The role of a senior management services officer in the health service.

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THE ROLE OF A SENIOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES OFFICER IN THE HEALTH SERVICE

submitted by Mr Graham Guest
for the degree of Ph.D.
of the University of Bath
1980

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Summary

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model of the role of a senior management services officer in one part of the National Health Service. It puts forward and discusses the deficiencies of other models of this role in order to identify parts of the role which a new model must seek to describe more adequately. The main parts of the role explored can be described as political and the expertise required to carry them out is usually said to be based on experience.

The model put forward in the thesis is a two part model. The first part consists of a set of categories which describe the events which make up all the various aspects of the activities of a management services officer. The general properties and characteristics of these event categories are developed. The second part of the model is concerned with how such events fit together into projects. The main theme of this fitting together of events is the negotiation of order in large complex organisations.

The model is based on a record of the change agent activities of one management services officer over a long period of time. Because of the present lack of understanding of this role and in order to include a wide variety of events in the analysis, an unstructured data collection method was used.
Qualitative data is used in this study and appropriate grounded theory data analysis methods are used in the analysis.

The generality of this model outside the context in which it has been developed is discussed.
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The purpose of this thesis

The successful management of change in large organisations presents many problems. Management Services Officers have a special responsibility for bringing about change and introducing completely new management methods in their organisations. Our understanding of the ways in which they perform that task is limited. There are many reasons for the existence of that lack of understanding, not the least being the wide variety of organisations and circumstances in which these officers must act and solve different sorts of problems. The building of our understanding of the task in organisations in general depends on better understanding of specific situations. At present, even our understanding of specific situations is limited. This thesis attempts to explore how I myself, the Regional Management Services Officer, perform this task in one particular organisation, the Pennine Regional Health Authority (the RHA) of the National Health Service. Although this thesis does include discussion of the generality of the conclusions reached and it is hoped that many conclusions will be widely applicable, it is appropriate to stress that the main aim of this research is to produce an adequate model of this one particular situation.

This chapter outlines the way in which the issue has been approached and the way in which the thesis will present the work done. The key concept which came to be used to explain my behaviour is the negotiation of order and it is suggested that changes of organisations from one state to another involve a variety of negotiations among individuals and groups. This thesis is an elaboration of that negotiation process as it exists in the Pennine RHA.
key concept evolved from the research data and was not part of my early ideas about the change process. It is profitable therefore to trace in outline the way in which the ideas developed before putting them forward in later chapters within the framework determined by this central theme of the negotiation of order.

The evolution of this research

Various explanations or models of the ways in which Management Services Officers bring about change seem to have existed in the past. These are presented in Chapter 2 and are based on published papers and my own experience. That chapter also explores various limitations of those models and identifies their lack of close correspondence with the ways in which these officers actually do behave as being one of their principal defects. This research seeks to remedy that major defect by basing its findings on my own actual activities as recorded in a diary over a period slightly longer than one year. The methods put forward by Glaser and Strauss (1977) are used to analyse that diary data and it was out of this grounded theory, that the key concept of the negotiation of order emerged.

I felt that my own activities over long periods of time fell into at least two groups. On the one hand I often worked on a few large projects in a sustained manner for a long period while on the other hand much of my time was spent on disconnected and seemingly random activities. For this reason, and this is discussed more fully as part of my own detailed research methods in Chapter 4, two diaries - one covering a project and the other covering general activity were kept. Two separate ideas emerged from these diaries. First, it appeared to be possible to give categories to the events in the general diaries, and these categories described the nature of the event. Second, the project
diary consisted of a set of distinct project themes and sets of objectives which appeared to be randomly interwoven. These separate themes were fitted together by people who did this creatively by making agreements with others. The determination of these event categories and the description of the interweaving of the project themes are contained in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, and are the case studies which are the basis of this research.

During the period that the diary data was being recorded and analysed, it was becoming clear that, as a manager, I was fitting together my various activities into significant behaviour patterns in order to do things. My methods for doing this fitting together were not obvious and could not be described easily. They were based on experience and skills loosely described as "political". The literature which was most useful in providing an understanding of this political activity was Allison (1971), Bailey (1977) and Mangham (1978) and (1979). One of the major themes of these books is that people and groups interact and come to agreements about the way forward. This coming together and reaching agreements, in other words negotiating order, became the key concept referred to above. It became clear that Strauss (1978) provided a paradigm for that negotiating process which, apart from its relevance to this key concept and the results of this research, provided a framework which could be used for the presentation of this work in the chapters of this thesis. This presentation method has been adopted but the process used to develop the ideas and described above in outline is important since it demonstrates the grounded nature of those ideas. In view of its importance it is appropriate to present the Strauss work in some detail and this is done below.

However, before presenting Strauss, the way in which I propose to deal with Bailey, Allison and Mangham must be clarified. The influence of those
books on this thesis occurred through their ability to provide insights into specific occurrences in my own data and in particular to help define my political activities. It is useful to identify these specific occurrences and to relate them to concepts put forward by the authors. That can only be done after my own data has been presented in later chapters. Therefore at this stage, despite their importance in the development of this research, I prefer to say only that these works provided these insights into the nature of "political activity". That political activity is described frequently as "using experience", "getting things done" and "causing the wheels to turn". This thesis will suggest that such activities can be viewed as negotiation and it will show how that negotiation occurs in a wide variety of contexts.

Strauss (1978)

As stated above, one of the few studies concerned with the negotiation of order in a variety of complex organisations is Strauss (1978) "Negotiations - Varieties, Contexts, Processes and Social Orders". It is particularly relevant to this thesis since it argues that negotiation is central to understanding a wide variety of social processes, not a subsidiary theme which should be made to support other key concepts such as functionalism or game theory. There are three parts to the discussion in the book followed by discussion of the implications of its theory. First, the parts which negotiation has played in other theories are investigated and found inadequate. Second, a paradigm for negotiation is put forward and third, the application of that paradigm to various case studies is explored. This review starts by describing the paradigm.

The first part of the analytic structure, the paradigm, suggested by the author is the description of the negotiation itself. That description would include the accompanying interactions, the type of actors and their strategies
and tactics, some consequences of and, in particular, the subprocesses of negotiation which exist. These subprocesses include concepts such as paybacks, and types of agreements.

The second part of the paradigm is the structural context of that particular negotiation and is an attempt to represent the totality of the effect which the context has on the negotiation. For instance, one of the studies in the book concerns the negotiation of a new order in a psychiatric institution, an exercise in which a variety of professional people were involved and moved a long way from the traditional structures which apply in such circumstances. In this case, the structural context of the negotiation includes the properties of the American medical care system, specialisation among caring professions and similar parts of a larger social framework surrounding psychiatric care.

Strauss introduces as the third part of the paradigm the concept of a negotiation context. Whilst ward or hospitals and similar entities are concrete social units, awareness contexts were developed by Strauss in his earlier researches as an analytic social unit used to describe and account for similarities in awareness in different wards or hospitals. Similarly, different negotiations are amenable to the same sort of descriptions and analysis. The kinds of negotiation context identified are:

(a) The number of negotiators, their relative experience in negotiating, and whom they represent.

(b) Whether the negotiations are one-shot, repeated, sequential, serial, multiple, or linked.

(c) The relative balance of power exhibited by the respective parties in negotiation itself.
(d) The nature of their respective stakes in the negotiation.

(e) The visibility of the transactions to others; that is, their overt or covert characters.

(f) The number and complexity of the issues negotiated.

(g) The clarity of legitimacy boundaries of the issues negotiated.

(h) The options to avoiding or discontinuing negotiation, that is, the alternative modes of action perceived as available.

Strauss insists that a steady focus on both the structural and negotiation contexts is necessary. He suggests that researchers have tended to concentrate on only one of these and gives example of how the use of the paradigm would have improved studies by prompting researchers to fill out the other part of their case. He points out the counterbalancing effects which more stress on structural context has for studies which concentrate on the negotiating process as such. In particular he says "It helps in assessing what has been omitted or glossed over in the author's analysis, either because of the nature of the data or because of his particular analytic scheme".

Another issue raised by Strauss in relation to the use of the paradigm is the extent to which researchers are aware of actors' assumptions about the negotiation process. In the examples which he uses there is a wide divergence of awareness. It is clear that the psychiatrists and other professionals in his study of psychiatric wards had little awareness. But one must assume that both the political and the legal case studies revolve round participants for whom such considerations were second nature.

Strauss quotes a review of negotiation by Zartman (1976) who identifies seven different schools of thought. Zartman says that these schools focus on particular interests:
1) Pure historical description of particular negotiations.

2) Contextual study of the contents of negotiations. Particular outcomes are seen as determined by a particular phaseological interpretation either of the history of the negotiation itself, or of the larger phase of history into which the negotiation fits.

3) Structural. Explanation of outcomes is found in the patterns of relationships between parties or their goals.

4) Strategic. Focus is on the element of choice, as determined by the structure of the values at stake and also by the other parties' pattern of selection.

5) Developing personality types in order to explain negotiation outcomes.

6) Behavioural skills as explanations of the outcomes.

7) Process. Negotiation is viewed as a challenge-and-response encounter in which the moves are the inputs and negotiating is a learning process. Parties use their bids both to respond to the previous counteroffer and to influence the next. The offers themselves become an exercise in power.

Each of these schools has generated case studies in which negotiating is important. But each selects another key concept as its principal analytical concept.

In Part 1, Strauss traces some of the ways in which he considers that the negotiating process has not been seen to be important by researchers and has led them not to concentrate their attention on that process. He traces this lack of concern right back to Hobbes and Rousseau who do in fact postulate a form of
social contract but simply assume some process will bring it into existence, but
do not explore that process. However, the main thrust of Strauss' analysis of
the neglect of negotiation in the literature is contained in Chapters 1 to 7 in
which he takes the studies by Goffman, Blau, Gouldner, Banfield, Ricker,
Coleman and Morse and attempts to describe the ways in which he believes that
they have neglected negotiation in preference to other key concepts.
Obviously, it is impossible to review all that Strauss says which leads him to
assert a need to give more emphasis to negotiation, but it is worth picking out
some of the major points in one paper.

Strauss chooses to analyse Goffman (1961) "On the Characteristics of
Total Institutions". The main thrust of Goffman's paper is that there exists a
class of institutions (among them prisons, concentration camps and - to the
consternation of many psychiatrists - mental hospitals) in which relationships
within them are primarily coercive. The principal actors in these dramas in the
institutions are the staff and the inmates. Goffman concentrates on giving a
social structural analysis of why people of different status act as they do.
Strauss insists that Goffman does indeed recognise that inmates and staff are
involved in relationships involving coercion, manipulation and negotiation. But
Goffman's main argument is that every organisation has official expectations of
what each participant owes it. Goffman goes on to recognise that there is a
complete "underlife" behind and beyond these official expectations. He cites a
vast array of clique relationships, having buddies, ways of influencing people to
carry out your wishes and says "these underlie and stabilize a vast complex of
unofficial, undercover practices". Strauss' main point is that, having recognised
the existence of these factors, Goffman devotes only three pages out of one
hundred and forty six to their analysis.
Strauss argues that Goffman is too much influenced by sociological preconceptions concerned with the individual's actions being at least framed, but more probably, structurally determined by their sociological setting. He suggests that Goffman does not notice his swinging backwards and forwards between the individual and his participant roles. In the final paragraph Strauss says:-

"But to return again to Goffman's substantive account of total institutions: In his analysis, the personnel are mainly acting, most of the time, to maintain the coercive order, and the inmates are either playing by the rules, both explicit and implicit, or acting around the margins of those rules. Their actions may or may not disrupt the ongoing order of events but certainly they do not, ultimately, shape anew the nature of social order of the total institution itself. Of course, we must readily agree that inmates must come to terms with institutional coercion - so must the coercive personnel, in their own way - but we may disagree with Goffman about how they come to terms. We may wonder, too, whether they necessarily develop selves primarily in reaction against the coercive elements of the institution."

By these sorts of arguments and examples and from a variety of points of view put forward in his first eight chapters, Strauss makes the case that negotiation has not been recognised as being sufficiently important. But in some form, it is there in all studies. He goes on to argue for the centrality of the negotiating process and puts forward his own paradigm described above.

In Part 2, Strauss applies his negotiating paradigm to a wide variety of different case studies. I think that it is worth quoting the wide variety of circumstances in which Strauss sees the application of the paradigm -
(a) Continuous Working Relations in Organisations:
   Case: Experimental Psychiatric Wards
   Case: Continuous Working Relations in Industrial Firms

(b) Interplay of Legal and Illegal Negotiations in the Political Arena:
   Case: The Corrupt Judge
   Case: Large-Scale Corruption - The Political Machine

(c) Building Co-operative Structures:
   Case: Benelux: A Durable Structure
   Case: The Nuremberg Trials: A Temporary Structure

(d) Negotiating Compromises Within Social Orders:
   Case: Clan Intermarriage and Bridewealth Negotiations
   Case: Negotiation Between Insurance Companies and Claimants

(e) Antagonistic Negotiation Within Changing Structural Contexts:
   Case: The United States and the Soviet Union:
       Negotiating over the Balkans
   Case: Kenya: Ethnic Negotiations

(f) Limits, Silent Bargains, and Implicit Negotiations:
   Case: Geriatric Wards and the Silent Bargain

In order to illustrate Strauss' application of the paradigm, it is worth following one case study in detail, namely, Continuous Working Relationships in Industrial Firms.

This study by Strauss is based on Dalton (1959). During the 1950's, organisational theory pictured industrial concerns as purposeful organisations, their policies determined from above and executed more or less rationally by
the organisation below. Dalton's work spells out a picture of heterogeneity, clashing of group and individual purpose, people working at cross purposes and there being no sense of unified purpose.

The first thing Strauss does with the Dalton data is to establish a structural context. A quotation illustrates this -

"The structural context that bears on these negotiations includes at least the following major conditions: 'what everybody knows' about American industry and the marketplace, the existence of management-labour conflicts within such industries, the existence of labour unions, of their agreements with both through negotiation with management and through the passage of legislation, and the differential status and social class positions and careers or jobs of workers and managers."

Strauss then starts to identify the negotiating context in the following sorts of terms:-

- Many principal negotiators have repeated negotiation with each other.
- One or both negotiators represent others not present, but in fact represent themselves additionally or instead.
- Much negotiation is covert.
- Ambiguity exists about the legitimate negotiating boundaries.
- The stakes are different on both sides, though not necessarily exclusive.
- The balance of power is variable.
- There are threats around if desirable outcomes cannot be negotiated.
- There is no recourse to law or any other mediating force if failure occurs -
- But the manipulation of contingent events is often an alternative or accompaniment of negotiation.

Within these two contexts, Strauss demonstrates a wide variety of negotiating stances and action from the Dalton data. At one extreme an aggrieved person is withholding his union dues from a person who is supposed to sort out his problems and who has not lived up to expectations. I think that Strauss would relate this to the negotiating contexts concerned with the shifting power and the different stakes.

Strauss quotes another example concerning the movement of a day foreman:

"Because of their repeated negotiations and cumulative obligations, one party may have to work very hard in order to make some working arrangement actually "stick" with others who have different stakes in those negotiations. For example, a general foreman wanted to move a day foreman to the night shift and a night foreman to the day shift. But when told this by the general foreman, the latter went to the griever to cash in on obligations owing to him from previous negotiations with the griever. The griever agreed to counteract the agitation among the workers for rotation of shifts, which had been set in motion by the night shift foreman, who himself wished to move to the day shift. Meanwhile the general foreman suggested to the griever that a change might be
good for everyone; the griever agreed but said nothing of his arrangement with the day foreman. The griever at first was unsuccessful in arguing against rotation with the workers, but eventually he succeeded in persuading the night workers and then won the general vote on the issue of rotation. The general foreman knew that he had been outsmarted but did not press the griever, who had previously helped him to obtain a vacation schedule that otherwise would have been difficult to get the workers to accept. That last sentence underscores what Dalton has, quite properly, called the "web of commitments" that evolves as a consequence of these typically repeated, serial, and linked negotiations."

This is clearly an example of several of the negotiating contexts at work, in particular, the two concerned with repeated negotiations and covert negotiations.

In summarising his conclusion from this case study, Strauss comments that negotiated order seems to be a useful concept and he contrasts this with Dalton's ideas in the following way:--

"In his attempt to conceptualize the structure of relationships within these establishments, Dalton leaned, it will be remembered on the cementing idea of 'informal relations'. His detailed analysis, however, is replete with such terms as the web of commitments and overt workable arrangements, which emphasise the continuous relationships required to get the organisations' and the men's work done. While there is no question at all that a full conceptualization of social order of these industrial plants would have to take into account such traditional items as hierarchy, authority, and the usual
terms referred to in tables of organisation, it is also equally clear that Dalton's data and its detailed analysis lead one to view that social order as much more. These organisations may not be as quickly or radically changing as the psychiatric wards discussed earlier (those seemed to be changing right under the eyes of the researchers, month by month); the web of relationships that sustains the work is nevertheless changing continuously and in the most subtle, not to say often covert, ways. The term negotiated order does not capture everything about the social order of these factories, but it does go a very long way in suggesting some major features of order."

In putting forward his theory of negotiation, Strauss illustrates the wide variety of sets of concepts which can be made to revolve around this theme. The concepts used to describe the change process in this thesis is another such set. This theme of negotiation and the contexts suggested by Strauss have been used as a structure for this thesis.

The structure of the thesis

As stated above, the purpose of this thesis is to describe the role of a senior management services officer in one Regional Health Authority. That description consists of a model with two main parts. The first part is a set of categories which describe and typify the individual actions which the officer takes while the second part describes the way in which events which can be given those categories are fitted together in projects to bring about major changes in the organisation. This two part model provides a refined description of those parts of the role which can be described loosely as political or based on experience.
There are other parts of management services work alongside which political activity and the use of experience must take place. For example, these other sorts of work include technical project work. In Chapter 2, and on the basis of my own experience, five models of management services work are put forward to illustrate some of these other aspects of management services. Not only do they illustrate other aspects of management services, they demonstrate a range of states of development in which it is possible to find management services organisations. For example, some management services departments are principally concerned with project evaluation which is the essence of one of the models. The first five models do not represent an in-depth analysis of our current understanding, but they are based on my own experience of the types of management services activity which can be found. The models in Chapter 2 illustrate some conceptions of management services which appear to be common at present. The sixth model is a very simple version of the one to be developed in this thesis. On the basis of these models, Chapter 2 starts to pinpoint the deficiencies of our present understanding of the role of a management services officer and to describe the issues with which this thesis attempts to deal.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the two parts of the Strauss paradigm, the structural and the negotiating contexts, provide two basic parts of this thesis. A structural context for the role of a management services officer in the NHS is the total set of organisational aspects of the NHS which affect the role. Part of that NHS organisational structure is the organisational structure created by legislation such as the existence of Regions, Areas and Districts. Another part is the particular interpretation of the official structure which exists in this Region. A third part is all of the informal organisational structure such as groups of people who eat and talk together regularly. In so
far as management services brings about changes, it occurs within these structures which therefore constitute Strauss' structural context. This structural context is described in Chapter 3.

The second part of the Strauss paradigm is the negotiating context. This corresponds in this thesis to an analysis of the role of the management services officer which is viewed principally as negotiating a new order in the NHS. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are that analysis. In Chapter 5, the individual events which made up the activity of a management services officer over a long period are analysed and categorised. In Chapter 6, a major project is analysed and an attempt is made to explain how events such as those explored in Chapter 5 are fitted together in that project. Chapter 7 is the heart of the model put forward in this thesis. In it, the categories developed in Chapter 5 are taken one by one and an attempt to describe their general characteristics is made. Chapter 7 also describes in general terms the process used to fit together into projects individual events such as those given categories in Chapter 5. That general fitting together process is based on the actual examples contained in Chapter 6. Thus, in these three chapters, a general model of the role of a management services officer is developed on the basis of the analysis of real data on specific events and projects. An important characteristic of the model developed in this thesis is that it is truly grounded on specific actual experience.

Chapter 4 explains the analysis methods which are used to ensure that the model is a grounded theoretical model. The chapter takes analysis methods, mainly those of Glazer and Strauss, and describes the way in which they have been used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The basic data used in the analysis is contained in two diaries in two appendices. Chapter 4 reviews the use of
diaries for these purposes, especially the strengths and weaknesses of their uses, and the analysis methods which have been used on diaries.

Having explained the way the analysis has been done, and having developed the new model in the first seven chapters, the eighth chapter is an attempt to relate the work in this thesis to other published material in the same field. The comparisons made are confined to the narrow fields of political activity and categories developed on the basis of diaries.
CHAPTER 2 - VARIOUS MODELS OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACTIVITY

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to formulate a model of the parts of the role of a management services officer which are usually described as "political" and are based "on experience". Other parts of the role, such as using technical skills, are better understood. It is useful to relate political activity to these better understood skills since one way of regarding political activity is as a cement which links the others together into useful coherent projects. The first five models of management services activity in this chapter are attempts to present these other, in the main, non-political skills coherently. The non-political skills are put together in the first five models in a way that reflects the attitudes of management services officers towards the problems they solve, the people to whom they must relate and the organisation they must change, i.e. the Regional Health Authority. The deficiencies of the five are pointers to the parts of the change agent activity which a better model must seek to describe.

Model 6 in this chapter represents the first crude version of the model which this thesis attempts to develop. Based on the case study material contained in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 contains the description of the developed form of Model 6. Models 1 to 5 are descriptions of various forms of management services activity which I believe exist. Each model of this activity is described in terms of six variables which seem to go a considerable way towards explaining the significance and effectiveness of that particular activity for a change agent role. It could be argued cogently that it is impossible to find actual departments corresponding to the five models. One reason is that, for the sake of clarity, the features have been charicatured.
Whether pure examples of these models exist or not, I suggest that by looking at real departments with the models in mind, significant explanations of major parts of the activity of those departments can be constructed. These models should be viewed in that light.

Ackoff has stimulated a discussion in the OR world concerned with the deficiencies of our understanding of how to change organisations, i.e. what is wrong with Models 1 to 5. Ackoff also puts forward a new paradigm for carrying out OR in large organisations. The chapter uses that discussion to clarify still further the problems which the model in Chapters 5 to 7 is seeking to alleviate.

Six models of management services activity

The six models of Management Services described in Figure 1 range from a very simple model to a very complex model. The first one which has been described as the Ivory Tower is one in which the Management Services organisation is completely technique orientated and regards the perfection of that technique and its use in a pure way as its role. The last one, model 6, attempts to start to describe a different sort of Management Services Division in which Management Services Officers seek to identify more closely with the officers and the organisation for whom they are working and to become fully involved in its corporate activity. The last model, number 6, can be found in many organisations and is the one which the RHA is attempting to operate. Most of the manifestations of that model which I know have leaders whose modus operandi is complex. That complexity is not well understood and is usually talked about in very general terms such as "experience" or "having a feel for the organisation". The major objective of this thesis is to explore some of the things which my Division currently does with a view to describing that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIG. 1 : SIX MODELS OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACTIVITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow specialist function technical problem solving only. Tight problem boundaries User situation explored sufficiently to get good problem definition from a technical viewpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well defined narrow technical problem solving skills. Problem as given, stripped of non-technical elements - often idealised Problems larger and more amorphous. Often not analysable to analytical solution. Ability to pursue improvements only - optimum rarely sought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High management service group support. Uncompromisingly narrow commitment to outsiders. Little need to relate below top levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predator for support and services Predator for good problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value academic correctness, elegance and analytical skill Interest in real problems and solutions. Prepared to consider inelegant methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often detached sometimes arrogant Naive attitude to change - &quot;someone else's business to manage and change&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounced and puzzled. Sometimes hostile. Essentially predatory. Needs organisation for good problems. Still essentially not very helpful,</td>
</tr>
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model more accurately. The thesis also tries to relate that model to the complex arguments about methodology and basic paradigms which are taking place at the present time in the operational research literature in particular. In that literature, the basic paradigm on which operational research has operated for a long number of years is being questioned very vigorously. Attempts are being made to replace it by a more suitable one. But even the models which are currently being discussed in the literature do not reflect the actual happenings in the type of Management Services Divisions which I would like to create. The models in the literature are still concerned essentially with a theoretical approach to doing management services jobs rather than the practice of doing those jobs.

In view of this division between what has been described in the literature and what actually happens in practice, it is unreasonable to expect to be able to describe the varieties of management service activity in a totally clear and logical way. Figure 1 sets out in an idealised way six different views of management services activity. Each can be observed in practice. Although the progression from Model 1 to 6 appears to suggest a development through consecutive stages to a more desirable state of affairs, any idea of a necessarily consequential development through those stages or value judgements concerning the worth of divisions in particular states should be discarded. Figure 1 and the change in attributes between the models are set out in this way merely as a framework to facilitate the discussion of management services paradigms in this thesis.

Between the first and the last models contained in Figure 1, there are four other models of behaviour which can be observed in Management Services Divisions. The models in Figure 1 are not intended to define exhaustively all of
the activities which can be found in Management Services Departments. They only seek to illustrate some of the main characteristics which can be detected among some Management Services Divisions in the country. Nevertheless, the main model characteristics which are described in the first row, are important ones and the differences between them reflect important differences in the behaviour of those organisations. It has been useful to also try to illustrate the models by talking about the skills and attitudes which seem to prevail in each one of them. For both the skills and the attitudes, a useful differentiation can be made among the ways in which these are applied to the problems which are being solved, the people within the host organisation i.e. the total RHA and the parent organisation itself.

Model Characteristics

The essential characteristics described in the top row of Figure 1 change from a Management Services organisation which is completely "academic" and "detached" in its basic approach to one in which the Division is completely "involved" and "concerned" with the changes which it brings about in the parent organisation. In Model 1, which is called the Ivory Tower, the problem definition tends to get simplified into a form in which it is amenable to analytical or at least well defined methods of solution. There is a basic difference between that approach and that contained in Model 2 where there is an attempt to try to model more precisely the problem which exists. Most models of problems tend not to be amenable to analytical solutions and the use of more complex techniques such as simulation, error analysis and sensitivity analysis become important and much more common. Attempts to obtain a solution which will at least work in theory are a feature of the way in which the Model 2 Management Services people define and solve problems. However, the
relationship of these Management Services officers to the organisation and to the people within it is still very detached on the whole.

Moving past the stage at which a reasonable problem definition is being provided for the user, the field of interest moves towards implementation of the solution. Model 3 describes the narrow implementation of solutions in areas which immediately surround the original problem area. Sometimes, these are very mechanistic implementations of solutions and provide only the lowest level training needed to get operators to work the solution. The fact that a particular solution of a limited problem has got immediate consequences for the larger organisation is ignored as being far too difficult a situation to deal with. One of the characteristics of these types of solution is that they tend not to be effective in the longer term or, if they are to be effective, they need to be considerably modified, often by the users, when the effects of the solution outside the immediate area of application become apparent.

Model 4, the evaluators, moves along much further into a field in which the Management Services officers become involved with value judgements about whether or not the whole exercise is deemed to be valuable and worthwhile. There is a mechanistic level at which the question of value can be answered and the associated mechanistic methods concern the identification of specific benefits which are said to accrue from the solution. Those benefits are formulated in terms of cash benefits, benefits which can be directly measured in terms which can be understood by management, or in terms of variables said to measure the behaviour of the organisation, for example, attitude surveys. But the model does represent a very significant change in the direction of Management Services and that change is probably brought home to the full in Model 5, the solution architects. In this particular model, the solutions are carefully cemented into other management structures which exist within the
parent organisation, so as to obtain a situation in which the solution is not only implemented but is thereafter continually monitored as part of the on-going management activity. The continuing realisation of the project's benefits has become important. At this stage the activities of the problem solvers have become quite complex and the implementation of solutions are exceedingly involved with the management organisation which can not only implement solutions but can keep them working thereafter and evaluate their performance.

An important characteristic of Models 1 to 5 which differentiate them from Model 6, the Corporate Innovators, is in the style in which the problems themselves come to be formulated in the first place. On the whole in Models 1 to 5, the problem formulation depends on an analytical approach carried out by the Management Services Officer. In Model 6, a much more complex problem identification procedure and solution implementation has completely taken over. The corporate body of managers is much more responsible for identifying the problem, its possible range of solutions, the methods of solution, including inter-divisional groups which are to provide a solution, and the way in which they are going to restructure their own procedures to encompass that solution.

In order to explore these six models a little more, the following three sections discuss the problem, people and organisation aspects of the models contained in the Figure. The discussion covers both the skills which are deployed and some of the attitudes which seem to be prevalent in the six types of management services activity.

Skills with and attitudes towards problems

The additions to the problem skills as one moves from Model 1 to Model 6 are numerous. Even the change between the first two is marked. The
difference between a neat, simple, analytical solution and one involving probabilities say in Model 2, especially if the statistics concern the use of "real" data, is large. The set of technical skills associated with evaluation work is different from the problem solving technical skills. As the emphasis switches towards better implementation, the need for skills associated with people and the organisation described below starts to build up, but they must not be allowed to displace completely the skill to provide a "correct" technical solution.

The attitude change towards the problem is important and full of issues. It may be that Model 1 over-values the technical problem definition and is prepared to make unwise compromises about reality in order to achieve that degree of definition. But it is also true that the deals and compromises inherent in Model 6 can destroy the value of the proposal. Model 2 probably presents the best statement of problem to be solved. Models 3, 4 and 5 all represent a need to compromise amongst sometimes conflicting attitudes towards problem definition, implementation and value judgements about what is worthwhile in any case. In particular, it is often true that implementation necessitates making compromises about the problem to be solved, and basic attitude changes are necessary if the new sort of solution is to be made to work. Similarly, the change to the evaluation Model means that the value systems which underpin the work being done must be radically different.

In the last Model, number 6, the whole problem of who in the organisation is seeing the different facets of the problem, can make a radical difference to the problem which gets solved. The feasibility of a particular set of actions, the political atmosphere surrounding the situation and similar considerations, help to determine the problem to be solved also. Who owns the problem eventually can become a major issue. But, despite these influences, all of the
skills involved in Models 1 to 5 ought to get carried forward into Model 6. For example, Model 6, to be effective must be built on solid technical problem solving foundations, but these are not in themselves sufficient. Perhaps the most difficult set of attitudes about problems in this model concerns the willingness to make compromises among the different facets of problem solving other models, the ability to contemplate the possible outcomes of those compromises and the determination to push that set of possible outcomes to the limit in order to bring about change.

Skills with and attitudes towards people

The people skills which are deployed in the six models show a similar development to those concerned with the problem above. At one extreme, ivory tower personnel can simply be nice ordinary people; while at the other extreme, their ivory tower can be used often to excuse appalling behaviour. On the other hand, a Model 6 operator needs to be very skillful with people.

A useful way of gaining understanding of the models of management services being discussed is to identify some of their negative characteristics and to try to compare the models from those viewpoints. Two such characteristics seem to me particularly important.

It seems almost inevitable that there is a mismatch between what change in organisational behaviour a Management Services Officer thinks is possible and the views of his customer. The first is accustomed to living with change, the second is less used to it. The frustration seen in Model 1 often arises from the intellectual arrogance and narrow world view which many ivory tower dwellers possess. For example, a mathematical demonstration that all the facilities and supply of raw materials exist to reach a given level of production is often accompanied by a lack of understanding of the difficulties of achieving
those production levels in practice. At the other extreme, Management Services Officers who have a good grasp of the basic elements of managing people in a change process can become very angry in private about the lack of management skill which seems to characterise senior managers who are their customers, and who are often highly paid in comparison with themselves. It is common for line managers not to have time to learn modern basic skills required for their own job. For example, few capital project managers have even an elementary grasp of the use of PERT for capital project control. This frustration disappears slowly, if ever, to be replaced by an acceptance of people as they are.

The other problem which seems worth identifying in a discussion of these models is the clash of basic value systems which can destroy completely the fruits of good project work. The difference in value system between a medical and a lay administrator illustrates the point. Whereas a lay administrator will set great store on the orderliness of a particular management arrangement in bureaucratic terms, a medical administrator will tend to see any new arrangement from the traditional medical freedom and power viewpoint. Both value systems may clash with the efficiency viewpoint of management services. For example, the control of drug usage is a classical case of this conflict. The three viewpoints are manifestly incompatible and the various forays into this particular field, even when backed by high powered individuals or groups, achieve very little.

The development of skills with people as one passes through the Models shows the sort of development one would expect. Greater involvement with real change means involvement with people. Thus the abilities to train, motivate, negotiate and the whole range of inter-personal skills come into play
sooner or later. Perhaps the one characteristic of management services projects is the high degree of training skill which is involved. Model 5 depends on very high quality training in systematic management for a successful outcome.

Skill used in dealing with and attitudes towards the functioning of the organisation

The relationship of Management Services Officers operating the first five models to the organisation shows the same sort of development as does their relationships with people and problems. That development reflects the dawning realisation that in order to implement change in a complex bureaucratic organisation, a considerable amount of social engineering is required, i.e. a complex relationship with the organisation, its people and its structures must be built. Again, it is characteristic of the development of that relationship that there are stages within it when frustration is very deeply felt. It seems to be a feature of Management Services organisations and their becoming more involved with the people outside its own boundaries, that they grapple with that involvement problem in a comparatively naive way. For example, they do not study the problem of effectiveness and their relationship with their own parent organisation using their own problem solving techniques. A characteristic of the development of the relationship with the organisation is the growing knowledge of how the formal and informal structures within the organisation can actually be made to work. The growing appreciation of the power, window dressing, status, and the many other facets of various committees, groups and other parts of the structure with which one has to deal is part of that process. Another important change which occurs alongside both of the people and the organisation rows in Figure 1, is the change from an interest in the problem
formulation to a determination to get things done. That development can be seen in the columns of the Model but it is a most difficult thing to describe in detail.

One of the characteristics of the work done in this research project is to examine the nature of the end product of the changes described in Figure 1. Model 6, the corporate innovators, is described in the table using terms which lack precision such as trusting relationships. Trust relationships among groups of people can be talked about easily but to actually construct them within an organisation in which differing value systems motivate people to move apart from each other is a very different thing from talking about them. Trusting relationships (Golembiewski 1976) are important and are reviewed in Chapter 7. Actually understanding what value systems exist in the organisation and how they differ fundamentally from the ones which apply within the Management Services Division is complex. It often relies on being able to wonder how a certain person became what he is and to piece together an explanation of that process and its result. That understanding can transform the customer's set of obdurate stances and the operation of seemingly senseless value systems into ones which make sense. Knowing that there are informal methods of getting things done and knowing that 'front stage' negotiation is not usually a good thing to do is completely different in kind from being able to use that knowledge. Even knowing what are the real informal routes for getting things done and where the power lies within the organisation, can be quite complex. The ability to have open discussions with other senior officers is a subject which is talked about at length and not achieved very often. To describe these skills in general terms is not very useful. What appears to be needed is a framework which can be used to structure the activities of senior managers as they try to operate as change agents in this way.
Examples of the models of management services activity

A perfect example of Model 1 is the collection of papers published on queuing theory, for example, The Economic Service Rate, W K Grassman (1978). The paper considers the problem of finding an optimal or economic service rate in queues regarded as a birth and death process. Various costs and the revenue gained from each customer are considered and it presents graphs which aid the solution of the problem. The paper compares similar explorations of the same problem from somewhat different viewpoints which have been presented elsewhere. The paper is in an applied research journal, but it actually consists mostly of applied mathematics. Generalisations are suspect, but most queues in business tend not to conform to the underlying birth/death model in this paper. In particular, shift changes and similar features disrupt arrival and service patterns in a systematic way. Managers must re-arrange the order of items in queues to serve their important customers. The relevance of advanced queuing models to such situations is very questionable.

An excellent example of Model 2 is a paper given at the 1960 Oslo OR Conference by K D Tocher and G Guest. It concerns a complex simulation of the flow of steel through a steel plant and attached to the plant model was a simulated set of heuristic control algorithms, the purpose of which was to increase throughput. The superiority of the simulated control over the existing managers was demonstrated by an equally complex gaming model which allowed managers to control the flow of the same lot of steel through the plant model and this they did. The problem and solution definition was very good, but the work, which consumed many years of effort, was not implemented.

Examples of narrow solution implementors are many. One of the most common must be the narrow use made of payroll data bases. That information
data base has considerable potential for manpower planning and control. And yet, for example in the NHS, the preparation of plans depends on the tedious and costly manual extraction of manpower data from payroll computer print outs designed for other purposes. This is only a small part of the problem of attempting to relate together all of the major computing systems in the NHS, for example, payroll, accounting, patient care activity statistics as well as manpower data. The drawbacks of the lack of integrated design concepts were known at least a decade ago, and yet no effective action has been taken to rectify the problems created by narrow implementation. And the attitude still persists.

Examples of Model 4 evaluation activities can be found in most management services papers, since one of the principle reasons for many of the projects is a "saving" of some sort. It is important to note that there is an almost continuous tension between the accountants who claim to be expert in this field and the OR scientists about the basis for this type of work. The principle arguments seem to be about what type of costs are appropriate to the different calculations, M F Cantley (1979). This paper is a plea for better understanding by accountants and OR scientists of each others approaches to basic money calculations. For example, different attitudes towards set up costs and inventory holding costs are explained. One of the regular areas of disagreement is the use of marginal costs, an example of which has been the pricing of steel on the over-supplied export markets, Private paper, Cost Model (1968). In the NHS, the best example of evaluation work is that concerned with the National Experimental Computer Programme. This is still the basis of much work, Handbook for the Measurement of Performance Criteria, Head Office (1979). It purports to be a detailed set of methods for calculating the benefits which a Health Authority can obtain from a whole set of computer
control routines for running hospitals.

Examples of the Monitored Solution Architect's work are harder to find. A prime example in the work of the Division is the control of catering standards throughout the Region, Catering Monitoring Programme, RHA (1978). Catering has been split into eight main areas of concern, e.g. waste. Detailed objectives and standards have now been set. For another aspect of catering, patient services, there are over a hundred aspects of serving meals to patients which have been identified and for which an acceptable practice has been agreed. A whole method of measuring performance has been created, comprehensive training programmes for all staff in each aspect of their work exists and managers throughout the Region have been trained and appear to be motivated to make this work. The management must report performance to their Authorities in a prescribed manner and levels of performance are being raised. There is no doubt that the whole system was built into the very structure of power and authority at all levels in the Region.

Another example, Doyle and Fenwick (1979) concerns the development and monitoring of the network of local bank branches. Again the performance variables, e.g. number of personal accounts, and the control variables, e.g. location features, are identified and a relationship model established between them. On the basis of this model managers can define and monitor performance objectives for each branch and the network as a whole.

Model 6, the corporate innovators, presents many more problems for the person seeking to provide a description. The literature tends to deal with particular and fairly narrow aspects of this type of work but does not seem to try to deal with the process of changing practices in a large complex organisation. For example, in the above banking project it must have been very
difficult to negotiate the required change with the hundred and eighty branch managers. The stereotype of a local bank manager suggests a person of extremely conservative nature. A tantalizing set of unanswered questions surrounds these negotiations and the author does not appear to wish to provide those answers. If the process is discussed, then it seems to take place in a somewhat theoretical way rather than be based on ordinary actual experience. The best developed example of that type of discussion is occurring in the OR world at the present time and important contributions to the JORS, Ackoff (1979) have served to crystalise the debate.

Some difficulties associated with Model 6

In theory, the basic paradigm underlying OR work has been clear for a long time and is printed in every copy of the Journal of the OR Society.

"Operational Research is the application of the methods of science to complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials and money in industry, business, government, and defence. The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as chance and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcomes of alternative decisions, strategies or controls. The purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically."

It states that analysis leads on to the formulation of a model on the basis of which predications about the future can be made and from those predications a solution is chosen and implemented. Ackoff suggests that this "predict and prepare" position should be replaced by "designing a desirable future and inventing ways of bring is about". From the point of view of this thesis, the most important parts of the papers concern the change in process for doing OR that is entailed. For the first paradigm a machine age mechanistic set of
attitudes is appropriate. But, for the second, recognition of the "mess" with which managers deal, and in particular, the effects of that "mess" on processes designed to bring about changes and improvements, becomes important. Ackoff describes in vivid terms the way in which the analytical tools, in the main pieces of applied mathematics, have come to be taught as straight techniques in colleges and universities and, in that process, OR has become essentially unidisciplinary, i.e. the OR discipline. He argues that this, and other factors have had the effect of changing the involvement in and the approach to the problem which the customer wishes to be solved. The machine age, reductionist OR man cannot cope with a "mess".

The second Ackoff paper describes various facets of designing a more desirable future, i.e. how to cope with a "mess", in a word, planning. It develops the idea of a five step interactive planning process.

- formulating the mess
- selecting organisational goals, objectives and ideals and the means of pursuing them
- providing the resources required by the pursuit
- implementing and controlling it.

The hallmark of this planning is participation by those for whom the plan is being made and the whole process is a development of ideas already published, Ackoff (1970).

Ackoff then goes on to suggest changes in the practice of OR, the way education for OR should change and the way in which its professional society should function in order to support this new activity. He goes on to describe
the way in which this type of approach has been realised in the Busch Centre in which Ackoff works.

There is no doubt that the Ackoff papers represent a simulating challenge to existing OR methodology and practice. But the reaction of the OR world to them has been cautious. This was exemplified by a Seminar at Bath University which took the Ackoff papers as its theme. Many aspects of the approach were discussed but, the theme important to this thesis concerns the necessary types of skill used to bring about change. Two particular points were made. First, despite the fact that a major theme of the Ackoff papers is that the machine age analytical approach had severe drawbacks, it was defended strongly. Second, whilst acknowledging that implementation did depend on "political" skills, there was a marked reluctance to analyse those skills. Experience or personal native wit were deemed to be the main, if not the only, prescriptions for success. It would be wrong to say that the Ackoff papers dismiss those aspects of practice based on the new paradigm with the same ease as the Seminar appeared to do. Ackoff identifies six aspects of his interactive planning process which come near to discussing the skills to be used:

- participation by the stakeholders
- incorporation of the aesthetic values of stakeholders
- generating a consensus among participants
- releasing creativity and focusing it on the development of the organisation
- mobilising the crusading spirit of participants
- expanding the participants concept of feasibility.
These six points demonstrate a fundamental characteristic of the papers, optimism and the paper describes the process as being "fun". Obviously Ackoff would have much to say about the serious business of negotiating change but he does not do this in the paper. But lying beneath these differing views on the nature of the change process lies an important problem and there appears to be a gap in the literature. What are the set of processes which facilitate change and how do senior OR managers operate day by day to bring about change?

Summary

The main aim of this chapter has been to discuss the deficiencies of our present understanding of the role of a management services officer in the NHS. Five models of our present understanding have been given and a crude version of a sixth, the one to be developed in this thesis, has been put forward. A major characteristic of the first five models is that they place great reliance on analytical techniques and tend to undervalue or not represent at all the political skills needed to make project work effective. The above discussion which uses the Ackoff debate about management messes as a central theme suggests that insufficient attention has been given to understanding and modelling the actual activity of change agents. It is still common to use very theoretical models of how to change big organisations and such models seem to be inadequate.

The sixth model is the main concern of this thesis. The research is based on the idea of refining Model 6 by answering the question "What do management services people actually do?". The approach depends on the ideas of Glaser and Strauss (1976) in their book, "The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Strategies for Qualitative Research". The way in which the research has been done is described in the next chapter. The research seeks to describe more fully the
actual processes involved in applying Model 6 above - "The Corporate Activist". It attempts to base that description firmly on what actually happened over a long period of time and to synthesise the categories used in that description from a detailed record of the actual experience. The research attempts, although to some extent it must fail, to ignore preconceived and existing models of what "ought" to be happening.

In the next chapter, there is an attempt to describe the context within which NHS management services people must work. As explained in Chapter 1, these NHS structures are equivalent to the structural context of the Strauss paradigm. That structural context influences greatly what a change agent can attempt to do. The description of the NHS structures in Chapter 3 has therefore an important influence on the role of a management services officer.

Following that description of the structural context in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 to 7 take up the development of Model 6. Chapter 4 describes the development methods to be used. Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies. Chapter 7 is the general statement of Model 6, in so far as it has been possible to develop it in this thesis and is based on data from the case studies.
CHAPTER 3 - NHS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO MANAGEMENT SERVICES

Introduction

The Strauss paradigm in Chapter 1 requires one to describe a structural context for the management services processes being investigated. That context consists of the regional organisation surrounding change agents. Model 6 from Chapter 2 is also greatly influenced by that organisation. This chapter attempts to meet both of these needs for a full description of the NHS management structures.

The major part of this Chapter is a description of the NHS management organisation as set up by Acts of Parliament. Each Region has interpreted those Acts in a slightly different way and so some understanding of the local implementation of the Acts is necessary. Other major influences on change concern certain basic attitudes which types of individuals and groups exhibit and so these informal aspects of management need to be borne in mind. In order to complete this picture of the customer for management services, a very brief account of the geography of the Region and its major client services have been included.

The official NHS management structures

The NHS was established by Act of Parliament. Not only was it established and reformed in this way, health and related subjects have been the subject of fairly plentiful legislation since 1800. Apart from setting out the major parts of the organisation within which NHS officers must work, its legal framework means that it is impossible to suggest certain sorts of development common in industry, because they are precluded by law. Thus, the basic functions of the various levels of administration are fixed and it matters little...
whether they contribute to or detract from efficiency. Whether or not it is efficient to process a birth registration as it is now done is irrelevant, it is the law, and maternity hospitals must comply with it. There are many such cases of the NHS being constrained not only at a policy level but also at the detailed level in the way in which it can or cannot perform a particular function. One of the basic rules for carrying out management services work is that problems should be looked at in their entirety if at all possible, similarly, solutions should not be constrained unnecessarily. Unlike other public and nationalised bodies, it can be argued that the framework of law, and in particular the present interpretation of that law by DHSS, precludes fundamental change and thus restricts the change process.

One of the main effects of the various Acts of Parliament relating to health matters is to set down the basic structure of the Department of Health and Social Security, Region and Area, including Districts, within which the service must work. That structure is shown in Figure 2. Among other things, that structure influences management changes since it establishes the line relationships which exist and, of equal significance, those which do not. Line relationships exist from the Secretary of State to the actual Authority consisting of Members at Region, and from the Regional Authority to the Area Authorities in that Region. Officers at all levels are responsible through an appropriate officer management structure to their own Authority or Secretary of State only. Area and District officers are separately responsible to Area Authorities. Officers at one level are in no sense responsible to officers at another level. From a Management Services project point of view this means that obtaining terms of reference or implementing work can involve incredibly complicated sets of negotiations across these boundaries. Even if one acknowledges that line authority is not very useful for such purposes in any case
Fig. 2: DHSS, Region and Area Management Relationships
in these days the health service structures do not help the process of change. Most projects do actually spread across the Authority boundaries at some stage in their development, whether they be policy projects or operational systems. A project connected with policy will almost always impinge on the operational service eventually and it will be the job of management services to negotiate both the policy and its consequences. Similarly, projects at the operational level often impinge on policy of some sort and the effect on that policy must be negotiated through the higher tiers of management.

While line relationships between similar officers at different levels do not exist, the functions which they perform overlap considerably. In a sense, the functions of DHSS, Region and Area, including District, are all planning and monitoring progress against plans, the difference being that they are working on different timescales. Thus, although DHSS is almost completely a policy body, or should be, any DHSS policy statement ricochets through all of the levels, even in its formative stages. The Region is also a policy and planning body but there again its work cannot be independent of DHSS or Area. Just as the lack of line relationships between levels adds to the difficulty of undertaking change, the confusion of roles among levels adds to the difficulty of negotiating changes in any project. The best example of this confusion concerns Strategic Planning. Both Region and Area prepare such plans but the ways in which these two plans fit together is ill-defined and leads to conflict.

Because the Regional and Area levels have independent officer structures, the firm decision on a major change can become one at Authority level quite rapidly. Authorities are lay member bodies which tend to meet at most bi-monthly and, as such, their decision making is slow and at a fairly high level. Members tend to be active on one or two fronts only, with only the Chairman of
the Authority taking an overall interest. But the interest which an Authority
takes in a particular piece of work will always have its unexpected side. Thus,
even a relatively technical piece of work of a fairly straightforward nature will
require careful consideration if it is at all likely to find its way to the
Authority.

The structure which exists below both the Member Authorities splits
immediately into the professional interest groups, medical, nursing,
administrative, treasurers and works. The same split is reflected in an even
more complex form in DHSS. Each function reports separately to the
Authority. Within Area, even the reporting of the same professional groups at
Area and District is split. Within the medical function, most senior people are
of consultant status and enjoy the appropriate degree of independence.
Although these various disciplines join together in consensus teams, the most
important being the Regional Team of Officers, Area Team of Officers and
District Management Team, official resolution of problems if no consensus
agreement exists can occur at Authority level only. The pressure on officers to
find agreement is great, but that process can be slow. For management
services projects, the need to get the different disciplines all to agree to change
and the need to get the support of consensus groups complicates project
negotiations.

Apart from being clearly differentiated in the management structure,
both the medical and nursing groups have representatives on advisory groups
which report directly to the Authorities. Their advice is usually in the form of
collective wisdom and it would be rare for them to be involved in their own
project work, although they would almost invariably comment on other people's
work if it were sufficiently important. These advisory groups are influential
and, in addition to their official communication routes with the Authority, usually have at their disposal the most effective influencing channels in the Service. For example, their members often have direct access to or are themselves authority members. The effect of these groups on any piece of work must be taken into account for any management services project.

Clinical freedom must be included in any review of the official management structures, although at first glance this may seem odd. Various aspects of the relationship of the clinician with his patient are part of the law and the clinician is held responsible in the courts for some parts of his practice. Clinical freedom is the fundamental basis on which practitioners will often base their objection to particular changes in their way of working. It would be rare for a management services project to founder on this rock in its final stages, but it is almost certain that any project will have been greatly influenced by these sorts of considerations in its formative stages.

A simplistic view of management services activity might be:

(a) obtaining project work from customers
(b) carrying out the necessary studies or other work
and (c) implementing the results.

Management structure is important in that it determines formally who has the right and power to commission projects and to change things. That is not to say that the only or the most effective way of introducing change is through these structures. It is true that if a part of the organisation has not played its 'rightful' part in any change process, then the risks of some destructive and possibly cataclysmic intervention by that part at a late period in the work of the project has increased. Therefore, a reasonably full understanding of these
structures is essential if the full working through of a project is to be understood. Within the official structure described above, each Region has set up a local structure and it is necessary to understand that local situation and its effects on management services.

The regional interpretation of the official management structures

Within the outlines laid down in the Grey Book (Management Arrangements for the Reorganised National Health Service) each Region has had freedom to create organisations which seemed to it best. In Wessex these were set down in the Blue Book, as it is known locally. Each Chief Officer has a set of officers responsible to him and for the most part, these come from his own discipline. Under each Chief Officer, there are divisions, there being two responsible to the Treasurer, three to the Works Officer and four to the Administrator. The Administrative Divisions of Personnel, Planning, Management Services and Secretariat provide the main support to doctors and nurses, there being only very small numbers of doctors and nurses at HQ. Most HQ projects spread across not only the administrative divisions but the others also. Most project work is done by the less senior people in the Divisions. For example, the technical methods to be used in the 1979 Strategic Plan have been developed by a team from all divisions led by the Regional OR Officer. This inter-departmental team was a new departure for the RHA and was an attempt to overcome a strong tendency for issues to be given to one Division only, or even worse for them to be followed up by different Divisions or groups completely independently but for exactly the same purpose. The divisional structures means that for any project, management services must be careful to get all of the appropriate people involved at an early stage, no matter where the work originated.
Each Chief Officer meets his own subordinates at regular intervals, in the case of administration once a fortnight. On the alternate week, the Heads of Administrative Divisions meet as a co-ordinating group with the major purpose of making sure that we have not each been asked to do the same thing and to discuss what is going on. These meetings are of key importance since as a group of four we decide what issues must be sorted out and this usually means, what people have got to be sorted out. The meeting is informal, full of soft information and can often have an important effect on most issues. Soft information includes rumours, how people felt that a particular suggestion had been received, what troubles projects have run into that is not yet common knowledge and similar pieces of intelligence. Their other important function is to decide what matters get pursued vigorously with the Regional Administrator. Heads of Division, as it is called, must talk about all management services projects since this is a prime way of determining whether or not the projects are heading for trouble. No high level multidisciplinary group made up of doctors, nurses, administrators and treasurers exist and this is an important feature of the RHA.

The other important group in HQ is 'D' Group. Originally, this was only the divisional meeting of the Development Division but, since planning has always been an important and established part of Region's work and since 'D' Group came into existence long before any other, it attracts to itself all sorts of activity. It is also important because it is carefully administered and agendas, minutes and so on exist. In the case of the other divisions, their meetings are strictly private and fairly informal affairs. 'D' Group is interdisciplinary and this gives it an edge since it is the only truly inter-disciplinary group that functions continuously on site. Its importance to management
services is that many major projects will find their way through 'D' Group eventually.

The business of HQ and other headquarter sites, e.g. Blood Transfusion Service, is co-ordinated by the Headquarters Management Team (HMT) and there is continuous conflict between the RTO and HMT. The main, but not the only, reason for this is that the RTO will change the plans constructed by the HMT without considering the wider consequences of the change. Thus, for example, additional capital from outside the budget, must be found for an RTO favoured project such as a computer terminal for Treasurers. HMT's importance to management service work is not great, but it can on occasion be crucial, for example, in battles for facilities or space.

Apart from the recognised groups, at any particular time there will be in HQ many groups meeting on particular topics. Some of these groups will be recognised by the RHA. Most of them will have no structured impact on the work of management services whatsoever, but in a random sort of way, each can go down paths which affect management services interests. It is highly probable that any such group will call for information at some stage and that means work for Statistics Department. Much more time consuming will be the fact that the group often does not know what to do with the information when it receives it. In a similar way, groups are liable to raise a wide variety of management issues and problems and, through lack of appropriate advice or guidance, suggest some odd ways of tackling them. For example, officers outside management services may not know that a computer system exists which will provide information of a given type and will put forward complex methods of getting it from districts. That must be corrected. Information about the way people in such groups are thinking, as well as hard fact about
what is going on in such groups in general is vital to running the Management Services Division.

One of the features of HQ is that project work and, often, detailed knowledge about any subject starts at the third level down in the staff organisation. It is imperative that one recognises the need to talk to the person near to the action when formulating projects and implementing results. It is also important to recognise that this is where the power of the RHA to do work lies and it needs to be carefully nurtured. Management services project work relies on the co-operation of these third level officers.

One of the features of the present HQ organisation is the difference in level of sheer technical expertise which there is between management services and other Divisions. Apart from management services, the basic training of the other parts of HQ, except Works, is administration, with relatively simple and established technology as a sideline. Only Management Services understands and can use much of the new management technology such as computers. This is a dangerous situation and I spend a great deal of time reassuring people and slowly teaching them different ways of working and behaving. Old fashioned administration, such as keeping good files and dealing with committees is still highly regarded, much more so than new management skills. Some of the rest of the RHA believe that management services officers ought to want to excel in this sort of field, and the fact that I do not value such skills above those of my own people can cause tension. A balance must be struck between remaining acceptable to the rest of the RHA while at the same time remaining a strong advocate of the new technologies.

The last point to make about the local structure is that their complexity adds to the communication problem. NHS objectives as such really do not
exist, but are replaced by a whole series of sub-objectives, each hungry for resources and each backed by its own followers. Even on a fairly simple project, one can guarantee that, having succeeded in limiting the brief to something which we believe can be handled, then the whole process of making sure that people know what you intend to do and what expectations they must not entertain, can be most difficult. One of the important features of the research described below is the negotiation of order in project work.

The divisional structures

In most organisations such as the RHA, a quite specific operational role for it exists. The Regional tier of the National Health Service is peculiar in this respect since most of the operational services to patients are managed by the Districts. The Regional headquarters sees its role in terms of development mainly and one of its main Divisions is a Development Division for the whole of the Region. The Development Division provides a capital development, i.e. mainly building, and a service planning function. But the other main Divisions in the RHA also see themselves as having a development role and being responsible for planning the future rather than managing the present. For example, most of the work of the Personnel Division is concerned with the formulation of future Regionwide policies in the personnel field. In these circumstances, the introduction of new management ideas into the working of the NHS throughout the Region tends to become a set of integrated exercises in which all of the Divisions are playing a part. The contribution to this process by the various Divisions is a reflection of the skills possessed by their top managers, e.g. participative learning from the Training Department. In effect, it is the Head of Division who chooses to develop particular parts of the service which his Division offers. In 1974, the Heads of Divisions were all new in their
posts and this removed many of the historically entrenched attitudes towards
the division of work. Combined with the ability of Heads of Divisions to choose
their roles and their wish to introduce new roles, this removal of many
historical precedents has made it possible to fashion a new pattern of Divisional
roles at the RHA. In the early days of the RHA, and to some extent ever since
that time, the various Divisions negotiated their own particular contributions to
the management of the Region. Thus, the role of Management Services
Division has been determined by myself in that negotiation and I was able to
make and carry through quite specific choices.

The change agent role of Management Services Division at Regional
headquarters has been formulated only in general terms by the RHA. Those
general statements concern the provision of various types of services which are
thought to be part of the Management Services function. For example, there is
a specific objective to provide an O & M service to the RTO and to advice
members of the RTO and to advise members of the RTO on the development of
that function throughout the Region. This definition by the RHA of the
purpose of Management Services never gives any detailed specification of the
type of work to be done. Another mechanism, the promulgation of national
policy, has defined two work areas, participation in the national standard
computer programme and the introduction of incentive bonus schemes. Such
other definitions as exist have consisted of lists of tasks which the Division
itself proposed to undertake during a specific year. Some of those tasks have
been fairly general in their nature whilst others have been quite specific. Thus,
the RHA's definition of what it requires of Management Services is very broad
indeed but that definition has been supplemented by task lists which cover most
of the work to be undertaken using the resources which the Division possesses.
Management services projects involve change to existing procedures and the operators of the systems are at the third and lower tiers in the organisation. These tiers lie within the divisions and, for the most part, a strict compartmentalisation of the RHA is operative at this level. The compartments are the departments which exist within Divisions and Figure 3 gives details.

The Medical Division tends to work by outposting its officers to administrative divisions and the same is true of some Nursing Officers. Doctors and nurses advise teams of various types on planning and one doctor is attached to Management Services. It is only very recently that officers from several divisions have been put into a team nominally under the "control" of one officer. This was for the production of the 1979 Strategic Planning Methods and the Plan. But this is a rare event and cut right across established methods of working. In general, it would be true to say that most project work is done using the head of the department if not the division or chief officer as the means of discussing the work to be done.

There are several officers in the RHA who can have considerable influence on project work and who are not attached to Divisions. These are:

- The Regional Scientific Officer
- The Regional Supplies Officer
- The Regional Ambulance Officer
- The Regional Pharmaceutical Officer

All are attached to some chief officer. In some management services projects these officers are key participants.

Despite the fact that Region is nominally primarily a planning organisation, and this should predispose the whole organisation towards
Fig. 3: FRAMEWORK OF THE RHA ORGANISATION

ACCOUNTABLE TO RHA

- Full accountability and individual officer accountability
- Individual accountability
- Monitoring and accountability
- Representative system - advisory relationship

RHA

REGIONAL TEAM OF OFFICERS

REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER
- Services planning
- Capital building projects
- Personal and post graduate education
- Information services
- Scientific services

REGIONAL NURSING OFFICER
- Nursing personnel
- Service planning and capital projects
- Training and education

REGIONAL WORKS OFFICER
- Architecture
- Engineering
- Quantity surveying

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
- Administrative services
- Personnel services
- Management services
- Supply services
- Ambulance services

REGIONAL TREASURER
- Financial services

PROFESSIONAL ADVISORY MACHINERY

MULTIDISCIPLINARY SERVICE PLANNING TEAM

- Team job responsibilities and individual officer accountability
- Individual accountability
- Monitoring and accountability
- Representative system - advisory relationship
developments such as management service projects, most of the divisions have a
great deal of operational activity concerned with running the service. Below it
is suggested that the business of the NHS is much more complex than that of
other organisations. Much of that work has a random nature because the NHS
is basically a responding service. MPs, local situations and many other factors
disturb the ordered working of HQ. The divisions provide the basic response to
these "random" disturbances and development work takes second place to these
disturbances.

Divisions tend to become established in their way as time passes and the
opportunity to change gets more difficult to find. Management services work
often demands quite radical organisational changes. It becomes especially
difficult to find homes for new activities if no precedent exists. Such is the
case for monitoring which, apart from being slightly distasteful in any case, was
not mentioned in any definitive way in the Grey Book. It is proving difficult to
determine what division should manage the RHA monitoring activity. The
same was the case with networks for capital project control.

One problem for management services in the labyrinth of divisional
structures is where to try to make and maintain contacts for any project. It is
too costly to cover all interested parties, yet not to do so can alienate people
whose co-operation will be required in the future.

Informal parts of management

Despite the richness of the recognised structure, the unrecognised parts of
the structure are probably the most vital parts. Work scheduling meetings are
occurring all the time and these mesh together to give progress. That meshing
together involves all sorts of deals between groups and individuals and "deals" is
the right word. Pressure is exerted, user requirements are relaxed, law is laid
down and so on, and so on. Each department tries to organise its own "patch", and when satisfied, sends out emissaries to negotiate. In general, work slips around within timetables set by senior managers. But in this loosely controlled situation it is the unofficial structure which really decides what work can actually get done. This applies just as much to management service projects as to any other.

Apart from the work scheduling group and person to person contact, much important work is done in what might appear to be "social calls" or "over lunch". It is necessary to break up the "whiz kid" image of the technical management services officer. If, during coffee after lunch these management services whiz kids are seen to talk about car repairs or decorating, they recapture something of their human face in so doing and become more approachable. Also, sipping coffee, looking very like an ordinary human being, is often the best position from which to try to persuade customers to accept new ideas. Managers meet other Divisional Heads over lunch as well and can obtain friendly advice given by someone with a different point of view. Such activity is often powerful in the fight to persuade people to support a management services approach.

Another important aspect of this unofficial activity is its ability to circumvent status problems. Front stage performances in which medical officers lose face to a management services officer do not help, no matter how gentle the encounter. It is often in the low key private session where the actual stumbling blocks can be explored.

Official methods determined by set procedures or a senior officer decision are supposed to deal with most issues. But issues float away from such procedures very easily and it is common to find them being dealt with in unexpected ways. One reason is the practice of "confetti" management by
chief officers - "scattering" the issue or parts of it like confetti across the organisation in an unco-ordinated way. The principle of "confetti" management appears to be that if you ask enough people the same question, you must obtain an answer, possibly by taking the "average" of all those requested! This is one way in which issues "float" in the total management structure. It is only by using the unofficial mechanisms that the extent of the confetti can be judged and remedial action taken. Issues "float" in other ways also and sometimes possess no effective owner. It is important to know what "confetti" is around and what issues are being handled ineffectively if scarce management services resources are to be conserved.

In many unexpected places one can encounter the interests of staff which will be affected by change. On the whole staff and unions are amenable to new ideas. But it would be foolish to overlook a possible staff interest in any change.

People and groups

As a crude generalisation, management services can be said to be about various types of efficiency. Clear objective setting, careful thought about what those objectives mean and clearly defined, carefully constructed ways of reaching them are the essence of management services work. But, the raison d'etre of the NHS is the sick person who needs individual attention, cannot be put into neat categories and might not fit into pre-determined patterns for dealing with patients all of the time. The vast majority of staff in the NHS are orientated towards patients and it is only with great difficulty that they adjust to the "management roles" to which they graduate in the course of their career. The contrast between the education process which fits them for the first task, a doctor say, and that used for their second career is enormous. The first is well
tried; the second scarcely exists. For example, courses for Specialists in Community Medicine have only just started and contain very little "practical" management. Thus, it is often the case that change must be achieved through people who have obtained what management skill they have through "experience", most of which is fundamentally opposed to basic attitudes drummed into them by the quite efficient patient care education system during their early formative years.

A fundamental part of that early training for doctors was "clinical freedom" in the interests of the patient. The responsibility of the doctor to the patient and for his own actions is enshrined in practice, law and the whole ethos of the NHS. There is a fundamental, almost untramelled freedom to use as he thinks best all of those facilities, services, drugs and other things which he can make available. At the point of care the practitioner has no need to consult, to agree, to obey or to participate in any way, as long as the patient will go along with him. Discipline, agreement with colleagues and related themes are not a part of the "fundamental" behaviour patterns of these people, although this is not to say that they are awkward. Individuality, if not encouraged, certainly is not frowned upon. It is not a long step from clinical freedom and individuality to a state of bemusement, less than even tempered and, in some cases downright hostility felt towards a management system whose fundamental job is to restrict and to form into some manageable coherent pattern, not only the resources they use, but in the final analysis their own activities as well. A management orientated change agent has got to be very good, to persuade people that, even if he is not the bearer of largesse from on high, which is the fundamental image of some regional officers such as capital planners, he can help these individualists to make better use of existing resources in ways acceptable to themselves.
The service demanded from the NHS is always far greater than its potential to provide and the variety of that service is large. Given these two factors and the individuality described above, it is not surprising that getting agreement about what the priority issues are proves difficult. With extreme ease, individuals can claim prior commitment to other work, a difference of opinion on clinical priorities and a thousand other reasonable things when being asked to participate in a management services project. Even if it were desirable, coercion is very difficult and even the power of their own peer group to influence them can be ineffective. Such is the power of the individual that the change agent's power of persuasion is sometimes sorely taxed in projects in which doctors and nurses become involved.

It has been stated above that the professional groupings, i.e. administrative, nurses, doctors, treasurers and works, do not come together as an integrated corporate management system. Each of these groups has got its own specific identity, its own beliefs and its own education systems which have ingrained in them patterns of behaviour peculiar to themselves. Statements of their own particular group interests are very common. Each of the professional groups has got a powerful professional organisation associated with it. Each of these professional views is almost inevitably in conflict with the views of others including Parliament on how the service should or should not be run. All professional groups will view a management services project from its own point of view and any regard paid to other viewpoints will be secondary. An integrated project is often at its best when it appears to be all things to all men.

One of the features of the NHS is that it tries to do a large variety of jobs which do not form an integrated whole and this permits a variety of conflicting
views to coexist. Many of the NHS objectives conflict with each other and some of these conflicts are reflected in the professional groupings. For example, violent disagreements exist about the appropriate level of nursing expertise required for specific care groups and the use of resources to obtain that expertise.

