



Citation for published version:

Bui, H, Chau, VS & Cox, J 2019, 'Managing the survivor syndrome as scenario planning methodology ... and it matters!', *International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management*, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 838-854.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPPM-05-2018-0202>

DOI:

[10.1108/IJPPM-05-2018-0202](https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPPM-05-2018-0202)

Publication date:

2019

Document Version

Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication](#)

The final publication is available at Emerald via [10.1108/IJPPM-05-2018-0202](https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPPM-05-2018-0202)

University of Bath

Alternative formats

If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



Managing the Survivor Syndrome as Scenario Planning Methodology ... and it Matters!

Journal:	<i>International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management</i>
Manuscript ID	IJPPM-05-2018-0202.R2
Manuscript Type:	Reflective Practice
Keywords:	foresight, scenario planning, survivor syndrome, strategizing, Performance management

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Managing the Survivor Syndrome as Scenario Planning

Methodology ... and it Matters!

Abstract

Purpose: The importance of foresight is discussed in relation to why traditional scenario planning methodology is problematic at achieving it. The ‘survivor syndrome’ is borrowed from the human resources literature and presented as a metaphor for foresight to illustrate how better ‘scenarios’ can be achieved by understanding the syndrome better. A practice perspective is given on the use of a 7-theme framework as a method of interviewing survivors.

Methodology: The article draws from an empirical research that took place during the 2008 global financial crisis to illustrate the richness of the insights that would otherwise not be obtainable through scenario planning methods that do not involve ‘survivors’. In that research, semi-structured interviews were employed with key personnel at multiple levels of one private and one public organization that had undergone a redundancy process at the time of the crisis to explore its effect on the remaining workforce.

Findings: The ‘survivor syndrome’ itself would be minimized if managers consider the feelings of survivors with more open communication. Survivors in private firms were found generally to experience anxiety, but are more likely to remain more motivated, than their counterparts in the public sector. These detailed insights create more accurate ‘scenarios’ in scenario planning exercises.

Originality/value: Organizational performance can be better enhanced if the survivor syndrome can be better managed. In turn, scenario planning, as a form of organizational foresight, is better practiced through managing the survivor syndrome. **Scenario planning methodology has proliferated well in the human resource management literature.**

Keywords: foresight; scenario planning; survivor syndrome; strategizing; performance management.

Paper type: Reflective practice paper

Introduction

Foresight has become one of the latest management buzzwords, rising above many other tools of strategic competitive advantage, particularly in times of uncertainty and environmental turbulence.

Principally the ability to incorporate into the present decisions of organizations (organizational foresight) or specifically into the strategic decisions (strategic foresight) the expectations of future conditions, foresight is the capacity to think systematically and develop as individuals and as an organization to prepare for those future eventualities. More elegantly put, “foresight is a unique and highly-valued human capacity that is widely recognized as a major source of competitive advantage and cultural renewal within nations and corporations” (Chia, 2002, p.5). However, how exactly foresight can be practiced remains at the forefront of researchers’ agenda, and has offered a variety of answers, not the least one involving the use of scenario planning methodology.

The much documented global financial crisis of 2008 has provoked an outbreak of research to understand it better, such as the causes and lessons learned so that firms may revert smoothly back to their routine activities (see Chau et al., 2012). While luck may have had a significant role to play (Parnell et al., 2012) in volatile environments, at times when luck is not on a firm’s side, it is resorted to utilizing foresight as a valuable vehicle with which to forecast, scan and scenario plan for the future. **In this article, the importance of scenario planning (as a methodology of foresight) is presented as a metaphor for how employees felt after coming close to redundancy during a major restructure of the organization. Understanding and stabilizing these feelings are useful in engaging in foresight/scenario planning exercises as these staff are responsible for restoring the organization.** The term ‘survivor syndrome’ is used in this article to refer to this set of feelings, following Baruch and Hind (2000), specifically in the context of downsizing or redundancy, but can concern any other reason for reducing a workforce, such as downscoping, implementation of artificial intelligence systems or simply improving management processes, which itself has been a growing phenomenon and is seen as a part of work life (Datta et al. 2010). As a mental condition originally understood from the discipline of psychology that stems off from post-traumatic stress disorder, it relates to any ‘tragedy’ felt by the sufferer and the overall guilt about surviving, what should have been done and what the survivor actually did (Hendriksen, 2018). A major reason for the failure of many firms is not

1 just the original causes of the downsizing but also their inability to manage the survivor syndrome
2 afterwards, as survivors are unlikely to behave in the same way after the downsizing, despite the small
3 majority who suffer ‘learned helplessness’ – a condition that explains why sufferers (such as victims
4 of domestic abuse) remain in the same situation, believing little can change and accepting the
5 continued suffering (Appelbaum et al., 1997). van Dick et al. (2016) found that identification (the
6 ability of the survivor to identify themselves within the organization immediately after the
7 downsizing) is a mediator of individual performance, so it is imperative to understand the self-
8 categorization process of individuals that can either plunge the organization into further difficulty or
9 pull it out of existing trouble, which in turn will assist an economy to recover.

10 Hence, the reason for using foresight as a metaphor to understand the survivor syndrome
11 better – to ‘problematize’ the body of knowledge, to borrow a term from the management research
12 literature (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011) – is because these ‘survivors’ are those an economy must
13 rely on to pull it out of an existing recession, and so such insights have valuable, practical
14 implications and offer transferrable lessons learned for managers for future recessions of a variety of
15 capitalist types (for a review of such varieties of capitalism, see Witcher and Chau, 2012). Sahdev
16 (2004) argues, because the survivor syndrome can be likened to a breach of the psychological contract
17 and a violation of organizational justice, the reconciliation process (and reorientation of survivors
18 after the redundancy) would involve top leaders (including politicians) in mediating between internal
19 and external institutional forces, thus linking the behaviors of the survivors directly to macro-
20 economic conditions, such as economic growth.

21 The referent of a major economic recession is also supportive of Taleb’s (2007) argument to
22 establish ‘convexity’ in achieving a positive outcome (Derbyshire and Wright, 2016), when the 2008
23 global financial crisis was possibly a ‘black swan event’ due to its high unpredictability and high
24 impact, making the practice of scenario planning particularly difficult. Foresight is therefore
25 facilitated by the micro-practice perspective of the firm (eg. Sarpong et al, 2013) to smooth out the
26 harder strategic options during a recession. The attention of this article is therefore on understanding
27 the detailed management issues, such as individual staff motivation levels from the broad

1
2 management literatures (eg. Brockner et al. 1986; de Vries and Balazs 1997; Paulsen et al. 2005; Bean
3
4 and Hamilton 2006), to advise how to manage better in major economic recessions.
5

6
7 To do so, the present article draws from a firsthand research project to offer insights obtained
8
9 through the use of conducting interviews with survivors of two large organizations (of around 500
10
11 employees in each) that underwent a major redundancy program. The purpose of the interviews was
12
13 to obtain deeper insights on the themes relating to the survivor syndrome, so that it could be better
14
15 managed by the senior managers to re-orientate them back into the routine work of the organization in
16
17 the post redundancy phase. The organizations were selected based on them being a major employer in
18
19 the region, which meant that jobs were scarce and thus represented an extreme survivor syndrome that
20
21 the interviewees faced. The fact that the organizations represented both private and public sectors
22
23 meant the insights obtained would represent good generalizability; while there were some differences
24
25 between the two organizations that required noting, the purpose of the research was not to conduct a
26
27 direct comparison between them. Non-probability sampling within the organizations for identifying
28
29 the interviewees was used because (i) the topic was perceived sensitive to many survivors after the
30
31 downsizing so it was best not to have pre-discussed matters with them, and (ii) most of the survivors
32
33 were overloaded with additional work as the structure had just been reduced so it was too much to
34
35 pressurize an already busy workforce for additional volunteers. Over thirty people volunteered to take
36
37 part in the study, although the final sample consisted of eighteen individuals because the data had
38
39 already become saturated and sufficient insights had been obtained. The sample included six females
40
41 (12 males), nine from the private firm (9 from the public firm) and six in managerial positions (12 at
42
43 operational levels). The (arithmetic mean) average age was about fifty years. The interviews took
44
45 place between six and eight months after the redundancy rounds of both companies; this enabled the
46
47 interviewees to have calmed down, carried on and thought forward with respect to their organizational
48
49 performance and their own careers, enabling a more accurate reflection of their experiences.
50
51

