Transformation Narratives and The Impact of Corporate Lobbying: The Politics of Performance

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for the degree of MPhil
of the University of Bath
2010

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Summary

This study begins by outlining two narratives that offer explanations of transformations in politics from the end of the Cold War to the present day. These are principally: the End of Politics and the rise of corporate colonisation; the Reinvention of Politics and the rise of civil society; and from these a third transformation is presented which is a synthesis and enhancement of these propositions. This is the Politics of Performance and highlights the previously deficient exposition of the impact of British corporate lobbying.

As corporate lobbying is carried out by paid advocates, the incentive to engage in politics is not mobilised by a belief or ideology. This is essential to the professionalisation of lobbying and is also the foundation for the narrative’s twin pillars that hold up the Politics of Performance edifice: the projection of an argument, a presentation-performance; and the ability to deliver this persuasively and secure a favourable outcome, an achievement-performance. The Politics of Performance builds on the ideas of delegation, simulation and role-playing over accountability, authenticity and substance in democratic engagement.

In support of the theoretical arguments, the narrative is also assessed in practice by considering the impact of corporate lobbying in two UK case studies. These revolve around how the motor industry reduced the financial impact of the European Union’s End-of-Life Directive 2001-2002; and how the information technology sector enthused the UK Home Office to include specifications that significantly increased cost into the design of the UK identity card proposal 2002-2006. These form the centrepiece of this study and show how corporate lobbying develops a particular presentation of the business perspective and can secure a more favourable outcome for its patrons.
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Chapter One - Introduction

The way politics is viewed is always changing (Dahl, 2000, p.1). This thesis looks at recent transformation narratives in British politics and draws attention to the specific area of the business view of politics: corporate political lobbying. In a general sense, this is the way business interacts with the polity to maximise profits for its enterprise. A more specific definition will be provided later. In line with much modern Socialist thought, this thesis argues that today’s sophisticated business lobbying is one of the most influential recent developments on the political landscape and that it is having a profound affect on the polity. It argues that there has been a transformation in the way politics operates and in particular that several fundamental structural changes have taken place in the past few decades so that for politics to be better understood today, a new narrative is required.

Although corporate lobbying and its impact is well-researched in the United States of America, it is far less so in Britain (Moloney, 2006, p.ix). This is despite there being significant recent changes that have transformed the way politics works in this country. The definition of social class structure is less clear than it was thirty years ago (Cannadine, 1998, pp. ix-xiii). Ideology does not galvanise people in the way it did previously (Eatwell & Wright, 1999, p.279). British people travel far more; they take more holidays to more exotic destinations, and they have, on aggregate, increased levels of disposable income and consume products avariciously (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009). Significantly, the media has expanded in scope, depth and space, much of it inhabiting the digital and online worlds, allowing a greater range of information to pour into the human experience. Basic signifiers that determine the British identity have changed and subsequently the character of politics has altered to reflect this.

Much contemporary political discourse considers the challenging issue of renewal to explain how the changes Britain has been undergoing affect politics. This weighty and wide-ranging area occupies a great proportion of serious academic discussion especially following the seminal *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Giddens, 1998) that ignited discussions around renewal in politics. Searching for ways to re-engage a population that appears less and less inclined to vote in major formal elections is a significant concern. The perceived and actual decline in traditional relationships and in formal structures and how these are refreshed would be paramount if the challenge were simply to re-establish what once was. It is not. The foundations on which the structures are built are changing. Power is more diffuse and rests in many vestiges outside The Palace of Westminster’s St Stephen’s Gate as well as within it. While analysis and classification of groups influencing the polity has long been explored with Dunleavy’s (1988, pp.21-49) exogenous and endogenous delineations helping to form the way for Jordan, Maloney and McLaughlin in 1992 (cited by Page, 1999, p.214) to develop their insider and outsider group terminology, Grant’s (1995, p.23) seminal analysis into this area over-simplifies the location of power. His argument that “above all…the insider/outsider distinction is that it highlights the way in which the state sets the rules of the game for pressure group activity” (ibid) assumes that government is the sole arbiter when today power is held by a number of groups. Grant’s view can be considered largely redundant in a world where single-issue pressure groups have greater membership, wealth, and ability in mobilising support for their one cause through the media, scientific communities and other decision-making publics than mainstream political parties. A recent example of this is the Make Poverty History campaign in 2005. This was highly effective in raising awareness
of the issue, generating funds and demanding commitment for change. In response to this, the UK government made some significant policy changes including recognition of the imposition of ‘tied aid’ including the forcing of economic policies from donors on developing countries as an anachronistic, inappropriate and ineffective way to achieve poverty eradication (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005). The response also included the commitment to make UK aid more predictable so action against poverty can be more effective. It also secured the statement from the UK government that poor countries should not be forced to open their markets and provide assurances that this is a priority approach in regional and multilateral trade negotiations. The Make Poverty History example is also interesting as these aims had largely been policy objectives of the Labour party, yet it took a non-party affiliated campaign to help implement it.

Another example that shows that politics is functioning in a different way is demonstrated by how people are using the internet to communicate their individual views to potentially a wide audience. For many bloggers, the internet has become their personal ‘soapbox.’ It is relatively easy to set up a website or to establish a free blog and broadcast your views and interact with an interested audience. For businesses that have hate sites set up by disgruntled employees, customers, suppliers and those who hold a grudge against the company, the internet can cause significant political pressure to bear on the way a company does business (Kotler and Armstrong, 2010, p117). New ways to express political sentiment have blown away the idea that a grievance should be pursued only through writing to the constituency Member of Parliament or local paper.

This thesis therefore focuses on transformation in politics and considers narratives that seek to explain this. In order to understand this it is vital to appreciate the way the term ‘transformation narratives’ is used in this study. It is not meant in the sense of “wave[s] of democratization” (Huntington, 1993, p.xiii) or in terms of regime changes. It is not made in reference to the evolution of the state as the central political entity and should not be seen as attempting to extend the narrative of Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation* (1971) in which, crudely put, he charts the movement from feudalism to a market society (*op cit*, p.45). It instead accepts the provenance of the democratic free market society and refers to the way political mobilising factors within this system are given different leading roles in each narrative. This may appear to be focusing on nuances but is fundamental and worthy of the label of a transformation. The positioning of the mobilising factor in each narrative determines a change in the theoretical, practical and power constellations of the polity. These three measures support each of the narratives analysis as a transformation and will ultimately be a guide to assess the success of the new narrative put forward by this study as a result of the impact of corporate lobbying.

This new narrative builds on two overarching narratives that offer explanations of the transformations in politics since the end of the Cold War to the present day. Through analysis of the mobilising factors in each, the third interpretation is developed that more fully reflects the role of corporate lobbying as a leading force shaping UK politics today. The transformations are principally: The End of Politics and the rise of corporate colonisation; the Reinvention of Politics and the rise of civil society; and the third transformation is a synthesis and enhancement of these two which highlights the previously deficient exposition of the impact of British corporate lobbying. Each will be analysed to expound its theoretical structure, its practical applicability and whether it correctly reflects the true diffusion of power.
To understand the focus on corporate political lobbying, it is of course important to understand some of the key ways that business has changed. The rise of business as a dominant force on the political stage can be seen in terms of demand and supply factors. The most stark demand factor can be seen in terms of the increase in the outsourcing of the public sector to commercial operations. The role of business in carrying out tasks previously delivered by the State include helping establish and run Foundation Hospitals and educational Academies. Since 1992 successive governments have pioneered the Public Private Partnerships, creating a commercial demand for business engagement in the public sector. It can also be viewed in the increasing number of pieces of legislation that affect the operation of business and the attempts that are made to repel or reduce, or alternatively to increase and expand, the impact (Harris and Fleisher, 2007, p.97). Moreover, across government departments best practice in policy development has regularly supported a consultative strategy that includes drawing upon the expertise and experience of the private sector to suggest policy shape, impact assessment and practical application. This has strengthened the relationship between the public and private sector.

One of the significant developments of the blurring of which sector does what type of work can be seen in terms of the role of businesses acting as inspectors to uphold regulation and law. Heritier, Mueller-Debus and Thauer (2009) note the number of companies that “deploy supervising activities over their suppliers' products and production processes in order to ensure their compliance with regulatory standards thereby taking on tasks commonly performed by public authorities.” While on one hand this could be seen as good corporate governance and compliance, on the other it could be seen as a response to a deficient service from the government and the need for the private sector to take on additional responsibility. Either way, this represents the reduction in what was previously understood roles for private and public sector and makes the penetration of corporate activity in realms previously occupied by the public sector more of the norm.

Additional supply factors include businesses seeking to create market opportunities through attempts to change legislative measures to provide access to government contracts. Allied to straightforward product marketing, this approach can be seen in more detail in the enhancement of the UK ID card case study. Collectively, these factors, among others, have led to greater industry-government contact. The actions of business at this coalface are generally encapsulated within the work of corporate political lobbying. The emergence of corporate lobbying is well-charted territory, and it does not come as a surprise to note that business is heavily involved in the work of government. This is due to the basic and ancient symbiotic relationship between the two: business needs government for trade regulation and government needs business for taxation and employment.

Following examination of the transformations that have taken place since 1989, this investigation focuses specifically on one of the primary results of corporate lobbying. It then assesses how this leading feature of the modern political landscape has removed certain pre-existing actors from the decision-making process and replaced them with professional advocates who perform their function. The specific impact will be examined both in theory and practice to demonstrate that when business engages with the decision-making process it creates, among others, two effects. One is the projection of a honed argument in which presentations of corporate positions are carefully constructed and aligned to business objectives and principles – a presentation performance. The second is Performance as a
measure of achievement and can be assessed through the lobbyist’s policy and issue-management ability. In these two senses, this thesis argues that the impact of corporate political lobbying on the transformation of, and operation of, politics has been to create a Politics of Performance.

The practical assessment revolves around the two case studies; how the motor industry reduced the financial impact of the European Union’s End-of-Life Directive; and how the information technology sector enthused the UK Home Office to include specifications that significantly increased cost into the design of the UK identity card proposal. By using a typology of the Channels of Influence that business can use to influence the decision-making process, this provides a methodology to examine the claim that there is a Politics of Performance. These are the conduits through which business (and other bodies) seek to influence the decision making process. They include: Parliament, government, the media, and third party advocacy such as using engaging an independent think tank to publish a supporting report. The Channels of Influence typology provide views through which it is possible to see the way corporate lobbying develops a particular presentation of the business position, and is able to use this ability to seek a more favourable outcome. This focus on performing to the different stakeholders in the decision making process and achieving the result for business, are the twin hallmarks of the new transformation of politics.

This new phenomenon derives from having a professional lobbyist in the discussions between industry and its political stakeholders negotiating on behalf of the business rather than by having the position of business set by those managing the short-term profit and loss accounts. With the lobbyist’s broad view across the business and the strategic direction of the company, they are able to apply this insight to negotiate more favourable outcomes for the company through selected use of a range of media and communication tools. Coupled with the modernisation of government which has involved a strong focus on policy delivery, rather than on enhancement of the policy system and debate, this development has helped bring about an understanding that the decision making process can be managed. This is predicated on the New Labour modernisation of government belief that what people care about is the efficient execution of a policy rather than the ideology behind it. Given that political maxim that the government of the day wants to show the voting public policy delivery results, corporate lobbying has been promoted in importance in this environment as it connects business expertise to public sector requirements in order to deliver this. These are two recent developments that have helped to distinguish the Politics of Performance concept in the transformation debate and begin to set it apart from the other narratives that fail to register this, as will be shown more fully in Chapter Two.

It is principally due to the corporate lobbyists incentive for profits that feeds the drive to create and refine powerful presentations of corporate positions. The desire to make money by selling the knowledge that increases the persuasiveness of an organisation’s arguments is most acute in those lobbyists who work for businesses. It is in the private sector that the highest fees are paid to lobbyists although there are some notable exceptions which prove the rule. These include the major international non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and WWF who have multi-million dollar turnovers and use these to appoint highly-able lobbyists. In this way, these organisations similarly employ highly professional advocates who are driven, at least in part, by high salaries. The former Global Head of Communications for Greenpeace, Francesca Polini, held a similar role for the food and drink multinational Mars, Incorporated, beforehand. The commitment to professionalism
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is inextricably linked to how well the lobbyist is able to create a presentation and give the best airing of the argument. This ability is what is often lacking from the politically unaware and less well financed civil society groupings that draw support more from emotional appeal than successful direct engagement with decision-takers. As a result, corporate lobbying can be seen to encompass the large international non-government organisations since the actual agents approach political engagement based on their professional experience. Corporate lobbying is therefore seen as principally the mobilising factor that is bringing about the general political transformation of the Politics of Performance.

While the emergence of corporate lobbying as the antithesis of the politically-motivated authentic activist explains the transformation of, and the operation of, the Politics of Performance that is taking place it does not address the impact that corporate lobbying is having on this development. Crucial to understanding the impact of business advocacy on the transformation is the point that belief in the truth of the corporate message is not necessary to them. A business employs professional political operators specifically to ‘act out’ engagement in politics on their behalf. This is a significant change from traditional belief-led ideological politics and is the primary impact that this thesis seeks to communicate. Politics is changing: not all participants in the policy-making process believe in the political cause in which they are active and this is a fundamental change in the configuration and the way that politics works.

The Politics of Flux

Politics-in-motion (Jones, Gray, Kavanagh, Moran, Norton, & Seldon, 1991, p.277) is an important concept as it is the foundation argument. The Politics of Performance is not static nor governed by transient ideology, but is dynamic and responsive to the audience. For businesses, their presentation will always seek to promote their economic benefit through a flexible set of arguments which can be employed as and when appropriate. Central to the thesis of corporate lobbying transforming the polity therefore is the definition of politics. Politics is the space that permits the co-existence of opposing interests, encapsulating the ideas and the expressions that these take. It is the communication of the concept as much as the germ of the thought behind it that is essential to politics. “Politics is…an activity…and must be brought to life” (Crick, 2000, p.25). Without the delivery of the message, the idea is unheard and the conflict of politics is not created. Therefore the way an issue is communicated is fundamental to the shape politics takes. The ability to articulate a concept and counter resistance is an essential primary skill to ensure that the issue is represented. Politics is subsequently considered in terms of the existence of dialectic, of the relationships between opposing ideas, and through examination of the way business seeks to influence the policy-making process in the case studies. This is affected through investigation of the key points of contact that business has with the decision-makers which are described as Channels of Influence. These are the specific routes to audiences at the appropriate moment in which it is possible to identify opportunities to exert influence and change the direction of the issue. Examination of the transformation is continued through consideration of these criteria for communication opportunities. Analysis of the Channels of Influence will also show how business responds to those actors who hold opposing ideas and behave in ways which attempt to scupper the intentions of business. The key objective is to both secure a share of voice on the political stage and make a more persuasive case than any actor which may hold an
opposing view. To do this effectively today requires the presentation and achievement ability of those who can perform in the political arena – specialist lobbyists.

The importance of communication in politics has long been acknowledged. From Greek oratorical tradition through to Leni Riefenstahl’s epic documentary film, *Triumph des Willens*, (1935) of the Nuremberg rally, and modern social media, the way in which messages are delivered shapes their political reception. For example, in the four years prior to David Cameron becoming British Prime Minister, as leader of the Conservative Party he produced podcasts to reach out to voters more comfortably using this medium and also as a way to appear modern and in touch with how communications are used. Similarly this can be seen with modern political parties pages on Facebook.com. The importance of the way a message is conveyed as much as what is said is, as McLuhan (2001, pp. 7-24) suggests with his famous insight, that “the medium is the message.” This is increasingly important in mass communication media that first began with the Gutenberg printing press in late 1430s, and more recently can be seen to have expanded with the technological development of the internet and the ability for anyone to potentially communicate to a wide audience. A direct result of this has been the amplification and dissemination of political ideas. In the modern world this creates increased threats but also opportunities for those wishing to shape the polity. As business engagement in politics has continued to grow, it has been identified and recognised that major companies have responsibilities to society in general. Corporate political lobbying has developed to help achieve this. The ability to participate in politics and present business as a functioning part of society and, indeed, secure the licence to operate, made the engagement of professionals crucial to a company’s business plan. Protection of reputations and brands, which are financially accounted for in annual results and business valuations, ensures that companies invest resources in managing their image. Today, corporate lobbying is an industry in itself with consultancies working alongside in-house teams. As Harris and Fleisher (2005, p.105) powerfully demonstrates there has been an explosion in interest in the sector since the late 1970s as their graphs charting the rise of employees in this market illustrate.

Corporate political lobbying is carried out by political communication specialists who offer for sale their ability to improve the engagement in the policy making process. As such they are essentially ‘guns-for-hire.’ Professional in approach and emotionally detached from his work, the lobbyist is able to promote a cause to the best of his ability until payment stops. The importance of communication to politics in its latest form of corporate lobbying is focused upon in the case studies which are considered below. These are considered in detail in order to demonstrate the way in which politics is shaped by communication and the degree of reliance upon the validity of briefings and sources sought by the policy-making process. The sensitive framing of a message and the particular way it is delivered can have the power of persuasion to determine the policy agenda and is essential to the success of any participant. Communication by new mobilisers transforms politics and the agents today are corporate political lobbyists.

The Politics of Transformation

The particular atmosphere that surrounds politics determines the form it takes and an understanding of this influences the core assessment of its transformation. As Bieling (2007) observes, one of the key impacts of “globalisation, new forms of private authority and the
increased power of transnational business…[is]…not generally [to have]…weakened the state, but rather advanced a business-oriented transformation of statehood.” In line with this understanding that key concepts that frame the polity are changing to recognise a greater role for business in the way decisions are made in a country, this thesis identifies the leading role that business has come to play in the transformation of politics.

Whilst it has been claimed that politics is in decay and, indeed, that it had even reached an End of Politics, assessment of the atmosphere and the mobilising factors within it demonstrate that this is an absurdity. Politics by its nature can never suffer from decay but will transform into a new way of working. Consideration of the key current political mobilisers identifies the key deficiencies in the arguments of the End of Politics thesis. An important factor is the vibrancy of civil society that has continued the participation, expression and engagement in politics beyond the decline in interest in ideology.

This discussion is broadened by consideration of the definition of what is meant by end/endisms and the key arguments that support it within the literature review in Chapter Two. While the authors convey the idea that leading aspects of politics have withered away, and in particular highlight the condition of belief-centric politics, two key ideas are integral to the Politics of Performance hypothesis and developed from the body of thought. These are the emergence of corporate lobbying as a political force, albeit seen as a negative and corrosive development, and the issue of communication in the era of information technology and mass media. These two transforming elements are highlighted by this thesis and provide the foundation for the shape of politics to come but as a positive, rather than a negative force.

While the “corporate colonisation” (Boggs, 2000, p.6) of politics is taking place, the emergence and identification of the growth of civil society groups has also achieved significant academic interest as the new centre of political gravity for engagement in, predominately, single-issue groups. Almond and Verba (1989, pp.337-357) adopted the term civil society in recognition of the explosion in membership of organisations outside the formal establishment and the role of the groups in society. They led a new wave of thinking that identified the locus of pressure group and interest group activity (Grant, 1995, p.5). However, as with the Endist theories, the civil society-dominated polity also fails to provide a full description of the state of politics. In highlighting only one major group of protagonists, only one side of the argument was exposed. There are of course several leading mobilisers in politics, including business, the media, the increasing influence of celebritocracy, unelected quangos and other factors which can be gathered under the umbrella of those influencing the shape of politics having less of a direct, authentic belief in their political activity. This movement away from belief holders to non-belief holders engaging in politics may be seen as part of a delegation of responsibilities in the political process rather than as the widely held assumption of depoliticisation.

The Politics of Delegation

Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2003, p.vii) note that delegation has become a wider hallmark of modern politics. They highlight the shifts of power to independent central banks, constitutional courts, and independent regulatory agencies and from national to supranational organisations such as from member states to the European Union. Delegation theory is also often considered as reductionist (Senge, 1991, cited by Mills and Ungson, 2003, p.147). As
Crick (2000, pp.56-74) argues throughout his chapter on “A defence of politics against democracy,” control of political representation is diminished and transformed by delegation. When power is dispersed among more than one decision-maker, representation is diluted. When lobbyists act on behalf of their business the responsibility to communicate the business objectives is delegated to them. In order to evaluate this within the relevant academic literature, two of the leading delegation concepts will be considered. These are the policy uncertainty principle and the ally principle. When applied to politician-civil servant relations, the delegation concepts stress the master-subordinate relationship. However, there is a clear distinction to be made in using them to analyse the interaction of a business with a commercial lobbyist, due to the paid relationship determining the contractual objectives and activity. In this sense the delegation is not subject to the same power constellation, but is driven by a demand for the expertise of the lobbying by business and the supply of this ability by the lobbyist.

The uncertainty principle, that the passing of control will result in a reduced and impoverished result (Huban and Shipan, 2006, cited by Weingast and Wittman, 2006 p.256), is overcome by the effective persuasion of the lobbyist that he has a specialist ability to deliver political change (Braun and Gilardi, 2006, p.89). This can result in considerable autonomy for political expression provided that the communication is tied to business imperatives. Consequently, business must ally itself to the lobbyist and place faith in his ability to deliver. The result of this is that responsibility to deliver the political result by believers is passed to non-believers, indicating the general shift towards a result-focused polity that is more concerned about delivery and issue management than authentic participation.

Political action shifts from the factory workers who care about the future of the company to professional lobbyists who are not as emotionally committed to the business. Briefings and contact with the policy-making process are therefore part of a communication programme of simulation and role-playing in which political engagement is carried out under pretence and is an artificial construct with the lobbyist separate from direct managerial responsibility of the core business. It is the politics divested of an honest passion for the subject matter but expert and experienced at securing a favourable outcome. The lobbyist is devoid of emotional commitment to the argument and can rationally assess the best cause of action and this is a core function of delegation in lobbying. This empirical evaluation and management of an issue is considered the height of professionalism and sophistication for the paid corporate advocate. Securing the result is recognised as being of a higher strategic need than actual involvement simply because it is what is believed by the actor with the cause.

By contrast, those who are emotionally motivated do not place as a clear a direct objective weight on the way in which their cause is managed (Lattimer, 2000, p.348). The prime concern for civil society groups, for example, is on the successful achievement of the end goal and less the means by which this had been achieved. While this may have been a result of skilled advocacy, though this would be more by the happy coincidence of the member skill pool than by the strategic decision to employ experts. By contrast, the politics of corporate lobbying is a process that develops and matures through active and deliberate learning of best practice of effectiveness. The result of this professional mechanism ensures that the lobbyist is not guided by an emotional response-focused approach but one that is governed more by experienced strategic analysis. Corporate lobbying identifies stakeholders, audits favourability towards issues, creates detailed stakeholder maps of the various groupings and highlights the key linkages and opportunities to influence the policy-making process at
The professional approach taken by lobbyists is core to the development of the Politics of Performance. The presentation of the argument and success in political debate are recognised as dependent more on a lobbyist’s research, writing, briefing skill and general ability to communicate rather than the articulation of a belief by an impassioned activist. This fundamental divergence strikes at the heart of the emotion that compels individuals to become engaged in the decision-making process. Authentic and genuine belief in the goal of the political activity as the mobilising force in politics can no longer be understood as the primary motive for engagement. The twin drivers of the Politics of Performance, the corporate lobbyists’ focus on presentation and achievement, have changed this.

This is further supported by Kettl (2002, pp.ix) who stresses that politics can be managed through the focus on measurement and evaluation of actions in a systematic way and can essentially be distilled as a form of project management and implementation. Delivery is not achieved solely by social aim but also requires process-ordered efficiency. This is not a development called for by business alone but has been grasped by recent Governments. Indeed, one of New Labour’s first management decisions was to establish the Better Regulation Task Force to improve the execution by government of policy and law-making in 1997. Recognition that management of policy is key is a core building block that underpins the Politics of Performance and the success of corporate lobbying. In line with other ways a business seeks to maximise its profit, a strong managerial approach is essential. This idea returns to the underlying analysis that corporate lobbyists are non-cause believers who are focused on performing to the best of their paid ability. The goal of a lobbyist is to ensure delivery through professional management of information by communicating the right messages at the right time to the right people.

