Norwegian Euroscepticism:
Values, Identity or Egotism?
A Multi-level Mixed Methods Investigation

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for the degree of PhD
of the University of Bath
2011

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Thesis Abstract

Norway is the only country which has turned down EU membership in two popular referenda. It occupies a unique place in the study of Euroscepticism due to its population’s stable and persistent misgivings about European integration. The thesis seeks to find out what Norwegian Euroscepticism really is and how it can be explained. Adopting a theoretical framework drawn from the Norwegian and comparative literature on EU support and a sequential exploratory mixed methods research design, the thesis first examines how the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse has played out in a major national newspaper and the party political arena in the last fifty years, through the three periods of heightened Euroscepticism (1961-62; 1970-72; 1989-1994) and one period of latent Euroscepticism (1995-2010). Subsequently, the results of the qualitative analysis are tested on the 1994 Referendum Study to ascertain whether the issues mobilized in the public debate do indeed resonate on the popular level. The thesis finds that there are essentially two broad types of Norwegian Euroscepticism, mainstream (centre/left) and right-wing Euroscepticism. It argues that concerns about postmaterialist Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR) are at the heart of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, that values (the desire to make Norway and the world a better place), political culture (self-determination) and rural attachment are much more potent explanations for the phenomenon than economic interest (wanting to make Norway a richer place) or national identity concerns. Right-wing Euroscepticism, however, has an altogether different structure. Although it shares the political culture element with its mainstream counterpart, it does not exhibit postmaterialist or rural society sentiments. Conversely, it is driven by economic utilitarianism and the view that the EU is not sufficiently neo-liberalist. The findings also suggest that perceived cultural threat might be relevant to right-wing Euroscepticism, but this is an issue which must be investigated further by future research.
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my first supervisor, Professor Richard Whitman, for having provided helpful advice, support and encouragement, whenever it was needed from the very beginning of my PhD to the end. I am also grateful to my second supervisor, Dr. Sue Milner, for always offering specific feedback and her honest opinion on my work. I could not have wished for a better team of supervisors.

The University of Bath has provided funding for the last two years of my studies, and the Department of European Studies and Modern Languages has provided the support I have needed to attend conferences during my PhD. I also wish to thank the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES) and the European Commission for the financial support they provided for a research trip to Norway in January 2010.

Furthermore, I am indebted to the ten politicians and EU membership opponents who so kindly agreed to be interviewed and quoted in the thesis. I would also like to thank the staff at Nei til EU, who were incredibly welcoming and helpful, allowing me access to their archives and photocopier and giving me books to take home.

During my time at Bath, I have been so fortunate as to have been surrounded by friendly and supportive fellow PhD students. All of my colleagues have in different ways contributed to make my life as a PhD student less stressful and more enjoyable; I am particularly happy that Jo, Jo, Christos, Bilge, Wenwen, Brett and, most of all, Claire were there to share the PhD experience with me.

To Dome and Traci, who both in different ways helped me with my quantitative chapter, I am very grateful.

I am extremely grateful to my family for all the help and encouragement they have offered over the last three years. A very special thanks goes to my mum and dad for all the care, home cooked food, lifts and photocopying assistance they have given me during my trips to Norway, and for always being there. I am also indebted to my brothers Øyvind and Knut Einar, who helped me find accommodation in Oslo on several occasions during my fieldwork trips, and to Rich and Jan for their excellent Sunday roast dinners.

Finally, and most importantly, I owe my deepest gratitude to my husband, Jon. The thesis would not have been possible without his continued and unwavering support.
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NSD Disclaimer

Some of the data used in this publication are taken from Statistics Norway’s referendum surveys 1972/1994. Anonymized data have been placed at the author’s disposal through the Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelige Datatjeneste (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, NSD). Collection and preparation of the data were originally carried out by Statistics Norway. Neither Statistics Norway nor NSD are responsible for the analysis of the data or the interpretations carried out here.
## Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGFI</td>
<td>Agriculture and fisheries</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIK</td>
<td>Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomité mot norsk medlemskap i EF (the Labour Party’s Information Committee against Norwegian membership of the EC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ap</td>
<td>Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUF</td>
<td>Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (Norwegian Labour Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFP</td>
<td>Common Fisheries Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Centre Party (Senterpartiet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUL</td>
<td>Political Culture, Utilitarianism and Market Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRD</td>
<td>Data retention directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Eurobarometer</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>ECO</td>
<td>European Consultative Organ</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>European Currency Unit</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPERN</td>
<td>European Parties Elections and Referendums Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>EFTA Surveillance Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy (renamed CSDP in 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>EU with 15 member states (between 1 January 1995 and 1 May 2004 enlargements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX</td>
<td>Exceptionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVH</td>
<td>Framtiden i Våre Hender (the Future in Our Hands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FoEN</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth Norway (Norges Naturvernforbund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAL</td>
<td>Green, Alternative and Liberalitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GH</td>
<td>Geo-historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hypothesis (e.g. H1 = Hypothesis one, H2 = Hypothesis two)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KrFU</td>
<td>Kristelig Folkepartis Ungdom (Norwegian Young Christian Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEs</td>
<td>Labour Party Eurosceptics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Landsorganisasjonen (The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
LP  Liberal Party (*Venstre*)
LPP  Liberal People’s Party (*Det Liberale Folkeparti*)
ML  Maximum Likelihood
MM  Mixed methods
MPs  Members of Parliament
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHO  *Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon* (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise)
NI  National identity
NKP  *Norges Kommunistiske Parti* (Communist Party of Norway)
NPP  New People’s Party (*Det Nye Folkeparti*)
NRK  *Norsk Riksråd* (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation)
NSD  *Norsk samfunns-vitenskapelige datatjeneste* (Norwegian Social Science Data Services)
NtEU  *Nei til EU* (No to the EU)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC  Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OERN  Opposing Europe Research Network
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares
PoM  Postmaterialism
PM  Prime Minister
PP  Progress Party (*Fremriktpartiet*)
RS  Rural society
SALT  *Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ* (Social Democratic Alternative)
SEA  Single European Act
SLP  Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*)
SME  *Sosialdemokrater mot EU* (Social Democrats Against the EU)
SPP  Socialist People’s Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*)
SSB  *Statistisk Sentralbyrå* (Statistics Norway)
SVP  Swiss People’s Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*)
TAN  Traditional, Authoritative and Nationalist
UK  United Kingdom
UmEU  *Ungdom mot EU* (Youth against Norwegian Membership of the EU)
UN  United Nations
US  United States
USA  United States of America
UT  Utilitarianism
VAT  Value added tax
VCRUNI  Political Values, Political Culture, Rural Society, Utilitarianism, National Identity
WTO  World Trade Organization
WWII  World War Two
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Thesis

The poem *Nordmannen* (“The Norwegian”), written by Ivar Aasen in 1863, depicts the Norwegian building his home between hills and rocks out by the sea, enduring hardship and the harshness of the climate for the rewards of ownership and the beauty of the hills in the spring. *Nordmannen* represents part of the Norwegian cultural heritage, and narratives like Aasen’s have arguably helped shape aspects of the national identity because they illustrate the dynamics between the harsh landscape and central national values and characteristics such as independence, modesty and equality (Esborg 2002). The case against membership of the European Union (EU) in Norway has commonly been rooted in the argument that the Norwegian way of life and national social democratic values are incompatible with those of continental Europe. Indeed, the strong opposition in the Norwegian peripheries in both the 1972 and the 1994 referenda might suggest that opposition to EU membership can be explained by a desire to defend the Norwegian way of life against forces of centralization and Europeanization.

European integration notwithstanding, peripheral Norway has not been immune to the forces of globalization. As Eriksen (1993a: 16) aptly puts it:

“The Norwegian periphery, Utkantnorge,¹ is scarcely that picturesque, slightly anachronistic kind of place which tourist brochures try to depict it as – where time has stood still for a century, where the fisherman still patiently mends his nets on the wooden pier and the farmer’s working-day follows the sun, where rustic and simple folk still worship nature and their Protestant god as if NATO and the European Community had yet to be invented.”

¹ Translations of Norwegian terms and names used throughout the thesis can be found in Appendix K.
However, while it is certainly true that life in peripheral Norway has departed from Aasen’s narrative and that Norwegians’ lives are much more urbanized today, the values of the rural, simple way of life remain important to the Norwegian nation. As Ramsøy (1987: 100-1) argues, despite the fact that many people have moved away from rural and peripheral areas and that “urban ways of life have been diffused to the countryside”, “few admit that any benefits are gained by being an urban dweller”. Aasen’s narrative is still relevant because of Norwegian culture, which is “a culture with a deep-seated anti-urban ideology” (Ramsøy 1987: 101).

The recent comparative literature on EU support theorizes that issues of identity and cultural threat are important to the development of Euroscepticism. However, in the academic literature on Norway, perceived cultural threat and national identity concerns are rarely used to account for the Norwegians’ reluctance to join the EU. Rather, the country’s history of foreign rule and its oil wealth are frequently cited as explanations of Norway’s unwillingness to participate fully in European integration. Nevertheless, the latter proposition is open to criticism. Norwegian Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which precedes the discovery of the North Sea oil. Oil did not have an impact on the Norwegian economy until the mid-1970s (Galenson 1986), and, as Galenson (1986: 1) points out, Norway was already wealthy when the oil find occurred: “In 1970, Norway ranked seventh in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) among the OECD nations. It was already considerably ahead of the United Kingdom, and close to the United States and Germany.” Besides, if disregarding the interests of marginal economic sectors (the domestic industries) the “yes” side has had far stronger ownership of the economic argument than the “no” side in the debates on membership. Thus, it appears that the causality of Norwegian Euroscepticism is substantially more complex than the oil and pure economic considerations.

In the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, there has been much debate about what Euroscepticism really is. Does opposition to some aspect of the EU suffice to qualify as Euroscepticism, or is Euroscepticism only present when European
integration is outright rejected? Typologies such as the hard/soft dichotomy (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001) have been put forward to differentiate between different types of Euroscepticism, but it remains unclear how Norwegian Euroscepticism fits into these typologies, and indeed whether there is such a thing as a “Norwegian Euroscepticism”. The thesis attempts to enhance current understanding of what Norwegian Euroscepticism really is, and using the comparative and Norwegian literature on EU support, it also seeks to explain the phenomenon, examining the whole period of its existence, from 1961 to the present day.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. First, the concept of Euroscepticism and the main developments in the literature on the phenomenon are introduced. Second, the chapter makes a case for studying Norwegian popular and party-based opposition to European integration. In the third section of the chapter, the research questions and the aims and objectives of the thesis are set out. Fourth, the chapter discusses the methodological issues involved in the research, and in the final section, an overview of the thesis is given.

1.1 Euroscepticism: an Introduction

The term “Euroscepticism” is thought to have first appeared in the British popular press, more specifically The Times newspaper, in the mid-1980s (Harmsen and Spiering 2004b). The label did not become widespread in use until after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, when the EU was created and European cooperation in new areas, such as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and foreign and security policy, were introduced. Since then, “Euroscepticism” has been increasingly used as a broad term in both the press and political debate to denote negative attitudes towards European integration and/or the EU.  

2 Taggart (1998) provides a definition which is in keeping with both popular and academic usages of the term. He defines Euroscepticism as

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2 The thesis will use the terms European Economic Community (EEC), European Community (EC) and European Union (EU) interchangeably to denote the processes and institutions of European integration. When specifically referring to the time before the 1992 Treaty of the European Union, EEC or EC will be used.
“the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (1998: 366).

As mentioned above, one of the main strands of the increasing literature on Euroscepticism concerns the problem of definition. Some authors (Flood 2002a, b; Flood et al. 2007) criticize the inclusion of “Euro” in the nomenclature, arguing that it would be more correct to use the prefix “EU” to avoid confusion about what the scepticism is directed towards. Others are concerned about the broadness of the definition, arguing that by including qualified opposition in the definition, it wrongly ascribes Euroscepticism to broadly pro-European positions. This is linked with another definition issue commonly debated in the literature, namely whether or how Euroscepticism is best divided into different stances to denote varying degrees of opposition to the EU. To date, the “hard” and “soft” typology developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) is perhaps most used and acknowledged in the literature, despite having attracted criticism for being too broad and over-inclusive. The definition distinguishes between rejection or opposition to European integration in principle (“hard”) and qualified opposition to the EU, such as objection to a single EU policy (“soft”).

In the scholarship on EU support, there was a watershed in the early 1990s, when what had been known as the “permissive consensus” came to an end with the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France. Post-Maastricht, public opposition to European integration is thought to have escalated, due to European integration expanding into new policy areas outside the economic sphere and the public realizing that developments at the European level have a real impact on their lives. Along with the end of the permissive consensus, criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit became more widespread, as it was clear that the elites no longer had the support of the citizens of Europe to push integration forward. Linked to this, after 1992 it became more common for governments to use referenda

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3 This term was first coined by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and has been widely used in the scholarly literature to denote the largely uninterested EC public’s general sense of approval of European integration in the first thirty-five years of the Community’s existence.
as a means of ratifying significant European-level policy-decisions and this has increasingly enabled the public to put brakes on the level and pace of integration. As a corollary, in the second half of the 1990s, public opinion on the EU, previously considered largely irrelevant to the processes of European integration, suddenly became a popular subject of academic interest. Eurobarometer-based studies aiming to explain fluctuations in public support for the EU is now an integral part of EU studies. They put forward various theories explaining popular support for the EU, for example that EU support is related to cognitive skills, postmaterialist values, longevity of one’s country’s membership, political effects, economic interest and issues of identity.4

As neither the public nor political parties exist in a vacuum, the developments in the EU in the early 1990s also had an impact on parties and their programmes. European political parties increasingly incorporated elements of Euroscepticism into their political platforms in response to the concerns of their constituencies, and as a corollary, questions of what drives Euroscepticism on both levels have frequently been posed in what has become a growing literature on the topic. Scholarly interest in what has become known as “party-based Euroscepticism” also expanded considerably in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Much of this research activity had its origin in the Opposing Europe Research Network (OERN) organized by Aleks Szczepanik and Paul Taggart from the Sussex European Institute. The network, which in 2003 changed its name to the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), consisted of scholars conducting research into the comparative party politics of Euroscepticism and predominantly focused on issues of definition, measurement and causality. The network published a series of research papers which in 2008 culminated in two book volumes on party-based Euroscepticism (see e.g. Szczepanik and Taggart (eds.) 2008b, c). However, there is still no consensus on the matter of causality or measurement. Observers determine variables such as ideology, strategy, party system centrality and institutional variations of differing importance as to why parties adopt Eurosceptic stances and/or rhetoric, and there is

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4 All of these theories are discussed in more detail in section 2.4 of Chapter Two.
considerable disagreement whether or to what extent it is possible to determine levels of Euroscepticism within a party system. This is because the research on party-based Euroscepticism tends to rely on expert survey data and other quantitative indicators to map European parties’ positions on European integration and their relative strength.

In spite of the expanding literature on Euroscepticism in the EU, Norwegian Euroscepticism, at least beyond the study of Euroscepticism as party strategy (e.g. Sitter 2005a, 2008), remains an under-researched area of study. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that Norway is not included in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys on which scholars of comparative Euroscepticism most commonly base their research on; in EU studies, non-member states like Switzerland and Norway are commonly excluded by default. Some might even argue that EU membership is a precondition for Euroscepticism. According to Taggart’s (1998) definition, quoted above, this is clearly not the case, but it is important to acknowledge that there are structural differences between member states’ Euroscepticism and non-member states’ Euroscepticism. This especially applies to differences in how the pro-/anti-membership question is treated in member and non-member states.

Norway’s exclusion from the EB-based research notwithstanding, the Norwegian public’s rejection of EU membership has by no means been overlooked as an area of study. Quite the contrary, in parallel to the body of literature on EU support in member states, there is a considerable body of literature attempting to explain why Norway voted “no” to the EC/EU in 1972 and 1994. Many of the theories explaining opposition to the EU found in this body of literature are different from those mentioned above: these are history, geography, socio-economic and territorial-cultural cleavages, Nordic exceptionalism, attachment to the countryside and primary sectors’ interests, to mention but a few. However, these explanations are rarely considered alongside each other or alongside the explanations put forward in the comparative literature. The next section explains why it is important to enhance current understanding of Euroscepticism, and of Norwegian Euroscepticism.
1.2 Why study Euroscepticism? And why study Norwegian Euroscepticism?

Euroscepticism is a worthwhile research topic for many reasons. First, there is no doubt that Eurosceptic attitudes among both European publics and parties pose a threat to the future of European integration, or in the case of non-member states, countries’ ability to participate in the process. In member states, the threat by a negative public opinion is illustrated by the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 and the Irish people’s “no” to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. In non-member states, the Norwegian “no” to membership in 1972 and 1994, and the Swiss “no” to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in 1992 give an idea of the public’s power to halt their countries’ participation in European integration.

Political parties, on the other hand, can play a central role in relation to public attitude formation, as well as the shaping of European integration. Not only are they cue givers and agenda-setters (Zaller 1992), they are also “gatekeepers” between their political system and the EU when in government (Hoffmann 1966). Although the agenda-setting role of Norwegian political parties was remarkably incapacitated on the issue of EU membership in the post-referendum periods because of the devastating effect the EU battle had on the Norwegian party system and traditional cooperation constellations, in a future battle over membership, the parties are likely to resume their roles as opinion shapers and agenda-setters. Besides, the parties’ continued polarization of opinion on the EU issue contributes to the legitimization of a variety of viewpoints in the electorate, as they signalise that there is no widely accepted “truth” about the desirability of increased European integration for Norway. Moreover, the parties and their elites are very central to the shaping of

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5 In 2001, the non-socialist Christian Democrats-Liberals-Conservatives coalition took office with a cooperation agreement including a so-called “suicide clause” on the EU issue, whereby the centrist parties announced their intent to withdraw from the coalition if the EU issue was brought up during the election term. The 2005-2009 socialist Labour-Socialist Left-Centre Party coalition has copied this clause.
Norway’s future relationship with the EU. For example, the power to introduce or block a new application lies with the political elites.

The EU’s democratic deficit is a further reason why it is important to understand the currents of Euroscepticism in the population. The EU cannot be a credible champion of democratic values at home or in international relations if it does not have the support of its own electorate. Understanding Euroscepticism is essential to be able to overcome the difficulties the EU has in convincing its citizens and the citizens of prospective member states that European integration is a good thing.

While the above reasons make up the rationale behind researching popular and party-based Euroscepticism in general, it is important to note what the value of a case study of Norway is. Firstly, by filling some of the gaps on Norway in the comparative literature, a case study of Norwegian Euroscepticism contributes to the body of knowledge in the comparative study of Euroscepticism. Secondly, as any future Norwegian application for EU membership will have to be followed by a referendum, new insights into what Norwegian Euroscepticism is, and what drives it, are undoubtedly valuable and of interest to anyone who wants to see a future EU vote in Norway result in a “yes”, or a “no”.

1.3 The Research Questions and the Aims and Objectives

Many scholars have attempted to explain why Norway is not a member of the EU, but, as Neumann (2002: 88) registers, “the literature on the topic is less than convincing”. The main objective of the thesis is to bridge this gap in the literature, to go some way to classify and explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, defined as qualified and unqualified opposition to the European Community (EC) or EU. Specifically, the thesis’ focus is on the nature and motivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Consequently, the research sets out to answer the following two research questions:

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6 Norway is not constitutionally bound to hold a referendum on the issue, but since a referendum was promised in connection to the first Norwegian EC membership application, the political establishment have been politically committed to the promise of a public vote (Bjørlund 1994).
1) What is Norwegian Euroscepticism?
2) How can Norwegian Euroscepticism be explained?

A number of sub-questions accompany these two questions, as touched upon above. For example, what is specific about Norwegian Euroscepticism? Is it appropriate to speak of a Norwegian Euroscepticism, or are there essentially many different types of Euroscepticism in Norway? When did it come about and how has it developed? Was the Euroscepticism which was rife in the early 1970s a different phenomenon from the Euroscepticism which exists in the Norwegian people and parties today? What motivated Euroscepticism in Norway then, and what motivates it today?

As mentioned above, the research has two primary objectives. First, it aims to address the gap in the comparative and Norwegian literature on Euroscepticism in Norway. It is the thesis’ ambition to conduct a comprehensive investigation into Norwegian Euroscepticism, and thus, it does not, like previous research, restrict itself to only one level of analysis, one specific period or one specific type of data or methodological tool. By moving beyond the post-positivist research tradition of the majority of the existing literature and instead drawing on a wide variety of sources, it examines how Euroscepticism has developed across time, from 1961 to 2010, in the Norwegian public debate, in the political parties and the population. The wide time frame and the use of new data and alternative methods is where the thesis’ first principal claim to originality lies.

The second objective of the thesis is to bring together the existing knowledge and theories from the comparative literature on Euroscepticism and the literature on Norway and assess to what extent they can assist in explaining Norwegian opposition to the EU. This is the second element of originality that the research offers, as no other study has fused the Euroscepticism literature and the Norwegian literature in this manner to inform research on the topic. The following section
outlines and considers the methodological choices and issues involved in the research.

1.4 Methodology: Mixed Methods

As already stated, as most of the existing literature on Euroscepticism and Norway is rooted in statistical methods and therefore does not offer much qualitative insight into the phenomenon, one of the main objectives of the research was to close some of this gap. Quantitative methods are indeed useful and can help to reveal part of the picture, but they are by no means capable of capturing the full picture. Therefore, the research employed a qualitative methodology to achieve a fuller understanding of Norwegian Euroscepticism. However, because the thesis extends to the public level and issues of representativeness made it necessary to use quantitative methods to make any inferences about public Euroscepticism, a mixed methods (MM) strategy was adopted. The MM sequential exploratory research method is designed to test the findings of qualitative research on quantitative data in order to establish the trustworthiness of the qualitative findings and maximize the impact of the study’s conclusions (Creswell 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of the research design used in the study.

**Figure 1.1** MM sequential exploratory research design

![MM sequential exploratory research design](image)

The EU is an issue which has been in the majority of the Norwegian parties and politicians’ interest to remove completely from the agenda when there have been no

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7 Note that stage three, the quantitative data collection, in the case of this study is only the sourcing and adaptation of an already existing national survey.
active membership applications, and therefore, there is very little data available on Norwegian Euroscepticism. This practically necessitated the utilization of a variety of data and methods if the thesis was to fulfil its requirements as an independent and worthwhile piece of research. Using MM allowed for the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to acquire the depth and breadth that was required to address the research questions. Besides, the cross-verification obtained from using different methodological techniques and sources is an added strength of the research; the triangulation of methods warrants more confidence in the results of the study. Furthermore, as the bodies of literature on Euroscepticism and Norway were used to inform the study, the study used a combination of inductive and deductive strategies. This made the research both exploratory and confirmatory, and the MM strategy is particularly suitable for carrying out this kind of research (Creswell 2009; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009).

1.4.1 The Choice of Time Period: 1961-2010

As the research questions asked about the nature and causality of Norwegian opposition to the EC and EU and the main objective of the thesis was to give a comprehensive appraisal of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it was necessary to go back in time and start at the beginning of Norwegian Euroscepticism. 1961 was chosen as the starting point for the research because it marked the start of Norway’s involvement with integration in Europe. From 1960, Norway was member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the literature reveals that the appearance of the EC membership issue in 1961 caused considerable public debate and political tension (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Ørvik 1972b; Bjørklund 1994). Although there are some reports of late 1940s and 1950s elite scepticism towards European integration (e.g. Pharo 1986), the thesis does not go further back in time than to the 1960s because pre-1960s Euroscepticism did not extend to the public. As Chapter Eight will show, when the issue of EC membership appeared on the political agenda in 1961, the majority of the public was still poorly informed about European integration and was not able state a preference on EC membership. On the

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8 This is primarily due to the harmful effect the issue has on intra- and inter-party cohesion (and in the pro-European parties, electoral fortunes)
opposite end of the time scale, 2010 was chosen in order to bring the analysis up to the present day. This also enabled the thesis to examine the phenomenon through five whole decades, and as the thesis also looks at Euroscepticism in the Norwegian political elite, it was also appropriate to bring the analysis past the 2009 parliamentary (Storting) election.

For the purposes of the research, the fifty-year period was divided into four sub-periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism: First was the 1960s, when the issue of membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) appeared on the Norwegian political agenda and the British applications of 1961 and 1967 prompted Norway to follow suit. Second was the period from 1970-1972, a period which was characterized by heightened debate, membership negotiations with the EC and the 1972 referendum. The third phase started in 1989, when European integration once again appeared on the agenda, as the plans for the EEA agreement started to unfold and the Iron Curtain fell. This period culminated in the 1994 referendum. The final period, 1995-2010, was a period which was characterized by Norway’s continued participation in European integration through the EEA and the Norwegian political elite’s inability to reintroduce the issue of full membership to the general public. The period between phase two and three (1973-1988) is not considered a separate period of Euroscepticism, because, as Chapter Six will reveal, during this period, the EC issue was completely removed from the political agenda.

1.4.2 The Qualitative Part of the Research: the Public and Party Debate

In MM research, the research questions drive the methods used (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009), but it is worth keeping in mind that the thesis also had to take in to consideration significant restrictions on data availability. For the qualitative part of the research, the target data were documents which were likely to contain expressions of Euroscepticism. This meant that the options were more or less restricted to party documents, speeches and newspapers. Accordingly, it was decided that a documentary analysis would be carried out. For the public debate level of the study, readers’ letters were chosen as the primary documentary data on
which to base the analysis. It was decided to use readers’ letters as opposed to other newspaper features because of their larger likelihood of exhibiting Eurosceptic sentiments, as the readers are freer to express their disagreement with a newspaper’s pro-European stance than its journalists and editors.\textsuperscript{9} Moreover, it was thought that readers’ letters have the potential to contain truer expressions of popular Euroscepticism, as contributions to letter pages are not necessarily written by members of elites. After conducting a pilot study in Nasjonalbiblioteket’s (the National Library) micro film archive in Oslo, sampling readers’ letters in six Norwegian newspapers from the four phases,\textsuperscript{10} the plan was to analyse three newspapers in the study. Firstly, the national newspaper Aftenposten was chosen because of its status as the largest broadsheet in Norway. The tabloids VG and Dagbladet were not chosen because of their restrictions on the length of the letters and their policy of editing contributions, and the increased bias resulting from this. Secondly, Adresseavisen, Norway’s oldest daily newspaper still in print and local to the Trøndelag and Møre og Romsdal area,\textsuperscript{11} was chosen in order to control for regional differences.\textsuperscript{12} And third, Nationen, a daily newspaper which calls itself “District Norway’s National Newspaper” was chosen because of its Eurosceptic stance. In 2008, the newspapers’ daily readership numbers (as a percentage of the population) were 18.3 for Aftenposten, 5.6 for Adresseavisen and 1.7 for Nationen (Medienorge and TNS Gallup 2009).\textsuperscript{13}

There are no digital archives which contain Norwegian newspapers from before the 1980s, and therefore, the micro film archive in Nasjonalbiblioteket in Oslo had to be used for the newspaper search. This meant that the newspapers had to be searched manually, and it soon became apparent that covering three newspapers was beyond

\textsuperscript{9} All the biggest national newspapers and the vast majority of all Norwegian newspapers have a pro-EU outlook.

\textsuperscript{10} Details about the pilot study can be found in Appendix C.

\textsuperscript{11} See Appendix A for a map of the Norwegian counties.

\textsuperscript{12} The reason why Adresseavisen was chosen instead of for example Nordlys, the local newspaper for the northern region Troms, was that Nordlys’ readers’ letters column was more sporadic than Adresseavisen’s.

\textsuperscript{13} The newspaper readership number for Aftenposten has remained relatively stable across time: between 1986 and 2010 it declined by only 4.3 percent. Adresseavisen and Nationen defined by 15.7 and 31.9 percent respectively in the same period (Medienorge \textit{et al}. 2011).
the realms of the project: it would have been far too time-consuming both in terms of data collection and data analysis. As a corollary, Adresseavisen and Nationen were dropped from the study. Aftenposten was retained because of its larger readership, because the content of the newspaper’s debate pages was likely to have influenced more people than the other newspapers, and because it was likely to be representative of the debate that went on in the mainstream national press in the different periods. Three years from each Euroscepticism period were selected for the data collection in order to make the workload manageable, in addition to three years from the 1980s (to affirm its lack of debate activity and justify its exclusion from the study). Due to the research being deductive in nature and aimed at theory testing,\(^{14}\) initially, the sampling strategy chosen for the newspaper data collection was probability sampling. The idea was to collect Aftenposten readers’ letters from the first three years of each decade (i.e. 1960-62; 1970-72 etc.), because debating activity in this three-year period in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s was expected to be high.\(^{15}\) However, limited availability of “no” letters in certain periods\(^ {16}\) as well as changes in newspaper practices across time made collecting a more or less random sample a meaningless goal. Besides, it can be argued that in this situation, there is no such thing as a random sample because of the editorial selection bias which is already inherent in the publication of letters to the editor. Purposive sampling, that is, targeting the years in each decade when the literature reported the most debating activity, was therefore used, in line with the traditions of qualitative inquiry. Thus, every Aftenposten newspaper,\(^ {17}\) both the morning and evening edition,\(^ {18}\) from the years 1960, 1961, 1962, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980, 1981, 1986, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2002 and 2004 were searched manually on micro film. Additionally, the debate pages from all the Aftenposten newspapers (morning edition only) from 2009 were accessed

\(^{14}\) Testing six theories from the literature.

\(^{15}\) Due to the active applications.

\(^{16}\) The 1960s newspapers were searched in this way. Much time was wasted searching 1960 and 1961 newspapers in which extremely little EEC-related material in 1960 and no readers’ letters on the topic were found.

\(^{17}\) Every newspaper on micro film in the Oslo National Library. Approximately a handful of newspapers were missing from the micro film collection from each decade.

\(^{18}\) The morning edition is the nation-wide edition, while the evening edition is a newspaper only for the Oslo area. Because both editions were on the same micro film, it was unproblematic to include both in the study.
on the library’s online avis2 database to bring the study closer to the present day. If calculating with 290 newspaper days per year and two newspaper editions per day, the total number of newspapers searched manually was over 9,000. To maximize the size of the data sample, the target data was expanded to include not only readers’ letters, but any commentary/news item containing Eurosceptic argumentation. Nevertheless, letters to the editor were the main newspaper feature included in the analysis. At Nasjonalbiblioteket, all EEC/EC/EU-related letters and newspaper items were looked over or read and subsequently either electronically scanned and saved if deemed potentially suitable for the analysis or discarded if deemed irrelevant. All of the saved letters/items were later read more closely and considered for inclusion in the documentary analysis. For example, 180 items were saved from the 1960-62 search, but only 25 items qualified for the final data sample. For the other periods, the numbers were 1,073 and 187 (1970-2), 1,261 and 341 (1992-94), and 275 and 51 (2000, 2002 and 2004).

For the research on party-based Euroscepticism, all the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SLP), Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet), Centre Party (Senterpartiet, CP), Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, CDP), Liberal Party (Venstre, LP), and Progress Party (Fremskriftspartiet, PP) manifestos from the period in question were included. There are several benefits of using party manifestos in the analysis. First, access to this type of document is relatively easy to obtain; second, manifestos provide an accurate record of parties’ positions across time, and finally, they include good examples of Eurosceptic argumentation. Nevertheless, the study of manifestos does carry some limitations. It does not necessarily allow for a thorough examination of nuances in party positions on

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19 There were no Sunday Aftenposten newspapers in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and only a Sunday morning edition in the 1990s and 2000s. 290 per year also factors in strikes, missing papers and other bank holidays. In 2009, the number of newspapers searched was over 300.

20 Plus another eight from the 2009 avis2 search.

21 The manifestos from its predecessors, the Socialist People’s Party (Sosialistisk Folkeparti (SPP), 1961, 1965 and 1969 elections) and the Socialist Electoral League (Sosialistisk Valgforbund (SEL), 1973 election), were used prior to 1975.

22 The Conservative party (Høyre) was excluded from the party analysis because of its pro-EU membership stance and lack of a Eurosceptic faction.

23 The manifestos were accessed through NSD’s (2001) CD ROM and copies of the 2005 and 2009 manifestos were downloaded from the parties’ websites.
European integration, especially at times when the EU issue is not considered politically salient, nor do they reflect the extent to which a party is internally divided on the issue. To address these problems, attempts were made at collecting Eurosceptic political speeches, and two elite surveys and interviews with politicians were carried out to supplement the document-based research. Unfortunately, the availability of speeches was sporadic. Johansen and Kjeldsen’s (2005) collection of political speeches was the primary source of the speeches used, and the majority of speeches were from the 1990s period. In addition to the qualitative party research, two surveys of Norwegian Members of Parliament (MPs), the Storting, were carried out, the first one in November 2006 and the second one in January 2010. Questionnaires containing questions about MPs’ attitudes to EU membership, European integration and EU-related issues were delivered to all 169 MPs on both occasions. Translated copies of the questionnaires and further details about the surveys and their response rates can be found in Appendix D. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews with one politician/representative from each of the parties under study were conducted in Oslo between March 2009 and September 2010. The interviewees were targeted on the basis of their experience and/or expertise in the area; in most cases, recommendations were made by the different parties’ head offices on who to contact. Two politicians from the PP were interviewed because the first interview was with the party’s foreign policy spokesman, who was not a declared Eurosceptic. The interview was therefore mainly focused on the party’s stance. The second PP interview, on the other hand, was with a professed Eurosceptic and so the interview focused mostly on the interviewee’s personal views. In addition to the elite interviews, interviews with the 2009/10 leader of the youth “no” organization Ungdom mot EU (UmEU, Youth against Norwegian Membership of the EU), her successor (2010/11 leader) and a Eurosceptic farmer, who is also a CP member and has previously been active in a local branch of the ad hoc organization Nei til EU (No to the EU, NtEU), were conducted to control for

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24 Both surveys were carried out by the author, but the 2006 survey was originally conducted for a separate project.
25 The surveys included both open and closed ended questions, and thus produced both quantitative and qualitative data.
differences in the argumentation used by politicians and other activists. The two UmEU activists were approached because they were listed as “independent of party” on the organization’s website, and the interview with the farmer was unplanned, a random result of a conversation with an acquaintance. Details of the interviews and the interviewees can be found in Appendix E.

Table 1.1 The newspaper items included in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Letters/commentaries</th>
<th>Other newspaper items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s newspaper study

Having targeted newspaper items, manifestos, speeches from 1961-2010 for the documentary data collection and conducted elite surveys and interviews in 2006, 2009 and 2010, the data acquired for each of the four periods of Euroscepticism were naturally not identical, neither in type nor in volume. As Table 1.1 illustrates, there were large differences in the number of Eurosceptic readers’ letters and other newspaper items across the decades, with the 1990s Aftenposten editors being most generous in allowing the expanse of Eurosceptic argumentation on its pages. While only 25 items containing Eurosceptic argumentation were found in the 1960s period, 341 items were found in the 1990s period. This is of course not merely a result of the benevolence of the editors towards the “no” side or of their sense of duty to cover both sides of the debate in the 1990s, but more a reflection of the increasing number of readers letters and expansion of the newspaper’s debate pages over the decades; a total of 578 readers’ letters were found in Aftenposten’s newspapers from 1960, while in 1970 there were 4,028 and in 1993, 5,802 letters to the editor were searched.

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26 The vast majority of these were written by people who were against membership, but a few letters with an unclear stance or a “yes” stance which cited “no” argumentation were also included.

27 E.g. interviews and news stories.
To address the imbalance in data across the periods, other material was also sourced. For example, in the absence of manifestos and other party material in the 1970-72 period, a selection of material published by the ad hoc “no” organization Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet (the People’s Movement against Norwegian membership of the Common Market, Folkebevegelsen for short) was analysed to enable comparison between the newspaper debate and the argumentation of the “no” campaign. And in the 1990s period, material published by the organized “no” faction within the Labour Party, Sosialdemokrater mot EU (Social Democrats Against the EU, SME) was analysed to cover the gap on the social democratic argumentation against the EU, and in the 1995-2010 period, online commentaries and material from the “no” organization NtEU were included to increase the limited data sample. Naturally, the elite survey data and the interviews conducted were primarily useful to the latter period, but the interviewees who were active in the 1960s, 1970s and/or the 1990s debates were also able to give some interesting insights into how the debate has developed across the decades. The retrospective part of the interviews had merely an affirmative/ triangulating function.

1.4.2.1 Data Analysis

In the study of the documentary data, directed qualitative content analysis was used, whereby an initial list of coding categories was generated from the theory, but themes were allowed to emerge during the course of the analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Miles and Huberman 1994). Six of the theories used to account for Euroscepticism or Norwegian Euroscepticism, discussed in the literature review in Chapters Two and Three, made up the pre-defined categories for the analysis.28

More interpretivist research techniques such as discourse analysis were rejected because of the remoteness of their epistemological underpinnings from the literature the study is informed by and aspires to contribute to. Moreover, the method does not marry well with the positivism of the second part of the research. Another reason

28 The pre-defined coding categories are detailed in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four and in Appendix G.
was lack of originality, as discourse analysis has been used on Norway before; Neumann’s (2001, 2002) work on “Why Norway is not a member of the EU” is rooted in this research tradition.  

Because the vast majority of the documentary data were photocopies of printed material and not easily transferred to formats compatible with qualitative data analysis software such as Nvivo, the entire qualitative data analysis was conducted manually, without any technological aids. This had the advantage that full control over and perspective on the data and results was retained, even if the work was somewhat slowed down as a result of it.

1.4.3 The Quantitative Part of the Research: Public Opinion

Clearly, readers’ letters can not be treated as synonymous with expressions of Norwegian public Euroscepticism, as it has been shown that contributors to letters to the editor pages are not necessarily representative of the general public (Grey and Brown 1970). An analysis of Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation undoubtedly generates valuable insight into the public debate on the EU issue in Norway, but the findings of such a study do not automatically extend to the general public, as research shows that writers of letters to the editor are more likely to be older, better-educated, wealthier and more conservative-oriented than passive newspaper readers (Renfro 1979; Grey and Brown 1970). In effect, an analysis of letters to the editor and party documents alone was not sufficient to address the research questions. It was clear that the findings of the documentary analysis had to be tested on a nationally representative data sample for the conclusions drawn from the study to be extended to the general public.

There are only two comprehensive surveys conducted covering public attitudes towards European integration and other political issues suitable for the theory testing the research sets out to conduct. Both of these were carried out in conjunction with the referenda in 1972 and 1994 by Statistisk Sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway, SSB).

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29 Neumann’s work is discussed later in the thesis.
The public opinion data analysis, the results of which are reported in Chapter Eight, was based on these data sets. Both data sets satisfied all the criteria of good and reliable secondary data. One of the major advantages with using these two data sets is that they were carried out by an organization which has wide experience with creating nationally representative data.

The theories which made up the pre-defined categories in the qualitative part of the research were subjected to statistical testing on 1994 survey data. For this, regression analysis was used. In addition, descriptive statistics from both the 1972 and 1994 data sets were used to triangulate the findings. The methodological issues involved in the quantitative part of the analysis are considered in further detail in Appendix H.

**Figure 1.2** Data used in the thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUAL</th>
<th>Quan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Readers’ letters/other newspaper items, <em>Aftenposten</em> (all periods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- online commentaries/resources (post-1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Party manifestos (1961-2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political speeches (all periods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <em>Ad hoc</em> organizations’ material (all periods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secondary literature (all periods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectional aggregate data (1972 and 1994 surveys)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite surveys (2006, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2 above gives an overview of the data used in the research. An exhaustive list of the documentary data which were systematically analysed according to the coding scheme can be found in Appendix F.

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30 Creating a new quantitative data set for the study was not considered an option for several reasons. The main reason was that, covering a fifty-year period, the research did not need to be based on a new data set; the data analysis could quite satisfactorily be carried out on the data from one of the referendum surveys. Besides, it was far beyond the capacity of the study to create a whole new data set that would be comparable to the referendum surveys, matching their quality and validity.

31 A representative sample of the relevant population was used along with appropriate methods of data collection. Acceptable response rates were achieved, the availability of documentation was good, the data are widely used in other publications, and the originators have a respectable reputation.
1.4.4 A Final Note on Methodology: Why a Case Study?

It is necessary to clarify the reasons why the case study approach was chosen for the research as opposed to a comparative study. The main reason was that no comprehensive study examining both public and party-based Norwegian Euroscepticism across time has ever been conducted, and doing a case study of Norway enabled the analysis to stretch both in terms of depth and breadth. Conversely, comparing Norway with for example Sweden or Switzerland would have limited the scope of the research on Norway, as time and resources spent on investigating another case would have equalled less time and resources spent on researching Norway. History was another reason why the case study approach was considered more expedient to investigate Norwegian Euroscepticism; the two “neutrals” do not share Norway’s history of intense public debates and campaigning on the European issue. Although Norway does indeed share some characteristics with the “usual suspects” of Euroscepticism, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK), the country’s history of clashes between pro-European elites and the unwilling population is unique: it stretches back to the early 1960s. In Sweden and Switzerland, EU membership was not a viable option until 30 years later and the end of the Cold War because of their commitment to neutrality, and Denmark and the UK joined in the first enlargement wave in 1973. The Norwegians, on the other hand, have defied their principally pro-European press and political elite through fifty years. Thus, comparing Norwegian Euroscepticism with for example Swedish or Swiss Euroscepticism would have been incompatible with one of the objectives of the thesis, that is, exploring Norwegian opposition to European integration through the decades.

1.5 Thesis Overview

The thesis is divided into four parts. In Part I, the existing literature on Euroscepticism and Norwegian opposition to EU membership is reviewed. Part II reviews the history surrounding the Norwegian debate on Europe and reports on the results of the newspaper and party analysis. Part III investigates public opinion
through the whole period under study (1961-2010) and discusses the findings of the regression analysis. Part IV provides an interpretation of the overall analysis.

1.5.1 Part I: Literature Review
The aims of Chapter Two are to contextualize Norwegian Euroscepticism within the broader literature on Euroscepticism, identify gaps in existing knowledge and inform the research. It frames the research within the comparative literature on popular and party-based Euroscepticism, focusing on issues of definition, the arguments of Eurosceptics across Europe, how Euroscepticism has developed over time in the EU, theories of popular Euroscepticism, and the manifestation of Euroscepticism in European party systems. It is argued that different Euroscepticism typologies have different strengths and weaknesses and are more useful when used together as analytical tools. Furthermore, through its review of causality theories, the chapter finds that there is no consensus in either the public support or party-based Euroscepticism literature on what best explains Euroscepticism. The public support literature focuses on theories like postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization, socialization, utilitarianism, cueing and identity, whereas in the party-based Euroscepticism literature the discussion on which of ideology, strategy, party system centrality, institutions and inter-party competition are most central in shaping the politics of Euroscepticism continues.

Chapter Three considers the academic debates on Norwegian opposition to the EU. Specifically, it looks at how Norwegian Euroscepticism has been defined in the literature and discusses existing theories attempting to explain Norway’s “no”s and party-based Euroscepticism. Discussion of the arguments most central to the Norwegian debate and the historical development of Norwegian Euroscepticism is left out of the review, as this forms part of the analysis in subsequent chapters. The purpose of the chapter is to identify gaps in existing knowledge and inform the research. It concludes that the issue of defining Norwegian Euroscepticism is largely overlooked in the literature; there is little to extract from existing research on different types of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the chapter finds that the
theories used to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism are different from those put forward in the comparative literature. In the Norway-related literature, the focus is on Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage model, geography, Atlanticism, rural identity, the oil economy, Scandinavian exceptionalism and cueing. In the party-based literature, Sitter’s work (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a, b, 2008) has brought Norway into the ideology/strategy/party system centrality discussions of the comparative literature. But although Sitter argues that parties emphasize their stance on the EU depending on whether or not they stand to gain from it in electoral, policy or office-seeking terms, his “politics of opposition” model does not explain why the different Norwegian political parties are Eurosceptic and have been Eurosceptic over the last almost fifty years.

1.5.2 Part II: Analysis of the Newspaper and Party Debate

Each of the four chapters in Part II of the thesis are made up of two components. In order to contextualize the documentary analysis, the first part of each chapter discusses issues and events relevant to the EU debate in each period, based on an intensive survey of secondary sources. Chapter Four starts by looking at the party system and foreign policy before 1961, before moving on to the first phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, i.e. the 1960s. It first discusses the events and developments of the 1960s and subsequently reports on the 1960s documentary analysis. It is argued that 1961 is an appropriate starting point for studying Norwegian Euroscepticism because Eurosceptic attitudes prior to 1961 were only widespread among the elites and other motivations than Atlanticism did not come to the fore before 1961 due to the general consensus on non-participation. Moreover, the documentary analysis finds that political culture and political values, and also to a certain extent national identity and rural society concerns, were of importance to 1960s Euroscepticism in Norway. Conversely, the results suggest that economic interest were only of secondary importance to its motivation.
Chapter Five covers the second phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, that is, 1970-72. In the first part, it looks at the developments in the government(s) and parties and at the non-parliamentary opposition. It argues that it is necessary to separate the 1970-72 period from the 1960s period in the study of Euroscepticism because the 1970s period witnessed higher levels of first, knowledge and experience with the EC issue, second, debating intensity, third, polarization and fourth, public involvement. In addition, the documentary analysis indicates that integration was viewed in more political terms in the 1970s than in the 1960s. It confirms that political culture and political values arguments were extremely central to early Norwegian Euroscepticism. It also suggests that rural society concerns, i.e. concern about e.g. the primary sectors, the settlement pattern and rural life, were also very important in the 1970s debate. National identity argumentation, on the other hand, was less prominent; as was economic argumentation, which primarily consisted of counter-argumentation to economic “yes” argumentation.

Chapter Six deals with the third phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, which started as the Cold War neared its end and the plans for the Single Market got underway. This period, which was a period of heightened Euroscepticism, culminated in the 1994 referendum. The chapter finds that there is much continuity between the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s debates, but argues that in the 1990s Eurosceptic argumentation it is possible to detect a rise in confidence in, and in many instances, sophistication of the arguments. This is put down to exogenous factors, such as the EC’s change from “Community” to “Union”, and endogenous factors, such as experience and learning from the previous debates. The chapter finds that the 1990s argumentation is more or less a perpetuation of the 1960s/1970s phenomenon. Political values and political culture are the two most central themes, and rural society also plays an important part in the 1990s argumentation. Economic interest comes up again as a second order concern, and the national identity argumentation makes up an even more marginal part of the Eurosceptic side of the debate than in the 1970s. Chapter Six is also able to conduct a closer examination of the different parties’ separate discourses on European integration. It finds that with the exception of the PP, whose Eurosceptic
argumentation is more economy-oriented, the Norwegian Eurosceptic parties’ argumentation follows the same pattern as the newspaper arguments. In other words, the focus is on political Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR).

Chapter Seven gives a thorough account of the developments in the relationship between Norway and the EU between 1995 and 2010 and the characteristics of the debate in the period. It is argued that 1995-2010 is a period of latent Euroscepticism, because the “suicide clause”, the EEA agreement’s function as a national compromise and the negative public opinion towards EU membership served to put a lid on the debate, at least in the parliamentary arena. Unlike the 1973-1988 latent period, 1995-2010 is treated as a separate period of Norwegian Euroscepticism, because post-1994, the EEA agreement and developments in the EU did not allow the elites to bury the issue. In the second part of the chapter, the documentary analysis confirms that the continuity observed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s argumentation can be extended to the 2000s. Again, it is argued that the Eurosceptic argumentation found in the newspaper/online debate is mirrored in the middle and left-wing parties’ discourse on the EU, with its emphasis on VCR issues, and lack of emphasis on economic interest and cultural threat. The VCR structure is also shared by the “no” organization, NtEU, but the PP’s Euroscepticism stands out in its focus on economic issues, and lack of concern for political values and rural society.

1.5.3 Part III: Analysis of Public Opinion

Chapter Eight examines the development and causality of public Euroscepticism in Norway. The first part looks at how the phenomenon has developed across the four periods, from its formation in the early 1960s, to its blossoming in the early 1970 and 1990s and into the post-Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and eastward enlargement period. The investigation shows that the strength and resilience of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism is more than a myth,\textsuperscript{32} as between 1961 and 2010, there were only short periods when the “yes” side were ahead in the polls (1972-73, 1998-99, 2002-04). Using multiple regression analysis, the second part of the chapter

\textsuperscript{32} These findings challenge Sitter’s (2009) claim that “there is as much change over time in Norway as there are in […] other countries”.
tests the VCR model and the economic interest and national identity theories on a nationally representative sample of the population (the 1994 Referendum Study) in order to find out whether the findings of the newspaper/party analysis can be extended to the public level. It confirms the centrality of geo-historical and rural society factors to Norwegian Euroscepticism, but the findings are inconsistent with the postmaterialist thesis. The national identity thesis is also rejected, but the economic interest thesis finds some support.

1.5.4 Part IV: Norwegian Euroscepticism – what and why?

Chapter Nine pulls the findings of the MM study together and concentrates on the research questions: what does the research tell us about the nature and causality of Norwegian Euroscepticism? It argues that there are two broad types of Euroscepticism in Norway, namely mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. The first type is characterized and motivated by postmaterialist values, geo-historical factors and ruralism (VCR), while the second type shares the geo-historical element, but is much more economy-oriented in its outlook on European integration. On the basis of a triangulation with additional public opinion data from the 1972 and 1994 Referendum Studies, it is suggested that the VCR explanation is applicable also on the public level even though the regression analysis in Chapter Eight returned results which contradicted the postmaterialist and non-economic aspect of VCR. The above conclusions also bid further research into public opinion to establish whether the discrepancies between the results of the qualitative and quantitative parts were due to the failure of distinguishing between mainstream and right-wing public Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the merits of the MM approach, arguing that in spite of its weaknesses, it offers valuable insights into and a new perspective on Norwegian Euroscepticism. The thesis concludes with a summary of the main arguments and makes suggestions for future research.

This chapter has given an introduction to the study of Euroscepticism, considered why Norwegian Euroscepticism is a worthwhile area of research, outlined the
research questions, the aims and objectives and methodology of the study and given
an overview of the thesis. The following chapter offers a review of the comparative
Euroscepticism literature.
Chapter 2

A Review of the Comparative Euroscepticism Literature: Definition, Trends and Causality

This chapter focuses on five of the most important issues in the comparative literature. These include issues of definition; the variations in the foundation of EU opposition across Europe; how public Euroscepticism has developed through the last fifty years; the theories explaining variations in public support for and opposition to European integration; and Euroscepticism in party politics. The purpose of the chapter is to uncover how different types of Euroscepticism are defined; review the main developments of Euroscepticism in other European states in terms of argumentation and historical development, as well as theory pertaining to party politics and public opinion. This is all done to contextualize the research and identify the theories that are to be tested on the Norwegian case. First, the chapter deals with the problem of defining Euroscepticism.

2.1 Defining Euroscepticism

As the popularity of the term Euroscepticism increased through the 1990s, it became progressively necessary to evaluate the meaning behind the concept. Taggart (1997, 1998: 366) provides a widely accepted definition of the term, attributing it to expression of “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) provide a refined version of the above definition: while they consider Euroscepticism to be “all-encompassing and to incorporate a wide range of varying positions” (2001: 9), they distinguish between “soft” and “hard” Euroscepticism. Their “hard” and “soft” categorization is widely used as a labelling schema for party-based Euroscepticism, and can arguably be transferred to other types of Euroscepticism, too. Hard Euroscepticism entails rejection of or principal objection to European integration, whereas the soft variety encompasses opposition to certain aspects of the integration
process. In other words, to be classified as a hard Eurosceptic, one would either have to be against one’s country’s membership of the EU, thus advocating withdrawal if already a member or opposition to joining if a non-member, or oppose European policy initiatives to such an extent that membership would, by implication, be untenable. Soft Eurosceptics, on the other hand, commonly oppose one or several aspects of the EU and/or the integration process, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU’s democratic deficit and/or EMU.

Kopecky and Mudde (2002) criticize Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2001) definition for being too broad, as they believe it potentially ascribes Eurosceptic attitudes to people who are largely Europhile (pro-European) and only have reservations about limited aspects of the process. They introduce an alternative schema to that of Taggart and Szczerbiak, based on the two dimensions “diffuse” and “specific” support (for the ideal of European integration and the EU respectively), creating the four labels “euroenthusiasts”, “Eurosceptic”, “europragmatist” and “euroreject” (see Table 2.1 below).

**Table 2.1** Kopecky and Mudde’s typology of party positions on Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for the European Union (Specific support)</th>
<th>Support for European Integration (Diffuse support)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-optimist</td>
<td>Euroenthusiast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-pessimist</td>
<td>Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 303)

Arguably, two of the most obvious flaws of their work are firstly, that it is overly complicated and creates confusion as to what attributes are ascribed which label, and second, that they have used the term “Eurosceptic” for one of their positions which carries a different meaning in the wider literature than it means here (in their model, a “Eurosceptic” harbours a combination of Europhile and EU-pessimist attitudes).

Flood (2002b) provides a different categorization solution. In contrast to the arguments of the authors mentioned above, he argues that the Euroscepticism
classification should not be extended to include reformist positions which involve opposition to specific aspects of the EU but are broadly pro-integration (i.e. “policy” and/or “national interest” variations of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s “soft” Euroscepticism conceptualisation). He believes the term is best used to describe three Euroscepticism positions, the first and softest being resistance to further integration; the second being a desire to reverse integration to a former stage (most commonly before Maastricht); and the third being a rejectionist position, advocating withdrawal or refusal to join the EU. Flood (2002a) emphasizes that an Euroscepticism categorization model should be clear and free of assumptions about positions, and he advocates the use of “EU” as a prefix instead of “Euro”, as he believes “Euro” has the potential to create confusion about what object the scepticism is directed towards. He puts forward a set of six descriptive labels which is arguably clearer and more specific than the hard/soft model and Kopecky and Mudde’s two-dimensional model. These are rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, reformist and maximalist, and all include the prefix “EU” (see Flood et al. 2007 for the refined version). A benefit of Flood’s model is that, as it includes both pro-European and anti-European attitudes, he avoids problems of separation between supportive and opposing positions altogether. Nevertheless, as Flood’s model is not as widely used as the hard/soft model of definition, its lack of familiarity is a disadvantage. Another limitation is that, although one can argue that the schema is more accurate and therefore more appropriate for the study of the Euroscepticism of elites and people with carefully thought out stances on European integration, its applicability to Euroscepticism in the general public is more ambiguous. When studying public Euroscepticism it may be more appropriate to separate between the hard and soft types rather than six different stances, as many do not have elaborate opinions on the intricacies of the different integrationist initiatives or the process of integration. Besides, in a non-member country like Norway, where European integration is primarily debated in terms of “yes” or “no”

33 It should be noted that Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a) have since acknowledged that national interest rhetoric does not qualify for inclusion in the definition of Euroscepticism, and now differentiate between “peripheral” and “core” policy opposition.
34 He believes that “Euro” could potentially imply “Europe” as a geographical area or refer to the single currency.
to membership, it is perhaps more relevant to differentiate between different degrees of rejectionism, thus reverting back to the hard/soft continuum.

Notwithstanding the dissent on which positions should be considered Eurosceptic and how the positions should be categorized, there is a consensus in the academic literature that differentiation between different kinds or degrees of Euroscepticism is required. Because the issue of European integration is complex by nature, attitudes towards the process are, too. Therefore, Euroscepticism can also be described as diverse sets of positions on European integration (Sitter 2002), as the project is in itself an elaborate and non-static set of ideals and processes. Consequently, it may be futile to conjure up a wide variety of Euroscepticism categories, as they are cumbersome and difficult to operate with.

**Figure 2.1** Three Euroscepticism typologies put together

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimalist</th>
<th>Revisionist</th>
<th>Rejectionist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dimension</td>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Single market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for the principle and practice of the EU. Rejection of further integration.  
Support for the principle of the EU. Significant reservations about EU policies. Rejection of further integration.  
Rejection of the principle, practice and future of the EU. No wish to participate.

Source: Skinner (2011: 25)

What is more, the majority of alternative Euroscepticism conceptualisations more or less resemble that of “hard” and “soft”, making a conversion to an alternative

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35 E.g. “rejectionist”, “radically revisionist” (Flood 2002b) and “fundamentalist sceptics” (Forster 2002a) fit the “hard” definition, whereas “pragmatic opponents”, policy specific opponents (Forster 2002a), and “revisionist” (Flood, 2002b) fit the “soft” definition.
labelling schema more or less without purpose. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which displays Flood’s (2002a) three anti-EU categories (top), along Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard/soft continuum, with Vasilopoulou’s (2009: 6) definitions below. Arguably, the three typologies complement, rather than compete with each other.

2.2 The Diversity of Eurosceptic Argumentation

As Euro scepticism is either opposition to European integration in principle (hard Euroscepticism), or a (potentially wide) variety of oppositional positions on aspects of the integration process (soft Euroscepticism), and thus is an exceptionally diverse concept, it is essential to review the most common arguments voiced by Eurosceptics across Europe to understand the origins of the phenomenon.

According to Flood (2002b, 2005), Euroscepticism is most commonly based on arguments of over-centralisation; the perceived incompatibility of deepening and widening of integration; that the EU is undemocratic, bureaucratic and insufficiently transparent; the belief that EMU will have a grave impact on national economic and social stability; that national laws should have primacy over European laws; that a workable Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe is impossible to obtain; and/or that the EU should be based on a free, intergovernmental cooperation structure as opposed to moving towards increased supranationalism. Moreover, Euroscepticism commonly features across the left/right spectrum; it is ideologically diverse. For the same reasons as people and parties of different ideologies are in favour of European integration on different grounds, Eurosceptics base their opposition to the EU on a variety of arguments. Forster (2002a) argues that Euroscepticism on both the left and right of the political spectrum is based on concern about sovereignty, national identity and economic political autonomy.

36 Vasilopoulou (2009) provides these definitions alongside her labels “rejecting”, “conditional” and “compromising” Euroscepticism.

37 The right is traditionally attracted to the EU because of its commitment to market liberalism, whereas the Europhile socialist left sees it an important economic and social policy-making institution (reflected by for example the EU’s social policy dimension; environmental policy; cohesion policy; and structural funds).
However, concern for national sovereignty is more typically associated with right-wing Euroscepticism (e.g. Flood 2002b; Holmes 2002), along with criticism of the EU’s liberalist shortcomings: excessive regulation and unreasonable budgetary demands (Flood 2002b). On the left, on the other hand, the EU is attacked for being too liberalist and acting as an agent of (undesired) deregulation, free trade and globalisation.

Despite some elements of common ground across the borders of Europe, it is important to remember that there are national variations also in ideology-based arguments against the European project. In France, the EU is criticized for being too liberalist; here even the right is concerned about the liberalist direction of the EU (Benoit 1997; Flood 2005). In the UK, however, the scenario is quite the opposite; here European integration is “widely denounced as a socialist plot and a model based on archaic regulations” (Benoit 1997: 78). The French position is shared by many Germans (Hix 2005) and Scandinavians, where there is deep-rooted concern about the EU’s lacking social and environmental dimensions and the detrimental effect neo-liberalist EU policies have on national welfare provisions and public expenditure (e.g. Sørensen 2004; Petersson 2004; Fitzmaurice 1995). Another strong characteristic of French Euroscepticism is the perceived threat of European integration to French culture.

In the Scandinavian countries, the democratic deficit argument has particular stronghold because of their relatively long history of stable democracy and value systems deeply concerned with democratic accountability, transparency and equality (e.g. Sørensen 2004; Petersson 2004). Moreover, Scandinavian Eurosceptics also differ with regard to their structure of the emphasis on economic interest, as they are particularly concerned with protecting societal and territorial interests (e.g. hostility towards EU agricultural and fisheries policies) (Milner 2000; Fitzmaurice 1995). Furthermore, regular payments of disproportionate budget contributions have given rise to the notion that their respective countries are unfairly treated and effectively “footing the bill” of the less developed parts of Europe, thus fuelling resentment
towards the EU. This is a sentiment shared with British Eurosceptics and which is arguably also increasing in force in Germany and the Netherlands (Hix 2005). Conversely, Sørensen (2006: 9) infers from 2001 EB poll data that the Danish are more positive than the majority of other EU nationalities towards taking on the financial burden of eastward enlargement. Another characteristic shared by Scandinavian and British Eurosceptics is the strength of opposition to EMU (e.g. Milner 2000; Petersson 2004), and German Euroscepticism is also characterized by reservations about the single currency (e.g. Noelle-Neumann 1980; Flood 2002b; Lees 2002). Examples of additional nation-specific EU-related concerns are the Swiss defence of their unique political traditions (Church 2003); German Eurosceptic positions on European economic policies in relation to re-unification (Milner 2000); the German apprehensiveness regarding the eastward enlargements (Lees 2002); and the Finnish, Swedish and Austrian pre-1989 argument of neutrality.

Considering the diversity of Eurosceptic arguments, it is quite clear that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism is multi-faceted, making it necessary to carefully consider the concept’s application to different cases. Its apparent complexities and lack of uniformity require scholars of the concept to approach it differently according to the level of inquiry (European aggregate/national aggregate/party/individual) as well as the national context. Sørensen (2006) argues that there are four types of Euroscepticism, ideological, utilitarian, sovereignty-based and principled, and that national variations of Euroscepticism draw on the four types to different degrees. Harmsen and Spiering (2004b: 17) also emphasize the importance of the national context, as they argue that “it assumes a meaning which must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those debates”. The next section deals with how Euroscepticism and the debate on European integration have evolved during the last 50 years as well as events of particular importance to the pan-European and national development of Euroscepticism.

38 In a later paper, Sørensen proposes a typology of public Euroscepticism which differentiates between economic, sovereignty, democracy and social Euroscepticism (Sørensen 2008).
2.3 The History and Development of Attitudes towards European Integration

From the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 up until the first accession in 1973 and the preceding debates, the literature reports that there was very little opposition to the process of European integration, perhaps with the exception of the resentment which emanated from de Gaulle vetoes on British entry to the Community in the 1960s (Inglehart and Reif 1991). The publics of the member states were relatively distanced from the project because of its elite-driven nature, and the common assumption is that there was little public interest in the EC and its workings despite essentially high support levels (Hewstone 1986). These healthy support levels might be explained by the high level of prosperity the member states were enjoying during this period, which was thought to be at least in part a product of European economic integration (Inglehart and Reif 1991). In the academic literature, this popular pro-European atmosphere is widely referred to as the “permissive consensus” (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Evans 1998; Flood 2002a), a concept which was first put forward by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). This “permissive consensus” is understood as “the general affirmation of a somewhat hazily understood European project by an uninvolved public” (Evans 1998: 576).

The accession talks and ancillary debates in the four applicant countries (Denmark, Ireland, the UK and Norway) in the early 1970s arguably marked the first stage in the development of Euroscepticism. For the first time, the pros and cons of European integration were debated vigorously in the public domain in order to reach conclusions on the desirability of membership of the Community. The publics of Denmark and Ireland consented to joining the EC with healthy referenda majorities, whereas the Norwegians rejected membership with 53.5 percent voting against. The UK joined without consulting the public in a referendum, but as a result of the political establishment’s failure to promote the ideal of Europe in other than economic terms and the government allowing the EC to be blamed for the country’s economic problems, the unpopularity of membership grew among the public as well
as in the party system. This culminated in the renegotiation of the British terms of membership in 1974 and a referendum on withdrawal from the Community in June 1975. Although the 1975 referendum campaign gave rise to Eurosceptic sentiment in the UK, the Europhiles won the referendum by 67.2 to 32.8 percent (George 1998: 95). The descriptor used for the Eurosceptics in Britain at this point in time, however, was “anti-marketeers”, because of their emphasis on the anti-market argument (Forster 2002b; George 1998).

The 1970s saw popular support for the EC drop across Europe (see e.g. Niedermayer 1995; Handley 1981; Inglehart and Reif 1991), as neither of the member states were exempt from the economic volatility of the decade or the destructive impact of enduring membership negotiations, the British re-negotiations, the Norwegian rejection of membership and the continuation of British “awkwardness” (George 1998). Handley (1981) argues that the first enlargement afflicted the existing members with a large amount of stress and blames the decline in EC support in the 1970s (or what he calls the “crisis of the 1970s”) on a combination of a damaged self-image and economic decline. It is commonly thought that the EC’s inability to deal with the rising inflation levels and unemployment rates of the 1970s combined with the national governments’ prouneness of using the EC as a scapegoat for economic ills are important factors in explaining why support for the EC declined in the 1970s (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1996).

In the 1980s opinion polls showed that member state support levels for European integration were on the rise again (e.g. Niedermayer 1995; Evans 1998; McLaren 2007b). According to EB data, the first half of the decade saw support for integration rise almost uniformly across the EC, a trend which continued in the remainder of the decade in the six newest member states, the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Niedermayer 1995).39 A generally more positive public mood following

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39 This slowing-down (and in some cases even reversal) of support in the original member states has been explained by the “ceiling theory”. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) believe that every country has a ceiling of support, and when reaching or coming close to this ceiling, support levels will slow or reverse.
improving economic conditions may account for this sudden resurgence in support for the European integration. However, this EC-optimism provided ample scope for a drop in support for European integration in the 1990s, when the actual deepening of integration was scheduled to take place.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 marked a watershed in attitudes towards European integration, as the complexities of the treaty transformed the issue of Europe from being a question of support or opposition to membership of the EC/EU into highly diverse positions on different aspects of the various policies and developments of the integration process (i.e. a widespread appearance of soft Eurosceptic attitudes). The sudden decline in public support across the EU throughout the 1990s is clearly illustrated by opinion poll data for member states as well as for non-member states. As a result of this, the time of the Maastricht referenda in Denmark and France has been widely cited as the end of the public “permissive consensus”, thus characterising 1992 as a turning point in the debate on Europe and essential to the development of modern Euroscepticism (Forster 2002a). Additionally, the Maastricht debate put increased focus on the limited access European citizens had to European affairs, fuelling concerns over the legitimacy of the European institutions and the quality of EU democracy (Franklin et al. 1994). In effect, the Maastricht Treaty increased focus on the importance of popular involvement in the integration process and made it clear that the project could not progress without the continued support of its citizens. In other words, it was around Maastricht that the European public’s role in determining Europe’s future development became more widely recognized. Furthermore, a considerable discrepancy between mass and elite support for integration has been documented in recent years (e.g. Hansen 2002; Hix 2005; Petersson 2004; Sørensen 2004; Hooghe 2003). This gap has fuelled concerns that the European elite is losing touch with the public’s preferences (Hix and Lord 1997), exemplified by EB data which shows that 94 percent of European elites consider EU membership a good thing as opposed to only 48 percent of the EU public (Hix 2005: 166). Startin (2005: 67) argues that in France “[i]t was the debate surrounding the Maastricht referendum which was to bring the issue of Europe to a head and to
demonstrate fully the gulf between France’s political elites and large swathes of the electorate”. In Denmark, on the other hand, Sørensen (2004) believes that it was around 1986, the time of the Single European Act (SEA), that public opinion changed and the gap between mass and elite support started widening.

Another event important to the development of Euroscepticism post-Maastricht is that of the 1994 referenda in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway and the subsequent 1995 enlargement, which increased the number of members from twelve to fifteen. There are two main reasons why these developments are of particular significance to the debate on Euroscepticism. First, as Norway rejected membership for the second time (this time 52.2 percent voted “no”), it not only reinforced the position and strength of Eurosceptic sentiment in Scandinavia, throughout the next decade the country has also served as an example of an economically and politically successful West European non-member state, lending added credibility to the Eurosceptic argument that membership of the EU is not necessary for a country to prosper (e.g. Holmes 2002). Second, the accession of three countries thought to have above average levels of public Euroscepticism served to equal out the balance between the more eager member countries (traditionally the six original signatory countries, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) and the more “awkward” members (typically Denmark and the UK). In other words, it is argued that the 1995 accession “diluted” the pro-integrationist drive within the EU itself (George 1998) and consequently made Eurosceptic sentiments more common within the organisational structure of the EU.

After the 1995 enlargement, there are three main developments which have influenced the debate on Europe. First, the introduction of the Euro mobilized large oppositional movements, especially in the UK, Denmark and Sweden, but also in Germany, where affective and historical ties to the national currency were particularly strong. Second, the issue of the eastward enlargement witnessed powerful stirrings of disagreement with the direction of integration as it represented threats to EU immigration controls, employment, welfare provisions, social
dumping, and cultural cohesion. In France, the potential accession of Turkey into the Union has been particularly controversial because of concerns about French culture and identity in the event of mass-migration from a country with a large Muslim population. In Germany (as well as other member states which are particularly exposed to influxes of Central and Eastern European (CEE) workers), fears of rising unemployment and social dumping have been at the centre of the scepticism directed towards eastern enlargement. Conversely, usual Eurosceptic suspects Denmark and Britain are curiously supportive of enlarging the Union. This feature of Danish and British Euroscepticism is commonly explained by their desired option of widening economic cooperation, which acts as a barrier to the undesired model of a close and more homogeneous political Union (e.g. Sørensen 2006; Flood et al. 2007). According EB data, in 2002, 72 percent of Danes were supportive of eastward enlargement, as opposed to a mere 20 percent of the French (Sørensen 2006:17). The third important development was the “no” majorities in the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution in 2005, which sent the EU into a temporary existential crisis. Having the traditionally EU-supportive publics of two of the founding members reject an important treaty and subsequently halt planned developments in EU-level policy was an unexpected turn of events to very many. Admittedly, potential problems with ratification of the treaty in other member states had been anticipated, for example in the event of a British referendum on the issue, but the return of healthy “no” majorities in both France and the Netherlands was unprecedented. This was a serious blow to pro-integrationists, as it was not “merely” another protest by the usual suspects Denmark or Ireland; this was

40 Taggart and Szczepaniak (2003; 2008a) argue that opposition to enlargement is not a feature of party-based Euroscepticism. Sørensen (2006: 17), however, points out two valid points which link opposition to eastward enlargement to Euroscepticism quite convincingly. First, as enlargement to the East inevitably represents increased financial contributions to the Union to the majority of the existing member states (as well as the loss of benefits to some), it is reasonable to conclude that it carries implications for shifts in utilitarian EU support/opposition. And second, because of the scope of recent enlargements and the diversity of the joining countries and their cultures, it would be naïve to think that these considerable changes cannot touch on ideological grounds of support or opposition. Arguably, opposition to eastward enlargement is thus a powerful “soft” Eurosceptic stance, which, considering the EU’s current trajectory, has the potential to transform a “soft” Eurosceptic position into a “hard” one.

41 Having rejected the Nice Treaty in June 2001, the Irish voted “no” again to the Lisbon Treaty on 12 June 2008. Both referenda were followed by another referendum which resulted in a “yes”. Denmark voted “no” to Maastricht in June 1992 and to EMU in September 2000.
significant discontent with the EU’s trajectory voiced by the citizens whose support Brussels’ elites relied upon. Or was it? Could it instead have been the French and Dutch publics’ way of protesting against their respective governments, as the national government thesis would have it? The following section reviews the most established theories of public Euroscepticism, some of which have also been used to explain the outcome of the 2005 referenda on the European Constitution (e.g. Lubbers 2008).

2.4 Explaining Public Support for/Opposition to the EU

In the literature there are numerous theories explaining individual-level variation in public support for European integration and, by implication, popular Euroscepticism. Early work in this area mainly revolved around Ronald Inglehart’s (1977) theories of the “Silent Revolution”, which put forward postmaterialist values and high cognitive skills as predictors for support for European institutions and governance (see e.g. Janssen 1991; McLaren 2006). Early studies also found that the length of different countries’ membership had an impact on support levels (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Hewstone 1986). After the Maastricht referenda, however, much focus was shifted to the unpopularity of national governments as determinants of popular Eurosceptic sentiment (i.e. the use of proxies in attitude formation) (e.g. Franklin et al. 1994, 1995; Anderson 1998) as well as evaluative/utilitarian economic cost/benefit theories (e.g. Bosch and Newton 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a). More recent research has moved onto issues of identity (e.g. Deflem and Pampel 1996; McLaren 2002; Carey 2002) and political effects (party cueing) (e.g. Hooghe 2007). These shifts in theory focus are part of a natural process, considering the changes in and evolution of European integration. As the Union was primarily concerned with economic integration up until the mid- to late-1990s, the developments in the literature reflect this (Hooghe and Marks 2005). This part of the chapter summarizes the most important of these theories and briefly evaluates the extent of their validity.
2.4.1 The Postmaterialist Thesis

First, the “political values” or “postmaterialist” thesis (Inglehart 1977) posits that people with postmaterialist values are more prone to support European integration than those who have materialist-based value systems, due to the expectation that the ideal of supranational governance has a stronger appeal among postmaterialists than materialists.\(^{42}\) The theory goes on to assume that support for European integration is higher among young people, as they score higher on the postmaterialist index than older people. This relationship has been confirmed by later studies (e.g. Deflem and Pampel 1996), but has also been widely contested. Janssen (1991), through his multi-level evaluation of the thesis, finds no relationship between postmaterialist values and support for Europe, and Gabel’s (1998a) study shows that political values are related in quite the opposite direction. In other words, Gabel finds that materialists have more favourable attitudes towards the EU than post-materialists.\(^{43}\) Moreover, in Anderson and Reichert’s (1996) analysis of postmaterialist values’ impact on support, a relationship is found only in the newer member states. McLaren (2006), on the other hand, finds that the relationship between this type of political values and EU support is of a spurious nature. She argues that the relationship can be explained by Inglehart’s second theory, cognitive mobilization, as cognitive skills are thought to precede the development of political values.

2.4.2 The Cognitive Mobilization Thesis

Inglehart’s (1970) second theory, the “cognitive mobilization” thesis (also referred to as the “cognitive skills” or “political interest” hypothesis (Ray 2003b)) supposes that people with high cognitive skills/mobilization and thus increased understanding of the EU are more likely to support efforts of European integration than those with low levels of cognitive skills (Inglehart 1970; Hix 2005; Wessels 2007). McLaren’s (2007b) empirical testing of the thesis broadly supports its contention, but she points out that lacking knowledge of European governance and cognitive skills do not

\(^{42}\) People with postmaterialist value systems typically emphasise values such as self-actualization, morality and quality of life over material values such as physical and economic security.

\(^{43}\) However, in a different study, Gabel (1998b) finds that the thesis is valid in the founding members of the union.
necessarily link up with opposition to the EU, as there is a relative prominence of apathy towards the EU among people with low cognitive mobilization scores. Moreover, inconsistencies have been reported by a number of commentators (Janssen 1991; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Lobo 2003) despite the theory’s established position in the literature.