52
53 In this illustrative example, semi-structured interviews were used: no specific set of questions
54
55 was asked to the interviewees, as the nature of the research was inductive with the intention of
56
57 obtaining as many new insights as possible, although the questions fell within the topic of the survivor
58
59 syndrome. The conversations were mainly one-sided, allowing the interviewees to discuss their
60

1 experiences and only a few prompts were made by the interviewer to ensure the conversations did not
2 go off-topic. Each interview lasted around an hour in length, was digitally recorded and transcribed
3 verbatim afterwards. The interview transcriptions were analyzed manually as the researchers knew
4 the contexts extremely well, using traditional theme tree and content analysis (thematic analysis)
5 techniques to group and present the conversations within their popular researched themes (eg. Miles
6 and Huberman 1994). A reflexive account of the researchers' observations and personal judgements
7 was kept to control for bias, in line with recommendations made a decade ago in the present Journal
8 (see Chau and Witcher, 2009).

19 This article contributes empirically in two ways: first, rich and in-depth insights from
20 survivors are sought that have the benefit of understanding social practice that connects the future and
21 past (as argued for by Sarpong and Maclean, 2014), which complement extant research findings that
22 are too specific and isolated; and second, these views pivot around how defining characteristics of
23 private and public firms shape the emotions and motivation of employees during economically critical
24 times. In so doing, it also contributes theoretically by arguing the appropriateness of interviewing on
25 the themes of the survivor syndrome as an augmented scenario planning methodology for the specific
26 situation of managing in conditions of severe economic crises (but does not necessarily replace other
27 well-established approaches of general planning already in use for other general conditions); this is
28 purported as an improved mechanism as it overcomes the doubts over the suitability of research
29 participants within the technique and strikes an appropriate balance between plausibility and
30 probability, as the participants are exclusively all those at stake and have come close to the most
31 plausible and highly probable conditions concerned.

47 It is now a decade since the highly impactful global financial crisis of 2008. This article
48 contributes to the special issue by offering a practice reflection on the use of the once considered
49 'breakthrough' methodology of scenario planning. Thus, it argues that interviewing survivors on the
50 themes identified in this article relating to the survivor syndrome is an improved method of
51 conducting scenario planning because of the near-redundancy experiences that would have led them
52 to a different behavior within the organization, that could not otherwise be obtained through
53 laboratory-based methods of strategizing. The harmony between this interviewing technique and the

1
2 aim of scenario planning suggests a natural proliferation of the use of scenario planning for the broad
3
4 purposes of managing organizational performance.
5
6
7
8

9 **What are Foresight and Scenario Planning, and why they matter?**

10
11 They matter, at least for foresight, as in the words of Chia (2002: p.5) "... the ability to read, interpret,
12
13 foresee and redefine emergent global socio-political and economic trends ... are all important assets
14
15 that no forward-looking nation or organization can afford to ignore". While it is generally agreed that
16
17 foresight is a capacity of individuals and firms with which to develop a competitive advantage, the
18
19 exact way this is achieved has been heavily disputed. In this section, these key propositions are
20
21 reviewed and discussed in the light of our argument for how it matters for firms considering
22
23 downsizing strategies as a strategic option during an economic crisis, as a way to remain forward-
24
25 looking and competitive. Foresight is a metaphor in this sense because of its importance in
26
27 considering future eventualities, but is only possible in knowing the counterfactual of a strategic
28
29 downsizing decision, which can only be obtained from those who were placed in a vulnerable position
30
31 of that decision and 'survived' it and can subsequently tell their stories and comment on that
32
33 apprehension.
34
35
36
37

38 Foresight though is understood under a number of guises. Neugarten (2006) reviews the
39
40 usable value of foresight as competitive intelligence by likening its limitations to those of a biological
41
42 eye; looking too directly into the future is problematic (eg. tunnel vision ignores the surroundings and
43
44 blind-spots), and looking forwards should not neglect the importance of looking sideways. For the
45
46 organization, additional vision should involve those players who are not ordinarily deemed core to
47
48 decision making. For example, Chau and Quire (2018) identify the most common – women – and
49
50 their particular value in foresight exercises in the technology sector. Research by Sarpong and
51
52 Maclean (2014) and Sarpong et al (2013) also emphasizes the importance of human participants – that
53
54 is, the need to examine ordinary organizational members – in order for human capacity to connect
55
56 with the past, present and future in a social practice. In this instance, survivors of redundancy rounds
57
58 are those key human participants of the organizational process whose 'feelings' are core to the future
59
60 outcome of a present decision, and can be understood as an opportunity to preview a particular

1
2 strategic consequence, thereby linking together all states of past (the economic condition that resulted
3
4 in the strategic consideration), present (strategic choice of downsizing) and future (the resultant labor
5
6 force). It is therefore necessary to examine the themes of the downsizing/redundancy literature (eg. e
7
8 Cunha et al., 2006) in order to understand the minutiae of an organization's working, to enable the
9
10 conduct of effective foresight exercises.

11
12
13 Scenario planning is probably the broadest form of foresight in that it does not predict the
14
15 specifics of the future per se, but attempts to understand the critical uncertainties that organizations
16
17 face in their strategic context and to improve the quality of strategic decisions (Meissner and Wulf,
18
19 2016). Argued in Schoemaker's (1995) seminal article as a valuable tool for strategic thinking and
20
21 based on first use of the methodology over half a century ago at Royal Dutch/Shell Company in the
22
23 1960s (see Wack, 1985), scenario planning constructs scenarios to overcome highly uncertain
24
25 situations for managers to predict; over the long-term, the usual problems of overconfidence and
26
27 tunnel vision can be compensated for. Its application has been varied and continues to be of
28
29 considerable research interest in new and different contexts – for example, for energy and online
30
31 platforms in Alizadeh et al's (2016) and Rford's (2015) respective recent reviews.

32
33
34 At the core of scenario planning lies the main question, 'if then?', to set out such scenarios,
35
36 and numerous attempts have been made to refine the most appropriate technique for carrying out this
37
38 task (see Wulf, Meissner and Stubner, 2010). These have typically involved the regular two-by-two
39
40 matrixes as well as the use of repeated strategic workshops to go through intensive steps of procedure
41
42 and discussion (see Franco et al., 2013). Cairns et al. (2016) argue the use of such workshops helps
43
44 make the unfamiliar more familiar, but also suggest the inclusion of scenario refinement and
45
46 improvisation, such that "the improved scenario(s) must be designed to make the familiar *unfamiliar*
47
48 [emphasis added], to provoke challenge, but aim to be credible and relevant" (p. 101). Perhaps one of
49
50 the key problems is that involving the need to understand better the significance of historical events
51
52 (Bradfield, Derbyshire and Wright, 2016) that average out in future decisions.

