Institutional Culture, Social Interaction and Learning
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Introduction

As the title of this paper suggests my re-ordering of the name of the Journal (Learning, Culture and Social Interaction) reflects my interest in the way in which the cultures of institutions and the patterns of social interaction within them exert a formative effect on the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of learning. This is part of a more general argument to which I subscribe. This is that we need a social science that articulates the formative effects of a much broader conception of the ‘social’ than that which inheres in much of the slew of research which emanates from the writings of Vygotsky and his colleagues. The boundaries which shape researcher’s horizons often serve to severely constrain the research imagination. Sociologists have sought to theorise relationships between forms of social relation in institutional settings and forms of talk. Sociocultural psychologists have done much to understand the relationship between thinking and speech in a range of social settings with relatively little analysis and description of the institutional arrangements that are in place in those settings. At present there is a weak connection between these theoretical traditions.

As Sawyer notes:

Socioculturalists have rarely drawn substantively on sociology, political science or history—disciplines that argue for the irreducibility of macro-level entities or structures such as social class, educational level, geographic region, race and ethnicity, social networks and institutional structures, and social power and its forms. (Sawyer, 2002, p 301)

This paper is part of an endeavour to forge the hitherto elusive connection between macrostructures of power and control and micro processes of the formation of pedagogic consciousness. It does this through the development of an approach in which a dialectical relation between theoretical and empirical work draws on the strengths of the legacies of sociological and psychological sources to provide a theoretical model which is capable of descriptions at levels of delicacy which may be tailored to the needs of specific research questions. The development of the
theoretical model along with the language of description it generates will hopefully open the way for new avenues of research in which different pedagogic practices are designed and evaluated in such a way that the explicit and tacit features of processes of the mutual shaping of person and context may be examined (e.g Daniels, 2010). This will enable significant contributions to be made to the possibilities for studying fields or networks of interconnected practice (such as those of the home, school and community) with their partially shared and often contested objects. Alongside this enhancement of the ‘outward’ reach of the theory must be increased capacity and agility in tackling ‘inward’ issues of subjectivity, personal sense, emotion, identity, and moral commitment. In the past these two directions have tended to remain the incompatible research objects of different disciplines with emphasis on collective activity systems, organizations and history on the one hand and subjects, actions and situations on the other hand (Engeström, & Sannino, 2010).

In this paper, a more constrained notion of the social is deployed. I will consider the institutional level of social formation. I will outline an approach to the study of learning which examines the way in which societal needs and priorities and/or curriculum formations are recontextualised within institutions such as schools or universities. This approach seeks to understand, analyse and describe the structural relations of power and control within institutions and deploy a language of description to the discursive formations to which the structural formations give rise. I argue that the specialised communicative practices, which particular institutions seek to maintain, differentially deflect and direct the attention, gaze and patterns of interaction of socially positioned participants. This paper builds on previous writing in which I have explored the interface between post-Vygotskian psychology and sociologies of cultural transmission (e.g. Daniels 2001, 2006, 2008, 2010). It is, of course, a work in process and as yet far from realising its aspirations.

Institutions and the social formation of mind

The way in which the social relations of institutions are regulated has cognitive and affective consequences for those who live and work inside them. The current state of the art in the social sciences struggles to provide a theoretical connection between specific forms, or modalities, of institutional regulation and consciousness. Attempts
which have been made to do so tend not to be capable of generating analyses and
descriptions of institutional formations which are predictive of consequences for
individuals. At the same time social policy tends not engage with the personal
consequences of different forms of institutional regulation. This paper will discuss an
approach to making the connection between the principles of regulation in
institutions, discursive practices and the shaping of consciousness. This approach is
based on the work of the British sociologist Basil Bernstein and the Russian social
theorist Lev Vygotsky.

From the sociological point of view Bernstein outlined the challenge as follows:

The substantive issue of . . . [this] theory is to explicate the process whereby a
given distribution of power and principles of control are translated into
specialised principles of communication differentially, and often unequally,
distributed to social groups/classes. And how such a differential/unequal
distribution of forms of communication, initially (but not necessarily
terminally) shapes the formation of consciousness of members of these
groups/classes in such a way as to relay both opposition and change.
(Bernstein 1996: 93)

The following assertion from Vygotsky recasts the issue in more psychological vein
but with same underlying intent and commitment

Any function in the child’s cultural [ie higher] development appears twice, or
on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the
psychological plane. First it appears between people as an inter-psychological
category, and then within the child as an intra-psychological category. This is
equally true with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation
of concepts, and the development of volition. . . it goes without saying that
internalization transforms the process itself and changes its structure and
functions. Social relations or relations among people genetically underlie all
higher functions and their relationships. (Vygotsky 1981: 163)

I argue that, taken together the Vygotskian and Bernsteinian social theory have the
potential to make a significant contribution to the development of a theory of the
social formation of mind in specific pedagogic modalities. Following Bernstein, pedagogy may be thought of a sustained process whereby somebody(s) acquires new forms or develops existing forms of conduct, knowledge, practice and criteria, from somebody(s) or something deemed to be an appropriate provider and evaluator (Bernstein, 2000). Defined in this way the general practitioner, the policy maker, the therapist, and the broadcaster are all involved in a form of pedagogic practice.