Another key development in the political arena that supports the Politics of Performance has been the use of political marketing. This term recognises the cross-over from the way business researched the sale of its goods and services to the way it communicated to the political sphere. Whilst political marketing has generally focused upon political party communication there now exists the Fordist political communication process where arguments are constructed on an assembly line by paid advocates who build stakeholder toolkits designed to create a desired presentation. As Lees-Marshment (2001, p.13) argues, “political marketing” is more than merely campaigning and electoral engagement, but is determined by a sophisticated set of professional tools including the use of market intelligence techniques such as focus groups, polls and most powerfully, constituent and electoral role-profiling statistics held on searchable mass databases. Pioneered in the US and known as ‘micro-targeting’ or ‘modelling,’ the Conservative Party used Voter Vault in the 2001 election. Furthermore, based on the success of political marketing, Lees-Marshment and Lilleker (2005, pp.165-181, 205-229) have noted that today the market-oriented party approach has spread around the world, including Europe and the new democracies of Brazil and Peru. These systems allow parties to target messages to those electors with whom it can reasonably expect to resonate. Lees Marshment (2001, p.35) highlights the example of targeting party’s health investment pledges to the elderly.
Business employs a similar systematic approach in the marketing of its public policy positions. Whilst this might be expected in bid work, companies also apply the same due diligence to the communication of sensitive announcements and issues. The preparation that goes into the presentation that businesses commission should not be underestimated as simply the product of a company producing a ‘wish list’ of messages that it broadcasts to the general populus. Care and attention is given to each engagement with an identified key decision-maker. Use of the Channels of Influence are practiced with as much professional aptitude as the lobbyist can muster since this will not only affect the success of the campaign, or issue-management, but also whether or not he or she is able to keep their job. This is the performance measure of the function. If the lobbyist is a consultant this is even sharper as it will likely determine whether or not they win repeat business.

The Politics of Performance has some powerful mobilising forces behind it that have propelled it forward as a key factor in the newly transformed political system. A polity in which political activity is exercised outside the established formal democratic system by professional non-cause believers, corporate lobbyists have changed the structural foundation and agency operation. There are, of course, critics of this hypothesis, most notably the long established concept of the Social Contract between the state and the individual that determines the accepted rules, norms and behaviours of the political system. This is challenged by the idea of politics being mobilised by the artificial constructs and performances of lobbyists. The contract cannot be said to be accepted when the lobbyist engaging a political argument does not have the authentic belief in the argument and therefore the accountability and responsibility to be able to accept the direct relationship this prescribes. Arguably corporate lobbying and the Politics of Performance supported by Chomsky and Herman (1988) ideas on the social contract that individuals are, in fact, subject to the eponymous “manufacturing [of] consent.” The Politics of Performance involves business manufacturing an image of itself in a way that is persuasive but sufficiently balanced to gain the consent of society in general. The plausibility of the presentation and the palatability of the achievements of business in politics are the challenges for the continuation of this performance-centred transformation.
Chapter Two - Literature Review of the Narratives

This chapter provides an overview of two transformations in UK politics since around the end of the Cold War. It details the questionable foundations of the lead arguments in The End of Politics thesis and the one-sided Reinvention of Politics civil society interpretation of the transformation in politics. Through review of these narratives it highlights the weaknesses and deficiencies in particular with regard to the role that corporate political lobbying plays. Although it is well understood that fundamentally business interests differ from those of the state, the literature on this subject does not illustrate how business actually manifests itself in politics today. In this thesis the role of corporate lobbying is explained as part of the transformative shift from a centralised system of decision-making which has historically rested with government to a much wider spectrum in which many interests contribute to the shaping of a decision. While the focus of the chapter is on the theoretical background and the origins of the Politics of Performance hypothesis, it will first set out some of the major developments that have changed the political landscape and the way business features in it.

One of the hallmarks of the modern polity is “consumer politics” (Bykerk and Maney, 1994 p.vii) Voters act like consumers and will buy what satisfies them. In the UK this has resulted in successive recent government’s need to fulfil increasingly raised expectations of policy-delivery, which can only be achieved through the process of multi-level governance. Governance requires the involvement of business, among other actors, to make the delivery of policy commitments possible. Numerous examples from Foundation hospitals to school Academies demonstrate the trend for a shift of risk from public to the private sector which, coupled with the injection of funding, showcase that policies are being delivered which otherwise would not be. Boutilier (2009, p.18-19) argues this is a step change in the way decisions are made and represents the shift from direct elector-elected politics to stakeholder politics. There are, of course, criticisms to this approach including the principles of egalitarianism and the potential long-term increased cost to the taxpayer (Monbiot, 2001, p.6). Nonetheless, as Boutilier (op.cit) makes clear, the resources within the private sector, principally technical expertise coupled with a managerial approach toward achieving efficient outcomes, are prized by the public sector.

Recognition of the full extent of the process of governance and the enlargement of the social contract is a key development highlighted by this chapter. This thesis demonstrates that the authoritarian risk is not that the state will take over in the Orwellian sense, nor that there will be a “corporate takeover” (Monbiot, 2001, p.1) but that the skills needed to participate in the presentation and achievement-driven system of governance will make decision-making less understood or penetrable to those without this understanding. Many civil society groups are highly adept at operating in this system (Grant, 1995, p.195). While the aspiration of multi-level governance is an elegant concept, in practice this does not overcome the risk that, in instances where highly incentivised interests are involved, specific groups may be able to hold sway and have a greater influence over the decision-making authorities. This idea is not a new one and one that de Tocqueville captured neatly in 1835 with his powerful concept of the “tyranny of the minority” (1988, p.107).

While this chapter makes clear that the increased participation of business in politics is driven by companies seeking profit, principally through seeking to increase its own power in the decision-making process in line with Schumpeterian (2003, pp.24-29) and realpolitik
arguments, business interests are balanced by a number of competing forces. These include the canon of civil society groups, redistributive-committed governments in the UK and abroad, and media-focused populist agendas that find business overtly getting what it wants distasteful (Bauman, 2000, p.173). The result is not only that a company must abide by existing laws that are made by Parliament in the interest of the people and not just business, but also that the company’s reputation and social licence to operate is continually under examination within the court of opinion and faces the threat of being further curtailed. This is a fundamental issue and not as simple as it might first appear.

Business is sometimes positioned to be in opposition to civil society but this is a mistake (Cohen and Arato, 1994, p.x). While the definition and role of civil society and the dimensions of its relationship with business is explored in more detail later in this chapter, under the section Review of the Reinvention of Politics Narrative, it is vital to understand that civil society is a “dense network of civil associations” (Foley and Edwards, 1996). In a free market economy, business and civil society are interwoven and symbiotic. Business requires the general favour of the networks to enable its enterprise to be normatively accepted and supported, and civil society requires goods and services to ensure needs are met in order to provide a base level for civil associations to be formed and maintained.

Moreover, companies and civil society share a civil association foundation. They are built on the shared principles of groups being free to organise and self-organise in order to represent their respective interests (Hann and Dunn, 1996, p.5). As such, civil society must not be seen as entirely separate from the economic society of the organisations of production and distribution. This inter-related system demonstrates that the individual, unless a hermit, is part of both civil and economic societies and that what is key are the values that underpin each. A civil society group that supports euthanasia may be seen as more unsavoury to some than a business which maximises its profit by locating its registered office in a low tax environment. Nonetheless, the drive for profit maximisation and its effect of concentrating wealth in the hands of the few, achieved through the toil of the many, has led to the very well known description that “hitherto, every form of society has been based…on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes” (Marx and Engels, 1985, p.93).

The importance of the checks and balances and role of ethics in the democratic system must not be underestimated. Despite the closeness between business and civil society, the latter embodies views which, of course, act as a counter weight to the demands of capitalism. It is interesting therefore to note that typically the market economy “favours democracy” (Dahl, 2000, p.166). While it is a system of governance that has “typically led to economic growth” (Dahl, 2000, p.167), it however leads businesses to not only pay for lobbyists to represent their interests to further their cause, but also to protect them from attack (Nownes, 2006, p.4). In the “tempestuous marriage” (Dahl, 2000, p.166) between democracy and market-capitalism, business employs lobbying to increase its chances of winning against counter views held by certain civil society groups. Business lobbying is therefore not only to enhance the political and legal framework in which the company will operate but also to defend it. This is common to all profit maximising enterprises and the demand to repeatedly deliver these two primary requirements of lobbying underpin the professionalisation of the function and the ability to create presentations that perform the interests of business in the most effective way possible.

This study seeks to halt the swinging pendulum between the limited End of Politics argument that believes businesses have swept away the space for debate, and the solely outsider-focused...
politics of Reinventionism that does not afford business a significant role in political renewal. It seeks to convey an approach to understand this transformation that can be seen along a continuum that moves from the End of Politics to the Reinvention of Politics and finally to the Politics of Performance. While this transformation is not strictly chronological, it shares elements of the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and stresses the role of dialogue in politics as the essence of the formula. As Macedo (1999, p.18) points out, this approach declined in practice following the end of the Cold War as an acceptance of the triumph of liberal constitutionalism led to a restricted view around how we interpreted the polity. Indeed, this may be considered part of the dictum that contributed to the End of Politics thesis.

However, throughout Rawls seminal work, Political Liberalism (2005) first published in 1993, the individual is charged with a duty to continually challenge the system of governance. More recently this view has been operationalised by Gutmann and Thompson (1996, pp.11-52) in their assessment of how disagreements are represented in contemporary politics. Macedo (1999, p.11) viewed that the most powerful aspect of Gutmann and Thompson’s (op cit) work is how they deliberated political issues rather than the content of the debate itself. This approach and the coining of the phrase “deliberative democracy” (1996, p.1) require a thorough evaluation of theoretical discourse analysis and is a core part of the need for a continual reassessment of how politics is analysed. This is key not only for the need for new narratives to offer new interpretations of the polity but also for a closer examination around the role of communications in politics. This study will attempt to undertake this through evaluation of two case studies to assess the how business engages in UK politics today and the impact it has. However, in order to reach a conclusion, this chapter will, in the vein of Gutman and Thompson (op.cit), set out the “background conditions of the deliberation” (Macedo, 1999, p.19) in the transformation of politics that has been underway since the end of the Cold War.

In short, this chapter will reveal the impractical nihilism of the End of Politics and the one dimensional approach offered by the Reinventionist school and through analysis of the deficiencies in the arguments, a fuller understanding of transformation and the elements which contribute to the Politics of Performance hypothesis. Key to the theory is the need to better understand the role of business, and more specifically of corporate lobbying, in the operation of contemporary British politics. Much has been written about End of Politics, Reinvention of Politics, Transformation in Politics and, indeed, corporate lobbying and this chapter will review the leading works to present an understanding of the definitions. It will illustrate how far each narrative is insufficient, unconvincing, and lacking in effective demonstration of the need to understand the role and impact of corporate political lobbying.

**Review of the End of Politics Narrative**

In 1960 Daniel Bell wrote The End of Ideology and the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s in the United States and first coined this eponymous famous phrase. Bell’s seminal study shared some of the mechanised totalitarian philosophy of the Frankfurt School and can be seen echoed in the more recent concerns about the commoditisation of society described by Klein (2001, p.5) in terms of an “obsession with brand identity [and that this is] waging war on public and individual space”. Although Bell (op.cit) explicitly highlights in later editions that his book is not about an end of politics, but rather the end of the condition of politics in
that age, it can be understood, from the critical threads in the work, that they link to much later works such as *The End of History and the Last Man Standing* (Fukuyama, 1992). In particular, they both make reference to an “end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” *(op.cit, p.xi).* Bell’s (1960, p.39) analysis from the break up of family capitalism underpins his claim in the “exhaustion of utopia” *(op.cit, pp.275-393).* These claims of the end of politics in the past half century were preceded by a tumultuous clash of politics, in this case the anti-liberal Nazi ideology versus the Liberal world. With the conclusion of the Second World War making the tension no longer as strongly felt, resulted in dialectic vacuum. The desperation of this apparent void was as intense as the polarised geopolitical divide and massive-scale industrialised world war that it replaced. This space encouraged Bell to falsely discern a new era. During the 1950s, and even throughout the 1940s, the seeds were sown for Soviet Communism to lead forward a new clash of ideas against the Western liberal democratic model.

Similarly, following the triumph of liberalism at the end of the Cold War, the political space that was once the battleground between the competing ideologies was left an apparent barren wasteland. However, this was again far from true. Although liberalism has survived once more, it cannot be considered hegemony when it acts as the system permitting dissent and the enabler of the struggle between the separate and, on occasion, opposing dialectics of business growth and citizen action.

Four key arguments may be identified across the body of work that supports The End of Politics thesis. The first of these is the claim of the decline of ideology. This has been signalled by many writers and is usually accompanied by claims of a policy shift toward the ‘centre ground’ (Boggs, 2000; Gray, 2002; Crouch, 2004). In the UK, Blair’s Third Way embodies this movement incorporating, at least theoretically, liberal capitalist means in order to achieve a Socialist redistributive end. This has been part of what may be understood as ideological stagnation. Clearly, as Eatwell and Wright (1999, p.8) outlines in defining ideology, “the programme and vision” which underpins New Labour does not fit into this classic definition but on closer reflection indicates a system of ‘consensus politics.’ This was seen in the Lib-Lab pact formed in 1997 and again in 2007. This was not necessary under the first-past-the-post system, but reflected a shared approach and support for consensus politics. Although it should be mentioned that it was also a power political measure to ensure power was not shared with the Conservatives. It is also worth noting that the private-public partnerships (PPP), a hallmark of the Third Way, was actually an idea first put into practice by the Conservatives under John Major’s premiership. One of the leading current campaigns of the Conservatives is “Stop Brown’s NHS Cuts.” *(The Conservative Party, 2008).* This, from the party characterised as previously managing a reduced public sector budget with lower taxes and less regulation.

The shift to the centre ground can be seen as the response to demands to achieve policy deliveries through consensus rather than adversarial approaches. Taking the traditional left versus right debates out of the equation has led many to claim The End of Politics, often reinforced by the substantial decline in membership of the main three political parties in the UK, as there has been in the US. The declining membership of trade unions is also an oftencited statistic. However, this fails to appreciate the movement of expression of politics from inside traditional political structures to the outsider organisations. Civil society activism has increased exponentially. The Seattle World Trade Organisation protests in 1999, where it is
estimated at least 40,000 people took to the streets to raise concerns about the direction of the trade negotiations, was a stark indication of the trend for direct action and increased membership of informal organisations outside the traditional structures. Within the system, managerial politics, the process of achieving the maximum policy output in the most efficient way possible has been seen as a hallmark of The End of Politics. As Dillow (2007, p.1) quotes Tony Blair, former Prime Minister, “that equality and efficiency are partners, not enemies” is untrue. Evidencing his hypothesis with New Labour’s main economic policies of tax credits, the minimum wage, expanding higher education and promotion of macroeconomic stability, Dillow (op.cit) argues that this has not removed the trade-off between equality and efficiency. This argument is explored theoretically (Okun and Ladwig 2002, cited by Bluhdorn, 2007, p.75), and was neatly summed up with the analysis that “the first virtue of economy and administration is efficiency,” whilst “the first virtue of democracy is equality”. This reflects the view that politics has to be about normative assessments rather than substantive achievements and is a highly subjective view of a system of politics that should exist rather than what actually is taking place. This same prescriptive mistake is also made by other Endists. Lee and Stanley (2006) describe a politics obsessed with “management” and “service delivery” and one that is “short on vision”(op.cit, pp.1-9). They call this Triangulation and argue this is causing the strangulation of democracy, participation and social dialogue. Fundamentally, while the complaint against managerialism replacing political debate in a shift to the centre-ground continues, it fails to recognise the renewal of politics taking place in civil society activism. Indeed, the problem also facing the managerial approach to politics is that it often overlooks the role of businesses involved in the public sector, the architects of efficient capitalist management on which many public sector approaches are based.

A second tenet of The End of Politics is the claim that corporate colonisation of public space is part of a process in anti-politics in which there is standardisation of experience through product and cultural homogeneity (Boggs, 2000, pp.67-89). Before considering notions of anti-politics, it is important to assess the term ‘corporate colonisation.’ This highly charged piece of alliteration rests on the incontrovertible truth of the symbiotic relationship between business and the state in which industry requires the state to provide fair regulation in order to trade and the state requires taxation in order to deliver its policy commitments. The claim of ‘colonisation,’ with imperial overtones of military conquest could only at best be applied to the corporate-military complex in which business has an incentive in turning a profit from supporting this activity. Whilst Boggs (op.cit, p.79) and others refer to the colonisation of public space in claiming that there is little academic independence, policy criticism, localism and only at best an ‘enclave culture, this is simply false. The fragmentation and division apparent in UK society has created an outburst of debate, controversy and conversation. Divisions between urban and countryside views, those of the fundamental religious and the sectarian, the ecologist and industrialist, the northerner and southerner, the homosexual, bisexual and heterosexual, the bigoted and liberal, and the isolationalist and integrationist are all clearly observable. Indeed, even these descriptions are highly political with in some cases, pejorative emphasis.

Corporate colonisation is also argued as the result of apparent multinational domination, clever marketing and elite networking. While it plainly fails to recognise the substantial criticism levied at legitimate business in the mainstream as well as specialist media, this view is popularised by highly selective case studies and subjective treatments in works such as Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain (Monbiot, 2001) and Tescopoly: How One
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*Shop Came Out on Top and Why It Matters* (Simms, 2007). Both works provide case studies that argue that superstores ‘hollowing out’ of local communities, results in a weakening of social cohesion and a desiccating of collective spirit. Such approaches could be described as ‘single-issue fanaticism’, a phrase attributed in his obituary to the former *Times* journalist, Bernard Levin, (The Times, 2004) and highlights the extremism in certain individual civil society campaigns. As Carden, Courtemanche, and Meiners (2009) note in their examination of the social impact of the multinational company WalMart that there is “little evidence that…[the company] makes communities more conservative or more progressive.” It is far from universally agreed that simply because a major business is providing useful services, that this results in the politics of the locality. The broad brush stroke approach to the role of business in politics is woefully inadequate and the wider range of literature on the function and the roles companies take through corporate political lobbying will be explored towards the end of this chapter.

The third Endist claim is that the post-modern is the post-political. Boggs (2000, pp.213-222) claims that deconstructivism within post-modernism sows the seeds of the end of politics. By seeking to break down political actions into component and sub component parts and thereby challenging established norms, drivers and structures, Boggs argues that this is leading to a crisis of modernity and the dearth of political critical thought. Furthermore, the Endist treatment of post-modernism can be seen in Jencks (1996, p.21) analysis of Derrida and Foucault work into deconstructivism as being part of the theoretical superstructure that led to the disintegration of cohesive ideologies and binding social movements. By contrast, deconstructivism can be seen to be a far stronger contributor to the transformation of politics and has been argued to be a leading mobiliser of renewal. Mosco, (1996, pp.135-138) similarly supports this perspective, which he describes as a “rethinking” and renewing of the political economy of communication. Deconstructivism, when taken to its logical and final conclusion, results in an unpackaging of the individual’s motivations and actions, highlighting that within each person there are conflicting views. An individual may work on a motor-manufacturing line during the day and in the evening participate as an active member of, for example, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). Despite the fact that cars produce pollution that hangs around in the air at children’s head height and kill and injure many thousands every year, an individual can have the dual objective of maximising car production and, as part of the work of the NSPCC, campaign to minimise the threat and injury motor vehicles can cause to children. This facile example of internal corporate lobbying versus social lobbying illustrates that conflict exists within the individual. Moreover it demonstrates the fallacy that the post-modern automatically leads to a post-political condition. The impact of post modernism can be more securely said to show the disinterested structures and existence of competing interests that one can hold.

Another key argument that runs through the End of Politics thesis is the belief that social movements are predictable, cyclical and regimental (Boggs, 2000, pp.243-245). Peculiarly, this fails to appreciate the natural spontaneity of politics and political events. Focusing too heavily on a structural view, it does not recognise the innately passionate civil society activist who, convinced of the righteousness of his campaign, draws on qualities of personality and determination to make sudden, unexpected and often opportunistic moves. Indeed Weber (1968, p.46) portrays a detailed celebration of the power of the charismatic leader highlights the role that individuals play in history and, more importantly, in shaping presentations and, subsequently, politics. Furthermore, the complexity and inter-relationships of politics make each occurrence unique and impossible to replicate.
Despite the multifaceted End of Politics arguments and a refutation of some of the key threads that run through that thesis, the bottom line is that there is a fundamental ideological difference of opinion. First, Endists believe in the triumph of economics over politics and the disappearance of the form of politics they cherish. This conclusion is stated unreservedly and emphatically in the updated Postscript to Boggs’ *The End of Politics (Paperback Edition)* in 2000 (pp.311-326). Indicating a sense of despair at the evaporation of an apparent ‘golden age’, supported by media headlines telling stories of the declining standards of debate, the encroachment of the nanny state and the perceived irrelevance of politics and supposed apathy towards it, politics is a term widely misrepresented and misused.

**Review of the Reinvention of Politics Narrative**

In 1963 Almond and Verba first published their seminal work *The Civic Culture* (1989) and encapsulated the concept of political culture as part of a heritage of social analysis citing Plato’s *Republic* as one of the first great advocates of this exposition. With this focus on the impact of the socialisation of politics, their research led to the development of civil society in the contemporary context. In this investigation not only did they offer the definition of this grouping and some of the lexicon to analyse and interpret its role, more importantly they also set out the power and force of the capability of civil society. Principally they encapsulated it as “a substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of public policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of interests and belief in their reconcilability, and a widely distributed sense of political competence and mutual trust in the citizenry” (Almond, 1980, p.4). While this may appear at odds with an understanding that views civil society as essentially informal, non-governmental and dominated by grass roots activism, they both show that what is core to the definition of civil society is that it permits a range of views and interests and that some may be counter to the consensus.

Almond and Verba’s (1989, pp.337-357) evaluation of civil society as the essential feature of democratic stability in five countries, as appreciated through extensive perception surveys, demonstrated a powerful role for civil society in moderating and balancing political views to help produce stability. Their study cited the US and the UK as the two countries where a discernible civil society could be distinguished most clearly. The exceptional political stability of these countries up to the early 1960s relative to the other countries analysed was used as evidence of the contribution that civil society makes. Indeed, it provides further proof that the US historically has, and has had, a remarkably similar political culture to that of the UK. However, a cultural comparison between the US and the UK is not the focus of this investigation. Moreover, their later updated work in 1980 highlighted the development of the vibrant civil society in Germany and Italy. Nonetheless, Almond and Verba’s *(op.cit)* study remains a remarkably powerful work and the resonant force that it attributes to the capability of citizen political lobbying is a powerful argument.

While civil society is laudably recognised for achieving stability in democracies, it is in its richness for expressing views outside of the norm that it is most drawn upon by the Reinvention of Politics narrative. To understand this more clearly it is useful to consider its origins and theoretical building blocks in order to appreciate its strengths, weaknesses and how it represents a transformation. The modern forefather of the concept of civil society is often considered to be George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who envisaged it was part of
humanity’s system of needs (Cohen and Arato, 1994, p.xiv). He developed the concept of civil society from being the formal place where Socrates held public dialogues which would lead to resolution in an institution to one which embraced dialogue outside of the official Senate chamber. This definition was supported by characterising civil society as resting on three levels: legality, plurality and association and publicity (ibid). These conditions were necessary for civil society to exist freely. In delineating separate spheres, Hegel outlined that the link between civil society and the state was in terms of “mediation and interpenetration” (ibid). He did not however posit that business was outside of civil society but included it as part of it.

This broad church analysis was refined by “Gramsci and Parsons… [who] improved [it] by introducing a three part model differentiating civil society from both the economy and the state” (ibid). This reconfiguration of spheres led to divergent analyses during the Cold War with Ehrenberg (1999, p208) according that Gramsci’s view of civil society interpreted it as part of the superstructure and part of the hegemony that supported capitalism. By contrast, Cohen and Arato (1994, p.117) argued that Parsons’ analysis of civil society in the free market of the US centred on its functionalist and normative nature and did not follow a recognisable ideology. These fundamental developments in the evolution of civil society demonstrate the cyclical challenge of positioning business vis a vis the state and civil society. While they require a political liberal foundation and share respect for individual rights and private property (Jayaram, 2005, p.46), there is a continuing ambiguity around where precisely business should sit since civil society is determined as outside of the state and not outside of business. Nonetheless, the evolution of the concept has come to place business as exogenous to civil society despite the common factors that they both need to flourish. Given this theoretical heritage, business is largely excluded from the definition of civil society and subsequently is barely featured in the Reinventionist narrative.