53
54
55 Termed the 'scenario planning paradox', it is argued there is insufficient theory to support
56
57 scenario planning methodology, therefore rendering it chaotic, so empiricism is crucial to make it
58
59 useful (Spaniol and Rowland, 2018). In other words, more data are needed to support procedure.
60

1
2 Specific steps for conducting scenario planning, like those of Burt et al. (2006) or Konno et al. (2014),
3
4 offer valuable ‘how-to’ guidance on the methodology, and are heavily premised on environmental
5
6 analyses. However, following Taleb (2007) on recognizing ‘black swan’ events that subvert from
7
8 industry trends for which organizations struggle to plan due to unpredictable conditions, there is the
9
10 need to build on more organizationally resilient approaches that establish convexity to redistribute
11
12 events for a more positive outcome (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014). ‘Surprise’ (borrowing from
13
14 ‘potential surprise theory’) suggests there is some theoretical grounding surrounding the uncertainty
15
16 around decision making during turbulent environments (Derbyshire, 2017). Much questioned in the
17
18 extant literature is the extent to which the 2008 global financial crisis constitutes a recent black swan
19
20 event (Witcher and Chau, 2014) – ie, one which came as a surprise. As history has indicated the
21
22 likelihood of its occurrence, some might argue that some black swans turn white, and some events are
23
24 in fact ‘grey swans’ (as events average out over time).
25
26
27

28 Averaging out events realistically, or striking the balance between those conditions that are
29
30 plausible and probable (Ramirez and Selin, 2014), is difficult when environmental conditions are
31
32 turbulent and highly unstable, so some form of go-between to get closer to the most appropriate
33
34 scenario is required. The need to scenario plan is heightened when conditions are uncertain and when
35
36 competitive environments are dynamic (Oliver and Parrett, 2018). It is found that the wider the pool
37
38 of participants involved in generating the scenarios, the more realistic the scenario might be derived
39
40 (Zapata and Kaza, 2015), but reliance is placed significantly on additional scenario developers who
41
42 might already be few in existence. Other common ‘pitfalls’ or established problems associated with
43
44 scenario planning in general include bias (availability and reporting, group-think, culture), relevance
45
46 (appropriateness and availability of participants) and longevity and resilience (short-termism involved
47
48 in some work and availability of tools and techniques) (KPMG, 2011). Scenario planning can also
49
50 ‘muddy communications’ if presentation of too many scenarios complicates current decision-making
51
52 and lengthens the tails of the distribution (Roxburgh, 2009).
53
54
55

56 Nonetheless, we argue the use of a methodology that captures a specific event of volatility is
57
58 core in improving scenario planning, and can address the above problems, such as by relating to the
59
60 survivor syndrome. This view is consistent with that of storytelling and the use of an inductive

1
2 practice approach are a good conceptual lens for successfully analyzing scenario planning and process
3
4 data (Bowman et al., 2013). The assumption of a linear relationship between scenario planning and
5
6 strategy development is wrongly conceived by many pre-existing models as human beings are a rather
7
8 complex species (Rowland and Spaniol, 2017). Some form of extensive scenario orientation (O'Brien
9
10 and Meadows, 2013), involving the extensive use of appropriate informants, is the bridge to effective
11
12 strategy creation. The need to draw directly from the intricacies of human beings was recognized as
13
14 building new social capital in order to access new information, novel strategic options and
15
16 collaborative opportunities (Lang and Ramirez, 2017). The common pitfalls mentioned earlier are
17
18 thus minimized: for example, the problem of bias in opinions can be overcome by the personal jobs at
19
20 stake of the participants and relevance to context would be high as the participants of the exercise are
21
22 those who have come close with the situation the organization is scenario planning for. Reducing
23
24 'muddy communications' and curtailing the distribution of possible scenarios to become more
25
26 probable/plausible ones will be more achievable as the participants are specifically selected and
27
28 scenarios are all clustered around the employment conditions in question.
29
30
31

32 Hence, our suggestion is to use a 7-theme framework relating to the survivor syndrome which
33
34 offers up closer insights (or 'scenarios') for understanding situations relating to the better
35
36 management of the syndrome for the benefit of the survivors. These insights might otherwise not
37
38 have been achievable through the use of other traditional scenario planning techniques, so this
39
40 approach helps close the gap (Chermack, 2005) between the theory of scenario planning methodology
41
42 and practice. The themes framework, explained in the next section, is also consistent with thinking on
43
44 the meaning of theory within foresight (see Piirainen and Gonzalez, 2015) – that knowledge is created
45
46 (the seven themes), a process of usage (incorporation into interviewing), and which helps to theorize
47
48 about the future (by raising specific scenarios).
49
50
51
52
53

54 **Themes relating to the Survivor Syndrome**

55
56 The following themes were identified from an extensive review of the extant literature relating to
57
58 feelings of employees who survived a redundancy round at their place of work, although 'survivor
59
60 syndrome' was not the only phrase used in the paper search (other keywords included 'feelings',

1
2 ‘aftermath’, ‘redundancy’, etc, among others). Other related issues that emerged from the literature
3
4 review were broadly fitted into the themes given below to minimize the number in total, so that the
5
6 themes could be used collectively as a simple framework with which to ask questions during
7
8 interviews with other survivors as part of an organization’s strategic foresight (particularly, scenario
9
10 planning) exercise.

11
12
13 *Fairness:* Brockner et al. (1987) carried out a field and laboratory study utilizing the justice
14
15 theory which illustrated that survivors’ work behaviors and attitudes are influenced by the selection
16
17 process undertaken by the organization to lay-off their co-workers. The survivors’ reactions to the
18
19 victims of perceived injustice resulted in survivors distancing themselves from the organization and
20
21 displaying dysfunctional behavior and attitudes. A selection process that is perceived by survivors to
22
23 be unjust can therefore have negative consequences and reduce commitment and individual work
24
25 performance. Travaglione and Cross (2006) however find the converse situation in which any
26
27 injustice survivors witnessed was overpowered by the feeling they had survived the redundancy
28
29 process and were treated well in comparison with their colleagues. The manner in which downsizing
30
31 is executed and the perceived fairness of the downsizing process also influence the behavioral and
32
33 attitudinal consequences of survivors (Brockner, 1988). A series of studies (see work by Brockner
34
35 and colleagues, 1988; 1990; 1992) examined the effect of perceived fairness in a controlled
36
37 environment. This involved survivors witnessing that the organization had dealt with the redundancy
38
39 process fairly using open communication, an explanation of the redundancy along with a fair selection
40
41 process and consultation. They felt this would leave survivors feeling committed to the organization,
42
43 thus increasing their motivation, and ultimately overall company performance. Furthermore, Davy et
44
45 al. (1991) recommended that requesting input from employees into any organizational decision
46
47 process further enhances fairness, while Trevor and Nyberg (2008) discussed the impact procedural
48
49 justice has on the perceived fairness of survivors. Therefore, influencing survivors’ perceived fairness
50
51 prior to downsizing has been shown to manipulate survivors’ reactions (Travaglione and Cross, 2006)
52
53 significantly. Similarly, if a survivor has witnessed an unfair redundancy process s/he tends to have a
54
55 broken psychological contract (Legge 1995; Sahdev, 2004) which can lead to disruptive behavior,
56
57 with fear displacing loyalty and trust. Fineman (2003) went further to describe that watching
58
59 colleagues during a redundancy has been depicted as similar to that of experiencing grief.
60

1
2 *Organizational Assistance:* The survivor syndrome is more likely to surface if the survivors
3
4 perceive that organizational support for those who were laid off is low (Travaglione and Cross, 2006).
5
6 Survivors must not feel that they have been neglected and that assistance had been provided
7
8 throughout, during and after the process of organizational transformation during the recession.
9
10 Organizational assistance is also linked to the perceived fairness of survivors. If an organization is
11
12 seen to assist survivors and victims then perceived fairness is raised, although the opposite effect
13
14 occurs if assistance is not provided.
15

