits, diet and toilet, but this does not mean that Islam has always been scrupulously followed. Thus in Islamic society an extraordinary gulf had arisen between the Islamic ideal and reality. On the other hand there is resistance among fanatical religious thinkers to accommodating ideals with the reality of social life, and social life failed to be raised to the level of the ideal in Islam.
The power-distance widened between the rulers and the ruled, and in other areas of social life. In fact during the Ottoman rule, which lasted for four centuries up to World War 1, the gulf between rulers and their subjects was wider than ever and seldom bridged. The Arab institutions and attitudes were shaped for a long time by this relatively recent Ottoman system. For the Arab, the Ottoman ruling class (who were represented as the upper-class in Iraqi society) were felt, as Berger states: "to be a foreign one; it maintained a rather formal contact with the Arab community; it dominated through a partly-Arab provincial bureaucracy which both protected the masses from far-off rulers and joined in exploiting them as well" (Berger 1962, p. 293).

The conception of the individual's value as a Moslem on a par with all others and equal before Allah, has not prevented or even mitigated sharp differences among the social classes, or authoritarian government, which has arisen in Islamic society beyond the desert. Islamic religion, against its principles through accumalated negative perception, interpretation and practises, with the help of other factors, has lent support to authoritarian tendencies and submissiveness in relation to authority in Arabic society.

4. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR SOCIETAL NORMS DURING BRITISH INFLUENCE (BRITISH MANDATE AND IRAQI KINGDOM 1920–1958)

The Turks, after holding Iraq for nearly four centuries in the Sultan's name, left the country (after the First World War) a little less ignorant, but no less corrupt than it was in the sixteenth century. Iraq passed into the nineteenth century, still backward and undeveloped, still poor because its greater potentialities were neglected and its resources lay untouched, lawless and resentful of its rulers, still not set upon a pathway of progress (Longrigg 1968).
The Ottomans ruled the country according to the principle that the rule of subjects is for the glory and benefit of the ruler, while millions of Iraqi people were starving, bullied and dissatisfied.

World War I put an end to the Ottoman Empire. That war ended a long period of Turkish sovereignty, but brought about another period of occupation when Iraq came under British sovereignty.

The British occupied Iraq step-by-step with their promises to free Iraqi people from the Turks and to give the Arabs a 'free choice', that they might rise once more to greatness and renown (Akrawi 1936, Main 1935). In the beginning the Iraqis (particularly those in the cities) welcomed the British because of what they had suffered under Turkish rule and due to British promises which made them believe that they would have their own national government (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5). But that welcome turned very soon to a murmur when the Iraqians realized that the new rule which had rescued them from Turkish injustices and evils had brought them a new set of injustices and wrongs (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5). Longrigg (1953) stated that in the beginning "Iraq was to witness a period of general public relief and confidence, followed too soon by the accumulation, at first invisibly then openly, of elements of discontent and disorder" (p. 99), especially when people realized that the British promises were not going to be fulfilled. During the war the British made promises which Lady Bell interpreted as 'a regrettable necessity' for gaining domination over the country through the war period (Bell 1928). This raised the people's hopes of attaining national government (Alwardi 1969, vol. 5; Wilson 1936). Also, before the legal institution of the British Mandate in 1922, there was a long period of delay by the British in settling the future status of Iraq. This delay gave time for the Iraqi people to realize that the British were weak and had no settled policy.
From 1914 to 1920 the British set up a form of military government, with military governors, assistant political officers, and deputy governors and a few commissioners for special purposes, all responsible to the Chief Political Officer, who was himself responsible to the general officer commanding the forces. During that period the supervision of the civil administration was confined to a British military governor who was linked in his correspondence and communications with the State Minister for Indian Affairs (Bell 1928).

The British devised a new administrative system to fit their power purposes, and to face the administration's difficulties which increased with the departure of all Ottoman officials who had held responsible positions; when the latter left, they removed all the most important recent records and documents on which the administration depended and they spoilt and destroyed what remained (Bell 1928).

The British applied ideas used in India to the civilian Iraqi administration (Langley 1961). The employees in the provisional administration were mostly British and Indian personnel who were originally drawn from the army or borrowed from India, due to the lack of British civil servants in Iraq at that time (Ireland 1937; Bell 1928). The Iraqians were recruited in a few low positions; their number among senior level government officials was, until 1920 not more than 20 out of 534 officials of the government, while 507 were British and 7 were Indian (Ireland 1937, p. 146). In fact, this was one of the reasons for Iraqi dissatisfaction with British rule in Iraq as their feeling was that it was their right to be employed in those offices (Akrawi 1936).

The administration of occupied Iraq remained, until 1920, the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces exercised through his subordinates. The administration of social
matters, the collection of revenue and relations with the army were
the main functions of the Civil Commissioner's personal office, acting
in the provinces through his political officers (Longrigg 1953). British judges were appointed to manage courts and the police force.

The military officials administered the country on the basis of the laws in force as far as was possible; their decisions regarding the law, the modification and adoption of Turkish Procedures, tribal policy, the structure of the administration and management of the people, directly or indirectly were to contribute to the shaping of the public life of the country (Longrigg 1953). Alwardi notes that Iraqis experienced a new style of rule different from that experienced under the Ottoman occupation; the Turks had exerted a loose rule over the people except in some affairs such as taxes or keeping their power and occupation, but in public life the people had been left to do what they wanted as long as it had not harmed or affected Ottoman authority or their revenue. This had led, consequently, to disorder in many aspects of the social and economic life of the individual and society. Also the Bedouin values had been revived again and the people had begun to solve their problems by themselves or through informal organizations rather than through the government's establishments to the degree that they had been disdainful of appealing for justice through governmental courts. Added to that, the Turkish officials had been lax in applying the laws and regulations due to the influence of nepotism and bribery. Under the British occupation, the people faced a very rigid and rough system which disregarded people's feelings and their social prestige - a kind of system which was unfamiliar to the people and to the prevalent norms and values. The British police, or military men, for example, beat individuals in public who ignored traffic instructions, or who
did not follow some desired rules such as according recognition to the military governor when he passed by in the way they stipulated. Alwardi continues by saying that the Iraqis were not satisfied with the British occupation as they saw that some people who were considered of low rank or common individuals were appointed by the British authorities to positions beside the Indians in many governmental positions. The employment of a considerable number of those individuals in the police force put them in frequent contact with the people who saw them wearing short trousers and special hats as a uniform, all of which was strange and unfamiliar to the Iraqi's at that time (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).

The British domination over Iraq had its influence on the social life and its structure and on peoples' mentality and their material life as they came under the impact of Western culture: they had to face a new set of problems. The large expenditure by the British army, especially at the beginning of their occupation to fill army requirements for food, buildings, communications, etc., resulted in sharp inflation. Trade flourished and big profits were made in many areas. The people observed a lot of money being spent by British troops (Main 1935). Some individuals benefitted from this inflation, particularly the sheikhs and landlords, the merchants and the speculators. Thus, 'The made rich by war' group arose in Iraqi society at that time. The British government in Iraq benefitted too when its revenues from taxation increased up to three times in comparison with the amount during Ottoman rule. But, by and large, numerous people were harmed by the great increase in prices to the degree that they were almost starving (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).

British military control ended after the revolution of 1920 (Main 1935), which is known as Al Thawrat al Iraqieh. In fact, the
effective reasons for that revolution were mainly the rigidity of British rules and insufficient consideration by certain British political officers for the tribal and urban mentality. Also favouritism toward certain tribal sheikhs at the expense of others and the insubordination of the tribes to any control exacerbated the situation. But beside all this and several other factors was the Arab nationalist movement and the support of the mujtahids (religious leaders) for the Iraqi nationalists who strongly backed the tribes against British occupation (Jamali 1934; Akrawi 1936). After that revolution British authority felt the need to establish a civil administration, since the Iraqis were dissatisfied with the British military administration with its rigidity and the tense atmosphere created by military law. So in March 1921 it was decided by the British to create an hereditary kingship of Iraq and make Faisal a King of Iraq, under the British Mandate. In fact the British made it clear to Faisal before they made him King "That his candidature for the throne of Iraq must be conditional on his support of British policy" (Main 1935, pp. 87-88).

During the British Mandate (1920-1932) the civil administration was taken over by the new High Commissioner. A number of British political officers became the advisers of the new government ministers and the mutasarrifs (provinces governors). These advisers were responsible to the High Commissioner who had supreme control (Main 1935). In the relationship between these advisers and the Iraqi government, there was "emphasis on the advance information to be given by the Advisers through the High Commissioner to the British Government regarding any step proposed by the Iraqi Government which might affect the international and financial obligations of the British Government" (Main 1936, p. 86). Although the function of
those advisers was not intended to be executive but advisory, in reality the executive functions were discovered when people realized that the real power was in the hands of the advisers and not the ministers, for although the ministers were the formal power holders and were supposed to be responsible to the Iraqi Parliament, the British advisers were operating the real power behind the scenes. So, the people preferred to go directly to the adviser, rather than to the minister in their communications because they were sure that their problems would not be solved without the approval of the adviser (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 6).

The administration of the Mandate with its system of Iraqi ministers and civil service and British advisers, says Langley (1961) "may have lacked clarity as far as local understanding of the source of power was concerned" (p. 133). In fact there was no clear-cut line separating the authorities and responsibilities of the the Mandate's authority from that of the Iraqi government (Alkhattab 1973).

The power during the British Occupation and Mandate of Iraq remained extremely centralized, as it had been under Turkish rule - but in Baghdad instead of Constantinople (Langley 1961). A special council - consisting of British and Indian members who were appointed with the approval of the British Commissioner and who held the major administrative assignments in the government - was the main authority to appoint officials to Iraqi government positions (Al-Shamsie 1979). The Iraqis were sensitive to the employment of British and Indian personnel, especially to key positions, while most of the efficient Iraqis at that time were expatriated to Syria and Hejaz (Al-marayati 1961). The strategic positions inside Iraqi administrative machinery were held by British officials in order to practise the actual supervision of government management and therefore to keep power in their hands (Al-Shamsie 1979).
The Iraqi administrative body, half of which was inherited from the Turks and half established by the British military, suffered from many shortcomings and omissions. In fact one of the most important problems of the administrative body in Iraq of that time was mistrust between Iraqi officials and British advisers (AlKhattab 1973). As well as this, there were the added problems of the newness of the administrative system itself, the inter-weaving of responsibilities, the lack of civil service regulations which organized the processes of appointment and promotion in government service (Ireland 1937) and the differences in motives of both the Iraqi and the British officials in the administrative work. The fact is that the object of the High Commissioner during British Mandate of Iraq, was as Main stated, "to gain political advantages for Britain". The Advisers were specially selected with the view that British interests, especially financial ones, should be safeguarded (Main 1935, pp. 88-89). So the motives of the British officials and the advisers were concentrated on how to keep their government's interests safe, while the issues relating to the progress of the country or its peoples' needs were considered a secondary matter (Ireland 1937). Meantime, the Iraqi officials became increasingly aware of national feeling and of the fact that the real power in the country was in British hands. They began, with many other people, to point out that it was anomalous to have a double set of officials in each department paid by the Iraqi government. In addition the British adviser was receiving a salary very much bigger than that of an Iraqi executive. People also pointed out that in many cases British officials were obviously second-rate or even third-rate men, who had been chosen during the war, when the occupation authorities were looking for individuals of a particular military rank (Main 1935). So accordingly, the Iraqi official released himself from
the advice of the British adviser whenever there was an increase in national feeling and opposition among the Iraqi people. As the British had appointed many of their patrons in administrative positions, so did the Iraqi officials favour their relatives or supporters (Alkattab 1973).

The Effendis (officials and officers who served during Turkish rule) remained loyal to the Turks during the First World War and British occupation. Their attitude was anti-British and called for the immediate creation of an extensive Arab officialdom. Most of them during that period had lost their jobs and did not have the financial resources to support themselves. Their influence in the society and politics of Baghdad was considerable as they had the respect of the people because of their general knowledge, even though what they really had was merely a shallow acquaintance, it was considered considerable at that time and useful for the domination of the ignorant. The British, up to the revolution of 1920, neglected the Effendis, but during the Mandate, after they realized the influence of the Effendis on the people, they appointed them widely in different positions in the administrative body and worked to gain their loyalty (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).

With the passing of time, two contrasting points of view appeared among the Iraqi officials; on one hand there was a demand for a complete, national administration regardless of British advice, whilst on the other hand there was a demand for more co-operation with Britain (Alkhattab 1973).

The British began to eliminate some Iraqi officials in higher ranks who opposed British policy and were disloyal to them (as happened in Hilla and Dewaneya provinces) (Alkhattab 1973).
After the establishment of the new Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, some tribes of southern Iraq, who had taken an active part in the revolution of 1920, showed discontent toward the formation of a government which they believed was made up ofEffendisfrom the cities and who were thought to be hostile to tribal interests (Jamali 1934). From the very beginning the term Mandate was offensive to nationalist leaders as it indicated a sense of 'command' instead of 'trusteeship'; they also felt that the real power in their government was in British hands. This dissatisfaction contributed to the growth of anti-British feeling amongst different kinds of people in Iraqi society.

Iraq, by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 became independent in 1932, thereafter becoming a member of the League of Nations. But the attitude of the Iraqi opposition nationalists was that the 1932 independence was neither real nor complete. Britain's policy, which negotiated and agreed to Iraqi independence, especially politically and militarily, was as Main puts it "to hold to essentials and let the rest go" (Main 1935, p. 101). The 1930 treaty gave Britain certain political, economic and strategic advantages at a relatively low cost. The influence of the British continued in Iraq even after 'independence' but in another form and through the treaty of 1930 and all its agreements.

Iraq progressed a little during the inter-war period – from British Mandate to the independence of 1932 – but its economic development during the twenties or the depression years of the early thirties was very limited and mainly in specific areas such as agriculture, transport and communication, construction and social services. The government's role in business and its intervention in economic life started to increase after the establishment of an Iraqi government in 1921, but that role expanded more after independence for
many social, political and economical reasons, and became more extensive after 1950, when income from the oil trade increased and the public sector grew (Aboona 1975). After the revolution of 1958 the role of the government in economic life became more positive in order to achieve the economic independence of Iraq through the strengthening of the public sector, but the private sector still dominated particularly in local industry and trade, and was expected to play an important role in economic development. Later the replacement of 'old' regimes by more 'nationalist' ones with the desire for greater control of the nations' wealth and resources and fairer distribution of them lead in 1964 to a new policy, known as 'Arab Socialism'. By that policy, the public sector started to play a dominant role which it had never done before. When the revenue from oil sharply increased during the early fifties, government expenditure on economic development increased greatly. But very little was spent on social welfare, and the effect of development expenditure, as Warriner noted, was: "to make the contrast between rich and poor more striking. The great increase in imports benefitted chiefly the rich, whose consumption of cars, air-conditioning and luxurious new houses is very conspicuous. The sarifa (mud hut) slums were growing fast without sewage or drinking-water" (Warriner 1962, p. 125).

Consequently, through the extension of the government's role, the government administration, or public services started to play a vital role in social life and all levels of society expected leadership from the government and hence from government officials.

The period between 1932-1958 was distinguished first by the political instability, many revolts and rebellion movements, for example 1936, in May 1948 and in 1948-1953; and secondly, by an increase in the struggle for power and authority, particularly in the Cabinet, which was formed for the first time in 1920-1921.
The Monarchy system in Iraq between 1920 and 1958 had imprinted on its structure the behaviour and relations of its individuals, manifestations of a "Bureaucratic Polity", as Alhasso (1979) remarks. In that system the political authority (the Parliament) was weak and not able to direct and control the administrative body (the executive authority). Theoretically the legislative authority (Parliament) was responsible for policy-making and following-up the executive authority (the Cabinet) which represented the top of the administrative apparatus. In reality the Monarchy system suffered a lot from the absence of any effective political constitution (Parliament, parties) capable of directing the administrative body and its leaders towards meeting the public benefit. On the contrary, the Cabinet played a dominant role in the political system (Alhasani 1953). Meantime, a contradictory phenomenon distinguished that period. This was the weakness of the formal authority of the ministerial positions (which appeared in rapid succession in the Cabinet, i.e. a change of Cabinet nearly every 8 months) (Alhasso 1979, p. 22). This was due to different political, economic and social factors, such as the existence of informal pressure groups (tribes, civilian and military cliques) which were increasing their influence over the governmental body. This weakness in formal authority increased the tendency towards more dependence upon the informal sources of power, viz, allied relations with the tribes, blood ties and wealth.

In fact, wealth became an important source of power and a political motivator in Iraqi administration and society during the Monarchy. High ranking administrative officials (the elite) were appointed in political circles, who paid little attention to serving the needs of the people. By such engagements 'powers centres' emerged which were continuously battling in an attempt to protect or ensure
their own interests in reaching the high-ranking positions in the administrative apparatus (particularly the Ministerial positions), and in protecting such positions whenever possible if they were already occupying them. In fact that struggle for power was motivated by the unsatisfied 'superiority propensity' the inhabitants of the cities inherited from the Bedouin culture and was encouraged by traditional respect for power.

As has been said before, this period displayed an absence of strong political constitutions. Power was concentrated in the hands of high-ranking officials at the top of the administration, many of whom did not consider authority as a means to serve and develop the interests of the people but as a means (and end in itself) to serve their own interests (Alhasso 1979).

The period of Kingdom rule, also encouraged taking advantage of the authority attached to governmental positions for personal benefit and interests, particularly in gaining an illegal income. The high-ranking positions in the administrative body became a source of wealth for some of those individuals who occupied these positions, especially the Ministerial positions. Examples of abuse of authority could be seen in different ways, for example they misused the personnel to the degree that some of their subordinates were employed as personal gardeners or servants in private houses (Alhasani 1953). Also they utilized the public domain for their own benefit and many of them became wealthy individuals and owners of property and farms within a short period of time. More features of this corruption could be seen in their relationship with their clients. The public and especially some sections of society were subject to that corruption; the merchants, for example, were under continuous pressure either to bribe influential people or under threat of being denied governmental-
controlled import licenses (Alhasani 1953). It is necessary to point out here that the corruption was a way of getting legal rights. Unfortunately the phenomenon of corruption gradually penetrated other levels in the administrative hierarchy. In fact during that period civil servants in Iraq were basically under-paid; also, as Main states "they have had their salaries cut and their complements reduced, while British and Indian officials, on contracts, have seen their rates of pay maintained if not increased" (p. 168). Another factor which led to the corruption was that Iraqis of the official class adopted far too high a standard of living through the influence of the British and the Western way of life (Main 1935).

In the previous pages, it has been shown that formal authority was abused for personal benefit by some of the high-ranking officials at the top of the administration. But at the same time the collecting of wealth was not merely an end in itself, but more a means of obtaining power. Wealth in this period became an important dimension for gaining power and for realizing wider objectives, e.g. for developing and protecting the social, economic and political position and prestige of many individuals at the top of the administration, politicians and influential people (Alhasso 1979). Wealth was considered as a means in itself in order to keep a high standard of living, which was in its turn, a reflection of having and maintaining power, thus serving the immediate, short and long term objectives of those individuals in the service or those who are looking for high-ranking positions or willing to re-enter such positions. The luxurious life-style was an important symbol of wealth and consequently of power in the eyes of the people. Wealth was one of the means used to support the basis of authority by developing the informal power of the politicians, whether they were inside or outside
'Strategic spending' was a device for long-term objectives by which individuals spent money on followers and supporters in order to gain their loyalty and support when necessary, and to prevent them from moving to other rivals (Alhasso 1979).

The phenomenon of using wealth for getting more power has often been dressed up in different shapes but, by and large, it benefitted from some of the social traditions and values inherited from Bedouin culture, such as generosity and hospitality. Such values have an especially high respect in most of the Arab world, where the individual's social evaluation and prestige is according to the degree of his obligation to the traditional cultural framework. Such traditions and values have, unfortunately, been diverted from their original meanings by those individuals who have used them as a means for getting and maintaining their own personal power, illegal wealth and more alliances and followers (Alhasani 1953). The higher the political and official position of the individual, the more important was wealth for him to gain alliances, especially if his family's wealth and his formal income (salary) were limited and not sufficient for his strategic spending. So some of those individuals had recourse to corruption to obtain wealth. As they were mostly at the top of their ministerial hierarchy, it was not easy for them to reach the sources of wealth directly within their organizations because of the structural and geographical distribution of their organizational hierarchy; these resources were under the direct supervision of other individuals who occupied lower levels in the hierarchy in different parts in the country. Such being the case, those high-ranking occupiers were keen to avoid scandals and accusations of corruption from their society so they established informal links with the individuals in the lower levels who supervised the resources and who
themselves had a predisposition to operate willingly in the direction of unlawful appropriation. In fact that kind of informal and personal work-relationship played an important role in administration and politics in Iraq at that time (Alhaidari 1963). Low-ranking officials, who were serving the personal objectives of the high-ranking officials, secured for their loyalty advantages and privileges such as financial rewards, leaves, promotions and higher positions, etc. (Alhasso 1979).

As has been previously described, the economic dimension was an important reason for the emergence of the 'cliques' in the administrative context. The relationship between the position and the financial availability increased the struggle for authority and power in high-ranking governmental positions at that time.

Those individuals at the top of the administration were interested in disclosing their relationships and in being associated with persons who were regarded as socially important and powerful, such as clergymen and tribal sheikhs. The significance of showing this kind of relationship is of giving others the impression of power and of gaining support from important people who have a certain prestige in the society. So it was very important for these high-ranking officials to build personal relationships through social meetings, invitations for dinner or lunch,...etc. As they perceived it, the higher the number of one's guests and social activities, the higher one's prestige and impression of generosity and influence will be in society. This was consequently very important in power calculations (Alhasso 1979).

The entry of wealth as an important dimension for power was one of the reasons for stimulating the rivalry and divisions between high-ranking officials. The struggle increased in the administrative body
as each minister or influential person tried to hold the positions of his alliances and followers. This increased the dependency on the subjective criteria in the appointments and shifting in positions. In particular ministerial changes usually brought about a redistribution of the posts of all grades. Also a government appointment became, after 1920, attractive and was regarded by most Iraqis as the goal of their education. This was partially a legacy of Turkish times, when the traditionally-held jobs for educated men were in the government, and the post of government official was the highest position a non-Turk could attain (Main 1935).

Because of oversupply of candidates for the civil service and the consequent creation of jobs, several unsuitable people were appointed to the administrative body. Underemployment became endemic with apathy, nepotism, rigid and inflexible regulations, shifting responsibility, preoccupation with security, status, prestige, formalities rather than performance and level of service, and extreme centralization, which was brought about partly because most of those who reached the ministerial positions between 1923-1941 were graduated from military schools (Alhussrie 1960). All these factors, along with many other shortcomings, contributed to ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the administration. Also there was a lack of serious interest in the detailed administration of the country and its development, while office and power continued to be largely confined to a narrow circle of some influential families, who were supporting the government on condition that their wealth and privileges remained untouched (Warriner 1962).

In fact the British, in the formation of the first Iraqi Cabinet in 1920, were keen to choose those who had social power and prestige to occupy ministerial positions, in order to use their informal and power to boost the monarchy rule in Iraq (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 6).
Meantime, governmental positions acquired and increasing importance as a potential source of power during the Mandatory and the Monarchial periods, and the influential and the power-seekers struggled to obtain it. Thus, the position was considered prestigious and to be acquired, rather than a duty and responsibility. This, along with other factors, led subordinates and other individuals outside the governmental jobs to show more personal loyalty to the occupiers of high-ranking positions.

Akrawi (1936) described the civil servants at that time as considering themselves a privileged and a bureaucratic class above the mass of the people. They tried to make themselves respected and their presence felt. This was possible because the people themselves accorded the civil servant full respect and honour. What increased the distance between the civil servants and the people was that the civil service was, in Turkish days, the preserve of the town Arabs, who tended to ignore the basic agricultural needs and interests of a greater part of the population. In fact, the ministries and parliament were dominated by the big landowners from the town and even more by the feudal sheikhs who were against any movement which could threaten their political and social power.

The growth of feudalism under British Mandate and Monarchy:

The changes that happened within Bedouin society as a result of the Ottoman policy of dealing with the tribes and their adaptation to the new environment's conditions in their coming to Iraq have already been dealt with.

Since the First World War, the impact of Western influences made the Iraqi people face a new set of problems and a new culture. Bedouin tribes, no less than the town population, were affected. In
fact imperceptibly these changes had been under way for a long time before the days of Midhat Pash, but these changes became even more pronounced during the period after the First World War (Jamali 1934).

British influence was making itself felt among the tribal population of Iraq. The Ottoman government was at no time able to win the sympathy of all the tribes. The British before and during the war tried to win, by money and arms, the allegiance of the tribes against the Ottoman, or at least to keep them neutral. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, tried to arouse the religious emotions of the tribes. The result was a perplexing situation for the tribes, some of the tribal sheikhs giving the allegiance to the British, while others opposed the British as infidels. Still others wavered between the British and the Turks (Jamali 1934). In fact, by the last days of the Ottoman Empire before World War 1, the tribes were weakened in their resistance to government and the sheikhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics (Longrigg 1953). So among the tribes there was a feeling of uncertainty; they feared those who had allied themselves to one power or the other with respect to their own future when the war was over. The First World War not only affected the tribes psychologically but also their material life, and stimulated their political thoughts and shaped their attitudes (Jamali 1934).

The British administration, Jamali (1934) remarks, had the Ottoman policy and its shortcomings in mind, especially when it began to deal with the tribes. They tried to impress the tribes with their strength and greatness, and they adopted definite policies which utilized the power of the sheikhs for British objectives. They followed similar methods of Turkish administration in exerting their control over the Bedouin tribes through the influence of the prominent
sheikhs. Instead of instituting a single unified system of law for all the people, the British recognized tribal customary law and treated the tribes as a separate category of people to be governed under a separate body of laws known as the "Tribal Disputes Regulation" issued in 1916, which continued to exist until the revolution of 1958. So Iraq not only faced duality in its social structure due to the existence of tribes within the larger society, but until quite recently was facing these historic issues of duality in law and all the conflicts and tensions rising out of it (Al-Wahab 1964). In fact this law gave the sheikhs more power as they became legally responsible for controlling disputes among tribesmen.

The British authorities employed the most important sheikh in each area in Iraq, as a government representative to his area or as a Mudir (manager) and supported him with money and arms (Jamali 1934). In fact they chose only those who showed their loyalty and friendship, or who had old relationships with them from Turkish days (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5). Wilson notes that those sheikhs soon appreciated the value of an official position with the title of Mudir and a salary, so they were willing to obey any order sooner than risk losing it (Wilson 1930).

The British favouritism toward certain tribal sheikhs at the expense of others, the insufficient consideration for tribal mentality, and the British rigidity were factors in bringing about the Iraqi revolution in 1920. The period after 1920 witnessed a greater growth of feudalism; the British authorities started to support and reward those sheikhs who did not participate in the Iraqi revolution of 1920 and thus made it easy for them to acquire lands as their own property (Althahir 1946). Some sheikhs came to own land exceeding 1 million donums (donum = 2500 sq. meters) Warriner 1962. As a source
of wealth they depended partly on investment in pumps or machinery, partly on the exploitation of the cultivators.

Many sheiks had a tenancy-right to state land through Midhat Pasha's land settlement policy, and those sheikhs eventually began to consider themselves the real owners of the tribal *dirah* which originally was state land. In fact these were consolidated by the land settlement of title to land carried out from 1933 under the supervision of British officials and by the settlement law of 1932 which made the sheikhs the landholders since they became the legal owners of the *dirah*. The great sheikhs became the owners of vast areas of land on which they employed hundreds of tribesmen as share-cropping *fellahin*, with no rights or status (Warriner 1962). The *fellah* (who was merely a peasant labourer) was, by the law of 1932, tied to the land. He could not leave the land as long as he was in debt to the landowner and as he was usually in debt, he was in effect a serf, and had no security or freedom of action. Also the 1940 law for the sale of land greatly accelerated the process of assigning tribal land to large landowners, especially in the flow-irrigated regions. In fact as in the kingdom state, the large landowners were powerful, thus the strong pressure to introduce the system of land registration of 1932 came from the sheikh landholders, who in the past had resisted the central government in its efforts to register land in individual holdings in the names of the cultivators. So under that system the wealthy used the state against the cultivators, the state was not aimed at securing the rights of the cultivators against the wealthy (Warriner 1962).

The sheikhs under Ottoman rule, British Mandate and the Monarchy were all powerful, and their power increased enormously because they became the largest feudal landowners. Issawi (1966 a) remarks that
"[by] the 1950's, some 85 percent of the arable land was owned by only 33,000 persons and the bulk of the rural population was landless" (p. 145). Some Sheikhs starting from Ottoman times, became cruel and autocratic. Each of them surrounded himself with a body of armed ruffians from his own tribe to act as his bodyguards and keep the peasants in subjection. The sheikh was able to control the peasants with the support of his bodyguards, the official police force and the government machinery. Some sheikhs even had insanitary prisons, into which their victims would be thrown until they promised to obey their master and no peasant dared to complain or tried to prevent the sheikh from stealing his produce or refuse to work on his land (Alwardi 1965). The sheikh who became a feudal landlord collected an enormous amount of wealth for which he had not worked at all. They became more involved in city life, most of them lived in Baghdad or their local province headquarters and departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures. It became usual to find sheikhs owning private motor cars manufactured in the United States and residing in 'palaces' while their sons could go, and went, to higher education and Western sophistication in Beirut, Cambridge or Columbia (Longrigg 1953). While the sheikh lived in luxury and extravagance, the fallah was in dire poverty and ignorance. In fact the fallah was not only at the mercy of the powerful sheikh, but also at the mercy of the new feudal class consisting of townsmen (i.e. the Effendis) as they were the owners of pumps installed in their land (Althahir 1946).

The prestige of the sheikhs rested on their formal function as leaders in a tribal society. The foundation of the new kingdom strengthened them, giving them legal ownership of land and representation in Parliament, but at the same time weakened them by removing the need for tribal wars and tribal rule, through the
creation of a national army and a national administration. Thus the sheikhs secured a position of privilege in the state, without obligation to it (Warriner 1962). They became involved in city life and associated socially with the Effendis. They became involved in politics and sought ministerial positions in order to influence the government for their own benefit. There was no social or political force which could challenge the power of the sheikhs. Some said that three pillars were the real government of Iraq at that time – King Faisal, General Maude (British), and Sadun (i.e. the landowners) (Warriner 1962). The policy was that the conventions of independence must be maintained, in particular the facade of parliamentary sovereignty, to show that Britain did not intervene. 'The sheikhs', says Warriner (1962), "of course, have power and prestige outside this facade, of which they are the other main support... Government policy is never initiated by the sheikhs, but by the Prime Minister supported on the two-fold base of British influence and the large landowners" (p. 173).

The sheikh in the village, however, was trying his best to emulate the values, ethics and tradition of the Bedouin sheikh. He still wanted to be brave and generous, and wished to give his protection or dakhala to those who sought protection from him, but he was not able to do so because of the government authority which pressurized him into giving up the protected person to them. The sheikh in doing so came under two conflicting pressures, one his Bedouin norms, and the other the government. So the sheikh in the settlement environment, as Alwardi (1965) notes, was under a "cultural ambivalence" and started to suffer from a "schizoid personality" as his tradition pushed him towards Bedouin values and norms on the one side, and the new environment with the authority of the government and
its domination forced him to be autocratic and arbitrary on the other. But the sheikhs were not all on the same level of duality; some of them tended to be chivalrous while others tended to be authoritative (p. 201). In general the sheikh became self-centered rather than tribe-centered.

Nevertheless, the Bedouin values, such as hospitality and having the mudhif (the guest-house and civic and social centre), which were not contradictory to the new environment's requirements, continued to exist strongly within tribal life. The tribesmen like the sheikhs were under great pressures in the settlement environment in Iraq, which pushed them gradually away from many Bedouin characteristics. Through their old tradition, their sheikh had to maintain the tribal militia and keep the mudhif open to welcome guests, so revenues to enable the sheikh to carry out these duties were collected from the tribesmen by the sirkals (sheikh agents). The tribesmen also had to provide the sheikh with large portions of their crops as his income from the land, in addition to paying taxes to the government. The fellah was unable to meet all these heavy demands, because it meant more poverty and starvation. Thus, his living difficulties pushed him to submit to the sheikh's agents (sirkals) and the government tax collectors (Alwardi 1965) in the hope that this submission would gain their pity and protect him from giving them most of his low income or crop. He submitted to the will of master in the hope that this submission would satisfy the sheikh and leave him some kind of existence. Also he tried to avoid paying the tax collectors by providing them with false information. But at the same time in his relationship with other tribesmen or his peers, he continued to follow the Bedouin characteristics of pride, dignity, etc. In fact, these circumstances on one side and the ties with Bedouin tradition on the
other have only deepened the phenomenon of schizoid personality and the duality in norms and values in fellah life (Alwardi 1965). However, it is important to realize that the Bedouin (who became fellah) with his desert heritage of freedom and independence hardly bowed to the material riches of his sheikh. Starvation and poverty were not new to him. Thus his loyalty to his tribe and his respect for the tribal leadership of the sheikh did not break down, but no doubt the sheikh's prestige and bonds with his followers weakened gradually.

In Iraqi society, like any other agricultural economy, respect for power is traditional. Also people associate leadership (i.e., the government) with a paternalistic attitude: leadership and power are accepted as synonymous.

The feudal system was originally a deviation of the tribal system through the negative change of the Bedouin culture under the conditions of the settlement's environment in Iraq and the influence of the Ottoman and British powers. Thus it was not merely an economic relationship system, but more it was the backbone of the whole social structure on which the social, political, educational and even religious systems were based (Kubba 1957). Main noticed this phenomenon in Iraqi society at this time (Mandate and Independence period) when he remarked that in villages and towns the "social structure is feudal" (Main 1935, p. 25).

Iraqi nationalists remained dissatisfied with the Iraqi kingdom system and British influence. They tended to concur with a Pan-Arab movement, and aimed at freeing all the Arab world from European control and to achieve a full independence. The Iraqi army came to be regarded as a chosen instrument for this policy and began to acquire an unforeseen influence in Iraqi politics which lead the latter to
come to power in the revolution of 14th July 1958 which overthrew the monarchy system, and set up the new Iraqi republican system.

After that revolution, during the sixties, the country witnessed a period of continuous changes in political regimes until 1968, and political instability which dominated the social and economical life as well. Meantime, civil administration was conducted largely along military lines because many militants had been appointed to top management positions. Thus, because of their educational and work background, these army officers began to adopt and apply the military style of behaviour in the civil organizations which they headed, (Al-Atiyyah, 1977). This behaviour was evident in the superior-subordinate relationship practiced by those militants where they expected absolute unquestioning obedience from their subordinates. Inconsistent behaviour with such expectations usually resulted in severe punishment, in different ways, for disobedience. In addition, these militants were inefficient and incompetent in civil administration and the only merit which entitled them for these positions was their loyalty to the dominating political authority. Consequently, the administrative body deteriorated both in its effectiveness and efficiency and in its personal morale. Moreover, political considerations dominated the administrative milieu, (Al-Atiyyah, 1977). Particularly in the early years of the regimes, 'loyalty' was given precedence to 'efficiency' in order to give the regime a greater foundation. It has been stated, that during the sixties, most managerial leaders in top positions were those whose scientific and practical qualifications and experiences did not suit the nature of jobs and positions assigned to them, (Aljawishli, 1967). The result of this, was their complete dependence on middle and junior managerial levels, and the conversion of the leadership into a
bureaucratic and inefficient force. The political appointments, instability, high turnover, and insecurity and uncertainty lead the managerial leaders to comply with the authority and to show their loyalty by following their instructions strictly (Al-Atiyyah 1977), thus emphasizing urgent and immediate tasks, even at the expense of long term plans. This was done in order to secure themselves positions. Iraq, like most developing countries who were embarking on state ownership on a large scale, has suffered from a severe shortage of national experts who have sufficient scientific and technical qualifications to occupy the administrative positions particularly in the leadership positions. This shortage has been increased by the "Governmental Purification Law" which led the administration to lose many qualified and efficient persons (Al-Aisamie 1969).

Since the 1958 revolution, there has been a fundamental change in economic activity and political economy, especially the agrarian land reform which effectively terminated the prevailing feudal system through a greater role for the government in land expropriation and distribution, and the strongest growth in the size and influence of the public sector after the extensive nationalization move in 1964. All private banks and insurance companies, the three trading companies, and 27 industrial companies were nationalized. Also by 1961 the first move towards the nationalization of oil was taken; by 1972 and 1973 the most important economic sector has been brought under virtually full national control (Aboona 1975). The country since the 1958 revolution has started to move extensively toward industrialization which is regarded as the main hope for economic development and military and political power.

Before the sixties, management did not receive the same degree of attention as other activities. There was a lack of recognition of
management as a profession or subject; little or no attention was paid to the issue of efficiency, quality requirements, management, education and training. As a result management became more of a bottle-neck to national development than technology, capital, labour and other factors.

The first signs of a serious recognition of the need for management improvement was in the early sixties. Since the late sixties and particularly in more recent years, there has been a widespread awareness of the need for management improvements, particularly in the public sector.

Although many steps have been taken since the fifties to meet the need for rapid improvement which was recognized by international consultants and experts, Iraq still suffers from a large number of shortcomings and managerial problems with some variations in type and degree. The underdevelopment, even today, of Iraqi management and administration is still recognized as being one of the main obstacles to rapid economic and social progress.

Since 1970 management development has begun to be considered as an integral part of economic development and in 1972 a new step was taken by declaring, through the Resolution No. (333), a plan for Management Development in Iraq. The Industrial Management Development Centre which was established in 1962 and reorganized and expanded in 1970, became the National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development (NCCMD) (Al-Rubaie 1983). This centre became the focal point of all management and administrative development or reform activities. The government's formal support was given to the NCCMD and also to the "organisation and methods units" which have been established according to Resolution No. (333) which provided a legal framework for their activities. But the change is still seen as too
slow and ineffective. Many of these problems, such as 'bureaucracy' and 'routine' upon which war was declared many times by many public figures or government ministers, still obviously exist strongly in the administrative body. Also the tendency is to deal with superficial symptoms rather than root causes and to emphasize minor immediate problems rather than major long-term ones. Moreover, all the management and administrative development effort has been concentrated on the structural framework for development, such as organizational structure, procedures, laws, regulations, economical aspects, etc. These efforts do not take into account the gap that exists in the whole life of the country between the development of the physical framework and that in the social structure, norms and values, and social relationships. Iraqi society during the fifties, with its half-tribal, half-urban structure was facing, as Warriner notes: "the task of constructing the physical framework for development and also the social structure for expansion" (Warriner 1962, p. 175). Since that time the physical framework has received major emphasis on the development particularly after the nationalization in 1972 of the main international oil operations in Iraq and the sharp increasing of oil revenue and the emphasis on economic development, which is considered necessary for the national strength and high standards of living. The social structure has not received the same efforts in development in order to suit the development of the physical framework and its requirements. In fact the gap between the economic potential of Iraq and the social structure has been clear since the fifties when Warriner commented on the change that started to occur in society by saying: "it is inaccurate to speak of conflict between the old and new society, for the old society is collapsing, and if the new society is represented by the urban agglomeration of Baghdad, then it is
taking the imprint of the West like wax - the superficial imprint, without the things that the Western world believes to be its best".

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

An attempt has been made in this chapter to identify as well as account for the societal norms and values that are historically embedded in the evolution of Iraqi's social and institutional development particularly in relation to authority. In studying this evolution, four stages have been devised which cumulatively have crystalized Iraqi culture, particularly its societal norms of power and authority. These stages deal with power and authority and their societal norms in the Bedouin culture, in Islamic culture, during the Ottoman Empire, and during British Influence. By referring to the historical development of Iraqi political, social, economic and other institutions through the above stages and by the manner in which basic events and crises have been handled, it becomes possible to assess the original identity of Iraqi culture and the identity that this culture has acquired through evolution. Despite the fact that principles of 'equality', 'justice' and 'democracy' lie at the heart of Bedouin culture and Islam which are the most important elements in the crystallization of Iraqi culture, this culture has through a very long history of suffering, acquired an identity which is far away from such principles. So neither Bedouin small power-distance and principles of democracy and strong equality nor those of Islam have been able to exist in Iraqi culture and to prevent the large power-distance, inequality and authoritarian tendencies which have shaped a great part of Iraqi culture. Moreover, the distorted development of Bedouin culture during Ottoman and British influences and of the interpretation and practices of some Islamic relevant teachings have
lent fundamental support to such authoritarianism in power or authority relationship in Iraqi culture. Islam, which is meant to be a social revolution against inequality, injustice, and all kinds of arbitrariness, started to depart from these principles, particularly in reaching and exercising power and authority since the Umayyad rule. Also starting from that time the power-distance in Islamic culture got wider and wider between rulers and ruled, but to various degrees from one period to another, but it was wider than ever and was seldom bridged during the Ottoman period. In fact Ottoman rule has resulted, to a great extent, in a misconception of the Islamic teachings among people in Iraqi society, as the Ottomans interpreted and practiced these teachings as a means of upholding authority and power. This distorted development of the interpretation and practices of Islam have an important impact on social life since religious influences extend to all social institutions, and govern people's thinking. Also most fanatical religious thinkers justify submission to power and authority regardless of its just or unjust nature in many different ways and they limit the right to ijtihad (i.e. innovations) because for them it may change accepted doctrines and practices, and result in confusion. Thus an extraordinary gulf has arisen between the Islamic ideal and reality, and Islam which is meant to be a 'way of life' became a religion that organizes the relation with God much more than a political, economical, and social system which organizes the interrelationships within the society. While traditionalists resist accommodating the ideals in the reality of social life, social life failed to be raised to the ideal of Islam.

The distorted development of Bedouin tribal culture under Ottoman and British occupations has also highly supported the
authoritarian tendencies in power-relationships in Iraqi society. The Bedouin traditional power and authority relationship, with its sense of democracy and extreme equality have changed, under the impact of Ottoman and British policies, to a 'feudal-type' of relationship with a dominant-submissive authoritarian pattern. The growth of the feudal system has had an important impact on Iraqi societal norms, because this system was not simply an economic system but rather a social one, as it was a distorted development of Bedouin culture in the desert, which is one of the basic components of Iraqi culture. Thus this system combined the basic features of all patterns of power relationships and their norms and values in Iraqi society. So the two-way communication of Bedouin traditional-charismatic authority with its sense of 'rational agreement' deviated, as happened with that of the very early Islamic society, to become an authoritarian one-way type of communications.

'Power' continues to be, as it was in the Bedouin culture, an essential element and a great motivator to satisfy individual's inherited traditional 'superiority propensity'. But this cultural concern for power has moved in practice from a "socialized" Bedouin democratic type to a "personal" authoritarian one (McClelland and Burnham 1980, p. 288). This personal type of power manifests itself clearly in the Iraqi administrative body, half of which was inherited from Turks, and half established by the British military rulers. Also this personal type of power manifests itself in the extreme struggle for power and influence that characterizes many different periods of Iraqi contemporary society, as was very clear during British influence, particularly in the period of the Monarchy system. Here formal authority was abused for personal benefit and wealth became an important means for getting power and personal loyalty. In
fact the British domination over Iraq had its influence on social life and its structure and peoples' mentality and their material life: they came under the impact of Western culture, which brought a new set of problems.

Also such concern with a personal type of power appeared in the continuous changes in political regimes until 1968, and in the political instability which dominated the social and economical life in Iraqi society. The managing of the civil administration by military who were appointed to top management positions also contributed to the large power-distance between superiors and subordinates in Iraqi work organizations. Also the political considerations dominated organizational life, which generated instability, insecurity and uncertainty, and led to more compliant hierarchical relationships. Despite the recognition in the early sixties of the need for management development, the effort has been concentrated on the structural framework or on the organizational 'hard' aspects, rather than 'soft' aspects, while totally ignoring the culture of wider society and of organizations.
CHAPTER (5)

THE DOMINANT VALUE-ORIENTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAQI SOCIETY RELATED TO IRAQI ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS
It is difficult to study the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi societal norms because of the scarcity of data and the types of studies which deal with such evolution; most of what is available is either out of date or is of a purely historical nature. The same is true regarding the studies about individuals' general traits in Iraqi society; most of what is available is either about the Arab society as a whole or Middle Eastern societies in general. In addition, a great many of these studies was written by foreigners who view the society from the outside and through their own cultural concepts. Also, these studies have not taken into account the changes that have been occurring in social ideologies, principles and cultural revivals. Most of the social-psychological studies dealing with the 'basic Arab personality' have been criticised for their reliance on anecdotal reports, and as has already been stated, for their inadequacy in explaining Arab collective behaviour (Moughrabi 1978). In fact many of the traits that have contributed to the Arabic personality, as well as many cultural phenomena and socialization patterns - particularly the dominant child-rearing practices that have been distinguished in the Arab world - become extremely difficult (with the new evidences) to categorize as typical of Arab societies or typical characteristics of Arabs only. Evidence is available that similar cultural phenomena and some socialization practices - i.e. in child-rearing - that can be recognized in the Arab world also exist in the non-Arabic Moslim countries e.g. Iran (Tayeb 1981), and Turkey (Kagitabasi 1970). While all these studies would suggest the crucial influence of Islam and its interpretation in shaping the cultural phenomena and the socialization practices in Arabic or non-Arabic Islamic societies, once again we cannot consider
all these phenomena and practices as typical of Islamic societies only. There is much evidence of similar phenomena and practices to varying degrees in many European countries (Hofstede 1980), such as Italy (Ferraratti 1959). Similar cultural phenomena that were observed and studied in my field work in Iraqi organizations in 1980 have distinguished in organizations in other Islamic countries - Iran (Tayeb 1981) - and also in organizations in France (Grozier 1964, 1969), and England (Bate 1982), as will be shown later.

Thus, it is quite possible to find cultural phenomena and characteristics similar to those of Arabic and Islamic societies in any other society, particularly in those countries who rank 'high' in the cultural dimensions, as applied by Hofstede (1980) in his international study. But this similarity or universality in dimensions is associated with cultural variation, and thus cultures would rank, in any cultural dimension, to a different degree - high, medium, low. In fact all these evidences gives more recognition to the 'universal but variable' theory of culture (Kluckhohn 1964).

However, it is true that Iraq is after all, part of Arab society and a close socio-historical examination of the 'Arab' would reveal the presence of commonalities among them, such as common language (Arabic), common faith (Islam), common historical and cultural tradition, as well as the same heritage, architecture, passions and temperaments. Also, the Middle East is referred to as a 'culture area' in which the people "share a way of life which is recognizably common in important respects, and recognizably different from the way of life in surrounding areas" (Gardener 1959, p. 20). But despite all the commonalities, still each society in the Arab world and the Middle East has its peculiar settings, environment, conditions, historical events and way of thinking. At the same time, the Arabs
of today are not the Arabs of a hundred years ago or, even more so, today, their attitudes, values, personalities and social institutions are changing under the impact of many factors and events.

But above all this variety and change, there are extremely influential elements that have played dominant and concrete implicit and explicit roles in constructing important common features in the identity of Arabic culture; these are - nomadic values, the Islamic religion, and a long history of subordination. This identity has been reinforced by the basic structure of social institutions and the socialization pattern. Arab societies are different in certain aspects and at the same time similar to each other. Such societies are described in terms of being "prismatic" (Riggs 1964, p. 38), where the differentiation process may remain indefinitely incomplete. Hofstede (1980) remarks that among five Arabic countries that were surveyed in the large multinational corporation study "Hermes", there were small differences in the cultural dimensions which were under study. Also Patai (1973) points out the striking similarities in social structure, social behaviour and child-rearing practices among different Arab countries. These similarities can be recognized from many investigations covering such countries as Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco and Iraq, which all suggests a general all-Arab pattern of social behaviour.

So the cultural and individual characteristics which will be detailed in this chapter will indicate the dominant value-orientations which are behind the observable modes of behaviour in Iraqi society. The same characteristics are likely to be found in varying degrees in any other society that has been through similar influences or similar situations where the population has had to confront similar historical realities to that of the Iraqi people.
Klukhohn (1964) emphasizes that if we aim to understand better the relationship of cultural factors within either the structuring of social groups or the personalities of the individuals who comprise the social groups, the generalized meanings or dominant values should be the major or at least the first concern rather than the 'individuals differences'.

Before moving to study these dominant value-orientations in Iraqi society, the researcher will provide a general review about Iraqi social structure in terms of its diversity and major loyalties. Such a review will be very useful in understanding the dominance and variation of individuals' cultural make-up.

**GENERAL REVIEW OF IRAQI SOCIAL STRUCTURE:**

The Arab and Middle Eastern societies have been subject to heavy influences of Western culture and way of life. Modern technology has been introduced to most of these countries, as is the case in Iraq, where the population has become familiar with modern communication and information systems (telephone, telex, computers, and so on). People nowadays receive higher education, and changes have occurred in medical practices, national dress, housing and the standard as well as the type of living, which in many areas rose very high. But all these changes are taking place within a social structure and cultural norms and values which have not substantially changed. In particular, individuals in many of these societies have started to find themselves in a situation where neither their old tradition nor Western ideologies and institutions provide them with a complete and suitable 'formula' for a 'way of life' which they would find satisfactory. The individual becomes a mixture of traditionality and modernity but without a clear identity, varying in degrees from one
individual to another. The deeply rooted Bedouin traits, despite their modification, continue to exert their influence on attitudes and behaviours even in the more Westernized Arab areas. These embedded traits tend to be more visible when moving from the cities to rural areas, but this varies in degrees from one Arabic country to another. So the individual in Iraq, despite his surface modernity, may still be traditional in his outlook; he values belonging to a family, tribe, ethnic or religious group more than his membership in a newly established entity, the nation state. In many ways, his attitudes and behaviour are still conditioned by the norms and customs of his traditional reference groups. His loyalty is to his personal goals, family, cliques, friends, and religious group more than to the organization.

The societies of the Middle East and the Arabic world have been characterized by a 'mosaic' social structure. Such a structure has been recognized by many investigators (Gardener 1959; Bill and Leiden 1974; Muna 1980). For any investigator who may view the Middle East, a clear picture of amazing variety and the contrasts of people living within that area will be drawn to his attention, specifically such a picture signifies both unity and variety. Bill and Leiden (1974) describe the Middle Eastern social structure as follows:

"The overall social structure might best be viewed as a grid or creased mosaic in which the intricate web of groups is partially partitioned by class lines. Both group and class structures relate to one another reciprocally, and it is this reciprocity that builds coherence in to the sophisticated system ... Group fissures within classes are numerous and deep enough to weaken class cohesion and to retard class consciousness. Loyalty to primordial groups such as family takes preference over loyalty to class." (p. 89)

Thus we can find within that mosaic social structure a complex web of group rivalries and a deep sense of loyalty to ethnic groups which provide the individual with his basic identity. We can also
see the failure to develop a broad sense of community identification. People have a social and religious multi-group affiliation which links them differently. People are proud of their differences which are maintained throughout history but which vary in degree from one period to another; in the period of the Ottoman Empire, for example, such differences were formally institutionalized in the "Millet system" as an administrative technique to organize the great variety of Middle East groups (Gardener 1959).

The mosaic social structure of the Middle East is especially clear in some of the Arab Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq. In addition to its original inhabitants, a great variety of people from Asia, Africa and Europe have moved into Iraq throughout history, either to settle or occupy, sometimes for generations, bringing with them and keeping their traditional ways of life. The physical geography of Iraq, with all its varied conditions, has helped to produce that mosaic social structure; there are mountains, where the 'Kurds' mostly live, and who are influenced by mountain tribes much more than by the Bedouin desert tribes; there are areas of grassland, desert, semi-desert and sedimentary areas, where mainly Arabs live, but with varying degrees of attachment to the Bedouin culture and values. The desert and semi-desert areas are inhabited by the Bedouin tribes and those tribes are strongly attached to Bedouin values more than the tribes who inhabit the sedimentary areas, where a very old civilization flourished and for many reasons, the 'cultural construct' is clear and strong. On the other hand, people in the grassland areas, such as Basra, are much less attached to the Bedouin values. Also there are other 'minorities' who inhabit different areas, e.g. Turks, Chaldeans, Persians, Assyrians and Armenians (Alwardi 1965). Iraqi society also displays a clear
structure of religious denominations; within the dominant religion of Islam there are Shiite Moslems and Sunni Moslems. Within the Christian religion there are Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians and in addition other minority Christian groups. There are also fringe religious groups and sects such as Sabians and Yasid'hians. The above divisions have helped preserve group differences within Iraqi society.