Change is seen from different points of view and often the direction in which different professional groups wish to take the service is completely different. Administrative efficiency often conflicts with a view of personal medical care. Good financial practice often conflicts with new methodology for providing research or care. Good nursing often conflicts with various types of medical practice in which high technology is involved and so on. Given these conflicts, it is inevitable that the change process is viewed from different points of view and requires much negotiation.

The work of the NHS

Defining "health" is a well-known pastime and most health service managers have given up the game. It is usual to pretend that it is a fruitless exercise and maybe this is true. What is not at issue is that the quantity and variety of activity carried out by a health service is vast. There are about a dozen major classes of patient and twenty to thirty others each seeking independent recognition. Apart from the actual caring side of the NHS which is very complex, the hotel and industrial business, the technical support service, the transport business are vast. Figure 4 gives a breakdown of the service which demonstrates its complexity.

A brief description of the region

The Region covers several counties, and within that area there are several
FIGURE 4 - Analysis of the basic business of the NHS

Care Group Activities

1. Services for Children
2. Services for the Elderly
3. Services for the Mentally Ill
4. Services for the Mentally Handicapped
5. Services for the Disabled
6. Maternity Services
7. Primary Care and Preventive Services
8. Acute Services
   a) General Surgery  j) Ophthalmology  s) Dermatology
   b) Urology  k) Neurosurgery  t) Radiotherapy
   c) Gynaecology  l) Neurology  u) Infectious Diseases
   d) ENT  m) Thoracic Surgery  v) Physical Medicine
   e) Dental Surgery  n) Chest Diseases  w) VD
   f) Orthodontics  p) General Medicine  x) Rheumatology
   g) Orthopaedics  q) Cardiology  y) Plastic Surgery
   h) Paediatrics  r) Intensive Care  z) Nuclear Medicine

9. Accident and Emergency

Support Service Activities

1. Industrial Services
   a) CSSD  f) Supplies  l) Medical Records
   b) Laundry  g) Domestic Services  m) Computer Services
   c) Catering  h) Portering  n) Staff support
   d) Transport  j) Building & Eng.  p) Voluntary Services
   e) Ambulances  k) Administration

2. Medical Services
   a) Theatres  f) Speech Therapy  l) Chiropody
   b) Pathology  g) Hydrotherapy  m) Blood transfusion
   c) Pharmacy  h) Chemotherapy  n) Health education
   d) X-ray  j) Occupational Therapy
   e) Physiotherapy  k) Artificial Limb Service
hundred points at which service is provided. A county corresponds to an area health authority. Four of the areas become involved in the project work described later. Even if one counts only major hospitals, there are about forty of these. In between the RHA and the actual point of service are all the Region, Area and District structures. Any proposal which recommends a widespread change in hospital practice probably means changes in this whole structure and there are bound to be problems in transforming a proposal into practice. A large education process which must take place to transform the activities of so large a community. The net of management relationships within that structure does not lend itself to change. The sorts of factors which are described above are at play throughout the layers in a random manner. It is almost certain that the problems arising in one part of the structure will be different from those in another part. Any proposal to change is usually met by all the difficulties described above, if only because one can guarantee that all of the component parts will react differently.

The particularly vulnerable project is the one that relies on various activities going on systematically throughout the Region. For example, catering monitoring relied on there being reasonable agreement that there were eight basic aims for the catering services. Tacit, even explicit, agreement that this was true did not imply that these were the goals which middle managers pursued or knew about in any objective systematic way. There is a basic conflict between management devolution with systematic management.

Summary

This chapter describes the NHS organisation, and in particular its local interpretation, within which a management services change agent must operate. The importance of this description in the context of this thesis is twofold.
First, these structures form the structural context of the Strauss paradigm being used in this research. Second, the development of Model 6 - the Corporate Activist - in Chapter 2 is the main method by which this thesis will seek to define the role of a management services officer. Chapter 2 has already attempted to show, and the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate further the influence of the organisation on the change process. It will be claimed that the developed version of Model 6 contained in Chapter 7 which is based on the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 is a general model. However, it must be stressed that in this thesis the general model in Chapter 7 has been shown to work within the context described in this chapter. Further work would be necessary to demonstrate its applicability outside that context.

Having defined in this chapter the first part of the Strauss paradigm used in this thesis, namely the structural context, the research will now concentrate on the negotiation context of the paradigm. As explained earlier, within the NHS structures described above, a grounded theory answer to the question "What do management services people actually do?" based on the use of diaries is being sought. In the next chapter, the methods of grounded theory as they came to be applied in this research are described. The case studies generated by that analysis and the developed version of the Corporate Activist Model are contained in the following three chapters.
CHAPTER 4 - THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THIS THESIS

The objective of this research was to develop a model of the ways in which one management services officer attempts to bring about change in one organisation. The method used was to keep diaries and then to analyse them by methods suggested by Glaser and Strauss. Before describing my use of these analysis methods in detail, it is useful to review the use of diaries in management research and the Glaser and Strauss analysis methods.

The application of diaries to management research

Mintzberg (1973), as well as reporting an extensive diary study carried out by himself, devotes a considerable portion of his book to reviewing diary research. Part of a table of studies which used diaries contained in this book is reproduced in Figure 5. In this chapter some of those diary studies are reviewed together with the major studies by Mintzberg and Stewart (1967). The Mintzberg diary study is relevant to the event categories developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis and for this reason, special attention has been given to his research.

The first significant diary study was Carlson (1951). It was a structured diary and is used below to illustrate this type of diary. Carlson was the first of a long list of researchers who tried to identify what managers actually did do with their time. In his research, communications appeared to be one of the prime activities of senior managers, in his case, directors of companies. From the point of view of my thesis, it is interesting to note that the difficulty of coding events appeared so early in the use of the diary methods. Despite the use of a form to try to obtain specific data, the directors concerned did not use the codes consistently. Their recorded views on the same activity were almost
Fig. 5: Empirical Studies of Managerial Work Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher</th>
<th>Year Reported</th>
<th>Method Used</th>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Study (Days)</th>
<th>Special Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlson</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>9 Senior managers (managing directors)</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>Finding common behavior patterns (particularly communication) in the work of managing directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>4 Middle managers</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Relationship of managers in one departmental group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>76 Senior and middle managers</td>
<td>1520(^a)</td>
<td>How managers spend their time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copeman</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>58 Senior and middle managers</td>
<td>290(?</td>
<td>Comparison of the work of chief executives and department heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubin, Spray</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>8 Senior and middle managers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>How managers spend their time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewer, Tomlinson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>6 Senior managers</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Decision-making behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horne, Lupton</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>66 Middle managers</td>
<td>330(^b)</td>
<td>How managers spend their time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomason</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>Various configurations of managers</td>
<td>not reported</td>
<td>Communication centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawler, Porter, Tennenbaum</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>105 Middle and lower level managers</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>Manager's reactions toward interaction episodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Diary</td>
<td>160 Senior and middle managers</td>
<td>3200(^b)</td>
<td>Variations in managerial jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Estimated; Burns only states that each was studied for three, four or five weeks  
\(^b\) Assumes an average work week of five days  
Source: Mintzberg (1973)
contradictory. What one director regarded as operations, another coded as development. A recurrent theme of all the diary work is the possibility of seeing situations from different viewpoints, e.g. Burns (1954). Many explanations, e.g. straight misunderstanding or a genuinely different viewpoint, have been offered, but there is no doubt about the existence of the phenomenon.

There are several main themes and purposes which can be identified in the diary studies, perhaps the most common being attempts to identify the content of the work as in Carlson's research. A more difficult issue is "why are they doing it?". The types of analysis vary from how time is spent at the activity, e.g. Mintzberg, through to a high level statement of the FOUR type, Horne, Lupton (1965). FOUR stands for formulating, organising, unifying and regulating. The FOUR theory illustrates the link backward in time of the diary studies to more classical work concerned with the description of the major functions of management and that is discussed briefly below also. Another main theme which started to emerge in the Lupton work was the wide discrepancies between different organisations and managers' jobs. One of the important issues in the diary work is the extent to which the various ways of looking at the activities of management support each other. Apart from listing the studies, Figure 5 gives some of their characteristics and shows that the extent of their mutual support for each other is debatable.

It is worth pausing in this review of diary work, and especially the codes such as FOUR which people have put forward, to attempt to put them into an historical perspective. The basic functions - planning, organising, coordinating, commanding and controlling were suggested by Fayal (1916). Gullick and Urwick (1937) produced POSD CORB, Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Co-ordinating, Reporting and Budgeting. Barnard (1938) defined the
executive function as "first to provide the system of communication, second to promote the securing of essential efforts and third, to formulate and define purpose". There are great differences between the ways these sorts of classifications came to be developed and those of the diarists like Stewart and Mintzberg. The diarists produce actual data on content and activity which is lacking in the earlier works. But it is interesting to note that some of the basic themes of the earlier work have remained almost completely intact.

Although the methods by which the various codes have been established vary, this typography is now common. The categories suggested by these earlier writers and confirmed by diarists are used by managers. Thus, if one were to ask what were the main functions to be supported by senior RHA managers, the answer would be "planning and monitoring".

Types of diaries

Essentially two types of diary have been used in management research. They are based on structured and unstructured data collection. I think that one must draw a distinction between structured intent and structured "data collection" and it is easier to start with data collection.

Carlson used structured data collection and, as part of his study of directors used the form reproduced in Figure 6. He attempted to record the significant separate events in the activity of these directors. It can be seen from the form that it contained a restricted set of data only. However carefully that restricted set is prepared, it necessarily represents a statement that those elements of data are the important ones from the point of view of the research. Even the most complex forms used only about fifty distinct pieces of data. Thus the data is restricted and pre-defined, at least to some
Fig.6: Diary recording form designed by Carlson

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 3/11 49</th>
<th>Telephone: In □ Out □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time: 10:49 - 11:05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place (other than own office):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manuf. dir.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works man. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works man. B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organ. dir.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adv. dir.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers. dir.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales dir. Swed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales dir. exp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Question handled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance, legal</td>
<td>Getting information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>Systematizing information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying</td>
<td>Taking decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Confirming or correcting decisions of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Giving orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Advising, explaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations</td>
<td>Inspecting, reviewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organ. planning</td>
<td>Executing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Question handled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current operations</td>
<td>Application</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Question handled

| Source: Carlson (1951) |
extent. These appear to me to be the two major characteristics of the structured diary. However, structured data does have the advantage in theory of being analysed more easily than that available in the unstructured diary, but even that need not be the case in practise.

Structure of "intention" seems to me a more important issue. It is probable that a diary with structured content does presuppose that the purpose of collecting that particular data is understood, although that need not be true. Of course, the general purpose of keeping the diary at all must be known. But the unstructured diary acknowledges that we know very little about the higher levels of management and there is a need to gather data just to attempt to establish patterns of behaviour and intention. It is necessary to focus on issues in research if it is to be worthwhile and, to some extent, that must require structure of "intention" if not data. The concepts of the Discovery of Grounded Theory discussed earlier are relevant to this issue and it seems more realistic to allow results to emerge from the data, rather than attempt to pre-define them. The movement towards a structured intention by those grounded theory methods also has the advantages that there is no need to freeze the data format into a relatively inflexible state at an early stage in the research.

Two problems in using both structured diary data and unstructured data are their interpretation and reliability. These aspects of data collection are discussed below. But it is important to stress that due mainly to human frailty, structured diaries do not overcome either problem completely.

One other issue raised by Burns (1957) and Stewart (1967) is the need for managers to record continuously, and by this, I believe them to mean not to leave out significant items. Even in studies of comparatively short duration,
they both stress the difficulty of achieving this. Most researchers agree that all managers work fast, change activities swiftly and do not spend long doing any one thing. In this thesis, I will introduce the concept of "frantic action" to illustrate the need for fast reaction in managerial tasks. In the context of activity data collection of any type, and diaries are included, it is inevitable that factual data is omitted when people act quickly. The loss of data in this way is also noted by Marples (1967).

Completely unstructured diaries of my own type do not appear to have been put together for research purposes. They do exist in other fields, especially politics. Prime Minsters and cabinet ministers appear to publish them automatically nowadays. Presumably, they intend to record that which appears to them to be significant at the time. This was the intention behind my own diary, except that my own field of interest was more limited. There are interesting parallels between my own and this type of diary and although it would not be appropriate to dwell on the similarities, two are worth mentioning. First, both are full of fast moving events and crises. For example, MacMillan (1971) devotes whole chapters to the conduct of unexpected and uncontrollable activities. Secondly, significant illuminating events emerge from the content of the diary in a random unplanned way. That significance relies often on MacMillan's interpretation of the events. It is this sort of event recording plus interpretation which shows the unstructured diary at its most potent when trying to construct a set of categories to interpret significance. Apart from emphasising the ability to recognise the juxtaposition of events which have this characteristic I do not know how the interpretation is accomplished. But it is, and the possibility of doing this seems higher if the unstructured diary is used.
The Stewart diary

Stewart published one of the most influential diary studies in 1967, "Managers and their jobs". The main aim of her study was to discover some of the similarities and differences in the ways managers spend their time. These were to be related to the actual jobs rather than the individuals carrying out that job. Stewart suggests that two of the measures of activity of particular interest are the amount of time he spends on particular activities and the frequency with which he does something. She goes on to suggest that some of the main questions which one might ask are:

(a) How specialised is the job?
(b) To what extent does the job involve working with others?
(c) What kind of contact does the job involve?
(d) What form do most contacts take?
(e) What type of work pattern does the job tend to impose?
(f) What kind of decisions does the job involve?
(g) How much time is spent on different aspects of the manager's work?
(h) How much and what kinds of variety are provided by the job?

Three methods were considered for carrying out a study with the above sorts of objectives. These were:

(a) to ask managers how they divide up their time
(b) to ask a manager to keep a record of activity himself
(c) to obtain data by observation
The book discusses all three methods but it is probably only useful to quote the comparison of the last two methods.

"The main advantages of the diary method compared with observation are:

1. It is less time-consuming, less expensive and much less restricted in locality. Hence many more managers can be studied over a wider area of industry and locality.

2. It is easier to record the activities for a longer period, as with the observation method the longer the period of observation the fewer the number of people that can be studied.

3. Classification is made by a man who knows what he is doing. For some types of analysis the observer would have to ask the manager what he was doing.

4. All time can be recorded, whereas an observer may be excluded from confidential discussions.

The main disadvantages of diaries is that they greatly limit both the scope and the content of what can be studied. The scope is limited because the manager cannot devote much time to the recording, and the content because it is difficult to get managers to record in the same way if the item being recorded allows much scope for differences in interpretation.

The main advantages of observation compared with diary keeping are:

1. The observer has time to make more detailed and comprehensive recordings.

2. The record is likely to be more complete and the observer is much less likely to omit a recording through pressure of work.
3. He can apply a consistent standard when recording the activities of different people.

On the basis of this reasoning the diary method was developed. Seminars of managers considered the designs of structured diaries and tried to use versions of it. From this experience the four structured diaries shown in Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 were developed.

One hundred and sixty managers took part in the research study and collected data for four weeks. They represented a wide spread of managers and their co-operation was obtained through professional management bodies, the Institution of Works Managers, the Institute of Marketing and Sales Managers and the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants. In addition, the Institution of Production Engineers approached a more specialised selection of managers and some large companies were approached. Thus the design permitted the comparison of similar jobs using a very wide and varied sample of people.

In the analysis of the data a variety of techniques were used to check the quality of the data. All of these techniques are interesting but the cluster analysis which was used to deal with the mass of data generated in this attempt to obtain comparable data deserved special comment. The statistical basis for this work is described in the book. What is important is that this technique was used to delineate five basic job profiles from her twenty five variables. These were:

Group 1: The Emissaries. These managers spend much of their time away from the company, dealing with and entertaining outsiders. They work longer hours, but their days are less
Fig.7: The Stewart Diary 1 – Main diary

Time of Starting Incident?
Duration: Hrs. Minutes (nearest 5 mins.)

**DID YOU DO THIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHERE?</th>
<th>WHO?</th>
<th>HOW?</th>
<th>WHAT?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Own Office</td>
<td>+ INTERNAL Boss</td>
<td>Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other internal</td>
<td>- Boss's boss</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Other units</td>
<td>- Secretary</td>
<td>Selection interviewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>- Subordinates</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>- Subordinates' subordinates</td>
<td>Telephoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Travelling</td>
<td>- Colleagues</td>
<td>Figure work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Fellow Specialists</td>
<td>Reading, external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other internal</td>
<td>- Writing &amp; Co. reading</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EXTERNAL Customers</td>
<td>- Inspection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Suppliers</td>
<td>- Lectures and conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other external</td>
<td>- Travelling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOR EPISODES LASTING 5 MINUTES OR MORE**

Please start a fresh sheet whenever there is a change under any one of the headings: 'Did you do this', 'Where?', 'Who?', 'How?', 'What?'. This means that, except for 'Who?', there should never be more than one tick under one of these headings.

- 'Incident' is what you have taken a fresh sheet to record, that is a change in one of the headings.
- 'Other units' means other establishments, divisions, or subsidiary companies belonging to the same parent company.
- 'Colleagues' are those reporting to the same line boss as you.
- 'Fellow Specialists' are those doing a similar job to you, in another department, or elsewhere in the parent company. They may or may not be at the same level as you.
- 'Committee' is any pre-arranged group meeting. It may or may not have an agenda.
- 'Discussion' is talking, which is not classified under one of the other headings.
- 'Social' is when work is combined with a social activity.
- 'Writing & Co. reading' includes dealing with correspondence. Company reading is of material produced by the company.
- 'Other work' means just thinking. But please read more detailed notes.
- 'Inspection' is a personal tour of work place.
- 'Travelling' is when you are travelling for your work and not doing any other work listed under 'How?'
- 'General management' is when you are dealing with two or more management functions, such as sales and production, at the same time, or in the same meeting. But if there is a clear division between the discussions on two functions, please record on separate sheets.

For more detailed information about headings, please see separate instructions.

Source: Stewart (1967)
Fig. 8: The Stewart Diary 2 - fleeting contacts

### Fleeting Contacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Interruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boss</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For Contacts of Under 5 Minutes**

Please enter in Fleeting Contacts section below.

There may be a number of such fleeting contacts during the main incident that you have recorded above, or before you start a fresh sheet. So you can have a number of ticks in this section.

When recording a fleeting contact no entries should be made in the main section of the diary, but a tick should be put in the adjoining column if this interrupts what you were doing.

Source: Stewart (1967)
### Fig. 9: The Stewart diary 3 - Work Priorities Diary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2 Brief description of activity</th>
<th>Column 3 Was this something I should have been doing then?</th>
<th>Column 4 Reason for stopping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a Yes b No</td>
<td>a Finished b Unfinished c by Others d by Self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fig. 10: The Stewart diary 4 - Analysis of Fleeting Contacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1 Type of contact</th>
<th>Column 2 Who was it with?</th>
<th>Column 3 Who initiated it?</th>
<th>Column 4 Was it an interruption?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Self Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stewart (1967)
fragmented than most. Typical of this group are the sales managers and senior manager who act as public figures.

Group 2: The Writers. These managers who spend a greater share of their time in writing, reading, dictating, and figure work. They are solitary "only by comparison". They tend to work shorter hours and are less subject to day-to-day pressures. By all appearances, these are the staff specialists or those who manage them - the assistant manager of a computing branch, the chief electrical engineer, and so on.

Group 3: The Discussers. These are the average managers. They spend much time with other people and particularly with their colleagues, and they carry out a diverse range of activities. Many types of managers fit in this group.

Group 4: The Trouble Shooters. These managers must spend more time coping with crises, hence their work is most fragmented. They spend much time with subordinates and less with peers. A relatively large share of their time is spent on inspection. Most of the production people fall into this group.

Group 5: The Committeemen. These managers spend a great share of their time in committee meetings. Their contacts are both vertical and horizontal but not outside the company. In the study these managers were found exclusively in larger companies.

In addition to using her data to obtain the clusters referred to above, which do seem to have a similar flavour to the Mintzberg roles and my own
categories, a very comprehensive set of statistical tables and diagrams was produced to illustrate the wide range of management activity which she described. It is worth quoting a list of these, see Figure 11, to demonstrate the breadth of the study. I do not have the ability to select from this set of results the most valuable, especially in view of the variety which they represent. However, Mintzberg does select and it is worth quoting his views.

"Each finding of this study is presented in the form of a histogram. Many of these suggest that most managers, but never all managers, exhibit a number of common work characteristics. Listed below are some of the main findings of this study with the figures representing arithmetic averages:

The managers averaged 42 hours of work per week. 75 percent of their time was spent in their own establishment, and 51 percent in their own offices. 60 percent of their time was spent in discussion - 43 percent informal, 7 percent committee, 6 percent telephoning, and 4 percent social activity. 34 percent of their time was spent alone; 25 percent with their immediate subordinates, 8 percent with their superiors, and 30 percent with peers and others (of this, 12 percent with colleagues reporting to the same superior, 8 percent with fellows doing similar work elsewhere in the organisation, 5 percent with other internal contacts, and 5 percent with external contacts).
Fig. 11: List of figures contained in the Stewart diary (1967)

1. Range of average hours worked per week for four weeks
2. Range of time spent in own establishment
3. Range of time spent visiting other units of the company
4. Range of time spent working outside the company
5. Range of time spent in own office
6. Range of time spent travelling
7. Range of time spent on all paperwork
8. Range of time spent in inspection
9. Range of time spent in informal discussions
10. Range of time spent in committees
11. Range of time spent telephoning
12. Range of time spent in social activities
13. Range of time spent alone
14. Range of time spent in discussions with one other person
15. Range of time spent in discussions with two or more people
16. Range of time spent with immediate subordinates
17. Range of time spent with boss
18. Range of time spent with colleagues
19. Range of time spent with fellow specialists
20. Range of time spent with 'other internal' contacts
21. Range of time spent with customers
22. Range of time spent with 'other external' contacts
23. (a) Number of alone periods of half an hour or longer during the four weeks, broken by brief contacts
24. (b) Number of alone periods of half an hour or longer during the four weeks, without interruptions
25. Distribution of number of diary entries per day
26. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent alone in the maximum and minimum weeks
27. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent in informal discussion in the maximum and minimum weeks
28. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent in writing and in reading company material in the maximum and minimum weeks
29. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent in own office in the maximum and minimum weeks
30. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent with subordinates in the maximum and minimum weeks
31. Range of differences between the percentage of total working time spent in inspection in the maximum and minimum weeks
32. Percentage of total working time spent by each group in different places of work
33. Percentage of total working time spent by each group alone, with one person, and with more than one
34. Percentage of total working time spent by each group with different categories of people
35. Percentage of total working time spent by each group in different activities
36. Three measures of the fragmentation of each group's working day

Source: Stewart (1967)
Fragmentation in work was great, according to each of the three measures: in 4 weeks, the managers averaged only 9 periods of 30 minutes or more without interruption (and 4 out of 5 managers had less than 15 such periods); the managers averaged 12 fleeting contacts per day (i.e. less than 5 minutes duration); they averaged another 13 diary entries per day, for a total of 25.

A manager's job is a varied one in the place of work, in the contacts, in its activities and in its content.

The Mintzberg diary

This work is described in Mintzberg (1973). The study was limited to chief executives of substantial experience in medium to large organisations in various industries. A pilot run was done on three men who were the President of a small engineering firm, the Dean of a Management School and the Vice-Chairman of a large food retailing chain. After that the five people to be studied were selected. These were:

(a) Chairman and Chief Executive of a major consulting firm

(b) An Engineer who had become President of a firm carrying out research and development

(c) The Head of a large urban hospital

(d) The President of a firm producing consumer goods

(e) The Superintendent of a large suburban school system.
The common characteristics of these men were four.

(a) their position - the Chief Executive
(b) both large staff and line organisations reported to them
(c) the organisations were a success
and (d) all were experienced and had college education to a very high management level.

The study reveals that there was very little known about "content" of managerial work. This study therefore concentrated on:

(a) the job rather than the man
(b) basic similarities in their management of the work rather than differences
and (c) the essential content of that work.

The diary relies mainly on structured observation but Mintzberg supplements this with anecdotal and other material. Also, he accepts the limitations of the short duration of the diary preferring instead an in-depth study. He comments on the difficulty of deciding how to combine his various types of data in one analysis. It was his policy to develop his roles during the observation and after it has taken place. The field study proceeded through three basic stages:

(a) data collection
(b) recording observations
(c) coding
For each manager studied, he collected one month of scheduled appointments, information about the organisation and information about the manager. In the major part of the diary two types of data were collected. The first was the anecdotal diary type material which I collected and he did this in considerable depth for given incidents. He collected also the chronology record and this was supported by the mail record and the verbal contact record. Each evening the data on the three records were tabulated.

Mintzberg gives an example of the type of material collected. It consists of precise items, the way he greets his secretary, the way detailed information starts to flow in, all the telephone calls he makes and all the mail. It is not only the important incidents which are included, it is each and everything which he is doing. Figures 12, 13 and 14 are examples of the chronology record, the mail record and the contact record. The mail record contains seven items and this includes all sorts of trivia. The chronology record contains thirteen items between 8.20 and 1 o'clock. Some of these items last some time, e.g. a tour, while others, e.g. a telephone call, are short. The contact record contains ten items.

Figures 12, 13 and 14 illustrate also the way in which Mintzberg analyses the data and the types of results which he obtained. The paper claims that the one week periods were representative of each man's work, that these men were typical chief executives and that important basic similarities exist between types of jobs studied here and those found elsewhere.

An analysis of the differences follows and Mintzberg summarises his results as follows. Clearly, this analysis is far from conclusive. The research was not designed to compare or categorise different types of manager's work. Nevertheless, the analysis does suggest that a number of variables influence the
### Fig. 12: Mintzberg Journal - the chronology record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Duration (in hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:10</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:22</td>
<td>Jot work</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:40</td>
<td>Unscheduled meeting</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:55</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>Scheduled meeting</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:10</td>
<td>Unscheduled meeting</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Jot work</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>Tour</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:40</td>
<td>Tour</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:55</td>
<td>Call</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Scheduled meeting</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>End of meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cross references to items in Figs 13 and 14*

### Fig. 13: Mintzberg Journal - the mail record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Attention</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Trade organisation</td>
<td>Request to speak</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clipping</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>Solicitation</td>
<td>Skim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>External board</td>
<td>Notice of meeting</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Periodical</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Skim</td>
<td>Forward advertisement to production supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Foreign vice president</td>
<td>Request resolve staff conflict</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td>Reply: explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Financial data</td>
<td>Skim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>R &amp; J vice president</td>
<td>Request signature</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sigs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fig. 14: Mintzberg Journal - the contact record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call</td>
<td>Informed (event)</td>
<td>Manufacturing manager</td>
<td>Opposite</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled meeting 2</td>
<td>Informed (I.C.)</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Opposite</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call</td>
<td>Informed (I.C.)</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled meeting 3</td>
<td>Ceremony</td>
<td>Retiring employee: Personnel staff</td>
<td>Opposite (personnel (staffers)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled meeting 2</td>
<td>Informed (action taken)</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Plant employees</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Medical plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour</td>
<td>Informed (idea)</td>
<td>Assistant superintendent</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Executive vice president</td>
<td>Opposite</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call</td>
<td>Informed (decision)</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled meeting 4</td>
<td>Negotiating</td>
<td>Assistant, consultants</td>
<td>Clock</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Board room</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mintzberg (1973)
work of managers and these include the following:

(a) the nature of the industry
(b) the nature of the particular organisation
(c) the nature of the particular man's style
(d) the needs of the moment

Mintzberg develops a wide ranging theory in his book. It covers the characteristics of managerial work, various roles which they play and the variations which exist in the work which they do. It is impossible to review all of this material but a comparison of the roles with my own categories is carried in Chapter 8 after my own categories have been described. Some other observations on this work are given below.

It is interesting to note some of the difficulties experienced in this work, especially in the use of structured data. Four of these are listed below.

(a) Problems of data collection

In the context of diary use in general, Mintzberg's comments on his own problems of collecting data are interesting. These are:

(i) it is not possible to hear the other end of a telephone conversation
(ii) work in the evening could not be observed
(iii) activities away from the office were difficult to observe
(iv) many meetings were missed for various reasons
(v) Some of the meetings were very complex entities.

Unsatisfactory solutions to all of the above points were found. It is characteristic of this type of work that compromises on data collection are necessary.

(b) Effects of the presence of researcher

Mintzberg claims that he had no effect whatsoever on the work of the chief executive. He produces no evidence for this statement. Diaries ought to disturb managers less than other data collection methods. But I think that the very act of recording something will change at least attitudes. To record necessitates devoting more time to an activity and that can be used to reflect on the action.

(c) Hectic pace of work

Mintzberg recorded approximately five hundred pages of preliminary data in this study of one week’s activity for each person. The neat categories required for diary recording are not characteristic of managerial work and managers are far too busy to record things exhaustively and properly. Mintzberg doubts whether any of the studies even lists the amount of work covered by managers adequately. He suggests that it would be foolish to over-estimate even our understanding of what managers do, without any consideration of their reasons for doing it.

(d) Problems of coding

The first problem considered by Mintzberg is whether or not any particular happening is worthy of a record. The second is that a lot of
contact was purely social, e.g. talking to his wife.

Mintzberg found it difficult to classify things like a tour or an unscheduled meeting since one often merged into the other. Again, it was often difficult to say whether the executive was skimming, reading or studying mail. The duration of contacts was not timed except to the nearest 10 minutes. Deciding who the participants in any interchange were and whether they were important was difficult. Deciding who initiated a particular contact presented problems. He tried to record the functional area, e.g. marketing or manufacturing, to which any particular event belonged and did not succeed. They belonged to several sometimes. Mintzberg admits that his categorisation of purpose was weak. In discussing a purpose, he distinguishes five types of a situation which presented categorisation problems:

(i) Sequential purpose. Here the question was to distinguish which of several issues discussed in sequence was the real purpose of the meeting.

(ii) Overt-covert purposes - here the problem is one of "double talk".

(iii) Ostensible purpose - having gained access on one issue the real purpose is to discuss another.

(iv) Multiple purpose - people usually deal with many things almost simultaneously.

(v) Changed purpose - this is common, especially being "sidetracked".

Mintzberg then goes on to enunciate the rules to be used for coding purpose.
(a) Incidental information flow should be ignored.

(b) Ostensible and overt purpose of an event was to be used unless the covert purpose was obvious and suspected to be important.

(c) The most important of several purposes for an event was used.

(d) He has a complex rule for deciding who was giving or getting information.

(e) If an event focussed on one area but appears to be equally important in others, it became a review session.

(f) He was prepared to change the categorisation if some instant communication changed the course of an event.

Mintzberg goes on to develop roles using his diary data and these are compared to my own categories in Chapter 8. However, before leaving this initial survey of his work, it is worth quoting his conclusions about diaries:

"In conclusion, let me emphasise my strong belief that with our present understanding we cannot rely on the indirect methods of research, such as diaries, questionnaires and interviews. Managerial work is complex; we know too little about it. Once we have an appropriate theoretical understanding of managerial work, the diary method may prove useful to collect data efficiently and to compare many types of managers. But first we must have the basic understanding. Early use of the highly structured forms of research that pre-suppose much knowledge of the subject and that do not enable the researcher to create new structure as
he goes along is likely to perpetuate the naive views that we now have of managerial work."

Having surveyed the use of diaries in management research, it is useful to describe the methods which I used to analyse my own diary. These are described next.

The application of grounded theory in the development and analysis of my own diary

The method described by Glaser and Strauss (1976) in the Discovery of Grounded Theory and subsequently developed in Theoretical Sensitivity by Glaser (1978) are the methods which were used in the development and analysis of the basic diary. This section outlines my use of that theory and the ways in which the theory influenced the data. A description of my own diary occurs later in this chapter.

The basic theme of the grounded theory approach is to allow the theory relating to the social process being investigated to develop and emerge as the research progresses. It is assumed that coding of data will be one of the main research activities and that the codes which are used will be those which "emerge" from the data. In the second book quoted above, the way in which this emergence of codes should happen is described in detail. It is necessary to consider the extent to which the categories in this research did emerge from a study of this data in the way described.

I have been working in the management services field for a long time and have been interested in the methodology of running large projects for at least ten years. Despite the fact that up to the time of starting this research I have not attempted to describe the total process of running management services in
detail, certain parts of it were clear to me. For example, it was inevitable that there should be some categories concerned with the control of work within the division. Equally, I knew that my own management style predisposed me towards a greater degree of learning on the job than might be true of other managers. But the fact that such categories did not wholly emerge from the diary data does not alter the fact that they were well and truly grounded in experience over the last twenty years. What is clearly new about the work is the way in which the definitions of even those categories which were known to exist beforehand have been refined in the thesis. Further, the process by which all of my categories fitted into the master category of "negotiation of order" is completely new and has been developed almost completely from the evidence within the data. Although that master theme is developed in other parts of the literature, those papers and books were not known when I was developing this theory. Further, that master theme does not appear to have been applied specifically to management services anywhere in the literature.

Considerable attention is given in Theoretical Sensitivity to the way in which data is used to develop emergent categories which are then checked over by reference to other data as it is processed. This concept of rechecking and refitting the categories seems to be central to the grounded theory process. There are various levels of detail at which this process of refitting and checking back is described. I think that it would not be correct to claim that that total process of checking back and rechecking the categories occurred in my work. One of the reasons for this appears to me to be that the categories used in this thesis are essentially strategic ones. They are intended to provide a macro picture of being an RMSO, and do not describe, as is more usual, the more detailed make-up of the work of a person. The constant reshaping and
refitting, together with a theoretical possible abandonment of strategic broad categories probably would not have worked. What really happened was that each example from the diary data provided a certain nuance of the main theme. Those main themes which became the twelve categories were developed by sorting and resorting the event card early in the analysis process. For example, most of the events which became categorised as learning were identified in the early sorting process but were very varied in their nature. But the master category learning, did apply to them all and each event provided a part of a more detailed definition.

As stated above, the nuances and refinements of the definition of "learning" did emerge by a process similar to refitting in Glaser. A complication in the development of category definitions was that many of the events contained in the diary were very rich in content. For example, an Objectives Meeting was often reduced to one or two categories. But an Objectives Meeting is a complex meeting in which all sorts of issues and activities are being processed at the same time. The richness of the detail is not recorded and, in fact, a very selective sample of the actions taking place appear in the diary. One of the objectives of this research is to try and to deal with the total picture and all of the richness of activity and to simplify it in such a way as to show the total pattern of the activity rather than appreciate its individual parts in detail. Glaser does describe a way in which micro activities are regrouped into larger categories. Given the variety and extent of the data used in this diary, the use of such a process was not possible within an acceptable timescale. The reverse method of amplifying a macro type category by example was more appropriate.

Another criteria which should be applied to categories in the grounded
theory approach is that they must "work". Again it is important to interpret that at the macro level and not the individual activity level. At the individual categorisation of event level, my categorisation does not cover all aspects of an event. An example is the Objectives Meetings mentioned above. It is probable that in order to explore the detail, all of the categories put forward as part of the macro model could be the basis of an intense research programme in its own right. For example the diary, the analysis, and the definition and general characteristics of learning which are developed in this thesis do not do full justice to learning as a process in the life of an RMSO. But the analysis does establish beyond any doubt that the various types of learning which are described are an important part of the process of running a management services division. This is another aspect of the difference between using grounded theory at the macro and the micro level of activities. I believe that this thesis has shown that the model of negotiation plus event categories can be made to work at the macro level.

Another issue raised by Glaser and Strauss is the extent to which the theory developed in this thesis is a substantive or a formal theory. I believe the theory is a substantive theory but that the evidence presented is insufficient for it to be regarded as a formal theory. The ideas have only been developed in one context and that context was peculiar to the particular Regional Health Authority concerned. In Chapter 8 I have considered whether or not the analysis would apply to other RMSOs, other Regional Health Authorities and other sorts of organisation outside the National Health Service. Those considerations suggest that more work must be done before the generality of this model and therefore the formal status of the theory has been established.

Another issue discussed in Theoretical Sensitivity is the sampling methods
which are used to gather data. Considerable emphasis is placed on the need to use an inductive method for deciding what data should be gathered. That inductive method starts with a specific dissatisfaction with current theory and that was certainly the case for this thesis. The basic process used to collect data enabled me to modify the collection of data on the basis of experience. I analysed the data which had been collected up to that time in order to make the modifications. The way in which data was collected for my diary certainly developed as time passed and this is clear by comparing the initial entries with those which occurred at a later stage. During the collection of the diary data it became obvious that certain types of data were more illuminating and important for the development of the type of negotiating theory which was being put forward towards the end of the exercise. Nevertheless, I think it would not be possible to claim that the modification of the data collection was done in a systematic way using well established criteria for the change. Indeed, I am not clear how that would have been possible in this particular case. Even now it would be difficult to define in general terms the type of data which proved to be useful for this type of research. It is true that senior managers do feel that they know when they are involved in a significant event and all of their "antennae" used to collect different signals and wits will function well in those circumstances. Antennae and wits are appropriate words in the description of this process. It is debatable whether those processes can be modelled, reflect a real juxtaposition of significant acts or are plain post hoc rationalisations. But processes like these do seem to exist and I believe that as the collection of diary data progressed, they influenced its content.

Theoretical Sensitivity suggests that the secondary analysis of data is an important part of checking back on the categories being developed. A heavy
reliance on secondary analysis of data occurs in this thesis. The major categories emerged during the secondary analysis, or at least became substantially well established during that process. The major ideas on negotiating had started to be established before the secondary analysis took place. But it was a second data analysis which established negotiation as a main theme. However the process of establishing emergent theory does not seem to live up to the very high standards which are described in Glaser's work which seems to require a much more systematic approach. It is not obvious to me how I might have improved the analysis to meet Glaser's standard.

The coding section of Theoretical Sensitivity suggests that there are three basic questions which should be asked continuously during the coding process, namely:

(a) What is this data a study of?

(b) What category does this particular incident indicate?

(c) What is actually happening in the data?

The book develops the idea of open coding which depends on the use of these three questions in a systematic manner. It further suggests that an analysis of the data line by line is required to develop this type of theory. Given the amount of data contained in my diary, there was no possibility that such a diligent analysis of that data could have been undertaken. Nor do I think that it would have been profitable from the point of view of the objectives of the thesis. It seems more important to ask questions like "what is going on strategically in this incident?" and "what in the total picture has got strategic importance?". The emphasis on the strategic model even at the coding stage was important, and this has influenced the types of codes and categories which
have been developed.

Checking with other analysts is recommended by Glaser. No checking with other people other than the discussion of the results as they became available was possible. There was little discussion of what to do with particular pieces of data although there was a great deal about the general picture which was emerging. To this extent, the checking of the results was once again at the strategic model level rather than the interpretation of individual pieces of data.

Lastly, the Methodology of Grounded Theory describes at length development of the core of the theory and ways of making sure that the data is being used to the best effect and that the categories being suggested are 'saturated'. Although I believe that the categories which have been developed are at the very centre of the role of RMSOs who work in a manner broadly similar, I think that it would be wrong to suggest that the data has been used to its maximum in this theory. There is a great deal more which could be obtained from the diary by analysing it possibly from other directions. But I think that the macro picture is developed as well as it would be supported by the research diary. The core of the theory does appear to be there and is, in my view, substantiated by the analysis.

McCall and Simmons (1969)

Before proceeding with the detailed description of my own research methods, it is worth placing the methods of Glaser and Strauss in a wider context. There are two relevant underlying research issues, the nature of observations made in the type of diary study in this thesis and the use of case study qualitative data as opposed to quantitative data. Both issues are

The first chapter is about participant observation in general and makes the point early on that many techniques are given that name. They include direct observation, counting events, interviews, many types of face to face interaction and studying documents from and histories of organisations. Some researchers prefer to reserve the term for those activities in which the researcher becomes deeply and personally involved in the activities being studied. However, all the techniques are used to produce case studies containing and based principally on qualitative data. These techniques differ from other methods which produce quantitative data which has been subjected to statistical analysis of various types. The disputes between researchers using these two types of methods were at their height in the 1920's and 1930's but McCall and Simmons claim that such disputes tend now to centre on participant observation. He suggests that it is more profitable to attempt to understand the nature of the results which can be obtained from case nature of the results which can be obtained from case studies rather than take part in partisan arguments and this is the purpose of the three sections of Chapter 1 mentioned above.

Early in the chapter, the point is made that any form of participant observation relying on observation by the researcher must be supplemented by other methods since:
(a) organisations exist in several places

(b) organisations have existed before the observer starts his research

and (c) direct observation can only show up certain parts of the organisation

To overcome (a) and (b) informants must be used and for (c) respondents must be used. Informants, and this term can be used to cover documentary evidence, are persons who act in the same way as the researcher acts, e.g. to observe, whereas respondents are persons who provide expert advice on the organisation's function, or some part of it.

Zelditch takes up the discussion of the type of work and data produced by studies. First he suggests that there are three types of data in case studies:

(a) descriptions of single events which fit together into histories,

(b) enumerations and frequency distributions,

and (c) statements of known rules or statuses which apply in the organisation.

He goes on to suggest that three types of method exist for obtaining such data:

(a) participant observation as defined above,

(b) informant interviewing,

and (c) taking samples or enumerating cases.

He suggests that a research method can be described as a combination of data and method and that there are standard combinations, or prototypes, of
methodologies which are found frequently. He also suggests that one should associate two criteria of goodness with any research method, namely:

(a) information adequacy - is it accurate, precise and complete for example?

and (b) efficiency - in essence, is the method costly?

Zelditch discusses many aspects of the different prototypes and research methods which can be generated within the above framework. Although it is clear that some methods are more efficient for certain tasks than others, the results produced by the less efficient ones are not necessarily wrong. Different methods produce different and often complimentary insights into a problem. In no sense does any approach produce a "whole" or a "better" result. To insist on particular methods, e.g. a statistical sample must always be taken, say to find the answer to a status or rule issue, is to raise false methodological issues. The advantages, disadvantages, and the type of conclusion or model which I have tried to generate from a diary are discussed later. It is relevant to bear in mind the analysis suggested above in that later discussion. It seems to me that, for reasons given later, the diary method used in my research was appropriate and efficient.

Dean, Eichorn and Dean put forward a number of advantages and disadvantages of the use of qualitative data. Although it is not possible to include their argument, it is worth listing the points which they make:

Advantages

(a) Observation and interviewing deals with non standardised data whereas more structured methods have difficulty in doing this.
(b) Better use can be made of relationships which the researcher makes with informants.

(c) A researcher can structure a problem as he proceeds.

(d) Misleading questions and issues can be avoided more easily.

(e) Impressions of field workers can be used to classify events and are often more reliable than techniques such as an index based on questionnaires.

(f) It is possible to use better qualified staff on the data gathering.

(g) The researcher can ease himself into situations and thus explore the more delicate ones.

(h) The researcher can modify his categories almost continuously to make them fit better.

(i) The research can select informants who can provide relevant data as the research progresses.

(j) Depth material can be obtained more easily.

(k) The researcher absorbs valuable information as the research progresses and can modify his approach.

(l) The researcher can move between data gathering and analysis.

(m) Data that is difficult to quantify does not get distorted by qualitative methods.

(o) Surveys, etc. used to obtain quantitative data are more expensive.

Limitations

(p) Non-standardised data is difficult to process, especially by statistical methods.
Researchers can build bias into observation more easily with unstructured than with structured data.

In the article by Strauss, participant observation is approached much more broadly. He begins by emphasising two facets of the difference between quantitative and qualitative research methods. First, casual relationships are at best only part of the set of propositions about an organisation which a researcher must produce. Second, all the parts of the set of propositions tend to improve if they are allowed to develop during the research. In his argument for the broader, developing approach, Strauss suggests that there are three phases to field work:

(a) general observation

(b) making sense of the flow of events

and (c) pinpointing specific hypotheses

He is obviously very much in favour of this route for developing theory as an entity grounded in experience and observation.

Participant observation and its relationship to this research

I would not necessarily agree that the above summary of Chapter 1 of McCall and Simmons puts forward a balanced view of the merits and limitations of research methods based on the use of quantitative and qualitative data. This is not the place to develop that argument. However, its positive description of the advantages of participant observation and the use of qualitative data are relevant to this thesis. Below, more specific issues concerning my use of the diary data are discussed and it does seem useful for that discussion to take place within a more general context given above.
The advantages of using the diary method for this research

Although the diary method for my particular research appeared to be the best available, there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with using it for this work. This section records these advantages and disadvantages and other ways in which the thesis has been affected by the choice of the diary method.

One of the objectives of this diary was to facilitate reflection on the purposes behind the various actions which I have recorded in a diary. I selected a method of recording data which allowed this to happen in as free a way as possible. The diary was an attempt to record the significance, of any type whatsoever, as well as the form of the action and it is difficult to see that any other method would have made this possible. It would have been difficult to have systematised and coded beforehand even the types of purpose which I would have during a twelve month period. Such a code would probably have been required if other methods had been used.

None of the material which is recorded in other research of this type appears to have been orientated towards my particular purpose, i.e. constructing a model of a change agent. Since there was no guidance in the literature on how to collect such data, it was appropriate to adopt a method which allowed a free style of recording data such as the unstructured diary. The diary does record reflections, feelings and many other intangible factors concerned with an event. It talks about the purpose of the action, things which were causing difficulties or making actions easier to take, as well as the feelings and reactions of participants as I saw them. The ability to identify and record significance in this way and to associate with those all these different
types of record things which I thought about later, was an advantage of the diary.

In my diary, no attempt was made to use the structured type of recording used in other research. People such as Mintzberg and Stewart pre-selected the type of data that they were going to record and they have often associated it with other structured data collected at the same time. In my view, the structured diaries and the structured forms which they used tend to emphasise the mechanistic part of the work of managers. I do not think that these mechanistic interpretations of the activities of managers, however senior they might be and however helpful the structure might be, would have allowed me to investigate the models used to describe management services activity.

My diary permitted a wide range of topics to be recorded. Although the variety does make the analysis of the data difficult, it does reflect the richness and the variety of the work which I do. The extent to which it has been possible to deal with this variety using the analysis methods of Chapters 5 and 6 is debatable, but it is probable that any data collection method which would have excluded this variety of data from the start would have produced a biased and unrealistic interpretation of the activity of a change agent.

Unlike other diaries, this diary has attempted to cover a long period of time as well as a wide variety of experience. Any method of collecting data over this length of time and in the variety of circumstances covered by the diary would produce a great deal of data. I doubt if that amount of structured data could have been collected and analysed. Although difficult, it is worth restating that, despite all the difficulties of processing the data, the diary contained the facts which did seem significant at the time. This is a very
important quality. I think that the thesis has shown that it is possible to take
diary material of this type and analyse its significance using the methods in the
two case studies.

The variety of incident which is covered by this diary suggests that it
would have been impossible to negotiate the use of any other medium within a
reasonable time scale. For example, to have used a tape recorder in all of the
variety of meetings which are covered in the diary would have been far too
difficult to negotiate with the groups concerned. Although it is claimed that
people do rapidly settle down even when their meeting is being recorded, the
type of meeting which is included in this diary was such that that might not
have been the case. Often, very senior officers were involved and they would
not accept interventions of this type in their meetings. In contrast to the
difficulty of using methods such as tape recorders, the diary has involved no
disturbance whatsoever to the incidents being recorded. There is no observer
interference of which other people were aware.

A major advantage of the diary method was that it allowed the use of an
inductive methodology which facilitated the discovery of things which were
completely unknown at the start of the exercise. I did not know specifically
what I was looking for. The diary allowed me to move the research forward
and to record things better as time went on. The diary does show a significant
improvement in the quality of data suitable for this research purpose after the
first few weeks. Mintzberg stresses the need for an inductive method and
Glaser emphasises this theme in his books on the Discovery of Grounded Theory.
My research gained from this inductive method also.
The disadvantages of using the diary method for my research

However, the diary method is not without problems and it is worth recording the limitations of diaries. One of the major ones must be the missing material which has been left out of the record of events. Because of the length of time which the diary covered and the variety of incident recorded in it, it may be that there are examples of most of the activities which occur during twelve months. But that is not certain. Several varieties of relevant material do appear to be missing. On the whole, the diary makes no reference to the visual communications, the expressions on faces, and other indicators of mood which add to communication between people. Mintzberg in his analysis of diaries records desk work, telephone calls, scheduled meetings and tours as being useful ways of analysing his chronology records of chief executives. That set of classes of event reflects some of the missing material from my diary. Some important social calls are also missing from the basis such as those that one pays to friends. There must be other elements missing from the diary as well. Some of these are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

One problem of the unstructured diary is that it generates different levels of detail. Thus, some of the events recorded have long entries while others get a passing mention in one sentence. The structured methods of recording impose some measure of control over levels of detail. This diary does not impose any such discipline. Many factors, such as my mood or the time available to make the record, influence the quantity and quality of the diary entry.

Another part of this analysis states that the RHA is subject to major influences such as reorganisations which extend over a particular period of
time. But there is also an annual cycle of such activities in the life of the RHA which has not featured in the diary. For example, the flow of the planning cycle and the way its parts fit into the various parts of the year, had considerable influence on the timetabling of some of the events in this analysis. Other regular RHA activities had a similar effect on the events recorded. Such RHA activities must have had a formative influence on the actions taking place within headquarters at any time. The pressure which such timetables bring to bear on negotiations is not reflected in this diary.

The diary must be regarded as a particular slice through the very varied and rich activity of the regional headquarters. The diary probably represents a very peculiar way of slicing through and selecting from that whole activity. Any other way of collecting sociological data would also have given at best a partial view and allowed a partial analysis to have taken place. One of the peculiarities of the diary is that the way in which it selects from that RHA activity is not very precise. The only criteria for getting into the diary was that the event seemed to me to be significant at the time it was recorded. Although that criteria was a useful one to adopt, problems arise when one is trying to assess and establish the validity of the conclusions which have been drawn from the analysis of such material.

In the next two sections, I shall attempt to demonstrate the use of diaries in my research. Some of the features described above are illustrated by these studies.

The application of these methods to my own diary

The main objective of this research is to explore the nature of the last model of management services activity proposed in Chapter 2, i.e. the
Corporate Activist, and to put forward extensions to it. Successful management services activity depends on having a range of specialised skills available and being able to use them within an organisation to bring about actual change in the ways the executive part of the organisation works. The discussion of the six models in Chapter 2 shows that changing organisations requires a wide variety of skills, some of which are not understood. The structure of skills and other factors concerned with change is complex and this is the subject matter of the studies in Chapters 5 and 6. It is not sensible or possible to exclude completely any part of that change process from these studies, but the studies have been biased away from the numerical/technical activity and direct interpersonal interactions which are used to design and implement new systems. These studies are concerned more with making it possible to do project work in the first place and the processes through which one goes to make them an accepted and used part of the management system.

In the last model of management services proposed in Chapter 2, a degree of corporate activity is present. One of the main effects of this is to start breaking down the barriers, between the different Divisions of the RHA. Thus, as will become clear from the second case studies, inter-divisional teams start to be very important. In the same way, the laboratory project relies on teamwork, albeit of a different type. There is a lot more to making these teams work than having the right group or interpersonal skills. Their political significance, relationship with other parts of the organisation, the way in which they change the power structure, their effects on status and pride, and so on, are all aspects of teamwork which need to be understood. Another aspect of corporate activity is the individual's set of meta-objectives. For example, if someone believes that a fundamental need is to change the power structure say
in a given way, this will probably be more significant than his interest in facilitating group discussion or making the project work. The problem of refining the model of management services is explored from these and similar points of view in this research.

My own diaries

The basic research method has been to keep a diary of the activities of a Regional Management Services Officer over a period of fifteen months and to analyse that activity. All of that activity in the diary can be described as top level activity and a staff of over one hundred, forty of whom are technically qualified, exists to provide support for it. It was not possible or useful to use tapes for direct recording for a variety of reasons. The diary covers a wide variety of circumstance and it would not have been possible to negotiate the use of tape. In any case, the period of time to get back to normal behaviour would have been prohibitive in this wide ranging project. Also, the data for this project was collected from a random set of events in order to get the necessary width of view into the analysis. The method of writing or dictating the diary immediately after the event suited this purpose better than tapes. The data is unstructured and there was little point in considering the use of structured data collection such as questionnaires.

There are three different things which could have been done with the diary material. First, there is a great deal of detail about activities in the diary and a macro-study of the inter-personal activity involved would have been possible. Secondly, because of the time period covered by the diary, longitudinal studies of projects as they develop through time are possible. Thirdly, a macro-study of the pattern of the whole year's work was possible. On
the whole a study of personal behaviour seemed unlikely to contribute greatly to understanding the strategic behaviour of a change agent and so the analysis of the data was orientated towards the other two possibilities.

The diary evolved during the period of the study. A definite attempt to record all the significant events on one project concerned with laboratory computing was made. At the end of the study the Laboratory Diary (Appendix 2) was separated off from the Main Diary (Appendix 1). The only reason that an event became part of the diary was that it seemed important to me at that time. The diary does not purport to be an exhaustive or in any real sense structured or comprehensive account of the period covered. It was written under a variety of circumstances, usually immediately following an event but sometimes several days later. Some of the diary was taped, some dictated and some prepared in longhand, depending on circumstances and the availability of time and recording material. Recording the material as soon as possible after the event was given a high priority. It was thought useful to incorporate a small amount of material written for other uses because it illustrated specific issues.

The analysis of my diaries

The study described in Chapter 5, the analysis of my activities over long period is complex and is described below. However, the laboratory study does not require a lengthy introduction in this chapter and so I have chosen to introduce that study first so that the thread of this chapter remains clear.

The study of the laboratory services in Chapter 6 attempts to follow a very complex project over the fifteen months period. It is an attempt to tell that story in the way it happened. The diary reflects the unstructured way in
which the project was pushed and pulled between different sorts of objectives, value systems and other formative influences. The interplay of strong personalities, different perceptions of what is important and the need to fashion compromise all appear in the mixed up, random nature of the diary. The evolution of that project could not have been forecast accurately enough to be useful at the start of that work. The analysis of the project has two parts. The main themes of the work are separated from each other and then the major lessons to be learned are described. The study includes commentaries on the activity of the major participants, especially in so far as that activity is related to the factors mentioned above and is of particular significance for the development of a better model of management services activity.

The first study in Chapter 5 attempts to answer the question "What does an RMSO do over a period of fifteen months?" The diary attempted to pick up all significant activity - but I feel sure that it failed to collect everything. However, the variety of the record is still very full and the study has attempted to put some structure into the activity which is recorded. The basic method was to split the diary into events, to construct categories of event and then to analyse the events in a given category.

For the first study, having the diary available made it possible to study the material and to try to put it in order. On the basis of that careful study, and taking into account certain predispositions of my own, a set of event categories was constructed. I then attempted to split the diary into events and to give these events categories. This appeared to confirm that the exercise was feasible. In order to facilitate subsequent manipulation of event data, a card was designed, see below. TYPE and BOOK refer to the source of the material in the original diary, one half being typed and the other hand written in
a book. DATE of the event and EVENT were used to describe the event. It was thought that it might be possible to describe the objective of most events in GOAL but this proved not to be the case. Many events have elusive objectives. GOALS were used to extend the description of the event.

Figure 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>28.4.78.</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REF</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>First meeting of Planning Methods Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| GOALS | 1. Give project some momentum  
2. Clarify its status and importance  
3. Clarify my own intentions and role  
4. Start getting the group together |

E104 Paras. 159/160

The categories 1 to 12 on the card were circled in order to provide an event categorisation. An event could have more than one category if this seemed appropriate. Not giving an event a category was also allowed. The categories had the following definitions at the start of the exercise after the initial study of the diary material.
An early definition of event categories

1. Create To start a new pattern of thinking or actions. Often, simply to think about how to do these things.

2. Learn Apart from conventional learning about new techniques, etc. from books and lectures, to watch and listen to people, groups and organisation behaviour in general. If possible to systematise that knowledge.

3. Ethos To change attitudes about what is acceptable or unacceptable. To change the organisation's culture.

4. Relate Use or reinforce a personal or group relationship.

5. Big To pursue by all possible means some very important objective, often not possible without an ethos change.

6. Opportunism To spy a chance to do something non-routinely and to take it.

7. Maintain To keep in repair and working order projects and organisations which are essentially all right and to make your ongoing concern for them known.

8. Facilitate Make an agreed course of action work, especially by providing a resource or removing an obstacle in a way that only yourself can do.

9. Oil Pour oil on all kinds of troubled waters.

10. Control To keep control of a set of actions, occasionally in contradiction of my own delegation principles, because difficulties have occurred. If the project is big enough, I manage it.
11. Troubleshoot To go and deal with a problem at any level if I judge it necessary.

12. Takeover To take back delegated control if I think it wise.

The order of these categories is important since it represents my considered view of their importance. They fall into three groups: 1 - 3, 4 - 8, and 9 - 12. These groups seem to me to be associated with three macro-activities:

(a) making new things possible;
(b) getting things done;
and (c) getting out of trouble.

The criteria for classifying events

The purpose of this research is to develop a model of management services activity and a major part of that development is the set of categories described briefly above. It was only after the completion of the analysis of data that a fuller definition of the categories became possible and that fuller definition is contained in Chapter 7. Although the categories evolved from the diary data, the initial definition of them was in general terms such as those given above and the criteria used to group events together were not precise. The events given a particular category seemed to fit together within an appropriate set of umbrella-type concepts. It is inappropriate to believe that the recognition of the similarity can be explained easily. This difficulty is strictly analogous to the logical problems of making computers recognise patterns which to human beings are obvious.

Some of the ideas behind the grouping of events are described below.
Category 1 - creative thinking

A large proportion of management situations have occurred many times or are similar to ones which have. Although the set routines for dealing with them might involve senior management, they are fairly well established routines in which the risk factors are all low. Creative thinking must occur when no such set of routines exists or when the pattern for bringing together routines which do exist is very novel. Very often creative management thinking is a step by step manoeuvre concerned with what is at first sight, and possibly is in fact, an intractible problem. For example, trying to reorientate the National Review of Statistics presented organisational problems which had never been solved before and somehow several sets of ingrained patterns of national review behaviour had to be changed. Being clear about the objectives of my intervention and the way of achieving results demanded new and wise thinking.

Category 2 - learning

Organisations are always changing and adaptation to new circumstances is always occurring. It is particularly important for mistakes to be recognised and for alternative and more appropriate responses to be devised. But it is also necessary to try to improve even the best performance. Learning appears to be most useful when it is feeding into the body of knowledge which can be used systematically to improve performance and this applies to both the new routines of individuals and the organisation. The variety of learning which should be occurring is very great and I do not think that it is useful to set down areas of learning which are more precise than those given above. It may be worth emphasising the breadth of the category by noting that much learning is based
on just being aware of what is happening around one all of the time. Watching can be learning if one wishes to make it such.

Category 3 - ethos creation

Ethos is the characteristic spirit of a community or organisation. It determines what is acceptable and how things can be done. Making it possible to manage differently and if possible, making an organisation want to improve continuously, is very important. Different people have different visions of what is desirable and what should be acceptable. If an event is placed in this category, apart from its immediate interpretation, it should have an underlying significance concerned with organisational attitude. Thus, although arguing about nomination to the Technical Committee has an immediate importance in its own right, it has significance for ethos since it seeks to replace a "let's balance the disciplines" principle by "let's get the best technical advice".

Category 4 - relate

In a sense, one cannot do anything without relating to another person, except work by oneself. And so the category may seem at first sight to be redundant. However, logical encounters with other people purely about work simply do not occur. Other factors intrude and it is necessary to spend a great deal of time understanding and assessing the impact of them. Understanding the behaviour of other people and designing appropriate responses, i.e. relating to each other, is the context within which work proceeds. For an event to be classified as "relating", a significant part of that event should be about understanding the immediate approach of that person, responding to it and attempting to place that encounter within a longer term context. For example,
being assessed by a boss might include a significant review of work done but it
is really an encounter in which each is trying to get at what the other expects
of him and, on that basis, to negotiate a future relationship.

Category 5 - big

Defining "big", the project that must succeed and represents a very
significant achievement, is a key top management activity. Putting priorities
on work is one of the things for which senior managers are paid their salary, and
if their judgement is in error, major organisational problems are inevitable. If a
project is given this classification, then added attention must be given to every
aspect of that work and senior management must institute sufficient controls to
ensure that the possibility of trouble is minimised. A wide variety of reasons
can place a project near the top of the priority list. For example, I believed
that if the nature of the RHA Objectives could be changed, the whole Region
could veer off in a new and better direction. But that was my judgement.

Category 6 - opportunism

Creative management is concerned with pushing forward to take
advantage of the unexpected. To pursue an objective which takes an
organisation beyond its present limits implies taking risks because it is usually
impossible to preplan every aspect of the project. Filling in some of the
missing parts of a plan can depend on taking opportunities which just present
themselves. I knew for certain that these were deep rooted objections to
evaluation work. It was straightforward opportunism that got round those
difficulties. The chief criteria for this category is the existence of an
unexpected chance. Such opportunity taking justifies the event classification.
Category 7 - maintain the division

The process of keeping in order all the routines necessary to make the Division work is a major task. Unfortunately, it did not get recorded in the diary to any great extent.

Category 8 - facilitate action

In most management hierarchies, the necessary power and authority to get most things done is given to middle management. But projects do require the intervention of senior management to take action which removes certain types of blockage. Once the blockage has been eliminated, control should return to the lower level manager. The most common example of facilitate is the agreement to the provision of resources or the renegotiation of the appropriate level of resources for a particular job. Facilitate is different from Control because the responsibility for the work is and remains delegated.

Category 9 - control

The criteria for deciding that an event is controlled rather than facilitated is the extent of power to direct work which is retained by myself. For example, interfering with the course of catering monitoring to an extent that required to obtain a response from Areas and Districts was control. I did not simply set a goal to be achieved. I took action designed to achieve it in a way which I selected.

Category 10 - oil the works

The range of actions taken by a manager can be regarded as being on a
scale at one end of which are those for which he has clear responsibility and
timescale and at the other no acknowledged responsibility at all. Being helpful
outside one's own area of responsibility is not necessarily a good thing and it
costs time and effort. I do not feel obliged to make it up with someone after a
difference of opinion but sometimes it is worthwhile.

Category 11 - troubleshoot

Troubleshoot is an event category used mainly for corrective project
management or the avoidance of unforeseen or randomly generated events
which will cause trouble. The essential features present for a situation to
require this type of action is that it is outside a plan and that it has
considerable actual or potential nuisance value. The examples of actual
mishaps on projects are obvious but judging that an event is potentially
dangerous, e.g. taking decisions on systems development into a national forum,
is one of the less obvious cases for this category.

The origin of the categories and criteria for classifying events

As stated above it is very difficult to describe the precise process by
which these categories came into existence. To some extent the three major
groups of categories, making new things possible, getting existing work done
efficiently and getting out of trouble, have been part of my management
philosophy for a long time. Once the event cards had been created for an
experimental sample of events a sorting process into these three piles was
inevitable. In the same experimental sorting procedure some events had
obviously to be separated out from the other, e.g. learning, controlling and
troubleshooting. All three represent deeply ingrained personal behaviour
patterns. The more subtle distinction, such as the one between ethos and
create, were based on a much more intense look at the data. Although they are closely related, there are important differences between them and these are brought out in Chapter 5. It was really during the sorting of the experimental cards that the differences between related categories started to emerge. Thus, once control and troubleshoot existed, it was inevitable that facilitate should slot in between them. Some events did not fit into the emerging scheme. For example, it became apparent that "oil the works" was another of my activities. Although this concept is now a much better recognised part of my own activity, it was not a major part of my own conceptual management framework before this research work was undertaken.

I do not think that it is possible to describe how the conceptual framework of categories evolved in more precise terms, without running grave risks of post-hoc rationalisation. The categories evolved to some extent before the research started, but to a much greater extent during the sorts of searches for a pattern in the experimental event cards described above.

Sorting events into lists with the same category

Following categorisation, all of the events were split into lists with the same category. Events with more than one category were put in all the appropriate lists. In a given list, three groups exist, those with a single category, those in which that category is the most important, i.e. the lowest numbered, given to the event and the rest in order of the most important category given to the event. For each list, the event characteristics are discussed and two events from each list are discussed in detail. The events which were not categorised are discussed also. The implications of the event analysis for the set of categories and the general lessons to be drawn follow.
During this process, it became apparent that 'Takeover' was associated almost exclusively with the major project discussed in Chapter 6. In the discussion contained in that chapter, considerable attention is given to the takeover process and consequences. Any good example of takeover discussed in Chapter 5 would almost inevitably have been taken from the Chapter 6 material and this would have been probably confusing and certainly repetitious. For this reason, takeover is not discussed in Chapter 5.

Summary

The basic research methods used in this thesis have been described in this chapter. The first part of that method was to keep two types of diary, one covering all of the significant events on the work of a management services officer, the other covering one long project. These two sets of data were analysed using grounded theory methods to produce sets of event categories and a description of the way in which events of these type were linked together into major projects. The first step in both studies was to split the diary into events and an event card was filled in for each event. From these two case studies, general properties of the event categories and the negotiating processes which link such events together into major projects were developed. The two case studies are contained in the next two chapters while Chapter 7 describes the general characteristics of both the set of event categories and the negotiating process.
CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY 1 - THE NATURE OF THE RMSO WORK OVER A
ONE YEAR PERIOD

Introduction

This chapter contains the first of the case studies described in Chapter 4 and starts to put together the first part of the developed version of Model 6 which is described briefly in Chapter 2. This case study is an attempt to describe the total activity which made up the work of the Regional Management Services Officer over one year excluding that described in the Laboratory Project.

The next section describes the way in which the event classification given in Chapter 4 has been used to analyse the diary events. The year's events are then described in simple statistical terms. The following eleven sections consider for each category the events falling uniquely into that category, and also events to which several categories were assigned including the section category specified. Apart from listing the relevant events, the sections discuss their main characteristics, the associations among categories, the event type variability and level of importance of the events as well as their relationship to the category as defined initially. Despite the care given designing the categories, many events were not given categories and these events are described. A discussion of the issues raised completes the chapter. These categories are the first part of my main model.