Nonetheless, the catalyst for the Reinvention of Politics narrative rests on the power of civil society as a pipeline for political vent and expression that was otherwise being smothered by the triumphant monopoly of post Cold War liberalism as the only political discourse. One of the most influential struts for the efficacy of civil society is the concept of social capital which has in recent years in given weight to the Reinvention narrative spelling out a transformation in politics. One of the key definitions of social capital is Putnam’s (2002) conceptualisation. His analysis highlights the galvanising forces that bind human to human and generate the power in numbers definition (Putnam, 2002, p.1) of citizen lobbying. Indeed, Putnam’s appreciation for the value of critical mass has been championed by even detractors, such as Laitin (1995, pp. 168-173), who argue that the pseudo-economic lexicon of ‘social capital’ adds weight to the normative argument of the rejuvenation of politics.

Whilst concern has been expressed over the binary nature of attributing too much attention to causal mechanics, indicators, historical explanations and whether social capital always has positive consequences (ibid), Putnam’s insight provides a useful exposition of the demand for representation that numerical critical mass can loudly request. Membership of organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) is today reckoned at 80,000 (Harris and Fleischer, 2005, p.220). The influential power that this organisation wields results not only in well-funded single-issue campaigns but also through the social capital critical mass of its membership. This helps the organisation to secure meetings with senior Ministers, earn access to opinion forming forums and have views conveyed in highbrow discursive media articles on the subject (ibid). Furthermore, due to the “exponential rise in both the number and membership of pressure groups, as individuals have come to
regard pressure groups as a more effective channel for political expression…[has led to] more than half the adult population…[being] members of at least one organisation” (Kavanagh, Richards, Geddes, & Smith, 2006, p.419). Indeed, in May 2010, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds announced its membership had reached 1,076,112, which is more than double the members of the three main UK political parties combined.

The growing influence of nationalism and ethnic identity is another tenet that supports the compelling force of civil society in helping the reformation and transformation of politics. In developing the argument that civil society has helped pioneer political activity and vibrancy via an essentially political culture discourse, the role of territorial politics cannot be ignored. The emotional drive of regional identity and attachment to locality and community make this a highly persuasive and pervasive discourse. The battleground between local and central government is a well-traversed land and the testament to its contemporary citizen political representation is clearly made in the multitude of local action groups, and the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) groupings.

The Reinvention of Politics (Beck, 1997) can be seen as one of the leading modern works on the renewal of politics through his analysis of the “sub system” (op.cit., p.134) of civil society. To Beck, civil society is the modern vent for political discontent following the “disillusionment found in mainstream politics.” This was originally developed in his earlier work: Risk Society, Towards A New Modernity (Beck, 1992) in which he signalled the mobilisation in practice of the concept put forward by Almond and Verba (op.cit). Using this radical paradigm that can be crudely simplified to say that life is extremely fragile and it is vital to minimise risk through understanding the threats that exist in every action and inaction we undertake, Beck (1997) argues for political consciousness, especially regarding personal health and the environment. His work is a champion of active engagement in politics and can be seen as the civil society activist’s call to arms. In particular it refers to pressing for change in support of the Green cause in improving the natural world.

Many of the ideas that run throughout Risk Society, such as “reflexive modernity” (Beck, 1992, pp.3) and the “individualisation of social inequality” (op.cit p.85) are issues that promote highly controversial topics to which it assumed that the Reinvention marks a comprehensive appreciation of the leading factors determining the decision-making. In several arenas the role and importance of civil society is undeniable but in general this is not tempered and overly-stated for the modern era. Within the discussion surrounding reflexive modernity, for example, is the issue of the increase in gender misrepresentation. The delineation between equality activists and supporters of a male-dominated hegemony is drawn. This is now an antiquated argument insofar as the suffragettes pioneered this cause from the early part of the twentieth century and many advances in terms of the extension of the franchise, equal employment legislation and social attitudes have already significantly occurred. Nonetheless, the contribution of civil society through citizen lobbying to the transformation of politics can clearly be seen in the establishment of one of the key pillars of political thought, that civil society is part of the politicisation of society falsely denied by the End of Politics thesis.

Baker and Chandler (2005, p.1) noted that “…civil society is gathering momentum today as the search continues for forms of community and political action outside of what is often seen as a discredited state” highlighting the importance of civil society as citizen lobbying. Celebrations of civil society are part of the transformation of politics and an essential pillar of performance politics.
The mobilisation of civil society can be seen as the result of a multitude of factors, many of which are specifically modern and make this current political transformation unique. A frequently overlooked element is the UK’s relatively stable economy is that it enables space and time for specific interests to be pursued. This is focused through a sophisticated system of information exchanges which has helped to make the personal become the political through interest groups rather than, as previously, through broad-church parliamentary parties. Society has become more fragmented through flexible working, denuclearised families, specialised service sector employment and the disintegration of class-dominated communities. As a result single-issue groups, sectional issue organisations, charities, and NIMBYs have increased exponentially as the platform to voice political sentiment (Grant, 1995, pp.10-11).

However, as Baker and Chandler (2005, p.111-112) argue in delineating the “taming of the idea of civil society,” the concept is not sufficiently comprehensive in specifying a political solution to explain state-market relations. Civil society cannot, therefore, be the only force in the transformation; it can only play a part. A critical problem in understanding civil society is that, unlike socialist theory for example, it is relatively silent on what to do about the state and the market (Baker and Chandler, 2005, pp.159-161). He explains that this is due to “the general hostility to the state, in particular, and means that much republican civil society theory, if only by default, endows civil society with a deceptive aura of moral purity and disinterestedness” (Baker and Chandler, 2005, p.159). This patronising approach towards the functioning of business in politics, viewing it as separate entity from the goals of participation, legitimacy in decision-making and democracy, is a current theme dominant throughout the wide range of renewal literature.

Throughout Bauman’s In Search of Politics (1999,) he demonstrates this civil society dominance clearly by concentrating almost exclusively in identifying civil society as the great hope for the way in which politics should operate at the expense of other actors including business. Similarly, the anti-capitalist thesis (Callinicos, 2001, pp.109-121), places considerable weight in grass roots engagement and localism as a way to “buck the market” (Callinicos, 2001, p.97). While this is certainly an attractive approach that offers increased opportunities for enfranchisement to the masses through localised organisation and recognises the opportunities technology offers to transform the polity (Bluhdorn, 2007, p.85), it lacks a full explanation of how this functions in practice. Indeed, this approach misses a fundamental necessity in the operation of any enterprise: the requirement of funding. Nonetheless, the ecological movement has made great steps and achieved global publicity. The climate change agenda, while not necessarily homogenous, has become part of contemporary lexicon and has been given the normative mantle of a social good. Few would contend the need for countries to manage the global environment better, particularly those such as the UK, which as a developed country uses more of the world’s resources than some of the poorer developing countries. However, as Bluhdorn (ibid) argues, the modernisation of the ecological movement requires a harnessing of resources. For this to be effective, this requires the support of business and effective engagement with their political arm, the corporate political lobbyists.

As both civil society and business fall outside the traditional core of government and the civil service as the decision-making bodies, the opportunity for partnerships potentially offers greater weight in influencing a decision when specific objectives can be aligned. The core-periphery model treats civil society and corporate political lobbying as outside forces exerting pressure inwards. Although in this model it is vital to note that, whilst they are both outsiders, they will hold fundamentally different drivers, with business seeking profit and civil society
an issue resolution. It is the skill in finding common ground that offers the greatest opportunity for influence. This is not a commonly held belief, with Gellner (1995, p.142) overstating that civil society is strong enough to counterbalance the state alone and is the rescue boat to prevent the state from capsizing and “atomising the rest of society”. Viewing political transformation in this one-sided approach is dangerous. Certainly, pluralists such as Dahl (2000), and leading neo-liberals such as Hayek (2001) believe that the role of the public sphere is to provide citizens with the representation that best suits their needs. However, as they note, business is necessary in order to allow there to be a healthy public sphere in which the dominant issues are not mere survival.

Civil society has achieved much success without the help of business (Danahan and Marks 1995, cited by Baker and Chandler, 2006), and indeed, the anti-globalisation movement identifies industry as the cause and obstruction to the resolution. They highlight civil society successes from uncovering major retailers' links to sweatshop abuses, questioning corporations' ties to repressive dictators, shaming food processors into selling dolphin-safe tuna and demanding that businesses stop destroying old growth forests. They rightly note that citizens are not communicating to a wide audience their dissatisfaction and challenges to unethical corporate practices. These steps forward are an important part of the politics that is taking place and must be understood as a key mobilising factor in the transformation of politics. What is absent from the entire Reinvention school is adequate attention to the political response that business provides in their defence and, in cases, capitulation to the demands of civil society, customers, stakeholders and shareholders.

Recognition that politics has traversed from a plane of ideology through to an expression via a miasma of single-issue civil society groups is evidenced statistically by a change in membership profiles. However, this indicates only partly the movement that the transformation is taking. Crouch (2004, p.19) builds on the Endist tenet that “boredom, frustration and disillusion” set in with the current system of rule. However, Crouch (2004, pp.11-15) relates this not to a failure of democracy, but in the vein of the Reinvention school, after there had been a “democratic moment” (Crouch, 2004, p.11). He argues that the decline in the cohesion and identity of a British working class resulted in the prevention of mass political participation continuing. He argues that the transformation is part of a move beyond democracy to one in which there is a “form of political responsiveness” (op.cit, p.21, although he then argues in line with elitism, that resource rich entities manipulate public opinion. New Labour’s attempts to engage with the voter on the street through focus groups, as celebrated and criticised by Gould (1998, pp.326-332), are often considered as being merely appointed, self-affirming exercises while also providing key marketing intelligence on what messages will sell well.

In line with populist elitist thought, Crouch (2004, pp.31-53) focuses on the “The Global Firm: The Key Institution of the Post Democratic World and that it is imperative that global financial capitalism be brought to terms). Undoubtedly, multinational corporations are able to influence political decisions, and this will be shown in the practical example of the way in which General Motors was able to secure a suspension in the End of Life Vehicles Directive but it does not account for the fact that ultimately it was implemented within the original timetable and that the final decision making body, and implementing national bodies, were democratically elected supra-, and national-,governments. Similarly, it does not account for the fact that the majority of employees in the private sector work for small and medium-sized enterprises (UK National Statistics, 2004) and are subject to legislation from the top down
with little recourse or direct lobbying, excluding the efforts of trade associations and organisations such as the Federation for Small Business. While these organisations carry less political and media impact than can be achieved by major business threatening to relocate its businesses abroad should its demands not be met, the current political set-up squeezes them out of the process. However, regardless of the lack of distinguishing different elements of the business community or the demonisation of corporate power, this thesis examines the impact of corporate lobbying on the operation of politics through examination of the professional non-committed political communicator versus the belief-holding activist and delegation of authority as part of this process.

Bache and Flinders (2005, p.3) have attempted to address this in arguing that one strand of multi-level governance is that “sub-national actors were increasingly influential in decision making” In doing this, business is accorded a role as part of the embracing pluralist approach of governance. Their thesis is that the direction of an increasingly inter-dependent polity is laudable and is reflected in the propensity of PPPs. However, what is lacking from this trajectory is the next step, the effect that corporate lobbying is having on politics. Although Bache and Flinders (op.cit) recognise a role for business in the transformation of politics, it is still largely seen as part of a an unsubstantiated trend of “corporate hijacking of political power” (Klein, 2001, p.339) and employs the same sweeping terminology employed by more populist writers such as John Pilger (1998), George Monbiot (2001) and Greg Palast (2003) to describe the role of business in politics. This is dangerous when it is not widely understood exactly how corporate political lobbying operates, how this is affecting politics in terms of participation, authenticity and policy outcome, and indeed that business itself is not a single homogeneous entity. This neglect of academic investigation into corporate political lobbying is a worrying concern that the Endists, Reinventionists and those spearheading the transformation agenda overlook.

Review of the Impact of Corporate Political Lobbying

Lobbying, and in particular corporate lobbying, are terms laden with pejorative overtones of sleaze, favours, and personal networks. In the UK this is still particularly acute following the infamous cash-for-questions scandal in 1994. While the then Prime Minster, John Major, established the Nolan Committee to raise Standards in Public Life and despite senior civil servant Sir Gordon Downey publishing his report exonerating Ian Greer, Neil Hamilton and Tim Smith from the allegations of paid-for questions, which is against the UK Parliamentary code of conduct, the perceived marriage of corruption with corporate lobbying has yet be divorced. More recently, the cash for peerages debacle in 2007 and the ongoing issue of whether or not to force all UK lobbyists to register and disclose the advocacy they undertake, and on behalf of whom they represent, rather than by getting away with offering a voluntary sector-led code to uphold ethical behaviour, continues to leave corporate political communications in a less than positive light. Lobbying is seen as the ‘dark art and with high profile scandals and a lack of understanding about what a lobbyist actually does mystifying the understanding of professional political communications, lobbying, like public relations, has, ironically, a poor name (Lattimer, 2000, p.9).

This misinformation about lobbying underpins the prejudiced and simplified view of those who represent financial interests in a democratic setting. Unusually, this view is not just found in mainstream media but also in large swathes of academic discourse. The Endists make
inflammatory claims of “corporate colonisation” (Boggs, 2000, p.6) and “corporate takeover” (Monbiot, 2001, pp.1). Reinventionists present a more sophisticated and subtle argument in the “political economy of uncertainty” (Bauman, 1999, p.171), brought about by globalised capital that purportedly leads to a hollowing-out of citizenship. Transformation theorists generally argue that business is an overly powerful influence (Crouch, 2004, viii; Welch and Kennedy-Pipe, 2004, cited by Bache and Flinders, 2005 p.129). This consensus of opinion in the descriptions of the phases of transformations in politics since the end of the Cold War is a disturbing observation. It represents almost an oymoronic loathing of capitalism on one hand and an acceptance that it is necessary on another (Bluhdorn, 2007, p.185).

Despite the attempt of the Third Way to bridge this divide, the self-policing measures of the lobbyists have had some high profile failures which only further tarnish a sector seen as unclean. On 30 July 2007 The Evening Standard newspaper published an investigation of public affairs consultancy PPS who it alleged, “used trickery, deceit and manipulation” (Gilligan, 2007) in order to secure planning permission for property developments. PPS is a member of the Association of Professional Political Consultants and in order to be a member, it is required that all signatories commit to the code of conduct. However, there are many agencies outside the self-regulated bodies that have reputations that damage the industry. Leading public affairs consultancy Sovereign Strategy is headed by former MEP Alan Donnelly and cites Carole Tongue, a former MEP, and David Jamieson, a former MP, as employees. While it is not illegal for former elected officials to trade on their former roles and contacts, this supports the concern that lobbying is less a profession than a way to pay for access to, if not necessarily influence, an elite network of decision-makers. However, not withstanding these high profile exceptions, the work of the corporate lobbyists must be legal, ethical and responsible. This is for the simple reason that if lobbying is not, then the impact not only on the cause upon which they are being hired, but also on the reputation of the client, would result in the lobbyist losing future business. Ian Greer Associates was the public affairs company involved in the cash-for-questions scandal: the company closed business in December 1996. Any business, and particularly one involved in the presentations of messages, relies on its reputation. Once that has been tarnished, the foundation of the business model crumbles.

Corporate lobbying is also governed by a number of statutory regulations in the UK including MPs register of interests and the EU Aarhus Convention on information transparency. The system is not as structured as it is in the US, nor is the culture of paying for access as systemised. The UK Parliament does not have US Public Action Committees which are purposefully set up as vehicles to promote causes, including those of business. The majority of the academic literature on UK lobbyists is focused on mathematical models of what is likely to happen in a given scenario, and fail to draw on the real-life experiences of actual lobbyists (John and Thomson, 2007, p.4). Less academic works tend to fall into two camps: they are either highly critical and focus their concern around a claimed lack of accountability, legitimacy, transparency and democracy in business activities and those which provide advice and give ideas and share experience on ‘How to be a Lobbyist.’ These latter works help to demystify the profession and provide welcome refreshment from the simplistic view that the representation of business is a moral evil. One of the best examples of these is Public Affairs in Practice: A Practical Guide to Lobbying (John and Thomson, 2007). These self-help books are often written by practising lobbyists: Thomson is a Director at the law and public affairs firm Bircham Dysom Bell and John is European Public Affairs Director for PepsiCo. They clearly set out strategies for stakeholder identification, mapping and engagement, issue
prioritisation, message development and analysis, implementation, follow-up and process review. Strategic steps for engagement set against key timings are designed and can be carried out in order to present a case in the most influential way possible. These books are examined in more detail during the case studies in this study under the headings of Channels of Influence.

The professionalisation of the sector is a development largely overlooked. Spencer and White (2001, pp.281-284) argued that corporate lobbying is legitimate but believes formal qualifications are needed to be seen as a proper professional sector. The majority of employees in the sector have degrees from leading universities and these are often in humanities if not politics itself. While the sector is represented by organisations such as the Chartered Institute of Public Relations, and lobbyists can claim professional status through undertaking recognised courses, it is not as prestigious as becoming a chartered accountant, passing the bar exam, or becoming a medical doctor. This is interesting considering the influence that it is perceived a lobbyist is able to wield. Indeed, Nownes (2006, pp.2-5) details a number of the different activities a government relations practitioner is able to specialise in and submit fees for doing so. His list includes initiating public policy across every sector from healthcare to defence together with seeking to write in additions, delete certain clauses, amend passages, suspend implementation dates, fees and fines, and shaping those organisations that will deliver the infrastructure.

Effectively, in terms of public policy and legislation, the extent of what can be discussed is limited only to what can be democratically challenged. Representation “is a device of government before ever it can be viewed as a right of the governed” (Crick, 2000, p.31). The modernisation of the UK government under New Labour created a system of governance and consultation that acted as a catalyst for corporate lobbying, clearing pathways that previously could not be crossed. One of these pathways has been the increased involvement of business in providing goods and services and the corresponding increase in marketing support including procurement lobbying. Lees Marshment (2004) develops her political marketing concept from the UK political party processes of micro-modelling and profile-targeting of swing voters using complex databases, such as Voter Vault, to also note this country-wide approach of capturing information on stakeholders who can influence the bottom line of the business is being adopted by other groups which have the resources to do so including the monarchy (Lees Marshment, 2004, pp. 43-68), hospitals (Lees Marshment, 2004, pp.122-148), university education (Lees Marshment, 2004, pp.148-178) as well as businesses (Lees Marshment, 2004, p.234). Harris and Fleisher (1996) eponymously describe corporate lobbying as “machiavellian marketing” and chart the startling growth of the industry over the past twenty years with cases studies and growth in the function in-house and in consultancies (op. cit, p.96). While a militaristic approach to analysing the preference of individuals and organisations towards a company or an issue may appear calculating, it is part of the process of professionalisation that is inherent in a function being executed well by capable individuals who are committed to furthering the clearly commercial aims of a company.

One of the much-debated academic discussions on lobbyists is whether or not they are actually able to influence a decision. Moloney (2006 p.1) argues that hired lobbyists are “corporate accessories,” and not prime movers, in policy and legislative development. This stands in stark contrast to the boom in the sector Harris and Fleisher (ibid) chart. Moreover, it fails to recognise the development of the roving brief that public affairs practitioners enjoy. In line with the ambiguous title, ‘issues management’ is coming in to vogue and represents a
development described as fusion public affairs (McGrath and Spencer, 2006) in which the
government relations practitioner is given authority to manage communications with the
media, regulators, investors, and often the internal audience. This roving brief across the other
disciplines within the professional communications team enables the classic lobbyist to gain
broad corporate communications experience and subsequently influence in terms of how to
manage an issue. This provides the lobbyist with a leading role in the communication and
management of the reputation of the business and, as the case studies will demonstrate, shows
the importance of lobbyists to business.

One of the responsibilities that is often within the remit of a lobbyist is marshalling the
corporate social responsibility of the business. Undoubtedly, this activity falls foul of claims
from Socialists of being, at best, self-interested philanthropy and short-term good will and at
worst, fakery and deceit. A business that was found to be giving away resources in order to
cheat customers or stakeholders will damage its reputation and this argument collapses under
the weight of the business need to perform and engage in its community in order to protect its
licence to operate and have a workforce with a high morale. Moreover, stakeholder
expectations of corporate governance have increased substantially since the end of the Cold
War and the extent to which the social engagement of business is closely watched. Mallin
(2004, pp.11-21) cites the focus on corporate governance emanating from the collapse of
Barings Bank, Enron and Royal Ahold which helped to further erode public trust in business
to act responsibly, ethically and honestly. While there are countless examples of business
irresponsibility, the recent focus on corporate governance contributed to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999) definition “...a set of relationships
between a company’s board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining
those objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined.” While the focus on corporate
governance is largely focused on internal controls, indeed if they were sufficient Barings
Bank, Enron and Royal Ahold might still be operating today, the OECD definition also
embraces external stakeholders who affect the business’ licence to operate. This is
fundamental and reinforces the view that corporate lobbyists perform an essential function to
the sustainability of a business to realise the environment that it finds itself in and to engage in
it successfully.

Conclusion

The transformations of politics can be seen through a deliberative understanding of the
counter-arguments. This chapter has delineated some of the principal deficiencies in Endism
and Reinventionism and determined that a new understanding is required. This is the
transformation into performance politics. It is the product of structural factors including
competing and fragmented interests, managerial politics focused on the achievement of
objectives, delegation of responsibility to specialist agencies, and the simulation of
engagement through presentations. The key agency factor recognised in this development is
the function and growth of corporate political lobbying. This professionalised expression of
political will in part of the general shift of interest from the traditional ‘insider’ power
structures of government to a balancing of ‘outsider’ power governance. The trajectory along
the transformation of politics from Endism, via one-sided Reinventionism, has also been the
relocation of power, of public interest and political group membership. The review of this
transformation and the configuration of power poses new risks. These are not just in ways
already predicted by Orwell (1991) or Monbiot (2001), but also in terms of the difficulty for
small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and less politically astute civil society groups to find a voice. Technology offers a hope, however, but paid for professional lobbying by smaller groups as well as larger and better-funded ones, may be the only option as the complexity and noise of other groups surround the decision-making process and the UK electorate is promised more policy deliveries.

Lobbying is changing the process and articulation of the way in which one of the leading mobilisers of the twenty-first century engages with the decision-making process. The delegation of business responsibility in the decision-making process from product or service managers to communication specialists creates a new type of language and begins a simulation process in which the detachment of belief in the argument is less important than it is to a passionate belief-holding member of a civil society group. The question of legitimacy is overshadowed by the clamour for the delivery of business’ message. This is a clear break from the democratic requirement and participatory role that is inherent in the civil society movement (Crouch, 2004, p.11). For business, it does not matter that everyone should be able to contribute to the design of the strategy. It is more important that the strategy works. This approach is beginning to traverse into the second and third sector and is part of the narrative transformation of the Politics of Performance in which achievement and presentation are becoming the guiding elements of the age of policy delivery, ideological decline and the dialectic between civil society and business.
Chapter 3 – The Politics of Performance

This chapter offers the crystallisation of the concept of the Politics of Performance based on analysis of the leading narratives on the transformation in UK politics reviewed in Chapter Two. Drawing on threads from each discourse, the Politics of Performance is a synthesis of leading aspects in each of the interpretations. Essentially this concept rests on the twin pillars of performance: the projection of an argument, a presentation-performance; and the ability to deliver outcomes, an achievement-performance. The transformation of the Politics of Performance builds on the ideas of delegation, simulation and role-playing over accountability, authenticity and substance. It also is mobilised by the government decision-making process to focus on policy delivery over ideological debate. Each of these sub-concepts will be unpacked and defined in more detail.

Fundamental to the concept of the Politics of Performance is the rise and development in corporate political lobbying in the UK as set out in Chapter One. The phenomenon of corporate lobbying has been a catalyst that reinforces the twin pillars of presentation and achievement performances and as a key new mobiliser has led to a shift of incentive to engage in the decision-making process. As paid advocates carry out professional lobbying, the incentive to engage in politics is no longer mobilised principally by a belief or set of political values. The lobbyist’s pursuit of substantive value in influencing the policy making process is secondary to his primary goal of securing payment from the client. This is more acute in those lobbyists who work for business than in the second or third sectors. The primary aim for business is to make a profit, whereas this can not be observed as strongly for those who work for the state, or charities, as these also aim to chiefly promote social good. This significant change in the incentive for engagement gives the twin pillars a solid foundation on which to stand and to uphold the edifice of the Politics of Performance.