The individual in Iraq lives and works in a society whose social structure, with its contrasts, diversity and gross-loyalties, has some distinctive features which have considerable impact on him. In that social structure the individual is governed by a number of institutions with primordial ties which provide the basis upon which society is formed. The strongest of these ties are those of the family, religious and regional groups, tribes, and also the neighbourhood and friendships. This is in addition to other competing ties and loyalties in other institutions, such as political, economic and professional institutions. Using all those institutions, affiliations and loyalties, the individual would introduce himself by identifying his various affiliations; he may name his ethnic origin, tribe, clan, family, as well as stating the location of his residence in Baghdad or one of the other provinces or cities, and he may also refer to his or his family's original quarter of residence. In addition he may specify that he is a true Arab assil (i.e., his family lineage is known) from one of the original tribes, not from those who were arabicized when they joined the original tribes under different conditions throughout generations. People are very proud of their original affiliations to their tribes and most of their 'surnames' are in fact names relating to a tribe or clan. Thus the individual in Iraqi society is under
great socio-cultural pressures where his loyalty and identity are divided among his country, traditional ties as well as newer institutions, and his own self image. His societal norms and values are derived from a mixture of three original communities (tribal, rural, urban) and their interaction and coexistence under different historical realities. Moreover, as a result of many influences such as 'urbanization', economic factors, the feudal system, and easy access to the town, the tribal and rural communities have been subject to a kind of dissolving process within the urban community, but to different degrees; the old tribal society nowadays has become a very small ineffective community in small semi-remote areas in the desert near the Iraqi western borders. A considerable part of rural society, through the immigration to the towns, has become part of the urban community, while the rest still have an interdependent relationship with the urban community. This does not mean that the three communities are the same nowadays, but rather each has remained distinct in its demographic characteristics and economic life style and in its peculiar setting. At the same time, the three communities have many socio-cultural traits and customs in common with a clear influence of tribal Bedouin values and traits; for example, individuals from the three communities have strong kinship relationships and they value loyalty to the clan, family, pride, manliness and hospitality. The changes that happened in the old tribal society strengthened the 'extended family' in the rural and urban communities, which plays the same important role of the 'clan' in tribal society. But the extended family continues to value its original affiliation to the clan and tribe, particularly in the rural community.
So the dominant cultural values that were built-up and reinforced within such social structures containing such contrasts, diversity and gross-loyalties could have their effect on the way individuals construct their behaviour, as well as on their expectations and relationships within the organization.

Following Kluckhohn (1964), in this chapter my concern will be in highlighting some of those generalized or dominant values, meanings and ideas relevant to this research. These are shared by the majority of individuals and deeply rooted in their societal norms and form broad or general dispositions or tendencies to behave in particular ways. In other words the concern in this chapter will be with the dominant value-orientations within contemporary Iraqi society, which characterize the culture as well as the individuals, and which have been acquired cumulatively through the confrontation and coping mechanisms within the historical realities and situations of the evolution of this society.

In order to highlight these value-orientations, which are historically embedded within Iraqi society and its institutional structures, I will employ on the one hand, the previous chapter regarding the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi culture which provides the identity of this culture that has been acquired over successive generations and on the other hand, I will use the available data about individual characteristics and their observed general traits. In fact personality traits have a substantial relevance for the internalization of culturally preferred values, and thus provide a concrete insight into the underlying personality process by being directly and readily observable (Herbert 1976).

What will be studied in this chapter will provide a basic framework for more important steps in our journey to arrive at a
better understanding of the orientations, meanings and styles of relationships that members of Iraqi society derive from their socialization in wider society and are likely to reflect when they join an organization.

To understand the relationships between the dominant cultural values and the individuals' general traits in one hand and the organizational setting in the other hand, the following analytical conceptual tools will be used. These provide a linkage between the characteristics of culture, individuals and organizations, especially those related to man's relationship to other men in work organizations in Iraq:

1. Power-distance or relation to authority.
2. Egotism and open confrontation.
3. Formality and informality.
5. Dependence and taking responsibility.

1. **POWER DISTANCE OR RELATION TO AUTHORITY**

Power-distance is the relationship, together with its component values, between those who hold power or authority and those who are subject to that power or authority, or between a superior and a subordinate in a hierarchy; it is the degree of inequality in power between the less powerful individual and the more powerful one, and the extent to which each of them could determine the behaviour of the other (Hofstede 1980).

The dominant values or group norms within any society concerning 'inequality', which are coupled with their values and norms about power, are behind the degree of 'power-distance' in that society. Consequently these values affect the way members of society construct
their relationships with authority or people in power, as well as the way power holders construct their behaviour in exercising power or authority.

Patterns of inequality between groups within society relate to the value systems of both the powerful and the powerless. So patterns of power inequality and the modes of boss-subordinate relationship within the organization reflect the value systems of both bosses and subordinates and relate to their collective values.

By reviewing the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi culture, as was done previously, we can distinguish the pattern of societal norms (shared value-systems) of power and authority which the individuals are provided with, and which have been reinforced throughout history. This pattern, which is shared by the majority of the population, consists of two kinds of contradictory sets of values. The first set are the 'superiority values' which are strongly embedded in the minds of the people, and are socially required as an important feature of 'manliness'. These values stem mainly from nomadic Bedouin culture which emphasizes power, dominance, having influence over others, pride and prestige. The second kind are 'submission values', which stem from the very old agricultural civilization of Iraq, a very long history of subordination, centuries of crushing poverty and uncertainty of life, and the misinterpretation and negative practices of some significant principles of Islam. These values call for blind obedience, subordination, extreme conformity, and flattery of the powerful and influential.

Such sets of values, which are at the heart of 'authoritarianism', underpin the large power-distance that Iraqi society has maintained in different areas. Through these authoritarian societal norms, which have been reinforced by the
structure of social institutions and patterns of socialization, the
customary mode of superior - subordinate relationships in different
role-taking situations where individuals are involved (God-man,
ruler-subject, parent-child, teacher-pupil, man-women,...etc.) is a
'dominant-submissive' pattern. In fact, such an authoritarian
cultural pattern is clearly the most conspicuous contribution to the
power relationships and beliefs of most political systems throughout
generations. In addition, the political systems, backed by religious
doctrines, have acted upon society in a way that reinforce the
dominant-submissive role pattern in interpersonal relationships (as
has been demonstrated previously). Also this pattern is perpetuated
and reinforced through the family and the educational system, as will
be seen later in this research.

From these kinds of 'authoritarian' societal norms, the
individual personality derives two major, parallel sources of values,
'dominance' and 'submission' which are reinforced by the patterns of
socialization and the structure of social institutions; individuals
within Iraqi society are socialized to perceive themselves as either
the wielders of authority or the objects of others authority, where
they become predisposed to the values of dominance and command when
they are in positions of power, or submissive and obedient when they
are powerless (Alwardi 1951; Berger 1962). Such a value system was
also found by Melikian (1977) to exist among Saudi Arabian college
students; among those students who shared a general willingness to
accept the authority of a 'boss' and to esteem it, it was discovered
that these attitudes were accompanied by a willingness to be in that
position themselves. In fact many investigators have remarked on the
high degree of authoritarianism in Middle Eastern societies (Gardner
1959; Tayab 1981 - Iran: Kagıtçibasi 1970 - Turkey) as well as in

In Iraqi society, authoritarian social institutions and authoritarian tendencies in personality have reinforced one another in conforming to authoritarian societal norms, thereby constructing the general cultural pattern. In fact authoritarianism within the individuals' orientation in any authoritarian culture and society, such as Middle Eastern and Arabic society, is likely to be a healthy psychological adjustment to the general cultural pattern and societal norms. These attitudes are accumulated through the socio-historical evolution of society and do not necessarily imply an unhealthy authoritarian personality, such as the F-scale (developed by Adorno et al. 1950) for example would indicate (see Kagitcibasi 1970 in her study of the United States and Turkey). Melikian (1959) in his study of young adults in Egypt and the United States, also using the F-scale and in addition the questionnaire measure of adjustment, concludes:

"The relationship between positive attributes of personality and authoritarianism tends to be opposite in Egypt and the United States. They suggest that in Egypt the authoritarian Moslem may be more healthy psychologically, this perhaps because he is conforming to the general cultural pattern. On the other hand the Egyptian Christian who is authoritarian, whose subculture is more fluid, presents a less healthy picture. Similarly in the United States, the more authoritarian Catholic may be somewhat better adjusted than the Protestant authoritarian whose subculture tends to be more liberal. Thus it appears that when the personality picture of the authoritarian is taken into account, the general culture as well as the religious context must be defined." (p. 68)

The relationship to authority in Iraqi society is not only dominated by authoritarian norms but also by the prevalence of 'paternalism' which stems from the strong role and influence of the family within Arabian society. As has been previously shown the
paternalistic attitude was demanded by the Bedouin from their Sheikhs. In contemporary society the paternalistic and familiar nature of the social structure have a double effect. When the old tribal society breaks down, the extended family - in addition to its original importance - becomes the basic unit and plays the same important role as the clan in the tribal society. The long history of harsh treatment and long-term insecurity has increased the individual's identification with traditional groups, specifically with his family, in a natural reaction to find security care and support. The individual in Arab society defers to the authority of the father or the head of the family, but he also at the same time depends and expects a lot from them. He may have the same attitude and expectations in his relationships with people in power or the government. In particular, the individual's need for a 'paternalistic' relationship with those in power has been emphasized because the latter have not satisfied such needs and provided a familial nature of relationship with him, which to him means care, support, love and security. So such need has been unsatisfied throughout generations, despite the fact that those in power realize the paternalistic demands of their people. However, these are perceived as negative expectations, as is shown in the following statement made by an Egyptian journalist, Mansour (1977):

"People are like children who expect miracles from their fathers and the government is father and mother to the people."

In fact such paternalistic expectations by individuals in their relationships to those in power have a negative component because although individuals expect a great deal from their government, they are unwilling to take responsibility and work in co-operation, as a result of their negative individualism, as we will see later. Berger
(1962) quoted the following statement from Dr Jamil Saliba (1958) which describes the Arab's (Syrians and Lebanese) expectations in their relation to their governments:

"They ask their governments to plant their deserts with figs and olives, to make their wells gush forth, to revive the land for them, and to guarantee their livelihood. But whenever they are called upon to work in co-operation, they object and each one prefers to do the work individually." (p. 157)

In Iraq, as well as in most Arab societies, the authoritarian and paternalistic societal norms of power and authority through different historical realities produce the following interacting influences:

A - Traditional respect of authority
B - Personalism, or 'personalized possessing of authority'.

A. Traditional respect of authority in Iraqi Society: the individual from his early childhood is instilled with the value of respecting, or at least showing respect toward his parents, elders, religious men, ... etc. In effect 'respecting authority' for members of society means: be obedient, and do what you've been told and if you do, you will be rewarded. This is achieved firstly, by being accepted into the community which means security and affiliation; and secondly, by not feeling guilty as they meet some of their obligations toward parents, society and above all, to God - religion strongly emphasizes such values in man's relationship with his God, parents and benevolent leaders. Such positive motivation in respecting authority was emphasized more in the past through the 'Caliph system'. The post of the Caliphate was a 'spiritual central' and the Caliphate was not only a secular but also a religious guide, a role that imparted a certain degree of sanctity to his person. Moreover, because of the experience of many centuries of political instability, which was perceived as a threat to the unity of the
Moslem people and the strength of the religion, many Moslim Ulama or theorists have stressed the principle of obedience to any kind of ruler, particularly to those who promised to respect the religious law of Islam, in preference to the confusion which might result from attempts to overturn the ruler (Berger 1962; Issawi 1966 b; Alwardi 1954; Khadduri 1970).

Throughout the long history of arbitrary rulers who dominated Iraq (mainly by introducing 'fear' during which the individual's only concerns were survival and security), people became accustomed to showing respect to the holders of power and authority, even if they did not really feel it, not only to protect themselves but to gain the security and rewards of just being accepted by the powerful, and to be in the shadow of their power and have the privilege of being associated with them. This is so, especially when those in power hold a type of power which is positively evaluated, and can effect one's standing or respect in the community; an example is the bureaucratic Effendis, who won people's respect because of the power of education or rather information, and their position in the government's administrative body. This was at a time when ignorance prevailed, and when education and a government position was, for a lot of people, the way to move up from their social class and gain respect and power within their society. The Effendis also gave the impression that haughtiness and respect were linked.

B. The second influence in relation to authority is 'personalism': the individual's perception of those who hold power and authority is affected by the inherited impression of what could be called 'personalized possession of authority' by those who hold power and authority in society. For generations the people have experienced authority as the right and privilege of their ruler who
either inherited from their fathers and thus could pass authority to
their sons, or acquired it by force or through the right of conquest.
This is the case with all the foreign rulers who occupied the
country, one-by-one, for hundreds of years. Thus it does not matter
how the ruler came to power: he would hold authority in his hand as
long as he could keep it, whether he was just or unjust, qualified or
unqualified, and the only way to take the authority from him was
either on his death or by the force of another more powerful person.
Thus individuals grow up in a culture where authority is perceived by
people as not only a personalized, but also a cruel exercise of power
to be avoided or to be manipulated to mitigate its harshness. One of
the most recent examples which still remains in the 'memory' of
people is the Ottoman conquest, which perpetuated foreign
administration of a servile character for more than four centuries;
there was little connection between the rulers (Sultans) who
inherited their authority, and the ruled, except through the exercise
of force and the collecting of taxes by provincial officials, who
used their governmental positions for personal ends. These
provincial rulers - by their bribery and corrupt administration, as
well as through the Ottoman general policy of extreme centralization,
suspicion and high turnover in positions - used their positions
chiefly as an opportunity to get as much as they could for
themselves. Ottoman policy encouraged a combination of subservience
to one's boss and tyranny over one's subordinates.

The British provided a different example in some respects, but
as foreigners they also gained the authority to rule the country by
force when they occupied Iraq after the First World War. They
followed the same policy of extreme centralization and as Berger
(1959) stated, "encouraged sycophancy dissimulation, and distrust
when their word was carried out ultimately by force although nominally by advice" (p. 121). The monarchical system gave another example; this was one of the most effective in social structure and combined the basic features of all patterns of power relationships and their norms and values, that is the 'feudal system', where the feudal sheiks, in addition to the traditional leadership of their tribes, acquired the power of possessing land and wealth, which they passed on to their sons. This became part of their legal rights, along with a position in Parliament and in the government administrative body. Associated with this were the examples of the bureaucratic class Effendis and the new political elite, who both had the power of education, wealth and land. Many of them became wealthy feudal landlords, in addition to occupying many high ranking posts in the governmental administration and the parliament as well as in the political world. In that hereditary kingdom, posts in the administrative body were inherited in a functional sense rather than in the usual traditional manner of succession of office, title and wealth, and through education and belonging to cliques that dependent on personal loyalty. Finally, there is the example of military regimes who also obtained authority by force, and who in many cases applied the military system to managing people.

Personal loyalty played a dominant role in men's relationship to other men in Iraqi society. The population grew to expect that authority meant not only a legitimate power, but also a display of harshness and violence; it accepted authority as a form of special privilege, not merely as a form of defined power and that authority belonged to the office and not the incumbent. Authority is dealt with mainly by showing respect, personal loyalty and subordination. In such a society where personal connections, belonging to
traditional groups, group and personal rivalry and the competitive spirit are crucial elements (Berger 1962), personal loyalty is an important element in getting and keeping power and authority.

The dominant values of authority and power are a combination of three fundamental influences: tradition, blind faith and fear. In traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies a traditionally sanctioned position of authority. In the Bedouin culture, traditional authority is not a simple impersonal system, but rather a combination of "traditional" and "charismatic" authority (Weber 1953); because the Bedouin or the Arab in general is highly individualistic, the traditional authority in their culture is influenced by the blind faith of the 'charismatic', where the people respond to the leader who has characteristics they admire, or the person who is a 'super model' of what they themselves would like to be. The leader tries to generate faith and loyalty among his men, to expand his personal power. In fact, occupying the traditional position of authority increases the personal power of the incumbent among the people; for example, this was the case with many people who occupied the post of the Caliphate, or the feudal sheikhs. The traditional charismatic authority within Bedouin society was conditional on the sheikh's ability to meet his tribe's expectations, but if a series of failures occurred they refused to accept him and chose another leader. Also the Bedouin's kind of authority had to some degree an important component of 'rational agreement'; the leaders tried to use their referent and expert powers to persuade their tribesmen rather than order them. As a result, the Bedouin felt that he was sharing power rather than being dominated by it. As the Islamic 'shura principle' (i.e. consultation practice) is based on two-way conversations, thus the rational agreement played an
important role in the very early times of Islam when such a principle was applied. But throughout history the situations became more one-way authoritarian types of conversations, as a result of changes in the nature of the traditional-charismatic leadership and the weakening or rather disappearance of the old Bedouin 'rational agreement' for very long time through the evolution of the society, as it was replaced by the strong influence of 'fear' and 'coercive and reward power'. But despite this change, 'charisma' is still the most effective leadership in the Arabic world, where leaders must have dynamic, dominant and overpowering personalities, in other words, the effective leader must be firey and charismatic, trusted for his integrity, straight forwardness and strength of character (Khadduri 1970; Pezeshkpur 1978).

Fear, blind faith and tradition are judged to be essentially signs of authoritarian situations (Hampton et al. 1978), as they are one-way communications. In this respect the Bedouin traditional-charismatic authority and the early Islamic Caliphs gave different examples. They both contain some elements of a two-way communication process because of the influence of the 'rational agreement', but gradually such examples deviated to become authoritarian situations.

The response of individuals in Iraqi society to authoritarian situations combines rational elements, personality predispositions and strategic elements: it reflects their belief that obedience serves their interests in avoiding pain, sustaining life, remaining a member, and getting rewards. On the other hand, individuals are predisposed to submission as they learned such behaviour during their socialization process, which in fact reflects the dominant cultural values in their society. Also obedience in authoritarian situations appears to be, within Iraqi society, one of the limited strategies
available to the powerless to cope with the powerful. Individuals in Iraqi society, as we have seen previously, have had to ingratiate themselves with different arbitrary rulers. By their subordination, which induced obsequiousness, they aimed to please and satisfy the powerful or the person in authority and thus manipulate his reactions. It became part of the peoples' philosophy for dealing with authority and power, as can be recognized from many old proverbs.

Such a philosophy for obtaining the favour of others to serve one's interests arises through the individual's search for the best ways to cope with different, difficult situations throughout the historical realities of society. This philosophy could be behind the observation of the Arab being an "oriented-person" (Berger 1962; Pezeshkpur 1978) or being a Fahlawi (Al-Azm 1968). Hamady (1960) describes the first characteristic of the "oriented-person" attributed to the Arab as follows:

"The Arab changes his identity with little reluctance. With the Asiatics he is an oriental, with people from the West he is an occidental, with the old societies he is a traditional man, with the new a modern. The Arab is ready and able to form an in-group on relatively meagre bases for identification." (p. 67)

Also, Al-Azm's Fahlawi, according to Baaklini (1974) and Moughrabi (1978), is a highly adaptive person who is characterized by always being ready to express superficial agreement, belittling difficulties and fleeting amiability. He is quick-witted, exaggerated and self-assertive to an extent which is not based on self-confidence but rather derives from a loss of confidence and lack of desire to assess situations objectively. The Fahlawi also lacks qualities of perseverance, endurance and the ability to work systematically. He justifies an embarrassing situation by a 'removal and relegation' technique as he shies away from responsibility and
blames others for his failure, or relegates it to an area outside his own sphere.

It seems that the underlying concept of the power-relationship that was previously demonstrated is an exchange bargain. Here the powerless give respect and subordination to satisfy the powerful person's needs for dominance and keeping power; in return, the powerful helps the powerless to satisfy the latter's need for security and more, assisting them to require some resources of power.

Authority, as has been explained, in most people perceptions (as it arises out of their interactions and as I have indicated) is a phenomenon attached to a person rather than to the post or position occupied by that person. This concept of perceiving authority has been distinguished in many developing societies (Braibanti 1966) such as in Egyptian society (Berger 1957). Also a similar way of perceiving has been recognized in Italy (Ferrarotti 1959) where authority in Italian society (e.g. family, enterprise) is highly centralized and personalized, and reflects the paternalistic orientation and the rigidly hierarchial pattern of structure. Thus Italian managers tend to think of their authority in terms of personal power within a kind of private kingdom (the enterprise) rather than in terms of a necessary function related to the enterprise itself.

2. **EGOTISM AND OPEN CONFRONTATION**

The Iraqis, or in general the Arab, as Berger (1962) remarked, seem "to harbour two major contradictory impulses: egotism and conformity. The first takes the forms of extreme self-assertion before others, pride, and sensitivity to criticism. The second is reflected in obedience to certain group norms which are resented, and
an inability to assert independence as an individual with confidence or finality" (p. 155).

Egotism has strong roots in the Bedouin culture and many of its values are embedded in Iraqi culture. The Arabs in general have been conceived by different investigations as being characterized by an alternating pattern of extremes (Gardner 1959; Berger 1962; Patai 1973; Sanua 1974) because different sets of contradictory values find an ambivalent mode of accommodation together. Those contradictory values are manifested in different characteristics - being extremely emotional on some occasions and exercising self-control on others, displaying dominance and then submission, and being as Gardner (1959) stated: "too hard or too soft, too level or too secretive, too pushing or too submissive, fiercely sure of themselves at one moment and timidly insure at other moments" (p. 26). The Arab thus veers from one extreme to another, their excessive pride can quickly turn to self-condemnation, depression to exaltation, secretiveness to absolute openness and friendliness to hostility or the opposite way round (Sanua 1974).

In fact such contradictory characteristics are a reflection of the values and norms which have been built up through the diversity, richness and incredible contrasts of Arabic society, and which are accumulated through its confrontation with different socio-historical realities throughout evolution. Bedouin culture on one side, Islam and the long history of subordination, particularly to foreign powers on the other, with the pattern of socialization, all intertwine to build modes of contradictory values in the context of Arabic culture. In fact some old proverbs in Iraqi society, which are still used by the people, reflect these kinds of modes e.g. "Either with two lights or darkness". Thus individuals' contradictory characteristics are
overcompensations for the people who are on the one hand refined, intelligent, sensitive, aware and proud of their past glories: Arab history has had a deep impact on their pride and inspiration, for Arabs have played in a certain episode in history, "a leading part, which was important not only for them but for the whole world, and in virtue of which indeed they could claim to have been *something* in human history" (Hourani 1962, p. 2; Hourani's emphasis). But, on the other hand, they have been humiliated by being cut off from their own past, subjugated for too long to foreign decayed empires, having to adapt to the ways of their conquerors, frustrated in their efforts to direct their own affairs, exposed too soon to the corruption of wealth and power, and being politically disunited, as well as suffering economic backwardness (Gardner 1959). So as a result, they suffer from a deep inferiority, which has grown out of long history of foreign domination and thus they are described as displaying a 'wounded pride' or "wounded Arabic ego" (Zayaor 1978, p. 156). Thus they are highly sensitive to criticism and they "display the double effect of wounded pride, self-exaltation and self-condemnation" (Berger 1962, p. 155). In fact, the creation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict have had a great impact on the Arabic wounded pride. However, at this point we should say that in most social-psychological studies, there is an impression that the Arab is oversensitive to criticism in his personal relationships outside the family, in matters concerning his dignity, honour, standing in the community (Hamady 1960; Khadduri 1970; Pezeshkpur 1978; Alwardi 1965). As Arabs are intensely sensitive and very concerned about their own egos, so they are careful not to offend another's. Individuals in Arabic society are, as Khadduri (1970) observes, "contrary to their submissive appearance and pacifist manners ....,
robust, violent, highly sensitive people whose volatile emotions may rise to a very high pitch in moments of excitement" (p. 24).

Avoidance of open confrontation is a general tendency in individual communications in Arabic society (Berger 1962; Muna 1980). Generally, they try through their politeness to maintain enough distance to control the aggressive tendencies of others, which is an accepted attitude in a society containing interpersonal rivalry, conflict and sensitivity. Hospitality and generosity, which are highly valued, also provide a means of demonstrating friendliness and serve to avoid aggressiveness.

Individuals in Arabic society are observed on the one hand as having a tendency to avoid the expression of differences and avoid controversial issues, and on the other hand, they are constrained by a certain rigidity of thought and behaviour. While the individual is ready to offer personal opinions on whatever subject, he tends to reject the facts that demonstrate that his opinion may have been incorrect and consider such facts as invalid or inapplicable when confronted with contradictory evidence (Sanua 1974; Pezeshkpur 1978). The individual, as Berger (1962) quoted from Saliba, "holds fiercely to his own opinion and would like to impose it upon everyone; and if people disagree with him, he will intrigue against them and consider them inimical" (1962, p. 162). Differences or opposing beliefs and opinions are expressed using a few informal mechanisms, and when they are discussed, people do so without letting them lead to states of unmanageable discord which could result from any simple verbal disagreement. So individuals tend, in their interactions, to talk very shrewdly about insubstantial subjects to make sure that harmony prevails and avoid expression of opinions on controversial issues, which could be "perceived as an attempt to impose another's authority
on one's self. Not being predisposed to compromise, the automatic reaction is to impose one's own ideas on other, and the continuation of this process would inevitable lead to disagreements" (Pezeshkpur 1978, p. 52), which could be considered a personal insult. Such tendencies are a distortion of Bedouin desert culture; avoiding open confrontation or the expression of differences are ways of avoiding ill-feeling and outright hostilities. In other words the Bedouins were careful not to offend or insult others from other clans or tribes where it was a question of avoiding hostilities and war. But the Bedouins were also characterized by directness, frankness and confrontation in their communications, particularly within their tribe. The individuals started to lose such characteristics through their suffering and fear along with the harsh historical realities and centuries of subordination. The stance of 'not to offending others' took the form, in the new society, of avoiding open confrontation or expression of differences, rather than keeping its old nature and forms of desert life which were used to avoid wars and bloodshed between the tribes. On the other hand, the Bedouin through his 'superiority propensity' was willing to assert himself and prevail over others by impressing them with his chivalry, bravery, defiance, virtue, manliness and construction and telling of poetry. So the individual in the new society, is also willing to impress others with his opinions and ideals, but this will is associated with a tendency to impose his own rigid opinions upon others as a result of the unsatisfied need of self-assertion. The old desert ways of satisfying such needs became impossible because of the requirements of the new society and the individuals suffers from ignorance, humiliation and subjection through long periods of history under different kinds of arbitrarily rulers.
Thus people in Arab society are, as Muna (1980) state, "very sensitive to criticism, open confrontation, directness and frankness, especially when in front of a group. Deference to authority, face-saving, manliness, pride and loyalty - all of these act as serious obstacles to open confrontation" (p. 18). Such characteristics are also recognized in Iraqi society by Alwardi (1965).

3. FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY

The Arab in general, as has been previously demonstrated, gives the impression of having a special constellation of influences, which lead to contradictory extremes in interpersonal relations and rapid alternating behaviours, such as friendship and enmity, suspicion and ingrety, intimacy and formality. Although secretive about facts in their personal lives, Arabs are emotional individuals, quick to express their feelings, and there is little reticence by them in revealing their emotional state, especially in pain or sorrow. They will show their friendliness even to strangers who they happened to meet briefly (Berger 1962; Pezeshkpur 1978).

The Arabic language helps greatly to increase the informality in social relationships, as it allows highly emotional expressions to be used, which provide people with an effective means to engage in small but deep talks. Arabic language, writes Almany (1981) "is beautiful and resonant language, rich in vocabulary, images, smiles, unusual metaphors, ornate, expressions, elegance, and sonority" (p. 11). Hardly any language, says Hitti (1970) "seems capable of exercising over the minds of its user such an irresistible influence as Arabic" (p. 90).

Thus Arabs basically prefer informality in their communications because of the very strong primordial ties with traditional groups
(Muna 1981), e.g., the family, neighbours, friends, members of one's clan or tribe, as well as other ties, such as 'school mate'.

Arab social gatherings are full of trivialities, jokes and pleasantries. Even in business meetings they open and close the communication with small, informal, polite, initial exchange talk.

People usually rely very strongly on their personal ties (family, friendship, neighbourhoods, etc.) to get things done, and they feel a strong obligation toward their primordial ties. In fact traditional ties of family, tribe, ethnic group and neighbourhood have always provided the individual with a strong sense of affiliation, beyond any other change within the society. The retention of traditional attitudes towards family and ethnic group has been found even among young Arabs studying in the American University of Beirut; no significant differences were found between 1957 and 1971 in the importance given by those Arab students to 'family' which continued to be ranked first in commanding their loyalties, followed by national (ethnic) affiliation as the second in importance (Melikian and Diab 1974). The view that is held of Arabic society is that the family expects from the individual absolute loyalty, and thereby sacrifices autonomy and self reliance in favour of obedience and reliance on others (e.g., father, parent, elders) with acceptance of their authority (Barakat 1974). But the other side of the coin is, as Moughrabi (1978) describes, that in "times of crisis and of social upheaval, the persistence of the family as a tight-knit organization has served a very significant purpose among various groups of people. Were it not for the family structure, countless hundreds in various Arab countries would have never received a University education, so that their younger brothers or sisters could receive one. Furthermore the family has helped maintain the identity of many whose very existence was rejected by many" (p. 111).
Thus the family's affiliation provides the individual with social security, identity, care and support. So the individuals in Iraqi society are highly self- and family-centred people for self- and family-orientations have strong roots in the cultural characteristics of Iraqi society. People are socialized in a way that reflects such characteristics; through being suspicious and mistrustful of others and the development of negative individualism, individuals are brought up to believe that the world outside the family circle is hostile to his interests and is after something from him if it is nice to him. Thus the individual tends to look after himself and his family, even at the expense of others in the community. In the Arabic world, self- and family-orientations have been recognised, through different perspectives, by many studies (Berger 1962; Barakat 1974; Muna 1980), as well as in some Middle Eastern countries (Tayeb 1981). In fact the way the individual has been treated by authorities in most of these countries, emphasizes and justifies the value of his affiliation to traditional groups, primarily the family which gives him a lot of personal security and support.

Islamic principles of co-operation, humbleness and equality give support to informality within Arabic society. This is clearer in rural areas and among traditional people than in modern Arabic cities; Antoun (1965) observed that in the Arabic villages (such as the case in Jordan), the "day to day superordinate-subordinate relationship that prevails between a daily agricultural wage labourer and his employer is modified by social relations of a more friendly and informal sort. The men of the wealthiest and most respected families plow land and quarry rock alongside the labourer they have hired" (p. 71).
Informality in Iraqi society is associated with formality; Arabs are strongly attached to their traditions; and the individual is recognized as having the characteristics of indulging in a seal for ceremony, formalism and rigidity (Berger 1962; Sanua 1974). Conservatism, quietism and traditionalism are characteristics of the culture and the individuals in Arabic society, in different periods to different degrees and in different forms. The role of tradition had been important within Bedouin culture and continued to be so in Islamic society, particularly in making it difficult to accept the introduction of innovations and new interpretations of the words of the Koran. Such influences of tradition, conservatism and quietism are clearer among traditional people who have been relatively secluded from the influences of other cultures and especially those in rural areas (see Antoun 1965; Zayaor 1978).

The Arabic language helps in maintaining formality by providing individuals with stereotyped or a 'ready-made' phrases for exchange in greetings and courtesies, which encourages every situation to be treated in a traditional or familiar manner. The old proverbs, folk sayings, stereotyped phrases, as well as the Koranic verses, and the Prophet's words, which are usually included in ordinary conversation, all maintain the impersonal type of intercourse. These methods of formality, are useful in expressing differences, opposing views, making criticisms and refusals with a minimum of disagreeableness and personal offence, and also in avoiding a show of hostility and directness. This is true for the Arabs who are sensitive to criticism which may depreciate their honour, courage, generosity and standing in the community. Also in Iraqi society, and generally in the Arabic world: "Personalities superimpose themselves on issues to such an extent that personalities and issues cannot be separated"
(Pezeshkpur 1978, p. 53). Iraqi society values politeness, and ceremonious forms, and requires them as a part of a show of good manners. Thus people generally tend to give weight to politeness, form, agreeableness, seriousness and looking and behaving respectfully at the expense of the accuracy, directness and behaving naturally. Formality becomes a sheild where many characteristics are hidden underneath such as haughtiness, pride, willingness to look powerful, sensitivity, fear of negative judgements, and covering up personal weaknesses. It is feared that once a certain degree of informality was permitted the individual "would trespass on any privacy, he would ask the most personal impertinent questions, he would lay bare his opinions and feelings, and would expect many services from and strong ties with the others" (Hamady 1960, p. 71). In fact this manner, as I see it, is basically derived from the Arab's inherited obligation towards the concept of unlimited hospitality, which basically means establishing a long and deep friendly relationship with those to whom they give their hospitality. Thus they tend to treat their friends or guests, even if they have just met them, as equal or even better than one's immediate family. In social relationships, they dislike formality, haughtiness, and being subject to other's superiority, but they have been forced by a long history of subordination to accept and respect those who seeks formality and haughtiness. So when they are treated in a familiar way, particularly by those who usually seek formality, they move quickly to build and deepen the informality with him, where informality provides the opportunity for the feeling of equality.
4. CONFORMITY AND SECURITY

The Arabs, as some studies suggest, suffer from a lack of personal security resulting from a number of different factors: a long history of subordination and poverty, uncertainty, political instability and the pattern of child-rearing.

The individual's feeling of insecurity shows itself in suspicious attitudes, certain kinds of extremism, a preference for oral communication on one hand and dictating on the other. Such a feeling is also appears in his adherence to rules and traditional general agreements which is reflected in his conformity to certain groups' norms and values (Berger 1969). Individuals learn to conform in a society which exerts a strong pressure on its members to conform, and where conformity is required and rewarded. They conform to others expectations, even to those with whom they do not interact, because they fear being 'found out' and sanctioned by those others. Thus part of their conformity is to secure a good reputation - often a family reputation - in the community. Also conformity to others' expectations (compliance) especially the significant others, is induced through their customs, values, habits and love of others (i.e. parents, leaders etc.). The individual in Arabic society in general depends on his traditional groups, and devotes to the stereotypical and mannered relationship, because he can control matters within the bounds of the known and the predictable. Thus the individual is observed by many investigators as accepting his lot in life and being content with events as they are and with his own way of doing things. His attitude, in general is to accept things as they are and not to be concerned about change (Hourani 1956; Berger 1962; Barakat 1971; Tomeh 1974; Pezeshkpur 1978). Free forms of relationships, risk, uncertainty, scientific exploration, philosophic
speculation, the questioning of systems of government and of authority - all these, says Berger (1962) "are leaps into unknown and hence challenges to fate, to what has been laid down by religious and secular authority..." (p. 175). In fact nowadays, such observation is more true about people in the rural areas, as Ammar (1954) shows and with very traditional people who have been relatively secluded from the influences of other cultures. If the individual is indifferent to things which affect his present or future, this is not only because of his lack of perception or because of his conservatism, but also because such an attitude results from a history of harsh, brutal regimes, and feelings of insecurity. His participation in starting changes or discussions about them have in the past not been required or taken into account.

In general the individual in Iraq as well as in Arabic society does not see himself as the master of his surroundings (Alwardi 1965; Barakat 1971; Tomeh 1974). Thus, his feelings of lack of control in his situation or not being master of his environment has led him to feel 'helpless', to the degree that he takes great satisfaction in pretending helplessness in order either to lessen the risk of others trying to take advantage of him, or to be used as a source of power (Pezeshkpur 1978). In Arabic society, the individual's being fated to be what he is must not be attributed to the teachings of Islam, as Patai (1973) claimed to be the case, for as usual Islamic religion is often blamed for a belief in fate and predestination which is said to exert a great influence on the Arab personality. In fact, Islamic teachings encourage initiative, activity and self-change rather than restraining them; this encouragement appears clearly in different places in the Koran, such as the following verse: "Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves"
(The Koran, Sura XIII; A Y Ali's translation). Also it appears in different words or Hadith of the Prophet, e.g.: "The heavens do not rain gold or silver". Even the expression Ensha Allah which means "If God is willing", could be interpreted not as a sign of inactivity and complete reliance on God, but rather as "I will do that (whatever is required) with the will of God". In fact such an expression, as Muna (1980) explains, is a part of religious custom and similar ones could be found in other religions, such as the Christian Lord's Prayer: "Give us this day our daily bread"; or the words that appeared in Time Magazine, September 1978, to express the shock of the death of Pope John Paul I: "God has willed it, as painful as his will is". But that does not mean that the 'fatalism' becomes 'myth' in the Arabic society, as Muna (1980) says, for as he found in his study, Arab executives are not fatalistic. These Arab executives, as Muna himself indicated (1980, p. 310), have quite a good educational background - 50 per cent of them received their University degrees from the West, and 35 per cent obtained their degrees from Universities in the Arab world. In addition, they are exposed to the West through business or personal travel and all of them spoke at least one foreign language. Also, they were either owners or top managers of organization, which are mostly family-owned or owned by two or more partners. These executives deal with many companies or businesses in different Western countries and they need to plan ahead if they want to succeed and obtain profits. But we cannot generalize from the lack of fatalism of these Arab executives to other groups in different parts of the Arabic world. Thus when we talk about fatalism in the Arabic world, we should consider a variety of social, economic and political factors. If Arabs become very 'passive and fatalistic' (Patai 1973) it is mainly the result of the experience of
very long periods of intense hardship and extreme uncertainty, during
which the individual had to struggle for his very existence and
security. This was particularly so in rural areas in recent years,
where people were dominated by ignorance, poverty and disease.
Moreover, they were usually at the mercy of nature because of the
conditions of the land. Thus religion becomes a useful escape
mechanism which provides psychological relaxation and security in the
midst of surrounding uncertainty, poverty and suspicion. Because of
this escape mechanism many negative interpretations and
misunderstandings of Islamic teachings grew and accumulated in Arabic
society, which considerably disguised the real teachings of Islam
(Jurjis 1973; Darwish and Takila 1976). This tendency increased to
the extent that, as in the case of Iraq, people in rural areas did
indeed become very fatalistic to the degree that some of them did not
plan anything in detail because it contradicts with the will of God
(Al-Dahiri 1969).

Thus, the individual in Iraqi society does not in general use a
'passive defence' to cope with uncertainty; the collectively-shared
values of his culture tend to emphasize avoiding uncertainty and risk
taking rather than confrontation and attack. Such values can be
distinguished in many old proverbs, as expressed in the following:

'Do walk for a month but do not cross a river.'

'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'

Certain values are emphasized which encourage the individuals
reliance on luck, whatever their personal abilities, can be
recognized in the following proverb:

'Seven trades but no luck' (i.e. 'Jack of all trades and master
of none').
The individual's experience in different stages of his life, within such societal norms which are reinforced by the socialization process and the collectively shared characteristics of people among whom he has been brought up, does not provide him with a high tolerance for ambiguity. So he finds in 'authoritarianism' and 'fatalism' a buffering mechanism within which he could shield himself and escape from uncertainty (Berger 1962). Thus individuals respond to the anxiety which freedom may bring by avoiding risky decisions, and with a low tolerance of ambiguity.

Another trait which is found to be current among individuals in Arabic society in different regions is that of extreme suspiciousness and distrust (Hamady 1960; Berger 1962; Sanua 1974; Pezeshkpur 1978). In fact such extreme suspicion is mainly the result of individuals' experiences throughout different harsh and difficult historical periods. Arabs were originally very self-confident and trusted anyone who asked for their hospitality, even their enemies. Thus they would give their protection and hospitality easily, which means a commitment to a long and friendly relationship. The reasons behind Arabic distrust and suspiciousness are many. Pezeshkpur (1978) indicated two particular reasons for Middle Eastern distrust: first, people in these areas are generally of an emotional make-up and their actions are guided more by feelings than by cool, calculating reasoning. This makes behaviour unpredictable and unstable, and it becomes difficult to develop trust when one sees no stability or predictability in his own behaviour or that of other human beings. Secondly, as Arabic society is in a state of transition and continues to change, stability and predictability become difficult to sustain in a society where almost nothing can be taken for granted. The Arabs particularly in traditional areas tend to cover up their
personal problems and are reluctant to contribute information about themselves and their families. They are like the Bedouin, highly concerned about their 'reputations in the community', since this reputation - often the family reputation - is an important base from which the individual works to reach many of personal goals. They would like to avoid negative judgements, which may put their reputation at stake, where they want to or have to continue to be part of its membership. So any information about themselves or their families is considered a private matter and part of one's person, and thus giving any information about such matters, according to their community's norms, is considered as something ayb (shameful). This accusation of 'shame' is a strong motive for behaviour in Arabic society. In addition attitudes of distrust of others and fear of revealing personal facts such as wealth, and number of males in the family arises from the experience of this and other kinds of information being used by authorities over the centuries against them, such as in setting tax rates or conscripting youth for the military. The other reason for covering up personal facts (wealth, number of males, etc.) is the fear of the 'evil eye' and the envy of others. In particular, to previous tribal societies before the establishment of the relatively strong national government, such items (wealth and number of males) were very significant to people for defensive purposes, security and strength. Thus the above personal details were crucial to families which lived under threat to their lives.

'Human nature' in Islam is conceived as 'mixed' - it could be good or evil; human beings are born into any situation naturally sinless, and it is man's deeds that make him good or evil. But it is clear that Iraqi culture through different historical realities has
acquired a dominant value-orientation which conceived 'human nature' generally evil and dangerous, thus others outside the family are distrusted. Part of the people's philosophy states only God can be trusted fully because only God can give love, protection and guidance without asking for anything in return. A similar kind of trusting relationship can be found within the family, especially towards parents. But everyone else wants something in return for his good intentions and care, so it is very hard to trust others. Individuals may be willing to trust others but their experience leads them not to do so. In Iraqi society we can find a very strong and long relationship between neighbours, friends and relatives but at the same time, people in general shift from trust to distrust, even when simple mistakes or misunderstandings occur. Individuals not only generally distrust others but also on many occasions distrust their own ability to recognize 'good' from 'bad'. In fact, feelings of suspiciousness and mistrust mainly result from insecurity, fear, rivalry in interpersonal relationships, ignorance and the inability to master either the present or the future, all of which have been experienced throughout the passage of history. Societal norms which grew because of such feelings have shaped the pattern of the socialization in a way that reflects the same feelings and norms of suspicion and distrust.

The heavy legacy of suffering and subordination throughout history which the Arab has undergone is the main factor in developing what is called "negative individualism" (Berger 1962, p. 157). Originally, individualism was deeply ingrained in general Arabic attitudes, and this becomes much clearer within those groups who were influenced by Bedouinism, as is the case with the people in Iraqi society. For generations under different historical factors, and
with the influence of the particular patterns of socialization, the individual has been unable to satisfy his inherited sense of individualism, as was possible in past tribal society in the desert. In particular, the most common attitude toward the individual which could be recognized in most Arabic countries is that the individual is not important, or perhaps he is only the cheapest element and his life is already prescribed (Barakat 1971). Thus strong individualism continues to exist, but unsatisfied. Especially as Fayerweather (1977) explains, the authoritarian systems in political, religious, educational, and family life, usually encourage subordinates to compete excessively for the favour of superiors and to escape their approbation by lies and evasion. All this encourages the development of the individualistic personality - a man views the world as dangerous and tries to obtain enough skills to get the most he can at the expense of others.

Through all this negative development, the individual manifests his individualism as Hamady (1960) describes:

"in the unique sense of self esteem, in his wish to assert differences, in [a] lack of social consciousness and civic responsibility, in an unruly spirit and disobedience of authority, and in the absence of co-operation with and trust in other" (p. 87) (my emphasis).

Fayerweather (1977) remarks that the individualistic personality walls himself off as much as possible from those around him and he is:

"distrustful, suspecting them of predatory intentions towards him; and he feels a sense of hostility towards him. In any relationship he is intensely concerned with his own position and not very conscious of the attitudes of others except as he perceives their impact on him. As the size of circles indicates, he gives much more attention to those above him than those below." (p. 17)

So one of the ways that individuals indicate their 'negative individualism' is by unwillingness to work in co-operation and
preferring to work individually, which has resulted in a lack of teamwork and group participation. The group in Arabic society, as Pezeshkpour (1978) describes it, is really not more than a number of individuals gathering together, who have not come together for mutual benefit but each individual playing his part as a member of another group. Thus they are prone at any moment to break away and act on their own, and group goals become as varied as the number of individuals in the group.

In fact, the extended family plays the same important role as that of the clan in tribal society and the individual's familism has the same sense as the old tribalism. We have demonstrated previously that distrust and suspicion are directed towards those outside the family. In the same way 'co-operation' is largely a family affair or based on blood group, especially in the village. But little can be found outside these areas as there is not sufficient trust to co-operate with others outside the traditional groups.

Despite this, a strong exchange of help and favours has been well established within the co-operating units in society such as among friends and neighbours. In Iraq such an attitude was clearer some years ago, particularly among traditional rather modern people. Generally, generosity to the needy and mutual aid among various groups are highly valued and well-established, inspite of feelings of distrust and fear of negative judgements. In fact the Islamic principles of 'co-operation' have strongly supported such exchanges of help and assistance toward others, particularly the poor and needy.

Such 'co-operation' has two distinguishing features; first, the inherent 'give-and-take' obligation in the exchange of good deeds, help and favours. Since such co-operation is mainly derived from
feelings of generosity and part of the inherent 'hospitality' which everyone understands as an impulse towards everyone else, each person is constrained not only to offer but also to receive hospitality. It is very difficult for the individual to receive help, favours and good deeds from others without repaying the same and perhaps more, in order to feel free of any obligation or, I would say, to be like the Bedouin in the desert, the giver more than the receiver, in other words to satisfy his 'superiority propensity'. Anyone who fails to repay a good deed or procrastinates in doing so, becomes subject to criticism and ma-yara (shaming). The second feature of co-operation between individuals is that as long as generosity is seen to be valued strongly, the individual will do it, but in general people are more willing to help the weak and those who display dependence upon the benefactor, than to be generous to an equal person, unless exchanging an obligation (Berger 1962).

5. DEPENDENCE AND TAKING RESPONSIBILITY

The picture that emerges from most available studies and from what has been previously demonstrated is that Arabic culture, such as in Iraq, emphasizes conformity and compliance towards others' expectations, especially to significant others and that the patriarchal family encourages subordination to authority, discipline and stressed emotional dependence rather than fostering individual autonomy (Ammer 1954; Khadduri 1970; Hamadi 1960; Darwish and Takila 1976; Pezeshkpur 1978; Prothro 1969; Berger 1962; Alwardi 1965; Patai 1973; Nahas 1969). The Arab's traditional family structure and pattern of child-rearing require a substantial family dependence from the individual; the father protects and provides for the entire family. In return, the family members have to respect all the
father's wishes and remain psychologically and often physically under his domain.

Thus children remain totally dependent on parental authority for many years, which may last until their adolescence. The father usually takes all the important decisions for the family and thus independent activity and responsibility are fostered or expected to a lesser degree. Tomeh (1970) in his study about reference-group support in making decisions about an academic future among Arabs college students, remarks that "decisions on specific and general academic matters in the Middle Eastern society are basically handled by the family". He found some evidence of the influence of traditional 'father dominance', and that the influence of the family including kin is most pronounced among some Middle Easterners such as Iraq (p. 158).

Through the pattern of socialization through which the children have passed in their child-rearing, school and reinforcement by other social and political institutions, individuals grow up lacking self-confidence and a healthy individual autonomy. They are brought up to be dependent on their seniors for direction, and within their family they are perceived as an extension of their parental egos. Within this kind of socialization, individuals are not experienced in problem-solving and analytical thinking, they are not trained for self-independence, participation in decision-making, taking initiatives and learning by discovery. Their relationship with their socialization agents (father, elders, teachers, etc. ...) is in general an authoritarian pattern with a high degree of conformity and dependency. All this plus the prevalence of suspiciousness and mistrust, lack of a co-operative spirit, searching for safety and security, fear of negative judgement, and low tolerance of
uncertainty, have produced a tendency to avoid accepting responsibility and a willingness to let decisions be made by others, thereby removing responsibility from oneself to others.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To summarize the previous 'dominant value-orientations' which have been suggested to be constituted within the Iraqi cultural system, it is useful to use the 'five life-problems' orientations given by Kluckhohn and Stradtbeck (1961); then in addition, to use another orientation, that of "relation to authority" (Inkeles and Levinson 1969, p. 447), or what has been termed the "Power Distance" (Hofstede 1980) as follows:

1. Dominant orientation in relation to authority:
   - an authoritarian relationship associated with submission, ingratiating, personalization, respect for authority and power, which maintains a large power distance. An expectation of paternalistic familism about authority figures, dignity, strategic compliance, and great willingness to be in a power position.

2. Dominant orientation towards human nature:
   - mainly evil and dangerous, and thus distrust others, secretive, avoiding open confrontation, and being sensitive to criticism.

3. Dominant orientation of man to nature:
   - mainly subjugation to nature thus 'fatistic' in general, feeling helpless, and avoiding uncertainty and risk taking.

4. Dominant time-orientation:
   - mainly towards the past, and somewhat toward the present.

5. Dominant activity orientation:
   - mainly being, being-in-becoming, and a weak orientation towards doing.

6. Dominant relational orientation:
   - hierarchical relations, negative individualism, lack of
teamwork and co-operation, self- and family-orientation, informality and high obligation toward traditional personal ties, formality and ceremony, rigidity and conservatism, seriousness and manliness, and pride. Also politeness, agreeableness, conformity to certain groups' norms and to others expectations, and stereotypical and mannered relationships.

Insofar if the people in Iraqi society do share the previous value-orientations in their societal norms and collective characteristics, it is reasonable to influence the conduct of organizations located in Iraq, especially in regard to individual behaviour, style of interpersonal relationships and the expectations about the legitimate use and manifestation of authority. When individuals enter the organization with their cultural values and norms, they construct their behaviour according to how they see and understand their situation through concepts and meanings derived from their culture: "Thus just as they reflect their culture, so it is argued will their organisation" (Child 1981, p. 335).

So if the power structure in Iraqi society is such that it contributes to the gap between the powerful and the powerless and thus maintains a large power-distance, and hence the authoritarian relationship is the prevalent pattern of power relationship within the influence of 'traditional respect' and 'personalization' of authority, then logically, organizations too in that society would have a relatively authoritarian structure. The organizational member would have perceived those in organizational authority through the underlying concepts of traditional 'respect', 'personalization' and fear; hence members would never challenge those in authority and always wait for them to take the initiative and have decisions made by them, and then the only responsibility one could expect is to carry out the instructions.
Individualism, sensitivity to criticism and frankness, especially in front of a group, extreme suspiciousness and distrust, face-saving, manliness, rigidity of thought, expected hostility, the superimposing of personalities on issues, personal loyalty, and deference to authority - all those characteristics act as serious obstacles to open confrontation and act in the same way by avoiding open confrontation in group communications and discussions of organizational 'negatives'. The organizational members will avoid showing or sharing feelings, emotions, and criticism, as well as trying to isolate themselves from each other. Each one will avoid criticizing issues related to others, justifying this in terms of "everyone should concern himself with his own affairs and let others concern themselves with their own business." They will avoid criticism in discussing important organizational issues that could have an effect on someone else if it could be perceived as an attempt to reveal personal weaknesses or negative judgements of others for some personal purpose. Such avoidance is emphasized by the obligation of individuals towards their traditional personal ties with others. So in reaction to these ties, people would tend to depersonalize the issues and not implicate anyone specifically, and avoid hostilities by generalizing matters. If distrust is the prevalent value-orientation or the 'rule of the game' in Iraqi culture, as we have seen in this chapter, then the structure of the organization embedded in that culture is more than likely to be centralized, and thus authority would be in the hands of a few members.

'Fatalism' and excessive 'authoritarianism' stand as kinds of buffering mechanisms within which people in wider society can escape from uncertainty and the ambiguity of 'freedom' (Fromm 1941), as this
chapter shows. So we and others (Tayeb 1981) could argue that the organizational structure will tend to reflect the degree of ambiguity offered and tolerated by the organizational members; such reflection will be in terms of 'tightening' or 'loosening' the structure.

In the same way, the above characteristics coupled with the lack of co-operative spirit, negative individualism, self- and family-orientation, a need for safety and security, dependence, and lack of autonomy, all of which are prevalent in the wider society, would have influenced the conduct of the organization. Such characteristics are assumed to discourage the commitment and acceptance of responsibility, participation in decision-making and leadership, teamwork and organizational belongness.

