‘Securitizing Democracy and Democratic Security: a Reflection on Democratization Studies’¹

Abstract

The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent attempt to engineer a democratic state highlights the strengths and limitations of democratization studies to explain why, where and how democracy occurs. This paper argues that the way power is played out globally and locally determines the nature of democratic success or failure. Traditionally, democratization studies has focused on internal structures and agents of change. However, Iraq indicates that democratization is more complex than traditional comparative politics approaches have ascribed it. In this paper, there are two key propositions. Firstly, global power-holders do not hold the exclusive ability to bring about democratization, but the drive for democratization is shaped by the display of power and disputes over global authority at least as much, if not more, than national level politics. Secondly, the display of power internally determines two key dimensions of democratization: state capacity and societal security. This paper relies on the example of Iraq to illustrate the shortcomings of the traditional approach to democratization and calls on a reinvigorated inter-disciplinary approach to why democratization succeeds or fails.

Introduction

That the events of 11 September changed profoundly the world we live in is so obvious as to be hardly worth saying. But the politics of the post 9/11 world is full of contradictions. We now live in a world where western states can openly defend the use of torture and routinely employ detention without trial and, at the same time, claim to be protecting and advancing a liberal agenda of

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democracy and individual rights. The securitization of global politics following 9/11, the subsequent debates as to whether we live in a more, or less, liberal world and the real challenges to Atlantic domination within the international system have given new layers of complexity to the ‘globalisation’ of democracy. This paper argues that ‘democratization studies’ still fails to take sufficiently seriously several dimensions of democratization, despite past partial engagements. The contemporary dilemmas of democratization no longer refer to either levels of development or agency and elite leadership, but rather to the ways in which power is played out globally and at home. In this regard, the paper makes two propositions. Firstly, global power-holders do not hold the exclusive ability to bring about democratization, as we may see in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, but the drive for democratization is shaped by the display of power and disputes over global authority at least as much, if not more, than national level politics. This drive for democratization is framed in terms of security. Secondly, the display of power internally determines two key dimensions of democratization: state capacity and human security. Without democratic security at the state and individual level, a democratic transition will fail.

The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent war forces us to recognise that the terrain of democratization has irrevocably altered since the 1980s and 1990s when democratization studies was consolidated as an important sub-field within politics and international relations. Yet the process of intellectual catch-up with these transformations has been woefully slow. For too many scholars, analyses of democratization remain locked in a comparative politics mode of analysis and the international dimensions are reduced to, at best, the status of a minor footnote. A reassessment of democratization studies with Iraq in mind produces several additional explanatory factors, including the securitization of democracy and an intensification of the drama of identity and

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stateness, which leads to a gradual seepage of interest away from some very important prerequisites for democratic development over the long term.

This article is an attempt to open a debate about the way forward. The argument is, in one sense, straightforward: what is required is a creative and constructive engagement between comparative politics, from where early debates emerged, and international studies on the other. A dialogue between these fields can help build a critical approach, be able to identify the drivers of contemporary democratization and explore what it has come to mean and, at the same time, provide a way to explore some of the core issues, long identified within democratization studies, as the obstacles to democratization. These include questions of stateness, state capacity and governance. Linking them to the ‘international’, however, means that this paper will be able to explore them in a more holistic fashion than has usually been the case hitherto. At the same time, making explicit the ways in which international concerns now shape political agendas traditionally regarded as ‘domestic’, will allow us to explore more fully the normative underpinning that lies behind current pro-democracy practices.

The Limits of Democratization Studies
The study of democracy and democratization has undergone considerable change since Seymour Martin Lipset set out the economic and political prerequisites of democracy.\(^3\) Yet, the war in Iraq and the failure of democratization in much of the former Soviet Union reminds us that democratization is a complex process that Guillermo O’Donnell and Thomas Carothers point out does not have an end.\(^4\) Rather, states are more, or less, democratic. The traditional study of democratization largely became a comparative politics study of a one-way process of regime change, from authoritarianism to democracy.