The process of analysing data for this case study

Chapter 4 discusses the basic research methods used in this project. This Section explains some of the finer details of the methods used and the construction of later parts of this Chapter.
The part of the diary used in this section consists of 247 events. These exclude laboratory project material. On average this represents 1.2 entries per working day and it is clear that a very selective process chose these events from those which made up the complete year. At various points in the Chapter, the nature of some of the missing material is discussed. Intentionally, the laboratory project received a disproportionate amount of attention in the diary during the year. The most significant events are not necessarily those receiving greatest space and, seemingly therefore, attention in the diary. However, at the time of being recorded, all the events did seem to be sufficiently significant to be recorded.

For data recording convenience three types of diary note existed, handwritten notes, dictated notes and typed early notes. All of these were read, and split into "events". An event is a set of activities which seem to fit together. Several events can happen in any given meeting or encounter. Each separate event, its date and reference to original diary was transferred to a separate Analysis Card. The event description on card was written at the time of transfer to cards. The Diary Event Reference Number used in the typed thesis diary at the beginning of paragraphs and in any event listing at the beginning of each of the category section below is the number of the event card in date order. The events were given categories on three different occasions, corresponding to the transfer of the three parts of the diary to cards.

During the process of selecting categories for events, some of the inadequacies of the codes became apparent. Apart from those events left uncategorised, the categorisation of events was based on judgement and it was felt that compromises were being made and information was being suppressed. The notes made during this process and discussed in the last section were
important in using this analysis to refine the model of Management Services activity.

Statistical analysis of diary events

Figure 16 shows the number of events being given each category uniquely and being given each category along with others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Single Category</th>
<th>Multiple Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Create</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Learn</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Relate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ethos</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Big</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Opportunism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Maintain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Facilitate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Control</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Troubleshoot</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Takeover</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17 shows the incidence of events being given one or more categories.
Figure 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Single category events</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>42.5%</th>
<th>Double category events</th>
<th>53</th>
<th>21.5%</th>
<th>Triple category events</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>7.3%</th>
<th>Quadruple category events</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>3.2%</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>25.5%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>247</th>
<th>100.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 18 shows the incidence of events with a single category and with each category among others in descending incidence order.

Figure 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Single categorisation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th></th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Multiple categorisation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Learn</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Relate</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Relate</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Big</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Big</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Learn</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Facilitate</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Troubleshoot</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Facilitate</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 Troubleshoot</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Create</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Ethos</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ethos</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Create</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Opportunism</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Maintain</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Opportunism</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Maintain</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Takeover</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Takeover</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perhaps the most significant statistic is 25.5% for unclassified events. The commentary below shows that a significant proportion of these are concerned with defensive actions and with feelings of passive reaction to other peoples' initiatives, e.g. frustration. It is however significant that my own preconception and initial analysis of the job of RMSO did not admit that initiative does lie outside our control to this extent and that all that can be done is to react. The extent of the unclassified category also suggests that the job contains even greater variety than originally envisaged and this is confirmed below.

Apart from "learning", the statistics confirm that a large proportion of effort is spent on getting major pieces of work through the management system. Thus "big", "relate", "facilitate" and "control" are all high in both single and multiple category events.

"Learning" features high on both lists in table 3, and this confirms my own feeling for the importance of this activity. Although a significant proportion of this learning activity is of a very personal type, e.g. books, much of it is concerned with learning about how people act and how the RHA behaves as an organisation.

Although fairly low in the tables, I consider "creative thinking" and "changing the ethos of the RHA" to be important. The events in these categories contain the most far reaching parts of my activity.

Although surprising, the position in the table and the low number of "opportunistic activities" may reflect the actual situation. However, the statistics on "maintenance" must be misleading. A great deal of time is spent just chatting to management service staff, giving advice, discussing how things are going and performing similar activities. But they are mainly small
activities in the office, meetings in corridors, chats over lunch and coffee, monthly reporting sessions and similar activities. These do not feature in the diary.

The statistics on multiple activity are interesting. Learning can be removed as a personal activity mainly and creating a particular change in the ethos is often a very deliberate action. Trying to get a "big" project launched can be a very single-minded activity. But, on the whole, multiple objectives can and must be pursued in most situations. In difficult situations, or open opportunistic settings, it is essential that each situation is used to the full. It would be surprising if the diary revealed otherwise.

### Category 1 events - Creative Thinking

**Table of Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.4.78.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Talk to Giff Reynolds about how to sort out problems connected with Luke Downs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>17.4.79.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Think about the need to get evaluation of projects on a firm footing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>23.5.78.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Think about problems connected with computer strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>10.6.78.</td>
<td>(1,2,3)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques says that the Chairman is allowed to have two bees in his bonnet per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>3.7.78.</td>
<td>(1,2,4,8)</td>
<td>A typical Henry Jacques Objectives meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>24.4.78.</td>
<td>(1,3)</td>
<td>Discuss the viability of small departmental units with Giff Reynolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>21.11.79.</td>
<td>(1,3,5)</td>
<td>Try to fix the Regional Objectives for 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>23.10.78.</td>
<td>(1,3,6,10)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques floats the idea of having a deputy. Get my colleagues to see it as an opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>13.4.78.</td>
<td>(1,4,5)</td>
<td>Coping with nine different things out of the Management Services Committee, at least five being quite important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>28.3.78.</td>
<td>(1,4,5)</td>
<td>Agree the separation of the production of and the methods for reducing the 1979 Plan with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>24.11.78.</td>
<td>(1,4,5,6)</td>
<td>Discussing the consequences of integrated working for the 1979 Objectives and getting Henry Jacques to accept them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>13.4.78.</td>
<td>(1,5)</td>
<td>Being highly critical of head office for their attitudes towards the National Statistics Review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Category 1 events

As defined originally, it was thought that part of being the RMSO would be initiatives which had very little stimulus from sources other than my own thoughts. The twelve events do have that characteristic. At least two distinct types of initiatives can be distinguished:

(a) those which are work orientated, both at Regional and Head Office level; and

(b) those which are concerned with transforming situations in which a personal or social relationship of a long lasting variety causes difficulty.

Others exist, but they do not appear to have any particular characteristic.

These events are all "difficult" situations. This is especially so when they refer to people and the need to bring about radical change in a person's attitude or activity which is frequently the case. For example, the process of introducing a new evaluation methodology into the Region is difficult because it is perceived as useless and irrelevant, taking over "my patch", being too technical and so on by RTO members. The nature of what constitutes "creative thinking" in this instance is important. As well as having the original idea, such ideas must be framed in terms which particular individuals will grasp and with which they have sympathy. Known animosities and dislikes must be avoided. That requires careful thought.

Despite the fact that the list of Category 1 events is short, I am convinced that some of them contain the seeds of radical transformations of the RHA role. The adoption of the ideas by the RHA and their subsequent develop-
ment to a stage at which they could survive on their own require careful planning beforehand and nurturing during their early life. Equally, they require protection from the inevitable attacks when they are most vulnerable. Two are chosen from the list to illustrate their possible seminal character and the process by which their survival was engineered. These are the transformation of the nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives and the introduction of evaluation into the Region.

The 1979 Objectives were quite different from those of 1978. In 1978 they had been put together in such a way that the actual objectives were those of the administrative divisions only. They had more to do with methods rather than with ultimate objectives of the RHA which should concern the care of patients. For example, planning and monitoring methods had featured very prominently. There was considerable frustration around RHA Headquarters because people like Giff Reynolds and myself felt that we must get nearer to the "sharp end of the business" of providing care rather than "bother about" methods all the time. "Sharp end" and "bother about" carry many overtones and reflect accurately our conversation at that time. It was therefore important that the way in which people, Henry Jacques in particular, thought about objectives and their nature was changed.

The first step in doing this was to provide a power base from which to influence both the medical and administrative sides of the Headquarters. It was clear that I would have to work through Giff Reynolds and Ralph Bains. When I opened up the subject privately with Giff Reynolds, he was in a state of disillusionment and frustration about Henry Jacques' attitude. My first job was to make him see that it was possible to make Henry Jacques change his approach this year, providing we played our cards right. We then fixed the
nature of the paper which had got to be put to Henry Jacques to achieve this. It was also clear that the approach had got to be constructed in such a way that it met Giff's own personal requirements for work fulfilment. That approach must allow Giff to get to the front line positions in Districts and to work with people concerned directly with care groups. During that meeting we discussed the inter-authority problems which were bound to arise if an integrated project was launched which would not only plan events, such as the construction of a mental handicap policy, but would bring them to fruition in Districts. And so we did a private deal on nature and the way in which any approach was to be carried through. The deal was the form and content of the paper to be given to Henry Jacques, written by ourselves, and the way in which our meeting with him and other divisional heads was to be handled.

With Ralph Bains, the matter was entirely different. A perfectly good project existed and could be placed in the RHA Objectives providing it was possible to cut down the project in size, to sharpen up its definition and to remove it from the clutches of a committee. Achieving that was what we discussed. We knew that the committee would flounder until someone put forward a substantial piece of work. Promoting that project in a specific form was the tactic which we decided to adopt. Methods of dealing with the committee were agreed also.

Giff Reynolds and I then talked to our fellow Heads of Divisions about how we would play the meeting at which this new type of objective was discussed with Henry Jacques. We all tried to anticipate the problems which would arise. This was after Giff and I had talked them into this sort of approach for 1979. This was fairly easy because they were all rather tired of planning in isolation at a high level and never seeing any part of the real results of the planning.
coming into being at the District level. Armed with these preparations, we went to see Henry Jacques.

In fact, much to everyone's surprise, Henry Jacques provided no obstruction whatsoever, once it became clear that he was facing a viewpoint held strongly by all Heads of Division. Except that, as Giff Reynolds pointed out later, he did not accept specifically that this meant that all of "his pet things" like "staying in HQ" were going to have to be altered if we were to negotiate this through the total Regional organisation. Giff noticed this. Despite the fact that Henry Jacques accepted the approach, he was in fact quite tough about the way in which such an integrated approach might be carried through and there was a lot of hard bargaining about how everyone would have to play their parts.

Similar tactics were used on the other 1979 Objectives. The result of this work is that the 1979 Objectives have quite definitely changed their nature. They are no longer only about development of management in Headquarters. They are wide ranging projects in which Districts must participate and, as a result of which, direct patient care should change in the fairly near future.

The introduction of an evaluation team financed from Research and Development Head Office funds is a complete contrast to the above work. Head Office wished to do this work in order to show the benefits of some standard computer systems by comparing them with ordinary manual systems. Head Office wished us to choose two hospitals in the Region and to measure performance there over a period of eighteen months. I was very keen on this work because of my own interests and background and because it was a way of getting more definite objective setting associated with the performance of our
own manual systems. For a variety of reasons I had to negotiate this introduction of the evaluation staff through the system most carefully and this event illuminates the difficulties which occurred.

The event was getting the proposition through the RTO. Almost immediately in that RTO meeting there was a split between the Works Officer and the Nurse and the Treasurer and the Medical Officer. The former two were in favour of the work, especially if it could be done at new hospitals where we would then have the benefit of using that data to design the operational systems for the new units. The Medical Officer was right against any such proposal because it came from R & D funds in Head Office, which he hated, having been associated with a committee concerned with R & D work for several years. The Treasurer disliked the suggestion intensely because he was trying to get extra staff and could not find a way around the staff control procedures. There was a violent argument about it being possible to launch HO R & D projects when their own favoured projects, the Treasurer's in particular, could not be funded. I had to point out how irrelevant that argument was, that we could not cut off our nose to spite our face and that we could not miss opportunities of this type. But the important feature of the meeting was the obvious heat that was going into the argument on an emotional level and in my view it represented the pent up feelings of these people against any development of an administrative division when their own was being, in their views, restricted and kept to a very low level indeed. They insisted that we approach the two Districts concerned and get their blessing, a foregone conclusion, but I am sure they were hoping that in some sense these Districts would refuse to have the work done. Of course, the Districts accepted the offer without hesitation and the project was launched. The RTO event demonstrates vividly the need to consider carefully what boulders will slip or be
pushed into the way of a new project when it is being launched.

I went round to see Freda Simm afterwards just to make sure that at the following week's meeting we had a much smoother ride and that she tried to remove some heat out of Martin's objections before we came across them again.

Category 2 events - Learning

Table of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>17.3.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Personal reading of books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>20.3.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Martin Williams is trying to prepare Oncology Monitoring in his own model rather than the Region's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>21.3.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Go and look around another Region's computer building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>24.3.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>More personal learning books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>31.3.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Go out to consult Elizabeth about how to relate to Freda Simm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gathering a comment just for my instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Learning by reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>7.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Personal learning books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>12.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Watch the William Lee perform at the Monitoring Panel at Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>17.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Watch the Chairman gun for one of the major building extensions at an important DGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>19.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Listen to the Areas explode on being reconsulted by Henry Jacques about the computer strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>21.4.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reading books, e.g. the BBC one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>2.5.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self education on Crossman's diaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>15.5.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Henry Jacques supports the computer building, ie a separate machine and a building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>21.5.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Listen to David James talking about Martin Williams performing at the Planning Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>5.6.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Considering my own truncated staff assessment by Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>12.6.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Listen to Ralph Rains questioning the politicing that is going on on patient care and its relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>22.6.78.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Watching the Regional Scientific Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Category 2 events - Learning

### Table of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>27.6.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Listen to David James talk about normative planning in the 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>27.6.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Listen to Giff Reynolds talk about his attitudes on confidentiality in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>29.6.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The R &amp; D National Committee push through the computer strategy inspite of any objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>24.7.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Luke Downs comes down with a takeover bid for the Accounting Systems Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Liasing with Martin Williams over the use of norms in planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>1.8.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self education by relating Allison's book to the signalling going on with West Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>7.8.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thinking about brandishing sanctions from the Regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>17.8.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>More thoughts and examples of sanction brandishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>17.10.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Watch Authority Members deal with the Mental Handicap Review. Listen to Walter Ame saying that Henry Jacques has gone control mad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Giff Reynolds and I discuss the contrary RTO feedback which we receive from Henry Jacques and Luke Downs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Walter Ame says that Henry Jacques cannot tell anyone what he wants coherently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>3.11.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Go to Salton Meeting of Administrators about the third draft of the Computer Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.11.78</td>
<td>(2, 9)</td>
<td>Pick up the Newton computer problem at Salton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>24.11.78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>At lunch Giff Reynolds points out that Henry Jacques did not accept the integration consequences of the 1979 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 4, 8)</td>
<td>Typical Objectives Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 8,11)</td>
<td>Get Henry Jacques to accept the Manpower Planning systems costs and the staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>3.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 5)</td>
<td>First meeting with Freda Simm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>26.6.78</td>
<td>(2, 4)</td>
<td>Mark Williams is expressing deep concern about me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>(2, 4)</td>
<td>React to Henry Jacques trying to re-establish control after his foreign trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 5)</td>
<td>Talking to Henry Jacques on the computer strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.5.78</td>
<td>(2, 5)</td>
<td>Receive the National OR Group papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>28.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 9)</td>
<td>Peter Tibbs visits the Dental Committee about monitoring and reports back to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>10.6.78</td>
<td>(1, 2, 3)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques says Chairman is allowed two bees in his bonnet per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>3.7.78</td>
<td>(1, 2, 4, 8)</td>
<td>A typical Objectives Meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 128 -
Analysis of Category 2 events

If an essential feature of a management services division is to be a change agent, then knowing the likely response of people and parts of the organisation to types of proposals is important. Learning is about how to anticipate those responses. The number of events in this category confirms the relative importance of this category of event in the Management Services Division. It is possible to break down the total number of events into four classes:

- **personal learning**
  - books, etc. (8 events)

- **learning about people**
  - reactions, support, feelings (16 events)

- **learning about organisations**
  - committee activity and authority action (8 events)

- **learning about work**
  - big issues only (5 events)

Learning from books may reflect a personal disposition on my part, but it also reflects the type of Division which I wish to run and the type of RHA I wish to work for. In a variety of ways, I put pressure on the Division to take pride in being better informed and more technically and managerially qualified than their counterparts in other Regions. The Departments in the Division have book and training budgets, and I enquire about their use. I have put one manager on a three months course this year. I prompt people by asking "Have you read 'X'?".

Having systematic knowledge about how other officers will react to types of suggestion or paper is at the heart of being a change agent. Often that knowledge is obtained through others, e.g. Giff Reynolds and I discuss feedback from the RTO. Knowledge of another's past, e.g. what did Martin Williams do with normative planning in the past?, can be a key to playing the development
of planning methods. Giff Reynolds' observation that Henry Jacques had not accepted the operational consequences of the 1979 RHA Objectives had bypassed me completely and the effect of that observation was salutory.

Knowing how the organisation will react is the third class of event. There are two aspects of this, groups such as committees and different organisational layers, i.e. Region, Area and District. Any officer is continually using groups and organisation levels to achieve his objectives. The extent to which their reaction can be anticipated is a major determinant of the success of the project work.

Learning about how work is progressing in the Division is very under-represented by the five events listed. The diary does not contain the almost daily contact which I have with my own divisional managers on work issues. The basic attack on all problems, especially those connected with management services tasks, is to learn about the situation so that alternative courses of action can be evaluated.

On reflection, the number of events categorised as learning only must be regarded as misleadingly high. Despite the fact that the diary recorded a group meeting as a learning experience, other reasons for being there must have existed. One reason could be that simply operating the system which constitutes RHA procedure takes up a large amount of effort in its own right - and none of that effort is recorded. For example, I go to six Member committees per year whether they are considering our project work or not. There does not appear to be anything particularly significant in the mixture of categories in multi-category event, possibly reflecting the fact that every event is a potential learning experience.
Selecting from the list of learning activities is not easy but one of the events, namely, listening to the Regional Scientific Committee must be a choice. Even the written record of the meeting from paragraphs 233 onwards in the diary give the impression of the power which most of those people on that Committee exerted. The Committee advises the RHA itself directly and as such no officer has a right to stop its Minutes reaching the Members. At this particular Committee, it happened that there had been a flagrant ignoring of the advice which the Committee had given on the disposition of major scientific equipment. The fact that the money had been spent in the way chosen by management meant that there was less to be spent on Committee members' own larger departments in DGHs. The language used to express their disapproval and the way in which they chose to minute their feelings leave no doubt that they were very annoyed. The fact that they were not members of the management teams and therefore they did not determine the priorities which would be used to determine the disposition of new equipment was put to them. But the fact that their advice could be ignored, gently but specifically brought to their attention by the RMO, was not a statement which they were prepared to accept easily. Advice which did not carry the force which they thought appropriate to it meant that they were going to threaten to resign, not to meet and withhold their further advice, etc., etc. The language used, the force behind their own contribution to the discussion, the parading of their own status, all reflected their power as they wished to see the situation.

It is interesting to note that in these exchanges the officers servicing that Committee did show due deference. Despite the fact that they were putting the managerial point of view, it was clear that they were handling the whole affair with kid gloves. Thus the remarks of the Committee were to be
"transmitted to the RHA", and "their views would be carefully considered", and so on. That sort of statement was typical of the way in which what was being said on this Committee was handled.

I had gone there principally to introduce a set of technical papers on the new planning methods. It was not clear why these particular papers had gone to the Committee in any case. It appeared to be part of the "consultation routine" designed to ease in the new system. But, this is not a Committee to be dealt with routinely. Matters were not helped by the fact that this Committee had been left out of the published consultation timetable. Their disapproval of the papers was made quite plain and it was clear that they thought that I should do something about their remarks. The fact that these were only working papers as opposed to ones which had been put together specifically for them did not please them either and the English and everything else which they could not understand underwent a great deal of criticism. The other side of the coin was that if they had not been consulted about these methods, then that would also have been a major issue that they would have taken up later on. The papers contained planning models and so two of the model minded members decided that they could criticise the work whether they understood it or not. They proceeded to do this using all the technical terms at their disposal. I chose to go on the attack pointing out to them that they were only working papers and the object of my coming to their Committee was simply to tell them that methods of this nature would be used this year.

But perhaps the most interesting part of the meeting was concerned with their own papers. These were all couched in positive and almost aggressive terms. Arguments were not contained in the papers, no matter what course of
action was being discussed. It was clear that, from their point of view, all they had to do was to write down the conclusion to which they had come. Matters such as the financial viability of their proposals or their acceptability to other professional groups were not even mentioned. There was never any question of the weight of the argument being in favour of a certain course of action, it was always that their considered opinion was that this was what ought to be done. Their papers stated clearly that their role was to be the wise men of the Region, adjudicating and deciding action and that other people's role was to take that advice and to act on it without question.

A totally different sort of event in the listing is that in which I obtained from David James information about planning methods in the 1960s. The event was a short exchange over lunch and was part of a general conservation. These planning methods were based essentially on normative methods in which provision was calculated on the basis of the population and the provision per thousand heads that you were supposed to give. There are all sorts of arguments which can be put against this type of method and many refinements to such methods have been developed over the last ten to fifteen years. The new planning methods being used in the Region are of a very different character than this rather simplistic approach. The important thing about these old methods is that they were the methods in use during the time that our own RMO was an active planner in his heyday. He has never moved beyond those methods except to refine very slightly the nature of the norms being used. As I listened to David talking about the use of these methods a decade or so ago, different aspects of the problems which we are having with Martin at the present time started to fall into place. It was clear that any suggestion that normative planning of this nature was "old hat" and "prone to many many errors which just
had to be avoided" would be quite unacceptable to Martin. In the same sort of
way that David James had come to see the new planning methods as a
development of his own planning technology, somehow or other we must show
Martin that these new methods fall in with his somewhat older ideas. No
solution to this problem has been found. With the support of the Chairman and
Members, the new methods are being used, whether Martin likes it or not.

Category 3 events - Ethos Creation

Table of Events

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<tr>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>26.5.78.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Take Freda Simm around my own Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>4.6.78.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I am getting steadily more angry with the Henry Jacques report on National Staff Committee and Staff Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>2.11.78.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I visit two RMSOs to talk about the Staff Development report and prepare comments for our committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.2.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4)</td>
<td>Disastrous seminar with the Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>7.4.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4)</td>
<td>Have a pub lunch with two computer managers and talk about how to forward computing in the NHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>15.5.78.</td>
<td>(2, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques about the computer client groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>20.7.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Go to Bath to talk to the Nursing Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>20.11.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Start fixing the nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>24.11.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Go on fixing the 1979 Objectives in more detail</td>
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<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>27.7.78.</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Get the evaluation team through the RTO</td>
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<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>12.5.78.</td>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>Go to the Technical Committee about principles and RCSO nominations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>15.5.78.</td>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques about computer staffing points for the coming year's strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>14.7.78.</td>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>Meet Neil Moore and Will Curry to push home the need of the Technical Committee to investigate SPS in another Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>2.5.78.</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Go to the extended Development Group to ease in the new planning methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241</td>
<td>24.11.78.</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Fix the transfer of planning methods of David James over lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>6.12.78.</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8, 9)</td>
<td>Meet David James to fix the 1979 planning action and timetable for methods transfer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category 3 events - Ethos Creation

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<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>17.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 11)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques gets other RAs involved in the national systems resources problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>(1, 3)</td>
<td>Discuss the viability of small units such as training, with Giff Reynolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>21.11.78</td>
<td>(1, 3, 5)</td>
<td>Fixing the 1979 RHA Objectives again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>(1, 3, 5, 10)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques floats the idea of having a deputy - opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 4, 8)</td>
<td>A typical review in Objectives - flying kites, liaising, reviewing, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 8, 11)</td>
<td>Getting Henry Jacques to accept the national systems costs and staffing for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>10.6.78</td>
<td>(1, 2, 3)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques says that the Chairman is allowed two bees in his bonnet per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Category 3 events

One of my main strategic aims in the management of my Division is to create a management atmosphere in which improvement and change and the seeking for these two things is part of the ordinary way of life. It is important to spread that way of looking at things to other parts of the RHA as well as my own Division. Because of this part of my basic attitude, all of the activities listed in the diary will have made some contribution to that steady transformation of the way in which the RHA behaves. But some activities are more influenced by this strategic aim than others. Those listed above seemed to me to fall in that class at the time of coding the events. It was difficult to choose events to illustrate this category because of the above reasons and because it is hard to judge which events really are significant. However, there are two events which seem to deserve to be selected as the ones to illustrate my concern to transform peoples' attitudes and the way in which they regard both officers and the contributions from them which they value most highly.
The first is the effort which I made to introduce a new RTO member to the Division, while the second concerns the activities surrounding the Report of the National Staff Committee.

The diary records that I went to great trouble to engineer a meeting with Freda, the Regional Nurse, at which I was well informed about how to approach Freda and how to discuss important issues with her. That being accomplished, the next step was to take Freda round the Division and to show her some of the things which we did. I made sure that this was not just a "nice trip" with everyone saying "Hello" at the right time. We went through a few of the things which were going on in each room and their possible relevance to those issues which she would be concerned about. Each manager was given the chance to make his mark and to say something of the top-level skills which he could put at her disposal. Ideas were floated, contacts were made. The exercise was a two-sided affair. All members of the various sections were introduced, at least as a group. During the whole of the visit, it was being made clear that we would like to contribute to nursing development in a unique way and the possibilities were being opened up. That visit was designed to influence Freda's attitudes to management services for a very long time to come.

The second event was much more positive and could be described as traumatic. The National Staff Committee, of which Henry Jacques is a leading member, had set up a sub-committee under Henry Jacques as Chairman, which had issued a report on the development of administrators. It was completely biased towards the general administrator, or so the various specialist groups under administration such as personnel and management services thought. We considered it to be a disaster. Apart from being incredibly arrogant about the
skills which they thought the generalist possessed, which we would dispute heatedly, it put forward a view of the future of specialist services which seemed almost designed to be rejected by them and to provoke their anger.

The first reaction was an explosion. I wrote my views in a report for our own management services and made sure that a copy went direct to Henry. Giff Reynolds and all the other specialists did likewise. Although not recorded in the diary at length, an Objectives meeting followed at which Henry was taken to task. He opened by explaining that he had worked hard to cut down the excesses of some of his generalist colleagues. This caused hoots of derision and unfunny laughter. Henry was nailed for 'using' specialists and then denying them their place in the sun. He wanted to use their skills but not to encourage their competition for his job. The exchange was hard-hitting and blunt.

My second reaction was to consort with my fellow RMSOs in order to get a considered reaction into the Staff Committee. Much effort went into making that document a wise, responsible comment which stood some chance of not being ignored. Given the make-up of the National Staff Committee, that is probably a pious hope. The wise comment was put together privately and the best political and drafting skills were brought together to do it. Even Henry Jacques would be unable to ignore points made in that memorandum specifically for his benefit.

These two contrasting events illustrate that changing the basic attitudes of the NHS takes many forms. Most of them are based on helpful and gentle interventions, but this is not the case invariably.
## Category 4 events - Relate

### Table of Events

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>30.11.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>A reconciliation with Luke Downs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>28.2.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ralph Rains and I trim down Martin to talk about our Divisional Work Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.3.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Luke Downs is trying to get a position on the Wessex Data Protection Member Group and worknings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>29.3.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Relating to Wayne Cook on computer strategy and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>11.4.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Liaise with Martin and Ralph about work for the Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>11.4.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Try to get Henry Jacques to do something and to see sense about Domestic Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.4.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Liaise with Steve Todd on computing and child's project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>2.5.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Getting hold of Henry Jacques or rather failing about the planning of the planning methods papers for the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>12.5.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Listening to Martin and Barry Hunt going on about the Region, our Head Office, the scientific market, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>21.5.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Trying to understand Martin on planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>23.5.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>A staff assessment with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>26.5.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Take my own staff out for a birthday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>5.6.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Henry Jacques gives the go ahead for the West and South Area computers providing the Areas pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>28.7.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Commiserate with David James on the behaviour of the RTO</td>
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<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>7.8.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Advising Peter Tibbs on making his name on planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>11.9.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Liaise with the Head Office OR Service and South Dorset project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>23.10.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Heads of Division discuss RTO and how to deal with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>23.10.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Martin is going on and on and on about research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>23.10.78.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aggravation with Henry Jacques over cover and his own secretory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.12.77.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Objectives meeting to fix 1978 RHA Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.12.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Ralph and Martin about the 1978 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>29.3.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Agree the methods and the production split with David James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>12.5.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Visit Professor Pat Roberts about the National OR Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>27.7.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A traumatic RTO trying to get the evaluation team through it and other things</td>
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<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>27.7.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A traumatic RTO connected with the lack of computer staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>4.8.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Meet Freda and Winnifred to discuss the Nursing Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>14.9.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A private RMSO meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>18.9.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>An Objectives and a Seniors Officers' meeting - a typical one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>26.9.78.</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques about computer strategy after his return from the States to get him to see more sense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category 4 events - Relate

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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Final meeting with David James and Henry Jacques to take over the planning methods next year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>30.3.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Agree the planning methods and the plan protection with the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>8.5.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Re-writing Computer Strategy for Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 9)</td>
<td>Feed back to Peter Tibbs his effect on Freda by his interference with her meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>21.12.78</td>
<td>(4, 6)</td>
<td>A week full of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>26.5.78</td>
<td>(4, 7, 8)</td>
<td>The National System Committee with Henry Jacques and Luke Downs and all the rest of them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 8)</td>
<td>Get the User Group Chairman onto Tony Peer's side over the Computer Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.2.78</td>
<td>(4, 8)</td>
<td>Lack of co-operation from Computer Services on my first Ph.D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>25.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 8)</td>
<td>Send memo to Henry Jacques on things we are not communicating about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 8, 11)</td>
<td>Get the Newtown computer replacement through the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 9)</td>
<td>Talk to Lionel Dunn about his girl in statistics whom we employ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>31.3.78</td>
<td>(4, 9)</td>
<td>A meeting of Heads of Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>31.3.78</td>
<td>(4, 9)</td>
<td>Re-assert my control of departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>21.12.78</td>
<td>(4, 9)</td>
<td>Consorting with Ralph on the major information project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 11)</td>
<td>Respond to rude summons by Luke Downs on accounting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 10)</td>
<td>A reconciliation with Luke Downs after accounting blow up ride downhill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>13.4.78</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Coping with nine different things out of the Management Services Committee, at least five being significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>3.7.78</td>
<td>(1, 2, 4)</td>
<td>A typical Objectives Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>28.3.78</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Agree the separation of the production and methods for the 1979 Plan with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>24.11.78</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Discussing the consequences of integrated working for 1979 Objectives and getting Henry Jacques to accept some which he does not like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>3.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 4)</td>
<td>First meeting with Freda Simm</td>
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<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>26.6.78</td>
<td>(2, 4)</td>
<td>Martin is concerned about me!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>(2, 4)</td>
<td>React to Henry Jacques trying to re-establish control after American trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.2.78</td>
<td>(3, 4)</td>
<td>A disastrous seminar in the Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>7.4.78</td>
<td>(3, 4)</td>
<td>A pub lunch with two RCSOs after the Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>15.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Talking to Henry Jacques about Client Groups</td>
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Category 4 events - Relate

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<td>20.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Visit to Bath with nurses</td>
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<td>20.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Fix the nature of the 1979 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>24.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Fixing the 1979 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Get evaluation through the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 4, 8)</td>
<td>Typical Objectives Meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Category 4 events

Relating to other people and groups is a key activity for a change agent. It is not therefore surprising that it appears frequently in the diary. The variety of the relationships created is interesting and the picture presented by the list of events is complex. A possible breakdown of the group of events would be to rank them according to the degree of aggression which they show. At one end of the scale, these events show a sympathetic, helpful stance; at the other a very distinctly defensive or hostile attitude is apparent. It appears often that the attitude adopted is a positive response to the perceived stance of the other party to the relationship, whilst on other occasions, a positive position has obviously been adopted as a matter of policy.

The verbs and other words which have been chosen inadvertently to record in the diary and to summarise on card each event, reflect the reality of relating as part of being effective. The positive course of action aspect of the work produces words like "re-assert", "cope with", "fix", "get X through Y", "agree the method". Negotiating situations produce "signalling", "consorting", "reconcile", "discuss", "talk to", "liaise with" and "relate to". Frustration produces "rewriting", "lack co-operation", "commiserate". The "typical
"Objectives meeting" sums up a very complex negotiation on quite high level topics. The "private" RMSOs meeting is only one instance of many hard bargaining meetings. "Trauma", "aggravation", "going on and on" are appropriate words. A "pub lunch" is at the opposite end of the spectrum from "a lunch with important nurses in Hillbury in an oak panelled historic room", but both occasions are a negotiating lunch. The texture of relate is rich, violently varied and would be lost if transformed into analytical terms.

The range and variety of relationship contained in the diary is very large. Cementing Divisional relationships at a birthday or Christmas drink meeting, talking to an immediate subordinate or superior, doing deals with equals, getting the support of outside agents and many other types of activity are all events in this category. It must be possible to analyse the activities called relating into a more structured order but that structure would be complex. The descriptions identified in the above paragraph give a clue to the further categories which might be used. But, it would probably be a mistake to believe that relating is a highly structured activity. Given a particular set of objectives, an organisational setting and particular individuals in a given mood, each such situation must be managed creatively even if particular patterns of behaviour from the past do shed light on the way forward in a given setting.

Two examples to illustrate "relate" have been chosen from the above list of events. They are happenings at completely opposite ends of the spectrum. In the first case, I am attempting to talk to a professor at a very high level who is going to sit on a national committee. It is my strong view that he may be able to help me to do something on that committee which will be very difficult for me to achieve by myself. I think that he will be sympathetic to the course of action which I want to follow but it is absolutely vital that we have a degree
of understanding and sympathy before the operation starts. At the other end of the spectrum I am describing one small event in a running battle with a man in the organisation, Luke Downs. Despite the fact that he is a top person, he is erratic in the extreme. At one time he will be all that is reasonable and at another time the course of actions which he is proposing and is taking could be so disastrous as to be unbelievable. In the first case the event records a very positive action on my part which took a great deal of trouble to arrange and cost me a day out of the office. In the second case, the event was one of those random happenings which occurred at the drop of a hat one morning.

As stated above, the background to my visit to this professor was that I wished him to support a course of action which I was trying to follow on a national committee. It was not a foregone conclusion that he would do this but in my view there was a good chance that he may choose to do so. The event itself was a lunch for the two of us in a private roof garden. We had a sherry in the roof garden and started with all the usual pleasantries. Amongst those was his conversation with the butler who was serving us about the local football team which they both supported. It was clearly important that I should help that conversation along and I did this. And so a relaxed atmosphere was set up. The next phase of the operation was to establish my credentials. Of course this was not done in an open manner, simply that we got round to talking of times past. I established that I had worked for several wellknown figures in his field whom I knew that he would respect. I also knew several of his friends and they were mine as well and we talked about them in a kindly manner. He knew that I had done things for the Society of which we were both members in the past and all this was gently reviewed.
Over lunch we actually got onto the problem that we wished to talk about. I had given him some warning in a letter about the nature of this and so we started to explore it very very gently. I made the point that we really did require more active participation by the person concerned, and that this had not been forthcoming for a very long time. I explored the reasons why I thought that this might be the case, especially his position in the organisation and the position of that organisation with respect to the NHS. Pat listened and nodded and then proceeded to add some facts which I did not know. I made it quite clear that I could see that there might be very little that he could do, on the other hand there might be very much that he could do because of certain types of entree which I did not have. We parted, Pat saying that he was not sure what he could do but he would think over things. But much more important than that, we parted good friends and this has been proved by the fact that subsequently I have had two invitations to his more important seminars.

The other event referring to Luke Downs and myself is at the very opposite end of the spectrum. One morning I received a phone call summoning me in a non too polite way to attend immediately because he wished to talk to me about a problem. I was told that he had two people with him, whom he did not identify, nor did he identify the problem. The tone of his voice and all that he said put me in a bad mood and so, despite the fact that I was doing nothing in particular, he was told that I could not come for a quarter of an hour. I sat there more or less wasting time because of the irritation that I had suffered. I arrived in his room to find two senior officers and to discover that they were all talking about a well rehearsed, wellknown problem concerned with one of the standard computer systems. Luke proceeded to harangue me and rail on about lack of progress on this particular issue. At first I was fairly reasonable and
just pointed out what the facts were, despite the fact that he already knew
them or at least had been told them. A variety of problems were contributing
to the delay and I had established that they were all beyond our control. I was
getting more and more angry at being shown up in front of two people. And so
I decided quite firmly to shut him up by shouting at him. And this I proceeded
to do, interrupting him in as rude a manner as he had interrupted me formerly.
If he shouted lounder, I shouted lounder. The two visitors were obviously
embarrassed and started to join in on my side, since they themselves knew the
facts equally as well as either Luke or myself. I proceeded to talk reasonably
to them and shout at Luke at the same time.

There were no winners in this interchange, but equally there were no
losers either. The interview ended by my walking out leaving the situation
exactly as it was when I walked in. I imagine that both of the visitors changed
their opinions of both of us, they have certainly treated me somewhat
differently since. They both realise that I am prepared to fight if necessary
and they test by reaction to proposals more often and with more circumspection
than used to be the case.

Later that night, Luke passed me on my regular walk home down the hill.
I decided that I had better accept the lift which he offered and we then passed
two or three minutes just chatting to one another as normal individuals, as if
nothing had happened. Somewhat sheepishly he did say that he had got over the
thing. And so we started talking to each other normally again. Til the next
time!
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<td>24.11.77.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The visit to 'D' Region about the National Statistics Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>18.12.77.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Meet Head Office with two RMSOs to talk about the National Statistics Review. They were not in a state to do this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.4.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Push my version of the Technical Committee's comments on the R &amp; D Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>27.4.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Visit Birmingham to draft strategy for computing for the Technical Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>27.4.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Formulate an NHS view on Operational Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>12.5.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Go to the OR Committee following my visit to Professor Pat Roberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>23.5.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Henry Jacques edits and &quot;adds to&quot; the Area comments on the Computer Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>4.8.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Meet Winifred Black and Freda Simm in my office to fix the first meeting of the Nurse Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>13.9.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Go to the Technical Committee in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>8.11.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Get the standard payroll ordered and away at the Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>20.11.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Try to get the information project for 1979 launched with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td>20.11.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Technical Committee discusses Centre of Responsibilities contracts for work</td>
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<td>237</td>
<td>21.11.78.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fix the Positive Health Objective for 1979</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>28.4.78.</td>
<td>(5, 8)</td>
<td>Fix the first meeting of the Planning Methods team</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>27.7.78.</td>
<td>(5, 8)</td>
<td>Talk to Lionel Dunn about Evaluation Team work in his Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>20.11.78.</td>
<td>(5, 8)</td>
<td>Try to get solutions to serious staffing problems through complex Regional and National machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.4.78.</td>
<td>(5, 8, 9)</td>
<td>Clear the Planning Methods effort with Peter Tibbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td>20.11.78.</td>
<td>(5, 9)</td>
<td>Get the Divisional Heads to agree the 1979 Information Project with GG in control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>31.11.78.</td>
<td>(5, 9)</td>
<td>Fix the first Policy Group by meeting Henry Jacques and Tony Peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>8.5.78.</td>
<td>(5, 11)</td>
<td>Heads of Division discuss computer building and the 1903T replacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>27.7.78.</td>
<td>(5, 11)</td>
<td>Drippish Freda support for the Evaluation Team outside of the RTO meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>21.11.78.</td>
<td>(1, 3, 5)</td>
<td>Fix the 1979 RHA Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>28.3.78.</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Agree the separation of the production of and the methods for the 1979 Plan with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>13.4.78.</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Cope with nine different things coming out of the Management Services Committee, at least five of which are significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>24.11.78.</td>
<td>(1, 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Discuss the consequence of integrating working for the 1979 Objectives and try to get Henry Jacques to accept this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>13.4.78.</td>
<td>(1, 5)</td>
<td>Give Head Office a lot of stick on the Statistics Review</td>
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<td>(2, 3, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Typical Objectives Meeting</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques about the Computer Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.5.78</td>
<td>(2, 5)</td>
<td>Receive the National OR Group papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>15.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques on the Client Groups for Computing</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>20.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Visit Hilbury with the nurses</td>
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<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>20.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Fix the nature of the 1979 Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>24.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5)</td>
<td>Fix the 1979 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Get the Evaluation Team through the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>12.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 5)</td>
<td>Go to the Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>15.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques on computer staffing points for the Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>14.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 5)</td>
<td>Meet Neil Moore and Will Curry to push in Head Office the audit visit on payroll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>2.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8)</td>
<td>An extended 'D' Group on Planning Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241</td>
<td>24.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Fix the planning systems transfer over lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>6.11.78</td>
<td>(3, 5, 8, 9)</td>
<td>Meet David James to fix the 1979 planning action plus methods and the transfer timetable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>An Objectives Meeting to fix the 1978 RHA Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Ralph Rains about Martin Williams and the 1978 Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>29.3.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Agree the methods and production split with David James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>12.5.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Visit Professor Pat Roberts about the National OR Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A traumatic RTO trying to get the Evaluation Team accepted</td>
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<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A traumatic RTO on the lack of computer staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Meet Freda and Winnifred to discuss the Nurse Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>14.9.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>A private RMSOs meeting to fix Head Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>18.9.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Objectives Meeting and Senior Officers Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>26.9.78</td>
<td>(4, 5)</td>
<td>Talk to Henry Jacques about the Computer Strategy after his return from the USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Fix a meeting with David James and Henry Jacques to take over the planning methods</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>30.3.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Agree planning methods and production of the Plan with the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>8.5.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Re-writing the Computer Strategy by myself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 9)</td>
<td>Feed back to Peter Tibbs on his effect on Freda by his interference in her meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>21.12.78</td>
<td>(4, 6)</td>
<td>A week full of parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Category 5 events

It is good to see a large number of events being given category 5. In these events, my involvement is that of a top level technical support manager. Concentration on top level activity reflects the positive attitude which I adopt towards delegation and I refuse to work at detailed levels in most projects. About two thirds of these activities are at Regional level, two ninths at National level and one ninth at Area level. The national activity and a large proportion of Regional activity is about the direction of developments and the major ways forward to be taken by the three Departments in the Division. At national level, the OR Committee, the Statistics review and the Computer Technical Committee are all about major developments over the next decade. At Regional level, changing the planning methods, the nature of 1979 RHA Objectives, getting evaluation onto a firm footing are major initiatives. Staffing problems and building a new computer building are difficult problems to solve.

The most important Regional activities were to change the whole nature of the planning methods used in the 1979 Plan and to change the nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives. There is no sense in which the Division played a passive role such as just saying what might be possible and responding to initiatives from "management". Careful persuasion was used to make both ideas acceptable and non-threatening. The timing and the social processes associated with both developments were carefully conceived and followed through. Once both activities were rolling forward, I withdrew and watched from a distance. But, they were watched very carefully indeed. This is a common pattern for "Big" projects to follow.
Category 5 events cover a wide variety of happenings. Among other important things about these events is the degree of power which I possess to influence the outcome. This can be seen by comparing the work for the Nursing Development Group and that connected with the National Statistics Review. In the former case, my position was strong, whilst in the latter case, my position was weak. These are the two events described below.

Senior nurses are still fundamentally patient care orientated and their natural habitat is in those areas of work which traditionally belong to them. Thus, whilst they possess almost extreme power in the nursing hierarchy which depends on strong line relationships, this contrasts strongly with their relative weak position with respect to doctors in management positions alongside themselves. That relative weakness applies not only to doctors but also to the top administrators with whom they have had to deal over the decades and with whom, on the whole, they have lost most battles. That having been said, the nursing service consumes 40% of the revenue of the Health Service and so management development work ought to go into this management area. Much against the wishes of Henry Jacques, I was determined to get that development into the Management Services work programme. Henry Jacques contends that because of the lack of middle management skill in nursing such effort will be wasted, and there is an element of truth in that statement.

I had selected a simple nursing information project to be put into our work programme, since it would start to improve the level of control which nurses had over their staff complements. I had designed the project so that it came out as a monitoring project, one of the things which Henry Jacques wished to support. So the essence of the manoeuvre was to hoist Henry on his own petard. A part of this project launching process was a meeting between Freda
Simm, Winnifred Black and myself and its purpose was to fix the outcome of the Nursing Development Group discussion which we had jointly set up to get development work in nursing moving. The meeting was really concerned with briefing Freda and giving Winnifred, who was the Chairman of the Group, sufficient material to get the Group to agree to this particular project and its orientation as a monitoring exercise. By getting the approval of this Nursing Development Group, it was inevitable that the project should go up through the Nursing Group straight to the Regional Nursing Advisory Group and into the RHA direct. This avoids interference by other RTO members. It was a very gentle interchange which worked perfectly.

The above activity contrasts with the Statistics Review meeting in London with two Assistant Secretaries from Head Office and two other RMSOs. On this Statistics Review, the NHS side were in a weak position because Head Office already had all of the initiative and the power. It was important to get that project re-orientated so that the NHS objectives became more important than those of Head Office. This meant toppling the declared priorities and replacing them upside down and every ounce of my skill would be needed to do this. A vital meeting in this process happened near Christmas and my two RMSO colleagues turned up in a seasonal mood. They proceeded to give way point after point after point. "Yes, of course, we must have Head Office predominance of the Committee", dressed up in another form, but they gave the point away. "Yes, of course, the reporting mechanism should be through the Head Office structures", and again the point was given away. A major issue was the degree of technical support to be fed into that Review and I had carefully structured the committee so that that would be high. This was not in the interests of Head Office and of course they opposed it. My colleagues did
not come to my side. I spent the meeting watching them more carefully than
the people I was seeking to beat on the other side of the table. Due to their
mood they were bubbling on and on slipping in the odd joke and doing all sorts of
irrational and unwise things. I ended the meeting in sheer desperation trying to
get the final agreement back into the main committee of the RMSOs. Instead
of having gone forward with a carefully worked out programme of objectives
being achieved as agreed, we ended up in a state of disarray due to the fact that
they could not see what political points were on the table at any one time. The
result was a catastrophe.

There is usually a degree of risk associated with any major undertaking,
especially in its early formative stages. That risk can be controlled when you
have the power to place the pieces on the board beforehand. It is usually
foolish to enter arenas when the outcome is unsure, but sometimes it is
unavoidable. In the above examples, the course of events was almost certain in
the first, whilst in the second, a rogue elephant appeared on the scene
immediately the curtain went up. Risk taking is a major part of top level
management, even in a management services activity. When things do start to
go wrong for the change agent in most organisations, usually it is not possible
for him to go back to a former stable state. This is unlike many operational
tasks where an option exists in most cases to go back to the old way of doing
the job. Quick thinking and acting is needed if one is to stand any chance of
getting the problem into an alternative arena in which you can control the
outcome.
Category 6 events - Opportunism

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<td>6</td>
<td>Visit to a Northern Region and pick up Martin's &quot;little book&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>26.5.78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Get Henry Jacques to agree to the Head Office Evaluation Team</td>
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<td>222</td>
<td>6.11.78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Get Wayne Cook to take action on Domestic Monitoring by contacting him at the King's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>(1, 3, 6, 10)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques floats the idea of a deputy</td>
</tr>
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<td>175</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(3, 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Get the Evaluation Team through the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>21.12.78</td>
<td>(4, 6)</td>
<td>A week full of parties</td>
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</table>

Analysis of Category 6 events

I do not believe that there were only six occasions on which opportunism played a significant part in my activities for one whole year. A possible reason for some of the under-recording of opportunistic behaviour is suggested below, but it does not seem to be a complete explanation.

There are at least two types of opportunism in management. It is only on the right occasion that it is possible to get something difficult and big to start moving forward. That demands opportunistic behaviour of the first type. For example, getting evaluation into the Region depended on my launching that idea at the right time in a variety of places. No amount of planning could have provided the wit to see that the idea could be slipped into the water and launched successfully at the time it occurred. In the same way, once people are prepared to contemplate organisational change, many different ideas become runners. Spying the chance and having a sufficiently rehearsed set of routines associated with the launch, come together to make that which was formerly impossible possible.
But, if anything, another type of opportunism is more important. It is the passing remark that reinforces a need, an opportunity, an attitude or any of a dozen other aspects of a situation. They slowly transform an ethos and peoples' attitudes. I am sure that both the transformation of planning methods and the change in nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives depended on a succession of such small happenings - despite the fact that they did not get recorded in the diary.

The two contrasting events which illustrate opportunistic behaviour are chosen because of the background which brought them about. For one of them, namely, how to get the evaluation team into the Region, I had been trying to solve the launching problem for a long time. The second one was based on a purely random event concerned with a visit to Northern Region about something completely different from the event listed.

I had strolled back with Henry Jacques from a meeting which had gone exceedingly well. We had gone to his room and we were sitting down congratulating each other on the way things had gone. He had offered me a drink and this reflected our mood. The meeting had been about various aspects of control and this subject appealed to Henry's systematic mind. It was inevitable that we should start talking about how objectives had been set for the control procedure in that particular exercise. And so, we went on to discuss ways of making sure that those objectives were met. How did one measure the degree of achievement? It was an almost natural development to start talking about the methods which had been used by the computer evaluation teams throughout the country over the past decade. As an aside, I slipped in an enquiry about whether or not he had had the opportunity to think about the team coming in from Head Office. He connected the two things. He saw the advantages in a new light in relation to his own objectives at that particular moment in time.
The only reservation he had was about whether or not these people could be fitted into the staff control scheme and I said that they were outside it. Somehow or other, I avoided the issue of what we did with them when this job came to an end in fifteen months time and he then agreed that I could go ahead. The most important thing which allowed me to use the opportunity was the fact that I had rehearsed the facts very carefully before it started and I knew them off by heart. The mood, the drinks, the pre-preparation of the material, the opening, everything lent itself to this particular move at that particular moment.

The other event, collecting the Guide to Statistics from Northern Region was completely different. The actual book appeared on the table during a conversation about the National Statistical Review because the book was their statistics showpiece. It didn't really matter what I thought of the book itself but I saw its importance immediately to the Henry Martin situation. The RMSO of that Region went on at length about the way in which this book had been used as part of their planning procedures. I knew that those planning procedures had been medically dominated and he confirmed that fact. I had to get hold of that book at whatever cost. Fortunately, the other RMSO there came in on another tack saying that he was interested in book because they might present their own statistics in that way. He was having problems with his presentation of that particular data. I joined in that conversation saying how difficult the problem was, whether I believed this or not. And so both of the visiting RMSOs were offered this book which was the pride and joy of the North Region Statistics Department. I could not wait to look at it and to find out what it was that so inspired our new RTO member.

Both of these illustrations have an important thing in common, the
determination to exploit the occasion. No matter how it had been achieved, I would have left Northern Region with that book. Having seen the connection between my evaluation team and the objectives conversation, I would have kept that topic alive until I had at least talked about the team. Opportunities are very rarely a question of just changing tracks in the middle of a conversation. They are more like seeing a train running on a track with other parallel ones alongside. It takes a lot of skill to see the approaching points and to switch track without derailing the locomotive.

Category 7 events - Maintain the Division

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<td>(4, 7, 8, 11)</td>
<td>In Room 108 have a national standard meeting with Henry Jacques and Luke Downs</td>
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</table>

Analysis of Category 7 events

I do not believe that only one divisional maintenance activity took place in the year. This is an extreme case of the selectivity of the diary. Maintenance is composed of several sets of activities, many of which are of very short duration and scattered amongst other activities. Since most direct management of activity is delegated, three Heads of Department carry prime responsibility for maintenance, but I carry out some direct maintenance activity and two are worthy of note, although they are unrecorded.

Despite the size of the Division, I do know what work is being done within it and who is engaged on what projects. I make it a principle to get regular verbal reports on all work and major written reports at least quarterly. Also, I talk about parts of that work to people below Heads of Department level. This
is not allowed to detract from delegated responsibility of Heads of Department but it does allow me to talk to members of the Division in a natural way. In a similar vein, I sit with staff over lunch frequently and I talk about problems and relate generally to them.

The second action of mine significant in this field is to put pressure on Heads of Department to adopt positive staff development and involvement policies. For example, the Division had a good staff assessment scheme going before any other part of the RHA, and I make the Division take this seriously.

Category 8 events - Facilitate Action

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<td>227</td>
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<td>Try to strengthen our training nurse for our own work</td>
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<td>21.12.77</td>
<td>(8, 9)</td>
<td>Setting up the Computer Liaison Groups</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>3.4.78</td>
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<td>Another Planning Methods meeting</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<td>Fix the planning systems transfer over lunch</td>
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Category 8 events - Facilitate Action

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<td>Meet David James to fix the 1979 planning action and the methods transfer timetable</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>5.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 5, 8)</td>
<td>Final meeting with Henry Jacques and David James to take over the planning methods in 1978</td>
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<td>A meeting of the national system with Henry Jacques and Luke Downs</td>
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<td>Get the User Group Chairman onto Tony Peers' side over the Computer Strategy</td>
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<td>28.2.78</td>
<td>(4, 8)</td>
<td>Lack of co-operation from Computer Services over my first Ph.D</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>25.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 8)</td>
<td>Send memo to Henry Jacques about things on which we are definitely not communicating</td>
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<td>(5, 8)</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>1.4.78</td>
<td>(5, 8, 9)</td>
<td>Clear planning methods with Peter Tibbs</td>
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</table>

Analysis of Category 8 events

In a large Division, it is necessary to delegate most activity, but there are things which either only I can do or I can do much more easily than others. The actions are designed to facilitate the work of others for the most part.

Most Regional activity is inter-divisional and a Heads of Division agreement is a precursor to activity on projects. The planning methods, the national computer systems and most monitoring projects are typical examples. Having agreed the outline goals and resources, Heads of Divisions leave the scene of action but that initial agreement can be made only by Heads of Division.
Apart from the initial launch, projects require support when unseen problems occur. Intervening on catering monitoring or talking to Areas about evaluation are typical examples of unlocking situations by management intervention. Facilitation can be having the right and power to call people of a given status together to make a deal. Calling together the chairmen of the computer user groups or the first planning methods meeting is such an action. In these cases, facilitation consists of using status to make deals which allow other people, especially subordinates, to carry out agreed tasks. The diary reflects my activity as a facilitator on many occasions.

The event listing shows a close association of the work categories "big" and "facilitate". This reflects my own belief that I try to help the important projects more than the other work of the Division.

Facilitate covers many different types of actions and it would be possible to take many pairs of different types to illustrate the category. One of the chosen events represents the use of my position to help the action of one of my managers whilst the other one concerns a situation which was complete outside my control getting emmeshed in a long series of actions which I was trying to take on a particular topic. The first event was nudging catering monitoring in the Region over a particularly nasty hump, whilst the second one was a major public flare up that occurred whilst I was trying to persuade Henry Jacques to sanction new accommodation for computing.

The monitoring work had got into severe difficulties in West Area in particular due mainly to the lack of a catering manager in one district. The result was that the Area was not meeting promises which it had made about giving documents summarising the state of catering in that Area to the RHA.
Apart from the fact that monitoring was one of the things on which Henry Jacques had set much of his reputation, the RHA members were becoming annoyed at the lack of co-operation from the Areas. This had been the theme of two of their discussions and they had started to insist that we make the exercise go forward more quickly. I phoned up the man in charge in the Area to try and get the facts about the situation straight. I explained to him that there was no way in which the RHA was going to be put off, whatever the opinion of the Area officers happened to be. I spelled out the fairly dire consequences of their lack of action stating that our Chairman was likely to become involved personally. Somehow or other, he had got to get the facts through to his own chief officers and make them take effective action in this matter. With one word I was threatening, and with the next word I was offering whatever help we could. He was signalling loudly to me that I must do my best to call off my own officers and members and I was telling him that there was no way I would do it even if I could and that in any case I couldn't. There was a combination of offering help and putting on pressure which ought to bring about their co-operation and this was the aim of the phone call. Although this event is one of the clearer examples of this type of negotiation, there are many occasions on which negotiations have a similar character.

Somehow, without having any authority, I was trying to help my own manager to do his job. It would have been very difficult for me to have gone back to my member committee to ask them to bring West Area to heel. But I reckoned that by using a combination of persuasion, pulling rank and sabre rattling, I could get West Area to move.

The second example, computer accommodation, is a very confused one.
The diary records an almost continuous effort on my part to persuade Henry Jacques to allow this building to be designed and built. Apart from establishing the need, all I could do was to persuade various parts of the organisation to take steps for which they had no real authority. Accommodation had become a matter about which the Staff organisation and the Union were becoming irate. In their view, no effective action was occurring. It came to a point at which the Joint Consultative Staff Committee in which management faces staff, and in particular Henry Jacques faced members of the computer staff at its lower levels, started exchanging views on the problem. Staff Side explained the problem in graphic terms. Henry said that he had no idea that the problem was so serious. He had been told of the problem many times. When I heard that report, I was flabbergasted. And that was precisely the reaction of the Staff Side in this meeting and the whole situation blew up in his face. For the next few weeks it was as if someone had thrown a large bomb into the middle of the computer accommodation situation. I scarcely dared to mention it without seeing the whites of Henry Jacques' eyes start to blaze.

Direct effective control over all the parts of the organisation involved in a problem is an easy situation in which to obtain a solution, but it is rare. For the most part, one helps to push the RHA towards a better position by making small movements in the right direction possible. The movements forward depend on all kinds of manoeuvres, often not backed by any authority or real power. When situations go wrong and explode, there is little to be done except wait for the storm to subside and try again.
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<td>Get the Region's terminal into HQ on economic basis</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>13.1.78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Force Dorothy Pines and Henry Martin to tie up the ends of the national system properly</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.1.78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sort out the national system again</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>22.1.78</td>
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<td>Stop Henry Jacques interfering with Peter Tibbs agreed work</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>23.3.78</td>
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<td>Get back control of Tony Peers' work using staffing control</td>
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<td>Decision to formalise the Heads of Departments meeting</td>
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<td>162</td>
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<td>163</td>
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<td>A discussion of &quot;private and in confidence&quot; with departmental heads</td>
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<td>223</td>
<td>8.11.78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Providing bits and pieces for Henry Jacques' computer policy</td>
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<td>229</td>
<td>20.11.78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Agree with Tony Peers on the nature of my control</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>4.5.78</td>
<td>(9, 10, 11)</td>
<td>Preventing Divisional strifes on the OR/Computing boundary problem existing in the Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
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<td>(9, 11)</td>
<td>Sort out the Division's work with Henry Jacques and stop his interfering with Peter Tibbs</td>
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<td>21.6.78</td>
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<td>Make Tony Peers visit Sheila about Eastbury and the nurse allocation project</td>
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<td>Sort out the timetable for the payroll and the accounting standard systems</td>
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<td>Visit Newton Computer Steering Committee to investigate the work programme</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td>Peter Tibbs visits the Dental Committee about control and reports back</td>
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<td>243</td>
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<td>Meet David James to fix the 1979 planning action and methods transfer timetable</td>
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<td>190</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>(4, 5, 9)</td>
<td>Feed back to Peter Tibbs his effect on Freda Simm by his interference in her London meeting</td>
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<td>Talk to Lionel Dunn about the staff that we have in Statistics for his Area</td>
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<td>A meeting of my departmental heads</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>Get the Heads of Division to agree the Information Project with myself in control</td>
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<td>Fix the first Computer Policy Group meeting by talking to Henry Jacques and Tony Peers</td>
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<td>Setting up the Computer Liaison Groups</td>
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Category 9 events - Control

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<tr>
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<td>A meeting with the Heads of Departments</td>
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<td>(8, 9, 10)</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>(8, 11)</td>
<td>Watching Oncology through Ralph Rains' eyes</td>
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Analysis of Category 9 events

My basic policy in the Division is to delegate control of work to the Head of Department. This being so, the category 9 events tend to fall into groups which reflect specific positive supplementary activities superimposed on this policy.

The largest sub group of category 9 events is the set of regular meetings of my own Heads of Department. The main purpose of these meetings is to agree patterns of work, especially those which involve more than one of the Departments. Also, the meetings are a forum for talking about things in general, especially my own relationships with Henry Jacques, the RTO, the RHA and its panels. It also forms a forum within which to launch a "big" project and formulate a pattern of attack.

The second biggest sub group is the national system Management Meetings for which both Giff Reynolds and myself carry joint national responsibility. Organisational and work decisions are made which affect other Regions and trouble in other Regions can escalate to RTO and Head Office levels quickly. It is appropriate to keep a fairly tight control of this project.
Five events are given in category 11, troubleshoot, also. When severe problems are being encountered, I must become involved if those troubles cannot be resolved satisfactorily.

The other major activity, and I feel that this is under represented in the diary, concerns events in which Henry Jacques interferes with our work unnecessarily and not through me. Priorities set for the Division's work programme can be disturbed by his actions and it is possible for major conflict to occur.

The other large group of category 9 events are those in which I am putting pressure on the system using the weight which I have over and above my own managers. This involves control in the sense that I determine how to interfere and where to apply persuasion or pressure. The monitoring examples are good ones since they were very specifically designed to ease specific blockages in the work flow for that project. Oncology monitoring was another example in which a specific set of possibilities depended on putting together an appropriate pattern of events and being able to make them happen.

It is significant that category 8 - facilitate action - is the most common category associated with control. This reflects the process of handing back the action to other people in the Division to complete the task.

The two contrasting events used to illustrate "control" are chosen because of the different sizes of action which is recorded. In one example and from a limited viewpoint, the issue appears to be trivial, whilst in the other, a major intervention occurred on my part to straighten out a number of things which were going distinctly wrong from my point of view.
The first event concerned the use of 'private' and 'in confidence', especially when used for meetings of the Heads of the Departments. Tony Peers had got into the habit of releasing such information to his own lieutenants and carrying out a full discussion of it. Apart from the fact that this information was leaking all over the Division and embarrassing other Heads of Department it was becoming impossible to talk things over and to get a management view about them without having it discussed throughout the Division. At this particular meeting, both Simon and Peter were annoyed by the action which Tony had taken on a number of issues. As the point of the discussion became clear, Tony became defensive and then he became belligerent, trying to make out that he couldn't possibly discuss issues like this in the "inner cabinet" and then keep them away from his members of management teams. This inflamed the feelings in the meeting because he appeared to be giving more importance to his own managers than to the group in which he happened to be at that time. He threatened to do the same thing with another issue that had been discussed that morning and that caused a major row. I ended up by issuing a quite distinct order that he was not to do this. In a sense the whole incident had got out of hand. It may have been that the original mis-use of information had been an accident but it certainly did not appear that way during the meeting and so direct intervention became inevitable.

The other event concerns a NATSYS management meeting in which for a change I was in the chair. The project had not been going particularly well due to a variety of issues which simply were not being resolved. I had the problem of having two fairly senior managers who should never have allowed two or three things to drift. Some of the things which had drifted were administrative
issues such as obtaining project money from Head Office. One concerned not having made sure that Head Office had completed some important national negotiations. Others concerned internal management matters which had become slack. Both Giff Reynolds and myself were responsible for actions in this project but he was not there. And so I decided to go straight through these laying down the law on what had got to happen. I also made quite sure that each decision that I had made was minuted so that it could be checked through at the next meeting. The two senior managers resented my interference and attempted to play down the issues and pretend that I was unreasonable. It is tempting to believe that good management on my part would have avoided this situation. But I would contend that it is more efficient to have the occasional row rather the attempt to preplan and control everything all the time. There is a sense in which action of this type becomes vitally important just to show that officers are never free agents but are responsible to higher authorities for the courses of action which they are taking or failing to take. The level of feeling expressed in this meeting was high and afterwards many comments were made about the mood that I appeared to be in. In a sense, this event was a crude use of power.

Category 10 events - Pour Oil on Troubled Waters

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<td>215</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>(1, 3, 6, 10)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques spreads the idea of a deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 10)</td>
<td>Reconciliation with Luke Downs after the accounting blow up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>4.5.78</td>
<td>(9, 10, 11)</td>
<td>Sort out the OR/Computing boundary problem within the Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>(8, 9, 10)</td>
<td>A meeting of the Heads of Departments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of Category 10 events

The rather surprising thing about this list of events is that it is so short. On reflection, this probably reflects the situation as it exists in 1978/79. Within the administrative divisions of the Region, an understanding has built up which permits fast direct communication to take place across the many organisational boundaries which exist. Within these parts of the RHA, people are not hyper-sensitive any longer.

The four events are significant. A deputy for Henry Jacques, even though he would be from within the existing Heads of Division, and the choice is obvious and would not be resented, would represent quite a ripple in the organisational pool. The ramifications might have seemed obvious but could turn out differently. And so, much discussion took place in many private conversations, only one of which is recorded.

Luke Downs, although well meaning most of the time, is a source of considerable irritation. Only one oil pouring event is recorded and the conclusion must be drawn, and is undoubtedly correct, that I chose not to do likewise on many other occasions.

The other two events refer to an inter-Departmental squabble which breaks out intermittently in the Division. People in one department believe that others in another department are doing "their" work. On the whole I choose to ignore the squabble, sometimes show irritation and very occasionally pour on a few drops of oil.

The first event chosen to illustrate this particular category of work is an action undertaken for one other person and is a purely personal matter. The other event is surrounded by lots of organisational issues which have not been
resolved.

Relating to Luke Downs was always troublesome and will continue to be. The rate at which a reconciliation was forged after any particular row was a measure of his nuisance value more than anything else. Probably he will continue to annoy me in an ineffectual way over many years and it is probably best to clear up the mess as quickly as possible after each event. Accepting a lift home is against my principles, because I walk home for the exercise. But when his car drew up on Sleepers Hill it was clear that the opportunity would be there to make pleasant conversation and to pretend that a row that had occurred that morning really didn't matter all that much. That is what I did.

The floating of the idea of a deputy for Henry Jacques was a much more complex matter. In the first case, it could consume staff control points for new staff, or at least on the face of it that might be the effect. In the second place, it introduced a new person into the set of top administrators in the Region, and that was not something that people were going to allow to happen without due consideration. The other top administrators, especially Giff Reynolds who was in charge of the staff control procedures, reacted violently to the suggestion that another top administrator should be slipped in. David James became worried because the new position would have affected his relationship with Henry Jacques. Everyone except myself could have been very effected by the new man. And everyone jumped to the conclusion that Henry Jacques intended it to be a new person, despite the fact that he had not said so explicitly. I had to work exceedingly hard to make them see that with another man there, we could get Henry off our backs. It suddenly dawned on them that if we could get Henry to give the new deputy those parts of his job which represented interference with ourselves, life could become much more simple.
Furthermore, we could probably get Henry to concentrate on the political aspects of his own job and there would be distinct advantages in that for us. It would probably succeed in removing the Chairman's influence one stage away and we were all quite fond of grumbling about the effects of that upon us. But the outrageousness of using the staff points required to recruit working staff in their Divisions blinded them all to the possible advantages which there might be in it for us and for the organisation. And so I did some fast talking to calm them and to persuade them to use this as an opportunity to get improvements.