Defining the Twin Pillars of Presentation and Achievement Performance

It would be remiss to argue that highlighting the role of presentation and a focus on achievement are new features in the political landscape. These have, of course, been key characteristics found throughout the pantheon of political history. As captured by The Republic (Plato, 2005), the ability of the Orators to present a case and celebrate its merits was an essential part of the decision-making process. Indeed skill in rhetoric was a prized political art that codified the need to be able to present persuasively in politics. This was celebrated in 1513 with the first publication of The Prince (Machiavelli, 2005, pp.16-17), and its advice still holds true today that the key to securing and maintaining power is by gaining the consent of the populus to be ruled. For this cannot be maintained indefinitely through the tyranny of “contempt and hatred” but “a Prince must act to win honour” (Machiavelli, 2005, p.58) by understanding the importance of presenting his position in a way which in the longer term serves his own interests best. The need for achievement and delivery has, of course, been essential for politicians in order to appease the competing demands of the ruled while at the same time maintaining power.

The current aspects in presentation performance may be seen in terms of three areas. The first to be addressed is the impact of technology. In the past three decades mass communication has made a quantum leap. The emergence of the internet, of email, of intranets, of text
messages and multimedia for communications have enabled a greater sophistication in terms of the way communication is administered and disseminated. While the Guttenberg Press brought print media to a mass audience the recent technological advancements enable the written, aural and visual messages to be disseminated to the individual at any time to almost any place regardless of time zone or other environmental restriction. The impact that this has had on presentations has meant that a more detailed and multi-layered message construction can be created and tailored to the recipient (John and Thomson, 2007, p.106). While McLuhan (2001, pp.7-24) may have overstated the claim that the medium is the message, the increased range of media has clearly enabled the communicator to have a wider palette of colours from which the artist is able to paint his picture.

Within this environment of mass communication it is important to register the affect that this has had on, and by, the media. The exponential information flow has led to the recipient filtering, to some degree, the messages that they can digest. It is therefore paramount for a communication to have as much impact as possible in order to ensure its share of voice in this crowded space. Consequently the media has adapted to this changed environment and typically employs tactics, which in certain circumstances, appeal more to a sensationalised summarised essence. Many criticise that brevity has replaced intellectual rigour in discourse analysis, particularly around some of the more ‘high brow’ elements of the way news, for example, was communicated but has now become brief to the point of being ‘low brow’ or ‘dumbed down’. From evaluating the trends of presentation in the serious decision-making process this has led to a propensity for ‘buzz words’ and ‘sound bites’. As a result the skill in conveying the message sharply and briefly cannot always be accommodated in this new technologically advanced era of mass communication. The increase of such an approach to presenting a development does not always afford an elaborated storyline. In television news the words accompanying the pictures become less important than the images and the story may be brief and, in some cases, misleading.

To respond to this, the ability to present has evolved an increased use of audience targeting. Presentation performance rests on a code of sending targeted messages to predefined audiences. The practice of audience identification based on reviewing social strata, cleavages, fragmentations, groups and associations show that each has different wants and needs and respond in differing ways to the same message. With this information about the recipient and the likely response, a message is selected and tailored as appropriate. Lees-Marshment’s (2001, 2004, 2009) extensive research into Political Marketing and the way UK political parties dissect the electorate’s response to key messages demonstrates this point. Building on her “market/sales/product-oriented party framework” (2009, p.43) in 2001 where the aforementioned Voter Vault postcode tool was highlighted and analysed to show the extent of micro modelling and targeting of messages to selected audiences, her more recent work includes military strategy (2009, pp.59-61), branding (2009, pp.111-113) and even guerrilla marketing (2009, pp.169-170) to demonstrate the surgical approach that is taken with regard to how messages are developed and executed. These systems have long been in use across many developed and developing countries and extend far beyond simple postcode analysis and penetrate an assessment of some of our key social preferences, associations and values Lees-Marshment and Lilleker (2005, p.165).

Development of presentation is also a response to the decline in political values. This view has been clearly argued by the Endist theorists who propose that a system based on political values and indeed ideology was in a state of “entropy” (Boggs, 2000, p.2). This decay of
commitment to certain values has enabled a culture in which ‘spin’ and manipulation become more possible, unhindered by the need to rigidly follow a known bias or propaganda line (Rupert and Solomon, 1999, p.260). The decline in political values and lack of clarity about what the party represents can be seen in the modernisation changes brought about in the birth of New Labour. A party that still describes itself as socialist yet supports private education, private healthcare and private-public partnerships to deliver social services may be interpreted as deploying a new patchwork quilt approach to policy-making. By winning the UK General Election with a landslide victory in 1997, this approach secured the party the office of government and continues to maintain this. As a result, the new political non-value system is the choice of the electorate (Cox and Kernell, 1991, p.5), although, too often, this choice is steered by the use of advertising techniques. Today, the need to be able to present a case is governed by the need for it to be delivered. The promise to the electorate from government is that in electing them to power, they will be the party that delivers. This is a case made now by all parties in the UK and represents the movement to the ‘centre ground’ ideologically in which all policies are available to be adopted by one another in similar guises and there is a race to secure the next winning idea. Presentation in this environment is given the oxygen to breathe with the different parties competing to posit and persuade the electorate of the superiority of their centre ground idea. Collectively, these explanations are part of the underpinning of the trend for the ability to present growing in importance in politics (Hansard Society, 2005, pp.x-xii).

Three areas can also be identified to support the trend of an achievement-focused political agenda gaining importance. As mentioned, a government that fails to deliver its policy is unlikely to last long and may fall at the first democratic electoral opportunity. However, the expectation of the populus for the decision-making process to provide achievements has been bolstered by the raised delivery promises offered by the grand claims of the Third Way. The bringing together of private sector dynamism, tight timelines and cost controls with the public sector focus of major project social infrastructure aims, offered an agenda that projected a heightened sense of what could be delivered. The formulation of PPP heralded an era in which new buildings for schools, hospitals and other social amenities could be established rapidly and in areas in which they were needed most. This seismic shift in the design of public sector projects enabled the risk to be offset to the private contractor and encouraged the public sector to embark on a range of new projects across the country. These have ranged from bridge constructions to catering contracts and exert a new pressure on the decision-making process to ensure that a delivery solution is found and that the objective is met (Bache and Flinders, 2005, pp.34-36).

This pressure, of course, should be seen in the light that there are many concerns around PPPs and the impact that they are having. This is not simply restricted to the political value assessments of whether or not it is benign for business to have such a strong role in affecting the decision-making process for, as an example, the education needs children receive. The profit maximisation objective of business does not necessarily sit well with those analysing the impact that the Academies are having on the young students who attend them (Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006). Similarly, the private sector’s pivotal role in resource allocation, construction design and efficiency of operating certain units in Foundation Hospital Trusts, for example, has led to major public rows around the role of PPPs in delivering the kind of democracy the Third Way initially voiced (Callinicos, 2001, p.121). The detail and balance in discovering where to draw the line in allowing the private sector creative freedom to exploit its dynamism, tight deadlines and cost controls are often found to leave the social service
provision lacking. Furthermore, major problems around the drawing up of some of the contracts and the lines of responsibilities in the detailed delivery of key areas have led to some PPPs resulting in major financial problems for the public sector (Ratcliffe, 2006). Nonetheless, this does not detract from the raised expectations that the PPPs first offered and the shift towards an agenda focused on the need to deliver for the political masters (Clark and Newman, 1997 cited by Faircloth, 2000).

The commitment to achievement performance has also been supported by the need for specialisation, expertise and experience from the private sector to ensure the delivery agenda is met. This has been brought about by the increasing technicality of projects and the services they must include. The emergent technocracy of business expertise, facilitated by PPPs, has led to a funnelling of specialist knowledge into the decision-making process. Consequently, the growth of partnership working and cross-discipline interaction has supported the trend of achievement performance (Grayson and Hodges, 2004, p.45).

The movement away from ideological political maxims to one predicated more on the voter value proposition (Brennan and Henneberg, 2008) offered by competing political parties has also supported the trend. The voter value proposition can also be seen in terms of setting a demand agenda in the decision-making process. The competition for voter favour results in the offers made by each party to increase. This populist response approach continues to push the promises made to the electorate ever higher and results in maintaining the raised expectations of what will be delivered by the state. At the same time, voters demand sincerity and authenticity in their representatives and thus in their promises. A voter has seen many examples of spin through newspaper comment or satirical television programmes and the political broadcasts prepared by all parties prior to elections have seen the need to become ever more subtle yet outwardly sincere and ‘authentic’ to attract attention and thus votes. Here the advent of technology impinges yet again. Whereas a politician who depended on speaking on the stump could rely on the same speech to a different audience in fifty different venues, now one television broadcast uses the same material once and casts it aside. Worse still, he may be so easily caught out if he suggests different opinions on a subject in two televised moments, even if in one he is speaking extempore. The video camera is merciless and picks up any slip of the tongue or poorly expressed viewpoint.

This focus on the voter value proposition operates in much the same way as a company offers its customer value proposition to its most important stakeholder and has resulted in an increase in the focus of delivery. Both government and company depend on perceived authenticity. No longer can the state so easily explain why a school cannot be built in order to support the Socialist development of municipal housing elsewhere. A new form of political lexicon that includes the use of partnerships, such as PPPs, is employed to delineate a timeline that will provide a school or alternative. While it should not be overstated to say that failure to deliver is not evident throughout the UK public sector service provision, the key difference is that the commitment and focus today is on the management of the business of government rather than debate around whether following a particular route follows the approved political value system of the ruling party. The delivery focus of the decision-making process, through partnership with external bodies providing expert input, is a pervading development that shores up support for the trend of achievement performance. Achievement performance itself delivers authenticity.
As a result of the number of trends within the twin pillars of presentation and achievement performances, these developments can be clearly observed as mobilisers transforming politics. These increasing trends form the key structural agents that uphold the argument that there is a shift occurring from a system that places the primary focus on political values to one in which performance is a more discernible feature. This is most clearly seen with the explicit involvement of business in politics and the underlying affect that this has had on the reason to engage in the decision-making process. With paid corporate lobbyists shifting the incentive to engage in politics to being one predicated on the self-serving interest of monetary gain and successful execution, this provides the foundation for the twin pillars upon which to stand.

**Incentives in Politics**

The increase in political representation for commercial gain does, of course, only constitute the smaller part of the total incentive to engage in politics. The vast majority of political participation can be seen to be motivated by authentic belief-holding conviction in a cause, such as is the case for single issue groups, or through the British institutional processes of representative democracy, such as are embodied in the functions of a Member of Parliament. However, in order to understand incentives in engaging in politics it is useful to grasp what the incentives are actually seeking. There are of course many definitions of politics and it would be a digression to analyse the various interpretations. Nonetheless, an important one is the description of politics as the “art of the possible.” It is a process of compromising to seek an outcome. Seen by Easton (1953, p.129) as the “authoritative allocation of values” and by Weber (1968, p.xxiv) as part of the “legitimation” of rule, engagement in politics can fundamentally be argued to be, as the title of Lasswell’s famous book proclaimed Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (1936). The over-riding influence for participation in politics is to exert power. As Hobbes (2008, p.86) noted in 1651, “I put for general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”

Self interest to secure power in the decision-making process has long been recognised as one of, if not the, strongest of incentives for engaging in politics. The spectrum that runs from self-interest to absolute altruism encompasses the various shades that cover the benefit of participation to the individual. For business, the engagement is clearly linked to the ultimate and well-known aim to profit maximise. Any business involved in public sector projects should provide the public sector with a clear and transparent understanding of its aims and behaviour in the partnership. While this does not always happen due to the aforementioned difficulty in finding a balance in allowing the free market to respond innovatively to a solution and closing out possibilities which would create unnecessary costs to the tax payer and result in inefficiencies, the over-riding understanding of the aim of a business must be recognised.

With the increasing involvement of business in politics, self-interest can be seen to have become more apparent in the decision-making process. Coupled with the decline in political values signalled by the End of Politics arguments and the fragmentation of interests heralded by the growth of single issue groups celebrated by the Reinventionists, a focus on participation in politics for the benefit of the cause that is being pursued demonstrates that self-interest is the underpinning incentive. While there are constructivist objectors to this (Banker and Chandler, 2005, pp.149-171), that claim civil society is founded and mobilised around norms and behaviours, the over-riding driver for sustained mobilisation is what is actually achieved from engagement in politics. The self interest of single issue politics provides fertile ground
for the concept of the Politics of Performance to have developed. The focus on achieving objectives and normalising. It is not to say, though, that the self-interest of corporate political lobbying naturally leads to deception. Although in the Gramscian sense business does look to establish a hegemony in order to continue the fulfilment of its corporate objectives, the scrutiny that business attracts due to its clear non-social primary aim generally results in a deliberate approach to avoid deceptive play. The corporate lobbyist who is embroiled in an unsavoury political situation may easily be singled out for exceptional criticism as there is a natural distaste towards business in the UK (Association of Parliamentary Political Consultants, Code of Conduct, 2010), as opposed to other political activists, being involved in the decision-making process.

Within the definitions of the twin pillars of presentation and achievement performance, the issue of deception may be seen as a recurring theme in the concept of the Politics of Performance. While former British Prime Minister Disraeli (1881, cited by Crick, 2000, p.245) has argued that politics is “the art of governing mankind through deceiving them,” deception in this case is more accurately understood as part of the legitimisation process. The incentive to engage successfully requires the consent of those involved in the decision-making process to accept its presence and views. In order to achieve this goal, an ability to present is vital to secure the achievement needed as part of performance. This is acknowledged by business as necessary to secure and maintain the “licence to operate.” Legitimisation is essential in order to protect the incentive to pursue self-interest. To describe it as deception is inaccurate as the aim of business is always known to be to secure profit. The concept of legitimisation is therefore more appropriate and furnishes the particular self-interest incentive of corporate political lobbying with a need to reassure those in the decision-making process about its intentions. This is a crucial appendix to the self-interest incentive of business. It is this that has precipitated the developments around corporate social responsibility and recognition in the business community that it is necessary to develop strategies that address key stakeholder interests so that there is wide support for continuation of the business practice.

In delineating this particular definition of the self-interested business incentive, it is apparent that this has far reaching and profound impacts on the social contract (Crane, Matten and Moon, 2003, pp.1-5). This can be seen in a shifting of the relationship between the citizen and the state in favour of a third party actor: business. The balance of accountability in the voter-elected relationship is radically altered with the responsibility to provide the services incumbent on the state being shifted to their provision by business. Furthermore, the role of the citizen is changed (Andriof and McIntosh, 2001, p.13). No longer is the aim of citizenry to aspire to the development of civilisation rooted in the social accountability for one another. The promise that the state will act in order to safeguard the development of the citizenry to ensure public sector aims are met has been handed over to the private sector with a grant of degrees of freedom to innovate efficient solutions. In effect, the impact of business on the role of the citizen in the social contract is affected by a reduction in their democratic representation. Business becomes the surrogate provider of the functions of the state and in doing so transforms the bilateral relationship into a tripartite.

This reformulation of the social contract as a result of the increase in the self-interested business variant of incentive can be seen as a revolution, rather than evolution of social contract theory. From the origins of Rousseau’s concept of the noble savage through the Hobbesian view of life as “nasty, brutish and short” to the foundations of the modern state-

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citizen relationship in Locke’s Treatise on government, a line of socialisation and a practical system of governance has developed (Kingdom, 1991, pp.38-41). In the conceptual shift from the purity of the uncontaminated individual through the tooth and claw of the fight in the state of nature to the establishment of a system that more peacefully provides for all and the clear recognition of the goal of society, the involvement of business in this relationship suggests a halting of progression in this direction. With the clear object of business being to ensure profitability by providing services and products that they will buy, the longer-term strategic objectives of governance in the Lockean sense, are challenged. The opportunism of business which can be seen to have many similarities with the Hobbesian view of politics suggests the beginning of a potential return to a vision closer to this understanding of the way the decision-making process works. Included in the innovations is the dynamism of business being allowed a rein to explore how best to deliver the services and products of government, while the Hobbesian part of the evolution of the social contract may seem to be strengthened at the expense of the Lockean sense of social responsibility, accountability and consent to be ruled.

The incentive of business also affects the concept of those who are ruled consenting to be so. This is articulated through the limited representative ability of business to provide the democratic function that its increasing involvement asks it to do. Business is not a melting pot of different views that is able to judiciously create a synthetic compromise. It has a driving force that is fixed first on profit and not on creating a better society. While business engages to ensure that it participates in helping bring about by obeying laws and regulations, its function as a corporate citizen is to act in order to secure and maintain its licence to operate. The decision regarding the development of society, about which rules, norms and issues are of priority and need to be addressed, is the role of government. While Downs (1957) application of economic theory to the functioning of a democracy led an investigation into the role of government in market success and failure, the economic process of resource allocation is not one that may be best employed to determine moral, social and ethical decisions. Although it will, of course, provide the parameters within which the options to respond will be governed, it lacks the sensitivity to recognise the inter-relation of emotions and other aspects that can irrationally determine individual behaviour (Schumpeter, 2003, pp. 24-29). In this way the further involvement of business in the decision-making process removes to some degree the role of government to preside over these fundamental social areas. This is not a responsibility that business always wishes to assume since the delicate subjects that this touches on leave business open to attack from customers. As will be demonstrated in the case study regarding profiling the technology enhancements available to the UK Identity Card programme. This attracted criticism not only directed at Government, but also at the information technology companies that could furnish the Home Office with greater functionality and thereby an apparent increased infringement of personal privacy. With business coming in to influence the direction of open debate, and more importantly the decision-making process, the monetary incentive can be seen to be incompatible with the function of representation. This is an apparent paradox, as government cannot operate such a technically demanding project such as the identity card without heavy involvement by technocrats, business and their financial resources.

Under social contract theory this can be understood as part of a lack of citizen consent to be ruled by business as it is perceived to be providing too much of the function of government; a role that it cannot undertake. The level at which it becomes ‘too much’ is also a decision that must be taken by government for the incentive of business is to move into spaces that will
continue to provide payment. The provision of frontline policing by private firms is not considered as a policy area in which business should have a role for many reasons. However, this is an area in which the private sector would operate should it be allowed to do so. The incentive of business does not easily curtail itself as one entrepreneur may not learn from those who have embarked on a similar line of work beforehand (Templar, 2004, p. 98). The role of regulation in determining where, how and in what way business can participate in the delivery of public sector provision is crucial to management of the highly motivated incentive of business.

The significant increase in regulation in the UK, and indeed across all major developed countries, may be seen as part of a response to manage this pressure. In order to accommodate the growing web of partnerships and multi-disciplinary approaches, frameworks have been drafted to facilitate and measure the penetration of the business incentive in specific areas. However, the trend of the Politics of Performance demonstrates that through presentation and a focus on achievement of a set goal, the essential impact is that business is becoming well regarded as a core partner with the public sector to deliver its increasing commitments to the electorate. The sacrifice of democratic representation as shown by the impact on the evolution of social contract theory in order to ensure the delivery of the agenda of government also can be seen to be mobilised by the way that the incentive affects the actual functioning of politics.

**Delegation, Simulation and Role Playing**

With the financial business incentive driving the opportunity to engage in the decision-making process, the ability to present an argument has increased in importance and can be seen as the methodological trend to ensure delivery. As already delineated, the role of presentation in politics has grown as part of a response to technological developments; recipient filtering of, and desensitisation toward, information as part of growth in exposure to multi media; and the competition for the voter’s support on policy options as a result of the decline in belief in cohesive world views. In essence, this has resulted in the ability to present having a greater impact than ever before on the decision-making process. With the availability of information on any subject and its real-time mass communication, the presentation of a position needs to be handled with the utmost care and attention in matters where there are high incentives.

The incentive for business to engage in politics is high. The opportunities for profit are many and increasing with PPPs. Across every department, business provides key services to assist public sector delivery. From consultancy and advisory roles on major projects to furnishing the hardware itself, the British Government is one of the main customers for some of the largest companies operating in the UK such as EDS, BAE Systems and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. How business represents itself to this customer is crucial when bidding for large projects. Moreover, the way in which business represents itself in the decision-making process in regard to regulations and legislation that could significantly affect markets and growth potential or even remove the licence to operate carries the ultimate incentive for business to ensure it is as capable at presenting its position as possible. To realise this, specialists are hired: corporate political lobbyists.

Corporate lobbyists operate as the interlocutors in the interaction between business and those who are also part of the decision-making process. They are delegated the responsibility to navigate companies through the corridors of power. This section will show how delegation
theory is a key building block for both of the twin pillars of the Politics of Performance. Hired due to clients’ lack of expertise in presenting a case in the political decision-making process, lobbyists provide a similar, if less codified, role to that of lawyers in law courts. Lobbyists represent cases and provide the benefit of their experience and technical area. This may be in a particular market sector such as aerospace or in a particular type of lobbying such as engagement with planning work with local government. Based on this transfer of the reins of political representation from the company to a specialist consultant lobbyist, delegation can be seen as a reduction of control over the business. As explored in the literature review in Chapter Two, the lobbyist offers clear supply side skill set to meet the demand needs of the business looking to protect or enhance its business. This can result in considerable autonomy for political expression, provided that the communication is tied to business imperatives. Consequently, business must ally itself to the lobbyist and place faith in his ability to deliver. The result of this, as aforementioned, is that the responsibility to deliver the political result by those who believe in the cause is passed to non-believers, indicating the general shift towards a result-focused polity that is more concerned about delivery and presentation than authentic participation.

By contrast, as stressed by the Revisionists, the politics of civil society does not place a direct objective weight on the way in which issues are dealt with and managed. The prime concern for civil society groups is obviously on the successful achievement of the end goal but crucially, this is through their own means and involvement. This may, incidentally, be professional in nature though this would be more by the happy coincidence of the member skill pool than by the strategic decision to employ experts. By contrast, the politics of corporate lobbying is a process that develops and matures through active and deliberate learning of best practice and effectiveness. The result of this professional mechanism ensures that the lobbyist is not guided by an emotional response-focused approach but one that is governed more by experienced strategic analysis. Corporate lobbying identifies stakeholders, audits favourability towards issues, creates detailed stakeholder maps of the various groupings and highlights the key linkages and opportunities to influence the policy-making process at strategic timings in the deliberation and decision-making process.

This practised and rehearsed approach to engagement in the decision-making process ensures that in each engagement by the lobbyist, the communications are essentially simulations. While the messages may be logically constructed and persuasive, there is no emotional commitment to them. The words used are often repetitions found effective in a number of similar situations for similar corporate clients before. They are designed to target audiences and call upon their support. This fundamental superstructural difference in terms of the incentive between business and those who hold authentic beliefs for their cause ensures that the simulation further removes actual empathy from the representation of business in the decision-making process. The concept of simulation also draws attention to is the understanding that the incentive to for business to engage requires that it must behave within the normative environment of other political actors.

This insight supports the need for business to perform the corporate social responsibility activities rather than recognise them as a core part of the marketing strategy. A distinction could be drawn to say that if this were to be carried out by direct employees then it could be construed as a genuine part of the way the business attracts customers, but if this were carried out by a hired external lobbyist then it could be argued to be part of the simulation. However,
this discussion is superfluous since any action relating to the presentation of business in the
decision-making process is a simulation. While the commitment of business to corporate
social responsibility practices is espoused evangelically by companies such as Marks &
Spencer in their support for ‘Plan A (because for the environment there is no Plan B),’ this is
part of the business corporate communications strategy and a core component of the way the
business seeks to ensure its licence to operate and enjoy the support from the decision-making
process. Marks & Spencer’s corporate responsibility approach is part of the way the retailer is
able to demonstrate its politically fashionable views. The decision to say what is palatable
supports the assertion that a role is being played and that the engagement itself is a simulation
rather than the more vulgar, but ultimate, objective of developing ways to increase shareholder
value.