This comparative politics approach to democratization is problematic in both its concentration on agency and domestic political factors. As Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan illustrate, structure is as important a driver of democratization.\(^5\) For example, Linz and Stepan discover that structural elements of the prior regime have an important impact on regime paths and consolidation ‘tasks’.\(^6\) To a great extent, these structural elements have an impact on the nature of agency. In this regard, Linz and Stepan find that the “possibilities and limits of [elite] ‘pacts’” are largely, although not wholly, determined by the structure of the prior regime. Others such as Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, illustrate how economic structures determine the opportunities and paths of democratization.\(^7\) Finally, many authors have illustrated the impact of

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\(^{6}\) Ibid.

ethnic structures on democratic transitions. Whether political, economic or cultural, these structures have an important impact on democratic transition, but at the same time should not be so detached from agency in that both structure and agency are ‘mutually constituted’.

Perhaps the most often cited (and contested) structural causes of democratization have been geographical location. The world saw democratization spreading from Southern Europe to Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the debate was whether or not we could use the same explanatory models for Latin American and Post-Communist states. Perhaps location has made a difference to the path and nature of democratization in different states in different regions of the world. Carsten Q. Schneider and Phillipe C. Schmitter argue that many Central and East European democratizing states have performed far better than their South European and Latin American counterparts. However, eventually democratization studies was used to explain regime change of any type which illustrated some degree of liberalization. Democratization studies eventually moved beyond the ‘third wave’ democracies and began looking at South-East Asia, Sub-


Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and the Middle-East. These applications have proved the more difficult test for democratization studies for three reasons. Firstly, there are few existing or successful democracies in these regions making the notions of ‘transition’ then ‘consolidation’ difficult to apply. Secondly, the nature of the state is still challenged by alternative organizing narratives which bring into question the nature of statehood and justice. Thirdly, we cannot talk about democratization efforts in these regions without taking into account the exogenous factors of power and norms in international politics.

The term ‘transition’ in democratization studies is problematic. On one hand, the term transition indicates a common starting point and a common end point, ordinarily referred to as ‘consolidation’. Across the different regions that experienced the ‘third wave’, there has not been a common starting point. Even within one region such as Central and Eastern Europe, there was no common starting point.\(^{11}\) Furthermore, there has not been a common end to many transitions, as illustrated in much of the post-Soviet area.\(^{12}\) For example, we saw in the Russian Federation a flirtation with democracy only to return to a new type populist authoritarianism.\(^{13}\) Thus, ‘transition’ is not necessarily a transition to democracy but could be a transition to an alternative form of authoritarianism, which may or may not be ‘less bad’. On the other hand, the term ‘transition’ often obscures both normative political goals and geo-political elements of democratization. For example, Milada Anna Vachudová and Tim Snyder argue that ‘transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe ‘smuggled’ the ‘return to Europe’ movement in the academic literature and further obscured the differences between these states, such as existing ethnic heterogeneity and the resulting ethno-


nationalism. Thus, upon entry in to the European Union, some states were more democratic than others.

While the traditional comparative approach maintained a strong emphasis on the state, the democratization literature has also undervalued the capacity of the state in terms of democratic governance. Many authors ignored state capacity as a determinant of democratization presumably expecting that a democratic transition from bureaucratic authoritarianism would lead to a strong, modern state that could acquire the responsibilities of a liberal democratic state. For instance, while Guillermo O’Donnell and Terry Lynn Karl both consider the role of the state in Latin American democratic politics, neither considers the tensions between the extensive security infrastructure and the new democratizing societies much less the capacity for states to provide democratic governance. Linz and Stepan make some attempt to direct the democratization literature in this direction by problematizing the notion of ‘stateness’ in democratization. Similar to Rustow’s notion of national integrity, ‘stateness’ has more to do with territorial integrity and sovereignty than state capacity. Rather, state capacity is the ability for the state to provide for democratic governance with an established assumption that state capacity is directly related to the path of

democracy.\textsuperscript{19} The paper expands on the relationship between state capacity and democratization later in this paper.

As others have said before us, the traditional comparative politics approach simply does not go far enough in explaining democratization. As Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde argue, the democratization literature has neglected two fundamental dimensions of democratization: the relationship between nation and state-building and the international dimension.\textsuperscript{20} More recently, there have been attempts to address these deficiencies from the perspectives of citizenship and globalization studies. As they regard democratization, the two areas of study coincide to stress the role of global civil society as an ‘opportunity structure through which to engage in social struggle in order to transform and extend citizenship’.\textsuperscript{21} Yet, international politics illustrates that there are other international forces at work in democratization. The paper argues that as much as democratization has been shaped by domestic agents and structures, it has also been shaped by international politics. In the following section, the paper highlights the need to incorporate the international dimension into democratization studies.