16
17 *Feelings:* Managers need to realize that the way in which victims of layoffs are treated will
18
19 be observed by those who remain (Travaglione and Cross, 2006) and they should therefore consider
20
21 survivors' feelings throughout the redundancy process. Most research examines the survivor's
22
23 affective reactions to redundancy such as anxiety, stress or emotional well-being (Appelbaum and
24
25 Donia 2001a), whereas redundancy can also lead to more specific emotional states, such as guilt or
26
27 shame (Fineman, 2003). Survivor guilt is defined as including symptoms such as depression, fear and
28
29 anger, along with feelings of envy towards those who have left the organization (Sahdev, 2003).
30
31 Brockner et al. (1985) tested a range of emotions that survivors displayed and questioned whether
32
33 subjects that felt guilt worked harder to eliminate this feeling and the impact this had on the
34
35 individual's motivation and attitude. However, as this test was undertaken within a laboratory
36
37 environment, there was no real threat of job loss to the individual, so it lacked credibility. It could
38
39 also be plausible to argue that survivors should not feel guilt, as they are typically not responsible for
40
41 making the decision to dismiss their colleagues. Thinking, known as Adam's Equity Theory (Adams,
42
43 1965), demonstrates how redundancy can create an assortment of psychological states in survivors
44
45 such as job insecurity, positive inequity, anger and relief. These emotional states will likely have an
46
47 impact on the survivor's motivation, job satisfaction and commitment (Brockner et al., 1987).
48
49

50
51 *Motivation:* Chipuza and Berry (2010) examined the relationship between a survivor's
52
53 attitude, commitment and motivation, and recommended that an organization's human resources
54
55 process should involve survivors within the consultation process, in order to improve motivation and
56
57 commitment. This research was carried out in Zimbabwe, and may have been subjected to specific
58
59 cultural and austere economic constraints. Nonetheless, similarly, Weiner's Equity Theory suggests
60

1 that motivation is influenced by procedural justice (Trevor and Nyberg, 2008), with job insecurity
2 playing an important role in determining the motivation of survivors. Brockner (1988) shows that
3 motivation is negatively influenced by job insecurity. In addition, motivation may be further affected
4 due to the change in survivor's roles as they adopt increased workloads along with a fear of further
5 layoffs can lead to a reduction in motivation and an increase in anxiety level (Appelbaum et al.,
6 2003).

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 *Communication:* Communication is often viewed as one of the most important aspects of the
16 downsizing process (Brockner, 1992; Marks, 2006). It has also been identified as one of the reasons
17 why the redundancy process fails, as a lack of information is likely to cause more damage. Survivors
18 will desperately seek as much information as possible (Brockner et al., 1990) to allay their fears about
19 the future (Paulsen et al., 2005). It is therefore important for employees to feel that they are being
20 listened to and that their feelings, views and suggestions are taken into account, which will also
21 increase the level of employees' trust in the management (Tzafrir et al., 2004). Survivors need to
22 know as soon as possible that they will not be losing their jobs and they will further benefit if
23 information concerning the reason for the redundancy is relayed to them effectively and efficiently.
24 While it is vital that positive information be relayed throughout the process, it is also important that
25 bad news is openly communicated (Noer, 1993). Furthermore, survivors will want to receive news
26 about victims and how they have been treated along with information relating to any assistance
27 offered to the victims as this will provide the survivors with an indication of how they may be treated
28 in the future (Thornhill and Gibbons, 1995). The effective management along with extensive
29 communication (Marks, 2006) and the development of a 'best practice' HR strategy (Noer, 1993), and
30 not just organizational learning (Bui et al., 2016), can assist in diminishing the syndrome.

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49 *Workload:* Survivors may be expected to take on increased workload in the case of
50 organizational restructuring, but not many organizations have plans in place for them to adjust to this
51 new workload (Appelbaum et al., 2003), thereby resulting in survivors feeling a loss of control and
52 uncertainty, which can cause stress (Chipunza and Berry, 2010). As workloads increase due to the
53 re-distribution of the remaining work among the survivors, the survivors are left facing job insecurity.
54 Work boundaries are often not clear (eg. Chau et al., 2017). However, Brockner et al (1992) find that

1
2 sometimes survivors who had perceived an increase in their workload may feel positive and have
3
4 enriched their skills.
5

6
7 *The Future:* It is argued that a broader approach for downsizing can have a positive long-
8
9 term impact in the longer term (Appelbaum and Donia, 2001b). This should comprise a complete
10
11 strategic transformation and become part of a continuous improvement plan to improve productivity,
12
13 cut costs and increase turnover (de Vries and Balazs, 1997). The future will also see relationships
14
15 between individuals and organizations changing with employees becoming more focused on career
16
17 self-management (Appelbaum and Donia, 2001b). Cameron (1994) proposes a prescription for best
18
19 organizational practices which includes an approach for the use of long term strategies, good
20
21 preparation and employee involvement, for example.
22
23

24
25 These seven themes, in no particular order of preference or importance, are therefore
26
27 recommended for use as a broad list of categories to cover when interviewing survivors when
28
29 conducting scenario planning exercises. Any insights obtained within these themes form the new
30
31 ‘scenarios’ that advise how to manage redundancies in the future, as well as offer up suggestions for
32
33 rebuilding the organization.
34
35
36
37

38 **Survivor Interview Framework in Use**

39
40 The following practice insights were obtained on each of the themes derived from the above section
41
42 relating to the survivor syndrome, after interviewing survivors. The insights offer a practice
43
44 perspective in relation to the private and public organizations, in which only brief differences are
45
46 presented. They are of a nature that is rich and otherwise difficult to obtain **had the principal research**
47
48 **subjects not been these survivors, which might be the case in other scenario planning methodologies.**
49
50
51
52
53

54 *Perception of the Selection Process and Fairness*

55
56 About double the number of respondents in the private firm felt the process of redundancies was
57
58 carried out unfairly, compared to that in the public organization. Survivors tended to be somewhat
59
60 suspicious and fearful of the future, and this observation is in line with Fineman’s (2003) finding that

1 trust and loyalty are diminished by survivors who perceive a process being unfair. A typical comment
2 was on the lines of:
3

4
5
6 “... errh, it probably wasn't fair, in terms of a process I think it is still difficult to quantify coz
7
8 I'm not sure I fully understood what their process was in the first place” [Male, 8 years'
9
10 service]
11

12
13 Only one respondent (in the private firm) had no view on fairness, but perhaps this was biased in that
14 she worked closely with the chief executive during the redundancy process and therefore had
15 increased her feeling of loyalty towards him and the organization, having been so engrossed in the
16 rationale behind the downsizing. Those who felt that the selection process was fair worked in various
17 positions, from managerial to manual work. These insights conform with Robbins' (1999) earlier
18 work that identified the symptoms of the survivor syndrome as fear of change, loss of confidence in
19 management and loss of loyalty, all of which influence an individual's perception of fairness. It
20 seems, if survivors feel they have been ignored at any part of the downsizing process, their levels of
21 anxiety, anger and mistrust have increased.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 *Perception of Organizational Assistance*

36
37
38 The survivor syndrome is most likely to surface if employees have perceived that organizational
39 support for those that are laid off is low. In the case of the private firm, an employee helpline was in
40 operation throughout the redundancy process from the moment it was announced. Only three of the
41 respondents actually mentioned this during their interview. When questioned further, it was found
42 that those who were aware of the helpline had not made use of it and were not aware of anyone else
43 who had utilized this facility. A respondent who was a trade union representative further explained
44 that if any of the employees had issues, they would find it hard to approach the management and
45 would therefore ask for assistance directly through the trade union. The union offered re-training
46 which consisted of various courses at subsidized rates. In contrast, no such helpline existed in the
47 public organization. Two factors seemed to explain this. First, it did not appear to be within the
48 culture of the workforce to ask for assistance, plus the lack of communication from the organization
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1 on the assistance available. Second, the influence of the trade union was extremely prominent and
2
3 was therefore easily accessible. An employee commented interestingly:
4