Finally, Iraqi culture and the individuals within that culture are characterized in general by traditional values and conservatism, as well as a willingness and a sense of obligation to conform to the community's norms and expectations. So organizational members would have inherent conservative views about organizational life and the ways they fulfill their jobs; this can be summed up in the following proverb: "Better the mad man you know, than the normal person you don't". At the same time, they would still have a strong obligation to their traditional values within their organizational relationships.
CHAPTER (6)

THE CULTURAL SETTING AND CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAQI BUREAUCRATIC-ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION

In the research model, it has been argued that not only a basic understanding of individual characteristics is of direct importance to organizational behaviour, but also a basic understanding of the nature of the formal organization. In the previous chapter the dominant value-orientations that characterize the culture and individuals in Iraqi society were indicated. But not only the 'culture' and 'socialization' of wider society have an indirect, enormous, fundamental, impact in constructing individual organizational behaviour, but organizational 'sub-culture' and structure also have a great and more direct impact on the ways individuals behave within organizations (Cooper 1979). Using the cultural approach of 'organization within society' it has been argued that logically organizations within Iraqi society would reflect in their characteristics and 'sub-culture' partly the value-orientations of wider society and partly their peculiar setting, structure and experiences.

So in our journey to understand the middle managers' behaviour toward top management in Iraqi organizations, I believe now is the time to return to the organization. In fact, as was stated earlier in the research model, the journey began with the organization itself and we moved to study the culture in wider society in order to understand and explain the kind of behaviour that has been observed and studied by the researcher and the meanings that stand behind that behaviour within Iraqi organizations.

In this chapter the researcher will study the characteristics and nature of 'Iraqi bureaucracy' that has been acquired through its historical experiences within Iraqi society. Such a study will indicate the deep, structural characteristics that reflect the
organizational values and norms and the model of reality that is held by individuals in Iraqi organizations. In doing so the researcher will use the previous two chapters, some relevant studies and the researcher's previous work experiences within some Iraqi organizations.

1. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND NATURE OF IRAQI BUREAUCRACY THROUGH ITS HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES WITHIN IRAQI SOCIETY

In Iraq and in many developing countries, the efforts and trends one could recognize through the evolution of their bureaucracies have been aimed at reaching the 'rationality' of Weber's model of bureaucracy. The emphasis on organizational rationality appeared strongly within these countries after the Second World War and after most of these countries, as with Iraq, gained their independence (Hamdi 1977). The British Colonial rulers set-up their classical model of bureaucracy in Iraq and the national organizational designers have continued the 'bureaucratization process' since that time by applying exactly and literally as much as they can the Weberian type of bureaucracy through rules, regulations, instructions, structuring activities, building a pyramidal hierarchy of authority relationships and emphasizing formality and impersonality. These designers have not taken into consideration the values, norms, orientations, social settings and structure of wider society. They forgot that the human being cannot be something else, but only a human being; he cannot be absolutely impersonal, especially if he belongs to a society full of personal ties and loyalties, as is the case in Iraq and generally in Arabic Society. They conceive human beings in the same mode as Weber for whom the human being, as quoted by Mouzelis (1975), is as follows:
"In a great majority of cases he (the bureaucrat) is only a simple cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march" (p.41).

In fact, Weber did not construct a model of bureaucracy to be followed as much as possible in concrete reality. Rather he tried to identify the common elements which bureaucratic organizational forms may manifest regardless of era or region, then be built his ideal model. Weber himself was aware of the necessity to compare the ideal with the real in order to understand organizational reality (Mouzelis 1975). Weber's type is meant to be an analytic tool contributing directly to the explanation and interpretation of social phenomena.

Although this type was constructed through a wide historical comparative analysis of administrative systems, Weber, as Gouldner (1960) states, "has constructed his type of bureaucratic organization out of elements which may be constant, regardless of varying social structures" (p.48). Thus Weber was concerned with universality or generality rather than with variations in bureaucratic forms, and thus he did not give attention to the manner in which the common characteristics designated as bureaucratic are interrelated with historically specific social structures (Gouldner 1960).

Weber (1946) himself realized the consequences of his mechanistic assumption when he states, as quoted by Mangham (1979):

"It is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing but these little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving toward bigger ones - a state of affairs which is to be seen ..... it is such an evolution that we are already caught up in, and the great question is ...... what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parcelling-out of the same, from the supreme manifestation of the bureaucratic way of life" (p. 8).

Weber's type, gives as he meant, the functional aspects, that of "rationality, reliability, and predictability", which are one side of
the bureaucratic picture. The other side, that of "dysfunctional aspects", has been pointed out by many writers mainly Merton (1940; Gouldner (1955; 1960); Selznick (1949) Blau and Scott (1962), and Thompson (1961) who terms these aspects "bureaupathologies". Modern writers on bureaucracy, although influenced by Weber's construction of bureaucracy have ignored the problems of development and cross-cultural comparison of organizations. Bureaucratic theory as Mouzelis (1975) states "has become 'predominantly ethnocentric, nonhistorical and microscopic in orientation'" (p.53). So these efforts to indicate the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic organization are also concerned with the universalistic model and gives, as appears in the work of Merten (1940), a one-sided picture, that of the effect of bureaucratic structure on individual personality and his behaviour within the organization. These studies ignore the other side of the picture, that of what the individual brings from his cultural norms and values in wider society, and its effect on bureaucratic organizational settings. Crozier's model arose out of this second view as he relates cultural patterns of a specific country (France) to the pattern of bureaucratic organizational behaviour within that country. But also he only concerns himself with the impact of culture on organizations, which is also a one-sided picture, although the most influential one.

The 'bureaucracy' in Iraq and other developing countries has acquired an opprobrious meaning, and odious connotations. The term 'bureaucracy' became used only as a synonym for inefficiency; lack of initiative; un-intelligent rigidity in the approach to human problems; undue fussiness and bossiness on the part of officials and downright stubbornness. In other words the term 'bureaucracy' appears to be coupled only with 'dysfunctional aspects'.
In fact many studies conducted on public administration in developing countries (Riggs 1962, 1964; Berger 1957; Braibanti 1966, 1969) clearly revealed the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of this type of administration, despite (a) the technical assistance provided to those countries by the transfer of technology in order to follow the Western example; (b) the efforts to improve public administration and planning for economic growth; and (c) the aid of wealth in some of these countries, e.g. many Arabic and Middle Eastern countries.

The case of developing countries reveals the crucial effect of culture on organizational effectiveness. Cultural obstacles, said Milne (1970) do not permit either mechanistic or organic organizations to work effectively, and disturb informal as well as formal organizations. People in countries such as Iraq live and think in some ways which are radically inconsistent with the requirements of formal organizations. In most of those countries the political and bureaucratic recruitments are still, to various degrees, governed by tradition rather than the merit principle, and legal codes have not completely displaced tribal and religious customs. Thus the human element of organizations in those countries cannot be permeated with the same behavioural norms and criterias of Western organizations. Cultural factors, particularly in developing countries, affect management practice and its development (Akinmayowa 1981) and these factors are the organization's boundries to responding to environmental demands. This response is to a large extent determined by the values and attitudes of organizational members (Tayeb 1981).

As the main concern of this research is with Iraqi organizations, whose bureaucratic nature and characteristics have been taken for granted by most Iraqi writers, I will in the following
pages, try to study the main characteristics of Iraqi bureaucracy in its 'hard' and 'soft' aspects. Iraqi bureaucracy has acquired its characteristics through its historical experiences, not as formal organizations with an identity separate from their environment, but as a part of wider society.

The most important historical influences upon Iraqi organizations of today, as we have seen previously, were the Ottoman and then the British occupation and administration. The emergence and evolution of Iraqi bureaucracy were originally shaped by these two streams of influences, and then its characteristics were crystalized during the following historical experiences.

Iraqi bureaucratic administration, half of which is inherited from the Turks and half of which was set up by British Colonial rulers, has, as in the case of most developing countries, certain special features (Dube 1971). These kind of features shaped and deeply affected the nature and the extent of the existence of Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy within Iraqi organizations. Understanding these features of Iraqi bureaucracy is significant in revealing the deep and subconscious level of Iraqi organizational structures, and the deep elements of culture that constitute contemporary organizations. The main important features of Iraqi bureaucracy are:

A - Duality in identification or the existence in a twilight zone of cultures.

B - The heavy involvement in politics.

C - Its organizational structure and settings are constructed through the congruence and clashing between bureaucratic components and Iraqi cultural components.
A - The Duality in Identification of Iraqi Bureaucracy

From reviewing the evolution of Iraqi culture and Iraqi social structure, we can recognize that Iraqi bureaucracy in its emergence and evolution has existed largely in a twilight zone of cultures; partly traditional and partly modern. Moreover, the bureaucratic administration that was established by the Ottoman and much more so by the British, and the culture in wider society negatively affected each other under the impact of Ottoman and British policies with the help of many social, economic and political factors.

During the Ottoman and British administrations, the traditional Bedouin culture changed for the worst. One of the most important changes that happened within this culture was the nature of power or authority-relationships between the tribal sheikh and his tribesmen, as well as the type of the traditional sheikh functions. The traditional Bedouin relationship between the sheikh and the tribesmen, with its sense of democracy and equality, changed to become a feudal one between generally an authoritarian autocratic sheikh and submissive followers. Ottoman and British policies not only increased the power of the sheikhs enormously but more importantly changed its base and nature; they became the largest legal feudal landowners and their tribesmen their submitted fellahins. The powers of the sheikh were utilized by the Ottoman and British authorities for their own objectives. A number of sheikhs became the Ottoman governments' men in their tribal areas, and collected the required taxes for the government. Also a number of powerful sheikhs under the British policy became legally responsible for controlling disputes among their tribesmen. The sheikhs' functions started to have a duality in nature since they were given by the Ottomans, an official authority and such titles as Pasha and
Bey thus constituting them as civil administrative officials. Furthermore, the British employed a number of the most important sheikhs who showed their loyalty to the British as government representatives to their own areas, and gave each of them a bureaucratic position mudir (i.e. manager) with a salary and supported them with money and arms. While those sheikhs retained their traditional leadership of the tribes, they became the legal landowners of vast areas and involved in politics. Many of them became members in Parliament seeking ministerial positions. They held a political and social power and formed one of the most powerful pressure groups in the governmental administrative body.

Thus, inequality and power-distance between the sheikh and his tribesmen became greater especially from the sheikhs points of view, as the tribesmen (fellahins) were living in dire poverty and ignorance, working for the sheikh as peasant labourers under a system of unequal share-cropping, which offered them no rights or status and tied them to the land. On the other hand, the sheikhs collected enormous amounts of wealth for which they had not worked at all, and they moved to 'palaces' in Baghdad or other cities, adopting a Western style of living with a high level of luxury and extravagance. They involved themselves in city pleasures and associated socially with the Effendis who formed the bureaucratic class of that period. So the feudal sheikhs started to adopt the elements of modernity, in addition to their strong traditional elements. The Bedouin's charismatic type of authority with its element of 'rational agreement' changed to a pure authoritarian system of 'the one (sheikh) over the many (tribesmen)' rather than 'the many over the one'. The feudal sheikh became self-centred rather than tribe-centred, and his power derived mainly from the support of central
authority and the possession of land, wealth and political or/and bureaucratic positions, more than from the respect and cooperation of his tribesmen. Some of them became able to keep their tribesmen (fellahins) in subjection with the support of their bodyguards as well as the official police and the government machinery.

Despite these changes, the prestige of the sheikhs continued to rest on their function as leaders of their tribes. The sheikhs secured positions of privilege in the state, but without obligation to it. Also the loyalty of tribesmen, who became fellahins living in extreme poverty, to their tribes and their respect for the traditional leadership of the sheikhs, did not break down as starvation and poverty were not new to them, but no doubt the old bonds between the sheikh and his followers weakened gradually.

It is important to keep in mind that 'feudalism' in Iraqi society was not an economic system only, but also and mainly a social one, as it was a deviation of Bedouin culture. The fact that Bedouin culture enormously affects the whole culture in Iraqi society, feudalism in a social sense (values, norms, structure) was not limited to the rural areas, but rather affected the whole society in towns and villages but to varying degrees. Many urban figures and members of the administrative body (the political elite and the bureaucratic Effendis) also became feudal landowners, associating socially with feudal sheikhs. The mode of values and norms which Iraqi culture acquired through its socio-historical evolution supports the above factors in crystalizing the dominant social structure in Iraqi society as a 'feudal one'. These values and norms, as seen previously, stemmed from different sources, mainly Bedouin culture, misinterpretations of some Islamic teachings, harsh experiences under colonial powers, and the high uncertainty of life as well as instability in political life.
Duality in function was not limited to the feudal sheikhs, but rather appeared among the bureaucratic class of Effendis and the political elite of that period. While members of these two categories occupied different ranks in the administrative body, mainly in management and holding or looking for influential political positions, most of them were also feudal landlords. The fallahin were at their mercy also because those urban landlords were the owners of the pumps which were installed in the rural areas. Many of them became very wealthy and lived at a high level of luxury. Many of them used their personal connections, traditional values of hospitality, wealth, association with powerful figures like the sheikhs, and formal positions to gain and maintain their social and political positions and prestige.

These bureaucratic officials who were at the same time feudal landlords, also presented both elements of modernity and tradition. They were partly absolved from their traditional obligations of having to share communal attitudes, sentiments, and ways of thinking. Although they were influenced by Western culture, they were not able to break away from tradition and adopt the ideals and values of the modern world.

While the prestige of the feudal sheikhs was essentially derived from their traditional positions as leaders of their tribal society, the prestige of the political elite and the bureaucratic Effendis was mainly derived from their bureaucratic formal positions in the governmental body.

So the duality in identity and nature has been embedded in Iraqi bureaucracy since its emergence during the Ottoman and especially the British ruling periods, thus the dominant mode of organizational culture in Iraq acquired the identity of being a 'bureaucratic-feudal' one.
B - The Heavy Involvement in Politics

In Iraq, as in the case of most Arab and developing countries, the connection between bureaucracy and politics has been much closer than in the West (see Dube 1971; Berger 1957). This connection has been in Iraqi bureaucracy since its emergence through the influence of the following two factors:

1 - The bureaucratic administrative body has been an instrument for political influence and control, especially for nation-building.

2 - The close connection between economic and political power.

1 - The bureaucratic administrative body as an instrument for political control and nation-building

The bureaucratic administration, when first emerging under the Ottoman power, was an instrument for direct control over Iraq in order to collect and provide the central government with taxes and land revenue for the treasury, manpower for the army, and to maintain governmental supremacy. The sultan and his governors held the political power besides the centralized authority of the government administration. The Ottoman government, in its relationship to the Iraqi people was very concerned about keeping a superior position in the eyes of the people, thereby enjoying obedience and respect, and the people's flattery.

The new administrative system that the British devised was aimed at suiting their colonial purposes in their political struggle for complete control over Iraq. This administration was first under military supervision and the main responsibility lay with the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, who acted in the provinces through his political officers. The governmental administrative body was not only an instrument for ruling the country and political control, but more a focus of much local political struggle and
nationalist agitation against the British. It was a weapon of partisanship among Iraqi political groups in their struggle against British power.

The period between 1920-1958 witnessed the formation of the Iraqi state by Mandate. This state not only became a new centre from which power could be exercised, but this power was concentrated in the hands of a new Iraqi political elite which consisted of two major wings: the Sharifians who were originally Ottoman army officers, and the tribes' sheikhs. In the new order and as a consequence of the social and economic vacuum, the political elite was transformed into a class interest, rather than a disparate collection of ruling groups of divergent former Ottoman army officers and tribal leaders (Pool 1980). They played a dominant role in Iraqi political life at that time as they occupied a wide array of political positions.

This period was characterized mainly by the fluidity of politics and the struggle for power, influence and status. Through this fluidity the governmental officials, especially those in high-ranking positions, who were mostly members of the political elite or Effendis, i.e. former Ottoman bureaucrats, were heavily involved. Politics, through the above struggle which led to personality conflicts and tensions, centred round individuals who formed with their followers many 'power centres'. Also 'cliques', formed around key personalities through personal loyalty and exchange of personal benefits. In fact personal loyalty played an important part in the process of political identification and decision-making (Pool 1980). The political elite and the administrative high-ranking officials used in their struggle for power, status, and influence, all their formal positions, wealth, traditional values such as 'hospitality' and 'generosity', association with powerful figures... etc. Thus administration under such leadership could not be wholly impersonal.
In the Middle East and Arabic world, the government is the major source of any organized social power and the dominant source of political and economic power; no class wields much power outside it (Berger 1969). Through harsh and long experiences under different historical realities, the government and those who speak for it or who are symbols of its power are respected and feared, especially in Iraq the government was associated for hundreds of years with foreign conquerors. The prestige of the civil servant in Iraq was, until the 1960's, very high because of the above reasons, and because the government service was the goal of the educated men who were likely to come from high socio-economic and traditionally privileged groups. Such groups were able to provide the necessary general background and more, the expensive education required for entrance into the high prestige bureaucratic strata of Iraqi society at that period.

After the revolution of 1958 and much more after that of 1968, the supremacy of the bureaucracy has been replaced by the sovereignty of politics which has become the most important activity. As the new leaders have new ideologies or belief systems for nation-building and economic development and new political attitudes, the bureaucracy found itself subject to political authority and had to follow the direction and policies that are set by political power. While the bureaucracy's power and prestige in the new order have been decreasing, its burdens and responsibilities have been increasing. The bureaucracy has been called upon to assume major responsibilities in the implementation of national plans for economic development and social change. The main areas in which bureaucracy in Iraq, as well in other transitional societies, found itself forced to redefine and readjust its position and responsibilities were, as Dube (1971) states, firstly: the culture of politics; secondly: the emerging
ethos; and thirdly: the expanding sphere of state activities and the new institutional arrangements. The bureaucracy started to find itself in a difficult and uncomfortable position, always receiving attacks from several sides with mounting pressures to modify its structure, values, and work habits, and to adapt itself to the idiom of the fast changing situation. But the fact remains that bureaucracy mostly adjusts itself to new pressure by accepting the new elements only theoretically. This is true, not only because the bureaucracy in Iraq was carefully trained in classical administrative procedure and routine during the Ottoman and British colonial periods, but also because it contains deeply embedded values and structures which are the continuation of many well-established societal norms in wider society.

The post-independence period has been characterized by violent political changes and political instability, particularly during the sixties. Such instability, with the latent effect of the past struggle for independence, lead to high levels of anxiety and insecurity. These experiences of the previous struggle for independence have sometimes manifested themselves in ways such as seeing a colonialist or new-imperialist behind every bush, and suspecting nationals of aiding neo-imperialists, all of which can generate feelings of insecurity, especially among those who are not loyal to the ruling party or leadership group. Political considerations during post-independence have dominated organizational life; loyalty to the ruling group or party has been looked upon as potential leadership points. Political leaders who aspire to change their societies rapidly, sometimes regard changing the administrators as part of the revolution. Al-Aisamie (1969) and Alkubaissi (1974) point to the negative consequences of the practice
of 'purging' the government administration of employees whose retention in office is considered, under the influence of political considerations, to constitute a threat to public interest. In some developing countries which follow the one-party system, the 'outsiders' i.e. those who do not belong to the ruling group or party, are not likely to be appointed to important positions in the administrative body. They are sometimes subjected to pressures to join the loyalist party; those who are non-committal or who are not willing to join the loyalist party may lose many advantages and face many difficulties. Thus members of organizations are not assured of job security, careers or promotions even if they prove their ability on the job. Also the formal authority of their bureaucratic hierarchical positions is sometimes challenged and undermined by the political hierarchy; thus they learn from experience that joining a political party in power can better serve their interests in the organization.

2 - The close connection between economic and political power

As has been demonstrated, the government has always been the dominant economic and political power in Iraq.

The governmental post was, during Ottoman rule, British mandate and Monarchy system, one of the few outlets for Iraqi educated youth, and the goal of the middle classes and the ambitious poor. This was because of the depressed state of the vast majority of the population who lived in poverty, lacked work opportunities in private business because of economic stagnation and lack of private capital, especially after the depression of the thirties, and the domination of the government as a major source of economic and political power.

The economic power of the 'political elite', who became the upper economic class in Iraqi society during the Monarchy system, was
not mainly a private independent economic power as it is in the West but, even when based on land or trade, was derived from holding political power in the state or a close relationship with the holders of political power. In fact this is clearer in the case of the modern educated wing of the Iraqi political elite of that time, particularly those 'ambitious poor' and those who came from middle and upper level bureaucratic families, the great majority of whom depended on the state for their daily bread. Also they had no traditional power and 'natural' followers, as did the tribal sheikhs who were the other wing of the political elite of that time (Pool 1980).

The connection between economic and political power has increased enormously since the 1950's and particularly after the fundamental changes of political economy since the revolution of 1958. These changes are mainly the initiation of agrarian reform which terminated the prevailing feudal system, nationalization of most private industrial and commercial enterprises and the highly important 'oil sector'. These changes meant a great growth and extension in size and influence of the public sector which became and still is by far the largest employer in the country. This created a central role for the government in planning for economic development, encouraged by the increased inflow of oil revenues. This has been especially in the case since the nationalization movement, and through the recent socialist, political-economic beliefs of controlling economic activities of the country and in using its resources.

In fact during the last ten years and particularly the last six, employment within the state has lost its attractiveness, not only because governmental officials are no longer symbols of government
power as this power now rests on a political basis, but also because the income from it has become unsatisfactory as a result of high inflation and the flourishing of the private sector, including new employment by foreign companies working in Iraq to execute many public projects.

C - The Construction of Iraqi Bureaucratic Structure and Settings

Through the Congruence and Clashing between the Bureaucratic Components and Cultural Components

Iraqi bureaucracy has been influenced structurally by its Western counterpart (Britain). But its nature is a product of the interaction between Iraqi cultural elements and bureaucratic elements. The bureaucratic pattern in Iraq, and the Middle East and Arabic world in general has been in many aspects the opposite of the Weberian organization (Pezeshkpur 1978; Wright 1981). Thus there is a need to understand the nature of Iraqi bureaucracy and its deep level of culture, which are constructed through congruent and clashing interactions between culture in the wider society and the required characteristic of bureaucracy. In doing so, it is useful to use the basic characteristics of Weber's type of bureaucracy as a tool which will help to throw light on the reality of Iraqi bureaucracy. The data I will use in this part are the preceding chapters, which presented the socio-historical documentary data, my work experience and observation within some Iraqi organizations, some relevant studies, and the general indications of this research's field work.
Hierarchical authority structure with impersonal authority relations

Weber's model of organization is based on "legal" authority as contrasted with that of "tradition" (custom) or "charisma" ('the gift of grace')(Weber 1949, p.328). Bureaucratic authority structure is characterized by a pyramid consisting of positions which are ordered into a hierarchical system of super-and subordination resulting in a chain of command (the scalar principle). The individual officials follow the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. The nature of authority relations within this bureaucratic hierarchy, as explained by Blau and Scott (1962); and Mouzellis (1975), is 'impersonal' and through the exercise of legal authority which resides in the office not the occupant. Within bureaucratic authority relations, obedience is not owed to a person such as a traditional chief or a charismatic leader, but to the impersonal authority of an office. Also loyalty of the bureaucrat is oriented to an impersonal order, to a superior position, not to the person who holds it.

Iraqi bureaucracy maintains a pyramid hierarchy authority structure, but with centralizing excessive authority at the top, while relatively less is vested in the base of the triangle (shamaa 1978; Al-douri 1976). Such a kind of hierarchy structure of authority relation is congruous with the type of authority relations in Iraqi society, which is based upon the same hierarchy structure with a very great amount of authority at the top as in the family, school, and all other institutions. If the inevitable result of bureaucratization is centralization of authority and control, the dominant value-orientations in Iraqi culture make it more excessive and construct its latent functions. The value-orientations of
'distrust' outside the family group, the lack of personal security and avoiding risk-taking, personalization of authority, deference to authority and 'superiority propensity' all have their great effect on centralizing authority in Iraqi organizations. Through these types of value-orientations, not only are the top level unwilling to delegate authority to other lower levels of managers, but lower level managers themselves fear accepting it, and they would try to distribute responsibilities away from themselves by pushing the issues up the ladder for top level decisions. In fact greater centralization is found to characterize the organizations in all "high PDI" countries than those in "low PDI" countries (Hofstede 1980) as a consequence of the large power-distance that exists in national culture.

The nature of authority relations in Iraqi bureaucracy develops differently than that of Weber's type, through the clash between bureaucratic impersonality and 'personalization' of Iraqi culture. This nature is not 'impersonal' but rather a combination of personal and impersonal elements with special consequences. The picture which Iraqi organizations try to give is of everything being very formal and impersonal, while personal elements are deeply embedded within the bowels of the organizational culture. If Weberian Western organizations tend, as Pezeshkpur (1978) suggested, to accommodate the executives to the organization, the Iraqi bureaucratic organization tends to accommodate or adapt the organization to the executives. Iraqi organization follows the personal tendencies of its top boss or manager, and the power and duties shift with his decisions. As authority and control are centralized at the top, even insignificant matters are often pushed up for top-level decisions. Thus Iraqi organizations have had relatively frequent changes in
their structures and functions in order to adapt to their transitory leaders. The personality of the top manager or the head of the organization is superimposed on the organization which often is moulded and remoulded around his personality. The dominant belief is that organizations need strong leaders who are willing to force their wills on their organizations. Thus success or failure of any Iraqi organization is thought to be determined primarily by the individuals who occupy top positions. If anything goes wrong with the functioning of an organization, criticism is directed at the head of the organization and his personality rather than to the policies or the system of the organization. The philosophy which is predominant in Iraq and all other "high PDI" countries is as stated by Hofstede (1980): "change the top person and you change the system" (p.121). In fact this is a popular solution in Iraq for organizational problems, although in reality problems often survive after top persons fall. Such changes may only influence, as often happens, the formal surface of the organizational structure, while its deep culture would not change in the planned direction.

This top-man syndrome is also found by Muna (1980) in many organizations in five Arabic countries, where 23(44%) Arab executives described themselves or their role within the organizations that they headed as "the motor of the company; the decision maker; the person who is responsible for the profitability and growth of the company;... etc" (p.39), while 29(56%) executives perceived their role as a "head of a family" (p.40). This top-man syndrome is also found in Islamic firms by Wright (1981).

Loyalty within Iraqi bureaucracy is not impersonal and simply orientated to a superior postion and not to the person who holds it. Through the "personalization" of Iraqi culture, loyalty can only or
at least mostly be felt toward people. Wright (1981) suggests that in Western countries, "the concept of loyalty can also apply to non-human and non-spiritual entities like the organization", and thus the Western employee, "would be more prone to uphold organizational interests when those interests cross the personal interests of the boss or the very person of the employee" (p.89). If this is true in Western organization, it is quite unlikely to be so in Iraqi organization where personalization of loyalty is deeply embedded in its culture. Personal relations and loyalty play an important role and affect different aspects of organizational life. Personal loyalty and goodwill toward superiors are highly valued, and subordinates tend to be aware of the influence of such loyalty on promotion and upward mobility. Through personal loyalty, subordinates serve as a buffer for their superiors who gain power by accepting loyal retainers who can in the long run contribute substantially to the success or failure of their superiors. The loyal subordinate will do his best to protect his superior when something goes wrong, and he will try to blame other variables for the problem at hand, not the boss, even if the boss caused the problem (Pezeshkpur 1978). In return, superiors will promote the interests of loyal subordinates and move them up the hierarchy when the opportunity comes, even if those members have poor qualifications.

Loyalty has always been of paramount importance in Arab societies and is a highly valued personality trait. This loyalty has strong connotations of trust, faithfulness and obligations. Arab executives who were investigated by Muna (1980) valued loyalty more highly than efficiency for all levels of employees (p.79). This attitude of 'loyalty first, efficiency second' within organizations
is in accordance with the dominant societal norms and values of 'personalization' and 'paternalism' of wider society in the Arabic World.

Employees within Iraqi organization are highly dependent on their superiors for decisions and directions, and they rarely exercise personal initiative, sometimes not even within the permitted degree of bureaucratic rules. "Discretion" is defined as "an emphasis upon personal judgement and initiative, acceptance of responsibility and full use of discretionary powers within the rules" (Mouzelis 1975, p.40). In fact Weber's type in this matter holds an ambivalent position; for some writers such as Blau (1962) and Mouzelis (1975) this type, as well as the theory that is adopted by the theorists and practitioners of scientific management, deprives the individual of every initiative or at least limits it to a minimum degree, and thus the only way for these theories to make someone behave rationally as is required by the organization is to tell him exactly what to do through strict rational rules and top level instructions. But for Berger (1957), Weber's type of bureaucratic rules left room for a high degree of 'discretion' and permitted a degree of personal judgement and initiative. In fact in the case of Iraq, as in Egypt where Berger (1957) found a low degree of discretion, the culture in the wider society, where organization members have been socialized before joining the organization, provides them with a set of value-orientations which do not enable them to exercise a high degree of 'discretion'. The prevalent value-orientation in their society - such as extreme suspiciousness and distrust, avoiding acceptance of responsibility and search for safety and security, dependence on others for directions and guidance, and authoritarianism with a high need for escape from uncertainty and
ambiguity - have all prevented an exercise of personal judgement or initiative, and acceptance of responsibility.

'Formality', that is what derives from bureaucratic impersonal rules which prescribe relations between various offices, makes a sharp distinction between the administrators and the administered (Stewart 1970), or puts a clearly defined social distance between the occupants of various bureaucratic positions. This formality is manifested by means of social ritual which symbolizes and supports the hierarchical power structure or the "pecking order" of the various offices (Merton 1940).

This social distance or sharp distinction provided by bureaucratic formality is in congruity with the large power-distance or 'inequality' between those who hold power or authority and those who are subject to that power which Iraqi culture has maintained. Formality makes it possible to practice, in its latent function, the authoritarian conception of authority, haughtiness and the traditional respect of authority. Thus formality within Iraqi bureaucracy serves as a modern means of satisfying the old inherited 'superiority propensity' where a formal position becomes a privilege rather than simply a function to serve the public, and where authority is guarded jealously to maintain status. The bureaucrats, especially in high rank positions, enjoy supremacy and generally try to look powerful as much as they can. Their exercise of formal authority is authoritarian in tone and content. In fact, occupying the top of the bureaucratic pyramid and holding the higher legal authority, often increases the personal authority or power of the top person in Iraqi bureaucracy. The subordinates must always keep a gap or distance between themselves and their superiors, and accountability is demanded by superiors from subordinates.
Exercising power within Iraqi bureaucratic organizations is different from that within Western organization. Managers in both organizations desire power, but European managers in those countries of 'low PDI' (Hofstede 1980) would consider power as something they would almost be ashamed of or as being socially unacceptable to desire, and which they try to underplay (French and Raven, 1960). Thus managers in these countries would try to look less powerful than they really are, or deny having power, and their exercise of power is usually done discreetly. Seeking power and using it is done openly in Iraqi organizations, as is the case in other developing countries (Pezeshkpur 1978; Wright 1981), and managers or powerful people in general, as was found by Hofstede (1980) in other 'high PDI' countries try to look as powerful as possible.

From what has been indicated previously, it is clear that Iraqi bureaucracy through its historical experiences within the wider society has been moving from the model of 'traditional-charismatic authority' with its personal type of relations to that of 'legal authority' and those vestiges of the older model persist strongly to this day and are deeply embedded within Iraqi organizational culture. The formal nature of hierarchical bureaucratic structures are supposed to rationalize or impersonalize the relationship between organizational members, but the nature and psychological mode of this structure develops, in the case of Iraqi bureaucracy, to be not very different from that of the 'traditional and charismatic' model. This model is found within traditional and feudal systems where the authoritarian relation between master who commands by virtue of his inherited status, and subjects who obey orders, and where there is personal loyalty to the charismatic or traditional leader. In fact if the 'Bedouin traditional model' gives a different example of
traditional charismatic authority relations with its strong sense of equality and democracy, the bureaucratic model of Iraqi organization gives a kind of authoritarian legal relation with deeply embedded charismatic-traditional elements, but without the old sense of equality and democracy. Furthermore, if the nature of charismatic-traditional domination which consists of an authoritarian mode, is very loose and unstable (Mowzelis 1975), the bureaucratic domination within Iraqi organization and many other countries, develops more stable and permanent authoritarian modes under the call for organizational rationality. As was the case with traditional and feudal models, the status of the individuals within Iraqi society outside the organization is coupled or judged according to their status within the bureaucratic hierarchy. The top manager is treated, in most of his day-to-day communications outside the organization, on the basis that he is the top person in an organizational hierarchy.

The bureaucratic setting through its clash with culture in Iraqi wider society has had a hostile relationship with many cultural elements and thus failed to use them to serve organizational objectives. While this bureaucracy has allowed the authoritarian societal norms of authority and power, with its traditional respect of authority, personalism, and fear, to enter the organization, the paternalistic mode has failed to do so under the influence of organizational rationality. It has been mentioned previously that the 'family' is one of the dominating social institutions not only in Iraq but in all Arabic countries, where the extended family is still very strong. The authoritarian pattern of relation to authority and its corresponding norms and values which is one side of the 'father-children relationship' or head-family members has always been able to
exist within Iraqi work organizations. But the paternalistic attitude - in terms of care, love, support and help in personal matters, which is the other side of authority relation within the family - has failed to survive within Iraqi organizations in contrast to the case of Japanese organizations. Under the call for 'rationality', the individuals have been socialized within Iraqi organizations through the notion that there is no consideration for private matters, the organization is not their home but a place to conduct formal activities; thus any personal issues must be left to be dealt with outside the organization; a formal relationship is the ideal one. So it is very normal for any subordinate to receive a formal statement objecting to his behaviour, saying "where do you think you are ... , do you think you are sitting at your home". Despite this hostility between Iraqi bureaucracy and the cultural paternalistic mode, Iraqi and Arabic organizations continue to be influenced by 'paternalism' (Muna 1980). Employees' expectations and behaviour towards their superiors stems from this 'paternalism' and thus for them the ideal superior is the one who performs his role as a 'good father' or older brother, in other words, one who has a fatherly attitude toward them which means 'love, care, and help in personal matters'. In fact having such an attitude toward subordinates in Iraqi organization becomes a matter of personal choice, rather than a well established mode, and within the emphasis on formality and rationality, this attitude is very rarely found in Iraqi organizations, unless it is a part of personal strategies for expanding power and influence.

2 - A spirit of formalistic impersonality

In the Weberian model of bureaucracy, as explained by Blau (1956), the "ideal official conducts his office in a spirit of
formalistic impersonality sine ira et studio, without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm" (p.30). In order to reach this dehumanization or impersonalization, rational standards must govern operations, detached from any personal considerations. Bureaucratic rules should be uniformly applied in all bureaucrat-clients relationships as well as between bureaucratic hierarchical levels. Thus the official must not let his personal feelings, which might develop about some organizational members or clients, influence his official decisions concerning them.

It is not difficult to realize how strongly the bureaucratic impersonality has clashed with the 'personalization' of Iraqi culture as well as of Arabic culture in general. If it is true that Western organizations have, to some degree, gained the 'rational organizational man' who becomes able to separate his personal relationships and obligations from his official or formal relationship within the organization, this man has not yet been found for Arabic and most Middle Eastern organizations. In fact it is more true to say that Western organizations and Arabic and Middle Eastern organizations vary in the degree of 'irrationality' as there is likely to be high irrationality within the latter compared with the former. In fact because of the very early movement of Western societies toward industrialization, the social structure and norms and values in these societies have changed to cope with new conditions and requirements. This along with other factors, have weakened family life and personal obligation toward members of the extended family, relatives, neighbours, and other traditional groups, all which provide a degree of rationality in the terms of 'impersonality' in Western organizations. But in Arabic and Middle Eastern societies, who have very recently started to move toward
industrialization, because of many cultural, religious and historical factors, most of a person's role relations are still to great extent set within traditional groups (extended family, tribes, religious groups, neighbours, friends, ..etc). The rights and duties in this society are defined in terms of personal relationships. Personal ties and obligations to kin and friends are part of the individual's identity and form a strong socio-cultural pressure in these countries (Muna 1980). So it has been extremely hard for a human being who lives in such society where life outside the organization is full of personal ties and obligations, to be a rational, impersonal organizational man. This is simply because he cannot put his 'social skin' away each morning when he enters his work organization and then put it back on again when he leaves. To reach a healthy balance between the 'personalization' of his culture and the impersonalization of bureaucratic work organizations he needs to have a 'schizophrenic' or ambivalent personality which is not healthy in itself, or he needs to find another way to cope with such a conflict of expectations. Thus the 'personalization' of Iraqi culture in reaction to the hostility of bureaucratic impersonality has had to find a means by which to exist and hide deep within Iraqi organizational life. This personalization appears in forms judged to be 'irrational' and negative, and thus must be fought and removed; such forms as nepotism, favouritism, personal consideration, and cliques which are based on charasmatic and traditional relationships and the exchange of benefits for personal objectives. These kind of forms strongly characterized the emergence and evolution of Iraqi modern bureaucracy during the period of Ottoman rule, the British Mandate and Monarchy system, as seen previously. In reaction to the strong appearance of these forms which are judged as irrational and
dysfunctional, the bureaucracy in Iraq witnessed, particularly since
the revolution of 1958, a tendency to enforce bureaucratic
formalistic impersonality over informality, as it was considered to
be a step in the direction of improving rationality.

Not only 'informality' but also 'formality' within Iraqi
bureaucracy has many dysfunctional aspects which were constructed
through the interaction between the cultural meanings that
organizational members bring from their society and the specific
meanings they find within the bureaucratic rules. The nature of
'formality' makes it possible for many value-orientations of Iraqi
culture to exist and function behind it. Formality, states Merton
(1940), "facilitates the interaction of the offices despite their
(possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one another" (p.560).
This nature of formality is very useful to people, such as the
Iraqis, who are very sensitive to criticism, directness and
frankness, dignity and open confrontation. Negative individualism,
rigidity, suspiciousness and distrust, manliness, a high concern with
ego, expected aggressiveness or hostility, superimposition of
personalities over issues, respect and deference to authority,
dependence and lack of initiative and unwillingness to take
responsibility, uncertainty avoidance, and a need for security and
safety, fear of negative judgements - all which characterize Iraqi
culture in wider society - function through Iraqi bureaucratic
formality. Formality within Iraqi bureaucracy takes the form of what
Thompson (1961) terms "cold aloofness" (p.357) which he considers as
a kind of bureapathic behaviour stemming from personal insecurity.
This formality as Merton (1940) explains, gives rise to the
"arrogance" and "haughtiness" of the bureaucrat, especially in a
society such as Iraq, where haughtiness and respect are often coupled
and where individuals have a great need to be powerful and respected.
The bureaucrats, from their adaptation to different bureaucratic situations, learn how to use both aspects of 'formality' and 'informality' for their own ends; they widely use formality as a "defensive strategy" (Silverman 1970) to protect themselves and avoid the dangers of criticism and punishment. The bureaucrats within Iraqi organization find that when they do not maintain social distance and let their personal considerations influence their dealing with cases of clients or of organizational members, especially their subordinates, they are very often accused, and may be punished, for being partial in their treatment and favouring some individuals over others to gain personal objectives. This would encourage them to defend themselves by stereotyped, formal treatment of affairs, even when they may realize that this treatment does not provide a reasonable or just resolution of specific problems. When they apply the bureaucratic rules formally and universally, they are often criticized for being characterized by un-intelligent rigidity in their approach to human problems, inefficiency and maybe hostility to the public. Also when the bureaucrat in Iraq follows such formal treatment, he may be faced with the anger of his relatives or friends for his formality with them when they happen to have cause to interact with him or to require his help as an official within the bureaucracy. As such treatment often means failing to meet one's personal obligations, and maintaining social distance and a cold relationship, so he may lose many of his important personal relationships, and would not receive any personal consideration and support when he needs them.

Within Iraqi bureaucracy one can note that formality is mainly demanded by superiors rather than subordinates, members with high rather than low insecurity feelings. In general subordinates try to
establish informal friendly relationships with superiors as such a relationship gives a greater feeling of equality and allows them to gain some power and influence, especially when they have independent resources of power. Superiors may find formality, which in their culture is coupled with respect, provides them with a clear power-distance and a greater satisfaction of their superiority propensity. Also this formality provides security, especially to the insecure superior and could hide lack of ability and cover up personal weakness.

3 - A system of rules (Standardization)

A system of rules is the third basic characteristic of bureaucracy which is strongly related to 'impersonality', since the aim of the rules is an efficient and impersonal operation (Stewart 1970). In Weber's type of bureaucracy, operations are governed "by a consistent system of abstract rules .... [and] consist of the application of these rules to particular cases" (Blau 1956, p.29). The bureaucratic system of rules defines the responsibilities of each member and his relationship with other members at different levels within the organizational hierarchy as well as with clients. Bureaucracy not only should be impersonal but should be seen to be impersonal.

When we talk about Iraqi bureaucracy we should distinguish between 'formalization' which refers to the extent to which procedures, rules, instructions, and communications are written down, and 'standardization' which is the extent to which activities are subject to standard regular procedures, which deal with rules and definitions that purport to cover all circumstances (Pugh et al, 1968). Also we need to clear up the confusion which often appears in Iraq from understanding 'standardization' as linked to the phenomenon of 'red tape'.
In Iraqi bureaucracy a wide area of execution of jobs and relating to each other is governed by formally prescribed written rules, laws, and regulations. Some aspects of organizational activities such as 'accounting' or 'personnel' are highly structured and apply many long-established rules, laws, and regulations from which little variation is possible. Also one may note the tendency toward uniformity and structuring of activities as far as possible. But from my work experience within some Iraqi organizations, and my observations through dealing with other organizations, I have realized that in reality formal written rules and regulations are not always applied in conducting the jobs, at least not to the same degree in different organizational activities.

Rigges (1964) observes a great discrepancy between the formally prescribed laws and procedures and the effectively practiced or the actual behaviour of individuals within many organizations in developing countries. Rigges (1962) remarks that techniques are followed by developing countries as an end in themselves, irrespective of their relevance to the context of the culture and environment in which they are introduced. And that the phenomenon of 'apparent standards' in developing countries could be attributed to the constant pressure to satisfy the requirements set by developed countries when providing technical aid. In fact the discrepancy between organizational rules and procedures and the actual behaviour, particularly of top and middle level managers, has been found by Muna (1980) in many Arabic organizations. Also Rigges observation about this phenomenon has been supported by Al-Awaji (1971) in his study about bureaucracy and society in Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the cultural dislike of 'formality' which stands behind the lack of 'standardization' in Iraqi organization, several
reasons have also contributed to the existence of this phenomenon; in appointing individuals to jobs in Iraqi organizations a knowledge of bureaucratic rules and regulations as well as organizational objectives are not required or provided in training before taking up the job. The newcomer usually learns his job and the required way to fulfill it through the teaching by older members: 'that is how we do the job here'. The newcomer may conduct his work in a 'routine way' or through his superiors instructions without even knowing of the many bureaucratic rules and regulations which govern his job. He may learn some rules as a part of his routine work rather than as a part of his organization's rules system, which should be applied by following a standard procedure. Lack of clear programmed objectives may also participate in the lack of effective standards. In Iraqi organizations the organizational goals are neither clearly stated nor do the organizational members have a clear understanding or internalizing of their organization's objectives (Abona 1975; Al-Shamsie 1979). The proliferation of rules, regulations and instructions, in addition to frequent modification and elimination, have added more difficulties to remembering and following them, especially when they are contradictory. Within Iraqi bureaucracy through the impact of cultural personalization, the authority of the person is, as in French bureaucracy (Crozier 1964), above the system of rules. Formal rules and regulations are usually subject to definition of their meanings or the situations to which they apply by the top person. In fact organizational members in Iraq generally work according to the top person's or superiors order and instructions more than by standard procedure. They follow the top person's instructions, especially when they have a good relationship with him or are trying to develop one, even when they may realize
that the instructions which are sometimes oral, are contradictory to
the written bureaucratic rules or regulations. For many it is only a
matter of security; if it is a written instruction, the author
(superior) will be responsible, not them, for not applying the rules
or regulations. But if he gives his instructions orally, some of
them, especially those with high insecurity feelings, would try to
have these instructions written down, to provide absolution from any
responsibility. Working on orders and instructions from those at the
top and the consequent lack of standardization within Iraqi
organizations also stems from the following reasons; First: the lack
of role definition, as there are no job descriptions or terms of
reference for jobs within Iraqi bureaucracy (Al-Shamsie 1979).
Second: the lack of job classification and performance appraisal and
the subjectivity of promotions and advancements based on personal
factors and arbitrary judgements, and the personal inclinations of
immediate supervisors and the top person within the organization.
The third reason is that authority is seldom delegated down the
organizational structure so all other managers, except the top level,
are left with little authority. Except for the strictly routine work
which has been done throughout the years, the little delegated
authority in other types of work is in reality often subject to top
management approval. Furthermore, it is subject to arbitrary
freezing or withdrawal by the top person. Thus the middle-level
managers and lower-level supervisors do not know the parameters of
their levels of authority as they do not perceive their jobs through
preciseley fixed responsibilities and authorities, so they play the
role of assistants to the heads of their organization.

Although rules cannot be openly ignored in Iraqi organizations,
they are sometimes used selectively or manipulated in a way to get
some advantages. The confusion, generality, and contrariness of many bureaucratic rules and regulations in Iraqi organizations leaves room for individual interpretations of the rules and which rule is to be applied to the situation they encounter. Although organizational members in Iraq follow the top managements' definitions of the meanings of rules, there still may be some aspects related to the situation not covered by the rule or by the definition of its meaning. Also in other aspects the actors may have no previous definition, or it could be defined in more than one way. Thus knowledge of the rules, ability to use them selectively and manipulate them or their meanings through using the space sometimes available for individual interpretation, has been part of the power resources in Iraqi organizations. Such knowledge and ability has also been useful as a tactic for protecting or expanding power, even outside the organization, by being able to find a way to solve client's problems through what seems like an exception to the rules and regulations. In fact one of the important reasons for the discrepancy between the formally prescribed laws and rules and those effectively practiced, are the many exceptions for influential people, relatives, friends, political considerations... etc.

At this point, we could say that 'formalization' and 'standardization' within the structure of Iraqi bureaucracy do not exist to the same degree, nor are they as closely related as in the case in other organizations (Pugh et al. 1968; Child 1972). Within Iraqi organization, as well as within many Arabic and developing countries, the degree of 'standardization' is much lower than the degree of 'formalization' but it varies between one country and another.
Applying rules and regulations within Iraqi bureaucracy, particularly in the traditional service departments, is characterized by the phenomenon of 'red tape' and the strict adherence to the implementations of rules. This phenomenon means that in many aspects of work, there are long complicated and tedious procedures, and excessive routine, which very often includes delays, frustrations, narrow-mindedness, inefficiencies, and ritualistic procedures. This kind of bureaucratic mode appears mainly within activities where work is well established and where few disturbances interrupt the routine of the work, i.e., where the area of the job is covered by long established rules and procedures. In such activities the bureaucrat is seen by the public as a pompous and arrogant pedant who rigidly sticks to the 'letter of the law' in applying the rules and regulations that cover his job. Within bureaucracy, rules, as Merton (1940) explains, and as it is the case in Iraq, acquire a symbolic significance on their own and become ends rather than means to ends, which leads to the situation in which past decisions are blindly repeated with no appreciation or concern for changed conditions.

This phenomenon of 'red tape' and strict adherence to formal rules is not only the consequence of bureaucratic emphasis on obedience and conformity to rules, which extremely limits individual personal freedom and spontaneity (Merton 1940), but is rather the consequence of the interaction between this emphasis and the dominant value-orientations in wider society. Extreme suspiciousness and distrust, rigidity of thought, dependency and avoidance of taking responsibility, fear of negative judgement, oversensitivity, uncertainty avoidance, and search for safety and security - all characterize the culture and individuals in Iraq and are behind the existence of this phenomenon.
It is true that the excessive 'routine' in Iraqi administration was originally introduced by Ottoman and British occupying powers to the extent that it has become part of Iraqi administrative tradition. But this 'red tape' and the meanings behind it are strongly related to the dominant value-orientations within Iraqi culture. Also the long period of connection between bureaucracy and politics in Iraq, and the violent political struggles after the revolution of 1958 have added more uncertainty to the organizational environment and thus increased officials' adherence to the established rules and routine procedures in order to secure posts. So formal bureaucratic rules perform a "screening function" (Gouldner 1955) within Iraqi organizations, as individuals can, through their adherence to these rules, avoid the risk and uncertainty of an independent judgement or action. Members of organizations, remarks Selznik (1949), become aware just how little they can do and still remain secure, because bureaucratic rules not only define in detail the unacceptable behaviour but also serve to specify a minimum level of acceptable behaviour.

Many aspects of 'ritual' appear on the surface of Iraqi bureaucracy which stem from seeking security and superiority and avoiding uncertainty, rather than from organizational effectiveness and productivity. These ritualistic aspects appear in the extreme insistence upon formal channels; a stress on rights rather than abilities; the insistence upon the full-rights of the superordinate role which means 'close supervision', and the emphasis on protocol and procedure. Another clear ritualist aspect, is the use of memos and dictated notes, even sometimes between two sections of one department, which often contain no information that any one will act upon and are not more than a device to 'stop time' for a moment.
(Hofstede 1980) or to remove responsibility. These ritualistic aspects, are considered by Thompson (1961) as bureaupathic responses to insecurity and doubts about the loyalty or ability of subordinates.

Poor managerial practices, lack of ability to organize and administer, ignorance about managerial education and training needs, overlaps in individual responsibilities, and the managers heavy involvement in details, all give strong support to the phenomenon of excessive routine or 'red tape' in Iraqi bureaucracy.

4 - **High degree of specialization and departmentalization**

According to Weber's model, bureaucracy is characterized by a high degree of division of labour and specialization of employees. The regular activities required by the organization are divided in a fixed way as official duties, so that the responsibilities of each member are clearly defined and legitimized as official duties. Therefore the individual who fills it must have the experience and education required for that post. By the clear-cut division of labour, bureaucracy employs specialized experts in each particular position where every one is responsible for the effective performance of his duties. Bureaucracy means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge not on tradition or charasmatic personality, as it is within feudal and traditional administrations (Mouzelis 1975).

Western organizations have evolved in response to modern science and technology, thus the trend toward departmentalization has received a strong impetus from the tremendous advancements in scientific and technological breakthroughs. These organizations have incorporated departmentalization and specialization in order to improve productivity and hence profitability (Wright 1981).
Specialization and departmentalization within Iraqi organizations have different features than that of Western organizations. One could distinguish two phenomena; first: the low degree of specialization; second: the high belief in experts and their knowledge. Iraqi organization has suffered from lack of specialized personnel. Originally this was due to the small number of educational and training establishments and the ineffective system of supplying adequately educated and properly trained personnel. Up to 1972 the percentage of personnel who had the equivalent of a university degree (BA and BSc) and above, did not exceed 10.16%, compared with the much higher percentage of individuals who had only finished secondary or even primary school. The situation within Iraqi organizations has not changed radically despite the huge increase in university graduates who entered these organizations as a direct result of the political leadership decision to absorb all the university and technical college graduates into the administrative body (Maarof 1977). The employment of those graduates did not come about because of their specialization but simply because they had a university degree. The educational system in Iraq lacks the coordination and integration with organizations and thus this system is poorly oriented towards organizational requirements in numbers and types. In fact management or business education was largely neglected in Iraq while other forms of scientific, technical, and economic education were being developed. Despite the recent development in some courses in business administration and in the field of public administration and some other related areas within Iraqi universities, there is still a large gap between the quality and content of these courses and the organizational needs, especially in developing and improving the abilities and practices of managerial
systems. Also the lack of 'Apprenticeship Training' before employment and the shortcomings of training during employment inside the organization or in special institutions, have contributed to the lack of specialists within Iraqi organizations. The new employees are mostly dependent on their inadequate or irrelevant previous education and experience, and gradually pick-up the prevalent practices and attitudes which are often wrong.

As a result of the previous mentioned points the administrative body in Iraq has ended up with large numbers of graduates who are not necessarily of the right specialization. The lack of manpower planning and low efficiency of the allocation methods used, with the phenomena of 'nepotism' and 'mediation' (Wastah) have resulted in the employment of people who have the wrong specialization, where they fill positions or hold jobs which are not of their educational and experiential background. In addition, while some departments lack staff, over-employment exists in many other departments with its inevitable Parkinsonian results. Thus to meet this over-employment, division of labour becomes a matter of dividing a job into smaller and smaller tasks in order to create jobs. Consequently 'disguised unemployment' becomes endemic within Iraqi organizations (governmental organizations and semi-autonomous organization)(Aboona 1975).