2.4.3 The Socialization Thesis

Another traditional theory of public support for the EU is the “socialization” thesis, which links support for integration to how long a person’s country has been a member of the EC/EU.44 In other words, the theory contends that countries with a shorter history of participation in the EC/EU are more likely to have high Euroscepticism levels, due to lacking identification with and knowledge about European institutions and the notion that “familiarity breeds content” (Bosch and Newton 1995). This thesis is backed up by a number of studies (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Hewstone 1986; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Gabel 1998a), but has also been contested as it fails to account for increasing levels of public Euroscepticism in for example France and Germany post-Maastricht (Flood 2002b; Milner 2000; Hix 2005) and stable levels of support in countries such as Ireland and Spain, countries that either joined at the same time or later than Eurosceptic Denmark and the UK. As a potential explanation for these diverging reports, Anderson and Kaltenthaler’s (1996) suggests that it is useful to couple the “socialization” theory with that of timing of entry to the Union and the idea of a “ceiling” (as explained above). They expect support to be highest in the founding members of the Union, followed by the 1980s entrants and then the 1970s entrants, as the lateness of Greece, Portugal and Spain’s entry was due to institutional and democratic reasons, not Euroscepticism and lacking affective support for European integration. Arguably, Anderson and Kaltenthaler’s (1996) contentions can act as viable explanations for aggregate-level differences in Euroscepticism levels across the Western European member states, with the exception of Ireland. However, one might look to utilitarian considerations to

44 This thesis has also been called the “acculturation thesis”, the “acclimatisation thesis”, the “national tradition” thesis or simply the “length of membership” thesis.
address further discrepancies, which brings the argument to the fourth theory of support and opposition to the EU.

2.4.4 The Economic Interest Thesis

The “economic interest” hypothesis, also labelled the “cost/benefit” thesis, can be divided into the “utilitarian” or “policy appraisal” hypothesis and the “economic perception” hypothesis, depending on whether it is based on subjective or objective evaluations (e.g. Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a, b; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; McLaren 2006; Hix 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005). The thesis takes national (sociotropic) and/or individual (egocentric) evaluations of costs and benefits derived from European integration into account to determine support for the EU (see Table 2.2 below). The main focus here is on the utilitarian model of support (both individual and national), as this is the main explanation used to explain EU support variation in the literature.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2</th>
<th>The economic interest models</th>
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<td><strong>Level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Theory</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual (egocentric)</td>
<td>Economic perception (Subjective)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Utilitarian / policy-appraisal (Objective)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National (sociotropic)</td>
<td>Economic Perception (Subjective)</td>
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<td>Utilitarian / policy-appraisal (Objective)</td>
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Source: Author’s summary of the various economic interest models

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45 i.e. the four freedoms of movement: goods, services, capital and people.
46 See Hooghe and Marks (2005: 422) for an alternative summary.
The “utilitarianism” theory posits that there is a positive relationship between support and the individual-level and/or national economic benefits derived from European integration. Gabel (1998a) argues that EU citizens form their attitudes towards European integration based on economic self-interest policy appraisals of the EU’s four freedoms and the CAP. Thus, he argues, the likely beneficiaries of Europeanisation are prone to favour the EU (e.g. people on high incomes, the highly skilled, and citizens connected to export-oriented businesses), and those likely to be disadvantaged by integration are prone to Euroscepticism (e.g. high income manual workers, public sector employees, and small-scale farmers). Anderson and Reichert (1996) find that sociotropic and egocentric utilitarian considerations are related to support and opposition to the EU, with the exception of individual direct costs/benefits (i.e. farmers and fishermen). Increasing Euroscepticism in the aftermath of the post-2004 enlargement reform of the cohesion policy in the countries traditionally major beneficiaries of the fund, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, can also potentially be explained by the sociotropic “utilitarian” thesis. Put differently, the traditionally high levels of support for the European project in Southern Europe are widely thought to be (at least) partly due to the economic benefits they have derived from EU membership (see Lobo 2003; Royo and Manuel 2003).

It is clear that the utilitarian thesis is backed up by a number of studies and holds ground across different national contexts as well as time. Nevertheless, the major bulk of studies incorporate additional theories in their models (e.g. Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Hix 2005; Royo and Manuel 2003; McLaren 2002, 2006, 2007a; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005). Bosch and Newton (1995), for example, find that sociotropic evaluations have stronger correlation to support than what they call “pocket-book calculations” (McLaren (2004) reports the same findings), and argue that economic benefit, although important, is not the primary determinant of EU support; idealistic convictions for supporting Europe are more important. This is in line with Gabel’s (1998a) argument; he, too, argues that the structure of support for European integration relies on the mixture of two different variables: affective support for the
EU as well as the utilitarian dimension (the Eastonian model of support).\textsuperscript{47} He believes that both diffuse and specific support have to be included to achieve valid conclusions on support for European integration. McLaren (2006), too, identifies an inconsistency in the thesis, as she finds that the so-called “losers” of integration do not convey particularly hostile attitudes towards Europe, rather “lukewarm” or apathetic attitudes.

2.4.5 The National Economy Thesis
Not very different from the sociotropic “utilitarian” hypothesis, the “national economy” thesis postulates that economic decline has a negative effect on public support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In other words, it holds that citizens blame poor national economic conditions, such as high unemployment and increasing inflation as well as poor GDP growth, on EU institutions and governance. Thus, in times of economic recession, popular Euroscepticism levels are expected to rise. Hix (2005) supports the theory as he believes it can assist in explaining traditionally healthy levels of support in Germany and the Netherlands due to beneficial EU-trade arrangements and slumping support levels in recent years as a result of increased focus on disproportionate budget contributions. Moreover, Benoit (1997) believes that France’s economic decline (the drop in GDP growth and rising unemployment) in the 1990s was a major factor in explaining the increase in French Euroscepticism post-Maastricht. Gabel (1998a), on the other hand, discredits the thesis as he finds that improving national economic conditions are also related to a decline in support for the EU. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) similarly question Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) thesis, as they report a weak relationship between GDP growth and EU support as well as negative relationships between unemployment and inflation.

2.4.6 The Identity Thesis
The sixth theoretical family embraces the issue of identity as a predictor of support for the EU; a variety of identity-based theories have been tested in the more recent

\textsuperscript{47} For more on the two-dimensional Eastonian model of system support, see Easton (1965).
scholarly literature on Euroscepticism (e.g. Deflem and Pampel 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Baker 2005; McLaren 2006). In one of her early articles on the topic (2002), McLaren contends that those who are particularly concerned about threats to the nation-state and thus national integrity are more likely to harbour Eurosceptic attitudes than those who are not. However, in a later article (2004), she argues that egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations are the main predictors of EU support, as she finds that the perceived threat of European integration to national identity is not as central to opinion formation on the EU as expected. Nevertheless, McLaren (2006) later arrives at the conclusion that considering the perceived threat the EU poses to national identity (national symbols and resources such as the welfare state, pride in national economic success, language and culture) is essential to understand attitudes towards European integration. Carey (2002) also tests three diverging concepts of national identity and their relations to support for European integration: the intensity of attachment to one’s country; the relationship between different territorial identities; and the degree of perceived threat from other cultures and identities to one’s own. He argues that the issues of national identity are just as important as utilitarian considerations in predicting support for the EU. However, as his study was only based on survey data from 2000, one has to be careful to make sweeping statements about the role of these three identity variables. Nevertheless, Hooghe and Marks (2005) contend that, coupled with economic calculations, the issue of national identity is extremely important to understanding public Eurosceptic sentiment. However, they add another dimension to their model, that of political effects. Specifically, they argue that attitude formation on the issue of Europe is based on “Calculation, Community and Cues”. This brings us to the seventh theory of EU support: party cues.

2.4.7 The Political Effects Thesis: National Government, Proxies and Partisanship

Increased focus on the “political effects” or “party cue” thesis is another recent development in the literature on public support and opposition. This argument asserts that citizen positions on European integration are products of party and
government politics, implying resistance on the part of political parties to voter
cueing as well as strong ideological preferences and party competition structures
(Hooghe 2007). It is related to three other individual theories of mass support for
European integration: first, the “national government” thesis of Franklin et al. (1994,
1995; also see Franklin 2002; Gabel 1998b; Hix 2005; Marquis and Lutz 2004; Ray
2003a; Svensson 2002) which links support for European integration with trust in or
the popularity of the government; 48 second, Anderson’s (1998) “proxy” model, which
contends that, in the absence of sufficient knowledge about the EU and its workings,
European citizens use national proxies in opinion formation; and third, the
“partisanship” thesis, which holds that there is a relationship between party and
voter positions on the European issue. The latter theory has been verified in
numerous studies (Inglehart 1977; Gabel 1998a, b; Hix 2005; Lobo 2003). The
robustness of the “partisanship” theory, in particular, poses the following question:
do parties “pull” public opinion, or does public opinion “push” party positions?
Hooghe and Marks (2005: 425) argue that since “[t]he European Union is part of a
system of multi-level governance that encompasses domestic political arenas, […]
one would expect domestic politics to shape public views on European
integration.” 49 Notwithstanding, the relationship between elite influence and public
support for the EU is of a highly contested nature. Milner (2000:6) states that “[e]lite
commitment to European integration plays a crucial part in shaping public
responses, but the causal relationship remains elusive.” Ray (2003b) argues that
political effects on public opinion about Europe depend on the contexts of the
different national party systems. His study shows that there is a relatively strong
positive relationship between party impact on public attitudes to the EU and high
party emphasis on the issue and between party influence and the strength of party
attachment. In addition, he establishes a (moderate but) positive relationship
between political effect and variety of party positions on Europe and public interest

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48 The “government support” thesis is applied primarily in conjunction with European referenda, where
“no” votes are thought to reflect dissatisfaction with the current government.
49 Moreover, recent research has suggested that extremist parties are more powerful cue-givers than
mainstream parties. A potential explanation for this divergence is party cues’ dependence on strong
opinion leadership, which is a common characteristic of extremist parties (Steenbergen et al. 2007).
This development could have significant implications for mass levels of Euroscepticism in countries
with Eurosceptic extremist parties of relative strength and popularity.
in politics (cognitive skills) as well as a relationship between intra-party dissent on
the issue and variation in voter preferences on Europe (see also Gabel and Scheve
2007). Inglehart (1977: 328) also believes that the political effect thesis is conditional;
he argues that public opinion is particularly receptive to elite influence when public
preferences are not deep-rooted, but he also points out that “publics and decision-
makers are linked in a feedback relationship” (p. 328). It is in other words much too
simplistic to approach popular Euroscepticism as a straight-forward matter of the
public adopting party attitudes.

2.4.8 Other Relevant Issues
It has been pointed out that countries with strong (trade and/or security) relations
with other than European partners, such as the UK and the Nordic countries, are
more prone to high levels of Eurosceptic sentiment and commonly prefer a global
intergovernmental cooperation structure including the United States of America
(USA), as opposed to an exclusively European one (George 1998; May 1999; Hix
2005; Sørensen 2004; Milner 2000). Moreover, satisfaction with EU democracy has
been highlighted as a significant determinant of support for the EU (Lobo 2003;
Petersson 2004). Furthermore, political/cultural heritage is also a relevant factor
(Milner 2000); the focus here is on national political and historical factors that are
seen as at odds with the direction and/or nature of European integration, in
particular those related to the second world war (WWII) and the desirability of peace
on the continent, political traditions and democratic stability. This provides a
possible explanation for the support discrepancy between countries with significant
historical baggage like traditionally pro-European Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain and
Portugal and countries with a long history of stable democracy like the traditionally
Eurosceptic UK and Nordic members (Hix 2005). Additional factors that are
commonly brought to the fore are the Swiss political tradition of direct democracy,
the increasing realization in France and Germany that the Franco/German power
axis is losing its significance in an EU of 25 or more members; the absence of an
affective dimension of British support for Europe (George 1998); and the vehemently
Eurosceptic press in the UK (e.g. Hix 2005).
2.5 Euroscepticism in Party Politics: the Issue of Party-based Euroscepticism

Having explored different aspects of mass Euroscepticism, it is also necessary to comment on how Euroscepticism is embodied in European party systems, as political parties and governments clearly play an important part in both shaping European integration as well as influencing public opinion on the issue. Whereas up to the time of Maastricht there was little research into the question of what impact Euroscepticism had on European party systems, mostly due to the general pro-European elite consensus on the issue, there has been an upsurge in the literature concerning party-based Euroscepticism in recent years.\(^50\) As a response to the rising importance of public Euroscepticism, the changing face of Europe and the increasing diversity of EU policy areas, Euroscepticism has become a significant feature of most European party systems\(^51\) despite its largely limited impact on electoral fortunes of political parties (Harmsen and Spiering 2004b). Before moving on to a review of the main developments in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, the paper deals with the complex nature of the European issue and its contested applicability to ideology.

Not only does European integration represent a vast selection of different policies and ideals, it is also highly dynamic. As Hooghe and Marks (2005: 426; also see Marks 2004) aptly put it, the EU is a “moving target”, and because the EU itself is constantly changing,\(^52\) positions and opinions on the EU cannot be static either. The element of dynamism has particularly relevance to soft Eurosceptic stances, as hard Eurosceptic stances are more commonly linked to opposition to the EU in principle and often based on ideological and static concerns (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). When examining party family affinity of Eurosceptic parties, it becomes clear that Euroscepticism commonly feature across the ideological spectrum (i.e. it is not

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\(^{50}\) See e.g. Harmsen and Spiering (eds., 2004a), Marks and Steenbergen (eds., 2004); Sz cerbiak and Taggart (eds., 2008b, c), Fuchs et al. (eds., 2009) and Leconte (2010).

\(^{51}\) with the exception of Spain (Taggart and Szcerbiak 2002).

\(^{52}\) European integration’s transition from being a mainly market-oriented to a more polity-oriented process is of extreme importance to the evolution of Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic stances (see Marks 2004).
confined to neither the left nor the right), illustrating that the European issue in
general and Euroscepticism in particular are exceptionally malleable\textsuperscript{53} (e.g. Taggart
1997, 1998; Flood 2002a). However, Brinegar \emph{et al.} (2004) point out that in countries
with extensive welfare states, the political left is prone to Eurosceptic stances,
whereas in conservative welfare states, the right is more likely to be Eurosceptic.

Moreover, it is worth noting the differences in how the issue of Europe presents
itself in across borders, whether “Europe” is debated in terms of support for or
opposition to policy, accession negotiations and/or membership. What Europe
signifies is naturally related to membership status, whether a country is a member
state, an applicant country or a non-applicant non-member state. Nevertheless, in
some member states, like the UK and Sweden, the debate on whether or not their
respective country should be a member of the EU continues (Sørensen 2004;
Petersson 2004), and according to Church (2003), in non-member Switzerland, the
debate is not mainly characterized by a uniform hostility towards the EU, but rather
divisions over and scepticism about EU issues.

Research shows that real levels of public Euroscepticism are higher than electoral
support for hard Eurosceptic parties (e.g. Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak
2002). In other words, high levels of public Euroscepticism do not translate into high
levels of support for Eurosceptic parties, or vice versa. As of yet there is no widely
accepted indicator of the strength of party-based Euroscepticism and the impact it
has on European party systems (see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003). This is
exemplified by France, which has generally high levels of public support for the EU
and quite high support for Eurosceptic parties, and the UK, which conversely has
high levels of public Euroscepticism, but limited success for parties expressing
Euroscepticism.\textsuperscript{54} The reason for this discrepancy is simply that to very few voters
European integration is a vote-defining issue; Europe is widely thought to be a
second order issue (e.g. Flood 2002b, 2005; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). This
applies to parties as well as voters, as European integration is a low-salience issue to

\textsuperscript{53} I.e. it carries considerable potential to fit into virtually any policy platform, regardless of ideology.
\textsuperscript{54} At least hard Eurosceptic parties, such as the UK Independence Party.
the majority of European parties; in most cases Euroscepticism is only a small component of a party’s overall programme. Besides, parties experiencing internal dissent or that have adopted an unpopular stance on the European issue (i.e. those parties which stand to suffer from emphasizing it) commonly downplay the debate on Europe (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Moreover, the electorate is more likely to vote on domestic issues and national concerns, most likely because of the perceived remoteness of Brussels and European affairs, but also because electoral campaigns and even EU-related referendum campaigns often revolve around domestic issues (Franklin et al. 1994). Another reason there can be no automatic relationship between mass-level support for Euroscepticism and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is that there is wide variation in where party-based Euroscepticism has been able to break through. As national contexts and variations of Euroscepticism differ massively, it is not very surprising that the nature and make-up of Eurosceptic parties in the different European party systems are highly heterogeneous (Taggart 1998; Brinegar et al. 2004). This is because electoral, institutional and cultural variables facilitate the growth of party-based Euroscepticism in some countries, but put constraints on the use of the issue in others.\footnote{For an account of the French and British case, see Harmsen (2005).} Hix (2005) believes that the European issue is more likely to be of more political relevance in countries with exceptionally large or small welfare states (e.g. in Scandinavia because of socialist worries about the welfare state) (also see Brinegar et al. 2004), in countries which are net contributors to the EU budget (e.g. in Britain because of protests against the size of the country’s budget contributions and in the Netherlands and Germany around 2004 as the budget-related EU hostility surfaced), in countries with strong foreign policy links outside the EU (e.g. in Switzerland because of the left’s concerns about neutrality), and/or in countries that are about to join or are new members. The five member states (of the EU15) harbouring the strongest Eurosceptic forces in terms of votes cast in parliamentary elections are Denmark, the UK, France, Austria and Sweden (Taggart and Szczersiak 2002). Interestingly, this largely corresponds with the countries which according to opinion polls harbour the highest aggregate levels of Eurosceptic popular attitudes (as stipulated above).
Moving on to the discussion of how Euroscepticism manifests itself in European party systems, Taggart and Szczterbiak (2000, 2002) argue that mainly protest parties adopt hard Eurosceptic stances (with the exception of factions), as they commonly use Euroscepticism as a means of distancing themselves from the party mainstream. Nevertheless, they find that when these parties move closer to the mainstream, they tend to soften their Eurosceptic rhetoric from hard to soft. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, are not usual agents of hard Euroscepticism, but may at times engage in “soft Eurosceptic rhetoric to maintain or advance their position within their domestic party system” (Taggart and Szczterbiak 2000: 8). However, Hix (2005, also see Marks 2004) believes that this model of Euroscepticism (which holds that Euroscepticism is mainly found in protest and peripheral parties) has become redundant; he argues that the model now only applies to Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark and Austria. He suggests that there are another two models of EU party positions complementing the “dissent model”: the “right pro-EU, left anti-EU” model, which includes Spain, Greece, Sweden and Finland; and the “left pro-EU, right anti-EU”, which he argues applies to Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and the UK.56

Sitter’s (2001, 2002, 2003) argument that party-based Euroscepticism is the “politics of opposition” largely corresponds with the dissent model (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczterbiak 2000, 2002), as both essentially expect Euroscepticism to be adopted by peripheral parties as a means of opposing the party mainstream. Sitter argues that because Euroscepticism is mainly adopted by parties in opposition, party positions are heavily reliant on strategy and dynamics of inter-party competition as well as ideology. In addition, he believes that the way in which parties use Euroscepticism depends on their position in their respective party system, in other words, whether they are competing along the mainstream dimension, the territorial dimension or the flank dimension of their system. Kopecky and Mudde (2002), on the other hand, maintain that ideology is the key variable explaining party-based Euroscepticism

56 For an overview of different models of political conflict over the European issue, see Steenbergen and Marks (2004).
and that strategy only influences EU policy-specific opposition (i.e. soft Euroscepticism). Moreover, Conti (2003) combines three of the main causal theories of party-based Euroscepticism, contending that party-based Euroscepticism is shaped by a combination of ideology, party centrality (in the party system), and government participation aspirations. However, Crum (2007) and Kriesi (2007) are in agreement with Kopecky and Mudde’s contention that parties emphasize ideological preferences more than strategic concerns when forming their stances on the European issue. Taggart and Szczepanik (2003) argue that because of the malleability of both party ideologies and the issue of Europe, it is impossible to determine a party’s stance on the EU purely from its ideological orientation. They also refute Sitter’s contention that strategy is the main determinant for party-based Euroscepticism; they believe that strategy and tactics are merely related to the party emphasis on a Eurosceptic stance. Szczepanik and Taggart (2008a: 256) thus argue that the main predictors for Eurosceptic positions are ideology and the perceived interests of the party’s voters, but that they are also influenced by the party’s government participation aspirations and its emphasis on ideological concerns. However, Hooghe et al. (2004) disagree with Szczepanik and Taggart’s view that ideology is not a sufficient predictor of a party’s stance on Europe. They believe that a party’s stance on the European issue can indeed be predicted if knowing its position on two scales: the left/right ideological continuum (according to the party’s desire for more or less regulation) and a new politics GAL/TAN scale (ranging from Green, Alternative and Libertarian to Traditional, Authoritative and Nationalist). They believe that the latter dimension “powerfully structures variations on issues arising from European integration” (p. 140) as they find it has stronger correlation to party stances on “Europe” than the left/right dimension. It is worth noting, however, that their results also correspond with the “dissent model”, as Eurosceptic parties are mainly found on the hard left and right (i.e. the extremes). In a later study, Marks et al. (2006) confirm this thesis of causality and apply it to the CEE member states. However, they find that although the structure of party-based Euroscepticism is the

57 Kopecky and Mudde’s “specific support” dimension can arguably be translated into soft Euroscepticism, as it is largely based on policy support or opposition.
same (according to the GAL/TAN model), in CEE, all the Eurosceptic parties are concentrated on the hard left (i.e. they show both high GAL and high TAN scores).\textsuperscript{58}

In sum, the existing research on party-based Euroscepticism shows that there is a clear majority of peripheral parties adopting Eurosceptic stances and that Euroscepticism rarely appears in mainstream parties (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2003). In other words, most European mainstream parties are pro-European (Mair 2000; Ray 2004b; Marks 2004). The two main reasons for this are that Euroscepticism is considered to be incompatible with the common catch-all strategies of mainstream parties (Sitter 2001, 2002) and that Euroscepticism is widely thought to be conflicting with government office, considering the vital role of governments in participating in and shaping the EU. However, if Euroscepticism does appear in the party mainstream, it is mainly in the form of factions or the engagement of soft Eurosceptic rhetoric (the latter mainly employed in the pursuit of electoral advantage) (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2000; Sitter 2002). There is not a consensus in the literature regarding Euroscepticism causality on the party level either, but the main theories are that it is caused or influenced by one or several of the following factors: ideology (in terms of left/right and new politics), strategy/tactics, competition/opposition politics and office-seeking, polity and electoral system and party system centrality (whether in the core/mainstream or on the periphery of the party system).

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, five core issues from the existing literature on Euroscepticism were reviewed: definition, motivation, historical development, the theories of public Euroscepticism causality and the manifestation of Euroscepticism in European party systems. The objectives of the chapter were to review the state of affairs in the literature on the conceptualization of Euroscepticism; get an impression of what arguments dominate the Eurosceptic discourse across Europe; assess the historical development of Euroscepticism; and review the theories and models of public and

\textsuperscript{58} Also see Hooghe (2007) for her support for this argument.
party-based Euroscepticism in order to contextualize the research on Norway and find a model which can assist in the research design of the thesis.

In the first section, the chapter argued that because Euroscepticism is so diverse and different stances do not necessarily fit into specific categories of Euroscepticism, the hard/soft distinction, where different stances can be located along a continuum, is preferred over other, more intricate typologies when analysing Euroscepticism. This does of course not mean that other typologies, such as the rejectionist/reformist/revisionist categorization are redundant; arguably, Flood (2002a) and Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2001) typologies are analytical tools that complement each other. However, in the case of Norway, where Euroscepticism is, almost without exceptions, cast as opposition to EU membership, it makes most sense differentiating between harder and softer types of EU-rejectionism.

The second section reviewed the most common criticisms levelled at the EU across Europe, and the third section provided a summary of the main developments of Euroscepticism across the last five decades. These two sections provided a basic foundation for comparing Norway with other European countries so that it will be possible to make some inferences about Norwegian Euroscepticism’s uniqueness, i.e. the extent to which the discourse and phases of Norwegian Euroscepticism follow the same patterns as those found in other European states.

Moreover, the chapter showed that the postmaterialist, economic interest and the identity theses are among the most influential theories explaining the rise of public Euroscepticism. Other prominent theories of public Euroscepticism, party cueing theory and proxies, were also discussed, but it was argued that this approach takes a rather simplistic view of political opinion formation, as the causal relationship between elites and public opinion remains unclear (Milner 2000; Ray 2003b; Inglehart 1977).
In the final section which reviewed the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, the chapter demonstrated that to be able to understand the rise of Euroscepticism in European party systems, a range of factors require consideration. These are related to ideology (left/right and new politics), strategy, party system position (mainstream versus periphery), institutional factors, inter-party competition and oppositional politics. The main model of Eurosceptic party positions posits that the European mainstream is largely pro-European and that party-based Euroscepticism is mainly found in the protest dimension or the periphery of European party systems. However, the Norwegian party system does not fit into this model, as in Norway, party-based Euroscepticism is found across the party system and the party bordering on the far-right, the PP, has not embraced a Eurosceptic stance. A review of the literature on Norway follows in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
A Review of the Norwegian Euroscepticism Literature: Definition, Causality and Manifestation

As mentioned previously, Norway is rarely included in the EB-based comparative research on public Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, there is a substantial separate body of literature on Norwegian opposition to European integration. This part of the literature review looks at how Norwegian Euroscepticism has been explained by existing research in order to identify potential gaps in the treatment of the subject to date and contextualize the research of the thesis. Firstly, it looks at how Norwegian Euroscepticism is defined in the literature. Secondly, it reviews the explanations of Norwegian EU opposition, the majority of which focuses on geographical, historical, political and cultural (values and/or identity) factors. Finally, it explores the literature on party-based Euroscepticism to shed light on how Euroscepticism manifests itself in the Norwegian party system.

3.1 Defining Norwegian Euroscepticism

Within the body of literature on Norwegian opposition to European integration, the use of the term Euroscepticism is not very widespread. Extremely few observers use the term to denote negative attitudes towards European integration (or EU membership); in both the English and Norwegian language literature there is a propensity to use alternative terms and prefixes such as “anti-EU”, “opposition” or simply “no” to describe Eurosceptic sentiments (e.g. Saglie 2000a; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997; Valen 1994). Only in the party-based Euroscepticism literature is the utilization of the term prevalent (Eliassen and Sitter 2004; Sitter 2004, 2005a), where it conforms to the definition established by Taggart (1998: 366). Archer (2000) and Hille (2007) are two of the few observers who consistently apply the label Euroscepticism to the Norwegian case.
The relative absence of the term Euroscepticism in the Norwegian language scholarly literature is not very surprising, as even in the popular media, the usage of the corresponding Norwegian terms “EU-skepsis” (EU-scepticism) and “euroskpsis” (Euroscepticism) is still very limited.\textsuperscript{59} Nevertheless, in some of the early Norwegian literature the word “scepticism” frequently appears; for example, both Eriksen (1977) and Pharo (1988) use the term to describe the Norwegian elite’s attitudes towards European integration up to the 1960s, as does Tamnes (1997) about the 1990s.

A point worth noting when considering the definition of Norwegian Euroscepticism is that the public debate on European integration in Norway has revolved around the question of membership. Hagen and Sverdrup (2003) argue that “Norwegian EU debates have revolved around Norway [and] what is good or bad for the democratic national state, business or individuals” (p. 19),\textsuperscript{60} and that there has been little focus on the Norwegian public’s attitudes towards the integration process itself. Their analysis of a 2003 opinion poll probing EU attitudes suggests that Norwegian popular attitudes towards the EU have become increasingly nuanced. They argue that positions on the EU can be divided into the following four stances: 1) Norway should join the EU; 2) Norway should not join the EU; 3) European integration is good for Europe, but not for Norway; and 4) the EU is more relevant to Norway now than before. Hagen and Sverdrup’s findings indicate that Norwegians are generally positive to the development of the EU, especially in the areas of justice and immigration policy, eastward enlargement and a common foreign policy, but that the scepticism prevails when there is mention of a European constitution or developments in the direction of a federation. Thus, it seems that Pharo’s (1988) characterization of Norwegian EC-scepticism still applies, that one of the cornerstones of the phenomenon is a strong aversion to surrendering “parts of Norwegian sovereignty through mutually binding agreements” (p. 54). In other words, although generally positive to

\textsuperscript{59} When the term is used in the Norwegian press and online, “EU-skepsis” and “Euroskpsis” are used interchangeably, but the term “euroskpsis” is also used to denote reservations about the single currency.

\textsuperscript{60} All Norwegian language sources quoted in the thesis are translated by the author, and any errors and misinterpretations of the contents of these are the sole responsibility of the author.
international cooperation in for example human rights, the United Nations (UN), disarmament and European integration, the Norwegians back away from the question of EU membership or what is perceived as concrete, binding agreements (Hagen and Sverdrup 2003). The next section considers the explanations most commonly used to account for the Norwegian unwillingness to commit fully to European integration.

3.2 Theories of Causality

Some observers of Norwegian EU opinion have in recent years borrowed theoretical frameworks from the Eurobarometer-based literature (e.g. Munkejord 2006; Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005), but no single publication has offered a systematic discussion of the aptitude of various models of public Euroscepticism to explain variation in support for EU membership in Norway. The body of literature attempting to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism focuses on different explanations from the literature on EU support in member states. This section of the paper outlines and discusses the theories that have been put forward to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, namely the innovation thesis, the economic interest thesis, the geography/Atlanticism thesis, the geo-historical thesis, the rural identity thesis, the exceptionalism thesis and finally the political effect thesis (cueing and partisanship).

3.2.1 The Innovation Theory

The application of the innovation theory to the case of Norwegian Euroscepticism was prominent in the 1970s. The theory holds that new ideas will first be accepted in the centre of a society and with time spread to the peripheries. Here, “centre” refers to either where the power lies/decisions are made or high social status (Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973). 61 Gleditsch (1972) refutes the innovation theory because of the stability of the negative opinion among people with low social position between

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61 Hellevik et al. (1975) utilize Johan Galtung’s Social Position index, where respondents are given a rank according to their score on eight different variables: geographical position (centre vs. periphery), ecological position (urban vs. rural), income (high vs. low), sector of occupation (secondary and tertiary vs. primary), occupational position (high vs. low), gender, age (middle aged vs. young and old) and education (higher education vs. no higher education).
1961 and 1972. Although Hellevik and Gleditsch’s 1973 data supports the innovation theory, in a later publication, the same authors dismiss the innovation theory as they argue that the Norwegian peripheries’ “no” was not a result of ignorance, but a conflict of interests and values (Hellevik et al. 1975).

3.2.2 The Economic Interest Thesis
The economic argument has frequently been used to explain Norway’s reluctance to participate in European integration as an EU member (e.g. Ingebritsen 1998, cited by Neumann 2002: 89; Ingebritsen 1997; Matlary 2000; Wallis et al. 2002). The theory holds that the healthy state of the Norwegian economy and the country’s economic independence, which is by and large due to the wealth accumulated through the petroleum sector, are important reasons why the majority of Norwegians do not deem EU membership necessary (e.g. Ingebritsen 1997; Matlary 2000; Gstöhl 1996). Furthermore, it assumes that economic interest related to the primary sector, in other words protection of the agricultural and fisheries sectors, is another important reason for Norwegian opposition to EU membership (e.g. Ingebritsen 1998, cited by Neumann 2002: 89; Hille 2007). However, Neumann (2002) emphatically refutes this argument. He points out that in 1972, when the Norwegian oil wealth had yet to show its extent, the oil argument was not a significant feature of the debate on EC membership. Furthermore, Neumann argues that the strong Norwegian desire to protect the primary sector can hardly be put down to economic interest. The sector was small in size in 1972, when it employed only 12 percent of the workforce, and was even more economically insignificant in 1994, when it accounted for only 6 percent of total employment62 (Pettersen et al. 1996: 262). Egeberg (2003) also believes that the economic argument should not be over-emphasized because of the remarkable stability of the voting pattern and its clear centre-periphery dimension. As the extent of Norwegian oil fortunes was not yet discovered in 1972 and the 1994 referendum was a near duplication of 1972, he believes that there is more to the vote than economic considerations. Additionally, as economic interest is a considerable more prominent feature of the pro-EU side’s argumentation than of the anti-EU

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62 The figure is from 1990.
side’s (Aardal 1983), it has been suggested that in Norway, economic considerations rather explain Norwegian EU-enthusiasm than Euroscepticism (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). These contestations notwithstanding, one cannot deem the economic thesis completely irrelevant, as the debates on EU membership have traditionally centred on what is best for the country, and economic concerns arguably form a very central part of domestic interest considerations. Economic arguments have often been the main feature of the “yes” campaigns in most countries’ debates on the issue, as EU membership has been regarded as an economic necessity by many states (Lawler 1997). In Norway, however, it has been argued that the country’s fortunate economic position has allowed the Norwegian debate to centre on cultural and political issues rather than economic ones (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). In effect, it could be argued that Norway’s beneficial economic position is not the direct reason for the persistence of Norwegian Euroscepticism, but that it has, in Lawler’s (1997: 587) words, “effectively crippled the pro-EU case”. Or as Gstöhl (1996: 4) aptly puts it: “Being rich is not the reason for [Norway’s] reluctance but it allows [her] to cherish national peculiarities much longer.” Thus, the question is whether the public would be more receptive to economic interest-based arguments in the event of economic recession, or whether these “peculiarities” would still prevail as the Norwegian electorate’s primary concerns in a future debate (Lawler 1997; Gstöhl 1996; Ingebritson and Larson 1997).

Some research has been conducted on the relationship between Norwegian attitudes towards the EU and fluctuations in the national economy. In a study of opinion polls from 1989-2004, Grünfeld and Sverdrup (2005) test the national economy thesis on public attitudes towards EU membership, i.e. the impact fluctuations in unemployment, GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, trade and oil prices have on EU attitudes. Their analysis suggests that support for EU membership declines when the economy is performing well63 and that unemployment (positively related to

63 The “national economy” thesis holds that for an EU member state, support for the EU will increase when the economy is doing well and decline when it is underperforming. However, in a non-EU member state, like Norway, the opposite effect is expected because of the notion that change (EU membership) is undesirable when the status quo (non-membership) is working well.
support) and GDP growth (negatively related) are particularly strong predictors of EU membership support in Norway.

There is a general lack of empirical studies applying the economic voting model to the Norwegian case in the literature, and those observers who have conducted studies in this area (e.g. Jenssen et al. 2004; Moses and Jenssen 1998) base their research on the 1994 referendum study and conclude that economic voting is of little relevance to the Norwegian case, particularly egocentric economic voting. Conversely, Bjørklund (1997a: 147) suggests that in some instances economic interest might be an important factor of Norwegian EU opposition, as the 1994 no votes were mainly drawn from the farmers/fishermen group (94 percent voted “no”) and the public sector (53 percent). Furthermore, the only two municipalities that voted “yes” in the “no” region of the west were Årdal and Sunndal, export-based industry communities which were thought to benefit economically from EU membership through the free market. Other commentators (Pettersen et al. 1996; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997; Jenssen et al. 1995) also report results that correspond to Gabel’s (1998a) utilitarian thesis: young and female voters as well as primary and public sector employees and people with low levels of education are more likely to be against membership. While these findings all support Gabel’s (1998a) utilitarian/economic interest thesis, social class, on the other hand, does not seem to have had any bearing on the vote in 1994 (Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). However, in 1972 there was a relatively clear relationship between the traditional working class and the “no” vote (Jenssen et al. 1995).

3.2.3 The Geography/Atlanticism Thesis

Norway’s geographical position on the periphery of the continent is another feature of the country which has been cited as an explanation for the nation’s reluctance to commit herself to European integration through full membership (e.g. Bjørklund

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64 According to the economic interest thesis, these groups are thought to be the economic losers of European integration, due to loss of subsidies (in the case of the former) and job security.

65 Primary sector occupation in Gabel’s model is positively correlated to a ‘yes’ vote, but in Norway, where farmers and fishermen are expected to lose out from European integration, the hypothesized relationship is negative.
1997a, b; Matlary 2000). This argument acquires more credibility when the country’s geography is coupled with its traditional international political orientation. Not only is Norway positioned away from the European continent on the northernmost periphery, she also has an exceptionally long coast line, which faces west towards the UK and the United States (US). These geographical features are by and large the reasons for her traditionally strong Atlanticist orientation in both trade and security (Bjørklund 1997b). Several observers provide this Atlanticist orientation as the background to a Norwegian scepticism towards the EU specifically as well as the European continent in general (Pharo 1986, 1988; Ørvik 1972a; Archer 2000; Svåsand and Lindström 1996; Matlary 2000; Rieker 2006a). Most studies of elite attitudes towards European integration in the first decades after the war focused on this issue: the Norwegians were “uneasy” about European integration because of the incompatibility of the living standards, social security levels and economic policy in Norway and on the continent (Ørvik 1972a; Pharo 1986). In 1972, Ørvik (1972a: 12) stated that “there is an ingrained element of insularity in the Norwegian attitude to the European Continent, [Europe] meaning something remote and different”. According to Hille (2007: 67), the slogan “A long way to Oslo, but even further to Brussels”,66 which was used by the “no” side in 1994, signifies two conceptions of distance: geographical distance as well as the distance between just and democratic Norway and the distant and bureaucratic EU institutions. The 1994 slogans “Environmental Protection or Union”, “Solidarity or Union” and “Participatory Democracy or Union” (Jenssen 1995b: 18) also illustrate the “no” camp’s conception of the differences between Norwegian and European values and their incompatibility.

This lack of identification with the European continent is illustrated by data from the 1990 European Values Survey. In the survey, only six percent of Norwegians reported geographical identification with Europe (as opposed to 25 percent of the French and 12 percent of Swedes), and when asked about their attachment to other nations, their preferences clearly pointed to their two Scandinavian neighbours and

66 In Norwegian: “Langt til Oslo, men lenger til Brussel”.

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subsequently across the Atlantic, and not towards the continent. 50 percent of Norwegian respondents listed the Swedes as their first choice; 25 percent listed the Danes, and the only two nationalities which scored more than 2 percent were the Americans and the British, with 9 and 6 percent respectively (Huseby and Listhaug 1995: 143, 148). Huseby and Listhaug (1995: 148) argue that “these geo-attachments may also play a role in feeding Norwegian Euroscepticism, as the dominant and driving powers of the European Union are not those of the peoples that we feel easily and strongly attached to.”

3.2.4 The Geo-Historical Thesis

Norway’s territorial peculiarities have also been frequently used to account for Norway’s reluctance to join the EU (Matlary 2000; Wallis et al. 2002). Especially through empirical testing of Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage model, the relevance of the country’s dispersed settlement pattern and the periphery’s strong political tradition to the voting pattern in the Norwegian referenda has been established (e.g. Valen 1973; Bjørklund 1997a, b; Jenssen et al. 1995). Rokkan and Valen (1964) identified five traditional conflict dimensions in the Norwegian political system: the territorial, socio-cultural, religious, commodity market and labour market cleavages. However, the cleavages are perhaps more appropriately divided into six conflict dimensions (Rokkan 1967; Valen 1976; Jenssen et al. 1995). These are presented in Table 3.1 below.

The three socio-cultural movements, also called the “countercultures”, have traditionally drawn strong support from the South-Western periphery. Thus, the five first cleavages in Table 3.1 either have a centre/periphery or an urban/rural territorial dimension.

Although the historical cleavages had become largely irrelevant to voting patterns in Norwegian politics by the 1960s, Rokkan and Valen (1964: 171) suggest that all the
traditional cleavages were reactivated in August 1961 when the decision whether or not to apply for EC membership had to be made:

“The Southerners and Westerners again stood out as the defenders of the cultural autonomy of the provinces against the encroachments of the centre: this time the enemy was not just in Oslo, but, what made it much worse, in the distant bureaucratic centres on the European continent.”

Table 3.1  Norway’s six traditional political cleavages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Territorial: Centre vs. Periphery</td>
<td>Territorial-cultural Between Oslo/the Eastern Centre and the two peripheries (the South-West and the North) over national independence and representative democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Socio-cultural: Linguistic policy</td>
<td>Territorial-cultural Between the defenders of the Danish-influenced established standard riksmål (the educated, Europeanized officials) in the cities and the promoters of the rural language nynorsk (the increasingly status-conscious and nation-oriented peasants) in the rural districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Socio-cultural: Teetotalism</td>
<td>Territorial-cultural Conflict between the liberal alcohol policy promoted by central Norway and the prohibition movement in the periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Socio-cultural: Religious</td>
<td>Territorial-cultural Between the secularism and tolerant liberalism of the established urban population and the orthodox and fundamentalist Lutheranism of large parts of the rural and recently urbanized population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Commodity market: Urban vs. Rural interest</td>
<td>Functional-economic Between the producers and consumers of agricultural products over prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Labour market: Left vs. Right</td>
<td>Functional-economic Between employers and wage-earners/ salaried employees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Rokkan and Valen (1964: 166) and Valen (1976: 50).

The salience of all of the six traditional political cleavages in both the referenda has been widely established (Valen 1973; Jønssen et al. 1995; Bjørklund 1997a, 1997b; Pettersen et al. 1996; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997). Both in 1972 and 1994, affiliation

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67 It was the 1962-1963 debate on EC membership which inspired Stein Rokkan’s original contribution to the model (Jønssen et al. 1995).
with the countercultures was positively correlated to a “no” vote and research indicate that the countercultures were even more important to the referendum vote in 1994 than in 1972 (Jenssen et al. 1995: 159).

The reasons why there are such stark contrasts between the preferences of the peripheral and central populations are mainly historical, as the inhabitants of the peripheries have traditionally been the defenders of Norwegian democracy, culture and values against forces of centralization, urbanization and Europeanization. In other words, they have been extremely central to the country’s political and social development. The Norwegian society’s agrarian heritage, Norwegian farmers’ history of independence and collective experience of economic asperity in the nineteenth century are important aspects of the background to the historical struggle against the centralizing urban forces (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Rokkan 1967; Ingebritsen 2006). Additionally, the exceptionally strong mobilization of the periphery is firmly rooted in the three counter-cultures, the lay, prohibition and rural language movements, as well as the egalitarian structure of the Norwegian society, embodied by Norwegian regional policy, the welfare state and a preference for folkestyre (local participatory democracy) (Bjørklund 1997a, b; Gstöhl 1996). On the party political level, it was the LP and its descendants, the CP (previously Bondepartiet, the Farmers’ Party) and the CDP who represented these interests. Additionally, the periphery was the driving force in the battle for parliamentarism in the 1880s as well as in the independence movement in 1905, when Norway cut loose from the 90 year-long union with Sweden (Bjørklund 1997a). Its main objective then, like in 1972 and 1994, was to defend its ideal of folkestyre. Neumann (2009: 421) emphasizes the importance of this part of history to why Norway is not a member of the EU, as he argues that

“the main point is that the later representations of 1905, without exceptions, emphasized that the dissolution of the union came [...] as a result of the people’s battle for independence [original italics], expressed through a part of

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68 During the serfdom period, Norwegian farmers were comparatively more independent and retained greater control over their land than elsewhere in Europe (Ingebritsen, 2006: 23).
the state – the Storting. As a result of the nationalists’ initiative and the leading role they had played in the battle for independence […] a central connection between the concepts *people, democracy* and *independence* [author’s italics] was established”.

Neumann’s key argument is that because of their “conceptual power” (*begrepsmakt*), these concepts (people, democracy and independence) are at the roots of Norwegian EU opposition. Norway’s history of union (or foreign rule) and status as a young independent nation is commonly brought to the fore when scholars try to account for its population’s reluctance to join the European Union (e.g. Ingebritsen 1997; Matlary 2000; Gstöhl 1996, 2002a, b; Bjørklund 1997a and 1997b; Lie 1972). The historical element is also linked to the periphery’s strong political tradition. As Gstöhl (1996: 17) argues, the

“psychological heritage of 500 years of governance of foreign powers [has made] the victories over those hegemons⁶⁹ […] important elements in Norwegian nation-building. They make it rather unattractive to the Norwegians to restrict their hard-won sovereignty by joining a supranational union.”

The importance of the sovereignty and democracy element in the formation of attitudes on EU membership is further illustrated by the prevalence of the political culture-driven arguments of the “no” campaigners and voters in the referendum (Bakke and Sitter 2004; Hille 2007; Kvalvåg 2008; Sciarini and Listhaug 1997: 429). The remarkable stability of the Norwegian electorate’s Euroscepticism, as illustrated by the nearly identical 1972 and 1994 referenda’s regional vote pattern (see Figure 8.6 in Chapter Eight), is another reason why the territorial cleavages cannot be ignored in any study of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

⁶⁹ Gstöhl refers to the year 1814, when Norway broke away from Denmark, 1905, when the union with Sweden was dissolved, and 1945, which marked the end of the German WWII occupation.
3.2.5 The Rural Identity Theory

The fifth theory attempting to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, namely the rural identity theory, overlaps with the latter two explanations discussed above, as all three hold that Norwegian culture and values are important to Norwegian Euroscepticism. The rural identity theory, which embraces the notion that Norwegian identification with the countryside and peasants’ culture is at the core of Norwegian Euroscepticism and the two “no” votes (Gstöhl 1996; Ingebritsen 1997; Neumann 2002; Hille 2007), has captured a fundamental element of the Norwegian identity, one which is irreconcilable with EU membership because of the inevitable damage it would cause to Norwegian agriculture.  

This theory claims to explain the reason why the agricultural and fisheries sectors were able to rally so many voters to their cause, despite their limited size and scope. Employing discourse analysis, Neumann (2001, 2002) argues that that the concept of “Norway” as embodied by the territory and the people and how these two interlink are extremely central to understanding Norwegian Euroscepticism. He believes that the whole idea of Norway relies upon population of the whole territory of Norway. Put differently, without its rural population, Norway can no longer be Norway. Neumann (2002: 115) states that

“[…] agriculture and fisheries are about much more than simply money. Inasmuch as they uphold current demographics, they are institutional mechanisms which sustain a certain representation of Norway. This representation is endangered by EC membership, which must therefore be fought tooth and nail. This explains how two parts of the economy which in terms of productivity were rather peripheral to an already heavily industrialized country could become so central to the debate about the EC.”

Gstöhl (1996) agrees that as the EU and the application of the CAP would result in a mass exodus from the peripheral regions, EU membership would be detrimental to

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70 Contending with a short growing season and extreme weather conditions, Norwegian farmers are among the most subsidized in the world (Bjørklund 1997a). EU membership would entail large cuts in subsidies for farmers and the demise of the agricultural sector in Norway.
“the important role of peasant culture” in the Norwegian identity, as well as the country’s security and food supplies. Hille (2007: 67) also contends that the centre-periphery dimension has more to do with “the background of a national romantic idealization of the peasants and the countryside”, ingrained in the Norwegian identity and values, and less to do with Norwegian political and economic rural interests. In this context it is worth noting that in Norway, territorial identities are not tied to specific regions, but rather to the idea of a peripheral location (Aarebrot 1982: 103, 107).

3.2.6 The Exceptionalism Thesis

The exceptionalism thesis is also value- and identity-based. The thesis holds that at the very core of Scandinavian exceptionalism lies the ideal of social democracy and “the commitment of citizens to taking care of everyone in the society” (Ingebritsen 2006: 23), and that this ideal is inseparably intertwined with the national identity. This exceptionalism implies that there is a dominant Scandinavian perception that social democracy and its institutions upholding the values of solidarity (in both domestic and foreign policy), egalitarianism and environmentalism constitute a form of society superior to that of the continent (Lawler 1997; Ingebritsen 1997; Pharo 1988; Archer 2000). European integration is thus seen as a threat to the Norwegian way of life as “it would accelerate the erosion of a superior form of society” (Lawler 1997: 566, also see Ingebritsen and Larson 1997). Moreover, EU membership also signifies a threat to Norwegian internationalism, such as her tradition of foreign aid and international peace-keeping role. In other words, it is feared that if joining the Union, Norway’s role as a “global advocate for human rights, solidarity, peace, the environment and equality” would be undermined (Ingebritsen 2006: 21; also see Lawler 1997: 580). The idea of a Nordic feeling of superiority is also echoed by Wæver (1992: 84), as he states that Nordic exceptionalism (or “nostalgia”) implies “being part of Europe, but being a little better off than the rest. In what respects? In being more peaceful than Europe and in having more social and global solidarity”. The notion of a collective Scandinavian identity is backed up by evidence that the Scandinavian identities are primarily attached to each other and that they lack
identification with the rest of Europe. Drawing on data from the 1990 values survey, Huseby and Listhaug (1995: 148-9) report that 74 percent of Norwegians list their Scandinavian counterparts as the people they feel most strongly attached to, compared to 59 percent of Swedes and 60 percent of Danes. Norway was also the country in the survey which showed the least support for the idea that national identities and European integration can coexist. Norway’s reported weak identification with Europe is arguably also a central part of this thesis, as it illustrates the importance of value differences between the Norwegian exceptionalist state and an EU which “runs counter to the traditions and policies of Nordic social democracy” (Ingebritsen 1997: 253). In effect, “Scandinavian Euroscepticism could be viewed as a familiar mix of collective nostalgia and nationalism” (Lawler 1997: 566).

3.2.7 The Cueing Thesis

Finally, the widely acknowledged success of the “no” movement in both referenda (Archer 2000 and 2005; Ingebritsen and Larson 1997; Bjørklund 1997a, b; Gsthöl 1996; Jenssen and Listhaug 2001; Neumann 2001, 2002) suggests that the political cueing thesis could be relevant to the study of Eurosceptic opinion formation. According to a survey conducted after the 1994 referendum, 28 percent of respondents stated that the ad hoc organization NtEU had had an impact on their vote (Bjørklund 1997b: 217). Neumann (2002) believes that the “no” movement was very central in forming Eurosceptic opinion at the time of the Norwegian referenda, stating that it captured “the heart of the nation”. He asserts that through utilizing identity politics and a national discourse (employing the terms “state”, “nation”, “people” and “Europe”, terms which carry historical connotations), the “no” camp and primary sectors were able to mobilize sympathizers to their cause (p 90).

Jenssen and Listhaug (2001) argue that the Norwegian political parties were important cue-givers in the Norwegian 1994 referendum and that voters are more likely to change position on policy issues according to party cues in referenda than
in elections.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, Sciarini and Listhaug (1997) and Pettersen \textit{et al.} (1996: 270) found, in their studies of the 1994 Referendum Study, that partisanship was a strong predictor of the “no” vote, as the vote for “no” parties in the 1985, 1989 and 1993 elections carried a correlation of 0.51, 0.57 and 0.86 respectively to the “no” vote in the referendum.\textsuperscript{72} Conversely, in his study of the 1994 referendum data set, Saglie (2000b: 243) argues that “a simple cue-taking model, whereby citizens adopt EU attitudes that reflect the positions of their preferred parties, is not appropriate in the case of the Norwegian referendums”.

3.3 The European Issue and the Norwegian Political System

The relationship between the Norwegian political parties and the EU is naturally different to that of parties in EU member states, as Norwegian parties do not participate in European politics to the same extent as their EU counterparts. For example, the Norwegian government is not represented in the European Council or the Council of Ministers, and the country’s political parties do not compete in European elections.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, the extremely strong politicization of the EU issue in Norway in the early 1990s (Valen 1994; Saglie 1998) and the massive impact it has had on party politics, in particular with regard to coalition formation, has attracted much attention to this area of study.

It is quite clear that the EU issue has had a significant impact on Norwegian politics. First, this is demonstrated by the division it caused in the party system as early as in 1961, both on the inter-party and intra-party levels. The Labour splinter group and

\textsuperscript{71} The authors argue that parties are, contrary to widespread belief, active in the politics of referenda, as they influence the institutional elements of the referendum through deciding the timing of the referenda; they provide leadership and activists to the \textit{ad hoc} organizations and allocate financial resources for the campaigns; they take clear stances on the issue and become cue-givers; and finally, they implement the referenda results.

\textsuperscript{72} Although it is important to note that very many of the 40 percent of the voters in the 1993 election who either changed their party preference or participation/abstention status in the 1993 election, did so due to the European issue (Aardal and Valen 1995).

\textsuperscript{73} However, the Norwegian parties are part of the pan-European family groupings. For example, the Labour Party is a member of the Party of European Socialists and \textit{Miljøpartiet de grønne} is a member of the European Greens.
other left-oriented anti-EC politicians who went to form the SPP and SEL in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to the EC issue exemplify this impact perfectly (Bergh and Pharo 1977). Secondly, in the early 1970s, the non-socialist government (1971) as well as the LP split over the issue. In addition, the 1972 election saw the LP’s vote plummet from 46.5 to 35.3 percent (Aylott 2002: 443), and the 1972 referendum forced the Labour government to step down as a result of having stipulated a vote of confidence. Moreover, both the 1973 and 1993 general election results show that the issue has contributed to the loosening of party ties and increase in electoral volatility. Valen (1998) argues that the EU issue continued to dominate Norwegian politics long after the 1994 referendum, and that in the 1997 election, large parts of the electorate were still alienated by the long referendum campaign. Grünfeld and Sverdrup (2005: 39) contend that “The EU issue is today one of the most important political conflict issues in Norway, and constitutes one of the clearest cleavages in Norwegian politics”. Furthermore, the EU issue has complicated coalition formation in Norway since the early 1990s; it has diffused government alternatives and in periods suspended the traditional Norwegian two-bloc system (Valen 1998). The intra-governmental disagreement over the issue which caused the Syse government to collapse in 1990 is a case in point. Commenting on the coalition dilemma, Sitter (2004) describes coalitions on both the socialist and non-socialist sides as “hostages” to the EU issue. One could also hypothesize that the EU issue has indirectly facilitated changes in some parties’ alliance-orientation, as the case of the CP illustrates. The party terminated its history of coalition cooperation with the Conservative Party in 1990 and is currently participating in a red-green coalition with fellow hard Eurosceptic party, the SLP, and the divided Labour Party. Ray and Narud (2000) find that the CP and the SLP’s positions on the two main Norwegian cleavages have converged: the CP has moved closer to the left, i.e. towards the SLP’s position, on the left/right continuum, and the SLP has become more pro-rural on the territorial dimension. This, they argue, could be a result of their alliance in the referendum campaign.
Sitter (2001, 2004, 2005a, b) examines “Euroscepticism as the politics of opposition” in the Norwegian party system and draws on the general European comparative literature to a larger extent than other scholars studying the Norwegian case. Sitter (2005a) contends that the Norwegian case of party-based Euroscepticism does not fit into Taggart’s (1998) “dissent” model, because Eurosceptical positions feature across the political system and have remained more or less stable during the last almost five decades. He believes that party-based Euroscepticism is a result of party system and party strategy, and his “politics of opposition” model contends that parties compete along three dimensions of competition and choose the corresponding strategy to this dimension. These are the catch-all (left/right) dimension, the territorial/interest dimension and the flank dimension. The Labour Party and Conservatives are allocated to the first dimension as they are the two mainstream parties of the left and right that aim for a broad voter appeal. Second, the three middle parties are labelled territorial/interest parties, as their Euroscepticism is based on defending the interests and values of their target electorates. Finally, the SLP and the PP are located in the flank dimension of electoral competition, because of their peripheral positions in the system as well as their protest dimensions.

Sitter emphasizes that when dealing with coalition politics, all parties face incentives to modify their positions. An illustration of this is the PP’s abstention from using Eurosceptic sentiment, as it would be incompatible with the party’s recent attempts to improve relations with their desired coalition partner, the Conservative Party (Sitter 2005a, c). Coalition strategies notwithstanding, Sitter (2004: 29) observes that “at the moment, all the major players prioritise their position on EU membership over coalition games”. This is exemplified by the design of the suicide clause. Sitter (2005a) finds Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism to be particularly unique in three ways: first, it is remarkably persistent; second, it is, unlike elsewhere in Europe, found in the centre of the party system as opposed to on the far right; and third, in Norway, the pressure to moderate the party’s stance on European integration when faced with coalition politics has been on the Conservative Party, as opposed to the Eurosceptic coalition parties.
3.4 Conclusion

In order to identify gaps in existing research on the phenomenon and inform the research design of the current research, this chapter reviewed three key strands of the literature on Norwegian Euroscepticism: the issue of definition, theories of why Norway voted “no” in 1972 and 1994 and the EU issue in Norwegian politics. It was pointed out that the issue of what defines Norwegian Euroscepticism has not been a major topic in the literature and that the concept of Euroscepticism is not commonly applied to Norway. Although the national debate has traditionally revolved around the question of membership, Hagen and Sverdrup (2003) suggest that the Norwegian public do consider European integration in other terms than “yes” and “no”. They put forward a categorization of EU attitudes which divides Norwegian Euroscepticism into two categories: 1) Opposition to the European integration process and to Norwegian EU membership; and 2) Support for European integration as a project, but opposition to Norwegian EU membership. Notwithstanding, this categorization does not reveal what Norwegian Euroscepticism is really about, that is, what aspects of European integration Norwegians object to. Besides, the two categories are, in essence, merely a hard and a soft version of rejectionist Euroscepticism, to use a combination of Flood (2002a) and Szczepielak and Taggart’s (2008a) typologies. In the following chapters, the thesis will investigate the nature of Norwegian Euroscepticism further, seeking to find a more refined definition/classification of the phenomenon.

The chapter also reviewed the theories used to explain the Norwegian reluctance to join the EU, finding that it is usually put down to one or more of the following characteristics: the country’s unique natural resources and correspondingly favourable economic position (i.e. protection of the fish resources and the oil wealth and its facilitation of heavy subsidisation of the agricultural sector); its geographical position, which is related to a lack of identification with the European continent and a tradition of strong Atlantic ties; its periphery, which has a strong tradition of
mobilization against the forces of centralization and Europeanization in defence of *folkestyre* and national independence; two elements of the Norwegian identity, the first of which is characterized by strong affective ties to the countryside and is highly dependent on the comprehensive Norwegian regional policy, and the second of which is concerned with Scandinavian exceptionalism and its social democratic values of solidarity and egalitarianism, embodied by a strong welfare state; and finally, political effects: the importance of elite cueing.

Furthermore, it was argued that the European issue has had a significant impact on Norwegian politics, as the question of membership has broken up governments, split parties, created voter volatility and complicated coalition formation since it appeared on the political agenda in the 1960s. Sitter (2001, 2004, 2005a, b, 2009) argues that Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism is a matter of party strategy and tactics; he contends that parties emphasize their stance on the EU depending on whether or not they stand to gain from it in electoral, policy or office-seeking terms, and that the parties’ strategies differ according to what opposition dimension they compete along. But many party-based Euroscepticism scholars like Sitter fail to make an important distinction in their analysis of the phenomenon, between parties’ position on the EU (i.e. why they adopt Eurosceptic stances) and to what extent and how the EU issue is used in inter-party competition. In the vast majority of cases, a party’s underlying position on the EU diverges from whether and how the party articulates this position, and as Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a: 256) correctly point out “these two distinct phenomena have different causal mechanisms”. More to the point, the body of literature focusing on party strategy can only explain why some parties give priority to their position on Europe and others do not. In effect, in the Norwegian case, Sitter’s politics of opposition theory can only explain the different parties’ motivation for emphasizing or playing down their Euroscepticism. It cannot explain the motivation behind parties’ Eurosceptic attitudes, which is the focus of the thesis. Therefore, the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters uses a framework for analysis derived from the literature on EU support in Norway and EU member states, focusing on values, identity and interest. It assumes that although the media
and political elites play an important part in shaping public attitudes, the three levels (media, parties and public) are linked in a relationship characterized by multidirectional causal mechanisms. The next four chapters report on the documentary analysis of Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation through the five-decade period under study. The following chapter looks at the 1960s period.
Chapter 4
The First Phase: the 1960s

Norway’s relationship to the EU has, from the early talks of European cooperation in the late 1940s up until the present day, been more complicated than those of most other European states. To enhance the understanding of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is essential to know the history and background to the case: how the country’s relationship to the EC/EU has evolved over time; how the issue of Europe played itself out in the party system in the different periods; when and in what parts of society opposition to European integration was strong, and what economic and societal forces were at work during the different periods. Therefore, alongside the analysis of Eurosceptic argumentation between 1961 and 2010, the next four chapters provide a chronology of the political and societal developments in Norway from 1947 to the present day, in order to contextualise the documentary analysis. Additionally, this kind of approach has the potential benefit of identifying and eliminating any explanatory factors of Norwegian Euroscepticism which the integrated research design does not account for. Thus, for the purposes of coherence, the next four chapters are chronological; each chapter deals with a phase of Euroscepticism. The first three, the 1960s, 1970-2 and 1989-94, were periods of heightened debate, which started with new developments in the EC and culminated in the 1972 and 1994 referenda. The 1995-2010 period, in contrast, can be characterized as a period of muffled debate and latent Euroscepticism, as the EEA agreement prevented the issue from being completely removed from the agenda, unlike the period between the referenda when it was considered dead and buried.

Thus, this chapter aims to investigate the nature and causality of Norwegian Euroscepticism in the 1960s, in the phase that the phenomenon started to form. The first part of the chapter, section 4.1, is based on a survey of secondary sources; first, it focuses on the party system and foreign policy prior to the first debate on

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74 Between 1973 and the late 1980s, the EC issue was considered settled by the 1972 referendum, and there was extremely little debate about the issue. Therefore, the period does not warrant the attention of a separate chapter, but will instead be commented on in Chapter Six.
membership in 1961, and second, on the events and developments of the 1960s. Subsequently, section 4.2 reports on the findings from the 1960s newspaper and party analysis.

4.1 Going Back to the 1960s Debates and Beyond

4.1.1 The Norwegian Party System and Foreign Policy before 1961

In the early part of the twentieth century, after the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905, the Norwegian political system underwent substantial changes, as the Labour Party gradually took over the LP’s position as the Conservative Party’s main political contender. After the First World War, political competition took on a stronger class profile, and as a result, the centre-periphery cleavage which had traditionally structured political opposition in Norway was weakened. In 1920, a faction of the LP left to form the Farmers’ Party, later renamed the Centre Party, and in 1933, another Liberal splinter group formed the CDP, a party concerned with protecting Lutheran values against the secularizing forces from the centre.

In addition to the religious counterculture championed by the CDP from 1933, in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, the issues of teetotalism and the rural language nynorsk were politicized. The main defenders of the countercultures were the Liberal party and its splinter parties, which drew their main support from the peripheral areas, whereas the Conservative Party, with its main electoral stronghold in Oslo and the surrounding area, supported a more liberal alcohol policy and the Danish-influenced bokmål language. Another important element of Norwegian politics established in the mid-1930s is the cross-party commitment to regional policies and the will to give rural areas a special place in national policy. This included protection of the primary sector, and gradually (particularly from the

75 For readers unfamiliar with the Norwegian party system, an overview can be found in Appendix B.
76 The party will hereafter be referred to as the CP.
77 For details on electoral results between 1906-1936, see Table B2 in Appendix B, which clearly illustrates the changes the Norwegian party system underwent in this period, with the LP gradually losing out electorally to the Labour Party (and the CP) in the first part of the 20th century.
1970s) also welfare policies, and the result of this “policy-mix” has been
decentralized settlement (Frøland 1998: 4). All of these changes were to prove
significant to the battle over European integration in Norway. Not only were new
political parties created, new lines of political conflict which could be mobilized as
part of the EU battle between the centre and the periphery were also drawn up.

Norwegian foreign policy in the late 1940s and 1950s saw a break with the
Norwegian pre-war commitment to neutrality and her immediate post-war bridge-
building policy. The policies were conceived as unsustainable in light of the
experience of the German invasion during WWII and the emerging Cold War.
Because of the country’s geographical position and the close economic, political and
military cooperation with the UK before and after the war, as well as the UK’s
position as Norway’s primary trade partner before, during and after the war, it was
only natural for Norwegian decision-makers to follow the British line of foreign
policy after 1945. Consequently, Norway adopted an Atlantic foreign policy
orientation as opposed to a continental one. In other words, up until the 1960s, “the
diplomatic and political contact with the continental states meant less for Norway
than the contact with the Nordic states and the UK/USA” (Eriksen 1977: 256). This
orientation was reflected by voting in the UN (Eriksen 1977: 256) as well as in
departmental proposals and position papers and speeches made by members of the
Norwegian Labour government in this period (Pharo 1986).

On April 4, 1949, Norway became one of the founding members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move which set the country’s security
orientation for the remainder of the century (Archer 2005: 31). Norway also joined
the Council of Europe when it was formed in 1949, but among Norwegian elites,
there was little enthusiasm for the forum and its functions (Pharo 1986). Throughout
the 1950s, there was a broad cross-party consensus on the Norwegian preference for
Nordic and Atlantic cooperation in both the security and economic spheres (Hanssen
and Sandegren 1969; Eriksen 1977; Archer 2005). Attempts to create Nordic security

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78 For more about the bridge-building policy, which characterized Norwegian foreign policy in the
and economic cooperation structures were made, but they were unsuccessful in outcome.79

In the early 1950s, Norwegian decision-makers tried to push for a north-Atlantic cooperation alternative consisting of NATO, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe. None of the Nordic countries or the UK desired at this time to be part of a Western European customs union or any kind of supranational organization. An Atlantic council was therefore consistent with the Norwegian (and British) preference because it would first, be too vast and diverse to foster any comprehensive integration, second, prevent Norwegian isolation, and third, guarantee a satisfactory distance between Norway and the continental states (Pharo 1988), some of which had an “immediate past [which] was still alive in [people’s] minds” (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969: 48). However, as the US had started advocating more intra-European liberalisation and independent European integration both on the political and economic level, the British and Norwegian preference of an Atlantic-European cooperation solution did not win through (Pharo 1999: 18, 20; see also May 1999; George 1998).

The common view in the Norwegian government at this time, as reflected by a variety of speeches made by the foreign minister, Halvard Lange, was that the distance between the economic and social policies of the countries on the continent and Norway was too vast for comprehensive integration to be feasible (Eriksen 1977; Pharo 1986). The free market orientation of the “six” was seen as incompatible with the Norwegian goals of full employment, decentralised settlement, central planning and state control (Eriksen 1977: 257; Pharo 1988; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969).

79 For example, there were attempts to set up a Nordic customs union called NORDOK, but negotiations collapsed in March 1970 when the Finns pulled out. The Finnish government did not consider their policy of neutrality compatible with membership in NORDOK in light of the other participating countries’ future affiliation with the EEC (Øvirk 1972a). The Finnish u-turn notwithstanding, throughout the early stages of planning Scandinavian cooperation it was the Norwegian aversion to any kind of deep integration which signified the major obstacle to progress (Pharo 1986). Despite the dead ends on Scandinavian and Nordic economic integration, the Nordic parliamentary cooperation organ, the Nordic Council was set up in 1952, and in 1954 the Nordic Passport Union was formed. See Pharo (1986, 1988), Archer (2005) and Eriksen (1977) for more on Nordic cooperation and Fullerton and Knowles (1991) on Scandinavian cooperation.
Additionally, there was a general aversion to the idea of giving up national sovereignty to a supranational institution. Hence, the Norwegian policy throughout the 1950s was to support “intergovernmental trade schemes which promoted Norwegian exports and net capital imports and still allowed for protection of domestic sectors” (Frøland 1998: 6).

The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the EEC, did not get much attention in Oslo because of the organization’s continental character and its perceived limited relevance to the country (Archer 2005; Pharo 1986). As long as the UK did not partake in the different initiatives, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the EEC were perceived as irrelevant to Norway. However, this situation was to change rapidly in 1961, when the British government submitted their first application for membership of the EEC.

4.1.2 The Establishment of EFTA and the First Applications

As a result of a 1959 British initiative, the EFTA was founded in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. There was little political opposition to participation in the EFTA cooperation, due to the organization’s lack of supranational functions and its exclusion of agriculture and fisheries, and the perceived necessity of economic cooperation. All of Norway’s main trading partners were members of the trading bloc, it provided a solution to the Nordic integration problem and it gave Norwegian businesses a better negotiation position with the EEC (Eriksen 1977; see also Frøland 1998). It was considered a more or less ideal solution to the integration dilemma by all the political parties, whereas membership of the EEC required the Norwegian constitution to be amended to allow the transfer of power from the Norwegian state to the EEC (Ørvik 1972a; Archer 2005). Only one MP voted against the EFTA treaty, and there was also little opposition to (or interest in) it among the public. A 1959 poll shows that 28 percent were positive towards EFTA, 10 percent were negative, and 62 percent had no opinion (Frøland 1998: 8).
Nevertheless, the inter-party consensus on foreign policy in the first decade and a half after the war was not to last into the 1960s. Not long after the establishment of EFTA, three months before the 1961 Storting election, the British changed their course and on 3 July 1961 applied for full EEC membership, compelling the Storting to take a stand on the issue. This was because of the widespread perception that remaining on the outside if the UK joined “would be directly contrary to Norwegian trading, shipping, and political interest” and disastrous for trade (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969: 49). Unlike the Danes, who managed to make a swift decision to follow suit, Norwegian decision-makers struggled to issue a prompt response to the British application. This was due to significant forces of resistance among the public and within the Norwegian parliament, as well as the problem of constitutional change (Ørvik 1972a; Archer 2005).

Both the Conservative and Labour leadership came out in favour of applying for entry. The main rationale behind this change in policy was economic growth; it was thought that EFTA would be marginalized without the British and that exclusion from the EEC’s Common Market would leave Norway’s economy lagging behind. In addition to the two largest parties, Landsorganisasjonen (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, LO), the main industry, trade and shipping organizations and the majority of the press were in favour of EEC membership negotiations. It should be noted, however, that there is very little evidence to suggest that the decision to apply for membership equalled clear and unambiguous support for EEC membership in the “yes” constellation. Frøland (1998), for example, argues that “the short application of 2 May 1962 signalled nothing more than a will to take up negotiations in order to clarify conditions for possible membership.”

Conversely, the opposition against entry was strong within the Labour Party, and it took the party leadership several months to achieve general agreement on the decision to apply for membership. In addition to the left-wing EEC opposition consisting of the Labour Party faction, the SPP and Norges kommunistiske parti
(Communist Party of Norway, NKP), the CP and considerable factions of the LP and the CDP were against entry. The interest organizations of the fisheries and agricultural sectors, although sceptical towards EEC membership, did not state their preferences in the 1960s’ debates (Eriksen 1977; Bjørlund 1982). Analysing the 1962 Storting debate on the EEC, Heradstveit (1972) argues that while the left-wing anti-EEC constellation in the Storting was opposed because of the capitalist element of European integration, and the bourgeois anti-EEC parties’ motivation was protection of the primary sector, both coalitions were equally concerned about national sovereignty.

Table 4.1  Storting votes on the EC membership application by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>April 1962</th>
<th>July 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP/SLP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre (CP)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (LP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 310-11); Ørvik (1972a: 13).

It took almost eight months from when the British application was submitted until the Labour government put the issue to the vote in the Storting. The reason for this delay, Froland (1998: 12) argues, was not that it was too difficult for the government to weigh the costs against the benefits, as this had increasingly been done since the mid-1950s, but that it was a conscious tactical choice “as the issue carried considerable potential for escalating domestic political conflicts”, related to the socio-political cleavages in particular. On 28 April 1962, the vote came out as 113 in favour and 37 against the EC application (Ørvik 1972a: 11), with all the 29 Conservative MPs and 63 of 74 Labour MPs voting for. Dissent was widespread among SPP, CP and CDP MPs, whereas in the LP and Labour Party, the dissenters
were in minority (see Table 4.1 above).\textsuperscript{80} It is important to note that parliament did not view the application as synonymous with wanting membership \emph{per se}, but as an application for membership \emph{negotiations} so that it could clarify the terms of a prospective relationship (Frøland 1998: 12). The EC membership application was submitted to Brussels on 2 May 1962 (Lambert 1962: 352).

De Gaulle’s veto on British membership in January 1963 marked an abrupt end to the accession negotiations for all the four applicant countries.\textsuperscript{81} This was one of the reasons why the question of membership was not an issue for discussion in the election campaigns in the 1960s, but a more important reason was the divisive impact the issue had on inter- as well as intra-party relations in the Storting, as neither of the parties faced any incentives to play it up (Gleditsch and Hellevik 1977).

Between January 1963 and 1966 there was little public political debate on the issue of Norwegian participation in EEC integration, but in January 1966 a Cabinet committee was set up to look into the problems surrounding Norwegian EEC membership (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). The first report resulting from this committee, published in February 1967 provided, according to Hanssen and Sandegren (1969: 57), “a rational basis for discussion; a situation quite different from that of 1962”.\textsuperscript{82} So in May 1967, when the UK government’s new application for entry put the issue back onto the Norwegian political agenda, it “only” took the Norwegian government two months to respond. The Storting vote returned 135 to 13 in favour of new negotiations for EC membership (Ørvik 1972a: 13), after a parliamentary debate mainly focused on economic interest and the desirability of

\textsuperscript{80} A similar outcome (115 to 35) was achieved on the vote on the constitutional amendment, held a month before (Eriksen 1977: 262). The constitutional amendment enabled the Storting, if obtaining a three-fourths majority in favour, to apply for membership of the EC and join the Community if they so desired.

\textsuperscript{81} Ireland, the UK and Denmark applied in 1961 and Norway in 1962. De Gaulle vetoed British entry on the grounds that the UK was too different from the EC member states and argued that she would be like an American Trojan horse, and the remaining three because of their free trade affiliation to the UK (Archer 2005; May 1999).

\textsuperscript{82} It should be noted that this was not a view held by all. The information material originating from Norwegian governments was widely criticized by the “no” side as being propagandistic or incomplete (e.g. Bergo n.d.; Berg and Rostad, n.d.)
international cooperation on the pro-EC side and concern for national sovereignty and democracy and anti-capitalism on the opposing side (Vefald 1972). The vote seems to reflect more cohesion in all the parties compared to 1962, but the drop in parliamentary votes against membership from 37 in 1962 to 13 in 1967 (and 17 in 1970) is somewhat misleading in terms of measuring the number of Eurosceptic MPs in the Storting at the given points in time. Solhjell (2008: 243-44) points out that the decision to put the issue to the public in a referendum\textsuperscript{83} led to weaker polarization, and besides that “in the [pro-application] majority [in the CDP], there were many who knew with themselves that they would vote against membership when the negotiation result was known.” Centre, CDP and LP MPs also had to take loyalty to the coalition government they were part of into consideration when casting their votes. This is illustrated by the change in CP MPs’ “no” votes from 4 (of 18) in 1967 when \textit{in government} to 20 (of 20) in 1971, when free from governmental ties.

The interest organizations’ positions on the issue (or their lack thereof) were more or less the same as in 1962, the only change being that the political atmosphere was different in 1967, due to less pressure being put on the government particularly by \textit{Norges Bondelag} (the Norwegian Farmer’s Union) (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). Whereas a small minority of significant newspapers had been very critical to the EEC application in 1962, such as the Liberal paper \textit{Dagbladet} (the second largest Norwegian newspaper), the CP press, primary sector press and a few minor left-wing and Labour Party newspapers, no major newspapers opposed the government’s policy this time around (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). Moreover, the fact that de Gaulle was still a force to be contended with within the EEC certainly did not heighten the perceived urgency of the situation either, and surely enough, his second veto ensured another suspension of the negotiations. It was not until the French President’s resignation in 1969 that the application could be reactivated.

\textsuperscript{83} All the parties agreed that the issue should be put to the public vote in a referendum, and although “the vote was in theory consultative, in fact all the political parties accepted that the result would be binding” (Archer 2005: 47).
4.1.3 A Note on the Differences between pre-1961 and post-1961 Euroscepticism

The sea change in elite attitudes towards cooperation with the continental states from the 1940s and 50s to the early 1960s lends credibility to Pharo’s (1986) Atlanticism thesis in terms of explaining pre-1960’s Norwegian Euroscepticism. At least for those of the political elite whose main argument against getting involved in the integration efforts of the “six” pre-1961 turned into their main argument for EEC entry in 1961, that is, mirroring Britain’s EC policy, it is reasonable to conclude that Atlanticism was at the core of their Euroscepticism. Conversely, that implies that the scepticism of those Labour, CP, CDP and LP representatives who remained unconvinced about the EEC’s benefits even after the British had applied for entry were rooted in other concerns from the start. Protests against giving up national sovereignty and the incompatibility of the continental value system with the Norwegian, as suggested by Eriksen (1977) and Pharo (1986) are more plausible explanatory factors of the Norwegian Euroscepticism which went beyond the 1950s.