\textbf{The ‘Global’ Factor}

For many transitologists, the main exogenous factor of democratization was the \textit{zeitgeist} of liberalization. As stated earlier, democratization studies most often focused on endogenous agency as the drivers of democratization, despite the fact that external actors have been important


‘consolidators’ in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. However, there has been an ongoing discussion of international actors and democratization in both the area studies and International Relations literature. For area studies, the focus on external actors and their importance in the democratization process came with the lead-up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU). Following enlargement, much of the focus has been on how the EU is becoming an international, over that of a regional, democracy promoter. International Relations has long been interested in the relationship between democracy and international politics as can be seen in the debate over the democratic peace theory. However, much of this literature has been on how democratization impacts international relations, rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, this debate has influenced decision-makers to the point that the democratic peace theory has become a supporting pillar of Western (and in particular US) foreign policy. In essence, the democratic peace theory has led to a securitization of democratization. More recently, there has been increased attention given to


the impact of specific actors, such as the USA or United Nations, as well as larger processes like globalization on democratization.\textsuperscript{26} The war in Iraq has illustrated the importance of exogenous actors and their impact on the democratization process and democratization studies must change to continue to have some explanatory power.

The traditional approach to democratization does not reflect the current events in the world. The argument laid out here states that democratization studies requires an inter-disciplinary evolution to deal with these corrections in our understanding of democratization. Many of the explanations of failed transitions, statehood and capacity, and the impact of international actors can be found in such areas as political theory, international relations, development, globalization and area studies. As an attempt to force democratization from the outside, Iraq illustrates many of the shortcomings of democratization studies. The democratic transitions in the ‘third wave’ had their own external causes and influences. The causes include the change and eventual end of the Cold War, changes in United States foreign policy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, democratic ‘contagion’, and a general \textit{zeitgeist} for democratization.\textsuperscript{27} Not only was this the case for the Eastern Bloc, but also for Southern Europe and Latin America. The influences on democratic transitions have also had an international quality including Western democratic engineering, regional integration and global civil society. However, none of these countries came to liberalization or democratization (even those that have since failed or never got off the ground) by way of invasion, occupation and large-scale violence. But yet, the democratization literature continues to analyse Iraq in a like-for-like fashion. Unlike the ‘third wave’ democratic transitions, Iraq’s regime change was the result of the securitization of democratization. Thus, today we witness a much more


dramatic example of Valerie Bunce’s worries of how far to the ‘East’ democratization studies can go.  

Democracy and democratization has been an important part of the West’s foreign policy rhetoric since the end of the Second World War. This democracy-promotion rhetoric was primarily tied to the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. ‘Protecting democracy’ is not only the core rhetorical principle of the ‘War against Terror’ but was also the core rhetorical principle of ‘containment’. While democracy and democratization was a core rhetorical principle of US foreign policy during the Cold War, one only need to look as far as Latin America, North and South East Asia, and the Middle East to see that the US supported any alternative to communism, whether democratic or not. However, since the end of the Cold War, the notion that democracy brings with it peace and stability has become more prominent in US foreign policy. The democratic peace principle has been as relevant to the George W. Bush administration as it has been to the Bill Clinton administration. This is not a claim that spreading democracy is the only reason for the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Rather, we claim that ‘democratization’ is at least one of the main reasons and thus demands that the democratization studies literature be able to take the securitization of democratization into account in its overall conceptualisation of the political process.

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Vincent Boudreau argues, as democracy became a core foreign policy goal, ‘questions about the policies that might best help democratic systems also become more urgent.’ The democracy promotion debates moved from how best to topple a tyrant, to how to entrench a consolidated democracy. Thus, while democratization had become an assumed ‘high’ foreign policy goal, democracy promotion became a series of ‘smaller policy puzzles that a range of governmental and non-governmental actors could try to solve’. These ‘policy puzzles’ could range from individual projects to nation-building processes. Regime change in Iraq came on the back of democracy promotion in the former Yugoslavia as well as less concentrated efforts in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Haiti. The current crisis in Iraq is painted well by Boudreau who says that ‘we find ourselves at an ambivalent pass, where the need to trust democracy promotion policies uneasily coexists with the lessons we have learned about how daunting a task it can be to help countries develop a democratic system’. We have seen already how Iraq challenges the democratization studies literature internally, but the war and occupation also challenges the external influences on democratization. Many states are receiving democracy assistance, such as Ukraine and Botswana, but none are undergoing democratization with thousands of foreign troops. Thus, Iraq raises a challenge to policy-makers to employ democracy-assistance techniques within a complex environment riddled with insecurity.