5
6 “... you have to come back to the culture. I thought that [the union] helped, and I think this
7
8 is one of the better parts of the union – they got help. I am pleased with that side of things,
9
10 but it is very difficult at times. How far can you go with people? You can't force them to take
11
12 help.” [Female, 12 years' service]
13
14

15 This had been a long tradition with the type of work undertaken within the organization, and
16
17 employees were probably more inclined to seek assistance via this route than make use of assistance
18
19 offered by the organization.
20
21

22 Four respondents from the private firm and two from the public organization felt that no
23
24 assistance had been offered at all. Again, this may have been due to the lack of communication from
25
26 the organization to the workforce, or the individuals were of the mind-set that they did not require
27
28 assistance and did not look for it. This is worrying, given Armstrong-Stassen's (1994) suggestion that
29
30 management need to ensure that perceived organizational support is sustained at all times to maintain
31
32 motivation within the remaining workforce, and the survivors in particular need to feel that they have
33
34 not been neglected and assistance has been provided, whether they utilize it or not. Again,
35
36 organizational assistance is linked with perceived fairness which is increased if an organization is
37
38 seen to assist survivors and victims, whereas the opposite effect will occur if assistance is not
39
40 provided (see Baruch and Hind, 2000).
41
42
43
44
45

46 *Perception of Communication*

47

48 The perception of communication within the two contexts was different. In the public organization,
49
50 all respondents perceived that the top-down communication was sufficient. This information was
51
52 about criteria based upon which an employee could stay or had to leave. In contrast, the bottom-up
53
54 communication seemed intentionally ignored, partially due to the pre-selected preference of
55
56 managers. Thus, it affected the perception of fairness. In the private firm, the initial communication
57
58 of a loss of key clients/customers, leading to some redundancies, was viewed as positive at first.
59
60

1
2 Following that initial meeting, contact was reduced and the majority of the survivors commented on a
3
4 major lack of communication. For example, a survivor commented:

5
6 “... very uncertain times for everybody – some people not receiving some of the information
7
8 they need and a lot of people just in limbo really, not sure if it’s going to affect them, or not
9
10 affect them, because some people were told their jobs were in danger, while others didn’t
11
12 have a clue.” [Male, 27 years’ service]
13
14

15 This lack of communication could have been due to a number of reasons. For example, the
16
17 organization was probably not eager to relay bad news to its workforce. While Noer (1993) argues
18
19 that bad news should be openly communicated as much as good news, this was not the case for either
20
21 organization, and additionally there did not appear to be any plans put in place to help the survivors
22
23 adjust to their new workloads. Furthermore, survivors wanting to seek information to allay their fears
24
25 about the future (Datta et al. 2010) may, therefore, piece together information from different sources
26
27 which could result in feeding the rumor mill which further damages the employer/employee
28
29 relationship with consequent feelings of mistrust and resentment.
30
31
32
33
34

35 *Feelings during the Redundancy Process*

36

37
38 It emerged that most of the respondents had similar feelings during the redundancy process, and
39
40 concur partly with research undertaken by Brockner et al. (1985; 1986) which identified anxiety and
41
42 stress as the two main emotions. Some additional observations emerged:
43
44

- 45 • *Feelings of Shock:* The initial reactions of the respondents appear to be of shock.
46
47 The redundancy in the private firm was initiated by the loss of the organization’s
48
49 major customer. In order to survive, the company announced in a memo to all staff
50
51 that the only way the organization could reduce costs to the required levels would be
52
53 to downsize and restructure the organization. In the public organization, the selection
54
55 criteria which were sent out to employees at 5pm on a Friday left many employees in
56
57 shock as well. Shock was not a key element that was documented explicitly in the
58
59 extant literature. With the process of being made redundant referenced by Fineman
60

(2003) as being similar to that of experiencing grief, it is unsurprising that it has not been pursued further. The respondents' sense of shock may have been caused by several factors. First, the scale of redundancies would have a severe impact on the remaining workforce – that being, an increase in workload, stress and anxiety for the future of the organization (Robbins, 1999). Second, the length of time taken to relay this information to staff in the private firm and the surprise that key customer was lost in the first place, when it had been stable for quite some time with no apparent hint of the impending loss of business. Third, the timing of the selection criteria being issued in the public organization was seen as devastating as employees did not have a chance to discuss with their colleagues those criteria and their possible impacts on each individual. Open communication would have been vital in this situation in order to keep rumors at bay and survivors informed, which in turn would have raised their perception of fairness (de Vries and Balazs, 1997).

- *Feelings of Anger:* Only one respondent admitted explicitly to feeling anger. One other referred to his colleagues feeling anger but not himself. This contradicts Noer's (1993) research that identified anger as being one of his four "feeling clusters" and Adam's Equity Theory (see Brockner et al., 1985) which advocated how redundancy can create an assortment of emotional states. There may be many reasons why the majority of respondents did not feel anger. For example, it could be they felt secure that their role would remain safe and had high levels of self-esteem (Brockner et al., 1985). Consequently, they did not fear the outcome of the layoffs. Furthermore, due to the period of time that has lapsed since the redundancy and undertaking this research (between six to eight months), their perceptions of events at the time may have changed. Demography could also be another factor which has influenced their feelings. Nearly two-thirds of the sample had experienced redundancies before which could also explain the difference between these insights and those of Noer's (1993) and Brockner et al's (1985).

- *Feelings of Guilt:* All respondents except one expressed that they did not have any feeling of guilt, which contradicts Brockner et al's (1985; 1986) research. The respondent who did express feelings of guilt was female and had worked for the organization for 20 years, while no male admitted to such a feeling, consistent with Fineman's (2003) view that males tend not to be as subjected to emotions as females within the workplace. Furthermore, the males may have had higher levels of self-esteem due to their positions and security in their current role along with their length of service, and therefore felt justified that they have been able to keep their jobs (cf. Brockner et al., 2004).

Motivation

A redundancy that is not handled effectively will result in survivors demonstrating negative behavior and attitude, such as a lack of motivation (Appelbaum et al., 2003). The period of a survivor's tenure also has an impact on their motivation levels (Furnham, Eracleous, and Chamorro-Premuzic 2009). Furnham et al. (2009) depict motivation as intrinsic to the role and their findings demonstrated that survivors from a management level or higher are less concerned with their working conditions and clarity in their work than those employees of a lower level. This view is consistent with the observations, as the majority of the respondents, mainly from the private firm, expressed that they still felt motivated following the redundancy process. As one respondent commented passionately:

"... I've always liked the challenge – it doesn't matter how much pressure. I've always loved the work before the pressure. I suppose it's pride – you get something, you've achieved it. It isn't a job, it's in your blood, there's nothing you can do. I worry if this place is going to be here in 50 years' time, but I'm not going to be here, but I would still like to think that what I've worked for will still be here for somebody else." [Male, 27 years' service]

This is also consistent with the view that self-esteem will impact on a survivor's motivation, and individuals that display high self-esteem are more motivated than their counterparts who show low levels of self-esteem (Brockner et al., 1993, 2004; Marks, 2006). However, it seems that the female respondents who were not in a managerial position also displayed good levels of motivation.