A sociological focus on the rules which shape the social formation of discursive practice may be brought to bear on those aspects of psychology which argue that cultural artefacts, such as pedagogic discourse, both explicitly and implicitly, mediate human thought and action. Sociocultural theorists argue that individual agency has been significantly under acknowledged in Bernstein’s sociology of pedagogy (e.g. Werstch, 1998a). Vygotsky’s work provides a compatible account which places emphasis on individual agency through its attention to the notion of mediation. Sociologists complain that post-Vygotskian psychology is particularly weak in addressing relations between local, interactional contexts of 'activity' and 'mediation', where meaning is produced and wider structures of the division of labour and institutional organisation act to specify social positions and their differentiated orientation to 'activities and 'cultural artefacts' (e.g. Fitz 2007).

Many sociologists have sought to theorise relationships between forms of social relation in institutional settings and forms of talk. Sociocultural psychologists, working in the post-Vygotskian tradition, have done much to understand the relationship between thinking and speech in a range of social settings with relatively little analysis and description of the institutional arrangements that are in place in those settings.

We can never ‘speak from nowhere’, given that we can speak (or more broadly, act) only by invoking mediational means that are available in the ‘cultural tool kit’ provided by the sociocultural setting in which we operate ... this does not mean that we are mechanistically determined by, or are mere puppets of, the mediational means we employ, but it does mean that constraints of some kind always exist. (Wertsch et al, 1995, p. 25)
Vygotsky’s sociogenetic approach

Vygotsky provided a rich and tantalising set of suggestions that have been taken up and transformed by social theorists as they attempt to construct accounts of the formation of mind which to varying degrees acknowledge social, cultural and historical influences. There is also no doubt that Vygotsky straddled a number of disciplinary boundaries. Davydov (1995: 15) went as far to suggest that was involved in ‘a creative reworking of the theory of behaviorism, gestalt psychology, functional and descriptive psychology, genetic psychology, the French school of sociology, and Freudianism.

Recent developments in post Vygotskian theory have witnessed considerable advances in the understanding of the ways in which human action shapes and is shaped by the contexts in which it takes place. They have given rise to a significant amount of empirical research within and across a wide range of fields in which social science methodologies and methods are applied in the development of research-based knowledge in policy making and practice in academic, commercial and industrial settings. His is not a legacy of determinism and denial of agency rather he provides a theoretical framework which rests on the concept of mediation. These developments have explored different aspects of Vygotsky’s legacy at different moments. As Puzyrei (2007) notes, his work constitutes a dynamic resource for modern day researchers who will explore different facets of the texts we have available in line with their own interests and to some extent the prevailing zeitgeist. These wider social influences are seen to have mediated the development and uptake of the theory itself.

Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory (like any great theory) resembles a city. A city with broad new avenues and ancient, narrow backstreets known only to longtime residents, with noisy, crowded plazas and quiet, deserted squares, with large, modern edifices and decrepit little buildings. The individual areas of that city may not be situated on a single level: while some rise above the ground, others are submerged below it and cannot be seen at all. In essence, it is as though there were a second city that has intimate and complex associations with the ground-level city but completely invisible to many. And the sun rises above it all and the stars come out over it at night. Sometimes dust storms and hurricanes rage, or the rain beats down long and hard and “the sky is overcast.” Life is a constant feeling of effervescence. Holidays and the
humdrum follow one another. The city changes, grows, and is rebuilt. Whole neighborhoods are demolished. The center is sometimes over here, sometimes over there. And so it goes. (Puzyrei, 2007, pp. 85-86)

Smardon (2010) takes this line of argument somewhat further in suggesting that the Vygotskian way of seeing the world has been and continues to be marginalised in some academic settings

The Vygotskian project has been largely overlooked outside of the field of educational psychology, where Stetsenko argues it is still marginalized in comparison to other, more dominant theoretical models. Furthermore, Marxist psychology has never been a part of American sociology, a discipline that has instead focused on macrosociological Marxist models, --- Thus, the Vygotskian project exists at the marginal nexus of both psychology and sociology. (Smardon, 2010, p.70)