Category 11 events - Troubleshoot

Table of Events

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<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>29.11.77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>A row with Luke Downs and Tony Peers on three separate topics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.4.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Anticipate planning methods debate with Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>11.4.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sort out Martin Williams on Oncology Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>17.5.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Neil Moore of Head Office trying to force Giff Reynolds and myself to take on another Region's comments on the national system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>23.5.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Collared by Martin Williams on the Eastbury Intensive Care Unit computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>21.6.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>React to Dorothy Pines grumbling about Tony Peers and talk to Giff Reynolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>21.6.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Straighten out the salary payroll supplement from Head Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>29.6.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Start Garry Kay on a new job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195</td>
<td>11.9.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Deal with a delay to standard systems and sort out Luke Downs for Tony Peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>6.11.78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Henry Jacques jumping up and down about stupid telephone cover, etc, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(2, 3, 8, 11)</td>
<td>Get Henry Jacques to accept the national system costs and staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>12.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 11)</td>
<td>Henry Jacques gets other RAs involved in the national system resources problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>17.4.78</td>
<td>(4, 11)</td>
<td>Respond to a rude summons by Luke Downs to discuss accounting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>26.5.78</td>
<td>(4, 7, 8, 11)</td>
<td>A national system meeting with Henry Jacques and Luke Downs and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.12.77</td>
<td>(4, 8, 11)</td>
<td>Get the Newtown computer replacement through the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>8.5.78</td>
<td>(3, 11)</td>
<td>Heads of Division discuss the new computer building and the new computer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Category 11 events - Troubleshoot

#### Table of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>(5, 11)</td>
<td>Get Freda's support for the Evaluation Team outside the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>(8, 11)</td>
<td>Watching Oncology through Ralph Raimes' eyes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.2.78</td>
<td>(9, 11)</td>
<td>Sort out the Management Services Division work with Henry Jacques and stop his interfering with Peter Tibbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>21.6.78</td>
<td>(9, 11)</td>
<td>Make Tony Peers visit Freda about the Eastbury computer project on nurse allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>26.9.78</td>
<td>(9, 11)</td>
<td>Sort out the payroll and accounting system time-tables slip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>10.12.78</td>
<td>(9, 11)</td>
<td>Visit the Newtown Computer Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Analysis of Category 11 events

These twenty-two events are very much a part of the role of a Regional Management Services Officer. I feel strongly that one of my main roles is to avoid trouble, while another is to judge when subordinates and others need to be extracted from trouble by my intervention.

The words used even in the event summary reflect the character of the Troubleshoot activity. "A row", "sort out" (three times), "react to", "straighten out", "deal with", "get through" and "force" are a true reflection of the underlying aggressive attitude which troubleshoot often implies. This activity is about using status and weight, often in conflict and invariably in poor management situations. Sometimes, the events do not have these characteristics but, for the greater part, they do.

The list shows that troubles occur in a variety of different circumstances. It appears to be most common as a one to one conflict with another person but, on the other hand, some of the most important of these events are formal group activities. The level of event varies from interaction with Head Office to
On the whole, the success rate for troubleshooting is high, but there are gross examples of running battles which are very like wars of attrition. There are at least four interpersonal relationships in this list which will ensure that disputes will continue no matter how good a work contract or project management scheme is devised at the beginning of any project. Even if it were possible, it is unlikely that it would be economic to attempt to remove troubleshooting from the methods used to run the Division.

The two events chosen to illustrate this particular category of work are different in the following respects. The first concerns a row with an individual, Luke Downs, and it is typical of the fact that this individual acts completely outside the rules of the game in a maverick style are often. On this particular occasion he had overstepped the mark on three separate issues, in the space of two days and I had decided that all three had got to be sorted out. And so I had said to Henry Jacques that a meeting must be arranged to do just that. The second event concerned the national system costs which had been put to Henry Jacques and appeared to come to him as a complete surprise. This was despite the fact that he should have been aware of them for at least twelve months.

As stated above, Luke Downs had stepped right outside the agreed procedures for getting things done on three different occasions. All three of them were directly in my line of business, represented an outright challenge to my managerial responsibilities and further represented incursions into my territory that he had been warned about. The meeting in Henry Jacques' office got off to a grand start right from the word go, despite the fact that Henry thought that he was going to keep it calm. Unlike a previous occasion described in this diary, there was no attempt on my part to explain the situation
reasonably at the start of this meeting. It was my strong view that Luke knew what he was doing and had done it on purpose and so I felt justified in getting stuck into the essential points immediately. These concerned the fact that he was taking decisions which he had got no right to take and that he was taking over my part of the HQ. The whole tone of the meeting was filled with belligerence and I had no hesitation in raising my voice or thumping the table or taking advantage of every slip of the tongue which he made. If Luke dared to claim that he had got some rights as a chief officer, I immediately denied this, despite the sheer unreasonableness of my statement. Henry was trying to hold the ring. I was pushing my decisions onto Henry without any consideration of his feeling whatsoever. I was rude and I shouted. Henry was trying to get back to principles of good administration all the time and was continually pointing out when things were not a matter of policy or had not been decided in the proper manner. I was concentrating on hitting out in a way which even Luke Downs could not possibly misinterpret. It was a straight battle in which the only message that I wished to get across to him was 'keep off my patch'.

The national system costs was an entirely different matter. Henry had been told and should have known these costs but he claimed not to have assimilated them. For some odd reason, he had decided that he could not persuade the appropriate members and committees to accept them and it was clear that we had come across a major stumbling block which could cause considerable delays unless I could get rid of it somehow. During the whole of the meeting I was keeping my temper very much under control despite the fact that I was of the opinion that Henry should not have got us into this state. What I eventually did was to negotiate with him a different formula for putting the actual cost down on paper. It was still all there but it was split up under
different headings and in different timetables in such a way that he thought that he could cope with it politically. Some of the more irritating parts of the figures from his viewpoint were lost in more acceptable classifications. The whole essence of this piece of maneouvring came down to adjusting this cost statement in such a way as to make it manageable from his point of view.

There is no doubt that trouble is always best dealt with quickly. But it is not possible to do this always. Festering sores erupt sometimes. They have to be accepted and the eruptions dealt with as best may be done. Troubleshoot degenerates into defensive action on some occasions, and although selfish, this may be the best that can be done.

Events in the "Unclassified" Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ret. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.11.77</td>
<td>Heads of Department discussion on how to use Ralph Rains to best advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.11.77</td>
<td>Luke Downs makes a takeover bid for part of my Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.11.77</td>
<td>I perceive Wayne Cook as presenting major problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.11.77</td>
<td>Puzzling about how to run the Division and do research on it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>29.11.77</td>
<td>Talking to Martin Williams about computer strategy going to the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.11.77</td>
<td>Discover by accident that payroll is going to be late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.12.77</td>
<td>An RTO force. Consider computer strategy with Tony Peers to see what we can do about it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.12.77</td>
<td>Luke Downs tries yet another monitoring programme through the Monitoring Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>14.12.77</td>
<td>Get Computer Strategy through the Monitoring Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.1.78</td>
<td>Abreaction and lack of faith in the RTO to get things done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.1.78</td>
<td>A disastrous RTO trying to substitute for Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.1.78</td>
<td>Tony Peers fixing things behind my back - 7302 and IDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.1.78</td>
<td>Trouble with Tony Peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>28.1.78</td>
<td>Martin Williams does not attend a major monitoring seminar!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.1.78</td>
<td>Prevent William Lee abusing my review of Lionel Dunn's Department and team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>17.3.78</td>
<td>Henry Jacques will not tackle Chris Judd about accommodation in a nearby cottage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Events in the "Unclassified" Category

**Table of Events**

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>18.3.78</td>
<td>Reflections on the loss of O &amp; M at Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.3.78</td>
<td>Objectives Meeting with Henry Jacques about resources for the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>20.3.78</td>
<td>Defend Wessex Planning Methods against Head Office - but agree to do their silly forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.3.78</td>
<td>Yet another episode in the nearby cottage accommodation saga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>20.3.78</td>
<td>Record the deteriorating relationships with Luke Downs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>22.3.78</td>
<td>Puzzling with Ralph Rains and Tony Peers about an R &amp; D GP project which we fail to get through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>22.3.78</td>
<td>Manoeuvring for extra staff with Giff Reynolds and David James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>10.4.78</td>
<td>Martin Williams on Oncology monitoring - trying to sort him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>11.4.78</td>
<td>Speculating about Martin Williams and Oncology monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>13.4.78</td>
<td>Discussing with Head Office their taking incentive bonus schemes staff out of the control system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>19.4.78</td>
<td>Trying to find ways around staff control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>19.4.78</td>
<td>Help Norman Dale in another Region to solve top management problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>19.4.78</td>
<td>Get angry at the dead hand of administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>19.4.78</td>
<td>Outburst on staff control and bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>19.4.78</td>
<td>National system business interrupts work at home on the house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>24.4.78</td>
<td>Talk to our newspaper reporter about confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>25.4.78</td>
<td>Try to get some computing issues straight with Henry Jacques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>12.5.78</td>
<td>Another expression of sheer frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>15.5.78</td>
<td>Talk to a researcher on mental handicap about monitoring programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>17.5.78</td>
<td>Receive from Walter Arne an account of how Henry Jacques denied knowledge of bad computer staff accommodation!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>Talk to Walter Arne about the school accommodation for computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>5.6.78</td>
<td>Dorothy Pines is preparing a national computer system paper for the RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>19.6.78</td>
<td>Talk to the headquarters personnel man about staffing matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>19.6.78</td>
<td>Argue with Giff Reynolds and Walter Arne about accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>21.6.78</td>
<td>Trying to avoid rewriting the Computer Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>29.6.78</td>
<td>Chaos at a Regional Management Services seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>4.7.78</td>
<td>Tony Peers does not turn up for one of my important meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>10.7.78</td>
<td>Force a payroll review at the Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>26.7.78</td>
<td>Listen to Dorothy Pines' trouble with her users of the national system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>Martin Williams and Luke Downs squabbling about going to Head Office about computer staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Events in the "Unclassified" Category

Table of Events

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>A typical day of utter mess ups of one sort and another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>27.7.78</td>
<td>Reflections on the chaotic state of headquarters at the moment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>1.8.78</td>
<td>Holiday season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>Meet the Area Administrators with David James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>4.8.78</td>
<td>Dealing with Area comments on computer strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199</td>
<td>15.9.78</td>
<td>Tony Peers brandishes AHA going direct to RHA over strategy in front of me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>26.9.78</td>
<td>Henry Jacques and Garry Kay clash in public on computer staff accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>26.9.78</td>
<td>Go to a Regional Staff Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>Discuss consulting Henry Jacques on a variety of issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>23.10.78</td>
<td>Discuss the Chairman's attitude towards Panels and Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>13.11.78</td>
<td>Henry Jacques is studying despair in the organisation about stupid things like filing and cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>20.11.78</td>
<td>Tony Peers' reaction or lack of it to the information project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>20.11.78</td>
<td>Thanks that the national computer system has eventually emerged from its summer of discontent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>21.12.78</td>
<td>Henry Jacques does another Christmas 1977 on the Plan and drives everyone spare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Unclassified events

There is a sense from the thesis point of view in which this set of events is the most important of all the event categories since it represents that for which, not only did existing models of management services not cope, but neither did the new one suggested as a basis for this analysis. About a quarter of the diary events fall into this class and although, on reflection some unclassified events could be fitted into the categories, this is not so to any great extent. There is reason to believe that this 25% is the tip of a much larger iceberg since the analysis given below will suggest that some of the events must be part of a much greater set.
A cursory glance through these events confirms that the construction of the event categories was a very biased set of actions, although not perceived as such at the time. The categories worked out during the initial sorting of the diary data dismiss the work which straightforward administration of the Division represents and, on reflection, so does the diary. Working the system, member panels, staffing matters like appeals, staff conditions, getting reports in on time, helping other Regions as well as the unrecorded daily answering of letters, taking phone calls and other activities are a significant burden. More important, they are the things by which an important section of customers and others form a view of the Division.

The establishment of categories was weak in one other respect also. It tended to concentrate on the positive aspects of the job. The unclassified events reveal at least two important negative aspects of the job. Thirteen of these events express frustration and probably under-represent by a large margin this aspect of work. Only four can be described as defensive but again, that must be an underestimate. Both of these sorts of experience must be common in divisions responsible for creating change. Lack of frustration would suggest that sights have been set too low; lack of defensive actions would suggest that raiding expeditions by outside bodies were not worthwhile because the quality of the prize was inadequate. Both would be incompatible with my own basic attitudes.

At least five of these events fall in the category "watching helplessly". Even though at least one of these events was going to have disastrous repercussions on the Division and my own personal relationships, there was absolutely nothing I could do except watch it happen. This is an extreme case of the part of organisational existence which is passive. These "watching
helplessly" activities become frustrating insofar as a great amount of effort which I have put into an activity can be made ineffective. But is is frequently the case that, despite having been advised strongly to do something, other officers do not do the expected things, often to the extent of substituting actions which I judge to be unwise, foolish or stupid.

There is only one instance in this list of counselling and this is grossly inaccurate. Giving advice, on work and on career, on particular situations and in general, on personal and organisational issues, is a regular part of my activity. It is given on a wide variety of occasions both in groups and on a one to one basis.

Just being a part of the NHS in an unstructured way is part of being RMSO also. Chief and senior officers phone or write seeking specialist knowledge on a wide variety of topics. Ad hoc lectures, seminars and other meetings occur. Although only one such instance is recorded but they occur much more frequently.

It is impossible to pick out all of the features of this diary. But perhaps it is worth pointing out that, however inadequately, the unclassified events cover more personal reactions than seem to be the case elsewhere. Most of the event recordings in the list contain an emotive word phrase. This seems to suggest a very heavy personal involvement which I believe is an essential feature of being an effective change agent.

It is not possible to choose events from this list with a view to illustrating the nature of the events, since they are so diverse. However, two have been described in more detail in order to show that these events are significant, despite the fact that they fell into no preconceived way of life or emerged as a
significant pattern during the initial examination of the diary data.

Earlier in this chapter working the Avon management system was identified as a major activity, and in many cases a chore. Beating the system, or at least attempting to or finding ways round it, is a constant pre-occupation. This can be trivial in nature or involve important issues. Although recorded explicitly in this list only once, a constant theme in the diary is getting round the staff control procedures. They were devised by Henry Jacques some time ago as part of work done nationally by leading Regional Administrators to avoid crude cost controls imposed by Head Office. Whereas, anything which Head Office designed would have died its death quickly, this particular form of control has an inner life of its own, and is fed and nurtured by Henry. To have actually helped to place this noose around our necks, especially since it does little to move staff into more useful jobs as time passes, is seen by myself to have been the height of folly, despite the fact that some cogent arguments can be put forward for some form of staff control.

There are various ways around this system, and it is widely believed in Avon that other Regions, whose leaders are not so committed to control, use them. This is a source of irritation. But there are a few legitimate routies to be taken among these, the most important being to get a "Research and Development" label attached to any activity. The events concerned with the introduction of evaluation into the Region used Head Office funds is one such example. Another source of uncontrolled funds are the charities.

Not only must one attempt to get new resources, it is vital to secure what one possesses already. As posts fall vacant, their priority is supposed to be assessed calmly and the points used to the best advantage of the RHA. Clearly this cannot be allowed to happen, especially when the criteria for determining
"RHA advantage" are ill defined. Equally, such a system requires commitment to higher principles and those would need to be sold to the staff carefully. This has not been done. In the best of all possible worlds, Management Services would be prepared for this system to operate since we believe that we would not suffer. But that world of fairness and objectivity does not exist and as such, we seek to avoid the consequences of the system. In particular, any post which can be classified as "operational" - needed for some vital part of the RHA task such as paying people is shot through the system at full speed and not questioned. Very little becomes available for redeployment. A great deal of energy goes into working this system to best advantage.

An unusual event in this list is the talk with a care evaluation research man about monitoring. Monitoring consists of many parts but two are relevant to this event. It is useful to have a set of standards of performance to apply to our care group services and it is necessary to make managers use this information to raise their own levels of performance. Many researchers have useful insights into the setting of standards and the subsequent attainment but few are interested in making management act in accordance with their insights. The purpose of this meeting was to persuade this person to become more involved in this second activity.

Apart from the fact that my division is the main driving force behind monitoring, I was talking to this person because of my own personal interest in this type of research. It was thought that my known interest would influence this person. Properly speaking, it was the job of the Regional Medical Officer to launch this monitoring exercise. It is common for people to be asked to do jobs for which they have special aptitude rather than it being their
responsibility. This incident illustrates a continuous activity concerned with getting square and round pegs into the right shaped holes as far as work is concerned. The round peg is never quite round, nor is the hole. An important top level management activity is to try to juggle staff so that the most appropriate people do particular jobs.

Discussion of the analysis

The above analysis of the diary events does confirm that the categories do provide further insight into the way management services function. The discussion of unclassified events suggest that at least the following sets of activities also occur:

- administration of the Division and working the RHA/NHS system
- dealing with a high level of frustration
- defending the Division
- watching helplessly
- counselling
- helping other parts of the NHS

Consideration of these and the event categories defined originally suggests that it is possible to add to the most advanced model of management services in chapter 3 in the following ways.

(a) Effectiveness depends on knowing and learning about the host organisation. This is a complex activity but the need to watch and to study how the organisation reacts is very great and is best done positively and systematically.
(b) Management services is not purely a reacting management needs. Technical and organisational creativity are helpful. At least management services must feed in its own initiatives and alternatives so that wider choices of working methods become available to management. It is possible to become more involved in the management process and to start shaping the future positively.

(c) The relationship of management services with the host organisation does not necessarily have to be only that of possible servant plus seller of new ideas. It can enter into a complex negotiating position in which the future evolves as the result of not only technical work and feeding in new ideas but also a change in ethos and motivating the whole organisation to want to change. The way in which systematic change and change in social arrangements and inter-personal relationships contribute to the moving forward of the RHA is complex. But all of these various parts of the interface between the RHA and management services can be regarded as a complex negotiation which can be analysed using the event categories as extended above.

Probably the major problem raised by this analysis is how to create and maintain a large change agent group based on these ideas and the more conventional management services skills and attitudes. Creation of Divisional attitudes is a long process. It is easier to do this when a new Division has to be created that when an existing one needs to be transformed. Also it is a function of the available personnel, not all of whom can or want to make such a transformation.
Any change in management services role has an effect on the RHA itself. The extent to which other parts of the RHA can retain a conventional posture, e.g. the traditional RTO leadership role, is open to debate. The planning methods project upset all of the conventional planning roles in the RHA and they will never return to anything resembling their original form. Those changes are part of a much larger study but the issue is raised by this study.

The implications of this analysis for the models of management services discussed in Chapter 2 are discussed in Chapter 6.

Summary

In this chapter individual events have been given categories and an analysis of the properties of the categories has been started. In Chapter 7, that analysis will be carried further and the general properties of the categories will be built up from the data contained in this chapter. One of the characteristics of the analysis so far performed is that it illustrates the richness in many types of quality of the personal and social interactions involved in being a management services change agent. The general characteristics which will be set out in Chapter 7 will tend to lose some of that richness in the generality of the statement of a category characteristic which must then be made. It is therefore important to remember the rich quality of events which are contained in this chapter and are being illustrated by the general model.

It will be remembered that the analysis in this chapter is the first of two parts of the developed version of Model 6 first described crudely in Chapter 2. This first part is the definition of categories which typify the character of events which make up the life of a management services change agent. Before generalising both parts of the model in Chapter 7, it is necessary to generate a
grounded theory version of the second part of the developed version of Model 6. This is done in the next chapter. This second part of the model shows how individual events of the type described in this chapter are fitted together into large projects.

The emphasis in the second part of the Model in Chapter 6 will be on the fitting together process. It would have been possible to attempt to give the events in Chapter 6 categories in the same way as has been done in this chapter, but that would have confused the fitting together issues in my view. In Chapter 7, there is reference to an important check that was made to ensure that events in the next chapter can be categorised. But this was only a check, and it is in this chapter that the important work on the definition of event categories has been done.
The relationship of this case study to the main theme of the thesis

Proposals for the development of the second half of Model 6 - The Corporate Activist - from Chapter 2 are described briefly on page 36. A major part of this second half is the interaction between the management services officer and the NHS structures given in Chapter 3. Laboratories are part of that structure. These interactions make up the processes which fit together events of the type which are given categories in Chapter 5 into projects. This chapter is a case study concerned with that fitting together.

Both the case study in this chapter and the one in Chapter 5 are stories of encounters in real life. Although it would have been possible to have related these stories using neutral terminology, an important part of their character would have been lost and the encounters recorded would have seemed insipid. The nature of the encounters is a fundamental part of this research and this justifies the use of accurate colourful descriptions.

The case study lasts fifteen months. It covers only part of the work carried out by the Division during that period, and it covers only part of the history of the project. The action is complex and, for that reason, it is split into five subthemes. These subthemes represent different parts of the way in which laboratory computing policy for the whole Region is being formulated. Each subtheme is built up in layers. First, the relevant parts of the laboratory diary have been identified and then brought together as a Subtheme Synopsis. Then, Subtheme Commentaries have been constructed which draw out the main conclusions for that Subtheme. Although an attempt to present the complete
picture of the project events is made below, it is probably better to read this analysis in conjunction with the actual diary in Appendix 2. An attempt to put the conclusions together is made in the last section of the case study.

This case study occurs within a history of laboratory computing which lasted a long time and the story which unfolds is complex. It is useful therefore to sketch in that background and to outline the main project story.

Management issues in laboratory computing

Health Service laboratories exist principally to analyse samples taken from patients and to feed back an analysis of the sample to doctors responsible for the care of the patient. Typical samples are blood and urine and typical results are a set of twelve proportions of various chemicals in a sample. Samples from inpatients, outpatients and general practitioners in a district with a population of half-a-million are often processed by one laboratory since the automatic analysers used to process samples are costly to buy and run. The ability to send back results quickly can be critical and, in any case, performance criteria relevant to timing and quality control are important. For these reasons, the handling of samples and results, i.e. data processing, in laboratories have become difficult problems.

For various reasons, there is a good case for believing that computer processing in hospital laboratories became essential by any standard a decade ago. For two computer generations at least, attempts have been made to develop a system and both previous generations have existed in this region. These systems were part of the national initiatives by Head Office. The second one was a definite attempt to produce a standard system based on parallel development work in three laboratories each of which had had a first generation
system. It was completely financed by Head Office from research funds and staffed by research people outside Regional structures. The three laboratories and Head Office determined the system development route to be followed with no more than a somewhat naive acquiescence from local Health Authorities. The beginning of this case study is the collapse of this project, the withdrawal of Head Office support and the consequent emergence of a series of problems which were fairly and squarely placed in Region's lap accompanied by the somewhat shamed faced statement by Head Office and very reluctant acceptance by Region that the problem was ours in any case. This acceptance by Region was with a complete lack of grace due to the fact that, in any case, the Head Office controlled R & D budgets were resented and for their use to be accompanied by abject failure was rubbing far too much salt into open gashes.

The two issues raised by the collapse of the Head Office project were:

(a) What to do about the immediate problem in the laboratory concerned

and (b) How to construct a system for all District laboratories, i.e. a replacement Head Office system.

There are many Districts in the Region each of which provides a laboratory service in pathology, haematology and microbiology. Several are very large laboratories and their need for computing support before 1980 appears to have been accepted. At least five of the others could make a reasonable case as well. The basic theory behind the Head Office system replacement was that a trial of an existing system would be carried out in a quieter laboratory and that system would become the core of a Regional system. The trial collapsed and this story is about attempts to rescue the situation.
Participants and groups

The major participants in this case study are the personnel of the laboratories themselves. In each of the Districts, at least one laboratory in each of three fields exists, pathology, haematology and histology and with each of these topics is associated at least one consultant. Many of these consultants have qualifications in their own field (e.g. PhD chemists) rather than being medically qualified. Beneath the consultants are technicians of various levels and these are the people who actually do tests to make the system work and know its intimate details.

The consultants form part of the ever growing ranks of the Scientific Services in the NHS (X-ray, ultra sound, radiotherapy, etc., etc). As a group they take bigger and bigger slices of capital and revenue and are sufficiently important for there to be a Regional Scientific Committee which advises the RHA directly. Over the years, this group has been one of the most active pressure groups in the Region. The Medical Scientific equipment field develops at a rapid rate, is very lucrative commercially and its products provide the main route by which these consultants can do their work, improve the quality of their service and, since they are for the most part still active scientists, fulfil their own personal and professional needs to develop.

Another part of the system of control and development of scientific services is the Regional Scientific Officer. Among many activities, his main relevant activities are forming Regional policy and controlling the capital budget. The various types of discipline in the Scientific services show little sympathy towards each other, especially if they are contending for the same piece of money. He is at the centre of a web of influential people and bodies
and his lot is not an easy one. From both the capital and policy viewpoint, he has a major interest in laboratory computing.

The third important influence on laboratory computing is the Computing Services Department, part of Management Services. This Department has acquired interests outside batch data processing activities only in recent years. Its image is still one of the large machine doing payroll, despite the fact that this is not true. Characteristically, it is still very much a young organisation concerned about its own internal workings and its status in the outside world. Professionalism is a word that comes rapidly and easily to their lips, and they do not understand that others care little for their standards and other professional paraphernalia. It is also a department which is on the sidelines of the NHS. Its members do not see their careers in the service but in computing.

Hovering over these four entities, each of which does have a grasp of at least part of the laboratory computing problem, is the NHS management structure. All of its parts, Head Office, Region, Area and District view laboratory computing with alarm. It has consumed relatively large amounts of resource over the last decade and there is little to show for it. And yet, powerful groups and important people continue to support laboratory computers. This presents management with a dilemma - should they support it or not.

The rescue operation

Given the collapse of the Head Office Project, it was inevitable that Region should be asked to mount a rescue. Having nodded its blessing at the project, despite their state of abject ignorance of the consequences of success, having accepted some sort of commitment to and responsibility for it, having abdicated effective control to outside agencies, the day of reckoning arrived.
The so-called experts had "boobed". Of course all of this was put in different terms at that point in time. There was no way in which I as a new RMSO was going to accept any blame and I determined to enter this arena on my terms. At that point in time, the justice of any statement regarding blame for the catastrophe was not talked about. If you arrive at the end of a project with a system which is too complex to make work, too big for the effort available and too slow to meet the requirements, it is unlikely that effective control was exercised over the user requirement or that technical development had been adequately supervised. For someone to have been blamed was reasonable.

I was determined to control all aspects of the rescue project during its development period, the machine, the people, the work programme, everything. This was anathema to the local District people, especially the Consultant in charge of the Laboratory, who thought direct control should be vested in him. Second, and much more potentially explosive, I was determined that the user requirement would be cut down to something that we could produce in a reasonable time. That meant that all fancy realtime applications and all the more exotic applications in the system must be scrapped. Third, the user requirement was going to be set down in an unequivocal way before work began. I did not have very good people in the team inherited from the Head Office work and these sort of restrictions were essential. The consultant concerned squealed. How dare an administrator (a term to which I object violently) come along with conditions like these. But I did, and over a pint which I bought for him, I explained that I was prepared to go to the Regional Authority and recommend that he be allowed to get on which it himself - no help, no rescue, no nothing. And so the rescue deal was accepted.

In the meantime, the other two parts of the Head Office project in
laboratories outside this Region went their own ways. The consultants refused to co-operate with each other.

The next hurdle was to make sure that Head Office paid for the rescue. In fact, because of the simplicity of our proposal, no difficulty occurred, until later in the game, when Head Office decided that they could slide out from under just a bit too soon. Without any form of negotiation, a letter to Region arrived informing us of their intention to withdraw their financial support before the project was completed. There was only one way to deal with that, namely, to put the sort of letter on their files which they could not ignore. I made a mistake by not copying it to quite the right people and we had to take emergency action to deal with that. The letter was carefully drafted and listed the known sins of Head Office regarding the management of the original project before it accused them of sabotaging a successful rescue. The Head Office Regional Liaison Officer was livid about the disruption of good relationships especially since he had more important issues to keep straight. Head Office extended the support very quickly when he received his copy of the letter.

Part of the deal with the Consultant was a vague statement that we would review the extension of the system after our promised first phase worked but it was surrounded with caveats about resources being available, priorities being set by District and so on. It saved his face and he still grumbles about promises never met or, never made, depending on whether he or I tells the story.

Somewhat later than we had hoped this phase 1 interim system went into the laboratory and provided a service without which the consultant would have the utmost difficulty in running his service.
The main system - the story and the actors

Effectively, after the politics of the rescue of Head Office project, I went to sleep on this project. A smaller laboratory was selected as a suitable place for the pilot regional system and a system was selected which was supposed to work. All of the rituals which surround a computer purchase were performed. Knowledgeable phrases about tests and bench marks were used and a pilot system was bought. Suddenly the pilot system was crashing in its parent laboratory outside this Region and everything that could go wrong was going wrong. I had to take an interest.

The analysis of the main story

The main story of this case study is about an attempt to formulate Regional Policy for Laboratory Computing. As stated above, the story has been split into Subthemes, each of which is described in a Synopsis of Events and a Subtheme Analysis on those events. The Subthemes are:

1. An attempt to replace an experiment by a turn-key contract
2. Forcing through the original experiment
3. The entry of another possible major supplier into the arena
4. Another important experiment on transferring systems
5. Other subthemes in the case study

In order to facilitate the analysis of these subthemes later in the chapter, it is worth giving the main story of each and linking them together.

As stated above the aim of this project was to find a replacement for the national system by carrying out an experiment in a smaller quite laboratory. I started taking an interest when, for no good reason that I could discern, that
experiment failed. Almost in a panic, my own computer people persuaded me to allow another company to provide a packaged solution. Subtheme 1 is the story of the rejection of the suggestion. A series of complex negotiations brought this about and the subtheme tells of the moves and countermoves in the battle.

I was unhappy about abandoning the original experiment. No good reasons for its failure were apparent. And so I determined that either the original equipment would be made to work somewhere or I would obtain a coherent set of reasons for its failure. Many different people were trying to force computer services to make it work. Others were attempting to undermine the experiment. Subtheme 2 is about these manoeuvres.

For some reason which I could not determine, one major equipment supplier had been excluded from the contract. After much consideration I determined to reinstate that company. The third subtheme is about my achievement of that aim. My actions were opposed and I had to overcome many obstacles.

Late on in the project, an opportunity arose which persuaded one pathologist that he could transfer a working computer system into his laboratory cheaply. The fourth subtheme is about the many difficulties encountered in that transfer.

The fifth subtheme is an attempt to collect together all the other happenings in this major project.

These subthemes do not exhaust the diary material nor do they represent the only or possibly the best way of analysing that data. It could be argued that the relationship between people, departments and parts of the advisory
machinery would form a better analysis. The reason for the choice made was that it is task orientated in the sense that each of the first four subthemes is about a genuine task that was being attempted by Region.

In analysing this data into subthemes, an artificial order is being placed on the data. The diary itself represents much better the disorderly nature of and relationships between events which make up this story. The extent to which the subtheme analysis represents post-hoc rationalisation is an important issue since the analysis camouflages a great deal of ad hoc ingenuity, chance and opportunity taking and genuine creative management in a difficult situation.

In order to understand the subtheme analyses, it is necessary to know the roles of the participating characters. These are described below.

The scenes and the cast

The Region consists of many Areas, four of which become involved in this case study. These have been called East, West, North and South. Many Districts become involved, three of which are important in this story. Ralton in West Area is the place where the original experiment was carried out, Eastbury in North Area must be provided with a working system for its very large laboratory in the near future and Sleeton in East Area has used the laboratory computers for a long time and wishes to replace its system with a better one.

Dr. Hunt is the Regional Scientific Officer. He is an Adviser on the staff of the Regional Medical Officer and his basic responsibility is for all aspects, including the purchase, of scientific equipment throughout the Region. Officially his position is only an advisory one but it would be very rare for that advice to be over-ruled and for equipment which he had not suggested to be
bought. In the rapidly expanding field of scientific equipment in the Health Services, he performs a very lonely and exposed job. He is surrounded by powerful consultants of several varieties, each of whom wants infinitely more than he can have due to lack of resources. He has no assistance and is therefore overworked. He is a fairly brusque, forthright character, very pleasant in many ways but certainly not liked by many people. This is probably because of the nature of the job which he does and the way in which he maybe has to perform it. Laboratory computing has been a vale of miseries for the past decade and Barry is aware of the fact that he cannot afford any more major mistakes. This probably accounts for the fact that he is looking for cast iron protection, well documented on files, in this particular activity. His major "hang up" on this project is that he and Tony Peers, the Regional Computer Services Officer, have clashed violently and his memory is proving to be a long one. He does not like Computer Services.

Dr. Pat Hills is the Pathologist from Newton who came there from a laboratory in which computing was well established. He has used a District computer to provide a very elementary laboratory computing system for some time. His experience of computing is wide and he is a member of the Newton Computer Steering Committee. Pat is a quiet sensible character, who tries to get useful action taken in any particular circumstance.

Dr. John Jarratt is the most experienced laboratory computing person in the Region, having been associated with it in a practical sense for the past ten years at least. He had the first and second generation of national machines in his laboratory. This means that he must be a very able politician. His present machine is about three years old. He does not particularly like the system which he has been provided with, according to his design. He badly wants a better system in his laboratory at Sleeton.
Dr. Max Hart is the Pathologist from Eastbury. This is one of the biggest laboratories in the Region - full of specialist work of various types. According to Barry Hunt he is the wiliest and cleverest pathologist in the Region. Unfortunately in the middle of this study, he was taken ill. He knows very little about laboratory computing. He plays a very canny game and behaves quite sensibly.

Dr. Alec Johns is the Pathologist in charge of the Ralton laboratory. Ralton is a laboratory in a new hospital and for various reasons, has been provided with automated equipment which means that he finds it quite easy to get through the medium sized workload that it has got. He seems a very nice fellow but on the whole, obviously does not carry a great deal of weight.

Dr. Smiley is the Salton Pathologist. A young chap, obviously active in many respects but for some odd reason, he has not chosen to become involved much in the main laboratory computing issues. He has, however, put little machines onto his equipment.

Mr. Sam Earle is the Technician in the Ralton laboratory, who has cooperated with the Computer Department in designing the details of the Regional Specification.

Tony Peers is the Regional Computing Services Officer and is in charge of computing throughout the Region. Most of this is on large machines but two years ago we decided to become involved in laboratories following the collapse of the Head Office project in Sleeton. He knows very little about this type of computing. More important, he was a recruit to the NHS and has had difficulty in coming to terms with the sort of organisation that it is. On the whole, he has not found it easy to accept Public Service activity nor in my view has he
found the negotiation with the total set of Pathologists in the Region at all easy. Most important, he has succeeded in clashing with Barry Hunt to the extent that they have ended by shouting at each other and that relationship has never been anything but sour.

Robert Jones is the Senior Designer and has been concerned with laboratories for a long time. I suspect that he knows quite a lot about them by now. For some odd reason, he does not get on with Barry Hunt either. His main work down in Sleeton up to about three years ago, was on the Head Office project.

Garth Boles is a Computer Systems Designer who has been working on laboratory systems over the past two years, on and off with other things.

Willy James is a Systems Designer/Programmer who has been working in this field as well. He is very concerned about prospects and professionalism and on the whole does not understand the NHS.

Graham Pate is the Area Management Services Officer in West Area. He has been the Chairman of a Working Party in West Area responsible for the design of much of the system for the Ralton laboratory.

Hugh Robins is the District Administrator of the Woodbury District and this is where Dr. Jarratt has got his laboratory. Although a medical matter, the whole business of laboratory computing in a District should be one of the principle concerns of the District Management Team.

Dr. Martin Williams is the Regional Medical Officer to whom Dr. Hunt reports. He came to this Region a short while ago from the Northern Region. Martin has had problems settling into this Region especially in view of the fact
that the Regional Administrator, Henry Jacques, is well established in his seat and is a very powerful person.

Henry Jacques is the Regional Administrator to whom I report. Insofar as the Management Services Division is concerned with any activity, Henry Jacques should be concerned to keep it on the line at the most senior level.

Dr. Ralph Raines is attached to the Management Services Division from Martin Williams. He is not really concerned with medical computing in laboratories but he does follow this interest generally. I talk to Ralph quite a lot about this topic.

Charles Poole is one of the Specialists in Community Medicine in the West Area Health Authority. Insofar as an Area doctor has become involved in laboratory computing in Ralton, it has been Dr. Poole.

Dr. Harry Rees is the Pathologist in charge of the Limpton laboratory to which one of the laboratory systems has been transferred.

Dr. Wood works at a London Hospital. He was a participant in the Head Office project and has designed the Alpha system. This now works and is the basis of most of the laboratory computing developments throughout the country.

Dr. Bates is the Regional Scientific Officer in Region 4. Limpton is part of that Region and Dr. Bates is therefore connected with the Limpton transfer of Alpha.

Bill Acton is the Sales Manager of Orion Computer Systems whom I know from a long way back in my career.

There are companies who have become involved in this tale:
London Company is a supplier which does not normally operate in this field. They proposed a turn-key solution with themselves doing all of the development and implementation work.

National were the providers of the original hardware at Sleeton for the original national project and as such the Alpha system in London has been developed on their equipment.

Delta computers were bought on a fairly large scale by laboratories throughout the country. In particular, the Alpha system is being transferred to a Delta situation in Burnage in another Region.

Orion are the suppliers of the Limpton hardware. There are other manufacturers in this field and they appear in various bits of the story.

The subthemes of the main story

Subtheme 1 - an attempt to replace the delta computer development by a turn-key contract

Subtheme 1 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Feb 78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tony Peers promises to give me case for getting rid of the Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16 Feb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>London Company propose 6 machines and get rid of two Deltas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Regional Specification discussed throughout Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 Mar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oldtown comments on Regional Specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Newton comments on Regional Specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Eastbury comments on Regional Specification.</td>
</tr>
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### Subtheme 1 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13 Mar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Consolidated North Area comments - thirty four points raised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>15 Mar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Barry says North Area accept Specification except for a few minor details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tony Peers strongly recommending London Company (memo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tony Peers claims authority to design standard system. Barry Hunt says this is not true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>April/May</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>At some stage Head Office say no alternative to London Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Big meeting of pathologists accepted. London Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Robert Jones replies to comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Barry Hunt says London Company cannot be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Barry Hunt came in specially to say London Company cannot be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>I try to persuade Henry to take up London case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Meeting with Martin to persuade him to take London case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Long mem to Henry to try to get him involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>RTO sent a recommendation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Still trying to get Henry involved, he is not playing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Memo to Henry still trying to get London Company in on a &quot;no lose&quot; contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>GG avoiding Barry Hunt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>West Area meeting, they have not even seen the London quotation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>My feelings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Suddenly the West Area need disappears and I give in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Barry says that reason for rejecting London Company is that he is not convinced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>London Company still trying to get contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>At Limpton talkabout London Company not doing well on ALPHA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>London Company send price of one system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subtheme 1 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>Barry Hunt disagrees over Ralton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>20 Nov</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>I fix West Area to push their case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>Pub meeting Graham Pace to fix Cook/Jacques meeting. I brief Jacques. The meeting doesn't happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>Paper with case for Ralton and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>I force my paper on Jacques. As a result, Barry shrieks BUT he has my paper on HIS file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of subtheme 1

The regional replacement for the national standard system had been devised by Computer Services. It was based on a Delta computer system which was supposed to work but did not do so. Suddenly there was a rush to sell off the Delta and get the London Computer Company to do the whole job for us.

Even if the attempt to replace Delta in this way had been wise, Dr. Hunt had to be persuaded that this was so in private. Perhaps the most important lesson concerned with the London Company contract is that the Computer Department completely misread the part which Barry Hunt would have in this decision. Right from the start, it should have been quite clear that his position would be one of the most important factors deciding the course of action that should be taken. Instead of playing the game accordingly, the whole action was played out in committees of insubstantial power. It was stated by Computer Services again and again that agreement to proceed along the new Regional Specification lines had been obtained in these committees. It was not acknowledged that Barry Hunt probably would never say in open committee...
what his position was, if it had not been agreed beforehand. This complete misreading of the power position is right at the heart of the problems of this project.

The basic philosophy of the Ralton laboratory experiment was that Ralton was a fairly quiet laboratory in which it would be possible to carry out an experiment without undue pressure. In the event, this philosophy went sour and one of the contributory factors was that Ralton did not actually need a computer. The need to compromise about their "needs" was not very great and so they stuck out for their full requirement. Consultants are completely independent operators in their prime patient care roles and they do what they believe best for the patient. Compromise is not part of their normal lives. In practical development projects, the need to compromise is always there and if the pressure on the customer to do this is insufficient, many problems are likely to occur. That pressure can be of various types but in the NHS it is very unlikely that the need to conform to management pressure will be enough if the need for that project is questionable.

Although London Company did take part in the original bidding for the project at Ralton, it was always felt that London Company as a company was not there by right but because of some bureaucratic rules about who should be invited to tender together with the disposition of the Regional Computing Services organisation towards that company. The Laboratory Consultants have never considered London to be in this field. For some odd reason which no one understood and about which everyone was very suspicious indeed, London produced a turn-key bid. I had to appear at a meeting of Pathologists to try to coerce them into agreement about that bid, against their better judgement and instinct. In addition to this, they were completely unfamiliar with a situation
in which a system was to be produced according to a specification on a piece of paper. Their whole approach had been to see a system working before they even started to think of buying it. The acceptance of this particular contracting procedure based on a written specification was completely contrary to their usual pattern of behaviour and alien to them.

One of the features of this case is the totally different approach which was being adopted by the Computer Department and by the users of the system and the RCSO. The Computer Department was sticking by its "professionalism" and its approach to doing computer systems. The specification was only a small part of this difference in the basic approach. The Pathologists were subjected to all sorts of "funny talk" about "bench marks" and "documentation" and "testing" and so on and so on. The Computer Department perceived it as necessary that these people should understand and adapt to the computer way of life. There is no clear reason why this should be the case.

One of the interesting features of the project was the way in which North Area tried to behave as a unit. This is a typical behaviour pattern. North Area's consolidated comments were dealt with at a special meeting much more precisely and expeditiously than any other set. It is intriguing to note this despite the fact that this system was being developed at Ralton in West Area. The Ralton Laboratory Consultant only got invited to that meeting by a default procedure by which he succeeded in inviting himself. Region always seems to listen to the North Area voice rather more than any other voice, despite the fact that it claims to be unbiased.

If one neglects the fact that the Management Teams and all the other parts of the management structures that should have been involved in this
decision did not take part, it is possible to distinguish four major parts of the organisation interacting. These are:

(a) The Pathologists in various groupings outside the Headquarters
(b) The Regional Scientific Officer
(c) The Regional Management Services Officer
and (d) The Computer Services Department

All four of these groups or individuals were acting separately and independently in a variety of ways. Their interpretation of the goal to which they were moving was fundamentally the same but there were important differences in their interpretations of what that goal meant. All of them wanted computing in the laboratories throughout the Region. But all of them felt that the important issues which had to be dealt with and the principles which should be built into the overall solution, should be their own ones. Each of them had a particular power base from which they were working and a particular point of view. Right up to a very late stage in the development of this project, they were on collision courses of various types due to the fact that they all perceived different things as being important. The bureaucratic machinery consisting of management teams, advisory committees and working parties did not resolve these conflicts. The necessary 'off stage' negotiation went sour, even if it was perceived to be needed at all. The roles which the participants played either by intention or by accident did not constitute a conciliation procedure and so in the end, this particular solution to the problem - even if it had been correct - would have had to go through on the basis of the power of the Regional Scientific Officer. An agreement to use that power did not exist and the main reason it was not there was that this solution made him vulnerable from many
points of view. In his exposed position, such risk taking simply was not possible even if had felt motivated to support this course of action.

Subtheme 2 - forcing through the original experiment

Subtheme 2 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pre-Feb</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barry Hunt bought Ralton equipment to fit in Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Feb 78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tony Peers promises me the case for getting rid of Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Apr 78</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Barry Hunt gunning for Computer Services trying to blame them for Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Barry Hunt trying to bully me, who is responsible for Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>I am worried about Graham Pate's reaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>I agree to meet West Area. Barry Hunt comments &quot;Major West Area error&quot;. Graham Pate still on my mind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>I include Delta collapse in memo to Henry Jacques. Disposal of Delta difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Salton try to steal Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Visit to West Area Committee faith in me to sort this out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>I appreciate that Ralton does not really need the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Barry Hunt says Ralton requirement has not disappeared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>I say one last try of Ralton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Oldtown tries to steal a Ralton Video terminal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>Tony Peers is trying desperately to get from under PAC. Ralton bought off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>RTO accept Ralton last try.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>See Martin Williams about RTO recommendation - trying Delta for last time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>GG gets grilled by Computer Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>12 July</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Trying to get from Tony a list of Alpha drawbacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>Tony Peers talks threateningly about solicitors and PACs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>19 July</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>Sleeton tries to steal Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>Tony Peers wants to put Delta into Hillbury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Robert Jones says Delta might work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subtheme 2 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>17 Aug</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>Meeting Boles and Jones to know what needs to be done at Delta to fit Ralton (Quick Report arrives 4/11).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>Boles produced overview - not asked for, NOT what I want</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>25 Sep</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Boles claims not to have understood my 17 Aug request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>26 Sep</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>Boles is trying to get Delta into Hillbury! I force Ralton date and brief on Boles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1 Nov</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Jumping up and down for Ralton report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>Ralton meeting. Must have cumulative reports!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>7 Nov</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>Conspiring with Graham Pate and Wayne Cook at Kings Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Barry Hunt asks for my opinion of London Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>RTO recommendation (London Company official).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>Barry and I see Martin about Salton transfer, Delta last time attempt, Inter-Regional cooperation and we talk London Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Account of my meeting computer services. Explain London Company - no chance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of subtheme 2

The basic Delta subtheme is simple. A small but nevertheless significant lead-in experiment to the main laboratory computerisation activity went wrong. The actual money involved was not significant in comparison with the other issues which were at stake. These were:

(a) If the exercise was to be abandoned, then the reasons for that abandonment must be solid, clear and understood and the alternative action must be agreed.
(b) If the exercise was a failure, then the reasons for that failure must be known so that they were avoided in the future.

(c) The impact of failure on both the reputation of management service and the morale of laboratory staff needed to be assessed and these effects dealt with in a constructive way.

When I decided to become involved, an undignified, unhelpful series of squabbles was going on, the main participants being the Computer Services Department and the Regional Scientific Officer. The Delta story is an attempt to return to more rational decision making and to stop individuals indulging in defensive behaviour.

The hardware from Delta never presented problems. The software system was to be obtained from Region 9 which had bought many such systems. Despite the fact that such an investment ought to have been without problems, Computer Services should have gone through a routine designed to ensure that a working, transferable system was available. Somehow a computer was actually bought with insufficient regard to these needs and safeguards. In panic almost, a second supplier Region was contacted, which fortuitously existed and this time the total sequence of acceptance and performance tests was carried out. They failed. Not unnaturally the condemnation by our Region of the system did little to cement a good relationship between the supplier of this second system and ourselves. The fact that the system collapsed in its parent laboratory a few weeks later was too late to influence the bad feeling generated in the manufacturing Region. But the basic fact is that the Computer Services did not deliver a working transferable system. It was never possible to get them to accept any part of the blame.
The move to get rid of Delta by Computer Services appeared as an orchestrated attempt to avoid blame. Such reasons as did exist for the failure were not made clear. Senior managers, myself included, were harangued by Computer Services for not accepting meekly "technical jargon" and "professional advice" connected with the failure and the way forward. The "rational top managers" escape route was paraded by Computer Services and pushed hard, namely that we should invest additional money in a turn-key solution from the London Company proposition. Or so it seemed. Right in the middle of this was my stubborn belief that laboratory computing was essentially a simple computer job which I could have put on a first generation process control machine fifteen years ago. I never got a set of coherent reasons to explain the difficulties because, as time showed, they did not exist. In the meantime, spectres wandered around. A Public Accounts Committee enquiry could never have affected computer staff and yet "independent legal advice" was sought by Computer Services. Tirades on the lack of "effective management action", by other people of course, poured from the lips of computer personnel. All of this verged on being hysterical.

A similar episode occurred over the reasons why Ralton could not accept from the second parent site the system which eventually worked. It took three months in order to obtain the list of amendments needed for the District to be able to accept it. There was no sensible reason for this delay.

Many other diversions concerning the possible use of Delta occurred. "Hillbury would take it" - but West Area could not even confirm that Hillbury had been visited or were interested. Sleeton needed it. The whole business of forcing the Ralton issue to a decision was beset by the intrusion of irrelevant issues. Hillbury, the London Company, Public Accounts Committees and so on.
were irrelevant to the main issue - "Why can't Delta work in Ralton?"

Management Team participation in the Delta exercise has been negligible. I have not been aware of any DMT activity whatsoever. An Area Medical Officer representative stated, quite genuinely that "he would rely on my judgement". Despite efforts by Graham Pate and myself, no administrative view of the Ralton project has been put forward. The RMO intervention was never sustained although he was embarrassed by having two idle Deltas in the Region. All negotiation has been informal usually between two people at a time, though occasionally within a small group. Theoretically, all the relevant decisions require Management Team approval.

Ralton's attitude to compromise is important. A meeting of top people occurred to explain that there was no way in which we could meet their final demand. In order to keep the negotiation open and free, nothing was written down. And yet, the letter making their demands was sent to Region. A half-hour 'phone call explained to their "honest broker" that the reply would reject their request and that Region could find another home for the Delta. No change in negotiating position occurred. And yet, experience says that normally, the computer would have been taken followed by a fight to reverse the decision and obtain the required cumulative report by some means or other. Ralton have plenty of equipment and are not under pressure. Perhaps the lesson is that development work should go to the lean and hungry or the voracious and clever.

An analysis of this type loses a great deal of the flavour of the interaction of people and organisations. The anger of Barry Hunt at being exposed tends not to be apparent. Dr. Johns showed his frustration and helplessness. Computer Services felt hurt, defensive, angry, frustrated - one of its members
left. I felt as though I trod on ice. I resented the lack of support from Henry Jacques. Smoothing relationships - making them survive, these were the essence of the negotiating and other processes.

The extent of the loss of credibility among laboratory staff by the Computer Services Department is difficult to judge. Dr. Hunt played on this aspect of the situation. In the end, I was playing a mixed role of "honest broker" and effective "undercover manager" of the operation. Both roles should have been handled by Computer Services. The fall back position for Management Services Division, i.e. the existence of a second Region which could supply a Delta system, in the face of initial disaster was fortuitous. On the whole, Computer Services did not deserve a second chance, not because of the mistake, but because of their subsequent attitude and failure to accept responsibility. If Computer Services do not support an NHS built package in the long run, it will cost Region a great deal of money. And yet their ability to fulfil that major role in such the long term is in jeopardy because of this set of encounters.

Subtheme 3 - the entry of another possible supplier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14 April</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dr Hunt on phone about Orion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Dr Hunt says Orion or National are preferred to London Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Memo to Henry Jacques. Orion is floated as an alternative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Orion put forward first hardware proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 June</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>I try to avoid Barry who is only trying to fix Limpton visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>14/15 June</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Visit to Limpton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Barry Hunt's comment on RSO from Region 7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Subtheme 3 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Meet Barry in corridor after the visit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>GG pushing Orion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>GG accused of jumping to conclusions re Orion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>GG attacked by Computer Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>GG and Martin on the train.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Tony Peers told of my Orion intention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Harry Peters tries to make local capital out of Avon interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Acting RA David raises co-operation with Region 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 Aug</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Head Office tells Avon about Limpton position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11 Sept</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Boles goes to Cambridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Meet Tony in West Area, go to Hillbury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>11 Oct</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>Letter to Region 4 asking their Delta philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>20 Oct</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>Region 4 reply to 11 Oct letter on co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Visit to Region 4 about co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>3 Nov</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>Visit to Hillbury. Letter from Orion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Analysis of subtheme 3

It is not clear why Orion were not in the competition to supply a system right from the start. I was told that it was because they had not get a laboratory system to offer. There was an element of truth in this but it was wellknown that they were working in Limpton on the transfer of Alpha laboratory system and that they were being supported by Head Office. It was I who decided that Orion must be involved in this contract. I had known Orion from my own project days, when they were somewhat unlucky not to obtain a major contract from me. My main reasons for wanting them in was that they...
are a big company in comparison with the other British company and they were being backed by Head Office. Moreover, the Limpton work had Regional support. It was much better to have a Regional backing than any other sort of backing in the NHS. Most other projects were being done at District level with no Regional commitment whatsoever.

Once it had been made plain that I intended to get involved with Orion, the reaction of the Computer Services Department died down. No helpful comments about Orion were ever made. Various types of sniping continued concerning, for example, Orion's Cambridge demonstration, the very small faults which could be picked up from the Limpton visit and the way in which I was thought to be jumping on that particular band wagon too quickly. These reactions became more muted as time passed and the only really vicious attack occurred during my early meeting with my own Computer Services, following the rejection of London Company (see para. 125 of diary). However, I was told on several occasions that the Orion affair was mine and that was not meant in a particularly kindly way.

There were only two attempts to get Orion to tell us about the work which was being done in Limpton. One was the visit to Limpton and the other was their visit to us. The Limpton visit lasted two days and it was eventful in terms of reactions between people. During that visit, I established my right among Pathologists, among my own people and with Limpton, to question actions and to have a major say in this decision. This questioning was done on a technical level on purpose. I also spent a great deal of time talking to people on trains and trying to get them to change their attitude. One of my major preoccupations was to try to get the Company itself to take the work sufficiently seriously. They had been involved with the NHS in other matters and had
decided that it was much too complex a way of making a living. But there
must be something like a hundred laboratories who want systems costing
between £30,000 and £100,000 and this is a big market for any company.
However, it was only with reluctance that they eventually decided to put their
own people onto the transfer of the complete Alpha and the sale of it to that
market.

The attempt to get this work launched on an inter-Regional basis has been
a failure. Region 4 were exceedingly wary about getting involved and
becoming responsible for anything outside their own Region. This was in the
wake of their bad experience as Centre of Responsibility for another large
system for the whole country. This may be understandable but it appears to be
typical of the NHS that having encountered problems of inter-Regional co­
operation, no attempts were made to solve the problem. Instead, regions
retreat to much surer ground. It is a pity that Region 7 based near to us
appears to be so much further behind in laboratory computing. Co-operation
based, say, on a centre in Hillbury, would have been to both of our advantages.
The negotiation of such an arrangement with Region 7 was not helped by the
attitude of both Regional Computer Services Officers who decided to get
embroiled in the detail rather than settle the principle of co-operation at a very
early stage. In my view, unless one can build up an adequate relationship before
you start exploring problems, which I admit exist, then those problems will
appear to be overwhelming.

Once again the whole of this subtheme is full of reactions between people.
I was continuously negotiating to get the various main actors to accept Orion
and to go along with that Company. Oiling the works included long periods of
talking with Dr. Hunt, talking over the 'phone with Harry Rees and making re-
assuring noises, becoming involved with Head Office and making sure that their people were happy with the approaches which were being made, trying to get the Pathologists like Peter Hills and John Jarratt amenable to the suggestion that Orion was a suitable supplier for the main machine. It is significant that the Orion affair had an honest broker/negotiator in the middle of it right from the start. Of course the trying time for Orion has not come, namely, the delivery of a system. But everyone is being fairly co-operative and are willing to give them the benefit of their doubts. The odd thing is that, unlike London Company, which were regarded as an outsider in this particular work, Orion is not being regarded in this light. And yet it is a fact that Orion have never put a system into a laboratory. This acceptance of Orion is perhaps one of the most significant differences between the Orion and the Delta and National experiences. The main person with whom I have worked, who was left out of other negotiations, was Dr. Hunt. It could be that his power is such that the former two courses of action would inevitably lead to trouble in the long run for this reason.

Subtheme 4 - an experiment in transferring systems

Subtheme 4 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Visit to London Teaching Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>I tell Barry and Martin that Alpha must be supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>May/June</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>John Jarratt wants Alpha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>At Scientific Committee I tell John Jarratt that he is about to perform a miracle, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Barry Hunt asks for help for Sleeton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>RTO accept transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>I talk to Martin about Orion on train.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>Martin told that JJ is trying for a miracle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Subtheme 4 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Dr Jarratt told Yes to transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12 July</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>I ask for Tony Peers' comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Dr Jarratt tells Barry that Wood agrees to transfer. I warn Barry of difficulties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>I try to amend Scientific Committee Minutes to get more accurate version of what I said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>21 July</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Various hustles over transfer letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>Letter to High Robins goes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>Robins accepts transfer terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>25 Sept</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Woodbury Costs - a discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>27 Sept</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>Barry Hunt lays down law on scientific equipment to High Robins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1 Nov</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Wood reassures John Jarratt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>John Jarratt will take Alpha as it stands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>20 Nov</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>John Jarratt after Paddy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>Woodbury - a discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>22 Nov</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>Visit Sleeton about transfer by Dr Hunt and GG.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis of subtheme 4**

Dr. Jarratt in Sleeton had separated from Alpha a long time ago. He had accepted, somewhat reluctantly, the help offered by Computer Services and his own Phase 1 system was now available. Why then did the transfer of Alpha to Sleeton become a major active issue? There is little doubt that once Dr. Jarratt had seen Alpha in London, he would want it. It was better than his own system. He knew that his own equipment had still got a life of several years and so, even if he did become eligible for the Regional system eventually, he had a long time to wait. Once Dr. Jarratt had started down the road of getting the Alpha system transferred to him, it was inevitable that he would use every
means within his power to achieve this. A convenient rationalisation by Dr. Hunt that a Sleeton transfer would help to convince the other Pathologists of the value of Alpha. Dr. Hunt's statement that there was nothing to be lost by the transfer was not necessarily correct but it did avoid fights, it did keep him in with Dr. Jarratt, and it did serve other sub-objectives which he had. Early on, I was giving public warnings, warnings to Martin Williams, warnings to Barry Hunt, warnings to everyone that the transfer would cause problems. Despite such warnings, it is doubtful whether the management teams would have deliberately said 'No' to this transfer. Being as generous as possible about the process of rationalisation, one is forced to the conclusion that Dr. Jarratt's wish to have that system was the driving force behind the transfer.

The way in which Dr. Hunt and I attempted to tie up in writing the terms of the transfer from Wood's laboratory to Sleeton was very interesting. The letter is the only attempt that I am aware of to tie up all of the small details and to make sure that the District and Dr. Jarratt understood quite clearly our reaction to the transfer. Region did supply a small amount of money to oil the works but our basic attitude was to stand off. In my view, the transfer was never possible without adequate Computer Services Department support and we were not in a position to give that. There really was very little that we could do which would have influenced the support available from Wood. It never was possible for Wood to actually support the transfer in the way that would be required. There was no inducement which we could have offered in any case. In a sense, the letters which attempted to tie up the deal, were a protection mechanism for the Region against the inevitable difficulties which would be encountered.

As the transfer proceeded, it is interesting to note the difference between
Dr. Jarratt and the Ralton Delta situation. Dr. Jarratt started off with all sorts of little things which he would like to have done to the Alpha system to tailor it to his laboratory. At the end of the day when it was clear that he could have only small things which were absolutely vital, he was willing to give way all along the line, if it made the transfer possible. No sticking out for this, that and the other. That could all be negotiated later. Although outside the timescale of my diary, Dr. Jarratt did get all his changes made.

When in fact the miracle transfer by Wood did not materialise and the troubles and misfortunes started to appear, very, very much later than the original completion date, all sorts of interesting things could be observed. Dr. Jarratt was almost frantic to get help that would enable him to get the transfer going. Help from Computer Services Department, which he had rejected a little while earlier, was necessary and he fought to get that support. When it was becoming apparent to Dr. Jarratt that Wood really couldn't support this transfer, despite his wish to do so, I had to make sure that no untoward foolish action was taken because Wood is essential to my longer term development of Alpha in the Region. I believe that the development of Alpha over the next few years depends on Wood and I could not afford to have Dr. Hunt or Dr. Jarratt denouncing Wood in public or even saying uncharitable things about him in private. If Wood could have helped with the Sleeton transfer, he would probably have been delighted to do so, but he does not have the resources. The only possible way of oiling those particular works was to support a deal between Wood and Head Office to get additional money to either pay his existing staff a little more or to get another person into Wood's laboratory and this I attempted to do. I failed.

During the whole of this process and indeed ever since I became involved
in laboratory computing, Dr. Jarratt has, on a number of occasions, introduced
into the discussion a version of Alpha called Socsys. It is claimed that this is
fully documented and easily transferred. There is little point in discussing
Socsys at length but it is interesting to note that Dr. Jarratt was desperate to
get something into his laboratory which would put him back with the leaders of
developments in laboratory information. Socsys, if he could have got that,
would have been acceptable. How that situation develops in the long run and
how Region deals with Dr. Jarratt's wishes and needs will be interesting.

There was slightly more District Management Team involvement in this
part of the laboratory exercise than was the case in other parts. There are two
main reasons for this, namely, that Region insisted on negotiating the terms of
the transfer with the District and not with Dr. Jarratt and, that Region
succeeded in overcharging the District in the middle of the exercise. This
completely irrelevant action provoked infinitely more interest on District's part
than any of the major issues concerned with laboratory computing policy in the
Region. In any negotiation, it is quite difficult to keep attention focussed on
what we regard as the main issue.

The contrast between Dr. Jarratt's attitude of wanting to get hold of
Alpha almost at any price and the Ralton attitude is very interesting. If the
Alpha transfer occurs it is Dr. Jarratt's attitudes which will force it through,
despite his management team's inaction in the long term.
Subtheme 5 - other activities

Subtheme 5 Synopsis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Theme Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diary Ref.</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dr Hunt tries to get me involved in a big way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dr Hunt gunning for Computer Services about Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>John Jarratt trying to get Phase 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Off stage noises from Head Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Martin and Barry getting irate with Head Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Try to get Henry Jacques involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Try to get Henry Jacques involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Still try to get Henry Jacques involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>General comment on my feelings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14/15 June</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Limpton visit and general comment on people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>The Socsys system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Tony Peers does not like my interference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Barry Hunt wants John Jarratt in Regional decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>An example of the many sided conversations going on incessantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>AIC enter the arena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>AIC writes in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>An example of Computer Services histronics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>John Jarratt trying to get unusable SK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Salton pathologist, and Boles go to Region 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>Woodbury overcharging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>12 Sept</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>Dr Hunt and I agree to get Region 6 to support Alpha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Hillbury visit about Alpha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>21 Sept</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>Head Office register of laboratory computing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>21 Sept</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>Dr Hunt - secret visit of AIC to Salton.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of subtheme 5

In a complex exercise such as the laboratory project, a multitude of small sideshows are being staged all of the time. This subtheme is an attempt to
gather together some of the more interesting of them.

In the examination of the main themes detailed earlier in this thesis, it is very easy to overlook the inter-action between the main players. Dr. Hunt and I spent a considerable amount of time in each other's offices doing deals. Some of those deals were done at almost frantic speed, such as the need to stop John Jarratt doing anything specific when he thought that Wood would not support his transfer. Other inter-actions with senior officers were in fact complete failures, such as the attempts to get the RTO to take an intelligent interest in the work and to intervene in certain basic decisions. Many inter-actions were full of acrimony such as those between Computer Services and myself. I carried on despite their objections, not with the support of that team. Although Head Office were quiet bystanders once their Sleeton project had died, I was very careful to keep them involved and, if anything, my relationship with Head Office Senior Executive Officer has become much stronger.

Although the diary does not show it, I have used our own Specialist in Community Medicine as a sounding board and someone with whom I could discuss privately most of these developments. In the same way, you can observe Barry Hunt talking to people like John Jarratt and the Salton Pathologists quietly and secretly and trying to get the decisions and attitudes accepted widely. I spent a long time one morning on the 'phone to the Pathologist in Limpton making soothing noises when he thought that everything was going wrong. He obviously had his own furrow to plough and needed us to make capital locally. Although not a major influence, both the Regional Scientific Officer and the Regional Computer Services Officer from Region 7, helped to form the attitudes of Barry Hunt and myself. It is clear from the record that train journeys played an important part in the inter-personnel
contacts which occurred. It would be wrong to underestimate the effect of these journeys on the views of the people involved.

It was almost inevitable that the Pathologists themselves should "drag in" various versions of solutions which they thought might work. AIC was an example, a foreign company from the Continent was another and so on. By far the most important one must have been the manufacturer of laboratory equipment - American Instruments. The intervention from American Instruments was used in a variety of ways. At one stage, Dr. Hunt was using their intervention as an "answer to a maiden's prayer" to provide a system that would be used in due course. It was used as a threat to Computer Services as being a demonstration that there were organisations that could do Dr. Hunt's will. I used their involvement to extract from the Company a very complete picture of the financial consequences of not doing the project properly ourselves. The Pathologists used them as an example of "goodness and purity and wellbeing" to which we should all aspire and, in particular, a means of attacking the "would be suppliers" namely, the Computer Services. These other parts of the project illustrate its complexity.

Although not recorded in the diary, Barry Hunt was always seeking to involve his colleagues, especially in some sort of private committee decision. Sometime in the future, he has got to go to the Regional Scientific Committee and get them to agree a proposal for a Regional system. I am quite sure that he works quietly on this sort of issue most of the time in private meetings with Pathologists and in their sub-committees. There must be a whole network of contacts which have been established over the years between the Pathologists and which are being used almost continuously. That network exists not only within the Region but on the national level as well. The meetings of Chemical
Pathologists to discuss their own particular interests cannot be completely filled with the scientific papers which are the official substance of the meeting. There must be many other nets of information which are being used in major and minor ways on this particular subject. I feel sure that the manufacturers, for example, are talking to Head Office in ways which are not known outside Head Office. Therefore, the picture which is being drawn in all of the subtheme analyses is a very partial one. It is probably completely impossible to paint that total picture. Equally the interpretation of the actions which take place, must be very peculiar to the people who must interpret them in their immediate local situation. All of those must in fact be subthemes in the total picture of laboratory automation in the Region. Most of them are completely 'off stage' but it would be quite wrong not to acknowledge their existence.

Summary

Despite the complexity of the analysis into subthemes, the actual muddle is represented more satisfactorily by the diary. The extent to which the project was steered by rational decision as opposed to other negotiating positions and factors cannot be determined. It is certain that the strands of the project which became the subthemes were not preplanned but evolved. No one could have predicted even the rough course which the project would follow at its inception.