It is clear that opposition to European integration has existed in Norway since the 1940s and 50s. However, there was a watershed in attitudes towards participation in the EEC in the early 1960s, due to the changed British orientation towards membership. In other words, present day Euroscepticism in Norway can only be traced back to the early 1960s, as pre-1960s attitudes were heavily characterized by Atlanticism – a preference for cooperation with the UK and the US (and the Nordic countries) over the continental states. Moreover, the early 1960s also signifies a watershed in terms of the spread of Eurosceptic attitudes: the 1961-2 debate marked the beginning of Norwegian grassroots opposition. Public opinion polls show that up until 1961, the issue of European integration failed to capture the public interest (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). Besides, prior to 1961, there was no wide-ranging public political debate on the issue either (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969). Next, the chapter turns to the methods and results of the documentary analysis.

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84 See section 8.1.1 of Chapter Eight for more on public opinion in the 1960s.
4.2 The 1960s Documentary Analysis

The existing literature offers some insight into the Eurosceptic argumentation used in the 1960s: the parliamentary debates have already been subjected to scrutiny (Heradstveit 1972; Vefald 1972) as has the ad hoc organizations’ material (Bjørklund 1982). However, the objective of this part of the chapter is to carry out an investigation into what kind of argumentation was expressed in the 1960s public debate, focusing on the Norwegian national newspaper Aftenposten and available party material. More specifically, it aims to find out how the anti-EEC arguments used in the public debate fit into categories based on six theories of Euroscepticism discussed in the two previous chapters. The next two sections present the data, methods and theory used in the analysis.

4.2.1 Data and Methods

Unfortunately, availability of the target data from the 1960s period was very limited. Party manifestos from the 1960s were shorter than today’s, and parties generally devoted very little space to the EEC issue. The latter was most likely because the British applications were always submitted after the general elections, something which made it relatively easy for the politicians to keep the highly divisive membership issue off the electoral agenda. Moreover, anti-EEC speeches from this decade were hard to locate, as neither the Eurosceptical political parties nor NtEU keep systematic records of speeches. Book collections of political speeches were therefore the main source of this data. The final type of documentary data targeted was readers’ letters from the early 1960s in Aftenposten. However, in the years surveyed (1960-62) it was almost exclusively the Oslo-focused evening edition which contained readers’ letters and these were largely focused on local issues. For example, only 10 out of the 1,049 readers letters surveyed in the 1962 newspapers mentioned the EEC, but none of them argued for or against membership. Therefore, it became clear that the sampling strategy had to be broadened to include anti-EEC letters or commentaries printed outside the readers’ letters column, as well as any

85 Or only weeks before, as in 1961.
other news items or editorials reporting or commenting on Eurosceptic argumentation. Table 4.2 below shows the data which met the criteria and which were subsequently included in the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE OF DOCUMENT</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>PARTIES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Letters/commentaries</td>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Articles or other</td>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>CP, CDP, SPP, Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>newspaper items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s study.

Albeit somewhat limited in scope compared to the later periods, the 41 sources used arguably provide an adequate base for gaining some insight into which concerns were most prominent during the first debate on EEC membership in Norway. A benefit of the material used is that it is quite evenly balanced when it comes to the Eurosceptic parties; only the Liberal party suffers from underrepresentation.

4.2.2 Theory

Three theories from each body of literature were selected to form the predefined categories according to which the data were analysed.86 From the comparative literature on Euroscepticism, the reverse postmaterialist thesis (Inglehart 1977; Gabel 1998a); the utilitarian thesis (Gabel 1998a; Anderson and Reichert 1996); and the identity thesis (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002) were singled out on the basis of fulfilling three separate criteria: first, they were theoretically relevant to Norway (as a non-member state); second, they were well-established in the literature; and third, they had not already been tested on Norway. From the Norwegian literature, the geo-historical, exceptionalism and rural society87 theses were chosen. This was because,

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86 New themes were allowed to emerge from the analysis.
87 Adapted from the rural identity theory, as discussed below.
as explanatory theories, they had not been subjected to empirical testing before.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, Atlanticism was excluded because it was not a theoretically feasible explanation for Norwegian Euroscepticism beyond 1961 because of the UK’s entry application.

As is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below, utilitarianism (economic interest), political culture (geo-historical factors), rural society and national identity stood alone as separate categories, and the exceptionalism (EX) and postmaterialism (PM) theories were grouped into a political values category.

\textbf{Figure 4.1} Pre-defined coding categories

![Diagram showing the relationships between Political Values (PoM/EX), Political Culture, Rural Society, Utilitarianism, and National Identity]

Source: Author’s study

The first component of the coding model was based on the reverse postmaterialist thesis. It holds the assumption that people with postmaterialist values, i.e. people who rate values such as morality, environmentalism, quality of life, equality and peacefulness highly, are more likely to be opposed to European integration, which in Scandinavia is seen as having goals different to these. As all of the ideals connected to exceptionalism or the Nordic “superior form of society” are rooted in solidarity and equality (Lawler 1997: 556; Dahl 1984), and thus, morality, exceptionalism was treated as a sub-category of postmaterialism. Argumentation which could be classified as ideologically left-wing was also treated under this heading, because, as Dahl (1984: 97, 106) observes “the appeal of social justice and equality in party

\textsuperscript{88} Although the applicability of the territorial cleavage to public opinion on the EU has been widely established through statistical testing, Rokkan’s cleavage model does not explain \textit{why} Norwegians voted “no” in the referenda (see also Neumann 2002).
politics” is no Social Democratic or socialist invention, but “goes back to at least the 1890s […] when it was propelled into the bodies politic by the Liberals” and has since then been pursued by all the traditional parties, from the left to the right.

Secondly, the political culture category was based on the geo-historical thesis, the idea that Norway’s short history as an independent country and the periphery’s strong political tradition are central to Norwegian opposition to EC/EU membership. The code encompassed argumentation which cast opposition to the European project as a furthering of the Norwegian struggle for democracy and independence which started in the 19th century. It holds that folkeøyre and independence are closely interlinked and extremely central to Norwegian political culture; the dominant view is that the people (folket) should rule, not bureaucrats and elites in a distant centre.

The third coding category covered the more diffuse concept of rural society, that is, the desire to maintain rural Norway as it is. In the academic literature on Norway, much emphasis has been put on the ability of the primary sector to rally sympathisers to its cause, a phenomenon which some scholars explain with the concept of a rural identity: Norwegians’ attachment to nature, the countryside and peasant culture (Gstöhl 1996; Hille 2007; Neumann 2002). Initially, the rural identity concept was tested on the 1960s data, but it quickly became clear that it was doubtful that all primary sector argumentation could be put down to identity concerns. Nevertheless, as both the literature and the documentary data confirmed that the rural society dimension of Norwegian opposition to European integration is important, the solution was not to scrap the category, but to broaden it. In Norway, there is certainly agreement that maintaining a decentralized society is desirable; all the parties in the Storting recognize this as a central political goal. As a means to achieve this, there is consensus on the need to maintain Norwegian agriculture and coastal fishing, protect nature and cultural landscapes, keep the decentralized settlement and promote thriving districts. The data analysed showed that these objectives were shared by the vast majority of the rural society patrons, but it was

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89 Although it is questionable how committed the PP is to upholding the settlement structure.
clear that the motivation behind the patronage varied. For some, material considerations, such as food quality, security and/or economic utility, were at the core of their concern for upholding decentralised Norway. For others, postmaterialist considerations were key: focus on quality of life, environmental protection and responsible administration of resources, and/or a moral duty to feed one’s own population in an overpopulated world. The third grouping was primarily worried about nature, the cultural landscapes and cultural diversity. However, it was not possible to make inferences about the motivation of all rural society related argumentation, as very few commentators explained why they think it is important to protect Norwegian agriculture, coastal fishing or the settlement pattern. Nevertheless, although the motivation behind the desire to protect the rural society in Norway will be commented on when appropriate, it is of secondary importance to and beyond the scope of this study. In other words, the thesis asks what role rural society concerns plays in Eurosceptic argumentation in Norway, not why Norwegians want to uphold a decentralized society. The rural society category was linked to political values because the notion of “leftishness”, as associated with post-materialist values, is “a cluster of values that [speaks] to the ideals of nearly all rural factions” (Dahl 1984: 98). Additionally, the territorial dimension of the rural society concept connects it with the geo-historical category.

The fourth category, economic interest, covered economic and material concerns. The economic interest thesis holds that economic cost/benefit considerations determine people’s attitudes toward the EU, i.e. that people who believe that they personally or the country as a whole will lose out economically due to European integration are more likely to oppose EC/EU membership. Therefore, Eurosceptic argumentation focusing on economic utility is coded to this category.

Finally, the national identity theory holds that people who are particularly worried about threats to the nation state and the national identity are more likely to oppose European integration. Therefore, the category captures the argumentation which reflects hostility towards other cultures or nationalities, hesitation about cooperating
with nations with different cultures and/or values, perceived cultural threat, and/or strong national attachment and pride. Further details about the coding protocol can be found in Appendix G. The next section communicates the findings of the analysis.

4.2.3 Findings of the 1960s Documentary Analysis

Most of the arguments found in the source material from the 1960s fit into four of the five broad categories outlined above. The first is the geo-historical category, which accommodates arguments based on the principle of self-rule, in other words concern for Norway’s independence and traditional form of participatory democracy (folkestyre). The second category concerns political values and is representative of postmaterialist, exceptionalist and/or left-wing ideological value-based arguments. The data confirms that these three sub-categories are not always easy to separate, with all sharing the same desire to prioritise equality, fairness, internal (and external) solidarity and high social standards over economic growth and material gain. As a result, the umbrella term “political values” is used. Rural and cultural elements form the basis for the third and fourth categories: worries about the districts, identity and culture, both national and rural, are additional motivators for the Euroscepticism of the 1960s in Norway. Utilitarian considerations, on the other hand, did not generate convincing results, at least not as first order concerns. Notwithstanding, the findings of all of the five groupings are reported below. It should be noted that all the quotes from the second part of each of the next four chapters (i.e. the documentary analysis) and any interview quotation used in the thesis are translated from Norwegian into English by the author.\textsuperscript{90} All the different newspaper items (letters, articles, commentaries) are referenced with surname and the date the item was printed (e.g. Olsen 29/12/61) to ensure transparency and enable the reader to check up on any original source material of interest. The complete list of the material analysed can be found in Appendix F.

\textsuperscript{90} Any errors resulting from this are the sole responsibility of the author.
4.2.3.1 Political Culture: History, Independence and Democracy

The geo-historical category generated the most results in the study, unsurprisingly perhaps, because it is home to the “sovereignty” variable. With 20 references\textsuperscript{91} from a variety of sources, it is clear that concerns about independence and sovereignty were central to Norwegians’ opposition to European integration in the 1960s. Berner (08/01/62) asks: “Is it unwarranted to consider a purely emotional need for freedom and independence as part of our living standard?” and Rolfsen (19/01/62) points out that the Constitution’s first paragraph stipulates that “Norway is free, indivisible and inalienable.” Furthermore, both the SPP and the CP’s manifestos from this decade note the importance of safeguarding national sovereignty, and so do news reports of the argumentation of the EEC-opponents in the CDP and the Labour Party. Careful not to affiliate the urge for maintaining the right to be “masters of one’s own house”, as one commentator puts it, with isolation, Trygve Bull (Labour) argues in his 1962 speech that “what many of us today fear is not international cooperation. It is not binding international cooperation either; but it is to issue general authority for all the future.” Accordingly, there can be no doubt that sovereignty and independence was at the very heart of Norwegian Euroscepticism at the time.

Norway’s history and traditions of participatory democracy also feature prominently as a theme; anti-EEC politicians from all of the parties under investigation underline the need to preserve as much as possible of the country’s traditional form of \textit{folkestyre} so that everyone can partake in deciding the country’s development. Bull (1962 speech) states that “the idea of people sovereignty (\textit{folkesuverenitetstanken}) is in a particularly intimate way tied to democratic-radical traditions in our people” and argues that the trend seen on the continent, de-democratisation and centralisation of power, is not something Norway needs to be affected by. He said, “It is not written in the stars that small states will be stricken by this to the same degree as the large ones. [...] We avoided, to a large extent, feudalism in the middle ages. And we need not be overtaken by this new trend, if we are vigilant”. Although this strong

\textsuperscript{91} In total, 39 references were coded to this category, but 20 of these related directly to sovereignty or independence.
opposition to continental traditions of centralisation is only clearly visible in Bull’s speech, several letter authors cast the ways of “the continent” as something negative and alien to Norwegian political traditions. According to these sceptics, it is not in Norway’s interest to become involved in “the complicated games between the leading continental powers” (13/04/62 news report) and cooperation with “a Europe which is responsible for acquisition wars, empires and suppression, economically and socially” (the 143 02/01/62). The contrast between the aversion to the power-driven continental European states and people and democracy-driven Norway is aptly captured by the following quote from Bull’s speech: “While the nation state and the ‘nation feeling’ on the Continent all too often has been used in the service of chauvinist and reactionary powers, in our country it has, in a distinctive way, been tied to the interests and trends of the people.” The lack of identification with the big continental states is also confirmed by the interview findings, as Dag Seierstad from the SLP, Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP and Odd Einar Dørum from the LP, who all were active in the 1960s and/or 1970s debates, mention the negatively charged terms “colonial powers” and “bloc politics”92 as a reason for their scepticism towards the EEC in the early years.93

It is clear from the analysis that arguments linked to history and political culture were utilized from the very beginning of Norway’s dealings with the EEC. The people’s right to govern and the country’s independence rank very high on the list of arguments; they cast the EEC as a system of government which is not compatible with the Norwegian model of folkestyre and membership as synonymous with Norway losing control of its own destiny.

4.2.3.2 Political Values: Postmaterialism and Exceptionalism

As early as in 1961, Norwegian Eurosceptics, socialists (SPP and Labour) as well as representatives from the bourgeois bloc (LP, CP and CDP), identified the free market

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92 The organization of countries into blocs, i.e. bigger entities, which was in keeping with the politics of the great powers (størmakspolitikk). Bloc politics was criticised for exacerbating East/West tensions and creating a divide between Europe and the developing world (see the 143 02/01/62).
93 The interviews took place in Oslo, 18 September 2009, 22 September 2010 and 13 January 2010 respectively.
ideology set out in the Rome Treaty one of the main reasons not to join the EEC. According to an Aftenposten editorial (16/11/62), the whole debate started with the EEC being branded by the anti-EEC camp as “the ignorant money power”, an organization whose overarching concerns revolved around material values and economic gain. Some left-wing opponents of membership from the period are clearly motivated by the socialist ideology, as they use anti-capitalist rhetoric and display the belief that a planned economy generates higher economic prosperity. Most commentators’ argumentation, however, is characterized by a slightly different conviction: the idea that welfare, internal and external solidarity should be prioritized over economic growth. These arguments come together under the themes postmaterialism and exceptionalism, where the latter is a sub-theme of the former because of their overlapping nature in their focus on peacefulness and solidarity.

One recurring theme in the newspaper items in the study is criticism of the “yes” side’s exaggerated focus on material and economic benefits. Research Fellow Gjæver (05/12/61) seeks to discredit what he terms the most important “yes” argument, namely “we cannot afford to be on the outside”. He argues that political, not economic considerations are more important and that “by entering the Common Market, we reduce the possibility of directing an economic policy which is as congruent as possible with our own value rankings.”

Over half of the newspaper items include one or several arguments related to equality, anti-discrimination, peace, quality of life, morality and/or solidarity. The SPP’s manifesto, for example, argues against the EEC on the basis of it being an “economic bloc [which] is a barrier to creating a peaceful, democratic world” and it exacerbating “the economic inequality between rich and poor countries.” Moreover, the exceptionalist variety of the value of external solidarity is also found in multiple items: here, the idea of the internationalist sovereign state as the promoter of equality, democracy and peace is essential. The anti-EEC appeal with 143 signatories printed in Aftenposten on January 3, 1962 provides an excellent example of this. They write the following:
“Today it is only by safeguarding our political freedom that we can secure the democratic ideals within our own territory and simultaneously try to make these ideals dominant in the world. Only in this way can we make a real contribution to the cause of peace.

The small nations have not outplayed their role. Norway has a responsibility both to itself and to the world. As an independent state, our country must strengthen the work which through the worldwide organisations is done to bring all peoples closer to each other for mutual understanding and cooperation. The new west European union, which the Common Market will become, does not have those kinds of goals.”

Internal solidarity is another reasonably large group of arguments which doubles up as postmaterialist and exceptionalist. An example of this is the CDP and CP MPs’ desire to retain sovereignty so that “our natural resources can be exploited in a form and a tempo which serves both those who live here today and future generations living in Norway” (article 13/04/62). Politicians and commentators also use exceptionalism when pointing out the country’s distinctive economic structure and unique outlook on society; “the 143” (03/01/62) argue that “economic and social policy, [coordinated] according to the wishes of the people and to the benefit of the people, will be lost under the Rome Treaty” (emphasis added). Internal solidarity is about safeguarding the interests of the disadvantaged in society and promoting equality, and a main aspect of it concerns gender equality and more left-wing ideals such as welfare and redistribution. However, the idea also extends to the districts and those employed in the primary sectors, as illustrated by a quote from Butttingsrud’s letter (08/03/62):

“‘There is an old expression which goes roughly like this […]: ‘He who has a lot, he shall be given more, but he who little has, he shall be robbed of what he’s got.’ […] I know for a fact that the income situation is far worse and
much less secure in agriculture and fishing than in industry and other professions. And I am afraid that we, by entering the Common Market, will make this expression come true, [this expression] which has always occurred to me as bitterly unfair and cynical.”

As illustrated by this quote, it is clear that sentiments of exceptionalist internal solidarity, which centre on social protection for all, play into the Euroscepticism of the 1960s. However, these findings also make the exceptionalist thesis a contender to the rural identity thesis, as protection of the primary sector could potentially have more to do with the value of solidarity than attachment to rural society.

4.2.3.3  Rural Society

The rural society category yielded some results, but coding to this category was not as widespread as expected. Agriculture employed more than 20 percent of the workforce in the 1950s, compared to 2.3 percent in 2007, and the number of fishermen declined from approximately 100,000 to 13,300 during the same time period (SSB 2009a). Because of the larger size of the primary sectors in the early 1960s, it was expected that concern for the primary sectors would be among the most noticeable elements of the early anti-EEC argumentation. Nevertheless, only seven out of the 37 items analysed draw on argumentation related to the protection of the primary sectors, Norwegian nature, the settlement pattern or rural culture. This is much less than expected, considering the academic literature has put heavy focus on this aspect of the EEC opposition since the 1960s (e.g. Lambert 1962; Neumann 2002). The underrepresentation could, however, be due to the uncertainty surrounding the government’s ability to negotiate exemptions for the country’s primary industries if becoming a member. Many news articles suggest that there was widespread belief among at least proponents of membership, but also some opponents, that in the event of membership negotiations, the EEC would respect firstly, the need to shield Norwegian farmers from competition in an open European market, and secondly, the Norwegian fishermen’s rightful claim to their traditional fishing territories.
Nevertheless, arguments about retaining the concession laws, the regulations and supportive measures set up for the agricultural sector and fisheries are most central in this category, and so is the wish to prevent depopulation of rural Norway (utkant-Norge) and shield the country’s “glorious nature” (naturherligheter). The reasons for resisting structural change are for the most part not divulged; predominantly, it is taken for granted that the survival of the primary sectors, the settlement pattern and Norwegian nature is a desirable goal for the whole of the country. However, CP and CDP MPs do note the psychologically negative effect the demise of food production could have on the nation in terms of security arrangements. Additionally, there is some evidence to back up the existence of a rural component of Norwegian culture which is seen as under threat by European integration. Labour’s Bull notes the psychological and the social readjustment problems EEC membership would entail:

“[If becoming members] we renounce – at least after a short while – the right [...] to uphold traditional economic activity, which from a purely rational point of view is not lucrative, but which has its deep roots in the life of all of our people.”

The concept of farming and fishing as something which is deep-rooted in the Norwegian people’s lives implies that rural culture is an important aspect of wanting to protect the primary industries. Magister Langslet (17/10/62) supports the idea that the EEC opponents’ rationale behind protecting agriculture is more about protecting culture than material concerns, arguing that it is about preserving “Norwegian farmer’s culture and the culture-creating work which has its roots there.”

4.2.3.4 Identity: Incompatibility and Threat

Identity-related 1960s argumentation aside from the rural dimension was also present in the data. Ten separate sources touch on issues of identity, primarily covering lack of identification with and antipathy towards continental cultures. Two letters, both written by Rolfsen (19/01/62, 26/01/62), stand out in their blunt hostility
towards the cultures of the “six”. Explaining his reasons for opposing EEC membership, the letter writer states,

“... we do not want to see Norway under political guardianship of a France, whose strong fascist forces are currently bombing themselves forward towards military dictatorship. And of a Germany where Nazism smoulders in the best of health and could feasibly break out in flames, stimulated by border regulation demands. With these historical currents, we feel no sense of community.”

It has to be noted that this is an example from the extreme end of the scale. However, other sources back up this notion that anti-German sentiments stemming from the occupation (1940-45) played a part in shaping opposition to the EEC in the 1960s (Lambert 1962). Dag Seierstad, for example, says in an interview with the author94 that he thinks that anti-German feeling was a part of the scepticism towards the EEC back then, especially in Northern Norway. Nevertheless, the majority of items coded to this category show scepticism towards the dominance of Catholic countries in the Community, or the “Catholic danger”, as it was scathingly termed by some pro-EEC commentators. This concern does not, however, only involve distinctive religious traditions, but links back to the political culture of individualism and resistance to authority. Bull contrasts Catholicism and the Pope, the perfect technocrat, with the Norwegian Protestant religion which is based on “the democratic idea that every man is responsible to his God” and presupposes that “there is no authority here on earth that can say that it’s like this and it’s not like this.” In his letter, Professor, dr. theol. Hygen (25/10/62) argues along similar lines. He believes that “the Roman Church intervenes in politics in a whole different way than Protestant churches” and “a change in our position from an independent protestant country to a province in a Catholic-dominated association will [not] benefit the country, the people or the church.” These findings indicate that independence and folkestyre are not confined to

94 Oslo, 18 September 2009.
political issues, but cross over into the cultural sphere. All aspects of Norwegian
culture, even religion, reflect individualism, and the EEC represents a threat to this.

Despite this, little evidence of strong attachment to the nation state is found in the
data. Only one direct reference to the state as the appropriate carrier of the nation is
made. When it comes to national pride, the findings are more diffuse. Exceptionalist
value-driven arguments could potentially fit here, because they imply positive
identification with the Norwegian and Nordic culture of solidarity.

4.2.3.5  Utilitarianism: a Second Order Concern
Strikingly little of the argumentation against membership from the 1960s is of a
utilitarian nature. Nevertheless, a limited number of commentators do express
concern about the parts of the national economy which would suffer from open
competition in a common European market, such as agriculture, the fisheries\textsuperscript{95} and
the domestic industries. Contrary to the expectations of the sociotropic economic
interest thesis, the recurring economic theme of all the newspaper items analysed is
the acknowledgement that on the whole, the national economy would benefit from
membership. In effect, rather than arguing that non-membership would be more
economically beneficial for the country, the trend is that Eurosceptic letters to the
editor play down the magnitude of these economic benefits. The tactic here seems to
be, in order to focus on other, more important issues such as independence and
political values, to discredit the “we cannot afford to be on the outside” argument of
the “yes” side. This is done by using phrases such as “economic growth will be
modest” (Svendsen\textsuperscript{96} 20/11/61), “it is possible that our total economic growth will be
stronger with membership” (news report about cabinet minister Bøe’s views
02/03/62), and “the national economic loss [if opting for non-membership] is
considerably lower than has been claimed” (Gjæver\textsuperscript{97} 05/12/61).\textsuperscript{98} In other words, the

\textsuperscript{95} Concerns about the fisheries were mostly about keeping foreign trawlers out of Norwegian fishing
waters (as they would rob many small scale Norwegian fishermen of their livelihoods) and in some
cases, worries about fish refinement being outsourced to foreign firms in the event of membership. It
was commonly accepted that the export industry would benefit from the abolition of tariff barriers
membership would entail.

\textsuperscript{96} Reader.

\textsuperscript{97} Research Fellow.
1960s’ Eurosceptics do not appear to have been motivated by national economic interest, as there seems to be widespread belief that non-membership is the least lucrative option for the country’s economy. However, the EEC-opponents do argue in favour of the protection of certain sectoral economic interests, but in its disregard for the strong export industries and emphasis on solidarity with the weaker economic sectors, the tendency to focus on the disadvantaged economic sectors rather supports the postmaterialist or exceptionalist thesis than the utilitarian thesis. The following quote from CDP MP Kjell Bondevik (news report 25/10/61) provides an illustration of this idea:

“If one is to put the main emphasis on economic considerations and primarily aim for a higher standard of living, then a country with high industrial standards [...] would yield the largest advantages with full membership. If one is to choose to retain as much national independence as possible, political and social, then the association alternative would be preferable.”

Bondevik, who was part of the “no” minority in the Storting, clearly prioritised political and social independence over a higher standard of living. Quite a few other commentators from the period argue along the same lines. This indicates that the applicability of economic interest as a main explanation for early Norwegian Euroscepticism is limited. Economic interest is perhaps best described as a second order concern, as one cannot deem it completely irrelevant to the Eurosceptic case of the 1960s if it really was so that people did not believe that the negative impact of membership would be too significant.

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98 All italics are added.  
99 This is backed up by the academic literature, as Hanssen and Sandegren (1969: 51) note that “hardly anyone disagreed on this point, even though there was disagreement as to how much Norway would lose in economic terms by remaining outside”.

113
4.3 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the secondary literature on, and documentary data from the 1960s in order to provide a comprehensive coverage of the EEC-opposition from the period. The analysis showed that Norwegian opposition to European integration can indeed be traced back to 1961 and the first real debate on membership, or even further back - to the late 1940s, as the secondary literature suggests. However, it was argued in the first part of the chapter that the roots of current day Norwegian Euroscepticism do not transcend the 1960s, as Eurosceptic attitudes prior to 1961 were only widespread among the elites, and potential other motivations than Atlanticism did not come to the fore due to the general consensus on non-participation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the pre-1961 Euroscepticism extended to the general public, as public opinion polls show that it was not until 1962 that the general population were educated enough about the EEC to state a preference on Norwegian membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969).

The documentary analysis, reported on in the second part of the chapter, looked at the extent to which different news items and commentaries from the newspaper Aftenposten, one speech and the “no” parties’ manifestos drew on arguments related to political culture, postmaterialist/exceptionalist values, rural society, national identity and economic interest.

Figure 4.2 below broadly illustrates the distribution of the coded arguments in the analysis according to the five categories.\textsuperscript{100} It makes it very clear that political culture and postmaterialist/exceptionalist value-based arguments were most widely used in the debate. The analysis showed that in Norwegian political culture, independence and democracy are intertwined in the concepts folkestyre (people’s rule) and folkesuverenitetsprinsippet (the principle of people sovereignty), and the opposition to “binding our people’s right to decide their own fate on an indefinite basis” (CDP and Centre MPs, news report 13/04/62) was one of the most frequently recurring themes

\textsuperscript{100} The quantification of results from qualitative coding, albeit methodologically unsound to use as a basis for analysis, is only used here to illustrate the general tendencies in the data.
in the data analysed. Furthermore, references to continental political traditions and mention of historical junctures for Norway’s democracy and independence, like 1814 (when the Constitution was created), 1905 (the year of the dissolution with Sweden) and 1940 (the German invasion) further contributed to establishing the relevance of “the wounds left by a history of foreign rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214) as an explanation for Norwegian Euroscepticism.

**Figure 4.2** The distribution of arguments according to category

![Pie chart showing distribution of arguments](chart.png)

Source: Author’s documentary analysis

The analysis also showed that political values was of great relevance to motivations for opposing the EEC. Interestingly, the “no” letters in the study almost exclusively cast membership as the most economically lucrative alternative, but they argued that other issues were more important, such as welfare, looking after disadvantaged groups in society and the districts, and promoting peace and equality internationally as well as nationally. Exceptionalist sentiments, that is, viewing Norway and the values championed in Norway as essentially different and morally superior to the EEC, certainly shone through many of the postmaterialist arguments relating to internal and external solidarity.

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101 Number of news items or party documents coded to each of the categories In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic issues and the ‘yes’ side’s economic arguments are not included.
The lack of indication that Eurosceptics in the 1960s viewed the non-membership alternative as economically more beneficial, impacts negatively on the economic interest thesis’ explanatory power of 1960s’ opposition. However, that is not to say that many farmers, fishermen, employees in the home industries or other social groups that would have lost out economically as a result of membership did not oppose EEC entry on egocentric utilitarian grounds. The findings of this part of the study only showed that sociotropic considerations cannot be deemed to be among the main driving factors for opposition to the EEC in the first round.

On the level of rural society arguments, a couple of commentators mentioned concern for farmer’s culture and Norwegian nature, but otherwise there was little evidence that attachment to the countryside played a large part in the “no” side’s arguments against membership. On the contrary, there was surprisingly little focus on the primary sectors and the settlement pattern, considering the considerable role played by these sectors in later campaigns and their size in the 1960s compared to later periods. It was argued that this discrepancy could be due to the uncertainties surrounding the EEC’s entry terms: it is possible that both proponents and opponents of membership were more optimistic about obtaining special arrangements for the country’s special interests, such as agriculture and the fishing territories in 1962 than a decade later, when both the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were firmly in place.

Finally, national identity as a driver of EEC opposition found some support in the data, albeit not as strong as the political culture and values variables. Lack of identification with, and in some instances outright hostility to continental European culture were themes that emerged from the data, concomitantly with perceived cultural threat, as theorized by Carey (2002) and McLaren (2002). The most common sub-theme of these categories was the dominance of Catholic countries in the EEC, but also terms such as “chauvinist” and “fascist” were used to describe European trends, contrasting the righteous Norwegian people.
In conclusion, it is clear that Norwegian Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which stretches far back in time, at least to 1961 and the first debate. Although the identity and rural society theories cannot be entirely discounted, the political values and geohistorical theses evidently have stronger explanatory power in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism in its first phase. The utilitarianist thesis, on the other hand, did not stand up to the first order concern test, and cannot be put down as one of the determining factors of 1960s elite opposition to the EEC. The next chapter reports on the trends and tendencies in the second phase, the early 1970s.
Chapter 5
The Second Phase: 1970-72

Norwegian Euroscepticism entered a new phase in the 1970s; the decision of the “six” at the Hague summit in December 1969 to invite the four applicant countries back to the negotiating table marked the start of a new period of opposition to European integration in Norway. As will be shown in this chapter, although continuity can be seen in many areas of the debate between the 1960s and the early 70s, such as the constellations for and against membership and, to a large degree, the arguments, there are also significant differences between the two periods, such as increased polarization, knowledge and participation. These changes make it necessary to distinguish 1960s Euroscepticism from 1970s Euroscepticism.

The objective of this chapter is to ascertain the characteristics of Norwegian Euroscepticism in the period between 1970-2 and draw up some conclusions about its influences. Similarly structured as Chapter Four, the first part of the chapter gives a short outline of the main events and developments of the early 1970s and the characteristics of the referendum campaign, based on a review of secondary sources. The second section of the chapter turns to the documentary analysis and the examination of the argumentation found in newspaper commentaries, speeches and “no” campaigning material from the second period.

5.1 The Constellations and Campaign

5.1.1 Developments in the Parties and Storting 1970-1972

In 1961, the Labour party was re-elected to office, and the Gerhardsen government was therefore in charge of the first EEC membership application, which was submitted to Brussels on 2 May 1962. The 1965 election, however, produced the second non-socialist government since the war. This government, which consisted of the Conservatives, CDP, LP and CP and was led by Prime Minister (PM) Per Borten (from the CP), survived the 1967 application, the 1970 Storting vote and much of the
negotiating phase in the 1970s. As in the 1967 Storting vote on EEC negotiations (see Table 5.1 below), the majority of the governing parties’ MPs voted in favour of negotiations in June 1970. Among the 17 dissenters were only seven of the 20 Centre MPs[102] and three of the 14 CDP MPs. The remaining seven were Labour MPs. Despite increasing opposition to the EC in the party already in the early 1970s, the CP supported membership negotiations to keep the coalition together (Madsen 2001; Archer and Sogner 1998), and presumably, loyalty to the coalition played a part also to Eurosceptic LP and CDP MPs when they cast their votes in 1970.

Table 5.1 Norwegian MPs against EC membership by party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP/SLP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 312-4). The 1970 and 1971 data are from parliamentary votes, the 1972 data are based on information gathered by Gleditsch and Hellevik from the mass media and other sources.

However, keeping the coalition together was to prove to be a real struggle. The membership negotiations with the EC were resumed on 30 June 1970 (Preston 1997: 11), but in March 1971, almost mid-way through the negotiations, the Borten government resigned because of internal disagreement on the issue. The catalyst for the resignation was a controversy about the PM’s disclosure of secret negotiation documents to Felkebevegelsen’s leader, Arne Haugstad.[106] A new minority Labour

[102] Archer and Sogner (1998: 33) argue that the remaining 14 CP MPs, who were also opposed to membership, “hoped to achieve this end [non-membership] without destroying the coalition”.

[103] The SPP lost Storting representation in the 1969 election, but regained representation when Labour MP Arne Kielland joined the SPP in 1972.

[104] The 1972 figures include the MPs from the Liberal People’s Party (Det Nye Folkeparti), the splinter party from the LP.

[105] 132 MPs backed the decision to apply (Archer 2005: 46), i.e. one MP abstained.

[106] Because of the divisions between the coalition partners on matters arising in Brussels, particularly between the progressively Eurosceptic/anti-market CP and the pro-EC Conservatives, the split was
government, headed by Trygve Bratteli, assumed office and took over the negotiation reins in Brussels, as well as the main responsibility of convincing the public to vote “yes” in the referendum. Although the Labour government’s leadership and negotiating team managed to sell most of the outcomes in Brussels as victories or good compromises, in January 1972, the Norwegian Fisheries Minister, Knut Hoem, resigned and caused the government and “yes” camp considerable embarrassment and harm. He resigned because he could not accept the accession agreement on fisheries policy (Allen 1979). The agreement was signed on 22 January 1972.

The Labour Party decided to refrain from taking a stand on membership until after the negotiations were completed, and in effect, the “yes” campaign, conducted by the Labour government, the Conservatives, the business and industry organisations and the trade union leadership, did not commence until the membership negotiations were completed in January 1972. In contrast, the “no” campaign, consisting of the “no” parties from the 1961-1963 campaign, the ad hoc organizations (see below) and the primary industry’s main interest organizations, started in early 1970. In other words, the “no” campaign had got a head start.

5.1.2 Non-Parliamentary Opposition

In the 1960s, “no” movements like “Appeal against the Common Market – The 143” and “the Information Committee” were founded. The “no” organizations

inevitable. By some of his coalition partners, Borten was accused of having planned to break the negotiation line from the start (Madsen 2001).

107 Norway was allowed to retain a 6 mile exclusive fishing belt for 10 years after accession. Originally, “[t]he fishermen wanted to keep their exclusive fishing limit and their producer organisations’ considerable rights under Norwegian law, including compulsory membership, the handling of all sales of landed fish, and price and market regulating powers” (Allen 1979: 120).

108 This was part of Labour’s tactic of not disturbing the upward trend in support that the party experienced in 1970-1971 (Lie 1972).

109 “The 143” referred to the number of petitioners in the early stages of the founding of the organization. The newspaper appeal of this group was also included in the documentary analysis in Chapter Four.

110 Both of these were founded in 1962. In addition to these, there were a few regional ac hoc organizations, namely the “Oppland’s Committee”, which was founded in January 1963 and was more or less a regional wing of the Information Committee; “Bergen’s Committee”, which was a Bergen-based independent “no” movement particularly active during the 1961-1963 debate; and the “West
made their mark on the debate in the early 1960s, but grassroots opposition was more anonymous in the 1967 debate. Archer and Sognes (1998: 32) put this down to security issues taking up centre stage in 1967, but it is also important to take the “De Gaulle effect” into account when considering the reasons why the 1967 debate could not match the ferocity of its predecessor or its successor. Froland (1998: 6), for example, argues that the 1967 parliamentary vote is irrelevant because the Storting anticipated the French veto.

According to Bjørklund (1982), it was only after the 1969 summit in the Hague and the renewed British application that mobilization of non-parliamentary Norwegian opposition to the EC started for real. Unlike in the 1960s, the 1970s grassroots opposition to the EC was very well-organized. On 28 August 1970, “the Contact Committee”, an organization made up by all the anti-EC youth wings of the political parties,111 and Folkebevegelsen were formed (Bjørklund 1982: 106). Other “no” organizations founded in the early 1970s were Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomité mot norsk medlemskap i EF (the Labour Party’s Information Committee against Norwegian membership of the EC, AIK for short), “the Youth Front against the EEC”, “the Women’s Movement against the EEC” and AKMED, the latter a left-wing anti-EC organization set up to counter Folkebevegelsen. The other three, however, were established to increase the appeal and impact of the “no” camp and drew most of their financial resources from Folkebevegelsen. Folkebevegelsen, led by Supreme Court advocate, Arne Haugstad, brought together representatives from the various anti-EC movements from the previous decade and opened up to cooperation with the six anti-EC political youth wings. The organization’s primary sources of funding were the agricultural interest organizations, especially the milk producers’ organizations. Conscious efforts were made by the EC opponents to establish a broad cross-political cooperation structure in the fight against the EC; by August 1970, the anti-EC activists managed to unite behind a policy preference of a joint

Country’s committee”, founded in the autumn of 1967 (just after the second application had been submitted to Brussels) by editor and pietist, Arthur Berg (Bjørklund 1982).

111 This constituted all the political parties’ youth wings, except the Young Conservatives, who, in 1970, were the only youth wings to support EC membership for Norway.
Nordic trade agreement with the EC,\textsuperscript{112} and, as in 1962 and 1967, the main “no” argument was that of sovereignty (Bjørklund 1982, 1997a), as it was easiest to unite behind.

5.1.3 A Note on the Differences between 1960s and 1970s Euroscepticism

Despite striking similarities in the constellations for and against membership, there are also significant differences between the 1960s and early 1970s periods of Euroscepticism. One of the most important differences is that, after 1970, the membership application was much more real; there was no longer a Charles de Gaulle in the EC who could come to the sceptics’ rescue and veto accession. In addition, the EC’s confirmation of its plans to move towards a genuine economic and monetary union at the 1969 Hague summit served to make the issue much more urgent in many people’s minds (e.g. Madsen 2001: 120). This was particularly the case in the CP and the CDP,\textsuperscript{113} where in 1967 many had expressed support for negotiations out of loyalty to the government they were part of, despite being generally sceptical about membership (Solhjell 2008; Madsen 2001). The more reticent opposition of the 1960s as a result of the French vetoes is further illustrated by Hanssen and Sandegren’s conclusions in 1969. They write:

“The Centre Party still has some reservations. In fact, one may say that the idea of European integration has gained full acceptance in the mind of the individual and the party. This has come somewhat belatedly, and could be open to criticism, since the idea no longer presents serious danger of being realized [...]” (p. 59)

After December 1969, it was to become very clear that this was indeed open to criticism. That “the idea of European integration” had “gained full acceptance” within the CP in the 1970s could not be further from the truth. Nevertheless, the

\textsuperscript{112} However, the trade agreement preference was a conflict issue within the organization. At the annual conference in 1971, there was heated debate about leaving the trade agreement out of the organization’s mission statement.

\textsuperscript{113} and potentially also the LP, although the reviewed literature reveals little about the conflicts within the LP.
quote illustrates that when an issue does not “present serious danger of being realized”, opposition to it may appear deceptively modest. The non-socialist government managed to survive the 1967 debate, thanks to De Gaulle’s veto, but in 1970-71 it became increasingly difficult for the coalition parties to find compromises on EC issues. The affair which ended in the Borten government’s resignation on 2 March 1971 was an inevitable consequence of a crystallization of CP opposition to EC membership in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{114}

A second element that sets 1960s Euroscepticism apart from 1970s Euroscepticism is that in 1961, EC membership was a fresh issue, one that had never been discussed and examined in detail before. When the issue came up again in 1969/70, all the parties in the Storting had a history on the issue, and people and parties had had more time to process what membership would entail for Norway.\textsuperscript{115} The CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter, explains\textsuperscript{116} that in principle, the CDP was positive towards international cooperation, and this attitude resulted in support for clarifications/negotiations. However,

“when this became more pressing and [something] concrete which one had to take a stand on... and one went into what the realities and the consequences were, then one started to tighten the conditions and criteria for being able to say that a negotiation solution would be satisfactory.”

Moreover, in the 1960s, the issue was primarily treated as a market issue. Frøland (1998: 14), for example, finds that government speeches and public papers from the first debate “reveal a tendency to reduce the political implications of membership. Arguments state it was primarily a framework for economic co-operation and it would in practice work as an intergovernmental machinery”. But when the issue resurfaced at the turn of the decade, anti-EC commentators were, to a much greater

\textsuperscript{114} and, to a lesser extent, opposition in the CDP and LP.
\textsuperscript{115} For example, the cabinet committee set up to investigate Norway’s problems with entering the EEC produced reports on this, the first of which was published in February 1967 (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969).
\textsuperscript{116} Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
extent than before, arguing that EC membership would have far-reaching effects on other areas of integration outside the economic sphere. This shift is illustrated by a 1970 quote from the documentary analysis:

“There are still many people in Norway who walk around thinking that membership of the EEC is just a question of a kind of economic contract which Norway can benefit from. This misunderstanding is maintained by some who still talk about “the market issue”. [...] We now have a completely new situation seen in relation to the popular arguments which were brought up the last time the issue was up for discussion.”

(Professor Frisch 10/12/70)

Additionally, in the early 60s, it was less clear in what direction the EEC would develop (Frøland 1998). In 1961, many sceptics, like the LP MP Gunnar Garbo, were in favour of negotiations, thinking that the cooperation would be limited to the economic sphere and/or “believing that Norway will obtain the understanding needed of those provisions which are of particular importance to us, so that we can get lasting security for our most important interests” (Garbo 05/02/72). Dag Seierstad’s recollection of the debate in the early 1960s also confirms that “there were no one then who knew how far-reaching membership would be”.117 But in the 1970s, with the EC having put the CAP118 and the CFP firmly in place and plans for a common currency announced, this “optimism” was set back. Frøland’s (1998) interpretation, that the Labour government’s 1962 and the non-socialist coalition’s 1967 positions on EEC membership were characterized by policy confusion, that is, a lack of clear preferences, supports this contention; in the 1970s, in contrast, positions on the EC quickly firmed up.

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117 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
118 Optimism about the Norwegian agricultural sector’s survival with full EEC membership was arguably thwarted as early as 14 January 1962, when the EEC agreed on the key principles for the CAP. After it became clear that farmers would face substantial income cuts under the CAP, agricultural interest organizations and the CP increasingly voiced opposition to EEC membership (Riste 1997, cited by Frøland 1998: 14).
The increased mobilization of the general public in the debate in the 1970s is a third difference between the 1960s and 1970s – a corollary of the first and second points, is. The intensity of the campaigning, the size/number of ad hoc organizations and the fierceness of the newspaper debates are all elements of the period which cannot be compared with the 1960s. Similarly, the massive drop in the number of undecided respondents in opinion polls from 1971 to 1972 is unparalleled by the numbers observed in the 1960s. In 1961-3, the average number of undecided respondents in polls was 38 percent (Hanssen and Sandegren 1969: 56), in 1971, it was 33, in the first half of 1972, it was 28, and in the second half, the average was only 14 percent (Høllvik and Gleditsch 1973: 227).119

5.2 The 1970s Documentary Analysis

The academic literature reveals very little about the dominant discourse in the 1960s and 1970s battles over EC membership. The literature reports that the predominant arguments of the debate were protection of sovereignty, natural resources, primary industries and democratic traditions as well as difference of value priorities, but it does not account for the nuances in the argumentation or give any in-depth analysis of the public Eurosceptic discourse. This part of the thesis examines the argumentation used in the public debate on EC membership between 1970 and 1972 to get a better understanding of 1970s Euroscepticism. The next section presents the data and methods used in the study. Subsequently, the findings of the documentary analysis are presented and discussed.

5.2.1 Data and Methods

The newspaper sample was drawn from both the Aftenposten editions’ debates pages between 1 January 1970 and 31 December 1972. The main focus was on the readers’ letters column, where a total of 11,094 letters were surveyed in the three year period.120 All the EC-related letters were collected, and with the experience of a shortage of data from the 1960s fresh in mind, as were all EC-critical commentaries

119 A more through account of public opinion in the 1970s period can be found in section 8.1.2 of Chapter Eight.
and some EC-positive commentaries and articles/news reports. The data collected totalled 1,072 newspaper items, but only the 187 items containing Eurosceptic argumentation were included in the analysis. These are displayed in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Data used for the 1970s documentary analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF ITEMS</th>
<th>TYPE DOCUMENT</th>
<th>OF SOURCE</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>PARTIES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>&quot;No&quot; letters/commentaries</td>
<td>Aftenposten</td>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>Labour, CDP, LP, SPP and CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>&quot;Yes&quot; letters/commentaries</td>
<td>Aftenposten</td>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>SPP, CP, Labour, CDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other letters/commentaries</td>
<td>Aftenposten</td>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>SPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interviews/articles</td>
<td>Aftenposten</td>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>Labour, CP, SPP, CDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>Virksomme ord</td>
<td>1971, 1973</td>
<td>SPP, Communist Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s documentary analysis

As there was no general election during the 1970-72 period, manifestos did not form part of the 1970s documentary analysis. The party political data sourced for the analysis in this time period were limited to speeches, but after searching libraries and contacting NtEU\(^{121}\) it was only possible to obtain two speeches, one by the a SPP member and one by an NKP member. However, Aftenposten’s debate pages provide fertile ground for studying the Eurosceptic discourse of the 1970s, and many of the newspaper commentaries are written by party representatives or discuss party positions on the EC. In this way, all the different (Eurosceptic) party orientations have been covered in the analysis, as indicated in Table 5.2.

In addition, the newspaper and party analysis is supplemented by an examination of “no” campaigning material published by various anti-EC organizations. With the exception of Folkebevegelsen’s 1972 pamphlet “Norge og EEC: Hva saken gjelder” (Norway and the EEC: What the issue is about), which was accessed online

\(^{121}\) As well as contacting one of the editors of the collection of political speeches used, “Virksomme ord”, for advice.
(Cappelen 2011), all the “no” literature analysed was sourced from the Norwegian State Archives, Riksarkivet, in Oslo. Only “no” literature which covered a range of topics/argumentation\textsuperscript{122} was included in the analysis in order to get an idea of which topics or arguments were prioritized/considered most important when the “no” parties and organizations were dealing with the issue of EEC on a general basis. Consequently, the following material was analysed: “Argumentasjonsplan vedr. EEC” (Argumentation Plan re. the EEC) published by Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF), the youth wing of the Labour Party (Bergo n.d.); “Vi stemte imot” (We voted against), a collection of 13 MPs’ reasons for voting against the proposal of applying for membership in July 1967, published by Vestlandsutvalget mot norsk medlemskap i EEC\textsuperscript{123} and Opplysningsutvalget av 1962\textsuperscript{124} (Berg and Rostad n.d.); the booklet “EEC-motstand: det vesentligste” (EEC opposition: the most important [issue(s)]), authored by political science professor Thomas Chr. Wyller and distributed by Folkebevegelsen; and an article collection with contributions from a variety of student organizations “Hva er EEC?” (What is the EEC?), published by Folkebevegelsen in 1971 (Sæther et al. 1971).

All of the data were coded according to the coding scheme described in part 4.2.2 of Chapter Four and Appendix G, which separates between argumentation related to political values, political culture, rural society, economic interest and national identity.

5.2.2 The Findings of the 1970s Newspaper Analysis
Much like in the 1960s, the majority of the argumentation against the EC that is displayed in the debate pages of Aftenposten in the early 1970s primarily draw on political values and/or political culture issues. However, in contrast to the findings on the 1960s, also the rural dimension plays a very central role in the 1970s debate. Utilitarianism and national identity, on the other hand, do not stand out as

\textsuperscript{122} i.e. was not specific to one subject, for example, EEC membership’s impact on the shipping industry or employment.

\textsuperscript{123} the West Country Committee against Norwegian Membership of the EEC.

\textsuperscript{124} the Information Committee of 1962.
fundamental to the Eurosceptics’ reasoning against EC membership, although the odd letter writer does make use of economic or cultural elements in defence of the anti-membership case. Below the findings are reported, according to category.

5.2.2.1 Political Culture: At the Heart of the Matter

Over half of the articles analysed were coded to one or several geo-historical variables, and the analysis of the 1970s documents thus confirms the central position that the idea of “self-rule” and “people rule” holds in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism. Just within the 39 newspaper items analysed from 1970, a plethora of different terms describing the concept of sovereignty and independence is introduced: suverenitet (sovereignty), folkesuverenitet (people’s sovereignty), selvbestemmelsesrett (right to make own decisions), selvstyre (self-government), styrerett (right to govern), selvstendighet (independence), rådighet (right to control), frihet (freedom), and uavhengighet (independence). Maintaining Norway’s “wonderfully free position in the world” (Tysland 06/04/70) is evidently something that is very important to many opponents’ attitudes towards EC membership. Bjørkan-Melsom (14/09/70) describes the predicament in the following way: “We are faced with a potentially fatal choice. Between Norway’s freedom, the Constitution and our own justice system – or the Rome Treaty with appendices decided by the EEC”.

As mentioned earlier, between the 1960s debates and the 1970s debate there was a shift in the geo-historical body of argumentation. Whereas the membership opponents of both the 1960s and the 1970s are concerned about national sovereignty and independence, the rejection of the EC on the basis of its supranational or union-like character first appears in the 1970s debate. A number of letters printed in Aftenposten in 1970, primarily written by sixth form teacher Johan I. Holm (e.g. 02/03, 16/03, 06/05, 14/05, 29/06, 19/08, 17/11, 25/01/71), but also by other writers (e.g. professors Frisch 10/12/70 and Eckhoff 02/01/71), argue against “the EEC’s political goal: Europe’s union”, the “new superstate”, “the federal state idea”, “the half Europe state” and “the United States of Europe”. Focus is, in other words, much
more on the political dimension of European integration in the anti-EC argumentation of the 1970s than was the case previously. For example, the chairman of the Oslo CP, Godal (14/01/71) asks rhetorically, “Whose voice will count most in the future, Sweden’s or that of a peripheral province in a European Union (not to mention a Half-European Union)?” and professor Eckhoff (10/03/72) states that “the joint government which we had with Sweden between 1814 and 1905 is not even close to as comprehensive as that we will get with the EC states if we enter”.

The case against the EC on the basis of weakening democracy is also elaborated on in the 1970s. Arnstad125 (08/08/72) gives perhaps the most thorough account of the logic behind this argument:

“I [have previously] raised the question of to what extent democracy and freedom is tied to the EC issue. Just these values are strongly rooted in our society […]. I believe that membership of the EC entails a weakening of our traditional democracy and that it will lead to far less freedom for the Norwegian people to decide themselves over the fundamental things in their lives.”

With this, Arnstad points out one of the elementary concepts of Norwegian democracy or folkestyre: the need for government to be close to the individual so that he/she can influence decisions that are made. If decision-making is moved to Brussels, the individual will be powerless. He argues:

“In my view, democracy is not a majority’s right to dictate a minority. Nor is it an expert regime and bureaucratic power. Democracy is, quite the contrary, the individual human being’s right to govern his/her own destiny as directly and closely as possible – in a work situation and in society.

[…] The point is that Norway as a full member comes under pressure from well-intended EC bodies and functionaries, who with their good deeds

125 Assistant secretary-general (of which organization is not stated).
nonetheless deprive us of the freedom to decide fundamental things in our existence.”

Historically, the peripheries were governed by the unelected elites and bureaucrats in Oslo; the struggle for the introduction of a parliamentary system of government was also a struggle for the rural population’s voice to be heard. Therefore, large political units and non-elected decision-makers is something that is very alien to the Norwegian tradition of democracy, and opposition to “expert regimes” and “bureaucratic power” is in this way ingrained in Norwegian geo-historical Euroscepticism. Thus, EC membership is synonymous with disempowerment of the individual, as the distance to decision-makers would increase massively with membership, entailing a transfer of power from the local to the supranational level. The CDP’s youth wing’s leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik (18/12/71), also outlines democracy as one of his organization’s key reasons for opposing EC membership (the other two being the districts and solidarity with the Third World):

“Decisive for people’s well-being is the feeling of identity with and influence over one’s local environment and life pattern. [...] We don’t think that these large units give the individual human being the room and the influence that is required today”.

Around a fifth of the documents analysed argue against EC membership on the basis of the people’s diminishing influence over their own lives, but if anti-bureaucracy and anti-elite rule sentiments are included, the number goes up to over a fourth. Here, “international expert government” is pitted against “national democracy” (professor Eckhoff 28/08/71), and the “bigwigs” and “smarty-pants” in Brussels against the people (Kristofersen 05/08/72). Døhlie (28/11/70) snorts at the elitism of the EC system and the negotiations, saying sarcastically, “I guess we [the people] had better capitulate straight away, so that these representatives can shape the new

126 This line of thinking is also reflected in the SLP’s argumentation today, as interviewee Dag Seierstad also argues that “folkestyre in very large units have a problematic life” (interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009).
community undisturbed”. All of this is congruent with the idea that the historical aversion to being governed by bureaucrats and experts a distant centre plays a key part in the Eurosceptic motivation of many Norwegians.

Although the link between history and the reluctance to surrender national sovereignty is not made explicit by many letter writers, one of the few who couples the two is Sørlie (18/09/72). He points to Norway’s “hard-earned historical experiences” with Danish and Swedish rule when accounting for his Euroscepticism:

“It is not ‘a fear of the unknown’ which makes me react against Norwegian membership, it is a fear of the known, for that which is known by all Norwegians. We know what dependence is, we know what powerlessness is, and we know how it feels to be destroyed in a powerful brotherly embrace.”

In school, all Norwegian children learn about Danish (and Swedish) lack of interest in and knowledge of Norwegian circumstances in the union years from 1536 to 1814 (1905), and the resultant neglect of the country’s development. Also in the author’s interview with farmer and CP member Per Ole Lunde,127 this theme came up. Lunde believes that

“The knowledge and the picture which has been drawn for us in relation to the union with Denmark and Sweden [is probably very important to many, me included]. And [...] thus, it is easy to draw a parallel to the EU and a new union. I know that when I was in Copenhagen for the first time, then you saw some of our prehistory which you kind of… There were buildings and monuments which were built from Norwegian raw materials and Norwegian resources, maybe at the expense of the development in Norway in the time [we were ruled by] Denmark”.

127 Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
Because Norway has been, in the CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter’s words,128 “the smaller or poorer part of a union and felt that it has, in a way, put us in an inferior position”, it is not surprising that the view of sovereignty as something extremely valuable is ingrained in the Norwegian identity, and that this kind of argumentation, linking Norway’s historical experiences with the issue of EC membership, has the potential to strike a chord with many individuals. Also the PP’s Ulf Leirstein129 expresses a similar sentiment:

“Yes, I think it is somewhat connected to that... 1905, and... I don’t remember [1905], and you don’t either, but what I mean is that... it is part of our soul. We learn about it in school [...]”.

In fact, all of the interviewees acknowledge the central role that history plays in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism.130 In the SLP’s Dag Seierstad’s words,131 the country’s short history as an independent state and experience with union and occupation did and still does matter, as it is all “saved in a kind of collective memory which, even if perhaps not much of it was used as active arguments, it lies... it lies somewhere and creates the kind of basis which human thought originates from”.

The CP’s Cathrine Strindin Amundsen132 also thinks that it is obvious that history plays a part in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism, as, she says,

“We are influenced by the society we grow up in and the context and knowledge that we acquire along the way. And Norway is a young nation state, and all of the history education in school is in reality a long series of building up national feeling.”

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128 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
129 Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010.
130 Some even unprompted.
131 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
132 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
5.2.2.2 Political Values: Shared First or a Close Second?

If not as important to 1970s Euroscepticism as the protection of Norwegian political culture, then political values gets a very close second place. Almost half of the texts surveyed contain Eurosceptic argumentation which either explicitly states that material benefits and/or economic growth are less important than other issues, and/or criticize the EC for not sufficiently promoting morality, environmental protection, peace, equality, quality of life, and solidarity with the Third World and with disadvantaged groups in society.

The 1970-72 debate confirms the findings from the 1960s; it is clear that already in the first two phases of Euroscepticism, a large number of Norwegian Eurosceptics were driven by postmaterialist concerns. Also confirming the results from the 1960s, the 1970s material brings forward little evidence to suggest that the Eurosceptics sincerely thought that non-membership would bring more economic benefits to the country. Rather, it is quite clear that a significant number of the Eurosceptics consider material concerns subordinate to other matters, when appraising EC cooperation.

Quality of life is one of the key themes of the political values category. Minister for Public Health Evang (11/09/72), among others, argues that there is a distinctive difference between a “material standard of living” and a “standard of life”, and that these must not be confused. Sørlie (09/06/72) argues that, although living standards might rise with EC membership, people’s well-being is not likely to increase. The concept of life standard, that is, “normal people’s wish for a stable environment”, is commonly juxtaposed to the EC’s economic system, which “leads to extreme mobility with commuting and economic migration” (Professor dr. med. Kringlen 19/06/72). Quality of life is also often contrasted with urbanization, which, according to the sceptics, creates social problems and conflicts and does not correspond with most people’s choice of environment. Much focus is thus put on the individual’s right to choose where he/she wants to live, something which is not seen as
compatible with EC membership. Tingstad (20/11/70) contributes to the debate with a sarcastic comment on the effects of increased mobility for workers:

“I’m sure Oslo is prepared to receive more new inhabitants. There is plenty of housing, and cheap it is too. [...] And the extent of people’s well-being! A survey in Oslo showed that only 75 percent would prefer to live in a smaller city if they could choose.

But there are also other opportunities: You can settle down out in the woods and become a commuter. That way, you can get a refreshing morning trip which lasts several hours before work, and a corresponding outing before dinner.”

A reluctance to give in to the forces of urbanization and centralisation is evident, as life in rural communities, with no overcrowding or commuting, is seen as a better alternative when it comes to quality of life, than life in the city.

The EC’s economic policy is also seen as inhumane in other ways, as it is argued that the open competition it represents will increase the pressure on the weakest in society: not only workers and their families, but also the elderly, disabled people and individuals with special needs. This is where the issue of internal solidarity enters the equation. The centralisation and structural changes that the Rome Treaty’s principles produce, it is argued, lead to undesired “relocation, re-education and ruthless rationalization”, which again result in problems, “especially for older workers, the disabled, the low skilled and various uncompetitive groups” (Aftenposten interview with medical doctor Hanoa 12/05/72).

The Rome Treaty’s focus on economic growth as its primary goal is further criticised in relation to external solidarity, the promotion of peace and the environment; the sceptics condemn this economic way of thinking for its lack of long term perspectives, for going by the philosophy that “the profit of today is more worth than the problems of tomorrow” (Parmann 03/01/72). For example, Opsahl (04/05/72)
contends that the EC’s principles and policies “entail a danger for continued imbalance in the exploitation of the global resources and of the world’s poor people”, prioritizing “its own economic growth over global equalization or ecological balance”. Tollefsen (18/08/72) also argues that if the EC retains its goals of increased economic growth, it will constitute “a very serious threat against the whole of our biological basis of existence here on Earth”.

When considering exceptionalist political values, it is not prominent as a stand-alone category: only 25 of the 189 sources contain arguments that in some way or another express a belief that the value system of the EC is inferior to the Norwegian or Nordic one. Moreover, if excluding “yes” letter writers, the percentage of sources is even smaller. The fact that the proportion of “yes” letters which mention this kind of argumentation is twice as large as that of “no” letters (25 versus 12.5 percent) suggests that exceptionalist argumentation133 is a branch of the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse that has been magnified by proponents of membership, but has limited resonance in the “no” camp. Nevertheless, there are some Eurosceptics who engage in this kind of rhetoric, and the areas which they believe Norway would be pulled down to a lower level by the EC are internal peacefulness and solidarity, trade (and thus solidarity) with the developing world, gender equality and health standards. Minister for Public Health, Evang (11/09/72), for example, clearly believes that Norway has achieved greater social equalisation than the EC countries, as he argues that the EC

“will disturb, break up and complicate the distribution of the economic benefits we have achieved in this country, and which is – even if it’s still not good enough – in my opinion far better than in the EC countries, generally speaking. The wage policy which is adopted with us, benefitting the low-paid groups, is not typical within the EC.”

133 Conceptualized as promoting the notion that the Nordic/Scandinavian countries have a superior form of society.
Wiig (18/09/72), too, argues against the EC because of its inferior gender equality record:

“EC women’s dependence on their husbands’ social security arrangements, the lacking security for unmarried mothers, the actual wage situation for women, women’s minimal representation in the national assemblies and in EC bodies, the general attitude to women, and their weak position in civil law”.

She concludes that the position of women in Norway and Scandinavia is stronger, and that this is a fact that is accepted internationally. Entering the EC, it follows, would entail a step back for gender equality in Norway (and Scandinavia).

At the centre of all of these political value-based arguments is the belief that the EC is not suited to solve the moral issues and the social, structural, environmental problems that individual countries and the world are faced with, but that it “will, on the contrary, contribute to intensify many of them” (Academic appeal, cited by Bilton et al. 18/08/72).

5.2.2.3 Rural Society: Common Objectives, but Different Motivations

The arguments against the EC in favour of protecting rural Norway, i.e. the primary industries, the settlement pattern, the rural districts, nature and the rural way of life, are much more prominent in the 1970s debate than they were in the 1960s. The fact that a substantial amount of the documents analysed contains this kind of argumentation suggests that the rural sentiment played a significant part in shaping Eurosceptic attitudes in the period.

In the context of the 1970s EC debate, the “no” side’s wish to protect farmers’ (and fishermen’s) level of income (by the means of subsidies) is commonly depicted as a question of materialism and selfishness by proponents membership. “P.B.” (06/07/71), an EC proponent, even goes as far as accusing Norwegian farmers of
sponging, saying that Norwegian farmers’ motivation for rejecting the EC is to retain their “exclusive right” to “put their hands even deeper down into the consumers’ [and the state’s] pockets”. This depiction does not correspond with the way in which the Eurosceptics themselves view the situation. Eurosceptic letter writer, “E.S.” (19/07/72), writes that when the EC proponents talk about agriculture and fisheries, they talk about the farmers and fishermen, while when the opponents talk about agriculture and fisheries, they talk about the industries agriculture and fisheries. “E.S.” declares that it is not the minority of the Norwegian population who work in these sectors that are at the heart of the matter, but the battle “to keep agricultural production for the benefit of everyone in this country” (original italics). In Aftenposten’s debate pages, most defenders of the primary industries agree that it is not the detrimental effects EC membership will have on farmers and fishermen’s income that is the key issue, but rather that “it is all of the Norwegian people who has to decide whether our country as a whole will benefit or lose out” (Kjøs 17/12/71). This is also illustrated by Lo (10/04/72), who criticizes the “yes” side for ascribing Norwegian farmers egotism as motivation. He refers to a poll in which, he claims, 69 percent of respondents were supportive of the agricultural subsidy scheme, showing the common man’s “broad understanding of the agricultural sector’s place in our economy and our society’s image, and for the conditions the farmers work under”. Protecting the primary industries is in other words not a straightforward material matter, but rather a multi-faceted issue.

As noted in Chapter Four, the motivations behind different people’s wish to conserve the primary industries and their production levels vary. For example, “E.S.” notes the importance of a guaranteed food supply, while Kjøs (04/12/71, 17/12/71) points out the sectors’ pivotal role in maintaining the settlement pattern. Others view upholding food production as a moral duty (e.g. Parmann 03/01/72), and the maintenance of thriving districts and decentralised settlement is, as discussed above, some times connected to the pursuit of well-being and quality of life.
As a former agrarian party, the CP’s Euroscepticism is clearly coloured by its strong links with the primary industries. But it seems that not even in the CP is the rural dimension of its EC opposition primarily about protecting their core electoral constituency’s income interests. Rather, Lyngstadaas (24/03/71), the former chairman of the Oslo CP, states that

“The real reason for the scepticism lies in that the Common Market’s political structure [...] so fundamentally contrasts [with] the Centre Party’s vision of future society. [...] The rural district society and everything it represents [is] a fundamental element of the Centre Party’s ideology.”

The writer asserts that the way of life that the farmer represents is central to the party’s vision. Because this way of life is based on the notion that the individual should have a maximum level of freedom in relation to the society he is part of, there is a political culture element to the Centre Party’s agriculture-motivated Euroscepticism. “Centralism and concentration of power have [...] always provoked strong reactions in the party”, Lyngstadaas explains. Also Nordhus (29/07/72), who identifies himself as a Liberal, points out that “our farmers and smallholders today stand for the individuality ideal we are about to lose in our bureaucratic industrial society”.

CP MP Unneberg (11/10/71), emphasizes another dimension of the CP’s belief in the rural way of life, the so-called “resource democracy”, which not only touches on democracy and the political culture category, but also postmaterialist values. He argues that responsible resource management in a global and long-term perspective is not compatible with the EC’s core principles, but that this is best achieved by establishing “responsibility communities”: “moulding Norway into 450 self-governed, distinctive and, to the extent that it is possible, economic and culturally self-sufficient units”. Unneberg’s (and the CP’s) commitment to maintaining the rural way of life, draws on many elements connected to postmaterialism:
environmentalism, quality of life, reduction of consumption, and concern about inequalities in the world.

Rural districts argumentation is not confined to the CP and the rural population, as representatives from both the left-wing and the middle parties voice concern about rural interests.\textsuperscript{134} That this type of sentiment has resonance even among the urban population is illustrated by a reader’s letter written by Gunnleik Seierstad (15/06/72), in which he argues that “we Oslo inhabitants” would be better off moving to North-Norway than to the continent, as in North-Norway “we will most probably find a way of life which is not like our own. That would hardly do us any harm”. This implies that not only does he consider the way of life in the Norwegian periphery preferable to that in EC countries, but also to that in Norwegian urban centres, in this case Oslo.

5.2.2.4 National Identity: Present, but of Limited Relevance

Some of the documents analysed express worries about the cultural threat posed by European integration, and a few even reflect outright hostility towards the cultures and value sets of the EC countries. However, these expressions are rare among the Eurosceptic writers; much like the findings on exceptionalism, perceived cultural threat and identity concerns seem to be more popular as a “no” argument among the proponents of membership. 45 percent of the items written by advocates of membership reproduce national identity-related “no” arguments, but only 16 percent of the other items rely on this kind of argumentation. The high proportion of “yes” letters highlighting these kinds of arguments is not surprising, considering that the “no” side was frequently accused of being nationalist by EC proponents. It was in the “yes” side’s interest to play up these “no” arguments, which only a very small minority of the “no” camp sympathized with, as it was believed to further the “yes” cause.

\textsuperscript{134} Also, as mentioned in Chapter Four, there has been a cross-party consensus on maintaining a comprehensive regional policy and protect the primary industries since the 1930s (Frøland 1998).
Nevertheless, although national identity sentiments did not play a very central role in the 1970s debate, it cannot be said that they did not exist. Sørlie (05/05/72, 19/05/72, 09/06/72, 27/06/72) is one of the usual suspects when it comes to this line of reasoning, as is Nordhus (19/07/72, 29/07/72, 26/08/72, 22/09/72). Neither of the two writers identify with, or trust, the “European superpowers”, and Nordhus even brings up Germany’s nazi and Italy’s fascist past in two of his letters (19/07/72, 26/08/72). In other words, although not very widespread, some letters display outright hostility to the traditions, political culture and values of the EC countries, and a couple of letters play on anti-German sentiments. However, the general tendency in this body of argumentation is a somewhat softer expression of the differences between the EC’s and Norwegian policy, and the implications of these differences to alcohol policy and cultural diversity. Unlike in the 1960s, religion does not feature as a theme in any of the “no” writers’ letters, although the re-emergence of “Dyret” (“the Beast”) in the debate, i.e. the parallel between the EC and the Book of Revelation drawn by religious opponents of membership, is brought up by a couple of “yes” authors. This was clearly done to ridicule the “no” side’s agitation, and was perhaps given more space in the press than its real scope called for.\footnote{Also in the early 1990s, biblical prophecies were used as EU argumentation in some Christian environments. Saglie (2000c: 167) notes that “even though biblical arguments had a marginal place in the EU debate, they still got quite a lot of attention in the media”. That these types of arguments were overrepresented in the media in the 1970s too is very likely, considering their sensational value.} In an interview with the author,\footnote{Oslo, 22 September 2010.} the CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter states that this kind of argumentation was rare. It was not something he felt the party experienced in meetings or party conferences: it was altogether a rarity, he says.

When it comes to the strength of national attachment and national pride, conclusions are harder to make. This is due to the fact that the geo-historical dimension captures many elements which are likely to evoke pride in Norway as a nation, sentiments that are not necessarily made explicit. A reader’s letter printed almost a month after the referendum reflects the connection between political culture and national pride, as the author criticizes another letter writer for being embarrassed that Norway
rejected EC membership. He scolds her for her lack of patriotism and national pride and for being ashamed that

“the majority of the Norwegian people proved themselves to have enough backbone and will power, and to be so headstrong and proud that they still want to have the right to govern themselves and be masters of their own house.”

(Laumann-Olsen 20/10/72)

Solicitor Rabe (31/07/72), on the other hand, defines his national attachment more along the lines of the rural identity thesis, that is, attachment to the countryside and Norwegian nature, as he writes that

“The majority of us have an image of Norway in our hearts. We know that a large part of this country is ours, and that we can roam freely in the woods and fields and the mountains – both summer and winter. [...] We, who have fallen in with a bad crowd, cannot make ourselves view Brussels and the EC as equal in value to what we will lose.”

This suggests that to some, national attachment is indeed also interconnected with the territory of Norway and its nature, as suggested by the academic literature (see e.g. Eriksen 1993b). According to this line of reasoning, the EC poses a threat to the culture of “roaming” the woods, fields and mountains – glorious, untouched nature, as Norway and the people of Norway would lose control over its territory to Brussels if joining the EC.

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137 In the readers’ letters from the last months before the referendum, this expression was used sarcastically by a few anti-EC writers after repeated stabs from EC supporters about the bad company on the “no” side: communists, left-wing radicals, religious extremists, the CP and farmers, the latter “the most conservative elements in Norwegian politics” and not famous for being very progressive (cited by Nordhus 29/07/72).
5.2.2.5 Economic Interest: At Best a Second Order Concern

Economic argumentation certainly plays a significant role in the 1970s debate over EC membership, but the form it takes makes one wonder whether it is purely a part of the forensics, that is, the art of countering the economic arguments of the “yes” side, rather than an expression of Eurosceptic motivation. Like in the 1960s debate, there is little or no evidence to suggest that the “no” side sincerely believed that Norway as a country would be better off economically outside the EC, but there is a subtle difference in the confidence with which the Eurosceptic letter writers now argue that non-membership will not be economically ruinous, due to the country’s sound economic track record since 1962:

“Catastrophe was predicted in 1962 if Norway ‘missed the bus in Brussels’. As is common knowledge today, things turned out somewhat differently.”

(Holm138 06/05/70)

So, little effort is put into arguing that the Norwegian economy would lose out if joining the EC, but that is not to say that little effort is put into countering the “yes” side’s “we cannot afford to be on the outside” argument. The discrediting of economic “yes” arguments is clearly quite central to the 1970s debate; it indicates that many viewed it as important to make sure the economic, second order arguments did not take over the first order nature of other arguments, those related to political values, political culture, rural society or national identity.

Different strategies are used to obtain this goal. One is to emphasize that any effects as a result of membership or non-membership are only presumptions: “the contention about the market related benefits remains a contention until it is proven” (Haugestad139 26/08/70). Another is to depersonalize the benefits that Norway, according to the “yes” side, will get: “It is, on the whole, hard to find any category of concrete Norwegians who will profit from the EEC, even if we are constantly told

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138 Sixth form teacher.
139 Supreme Court advocate.
that the abstract term ‘Norway’ will benefit from membership” (Brox 140 02/10/70). A third method is to use the so-called “counter expertise”, referring to experts who have come to a different conclusion than the “yes” side about the economic issue in question (e.g. Tingstad 20/11/70; Godal 141 14/01/71). Additionally, one of the letter writers uses the oil as an argument: he/she thinks that Norway’s economy will be strong regardless of EC affiliation because of the North Sea oil, making economic utility a second order concern (IØ. 03/12/70). The most common strategy, however, is to acknowledge that membership would be beneficial to the “big” industries in Norway, while simultaneously pointing out that to the domestic and primary industries and the individual citizen, the economic benefits of membership are more diffuse (e.g. Stokke 15/06/72).

It is very clear that most of the “no” argumentation in the debate pages is geared towards other aspects of the integration process than economic matters. Moreover, to reiterate the point made above, the economic argumentation that is present is predominantly treated as second order concern, or comes up as a response to arguments from the “yes” side. Although there is no doubt that it is easier for people to focus on sovereignty, morality and decentralized settlement if they are convinced that they will not be worse off economically as a result of joining the EC, the evidence does suggest that to quite a few Eurosceptics, the economy is completely irrelevant to their opinion on membership. This particularly applies to many of the letter writers using postmaterialist arguments, but also to many political culture-motivated Eurosceptics it is clear that the issue of economic gain is of no pertinence. Besides, whether or not the “no” camp succeeded in undermining the “yes” side’s economic arguments is questionable. It is important to remember that the “yes” camp did “own” the economic issue and that, according to the 1972 Referendum Study, only 15 percent of voters thought that non-membership would give higher economic growth, compared to 39 percent believing that membership

140 Social scientist and socialist left politician.
141 Chairman of the Oslo CP.
would have a more positive effect.\textsuperscript{142} Only 26 percent of “no” voters were of the belief that Norway’s economy would benefit from not joining the EC, and 11 percent even acknowledged that membership would boost national economic growth.\textsuperscript{143} It is therefore more likely that the “yes” side enjoyed more credibility in the economic sphere than the “no” side, although it is doubtful that there was much certainty among the population about the effects of membership, as the debate was littered with contradicting messages. After all, 16 percent of the voters in the 1972 Referendum Study stated that they did not know which option would give Norway higher economic growth.

Nevertheless, the interview data as well as many of the readers letters illustrate that many retained confidence in the Norwegian economy even without membership. Farmer Per Ole Lunde,\textsuperscript{144} for example, provides the following account of his recollection of the 1970s debate:

“The ‘yes’ side had intense emphasis on that – that we would be isolated and wouldn’t have a chance of producing or selling anything at all. [That’s what] it sounded like.”

“And why didn’t you buy it?”

“Well, I didn’t believe in it, I guess. No... [laughs] I thought that if we were clever and arranged things right, there would be demand for what we produced.”