The practice of role-playing is another important element that helps build support for the twin
pillar arguments of an increase in presentation and achievement performances in politics. In
viewing the inauthentic non-belief holding position of the lobbyist, the representation of
business in politics can be seen as an act of role-playing. This affords the function a clear
sense of performance in terms of the presentation of a position on the decision-making stage.
This can be viewed as stressing the ability to articulate clear logical arguments and cases. The
other understanding of role-play is the function of business itself playing a role in effecting
change. This interpretation emphasises the delivery focus of delegation and is a central trend
supporting the Politics of Performance proposition. In capturing both elements neatly in the
same area of role-playing it highlights the commonly held maxim that if there is presentation,
there is likely to be no delivery. It has been more simply put that politics has become more
about “spin than substance” (Moloney, 2000, p.iii) This criticism would therefore appear to
undermine the concept of the twin pillars and would cause the edifice of the Politics of
Performance to collapse. However, as demonstrated by the practice of role-playing, in order
for business to play a part in securing the delivery of its aims, this necessitates the role-playing
and creation of a successful presentation. Each is required in order for the other to be
successful. This will be explored in more detail by the consideration of lobbyists’ behaviour
in order to demonstrate the way in which this supports the twin pillars and upholds the
transformative argument and emergence of the Politics of Performance.

Lobbyists as Presenter-Performers

One of the chief skills of a lobbyist is the ability to present a position persuasively. This is the
embodiment of the presentation performance pillar. The experience, expertise and particular
understanding of the way decision making operates informs the presentation ability of the
lobbyist and enables him to offer a well paid service to clients (Grossman and Helpman, 2002,
p.6). For the corporate lobbyist this ability also must not be encumbered by any political
values that would inhibit working for any cause since the business client sets these. Free of
political value or moral judgement about the political activities that he is paid to represent, the
only formal restrictions are those that are determined by law. However, there are a host of
informal norms that influence and shape the presentation.

Due to the British unwritten constitution the importance of informality and the ‘rules of the
game’ form a code which prescribes the way the decision making process works. The
commercial lobbyist is expert in deciphering this code and is able to transmit messages
through this medium. The social norms inherent within dealings with the key decision makers
such as understanding that MPs must walk through the voting chambers on the sound of the division bell to the time restrictions faced on projects that civil servants must abide by dictate an additional framework in which the lobbyist must function. Recognition of these pressures, coupled with a sensitivity and sense of empathy can help secure a camaraderie in the pursuit of decision-making. Indeed, the ability to draw upon the emotional as well as the logic of argument highlight that such personal attributes are necessary and are exhibited by the leading lobbyists.

In order to create a powerful argument the presentation must be conveyed in such a way that it is credible and saleable. In this way the construction of argument is developed to aspire to the definition of ‘charismatic authority’: “Resting on devotion on the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” Weber (1968, p.46). It would be an overstatement to claim that a business would feel any sense of devotion to the corporate lobbyist beyond the contractual relationship and this may be even more true of the others involved in the decision-making process. However, the function of corporate lobbying has enabled the delivery agenda of government to be ostensibly met. This is in part due to the charm of corporate lobbyists in becoming ‘go-to guys’. In this role corporate lobbyists are able to bridge and act as a central point of contact across the numerous government departments, quangos and other interested parties. This co-ordinating role enables the lobbyists to acquire the status of being an accepted part of the process. Indeed, in the Weberian lexicon, the charisma of the corporate lobbyist becomes a routinised part of the decision-making process.

In establishing credibility, corporate lobbying furthers its ability to present an argument by entering into the “insider” (Grant, 1995, p.19-21) world through routinisation. This is the process by which “charismatic authority is succeeded by a bureaucracy controlled by a rationally established authority or by a combination of traditional and bureaucratic authority” (Kendal, 2000, p.432). Lobbying has become routinised and therefore an accepted part of the decision making process and practice. This is part of the legitimisation process of not only corporate lobbying but fundamentally to the Politics of Performance in creating endorsed presentations. The routinisation of engagement leads to legitimisation and subsequent vindication of the lobbyist as the presenter - performer despite enjoying exceptional influence in a democracy. This position furnishes corporate lobbying with the necessary endorsement within the decision making process. This enables the arguments and messages projected by skilful corporate orators, writers and communicators to put powerful pieces of information into the hands of the decision makers when it matters most. This will be explained in detail in the two case studies in the following chapters.

Support for lobbying backing up the presenter-performance trend can also be seen as part of the government’s preference to hire senior executives from the private sector in an attempt to give greater authenticity to the decision making process. While this is motivated by the public distrust in politicians, the attempt to bring in outside expertise and publicly exclaim the independence of the business adviser, the approach is part of the entire decision making process being a presentation to the electorate. This approach to legitimise is however fatally flawed since the skill of the business executive is in providing commercial success and not in providing democratic representation. Derek Wanless’, report into the modernisation of the NHS (King’s Fund, 2007) is certainly not without merit. However, as the former Chief Executive of NatWest bank, his democratic credibility in the decision making process is at best indirect through being appointed by government. However, as an exponent of efficiency
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and delivery, he is a champion. It is recognition of the commitment to creating a presentation in terms of how the whole debate is carried out that can be seen to further substantiate the trend of presentation performance. While it may be interesting to explore if, and to what degree, corporate lobbying influenced other forms of lobbying and indeed the extent to which this impacted the entire presentation of the decision making process, this is not the focus of this investigation or even this chapter in specifically substantiating the concept of The Politics of Performance. Nonetheless, the correlation of the development, rather than the debate around causation, continues to evidence that presentation is being mobilised by corporate political lobbying.

Lobbyists as Achiever-Performers

Corporate lobbying is also one of the building blocks for the second pillar of the Politics of Performance. The characteristics of a lobbyist and the core qualities inherent in carrying out the function focus the role on achieving a clear end result. A focus on delivery is key for professional communicators; it’s about what you have done, not what you are going to do (Larkin and Regester, 2005, p.48). This may be seen to be in stark contrast to those with strongly felt political convictions and may feel a preference, in terms of points and principles, to debate at length the political position that they have. The debate itself is of less importance to the lobbyist than delivery. Access to decision makers and the ability to influence are considered more important than deliberative politics. This is a key component of the lobbyist’s identity, which directly supports the trend for achievement performance, of successful policy delivery and focus on execution. While the shape of success itself will be constructed by the business partner to be one that has the correct incentives in place which may be at the expense of democracy, the focus on implementation as prescribed by the terms of the contract will be the core objective of the private sector partner. This commitment to delivery is essential for the lobbyist representing business, as this is one of the strongest messages he has to communicate and the offer to take this risk away from the public sector is a powerful argument that is redefining the transformation of politics.

This shift is being pushed, in particular, by corporate political lobbyists and the process of professionalisation within the sector, that is reinforcing its commitment to securing policy delivery. Corporate lobbying is a professional career, populated with educated people adept at composing arguments and with the ability to communicate them in rehearsed and practiced ways. Professional lobbyists are mercenary in being prepared to defend or promote any cause, subject to personal moral and religious restrictions. Therefore when projecting an argument it is only a presentation as the authenticity of the view is false. This is a core element of corporate political lobbying. A professional lobbyist employs skills, tools and techniques in order to achieve a specific outcome. These are distinct from his values, beliefs or interests. In this sense, the professional is a technician who may use the communication of ethical beliefs and a commitment to the public good to reach the goal. By contrast, civil society ‘authentics’ may also be working toward promoting ethical issues which may be of benefit to the public good, but this would be purely for these reasons. For ‘professionals’ the communication and engagement in politics is instrumental, rather than intrinsic as it is for authentics.

The instrumentalist approach of corporate lobbying underpins its delivery focus, however, this is not a simplistic inputting of views activity. In recognising that the decision making process itself is shifting toward a process for the management of the business of government itself
rather than a representation and synthesis of views, intelligent lobbying is able to create win-win-win scenarios in which it is able to chime with the government demand-led agenda. The triple win involves a success for the demand of government, a success for the demand of the civil service and, of course, an ultimately commercial success for the demand of the business partner. The UK Identity Card case study examined in Chapter Four demonstrates how the IT sector was able to create a win for government in proposing the delivery of a system that could be held up as a measure to improve the security of the state as part of the ‘war against terror.’ Business helped to ensure that this was a win for the civil service as it provided the functionality that would centralise and increase the recording of information held on individuals and thereby enhance the control that they would wield along with offering the opportunity to vastly improve better working and service delivery. In appealing to the civil service, they were able to exercise a degree of “managerial discretion” (Vaughn and Otenyo, 2006, p.xv) to help administer a successful outcome. In working to ensure that the needs of the key audiences were being met, business was able to drive the management of politics as part of seeking profitable markets. The incentive for business to act was instrumental in shaping the ID Card procurement process and captures how the transformation of politics is being affected by corporate lobbying. The focus on ensuring that the policy goes ahead and that there is commitment from the key decision makers is part of the contribution that corporate lobbying is making to the Politics of Performance narrative.

This is reflected in the professionalisation of the sector and the strategic practices of corporate lobbying. As will be shown in Chapters Four and Five these can be observed in terms of the development of lobbyists ensuring that their engagements are Strategic, Measurable, Action-Oriented, Realistic and Time-Limited (SMART) approaches. With business clients seeking a defined and defensible explanations to stakeholders, including shareholders, for paying for engagement in a system of governance in which equality of opportunity to access power underpins the democratic process, corporate lobbying represents recognition that while access may be obtainable, influence is not always so easily achieved. The tried and tested, respected, repeatable professional techniques to engage in the decision making process is part of a commitment to reach and secure the delivery win-win-win that is essential for business to triumph in the decision making process.

The SMART practice of lobbying in action will be detailed in the case studies and will show that through engagement in the Channels of Influence (government, civil service, regulators, media, trade associations, third party advocacy, partnerships, civil society dialogue/engagement) influence in the decision making process can be made. Tailored messages that will resonate with each audience, that are credible and transmitted at the right juncture and right time result in support for the trend of achievement performance. The ability of business to execute a project and ensure that delivery can be achieved, motivated by the thrust of profit, is the underlying argument for corporate political lobbying supporting the achievement performance pillar of The Politics of Performance.

The impact of corporate political lobbying on the transformation of politics can be seen within a new interpretation. This is the edifice of the Politics of Performance, held up by the twin pillars of presentation and achievement which rest firmly on the sound political foundation in which the incentive to engage in politics today is increasingly self-interest. With political values and world views in decline in the polity, the commitment to an agenda which serves the specific aim of single issue politics or profit maximisation for business is one of the leading incentives in the modern era. In summary, this transformation is supported by the structural
triumph of “managerial discretion” in politics (Vaugn and Otenyo, 2006, p.xvii) and an agenda of delivery on policy pledges (Gould, 1998, pp.267-272) rather than policy debate for current British governments, the decline of formal party politics and shift to the centre ground.

The movement from authentic to inauthentic belief in the political position is one of the hallmarks of the transformation. With the corporate lobbyist acting as a ‘gun for hire,’ the flexibility of the lobbyist to represent any cause regardless of whether or not this is supported by the lobbyist is regarded as being the pinnacle of professionalism. The stress on creating an image and crafting a presentation within the Politics of Performance through the professional capacity of a charismatic lobbyist underpins how these political operators function.

To view the corporate lobbyist as the sole mobiliser of the Politics of Performance would however be a step too far. Although other mobilising factors have not been given the same attention, the commitment of New Labour to policy delivery and the much commented culture of ‘spin-doctoring’ support the twin pillars of The Politics of Performance. Indeed the trends of achievement and presentation performances can be seen as explicit modern manifestations of the way political superstructure ensures that consent to be ruled by the rulers is maintained. The Performance of Politics may therefore be seen as part of the operationalisation of the concept of the “manufacturing [of] consent” (Chomsky and Herman, 1988) arguments. With the sustained growth in the corporate political lobbying sector (Harris and Fleisher 2005, p.96), and the increasing political involvement of business in PPPs and moreover acceptance that business is a natural partner in the decision-making process despite being devoid of political values as prescribed by its driving incentive for profit, future of The Politics of Performance as an analytical tool to describe the polity may be strong. In terms of its impact on the decision making process, it is likely that given the focus of the twin pillars it argues that potentially politics will evolve into a more efficient system of rule, if not a democratic one.
Chapter Four - The Politics of Performance in Practice: Overview of the Case Studies

Following the theoretical analysis around the deficiencies of current narratives of transformation and the subsequent need for the Politics of Performance argument, this chapter seeks to provide concrete examples to test its validity in practice. The case studies that will be examined in depth are the transposition of the European Parliament and Council, End of Life Vehicle (ELV) Directive into UK law 2001 to 2002, and the factors that led to the enhancement of the UK Home Office ID Card proposal 2002-2006. The background and detail that explain these two case studies are laid out in order to give context and enable Chapter Five to provide comparative analysis of the case studies through thematic unpacking of them. The thematic approach supports a deeper analysis of how the Politics of Performance in practice can be understood as it allows the professional techniques of corporate lobbying to be examined in detail and demonstrates how these link and support one another.

The format for this chapter will be first to set out the reasons for selecting the two case studies. It will then show how they fit into testing and subsequently demonstrate the impact of corporate political lobbying and the shift towards a system where the twin pillars of presentation and delivery performance can be seen as hallmarks of the new narrative. Following this section, the separate overviews of the case studies will be delineated and key perceptions inherent in their development will be drawn out. This is necessary as the next section will explore the role of perceptions and sensitivities in the case studies and indicate how they contribute to the aforementioned twin pillars. This is an essential consideration as the role of perceptions is insufficient in other transformation narratives that focus predominately on power loci in Endism or plurality in Reinventionism.

Reasons for Case Study Selection

To explain the use of the case studies in this thesis, the reasons for their selection need to be clear. At a macro level, the objectives of the case studies are threefold: first, they must provide a situation in which there is conflict between business on one side and those in opposition on the counter side. This is important as this challenging environment best showcase what it takes to get the message across and participate in a competing polyarchy. The second macro objective is to present two situations in which the opposition views are powerful and demonstrate that the process of influencing is not dominated by one side. It is essential that the way arguments are presented can be seen to shape the outcome. This is clear in both the cases with the issues played out under the media spotlight and submissions and representations made to the decision making process throughout the timeframes being considered. This second objective is essential to the case studies as it enables the performance argument to be tested in an environment where the lead protagonists are both highly active. If they were not active, then the test would be of limited use and fail to represent the pressures bearing down on an issue from more than one side, as can be more clearly seen in the narrowness of the Endist and Reinventionist narratives. The final objective is therefore for the case studies to be able to show a transformation from how political decisions are made as suggested by the Endist and Reinvention schools toward one that is closer to the Politics of Performance model.
Looking at the case studies in terms of the actual issues they bring up it is possible to see why in their different ways they work well together to test the Politics of Performance transformation description. At a micro level, the objective for the case studies is to show that over a range political circumstances where business and civil society are involved, the Politics of Performance analysis is relevant. The case studies complement each other in a number of ways. First, as the ELV transposition demonstrates lobbying, defending and seeking to decrease the impact on business from punitive legislation, the ID card enhancement case study shows lobbying seeking to increase regulation beneficial to a particular sector of business, namely the information technology industry. The impact to business of the ELV legislation being implemented verbatim and un-redacted is given an upper cost estimate of 520 GBP million (Local Authority Advisory Committee, 2003). By contrast, the benefit to business of increasing the technological capability of the ID card meant the project was revalued from 1.3 GBP billion in 2002 to 3.1 GBP billion in 2004 (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Fourth Report, 2004) with some estimates magnifying this to more than 5.5 GBP billion (LSE: The Identity Project, 2005). Another key feature of the two case studies is that ELV transposition focuses on actual legislation that has been ratified by the European Union and must be implemented within the flexible scope provided by its status of law as a Directive. The ID card lobbying is toward the other end of the policy legislation initiation spectrum: the policy development and consultation stage. The two studies therefore show lobbying working throughout the life of policy with the ID card enhancement at the start of creation legislation and ELV transposition towards final implementation stage. Collectively their findings can be seen as representing not merely a behaviour inherent at one point in the execution of policy but as demonstrative of a need for a new transformation narrative as offered by the Politics of Performance interpretation.

Furthermore, there are other ways in which the selection of the two case studies differ yet complement and compensate for deficiencies in one another. These include that the ELV transposition showcases an industry working largely through a trade body, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, as a mechanism to deflect as much direct criticism on any particular company, in seeking to change policy whereas in the ID card case study each enterprise acts engages with government largely on its own or through selected consortia as they vied for a slice of the budget of the Home Office ID card cake. Other key differences illustrating the practical assessment that encompasses more of the main environments in which lobbying takes place are that the ELV transposition was led mostly by teams ‘in-house’ of large companies affected while smaller consultancies were in the main employed by major IT firms to support and influence the ID card system. All of the major motor manufacturers have specialist in-house lobbyists experienced in the sector whereas the IT sector approached this issue more as a new business development opportunity and engaged specific consultancies to support this bespoke activity. Regardless of the corporate lobbying set-up, the breadth of lobbying aims, audiences’ types and some of the specific and differing incentives of those involved, the case studies used encompass a wide range of corporate lobbying activity in the UK. The two case studies have therefore been carefully and deliberately adopted in order to provide a full demonstration of transformation, to demonstrate their role as agents of change, in order to help assess whether the Politics of Performance is substantiated through these examples.

While the focus has so far been on examining the inter-relation of business and the UK government, it is important to identify the civil society activity around these issues and how
they are positioned in relation to corporate lobbying. In the case of the transposition of the ELV that prescribes that motor vehicle producers pay for the recycling of their products, while the manufacturers agreed with the spirit of the Directive, they did not want it implemented in entirety as planned. By contrast, multitudes of environmental organisations did. This included international groups such as Friends of the Earth and national organisations such as Recycle More. This diametric opposition is crucial to the case study. It allows a clear opportunity to see separate interest groups seeking to influence policy and thereby providing a relative measure of the success of corporate lobbying as will be later analysed in Chapter Five. In the second case study on the planned introduction of the UK national ID card, IT manufacturers and system integrators are particularly interested in procuring multi-billion GBP business whereas civil liberty groups such as Liberty, idFolly and Privacy International oppose the idea on a number of levels. In both cases it is clearly possible to discern the difference and opposing opinions held by industry and civil society organisations. The following section elaborates considerably on this overview, setting out the history of the issues, the motivation for the policies in 2001 for ELV transposition and in 2003 for ID card enhancement. The key actors that influenced the development of the issues are also highlighted along with major concerns around key aspects including cost, responsibility and benefit in which terms each of these considerations are seen. Alongside each of these elements of the overviews is a continuous focus on the divisive issues relating to perceptions of the impact of ID card enhancement and ELV transposition. The overviews will also touch on areas that are only being specifically discussed in this practical examination, and not on those which while are important are peripheral to the examination. Notably, in the case of the ID card the key issue being explored is how the enhancements came into being, were developed, endorsed and included within the UK ID Card policy as opposed to the actual issue of legislative progress and failure at the time of writing to reach the statute book.

Overview of the ID Card enhancement Case Study

ID cards have fallen in and out of UK legislators favour throughout the past one hundred years. Each time they have been introduced strong views against and in support have been made and they remain today one of the most “controversial, sensitive and divisive domestic policy issues in the UK” (Joinson, Paine and Buchanan, 2006). Compulsory UK ID cards were first issued during World War One, and abandoned in 1919. Cards were re-introduced during World War Two under the National Registration Act 1939, but were abandoned seven years after the end of that war in 1952, amid widespread public resentment. A divisive issue from the outset, it polarised opinion and highlighted that despite the attractions of the system to the successive governments, a vocal sector of UK society was not prepared to accept it. This is a recurrent theme. Even during World War One, the ID card scheme was highly unpopular, though accepted in the light of the prevailing national emergency. Taylor (1965, p.464) described the system as an “indignity” and highlighted that in World War Two the Home Guard were well known for “harassing” people to produce their cards. After World War Two Clement Atlee’s government decided to continue the scheme in the face of the emergent Cold War and the perceived Soviet threat, though it continued to become less popular. In the mind of the public it was more and more associated with bureaucratic interference and punitive rationing as reflected, comically, in the 1949 film Passport to Pimlico. Indeed the ending of the system was brought about not by proactive government reassessment but by a civil liberty case in 1950 (Stefanou and Xanthaki, 2008, p.110).
Clarence Willcock, a member of the British Liberal Party, refused to produce his ID card after being stopped by the police. During his subsequent trial he argued that ID cards had no place in peacetime, a defence rejected by the magistrate’s court. In his appeal, the judgment of the lower court was upheld, though in summing up Lord Goddard, stated on 26 June 1951 that in general he accepted the principle of Clarence Willcock’s defence:

"it is obvious that the police now, as a matter of routine, demand the production of national registration indemnity cards whenever they stop or interrogate a motorist for whatever cause. Of course, if they are looking for a stolen car or have reason to believe that a particular motorist is engaged in committing a crime, that is one thing, but to demand a national registration ID card from all and sundry, for instance, from a lady who may leave her car outside a shop longer than she should, or some trivial matter of that sort, is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes, and not for the purposes for which, apparently, it is now sought to be used. To use Acts of Parliament, passed for particular purposes during war, in times when the war is past, except that technically a state of war exists, tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs. Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that exists between the police and the public and such action tends to make the people resentful of the acts of the police and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of to assist them..." (cited by Liberty, 2009)

After the defeat of the Labour government in the General Election of October 1951 the incoming Conservative administration of Winston Churchill removed the scheme, “to set the people free.” This was a repeated phrase of Winston Churchill which he first made in his famous BBC Radio speech given in 1948 of the same name. This was a popular move and instrumental in helping the Conservatives overthrow government. The context was clear: it was an attack on post-war restrictions and, in particular, on the power of the post-1946 civil service. Although it was adopted against the wishes of the police and the security services, the decision to repeal the 1939 legislation was, largely, driven by the need to reduce the economic burden of the scheme on the state. By 1952 the scheme was costing £500,000 a year, at the time a colossal amount, and required 1500 civil servants to administer it. The core issue of financial cost and the civil liberty price made the system too expensive. Among other objections, these two issues have continued to lead in dogging the numerous attempts by governments of all colours, including the so-called Lib-Lab pact of 1997, in attempts to reintroduce the card. The public reasons given for the need of the card have varied, from improving tax administration, better management of immigration control, and increasing the integrity of drivers’ licenses to helping manage football hooliganism and more latterly as part of the arsenal in the “war on terror” (Home Office, 2008).

Clearly, the significant political challenges of each decade can be seen to be answered by each reinvention of the ID card, re-emerging each time as a panacea. Notwithstanding the introductions during the world wars, the more recent incarnations of the policy during the early 1990s. In 1988, Tony Favell, Conservative MP tried to introduce a Bill under the Ten Minute Rule to introduce a British ID Card, to help combat the level of crime and disorder at that time, as well as the increase violent behaviour associated with football. The Bill was defeated by 172 votes to 114. Similarly, the Labour attempt to introduce legislation in 2001 following the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York was in part explained as a response to protecting the UK from the threat of terrorism. Indeed, the UK Home Office continues to
advance this reasoning, noting that “ID cards will…disrupt the use of false and multiple identities by criminals and those involved in terrorist activity” (Home Office, 2008).

Furthermore, there are also notable repetitions in the patterns of events surrounding the inception and consultation stages of an ID card. In 1995, when the then Prime Minister, John Major, issued a consultation paper there was considerable public and Cabinet opposition including from John Redwood MP who left his position that year. Shortly following the consultation, the proposal was quietly set aside in 1996. In 2006 when David Blunkett, then Home Secretary, brought forward enabling legislation for an UK ID Card programme there was again significant public and Cabinet opposition. Following much criticism about the spiralling costs and questions around the real benefit as well as motives for the system, the ID card no longer occupied the central public policy platform it once held, although it is still a commitment in the Labour manifesto at the time of writing. Moreover, further similarities can be observed in the development of a protracted consultation process in both instances by comparison with other public policy issues. Both governments made statements that claimed support from the silent majority in favour of ID cards and subsequently were challenged in terms of the accuracy of this projection and experienced the lobby of civil liberty groups. In 1996, Charter 88 produced member briefings on the ID card proposal including Mistaken Identity! and ID cards and the Slow Death of Parliamentary Government. In 2003 when David Blunkett secured the ID card a position in the Queen’s Speech, setting out the legislative programme for the year, criticism from the civil liberty camp was vociferous. Led principally by Liberty, under the articulate auspices of Shami Chakrabarti, together with numerous briefings provided by Transparency International and others, they collectively highlighted that this issue continued to incense vocal sectors of society opposed to introduction.