Another major feature of the analysis is that it demonstrates the involvement of management services in the project process. Any suggestion that management services played a detached, advisory role is obviously untrue. Even within management services, radically different positions were taken up and held to tenaciously.
In the end, a negotiated way forward was followed. The extent to which that way forward was the "best" whatever that means leaves much room for debate.

In this chapter, the second part of the developed version of Model 6 - The Corporate Activist - has been described. Models 1-5 in Chapter 2 suggest that projects have simple objectives which are pursued in a fairly rational way. This chapter shows that complexity not simplicity is the characteristic feature of the objectives of a project. In addition, the method by which a project moves forward is by complex negotiation, not necessarily rational decision making.

In Chapter 7, a general version of the lessons of this chapter will be put forward alongside the general characteristics of the categories derived from Chapter 5. These will be the two parts of the developed version of the Corporate Activist Model first described briefly as Model 6 in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 7 - A DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPORATE ACTIVIST MODEL
BASED ON THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Introduction

In Chapters 5 and 6, aspects of my work as an RMSO are investigated and analysed. The purpose of those analyses of my actual activities was to relate them to the models of Management Services activities described in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, model 6, known as the Corporate Activist, was described in general terms. The purpose of this chapter is to use the results concerned with the actual activities of an RMSO from Chapters 5 and 6 to fill out the description of the Corporate Activist and to obtain a better understanding of the way in which an RMSO acts out this role.

This thesis does not claim to investigate fully the Corporate Activist model because that is too complex a task. This thesis attempts to define an overall set of event categories in order to describe the model from a wide point of view. It then shows for one project, the Laboratory Case study, how such events fit together. In this chapter, an attempt is made to take both these case studies and to generalise the lesson which they contain. Some of the material contained in Chapters 5 and 6 will be repeated but this seems necessary if a balanced and complete picture of the role is to be presented.

Chapter 5 analysed a large proportion of the total activity of the Regional Management Services Officer over a period of fifteen months into events and gave those events categories. Those categories were developed by examining the recorded events and trying to use the ideas of the Discovery of Grounded Theory to develop categories which definitely reflected the character of the data rather than being preconceived. Given that the original categories were
grounded in this way, the next step should be to generalise the properties of the categories.

Category groups and extensions

The first important point about the categories is that they seem to fall into groups. It was possible to recognise three groups of these categories:

- creative management,
- managing project work,

and
- rescue management.

Part of the analysis was to identify events which did not fit easily into categories as they developed during the analysis. In the latter part of Chapter 5 these events without categories were later recognised as falling into the following groups:

- administration of the Division and working the RHA/NHS management system,
- dealing with a high level of frustration,
- defending the division,
- watching helplessly,
- counselling,

and
- helping other parts of the NHS.

It is possible to argue that these new activities with the exception of watching helplessly, fall easily into one of the three main divisions of categories identified above, namely, managing project work. "Watching helplessly" could be thought of as being related to the passive element in rescue management in which very little can actually be done by myself.
The basic twelve categories are very different in nature. In particular, the creative management group tend to be less well defined than the rest of the categories. This accords with the intrinsic nature of creative management.

The definition and general characteristics of the twelve categories

**Category 1 - Create - General Characteristics**

- New idea required
  - create or import a new idea
  - extend existing ideas
  - extend and juggle parts of existing ideas
- New patterns of work and organisation required
  - examine and change boundaries
  - consider patterns of work and people
  - fit problems to resources
- Consider the reaction to a change

Having a new idea is much more likely if an organisation seems to want its officers to do new things. The actual process of having new ideas and using them is difficult to define. It is rarely having brand new thoughts but is much more likely to be the recognition of a justaposition of problems, situations and old solutions or ones available from elsewhere which make it possible to do something new. A major characteristic of creative thinking is to put together a new situation in which the natural aptitudes and energy of people can be released and activities transformed. Attempts have been made to describe this process in the literature, for example, D A Schon (1978). A major part of "create" is concerned with the stage beyond actually having the glimmer of an idea and "create" is mainly about how the idea gets developed. The "create" process considers implementation at an early stage and it begins to consider the feasibility of a plan which will bring about the new situation.
The first feature listed above in the general characteristics of the category is anticipation. Anticipation must be applied both to what can go right as well as what can go wrong. Attempting to anticipate the relationship that people and different parts of the organisation will develop towards a new initiative is demanding. What other people will see as relevant to the issue or important to get right will not correspond in all cases with one's own views. What they see will depend on their own value systems and past experience and usually these are not well understood by other people. At the least, anticipating incorrectly and acting accordingly makes corrective action necessary and can make progress impossible.

For an idea to have a chance to work, the way in which it is launched must be thought out carefully and that launch must be executed efficiently. It is usual to start to build up a power base of people who are in sympathy with the new development fairly early in the life of the idea. Later in this chapter it will be maintained that objectives and the way forward in a project are being changed all the time. If the project is to move off in approximately the right direction it must get powerful backers early in its life. Negotiating agreements about support will come early in the launch process and creative thinking must include how that will be done. The nature of that initial power base and its probable influence on the directions in which the project might be diverted need consideration. This initial support has got to be stable in the early life of a project. Consideration of influences of this type must surround the initial launch of the idea.

Apart from mounting a power base consisting of supporters it is also necessary to think out the organisational aspects of the launch. Getting it accepted by the various groups in the organisation, taking account of their
relative power must be thought out. There are different ways of launching ideas organisationally, and the consequences of each must be at least appreciated even if one cannot always use the route which one would prefer.

At a fairly early stage in the launch, one wishes to see the idea rolling forward with organisational and personal backing which will ensure its continued existence. It is helpful if the idea has been adopted generally throughout the organisation and continuing personal "ownership" of it by myself is often a bad sign. It is inevitable that, during that process of adoption by the organisation, compromises will be made and some of those will be more acceptable than others. The anticipation of the results of all these compromises constitutes the major part of creative thinking and this should influence how the idea ought to be launched.

Category 2 - Learning - General Characteristics

Conventional learning -
seven such events are recorded, most concerned with the politics of organisations

People in situations
how people fight the system
know how others do things
seek personal knowledge from a respected person
watch personal performances and different styles
observe the use of power
learn to anticipate reactions by watching them happen
watch people produce their own funny logic
watch people duck apologetically when they do not like something
watch people deal with something they do not like
liaise with an opposite value system and recognising it
compare different feedbacks from same situation
learn how individuals react to others
size up someone
learn about your friends and establish mutual respect and sympathy
learn about quirks

Gathering intelligence

Intelligence - pick up gossip and scraps of information
learn in a talk about something big
learn about a disaster
get intelligence and feedback

Becoming wise

seek wise counsel
absorb a wise saying
recognise and learn the nature of a pointed question
learn to recognise danger in its many forms
take lessons about things you missed
Category 2 - Learning - General Characteristics

Learning background and history

learn a historical background to a situation and its formative influences

Absorbing group behaviour

observe the use of power
learn to anticipate reactions by watching them happen
watch power group behaviour and learn to know what they might do to you
pick up an illuminating bit of history
watch ruthless use of power to gain one's own end - people + group
watch the authority playing with an issue outcome uncertain
watch a group deal with an issue
watch a group
watch a group act

The analysis of learning in Chapter 5 identified four parts of it:

- personal learning
- learning about people
- learning about the organisation
and - learning about the work being done.

There are many ways of looking at learning. Another possible grouping of the learning activity is given in the above table. The view put forward in the table is based on the need to know what is going on throughout the organisation and is very important. Having such knowledge and being able to use it has advantages. To be available for use, such knowledge needs to have been carefully sifted so as to provide to its user well understood ways of viewing events. Knowledge which has not been systematised in this way tends to be less useful. Much learning is concerned with the progress of project work. Knowing what has been accomplished both within your own and other Divisions may seem an obvious requirement but it can be difficult to acquire such knowledge. The different interpretations of what has been accomplished
require careful sieving if a suitable way forward is to be found. It may not be politic to press one's own view of the progress made but it is vital to know what you believe the situation to be.

The groups of learning types contained in the above table can be used more widely than just learning about work progress. They apply to learning about people and the organisation equally well. For instance, gathering intelligence about people's attitudes towards issues in general is a crucial activity for a senior manager. It can affect all of his activities. The major groupings in the table are not a correction of that suggested in Chapter 5 and quoted above. They are an equally valid alternative way of understanding the complex phenomenon of learning.

Personal learning from books and various other sources of a similar type is a straightforward activity. It is worth recording that the range of learning from these sources which a senior manager thinks worthwhile varies enormously. I think that my senior managers should be more concerned with "wisdom" literature rather than technique. It is difficult to identify what is worth reading and building into a systematic body of knowledge which can be used by a senior manager since the range of such literature is enormous. More and more I prefer to read autobiographical and other records of the practice of senior managers. It may be that this is an important choice in relation to the type of Division which I wish to create because this variety of knowledge does affect my view of the ideal.

Learning about people by gathering intelligence, knowing the background and analysing their behaviour becomes almost automatic. The scene is always changing and so is one's prediction of people's behaviour. The forces acting on individuals develop, vary from situation to situation and determine to a very
large extent the range of action which which the other person can take. It is necessary to have up-to-date information in these fields. The whole process of project negotiation is heavily dependent on that understanding.

Category 3 - Ethos - General Characteristics

Note: The order in this table moves from the use of gentle persuasion to forceful action.

- flying kites
- making management services better known as a set of people whose help can be sought
- talk to nurses to persuade them to change their attitudes towards change work on Regional Administrator's understanding of issues
- appreciate what can be countenanced
- trying to uplift the sights of my own staff
- try to improve customer relations
- agree arrangements privately so that computing has a brighter future
- change the nature of RHA business
- establish sets of principles to guide NHS work in computing
- ease in "new" planning methods then transfer into other division
- slide in a new set of methods in another division
- discuss how to get in new developments in the organisation
- getting resources switched
- push for tougher national project management
- attacking the anti-specialist forces (training and development of staff)

Ethos is about the fundamental nature of an organisation, its culture and what is possible within that culture. The major property of an event which has been given the ethos category is that it should change that culture so that more things become possible and things which were unthinkable at some stage become more acceptable. In this thesis, ethos change is concerned primarily with transforming the acceptability of management services methods throughout the RHA.

The above table contains a list of the characteristics of activities which have been put into the ethos category in their general forms. On the whole, changing the nature of an organisation like the RHA occurs fairly slowly and gradually but is nevertheless an activity which I have pursued relentlessly. But a gradual change is not always appropriate or what happens. The above table is arranged so that the first entries rely on persuasion while the last ones concern
direct conflict aimed at destroying activities which would militate against the RHA accepting management services. The nature of activities in the central portion of the table is different from those at either end. These activities are concerned with bringing suggested changes to fruition and pressing home gently those things which have been agreed or achieved. These activities in the middle of the table rely for the greater part on project work being completed successfully and the broader lessons being drawn from these changes. Thus, not only were new planning methods made effective in the RHA but they are made quite definitely the property of the receiving Division and real intellectual and managerial responsibility for them was passed over to that Division. At the bottom of the table, the activities concerned with the creation of ethos are definitely defensive and active in character. For example, attacking the anti-specialist forces refers to the conflict with general administrators over the way in which the organisation should view management services people from a training, recruitment and advancement viewpoint. This was a conflict situation in which views which would have diminished the acceptance of management services were being attacked. There was no other way of dealing with this situation other than to attack.

Category 4 - Relate - General Characteristics

ongoing difficult situations  
pin down people  
stop a power gain by individuals  
obtaining mutual understanding of positions on an issue  
try to get chief officer commitment (work programmes and monitoring)  
negotiate how to play difficult situations  
become accepted by listening  
try to understand a person  
try to talk about motivation, etc - the deep things  
have fun and be human  
get a decision  
be sympathetic and helpful if possible  
encouraging and advising someone  
get someone to use their power  
agree to an alliance  
switch off  
suppress aggravation  
use an alliance  
conspire to do something  
persuade someone to use his power  
fight for a project
Category 4 - Relate - General Characteristics

fix a decision
negotiate with friendly colleagues
a typical weak meeting
try to convert someone
conclude the agreement
an action agreed
make specific work agreements
bite back resentment and frustration
feedback all sorts of things to subordinates
have fun
behave reasonably despite bitterly resented interference
talk a group on our side
feel personal hurt
get driven to extremes
get a work proposal accepted
encourage and/or command subordinates
order a set of actions
try desperately to change someone's course
agree major action in private
keep cool in the face of provocation
patch up a situation
acting as a sophisticated post box
doing a routine
agree work
set up a complex deal on work
carry through a designed first meeting
react to someone's friendliness
react against interference
establish personal contact
dealing with difficult topics
meet new groups and individuals
agree a course of action

This attempt to define "relate" more accurately must be difficult. The variety of circumstances in which a senior manager must act is large and the relationships which will develop in those circumstances vary enormously. The type of relationship which he must build up with customers, other people, and with groups depends on the individual circumstance.

In the above table, the events recorded and given the category "relate" are taken individually and a general statement about how they come to be categorised as "relate" is made. It has not been possible to produce these generalisations in a particularly systematic way and there does not appear to be any helpful suggestions in the literature. I have generated these characteristics by thinking of the type of event which I believe occurs fairly often in my work and which is similar to the particular event. This general characteristic should reflect the essence of that event.
Given these generalisations I thought that a pattern would emerge which would allow me to group the characteristics in a similar way to previous categories. This did not happen and so the analysis of general characteristics has taken a different form. In the paragraphs below, I have attempted to identify the main features of the general characteristics. They are somewhat arbitrary and other people may choose other features as being more important.

An obvious feature of these characteristics is that they split between relating to individual people and relating to groups of people. The relationship with a group depends, among other things, on the nature of the group and purpose for which it meets. Within those groups are individuals with whom individual relationships exist and so there is an overlap between relationships with people and relationships with groups. The relationships with a group tend to have many more formal characteristics than those which exist with people.

The time over which a relationship exists influences its general characteristics. Passing contact with either an individual or a group makes very different demands from those which are 'on going' contacts which will have to be sustained possibly over many years. For both friendships and fights, there is a difference between those which are part of a continuing relationship and those which are not. Some sort of an accommodation between the parties must be found or will emerge in a continuing relationship.

The word 'Relating' suggests a positive relationship. Many management scientists would argue that it is necessary to have reasonably good relationships with people if change is to happen. But it would be wrong to idealise situations or to pretend that it is always possible or necessary to "get on well" with people who are involved in project work. Relationships vary from those which are
completely aggressive and destructive to those which are extremely helpful and constructive. Although most people would tend to be courteous on most occasions, that should not be mistaken as a commitment on their part to have positive relationships with oneself all of the time. The ability to deal with many types of relationship must be characteristic of a senior manager. In the majority of cases, a manager must be relatively indifferent towards any contact which is occurring since they will have very little effect on the work which he actually does.

One of the more useful scales for categorising a relationship is the amount of ease with which it is being conducted. This scale starts with the very easy going cases and moves through normal contacts into those which are getting difficult and on still further to those which must be regarded as being distinctly aggressive. It is a mistake to automatically connect the relationships which are difficult or aggressive with ones which are less productive. It is often the case that when a big issue is being resolved, difficulties are unavoidable. When a major policy switch is occurring and values are being challenged, acrimony will occur. The total range of this particular scale must be accepted by managers.

A feature of any relationship is the degree of purpose which it possesses. A large proportion of attempts to relate to people or groups concern agreements to do specific pieces of work. But some events are concerned only with cementing an on-going human relationship. For instance, it is important to maintain a friendship and one of the ways of maintaining relationships which are fundamentally good is the simple process of having fun. People relate much more easily to individuals who have got human characteristics and human faults as well, as long as those faults do not hinder purposeful activity. These
are two of the many aspects of just being human in a relationship. The purposefulness of any relationship will be on the same sort of scale as that described above in relation to the amount of aggression present.

Purpose in an event can also be related to events outside project work, e.g. obtaining agreement to a deal of some type, say about training. The importance of the subject matter of the event influences participants' commitment to the meeting. This depends on the individuals' values and it is often the case that participants show different levels of commitment to an interchange. Circumstances may be such that particular individuals "switch off" completely. Either they are simply paying no attention and are not bothered about the outcome, or they have decided that their disagreement with the main trend of the discussion is such that they wish to disassociate themselves from it. Often, they do this literally by switching off. Recognising the state of commitment among a group of people at any time can be very important and can determine whether or not it is useful to progress to another stage in the development of an idea or subject.

An adequate definition of establishing relationships in a senior management role would require more intense research than has been possible in this thesis. However, it has been possible to show that the creation and maintenance of relationships is a part of the top management function of a change agent which must be cultivated.

Category 5 - Big - General Characteristics

- Pre-planning
  - obtain essential background understanding
  - negotiate high level cooperation
  - try to get agreement on a vision of the future
  - try to impose order on a huge set of projects by national negotiation
  - create the right framework for a big project
  - negotiate the launch of a big project
  - get the right resources
  - get into a position of power
  - fix high level support by negotiation

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Category 5 - Big - General Characteristics

- Get an idea accepted
- Carefully separate out the important parts of work
- Try to get main consequences accepted early on
- Try to relate the project to vision, etc - a wider context
- Get into places of influence
- Get resources
- Form alliances to remove difficult obstacles

Launching

- Push for a particular course of action against the odds
- Negotiate for your view
- Fix the first meeting of an important group
- Smooth the way, especially initially
- Pre-plan and negotiate the launch
- Negotiate the plan
- Don't miss things - watch meetings
- Fight for a project
- Use the agreed machinery competently
- Negotiate for your view of things
- Fix things nationally
- Join in important meetings to maintain influence
- Launch the idea
- Negotiate the big change
- Fix specific issues by person to person negotiation
- Fix important event timetables and monitor them
- Get the projects through the management system
- Clear the ground with important people
- Fix details
- Use powerful people
- Fight for the project
- Fix group meetings
- Use the management system properly
- Negotiate with chief officers
- Negotiate the launch
- Control your own resources

Ensure its survival

- Cope with a crisis
- Try to ward off foolish interference
- Keep big projects on track
- Care for large projects and defend them especially in their early life
- Push for corrective action if things go wrong
- Rewrite agreed documents

A constant cry from management services people and change agents in general is that they are not allowed to do the really important work. Those processes by which management services divisions get such work and undertake it are therefore important. Before one can expect to be given important work, a Division must become recognised as creative thinkers and people who can contribute to 'big' projects. In the definition of the first two categories, create and ethos, some of the characteristics of creating new possibilities and putting together an environment in which ideas will survive have been explored. Those
two activities form the essential atmosphere within which 'big' projects exist. Another important feature of 'big' projects for the customer is that they remain practical. It is not easy to maintain the practicality of project work and yet ensure that both the vision which inspires the project remains in tact and the heights to which it aspires are demanding. These factors influence the parent organisation when it is deciding whether or not the project officers are people who can be trusted with the future of the organisation to any great extent. The degree of confidence which the parent organisation has in the change agent determines whether or not 'big' projects are given to it.

The event listing has been split into three groups, pre-planning, launching the project and ensuring its continued survival. These general groupings are those which one might associate with any project. One of the differences for a 'big' project is the degree of challenge which it will probably meet during these stages. If the 'big' project has been chosen wisely, then it will be a challenge to the existing order and that challenge will almost certainly involve some top level personnel who will have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. The status quo will be the world that they have created over the years and they will wish to see it survive. Since such people are involved, this means that for 'big' projects, the power which interested parties have is of a different order to that which will be present when the project is less important. People will use that power and will block developments if they think it right to do so. Equally, that power could be used to persue someone's own ends. Much of the work in 'big' projects is concerned with the negotiation with senior people who have got power to either facilitate the progress of the projects or to bring it to a halt. Of the three groups of general characteristics, I believe that the launch is the most vulnerable to these interventions. Pre-planning and ensuring its survival
can be done by covert negotiating. But, "going public" for the first time, i.e. the launch, is an event which is bound to attract the attention of opponents. If they can do so, the project will be killed at that time.

It is not possible to encapsulate all of the ideas which are contained in the above table in a few descriptive phrases. Careful study of these general characteristics does capture many facets of the category 'big'. Most of the characteristics are significant inter-actions with other people and groups. The words negotiate, fight and fix occur frequently. All of these terms represent very active states. Although it does not appear in the analysis as such, a factor in all of these situations is once again the system of values of each party to the negotiation. The negotiation is not about the trivial details of a change, none of which really matter. If the nature of the 'big' project is important, then one is negotiating a change in a way of life and redefining how things ought to be done for the best. Beliefs about such issues are held with tenacity. It is foolish to think that other people's beliefs will be abandoned easily. Any process of persuasion, or fighting if it gets to that stage, can involve a great deal of time and effort.

The category 'big' is concerned with one of the most important parts of the RMSO's job and deserves careful study. The above analysis demonstrates some of its major characteristics but many other nuances of its meaning must exist.

Category 6 - the definition of opportunism

In Chapter 5, two illustrations of opportunistic behaviour exist. It is suggested that there are other occasions on which this type of behaviour occurs, but no evidence is produced. Having studied the evidence in the diary, there
seems to be little material on which to base a table of its general characteristics. However, two remarks do seem to be justified. Opportunism is recognising a pattern of events which turns up unexpectedly and which can be made to serve a purpose different from the original one for which the event is taking place. Secondly, considerable skill and quickwittedness is needed to use an opportunity. In Chapter 5, opportunism is likened to changing tracks on a train journey. Opportunism was likened to making that change to a parallel track at a set of points which suddenly appear and can be used for that purpose. Using the same analogy, the crash can be spectacular if the manoeuvre does not work. Opportunistic behaviour should not be indulged in lightly.

Category 7 - the definition of maintain

In Chapter 5, it is suggested that the evidence contained in the diary is misleading with respect to this category of work. I remain convinced that the activities which are missing from the diary would have at least some of the characteristics suggested for them in Chapter 5 but there is no evidence to present. Therefore it seems best to regard the definition of maintain as not having been illuminated by this research.

Category 8 - Facilitate - General Characteristics

Provide Resources
- provide resources - accommodation
- get resources locally
- get resources nationally
- agree use of resources
- fix the provision of resources

Remove obstacles
- devise a mechanism round an obstacle
- move obstacles
- remove obstacles and interference

Call meetings
- call meetings
Category 8 - Facilitate - General Characteristics

Make agreements
- put together complex deals using position
- meet the right people and agree work programmes
- persuade people to co-operate
- agree that my people can act
- agree that staff in other Divisions will respond
- get people to co-operate

Miscellaneous
- make things move faster
- lend out your own strength or power
- take decisions
- get people to accept nasty facts and to move
- make sure that the management system did operate
- provide a work framework
- get people onto my officers' side
- try to get communications going
- negotiate through national machinery
- inform people of action to be taken

It could be argued that the major function of a senior manager is to make it possible for others to carry out their tasks, i.e. to facilitate their activity. Power to perform this type of act is derived from a variety of sources, but it is generally associated with more senior positions.

The above table does provide an elaboration of the concept and the grouping of the characteristics seem to make sense. It does not seem necessary to do more than note the existence of the first four groups.

The miscellaneous group contains items which are equally as important as any other. All of the summary remarks in the above list seem to add a little to the definition.
Category 9 - Control - General Characteristics

Fix the disposition and work of my own teams
make a decision and order its execution
force direct specific accountability on someone
design a work programme
order the formulation of a project work programme
retrieve misplaced delegated control
design a work programme
agree limits of authority and responsibility
discuss and agree to change customer relationships
sort out a mess
various types of disciplinary action
feed back my perception of a situation
discuss and determine customer relationships

Divisional group meeting to discuss work programmes
impose a decision
summarise and encapsulate a decision
identify and clear up undercurrents
negotiate and decide work boundary issues

Determining customer relationships
force a specific relating act
direct negotiation about facts and possibilities
agree a project timetable
agree responsibilities and liaison arrangements
agree a compromise
set up a type of relationship, especially at the outset

Negative control of work programmes
forcing a recognition of value for money
deciding what information to reveal
stating constraints especially on resources

Negotiation but with real power
agree work programmes
visits to individuals and customer groups
signal important messages
clarify inevitable unpleasant outcomes
fix meetings and their probable outcome

The control of work and disposition of resources is a fundamental part of being a manager. Control can have many shades of meaning depending on the amount of direction or negotiation involved. In attempting to identify the general characteristics of control, the above table groups the activities contained in the diary according to the degree of control and authority which is being exercised. The groups in the table start with those situations in which maximum control is being exerted and move through to positions in which a
great deal of negotiating about what to do is taking place. However, for this particular work category one must remember that even in the weakest negotiating position, there must still be an element of real power, otherwise control is an inappropriate word to use.

The first group of events are those in which I do have specific power and responsibility to exercise my management function. Two such situations exist, namely, those in which I have been given control by the Authority for a specific job and those within my own Division for which I have been given continuous authority and power. The entries in the table are self-explanatory and move from ordering a specific course of action, through situations in which I am determining only that a course of action has been designed, and on to those in which we are attempting to obtain feedback from specific situations in order to try to obtain further action.

The second set are situations in which I work with a group of managers rather than the individual departmental managers in the division. The purpose of the event is controlling part of the work of the Division and making sure that the work moves forward in a co-ordinated fashion. Once again the control moves from a positive forward planning action through to one in which corrective action is being taken by reviewing current situations. An important part of this type of group event is to bring into the open those things which people would prefer not to discuss and to make positive decisions about their resolution.

The design and control of relationships with project customers is the next main group. A great deal of negotiation must occur with customers about the projects which will be done for them. Within that negotiation there must be a recognition of the constraints which exist on both programmes of work and their
timetables. From a control point of view, relationships which are tending to go sour must be identified and specific relating acts must be designed to rectify the situations.

As the amount of authority and control which one has in a given situation lessens, the constraints on the projects must be spelled out more closely to the customer. The next group describes those situations. It is especially important to tell customers about constraints that will definitely prevent the realisation of their wishes if they are not removed. It is also necessary to refuse to undertake work on the basis that it is not worth doing. Such refusals may cause additional problems, but it is clear responsibility of a senior manager to say if this is the case because resources are not being used effectively in such situations.

The last group concerns situations in which one's power and control is severely curtailed. If the situations are still within the control category, residual power still exists. That residual power can be used effectively given care.

All of the control activities are part of a continuum of activities which stretch into the other major categories identified in this thesis. As power diminishes in a given situation, the control category tends to merge with the facilitate category at one end and as control becomes extreme it can merge into the troubleshooting and takeover categories. It is becoming much more difficult for a manager to exercise power in the old fashioned manner, i.e. without excessive regard for other people, and this affects control. It is possible to negotiate one's way into positions of power and for power to be given to you by other people. Such power positions do not rely on the formal one of
your being in a particular position in the managerial hierarchy. Whatever its source the responsible exercise of power is a significant and central part of the role of a management services officer.

Category 10 - Oil the Works - General Characteristics

- reassure individual
- point out advantages
- make it up after a row
- sort out a problem with someone
- discuss boundary disputes
- take part in group activity

The diary does not contain much material in this particular category but I feel that many more events of this type actually occur than are recorded. As a result, I think that the definition of the term 'oil the works' contained in the above table is an inadequate refinement of the original definition.

One comment which is contained and in the analysis in Chapter 5 is worth repeating. The activity of pouring oil on troubled waters is optional and I may or may not decide to act in that way. I will only take trouble to do this when it affects something which is important to me. In most organisations, the relationships between people are somewhere between being very bad and very good. Staff are rarely satisfied completely by their work and they are often confused about its purpose. In most organisations, a level of dissention and acrimony exists in some parts of it most of the time. Despite the fact that I am aware of this situation, as a senior manager I do not feel responsible for alleviating all the troubles of the organisation on a wide scale or inclined to take action. Compared with the amount of oil that could be poured on troubled waters, the amount this is actually poured onto them is relatively small.
Avoidance of trouble

- anticipate its source and form
- line up defence forces, especially people
- try to contain a problem, do not let it spread
- obtain intelligence

Negotiate around trouble

- try to get agreement with troublemakers
- keep dealing with running sores
- sort of a lack of understanding
- sort out muddleheadedness

Attack and eliminate trouble

- bring in support
- eliminate management interference
- fix top level support
- go to right places and people to stop the rot
- take on powerful enemies
- straighten out muddled work instructions
- clarify major objectives
- move someone out of the way

Implementing management services projects within any organisation is complicated. It can be argued that with adequate planning change it should go smoothly. But it does not do so. The extent to which planning can eliminate troubles which arise in a project is debatable and it is not clear that one would be economically justified in seeking to eliminate more than a reasonable proportion of the risks of trouble. It is inevitable that many projects will experience difficulties and management must be prepared to negotiate around the problems which arise. The above table of general characteristics of this troubleshooting activity is in three sections and these are described below.

If one accepts that trouble is bound to arise sometimes, then it is sensible to try and detect the first signs of it and to try to avoid its worse ravages. In some projects, it may be inevitable that the work programme will encounter difficulties and one will have to get around them. In other cases, it is simply generally known that doing projects of a particular type always tend to have to
weather particular sorts of storms. The sources of problems are often well known. It is sensible to try to assess the probability of trouble and to be prepared for it.

Preparing to deal with the trouble, if that is possible, must be followed by actions which will deal with the issues. There are two ways in which this occurs. These are contained in the two parts of the table above concerned with negotiating and eliminating trouble. The negotiating occurs in both of these sections of the table but it is more pronounced in the middle one. The entries in the table are concerned with situations in which it is preferable to try to eliminate whatever is causing the problem in as speedy a way as possible. But inherent in the descriptions are the various uses of different degrees of power discussed earlier.

There is a third category of trouble which comes into existence quickly, cannot be anticipated or prepared for and which has simply got to be dealt with. In this third category, some of the actions are quite straightforward such as sorting out work instructions and clarifying major objectives. The origin of the trouble in these particular circumstances is often the building up of various types of misunderstanding, which seems to be characteristic of most large organisations. But there is a small part of this section of troubleshooting in this part of the table concerned with dealing with enemies, those people who do not have sympathy with our objectives and would wish to see the projects fail and their originators and supporters eliminated. Not all head-on clashes can be avoided and it is the role of a senior manager to deal with issues of this type effectively.
The implications of the laboratory project

In the above paragraphs, the original definitions of the categories of activity have been expanded using evidence from the first case study. The events which can be given categories in this way are discreet and have been taken out of context. In order to form a change agent activity, they must form part of a more coherent, larger activity put together to pursue a given management objective. One such activity is the Laboratory Project described in Chapter 6. In that context, it is maintained in this thesis that a possible key to understanding this mixture of smaller events is the set of negotiations which occur to decide what the next project steps shall be. In the next section of this chapter, the Chapter 6 case study will be used to illustrate this process of negotiating order and the factors which seem to influence that negotiation.

However, before considering this further analysis of Chapter 6, it is useful to relate the analysis of Chapter 5 above to the model discussed for OR in Chapter 2. In crude terms, the OR model was "let us negotiate with our customer and determine the more desirable state to which he wants to move and then, let us find a way to get there". Suppose that we equate the joint discovery of a more desirable state with category 1 to 5 activities and categories 5 to 11 plus the unclassified ones with getting there. The interventions connected with 'big', category 5, are often associated with fashioning the objective and pursuing it at the same time and so the above overlap is necessary. For instance, altering the nature of the 1979 Objectives did not preclude work on those objectives. Even if the new OR model is roughly correct, then the process by which it is operated must be much more complicated than appears to be suggested in existing papers. Putting together a rational plan and following it, whether that plan be made by optimising
algorithms, heuristic sensible methods or just plain agreements does not correspond in any way to the processes described in the diary. Thus, although we can supplement the above OR model by the categories, the definition of the process of running projects is still weak.

Conceptually, order is preceded by chaos and the negotiating process referred to above concerns the change from one to the other. Although the relative degrees of each which exist in any management situation change and although managers will have different perceptions of what is chaos and what is order, to effect a change from less to a more desirable state of affairs from their point of view will be the objective of most participants in a negotiation. Before commenting on this process further, it is worth noting that the concept of an existing degree of chaos is analogous to Ackoff's concept of a "mess". Ackoff does not describe the nature of a "mess" but it may be worth pausing to consider the nature of chaos.

I think that the first thing to note is that chaos, or at least the degree of it, is in the eye of the beholder. That which is unacceptable in a situation will vary from person to person. Each person will have a view on the part of a situation which needs improvement most and each will have a different view on which parts definitely require remedial action. In so far as there are "objective" statements available on the situation, e.g. the throughput levels are low, these will be subject to differing interpretations as well. Each person will see a different mess and, whatever "objective" analysis of the problem has or has not been done, everyone will possess a view on that problem and, most probably, a favoured solution. People will relate to each other in that situation and, not only will they have views on the situation itself, they will have views on the positions and views which are held and on the other people as individuals.
Any change will affect not only the "objective" side of the problem but it will probably change the influence and power of people. A "mess" or "chaos" has all of these different facets.

It is within this sort of situation that one must consider movements from chaos towards order. One of the first movements towards order within a group of managers seems to be an agreement in broad terms that a particular different state would be more desirable than their present one. The growing consensus that laboratories need automation or that planning models are a good thing is a very important agreement within a group and is often the first step in a complex set of negotiations. It is worth examining the nature of such agreements.

The emergence and establishment of these broad agreements is the first point of interest. Although it is true that such broad objectives can be established by rational arguments, I do not think this is probable. The broad agreements mentioned in the last paragraph are underpinned by an 'ethos' change. Those ethos changes were the result of quiet persuasion mostly on a one to one basis. Of course, post hoc rationalisations will exist but most of the activities concerned with the launching of these two ideas will be in the low numbered categories, create, ethos and relate. These broad agreements tend to have a uniting aspect which commands commitment and this is described below. The quiet negotiation, letting water drip on the stone, showing people that their peers are thinking about the same sort of development, are the ways in which this type of agreement comes into being.

Once established, these broad objectives are not questioned by the participants in that agreement. For example, no debate among consultants occurs over issues concerned with the relationships between the improved
automated laboratory service and its effects on patient care. The relative values of different diagnostic techniques such as X-ray and laboratory services are not debated. Within the services provided by laboratories, it can be argued that delays in getting reports to clinicians and getting them to act on those reports quickly is more important than laboratory automation. But even an important body like the Regional Scientific Committee, which one might expect to be concerned with wider problems, chooses not to pursue the question vigorously. This lack of concern and the related consultant attitudes should not be interpreted as a necessarily mischievous conspiracy. Some people will believe genuinely that laboratory automation is a top priority issue for the total RHA organisation. Others will believe that within their own limited field of responsibility it is top priority for them. Still others will believe that whatever anyone's priorities happen to be, laboratory automation is the only field in which they can take effective action. But the implication for a negotiating situation is that participants have a tacit agreement on what broad objectives and other limiting factors are to be taken for granted. Substantial challenges to these agreements and assumptions are likely to be dealt without pity and will be regarded as threatening and therefore unwelcome. This thesis contains no evidence to this effect, but if a challenge to the agreed major automation objective had come from outside the laboratory circle, I believe that a wide variety of tactics would have been used to nullify its effects. Although not part of the diary, it is interesting to note that whenever the newly formed Regional Computer Policy Group shows an interest in laboratories, the laboratory personnel become very suspicious and defensive. That Group does question and determine computing priorities.

This phenomenon of there being tacit and agreed macro-objectives which are not questioned is part of a much broader agreement to limit the bounds of
negotiation. This broader agreement is even more implied and tacit and part of it concerns all the known weaknesses in the positions of the participating negotiators. Everyone's position is a collection of possessions, attitudes, ways of working and so on, and there exists a whole series of views in the negotiating group about the many facets of each individual's position. This theme will be developed later specifically in relation to power, but it is wider than power. Except in the most kindly way, no one is ever going to comment on the gross over equipping of some laboratory. No one is going to be pointed in their questioning of professional practice - except in the most academic of atmospheres. If such boundaries were transgressed, retaliation by a similar sort of transgression is inevitable. For example, even in private if I stray onto a sensitive area with Dr. Hunt, I will be reminded of the transgressions of "my" Computer Department. If the transgressions are too blatant, which probably means that they are not an accident, the negotiation will break down. Although not recorded in the diary, the latter stage of the breakdown of negotiations between Dr. Hunt and the Computer Department were full of such transgressions. For example, Dr. Hunt frequently poured scorn on the use of bench marks to test the ALPHA system. This is a direct attack on the professional paraphernalia of a computer man and it would never have been launched if the relationship between computer services and Dr. Hunt had been better.

However, given the strategic goal of laboratory automation, the project objectives are open to negotiation all the time. Although outside the time span covered by the diary, the fact is that the first ALPHA system did go into Sleeton, first on the old hardware. That hardware was replaced by new hardware, a piece at a time admittedly, before any other laboratory operated
ALPHA. Sleeton laboratory belonged to the man most alive in this field in the Region. Despite the fact that all the odds were against him, he has successfully retained the lead. A wide variety of changes in project direction occurred before that happened. By a variety of methods, he negotiated the necessary changes and achieved his objective. Those changes in the project objectives were being negotiated all of the time and it is worth illustrating this in some detail.

The laboratory project is split into main sub-themes and sideshows. I suggest that all of those different sub-theme goals were present throughout all of the period covered by the diary. The concept that a pilot study should be done in a quite laboratory never was accepted by all of the participants. Paragraphs 17 to 24, page 331 of the diary illustrate the completely different attitudes being taken at the same time. One person thinks that before his actual need becomes pressing, he will have time to watch the situation develop. Another wants to get a second pilot machine in. No one appears to like the proposed way forward. The man with the most advanced laboratory can see his lead slipping away and so decides not to commit himself one way or the other, preferring to carry on fighting for his own laboratory in a different way in a different arena. The meeting eventually takes a decision which is overturned within a few days. That meeting and the decision taken should have helped to progress the objectives of theme 1, giving the contract to a firm to start the pilot study, but it did not do so. Most of the objectives of the other sub-themes were presented, some in a rather hazy form and others very explicitly at that meeting. They were being pursued all the time.

The above paragraph concentrates on objectives which develop into main themes in the project and for that reason might be regarded as sensible. But
there are others which illustrate patterns of behaviour which appear to show
smaller degrees of sense and reason. Although this is necessarily a personal
judgement, some of the minor objectives being pursued at various times do
appear to be distinctly bizarre. The proposition to transfer the failed Ralton
experiment to Hillbury seemed bizarre. Apart from there being no local
support in Hillbury for that action, the briefest consideration of local conditions
rules out a pilot study of any sort. To undertake two pilot studies instead of
the one which isn't going very well is not reasonable. Attempts to remove whole
pieces of the pilot equipment for other uses or to transfer it into completely
different departments seems to be very odd behaviour. The examples, and
there are others, illustrate the wide range of ideas which people were prepared
to launch and pursue. Although at first sight, all of these actions do seem
bizarre and unreasonable, it is much more likely that these actions were
motivated by schemes which did seem reasonable, or at least worth trying out,
to the person who launched them. Frequently one's own partial view of a
situation makes it impossible to fit together and make sense of the actions
which are going on around one. But they do make sense in some context to
some one.

The OR model described in Chapter 2 does not recognise that most
situations have such a complex set of objectives associated with them. People
in the case study are only partially committed to common objectives, if at all.
Those private ones to which they have higher commitment will be pursued more
vigorously than the common objective should the opportunity arise or if it can
be engineered. The OR model's plan to meet your customer's objectives
constitutes a partial agreement which may be useful as a bargaining counter in
the negotiating of project direction at any time, but it does not constitute a
charter for developing the organisation in accordance with the plan whatever happens.

If it is true that moving a project forward is negotiating steps forward within the above multi-objective environment, it is necessary to start identifying parts of that negotiating process. This thesis does not put forward a total, coherent theory of that process of negotiating change; it only tries to illuminate some aspects of it.

A striking feature of the diary is the way it moves through a continuous series of crises. The initial collapse of the original project, failing to find replacement systems, the threat that an important supporter of the long term solution will be insulted and so on, are all crises. At a slightly lower pitch, unexpected happenings occur frequently. For example, American computer companies selling an alternative system become involved with a unit which is supposed to be committed to waiting for the result of the pilot study. If the events of this project had to be categorised, "troubleshoot" would have been used often. Once a "big" project is launched, one that is bound to bring significant changes in management's operational behaviour, an issue seems to be whether the progress of the project is going to be characteristically smooth or rough. What are the factors which determine this aspect of its nature? The progress of the laboratory project was characteristically rough, even to the extent of two of the main actors becoming almost paranoid about it at some stages. The rumour that a certain company was behaving in a given manner caused another senior manager and myself to take a variety of actions to eliminate that intervention which, on mature reflection, were not particularly wise. As stated above, the troubleshoot category is very appropriate for this project. Troubleshooting demands fast action. A senior manager must be
careful that the action does not become, in the words of David Owen, "shooting from the hip". Fast reaction must not take place in a wild and uncontrolled manner.

Crisis and troubleshoot were characteristic of this project, and it is possible to identify several ways in which people attempted to negotiate a way around crises. The first is the quiet meeting. There are at least three accounts of such meetings in quiet pubs at lunchtime when straight talking was required. The people at those meetings knew that serious talks were taking place and that these would later determine a stand which would be taken, possibly formally and certainly in public. Such private discussions did not always resolve issues and sometimes the subsequent public event simply established the relative and uncompromising positions being taken. For example, a compromise on user requirements for the pilot study was not fashioned either by private or public negotiation. There were two distinct types of private meeting associated with the project. One type can be represented as positive collusion, the other as seeking to avoid a confrontation or other type of not particularly productive meetings. As my relationship with Dr. Hunt improved throughout the course of this project, and since our offices are close to each other, private collaboration became common. Thus for example, each encounter with the companies and each letter sent to districts or laboratories became matters for consultation. Officially, we were usually acting separately and independently on these matters. It is a mistake to confuse positive collaboration with friendship or any of the conventional politeness which you must observe in any organisation. Collaboration and collusion are based primarily on carefully measured out trust, a concept developed below in more detail. A second type of private meeting was with Area personnel in a very quiet country pub and was meant to exert pressure to
produce a change in their attitude towards the need to alter a system. We were trying to find a formula by which they could accept our position. If no solution were found, the crisis was bound to get worse. These meetings could have provided a solution.

The second way of dealing with crisis, negotiation within a group, required very different sets of skills from those of the private meeting. The meeting to get the system specification accepted is a good example. Around the table there were very different points of view and the object of the meeting was to get them all to agree to the specification. Whatever the provocation, the temperature of the debate had to be kept down. By taking the initiative and getting the simple case for a given course of action on the table first of all, an important part of this negotiation had been completed successfully. It would have been so easy for others to have produced all the counter arguments initially, blown up one or two of them into issues of major principle, and then it would have been very difficult to have dealt with the situation. Although not in the laboratory project, the Christmas meeting of RMSOs with Head Office to discuss the National Statistical Review, is a perfect example of being reduced to a lose situation in a meeting. As explained in Chapter 5, our position became so weak that a hasty withdrawal of the issue for discussion in another arena was the best I could do. In the laboratory case, the second that individuals started to side with me it became possible to start isolating the known hard core of resistance. The best that could be hoped for was for that hard core not to oppose the proposed action at this meeting and this was achieved. Active support from these people was out of the question. At least one major counter argument to the proposal existed, namely, lack of experience on the part of the would-be supplier, and that could have upset the balance, but it was never advanced decisively. The gentle pressure of a seemingly logical case eventually
won the day. For the outcome of a meeting to be so uncertain is rare and it is a situation which should be avoided. To know that you are following a course of action about which powerful people have deep reservations is a dangerous situation.

A third type of negotiation must be the frantic action. Suddenly, on your desk there is a situation which cannot be allowed to develop. Negotiation is usually to decide an action and take it, usually by phone, immediately. Typical examples are threats or supposed threats of the withdrawal of support or reneging on an agreement. The threatened person can do a wide variety of unwise things and he must be persuaded not to do them. Sympathy must be given, promises to act as honest broker made, forthright commands not to be stupid or threats to take punitive action can be made. Often frantic action is associated with a threat to a person of high status or a threat to a sensitive part of an action plan. For example, the attack on the ALPHA system designer or the unwise act in a tendering situation both caused frantic negotiations to take place.

Frequently managers complain about, or at least comment on, the pace at which they are expected to work and the pace at which they do work. Whilst it is true that managers need to sit quietly and think for some of their time, and it is usually very difficult to time-table such activity, it is also true that a major, and possibly the most important, part of their role is to act or react in order to move things forward. In this thesis, it has been shown that a manager has a large number of diverse objectives being pursued by his colleagues and himself at any time. Even if it were possible, it is not economic to preplan all activities so as to virtually exclude the possibility of mishap. This thesis maintains that, in so far as a project moves forward, this occurs as a result of
almost constant negotiation and it is not possible to exclude the unexpected results of other people's actions from the ongoing action. It is not bad management necessarily if one must react frantically. It is an essential part of a fast moving negotiation or set of actions which move a project forward.

Another important factor affecting the need for frantic action is the sheer number of things which a manager has going on at any time. As suggested above, few if any are in a state of complete control or perfectly planned. It is always possible to plan things better but it is foolish to pretend that perfection is attainable. The number of uncontrollable factors and the number of interacting and conflicting value systems in any situation mitigates against this. Whilst advocating that an appropriate degree of planning must go into a project, the need to act fast to overcome the limitations of a project plan exists as well.

The examples given above are typical of the way events mesh together in negotiations. It is possible to go beyond this and to enquire about the underlying factors which shape the negotiation and there are at least three in evidence in the laboratory project, power, trust and values.

Power has been defined by Walter Buckley, as "control or influence over the actions of others to promote one's goals without their consent, against their will or without their knowledge or understanding (for example, by control of the physical, psychological or some cultural environment within which others must act)". The first thing to note that such power is that it does exist and people are prepared to use it. The NHS is in some ways a classical bureaucracy and there is a widespread belief that things get done in bureaucracies by committee work only. In fact, little gets done in this way. Most actions get taken by individuals who wish to take them for their own reasons. Most committees are
very important methods of obtaining formal approval. Dr. Hunt did possess the power to spend capital and to refuse to spend it. He did this at the Ralton Laboratory and without that action, and more basically his agreement to it, the pilot work would not have started. I wanted a new Company in the tendering process and I forced this to happen. The Ralton consultant decided that he was unwilling to compromise on his requirements and did not do so. These examples demonstrate the reality of power and in negotiating, it is vital to have assessed correctly who might act decisively to determine what the next step is going to have to be.

If its existence and the fact that people will use it is the first to note about power, then the second must be that power to stop progress is much more common than power to make something happen. The diary illustrates the need to get many people's agreement to a step forward, for example, the transfer of the ALPHA system onto the old hardware at Sleeton. The District agreed, Wood agreed, the Treasurers agreed, and so on. Fundamentally, I said 'No' to Phase 2 of the rescue system. Both were the subject of negotiation, the first being a long protracted affair, the second lasting one short lunch hour.

The source of various types of power is important. Much of the power used by Dr. Hunt and myself was directly due to our position in the management hierarchy and had been given to us. But some of it came from being the acknowledged expert in the field. If a computer 'expert' stated that the benchmark had demonstrated that the Delta system was unstable, there was little that a Ralton pathologist could do about it, whatever position he held in the management hierarchy. Having expert knowledge, e.g. knowing about computers, also gave one a right to a particular sort of opinion. Thus, my opinion about whether or not a particular Company could do a job was deferred
to and I have to be careful about the way in which I expressed such opinions. It was apparent that Dr. Hunt had another sort of power deriving from his long term control of capital. It would have been very dangerous for pathologists to have got "across" him in any real sense since their need for his co-operation with their plans was important. They are unlikely to argue too violently with him for that reason. This thesis cannot present an in-depth analysis of the source of power but the effect of power on negotiation must be noted. In the next chapter, a classification of the different types of power is discussed.

One situation in which the use of power is of particular interest is conflict. In any negotiation varying degrees of different sorts of power will be possessed by the participants. Holding the purse strings, having the right to a particular sort of technical opinion, being managerially responsible for the operation of the service, are all different sorts of power. In a particular negotiation, these types must be used by different people acting together and any decision is the result of this interplay. By standing on different ground, and arguing accordingly, for example the availability of money and technical opinion, two individuals can make it difficult to find a way forward. The importance which a participant gives to his view is a choice which he makes and he can play something up or down. It may be possible for one participant to ignore the views of another in any case. If conflict occurs, it is often between people from different parts of the RHA, e.g. a finance officer and the scientific service section. There is little that one can do to topple the arguments of the other, especially if one of them decides that a particular course of action would not fit in with his own global preoccupations at that time. For example, he might want to reserve this money for another purpose. The treasurer might well be prepared to put up with all sorts of bullying and other tactics and still use his veto power in such circumstances.
Power should never be seen as some sort of master card in the game of negotiating. It is an element in the total game, a very important part of the pack of cards maybe. But just as it is possible to lose your ace in the last few hands of a game of bridge, it is equally possible to fritter away an undoubted position of power by inexpert negotiation. It is usually unwise to underestimate the possible effect of even the weakest sort of power especially if the person who holds it is an expert player. If, in the above example, the treasurer is bluffing about the financial position and really is keeping back money for a favoured scheme, a clever opponent can and will call that bluff.

"Getting across" a powerful person is a particularly interesting part of the effects of power and conflict in negotiation. Relationships within organisations are usually stable and will last for many years. Every development in the future will probably involve the same people. If any way forward involves a serious loss of face, change in power structure or simply a diminuation in some particular aspect of a person's standing, then the negotiations are going to get difficult. A possible loss of leadership by the most automated laboratory in the Region caused its chief to modify his behaviour over a long period of time. There are always many ways in which a relationship can be made less helpful. To become involved in a dispute with the person with power of the development monies is very unwise. Even without actions which might be regarded as "malicious", he will be inclined to favour those people with whom he has an easy relationship if he wishes to do an experiment for example. Put more graphically, at the very least, the icing on the cake is always subject to a grace and favour type of action and "getting across" someone in power is a sure route to eating plain cake in the future.
Having made the case that only the major objective of any exercise can be taken for granted and that all others are subject to change, it must be pointed out that some are more stable than others. In the above paragraphs, power is discussed at some length. The fact is that the automation of the Eastbury laboratory is becoming more pressing as each month passes and Dr. Hunt requires a solution. I do not believe that the precise nature of the solution matters very much to him, but the fact that a solution exists matters a great deal. Although not recorded, the various actions being taken in this project are being constantly related to that goal. The first two systems, both at Ralton, the transfer to Sleeton and all of the action since the diary closed are concerned with this goal. Of course, only Eastbury and Dr. Hunt think that this is what matters in the end, but Dr. Hunt has the power to cause all actions to relate to this particular objective and he will continue to press people to at least pay lip service to it and to act so that we move in that direction. Thus, whether he wants to or not, Dr. Jarratt is helping Eastbury all the time. Of course, he may have done this in any case, but the fact is that he has no option if he is to protect the future of his own laboratory. The steady movement towards an Eastbury solution is going to be protected in all situations and as time passes, the pressure to give that objective a higher priority increases. That solution is going to have to be acceptable to Dr. Hunt and everyone knows that.

In an earlier paragraph, it is suggested that the negotiators establish fairly quickly a set of boundaries within which they agree to work and a set of assumptions that they agree not to challenge. The existence of areas of weakness in each others position was also discussed together with tacit agreements not to venture into those areas unless provoked. But there are also sets of rocks on which they know that they will founder if they approach too
close. I doubt if many people outside Region and Eastbury really care about Eastbury's problem, in fact it is a positive nuisance to them if anything. Its solution will consume resources which otherwise might go to themselves. But no one is going to challenge the wisdom of having that particular priority. Similarly, no one would dream of challenging the status of the Regional Plan, and would be very careful about suggesting changes to its form. In general, all projects are carried out under similar sorts of constraints. There are always powerful negotiators whose primary sets of objectives and values must be respected.

If the exercise of power is a feature of negotiating order, then attitudes towards the extent to which other people can be trusted is another. The laboratory project contains two almost perfect examples of the way in which a set of negotiations changed the level of trust which one party was prepared to place in another party. The failure of the Computer Department to put the second system into Ralton removed from them most of the power and status which they had had up to that point. The effect of that failure was compounded by their subsequent actions. The rights and wrongs of their technical judgements were in my view secondary to their failure to accept an appropriate level of responsibility for their errors. Trust plummeted because their integrity was open to question, not their expert opinion, although that might have been the case also. A second example was my relationship with Dr. Hunt which has been through many phases, and will go through more. Initially, I was identified with the Computer Department and all that meant. Slowly, that has changed and we now have a more profitable relationship in which deals are possible. We check each other's position now as a matter of routine. For example, we vet important letters jointly although we are independent agents.
The extent to which each is willing to rely on the other is subject to constant review.

Real negotiation occurs when powerful people make a deal and an important part of each deal is the extent to which they trust each other. It is a sign of immaturity to believe that holding an explicit view on the extent to which a deal will be honoured is an unnecessary or distasteful part of a manager's role. It is a responsible act and must be based on experience. Any suggestion that one should place indiscriminate levels of trust in people with unknown performance characteristics, presumably because that is the "nice" thing to do, is foolish. Negotiated levels of trust are the only possible basis of action. Delegation in particular is a negotiated trust relationship, not an axiomatic right of a subordinate manager.

A lack of this type of negotiated trust has significant repercussions. This is especially the case if powerful people are involved. The need to negotiate in these circumstances is common. Three common practices occur in these circumstances. First you can attempt to fix the deal in another arena, second you can attempt to limit what is at risk and third you can prevaricate. All of these are subject to a wide range of interpretation but these appear to be the fundamental positions which can be taken. None of these actions are immoral and some of the ends do justify the means. Real negotiation occurs when powerful people of different views must make a deal. It is unwise to overlook the need for form a view on the extent to which a deal will be honoured without constant wrangling. One is often forced by circumstances to make deals which may not be kept. Blatant breaking of an agreement must be rare, but the possibility of finding excuses not to carry out obligations is related to such events. Most of the agreements in the laboratory project had at least some
characteristics which made me uncertain about their outcome. But there was no alternative to attempting to move forward on the basis of them.

Another important aspect of this type of negotiated trust can be demonstrated from my relationship with Dr. Jarratt. My working supposition with regard to him is that he will look after his own interests, if necessary, to the complete exclusion of others. This does not imply that any action would be in any sense dishonest or dishonourable, but that he will use every possible means to further the well being of his laboratory. If I am attempting to negotiate anything with him, I spend a great deal of time working out what I think his next move will be. During the transfer of Delta in his laboratory, I was curious beyond belief to work out how he would persuade Wood to help him. I watched him like a hawk and I doubt if I would have given him much leeway if I had thought things were going badly wrong. The expectation which you have about another person's behaviour is one of the factors which influence the negotiating process.

There are many other examples of the influence on negotiation of the roles or attitudes which one thinks others will adopt. One of the recurrent roles and sets of attitudes which can be seen in the diary are those of the RTO. Despite my constant efforts to try to Henry involved in the major decisions on laboratories, and despite the fact that I believed that he should be involved, I did not really expect him to be helpful. It seems that one's boss is always at odds with a person about the amount of interest he should take and the balance is never right. Taking an example from outside laboratory work, I did expect my own O & M officer to push through the new planning methods, whatever opposition he encountered, and he did this. The extent to which I allow him to do this without my intervention is a negotiated position. Of course, one can be
wrong about these expectations too. I was completely wrong in my forecasts of the results of my own people doing the laboratory work and the set of attitudes which they would take in the face of disaster. But the principle remains unchanged. One enters a negotiated process with a set of expectations about the way in which individuals and groups are going to behave. That expectation is based on past experience of the individual or group and will have had a considerable effect on the way you propose to play the negotiation. Expectation is very closely related to trust. The key set of expectations which one brings to any negotiation is determined by the degree of negotiated trust which you have for the people concerned.

One of the important features of both diaries mentioned above, is the involvement of our own chief officers in the negotiating processes. There is clearly no agreement between Dr. Hunt and myself on the one hand and them on the other as to what their involvement should be. Every time the situation was very messy, their refusal to participate in the decisions became stronger. For example, the diary records several attempts to obtain guidance on the sorts of risks which they are willing to take when letting tenders. Although not recorded in the diary, one instruction was a very firm direction to obey the Standing Financial Instructions of the Authority, which on this issue happened to be irrelevant and unhelpful. They did not even refer to that particular circumstance. Another specific instruction was that we could not proceed with a certain action without the whole-hearted support of many consultants. Although this might seem eminently sensible, it was a formula for doing nothing. Thus, not only was the RTO's degree of involvement disputed, but the responses which were obtained from them seemed to be outside the range of what we considered appropriate and helpful. This is an example of an expectation not being met, a subject discussed below. It is often the case that
interventions which are sought for perfectly sensible reasons do not work out. Negotiating is full of risks and counting on the usefulness of a given set of manoeuvres is one of them.

A series of fundamental conflicts in oneself is associated with these negotiated sets of expectations and negotiated trust relationships. Over and above what one knows to be the case, e.g. the extent of interest which a boss will take in a subject, there exists a very real sense of what ought to be the case. Similarly you know, or think you know, what an ideal subordinate should be like. Feelings of this nature lead to two different sorts of action. First, using the boss relationship as an example, in a very real sense I will try to change his perception of his priorities to persuade him to give more support. One is constantly concerned to retain, maintain and improve the position from which you start to negotiate. Second, frustration seems to lead to game play as well. To parade issues which you know will leave someone else completely cold, especially a boss, seems to be a ritualistic assertion that "I have got important things to say which you are not listening to". A slight derisory description of some of these subjects is "hobby horses". But such ritual games do seem to be important and are played with commitment.

Although not discussed in this thesis, game playing within negotiations is important. It is possible to argue that the particular game with a boss referred to above in its many forms is about something very fundamental. For example, I do not accept his priorities for the work which he does. Administrative adeptness seems to be less important to me than creative management. If a little chaos reigns, so be it. But that is anathema to my boss. We choose not to change our relative positions and these games seem to be there in place of outright conflict.

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Earlier in this chapter, the concept of 'frantic action' is developed in the context of 'toubleshoot'. However, speed is characteristic of many actions in the diary. The 'typical objectives meetings' referred to frequently in the main diary are full of agreements made at speed. Each encounter with Dr. Hunt in the later stages of the laboratory project was full of decisions, most of which were not particularly premeditated. All would have been shaped to some extent at least by the general project background but the detail would be decided quickly there and then. Thus, the amount of support which Region gave to the transfer into Sleeton was decided on the spot. In Chapter 5, the unclassified events accounted for about a quarter of the total number of events. It was established that these events were concerned with the general administration of the Division to a large degree. I am sure that the majority of those events were dealt with rapidly and that any decisions were taken immediately. Deciding the limits of the planning system, getting hold of staffing information on computing, agreeing to talk to a national group about Natsys, were all instant decisions, or nearly so. Negotiation is about making decisions or getting other people to make or agree to them. Those decisions are taken against a deadline and most of those deadlines are very short if not immediate.

In terms of the categories developed in Chapter 5, the laboratory project is the major example of 'takeover' and a good example of 'control'. To all intents and purposes, I have taken over from the Regional Computer Services Officer. Whatever the circumstances and however justified it might seem in my eyes, 'takeover' is a bitterly resented act, especially when it goes on for a long time, as this one has done. In my view, the relationship between Computer Services and their laboratory customers was such that effective negotiation of any sort had almost ceased, whatever the set of reasons might
be. Widely divergent views as to what those reasons were existed but the
effect on negotiation was the same. It would be foolish not to recognise that
the 'takeover' effects all my relationships with that Department. The
ramification of most actions spread beyond the area immediately concerned but
those of a 'takeover' action tend to be more marked than others.

The direct influence of 'takeover' or 'control' on one's ability to negotiate
is great. In most circumstances, a senior officer is negotiating using some sort
of briefing. Whether it is written or spoken is largely irrelevant. What matters
is the degree of confidence which you have in it. When negotiating with West
Area about possible change to the experimental system to make it acceptable to
them, I was on very slippery ground. The statement of requirement and the
estimate of effort required were taken on trust. I had not checked either of
them at all carefully. Of course, it can be argued that that should be the
normal position. Senior officers are brought into a negotiation to contribute
things other than the basic facts. But the degree of control which you have
exercised, and in 'takeover' that is large, alters significantly one's negotiating
stance. You are more prepared to deal with 'misinterpretations' of 'fact' should
they arise. Thus, despite the serious disadvantages of 'takeover' mentioned in
the last paragraph, there are also many advantages for the negotiator.

The relationship between the two case studies

It is stated earlier in the discussion of my research methods in Chapter 4
that the two case studies are orientated separately towards the two halves of
the developed version of the Corporate Activist Model. As explained in
Chapter 4, and demonstrated in the above section, the principle example of the
takeover category in this research is the laboratory project case study. It was
also explained in Chapter 4 that, although I believed that the event categories could have been used on the laboratory data also, their use in the second half of my model would have been confusing. Nevertheless, the relationship of the categories to the laboratory data is important and I believe that the categories do work on it.

It has not been possible to do a comprehensive mapping of the Chapter 5 categories onto the laboratory project. The above illustrations in the last section do show that the categories work in general. In the first part of this chapter, the definition of each category was expanded by developing lists of more detailed characteristics of the events used to generate the categories. As a partial test of those general characteristics, I have taken the fifty-three contained in the 'relate' list and attempted to match them against the laboratory diary. I believe that among the laboratory events which I would classify as 'relate', at least twenty-seven of the general characteristics would be the reason for some of those laboratory event classifications. It is also true that some of the laboratory 'relate' events would have different general characteristics from those which have been developed. But this does confirm that confirmatory evidence for the categories would be found, at least to some extent, in projects not used to develop the categories.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the final form of the Corporate Activist model developed in this thesis has been described in general terms. This model corresponds to Model 6 of Chapter 2 and describes the role of a senior management services officer in the NHS. The model has two parts, the first being a set of event categories which typify the sorts of action that such a person might take while the second part describes ways in which such events are put together in major
projects. Essentially this second part of the model has a central theme dominated by a negotiating mode of behaviour. I believe that the negotiating model of management services and the event categories are more useful than the models described in Chapter 2. The general character of the Corporate Activist seems to be described by the event categories and the above type of negotiating model is a more accurate representation of the process used to bring about organisational change. This does not imply that the characteristics of Model 1-5 developed in Chapter 2 are wrong or irrelevant. It does imply that they can be supplemented usefully by the negotiating model developed above.

Apart from the comparison of this two part model with other models and related ideas in the literature, the description in this chapter concludes the research. These comparisons and ideas are the subject matter of Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 8 - THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD

Introduction

These are the following main sections in this Chapter.

(a) This research attempts to look at the functioning of management services as a change agent on a broad front, and it makes certain assumptions about the environment within which the change processes are taking place, i.e. Strauss' structural context. The first part of this chapter describes some of the major assumptions which have been made and identifies the main effects of these assumptions on the research which has been done.

(b) Having developed my own categories it is useful to compare them to roles developed in the Mintzberg study referred to in Chapter 4.

(c) Chapter 1 states that four books influenced the development of this research in a significant way. It was suggested that the detailed review of those books ought to refer back to the data and themes of this research in order to illustrate their relevance. This chapter contains reviews of that type.

Limitations of the research

The research concentrates entirely on the political types of activity which are necessary to bring management services projects to a successful conclusion. It is assumed that such activity is underpinned by various skills which must be available on a fairly wide basis throughout the Management Services Division.
Among the most important of these are the technical skills, necessary if project work is to be done in a way which would provide adequate solutions for the customers. The creation, retention and development of these technical skills represents a challenge from a management point of view. The range of problems for which a solution is needed is very wide. Making judgements about the potential of people to acquire skills during the several years which they will be with the Divisions needs very careful selection techniques. Choosing which skills will be most valuable and which ought to be developed at what sort of expense to the organisation are the top management problems within the Division. This problem is particularly acute in operational research where the team of people is very small. The range of available skill will determine to some extent the types of problems which can be accepted with some certainty that they can be solved.

The matching of skills to problems and obtaining right sort of problem also present managerial problems. Since it is my policy to move into more challenging fields, obtaining skills and matching them to problems is not simple. Any implied assumption that the right skill mix is always available within the Division is a large one. The procedures for matching technical skills to problems produced a very adequate solution for some of the work contained in this thesis, e.g. the 1979 Planning Methods, while in other cases the match was less adequate, e.g. the laboratory project.

If one assumes that the necessary skill mix is available, putting the people with the skills into project teams needs careful thought. Ensuring that adequate project plans exist and are executed efficiently can be difficult. The main theme of this thesis has been the negotiation of order. One part of the order to be negotiated is the changing set of objectives which projects acquire during their lives. When project objectives change, the skills needed to support
the project can change also. The project plans must be robust while at the same time making sure that proposed solutions are sound and are not unduly influenced by distorting political pressures.

The personal characteristics which people bring with them to all their project work are relevant to this thesis. These influence the personal and group behaviour which can be observed in project work described in this thesis. A range of these skills is described in Cohen, Fink, Gadon and Willitts (1976). These range from simple listening skills through to the most complex group skills needed to liaise with people and groups at large. These are particularly relevant to those models concerned with implementation in Chapter 2. It is assumed that project officers have the necessary skills in this field to carry out their work.

A less obvious assumption concerns the new work which is breaking through and extending the boundaries of the Division's existing knowledge and experience. The strategic use of the results of such projects depends on our having an adequate research and development philosophy. For example, the laboratory work assumed the existence of a way of spreading these systems throughout the Region. Another example is the development of information systems in the broadest sense. Such information systems are assumed to fit into a pattern of management development which will make the Region better able to carry out its control, monitoring and planning functions. Research and development philosophy and strategy is rarely, if ever, discussed and most of the ideas on this topic exist in only my own mind. Much research and development work is done within the NHS against a background of inadequate planning of the future use of project results. Although the lack of an R & D philosophy and strategy at first sight appears to be a slightly peripheral issue
for this thesis, it is a major weakness of the Region's thinking and it does affect project work.

Throughout this thesis there is much talk of working with groups of people. People in those groups have different professional backgrounds. Although it is only occasionally referred to obliquely in the text, a major factor in group behaviour is the impact of the value systems which different professions have. Reference is made on one occasion to the differences between the value systems of a medical officer and an administrator. Value systems determine many of the decisions which are discussed in the thesis, and they cause people to behave in particular ways. The impact of these value systems on decisions and actions has never been looked at in any detail. The explicit recognition of their importance by the Region might be a major step forward. But there is a danger that such recognition would raise issues which could not be dealt with adequately by the RHA and would be a step backwards. The need to hold the service to patients below the levels which the best medical practice makes possible involves a direct conflict between medical ethics and financial rectitude. This research is very limited in its discussion of the effects of such conflicts on the negotiation of change.