The accumulated experience which personnel in Iraq may acquire through doing specific work for some time is also reduced or wasted through the effect of a high rate of transfer of personnel among different departments within one organization, or between different organizations. Such transferring is in many cases done as a punishment or because of over-staffing, or to 'solve' conflict between superiors and subordinates or among subordinates themselves,
or for many other reasons unrelated to specialization or specific areas of expertise. In other words the transferring criteria are not oriented to 'fit the right person into the right job'.

The personnel in Iraqi organizations in general cover a wide variation in the standard of qualifications, which coupled with the absence of suitable working criteria in many cases means that qualified people end up with very routine and uninteresting jobs with very little responsibility. People with very low qualifications may hold very important jobs, which leads to the lowering of organizational specialization standards. Thus 'specialization' in Iraqi organizations is mainly the result of doing the job repeatedly and probably having some related education or training background and sometimes some previous experience.

Iraqi organizations have not evolved in response to modern science and technology, as is the case in Western organizations, but rather these organizations, as in most developing countries, have responded only to a limited degree within their deep structure and working practices to scientific and technological developments. In fact, as Rigges (1962) has noticed within many developing countries, technology is followed as an end in itself rather than as a means by which productivity and consequently profitability could be increased. Complex technology has been imported for use in Iraqi organizations, but there is a need for specialists with high skills to operate such technology. The emphasis of these organizations, as Wright (1981) says, is not on 'productivity' as it is with Western organizations, but rather on various factors only one of which may be productivity.

Cultural value-orientations have handicapped these organizations from responding to science and technology. Fatalistic outlooks and feelings of helplessness in mastering the surroundings, avoidance of
uncertainty, feeling insecure, have all destroyed an appreciation of the need for planning. These orientations have perpetuated an unbalanced emphasis on the spirit of other-worldliness, obstructed an appreciation of the value of time, and above all, impeded the spirit of inquiry and logical reasoning which is a basic ingredient of education for change. Also the low social status of manual work in Iraq has fostered class consciousness and inhibited cooperation, communication and opportunities for advancement.

In Iraqi organizations the approach to management is more through 'personalization', not departmentalization or specialization, as these organizations have remained essentially charismatic, despite its movement toward a legal bureaucratic model. Because of this 'personalization' the individual with specialist or expert knowledge or who demonstrates an adequate technical training is not necessarily appointed to the right post and often specialization and expert knowledge have little to do with who moves up to occupy higher positions. Also many heads or top managers in Iraq are appointed not for their expert knowledge but for many other political or traditional considerations. Thus the head or top manager may quite likely lack any expert knowledge related to the position he occupies, while others who are specialists or have expert knowledge may stay lower down in the hierarchy.

Managers in middle and lower level lack confidence and incentive, and have a narrow concept of their roles, which results partly from the very nature of centralized decision-making which is dominant within Iraqi bureaucracy. This also lowers the standard of specialization, where the individual has relatively few alternative courses of action to choose among, and where there is little need for planning and generating ideas regarding alternative courses of action.
involving the organization since such activities are executed only at the top level.

Departmentalization and specialization becomes a cover for many cultural orientations. Secretiveness, distrust, sensitivity to criticism, avoidance of open confrontation, lack of teamwork and cooperation, expected hostility and superimposition of personalities on issues, all function behind departmentalization and specialization. Organization members sometimes make use of departmentalization to distance themselves from other departments and also they make recourse to specialization to isolate themselves as individuals from one another. Thus they avoid criticizing issues relating to other departments or to other peoples' areas of specialization justifying this in terms of 'each one should concern himself only with his own affairs'. As criticizing issues is perceived, through expected hostility and superimposing of personalities over issues, as an attempt to fault-find and reveal personal weakness, so individuals within organizations try to depersonalize the issues or each one restricts his concern to his area of specialization which often means his routine job. Thus one can note the absence of adequate coordination between departments and of critical analysis of major issues within Iraqi organizations.

The second phenomenon (the first being low specialization), which has been previously suggested to be noted in Iraqi organizations, is the high belief in experts and their specialized knowledge. In fact this belief not only involves uncertainty-avoiding rituals (Hofstede 1980), but also reflects the notion of 'power'. The 'expert' or 'specialist' is perceived by people in Iraq as indicating a high degree of knowledge which is highly valued in itself. Through the evolution of Iraqi culture, education or knowlege
coupled with respect and power. Thus individuals within organizations realize that their special knowledge of work information which is often accumulated from their work experiences, provides them with power inside the organization; especially because this knowledge or information has been concentrated in a limited number of individuals for the previous mentioned reasons. In fact such information or knowledge is often used as a powerful weapon either for job and position protection, or for expanding personal power. Thus bureaucrats may keep information secret if they find it suitable for their purposes (Abrahamsson 1977), or they may not transfer their experiences and knowledge to others if they feel this would endanger their positions within the organization.

5 - A system of impersonal criteria for employment

The basic characteristic of Weber's type of bureaucracy is impersonal criteria in employment. Organizational members are to be selected on the basis of technical qualifications through formal examinations or by virtue of training or education; thus employment in bureaucracy is protected against arbitrary dismissal (Blau 1956). Administrative officials work for fixed salaries and they are 'career' officials. "There is a system of promotions according to seniority or to achievement, or both" (Weber 1946, p.334). These policies for employment will develop loyalty to the organization and members identification with it, which motivates them to act in ways and expend greater efforts in advancing the interest of their company and their country.

In Iraqi organizations, the 'education certificate' has been the basic criteria for individuals' recruitment and selection. Thus, the applicant should hold an authorized school, institution, college or university certificate as required in order to fulfil the vacant
position. The absence of job description and the lack of training before employment - 'Apprenticeship Training' - have resulted in many cases in which the individual may be appointed to an organization as long as there is a vacant position available in its 'approval cadre' without consideration to the real need for his job or of his type of qualifications. Furthermore, through the lack of distributing personnel plans, the newcomer may be put to work in the same department where the 'approved cadre' indicates a vacant position even if there is no need for him, or he may be located or affiliated to work with other departments despite the fact that the vacant position, for which the individual was recruited in the first place, is within another department. Thus the newcomer may work with a department where there is no need for him, and quite possibly at the beginning of his appointment, he may stay for sometime without any work to do until the head of the department finds some for him, which often means redistributing the same activities of the department between its members to provide the newcomer with some work.

In fact recruiting individuals to occupy the bureaucratic positions on the impersonal criteria of an 'educational certificate' and 'availability of a vacant position in an organization approved cadre' has left a great deal of room for nepotism, mediation, personal connections and political consideration to play a great role in selecting individuals among many applicants who may apply for a vacancy. all these reasons have contributed to the phenomenon of 'disguised unemployment' in addition to the desire of some managers for empire-building in the administrative sense of the word. Within this phenomenon, one could note that while administrative posts suffer from highly disguised unemployment, there is a crucial lack of manpower within industrial and agricultural sectors, to the degree
that labour force has been imported from other Arabic and some foreign countries to fill this gap. This not only results from a lack of accurate manpower planning, but relates strongly to the Iraqi culture value-orientation of valuing white-collar jobs much more than blue-collar and manual work which appeared from the time of the Effendis. In fact such a value-orientation is also found by Hofstede (1980) in all countries with high power-distance.

'Salary' in the Iraqi administrative system, is linked with educational certificates, years of study, and years of service. This system 'prices the educational certificates and seniority' rather than 'prices the job responsibilities and performance' as they are the only criteria available to this system through the absence of job descriptions, job evaluation, performance appraisals, incentive plans, and scientific ways of recruitment, selection, and promotion. In 1975 a high committee was established to undertake the task of preparing a unified public service law. The NCOiD was authorized to formulate work teams to prepare the draft of this law. In the preparation process of this law, job descriptions were used for the first time to define all jobs within the body of public service in the country and to correlate jobs performed and salaries paid. Also part of this process included efforts to prepare job analyses and job classifications for all job titles within Iraqi public service organizations. Rules for performance appraisals and advancements were also designed. Although the researcher, as a previous member of one of the teams which worked in part of the preparation process of this law, is able with some others to take issue with some aspects of this preparation process, the fact remains that this law was the first real attempt to follow the principle of pricing jobs and performance rather than educational certificates and years of
service. Nevertheless, up to now no action has been taken to enact the suggested new law.

In fact for organizations and individuals with a high degree of uncertainty avoidance, suspicion and distrust, obligation toward traditional personal ties, and personalization, the criteria of educational certificates and years of service provide organizational members in Iraq with more certainty and security in their 'careers' than the criteria of abilities, skills, performance and responsibilities.

The promotional system in Iraq is more or less a routine procedure which, in its bureaucratic sense, is based on 'seniority', as there is no job description, performance appraisals and personnel evaluation system. Promoting personnel in terms of giving them the annual increments is mainly a routine procedure which is based on period of service. Even the amount of evaluation that may be done for this purpose, as Al-Shamsie (1979) states "[is] handled exclusively by direct supervisors and agency heads. No other party is involved in this process which may require professional expertise to study items of the forms and to analyze data...factors inside the efficiency reports are subject to arbitrary judgements and personal inclinations of direct supervisors and heads of departments" (p.46). Thus employees learn how to get their promotions by satisfying their supervisors and to be on the safe side by following their instructions and orders and to mind their own business. By doing so their performance is very likely to be evaluated as good or at the minimum acceptable.

Formally, promotion in terms of moving up to occupy a higher position, was also based on 'seniority'. Performance, initiative and abilities has little to do with who moves up in the hierarchy of
Iraqi bureaucracy. This is not only because of the previously mentioned points, but also for many personal factors and political considerations. As such, promotion is not based on performance and initiative but determined largely at the will of superiors of heads of organizations. The ambitious individual who seeks to be chosen by a top person for a higher position learns how to satisfy him and how to cultivate the 'right' people for such purposes.

The evaluation of subordinates within Iraqi organizations as in most Middle Eastern countries, is not simply based on looking at the employees in a categorizing way and assessing their strengths versus their weaknesses and, emphasis on job performance, as Wright (1981) said is the case in Western organizations, but rather on the personality of the subordinate. The former evaluation takes into consideration the subordinates as a total person with related personal factors, personality characteristics, political considerations, and loyalty and goodwill to superiors which are the supreme criteria in moving up for higher and higher positions. If western superiors promote a subordinate who is talented, but rates low with him in personal aspects (Wright 1981), it is unlikely to be so for the Iraqi superior because the later one evaluates a subordinate as a total person. Thus it is not surprising to find that individual qualifications have little relation to job functions and official titles in many Iraqi organizations.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The characteristics and settings of Iraqi organizations, as is the case in most developing countries, reveal the crucial impact of national culture on organizational structure and behaviour. This impact is the consequence of the interaction between the culture in
wider society and the peculiar bureaucratic settings and requirements. Iraqi organizational culture is a socio-historical product which was obtained through the evolution of organizations within the wider society under different historical realities. In the evolution of Iraqi bureaucracy there has emerged an increasing emphasis on 'organizational rationality'. Thus this bureaucracy has been trying on the surface to present a picture that everything is impersonal, while its underlying character reveals the 'personalization' of Iraqi culture in wider society. Cultural impact appears within the latent function of many apparently dysfunctional activities in both aspects of 'formality' and 'informality' of Iraqi bureaucracy. This bureaucracy, through its historical interaction with culture in Iraqi society, has gained certain special features which has shaped and deeply affected the nature and the extent of the existence of Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy within Iraqi organizations. These features, which would help to reveal the dominant social or organizational meanings and the deep elements of culture, structure, and behaviour within contemporary organizations in Iraq, are as follows:

A - Duality in identification or the existence in a twilight zone of cultures.

B - Heavy involvement in politics.

C - Organizational structure and settings of Iraqi bureaucracy constructed through the congruence and clashing between bureaucratic and cultural components.

In order to sum up the previously indicated characteristics of the structure and nature of Iraqi bureaucracy, it is useful to use the five basic concepts of Weber's type as follows:-

1. Hierarchical authority structure with impersonal authority relations:
bureaucracy in Iraq maintains a hierarchical structure with
great centralization of authority at the top; its nature is an
authoritarian legal-charismatic-traditional type of authority
relation, with strong elements of 'personalization' of authority and
loyalty. Subordination, rigidity, and concern for hierarchical
differentiation by status and privilege.

2. A spirit of formalistic impersonality:

- a predominance of formality over informality under the name
  for 'rationality', rigidity, using formality as a defensive strategy
  and a shield behind which many dominant value-orientations exist and
  function, such as fear of negative judgements, unwillingness to take
  responsibility, need for security and safety, expected hostility,
  willingness to look powerful and respectful and sensitivity to
  criticism, directness and confrontation. Personalization of Iraqi
culture in its reaction to the hostility of bureaucratic formality
found ways to hide within the deep levels of organizational culture.
This personalization appears in forms judged to be 'irrational' and
must be fought.

3. A system of rules (standardization):

- a great discrepancy between the formally prescribed laws and
procedures and those effectively practiced. Lack of training before
and during employment, lack of clear objectives, working on top-
person orders and instructions, centralizing authority, and many
exceptions for influential people, relatives, friends, political
considerations, thus low standardization. Strict adherence to the
implementations of rules, 'red tape' phenomenon behind which many
cultural value-orientations function, such is the need for safety and
security, avoidance of uncertainty and risk-taking, antipathy and
rigidity.

4. A degree of specialization and departmentalization:

- the approach to management is more through 'personalization'
not departmentalization or specialization. Low specialization and
high belief in experts and their knowledge. The use of knowledge or
information as a weapon for protecting position or expanding personal
power. Specialization and departmentalization function as a shield
for 'isolationism' and 'unemotionality'.

5. A system of impersonal criteria for employment:

- recruitment, salary, and promotion all based on pricing
educational certificates and seniority, not job responsibilities and
performance. Absence of job description, job evaluation, and
performance appraisals, thus evaluation of individuals is subject to
the arbitrary judgements and personal inclinations of superiors.
Personal connections and loyalty, and political consideration have a
lot to do with who moves up for higher positions.
PART THREE

RESEARCH FIELDWORK FINDINGS

[It should be noted that all tables including the cross-tabulation analysis are to be found in Appendix 1 referred to in this part]
CHAPTER (7)

MIDDLE MANAGERS' DOMINANT ORIENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO TOP MANAGERS IN IRAQI ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION

One of the first basic assumption of the research model proposed earlier, was that the middle manager's compliant behaviour arises out of shared definitions or 'meaning' which they hold in common, by which managers conceive the role of the top managers. These meanings can be inferred from norms, values, and observed actions.

As was commented previously, working for a long period within various Iraqi organizations before the formal study enabled the researcher to identify many of these meanings. The researcher's first hypothesis describes the dominant mode of middle managers' behaviour toward the top manager and the recurring meanings which were identified within it, as follows:

'Middle managers' behaviour toward the top manager tend to comply with and conform to his expectations as a person who possesses the authority and power rather than as a leader with whom they share the organizational leadership and responsibilities'.

The primary concern of the research field work was to explore the middle managers' 'shoulds' (norms) and 'beliefs in' (values) as well as their mode of action in relation to top managers. In other words, to measure their 'orientations' and 'behaviour'.

It has been found (Chapter 6) that the Iraqi organizational culture is a 'bureaucratic-feudal' culture; in other words, a mixture of "role and power cultures" (Handy 1976). So measuring the bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour of the middle managers under study would indicate their commitment to the set of attitudes, values, and behavioural modes that characterize their relevant environment through which they have been socialized. Above all, this orientation and behaviour would enable us to infer the shared or dominant cultural meanings that they hold in relation to authority figures (the top manager) in common which have been identified and hypothesized by the researcher.
To measure the middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' and consequently verify the first hypothesis, two scales including 10 items were used to assess the 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' side-by-side with two 'imaginary situations' (based on real situations which the researcher witnessed in Iraqi organizations) to measure compliant behaviour. The scoring of the 80 middle managers on both scales (i.e. bureaucratic and feudal orientations scales) were tested statistically (Pearson correlations) in order to ensure the different items interdependency. It was found that the items in each scale were significantly correlated as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Bureaucratic orientation as well as feudal orientation were scored by assigning a weighing scale which ranged from the weight of 5 for 'Strongly agree' to weight of 1 for 'Strongly disagree'. By adding the weights of each middle manager scoring on each scale, the degrees of bureaucratic orientation and of feudal orientation were obtained. In the remaining pages of this chapter, the research findings obtained from studying middle managers orientation and behaviour will be demonstrated and discussed.

1. RESEARCH FINDINGS

A - The Bureaucratic Scale

As mentioned previously (Chapter 3) this scale was set up according to a schema containing five categories specifying the particular attitudes, values, and behavioural patterns that comprise the bureaucratic orientation:

- Self-subordination
- Compartmentalization
- Impersonalization
- Rule conformity
- Traditionalism.
Table 3 shows the distribution displayed by 80 middle managers which is summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 80

The above table shows that all the 80 middle managers displayed considerable bureaucratic orientation, but to various degrees. Whilst no-one scored 'low' on the scale, only 8 (10%) scored 'middle' compared with 37 (46%) 'high' and 35 (44%) 'very high'.

These results show that these individuals endorsed the attitudes, values, and behavioural patterns that characterise their work environments, and that they are apt to behave in a bureaucratic mode that consists of applying rules and procedures inflexibility, and treat compliance as an end in itself.

B - The Feudal Scale

This scale was prepared according to a set consisting of the following five categories, which are based on the concept of a feudal mode, described in the relevant literature, which as a social system contains the social concept of:

- Respect for authority
- Personal loyalty
- Disciplined conformity
- Dependency in action
- Consideration of social norms.
Table 4 shows the distribution on the feudal orientation scale that the 80 middle managers produced, as summarised below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 80

While no-one scored 'low' on the scale, only 9 (11%) scored 'middle', compared with 42 (53%) 'high' and 29 (36%) 'very high'. This result indicates that these 80 middle managers are not only oriented toward a 'bureaucratic mode' but also a 'feudal mode'. They generally tend to respect the authority figure and comply with him as a person who possesses authority and power within their work organization. Also they are apt to conform strongly to the discipline of work, social norms and values, and they prefer not to be responsible for taking independent actions.

In fact, by examining the scoring of the 80 middle managers on the feudal orientation scale, one notes that the distribution on four items of the scale (items nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5) showed that the majority were in the high and very high degrees (agree and strongly agree), whilst item no. 4 (not taking independent action) showed, to an extent, diverging results, with 45 out of 80 disagreeing (32 in disagree and 13 in strongly disagree) with not taking independent action (see Table 5). Nevertheless, this item shows a statistically significant relationship in a positive direction with the total feudal scale, as shown in Table 2, where the correlation between item
no. 4 (VAR. 9) and the total of the scale is 0.6484. Thus it was concluded that the scale items all showed a sufficient correlation relationship to justify using the scale as an indicator of the feudal orientation held by the middle managers under consideration.

The relatively incompatible distribution between item no. 4 and the other items on the feudal orientation scale could have many implications. One factor that might have influenced this response is the willingness of those middle managers to appear powerful, or to expand their power in the organization and overcome their lack of influence in decision-making. By accepting the taking of initiative, they are willing to gain the influence and power that might be associated with them.

One of the major factors for explaining the somewhat high percentage of middle managers (45 out of 80) who responded in favour of taking independent action could be the impact of the very recent ideological emphasis by the highest political authority in the country on the ideas of 'employee participation in management and sharing with superiors the responsibility for initiatives inside the organization' (a series of newspaper articles on the administrative system talked about "Condemned phenomena that will (sic) not pass without reckoning", 1976). This was followed by a communique issued by the supreme leadership council, declaring that there is a definite backwardness in democratic practices between superiors and subordinates, and a lack of acceptance of work responsibilities (Conference on Low Productivity in the Government Agencies, 1976). The immediate accountability that was carried out in the above conference resulted in punishment for those managers who were judged as failing to take on responsibility and take the required actions. Conversely, this accountability produced some promotions and
advancements for those who appeared to have taken necessary initiatives related to their jobs. This might explain why those 45 middle managers responded to item no. 4 in favour of taking independent action.

In fact, the above result could indicate the likely instability of the feudal relationship between superiors and subordinates; ambitious middle managers, in their efforts to rise up the promotion ladder, may try to impress higher authorities by showing their readiness to take responsibilities for independent action. These middle managers will use this strategy as long as their work atmosphere or environment is dominated by that particular ideological emphasis, and as long as they perceive such a strategy is effective in serving their objectives. This is especially true when we consider the age of those 45 middle managers who were in favour of taking independent action; while 38 out of 45 were aged less than 38 years, only 7 of them were around 45 years old.

However, the favouring by 56% of the middle managers of taking independent action does not necessarily represent reality, or a permanent situation. The researcher believes that, by studying the nature of the Iraqi organizational setting, one could realize the contradiction between the new instructions that were issued by the political authority and the inherited bureaucratic and authoritarian norms and values held and practised by organizational members. Thus middle managers, in their daily interactions with superiors, would rather not take independent actions and accept responsibility for them. But because these new instructions were issued by a supreme political authority, those middle managers may have felt compelled to accept the new type of instructions, or rather to be seen as accepting them, since they fear criticism and punishment if they
appear to be obstructing the implementation of these instructions. In fact, the Iraqi administrative system has frequently shown quick and superficial responses to such pressures or ideological emphases, which were not congenial to Iraqi organizational culture. But, once time has passed and the pressure has diminished, the system usually returns to its previous position, even though the pressure might have managed to inject some apparent reforms into the system.

Such an ideological emphasis, or even the policy of changing top managers and key middle managers, would influence the surface of organizations, but the deep culture will not necessarily change in the planned direction and at the same time, since there is a lag between formal changes on the instrumental surface and changes at the deeper levels of organizational culture. To transform an authoritarian culture to an open learning one, there is a great need for group-questioning of the actions of top management, but Iraqi organizational members are very weak in this activity.

This response by those middle managers who favoured 'taking independent action' could be not more than an 'ideological support for a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative' - a cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries, described by Hofstede (1980), who states that:

"People in higher PDI countries are more open to ideological solutions to an inequality which is felt as problematic, but for which daily interactions between more and less powerful people offer no alternative. Ideas of worker participation in management are more strongly endorsed on the "desirable" level. Managers in high PDI countries are more ready to admit a wide distribution of capacities for leadership and initiative among people." (p. 120)

If the response of those 45 middle managers is because of the impact of an ideological emphasis imposed by persons in high political authority, this response in itself could indicate the
bureaucratic and, even more so, the feudal orientations of those managers. They move quickly in their overt behaviour to carry out or to be seen to be carrying out what has been injected into the administrative system by higher authority so as to show their obedience and good will. This is so, despite the fact that those managers might not feel that what has been injected is congenial to their organizational environment and its norms and values, through which they themselves have been socialized and under which they are likely to work more comfortably.

Finally, this response may have arisen because of the way the statement relating to item 4 was worded, which might have attracted the respondents' own cultural values or norms of 'pride' and 'manliness' in a way that led them to assert themselves and thus react in this particular way. Therefore, in future research, more attention should be paid to the wording of such statements in any similar measurements and to the respondents' cultural values and norms.

C - The Bureaucratic-Feudal Orientation

Comparing the trends of the distribution scored by the 80 middle managers on the bureaucratic with that on the feudal orientation scales, one can clearly see that both exhibit the same trends. This indicates that as the two orientations co-exist together at the same level, they are very likely, through their interaction, to supplement and influence each other.

By adding up the scoring of each middle manager on both scales, the total distribution of the 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' that the 80 middle managers have shown can be produced (summarised from Table 6) as follows:
The distribution shows that whilst no one rated 'low' and 9% (7 out of 80) rated 'middle', 91% of the distribution is concentrated in the 'high' and 'very high' degrees which comprise 50% and 41% respectively.

As the rating of the 80 middle managers is concentrated in 'high' and 'very high', widening the boundaries would allow the researcher to deal with their variation in more detail and derive further implications. So it was decided to deal with the range of the actual distribution that stretches between the lowest degree (26 out of 50) and the highest degree (49 out of 50) produced by the research subjects. By classifying this range, we can obtain a more accurate distribution, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 80 \]
This illustrates the middle managers' levels of bureaucratic-feudal orientation: those who appear in this distribution in the 'low' level were previously 'middle' on the scale; likewise, some previous 'middles' and 'highs' moved down a level.

**D - Compliant Behaviour**

As mentioned previously, the measurement of compliant behaviour by the Iraqi middle managers under study was mainly based on two 'imaginary situations', the purpose of which was to reveal the mode of middle managers' actions in relation to authority (top management) within their organizations.

1. **The first imaginary situation:**

   In this imaginary situation, which is very similar to former real cases observed by the researcher within various Iraqi organizations, the respondents (80 middle managers) were asked to consider the following situation:

   "A civil servant is employed in a post in which it is his duty to devise ways to improve sanitation and cooperation in rural villages. After much study in the field, he prepares a memorandum presenting a full program towards this end. His superiors reject it. Instead they adopt a program which in his opinion would not be in the interest of the villagers whose conditions he has studied in detail. His superiors, nevertheless, ask him to carry out this policy in the field."

   The researcher aims, through this imaginary situation, to explore each middle manager's conceptions of the expectations of superiors and his loyalty to them, and the appropriate action to be taken on receiving these expectations. Through the story of this imaginary situation, the middle managers were confronted with a conflict between their loyalty to superiors in work organization and a conception of their duty to the public whose interests they are, as civil servants or governmental officials, supposed to serve.
In phase 'A' of this imaginary situation, the middle managers were asked whether the superiors could expect the civil servant to carry out their policy despite his belief that it would not serve the villagers' interest. As is shown in Table 7, 51% (41 out of 80) of the respondents said "Yes, they can". The public interest (villagers), the civil servants's detailed knowledge about the villagers' conditions, and the fact that his individual initiative was within the framework of normal bureaucratic loyalties, were all supposed to influence the responses of the middle managers under study. But despite the confluence of these three factors, they admit to their superiors' right to expect compliance from subordinates.

In fact, through the field work interviews, it was clear to the researcher that such an admission not only derives from the top manager's position of authority, which quite naturally appears to be legitimate power giving access to organizational sanctions, but also from organizational norms and well-established practices; in other words, from organizational culture. Many middle managers put forward very similar explanations, to the effect that:

"It is something that has been taken for granted, that top manager's instructions ought to be carried out by subordinates, as he is the person who holds more authority and is responsible for determining organizational policies".

From such responses and comments, one could conclude that it is unlikely for those middle managers to perceive their organizational roles in relation with top managers as co-workers who participate with them in regard to organizational leadership and responsibilities. They would rather consider themselves more as followers who are only responsible for carrying out top management or higher authority's policy.
On the other hand, 49% (39 out of 80) of the middle managers did say that superiors could not expect the civil servant to carry out their policy. Asked 'why' during the field work interviews, many of them pointed out that the superiors would realize that as long as the civil servant's policy was rejected, he would try to escape from applying their policy. Here they mentioned the 'possibility' of acquiring compliance rather than the 'right' of superiors to expect it. Very few of them (only 2) said that superiors have no right to expect the civil servant to carry out their policy, when they had not studied the problem in detail and which would not be in the interests of the villagers.

In phase 'B' of this imaginary situation, when asked whether the civil servant should action his superior's policy or refuse to carry it out, 55% (44 out of 80) said 'yes', the civil servant should carry out the policy. In discussing why, in their opinion, this was so, the majority of them gave comments which can be grouped in the following way:

"He is only a governmental official charged with carrying out his superior's orders and instructions. He has expressed his viewpoint, so he will not be responsible afterwards for the consequence of applying his superiors' policy, but they will be responsible for it".

Some of them continued to say:

"He should use dictated notes or memoranda in his communications with his superiors so as to be prepared for any accountability required in the future".

Such comments clearly reveal the middle managers' underlying cultural concepts which discourage commitment and acceptance of responsibility, risk-taking, and challenge to those in authority. But above all, these comments indicate middle managers' need for safety and security, their dependence, distrust, and lack of autonomy.
Some of them offered another comment:

"Although the civil servant in his position in the field is closer to the villagers and their life conditions than his superiors, this does not mean that he knows better than his superiors what is best for the public interests".

Here they reflect the concept of 'superiors know better than subordinates' which could be part of the societal norm - "subordinates consider superiors as being of a different kind" - which has been found to be cultural phenomenon in high power-distance countries (Hofstede 1980, p. 122).

Forty five percent (36 out of 80) of the respondents showed a tendency for non-compliant behaviour toward superiors, by saying that the civil servant should refuse to carry out policy. But when they were asked during the interviews what they thought the civil servant should then do, they divided into five groups (see Table 8). The first and the largest group of 58% (21 out of 36) said 'he should try to discuss the issue with his superiors'. This group then subdivided about what he should do if his superiors refused to listen, 71% (15 out of 21) said he should carry out his superiors' policy (the answer of 44 middle managers from the beginning). By adding the number of these 15 middle managers to those 44, one finds that 74% of the 80 middle managers believe that the civil servant should carry out his superiors' policy, which means 'complying with orders'. The 15 middle managers of the first group justified their subsequent view (that the civil servant should carry out superiors' policy when they refuse to listen to him) in the same manner and with the same type of comments as those of the 44 middle managers described earlier. Although these 15 middle managers appear to have shown nothing more than a delay in their compliance, they also seem to favour a degree of personal initiative or non-compliant behaviour which neither in reality would they be capable of offering nor is expected or rewarded
in their organizations. That is, 10\% of the respondents of the first group (2 out of 21) said that the civil servant should raise the issue with the highest possible level of authority which was the main answer of the second group consisting of 6 middle managers (17\%). At the same time, 19\% (4 out of 21) of the first group identified with the third group (11\%), that the civil servant should try to find another job.

From these answers (of those middle managers who said that the civil servant should raise the issue with the highest authority level), two things can be deduced; first, the hierarchical order of power and authority relationships, where higher levels have greater authority than the levels below; and second, the influence of the political ideological emphasis of what could be called 'the open door' policy. This means that the employees can go to the highest levels of authority to report negative practices, unsolved work problems, and some kinds of personal problems. This kind of policy has given the impression to employees in Iraqi organizations that there is a strong possibility of support by authority for raising issues up the hierarchy, especially if it concerns the public interest, when it is felt that their superiors are not dealing with the issues as they should. The influence of this kind of ideological political emphasis is also clear among the fourth group of 3 middle managers (8\%) who said that the situation should be reported to the newspapers, which as a political and governmental form of mass media do have such a direction to publish.

Only two among 80 middle managers (6\%) showed a tendency to a greater extent toward personal initiative, and a clearer understanding of civil servants' duties to serve the public interest: they said that the civil servant should try in every possible way to
convince his superiors to do what was really for the benefit of the villagers. But the question is, to what extent does their environment welcome such behaviour, and will they, in reality, practice such a degree of initiative and commitment? From what has been studied and demonstrated, it is not likely to be so.

2. The second imaginary situation

The subject of compliance was touched upon in another imaginary situation which was constructed by the researcher from some real life former cases observed while working in Iraqi organizations. Through the story of this second imaginary situation, the 80 middle managers were drawn into more involvement or direct concern:

"The top manager of your organization has issued an order to the effect that all employees should work extra hours and also during weekends for an unspecified period of time to fulfill work which is believed to be delayed and needs to be done. At the same time, the employees in your department have already informed you that they feel overloaded and thus are not ready to work extra hours."

In phase 'A' each of these 80 middle managers were asked which one of three different kinds of action (stated in the questionnaire) he would choose when faced with such a situation, 'keeping in mind that you do not feel it is necessary for them to work extra hours'.

As shown in Table 9, 27% (22 out of 80) said they would "simply inform their workers to stay and work as long as it is the order of the top manager". Here these 22 middle managers indicate a readiness for immediate compliant behaviour and no personal initiative is used at all.

One of this group had something to say on this issue:

"What is the point of saying that I will challenge the authority in my organization for the sake of my workers, when in reality I know very well I'm not allowed to do so; in such a situation I can't do anything but just pass on orders of those who are responsible for this organization."
Another said:

"You have worked in this organization ... do you think you would really be able to argue in such a case, or challenge the orders of the top authority, without causing yourself a lot of problems?"

49% (39 out of 80) indicated less compliant behaviour; they explained that in facing such a situation they would contact those in top management, asking about the need to stay, and informing them that there was no backlog of work in their departments. 24% (19 out of 80) selected the third type of action, which proposed discussing the issue with their workers and, subsequently, contacting those in top management, to argue with them about relieving workers from working extra hours.

In phase 'B' of this imaginary situation, all the 58 middle managers (39 of whom selected the second type and 19 the third type of actions) were asked what they would do if the top managers refused to rethink or cancel the order; either 'you allow your workers to leave' or 'you ask your workers to stay and work'. All of these 58 middle managers stated that they would ask their workers to stay and work.

From the responses of those 22 middle managers who showed an immediate compliance, it appears that the expectations of the subordinates, with their feelings of being over-loaded, plus the fact that there was no need to stay extra hours, did not impel their orientation in the direction of less compliant behaviour toward higher authority. These three factors (expectations, overloaded, no need) had some influence on persuading 49% (39 out of 80) of the respondents to show less compliant behaviour, or at least delay the moment of compliant behaviour. Its appearance was delayed as long as the managers perceived there was room, but not to the degree that would endanger their positions and interests. In other words, these
39 middle managers would compromise the situation by playing the role of "transmitter" and/or mediator who requests, from the top, some information (about the need to stay and work) and, at the same time, informs them about his subordinates' feelings.

By doing so, the middle manager would not only project conflict outwards from himself, but he may appease his workers by showing some consideration for their feelings. However, these middle managers will not go further and fight for their subordinates. Thus, in phase 'B' of this imaginary situation, when they came into conditions of extreme conflict, they totally complied with top manager's expectations. In fact, as one of them mentioned, such an order to work extra hours was very frequently a part of the political ideology or policy of what it called 'the public voluntary work campaigns'. Thus, not carrying out such an order would create a lot of negative judgements about their good will and attitudes which would endanger their position and career. So, they tended to 'play it safe' and carry out the order by higher authority to work extra hours.

On the other hand, 24% (19 out of 80) tended not only to delay their compliance but to favour a somewhat high degree of personal initiative and leadership, which is neither customary nor encouraged in Iraqi organizations. In fact, from personal observations in such cases, these 19 middle managers are very unlikely to practice such a degree of personal initiative and leadership in reality. Even if they would have really discussed the issue with their workers, it would be in a superficial way rather than actually practiced as something they believe in. Also, when contacting those in top management to argue the issue (which is doubtful) they would be very careful in their choice of words and way of talking, to 'play it safe', and not to upset the top manager, or show personal
disagreement or leave any unpleasant impression about their personal attitudes toward his policy. They would not use direct and clear expressions, but rather words phrased them in such a way as to allow them to probe or feel the boss's pulse, and rework their prepared words (in case of unpleasant impression) in terms of acceptable explanations, by saying, "Sorry, I didn't mean that; I was only trying to say ...". Such responses could be a part of the middle manager's efforts to be seen by his subordinates as their powerful leader who possesses influence with his chiefs, since "people like working under a respected chief" (Handy 1976, p. 166). Closeness to employees and supporting them, as Pelz (1952) has found, has a positive effect on worker morale and satisfaction only when the supervisor or manager has enough influence with his superiors to provide conditions which fulfill their expectations. The dilemma of these middle managers is that they cannot really fight for their men or take their side against the boss, because by doing so, they may lose their power and influence, which is contingent upon the backing of the boss. Thus when in phase 'B' of the second imaginary situation, the situation developed into a state of extreme conflict and the middle managers had to take sides, those 19 middle managers took the side of the bosses rather than their subordinates.

E - Bureaucratic-Feudal Orientation by Compliant Behaviour

By examining the answers of each one of those 80 middle managers to the two imaginary situations, the researcher found that the total responses could be categorised into three general kinds of traits. As is shown in Table 10, while the actions of 17% (14 out of 80) of the respondents indicated a tendency towards complete compliant behaviour, 49% (39 out of 80) displayed a wavering behaviour tending
toward compliance, and 34% (27 out of 80) wavering behaviour towards non-compliance.

In order to obtain a complete picture of middle managers' behaviour, a linkage will be presented, through gross-tabulation between levels of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and the modes of behaviour they indicated. As it shows in Table 11, the 80 middle managers who scored different degrees in bureaucratic-feudal orientation show various degrees of compliant behaviour, as follows:

1 - In the group rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation (8 middle managers), none of them showed complete compliant behaviour. All of them indicated wavering behaviour but 50% of them tended more to comply, and the other 50% not to.

2 - Complete compliant behaviour was clustered in very close percentages (20%, 19%, 21%) by the three groups who rated 'middle', 'high' and 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation.

3 - Groups who rated 'middle' and 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour, but while the majority of both groups (60% and 55%) tended more to comply, 20% of the 'middle' and 26% of the 'high' tended more to non-compliance.

4 - Only two of the group who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated a wavering behaviour tending to compliance. The majority of them - 64% (9 out of 14) - showed wavering behaviour tending to less compliance.

Although we should distinguish the 'behaviour' obtained from responses to questionnaires or interviews (verbal behaviour) from 'deeds' or non-verbal behaviour (Hofstede 1980), even within verbal
behaviour, a discrepancy has been found between middle managers' 'orientation' and their 'actions' or behaviour. An obvious and unexpected example of this discrepancy is between the very high bureaucratic - feudal orientation of 9 middle managers and their wavering behaviour tending not to comply. This result may appear surprising at first sight, because Gorden (1970) found that "individuals who score high on 'bureaucratic orientation' are inclined to place a high value on conformist behaviour and on being systematic and orderly, and a low value on having personal independence of action ..." (p. 6). But when we look at the deeper implications, the picture becomes different. 'Orientation' is a good predictor of behaviour, but behaviour depends on both the person and the situation, so people will not necessarily do what they say they will. When there is a conflict between orientation and social pressure, a person might act, as Triandis (1971) remarks, counter to his orientation to conform with social pressures. Norms, values, and actions all reflect the dominant conceptual structure in any given group, but because 'action' is, by nature, readily observable, so it is more subject to social pressures. As has been mentioned before, the natural order of events within Iraqi organizations has been subject to the political ideological emphasis on issues such as sharing leadership and work responsibilities, fighting bureaucracy, taking necessary actions to serve the public interest, etc. This ideological emphasis is influential because it is linked with accountability and sanctions against those whose previous actions were judged negatively by high political authority. Although such pressure has had a very limited effect on reality within the administrative system, during its heyday it dominated organizational life and influenced at least the superficial actions of
organizational members, especially at managerial levels. It gave organizational members the impression that their superiors' authority was being questioned by those far higher up than them. Thus, this perceived degree of questioning authority could stand behind the verbal non-conforming behaviour that those middle managers have indicated.

This phenomenon may be, to a degree, what Mangham (1978) was illustrating in the following passage:

"That which is taken for granted, unquestioned, part of the natural order of events, is nothing if not constantly reaffirmed in the interpretation and actions of the social actors associated with it. Once the cues are questioned, the parts and lines subjected to scrutiny, the present order may be changed; where there is no questioning, no scrutiny, the script is performed normally and order is sustained." (p. 67)

Through the influence of such pressure, those 9 middle managers who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic - feudal orientation and many others were perhaps keen, even in their verbal behaviour, not to be thought of as not willing to share work responsibilities, and unwilling to take necessary action to serve the public interest. In fact, their compliance and conformity become a question of to whom should it be directed? When there is conflict between superiors' expectations and the expectations of those higher up in the hierarchy they are likely, and depending on their calculation of what and who will serve their interests better, to meet, or rather be seen to meet, the expectations of those higher and more powerful than their superiors.

Those 9 middle managers, as shown in Table 10, responded to the first 'imaginary situation' by saying that superiors cannot expect the civil servant in the story to carry out their policy and he should refuse to carry it out. 6 of them said he should try to discuss the issue with his superiors, and if they did not listen to
him, he should comply with their policy. Such responses indicate their tendency to discuss issues when they see room for it and comply when such room is, no longer available. Such a tendency is also clear in their response to the second 'imaginary situation': they said that they would discuss or argue the matter with superiors and if the latter refused to rethink the orders, they would comply with them. Whether this tendency of discussing with superiors is practised in reality or not, it nevertheless here gives us an indication of another deeper implication of the responses of those 9 middle managers.

From my observations and the notes that I took during my field work, such a tendency does not mean that those 9 middle managers would fight for their men or protect their role as leaders, but rather it shows their likely influence on superiors. Such influence could be derived from political or social power, or their technical skills and knowledge, or merely their personal abilities and tactics. Through this influence they are likely to possess an informal relationship with superiors which would make them feel less afraid or more able to argue or request something from the boss, and thus be seen by subordinates as powerful managers. Gorden (1970) found that individuals who score high on 'bureaucratic orientation' "tend to place a higher value on being treated as important, on taking care of their possessions, ..." (p. 6). Also, the trick for a person in the middle, says Kanter and Stein (1979) "is to be both firm and fair - to exercise authority but to be seen as justified in doing it" (p. 93). But they are more than keen not to go further than the point at which their relationship with the boss could be endangered, which to a great extent determines their power and influence.
It is also a cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries that managers are more ready to admit a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative among people (Hofstede 1980). It has been found in this research that such capacities are admitted to a greater extent by managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation than managers with 'lower levels'.

F - Further Implications

The preceding findings in this chapter show that the bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour are dominant among the 80 middle managers under study, but to varying degrees. What remains to be done is to reconsider these findings in terms of their cultural reflections which would give a clear idea of what and how certain cultural orientations have their impact in constructing organizational behaviour. Also, this will enable us to infer the dominant 'meanings' in relation to authority which are held in common by Iraqi middle managers, and out of which arise their compliant behaviour toward top managers.

In the following pages, I will reconsider each category of the two scales that measured the bureaucratic-feudal orientation, in order to see how and which Iraqi cultural value-orientations Iraqi organizational members (i.e. middle managers) reflect through each category, particularly the 'dominant relational orientation' to authority, work, and to each other, which their organizations already reflect in their 'hard' and 'soft' aspects. For this purpose, I will use the same five categories of bureaucratic orientation (i.e. self-subordination, compartmentalization, impersonalization, rule conformity, and traditionalism) as they are parallel to those of Weber, which have been used as the basis of this research to describe
the organizational context. To this end I will widely use my previous work experience and the observations obtained thereby to elaborate the field work findings and observations.

1 - **Self-subordination:**

In this research field work, the middle managers under study have indicated their dominant value-orientation in relation to authority. They are willing to comply with the stated wishes of the authority figure (top manager) and to meet his expectations. They are also willing to absolve themselves from the need to take initiative and hold responsibility by having decisions made for them by higher authority. They depend on him as they perceive him as possessing the higher legitimate authority which gives him the right and responsibility of formulating organizational policies and making important decisions. They admit his right to expect compliance from subordinates. From their responses and comments, one can realize that for them the interface between them and their superiors or the 'fellowship relationship' is more important that the leadership relationship between them and their subordinates. Most of them seem to be aware of the implications of their compliance and are preoccupied with what Leavitt (1972) termed as "short term prospects" (p. 127) which simply means that they will do whatever is asked of them by their superiors. One may realize from their responses and comments that they do not orient and act towards top management as if they are sharing the leadership and responsibility within the organization. In their responses to the two 'imaginary situations', as well as when I observed them, they submitted to the top manager's orders and policies, which were made without their input or contribution. In other words, none of those 80 middle managers said
that he would refuse to carry out the top manager's policy or orders which directly concerned his department and men, simply because no one consulted him or even gave him an explanation. This would clearly give us an indication of the absence in middle managers' conceptualization of seeing themselves as 'leaders'. In fact, Gorden (1970) has found a highly consistent significant negatively-correlated relationship between 'bureaucratic orientation' and values of leadership, achievement, independence and variety. These findings also imply that Iraqi organizational culture, like national culture, does not encourage and reward the exercise of personal initiative or non-compliant behaviour. Hierarchical responsibility has developed in Iraqi organization, as in the case of Egypt (Berger 1957) "at the expense of the growth of initiative and of responsibility to the post itself and to the public the government official is supposed to serve" (p. 166). Furthermore, these findings show that a large proportion of Iraqi middle managers themselves do not consistently or with full understanding defend the right to take initiative, but rather seek to 'play it safe'. They tend to be reluctant to exercise even that degree of discretionary power that is permitted by the formal distribution of functions in the bureaucracy. In fact when I observed many Iraqi middle managers in action in their work daily life, they worked and acted on the boss's orders and instructions much more than according to predetermined rules, especially those who were very eager to get the backing and support of the top manager so as to increase or maintain their power and influence within the organization. Thus they used compliance as the most effective tactic of power expansion. This may support what Higgins (1975) states, that in upwardly organizations, the more effective successful middle managers "show a high degree of responsiveness to superiors, displaying a fairly high need to defer to authority" (p. 344).
Such a degree of compliance and a low degree of personal discretion were found in Egyptian organizations by Berger (1957). He refers to Lord Cromer's observation, who stated that the Egyptian official "flies for refuge to the French system" and so shirks responsibility, fears blame, and shrinks from the British administrative system which allows a considerable degree of personal discretion. Berger then stated that "just why the Egyptian civil service should follow the French rather than the British administrative tradition, despite the fact that the British controlled Egyptian administration from 1882 until well after Cromer's departure in 1906 is a question of historical development and cultural influence" (p. 164). In fact, this is more true in the case of Iraq which was occupied and controlled by the British and has not been influenced at any time by the French administrative system. This supports my earlier argument with Crozier (1964, 1973) that what he claims as uniquely French traits such as 'subordination' can be found in other organizations in different countries where cultural components have similar dimensions to those of French culture and stand behind the existence of such traits.

Muna (1980), in his study about Arab executives in many Arabic countries, found that these executives, in general, experienced relatively low opposition and resistance from their subordinates, although they occupied a high managerial level. He states that such "subordinate's over-compliance could indeed be unhealthy" (p. 67). In fact, to find such degrees of compliance at high managerial levels, who in the case of this research are the 'departments' heads' in Iraq, may appear as unhealthy, but when we introduce their dominant cultural value-orientation in relation to authority and power, and their role dilemmas, particularly their 'power dilemma',
their compliance becomes a more healthy adaptation. Their deference to authority and compliant behaviour appear to be quite congruent with their upwardly-oriented organizations and with their powerless situation. Also, such behaviour is a natural reflection of what they have learned through their socialization in a culture whose dominant value-orientations in relation to authority and power are authoritarian, associated with personalized possession of and traditional respect for authority and power, dependency, and avoidance of risk-taking. Such value-orientations have shaped and are reinforced by Iraqi organizational culture, which is a 'bureaucratic-feudal' culture that maintains a hierarchical structure of authority and great centralization at the top. Also this culture contains 'legal-charismatic-traditional' types of authoritarian relationships, with strong elements of 'personalization' of authority and loyalty, subordination, rigidity, and concern for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege.

In upwardly centralized organizations, in such as those in Iraq, Child (1977) found "a tendency for behavioural patterns actually perceived at the managerial level to be more cautious and conforming" (p. 37). If in upwardly oriented organizations there is no relationship more important than that of the subordinate to his superior (Higgins 1975), this relationship becomes basically more important for the middle manager in his power position. In his striving for power he is more eager than other members to maintain and/or expand his power and influence, which is highly contingent upon the support and backing of the top manager or authority figure. The middle manager situation becomes more insecure in such upwardly organizations where accountability is demanded by superiors from subordinates, authority is rarely delegated, and matters are very
frequently pushed up the organization by personnel for top level decisions. He needs to inform the top manager of what is happening at the work level and seek his approval, but at the same time he needs to communicate his information in such a way that it does not bring unfavourable criticism on himself for not doing his job correctly or adequately. Faced with this dilemma, each middle manager resolves that conflict in terms of his own individual past experience, personality, and expectations. As Roethlisberger (1945) notes, while some managers "become voluble in the face of this situation; other are reduced to stoney silence, feeling that anything they say will be held against them. Some keep out of the boss's way, while others devise all sorts of ways for approaching him and trying to direct attention to certain things they have accomplished" (p. 288). But above all, the middle manager wants to be secure, to maintain good relations with the boss by adjusting himself to the boss's demands and to seek approval.

It is not at all surprising to find those Iraqi middle managers in their orientations, actions and comments, reflecting their underlying cultural respect and personalization of authority. Personalization of authority and loyalties are deeply rooted in their culture and hence in their collective level of mentality. Also, the centralization of decision-making, as is the case in their organizations, implies a personal mode of control (Child 1977). Viewing legitimate authority with high respect as something that belongs or attaches to the person who holds this authority rather than to the office itself, has also been found in Egyptian organizations (Berger 1957). Muna (1980) found that compliance occurs in many Arabic organizations as a result of the manner in which 'power' is often wielded. This manner was described as
follows: "The subordinate gets to know his boss so well he can 'read
his mind' - he is so eager to please his boss that he is unlikely to
think of or engage in activities which may displease the boss. The
result ... no opposition" (p. 67).

The power of the incumbent of the post of top manager is greatly
enhanced through respect and personalization of authority, much more
than by the authority itself which accrues to him by virtue of his
position. One of the norms which can be identified when working in
an Iraqi organization is that the department or section whose manager
builds a good relationship with and has the support and backing of
the top manager is often considered to be a good department by
organizational members, and many would like to work in it. Even the
location of the department on the same floor or near the top manager's
office gives it a kind of importance in the eyes of organizational
members. The powerful atmosphere which surrounds the 'top person' is
increased by grandiose furniture and the way things are displayed in
his office. Psychologically, this would increase the subordinates'
feelings of awe, accompanied by some amount of fear toward the person
in the top position, which varies proportionally with the power-
distance between him and his subordinates. Those middle managers and
Iraqi in general, as part of their cultural value-orientations, are
highly self- and family-oriented rather than group-oriented people.

Such a self-oriented person, comments Fayerweather (1977):

"... views his superior with a mixture of awe and fear.
His chief concern is to keep the superior feeling
favourable towards him by being obedient or at least
appearing so, if he disagrees with the superior he is not
likely to say so. He will either follow instructions
without question or, if he feels strongly about his own
views, he may evade the instructions. He makes little
effort to inform the superior about affairs in his
department, especially if there are problems which may
reflect to his discredit. His general attitude towards the
superior is one of 'dealing with'. The superior is feared
as a powerful force and tremendous effort is expended in
keeping on the right side of him." (p. 120)
The superior-subordinate role-taking situation within Iraqi organizations where the middle manager plays the role of 'subordinate' to the top manager, does not differ in its fundamental construction from other customary situations which the middle manager has experienced individually, for instance, child-father, pupil-teacher, subject-ruler, ... etc. The top manager or the 'head' symbolically represents all the authority figures that either the middle manager as an individual was subjected to through his primary and secondary socialization as father, teacher or ruler, or has experienced their influences indirectly as feudal sheikh, bureaucratic Effendi, ... etc.

2 - **Compartmentalization:**

Compartmentalization in bureaucratic systems refers to the degree of departmentalization and specialization. It means running the organization in a certain prepared manner to ensure its effectiveness. In this category the 80 Iraqi middle managers showed their belief in expert judgements, and the need for each member to be only concerned with his own area of specialization and not to volunteer opinions to his superior outside his area of specialization. This does not mean that Iraqi organizations have incorporated departmentalization and specialization in order to improve productivity and efficiency, as is the case in Western organizations. It may be introduced in the same way, but the fact is that Iraqi organizations are managed through personalization rather than by departmentalization or specialization. It has been indicated previously that the degree of specialization is low and is coupled with a lack of specialists and a high belief in experts and their knowledge. Thus possession of specialized knowledge gives the individual some power within the organization.
Working within various Iraqi organizations as I did, it could be seen that specialization and departmentalization contained behind it many cultural value-orientations, such as secretiveness, distrust, sensitivity to criticism, avoidance of open confrontation and directness especially in front of a group, a lack of co-operative spirit, and expected hostility and superimposition of personalities on issues. So, not only from my previous observations, but also from the comments gathered in my field work, it can be said that behind middle managers' preference toward 'compartmentalization' stands the cultural orientations of "isolationism", "depersonalization", "unemotionality", and "antipathy" (Bate 1982). The existence of such cultural orientations is basically strong at the level of middle managers who are affected by their role dilemmas and situations within the organization. Their isolationist orientation is more clearly seen in their responses to organizational insignificance; they often become more concerned with their divisions or departments, and insist on the need to restrict one's concern to one's own area of specialization. In other words, as Kanter and Stein (1979) put it, they:

"turn to their own small territory, their own piece of the system - their subordinates, their function, their expertise. They guard their domain jealously: They narrow their interests to focus exclusively on it. They try to insulate and protect it and to prevent anyone else from engaging in similar activities without their approval as "the experts" in that domain." (p. 96)

Two middle managers brought to the picture, in their comments on this category during the field work, an old Iraqi proverb, saying:

"Who ever interferes in things which are none of his business will receive unpleasant consequences".