The reasons for formation of this marginal position may be that in attempting to resolve the disconnection between disciplinary imaginations it manages to offend both. Whatever the reasons it is clear that many disciplines contributed to the formation of Vygotsky’s ideas. For example, Van der Veer (1996) argued that Humboldt with reference to linguistic mediation and Marx with reference to tool-use and social and cultural progress influenced Vygotsky’s concept of culture. He suggested that the limitations in this aspect of Vygotsky’s work are with respect to non-linguistically mediated aspects of culture and the difficulty in explaining innovation by individuals. Vygotsky’s writing on the way in which psychological tools and signs act in the mediation of social factors does not engage with a theoretical account of the appropriation and/or and production of psychological tools within specific forms of activity within or across institutions. Just as the development of Vygotsky’s work fails to provide an adequate account of social praxis so much sociological theory is unable to provide descriptions of micro level processes, except by projecting macro level concepts on to the micro level unmediated by intervening concepts though which the micro can be both uniquely described and related to the macro level.
Bernstein’s Sociology of Pedagogy

Amongst sociologists of cultural transmission, Bernstein (2000) provides the sociology of this social experience which is most compatible with, but absent from, Vygotskian psychology. His theoretical contribution was directed towards the question as to how institutional relations of power and control translate into principles of communication and how these differentially regulate forms of consciousness. It was through Luria’s attempts to disseminate his former colleague’s work that Bernstein first became acquainted with Vygotsky’s writing.

I first came across Vygotsky in the late 1950s through a translation by Luria of a section of Thought and Speech published in Psychiatry 2 1939. It is difficult to convey the sense of excitement, of thrill, of revelation this paper aroused: literally a new universe opened. Bernstein (1993 p xxiii)

This paper along with a seminal series of lectures given by Luria at the Tavistock Institute in London sparked an intense interest in the Russian Cultural Historical tradition and went on to exert a profound influence on post war developments in English in Education, the introduction of education for young people with severe and profound learning difficulties and theories practices designed to facilitate development an learning in socially disadvantaged groups in the UK. In November 1964 Bernstein wrote a letter to Vygotsky’s widow outlining her late husband’s influence on his developing thesis

As you may know, many of us working in the area of speech (from the perspective of psychology as well as from the perspective of sociology) think that we owe a debt to the Russian school, especially to works based on Vygotsky’s tradition. I should say that in many respects, many of us are still trying to comprehend what he said. Bernstein (1964b p. 1)

In a commentary on the 1971 publication of ‘The Psychology of Art’ V.V. Ivanov (1971, p.269) identifies Bernstein’s influence on the dissemination of Vygotsky’s ideas in the west, despite some somewhat inaccurate claims about publication and disciplinary identity.
It was Vygotsky’s (1978) non-dualist cultural historical conception of mind claims that ‘intermental’ (social) experience shapes ‘intramental’ (psychological) development that continued to influence Bernstein’s thinking. This was understood as a mediated process in which culturally produced artefacts (such as forms of talk, representations in the form of ideas and beliefs, signs and symbols) shape and are shaped by human engagement with the world (e.g. Vygotsky, 1987; Daniels, 2008).

Language here is a system of meanings, a relay for the social, a primary condition for the formation of consciousness and the levels and variety of its function. Relation to (the social) precedes relations within (the individual). This insight was of course, Mead’s, much earlier than Vygotsky but his insight produced a very different model. The I/Me dualism of the Meadian self is a dualism endemic to European thought, perhaps even to christianity, with its distinction between inner/outer, individual/society. The relaying, mediating role of language is shared with Durkheim. Bernstein (1993 p. xiv)

However, as Atkinson (1985) notes, despite his acquaintance with the various philosophical and anthropological authors on language and symbolism including Cassirer and Whorf and Vygotsky and Luria, Bernstein’s approach epitomizes an essentially macrosociological point of view.

‘It is undoubtedly true that in Bernstein's general approach there is little or no concern for the perspectives, strategy and actions of individual social actors in actual social settings.’ Atkinson (1985 p.32)

Durkheim influenced both Vygotsky and Bernstein. On the one hand Durkheim's notion of collective representation allowed for the social interpretation of human cognition, on the other it failed to resolve the issue as to how the collective representation is interpreted by the individual. This is the domain so appropriately filled by the later writings of Vygotsky. The fact that Bernstein has utilized Mead and Vygotsky in the formulation of his model allows for the exploration of interpersonal relations at the face to face level in the classroom. Many of the symbolic interactionist and Vygotskian insights can be subsumed into his model which affords the wider social dimension a central place in a general thesis.
Although Vygotsky discussed the general importance of language and schooling for psychological functioning, he failed to provide an analytical framework to analyse and describe the real social systems in which these activities occur. Vygotsky never indicated the social basis for this new use of words. The social analysis is thus reduced to a semiotic analysis which overlooks the real world of social praxis (Ratner, 1997).