Notwithstanding, there were also quite a few Eurosceptics who openly admitted to the adverse economic effects non-membership could entail. For example, CP MP Unneberg’s statement that saying “no” to the EC would result in economic strains just a few days before the referendum was well-publicized by “yes” commentators (e.g. Labour MP Aune 20/09/72; Hanssen 22/09/72). Therefore, it is perhaps more

\textsuperscript{142} 16 and 30 percent said “don’t know” or that it would be the same, respectively. The question asked if respondents thought economic growth in Norway would notably increase or notably decrease if Norway became a member of the EU, or whether it would not make a difference.

\textsuperscript{143} Among “no” voters 19 and 44 percent said “don’t know” or that it would be the same, respectively.

\textsuperscript{144} Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
likely that people with economic issues as their primary concern ended up on the “yes” side, as also indicated by the 1972 Referendum Study results, where 41 percent of “yes” respondents listed economic interest as their primary reason for voting “yes”.

The above notwithstanding, there are some recurring economic themes in the 1970s Eurosceptic debate which could have coloured some voters’ decisions on how to vote. Although the economic arguments are extremely rarely the focus of the letters, Eurosceptic writers did identify several problems with EC membership: Firstly, Norwegian shipping would be worse off. Secondly, Norway would have to open up its fishing territory to foreign trawlers. Third and fourth, unemployment and prices would rise. Fifth, Norway would lose control of its natural resources, and sixth, some Norwegian industries would struggle in open EC competition. And finally, some writers complain that the EC is protectionist and does not promote free trade.

5.2.3 The Arguments in the “No” Literature

_Folkebevegelsen_ was, at the time and has been since, accused of preferring to use “terse and easy to understand messages” over “sophisticated arguments” (e.g. Archer and Sogner 1998: 33). This is not only common to the EC protagonists participating in the debate, also the academic literature has a tendency to emphasise the less sophisticated elements of the “no” argumentation and campaign. In a style familiar from membership proponents’ commentaries from _Aftenposten’s_ debate pages, Allen (1979: 106-7), for example, caricatures these messages in the following way:

“all Norwegian fish would be taken by foreign trawlers; agriculture would be finished; small industries would be ruined and bought up by foreign capital; the north would be depopulated; the country would be invaded by foreign workers, catholic ideas, rabies, continental drinking habits; and foreigners would buy up mountain huts, lakes and forests”.

145
Thematically, many of these arguments correspond to those found in the “no” literature surveyed, but overall, they are exaggerated and have much more in common with the adverse portrayal of “no” argumentation by the “yes” side in the newspaper debate than that advanced by the Eurosceptics. This indicates that Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation has been somewhat misrepresented in the literature.

The documentary analysis shows that the argumentation in the “no” literature follows the same pattern as that in the newspaper debate. Political culture and political values arguments come up most often and are the ones emphasised as the most important, followed by rural society. National identity, i.e. argumentation reflecting for example perceived cultural threat or hostility towards other cultures is negligible, and the economic arguments take the same form as in the newspaper debate: they mainly focus on playing or putting down the government or “yes” side’s warnings about economic isolation and decline as a result of non-membership.

Wyller’s booklet “EEC opposition - the most important [issue(s)]” argues that “as long as the economic arithmetic problem results in such a good balance […] the question [of whether] membership will promote or hamper […] values [such as democracy, protection of the natural environment, Norwegian agriculture,] general human safety, full employment, care for loser groups, [and] an extensive egalitarian attitude […] is the essential problem. The most important [issue]” (pp 2-4). He concludes:

“We are opponents of membership because the EEC’s political value standards are not ours, and because the EEC therefore is not a suitable means to promote the values that we today and in the future prioritize for our country and our people.”

(p. 11, original emphasis)
In other words, Wyller emphasizes political culture and political values, particularly democracy, egalitarianism, quality of life, the environment and (external) solidarity, after having discussed and established that the economic prophecies of the “yes” side are unfounded: “If we are outside the Common Market, our living standard will doubtfully be reduced. We can possibly speak of a smaller growth tempo” (p. 1, original emphasis). He also briefly touches on cultural issues, noting national goals such as “language development, religion, teetotalism, [and] safeguarding of the people’s cultural distinctiveness” (p. 3); the mention of these goals suggests that he believes that they are of relevance to the EC question, but the section in which they are mentioned is not particularly emotive. Interestingly, Wyller does not discuss the issue of the primary sectors in any detail (the fisheries are not even mentioned), but when agriculture is mentioned, it is, like in the newspaper debate, brought up as something important to the Norwegian people in more terms than just food. He says: “I suppose we can eat our fill of German potatoes, but [we can] not survive as a people without Norwegian agriculture” – again indicating that agriculture is much more to the Norwegian people than just an economic sector.

Among the 12\(^{145}\) MPs’ contributions in the “no” publication “We voted against”, the most common argument against membership is the loss of sovereignty, followed by concern for democracy and opposition to centralization of power. The CDP’s Sverre L. Mo, for example, expresses scepticism towards the EEC’s “\textit{consummate} bureaucratic technocracy or expertise rule” and that “the organ which is elected by the people […] has absolutely no legislative power” (original italics). After political culture arguments, arguments relating to the primary sectors or settlement pattern are most commonplace: four MPs, one from each of the parties covered (SPP, Labour, CDP and CP), express concern about these aspects of the EEC issue, and three MPs from the SPP, Labour Party and CP, use political value arguments, specifically external solidarity and/or egalitarianism/internal solidarity. The MPs’ contributions follow the overall trend also in terms of economic arguments: they are not prominent. Only Labour’s Einar Stavang points out that “the gains are rather

\(^{145}\) There were 13 contributions in total, but one of them, Erik Braadland, did not, strictly speaking, argue against the EEC.
uncertain” and CP MP Hans Borgen’s comment suggests acknowledgement of the view that membership would lead to a “somewhat quicker increase in our living standard”. There were no references to national identity or culture in any of the articles in the booklet.

In AUF’s argumentation plan, the anti-capitalist rhetoric is prominent, as it is argued that excessive liberalism and large multinational corporations get in the way of the labour movement’s work, greater social equalization, environmental protection, gender equality and normal people’s quality of life. These are clearly postmaterialist themes, but also democracy features prominently as a theme. National identity issues do not feature in the publication, but the “yes” side’s economic argumentation is given attention towards the end, in familiar form: “it makes no difference if we go in or remain on the outside. The economic consequences for Norway are more or less the same” (p. 9).

The booklet “What is the EEC?” contains nine articles on different topics: invalid “yes” arguments; EEC and democracy; EEC – capitalism’s battlefield; what is the EEC; the costs of being on the outside; Norwegian agriculture and the EEC; the fisheries and the EEC; the nynorsk movement and the EEC; and the developing countries and the EEC. With the exception of the second and ninth article, which only deal with their main topics, democracy and the developing countries, the argumentation in all the other articles are characterized by the same themes as above: political culture (sovereignty, democracy and opposition to union and bureaucracy), postmaterialism (external solidarity, humanitarianism, environmentalism, morality, quality of life, equality and anti-war), rural society (protection of the primary sectors, settlement pattern and districts), and a playing down or denial of the economic disadvantages of non-membership. Little of the argumentation present in eight of the booklet’s articles stands out from what has been reported above, but the penultimate contribution, which is written by Ola Svein Stugu from Studentmållaget (the Student wing of the Norwegian Language Society,
Noregs Mållag\textsuperscript{146}, deserves further mention. His reasoning supports the rural identity theory, as he defends the primary sectors, settlement pattern and local communities on cultural grounds. He says: “so small and sparsely populated the Norwegian rural communities are, even the smallest changes in their economic basis would be fatal for the villagers” (p. 51), and “this is about the all-important material basis for they who hold up the rural culture and the language variant we claim to represent”. Although he cites other reasons for being against the EEC, like the EEC’s strong capitalist profile, suppression of the development of the Third World, democracy and sovereignty, he also states that as an adherent of the nynorsk language movement, his main argument is his opposition to the changes EEC membership would impose on Norwegian rural districts.

The Folkebevegelsen pamphlet, “Norway and the EU: What the issue is about”, is the only source analysed which to some degree resembles Allen’s above-cited recital of the “no” side’s argumentation as “terse and easy to understand messages”. However, it is important to point out that the form of the publication, a short bullet point pamphlet, prevents the development of “sophisticated arguments” as found in the previous publications analysed. The pamphlet states that “foreigners get the right to fish in Norwegian waters”, and this could potentially be understood as “all Norwegian fish will be taken by foreign trawlers” (cf. Allen 1979). The review of the EEC’s impact of the agricultural sector\textsuperscript{147} might give out the impression that “agriculture will be finished”. “We can’t limit the import of foreign workers; these will compete for jobs on the same terms as Norwegian workers” could be read as “the country will be invaded by foreign workers”. “Depopulation of large parts of coastal and rural Norway” and “rural Norway becomes depopulated” closely resembles “the north will be depopulated”. And “According to the Rome Treaty, foreigners can buy up and develop our energy and resource sources” comes close to

\textsuperscript{146} Noregs Mållag is the leading member based organisation promoting nynorsk, the language which was created in the mid-19th century as an alternative to Danish, which was the written language in Norway at the time.

\textsuperscript{147} Abolition of subsidies and support arrangements, restructuring towards larger units, reduction of the agricultural population by 50 percent in 10 years and financial benefits from shutting down agricultural areas.
“foreigners will buy up mountain huts, lakes and forests”. That “small industries would be ruined and bought up by foreign capital” and that “the country would be invaded by catholic ideas, rabies and continental drinking habits” (cf. Allen 1979), on the other hand, feature nowhere in any of the “no” literature analysed.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the secondary literature and analysed the arguments against EC membership between 1970 and 1972. It was argued that the period differs from the 1960s period in three ways. First, de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969 and the EC’s confirmation of their plans of economic and monetary union in December 1969 contributed to intensifying the debate and increase polarization. Whereas in the 1960s, the EC issue was cast in primarily economic terms, the 1970s saw a much more impassioned opposition towards political integration and supranationalism, because the EC’s objective of an “ever closer union” became much clearer and more real with the objectives of political integration set out at the 1969 Hague summit. Second, by 1970, all the parties and political actors had had time to digest the issue of European integration to a much larger degree: study circles had taken place and more detailed investigations into Norway’s problems with integration had been carried out in the 1960s. What is more, the availability of Norwegian language EC reports and other literature was much better in the 1970s, also contributing to increased knowledge of the Brussels machinery and EC policy. And third, increased polarization and perspicacity led to increased public participation in the debate. There were more activities on the grassroots level (protests, canvassing, meetings and the establishment of local branches of Folkebevegelsen), more activity in the newspapers’ debate pages, and polls showed a consistently declining percentage of undecided voters from the 1960s debate to the end of the campaign in 1972. These differences between the 1960s period and the 1970-72 period made it necessary to separate the analysis of the 1960s from that of the 1970s, although they both arguably make up the formative period of Norwegian Euroscepticism.
The second part of the chapter reported on the findings of the analysis of two political speeches, 187 items from *Aftenposten’s* debate pages and a selection of the “no” literature from the period. It showed that the 1970s Eurosceptic discourse follows the same pattern as the 1960s discourse, with one exception: the rural society category plays a larger role in the 1970s than in the previous period. It is clear that political culture and political value variables are at the core of 1970s Euroscepticism, as the themes of independence, democracy and foreign rule on the one hand, and of morality, quality of life, solidarity and environmentalism on the other, reinforce their strong position in early Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation. Economic interest, however, plays only a secondary role, with most arguments only seeking to play down the relevance of economic matters in order to focus on other more important issues. Furthermore, national identity is only relevant to a limited amount of letter writers, and is more commonly played up by proponents of membership seeking to brand the “no” camp “nationalist”. Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of codes according to category, giving some indication of how many sources contained arguments from the different categories.

**Figure 5.1** Number of news items coded to each of the categories (1970-72)

Source: Author’s documentary analysis

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148 In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included.
With the 1970s documentary analysis confirming the centrality of political culture and political values to Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation, also observed in the 1960s study, the geo-historical thesis and the reverse postmaterialist thesis gain added credibility in the context of Norwegian Euroscepticism. In addition, the rural society variable also lays claim to motivating Norwegian Euroscepticism. There is no doubt that the desire to protect the settlement pattern, the primary sectors, the districts and the rural way of life is also a very important stimulus of EC opposition. However, rural protection is usually coupled with either postmaterialist values, for example for the purposes of environmentalism or providing quality of life, or political culture, wanting a local democracy and freedom for the individual to make his/her own decisions. Besides, it seems that when the opponents are asked to rank the issues in order of importance, the primary sectors argument is not at the top of the list. For example, Borgen (14/07/71), a CP MP, states that his position on the EC does neither have “its origin nor its fundament in the agricultural sector’s circumstances”. When considering membership, he thinks the issue of special arrangements for agriculture is subordinate. To him, “the question of our national right to make our own decisions (selvbemmeløsrett) is paramount” (original italics). Tingstad (20/11/70) also couples geo-historical and rural society concerns in his letter to the editor. Speaking sarcastically about the Rome Treaty, he sums up his distaste for the EC’s lack of democratic government and the Norwegian pro-EC elites who show no regard for the population’s concerns about EC membership’s assaults on rural Norway and the country’s democratic ideals:

“[...] article 235 in the Rome Treaty [...] stipulates that the EEC’s authorities have blanket powers to make decisions on every initiative which ‘seems necessary to realize one of the Community’s goals’. That’s the way it should be, no democratic nonsense with a division of responsibilities and elected bodies.
I am so happy that we have newspapers and politicians who can really handle this EEC business in a proper way. 149 And it is clear: if we are to enter an economic and political union of an everlasting character, then I think that it should happen as fast as possible, and without attaching importance to details such as fishing territories, settlement, folkestyre and this kind of hairsplitting."

The CDP’s youth wing, Kristelig Folkepartis Ungdom (KrFU), emphasises, like the CP, all three of the political culture, postmaterialism and rural protection categories, that is, the issues of democracy, solidarity with developing countries and the districts in their opposition to the EC (KrFU Chairman Bondevik 18/12/71).

The combinations are many, but from the documentary analysis it seems that these three categories together can account for the motivation behind most of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Economic interest, however, is not very prominent as a Eurosceptic argument because of the “yes” side’s ownership of the issue. Moreover, the commonality of assertions by EC opponents that it is assumed that membership will lead to quicker economic growth, and that people in the “no” camp “prioritize other values than maximal economic growth and as many material benefits as possible” (Bondevik 18/12/71), is not likely to have attracted “hard-line” materialists. Notwithstanding, economic considerations cannot be discounted as a second order issue, as the “no” side did put in significant effort in convincing the public that the economic impact of a “no” would, at least, not be catastrophic. Similarly, the national identity thesis appears to have limited explanatory power of 1970s Euroscepticism, as the argumentation relating to national pride, cultural threat and hostility towards other cultures was limited. The next chapter considers the events of the 1973-late 1980s and 1989-1994 period, before moving on to the Eurosceptic argumentation of the latter period.

149 Criticism levelled at the predominantly pro-European media and politicians’ approach to the EU question.
Chapter 6
The Third Phase: 1989-94

Modern day Norwegian Euroscepticism was formed in the 1960s and 1970s and consolidated in the 1989-1994 period, the second period of heightened Euroscepticism. In the intervening period, from 1973 to 1989, there was a cease-fire between the opponents and proponents of EC membership, a period of latent Euroscepticism. The bilateral trade agreement with the EC, negotiated by the non-socialist government on 14 May 1973, came into force in July the same year and gave Norwegian industry free access to important Western European markets (Allen 1979; Tamnes 1997). With this, the European issue disappeared from the political agenda. However, the 1972 public vote only enabled (or forced) the parties to bury the issue; Norwegian Euroscepticism (and support for the EC) never disappeared. Although in the following one and a half decades, discussion of the EC was a taboo in Norwegian politics (e.g. Værnø 1981; Udgaard 2006: 325), when the issue resurfaced in the late 1980s, it was clear that Euroscepticism had been latent in the parties, the “no” organizations from the 1970s debate and the population. The fronts were still there and, as would become apparent, the arguments used to defend Norway against membership had changed little since the 1960s and 1970s debates, except that they were now advanced with more clout and confidence than before.

This chapter covers the early 1990s, i.e. the second period of heightened Euroscepticism, but it also comments briefly on the period which stretched from 1973 to the late 1980s. In order to contextualize the research into the nature of and motivation behind Norwegian opposition to EU membership, the first part of the chapter summarizes the developments in the Norway/EC relationship from 1973 up until 1994. This is also done to show why it is natural to exclude the 1973-1988 period from the subsequent analysis. Part two of the chapter then presents the findings of the documentary analysis.
6.1 A Period of Latent Euroscepticism and the Subsequent Period of Heightened Euroscepticism


In August 1972 the Labour PM Bratteli declared that the Labour Party would not continue in office if the population voted “no”. In other words, he made the referendum a vote of confidence, and in effect, the Labour government became the second government in seventeen months to step down due to the European issue. Labour’s misfortune did not end with this however: some of the protagonists from the no-organization AIK defected and joined the newly formed SEL, and the 1973 general election saw the party’s vote plummet from 46.5 to 35.3 percent. The other “yes” party, the Conservative Party, also saw a drop in their level of support in the Storting election following the referendum, whereas all the “no” parties increased their vote shares (see Table B3 in Appendix B for details). There was one exception, however: the officially anti-EC LP, which had suffered grave internal disagreement on the EC issue during the battle and split in 1972,150 also suffered major electoral losses. The party’s vote declined from 9.4 percent in the 1969 election to 3.5 percent in 1973.151 Of the “no” parties, the SLP’s predecessor, the SEL, achieved the highest gains up from 3.5 percent of the vote at the previous election152 to 11.2 percent in 1973. It was in other words clear that a “no” stance was a vote winner after the referendum, at least more so than a “yes” stance was.

With the exception of the pro-EC breakaway party from the LP, Det Nye Folkeparti (the New People’s Party, NPP), some central figures within the SLP, who in the early 1980s saw a European foreign and security policy as a possible solution to the détente (Værnø 1981; Sæter 1981; Johannessen 1981), and a few EC advocates from the Labour and Conservative parties, none of the parties made any attempts to play up the EC issue in the one and a half decades after 1972. Thus, little reference to

150 The party’s pro-European splinter group went formed the NPP in time for the 1973 election. The party achieved 3.4 percent of the vote in 1973, but their results in subsequent elections were dismal. The LP was reunited with the splinter party in 1988.
151 The party’s electoral fortunes have not recovered since.
152 when it was still the SPP
participation in European integration was made in the party manifests or the political discourse of the 1970s and 1980s; the manifestos of the anti-EC parties, the SLP, LP, CDP and CP, were restricted to defending the existing arrangements and the 1972 referendum outcome, and the Conservatives, united behind a pro-EU stance, and the internally split Labour Party played down the issue and merely emphasized the need for close cooperation with the EC in their party programmes.

When asked about her views on EC membership in May 1981, the Labour PM Gro Harlem Brundtland declared that she thought it was best to let Norway’s position in Europe stay as it was, and to let the EC/Norway relationship be determined by a natural development process in the long term (Aftenposten 1981).

Although the parties played down or ignored the issue altogether during the 1973-1988 period, their stances remained the same, with the CP, SLP, CDP and LP on the “no” side, and the NPP,153 Conservatives and Labour on the “yes” side. The only party with an ambiguous stance on European integration was the 1973 newcomer to the party system, “Anders Langes parti til sterk nedsettel av skatter, avgifter og offentlige innkre”, which in 1977 was renamed the Progress Party (PP) and in the coming decades was to make a massive impact on the Norwegian party system.154

6.1.2 Slowly Getting to the Heart of the Matter: 1986-89

As part of EFTA and as an individual trading partner to the EC, Norway’s relations with the EC developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Several consultation agreements in areas such as research, the environment, and science and technology were negotiated in the 1980s (Tamnes 1997; ECDNI 2008). In the latter half of the decade, the Labour government’s foreign policy became increasingly Europe-oriented. This policy change has largely been attributed to external factors: firstly, in 1986, the oil prices fell sharply, prompting a change in the Norwegian outlook on economic policy, as national petroleum revenues declined dramatically. Secondly, the 1986 SEA signified massive changes in the EC. The new initiatives it introduced, especially the plans of a Single Market, were projects PM Gro Harlem Brundtland

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153 In 1980 the NPP was renamed to Det Liberale Folkeparti (the Liberal People’s Party, LPP).
154 It is today the second largest party in the Storting.
and the Labour leadership wanted Norway to be part of. The Labour government’s tactic was to progress with the EC matter slowly and carefully, in order to mature the general public for membership. Mrs. Brundtland wanted to wait with reintroducing the membership issue until the timing was right, and in the meanwhile, she focused her wholehearted efforts on securing a deal with the EC. She wanted an arrangement which would secure Norwegian participation in the proposed Single Market until the time was right to apply for full EC membership. Archer (2005: 57; see also Archer and Sogner 1998: 49) states that

“[i]t seems that the Labour leadership had originally hoped that the EEA would be brought in from 1 January 1993 and, after a few years of ‘socialization’ in the single market the public would come more easily to accept full membership of the EC”.

6.1.3 The Developments Framing the 1990s Debate

6.1.3.1 The Reactivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism: 1989-1994

Although the wheels of the Europe debate were put in motion around 1986 and the increasingly pro-active European policy of the Labour government, it did not start gathering speed until August 1988, when the Conservatives broke the cease-fire by expressing their wholehearted support for EC membership (Saglie 2000a; Archer 2005). This put pressure on the other parties to take a stand on the issue in time for the 1989 general election, and in 1989 the EC issue reappeared in party election manifestos after a 17 year long absence. The “yes” parties from 1972, the Conservatives and Labour (the latter still divided internally), were this time joined by the right-wing populist PP, which in the 1989 general election received 13 percent

155 The collapse of Communism at the end of the decade was also very important to the Norwegian change of policy, especially as it enabled the Swedes and Finns to apply for membership of the EU. Another significant development within the EC in the 1980s was the enlargements to the south, which increased the number of member states from nine to twelve: Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal became members in 1986. For example, the accession of “under-developed states in Southern Europe” was noted as a positive development by the SLP leadership in 1986 (Seeland 1986), and also made the argument that the EC was a “rich man’s club” less relevant.

156 But, Archer (2005: 57) adds, “these hopes were dashed when the Swedish Social Democrat government, followed by the Finns, submitted applications for full membership in 1991.”
of the vote.\textsuperscript{157} On the other side, the LP, CDP, CP and SLP again joined their forces against EU membership.\textsuperscript{158} The party stances are outlined in more detail in Table 6.1 below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Official party positions on EU-related issues}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Party & EU membership & EEA membership & Intra party dissent\textsuperscript{159} & Use of minority veto to block a yes \textsuperscript{160} \\
\hline
Conservatives & Yes & Yes & None & No \\
Labour & Yes & Yes & Anti-EU faction & No \\
PP & Yes & Yes & Anti-EU faction & No \\
LP & No & Yes & Pro-EU faction & & anti-EEA faction & No \\
CDP & No & Yes & Pro-EU faction & & anti-EEA faction & No \\
SLP & No & No & None & Yes \\
CP & No & No & None & Yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{Source: Adapted from Saglie (1998: 352)}
\end{table}

The pro-EU parties were joined by \textit{Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon} (the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, NHO) to form the basis of the “yes” camp, whereas the EC opponents were joined by the primary industry’s interest organizations, environmental organizations and LO (Neumann 2002; Scarini and Listhaug 1997). This formation of alliances was more or less the same as that of 1972 and the “no” camp used the “grassroots versus elites” image to its advantage: it was the Labour leadership, Conservatives and Norwegian business elites against the people (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995).

\textsuperscript{157} The party did not take a clear stand on membership in its 1989 manifesto, but the party leadership and its youth wing were quite uninhibited in their support for membership between 1989 and 1993. However, after the 1993 election, the party leader, Carl I. Hagen, expressed regret that the party had adopted such a strong “yes” profile. He also declared, and as does the 1993 manifesto, profound scepticism about the direction of integration as set out in the Maastricht Treaty (Skinner 2011).

\textsuperscript{158} The small party \textit{Red Velgallianse} (Red Electoral Alliance) was also anti-membership.

\textsuperscript{159} The intra-party dissent column refers to whether there were any dissenting factions within the respective parties, i.e. factions in disagreement with the official party stance.

\textsuperscript{160} Prior to the referendum, there was an inter-party debate on whether Norway should go ahead with the application if the referendum, which was not legally binding, was to produce a narrow ‘yes’ result. The minority veto column refers to whether the various parties were in favour of vetoing membership in the event of such an outcome.
The 1989 general election caused a change of government, from Labour to a centre-right Conservative/CDP/CP\(^{161}\) government, but the coalition was not to last long. Brundtland’s project, the EEA agreement, was to ensure Norway’s and the other EFTA states’ inclusion in the Single Market, and its negotiations officially commenced in June 1990. However, on 28 October 1990, the non-socialist government was terminated as a result of disagreement between the CP and the Conservatives on a number of different issues related to the EEA agreement and its negotiations.\(^{162}\) For the second time, a non-socialist government saw no other alternative than to resign over their internal disagreement on Europe. As a result, the Labour Party and Mrs. Brundtland reassumed office. The negotiations for the EEA agreement, which was to form the basis of Norway’s relationship with the EU for the next two decades, were concluded by the Labour government in 1991. It was signed on 2 May 1992 and ratified by a 130 to 35 majority in the Storting 16 October 1992 (see Table 6.2 below). It entered into force in January 1994, by which time all the EFTA states except Iceland and Liechtenstein had applied for full EU membership.\(^{163}\)

Thus, the next step for the Labour government was to carefully prepare a strategy to achieve its policy goal of obtaining EC membership for Norway, and, anxious to avoid repeating the mistakes from 1972, combine it with successful management of internal dissent and prevent devastating electoral losses.

The economic recession of the early 1990s did not hit Norway as badly as its Nordic neighbours, which one can assume with reasonable certainty is one of the reasons why the Swedes and Finns approached Brussels before Norway did. No longer constrained by the Cold War and their policy of neutrality, in July 1991, the Swedes submitted their application for EC/EU membership, and in March 1992, the Finns followed suit. Despite the pro-EU Labour leadership’s preference of delaying the

\(^{161}\) The LP did not get enough votes in the 1989 election to be represented in the Storting.

\(^{162}\) Discontent within the CP had been building up since the formation of the coalition in 1989 particularly over the issue of market adjustment (especially those of the EC’s demands which affected Norwegian agriculture), but also the decision to tie the Norwegian Krone to the European Currency Unit (ECU). Nevertheless, it was the CP’s unwillingness to agree to the EC’s demands of abolishing the Norwegian concession laws which ultimately led to the break-up of the coalition (Tannnes 1997).

\(^{163}\) Switzerland applied for full membership in May 1992, but in December, the Swiss population rejected the EEA agreement, making the Swiss membership application redundant for the time being.
application until the EEA agreement had come into force and acclimatised the general public to the idea of EU membership, in light of the Swedish and Finnish applications, the government saw no other alternative than to apply for membership (Archer 2005; Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). On 16 October 1992, the Storting approved a new membership application with 104 votes against 55. The breakup of the vote is presented in Table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2 1990s Storting votes on EU-related issues

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<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future for Finmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
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* The “For” columns also include the MPs who abstained
Source: Archer (2005: 56-7)

By the end of 1992, the application was submitted (Archer 2005: 57). Norway’s accession negotiations began in April 1993 and were concluded in March 1994 together with those of the other three applicant countries, Austria, Sweden and Finland. The main controversies of the negotiation process were the blows the Norwegian negotiators suffered in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. The EU’s reluctance to agree to special arrangements in these two fields was particularly controversial. Other areas Norway had particular interests in were petroleum and regional policy; obtaining good deals with the EU in both policy areas were considered essential to be able to persuade the Norwegian people to vote “yes”.

164 It is worth noting that the majority in favour of membership did not exceed the three-fourths threshold required by Article 93 of the Norwegian Constitution to join a supranational community. However, the Labour leadership decided to go ahead with the application in spite of not having obtained sufficient backing for membership in the Storting. The plan was to put the issue to the parliamentary vote again after the referendum had produced a positive outcome, by which time, it was hoped, many MPs had changed their “no” stance to a “yes”.
Whereas the Norwegian negotiators tried to bargain for transition arrangements in sensitive areas, the EU went for what was to be known in Norway as the “Big Bang” strategy: like all the other member states, Norway had to accept the *acquis communautaire* and only limited transition arrangements were granted (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). It was to prove hard for the government’s representatives to pass the deals on agriculture and fisheries as victories to the primary sector’s interest organizations and the general public. Nevertheless, the Labour leadership’s co-option strategy proved very successful: EU opponent Jan Henry T. “no fish” Olsen\(^\text{165}\) was appointed to the Fisheries Minister post and given the task of representing Norway’s interests in the fisheries negotiations in Brussels. PM Brundtland thought that the only way she could possibly win parts of the fishing community over was if the negotiation result was acceptable to someone like Olsen, who was a passionate EU opponent. Thus, when “No Fish” Olsen not only ended up recommending the fisheries deal to the fishing community, but converted to a “yes” stance, it was a major victory for Brundtland and the “yes” side. Conversely, the Danish “no” to the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 was a major blow to the EU supporters, as opinion polls in the subsequent months showed significant drops in support for membership (Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005). These events show that throughout the campaign, both sides of the debate suffered blows and celebrated victories, all of which had the potential to sway significant parts of the electorate to vote in their favour. Nevertheless, with the Labour Party in the driver’s seat, it was the “yes” camp which had the most resources at its disposal to manipulate the electorate to vote according to its preference; this was particularly evident in deciding on the timing of the referendum, both in relation to the general election and the other applicant countries’ referenda. Additionally, the “yes” camp was backed by most of the national press, as all of the 20 largest Norwegian newspapers were declared supporters of EU membership (SLP 1993 manifesto). Or, as Kallset (2009: 3) puts it, “Brundtland had practically the entire elite in Norwegian politics, organizations and media on her side”.

\(^{165}\) The Norwegian Fisheries Minister acquired his nickname “No Fish” Olsen because of his announcement before embarking on the negotiations that he would refuse to give the Spaniards and the EU any of the Norwegian fish quotas in the negotiations. He had “no fish to give”.
The Labour government’s strategies in the lead-up to the referendum drew heavily on the experience from the 1972 referendum. One of the strategies was to ensure that the referendum followed shortly after the general election, and not the other way around like in 1972, when the party suffered grave electoral losses. The nature of the 1993 Storting election campaign and its voting pattern clearly illustrate the massive impact the EU issue had on Norwegian politics and electoral behaviour in the early 1990s. The election, held fourteen months before the referendum on EU membership, was heavily coloured by the exceptionally strong politicization of the EU membership issue in the early 1990s: 62 and 53 percent of voters in June and September 1993 respectively considered the EU issue to be one of the two most important issues for their vote in the election (Valen 1994: 172). Moreover, because the EU issue had split the non-socialist Syse government in November 1990s, in the election, the voters were left with no other realistic government alternative than a minority Labour government.166 The 1993 election outcome had a very marked urban-rural and centre-periphery dimension, and the main “no” campaigning party, the CP, increased its vote by 10.3 percentage points (from 6.5 to 16.8 percent) (Valen 1994: 173; also see Table B4 in Appendix B). Aardal and Valen’s (1995, cited by Bjørklund 1997b: 209-210) study indicates that over 40 percent of the voters in the 1993 election either changed their party preference or participation/abstention status in the 1993 election, many of these due to the European issue. Moreover, Ray (1999a: 334) finds that 9.5 percent of participants in the Norwegian Referendum Survey changed their party preference in the 1993 general election to reconcile it with their opinion on EU membership and that 15.3 percent changed their EU preference in line with their preferred party’s stance. This illustrates that Norwegian public Euroscepticism is not a straightforward matter of party affiliation, and that many voters formed their opinions on the EU issue on the basis of other sources than the leadership of their preferred party.

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166 In 1993, it was clear that the Conservatives would not have the parliamentary support needed post-election to form a minority government. Thus, the traditional two-bloc alternative was not present in the election.
6.1.3.2 The Campaign Fronted by NtEU, the CP and the Labour Government

The “no” movement was quick to mobilize its forces when it became apparent that the issue of EU membership was about to resurface in the late 1980s. Opplysningsutvalget om Norge og EF (“The Information Committee about Norway and the EC”) was formally founded in November 1988, and in August 1990, it changed its name to Nei til EF167 (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). From 1989 and through to the referendum in 1994, the “no” movement conducted a successful campaign, drawing on the legacy and experience from the previous referendum in 1972 (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001). At the peak of the campaign, NtEU boasted 140,000 members, whereas the main “yes” organization, Europabevægelsen (the European Movement) could only show for 35,000 (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001: 172). The “no” camp, like in 1972, was mainly funded by the Norwegian Farmers’ Union and managed to maintain a united front. Within NtEU the EU opponents worked together despite their political differences.168 The “yes” camp, on the other hand, struggled not only with maintaining intra- and inter-organizational cohesion, it also lacked leadership and suffered from well-publicized disagreements with their main source of funding, the NHO (Archer 2000; Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995). The “yes” camp was further disadvantaged by its late organization and delayed campaigning efforts, the latter partly due to the Labour Party’s strategic decision to refuse to debate the issue in the months leading up to the 1993 election in order to avoid internal disunity and electoral losses. The Labour leadership defended this strategy arguing that an electorally strong and united party was essential to the success of their pro-EU campaign (Saglie 2000a). Whereas NtEU had been actively campaigning for the “no” cause for five years already, the “yes” campaign commenced a mere three and a half months before the referendum, on 15 August 1994 (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995: 211). The “no” camp and its various actors faced no incentives to suspend their campaigning activities at any point in the years or period leading up to the referendum, as the 1993 election result of the main “no” party, the CP, illustrates.

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167 And naturally it changed its name to Nei til EU when the EC changed its name to the European Union in 1993.
168 The most divisive issue within the “no” movement was the EEA agreement, but even this was successfully overcome in the battle against EU membership.
The “no” stance was a clear vote winner for the Eurosceptic parties in this period, and it provided the anti-EU parties with an additional incentive to keep the issue on the political agenda. Moreover, the “no” parties did not suffer from any notable internal dissent, contrary to the Labour Party, to which the EU issue represented more concerns than just achieving a “yes” in the referendum. For Labour and PM Brundtland, the whole campaign entailed a struggle to achieve the party goals of maintaining internal cohesion and ensuring the survival of the party; avoiding alienating Labour voters in the 1993 election despite the party’s unpopular “yes” stance; and achieving a “yes” in the referendum (Saglie 2000a; Aylott 2002).

On the “no” side, the CP leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, was the spearhead of the campaign.  She travelled around the country and was applauded for her successful mobilization of the grassroots to the “no” cause. Whereas the pro-European elites primarily used the national media and events in central areas to forward their message, the “no” camp’s campaigning efforts had at least as much focus on the local level as the national level. The “no” campaigners travelled out to the peripheries and utilized the local media and grassroots activists in the mobilization of membership opposition to a much larger extent than the EU supporters (Bjartnes and Skartveit 1995: 125, 235). The CP’s position as the main “no” party is illustrated by its 0.84 rating by voters on a 1-10 opposition-support scale in the referendum survey (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001: 180).

On the “yes” side, PM Brundtland and the Labour government headed the campaign. The onus of proof was on the “yes” side; they had to convince the Norwegian public that EU membership would be more beneficial for Norway than non-membership. The highly Europhile and united Conservatives kept a reasonably low profile in the campaign. The undecided voters who needed to be won over to achieve a “yes” majority were largely Labour supporters, and the Conservatives strategically let the Labour Party take the lead role in the “yes” campaign to recruit these voters to the “yes” side to secure victory in the referendum (Ray 1999a).

169 Tamnes (1997: 232) argues that “she became the ‘no’ side’s First Lady in the battle against Norwegian EU membership”.

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Labour’s position as the major “yes” party is illustrated by its rating as the most pro-EU party by voters in the referendum survey, more pro-EU than the consistently pro-EU Conservatives (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001).

6.2 The Documentary Analysis

The chapter now turns to the documentary analysis of the second phase of heightened Norwegian Euroscepticism, the early 1990s, when Eurosceptic argumentation both intensified and diversified. However, before presenting the data used and the results of the 1990s analysis, the 1973-1988 period is commented on to fully justify its exclusion from the study.

6.2.1 A Note on the 1973-1988 Period of Latent Euroscepticism

The investigation into Aftenposten’s debate pages from the 1980s confirms the period’s status as a period of latent Euroscepticism. Knowing from the literature that the debating intensity would be limited in this period, 1980 and 1981 was targeted because of Tamnes’ (1997) reports of certain actors on the “yes” side trying to raise the debate between 1979 and 1981. Having looked through 7,294 readers’ letters plus any other commentaries and news reports which featured on the newspaper’s debate and politics pages in both the morning and evening editions of Aftenposten in 1980 and 1981, it was only possible to find 42 items related to the EC or European policy, and only five of these items could be considered to contain Eurosceptic argumentation. Considering that the debating activity on the EC was expected to be even more modest between 1982 and 1985, 1986 was chosen as the third year for the 1980s investigation. Although the issue of Europe was more topical at this time, due to the SEA and the Danish referendum on the treaty, a striking absence of discussion of the EC in Aftenposten’s debate and politics pages could be observed. Out of the 2,775 letters to the editor and other various news items that were surveyed from 1986, only 69 items were EC-related and 10 items contained anti-EC argumentation. This indicates that as long as the Labour government maintained that the EC issue was not on the political agenda and none of the parties advocated a new debate on membership, the debating activity remained modest. As a result, 1989 marks the
beginning of the third phase of Norwegian Euroscepticism, as it was only then that all the Norwegian parties were compelled to officially take a stand on membership due to the Conservative Party’s announcement of their support for EC membership in August 1988.

6.2.2 The 1989-94 Documentary Analysis: Data and Methods

For the newspaper study from the period, the sample was drawn from Aftenposten’s morning and evening editions from the three years leading up to the referendum: from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1994. Targeting the three-year period before the referendum ensured that a large number of newspaper items were included in the study. All of the newspapers’ letters to the editor were looked through, 16,424 in total, as well as feature articles, news stories and other commentaries. 1,261 items were collected and exposed to closer examination. Subsequently, 341 items which contained Eurosceptic argumentation were extracted for the study: 282 readers’ letters, 23 feature articles/commentaries, 19 interviews and 17 news stories. The data was coded according to the same coding model as in Chapter Four and Five, differentiating between arguments related to political Values, political Culture, Rural society, Utilitarianism and National Identity (VCRUNI)

For the analysis of the Eurosceptic argumentation used by the political parties, the manifestos from the 1989 and 1993 general elections were used. This does not include the Labour Party and Conservative Party’s manifestos, as they did not contain any anti-EC arguments. However, four documents which were central to the “no” faction in the Labour Party (AUF and SME) were analysed to make up for this gap in the study. These were the SME’s 1994 conference statement; the LO’s 1994 EU resolution; the AUF debate booklet, Det visjonære nei (Kallset and Heinum 1991); and SME’s Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ (SALT) (Ottervik et al. 1992). The study also employs all of the anti-EC speeches from Johansen and Kjeldsen’s (2005) book collection of political speeches from this period. These were 10 speeches by the CP’s leader Anne Enger Lahnstein and one by the SLP’s leader Erik Solheim. In addition, a CP book publication and secondary literature such as Furre’s (1994) book Nei til
EU, Solhjell’s (2008) book about the CDP and Kallset’s (2009) book about the Eurosceptic Labour faction are used to complement the primary sources. The PP, LP and CDP were underrepresented due to the lack of available speeches and, in the case of the latter two, their limited coverage of the EC/EU issue in their 1989 and 1993 manifestos. The PP’s coverage, albeit limited in 1989, is more extensive in 1993. Nevertheless, this is, to a certain extent, a reflection of the visibility of the different parties in the debate and therefore does not have any grave implications for the research. Besides, the aim of this part of the analysis is primarily to confirm that the themes and topics of the newspaper arguments correspond with those used by the political parties, and the material examined is adequate for this purpose. The next section presents the findings of the documentary analysis from the 1990s debate.

6.2.3 Findings of the 1989-1994 Newspaper Analysis

The 1990s newspaper study reaffirms the central part political values and culture play in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism. As Figure 6.1 below illustrates, over two thirds of the total number of category codes allocated to the different news items were either political values or political culture. The prominence of these types of arguments was higher than in the studies of the two previous debates, and this shift has happened primarily at the expense of economic and rural society arguments, which made up a larger share of the 1960s and 1970s discourse. Notwithstanding, this is not to say that there is a lack of continuity in the argumentation pattern from the 1960s and 1970s. Quite the contrary, the study shows that almost all the arguments that were formed in 1960s and early 1970s had the same relevance two decades later.

Although in the early 1990s the arguments remained more or less the same, but they were declared with more confidence and conviction than in previous debates. There are many possible factors contributing to this. First is the ability to learn from the successes and failures of the previous debates; in the early 1990s, still relevant, tried and tested arguments from 1972 could be polished, and previously exposed weaknesses in arguments advanced by the opposing side could be exploited. In the
same way that the Labour “leadership’s strategies and actions were pervaded by the 1972 experience” (Saglie 2000a: 110), the various actors on the “no” side took advantage of the first and second hand experiences from the previous debate. The “no” faction of the Labour Party, for example, used the remaining copies of Hellevik’s (1979) book about the 1970s’ “no” faction AIK as a “cookbook” for organizing SME.\(^{170}\) There were of course also many people involved in the “no” camp (as in the “yes” camp) who had “overwintered” from 1972 and had first hand experience of the first referendum battle. In addition, the previous debate had contributed to make knowledge of the most typical arguments for and against membership more widespread; as a result, arguments could much more easily be developed and elaborated on than in the 1960s and 1970s, when public awareness of the issue had to be built up from scratch.

**Figure 6.1**  Number of news items coded to each of the categories (1992-94)\(^{171}\)

![Pie chart showing distribution of news items by category](chart.png)

Source: Author’s newspaper study

Second, the “yes” side’s economic arguments could now (in 1994), even more comfortably than in 1972, be dismissed as scaremongering, due to the Norwegian economy’s resilience to the economic recessions in the 1970s and the 1990s.

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\(^{170}\) Author’s interview with Wegard Harsvik, Oslo, 8 January 2010, see also Kallset (2009).

\(^{171}\) In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included.
Moreover, as Norway was soon to be part of the Single Market through the EEA, the “yes” side’s argument of market access was considerably weakened. Third, and perhaps most significantly, in the 1990s, changes in the EC added fuel to the Eurosceptic fire. In 1972, the “no” side’s warnings about the union-like character of the EC and its future development had been based on mere speculations, and back then the “yes” campaigners branded these claims as exaggerations and scaremongering. In 1994, however, the union was a fact. In SME’s Wegard Harsvik’s words,\textsuperscript{172} “that which was scare propaganda from “no” people in ’72 was reality in ’94”. Additionally, the Single Market and the four freedoms, which encouraged free competition and increased consumption, empowered the postmaterialist arguments related to equality, solidarity and environmentalism. The agents behind this consolidation of Norwegian Euroscepticism were in other words endogenous, through the process of learning and experience, and exogenous, in terms of the economy, the EEA, the union and the Single Market.

6.2.3.1 Political Culture: “Why be big when happy being small?”

Over half of the items analysed display political culture opposition. Opposition to bureaucratic or elite rule, reluctance to surrender Norwegian folkestyre to the EU’s democratic deficit, attachment to Norway’s independence, parallels to Norway’s history of union and dominance by other, stronger states – all these notions are as prominent in the 1989-1994 period as in the previous periods. However, on the level of argument frequency, there are two elements of the findings that are worth mentioning. First, despite the EC’s change to the European Union and the increased supranationalism post-Maastricht, the sovereignty and union arguments are less pronounced than in 1972 (as a proportion of all references made to the geo-historical category in the respective debates). And second, the folkestyre argument is more pronounced. In other words, the drop in the proportion of sovereignty arguments is made up by a corresponding rise in the display of pro-folkestyre (and antibureaucracy) sentiments. Notwithstanding, the democracy and sovereignty arguments are intertwined by the principle of people sovereignty

\textsuperscript{172} Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
(folkesuverenitetsprinsippet), so the political culture argumentation can certainly be said to be characterized by continuity between 1962 and 1994.

Norway’s independence is just as important to the 1990s discourse as before. As in the previous debates, sovereignty/independence is widely treated as a value in itself, either on its own or connected to the experience of the war or the history of union. Andersen (24/11/93) reasons in the following way: “As individuals, the majority of us would rather give up prospective benefits from cooperation than lose our independence as individuals. Shouldn’t one react the same way as a people?” Øi (03/11/94) explains that “the reason [that the majority of the older generation are no voters] is of course that we, who experienced the war, know better than anyone to appreciate a free fatherland”. Furthermore, Moen (12/12/94), who also experienced the war, writes:

“I [...] will never forget the feeling of freedom I and everybody else had when the war finally was over after five hard years. Norway was again free! We have been in a union both with Denmark and Sweden before. To me, putting Norway’s constitution aside for a rather dubious and quarrelsome union would be sacrilege.”

Many of the 1990s Aftenposten letters/commentaries illustrate that Norway’s history of union is central to Norwegian Euroscepticism. On the day of the referendum, a letter pays homage to the people who voted “no” in 1972:

“They gave our independence and self-government a chance, as the ‘no people’ did in 1814, 1905 and 1940. The ‘no people’ have wanted to preserve our country against union, foreign rule and remote rule.”

(Hustad 28/11/94)
However, there are other history elements which enter the debate too, ones that touch on issues of geography. One letter writer looks back on times of economic hardship, times when the peripheries battled with cumbersome bureaucracy to keep settlement and trade up (Bjarneson Prytz 25/11/94). Persen (07/11/94), the leader of NtEU’s Sami Political Committee, also draws on Norway’s history of battle against stronger forces in her letter to the editor, talking about knowing “what our ancestors did” and “what we ought to be proud of and build on”. She writes: “We shall carry our forefathers’ sorrows and powerlessness and fight because we believe and know that it makes a difference!” (original italics). The key here is the concept of sovereignty, or independence, freedom or self government – the right of Norway, the people of Norway to make their own decisions, having spent so many years, decades, centuries through history not being able to do just this. The following quote captures the very essence of the geo-historical concept, bringing history, independence, democracy satisfaction, freedom and the battle for all of these things together:

“No Norway has a short, but proud history as a background to our independence. To most people, we have achieved something so valuable with [this independence] that it takes priority over everything. We are, quite simply, happy with our government, symbolized by statements like ‘all power in this hall’. We have seen how Norway has thrived as a free nation. We don’t alter the hard-won (tilkjempet) and established just like that.”

(Okkenhaug 30/03/94, emphasis added)

That Norwegians are “happy with their government”, i.e. the way democracy works in Norway, and see the EU’s democratic deficit as a large barrier to membership is something that is very clear from the analysis of Aftenposten’s debate pages. Criticism of the EU’s decision making processes and the defence of the Norwegian form of

173 Nei til EU’s samepolitisle utvalg
174 Johan Sverdrup, the Liberal who is considered the “father of parliamentarianism” in Norway, is ascribed the expression “all power in this hall” in his fight for parliamentarianism in 1872 (Stortinget 2009). The expression became a descriptor of the foundation of the country’s representative democracy.
democracy are even more widespread in the 1989-1994 period than in the previous two periods. The democracy sentiment builds on conceptions of people empowerment, bureaucracy antipathy, accountability, transparency and, to some extent, geographical distance. The EU is cast as the antithesis to the Norwegian foikestyre: the EU is “an unelected organization” (Johansen 01/09/94) which exacerbates the tendency from participatory democracy to “spectator democracy” (Furre175 11/06/94) and dictates decisions to its citizens, decisions which are the results of closed/secret meetings in Brussels. Strøm (15/10/94) from the Report Office of Agriculture176 criticizes the EU for prioritizing efficiency in decision making over democratic legitimacy, whereas another letter writer (Solvang 16/11/94) views its “democratic fundament” as “the least thought through [element] of the whole of the union’s edifice”. He goes on to ask what the reasons for this “tack” are:

“Does one choose this method to be able to steer effectively towards an ever closer union, without bothersome, democratically established arrangements? What guarantee does one in that case have to ensure that the EU is not a danger to democracy?”

In Norway, contrastingly, there is, “on the local and national level, advance information, openness, access to a broad debate and participation in all phases” (Heffermehl 27/06/94). The EU is the antithesis to this, as it introduces unelected, elite rule and damages local democracy. Thus, with EU membership, “people’s influence over their own lives is gone, and the desire to participate in decision making will disappear. The result is a disintegration of the foikestyre” (Johansen177 01/09/94).

The “right to govern ourselves” (Nordbø 15/11/94) is evidently also central in the 1990s debate; here, the concepts of national sovereignty and foikestyre are linked. A letter printed around a month before the 1994 referendum illustrates the writer’s

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175 History professor and former SLP MP and the party’s leader between 1976 and 1983.
176 Landbruks utredningskontor
177 The LP’s political deputy leader.
aversion to the notion that politicians or officials who are not elected by the Norwegian people, in a centre away from Norway, should make decisions concerning local or national issues:

“[The issue is] that Berge [Minister of Local Government and Labour] thinks that it is OK that a foreign politician, a commissioner, makes proposals about support arrangements in a municipality in Northern Troms to a commission in Brussels. And that the final decisions are made there. What a betrayal!
If Gro Harlem Brundtland & Co had used the following in an election campaign: ‘Transfer power from Storting, government and municipalities to Brussels’, they would of course have lost. But it is this they work for, every day. This is the greatest betrayal the post-war generation experiences in Norwegian politics.”

In other words, the EU breaks with the principle of people’s sovereignty, the idea “that all power of society has its origin in the people”, and other fundamental principles of democracy; the EU does not have a public sphere, the general public does not have equal access to information as the people who govern, and the lobby system favours powerful groups (e.g. CP MP Dale 19/10/94). Furthermore, Professor and former SLP MP, Berge Furre (11/06/94), adds another dimension to the democracy argument; he pits the free market up against participatory democracy, arguing that it is not only the EU’s decision making structures which “thins democracy and threatens the vitality” of political debate, but the entire free market ideology. He writes: “I fear that the EU with its ‘four freedoms’ and prohibition of capital control is part of the disease, and by no means the medicine”. However, opposition to economic liberalism as part of the democracy argument is not very common; the EU’s commitment to the “four freedoms” usually comes up as part of other “diseases”: environmental problems, social problems, inequality, world poverty and conflicts. The next section deals with this body of argumentation, the postmaterialist arguments.
6.2.3.2 Political Values: The EU’s Market Liberalism vs. Social Justice and Environmental Responsibility

“The EU is an undemocratic, neo-liberalist, environment and developing countries hostile male union, which makes the rich richer and the poor poorer!”

(Mediaas Wagle 27/10/94)

The second main feature of the 1990s argumentation, at least equally as important as political culture, is the postmaterialist values element. As in the 1970-72 debate, arguments related to the value of equality and internal solidarity are most common in the newspaper items analysed. The second most used postmaterialist argument is concern for the environment. This element is more pronounced in the 1994 debate than in the previous debates, presumably because green issues had become a more integrated part of the political agenda in the 1990s than had been the case in the 1960s and 70s. In addition, the concept of external solidarity occupies a relatively central place within the postmaterialist argumentation, and also anti-war, quality of life and morality related arguments are used to call the desirability of EU membership into question. Issues linked to health, i.e. drugs (and alcohol), food safety and animal welfare, also appear in the 1994 debate, unlike in 1972, when these kinds of arguments were limited to alcohol use and pharmaceuticals. Arguments that are mobilized to a lesser extent in the 1990s debate than in the 1970s are those more explicitly related to quality of life and morality, but arguably both of these elements can be traced in other postmaterialist arguments, such as environmentalism and solidarity.

Common to the vast majority of the arguments belonging to the postmaterialist category is rejection of the EU’s market liberalist economic philosophy. It is argued that the EU’s prioritization of economic growth is a barrier to progress in the above-mentioned areas and even exacerbates inequality and environmental damage. Many commentators express distaste for this obsession with economic growth and do not associate with the idea of “much wants more”; opposition to the EU is a question of
morality. In a mini-interview, answering questions of why he has changed from a “yes” in 1972 to a “no” in 1994, Professor Asbjørn Aarnes (26/02/94) says:

“Today, the political and economic development in Europe has become a question of conscience for me. [...] [Things bought for money] are not really that important. [...] Europe now resembles a department store where everything is about buying and selling, and I care less and less for this business culture. [...] Inasmuch it is possible, Norway ought to be cut off from this development [...]”

Also the writer, Odd Børretzen, explains his conversion from “yes” to “no” in terms of needing other solutions to solving social problems than economic growth and consumption. In an interview (03/03/92), he says: “It’s not like the human race progressively needs more goods and things to be happy”. In this way, the EU is cast as not focusing on the “right” or most important things; it is “egotism put into system” (Persen178 07/11/94). Thus, there is no doubt that value priorities are very central to Norwegian Euroscepticism. Another letter writer asserts that

“it is a question of which values you cherish the most. If you cherish economic growth in Norway and Europe highest, then vote yes to the EC. If you think that Norwegian nature, culture and ecological balance on earth are more important, then vote no”.

(Bergholt 09/01/93)

The logic behind the environmental argument is not very hard to follow; it holds that increased consumption equals intensified strain on the world’s already exploited resources, and as the EU’s primary goal is economic growth and increased consumption, the EU is a threat to the environment. The consolidation of the environment argument between the 1970s and the 1990s is assisted by external factors; the increased interest in and knowledge about environmental challenges

178 Leader of NtEU’s Sami Political Committee
since the 1970s was clearly beneficial for the “no” camp. For example, Hübert’s credibility (25/07/94, 11/08/94) is strengthened because her arguments are backed up by ecologists’ expert advice. She writes:

“What is the point in having common rules for cleaning up when the policy and its aims are environmentally harmful? [...] If one is among those who, like the writer, take ecologists’ reports and predictions dead seriously, then a radical turnaround is required, regardless of what it will entail as regards less consumption benefits and a lower living standard.”

It is quite clear that Hübert’s arguments (and many others’) in their advocacy of sacrificing economic and material benefits on the altar of the environment (also observed in countless other letters) have little power to mobilize economic egotism, and thus challenge the economic interest thesis. In essence, the inappropriateness of the EU as a solution to environmental problems lies in the contradiction between environmentalism and economic growth, namely the EU promoting “environmental measures with the left hand, while the right stimulates continued [economic] growth” (Hübert 11/08/94).

Also Dammann, the founder of the organization Framtiden i Våre Hender (the Future in Our Hands, FIVH),179 in a commentary (07/11/94) argues against the claim that the prioritization of free competition does not affect the consideration of other values, terming the notion naïve. In his mind, however, the value conflict is not restricted to the protection of the environment; he extends it to equality and solidarity. Dammann asserts that “for any person who puts justice and social values higher than free competition and growth, [the EU] provides terrifying perspectives”. As noted above, the concept of social equality is a very central aspect of the postmaterialist argumentation. Professor Berge Furre points out in one of his commentaries (15/10/94), “the thought of a society with more or less equal circumstances for

179 The organization works for environmental responsibility and an equal distribution of the world’s resources. Its three pillars are, according to its website, “consumption and quality of life”, “fair distribution” and “business ethics” (FIVH 2008).
everyone collides head-on with EU membership”. This notion is also reflected by farmer Hokland’s (news report 27/04/94) statement that “the worst about EU membership is that there could be more inequality among people”. Also actor Jon Eikemo (interview 07/06/94) cannot consolidate his ideal of equal distribution of benefits with EU membership, as he sees the EU as “an economic structure for the strong”. Thus, linked to the attachment to the value of equality is the concern for “the weak” and the commitment to look after everyone in society.

It is evident that the EU’s failure to put the individual human being in the centre is at the heart of the problem to very many Norwegian Eurosceptics. However, this theme, focus on people, is not confined to the political values category, where it revolves around the ideals of equality, solidarity, quality of life and peace; it is also extremely central to all the political values concepts (e.g. folkestyre) and to rural society, with thriving districts depending on individual responsibility and local self-government. This “people dimension” is also evident in the earlier debates, and the conflict is between the EU’s focus on economic growth and the desired focus on people. A letter printed just over a year before the 1994 referendum (08/11/93) illustrates this incompatibility of value priorities. The writer, Haldorsen, outlines the measures set out in a white paper from the European Commission that are aimed at improving efficiency in the EU in the future:180

“more economic growth (without mentioning the sustainability in this growth), more use of part-time work, job sharing and more flexibility in the labour market, stricter control with the social security arrangements and expansion of the work period for pensions, to make it less attractive for firms to invest outside of the EC (where do the developing countries come into the picture here?), more remuneration moderation and more privatisation – just to mention but a few of the future prospects we will get as possible members of the Union”.

(all original italics)

180 The letter writer does not specify which white paper this is, except that it is about “Growth, competitiveness and employment in the EC” and was being prepared at the time (i.e. November 1993).
The letter writer’s sarcasm and aversion to these policies, which improve competitiveness at the expense of normal people’s stable working lives and well-being, are expressed more clearly in what follows:

“I say, there is quite a lot of ammunition here for a debate about values: Is it the capital or the human being which is in the centre? Words that cover consideration for children, women, security, equality and – solidarity are, understandably enough, absent in a white paper of this kind.”

Furthermore, Øyen (12/06/94), Professor of social policy, draws on the value of internal solidarity and ethics in her commentary against membership. The welfare state, in which the values of justice, equality and democracy are embedded, is central to her argument. However, it should be noted that the majority of newspaper items which contain equality/internal solidarity argumentation do not explicitly refer to the welfare state, but only bring up the values the model is based on. Øyen argues that EU membership is a threat to humanistic values and portrays it as a choice between “a society characterized by economic considerations in ethical questions” (the EU way) and one “where we choose to pay for the care for the dying out of the communal kitty” (the desired way). To illustrate her point, she asks:

“Should our children be taught the humanistic cultural view which is embedded in the welfare state, or should they be taught to just think in terms of ECU and private insurance arrangements when the old dear falls down the stairs?”

By framing the issue as what to pass on to “our children”, Øyen draws not only on the values of justice, equality and solidarity; she argues that the generation of today has a moral responsibility to future generations to preserve this humanism as a central part of the society.
Many of the letters and commentaries which contain argumentation related to the above-mentioned elements, particularly those concerned with environmentalism and sustainable development, also express concern for the increasing gap between the rich and poor in the world. Because of the EU’s discriminatory trade policies (towards third countries) and member states’ limited freedom to make bi-lateral trade arrangements with developing countries, it is argued that Norway’s solidarity with the Third World would be better exercised outside the EU. Alsos (03/03/94), from Studenter mot EU (Students against the EU), wants other issues than the EU’s main aims, namely economic growth and low inflation, to be on the agenda. His priority is for “Norway to become a pioneering country in environmental protection and international solidarity – not just in words, but also in action”. The wish to make the world a better place and seeing the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution are, in other words, central to 1990s Norwegian Euroscepticism. Although limited in spread, occasionally, exceptionalism comes into play here. Alsos’ above-mentioned letter provides an example of this, in its expression of the belief that Norway is able set an example for the rest of the world in environmentalism and solidarity. Kloster (17/10/94) is another letter writer who expresses remarkable optimism about Norway’s potential normative power outside the EU. He thinks that “a rich, little Norway” can “push for a global turnaround” by stopping “material over-consumption” and distribute goods “in a new and fairer way”. Put simply, he wants Norway to do this “by the power of example”, and does not think that Norway in the EU would be “free to think those kinds of thoughts”. Although quite a few letters in their commitment to external solidarity, implicitly or explicitly, assume that a Norway without membership would serve the world better than a Norway with membership whether it is as a trade partner to developing countries, an independent voice in international fora or by the power of example, it is clear that many also have a sober view on Norway’s influence in the world. Many who use this argument acknowledge the limits to Norway’s power to change the world, but point out that what the EU stands for conflict with their values and principles.
Finally, Norway’s superior standards in animal care and health, food safety and quality and narcotics border controls are three themes which are new to the debate. The arguments on the subject of health hinge on the notion that the current (high) standards will deteriorate as a result of EU membership: the bigger and more intensive meat production units typical in the EU breed more disease, necessitates increased use of antibiotics and entail a worsening of circumstances for animals; the Single Market’s non-discriminatory rules will terminate the current strict restrictions on food additives and dye; and random border controls will be prohibited by the EU as a part of its commitment to freedom of movement, and as a corollary, drugs can enter Norway more freely and cause increased drug-related social and health problems. These arguments, particularly those concerned with meat production and animal health, also commonly touch on environmental responsibility and sustainable development, and protection of Norwegian agriculture. This is because the traditional Norwegian regional policy\textsuperscript{181} encourages production in small units, which is considered better for the animals, food quality and the environment than production in large units (like in the EU). Put differently, Norwegian agriculture, as opposed to EU agriculture, goes hand in hand with good animal care, food quality and environmentalism. Compared to EU farms, veterinary Jordhøy (21/05/94) goes as far as to characterize the Norwegian livestock system as “a model farm”. In his letter about the EU and pig-farming, he argues that “our system ought to be a model for a future-oriented livestock production which to a larger degree than at present is run on the conditions of the animals and nature.” The antipathy towards the EU’s standards in this area is illustrated by the following statement in Dalen’s\textsuperscript{182} (18/08/94) letter: “if you are preoccupied with questions which concern food quality, and link these to regulations on the use of poison, medicines and hormones, then EU membership is not the solution. Then it is the problem!”

\textsuperscript{181} Regional policy (\textit{distriktspolitikk}) is the collective term used in Norway to denote the various policies aimed at benefitting the peripheries (at the expense of central areas) in order to maintain the following goals: that everyone can choose where they want to live; to ensure equal living conditions; use the resources all over the country; and maintain the main aspects of the settlement pattern “in order to further and develop the historical, cultural and resource-based diversity which is embedded in this” (Kommunal- og Regionaldepartementet 2010). Examples of policies are the selective employers’ tax, transport support and innovation support.

\textsuperscript{182} 2\textsuperscript{nd} deputy leader of \textit{Norges Bondelag}.  

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6.2.3.3 Rural Society: Not as Widespread, but Still Important

There are not many changes in the rural society body of argumentation between 1972 and 1994, except that its magnitude has diminished compared to that of the above two categories. Whereas in the 1970s debate, the rural society arguments were almost on par with political values in terms of spread, less than an eighth of all the items arguing against the EU in Aftenposten between 1992 and 1994 mention the primary industries and/or district interests. The other difference between the 1970s and 1990s debates is that there is not as much explicit reference to the importance of maintaining decentralised settlement. This is linked to the fact that the postmaterialist argument of quality of life, much used in 1972, is more or less absent from the 1990s debate. It is also important to recognize that the late 1960s/early 1970s was a period when there was much general political debate about the value of the peripheries and rural districts (see e.g. Klepp and Lutræs 2004). The (late 1960s/early 1970s) period witnessed a “change in the Norwegian discourse on regional development”, with the dispersed settlement pattern no longer talked about as “a ‘problem’ that ought to be eliminated, but rather a potential that should be developed” (Bryden and Storey 2006: 1, original italics). This can help to explain why there is less explicit references to the importance of maintaining the decentralized settlement pattern in the 1990s period, when this debate had subsided. However, it is still clear that the desire to uphold the settlement pattern is at the heart of the rural society sentiment.

Like the postmaterialist opposition to EU membership, the rural society motivation for rejecting the EU is rooted in ideological opposition to the EU’s commitment to free market economics and open competition. The EU’s commitment to the four freedoms poses a threat to rural society primarily because it puts the settlement pattern at risk. It does this through its negative impact on employment in the peripheries and the districts by forcing change in Norwegian agricultural, fisheries and regional policies. EU membership entails the end of the Norwegian agricultural subsidies system, and very few Norwegian farmers would qualify for any considerable financial assistance from the CAP because it favours large-scale farming
over the small-scale farms most commonly found in Norway. Without subsidies, it is assumed that because Norwegian farmers contend with much more severe weather conditions than continental farmers, they will not be able to compete in the Single Market, and thus, it will not be possible to maintain employment in the Norwegian agricultural sector.

Moreover, the Labour government’s fisheries minister, “No fish” Olsen’s sellout to the EU of thousands of tonnes of fish and (in the long term) the 12 mile fishing zone would put pressure on coastal and northern settlement because the livelihood of coastal fishermen would be taken away. This is because the fishing quotas would be consumed by foreign trawlers, and fishing activities would be regulated by the CFP, not Norwegian regional policy and concession laws. In addition, regional policy is at the heart of the matter: conscious discrimination in favour of the peripheries and rural Norway to encourage settlement underpins both Norwegian fisheries and agricultural policy and encompasses other positive discriminatory initiatives designed to boost settlement in rural and peripheral areas. The policy of reduced employers’ contributions in Northern Norway and Nord-Trøndelag is one example of this kind of positive discrimination, a policy which is at odds with the EU’s non-discriminatory principles.

But what are the motivations for nurturing this aspect of Norwegian society? The 1990s documentary analysis provides some clarification and strengthening of the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. Firstly, many of the protagonists of the Norwegian agricultural sector are not only motivated by the concern for settlement, but also by their attachment to agriculture as a central element of Norwegian society. Edelmann (09/09/94), the leader of Norsk Bonde- og Småbrukarlag (Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders’ Union), points out that the question of yes or no to agricultural subsidies is not the issue, as subsidies is just as integral to the CAP as to the Norwegian agricultural policy. She further argues that the problem is not economic, that is, whether or not Norwegian farmers will survive EU membership, but structural. Specifically, Edelmann’s contention is that Norwegian agriculture as it
exists today, with its small farms spread across the country, cannot continue with membership; the choice is between non-membership and a continuation of agriculture as a rural industry on the one hand, or membership and agriculture as an industry purely driven by profit on the other. In other words, the threat is not to the survival of Norwegian agriculture, but its important societal function. CP MP, Lund (12/03/94) approaches the issue from slightly different angle. He notes the importance of a Norwegian food production to the foodstuff industry and the development of society. Lund thinks that “Norwegian voters [...] will understand that we, in this country, cannot support ourselves by competing with each other to death”. Many commentators argue along these lines, pointing out that the EU’s CAP which encourages large scale production in central areas is in direct conflict with the traditional Norwegian view on agriculture and its function in society. That it is a common view that agriculture plays a significant role in the Norwegian society other than in terms of the economy is clear from many newspaper items. This is further exemplified by a letter by Halbjørhus (07/10/94), a former dairy farmer; he argues that EU membership’s detrimental effect on the agricultural sector is not only the farmer’s problem, but the entire Norwegian people’s problem.

This logic is also extended to the fisheries; like the farmers, the fishermen do not only represent an economic group, they play an important role in Norwegian society, in terms of settlement, identity and traditions, to name but a few. What Professor Berge Furre (15/10/94) describes as “the [Norwegian] aversion to upper class behaviour, work free income and the ‘sweet life’”\(^\text{183}\) is echoed to some extent in a letter written by Rakozcy\(^\text{184}\) (15/09/92). He states that, contrary to popular opinion, most of the fisheries’ organisations are against the EEA agreement (and EU membership), because they believe in “a bright future outside the EU, based on the best traditions in the Norwegian fisheries industry”, and continues, “the banking and insurance scandals the last few years ought to have taught us that we don’t earn a living from investing and speculating in this country, but from hard, value-creating work”. This is clearly an expression of aversion to the idea of “work free

\(^{183}\) Which, according to Furre, was fuelled by religious Puritanism and socialist class rebellion.

\(^{184}\) The head of administration of Norsk Fiskarlag (the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organisation).
income” and the greed and inequality it represents and positive identification with the common man’s work, perfectly exemplified by the primary producer. The argument is also very similar to that put forward by CP MP Lund, presented above, as they both talk about “we”, “here in this country”, and how “we” made it through the hardship in the past because of hard, traditional work and cooperation, not because of work free incomes and fierce competition with each other (which the EU’s market liberalism represents). It cannot be disputed that many Norwegians identify with farmers and fishermen because of their central place in the history of the country and the nation building which went on in the 19th century onwards.

The identification with the farmer and the smallholder comes out in a series of letters written in response to a commentary written by EU supporter Nina Karin Monsen after the referendum (08/12/94), in which the “no” voters’ “smallholder’s spirit” is attacked. The rural traditions of cooperation and sharing and the aversion to “upper class behaviour” are reflected in the following statement by letter writer Aall (16/12/94): “One can ask oneself if it is more typical for the smallholder to share what they have with others – or for big shots and the wealthy.” Like many Norwegians with her, Aall obviously identifies more with the smallholder and common man, who represent the “no” side, than the rich and powerful, who represent the “yes” side. Another letter writer, Kjus (13/12/94), goes into further detail describing what she sees as the characteristics of “the smallholder’s spirit”:

“for example, stamina and the ability to make do with simple and essential means. [...] People went to each other, thought about each other, could both talk behind each other’s backs and help each other. People were in other words compassionate in everyday life. The smallholder got by, aided by his human qualities – and he frequently became a robust and proud person.”

The smallholder was, then, a role model in different ways: he was hard-working, charitable, helpful, compassionate and proud. However, none of these characteristics are seen to be championed by the EU and its neo-liberal agenda or the “yes” side,
which was dominated by the Labour Party leadership, the Conservative Party and the business and employers’ organizations – i.e. the “big shots and the wealthy”.

The Postmaterialist arguments are generally more prominent in the 1990s debate than earlier, and this is also evident in the rural society argumentation. The EU and the CAP crashes head-on with postmaterialist values such as morality, external solidarity and environmentalism, and the Norwegian agricultural and fisheries policies are often seen as more responsible, ethical and environmentally sustainable than their EU counterparts. Arnostad, a CP MP (16/08/94), criticises the following recipe for how to deal with food production and labels it “market liberalist”: “It would have been cheaper for us and better for the developing countries if we had left more of the agricultural production to countries with a more favourable climate and better soil for this”. She goes firmly against this idea and the deconstruction of Norwegian food production:

“In my view, free food trade is a time bomb in a world where the demand for food is just increasing. In their report, Vital Signs for 1994, Worldwatch refers to the fact that grain production per person in the world has been in decline since 1984 and that the world’s grain stores are now extremely low. The only sustainable solution to the future’s food needs is to cultivate the soil locally everywhere that it is possible. If the developing countries are to produce food for us because this is cheapest for us, then the question is: Who is then to produce food to the developing countries in a world with a shortage of food? Or put differently: Who should this be at the expense of?”

By expressing the desire to take responsibility for own food production and thereby enabling the developing countries to feed their own populations, she mobilizes the Postmaterialist values of morality, responsibility and solidarity to developing countries in her defence of Norwegian agriculture against the market liberalist thinking of the EU and its proponents. Another example of the linking of political values to the primary industries is provided by the secretary general of Norges
Naturvernforbund (Friends of the Earth Norway, FoEN), Hareide (09/10/92). He expresses the FoEN’s concern about the threat the EU poses to Norwegian coastal fishing, which according to the organization “in comparison to Norwegian and foreign trawl fishing represents a far more ecological type of fishing, with less pollution and less use of resources”. In other words, the FoEN opposes the EU’s CFP on the basis of environmentalism because they think that the “fishing ecology and culture [of Norwegian coastal fishing] is unique in a European context and ought to be developed into being an example of ecological fishing”. CP MP Angelsen (22/09/94), also argues against the EU’s fisheries policy on the basis of the environment and sustainability, criticizing the EU’s oversized fishing quotas. Norway’s fisheries policy’s prioritization of responsible management of the resources is contrasted with the EU’s policy which to a much larger extent prioritises short-term profit and over-sized quotas.

The quality of life arguments from the 1970s, albeit less commonplace, are also consolidated in the 1990s debate. The key word here is *trivsel/trives* (noun/verb), which in English means well-being, contentment, to be or feel happy/comfortable. Put simply, the countryside and rural life offers *trivsel*, a feeling of comfort, contentment and well-being, and the EU is a threat to this. A comment by Hokland (news report 27/04/94), a female student who is married to an Englishman, illustrates the fear of losing this important element of rural life as a result of EU membership:

“Just look at the British. If you get out in the countryside in Britain, the farmers are noticeably worse off than here in Norway. There they really are a lower class with less well-being and contentment [*trivsel*] and more pressure. Here in Norway, it is after all possible to be happy and comfortable [*trives*] in a rural community.”

Hammer (02/03/92) is another letter writer who identifies his *trivsel* living in the countryside as the reason for his opposition to EU membership. He writes:

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185 Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature/Friends of the Earth Norway.
“I lived in Røa in Oslo in 1972, and both my wife and I voted yes back then, on the grounds that we could not place ourselves on the outside of the community in Europe. We now live in Nord-Trøndelag and are now going to vote no. We are happier (trives bedre) here than in Oslo, and acknowledge the uncivilized primitive instincts as the reason for this. [...] Why should we with our thirst for liberty make the same mistakes as all other industrial countries? [...] In material terms we have more than we need, but joy, go-ahead spirit and optimism are in short supply.”

As the argument goes, urban living can provide material and economic benefits, but only the countryside, with its “peaceful and rural surroundings” can offer true trivesel, i.e. true well-being, contentment, comfort and happiness. Like Hammer, another letter writer, Østbye (16/10/94), rejects materialist and economic considerations. However, she links trivesel not with the peacefulness that the countryside offers, but with agriculture, cultivating one’s own land:

“To reap the fruits of the soil gives a feeling of interdependence which is far more deep-rooted than all the world’s profitability considerations. That is exactly why we want to ensure that no EC shall be able to come here, now or later, and claim that it is not worthwhile to cultivate our own soil, that we should close down and rather come up with other things which result in more earnings, but rust on our souls. Rural tourism, for example, put ourselves on display for money – no, thank you very much.”

Again, a Norway with EU membership, where everything is driven by money and profit is contrasted with a Norway with the freedom to maintain a society and values that cannot be measured in monetary terms. “Norway is not for sale” was also one of the key slogans from the 1970s, and “No to the sale of Norway” was a campaign slogan in the 1990s, further illustrating the centrality and continuity of this notion.
The commitment to equality permeates many aspects of Norwegian Euroscepticism, from political values and political culture to the rural society category. In the latter, it is not only in terms of distribution of wealth to, and solidarity with, farmers and fishermen and less prosperous regions, but also when it comes to the attachment to nature. This is because of the concession laws which put considerable restrictions on the sale of Norwegian properties to foreign investors and nationals and ensures national ownership of land and resources which in effect, all Norwegians can enjoy.

Skonhoft and Kjærvik (11/11/94) argue against EU membership because it will weaken the traditional economic base in the rural communities and because the market ideology that guides the EU’s principles will put pressure on the Norwegian government to sell state property to the private sector. This, they argue, will affect those of the Norwegian population who enjoy outdoor pastimes, such as hunting and angling:

“The traditional Norwegian system with great equality between people, common land, free traffic, large state properties and so on, has hitherto secured low prices and a relatively just access to hunting and fishing in Norway. Hunting, fishing and berry picking are indisputably the most widespread pastimes in the country to date, and quite a lot end up in people’s freezers. This is a great privilege for the Norwegian people.”