Another middle manager said:

"If anyone has something to say about another person's work and he really wants to help, he should go to the person concerned and tell him ... but not volunteer his opinion in front of the others ..."
Another said:

"... one should not cause problems for others ..."

So, the middle manager, by drifting into 'compartmentalization', implicitly protects himself from the interference of people outside his department, not only because of the distrust, expected hostility, and secretiveness, but also because he is likely to feel that his department and specialist knowledge are important sources of power, and any interference may infringe upon this power. This state of affairs was confirmed by the NCOMD in one of its reports which mentioned that middle managers strongly resist any interference in their work and delay making any changes that might be suggested by others (Al-Himyari 1977). Thus the middle manager needs, maybe more than any other member, to increase his 'power' by using his specialized information or knowledge and experience as a 'weapon' in his struggle for power. At the same time, the middle manager is not willing to interfere in other people's areas of specialization or to volunteer opinions, particularly in front of superiors or other people. This is because he would feel that others may consider such interference as a criticism of their performance, or even of them personally. So for him it means the less he interferes in other people's business, the less they would be inclined to interfere in his. Behind such methods of constructing relationships with others stands the cultural value-orientations of distrust, expected hostility, superimposition of personalities on issues, and avoidance of open confrontation, expression of differences, controversial issues and directness and frankness, especially in front of others. Also, as a reflection of his 'power deficiency', he is not ready to endanger his relationship with others while he can protect it. This occurs particularly in relation to those important others with whom
he tries to develop a network of social relations in order to surround himself with allies, to supply him with resources such as information, as well as to conceal his shortcomings from his opponents and thus expand his power (Nundi 1975). The higher aggressiveness and emotional levels in Iraqi culture make conflict and competition between people into something more threatening. So the middle manager tries to avoid showing his emotions or feelings and depersonalizes the issues in confrontation with others. This state of affairs is very clear in Aboona's (1975) statements about various practices in Iraqi organizations. He remarks that one of the shortcomings found in these organizations is the absence of

"critical analysis of, or self-criticism in, major issues because of formal and personal relationships between members, particularly with respect to the chief executive."

(p. 235)

So the middle manager, in his forbearance to interfere in other's business, maintains peace with many social norms, by which means he considers such interference as an unfavourable activity.

3 - Impersonalisation:

Here the 80 Iraqi middle managers show a preference for formal relationships between superiors and subordinates inside the organization. While observing middle managers' actions inside organizations, I noted that whilst there is a high emphasis on formal relationships, especially ideologically and on the surface of their interaction with others, the personal and informal considerations enter almost every conceivable interaction, whether occurring within the same hierarchical level or between levels. As indicated previously, impersonal and personal elements co-exist together inside Iraqi organizations. But through the hostile interaction between bureaucratic formality and cultural personalization, the co-existence
of the two becomes defective and faulty, creating many of the
dysfunctional characteristics of Iraqi bureaucratic systems. Despite
the apparent prevalence of bureaucratic formality in Iraqi
organizations in the short run, in the long run the inherent
contradictions between this formality and cultural personalization
can be expected to be made increasingly manifest and intensified,
which on many occasions leads to a total breakdown of rational
bureaucracy. What may appear as the practice of bureaucratic
formality is, in its latent function, a reflection of imbedded
cultural meanings.

When middle managers favour formal relationships between
superiors and subordinates, they are in reality favouring the
cultural implications or the 'meanings' that construct the latent
functions of formal relationships within their organizations.
Through their role dilemmas and situations within the organization,
they learn how to use formality and informality politically, either
to defend themselves or to expand their power and influence. As
bureaucratic formality by its nature symbolizes and supports the
'hierarchical power structure' of various offices and clearly defines
the power-distance between superiors and subordinates (Merton 1940),
middle managers are thus more oriented to demanding it from their
subordinates than willing to establish it with their superiors.
Formal relationships produce a clear power-distance between superiors
and subordinates, which satisfy the middle manager's cultural
'superiority propensity' and his willingness to be respectful; it
also allows him to play the dominant role and have his subordinates
play submissive roles; both their behaviours derive from their
dominant-submissive customary role pattern. Iraqi middle managers
would use formality or rather haughtiness to the point where it
provides him with the respect and subordination of his men that he wants, and a clear power-distance between him and them. Associating with Iraqi middle managers in an organization, one may come across a repeated expression: "One should not omit formality with subordinates". Through such comments, the Iraqi middle manager demonstrates his cultural fear that when a certain degree of informality is permitted, the subordinates would lay bare their opinions and feelings and expect strong ties which may obligate him.

Also, through such informality, he would not be able to satisfy his cultural 'superiority propensity' and his strong organizational need for power and influence. It may also make it difficult, in a state of conflict, for him to stay aloof and project conflict outwards from himself by playing the role of pure transmitter between his superiors and subordinates. As formality provides security to the insecure middle manager, it is often exaggerated, as Thomphson (1961) explains, into a 'cold aloofness':

"(Formality) protects an insecure superior from commitments to his subordinates which he fears will be inconsistent with demands upon him from above. It makes it easier for him to mete out punishment or to perform other aspects of his hierarchical role, such as rating his subordinates. It protects him from the aggressions of his subordinates by maintaining a psychic distance between him and them." (p. 357)

On the other hand, the middle manager is also aware of the importance of personal relationships in 'who gets what' in his organization, so he needs, with his uncertainty and insecure feelings more than any other to have personal contacts with influential others. Thus he joins informal groupings and cliques as a part of his tactic to secure and promote his interests and ward off threats, and above all, to expand his power (Nundi 1975). The dimensions of his likely personal relationship with his subordinates are related to the importance of their personal loyalty and to how to discriminate
trustly employees from others. This is especially true when his authority is challenged by one or more of his subordinates who may have better qualifications and abilities, or who outrank him on the extra-bureaucratic hierarchy, i.e. the political or social status hierarchy.

The informal pattern of relationships or interaction between middle managers and superiors in Iraqi organizations has a special nature and goes further than the usual consultation or information-exchange patterns of Western organizations. As previously demonstrated, personal loyalty, obligations, ties and connections shape the underlying character of the interpersonal relationships within Iraqi organizations. Through the 'personalization' of Iraqi culture, loyalty can only or predominantly apply to or be felt towards 'people' and religious matters. Thus in Iraqi organizations, as in other Arabic and Middle Eastern organizations (Wright 1981), an organizational member is unlikely to be prone to uphold organizational interests when those interests cross with the personal interests of the boss or the personal interests of the member. Members in these organizations have the cultural notion that 'superiors know better than subordinates', and they are somehow convinced that their loyalty to superiors expresses indirectly their loyalty to the organization. 90% (72 out of 80) of the Iraqi middle managers in this research agreed with item no. 2 of the feudal orientation scale (see Table 5) which measured 'loyalty to superiors', and thus they agreed that each member in the organization should be loyal to his superiors and act to meet their expectations and according to their orders. Muna (1980) found that Arab executives working in different Arabic countries valued 'loyalty' more highly than efficiency, both in employees in general and in their immediate subordinates in higher managerial levels.
The Iraqi middle manager, not only because he has been socialized through such 'cultural personalization of authority and loyalty' but also because of the peculiarity of his role, tries to establish social relationships with superiors and to demonstrate his loyalty to them, as well as to surround himself with allies as part of his tactics to secure and expand his power and influence. He may learn from experience that being friendly with superiors and joining a clique strengthens his shaky power position. But his success in building such a network of informal relationships depends on his independent resources of power and influence which he may bring with him to the organization, and particularly on his ability to use these resources to his advantage. But even if he develops such informal relationships with superiors which would give him a feeling of equality or at least allow him to be in the shadow of the powerful, he must always leave a formal gap between himself and them. By such a gap he assures the superiors of his subordination to them and shows his formal, traditional respect for their authority, particularly when confronting them in front of others. Formality, as Mouzelis (1975) quoted from Weber, "is easily made to function for anybody who knows how to gain control of it" (p. 25); thus, middle managers who do not have independent resources of power and influence or who lack the ability or fail to develop them, are more likely to feel insecure and thus more apt to rely on formality. Also, formality protects the insecure middle manager from the arbitrary action of his superior "since the actions of both are constrained by a mutually recognized set of rules" (Merton 1940, p. 50). Iraqi middle managers, especially ones who have high feelings of insecurity, are motivated by cultural value-orientations and by role dilemmas to seek defences and protection, to depersonalize issues, to avoid showing feelings or
emotions, and to become isolated. By using formalities he would be able to defend and isolate himself, as well as depersonalize issues since formality "serves to minimise friction by largely restricting (official) contact to modes which are previously defined by rules of the organization" (Merton 1940, p. 50). The verbal preference of the Iraqi middle managers for formal relationships could also be a reaction to the dysfunctional characteristics of informal relations in their organizations. They may fear the possibility of other managers having an informal relationship with superiors which means more power and influence. They are careful not to be overtly related with any personal relationship that might bring accusations of favouritism and nepotism, which are ideologically condemned by political leaders and society in general.

4 - Rule-conformity:

Our 80 Iraqi middle managers showed a desire for strict adherence to rules, regulations, and work discipline. Behind the rule-conformity of Iraqi middle managers stands his need for security, lack of personal autonomy and initiative, low trust, isolationism, fear of negative judgement, rigidity, uncertainty, avoidance of risk-taking, and deference to authority – all of which are elaborated in his cultural value-orientations and role dilemmas. His culturally-produced lack of personal security and his dilemma of possessing a boss's responsibility but not a boss's authority, have shaped his 'play-it-safe' attitude. Kanter and Stein (1979) recognize this desire for security that rule-conformity affords to people in the middle, who are often put in, and put themselves in the position of "rule enforcer" (p. 94). The demand for strict adherence to the rules, as Nundi (1975) explains, "is one solution for the
manager without power since it absolves him from the need to take initiative for which he lacks the structural and situational prerequisites" (p. 59). Middle managers, as do all other members in Iraqi organizations, learn from experience just how little they can do and still remain secure. Among them, as Aboona (1975) remarks, there is an implicit motto of "no action means no mistakes, no penalties, and hence promotion" (p. 243). Their desire for security and protection is increased by the prevailing lack of faith and distrust through which mistakes or failures are often unjustifiably attributed to ill-will and seriously penalized. They choose to play-it-safe and hence follow the rules rather than personal autonomy and risk-taking. Their rule-conformity is also a reflection of their cultural feelings of surrounding hostility and low tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, which were acquired through their socializational experiences, in addition to the fact that 'life in the middle' itself also "generates hostility and resentment" (Kanter and Stein 1979, p. 93).

Middle managers' rule-conformity has a special nature or character which reflects part of Iraqi organizational culture. As previously mentioned, while this culture is partly a 'role culture' containing a high tendency for written rules and greater uniformity, there is a discrepancy between formally prescribed laws and procedures and those effectively practised. In addition, Iraqi organizational culture consists of another and more dominant part, a 'power culture' with strong 'personalization'. These factors have produced the result that the authority of the person who is precisely at the top is over the whole system, and that employees conduct their work mostly through what they have learned from their seniors and by the boss's orders and instructions, without even knowing most of the
rules and regulations that govern their jobs. Although they are likely to adopt a bureaucratic style that consists of applying rules and procedures inflexibly, they rely more on superiors' orders, instructions and direct intervention for getting things done. They choose to have actions prescribed for them, whether by bureaucratic rules and regulations and/or by superiors' orders and instructions. For them it is mainly a matter of security, avoidance of risk-taking and coping with uncertainty; thus, as long as they are doing their jobs according to the agreed bureaucratic rules, regulations or superiors' instructions, they need not be held responsible for any shortcomings that might occur. In fact, these concepts or ways of viewing reality were very clear in the responses and comments of most of the 80 Iraqi middle managers in the field work; they indicate their desire to narrow their responsibility to the implementation of superior instructions and orders, and by doing so they deny any accountability for the outcome.

Rule conformity, in terms of written formal rules and regulations, is used as a defensive weapon, particularly by the insecure middle manager who fails to get the backing and support of the boss. He protects himself from superiors' criticism by limiting his responsibility to a strict interpretation of the letter of the law (Nundi 1975, p. 59). His rule-conformity in this sense may also give him a feeling of some equality with the boss as both are subject to the same rules which screen the superiority of the boss (Gouldner 1955). Also, it allows him to feel the depersonalization of his subjection as he is conforming to rules rather than to the boss. In fact, this is implicitly what one of the Iraqi middle managers (a head of an accountancy department) was trying to say in his comment on the second 'imaginary situation' during the field work:
"I will carry out the top manager's instructions if they are what the rules and regulations have defined".

5 - Traditionalism:

The Iraqi middle managers showed a need for the security provided by organizational identification, conforming to social values and the 'in-group' norm. The group norms, either within the organization or in wider society, are distinguished by a degree of stability and recognition, both by the personal and the social or organizational system. By his identification with group norms, the individual is trying to provide a shelter and stability for himself. This is boosted when his psychological and sociological needs are in harmony with the implications of those norms.

As Iraqi national culture, as well as organizational culture, contains the components of 'conservatism, quietism, and traditionalism', so middle managers who have been socialized through this culture would have, to various degrees, shared traditional concepts and conservative views about organizational life and the obligation to conform to the group norms and to traditional values.

Part of the traditional norms of Iraqi organizational culture is the emphasis on 'seniority'. In this culture, which is partly a power culture, "the new man is expected to learn from his seniors and to model his behaviour on theirs" (Handy 1976, p. 287). Through the absence of scientific and logical schemes of appraisal, group norms and the system itself consider the 'length of service' as the primary criteria for increments and promotions. For the middle managers, length of service is the most important acquisitive right by which they secure a source of power and stability during service. This is more true in organizational cultures, such as that of Iraq, where the assessment is highly personal and subjective. When the majority of those 80 middle managers agreed, in the research field work, to give
length of service a high rating, they may have feared that other appraisal tools, such as 'performance' may be subjected to and dominated by other people's personal views (i.e. their superiors). Accordingly, the performance might be evaluated positively or negatively, and hence would not guarantee his increment or promotion, especially in the absence of job-descriptions and personnel appraisal systems. Given the 'length of service' almost as much as or even more recognition of a good level of performance, it may reduce the hostility and resentment generated by the 'life in the middle', where older people "tend to resent younger people who are on the move, ... and people who never advance often resent anybody who's moving upwards. People still at the bottom may resent those in their ranks who get a chance to move up and are suddenly in a position superior to them" (Kanter and Stein 1979, p. 93). On the other hand, by demanding such importance and recognition for 'length of service', those Iraqi middle managers are seeking to stay on the safe side of the service. For them, it is through this traditional method that they are being paid, and their increments and promotions are due, like anybody elses, when the date is reached. In addition, such a method does not require any initiative, innovation, or high standard of performance, but rather simply obedience to the prevailing laws, regulations and superiors' instructions. In fact, this way of thinking is clear in Iraqi organizational group norms which are evidenced in many of their sayings and proverbs, such as (Id Aiam Wokhud Ratib) viz. "Count the days and receive your salary".

2. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter the findings from the research support the first
hypothesis. These findings indicate that Iraqi middle managers in relation to the top manager conceive themselves and behave as 'followers' rather than as members in an organizational leadership. They display a style of behaviour that consists of acting in a bureaucratic manner and showing compliance. They are highly concerned with defending their position and playing-it-safe strategies. In complying with an authority figure (the top manager), the attention of most of them was directed to 'objective' rather than 'subjective' authority (Barnard 1938). In other words their compliance was not mainly because of their belief in the logic of the proposed action, but more because, as Simon (1957 b) explains, they set for themselves a general rule that permits the communicated decision of the top person to serve as a premise for their choice, independent of their own judgement about the correctness or acceptability of the premise. They do not contribute significantly to the decision-making processes and are 'reactive' to the events rather than 'proactive'. These findings show that Iraqi middle manager is highly dependent on his superiors and tends to be a 'yes man'. The quality and implications of Iraqi middle managers' compliant behaviour in relation to the authority figure reflect their unconscious image or the deeply rooted cultural meaning of 'personalization' of authority and loyalty. From their answers, comments and expressions, one could conclude that Iraqi organizational culture in general inhibits discussion of feelings and fears, and subordinates are expected to get on with what they have been told to do by superiors. Also 'loyalty' is equated with doing or meeting what the boss said to do and not 'rocking the boat'. So at the collective level of their "mental programmes" (Hofstede 1980) they have generalized meanings or dominant values which form their
broad or general dispositions or tendencies which in their relations to authority figures (top manager) appeared to be: an authoritarian relationship associated with submission, ingratiation, personalization and respect for authority and power. Their compliance or bureaucratic-feudal modes of behaviour are not only typical reactions to their dilemmas, particularly their "powerlessness" as middle managers as Nundi (1975) claims, but also rational and strategic adaptions to the societal norms of their culture. This means that if the 'middle manager' in any given organization tends to be a 'yes man' or over-dependent on his superiors as the literature suggests, the degree of the 'yes' and the meanings behind it are culturally bounded. Despite the fact that Iraq and Egypt belong to the national Arabic culture and despite the closeness in their historical development, the degree of subservience and the reluctance to exercise discretionary power that I found in Iraqi organizations is somewhat lower than that found by Berger (1957) in Egyptian organizations. This could be because Berger's study was carried out in the 1950s and mine in the 1980s and might indicate the influence of development between the two periods. Also, and more likely, it could be due to the fact that Iraq has been influenced much more than Egypt by Bedouin culture which calls for superiority, power, dominance, etc., (Alwardi 1965). This would support my observation and argument that Iraqi organizational members, and precisely the middle managers, are highly politically minded in their relationship to authority because they have a cultural 'superiority propensity' and a willingness to be powerful but, at the same time, they must comply with the authority figure if they want to live within work organizations. So their compliant behaviour and ingratiation is more a strategy to handle the boss and
expand their power than a simple subservience in response to a stimuli or as a reflection of a personality disorder, as suggested by Merton (1949).

The research findings and their implications in this chapter show the impact of culture in constructing the latent function of apparently dysfunctional activities. This supports Crozier's (1973) thesis of the bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour which suggests that organizational structure and patterns of action are to a large extent culture-bound, and thus dysfunctional patterns of "bureaupathology" take forms that are related to the culture where the sick bureaucracy is found. The researcher has found cultural traits such as subordination, isolationism, unemotionality, rigidity, a predominance of formal over informal, and concern for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege in the Iraqi organizations under study. These findings (in addition to those of Hofstede 1980; Tayeb 1981; Child 1981; Bate 1982) give great support to the earlier argument of this research and some others with Crozier (1964, 1973), i.e. that what are uniquely French traits can be found within organizations in other countries but to varying degrees. Thus, as Bate (1981) states, the universal or 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture (Kluckhohn 1964) equally well applies to organizational cultures: "while the choices facing organizations are universal, the solutions are infinitely variable" (Bate 1981, p. 35). The findings of this research have singled out this 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture on the level of different individuals in one organizational level (i.e. middle managers) across different organizations in one country, viz Iraq. While these Iraqi middle managers hold a dominant cultural orientation (i.e. bureaucratic-feudal orientation) and common type and quality of behaviour in
relation to authority (i.e. complying with the top manager as he possesses authority and power), they have rated different degrees of variation. Similar to Tayeb (1981) and Child (1981) but unlike Bate (1981) who only studied the cultural orientations on organization level without finding their relationship with the culture of the wider society, this research demonstrates how cultural orientation of Iraqi organizations have their origin in Iraqi national culture.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the fieldwork findings of Iraqi middle managers' 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' and their compliant behaviour in relation to the top managers. All of the 80 middle managers under study displayed considerable bureaucratic orientation but to varying degrees ('low', 'middle', 'high' and 'very high'). Also the common quality of their behaviour toward the top managers are to comply with him and conform to his expectations. The quality and implications of their compliance reflect their unconscious image or their shared rooted cultural meaning of 'personalization' of authority and loyalty. But also they vary in the degree of their compliant behaviour: while some indicated complete compliant behaviour, the majority showed wavering behaviour but some tending towards compliance and other towards non-compliance. Their shared 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' consists of many cultural value-orientations that are related to their national culture. These cultural orientations construct the latent function of the apparently dysfunctional aspects of their organizational behaviour. Their cultural value-orientations and their role dilemmas and situation within organizations, interact together, resulting in their compliant behaviour in relation to the top manager.
CHAPTER (8)

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES FACTORS AFFECTING MIDDLE MANAGERS' BEHAVIOUR TOWARD TOP MANAGEMENT IN IRAQI ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION

Using the 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture (Kluckhohn, 1964), one of the basic arguments in this research has been that although individuals belong to any given group hold a general or dominant conceptual structure in common, it is also at this dominant level that they perpetuate a degree of variation. Hypothesis II in this research puts forward the following set of individual differences factors which, from the researcher's previous work observation and the material found in some relevant studies, are assumed to effect middle managers' behaviour toward top management in Iraq:

1 - Age.

2 - Family background and childhood socialization
   a) geographical area of living
   b) father's occupation
   c) parents' level of education
   d) childhood experiences.

3 - Educational background
   a) level of formal education
   b) nature of formal education (place of education).

4 - Work experience
   a) length of service
   b) years in managerial job in the present organization.

As the dominant value-orientation or 'meanings' and modes of engaging with others are built-up and learned through the socialization process, particularly early socialization by the family and school, studying individuals' past learning experiences during their socialization process is essential in understanding why they behave within the work organization as they do. Although individuals in any given society are socialized within the context of their dominant cultural norms or 'meanings', and despite all the basic similarities in the socialization process, there is always a wide
individual variation within the framework of their societal norms. However much the cultural meanings are taken for granted, says Mangham (1978), they are "always and inevitably influenced by the fine gauze of individual experience" (page 47).

In the previous chapter, Iraqi middle managers across different organizations located in Iraqi society indicated a shared collective pattern of orientation and behaviours in relation to the authority figures of their organizations (i.e. top managers) but to various degrees. Their dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour show the inequality of power or the power-distance that exists between themselves as middle managers, and those in top management positions. Such an orientation and behaviour reflect the dominant conceptual structure of relation to authority that they hold in common. At the same time their differing degrees of dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour indicate their variation within the generalized conceptual structure.

In this chapter the researcher will be concerned with two dimensions: firstly, the way and the extent to which socialization within the family and educational system in Iraq builds up and reinforces the dominant value-orientations or the conceptual structure relevant to this study - in other words, to understand the role of such socialization in securing or producing compliance; and secondly, to understand the middle managers' variations on the dominant conceptual structure in terms of their 'individual differences'. This latter dimension has prompted the researcher to investigate the influence of the 'national subcultural distinctions' on individual learning experiences during their socialization process and the consequent impact on organizational behaviour. These subcultural distinctions, such as geographical area of residence and
family background, are likely to be significant in the case of Iraq due to the 'mosaic' social structure of Iraqi society with all its diversity (as has been indicated previously).

1. **RESEARCH FINDINGS**

   In this section the research findings obtained to verify the second hypothesis (to analyze the middle managers variations in terms of their individual differences) will be demonstrated and discussed. In order to verify this hypothesis, the degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour have been cross-tabulated against each of the individual difference factors, in order to examine the affect of each factor on middle managers' orientation and behaviour.

   **A - Age:**

   Table 12 shows that the majority of the middle managers under study are aged less than 45 (46% between 33 - 38 years old and 35% between 39 - 44). Only 19% of them (15 out of 80) are over 45 years old.

   The data presented in Tables 13 and 14 and their analyses (Appendix 2) show that older managers are more ready to behave with compliance than younger ones. Furthermore, although the number of older managers is relatively small (15) compared with the younger ones (65), the distribution of the association between the orientation and behaviour of the older managers shows a kind of clear-cut or shift from compliance to non-compliance, or the other way round (as it is clear among the groups with 'middle' and 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation). This result may show the insecurity feelings of older managers and, furthermore, the
general tendency for older workers to be more favourably disposed than younger ones, or what is termed "favorable adjustment" (Tannenbaum et al., 1977, p. 14), despite the fact that they may be less happy with such adjustment.

B - Family Background and Childhood Socialization Experiences

1. Geographical area of living (i.e. urban vs. rural)

It is notable from Table 15 that the majority (81%) of the Iraqi middle managers under study are from urban backgrounds, and only 19% of them have grown up in rural areas. But among 80 middle managers, 43% (34 out of 80) grew up in Baghdad, 21% (17 out of 80) in other provincial capitals and cities, and 17% (14 out of 80) moved after the age of 10 from the provinces to Baghdad. In considering the affect of the type of residence (i.e. urban vs. rural), Tables 16 and 17 and their analyses (Appendix 2) suggest that managers who come from a rural background are less oriented toward compliance and more inclined to behave in a less compliant way than those with an urban background. In fact the data presented in Table 16 shows that managers who are socialized up to their 20s in rural areas scored both 'low' and 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in percentages, higher than those of the urbanites. This would demonstrate what has been explained before, and what may be called a 'cultural pattern of extremes', which results from the accommodation mode through which different sets of contradictory values exist together. Bedouin cultural values, which call for power and superiority on the one hand, and the feudal system, the misinterpretation of Islamic teachings, and the long history of subordination - all of which call for submission and subordination - on the other hand, have produced such a pattern of extremes, which,
as we have seen, influenced rural more than urban populations. But still the possibility of rural managers holding 'low' degrees of B-Po is much higher than holding the 'very high' degrees (see Table 16).

2. Father's occupation

Table 18 shows that the majority (60%) of the middle managers have been raised in homes where the fathers held entrepreneurial occupations. This may be because such occupations have been generally higher in income than bureaucratic occupations and thus allowed the fathers to meet the expenditures of their children's formal education, which is required for a post in the governmental administrative body. Also from a socio-historical perspective, entrepreneurial occupations are more rooted in the society, since they were the original occupations of the majority of the population in Iraq before the country entered the twentieth century, and before the impact of Westernization after the First World War. So it is natural to find the majority of managers' fathers holding such occupations, compared to the 40% holding bureaucratic occupations, which are historically new. Also among the bureaucratic occupations, we notice that the 'civil servant' category is the main one (22 fathers out of 32 hold such positions, compared to 6 'army officers' and 4 'factory workers'). This could indicate the influence of the level of income of the factory worker, which was too low to allow him to spend on his children's education. On the other hand, it also indicates the influence of 'power'; the army officer was usually more willing to send his sons into the army, which provides him with a great deal of respect and power in society. The influence of the level of income is likely to be behind the situation of even the entrepreneurial occupations: only 5 fathers out of 48 were
'craftsmen' on low incomes, compared with other entrepreneurial occupations which provided their children with the advantages of education. This is in addition to the fact that the 'craftsman' was usually training his sons to take over the same family career.

In respect of the affect of 'father's occupation on middle managers orientation and behaviour', Tables 19 and 20 and their analyses, suggest that managers who came from entrepreneurial backgrounds in terms of their fathers' occupations are more likely to have a 'low' tendency toward compliance and more likely to behave with less compliance than those with bureaucratic fathers. In fact through a comparison of the above Tables it may be concluded that managers who are socialized by entrepreneurial fathers or parents (in terms of fathers' occupations) are more likely to hold 'low' as well as 'very high' bureaucratic-feudal orientations. In other words, both the two extremes (i.e. low and very high) can appear among them. Such extremes were not revealed by managers who were socialized in homes where fathers held bureaucratic occupations, but rather they exhibit their moderate orientation by centralizing in the 'middle' and 'high' degrees. This may indicate that managers with bureaucratic fathers could have been socialized by their parents not to take extreme sides, or to adopt a favourable adjustment, as a reflection of their father's experiences in working in bureaucratic organizations where such extremes are likely to bring unpleasant outcomes. Also they show a greater tendency to behave compliantly than managers with entrepreneurial fathers.

3. Parental levels of formal education

Parental level of education is another factor that the literature suggests has a significant affect on childhood
socialization. Table 21 presents the levels of formal education that the mothers and fathers of the 80 middle managers acquired in their lifetime. On the basis of the data reported in this Table, it does seem clear that fathers had greater access to formal education than mothers (for example 69% of the mothers were 'illiterate', compared with 19% of fathers, and 12% of mothers could only 'read and write' compared with 39% of the fathers). Also, while 9% of mothers have had 'primary' education, compared with 18% of fathers, none of the mothers held a B.A. or B.Sc. degree, compared with 11% of fathers who held such degrees). Such differences between mothers' and fathers' education are mainly because of the Iraqi societal norms which in the past have considered that female education was unnecessary and unfavourable for many different reasons.

By examining the data obtained in order to investigate the effect of parental level of education on middle managers' variations in orientation and behaviour, the researcher found that before dealing with this effect, one should first understand what kind of training and knowledge, or, rather, socialization, the Iraqi educational system provides for its practitioners. This understanding will be necessary later on to study the effect of middle managers' own level of formal education on their orientation and behaviour.

The formal educational system in Iraq has been a centralized bureaucratically oriented system since its establishment during the Ottoman's rule and then British colonial occupation of Iraq (Al-Gibori 1970). During the Ottoman period, the aim of the formal educational system was to qualify mainly military men for the army, and officials for the government machinery. The teachers were mostly Turkish, borrowed from the army (Ireland 1937). Since that time and
until recently, a government appointment was the goal of formal education holders. Despite the great quantitative development in this system - for example, in 1920, there were 88 primary schools, by 1958 increased to 1700, in 1968 the number reached 4907, and in 1978 the number reached 8387 (Ministry of Planning 1978; Al-Atiyyah 1977) - its nature continued to display the same basic qualitative features.

As is the case in most Arabic and Middle Eastern educational systems (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981), the teacher-pupil relationship in the Iraqi educational system is one of clear-cut inequality and a large power-distance, which represents the customary dominant-submissive role pattern. Through this mode of relationship, a student is expected to comply with the teacher's instructions and expectations, and work exactly as he is told by the teacher. The nature of the teacher's authority is a combination of traditional-charismatic-legal types of authority. As all authority figures in Iraqi society enjoy the traditional respect of authority and power, the teacher who holds the power of knowledge is no exception. This traditional respect, loyalty and obligation appears in one traditional saying: "he who teaches me a letter, has me as a slave", which nowadays is often used to exaggerate such respect, as a reaction against the fact that teaching in school as a career, particularly for men, is not highly valued by society. This could be because of its relatively low income or because the power of knowledge is no longer limited to the 'teacher' only. After all, the power of knowledge is only practised on the very powerless (i.e. children or students) and is unlikely to open up other sources of power and influence. But within the teacher-pupil relationship, students are expected to obey and submit to the teacher as a person of knowledge and experience, who always knows better than they do. Contradicting
a teacher or questioning his knowledge are not permitted, and even
not expected. Although nowadays physical punishment is not often
used and the educational authority advises against using it, such
methods were employed in schools by teachers and its enforcement
depended on the teacher's personal characteristics and style. Even
parents, until recently, were not only aware of the use of such type
of discipline, but also permitted its use by teachers in order to
teach their children respect, discipline and manners. The father,
says Alwardi (1965) when he put his son in the mulla (i.e. Qur'anic
school) used to tell the teacher: "The flesh to you (the teacher) and
the bone to me (the father)" (p. 301). The student, from his
subordinate position in relation to superiors (i.e. teachers) is not
encouraged to express his opinion to his teachers, and must be very
careful in criticizing them. If students, says Al-Shahi (1980),
attempt to question or criticize their teachers' opinions, then they
face various measures of disapproval and unpleasantness. Al-Fakhry
(1971) found that in Iraqi primary schools, the teacher's authority
to use force and the pupil's fear of physical punishment or any other
unpleasant outcome hinders the development of a spirit of solidarity
among children. From the quotation of many children's replies to her
questions, one can realize the preoccupation in these children's
minds with complying with their teacher's expectations and with
avoiding her physical punishment or gaining her rewards.

The educational pattern that is prevalent in Iraq as well as in
Arabic and Middle Eastern countries (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981) is a
one-way process with limited knowledge and facts. The learning
process is based on memorizing or learning by heart darrāk
information and facts, as instructed by teachers and written in the
assigned syllabus, rather than learning by discovery or encouraging
further enquiry and introducing new opinions. This uniform system of instruction lacks independency training and does not encourage students to follow a logical and analytical way of thinking: "students are given a monotonous and mechanical education which emphasizes the passing of examinations rather than the gaining of understanding and the furthering of knowledge" (Al-Shahi 1980, p. 80). They are not trained to be active in discussion or participate in presenting arguments, but rather follow what the teacher selects and presents to them and what is written in their text books.

Lack of independency training and analytical thinking are not limited to the schools only, for even at university level one can find the same lack and the same type of superior-subordinate relationship between lecturers and the students. There are "no seminars or tutorials through which students can express their opinions, their reservations or their criticisms as to the subject matter of what is being taught" (Al-Shahi 1980, p. 84). In fact, the main characteristic which this educational system enforces is a 'conformity' which appears in most aspects of the system as presented by Al-Shahi (1980). He states that:

"Students generally are afraid to contradict their teachers lest they attain lower marks in examinations, in which event they fear ridicule in front of other students. In other words, deviation from the main stream of teaching is discouraged, and students are not required to think for themselves since ideas, thoughts and solutions are provided for them. Students are not free to choose or argue: their outlook is guided and restricted not only by religion and cultural values, but also by the system of instruction. Just as pupils repeat what the teacher says, so also do teachers repeat what writers say without giving their own opinions about the subject-matter passed on their students (p. 84) ... Teachers are alike in following the same methods of instruction. If a teacher attempts to change a syllabus or method of instruction, he is looked upon with displeasure, and it is thought that he is creating difficulties not only for other teachers, but also for students ... Students are not encouraged or expected to
read outside the set texts or lectures or to seek further information or various opinions. Teachers regard their texts and lectures as the 'truth' and on the whole they do not follow up developments or consult recent publications in their field. The system of examinations is closely connected with the traditional system of instruction. Distinction in an examination depends on the amount of information a student has learnt by heart, memorised and put down on paper. What a student puts on paper is no more than what the teacher has taught him, and there should be nothing in the script either to contradict the teacher or to displease him" (p. 85).

Thus, through such socialization which Iraqi educational institutions provide individuals with, education becomes an important source of honour and influence since education for most people is a matter of acquiring a degree rather than a process of seeking knowledge. Consequently one may find, as Al-Shahi (1980) has stated, that "creativity both in humanities and sciences is minimal in relation to the relatively high number of qualified people in certain countries ... Once a person acquires a higher degree, he is thought by himself and by others to have mastered his subject" (p. 88-89). So, the higher the formal education acquired by the individual, the greater is his power and respect in society.

In taking the effect of parents' level of formal education into consideration, the researcher found that grouping both parents in different categories according to their level of education becomes extremely difficult and inadequate because of the great differences between fathers' and mothers' levels of education. Thus, as appears in Table 22, parents are grouped according to the fathers' and mothers' levels of education and to the differences between fathers' and mothers' education. This Table indicates the following points in the relationship between parents' levels of formal education and the middle managers' orientation and behaviour:

- 'Low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation only appeared among managers with less educated parents (i.e. 'uneducated or
very poorly educated parents' - 13%; 'fathers with some education, mothers uneducated or very poorly educated' - 13%). Managers with less educated parents (groups 1 and 3) have tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance in higher percentages (33%; 33%) than those in group 4 (i.e. fathers with higher or better education, mothers uneducated or with some education - 18%). This would indicate the effect of the nature of the educational system and societal norms in Iraqi society through which education is more a source of power and honour than training for free and logical thinking, which would increase the individual's ability to bring a new interpretation and judgement to the world around him. Thus a degree in education would add more power to the father, particularly when the mother is uneducated or very poorly educated, especially those fathers who gained their education during those days when Iraqi society was highly respectful to those who held any education or information (e.g. the Efendis). In the past, many middle class and poor families tried hard to get their sons a degree in formal education which would lead them to hold a post in the government administrative body and enjoy all the honour and influence it confers within their society.

- Table 22 shows that in comparing managers with 'uneducated or very poorly educated parents' (group 1) with managers who have 'fathers with higher or better education and mothers uneducated or with some education' (group 4), we find that while 13% of the first category (6 out of 45) rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation, no-one did in the latter category. Also, while the 'middle' degree is higher in the first category (24%, '11 out of 45') compared with 18% (2 out of 11) in the second category,
'high' and 'very high' degrees are higher (55%; 27%, '6 and 3 out of 11') in this second category ('fathers with better education, mothers uneducated or with some education') than among those in the first category ('uneducated or very poorly educated parents' - 47%; 16%, '21 and 7 out of 45'). Also complete compliance behaviour was shown by 36% (4 out of 11) of middle managers whose fathers held high or better education and whose mothers were uneducated or with poor education, compared with 18% (8 out of 45) of those with uneducated or very poorly educated parents. Managers in this latter category tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance in higher percentages (33%) than those managers in the former category (18%).

- The effect of parental levels of education (in terms of managers with parents who are less educated show more compliance behaviour than managers with higher or better educated parents) has mostly appeared in the comparison of levels of compliant behaviour between groups (1) and (2). In both groups, parents are closer in their levels of education, but in the first they are less educated.

Taking into account the above mentioned points, the researcher decided to group parents according to the degree of inequality between fathers' and mothers' in formal education (Table 23) and then to study the effect on middle managers' orientation and behaviour.

From all the comparisons that are presented in the analysis of Tables 23 and 24 (Appendix 2), it seems that the level of education and the degree of inequality in education between fathers and mothers both affect the orientation and behaviour of middle managers in the study. In other words, one can suggest that those with parents having better and closer levels of education are more likely to have
a reduced tendency toward compliance than those with parents having less and different levels of education.

4. Childhood experiences

Before demonstrating the research findings on the effects of the middle managers' childhood experiences on their variation in orientation and behaviour, we need to understand the culturally dominant patterns of family structure and child-socialization in Iraq. Patterns of family structure and socialization in Iraq and also in most Arabic countries have been described by various writers (Pezeshkpur 1978; Patai 1973; Nahas 1969; Berger 1962; Prothro 1969; Hamady 1960). From their descriptions the following picture of Iraqi traditional family structure and child-socialization emerges:

'Its structure is a patriarchal hierarchy where the head of the family - who is normally the father - is usually the most influential man in his family. If the father is dead, the grandfather or an 'uncle' (father's brother) or the eldest son, if he is mature enough, is usually the most influential man. Levels of authority flow downward, according to age, from father to the eldest and then younger sons with, often, little remaining for the women. Although the father remains aloof from his children and has little to do with raising them at least until they are of school age, he is to be respected and children are expected to maintain a respectful distance from him in their ways of acting and speaking in his presence, particularly in public. In his relationship with his children he tends to be authoritarian and often severe and stern. Children remain totally dependent on parental authority for many years, which may last into late adolescence or even longer. The parent-child relationship is a dominant-submissive pattern and the child's obedience is maintained through both love and punishment which is usually a physical punishment used by both parents but mostly by the father. Such punishment aims to get the child out of the period of 'ignorance' and into one of usefulness. The child lacks verbal interaction and parents are unlikely to play with him for any length of time. He receives in his early years, a great deal of affection, indulgence and permissiveness, particularly from the mother, but in his later childhood he suddenly comes under greater control, particularly from the father. A child's personal initiative and autonomy are restricted to a great degree. Conformity and respect are demanded from children towards seniors and considered part of the good manners a
person must have. Seniors make decisions and give orders and advice to the youngsters, who are expected to carry out their seniors' decisions and orders."

Some aspects of the Iraqi traditional picture have been changing, particularly the functions of traditional large families and the movement from the 'extended family' to the 'nuclear family', mainly among the urban educated populations. Also some changes have been undertaken in the position of the older generations and the domain of the head of the extended family, but these have not significantly affected the underlying authoritarian conceptual structure upon which the family socialization continues to function. Thus one may still observe the authoritarian approach in family socialization and relationships, especially in the father-child relationship which is still a model for the high degree of power-distance which Iraqi society expects.

This illustrates the statement made by Hofstede (1980) in pointing out that the family as well as other social institutions may be changed, but "this does not necessarily affect the societal norms: and when these remain unchanged, the persistent influence of a majority value system patiently smoothes the new institutions until their structure and functioning is again adapted to the societal norms" (p. 26). One of the most important effects of Iraqi authoritarian ideology and its approach to child-socialization is the child's dependency on and special respect for authority figures. He learns to conceptualize and see himself in relation to his father, seniors, teachers and other authority figures as 'submissive', but in relation to his younger brothers and sisters as 'dominant'. Not only his parents, but also societal norms that dominate his life at home, school, and even when playing outside the house with other children - all these make him strive to be the most powerful in relation to his
peer group, rather than the powerless; the dominant but not the submissive. Thus childhood socialization participates in making the individual in Iraqi society, as Alwardi (1951) pointed out, predisposed to the values of dominance and command when he is in a position of power, and submission and obedience when he is powerless. Also, as Berger (1962) explains, the child lacks regular and predictable attention from adults and particularly from parents, because he is considered a jahil (i.e. an ignorant one) who does not need to be noticed much, at least until he is old enough (six or seven) to be properly formed into an adult as quickly as possible. The arbitrariness of parental control and the use of physical punishment induce the child to learn ways of getting attention and approval, to ingratiate himself and to adopt socially desirable behaviour in order to get rewards and avoid punishments. In other words, "to master the means of ingratation and manipulation" (Berger 1962, p. 169).

From what has been shown, one can find that the Iraqi familial socialization approach consists of two major aspects: first, an authoritarian father-child relationship with its connected familial values; second, authoritarian controlling practices carried out mostly by the father through using mainly physical punishment without reasoning with the child.

These two major aspects have been the concern of this research in studying the middle managers' childhood experiences and are what the researcher has tried to study by collecting relevant data when she carried out her field work.

In the process of analyzing the data, the researcher found that in responding to the two questions (i.e. each question consists of two statements and the respondents were asked to pick the one they
agreed with most) aimed at measuring the degree of power-distance in
the father-child relationship that these 80 middle managers
experienced in their family socialization, 85% (68 out of 80) of them
said, in relation to first question, that they experienced a large
power-distance in relation to their fathers. This authoritarian
relationship was also reported in the second question by 81% (65 out
of 80) of these managers. When they responded to the third question
(which consists of five items aimed at indicating the middle
managers' familial values that correspond to the customary dominant-
submissive role pattern) 39% (31 out of 80) agreed that they
experienced all that was stated in the five items, 32% agreed with
four items, and 24% with three items. Only 5 middle managers showed
less agreement; 2% (2 out of 80) agreed with only two items; 1% with
one; and 2% disagreed with all of them. In fact, these two latter
middle managers also previously denied having experienced a large
power-distance in relation to their fathers, and they were the most
prominent in trying to give what they thought as desirable answers
which would protect them from any negative judgement. In the course
of an interview, one of these two managers told the researcher:

"I know what you are up to ... you want to see if
there is a relationship between our past private life and
our present position within this working organisation ...am
I right? I don't think that you have the right to ask
people about their personal life ..."

Furthermore, even what was reported by the '11' middle managers
in the first question and the '15' in the second question, i.e.
saying that they did not experience an authoritarian father-child
relationship, does not necessarily represent reality, because the
vast majority of these '11 middle managers' reported having an
authoritarian relationship in their response to the items '1' and '2'
of the third question. These items were no more than rewording, in a
different way, what was stated in the first and second questions.
So, we can conclude that the authoritarian father-child relationship and its connected familial values dominated the childhood experiences of the vast majority of these 80 middle managers. Also, among those few middle managers who reported having experienced less authoritarian relationships and values, some were only concerned with giving what they thought as desirable answers, or what would protect them from any negative judgement about their personal life.

In fact such a fear of negative judgement or the attitude of giving 'desirable answers' also appeared when the researcher analyzed the responses of those 80 middle managers to the two questions related to the second aspect of childhood experience, that of the authoritarian controlling methods (i.e. using punishment vs. reward discipline without reasoning with the child). In fact, the research findings in this respect not only showed inconclusive results but were also unexpected in terms of what the literature suggests. For example (as Table 25 shows), the 39 middle managers who reported having experienced punishment vs. reward discipline by their fathers only for some of the time and reasoning with them for most of the time, were the highest group to indicate complete compliant behaviour (23% '9 out of 39'). This compared with only one manager who showed such a type of behaviour among 12 middle managers who reported that their fathers constantly used this authoritarian discipline without reasoning with them at all (group 3).

The researcher believes that these unexpected results of the effect of constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning is not only because of the attitude of many middle managers to giving desirable answers, but, more, it may indicate what Hofstede (1980) suggested about the distinction between "norm authoritarianism" and
"personal authoritarianism" (p. 115). Thus the constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning, which Harvey et al. (1961) suggests highly affects the degree of 'personal authoritarianism', does not have such an affect when we study the degree of individual internalization of authoritarian societal norms through the socialization process.

Thus the researcher decided to study the affect of only the first aspect of childhood experience (i.e. the authoritarian father-child relationship and its connected familial values) on those 80 middle managers' behaviour and orientation, as this aspect expresses Iraqi norm authoritarianism which operates on the cultural level. By grouping those 80 middle managers into two categories, according to the total degree that each one of them scored in the three questions, we can compare those who reported having experienced a less authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values with those with high authoritarian experiences. As is shown in Table 26 the vast majority (86%, '69 out of 80') reported having high authoritarian childhood experiences, and 14% (11 out of 85) reported less authoritarian childhood experiences. The analysis of Table 26 shows that the tendency to behave with compliance among managers who reported having high authoritarian childhood experiences is more than among those with less authoritarian experiences. But the affect of this variation in childhood experiences appears when we have examined the middle managers' behaviour more than orientation. This may suggest that acquiring such an orientation does not depend only on experiencing an authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values but more the reinforcement of such a pattern of relationships and values through different life stages in the socialization process. But the authoritarian father-child relationship and its
corresponding familial values have their impact in the way individuals as socialized adults will construct their behaviour in relation to other authority figures. In analyzing Table 27, it was found that one cannot draw a conclusive result about the affect of childhood experiences on the relationship between middle managers orientation and behaviour. As was mentioned before, obtaining such results could be because of the distorted information relating to childhood experiences, since the questions tackled very personal parts of their lives, about which it was genuinely difficult for them to provide undistorted information. Such a tendency was pointed out by Schaffer (1980). He states that 'social desirability' tends to play a large part in determining the answers given in questionnaires about child rearing.

C - Educational Background

1. Level of formal education

The majority (73%, '58 out of 80') of the middle managers under study held undergraduate degrees (Diploma, B.A. or B.Sc.), while 21% (17 out of 80) held only schooling certificates (Intermediate and Secondary), 7% (5 out of 80) had acquired postgraduate degrees (Diploma, Master and Ph.D.). Table 28 presents the data related to the variation in orientation and behaviour between those with a low level of formal education (i.e. holding only school certificates) and those with high level of formal education (i.e. holding undergraduate and postgraduate degrees). From the analysis of Tables 28 and 29, it seems that, in general, low degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation are more likely to be shown by those with less education. And the less-educated ones are more ready to behave with complete compliance than the more-educated managers. This result is more
likely because of the feeling of equality or power that the holding of higher formal educational degrees provides those middle managers with, rather than the affect of education in increasing the individual's ability to bring a new interpretation and judgement to the world around him. In other words, when the power-distance in the superior-subordinate relationship between two actors is large, and when education is a source of power and honour, as is the case in Iraqi society, holding higher formal education certificates by subordinates would decrease the power-distance, particularly from the subordinate's point of view.

2. The nature of formal education (place of education)

It was hoped to examine the affect of the nature of formal education by comparing those who possessed an education degree from Western countries with those who finished their study within the Iraqi educational system. But, in fact, only one among 80 middle managers finished his Ph.D. outside the country (Poland) and 3 middle managers in an Arabic country (Egypt), so such a comparison has not been possible. However, those three middle managers who finished their postgraduate diplomas in the Egyptian educational system, which is very similar to that of Iraq (Al-Shahi 1980), showed 'high' and 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but they tended in their wavering behaviour towards non-compliance. Also the middle manager who obtained a Ph.D. from Poland showed a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but tended in his wavering behaviour towards compliance.
D - Work Experience

1. Length of service

From Table 30, we can see that the majority of the 80 middle managers under study have worked in governmental organizations for over 14 years (the length of service of 38% of them spread between '14 - 19' years, and 40% 'over 20 years'). Only 22% of them held lengths of service between 8 - 13 years.

The analysis of data presented in Tables 30 and 31 has shown that in general managers who would indicate 'low' as well as 'very high' degrees of compliance in their 'orientation' and 'behaviour' are more likely to have obtained 'more' rather than 'less' seniority. But the possibility of the 'very high' degree of compliance appearing among managers holding 'high' seniority is greater than the 'low' degree.

In fact, the researcher found that 7 of those '9' middle managers who rated 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who showed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance, were in fact part of the second group presented in Table 32 who have 14 - 19 years of seniority. Managers in this second group are more likely, than the other two groups, to have developed their influence in their own organizations; in other words, they are in the 'innovation' stage of their career. This could be behind the appearance of wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance in higher percentages (40%, '12 out of 30') compared to the first group who hold 'less seniority' (33%, '6 out of 18') and the third group who have the highest seniority (28%, '9 out of 32'). This tendency toward non-compliance which was shown mostly by those with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation could be, as was explained in the previous chapter, no more than admitting a "wide
distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative", or as a favourable adjustment in being seen to behave in line with the political ideological emphasis introduced into the organizational environment. Many of them may find that making this favourable adjustment may serve their interests of moving up the ladder; others would continue to be oriented in 'very high' degrees to satisfy their superiors by showing a great amount of compliance, as long as such behaviour helps them more in moving up. Among the first group who held the least seniority (between 8 - 13 years), the 'very high' degrees did not appear at all and they were the lowest group in indicating a 'low' degree. Also their tendency toward non-compliance (33%, '6 out of 18') was lower than that of the second group. On the other hand, the 'very high' degree appeared among managers in the third group (those with 20+ years of service) but at a much lower level (13%, '4 out of 32') than that of the second group (33%, '10 out of 30'). Also they were the lowest group in indicating a tendency toward non-compliance. This could be because the first group are still working in establishing their positions and developing their influences in their own organizations, thus they are less ready to take the risk of any extreme behaviour (i.e. showing 'very high' degrees of compliance or behaving non-compliantly). On the other hand, as many of those in the third group are likely to be in the last stages of their career, they may not be able to expect to move up the promotional ladder for higher positions and start to suffer from "the boxed-in-feeling" (Kay 1974 a). Thus they also become less interested in taking risks in any extreme direction. Furthermore, the fact that some of the managers in the third group have been transferred from top management level to middle management positions for different reasons may also contribute to the low level of the 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation compared
with that of the second group. However, the appearance of the 'very high' degree only among those who hold over 14 years of seniority could manifest the affect of the length of socialization that these managers have been subject to within Iraqi organizational culture, with its emphasis and rewarding of compliance. But this is not shown by those with less seniority; they are not yet fully socialized into the Iraqi organizational culturally predominant style.

But managers in the third group showed 'low' degrees (12% '4 out of 32') which may not be congruent with saying that managers in this group tend to avoid taking any extreme direction. In fact, when the researcher examined the data, she found that those 4 managers had worked for a number of years in the private sector before they joined the governmental organizations of the public sector. Thus these middle managers have been exposed to different organizational cultures for a number of years. Also despite over 20 years of seniority they, together with the other 4 middle managers who all rated 'low', spent less than 8 years in middle management (3 of them less than 2 years, and 2 of them less than 5 years). This is because these and many other employees started working at quite an early age (i.e., after primary or intermediate school certificates) and, at the same time, many of them continued their education. For that reason one finds that the length of service of some employees in Iraqi organizations could be over 20 years although they are younger than other employees who hold many fewer years of service, as the latter started working after they finished their university degree or even later. Thus, as 3 of those 4 middle managers with over 20 years of seniority who rated 'low' degree have less than 8 years in middle management and the other one less than 5 years, this could mean that they are still at the peak of their careers as middle managers and
are still likely to be holding their influence in their organizations. Also, they may still be expecting, as is the case in the second group, to move up to higher positions.

2. Number of years in a managerial job in the present organization

The number of years the middle manager has been holding his managerial position in the present organization, it is suggested, affects his orientation and behaviour in relation to organizational authority. By grouping the 80 middle managers under study according to the number of years they have been working at the middle management level, we shall be able to compare those with less than 4 years service with those with more years (over 4 years).