The response to 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have always carried with them a core rhetorical principle of democratization. More importantly, 2001 changed the world

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32 Ibid. (2007: 195)


not just because it opened a new form of international terrorism, but rather because of the US and its allies’ reactions to this terrorism, even to the point of intervention in unwinnable wars, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. What does this mean insofar democratization studies is concerned? Firstly, western assumptions are based on democratic peace theory, which means that if Iraq can be turned into a democracy, it can become a stable, predictable, and friendly part of the international community. Secondly, Iraq reflects a belief that democracy can be, and in some cases must be, engineered from outside. In this sense, the US moves beyond humanitarian interventionism, which arguably shored up support for democracy in the Balkans in the 1990s, to military interventionism designed to shore up democracy. The move from humanitarian intervention to military intervention, of which the UK under Tony Blair was a committed part, represents a qualitative shift from the model of external support for democracy typified by the EU in Eastern Europe. Military intervention is quite different from the west’s view in the cold war that democracy had to be protected by containment. It is also different from the view in the 1980s and 1990s that democracy could be supported. Instead, now what we have is a pro-western view that democracy can be created and manufactured, even when there seems to be little substantive basis for it in any structural sense.

The ‘Societal’ Factor

Iraq illustrates that the assumption democracy can be created by war and international power is proving to be erroneous. The military intervention in Iraq stresses the primacy of the international over the domestic. In this context, the importance of the international dimension means stressing the securitization of democratization, as discussed above. The change in stress forces us to question ‘policies in support of democracy’ as a means of imposing democracy from above. Secondly, where international relations explains the thrust of democratization in the world today, comparative politics can help us explain why it is does not work out as policy makers think it should. The intervention in Iraq means we need, as Kopecký and Mudde stress, to problematize the relationship
between the nation and state. In this section, national integrity and state capacity have a significant impact on the performance of democratic transitions. While there has been considerable discussion of each of these issues in turn in the literature, they have not always been found in the democratization literature. Our focus on Iraq will illustrate the challenges for both democratization studies and democracy in Iraq.

Democratization is as much about remaking the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ as much as it is a restructuring of power relationships. Linz and Stepan argue that the logics of the ‘nation’ and ‘state’ run counter to each other where there exists any sectarian divides, which is to say the overwhelming number of states in the international system. Nation-building is a process of deciding ‘whose nation is this?’. State-building in a democratic transition is concerned with redirecting state institutions to serve equally, fairly and unanimously. In turn, nation-building is about capturing state institutions to support one group more so than another. Some scholars have argued that the relationship between nation-building and state-building has in fact led to intra- and inter-state conflict, casting a shadow on the democratic peace theory. In essence, when one sectarian group attempts to dominate the state, it is both likely to create internal unrest, as the ‘other’ reacts, and regional instability, as neighbours get involved. For Mansfield and Snyder, the Yugoslav area supports their claims of a violation of the democratic peace theory. Despite a successful attack on the democratic peace theory.

peace theory, there remains the problem in differentiating between regime change in general and democratization specifically.\(^{38}\)

In this regard, the familiar complaint is that democracy promotes ‘one person, one vote’, automatically favouring the largest group assuming (and this is often a big assumption) that individuals rally behind the ‘in-group’ rather than a non-ethnic political party. Donald Horowitz reminds us that as ethnic competition and thus salience increases, there will be increasing pressure for ordinarily non-ethnic parties to pick sides.\(^{39}\) Altogether, John Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ which dictates constitutional neutrality does not lead to a prolonged political settlement within societies divided by sectarianism.\(^{40}\) To avoid this kind of state-capture, several scholars have suggested methods of reducing tension between sectarian groups within a democracy. Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism offers groups ‘internal self-determination’, but this requires that groups effectively live in separate communities.\(^{41}\) Even should groups live separate, homogenous communities, there still exist tensions between centralisation and decentralisation.\(^{42}\) Democratic liberalism, as put forward by Albert Weale, emphasises the need for political participation as a means of promoting compromise through negotiation. While democratic liberalism says much about the political, it says little about society.\(^{43}\) More specifically, different groups have different capacities for bargaining. Democratic liberalism requires that all participating groups have similar levels of bargaining power, a circumstance unlikely to happen in the real world especially in times


of transition. However, no form of decision-making procedure will ever be perfect. ‘The creative challenge is to devise methods of governance that both condition existing ways of doing things democratically and open the way to their re-evaluation over time’. The more that the state can provide public goods for all, despite group membership and avoid accumulating private goods for one group over another, the greater the chance that the state will remain unchallenged.