The writers think that this privilege will be lost if the EU with its market principles takes over. In other words, EU membership entails greater inequality also when it comes to access to nature and the recreational countryside. Interestingly, there is a direct parallel between this sentiment and one expressed in a letter from the 1970s study: Rabe (31/07/72) also wrote about the importance of knowing “that a large part of this country is ours, and that we can roam freely in the woods and fields and the mountains – both summer and winter”. The concern about losing control over and equal access to Norway’s nature and recreational grounds is evident in a few letters; for example, “M.O” (04/09/94) asks the following rhetorical question: “We have a
country with a unique nature. Do we want wealthy foreigners to be able to freely buy up properties – without concession?”

6.2.3.4 Economic Interest: the Consolidation of its Second Order Concern Position

All of the themes discussed above, from democracy to the environment to the preservation of nature, to a greater or lesser extent incorporate a rejection of economic thinking. The scope of the non-economic kinds of arguments implies, even before the examination of the economic argumentation, that its significance is limited. Like the rural society category, economic interest makes up an even smaller proportion of the body of arguments than in the 1970s. Economic interest arguments are strikingly inconspicuous in the 1994 debate; they account for only about 10 percent of all the arguments coded, and two out of five of these are concerned with playing down the importance or relevance of the “yes” side’s economic arguments. The remaining three are also predominantly concerned with responding to “yes” arguments, but more in the sense of countering them. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the vast amount of postmaterialist arguments present in the debate, particularly the rejection of economic growth and increased consumption as the ultimate goal, consolidates economic interest’s status as a second order concern in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism.

The economic “no” argumentation of the 1990s is very similar to that of the 1970s in that it plays down the significance of economic issues. In fact, it is strikingly so, so that one has to admire the “no” side in the 1970s for not faltering in their persistence that the economy was a second order concern. After all, back then Norway was in a much more uncertain economic situation than it was as a fully fledged oil nation 20 years later: in 1972, the “no” side had little “hard” evidence that Norway’s economy would do well outside an EC made up of nine (or 12) member states. So, considering that the 1960s and 1970s opponents developed a practice for brushing economic arguments aside to focus on other arguments, it is unsurprising that the 1990s Eurosceptics also used this approach. An example of this rejection of economic thinking is from a mini-interview with political science Professor Thomas Chr.
Wyller (01/04/92). He states that “I am still not very interested in the issue’s economic aspects. We have managed well outside the EC. […] A ‘yes’ will not solve [today’s problems], and a ‘no’ will not make them worse”. A news report from a fisherman’s boat in Vesterålen (23/05/92) also reflects a lack of economic thinking among the fishermen onboard. Their focus is on the survival of fishing as a profession and traditions much more than it is on personal economic gain; one day’s fishing does not yield much profit, but they are happy with the situation as it is and do not think that the EU would make a difference to their financial situation. That “the EC has no respect for the law of nature and the sea’s silver” seems to be more important. Heffermehl (18/10/92) provides another example of this disdain for the “yes” side’s economic arguments, as he writes that

“the positive effects on our business and industry are disputable; the domestic market and important sectors are greatly exposed. Are the EC’s main goals (increased economic growth and competitiveness in relation to the USA/Japan) desirable – and are they compatible with much more important goals, such as protection of life environment, resources and ecological sustainability?”

The bilateral trade agreement and later the EEA agreement are used to illustrate that the Norwegian economy does not rely on membership; they are depicted as alternatives which look after the country’s economic interests well, giving Norwegian businesses market access to the EC.

The marginal position of economic interest arguments notwithstanding, some recurring themes exist. Like in the 1970s, some express concerns about unemployment (e.g. Haldorsen 08/11/93; Gonzale 18/11/94) or the domestic industries and businesses which will not be able to compete in an EU-wide market (e.g. Professor Eckhoff 27/07/92; Eidsvig 11/10/94). Others are opposed to giving up national control over economic and monetary policy, as they believe that the economy would suffer with EMU because Norway, as a producer of raw materials
(oil, gas, hydroelectricity, fish and timber), has different interests to the other EU countries (e.g. Professor Thonstad 04/05/94; Seip186 28/11/94). Control over the fish resources is also quite a common theme,187 but agriculture only comes up in a clear economic context once, in conjunction with employment. A couple of letter writers argue that Norway will lose out economically because the country will now have to pay tariffs, set by the EU, on imports from countries outside the EU; another two letter writers are worried about the negative impact foreign acquisitions will have on the economy. The last significant theme in this category is the aversion to the direct cost of EU membership, that is, the direct transfers from the Norwegian government budget to the EU budget. This is of course coupled with criticism of how the EU is run and how it spends its money, for example its bureaucracy (Väsgård 07/11/94), its structural funds (CP MP Lund 25/11/94) or its policies (e.g. allowing food additives):

“By the way, we have to pay an enormous sum of money to join. Have you thought about that – another insane investment of our tax money. And what do we get in return for that? A load of food which contains additives which have been banned in Norway ages ago due to our strict food controls.”

(Røysum 21/11/94)

Yet again, as this quote illustrates, it seems that the issue comes back to the idea of being short-changed: in the political culture category it was the idea of swapping a well-functioning democratic system with a severely flawed one, or in the political

186 Lecturer in social economics
187 Additionally, retaining control over “the natural resources” also comes up a few times, but it is unclear whether this is motivated by economic factors or postmaterialist ideas, for example responsible and sustainable management of the resources. The latter is something which has featured in for example the SLP’s discussions about the country’s natural resources, and which is reflected in Dag Seierstad’s comments in an interview with the author (Oslo, 18 September 2009): “intermittently, we touch on the thought that there is something absurd about the fact that Norway has such a large part of the global oil and gas resources at its disposal, and that we, ourselves, ought to have suggested to put them under a kind of UN type of management. At least parts of it”. But if the alternative is that “the big, international capital interests” take over, in Seierstad’s view, then national control over the natural resources is preferable. A similar viewpoint is put forward by SME’s Wegard Harsvik (author’s interview, Oslo, 8 January 2010), who says that “there is nothing that indicates that, if we had given up the management of the energy resources to the EU, that it would have benefited the poor in the world in any way”.
values category, a relatively equal and considerate society with a more unequal and indifferent one; in economic terms, it is the idea of paying more money for poorer products and services. Sigrid Zurbuchen Heiberg from the organization UmEU expresses a similar sentiment. She thinks that if the EU had only been aimed at dealing with transboundary problems, then it would have been okay. But, she says “the EU is so much more. It is a kind of political union which builds policy in areas which are completely unnecessary, and which in addition, has poor policies in those areas”.

Extremely few news items touch on themes related to egocentric utilitarianism: higher energy prices as a result of membership comes up once, and so does opposition to the EU’s policy of charging value added tax (VAT) on hotel bookings. The issue of food prices also comes up once, in a letter by SLP MP Kristin Halvorsen. However, she does not use food prices as an argument against the EU; her letter attempts to invalidate claims from the “yes” side, which she says “makes arithmetic problems which gives out the impression that most people will save a lot of money on getting EU prices on many foods from day one”. This type of argumentation is also the cause of Berg’s (18/11/94) frustration, who considers egocentric considerations unworthy of discussion:

“All the talk about more expensive or cheaper food, cars, alcohol, etc both angers and saddens me. […] After all, this is not what it is about. […] If my job gets better conditions in the EU, I will still vote no. The question is not about whether I get more or less in my wallet. It is not about whether it will get easier to travel and some goods will become easier to get hold of. Quite simply, I do not want to give up any more sovereignty.”

Nevertheless, there is one letter which clearly reflects egocentric (and sociotropic) sentiments; Paus (18/11/94) is critical of how much it will cost “us”, namely Norway, to be in the EU. She does not view the prospect of sharing Norway’s natural

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188 The SLP’s leader (1997-present)
resources with the EU favourably and sourly states that “the idea is evidently that we are supposed to pay more than we get in return”. Her conclusion is that “any possible economic gain is highly hypothetical, while expenses in the billions are guaranteed” (original italics).

The economic themes in the 1990s debate which reflect utilitarian thinking are in other words more or less the same as in the 1970s: concern for unemployment; disagreement with the transfer of large sums of money to Brussels; that the fisheries would lose out; that Norwegian industry would not be able to compete; and fear of foreign acquisitions of land and industry. The first deflection from these themes is the consideration of the shipping industry in the 1970s newspaper items, a theme which does not come up at all in the 1990s material. Secondly, oil came up several times in the 1970s, but not once in the 1990s; and thirdly, the discussion of food prices was more prominent in the 1970s than in the 1990s material. The only argument notably more prominent in the 1990s than in the 1970s is that of EMU and incompatible economies, and hence, there are only marginal changes in the 1990s economic arguments due to exogenous factors.

In addition to the copying of the 1960s and 1970s strategy of playing down the importance of economic issues, the decline in the share of economic argumentation as a proportion of all arguments between the 1970s and 1990s also attests the consolidation of the “it is not a matter of the economy” and “there are more important issues at stake” arguments from the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the fact that the “no” side predominantly engaged in this kind of argumentation, namely counterbalancing the “yes” side’s economic arguments, and not in arguing that non-membership would be the more economically beneficial alternative is also consistent with the trends in the 1960s and 1970s and points to the conclusion that sociotropic utilitarianism can not be considered to be a primary determinant of opposition to EU

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189 In the 1970s this was mainly concerning the buying of cabins, which again could have more to do with preservation of and access to the countryside and mountain areas.

190 It should be noted that many of the “no” letters mentioning the shipping industry is written by the same author (Johan I. Holm), but it is clear that shipping was debated much more extensively by both sides in the 1970s than the 1990s.
membership. While non-membership was perhaps not necessarily known as the less economically beneficial option, it was certainly not viewed as the more economically lucrative option. Professor Furre’s (26/11/94) commentary gives a good summary of the debate two days prior to the referendum:

“I think the debate has done away with the most important economic arguments for EU membership. The NHO’s 100,000 jobs\(^{191}\) have met more or less unanimous slating in economic specialist environments. The speculations about investment drought and rising interest rates have been quite effectively punctuated. Our wealth of resources coupled with a good economy makes it so that Norway can manage well outside the EU. Even voices from business and industry which carry considerable weight verify this. Economic issues do not force us into membership.” (original italics)

The quote is congruent with the conclusions drawn above, but it also suggests that economic considerations do matter. “Norway can manage well outside the EU” and “economic considerations do not force us into membership” gives out the impression that the only reason why the economy does not matter is because it is doing well. Therefore, it is important to remember that although the documentary analysis shows that economic utilitarianism is of little pertinence to many Norwegian Eurosceptics, it could have been of great significance to many “no” voters, as the above messages might well have conditioned what issues were given priority in the referendum. What is clear, however, is that the idea of “much wants more” does not apply to Norwegians in the context of their Euroscepticism.

6.2.3.5 National Identity: a Marginal Position

That the national identity category is the least convincing of all five of the categories is again made apparent by the 1990s documentary analysis. Not only is it the category which fewest items are coded to, it is again questionable whether most of the arguments coded to this category can be said to express or mobilize concerns

\(^{191}\) In a press conference during the campaign, the NHO’s leader, Svein Aaser, famously declared that the referendum was a question of a yes or a no to 100,000 jobs.
about the threat the EU poses to the nation state and national identity. This is because they range from indirect criticism of Dutch drug policy (e.g. Botnen 25/08/94) to southern Europeans’ (lack of) respect for the law (e.g. Fjeld 28/11/94; Holm 22/09/94) to a lack of trust in Italians and the French’s willingness and ability to provide (military) security for Norway. Moreover, the fact that many letters and commentaries use arguments which completely defy the notion of cultural threat, nationalism and hostility towards other cultures also contributes to consolidating the marginal position of national identity sentiments, at least as it is conceptualised here.

Nevertheless, although not prominent or widespread, there are some examples of expression of cultural threat in conjunction with membership of the EU in some of the newspaper items. Noregs Mållag for example advises people to vote “no” on account of that “the indirect and the direct effects of Norwegian membership will harm Norwegian language and culture” (Faye192 20/08/94) because of French, English and German as well as bokmål dominance and concerns that “many of the political subsidy schemes for culture that [exist] today can be perceived as distorting competition and therefore judged illegal in the EU”. Bergholt (09/01/93) takes a different perspective on the problem; he believes that closer cooperation in the EC which is very diverse in terms of ethnic groups, cultures and religions is more likely to cause conflicts. Besides, he argues, the increased centralisation and urbanisation that results from EU membership will cause much of Norwegian culture to be lost, and replaced by the American “city culture”. His appeal is: “If you value Norwegian nature and culture […] the highest, then vote no”.

Some hostility towards the former great powers of Europe is visible in some letters, although the sentiment is not as commonplace as it was in the 1960s and 1970s debates. Hübert (01/12/92), Østbye (16/10/93) and Slåtten (17/08/94) are all opposed to enter an EC/EU dominated by the former “colonial powers”, and both “G.K.” (28/10/93) and Klemetsen (31/10/94) clearly display antipathy towards Germany. Østbye criticises the Labour leadership for uncritically admiring “these European ex-

192 the head of Noregs Mållag.
colonial powers with their *greedy* market orientation and *persistent patriarchal structure*. It is in direct conflict with ancient Norwegian values and Norwegian identity” (emphasis added). Through the rejection of the EU countries’ “greed” and “patriarchy” and the adherence to external solidarity, postmaterialist values are linked with identity in the battle against EU membership. Also actor Eikemo (interview 07/06/94) expresses distaste for Europe’s colonial history, notably a history which Norway has not been part of, as reflected in the use of “they”:

“I can’t understand that [being European] is something to adorn oneself with. Look what *they* have done in Africa, Asia and America. Has anyone been more greedy than English, French and Belgian colonists? They have suppressed people all over the world.” (emphasis added)

The above quotes can be said to express some hostility to other European cultures, or alternatively the idea that Norway is different to the EU countries and thus incompatible with the EU if the identity of Norway as a peaceful and solidarity-minded nation is to be preserved. Thus, through history, identity is also connected to political culture, and its costly experiences of foreign rule, which have formed national identity and values. Christensen (18/04/94) writes:

“Perhaps it is the battle against a dominating union which in turn has intensified the cultural identity of people who want their freedom. When we were in union with Denmark and Sweden, it was because we had kept our identity, yes, developed and made ourselves conscious of it, that we wanted to be masters of our own house!”

This suggests that Norwegians’ sense of identity is the reason for their thirst for freedom and independence, and that this freedom remains integral to the national identity. Put simply, there is a very strong link between the national self-image and the high regard for the concept of independence. A further illustration of the idea
that national attachment and patriotism is tied to the idea of liberty is found in a letter written in response to Monsen’s criticism of the “smallholder’s spirit”:

“The children were raised in fear of God, respect of (not subservience to) authority, and love for people and fatherland. The latter also entailed a great thirst for liberty and will to defend this liberty if it was under threat.”

(Solberg 23/12/94)

The letter writer touches on four of the categories used in the study: rural society, in her defence of the smallholder’s role in history and society; political values (equality) in her endorsement of “respect of (not subservience to) authority”; identity and national attachment through “love for people and fatherland”; and political culture and independence in the “great thirst for liberty” and defence of this liberty. Again, it is clear that the motivation behind opposing EU membership criss-crosses several or all of the categories. In effect, although one can safely say that hostility towards other cultures and cultural threat, as theorised by McLaren (2002) and Carey (2002), play only a minor part in the newspaper debate through the decades, it could be that the VCRUNI framework prevents other identity-related issues from being registered.

6.2.4 The Parties’ Arguments

As Figure 6.2 illustrates, the party manifestos and speeches analysed follow the same pattern of argumentation as Aftenposten’s debate pages. The political values and political culture arguments are clearly the most dominant also among the Eurosceptic parties, while economic and rural interest play a secondary role in the parties’ argumentation, and national identity a very marginal role. Although Figure 6.2 suggests that rural society and economic interest play a more significant role in the party discourse, this is only a reflection of the way in which the arguments have been quantified and measured for the purposes of visual presentation.193 Also in the

193 If the number of arguments or references to each of the codes was to provide the basis of the figure, then political values, in particular, would be heavily overrepresented due to its diverse and plentiful sub-themes.
party discourse, the dominant position of political values and culture arguments is clear.

**Figure 6.2** Party arguments (left) vs. newspaper arguments (right)

Source: Author’s documentary analysis

6.2.4.1 *The Face of the “No” Camp: Anne Enger Lahnstein and the Centre Party*

As the main “no” party, the CP, fronted by its leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, was a key opinion leader in the 1990s debate. The 10 speeches and two manifestos analysed, as well as Lahnstein’s (1993) book “The EC and the Norwegian Constitution” (*EF og Grunnloven*), confirm that the themes picked up by the newspaper analysis can be extended to the party political arena. In her book, Lahnstein’s alternative to membership revolves around the following 10 issues, to which the EC/EU is cast as the antithesis. Saying “no” to membership, she says “yes” to:

- a thriving *folkestyre*
- national control over natural resources
- respect for honest work
- full employment
- decentralization
- a policy of wealth distribution

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194 Number/proportion of sources containing arguments from each category
a society in ecological balance

own food production

sensible and fair international trade

a global wealth distribution and environment commitment

(Lahnstein 1993: 96-7)

The main focus is on postmaterialist values, such as the environment; internal solidarity, equality and focus on people; and external solidarity. Political culture arguments are also present through the themes of democracy and sovereignty. Moreover, rural society comes up in focus on decentralization and defence of agriculture and fisheries. And finally, economic interest is present through the focus on employment and control over the country’s natural resources, as they are the basis of economic activity throughout the country.

The CP’s manifestos and Lahnstein’s speeches generally follow the same pattern of argumentation as Lahnstein’s book; the postmaterialist themes of the environment, social equality and international solidarity and the political culture themes of sovereignty, union and democracy are most prominent, but also themes like morality, quality of life and focus on health standards feature in the postmaterialist argumentation. Morality comes up in the commitment to fair distribution of wealth, responsibility to future generations (natural resources and the environment) and the “fight against egotism” (Lahnstein speech 01/05/91). The 1993 manifesto stipulates that quality of life should be a higher priority than economic growth, and Lahnstein links this to the maintenance of decentralised settlement and rural society (speech 01/05/91). The health theme is about Norway’s ability to have higher standards in

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195 “ecological balance” and “global environment commitment”.
196 “full employment” – work opportunities for all, “national control over natural resources” as the basis for employment, “a policy of wealth distribution” and “respect for [common people’s] honest work”.
197 “sensible and fair international trade”, “a global wealth distribution” and “own food production”.
198 “a thriving folkestyre” and “decentralization” through dispersing power.
199 national control in all areas.
200 “own food production”, “national control over natural resources” and “respect for [the] honest work” of common people, such as the farmer and fisherman.
health and safety: animal health, pesticides, food additives, the work environment and restrictions on medicines. Outside the focus on high standards in health, safety and the environment, there is little evidence of exceptionalism; only a couple of references are made to Norway’s position as an example for other countries in projecting international solidarity (1993 manifesto) and “the high profile [Norway has] in the international society” (Lahnstein speech 12/03/94).

In addition, the political culture argument’s interconnectedness with postmaterialism, as also found in the newspaper debate, is evident in the following quote from Lahnstein’s speech to the CP’s national committee on 17 October 1992:

“It is my belief that the good society is not governed by big business, elites and bureaucracy far away. The good society is created where people live, have their roots and the basis of their existence. If we are to manage to create a society with room for everybody, with a fair distribution of wealth and with a better environment, then it depends on a thriving folkestyre and a diffusion of power and capital. It is also the best foundation for healthy and true economic activity.”

Opposition to bureaucracy and elite rule and the empowerment of the individual is here tied in with equality, solidarity, fairness and concern for the environment. But rural society sentiments are also implicitly added to the concoction, through the emphasis on “healthy and true economic activity”, best represented by farmers and fishermen, and where “the good society is created”, namely in the districts – “where people live, have their roots and the basis of their existence”.

The rural society arguments are conspicuously absent in both the CP’s manifestos and Lahnstein’s speeches; considering the party’s agrarian roots, it could be expected that they would occupy a more central place in its discourse on the EU.201 Notwithstanding, the EU’s impact on agriculture and fisheries are only mentioned in

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201 This is discussed in more detail in section 7.2.3.2 of Chapter Seven.
three of the speeches (and not at all in the manifestos) and although concern for the
districts and regional policy is expressed in both the manifestos and six of the 10
speeches, it is mostly in passing, or, as in the quote above, as an undercurrent of a
different theme. Lahnstein’s speech to the party’s national committee on 12 March
1994 is the only time that elaborate rural society arguments are advanced. She says
that the reasons why it is important to maintain agricultural production are
settlement, the environment and self-sufficiency, “not only for the food producers
themselves, but for all of the Norwegian society”. “Thriving rural communities” and
“food production” are the key concepts linked to the defence of the agriculture and
fisheries sectors, as are “meaningful work”, “honest work” and “pride”, as well as
“small units” and “ecological production” in particular with regards to fisheries.

Economic interest arguments are not very dominant in the discourse, and the
economic themes predominantly revolve around those mentioned above: full
employment and control over the natural resources. This also includes defence of the
concession laws restricting foreign ownership and the ability to discriminate against
foreign businesses in the name of regional policy and other government objectives.
The national identity argumentation is even more marginal. The only culture or
identity issues to come up in the CP data are Lahnstein’s characterization of the
coastal culture as “the thing which gives Norway a public face” (12/03/94) and her
reference to Rolf Jacobsen’s poem Anmerledeslandet (the Different Country) as
“expressing something important about our [Norwegians’] self-understanding”
(speech 16/10/93). By the latter, she means that submission to the union and the
four freedoms is not in the Norwegian nature because “we do not bow as deep as
our neighbours, it was too steep here”.

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202 These concepts are based on the conviction that to Norwegian farmers and fishermen the issue is
about being able to carry on with food production as a meaningful economic activity, and not merely
an issue of financial transfers.
203 Additionally, affirmations of the threat the EU poses to the strict alcohol policy and drug border
contROLS are made, as well as reference to many EU countries’ liberal drug policy.
6.2.4.2 The Socialist Left Party

The SLP’s discourse on European integration follows the same pattern as the CP’s, with its clear emphasis on postmaterialist value-based arguments, followed by political culture (folkestyre), rural society and economic interest. The SLP’s emphasis on postmaterialist arguments is not very surprising, considering that, as part of the New Left, postmaterialist issues like anti-militarism, anti-hierarchy and solidarity with the developing world have been among the party’s priority issues (Christensen 1996: 527). In both the 1989 and 1993 manifestos, membership of the EC/EU is opposed on the basis of the party’s commitment to social equalisation, the environment, internal and external solidarity, health and safety and peace, but the EC/EU is also mentioned under the headings of economic, agricultural and fisheries policy. Political culture-arguments are not used in the 1989 manifesto, but democracy makes up a central part of the argumentation in 1993, and the themes of sovereignty and opposition to the EC/EU’s development into “an economic and political superpower” are also present. The party leader, Solheim’s closing appeal in the televised leaders’ debate on 25 November 1994 confirms that at the heart of the SLP’s Euroscepticism are postmaterialist values and political culture. He ranks the environment as the most important reason to vote “no”, followed by equality and solidarity, which improve people’s quality of life, and finally, democracy, which is also motivated by left-wing/postmaterialist values:

“The most important issue […] for me is the environment. […] Therefore we ought to say no to a union which is based on unrestricted economic growth. After that it is to create a society with small social differences – because it is a society which with less crime. That means better quality of life. There are better relations between people in a society like that. Therefore we ought to say no to the strongly right-wing dominated economic policy that the EU is based on.
And after that it is democracy, for democracy is the best protection for the weak groups in society […].”
Like the CP, the SLP also defends the agricultural and fisheries industries; this is explained by the party’s commitment to maintaining the decentralised settlement pattern and ecological and responsible management of the resources, and its belief that every country should have the right to secure its own food supply (1993 manifesto). Even the SLP’s economic arguments, which are few and far between, are rooted in political values-concerns; they are about Norway’s ability to have an independent economic policy, promoting redistribution, employment and environmental requirements.

6.2.4.3 The Eurosceptics in the Labour Movement

The Labour Party Eurosceptics (hereafter referred to as LEs), represented by the SME, and the majority in the LO204 and the Labour Party’s youth wing, AUF, express an aversion to EU membership which is very similar to the SLP. This is not very surprising, considering that most of the LEs were, ideologically speaking, located on the left wing of the Labour Party (Geyer and Swank 1997; Kallset 2009: 86-7, 143). The political values of environmentalism and a “human friendly” or “good” society permeate the faction’s argumentation, whether the focus is on supranationalism, the economy or the preservation of local communities. The LEs identify the EU’s market liberalism as a major barrier to achieving their goals for not only making Norway a better place, but making the world a better place. They argue that to achieve this goal, it is necessary to hold onto the Scandinavian social democratic model and not giving in to the EU’s market liberalism and the forces of capitalism. The argument holds that if the Norwegian social model is preserved, it can serve as an example for other countries in terms of fair distribution of wealth, full employment, local democracy, environmentalism and small class differences. SALT, the debate booklet which effectively became the political programme of the SME (see Kallset 2009: 126), concludes the following:

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204 The “no” side won the 1994 vote in the LO by an extremely small majority. Four votes was what separated the “no” vote from the “yes” vote on the LO’s resolution on EU membership. 156 voted “no” and 152 voted “yes” (Kallset 2009: 170-1).
“Our vision is not tied to Norway as a nation or Norwegians as a people. Nor is it tied to the EC as an institution or the EC citizens as a people. Our vision is neither Norwegian nor European. Our vision is social democratic.”

(SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 58)

As the quote illustrates, Scandinavian Exceptionalism clearly plays a part in the LEs’ Euroscepticism. The LEs believe that the Norwegian/Scandinavian/Nordic way of doing things can and should serve as a model for other societies, as it has done in the past. The LO’s EU resolution, for example, states that

“The Nordic countries have played an important role. We have taken the poor countries’ side and been a motor for peace and the environment. Perhaps the most important influence we have had internationally is through the social model we have created. We have showed that it is possible to create a society with a more equal distribution, less unemployment and more security than market liberalism gives us, a society which has served as a model for many who fight for the same as us.”

This type of argumentation expresses not only optimism about Norway’s potential to influence the international community, it also expresses a substantial portion of idealism – wanting Norway to act as an example in terms of internal and external solidarity, environmentalism, equality and local democracy. This idealism is more prominent in the Labour movement’s discourse than any of the other parties.

Another characteristic which sets the LEs’ argumentation apart from the other parties (except perhaps the SLP) is that there is, quite naturally, more focus on typical Labour issues such as unemployment and workers’ rights. Clearly, it is not argued that the EU is for unemployment, but the LEs take issue with the EU’s priority of price stability over unemployment and that unemployment has “gradually disappeared from the [EU’s] agenda and [that] an ‘acceptance’ of that an
effective economy requires a certain level of unemployment has taken over” (Ottervik et al. 1992: 11).

Another difference is that there is much less focus on political culture issues in the Labour discourse. Most notably, there is virtually no argumentation in defence of national sovereignty as an independent value in any of the documents analysed (totalling 96 pages). The word “sovereignty” (suverenitet) is only mentioned once, and words like “self-determination” (selvbestemmelsesrett), “self-government” (selvstyre) and “self-determination” (selvråderett) are completely absent. When sovereignty is defended, less charged words like “freedom of action” (handlefihet) and “independent decisions” (selvstendige beslutninger) are used, and in addition to being able to conduct social democratic policy at home, particular weight is assigned to the value of having the freedom of speech in international organisations so that Norway can ally herself with the world’s poorer countries, for example in the fight against global warming (e.g. SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 39). In effect, even the sovereignty dimension of the arguments is coloured by the postmaterialist, idealistic discourse. This is further confirmed by the fact that the principle of supranationalism is not rejected, but seen as just the means to a goal, i.e. market liberalism and economic growth. It is argued that if the goal was to protect the environment and promote equality and a social democratic society, the means would be acceptable (Kallset and Heinum 1991: 21). The limited spread of the democracy argument contributes further to enhance the dominance of the political values aspect of the Labour movement’s Euroscepticism compared to political culture. Although the documents all protest against the EU’s negative effect on popular participation, both in the workplace and in terms of local democracy, it is crystal clear that the LEs’ main focus remain on the conflict between economic growth on the one hand and environmental protection and a more equal distribution of wealth on the other:

“It is impossible to create equalization by moving the whole world up to our living standard. If we are to achieve equalization, then we in the rich part of the world have to reduce our consumption. Still, [the EU’s] goal is
growth; a growth which increases our consumption of resources and result in more pollution. The demand for growth in the rich part of the world is the motor of the world’s environmental damages and makes equalization between the north and south impossible.”

(SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 28)

The rural society component of the LEs’ anti-EU ammunition is definitely present, but it does not make up a very central part of its arsenal. None of the SME’s 1994 conference statement, the LO’s 1994 EU resolution or the AUF debate booklet from 1991 argue in defence of the primary sectors. And although the SALT booklet from 1992 contains separate sections on regional policy, agriculture and fisheries, rural society argumentation cannot be said to surface to any great extent in any other areas (like it does to a much greater extent in the other parties’ argumentation). Nevertheless, decentralisation and upholding local communities and the settlement pattern are no doubt part of the LEs’ vision for a “good society”, because “in Norway, it is viewed as an intrinsic value that people can continue to live in small local communities across the country” (SALT/Ottervik et al. 1992: 21). The argumentation in SALT shows that the LEs share the same concerns as the other parties when it comes to the rural society aspect (effect on primary sectors, settlement, local communities), but the modest space devoted to this type of argumentation in the campaigning material suggests that, like political culture, rural society arguments are somewhat more peripheral to their Euroscepticism than political values. The same goes for economic interest, which is hardly mentioned at all outside the realm of unemployment. The only exception is argumentation (particularly in the LO congress’ resolution) which points to past experiences with the “yes” side’s scaremongering about the catastrophic effects a “no” would have on the economy and a trade agreement’s and (eventually) the EEA’s ability to secure access to the Single Market for Norwegian businesses. To sum up, the LEs share the three central features of Norwegian Euroscepticism, political values, political culture and rural society, but it stands slightly apart from the other parties and the
newspaper debate in their much stronger focus on values compared to the other categories.

6.2.4.4 The Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party

The LP also draws on political values and political culture argumentation, as well as rural society and economic interest. The 1993 manifesto’s main emphasis is on independence and “the nation state’s democracy resources” (political culture) and the ability to maintain an independent policy of solidarity towards developing countries (political values), but it also expresses concern about the primary industries and regional policy (rural society), the environment (political values), and the ability to have an independent economic policy and retain control over Norway’s natural resources (economic interest). The party devotes only marginally more space to political culture arguments in the manifesto than political values, and rural society and economic interest are not far behind, so it is hard to make any strong inferences about the LP’s issue priorities. However, a commentary printed in Aftenposten on 16 November 1992, written by the party leader at the time, Odd Einar Dørum, suggests that the LP’s main reason to oppose EU membership is political culture, as he expresses concerns about democracy and opposition to supranationalism. This is also backed up by Saglie (2000c: 173-4, 178), who notes that in the early 1990s, opposition to the EC’s plans for a political union was a particularly strong motivator for the party’s “no” stance as well as EU membership’s negative consequences for the democracy in Norway. Among the “no” minority in the party’s youth wing, the issues of folkestyre, environment and decentralisation were the most prominent arguments (Saglie 2000c: 176), more or less echoing those displayed in the mother party’s manifesto.

The CDP is the party with the most limited coverage of the EC/EU issue in its manifestos; the 1993 manifesto is only coded to political values (exceptionalism), as it emphasises the need for Norway to be able to set higher standards than the EU in environmental and health policy. The CDP does not mention sovereignty or folkestyre in its manifesto(s) and that makes the party the odd one out when it comes to the
political culture category, as all of the other parties draw on political culture arguments in their manifestos. Of course, this is not to say that political culture arguments are not a central feature of the CDP’s Euroscepticism; in the 1970s, there was a chain of letters printed in Aftenposten that were written by Kjell Magne Bondevik, the leader of the CDP from 1983 to 1995, and one of the key arguments against the EC in these letters was that of folkestyre (the other two were the districts and international solidarity). Besides, from Solhjell’s (2008) comments on the party’s main reasons for rejecting membership in 1994, it can be deduced that political culture (union and sovereignty), postmaterialism (welfare, external solidarity, exceptionalist internationalism) and rural society (farmers and fisheries) are central to the party’s Euroscepticism. Similarly, Saglie (2000c: 162, 166) identifies Maastricht’s restraining impact on the ability to conduct independent foreign policy and economic policy, the EU’s lack of democracy, environmental issues and concerns about regional policy and fisheries policy as the main CDP arguments, very similar to those of the LP. Thus, in terms of the broad categories, both the LP and the CDP follow the general pattern of Norwegian Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic discourse.

However, keeping the socialist and middle parties’ different stances on the EEA agreement in mind, there are some notable differences between their Eurosceptic argumentation. The CP and SLP’s Euroscepticism is heavily based on opposition to the four freedoms and argue that the EU’s free market orientation poses a serious threat to an equal and fair society based on solidarity and compassion for fellow human beings. With the exception of the CDP’s preference for keeping welfare a national matter, neither the CDP nor the LP use any of the anti-neo-liberalism, internal solidarity or equality/people focus arguments that are so central to the CP and SLP’s²⁰⁵ Eurosceptic discourse.²⁰⁶ But apart from this difference in the parties’ political values argumentation, the structure of their Euroscepticism is strikingly similar.

²⁰⁵ and to the degree this anti-neo-liberalism does not conflict with the EEA agreement, the LEs.
²⁰⁶ It is important to note, however, that significant factions within both the CDP and the LP are against the EEA agreement (see Table 6.1 above) and potentially identify with the anti-free market argumentation of the SLP and CP.
6.2.4.5 *The Progress Party*

Although the PP adopted an official “yes” stance on EC membership in the early 1990s, for the 1993 election it was modified to “Yes to EC, no to union” and its election manifesto shows clear signs of soft Euroscepticism. The similar structure of the socialist and middle parties’ Euroscepticism cannot be extended to the PP’s Euroscepticism. With the exception of the political culture arguments of democracy and sovereignty,207 seemingly a uniform feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the party’s arguments stand out from those of the other parties. Instead of using postmaterialist and rural society arguments, the PP’s scepticism to and reservations about the EU are mostly economically motivated and characterized by the party’s commitment to neo-liberalist economics; the party opposes the “unrealistic” EMU, the social dimension, structural funds and EU regulations and the restrictions the EU puts on free world trade.208 Thus, the PP appears to be the odd one out in terms of Norwegian Euroscepticism; its Euroscepticism is more similar to that of parties such as the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) and the British Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism than any of the Norwegian Eurosceptic parties. The PP indeed resembles Statham’s (2008: 37) description of the British Conservatives’ Euroscepticism as opposing “political and monetary union by defending national sovereignty and advocating a free market” and viewing the EU as “potentially re-introducing regulatory state-interventionism”.

6.3 Conclusion

The chapter argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism, having gone through its formative phase in the 1960s and early 1970s, only entered its third phase in 1989 because the 1972 rejection of EC membership served to suspend the issue throughout the remainder of the 1970s and most of the 1980s. The changes in the EC and the international environment in the late 1980s put the issue back on the Norwegian political agenda, and the early 1990s witnessed a battle over European integration.

207 Anti-bureaucracy and anti-union arguments also feature prominently in the 1993 manifesto.
208 This could potentially be linked to external solidarity, but considering the party’s track record of advocating cuts in foreign aid and peace-keeping missions, the motivation here is likely to be primarily of an economic nature.
which was as fierce, if not fiercer, than its predecessors. There was one newcomer to
the battle, the PP, which came out in favour of membership despite its scepticisms
about the Maastricht Treaty, but otherwise, the constellations for and against
membership were largely the same as before.

In the second part of the chapter, which reported on the findings of the documentary
analysis, it was argued that there is no doubt that the Euroscepticism found in
Norway in the years leading up to the referendum in 1994 was a perpetuation of the
phenomenon which was formed in the 1960s and 1970s. The findings confirmed that
Norwegian Euroscepticism is firmly rooted in political values and culture, as well as
the desire to uphold rural society. Economic interest, on the other hand, came again
out as a second order concern, and as in the 1970s argumentation, national identity
was only marginally represented through the lens that the VCRUNI framework for
analysis provides.

Political values was the strongest element in the debate in terms of issue frequency.
Like in the 1970s, it had its basis in the incompatibility of the EC/EU’s primary goal
of economic growth with other, more important values. The most common
arguments in the 1990s newspapers were those linked to equality and internal
solidarity, followed by the environment and then external solidarity. Explicit
references to quality of life and morality were less widespread than in the previous
period, but there were some new themes in health and safety, such as animal health
and welfare, drugs policy and food safety. This pattern was more or less echoed in
the left and middle parties’ Euroscepticism, with the exception of the pro-EEA CDP
and LP’s lack of anti-market liberalist/pro-equal society argumentation. It was
argued that the PP, on the other hand, with its anti-social dimension argumentation,
does not share the postmaterialist dimension of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

209 This is likely to be at least partly due to the (in relative terms) healthy state of the Norwegian
economy, so it is important to note that economic interest might have played a larger role in less
economically beneficial circumstances.
Political culture, conversely, seems to be the defining feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism, as all the parties were united in their opposition to the effects of the EU on Norway’s folkeystre and emphasis on national control and independence. Also in the newspapers, the key terms sovereignty, union, bureaucracy and democracy remained extremely central to the debate. It appeared that the meaning behind and importance of Norway’s independence has remained practically unchanged through the three phases; parallels to history and war were drawn in the 1990s debate, as in the 1960s and 1970s, and it seemed like the threat to Norway’s sovereignty was felt just as strongly (if not more strongly) in the 1960s and 1970s before the EC developed into a political union than in the 1990s when the EU was a reality. However, the democracy argument was definitely more prominent in the 1989-1994 phase than before, both in terms of letter writers’ and parties’ emphasis and in terms of its structure. This part of the Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation was undoubtedly strengthened in the 1990s.

The chapter also argued that rural society is another feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism which is shared by all the Eurosceptic parties except the PP. Like the postmaterialist opposition, the EU is rejected because of its free market philosophy. However, in the rural society context, it poses a threat to agriculture, the fisheries and regional policy and, as a corollary, the maintenance of a decentralized society and the values and traditions it embodies. The reasons why it is so important for Norwegians to retain the primary industries and a rural society are plentiful; they range from identification and solidarity with farmers and fishermen, a sense of solidarity with threatened social groups and/or geographical areas, a preference for Norwegian primary producers’ more ecological traditions of production, moral opposition to the EU’s butter mountains and discriminatory trade policy towards developing countries, the view that rural living equals well-being and contentment (trivsel), to attachment to nature and equal access to woods, fields and mountains. None of these themes are unique to the 1990s, as they all came up in the 1970s phase too. However, the 1990s debate did serve to consolidate these arguments;
particularly the postmaterialist element of the rural society argumentation was strengthened (e.g. environment and external solidarity).

Economic interest and national identity arguments took up an even more limited position in the 1990s debate than before. As already mentioned, the comparatively strong economy and the EEA agreement enabled the Eurosceptics to abandon their economic argumentation to an even larger extent than they had done in previous periods. Moreover, like in 1972, there was little evidence to suggest that sociotropic utilitarianism was a major factor contributing to the “no” vote in 1994, as practically none of the newspaper items or party documents expressed the belief that non-membership would be more economically beneficial for the country than membership. So, although the healthy economy might have conditioned many Eurosceptics’ priority rankings, economic utility cannot be said to be the defining feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism, perhaps with the exception of the PP, which bases its opposition/scepticism almost exclusively on economic argumentation. Similarly, this applies to national identity issues. It cannot be dismissed as completely irrelevant to the debate and Eurosceptics’ motivation, as the documentary analysis indicated that the EU issue did mobilize sentiments of cultural threat, hostility and national attachment in some parts of the electorate and even the elites. However, this part of the argumentation was very limited, and it had dropped in significance compared to the 1960s. Besides, it did not come up as prominent in the party discourse either.

The next chapter deals with the post-1994 period: developments and events relating to the Norway/EU relationship are covered in the first part of the chapter, followed by the findings of the post-1994 documentary analysis.
Chapter 7

The Fourth Phase: post-1994

To the extent there was a debate on Europe in Norway in the late 1990s and 2000s, it revolved around the shortcomings of the EEA agreement which came into force in January 1994 and Norway has been part of since. Other EU-related issues, such as the eastward enlargement, the proposed European constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, were also discussed in the media, by NtEU, Europabevegelsen and some politicians. This clearly sets the post-1994 period apart from the latent period (1973-1986), when discussion of the EC and Europe was practically absent. Sitter (2004) argues that the reason why the two sides were not able to bury the EU issue after the 1994 referendum was the existence of the EEA agreement. However, it is arguably more appropriate to hold developments in the EU responsible for the difference between the debate levels in the two periods: whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s the EC was hit by “eurosclerosis”,210 the post-1994 period was preceded by the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, which set out ambitious integrative projects to be implemented in the years to come. In other words, there was little debate in the 1970s and early 1980s because of the relative lack of progress in European integration, while post-1994, the acceleration and diversification of integration made debate inevitable. The history of Norway’s debates on Europe shows that discussion levels are heightened when major developments happen on the EU level, such as the SEA, the introduction of the Euro and the 2004 eastward enlargement. The form of association, however, whether based on bilateral agreements or the EEA, had less impact on the debate level in the two latent periods. This is because the past referendum(s) and the principal view that only the people can reverse the “no” put constraints on the Norwegian EU proponents’ ability to restart a new debate. It is harder to argue that the premises for Norwegian EU membership have changed because of the EEA agreement (which arguably was the same in e.g. 2002 as in 1994) than it is to argue that they have changed due to changes in the EU (which e.g. since

210 Eurosclerosis is the term commonly used to describe the stalling of integration between the late 1960s and early 1980s, which was due to member states’ reluctance to give up sovereignty and their use of protectionist measures to deal with the economic recession (Awesti 2006).
May 2004 has been very different than the EU of 1994). Besides, because of the use of referenda, there is little difference between how the proponents dealt with the question in the two post-referendum periods. In both periods, the “yes” side was characterized by a general acceptance of the people’s “no” and thus the status quo: after 1972, the trade agreement (negotiated in 1973), and in 1994, the EEA agreement. Nevertheless, because discussion of EU-related questions post-1994 has not been a taboo, unlike the 1973-1986 period, and it has been characterized by muffled debate rather than silenced debate, the post-1994 period emerges as a separate phase of Euroscepticism – the fourth phase.

This chapter looks at Norwegian Euroscepticism in its fourth phase. The first part of the chapter gives an account of how the relationship between Norway and the EU developed and how the Norwegian debate on the EU played out after 1994 in order to contextualize the documentary analysis. The documentary analysis is reported on in the second part and aims to ascertain if fourth-phase Norwegian Euroscepticism follows the same pattern as its precursors.

7.1 Norway and the EU after 1994 – an Overview

7.1.1 “As Close as Possible without Full Membership” (Archer 2005: 188)

The main implication of the public “no” in 1994 is naturally that the country remained on the outside of the EU, unable to partake in Brussels decision-making as an equal to the other EU member states. However, Norwegian decision-makers managed, in spite of non-membership, to keep an active and adaptive attitude towards European integration through the country’s quasi-membership (Eliassen and Sitter 2004), or “EEA+”, as Sverdrup (2009) calls Norway’s form of association. It has been argued that a policy of “eager adaptation” has been adopted by all parts of the political and administrative elite, more or less irrespective of which party they belong to (Claes and Tranøy 1999b; Fossum 2010). The Bondevik governments (1997-2000 and 2001-2005) as well as the Stoltenberg governments (2000-2001 and 2005-present) pursued an active European policy, aspiring to maximal participation in EU
initiatives as far as non-membership allowed. It may seem a paradox that Norwegian governments are unable to raise the membership question but are in the position to consistently pursue closer cooperation with Europe on a non-membership basis, but this can be explained by party system dynamics: whereas in government the pro-EU parties are tied to a suicide- clause by their Eurosceptic coalition partners which prevents them from raising the membership question, approval of EEA regulation and participation in EU initiatives requires a majority in Parliament, normally obtained by the pro-EU Conservatives and Labour Parties, as well as the variable support of the PP (Eliassen and Sitter 2003, 2004).

The main components of the Norway/EU relationship are the EEA agreement and the Schengen protocol, arrangements which have functioned as a compromise for the country’s EU supporters and opponents since the 1990s.\(^ {211}\) The EEA agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994, gives the EFTA countries and thus Norway access to the Single Market on the same grounds as full EU members, with the exception of agricultural and fish products. In line with the agreement, Norway has to adopt and comply with any EU legislation related to the four freedoms, such as certain aspects of social policy, consumer protection, environmental policy, business policy and statistics, but without having any formal influence on decisions. The EEA agreement also promotes EFTA cooperation in areas unrelated to the Single Market, such as research and development, technology, IT, environment, education, social policy, consumer affairs, small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, the audio-visual sector and civil defence (ECDNI 2008).\(^ {212}\) Norwegian governments have pursued maximal participation also in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) dimension in spite of the fact that their influence in the policy area is even more limited than in the EEA (Rieker 2006a).

\(^ {211}\) The Schengen agreement was signed in December 1996, and came into force on 25 March 2001 (NMTTE 2010a).
\(^ {212}\) Additionally, Norway’s participation in European integration includes aspects of JHA, EMU and the CFSP (Archer 2005: 5).
Norway, as an EEA agreement signatory, has extremely little formal decision-making power or influence on EEA legislation, but Norwegian decision-makers have the right to veto any EEA directive. This veto, however, has never been used, and it is commonly argued that it is unlikely to ever be used as it would effectively put the whole EEA agreement in danger.\textsuperscript{213} The way in which the Storting has allowed its influence in the EEA setting to be constrained has been likened to a “voluntary abdication as a legislative authority” (Andersen 2000: 11). This has been an important element of the debate on the (in)adequacy of the EEA agreement as the cornerstone of the Norway/EU relationship, as the veto is, as long as it remains unused, in practice only a symbolic instrument of Norwegian sovereignty and self-determination. Fossum (2010: 74) argues that Norway’s current arrangements with the EU “might even be construed as a kind of self-chosen ‘farming out’ of much of Norwegian democracy”. He finds this ironic, “given that the main reason for rejecting EU membership was to protect Norwegian democracy and Norwegian sovereignty” (p. 74, original italics). Against this backdrop, it is curious that Norway’s eager EU adaptation has not prompted more widespread criticism and protest than it has since 1994. However, it is important to remember the point made earlier, that the EEA agreement has functioned as a national compromise between the supporters and opponents of EU membership.\textsuperscript{214}

To Norwegian pro-European elites and anti-membership/pro-EEA elites, who make up the majority of the political establishment, the EEA is very important: it enables Norway to follow and take part in developments in the EU without formal membership, and it gives Norwegian businesses access to the Single Market – of vital importance, as the EU is Norway’s main trading partner. As Fossum (2010: 83) puts it: “Many of the reasons for Norway’s present incorporation in the EU relate to the recognized need to manage the close interdependence that a small and open West European economy and society experiences in a rapidly integrating Europe”.

\textsuperscript{213} Nevertheless, threats to use it have been made in the past. In the late 1990s in particular, the Bondevik government faced several controversies concerning several issues, most notably food additives and genetic patenting (Andersen 2000; Eliassen and Sitter 2003).

\textsuperscript{214} The chapter will return to this issue later.
As an EEA signatory, Norway make considerable contributions to the EU budget.\textsuperscript{215} Between 1994 and 1999, Norway’s yearly contribution to the EU’s structural funds was approximately 12 million Euros,\textsuperscript{216} and between 1999 and 2003, they were increased to 24 million\textsuperscript{217} (around 94 percent of the total EFTA contribution) (Sverdrup 2004: 9). Subsequently, the 2003 enlargement negotiations entailed a tenfold increase in the total Norwegian EEA contributions to economic and social development in the enlarged EEA, a staggering 235 million Euros per year (97 percent of the total EFTA contribution) between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2009 (Sverdrup 2004: 11). Added to this, between 1 January 2007 and 30 April 2009, Norway also contributed a total of 135.8 million Euros towards the second EEA enlargement (NMTTE 2010b). This means that Norway has been a larger financial contributor to the process of eastward enlargement than many of the “old” EU member states (Sverdrup 2004: 2).

The 2003 EEA enlargement negotiations illustrate the power imbalance in the Norway/EU relationship. Norwegian demands for compensation for loss of free trade with the ten new EU members were altogether ignored by the Commission, and the EFTA countries had little choice but to accept the EU’s financial demands.\textsuperscript{218} This implies that the onus of maintaining the current arrangements is entirely on the EFTA side. In other words, Oslo’s compliance with EEA regulations is extremely important to the future of the agreement, as the EU has the power to punish Norway for non-compliance, which in turn could lead to the collapse of the whole EEA agreement. Because of indications from the Commission that the EEA agreement’s future would be in danger in the case of significant disagreement, Sverdrup argues

\textsuperscript{215} It also has additional non-EEA “buy-ins”, which amount to tens of millions of Euros every year (Eliassen and Sitter 2003: 132).
\textsuperscript{216} Earmarked for Greece and certain regions in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Northern Ireland (Sverdrup 2004: 6).
\textsuperscript{217} Earmarked for Portugal, Spain and Greece (Sverdrup 2004: 6).
\textsuperscript{218} Norway’s willingness to comply with the demands could also be put down to a desire to show solidarity to the new member states, the Norwegian government’s desire to avoid attracting “free passenger” criticism, and the absence of public constraint on the decision to accept the terms. Very little attention was awarded the negotiations, both in the media and the public domain in Norway. There was a broad support for the EU expansion to the east in the Norwegian public, and there was no indication from the population that the suggested contribution was above the threshold (Sverdrup 2004).
that “the [2003] enlargement negotiations were in reality negotiations about the continuation or liquidation of the EEA agreement” (2004a: 14). The asymmetrical relationship between Oslo and Brussels, has been termed a “fax democracy” by several commentators and politicians alike; it refers to Brussels faxing new EEA directives and legislation to Oslo for implementation without protest (Eliassen and Sitter 2003).

On the policy level, the area where the EEA agreement perhaps made its most visible mark in Norway is the speeding up of deregulation and privatisation. Examples are reforms of the public monopolies on medicines and alcohol and in Norwegian regional policy, such as the cutting back on subsidies for the coastal express (Hurtigruten) and the selective employers’ tax (Andersen 2000). Furthermore, the EEA has had an impact on Norwegian policy “in typical infrastructure areas, that is, areas the European Community itself gave high priority when the Single Market was to be implemented between 1986 and 1993” (Claes and Tranoy 1999b: 291). In environmental policy, for example, Dahl (1999) argues that Norwegian authorities have, since 1995, become more passive in raising protection levels on their own accord and have instead waited for developments at the EU level. However, she points out that the EU’s leading role in environmental legislation post-1995 is not due to declining Norwegian standards compared with EU standards, but rather that the adaptation line that Norway has had to pursue since the Single Market and EEA processes started in the late 1980s has been irreconcilable with taking a pioneering role in environmental policy. Nevertheless, some environmental legislative measures have been perceived as having strengthened Norwegian protection levels, for example regulations for refuse depots and air quality, while there are concerns for reduced protection levels as a result of EU adaptation in others areas, such as genetically modified foods and the Life Patent Directive (Dahl 1999: 148). It has also been claimed that standards have been raised in other areas where Norwegian policy has traditionally been viewed as more advanced, such as health, safety and consumer interests (see e.g. Traavik 2003, cited by Archer 2005:190).
However, the broadest study of Norway and the EEA agreement to date (Claes and Tranøy, eds 1999a) concludes that, except in security,219 EMU, fisheries and agricultural policy, there has been little difference between the policies pursued in EU countries and those pursued in Norway since 1994. In other words, in policy terms outside the abovementioned areas, Norway has kept up with the developments on the European level. When considering the national economy, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of non-membership and the EEA agreement, as economic fluctuations depend on the global economy as well as the Single Market. As a result of this, economic arguments from both EEA supporters and opponents have subsided (Andersen 2000). Besides, the healthy state of the Norwegian economy since 1994 has effectively proved that the EU membership proponents’ economic arguments and the 1994 warnings about economic isolation were unfounded.220

The Norwegian “no” to EU membership and continued participation in EEA structures have, as intended, enabled the country to retain autonomy in the areas of special interest, such as agriculture, fisheries, petroleum and the welfare state,221 while at the same time avoiding economic isolation from the continent. Nevertheless, although the EEA agreement has largely circumvented the areas of energy, agriculture, fisheries and regional policies, there are other international organizations which have exerted pressure on Norway in these sectors and policy areas, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Eliassen and Sitter 2003, 2004; Claes and Tranøy 1999b: 287-90). Experts argue that changes on the WTO level are more significant to the development of and challenges to the agricultural sector and policy than a

219 Since the study was conducted in 1999, Norway has become more integrated into CSDP cooperation, as the country “contributes with troops and personnel to ESDP [CSDP] operations, participates in a battle group and has an association agreement with the European Defence Agency” (Rieker 2006a: 281).
220 In terms of GDP growth, the Norwegian economy outperformed the EU’s in 10 out of the 16 years between 1994 and 2009. Only in 1998-2000, 2003, 2006 and 2007 did the EU economy do better than the Norwegian economy (World Bank 2010).
221 See Veggeland (1999), Hoel (1999), Claes and Eikeland (1999) and Hagen (1999) for a detailed analysis of the effects of the EEA agreement on each of these sectors.
prospective membership of the EU (Veggeland and Mittenzwei 2003; Veggeland 1999).

Claes and Tranøy (1999b) differentiate between two aspects of the EEA agreement’s impact on Norwegian politics. The first is political content, the essence of which is that Norway is part of the Single Market and has to adapt to the EU’s rules for trade liberalisation and a more open market. They argue that, except in alcohol policy, the EEA agreement has not introduced any dramatic changes to Norwegian policy, although it has perhaps served to speed up the liberalisation process in some areas. On the other hand, they argue that the second aspect, namely the relationship between content and political procedures, is problematic because of the asymmetry between the EU and Norway in the decision-making arena and its grave implications for Norwegian sovereignty and democracy. However, Narud and Strøm (2000: 147) argue that

“The problem is less that Norwegian authorities lack power vis-à-vis their EU counterparts, but rather that they do not have access to the information they need to make informed and timely decisions. A longer and more complex chain of delegation increases informational demands, while the short deadlines under which the EEA decisions are made exacerbate them.”

In other words, Narum and Strøm think that the main democratic problem is not necessarily Norwegian authorities’ lack of decision-making power in Brussels, but rather the information deficit in the Storting and furthermore, reduced parliamentary control as a result of European affairs being treated as foreign affairs in the Storting (Narum and Strøm 2000: 139). The fact that EEA/EU affairs are treated as foreign affairs is important because foreign affairs constitutionally belong to the prerogatives of the executive branch. Put differently, because EEA/EU matters are treated as foreign affairs, the Storting is reluctant to instruct cabinet on EEA/EU related issues. Nevertheless, it is perhaps most likely that little time and resources

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222 The state’s 75 year old monopoly on import, export and wholesale of alcohol had to be abolished because of the EEA agreement. Vinmonopolet’s retail monopoly survived (Brøin 1999).
and the definition of EU affairs as foreign affairs combined with awareness of the limited influence Norway has on EU decisions have made Norwegian parliamentarians passive in relation to EEA business. The (absence of) debate on Norway’s affiliation to the EU and the degree of adaptation is discussed in more detail in the next section.

7.1.2 The State of the EU Debate post-1994

In the 1994 Referendum Study, respondents were asked the following question: “in your opinion, how many years should we wait before we have another referendum?” The answers to this question averaged seven and a half years (Jenssen 1995a: 200), but in spite of this, a new referendum has not been on the agenda in the 16 years that have passed since then. Although there has been periodic discussion on individual EEA directives and there were some signs of a new membership debate in the early 2000s, wide-ranging public debate on the big issues of the Norway/EU relationship has been absent since 1994. Fossum (2010: 75) notes that “Norway’s active adaption to the EU has taken place together with a virtual ban on discussion of EU membership amongst the political elite”. What there has been of debate on EU-related issues has taken place outside the Storting and without the conventional political actors; since 1994, mainly the “yes” and “no” organizations have been active in the debate on Europe (Sverdrup 2009). Fossum (2010: 86) points out that in the parliamentary arena, “[o]pponents recurrently and consistently refer to the referendum results as the authoritative statement on the membership issue, and most proponents defer to this”.

7.1.2.1 The Parliamentary Arena

Five different governments have been in office since the 1994 referendum. Before the 1997 general election, the Labour PM Thorbjørn Jagland indicated his intention to resign if the party did not improve on its previous election result. This it failed to do (it went from 36.9 to 35 percent), and as a result, the three small middle parties, the CDP, the LP and the CP, assumed office in October 1997 (with a total of 26.1 percent of the vote and only 42 out of 165 seats in the Storting). This government (Bondevik
I) stayed in office until March 2000, when it was replaced by a minority Labour
government, headed by PM Jens Stoltenberg. After the 2001 election, a CDP, LP
and Conservative coalition government (Bondevik II) relieved the Stoltenberg
government of its duties, and since the 2005 election, a red-green majority coalition
government made up of the SLP, CP and Labour Party has been in office (see Table
B5 in Appendix B for details on the election results from the post-1994 period).

Table 7.1 Governments since 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro membership governmental parties</th>
<th>Anti membership governmental parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Labour (minority)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Centre (minority)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CDP, LP, CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Labour (minority)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Centre-right (minority)</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>CDP, LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Centre-left (majority)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>CP, SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Centre-left (majority)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>CP, SLP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Table 7.2 Government alternatives in post-1994 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Centre left alternative</th>
<th>Centre right alternative</th>
<th>Other alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>CDP, LP, CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Conservatives, CDP, LP</td>
<td>CDP, LP, CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Labour, SLP, CP</td>
<td>Conservatives, CDP, LP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Labour, SLP, CP</td>
<td>Conservatives, CDP, LP</td>
<td>Conservatives, PP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Table 7.1 above shows the make-up of governments post-1994, according to their
stances on EU membership, and Table 7.2 the main government alternatives in the
last four general elections. The tables illustrate how central the Eurosceptic parties
(the CDP, LP, CP and SLP) have been to coalition formation in Norway in the last 15
years, putting the relative silence on the EU issue in the electoral arena in this period

223 The Labour government replaced the Centre coalition after it lost a vote of confidence in the
Storting.
224 To illuminate the ubiquity of the anti-membership parties, they are in bold.
into perspective. Only between 1993-1997 and 2000-2001 has Norway had a
government free from Eurosceptic parties, and pro-EU government alternatives have
been the exception rather than the rule.

The EU issue did not feature as a significant issue in either of the 1997, 2001, 2005 or
the 2009 general elections (Valen 1998, 2003). A 2001 election exit poll showed that
only 1.5 percent of voters considered the EU question the most important issue in the
election, ranking eighth on the list (Valen 2003: 181). However, the issue typically
received more attention in the media during election campaigns. Issues concerning
Norway/EU relations made up 13.4 percent of campaign-related issues in the media
in the 2001 campaign, ranking fourth after tax issues, education, and health (Valen
2003: 182). Party manifestos offer additional evidence for the relative insignificance
of the European issue in Norwegian electoral politics. In a study of party manifestos
of 15 western European countries, Norwegian parties had the least mention of the
EU and its impact on domestic policy since 1994 (Pennings 2006). Of linkages per
policy domain, Norwegian parties’ references to Europe averaged 1.4 percent
between 1995 and 2003, whereas in EU member states the average was 4.3 percent
and in Switzerland 3.1 percent.

The public rejection of EU membership in two consecutive referenda has had a
significant effect on how politicians from all parties view and cast their role in the
context of the EU debate. Since 1994, Fossum (2010: 84) argues, they have operated

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225 The four most important issues to voters were tax reductions (22.9%), health issues (22.2%),
education (17.4%) and family policies (10.5%).
226 There are a few factors that serve to explain at least some of the discrepancy between the media’s
and the electorate’s priorities in elections. One is that generally the Norwegian media tend to cover
general European issues and events as opposed to issues directly concerning Norway and the country’s
relationship to the EU (Andersen 2000: 8-9; Wallis et al. 2002), and thus they do not necessarily
actualize issues that Norwegian voters would consider relevant to them and the election. Moreover, as
all the main Norwegian newspapers are unambiguously pro-European (Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005),
it is not surprising that the media outlets put more focus on EU issues than the voters do, the majority
of the latter favouring the status quo.
227 The pre-2004 EU fifteen, except Luxembourg and Greece, and non-members Norway and
Switzerland.
228 Norwegian party manifestos appear under-Europeanized also when comparing the 1960-2003
averages for the three; whereas the results for the thirteen EU member states and Switzerland show
scores of 3.03 and 1.97 respectively, Norway scores significantly less with an average of 1.01
(Pennings 2006: 262).
“as receivers of already shaped popular opinion” as opposed to “leaders who actively shape popular opinion”. Although the PP is the only party which explicitly requires a change in public opinion before the membership issue can be brought back onto the agenda, in reality, this requirement is shared by all the parties. Because the commitment to hold a referendum has developed into “a constitutional convention” (Fossum 2010: 84), neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party would want to set a new membership application in motion unless there are indications that the people are positive to the idea. Kallset (2009: 253) asserts that “the only thing that can measure up to the [Labour EU proponents’] desire for EU membership [and the Conservatives’, author’s addition], is the fear that the people will say ‘no’ a third time” (also see Strandhagen 2004; Vermes 2010a). This perspective is further illustrated by the following quote by a Norwegian commentator: “no Norwegian politicians in their right minds would want to start a new debate on this until there is a clear and prolonged majority for membership in the population” (Five 2008). Moreover, the Conservative Party’s deputy leader, Jan Tore Sanner, confirmed in July 2010 that the precondition for bringing the EU issue back onto the agenda is that the people want another debate (cited by Vermes 2010a). The Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, obviously do not desire a rematch on membership, as their policy preference is maintaining the status quo (non-membership).

Sverdrup (2009) puts forward three possible reasons for the standstill in the Norwegian EU debate. First, he points out that because the EEA agreement offers few, if any, opportunities to influence or change regulations, neither the media nor politicians have any incentives to raise debates about EU-related issues. The lack of consequence does not stimulate debate, as it makes it irrelevant which arguments win or lose. A second reason is the “suicide clause”, which Fossum (2010) calls Norway’s European “gag rules”. These rules have been vital preconditions for the

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229 SME’s Wegard Harsvik also confirmed this (interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010).
formation of both centre-left and centre-right coalition governments since 2001. The essence of the suicide clause is that if any party in a coalition government opens up for a new debate on EU membership, the coalition will break up. The coalition governs on the basis of the EEA agreement, and internal dissent is acknowledged and accepted. These gag rules effectively stifle any meaningful debate about the Norway/EU relationship on the parliamentary arena, and Fossum (2010: 75) even argues that they “have greatly facilitated an active process of adaptation” to the EU without membership. Third, Sverdrup (2009) puts the absence of a proper debate down to the fact that no major economic or political crises have made it necessary to reconsider Norway’s form of association to the EU; there is general contentment with the situation on both sides. Sverdrup (2009: 432) argues that “there are few, if any, political leaders – both among those who want closer and those who want a looser form of association to the EU – who are willing to bring in a discussion about [Norway’s] form of association in the ongoing debate on European policy”. In simple terms, the EEA agreement represents an acceptable alternative to both the proponents and opponents of membership:

“One the one hand we find the ‘no’ side’s preferences which can be ranked in the following way: they want a looser form of association, can live with EEA+, and they fear Norwegian membership – while the ‘yes’ side on the other hand prefers full membership, can live with EEA+, and they fear Norwegian outsider status. EEA+ is the equilibrium.”

(Sverdrup 2009: 435)

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the will to reintroduce the issue onto the political agenda has not been there. Kallset (2009: 252) reports that the Labour leader at the time, Thorbjørn Jagland, started talking about a rematch as early as 15 days after the

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230 The Bondevik II coalition’s political platform included an EU “suicide clause”. A similar solution to that of the previous non-socialist government was chosen to manage the inter- and intra-party disagreement on the EU issue also by the red-green coalition which took office in 2005.

231 This is the case on the centre-left too, even though the Labour Party’s coalition partners, the SLP and the CP are against the EEA agreement. The two parties voted against e.g. free movement of capital, but since they have accepted the principle and acknowledged that the battle is lost as long as Norway is member of the EEA (Interview with Dag Seierstad, Oslo, 18 September 2009).
1994 referendum, and that since 1994, central Labour figures have spoken up in favour of a new EU application more or less every year – in addition to every time European integration has been widened or deepened. Furthermore, the Conservative Party adopted an “EU guarantee” for the 2009 election, where the party leader, Erna Solberg, promised to actively promote and encourage an EU membership debate even if in government with Eurosceptic coalition partners (see Solberg 2009). The previous leader (1994-2004), Jan Petersen, by contrast, was criticized for his passive approach to the issue (see e.g. Strandhagen 2004).

The EEA agreement and its shortcomings in decision-making has been the main topic for discussion on both the “no” side and the “yes” side, but at the turn of the millennium also the introduction of the Euro and the progress made towards the eastward enlargements, made the proponents of membership eager to bring the membership issue up again. The EU wind in Norway was particularly noticeable before the Swedish rejection of the Euro in September 2003, as the EU was widening and deepening its integration efforts and Norway was looking increasingly isolated (see e.g. Traavik 2003; Kallset 2009: 239). This was further fuelled by the relatively clear “yes” majority which had dominated the public opinion polls since the summer in 2002. With the Labour leadership flirting with the idea of prioritising a new EU membership application over government cooperation with the SLP and CP in 2003, the Norwegian EU debate was, in other words, brewing (Kallset 2009). However, by early 2004, public opinion had turned, and in March 2004, the Labour leader, Jens Stoltenberg, announced his party’s intentions of entering talks with the SLP and CP about forming a majority government alternative for the 2005 election. The EU issue was thus removed from the party’s agenda. Only months before it had been much more important to the party than government cooperation, but now, as the PM candidate stated, it was not to be allowed to stand in the way of a centre-left majority government (Stoltenberg cited by Kallset 2009: 239-241).
7.1.2.2 The EEA Agreement and Controversial Directives

Considering that the EEA agreement was originally intended to be a stepping stone to full EU membership and never a long-term basis of any one country’s relationship with the EU, it is not surprising that it has been deemed inadequate as the “backbone” of Norway’s relations with the EU (Wallis et al. 2002; Claes and Fossum 2002). The future of the EEA agreement and the structures the current Norway/EU relationship is based on have been continuously questioned in the last decade, although it has not resulted in a full-blown debate on Norway’s form of association to the EU. As mentioned above, especially current arrangements’ shortcomings in decision-making and their implications for democracy have dominated discussions on both sides. On the “no” side, among EEA opponents, there have been calls to replace the EEA agreement with a trade agreement, but predominantly, post-1994 EU-related discussion has revolved around individual EEA directives and promotion of the use of the national veto. The campaign to use the veto has been led by NtEU, and nearly all interventions in the European Consultative Organ (ECO)\textsuperscript{232} in the Storting have been initiated by CP, SLP and CDP members (Narud and Strøm 2000: 137).

When looking at the total number of directives and laws that Norway has adopted since entering the EEA agreement, it looks as though the workings of the EEA agreement have been largely free of controversies. By the end of 1998, Norway had fully implemented 1,168 out of 1,224 applicable directives (95.4 percent) (Narum and Strøm 2000: 145), but in the same time period, only in the areas of oil, gas, food additives and salmon exports were disagreements between Oslo and Brussels of any significance (Andersen 2000). In 1996, the “food cosmetics directive”,\textsuperscript{233} which permitted certain artificial sweeteners, colourants and other additives to be added to foods, caused controversy because it effectively lowered Norwegian environmental standards (Narud and Strøm 2000: 135). When the Storting voted on it, the SLP and

\textsuperscript{232} EEA matters belong to the domain of foreign relations in the Storting. The ECO (also called the EEA Commission) consists of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the six Norwegian representatives to the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee.

\textsuperscript{233} In fact, Norway tried to get exemptions from three directives on food additives (Andersen 2000). These were on food cosmetics and adding of vitamins and medicines in food (Aale 2010).
the three middle parties opposed it, while Labour, the Conservatives and the PP supported it (Svåsand 2002: 332). Furthermore, in November 1998, four of the six CP ministers in the centre government voted against the “veterinary directive”, which reduced controls on imported animals (Andersen 2000; Politiskanalyse.no 2002). The “gas directive” was another problematic directive because it “put Norway at a competitive disadvantage compared to gas suppliers outside the EEA, such as Russia and Algeria” (Narud and Strøm 2000: 135). The SLP and CP’s MPs went against the directive in the Storting vote on 18 June 2002 (Stortinget 2002). Moreover, in January 2003, the PM of the centre-right government, Kjell Magne Bondevik, his fellow CDP ministers and the LP ministers went against their government’s proposal to accept the “life patent directive”, a directive which attracted controversy across Europe (Kristoffersen 2003). The 2006 “services directive”, which decided that a service provider which is legally established in one EEA country can deliver services across the EEA, prompted fears about its impact on public services and social dumping. The directive created not only protests from the “no” side and numerous trade unions, but also dissent in the government; the SLP and CP MPs made up the minority that voted against the directive in the Storting on 23 April 2009 (Nergaard 2009; Aale 2010; Ødegård 2010).

EFTA figures show that in total, Norway had implemented 99.6 percent of 1,734 directives in 2010. Only seven directives remained (Aale 2010). At the end of 2010, controversial directives included the EU’s third “post directive” and the “data retention directive”. It was argued that the post directive, which harmonizes regulation in the EEA and entails liberalisation of European postal services, would make postal services in Norway (and everywhere) poorer (e.g. less frequent deliveries and poorer provision in the districts) and more expensive – and increase problems with social dumping (see e.g. Werner 2009; Øverland 2010).

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234 The SLP and CP MPs also voted against the directive in the Storting (Stortinget 2003).

235 For a full list of the consultation statements on the services directive, see Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet (2010). Also see the anti-services directive website: www.tjenestedirektivet.no, run by a number of youth organizations.

236 Also see the anti-post directive website: www.postdirektivet.no, run by the postal workers’ trade union Norsk Post- og Kommunikasjonsforbund (Postkom).
of 2010, it was expected that both the SLP and CP would go against the directive, but the Labour Party’s position was still unclear (Nationen 2009). The data retention directive (DRD), which harmonizes legislation on the retention of electronic communication data and requires traffic and location data to be retained for six to 24 months, was widely opposed on the basis of legal/data protection principles. The SLP, the middle parties and the PP all officially advocated using the veto against the directive. Even the Conservative Party expressed the view that they were very critical to the DRD (Aspaker 2010), but at the end of the year, they had still not decided on a position. Although there were speculations in the spring of 2010 that the PP might take a u-turn (Nrk Nyheter 2010), this was refuted by the party (Birhane and Hverven 2010). Thus, it remains to be seen whether the data retention directive will be the first directive that Norway uses its EEA veto on. This will be the case if the Labour Party, which is the only party in favour of the directive to date, fails to get support from the Conservatives and/or the PP. However, an editorial in Dagens Næringsliv in November 2010 made the following comment:

“To use the veto requires that Norwegian politicians have the backbone to go ahead with a new open battle over Norway’s relationship with Europe. They hardly have that. Unfortunately.”

(Dagens Næringsliv 2010)

7.1.2.3 Nei til EU since 1994

To the extent there has been a debate on the EU and the EEA agreement since 1994, NtEU has played a central and active role (Sverdrup 2009). The purpose of the organization’s work post-1994 has been twofold: firstly, to provide criticism of the EEA agreement’s consequences on Norwegian politics and society, and second, to keep the “no” movement in a state of preparedness for a new debate on EU membership (Seierstad 2006). In addition to the above-mentioned directives, NtEU

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237 On 3 November 2009, a non-partisan campaign organization against the DRD was established. It is called simply “Stop the data retention directive” (Stopp DLD). See its website for more information: www.datalagringsdirektivet.no.
also demanded that the veto be used to stop the “oil directive” (approved in 1995),
all three of the food cosmetics directives and the “children’s food directive”
(approved in 2002), and also campaigned against the Schengen agreement, which, it
was argued, conflicts with privacy and legal protection (Seierstad 2006). NtEU’s
membership has, quite naturally, decreased since 1994, when it totalled 140,000
members. After dropping to 25,096 members in 1995, it has remained quite stable. In
2005, the organization had 26,076 members, and in 2009 the number had increased to
over 29,000 (Seierstad 2006; Nei til EU 2009a).

7.1.2.4 The Financial Crisis, Iceland’s Application and the Lisbon Treaty
The onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 resulted in speculations about whether
it was going to be the external shock that would bring Norway into the EU (e.g.
Aasen 2008). Particularly the news of the Icelandic banking crisis and Iceland’s
imminent application for EU membership made many commentators predict (and/or
call for) a new debate on membership. After all, every time Norway applied for
membership in the past, it was in the wake of its EFTA partners’ decisions to apply.
Furthermore, the prospect of Iceland leaving the EFTA side of the EEA agreement
prompted discussion on the viability of the EEA agreement with only Norway and
Liechtenstein left as signatories. It was argued, by some, that the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (ESA), which ensures that the EFTA countries carry out their EEA
obligations, will lose its credibility and legitimacy if Iceland leaves – as, in practice,
only Norway would be left to oversee its own policy implementation (see e.g.
Sverdrup 2008). The Norwegian government denied that this was the case, as the
foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, declared in November 2009 that the government
position was

“that the EEA agreement remains the basis of our relationship to the EU,
also if Iceland is to go from EFTA to the EU. The agreement is, as is well-
known, not dependent on a set number of members”.

(cited by Norge EU-delegasjonen 2009)
Although Støre’s acknowledgement of the effects Iceland’s prospective EU entry would have on the EEA agreement was limited to “technical changes in the workings of the agreement” (Norge EU-delegasjonen 2009), it cannot be denied that if the EEA agreement is to be revised, it is likely that Norway will have a new debate on the association form on her hands: as Sverdrup (2008) points out, “if the EEA agreement is opened – then it is almost impossible to avoid that the EU debate is opened too”.

The prospects of Iceland entering the EU also raised issues related to fisheries policy. Iceland’s large fisheries sector is likely to give the country considerable influence in the development of the EU’s fisheries policy if the country joins, and this could potentially be at odds with Norway’s interests (e.g. Elsebutangen 2008; Sverdrup 2008). As one commentator argued in 2008:

“With Iceland on the EU side of the table, we face a huge challenge. If the Norwegian fisheries sector changes sides in the Norwegian EU debate [from ‘no’ to ‘yes’], the situation around Norwegian EU membership will be different than today. Then we will have a new membership debate before we know it”.

(Aasen 2008)

Sverdrup (2008) agrees with this view, as he also thinks that the fisheries issue has the potential to sway many voters from “no” to “yes”, especially in western parts of Norway.

It cannot be said that the Lisbon Treaty had a significant impact on the Norwegian debate, although it is possible that the Irish “no” might have had an indirect impact on the debate through putting the magnifying glass on things that do not work in the EU. As the chairman of Europeisk Ungdom (“European Youth of Norway”), Anne Margrethe Lund, stated in August 2010: when the media “focuses on the things that don’t work in the EU, then we struggle to explain why membership is a good idea”
(cited by Roshauw 2010). Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry’s analysis of the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on Norway returned the following conclusions:

“The immediate consequences for the Single Market and thus for the EEA agreement will not, in all likelihood, be of significance. [...] This is based on that all parties in the EEA agreement intend to continue building on the obligations and well run cooperation arrangements that exist in the EEA, and that prospective new issues that emerge as a result of the Lisbon Treaty can be solved in a practical and good way.”