From the analysis of Tables 33 and 34, it was found that the effect of the 'number of years in managerial jobs in the present organization' on middle managers' orientation and behaviour showed similar results to that of length of service. But in general managers who spent more years in their middle management positions are more likely to be more oriented toward compliance than those with less years. Also those with more years in managerial positions are more likely than those with less years to behave with compliant behaviour, as well as tending toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour.

In the process of analyzing the data the researcher found that among managers who have spent more years in managerial positions in their organization, those '6' managers who held 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who showed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance, are the same ones who previously reported this orientation and behaviour when we examined the affect
of length of service or 'seniority' on middle managers' orientation and behaviour. As was found before, these 6 managers are in the peak period of their service or in the innovative stage of their careers; it is the same situation when we go further to find the deeper implications of the association between the length of time they have spent in middle management positions in their present organization and their orientation and behaviour. As Table 35 shows, 5 of these 6 middle managers are part of the second group who have been at the middle management level for less than 8 years. As one can note from Table 35, those in the second group have centralized in 'high' and 'very high' degrees compared with the first and third groups who centralized in 'middle' and 'high'. Also, complete compliant behaviour appeared among them in higher percentages (23%, '5 out of 22') more than among the first group (16%, '8 out of 51') or the third group (14%, '1 out of 7'). On the other hand, the majority (45%, '10 out of 22') of them tended toward non-compliance, but the majority (53%, '27 out of 51') of the first, and particularly of the third group (71%, '5 out of 7') tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance. All the above points may indicate that managers in the second group, who could be in their 'innovation' stage in their career as 'middle managers', and who are more willing and have greater expectations of moving up the promotional ladder, are the most likely group to show extreme compliance as well as non-compliance in their efforts to move up in the organizational hierarchy. Although they are oriented more than other groups toward compliance, they behave with complete compliance or non-compliance depending on their interpretations of the situation they find themselves in. Some of them may find that satisfying their organizational authority figures by showing complete compliance to
their wishes is more likely to serve their interests in moving up the ladder; others - in our case the majority - may have found that it serves their personal interests better if they satisfy those who are higher than their superiors (i.e. the highest authority in the head office or the political authority), at least by showing the support to the political ideological emphasis on issues such as leadership, taking responsibility, and initiatives. Also the influence that those managers in the second group may have on their organizations - by which it may become less easy for their organizations to replace them - may make them feel more secure and important and thus more able to show less obedience. But the managers of the first group (those who have been in middle management positions for less than 4 years) and of the third group (who have been in management level for over 8 years) could be less ready to show an extreme direction (either to behave with complete obedience or non-obedience). Thus they tend to take a relatively moderate position (centralizing in 'middle' and 'high' degrees at bureaucratic-feudal orientation and in wavering behaviour tending toward obedience). This again could be because the first group still lack enough influence on their organizations and are more engaged with establishing their positions at the middle management level and thus not expecting to move up the ladder as quickly as the second group. And the third group may have lost their hope to move up the ladder, particularly since all of them hold over 20 years of seniority and are in their middle age (40 - 45). So they are likely to suffer from the middle-age or career crisises, one phenomenon of which is "the boxed-in-feeling" (Kay 1974 a).
2. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

After this mentally exhausting journey beyond the numbers searching for the individuality-affecting factors that contribute to middle managers' variation in orientation and behaviour, we can say that we did not find a 'clear-cut' variation associated with each factor. But what we did find was a kind of general tendency associated with each factor; only in this sense can we say that the research findings supported the second hypothesis. In other words, no single factor alone accounted for the total variability of middle managers orientation and behaviour. In fact, such findings in themselves give support to the major argument of this research in saying that middle managers behaviour is a function of individual and organizational factors interacting.

The general tendency that was found to be associated with the 'age' factor supports what the literature has suggested: older middle managers are more ready to behave compliantly than the younger ones, but, as Bate and Mangham (1981) suggests, with "notable exceptions in both the older and the younger groups" (p. 205). Also older managers tend to be more favourably disposed or, as Tannenbaum et al. (1977, p. 144) says show "favorable adjustment", which may demonstrate the insecurity feelings that the older ones are more likely to have.

The first variable that was dealt with in studying the family background and childhood socialization of those (80) middle managers under study was the 'geographical area of living' (i.e. rural vs. urban subcultural differences). In contrast to what most Western writers findings, this research showed that, in general, managers who have been socialized in Iraqi rural areas are more oriented and inclined to behave in a less compliant way than those socialized in
urban areas. The researcher believes that this represents the reality in Iraq and by considering the following points one can justify such a belief:

A. If the rural father-child relationship in Iraq is an authoritarian one, where the father tends to be stern and use corporal punishment, and the child-rearing practices emphasize subordination to father's authority and family interest (Ali 1977), the urban socialization in Iraq is not an exception. Such authoritarian relationships and practices are the general cultural pattern not only in Iraq but in most Arabic and Middle Eastern countries (Patai 1973; Tayeb 1981).

B. The modern urban society in Iraq is not a product of the industrialization movement as is the case in Western countries but, no doubt, such a movement has increased modernity in this society. Industrialization in Iraq is a recent phenomenon and has not emerged from within society but rather been transferred to this society from advanced countries in a packaged or "turn key" basis (Aboona 1975, p. 168). Furthermore, borrowing the technology, as Berger (1962) recognizes, has not been preceded by creating 'values' appropriate to it or at least developing such values later in order to realize the technology fruits in a reliable stable manner. So the Iraqi urban population has not experienced the cultural and social changes that go with industrialization. The industrialization 'movement' in Iraq has not changed the individual's basic cultural value-orientations (such as 'dependency') or led people, as it did in Western countries, to be self-reliant and independent. Gulick's findings (1966) showed that transferring Western industrialization to the Arabic urban cities has not destroyed their traditional cultures. Rather one may find, as he did in a Lebanese industrial city, a "number of cultural
patterns which differ from those which would be expected according to Western industrial theory, and at least one which is thought by many to be incompatible with Western industrialization" (p. 52). Modernization in Iraq, which was the result of the impact of exposure to Western culture mainly since the First World War, affected people's way of life, materials, education, dress, types of living, etc., more than their basic cultural value-orientations and practices. Thus, individuals in urban populations, despite their surface modernity, may still be traditional in their outlook. Although many educated urban Iraqis as well as other Arabs are nowadays moving away from the traditional pattern of child-rearing, "the majority cannot imagine themselves questioning the rightness of these traditional ways: they would think it funny, if not insane, for example, to go to doctors or to books to learn how to handle children" (Berger 1962, p. 135). So they raise their children mainly as their own parents did, according to fixed notions accumulated over many centuries. And if it is the modern formal schools in urban society that, some may argue, stand behind the differences between urban and rural child-training for self-reliance, all schools in Iraq - from those in villages with one teacher to the large modern ones in the cities - emphasize obedience, dependency and memorization.

C. Rural and urban communities in Iraq, as we have seen previously, have many socio-cultural traits and customs in common, with a clear and deep influence of Bedouin values of power, superiority, equality, pride and individuality. But the impact of Bedouin culture on rural communities has been greater than on urban inhabitants. Also if the urban population has had to submit to successive arbitrary rulers or governments, the rural areas were
geographically isolated for quite a long time and thus away from the influence of governmental power. Thus, while such Bedouin values considerably weakened in urban communities, rural inhabitants continued to be highly influenced by these values to the degree that the Iraqi fallah (farmer) liked to consider himself a settled Bedouin (Al-Dahiri 1969). Also the governmental offices or the 'civil service' was from the time of the Effendis and, to a degree, still is the primary sector for Iraqi modern urban occupations but to a decreasing extent. So, most of those who form the urban community have been heavily and more intensely exposed to the influence of Iraqi bureaucracy, with all its negative characteristics such as dependency of subordinates on superiors, discouraging personal initiative and independent actions, authoritarian relationships, etc. But the population in rural areas, particularly those who continued to work and live on the farms, have stayed aloof, to various degrees, from such influences. No doubt the fallah in Iraq has outwardly submitted to the powerful feudal sheikhs and to the tax collectors, but his internal desert heritage of freedom, equality, individuality, pride, etc. has been barely affected. Thus, his submission to them was his only available tactic when he had to deal with them, but he continued to follow his original values in his relationships with his peers (Alwardi 1965).

D. The nature of the open-spaced environment in rural areas on the one hand, and the fact that the children in these areas in Iraq usually start working on the farm and carry their share of the family's burdens at quite an early age on the other, allows more training in self-reliance than a child in an urban community. This is similar to the point that Swop (1970) makes about the differences between the nature of urban and rural socialization and their impact
on American executive's style and outlook. Also as Berger (1962) remarks, by age 7 in a rural community, as was the case in Bedouin society, the child is initiated into the company of men and their ways and by age 12 is treated as an adult. Thus he joins the men more often in their meetings, where he learns how to behave as a man. But the child in urban areas is not very likely to have such open space or training in responsibility and self-reliance as well as treatment as an adult. And if it happens, it is more likely to be among traditional people than among modern ones. On the other hand, the data showed that managers who socialized up to their 20s in rural areas displayed both extremes of orientation (i.e. 'low' and 'very high' degrees) more than those with an urban background only. Such extremes could manifest a 'cultural pattern' that results from the contradictory values that have coexisted together; the Bedouin values of power and superiority on one side and on the other, the values of subordination and submission in the feudal system, the misinterpretation of Islamic teachings and the long history of subordination. Such cultural patterns of extremes have influenced rural more than urban populations.

The research findings on 'father's occupation', which was the second variable in studying family background and childhood socialization, showed that, in general, managers who have been socialized by entrepreneurial fathers or parents (in terms of father's occupation) are much more likely to have a 'low' tendency toward compliance and would behave with less compliance than managers with fathers with bureaucratic occupations. These findings support the literature (i.e. Aberle and Naegele 1952; Miller and Swanson 1960; Kohn 1962-63 and 1969; Hulin and Triadis 1981). But the
findings also suggest that both of the two extremes of orientation (i.e. 'low' and 'very high') can be held by managers with entrepreneurial fathers, while managers with bureaucratic fathers exhibit a relatively moderate orientation (i.e. centralizing in 'middle' and 'high' degrees). This could indicate the avoidance of risk-taking and the disposition toward a favourable adjustment that managers who were socialized in homes where fathers held bureaucratic occupations, because a father's occupational requirements have important consequences for the values that parents display to their children (Kohn 1969).

The third variable that is assumed to have an affect on childhood socialization was the 'parent's level of education'. In studying the association between middle managers orientation and behaviour and their parents' level of formal education, the researcher found that, in general, those managers with uneducated or very poorly educated parents have neither shown a higher tendency toward compliance nor more compliant behaviour than those with better educated parents, as the literature suggests (Kohn 1969; Hofstede 1980) but rather, the opposite way round. Such a suggested affect, in terms of those with less educated parents having a greater tendency toward compliance than those with higher or better educated parents was only found when we compared two groups of parents where fathers and mothers in each group held closer levels of education. Consequently, managers whose parents held closer levels of education were found to be less oriented toward the bureaucratic-feudal orientation and behaved less compliantly than managers whose parents held different levels of education. This would reveal the affect of Iraqi societal norms and the nature of the 'educational system' through which 'education' becomes a source of power and honour.
Thus, according to the findings of this research, we can state that at least in a society such as in Iraq, the suggested affect (Khooh 1969; Hofstede 1980) of 'parent's level of education' is likely to be conditioned by the degree of inequality between fathers' and mothers' levels of education.

'Childhood experiences' was the fourth and the last variable concerned with middle manager's family background and socialization. Within this variable the researcher's concern has been on the two aspects of Iraqi family socialization that emerged from the description presented in this study. The first aspect was the authoritarian father-child relationship and its connected familial values, and the second was the authoritarian controlling methods (i.e. using punishment vs. reward discipline without reasoning with the child). In the first aspect, the research findings indicate that the authoritarian parents or, rather, father-child relationship and the familial values in relation to authority have dominated the childhood experiences of the vast majority of the (80) middle managers under study. This result strongly supports the cultural argument employed by Hofstede (1980) and Tayeb (1981) and shows that the 'family' in Iraq builds up and reinforces the authoritarian customary role of the 'dominant-submissive' pattern and its corresponding shared conceptual structural in relation to authority. In fact, Tayeb's findings about Iranian authoritarian family structure and ways of functioning are quite consistent with the authoritarian pattern of family structure and child-socialization that I have found in Iraq. This may appear to suggest the influences of Islamic teachings as Tayeb (1981) and Pezeshkpur (1978) have argued. But I do not agree with the notion that such authoritarian structure and ways of functioning are because of the marked impact of Islamic
teachings. Rather, they are an accumulative socio-historical product of the evolution of society during which people try to find some solution to their fundamental life problems within a limited range of possible solutions. Through their battles under centuries of subordination, fear, crushing poverty and uncertainty of survival, people in many Middle Eastern countries, as is the case in Iraq, have misinterpreted and negatively practised many principles in Islam. Cummulatively and through the socio-historical evolution of these societies, Islam itself became a source of blind obedience, extreme conformity and subordination to authority which is quite inconsistent with its original principles and message. The hierarchical family power structure and authoritarian parent-child relationships that Tayeb found in Iran (and I agree that it is also the case in Iraq) have also been recognized in Western countries although to lesser degrees - (Levinson 1968 in Germany; Ferrarotti 1959 and Kohn 1969 in Italy; and Hofstede in all high PDI countries).

Few middle managers (11 out of 80) reported having experienced a less authoritarian childhood. But some of them reported the opposite when the researcher re-worded the pertinent questions in different ways. In fact, many of those who continued to report having experienced less authoritarian childhoods were clearly very concerned with giving what they judged to be desirable answers or the answers that would protect them from a negative judgement about their family and personal life. Such fears of negative judgements, as we have seen previously, are one of the dominant value-orientations of Iraqi culture. When the researcher moved on to study middle managers variation in orientation and behaviour in terms of childhood experiences, it was found that the tendency to behave compliantly among managers with more authoritarian father-child relationships and
familial values was, generally, more than among managers with less authoritarian childhoods. But when the researcher examined the affect of such variation in childhood experiences on the relationship between middle managers orientation and behaviour, the findings were inconclusive. This could be, as has been explained previously, the result of distorted information or responses given by many middle managers concerning their childhood experiences because of their fear of negative judgement.

In the second aspect of childhood experiences (i.e. authoritarian control by using punishment vs. reward discipline without reasoning with the child) the findings were not only inconclusive but, furthermore, at variance with what the literature suggested about the affect of the constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning (Harvey et al., 1961). Out of line with what Harvey et al. (1961) argued, the 39 middle managers who reported having experienced the use by their fathers of punishment only occasionally and reasoning most of the time, were the highest group who indicated complete compliant behaviour, compared with the very low appearance of this behaviour among those who said that their fathers constantly used this authoritarian discipline without reasoning with them at all. Here again these unexpected results could have been obtained at least partly because it was difficult for adults in their positions with their cultural concepts of 'manliness', 'family orientation' and 'fear of negative judgement' to provide undistorted information about what they consider very personal parts of their lives. Thus in future research, new ways should be found to assess individual's childhood experiences in a society where culture makes it very difficult to deal with the people's personal and family life and where people are extremely
concerned with and sensitive to others negative judgements, particularly 'strangers'. Furthermore, these results may support Hofstede (1980, p. 115) who suggested the need to distinguish between "norm authoritarianism" and "personal authoritarianism". In fact Harvey et al. (1961) have suggested a cause and effect relationship between childhood experiences and the unhealthy "authoritarian personality" that was introduced by Adorno et al. (1950). The effect of the constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning that they suggested to effect the degree of authoritarianism in personality, does not apply in studying the degree of individual internalization of authoritarian societal norms. In fact, this authoritarianism within individual orientation in any authoritarian culture, such as the cases in most Middle Eastern and Arabic societies (Melikian 1959; Kagitcibasi 1970), tends to be a more healthy psychological adjustment than unhealthy 'personal authoritarianism'. The unexpected results of the effect of the authoritarian control by punishment vs. reward discipline could also show that the use of physical punishment by Arabic fathers does not necessarily mean a hostile father-child relationship, as some writers have suggested. It must not be taken to have the same implications as the 'abused child' phenomenon that one can find in Western society ('The Times' 11 Dec. 1984). This is so, because Iraqi or Arabic parents by the use of such discipline are only trying to make their children acquire what their societal norms consider as the ideal: 'to be well-mannered, respectful of parents and elders, helpful and obedient'. In one word, to be muaddab (i.e. well-behaved). In fact parents used to justify their use of physical punishment by referring to one of the traditional sayings: "If your son is dear to you, the well mannered is dearer". This is in addition to the fact that the
Iraqi and Arabic father is not only socially expected but usually does devote his whole life to his children, which not only demonstrates to them his great love and care, but also puts a great obligation on them to respect and obey him, particularly when they realize that he is usually their only source of financial security upon which their present and future life depends, and that their parents provide them with an amount of love and care that they are unlikely to find elsewhere. This obligation is especially strong not only because of the teachings of Islam to obey and respect parents, but also because of the pressure on people to be upwardly mobile and to acquire material wealth and security, which is connected with respect and status in society.

The third individuality factor that was looked at to find out its effect on middle managers' orientation and behaviour was 'educational background'. The researcher, by using her own experiences in the Iraqi educational system and that of others (Al-Shahi 1980) in addition to the available documents and studies have demonstrated how the authoritarian teacher-pupil relationship in the Iraqi educational system, through which all of the 80 middle managers under study have been socialized, portrays the customary dominant-submissive role pattern. Also the educational system, as is the case in Arabian and Middle Eastern countries (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981), is a one-way process with a great lack of independency training and analytical thinking, and which builds-up and reinforces the dominant conceptual structure in relation to authority. In fact for Tayeb (1981) and, furthermore, for Al-Shahi (1980) this type of authoritarian teacher-pupil relationship, the learning by heart and recitation and the whole pattern of instruction are connected with
marked impact of the earlier model of Islamic religious educational institutions upon secular education. This belief is clearly represented by the following statement of Al-Shahi (1980):

"Just as the Qur'an is learnt in the form of verses and chapters, so in secular schools teachers use set texts (mugarrarât), hand-outs (Malaffât), or sections of a book (malâzîm), and these must be learnt by heart. Thus, a book does not become a source of stimulation to intellectual activity, curiosity or further thinking, it is, rather, a mean to an end - the passing of an examination. Students are not encouraged to seek information beyond the set texts, and so knowledge is restricted to what the teacher provides. Learning by rote and the slow verbatim copying of information from teachers are very widespread in schools and universities. Knowledge gained by these two methods is considered to be the 'truth' and, by analogy, it is similar to the knowledge gained through learning the verses of the Qur'an. Students take pride in the number of times they have read the set texts which they read from cover to cover: min al-jilîd li-l-jilîd. The more a student recites these texts by heart the more it is thought likely that he will remember them at examinations. Reciting the Qur'an by heart many times brings greater religious merit, and, in the words of Taha Hussein a person becomes '... a Sheikh, even if he is very young'. Similarly in secular education a student who learns the text by heart becomes dhâki 'intelligent', or mujtahid 'industrious' "p. 33).

While I quite agree with his description of the pattern of secular education that is prevalent in Iraq as well as in other Arabian and Middle Eastern countries, I do not agree that such a pattern is originally and totally derived from the impact of religious educational institutions, that of 'Qur'anic schools'. Although these institutions have had considerable influence, the dominant-submissive role pattern of the teacher-pupil relationship as well as the one-way process of instructing education that characterized religious as well as secular educational institutions are the product of the cultural dominant value-orientations that have crystalized through the socio-historical evolution of Arabic and Middle Eastern societies. Thus, it is the societal norms or the dominant value-orientation that have built the educational system as well as the familial, political and economic systems into this
authoritarian pattern, and not the religious educational institutions by themselves. But no doubt each kind of institution reinforces the pattern of structure and way of functioning of the other institutions. If the lack of analytical way of thinking, dependency, and learning by heart a limited amount of knowledge or facts are all the impact of Islamic educational institutions, we would not find that in the past Islamic civilization made a substantial contribution to human civilization, during which Baghdad was a great centre of learning and where arts and sciences flourished. Thus, one should not forget the impact of the Ottoman occupation as well as the British occupation on the formal secular educational system, which in itself came to many Arabic and Middle Eastern countries through this domination, as is the case in Iraq. Carnoy (1974) explains how the Western schooling that was instituted in many colonized countries generated in those societies a dependency, alienation, loss of personal choice, and larger power-dstances, particularly between those who had formal schooling and those who lacked it. In fact, as Al-Shahi himself has mentioned, in secular education some of the religious educational terms have been distorted, e.g., mujtahid. This term in its original religious educational sense, as it is still used in the religious educational institutions of Najaf in Iraq, means not only the person who has fully studied the original sources of knowledge but who has acquired the capacity to initiate and provide further interpretations and implementations to the Qur'ānic verses and words. But in the secular educational system, "a student at school or university is a mujtahid if he has learnt by heart or memorized a great deal of what is set for him" (Al-Shahi 1980, p. 83).
In considering the effect of the 'level of formal education' on middle managers orientation and behaviour, the research findings suggested that, in general, the less-educated middle managers are more oriented toward and inclined to behave compliantly than the more-educated ones. When we take the nature of the Iraqi educational system and societal norms into account, this result is more likely to be because of the feeling of equality or power that the holders of more educational degrees would have in their subordinated position in relation to those above them, than because of the effect of education in increasing their abilities to bring new interpretations and judgements to the world around them. Thus we can say that in the superior-subordinate relationship, more formal education being held by subordinates would reduce the power-distance between them, at least from the subordinate's point of view, particularly when the superior has lower or even the same level of formal education.

Because all of the (80) middle managers under study were educated up to undergraduate degrees in the Iraqi educational system and only 4 of them studies outside the country (3 of them in Egypt), the researcher was unable to study, as it was hoped, the effect of place of education (i.e. nature of formal education) on their orientation and behaviour.

The last individuality factor studied in this research is 'work experience'. In general, managers with 'high' seniority displayed the extreme degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation (i.e. 'low' and 'very high') and of behaviour (i.e. 'complete compliant behaviour' and 'wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance') - which were greater in the former than in the latter - more than those with less seniority. This could produce suggestions about seniority
or length of service in two ways, first: 'the more lengthy period of organizational socialization within Iraqi bureaucratic-feudal culture, the more likely the actor would be oriented and ready to behave compliantly. This supports what Gordon (1970) has suggested in saying that "bureaucratic orientation" reflects an intended outcome of the "bureaucratization process" (p. 9); second: 'the more seniority the actor holds, the greater his experience and capacity to handle the job would be, and, consequently, the more his influence on his organization and the more likely to be less compliant'. This supports what Hall (1972) has suggested in his concept of 'the ease of replacement', and the 'career's stages' of Schein (1971). The combination of these two different effects may reveal the 'strategic interaction' that those 80 middle managers are likely to be involved with, in order to work and survive within Iraqi organizations with all the conflicting demands and ideologies that are demanded by different people. In fact, the researcher was also able to distinguish both the effects of the "innovation" stage (Schein 1971) and what is called the middle managers "mid-career crises" (Kay 1974b) when those 80 middle managers were divided into three groups according to their seniority or length of service. Managers in the second group who hold '14-19' years of seniority have tended toward non-compliance more than the other two groups, which would suggest the likely influences that they have developed on their organizations in this "innovation" stage of their career. Also they were the highest group to indicate 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, which could reveal that they are also very ready to show complete compliant behaviour in their relationship with top management. This combination of 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and a tendency toward non-compliance in their
behaviour would indicate the 'strategic interaction' that these middle managers would follow by making the favourable adjustment that is required by the situations they encounter in order to serve their own interests to move, as soon as possible, to higher positions. This is supported by the fact that the highest ones among managers in the second group who tended toward non-compliance were those with 'very high' degrees in bureaucratic-feudal orientation. But managers in the third group (over 20 years of seniority) are likely to pass this stage and enter - more than the other two groups - the "mid-career crises" and thus start to suffer from "the boxed-in-feeling" (Kay 1974 a); they were much less oriented in 'very high' degrees toward compliance than the second group and were the lowest among the other two groups who tended toward non-compliance. In other words, they became less interested and less ready to take the risks of showing these extremes of orientation and behaviour, as career mobility was limited for them and their age and the financial and other benefits locked them tightly in the middle management level. For these depressed managers, says Hunt (1982) the "dream" overstates their case, and thus they appeared psychologically to begin to die".

In considering the effect of the second variable in 'work experience' (the 'length of period in managerial level in the present organization'), it was found that it displays similar trends to that of seniority. But, in general, managers who have spent more years in managerial positions in their present organizations were more oriented toward compliance than those with less years. Also they showed both the two extremes of behaviour (i.e. complete compliant behaviour and a wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance) more than managers who spent less years in managerial levels. In fact by dividing the (80) middle managers into three groups according
to their 'length of period in managerial level in their present organizations', the researcher found the same implications about the effect of the "innovation" stage and of 'mid-career crises' that was found previously in middle managers orientation and behaviour.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the field work findings of studying the individuality factors that were assumed to affect the orientation and behaviour of Iraqi middle managers in relation to top managers. On the dominant level of their orientation and behaviour, it was found that, through their sub-cultures and socialization process, the family and school in Iraq participate to a great extent in securing or producing compliance. These institutions build up and reinforce the culturally authoritarian-dominant conceptual structure of relation to authority, with its notion of 'personalization' and traditional respect of authority. In considering middle managers variations in orientation and behaviour, it was found that the individual factors that were studied in this research affected middle managers orientation and behaviour in terms of the general tendency that was found to be associated with each factor, but no single factor alone accounted for the total variability of middle managers' orientation and behaviour. The general tendencies associated with 'age', 'father's occupation', and 'middle manager's level of formal education' were in line with what the literature suggested, as older middle managers, those with fathers in bureaucratic occupations, and those who had had less formal education were more oriented to and behaved with greater compliance. But the general tendency associated with the 'geographical area of living' was not in line with what most writers
have suggested, as Iraqi managers who were socialized in rural areas
were less oriented to and behaved with less compliance than urban
ones. This clearly reflects the peculiarity of Iraqi sub-cultural
differences, and is quite in line with what this research has
suggested about the culture in Iraq. Also it seems that the effect
of inequality in education between fathers and mothers on middle
managers' orientation and behaviour is greater than the effect of the
level of parents' education, which has been suggested by the
literature. This is likely to be, again, because of Iraqi societal
norms and the nature of the educational system. Although it was
found that the tendency to behave compliantly was generally highest
among those who reported having experienced high authoritarian
experiences, 'social desirability' or the 'fear of negative
judgement' dominated the middle managers' responses to childhood
experiences questions. The suggested effect of constant vs.
intermittent use of punishment and reasoning in childhood experiences
on the degree of personal authoritarianism has not appeared in
studying the degree of the middle managers' internalization of their
societal authoritarian norms. 'Seniority' was found to have two
general directions of effects: firstly, the more lengthy the period
of organizational socialization within Iraqi organizational culture,
the more likely the actor would be oriented and ready to behave with
compliance; secondly, the more seniority the actor hold, the greater
his experience and capacity to handle the job, and, consequently, the
greater his influence on his organization and the more likely he is
of being less compliant. Within these two general directions
associated with 'seniority' as well as 'number of years in middle
management positions', the research findings have identified the
effect of the "innovation" stage (Schein 1971) and of 'mid-career
crises' (Kay 1974 a, b).
CHAPTER (9)

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING MIDDLE MANAGERS' BEHAVIOUR TOWARD TOP MANAGEMENT IN IRAQI ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION

In the organizational behaviour research model proposed earlier, it had been argued that middle manager's behaviour towards top management is a function of the characteristics of both the person and the organizational environment. Also one of the basic arguments of this research has been that although individuals belong to one national culture and hold a dominant conceptual structure in common, it is also at this dominant level that they display a degree of variation.

Iraqi middle managers across different organizations in Iraq have shown a dominant pattern of orientation, i.e. 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation', and behaviour, i.e. 'compliant behaviour', in relation to the top managers of their organizations (Chapter 7). Such orientation and behaviour reflect their culturally shared conceptual structure in relation to authority. But at the dominant level, they still also show some variation.

In the previous chapter, the way and extent to which socialization in wider society (mainly family and school) builds and reinforces 'compliance' and the whole conceptual structure in relation to authority was studied and demonstrated. Also middle managers variations of the dominant 'orientation' and 'behaviour' were studied in terms of individual differences, which arise mainly from their past learning experiences in wider society.

Iraqi organizations have a universal or dominant 'bureaucratic-feudal' pattern of culture which partly reflects the culture of wider society, and partly their own settings. But although the basic model of socialization in these organizations aims to produce an organizational person who conforms fully to superiors instructions and to the bureaucratic norms and rules, one also finds wide
variation amongst these organizations above the dominating pattern of culture and socialization.

As individuals' socialization experiences in their wider society vary according to many affecting factors, so would their socialization experiences in work organizations. Hypothesis II in this research puts forward a set of organizational factors which, from the researchers previous work observation and the material found in some relevant studies, are assumed to mediate the middle managers' learning experiences and affect their behaviour toward top management in Iraq:

1) Nature of the relationship between top and middle managers:
   a) top manager's leadership behaviour in relation with middle managers.
   b) the degree of middle manager's participation in decision making.

2) Middle manager's degree of role conflict and ambiguity.

3) Middle manager's degree of job satisfaction.

1. RESEARCH FINDINGS

In this chapter the researcher will demonstrate the research findings obtained from studying middle managers' variations in 'orientation' and 'behaviour' in terms of the 'organizational factors' stated in the second research hypothesis. Through verifying this hypothesis, we will be able to understand the influence of organizational socialization on individuals' learning experiences during their career within Iraqi work organizations.
A - Nature of the Relationship Between Top and Middle Managers

This factor has been studied from the two aspects that are assumed to contribute towards the degree of power-distance between middle and top managers:

1 - Top managers' leadership behaviour in relation to middle managers

Table 36 shows that 66% (53 out of 80) of the middle managers under study reported that top managers in their organizations behaved toward them in a 'supportive' manner, and 34% (27 out of 80) stated that the behaviour of their top managers was more 'autocratic'. This could be an unexpected result for Iraqi organizations, but in fact this result in itself may reflect the nature and reality of top-middle managers relationship in these organizations. This result would have been influenced by the fact that the researcher, before being able to launch the research field work, had to meet the top managers of all the companies under study in order to obtain their approval. Thus many of the middle managers that were interviewed would have realized that their top manager was part of the picture, either because he had formally told them to answer the questionnaire, or by them taking it for granted that I must have gained the approval of the top manager, otherwise I would not have been able to proceed. Even more so, some of these middle managers, on not receiving the formal instruction from their top managers or on judging that the received instructions are not very clear, asked me to return to the top manager for an additional instruction or to clarify the one at hand. Needless to say, I tried to convince all the middle managers under study that no-one would be able to check their answers and no-one would be able to identify them, particularly since I did not ask them to state either their names or their departments. But despite
all that, many of these middle managers, through their cultural distrust and avoidance of risk-taking, may still have avoided stating that their top manager's leadership behaviour in relation to them was autocratic. For them, such a statement would upset the person at the top; it would be likely to be perceived as an insult to his personality, something quite expected in Iraqi culture, where criticizing issues is perceived through expected hostility and personalities are often superimposed on issues. Thus they were not ready to jeopardize (as they thought) their relationship with the person at the top. But rather they may have seen answering the questionnaire as an opportunity to flatter and show their goodwill by stating to others (i.e. the researcher) that he was not 'autocratic', especially after the recent political ideological condemnation of such characteristics. In fact the vast majority (11 out of 14) of middle managers who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation described their top leaders behaviour as 'supportive' (see Table 36). This may suggest that the tendency to give answers in favour of the top manager is likely to be high among those who are highly oriented toward compliance and feel a need to develop influence and good relationships.

Despite such probable influences in answering the questionnaire, Tables 36 and 37 and their analysis show that managers under autocratic leadership are more apt to comply than those managers under supportive leadership. Such an effect is clearly shown on middle managers' behaviour but not on their orientation. This would represent the tendency of middle managers to adjust themselves to the top person's leadership style and behave accordingly. Such an adjustment, especially to the supportive top leader, does not require these middle managers to change their 'shoulds' and 'beliefs in'
(i.e. orientation), particularly if we keep in mind the authoritarian nature of Iraqi organizational culture. Such an environment would make the supportive type of leadership behaviour more a temporary one and a matter of the personal characteristics of a person who happened to be at the top of an organization. The tendency to adjust to the top leader's style could be strong amongst those who are more oriented toward compliance, which may explain why the vast majority, 73% (8 out of 11) of managers held a 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and reported working under a 'supportive' leadership, tended in their wavering behaviour 'not to comply'. These managers may have an influence on their organization and its top management which make them able to afford the 'non-compliance' behaviour. But under 'autocratic' leadership, 67% (2 out of 3) of the managers holding 'very high' levels of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed complete compliant behaviour.

2 - Middle managers participation in decision-making

Since 'participation' can mean any one of a variety of consultation or joint decision making practices, the researcher found that, before studying the effects of participation on middle managers' orientation and behaviour, it was important to let the middle managers draw a profile of the decision-making styles of their organizations. Through such a profile it would be possible to know what the term 'participation' refers to in the minds of these middle managers. Table 38 presents the styles that the 80 middle managers identified as being followed by their organizations. From this Table we can see that while 11% (9 out of 80) reported that the 'goals are the orders issued' and 26% (21 out of 80) stated that the 'goals are set by higher authority', the majority, 59% (47 out of 80) said that 'goals are set after discussing with managers of different
departments the problems at work and any planned action'. Such discussions, as all the middle managers explained in the interviews, are mostly 'individual-to-individual prior consultation' i.e. the top manager tells the middle manager the problem at hand, asks him to provide the necessary information and produce his idea and suggestion on his own, rather than bringing together all the middle managers as a group. Then the top manager makes the decision which often does not reflect the middle manager's contribution. The researcher found during the interviews that 47 middle managers in choosing statement 3 when answering the goal-setting question (No. 30) were only referring to its second phase, which consist of the conception of 'consultation' regardless of its first phase, i.e. 'goal-setting'. In other words they used this statement to refer to the general and traditional practice of 'individual-to-individual prior consultation' in their organizations regardless of where it is applied. In fact this could be a reflection of these middle managers' lack of clarity and administrative knowledge regarding many management concepts, such as goal-setting, policy and decision-making, ...etc. In discussing the three middle managers who stated that 'except in emergencies goals are usually established by group participation', the researcher found that it was no more than their tendency to give what they thought the best and most desirable answer.

In considering the middle managers' replies to question (No.31) related to the 'decision-making' process in their organization, Table 38 shows that the majority (57%, 46 out of 80) stated that 'Policies and important decisions are made at the top level; specific decisions within a prescribed framework are made at the middle level'. That is, 24% (19 out of 80) reported the 'policies and most of the decisions are made by the top level', and 19% (15 out of 80) said
that 'Broad policy and general decisions are made at the top level, many decisions are made at the middle level'. No-one suggested that decision-making is widely carried out at all levels in the organization.

From the profile the the 80 middle managers drew of the 'decision-making' styles of their organization, it is clear that the picture of 'participation' that they have is an 'indirect participation' and mostly that of individual-to-individual prior consultation.

The effect of participation on middle managers behaviour and orientation was studied using three terms; first: the 'formal participation' as reported by middle managers; second: the "psychological participation" (Vroom 1960) which is the extent of influence which middle managers feel they have in making decisions; third: "delegation" (Vroom and Yetton 1973). One notes from Tables 39-44 (Appendix 1) that the majority of middle managers reported 'more participation' in all three terms. Two influences could be behind such a result. One is the tendency to give desirable answers, particularly in favour of top managers, and the other one is the 'ideological endorsement of participation and support for a wide distribution of the capacity for leadership and initiative' - a cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries (Hofstede 1980). Such ideological admission of participation in terms of saying 'we have high degrees of participation' acts, as Hofstede (1980) sees it, as a compensation for what happens on the pragmatic level in high PDI countries (as in the case of Iraq). In these countries he says, people are more emphatic about a need for more employee participation and thus there is a strong ideological push toward models of formal participation, but also more resistance to de facto participation.
In considering the effect of 'participation' in its three aspects on middle managers' orientation and behaviour, Tables 39-44 and their analyses have shown that 'participation' has its effect on behaviour rather than on orientation. Such a result suggests that managers who participate more in decision-making are less likely to behave 'compliantly' in their actions than those who participate less, but they are not necessarily or likely to be less oriented toward compliance in their 'values' and 'norms'. But participation in terms of 'delegation' has somehow affected middle managers bureaucratic-feudal orientation compared with the other two aspects. This could be because with 'delegation' the middle manager has more influence over decisions than he does with any other procedure, particularly when we know that top managers in Iraq, using an 'individual-to-individual' type of consultation or even group consultation, do not usually, when they take decisions, reflect the middle manager's influence. In other words, 'delegation' provides the Iraqi middle manager with clear cut 'authority and influence' which he culturally and organizationally strives for. In fact this does not conflict with saying that individuals in Iraqi organization find it easier and safer to take orders than to make decisions when we understand that the delegation that may be granted to middle managers in Iraqi organization is usually coupled with great limitations. Such limitations, guidelines, direct instructions, and oral approval are provided by top managers in addition to the limitations provided by rules, regulations, and policy statements; all make 'delegation' in Iraqi organizations more a matter of apparent influence and authority than carrying out real responsibility for taking decisions. Such 'delegation' would allow middle managers to enjoy authority or apparent power but not take responsibility for the results.
One can note from Tables 39-44 and their analyses (Appendix 1), the managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation have reported more participation to a greater extent than managers with lower degrees. This result supports previous results (Chapter 7) in that managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation are more ready to admit the ideological endorsement of participation and wide distribution of capacity for leadership which is a cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries. Also the likely influence which was proposed (Chapter 7) that these middle managers (i.e. with very high degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation) may have is evidenced in this chapter by the vast majority of them (13 out of 14 middle managers) reporting having high 'psychological influence' in the decision-making process in their organization (Table 41 and 42). Interestingly, as the form of participation that can be found in Iraqi organizations is that of 'individual-to-individual' consultation, middle managers perceived the 'psychological participation' as the overall influence they have on superiors in making decisions through 'consultation' rather than the influence they have on a jointly made decision.

B - Middle Manager's Degree of Role Conflict and Ambiguity

The assumption that derives from the conceptual consideration concerning this factor is that a high degree of role conflict and ambiguity would result in more compliance. The research findings presented in Tables 45 and 46 and their analyses suggest that the effect of 'role conflict' on middle managers' orientation is not clear, and inconclusive. Also this effect on their behaviour (particularly among managers with 'low' and 'middle' degrees of
bureaucratic-feudal orientation) is in reverse to the above assumption. In fact the above assumption (that more role conflict would result in more compliance) was only clearly supported by the responses of managers holding 'very high' bureaucratic-feudal orientation (see Table 46 and its analysis). The tendency of middle managers to give 'desirable answers' could stand behind this result, but it may also indicate that Iraqi middle managers who are not very oriented toward compliance (i.e. low degrees of B-PO), role conflict will not increase their compliance to superiors' expectations but may decrease it. But among those who are 'very highly' oriented toward compliance ('very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation), role conflict will increase their compliance to superiors.

In respect of role ambiguity, Table 47 presents the middle managers perception of the degree to which their roles are defined. 63% (50 out of 80) said that their roles are defined by job descriptions with or without a statement of objectives, and 24% (19 out of 80) reported no job description but said that they were told the objectives they were expected to achieve. Only 14% (11 out of 80) stated that they do not have a job description and were also not told any job objectives. Knowing that there is not job description or statement of objectives in Iraqi organization (as was demonstrated in Chapter 6), the researcher was concerned to find out why they said they had one. During the interviews it appeared that some of these middle managers were here again trying to give 'desirable answers'. Most of them were referring to the orders of the Division of Labour that their departments obtain, and referring to these as job descriptions; the 'objectives' were originally stated in what they call the 'Internal Enactment' which established their organizations. Interestingly, the majority were not able to say where they kept
these orders and enactments or where they could be found. Some of
them, after searching for a long time, handed to me the Division of
Labour's orders which were issued five years ago, since which time
many changes in their departments' activities and structures have
occurred. So it was obvious that such orders and enactments were to
some degree theoretically there, but in reality they were no more
than ink on paper. Also, those who said that 'they were told the
objectives they are expected to achieve' were referring to the
instructions and directions of top management and even of higher
political authorities concerning their 'day-to-day' work. So it
seems that working according to the instructions of those in
authority is enough for these middle managers to understand what is
expected from them clear, i.e. simply carry on obeying instructions.
So having the Division of Labour's orders and working according to
instructions and orders from higher up could stand behind the results
that the vast majority (84%, 67 out of 80) reported, i.e. low role
ambiguity, while only 16% (13 out of 80) reported high role ambiguity
(Table 48). In considering the effect of role ambiguity on middle
managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour', Tables 48 and 49 and their
analyses suggest that this factor, as with the case with the previous
organizational factors affects behaviour rather than orientation. So,
as the literature suggests, middle managers who are subject to high
role ambiguity are more likely to behave compliantly than those with
low role ambiguity.

C - Middle Managers Degree of Job Satisfaction

Table 50 shows that out of 80 middle managers 9% stated that
they are 'not satisfied', 18% 'only slightly satisfied', 48%
'satisfied' and 18% 'very' and 9% 'extremely' satisfied. In the
process of analyzing the research data, the researcher found that in comparing middle managers' responses to the questions of job satisfaction as a 'series of specific variables' (Questions 53-65) with their responses to overall job satisfaction (Question 66) 14 out of 38 middle managers who reported 'satisfied' in response to overall job satisfaction were really saying this in terms of 'we are barely or just about satisfied' (Table 50). In other words these 14 middle managers were 'satisfied' but their satisfaction was lower than the other 24 middle managers who also said they were satisfied.

Tables 51-53 and their analyses indicate that the relationship between middle managers' job satisfaction and orientation is more clear and conclusive than the previous organizational factors; managers who have 'more job satisfaction' are more oriented toward compliance than managers who have 'less job satisfaction'. In fact this suggests that orientation may affect job satisfaction rather than the reverse; those who are highly oriented toward compliance (i.e. high in bureaucratic-feudal orientation) are more likely to be more satisfied in Iraqi bureaucratic oriented organizations than those who are less oriented toward compliance. The effect of job satisfaction on middle managerial behaviour has appeared in more than one direction; 'non-compliance' behaviour is more likely to be shown by managers who are 'more satisfied' (Table 51). This result may support the previous suggestion in that 'more satisfied' managers, with the likely influence they have on superiors, are more able to afford non-compliance in a political way of behaving. In another direction, extreme compliance (i.e. complete compliant behaviour) is more likely to be shown by managers who are 'very low' and 'very high' in satisfaction than those who are just 'satisfied' (Table 52). This result may suggest that compliance may be used as a strategy
either to keep very high levels of satisfaction or to satisfy some active needs which are still at a very low level of satisfaction. In other words these two groups (i.e. 'very high' and 'very low' in satisfaction) will behave with such extreme compliance in order to serve their aims.

Table 54 provides a picture of the contribution of the 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables in the 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' of the 80 middle managers under study. Such a picture has been obtained by first finding the variables which middle managers in the six groups (Table 50) reported they are 'dissatisfied' with, and those variables which they said they are 'very and extremely satisfied' with. These were then ordered into a hierarchical manner according to their frequency in each group. In fact when we examine Table 54, it is clear that both 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables contribute to middle managers' 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction', but to various degrees. For example among those with 'very low satisfaction' (i.e. dissatisfied; slightly satisfied; and satisfied in terms of being barely satisfied). 'Pay' and 'using skills and abilities' have appeared at the top of the hierarchy of variables with which these middle managers were dissatisfied. This supports Kay (1974a) in saying that 'pay' is the strongest hygiene factor that contributes to middle managers' dissatisfaction.

While 'using skills and abilities' contributed significantly to the satisfaction of those who were more satisfied (i.e. satisfied; very and extremely satisfied) 'pay' continued to be a variable with which these middle managers were also dissatisfied. This suggests that 'pay' has its effect in producing dissatisfaction but has no affect in producing satisfaction. But 'using skills and abilities'
has its affect in producing 'dissatisfaction' and 'satisfaction'. In fact this could be a reflection of the absence of suitable working criteria in Iraqi organizations (as we have seen in Chapter 6) which in many cases means that qualified people end up with very routine and uninteresting jobs with very little responsibility. Thus one can clearly observe the discrepancy between the position one may hold and the kind of work or responsibility that he is assigned. Also 'relationship with superiors' is another 'extrinsic' variable that managers with 'more satisfaction' (i.e. satisfied, very and extremely satisfied) reported being extremely satisfied with. But this variable is near the bottom of the variables that the 'less satisfied' managers (i.e. dissatisfied; slightly satisfied; just or barely satisfied) have reported that they are 'dissatisfied' with. This may support the suggestion of the importance of 'having a good relationship with superiors' in middle managers' satisfaction (Pelz 1952; Kahn et al, 1964), particularly in Iraqi organizations where such satisfaction is highly dependent on those superiors.

2. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Through the analysis of the cross-tabulation of the association between 'organizational-affecting factors' and the orientation and behaviour of Iraqi middle managers, no single factor alone accounted or clearly underlay the total variability of middle managers' orientation and behaviour.

Although the tendency to give 'desirable answers' dominated the middle managers' answering of the questionnaire, it was clear that these organizational factors affect middle managers' 'behaviour' rather than their 'orientation'. Thus only in the sense of the general tendency of the affect of organizational factors on middle
managers' 'behaviour', can we say that the research findings supported the second hypothesis. Finding that 'organizational factors' affect middle managers' behaviour rather than orientation is in line with what Brim (1966) and Schein (1971) assert, in that organizational socialization affects the way individuals adjust themselves and construct their behaviour to meet their role expectations and it is unlikely that they will change in their basic personalities. In fact the affect that we have found on middle managers' behaviour (actions) rather than orientation (values and norms) is even less deep than the level suggested by Schein (1971) in saying that the individual may change drastically in his social selves in the sense of developing "new attitudes and values, new competencies, new images of himself........" (p.412). In fact such a result may reflect the fundamental impact of national culture on organizational socialization, and give support to the cultural argument, i.e. that in any given society social institutions, including organizations through their socialization functions, build up and reinforce collectively shared value-orientation. The impact of such a national culture will make the personal changes and the new values that organizational socialization may try to produce (and which are not in line with cultural custom) more a temporary issue than a continuous and fundamental one (e.g. encouraging non-compliant behaviour through supportive, democratic leadership). Thus as some investigators in organizational socialization (such as Van Maanen, 1976) have asserted, the cultural values of wider society are the "cornerstone" of most organizational socialization efforts. The above results would reveal that to give a realistic judgement about the personal changes that may have occurred during organizational socialization, one must take into account the value-orientations that
individuals have brought to the organizational setting from their socialization in wider society. In other words, one should first assess (as we did in this research) the 'orientations' or the conceptual structure of the individuals before joining work organizations. The lack of such assessment, i.e. of the 'orientations' that actors as socialized adults bring to the organization, may lead to unrealistic judgements on organizational socialization. One such unrealistic judgement is that of Schein (1971) in saying that the 'conformist' employee who is unable to innovate is the result of organizational socialization which "occurs only under conditions of coercive persuasion, i.e. where the individual cannot or does not psychologically feel free to leave the organization" (p.424). In taking the case of Iraq, one cannot make such a judgement as long as individuals before they have joined work organizations are, as a result of their socialization in wider society, already highly predisposed to 'conformity' and oriented to avoiding taking the risk of personal initiative. Thus, Iraqi bureaucratic-oriented organizations, by providing a reaffirmation and reinforcement of such orientations, would be able to gain such conformist employees who are unable to innovate. But, undoubtedly, the conditions of coercive persuasion that are mentioned by Schein (1971) have their influence in increasing the degree of conformity that individuals are ready to provide their organizations with. Also, these conditions have their effects in persuading individuals who join work organizations with less orientation toward conformity to be more conformist. so the above result and its reflected implications would give support to Van Maanen (1976) in arguing that the intensity and depth of the likely personal changes that may occur as a result of organizational socialization is situationally
determined and depends upon both organizational and individual characteristics.

In studying the nature of the relationship between top and middle managers in Iraqi organization, it has been found that managers under autocratic leadership (in terms of top manager's leadership behaviour) are more apt to comply than managers under supportive leadership thus, supporting the literature. In fact finding that supportive leadership holds it influence in Iraqi authoritarian organization reflects the influence of culturally paternalistic attitudes that these organizations have failed to maintain and which constitute part of their employees active needs. These culturally paternalistic attitudes which individuals would like to receive from authority figures have been found by Muna (1980) to influence the image that Arab employees have about a 'good manager'. For them, he says, a good manager is the one who plays the father-role in terms of treating them in a considerate and human manner, being interested and willing to provide good services and facilities, as well as 'care and guidance' for their personal problems, on and off the job. Considering the second aspect of the nature of the relationship between top and middle managers (that of the middle managers' participation in decision-making) research findings support what the literature suggests, i.e. that more participation would lead to less compliance. In fact finding that middle managers who 'participate more' in decision-making are less likely to behave compliantly than managers who 'participate less' would reflect the influence of 'consultation' practice which has deep roots in Arabic culture. In fact 'consultation' has been found more in the Arabian Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates - Al-Jafary and Hollingsworth 1983) than in other Arabic countries (Muna 1980). These Gulf countries have through their socio-historical evolution been more able to sustain the impact of Bedouin culture compared with other countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, where such influences have been weakened by the occupation by many foreign powers and the experience of a different type of historical reality than those of the above Gulf countries.

It has been found that decisions in Iraqi organizations (as is the case in many Arabic organizations - Muna 1980) are either made totally by those at the top of the organization (top managers) or through 'individual-to-individual prior consultation'. In both systems the influence of subordinates, including subordinate managers, is seldom acknowledged. But even if this type of 'consultation' does not acknowledge the influence of the middle manager on the decision taken. And even if the middle manager's opinions and suggestions are not incorporated into the decision, still this 'consultation' would provide him with the feeling of having a sort of psychological influence on the top manager, and of being important. Also this 'consultation' may please and placate him and provide him with a degree of informality and a feeling of equality which may reduce the power-distance between him and the top manager. Thus this type of 'consultation', which these middle managers considered to be 'participation', seems to have the effect of reducing the large power-distance between middle managers and top managers in Iraqi organization, which is in line with what has been suggested by writers such as Strauss (1963), Hofstede (1980), and Kavčič and Tannenbaum (1981). In fact middle managers may have used this 'consultation' as a "face-saving mechanism" (Muna 1980, p.60) which enables them to reply 'yes, we were consulted on....., or, yes,
we do participate in ....' when questioned by the researcher. However, 'delegation' has been found not only to affect middle managers' behaviour but also to have some affect on their orientation. This could be because 'delegation' provides the middle manager with apparent, clear-cut influence of authority, which partly satisfies his strong need for power and influence which stems from his cultural value-orientation and his organizational dilemma of power deficiency. Thus 'delegation' could effectively help in solving middle managers' organizational dilemmas and benefit their growth and reduce their compliance through developing their innovative abilities and initiative. But Iraqi organizations are unlikely to benefit from this style of decision-making in reducing middle managers compliance in relation to top managers. This is due to the fact that those in top management positions are not ready or willing to delegate part of their authority to middle managers and if they do they only delegate non-policy and routine decisions. Also in practice they tend to freeze middle managers' formal delegated authority by conditioning middle manager's ability to take decisions to their approval or agreement. In fact middle managers themselves do not utilize their delegated authority. This is partly because they are culturally not trained to be self-independent in taking decisions, and partly by their tendency to avoid accepting responsibilities, fear of negative judgements, and lack of experience in problem solving and analytical thinking. These and other factors have made middle managers in Iraq more willing to let/decisions be made by others for them. In fact under-utilization of 'delegation' has been recognized by Muna (1980) in many Arabic organizations.
The second organizational factor that is assumed to have an affect on middle managers' behaviour toward top management was 'role conflict and ambiguity'. Research findings have suggested that role conflict affects middle managers' behaviour rather than orientation. High role conflict, particularly among managers holding 'low' and 'middle' degrees of 'Bureaucratic-feudal orientation' tend to decrease their compliance to the expectations of superiors, except among those with 'very high' degrees of 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' who tend to increase this compliance. Such a result may suggest that 'orientation' may somehow condition the affect of role conflict on 'behaviour'. Thus among those who are 'very highly' oriented toward compliance, one can find support for the assumption that more role conflict leads to more compliance to superiors expectations as the literature has suggested. Finding that role conflict may decrease middle managers' compliance to superior's expectations among those who are not highly oriented toward compliance, would reveal many implications. Such responses are conditioned by the judgement of feeling that top managers' expectations from subordinates are not fair and there is a strong human reason and social values behind subordinates' objections to such expectations. Also even with such feelings or judgements, these middle managers - if we accept that in reality they will try to meet their subordinates expectations - would be very careful in their ways of communicating and talking so as not to upset the top manager or show any personal disagreement. On the other hand, middle managers in Iraqi organizations are not heavily exposed to role conflict, as is the case in Western organizations. This is due mainly to low opposition and resistance from subordinates which stems from the cultural deference to authority, avoidance of frankness and open
confrontation, concern for safety and security, and the superiors' reliance on a position of power. Also if conflict situations occur, top managers would use firm tactics to handle the situation rather than persuasion, bargaining, compromise and the like (Muna 1980). Thus Iraqi middle managers have not experienced being subject to real and sustained conflict which would test or stretch their compliance according to different situational requirements. And if they do experience such conflict, it is likely to have a little affect on them, due to their cultural characteristic of 'rigidity'. Rigidity, as Kahn and Boulding (1964) suggest, results in less feelings of tension in the high pressure situation, and an individual is less likely to modify his behaviour in ways which are organizationally desirable. So their reported 'high feeling of role conflict' could be, rather than a reflection of real experience, a tendency to give 'desirable answers', or show a verbal or apparent concern for subordinates.