If we rely on Rustow’s demarcation of liberalization and transition as the first two stages of democratization, we can see that many countries have failed or at least been set considerably back because of the lack of national integrity. The largest group of states that fit this bill are those in the post-Soviet area (arguably excluding the three Baltic States). Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Russian Federation (to name only four) have all had their difficulties in maintaining control over their territory and providing support among all relevant groups for the state. Georgia has had to face the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, neither of which is headed towards a solution especially after the precedent to make Kosovo independent. Ukraine first settled a contentious relationship with the Crimean Tatars, but now seems to be locked into a political struggle between the nationalist west and the pro-Russian east. Moldova experienced a short insurrection in 1992 resulting in the breakaway area of Transdneistria. Russia, an important agitator in these areas, has had its own problems in Chechnya (and to a lesser extent Dagestan and Tatarstan) which has seen a nationalist, separatist movement turn into an ‘Islamic jihad’ against the Russian state. All four states experienced an initial liberalization following independence in 1991 and all four have been impeded in varying degrees by their own challenge to the state.

Then what chance for Iraq? The internal and external challenge to Iraqi ‘stateness’ does not bode well for the future of democracy. The identity politics in Iraq are defined by two cleavages, ethnicity and religious sect. Ethnically Iraq is split between the Kurds (predominantly Sunni) and


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Arabs. The Arabs are themselves split between Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. Intra-Iraqi violence has mainly been fought along these cleavages. Of course, this is only one side of the large-scale violence in Iraq. The 2003 United States-led invasion, regime change, and subsequent occupation have exacerbated these tensions. While there has been considerable debate about the number of deaths in Iraq since 2003, there is no debating that hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died and millions have fled abroad mostly to surrounding countries. The multi-dimensional violence in Iraq has called into question the very essence of the state.

Yet, amazingly the academic literature discussing the prospects of democracy in Iraq says little about these challenges to Iraq’s ‘stateness’. Ordinarily, democracy and security in Iraq are discussed in two ways. Many scholars discuss regime change and democracy in Iraq, but fail to discuss the impact of sectarian violence on the ‘democratic’ transition occurring in Iraq. Diamond sheds light on the mistakes of democracy building in Iraq but says little about bringing peace between domestic groups instead focusing on relations between the occupied and the occupier. Perhaps even more frustrating, many scholars who attempt to address both democracy and security together tend to focus on the latter with scant attention to the former. Early in the conflict, Andrew

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47 (The Guardian, 16 October 2006)
Arato highlights the importance of the state in Iraq’s democratic future.\textsuperscript{51} He argues, ‘at present a pseudo-democratic government relying on external force, a theocratic authoritarian regime, or even the fragmentation of the now stateless country seems much more likely than representative government and the rule of law for a unified Iraq’.\textsuperscript{52} The Iraqi state is central to Iraqi democratization and democracy.

The economic circumstances of Iraq were poor leading to the 2003 invasion, following nearly 13 years of economic sanctions despite the ‘oil-for-food’ programme begun in 1997. The purpose of the sanctions, initiated when Iraq invaded Kuwait, was to force disarmament and regime change.\textsuperscript{53} Significant disarmaments had occurred during the 1990’s but the Hussein regime continued to glean from the top of Iraqi society. Unlike, for example, the ‘Eastern bloc’ or Latin American democratic transitions, Iraq’s transition was not the result of economic crisis but instead invasion. Thus, the focus on the political economy of Iraq’s transition and its impact on democracy lie within the post-invasion era. The political economy of Iraq’s democratic transition is dominated by oil. The two groups that are in the best location to benefit from the petroleum industry are the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, while Iraq’s largest group, the Shiia, are largely left out. Thus, the geographical location of oil fields enhances the conflict between groups. The Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraqi Interim Government and the current Iraqi Transitional Government have all placed access to the profits of oil at the top of the post-Hussein political agenda.