However, the London terrorist bombings on 7th July 2005 gave further impetus to the government’s push for ID cards. Enabling legislation for the UK ID Card was passed under the ID Cards Act 2006. While the multi-billion pound scheme has yet to enter procurement stage for every UK citizen, the defining criteria by which the consortium that will supply the system have been determined, at least in general terms of the technology and therefore cost is required. This took place over the period 2002-2006, and this is the central reason for the focus of this time frame in the case study. It is during this period that business had a clear financial incentive to increase the technical specification of the scheme and thus the overall cost of the scheme. This period of technical enhancement to the ID card is of particular note since it was also during this time civil liberty groups mobilised in defence of their belief in this attack on the “threat to liberty and privacy posed by the rapid growth of the database state” (NO2ID, 2008). One key perception to note is that while the cards attract the focus of attention and debate and are the symbols of the deterioration of civil liberties as the critical civil society groups protest, it is envisaged that they will have a lesser role than the database they are linked to, otherwise known as the National ID Register (NIR). The ID Cards Act specifies fifty categories of information that the NIR can hold on each citizen, including up to 10 fingerprints, digitised facial scan and iris scan, current and past UK and overseas places of residence of all those living in the UK throughout a person’s life. Moreover, it is intended that there will be indices to other Government databases effectively enabling them to be connected. The legislation also provides for further information to be added as deemed necessary. As Privacy International (1996) note, in the eleven years following the introduction of ID cards during the World War Two, the functions that the card provided grew from initially just three to thirty nine. The possibility of ‘functional creep’ with the UK ID
Card is therefore not only historically evidenced but furthermore was called for by Intellect, the IT sector trade body, who are noted in the Home Office’s (2003) report that *Identity Cards: A Summary of Findings from the Consultation Exercise on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud* that “it is important it is not undertaken in isolation…the project needs to be driven in line with other government initiatives such as the e-government programme, the NHS IT Strategy and initiatives arising from the PIU’s study into data sharing and privacy…” (Home Office, 2003, p.92). Their support for a focus on developing the database first rather than the card demonstrates the understanding that once the data was in place, a platform could be created and that this was secondary. Organising the data and enabling different types to be added would, in the view of Intellect, enable “significant efficiencies and an improved level of service to the customer” (*op.cit*).

The ID Cards Act 2006 also sets out the incremental way the ID card is planned to be introduced. For every British citizen renewing or applying for an UK passport their details will be entered on to the NIR. It is expected that this will happen soon after the UK Passport Service, which has now been renamed the ID and Passport Service, start interviewing passport applicants to verify their ID. Various degrees of concern about the scheme have been expressed by human rights lawyers, activists, security professionals and IT experts, listed in the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Fourth Report into Identity Cards (2004c). These will be specifically assessed in Chapter Five when it examines 2002 to 2006 when the ID card programme was widened in scope from being merely a plastic card that may or may not have a chip in it that contains personal data and that is linked up to a national database to one in which personal biometric details are to be included and all of this information will be linked to the range of other government databases. One of the driving forces for these enhancements to the programme is explained by the government as offering a suite of crime reduction benefits, including undermining organised crime and terrorism and, unsurprisingly, the card has received strong support from the Association of Chief Police Officers (Home Office, 2003, p.108). This issue has been contested by Privacy International (1996), along with other civil liberty groups, who claim that the undesirable elements of society that the police are looking to catch are unlikely to be carrying a card and that this is really just an unnecessary tax on ordinary citizens. This element of the ID card issue usefully identifies some of the different groups actively engaged in dialogue around this issue and highlights the different incentives. Clearly for business, the advantages in celebrating the technology behind biometrics and the potential security they can provide in an age of increased concern around illegal immigrants, Islamic extremism and rising violent crime supports the increased profits that are hoped to be gleaned from a major project. For individuals, the incentives can be seen in terms of taking action in order to prevent the purported threats listed above or, by contrast, others regard it as an expensive irrelevance. An interesting perspective to consider is the way that the government has sought to portray the ID card in full knowledge of the range of opinion.

In 2002 the ID card was not known by this name. It was called the Entitlement Card. All consultations and government literature referred to it in this way as the aforementioned 2002 Consultation and 2003 Findings report testify. This approach by the government began to frame the debate. Along with the domestic and international security benefits that this would provide, the real key selling point to the electorate was considered to be what the card would entitle and therefore deliver to the individual. Powerful arguments were made about its ability to aid in the prevention of fraud but the strongest point may be seen in terms of a citizen value proposition. The purported benefits are listed in each of the government consultations and
responses and are set out on the Home Office website. Treating members of the electorate as customers, the ID card was positioned as a key to unlock all the government services you may need. It was positioned as being part of the simplification of government, reducing the need, in time, to have a National Insurance card, a medical card, recall separate tax details and have different account numbers with the different parts of the business of government that we touch. This shift towards providing a mechanism for the delivery of services over the existing systems recognises and reflects one of the mobilising factors that is shaping the modern polity: the pillar of having a delivery performance above engagement in ideology.

This is a significant claim and can be clearly seen in the Home Office’s initial recent proposal for identity cards called *Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud – A Consultation* (2004b), published in July 2002. In this document contains the idea that the cards could also be used to obtain social security services and other “multi-use” (Home Office, 2002, p.73) purposes. Responses to the consultation indicated that the term ‘entitlement card’ was vague and superficial and lent itself to appearing “softer and warmer” (Home Office, 2003, p.45) but fundamentally some construed it as “weasely” (ibid). Consequently the euphemism was replaced in favour of ID cards demonstrating that while service delivery was of high importance the way this is explained to the populus should not be at the expense of using descriptions which detach it from political values that are widely understood. The term ID card polarises opinion whereas Entitlement Cards do not when called by this name. Indeed, Entitlement Cards were often cited as another example of over-playing an interpretation of what it actually was – an ID card (Home Office, 2003; Home Affairs Select Committee Hearing into Identity Cards: Fourth Report, 2004c).

One of the most significant issues is cost. Independent studies, including one by the London School of Economics (2005), suggested that costs could be as high as £5.5 billion. The reliability of this study has been strongly refuted by the government, disputing some of the assumptions used in the calculations such as the need to retake biometric information every 5 years. The government argued that this assumption had not been supported by any research in the London School of Economics report, and that biometric experts quoted in the reports have sought to distance themselves from its findings. The government also claimed that the authors of these estimates are established opponents to the scheme and cannot be considered unbiased academic sources. Nonetheless, cost estimates have continued to rise even in the government’s own reports. Following the 2005 General Election the Home Office stated that it would cost £584 million a year to run the scheme. In October 2006, the government declared it would cost £5.4bn to run the ID cards scheme for the next 10 years. In May 2007 the Home Office forecast a rise of £400m to £5.3 billion, a figure revised in November 2007 to £5.612bn. This is a considerable increase from the 2002 estimate of £1.3 bn.

Additional concerns have also been expressed around the effectiveness of the proposed system. David Blunkett, when Home Secretary in 2004 stated that “ID Cards cannot stop terrorism” (BBC News Channel, 2004) on their own, and that while his successor, Charles Clarke, said the same in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, he did note that they might help identify the perpetrators (BBC News Channel, 2007). Indeed, the existence of ID cards in Spain did not prevent the Madrid train bombings. Furthermore, the existence of a single definitive ID register may make it easier for people to assume a false ID with just one point of entry into the system. The effectiveness has also been challenged in terms of failing to provide a fair and non-discriminating system. The government's ID card Race Equality Impact Assessment within the Home Office’s *Identity Cards Bill Regulatory Impact*
Assessment (2004a) indicated significant concern among ethnic groups over how the police would use their powers under an ID Cards Act. The report recorded that 64% of black and 53% of Indian respondents expressed concern, particularly about the potential for abuse and prejudice. Furthermore, the then Commission for Racial Equality (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Hearing into Identity Cards: Fourth Report, 2004c) stated that the fear of discrimination is neither misconceived nor exaggerated, and note that this is also an ongoing issue in where Germany, the Netherlands and France.

The Commission for Racial Equality also feared that the existing disproportionate requirement by employers and the authorities for ethnic minorities to identify themselves may create a two-tiered structure amongst racial groups, with foreign nationals and British ethnic minorities feeling compelled to register while the white British people did not (ibid). Moreover, certain groups who move location frequently and who tend to live on low incomes, including travellers, asylum-seekers and refugees, risk being criminalised under the legislation through failing to update their registration each time they move due to lack of funds to pay the fee that may be charged.

The widespread concern of ID cards impinging on the human right of civil liberty and anonymity was not only voiced by “outsider” (Grant, 1995, p.15) interest groups dedicated to preserving the sanctity of this issue. The UK Information Commissioner Richard Thomas, a clear “insider” (ibid) given the statutory requirements of his role, stated in a press release on 30 July 2004, that the NIR raises substantial data protection and personal privacy concerns. He sought clarification of why each piece of personal information needed to be kept as part of establishing an individual's ID and indicated concern about the wide range of bodies who would view the records of services individuals have used. The Commissioner has also pointed out that those who renew or apply for a driving licence or passport will be automatically added to the National ID Register, so losing the option of not registering, a key element that had been used to garner support in government consultations. He subsequently stated: “My anxiety is that we don't sleepwalk into a surveillance society” (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Fourth Report into Identity Cards, 2004c). Furthermore, concern about the impact on civil liberty was highlighted by the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights Fifth Report, published in February 2005, which questioned the compatibility of the Bill with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights that refers to the right to respect for private life and Article 14 on the right to non-discrimination, both of which are encapsulated with the UK's own Human Rights Act 1998.

Apart from the political value debates, objections were also made by Liberty with regard to the flexibility built in to the legislation that enabled, even without new primary legislation, the ID Cards Act to allow the potential scope of the scheme to be much greater than that usually publicised by the government. Indeed, as the Information Commissioner (2004) makes clear during World War Two, the British ID card system grew from having three functions to 39 by the time it was abolished. While there is a functional benefit of having an individual’s blood type on the card in case of emergency transfer, there are grave concerns about increasing this to carrying the entire personal medical history of the owner. Moreover, the granting of access to a range of private as well as public bodies is not clearly prohibited in the legislation.

One of the major concerns shared about the system is potential for ID fraud. While the government has repeatedly argued that the introduction of ID cards is part of the solution to resolving the increasing issue of identity theft, security experts claimed in evidence given to
the Home Affairs Select Committee Fourth Inquiry into Identity Cards (2004c) that placing trust in a single document may make ID theft easier. This means that only this document needs to be targeted. Falsely obtaining such a 'secure' ID becomes very valuable because people are less likely to question its validity; effectively there is a single point of failure. While not an exact parallel, lessons can be drawn from the experience in Australia, where ID theft has risen above British levels since the introduction of a widely used Tax File Number (Cuganesan & Lacey, 2003). ID theft surrounding the social security number is also a major problem in the USA (Berghel, 2000). However, it can be argued that part of the problem in these countries arises from the lack of a national ID card as no positive identification exists which links an individual to their unique ID number. Indeed opponents to the UK ID card raise the point that in order to apply for the new ID cards, existing documents such as passports will be used to prove ID; however, such identification is already proficiently forged, allowing ID thieves posing as someone else to apply for cards (Whitley, Hosein, Angell, & Davies, 2007). While new applications could be made using false documentation, existing cards and database entries would also be targets. Supporters note that such claims ignore that actual process, which allows for electronic checks of applications rather than a solely paper based system. In addition to problems affecting the integrity of the card and threats of infiltration to the database, there may be the tampering or superficial forging of the actual biometric ID cards.

Based on the wide range of concerns surrounding the UK ID card, a plethora of opposition interest groups have mobilised. In May 2006, the group NO2ID launched the "Renew for Freedom" campaign, urging passport holders to renew their passports in the summer of 2006 to delay being entered on the NIR. This was furthered on 14 November 2007, when the NO2ID opposition group called for financial donations from the 11,360 people who had pledged to contribute to a fighting fund opposing the legislation. The organisation plans to challenge the statutory instruments that will be brought in to enable the ID card scheme. This is a key point worth noting. Together with groups such as Liberty and Privacy International, single issue groups can muster a significant financial force to direct solely at lobbying for change. Moreover, beyond sheer financial support is the sophistication with which these groups develop powerful communication arsenals. NO2ID for example provide free copies of different adverts, flyers and case studies together with a host of online material including website banners and adverts that can be added to anyone’s site thereby proliferating the message. Such commitment to delivering significant legislative alteration highlights the strong measure of feeling made to government and the Home Office and the cost effective communication across the digital mediums. Although this is not a step change for civil society groups to act in this way, it recognises the contribution to of single issue groups to delivery in the modern polity.

Furthermore, there are issues with the implementation of the plans. Apart from the technical challenges, there have been widespread calls for campaigns of mass civil disobedience, generally urging citizens to refuse to register for an ID card, or to attend compulsory photographic sittings. These calls have been led by prominent public figures including Baroness Williams, London Mayor Boris Johnson, and Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat Leader, Nick Clegg. The schedule for putting passport applicants' and renewers' details on the NIR has to be announced in full. It is understood that applicants will be able to opt out of having a card issued until 2010, although they cannot opt out of having their details recorded on the NIR. In 2006 it was expected that ID cards would be compulsory for anyone getting a new or renewed passport after January 2010 with registration becoming compulsory
for non-UK passport holders resident in the UK by 2013. However on 22 January 2008, the Home Office confirmed two leaks, the first that the timetable may be delayed so that large volumes of cards would not be issued until 2012, and the second that ID cards would be issued to young people from 2010 to aid them in verifying themselves upon opening a bank account, and also to teachers, social workers and others in 'positions of trust'.

While the UK system is being prepared for introduction, the reaction to the plans has continued to be met with support and opposition largely repeating the same positions that have yet to be fully reconciled. However, while the government has regularly made the claim that they have majority support, there has been growing concern following the data loss of a number of confidential government statistics suggesting that the government cannot be trusted to handle personal information. Indeed, the October 2007 disclosure of the loss of 15 million records by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (Henry, 2007) has done little to increase public trust in government. Clearly this is an issue in which deep-rooted feelings are held on each side and the complications in delivering such a system are multifarious and dependent not only on resolving technical difficulties but overcoming the greater political hurdle of attempting successful implementation. Nonetheless, as aforementioned, the focus is more on the lead factors up to 2006 when the enabling legislation came into effect. The current deal-making around framework agreements and which major IT company and consortia will deliver which part merely evidence that the initial scoping and preparatory work in defining the cost of the programme make the project commercially attractive. How this process took place and how this was affected by the myriad of political pressures exerting on the system given the range of views outlined above will be the focus of Chapter Five. The Channels of Influence will draw out key parallels between the ID card and the End of Life Vehicles case study.

Overview of the Transposition of the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive Case Study

The European Community ELV Directive aims to reduce the amount of waste from vehicles: specifically, cars and vans, when they are finally scrapped at the end of their useful life. In short, this is the essence of the legislation. The Directive changed several existing operations and requirements associated with this including tightened environmental standards for vehicle treatment sites, requiring that last owners would be able to dispose of their vehicles free of charge from 2007 and required car manufacturer to “pay all or a significant part” (European Parliament, 2000) of the free take-back from this date with any remainder being contributed by the government or other parties. It was this final point that aroused so much concern within the motor industry. Nonetheless as Kanari, Pineau and Shallari (2003) highlight, there were 180 million cars on the roads of Europe in 2001. Furthermore, this had increased by 30 million since 1995 (ibid), and since around 75% of a vehicle could be recycled, more should be done (Chartered Institute of Waste Management, 2008). However, as Bellman and Khare (1999) argued in while the ELV Directive was being developed in Brussels, the “economic issues in recycling end of life vehicles…[had]…many problems” (op.cit). Key issues in their work which were not sufficiently addressed by the legislation include securing agreement with the dismantling and recovery industry, determining the incentives for vehicle collection, and determining incentives for scrap adaptation. These major operational issues were overlooked as demonstrated by the delayed implementation.
Despite these challenges, the ELV Directive set rising reuse, recycling and recovery targets and restricted the use of hazardous substances in both new vehicles and replacement vehicle parts. On the 21st October 2000 the EU End-of-Life Vehicles Directive was passed and on Monday 3 November 2003 the UK transposition came into effect with the End-of-Life Vehicles Regulations 2003. This case study traverses the ground between these two dates and examines the key friction points around the Directive and which key groups grappled with these challenges.

One of the central issues can be pinpointed to the fundamental political value that underpins the push for the regulation. The ELV Directive emerged as part of a suite of legislation emanating from the producer pays principle. This concept argued that since the producer had manufactured and created a good, that the responsibility for its management throughout its life and its safe recycling at the end of this process should be built into the design and sale of the good (Kanari, Pineau and Shallari, 2003). The design and sale of the good ensured that a holistic life cycle management approach could be adopted and that our products would be more environmentally and socially conscious. The trend for legislation to include the producer pays clause was influenced by the owner responsibility set down in laws such as the Dangerous Dogs Act (1991) in the UK. It has been spurred on with fears that without it legislation could have the unintended consequences such as the situation that emanated from the EU Refrigerator Directive (1996). This Directive failed to sufficiently identify who would pay for the cost of the recycling leading to a build of “fridge mountains” (Williams, 2003). In the case of the ELV Directive, the fear is of creating ‘car mountains’ or even for an increase in abandoned vehicles. This was an impact the legislation sought explicitly to overcome. The Producer responsibility clause has continued to find fertile soil in EU law making with a similar clause incorporated into the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive in July 2002.

However, in applying this principle in a competitive market, especially one such as the motor manufacturing industry held which is largely recognised to be in decline in Europe, brought out many differences of opinion. Chief among these was the view that applying the producer pays principle, and legislating for it to be implemented in the EU, ensured that European manufactured goods would be more expensive that those that were being built and sold abroad due to the additional cost. This fundamental cost issue was the mobilising reason for the polarising of opinion around how the legislation should be implemented. Manufacturers, suppliers and trade unions expressed clear views in opposition of this due to the financial burden it would apply while environmental groups stressed the necessity of full implementation to timetable. The views of the UK government fell in between the two groups and finding common agreement was a process of debate and compromise. Indeed, the original form of the 2000 ELV Directive included the provision that manufacturers should not only pay for free take back of all vehicles that they produce from 2003 but also of every vehicle that they had ever created – this is known as the “historic car parc [sic]”. For some of the older mass market manufactures including Vauxhall and Ford in the UK, this would have caused bankruptcy.

Many scenarios were developed throughout 2001 to 2002 to discuss how implementation could happen. Part of the problem posed by the legislation was the speed with which it had been conceived, prepared and reached the statute book. While it was not made a full Regulation of the EU, requiring verbatim implementation with no exceptions or flexibility, receiving Directive status gave national legislatures room to manoeuvre in delivering the
policy while adhering to the aims of the legislation. This flexibility and space caused an influx of views, many of whom tried to move the heart of the legislation closer to their camp, and thereby execute a conclusion closer to their political stance. These are elucidated below within the period 2001 to 2002. It is within this timeframe that the competing factors came together to shape the precise nature of the legislation. While this did not happen in a vacuum with a strict timeline for implementation in 2003 set in place, the clock was ticking for the various interested parties to resolve through their campaigning methods for the settlement of a version that would be introduced. In a negotiation of this nature, it is reasonable to make the claim that no single party would get all that it desired. Compromise was necessary.

The primary aim of the business community in 2001 was for a suspension of the implementation of the legislation in order to prepare the businesses to respond, for the recycling market to prepare and for the government infrastructure to be in place. This was supported by complete eradication of the clause arguing that the “historic car parc [sic]” (ELV Directive, 2000) be removed entirely from the legislation with regard to manufacturers being asked to absorb this cost retrospectively. The business view can be seen clearly in The Vauxhall Briefing on End of Life Vehicles (2001) which stated that they while they supported the environmental spirit of the legislation, concerns centred around “liability placed on vehicle manufacturers…[as this will]…have a very detrimental impact on the sector.” This was underlined by highlighting that “there have been no indications of the likely method of implementation or cost apportionment for post 2007” (op.cit). The industry positioned was further strengthened by the SMMT position which highlighted that the main issues that needed to be addressed in a UK implementation scheme were: “A shared responsibility between economic operators, government and vehicle owners;…that any new market mechanism differentiates between ELVs with a positive and negative value;…[and that] ensuring that the regime introduced in the UK to implement the Directive is comparable with that implemented by other major vehicle producing EU [Member] States. The imposition of a more costly or onerous regime in the UK would send a very negative signal to global vehicle manufacturers and jeopardise future investment in UK based vehicle and component manufacturing capacity” (op.cit). These were all measures designed to ensure a competitive level playing field across the European internal common market. This is a long list of major concerns and demonstrates that, essentially, the view of business was that they did not want this legislation as it did little to improve their profitability.

By contrast, the view of environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth was that it must be implemented immediately. As their commissioned report on the issue of EU Member State implementing EU legislation Lost in Transposition (Rossem, Tojo, & Lindhqvist, 2006) makes clear, this Directive placed “concrete responsibility on producers” (2006, p.3). The cry was that it must not be watered down in any way and that already government has been too slow to act. Greenpeace saw the ELV transposition as part of a broader movement in which they called for legislative regime that would result in “zero waste” (ibid). Delay was seen as obfuscation and a lack of political will to tackle the weighty environmental issue. While the major green groups were pressing this issue in 2001-2002, it is notable that during the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) Select Committee Inquiry into ELV Transposition on 6 December 2001, no environmentalists were invited to be witnesses demonstrating that industry concerns around the crippling nature of the legislation needed further understanding. This should be considered not as a success for the motor industry in turning the ear of Parliament toward their concerns but more as a success for the environmentalist who had already succeeded in Brussels in securing the legislation in the first
place. The battleground was now on implementation and the green groups principal call was for timely introduction.

While business and environmental communities appeared largely at loggerheads over the issue of implementation being incremental versus verbatim, respectively, other groups also contributed to its shape. These included UK local councils who had until this point borne a considerable portion of their budget on removing and salvaging abandoned vehicles. Indeed, this group received large amounts of media coverage for their views given that this public nuisance was a recognisable and visual image easily identified by all. While they would not shoulder costs under the new system, their support that the business or central government should pay drew much support from blogs following online copy being posted on major media outlets (Kanari, Pineau and Shallari, 2003).

The involvement of the media in this issue will be explored as a Channel of Influence in Chapter Five in more detail, although it is notable that on a technical issue of recycling a complex manufactured product such as a car, the delicacies of the issue are difficult to convey. For example, few of the articles on this subject in the major press 2001 to 2002 recognised the call from business that the Directive, as it stood in 2003, was ill thought out and lacked the foresight for a workable solution. In particular, the requirement that all car owners could take their vehicle to an approved recycling centre was simply unfeasible. This was due to the lack of appropriate facilities in January 2003 coupled with the non-existence of the infrastructure to assess whether or not the recycling sites were carrying out their work to a satisfactory standard. As a result of the difficulty in overcoming these issues, these provisions resulted in being the subject of the 2005 Regulations that came into effect in March 2005. These regulations set out the requirements for vehicle producers to have available networks of facilities where last owners of their brands of vehicles may take them for treatment at the end of their lives. These facilities are required to provide this service free of charge from 1 January 2007 only in cases where vehicles are largely complete and have not had extra waste added as prescribed by the legislation.

Other issues that developed from the process of discussing implementation of the legislation related to the ‘knock on’ effects that this would have. In exploring this, a second tier of interested parties entered the policy arena and the size of the issue expanded in scope and impact. One example of this related to the impact on the recycling market. As ELVs are already one of the most highly recycled consumer products, components that have an economic value would be moved by auto dismantlers for refurbishing and reuse given the pre-ELV Directive implementation profit incentive to do so. The balance of the ELV is ‘shredded’ by metal recyclers. The metal fraction, accounting for approximately 70% of materials by weight, is recycled. The remainder of the ELV, primarily plastics, seat foam, glass and rubber, is sent to landfill as waste and is known as shredder ‘flock,’ although is also known as ‘fluff’ or ‘residue.’ In the Australian experiment of similar legislation, a high degree of consideration was given to this issue so that any measures to further improve ELV environmental outcomes do not adversely impact on the market dynamics responsible for current recycling levels. This then had to be balanced against encouraging potential environmental impacts related to waste and resource loss through not maximising ELV reuse and material recycling. As a result the incentives in the system could be observed to be creating a result that was at odds with the spirit of the legislation.
The aspiration, aims and spirit of the ELV Directive was a constant throughout transposition since this was clearly articulated in the preamble to the text. Reaching a conclusion on it and securing delivery remained a task that had to be met by each Member State. The ambitious timeline set out, demonstrates the commitment to delivery as part of the emerging factor in politics of execution as the ultimate objective rather than efficiency of operation. Indeed the spirit of environmental improvement was a universal aim that would be difficult for any organisation to argue against since it is seen as socially positive movement that should not be reversed.