Role ambiguity, coupled with low tolerance for 'uncertainty', was assumed through what the literature suggested, to increase middle managers' compliance in relation with top managers. It was found (Chapter 8), that the individual's socialization experience in different stages of his life within Iraqi society does not provide him with high tolerance for ambiguity or uncertainty and thus 'authoritarianism' and 'fatalism' provide him with buffering mechanisms within which he can shield himself and escape from uncertainty. Thus individuals' 'low tolerance for uncertainty' reflects itself in their reaction to role ambiguity; managers with greater role ambiguity are more likely to behave compliantly than those with less role ambiguity. In fact this factor also has its effect on middle managers 'behaviour' rather than orientation. So
one cannot say that innovation, autonomy and professional growth will increase in organizations such as those in Iraq when role clarity and definition is low, as Stewart (1970) has suggested. This is so because individuals in Iraqi organizations with their 'low tolerance for ambiguity' and sparse role definition (e.g. no job description or statement of objectives) tend to depend on authority figures' instructions and directions to provide them with a narrow concept in defining their roles. Also lack of role clarity increases their compliance to authority figures (i.e. top managers) as this compliance provides them with a buffering mechanism within which they can escape from the uncertainty generated by the ambiguity in their roles. This result supports Tayeb's (1981) findings in Iranian organizations and the positive relationship that has been found by Marsh (1978) between intolerance of ambiguity and 'field dependence'. Also research findings in role conflict and ambiguity seem to be in line with what House and Rizzo (1972) have suggested in that role ambiguity is a more powerful variable than role conflict for explaining organizational behaviour.

'Job satisfaction' appears to offer support in saying that individual orientations are more likely to condition or affect responses to organizational factors than the other way round. Thus the relationship that was found between job satisfaction and middle managers' bureaucratic-feudal orientation may show that managers who are highly oriented toward compliance are more likely to be 'more satisfied' in Iraqi organizations than those who are less oriented toward compliance. This result is quite in line with the assumption highlighted by Gordon (1970), in that "the greater the congruence between the orientation of the individual and the organization, the greater the satisfaction of the individual" (p.9). On the other
hand, job satisfaction has been found to affect middle managers 'behaviour'. This effect was not consistent in one direction, such as 'high satisfaction would result more compliance', but rather in two directions. **First**: 'non-compliant behaviour' was shown by the 'more satisfied' managers than by the 'less satisfied' ones. This would reflect the view that the more satisfied are those with a greater influence and good relationship with superiors and these are more able to afford non-compliance, which is likely to be apparent and a political way of communicating with both superiors and subordinates. This is particularly true of a high percentage of managers who are 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who have reported very high levels of satisfaction (Tables 51-53 and their analyses). These middle managers have been found (chapter 7), as Pelz (1952) suggests, to have influence on superiors, and they are likely to be viewed by subordinates as effective and successful. Thus, they try through their apparent non-compliance to show their subordinates their (i.e. middle managers) concern about their (i.e. subordinates) expectations. But as has been emphasized before, their attempt to meet subordinates' expectations would not make them stand up or 'go into bat' for their subordinates' rights, rather they would be very careful in handling the issue so as not to upset the top manager or show any personal disagreement or objection. **Second**: 'extreme compliance' was shown not only by those who were 'very high' in satisfaction but also by those who were 'very low' in satisfaction, more so than by managers who were only 'satisfied'. It seems that those who were extremely high and extremely low are in a position to be more concerned about their level of satisfaction; those who are 'very low' (i.e. not satisfied and slightly satisfied) desperately need to satisfy their very unsatisfied active needs,
which depends on those who overrule them (i.e. top managers). Thus they are ready to provide those superiors with complete compliance in hope of their help in satisfying their (i.e. middle managers') active needs. On the other hand those who are 'very high' in satisfaction (i.e. very and extremely satisfied) have reached a state of satisfaction of their active needs which they are not ready to lose. Thus their complete compliance is the price they have to pay for maintaining and as exchange for the very high satisfaction of their needs.

In respect of the contribution of the 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables in the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of middle managers under study, research findings do not support Hertzberg's two-factor theory (1959). This is so because in contrast to this theory, we found, [as Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) have found] that 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' job factors contributed to the 'satisfaction' and dissatisfaction of middle managers but to various degrees.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the fieldwork findings in studying organizational factors that were assumed to affect middle managers behaviour toward top managers in Iraqi organizations. Middle managers responses to these organizational factors were dominated by their desire to give 'desirable answers', particularly in favour of top managers. Despite that, on the level of their variation in 'orientation' and 'behaviour' toward top managers in terms of the general tendency that was found to be associated with each factor, organizational factors affect their 'behaviour' (action) rather than their 'orientation'. This would
support the notion that organizational socialization affects the way individuals adjust themselves and construct their behaviour to meet their role requirements rather than their basic characteristics. Even more, in the case of Iraq, organizational socialization seems not to result in a substantial change in middle managers' orientation (i.e. 'shoulds' and 'beliefs in'). This could give support to the cultural argument that organizations are a part of society and one of its institutions, which through their socialization functions, build up and reinforce the culturally shared value-orientations. So the compliance and over-dependency on superiors that one can observe in Iraqi organizations are not the product of organizational socialization only, but of socialization as a life-long process in which organizations participate too. The general tendencies of middle managers' 'behaviour' associated with 'top manager's leadership behaviour', 'middle managers participation in decision-making', and 'middle managers role ambiguity', were in line with what the literature suggested. So managers who are subject to supportive leadership, who participate more, and who experience low role ambiguity, were less likely to behave compliantly than those with autocratic top leadership, less participation, and subject to high role ambiguity. But the general tendency associated with 'role conflict' was partly not in line with what the literature suggested, as those who reported greater feelings of role-conflict held relatively low degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and indicated less compliant behaviour. But those who reported greater feelings of role-conflict and held very high degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation revealed more compliance. If this has given some support to the idea that 'orientation' is likely to condition the effect of organizational factors on middle managers behaviour, the
general tendency associated with 'job satisfaction' clearly supports such ideas; managers who are highly orientated toward compliance are more likely to be 'more satisfied' in Iraqi organization than those who are less orientated toward compliance. But if non-compliant behaviour was shown by the more satisfied managers, complete compliance was indicated by those who are 'very high' and 'very low' in satisfaction more than by those who are just satisfied. 'Intrinsic' as well as 'extrinsic' variables were found to contribute to both satisfaction and dissatisfaction of middle managers but to various degrees.
INITRODUCTION

Initially this research was conducted in an attempt to gain some significant insights and understanding into middle managers' compliant behaviour in relation to top managers in Iraq. Taking the position of viewing this behaviour as a function of both the organization and the individual (rather than the suggested one-sided picture of the organization alone) introduced this research to a wider and longer term investigation, that of exploring the impact of culture in constructing organizational behaviour, which later became the major contribution of this research. Among the many objectives at which this study was aimed, the investigations have mainly clustered around two objectives:

1 - To explore the impact of 'culture' in wider society and the organizational culture on employees' (viz. middle managers) organizational behaviour in relation to organizations' authority figures (viz. top managers).

2 - To investigate middle managers' compliance in relation to top managers, and the affecting factors and the extent of their effect on this compliance.

To achieve these objectives we have explored in the preceding chapters many topics at different levels of analysis: societal, organizational and individual. It is time now to stand back and critically review the research findings to assess their implications and the contributions of these implications to existing theories.

Inferences and Implications:

As a conclusion to the research findings was presented at the end of each chapter throughout the thesis, thus in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the concern in the following pages will be
with the main dimensional implications of these findings, without stating them again.

Through adopting the approach of "organizations within society" in studying organizational behaviour, particularly in relation to authority in Iraqi organizations, this research adds support to the utility of this approach in the field of organizational behaviour. Within this field, this approach, as Child (1981) states, "lacks a substantial body of supporting research" (p. 336). Also the outcomes of this research have demonstrated the contributions that a socio-historical study of the evolution of society and its institutional development can make toward understanding organizational behaviour. In fact such a study, as in the case of this research, has proved extremely difficult because of the existing scarcity of written sources in the social science on Iraq and Arabic world in general. Moreover, most of what is available (with extremely few examples) in the social sciences and in the history of Arabic and Middle Eastern countries has adopted either a legal-formal or pure historical evolutionary approach, thus maintaining a neutral and favourable, or preaching attitude. Also the few foreign studies about Iraq and Arabic and Middle Eastern societies and history are either purely historical in nature, or view people and society from the outside and through their own cultural concepts. Thus the researcher had to use a wide range of studies from many different fields in an extensive critical investigation of events, development and facts, and carefully weighing the evidence of the validity of the information provided by these studies about the past. Also the interpretation of this evidence and exploring their cumulative meanings and impact in the evolution of society had to be carried out. However, one of the contributions that this socio-historical study of Iraqi society has
made is in showing that the culture of Iraqi society has accumulatively acquired an identity, particularly in relation to authority, quite different than the original identity of its basic components, i.e. 'Bedouin culture' and 'Islam'. Also I have demonstrated how different generations have participated in the distorted development of this original identity through their efforts to find solutions among limited alternatives to their basic life problems under different historical realities. This represents the fact that individuals are not totally moulded by the societal norms and values that they receive from older generations, but rather these social norms are subject to the individual's interpretations and selective adoption through the limited alternatives available to serve their objectives and to cope with their life basic problems. In other words societal norms for any given society are both the "conditioning elements of further action" and the "products of action" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, cited in Child 1981, p. 329). Thus any new generation receives these conditioning elements of actions from older people which become subject to the new generation's interpretation and experiences in coping with their life problems. Accordingly the product of the new generations' actions reinforce, or modify and even alter, some features of the old product. Then the whole product passes to the next generation to be interpreted and experienced once more, but the framework of the whole product continues to be relatively persistent in nature, particularly in traditional societies. Also after looking at the socio-historical study, we gained more understanding of the grounded bases upon which we were able to distinguish and highlight the dominant value-orientations which are historically deeply rooted within the culture of the nation, and more to provide a deeper understanding of their
institutional origins. In addition, reference to the socio-historical institutional development proved of great value in identifying some of the variations in localized sub-cultures within Iraq national culture (such as urban vs. rural sub-cultures).

The culture of Iraqi wider society was found to have a foundational impact in constructing organizational behaviour, which lends great support to the view that 'culture' can shape patterns of organizational behaviour (Evan 1975; Brossard and Maurice 1976; Child 1981; Tayeb 1981; Bate 1982), particularly in power-relationships in bureaucratic-organizations (Crozier 1964; 1973). From studying the dominant value-orientations of Iraqi contemporary society we have distinguished the culturally shared conceptual structure, particularly in relation to authority, that Iraqi individuals would acquire from their socialization process and are likely to hold when they join work organizations. In fact this study has clearly revealed the invalidity of considering many cultural characteristics as typical of Arab societies or typical characteristics of the Arabs only, as they were found in many non-Arabic countries (i.e. Iran; Tayeb 1981), and Western countries (i.e. all PDI countries; Hofstede 1980), but to various degrees. However, individuals in Iraq in their shared conceptual structure are likely to be culturally predisposed and oriented toward submission values, i.e. compliance, dependency, respect for authority figures, and strategic submissive behaviour, when they are 'powerless'. But they are also highly oriented toward 'superiority values', i.e. dominance, command, and haughtiness when they are in positions of power. Thus these research findings challenged the one-sided picture of the impact of formal organizations on individuals personality characteristics, since individuals in Iraq before joining work organizations were found to
be initially oriented toward conformity and dependency, and it is not the bureaucratic structure of their organizations which has produced such characteristics, as Merton (1940) has suggested. But no doubt the bureaucracy has to a great extent reinforced and increased the level of such characteristics. In fact it was found that Iraqi organizations are not Weberian bureaucratic organizations, as had been assumed, but rather under the demand for 'rationality' and 'formality' they are bureaucratic-oriented ones. The nature and characteristics of these organizations clearly contrasts with the notion of a single type of modern bureaucracy governed by universalistic standards, which has dominated a great part of the literature. Iraqi bureaucratic-oriented organizations clearly reflect the impact of the culture of wider society. By referring to the historical institutional development of these organizations within society, it was found that certain special features marked its emergence and development, and deeply crystalized their cultural nature and affected the extent of the existence of Weber's bureaucracy characteristics. Out of its first special feature, that of the duality of identification or the existence in a twilight zone of cultures (i.e. Turks, British, Iraqi national culture with its tradition - modern sub-cultures), organizational culture in Iraq acquired the identity of being a 'bureaucratic-feudal' one (i.e. a mixture of role and power cultures). Such a culture partly reflects the culture of wider society whose feudal system symbolizes its main characteristics, and partly the formal bureaucratic characteristics as were set by the Ottoman and British occupations. The connection between bureaucracy and politics in Iraq has been much closer than in the West, which represents the second feature of Iraqi bureaucracy. This is so because of two factors; first: the administrative body has
been an instrument for political influence and control, especially for nation-building; second: the close connection between economic and political power. The last and the most affecting feature is that modern formal bureaucracy in Iraq did not emerge as a natural phenomenon from within society, but rather was established by the British Colonial power on what was inherited from the Ottoman occupation. Thus its structure and settings were accumulatively constructed through the congruence and clashing between bureaucratic and cultural components. Consequently cultural components appear within the latent function of many apparently dysfunctional activities in both aspects 'formality' and 'informality'. Through the extreme emphasis of bureaucracy on 'formality' many cultural components found a fruitful environment for growth, such as authoritarianism and maintaining a large power-distance, superiority propensity, haughtiness, and rigidity. But those components to which bureaucracy has been so hostile, such as paternalistic familism, personal obligations, emotionality, and dislike of formality has appeared in forms judged to be 'irrational' and negative, such as favouritism, personal consideration, and informal cliques. These findings highly support Crozier's (1964, 1973) thesis of the bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour. This thesis suggests that organizational structure and patterns of action are to a large extent culture-bound, and thus dysfunctional patterns of 'bureaupathology' take forms that are related to the culture where the sick bureaucracy is found. But if in the case of France as he reports as well as in England as Bate (1981) found, culture has "got it wrong" for organizations, in the case of Iraq not only has culture 'got it wrong' for bureaucracy but also bureaucracy has 'got it wrong' for culture, by participating in developing the negative
identity that this culture has acquired. Also it is not culture by itself that has 'got it wrong' for Iraqi organizations but rather the congruence - clashing type of interaction between bureaucratic and cultural components that is wrong for these organizations. So Iraqi bureaucracy, since its establishment, has tried, on its surface, to give a picture that everything is impersonal, while its underlying character reflects the hidden cultural 'personalization'.

In other words, while organizational culture and socialization in Iraq reinforces and validates the individuals' initial cultural orientation that suits the bureaucratic formality and centralization of authority, it rejects and invalidates those cultural orientation that do not suit this formality, such as an obligation toward personal ties and paternalistic familial expectations.

I hope this study will help the organizational designers in Iraq to realize that the human being cannot be something else but only a human being; he cannot be absolutely impersonal as they want him to be, especially when he belongs to a culture and society full of personal ties and loyalties. And thus they need to take into consideration the culture of wider society and the individuals value-orientations and expectations. In fact the problem with those designers is that they have been trying to accommodate or adapt the people's culture to the bureaucratic formal requirements under the notion of 'modernity' and 'rationality', rather than accommodate this bureaucracy to the culture of the people. All the efforts of the OD in Iraq are no more than an idealism, a call for 'rationality' in terms of a conceived Western example and 'ready-packaged' solution, and at the same time a condemnation of irrationality. This idealism has totally ignored the culture and reality of day-to-day life in wider society. In fact organizations in Iraq could benefit, as did
Japanese organizations (Abegglen 1958; McClelland 1969), from their congruence with cultural components of wider society such as the 'paternalistic familism' which is highly favoured by individuals in Iraqi society, but judged by organizational designers to be irrational, thus condemned and fought.

Although this research supported Crozier's (1973) thesis of the bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour, the research findings contrast with his claim of saying that rigidity, a predominance of formality over informality, and a concern for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege are uniquely French traits, as they have also been found in Iraq in this research. Here the research findings (in addition to those of Hofstede 1980; Child 1981; Bate 1982) lend support to the Universal or 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture (Kluckhohn 1964). This research has singled out this thesis on the level of different individuals in one organizational level (i.e. middle managers) across different organizations in one country (Iraq). These middle managers indicated a dominant pattern of orientation (i.e. bureaucratic-feudal orientation) and behaviour (i.e. compliant behaviour) in relation to the authority figures of their organizations (i.e. top managers) but to various degrees. Their dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour show the large power-distance that exists between themselves as middle managers and those in top management positions. Such an orientation and behaviour reflect the shared conceptual structure of relation to authority that they hold in common. At the same time their differing degrees of dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour indicate their variation within the generalized conceptual structure. The quality of their 'compliance' arises out of their cultural underlying
impression of 'personalization of authority and loyalty', thus as the research's first hypothesis described, they comply with the top manager and conform to his expectations as he is a person who possesses higher authority and power, rather than because he is a leader with whom they share organizational leadership and responsibilities. Their compliance is not a simple subservience in response to a stimulus or a reflection of a personality disorder, as suggested by Merton (1940). But rather their 'socialization' and 'powerlessness' both produced their compliance. Those adults have been socialized in a culture whose dominant value-orientations in relation to authority and power are authoritarian relationships that maintain a large power-distance associated with the image or impression of personalized possession of and traditional respect for authority, dependency, and strategic compliance. Such cultural meanings or value-orientations are built up and reinforced by the Iraqi social institutions, mainly the family and school. Also organizations in Iraq, with their dominance 'bureaucratic-feudal' culture, have strongly participated in building up and reinforcing these cultural value-orientations. So the superior-subordinate role-taking situation within Iraqi organizations, where the middle managers play the role of 'subordinate' to the top manager, does not differ in its fundamental construction of 'dominant-submissive' pattern from other customary situations (i.e. child-father, pupil-teacher, ... etc.) which the middle manager has experienced individually. Thus the power-distance that exists between middle and top managers and its authoritarian conceptual structure is actually a culturally derived phenomenon, which support Hofstede (1980) findings. But while Hofstede's findings remain, as Child (1981) states, no more than suggestions, the findings of this research are
grounded on the basis of the research's socio-historical and institutional analysis of the society concerned (i.e. Iraq), which is absent in Hofstede's analysis and judgements. So the top manager or the 'head' symbolically represents all the authority figures that either the middle manager as an individual has experienced them directly as father, teacher ... etc. or indirectly through their influences on the way societal norms of relation to authority have cummulatively constructed. Iraqi middle managers are highly politically-minded in relation to authority figures in their organization, not only because they are powerless, but also because they have a cultural 'superiority propensity' and thus a strong need and willingness to be in position of power. Thus they use their compliance strategically in order to handle the boss, to protect their positions, avoid unpleasant outcomes, and get rewards and serve their personal objectives, but mainly to get at the power resources.

Using the 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture in studying middle managers' organizational behaviour in Iraq, the investigation of this research did not stop at the dominant level but moved to investigate middle managers variations at this dominant level and the 'individuality' and 'organizational' factors that could underlay these variations. It was found that only in the sense of a general tendency that we can say that these factors affect middle managers' degree of compliance, as was assumed in the research's second hypothesis. The 'fear of negative judgement' and the tendency to give 'desirable answers' clearly dominated many middle managers in answering the questionnaire in respect to questions related to their 'family life' or to 'the behaviour of the boss'. Thus in further research great attention should be given to designing and constructing questions inquiring about information on these aspects,
particularly in choosing the words, as these questions can trigger some cultural sensitivities, as may have happened in this research. However the general tendencies of the affects of these factors on middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' suggests that 'individuality factors' affect both 'orientation' and 'behaviour', but the effect of organizational factors is clearer on behaviour rather than on orientation. In fact studying these factors proved to be valuable in understanding the peculiarity of Iraqi subcultural differences and the nature of Iraqi social institutions and socialization, particularly organizational socialization. In considering the individuality factors, it was found that older middle managers, those with fathers in bureaucratic occupations, and those who had less formal education were more oriented and likely to behave compliantly, which supported what the literature had suggested, but with notable exceptions. Factors such as urban vs. rural background, parental level of education, and childhood experiences clearly revealed the nature of Iraqi culture and social institutions, which was suggested in this research. Urban vs. rural subjective cultures or cultural differences in Iraq have contrasted what the literature suggests as managers with rural background have showed less compliance than urban ones. This reflects the peculiarity of Iraqi subcultural differences, as was shown by this research. Also Iraqi societal norms and the nature of the socialization of formal educational institutions have shown their influence, since it was found that the effect of inequality in formal education between fathers and mothers on middle managers orientation and behaviour is greater than the suggested effect of the level of parental education. Concepts related to personal authoritarianism in Western countries, such as the effect of constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and
reasoning in childhood experiences on the degree of such authoritarianism (Harvey et al. 1961), seems not to be the case in Arabic and middle Eastern countries. In these countries, as we have seen, authoritarianism is on the level of societal norms or culture and authoritarian orientations within individuals' characteristics are the result of their socialization within such a culture and not a personality disorder, as measurement such as the F-scale (Adorno et al. 1950) and like may show. So if individuals in Iraqi society are conforming to their general cultural value-orientations, this may open a door for new strategies in cultural changes. In fact no doubt that cultural changes are extremely slow and difficult, but one can work to establish the starting point. The strategies of OD and economical and social development in non-Western countries (such as Iraq) should not necessarily be based on a Western philosophical notion, but rather derived from the tradition of the people and on concepts that are partly already there such as 'Islam'. In fact in the long-run, 'Islamic teachings' could provide a culturally acceptable base which could be employed strategically to change socialization patterns or social value-orientations. If the misinterpretation and misconception of Islamic teachings helped to develop the negative identity of Iraqi culture, then employing the original identity of Islamic teachings in cultural change strategies could help to correct this negative identity. But the chances of doing this are probably pretty slim owing to the fact that employing Islamic teachings is a very delegated operation, and needs a lot of courage and patience in order to accommodate Islamic ideals to the reality of social life. Organizational socialization could provide another approach for the OD efforts in countries such as Iraq if such an approach tried to encourage organizations to meet the employees'
cultural expectations - such as paternalistic familism particularly in authority relationships. In fact Moore (1974), by referring to the Japanese example and to Rice's (1958) achievement in an Indian factory, draws attention to the importance of the congruency for non-Western organization, between organizational environment and setting and the culture and tradition of wider society. He concurs with Whitehall and Takazawa (1968) in saying that "the effectiveness of a particular industrial relations system lies more in the degree of achieved accommodation compatible with the economic and social goals of the society than [does it] conformity with ... industrially advanced nations" (p. 39) (Moore's words in brackets).

The length of organizational socialization reflected by 'seniority' and 'number of years in managerial positions' were found in this research to present what could be called 'directions of inter-influence' between employee and organization comparable to the individual in wider society at large with consideration to the time dimension of 'age'. In other words, in one direction the longer the period of socialization within a specific culture (e.g. Iraqi bureaucratic-feudal organizational culture) the more likely the individual would be oriented and ready to behave as culturally required (e.g. compliant) which present the dimension of the influence of culture and socialization. But in the other direction the more seniority the actor holds, the greater his experience and capacity (e.g. to handle the job in organization), and consequently, the greater his influence on his given group (e.g. organization), and thus the more likely he is to be able to afford not to behave as culturally required (e.g. non-compliant behaviour). This presents the dimension of individual influence.
Studying the 'organizational factors' that assume to affect middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' proved to be very valuable in understanding the nature of Iraqi organizational socialization. It was found that the effect of organizational factors studied in this research is marked in middle management 'behaviour' than in their 'orientation'. This supports Brim (1966) and Schein (1971) who suggest that organizational socialization affects the individual's social selves rather than their basic personalities. Such an effect is likely to be even less marked when the organizational socialization mechanism tries to produce personal changes that are not familiar to the people in the wider society and in work organizations, particularly when such mechanism is accidentally and temporarily employed. In other words, due to the authoritarian nature of culture in wider society and of the organizational subculture in Iraq, democratic or supportive socialization that may be utilized by the individual's formal leaders is an accidental and temporary issue as it is a matter of their personal choice and characteristics thus it would only produce a short adjustment on the level of employees' actions. This type of socialization needs a continual reaffirmation and more strategic activities in order to produce the personal changes that are not in line with what people have been accustomed to. However, finding that 'supportive leadership' and 'participation in decision-making' (in terms of individual - to individual consultation) hold their effect in reducing compliant behaviour in Iraqi organizations could reflect a cultural meaning that individuals may attribute to such socialization. A supportive leader could provide them with the image of a 'good father' who treats them in a considerate and human manner thereby satisfying some of their culturally paternalistic familism
expectations about authority figures. In fact this would support the research's previous argument that organizations in Iraq could benefit from accommodating themselves to the cultural paternalistic familism expectations of the employees. Such accommodation could make organizational socializational influence more effective in producing the required personal changes. Also 'participation' in terms of consultation in decision-making could provide employees with the traditional 'consultation' of wider society and with informality, and with a feeling of having influence and importance thereby reducing the degree of psychological power-distance that exists between them and their superiors. 'Delegation' could be highly effective in resolving middle managers problems in Iraqi organizations as it provides them with clear-cut authority and influence which they culturally and organizationally strive for and develops their initiative.

Research findings suggests that in studying the effects of 'role conflict and ambiguity' as well as 'job satisfaction' on middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour', such effects were not only apparent more on behaviour than on orientation, but more 'orientation' ('shoulds and 'beliefs in') seems, to one degree or another, to condition the affect of these organizational factors on behaviour. In fact the research findings on these factors reflected cultural influences. The assumption of the literature, that more role conflict leads to more compliance with the expectations of superiors, is only supported amongst those who are 'very highly' oriented towards compliance. The reported feeling of role conflict and the consequence of its association with any pattern of organizational behaviour (e.g. compliance), within Iraqi organizations, cannot represent reality because of the low cultural
exposure to role conflict. This low experience of role conflict comes about mainly because of the low opposition and resistance by subordinates as a reflection of their value-orientation of deference to authority, avoidance of frankness and open confrontation, and concern for safety and security. Also because of the top managers’ firm tactics in handling conflict situations which stem from their reliance on a position of power.

In contrast to the universalistic assumption of some writers as Stewart (1970) who suggest that low role-definition would lead to autonomy and innovation, it was found that a high feeling of role-ambiguity has the effect of increasing middle managers’ compliance behaviour. So it seems that such a suggested effect is conditioned by the degree of 'tolerance for uncertainty' that individuals have been provided with during their socialization experience. The culturally low tolerance for ambiguity that Iraqi middle managers have, coupled with high role ambiguity, led them to comply more with authority figures in their organizations (i.e. top managers) because such compliance provides them with a buffering mechanism with which they can escape from 'uncertainty' in their roles.

As Gordon (1970) highlighted and in line with Pelz (1952) findings, it was found that those Iraqi middle managers who are highly oriented toward compliance, and thus very likely to have influence on, and good relationship with superiors, are highly satisfied. In this respect therefore, it seems that 'orientation' maintains its effect on 'job satisfaction' rather than the other way round. However, on the level of 'behaviour', both those who are 'very high' and those 'very low' in satisfaction are more ready than others to provide superiors with extreme compliance, because both groups are in a position to be very concerned about their
satisfaction. Whilst the first group are not ready to lose the very high degree of satisfaction, the second one are desperate to satisfy their very unsatisfied active needs, which in both cases is dependant on those at the top.

As Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) found in studying middle managers satisfaction in India, research findings did not support Herzberg's two-factor theory (1959), as both 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' job variables contributed to the 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' of middle managers but to varying degrees. This supported Hofstede's (1981) argument against the 'universal order of needs' that characterize most motivational theories. It is likely that the degree that 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' factors contribute in producing 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' depends highly on the individual's culturally active needs and on the degree to which the relevant environment has been able to provide a satisfaction to such needs.

This research in its broader contribution is an example against all the universalistic models of assuming that organization behaviour is only the product of formal standardized organizations. Organizational behaviour is a function of both the individual and the organization.

LIMITATIONS

Initially, the researcher was faced with a basic problem, that of the lack of previous studies dealing with many aspects of the phenomenon under study. Despite the presumed importance of addressing the problems associated with middle management, there are few articles written on the subject and remarks appeared in some books and mainly through following a normative analysis. Moreover,
despite the great need for employing the "organizations within society" approach in studying organizational behaviour, one is faced with the problem of little supportive studies. The researcher experienced great difficulty in studying the impact of culture on management and organizational behaviour in Iraq, owing not only to the scarcity of studies on management and organization, but also on the culture of the Iraqi society as a whole, including its sociological, psychological, political and economical aspects. Such scarcity of studies on culture and society in Iraq made it necessary to draw, in many cases, on available studies about the Arab world in general. This, however presents other problems as Arabic societies, despite all their basic similarities in their dominant patterns of culture, still hold many variations which stem from differing historical, ecological, political and economical realities. Thus there is a need for cultural studies across Arabic countries to assess their variations and their impact on organizational behaviour. For this purpose this research could provide a basis for comparative cultural studies as well as for the growing interest of what has been called 'Arabic bureaucracy'.

Another limitation of this study concerns the methods of fieldwork study. Due to the sensitivity of subject-matter of this research requiring the respondents' co-operation, added to the difficult conditions of fieldwork study in developing countries, the research population was limited only to the 'Ministry of Trade'. So this may not represent all organizations in Iraq and their variations. Consequently, there is a need for studies to compare different organizations with different functions, age, and sizes to assess their variations within the dominated pattern of Iraqi organizational culture that has been suggested by this research. On
the other hand, owing to the limited availability of research resources, time and access to organizations, the verification of research hypotheses relied mainly on information collected by questionnaires with the aid of personal interviews. Although questionnaires and open discussions may provide enlightening details and insights, generally they cannot satisfactorily take the place of close observation of the way individuals behave in organizational settings. No doubt this investigation has benefited from the researcher's previous work observations and those of the fieldwork study, but still they cannot provide as much as a close 'participant observation' can do in understanding the complexity of organizational behaviour. Individuals are constantly redefining their relationships with each other and thus, the observation of their past behaviour or a small part of the present one cannot illustrate present organizational realities as a whole.

Finally, the reliance on what the numbers suggested in studying middle managers variations on the dominant level of 'orientation' and 'behaviour' may present another limitation of this study because we were able to work and assess the direction of these variations on this suggestive level only. Thus more studies are needed of 'variations within societies' and their effects on individual's behavioural variations within work organizations. These studies could benefit from an appropriate combination of different methods to assess such variations.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1

TABLES AND GROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS

NB: in the heading to each table

(A) Means that the percentages are calculated by comparing categories;

(B) Means that the percentages are calculated by comparing the total numbers within each category.
Table 1
"Pearson correlation" for scale No. 1 (bureaucratic orientation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>PAGE 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPU TIME REQUIRED</td>
<td>0.58 SECONDS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```plaintext
25 *COMPUTE SCALE1 = VAR001 + VAR002 + VAR003 + VAR004 + VAR005
26 PEARSON CORR SCALE1 WITH VAR001 TO VAR005