(Utenriksdepartementet 2009: 16-17)

The “no” side also maintained that the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on Norway were negligible. This is understandable as it was in its interest that the status quo was upheld. By Norwegian Eurosceptics, the treaty was viewed as another post-1994 development which only served to confirm that the EU was not something they want Norway to be part of. At NtEU’s annual conference on 12 March 2010, one speaker declared that the Lisbon Treaty only strengthened the “no” side’s arguments against membership, as the treaty only served to widen the gap between EEA and EU membership (Harper 2010a). Disagreeing with one of the Labour Party’s devout EU proponents and now Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland’s statement that the Lisbon Treaty is “good for everyone, except Norway”, the speaker proclaimed that the treaty is “bad for the EU, [but] irrelevant to Norway”.

Iceland submitted its application for EU membership to Brussels on 16 July 2009. However, at the end of 2010, the much hoped-for “Iceland suction” had yet to show its effect. The financial crisis, instead of prompting higher support for EU membership, seemed to have a negative effect on public opinion in Norway. Based on the assumption that Norwegian voters change their preference on the EU according to sociotropic utilitarianism, Sverdrup (2009) puts this down to the fact that the EU was worse hit by the financial crisis than Norway. Furthermore, in 2010,
the unrest in the union surrounding the Greek economic crisis was also a commonly cited cause of the high “no” majorities in the polls (see Moe and Strand 2010; Graven 2010). Besides, the Conservative and EU-proponent, Astrup’s (2009) logic is hard to abnegate: “If the Swedish suction appeared like a light breeze, then the Iceland suction will seem like ripples in the seashore a warm summer’s day”. Moreover, Professor of comparative politics, Frank Aarebrot, declared in May 2010 that “there is no reason to revitalize the EU debate at present”; the EU debate in Norway could not get any more “stone dead”, he said (cited by Moe and Strand 2010). However, there are indications that the debate might be resurrected in 2012. On 7 January 2010, the red-green government appointed a research based committee which was to undertake a thorough examination of the effects of the EEA agreement on Norwegian politics, law, the economy and society. The committee’s report is due at the end of 2011 (Vermes 2010b), so it is reasonable to expect that the EU debate will be revived, at least to some extent, in its wake.

7.2 The Post-1994 Thematic Analysis

So, the question remains: does the Eurosceptic argumentation used in the 15 years since the last referendum follow the same pattern as that which went before it? Did the themes of political values, political culture and ruralism retain their dominant position in the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse between 1994 and 2010? The data used and the methods employed to obtain these differed slightly from the previous chapters. This is due to the fact that the 1994-2010 period was not a period of heightened debate, unlike the previously analysed periods (and as a corollary, EU-related documents were less abundant). Besides, a wider range of methods were available for current-day research. The next section outlines the data and methods used for the post-1994 documentary analysis, and the subsequent sections present the results.

7.2.1 Data and Methods

The main part of the post-1994 thematic analysis was, like the analyses of the previous periods, the newspaper study. The data sample was collected from the
debate pages in Aftenposten’s morning and evening editions, from three separate years when debating activity was expected to be the highest (the early 2000s). In addition, the morning editions of Aftenposten in 2009 were included, to make the study representative of the whole decade and to increase the data sample. To supplement the Aftenposten data, internet searches for online commentaries, debates and other news items were also conducted, and only items containing Eurosceptic argumentation were retained for the analysis. This resulted in a total sample of 96 items for the newspaper study, of which 59 were letters to the editor or commentaries systematically sourced from the paper edition of Aftenposten from the years 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2009, and the remaining 38 items were articles, interviews, commentaries or online debates resulting from random online searches, and a few letters to the editors from other papers than Aftenposten. The online data was taken from a wide range of Norwegian websites, mainly online newspapers, but also websites belonging to e.g. Mission of Norway to the EU and NtEU. All the data were coded according to the coding scheme set out in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four and Appendix G, to sub-themes of the categories postmaterialist values, political culture, rural society, economic interest and national identity.

For the party analysis, the Eurosceptic argumentation in each of the Storting parties’ (excluding the Conservative Party’s) manifestos from 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009 were analysed, as were a 2008 parliamentary debate and qualitative responses from two surveys of Norwegian MPs conducted by the author (in 2006 and 2010, see Appendix D for details on the questionnaires and methodology). Attempts were made at sourcing additional data on the LP, CDP and PP due to their limited coverage of the EU issue in their manifestos, but this was only successful with regard to the CDP, on which two documents, one speech and one debate booklet, were

238 The reason why only the morning edition was included was that the national library micro film archive, which logged both the morning and evening editions on the same micro film, did not stock newspapers as new as 2009, and therefore, the 2009 papers had to be searched on its online avis2 system, which was much more time consuming.
239 Seven from 2000, 15 from 2002, 29 from 2004 and eight from 2009.
240 The websites the items were taken from are: idag.no, aftenposten.no, morgenbladet.no, neitileu.no, nytid.no, nationen.no, eu-norge.org, vg.no, dagsavisen.no, forskning.no, handelskampanjen.no and e24.no. Moreover, letters to the editor from the paper editions of the following newspapers were added: Kласsekampen, Oppland Arbeiderblad, Dagbladet, VG and Nationen.
added to the analysis. Moreover, an analysis of a selection of NtEU documents complemented the party-based study. Like in the 1970s study of Folkebevegelsen and other “no” literature, only documents which covered a range of topics/argumentation were included in the analysis in order to get an idea of which topics or arguments were prioritized/considered most important when covering the EU issue on a general level. Specifically the coded data for the party/NtEU analysis were 26 documents, four speeches, two NtEU songs, nine replies from a 2008 parliamentary debate and 44 qualitative survey responses to the question “what are your own feelings about Norway’s future relationship with the EU” (2006 survey) and “what are your main arguments against the EU (and Norwegian membership)” (2010 survey). Of the 44 qualitative responses to the survey questions, 8 were returned by SLP MPs, 10 by Labour, eight by CP, three by CDP and 15 by PP MPs.

In addition, the three argument books from the period were used to fill in gaps in the documentary analysis. These were Hei, verden! Et solidarisk og internasjonalt nei til EU (“Hi, world! A solidarity-based and international no to the EU”) from 2000, edited by Oen, Larsen and Moen from the Labour “no” movement and published by AUF; Hvorfor nei? (“Why no?”), authored by former sociology professor and SLP politician, Ottar Brox; and Et nytt nei (“A new no”), authored by four former SME members (Moen et al. 2004). The latter two were both published in 2004, the former by NtEU and the latter by Spartacus publishers. Furthermore, ten semi-structured interviews with “no” activists and politicians from each of the Storting parties (see list of interviewees in Appendix E) were conducted to supplement the research. Quantitative data from the two above-mentioned elite surveys (conducted by the author in 2006 and 2010) were also used to triangulate the findings from the

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241 This includes the 2006 Organisation handbook (Nei til EU 2006), Election information 2009: “Standpoint” Oppland (Nei til EU 2009b), a 2010 Flyer; “Four reasons to say no to the EU” (Nei til EU 2010), and the July 2010 “EU guide” (Harper and Matland 2010), as well as two speeches made by the current leader, Heming Olaussen, and one by the former NtEU leader, Kristen Nygaard.
242 i.e. was not specific to one subject, for example, EEC membership’s impact on the environment.
243 Further details on the data included in the study can be found in Appendix F.
244 Except the Conservative Party.
qualitative study. The next section presents the findings of the newspaper/online study.

7.2.2 Findings of the Newspaper/Online Study
In the post-1994 period, political culture and political values continued to dominate the Eurosceptic discourse in Norway. Nearly seven out of ten and six out of ten of the news items, letters or commentaries analysed, contained political culture and political values arguments respectively. This dominance is also illustrated in Figure 7.1 below, which shows that these two themes made up almost three fourths of all category codes in the newspaper study. Rural society arguments also continued to play a noticeable role in the debate, and economic interest remained a quite marginal, albeit stable, feature. National identity, on the other hand, had disappeared almost completely off the surface of the “no” side of the debate.

Figure 7.1 Number of news items coded to each of the categories (post-1994)\textsuperscript{245}

![Pie chart showing distribution of news items]

Source: Author's study

When comparing the 1994-2010 argumentation to that of the previous periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is clear that its structure remained exceptionally stable between 1961 and 2010. Nevertheless, when it comes to nuances in arguments within

\textsuperscript{245} In the economic interest category, the arguments merely playing down the significance of economic issues and the “yes” side’s economic arguments are not included.
the categories, there were of course changes from the 1970s debate to the 1990s debate, and this has naturally also been the case between 1994 and the late 2000s. Category by category, the next sections of this chapter explore the qualitative findings from the newspaper study and these nuances in more detail.

7.2.2.1 Political Culture: The EU’s Problems – Structural, not Cosmetic

As mentioned above, 67 out of the 97 news/debate items analysed contain political culture argumentation. Like in the 1960s, 1970s and the 1990s, the main themes in the post-1994 political culture argumentation are sovereignty and democracy. Gone are the references to the German occupation during the second world war and the post-war feeling of freedom that characterized some early Eurosceptic sovereignty/independence argumentation. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that aversion to the notion that Norway should give up the right to control its own destiny is as relevant to Norwegian Euroscepticism in 2010 as it was in 1961 or 1972. Even Norwegian 21st Century Eurosceptics view the surrender of control over the Norwegian people, territory and resources unacceptable. However, there are some slight variations in how the sovereignty aspect is expressed compared to previous periods. There is little use of the word frihet (freedom) and there are fewer emotive arguments that emphasize sovereignty as a value in itself. This is possibly because the effect of this kind of argumentation has declined due to the fact that the percentage of the population who lived through WWII has dropped, and because in the current political climate, the possibility of occupation and territorial acquisitions in Western Europe seems remote. Naturally, some reference to the importance of suverenitet (sovereignty), selvstendighet/auvængighet (independence), selvbestemmelsesrett (right to make own decisions), selvstyre (self-government) and selvråderett (right to self-government) remains, but the arguments more commonly specify exactly why or in what areas it is important to retain handlefrihet (freedom of action) and control. Examples are freedom of action in foreign affairs, control over military missions, and sovereignty over natural resources and economic policy/the budget.
Moreover, there are some interesting developments in the anti-union argumentation. Antipathy towards the way in which the EU has developed since 1992 seems to have increased, in particular after the plans of a European Constitution were announced. To be sure, references to “the United States of Europe”, a “European state” and a “federal Europe” were made in the 1990s debate too, but in the 2000s, they are much more commonplace, with two out of ten commentators arguing that the EU has moved (or is moving) in this direction.

As before, not only do the Eurosceptics reject the idea that the Storting no longer is to decide how national affairs should be run, but being governed by unelected officials from Brussels makes it all the worse. According to the Eurosceptics, willingly swapping Norwegian _folkestyre_ with Brussels’ technocracy would be a ludicrous idea to any Norwegian with his/her democratic ideals intact. “Why should [we] enter a Union and surrender the right to govern [our] own country to a remote elite in Brussels?” Refusing to join is not egotism, it is common sense (Olaussen 2010a). The democracy argument is commonly cited as the most important argument against the EU. Skaara (02/09/00), for example, declares in her letter to the editor that the Norwegian EU opposition _above all_ is about “the fight against the increasing powerlessness to a bigger and more remote power”, as does sociology Professor and SLP politician Brox (2004; Aftenposten 16/12/02), the CDP leader from 2004 to 2010 Dagfinn Høybråten (Haslien 2004; Nei til EU 2005) and many more.

Høybråten is also dejected with the EU’s way of governing which, he argues, reflects the French thinker, Paul Valery’s definition of politics as “the art of preventing people from busying themselves with what is their own business” (cited by Haslien 2004). The rejection of the EU due to its elitist and thus undemocratic nature is echoed by several Eurosceptic commentators. Ørnhøi (2009a) is another example. He complains that the Norwegian EU supporters “continue to worry about the fact that the majority of the people lack sense, and that we do not understand our own good”. Sarcastically, he continues:
“For good democrats [i.e. the EU elites] who work for the good of everyone are naturally always right. This is how the logic works in Oslo and Brussels, this is how the logic works in all of Europe’s capitals. While the EU project’s popular anchor withers away. [...] It is authoritarian to continue to insist that the majority of the people do not understand.”

Both Ørnhøi’s and Høybråten’s comments reflect disgust with and disbelief at the EU’s top-down view of politics. Brox (2004) also argues:

“The union is constructed to prevent politicians elected by the people from interfering in economic matters. [...] The EU is the European technocracy’s solution to the problem that the ballot can be used to influence economic policy.”

This democracy argument is clearly linked to left-wing opposition to the EU’s market liberalist ideology. All in all, the complaints about EU democracy up to the present day are echoes of those voiced in the early 1990s and even, to a large degree, in the 1960s and 1970s, although time and developments in the EU have served to strengthen them. This is because, as one letter writer puts it, in 2010, “it is still as logical that the degree of an active folkestyre decreases with the [increasing] size of the state or union and the distance to the people with the power” (Staale 02/09/00). The population of the EC/EU has increased by 163 percent between 1972 and 2010, from the EC “six”’ 190 million (1972) to the EU27’s 501 million (2010) (Eurostat 2011), and therefore, the democracy argument is, according to this line of reasoning, even more robust today. Additionally, in 2010, there are many more examples of the EU’s lack of respect for the voice of the people than there was in 1972 or in 1994; now, the Dutch and French rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 serves as an example of the EU’s dismissive attitude towards its citizens. This is because the Lisbon Treaty, which was put into force in 2009, “is almost identical to the European Constitution which was rejected both in France and the Netherlands in 2005” and because only the Irish were able to vote on the Lisbon Treaty, due to the elites’ fears
that the European public would reject it again (Harper and Matland 2010; also see Haga 2007). This is also criticized by the LP’s Odd Einar Dørum,²⁴⁶ who thinks that “it is a coruscating weakness with the project that they don’t dare to mobilize for themselves among their own citizens. If a project is to have strength, it has to have the citizens’ support”. Further examples are the Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty (2001) and Lisbon Treaty (2008) because they returned responses that the EU and the elites “did not like”, and therefore resulted in follow-up referenda with extremely powerful “yes” campaigns, which “forced” the people to vote “yes” (Harper and Matland 2010; see also Dagsavisen 2009b). SME’s Wegard Harsvik²⁴⁷ also comments on this “worrying practice” of “going round and over and past what the population has said” when the public has rejected “the union and an ever closer union”.

But what about the EU’s efforts in making its institutions more democratic in the years after Maastricht? Have the changes within the EU’s policy and decision making structures in recent years, for example the strengthened position of the directly elected European Parliament (EP) or the Citizens’ Initiative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (2007), served to quieten down criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit? It seems a select few Eurosceptics have accepted that progress has been made in some aspects of the area since 1994,²⁴⁸ but overall, the argument still stands tall:

“Norwegian EU opponents do not want to be members of a society where it does not matter what the majority of people thinks and where we cannot unseat a government which governs against the interests of the majority”.

(Brox 16/12/02)

In other words, the Norwegian Eurosceptics believe that the EU’s democratic problems are not cosmetic; they are structural and no change in the balance between the various institutions can remedy them. Gåsvatn (2009), for example, points out that in parallel with the EP’s increase in influence on EU policy making, public

²⁴⁶ Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
²⁴⁷ Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
²⁴⁸ This was at least a point made by the LP leader, Lars Sponheim, in 2004 (Storvik 2004).
interest in EP elections has dropped, something which indicates, she argues, that the EU is a faulty construction.

7.2.2.2 Political Values: Some Variation Due to EEA Directives

The postmaterialist values element, as a proportion of all arguments, remained relatively stable throughout the 50 year period under study. Naturally there was some variation in emphasis of different arguments or themes across the periods, and argumentation activity in this category was perhaps affected the most by individual policy developments within the EU. This was especially the case in the last 15 years of the 1961-2010 period because Norway had to adopt EU legislation through the EEA agreement which touched on typical postmaterialist concerns such as ethics, human rights, animal welfare and equality and because the EU’s military capabilities developed and prompted anti-war concerns.249

In particular, the recent DRD attracted widespread criticism on the basis of human rights concerns (privacy and legal protection), but also the Schengen agreement, which is accused of shutting out refugees in need and creating a “fortress Europe”, was very unpopular among human rights champions. This was one of the LP’s main arguments against the EU; the LP’s current party leader, Trine Skei Grande, stated in 2005 that “there is nothing that cuts a liberal heart as much as seeing people being shot as they are crossing a barbed wire fence. We do not want a Fortress Europe” (cited in Nei til EU 2005). The 2010/2011 leader of UmEU, Tale Marte Dæhlen (2010), argues in her letter to the editor that “the EUs attempts at standardizing European asylum and immigration policy would have been favourable if the goal was to get a treatment of asylum seekers that is as humane and fair as possible”. However, she concludes that this is far from the case, as conditions for asylum seekers only seem to be getting worse, and the walls around Europe higher.

249 Besides, outside times of heightened debate (like the other periods), specific issues of current interest are more likely to be the topic of letters and commentaries than a more general discussion of the EU and membership. This is illustrated by the relatively high frequency of peace-related arguments in the 2000s, which was undoubtedly due to the ongoing debate on Norway’s participation in the CSDP at the time.
Anti-EU argumentation as peace promotion is also prominent in the 2000s debate, and like in the early 1990s, Norway’s role as a peace negotiator is put forward as an important reason to why it is essential that Norway retains its “independent position”. Moreover, opposition to the EU’s “military cooperation which includes wars that are illegal by international law” (Hassel 2010) also features quite substantially in the data. The desire for Norway to “only participate in military operations which have an unequivocal UN mandate” is quite widespread (Solbjell, cited in Nei til EU 2005).

Health and environment issues are less widespread in the post-1994 discourse than it was in the previous debate. However, it is possible that health/environment issues have been underrepresented in the study due to a sampling bias; the debates surrounding the controversial food cosmetics directives and the veterinary directive took place primarily in the second half of the 1990s, a time which the sample did not account for. Nevertheless, the CDP’s commitment to a restrictive alcohol policy,

250 Traditionally, the developments in the EU’s security dimension have “been viewed through the prism of Atlanticism” in Norway; the main concern has been that a European CSDP should not weaken NATO’s role (Miles 2006: 81). However, this discourse changed somewhat after the Norwegian application for EU membership was reality in 1992, “towards a more balanced view of the EU and NATO, emphasizing the EU’s role as a soft security actor, with a special emphasis on its role in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council” (Rieker 2006b: 306). The Norwegian preference for participating in the EU’s CSDP, despite its non-membership, stems from the Norwegian government’s fear of marginalization in European security after the St. Malo summit of December 1998 (Rieker 2006b: 308). This fear translated into a more pragmatic approach to participation in the CSDP, with the CDP/CP/LP government proposing a notable contribution to the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. In 2004, the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative Party) successfully argued against isolation and remaining “on the sidelines as passive spectators while watching European security policy cooperation take shape without us”, offering 150 soldiers to participate in a Swedish-led rapid reaction force from 2008 (cited in Ministry of Defence 2004). Some disagreed with this decision, arguing that participation in the EU’s new Headline Goal 2010 was in conflict with the Norwegian constitution. Others opposed participation because of Norway’s non-membership of the EU and resulting lack of influence on decisions (Rieker 2006b: 308, 312). Nevertheless, most Norwegian politicians agree with the government’s “troops for influence” strategy (Rieker 2006b: 308), at least as long as the CSDP does not undermine the role of NATO. This might help to explain why the issue of Norway’s CSDP participation has not been more controversial and more widely debated. Another potential reason is the high support for humanitarian and crisis intervention and management among both the public and elites in the Nordic countries. Because of long-established traditions in foreign policy in this area, the contribution of resources to the EU’s efforts in this dimension is relatively uncontroversial in Norway (Kite 2006: 108). Moreover, there is also a possibility that the government’s emphasis on the country’s right to veto any proposal to use the forces (Udgaard 2006: 326) had a calming effect on the debate; this gave out the signal that the decision to contribute 150 soldiers was not binding. A final point worth noting is that the red-green coalition, prior to entering government in 2005 did agree on tightening the conditions under which Norway would take part in military operations (Udgaard 2006: 327), to meet concerns which mirror those found in the newspaper/online analysis about needing “an unequivocal UN mandate” (Solbjell, cited in Nei til EU 2005).
which clashes with the EU’s priority of open competition, is an example of the health argument’s continued relevance to Norwegian Euroscepticism (e.g. Høybråten 11/11/04). The trend towards “fake foods” which have questionable health effects and the “global market of cheating” is the topic of another commentary. The EU is criticized for approving this negative trend; poor quality foods with potential health risks are brought into the Norwegian market through the EEA agreement (Geelmuyden 08/12/09).

The variations in the content of the above sub-categories of postmaterialism notwithstanding, stability can be seen in the structure of the arguments which build on opposition to the right of way granted to market concerns in the EU. This includes the arguments pertaining to the sub-categories environment, external solidarity and internal solidarity (including protection of the welfare state and workers’ rights). Environmental and external solidarity arguments (and their position in the debate) in particular, remained very constant, from the 1970s up until 2010. The following citation from a 2010 commentary could just as easily have been taken from the 1970s debate:

“Outside the union, Norway can play an alternative role in relation to the South [...] and] aspire to conduct an international trade policy which gives South countries the opportunity to use the same developing policies which we once used during the building of the Norwegian welfare state”.

(Lundeberg 2010)

That the Norwegian Eurosceptics’ environmental arguments remain unaffected by the changes in the EU and the EU’s expanding competence in environmental policy is reflected by a statement the youth movement Natur og Ungdom (Nature and Youth, Young Friends of the Earth Norway), issued after their annual conference in 2004: “the EU has changed since 1994, but the environmental movement’s arguments against Norwegian membership are strengthened” (cited by Moen et al. 2004: 106).

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251 This was also confirmed in the interview with CDP’s Odd Jostein Sæter.
The statement follows the same logic as before: while the EU’s market liberalism produces increases in

“economic indicators like investments, production and trade [...] the most important environmental indicators become progressively more negative: the forests are dwindling, the groundwater level is sinking, the soil is eroding, the wetland is disappearing, the fisheries are collapsing, the pastures are being impaired, the rivers are drying up, the temperature is rising, the coral reefs are dying, and plant and animal species are disappearing”.

(Moen et al. 2004: 106)

Brox (2004: 40) focuses on a more specific aspect of the conflict between the environment and market liberalism, as he argues that “the goods transport which is generated by market liberalism might be the most serious threat against Europe’s environment”, as goods produced in more cost-effective parts of the EU, such as agricultural products, have to be transported across Europe, e.g. from Spain to Finland (or Norway). Similarly, an online commentary (Dagsavisen 2009a) reflects disgust at this development:

“A very sick example of this is people by the coast who through thousands of years have been able to buy fresh fish on the pier from the fishermen. An abrupt end was put to this a few years ago when a new EU directive decided that it was against the law [to sell fish on the pier]. And then it appeared that the frozen cod at Rimi252 on the pier had been caught a few months before in the same place. And then transported down to China for packaging... And subsequently back to Rimi on the pier some place in Finnmark.253 [...] In other words, the consumption of fossil products and global warming isn’t exactly reduced by this... [...] Stupid EU directives have a ditto origin, I suppose... And strong forces in the Labour Party and

252 A Norwegian supermarket chain.
253 The northernmost county in Norway.
Conservative Party have imposed this [stupidity] on us for almost four decades as something ‘superior and intelligent’...!"

All of these examples show that opposition to the EU’s trade policy and its goal of economic growth at the expense of the environment brings the environmental argumentation into the 2000s. But it is not only the EU’s trade policy which is being branded an “ecological catastrophe” (Moen and Harsvik 2005), so is the EU’s fisheries policy. The EU’s fisheries policy continues to be used as a horror story. The EU is also criticized for being too passive in environmental policy – for dragging its feet in climate conferences.

7.2.2.3  Rural Society: Agriculture, Fisheries and Districts Still Important
The position of rural society sentiments in the debate has, like the political culture and values dimensions, remained very stable. Fifty years after the first debate on Norwegian membership of the EC, rural society arguments are still a central part of the Eurosceptic discourse. A quarter of the letters and newspaper/online items analysed put forward defence of the districts or the need to retain national control over the fish resources and/or agricultural policy as reasons to remain outside the EU.

Keeping national control over the fisheries is the most common argument in this category, probably because it is important on two levels. The fisheries are not only important to the (coastal) districts, it is also important to Norway as a nation: “the fishing industry is supposed to contribute to that Norway also in the future shall be a good country to live in” (Teige\textsuperscript{244} 15/03/04). In other words, the fisheries are still perceived as important both in economic terms and in societal terms, maintaining coastal settlement and contributing to government revenues. Additionally, as noted above, the desire to keep national control over the fish resources are also connected to environmentalism, like in previous debates, as the EU’s fisheries policy continues to be compared unfavourably to the Norwegian policy.

\textsuperscript{244} Chairman of \textit{Fiskebåtredernes Forbund} (the Fishing Boat Shippers’ Association).
Also agricultural argumentation appears often enough in the debate to judge the maintenance of the sector of importance also to 21st Century Norwegian Euroscepticism. Brox (2004: 31) writes that “there is little we know as sure about the EU issue as the fact that all activity in the rural industries will be severely affected if our country joins the union”. This is not only because of the competitive disadvantage Norwegian farmers have to contend with, i.e. the harsh climate, but also the high salary and cost levels in Norway. Without the subsidies, no farmer would be able to afford goods and services on the Norwegian market, and thus the agricultural sector would not be able to recruit a work force. The following quote from the interview with Per Ole Lunde, a farmer from Eastern Norway, illustrates this well:

“At the moment [... at the farm] we need carpenters and [...] electricians [...]. And a carpenter earns at least twice as much as we do per hour, and an electrician earns four times as much per hour. Or, the firm we use costs us easily over four to five times as much per hour as what we earn working on this farm.”

So, the Norwegian farming sector is at a competitive disadvantage in the EU context in more than one way; it would not be able to compete with European farmers in an open European market or with Norwegian employers for manpower without subsidies.

In the newspaper debate, readiness for emergencies and maintenance of cultural landscapes are two cited reasons for nurturing the national agricultural sector. Global responsibility and solidarity is another. Hanssen (20/03/04), chairman of Forum for utvikling og miljø (Forum for development and environment), argues that the world is rapidly approaching a “critical point with a large-scale global food shortage” and believes that in this perspective “keeping an agricultural structure, 

255 Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
both in Norway and all other places in the world which secures the family farm and the thriving local communities, [is] a future-oriented, responsible policy”. In other words, he believes that western countries should take responsibility for feeding their own population, and like Lundeberg (2010, cited above), he thinks that developing countries should, like Norway “and other western countries at the time when we needed it”, be able to protect and develop their own industry until they are ready to participate in the global market.

Eurosceptic argumentation related to the protection of rural settlement and the districts is also present. The CDP’s Høybråten (11/11/04) reflects aversion to the idea that market considerations should take precedence over districts considerations, as he wants to have “a regional policy originating from the desire to make use of the whole country”. Opposition to the EEA’s attacks on the selective employers’ tax and to the EU’s third post directive are additional examples of additional district-related argumentation, as these EU initiatives are a threat to rural jobs and thus, the dispersed settlement in Norway.

7.2.2.4 Economic Interest: Not a Motivating Factor

As Figure 7.1 above shows, utilitarian considerations make up a small part of the Eurosceptic body of argumentation. What there is of economic argumentation in the newspaper/online debate primarily revolves around opposition to EMU and losing sovereignty over natural resources and economic policy. Additionally, like before, there are a number of commentators who play down the validity or importance of the EU proponents economic arguments or explicitly reject economic interest as an argument for either side of the debate. The general view is that economic arguments are considered less relevant to the membership question than ever before, as the EEA has given Norwegian businesses open access to the Single Market.

Nevertheless, there is one clear case of expressed utilitarianism in the newspaper/online debate. In an online debate (VG Nett Debatt 2003), the following is put forward:
“Norway will not manage without the oil; in the course of only a few decades, we have made ourselves dependent of the oil. And without that income, Norway would not have been as rich as she is today. [...] If we had joined the EU, we might as well have given up the oil straight away because it is not Norway who is allowed to regulate how much oil we are allowed to pump up.”

This shows that Norway’s wealth could, by some, potentially be viewed as threatened by EU membership and loss of sovereignty over resources such as oil or fish. However, these kinds of messages are not part of the mainstream of the debate. Rather, expressed economic considerations are on the whole characterized by sentiments like “Norway should retain sovereignty over our fish and energy resources”, “Norway should be free to conduct an alternative economic policy” or “the Euro would not work for us”. Although the EMU-related arguments have a clear economic, utilitarian profile, the other two types of arguments seem to be predominantly driven by either district concerns or the desire to conduct a different, more humane and egalitarian economic policy.

Furthermore, the arguments “time has proved that we don’t need membership to do well” or “the economy is irrelevant to the question of EU membership” are well-used. However, it is important to reiterate that this does not necessarily mean that the economy is unimportant to Norwegian Euroscepticism. It could be argued that its healthy state has allowed and still allows the Eurosceptics to successfully shift focus onto other issues, namely political Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR) issues. This was also reflected in the interview with the farmer, Lunde. Lunde points out that the fact that Norway is not in the position that she needs the EU to prosper economically, unlike Ireland in the 1970s or Sweden in the early 1990s, is a significant factor in Norwegian Euroscepticism:

256 Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
“[..] It is evident that this about economy and egotism is a factor which we can’t ignore. That we suddenly control so large economic resources [...] is one of the three, four [or] five main ‘no’ arguments. I think we have to be as honest as to say so.”

But even if the economy plays a role in Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is crystal clear that it is not the driving force, as the ownership of the economic interest argument as regards “the big picture”, i.e. the national economy, did and still do belong to the “yes” side. It was aptly put by one commentator: “We ought to know after two referenda that the economic arguments for membership do not carry enough weight” (Johansen 23/12/04).257

7.2.2.5 National Identity Sentiments: Practically Non-existent
Arguments that express sentiments that could be considered to reflect perceived cultural threat, hostility to other cultures, strong national attachment or national pride are practically non-existent in the items analysed. This is consistent with the trend observed from the 1960s to the early 1990s, where the number of national identity arguments declined decade by decade. The only items using sentiments which border on nationalism are a letter about Norwegian participation in EU military operations and an online commentary which refers to how 17 May, the Norwegian Constitution day, is celebrated and how Norwegian elites, by adapting Norway to the EU, are attempting to break this tradition. In the first item, the writer, MP for Kystpartiet (the Coast Party), Steinar Bastes, argues that “Norwegian soldiers should die for the King and the Fatherland”, not for the EU (20/11/04). The second item is written by representatives from Folkeaksjonen MOT EU-medlemskap (the People’s Action against EU membership). It argues that the 17 May celebration, when “[w]e put on our greatest and proudest clothes, our bunader,”258 and greet each other with a resounding ‘hurrah for 17 May’”, is under threat by EU membership.

257 However, it could also be argued that Sweden did not need EU membership to prosper economically either, as she too had, like Norway, access to the Single Market through the EEA agreement.
258 National costumes.
Other than in these two items, national identity feeling is not found in any of the argumentation. Two letter writers are concerned about threats to the Norwegian restrictive alcohol policy, and eight letter writers are worried about the effect Norwegian participation in the CSDP will have on Norway’s relationship to the US. Two of the eight also express disapproval of anti-American sentiment within the EU.\textsuperscript{259} However, it is more likely that health, social and security concerns respectively are at the heart of these arguments, rather than feelings of perceived cultural threat or lack of identification with Europe.

7.2.3 The Parties’ Arguments
The analysis of the party and NtEU material shows that political culture arguments are most prominent also on this level. Out of the 85 responses/documents analysed, 68 bring up issues related to sovereignty and democracy in their rejection of EU membership. Furthermore, the political culture dominance persists regardless of party, and is most prominent in the PP, illustrated by the fact that 12 of the 15 Euro sceptic PP MPs who responded to the qualitative survey questions gave bureaucracy, lack of democracy and/or loss of sovereignty as their main reason(s) to oppose EU membership. However, in all the other parties and NtEU, political value-related arguments are (nearly) as common as political culture ones. In the PP by contrast (see Figure 7.2), economic liberalist argumentation on the one hand and concern for the country’s natural resources on the other, particularly the fish (which makes up the rural society slice in Figure 7.2), compete for second place. In other words, if isolating the PP, then NtEU and the parties’ argumentation follows, like in 1994, the same trend as that which is observed in the newspaper debate.\textsuperscript{260} Ruralism makes up the third most common theme, and is closely followed by economic arguments. Also here, the national identity category continues its trend of decline.

\textsuperscript{259} Note that these letter writers are (or in the case of Gundersen, was) Progress Party politicians (Christian Tybring-Gjedde and Fridtjof Frank Gundersen).

\textsuperscript{260} This is not very surprising considering that it is primarily representatives from Nei til EU or politicians who write letters to the editor, especially outside the periods of heightened debate.
Figure 7.2  The Progress Party’s argumentation\textsuperscript{261}

![Pie chart showing the Progress Party’s argumentation](image)

Source: Author’s study

Figure 7.3  Norwegian parties’ argumentation (excluding the PP)

![Pie chart showing Norwegian parties’ argumentation](image)

Source: Author’s study

Figure 7.3 above shows the structure of the centre and left-wing parties/factions’ argumentation, which is very similar. If comparing it to the arguments in the newspaper debate (illustrated by Figure 7.1 above) and NtEU’s argumentation (see Figure 7.4 below), there is somewhat more emphasis on economic issues in the party discourse than in the newspaper and NtEU discourse. This is likely to be because the

\textsuperscript{261} Number of documents coded to each of the categories.
parties and their politicians need to appear as credible and responsible government alternatives, capable of maintaining the interests of the Norwegian people, whereas NtEU can afford to be more ideologically oriented. Or as SME’s Wegard Harsvik puts it, “it is not forbidden for Norwegian politicians to think about what is best for the Norwegian population”.

7.2.3.1 Nei til EU

NtEU’s “pillars” revolve around opposition to “power centres without effective democratic control”, protection of national sovereignty, viable local communities, the welfare state, full employment and the Sami people’s rights, and the battle against increased consumption and environmental destruction (Nei til EU 2006: 10). Moreover, its “Four reasons to say no to the EU” (Nei til EU 2010) are folkestyre, international solidarity, the environment and handlefrihet. Figure 7.4 shows how these arguments fit into the model.

**Figure 7.4** Nei til EU’s argumentation

![Pie chart showing the distribution of arguments: Viable local communities, welfare and employment for all (internal solidarity) external solidarity Human rights environment, and - democratic control/ folkestyre - national sovereignty handlefrihet]

Source: Author's study

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262 This was arguably also a difference between the parties and the LEs’ argumentation in the 1990s period.
263 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
7.2.3.2 The Parties

With the exception of one PP MP and three Labour MPs, all the MPs who responded to the qualitative question in the 2010 survey\textsuperscript{264} said that their main issue with the EU and membership was its impact on Norway’s sovereignty (råderett, suverenitet, selvstyre), democratic deficit and/or its “excessive bureaucracy”.\textsuperscript{265} As part of the democracy argument, representatives from all the parties used distance between the power and the people to illustrate the democratic problem. One PP politician responded that the “the EU has become a large bureaucratic organisation where decisions are taken far away from the inhabitants”, and a CDP MP expressed worries about the repercussions the trend towards remote democracy could potentially have more generally:

“Centralisation of decisions does, to a much too high degree, create an enormous distance from the decision maker to the citizen. Over time, it creates great powerlessness which weakens democracy and creates favourable conditions for growth of populism and different unhealthy currents”.

In addition to the political culture reasoning, several Labour, CDP and CP MPs cited the view that “the market has too high a priority” as one of their main arguments against the EU (and Norwegian membership). The MPs connected this “weakness” with postmaterialist values, as some argued that the four freedoms are promoted at the expense of solidarity with the weak in society (internal solidarity) or with the developing countries (external solidarity). For example, a CP MP stated “I am against the four freedoms which, in my opinion, lead to exploitation. They benefit only those who are strong at the point of departure”, and a Labour MP (among others) declared that the EU is “to a too large extent a fortress against the poor part of the world”. Other postmaterialist arguments put forward were the opportunity to have an independent position in environmental negotiations (CDP and SLP MPs), criticism of the EU’s “scandalous” fisheries policy, i.e. “massive overfishing of all

\textsuperscript{264} Question 8 (see Appendix D for details).
\textsuperscript{265} Eight SLP MPs, 10 Labour, eight CP, three CDP and 15 PP MPs
stocks” (PP MPs), and Norway’s position as a peace negotiator. Additionally, a SLP MP produced a slightly different peace-oriented argument:

“My main argument against is that I think it is unfavourable to organize the world in a bunch of large unions. It creates a concentration of power that I believe to be unfavourable both in terms of democracy and security policy. I have a stronger belief in ‘many nations in more balanced cooperation’.”

Very few MPs stated that agriculture, fisheries or the districts were among their primary arguments against the EU and membership. Considering the CP has its basis in the primary sectors, it is striking that none of the party’s six respondents mentioned any rural society arguments against the EU. In fact, only one SLP MP (out of six), two Labour MPs (out of eight), one CDP MP (out of two) said that the EU posing a threat to the rural industries and districts was very important to their positions on the EU.266 In an interview with the author,267 the CP’s Cathrine Strindin Amundsen explains the relative absence of the agricultural issue in the party’s literature with that

“there are some things that don’t have to be said as often as other things, because they are a given. You know, people know that [we think that the agricultural sector is important …], but there are also very many other things that the CP thinks are important. […] So, which message is it most important to spread? What is it people don’t know? […] And people feel that they know that the CP is preoccupied with agriculture. And internally in the party, people are more preoccupied with agriculture, it could be, than what is reflected by the time spent talking about it, because it is… that bedrock, we know lies at the base”.

266 In addition, another Labour MP and two PP MPs referred to fish in opposition to the EU’s fisheries policy or to losing sovereignty over the fish (seemingly more economically motivated).

267 Oslo, 13 January 2010.
This suggests that even if the CP and its politicians, and potentially politicians from the other middle and left-wing parties too, do not put much emphasis on the rural aspect of their argumentation, the argument is very much there, embedded in the base of their position against the EU. The diminishing focus on the agricultural argument against the EU is more likely to be a reflection of strategy than declining relevance; the Eurosceptics shift focus onto less widely known “no” arguments, as it is believed that the public knows that Norwegian agriculture would face problems if Norway joined the EU.

Table 7.3 Norwegian Eurosceptic MPs’ perceptions of the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which five of the following give the most accurate description of what you think the EU stands for?</th>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Democratic Deficit</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Free trade and liberalism</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Loss of Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>EMU</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Barriers to the rest of the world</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Federal Europe/a European superstate</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Economic community</td>
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<tr>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>CFSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>A peace project</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>A Europe of regions</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>A Europe of independent states</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>A higher form of democratic governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Principle of subsidiarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Insufficient focus on the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>Structural funds</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s 2010 elite survey

This interpretation is supported by the 2006 quantitative survey data, which show that almost nine out of ten Eurosceptic left-wing and centre MPs agree with the agriculture and fisheries argument and five out of ten agree with the argument that

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From question 5 in the 2010 survey (see Appendix D for details of the question). The figure shows only the top eight. n=32. The – and + stand for positively or negatively charged descriptors.
EU membership would be detrimental to Norwegian regional policy. Moreover, data from the 2010 survey show that almost two thirds of the Eurosceptic MPs associate the EU with centralisation, which could also indicate the desire to maintain a decentralised society in Norway in addition to resistance to concentration of power in Brussels.

Figure 7.5 Eurosceptic MPs’ support for “no” arguments

![Bar chart showing Eurosceptic MPs' support for “no” arguments](chart.png)

Source: Author’s 2006 elite survey

The quantitative data from both surveys back up the findings of the documentary analysis. Table 7.3 shows that to Norwegian Eurosceptic MPs, the EU most commonly signifies bureaucracy, democratic deficit, centralisation and loss of sovereignty, as well as free trade/liberalism and EMU (primarily the MPs from the red-green parties, who oppose the four freedoms and EMU). Furthermore, Figure 7.5 above shows the prevalence of political culture (green bars), rural society (orange bars) and postmaterialist arguments (purple bars), and the less central position of economic cost and cultural threat. The anti-bureaucracy argument is the most widely

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269 The PP is left out because of the dissimilar structure of its Euroscepticism compared to the other parties. This is also evident here, where only two and one out of ten PP MPs agreed with the statements respectively.

270 From question 6 in the 2006 survey (see Appendix D for details of the question). n=40.
supported arguments in all the parties.\textsuperscript{271} Otherwise, in the left-wing and middle parties, the argument most MPs agree with next is that of agriculture and fisheries. This is an interesting finding because the ranking of the primary sectors before postmaterialist values does not correspond with the frequency with which rural society arguments appear in the documents analysed.

This could mean that the primary sectors do play a larger part in Norwegian Euroscepticism than the arguments in the public debate indicate. This could be due to a carefulness on the part of the “no” side to avoid criticism for being “too narrow” in their outlook on the question, as it has been (and arguably still is) accused for defending only narrow interests. Third, fourth and fifth are sovereignty, foreign policy (indicator for external solidarity and peace promotion) and regional policy which over half of the MPs from all the centre and left-wing parties identified with.

By contrast, the PP’s MPs show a different structure in their argument support. After bureaucracy, PP MPs are most worried about losing sovereignty and the cost of membership. The PP was also the party with the highest proportion of MPs linking cultural threat to EU membership. Most commonly, the Eurosceptic PP MPs associated the EU with bureaucracy, centralisation and loss of sovereignty and except the CP, the party had a higher proportion of MPs viewing the EU as a federal Europe/a European superstate than the other parties.\textsuperscript{272}

7.3 Conclusion

Unlike the previous periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the post-1994 period was not a period of heightened debate. Between 1994 and 2010, there was little debate in the public sphere in Norway on the big questions concerning the Norway/EU relationship. Except a period between 2002 and 2003 when opinion polls indicated that the majority of the public had a positive attitude towards membership and there

\textsuperscript{271} It is worth noting that many of the supporters of membership also agreed with this argument in the survey.

\textsuperscript{272} For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the individual parties with reference to findings from the 2006 survey, see Skinner (2010: 305-9).
were signs of a new membership debate brewing, discussion of Norway’s form of association to the EU was practically absent. Many factors have been pointed to in order to explain the stalemate in the EU debate, but the “suicide clause”, which was designed to enable coalition cooperation between pro- and anti-membership parties (now used by governments on both sides of the left/right spectrum), and the fact that the current form of association, aptly termed “EEA plus” (Sverdrup 2009), represents the equilibrium for both the proponents and opponents of membership, were arguably the most important factors.

Notwithstanding the relative silence on the EU in the parliamentary arena, NtEU remained active in its protests against the EU adaptation participation in “EEA plus” has entailed; EEA directives such as the “gas directive”, the “food cosmetics directives”, the “life patent directive” and the “data retention directive” were particularly controversial. Among the most eager supporters of EU membership and the opponents of the EEA agreement, the current arrangements’ impact on Norwegian democracy has also been a topic of discussion. In addition, to the proponents, the lack of influence on decision-making in Brussels has been a massive issue, and to the anti-EEA Eurosceptics, the fact that the EEA veto has never been used is problematic. But outside these controversies, “EEA plus” seems to have worked well for Norway, and the plentiful EEA directives appear to have caused relatively few problems. Research into the impact of the EEA agreement concludes that in terms of policy since 1994, outside the areas of agriculture, fisheries and EMU, a “yes” instead of a “no” would have made little difference (Claes and Tranøy 1999b). Moreover, research also suggests that overall, EEA agreement or no EEA agreement would have made practically no difference in most Norwegian policy areas, except in typical infrastructure areas related to the Single Market (Claes and Tranøy 1999b) and that it has served to speed up deregulation and privatisation (Andersen 2000).

The second part of the chapter reported on the thematic analysis from the 1994-2010 period. It confirmed that the continuity observed in Norwegian Eurosceptic
argumentation from the 1960s and 1970s up until the 1990s can be extended to the 2000s. The analysis showed that the EU’s lack of democracy and the loss of handlefrihet are just as central to 21st century Norwegian Euroscepticism as 1960s, 1970s and 1990s Norwegian Euroscepticism, especially because many think that the EU’s “structural problems” have been exacerbated as the EU has developed. In the SLP’s Dag Seierstad’s words: “Yes, in my opinion, the development is negative. There is a... There is more of the things we don’t like, both on the democracy side of things, and the market liberalist side”. The criticism of the EU’s market liberalism remained as tightly linked to the political values and rural society argumentation as in the earlier periods, through its emphasis on internal and external solidarity, environmentalism and protection of the primary sectors and the districts. Additionally, human rights and Norway’s role as a peace nation were themes which featured prominently in the postmaterialist body of argumentation. Economic interest arguments, on the other hand, were marginal in the debate, and national identity argumentation was practically non-existent. Thus, it is unlikely that utilitarianism or national identity can be said to carry any weight as first order motivators for 21st century Norwegian Euroscepticism.

Furthermore, the chapter argued, like the chapter before it, that the structure of the argumentation in the newspaper/online debate, with its focus on VCR issues, mirror the Eurosceptic discourse found in the middle and left-wing parties/factions and in NtEU. The triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data in the party research showed that the Euroscepticism of the middle and left-wing parties/factions and their MPs are motivated by political values, political culture and ruralist concerns (VCR), but that the PP represents a different type of Euroscepticism. The documentary and survey data validated the tentative conclusions drawn in Chapter Six, namely that the Euroscepticism found in the PP is motivated by political culture and economic concerns. The nature and causality of Norwegian Euroscepticism will be discussed further in Chapter Nine, but first, the next chapter looks at public Euroscepticism across the decades.

273 Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
Chapter 8
Norwegian Public Euroscepticism 1961-2010

Since 1961, the majority of politicians, business elites and the media in Norway have been in favour of joining the EC/EU. However, after fifty years of pro-European elites striving for Norwegian membership, Norway is still not a member of the EU, all thanks to the population’s rejection of membership in the 1972 and 1994 referenda. If the Norwegian public had not been given a say on the matter, it is not only likely, but as good as certain that Norway would have been a member of the EU. Together, the Labour Party, Conservative Party and the PP (with the dissenters in the Eurosceptic parties) would have been able to achieve the three fourths majority required in the Storting to transfer sovereignty to a supranational community. For this reason, no comprehensive study of Norwegian Euroscepticism can be complete without an appraisal of public Euroscepticism, the scepticism which has ensured Norway’s outsider status for so long. Moreover, the findings from the documentary analysis, presented in Chapters Four to Seven, bid the question: to what extent are the concerns expressed in the public Eurosceptic discourse mirrored in public opinion? It is important to establish whether the political Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR) concerns are as central to the motivations of the common voter as they are to the Eurosceptic argumentation found in the political and newspaper debate, and whether economic interest and national identity concerns are as marginal. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to account for this third level of Norwegian Euroscepticism, and investigate whether the findings of the documentary analysis can be extended to the mass level.

The first part of the chapter deals with the development of public opinion on EU membership through the last fifty years, phase by phase from the 1960s up until the 1994-2010 period. The second part reports on the empirical testing of the theories derived from the literature and the documentary analysis on the 1994 referendum survey.
8.1 Public Opinion across the Decades: 1961-2010

8.1.1 Public Opinion in Phase One: the 1960s

Before the first debate on EEC membership started in 1961, the vast majority of the Norwegian population did not know much about European integration and thus, most voters had no opinion on either EFTA or the EEC issue (Allen 1979; Rokkan and Valen 1964; Hanssen and Sandegren 1969; interview with Dag Seierstad). In fact, in opinion polls in the autumn of 1961, nearly a third of respondents declared that they had not heard of the EEC (Allen 1979: 50; Rokkan and Valen 1964: 236), and a 1959 poll on public attitudes towards EFTA revealed that 62 percent had no opinion (Frøland 1998: 8).

Table 8.1 Public opinion on Norwegian EEC membership (percent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month &amp; Year of Poll</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rokkan and Valen (1964: 236)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1962</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanssen and Sandegren (1969: 56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1961</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1962</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1962</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of respondents having heard/read about the EEC

Table 8.2 Voters against EEC entry (percent, no opinion excluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>September 1961 poll</th>
<th>February 1962 poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist People’s Party</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rokkan and Valen (1964: 236)

At the peak of the EEC membership campaign in 1962, however, two-thirds of participants in an opinion poll were able to state a preference on the issue, and the majority of these did not want membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). Hanssen and Sandegren (1969) report slightly different results from 1962 opinion polls, with
marginal majorities in favour of the “yes” side (see Table 8.1). These inconsistencies notwithstanding, all the polls show that by the spring of 1962, public opinion had formed to a much larger degree, and although the increase in opposition to EEC membership was particularly noticeable among the middle party voters, all the parties saw their electorate grow more Eurosceptic (see Table 8.2).

In their study of public opinion data, Rokkan and Valen (1964) found that the voters of the CDP and LP had contrasting preferences on the EEC issue according to the urban/rural cleavage: rural CDP voters and urban Liberal voters teamed up in opposition to EEC entry and vice versa. They further argued that the southern and western regions mobilized their opposition to the EEC in defence of territorial and cultural autonomy. The only party in the southern and western regions without a “no” majority was the LP, but as Rokkan and Valen point out, this could be because the main liberal newspaper in the west advocated entry and the radical newspaper in Oslo, Dagbladet, ended up on a “no” stance. Among Labour Party voters, EEC opposition was fiercest in the largest cities and the sparsely populated areas, and among Conservative voters, the only groups which mobilized against membership were the self-employed and rural employers. It is likely that these groups feared negative economic consequences of membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). However, Rokkan and Valen (1964: 200-1) argue that for

“Liberals and Christians [...] the motives for resistance were clearly cultural and ideological rather than economic: they continued an ingrained tradition of opposition to central authority. [...] The old alliance of the 1880s tended to reaffirm itself: the urban radicals aligned themselves with the farmers and with religious dissidents in the countryside in their attack on central bureaucracy.”

Although only argumentation of the section of the Norwegian population which engages in letters to the editor was analysed in Chapter Four, interestingly, it does not seem unreasonable to extend the applicability of the findings to the general
public. If one accepts Rokkan and Valen’s (1964) conclusions, it seems that a mix of political values and cultural, geo-historical/political and utilitarian factors were at play in shaping public opposition to EEC membership in 1962.

The poll data presented above indicate that in 1961-62, i.e. the early stages of the national debate on Europe integration, wide-ranging popular mobilization was yet to take place. Nevertheless, Frøland (1998: 6) argues that if negotiations had been initiated in 1962 and/or 1967 and put to the public vote, “no-vote majorities on both occasions are not only imaginable, but quite likely” even if Britain and Denmark had become members. Hanssen and Sandegren’s observations also support this view, as they highlight the increasing intensity of the debate after the Storting’s decision to apply for EEC membership in 1962:

“[…] the announcement that a referendum would be held did not calm the waters. On the contrary, it served as a challenge to both sides to continue the heated debate. It became more important than ever to engage public opinion, to secure the support for the policy advocated by the two sides.”

(1969: 54, original italics, see also Allen 1979: 51)

This indicates that had the issue been allowed to mature in the population beyond January 1963 when De Gaulle put an end to the negotiations, a referendum campaign would have been likely to prompt popular mass mobilization on par with that seen in the 1970-2 period.

8.1.2 Public Opinion in Phase Two: 1970-1972

When the issue of EEC membership resurfaced in 1967, few people believed that a new round of negotiations would get under way at all,274 and because of the “theoretical character” this gave the issue, it “aroused little public debate and only feeble extra-parliamentary opposition” to membership (Allen 1979: 55). The issue came back onto the agenda with the Hague summit in December 1969, but the

274 This was due to the anticipation of a second French veto of British membership.
debate on the issue of membership “seriously picked up only toward the end of 1970” and polling activity on the issue only saw a notable increase from the beginning of 1971 (Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973: 228). As Figure 8.1 shows, the “no” majority persisted in the 12 months from September 1971 up until the referendum. However, the gap between the two sides did narrow, particularly up until January 1972, when the negotiations were completed. After this, opinion seemed to stabilize, although research show that individual-level changes were more commonplace than the aggregate-level data suggest (see Hellevik and Gleditsch 1973: 228).

**Figure 8.1** Intention to vote “no” (percentage, no opinion excluded)*

* The question asked in the polls was not identical for the whole period, but always referred to a dichotomous choice between “yes” or “no” to full membership (see source for details)
Source: Hellevik et al. (1975: 38)

As Table 8.3 shows, polls conducted in the early 1970s unveiled that people living in the peripheries and/or in rural areas, the lower educated, the under 29s, people on low incomes, primary industry employees, industrial workers, the self-employed, pensioners/ students and left-wing and middle party voters were more likely to be
Table 8.3  “No” voters in percent of those who had taken a stance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo, Akershus</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Østf., Vestf., Buskerud</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telem., Agder, Rogaland</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppl., Hedm., Trøndelag</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hord., Mø. og R., S. og F.</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordl., Troms, Finnmark</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City/countryside</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countryside</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory ed.</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary ed.</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>46.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income (NOK)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>up to 12 000</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-19 000</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 000</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 000</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 000</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 000+</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profession</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionary</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner, student</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sector of employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Commun.</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner, student</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Party today**

| Communist Party | 96.4 | 87.2 | 92.0 | 88.7 |
| Socialist People’s Party | 94.2 | 93.2 | 94.1 | 91.7 |
| Labour Party | 70.2 | 52.3 | 43.7 | 31.7 |
| Liberal Party | 61.7 | 56.0 | 58.9 | 60.2 |
| Christian Democrats | 82.0 | 79.6 | 73.4 | 76.3 |
| Centre Party | 94.5 | 94.3 | 94.6 | 91.8 |
| Conservatives | 25.1 | 16.8 | 13.4 | 7.7 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of polls (N)</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7,642</td>
<td>7,923</td>
<td>11,499</td>
<td>7,104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Translated from Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977: 316-7). The category “party 1969” is left out, as “party today” is more relevant to the period in question.

opposed to EC entry. Gender, on the other hand, did not seem to have a significant impact on the vote.

In the months following the referendum, for the first time in history, the polls consistently returned “yes” majorities. The only group with a higher percentage of “no” voters after the 1972 referendum compared to one year before was the highest educated, and the only groups with relatively stable “no” percentages across the period were the officially Eurosceptic parties’ voters, particularly the SPP, LP and CP voters. The Labour Party over halved its proportion of “no” voters and the Conservative Party’s “no” voter percentage dropped by almost three quarters in the same period.

The referendum was held on 25 September 1972. With a turnout of 79 percent, the Norwegian citizens ignored the government’s plea for a “yes”; 53.5 percent voted against membership, and only 46.5 percent voted in favour. According to Valen’s (1973) analysis of the referendum result, the referendum breathed new life into cleavages which had not been active in national elections for years. The centre/periphery and urban/rural cleavages were particularly salient, but also the three counter-culture cleavages (teetotalism, pietism and rural language) and the
Figure 8.2  The 1972 referendum: the geography of the “no” vote

EC Referendum, 1972

NO

Source: ElectoralGeography.com (Kireev 2010)
left/right cleavage were reflected in the result. As Figure 8.2 above shows, the central counties of Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold and Buskerud, were the only counties with “yes” majorities, and the peripheries, particularly the North and North-west/Middle, were strong in their opposition. All the three Northern counties, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, achieved over 70 percent “no” votes, as did the north-western county Møre and Romsdal. The more modest “no” percentages in Hordaland and Sør-Trøndelag illustrate the salience of the urban/rural cleavage, as these two counties are home to the second and third largest Norwegian cities respectively, Bergen and Trondheim. In Sognen and Archer’s (1995: 393) words: “[s]upport for membership increased with urbanization and in densely populated areas, while it decreased in smaller and sparsely populated communities and in those dependent on the primary sector.” The contrasts were strong: whereas only 6.5 percent of the inhabitants of the northern fishing island Røst and Træna voted yes, in the Oslo region and the cities of Moss (by the Oslo Fjord), Stavanger and Bergen (both on the west coast) the “yes” votes were 67, 66, 60 and 59 percent respectively (Brox 1972: 771). In addition to Rokkan’s (1967) six traditional territorial, commodity market, labour market and socio-cultural cleavages, the referendum (and preceding opinion polls) revealed another divide: the gap between the mass and the elite. This becomes very apparent when the above 1971 opinion poll results (68.8 percent “no”) are compared with the 83 percent who stated a preference for membership (out of three alternatives) in an elite survey in 1967 (Gleditsch 1972: 797) or the 25 percent of the MPs who voted against membership in June 1971, or when the public “no” vote of 53.5 percent is compared to the 30 percent of MPs who it was thought were against entry in September 1972 (see Table 5.1 in Chapter Five). According to Hellevik and Gleditsch (1973: 234), the anomaly was particularly evident in the trade unions and the Labour Party, as the leadership failed “to realize how its position on the EEC issue ran directly counter to established interests and ideologies”

The 1972 Referendum Study, conducted by SSB in two parts (the first just before and the second just after the referendum, N = 2,662), confirm most of the tendencies

275 See Table 3.1 in Chapter Three for more details on the six cleavages.
found in the opinion polls before and after the referendum (as displayed in Table 8.3 above); apart from the parts of the population living in the peripheries and rural areas, people employed in the primary sector, students and the supporters of the CP, SPP and CDP were the strongest “no” groups in the referendum. All these groups had “no” proportions in excess of 80 percent. In addition, industrial workers and LP voters had more modest “no” majorities (55 and 56 percent respectively), education levels and income were negatively correlated to a “no”, and there were no significant gender differences in the vote, as 51.8 percent of men and 51.5 percent of women in the referendum survey had voted “no”. The only group which returned different results in the Referendum Study compared to the opinion polls was the self-employed, of whom only 37 percent voted “no” in the referendum compared to an average of 67 percent in the polls. It should be noted that this discrepancy is most likely to be due to differences in categorization of profession groupings.²⁷⁶


As mentioned above, immediately after the referendum in 1972, the stable “no” majorities in the lead-up to 25 September turned into “yes” majorities in the polls. However, this was only a passing trend; when the trade agreement with the EC entered into force on 1 July 1973, less than a year later, the “no” side reclaimed its leading position in the polls. Allen (1979: 182) writes that within a year of the parliamentary vote on the trade agreement on 24 May 1973, “the debate had almost ceased, in public at least [...] and by the time most industrial trade had been freed in July 1977 the debate belonged to history for most people”. With the EC issue removed from the public agenda, support for EC membership declined throughout the 1970s and 1980s, up until the issue came up again in 1989 with the end of the Cold War and the commencement of the EFTA states’ negotiations with the EC about access to the Single Market. An element of public opinion in the period from 1972 to 1993 worth noting (see Figure 8.3 below) is that the proportion of undecided voters was low during the period of when the EC issue was not salient (1973-1981). In other words, voters were less hesitant to express a preference on membership

²⁷⁶ All the data in this paragraph are taken from Knudsen’s (1989: 47-9) tables, except those on gender, which were taken directly from the Referendum Study data set.
when they considered the issue unimportant, or when they knew that their
decision/answer would of little consequence. However, as soon as the issue came
back onto the agenda (1989-1991), uncertainty became more widespread.
Nevertheless, the proportion of undecided voters decreased again as the referendum
approached, with only 11 percent not turning out to vote on 28 November 1994.277

Figure 8.3   Public opinion on EC/EU membership (1972-1993)*

* The data are from the 1972 referendum and 1973-93 election surveys. The question asked
how the respondent would vote if there was a new referendum on membership tomorrow.

Figure 8.3 makes it clear that the “yes” side gained ground in the polls in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Support almost doubled from 1981 to 1989, and the opinion
climate was particularly favourable for the “yes” side in the autumn of 1991 and
spring of 1992, before the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (Aardal and
the Norwegian “no” side an advantage. In Aardal and Jenssen’s (1995: 32) words, the
Danish “no” gave the Norwegian EU opponents “a definitive and – as was to
become apparent – final upper hand”.

277 Note that the “don’t know” percentage from the 1993 election survey (17.1 percent, showed in
Figure 8.3) does not correspond to the results from opinion polls from the same period (Figure 8.4),
which indicate that the “don’t know” proportion throughout 1993 was between 20 and 25 percent.
Although public opinion was divided into three nearly equal parts (no/yes/don’t know) in 1991 and the first half of 1992, from June 1992, the “no” side assumed a leading position in the polls. As Figure 8.4 illustrates, this position was further consolidated in the autumn of 1993 (Bjørklund 1994: 94-6), when the “no” parties firmly put the EU issue on the agenda in the general election campaign, much to the dismay of the incumbent Labour leadership who tried to avoid any discussion of the EU and insisted that it was not a relevant topic for the election.

**Figure 8.4** Public opinion poll results on EU membership (1993-1994)*

* Average of monthly polls from MMI, Opinion and Norsk Gallup.
Source: Aardal and Jenssen (1995: 35)

Before the referendum, the trends in opinion data showed few changes in the opposition levels of different groups from 1972. Socio-economic variables, such as education, income and profession had the same “effect” on membership preference as they did 20 years earlier, as did region and party affiliation (Bjørklund 1994: 99-102). Nevertheless, there were some changes; there were new gaps in the gender, public/private sector and age groups. Whereas there were no significant differences between the preferences of men and women and public and private sector employees in 1972, by the early 1990s, women and public sector employees...
(regardless of gender) were much more likely to be Eurosceptic than men and private sector employees (Bjørklund 1994: 99). In age, the opposite development could be observed, from a significant relationship between the young and a “no” in 1972 to a lack of relationship in the early 1990s, with only a higher percentage of sceptics in the “70 plus” category (Bjørklund 1994: 97). Curiously, survey data also show that in 1989, support for the EC was higher among first-time voters than any other age group, but as Aardal and Jenssen (1995: 32) write, “the pro-EC wind among the youth must nevertheless have subsided quickly. A nationwide survey [...] showed that EC opposition had gained considerable ground in the relevant age group”. One possible explanation for this pro-EC wind among the youngest voters in 1989 could be that it was an immediate response to the changes in the international environment, an almost idealistic “yes” to a unified Europe after the fall of the iron curtain, without further reflection on what EC, let along EU membership entailed. Wegard Harsvik, who had a central position in the Labour Party’s youth wing, AUF, in the early 1990s and was later active in SME, explains how he went from a “no” to a “yes” position in 1989 and back to a “no” in the early 1990s:278

“Many of us who were a part of a very intense EU debate in the beginning of the ‘90s in AUF went... we went through a kind of development where you... you started with a kind of involuntary reflex: ‘well, the EC, we are against that’, you know? And if you are a socialist and a northerner, then you are definitely against the EU. But then the wall fell and Pink Floyd plays in Berlin and so on, and at one point I was personally an EU supporter, and I was just about to join [the] organization ‘Young European Federalists’ [...]. And it was in a way based on a kind of emotional ‘but we have to take part and go in and influence’. And then you had a phase when we... we... many were genuinely in doubt, and we had study circles and we read treaties and so on [...]. Then you had the ‘yes, but we will not join a beautiful thought, we shall prospectively join a concrete organization,

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278 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
which has this and this and this as its foundation, which is moving towards an ever closer union’. [...] There were many of those who later became central figures on the ‘no’ side in AUF and the Labour Party who went through exactly this development. [...] In other words, when the EU debate started, you were originally opposed, and then you were excited and fascinated by the vision and the spirit of the age, and then you had a review of what this... what the EU actually was, and then you ended up becoming an EU opponent.”

Harsvik’s account of his experience with the process within the Labour Party and its youth wing seems to suggest that early on in the 1989-1994 period, many people who were “no” voters at heart were, in his words, “emotionally attracted to the idea of a united Europe”, but that as they learned more about the EU, they doubled back on their “yes” position. Maastricht and the developments towards a European Union became perhaps particularly hard to swallow, as indicated by the “no” side’s persistent lead in the polls after the Danish referendum in June 1992.

The Norwegian referendum on membership took place on 28 November 1994, at a time when the Norwegian economy had already started recovering from the economic recession of the 1990s (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001; Bjørklund 1997b). The referendum was the last of the four referenda on EU membership held that year, with the Austrians going to the ballot box first, followed by the Finns, the Swedish and finally, the Norwegians (see Table 8.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13 November</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fitzmaurice (1995: 226)
The order of the referenda was not coincidental; it was a strategic decision made by the Nordic governments to synchronize the referenda so the countries considered most likely to achieve a positive result would go first, and ultimately create a “domino-effect” of “yes” outcomes (e.g. Saglie 2000a; Jahn and Storsved 1995). The domino strategy, which was designed to play on voters’ concerns about isolation and the future of Nordic relations, was successful to some extent, in spite of its failure to produce the desired fourth yes to membership; in Norway, the domino effect, which acquired the term “the Swedish Suction”, is thought to have boosted the “yes” vote by four percentage points (Aardal and Jenssen 1995: 38).

Comparisons of referendum surveys from the three Nordic countries which voted on EU membership in 1994 show that Norwegian voters were better informed about the EU than the populations of Sweden and Finland (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001). Saglie (2000b) believes that this could be due to Norway’s history of a previous campaign and referendum, the fact that the Norwegian campaign lasted longer than the Swedish and the Finnish, and the issue’s high degree of politicization and salience in Norway.279 The fact that 62 and 53 percent of voters in June and September 1993 (respectively) ranked the EU issue as the most important or second most important issue for their vote in the 1993 election (Valen 1994: 172) indicates that the majority of Norwegians did not form their opinions on EU membership according to party preference or other proxies (see Anderson 1998), but regarded the EU issue a definite first-order issue, one which, quite the contrary, had the potential to determine party preference. The strong politicization of the EU issue also runs counter to Inglehart’s (1970, 1977) cognitive mobilization theory, which holds that people who have more knowledge about European integration and are more politically involved, are more likely to support the EU. Data from the referendum survey show that the differences between “yes” and “no” voters in terms of political interest and involvement were negligible; “yes” voters were marginally more likely to consider themselves very interested in politics generally and to have engaged in political persuasion more

279 The latter is linked to high levels of voter interest in the subject (Jenssen and Listhaug 2001).
frequently than “no” voters, while “no” voters were more likely to have signed a campaign list or taken part in a demonstration (see Table 8.5).

**Table 8.5** Correlations between EU vote and political interest/involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General political interest</th>
<th>Tried to convince someone politically</th>
<th>Signed a petition/campaign list</th>
<th>Partaken in a political demonstration</th>
<th>Written about politics in the paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What did you vote?</td>
<td>.069**</td>
<td>.064**</td>
<td>-.100**</td>
<td>-.125**</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant on the .001 level.**
Source: 1994 Referendum Study

Moreover, the survey displays even weaker correlations between the vote and knowledge about the EU. As Table 8.6 shows, although the correlation between basic knowledge about the EU and the “no” vote is negative and statistically significant (i.e. “no” voters were more likely to get the questions about the EU wrong), the coefficient is very low – indicating a weak relationship. Furthermore, the correlation between self-reported knowledge and the vote is non-significant. Besides, the aggregate results in the Nordic applicant countries could be taken as further evidence against the cognitive mobilization thesis, as the countries with populations less educated about the EU were those that returned “yes” majorities whereas Norway, apparently with a better informed population and a higher degree of politicization of the issue, voted “no”.

**Table 8.6** Correlations between EU vote and EU knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spearman's Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic knowledge about EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What did you vote?</td>
<td>-.044*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level.
Source: SSB’s 1994 referendum study
In spite of the “yes” camp gaining ground in the last few months before the referendum, the 1994 referendum outcome was the same as in 1972: the people said “no” to EU membership. 52.2 percent of the 89 percent who used their suffrage, voted “no”, and as illustrated by Figure 8.5, again the strongest opposition to EU membership was found in the northernmost counties of Norway as well as in sparsely populated areas. Like in 1972, the pro-EU sentiment was only dominant in the major cities, Oslo and the surrounding region, showing the clear centre-periphery and urban-rural contrasts in the popular vote, once more reflecting not

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280 Of which, the last month’s gains have been mainly attributed to the effects of the “Swedish Suction” (Aardal and Jensen 1995).

281 Bergen and Trondheim also had “yes” majorities, but with smaller margins than the Oslo area (51.1 and 53.7 percent respectively compared with Oslo’s 66.6) (Bjørkland 1997b: 178; SSB 1995).

282 The only exception to this clear centre-periphery pattern were a limited number of rural, export-dependent and industry-dominated municipalities, such as the Årdal and Sunndal municipalities (Pettersen et al. 1996; Bjørkland 1997b; SSB 1995).
only the strength of the pro-EU sentiment in and around Oslo, but also the
dimension of territorial opposition in Norwegian society and politics.

As Figure 8.6 below shows, the fluctuations in the different counties’ results were
minimal: only five counties saw the yes vote increase by more than four percentage
points (Akershus, Møre og Romsdal, Østfold, Oppland and Nord-Trøndelag), and
two decrease by the same (Hordaland and Finnmark). This stability could also been
seen on the sub-county level: an astonishing 95 percent of the “no” municipalities\textsuperscript{283}
from 1972 produced the same outcome in 1994, 80 percent of those who voted in the
1972 referendum voted the same in 1994, and 95 percent of those who stated a
position on the issue before the campaign started in August 1994, did not change

\textbf{Figure 8.6} Change in the vote from 1972 to 1994

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig8.6}
\caption{Change in comparison to the EC referendum in 1972}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Change in the number of YES/NO votes from 1972 to 1994.}
\item \textbf{In percentage points per county.}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Country average:}
1.3 percentage points increase in the
number of YES votes from 46.5\% in
1972 to 47.8\% in 1994

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{4.0 - 5.3\% increase in NO votes}
\item \textbf{0.1 - 2.0\% increase in NO votes}
\item \textbf{0.1 - 1.9\% increase in YES votes}
\item \textbf{2.0 - 3.9\% increase in YES votes}
\item \textbf{4.0 - 5.9\% increase in YES votes}
\item \textbf{6.0 - 9.2\% increase in YES votes}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Source: Statistisk Sentralsyke}

\textsuperscript{283} 435 municipalities in total.
The stability in the voting pattern from 1972 to 1994 has made observers call the 1994 vote “a carbon copy” or “a blueprint” of the 1972 referendum (e.g. Bjørklund 1997a: 154). This stability is quite a remarkable feature of Norwegian public Euroscepticism, considering the substantial rotation of the electorate which takes place during the course of 22 years. It seems that the changes that occured in the Norwegian electorate, Norwegian society284 and the EU itself between the two referenda did not have any significant impact on the development of Norwegian Euroscepticism. However, the stability of public Euroscepticism is perhaps not so surprising when taking the continuity in the public debate into account; exactly the same issues dominated the Eurosceptic discourse in the 1990s debate as in the 1960s and 1970s debates, and many of these were issues of principle (e.g. not giving up sovereignty) which would not change over the course of 22 years, and others were issues that tend to mobilize specific parts of the population, most specifically the in the labour movement, the peripheries and rural areas.

8.1.4 Public Opinion in Phase Four: 1994-2010
Opinion polls between the 1994 referendum and the end of 2010 did for the most part return “no” majorities. Only sporadically, most notably a couple of short periods in 1998 and 1999-2000 and a lengthy period in 2002-2003, there were “yes” majorities in the polls (see e.g. Grünfeld and Sverdrup 2005: 41). In contrast to the aftermath of the 1972 referendum when support for EC membership rose, immediately after the 1994 referendum, the “no” side consolidated its position in the polls. Between 1995 and 1997, over 60 percent said that they did not want membership and less than 30 percent said they were in favour of membership. The proportion of undecided voters decreased from the 11 percent who abstained in the referendum to around or below five percent for the remainder of the 1990s (Svåsand 2002: 343).

284 Between 1972 and 1994 Norway had become more urbanized, the primary sector had declined (from 12 percent to 6 percent of the workforce employed in the sector), the 1970s had seen a rapid development of the petroleum sector, education levels had increased as a result of the expanded Norwegian education system (Pettersen et al. 1996: 262), and the public sector had expanded significantly (from 27.5 percent of total employment in 1972 to 40.7 percent in 1990) (Bjørklund 1997a: 146).
In the last two years of the decade and the early 2000s the “yes” side made some headway in the polls and even took the lead in some periods (see Figure 8.7). One explanation for this change in opinion could be that many viewed the developments within the EU at this time, namely the opening of negotiations with the Eastern European accession countries285 and the introduction of the Euro in a favourable light and wanted Norway to be part of them.

Figure 8.7 Development of public opinion on EU membership, June 1999-Dec 2010*

* Average of opinion polls
Source: Bernt Aardals hjemmeside (Aardal 2010b)

However, the fluctuations in the polls in the late 1990s and early 2000s have been most popularly explained by what Grünfeld and Sverdrup (2005: 40) term “armchair knowledge”: that economic downturns equal upturns for the “yes” side. However, Grünfeld and Sverdrup’s tests of the economic voting model on time series data from 1989-1994 give inconclusive findings. Although they report robust positive

285 Accession negotiations were opened with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia on 31 March 1998, and with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on 13 October 1999. The negotiations were concluded in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty was signed in April 2003 (European Commission 2010). These events naturally received attention in Norwegian media.
relationships between EU opposition and employment rates and GDP growth, they find no meaningful relationship between EU support and for example interest rates – the latter having been the assumed cause of the 1998-99 upswing for the “yes” side. Even the long 2002-2003 period with a “yes” majority is inconsistent with the hypothesis that support for EU membership is primarily strong during economic downturns. Besides, people have limited knowledge of macroeconomics, as critics of economic voting models point out, although “the public’s micro-observations pretty much square with the macro-facts” when it comes to unemployment (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000: 118). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the average voter has knowledge not only of the growth rates and unemployment rates of his/her own country, but also know how they compare to those in the EU. Alternative explanations are therefore needed.

Some commentators put the increasing support for membership at the turn of the millennium down to a “growing awareness of the shortcomings and the limitations of the EEA agreement” (e.g. Traavik 2003, also see section 7.1.2 in Chapter Seven), while others have pointed to factors such as greater sympathy for the EU in the context of the Iraq war, with France and Germany leading the opposition to the US invasion and a positive reaction to the opening up to eastward enlargement (e.g. Archer 2005: 181). From this perspective, Grünfeld and Sverdrup’s (2005) additional finding that support for EU membership increases in periods when there is much media focus on EU-related issues is interesting. This is because it is consistent with the hypothesis that the Norwegian public becomes more positive towards EU membership when big events or developments happen in the EU, such as the introduction of the Euro (1999 and 2002) and eastward enlargement (1998, 1999, 2002-03). As it is hard to imagine EU membership gaining support from negative news coverage, the idea that EU support is positively correlated with media coverage of EU-related issues suggests that positive media coverage of EU-related events and issues is much higher than of negative media coverage in Norway. This is not unlikely to be the case, as most Norwegian newspapers are pro-European in their orientation. Besides, the media have received criticism for being sloppy and
uncritical in their coverage of EU affairs (Harper 2010b; Kristoffersen, cited by Harper 2010b). The fact that the “yes” side’s lead in the polls started dwindling after the Swedish rejection of the Euro and the EU’s internal trouble in 2003286 and was absent in the second half of the 2000s when pro-EU journalists had more EU defeats than victories to report287 lends support to this notion. Archer (2005: 186, 194) also supports the view that public opinion greatly depends on the image of the EU in Norway. He argues that if a third vote again returns a “no”, “it will mirror not just Norwegian desire for autonomy, […] but more a reflection on the state of the EU” (2005: 186).