If the thesis is correct in suggesting that good project work and implementation relies on negotiation of order and related political activity such as that suggested by the laboratory project, the methods by which one creates a management services organisation which understands this and has the necessary skills to use that knowledge need to be developed. The laboratory project demonstrates that most people in the lower parts of the organisational structure in the Division, do not seem to give sufficient importance to negotiating skills. Nevertheless, many project officers in their late twenties become involved in
negotiations with customers. The amount of relevant training which they are given and which would be of value in carrying out this role is very small. It would be helpful to know how to create a learning community within the Division which passed these skills on to its members. This thesis has helped only to define some of those skills, not how to teach them.

The comparison of roles developed in the Mintzberg study with categories developed in this thesis

In the Nature of Managerial Work, Mintzberg (1973) describes research in which he investigates the roles of chief executives. This work is described briefly in Chapter 4 as part of the general use of diaries for management research. Mintzberg uses a mixture of structured and unstructured data, together with a review of timetables followed, mail dealt with and the personal contacts made by the executives concerned. He then goes on to develop some roles which he believes that these managers play. In the analysis, he describes how he compared his feelings about this research with those of other people doing research in this field. He claims that the ten roles which he has developed can also be traced in the work of the other people. Thus, it is reasonable to take these ten roles of Mintzberg as a piece of substantive theory supported by other research. It is therefore profitable to try to compare the twelve categories developed in this thesis with the ten roles of Mintzberg with a view to determining whether they overlap, complement each other or seem to differ in important respects.

Mintzberg, in his analysis, states that he believes that the set is exhaustive and covers all the important parts of the work of chief executives. He claims this on the basis of his analysis of the other work and the comparisons which he has made. It is worth setting out the roles and categories side by side for comparisons sake at this stage and this is done in Figure 19.
Figure 19. A comparison of the Mintzberg roles and the Guest categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mintzberg Roles</th>
<th>Guest Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Figurehead</td>
<td>1. Create</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Leader</td>
<td>2. Learn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Liaison</td>
<td>3. Ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Relate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Monitor</td>
<td>5. Big</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Disseminator</td>
<td>6. Opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Spokesman</td>
<td>7. Maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Facilitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Entrepreneur</td>
<td>10. Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Disturbance handler</td>
<td>11. Troubleshoot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Resource allocator</td>
<td>12. Takeover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Negotiator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table it can be seen that both sets of categories and roles have been grouped together into three sets. It is immediately apparent from these three groupings that the two approaches to the analysis were very different. Whereas I attempted to exclude the interpersonal roles of the manager, they have played a major part in Mintzberg's analysis. It is also clear from earlier chapters that I was particularly interested in my first group of categories and had emphasised that part of the role of the manager above others. It is important to note both studies have found macro groupings of the basic categories and roles to be important despite the fact that the groups are different. This suggests that both researchers felt a need for a more simple and basic description of the managerial role. Both sets of macro groupings are grounded theories and emerged from the data. They show that this basic approach can produce at least two theories which are radically different ways of viewing management.

Although "negotiate" is interpreted in a much narrower sense by Mintzberg, it is still surprising to see it at the bottom of his list in a similar place to the other nine roles. In the case of my analysis, negotiation eventually emerged as the one key over-riding activity which was used to interpret and knit together the other activities of the manager. The Mintzberg analysis makes it clear that he is confining negotiations to major activities only and the negotiating activity as such seems to be restricted to contact with outside or similar agencies. My own wider interpretation of negotiation does feature in some of Mintzberg's roles. For example, monitor is described in terms which resemble negotiation in that information is sought and attempts to develop a central focus of information and intelligence appear to be part of the function. Monitor appears also to have some of the features of learning in it as well and one must surmise that much of the learning activity in monitoring is done by
negotiation. But negotiation has not featured to the same extent in the Mintzberg analysis as in the analysis in this thesis and this difference is important.

There are some relationships between the roles and categories which do seem to suggest a fairly precise correspondence. For example, liaison and relate seem to have many common features, although they are not all common. Liaison seems to be mainly concerned once again with outside agencies and a large part is concerned with obtaining from other parties agreements without any ability to force or otherwise bring pressure on the other parties. Relate does not necessarily have these connotations and in the definition of relate it is pointed out that at one extreme the contact is an exceedingly friendly one while, at the other, a great deal of harsh forcing of issues might be involved.

There is a less direct relationship between the entrepreneur role and the opportunism category. Whilst the entrepreneurial role appears to have in it some premeditation, this is not characteristic of the opportunism category. For example, it appears that major developments can arise from being an entrepreneur and that these do not have to rely on anything other than the wish and the power to make them happen. Thus, as well as relating to opportunism, entrepreneur appears also to relate to big and create as well. It is interesting to note that the description of entrepreneurship talks about searching and trying to find alternatives and one cannot help feeling that there must be strong elements of negotiation being used in support of the entrepreneur role.

The most clear relationship appears to be between the disturbance handler role and the trouble-shooter category. The definition which appears in the tabular presentation of the role, namely, "responsible for corrective action when the organisation faces important, unexpected disturbances", corresponds
very closely to the words used to describe trouble-shoot. It is interesting to note that it is only in the disturbance handling role that the crisis idea appears to figure at all strongly in the Mintzberg roles. The analysis in this thesis suggests that crisis handling is almost a way of life for manager. In the book as a whole, Mintzberg does describe the hectic pace at which the chief executives work. He also describes the way in which very little of their time is actually under their control and the way in which their time is taken up by various activities which are not in any sense pre-planned. Reading some of his descriptions, it would not be inappropriate to describe those events as crises. Thus I believe that there should be an important part of the analysis of both diaries concerned with crisis and trouble-shoot but this does not seem to be recognised in the Mintzberg roles.

The leader role is of interest as well. This seems to have become split down much more finely among the change agent categories. It could be argued that all of the categories of five to twelve are in some sense a finer analysis of being a leader in an organisation. The caveat must be emphasised once again that being a change agent is the equivalent of the Mintzberg chief executive role categories and therefore the type of leadership which breaks down into the eight last categories is concerned basically with the change agent leader role and not with the leader role of the chief executive. Nevertheless, ideas such as the motivation and the control of subordinates, recruitment and general staffing problems do seem to feature both in the leadership role and the last eight categories.

It is difficult to see where category seven, "maintains", category ten, "pours oil", and category eight, "facilitates", feature in the roles described by Mintzberg. They could be regarded as being part of the leader roles for an RMSO. But these particular categories do not appear to feature in the leader
or any other role as described by Mintzberg. This may be due to the different levels at which chief executives and RMSOs work.

These differences in analysis illustrate what is perhaps the most important point in the comparison of the roles and categories, namely, that the two analyses have been approached from completely different standpoints. The Mintzberg analysis is after all basically to do with chief executives while that in this thesis is to do with a role within an organisation and concerned specifically with the role of a change agent concerned with the introduction of numerical and similar management techniques into management of the organisation. The two analyses start off from very different standpoints. But Mintzberg does claim generality for his roles and he suggests that those roles do apply at far lower levels than that of RMSO. The existence of the first group of categories concerned with creating new entities in the management structure is hardly represented at all in the managerial role described by Mintzberg. Equally, the really top executive roles such as figurehead and spokesman did not seem important in the analysis of the change agent activities. These two differences between the analyses seem to illustrate very well the positions from which they were both started. The generality of the Mintzberg roles is at the very least debatable.

Although there are interesting correspondences and overlaps between the roles and categories, it is difficult to support Mintzberg's view that his managerial roles are exhaustive. It seems more reasonable to recognise that the data on the activities of managers has been approached from very different standpoints. Different levels of roles and categories have interested each researcher and the net result has been that each presents a different insight into the activity of a manager.
Issues raised by the Mintzberg diary

In connection with his study of the Chief Executive function, Mintzberg raises three important questions. The first is whether or not the data which he collected was representative of their work, the second was whether the man was representative of that particular type of manager and the third was whether or not the job of that particular executive was similar to managers in general. It is relevant to attempt to answer the same three questions in the study of the RMSO role in this thesis and this is done below.

Issue 1 - is the data representative of my work?

There is no doubt that the work of the Regional Health Authorities does change very significantly with time. Apart from the development of medicine itself, which has been significant over the last twenty years especially insofar as it has become more science based, the NHS seems to have been through quite specific short organisational phases. In 1974 there was a major reorganisation and in the coming year, 1980, there will be a similar one. At times such as these, the work of the Management Services Division is influenced considerably by the major management issues which reorganisation raises. But it is also true that in each year some major issue is being faced by the service and these do seem to have different characteristics. For example, over the last few years there have been several major incidents concerned with the management of the long-stay patients in hospitals and some of these have caused major scandals. Such events bring about major disturbances in the management of the NHS and affect management priorities for development of the service. Following disclosures of the maltreatment of subnormal or elderly patients for example, it is inevitable that major projects are launched to investigate the management of
these particular services in regions which are far away from the actual incident itself. Again, certain developments seem to roll through the service and one can observe a bandwagon effect. For example, the use of five day wards has been gathering momentum over the past five years. Special projects are springing up everywhere to investigate the possible local advantages of their use. Thus it can be argued that the service itself is undergoing major changes of direction all of the time and that these inevitably affect the work done by Management Services.

The major project which is followed through in this particular diary is probably unique to this time in the history of the Health Service. This particular variety of automation in laboratories will probably not occur again once it has been successfully accomplished. It is probably true that there have been and will be major developments of this type being undertaken somewhere in the Service most of the time. But it is doubtful if they will involve the people who have been concerned with this particular large project and different people will operate from a different sort of power base and with different expectations of the amount of capital and other resources which they can expect to consume. For example, the Mental Handicap Service could never hope to have the same consultant support as Laboratory Services with respect to the available capital in the Region. For these reasons it cannot be argued that this thesis is necessarily typical of change in the NHS. But it might be.

The diary is probably unrepresentative of my general work in some other important respects. In the analysis quoted by Mintzberg of the activities of the chief executive, three tables of types of events are given. For example, Mintzberg in "An Analysis of Chronology Record" quotes the following categories. Desk work, telephone calls, scheduled meetings, unscheduled
meetings and tours. Because of its purpose and my own interests my diary contains data of a restricted type and, in particular, the above types are excluded. A very cursory analysis of my own desk diary shows that that the number of meetings and other events which have been left out of the research diary is large. The unrecorded events must represent the section of the work of an RMSO which goes on relentingly from year to year. The Mintzberg analysis might represent very well that type of unrecorded events which made up the majority of my activity in the year studied in this thesis.

The diary is selective and unrepresentative in other important ways too. Two examples are given below. During the whole of this period, there has been a growing need to cut back on the staff requirements. Money from the Exchequer has been becoming more scarce. That pressure is not reflected in the diary at all. Other major battles have been going on as well. For example, throughout this year there has been gentle but important pressure to reconcile the RHA to buying a new generation of computers in due course. The diary does not reflect either of these characteristics of the year adequately.

Thus it is very difficult to argue convincingly that the activities of the RMSO are represented typically in this diary. Indeed, it is not clear what a "typical" year would be.

Issue 2 - is the data typical of the nature of an RMSO in general

The next question raised by Mintzberg is whether or not the chief executives in his study were typical of all chief executives. He claims that there was considerable similarity in the records which he kept and draws a positive conclusion. It is more difficult to be so positive in the case of RMOs in the NHS. No positive evidence to support either view has been collected in
this diary. This issue is part of the problem of deciding whether or not the categories developed in this thesis represent a substantive theory or not considered in a previous chapter. No attempt has been made to test the applicability of my conclusions in other Regions and it would be difficult to do this.

Some salient points can be made however. First, most of the other RMSOs come from a completely different background of work experience and organisational experience. The majority of other RMSOs have a Work Study/O & M background, a number have a purely computer background and one has a purely OR/University background. To the best of my knowledge, no other RMSO has undertaken systematic research into his own activities. Although other RMSOs do have mixed backgrounds, I am probably the only one who could claim to have major experience in at least two of the disciplines covered by Management Services.

It is also true that the Regions differ very markedly in their nature and there are considerable differences among the Regional Administrators to whom RMSO's report. Regional Administrators tend to group together into various types and that the Regional Administrator in this Region would probably be associated closely with only two others I believe that even those three behave very differently in their own Regions. Thus the emphasis which has been given to any particular variety of work, for example, the planning field, is completely different in the separate Regions.

These factors suggest that there are great differences between the RMSOs and the Regional Authorities which they serve.
Issue 3 - are there similarities with other positions

Despite the difference among Regions quoted above, there is no doubt that many officers in the NHS are subject to the type of pressures described in this thesis. It must be true that negotiation is part of their way of life. This is brought about by two factors.

In Chapter 3 the management structures within which people must operate have been described. None of the regional structures contain line relationships with their areas and it is inevitable that officers undertake the same type of negotiation and suffer from the lack of power to do particular jobs which is described in this thesis. Apart from the effect of these structures the value systems referred to above are a common part of the working environment also. Thus the clashes between the value systems of different types of officer which were illustrated earlier in the thesis apply to most other NHS officers as well.

There is, therefore, reason to suppose that the major factors influencing the type of negotiation which must be carried out in the NHS operate on all NHS officers. Other types of officer must behave in ways similar to some described in this thesis.

The influence of these points on negotiations

In trying to answer the three questions which Mintzberg asks, a number of differences have been identified which might suggest that the particular analysis of negotiation in this thesis may not apply to other RMSOs. However, I think it is highly probable that some sort of negotiation occurs in all parts of the NHS. Although the thesis contains no evidence to this effect, I believe that negotiating is part of the jobs of the other RMSOs and indeed other chief
management services in many other organisations. It is possible that one cause of the years of debate in the OR society about the fundamental nature of OR is a lack of recognition of the importance of negotiation in the change process. The general ideas behind the negotiation of order, especially in its relation to change, must have general application in a fairly wide area of industry, commerce and public service.

Graham Allison (1971)

A publication which is very relevant to my thesis is Allison's study of the Cuban Missile crisis. Allison develops a model of the way in which powerful people negotiate a way forward in a complex bureaucracy. He sets this model alongside two other models, "The Rational Actor" and "The Organisational Process" both of which have strong parallels in the NHS. It is not possible to discuss this work at length and I propose to deal with it as follows. First, each model is built around a key concept and these are discussed in the text. Second, it is inappropriate to reduce these models to the key concepts only, and so Figure 20 contains their major characteristics. Third, the remarkable way in which each model relates to the RHA is illustrated and fourth, their relationships to my own models is discussed.

The rational actor

The first analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis relies on regarding both American and Russian action as being determined by cool reasoning based on their own value systems and world strategies. Rational choice by the actor nation has the following components, goals and objectives, options, consequences and choice. The sort of objective put forward is "The reason Russia put missiles in Cuba was to set up a bargaining position over Turkish US
### Fig. 20: Allison's Three Models of Organisational Behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1: The Rational Actor</th>
<th>Model 2: Organisational Process</th>
<th>Model 3: Bureaucratic Political Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS</strong></td>
<td><strong>ORGANISING CONCEPTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>DOMINANT INference pattern</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Happenings are chosen rationally, seeking goals and objectives</td>
<td>a) Organisational actors are a constellation of loosely allied organisation performing routines on top of which leaders sit</td>
<td>a) What happens is the result of a game - a resultant, not a choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Solutions are sought to strategic problems</td>
<td>b) A strategy of engaged members of the organisation performing routines on top of which leaders sit</td>
<td>b) Constituents in the game are compromise, conflict, confusion, power interests and politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL PROPOSITIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>DOMINANT Inference pattern</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dominant Inference pattern</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of an alternative relates inversely to its costs</td>
<td>a) Organisation action is a mixture of standard operating routines, programmes and reports</td>
<td>a) Identification of 4 (What is the game? above plus identification of foul ups, differences, misunderstandings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Options are few - 1) good fit in line with present, bad if not</td>
<td>a) Political results - the path from an issue to resultant is complex through individuals/actors/channel/advantages/disadvantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i) poor if across boundaries ii) poor if in between boundaries (communication)</td>
<td>b) Action = intention - seeing different faces of problem: No agreed doctrines: Action = piece-ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Limited flexibility and organisational change</td>
<td>c) Problems and solutions - Solution equals the sum of what must be done today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Long range plans institutionalised</td>
<td>d) Where you stand depends on where you sit - e.g. 836 bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) Goals + trade offs are seen as constraints - not opportunities</td>
<td>e) Chiefs and Indians - Chiefs deal with today's problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f) Empire building</td>
<td>f) '51/49 Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g) Proliferation of special purpose units</td>
<td>g) Intra - international happenings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h) Administrative feasibility - A gap separates leaders intention from what is done</td>
<td>h) Where you sit determines what you see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i) Directed change is uncommon</td>
<td>i) Misperception exists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Find the purgressive pattern within which the occurrence maximises value. What happens now is largely fixed by what happened a moment ago.
missiles. It is clear that starting from such an objective, the options, consequences and choices can be evaluated. The basis of this model is that such strategies exist and that such calculations can be made.

The parallel with a personified RHA is uncanny. For example, the RHA as such is often seen as having a whole set of policies which it is pursuing in a unified way. If an officer ventures into the Region outside Headquarters, he is seen as an agent at the least, but much more likely, as a leading advocate for those policies. The components of the rational actor model listed above almost constitute the index of the published Regional Plan. In any discussion with Districts, Region will assume that Districts have the same sort of objectives and have evaluated options and so on. The handling of mental handicap policy is being conducted by Region and Districts using this model and each has a different set of objectives and supporting strategies.

The rational actor parallels with the management services models are also striking. Most of the action coming from models 1 to 5 in Chapter 2 assumes that goals, options and choice are the appropriate terms in which to pursue project work. Management services also tends to assume that even if you cannot see your customer very clearly, all of his various "embodiments" which make varying demands can be put together into one rational actor. Often there is no alternative to making such a simplification if project work is to go forward.

The organisational process

Allison's second model recognises that an organisation is an amalgamation of different departments each with an established position. There are many important facets of such a structure but one of the most important must be the pre-programmed nature of most of their reactions. The airforce provided
Kennedy with an airforce solution to the missile crisis, the army and navy provided their own. The nature of each solution was to a large extent determined by their history and present capability. Not only is the solution determined in this way, but so is the problem. Routine analysis using their own basic organisational and military concepts are used. Even if the chiefs of these departments can see the different ways forward and try to change the approach, the more junior levels in their departments will transform the new initiative into established routine, if possible.

The parallel with the RHA is very marked. Every policy issue can be viewed from different sides. The methods put forward for developing a policy say will depend critically on the way it has been launched. If launched towards the Personnel Division, the solution will have a training bias. The Planning Division will process it through a "wise man giving advice" procedure. Management services will tend to start by doing a statistical analysis on relevant date - even if only crudely.

With respect to the models of management services in Chapter 2, there is little doubt that the types of management services activity described will produce characteristic solutions. Thus the ivory tower dweller does have a characteristic set of routines and types of solution which he will produce on most occasions. The basis of his solution will be an analytical technique, relevant or not. A keen evaluator will investigate the profit and loss account, even if the development is inevitable. The computer department will produce a computer solution.

The bureaucratic political model

The essence of this model is that change is a result of political action, probably carried out by a few people in positions of power. The action is not
"the solution to a set of problems" but results from compromise, conflict of interests, confusion and influence. All of these forces come together to produce a "game" in the Wittgenstein sense. Probably the most important influence on the nature of the game is the group of players. All players have their own priorities and they will fight for their own view. Their influence depends on the position and power which they have. But it also depends on the skill with which they play their own game.

Figure 20 makes it clear that this model is much more complex than the two described above. Power, compromises, the 51-49 principle, different viewpoints, misconception, expectation, communication, reticence, playing styles and so on is the terminology of negotiation. These are the type of words which I have used to describe parts of my model in earlier chapters. There seems to be little need to explore these similarities in depth. The different aspects of the Allison model correspond closely to the parts of a negotiation constructed in the last chapter.

The Allison models

It must be recognised that Allison does not claim that one of his models is "true", whatever that could mean. The three models are ways of looking at the same process. Depending on one's purpose, each has an advantage. A thesis could have been written on the standard operating procedures of the divisions of the RHA - Allison's second model. It would have been a partial view in my opinion but nevertheless perfectly valid as one aspect of the RHA's work.

F. G. Bailey (1977)

F. G. Bailey (1977) gave a sub-title, "The Folklore of Academic Politics", to his book "Morality and Expediency". In it, Bailey looks at the way
Universities function, the beliefs which academics hold, the type of community which they build and their ways of running it and causing it to relate to other outside agencies. Folklore, mores, an organisation's way of looking at and talking about itself help to determine what effective change activities can take place within it. It would be possible to dwell for a long time on this book and it is impossible to take out all the concepts which are relevant to my thesis from this book. Only a small selection has been chosen - and even these would justify more attention.

One of the main concepts used widely in the book is that of a "myth". He quotes the Malinowski definition of myth, "myth fulfils in primitive society an indespensible function; it expresses, enhances and codifies, it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains the practical rules for the guidance of man". Bailey explains his preference for the word myth in relation to academic politics over and above words like "culture", "values", "ideas", "cognitive map" and so on in the following ways. First, its Greek root has a primary meaning of the spoken word, and Bailey goes on in the book to emphasise the part which direct negotiation face to face plays in politics. Second, myth is a nice mixture of that which is sacred and that which deserves derision. Bailey goes on to liken myths and mythical characters to a set of spectacles through which it is possible to view academic life and to interpret actions. He suggests that everyone uses some set of spectacles and that any request to start about the "reality" of university life cannot be met. All one can do is to change spectacles.

Bailey uses the concept of myth in a variety of forms but two of his principal ones concern scholarship and community. He argues forcibly for the primacy of the scholarship myth in academic life and demonstrates its relevance and power in a wide variety of circumstances. For example, he gives
a long example of its use to block academic appointment of people who from many other points of view would be excellent. Scholarship is the raison d'etre of a university and the power of that myth is very great. In the same way, the "provision of patient care" has the same sort of mythical significance in the NHS. I doubt if any two people would agree on the definition of patient care and what really matters about it, but it is true that the mere ability to parade it in support of one's arguments will give one a head start over an opponent in any discussion.

It is significant from the point of view of this thesis that Bailey quotes "ethos", one of my categories, as a possible alternative to myth. Ethos and myth do have the same general characteristics. If a belief is part of the general ethos, e.g. planning is good, then it is almost impossible to challenge it. Equally one does not get the ethos of an organisation, e.g. planning methods, changed by rational arguments. There is a quality and a power about the NHS's belief in planning which is almost sacred and you ignore it at your peril.

Another concept developed by Bailey concerns the private and the public. This is connected to those things which he says about committee work and he uses seven different types of committee to illustrate various ways in which the work is conducted. It is impossible to review this fully but the two extreme cases relate an aspect of my work and negotiations in general. Bailey reviews the sort of formality, tasks performed, status and so on which are characteristics of his committees. At one extreme the Academic Council is a huge, public body. Bailey gives the impression that this is where the major rubber stamping, parading of value systems, making of public reputations and so on is done. On the other hand the Personnel Committee and in particular its sub-group which investigate particular appointments are very private affairs - often concerned with the exercise of real power. Bailey contrasts the
behaviour at these committees. At the first a somewhat pompous show of commitment to the primary values of the university is usual while in the second such behaviour will probably be interpreted as part of a larger and much more devious manoeuvre. The counter parts of these various types of meeting in my work are groups like the Regional Scientific Committee and my private sub-group meeting to resolve particular issues such as how to deal with a particular person's behaviour. Bailey points out and illustrates just how vital it is to have a good understanding of the type of group that you are called on to deal with at any time.

A very relevant theme from this book is Bailey's treatment of Arena's, "those myths which people have about how decisions are taken". He considers four myths:

(a) rational bureaucratic procedures and equity formulae,

(b) baronial politics or competition among strong men,

(c) conflict between central administration and bands of strong men, and

(d) patronage.

Bailey considers the sorts of people who are able to participate effectively in these different sorts of power struggle. Two interesting parts of this chapter concern the position of not making the grade in one or other of these ways of exerting influence and dealing with conflict. One of Bailey's examples of not making the grade concerns a "courtier" who does not know what can or cannot be leaked. Very rapidly his sources dry up. Generalising in this theme a little, power and influence having been negotiated are not there for all time and are subject to re-negotiation all the time. This is a major theme of the diary.
Bailey illustrates conflict by using an appointment which is bitterly contested due to the fact that the appointee is thought by some not to have sufficient scholastic attainment, a direct challenge to a prime myth. The man pressing the appointment had administrative and political reasons for wanting the appointment. The matter is resolved in private, as one would expect, but not before a threat to go public on the issue has been made. The example illustrates well the build up through various levels towards conflict of a major variety. He comments on the mixture of front and back stage negotiation. The conflict builds up until, in a private meeting, the objector threatens to go public on the whole matter. Such an action would disrupt the Community of Scholars greatly. In Bailey's phrase, this is equivalent to "blowing the whistle on the game". Power is there to be used and given sufficient reason, those who have it will use it. Conflict is just as much a part of negotiating as being co-operative and it is often in conflict that the new future is being carved out. This same theme was developed in my own study of a long project.

Bailey's book is full of important practical comments on the negotiating process. It is invidious to select only the above few examples. Despite the fact that it is set in the academic world, it is relevant to the Health Service.

I L Mangham (1979)

The process of negotiating order in organisations has been recognised as being of importance for some time. Strauss, Schatzmann Danuta Bucher and Sabshin (1964) appear to have been one of the first groups to recognise this and to attempt to define the concept. The concept was developed more explicitly by Mangham (1979) and it is relevant to review that work. In this review, it is more helpful to interleave the issues raised with their application to the RHA and this thesis rather than describe each separately.
The book by Mangham describes a variety of concepts concerned with the process of management looked at from a "political" perspective. One of the first themes developed is the creative participation of individuals in these management processes and, especially the influence of the way in which individuals and the group to which they belong see the world around them. A large proportion of the activity of an organisation follows fairly closely along lines which have been "pre-negotiated" in the particular group concerned with this interaction. There is a large element of personal choice in the way an individual chooses to play a role, but once determined, that method tends to remain stable. This set of concepts ties in closely with those set out in an earlier book, "Interactions and Interventions in Organisations" (1978), by the same author.

There are many examples of the interplay of negotiated roles in the thesis and the way individuals choose to participate in the work of the RHA and the Division. My own Heads of Departments have worked out among themselves a series of roles they wish to play and images that they find acceptable. At one extreme there is a person who "gets things done", while at the other is "the contemplative wise man" who really does have the ability to think up many aspects of a problem which can be overlooked easily. The interaction between them, whilst having large elements of mutual respect, is also full of instances when each is compensating for the known style of the other. Thus, just as one will compensate for the other's probable underestimates of the time it will really take to get a job done, so the other calculates the risks he is prepared to take in spite of cautions advice which may be given to him. The roles they usually play determine many of the roles which I give them. Thus, I would prefer to send the most cautious one into a known difficult situation, especially with a medical practitioner. But I would not dream of allowing him to become
involved in a real management confrontation. The need to win would have to
take precedence over any other motive which I might have, e.g. to develop the
manager. To use the other person is a better action.

In the earlier book, the roles played by people and the scripts which they
use are explored in some depth. One of the central propositions of both books
from the point of view of describing negotiating is that the notion of "self" is a
product of social interaction as well as a reflection of some self-determined
attitudes. Thus, behaviour changes as the scene changes and each actor in a
scene learns and plays idiosyncratic and often quite specific roles and scripts.
Often the roles, scripts and associated attitudes belong to a world taken for
granted, some of the simplest being straight situational scripts following
relatively boring and highly predictable lines. Thus types of people become
established and these people behave in typical ways. The process of interaction
is a two way process in which typical behaviour is expected from all members of
a group once it is established. Members start to have expectations of other
people - even when that expectation is that the "other person" will be
"difficult". Thus, interactions are not governed and predominated by the idea
that it is always possible to negotiate and establish an "acceptable" set of roles
and scripts for members of groups, simply that for the most part, they tend to
be predictable.

An important concept in this process of interaction is that the process
determines the rules, and not the other way round. In so far as a set of rules
exist, it is because individuals have explored the intentions, reactions and
attitudes of others and have reached an agreement on roles, scripts and so on.
This initial process of that negotiation, the "sniffing out" as the author puts it,
are very important. During the initial process, the sort of "self" that a person
wishes to be seen as, is presented, accepted or rejected and an infrastructure of
expectations on everyone's part comes into being. It cannot be emphasised too
greatly that the set of agreements are not necessarily to be co-operative - but
they do tend to be predictable - or at least, people believe this to be the case.

One of the more important explorations and "sniffings out" in the RHA
must have been those which have led to the powerful Heads of Division group.
That process continues on each issue of importance which gets decided. The
process of establishing a new RHA objective is very much this sort of
negotiation. For example, there are several ways in which the Regional
Personnel Officer and I can start off and run in a major project. He might
want one of his people to get a particular piece of experience - I might think
that I want to have a certain influence. For example, we both had specific sub-
objectives in mind when launching the mental handicap review. He wanted a
training officer to participate in a particular way and I wanted a particular
analysis done. Some of those sub-objectives were concerned quite definitely
with my own image in the RHA, namely being the hard headed "objective" type.
So we haggled and eventually a set of rules for running that scheme evolved out
of the process.

It must be emphasised that such agreements are not for all time and are
not to be taken for granted. Examples are given of straight refusals to play the
expected negotiated roles and to fulfil the implicit agreements. Mangham
quotes the example of an interviewee who caused consternation by refusing to
answer questions. Few of these agreements are explicit. All of them are
available for re-negotiation all the time, Mangham maintains -

"All situations, even the most routine and least problematic, are
created and sustained by the interpretations and actions of those
involved. Even the most boring and predictable situational script is
dependent upon and is only kept going by its members and may, within limits, be changed by its members."

A second related theme is that though this process of interaction, individuals create, change, and maintain definitions of reality for themselves to which they are committed tenaciously and which they bring to all interactions and negotiations.

One of the outstanding examples of both of the above themes is the gradual change which I am bringing about in what I allow Dr. Hunt to say about the Computer Department and how I allow him to use their services. When I had to intervene in the Laboratory project, I had no alternative but to accept whatever he did. After the size of mistake which had been made, and taking into account all my other objectives, I had to take whatever he chose to hand out in order to stay in the arena. The last sentence is a very appropriate way of describing a definition of reality which I had to accept. But the minute that the pathologists and Dr. Hunt started to rely on my judgement and to need my help, it was possible to start demanding recognition for services rendered. Personnel have now changed on this project - I have done this. If anyone chooses to comment on the new team, they are now careful to acknowledge their usefulness and live within the accepted limits of social life in the RHA. Eastbury is now dependent on our goodwill and that demands complete rehabilitation of my team. Even snide remarks about the past events are becoming rare.

Negotiating order on the basis of the above sorts of interaction is one of the main themes of the later book. Joint action is seen as one of the keys to understanding organisations and the nature of joint action is important. This is graphically described as "pulling and hauling" and "a moving pattern of
accomodative adjustments between organised parties". This dynamism
emphasises once again that it is the ongoing active processes in an organisation
which determine the rules at a given time - and not the other way around.

"The meanings that underlie established and recurrent joint action
are themselves subject to pressure as well as to reinforcement, to
incipient dissatisfaction as well as to indifference; they may be
challenged as well as affirmed, allowed to slip along without concern
as well as subjected to infusions of new vigour .......... It is the
social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not
the rules that create and uphold group life."

It is emphasised that the image of a rational and ordered organisation is a long
way from reality. Individuals and groups have different goals and different
levels of ability to achieve those goals. They do follow their own inclinations
within limits and such order as exists within organisations is a negotiated order
and is not determined by rules.

In the above paragraph, some very fundamental issues are mentioned and
it is useful to relate them to one of the big meta-themes in this thesis. The
fact is that I do not want to run an ordinary sort of Division as they appear to
exist in other parts of the NHS. Much of the action described is about how to
get hold of and do the more challenging projects. "Pulling and hauling",
"producing accommodation in other divisions", "infusing new vigour" are all
terms which catch the spirit of the quest for a better place for the Division, and
of course for me. Doing projects, helping and not threatening others, showing
management skills, divisng RHA objectives were part of the social process
which changed the rules which defined what a management services division is.
In a very real sense, the Division is accepted as what it is because it has done
what it has done. And a major reason for doing those things was that, within rules, I was inclined to do those things.

The book goes on to describe the factors influencing the negotiation of order and settles first on power.

"If we know the nature and disposition of power in an organisation, we are well on the way to knowing whose definition of situations will prevail. Power is the common currency of all negotiation and the basis of all social and organised behaviour."

Various types of power are identified, the most important and effective being those which rely on authority. "The boss is still the boss, even in these democratic days" illustrates authority. But power from the ability to reward is potent as well and takes a wide variety of forms apart from straight pecuniary advancement. Expert power is also widespread and is spreading rapidly with the advance of management and other technology. But all types of power need to be placed in a negotiating framework. Authority implies the existence of those who are willing to be led; expert advice implies that someone needs and will take it. "There is little point in threatening dismissal to a feckless drop-out", illustrates the complexity of using even blunt authority. In general, power is exercised within a constraining set of negotiations which are the essence of social interaction.

There is a long discussion of power in my own laboratory study. Different types are shown to exist, among them, the expert power referred to above. The interplay of different sorts of power and the exercise of them in differing circumstance is a theme in both this book and my thesis.

It is rarely the case that all power lies on one side of the negotiation, nor is it the case that power is necessarily the dominant factor in a negotiation,
although this is often true. Subordinates, even a storeman, can have sole access to certain types of information which gives him almost absolute power in a particular case - especially to mount a blocking action. Personal characteristics such as assertiveness or extreme submission play a major part in determining the outcome of an negotiation. Interpersonal factors such as the need to be included in a group, the need to control or the need for affection may determine a person's position in an interchange. The range of behaviours is illustrated by "The effective operator recognises when to assert, when to form alliances and coalitions, when to keep quiet, when to present himself as a warm human being and so on". These themes can be illustrated from our own powerful Heads of Divisions meetings. Alliances and pressing common objectives have been described in my analysis of the diary data. On the whole, members of that group present themselves as warm human beings to each other. But, each Head of Division can become very assertive if an issue causes disagreement.

Mangham refers to non personal factors, such as company policy, which constrain the negotiation. His books maintain that these "brick walls" are often not as solid as might appear at first sight. But the obverse is also true and that which appears negotiable turns out not to be. An example of a "brick wall" which I believed existed was the extreme reluctance to use R & D monies for evaluation. But it was. Negotiated accommodation for computer staff was an intractible problem that I completely underestimated. Judging what can be made possible inevitably gives rise to misjudgements if sights are not being set low.

The discussion of negotiated order takes place in a wide context and it is impossible to include all of the points made. But it would be wrong not to
mention three interpersonal skills which the author sees as vital to being an effective negotiator.

The first is given the title "The definitional or awareness dimension". Most people have at least some awareness of what is really going on most of the time. Few people "get the wrong end of the stick" consistently. Past experience plays a large part in determining our ability to grasp complex situations but the skilled negotiator must develop this kind of discrimination and awareness. Secondly, it is necessary to be technically competent to "put over" a given message. Aggressive behaviour is counter-productive if it is interpreted as being petulant or childish. Thirdly, giving the actual performance in a negotiation is different from being technically competent to negotiate "To perform effectively is to realise in action one's definitions and one's technical ability".

All three of the above points illustrate the difficulties of being able to perform in a political arena. That actual process deserves to be researched in its own right. Managers spend many years trying to develop the necessary skills to perform well. Knowing the theory of how to negotiate order might help; it certainly does not guarantee success and many managers who do not know any theory perform exceedingly well. In the diary there are many instances of my modifying my behaviour during meetings. There is a graphic description of judging when people had jumped off the fence on my side, persuading others to join them and isolating the rest. That performance had all of the parts suggested above.

Conclusion

There is a sense in which the last paragraph of the review of Mangham's books is a summary of the main problem which is addressed in this thesis. How
do people actually perform the change agent role? The elaboration of the negotiation of change in this thesis seems to me useful. But, it is the actual individual performance which matters.
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1: £1 : £3 24.11.77 I am on a visit to a Northern Region to see RMDS 1 and 2 about National Statistics Review. 
By chance I come across all the documents to which Martin Williams had access in Northern Region. I now knew what his 
"bluff" was for visits to areas and Districts looks like. The following questions are arising in my mind: (a) Is it safe to give it to him? (b) At what cost? (c) He is doing the wrong job. (d) But he must be made happier.

2 : £3 25.11.77 Departmental Heads meeting.

1 : Talking on Martin and Ralph. I have said that I want further thoughts on this. Is Ralph being used to his best advantage?

4 : In an attempt to get the conversation going on the Martin front, I strove into deep waters about Ralph. The basic situation was as follows: -
(a) Ralph's presentation of Care Group Monitoring to the HQ audience had been adversarial.
(b) I am realized that he could not cope with the theory and that I had got to get this back from him.
(c) There are different views around of what Ralph wants and what he can contribute.
(d) The issue is still on the table. Is Ralph an effective communication channel with Martin?
(e) Ralph believes that Martin will not be able to change his ways.
(f) We disagree about the wisdom of tackling RTO numbers separately. If Martin wants to read, is it our responsibility to do something about it? etc etc. His lack of briefing is his fault.
(g) The independent status of Ralph keeps showing through. (i) I am co-ordinated by Martin. (ii) I will not sit around his corridor like Barry Hunt (iii) Martin ryptical
(h) Ralph perceives the same dangers as I do in giving Martin a digest of simple data
(i) Interests in theory - (i) Peter does was wishing to get into deeper water about Martin and Ralph (ii) Tony Peers detested Ralph's new (iii) Simon was dead uncomfortable, objected violently and yet went on to analyse the Ralph situation such more wussy than anyone. Ralph wants AMO, Ralph needs articles.

3 : £12 : 1.12.77 In the afternoon, I did a different sort of polishing to take place when Lionel Down came to talk to Simon Ross. I meant about the work which Francis is doing as the HCO paid for North Area!!
20 : £17 : 14.12.77 at the monitoring Committee today, Luke Downs tried to get yet another stupid version of a monitoring Programme on capital/revenue running through the committee.

21 : £18 : 14.12.77 Tony Peers and I took the careful strategy through the monitoring Committee today. Big Luke just couldn't see where the others ended and was to be blamed. Chairman went through it all bit by bit. Normally asked why we were at the bottom of system suppliers. Martin did not say a word. Chairman was surprised at the hard line being taken on staff control. Surprising how the members picked up bits affecting their own status, e.g. Regions Data Protection Group is under their influence. We went through the capital and revenue size of the paper in some detail.

Discussion lasted one and three quarter hours.

22 : £20 : 17.12.77 The computer at Newton was bought secondhand at least six years ago. It has been giving a great deal of trouble due to the testers in the machine. The costs are very high and parts are difficult to obtain. The engineers have been taking parts from another machine in order to keep this one running. We have a programme in the strategy to replace these machines by new machines. We have not made the case for replacing the Newton machine through the methods which we have adopted in the policy.

23 : We have received free Luke Downs a memo saying that he is not satisfied with the case for replacing the Newton machine. The fact that the way in which cases to the RTO should be presented has not been specified, has given him ample opportunity to have a whale of a time and generally to talk about technical details which are quite irrelevant to the main issue. I shall be forced to make Tony Peers carry out the instructions which we are in the process of agreeing and I have no doubt whatever that Luke Downs will be as awkward as he can be about the whole thing. We are building up a glorious example of how policy and methods will be determined by practice. There will be a great deal of aggro in the system until this issue is resolved. In this particular case, I am bound to say that Management Services is to blame for setting up the rules and not obeying them. Of course Luke is making all that he can out of this situation. I suggest that one lesson which we ought to learn from this is that we must be much more watertight about our whole practice than we are being at the present time. Tony Peers say find this very irksome.

24 : I can anticipate already the various reactions of Tony Peers to this situation. The replacement machine does appear in the strategy. There is how considerable pressure from Newton to replace the machine since the present one is not functioning at all satisfactorily. All the HQ set up are going to get a very bad name in North Area for nesting about in this way. This will be another bad example of the present chaotic management arrangements in HQ and the way in which major decisions are bouncing around the organisation for far too long because of the way in which the RTO does not operate.

25 : £21 : 17.12.77 Sometimes Luke Downs attempted to obtain a terminal for HQ. It was done in such a manner as to break all the rules in existence. He had a spare £10,000 to £15,000 which he wished to spend. No one had ratified this. He had prepared a report himself and he tried to push this through the RTO. He also tried to obscure the requirements of other users. In short, we brought him back onto the tracks very forcefully. There was a major confrontation with him with Henry Jacobs using an HQ team to look into the requirement, the location of the terminal, etc.

26 : £23 : 21.12.77 Set up Liaison groups. At this point in time, we still have not managed to set up the various groups which we agreed should come into existence on the 1st August 1977. The reasons for the delay to the best of my memory are as follows: (a) There has been considerable misunderstanding by the Areas about the functions of the Groups. (b) North Area, in particular, have made a mess of the nominations and have put an accountant on all of the Groups including the Works and Medical Groups! (c) We had a meeting with all of the chairmen of the Groups at which I explained the function of the new major Groups. This took an awful long time to set up. In the event, many of the major participants did not turn up. The paper which was promised at that meeting has still not been produced by Tony Peers and myself.

27 : £22 : 18.12.77 At short notice two RMSUs and I arranged to see Head Office on the review of statistics. They met before lunch and got half canned. It was a very political meeting. One gave point after point after point. I ended up watching my own side more than the opposition.

28 : £24 : 2.1.78 I start the New Year with an almost complete lack of faith in the RTO and its being able to do anything effective to further the work of my Division.

29 : Martin does not read anything. He does not understand monitoring. He is committed to back-of-envelope planning. He is committed to one page/distinct statistics. He understands medical staffing - I think - and that is all.

30 : Betty - nice - waiting to retire - lost - pretty ineffective.


32 : Carl. Sit weak. OK really.

33 : £24 : 6.1.78 I am recording three days after the event a disastrous RTO at which I substituted for Henry Jacques who was ill.

34 : First, they abandoned the agenda and insisted on discussing Betty's replacement. Giff Reynolds was called in. No warning of what to bring. Martin complained of lack of courtesy in not letting him have the implications - all sorts of innuendos about suggesting delays, lack of openness, etc.

35 : When we did get onto the agenda - typical stropiness. Martin insisted on the administration of the Oncology contribution from RHA in North Area - and then he toned down my letter!

36 : £27 : 5.1.78 The 7502 and Patient Admin computer decisions were discussed with increasing irritation to GO, Nipicking decisions are bouncing around the organisation for far too long because of the way in which the RTO does not operate.

37 : £27 : 11.1.78 A situation has evolved of the utmost complexity. (a) The RTO is planning courses of action and not following them regarding Patient Admin computer and 7502.

38 : £27 : 17.1.78 During the whole of this factional Management meeting, I was definitely controlling with a view to getting a 1st rate precision into the way in which the caiys project was being run by both Dorothy Pine and Henry Martin. There are numerous ends around which had not been tied up. Some of these ends were exceedingly important and concern Head Office and their negotiations with staff committees. These had not been done and I was very cross. It was also clear that
neither Dorothy nor Martin understood how the decisions were going to be made by Cliff and myself. We are clearly not in a position of having that Vatsys meeting running at all smoothly and I think this reinforces the case for taking it as a part of my work.

Today a Vatsys meeting took place at which Cliff Reynolds being absent, I took the chair. I showed a degree of toughness throughout the meeting.

1. An incredible number of ends just are not tied up and I put into Dorothy and Henry.

2. Head Office have not cleared Vatsys post with the National Unions. As Tony Peers rightly pointed out, this could cost six months. Head Office person has left!

3. Dorothy and Henry Martin just do not understand that OR and OR are the final arbitrators on this. Yet result - one extra unnecessary round of national negotiation?

4. Head Office Group communications not working.

5. Even the minutes of the meeting were drafted wrongly after I had authorised the timetable.

6. There is considerable conflict with planning work. Jacques is over-ruling priorities for Dorothy and Peter Tibbs.

7. Dorothy's womanliness came out. I was unreasonably! Ref!

8. Henry Jacques is ad hoicing too much.

I have a problem - controlling my power.

My main problem is to get Peter Tibbs doing some work according to plan - not according to Henry Jacques ad hoicing. 1977 Plans have not been done according to plan and Peter Tibbs is doing a rescue on some fronts. But he is supposed to be designing next year's planning methods.

I have some notes sometime ago on an interchange which I had with North Area. Most of this concerns William Lee. I had written a paper on Lionel's department saying what to me was quite obvious. It did not alter the fact that I spent a great deal of time making sure that I wrote it carefully so it could not be used against Lionel.

I did this because I thought that William Lee could use the paper in all sorts of ways. It had been pointed out to me by Simon that I might have let myself into a situation which I certainly had not anticipated.

In the event, William Lee did use the paper in a variety of ways. It is interesting to note that in fact I got trapped with doing that work by not paying attention to the consequences of what I said in front of the DAs and As in North Area. Characteristics that I noticed in this work was the way in which William changed tack in various places. When he said that he liked the paper I became exceedingly happy. But understanding judgements and network. His use of politics is great and it was quite clear to me that this was the way in which it would be useful to him. In subsequent dealings with this paper I have been exceedingly careful.

The main event this week was a Day meeting with the three managers and Ralph to discuss the affairs of the Division. Despite asking allowance for Simon's flu, the day was a disaster.

The main argument this week has concerned Peter Tibbs' work. Henry Jacques has been told that there is only Peter and one scientist to do OR work around here.

I have got to write a paper on MSD Objectives:

(a) enacted (if possible scientific reproducible change)

(b) Change of Ethics (i) measurable objectives and timescales (ii) Science based

(c) Control at all levels - Policy to operations

(d) Scientific in character

(e) Change to be obtained

(f) Hypothetically

(g) Careful classification and

I need his backing on monitoring. What do I do about Martin and Ralph?

I have a problem - controlling my power.

Yesterday, Ralph and I pinned down Martin for a while. The topic was the work programme for the Division. He listened. He made snide comments. He made noises about doctor supremacy in the field of community medicine. He feels threatened.

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(f) Hypothetically

(g) Careful classification and

I need his backing on monitoring. What do I do about Martin and Ralph?
56: 2:40: 20.3.78 At the Henry Jacques meeting on Objectives today, we go into Middle East. It is a glorious example of a Henry Jacques project. Business only knows what is driving him, but he has pushed it through, against odds for little apparent gain - at least initially. Since he has to pinch resources he is alienating even his lieutenants. And he must know that he is doing it.

57: 2:40: 20.3.78 He had a meeting with Head Office about planning forms. I felt I was feeling for it. It has a good command of her planning management. I think we just uncoupe how to fill in these forms and publish then as a special volume for Head Office. It will cause more aggravation not to do it. And so we do it.

58: 2:40: 20.3.78 A glorious example of Martin not understanding mentoring is around. He is negotiating Oncology (HPCP) and, in fact, the Henley Programme is a highly structured entity which neither he nor the University the ISC fellow (who is also getting involved) understands. Is he determined to break the system? Is he clever enough to think like that? He is heading for disaster - with the Chairman and the Authority. Yet he goes on. And yet Henry Jacques clings to be glad that he is using the correct words.

59: 2:40: 20.3.78 Another example in the battle of computer staff accommodation occurred. Henry Jacques is supposed to be extracting from Chris Judd the HQ and the Elizabeth cottages. Elizabeth is more important so he extracted Dow House! He is afraid of even asking C.J. So we go on crisis to crisis. I secretly hope that the JCS take him to bits (and it did). 60: 2:40: 20.3.78 I have a sort of love/hate relationship with Henry Jacques. My principle hate is that I want a decent research team which I cannot get. And yet, he is the best RA in the country.

61: 2:45: 21.3.78 I went to inspect another Region's Computer building today. How do we get Avon to give us the same? And do I really want to do it?

62: 2:49: 22.3.78 I had a long session with Tony Peers and Ralph Raines about the rejection by the National Computer R&D Committee of the GP Project. Despite the fact that it had been put together in close liaison with Head Office, it was rejected. But there is something around this than I feel. I discover that the Professor did not perform well at our presentation.

63: 2:49: 22.3.78 There was a meeting with Dill Reynolds, David James and Walter Arne yesterday. We discussed bids for staff, power and work. My evidence is that Henry Jacques will not make decisions on priorities. He will not win against Luke and Martin if they decide to go for staff. Even this remark is an indication of the morale of Administration. We have no method of controlling demand to stay within resources.

64: 2:48 I am attempting to get control of Tony's staff control situation. I feel that I have been subjected to "Dual Control Maneuvering" and lost control of 33 staff control points as a result. It's a clever trick. Get two inconsistent control systems and swap from one to the other according to the way in which advantage lay.


66: This morning I tried to analyse "Why I wish to visit Freda Siam before she comes to Highcroft". See page 27 of my Research Notes.

67: 2:50: 28.3.78 The Aven Data Protection Group has set down principles governing confidentiality in Aven. The Treasurers seem to want to access their files from terminals. Luke Downs has been pressing for this for months but the necessary Codes of Practice and other safeguarding practices have not been defined. Henry Jacques wrote officially to the Administrators asking for Areas' authority to grant this permission. The South Area said "No" and some of the rest said a sort of "Yes". Luke Downs drafted a "set of rules" with authorisation and got the Treasurers to sign them. Tony argues that he now has Area Authority to act and has done so. The lines of authority are not clear. The interarea code of practice for accounting is inadequate. The line of authority from the ADM is unclear.

68: But all of the above is really a minor aspect of the problem. Does Luke Downs see himself as being as helpful as possible or is this a manoeuvre? If so, is it stupid or not? How do we reassert the correct line of authority when it does not exist?

69: 2:51, 253, 28.3.78 Diary Note on the Development of Planning Methods 1978/79

70: The background to this development is that last year there was a radical change in the way planning was conceived at the Regional level. Henry Jacques became dissatisfied with the level of conceptualisation which was the background to the planning system being used. Taking a book by a man called Argent, he developed a set of concepts which involved goals and ways to get them. Having determined ideal goals, one was inevitably led to the conclusion that these were unobtainable and the idea of making a compromise and deciding on something which could be obtained was born. Although there had been attempts to do this by setting up investment frameworks as they were called in the years previous to last year, these ideas had not been developed fully. The last stage in the Henry Jacques sequence was to use the interarea goals to determine for each of the Areas what they could have from the projected available capital. Using this projected available capital allocation to each Area, the Areas themselves could decide what particular schemes were to be undertaken within the guidelines which have been set down by the Regional tier.

71: It is clear that embedded in the centre of such a way of planning was the need to develop options from which RHA Members could choose. A manpower planner had suggested a way of using staff which was the main revenue consumer, as a way of calculating what care group development could occur. It rapidly became clear that although the calculation had been designed roughly, there was no capacity to be created fast enough by manual methods. This led to the method being computerised and it also led to the co-operation of other techniques alongside the manpower planning method in the option generation game. The whole process carried out last year including this late development in the Autumn, had begun to make it down on Henry Jacques that the numerical methods being used for planning left a very great deal to be desired. This being the case, it was inevitable that Management Services started to play a bigger role in developing these methods.

72: The major step came when it was decided to split the planning process into two distinct parts - namely, the development of a Regional plan itself and the development of methods which would be used in the generation of the plan. This latter activity was given wholly over to the Management Services Division and the net result is that I am responsible for co-ordinating all Divisional activities on this issue. This involves Treasurers, Personnel, Planners and ourselves. The mechanism by which this is being done in practice is for one of my lieutenants to officially co-ordinate the activities of these people from other Divisions. In actual fact, of course, we are playing a leading role in this and co-ordination is a slightly misleading word. It is in fact direct leadership and often direct management.
73: The situation starts to become interesting from an organisational point of view when one starts to vet this process and the role assigned to some in the organisation. Officially there is a large group of staff who are involved in the role and just below who oversee all of the planning activities this year and take decisions if the planning activity is falling behind the time. This was thought to be necessary because of the straight forwardness that the timetable got into last year with the net result that everyone was working on Christmas Eve and throughout the Christmas holiday trying to complete the plan. It remains to be seen whether this group of people will make any difference whatever to that process. It seems to me inevitable that David James who is in charge of planning and I will take the positive decisions which keep the process on track.

74: Another interesting bit of the theoretical decision making process is that the RTO will decide between different methods for producing the plan. There is now a quite full timetable of activities up to the end of the year involving the RTO at monthly intervals. The RTO is supposed to take important decisions on policy and so on which will be the basis of the plan. The timetable also includes meetings of Members of the Authority who form the planning pattern. Again, the idea is to keep these informed so that their wishes come to be met by the plan. It is interesting to note that the main principle methods of decision have already been taken by myself. I have curtailed developments to limits which I think are attainable and no one is going to argue with that decision. I suspect that in the case of the Committees, we will find that the only person who exercises influence is the Chairman of the Regional Health Authority. I will attempt to keep a check on whether this proves to be the case.

75: This morning David James and myself were supposed to meet the RTO and to go through the timetable and sequence of actions which they were going to take over the next year as devised by ourselves. The first thing that happened was that David James was hauled off to interview a Planning Nurse. Such an event could have been foreseen months ago but for some odd reason was not. It is interesting to note the set of priorities which enable the new Regional Nursing Officer to haul David into the interview process at five minutes notice and to cancel this important commitment on his part. David's deputy came into the RTO with me to take the RTO through the paper which we had prepared. 

76: The sequence of events in the RTO cannot be recorded because it was impossible for me to take notes and so I am forced to record a series of impressions. It is interesting to note that for the first half I saw on Martin Williams' copy quite copious notes demonstrating that he had read and criticised the document. In fact some of his comments were exceedingly intelligent and very helpful. It shows that the chap has got considerable ability if he chooses to apply it. Carl V., latched onto the arguments which we have had with Head Office over planning methodology for the last few years. He was easily re-secured that there is no way in which this process can be made to work. It is difficult to persuade, in fact there is quite considerable difficulty arising from our methods and this concerns the relationship between a Regional Strategic Plan and the District Operational Plan. Despite the fact that Head Office are unhappy about our methods, the only possible response for them is not attacking us is the fact that their own methods have got a similar result embodied in them as well.

Luke Downs was also in quite a constructive mood and only went off at a tangent once. As is usual he plugged the importance of his own discipline. I agreed with some of the points that he was making but it was a pity that he had not applied them to the wider field, where incidentally they applied equally well. My general impression of this particular RTO was that it was a very constructive affair. There was little acrimony about, many intelligent comments were made. In fact, it was quite a good meeting.

77: It is interesting to speculate on the importance of that meeting. It was purely about obtaining their commitment to a process, in fact, they did not contribute anything to the methodology of very great significance although some of the points that they made about the details were very valid. During last year when the timetable badly went wrong, acrimony crept in during the summer and the autumn. The general analysis of the problem was that as individuals they were not committed to the process which had been thought up by Henry Jacques in the mail. It will be interesting to watch whether or not this careful and nurturing of the RTO and programming them into a sequence of events, obtains the commitment which we need.

78: It could be argued that from many points of view the whole of the two hours spent this morning achieved very little. It was needed because the structures meant that to delegate responsibility to either David or myself would prove to be unacceptable to the egos of the RTO. In the middle of the discussion there was an interesting sequence in which we were discussing Peter's role on co-ordinating officers particularly from Luke Downs' Treasurer's Department. It was clear that Luke saw us usurping his right to control. In fact I spent quite sometime pointing out in a rather two faced manner that by going to them once a month this was their chance to be involved and this was the case that in fact officers will be working to the programming work which we have designed. It is interesting to reflect that there is no one who has got the authority to put together the working multi-disciplinary team in the organisation by right. It would only be Members of the Authority who could order people to form such a team. It is also interesting to speculate on how Management Services, especially myself, will use this to exploit it and by a series of threats, will attempt to persuade other people that they must carry out the tasks which we have assigned to them. This is on the assumption that at some stage things get difficult. Maybe they won't but this was not the case last year. But certainly it is a fact that at the end of the day I have a rather peculiar sort of authority to make that team work.

79: ESZ: 29.3.78: I went to see Wayne Cook today with Tony Peers. I came away very disturbed. He is an Area Administrator in his mid-thirties. I know that he has never stayed in a job for more than two years. Just enough time to make a splash - not enough time to make anything work properly. He has cultivated all the habits of a tough young manager - appearance, pleasantness, ruthlessness.

80: The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss West's response to Region's computer strategy. He wishes to set up a working party to consider that response. Tony Peers is to be on that working party. It may be that he intends to support that work. It may be that this working party will generate the commitment that is needed to make the strategy work.

81: We had a long debate about the responsibilities of Service Departments. In what sense am I responsible for the managerial effectiveness of the work of the Division? The logical theoretical argument is "not at all". But, in fact, managers do not often possess the necessary skills to perform this task effectively for themselves. An objective must be precisely defined in measurable terms, without big loopholes, if the extent to which it has been achieved is to be seen.

82: I came away with mistrustings. To what extent can, do I want, would it be profitable to the NHS, to work with Wayne Cook?

83: ESS: 31.3.78: I spent the morning with my Heads of Department at the monthly meeting. There are few inter-Departmental activities in the Division. I structured the meeting much more intensively than hitherto and everyone was a lot happier. It is interesting to note that I put Tony on the defensive right from the word go by pointing out that they had not done the task requested - the only task. All sorts of hot air came out as a result of that challenge.
84 : E53 : 31.3.78 I went to see Elizabeth in order to test out an approach to Freda Sim on Monday. It was worthwhile and reassuring and I shall try it openly. The subject is going to be ATD support or development work carried out by ATD.

85 : E57 : 31.3.78 During our testing this morning, I brought up the issue of the Divisional role and its responsibility (or inability) to develop systems work and continue to care. Tony Peer's pushed the logic of the monitoring approach. This is not the most interesting aspect of this episode. In fact, having lost some control to Tony, I am now getting back the initiative.

81 : E58, E59 : 1.4.78 At a later stage in the day, I was discussing with Horace Kay, the OS Scientist that we have got, the implications of limiting the development of the planning methods to be used. I was considering in the first instance whether more sophisticated methods could be made available and accessible to the OS Managers throughout the Region and that the strategic perspectives proposed by TF was not an issue I will raise important with the OS staff that I have got? There is a strong case for saying that the cost that I should do would be the least that would make the OS happy. At the end of the day, what is the importance of getting right the Regional Plan which is still mainly capital resource orientated? I strongly believe that we need to get stuck into basic management effectiveness in connection with the operational services which we are running. The major effect of the present plans being manufactured by the Region is to try to obtain a shift in resources from the acute sector into the deprived care categories such as the elderly and mental illness. It could be argued that a quite sophisticated mathematical calculation has been used to underpin a very crude club like blow which has attempted to divert the NHS from its usual course of giving the acute services all of the lolly. Why is the sophistication necessary? It has certainly dressed up the plan in new robes and given it a status that makes it more or less impossible to the arguments of the acute service managers and yet I know that they are not going to let that be. There are already signs that North Area in particular is preparing an attack for getting back most of the money into the acute sector. At that point in time, what sort of arguments do we apply which will save the day for the deprived care categories?

87 : Any effective argument is going to have to be using the same sort of gross political tools that North Area have used. They will be arguing that present mental illness and mental handicap and elderly facilities could be upgraded (to use the euphemism of Dr. Loom) and whatever these deprived care categories will not get the "super duper" treatment that will be handed out to the acute hospitals. At the end of the day is it going to come down to an argument about who can supply the best sort of political evidence to make the case of the deprivation of the deprived care groups and what will be the tactics of that particular battle? Certainly they will not be sophisticated mathematical tools.

88 : EGO : 1.4.78 Our ears were created open, our mouth shut!

89 : I saw Freda Slim today. I wanted to talk about the performance of the ATD and in particular how it is affecting the development of the management systems in Avon. I went through the following steps in order to get onto this difficult topic.

(1) I appealed to Freda's sense that the management environment for development was all important - especially at the highest level.

(2) I blamed myself for the lack of success.

(3) I gently explored the Martin Gillian background - North Region is not Avon etc.

(4) I explored objectively what has gone wrong with, for example, monitoring.

(5) I introduced Freda's stress - not reading, not being educated, not listening very attentively - and talked about out lack of success.

(6) I talked about Henry Jacques' strengths and their consequences for development work, e.g. he expects too much of other people's logic, power, etc.

(7) At this point the conversation had become pleasantly, constructively open, rapport established at a pretty high level.

90 : Now I had worked for that very hard by preparation, control in the meeting - I put on the right suit, made quite sure that Freda was treated with courtesy and attentiveness, came out from behind my desk, given her the best seat, etc. then

(1) We talked about RHA Objectives, their status and ATD members commitment to them.

(2) We began to think of the work programme - her reaction to it.

(3) We talked about the contribution which Simon, Tony and Peter could make.

(4) I talked about the Martin Gillion background - North Region is not Avon etc.

(5) I explored objectively what has gone wrong with, for example, monitoring.

(6) I introduced Freda's stress - not reading, not being educated, not listening very attentively - and talked about out lack of success.

(7) I talked about Henry Jacques' strengths and their consequences for development work, e.g. he expects too much of other people's logic, power, etc.

(8) At this point the conversation had become pleasantly, constructively open, rapport established at a pretty high level.

91 : E62 : 2.4.78 I held another meeting with Peter, Dorothy Pines, Frank Sims, Roger Hughes and Simon to co-ordinate action and to check difficulties.

92 : We agreed work programme yet, Peter Tibbs is not worried. Does not consider the repercussions of this on team or that of his attitude. Dorothy put on her usual show - to which I reacted. Peter has got problems - he has got to push the system to get results - Dorothy is out there now being as nice as pie to him. Peter has "power" - he is not handling it well. He resents my interference - too bad. I carry responsibility and I refuse to abdicate that role. I need to think about Peter as an example of power.

93 : E63 : 2.4.78 I have been reading Brian Abel Smith on Hospitals 1800 - 1948. The historical perspective given by 150 years is a thought provoking experience. What was it that transformed a meagre provision in 1800 to quite a comprehensive system in 1970? The amount of legislation is fantastic. The fights against conservative/puritanical ethics and various forms of professional self-seeking are numerous. What are the inbuilt brakes today and more important what is tomorrow's vision?

94 : E64 : 2.4.78 A Nat.Sys Management meeting occurred yesterday and there was a significant improvement over the last meeting. Due to pressure from me, a third was knocked off the time to produce the last two print outs. Henry Martin is starting to feel the pressure of this project. Last night, I have slipped up in that I have failed to process the memo which Henry Martin sent to Off on staff for phase 2. So much flows across my desk that I have an inadequate grasp of its progress. Second, I feel that the system is so complex that the probability of its not working is very high and so I have got to keep a firm grip on it. And yet I can't manage it.

95 : E65 : 2.4.78 I talked to Off Reynolds about the effects of Luke Downs on the management of ATD yesterday. Luke Ross will leave probably because he cannot stand Luke Downs. I do not think that this should be tolerated. Yet Off Reynolds is not saying "Ross" he says "Ross". Difficult.
Consultants involved are actually worried about this. The whole situation is complex beyond measure and, now, realise that this cannot possibly bring about a satisfactory definition of a monitoring programme. One wonders whether the University are being involved in the design of an exercise which they do not understand. One starts to question whether Martin Oncology monitoring is probably the latest.

Region and to obtain Regional backing since it is essentially a Regional service. Such manoeuvrings have included personal Committee. Hence B. of Ralton and Graham Pate are coming along for the Domestic Services. 'He have also made a mistake in become submerged and have nothing done about it. The real value of this problem is not that it is a computer problem, it is prevention, research, and things of this nature. Since much of the actual care took place by Consultants scattered throughout.

certainly do not understand what the requirements are. Thus we have got a situation in which the epidemiology services in the Centres themselves were poorly financed in the first place but nevertheless attracted in due course of time Professorships of Oncology which in themselves tended to provide a power base.

The treatment of cancer is in any case a very odd specialty in the Health Service and depending on how one is referred to the Oncology Centre in Southtown was not provided with beds when it was set up and the Professor arrived in post with only attempts on his part, I made it quite clear that our only part in this was to find out whether or not a programme had been designed. He made the point several times that his type of monitoring would not fit into the Avon pattern. It is also clear that he has got a bee in his bonnet about the need to co-ordinate this and eventually Ralph agreed, under pressure, to write a letter to them setting out some sort of objectives and co-ordinating role.

The other major part of the meeting was dealing with Simon Moss and the statistics programme. We talked for a long time about the development of his little book and he seems to think that we should be able to do better than the North Region's version. I must get Simon to go and see him to discuss this issue in the near future.

We agreed to meet again for another hour to discuss the progress being made and I must agree with Ralph in about three weeks time what subjects to tackle.

A major part of the meeting concerned the monitoring of the Oncology Service. It was pointed out to him that this was not being supported by the Division but was being done for him by the University. Despite repeated attempts on his part, I made it quite clear that our only part in this was to find out whether or not a programme had been designed. He made the point several times that his type of monitoring would not fit into the Avon pattern. It is also clear that he has got a bee in his bonnet about the need to co-ordinate this and eventually Ralph agreed, under pressure, to write a letter to them setting out some sort of objectives and co-ordinating role.

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107 : E73 : 11.4.78 A meeting with Henry Jacques and Peter Peers was inspired by the fact that domestic monitoring was to be discussed at tomorrow's Monitoring Committee. Henry Jacques had spent most of the previous evening with the Chairman. Many interesting points are now starting to come out of these conversations. It is clear that many of these are Chairman inspired.

It seems likely that Henry has become reconciled to the fact that he must take an expert on each programme to the Committee. Hence B. of Ralton and Graham Pate are coming along for the Domestic Services. We have also made a mistake in deciding that the actual programme is an appropriate document for the Monitoring Committee, since it is clear that many of their questions were not answered by the first part of the programme and yet we made the judgement that the second part was too complex for them.

An interesting note is Graham Pate's reaction to B. being invited by himself. It was also pointed out that Henry had not sufficiently involved the less in this particular piece of work. I had to send a note to Henry to try to get this cleared up at lunch time.

Oncology has got an incredibly complex history in Avon. Some years ago, Head Office set up three Oncology Centres in the country - one of which was in Avon. Their purpose was to determine whether or not such a service could provide an additional input to the care of cancer patients on a Regional basis. The main emphasis was on topics like prevention, research, and things of this nature. Since such of the actual care took place by Consultants scattered throughout the Region, the Centres themselves were poorly financed in the first place but nevertheless attracted in due course of time Professorships of Oncology which in themselves tended to provide a power base.