While the abundance of oil is a fantastic ‘cash-cow’ for a rehabilitating state like Iraq, its very existence adds to the tensions between ethnic and religious sects as well as the Iraqi state and

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\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
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regional autonomy. Far more stable states have suffered the ‘resource curse’ encouraging political corruption and thus impeding democratization. Suni Arabs are keen to maintain their control over the petroleum industry. At the same time, the Shiia Arabs must receive a mutually justified percentage of the profits. Without which, there is unlikely to be an end to violence until there is an end to Iraq. Again, the state and its ‘stateness’ is at the centre of any analysis of democratization in Iraq. National integrity and state capacity are key to understanding the political transformation in Iraq and shed light on their contribution to the democratization studies literature.

The conflict and occupation in Iraq will have a significant effect on how external engineering looks in the future. Iraq illustrates that democratization studies needs a more sophisticated understanding of societal (and human) security and the role it plays in democratization. Institutions and the rule of law are inherent parts of the Weberian state. Well performing institutions are ordinarily, although not always, a characteristic of democratic states. Yet, despite the progress seen in the regions of the ‘third-wave’, the lack of security has impaired many states that have made great strides politically and economically. At the same time, the lack of a respect for societal and human security offers a further explanation as to why some states have reverted to autocratic ways or those states who simply never carried forward with democratic reforms in the first place. This underdeveloped, or at least underappreciated, notion of security in democratization studies reflects itself on to democracy promotion. The policies and projects of democracy promotion must also encourage the development of human security as another ‘pillar’ of democracy.


Before Iraq, the US was the only superpower willing to venture across the globe to intervene militarily and politically. Furthermore, the US was the only superpower that could validly claim to be ‘spreading democracy’ despite the challenges and at times failed logic that followed this policy. Democracy promotion in the future will again return to the impact of globalization as a politico-economic process that has the potential to empower individuals. For democratization studies, this means again turning away from the view that democratization is an elite project.\textsuperscript{56} At the same time, Iraq suggests that it is hard to accept the notion that building democracy is a good faith liberal project of citizenship, current in many debates about external promotion of democratization. So what does this mean? Is democracy promotion simply realist politics by any other name? Yes and no. Iraq illustrates the use of democracy promotion as a ‘frame’ or ‘hook’ on which to hang geopolitics. Democracy promotion not only validates the intervention at home but also to foreign leaders (at least) abroad. Yet, the fall out of Iraq means that democracy promotion will again go through a crisis as it did in the Clinton administration.\textsuperscript{57}

However, the securitization of democracy and its link to the ‘War on Terror’, which remains an active policy despite Iraq, means that the US government can only withdraw so much without giving up the game completely. Second, US foreign policy will continue to be predicated on a messianic principle of civilising. It is telling that many democratic and republican candidates for the 2008 US presidential elections have criticised the war in Iraq and excesses of the ‘War on Terror’ like Guantanamo Bay, but few have touched on the ongoing war in Afghanistan. The future of democracy promotion will again return to promoting elite transition, party development and civil society (perhaps a Nordic brand of democracy promotion). Yet, this brings us to how far engineering can go? Democratization studies, and by its extension democracy promotion, must also reconsider the role of the state in democratization. With the role of the state on one hand and


democracy promotion on the other, this argument recognises an increasing intertwining between state and engineering.

**Conclusion**

How to address these issues in democratization studies? Clearly there is a need for democratization studies to address these issues since these are the very issues facing democratising countries and policy makers thinking about democracy building. Yet, how to do we do it? This paper invites a more inter-disciplinary approach that is at the same time less theoretically narrow. Democratization studies can gain greatly from the insights of comparative politics for its concentration on agency, international political economy for its focus on globalization and citizenship, as well as International Relations for its concentration on power, interests and norms in international politics. There is a need now more than ever for scholars from different parts of the political studies community to speak to each other. In so doing, democratization studies also needs to reorganise itself as a creative, genuinely inter-disciplinary endeavour able to analyse cogently and critically contemporary politics at the global and domestic level. Overall, there is a hope in this way to offer a mode of analysis of democratization that avoids endorsing what may be seen as morally indefensible and tantamount to the imposition of Western values and interests through terror and torture.