‘The feature that can be viewed as the proximal cause of the maturation of concepts, is a specific way of using the word, specifically the functional application of the sign as a means of forming concepts’.  

(Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 131)

Whilst it is quite possible to interpret ‘a specific way of using the word’ to be an exhortation to analyse the activities in which the word is used and meaning negotiated, this was not elaborated by Vygotsky himself. The analysis of the structure and function of semiotic psychological tools in specific activity contexts is not explored. The challenge is to address the demands created by this absence. Bernstein recognised the need for such an endeavour in his early writing.

Different social structures may generate different speech systems or linguistic codes. The latter entail for the individual specific principles of choice which regulate the selections he makes from the totality of options represented by a given language. The principles of choice originally elicit, progressively strengthen, and finally stabilize the planning procedures an individual uses in the preparation of his speech and guide his orientation to the speech of others (Bernstein, 1964a, p. 56).

Bernstein outlined a model for understanding the construction of pedagogic discourse. In this context pedagogic discourse is a source of psychological tools or cultural artefacts.
'The basic idea was to view this (pedagogic) discourse as arising out of the action of a group of specialised agents operating in specialised setting in terms of the interests, often competing interests of this setting.'

(Bernstein 1996p.116)

In Engeström’s (1996) work within activity theory, which to some considerable extent has a Vygotskian root, the production of the outcome of activity is discussed but not the production and structure of cultural artefacts such as discourse. The production of discourse is not analysed in terms of the context of its production that is the rules, community and division of labour which regulate the activity in which subjects are positioned. It is therefore important that the discourse is seen within the culture and structures of schooling where differences in pedagogic practices, in the structuring of interactions and relationships and the generation of different criteria of competence will shape the ways in which children are perceived and actions are argued and justified. This is the agenda which Hasan (2005) has pursued in an approach that draws on Halliday, Vygotsky and Bernstein.

The application of Vygotsky by many social scientists (e.g. linguists, psychologists and sociologists) has been limited to relatively small scale interactional contexts often within schooling or some form of educational setting. The descriptions and the form of analysis are in some sense specific to these contexts. Sociologists have drawn on ethnomethodology or symbolic interactionism (see Makitalo, and Saljo, 2002 for a discussion). Here the focus is on the creation and negotiation of social order by participants in clearly defined and categorised settings. Data collection tends to focus on what is said. As Bernstein (1993) notes extra-contextual structures of power and their discursive regulation are necessarily excluded from the analysis. He also notes the limitations of symbolic interactionism which, from his point of view:

focuses upon meanings, their negotiation, the construction of identities and their careers as these emerge out of face to face encounters in well bounded contexts. Here there is opportunity for showing relations to external constraints and possibilities in which interactions are embedded but not necessarily determined. Yet there still remains the crucial conceptual issue of
explicating this interrelation. This is not solved by a set of boxes which only index the very processes to be described. Symbolic interaction provides sensitive and insightful descriptions of interactions within the pedagogic format. The description it gives necessarily stems from its own selective focus. It tends to take for granted, that it does not include in its description, how the discourse itself is constituted and recontextualized. The theory focuses upon interactional formats rather than the way the *specialisation of knowledge is constructed*. From the point of view of Vygotsky the "tool" is not subject to analysis, although the articulation of the zone of proximal development may well be. This absence of focus is common to both linguistics and psychology. (Bernstein, 1993, p. xix)