The treatment of cancer is in any case a very odd specialty in the Health Service and depending on how one is referred to the first place, the treatment regime can vary enormously. There is a lot of ground for argument about what the most effective treatments are and this seems to vary immensely with the type of cancer that is being discussed.

To this adds up to a complex social/political set up in which people continually manoeuvre for positions. Thus the Oncology Centre in Southtown was not provided with beds when it was set up and the Professor arrived in post with only promises of facilities and none actually available. Since that time there have been various manoeuvres to try and sway the Region and to obtain Regional backing since it is essentially a Regional service. Such manoeuvrings have included personal visits to Martin, visits us to try and get much more statistical involvement and the whole series of manoeuvres of which Oncology monitoring is probably the latest.

Oncology monitoring should conform to the Regional system but as yet the people who have become involved in it certainly do not understand what the requirements are. Thus we have got a situation in which the epidemiology services in the University are being involved in the design of an exercise which they do not understand. One starts to question whether Martin realises that this cannot possibly bring about a satisfactory definition of a monitoring programme. One wonders whether the Consultants involved are actually worried about this. The whole situation is complex beyond measure and I am now sitting on the side line watching it develop.

I had a long chat with Steve Todd about the Computer Department Survey over the phone. We discussed the problems which had arisen in the Computer Department and agreed that somehow or other we could not allow this topic to become submerged and have nothing done about it. The real value of this problem is not that it is a computer problem, it is that it is the principal development problem for the NHS and applies to all systems development of every type.
115: I need to determine how on earth to involve Ron Smith in this work.
116: I also discussed with Steve the problem of Brown’s request for help from the Head Office GR Group. This concerns the Out Patients’ clinics. I have discussed this with our Development Nan and Ralph Rains. The point is that the real problem arises when new building Phase 3 opens and then it could possibly be counter-productive to have Brown vied for a system which (a) would not work in the new building and (b) could quite easily be not acceptable to his colleagues in that Outpatients clinic. On the other hand, with the view of a system that would work, he obtained his commitment to this by going to one of the Head Office Study Groups in Leeds. I have pointed out to Steve that in fact Head Office have operated successfully or seemingly successfully in North Area on a strategic plan problem. On the other hand, they have operated very unsuccessfully judging by local reaction in East Area. This says something about the way in which that particular group is capable of working and possibly something about individual members such as R, who is the guy operating in East Area. This goes back to my view that in fact local work requires a degree of commitment which you cannot get out of Head Office OR department as presently structured and fitted into the organisation.

117: ET 126:14:4:78 It is the Monitoring Committee today. North Area have been given a job by Region to sort out the operational problems of the report on Knightsbury. William Lee had sent a very short letter to the Committee and the Chairman blew his top. William was hauled back from holiday and had to give a forty minute rundown on their activities. He gave a superb political display which, considering that he can hardly see, deserves special mention. The Chairman and members grilled him but, having had their way and showed their power, they were very well mannered.

118: ET7 126:14:4:78 I need to write to RMS 3 about the Regional Planning Methods which we are developing because he is on this National Planning Committee.

119: An M.O. officer was pressing the need for a standards national control scheme for Incentive Bonus work. I need to make sure that he takes into account the need to delegate the overall running of these schemes and their control to INHS.

120: The management side of the Whitley Council appears to be seething aspects of bonus schemes including their control. Is there any method by which we can find out more fully what is going on?

121: I have been asked to choose the bonus scheme from the bonus scheme for the public sector staff whose measures need to be watched.

122: The Head Office letter on taking Incentive Bonus in the staff control scheme needs to be watched.

123: I need to talk to Simon and Ralph about the need to put together the Region’s comments on the Statistics paper.

124: It is interesting to note that the RMSs are preparing a note on the Y Y Z paper.

125: Is it possible for me to go to a 2 or 3 day seminar on distributed processing at Sutton on 24/25 May?

126: I need to suggest topics to M.J. Assistant Secretary.

127: ET8 126:4:4:78 The major content of this meeting concerned the Review of Statistics which is being undertaken by the NHS and Head Office at the present time. Swine were the Management Services Officers worked out a strategy for doing a major review of what is a major programme. £20 million per year is probably spent on collecting statistics and other information in the NHS. It is widely suspected in the NHS that Head Office jumped onto the bandwagon just as the train had been moving. There were various reasons why they should have done this - the main one being to preserve their own power in this sector. It may have been fortuitous but the fact is that Head Office is running down if anything at the moment and this was a particular field in which some very nice minor approximations of their work were possible.

128: Two RMSs and myself had prepared the paper for the Management Services Committee and the idea was that it should be sent through to the RAs who would then set up this major review. At approximately the same time, Head Office tried to steal the initiative by sending out a letter to the RAs saying that they were doing a preliminary survey. We have attacked them on this several times. One of the main initiatives has been to make the case and talk to the three Regions who had written the report during the time that they were doing a preliminary analysis of the problem.

129: Sometimes Head Office had started to do an exercise on this which really amounted to a simple 0 & P exercise on community statistics. This was a completely inappropriate thing to do because what was needed was a major questioning of the whole apparatus and mechanism for doing this job. This of course adds to the resentment that was felt in the NHS about the whole exercise and the way they have tried to take it over. The fact that their nan issued his letter to the NHS at the same time as our report was due to go to the RAs, was deemed by the NHS to be machination. Whether this is the case or not is not clear.

130: During the MDC meeting, all of the brighter RMSs spoke up. RMS 1 got onto his usual run trying to go over all of the old ground without making any real political point that would stick in the Department. RMS 3 was as usual more constructive but nevertheless on the whole played it at a fairly low key. As usual RMS 2 did his wise man act. I think it is true to say that in fact only I said some broad telling points at the meeting and I will describe what is wrong with this approach in these paragraphs.

131: The Review of Statistics is to be done then is a very big job indeed. It is no use trying to do that sort of consideration. I would include in such short term considerations most of the present planning system and most of the present ideas on monitoring, despite the fact that some are then are nine. There is ample justification for saying that planning in the NHS tends to have very little real effect when you get down to it and I instanced the fact that only that morning, Healey had announced £4 million for kidney machines whereas for the whole year, the priorities document had been saying that more and more money must go into community services. It is just a fact that politicians regard the NHS as one of their "play things" and it is interesting to note that David Owen in his book "Mickness and in Health" makes just that point. This being the case, this Review must either be latched onto operational issues which are not going to change whatever the colour of the Government or they must step right back and decide what from a health point of view would be useful information to have. In a sense and although I have heaped criticism on it in my time, hospital activity analysis was such a stand back. My main criticism of that system was always with the way it was set up and the way it was envisaged that people would use it was never worked out in detail. Nevertheless, if it were going to undertake a review of Statistics which might last several years, it is important that the timescale for such a development is considered carefully and taken into account.

132: ET9 126:4:4:78 One of the fundamental changes which is about to occur is the decontrolling of INHS staff. There are some pretty important principles around here and unless careful definition occurs from Head Office level, even is going to lose out as usual. The fact that our people are out at the Areas means that they will be able to nominate and de-control all sorts of people who do not work in this field. At the same time the Region has no method whatever for gaining any method of working better from this particular exercise.
As a very exceptional thing, they are agreeing to fund 50% of the accommodation for three years. Tony wants Henry Jacques to kill me. Goodness that it is a good relationship. Old hairy one of medical control of data. And N. wanted to know how Ralph and I got on. So we told him and thank OR and information. The M.O. is a fascinating study. Fundamentally lacking in every element of wisdom and yet brutally now wanting to relate together fiercely confidential work, national policy, our policy, resources commitment, etc. He claims I have been reading the BBC and apart from my notes, I was struck forcibly by the conflict issue. And yet I bet that we are in for a gross underspend next year.

The staff control system is a method of controlling the amount of "administration" done in the health services. Due to a grading quirk, s.s. staff are admin - and therefore controlled. For a variety of reasons the a.r. department was caught by the staff control freeze last year and lost one person. There has been a variety of promises to favour the development of numerical methods. Horace Kay avoided the Plan by the skin of its teeth last year. Profuse gratitude - marvellous thanks etc, etc, et-always-cetera. But when the chips are down, staff control is more important than decent work. At the end of the day, public service is worked on a non-creative system of obeying rules. There is no creative management.

I am frustrated with the NHS - The dead hand of admin - The Computer strategy force.

I spent another hour with Giff Reynolds and Henry trying to get a Nat System resource note to Henry. He is still trying to pretend that an alternative that Avon has is to not do Nat. System. Logically maybe - practically there is no way to do anything but slip into the old deep pocket and take it off the top. But the sheer stupidity of the pretense kills me.

NO rang as from Fordhaa today. Chris having left he is faced with the question of replacing or not, and he is trying to use the Avon model. He is currently saying no replacement without an integrated Division. Fordhaa is historically medically dominated. The present M.O. is being stupid and stubborn. I bet he wins and keeps control of OR and information. The M.O. is a fascinating study. Fundamentally lacking in every element of wisdom and yet brutally stubborn. I promised to do anything I could including talking to his members - if it would help. Fordhaa were off on the old hairy one of medical control of data. And N. wanted to know how Ralph and I got on. So we told him and thank goodness that it is a good relationship.

I am frustrated and angry because I cannot see any way of breaking into the stupidities of the bureaucratic system of management which we have got in the NHS. There is no way of breaking into this system, it spells death to management initiative and creativity - This outburst is based solely on the staff control nonsense.

I am decorating today on a day off. Tony Peers rang from Head Office today about Nat.Sys funding. As a very exceptional thing, they are agreeing to fund 50% of the accommodation for three years. Tony wants Henry Jacques to ring and say "thanks very much - how helpful". But this is not the Henry problem. Having committed himself hook, line and sinker to Nat.Sys in letters etc, he is trying to play games with it.
150: Four such machines on peripheral computers in Districts and areas exist and at least two more are scheduled this year. Customers, especially Wayne Cook, are pressing for these machines. Given present resources, the number of systems which we can write for these machines is small. Any economic evaluation of that workload will show, in my view, that for the next two years at least these machines are costly. It could be argued that the workload should be developed on one machine but the other customers would not wear that.

151: We have agreed that, ideally, developments must have measurable objectives which should be monitored over a given timescale. I produced the attached paper which was taken up by Head Office and there is now a body of literature which I can supply on this subject. The Avon position on the definition of measurable objectives is unsatisfactory in the following respects.

(a) Although Tony is willing to define timescales, etc., for the production of a system to a specified level of technical competence, he is not willing and probably lacks the competence to define customer objectives to an acceptable level of usefulness.

(b) I have a difference of view with Wayne Cook over the competence of Areas and Districts to define usable objectives. We also disagree over the roles of the HQ and Areas on monitoring, especially insofar as this applies to the achievements of benefits from computer systems. I take the view that a monitoring programme in which the HQ. at central level, and the Areas at a substantial role to play must be designed.

(c) I was in the process of discussing with Ron Smith and Steve Todd a project to investigate the problem of District knowledge about and commitment to the Computer Department work programme. I attach two papers on this - R15 (very rough draft) and R20. Peter is very keen to follow this through. I think that this type of work with Districts on objective setting (possibly wider than computer systems) must be undertaken if our investment in computers is ever: (i) to pay off reasonably fully and (ii) to be seen to be justified. Would you consider financing a research project to do this?

(d) You are obviously unhappy (and so am I) about our lack of definition of objectives. We need to agree a set of objectives in this field and decide where to get the necessary resources to achieve them. At the present time there is a gaping hole in our methods at this point.

152: Could we please discuss these issues?

153: Ralph reported the latest happening on the Oncology front. Steve Todd, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request at Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes.

154: It has taken Giff Reynolds three days to get the NATSYS memo into Henry's hands!

155: Peter returned from the Dental Committee today. The GPs have agreed to allow access to their major files - and this represents a major breakthrough. We can stick a Research Tag on this and so get round the staff control hang-up. Peter is hesitant because it might prove restricting in the longer term. But, the fact is that we have no short term all at present.

156: In comparison with last year, the preparation of methods is excellent. Once again the treasurers are behind. Not far out. The contrast with last year is tremendous. We got the organisation right. We got the launch right. I do not know whether the RTO know what is going on? Today we identified the decisions which have got to be made. I do not know whether I can get them made on Tuesday but the heat has gone out of the situation. Minor grumbles is all I can hear. Maybe next week on decisions is the crunch.

157: Public relations Sheila came to see me about confidentiality today. I chatted and she will write. I went to see Ralph about clearing it with Martin. He says Sheila must do it. It is getting to a point when he is avoiding like poison.

158: Four RMSOs met to discuss a corporate view on the development of OR in the NHS. Three very distinct points of view from my own were around - and there are ten other Regions. So what do we do? Please see the paper in my loose diary notes which I prepared later as a basis for talking to other RMSOs privately.

159: The contrast between Schmidt and Callaghan is fascinating and he made a virtue of muddling through. (a) It was fascinating to see both Schmidt and Callaghan in such force fully and (b) Schmidt contrast of German logic and British muddling through was fascinating and he made a virtue of muddling through.

160: In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin at his request from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to write in to confirm the discussion. Martin opens "Well what's this about Robert?" Anti immediately 'I don't know' and I can believe that [:]. In steps DJ started to take notes.
157: £107: 2.5.78 I have just had the usual frustrating experience of trying to get hold of Henry. I know that Pat is a top level small team man. He knows why I favour a lower level approach and we understand each other. Odd comments.

158: There is a telling remark about Grossman and Sob Hellish, men from opposite ends of the social spectrum. And Pellian is working on his. "As long as I am successful, he will be loyal to me." Successful in Bob Hellish's terms? How do I relate this to Tony Peers whose loyalty is on the wane. As opposed to Peter. Why the difference. Success for Peter is even worse than for Tony.

159: £109: 4.5.78 I have a severe problem in the Division relating to Peter's work and the way it relates to Simon and Tony. Apart from the demarcation issue, Tony has a major industrial relations problem at the Computer Centre. Earlier alienation is being further aggravated by the Henry Jacobs intransigence on accommodation, Nat. sec. etc. The RTO state is beginning to feed back to the lower levels.

160: £110: 8.5.78 I have just spent the day rewriting the Computer Policy and Strategy. To what purpose I would not know. I suppose that there will be available a document setting out in a very precise English a position which makes Henry happy. But the result of a new sort of document incorporating much of what has gone before plus some somewhat contentious material is hard to forecast.

161: £112: 8.5.78 At Divisional Heads this morning there was a very contentious argument about the effects of the computer replacement and the new building on H.Q. plans. David James was doing his usual trick of time-tableing the last possible decision time. Stiff Reynolds was trying to ease things through reluctantly coming to a crunch point which he does not like. Kaffer Annas getting down to brass tacks saying that a choice on the use of capital has got to be made. Eventually, having been all around the subject, it was put on next Monday's Objectives meeting. Yet we all know that Henry will kick it for touch. So I have just instructed Tony to take the building etc right to the IA Brief stage without Henry's permission.

162: £113: 12.5.78 I spent the last two days away from the office politicking.

163: Pat Robert's has joined the national OR Committee. I want to see him in Essex over lunch. I prepared what I was going to say quite carefully yet with the realization that I would have to play it by ear in a civilised way. The main messages were:
   a) Jack does not accept any responsibility for OR in the NHS
   b) He is not interested in Social Engineering
   c) He despises NHS OR units
   d) NHS OR is in a mess
   e) Most RMDS know nothing of OR
   f) Most Region's RTOs know nothing of it
   g) The situation is terribly full of vested interests
   h) The potential of OR in the NHS is enormous

164: We had lunch together. Football and the waiter occupied time and it was clear that Pat needed time to maintain his contact with the buffer, Brighton FC matches, etc. He slowly went round the subject. Things get better once my credentials had been established, i.e. 5 years with Tosh, five with RTO and I knew what Pat said at Oxford last year. I knew Donald H. And so we could go down to brass tacks. Pat ventured that Jack wanted a quiet time in his last 18 months. Quite a surprise to me - I'd guessed at five years. I reinforced with heart attack, gently and civilised. Jack must either take the reigns, do the social engineering and selling and let someone else do it and take the credit. We discussed the OR entry problem because I know that Pat is a top level small team man. He knows why I favour a lower level approach and we understand each other. Odd comments.

165: I made it clear that I understood that he could not become involved right up to his neck. He responded by saying that outside strategic interventions were possible, suggested that our talk should be private.

166: £115: 12.5.78 The next day I went to the National OR Committee. And I went on the attack after the paper from DHSS. First I got the RTO involved - despite Jack's opposition. Second I got Jack to accept that he must take a responsibility.

167: £116: 12.5.78 Another Committee - Computer Technical took place also. RCO 7 get put forward. I argued with RMO 5 on the telephone that it was necessary to get principles not political behaviour coming out of this committee. RMO 5's comment was that "this is too easy" when no one argued. What has happened?

168: £118: 12.5.78 I had lunch with Martin Williams and Barry Hunt this week and Martin got to sermonising about Avon. His tirade was fantastic showing all of his bitter resentment against Avon. As lead from Region - and this despite the cock up at Northam teaching Hospital. He wants Newton hospital more heavily used - or so he says - whether practical or not. Patients...
(continued)

to come from Oldtown and District. Does he start to realise how difficult to negotiate that would be? He hates the Plan despite the fact that he has gone along with it - to option. Chairman likes it. He is now saying that IT Division must do service planning. He was going on about H.U. instructions to spend cash on scientific equipment in a particular manner. Full list is not, who is not expert at any of these things.

172: 21:17 : 12.5.78 I am going round in smaller and smaller circles at present. Here are some reasons:-
(a) To accepted role for Management Services (b) RTOness up (c) irresponsible way in which PAYROLL is being run
(d) needs to feed back to Tony Peers

180 : 11:18 : 15.5.78 For some odd reason which I do not understand, Henry has become reasonably co-operative over the new Computer Centre. He has twisted the approach so as to get the case for the Centre from the case for the replacement machine. It is a thin line that he thinks that this avoids a major set to with the RHA, which, despite its necessity is bound to go for the new machine. I can see that Henry has placed an "ace" but I am not sure whether he is deceiving himself or not. I cannot believe that he thinks that the Authority, especially the Chairman, will accept this argument. So why is he suddenly calm?

EI : 119 : 15.5.78 Another fascinating insight is that he wants a trick to sort out future financing of computing. Negotiation with Areas over Strategy have shown him that they will not cough up staff. And so he argues that our presentation is all wrong. AAA's don't understand the issue - or so he claims or rationalises. He hates the argument that IT just takes it "off the top" - its against his publicly declared principles and practices. Front stage stuff. Yet he admits and declares in private that the RHA could and will do it - if necessary. But he says "Go away Graham and try to think of a way round it". And if I do, he will be very grateful.

182 : E120 : 20.5.78 He also does not like the Client Groups. Because they are uni discipline. Yet he has declared publicly that he does not want a Steering Committee. Again his public face is at stake. So he comes up with new names for Groups borrowed from another friend.

183 : E121 : 17.5.78 Paul from the Mental Handicap research team came to talk Monitoring today. He has got a research man's attitudes through and through. But I think that he might devise and design a good Programme. I must try to support and talk to him. But dear old Salooner is being confused by talking about an epidemiological/statistical approach which is not on when you are talking about 2000 strikingly dissimilar cases in the Region.

184 : E122 : 17.5.78 A most incredible thing happened at JCG today, when confronted by staff, Henry said that he had no idea that accommodation at the Computer Centre was such a major problem. We (14) & I must have had 4/7 meetings with him. I must have a dozen memos to him on my file plus three possible solutions. Two questions. Is it really true that I fail to communicate to this extent? How can he do that to me in public?

185 : E123 : 17.5.78 By his interference in Nat.Sys, Henry has created a completely uncontrolled situation. On 31st May RA as Policy Committee and officers from PAO as well as a number of senior men and women sat down and discussed the theoretical, practical and ethical implications of the Plan. There were several people who could not accept the Plan. The conclusion was that the Plan was not acceptable. It was decided that the Plan would be rejected.

186 : E124 : 17.5.78 John Moore (HO) raised at Nat.Sys the fact that Region II have recently approved a large computer project for the new hospital. H.O. had approved it. Region not having Region comment. He has drafted a dozen more comments. Perhaps he is correct.

187 : E125 : 21.5.78 Martin William's reaction to Planning in 1978 The background to this paper is that Henry Jacques has imposed on Avon a method of planning which appeals to his logical mind. In Region 2, Martin carried out another type of planning which was altogether different. He has been used to getting right down to the "nitty gritty" of detailed planning and being able to specify precisely what goes into every hospital, every room, etc, etc. Martin's planning has been a typical theoreo'sque type intervention in the development of the service. Martin believes that he knows what is right. On the other hand, Henry has provided in the Regional Plan, a particular framework for the development of the services.

188 : The real point of this note is to record the fact that at lunch time in H.Q., Martin came and sat by me. I was alone, although there were various people sat at other tables. Martin came and after a few niceties obviously started getting on his hobby horse about the way Management Services should be acting in relation to plans, etc. He drew himself up to his full height in his chair, he put on his sort of hurt grumpy type look. He put on his preaching voice and refused to listen to anything I said. When he finished he left without saying a word. I then went back to look over my lectures on the theoretical nature of the Plan and I lost track of detail, etc. I said to him forcefully that I did what the RTO told me to do. If he wanted it changed - change it. The situation was one in which he was not listening to a word I said. He was just trying to get off his chest his frustration. Now we are hell bent on grumbling, grumbling, grumbling.

189 : E126 : 21.5.78 I did not go to the Planning Committee which is a Member Comm. which considers all aspects of planning. I am told that at that meeting Martin sat there "grinning like a Cheshire cat" when various members made comments about the theoretical nature of the plan. He completely ignored all of the other Members who said that this was the type of framework which allowed them to consider strategic alternatives. It is a fact that at both the previous meetings of the RTO and in the Committee itself, Martin, despite his senior position in the organisation, has not intervened to change the method of planning in Avon. To the best of my knowledge he has not even objected to it.

190 : E127 : 23.5.78 I have supplied Henry with comments on the R & D Computer Strategy which he has elaborated into the Regional comment. He has drafted half a dozen more comments. Perhaps he is correct.

191 : E128 : 23.5.78 Martin collared me for an hour this morning on an intensive care unit computer for Eastbury. The £7000 computer is now due for the new hospital. H.U. had approved it, Region not having noticed it on the way through. H.O. picked up second time through, referred to Tony, got it stuck in Computer policy and delayed everything. The Consultant is not pleased. Martin said "If's my judgement that counts and that's that". And yet in the next minute he acknowledges that he does not know how to make that judgement. I do not trust Tony's judgement. I think that he does not manage hard enough. Henry is insisting on rewriting it, to what end?

192 : E129 : 23.5.78 I now have major problems with computing strategy. I do not trust Tony's judgement. I think that he does not manage hard enough. Henry is insisting on rewriting it, to what end?

193 : E130 : 23.5.78 I am due to see Henry about my staff assessment, I have got major problems.
(a) He does not communicate effectively, e.g. Datas, resources, small building
(b) Major major projects for Henry, e.g. policy and strategy seem to be neglected
(c) I do not know in strategic terms what Henry wishes to do or what his vision of management services is
(d) I cannot get a sensible basis for using work established in the Region

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At the end of the meeting, Henry is in a good mood with two large glasses to help things along. I asked him for two staff H.O.s to work with. He said I got room - yes. Outside control? Yes. Fine, Grumman. I was on top of that one, last extraordinary. I had predicted vast problems.

During the week Freya Siler came to visit us. She went round all the offices. It was a very good bit of P.R., after that. Peter and I agreed to a set of projects with her and I intend to launch them while Henry is bored.

I took the staff out to the pub. My image needed to be restored a bit. It was my birthday day and went very well indeed.

A meeting with Henry Jacques to discuss National commitment to the Natsys.


If you refer to my diary, you will find that over the last few weeks Henry has been getting more and more concerned about commitment to and finances for Natsys project. He went up to the RAs last week with a most extraordinary idea that they should contribute to the cost of Natsys, despite the fact that they were already making vast contributions to the cost of other standard systems. The logic of Henry's position cannot be denied, i.e., that people should pay for the things to which they are committed and which other people are producing for them but it is a complete change in the rules.

It has now become quite clear that his main concern is that he cannot get the whole cost through the RHAs. He does not seem to think that however he dresses it up, Chairman will go along with this project. Perhaps he is right. He went through once again all of the various ways in which the Natsys project has been designed. Dorothy has now come off her statement that in fact the Natsys II project is not what she requires and has gone on to another tack - namely, that there are a set of priorities in Natsys which determine the way in which it would be produced. This is a much more reasonable attitude. During the meeting Giff was exercising all the skills that he could to try and summarise the conclusions of the meeting from time to time.

During the meeting, Luke made the very forceful point that Avon was going to be worse off as a result of Henry's intervention, which is undoubtedly true. Giff and I both made the point strongly that in order to make a rational decision, one had to assume that all of the people at the meeting that was being called next week by Henry, did know what Natsys was about. It was pointed out that despite the fact that they had been in on Natsys and that one of their officers had liaised closely with Dorothy that this was a cost unlikely state of affairs. So Henry eventually agreed that the meeting should be prefaced by a short statement of the benefits of Natsys and the way in which it would perform its functions. Henry more or less insisted that at the end of the day, whether at the meeting or whether afterwards by past, all of the Regions should commit themselves to a £100,000 contribution to make up the cost of Natsys.

During the meeting, various extra ordinary suggestions were made as to the way in which Natsys could be managed and produced in the RHAs. These ranged from people lending us systems designers and programmers which we knew they do not possess, to people using their own staff in their own Region with Tony trying to co-ordinate all of their work. The possibility of getting anything done in arrangements like the latter is negligible, while in the former - considering that we are the best off Region for staff at the moment, there is no hope of people giving us staff.

During the meeting, Henry Jacques tested out strongly whether or not this system was the system that people actually wanted. This was despite the fact that people had explained to him the ways in which this system had been designed. It was also despite the fact that people had explained to him that Dorothy had authority to put in and to take out whatever she wanted.

One of the most important parts of the meeting was an interchange on the availability of the standard payroll system. At the end of the day, no one would stand up to Tony when he said that he did not require a working standard payroll system until the middle of next year. He also stated categorically that the timetable would only slip by three months which is an extraordinary. We still have not got accommodation for these extra staff and the recruitment of it will be very difficult. Luke and Lee would not move from their position that the Natsys payroll system could not be implemented early. I insisted that Tony should consider whether or not resources could be brought in early to get a trial payroll system working sooner. I insisted on establishing at the meeting that whatever Tony said, it would be advantageous to do this for everyone concerned. It did not go down at all well when Henry discovered through the meeting that he did not yet know what the total commitment for payroll was and that people were putting up the estimates of the manpower required daily, such as an extra 15 per cent required at the District level. I sympathise a lot with Henry on this particular aspect of the problem. I do not think that anyone has put forward even a guess of what resources would be required. This is appalling.

The display of attitudes and skills at the meeting was very interesting. Tony looked as if he was cheered off most of the time. He came back exceedingly strongly as he is wont to do on frequent occasions, using his position of technical authority. It is a very unfortunate stance because I am quite sure that he loses Henry's sympathy by doing it. Giff on occasions got quite cross with Dorothy. His main contribution was to exercise many of his group's skills including summarising the conversation at various points. I am sure that Henry got up Tony's nose when he kept saying "I'm sorry I can't do this, I can't do that". If anything, Luke was really quite sensible about the wisdom of doing the thing at all but he got nowhere with Henry. Henry was obviously determined to override Luke completely. Dorothy was very controlled for Dorothy. We had only two outbursts which were quickly controlled and put out by Giff. Perhaps he had said that he was going to do this to her beforehand - I do not know. My main contributions were to try and bring out important points to make quite sure that they had gone home to Henry. In a sense this was complementing Giff's activity. Lee had various excursions into using his old professional expertise but on the whole he kept to his own field.

The meeting as a whole was a very orderly affair. It was quite clear that Giff, Tony and myself did not agree with what Henry was trying to do. It was also quite clear that Henry was not going to pay any attention to that and that he was determined to go through with it. Everyone played the meeting coolly and logically. Henry insisted at the end that he was going to have an orderly meeting in London this week and that he was quite hopeful that he would come back with all the Regions agreeing to cough up the money. I do not believe this. Unless he has got some inside information and unless the RHAs agree to co-operate in a way which they have never done before, this just is not going to happen.

Another important issue is raising its head, namely Henry's national report on 'Recruitment and Training'. I have dictated a long note on this on the Departmental Heads meeting.

I am genuinely concerned that RSOs should be treated as second class administrators.
DCJ has talked to Peter about transferring AI systems into Avon from other places. At the same time, OCJ has raised the

210 : £134 : 5.6.78 The Henry Jacques Objectives Meeting of 5 June 1973

211 : Henry mentioned a paper by Klein on "The Control of the NHS" which I must obtain.

212 : Giff reported on organisational reviews. Possibly other people are very tight about not seeing resorts which mentioned

213 : £137 : 5.6.78 I must talk to Walter Lane about the Sanatorium and the interim accommodation problem.

214 : £138 : 5.6.78 Henry stated categorically that the West and east computers could only go ahead if they caught up the

215 : This morning we had the long expected talk between Tony, Peter, Simon and myself on the problems of the interface between

216 : £139 : 5.5.78 In the afternoon, Henry carried out an assessment of me. This was cut short by the Chairman who

217 : The meeting was interesting because it was gentle. We agreed that there should be another section in the monthly

218 : £140 : 5.6.78 As a result of Henry's visit to London with Giff and Dorothy about Natsys, Dorothy is now preparing a paper for the

219 : £141 : 5.5.78 In the afternoon, Henry carried out an assessment of me. This was cut short by the Chairman who

220 : £142 : 5.6.78 Dorothy has obtained £10,000 for Natsys and is now fiddling the books to buy three staff with it.

221 : £143 : 5.6.78 Walter is now going out to commercial property for 2,500 sq ft. Henry has left for the States. Cor, stone the crows!}

Please note: The text above is a natural representation of the document content. It may contain slight variations from the original due to the limitations of the conversion process. The aim is to ensure readability and comprehension of the information presented.
I thought like a cat. Walter came down on my side - after the event. He looks the guts to take an imaginative decision. He does not see that the second-in-liners are - at the end of the day - the people who drive things through.

Tony went to see Freda Dinn - after considerable difficulty in arranging a meeting. Tony planned to import a nurse allocation system into Eastbury without Freda's sanction. I had to nore or less pitch Tony into her room. Tony was asked "Freda was at the first but came round" then "Freda not that Tony can get bellow surface outside his narrow field. Tony is good with people so I would not be surprised if he was successful. I challenged him on Garth Boul. "But you must remember he's a bachelor - mobile, different iron us".

Dorothy has written yet another foolish memo to Tony re, his commitment to Head Office stats and Sat.day in Avon. I hit the roof with Diff and he agreed that Dorothy was stupid sometime. Honour restored! By design!

Sometime ago head Office allowed Regions to out payroll computer staff up the scale. Now having persuaded our people that it was not right, are the only people out of line in the country. All hell could break out soon. Diff does not even know about the Head Office letter! One Region is being sued. What price fairness?

I spent the whole day trying to avoid rewriting the Computer Strategy.

I also decided to sort out my secretary's job.

A genuine use of a myth occurred with Ralph and computing in laboratories. Ralton have been bought off by Barry Hunt with a £3,000 peak-picking mini. Ralph came in with "But what about Patient Care at Ralton?" He genuinely thought that this should carry weight with me and deflect my course of action - forget practicality, etc.

I decided to sort out my secretary's job.

I was invited to this meeting to introduce the working papers on planning and a paper by Barry on computing.

The first squabble occurred when the Minutes of the last meeting were reviewed. The Committee had given some advice on where particular sorts of equipment could be put in smaller hospitals and low and behold Barry was negotiating to out it into Forest. There are loads of these hospitals around and it is quite clear that the boys want to conserve the capital for their main departments in the OGHs. P1 opened up with a barrage to the effect that is the Region going to take the advice of this Committee or not or are we all wasting our time? Why is not Or William here? - he should be. (Martin and Luke arrived half an hour late). There was a real show of sectional power with Barry making a big stick in the absence of Martin. P2 eventually joined in and defended the Regional position, pointing out that the RNA could not possibly commit themselves to taking everyone's advice all of the time. In fact Barry did not say a word in defence except to say that no lasting decision has been taken. Eventually it was agreed to minute as the Region would take note of the Committee's comments. Several consultants joined in to the effect that they did not intend to waste their time unless the advice were taken.

An interesting paper on X2 was next on the agenda. It was fascinating to hear the way in which the paper had been drafted. All of the recommendations were positive. There were never any suggestions that X2 would be encouraged - resources permitting. Martin came in during this paper. A myth remark from P2 was that no one would quibble with the fact that patient care would be enhanced by X2. The Chairman threw in several remarks which backed some of the more outrageous claims by opening up "I am sure that you will accept*. There is not a flinch at the way in which the report was drafted until in fact Martin started watering the thing down by suggesting that the District might give favourable consideration to * rather than * accord prior ity to*. As he pointed out - "priority over what?". A fascinating point about the document was that despite the fact it had been drafted in such powerful persuasive language, they still had not noticed that they had put in two paragraphs 3 and that there was a general jumble about the arrangement of the paper.

Ve then got onto the Laboratory computing which Barry introduced. I joined in much more on this one. I spent quite a bit of the session correcting misleading comments by JJ. He gave one impression of the Avon produced laboratory system which suggested that it did not work. I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specifications it did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specifications it did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specifications it did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specifications it did not work. JJ claimed that he was going to transfer in a system - I immediately countered saying that we would start watering the thing down by suggesting that the District might give favourable consideration to * rather than * accord priority to*. As he pointed out - "priority over what?". A fascinating point about the document was that despite the fact it had been drafted in such powerful persuasive language, they still had not noticed that they had put in two paragraphs 3 and that there was a general jumble about the arrangement of the paper.

Going back to the X2 paper, it was fascinating to note that Martin put in several minor drafting amendments which I am sure could be made quietly outside the Committee. It is typical of the man that he niggles about things like that.

JJ got some stick on the planning papers. Several of the consultants, Dr JC in particular, criticized many of the statements and there was no doubt that they are politically keen. I had to defend by saying that these were working papers and that the Committee had asked to be kept informed and that they could not expect special papers to be written for them. I tried to put things in context first of all. I do not know that it did an awful lot of good. The Chairman got rather impatient. It was a thoroughly foolish move to take papers like that but there is not any clear alternative.

Going back to the first item, I have got several choice comments to record. Dr MM used phrases like: "a gross breach of the Northern system and I had to point out that North were putting in major changes. JJ stated that the System 2 was fully documented - I stated that no one had examined the documentation of System 2 and so on. I spent quite a lot of time picking up the little points that they were just dropping here and there but I was very careful indeed to give credit where it was due. At the end of the discussion we were congratulated on having produced a paper which was short and to the point.

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I need to consider carefully a myth to do with medical power as shown in Committees. It does not feature in any of my thoughts.
I was called to see Martin this morning as a matter of some urgency. When I got there in fact it was a completely urgent matter concerning the policy papers of the Committee on Patients. In fact it was very kind of him to think that this would be useful to me. The papers have been simply sitting around in his office and could have been very useful to Tony and myself. He was very concerned about the fact that I should not read anything that was genuinely confidential and that I should actually select it out and return it to him. I agreed to do this and to send the papers back to him in any case.

We then got onto the usual topic of planning. I think that the guy has got a genuine concern for my own well-being. He uses phrases "a grave warning to me", "I have been dragged into this situation this year." He is concerned about the reaction of the Consultants to it. There is no doubt whatever that he has a case in that the consultant of people to the planning methodology leaves a very great deal to be desired. What I found utterly incredible was the fact that he still sees Simon as the person to run the show in America and yet Martin cannot get his classification level down. It seems to me that Simon is not in the office at all. At the end of this discussion and I saw his afterwards. He was utterly amazed but the point about responding quickly to Martin despite the fact that it annoys me, that at least it gets him into his room talking to him on his own terms.

I discussed Private and in confidence and Tony got the message right away and brought it out into the open. Tony said "You're talking about the Seminar and my talk yesterday". Simon took the point fast. But Tony went on to say that he had this sort of open session/discussion with his people and I felt unhappy. Now the reason for that is that fundamentally I do not think that Tony understands the nature of the NHS or that his basic entrepreneurial and driving attitudes are in conflict with what is really effective and there are all sorts of attitudes and so on at the back of that sort of remark. I was called to see Martin this morning as a matter of some urgency. Then I got there in fact it was a statement that the papers have been simply sitting around in his office and could have been very useful to Tony and myself. He was very concerned about the fact that I should not read anything that was genuinely confidential and that I should actually select it out and return it to him. I agreed to do this and to send the papers back to him in any case.

The meeting started by people coming in late, during which David Jones and I started talking about the 19 papers which have been produced by Peter and his team. David said that this was the best documented piece of work which had been done. Key inputs were the case of papers - very valuable. Dead seen and in the sort of plans. Tech Survey and the value system going from -.3 to 1.3. He described the speed at which new printouts could be obtained by grunt, grunt, grunt and there it was three seconds later with everything changed. He really is incredibly enthusiastic about what has been produced and we have a friend for life there.

I reported on the fact that Martin was now having considerable misgivings about this sort of thing and I suggested to him that we should use this in his own thoughts. Various asides occurred in the conversation and his reaction to this particular work. It is incredible to note that David sees this role as a direct development of the investment and frameworks which he has been talking about for years and I suppose that in a sense this is so. AS a means of making it more acceptable to him it is incredibly powerful.
There were quite a bit of politicking knocking around especially on the medical front. It became quite clear that Martin’s advisors had been warning off Martin from Dr G.P., and the guy who appeared to have power was Alan Jan. This was in connection with the capital planning officer that Martin is after.

There are several examples of planning responsibility, the two which came to mind are the argument which I had with David’s No. 2 about the computer budget. Eventually David wanted to establish an XD group to have an advising think about the advice given them by the new Computer Steering Committee. One left with the problem of wounding just what priorities the RD is supposed to be sorting out. If it is not between things like Regional Services, Regional Scientific equipment and Regional Computing budgets.

There was an interesting session in which David reported that the RDs were going to discuss the staffing and accelerated growth through the scale of computer men. It was almost inevitable that David’s No. 2 should direct to this suggestion. He used words like “a special pleading” in a given tone of voice and suddenly he was set upon by all the others who pointed out that we could not afford to lose highly trained people only 18 months after joining the Service and that accelerated development was absolutely necessary at this point in time. David has got the interesting gloss on this particular issue that it is at this particular point in time and that as our stories move ahead of the private sector next time round the facility should not be used that is a very fair point.

During our review of objectives, our work on the Mental Handicap came up. It would appear that one of the Consultants is about to start writing to newspapers about some of the issues which he feels have been overlooked in this particular crisis. One of the main points being made at the meeting was the fact that if our own managers did decide to break ranks, then the whole thing was going to crumble about our feet. Seemingly he is about to start writing to journals. Being an independent contractor, there is no way that the organisation can do to actually stop him doing this. On the report it appears that the Chairman is still agitated with North Area about doing nothing and he is now stymied unless he somehow seeks to act via the Authority Line to get something done. Of course he is absolutely right - North Area will fire daily and try to pass the buck straight up to the Region. The determination of the Chairman to actually do something on this issue will appear quite soon and it will be interesting to see what tricks he gets up to to use the system to his advantage.

We are now in an interesting situation with Unions on the subject of secure mental units of which we have one in North Area, and goings on at X are now saying that they cannot exist on mental illness sites but need to be taken off them and made in some sense more secure whatever that means. It is a fascinating little bit of pressure being placed on the system by a sulliant union.

Tony did not turn up for one of my important meetings and I was livid. He came to my home and we sat in the garden talking over the problems. He sweetened me up in two seconds "I’ve been hijacked by Simon”. In fact although I keep feeling as if I’d been had just a little too much, I cannot put my finger on anything. Either Tony is more cleverer than I give his credit for, or I’m more stupid.

The other meeting which I wanted to recall was the Technical Group which met on Thursday. The main thing which I pursued in this meeting was the sorting out of the Natsys 1 System. I played all the tricks in the book. I stood on principles, saying that this Committee have got to take the job of co-ordinating standard systems seriously. It was our job and despite the fact that we have no line authority to X, it was still our job to sort it out. They knew damn well it is difficult. Eventually I got the Chairman and RCSO from Region 5 going up to X in the near future to try and sort out what the main issues are. I also insisted that what we were talking about was the authorities’ responsibilities in this matter and not their RCSOs. They made remarks like the wrong attitude being shown by X which I immediately leap in. I also single out two other factors and stuck to them as being things which that Technical Committee could not allow to pass. This was a piece of technique using logic against them. I made MB of Head Office squirm like mad because he knows the difficult position that he is in from the Head Office and as it went on...

This morning I met my managers to complete our business meeting i.e. to get through the projects being done across the Division. And it was very constructive. They are settling down into the new regime and have a much more constructive relationship. A few clays to territory occurred. Tony said he must be Divisional co-ordinator on two standard projects. Simon was completely non-plussed to find that Peter is completely willing to hand over care group monitoring lock stock and barrel. Simon has been skipping at Peter for eighteen months - mainly on the quality of data but also on the general quick and dirty aspect of his work. So I drew off a few of the monitoring rules there and then. The full model has got to be pursued and if that means using rotten data with reservation - that’s what we do! This is anathema to Simon. The basic method notes and commentaries and involving areas has got to say. How many of the digest and monitoring exercises do you want Simon? Cough splutter. I’ll let you know in 2/3 days. And he will!

I saw Neil and Will from Head Office today obviously talking to Tony re. Aldermoor. And so I took the opportunity of saying to him that three people are visiting the Natsy to sort things out. He said three people? That is OK, it’s the customers who have got it wrong! But how can that his boss has not told him about the Natsy. I wish they had not seen each other and maybe devious Charlie is up to some game. Simon? Cough splutter. I’ll let you know in 2/3 days. And he will!
Deo. Sec. and three (J/Secs! The fact that we have been pursuing the problem for twelve months seems to have escaped his notice! which they were talking about were very important ones. In fact, during the discussion of the H.O. letter, some very basic

Luke intervened to say that if Luke went to Deputy or Under Secretaries, then he was doing it on his own behalf and not

He suggested Southtown but that is out because there are too many computers around Southtown for us to measure a good manual system.

Agenda at 11.40 a.m. People often criticise the RTO for this sort of behaviour but it is not all clear to me that the

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277 (cont'd) saying very specifically that the sorts of measures which we are using for overall planning have not received the consideration that they ought to. He takes the point quite rightly that most of the names which are brought at the present time are to do with past history. Often they are just summaries of what people have achieved in the past and are in a sense being used as a levelling up or possibly in extreme cases as a levelling down device for resource provision. He quite rightly says that what we need is a radical view or some sort of view of where we should be going and some sort of positive statement about the sorts of provision that we ought to be making in view of that judgement. He was going on about the fact that certain specialties ought to be declining and others ought to be growing and that we ought to be controlling that growth. He was also going on about the fact that he has before him requests for three Consultants for work in cancer -- all along the North Range incidentally. He takes the point that we have got no evidence whatever that these people and their methods have got any impact on the illness patterns and that their work does not increase life expectancy at all -- or at least we do not know that it does. Now all of this is very correct I suspect. Martin sees this sort of issue against a background of our being involved in activities with which he has got very very little sympathy and the reason of course is that they are not his ideas. He could well be the same thing to Martin that we have just done to Henry Jacques, namely, to get the bees out of his bonnet so that we can get to some other work.

278 | 280 : 27.7.78 The issues which come to my mind in relation to what Martin has raised is the issue which was impressed on me by some weeks ago. This is the fact that we have got a problem does not necessarily imply that we have got a solution. The issues which Martin is raising are very valid ones. Over the last 10 years, the NMS has stumbled through on these matters. Martin claims that in North Region, examination of this type of issue did occur. I think that the first thing we need to do once again is to find out the truth of that comment. Again Martin claims that he has not had satisfaction on the businesses of the populations and catchments and so on for the various Districts. I found this incredibly puzzling and I cannot help feeling that if Martin feels like this then at least we ought to know what the position is and I am not convinced at this moment that we do know that position adequately. One of the organisational difficulties which are around this area is the fact that the Planning Division ought to have made Martin happy on this issue. It could be that that is an impossible task. It could be that they are under such pressure from Henry Jacques to produce particular sorts of plans and to do things in particular sorts of ways that it is not on. It could equally well be that they have not got the information or the technical advice to do what he wants.

279 | 281 : 27.7.78 As part of a favored activity on the evaluation men, I went down to see Lionel Dunn this afternoon and try to clear with him the use of hospitals in Hampshire. I also rang Graham Pate regarding the possibility of using the Bath site for this end. He advised me not to trouble Wally Andrews until Thursday of next week but that whatever else I might do I must feed this through Wally Andrews. Now that is an interesting statement because sometime ago I could quite easily have used his assistant as a channel. Wally Andrews has been away for three weeks.

280 | 282 : 27.8.78 During the past week I have been trying to straighten out catering monitoring. I strangled over to Region's catering man to get the picture from him. For him, he was in a pretty dejected mood. Areas are playing him up on the Return of Patient Services part of his work. The Programme has slipped six weeks. South Area will deliver according to the revised timetable after Area night with his help - and I objects to that - and West won't. Jayne Cook objects in principle to Avon monitoring - it goes into too much detail - he would like to see Regional Commentaries reduced to platitudinous statements. One of the main reasons for not being able to do the job is Hillbury's lack of DCH and their Wally Andrews independent attitudes.

281 : 283, 283 : 1.8.78 In the "Essence of Decision" Graham B. Allison describes the "signalling" that went on between U.S. and USSR over the result of putting missiles into Cuba. Graham Pate and I have been doing a bit of undercover action/signalling over Catering, West Area, having agreed to take part in it - according to the departed AA - are not co-operating. Hillbury have not done a damn thing on the 3rd and 4th areas of this topic. Graham tells us that the Area Members wish to maintain liaison. We have had some very spotty progress. Resistance to "signalling" comes from the excuse that they have no course on that - their Regional Steering Group has decided Graham is frantically telling me to avoid confrontation. I am frantically telling him that our Chairman will not be put off.

282 : 284 : 1.8.78 Yesterday David and I met the AAs or their sub's. We talked catering, Lab. computing and computer policy. After all West Areas' comments, puff and smoke. "Call Committee is mid October and agendas have got to go out - OK Well OK mid September it is!"

283 : 285 : 4.8.78 On computer policy draft, the matter was very different. Up came all the old objections. "Why not get onto quality of NAA. Must explain policy in two pages. PR Man must write a pop version. I got stuck in and said it was about time that they took their responsibilities seriously - the burden was not all mine. OK I will fix a seminar or two.

284 : 286 : 4.8.78 Diary Note on a visit by Freda Sinn and Winnifred Black to discuss the formation of the Nursing Steering Group for the development of work.

285 : 287 | 289 : We covered the following topics:

286 : We need a resume of what problems are presently seen as existing in the nursing area.

287 : Within these problems, we need to establish somehow or another a mechanism for setting priorities and thereafter monitoring against these priorities, objectives and so on.

288 : Freda has suggested that we use some of the money that is available in the research budget for a programme of visits.

289 : In connection with these visits throughout the country, Winnifred has suggested that we have got to get clear in our minds what questions have got to be asked.

290 : As an aside, Freda mentioned that Southtown ODH has in fact dealt with some of the problems which Winnifred thought were insuperable.

291 : I agreed to see whether there were any ones for Region 6 around and whether there was a day on which I could go to that particular conference to deal specifically with nursing and I must follow that up quickly.
We are going to run into considerable timing problems because of the new machine and it is highly improbable that we can never seem to have a solid timetable available to us for getting any of this work pushed through. He is quite right that we must follow this through and we are meeting tomorrow with Tony Peers and Lee Ross. I have some sympathy with Luke because get Natsys 2 onto the 1900 before it goes out and then it seems that the 2900 is not compatible with the 1300 - so we are playing however "reasonable it may be.

The bureaucratic system in which an Area is quite definitely resentful of the action which Region might take on its own initiative, A M S O sat there feeling most uncomfortable that in fact I was going to take a Regional initiative on some of the issues when the AMSO is confined to a very few items in the first place and there is nevertheless a lot of extra stuff put there by H.O.

It is worth referring to the Agenda of this meeting since it illustrates the fact that the actual hard business of this Group is confined to a very few items in the first place and there is nevertheless a lot of extra stuff put there by H.O. The first item on the Agenda was the action to be taken on the present national standard systems and we had some reports available to us in quite a good format. After the Committee had made various suggestions on bits of additional data which need to be included - all of which was quite constructive, RMSO attempted to push this lot through as if they were just there for note, it took me and two others quite sometime to actually establish that it was the business of the Committee to go through these in detail and state whether or not we were satisfied. RMSO was all for kicking this for touch and we had to be very persistent indeed.

One of the main things that we achieved on this particular issue was to get RMSO to start writing down the standards by which we were going to judge these projects. From the point of my research, this is another good example of the role which I think that H.O. wishes these committees to carry out. It allows them to say to their masters that they exist and at the same time by making them behave in this way, life can still be quite comfortable.

The pay roll we had to be exceedingly insistent that RMSO did not co-ordinate his activities with the Treasurers Users Panel which is visiting the Centres of Responsibility sometime in the next six months and that we did actually get his and RMSO and Neil Moore up to Region 4 as quickly as possible to investigate the issues which had been raised. It is utterly incredible that after two months since our last meeting, nothing whatever had been done on an urgent matter. What has happened in the field is that things have gone quiet because we are now away from the end of the year which causes all pay roll trouble and because we are in the mid-year lull, everyone is trying to pretend that they do not have to take effective action to avoid the same trouble in 1978. As RMSO pointed out, another round of pay amendments and so on is already on its way out and it is appropriate to act now.
monitoring and I want to help him as much as I can. The extent to which Henry will actually face up to the issues which are AA. We also talked about the things which North and East Area. i.e ambulances and CSSO, are doing pointing out that nothing beginning to end, illustrating this by the example of domestic services monitoring which badly needs much more backing from the necessary effort to administer a system at H.Q. It is clear to me that the first problem is the main one and we are going to have to solve it. He was in a very good mood having just come back from abroad and his holiday. He is obviously full of life - having learned a lot I gather from abroad. He was, nevertheless, back onto his old theme of getting out timetables and life - having just come back from abroad and his holiday. He is obviously full of life - having learned a lot I gather from abroad. He was, nevertheless, back onto his old theme of getting out timetables and objectives and so on. It remains to be seen whether he will cope with the other aspects of the problem which we have got, such as the staff relationships and carrying through issues with Members of the RTO who do not see things the way he does. Henry has returned from abroad and has been back a week or so. One of the things which he asked me to do before he went [and there are notes on this in the file] was to get the plan through various stages. The first thing was to draft it up to a given level and in particular to incorporate certain bits of committee work which simplified the existing step. He then asked me to carry out various stages of consultation like sending it to Areas and Districts giving it to the consultation groups and asking the RTO what they thought of it. I have done all of these except in the case of the latter. It has been quite impossible to actually see the RTO. It is claimed that this report is causing a rumour throughout the Region. The Treasurers are the most insistent. We are now told that North RTO wish to have and see the RTO over the report and at a meeting at which they had the opportunity to discuss this matter for half an hour, not a "dickie bird" was said. Henry has now come back and he wants to remove all committees from the official structure. As far as I see, this is going to be an absolute disaster. He is redrafting the report along the lines that he has suggested. I shall have to go and see him and say that on mature consideration, I do not think that he is right in this respect. This is to turn the line of attack away from the historical and the past, and to get across to the RH SOs that if they wish to be an effective body then they have got to co-ordinate action in this way at regular intervals. In fact NSG 6 and (acting as Secretary and he as Chairman) pressed through lots of actions which are going to be taken whatever or not the majority of RH SOs were there. RH 7 joined us for the first time.

Tony has been brandishing before my eyes the sight of North AHA going DIRECT to RHA about its dissatisfaction over Computer Plan!

Two important meetings today - one with the Heads of Division and the other with Henry Jacques, 318 : With the Heads of Division, we discussed many things - the most important of which was the accommodation problem at H.Q., and in the Computer Centre. A course of action was agreed in which it was said plain that we were going to tell Henry the facts of life or so we thought. In particular, if the accommodation problem at the Computer Centre is not solved, there will certainly be a retraction at the next JGO and things could get even worse.

In the Henry Jacques meeting we went through all of the objectives for the RHA as agreed and a very interesting meeting it was. On the accommodation, in fact, we did not get very far at all, it was left until the last five minutes because Henry arranged it that way and then we just slid over it. The net result was that I sent Off Reynolds back to see Henry with a message that the Unions would certainly hit him unless something was done which showed that the RHA meant business about solving the accommodation problem at the Computer Centre.

At both the Senior Officers Meeting and the Objectives Meeting with Henry Jacques we discussed monitoring. I opened up the report on the running of the monitoring programmes by declaring quite intensely that the whole thing was one mess from beginning to end, illustrating this by the example of domestic services monitoring which badly needs much more backing from the AAs. We also talked about the things which North and East Area, i.e., ambulances and CSSO, are doing pointing out that nothing

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honest I think that the programming and timekeeping ability which is being shown by Tony's department leaves a lot to be desired and I question whether they are fitting these timetables in. A six-week delay because a man is ill seems to be resulting in a clash between timetables of Natsys. 2 and 1 which is probably going to mean that one has got to slip by 12 months. Now this does not seem sensible to me, even you are setting out on a showy dummy. Tony now says that the trick is to save by putting both systems in at the same time will be more than he can stomach and contend with and I can understand that that might be the case but was not this foreseeable a long time ago and do you really timetable work on this sort of basis? And yet Tony is an intelligent person and he must have foreseen it.

324: (cont'd) During the whole of this summer, there has been a major row going on about the accommodation problem at the Computer Centre. There have been two confrontations in the JCG between Henry Jacques and Garry Kay. In the first one (which I described earlier) Garry was trying to get enterprise proper and not just run the way as we did and the process was胶敏and Area level to Regional level. This has got immense implications because it means that people will be given some help, get him going and so on. I have talked to Tony very carefully about how best to give Garry the sort of process and yet I think that the organisation itself is utterly incapable of moving away from its former ways and in a way to difficult thing to do because in fact they get away with murder at the moment. I think that the team under Peter has produced something that has got to be done and two alternatives face us. Either we take such action as we can to improve Garry's talents and we have done a lot already and then make it absolutely clear that a level of performance is required which he must deliver and all the consequences which follow from that or we try and fit him into another slot. This latter course of action is not a very pleasant one. It is well known that people do go along and talk to Garry and cry on his shoulder and that he is very interested in training and so on - okay so he has not had the help which a professional person had had and so when he gets compared with RETO that comparison is unfortunate but what we have done is to set up a secondment with a specific set of jobs for him to do and these are really to produce training packages for Natsys. 1 and 2 and the like. I am hoping that in this way he can so impress people around the organisation take him on, give him some help, get him going and so on. I have talked to Tony very carefully about how best to give Garry the sort of opportunity which he needs if this escape route is going to mean anything to him. In adding to my own burdens and I am talking about burdens with people in particular, I hope that in this case the experience will be rewarding and helpful to Garry Kay.

325: (cont'd) During the summer, I have been through the process of getting Garry Kay out of Tony's hair and I am afraid to say it but into his. He was put into his present job and whatever qualities he says he has had and he has got some very good ones, they are not really suitable for his present job. Over the years, Garry has never taken charge of and been in command and this is essential because such skills as he has are not really in this field at all. It is absolutely clear that something has got to be done and two alternatives face us. Either we take such action as we can to improve Garry's talents and we have done a lot already and then make it absolutely clear that a level of performance is required which he must deliver and all the consequences which follow from that or we try and fit him into another slot. This latter course of action is not a very pleasant one. It is well known that people do go along and talk to Garry and cry on his shoulder and that he is very interested in training and so on - okay so he has not had the help which a professional person had had and so when he gets compared with RETO that comparison is unfortunate but what we have done is to set up a secondment with a specific set of jobs for him to do and these are really to produce training packages for Natsys. 1 and 2 and the like. I am hoping that in this way he can so impress people around the organisation take him on, give him some help, get him going and so on. I have talked to Tony very carefully about how best to give Garry the sort of opportunity which he needs if this escape route is going to mean anything to him. In adding to my own burdens and I am talking about burdens with people in particular, I hope that in this case the experience will be rewarding and helpful to Garry Kay.

326: (cont'd) Peter has just managed to get the much more complex model for the planning process working. The whole thing this year has performed at a much higher level than was the case last year. The working of the inter-divisional team under Garry Kay and Henry Jacques in which Garry Kay more or less called Henry Jacques a liar. Now it just so happens that in fact this has brought the RTD to their senses and that they are now taking the problem seriously and that we do seem to have negotiated a higher rent for XXX for a five-year lease but is this the way to carry on? Why on earth have we got to get to this level of confrontation? What is wrong with the sorts of communication which are going on within the organisation to allow this to happen? The sad truth is that this sort of issue is not being faced fairly and squarely and it comes back at the end to whether or not Henry Jacques wants a responsive organisation or whether he really does think that he can take on people in this sort of way.

327: (cont'd) For some odd reason I decided to go on an appeal today to widen my managerial experience. I must have been stupid but it is interesting to see the papers. Apart from the technical side of the Appeal itself, it is quite clear that what I have in front of me is two utterly opposing views of the problem - a management and a Union one. Mainly this is inevitable in this particular case but I cannot help feeling that it is up to the management to get a thing like this more clear and not to land it on the laps of three Appeal people like myself.

328: (cont'd) I must not forget the interaction that went on in the RNA concerning the X-site report. Basically they wish to take action to clear up personnel management problems concerning a doctor and nurses. There were several reactions from the officers - to do with justice, to do with what you could or could not do professionally, to do with the etiquette, to do with whether it is proper to take action in this way. Another set of issues was the difference between professional and administrative functions which a certain doctor carried out and whether one could or could not separate these things. It seemed to me that certainly some of the points being raised were nitty gritty legal issues and others were devices for avoiding the issue of pinning the blame.

329: I was interesting to note that nevertheless the members were quite insistent that they were going to take action. It was their privilege to make judgements on the type of action that should be taken and it was then up to the officers to find some quasi legalistic way of getting their way implemented.
330 : E208 : 23.10.78 There are notes on Divisional Heads today. Fascinating conversation about interaction with ATO.

331 : E209 : 23.10.78 Henry Jacques came back from abroad having "lost control" and determinedly got it back by insisting on report back quarterly reports - "Why isn't my PA sitting still in her outer office? I want cover in the outer office!"

332 : E210 : 23.10.78 I got the conversation round to the extent to which we should meet these demands. Just face Henry with costs - no one else has it. He must be got off the bureaucratisation of this place/Ank.

333 : E211 : 23.10.78 Wally Andrews says Henry is control orientated but puts up a facade of "consulting" etc. Martin has accused Henry of being two faced on this one. Henry ignored all the A/O comments which have been sought on computer plan.

334 : E212 : 23.10.78 Martin is still going on about the research which we are doing on planning. And at the same time he is considering Peter generated options!

335 : E213 : 23.10.78 There is a lot of uproar around because next week in half term and both Giff and I have had brushes with Henry on "cover". Henry took three months off in the summer? What about our leave? (8 weeks course only).

336 : E214 : 23.10.78 I got an interesting picture of Henry reporting back ATO business from Giff. Henry said that Giff's paper went well - Luke and Martin told Giff "There was a hell of a row". Wonder what they did say about the Computer Plan?

337 : E215 : 23.10.78 Walter Arne says that Henry is floating the Deputy idea. Shouts from the rest "No go" etc. I had a terrible job to persuade them to see it as an opportunity.

338 : E216 : 23.10.78 Wally Andrews says that Henry cannot tell people what he wants. Henry never paints in the background and has a lovely habit of summing up and saying "Well this is what they want!"

339 : E217 : 23.10.78 A remarkable discussion occurred about the way the Chairmen is transforming the Monitoring Committee into an executive committee. On X he had the Group of three led by one of his pals. Was it fixed beforehand? Probably!

340 : E218 : 3.11.78 The day before, I went up to Region 4 to discuss the career development report with three A/Os. It was a very useful, constructive meeting. The comments which will come out will be exceedingly level headed - going straight to the heart of the problem and speaking quite bluntly that we do not agree with the underlying hypothesis about the structure of the institute. It was an incredibly purposeful meeting for which I think A/O 5 should take a lot of the credit.

341 : E219 : 3.11.78 Over the past few months at Henry Jacques' behest we have constructed a computer plan which amalgamates all of the various bits of the things we have put together on computing these past few years. This was taken to the AAO. It was the most incredibly gentle session that I can imagine. Nothing was said that was highly contentious - even William Lee was in a mood that explained the difficulties which we had rather than trying to make any political noises out of them. I did not understand that, because according to Tony, he is about to blast the RHA with his reply and comments on the Policy itself.

342 : E220 : 3.11.78 The most useful bit of the trip to Salton was the lunch which I had with the new DA from Newtown, who is clearly unhappy about his own committee at the present time. The new structure of committees seems to have taken him somewhat by surprise and when it was clear that I was emphasising their responsibility to say what it was that they wanted. On the whole, a very very uneventful meeting, in view of the importance of the plan and the reaction which it is supposed to have caused.

343 : E221 : 6.11.78 Today I returned from holiday. I was met by Henry Jacques in a state about the Computer Plan. He had been trying last week to find someone in Management Services to answer his questions about the plan and was in a right state because he thought that there was no one in charge. I gather from Tony that Caesar got very angry about the way he was so rude to him and the net result was that Caesar did not choose to ring back. This left me in for a load of trouble and was a very unwise move on his part. A five minute lecture from Henry on his pet administrative subject, namely, cover. A topic which makes me thoroughly sick.

344 : E222 : 6.11.78 At King's Fund on 7 November, I talked to Wayne Cook. Henry Jacques had not seen him over the monitoring programme. He emphasised to Wayne (as did Peter) so that he felt that he was truly being got at, that it was essential that someone takes action over that particular programme of work.

345 : E223 : 8.11.78 During the last two days since coming back from holiday, Henry has been trying to complete his version of the Computer policy. Bits and pieces were missing and both Tony and I have been out for Tuesday and Wednesday and Henry wants his bits and pieces doing. Henry does not realise just how switched off we are, both of us.

346 : E224 : 8.11.78 I went to the Technical Committee today. It has improved greatly. We even got a report from Req. I did more than a bit of praising for the RCM's 5 paper on standards of a particular type.

347 : E225 : 9.11.78 Giff and I discussed the Natsys Project problem if John leaves. It is agreed that he should have Scale 14. Both Giff and I felt that Tony would not co-operate with our deal. But I phoned him and he was co-operative. We both feel that he is looking for a job. I had to insist with Giff that although as a Natsys Manager only he could pursue confrontation courses, I could not. He really accepted this but it was a try on.

348 : E226 : 13.11.78 At the present time Henry Jacques has reverted to type and is in the middle of a session in which he is desperately trying to persuade people to take filling systems, English, etc, etc, more seriously. What he has not cottoned onto is the fact that this is not the time to do that sort of exercise. The RHA has got quite severe problems on motivation at the moment, as once again to start in on this particular thing really is not on. I have spent two or three hours with various members of the RHA, including Giff Reynolds in particular, who is most disillusioned at this development. I am dismayed as well as I think that it is symptomatic of the fact that running out of planning and monitoring work, Henry is desperately trying to think of something else. I have suggested to Giff that we must direct that line of thought and that this is our opportunity, not our death.

349 : E227 : 13.11.78 It was quite incredible the other evening to go into a room with Giff's people and see the amount of despair Henry has managed to create. I think that there is a degree of disappointment and disillusionment on the cost cutting exercise and on the lack of foresight on the training front and I have a great deal of sympathy with them. I made some quite relevant comments about myself and the degree of frustration which I have had with Henry over the last twelve months and yet at that meeting I was prepared to defend him. Quite clearly they were not.

350 : E228 : 13.11.78 I also had another meeting meeting yesterday with Personnel Nurse in which I pinned her down on this. It is quite clear that South AND is going to attempt to ride roughshod over the meeting for her Community Nursing work, rather than try and under the odd dozen or so subjects. I made some very strong points to X about the need to set up adequate criteria for making this judgement and about the need to take a look at the next decade and decide quite coolly what problems are going to hit us. One of them is quite clear even now and that is nurse shortage. In these circumstances, I think that to concentrate on even the best management information system which has...
get no relevance to nurse staffing, is very foolish. Later on the same subject, I spoke with Freda Sim on the phone and
once again exceedingly quickly she had got all of my messages and I am quite sure that they are going to be really very
effective, despite the fact that she spends most of her time outside H.O.

Meeting of Heads of Divisions. The meeting was concerned with the fact that we had to formulate Objectives and this was
an amazing discussion that turned against the background of Henry having been rather forefront about his need
for better filling, better cover, etc. etc. in fact a recession into administrative mode. It was a very significant
meeting because we all agreed that we had got to get out of this rut and get a more positive direction into how the RHA was
behaving. It was agreed that we had got to take the initiative in order to set that new direction. It was agreed that on
the whole that particular group was the only power group that could actually manage to do this. There was a great deal of
discussion about the participation which could be expected from various members of the RTO in doing this. We also talked
about the need to line up our actions with the expressed policy of the RHA and the interests of members.

It was agreed that we wanted to adopt a very integrated approach to whole subjects and in the end what has come out is
a list of six care groups. The intention is that we actually adopt the whole paraphernalia of planning, monitoring,
reviews and so on and try to produce an integrated attack on these. The subjects were mental handicap, mental illness,
information systems, primary care, positive health and orthopaedic services. I agreed to talk to Ralph Rains about these
so that we could get a feeling of commitment and so on from him and I have also undertaken to talk to my own people on these
subjects.

The meeting was primarily of interest in that we were prepared to discuss the need to take the organisation and give it
orientation by using 1979 Objectives in this way. If we can achieve this then I think that a major break through has occurred.

I saw Tony today and a note exists. He took up the whole control of cross/department projects, namely, nursing and
electrical control system on the terminal. CSC seem to get the wrong end of the stick on purpose. I told Tony that this was my opinion and that both projects would come up at the Heads of Department meeting next week. Tony
is now openly saying that he will probably have gone by next Spring. At a meeting with Giff and Tony it transpired that in
the effort to upgrade PA, Tony had not been consulted about the new job specification.