Workload

Once a redundancy has taken place, it is inevitable that survivors' workloads will increase as they take on their departed colleagues' responsibilities along with their own. It is therefore necessary for organizations to have plans in place for the survivors to adjust to this increase (Appelbaum et al., 2003), otherwise any uncertainty may cause stress. One example of how an organization may deal with workload increases is explained by a union representative, as follows:

"... The organization tried to exploit what was happening – [they] saw us as negative hours the time we were paid for not being at work, and tried to impose annualized hours on us On the other side of the coin, for every tool that management can use against you, I can always quote the Working Times Directive – I can't do that, I've got X number of hours between work breaks, etc. ... In any negotiation, you're gonna lose something, you're gonna gain something – at the end of the day, it's a two-way street, and in the end, common sense has got to prevail because you're all aiming for the same goal. So, yes my workload has increased, marginally." [Male, 5 years' service]

This view was consistent with all the respondents, suggesting that survivors are willing to accept the increase in their workloads despite facing job insecurity. There was no evidence that anyone felt the increase in workload had a positive effect by the need to enrich their skills (see Brockner et al., 1992). Four of the respondents even mentioned the need to resort to physical ailments following the increase in workload!

View of the Future

Twelve respondents, most of whom were from the public organization, expressed that they were worried about the future and did not display a positive outlook. This manifested in a workforce that lacked confidence in the organization's management and no eagerness from the survivors to look forward to the future, resulting in reduced performance and adding to the threat of the organization's future survival. One respondent commented with great passion and concern:

1
2 *“... I worry about [the future] a great deal. I worry about people sitting on the Board who*
3
4 *know nothing about the industry. I worry about Chief Executives who only rule by committee*
5
6 *and no by leadership qualities. I worry about interfering Chairmen who are meant to be non-*
7
8 *exec and have more say than they should. I worry about outside people dictating to what*
9
10 *happens to this place. We are just custodians of this place and we should, instead of like I*
11
12 *said just now, people looking to make their own little empire and their own mark on it, they*
13
14 *should look on it like – if you do what I do in the mornings, get down here at 5:30 and look*
15
16 *out across, and you see an odd house and think I’m so lucky to be here and you should look*
17
18 *after it and respect it. But I see other people – all they see is a fast buck and making their*
19
20 *mark and that annoys me and that’s what worries me.”* [Male, 33 years’ service]
21
22

23
24 The evidence challenges Thornhill et al’s (1997) findings that management have a higher perception
25
26 of the organization’s effectiveness following a redundancy process. It is particularly interesting as
27
28 many of the respondents held managerial positions and did not feel this way. It appears that some of
29
30 the survivors perceived a badly handled redundancy process which in turn had an impact on their
31
32 thoughts for the future. With the six individuals who did not have any worries about the future, four
33
34 of whom were already shortly due for retirement, which could explain their lack of concern; one
35
36 respondent had worked closely with the chief executive during the redundancy process, and stated that
37
38 she “does try very much not to worry about the future”. Even though the respondents were on
39
40 average middle-aged, the findings have shown that regardless of age or gender, individuals tend to
41
42 worry about the future following a redundancy.
43
44
45
46
47

48 **Proliferation of Scenario Planning Methodology**

49
50 Literature from human resources management was used to understand how the survivor syndrome can
51
52 be better managed, and if more accurate ‘scenarios’ are better presented, an improved tool is
53
54 conceived to carry out scenario planning. In this way, foresight is a metaphor for the implications of
55
56 the survivor syndrome. The nature of the above observations and their deviation from the extant
57
58 literature meant they would not have been possible to obtain had interviewing not been conducted
59
60 with ‘survivors’. For example, rich characteristics like feelings of fairness, support and shock would

1
2 have been difficult to hypothesize from scenario planning participants had they not been close to
3
4 redundancy themselves. Similarly, the lack of communication and lack of confidence in management
5
6 are post-experiences actually felt and difficult to gauge if scenario planners were to bring them up as
7
8 possible scenarios. In the same way, the traps and pitfalls explained earlier in this article have been
9
10 better controlled for: bias, for example, would not exist as the views are from genuine participants
11
12 who would otherwise not be affected, which in turn, overcomes the issue of relevance, and of course,
13
14 establishing greater plausibility.

15
16
17 Given the benefits of the use of survivors as part of scenario planning, we recommend
18
19 building in the seven themes as part of the interview schedule to ensure their coverage. However,
20
21 unlike other theorists who specify steps or procedures, we only argue for their inclusion rather than
22
23 impose a rigid order for the approach. The application of the 7-themed framework and method of
24
25 interviewing used may be repeated for understanding similar issues where the context might vary, or
26
27 be augmented. The interview themes of fairness, organizational assistance, feelings, motivation,
28
29 communication, workload and the future are the core anchors for designing interviews if used as an
30
31 instrument for conducting scenario planning, particularly in the part where scenarios are raised.
32
33 Survivors were used in the research as they pose the closest research subject to those who would be
34
35 victims but escaped redundancy by a narrow margin. In repeated use, alternatives to survivors can be
36
37 substituted depending on the economic and political contexts and availability of alternatives to
38
39 survivors, but they must satisfy the criterion of people who have come extremely close to a situation
40
41 without having befallen so.

42
43
44
45 In the 'tin anniversary' of the 2008 global financial crisis, its context, data from researched
46
47 subjects and representative phenomena still stand as valuable conditions on which to conduct research
48
49 on performance management improvement and methodology. **Scenario planning methodology was a**
50
51 **pioneering approach of the 1950s (Wack, 1985)**, and has proliferated well in the guise of
52
53 organizational foresight, via the HR field (such as managing the survivor syndrome), in performance
54
55 management. Its proliferation is due to the good closeness of fit between the need of scenario
56
57 planning to raise accurate future scenarios and the feelings felt by survivors of the survivor syndrome
58
59 who have come close to being a victim and incited a retaliatory response concerning the future of the
60

1
2 firm. So, to summarize: improved organizational performance is the ultimate aim, which can be
3
4 achieved by better strategic decision making, informed by foresight, in the form of scenario planning,
5
6 which is well achieved through exploring human subjects who meet the criterion of a 'survivor'.
7
8 Hence, as foresight sits in the middle and acts as the medium, it is the metaphor for all the insights
9
10 raised by the survivors presented in the illustration part of this article. So, foresight is an important
11
12 metaphor; it is scenario planning; and for the future of organizations ... it matters!
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