***** PEARSON CORR PROBLEM REQUIRES 240 BYTES WORKSPACE *****
```

<table>
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<table>
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<th>SCALE1</th>
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<th>0.5870</th>
<th>0.4326</th>
<th>0.6443</th>
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<tr>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
<td>p=0.000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / SIGNIFICANCE) (A VALUE OF .99.0000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
Table 2
"Pearson correlation" for scale No. 2 (feudal orientation)

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</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TRANSPACF REQUIRED: 100 BYTES**
1 TRANSFORMATIONS
0 RECODE VALUES + LAG VARIABLES
6 IF/COMPUTE OPERATIONS

**CPU TIME REQUIRED: 0.15 SECONDS**

27 *COMPUTE SCALE2 = VAR006 + VAR007 + VAR008 + VAR009 + VAR010
28 PEARSON CORR SCALE2 WITH VAR006 TO VAR01U

***** PEARSON CORR PROBLEM REQUIRES 240 BYTES WORKSPACE *****

<table>
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**FILE: DMNA80** (CREATION DATE = 01/07/81)

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<th>VARU09</th>
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<tr>
<td>SCALE2</td>
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<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
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(COEFFICIENT / (CASES) / SIGNIFICANCE) (A VALUE OF 99.0000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
Table 3

The distribution of 80 middle managers on the bureaucratic orientation scale

<table>
<thead>
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<th>LOW and Less</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>VERY HIGH</th>
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<td></td>
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</table>

*25 = Respondent No. 25
Table 4

The distribution of 80 middle managers
on the feudal orientation scale

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<th>5 - 25</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>LOW</td>
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<td>10 and Less</td>
<td>11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
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* 11 = Respondent No. 11
The distribution of the five items of the feudal orientation scale

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<th>Item No</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Very Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>32</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

N = 80.
### Table 6

The total distribution of the 80 middle managers on the bureaucratic-feudal scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low 20 and less</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low 20 and less</td>
<td>21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30</td>
<td>31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40</td>
<td>41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 27 54 19 5</td>
<td>34 29 28 11 4 35 7 10 1 6</td>
<td>20 23 43 13 9 16 32 74</td>
<td>26 31 50 22 46 41</td>
<td>52 42 67 49 56 58</td>
</tr>
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<td>25 24 75</td>
<td>72 18 45 39 14 2 12</td>
<td>55 44 78 62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
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<td>59 47 69 73</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>80 71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 17</td>
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</table>

N = 80

* = Respondent No. 27
Table 7
Middle managers responses to the first imaginary situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE A</th>
<th>PHASE B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can his superiors expect that civil servant to carry out their policy</td>
<td>He should carry out the policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 80


Table 8

The responses of the 36 middle managers who said that the civil servant should refuse to carry out the superiors policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Group</th>
<th>Second Group</th>
<th>Third Group</th>
<th>Fourth Group</th>
<th>Fifth Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with superiors the issue and if they refuse to listen:</td>
<td>Go to the highest level of authority</td>
<td>Find another job</td>
<td>Report to the newspapers</td>
<td>Every possible way to convince superiors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carry out</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiors'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
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<tr>
<td>N = 80</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 9
Middle managers responses to the second imaginary situation

<table>
<thead>
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<th>PHASE A</th>
<th>PHASE B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simply inform workers to stay and work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact top management and ask about the need to stay</td>
<td>Discuss the issue with your workers and then contact those in top management and argue with them about relieving workers from working extra hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow workers to leave</td>
<td>Ask workers to stay and work extra hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
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<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 80
Table 10

Middle managers' responses on the two imaginary situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First imaginary situation</th>
<th>Second imaginary situation</th>
<th>Code numbers of M.M. questionnaires</th>
<th>Reasearch categories of behavi­oral traits</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 'A'</td>
<td>Phase 'B'</td>
<td>Phase 'A'</td>
<td>Phase 'B'</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Carry out policy</td>
<td>First type of decision (i.e. simply inform workers to stay.)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Carry out policy</td>
<td>Second type of decision (i.e. contact top management and inquire about the need to stay...)</td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Carry out policy</td>
<td>Second type of decision (i.e. contact top management and inquire about the need to stay...)</td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Carry out policy</td>
<td>Third type of decision (i.e. discuss the issue with subordinates &amp; consequently contact those in top management &amp; argue with them...)</td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Refuse to carry out policy</td>
<td>First type of decision (i.e. simply inform workers to stay...)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Respondent No. 18
### Table 10 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle managers answers on:</th>
<th>Code numbers of M.M. questionnaires</th>
<th>Research categories of behavioural traits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First imaginary situation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Second imaginary situation</strong></td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 'A'</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase 'B'</strong></td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Refuse to carry out policy</td>
<td>19 27 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Second type of decision (i.e. contact top management and inquire about the need to stay...)</td>
<td>14 39 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>70 71 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 63 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Refuse to carry out policy</td>
<td>22 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Second type of decision (i.e. contact top management and inquire about the need to stay...)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wavering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Toward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Refuse to carry out policy</td>
<td>24 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Third type of decision (i.e. discuss the issue with subordinates &amp; consequently contact those in top management &amp; argue with them...)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Refuse to carry out policy</td>
<td>23 6 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Third type of decision (i.e. discuss the issue with subordinates &amp; consequently contact those in top management &amp; argue with them...)</td>
<td>16 38 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask workers to stay &amp; work</td>
<td>56 78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11

Bureaucratic-feudal Orientation by
Compliant Behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of Bureaucratic and Feudal Orientation</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 80
Table 12

Age categories of middle managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 - 38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 - 44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 -</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by Age (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Categories</th>
<th>Younger Group Under 45 years old</th>
<th>Older Group Over 45 years old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic-Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by Age (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Categories</th>
<th>Younger Group 'Under 45 years old'</th>
<th>Old Group 'Over 45 years old'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 13 and 14

By comparing those who are younger (i.e. under 45 years old) with the older ones (i.e. over 45 years old) as presented in Table 13, we can examine the effect of age on the middle managers' variations in the bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour. If we focus on the association of age and the degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, we can observe that 'low degrees' are indicated more by younger middle managers than by older ones:

- While none of those over 45 years old display a 'low' degree, 12% (8 out of 65) of younger managers indicate a 'low' degree in bureaucratic-feudal orientation.

- The percentage of younger middle managers with 'middle' degrees (26% '17 out of 65') is higher than the older ones of the same degree (19% '3 out of 15').

- A reverse result to the above appears when we deal with the 'high' degree in bureaucratic-feudal orientation, for while 60% (9 out of 15) of the older ones show such a degree, the percentage among the younger ones is 45% (29 out of 65). Although the older and younger managers have indicated 'very high' degrees in somewhat close percentages (17% '11 out of 65' of the younger, and 21% '3 out of 15' of the older), obviously the percentage in the older group is higher than in the group of younger managers.

Up until this point we could say that younger middle managers are more likely to have 'low degrees' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation. But while it is not very likely for the older manager to have a 'low degree', it is likely for the younger one to have 'very high' degree.
By examining the relation of age to the levels of 'compliant behaviour' (Table 13) as well as its affect on the relationship between orientation and behaviour (Table 14), it can be noticed that compliance is displayed more by older than younger managers:

- While 33% (5 out of 15) of older managers revealed complete compliance behaviour, only 14% (9 out of 65) of the younger indicated such behaviour. Also, this type of behaviour has clustered in similar percentages (Table 14) among the three groups with 'middle', 'high' and 'very high' in both categories. But the percentages of the older three groups (33%; 33%; 33%) are higher than the younger ones (18%; 14%; 17%). While the older three groups show no variation in this behaviour, there is some variation between the younger three groups.

- If complete compliant behaviour has appeared among older managers more than among the younger ones, wavering behaviour either tending towards compliance or non-compliance is more apparent among those who are younger (51% '3 out of 65'; 35% '23 out of 65' among the younger ones, compared with 40% '6 out of 15'; 27% '4 out of 15' among the older ones).

- Table 14 shows that in both categories, the majority of groups rating 'middle' and 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance. But while 23% (4 out of 17) of the 'middle' and 29% (8 out of 29) of the 'high' degrees of the younger managers' category tended more to non-compliance, none of the 'middle' and 22% (2 out of 9) of 'high' groups in the older managers showed such a tendency.

- The majority of older as well as younger groups with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, have shown wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance (67% '2 out of
3'; 64% '7 out of 11') but while none of the older group displayed 'wavering behaviour' tending to comply, 18% of the younger group did.
Table 15
middle managers' geographical areas of living up to age 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical area of living up to age 20</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces + Baghdad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countryside rural areas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total of Urban vs. rural managers</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by geographical area of living (urban vs. rural) up to age 20 (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Area of Living Up to Age '20'</th>
<th>Urban Areas (Baghdad and Provincial Capitals and Cities)</th>
<th>Rural Areas (Countryside: Villages and small towns)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels Feudal Orientation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by geographical areas of living (urban vs. rural) up to Age 20 (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Area of living up to Age '20'</th>
<th>Urban Areas (Baghdad and Provincial Capitals and Cities)</th>
<th>Rural Areas (Countryside : Small Towns and Villages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 16 and 17

Table 16 provides us with a comparison between those managers who have an urban background and those with a rural one. This comparison reveals that managers with a rural background seem more likely to hold 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation than those with urban backgrounds:-

- 'Low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared among managers with a rural background in much higher percentages (20% '3 out of 15') than the urban group (8% '5 out of 65'). In fact, the researcher has found that those urbanites who scored 'low' are originally not from Baghdad where urbanization or the industrialization movement has centralized, but, rather, they have moved with their families at some time between their 10s and 20s to this city.

- Urban managers displayed 'middle' and 'high' degrees in higher percentages (26% and 49% - 17 and 32 out of 65 respectively) than those displayed by rural managers (20% and 40% - 3 and 6 out of 15 respectively). But a 'very high' degree was scored in a lower percentage (17% '11 out of 65') than by managers with a rural background (20% '3 out of 15').

When we examine the association of the geographical factor with the levels of compliant behaviour, as well as its affect on the relationship between middle managers' orientation and behaviour (Table 17), we can notice (Table 16) that the tendency toward compliance among urban managers is higher than some rural managers:-

- While none of those with a rural background revealed 'complete compliant behaviour' (Table 16), 22% (14 out of 65) of those with an urban background did. Also, while the majority of the urban managers (55% '36 out of 65') showed wavering behaviour
tending toward compliance, the vast majority (80% '12 out of 15') of those with rural backgrounds tended in their wavering behaviour not to comply.

- As Table 17 shows, while 80% (4 out of 5) of the urban 'low' group tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, and 20% (1 out of 5) not toward compliance, 100% (3 out of 3) of the rural 'low' group tended more to non-compliance.

- While complete compliant behaviour was clustered in somewhat close percentages (23%; 22%; 27%) by the three urban groups who rated 'middle', 'high' and 'very high', such behaviour did not appear in the rural category.

- The majority of the urban managers with 'middle' (71% '12 out of 17') and 'high' degrees (56% '18 out of 32') displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance. But a reverse result was shown by rural managers - the majority of these two groups displayed a greater tendency not to comply (67% '2 out of 3'; 67% '4 out of 6').

- Although the majority (55% '6 out of 11') of the urban managers with 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation revealed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance, this type of behaviour was shown by all of the rural managers with 'very high' degree (100% '3 out of 3').
Table 18
Middle managers' fathers' occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' occupations</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrepreneurial occupations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Professional</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucratic occupations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                        | 80  | 100%|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by fathers' occupations (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' Occupation</th>
<th>Entrepreneurial (Landlord, merchant, craftsman farmer, independent professional)</th>
<th>Bureaucratic (Civil servant, army officer and factory worker)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels of Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No. 8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 20

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by fathers' occupations (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' Occupation</th>
<th>Entrepreneurial 'Landlord, merchant, craftsman, farmer, and independent professional'</th>
<th>Bureaucratic 'Civil servant, Army officer and factory worker'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 19 and 20

Examination of Table 19 does show that managers who originated from entrepreneurial backgrounds in terms of their fathers' occupations are more likely to have a 'low' tendency toward compliance than those with bureaucratic occupations:

- While no-one among the managers with bureaucratic parental occupations displayed a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, 17% (8 out of 48) of the entrepreneurial category did.

- The percentages of the 'middle' and 'high' degrees among managers recruited from bureaucratic backgrounds are much higher (31% and 63% '10 and 20 out of 32' respectively) than those managers with entrepreneurial fathers (21% and 37% '10 and 18 out of 48' respectively).

- Managers with bureaucratic parental occupations scored a 'very high' degree in much lower percentages (6% '2 out of 32') than managers with entrepreneurial fathers (25% '12 out of 48').

When consideration is focused on the association of the types of parental occupation with the levels of compliant behaviour and on their affect on the relationship between orientation and behaviour of middle managers, it can be said that managers with entrepreneurial fathers seem to be more likely to behave with less compliance than those with bureaucratic fathers:

- As Table 19 shows, complete compliant behaviour appeared among managers whose fathers held bureaucratic occupations to a greater percentage (22% '7 out of 32') than that of managers with entrepreneurial fathers (14% '7 out of 48').

- Within wavering behaviour, 53% (17 out of 32) of managers with bureaucratic parental occupations tended to comply, compared
with 46% (22 out of 48) among those whose fathers' occupations were entrepreneurial. Also the percentage of those who tended 'not to comply' in the entrepreneurial category is higher (40% '19 out of 48') than managers in the bureaucratic category (25% '8 out of 32').

Table 20 shows that 50% of the 8 middle managers who rated 'low' and whose fathers held entrepreneurial occupations tended in their wavering behaviour more to comply, and the other 50% not to.

Complete compliant behaviour was displayed in various percentages (20% '2 out of 10'; 11% '2 out of 18'; 25% '3 out of 12') by the three groups of managers who rated 'middle', 'high', and 'very high', and whose fathers held entrepreneurial occupations. Such behaviour appeared in closer percentages among those with 'middle' (20% '2 out of 10') and 'high' (25% '5 out of 20') in the bureaucratic category.

The majority of those who rated 'middle' and 'high' in both categories have shown wavering behaviour tending toward compliance (50%; 61% among entrepreneurial groups, and 70%; 50% among bureaucratic groups). But wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance was displayed by 30% (3 out of 10) of those holding 'middle' and 28% (5 out of 18) of those holding 'high' and are in the first category, compared to 10% (1 out of 10) of 'middle' group and 25% (5 out of 20) of the 'high' group in the second category.

Although the majority (58% '7 out of 12') of managers with 'very high' degrees and whose father's occupations were entrepreneurial have tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance, this tendency is revealed by the two middle
managers (100% '2 out of 2') who rated 'very high' but their fathers held bureaucratic occupations.
Table 21

Levels of formal education of middle managers' mothers and fathers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of formal education</th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading and writing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. B.Sc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 22
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant
behaviour by parents' levels of formal education and the
inequality between fathers' and mothers' education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of parents' formal education</th>
<th>Parents with closer</th>
<th>Levels of education</th>
<th>Parents with different levels of education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uneducated or very poorly educated parents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fathers with some education Mothers uneducated or very poorly educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | %   | 13%  | 24%  | 47%  | 16%  | 100%   | 33%  | 45%  | 22%  | 100%   | 13%  | 27% | 47% | 13%  | 100%   | 18%  | 55%  | 27%  | 100%   |
Table 23

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 'inequality' between fathers' and mothers' levels of education (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of Inequality in education between fathers' &amp; mothers'</th>
<th>Parents with closer levels of education</th>
<th>Parents with different levels of education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 24
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 'inequality' between fathers' and mothers' levels of education (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of inequality in education between fathers' and mothers'</th>
<th>Parents with closer levels of formal education</th>
<th>Parents with different levels of formal education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels Feudal Orientation Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 23 and 24

By examining Table 23, it can be seen that managers whose parents had closer levels of education tended to be less compliant than those whose parents had different levels of education:

- While 'low' and 'middle' degrees appeared higher (11%; 26% '6 and 14 out of 54') among managers whose parents possessed closer levels of education than among managers whose parents had different levels of education (8%; 23% '2 and 6 out of 26'), 'high' and 'very high' degrees appeared among the former group in lesser percentages (46%; 17%) than among the latter group (50%; 19%).

- Complete compliance behaviour appeared among managers with parents holding different levels of education in higher percentages (23% '6 out of 26') than among those whose parents have closer levels of education (15%, '8 out of 54').

- While managers in the first category (i.e., parents with closer levels of education) tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance to a slightly less degree (48% '26 out of 54') than managers in the second category, they tended toward non-compliance in higher percentages (37% '20 out of 54') than managers whose parents have different levels of education.

Table 24 shows how the inequality between fathers and mothers in formal education affects the relationship between middle managers' orientation and behaviour. One can note that:

- 67% (4 out of 6) of managers who rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation and belong to the group with parents who held closer levels of formal education, tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance, and 33% (2 out of 6) tended toward compliance. But with respect to the two middle managers
who rated 'low' and were in the second group (i.e., parents with different levels of education), both (100%) tended towards compliance.

- Although complete compliant behaviour was indicated by those with 'middle' degrees and with parents holding closer levels of education slightly more (21% '3 out of 14') than those managers holding the same degree but in the second category, 29 (4 out of 14) of the first category tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance, in comparison with none in the second category. The vast majority of those in the second category (83% '5 out of 6') tended more toward compliance compared with 50% (7 out of 14) in the first one.

- Among managers in the second category (i.e., parents with different levels of education), the group with 'high' degrees showed complete compliant behaviour to a much higher percentage (31% '4 out of 13') than that shown by the similar group in the first category (12% '3 out of 25'). But while wavering behaviour tending toward compliance appeared in a higher percentage (64% '16 out of 25') among those whose parents held closer levels of education than those in the second category (38% '5 out of 13'), 31% (4 out of 13) of those in the second category compared with 24% of managers in the first category tended toward non-compliance.

- Although the 'very high' group in the second category (i.e., parents with different levels of formal education) displayed slightly less (20% '1 out of 5') complete compliant behaviour compared with 22% (2 out of 9), they tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance to a higher percentage (20% '1 out of 5') and toward non-compliance to a lesser degree (60%) than those of the first category (11%; 67% '1 and 6 out of 9').
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of punishment and reasoning</th>
<th>Intermittent use of punishment without reasoning</th>
<th>Intermittent use of punishment with reasoning</th>
<th>Constant use of punishment without reasoning</th>
<th>Constant use of punishment with reasoning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 26

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of authoritarianism in childhood experiences (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of authoritarianism in childhood experiences</th>
<th>Less authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values</th>
<th>More authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Authoritarian</td>
<td>More Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>father-child relationship and familial values</td>
<td>father-child relationship and familial values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. | %   | No. | %   | No. | %   | No. | %   | No. | %   |
-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
1    | 9%  | 3   | 27% | 6   | 55% | 1   | 100%| 7   | 10% |

100% |
Table 27

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of authoritarianism in childhood experiences (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of authoritarianism in childhood experiences</th>
<th>Less authoritarian father-child relationship &amp; familial values</th>
<th>More authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tending toward compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 26 and 27

By examining the association of middle managers' variation in childhood experiences and their orientation and behaviour as presented in Table 26, it seems that the tendency to behave compliantly among those who reported having high authoritarian childhood experiences is more than among those with less authoritarian experiences. Such a tendency appears when we examine middle managers' 'behaviour' more than 'orientation':

- 'Low' and 'middle' degrees appeared among both categories in close percentages; 9% and 27% (1 and 3 out of 11) among those with less authoritarian experience, compared with 10% and 25% (7 and 17 out of 69) among managers with more authoritarian childhoods.

- Managers with less authoritarian childhood experiences rated 'high' degrees in somewhat higher percentages (55% '6 out of 11') than managers with more authoritarian experiences (46% '32 out of 69').

- The 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated by managers were reported more authoritarian childhood experiences in much higher percentages (19% '13 out of 69') than by those with less authoritarian experiences (9% '1 out of 11').

- 19% (13 out of 69) of managers with more authoritarian father-child relationships and familial values and practices showed complete compliant behaviour compared with 9% (1 out of 11) of managers with less authoritarian experiences. Also the vast majority (73% '8 out of 11') of those with this latter experience tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance and only 18% tended more to comply. But the majority of managers with the above former experience (54% '37 out of
tended more to comply and 28% (19 out of 69) tended more toward non-compliance.

By examining the affect of childhood experiences of those 80 middle managers on the relationship between their orientation and behaviour as presented in Table 27, the researcher also found that the results are inconclusive. This could mean that childhood experiences do not condition or affect the relationship between orientation and behaviour, but it could also reflect the distorted information provided by those middle managers related to part of their personal life.
Table 28

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation
and levels of compliant behaviour by the level of
formal education (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Managers' Levels of formal education</th>
<th>Less - educated Middle Managers</th>
<th>More - educated Middle Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 29
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by the level of formal education (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Managers' levels of formal education</th>
<th>less-educated Middle Managers</th>
<th>More-educated Middle Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tending toward compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 28 and 29

By examining Table 28, one can suggest that the less-educated middle managers are likely to hold a higher tendency toward compliance than more-educated managers:

- While not one of the less-educated managers scored 'low' in the degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, 13% (8 out of 63) of the more educated ones did.

- While the 'middle' degree appeared among the more-educated managers in higher percentages (27% '17 out of 63') than among the less-educated ones (18% '3 out of 17'), the 'very high' degree was scored by those with less formal education in much higher percentages (35% '6 out of 17') than by managers with more-education (13% '8 out of 63'). 'High' degrees appeared in both groups in the same percentages, i.e. 47%.

- Complete compliant behaviour was shown by the less-educated managers in much higher percentages (30% '5 out of 17') than by the more-educated ones (14% '9 out of 63'). In fact, not one of the 5 middle managers who held postgraduate degrees revealed this type of behaviour.

- Although the more-educated managers tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance in higher percentages (53% '33 out of 63') than those with less-education (35% '6 out of 17') they tended toward non-compliance in similar percentages - 33% - compared with those of the less-educated ones - 35%.

In fact, such a suggestion - that less-educated managers are more likely to hold higher tendencies toward compliance - can also be found when one examines the affect of the managers' level of formal education on the relationship between their orientation and behaviour (Table 29).
Complete compliant behaviour was clustered in higher percentages among the less-educated managers by the three groups who rated 'middle' (33% '1 out of 3'); 'high' (25% '2 out of 8'); and 'very high' (33% '2 out of 6') than among the more-educated ones (18% '3 out of 17'; 17% '5 out of 30'; 12% '1 out of 8').

Although the majority of the groups who rated 'middle' in both categories tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, the percentage of the less-educated ones was higher (67% '2 out of 3') than the more-educated managers (59% '10 out of 17'). Also not one of those in the less-educated category tended toward non-compliance, 23% (4 out of 8) of those in the more-educated category did.

The less-educated 'high' degree group tended toward compliance and non-compliance in very similar percentages (38%; 37%). But the majority of the more-educated 'high' degree group tended toward compliance (59% '10 out of 17') and 23% (4 out of 17) tended not to comply. Such results maybe because the less-educated middle managers, particularly those with a high degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, are more likely to demonstrate verbal non-conforming behaviour or an 'ideological support for a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative', especially when such an ideology is emphasized by the political authority.

In both categories, the majority of 'very high' degree groups tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, but the percentages of the more-educated group was higher (63% '5 out of 8') than the less educated group (50% '3 out of 6').
Table 30
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by seniority (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seniority</th>
<th>Less seniority &quot;8 - 13 years&quot;</th>
<th>More seniority &quot;14 and over&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 31

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by seniority (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seniority</th>
<th>Less seniority &quot;8 - 13 years&quot;</th>
<th>More seniority &quot;14 and over&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levels</td>
<td>Feudal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No 1 2</td>
<td>3 5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No 1 6 2 9 18 2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No 3 3 6 4 8 9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No 1 10 7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% 100% 100% 100% 100%

% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Analysis of Tables 30 and 31

By comparing the orientations of those with 'less' seniority (8 - 13 years) with those who held 'more' seniority (14+) as presented in Table 30, the researcher can say that, in general, managers who would be more oriented to show 'low' as well as 'very high' degrees of compliance are more likely to have 'more' rather than 'less' seniority. But the possibility of the 'very high' degree of compliance appearing among them is much higher than the 'low' degree:

- 'Low' degrees appeared among managers with 'more' seniority in much higher percentages (11% '7 out of 62') than among those with 'less' seniority (5% '1 out of 18').
- While the majority (56% '10 out of 18') of the less senior managers indicated 'middle' degrees, the majority of those with more seniority (50% '31 out of 62') scored 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation.
- 'Very high' degrees appeared only among managers with more seniority (23% '14 out of 62').

When we examine the variation in compliant behaviour between these two groups (i.e. managers with less seniority and managers with more seniority) we can see that although they show this type of behavior at three levels in quite similar percentages, high as well as low levels of compliance were shown by the second group slightly more than by the first group:

- 17% (3 out of 18) of managers with less seniority revealed complete compliant behavior, compared with 18% (11 out of 62) of the second group.
- While the majority of both groups tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance in close percentages (50%; 48%), 33%
(6 out of 18) of the first group and 34% (21 out of 62) of the second group reported wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance.

When we examine the affect of seniority on the relationship between middle managers' orientation and behaviour we find that managers who had a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation (those who held more seniority) are more likely to behave with non-compliant behaviour than those with less seniority. But among managers who had 'middle' and 'high' degrees of this type of orientation (those with less seniority) are the ones who are more likely to show such behaviour:

- Among managers with less seniority, the only manager who rated a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended in his wavering behaviour toward compliance. But only 43% (3 out of 7) of managers with more seniority who rated this 'low' degree tended toward compliance and 57% (4 out of 7) tended toward non-compliance.

- The majority of the 'middle' degree group in both categories (60% '6 out of 10'; 70% '7 out of 10') tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance. But while 30% (3 out of 10) of managers with more seniority indicated complete compliant behaviour compared with 10% (1 out of 10) among managers with less seniority, 30% of this latter group tended toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour compared with none among the first group.

- The majority of managers with 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and more seniority tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance (58% '18 out of 31'). While 28% '2 out of 7' of the less senior managers who rated this degree
showed such behaviour, the majority of them (43% '3 out of 7') tended more not to comply compared with 26% (8 out of 31) of the former group. But among managers with 'high' degrees, complete compliant behaviour was shown by less senior managers in higher percentages (29% '2 out of 7') than by those with more seniority (16% '5 out of 31').

- All of the managers who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation held 'more' seniority. The majority of them (64% '9 out of 14') tended toward non-compliance, and only 14% (2 out of 14) of them tended more to comply. 22% (3 out of 14) showed complete compliant behaviour.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service</th>
<th>Less Seniority (8 - 13 Years)</th>
<th>More Seniority (14 - 19 Years)</th>
<th>Higher Seniority (Over 20 Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.  %</td>
<td>No.  %</td>
<td>No.  %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels Feudal of Compliant Orientation Behaviour</td>
<td>Low  Middle  High  Very High</td>
<td>Low  Middle  High  Very High</td>
<td>Total  Low  Middle  High  Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-  1  2  -  3  17%</td>
<td>-  3  -  2  5  17%</td>
<td>-  -  5  1  6  19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>1  6  2  -  9  50%</td>
<td>1  5  6  1  13  43%</td>
<td>2  2  12  1  17  53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-  3  3  -  6  33%</td>
<td>2  -  3  7  12  40%</td>
<td>2  -  5  2  9  28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10  7  -  18</td>
<td>8  9  10  30</td>
<td>4  2  22  4  32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5%  56%  39%  -  100%</td>
<td>10%  27%  30%  33%  100%</td>
<td>12%  16%  69%  13%  100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 33

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by number of years in middle management levels in the present organization (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years as a middle manager in the present organization</th>
<th>Less than 4 years</th>
<th>4 - Over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % | 10%| 29%| 47%| 14%| 100%| 10%| 17%| 49%| 24%| 100%|
Table 34

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by number of years in middle management levels in the present organization (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years as a middle manager in the present organization</th>
<th>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels</th>
<th>Feudal Levels</th>
<th>Compliant Orientation</th>
<th>Compliant Behaviour</th>
<th>Wavering Behaviour</th>
<th>Wavering Behaviour Tending toward Compliance</th>
<th>Wavering Behaviour Tending toward Non-Compliance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 33 and 34

From Table 33, one notes that managers who have spent more years in their middle management positions are more likely to hold a higher tendency toward compliance than those with less years:–

- The 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared among both groups in the same percentages (10% '5 out of 51' in the first group, and 10% '3 out of 29' in the second). But the group with 'less years' displayed 'middle' degrees more (29% '15 out of 51') than those with 'more years' (17% '5 out of 29').
- 'High' and 'very high' degrees were scored by managers who have been holding middle management positions for more than 4 years in higher percentages (49%, 24%; '14 and 7 out of 29') than managers with 'less years' (47%, 14%; '24 and 7 out of 51').

If we examine the levels of compliant behaviour that were shown by managers in both categories, we can see that those with more years in managerial positions are more likely to behave with compliant behaviour, as well as tending toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour compared to managers with less years:–

- Complete compliant behaviour appears among those with 'more years' in higher percentages (21% '6 out of 29') than among managers with 'less years' (16% '8 out of 51').
- 53% (27 out of 51) of managers in the first group (with 'less years') have tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, compared with 41% (12 out of 29) in the second group. But 38% (11 out of 29) of the second group (with 'more years') have tended not to comply, compared with 31% (16 out of 51) in the first group.
When we examine the affect of the length of time the respondents have spent in middle management positions in their present organizations on the relationship between their orientation and behaviour (Table 34), we can say that among managers with more years in managerial positions (those with 'low' degrees as well as 'very high' degrees) are more likely to tend in their behaviour toward non-compliance than managers with the same degrees but who have spent less years in managerial positions. But an opposite result was obtained concerning those with 'high' degrees:

- The majority (60% '3 out of 5') of managers in the first group who rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation, tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance. But in the second group (managers with more years in middle management) the majority of those who rated 'low' (67% '2 out of 3') tended toward non-compliance.

- In both groups those with 'middle' degrees indicated complete compliant behaviour to the same level (20% '3 out of 15'; 20% '1 out of 5'), and the majority of them tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance (67% '10 out of 15'; 60% '3 out of 5'). But 13% (2 out of 15) of those in the first group tended not to comply compared with 20% (1 out of 5) of the second group.

- Among managers in the second group, those who rated 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated complete compliant behaviour in higher percentages (29% '4 out of 14') than that of those in the first group (13% '3 out of 24'). Also, in the second group where 57% (8 out of 14) of managers with 'high' degrees tended toward compliance, compared with 50% in the first group, only 14% (2 out of 14) of them tended toward non-compliance, compared with 37% (9 out of 24) in the first group.
29% of those in the first group who scored 'very high' degrees indicated complete compliant behaviour compared with only 14% (1 out of 7) in the second group. While in the second group not one of those with 'very high' degrees tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, 28% (2 out of 7) did. Although 43% (3 out of 7) of managers who rated this 'very high' degree and who spent less years in middle management position tended toward non-compliance, such a tendency was shown by the vast majority (86% '6 out of 7') of the second group.
Table 35
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by number of years in middle management levels in the present organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years as a middle manager in the present organization</th>
<th>Less than 4 years</th>
<th>4 - less than 8</th>
<th>8 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 36

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by types of perceived top managers' leadership behaviour (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of the perceived top management leadership behaviour</th>
<th>More autocratic Leadership behaviour</th>
<th>More supportive leadership behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% 11% 21% 56% 11% 100% 10% 26% 43% 21% 100%
Table 37

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant
behaviour by types of perceived top managers' leadership behaviour (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of the perceived top manager's leadership behaviour</th>
<th>More authorcratic leadership behaviour</th>
<th>More supportive leadership behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic-Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tending toward compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 36 and 37

By comparing those who said they are working under autocratic top leadership with those under supportive leadership, we can examine the effect of top managers' leadership behaviour on middle managers' orientation and behaviour toward top management. If we focus on the association of leadership behaviour and the degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation (Table 36), it seems that one cannot reach a clear and conclusive result. But when we deal with 'low', 'middle', and 'high' degrees, one may find that those under autocratic leadership are somehow more oriented toward compliance than those under supportive leadership:

- Managers under autocratic and under supportive leadership display 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in very close percentages (11% '3 out of 27', and 10% '5 out of 53'). They also display 'middle' degrees in somewhat close percentages but the percentage of those under supportive leadership is higher (26% '14 out of 53') than of those under autocratic leadership (22% '6 out of 27').

- Managers under autocratic leadership have indicated 'high' degrees (56% '15 out of 27') more than those by managers under supportive leadership (43% '23 out of 53').

- The 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared among those who describe their top leaders' behaviour as 'supportive' in much higher percentages (21% '11 out of 53') than among managers under an 'autocratic' top leadership.

With respect to the affect of top leadership behaviour on the behaviour of middle managers, it is clear that managers under autocratic leadership reveal more 'compliance' than managers under supportive leadership (Table 36):-
- Managers under autocratic leadership have disclosed complete compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (30% '8 out of 27') than managers under supportive leadership (11% '6 out of 53').
- Managers in both categories have shown wavering behaviour tending toward compliance in very close percentages (48% '13 out of 27' and 49% '26 out of 53'). But managers working under supportive leadership indicated wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance in much higher percentages (40% '21 out of 53') than that indicated by those under autocratic leadership (22% '6 out of 27').

Considering the affect of top leadership behaviour on the relationship between orientation and behaviour (Table 37), one can also find that the tendency toward compliance is higher among managers under autocratic leadership than among managers under supportive leadership:—

- Under autocratic leadership, 67% (2 out of 3) of those with a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance compared with 40% (2 out of 5) of the 'low' group under supportive leadership. But wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance was indicated by the 'low' group under autocratic leadership in much lower percentages (33% '1 out of 3') than by the similar group under supportive leadership (60% '3 out of 5').
- Under autocratic leadership, managers with 'middle' and 'high' degrees, have displayed complete compliance behaviour in much higher percentages (33% '2 out of 6', 27% '4 out of 15') than those indicated by similar groups under supportive leadership. The majority of these 'middle' and 'high' groups under both
types of leadership displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance (50% '3 out of 6', 53% '8 out of 15' in the first category, and 64% '9 out of 14', 57% '13 out of 23' in the second category). Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance appeared among these two groups under supportive leadership in higher percentages (22% '3 out of 14', 30% '7 out of 23') than among the similar groups under autocratic leadership (17% '1 out of 6', 20% '3 out of 15').

- Under autocratic leadership, the majority of managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation have revealed complete compliant behaviour (67% '2 out of 3') compared with only 9% (1 out of 11) in the similar group under supportive leadership. But the majority of this group under supportive leadership (73% '8 out of 11') displayed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance compared with 33% (1 out of 3) of the 'very high' group under autocratic leadership.
Table 38
Middle managers' profile of the decision-making styles of their organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals are set by higher authority</td>
<td>Goals are set after discussing with managers of different departments the problems at work and any planned action</td>
<td>Except in emergencies goals are usually established by group participation</td>
<td>Policies and most of the decisions are made at the top level; specific decisions within a prescribed frame are made at the middle level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 34</td>
<td>4 6 11 18</td>
<td>2 3 5 7 9 12</td>
<td>4 6 7 2 3 5 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 36</td>
<td>20 24 28</td>
<td>13 14 15 16 17</td>
<td>1 18 20 12 13 14 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 64</td>
<td>31 32 42</td>
<td>19 22 23 25 26</td>
<td>26 34 20 19 22 24 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 75</td>
<td>44 47 48</td>
<td>27 29 30 33 37</td>
<td>45 47 49 29 30 31 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>49 52 55</td>
<td>38 39 40 41 43</td>
<td>52 59 64 33 35 36 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 66 66</td>
<td>58 59 60 61 62</td>
<td>66 67 73 38 39 40 41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 72</td>
<td>63 68 69 70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43 44 48 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies and important decisions are made at top level; many decisions are made at the middle level</td>
<td>Policies and general decisions are made at the top level, many decisions are made at the middle level</td>
<td>Broad policy and general decisions are made at the top level, many decisions are made at the middle level</td>
<td>Decision-making is widely carried out at all levels in the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>46</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Respondent No. 10
Table 39

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by participation in decision-making (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' participation in decision-making</th>
<th>Less participating Middle managers'</th>
<th>More participating Middle managers'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 40

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by participation in decision-making (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers participation in decision-making</th>
<th>Less participation</th>
<th>More participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels of Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 39 and 40

To examine the affect of middle managers' degrees of participation in decision-making, we will compare those who said they participate less (the first category) with those who participate more (the second category). Taking into consideration the association of 'participation' with the degrees of middle managers' bureaucratic-feudal orientation (Table 39), it seems that its affect is unclear and inconclusive:

- Managers who participate less scored 'low', 'middle', and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation slightly more (11%, 27%, 50% '3, 7 and 13 out of 26') than those managers who participated more (9%, 24%, 46% '5, 13 and 25 out of 54'). But the 'very high' degree appeared among managers in the first category much less (12% '3 out of 26') than among those in the second category (21% '11 out of 54').

When we focus on the affect of middle managers degree of participation on their behaviour, it is clear from Table 39 that less participating managers reported more 'compliance' than more participating ones:

- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by managers who participated less in much higher percentages (31% '8 out of 26') than by managers who participated more (11% '6 out of 54').

- While less participating managers indicated wavering behaviour tending toward compliance slightly more (50% '13 out of 26') than more participating managers (48% '26 out of 54'), they tended toward non-compliance in much lower percentages (19% '5 out of 26') than managers who participate more (41% '22 out of 54').
Examining the affect of 'participation' on the relationship between orientation and behaviour (Table 40), one could also find that the tendency toward compliance is higher among managers who participate less than who participate more:-

- The majority (67% '2 out of 3') of less participating managers with 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated wavering behaviour tending toward compliance, and 33% of them (1 out of 3) tended toward non-compliance. But the majority of the more participating 'low' degree's group (60% '3 out of 5') tended in their wavering behaviour not to comply, and 40% displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance.

- Complete compliant behaviour was shown by those managers with 'middle' and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation who 'participate less' much more (43% '3 out of 7', 31% '4 out of 13') than similar groups who 'participate more' (8% '1 out of 13', 12% '3 out of 25'). Less participating as well as more participating managers who held 'middle' and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance in close percentages. None of the less participating managers who held 'middle' degrees and 15% (2 out of 13) of those who held 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance. But this type of behaviour appeared among more participating managers who held the above two degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in higher percentages (31% '4 out of 13', 32% '8 out of 25').

- Complete compliant behaviour appeared among middle managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation who participated less in decision-making in much higher percentages (33% '1 out of 3') than that of the more participating ones (18% '2 out of 11'). While only the more
participating managers indicated wavering behaviour tending toward compliance (18% '2 out of 11'), both the less and the more participated managers with the 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance in close percentages (67% '2 out of 3', 64% '7 out of 11').
Table 41

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by 'psychological participation' or influence (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of reported psychological participation</th>
<th>Less psychological participation</th>
<th>More psychological participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Levels Feudal Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complete Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% 17% 25% 50% 8% 100% 9% 25% 47% 19% 100%
Table 42

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by 'psychological participation' or influence (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of the middle managers psychological participation</th>
<th>Less psychological participation</th>
<th>More psychological Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels Feudal Orientation Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 41 and 42

In examining the affect of the middle managers' degree of 'psychological participation' on their orientation (Table 41) one can also find that such an affect is not clear and conclusive:-

- Managers who reported having 'less psychological participation' rated 'low' and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation somewhat higher (17%, 50% '2 and 6 out of 12') than managers with 'more psychological participation' (9%, 47% '6 and 32 out of 68'). Both managers with 'less' and with 'more' psychological influence indicated 'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in the same percentages (25% '3 out of 12', and 25% '17 out of 68'). But the 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation has appeared among those with 'more psychological participation' much more (19% '13 out of 68') than among managers with 'less psychological participation' (8% '1 out of 12').

By examining the association of middle managers' degree of 'psychological participation' and their level of compliant behaviour, it is clear (Table 41) that managers with 'less psychological participation' tended toward 'compliance' more than managers with more psychological participation:-

- Complete compliant behaviour has appeared among those with 'less psychological influence' in higher percentages (25% '3 out of 12') than among managers with 'more psychological participation' (16% '11 out of 68').

- Managers in the first category (i.e. less psychological participation tended in their wavering behaviour to comply more (58% '7 out of 12') than managers in the second category (47% '32 out of 68'). But in the second category (i.e. more
psychological influence) displayed wavering behaviour tending
toward non-compliance in much higher percentages (37% '25 out of
68') than those in the first category (17% '2 out of 12').

Considering the affect of 'psychological participation on the
relationship between middle managers 'orientation' and behaviour,
although such an affect is not very clear and conclusive the figures
(Table 42) still to some extent suggest that managers with 'more
psychological participation' are less apt to behave compliantly than
those with 'less psychological participation':

- The two managers with 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
  orientation who reported having 'less psychological
  participation' both displayed wavering behaviour tending toward
  compliance. But the majority of the 'low' degree managers who
  have 'more psychological participation' indicated wavering
  behaviour tending toward non-compliance (67% '4 out of 6') and
  only 33% (2 out of 6) showed wavering behaviour tending toward
  compliance.

- Managers holding 'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
  orientation who have 'less psychological participation' have all
  shown wavering behaviour tending toward compliance (100% '3 out
  of 3') compared with 53% (9 out of 17) of the similar group of
  those managers who have more psychological influence. Although
  this latter group displayed complete compliant behaviour (23% '4
  out of 17'), they also showed wavering behaviour tending toward
  non-compliance (24% '4 out of 17').

- Managers with 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
  orientation who reported less psychological participation
  displayed complete compliant behaviour in much higher
  percentages (33% '2 out of 6') than the similar group who
reported more psychological participation (16% '5 out of 32'). This latter group showed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance (59% '19 out of 32') more than that shown by the former group (34% '2 out of 6'), but they displayed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance (25% '8 out of 32') somewhat less than that displayed by managers of the former group (33% '2 out of 6').

- The only middle manager with a 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation who said having 'less psychological participation' indicated complete compliant behaviour compared with 15% (2 out of 13) of those 'very high' degree managers who reported more psychological influence. The majority of this latter group (69% '9 out of 13') displayed wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance, and 16% (2 out of 13) tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour.
Table 43

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by 'delegation' of decision-making (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of delegation of decision-making</th>
<th>Less delegation</th>
<th>More delegation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less delegation</td>
<td>More delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 44
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by 'delegation' of decision-making (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of delegation of decision-making</th>
<th>Less delegation</th>
<th>More delegation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 43 and 44

A comparative examination of the two categories of Table 43, (i.e. less delegation and more delegation), present us with the affect of "delegation" on middle managers' orientation which is not very clear and conclusive. But it may suggest that to some extent middle managers to whom more decision-taking are delegated are less oriented toward compliance than managers with 'less delegation':-

- 'Low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation only appeared among those with more delegation (13% '8 out of 62').
- While more delegated managers displayed the 'middle' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation higher (29% '18 out of 62') than the less delegated managers, this latter group indicated 'high' degrees much more (78% '14 out of 18') than the former group (39% '24 out of 62').
- The 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was shown by managers with more delegation (19% '12 out of 62') higher than that indicated by managers with less delegation (11% '2 out of 18').

Focusing on the relationship between middle managers' degrees of 'delegation' and their behaviour, it is clear from Table 43 that 'compliance' is displayed more by managers with less delegation than with more delegation:-

- Managers who reported having less delegation showed complete compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (28% '5 out of 18') than those with more delegation (15% '9 out of 12').
- The majority of managers in both categories tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance in close percentages (50%; 48%), but managers of the second category (i.e. more delegation) reported wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance much
more (37% '23 out of 62') than managers of the first category who have less delegation (22% '4 out of 18').

In examining the affect of the 'delegation' on the relationship between middle managers' orientation and behaviour, one can find that the figures of Table 44 suggest, to some extent, that the more delegated managers displayed less 'compliance' than the less delegated managers:

- All of the 8 middle managers who held the 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who reported having more delegation, indicated wavering behaviour, but 50% (4 out of 8) of them tended more to comply and the other 50% not to.

- The two less-delegated managers who rated 'middle' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour, although 22% (4 out of 18) of the more-delegated 'middle' degree group showed complete compliant behaviour and 56% (10 out of 18) displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance, 22% (4 out of 18) of them tended not to comply.

- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by the more-delegated 'high' degree group much more (29% '4 out of 14') than by the less-delegated 'high' degree group. The former group showed wavering behaviour both tending toward compliance and non-compliance more (58%; 29% '14 and 7 out of 24') than the latter group (50%; 21% '7 and 3 out of 14').

- The 'very high' degree group who reported less delegation indicated complete compliant behaviour (50% '1 out of 2') more than that indicated by those who rated 'very high' degree in bureaucratic-feudal orientation but held more delegation (16% '2 out of 12'). 67% (8 out of 12) of the latter group tended
toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour compared with 50% (1 out of 2) of the former group.
Table 45

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by role conflict (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' role conflict</th>
<th>High role conflict</th>
<th>Low role conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Orientation of Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% 13% 20% 52% 15% 100% 6% 32% 41% 21% 100%
Table 46

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by role conflict (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' role conflict</th>
<th>High role conflict</th>
<th>Low role conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 45 and 46

The association of numbers in Table 45 does not provide us with a clear and conclusive affect of role conflict on middle managers orientation:

- Managers who reported a feeling of 'high role conflict' rated 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation more than (13% '6 out of 46') managers reported 'low role conflict' (6% '2 out of 34').
- While those with more role conflict feelings scored 'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in lower percentages (20% '9 out of 46') than managers with less feelings of role-conflict (32% '11 out of 34), the former group rated 'high' degrees more (52% '24 out of 46') than the latter group (41% out of 34').
- The 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared among managers who reported feelings of 'high role conflict' in lower percentages (15% '7 out of 46') than those with 'low role conflict' (21% '7 out of 34').

In considering the affect of role conflict on middle managers behaviour, the cross-tabulation presented in Table 45 does not only suggest that such affects are not conclusive but more it provides us with a reverse result to the assumption that more role conflict would lead to more compliance:

- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by managers with feelings of 'low role conflict' in higher percentages (21% '7 out of 34') than by managers with 'high role conflict' feelings.
- While managers who reported 'low role conflict' tended slightly more toward compliance (50% '17 out of 34' compared with 48% '22 out of 46'), managers with 'high role conflict'
tended more toward non-compliance (37% '17 out of 46' compared with 29% '10 out of 34').

Similar results can be obtained when we examine the affect of 'role conflict' on the relationship between middle managers' orientation and behaviour (Table 46):-

- Among managers who reported 'high role conflict', the majority of those who rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour (67% '4 out of 6'). But the 'low' degree group who reported 'low role conflict' all tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour (100% '2 out of 2').

- In the category of 'high role conflict', managers holding 'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation did not indicate complete compliant behaviour compared with 36% (4 out of 11) of the 'middle' degree group in the 'low role conflict' category. While the former group tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance more (78% '7 out of 9') than the latter group (64% '9 out of 14'), both groups tended toward non-compliance in exactly the same percentages (22% '2 out of 9' and 22% '3 out of 14').

- Among managers of the first category (i.e., feelings of high role-conflict), those who rated 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated complete compliant behaviour more (21% '5 out of 24') than the 'high' degree managers of the second category (14% '2 out of 14'). But although this latter group tended in their wavering behaviour toward 'compliance' more (64% '9 out of 14') than the former group (50% '12 out of 24'), 22% (3 out of 14) tended toward 'non-compliance' compared with 29% (7 out of 24) of the other group.
- The assumption that more role conflict would lead to more 'compliance' appears when we consider those with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation; the 'very high' degrees group who reported a feeling of 'high role conflict', indicated complete compliant behaviour (29% '2 out of 7') more than that indicated by those who reported 'low role conflict' (14% '1 out of 7'). Also, this latter group tended toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour more (72% '5 out of 7') than the former group (57% '4 out of 7').
Table 47
Role definition as reported by the 80 middle managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Definition</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Role Definition</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Role Definition</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Role Definition</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a written job description and a statement of the objectives I am expected to achieve</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>There is a written job description, but no statement of the objectives I am expected to achieve</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>There is no job description, but I am told the objectives which I am expected to achieve</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>There is no job description, and I am not told the objectives which I am expected to achieve</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 48

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by role ambiguity (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' role ambiguity</th>
<th>High role ambiguity</th>
<th>Low role ambiguity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 49

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by role ambiguity (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' role ambiguity</th>
<th>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels</th>
<th>Feudal Orientation</th>
<th>Compliant Behaviour</th>
<th>High role ambiguity</th>
<th>Low role ambiguity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tending toward compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 48 and 49

In examining the affect of 'role ambiguity' on middle managers' orientation in relation to authority (i.e. top management) (Table 48) it seems that we are facing the same situation in that the affect is not clear and inconclusive:

- Managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' scored 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation much more (31% '4 out of 13') than those who reported 'low role ambiguity' (6% '4 out of 67').

- While the 'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation did not appear among managers who evidenced 'high role ambiguity', the 'high' degree appeared in higher percentages (61% '8 out of 13') than among managers who reported 'low role ambiguity' (45% '30 out of 67').

- The 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was indicated by managers with 'low role ambiguity' more (19% '13 out of 67') than by those with 'high role ambiguity' (8% '1 out of 13').

In respect of the affect of role-ambiguity on middle managers' behaviour, it appears that managers with 'high role ambiguity' are more likely to behave compliantly than those with 'low role ambiguity':-

- Managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' disclosed complete compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (31% '4 out of 13') than managers with low role ambiguity (17% '11 out of 67').

- Wavering behaviour tending toward both compliance and non-compliance was displayed by managers reporting 'low role ambiguity' more (49; 34% '33 and 23 out of 67') than those reporting 'high role ambiguity' (38%; 31% '5 and 4 out of 13').
Regarding the affect of role ambiguity on the relationship between middle managers orientation and behaviour, one can say, from the figures presented in Table 49, that although the affect is not very clear, managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' are more likely, precisely those holding 'low' and 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, to behave more compliantly than with 'low role ambiguity':-

- Among managers who reported high role ambiguity those holding 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance much more (75% '3 out of 4') and toward non-compliance much less (25% '1 out of 4') than the similar group who reported 'low role ambiguity' (25%; 75% '1 and 3 out of 4').

- Managers who exhibited 'high role ambiguity' and rated 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated complete compliant behaviour much more (38% '3 out of 8') than managers rated the same degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but reported 'low role ambiguity' (17% '5 out of 30'). But while the latter group tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance in higher percentages (60% '18 out of 30') than the former group (25% '2 out of 8'), they tended toward 'non-compliance' less (23% '7 out of 30') than the other group (37% '3 out of 8').

- The only middle manager holding a 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation who stated 'high role ambiguity' displayed complete compliant behaviour (100%). But while 15% (2 out of 13) of managers holding 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and disclosing 'low role ambiguity' showed complete compliant behaviour, 69% (9 out of 13) tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance and only 16% (2 out of 13) toward compliance.
Table 50

Levels of middle managers' job satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Only slightly satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Extremely satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*5 11 13</td>
<td>6 8 14</td>
<td>3 10</td>
<td>1 4 7</td>
<td>2 9 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 33</td>
<td>18 22</td>
<td>17 19 20</td>
<td>12 25 27</td>
<td>29 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>28 34</td>
<td>23 24</td>
<td>30 32</td>
<td>38 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>52 55</td>
<td>39 47</td>
<td>35 37</td>
<td>45 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61 72</td>
<td>60 66</td>
<td>41 43 44</td>
<td>67 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75 76</td>
<td>68 73</td>
<td>48 49</td>
<td>71 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79 78</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 51 54</td>
<td>56 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64 69</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7 14 38 14 7 |
| 9% 18% 48% 18% 9% |

* = Respondent No. 5
Table 51

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by job satisfaction (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' job satisfaction</th>
<th>Low job satisfaction</th>
<th>High job satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic LevellFeudal Compliant Orientation Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 52

Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by job satisfaction (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers' job satisfaction</th>
<th>Not satisfied and slightly satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Very and extremely satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Levels, Feudal of Orient-Compliant Behaviour</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 53
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour by job satisfaction (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of middle managers job satisfaction</th>
<th>Not satisfied and slightly satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Very and extremely satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Bureaucratic Feudal Compliant Orientation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete compliant behaviour</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivering behaviour tending toward compliance</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivering behaviour tending toward non-compliance</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Tables 51, 52 and 53

By examining Tables 51 and 52, one can state that managers who are high in job satisfaction are more oriented toward compliance than those who are low in job satisfaction. This appears when we analyze Table 51:-

- 'Low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation were shown by managers who held 'less job satisfaction' more (14% '3 out of 21') than managers with 'more job satisfaction' (8% '5 out of 59'). In fact this 'low' degree (as appears in Table 52) does not appear among managers who are 'very and extremely satisfied'.

- Managers who are 'less satisfied' displayed the 'middle' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in slightly higher percentages (29% '6 out of 21') than those who are 'more satisfied' (24% '14 out of 59').

- 'High' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation were disclosed by managers who are 'less satisfied' in close percentages (48% '10 out of 21') than managers with 'more satisfaction'. But as presented in Table 52 such degrees appeared among those who are only 'satisfied' in higher percentages (53% '20 out of 38') than among managers who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' and much higher than those who are 'very and extremely satisfied' (38% '8 out of 21').

- The 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was indicated by managers who evidenced 'more job satisfaction' in much higher percentages (20% '12 out of 59') than those with 'less job satisfaction' (9% '2 out of 21'). In fact Table 52 clearly shows that those who are 'very and extremely satisfied'
have scored 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in greater percentages (33% '7 out of 21') than those who are 'satisfied' (13% '5 out of 38') and those who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' (9% '2 out of 21').

Considering the affect of middle managers' job satisfaction on their behaviour toward top management, it seems as Tables 51 and 52 suggest that a tendency toward non-compliant behaviour is more likely to be shown by those who are 'more satisfied' than by the 'less satisfied' ones. But as appears in Table 52, extreme compliance (i.e. complete compliant behaviour) is more likely to be indicated by managers who are 'very low' and 'very high' in satisfaction than by those who are only 'satisfied':

- Managers who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' and 'very and extremely satisfied' (the first and third groups of Table 52), revealed complete compliant behaviour much more (24% '5 out of 21') than those who are just 'satisfied' (10% '4 out of 38').

- The first and second groups (i.e. 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied'; 'satisfied') tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance much more (52% '11 out of 21'; 53% '20 out of 38') than the third group (i.e. 'very and extremely satisfied', 38% '8 out of 21'). But the second and third groups tended toward 'non-compliance' much more (37% '14 out of 38'; 38% '8 out of 21') than the first group (24% '5 out of 21').

When we examine the affect of job satisfaction on the relationship between middle managers orientation and behaviour, the figures of Table 53 suggest, to some extent, the same result in that extreme compliance is more likely to be shown by managers who are 'very low' and 'very highly' satisfied than those who are only
'satisfied'. And a tendency toward non-compliance is more likely to be indicated by managers who are 'more satisfied' than by 'less satisfied' ones:—

- Managers holding 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance much more (67% '2 out of 3') than the similar degree group, i.e. the 'satisfied' group (40% '2 out of 5'). But the latter group tended toward 'non-compliance' in higher percentage (60% '3 out of 5') than the former group (33% '1 out of 3').

- Among managers of the first category (i.e. 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied') and the third category ('very and extremely satisfied'), those holding 'middle degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation disclosed complete compliant behaviour more (33% '2 out of 6' and 17% '1 out of 6') than managers of the second category (i.e. 'satisfied', 12% '1 out of 8'). Also the first group tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour slightly more (67% '4 out of 6') than the second group (63% '5 out of 8') and much more than the third group (50% '3 out of 6'). But while none of the first group tended toward non-compliance (25% '2 out of 8') of the second and third groups did.

- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by the 'high' degree group of the first category and the third one much more (20% '2 out of 10'; 37% '3 out of 8') than the second category (10% '2 out of 20'). The 'high' degree group of third category (i.e. 'very and extremely satisfied') tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour much less (38% '3 out of 8') than the second category (65% '13 out of 20') and the first one (50%
'5 out of 10'). But managers holding 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' tended toward non-compliance slightly more (30% '3 out of 10') than the other two groups (i.e. 'satisfied' 25% '5 out of 20' and 'very and extremely satisfied' 25% '2 out of 8').

- The 'very high' degree managers who are less satisfied (i.e. 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied') displayed complete compliant behaviour much higher (50% '1 out of 2') than those who are more satisfied (i.e. the second group 20% '1 out of 5' and the third group 14% '1 out of 7'). But the second and third groups - who hold more satisfaction - tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance more (80% '4 out of 5' and 57% '4 out of 7') than the third group (who are 'less satisfied', 50% '1 out of 2').
Table 54
The hierarchical order of the contribution of the 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables in
middle managers' satisfaction and dissatisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Slightly Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied (but more in terms of barely satisfied with)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied with</td>
<td>Dissatisfied with</td>
<td>Dissatisfied with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pay; using skills and abilities</td>
<td>1 Using skills and abilities</td>
<td>1 Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Achievement; participation</td>
<td>2 Pay; security; participation; advancement</td>
<td>2 Autonomy; using skills and abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Responsibilities; security</td>
<td>3 Achievement; company policy</td>
<td>3 Security; responsibility; authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Authority; relationship with superiors; company policy 'belongingness'</td>
<td>4 Authority; autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Responsibilities; relationship with superiors</td>
<td>5 Very and extremely satisfied with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very and extremely satisfied with</td>
<td>Relationship with colleagues</td>
<td>1 Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Relationship with colleagues</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Relationship with colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Relationship with superiors; achievement; company policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Security; pay; advancement; 'belongingness'; using skills and abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>Extremely satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very and extremely satisfied with</strong></td>
<td><strong>Very and extremely satisfied with</strong></td>
<td><strong>Very and extremely satisfied with</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Using skills and abilities</td>
<td>1 Relationship with superiors</td>
<td>1 Relationship with superiors; responsibility; using skills and abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Achievement</td>
<td>2 Relationship with colleagues; security</td>
<td>2 Relationship with colleagues; achievement; security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Relationship with superiors; relationship with colleagues; 'belongingness'</td>
<td>3 'Belongingness'; using skills and abilities; responsibilities</td>
<td>3 Autonomy; participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Security; responsibilities; authority; autonomy; company policy</td>
<td>4 Authority; advancement; achievement</td>
<td>4 Company policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Participation; advancement</td>
<td>5 Company policy; participation</td>
<td>5 Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dissatisfied with</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dissatisfied with</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dissatisfied with</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pay</td>
<td>1 Pay</td>
<td>1 Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Responsibility; authority; company policy</td>
<td>2 Autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

THE QUESTIONNAIRE
A – Covering letter

Dear Sir,

Greetings ...

I am an Iraqi Post-graduate student at Bath University, England, reading for the degree of Ph.D in Management. My research for this degree involves studying the work relationship between middle and top managers in Iraqi organizations. Consequently, the enclosed questionnaire is an important device to provide me with the necessary information for completing my study. To achieve the objectives and requirements of the research, this questionnaire has to be comprehensive and, thus, includes various organizational, social and educational aspects which are aimed to give a broad perspective to the subject of this research.

I would like to assure you that your answers will remain confidential, and the outcomes of this research will not relate to any of the respondents in person.

Finally, please accept my thanks and gratitude for your cooperation and I hope that you have every success in your work.

The Researcher

Lamya A J Al-Zubaidi
B - Instructions

Please read the following instructions carefully:

1. Most of the questions simply require you to tick an appropriate box to indicate your answer. Please tick (✓) in a suitable box when required.

2. Most of the questions are about your views and opinions. For these questions, there are no right or wrong answers. So, there is no need to check your answers with anyone else because your opinion and feelings may differ from anybody else.

3. There is no need to put your name on the questionnaire or anywhere else.

4. When you have completed the questionnaire, please place it into the provided envelope and I will be most happy to receive it from you during the second interview.

5. Please use the blank sheet provided at the end of this questionnaire to register any comments or additional information related to any aspect of your work.

6. If additional information about the questionnaire is needed, please contact the researcher at the following address:

   address:
   - The address
   - The telephone number
C - The questions

Q.1 Following is a number of statements. For each statement please tick only one box to show your opinion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Statements</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 A superior should expect subordinates to carry out his orders without question or deviation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 A person should not volunteer opinions to his superior outside his own area of specialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Formality, based on rank or position, should be maintained by members of an organization.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 People are better off when the organization provides a complete set of rules to be followed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Length of service in an organization should be given almost as much recognition as level of performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.2 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Tick one box for each statement to show your opinion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Statements</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 A top person in an organization should be respected and followed as a representative of higher authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Subordinates in an organization should be loyal towards superiors and act always to meet their expectations and orders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Organizational members should maintain work rules and superiors' orders and discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 One should not get involved in taking important decisions and action affecting the work without prior agreements from superiors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 People should consider the social values and norms when executing jobs and when dealing with both superiors and subordinates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.3 Here is an imaginary situation. When you have read it, I would like to ask you the following questions.

[Imagine the following situation:

"A civil servant is employed in a post in which it is his duty to devise ways to improve sanitation and co-operation in rural villages. After much study in the field, he prepares a memorandum presenting a full program towards this end. His superiors reject it. Instead, they adopt a program which, in his opinion, would not be in the interest of the villagers whose conditions he has studied in detail. His superiors, nevertheless, ask him to carry out this policy in the field"].

A  Can his superior expect this civil servant to carry out this policy?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

B What do you think this civil servant ought to do, in view of his obligation to the government and his obligation as a citizen who wants to improve the lot of the villagers? Should he agree or refuse to carry out this policy?
   - Should carry out policy [ ]
   - Should refuse to carry out policy [ ]

Q.4 Imagine the following situation:-

[The top manager of your organization has issued an order to the effect that all employees should work extra hours and also during weekends for an unspecified period of time to fulfil work which is believed to be delayed and needs to be done. At the same time, the employees in your department have already informed you that they feel over-loaded and thus are not ready to work extra time.]

A Faced with such a situation, which of the following decisions would you take? Keeping in mind that you do not feel it is necessary for them to work extra time. (Tick one box only)
   - you simply inform your subordinates to stay and work as it is the order of top management [ ]
   - you contact those at the top and inquire the need for working extra hours, informing them that in your department there is no delayed work [ ]
   - discuss the issue first with your workers and consequently you ask those at the top to re-think about issuing such orders, explaining that there is no need for your workers to stay and asking to relieve them from the extra work as they are over-loaded [ ]
If the top management refused to re-think or cancel the order, which of the following decisions would you take?

- you allow your workers to leave
- you ask your workers to stay and work
- others (please specify)

In that case do you feel that you have to consider two conflicting expectations at the same time; one from your superiors and one from your subordinates?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If the answer is yes, to what extent do you feel that you are under stress from these conflicting expectations?

- under very little stress
- under little stress
- under some stress
- under great stress
- under very great stress

Q.5 What is your date of birth?

Q.6 Where did you live most of the time?

6.1 Up to the age of 10 years

County ☐ City ☐ Town ☐ Village ☐

6.2 Up to the age of 20 years

County ☐ City ☐ Town ☐ Village ☐

Q.7 What was/were your father's (or guardian) main job occupations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job occupation</th>
<th>The period (if known)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.8 How much formal education did your father (or guardian) complete? (Tick one box)

- Primary school level
- Medium school level
- Secondary school level
- Certificate Diploma level
- University level
- Postgraduate level

Q.9 How much formal education did your mother complete? (Tick one box)

- Primary school level
- Medium school level
- Secondary school level
- Certificate Diploma level
- University level
- Postgraduate level

Q.10 Which of the following statements do you agree more with? (Tick one box)

- During childhood we could not inform our fathers about our mistakes because of the fear of their anger and punishment

Or

- During childhood we could inform our fathers about any mistakes without fear of their anger and punishment

Q.11 Which of the following statements do you agree with more? (Tick one box)

- During childhood we learn that our fathers possess the highest authority within the family and we must obey them without arguing or objections and we are responsible in front of them for our deeds.
Or

- During childhood we learn that our fathers are our friends and we can freely argue with them and inform them when we feel that their instructions are not fair without fear of punishment

Q.12 During our childhood we used to face the following situations. Indicate your opinion by ticking one box for each of these situations:

12.1 It is not acceptable to inform our father that he is wrong in his actions

Yes □  No □

12.2 The father has the right to teach his children manners the way he likes

Yes □  No □

12.3 It is easier to talk frankly with our mothers than with our fathers about our private affairs and problems

Yes □  No □

12.4 One of the good and accepted things is that the boy should turn out to be like his father

Yes □  No □

12.5 The children should not participate in grown up discussions

Yes □  No □

Q.13 Which of the following statements do you agree more with? (Tick only one box to show your opinion)

- During childhood our fathers used the method of punishment and reward frequently □

Or

- During childhood our fathers used the method of punishment and reward seldomly □

Or
During childhood our fathers never used the method of punishment and reward.

Q.14 Which of the following statements do you agree more with? (Tick only one box to show your opinion)

- During childhood our fathers did not offer an explanation as to why they were punishing us.

Or

- During childhood our fathers sometimes offered an explanation as to why they were punishing us

Or

- During childhood our fathers always offer an explanation as to why they were punishing us

Q.15 What is your level and place of formal education?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Place of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name of the place (i.e. country of formal education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Primary School level</td>
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<td>- Medium School level</td>
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<td>- Secondary School level</td>
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<td>- Certificate Diploma level</td>
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<td>- Undergraduate level</td>
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<td>- Master Degree level</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Doctorate level</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Q.16 How many years have you spent as a governmental official and what positions have you held prior to your present one?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of position</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>The Period</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q.17 How many years have you spent in middle management position in your present organization (Tick one box)

- Less than 4 years
- 4 - less than 8 years
- 8 and over

Q.18 To what extent does the top manager in your organization try to understand your work problems and do something about them? (Tick one box)

- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.19 To what extent is the top manager in your organization interested in helping you with personal and family problems? (Tick one box)

- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.20 To what extent do you feel free to approach your top manager and communicate with him because he is friendly and easily approached? (Tick one box)

- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
Q.21 To what extent does your top manager seem interested in listening to your suggestions and ideas? (Tick one box)

- None  
- Very slight  
- Slight  
- Some extent  
- Great  
- Very great

Q.22 To what extent does your top manager give you the opportunity to learn by doing, including the freedom to make mistakes and to learn from them? (Tick one box)

- None  
- Very slight  
- Slight  
- Some extent  
- Great  
- Very great

Q.23 To what extent does your top manager keep you informed about matters related to your job? (Tick one box)

- None  
- Very slight  
- Slight  
- Some extent  
- Great  
- Very great
Q.24 To what extent do you feel that your top manager is backing and supporting you with your responsibilities? (Tick one box)
- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.25 To what extent does your top manager let you feel that you are sharing with him the leadership and authority? (Tick one box)
- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.26 To what extent does your top manager give criticism in a helpful way when you do something wrong? (Tick one box)
- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.27 To what extent does your top manager value your ideas and take into account your opinions and suggestions? (Tick one box)
- None
- Very slight
Q.28 To what extent does your top manager ask you to participate with him in making important decisions related to general organizational problems? (Tick one box)

- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.29 Superiors at times must make decisions which seem to be against the interests of their subordinates. When this happens to you (or when your top manager makes decisions it seems to be against your interests), how much trust do you have that your top manager's decision is justified by other considerations and, if you were him would you make the same decision? (Tick one box)

- None
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.30 How are the goals set in your organization? (Tick one box)

- Orders issued
- The goals are set by higher authority (i.e., top management) in the organization
- The goals are set after discussing with managers of different departments
problems at work and any planned action

- Except in emergencies, goals are usually established by means of group participation

Q.31 At what level in your organization do you think decisions are formally made? (Tick one box)

- Policies and most of the decisions are made at the top

- Policies and important decisions are made at the top level; specific decisions within a prescribed framework are made at the middle level

- Broad policy and general decisions are made at the top level, many decisions are made at the middle level

- Decision-making is widely carried out at all levels in the organization

Q.32 When decisions are being made in your organization, how frequently are you asked for your opinions and suggestions? (Tick one box)

- Not at all

- Very little

- Little

- Sometimes

- Most of the time

- Always

Q.33 Do you participate in goal-setting and higher policy planning in your organization? (Tick one box)

Yes  No

Q.34 Do you participate in making important decisions related to general organizational problems? (Tick one box)

- Not at all

- Very little
Q.35 If you participate in goal-setting and higher policy planning in your organization, to what extent do you feel that your participation is effective and it is not just a matter of formal arrangement? (Tick one box)
- Not at all effective
- Very slight
- Slight
- Some extent
- Great
- Very great

Q.36 To what extent do you feel that your ideas, information, knowledge of processes and experiences are being used? (Tick one box)
- Not at all
- Very little
- Little
- Some extent
- Great extent
- Very great extent

Q.37 In general, how much say or influence do you feel you have on what goes on in your office? (Tick one box)
- Not at all
- Very little
- Little
- Some
Q.38 To what degree do you think you can influence the decisions of your top manager regarding things about which you are concerned? (Tick one box)

- Not at all
- Very little
- Little
- Some
- Great
- Very great

Q.39 If you have a suggestion for improving the job or changing operations in some way, how easy is it for you to get your ideas across to your top manager? (Tick one box)

- I cannot
- Very difficult
- Difficult
- Somewhat
- Easy
- Very easy

Q.40 How frequently do your superiors in top management ask your opinions when a problem comes up which involves your work? (Tick one box)

- Never
- Very seldom
- Seldom
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Always
Q.41 Do you take the important decisions related to your job? (Tick one box)

- Not at all
- Very little
- Little
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Always

Q.42 Do you have enough authority to take the important decisions related to your work in your organizational position? (Tick one box)

- Not enough at all
- Very little authority
- Little
- Enough
- Great
- Very Great

Q.43 Do you take the decision which you have the authority to take without your top manager's agreement? (Tick one box)

- Never
- Very seldom
- Seldom
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Always

Q.44 How often do you get conflicting demands from different people above and below you? (Tick one box)

- Never
- Very few times
- Few times □
- Sometimes □
- Often □
- Nearly all the time □

Q.45 How clearly defined is your job? (Tick one box)
- There is a written job description, and a statement of the objectives I am expected to achieve □
- There is a written job description but no statement of the objectives I am expected to achieve □
- There is no written job description, but I am told the objectives which I am expected to achieve □
- There is no written job description, and I am not told the objectives which I am expected to achieve □

Q.46 To what extent do you agree that the following situations exist in your work organization? (For each item below, please tick one box, according to the following scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46.1 No one is really clear where we are going</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.2 Different parts of the organization are pulling in different directions</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.3 We do not understand what other departments are aiming at</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.4 We are all very busy but we do not seem to get anywhere</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q.47 How clear are you about the limits of your authority in your present position? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
- Somewhat
- Clear
- Very clear

Q.48 How clear are you about what the people around you expect of you? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
- Somewhat
- Clear
- Very clear

Q.49 Are you clear about scope of responsibility in your job? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
- Somewhat
- Clear
- Very clear

Q.50 Are you clear about how your work is evaluated? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
Q.51 Are you clear about scope of advancement in your management position? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
- Somewhat
- Clear
- Very clear

Q.52 In general, to what extent are you clear about your role in your organization? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear
- Not very clear
- Not clear
- Somewhat
- Clear
- Very clear

Please answer the questions below about your own feelings about your job. (For each question, please tick one box, according to the following scale:)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfied</td>
<td>Only slightly satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>Extremely satisfied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.53 To what extent are you satisfied with the amount of security in
Q.54 To what extent are you satisfied with your pay?

Q.55 To what extent are you satisfied with your relationship with your superiors?

Q.56 To what extent are you satisfied with your relationship with other members in your organization?

Q.57 To what extent are you satisfied with the amount of responsibilities you have in your management position?

Q.58 To what extent are you satisfied with the amount of authority connected with your management position?

Q.59 To what extent are you satisfied with the opportunities for independent thought and action that the kind of work you do provides you with?

Q.60 To what extent are you satisfied with the opportunities you have for participation in setting goals and making important decisions in your organization?

Q.61 To what extent
are you satisfied with the opportunities you have for development and getting a more important position in the future?

Q.62 To what extent are you satisfied that your work in your present position makes good use of your skills and abilities?

Q.63 To what extent are you satisfied that your job provides you with a sense of achievement, sense of doing something worthwhile?

Q.64 To what extent are you satisfied that your job provides you with a sense of belonging to your organization?

Q.65 To what extent are you satisfied with the way things are done in this organization?

Q.66 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your job?
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher and Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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