However, what became apparent through the negotiations was the lack of empathy felt by one group for another and the dynamic response this resulted in. One of the most stark examples of this was among the motor manufacturers who recognising the need to abide the law and implement the new legislation realised that no single company could afford the single cost of shouldering the financial burden of meeting all the stakeholder groups, meeting with all respective senior civil servants, MPs, and committees. Furthermore, companies do not want to expose their brand to tarnish from being singularly identified as taking a harder stance on failure to implement or support environmental legislation than another. With a customer focus focusing attention, the response to the ELV Directive led to competition being put aside in order to establish an ELV Contact Group through the national trade body, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. This dynamic response enabled business to form a single voice capable of taking strategic communication decisions to push forward their cause, rebut counter claims, and speak with the weight of the entire industry without being singularly accountable. Although this is not an unusual response for business to take, the coalescing around this issue galvanised a commitment that in the case of ELV transposition, the legislators were believed to have gone too far. Following successful lobbying coupled with the realisation of the unworkable nature of the system resulted in suspension until 2007 for full implementation. This also neatly timed with the implementation plans in other leading countries across Europe so as to reduce the impact on competitive advantage across the region. The way that this took place will be explored in depth in Chapter Five.

Role of Perceptions

A key element in drawing the case studies is the role of perceptions and sensitivities in delineating a history. While important to provide the structure of events against a broad canvas of the respective timescales, the agency contributions made by groups and individuals can be difficult to fully assess. Indeed the mobilisation of Ford of Britain around the ELV issue led the way for the remainder of the industry in setting the agenda. Although this risks suffering from free riders (Olson, 2002, p.76) benefiting from endeavours to which not all beneficiaries have contributed, the role of certain mobilisers will be highlighted in the following chapter. This is an essential part of the case study to examine since it helps reveal the actual factors that are determining some of the actual issues at discussion and the conclusions that are being made against them: the role of corporate lobbying in leading a vanguard that is witnessing a political culture focused on delivery and policy execution and the arena of presentation that is helping fulfil it. Thus, the concrete underpinning of the Politics of Performance will be seen in the Channels of Influence typology and the professional practices that enabled the enhancement of the ID card to increase its value to the private sector and the suspension in transposition of the ELV Directive.
Chapter Five - The Politics of Performance in Practice: Case Study Assessment

Building on the previous chapter, this one will examine how lobbying in practice supports the emergence of the Politics of Performance. It will do this through comparative assessment of the two case studies to demonstrate support for the twin pillars of delivery and presentation. It will consider key points at which industry and government interacted and show how corporate lobbying was orchestrated to affect decisions in favour of business. The different interfaces examined between industry and the policy making process are defined as Channels of Influence. In particular the interfaces that will be examined are industry relations with government and civil servants, the media, and other opinion formers. These are supplemented by an assessment of the impact of brand equity and corporate social responsibility activities undertaken during the periods under assessment in the case studies. Channels of Influence are common routes taken by corporate lobbying to meet and shape opinion formers and decision takers about an issue and can be clearly seen in the case studies: the transposition of EU End of Life Vehicle (ELV) Directive into UK law 2001-02 and Enhancement of UK Home Office ID Card proposal 2002-2006.

Through Channels of Influence corporate lobbyists set out their stalls where they market their clients’ goods and services. How this is carried out can be seen as clear demonstration of the importance of presentation in the policy making process. The Channels of Influence outlined here are used extensively by all successful lobbying groups including, of course, civil society groups such as Make Poverty History, as already mentioned. Given the growing professionalisation of lobbying following the boom (Harris & Fleisher, 2005, p.96), tried and tested techniques are practised by all lobbyists. This is demonstrated in the case studies by showing that in each of the Channels of Influence, corporate lobbying follows an observable SMART (Strategic, Measurable, Actionable, Repeatable, Time-conscious) approach. Whilst the SMART approach is different at each interface, commitment to these tenements is paramount to the professional lobbyist who has to repeat consistently their activity in order to showcase to prospective clients the work they have done and how this can be applied to any given environment or situation. Moreover the SMART approach is intrinsically linked to the delivery pillar of the Politics of Performance and its demonstration in the Channels of Influence supports the emergence of this narrative. Through examination of the case studies using the Channel of Influence and SMART assessment tools, this chapter will demonstrate the two elements of the performance of politics: achievement and presentation.

This first part of the chapter will concentrate on the audiences that the lobbying function typically has primary direct responsibility. These may be divided into three key Channel of Influences. These are the relationships with first government and the civil service; secondly, the media; and thirdly, the wider opinion forming community as is relevant to each issue. Exact definitions of each audience are also set out to explain the parameters and reasoning for this typography. The second part will concentrate on two Channels of Influence that more indirectly impact the message than the interfaces set out in part one. These are naturally of less importance but create a wider environment that demonstrates business as being a responsible organisation with whom dialogue can be held. It will therefore examine relevant corporate social responsibility activities of the motor industry and the IT sector within the case study timeframe including exploring perceptions around this such as those which challenge its
validity. The second indirect Channel of Influence to be considered is to assess the role of brand equity on corporate lobbying and the impact this has on the Politics of Performance.

Collectively it will be argued that both direct and indirect Channels of Influence are effective ways to secure representation of a sectional voice in the policy making process. An important point to note is that all the Channels of Influence will impact one another. In disseminating messages across the media and across other interfaces, each agent will discuss the issue formally and informally with one another. As a result it is possible to create a virtuous circle of supportive viewpoints to business circulating amongst target audiences. Equally it is possible that if poor communication is administered, then a vicious circle of negative news toward business could spread. Indeed it is likely that this may be passed on more quickly if it is in currency and politic to do so. Incentives in the system are therefore of key importance to understand the motivations of different actors. In short, each audience is also a potential third party advocate and communicator to other target audiences and may be able to more credibly argue a point that otherwise would be difficult to make as will be demonstrated in the case studies. Understanding the interaction between the different actors is key to corporate political lobbying. The emergence of this phenomenon is mobilising the Politics of Performance concept through demonstrating the twin pillars of achievement-performance and presentation-performance throughout each of the Channel of Influence interfaces.

**Direct Channel of Influence: Industry – Government and Civil Servant Relations**

The first Channel of Influence to be examined is the direct relationship industry has with government and the civil service. This is the most important interface in terms of impact on outcome due to this interaction with the actual decision-takers and most senior opinion formers on the policy making process (Nownes, 2006, p.47). Although it is Parliament that enacts legislation, the role of government in the UK dominates the policy making process as they bring about their election manifesto commitments and respond to current political developments. The definition of government in this section refers more specifically to the responsible ministers and their respective civil service departments. With regard to the ELV issue, the lead department was the Department for Trade and Industry (now known as the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) supported by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department for Transport. The department tasked with administering the ID Card system is the Home Office together with nearly every other central government department, many executive agencies and other relevant state bodies. Furthermore, whilst the sensitivity of the issue is not in doubt with the highly publicised activities of groups such as Friends of the Earth and Liberty together with the significant support base for civil society views, the crucial point to reach within the civil service was not in the highest echelons of power but rather at the position where projects are managed. This is because it is at this level that decisions are taken regarding the exact form, structure and detail of the system as prescribed by the legislation. More senior levels of government will focus on the overarching strategy rather than points of detail. In the case of the ELV Directive, it is at grade eight that the project manager team operates. For the ID card, the project is managed within a large team. This however is mostly populated by civil servants in grades ranging from four to seven.

Whilst a minister or senior civil servant will provide the intent, or more often specify an outcome, it is the task of the middle ranking civil servant to perform the functionary
requirement of a deliverable system. As a result corporate political lobbying targets decision takers at the middle level as much as is possible. As Nownes (2006, p.88) notes in his handbook on UK political lobbying, it is worthwhile lobbying “middle level bureaucrats...because they pick up the phone.”

The ability to penetrate the ivory towers of Whitehall is a key skill of the corporate lobbyist (John and Thomson, 2007, pp.39-40). This involves discovering who to speak to from the departmental switchboard and then finally once contact has been made to get across the right selection of messages. This is an accomplishment made only easier with practice and knowledge of how the system works. As a result it is the particular ability of experienced, well connected, informed lobbying practitioners who can deliver significant change that could not have otherwise be achieved. In much the same way that an individual is able to represent themselves at a judicial court, a company can of course engage directly with the apparatus of government and the myriad of organs of the civil service. However, with the extensive capacity needed to understand and interpret just one type of law that may be causing concern, it typically results in the hiring of a legal expert to represent this position. The ability to affect change within one department can equally require the specialist abilities of a lobbyist to amplify the voice of the client in the policy making process. Knowing how to communicate with an audience is, as the lobbyists Bell Pottinger Public Affairs strap line sagely points out, down to “when the difference between winning and losing is politics.”

Before examining the case studies relationship to achievement-performance and presentation-performance, this Channel of Influence is also useful in demonstrating key elements in Endism and Reinventionism that the Politics of Performance builds upon. Namely this interface demonstrates that business and civil society groups actively engage in influencing politics. Indeed, within these case studies both interest groups can be seen to be competing for attention with government and relevant civil servants. For the ELV transposition, Friends of the Earth led the environmental call for verbatim implementation of the Directive and for the ID card, Liberty may be seen as one of the lead civil liberty civil society protagonists. This link demonstrates that it is not fair to claim a corporate takeover of politics filled the vacuum left by the evaporation of ideology as prescribed by Endists, nor that the insufficient Reinventionist interpretation fully explains the current state of politics. Instead, this shows that business and civil society groups actively participate in seeking to shape decisions. The Channels of Influence examinations will further support this and importantly move the debate on to argue that now corporate lobbying is an actor that is mobilising politics and that the impact this is having can be understood as the Politics of Performance.

The Industry-Government and civil service relationships will be considered by assessing official UK departmental consultations; briefings including informal, formal, written and oral; government-industry sector events and reports; cross-interest events including those run by charities and the ubiquitous party conferences. As already mentioned, the middle echelons of the civil service is typically the most influential target audience in which to focus attention in order to effectuate change. However, before a department can begin a major programme properly, it is convention that a public announcement will be made in the Houses of Parliament to declare the intention of the activity. In both of the case studies selected, the magnitude of the impact of the issue was such that this was the case. Indeed, the sensitivity of ELVs precipitated two debates, known as readings, following the announcement of the transposition. The primary objective of business was to stress that it could not afford the cost of £37 million per year to recycle the cars it was producing now. If the motor industry were
compelled to have to pay, under the producer pays principle, all cars ever produced by an enterprise, then many thousands of jobs from low skilled communities would be lost. General Motors UK alone estimated this would put further pressure on the company at the time since they were already closing down their largest UK manufacturing site in Luton. Furthermore, with manufacturing sites predominately located in Labour constituencies, the current party of government, the executive faced a difficult challenge in making the EU Directive work practically in the UK. Similarly, the ID card split government and MPs across the House. With the claimed focus of this government on improving public services, the significant expense of the ID card proposal was considered by some, as mentioned in Chapter Four, to not be worth the benefits. This may be broadly understood in terms of recognising that the anti-authoritarian wing of New Labour opposed the ID Card on the grounds that it provides increasing centralisation of power and was construed as a stepping stone to the totalitarian Orwellian scenario of 1984 whilst the libertarian wing of the Conservatives were against the policy on grounds they believed it to be an erosion of civil liberty.

With this background of sensitivity and split support towards the policy, the communication efforts from industry in both cases had to be carefully designed and delivered to ensure that their points were made persuasively and in such a way that would not whip up interest in a deconstructive fashion. Therefore, following the initial announcements regarding transposition of the ELV Directive and the design of the ID card, one of the first steps taken was to determine across businesses the precise position that would be taken. This is because once a company has set out its stall, it can be highly damaging to change this in a way that may contradict the initial position. Furthermore, changing strategy once set also disrupts market analysis and can affect share price. Also, getting this right first time is of key importance in securing and retaining the confidence of the decision takers and opinion formers. Indeed, given Parliament’s role to scrutinise the executive, they rely heavily on the expert testimonies of witnesses to assist in performing this function. Maintaining the mantle of being a proficient technical specialist can be of paramount concern not only in determining the effectiveness of shaping outcomes but also at a later date for business when it is attempting to sell its goods and services.

As a result, much time was spent within the motor and IT sectors determining their positions on the ELV Directive and the ID card respectively. Whilst individual sector companies were competing commercially outside of this legislation, benefit was to be derived from developing common positions on these issues. The transposition of the ELV Directive was a cost concern to every motor manufacturer whilst the shape of the ID card system and legislation was of concern to every potential supplier. The impact to the motor industry at large was recognised and as such the SMMT led the corporate political lobbying on behalf of the industry due to its large membership base. Although, the IT trade association, Intellect, developed and synthesised certain common viewpoints to present to government, it was individual companies who positioned themselves as having leading technological advantage over their competitors. The positions that these two sectors developed reached the ears of Parliament at key hearings.

The first aspect of the Industry- Government and civil service Channel of Influence to be considered is in the official consultation process. For the ELV transposition, engagement in the DTI ELV Consultation (2001) will be examined and for the ID cards case study, submissions to the Home Office’s Legislation on Identity Cards: A Consultation (2004b). The strategy for engaging in both these exercises followed the SMART lobbying approach and neatly draws out the importance of achievement and presentation as primary goals in the way
businesses conducted themselves and subsequently in the way politics unfolded. The final
text of the ELV directive had been completed on 21 October 2000, but it was almost a year
later that the first consultation with the industry was set up on 8 August 2001. Leaving only
nine months to deliver a workable solution to the vastly complex and politically sensitive
transposition must be understood as, at best, a challenging and difficult task, and at worst,
practically impossible. As a result of this to avoid the producer responsibility burden the
SMMT adopted the SMART approach in producing a professional press release aimed not at
the media but at government and civil service directly. This was entitled ‘End of Life Vehicles
Consultation – A Farce’ (2001). Distributing this to media across the country and making
personal telephone calls to journalists resulted in a plethora of articles in mainstream
newspapers, trade journals and industry reports over the ensuing days. With many of the
media simply cutting text from the piece and pasting directly into their articles, the media
swallowed the story without so much as what they had been presented with.

Despite the work of CARE and ACCORD in detailing a solution to transposing the ELV
directive with the support of industry since 2000 this was glossed over by media reports.
Instead what the car-buying public read was that government had made a mistake.
Government had been too slow in organising a consultation. Government had “completely
ignored the concerns of the UK’s largest manufacturing sector” (op cit). Government “could
raise vehicle price” (op cit) and that if Government did not listen to “industry pleads to delay”
(op cit) the motor industry could face a bill running into billions of pounds for recycling costs.
This dramatic response was the product of the European Community imposing onerous
legislation which industry could have shaped during its development in Brussels. However,
given the failings of ACEA the strategic option to respond with the call of ‘a farce’ enabled
industry to show that what was needed was an alternative view to the three options for
implementation of the directive to be discarded and the industry fourth option to be seriously
considered. This can also be seen as measurable as it provided the space for businesses’ views
to be heard and in relation to the imposing deadline at the time can be seen as a reasonable
response. In this way the action made it clear that the only achievable outcome was in the
short-term suspension and in the longer-term an amended version of the verbatim
implementation of the legislation. Publication of the press release on the day that the
consultation was announced by the DTI not only demonstrates the professional ability of the
SMMT to respond swiftly but also in a Timely manner to the delayed consultation. The focus
on delivering the objectives for business in the engagement with the policy making process in
this aspect of the case study is sharp and portent. It also showcases the way that the official
consultation process is not only influenced by the submissions received within the process but
also by the environment around it as created through the presentation of concerned views.
Performance can clearly be seen as a dominant concept emerging from business clashing with
environment groups.

The ID card consultation can also be seen to support the twin pillars of performance. Prior to
the consultation the notable exception in the contents was the discussion on inclusion around
the operation of the system. In particular it also omitted key details which were responsible
for the majority of the cost evaluation of the project, namely information around biometrics.
The reason for this omission was recognised implicitly in the consultation document as being
a separate issue that required further understanding due to the controversial nature of the topic.
The submission that individual IT companies to the consultation demonstrated three key
elements which gave indefatigable support for the government’s policy. These rested on the
ID card system being built by businesses which were experienced in similar project delivery,
expert in executing a major government project and could demonstrate a technological capacity beyond the current envisaged plan. These three messages were strategic as they set out a rationalisation of which enterprises could compete and also provided a longer-term view that provided government with the opportunity to add perceived greater functionality to a system beyond simply delivery an ID card system. This subtle but key point resonated well with government who in later response to the consultation were able to demonstrate that the ID card could provide joined up government services subject to the appropriate systems integrator winning the contract. This is a strong example of how presentation is key in corporate lobbying and signalling in politics. The messages around experience and expertise demonstrated that this was a Measurable approach as it highlighted that government could not deliver the project without outside help. They also showed that it was Achievable and Realistic and that if additional technology was incorporated into the design it could be delivered on time and avoid lengthy delays in the future. The technology that several IT companies including Fujitsu and EDS put forward focused on the identity card carrying a microchip on which there would be enough additional space to support applications from other government departments. The focus on the three messages illustrates that the Politics of Performance Twin Pillars can easily be seen.

The second area of the industry-government and civil service channel of influence that will be assessed is in the formal and informal briefings arena. Following the two consultation phases that the Home Office administered the Office of Government Commerce conducted gateway reviews on the design of the Identity Card system. Business briefings to OGC civil servants were instrumental in persuading them of the virtues of a greater level of technological capacity in the system. Whilst the consultation provided the political masters with a tool to communicate with the public on the need for technically advanced ID cards, business also sought to ensure that those designing the system held this view. The gateway review process is designed to eliminate unexpected inflationary costs and unworkable solutions in major multi-billion pound projects. Corporate lobbyists helped identify the otherwise anonymous civil servants and after offering pro bono advice and support from their IT clients, were able to set up key briefings which offered the business view of the future of ID cards in the UK. Following the presentations that were carefully choreographed to showcase the value of interconnecting the national identity register with other departmental databases in order to achieve the objective of the ID card. This system integration role, however, would also require additional funding which was naturally in the interests of the IT companies.

The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) in seeking to protect the interests of their members, also used presentation and a focus on delivery in their briefings. The appointment of the motor industry to the ELV Consultation group by the DTI enabled close and regular contact with the key policy advisers on the transportation issue. Other actors affected by the legislation were also members although since it was the motor industry who would have to pay all or a significant part of the cost of take back of vehicles at the end of their life, motor manufacturers were the most influential and dominant group. This can be seen simply by the composition of the group which was made up of ten motor manufacturers in an overall team of sixteen. Before every meeting the motor manufacturers would conduct a teleconference amongst themselves to reaffirm the strategy and position for reducing the impact of the legislation and this would also be reconvened after the consultation group meeting. This approach demonstrates professionalism and reflects the commitment to Strategy and ensuring that a Measurable assessment of each engagement was undertaken. It also ensured alignment to the objective of making the lobbying effort Achievable, and
Realistic. Managing the messages and response to upcoming concerns around the implementation of the Directive required a focus on Timing. Therefore, within this group the SMART characteristics can be observed demonstrating the commitment to delivery – performance. The control over messaging and co-ordination amongst the industry group also supports the clear trend of presentation – performance as being of paramount concern to effective lobbying. Indeed, this can be seen around motor industry support for early day motions which, in the case of Bill Wiggin MP’s sponsorship of the Abandoned Vehicles, first received unanimous support from the major motor manufacturers having provided key statistics, before it was published in Hansard.

Outside of the briefings, another aspect of the Industry-Government and civil service Channel of Influence is the way cross-interest events were exploited. Following the SMART approach, the IT sector established the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Identity Fraud. Although the IT sector already has an all party group in Parliament, this deals with the range of issues affecting the IT sector and is recognised as the voice of industry on this topic. It is run by Intellect, the IT trade body who have used it as a vehicle to raise the views of business on the ID card but is naturally not specific to the contentions around identity and the system. As a result it was decided that a specific group would be established which would research and support systems capable of delivering the ID card system and bring together sympathetic MPs and peers who could act as advocates on behalf of the industry. The focus on identify fraud rather than the system demonstrates the political nous of the IT sector in raising one of the chief concerns that the ID card would help overcome. This understanding of the need to present their views in a politically astute way is further evidence of performance. Furthermore rather than administer the group directly on behalf of industry through an organisation such as Intellect, a specialist corporate lobbying company, Fleishman Hillard, was employed by Fellowes Inc, one of the potential ID card suppliers, to help run the group.

In the case of the ELV transposition, Vauxhall Motors participated in cross interest events in order to focus their delivery and presentation on securing a suspension in the date of implementation. One way they gained access to the hallowed doors of St Stephen’s Gate was through sponsorship of charity events held at Parliament. A key example was the House of Commons versus House of Lords Tug of War in aid of Marie Curie Cancer Care on 24 June 2002. Here Vauxhall donated £2,500 and obtained a table capable of seating eight guests. Selecting carefully, Vauxhall asked key contacts to attend, including Sarah Chambers, then head of the Automotive Unit at the DTI, together with several MPs. Another event that adopted a similar tactic was when Vauxhall drew upon its close partnership with the charity Motability and held a parliamentary reception at Portcullis House on 23 October 2001. After Andrew Miller, MP for Ellesmere Port and Neston, with whom Vauxhall has a very close relationship since a manufacturing site is in his constituency, secured the booking of the room, the company celebrated its demonstrable commitment to persons with disabilities. At this event Vauxhall distributed a short briefing pack on key industry information including the ELV issue to the distinguished guests that ranged from Ministers to Parliamentary aides, thus continuing the dissemination of the industry view on the ELV transposition.

The final aspect of the industry-government and civil service Channel of Influence to be analysed is at party conferences. These fora are microcosms of the Politics of Performance in action. Prior to each of the three main party conferences in 2004 IT lobbyists defined strategies to support the enhancement of the ID card functionality, and therefore cost. This was similarly done by motor industry lobbyists in 2002 for the suspension and reduction of the
impact of the ELV transposition. In both cases this involved identifying fringe meetings of interest, attendance of influential MPs at the range of evening dinners, policy launches and speeches, and also other opportunities to communicate appropriate messaging. For the motor industry this was co-ordinated by the SMMT who assigned separate meetings for each industry delegate to attend. Given this Measurable approach the view of business was able to be presented to all decision takers and opinion formers in an Achievable Realistic and Time-effective manner. Thus clearly supporting the delivery pillar of the Politics of Performance. With each business delegate carrying consistent messages in their briefing documents, a consistent view could be orchestrated. Ford, for example, also provided a fleet of cars to act as a taxi service for selected MPs to transport themselves from engagement to engagement.

The IT sector executed their Strategy at the 2004 party conference Channel of Influence by purchasing stall space to showcase their ability to capture, store and manage biometric information. The growth of commercial organisations purchasing stalls next to think tanks, quangos and departments of interest likens a party conference to a trade show (John and Thomson, 2007, p.98). Indeed, it is also is a visual representation of the growth of the lobbying sector and the public sector market now available to private business. Moreover, the best restaurants at the party conference locations were pre-booked well in advance by large companies interested or already engaged in bidding for major public sector contracts. Potential ID card suppliers EDS, Fujitsu and BT all held dinners at the 2004 Labour party conference and invited Home Office Ministers, members of the Home Affairs Select Committee and the various civil servants to attend. Using a range of avenues to communicate demonstrates the commitment to delivery-performance of lobbyists. One of the most important Channels of Influence for lobbyists and for supporting the presentation element of performance is the copy produced by the media.