References

- Adams JS. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In Berkowitz, L. (ed), *Advances in Experimental Psychology*. San Diego, CA, Academic Press.
- Alzadeh R, Lund PD, Beynaghi A, Abolghasemi M, Maknoon R. (2016), An integrated scenario-based robust planning approach for foresight and strategic management with application to energy industry, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 104: 162-171.
- Alvesson M, Sandberg J. (2011). Generating research questions through problematization. *Academy of Management Review* 36 (2): 247-71.
- Alvesson M, Sandberg J. (2013). Has management studies lost its way? Ideas for more imaginative and innovative research. *Journal of Management Studies* 50 (1):128-52.
- Armstrong-Stassen, M. (1994). Coping with transition: A study of layoff survivors. *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 15:597-621.
- Appelbaum, S.H., Delage, C., Labib, N. and Gault, G. (1997), The survivor syndrome: aftermath of downsizing, *Career Development International*, 2 (6), 278-286.
- Appelbaum SH, Donia, M. (2001a). The realistic downsizing preview: A multiple case study, part I: The methodology and results of data collection. *Career Development International* 6 (3):128-50.
- Appelbaum SH, Donia, M. (2001b). The realistic downsizing preview: A multiple case study, part II: Analysis of RDP model: results of data collected and proposed new model. *Career Development International* 6 (4):193-211.
- Appelbaum, SH, Lopes R, Audet L, Steed A, Jacob M, Augustinas T, Manolopoulos D. (2003). Communication during downsizing of a telecommunications company. *Corporate Communications: An International Journal* 8 (2):73-96.
- Baruch Y. (1998). The rise and fall of organizational commitment. *Human Systems Management* 17 (2): 135-44.
- Baruch Y, Hind P. (2000). Survivor syndrome – a management myth? *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 15 (1): 29-45.
- Bean C, Hamilton F. (2006). Leader framing and follower sensemaking: Response to downsizing in the brave new workplace. *Human Relations*, 59 (3): 321-49.
- Bowman, G., MacKay, R.B., Masrani, S. and McKiernan, P. (2013), Storytelling and the scenario process: understanding success and failure, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 80, 735-748.
- Bradfield R, Derbyshire J, Wright G. (2016), The critical role of history in scenario thinking: augmenting causal analysis within the intuitive logics scenario development methodology, *Futures*, 77: 56-66.
- Brockner J. (1992). Managing the effects of layoffs on survivors. *California Management Review* 34 (2):9-28.
- Brockner J, DeWitt L, Grover S, Reed T. (1990). When it is especially important to explain why: Factors affecting the relationship between managers' explanations of a layoff and survivors' reactions to the layoff. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 26:389-407.
- Brockner J, Greenberg J, Brockner A, Bortz J, Davy J, Carter, C. (1986). Layoffs, equity theory and work performance: Further evidence of the impact of survivor guilt. *Academy of Management Journal* 29 (2):373-84.
- Brockner J, Grover S, O'Malley M, Reed T, Glynn M. (1993). Threat of future layoffs, self-esteem and survivors' reactions: evidence from the laboratory and the field. *Strategic Management Journal* 14 (S1):153-66.

- 1
2 Brockner J, Grover S, Reed T, DeWitt R, O'Malley M. (1987). Survivors' reactions to layoffs: We get
3 by with a little help for our friends. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 32:526-41.
- 4 Brockner J, Spreitzer G, Mishra A, Hochwarter W, Pepper L, Weinberg J. (2004). Perceived control
5 as an antidote to the negative effects of layoffs on survivors' organizational commitment and
6 job performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 49 (1):76-100.
- 7
8 Bui HTM, Baruch Y, Chau VS, He H-W. (2016). Team learning: the missing construct from a cross-
9 cultural examination of higher education, *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 33: 29-51.
- 10
11 Burt G, Wright G, Bradfield R, Cairns G, van der Heijden K. (2006). The role of scenario planning in
12 exploring the environment in view of the limitations of PEST and its derivatives,
13 *International Studies of Management & Organization*, 36(3):50-76.
- 14
15 Cairns G, Wright G, Fairbrother P. (2016). Promoting articulated action from diverse stakeholders in
16 response to public policy scenarios: a case analyssi of the use of 'scenario improvization'
17 method, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 103: 97-108.
- 18
19 Cameron K. (1994). Strategies for successful organizational downsizing. *Human Resource*
20 *Management* 33 (2):189-211.
- 21
22 Chau VS, Gilman M., Serbanica C. (2017). Aligning university-industry interactions: the role of
23 boundary spanning in intellectual capital transfer, *Technological Forecasting and Social*
24 *Change*, 123, pp. 199-209.
- 25
26 Chau VS, Quire C. (2018). Back to the future of women in technology: insights from understanding
27 the shortage of women innovation sectors for managing corporate foresight, *Technology*
28 *Analysis and Strategic Management*, 30 (6): pp. 747-764.
- 29
30 Chau VS, Thomas H, Clegg S, Leung ASM. (2012). Managing performance in global crisis, *British*
31 *Journal of Management*, 23: S1-S5.
- 32
33 Chau VS, Witcher BJ. (2009). The uses and usefulness of reflexive accounts in strategic performance
34 management research: the case of UK regulated public utilities, *International Journal of*
35 *Productivity and Performance Management*, 58 (4), pp. 346-366.
- 36
37 Chermack TJ. (2005). Studying scenario planning: theory, research, suggestions, and hypotheses,
38 *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 72: 59-73.
- 39
40 Chia R. 2002. What is foresight and does it matter? *International Conference at the University of*
41 *Strathclyde: 'Probing the future'*, Glasgow.
- 42
43 Chipunza C, Berry D. (2010). The relationship among survivor qualities – attitude, commitment and
44 motivation – after downsizing. *African Journal of Business Management* 4 (5):604-13.
- 45
46 Datta DK, Guthrie JP, Basuil D, Pandey A. (2010). Cause and effects of employee downsizing: A
47 review and synthesis. *Journal of Management* 36 (1):281-348.
- 48
49 Davy J, Kinicki A, Scheck C. (1991). Developing and testing a model of survivor responses to
50 layoffs. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour* 38 (3):302-17.
- 51
52 de Vries MFK, Balazs K. (1997). The downside of downsizing. *Human Relations*. 50 (1):11-50.
- 53
54 Derbyshire, J. (2017), Potential surprise theory as a theoretical foundation for scenario planning,
55 *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 124, 77-87.
- 56
57 Derbyshire J, Wright G. (2014). Preparing for the future: development of an 'antifragile' methodology
58 that complements scenario planning by omitting causation. *Technological Forecasting and*
59 *Social Change*, 82: 215-225.
- 60
61 Devine K, Reay T, Stainton L, Collins-Nakai R. (2003). Downsizing outcomes: Better a victim than a
62 survivor? *Human Resource Management* 42 (2):109-24.
- 63
64 e Cunha MP, Palma P, da Costa, NG, (2006), Fear of foresight: knowledge and ignorance in
65 organizational foresight, *Futures*, 38: 942-955.
- 66
67 Fineman S. (2003). *Understanding Emotion at Work*. Sage Publication, London.