In his work on schooling, Bernstein, (2000) argues that pedagogic discourse is constructed by a recontextualising principle which selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses to constitute its own order. He argues that in order to understand pedagogic discourse as a social and historical construction attention must be directed to the regulation of its structure, the social relations of its production and the various modes of its recontextualising as a practice. For him symbolic 'tools' are never neutral; intrinsic to their construction are social classifications, stratifications, distributions and modes of recontextualizing. The language that Bernstein (2000) has developed allows researchers to take measures of institutional modality. That is to describe and position the discursive, organizational and interactional practice of the institution. His model is one that is designed to relate macro-institutional forms to micro-interactional levels and the underlying rules of communicative competence. He focuses upon two levels; a structural level and an interactional level. The structural level is analysed in terms of the social division of labour it creates (e.g. the degree of specialisation, and thus strength of boundary between professional groupings) and the interactional with the form of social relation it creates (e.g. the degree of control that a manager may exert over a team members’ work plan). The social division is analysed in terms of strength of the boundary of its divisions; that is, with respect to the degree of specialisation (e.g. how strong is the boundary between professions such as teaching and social work or one school curriculum subject and another). Thus the key concept at the structural level is the concept of boundary, and structures are distinguished in terms of
their relations between categories. The interactional level emerges as the regulation of the transmission/ acquisition relation between teacher and taught (or the manager and the managed); that is, the interactional level comes to refer to the pedagogic context and the social relations of the workplace or classroom or its equivalent. Power is spoken of in terms of classification, which is manifested in category relations that themselves generate recognition rules. Possession of which allows the acquirer to recognise as difference that is marked by a category, as would be the case of the rules that allow a professional to be recognised as belonging to particular professional group. This is not simply a matter of finding out which service someone belongs to, it also refers to the ways in forms of talk and other actions may be seen to be belonging to a particular professional category or grouping. When there is strong insulation between categories (i.e. subject, teachers), with each category sharply distinguished, explicitly bounded and having its own distinctive specialisation, then classification is said to be strong. When there is weak insulation, then the categories are less specialised and their distinctiveness is reduced; then classification is said to be weak. Bernstein (1996) refined the discussion of his distinction between instructional and regulative discourse. The former refers to the transmission of skills and their relation to each other, and the latter refers to the principles of social order, relation and identity. Whereas the principles and distinctive features of instructional discourse and its practice are relatively clear (the what and how of the specific skills/competences to be acquired and their relation to each other), the principles and distinctive features of the transmission of the regulative are less clear as this discourse is transmitted through various media and may indeed be characterised as a diffuse transmission. Regulative discourse communicates the school’s (or any institution’s) public moral practice, values beliefs and attitudes, principles of conduct, character and manner. It also transmits features of the school’s local history, local tradition and community relations. Pedagogic discourse is modelled as one discourse created by the embedding of instructional and regulative discourse. This model of pedagogic discourse provides a response to one of the many theoretical demands which have remained unfulfilled in the post-Vygotskian framework. The rejection of the cognitive / affective dualism which Vygotsky announced was not followed by a model within which a unitary conception of thinking and feeling could be discussed and implemented within empirical research.
Different institutional modalities may be described in terms of the relationship between the relations of power and control, which gives rise to distinctive discursive artefacts. For example, with respect to schooling, where the theory of instruction gives rise to a strong classification and strong framing of the pedagogic practice, it is expected that there will be a separation of discourses (school subjects), an emphasis upon acquisition of specialised skills; the teacher will be dominant in the formulation of intended learning and the pupils are constrained by the teacher’s practice. The relatively strong control on the pupils’ learning, itself, acts as a means of maintaining order in the context in which the learning takes place. This form of the instructional discourse contains regulative functions. With strong classification and framing, the social relations between teachers and pupils will be more asymmetrical; that is, more clearly hierarchical. In this instance the regulative discourse and its practice is more explicit and distinguishable from the instructional discourse. Where the theory of instruction gives rise to a weak classification and weak framing of the practice, then children will be encouraged to be active in the classroom, to undertake enquiries and perhaps to work in groups at their own pace. Here the relations between teacher and pupils will have the appearance of being more symmetrical. In these circumstances it is difficult to separate instructional discourse from regulative discourse as these are mutually embedded. The formulation of pedagogic discourse as an embedded discourse comprised of instructional and regulative components allows for the analysis of the production of such embedded discourses in activities structured through specifiable relations of power and control within institutions. Bernstein provides an account of cultural transmission which is avowedly sociological in its conception. In turn the psychological account that has developed in the wake of Vygotsky’s writing offers a model of aspects of the social formation of mind which is underdeveloped in Bernstein’s work. The sociocultural account of the social, cultural, and historical context is insufficient for the task that Vygotsky set himself in his attempt to formulate a general social theory of the formation of mind. Bernstein’s account of social positioning within the discursive practice that arises in institutional settings taken together with his analysis of the ways in which principles of power and control translate into principles of communication allows us to investigate how principles of communication differentially regulate forms of consciousness.
Bernstein’s work provides the basis for a language of description which may be applied at the level of principles of power and control which may then be translated into principles of communication. Different social structures give rise to different modalities of language which have specialised mediational properties. They have arisen, have been shaped by, the social, cultural and historical circumstances in which interpersonal exchanges arise and they in turn shape the thoughts and feelings, the identities and aspirations for action of those engaged in interpersonal exchange in those contexts. Hence the relations of power and control, which regulate social interchange, give rise to specialised principles of communication. These mediate social relations.