The EEA agreement is an element of Norway’s relationship with the EU which the public never has been able to vote on, and polls measuring support for the agreement are few and far between. However, the agreement seems to be popular among the Norwegian people. An opinion poll, conducted on 24 April 2008, indicated that 57 percent would vote in favour of the agreement should there be a referendum tomorrow, while only 23 percent would vote “no”. 20 percent were undecided (Olaussen 2008; Ryen 2008288). The same poll showed that 52 percent were against membership, while 35 percent were for. There are different interpretations of these poll results. Ryen (2008), argues that

“it clearly shows that the Norwegian people, who do not wish to take part in such a comprehensive and supranational cooperation as the EU is, see that close and predictable relations with the Union is necessary”.

Conversely, the chairman of NtEU, Olaussen (2008), argues that the poll question could have easily have been understood by respondents as a choice between the EEA agreement or EU membership, and that support for the EEA would be much

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286 This was over EMU’s stability pact and disagreements over the constitution (Archer 2005).
287 The French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the Irish voting “no” to the Lisbon Treaty and the debacle with the Greek economic collapse were some of the main EU headlines in this period.
288 Ryen’s reports of the poll’s results do not add up (57.7 percent “yes”, 23.1 “no” and 23.1 “don’t know”), so Olaussen’s figures are used here.
lower if people were presented with “a third, realistic alternative to the EEA and EU membership”. This was also his response to similar poll results at the end of 2010 (56.2 percent in favour of the EEA). He stated that “I would also have said no to abandoning the EEA if I thought that the alternative was EU membership” (cited by Brøndbo 2010).

So the question which is important to a prospective rematch on Norwegian EU membership is: which way is public opinion likely to go if the EEA agreement is scrapped? To be sure, if the EU membership issue resurfaces as a result of the discontinuation of the EEA agreement, the debate has the potential to take on a very different character compared to the 1994 debate, when the EEA agreement was there to fall back on. Interestingly, Sverdrup (2008) mentions that opinion polls in the spring of 2008 showed that Norwegians wanted less, rather than more European integration if the EEA agreement was to disappear. However, one year later, a TNS Gallup poll indicated that a majority wanted membership if the EEA agreement was discontinued (Røen 2009). Whereas the latter poll showed a healthy majority against EU membership if the EEA agreement is sustained: 57.3 percent “no”, 33.2 “yes” and 9.4 “don’t know”; in the event of no EEA agreement, 47.2 percent responded that they preferred membership, 41 percent that they wanted a looser association form and 11.8 said that they did not know (Røen 2009). Nevertheless, although these statistics seem promising for the “yes” camp, it is important to remember the difference between the opinion poll context and the referendum context. Responding to hypothetical questions about an issue which is not political salient at that particular time is very different from voting in an actual referendum on an issue which has been debated openly for months preceding that referendum. After all, history has shown that the “yes” side only makes headway in the polls when the membership issue is off the agenda. As soon as the EU debate makes a comeback, opposition to the EU is mobilized (Svåsand 2002: 342).
8.2 Norwegian Public Euroscepticism: Testing the Five Theories Empirically

In the foregoing chapters, the thesis showed that political Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR) arguments were extremely central to the Norwegian Eurosceptic newspaper and party discourse throughout the 50 year period under study. It is in other words clear that the VCR themes are very resilient features of Norwegian Euroscepticism, and they are, considering their omnipresence in the debate(s) on Europe in Norway, very likely to have had a profound effect on how the electorate viewed their own and Norway’s position, how they viewed the EU and membership, and how they judged their own value priorities when they voted in the 1972 and 1994 referenda. However, to be able to ascertain to what extent the electorate was coloured by what went on in the public debate on the issue, or reflect the same concerns as were displayed in the party arena and in the largest daily newspaper through fifty years of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is necessary to subject the VCRUNI theories to statistical testing on a nationally representative sample of the Norwegian population. The theoretical underpinnings of each of these five explanations of Norwegian Euroscepticism can be found in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four, and will not be repeated here. However, it is necessary to formulate a series of testable hypotheses for the statistical analysis. These are presented in Table 8.7 below. Details of measurement and a discussion of other methodological considerations can be found in Appendix H.

8.2.1 The Results: VCR, Interest or Identity?

The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 8.8.\textsuperscript{289} They show that the sovereignty, \textit{folkeestyre} and federal Europe variables are statistically significantly correlated in the expected direction with Euroscepticism, and that concern about

\textsuperscript{289} Although both the unstandardized coefficients and the standardized coefficients are reported in Table 8.8 and the analysis is based on an interpretation of both sets of coefficients, the results discussion will primarily refer to the Beta values (standardized coefficients), because they are all measured in standard deviation units and are therefore directly comparable. The Beta values reveal “the number of standard deviations that the outcome will change as a result of one standard deviation change in the predictor” (Field 2005: 193). The unstandardized coefficients will be commented on in the instances this is appropriate.
Table 8.7 Regression analysis hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Formulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political culture</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1 (sovereignty)</td>
<td>The higher a citizen’s concern for national sovereignty, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 (folkestyre)</td>
<td>The higher a citizen’s concern for the Norwegian folkestyre, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3 (federal Europe)</td>
<td>The more strongly opposed a citizen is to the EU turning into a Federal Europe, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postmaterialist values</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 (environment)</td>
<td>The higher a citizen’s concern for the environment, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 (gender equality)</td>
<td>The higher a citizen’s concern for gender equality issues, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6 (income equality)</td>
<td>The more reluctant a citizen is to accept income equality, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7 (external solidarity)</td>
<td>The more concerned a citizen is about external solidarity, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8 (neo-liberalism)</td>
<td>The more opposed a citizen is to neo-liberalist economic thinking, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural society</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H9 (districts protection)</td>
<td>The higher a citizen’s concern for the districts, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10 (agriculture and fisheries, AGFI)</td>
<td>The more negatively a citizen assesses the effects of membership on the agriculture and fisheries sectors, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utilitarianism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11 (egocentric utilitarianism)</td>
<td>Citizens who believe that their personal economic situation will worsen as a result of joining the EU are more likely to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12 (sociotropic utilitarianism)</td>
<td>The more negatively a citizen assesses the effects of membership on the employment and the national economy, the more likely he/she is to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H13 (national attachment/pride)</td>
<td>Citizens with a strong sense of attachment to and pride in their country are more likely to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H14 (xenophobia)</td>
<td>Citizens who exhibit xenophobic attitudes are more likely to be Eurosceptic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.8 The impact of VCR on Norwegian Euroscepticism

<table>
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<th>Empirical Variable</th>
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<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Beta (Std. Coef.)</th>
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<td>Peripheral location</td>
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<td>.104</td>
<td>.035</td>
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</table>

N 1,716
Adjusted R² .703
F 185.73**

** Significant at the .01 level; significant at the .05 level.
Source: 1994 Referendum Study regression analysis

sovereignty is the strongest predictor of Norwegian Euroscepticism out of all those included in the model. The high coefficients for all the political culture variables suggest that political culture concerns are not only very central to the public

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290 The statistical package used was PASW 18.

291 Although the standardized coefficients for sovereignty and sociotropic utilitarianism indicate that the two variables have a similar effect, their unstandardized coefficients reveal otherwise. If multiplying the standard deviation of the independent variables by their regression coefficients (this is done to see what the impact is on the dependent variable if an average change in an independent variable is made), 1.827 and .831 is returned for sovereignty and sociotropic utilitarianism respectively.
Eurosceptic discourse in Norway, as established in the previous chapters, but that they are one of the key elements also of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism. The same goes for rural society concerns; the model shows strong support for both H9 (districts protection) and H10 (AGFI), elements which were also very visible in the public debate.

Nevertheless, when it comes to postmaterialist values, the VCR model is not confirmed. The regression analysis rejects all the political values hypotheses: none of H5 (gender equality), H6 (income equality), environmentalism (H4) or external solidarity (H7) seem to be supported by the regression results. The anti-neoliberalism hypothesis (H8), on the other hand, is confirmed by the research. It is the only variable connected to political values which is strongly and statistically significantly correlated to Euroscepticism. The fact that the model endorses the anti-neoliberalism hypothesis and rejects the other political values hypotheses suggests that neo-liberalism opposition is an attitude which does not necessarily go hand in hand with postmaterialist values in the population, even if these two are linked in the public debate. One should, in other words, be careful with labelling this sentiment “postmaterialist” when it stands alone.

Aside from the political culture variables, the strongest relationship revealed by the regression analysis is between Euroscepticism and sociotropic utilitarianism, and also the egocentric utilitarianism variable’s coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Consequently, Hypotheses 11 and 12 are supported. These results diverge from those from the documentary analysis, as the previous chapters showed that economic interest argumentation was not a very central part of the newspaper and party argumentation through the decades. However, when interpreting the results, it is worth keeping in mind the word of warning given in the methodology

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292 It should be noted that a ordered probit regression (with yes/no to membership as the dependent variable), was also run on the data in parallel to this study. The results of the probit model confirmed all the results from the OLS regression reported here, except that it confirmed the latter two hypotheses, suggesting that high environmental and external solidarity concern contribute to explaining public Euroscepticism in Norway. Sciarini and Listhaug (1997) also found that environmentally-oriented voters were more likely to vote “no” in the referendum.
discussion in Appendix H: H11, H12 and the variables used as indicators of egocentric and sociotropic utility only encompass cost/benefit evaluations; people who believed the EU to have an adverse effect on the economy or their personal economic situation might not necessarily have given the issue high priority, and as Jenssen (1998: 207) rightly points out, it is also likely that many voters made a judgment about the economic consequences of joining the EU after they took a stand on the EU issue, or that they formed their opinion on both as part of the same attitude. After all, this is what was argued in the newspapers and the parties throughout the whole period: that economic interest was and is a second order concern.

One theory which can safely be rejected according to the evidence showed by the two regression models is the national identity theory. There is no support for either H13 (national attachment/pride) or H14 (xenophobia), as the coefficients for these variables are not only small, but also statistically non-significant. Out of the control variables, only household income, gender, left/right self-placement and peripheral location have a clear “effect” on Euroscepticism when all the variables are included, and they are all related to Euroscepticism in the expected direction. Although the coefficient for left/right self-placement in the model is quite low, it is plausible that the anti-neo-liberalism variable accounts for some of the left/right difference. The unique effect of gender on Euroscepticism is also very limited; this could be due to gender differences in the values/concerns expressed by other variables.

8.3 Conclusion

The first part of the chapter examined the developments in public opinion on EU membership across the fifty-year period under study. When the EEC issue came up for the first time in Norway in 1961, public opinion was characterized by a lack of knowledge of and opinion on the EEC, and many had not even heard of the EEC. However, as the public debate on the issue intensified at the beginning of 1962, there

293 Jenssen (1998: 204) actually argues that due to the strong associations between economic assessment and the EU vote in the three Nordic referenda, economic assessment cannot be considered an independent variable.
was a marked increase in scepticism towards EEC membership among all the
Storting parties’ voters, and by February, the majority of SPP, CP, LP and CDP
voters expressed a preference for non-membership (Rokkan and Valen 1964). The
intensified public debate and increase in public Euroscepticism in 1962 have made
scholars suggest that if the debate had been allowed to mature in the early 1960s,
then opinion would have developed in the same way as it did in 1971-2. Because the
development in anti-market attitudes in the 1960s was cut short by De Gaulle’s veto
in 1963, public scepticism in this period is commonly viewed as somewhat softer
than in later periods. However, the chapter pointed out that this is not necessarily
the case.

At the start of the 1970-72 period, the “no” side was ahead with good margins in the
polls. Notwithstanding, the gap between the “yes” and “no” side narrowed in early
1972, with the negotiations in Brussels completed in January, but subsequently
stabilized, never to catch up with the “no” side’s lead: 53.5 percent voted “no” to EC
membership on 25 September 1972. Both the polls and referendum survey conducted
in this period showed that all the six cleavages defined by Stein Rokkan were
reactivated with the EC vote, with the peripheries, the countercultures, primary
sectors and workers mobilizing against membership. Moreover, age, education,
income and active employment (i.e. non-students and non-pensioners) were
positively correlated with EC support.

The chapter also showed that immediately after the referendum in 1972, for the first
time ever, the public opinion polls returned stable majorities in favour of
membership. This seemed to indicate a kind of panic in the population, perhaps
fears of isolation, a feeling that the wrong choice had been made, but these feelings
must have been quickly depressed, as when the trade agreement was in place less
than a year later, the “no” side was ahead again. For the rest of the 1970s and most of
the 1980s, when the EC issue completely removed from the public agenda, there was
little support for EC membership in the population. The 1977 and 1981 election
survey results represent the lows of EC support; only 17.3 and 18.2 percent of voters declared their support for membership respectively.

The gap between the two sides closed between the late 1980s and the autumn of 1991/spring of 1992; particularly among young voters was there indication of a more favourable mood towards the EC in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall. However, this favourable mood was not to last, as the Danish “no” to the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 propelled the “no” side into a leading position in the polls, and the Storting election in September 1993 further served to consolidate this position. The Labour government’s various strategies and the “Swedish suction” notwithstanding, on 28 November 1994, Norway repeated its “no” to EC/EU membership with a 52.2 majority. In fact, the “no” was almost literally repeated; minimal changes in the results both in terms of geography and on the individual level contributed to the branding of the 1994 referendum as a “carbon copy” of the 1972 referendum. The socio-demographic/socio-economic make-up of the “no” vote in both the polls and the referendum survey was also almost identical compared to the 1970-2 period; the only differences was the new public/private sector and gender gaps, and the disappearance of the age relationship from 1972, when the youngest voters were more likely to be against membership.

Polls from the most recent period under study, the post-1994 phase, have given conflicting indications about the Norwegian population’s attitudes towards European integration. At the turn of the millennium, with the realization of EMU and eastward enlargement, the Norwegian public seemed to be more favourably inclined towards EU membership. Aside from the post-referendum panic in 1972-3, 1998-2004 is the only period in which there has been a majority of respondents in the polls expressing a preference for membership over a consecutive number of months. However, paradoxically, 1995-2010 is also the period which holds the record for the highest “no” percentage ever: in 2010, polls returned “no” majorities of over 70 percent. Thus, it seems that the “yes” mood which came about in step with the EU developments of the late-1990s/early 2000s was a passing fancy. It is clear that
Norwegian public Euroscepticism was in 1962, 1972, 1994 and is today a force which the pro-European elites in Norway have to contend with and that the strength and resilience of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism is more than a myth. The phenomenon has persisted through five decades, and today it is, if we are to believe the opinion polls, stronger than ever.

How can Norwegian Euroscepticism be explained? Are the concerns reflected in the public debate mirrored in public opinion? To find answers to these questions, the second part of the chapter tested the VCRUNI theories on a nationally representative sample of the Norwegian population, using multiple regression analysis. The 1994 referendum survey data set was chosen for the regression analysis for several reasons, the most important of which was that it was the most representative option in terms of the time periods, as the purpose of the study was to be able to make some general inferences about Norwegian Euroscepticism, i.e. extend the conclusions beyond the 1994 “no” vote.

There are of course numerous limitations involved in using statistical methods to analyse political attitudes, such as categorization and question bias; respondents’ differing approaches to or assumptions about different questions, topics and categories; and missing data. On top of these more general weaknesses of survey research, differences in question wording in particular were flagged up as a source of potential bias in this study (see Appendix H). The fact that some of the attitudinal indicators used were based on questions about evaluations of effects of membership (AGFI and economic benefit) instead of attitudes towards a specific argument, statement or proposal, limits the ability to generalize about the relationship between agriculture/fisheries and economic interest concern on the one hand and Norwegian public Euroscepticism on the other. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the regression analysis returned some robust relationships and interesting results. First, there is no doubt that the political culture elements which are so central to the public Eurosceptic discourse, especially sovereignty and folkestyre, have resonance in the Norwegian population. Although idea of the EU developing in the direction of a
federal Europe also seems to trigger somewhat more aversion among the Eurosceptics, this is not an idea which is very popular on either side of the pro-EU/anti-EU divide. Postmaterialist values, such as commitment to equality, environmentalism and external solidarity, on the other hand, do not seem have much explanatory power in relation to public Euroscepticism. The income equality and gender equality hypotheses, as well as the environment and external solidarity hypotheses were rejected, because the relationships between the respective independent variables and the dependent variable did not come up as statistically significant. On the level of the rural society theory, however, both the districts protection and the AGFI hypotheses were confirmed. Although the AGFI hypothesis was based on evaluation of effect instead of level of agreement/attitude, the considerable “effect” also of high districts protection concern on Euroscepticism suggests that ruralism is at least as central to popular Euroscepticism as it is to the public Eurosceptic argumentation. The study also confirmed what the documentary analysis found, namely that strong national attachment and pride and xenophobic sentiments cannot explain Norwegian Euroscepticism. Conversely, the findings from the regression analysis suggested that cost/benefit evaluations, which were a limited part of the public anti-EU debate, make up an aspect which is of considerable importance to the Eurosceptic public. To be more precise, if accepting that negative egocentric and sociotropic evaluations are synonymous with a priority of egocentric and sociotropic benefits (see the above discussion about the limitations of the indicators used to measure utilitarianism) or that they signify a stand-alone attitude (contrary to Jenssen’s 1998 view, as discussed above), then the study demonstrates that utilitarianism, in particular sociotropic utilitarianism, is one of the strongest predictors of Norwegian public Euro scepticism. This will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, which considers the research findings presented in this and the previous four chapters in an attempt to answer the two very broad questions which have guided the thesis research: what is Norwegian Euroscepticism, and how can it be explained?
Chapter 9
Norwegian Euroscepticism: What and Why?

“The picture of the EU which is painted in the Norwegian media, and ditto by Norwegian scholars, is a distorted picture. That is to say, it gives a kind of fairytale about what we are faced with. [...] So in light of this [fairytale picture of the EU]... the [...] 35 percent “yes” [in the polls] which we have had for soon to be four years, it is one of the things that amazes me. It... If you want my explanation of that, then I have to say that I can’t explain it.”

The above quote, taken from the interview with SLP politician and NtEU activist Dag Seierstad,\(^{294}\) who has over fifty years of experience with opposing the EEC, EC and EU, communicates the essence of the research puzzle the thesis grapples with. When the “yes” side has had the might, media and millions on its side through the last fifty years, how can it be that Norway is still not a member of the EU? Instead of focusing on the last four years, like Seierstad, the research investigates Norwegian Euroscepticism across the last fifty years in order to find out what it actually is and how it can be explained. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings of the research and is structured as follows: The first part of the chapter aims to address the first research question, namely, what is Norwegian Euroscepticism? It considers whether it is appropriate to speak of Norwegian Euroscepticism as one type of Euroscepticism and discusses what the research findings reveal about the specific characteristics of Norwegian Euroscepticism. In the second part, the chapter focuses on the second research question, which asks how Norwegian Euroscepticism can be explained, and the third part appraises the merits of the approach used in the thesis. Hence, the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings presented in the previous five chapters, specifically the VCR concept.

\(^{294}\) Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
9.1 What is Norwegian Euroscepticism?

Norwegian Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which is manifest in six of the seven established political parties in the Norwegian party system, the vibrant ad hoc organization NtEU and (at the end of 2010) the vast majority of the Norwegian population. Norwegian Euroscepticism, as we know it today, was formed in the early 1960s and 1970s, when the issue of EEC membership came onto the agenda with the British applications for membership. From the perspective of the literature on EU support, it can be said to be based on a mix of different factors, primarily geo-historical ones, but also postmaterialism/exceptionalism, ruralism and utilitarianism. As Norway is not a member of the EU and in Norway the concept of EU-motstand (EU opposition) is synonymous with opposition to Norwegian EU membership, Norwegian Euroscepticism rarely takes the shape of soft Euroscepticism. Notwithstanding, it is possible to speak of softer and harder varieties of the phenomenon, as there are parties and factions on the “no” side in Norwegian politics which are supportive of Norway’s participation in aspects of European integration, such as the EEA and Schengen (e.g. the CDP, LP and SME), while others are not (the SLP and CP295). However, the most important divide is perhaps between centre/left-wing and right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Correspondingly, the next section proposes a two-fold typology of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

9.1.1 Norwegian Euroscepticism: Two Broad Types

If assuming that Norwegian political parties and the “no” movement NtEU are representative of and reflect public opinion in Norway,296 then Norwegian Euroscepticism can be divided into two broad types: one centre/left-wing type and a right-wing type. The documentary party analysis from the 1989-1994 and post-1994 periods shows that the VCR pattern of Euroscepticism, also found in the newspaper study, is present in NtEU and the left-wing and middle parties in the Storting. It demonstrates that political culture and political values arguments are the most prevalent in these parties and factions, closely followed by rural society and

295 and NtEU, see Figure 9.2 below.
296 regardless of whether parties influence the public or vice versa
economic argumentation.\textsuperscript{297} With the exception of the shared political culture aspect, the structure of the PP’s Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is altogether different. The PP is the party which reflects the most economic concerns in its Euroscepticism, with almost half its argumentation falling into either the utilitarian, economic liberalism or “retaining control of the fish” categories, and the other half falling into political culture. Because the centre/left-wing type is the most common type of Norwegian Euroscepticism, dominating the newspaper debate, NtEU and the party system in Norway, it can be appropriately labelled the \textit{mainstream} type. Moreover, as opinion polls make it clear that even the pro-European Conservative Party has Euro sceptic voters, it is likely that the PP’s Euroscepticism is more or less representative of a \textit{right-wing} type of Euroscepticism in Norway.

That it is appropriate to separate between \textit{mainstream} and \textit{right-wing} Norwegian Euroscepticism is also confirmed by the interview findings. Besides democracy and the right of self-determination (sovereignty), all the eight non-PP interviewees cite two or more of the following as their personal and/or their party’s main arguments against the EU: anti-capitalism/neo-liberalism, the ability to conduct social democratic policy, the environment, solidarity with the rest of the world, internationalism, regional policy and retaining national control over Norway’s natural resources. The two PP interviewees, on the other hand, focus on Norwegian interests and natural resources and express scepticism towards the deepening of (political) integration, the EU’s culture of economic transfers and protectionism and the CSDP.\textsuperscript{298} In addition, the issue of democracy comes up in the interview with PP MP Ulf Leirstein.\textsuperscript{299} He emphasises the problem of distance to decision makers:

\textsuperscript{297} The economic argumentation took up a larger part of the party discourse than the newspaper, LEs’ and NtEU discourse, perhaps reflecting the pressure on parties (as opposed to \textit{ad hoc} organizations) to present more interest-based, economically responsible positions.

\textsuperscript{298} The PP’s scepticism towards the EU’s emerging defence dimension was also reflected in readers’ letters written by PP MPs in the 2000s newspaper analysis and the 2010 survey. These sources, the interviews and also the 2005 manifesto indicate that the opposition to the CSDP is due to the belief that the ties across the Atlantic are more important to Norway than any proposed European defence policy.

\textsuperscript{299} Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010.
“I am preoccupied with closeness to the people. I am very preoccupied with a thriving democracy. [...] I remember being annoyed before I was... before I became a politician myself about... I felt that it was very far between those who make decisions and the people. [...] In Norway, there are quite short distances. The EU will be terribly far away [...]”

These findings all point to the conclusion that political culture/geo-historical issues are important to both mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism in Norway, but that the two types differ in other aspects. The most obvious difference is the opposing economic ideologies; mainstream Euroscepticism is characterized by opposition to the EU’s much too heavy prioritization of market forces, while right-wing Eurosceptics, in this case the PP MPs, view the EU’s ideology as not market-oriented enough. Thus, where the mainstream Eurosceptics’ anti-neo-liberalism directs them down the postmaterialist values lane, focusing on the environment, equality and solidarity, the right-wing Eurosceptics’ pro-market liberalism has only economic undertones. This difference can also be observed in the argumentation related to national control over the country’s natural resources and financial transfers through the EEA agreement: the contrasts between the farmer Per Ole Lunde’s300 and the PP’s Ulf Leirstein’s301 reflections on the topic of the current EEA contributions to economic and social equalization in the EU are striking. On the one hand, Lunde narrates about travelling to Eastern Europe and observing some of the cultural projects sponsored by the EU. He says: “I suppose we contribute to this [...] maintenance of local art and culture. And that is good. That is positive. We can afford that.” Leirstein, on the other hand, stresses that “I get to hear about how great it is with all of this money, but we don’t get anything back for it.” Put simply, Leirstein views the issue in monetary terms; Lunde does not.302

300 Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
301 Interview with the author, Oslo, 12 January 2010.
302 Another example, related to the natural resources, is the contrasts between the SLP’s Dag Seierstad’s comments about how “absurd” it is that Norway has such a large part of the world’s oil and gas resources at its disposal and that some in the SLP have toyed with the idea of putting some of it under UN management, and the PP’s Ulf Leirstein comments about not thinking it “a disadvantage that we have in many ways struck it lucky with our oil and gas wealth”.

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A further distinctive difference between the two types of Euroscepticism is the differing attitudes towards the agricultural sector: whereas all the mainstream Eurosceptics want to maintain the Norwegian agricultural policy as it is (with its high level of subsidies), the PP’s Leirstein does not want to join the EU because he thinks that there are bigger chances of changing the agricultural policy in Norway outside the EU than inside the EU. If Norway joins, the EU “will start giving out subsidies […] to sparsely populated areas in Norway to maintain something which shouldn’t… which isn’t able to sustain its own existence”. A quote from the interview with the PP’s foreign policy spokesman, Morten Høglund, further illustrates this difference between the mainstream Eurosceptics’ concern for the maintenance of the agricultural sector for societal reasons and the right-wing Eurosceptics neo-liberalist argumentation:

“Nei til EU is against [the CAP] because it doesn’t look after Norwegian farmers well enough. We are against it because it is too expensive and costly and is too… [it] doesn’t take good enough care of the free market and agriculture’s independent position […]. So, we attack this from a kind of free market way of thinking and a wish for less regulation, fewer transfers.”

Moreover, although the PP’s Leirstein supports the general political consensus in Norway that people should be able to live in the districts if that is what they want, he does not think that this is relevant to the EU question, because of the EU’s lack of market orientation. Besides, he says, the shipping companies, shipyards and the fishing industry ensure that there is decentralized settlement in Norway. This stands in sharp contrast to the argumentation used by the mainstream Eurosceptics, who throughout the last fifty years have argued that an active regional policy is necessary to keep peripheral/rural Norway populated.

The quantitative data obtained on Eurosceptic MPs’ attitudes also support the general findings of the qualitative analysis. They confirm that at the forefront of the

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303 Interview with the author, Oslo, 30 March 2009.
mainstream Eurosceptic minds lies first and foremost political culture, but also rural and postmaterialist issues are present. Economic interest plays a smaller role in their Euroscepticism, and cultural threat does not seem to be connected to the issue of European integration in these parties. Again, the findings prove that the PP’s Euroscepticism is, with the exception of the political culture element (which actually seems to be even stronger in the PP than in the other parties), completely different from that of the other parties. Whereas most of the other parties’ Eurosceptic MPs view the EU as being too liberalist and market oriented, many of the PP MPs evidently view the EU as being too protectionist. Second, although hardly any of the other Eurosceptic MPs in the survey thought that the cost of membership is an issue, six out of ten PP MPs thought so. And third, the PP was the party with most MPs believing that the EU poses a threat to Norwegian culture and heritage. This is an interesting finding, especially as it corresponds with the interview findings. Ulf Leirstein from the PP, although he does not think that Norwegian identity and values are threatened by the EU to a great extent, he is the only interviewee who acknowledges that he is “preoccupied with taking care of Norwegian culture”, which, he states, “might be difficult if [we] join the EU”. Conversely, all of the eight mainstream Eurosceptics interviewed state that they do not consider issues of identity or cultural threat relevant to the EU issue; the cultural exchange that accompanies globalization is seen as something positive.\(^{304}\) Furthermore, two of the interviewees bring up the building up of a European identity as something they view with suspicion, because of its unclear purpose. For example, Dag Seierstad from the SLP\(^{305}\) questions whether taking the leap from e.g. a Swedish identity to a European identity makes it easier to be an immigrant in Sweden. He argues that

“if we are to move on from a national identity, then we should change to a global identity and not stop at a white, European identity, or what else one is to mean by ‘European identity’”.

\(^{304}\) It is important to note that Leirstein shares the view that getting new impulses is something positive. His scepticism on this point is directed towards the uncertainty surrounding the EU’s future development, that in the long term, “some of the identity in your own country might disintegrate”.

\(^{305}\) Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
This is consistent with the overall findings of the study, which show that mainstream Eurosceptic argumentation throughout the decades has been largely free of nationalist, identity-oriented sentiments. However, further research is needed to ascertain whether national identity concerns are indeed something which sets right-wing Euroscepticism apart from mainstream Euroscepticism.

Ultimately, it is evident that there is a clear dividing line between mainstream and right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Although they share the geo-historical features, the two types differ in their approach to postmaterialist, rural and economic issues. The structure of the two types is illustrated in Figure 9.1 below.

**Figure 9.1** A schematic depiction of Norwegian Euroscepticism

![Diagram of Euroscepticism types](image)

Source: Author’s study

Although the separation between mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism is the most important distinction to make when considering and studying Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is of course possible, and indeed meaningful, to divide these two broad types into subtypes. In fact, Szczerbiak and Taggart’s (2001) hard/soft conceptualization is a particularly suitable tool here, and it is arguably most pertinent to divide mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism into a “softer” type,
encompassing the parties, factions and people that are against EU membership but in favour of the EEA agreement and other EU initiatives, and a “hard” type, which entails rejection of membership, the EEA, Schengen and the vast majority of EU policies. Figure 9.2 shows how the Euroscepticism of the different parties and factions on the left and centre can be conceptualized according to this division. Naturally, right-wing Euroscepticism can also be split into “softer” and “hard” Euroscepticism, but “hard” right-wing Euroscepticism is not very common, as the PP is pro-EEA and few market liberalists are against the EEA agreement, which gives Norway free access to the Single Market.

Figure 9.2 A diagram of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism

![Diagram of Mainstream Euroscepticism](image)

Source: Author’s study

To sum up, Norwegian Euroscepticism is most appropriately divided into two types, mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism, alternatively three types: “hard” mainstream, “softer” mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. These are all varieties of rejecting Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou 2009) or EU-rejectionism (Flood 2002b), i.e. hard Euroscepticism. Because Norway is not a member of the EU, the debate tends

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Note: NtEU is difficult to place because it crosses party lines and thus its members are people from different parties with different attitudes towards e.g. the EEA agreement. However, an analysis of publications and commentaries originating from the organization would arguably suggest that it is more appropriately placed under the “hard mainstream Euroscepticism” heading.
to be very polarized. This means that politicians, parties and organizations that are in favour of membership are unlikely to engage in soft Eurosceptic rhetoric. Hence, soft Euroscepticism is not a prominent feature of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

### 9.1.2 A Distinctive Euroscepticism?

“Much of that which is about scepticism towards union is certainly present in the vast majority of European countries, almost to the same extent as in Norway. The difference is that in Norway one has established a democratic practice which does not let itself get overrun.”

Wegard Harsvik

The thesis makes it clear that Norwegian Euroscepticism, both on the elite and public level, is a phenomenon which stretches from 1961 to the present day, through periods of heightened and latent Euroscepticism. Moreover, the research shows that its stability and strength are more than just a myth. However, Norwegian Euroscepticism is evidently not a wholly unique phenomenon. As LE Wegard Harsvik rightly points out, the scepticism towards the ever closer union, the EU’s constant expansion of its areas of competence at the expense of member states’ sovereignty is something which characterizes popular and party-based Euroscepticism across Europe. Indeed, right-wing Norwegian Eurosceptics seem to have much in common with right-wing Eurosceptics in other countries. For example, the UK Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism which is based on “a strong market-oriented neo-liberalism that is combined with a defence of national political sovereignty and institutions” and rejects “all potential EU regulatory intervention” (Statham 2008: 37-8) is nothing if not a close relative of the PP’s Euroscepticism.

Moreover, the protests against the EU’s democratic deficit are not specific to Norwegian Euroscepticism; EB data show that the gap between satisfaction with democracy at home and in the EU is particularly large in the three Nordic EU member states, Finland, Denmark and Sweden (Petersson 2004: 29). Furthermore,

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307 Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
308 The PP’s 1990s position on Europe did also, incidentally, take inspiration from Thatcherism (see Saglie 2000c; Skinner 2011).
the *mainstream* Norwegian Eurosceptics’ concerns for the environment or the welfare state are not unique either. Environmental and welfare related arguments against the EU are not only shared by Eurosceptics in Norway’s neighbouring countries (Petersson 2004; Sorensen 2004; Sunnus 2004), complaints that the EU is not “social enough” were also central to many of the French and Dutch “no” votes in the referenda on the European Constitution in 2005 (Mulvey 2005; EurActiv 2005; see also Kuklin 2004 for more about the welfare/Euroscepticism link). Moreover, Sweden’s referendum had almost the same pattern in 1994 as Norway’s, with clear centre-periphery and urban-rural dimensions. In addition, as in Norway, the Swedish “‘yes’ campaign was considered to be identical with the political establishment and all the resources at their disposal whereas the ‘no’ side, the underdog, was identified with the general public and its lack of resources” (Petersson 2004: 21).

9.1.2.1 The Geo-historical Aspect

The gap between Norway’s 52.2 percent and Sweden’s 46.8 percent “no” is not vast. But if one is to add to the Norwegian “no” vote the 4 percentage points which the Swedish suction is thought to have contributed to the “yes” vote (Aardal and Jenssen 1995: 38), then the gap spans almost ten percentage points. Why the majority in Norway voted “no” even after the Swedes had voted “yes” can perhaps be explained by Norway’s “unshakable” democratic practice, as Harsvik argues (see the above quote), but this is not to say that for example the Swedish democratic tradition is inferior to the Norwegian. The Swedish and Norwegian political cultures are strikingly similar in their emphasis on “transparency, equality and popular support” (Petersson 2004: 28), but they differ in two important aspects. The first, the countries’ historical experiences, is obvious, as every country’s history is unique and will shape the respective countries’ political culture. Norway and Sweden share certain historical characteristics, such as the absence of a powerful feudal structure and federalism and relatively weak urban and liberal influences, but unlike Norway, Sweden has no experiences of foreign rule or occupation. These “historical non-events” (Petersson 2004) are linked to the second aspect, namely Sweden’s
collectivism versus Norway’s individualism. As Petersson (2004: 19) argues, they “help explain why Sweden did not develop counter-reactions such as national pride, a sense of historical destiny, and strong institutions to defend individual rights”. Norway, on the other hand, did develop all of these three “counter-reactions”. The newspaper analysis from the whole period under study indicates that the battle against the EU is, by many, viewed as a furthering of the historical battle against Europeanizing and centralizing forces. In other words, it is perceived as the enactment of Norway’s historical destiny. And last, but not least, the ability to choose a separate path, as individuals (folkestyre) and a country (sovereignty) are themes which have dominated the Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and into the 21st century. Trust in the state is high in Norway, but arguably higher in Sweden, where there is a much stronger sense of collectivism, and thus of dutifulness. Eriksen (1993b: 74) puts forward the idea that Swedes can be compared to dogs in the sense that

“They are always obedient and optimistic […]. When the State asks a Swede to do something, it is claimed, he will do it! The Norwegians are also obedient, I suppose, but not to the same degree as the Swedes”.

(original italics)

The Norwegian author, Odd Børretzen, makes a similar observation in his humoristic book “How to understand and use a Norwegian”. He writes: “the Swede obeys all the laws, new or old, period. The Norwegian also obeys all the laws, but he protests and writes letters to the editor” (Børretzen 1993, cited by Eriksen 1993b: 74, original italics). Also in journalist and previous Sweden correspondent to the NRK, Kjell Pihlstrøm’s (2010) summary of the most significant differences between Sweden and Norway, the issue of obedience is awarded attention. He asserts that

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309 The 1994 referendum survey shows evidence that national pride is strong in Norway, with 59 percent saying that they are very proud of being Norwegian and 91.5 percent stating that they are either very proud or somewhat proud of being Norwegian. However, it should be noted that the regression analysis in Chapter Eight showed that national pride is not significantly related to Euroscepticism. Actually, Aardal et al.’s (1998: 251) simple correlations between the 1994 EU vote and a national pride dimension show modest relationships between the two in all the Nordic applicant countries. The correlation was lowest in Sweden (.05), followed by Norway (.10) and Finland (.16).
“Deep down in the Swedish mass of people, there is an obedience gene which is difficult to trace in the far more individualist Norway. Ethnologists have long ago established that the Swedish obedience is connected to a collectivist tradition and trust in the state, which have strong historical roots.”

According to Hofstede’s (2001) individualism (versus collectivism) index, Sweden’s score is indeed almost the same as Norway’s, but as Fjæro (2006) notes, “controversies occur when we consider individualism versus collectivism, dependence, independence, mutual dependence and related concepts”.310 Besides, the Euroscptic argumentation makes is very clear that self-determination is a highly regarded value in the Norwegian value set (see also Fjæro 2006). In other words, it seems plausible that the country’s negative historical experiences with foreign rule, which one of the interviewees argue “put us in an inferior position”311 and the positive historical experiences with challenging the state and the elites, which resulted in parliamentarism in 1884 and independence in 1905, have strengthened the Norwegians’ sense of individualism and corresponding diminished sense of obedience.

9.1.2.2 Rural Society

The ruralism aspect of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism is also something which not immediately stands out as distinctly Norwegian. In all European countries there are people resisting urbanization, and selling the countryside as “rural idyll” is as commonplace in Spain as it is in Norway (Baylina and Berg 2010). Moreover, at the brink of the second decade of the 21st century, with nearly 80 percent of the Norwegian population living in built-up areas (2008), Norway is more urbanized than it was in 1961, when only six out of ten inhabitants lived in built-up areas (SSB

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310 It should also be noted that in Hofstede’s definition of collectivism, it only refers to in-groups, such as families, and has no political meaning.

311 Quote from author’s interview with Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
In addition, even though the rural influences on Norway’s social and political development were stronger than in continental states which were industrialized and urbanized early, this is also a feature Norway shares with its Nordic neighbours (Ingebritsen 2006). Even so, the combination of three features arguably sets the Norwegian attachment to the countryside apart from that in other countries: the Norwegian nation building’s reliance on nature and the countryside; the country’s comparatively late urbanization,313 and the resulting high support for Norwegian agriculture and regional policy, which has been successful at keeping Norway comparatively decentralized. These three features are each considered in turn below.

Having been a dependency under Denmark since the Middle Ages, Norway could not bask in the glory of military, industrial or ancient architectural grandeur when the Norwegian nation-building took place in the nineteenth century. The images of victory and splendour which helped build up a sense of national identity in countries such as the UK, France and Denmark were completely absent when the Norwegian identity was constructed; instead, the nation-builders focused on nature and egalitarian and rural values (Eriksen 1993b). Eriksen’s (1993b) review of the literature on Norwegian identity supports the idea that the rural is important to most Norwegians. Bygda (the rural district) and nature are characteristics of the Norwegian identity, he argues. “Even though half of the Norwegians live in cities, the Norwegian self-image is rural. What Norwegians perceive as typically Norwegian is a smallholding in a mountain valley” (p. 84).314 Because the national self-image in Norway is rural and farmer-like to a much stronger degree than in other countries, by posing a threat to Norwegian agriculture and the rural, the EU also represents a threat to values that are important to the whole population. In an

312 For a collection of houses to qualify as a “built-up area” according to SSB, it would have to have a minimum population of 200 people and a maximum distance between the houses of 50 metres.
313 Finland and Sweden were also urbanized late, compared to other west European states.
314 Eriksen lists seven characteristics central to the Norwegian identity: egalitarian individualism, objectivity and sincerity, package solutions, bygda, simplicity, nature and Puritanism. The fact that Eriksen identifies simplicity and nature as highly regarded values can be linked to a different argument of his, namely that romanticism, when it finally arrived in Norway, got so stuck that it still has not let go (1993b: 34).
interview with the author, having been asked a question about why dispersed settlement is important in Norway, the former LP leader, Odd Einar Dørum, responds that it is because “the decentralized is a part of the Norwegian identity. [...] It is part of [Norway’s] diversity”.315

The urbanization of Norway happened very late compared to other European countries; while the urban population in Norway only made up 29.6 of the total in 1920, in Denmark the urban population was 44.2 percent, in the Netherlands 45.6, in France 46.4 and in the UK 79.3 percent. The reason why the late urbanization of Norway is important to Norwegian Euroscepticism is that it has affected the ties between the urban and rural population up to the present day. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, the ancestors of the vast majority of the Norwegian population were farmers and fishermen. As Eriksen (1993b: 80) aptly puts it,

“There are not many people from Oslo who have four grandparents from Oslo, and many – maybe a majority – of the capital’s inhabitants ‘come from’ a different place. Even hyper-urban people [...] go ‘home’ for Christmas, and ‘home’ then means some rural district in the eastern inland area”.

That the urban population has ties to rural Norway, not just through the national rural self-image but also through family and friends, and that this is of relevance to Norwegian Euroscepticism is supported by the data from the interview with Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP.316 After democracy and sovereignty, he lists the feeling of solidarity with the districts as one of the CDP’s main arguments against the EU:

“Even [among] people in the cities, in the CDP, this [solidarity argument] was very prominent because many... they felt a kind of solidarity with... shall we say, the districts, the rural areas [...]. We who [...] live in Oslo or close to the political establishment [...], in the central region, we have a

315 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
316 Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
responsibility for those who live in the districts. And this solidarity dimension, it certainly has a, shall we say, demographic or social explanation. That is, very many of those [...] who have been active in the CDP [are] people who have moved from the rural districts [...]. But that you also have roots in the rural districts is something which applies to large parts of the Norwegian population.”

Furthermore, the fact that ten percent of the population still lives on agricultural properties also serves to confirm the idea that Norwegians have strong bonds with the countryside and the agricultural sector (SSB statistics, cited by Oppland Arbeiderblad 2008).

These two points, the central position of the rural to the Norwegian self-image and the urban population’s ties to rural Norway, can help explain the continued support for Norway’s agriculture\(^\text{317}\) and regional policy, which has contributed to keeping Norwegian society, compared other European countries and its geography considered, relatively decentralized. According to UN statistics, the rural population of Sweden was only 16.6 percent in 1990, while 27.6 percent of the Norwegian population lived in rural areas (UN 1994). The Norwegians are a small people spread over a large territory: with only 16 inhabitants per km\(^2\), Norway has, second only to Iceland, the lowest population density in Europe (SSB 2011).\(^\text{318}\) Besides, 2008 SSB statistics show that over half of the Norwegian population live in municipalities with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants (SSB 2008).\(^\text{319}\) Moreover, Figure 9.3 below shows that although the population in Norway’s number one periphery, Northern Norway, has declined somewhat since 1951, it nevertheless has remained exceptionally stable over the last 60 years. It is, in other words, no exaggeration to say that Norway’s decentralized settlement pattern has been successfully retained to a large degree.

\(^{317}\) Ingebritsen (2006) claims that Norway has the highest level of support for agriculture in Europe.
\(^{318}\) No UN statistics are available for Sweden between 2000 and 2008, but in 2001, Norway’s rural population made up 23.5 percent of the total population (UN 2008).
\(^{319}\) 36 and 45 percent live in 50,000+ and 30,000+ municipalities respectively. Only five Norwegian municipalities have over 100,000 inhabitants (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Bærum).
Norway’s successful regional policy is a feature of Norway which is quite unique in an international setting; the word *Utkantnorge* (rural Norway) has an almost sacred ring to it among Norwegian politicians (Eriksen 1993b), at least among politicians outside the PP. Odd Einar Dørum from the LP tries to explain the contrasts between a Norwegians’ and a New Yorker’s take on investments in *Utkantnorge*:

“a journalist from the New York Times wanted an explanation of the tunnels on the Norwegian coast; to be sure, he didn’t see any cars! […] And from his perspective, driving through a tunnel in New York, my God, I can understand that: ‘what the hell are you doing?’ [laughs] So I understand… But that’s not the point! The point is that we have wanted this because we [want to] protect the settlement and because we also understand the export values that are in motion. […] But a person from another country will not

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320 Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold, Østfold and Buskerud.
understand that just like that. But for us, going in for an infrastructure which also is beneficial for the peripheries [is important].\footnote{Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.}

Cathrine Strindin Amundsen from the CP\footnote{Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.} too, emphasises the “export values”, i.e. the natural resources in the peripheries in her defence of the decentralized settlement pattern, but she also argues from a quality of life perspective: people should be able to choose where they want to live. LE Wegard Harsvik expresses this in similar terms.\footnote{Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.} He argues that “politics is not about allocating resources so that they maximize some number […]. It is about people.” But regardless of what Norwegians with a centre/left-wing political orientation give as their main reason for supporting Norway’s regional policy, their attitude on the matter can be summed up by the following statement, made by Amundsen from the CP: “there are actually no good arguments for why people shouldn’t live in the districts”.

The argument about (mainstream) Norwegian Euroscepticism’s distinctiveness comes full circle by returning to the point made by SME’s Wegard Harsvik about the Norwegian “democratic practice which does not let itself get overrun”, i.e. the absence of the “obedience gene” which the Swedes allegedly possess and the importance Norwegians attach to the value of self-determination. This is because, on the topic of the settlement pattern, Harsvik returns to the democracy aspect of his EU opposition. He explains,

“There is nothing that prevents Norway from having the regional policy that the Progress Party or the Conservatives want […]. And I will fight against the regional policy that these parties stand for. But if the population in Norway in an election, God forbid, were to elect a majority of Conservative and Progress Party [MPs] in the Storting, then they would implement that policy, right? The issue that is of EU relevance here is that the EU will force an agricultural and regional policy upon Norway, one
which it has not been possible to get support for in an election. At least not up until now.”

To sum up, the distinctiveness of Norwegian Euroscepticism lies in its geo-historical dimension, and to the distinctiveness of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, the rural society element can be added. Norwegian Euroscepticism is also unique in its stability; in no other country has Euroscepticism remained so enduring, both in terms of its structure and strength. However, this is not to say that Norwegian Euroscepticism is more distinctive than for example British or Swedish Euroscepticism, which are unique in their own ways, only that geo-historical and rural factors are what sets Norwegian Euroscepticism apart from its counterparts.

9.2 Explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism

The findings of the study show that Norwegian Eurosceptic argumentation on the party and newspaper debate level follows a clear VCR structure, with the Values component referring to the expression of postmaterialism (and to a limited extent Nordic exceptionalism), the Culture component referring to factors related to the Norwegian geo-historical context and resulting political culture and the Rural component referring to the wish to keep the Norwegian society decentralized. In other words, Norwegian mainstream Eurosceptics oppose EU membership because of threats the EU poses to the all-important right of self-determination (sovereignty and democracy), postmaterialist values such as the environment, the humane society and solidarity with the Third World, and finally agriculture and the decentralized society, which are important to most Norwegians for many different reasons. Sociotropic economic interest, on the other hand, the study demonstrates, has little bearing on the motivation of Norwegian Euroscepticism, as the documentary analysis makes it very clear that the dominant view in Norway is that as a whole, the country would probably be somewhat, albeit not much, better off with membership than without. It is of course likely that egocentric utilitarian considerations play an important part in the big picture among those groups of the populations which are pointed out as the losers of integration, such as farmers and coastal fishermen, but at
the same time, both the newspaper study, the interview data and the referendum study data indicate that even among these groups, utilitarianism is rarely their primary reason for opposing membership. Moreover, the study rejects the national identity thesis on all levels, as the issues of cultural threat, xenophobia and national pride have no significant relationship to Norwegian Euroscepticism.

Figure 9.4 gives an illustration of the results of the newspaper study. It demonstrates that, perhaps with the exception of the 1960s, when national identity sentiments were somewhat more commonplace than in the later periods, the above conclusions apply to any of the four periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

Figure 9.4 Results of the newspaper analysis 1960s-2000s

Source: Author’s newspaper study

This consistent pattern notwithstanding, it is important to remember that, as pointed out in the first part of this chapter, Norwegian Euroscepticism can be divided into

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324 Cf. News reports from Aftenposten (23/05/92, 27/04/9); interviews with Per Ole Lunde (Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009) and Cathrine Strindin Amundsen (Oslo, 13 January 2010). For the referendum data, see Figure 9.5 below.

325 Some interesting findings showed up in the elite interview and survey data on the PP, suggesting a possible relationship between concerns about cultural threat and Euroscepticism in the party. However, this is an avenue for future research.

326 It should be noted that the numbers of national identity-related arguments are inflated for all the periods, due to the inclusion of arguments which potentially do not express concerns about culture or lack of identification with Europe, but e.g. health and security.
two distinct phenomena: mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism. The findings of the newspaper study, displayed in Figure 9.4, only correspond with the results of the analysis of Norwegian party-based Euroscepticism on the centre/left of the political spectrum, i.e. mainstream Euroscepticism. In other words, only mainstream Euroscepticism can be explained by the VCR theory, to explain right-wing Euroscepticism, it is necessary to couple the geo-historical/political Culture explanation with Utilitarianism and economic Liberalism (CUL). It is absolutely crucial to make the distinction between these two types when considering Norwegian Euroscepticism because the reasons why right-wing Eurosceptics reject EU membership are diametrically opposed to why mainstream Eurosceptics do not desire a closer affiliation with the EU. While Eurosceptics from the PP criticize the EU for being too socialist and putting the market mechanisms under too much restraint, the Eurosceptics from the Labour Party, SLP and CP especially, but also from the LP and CDP, think the EU is far too liberalist and do not agree with the way in which the market forces are given priority over other “more important” societal considerations, such as social policy, regional policy and environmental policy. Unlike mainstream Euroscepticism, right-wing Euroscepticism can, at least in part, be explained by the economic interest thesis, as right-wing Eurosceptics have, overall, a much stronger focus on the economy. They express not only an ideological preference for neo-liberalist economics, much emphasis is also put on the cost of membership, weighing up the economic costs against the benefits.

On the topic of the cost/benefit evaluative aspect of Norwegian Euroscepticism, it is necessary to comment on public opinion. This is because the findings of the regression analysis in Chapter Eight indicated that a negative sociotropic utilitarian evaluation of membership is one of the most central motivators of Euroscepticism, while the documentary analysis did not. The explanation for this discrepancy is most likely to be methodological. Public Euroscepticism could be driven by economic utilitarianism to a much larger degree than what the VCRUNI documentary analysis was able to capture (i.e. limitations of the approach). Alternatively, the research design of the individual-level regression analysis might have been flawed (e.g.
imperfect indicators or failure to recognize the presence of two populations). In order to investigate this matter further, it is useful to look at additional data from both the referendum studies. Figure 9.5 below gives an illustration of the “no” respondents’ main argument against membership in the two surveys, coded into the same categories as in the documentary analysis. These data support the second explanation proposed above, i.e. they are congruent with the findings of the documentary analysis and disprove the regression analysis’ suggestion that economic interest is of primary importance to Norwegian Euroscepticism, at least the mainstream type. The triangulation of these data with those from the other part of the study strengthens the conclusions drawn previously: the data confirm that geo-historical and rural society arguments are as important to public Euroscepticism as the documentary and regression analyses suggest.

Figure 9.5 “No” voters’ arguments in 1972 & 1994 according to category

Sources: 1972 Referendum Study (taken directly from the dataset provided by NSD) and 1994 Referendum Study (taken from Pettersen et al. 1996: 275).

Another inconsistency between the documentary analysis and the regression analysis was the apparent lack of a relationship between postmaterialist values and Euroscepticism in the latter. The above data restores some of the confidence in the results of the qualitative analysis. Although the postmaterialist slice in the 1972 pie above is modest, the pie on the right shows that in fact, postmaterialist arguments such as concerns for the environment and welfare were of primary importance not

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327 Details of the arguments and which category they were coded to can be found in Appendix I.
only on the Eurosceptic discourse level but also among voters in 1994. Thus, the fact that postmaterialist values came up as non-significant in the regression analysis is likely to be a methodological issue. More specifically, the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that postmaterialist arguments such as environmental protection and peace promotion were also used by the “yes” side in the debate.\textsuperscript{328}

This means that postmaterialist values such as concern for the environment can be a key driver of Norwegian Euroscepticism without there having to be a positive statistical relationship between postmaterialist values and Euroscepticism. To give an example, for the same reason that a Conservative MP favours EU membership because it means free trade and liberalism and a PP MP opposes the EU because it is too socialist and protectionist, a postmaterialist whose main concern is protection of the environment can end up on either standpoint, depending on his/her appraisal of the EU’s environmental efforts. The goal is the same, but the individual’s perception of reality differs.

So, having triangulated the results of the MM analysis from the previous chapters with supplementary data from the referendum surveys, it appears that the VCR theory holds ground on all levels of the analysis. One exception is perhaps that the postmaterialist values segment of public Euroscepticism was somewhat underdeveloped compared to the public discourse in the formative periods. This is congruent with data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), which show that postmaterialist values were not very widespread in the Norwegian population at the time of the first referendum, but that there has been a “silent revolution” since the 1980s. Norway’s score on the survival/self-expression index in 1981, at 0.53, was lower than all the other Nordic countries,\textsuperscript{329} but in 2006, at 2.13, only Sweden had a higher score, at 2.35 (Inglehart n.d.). If the discrepancy between the findings on postmaterialism in the quantitative and qualitative data is indeed reflective of a post-1980s silent revolution in Norway and not down to a

\textsuperscript{328} The environment argument was the primary argument given by 7.1 and 5.8 percent of “no” and “yes” voters in the 1994 Referendum Study respectively (Pettersen et al. 1996: 275-6).

\textsuperscript{329} Denmark had the highest score at 1.44, followed by Sweden at 0.85, Iceland at 0.83 and Finland at 0.82 (Inglehart n.d.)
methodological issue, then it has implications for the explanatory power of the values segment of the VCR model in relation to early Norwegian popular Euroscepticism. However, this issue will have to be investigated further by future research.

On the topic of public Euroscepticism, one important point remains. This is, of course, the two types of Euroscepticism, which also have the potential to account for some of the discrepancies between the results on the different levels of analysis. The two-fold typology of Norwegian Euroscepticism was a finding which emerged quite late from the qualitative analysis. Therefore, the regression in Chapter Eight did not take the two different types into account, and it is possible that the failure to identify that there were two populations in the data (the middle/left parties’ voters and the Conservatives/PP’ voters) made the research design of the public-level analysis inherently flawed. It could be that the lack of recognition of the two-fold typology prevented the regression analysis from picking up on differences between mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism in the population, if these differences do indeed exist. This is significant because, as the analysis above has shown, mainstream and right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism are two phenomena which, with the exception of the geo-historical aspect, are built on almost opposing premises. Nevertheless, having identified the two types of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the study paves the way for future research in the field. It would be interesting to see the results of a regression analysis which replicates the above regression but differentiates between the two types of Euroscepticism.

9.3 A Critical Evaluation of the Approach

Any piece of research operates within theoretical and methodological constraints, and it is almost inevitably shaped by the researcher’s (or researchers’) moral, political and philosophical values. The thesis looked at Norwegian Euroscepticism through the theoretical lens provided by the literature on EU support, specifically the geo-historical, exceptionalist and (refined) rural identity theses from the literature on Norway, and the postmaterialist, utilitarian and identity theses from the
comparative literature. A wide range of data materials and different methods were used to maximize representativeness and minimize selection bias in the study. Although this triangulation strategy arguably served to close some of the gaps that might have been left open by a purely qualitative or quantitative approach, the choice of the MM approach, combining a thematic analysis of documents with an evaluation of qualitative interview data and quantitative survey data, did, at least to some extent, predetermine the type of answers the research would give. This is because methodology is inextricably linked to theory, which in turn has clear implications for what results and conclusions different research approaches generate. The next section looks at some of the ways in which the choice of the methodological approach has shaped the answers and conclusions reached, compared to if a more interpretivist approach had been used. The following section considers some of the problems involved in classifying and explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism according to the VCRUNI framework.

9.3.1 Mixed Methods and Implicit Assumptions
The MM approach was chosen because it was commanded by the research questions and the subject under study, i.e. popular and party-based Norwegian Euroscepticism. While one of the main aims of the study was to enhance qualitative understanding of the phenomenon, it would not have been possible to make any meaningful inferences about the Euroscepticism in the population if the quantitative analysis had been left out.

The research puzzle clearly has its origin in the researcher’s value judgements; for someone who does not think that public support for the EU matters, it would be meaningless to carry out an investigation into public Euroscepticism. For this reason, the interpretations made in the study may well reflect the researcher’s own belief that a farmer, housewife or a student’s opinion on European integration, whether Eurosceptic or Europhile, is just as valid and important as any elite actor’s attitude. This is a belief which is also integral to NtEU and all the Eurosceptic parties’ fundamental attitudes towards the individual and its role in politics and society. On
the left, there is opposition to the elites ruling the masses, and among the middle parties, which compete along the territorial dimension, there is a marked awareness of the periphery’s strong political tradition and respect for the fact that the elites take their power from the people. This is reflected by the interview with the LP’s Odd Einar Dørum:330 he points out that “in Norway, political power has in many ways grown from the periphery in towards the centre, unlike in many other states where the power only is in the centre, or has grown from the centre and out.” The fact that the researcher is sympathetic to her subjects’ cause is likely to have implications for the researcher’s objectivity throughout the analysis. However, in any qualitative research, the researcher is not a truly objective observer, but carries with her/him a set of value judgements which inevitably colour interpretations.

Moreover, the research is based on the assumption that the average voter is a rational being who makes decisions based on his/her values and perceived interests. The research conforms to the conviction that

“Politicians do not operate in a vacuum; their electoral promises and their policy-making decisions need to make sense in the context of the everyday practices and preoccupations of voters to give the former a reasonable change [sic] to succeed at the ballot box. For politicians to successfully mobilize voters on the basis of certain ideas or programs, voters must sense some (material or ideational) affinity with the electoral platform they are offered.”

(Boix 2007: 504)

In other words, the research is based on the premise that Norwegian Euroscepticism is neither simply an elite phenomenon which the Norwegian population is manipulated into adopting every time the issue is put on the agenda, nor a straightforward bottom-up phenomenon, whereby the political parties reflect the preferences of their electorate. There is interaction between the different levels. That

330 Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
Norwegian Euroscepticism does not follow a clear-cut top-down process is not only reflected in the high level of grassroots activity around the time of the referenda, it is also expressed by the interview data. Farmer and CP member, Per Ole Lunde,\textsuperscript{331} criticizes what he calls “conservative argumentation”, “that, if you don’t have knowledge, then you need someone to decide for you”. This is because he (and his party) believes in the “individual’s value and opportunities” and that “involved [people] are fully capable of understanding what the EU issue is really about” and thus, of making up their own minds. As Lunde states, “I have [always] wanted to acquire knowledge, form an opinion at least”. Interestingly, the interviewed politicians express different views on where Norwegian Euroscepticism comes from, also supporting the inference that party-based Euroscepticism cannot be explained by popular Euroscepticism and vice versa. Dag Seierstad from the SLP, for example, perceives his party and NtEU as shapers of public opinion because the vast majority of media coverage of EU issues is heavily biased against the “no” camp: “without information and therefore without real knowledge, [the goal was] to develop the [population’s] knowledge foundation for a ‘no’”\textsuperscript{332} Furthermore, Cathrine Strindin Amundsen from the CP\textsuperscript{333} believes that the party’s Euroscepticism comes from both the top and the bottom levels, but that it is primarily a bottom-up process. That party-based Euroscepticism in the middle parties does have a clear element of elites reflecting voter preferences is also supported by the interview with Odd Jostein Sæter from the CDP.\textsuperscript{334} He states that

“I think definitively that it has come from below. […] Clearly, those who articulate it the strongest will often be leading politicians in a party. But I think that in the CDP […] to the extent the MPs have been somewhat… how to put it… open to deliberate things […] I think that the general trend has been that it is the grassroots pressure which has pulled them from an open, more doubting situation, to a ‘no’.”

\textsuperscript{331} Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
\textsuperscript{332} Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
\textsuperscript{333} Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
\textsuperscript{334} Interview with the author, Oslo, 22 September 2010.
Explicitly put, the main reason for not choosing a purely interpretivist methodology was its poor fit with the research puzzle and the aims of the research, one of which was to empirically test theories from the literature on EU support on the Norwegian case. If for example discourse analysis had been the chosen methodology for the thesis, it would not have been possible to speak of “empirical testing” of the theories from the literature on EU support, as this would have been in conflict with the epistemological underpinnings of the method. Instead, the research is likely to have returned answers akin to Neumann’s (2002), that Norwegian Euroscepticism can be explained by the “no” side’s successful use of “identity politics”, i.e. that Norwegian Euroscepticism is a top-down process. In fact, this is another reason why the discourse analytical toolkit was considered unsuitable for the purposes of the research: the research puzzle itself stands in opposition to Neumann’s interpretation; if voters are indeed “fools that can be easily manipulated by politicians” (Boix 2007: 503), then Norway should have become a member of the EU a long time ago. After all, the “yes” elites have had the odds on their side throughout the last fifty years: they have been in majority and had the might, media and millions335 on their side all along. The pro-membership bias in the Norwegian news media is illustrated by several studies of the 1994 campaign. Jahn et al. (1998: 75) find that in two thirds of cases when the EU issue was mentioned in the two major newspapers, VG and Dagbladet, it was linked to positive consequences for Norway. Similarly, Ramberg (1995, cited by Ringdal 1995: 53) and Nilsen (1996, ibid) reveal that the non-subscription newspapers and the news casts on the two main TV channels, NRK and TV2, presented more “yes” arguments than “no” arguments.

9.3.2 VCR, Utility and National Identity
As mentioned above, in any piece of research it is inevitable that the choice of methods and theoretical framework determines, at least to some extent, what kinds of answers the research returns. Not only does the thesis give a sociological account of Norwegian Euroscepticism, the research is oriented towards theory testing, and

335 and in 1994, they also had Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kallset (2009) notes.
the analytical framework used in the study is also based on categories that are strictly defined according to different theories of EU support. This means that the answers generated by the research were always going to be either confirmations or rejections of the pre-defined theories put forward for testing. In other words, because of the choice of analytical framework, the study could never have returned other answers than rejection of all, some or none of the postmaterialist, exceptionalist, geo-historical, rural society, utilitarian or national identity theses. Clearly, there are several issues with the VCRUNI framework for analysis. In particular, several problems can be identified regarding the different categories’ definitions and their overlaps. For example, it is questionable whether anti-neo-liberalism motivated by protection of the welfare state qualifies as a postmaterialist value. In the study, it is treated as a postmaterialist value because it has its basis in the ideal of equality and egalitarianism, but it could be argued that it is rather a social democratic value.

Furthermore, the framework could be criticized because the line between political values and political culture is blurred. A clear example of this is that the widespread support for the welfare state in the Nordic states is just as appropriately described as part of their political culture as it is a political value. Similarly, the political culture characteristic of participatory, local, accountable democracy is just as easily identified as a self-expression value, and by implication, a postmaterialist value. However, these two theories/categories are perhaps clearer when called by their original names, namely the geo-historical and postmaterialist/exceptionalist theses. Because the political culture category’s definition focuses on geo-historical issues which are related to self-determination and Norway’s history of foreign rule, the social democratic part of Norway’s political culture is not a natural part of the category. One could rather argue that the “political culture” label for this category is inappropriate, and that it should rather be called “self-determination”. Solutions to the problem of the democracy overlap, on the other hand, were considered at the very beginning of the research. Because there was no capacity available to study nuances in this body of argumentation, it was decided that “democracy” arguments

\[336\] With the exception that new categories which did not conform to any of the VCRUNI categories could emerge (like the economic liberalism theme).
were to be consistently coded to one of the two categories instead of both. As the thematic analysis got underway, it became clear that the issue of democracy was a much more important part of the geo-historical body of argumentation than it was to the postmaterialist discourse, so unless democracy arguments were expressed in very clear self-expression/postmaterialist terms, they were all considered part of the geo-historical rather than the postmaterialist theme. This was by no means an optimal solution to the problem, but it served its purpose, which was to avoid ending up with a diluted analysis with no clear lines. Although “democracy” was clearly defined as a geo-historical element, not a postmaterialist one, the analysis does make it clear that the two categories interact and overlap. In practical terms it only means that “democracy” is treated under one heading instead of two; it does not prevent the reader from drawing his/her own parallels to popular political participation’s place in the definition of postmaterialist values.

The rural society concept is another issue which deserves a brief mention. It is evident from the analysis that what is termed and defined as “rural society” in the thesis is an intangible concept, which theoretical underpinnings are substantially underdeveloped. In the literature it has been suggested that the rural of the Norwegian identity and “attachment to the countryside” are factors which can account for the pro-agriculture dimension of Norwegian Euroscepticism, but findings from the study show that the arguments for the protection of rural Norway are plentiful and diverse, ranging from environmentalism to closeness to nature. More research is needed to refine this concept and its relationship to Euroscepticism.

Finally, it is necessary to comment on the tensions between national identity (or nationalism) and the geo-historical explanation. There is no doubt that there are some scholars who would be tempted to rename this theory/category “nationalism” because of its strong focus on national sovereignty. Knudsen (1989) is one of these. Even though he acknowledges that it is closely tied with democracy, he equals the fear of reduced national sovereignty with a nationalist ideology and argues that “nationalism as an ideology was the glue that held [...] Folkebevegelsen together” (p.
45-6). Notwithstanding, the thesis shows that xenophobia and national pride are not related to Euroscepticism in the population when other variables are accounted for and that extremely little of the argumentation in the public debate touches on culture or ethnicity. This indicates that the national sovereignty argument in the Norwegian Eurosceptic debate is rooted in geo-historical factors, i.e. emphasis on self-determination and “the wounds left by a history of foreign rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214), not nationalist sentiments. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the sovereignty/independence dimension is closely linked to issues of democracy in the debate. Consequently, it would not be useful or correct to explain Norwegian Euroscepticism in terms of nationalism. True, national symbols were used by the “no” side to further its cause in the past battles, but so were they on the “yes” side. It would be just as unfair to label the “no” side in Norway nationalists as it would be labelling the “yes” side traitors. Having said this, it is important to emphasise that the thesis does not argue that the geo-historical theory is free from links to national identity. Quite the contrary, as Knudsen (1989: 26) rightly points out,

“No Norway’s national identity was to a large degree shaped as a confrontation with the Danish dominance and with the union with Sweden. In the Norwegian cultural consciousness, democracy and nation state […] are] tied together as two sides of the same issue”.

In other words, the geo-historical explanation is preferred to that of “nationalism” or the national identity theory from the literature on EU support because the latter two imply that Norwegian Euroscepticism is motivated by perceived cultural threat, hostility towards other cultures and exclusive national identity – which clearly, is not the case.

Ultimately, the MM approach, guided by the VCRUNI framework from the literature on EU support, gives an alternative perspective on Norwegian Euroscepticism to those which have been proffered by previous research. Like any

337 Even simple correlations between “national attachment”/“xenophobia” and Eurosceptic attitudes, are not statistically significant <0.01.
other approach, it does not allow us to see Norwegian Euroscepticism “as it is”, but it allows us to see Norwegian Euroscepticism from a new perspective.

9.4 Conclusion

The chapter argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism is most appropriately divided into two broad phenomena: mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, encompassing the LEs, SLP, CP, CDP, LP and NtEU, and right-wing Euroscepticism, encompassing the PP and, in all likelihood, Eurosceptic Conservative members and voters. In other words, in Norway, it is not appropriate to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism, as the left-wing and centre parties and the mainstream “no” movement’s Euroscepticism has the same structure. Whereas mainstream Euroscepticism can be accounted for by VCR, with economic interest and national identity matters being of limited importance, right-wing Euroscepticism in Norway is based on quite different attitudes. The anti-neo-liberalist argumentation of the typical mainstream Eurosceptic stands in sharp contrast to the right-wing Eurosceptic’s complaints that the EU is too expensive, regulated and socialist. They do, however, share one thing in their Euroscepticism: the geo-historical element. Both mainstream and right-wing Eurosceptics are concerned about the impact EU membership would have on the “right of self-determination”, both on the individual (democracy) and national (sovereignty) level.

Furthermore, it was argued that Norwegian Euroscepticism is distinctive, but no more so than any other country’s Euroscepticism, as each country has its own unique history, background and political systems impacting on national political attitudes. Norwegian Euroscepticism’s distinctiveness lies in its geo-historical dimension and, in the case of the mainstream type, rural society elements. Having learned about their country’s history of union, Norwegians ascribe high importance to the value of self-determination, which again is connected to the EU issue. It was also suggested that because Norwegians have seemingly retained much stronger ties to the countryside than their fellow Europeans, the argumentation revolving around
keeping Norway decentralized is another aspect which stands out, even compared to the Nordic countries.

So, the main argument of the thesis is that postmaterialist values, geo-historical factors and rural society (VCR) can explain mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, that is, Euroscepticism on the left and middle of the political spectrum in Norway, and that right-wing Euroscepticism, at least Euroscepticism in the PP, can be explained by the geo-historical aspect and issues of economic utility and neoliberalism. The chapter argued that even though other approaches and conceptualizations would doubtlessly result in different ways of classifying and explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism, the VCRUNI perspective gives new and valuable insights into the phenomenon.

The next chapter sums up the findings and conclusions of the thesis and reflects on issues which have emanated from the study, making some suggestions for future research.
Chapter 10
Conclusion

A dominant assumption in the literature is that the country’s oil wealth is the reason why Norway is not a member of the EU. Gstöhl (1996: 4), for example, argues that “[b]eing rich is not the reason for [the Norwegians’] reluctance but it allows them to cherish national peculiarities much longer”. One of the main aims of the thesis was to challenge the assumption that Norwegian Euroscepticism is all about the economy. True, many scholars acknowledge that the economy may not be the motivating factor, but rather the enabling factor behind Norwegian Euroscepticism, but although this might be the case, it is important to point out that there is no evidence to support this theory. Quite the contrary, in relation to 1961-2010 Norwegian Euroscepticism, the research shows little evidence to support the economy claim; in fact, the thesis suggests that attachment to the “national peculiarities” might well supersede unfavourable economic conditions. The aim of thesis was to examine the motivation behind Norwegian Euroscepticism to find out more about the nature of the phenomenon, i.e. what the “national peculiarities” which Gstöhl and other scholars speak of are, and how it can be explained. This concluding chapter sums up the main arguments and conclusions of the thesis. It also comments on the wider implications of the study findings and makes some suggestions for future research in the field.

10.1 Two types of Euroscepticism: VCR and CUL

Drawing on a thematic analysis of a variety of sources, including letters to the editor, party literature, Folkebevegelsen/NtEU literature, online articles, interview and survey data, the thesis argues that it is appropriate to speak of two broad types of Norwegian Euroscepticism. The first type, mainstream Euroscepticism, is found on the left and middle of the political spectrum in Norway and can be explained by concern about postmaterialist Values, geo-historical/political Culture factors and the maintenance of Norway’s Rural society (VCR). In other words, quite uniquely,
Norwegian Euroscepticism does not follow a strict left/right structure, as it is not possible to separate a specific left-wing Euroscepticism from a centre Euroscepticism. Put simply, both the left and the centre share the same Euroscepticism, the *mainstream* Euroscepticism. The second type, *right-wing* Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is motivated by political Culture, Utilitarian and market Liberalist issues (CUL). Thus, the research returns little evidence to support the economic interest thesis in relation to *mainstream* Norwegian Euroscepticism, but suggests that it is relevant to Euroscepticism on the right of the political spectrum in Norway. Notwithstanding, considering that *right-wing* Euroscepticism was and still is the more marginal phenomenon out of the two and, strictly speaking, economic arguments were of limited validity in both Sweden and Norway in 1994 due to the EEA agreement, it is curious that Norway’s healthy economy was and is still used as an explanation for why Norway voted “no” to the EU in 1994 and Sweden voted “yes”. Besides, the thematic analysis in the thesis clearly shows that economic arguments have been considered more or less irrelevant on the “no” side throughout the four phases of Euroscepticism, from 1961 to 2010.

Despite this, Gstöhl (1996: 15) and others point out that “Norway used the oil money for subsidies to precisely those rural areas and industries – well represented in the Storting – where opposition to the EU was strongest”, consequently implying that EU opposition in the “rural areas and industries”, i.e. among farmers and fishermen and their sympathisers, would not have been as strong had the oil money not been available to spend on agricultural subsidies and other regional policies. However, this complex can be viewed from a different perspective, as farmer Per Ole Lunde’s comments illustrate. He is unsure whether the oil has been an advantage or a disadvantage to the agricultural sector and the average farmer, as he points out that

“[the oil] has, after all, changed the cost levels enormously in Norway. And the cost levels in other industries have increased an awful lot, certainly,

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338 Or that this electoral constituency would have diminished had the oil not been discovered.
339 Interview with the author, Vest-Torpa, 15 September 2009.
compared to what we earn per hour in agriculture. So I’m not so sure that the situation would have been so much worse for the agricultural sector if we didn’t have the oil”.

Put differently, speculations about what the situation would have been if Norway did not have the oil could point both ways. This also applies to speculations about EEA agreement or no EEA agreement post-1993. Dag Seierstad from the SLP,\textsuperscript{340} for example, does not believe that if the EEA agreement had not been in place, the country would have been a member of the EU. He thinks it depends:

“I mean, if Gro hadn’t gone down the EEA route, I think the majority in the referendum would have been just as large. But because the EEA already existed, it is possible that it was easier for people to vote ‘no’”.

Having found little evidence for the economic interest theory, the thesis argues that Norwegian Euroscepticism can be, at least in part, explained by issues of self-determination which have emanated from the “wounds left by a history of foreign rule” (Gstöhl 2002a: 214). It contends that throughout the last fifty years, principles grounded in history have stood in the way of Norway’s ability to join a supranational community with imperfect democratic structures; in 1961, 1972, 1994 and 2010 alike, the “no” side put significant emphasis on the country’s ability to retain its hard-won independence, sovereignty and national control over its resources, previously exploited or neglected by their Danish and Swedish rulers, and even more importantly, its democracy, its \textit{folkestyre}, which is characterized by closeness to the people and thus incompatible with Brussels’ “remote democracy”.

Moreover, as part of the VCR explanation, it is argued that \textit{mainstream} Euroscepticism is also motivated by postmaterialist values and a concern for rural Norway. Norwegian \textit{mainstream} Eurosceptics oppose what they perceive as the EU’s exaggerated neo-liberalist emphasis on economic growth, the Single Market and the

\textsuperscript{340} Interview with the author, Oslo, 18 September 2009.
four freedoms because they think that priority should be given to greater social equality, quality of life and solidarity with the developing world, and protecting the environment instead of promoting further pollution and exploitation of the world’s resources. In addition to threatening these postmaterialist values, the EU’s “preoccupation with economic growth” is also viewed as jeopardizing the tradition of maintaining “district Norway” as it is – populated and characterized by “thriving communities” – as many of Norway’s regional policy measures, having the potential to distort competition, would be prohibited if Norway joined the EU. Conversely, right-wing Norwegian Eurosceptics, as champions of neo-liberalist economic policy, oppose EU membership for exactly the opposite reasons: they want fewer transfers, less interference from the EU in the name of social and regional equalization, and for the Norwegian agricultural sector to die a natural death, without subsidies from either the national agricultural policy or the CAP.