- 1
2 Franco L.A., Meadows M, Armstrong SJ. (2013), Exploring individual differences in scenario
3 planning workshops: a cognitive style framework, *Technological Forecasting and Social*
4 *Change*, 80: 723-734.
- 5
6 Furnham A, Eracleous A, Chamorro-Premuzic T. (2009). Personality, motivation and job satisfaction:
7 Hertzberg meets the Big Five. *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 24 (8):765-79.
- 8
9 Hendriksen, E. (2018), How to handle survivor syndrome: helping those who question their own right
10 to exist, *Psychology Today*, May-June, 40-41.
- 11
12 Konno N, Nonaka I, Ogilvy J. (2014). Scenario planning: the basics, *World Futures*, 70: 28-43.
- 13
14 KPMG (2011). *Manage the Future through Scenario Planning*, KPMG Company Report,
15 [https://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Manage-](https://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Manage-the-future-through-scenario-planning-v3.pdf)
16 [the-future-through-scenario-planning-v3.pdf](https://www.kpmg.com/AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Manage-the-future-through-scenario-planning-v3.pdf)
- 17
18 Lang, T. and Ramirez, R. (2017), Building new social capital with scenario planning, *Technological*
19 *Forecasting and Social Change*, 124, 51-65.
- 20
21 Legge K. (1995). *Human Resource Management: Rhetorics and Realities*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- 22
23 Marks M. (2006). Workplace recovery after mergers, acquisitions and downsizing. Facilitating
24 individual adaptation to major organizational transitions. *Organizational Dynamics* 35
25 (4):384-99.
- 26
27 Meissner P, Wulf T. (2013), Cognitive benefits of scenario planning: its impact on biases and decision
28 quality, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 80: 801-814.
- 29
30 Miles MB, Huberman AM. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis*. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- 31
32 Neugarten ML. (2006). Foresight - are we looking in the right direction?, *Futures*, 38: 894-907.
- 33
34 Noer D. (1993). *Healing the Wounds: Overcoming the Trauma of Layoffs and Revitalizing Downsized*
35 *Organizations*. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
- 36
37 O'Brien, F.A. and Meadows, M. (2013), Scenario orientation and use to support strategy development,
38 *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 80, 643-656.
- 39
40 Oliver, J.J. and Parrett, E. (2018), Managing future uncertainty: reevaluating the role of scenario
41 planning, *Business Horizons*, 61, 339-352.
- 42
43 Paulsen N, Callan VJ, Grice TA, Rooney D, Gallois C, Jones E, Jimmieson NL, Bordia P. (2005). Job
44 uncertainty and personal control during downsizing: A comparison of survivors and victims
45 *Human Relations*, 58 (4):463-96.
- 46
47 Parnell, J.A., Dent, E.B., O'Regan, N., Hughes, T. (2012). Managing performance in a volatile
48 environment: contrasting perspectives on luck and causality, *British Journal of Management*,
49 23: S104-S118.
- 50
51 Piirainen, K.A. and Gonzalez, R.A. (2015). Theory of and within foresight - what does a theory of
52 foresight even mean?, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 96, 191-201.
- 53
54 Raford N. (2015), Online foresight platforms: evidence for their impact on scenario planning and
55 strategic foresight, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 97: 65-76.
- 56
57 Ramirez R, Selin C. (2014). Plausibility and probability in scenario planning, *Foresight*, 16(1): 54-74.
- 58
59 Robbins SP. (1999). A missing topic in organizational behavior. *Journal of Management Education*
60 23 (1):31-43.
- Rowland, N.J. and Spaniol, M.J. (2017), Social foundation of scenario planning, *Technological*
Forecasting and Social Change, 124, 6-15.
- Roxburgh C. (2009). The use and abuse of scenarios, *McKensey & Co Company Public Article*,
[http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-](http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-use-and-abuse-of-scenarios)
[insights/the-use-and-abuse-of-scenarios](http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-use-and-abuse-of-scenarios)
- Sahdev K. (2003). Survivors reactions to downsizing: the importance of contextual factors. *Human*
Resource Management Journal, 13 (4):56-74.

- 1
2 Sahdev, K. (2004), Revisiting the survivor syndrome: the role of leadership in implementing
3 downsizing, *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 13(2), 165-196.
- 4 Sarpong D, Maclean M. (2014). Unpacking strategic foresight: a practice approach, *Scandinavian*
5 *Journal of Management*, 30 (1), 16-26.
- 6
7 Sarpong D, Maclean M, Davies C. (2013). A matter of foresight: how practices enable (or impede)
8 organizational foresightfulness, *European Management Journal*, 31 (6), 613-625.
- 9
10 Schoemaker PJH. (1995), Scenario planning: a tool for strategic thinking, *Sloan Management Review*,
11 36: 25-40.
- 12
13 Shah SK, Corley KG. (2006). Building better theory by bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide.
14 *Journal of Management Studies* 43 (8):1821-35.
- 15
16 Spaniol, M.J. and Rowland, N.J. (2018), The scenario planning paradox, *Futures*, 95, 33-43.
- 17
18 Taleb NN. (2007), *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, New York, Random House
19 Publisher.
- 20
21 Thornhill A, Gibbons A. (1995). The positive management of redundancy survivors: Issues and
22 lessons. *Employee Counselling Today*, 7 (3):5-12.
- 23
24 Thornhill A, Saunders N, Stead J. (1997). Downsizing, delayering – but where’s the commitment?
25 The development of a diagnostic tool to help manage survivors. *Personnel Review*, 26 (1/2):
26 81-98.
- 27
28 Travaglione A, Cross B. (2006). Diminishing the social network in organizations: does there need to
29 be such a phenomenon as “survivor syndrome” after downsizing?, *Strategic Change*, 15 (1):
30 1-13.
- 31
32 Trevor C, Nyberg A. (2008). Keeping your headcount when all about you are losing theirs:
33 downsizing, voluntary turnover rates and the moderating role of HR practices. *Academy of*
34 *Management Journal* 51 (2): 259-76.
- 35
36 Tzafrir S, Harel G, Baruch Y, Dolan S. (2004). Consequences of emerging HRM practices for
37 employees trust in their managers. *Personnel Review*, 33 (6):628-47.
- 38
39 van Dick, R., Drzensky, F. and Heinz, M. (2016), Goodbye or identify: detrimental effects of
40 downsizing on identification and survivor performance, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 7, article
41 771, 1-9.
- 42
43 Virick M, Lilly J, Casper W. (2007). Doing more with less: An analysis of work life balance among
44 layoff survivors. *Career Development International*, 12 (5):463-80.
- 45
46 Wack P. (1985). Scenarios: shooting the rapids, *Harvard Business Review*, 63(6): 139-150.
- 47
48 Witcher BJ, Chau VS. (2012). Varieties of capitalism and strategic management: managing
49 performance in multinationals after the global financial crisis, *British Journal of*
50 *Management*, 23: S58-S73.
- 51
52 Witcher BJ, Chau VS. (2014). *Strategic Management: Principles and Practice (2nd Ed)*, Andover,
53 Cengage Learning.
- 54
55 Wulf T, Meissner P, Stubner S. (2010). A scenario-based approach to strategic planning: integrating
56 planning and process perspective of strategy, *Centre for Scenario Planning Working Paper*
57 *1/2010*, HHL Graduate School of Management, Leipzig.
- 58
59 Zapata, M.A., Kaza, M. (2015). Radical uncertainty: scenario planning for futures, *Environment and*
60 *Planning B: Planning and Design*, 42: 754-770.

Response to Reviewer Comments

1
2
3
4
5 P.1, lines 45-6: you refer to scenario planning METHODOLOGY as a BREAKTHROUGH THEORY. Are
6 you considering it to be a methodology / theory? If there is debate in the literature as to which it is,
7 you need to include reference to that. This point is repeated on P.21, lines 50-52. It is also
8 mentioned on P.5 lines 30-32 whereby your article “contributes theoretically by arguing ... as an
9 augmented scenario planning methodology”...

10
11 → So not to be unclear at the start (abstract) the sub-clause has been removed and no longer
12 makes reference to ‘breakthrough theory’. The sentence on p.5 has been unchanged because
13 scenario planning is a methodology for conducting foresight (which is correct). The sentence on p.21
14 has been changed so that the statement is describing scenario planning methodology as being
15 pioneering, for which the reference of Wack (1985), already cited earlier on and therefore should be
16 familiar with the reader, is given to qualify it.
17
18
19
20

21 P.2 lines 37-43 the sentence “ ... metaphor for understanding how employees ...” is very difficult to
22 follow and needs re-writing.
23

24
25 → This whole sentence has been completely rewritten for better clarity.
26
27
28

29 P. 5 line 2 PROMPTS not “prompters”

30
31 → This has been changed to ‘prompts’.
32
33
34

35 P.7 lines 6-10 the last sentence is incomplete.

36
37 → This sentence has been rephrased.
38
39
40

41 P. 8 line 10 “antifragile” is not a ‘proper’ word, but is taken from Taleb’s book of the same name and
42 presumably is used by the authors you cite. You need to indicate how the word is derived / use one
43 found in the dictionary please!
44

45
46 → The phrase has been replaced with ‘organizationally resilient’, which mitigates the need to
47 explain and derive the word ‘antifragile’.
48
49
50

51 P. 8 line 52 “complexes” should be COMPLICATES? Again, not a recognised word.

52
53 → This has been changed to ‘complicates’.
54
55
56

57 P.13 lines 48-9 “survivors ... USED by ... scenario planning methodology ...” Do you mean “used”? It
58 sounds somewhat derogatory.
59

60
→ This sentence has been reworded (and hopefully now sounds less derogatory!)