To understand his views on what underlies the social subjects’ participation in discourse is to understand the true meaning of speaking each act of speaking is a social event, behind which lies the history of the individual and so the history of the community of which the individual is a member. (Hasan, 2001, p. 6)

Mediation

Discourse may mediate human action in different ways. There is visible (Bernstein, 2000) or explicit (Wertsch, 2007) mediation in which the deliberate incorporation of signs into human action is seen as a means of reorganising that action. This contrasts with invisible or implicit mediation that involves signs, especially natural language, whose primary function is IN communications which are part of a pre-existing, independent stream of communicative action that becomes integrated with other forms of goal-directed behaviour (Wertsch, 2007). Invisible semiotic mediation occurs in discourse embedded in everyday ordinary activities of a social subject’s life. As Hasan (2001) argues, Bernstein further nuances this claim:

what Bernstein referred to as the ‘invisible’ component of communication (see Bernstein 1990: 17, figure 3.1 and discussion). The code theory relates this component to the subject’s social positioning. If we grant that ‘ideology is constituted through and in such positioning’ (Bernstein 1990: 13), then we grant that subjects’ stance to their universe is being invoked: different orders of relevance inhere in different experiences of positioning and being
positioned. This is where the nature of what one wants to say, not its absolute specifics, may be traced. Of course, linguists are right that speakers can say what they want to say, but an important question is: what is the range of meanings they freely and voluntarily mean, and why do they prioritize those meanings when the possibilities of making meanings from the point of view of the system of language are infinite? Why do they want to say what they do say? The regularities in discourse have roots that run much deeper than linguistics has cared to fathom. (Hasan, 2001, p.8)

This argument is strengthened through its reference to a theoretical account which provides greater descriptive and analytical purchase on the principles of regulation of the social figured world, the possibilities for social position and the voice of participants. These challenges of studying implicit or invisible mediation have been approached from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Holland et al (1998) have studied the development of identities and agency specific to historically situated, socially enacted, culturally constructed worlds in a way which may contribute to the development of an understanding of the way in which the development of social capital is situated. This approach to a theory of identity in practice is grounded in the notion of a figured world in which positions are taken up constructed and resisted. The Bakhtinian concept of the ‘space of authoring’ is deployed to capture an understanding of the mutual shaping of figured worlds and identities in social practice. They refer to Bourdieu (1977) in their attempt to show how social position becomes disposition. They argue for the development of social position into a positional identity into disposition and the formation of what Bourdieu refers to as ‘habitus’. Bernstein is critical of habitus arguing that the internal structure of a particular habitus, the mode of its specific acquisition, which gives it its specificity, is not described. For him habitus is known by its output not its input. (Bernstein, 2000).

Wertsch (1998) turned to Bakhtin’s theory of speech genres rather than habitus. A similar conceptual problem emerges with this body of work. Whilst Bakhtin’s views concerning speech genres are ‘rhetorically attractive and impressive, the approach lacks … both a developed conceptual syntax and an adequate language of description. Terms and units at both these levels in Bakhtin’s writings require clarification;
further, the principles that underlie the calibration of the elements of context with the
generic shape of the text are underdeveloped, as is the general schema for the
description of contexts for interaction’ (Hasan, 2005). Bernstein acknowledges the
importance of Foucault’s analysis of power, knowledge and discourse as he attempts
to theorise the discursive positioning of the subject. He complains that it lacks a
theory of transmission, its agencies and its social base.

Identity and agency

Hasan brings Bernstein’s concept of social positioning to the fore in her discussion of
social identity. Bernstein (1990, p. 13) used this concept to refer to the establishing of
a specific relation to other subjects and to the creating of specific relationships within
subjects. As Hasan (2005) notes, social positioning through meanings are inseparable
from power relations. Bernstein provided an elaboration of his early general
argument:

“More specifically, class-regulated codes position subjects with respect to
dominant and dominated forms of communication and to the relationships
between them. Ideology is constituted through and in such positioning. From
this perspective, ideology inheres in and regulates modes of relation. Ideology
is not so much a content as a mode of relation for the realizing of content.
Social, cultural, political and economic relations are intrinsic to pedagogic
discourse.” (Bernstein, 1990, pp. 13-14)

Here the linkage is forged between social positioning and psychological attributes.
This is the process through which Bernstein talks of the shaping of the possibilities for
consciousness. The dialectical relation between discourse and subject makes it
possible to think of pedagogic discourse as a semiotic means that regulates or traces
the generation of subjects’ positions in discourse. We can understand the potency of
pedagogic discourse in selectively producing subjects and their identities in a
within the Bernsteinian thesis there exists an ineluctable relation between one’s social
positioning, one’s mental dispositions and one’s relation to the distribution of labour
in society. Here the emphasis on discourse is theorised not only in terms of the
shaping of cognitive functions but also, as it were invisibly, in its influence on
dispositions, identities and practices’ (Bernstein, 1990, p. 33).

Within Engestrom’s approach to CHAT the subject is often discussed in terms of
individuals, groups or perspectives / views. I would argue that the way in which
subjects are positioned with respect to one another within an activity carries with it
implications for engagement with tools and objects. It may also carry implications for
the ways in rules, community and the division of labour regulate the actions of
individuals and groups.