I am trying to get a major project launched on information. Information consumes £15 million/£20 M, per year in the NHS and I am convinced that that goes down the drain as far as its effective use is concerned. During the Summer I tried valiantly to get Henry concerned about this on a national scale and failed utterly. During the writing of his computer policy I became clear that we could not define a GOAL for it over the next ten years. And let him work it out that this was because NHS managers did not know what they wanted SURPRISE, SURPRISE. But, whereas a £15M spend did not merit real support, lack of a GOAL did and so it get written into policy as something to be sorted by July 1979.

I took the bull by the horns at Divisional Heads and got it onto the list of 1979 RHA objectives with
control. My reason for doing this is that I can see a Committee getting hold of it and then nothing gets done.

I came back and launched it with Peter and after some explanation, it was OK. Talked to Tony about
it and up went all the shutters. "Yes providing its done properly" etc, etc. How defensive can you get?

We are just emerging from a summer of discontent on Natsys. After all the mess that Henry caused
we are now back with a clear 3 phase project. Henry Martin has been up to H.O. Committee all over the place to persuade
people that what we are doing is what they want done.

At the Technical Committee we discussed the need for more adequate contracts between COR's and the
NHS. Neil Moore came down and tried to hustle the management team into all sorts of commitment. He made wild statements
about the technical design of Natsys - which although not pressed, it would have been hard for him to justify. He tried to
claim that it is the responsibility of the Regional Objectives which although not pressed, it would have been hard for him to justify. He tried to
claim that we are committed by all that CSSC had said - God forbid! He would not respond to Giff's overtures to come
and talk about his difficulties! He knew that he does not get on with his bosses - who would? And his wife died from
cancer some time ago.

For the past few months, staffing in computing and to a lesser extent in H.S, has been becoming
critical. It will be recalled that the RCGD's true role was to form a back for everyone's back to get the problem to staff
and management side of Whitely. The RCGD's got this to the RAs who then drew it and then kicked it for touch. No.
thing is in limbo - God only knows when it will emerge from that state of affairs and in the meantime we play out a drama
in which the computer service goes to put.

I prepared a brief for Divisional Heads on the 1979 Information Project and then talked to Ralph
about making a positive health sub-project as part of the Regional Objectives. He was dead pleased, especially as he
has worked in the field already. That means that I have worked on Giff, HCSs and my chap's re. positive objectives in 1979.

Before this the Divisional Heads set to consider Objectives 1979. Giff said we'd done a great
job on his paper for Henry Jacques. David got the praise for many of the things I put in it. I anticipated trouble
with Henry at 10.00 and so did the others. We worked out a careful confrontation strategy especially on the issues
of vision and integration across boundaries. But it went like clockwork. We were all waiting for him to pull his usual fast
one - pat, pat, pat on the head, now let's talk about my version of this. But it didn't happen. It was in fact a perfect
Henry paper. We made sure that he accepted our two points. But in fact he made some excellent points. Certainly lets
work through the boundaries - but that means definition of role and responsibility - not fuzzing them. And it's a
perfectly valid approach, and he accepted that what we were talking about was taking our planning monitoring tools and
teaching and problem solving which are specific RHA skills and producing an implementable strategy for the five deprived
care groups so that they achieve the goal over the decade.

We were pleased.

Over lunch Giff brought up the point that Henry had not accepted the consequence that we would therefore be out a lot
more in 1979 and he, in best style, wanted to get him to accept this. I was putting the case that he could not win and
that he was paid 32 to put up with the gag. He's soft to pretend like this and I put my view forthrightly. So we had
a good go.

The main point of lunch was to establish with David James that he was going to have to take over
the U.M. model.

I spent two hours with Tony and Henry discussing setting up the new computer group.
David is drafting a short paper for the ATO by the 18 December 1978. He will be incorporating all of the planning actions for next year insofar as they are defined. In terms of methodology for the plans, I think that the important things are as follows.

I would like Peter to have examined the structure which we will be leaving basically unchanged next year and to have identified those parts which need changing and those parts which do not need changing. I would have hoped that by the end of January 1978, we could have launched the Strategic Regional Plan and people would have started to gather together some of the parts of it.

By the end of March 1978 I would have liked all methods for the 1978/9 Plan to be there in brief and by June 1978 all of the methods including in particular, the computational devices - be they computer programs or not - should be available.

One of the unknowns about the present methodology is the comparison methods to be used in relation to the Area Plans as they come up next Autumn. It is particularly important that we know how we will compare those Plans to our guidelines.

A particularly important bit of this process is to get Simon's contribution to it clearly specified a long time in advance. I include in this the modifications to RAMP which seem to be connected with FPC matters next year.

I went to the Newtown Computer Steering Committee. The OA had invited me up to it following the visit to him. We established that the Plan was misleading. It was established to my satisfaction that Newtown did not understand what the 7 items in the 1979 programme meant - let alone the ones up to 1983. I established that the machine would not be overloaded.

We are into the Christmas spirit with vengeance. I use the parties unashamedly to make my number with various people especially our middle managers and scale 14.

Henry has done another Christmas 1977 on the Plan. Has woken up at the last minute and become involved, is shifting whole massive chunks from main text to Appendices. Dorothy, David and Peter are swearing at him - he should have done it three months ago etc, etc. It might be true. Peter has just greeted someone with his booming "good morning" after a day of threats all day yesterday. It is wrong theoretically of Henry to intervene in this way. It is a lack of a definite theory of using his subordinates. But that is the way he behaves.

Giff and I have talked about the information project - He is anxious (a) not to lose the medical work that we have done on monitoring and (b) is anxious about the Martin AMO, OCP combination on the committee.

Because I have abandoned work for this week, the soft information flow has become overwhelming. Ralph having missed out, is very anxious about the present position.
APENDIX 2 - The Laboratory Project Diary

1 : 1.2.78 Tony Peers organised me the case for getting rid of the Delta computers (DC).
2 : 15.2.78 The National Company made proposal that we buy six machines.
3 : 17.2.78 The Avon Regional Specification based on Ralton is ready and being discussed throughout the Region.
4 : 3.3.78 Oldtown send in lengthy amendments to the specification (letter).
5 : 7.3.78 Newton accept the Regional specification - put in comments (letter).
6 : 7.3.78 Eastbury agree to specification with reservations (letter).
7 : 12.3.78 A consolidated version of North Area comments is circulating. Attached to these are further undated North Area comments. (Robert Jones found it necessary to identify thirty-four separate points in that paper! Was he histrionic? Was he plain defensive? Or, was it a bad spec?).
8 : 13.3.78 Barry Hunt is trying to get me involved in a big way.
9 : 15.3.78 Barry Hunt said that North Area pathologists accept the Regional specification except for a few minor details (all 34 i pressure).
10 : 1.4.78 Barry Hunt is starting to gun for Computer Services in a big way. Trying to blame them for a Delta decision.
11 : 6.4.78 Barry Hunt is trying to bully me! Who is responsible for recommending Delta?
12 : 14.4.78 The first note of a telephone conversation with Barry Hunt regarding Lancaster followed by all sorts of information and gossip.
13 : 20.4.78 John Jarrett is complaining bitterly about not getting his Phase 2.
14 : 20.4.78 Tony Peers is strongly recommending National.
15 : 20.4.78 Tony Peers says he has authority to design a standard system for Region. He claims that it was agreed in November 1977. Barry Hunt does not agree. Tony sends me a long, long memo to try to force National.
16 : 3.5.78 Throughout this period, Head Office are making all sorts of off-stage moves.
17 : 4.5.78 Meeting with North Area Pathologists to try and get National Company Spec, accepted. Tony Peers was not there. I could feel the distrustful eyes of Garth Bole in Robert Jones on me all the time. "Will he back us?" How on earth do you get into a meeting like this on a spec, agreement without the thing cut and dried? Barry Hunt was said to be anti-spec all the time. He played a typical hand "Difficult to get through RHA. Not sure I can accept all these amendments. Difficult to get capital in this year.
18 : 4.5.78 Max Hart sat grinning like a Cheshire cat - pretending that he could let the whole matter flow over his head. He was ready to fend off anyone trying to prescribe a system for Eastbury.
19 : Alec Johns from Ralton (base of Regional Spec) fumbled and grumbled about waste of time.
20 : I played the game of gently getting the people to agree. Eventually, Pat Hills came off the fence and then the others followed so fast it was not true. Onlyenny John from Sleeton said "I can't decide because I've not had time.
21 : For some odd reason Pat Hills wanted us to buy two systems!
22 : In the car park afterwards, Sam the technician grumbled like hell about Barry's behaviour in the meeting.
23 : 4.5.78 I attended a meeting of North Area path people today to try and get the spec, agreed for the final time. Tony Peers should have done this already. Barry Hunt played the Regional game. "Difficult to get through the RHA. Not sure that I accept all these amendments. Attacked by colleagues. Capital in this year. Max Hart sat there grinning like a Cheshire cat. "I don't have to decide yet" - but watching and ready to pounce or assert his authority in Portsmouth. Pat Hills was the most sensible man there but wanting to get ahead and spend the cash this year. Can't we buy two systems? CS insisting that Barry Hunt says "Not to go through the capital hoop again next year. All sorts of assertions of power by Barry. Fundamentally reinforcing his position.
24 : 8.5.78 Robert Jones sets out a detailed reply to North Area's comments.
25 : 12.5.78 I had lunch with Martin Williams and Barry Hunt this week and Martin got to sermonising about Avon. His tirade was fantastic, showing all of his bitter resentment against Avon. No lead from Region - and this despite the cock up on Northern Teaching Hospital. He wants Newton Hospital more heavily used - or so he says - whether practical or not. Patients to come from Oldtown and district. Does he start to realise how difficult to negotiate that would be? He hates the Plan, despite the fact that he has gone along with it - No option Chairman likes it. He is now saying that Management Services Division must do service planning. He was going on about Head Office instructions to spend cash on scientific equipment in a particular manner. Fuelled by Barry who is not expert at any of these things.
26 : 15.5.78 Barry Hunt says London Co. spec cannot be accepted.
27 : 19.5.78 Barry Hunt came in early this morning to announce that he had decided the London Co. Laboratory system could not be accepted. He is convinced that alternatives might be available next year. I am convinced that he is power mad. At a meeting last Friday, all but one of the Region's Laboratories said yes! to the Regional spec. Without real responsibility or power, Barry is taking action against the recommendation. He says he is willing to buy National or despite the fact that Tony advises him not to take the action. I felt that he was trying to take advantage of me and to put me at a disadvantage. I found it difficult to deal with Barry.
28 : 21.5.78 I try to persuade Henry Jacques to support London Co. on the basis that we cannot lose.
29 : 23.5.78 Martin and Barry and I talked computing. It was obvious that Martin had been/get at by Barry since I heard everyone of Barry's arguments coming out of Martin's mouth. I felt livid - maybe hurt pride at being out manoeuvred. No one except Tony Peers really feels that London Co. are the 'right' firm for the job, although they can probably do the job. I wrote out a case giving the logical case for doing the job through London Co. by turnkey contract. Officially we cannot lose! Great news.
30 : Barry Hunt keeps talking about the major risk to prepare a spec and so getting right up West/ nose because it is their spec!
buying only fully documented properly supported systems or contracts for such fully documented systems are entered into with

has offered a package deal. (b) The Alpha systems appear to be available on National equipment from XYZ but is not fully

be obtained from Burnage. The latter course of action is full of hazards in view of the probable lack of support from Burnage.

40: There are two ways of avoiding errors of judgement of this type. Either the Computer Services Department insists on

bought. It has transpired that that belief is not well founded. Similar support was sought from Burnage where a Delta has

prepared. It is basically an 'Alpha' system with additions. Alpha was developed at the XYZ Hospital using a National computer

38: On the basis of the Sleeton experience, and on the basis of other work in the country, a Regional specification has been

producing the system. Providing that a carefully negotiated acceptance clause forms part of the contract, it appears most

23.5.78 Mem: Development of Laboratory Computing in Avon.

There are two major parts of laboratory computing: (a) The direct control of and reading from laboratory instruments, and (b) the data processing of the results obtained in (a) to produce usable reports for clinicians. Other activities such as cumulative reports and archiving are often combined with (b) to produce a quite complex data processing activity.

36: In the early days of laboratory computing, attempts were made to combine (a) and (b) into one system and very mixed results were obtained. Following the development of mini-computers, it became possible to build (b) into the analysers themselves: thus leaving (a) as the major problem area in laboratories. Developments in Avon have concentrated on the (a) problem.

37: Following the collapse of the N.O. Project at Sleeton, a specification of a (b) type system was prepared and has been made to work in the laboratory according to specification. Currently attempts (which will probably succeed) to remove an unforeseen snag are being made. It will be difficult to find resources to improve this system due to its limited life and application throughout the Region.

35: There are two major parts of laboratory computing: (a) The direct control of and reading from laboratory instruments, and (b) the data processing of the results obtained in (a) to produce usable reports for clinicians. Other activities such as cumulative reports and archiving are often combined with (b) to produce a quite complex data processing activity.

39: For various reasons, Belmont Laboratory was the first laboratory requiring this type of support. Tenders were sought and a Delta Computer was bought. One of the main reasons for this choice was that it was thought that supporting software for laboratory applications would be available on this computer - the source being Region 7 where several such systems have been bought. It has transpired that that belief is not well founded. Stellar support was sought from Burnage where a Delta has also been bought. The system appeared to work also and plans to use that software were made. However, that system collapsed.

40: There are only two ways of avoiding errors of judgement of this type. Either the Computer Services Department insists on buying only fully documented properly supported systems or contracts for such fully documented systems are entered into with suppliers. There is a risk in any arrangement, but either of these sources of action should reduce the risk significantly. The relevance of this becomes clear below.

41: Two courses of action are possible for the Delta computer. Either it can be sold or it can be stored until a system can be obtained from Burnage. The latter course of action is full of hazards in view of the probable lack of support from Burnage.

42: The present situation appears to be as follows. (a) Of the Companies approached at the time of tender, only London Co. has offered a package deal. (b) The Alpha systems appear to be available on National equipment from XYZ but is not fully documented. The equipment is expensive. (c) Lipton laboratory in conjunction with Region B and Orion are transferring a straight copy of Alpha to Orion equipment. It is not documented although this is said to be being undertaken. Maybe a transferable system will be available in the Spring of 1979.

Note: There is evidence that all the 'Alpha systems' are developing differently from the User viewpoint. It is uncertain exactly what might be available next year.

43: It should not be thought that insistence on adequate documentation is a computer man's quirk. To the best of our knowledge, the Avon Experience is the only statement of what a system is required to do - even if much of it has been culled from elsewhere. If the system and programs are not documented, it is difficult if not impossible to change the system. Where theoretically necessary or not, the fact is that input and output is geared to particular hospital and laboratories. Without Computer Department support for this fine tuning work the systems will not match the different requirements and good documentation is essential to that activity.

44: The problem facing the Region is to determine a course of action which will give it a maintainable system over the next ten years. It should have the potential to provide a comprehensive service, e.g. to include haematology at some stage. It must be adjustable to fit all the situations in the Region and a potential to develop must be present.

45: It has been suggested that there is no immediate requirement to fulfill an urgent need at this time. This may be so but it is important to decide now far more pressing needs in larger laboratories will be met in the future. A foundation of knowledge concerning laboratory computing exists. It may be very unwise to delay and so risk slipping back from our present state. It is not clear that delay will provide a better way forward next year. It seems certain that the Orion could be the only viable Regional alternative - and that is unproven.

46: There is no cast iron way forward, but it is our opinion that nothing can be lost and much could be gained by negotiating with National the possible purchase of one machine on the basis of the attached letter. A better contract will probably be possible. It is thought possible to negotiate with National a contract which will provide a fully documented system capable of adoption for any laboratory in the Region. Although the National hardware may not be as modern as some other, there is no doubt that the National type of system is more reliable throughout the world will ensure adequate National support for a very long time. There is every reason to suppose that National's present acquaintance with Alpha should ensure that they are capable of producing the system. Providing that a carefully negotiated acceptance clause forms part of the contract, it appears most likely that the Region will possess at least one fully working and supportable system by March 1979. This course of action is recommended.

47: In our view, the consequences of not following a positive course of action at this time will be, (a) A loss of expertise in Avon, especially in the Computer Department. The value of this is considerable.

23.5.78 Mem: Development of Laboratory Computing in Avon.

(b) Saving seeds of disillusionment among pathologists. (c) The negligible risk of not having a better base to work from next year and (d) if an option to take more than one system is not negotiated, the disposal of the Delta will be difficult.

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48: 25.5.78 I have today sent a recommendation to the RTO on the laboratory system and I feel vulnerable. Despite everything
done by Tony Peers, the pathologists do not feel happy about the London Co. equipment. The case for waiting for Orion is,
on the face of it, very strong. But Head Office are vary. The costs to Avon are quite high in any case. But the case for waiting
will carry because it avoids people making nasty decisions.

49: 25.5.78 I am still trying to get Henry Jacques involved. Orion put forward their first hardware proposal.

50: 25.5.78 Laboratory Computing in Avon.

51: I am not here next week. It a clear way forward on laboratory computing is not available by the end of May, I shall have to
redploy staff on other work lasting a minimum of times to five months.

52: Subsequent to writing this note, Dalton Laboratory has asked that the requirement of their new laboratory equipment be
catered for by this package. We believe that this can be done.

53: The main snag about the London CC proposal is that it not clear how we get haematology and other laboratory activities
onto the system in due course. Either we have got to set up a team on London CC does it for us at a yet to be determined price.
The snag is obvious in this latter course of action but we believe that a system could be provided by Avon.

54: If the RTO cannot see its way to contracting for more than one system, subject to complete satisfaction on the part of
Avon with the first, then the London Co. offer is less relevant. A price for one system only could be negotiated and we
estimate that it would be about £x.. In our opinion, it is unlikely that London Co. would undertake the development work
without some contract from Avon.

55: 5.6.78 Barry Hunt was in today and I was trying desperately to avoid him. In the event it transpired that all he wished
to arrange was a visit to XYZ and Limpton. He had fixed this and by good fortune I have managed to arrive on the same train
to Limpton as Pat Mills. This should give me an advantage in that Pat Mills is rapidly emerging as one of the forces in
laboratory computing in the Region, if we can have a good talk on the way to Limpton, nothing but good can come of this.
However, it is an awful long time to fill with someone whom you only slightly.

56: 5.6.78 Max Hart, Barry Hunt and I visited XYZ and saw a remarkable display of his National Alpha Laboratory. It
covered biochemistry, haematology and was being extended to cover microbiology, etc. They had transferred the system to new
equipment. It was a real time system - VDUs in both labs and on a ward for enquiry only.

57: He had his office in a lab and made coffee for you himself. Tall, obviously cared for himself. Barry said a politician.
Not a nasty one. Barry said he wanted the system in another lab - a nasty remark really. His conversation was a trifle
brusque but he listened closely to what one said. He joined the unit Derby Day in a complete stranger in the loco. He got us a
single lunch in his lab. He demonstrated the system with expertise - gained the correct words, edited with skill on a VDU. He
reminded me of myself with the AFZ model.

58: Max talked to the operator, got impressed and genuinely felt pleased at being there.

59: Barry put on his show afterwards. Could not understand Tony, etc, etc. Max was putting on a show - that's what I want.
For no good set of reasons.

60: 5.6.78 A bid is made to put Delta in a Physics Department.

61: 5.6.78 Today I went over to West Area at the express invitation of Graham Pate, to their Path Working Party at Squareville.
Graham, PC and lab people were there. I acted out the wise man again. Put the alternatives to the setting. I picked up the
irate comments. "We haven't seen the London spec.".

62: PC asked me to note what he was saying twice. But expressed sincere faith in me personally.

63: 10.5.78 I have written various notes on lab computing which are on file and which are important.

64: I find myself with the following dilemmas on my hands.

(a) I have no good reason but I distrust the advice being given by my own people to go to London Co.

(b) I distrust Tony's bias towards London Co. (c) We are totally London Co. orientated.

(d) Ralph says that Barry is not to be trusted and has not get the support of his consultant colleagues.

(e) It is said to be wellknown that consultant

(f) Garth Beles and Willy James will probably leave. And then we will be in a mess on the other fronts.

(g) The viability of the whole Department is questionable.

(h) Barry Hunt pays lip service. I) Martin is completely incapable of coming to a decision. "Go away, think again,

(i) Barry does disad that he does not tell you about, e.g. promising some more equipment to David James.

65: 12.6.78: Memo: Comments on the visits to XYZ Hospital and the West Area Steering Committee.

66: I think that it is useful if I put down my feelings on both of these visits for you so that we are aware of each other's
position.

67: There is no doubt that the display put on by Wood at the XYZ Hospital was very impressive. It should be borne in mind
that that system applied to XYZ and was designed for their purpose. There is no way of knowing at this point in time that
that system does fit Sleeton's requirements. Although I am sure Dr Jarrett was impressed by the display which Wood put on and
the rate at which he could operate the system, it is still a fact that Dr Jarrett has not studied the detail of that system.
This is due to the fact that there is no system specification for him to study. The enthusiasm of both Dr Jarrett and Dr
Max Hart in Eastbury for the XYZ system is not based on a thorough understanding of the jobs which the system will do for them
but on the very superb display which Wood provided.

68: There is a serious question to be answered as to whether or not the hardware in the Sleeton Laboratory is adequate to do
the work which Wood does. An investigation of this needs to be undertaken. It goes without saying that if there is any need
whenever to buy additional National hardware for the Sleeton Laboratory for this experiment, this would be a major drawback
as far as the Region is concerned.

69: Wood very kindly offered to support the transfer to the Sleeton Laboratory, even to the extent of writing some of the
programmes which Dr Jarrett requires. We need to check very carefully the extent of these programmes and I do not think that
it is sufficient to assume that it only concerns Dr Jarrett's card system. A thorough check and costing of that work needs to
be undertaken.

70: You are undoubtedly aware of the fact that Tony Peers over the past year examined all of the Alpha systems and has some
comments to make on the suitability of the XYZ system for the Sleeton Laboratory. I have asked him to provide you with a
complete list of the comments which he collected during that period of time.
71: I am sure that you would agree with me that any transfer of the Alpha system from XYZ to Sleeton must be based on a thorough understanding of the costs and consequences of doing this. Everyone would wish for this to be successful but it would be foolish not to carefully count the costs and plot the way of doing this before the exercise is undertaken and before any explicit promise is made to Dr Jarrett that this will be undertaken by the Region on his behalf.

72: I am bound to say that I was somewhat surprised at the West Area meeting to find that the need for the Ralton equipment had disappeared so definitely and so persuasively. This obviously makes a huge difference to the need for a London Co. system at this time. Nevertheless, I think that you must appreciate that there are some factors involved than the clinical need for the Ralton system.

73: Whatever system comes into the Region, it is my view that we are going to have to provide support for it. I have informed you that I think that one of the major consequences of a decision not to go ahead, however reasonable it may appear, will be the disappearance of the people who are capable of supporting such a system in the Computer Department. I think it only fair to point out to you that I do not think that we will be able to replace these senior people. A recent report has shown that NHS salaries are now falling well behind the computer salary market and the computer press is now full of advertisements for staff. It may seem strange for the preservation of adequate computing expertise to be the major reason for going ahead with the ICL purchase at this time but I feel bound to warn you that it may be difficult to go ahead with any equivalent development at a later time, say next year, if the present staff leave. One of the fundamental questions which you will have to answer is whether the cost of working the National Co. system is too great a price to pay for the possible maintenance of adequate support expertise in the Region.

74: It is not only a question of adequate support for laboratory systems, these are the people who we rely on for this type of computing. They have, for example, done much of the work to support the three peripheral computers in the Region, especially that at Newton. The seriousness of losing this staff should not be underestimated on any account.

75: 12.6.78 Need for West Area system disappears?

76: This appears to have been my main reason for abandoning London Co.

77: I tell Barry Hunt and Martin that whatever Alpha comes to Avon it will have to be supported.

78: 14.6.78 Diary note on a visit to Linton with Dr Pat Hills, Garth Beales, Barry Hunt and John Jarrett.

79: Over the past few months, we have been trying to negotiate a way forward on computing. During that time, the Alpha system in the XYZ Hospital has become a competitor for the position of Regional standard system in competition with the London Co. package. I have described elsewhere the various goings on in the London Co. package and the way in which a very complex situation has developed. This consists of attitudes of people on the shop floor towards London Co., things which Barry Hunt is doing to shift the timetable in Ralton, and due to the insistence of Barry Hunt, we have been up to Linton for two days - namely, the 14th and 15th June 1978 in an attempt to assess the Linton system.

80: I went up with Pat Hills and Garth Beales. My intention was to try to corner Pat Hills for the whole journey. Garth's presence did not allow this. The second thing was that the train up to Linton was crowded and in fact I had to sit there 80%, I went up with Pat Hills and Garth Beales. My intention was to try to corner Pat Hills for the whole journey. Garth's presence did not allow this. The second thing was that the train up to Linton was crowded and in fact I had to sit there 80%. I went up with Pat Hills and Garth Beales. My intention was to try to corner Pat Hills for the whole journey. Garth's presence did not allow this. The second thing was that the train up to Linton was crowded and in fact I had to sit there 80%.

81: In the hotel that night we sat drinking until one o'clock, in the middle of a dance floor of some sort - having been ousted from the bar by a coach party who were doing the 'can can' round the place. The Scientific Officer from a Northern Region, together with a computer chap was there. I purposely and insistently put the questions which had got to be answered in the presence of John Jarrett and Barry Hunt and the other character from Northern Region. These people claim to be scientists. One of the best methods of getting hold of them is to take them on the scientific set of values to appeal to their scientific nature. I pointed out gently the fact that they did not know what the Alpha was about. That they did not know whether it is doing to shift the timetable in Ralton, and due to the insistence of Barry Hunt, we have been up to Linton for two days - namely, the 14th and 15th June 1978 in an attempt to assess the Linton system.

82: I did get Pat Hills to myself over lunch. During the meal I talked quite openly about some of the problems which I had with the staff and ....... He obviously knew that side of the problem quite well. I asked him to talk to the chief when it was possible. I wanted to try to get them to think objectively about the situation and recognise that despite their seeming lack of progress, in fact considerable progress has been made. Somehow or other they have got to come to terms with the result of the Delta. This they are going to find difficult because they are rationalising like mad to try and get out from under and make it all acceptable to their own minds.

83: We went out to the hotel in Linton - a long way out in a taxi driven by a nurse who had to work two nights a week driving taxis to make ends meet. His wife drove taxis another two nights a week when he stayed home. I was struck by the different image which he presented to that of the normal nurse as we picture his. 'The angels of mercy floating around.' The contrast was exceedingly great. Here was a guy who was being pushed to all sorts of limit who really was a rough diamond - not a smoothy at all.

84: In the hotel that night we sat drinking until one o'clock, in the middle of a dance floor of some sort - having been ousted from the bar by a coach party who were doing the 'can can' round the place. The Scientific Officer from a Northern Region, together with a computer chap was there. I purposely and insistently put the questions which had got to be answered in the presence of John Jarrett and Barry Hunt and the other character from Northern Region. These people claim to be scientists. One of the best methods of getting hold of them is to take them on the scientific set of values to appeal to their scientific nature. I pointed out gently the fact that they did not know what the Alpha was about. That they did not know whether it fitted their laboratories or not. In the quietness of the evening, drinking pints round a brass tooped table, issues which they knew about, gently pressed home. Pat Hills went to bed early. He is a very polite character. His manners are superb. He is gracious, making sure that you always get offered things. He is gentle.

85: In the evening, it became clear that the Linton people had laid on a demonstration which was the best that they could possibly do. In a sense they had been preparing for an exhibition in September and this was a sort of first run at it to try and get some of their own thoughts straight. A person from the MS department in North Region, John, picked me up in the car together with Garth Beales and the other designer from Northern. In fact the poor chap got grilled in the car right into town. I desperately tried to divert the conversation onto the greenery around us but could not resist the opportunity to grill the guy a little. I also made sure that my profuse apologies got back to RSMG 3 because I had not managed to contact him before going up there.

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86: Two of RMSO 5's people turned up - a systems designer and a girl. The quality of the staff was pretty high. The girl was delightfully Northern coming from Middlesborough and having spent all of her life in that part of the world. We were talked to during the morning. Rather it would be fairer to say that they attempted to talk to us and they got themselves interrupted at frequent intervals by all of us. They did their very best to answer the questions which we raised. The thing which emerged quite clearly is that the transfer of ALPHA to Lipton was far from iron the truth. They were transferring the important part of ALPHA. They were leaving other bits to a later stage. They were obviously planning even at this stage to change ALPHA quite substantially to fit in with the Lipton District Path Service. Barry Peers, the Consultant Pathologist, was exceedingly proud of what they were trying to do. Afterwards both John Jarrett and Barry could not resist saying remarks about the Lipton laboratory which is obviously quite low in comparison with our big ones but not so low compared with Halton. The remarks varied later in the day from coming in at 10 to going at 6 to "Holiday camp", I am actually quite intrigued by this. Because in a sense it shows the fact that they find it difficult to be easy and they were left in some difficulty because of the apparent naivety and openness and pleasure which the man showed. He was gracious in many little ways and yet there was no doubt that he cannot possibly be more than an average Consultant.

87: Two other actors on the stage were two Regional Scientific Officers. One man was a very quiet guy. He talked to us at length and on the Regional policy. He gave rather an answer- Baron's opinion of his was that in fact he was thoroughly effective. The obvious contrast between his and Barry Hunt in the way that they would approach any matter rather point for this. They did say that he was going to go to the authorities to get further resources for this project in September and it will be interesting to see whether or not this happens. If it does, busy for his and another comment on dear old Barry. The other Regional Scientific Officer from Northern Region was a very pleasant, quiet fellow who it was impossible not to like. We had obviously done his homework and got a fair amount done on this subject by his own 60 people. He obviously knew what had been going on in the rest of the country and could talk coherently about it.

88: I made sure that all the major technical questions were asked. Firstly those which concern the basic filling system. It is interesting that I should be the one asking these sorts of questions. There are two reasons for doing this, in a setting of this sort. First to find information and second to impress on people like Barry Hunt and the pathologists the importance of these sorts of issues and to get them in the ways in which they think. I think that they have started to appreciate at long last that some of the technical issues and issues like documentation are important in a practical sense to themselves and it is clear that Tony and his people have simply not managed to communicate this sort of issue to them.

89: At lunch I insisted on collating one of the two junior technical people and sitting by her. I very carefully balanced a cross-questioning of the technical bits of the system with chat about herself and Lipton and her children and her home. Apart from being very pleasant, it revealed to myself certain of my own characteristics. The lunch is exceedingly useful in that it certainly managed to cement a relationship there. One can be quietly confident that in due course they will transfer the ALPHA system onto the Orion software. One can be rather less confident that a fully documented system will evolve.

90: During the afternoon, demonstrations of the bits which were currently working were given to us. I looked at the displays for a few minutes and in fact spent most of the timequizing people privately. A good deal of disquiet was expressed about the way in which London Co. were dealing with their commitment to Alpha - changing horses, doing all sorts of things except to get their dates for commitment. Not a very happy scene at all in my view. I also renewed my acquaintance with Alan Kithlof of Alpha and talked to him. The scene was open, quiet, somewhat naive in some respects. It was certainly not appropriate to go on at length, all I did was really to chuck out a few facts on the costs and capabilities for expansion of the system and renew our friendly relationship - talk about old times, etc. It also became clear that Tony Bissett was quite an important character in Orion, so perhaps I will try and get Tony interested in this affair.

91: An interesting side issue was their view of the NHS as being an organisation with which it is very difficult to deal. They had not thought up methods of doing it and in a sense this ties in with the image which I have of that particular company. They could break into the NHS market so easily if they tried.

92: And so the day drew to its close and we were taken to Limpton Station and safely got onto the train. Barry Hunt, John Jarrett, myself and from Preston Garth Bales sat together. John is infinitely more clever clever I suspect. Inevitably in 91: An interesting side issue was their view of the NHS as being an organisation with which it is very difficult to deal. They had not thought up methods of doing it and in a sense this ties in with the image which I have of that particular company. They could break into the NHS market so easily if they tried.

93: On the way from London I took the opportunity of trying to talk to Garth Bales about some of the lessons which we learnt and how we ought to be trying to analyse the situation in order to do this. I said some quite hard things quite nicely to him. With a drink in front of him he was in a mood to listen. Over the period of about 50 minutes I went through some of the main features of this case with him. I did not hesitate to go into areas in which he was bound to be rather sensitive and I talked about them quietly with a view to getting him to analyse and face reality, putting aside his own feelings of resentment and hurt and facing up to the fact that at the end of the day the DELTA recommendation had been wrong. I talked to him about the lack of confidence that the pathologists had got. I talked to him about the fact that taking a system from X was in fact relying on things they knew about and A was a good chap whatever else he was. I talked to him about bias and about people's need to reinstate themselves in their own eyes and the lengths to which they will go to do this. I talked to him about his own obvious resentments and pointed out to him that in the circumstances he was incapable of seeing and learning about what he had done and that in these circumstances he was incapable of becoming better. So I suppose that was that hour's counselling which I hope had some effect. It is all the more effective because I was drinking his beer.
D is tr ic t *aight give favourable consideration to* rather than * accord p r io r ity  to*. As he pointed out, * p r io r ity  over what?*. Chairman said *No doubt members w ill maintain a watching b rie f of th e ir Areas o f conern®. Barry Hunt said *1 might add that planning tim etable, w e  were not included*. Barry Hunt said *R M O  apologises fo r th is  omission*. An in te re stin g  set o f comments b it of the session correcting misleading comments by John J a rra tt. H e  gave one impression of the Avon produced laboratory everyone thouoht i t  existed, oeoole were quite c r itic a l of i t  and thought that i t  could not possibly D e  a good one and so on.

We brandish statements lik e ; *The radiology legal requirements*. Or JC did not hesitate to sake clear that he was the your p o lic ie s  are brought to the atte n tio n  of the planners at regular in te rv a ls *. The Chairman said *Please note that in the of the advice* when ha was talkin g  about S. The Chairman said *1 w ill have to take up the status of our advice with Dr

R H A  could not possibly commit themselves to taking everyone's advice a ll of the time. In fa ct Barry Hunt did not say a  word in defence except to say that no lastin g  decision had been taken. Eventually it was agreed to minute as *The Region would take note of the Committee's comments.*. Several consultants joined in to the effect that they did not intend to waste their time unless the advice were taken.

An intere sting paper prepared by a Sub-Committee on Endoscopy was next on the Agenda. It was fascinating to hear the way in which the paper had been drafted. All of the recommendations were positive. There were never any suggestions that Endoscopy would be encouraged - resources permitting. Martin Williams came in during this paper. A myth emanates from RD that no one would quibble with the fact that patient care would be enhanced by Endoscopy. The Chairman threw in several remarks which backed some of the more outrageous claims by opening up *I am sure that you will accept*.*. There is not a flinch at the way in which the report was drafted until in fact Martin Williams started warning the thing down by suggesting that the Secretary might give favourable consideration to rather than * accord priority to*. As he pointed out, *priority over what?. A fascinating point about the document was that despite the fact that it had been drafted in such powerful persuasive language, they still had not noticed that they had put in two paragraphs 3 and that there was a general jumble about the arrangement of the paper.

We then get on to the Laboratory consulting which Barry introduced. I joined in such sore on this one. I spent quite a bit of the session correcting misleading comments by John Jarrett. He gave one impression of the Aven produced laboratory system which suggested that it did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specification it did not meet his current requirements. Dr Jarrett claimed that he was going to transfer in the X system which suggested that it did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to specification it was due. At the end of the discussion we were congratulated on having produced a paper which was short and to the point.

Going back to the Endoscopy paper, it was fascinating to note that Martin put in several minor drafting amendments which I am sure could be made quietly outside the Committee. It is typical of the man that he niggle about things like that.

I got some stick on the planning papers. Several of the consultants, Dr JC in particular, criticised many of the statements and there was no doubt that they are politically impol. I had to defend by saying that these were working papers and that the Committee had asked to be kept informed and that they could not expect special papers to be written for them. I tried to put things in context first of all. I do not know that it did an awful lot of good. The Chairman got rather impatient. It was a thoroughly foolish move to take papers like that but there is not any clear alternative.

Going back to the first item, I have got several choice comments to record. DrMcK used phrases like; *a gross breach of the advice* when he was talking about S. The Chairman said *I will have to take up the status of our advice with Dr Williams.* John Jarrett said *We ought to take steps to monitor the use of our policy*. (Note: not the RHA). The Chairman said *no doubt members will maintain a watching brief of their Areas of concern*. Barry Hunt said *I might add that your policies are brought to the attention of the planners at regular intervals*. The Chairman said *please note that in the planning timetable, we were not included*. Barry Hunt said RMO apologises for this omission*. An interesting set of comments from DrMcK; *We consider that X would be suitable. It is not necessary to provide YY. We use phrases like: *X will require*. We brandish statements like; *The radiology legal requirements*. Or JC did not hesitate to make clear that he was the Secretary of a National Working Party on Endoscopy. For Endoscopy, members said that the evidence was overwhelming. McK uses phrases like *It is a question of patient care which is being improved and not a question of the costs being kept down*. This is another example of the use of a myth to push forward an unreasonable and uneconomic course of action.

In the middle of the Endoscopy discussion, it appeared that a DHCS report popped out of nowhere. No one had seen it, everyone thought it existed, people were quite critical of it and thought that it could not possibly be a good one and so on.
resentful about Salton and the fact that I had committed resources. They do not accept that they had let themselves down by not committing resources fully in relation to what had been said. They resent enormously the fact that I could easily decide to give some support to the Orion work in view of the fact that three or four Regions are interested in this development. There is a very strong feeling about the way to get things done and the part that technical matters play in fundamental decision making.

I'm single handed, so some get away. But in his own politicking way he is genuinely trying.
125 (cont'd) I was going behind their back, double dealing with Barry Hunt. He declared quite openly that he would resign, as if that was going to make any difference whatever to my course of action. It would be unfortunate but certainly not a catastrophe in my view. I would much sooner have, suspect, Willy Jones in that particular position. I had not anticipated some of their reactions in that they accused me of jumping on the Orion bandwagon too quickly. I slipped up when I openly said that I was quite willing to pay cash to encourage the Orion/Region k. thing if need be by getting people upstairs, eventually got out of this by pretending that one of them was a University person but I did not know whether it was true or not. I think in fact Garth Boles got me off the hook inadvertently by giving us the necessary lead that this was the case. However, was that distinctly a faux pas. Tony Peers demonstrated his loyalty to that and not to me by siding with them throughout the interview. I do not know what goes this, whether he still takes it seriously that his main job is to stay on their side and not the side of the organisation. I was incredibly surprised to see Barry Kay puffing and puffing about his principles, especially those concerned with professionalism and not mixing politics into this technical decision. He really made quite a lot of noise, all being quite surprising because he really does not have anyone's respect down there and I am about to rescue the guy from himself.

126 By pure coincidence, on the way up to London, I met Martin on the station at Oldtown. This was fortunate because I had just had an idea on how to get round the laboratory problem, namely, to get our own system written on the Orion and to use the North West work in order to do this. The advantages could be that we would have an insurance system with the ALPHAs at North Region in due course and at the same time I could appease my own chaps by getting their work done. Of course they will not readily accept the Orion but life is like that. Somehow or other I have got to persuade everyone that there is sufficient in common between the ALPHAs and our own system to make this worthwhile and I think that there is a great deal of politicking necessary to achieve this. I carefully told Martin that I was having difficulty with the staff and he is obviously concerned about this. This was preparation for the basic message which I wish to get across. He did not like talking about people in the carriage and it was funny the extent to which he went to avoid using anyone's name. It was interesting to note the difference in our attitudes because as far as I could see we could have discussed this matter purely in terms of us, the RHA, taking a wise course of action and people need not have got involved at all. Martin's perception was obviously different. His ability to de-personalise something was different from mine. At any rate, Martin jumped at the opportunity of trying to find a compromise between Avon and North Region and Barry Hunt and everyone else. I also took the opportunity with Martin of reinforcing the fact that John Jarrett will have to perform a miracle to get the Salton laboratory system to work. I re-assured him at the same time that we would still have our own Avon system there available to run. I also reinforced with Martin the message that the fact that John Jarrett will have to perform a miracle to get the Salton laboratory system to work, I re-assured him at the same time that we would still have our own Avon system there available to run. I also reinforced with Martin the message that the transfer into Salton will not be a catastrophe in my view, I would much sooner have, I suspect, Garth Boles in that particular position. I had not anticipated some of their reactions in that they accused me of jumping on the Orion bandwagon too quickly. I slipped up when I openly said that I was quite willing to pay cash to encourage the Orion/Region k. thing if need be by getting people upstairs, eventually got out of this by pretending that one of them was a University person but I did not know whether it was true or not. I think in fact Garth Boles got me off the hook inadvertently by giving us the necessary lead that this was the case. However, was that distinctly a faux pas. Tony Peers demonstrated his loyalty to that and not to me by siding with them throughout the interview. I do not know what goes this, whether he still takes it seriously that his main job is to stay on their side and not the side of the organisation. I was incredibly surprised to see Barry Kay puffing and puffing about his principles, especially those concerned with professionalism and not mixing politics into this technical decision. He really made quite a lot of noise, all being quite surprising because he really does not have anyone's respect down there and I am about to rescue the guy from himself.

127: 10.7.78 Letter to John Jarrett says Yes to transfer.

128: 12.7.78 I ask Tony Peers for his list of ALPHAs. The H.O. man gives his opinions of all ALPHAs.

129: 14.7.78 In my other diary notes, I have recorded maddening discussions with Martin and Barry on laboratory computing. Having seen Martin on the train and launched my compromise, I suggested to Tony Peers that he might like to consider getting a version of the Avon system on Orion for this purpose. Splutter, splutter - but he agreed - Get to get in tenders properly. I've been through all this with a solicitor friend and a PAC is on the way! In fact, it is a Tony Peers trick to dangle PAC's and professionalised dealings in front of people and expect them to take fright. That is not say that I do not take a PAC seriously, I think that I could justify all of my actions.

130: However, Barry came to see me before I could get into his. It was obvious that he thought that I had pulled a fast one by talking to Martin without him, despite the fact that, as I pointed out, it was fortuitous. So Barry said, "Providing the cost of the premium is not too high, he'd go along with it". And I said it was £25,000. Shock pretended by Barry. Cost to GGH? No cost to RHA and Martin coughs up the answer.

131: P.S. Tony Peers was at pains to point out that I was way out on my own. Get to get in tenders from everyone else who tendered last time.

132: 17.7.78: Barry Hunt starts to talk to Martin about the basic proposals from Texco.

133: John Jarrett writes to Barry Hunt to say that Woods will support his transfer.

134: I am still trying to get a list of problems on the ALPHA transferred.

135: I have again told Barry Hunt about the difficulties of the transfer.

136: Dr H from Salton is trying to obtain the ALPHA from Dr Hunt again.

137: Dr Jarrett at Salton is trying to get 8k of core stored from the old National computers, despite the fact that he has not got room for it.

138: The Salton pathologists and Garth Boles go to Buxton. They find that Buxton is not running in the lab and that it is unlikely to do so until early part of 1979 but they do discover one more facility which they want to add to the system, namely, hard copy printers with all the QUs.

139: I waste quite a lot of time with Dr Hunt clearing up that John Jarrett cannot have another 8k core.

140: 20.7.78 John Jarrett speaks up the bid to transfer ALPHA into Salton on his National hardware.

141: Harry Peers (Limpton) is trying to make local capital out of the Avon interest to get more support for his own Northern system.

142: I have tried to amend the Regional Scientific Committee Minutes to get in my statement that the transfer into Salton will be a miracle.
Dr Hunt also wrote to Woods asking him for his help with the transfer of his Physics Department in Highbury. 

DELTA for his Physics Department in Highbury tends to tie up much more closely with the patient identity as used on the ward, by which we knew was limited in any case. This is a long memo and it is noticeable that Garth does not praise anything whatsoever in its first year.

Please note that during this period Hunt renewed his vendetta against Computer Services.

I try and give a briefing to Robert Jones and Garth Boles of what I want them to write about Ralton. This was fully comprehensive because they had not studied the ALPHA system. We would thus have two forms of quality control in the lab - one from the XYZ computer and the other from the ALPHA and it is possible that they would contradict each other.

Ralton do appear to want cumulative reports but the form that they require is not available on the ALPHA. I cannot help feeling that I have got this the wrong way round, despite my own note.

Ralton pathologists wish to keep their staff doing some of the calculations manually which the ALPHA computer would do for them automatically. This would need to have an automatic routine taken out of the ALPHA system.

Robert and Garth assured me that there was quite a bit of work in all of these things. They were not sure whether the list was fully comprehensive because they had not studied the ALPHA system.

Garth and Robert agreed to obtain as much relevant documentation from ALPHA as possible and to start work on it.

The action is with me in that I need to contact West Area and Dr Hunt to decide what action/pressure can be put on Ralton to fall into line with ALPHA. I need to contact Graham Pats on this as soon as I get back from holiday.

I was assured that in fact the pathology laboratories would be more in line with the ALPHA system than the Ralton ones and that in any case enthusiasm at Ralton was now falling off.

Report received 4.11.78.

Woodbury raise the overcharging issue and quote an agreement of 29.5.76. (their notes of course).

I try and give a briefing to Robert Jones and Garth Boles of what I want them to write about Ralton.

Hugh Robins accepts the terms for the Salton transfer with a bit of an argument. He then brings up the cost of the system.

Woodbury eventually accept the transfer offer.

Scolland is complaining about the service obtained from London Co. This is a confidential letter to H.O. Lee Ross is getting involved in the Woodbury costs and behaving like a true Accountant. He was not in on the Regional deal. He tries to apply all the niceties of all the overhead calculations to an experimental project. He does not consult me about the wisdom of this. He does not consult Barry Hunt either.

Garth Boles has gone to the exhibition and is now busy pointing out all the faults in the ORION demonstration which we knew was limited in any case. This is a long memo and it is noticeable that Garth does not praise anything whatsoever in the ORION situation.

I agree with Dr Hunt that we should try and get the Region 6 to join the ALPHA club and for us to co-operate with them. We agree on visits to Highbury and North Region.

Garth Boles produces an overview of the ALPHA system for which he was not asked. He also proposes to benchmark the DELTA system. Again, for which he was not asked. Barry Hunt tells Lily of Highbury that he cannot have the Ralton DELTA for his Physics Department in Highbury.

We all go to Highbury to try and arrange co-operation with the Region 6. I had lunch beforehand with Tony to try and get things straightened out. At the meeting, both NCSOs are anything but helpful.

As an aside to this story, we get involved in the H.O. account of what sorts of computers we have got. The NHS can't even co-ordinate its activities at this very rudimentary level.

Dr Hunt, out of the blue, tells me that TECNO have completed a survey in Salton and wish to offer us a system for £27,000. Having also produced a huge specification.
Tony Peers is still investigating the off charging of Woodbury, raised at least a month ago. Lee Ross is involved. Please note that we still have not resolved this issue on the 22nd November.

Garth Boles claims to have understood my original request for information on Ralton. He makes remarks like - it is clear that our perception of the meeting on the 17th August was different from that of Robert Jones and myself. I take short shrift of both of their objections but I still do not get that report until November.

Before I went away on holiday, I saw Garth Boles and Robert Jones on the subject of laboratory computing. I tried to perform that meeting in as friendly a way as possible. There were many issues and I suggested that quite a few of them were fairly minor and that we ought to concentrate on the two major ones. I was under the impression that they had gone away to deal with the two major issues and to give us a report on them. I thought that I had indicated clearly that the thing I wanted urgently was a meeting at Ralton to decide whether or not a laboratory should adopt its ways to take DELTA as it exists, whether in fact we ought to put the name into it or whether we should withdraw the system altogether and yet I came back and find them trying to put it into Hillbury which was their original suggestion. I find them not having produced the report which I specifically said I wanted - not on the basis of a deep investigation but on the basis of principle. Phone them up and say I want it, I want it, I want it, and get a memo back saying you can't have it. I have to go and see Tony and say specifically - not Hillbury. These things are irrelevant - I want a report on two. I personally have intervened to make sure that a meeting is set up in Ralton in the very near future to resolve these issues. How is this my job or not? Because it seems to me that it is important to decide the sort of instruction which I can give and expect to be carried out. In this particular case, I am delving into a subject at far too deep a level. I am doing this on purpose because I feel that I cannot do otherwise and expect to have other than a mess on my hands or the instructions and wishes of the RHA not being followed.

On the same subject of laboratory computing, I am trying desperately to get some form of cooperation going inter-regionally so that a common system can be backed. It will have to be an existing system. It will probably have to be the ORION system because that can be developed back to the development and that is the easiest politically etc.
I talked to Graham Pate subsequently at the meeting at the Kings Fund today (7 November) and he is going to try and look into ways of making effort available from Rallton.

Today I returned from holiday. I was met by Henry Jacques in a state about the Computer Plan. He had been trying last week to find someone in Management Services to answer his questions about the Plan and was in a state because he thought that there was no one in charge. I gather from Tony that Caesar got very angry about the way he was so rude to him and the net result was that Caesar did not choose to ring back. This let me in for a load of trouble and was a very unsatisfactory note on his part. I got a five minute lecture from Henry Jacques on his pet administrative subject, namely, cover. A topic which saves me thoroughly sick.

In the afternoon I went to Rallton to discuss with Barry Hunt and Ralton people the DELTA over there. At long last I had managed to get out of the system a report on the essential amendments and others for the Rallton work. As well as the amendments, I got a whole lot of other stuff in the report which I had not requested and which must have consumed one hell of a lot of staff time.

The meeting got down to facts fairly quickly and it transpired that Ralton were not willing to notify their requests for 300 days work on the DELTA system before putting it into the Rallton laboratory. This was despite the fact that we pointed out to them that the possibility of getting this work done was fairly negligible. But the fact of the matter is that they do not see all that bothered because the laboratory is a fairly quiet place. They are in an over capitalised position and can cope with their workload. They will put sufficient pressure on the DMT to recruit additional operational staff when the time comes. If they do not get all that they want, they are in a sense "making a sacrifice". As a whole we in Management Services are now in the position in which staff cannot be recruited and so there was a general air of despair and not caring very much and so on. The outcome of this means that they agreed to consider once again the requests as detailed in the report and to send us a final letter on the subject. We agreed to go back and consider it.

I am loathe to abandon this work because I think that the effects of doing this will be very unhelpful on the morale and so on of the staff concerned. At the same time I feel that they do not care all that much. They are not all that committed to the Region. They are not all that committed to anything in particular. It is interesting that this note probably reflects some of my feelings.

I met Barry Hunt today. We discussed two subjects. John Jarrett has once again changed his position on the Poola Laboratory transfer, in that Woodford letter (or rather his conversation with him) he has decided that he will take Woodford system as it stands. This is a quite incredible move. He says that he will do this temporarily at first but he is obviously quite determined to get his hands on ALPHA and it is quite illuminating to see the level of compromise that he is prepared to go to in order to achieve this.

The second issue was the Ralton transfer. Barry Hunt and I have met twice in the corridor this week - each rushing from place to place and I have twice indicated to him and once sitting in his chair in his room, that I think that we must try and write it postdated to tomorrow. I have started the argument with Barry in the friendly terms. I even let Barry scribble what we said at the meeting. All this of course pre-supposes that we have got the effort in any case.

I am going to fix the West Area letter tomorrow.

As an interlude in the laboratory saga Woodbury descended on H.O. today with three operational problems.

(a) They had been charged the lot in the Salton development year and thought that this was a bit much. Barry and I distinctly remember the Region being generous over this to a point of folly in the rescue. Lee Ross and Woodbury DFO put on their worst accountants' hats and argued about bills - I gave Woodbury £20,000.

(b) We then got into the same stupid set of arguments about Woodford ALPHA. You bend over backwards to be generous and encourage these people and then you get squeezed. I was feeling pretty chuffed by the end of it all.

(c) John Jarrett did not bring up support for Woodford ALPHA but we are going down there tomorrow. Tony Peers played the old swan song of no staff, etc, etc, and he claimed not to know what we were discussing.

Over lunch I saw Graham Pate at our favourite behind the scenes pub in Salton. I fixed that Wayne Cook would pressurise Henry Jacques to put priority on Rallton. In the afternoon I briefed Henry that it was coming.

Today, Barry Hunt and I visited John Jarrett to see how the transfer was going - with my Local man looking on - (Why?), it was in John's lab. We again explore support from Computer Services and I painfully emphasised that we could do little to help. Yes, we would say if it was an ALPHA fault or National Da. Yes; I would persuade Tony Peers to spend half a day to make sure that start up was possible. Yes, we would take copies of Avon system. John Jarrett, have you got an implementation programme with Woodford? Well not exactly. Has he got necessary amendments done? Well, no. What is he doing? Well he's transferring haematology to S.U. on new National equipment!!! Woodford won't need Sleeton after that. We might get the Sleeton transfer done in March. It then blows Barry Hunt's philosophy sky high.

Barry Hunt case in and surprised me as I was writing a Review of Laboratory Computing. I hurriedly turned over the sheets. I am determined to push through an economic case for computing in Avon and to make it surface at RTO. I have now written it postdated to tomorrow. I have started the argument with Barry in the friendliest terms. I even let Barry scribble on the blackboard knowing full well that I had all the figures on a piece of paper in front of me. BUT we are still on good terms. Barry is still saying that the clinicians would trust me even if they did not trust my guys.

I went to Henry Jacques with my review note or less forcing it onto an unwilling Henry. The conflict of approach was tremendous. I put a lot of skill into simplifying the issues and getting to the main point, namely, that there was £5 million difference between getting pushed into a commercial system and having the wit to do our own thing. Henry did not even want to listen. What we need to do is establish who's responsible. To hell with the business of £5 million. We waste that sort of figure regularly. I don't really want to read the paper. Must I really? Yes! You must. Then at least I have done my job - even if you don't care about the £5 million. We get quite stressed. He's got the paper.

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198 : 31.11.78 : Following my provocative long memo to Barry Hunt, I got an irate one back. Having put the ball firmly in his court, we now got down to the hard negotiations. Barry Hunt pretended that £5 million was nothing - lost and gained that sort of money all the time. But I stuck to that to my humble mind, this was important. Barry Hunt said that we underestimated it. I insisted that £5 million was significant and he accepted that we must avoid it but we must check the commercial price. I insisted that John Jarrett would need support and that to support the 2 year old ALPHA case sense. I insisted that Oldtown would pick up Ralton DELTA. Point of fact, they're doing it themselves. So, no so attractive an offer, I said. Barry's memo was vitriolic but you did confuse revenue and maintenance. Agree that Sleeton is irrelevant. So we will support it. Barry Hunt eventually agrees. But ALPHA needs 3 men to support. Can't say that yet Graham. But Barry - the £5 million and ALPHA does work - OK. What about Ralton? Chuck it out. But Barry - und so se - economic - so what? How about composite 52% from Area, 52% from Region. Phase 1 now Phase 2 assu. Well, economics - no mud - OK! Can't go to R90? Not to 'hugh - time pressing'. They're only interested in Plan and Mental handicap. Perhaps go in January. Then Hugh let slip that he's already talked to William - he got a raspberry - like I got off Henry. 199 : Later today I gave an unexpurgated version of this to Tony Peers. And he fell in line too. So I keep them apart and all's OK. 200 : Barry went on and on about pathologists not trusting Computer Services. Later, Tony Peers said that Pat Hills is willing to take DELTA as it stands now and supply two people seconded to Computer Services to amend it later. How's that for taking the biscuit. 201 : 7.12.78 : Yesterday, I became quite irate in the morning to find that Tony Peers was not visiting Texco with us. Not only was this not happening but Robert Jones had disappeared into the midst of Portsmouth without trace. Barry Hunt claimed to have invited Tony Peers and therefore took the opportunity to go on and on about this. I asked Barry Hunt for his report on Jarrett on the shortcomings of Texco system. He did not have then but did not apologise at all. 202 : What was Jarrett going to ask - didn't know. Phone Jarrett. Fix clandestine meeting with Jarrett in pub on way to Texco. 203 : I left early from the pub. Missed Barry and Jarrett who found their way into a bar past me. Jarrett produces his master questions (they were never used). And so to Texco. 204 : Here we were given a frugal/americal type treatment but we quickly established that Texco was a no go. Sure it worked but it was basically not orientated to Britain and not big enough for our purpose. And the big one which we really need is £250,000 and the maintenance is 8%. So all my figures underestimate the case against commercial system. 205 : Because I was making the running technically Barry kept getting me in. Then he insisted that Texco write it all down and send it to us. I left during the deal which showed just how much Englishing it needed. 206 : Next morning I saw Barry. Clearly he is now preparing a cast iron case for going ALPHA. He made it quite clear that the data from Texco had got to be exhaustive so that not one square cm of Barry's hide is showing. And he's probably wise to avoid all the flame throwers that the pathologists will turn on him. He hasn't any love coming from me on the ALPHA issue. 207 : I went to the Newton Computer Steering Committee. The D.A. had invited me up to it following the visit to him. He established that the Plan was misleading. It was established to my satisfaction that Newton did not understand what the 7 items in the 1976 Programme meant - let alone the ones up to 83. I established that the a/c would not be overloaded. 208 : Peter Hills placed a letter on the table making a bid for the DELTA as it stood. Robert Jones asked me to state the Region's position which I did. It was pointed out that the financial consequences of the move had not been put on the table and that OMT ought to agree that District supported the move. Barry made an intriguing set of remarks. 1. I came to Aven to lead Path and was getting very frustrated at lack of progress. 2. I think that I will get a /c over Barry's dead body. 3. I cannot control uptake of tests at present but I could if I had a machine, a. He stated that it was essential that someone in Aven jumped in with both feet. 5. He expressed great confidence in Computer Services. My friend afterwards said that Barry had not chance whatever of getting the case through OMT. 209 : Afterwards Peter Hills carefully collected in all the copies of his letter - no purpose. I was sitting next to him so there was no way in which I could keep a copy. 210 : In the morning, I phoned Graham Pate to get the cards on the table and told him that the best I could offer was six months work. I told him that Wayne had got lobbied Henry. He told me that he had and that Henry had made his usual statement "Yes I see that, I must get involved". We both sympathised with each other regarding our fance sitting Administrators. He had promised to come back to me in two days. 211 : 10.12.78 : I have just phoned our friend in H.O. about a grant for Peter Hills in Newton to do Lab research - Deal on. I have talked to Ralph and he wants me to sort Newton on the admin, net. The OCP is useless. So I must fix the QA. 212 : 12.12.78 : Barry and I have been colluding all morning on and off on Orion and visit to Eastbury on 8/9 January. Eastbury pathologist still cannot make the meeting. We are trying to get Region 6 to come in. Someone - from Eston must come. I have fixed to have a private chat to ORION when they are down here. 213 : Why and how did Texco get an entry into Salton? E.J., one of their tea used to work at Salton! But Barry Hunt must have colluded with Salton and Texco. And he never admitted this openly. 214 : Why is Texco not getting more money? E.J., one of their tea used to work at Salton! But Barry Hunt must have colluded with Salton and Texco. And he never admitted this openly. 215 : Today in a half drunk state, Barry said that he had written to physicists saying no a/c for them YET. I've heard his give that DELTA away to them a dozen times. But he still hates Peter Hills. Weak, 'I could kick him and he'd thank me'. He is the most queer mixture. 216 : Christmas
knocxed sideways so we asked then to send more details.

235: 16.1.79: Barry Hunt and I saw New Co. today. They had written to us giving us a load of information which led us to prioritise. We have another example of how a different source of cash can allow people to play ducks and drakes with the NHS and its ALPH A concept. I also play hard on the need to cut down clerical support and this depends on integration etc, etc. Here All going reasonably until up popped P HLS on microbiology and the guy was going it alone. Money from non-NHS resources was 233: And I passed up the chance to do sons research.

weighing up the pros and cons etc. What could we do? Eventually Barry got on the phone to Texco and I phoned Graham Pate to try to warn off trouble. We sent a letter from Martin to the AMO. And Luke, who got involved over lunch telephoned the AMO. Eventually not being able to unearth anything Barry telephoned Ralton who disclaimed all knowledge. Eventually we traced the conversation, our HO man gently dropped a rock in the pool. HO Supplies Division, a contract orientated group, were going down to Ralton to talk about Texco.

232: 11.1.79: I have just been through the most exacting bit of negotiating with Hunt about lab computing. On the basis of the ORION visit we agreed a set of actions to get through to a hard contract. As part of that process, I agreed to phone H.O. to find out more about the National position in particular and to try to engineer pressure on ORION to come up with better goodwills. Of course, in extracting this information, I did a trade of what was going on in Avea. At the end of the conversation, our H.O. man gently dropped a rock in the pool. H.O. Supplies Division, a contract orientated group, were going down to Ralton to talk about Texco.

231: I could well believe that Ralton, having been "disappointed", had started a deal going on the side. So we took action weighing up the pros and cons etc. What could we do? Eventually Barry got on the phone to Texco and I phoned Graham Pate to try to warn off trouble. We sent a letter from Martin to the AMO. And Luke, who got involved over lunch telephoned the AMO. Eventually not being able to unearth anything Barry telephoned Ralton who disclaimed all knowledge. Eventually we traced the call of the technician who had asked a HO man of same name down to talk Texco. Barry Hunt blew his up for not telling him about the visit.

230: 10.1.79: Barry Hunt came in today about a letter to Southton. The DA is pressing us to look at their preferred commercial system free abroad. He is repeating diplomatically asking Southton to provide full system specification. I do not think that they can do that so its really putting a block on it. But we cannot keep looking at everything.

229: I saw Graham Pate after the visit to Wayne Cook today. He said all the things I would expect about my letter. I gather that he is feverishly seeking views for his reply. Negotiate before letters to avoid confrontation.

228: 8.1.79: ORION cam e down to Eastbury laboratory. Oue to the petrol strike, Barry Hunt and I went together down to Eastbury. We toured both laboratories, including the one in the new lab. I met both haematologists and Max's assistant. I was not impressed and realised that this judgement is without any backing and is irrational but such is life.

227: One of the things carefully established about ORION yesterday was the nature of their hardware modern or not. Tony has been saying that its seven years old which it isn't. Tony and Robert went on and on about the need for a proper system investigation for the contract and I am determined to keep it to a minimum.

226: Tony came down heavily on support of National and Barry reacted immediately. I spent a longish time with Barry afterwards explaining why Tony might have changed his position on National. But Tony is very erratic in his judgement.

225: Barry Hunt has arranged to take National down to Eastbury on the same basis as ORION. I decided not to go.

224: On the first day ORION saw the layouts and got the necessary sizing statistics. Really, all is peace and quiet now on the lab front, it being made clear that I intend to motor this one through. Tony and Robert came to the second day and acknowledged the usefulness of it. Various bits of unpleasantness occurred - mainly concerned with my determination to cut corners. I am steering towards a corner cutting approach which will cause problems. Afterwards Tony told me of Region - getting into a hassle because they did not open tender for the replacement for their system - stupid RC S.

223: One of the things carefully established about ORION yesterday was the nature of their hardware modern or not. Tony has been saying that its seven years old which it isn't. Tony and Robert went on and on about the need for a proper system investigation for the contract and I am determined to keep it to a minimum.

222: I now back. After the usual round of Happy New yearing, I settled down for one and a half hours with Barry Hunt to sort out: (a) the visit by ORION to Eastbury (b) the visit by National and (c) the letter to Ralton.

221: We met National today to discuss their attitude to ALPHA. They are going to document and marvet it. At long last they appear to have seen the light on this one. The meeting was a good one.

220: Tony came down heavily on support of National and Barry reacted immediately. I spent a longish time with Barry afterwards explaining why Tony might have changed his position on National. But Tony is very erratic in his judgement.

219: Barry has got me into a position in which I write to Ralton. I don't think he did it malice aforethought but it's a very sticky wicket. Margaret took down notes on all three issues and gave me a copy.

218: Barry was in his snowkit, having just dug himself out of 6 fast drifts so there was a lot of irrelevant chit chat going on as well.

217: 2.1.79: I am now back. After the usual round of Happy New yearing, I settled down for one and a half hours with Barry Hunt to sort out: (a) the visit by ORION to Eastbury (b) the visit by National and (c) the letter to Ralton.

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The implications of this are enormous nationally and over a long period of time. We want to see Martin to try to get guidance on the approach. Martin opted for "getting the best" and hang the consequences. He was smiling ruefully. SS throwing example of a massive boulder being thrown into the pond plus top level politics coming into a fairly low decision.

I have been messing about with Barry Hunt trying to get visit to Linton fixed. Because of rail strike, I am not being driven to Lancaster by Barry Hunt in this weather. We did not get to Linton eventually due to rail strike.

Over the past three days, the bids from ORION, New Co. and National are in showing various degrees of interest, commitment and attitude. You feel like teaching some of them their business.

The paper is ready for an interesting meeting tomorrow.

I need H.O. badly to know whether or not they would support Orion in the same way as National. But with strikes etc, I have not spoken to him. I also still need to know if he has got the measure of New Co. Surely he must have and why did he not tell me about them?

Refer to Hunt paper. X did not come. Hills was on a course.

Fascinating to watch them split - Jarrett leading the ALPHA mob, Barry plays down New Co. - but being ever so careful.

Max saying for experiment, "must have the best", "follow our British". I am fascinated to see what Barry makes of it all.

SOUTHON grumbled on about AIC and their Foreign company. Barry took several direct swipes at them, along the line "You've not given me any positive information so - get lost!" Oh but "Region" knew. Barry "But I didn't". It is amazing that the teaching District simply cannot pull rank, weight or anything else effectively in this field.

Visit Haematologist at Southton. A very different meeting from the Chemical Pathologists. Dr Hunt was a chemical pathologist and so he handled them much more confidently and it showed. He turned up late which didn't do him any good due to the snow on H.Q. car park. The Chairman was much more dominating due to a bluff "confident" nature. As a group they had not taken the same interest in computers - except for two of them. Gently, with very little guidance they followed our lead and so we have their blessing.

Hunt has sent out to Pathologists and Haematologist notes confirming the discussions with them - covering his backside very carefully.

March 1979: Postscript. The diary finishes here. The project actually wandered on slowly to inviting tenders for ALPHA from ORION, National and AIC.