Because mainstream Euroscepticism is the most dominant type of Norwegian Euroscepticism, found in all the left-wing and middle parties (SME, SLP, CP, CDP and LP) as well as in the ad hoc organizations Folkebevegelsen (1972) and NtEU, it will be considered in further detail here. Certainly, alternative labels could be used to describe the motivators of Norwegian Euroscepticism. Political culture could be an all-encompassing term describing the VCR complex, as all the components relate to a centre/left-wing pattern of values, attitudes and beliefs regarding the political system in Norway. Identity is another term which has frequently been used to describe the underlying structure of Norwegian mainstream Euroscepticism by scholars in the field. For example, Archer (2005: 64), argues that

“a decision […] such as whether to join the EU – is affected not just by external elements but also by a mixture of interests, identity and interests shaped by identity. In turn, an appeal to a particular identity is made easier if it has been embedded in the country’s culture and institutions”.
Bringing the country’s “culture and institutions” into the equation, it is clear that Archer’s conception of identity is not the same as that of the national identity thesis in the literature on EU support (cf. McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). The analysis also shows that the way in which it is conceptualized in the comparative literature on EU support, i.e. with a focus on exclusive national identity, hostility towards other cultures and national pride, has very limited applicability to Norwegian mainstream Euroscepticism on all levels. Despite this, there is no doubt that identity, that is, Norwegians’ conceptions of themselves, their country and how it should be run, is a very important part of the VCR explanation.

The poem Nordmannen (“the Norwegian”), written by the 19th century poet and founder of the nynorsk language, Ivar Aasen, is an interesting point of reference in this context, both for those familiar and unfamiliar with its content. With the melody composed by Ludvig M. Lindeman, it is one of Norway’s unofficial national anthems (see Esborg 2002: 239), sung in classrooms and on Norway’s Constitution Day, 17 May, all across the country. Consequently, it represents part of the national cultural heritage which every Norwegian is familiar with. The song was also printed in NtEU’s songbook Stem i! in 1994 (Esborg 2002), and also features in its organization handbook. The author’s translation of the poem is presented in Table 10.1.341 The poem is interesting because it shows that values such as independence, self-determination and local self-governed communities, i.e. political culture (see verses one and two particularly), love for and closeness to nature, i.e. rural society (verse one to five), and equality, not wealth, i.e. political values (verses six and seven) are integral to the Norwegian identity and that they are values which are instilled into Norwegians from an early age. In this way, the VCR explanation corresponds with an identity or cultural explanation.

Yet another way the VCR totality can be expressed is a desire to protect the “Norwegian way of life” or the “Norwegian way of doing things”, which is different from “the EU way”. This could perhaps be linked back to Exceptionalism, but only

341 For the Norwegian version, see Appendix J. Only the verses printed in NtEU’s organization handbook are reproduced.
### The Norwegian

by Ivar Aasen

Between hills and rocks by the sea
the Norwegian has built his home,
there, he himself has dug the foundations
and put his house upon them himself.

He looked out at the rocky beaches,
there was no one who there had built.
“Let us clear and build ourselves communities,
and then we will safely own the clearing”.

He looked out at the undulating sea,
it was squally to get out on it.
But fish were playing down in the depths of the sea,
and that play he wanted to see.

In the winter, he sometimes thought;
I wish I was in a warmer land!
But when the sun shone on the hills in the spring,
he longed for his homely beach.

And when the hillsides green like gardens,
when flowers on stalks abound,
and when nights are as light as days,
he cannot imagine a more beautiful place.

South on the ocean he sometimes had to sail,
there were riches on benches and tables,
but around him he saw the thraldom hang back
and so he turned again towards north.

Let now other about glory quarrel,
let them sparkle with wealth and grandeur,
among bigwigs I cannot be comfortable,
among equals mostly I am happy.
in the sense of it being a different way of doing things or the Norwegians’ way of doing things, and not a superior way of doing things. The main issue here is to have freedom to decide how Norway should be run, “being masters in their own house”, being able to keep the humane and districts-oriented Norway, a society which is seen as worth keeping. Sigrid Zurbuchen Heiberg from UmEU\textsuperscript{342} gives a poignant account of what Norway signifies to her, parts of which she is worried will be lost through for example social dumping and more profit-oriented policies, which EU integration is seen as a motor of:

I feel that being from Norway, it’s a bit like having good parents who you can rely on. It’s a bit like always being able to come home, and then everything will sort itself out. If you get into lots of trouble, then you can go home to your parents, and then everything will be alright. […] In Norway I know that… regardless of […] if I do something bad […] I will be treated fairly, and I will… if I fall ill, I will get help. I don’t need any insurance; I will get help. And if I have kids, then they will get a good education and they will get free higher education, and… and all of that, that’s what I think is the great safety (trygghet) about living in Norway. Not necessarily that I have lots of money, but that my country actually… or that the society takes care of us. That, I think, is… yes, I think that’s very, very good.”

Odd Einar Dørum from the LP\textsuperscript{343} and Wegard Harsvik from SME\textsuperscript{344} are also reluctant to conform to the EU way of doing things because they do not believe there is one right way of organizing countries, economies and societies. Dørum argues that “everything does not get better by everyone going into the same system and the same mill”; he sees the value of small countries being able to give “the big [ones] a kick up their backside, forcing them to think”. His key argument is that he believes that a country like Norway, “— closely connected to important international institutions – can play a limited but meaningful role to contribute to eco-friendliness

\textsuperscript{342} Interview with the author, Oslo, 7 January 2010.
\textsuperscript{343} Interview with the author, Oslo, 13 January 2010.
\textsuperscript{344} Interview with the author, Oslo, 8 January 2010.
and easing conflict in the big international picture”. Harsvik is also worried about the one-sidedness the EU leads to. He thinks that “the culture of humanity […] should not be channelled in one direction because then you have fewer experiences and fewer opportunities to draw on when faced with new challenges […]”. Put differently, Norway’s way of organizing its society is regarded as a value not only to the people who live in the country, but also in terms of maintaining a diversity of ways to govern internationally.

Political culture, identity or “the Norwegian way of life”; these are all valid ways of thinking about mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the VCR viewpoint arguably refines these conceptions somewhat, and gives a different, a new perspective on what Norwegian Euroscepticism is about.

10.2 Contribution to Knowledge

Although the thesis does not necessarily challenge conclusions drawn in other parts of the literature about how issues of identity, political culture or conceptions of the Norwegian way of life or the country’s “peculiarities” can explain Norwegian Euroscepticism, it does serve to clarify what these labels signify, through reframing them and arguing that issues of self-determination, political values and rural society interact to form the typical Norwegian unwillingness to join the EU. Unlike much previous work on the issue, theoretical in its outlook, the thesis provides empirical evidence in support of its conclusions, showing how the geo-historical, postmaterialist and rural themes have played out in the debate on the EU in Norway. Moreover, instead of going down the avenue of quantitative research which is conventional to the study of EU support and Euroscepticism, the thesis wrestled with limited data availability and tried to shape a new, creative yet rigorous, methodological approach to gain new insights into the phenomenon. The long timeline, the gathering and analysis of original data and the utilization of MM

345 Personal communication, 21 February 2011.
346 E.g. readers’ letters and commentaries from five decades and new survey/interview data.
undoubtedly helped the thesis make an original contribution to current understanding of Norwegian Euroscepticism.

In addition, the empirical study also contributes to enhance the theoretical understanding of Euroscepticism, as it challenges some of the literature’s weak conceptual definitions and questionable assumptions about Euroscepticism. For example, it questions the way the national identity thesis has been applied in the literature on EU support, as it shows that it is of limited applicability to a country in which identity reportedly has played a significant part in the debate on the EU. Moreover, in the literature, it is often assumed that Euroscepticism both among the public and the elites is an illegitimate and predominantly populist reaction against European integration and a result of ignorance of what the EU is really about. Inglehart’s (1977) theorizing, which links low cognitive mobilization, shallow reasoning and materialist attitudes to low support for the EC is a good example of this; the national identity thesis, which links hostility towards other cultures with Euroscepticism (e.g. McLaren 2002) is another. Conversely, the findings of the thesis are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Schymik (2006, 2010) in his study of the three Scandinavian people’s movements against the EU. He argues that

“[t]he negative image which is nurtured in politics, media and science does not do justice to the people’s movements against the EU in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The EU opponents are not hesitant sceptics who are attacked by diffuse affictions and irrational anxiety. Their opposition is, quite the contrary, clearly articulated, rationally testable and above all, legitimate.”

(Schymik 2010: 85-7)

Schymik’s (2010) findings show that the conflicts between first, the Single Market’s principles and those of the Nordic equality-oriented welfare state, and second, the EU’s widely acknowledged democratic deficit and the Nordic ideal of nærdemokrati

347 Translated from German into Norwegian by Morten Harper and from Norwegian to English by the author.
(democracy close to the people) are arguments shared by all the Scandinavian countries. As these elements of the Norwegian opposition is elaborated on in the thesis, through an examination of the reasoning behind the democracy argument and the “humane society” versus the profit-driven EU argument, the thesis has the potential of shedding further light on the Nordic Eurosceptic rationale too. Thus, in this way, the thesis also contributes to the comparative literature on Euroscepticism.

Furthermore, through establishing that there are two distinct types of Euroscepticism in Norway, namely mainstream and right-wing Euroscepticism, the thesis arguably makes another significant contribution to knowledge. This finding has evident implications for future research in the field, as it compels scholars to distinguish between two separate phenomena when analysing Euroscepticism in Norway, and arguably also in other countries. That Eurosceptics on the left and right of the political spectrum base their Euroscepticism on completely different arguments is nothing new. This was even made evident through the discussion of the diversity of Eurosceptic argumentation in the literature review (Chapter Two). But for exactly this reason, it is perplexing that observers who are concerned with explaining why people oppose the EU in previous studies have not separated left-wing (or in the Norwegian case mainstream) Eurosceptics from right-wing Eurosceptics. The thesis makes a clear case for drawing this distinction in future research in order to refine our understanding of Euroscepticism in Norway and elsewhere in Europe.

The creation of new knowledge about Norwegian Euroscepticism is important not only for the “yes” side and “no” side in Norway in their continuing battle for and against Norwegian EU membership, it is important if we are to fully understand the European political and social environment we are part of. Currently, there are no signs that Euroscepticism is abating, neither in non-member states like Norway, nor in the EU. For national and EU-level politicians and policy-makers, it seems more important than ever to gain a better insight into what Euroscepticism really is. It is doubtlessly much more difficult, if not impossible, to combat a development which
is not well-understood or appreciated, than it is dealing with one which causes and force are comprehended and accepted.

10.3 Suggestions for Future Research

The study raises a number of issues and questions which would benefit from further research. First, as touched upon in the previous chapter, to confirm that Norwegian public Euroscepticism indeed follows the same mainstream and right-wing patterns of elite Euroscepticism as suggested in the thesis, a quantitative study which differentiates between the two types and tests the VCRUNI theories should be conducted. Using the VCRUNI approach to carry out a comparative study of Norway and one or several countries/parties is another avenue for future research, which would verify how and to what extent Norwegian Euroscepticism stands out from its Nordic and European counterparts. In this context, for example comparing the postmaterialist or political culture motivation in Norwegian and Swedish centre/left-wing Euroscepticism and Norway and Finland in terms of its support for agriculture and attachment to the countryside would be particularly interesting. Furthermore, a comparative study of the PP’s and for example the UK Conservative Party and/or the SVP could yield some valuable insights into the nuances in right-wing Euroscepticism across Europe, in member and non-member states.

Finally, the issue of identity in relation to Norwegian Euroscepticism should be explored further. First, the relationship between the PP’s Euroscepticism and concerns about national identity and immigration ought to be looked at in more detail, as the thesis findings suggest that MPs from the PP are more worried about cultural threat in relation to European integration than MPs from other parties. Specifically, research should be directed towards testing the national identity theory (McLaren 2002; Carey 2002) more thoroughly on the PP’s Euroscepticism or alternatively right-wing Norwegian Euroscepticism. Second, the rural society complex would benefit from more research. What exactly motivates the support for agriculture and the regional policy in Norway (which in turn motivates
Euroscepticism)? Is it a rural self-image, postmaterialist values such as solidarity or environmentalism, or some other unidentified force?

The thesis opens up several new avenues for future research in the field of Euroscepticism, both as regards case studies and comparative studies. Due to the increased awareness of the elite/public gap in EU affairs and the consequential rise in demand of the use of referenda to ratify new treaties, the next decade could prove to be a very interesting time for scholars of public and party support for and opposition to the EU. In Norway, too, the next ten years are likely to be an interesting decade in terms of the Norway/EU relationship: at the end of 2011, the report on the EEA agreement, which was commissioned by the government in January 2010, is due. This is predicted to open up a wide debate on Norway’s form of affiliation to the EU. Besides, 2014 does not only mark that it is 20 years since the last referendum on membership, it also marks the 200th anniversary of the Norwegian Constitution. Whether there will be a new debate on membership in the near future remains to be seen, but if the public opinion polls at the beginning of the decade are anything to go by, then the “yes” side has quite a lot of convincing to do.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Map of the Norwegian Counties
# Appendix B

## Overview of the Norwegian Party System

### Table B1  Party members 1950-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SLP</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>CDP</th>
<th>LP</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>PP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>200,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>150,500</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>56,500</td>
<td>52,500</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>153,500</td>
<td>53,500</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>59,500</td>
<td>170,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>128,100</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>56,200</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>146,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>72,600</td>
<td>46,600</td>
<td>56,600</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>78,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>58,800</td>
<td>31,600</td>
<td>47,900</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>51,600</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>49,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Heidar (2005: 810). Figures taken from parties’ annual reports, adjusted to closest 100.
### Table B2

**Storting election results 1906-1936 (percentages/seats)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chr. D</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SSB (2000); Aardal 2010a

### Table B3

**Storting election results 1945-1973 (percentages/seats)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPP*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chr. D</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Results for the SPP in 1961-1969 and for the SEL in 1973.
Sources: SSB (2000); Aardal 2010a
### Table B4  Sorting election results 1973-1993 (percentages/seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SSB (2000); Aardal 2010a

### Table B5  Parliamentary election results post-1994 (percentages/seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SSB 2000; Aardal 2010a.
Appendix C

The Pilot Study for the Newspaper Research

The pilot study was carried out in Nationalbiblioteket in Oslo on 2 March 2009. Before the pilot, six newspapers were considered for the study: five of the largest Norwegian local newspapers, each representing a region of Norway, and one national broadsheet newspaper, based in Oslo. The newspapers and their circulation are presented in Table C1 below.

Table C1   Newspapers initially selected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Counties*</th>
<th>Circulation**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordlys</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Finnmork, Troms, Nordland</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adresseavisen</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-Trøndelag, Møre og Romsdal</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergens Tidende (BT)</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Sogn og Fjordane, Hordaland, Rogaland</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fædrelands-vennen</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder, (Telemark)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppland</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Oppland, (Hedmark)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeiderblad (OA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftenposten</td>
<td>Centre (national)</td>
<td>(Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold, Østfold, Buskerud)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The counties in brackets are not covered by the newspaper, but are part of the region.
** Newspaper’s circulation in 2008, percent of the population (Medienorge, 2009).

The pilot study had three objectives. First, it aimed to determine whether the prospective selected newspapers were suitable for the study. Specifically, it had to be checked to what extent they had regular letters to the editor columns throughout the fifty-year period. It was also relevant to get an idea of what number of anti-EC/EU letters it would be reasonable to expect to find in the different newspapers in each decade. The second objective was to estimate the scope of the newspaper study, i.e. to find out how many and which newspapers to include. Here it was essential to ascertain how much time it would take to search through a newspaper according to the chosen data collection strategy and whether covering one, two or three papers
would return too little, too much or just the right amount of data for the analysis. Third, the purpose of the pilot was to test the analytical framework on a sample of the target data to make sure that it was able to capture the tendencies in the data.

All the six newspapers’ letters pages were inspected, but due to time restrictions, the full pilot was carried out only on the local newspaper for the Middle Norway region, *Adresseavisen*. The pilot used a cross-section sampling approach; for purposes of simplification, the third year of each decade (i.e. 1962, 1972, 1982 etc.) was selected (the first or the second would also have been appropriate to probe each of the five decades). For each year, the aim was to cover four months (two rolls of microfilm) selected at random in order to avoid striking any readers’ letters ‘black spots’ (i.e. months of little readers’ letters activity) and to minimize any bias on the part of the researcher. However, although the pilot kept to two rolls of microfilm per year, the four months goal was reduced to two months for the last three periods because of the increasing volume of the newspaper and the concurrent time limitations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>January, February, July, August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>March, April, November, December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>May, June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>January, October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>February, November</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C2 shows the periods that were covered by the pilot. At this stage, all the readers’ letters on the issue of the EC from the periods were collected (i.e. both pro-EC/EU and anti-EC/EU). This was done to reduce bias, to get a full picture of both sides of the debate and to maximize comprehension of those letters written in response to others.

The pilot generated 56 readers’ letters altogether, which were read and subsequently analysed according to the (unrefined version of the) coding protocol outlined in Appendix G. Thus, the pilot established the appropriateness of using the VCRUNI
framework for analysis. In addition, it confirmed that covering six newspapers and three years from each decade would be far above the maximum that one person could cover in the time frame of a PhD. Moreover, by giving some indication of the number of EU-related letters it would be reasonable to expect from a local newspaper, it was decided that, as a minimum, a large (national) newspaper would have to be included in the study, as it would contain more relevant data (and, having a larger readership, potentially be more representative of the general public’s views).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of months included in pilot</th>
<th>No. of letters found in pilot</th>
<th>Expected no. of letters per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows how many readers’ letters on the topic of the EC/EU (both pro and anti) the pilot study suggested that Adresseavisen would contain each year. These are rough calculations based on the number of articles generated in each of the years in the pilot study (e.g. 6 letters found during four months in 1962, equals an expected number of 18 letters for the whole year). The pilot calculations suggested that if three years from each decade were covered in the study and each of 1962, 1972, 1982, 1992 and 2002 were representative of the other two years in each decade, then that there would be 711 EC/EU-related letters available to collect in Adresseavisen. It was expected that Aftenposten, being a national newspaper, would have as many or more readers’ letters on the topic of EC/EU membership through the period and that it would form the core of the newspaper research.
Appendix D

Additional Information about the 2006 and 2010 Elite Surveys

The Surveys

The 2006 survey (Survey A) and 2010 survey (Survey B) were carried out to gain additional insight into elite/party attitudes towards the EU beyond what the documentary analysis and the secondary literature could offer. The first survey was originally conducted for my final year BA project at the University of the West of England, entitled “Norway: A Country of Persistent Eurosceptics or Moving towards a New EU Membership Application?” (2007), and created the starting point for the 2010 survey.

The Questionnaires

Both the questionnaires were limited to ten questions on two A4 pages to avoid deterring the respondents and maximize the response. For the same reason, the majority of the questions were closed-ended. The questions primarily asked about the respondents’ attitudes towards Norwegian EU membership, different aspects of European integration and issues related to Norway joining the EU. The design of the questionnaire for Survey B built on the experiences from Survey A; the most relevant and successful question items were reproduced, while the items which were less relevant to the current project were discarded. The latter were replaced by questions which addressed some of the issues raised by the literature review and documentary analysis, such as the importance of the settlement pattern and maintaining control over the natural resources. The Norwegian version and the English translation of the questionnaires are reproduced below.

Procedure

First on 31 October 2006 and subsequently on 6 January 2010, envelopes containing a copy of a two page questionnaire and a cover letter, were distributed to the 169 Norwegian MPs. On both occasions, the envelopes were left with the Storting
reception staff in Løvebakken in Oslo. The respondents were asked to return the completed questionnaires to my parents’ home address in Norway. Around a month later, an e-mail was sent to all the MPs, which thanked them for their participation and gave those who had not responded another chance to reply, this time by e-mail.

Response
89 questionnaires were returned for Survey A and 84 for Survey B, which means that the survey response rates were 53 and 50 percent respectively. In both surveys, the response rate was highest in the CP, Conservative Party and PP, consistently over 60 percent. It was lowest in the LP and the Labour Party, with less than half of the MPs returning the questionnaires on both occasions. It should be noted, however, that the LP’s zero response rate in 2010 is out of a total of three MPs. Further details of survey response according to party can be seen in Table D1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Survey A 2006</th>
<th>Survey B 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response (count)</td>
<td>Party response rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, 45 and 38 percent of the MPs who took part in Survey A and B respectively, reported that they did not want Norway to become a member of the EU.

Data Analysis
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was utilized to compile and analyse the quantitative data. The qualitative data obtained from the qualitative questions
were compiled in one document and analysed as part of the textual analysis in Chapter Seven.

(See below for copies of the Norwegian and English versions of the questionnaires)
Holdninger til europeisk integrering blant norske Stortingsrepresentanter

En spørreundersøkelse utført av Marianne Sundlisæter, forsker i Europeiske Studier ved University of the West of England, Bristol, Storbritannia

Kjønn: □ kvinne □ mann

Politisk parti: ________________________________

Fylke: ________________________________

1. Synes du Norge burde søke om medlemskap i den Europeiske Union (EU)?
   □ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening

2. Hva stemte du ved siste folkeavstemning om norsk EU-medlemskap?
   □ Ja □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme

3. Tror du Norge kommer til å søke om medlemskap i EU innen 2009?
   □ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening

4. Tror du Norge kommer til å søke om medlemskap i EU i neste Stortingsperiode (2009-2013)?
   □ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening

5. Hvilke av følgende EU-initiativer støtter du? Vennligst sett kryss i alle gjeldende ruter:
   □ Den felles landbrukspolitikken
   □ Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken
   □ Det indre marked
   □ EØS-avtalen (EEA)
   □ Schengen-avtalen
   □ Utvidelsen østover, mai 2004
   □ Videre utvidelse (inkludert Tyrkia)
   □ Økonomisk og monetær union (EMU) / Euroen
6. Hvilke av følgende argumenter mot norsk EU-medlemskap støtter du?
Vennligst sett kryss i alle relevante ruter:

**EU-medlemskap vil…**
- ...bety mer byråkratisering
- ...skade landbruket og fiskerinæringen
- ...ta fra Norge sin nåværende innflytelsesrike posisjon utenrikspolitikk
- ...true den norske velferdssaten
- ...true nasjonal suverenitet (inkludert selvråderetten)
- ...true norsk kultur og kulturarv
- ...true norsk lokalpolitikk
- ...være for dyrt

7. Hvilke av følgende argumenter for norsk EU-medlemskap støtter du?
Vennligst sett kryss i alle relevante ruter:

**EU-medlemskap vil…**
- ...bidra til å ivareta gode forhold og fred på kontinentet
- ...forbedre Norges forhold til Europa
- ...gi Norge en mulighet til å ta del i viktige beslutninger på EU-nivå
- ...gi Norge muligheten til å melde seg inn i EMU
- ...gi norske bedrifter bedre konkurransevilkår i Europa
- ...gjøre Norge mer innflytelsesrik i internasjonal politikk
- ...ha en positiv innvirkning på norsk økonomi
- ...vise norsk solidaritet med de mindre utviklede landene i Europa

Til hvilken grad vil du si deg enig med følgende utsagn:

8. **EU-spørsmålet er et viktig tema på den nasjonalpolitiske arena i Norge.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
<th>Uenig til en viss grad</th>
<th>Verken uenig eller enig</th>
<th>Enig til en viss grad</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9. **Norske partier og politikere bagatelliserer Europaspørsmålet ved nasjonale valg.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
<th>Uenig til en viss grad</th>
<th>Verken uenig eller enig</th>
<th>Enig til en viss grad</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10. Hva er dine egne føler som angår Norges framtidige forhold til EU?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Hjertelig takk for hjelpen. Oktober-november 2006/M Sundlisæter
Stortingsrepresentantenes holdninger til EU

Kjønn: □ kvinne □ mann
Parti: ____________________________
Fylke: ____________________________

1. Synes du Norge bør bli medlem i EU?
□ Ja □ Nei □ Ingen formening

2. Hva stemte du ved folkeavstemningen om norsk EU-medlemskap i 1994?
□ Ja □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme

3. Hva stemte du ved folkeavstemningen om norsk EF-medlemskap i 1972?
□ Ja □ Nei □ Avla ikke stemme

4. Når tror du EU-saken vil bli aktuell igjen i Norge?
_________________________________________________________

5. Hvilke fem av de følgende er mest dekkende for hva du mener EU står for?
□ Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken
□ Frihandel og liberalisme
□ Utilstrekkelig fokus på miljøet
□ Økonomisk samhørighet
□ Et Europa av regioner
□ Et fredsprosjekt
□ Nærhetsprinsippet
□ Sentralisering
□ Økonomisk og monetær union
□ Et føderalt Europa / en europeisk superstat
□ Et Europa av uavhengige stater
□ Demokratisk underskudd
□ En høyere form for demokratisk styring
□ Miljøvern
□ Barrierer mot resten av verden
□ EUs strukturfond
□ Frarøvelse av suverenitet
□ Byråkrati
□ Annet: ____________________________

6. Hvilken av de følgende utsagn er du mest enig i?
□ EU er en bra ting både for Europa og verden, og Norge bør bli medlem.
□ EU kan være en bra ting for andre europiske land, men EU-medlemskap passer ikke for Norge.
□ EU er verken en bra ting for Europa, verden eller Norge.
Eventuelle kommentarer:
7. Hvilke av følgende EU-initiativer støtter du? Vennligst sett kryss i alle gjeldende ruter:

☐ Den felles landbrukspolitikken
☐ Den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken
☐ Det indre marked (de fire friheter)
☐ EØS-avtalen
☐ Schengen-avtalen
☐ Utvidelsen østover, mai 2004
☐ Videre utvidelse (inkludert Tyrkia)
☐ Økonomisk og monetær union (euroen)
☐ Økt bruk av kvalifisert flertall
☐ EU:s strukturfond

8. Hva er dine hovedargumenter for/imot EU (og norsk EU-medlemskap)?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

9. Hvor viktig synes du det er at Norges spredte bosetting opprettholdes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ikke viktig i det hele tatt</td>
<td>Litt viktig</td>
<td>Verken viktig eller uviktig</td>
<td>Ganske viktig</td>
<td>Veldig viktig</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvis du kryset av for 4 eller 5, hvorfor er bosettingsmønsteret så viktig for deg?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

10. Hvor viktig synes du det er å ha nasjonal kontroll med naturressursene?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ikke viktig i det hele tatt</td>
<td>Litt viktig</td>
<td>Verken viktig eller uviktig</td>
<td>Ganske viktig</td>
<td>Veldig viktig</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvis du kryset av for 4 eller 5, hvorfor mener du det er viktig? Er det av hovedsaklig økonomiske årsaker eller er det andre målsettinger som er viktig?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Hjertelig takk for hjelpen! Januar 2010/M Sundlisæter Skinner
Attitudes towards European integration amongst Norwegian MPs

A survey carried out by Marianne Sundlisæter, a researcher in European Studies at the University of the West of England, Bristol, Great Britain

Gender: □ female □ male

Party: ____________________________

Constituency: ____________________________

1. Do you think Norway should apply to become a member of the European Union?
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion

2. Which way did you vote at the last referendum on Norwegian EU membership?
□ Yes □ No □ Did not vote

3. Do you think Norway will apply for EU membership before 2009?
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion

4. Do you think Norway will apply for EU membership between 2009 and 2013?
□ Yes □ No □ Undecided / No opinion

5. Which of the following aspects of the EU do you support (if any)? Please tick all applicable boxes:
□ Common Agricultural Policy
□ Common Foreign and Security Policy
□ Single Market
□ EEA Agreement
□ Schengen Agreement
□ Enlargement, May 2004
□ Further enlargements (including Turkey)
□ EMU/the Euro
6. Which of the following arguments against Norwegian EU membership do you support? Please tick all applicable boxes:

*EU membership would…*
- [ ] ... add unnecessary bureaucracy
- [ ] ... damage the agricultural and fisheries sectors
- [ ] ... rob Norway of its current influential position in foreign affairs
- [ ] ... threaten the Norwegian welfare state
- [ ] ... threaten national sovereignty (including “selvråderetten”)
- [ ] ... threaten Norwegian culture and heritage
- [ ] ... threaten Norwegian regional policy and municipalities
- [ ] ... be too expensive

7. Which of the following arguments for Norwegian EU membership do you support? Please tick all applicable boxes:

*EU membership would…*
- [ ] ... help maintain good relations and peace on the continent
- [ ] ... improve relations with Europe
- [ ] ... enable Norway to take part in important decision-making on an EU level
- [ ] ... give Norway the chance to join the EMU
- [ ] ... make Norwegian firms more competitive
- [ ] ... make Norway more influential on the world stage
- [ ] ... boost the Norwegian economy
- [ ] ... show Norwegian solidarity with the less developed parts of Europe

To what extent do you agree with the following two statements:

8. *The EU is an important issue on the domestic political agenda in Norway.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree to some extent</th>
<th>Neither agree</th>
<th>Agree to some extent</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9. *Norwegian parties and politicians downplay the issue of Europe in domestic elections.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree to some extent</th>
<th>Neither agree</th>
<th>Agree to some extent</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

10. What are your own feelings about Norway’s future relationship with the EU?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire. October, 2006/M Sundlisæter
Norwegian MPs’ Attitudes towards the EU

Gender: □ female □ male

Party: ____________________________

County: ____________________________

1. Do you think Norway should become a member of the EU?
□ Yes □ No □ No opinion

2. What did you vote in the referendum on Norwegian EU membership in 1994?
□ Yes □ No □ Did not vote

3. What did you vote in the referendum on Norwegian EC membership in 1972?
□ Yes □ No □ Did not vote

4. When do you think the EU question will come back onto the agenda in Norway?
________________________________________

5. Which five of the following best cover what you think the EU is about?
□ Common Foreign and Security Policy
□ Free trade and liberalism
□ Inadequate focus on the environment
□ Economic community
□ Europe of Regions
□ A peace project
□ The principle of subsidiarity
□ Centralization
□ Economic and Monetary Union
□ A federal Europe / a European superstate
□ Europe of independent states
□ Democratic deficit
□ A higher form of democratic governance
□ Environmental protection
□ Barriers to the rest of the world
□ EU’s structural funds
□ Loss of sovereignty
□ Bureaucracy
□ Other: ____________________________

6. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most?
□ The EU is a good thing, both for Europe and the world, and Norway should become a member.
□ The EU can be a good thing for other European countries, but EU membership is not for Norway.
□ The EU is not a good thing for Europe, the world or Norway.

Other comments:
7. Which of the following EU initiatives do you support? Please tick all relevant boxes:

- Common Agricultural Policy
- Common Foreign and Security Policy
- Single Market (the four freedoms)
- EEA Agreement
- Schengen Agreement
- Eastward enlargement (May 2004)
- Further enlargement (including Turkey)
- Economic and Monetary Union (the Euro)
- Increased use of qualified majority voting
- EU’s structural funds

8. What are your main arguments for/against the EU (and Norwegian EU membership)?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

9. How important do you think it is that Norway’s dispersed settlement is maintained?

1  2  3  4  5
Not at all important  Somewhat important  Neither important or unimportant  Quite important  Very important

If you circled 4 or 5, why is the settlement pattern so important for you?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

10. How important do you think it is to have national control over the natural resources?

1  2  3  4  5
Not at all important  Somewhat important  Neither important or unimportant  Quite important  Very important

If you circled 4 or 5, why do you think it is important? Is it mainly because of economic reasons, or are there other goals which are important?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

Hjertelig takk for hjelpen! Januar 2010/M Sundlisæter Skinner
Appendix E
Details of the Interviews and Interviewees

Amundsen, Cathrine Strindin. Interviewed in Oslo on 13 January 2010.
CP politician. Adviser for the CP’s Storting group from 2007, leader of Akershus CP
and deputy leader of Fredsinitiativet (the Peace Initiative). Previously she worked as
an Organization and Campaign Consultant in Nei til EU. She has also been
International Leader in the party’s youth wing, Senterungdommen and a member of
the managing body of Fellesutvalget for Palestina (the Joint Committee for Palestine)
for a number of terms.

Dæhlen, Tale Marte. Interviewed in Oslo on 7 January 2010.
Member of Oslo UmEU’s county board (2008-2009), member of UmEU’s central
board (2009-2010), and UmEU’s leader from January 2010 to January 2011. Currently
employed by Nei til EU.

LP politician. MP for Sør-Trøndelag between 1977-1981 and for Oslo from 1997 to
2009. Minister of Transport from 1997-1999 and Minister of Justice between 1999-
2000 in Bondevik’s first government and Minister of Justice from 2001-2005 in
Bondevik’s second government. Active in the LP since the early 1960s: elected leader
of Sør-Trøndelag LP’s youth wing, Unge Venstre, in 1962; elected leader of the youth

Harsvik, Wegard. Interviewed in Oslo on 8 January 2010.
Labour Party politician. In the early 1990s he was active in the Labour Party’s youth
organization, AUF and SME. He has also been active in FoEN and Nei til EU. He was
a government adviser to the Minister for Education in the first Stoltenberg
government (2000-2001), State Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Care Services
from 2005 to 2007 and in the Ministry for Culture and Church Affairs from 2007 to
2009. Harsvik is one of the authors of the 2004 publication Et nytt nei (“A new no”).
He is the leader of the union Fagforbundet’s (Norwegian Union of Municipal and
General Employees) Labour Party branch.

Heiberg, Sigrid Zurbuchen. Interviewed in Oslo on 7 January 2010.
Leader of UmEU from February 2009 to January 2010.

Hoglund, Morten. Interviewed in Oslo on 30 March 2009.
PP politician. MP for Akershus since 2001. Member of the Storting’s Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Chairman of the PP’s international
committee, member of the PP’s central board.

PP politician. MP for Østfold since 2005. First deputy leader of the Storting’s Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs and member of the PP’s central board since 2003. Declared “no” position on Norwegian EU membership.

**Lunde, Per Ole.** Interviewed in Vest-Torpa on 15 September 2009. Farmer, CP member and previously active in *Nei til EU*.

**Seierstad, Dag.** Interviewed in Oslo on 18 September 2009. EU adviser for the Storting group of the SLP. Member of the party’s national board. Active on the socialist left of Norwegian politics since 1958. Researcher for *Nei til EU* 1995-2003. His (Norwegian) blog can be found at: [http://seierstadeu.blogspot.com/](http://seierstadeu.blogspot.com/)

# Appendix F

Complete List of Data used in the Documentary Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table F1</th>
<th>Documentary data from the 1960s period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Document</strong></td>
<td><strong>Author</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speeches</strong></td>
<td>Trygve Bull (Ap)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aftenposten items</strong></td>
<td>Anon (feature article)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anon (feature article)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arnljot S. Svendsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harald Gjæver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Frisch-Johansen bruker ikke anstendige argumenter i EEC-saken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolf Pedersen</td>
<td>Professor Frisch og Fellesmarkedet*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the 143</td>
<td>Opprop mot norsk medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjørn Frisholm</td>
<td>Hva koster det å stå utenfor EEC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alf Rolfsen</td>
<td>Norges suverenitet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alf Rolfsen</td>
<td>Fellesskapet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>EEC kapitalistisk, sier Gunnar Bøe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alette Ruttingrud</td>
<td>Norge et politisk folkemuseum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Vår selvhjemmelserett må ikke bindes for alltid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Den politiske integrasjon er hovedmålet for EEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Jordbrukets årstap blir 660 millioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Statsministeren i kraftig oppgjør med hetsmakerne*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Braadland insinuerer at vi ikke er herrer i eget hus*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Stor feil å tro at bare Norge har sosialpolitikk*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lars Roar Langslet</td>
<td>Kan norsk kultur overleve?*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lars Roar Langslet</td>
<td>Kan norsk kultur overleve?*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lars Roar Langslet</td>
<td>Professor Hygen og EEC**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (editorial)</td>
<td>Europa-politikk*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (news report)</td>
<td>Kirken kan ikke ta standpunkt til EEC**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Pro-EC letter/commentary
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation

**Table F2** Documentation data from the 1970s period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Document</th>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>“No” literature</td>
<td>Folkebevegelsen (Cappelen 2001)</td>
<td>Norge og EEC: Hva saken gjelder</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olav Bergo (AUF)</td>
<td>Argumentasjonsplan vedr. EEC</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Chr. Wyller, professor</td>
<td>EEC-motstand: Det vesentligste</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Berg and Arne Rostad (eds.)</td>
<td>Vi stemte mot</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>Hva er EEC?</td>
<td>1971</td>
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* Pro-EC letter/commentary
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation

**Table F3** Documentary data from the 1980s period

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**Aftenposten items**

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* Pro-EC letter/commentary
** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Selliias</td>
<td>Derfor skal vi bry oss om EU(*)</td>
<td>19 Sep 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gisle Hannemyr</td>
<td>EU-direktiv betyrre redaktøransvar for nettverter</td>
<td>14 Oct 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel Liseth</td>
<td>Sveitsisk EU-avtale bedre enn EØS</td>
<td>29 Oct 2002</td>
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<td>Kai Leitemo and Erling Steigum</td>
<td>Euro ingen god løsning</td>
<td>31 Oct 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navn</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottar Brox</td>
<td>„Europas mørkeste krefter“</td>
<td>16 Dec 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sigurd Teige</td>
<td>Mange hindre for fiskernes ja til EU</td>
<td>17 Dec 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dag Leonardsen and Jon Helge Lesjø</td>
<td>Ble vi så nasjonalistiske etter OL i 94?</td>
<td>23 Feb 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>EU trenger en liberal utfordring</td>
<td>3 Mar 2004</td>
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<td>Ole J. Kobbe</td>
<td>Erna Solbergs EU-møter</td>
<td>10 Mar 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfred Kvalheim</td>
<td>Åslaug Haga og EU*</td>
<td>11 Mar 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sigurd Teige</td>
<td>Fiskerinæringens krav til EU-landene</td>
<td>15 Mar 2004</td>
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<td>Ragnar Kvam Jr.</td>
<td>Et tredje nei?</td>
<td>16 Mar 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottar Brox</td>
<td>Er det nok med 50,1 prosent i en folkeavstemning?</td>
<td>17 Mar 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halle Jørn Hanssen</td>
<td>Livsfjerne påstander om u-land og norske bønder</td>
<td>20 Mar 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Åslaug Haga</td>
<td>EU svekker velferden</td>
<td>24 Mar 2004</td>
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<td>Christian Tybring-Gjedde</td>
<td>Folket skal avgjøre EU-spørsmålet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lars Birkeland</td>
<td>Intellektuelt underskudd i Europa-bevegelsen</td>
<td>15 Apr 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridtjof Frank Gundersen</td>
<td>EU skritt for skritt mot en statsdannelse</td>
<td>18 Apr 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Tybring-Gjedde</td>
<td>Høyres EU-diktat</td>
<td>23 Apr 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Ørbech</td>
<td>EU – en stat?</td>
<td>26 Apr 2004</td>
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<td>Fridtjof Frank Gundersen</td>
<td>EU og nasjonalstatene</td>
<td>21 Jun 2004</td>
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<td>Fridtjof Frank Gundersen</td>
<td>EU-grunnloven – bare en ny Roma-traktat</td>
<td>29 Jun 2004</td>
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<td>Steinulf Tunesvik</td>
<td>Bitter EU-tilhengjar**</td>
<td>11 Jul 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ole Anton Smedshaug</td>
<td>Mer demokrati med EUs nye grunnlov?</td>
<td>20 Jul 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jon Kvalbeen</td>
<td>EU og Norge</td>
<td>27 Jul 2004</td>
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<td>Ottar Brox</td>
<td>Hvis industrien får kloa i fiskekvotene</td>
<td>4 Aug 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjørn Remseth</td>
<td>Liux er et seriøst alternativ</td>
<td>20 Aug 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridtjof Frank Gundersen</td>
<td>Norge forsvarspolitisk haleheng til EU</td>
<td>2 Oct 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leif-Andre Trøhaugen</td>
<td>EU er neppe interessert i Bøler</td>
<td>13 Oct 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leif-Andre Trøhaugen</td>
<td>Nok tilhengere av EU som det er?</td>
<td>21 Oct 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fridtjof Frank Gundersen</td>
<td>EU-parlamentet tilidesetter nasjonen</td>
<td>30 Oct 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagfinn Høybråten</td>
<td>Vårt nei til EU er nyansert</td>
<td>11 Nov 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navn</td>
<td>Tittel</td>
<td>Dato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steinar Bøntesen</td>
<td>Hvem skal norske EU-soldater dø for?</td>
<td>20 Nov 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Børresen</td>
<td>Skal Norge delta i Forsvaret for EU?</td>
<td>25 Nov 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arve Thorvik</td>
<td>Europa har endra seg – igjen**</td>
<td>28 Nov 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Børresen</td>
<td>Norge mellom EU og USA</td>
<td>2 Dec 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahn Otto Johansen</td>
<td>Vi er oss selv nok*</td>
<td>23 Dec 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anon (editorial)</td>
<td>Forbrukerne skal ha beskyttelse</td>
<td>3 Mar 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristin Clemet</td>
<td>EU er på dagsordenen*</td>
<td>7 May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erling Folkvord</td>
<td>Vil Ap ha dyrere og dårligere post?</td>
<td>8 Jul 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runar Iversen</td>
<td>Norge inn i EU nå!**</td>
<td>22 Jul 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bård Hoksrud</td>
<td>SV og Sp godtar overvåking</td>
<td>19 Oct 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heming Olaussen</td>
<td>Svabøs sleivspark</td>
<td>4 Dec 2009</td>
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<td>Niels Chr. Geelmuyden</td>
<td>Juksmakernes jubeltid</td>
<td>8 Dec 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hallgeir Langeland</td>
<td>Ingen post på lørdag</td>
<td>13 Dec 2009</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Other articles (online etc.)**


<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Link</th>
<th>Access Date</th>
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<td>OLAUSSEN, H. and HARPER, M. 2010. EU-debattens ømme punkt.</td>
<td><em>Forskning.no</em> [online] 7 June. Available from:</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</table>

* Pro-EC letter/commentary

** Not included in the analysis due to absence of anti-EC/EU argumentation
Appendix G

The Coding Protocol

**Approach:**
Directed qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005):
- The initial coding starts with a theory, but themes are allowed to emerge during data analysis.
- An initial list of coding categories is generated from the theory, but this can be modified during the course of the analysis as new themes emerge (Miles and Huberman 1994).

**Unit of analysis:**
- A word or a group of words that can be coded under one category.
- A text chunk of any size, representative of a single theme/category (i.e. a single word, a sentence, a paragraph or an entire document).

**Double coding:**
- The categories are not expected to be mutually exclusive or exhaustive.
- A unit of text can be assigned to more than one category simultaneously.
- Nevertheless, the defined categories should be as homogeneous as possible internally, and as heterogeneous as possible externally (Lincoln and Guba 1985).

**Sampling:**
- Probability sampling, as the research is deductive, aimed at testing hypotheses and address research questions generated from theories and previous empirical research.
N.B. Approach changed to purposive sampling post-1960s because of lack of data.

**Test on sample:**
- 50 readers letters.
- Doubts and problems about definitions of categories, coding, rules or categorisation of specific cases to be resolved.
- Some changes made: stopped coding democracy arguments to PoM; decision to code left-wing argumentation to PoM; redefined the rural identity category into RS; decision to double-code natural resources and employment argumentation to UT and PoM; to distinguish between PoM and EX, superiority has to be expressed; national sovereignty argumentation is coded to GH.

**Consistency checks:**
- Interpretations checked against raw data
- Consistency checks in the coder’s understanding of the categories and coding rules over time carried out by regularly referring back to the coding protocol

**Category definitions:** Main categories and sub-categories created
- Theory-based formulations of definitions, examples and rules for the individual categories
- Detailed definitions/properties of the categories
- Distinctions between categories defined where needed (coding rules)
- Examples to be added to the scheme in the subjects’ own language as it appears in the texts (prototypical text passages)

Table G1 Coding scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian (UT)</td>
<td>- Egocentric</td>
<td>Theory: Euroscepticism is the result of negative assessments of personal and/or national economic benefits from EU entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sociotropic</td>
<td>- Covers sociotropic or egocentric economic interest, such as concern for national economic growth, national business interest or loss of personal economic benefits (e.g. subsidies, job, higher prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Employment</td>
<td>N.B. Concern for employment and/or redistribution might also be coded to PoM if there is also expression of egalitarian values (PoM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Natural resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Play down disadvantages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist (PoM)</td>
<td>- Rejection of materialist thinking</td>
<td>Theory: Eurosceptics oppose the EU because its preoccupation with economic growth is a barrier to pursuing postmaterialist goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Morality</td>
<td>- Covers arguments driven by non-material goals and values, such as self-expression, morality and quality of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Environment</td>
<td>N.B.1 Democracy should only be coded to PoM when it is couched in clear postmaterialist terms, unrelated to Norway’s history and traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- External solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Internal solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacefulness/anti-war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Human Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Quality of life/focus on people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.B.2 Left-wing/anti-capitalist/liberalist sentiments (e.g. workers’ interests and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionalist (EX)</td>
<td>Superior form of society</td>
<td>Theory: The EU is opposed because it entails an erosion of the Nordic superior form of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Idealism</td>
<td>- Environment</td>
<td>Exceptionalism is the superior value-mix underpinning the welfare state (and social democracy):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Anti-liberalism</td>
<td>- Egalitarianism</td>
<td>1) prominence of the value of <strong>solidarity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- External/internal</td>
<td>- welfare state built on the principles of universalism and decommodification –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td>- regional policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- more peaceful</td>
<td>- foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) <strong>internationalist progressivism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ethically (not interest) driven activism above and beyond the average, e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>peace keeping, high ODA, conflict management, migration hospitality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- positive model of the internationalist sovereign state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) <strong>egalitarian</strong> values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4) <strong>environmentalism</strong> high standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.B. Superiority has to be implied or stated, or it should be coded to PoM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right-Wing/Economic Liberalism (RW)</th>
<th>- Anti-regulation</th>
<th><strong>Theory:</strong> Eurosceptics do not want membership because the EU has become a protectionist and socialist machinery.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Anti-transfers</td>
<td>- Covers right-wing ideological thinking, such as concerns for an open, free market (e.g. anti-regulation, anti-social policy/transfers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- EU criticized for being protectionist/socialist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity (NI)</th>
<th>- Strong national attachment/national pride</th>
<th><strong>Theory:</strong> Euroscepticism is a result of concerns about threats to the national identity and/or hostility towards other cultures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Hostility towards other cultures</td>
<td>- Expression of concern for the national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perceived cultural threat</td>
<td>1) Expression of intense feeling toward one’s country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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348 Striving for better societal and governmental conditions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Society (RS)</th>
<th>Geo-historical (GH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Settlement pattern  
- peripheries'/rural interests  
- regional policy  
- protect nature  
- agriculture  
- fisheries  
- rural traditions  
- romanticism  
| - independence  
- democracy  
- bureaucracy  
- elite rule  
- technocracy  
- history/previous battles  
- periphery's strong tradition  |

2) Antipathy/hostility towards other cultures (stemming from nationalistic attachment)
3) Exclusive national identity
4) Perceived cultural threat: fear of other identities and culture encroaching on the dominant culture of the nation (loss of national identity and culture)

N.B. If political/historical resistance to Europeanisation (political system, e.g. self-determination, form of democracy), then it is coded to GH

Theory: Norwegians have a strong attachment to the countryside and the rural way of life.
Norwegians are Eurosceptic because of the threat the EU poses to rural/peripheral Norway.

- Covers concern for keeping rural Norway as it is, i.e. wanting to protect the primary industries, the regional policy, the settlement pattern, the local communities, rural traditions, nature and countryside.

Theory: Opposition to EU entry is caused by the individual’s ties to the historical Norwegian nation, and thus the idea of self-determination.

Covers argumentation which
- deals with the issue of self-determination, whether on the individual (democracy) or nation (sovereignty/independence) level
- draws parallels to past foreign rule and the fighting Norwegian nation/the people’s struggle for independence
- uses historical images of “self”/“the other”
  - people/bureaucracy
  - people/state
  - open/closed
- casts the battle as between the elites and the people
Appendix H
Methodology: Regression Analysis

Data
Because the EU issue was not a live political issue in the 1995-2010 period and conducting statistical tests on a data set from this period would not give any strong indications about how people would vote following a new debate in the future, the study uses data sets from heightened periods of Norwegian Euroscepticism. For the regression analysis, the 1994 referendum survey is used, but descriptive statistics from both the referendum surveys are also included to supplement the analysis. Using data from 1994 (i.e. data from the latest period of heightened Euroscepticism) maximizes the study’s generalizability to a future membership debate. At the same time, it seems reasonable to assume that findings from statistical tests on the 1994 referendum survey can be extended to public attitudes in any of the periods under study (1961-2010) considering the continuity in the voting patterns between the first and the second referenda and the consistency in the Eurosceptic public discourse across the five decades.

Another reason why the 1994 referendum study data set was chosen for the research is availability and accessibility. Few surveys have been conducted on nationally representative samples probing public opinion on the EU and other political attitudes outside the context of the two referenda, so the choice was destined to be limited. Even the 1972 referendum survey, although providing an extensive collection of data, does not provide indicators for all the kinds of attitudes needed for the research, which is yet another reason why the 1994 survey was the best choice.

The data sets were kindly supplied by the Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelige Datatjeneste (NSD), but collection and preparation of the data were originally carried out by SSB.

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349 One exception is the survey (conducted by MMI for the employers’ organization NHO) Hagen and Sverdrup’s (2003) study is based on.
There are clear benefits in using data collected by an experienced and trusted agency like SSB, as they are committed to producing reliable and nationally representative data sets. Besides, in 1994, the agency had the benefit of being able to make use of the experience of having conducted an EU survey once before. The data for the 1994 referendum study were collected between August and December 1994 according to a national two-step random selection sampling procedure. In total, 4,891 respondents between 18 and 80 years of age were interviewed with a structured questionnaire, and of these, 700 were from municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. The net selection was 3,353 respondents (NSD 2010a, b). The data was collected in three stages: first structured interviews were conducted in late August/early September, second phone interviews were carried out some time during the campaign (with the respondents who had a phone); and third, phone interviews or questionnaires were completed after the referendum (Jenssen and Valen 1995). The data were supplied to the researcher in an SPSS format.

**Regression: Methodological Considerations**

The aim of the research was to ascertain what effect different independent variables (measuring concern for VCR) had on the dependent variable (Euro-scepticism) while controlling for effect from other variables (measuring utilitarian considerations, national identity, left/right self-placement, gender etc.). In effect, the choice of regression analysis as an analytic tool was straight-forward. However, in the literature on EU support, a variety of different regression methods are used. Some use the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while others use the maximum likelihood method (ML). For example, Gabel (1998b) and McLaren (2002) use linear regression (OLS) with a dependent variable constructed from two questions with ordered categorical responses, while Anderson and Reichert (1996) use OLS with a three-point scale dependent variable. Carey (2002), on the other hand, uses an ordered logit model, and in a different study, Gabel (1998c) uses ordered probit regression. Linear regression is based on the assumption that the variables included in the analysis are truly continuous (not categorical), and therefore, it carries a

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350 The latter were weighted to avoid bias in the data material.
weakening when applied to the study of EU support/Euroscepticism, where responses are ordered according to artificial scales. The ML method is more appropriate when the dependent variable consists of a few ordered categorical responses. However, because the dependent variable used in the study is a 12 point scale measure of EU attitudes, as opposed to the dichotomous variable “what did you vote?” used in previous studies, linear regression was used in the study.\textsuperscript{351} The primary aim of the regression analysis was to take stock of the unique effects of independent variables on the dependent variable; i.e. not to seek maximisation of the explained variance in the two models.

**Dependent Variable**

The survey question “what did you vote in the referendum” provided the basis for the dependent variable in the study. 49.2 and 50.8 percent of respondents in the survey voted “yes” and “no” to membership in the referendum respectively (N = 2,427). As discussed in section 2.1 of Chapter Two, support or opposition to the EU is more than merely a “yes” or “no” to EU membership.

**Figure H1** Attitudes to the EU (1 pro-EU, 8 anti-EU)

![Attitudes to the EU](chart)

Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset

\textsuperscript{351} The range for the dependent variable is wider than in the above-mentioned studies, and thus, it is arguably acceptable to use OLS.
This becomes evident when also taking into account how easy or hard people found it to decide what to vote in the referendum; the eight point EU attitude scale showed in Figure H1 is constructed on the basis of respondents’ yes/no vote and how easy or hard they found the decision.\(^{352}\)

Figure H1 shows that the convinced voters on either side of the yes/no divide made up the largest groups in 1994. However, it also shows that a large number of voters, almost 6 out of 10 voters, did not view the issue in black and white terms. Furthermore, if one disregards ease of decision and takes a look at voters’ preferences on Norway’s form of affiliation\(^{353}\) into account instead (combined with the yes/no vote), then it becomes clear that the groups at the polar opposites of the scale are in fact more marginal than the eight point scale suggests (see Figure H2).

**Figure H2** Attitudes to the EU (1 Europhile, 6 EU-rejectionist)

Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset

\(^{352}\) 1 = yes and very easy; 4 = yes and very difficult; 5 = no and very difficult; 8 = no and very easy.

\(^{353}\) The question asked: “In the political debate, there are different proposals on Norway’s future relationship with the EU. Which of the proposals are most congruent with your opinion? 1. Norway should not be a member of the EU, and the EEA agreement ought to be terminated. 2. Norway should not be a member of the EU, but should keep the EEA agreement. 3. Norway should be a member of the EU, but decline cooperation in selected areas such as defence and a common currency. 4. Norway should be a member of the EU in accordance with the negotiated agreement between Norway and the EU’s member states. 5. Norway should be a member of the EU and contribute to a merging of the EU’s member states to a united states of Europe.
These two computed variables were combined to form the dependent variable in the regression analysis to ensure that the variable captured not only respondents’ support or opposition to membership, but to the idea of European integration in general. In order to make the dependent variable as close to a continuous variable as possible, the eight and six point scales above were summated to create one 12 point EU attitude variable. To confirm that the 12 point scale is a meaningful measurement of respondents’ attitudes toward the EU and a suitable dependent variable for the analysis, the relationship between respondents’ preference on affiliation and their referendum vote as well as their location on the 8 point attitude scale were examined.

**Table H1** Correlation matrix for indicators of EU attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What did you vote? (N)</th>
<th>Preference on affiliation (N)</th>
<th>EU attitude 8 scale (N)</th>
<th>EU attitude 12 scale (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What did you vote?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.751</td>
<td>.876</td>
<td>.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference on affiliation</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>2526</td>
<td>2299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU attitude 8 scale</td>
<td>.751</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.775</td>
<td>.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU attitude 6 scale</td>
<td>.876</td>
<td>.775</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU attitude 12 scale</td>
<td>.876</td>
<td>.970</td>
<td>.849</td>
<td>.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>2299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

Source: 1994 Referendum Study dataset

The high correlation coefficients displayed in Table H1 indicate not only that, as expected, there is great consistency between how people voted in the referendum and their preference on affiliation, but more importantly that the eight point scale (vote and ease of decision) is a meaningful measure of attitudes, as it correlates even higher with affiliation preference (.775) than vote alone does (.751). The correlation coefficients for the 12 point scale are naturally all high, as they are based on three of the other variables, but they nevertheless confirm that the 12 point scale is a suitable measurement of EU support/opposition.
Hypotheses and Independent Variables

The independent variables were constructed according to the theoretical framework used throughout the thesis, namely VCRUNI, so that these theories could be tested statistically. First, the political culture theory posits that Norwegian citizens oppose EU membership because of the threat it poses to national sovereignty and independence, out of a deep-seated aversion to foreign rule and out of concerns about its damaging effects on Norwegian folkevyre, i.e. the average citizen’s ability to decide the country’s future. From this, hypotheses one, two and three were derived (see Table 8.7 in Chapter Eight). To test the hypotheses, two survey items asking the respondents to what degree they thought loss of sovereignty and “the average Norwegian’s loss of influence” were very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad arguments against membership were used, in addition to one asking them to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 to what extent they thought it to be “positive or negative if the EU develops into a federal state, a kind of United States of Europe”. The variables Sovereignty and Folkevyre retained the 1 to 5 scale (1 = low concern) and Federal Europe the 0 to 10 scale (0 = positive, 10 = negative).

Second, the political values theory holds that people with postmaterialist values, such as concern for the environment, equality and morality, are less supportive of European integration because the EU’s number one priority is economic growth, and as a result, it poses a threat to these values. Based on the availability of suitable proxies for postmaterialist values in the 1994 data set, Hypothesis four, five, six and seven were put forward for testing (see Table 8.7). An “environmentalism” variable was constructed by combining the responses to two survey items, that is, agreement with the statements “[we should] go in for an environmentally-friendly society even

354 Each of the hypotheses in the study could alternatively be formulated according to the following format: “As a citizen’s [concern for national sovereignty] increases, so does his/her level of Euroscepticism”.
355 Note that all the survey questions are translated from Norwegian into English by the author. The question asked: “In the ongoing debate, a multitude of arguments have been mentioned for and against becoming members of the EU. We have collected some of them. For every argument I read, I will ask you to tell me if you think it is a very good argument, good argument, neither good nor bad argument, bad argument, or very bad argument. ‘Membership of the EU will entail a surrendering of national sovereignty’. ‘The power machinery in Brussels is so remote that the average Norwegian will lose influence over the administration [of the country] if we enter the EU.'”
if it entails low or no economic growth” and “the environmental demands ought to be lowered with the economic situation Norway is in today”. Environmentalism ranged from 1 (low) to 9 (high). For gender equality, the survey question “would you say that gender equality ought to go further, has gone far enough or has gone too far?” was used, based on a scale from 1 (too far) to 3 (go further). On aversion to income equality, the question used asked for agreement or disagreement to the following statement: “To encourage individuals to work harder, we should accept higher income differences than we do today.” For this indicator, the 1 to 5 scale of agreement was retained, signifying low to high opposition to income inequality. To test the external solidarity hypothesis, a question asking to what extent the respondent thought reducing development aid was a good proposal was used. The scale ranged from 1 (low concern for external solidarity) to 5 (high concern).

Another category treated under the political values heading in the documentary analysis was anti-neo-liberalism, because these arguments argued against the EU’s adherence to neo-liberal economic thinking, that is, its priority of economic growth over other matters, such as egalitarianism and quality of life. This testable hypothesis of this sub-category took the form of Hypothesis eight (see Table 8.7). H8 was tested by using an anti-neo-liberalism indicator which was constructed by combining the answers to three questions about people’s opinions on the size of the public sector, priority of economic growth and productivity and control with multinationals, ranging from 1 (low anti-neo-liberalist score) to 13 (high anti-neo-liberalist score).

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356 The first question was preceded by the following: “I will now read a few proposals for you that many think ought to be carried through in Norway. Can you for each proposal tell me if you think it is a very good proposal, fairly good proposal, neither good nor bad proposal, fairly bad proposal or very bad proposal”, and the second by “We will now be dealing with quite a few opinions which people commonly express: Can you for each claim I read to you tell me if you agree entirely, agree somewhat, both agree and disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree entirely.”

357 The question asked: “We will now be dealing with quite a few opinions which people commonly express: Can you for each claim I read to you tell me if you agree entirely, agree somewhat, both agree and disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree entirely.”

358 This question took the same format as the first environmentalism question.

359 Level of agreement (1 to 5) with the proposals “reduce the public sector”, “we should go for a society with high economic growth and productivity” and the statement “we need stricter control with the multinational corporations’ activities in Norway”.

426
The rural society theory posits that voters are opposed to EU membership because of the damaging effect it would have on Norway’s decentralized societal structure. EU membership would derail the Norwegian agricultural sector and threaten the survival of traditional coastal fishing communities and as a result, put pressure on the dispersed settlement pattern, which is an extremely central feature of Norway in historical, political, cultural and economic terms. At the centre of this lies a concern for rural/peripheral Norway, the districts, and it was hypothesized in H9 and H10 (see Table 8.7).

To measure districts concern, the answers to four survey items were combined to form one indicator. The respondents were asked about their level of agreement with the following four statements: “The many small municipalities in this country have to be merged to make the administration more effective”, “it is only fair that income levels are higher in the cities than in the districts”, “it is the rootlessness in the cities which creates social problems and drug abuse” and “the politicians and the bureaucrats in Oslo understand little of what goes on in rural Norway”, and the indicator took the form of a 1 (low districts concern) to 17 (high) scale. To test H10, the survey question asking respondents to evaluate the effects of membership on different policy areas or sectors was used, specifically the “agriculture” and “fisheries” (AGFI) components of the question. The weakness of using this hypothesis/question as an indicator of concern for the primary sector is that it does not ask whether the issue is important to the respondent, merely what the respondent’s assessment of the effect of EU membership is. In other words, respondents who believe the EU to have an adverse effect on the primary sector but who do not necessarily care about this issue might wrongly be ascribed high AGFI concern in the study. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other suitable proxies for AGFI concern, this indicator is used. The answers to “agriculture” and “fisheries”

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360 The survey options were: agree entirely, agree somewhat, both agree and disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree entirely.

361 The wording of the question was: “What do you think that Norwegian membership of the EU will entail for the development in Norway in the following areas? Will there be great improvement, some improvement, neither, some worsening or great worsening.”
were combined into one variable, which ranged from 1 (low AGFI concern) to 9 (high AGFI concern).

Economic voting models postulate that people cast their vote in elections and referenda on the basis of cost/benefit analyses. Thus, according to egocentric economic voting theory, people do not want EU membership because they are worried about the adverse effect membership would have on their personal economic situation, while people who think membership would bring economic benefits, are for the EU. Similarly, sociotropic economic theory explains popular Euroscepticism in terms of positive or negative evaluations of EU membership’s effect on the national economy. Considering that employment was the only economic issue which was of any significant prominence in any of the debates, H11 and H12 are put forward (see Table 8.7).

The survey only contained one item asking about how respondents thought EU membership would affect their economic situation, so this was used. The question asked: “If we become members of the EU: Do you think that your own economic situation will become noticeably better, or noticeably worse, or do you think that your economic situation will not be particularly affected by our entry or non-entry to the EU?” The three point scale was retained, with 1 signifying “noticeably better” and 3 “noticeably worse”. To test H12, the above-mentioned survey question asking respondents to evaluate the effects of membership on different policy areas or sectors was used, but instead of AGFI, the focus was on “the national economy” and “employment”. Based on the same survey question as AGFI, the sociotropic utilitarianism variable naturally carried the same limitations as noted for the AGFI indicator above. The variable was constructed in the same way as AGFI concern, and was based on a 1 to 9 scale.

The final theory to be tested was the national identity theory, which puts focus on hostility towards other cultures, perceived cultural threat, strong national attachment/pride and exclusive national identity as explanations for Euroscepticism.
As the concept of exclusive national identity is problematic to operationalize in the study due to an absence of suitable indicators, only the relationship between EU attitudes and xenophobia and national attachment was hypothesized (see H13 and H14 in Table 8.7).

To measure national attachment/pride, an indicator ranging from 1 (low) to 12 (high) was constructed and used. It was based on questions about level of agreement with the statement “regardless of whether Norway acts right or wrong, I will always stand on my country’s side” and the proposal “[we should] go for a society which guards traditional Norwegian values”, as well as the question “how proud are you of being Norwegian? Are you very proud, somewhat proud, not particularly proud, not proud at all?” The Xenophobia proxy was based respondents’ reported level of agreement with the statement “immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national distinctiveness” and the proposal “[we should] go for a multicultural society with high tolerance to people from other countries with other religions and ways of life” and the scores were between 1 (low) and 9 scale (high).

**Control Variables**

Eight control variables were included in the model. These were variables which the literature suggests might have an effect on the relationships between the dependent and the independent variables. The first four were dummy variables: gender (1 = woman), primary sector employment, public sector employment, and peripheral location (1 = the West, Trøndelag and the North), which all were expected to be positively related to EU opposition. In addition, two continuous variables were included: age and income, also expected (in the comparative literature) to be positively related to Euroscepticism. And finally, the two ordinal variables, urban/rural location and left/right self-placement, were included. The urban/rural variable ranged from 1 (urban) to 5 (rural), and left-right placement retained its

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362 Oslo, the East, Agder and Rogaland were included in the reference category.
363 Household income was used to get a more accurate picture of the respondents’ overall financial situation. The Spearman’s correlation between household income and the vote in the referendum was slightly higher than between personal income and the vote.
original 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) scale. Several variables commonly included in studies of EU support were excluded from the analysis for a variety of reasons. First, occupation was not included because it has not been found to have a significant effect on the EU vote in Norway in previous studies (the primary and public sectors excepted). Second, party preference was also excluded because of the high electoral volatility recorded in the election preceding the 1994 referendum. Left-right self-placement was used as an alternative gauge of political views. Third, measurements of cognitive mobilization, such as involvement in politics and knowledge of the EU were not included because, as mentioned earlier, simple correlations between these showed up non-significant in the data set. And finally, education was not included because the indicators found in the survey for this were deemed inadequate. Tests were run to ensure that multicollinearity between predictors was not too high, and they confirmed that this was not a problem.

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364 Although few of the independent variables used in the study were truly continuous, they were treated as continuous variables. This is because, although the attitudinal variables included in the study are not truly quantitative in nature, they were arguably measured on meaningful numerical scales, and therefore the alternative (dichotomization) was more likely to return more misleading results than if scale variables are used (also see MacCallum et al. 2002). The nature of some of the indicators used, particularly those based on three or five-point scales (e.g. agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree) make it particularly inappropriate to use dichotomization, as the middle category would not fit into a dichotomized category. Another drawback of dichotomization is that information about individual differences can be lost (MacCallum et al. 2002: 19).

365 There was one question asking about pre-university education in the survey, which differentiated between different old or newer systems of compulsory schooling. This was not deemed an accurate measure of high or low levels of education, as both respondents scoring high and low on this scale reported they had started or completed some “other education which normally lasts at least 5 months”. An indicator based on these two questions was not constructed because of the vagueness of the latter; e.g. lumping people with a five year long full-time university education together with someone who has done a part-time 6 months course in marketing creates very heterogeneous categories and by implication, meaningless measures of education levels.

366 None of the predictors correlated above .65, and the VIF values were all well below 10 and the tolerance statistics all well above .2. The average VIF (1.399) was also satisfactorily close to 1 (Field 2005).
Appendix I
Coding of Public Opinion Arguments

The coding of the arguments given by respondents in the two Referendum Studies was in many ways more problematic than the coding of arguments in the documentary analysis. This was because, contrary to the qualitative data, no context was offered to identify what attitude or specific concern underpinned arguments falling into the categories. Therefore, in order to classify the different argument categories according to the VCRUNI scheme, the detailed knowledge of the Eurosceptic argumentation which was acquired from the documentary analysis was used. Particularly ambiguous categories included the “sale of Norway”, “the political consequences”, “Europe too large a bloc”, “free right of establishment”, “foreign workers” and “unstable labour market” categories in the 1972 dataset and “criticism of EU and EU system”, “economic policy, EEA”, “employment” and “welfare state, pensions, etc.” in the 1994 study (see Table H1 and H2 below). The “sale of Norway” and “free right of establishment” groups were classified as geo-historical (GH) arguments because in the debate they both referred to the ability to retain national control (sovereignty) over the country and its resources. The latter was also coded to utilitarianism because of its potential economic motivation. All double codes were split down the middle; to use “free right of establishment” as an example, 0.4 percent was coded to the geo-historical category and 0.4 percent was coded to utilitarianism. “The political consequences” argument was coded solely to GH. The reason why it was not considered for the political values grouping was that in the 1960s and 1970s debate, the “political consequences” referred to matters related to the constitution, primarily the loss of national sovereignty. The argument that “Europe [is] too large a bloc” was double-coded to GH and PoM. On the one hand, its underpinnings could have been geo-historical/political culture-based because the concept of “bloc politics” does not sit well with Norway’s political culture and historical experiences. On the other hand, it also frequented the debate as a postmaterialist argument: many feared that Europe as a large bloc would not be conducive to world peace and would further disadvantage countries in the
Table I1  “No” voters’ main argument in 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments as coded by SSB</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>VCRUNI code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too expensive ticket</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>UT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic argument generally</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>UT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote rule from Brussels</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose independence</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot leave</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of Norway</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political consequences</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic centralization</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe too large a bloc</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>GH/PoM (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No economic advantages</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>UT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway better than Europe</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>EX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries and agriculture</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional policy/periphery policy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign workers</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>NI/UT (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free right of establishment</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>GH/UT (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable labour market</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>UT/PoM (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal distribution of benefits</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>PoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good the way it is</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know what’s around the corner</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not included in Figure 9.5 in Chapter Nine.
Source: 1972 Referendum Study dataset

Table I2  “No” voters’ main argument in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument as coded by SSB</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>VCRUNI code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty, democracy</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>GH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of EU and EU system</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>GH/PoM (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policy, EEA</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>UT/PoM (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental concerns</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>PoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>UT/PoM (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries, fish quotas</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional policy</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-culture</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>NI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state, pensions, etc.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>PoM/UT (50/50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control, drugs, etc.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know what we have, but…</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU aggressive, oppose common defence</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>PoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>PoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other No arguments</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not included in Figure 9.5 in Chapter Nine.
developing world. The “foreign workers” 1972 argument might have been motivated by perceived cultural threat and/or hostility towards other cultures through opposition to immigration, or alternatively, threat to one’s employment and financial security. It was therefore double-coded to national identity (NI) and utilitarianism. Similarly, concerns about the labour market might reflect economic calculations, but it might also indicate a more (postmaterialist) solidarity-oriented attitude.

This utilitarianism/postmaterialism cross-over also applied to the “economic policy, EEA”, “employment” and “welfare state, pensions, etc.” 1994 categories, so they, too, were double-coded. “Criticism of EU and EU system”, on the other hand, was double-coded to GH and PoM: both geo-historical argumentation pertaining to the democratic deficit and postmaterialist argumentation referring to the EU as an inhumane system overly focused on economic growth were dominant EU-critical discourses in the 1994 debate.
Appendix J

Nordmannen (Mellom bakkar og berg)

Tekst: Ivar Aasen Melodi:L.M. Lindeman

Mellom bakkar og berg utmed havet
heve nordmannen fengje sin heim,
der han sjølv heve tuftene grave
og sett sjølv sine hus uppå deim.

Han såg ut på dei steinute strender,
det var ingen som der hadde bygt.
Lat oss rydja og byggja oss grender,
og so eiga me rudningen trygt.

Han såg ut på det bårute havet,
der var ruskut å leggja utpå.
Men der leikade fisk ned i kavet,
og den leiken den ville han sjå.

Fram på vetteren stundom han tenkte;
gjev eg var i eit varmare land!
Men når vårsol i bakkane blenkte,
fekk han hug til siheimlege strand.

Og når liene grønkar som hagar,
når det lavar av blomar på strå,
og når netter er ljose som dagar,
kan han ingenstad venare sjå.

Sud om havet han stundom laut skrida,
der var rikdom på benkjer og bord,
men ikring såg han trældomen kvida
og so vende han atter mot nord.

Lat no andre om storleiken kivast,
lat deiheim bragla med rikdom og høgd,
mellom kaksar eg inkje kan trivast,
mellom jamningar helst er eg nøgd.

Source: Nei til EU (2006: 65)
Appendix K

Translation of Norwegian Terms and Names

Aftenposten
Norway’s largest broadsheet newspaper
Aksjon mot medlemskap i
Appeal against membership of the Common Market -
Fellesmarkedet - de 143
the 143
Anders Langes parti til sterk
Anders Lange’s party for a strong reduction of taxes,
nedsettelse av skatter,
duties and government intervention
avgifter og offentlige inngrep
Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking

the youth wing of the Labour Party
Bokmål
The Danish-influenced written standard of Norwegian
Bunad
Norwegian national costume
Bygd, bygda
Rural district(s)
Dagbladet
Norway’s second largest tabloid newspaper
Dagens Næringsliv
Norway’s leading business publication
Det Europæiske Fellesskap
the European Community
Det liberale folkeparti
the Liberal People’s Party
Det nye folkeparti
the New People’s Party
Distriktpolitikk
Regional policy, the collective term used in Norway to
denote the various policies aimed at benefitting the
peripheries (at the expense of central areas) in order to
maintain a variety of goals related to settlement,
natural resources, welfare and culture (Kommunal-
og regionaldepartementet 2010)

”the Beast” (in the Bible)

EC
EU-motstand
EU opposition
Europabevægelsen
European Movement
Europeisk Ungdom
European Youth
Fiskebåtredernes forbund
the Fishing Boat Shippers’ Association
Folkeaksjonen MOT EU-
People’s Action against EU membership
medlemskap

Folkebevegelsen
People’s Movement
Folkestyre
People rule, participatory democracy
Folkesuverenitet
People’s sovereignty
Folkesuverenitetstanken
The idea of people sovereignty
Forum for utvikling og miljø
Forum for development and environment
Frihet
Freedom
Handlefrihet
Freedom of action
Hurtigruten
the Coastal Express
Kristelig folkepartis ungdom
Norwegian Young Christian Democrats
Kystpartiet
Coast Party
Landsorganisasjonen
the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
Miljøpartiet de grønne
the Norwegian Green Party
Nærdemokrati
Democracy close to the people

Nasjonalbiblioteket
National Library

Natur og Ungdom
Nature and Youth/Young Friends of the Earth Norway

Naturherligheter
Glorious nature

Nei til EU
No to the EU

NHO
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise

Norges Mållag
Norwegian Language Society

Norges Bondelag
Norwegian Farmers’ Union

Norges kommunistiske parti
Communist Party of Norway

Norges naturværnforbund
Friends of the Earth Norway

Norsk bonde-og småbrukarlag
Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders’ Union

Norsk Fiskarlag
Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organisation

Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelige datatjeneste
Norwegian Social Science Data Services

Nynorsk
The Norwegian language form based on rural dialects

Næringslivets
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise

hovedorganisasjon

Opplysningsutvalget om
The Information Committee about Norway and the EC

Norge og EF

Riksarkivet
Norwegian state archives

Rimi
Norwegian supermarket chain

Rød Valgallianse
Red Electoral Alliance

Rådighet
Right to control

Selvbestemmelsesrett
Right to make own decisions, self-determination

Selvråderett
Self-determination

Selvstendige beslutninger
Independent decisions

Selvstendighet
Independence

Selvstyre
Self-government

Sosialdemokrater mot EU
Social Democrats against the EU

Sosialdemokratisk Alternativ
Social Democratic Alternative

Statistisk Sentralbyrå
Statistics Norway

Stormaktpolitikk
Great power politics

Stortinget
the Norwegian Parliament

Studenter mot EU
Students against the EU

Studentmållaget
the Student wing of the Norwegian Language Society

Styrerett
Right to govern

Suverenitet
Sovereignty

Trivsel
Well-being, contentment, feeling of happiness/comfort

Trygghet
Safety, security, comfort

Uavhengighet
Independence

Ungdom mot EU
Youth against Norwegian Membership of the EU

Utkantnorge
Rural Norway

VG
Norway’s largest tabloid newspaper

Vinmonopolet
Wine monopoly, Norwegian state monopoly on (import, export and) wholesale of alcohol

1814
the year of the Norwegian Constitution

1905
the year of the dissolution of the union with Sweden