Holland et al. (1998) have studied the development of identities and agency specific
to historically situated, socially enacted, culturally constructed worlds. They draw on
Bakhtin (1978, 1986) and Vygotsky to develop a theory of identity as constantly
forming and person as a composite of many often contradictory, self understandings
and identities which are distributed across the material and social environment and
rarely durable (p. 8). Holland et al (1998) draw on Leont’ev in the development of the
concept of socially organized and reproduced figured worlds which shape and are
shaped by participants and in which social position establishes possibilities for
engagement. They also argue that figured worlds:

[D]istribute ‘us’ not only by relating actors to landscapes of action (as
personae) and spreading our senses of self across many different fields of
activity, but also by giving the landscape human voice and tone. – Cultural
worlds’ are populated by familiar social types and even identifiable persons,
not simply differentiated by some abstract division of labour. The identities we
gain within figured worlds are thus specifically historical developments,
grown through continued participation in the positions defined by the social
organization of those world’s activity (Holland et al., 1998, p. 41. my
underlining)

This approach to a theory of identity in practice is grounded in the notion of a figured
world in which positions are taken up constructed and resisted. The Bakhtinian
concept of the ‘space of authoring’ is deployed to capture an understanding of the
mutual shaping of figured worlds and identities in social practice. Holland et
al.(1998) refer to Bourdieu (c.f. 1977) in their attempt to show how social position becomes disposition. They argue for the development of social position into a positional identity into disposition and the formation of what Bourdieu refers to as ‘habitus’. It is here that I feel that this argument could be strengthened through reference to a theoretical account which provides greater descriptive and analytical purchase on the principles of regulation of the social figured world, the possibilities for social position and the voice of participants.

Engestrom (1999), who has tended to concentrate on the structural aspects of CHAT, offers the suggestion that the division of labour in an activity creates different positions for the participants and that the participants carry their own diverse histories with them into the activity. This echoes the earlier assertion from Leont'ev:

> Activity is the minimal meaningful context for understanding individual actions.... In all its varied forms, the activity of the human individual is a system set within a system of social relations.... The activity of individual people thus depends on their social position, the conditions that fall to their lot, and an accumulation of idiosyncratic, individual factors. Human activity is not a relation between a person and a society that confronts him...in a society a person does not simply find external conditions to which he must adapt his activity, but, rather, these very social conditions bear within themselves the motives and goals of his activity, its means and modes. (Leont'ev, 1978, p.10, our underlining.).

In activity the possibilities for the use of artefacts depends on the social position occupied by an individual. Sociologists and sociolinguists have produced empirical verification of this suggestion (e.g., Bernstein, 2000; Hasan, 2001; Hasan and Cloran, 1990). My suggestion is that the notion of ‘subject’ within activity theory requires expansion and clarification. In many studies the term ‘subject perspective’ is used which arguably infers subject position but does little to illuminate the formative processes that gave rise to this perspective.
Holland et al. also argue that multiple identities are developed within figured worlds and that these are “historical developments, grown through continued participation in the positions defined by the social organization of those world’s activity” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 41). This body of work represents a significant development in our understanding of the concept of the ‘subject’ in activity theory. As Roth (2007) notes:

Goals and actions are free-floating, generally intelligible, cultural-historically contingent possibilities. Because concrete embodied actions articulate between society and the self, a person’s identity does not constitute a singularity but is itself inherently intelligible within the cultural unit. It is because of what they see each other doing that two (or more) persons come to ‘recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another’. Publicly visible actions serve as the ground of recognizing in the other another self that recognizes in me its corresponding other. It is this linkage between self and other through patterned embodied actions that have led some to theorize identity in terms of agency and culture in which a person participates (Roth, 2007, p.144)

Voice and message

For my point of view there remains a need to develop the notion of ‘figured world’ in such a way that we can theories, analyze and describe the processes by which that world is ‘figured’. Bernstein’s (1990: 13) concept of social positioning seems to me to concur with the analysis outlined by Holland et al (1998). He relates social positioning to the formation of mental dispositions in terms of the identity’s relation to the distribution of labour in society. It is through the deployment of his concepts of voice and message that Bernstein forges the link between division of labour, social position and discourse and opens up the possibilities for a language of description that will serve empirical as well analytical purposes. The distinction between what can be recognized as belonging to a voice and a particular message is formulated in terms of distinction between relations of power and relations of control. Bernstein (1990) adapted the concept of voice from his reading of The Material Word by Silverman and Torode (1980).
From this perspective classificatory (boundary) relations establish ‘voice’. ‘Voice’ is regarded somewhat like a cultural larynx which sets the limits on what can be legitimately put together (communicated). Framing (control) relations regulate the acquisition of this voice and create the ‘message (what is made manifest, what can be realized). (Bernstein, 1990, p. 260.)

In his last book he continues:

Voice refers to the limits on what could be realized if the identity was to be recognized as legitimate. The classificatory (boundary) relation established the voice. In this way power relations, through the classificatory relation, regulated voice. However voice, although a necessary condition for establishing what could and could not be said and its context, could not determine what was said and the form of its contextual realization; the message. The message was a function of framing (control). The stronger the framing the smaller the space accorded for potential variation in the message. (Bernstein, 2000, p. 204.)

Thus social categories constitute voices and control over practices constitutes message. Identity becomes the outcome of the voice – message relation. Production and reproduction have their social basis in categories and practices; that categories are constituted by the social division of labour and that practices are constituted by social relations within production/reproduction; that categories constitute ‘voices’ and that practices constitute their ‘messages’; message is dependant upon ‘voice’, and the subject is a dialectical relation between ‘voice’ and message (Bernstein, 1990, p. 27).

Hasan (2001, p. 8) suggests that Bernstein’s analysis of how subjects are positioned and how they position themselves in relation to the social context of their discourse, offers an explanation of discursive practice, in terms of the relations of power and control which regulate speaking subjects. However, the theoretical move which Bernstein makes in relating positioning to the distribution of power and principles of control opens up the possibility of grounding the analysis of social positioning and mental dispositions in relation to the distribution of labour in an activity. Through the notions of ‘voice’ and ‘message’ he brings the division of labour and principles of
control (rules) into relation with social position in practice. This theoretical stance suggests that activity theory could also develop a language of description which allows for the parameters of power and control to be considered at structural and interactional levels of analysis. A systematic approach to the analysis and description of the formation of categories through the maintenance and shifting of boundaries and principles of control as exercised within categories would bring a powerful tool to the undoubted strengths of activity theory. This would then allow the analysis to move from one level to another in the same terms rather than treat division of labour and discourse as analytically independent items. Bernstein argues that positioning is in a systematic relation to the distribution of power and principles of control. I suggest that this approach to understanding the notion of social positioning as the underlying, invisible component which ‘figures’ (as in Holland) practices of communication and gives rise to the shaping of identity provides an important potential development from the current status of third generation activity theory.

Such a development requires a theoretical account of social relations and positioning. The theoretical move which Bernstein makes in relating positioning to the distribution of power and principles of control opens up the possibility of grounding the analysis of social positioning and mental dispositions in relation to the distribution of labour in an activity. Through the notions of ‘voice’ and ‘message’ he brings the division of labour and principles of control (rules) into relation with social position in practice. The implication is that ‘subject’ in an activity theory driven depiction should be represented by a space of possibility (voice) in which a particular position (message) is taken up. Thus subject would be represented by a socially structured zone of possibility rather than a singular point. This representation would signify a move to attempt to theorise the subject as emerging in a world that was ‘figured’ by relations of power and control.

Conclusion

The language that Bernstein has developed allows researchers to develop measures of school modality. That is to describe and position the discursive, organizational and interactional practice of the institution. He also noted the need for the extension of
this work in his discussion of the importance of Vygotsky’s work for research in education.

His theoretical perspective also makes demands for a new methodology, for the development of languages of description which will facilitate a multi-level understanding of pedagogic discourse, the varieties of its practice and contexts of its realization and production. (Bernstein, 1993, p. xxiii)

This approach to modelling the structural relations of power and control in institutional settings taken together with a theory of cultural–historical artefacts that invisibly or implicitly mediate the relations of participants in practices forms a powerful alliance. It carries with it the possibility of rethinking notions of agency and reconceptualising subject position in terms of the relations between possibilities afforded within the division of labour and the rules that constrain possibility and direct and deflect the attention of participants.

It accounts for the ways in which the practices of a community, such as school and the family, are structured by their institutional context and that social structures impact on the interactions between the participants and the cultural tools. Thus, it is not just a matter of the structuring of interactions between the participants and other cultural tools; rather it is that the institutional structures themselves are cultural products that serve as mediators in their own right. In this sense, they are the ‘message’, that is, a fundamental factor of education. As Hasan (2001) argues, when we talk, we enter the flow of communication in a stream of both history and the future. There is therefore a need to analyze and codify the meditational structures as they deflect and direct attention of participants and as they are shaped through interactions which they also shape. In this sense, combining the intellectual legacies of Bernstein and Vygotsky permits the development of cultural historical analysis of the invisible or implicit mediational properties of institutional structures which themselves are transformed through the actions of those whose interactions are influenced by them. This move would serve to both expand the gaze of post-Vygotskian theory and at the same time bring sociologies of cultural transmission into a framework in which institutional structures are analyzed as historical products which themselves are subject to dynamic transformation and change as people act within and on them.
References


Bernstein, B. (1964b). Letter to Vygotsky’s Widow Mimeo