**Direct Channel of Influence: Industry – Media Relations**

The Channel of Influence through the media to affect policy is substantial. The value of establishing a positive network with trade, local, national, and wire journalists enables lobbyists with the ability to influence an independent voice to provide third party advocacy. This increases the credibility of the point being made and was a tool used extensively in both case studies thereby supporting the trend of the increase of managing how messages are presented in the policy making process. As already demonstrated by the SMMT press release *ELV transposition consultation – a farce* (2001), the strategic approach to highlight issues at different timings within the development of the legislation stage is also crucial. For the ID card timing was also important although media engagements did not involve writing press releases around the offering the IT providers were trying to distinguish themselves around. This would have been too blunt an instrument given the sensitivity of the issue. Given that this form of lobbying was about determining the scope of the ID card so as to best position individual businesses during the contract bidding phase, seeking to embarrass government into action, as the motor industry successfully did, was not a course to be followed. Instead, the approach was to provide off the record briefings with Home Affairs journalists, rather than IT or business journalists, from major national media organisations, to explain the advantages of biometric and other technical offerings to support. This specific targeting was determined in order to inform journalists of the security options and measures the government could take in an era of the ‘war on terror.’ Indeed, following the 7 July 2005 terrorist bombs in London, in response to ID card articles being written, IT lobbyists provided timely background
information to journalists about the increased security offerings of a technically advanced ID card in order to help create support for an enhanced and ultimately more higher cost system. Targeting the audience with Strategically well Timed information which will be well received demonstrates clear support for the twin pillars of delivery and presentation performances.

Nonetheless, during the development and design phase of the ID card legislation the majority of media briefings and support from business was directed at the trade press. This was a Strategic decision to showcase their specialist technological differentiation within respected sector magazines and journals which would be seen by decision makers and decision takers. Messages to the trade media had to be carefully crafted so as not to generate a national story which could have had the headline that business was pushing for ID cards. It was important that business kept out of this arena as much as possible since they could be drawn into the stories about the undemocratic implementation of policy and concerns about the infringement of liberty. Influencing these debates is unlikely to have won the company much support from government with whom they are trying to win the business. A good example of this followed Atos Origin winning the multi-million GBP contract to run the UK Passport Service ID Card pilot scheme. The award announcement came from government and they led on all communications around the sensitivities of the issue adopting a deliberately reactive strategy in which no press release would be put out and questions would only be asked on a case by case basis. While Atos Origin would have been keen to have publicised this widely to help further shore up their share price via analyst recommendations, the company recognised the delicacy of the issue and that it must not be seen to have a view on this area of public policy.

By contrast the impending implementation deadline of the ELV directive required a high profile national media strategy to ensure its aims were met. The SMMT report ‘Whose Milking the Motor Car?’ (2001) neatly epitomises the SMART approach. Published on 24 May 2001, after a meeting in March of that year with a government who had failed to give assurances that the ELV legislation would not be implemented with the producer responsibility clause amended, the report was scathing in its attack. It noted that for a car bought in 1992 for 9400 GBP, government would receive around 11,700 pounds in tax duties since then. Thus the motor industry continued its attack as to whether the producer should pay for the vehicle at the end of its life. The imposition of the legislation was often put in the wider context of the decline in the manufacturing sector and cited as an industry riposte to the *Rip Off Britain* campaign. While the *Rip Off Britain* campaign is testament that business does not control the media, the monthly dinners were arranged by media relations managers at the major motor manufacturers and the SMMT. Building up personal relationships with Sophie Barker at *The Daily Telegraph*, Christine Buckley at *The Times*, Jon Menon and Andrew Porter at the *Sunday Business*, Danny Lee at the *Evening Standard*, and perhaps most influentially of all, Tim Burt at the *Financial Times*, all led to positive pieces. These relationships must be seen as partly responsible for the vast majority of the 138 articles written on the subject of ELV transposition 2001 to 2002 favouring industry (the author has copies of the articles available to view).

As the intensification of the motor industry lobbying increased with implementation of the ELV Directive appearing to be unchanged, the mass motor manufacturer Vauxhall, who would have faced one of the largest increased costs as the second largest seller of cars in the UK at the time (SMMT New Car Registrations, 2002), developed a proactive media engagement programme. On top of the monthly meetings, journalists were given short crisp updates on the ELV issue to keep the subject of a relatively dry piece of legislation being
transposed from one regulatory system to another in the mind of the journalist. Finding ways to do this so that Vauxhall did not appear to be incessantly whinging was overcome by developing the story angle of the need to find a workable solution to overcome abandoned cars. This instantly recognisable problem and key concern for UK councils who were tasked with removing them from public streets struck a chord with the media. Working with the Local Government Association (LGA), Vauxhall briefed them on the industry Option 4 to create a practical solution. Demonstrating this shared vision and acting as an organisation committed to the spirit of the legislation, this approach increased pressure from the councils to request government to find a workable solution. They recognised if business were to be forced to pay all or a substantial part of the costs, this could not work in practice and that in effect they would continue to have to bear the financial cost burden. As a result, the councils and the LGA publicised to local media the need for the ELV transposition to be sensibly introduced. Identifying this opportunity to present the motor industry argument through a third party demonstrates the impact of corporate lobbying in developing an increase in presentation performance in order to influence political decisions.

Moreover, the opportunity to identify the common linkage and promote the LGA and its members to actively remonstrate about an industry issue grew from the SMART approach of media monitoring. All major businesses employ media cuttings agencies which provide a tailored service. Dependent on requirement and budget, they will provide a regular media update of information that may contain articles in entirety or summaries thereof. All the major motor manufacturers and the SMMT employed such services as did potential ID card suppliers, EDS, Fujitsu, and BT, as examples. Indeed, Vauxhall received daily copies of newspaper cuttings from Durrants, real time information from the media on the internet via a contract with the DeHavilland news management agency along with updates provided by the SMMT, among others. For lobbyists, information is the currency that is traded and having up-to-date and accurate knowledge of what is being said, when and by who is essential (John and Thomson, 2005, p.22). This enables Strategic decisions to be taken by enabling an understanding of which organisations have what concerns. Identifying that the issue of abandoned vehicles for councils could be used to support the call from business for a workable solution highlighted a possible approach to gain traction in the Channel of Influence. Moreover media monitoring had shown that previous articles on abandoned vehicles called for them to be more speedily removed and the infamous ‘Police Aware’ sticker to be a less common sight. This information demonstrated that in working with the LGA on abandoned cars, the media reception to this issue could be Measured and was a Realistic approach to take. Again this can been seen to support the delivery pillar of the performance of politics, demonstrating the focus on achieving a clear focus on the outcome.

Nonetheless, one of the most challenging elements of industry-media relations is assessing the degree to which an article will contribute to influencing a political decision. There is much discussion around the extent of influence of the media on politics (Mosco, 1996, pp.70-135). The Achievability of political impacts of story placing is difficult to determine and the compound interest of column inches attempts to overcome this simplistically. As the case studies show, timing plays a crucial role. The SMMT press release on the ELV transposition consultation and the Atos Origin decision to not follow the capitalist instinct to increase shareholder value by engaging with the media in view of the political ramifications of entering the ID card debate, show this. Continual monitoring of the media space informs the SMART approach and underpins the emergence of delivery and presentation performances in this Channel of Influence.
Direct Channel of Influence: Industry – Opinion Formers Relations

Outside of the government, civil service and the media, a number of other actors participate in the pluralist UK political system. For the purposes of this chapter, this wide ranging group have been brought together as a Channel of Influence since the types of influencer vary in lobbying from case to case. For comparative assessment of the transposition of EU End of Life Vehicle (ELV) Directive into UK law 2001-02 and the enhancement of UK Home Office Identity Card (ID) proposal 2002-2006 case studies, the following opinion formers will be considered: sector, national, and international industry bodies; regulators; civil society groups; cross sector initiatives; and the UK Parliament. This last body may appear incongruous as an opinion former rather than being seen as a decision taker. For this reason, this will addressed first.

In many instances the UK Parliament may be understood as a Channel of Influence worthy of its own section. However, given that the primary role of Parliament is as a legislature and that the case studies under examination are not following the passage of a bill, the UK Parliament has an influential opinion-forming role. Indeed, is not the responsible agent for the transposition of an EU Directive that has already received democratic approval or for the development of the scope of a government policy such as ID cards. This may seem an unusual proposition since lobbyists are perceived to be ‘hawking’ around the corridors of the Palace of Westminster. However, for the majority of corporate lobbying, the work tends to be done prior to a bill entering the Readings and Standing Committee stages. Nonetheless, the role of parliamentarians in raising issues as part of scrutinising the role of the executive make them and the processes of Parliament a powerful Channel of Influence. Protected by parliamentary privilege, pointed questions can be made. In both case studies Select Committee hearings were held on ELV transposition and ID Cards respectively.

During the fourth Home Affairs Select Committee Hearing into Identity Cards, a dedicated session for witnesses from four separate businesses was held on 20 April 2004. This is typical of Select Committee hearings, questioning a broad remit of stakeholders. Indeed, Liberty, Privacy International, UK Computing Research Committee and the Police Federation for England and Wales along with 24 other witnesses were interviewed, some on more than one occasion. Many criticisms were levied at the system from ethical, logistical and financial positions. Despite this, the written and oral evidence presented by the business representatives which, in part, focused on the procurement process sought to give assurances that should they be successful in supporting the delivery of the policy, it could be done as outlined by the government. As a result the Select Committee report gave the opinion “The government's record on large-scale IT projects is not encouraging…[however] We do not believe that it is impossible for them to deliver the project on time, to specification and to cost” (Home Affairs Select Committee Hearing into Identity Cards: Fourth Report, 2004c). The report also referenced that “Intellect believed, based on their two years of work with the Home Office on the issues, that the Home Office had a better understanding of the capabilities of the technology [and that]… [o]ther witnesses from the IT industry were unanimous about the importance of taking decisions about the infrastructure and the basic shape of the system early on” (Home Affairs Select Committee Hearing into Identity Cards: Fourth Report, 2004c). In the government’s response, they noted support for the views of business and wish to move the project forward with infrastructure decisions. Although this did not immediately happen with government continuing to assess how well the card would be received), it demonstrates the ability of business to chime with the interests of the decision making government department.
and project an appropriate presentation that will help them. Moreover it demonstrates support for the Politics of Performance.

This can also be seen during the DTI Select Committee Hearing into the ELV transposition on 23 October 2001. Business was also well represented with Vauxhall, Ford of Britain and the SMMT giving written and oral evidence. Rather than exposing views around the ID card and associated National Information Register, this hearing focused, in part, on the imposition of the implementation of such a burdensome system. This was augmented by meetings with the Clerk of the DTI Select Committee who not only prepares questions for the Chair and other members of the Committee but also who writes the report of the Hearing including its recommendations. This pre-meeting was further supported by providing an exclusive of the SMMT’s briefing to the Committee to the *Financial Times* two days before the Hearing was to commence. As a result on 22 October 2001, they carried a piece that the “financial stability of the industry could be jeopardised by the government’s interpretation” (Financial Times, 2001) of the ELV Directive. This is at best uncharitable to government given that they had just set up a consultation on 8 August 2001. Nonetheless, the well Timed media briefing before the opinion forming Select Committee showcase the presentation and delivery focus of corporate lobbying.

Another parliamentary process that supports the Politics of Performance narrative is the use of Early Day Motions (EDM). The Strategic decision to brief the opposition party Liberal Democrat MP Vincent Cable on the major concern with how government was administering the ELV transposition led to him table an EDM on 11th July 2002. This highlighted that “as with the Refrigerator Directive and others, that it is the Department for Trade and Industry which takes the lead in negotiating but DEFRA which is responsible for implementing the details” (Cable, 2002). This Measured approach added to the chorus of criticism for the proposed implementation plans from business. Similarly, Graham Allen MP’s earlier EDM on Abandoned Cars tabled on 31 October 2001 called for the ELV consultation to produce recommendations for “appropriate measures coming into force to end this blight which afflicts our constituencies.” The echoing of consistent messages in different fora supports the corporate lobbying objective to create an environment conducive to support change in favour of business. The sophistication of this approach gives further weight to politics being manifested with behaviours motivated by the delivery of a policy based on local interest rather than ideological debate.

Inherent in orchestration of the Channels of Influence are the various industry bodies. For the UK motor manufacturers, the SMMT facilitated the sectoral, national, and via representation on the European Automobile Motor Manufacturers Association (ACEA), an international advocacy co-ordination body. Intellect acted as the body for the IT sector. Through these bodies common messages were developed and resources management was improved through avoiding sending duplicate delegates to the same meetings as noted at party conferences. Moreover, these organisations also serve as information sharing facilities which improve the information around upcoming events and increase options to engage in the policy making process. While the SMMT and its members dominated the Consultation Group and may be consider an insider group, complete with the access to DTI officials, Intellect established an ID Card Working Group that would meet virtually and face to face. The terms of reference for this group were to assess the technical scope of the ID card and the value proposition of adding increasing levels of complexity. Moreover, this group also worked closely with PA Consulting who on 26 May 2004 had been selected by the Home Office as the private sector
development partner to help determine the best way of designing and implementing the scheme. The company worked on the design, feasibility testing, business case and procurement elements of the identity cards programme. In order to support this work they drew on the experience and expertise within Intellect and specifically within the Working Group. In exchange for this information, competitors were able to stay close to the scoping of the ID card in a competitive market. Naturally, confidential details of PA Consulting’s work was not shared, however, the intelligence gleaned from understanding via Intellect’s network that the Home Office was willing to receive presentations from the Home Office highlight the trend of the imperative need to deliver policy engender an increasing appetite from the public sector to work with private sector businesses.

Furthermore, trade bodies were instrumental in demonstrating the Politics of Performance through SMART support of sector initiatives. The Strategic decision to establish the pan European Consortium for Automotive REcycling (CARE) and Automotive Consortium On Recycling and Disposal (ACORD) initiatives was taken to look for ways to reduce the motor industry’s impact on the environment. Moreover, these fora provided defence for the lobbyists to use in countering environmental criticism that the sector was charged with for seeking to delay implementation of the legislation. The contribution of direct funding along with the time and cost of senior staff, including technical experts to attend, demonstrates the value given to these groups. This commitment in seeking to find workable solutions by sitting at roundtable discussions with a wide range of stakeholders was also used to present the Measures that industry was taking in an Achievable, Realistic and Timely fashion in countering criticism. Co-ordination of industry opinion through trade bodies at these sector events was vital to ensure that no companies did not significantly take conflicting positions on issues and a united front was portrayed.

Moreover, corporate lobbying engagement with influential opinion formers through attendance at meetings, conferences and consultations within political parties, various think tanks, trade unions, and civil society organisations all contribute to evidencing the Politics of Performance. While IT suppliers were not inclined to explicitly engage in fear of entering the ID card controversy, the motor industry was keen to be seen as active as possible to demonstrate the criticality of securing a suspension in the legislation. As a result, both Ford of Britain and Vauxhall met with several major environmental groups including Friends of the Earth. Although industry set out their support for the ‘spirit’ of the legislation, fundamentally, the position of the environmental groups opposed business. However, while calling for implementation in accordance with the schedule of the Directive, and that their cause to eradicate ugly abandoned vehicles from the countryside chimed well with the government, and that depollution requirements of the legislation would reduce soil contamination, and that the executive was beholden to the articles of the Treaty of Rome (1958), they recognised that ultimately business could not afford the retrospective cost burden of the ELV Directive. Negotiation persuaded them to acquiesce on this element, which was instrumental in the historic car parc clause being removed in entirety in the transposition of the legislation in 2005, as it was in all EU countries. Engagement with critical audiences was not only useful in increasing understanding about how the behaviour of the motor industry was seen and the messages that government was receiving regarding verbatim implementation of the Directive, but it also demonstrated that business was part of the dialogue and actively engaging within the Channel of Influence. This is a SMART approach since it furnishes discussions in other Channels of Influence with the credibility that you understand and know a range of actors,
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some of who can be critical. It also provides a Measurement against the challenges and strength of messages that industry was countering.

The views of the ID card regulator, the Information Commissioner Richard Thomas did not require direct engagement. His high profile headline grabbing description of the UK as “sleepwalking into a surveillance society” (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Fourth Report into Identity Cards, 2004c) in 2004 was given his realised in 2006 when he claimed that the UK had already entered into it. In line with other opinion formers, the IT sector sought to distance itself from his opinions since they had little to offer him as a way to persuade him otherwise. By contrast, the ELV regulators were to be determined during transposition. As part of the recommendation of the DTI Consultation Groups, the motor industry representatives requested the Environment Agency be included in the discussions from the outset to help define a system that they could audit. This was supported by the Motor Vehicles Dismantlers Association who were also members who recognised that this was an opportunity for them to help shape the Environment Agency ELV regulator policies. This can be seen as Strategic since it demonstrated the commitment from industry to find a workable solution and helped to shore up support that business was a trusted adviser with whom the DTI could work with to find a way to transpose the legislation. In showing this foresight and balancing the immediate need to seek a suspension with looking at the longer-term implications of the legislation, the twin pillars of achievement and presentation performance can be seen through engagement with opinion former Channels of Influence.

Indirect Channel of Influence: Corporate Social Responsibility

Direct Channels of Influence pertain to specific engagements around the case studies. Nonetheless, they are instrumental in supporting the Politics of Performance narrative. Significant social investment were made by both the UK motor industry 2001-2002 and the IT sector 2002-2006. The reputation bank that socially responsible behaviour engenders was essential to the lobbying efforts during the case studies which had to draw credit in order to make progress. Before detailing socially beneficial projects and activities, the Channel of Influence itself has to carefully manage how it operates. Claims of ‘greenwashing’ are common. Indeed in 2005, Ford Motor Company and General Motors were cited as first and fifth worst offenders in Don’t be Fooled (The Green Life, 2004) report of their activities. It is this concern that makes many acts of corporate philanthropy, including the Strategically developed activities such as Vauxhall’s support for projects in the locality known as the Griffin Awards, a difficult area to assess. Furthermore, if a business is seen to be sponsoring a host of events and wields a large marketing budget, the cost of the ELV legislation may be imposed since it could reasonably be understood that actually they could afford it.

Nonetheless, if a SMART approach is adopted, this can support the corporate lobby and thus the Politics of Performance narrative. The movement from businesses providing more than payment and job security to entering the realms of public service provision has a long history stretching back to at least the Industrial Revolution mill owners providing housing for their workers such as John Whittaker, High Mason and Sir Henry Tate in the nineteenth century. The modern view in which there is a social expectation for businesses in the UK to actively participate in providing part of the mixed welfare system beyond taxation requires an astute understanding of the benefits and acceptability of engagement. As a result of the increase in ‘dataveillance’ (Privacy International, 1996) many of the potential ID card suppliers have
adopted codes of conduct. The company EDS commits the company to “conducting business ethically and with integrity” and challenges each employee to assess each decision about which they have doubt with an Ethics Quick Test. This involves asking “Is the action legal? Does it comply with EDS values? Am I treating others the same way I would choose to be treated? If I do it, will I feel bad? How would it look in the newspaper?” (op cit). While this may also be a useful internal tool for creating a more efficient work force, this can also be used as part of the customer value proposition. Furthermore, if tactfully incorporated into lobbying material, it can demonstrate the ethos of the company and how it differentiates from others that may not take this issue so seriously.

Nonetheless, the presentation of corporate social responsibility must also be considered not only in terms of what business does but in how it aspires to be seen. The clear EDS code of conduct that promises they will conduct their affairs “ethically and with integrity” stems from challenges faced by the sector, if not all business, around the transparency of winning contracts and carry out the activities. Indeed, as noted in the aforementioned Home Affairs Select Committee, the government’s procurement process needs to be more “transparent” and that the Office of Government Commerce needs to do more to win their confidence. Indeed at the time of the Select Committee report, Fujitsu, another potential ID card supplier was being criticised through parliamentary questions and scathing articles in the media over its role in failing to adequately provide IT systems to the NHS. It is this key element of corporate social responsibility and its aspiration to be perceived as a trusted adviser that supports the presentation pillar of the Politics of Performance. While the issue of presentation has thus far been largely predicated on the successful execution of messages which are professionally portrayed, it showed be noted that the aspiration itself is also evidence of the growing trend. Although Klein (2001) has challenged corporate social responsibility as being the capitalist response of companies continually seeking to differentiate their brand, it must also be seen as a response to the increase in society’s expectations around how business operates. The plethora of civil society corporate watchdogs testify to this and can be seen as part of the shift from the “shareholding to stakeholder society” (Marquand, 1996, p.3). The Channel of Influence of corporate political lobbying can therefore be seen to evidence both trends of achievement and presentation performances through demonstrating how industry seek to improve the light they are sometimes cast in as a way to help more business be won.

**Indirect Channel of Influence: Brand Equity**

As a Channel of Influence brand equity can be seen in a similar way to corporate social responsibility. Referring to the marketing effects or outcomes that accrue to a product with its brand name compared with those that would accrue if the same product did not have that moniker (Aaker, 1991, p.15), it is in many ways the sum of the different Channels of Influence. If a company has worked well-handled relations with government, the civil service, the media, and opinion formers, the equity in its brand will build and act as a shorthand description of how the business will operate in the future and how it should be treated. Moreover, brands also represent the size of impact they may have on the communities in which they operate through consideration of the number of employees on the payroll and size of supplier base together with the technical skills and training they bring in to an area. Despite the decline in the motor manufacturing sector, 800,000 are still employed by this industry (Society of the Motor Manufacturing and Traders, 2009). Established motor manufacturers were able to use their brands as door-openers and present their case directly. Upon calling a
government department, meetings could be arranged with ease with senior civil servants and Ministers. Indeed, Nick Reilly, Chairman of Vauxhall during 2001-02 arranged twice yearly meetings with the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to discuss issues affecting the sector. While brand equity may be seen in terms of lobbying as a barometer of the political esteem with which the company is held in, the focus on the value of brands and reputation through effective management of the Channels of Influence demonstrates the importance of presentation in delivering business.

The case studies demonstrate that the Politics of Performance is more than a theoretical construct. Through the Channels of Influence the transposition of the EU End of Life Vehicle Directive into UK law 2001-02 and the enhancement of the UK Home Office ID Card proposal 2002-2006 support growing trends of presentation and a focus on a culture of delivery within the decision making process. The sophistication with which the Channels are used to augment a sensitive view of business concerns through using techniques such as third party advocacy, is a hallmark of the professionalisation of corporate political lobbying and the presentation pillar of the Politics of Performance. Furthermore, the discernible SMART approach evidences a clear structure and purpose in the engagement strategy in the Channels of Influence. This evidences a shift that individuals not previously dedicated to corporate political lobbying would not have had time to rehearse and implement. As a result the delivery focus of business activity in politics adds greater weight to this dimension in the modern polity. Through the both case studies, the Politics of Performance can be seen to more firmly embedded as a new narrative in our understanding of how decisions are made.
Chapter Six - Conclusion

At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Politics of Performance narrative offers a view of how politics may develop in the future. In focusing on the role of business in politics, it moves away from the narrow, simplistic, one-sided corporate takeover interpretation and also challenges the idea that political renewal is dependent solely on civil society activism. It seeks to challenge the understanding around political activism as an activity that only civil society groups are able to practice, and offers a more detailed appreciation for the contribution business makes to the polity through its political face: corporate lobbying. This thesis argues that this is helping to create a new politics; one which is moving in the direction of performance: conceptually and, crucially, in practice. The twin pillars that hold up the edifice of the narrative: presentation-performance and delivery-performance are two evidenced impacts of the increase of paid advocates in the political sphere. Mobilised less by belief or ideology, corporate lobbying is having a profound difference on the operation of politics.

The Politics of Performance is not of course only the product of corporate lobbying but is supported by many of the other mobilising factors that also contribute to the narrative. With new technology has come new media. Access to information and the expectation of availability of this has increased (Adams & McCrindle, 2007, pp.603-605). As a result, there are an increased number of public interfaces on the internet and this wealth of information can easily be accessed in order to scrutinise business’ activities and demand a response and explanation either directly or through the media, governments or other stakeholder. While this has formed part of the business case for better and more corporate lobbying, another factor has also been the substantial increase in government regulation on business (Nownes, 2006, p.4). This has in turn encouraged the corporate response together with the significant development of the public sector move to significantly increase its outsourcing of selected services to the private sector. This summary of the major supply side developments have all helped to increase corporate lobbying activity and simultaneously support the tenets of the Politics of Performance.

Rather than take a simplistic extreme view that either overstates the impact and power of corporate lobbying, or almost ignores it completely, the Politics of Performance offers a revision of these interpretations. In the Introduction, the measures of a transformation were set out as having a robust, rich and logical theoretical basis, being evident in practice, and representing the true power constellations of the polity. This chapter draws together the theoretical narratives and assesses them in the light of the practical case study examinations in order to demonstrate the way the transformation took place. The connection between the two will be carried out by revisiting the inadequate assessments made by the End of Politics argument and within it, the corporate takeover position in particular, and the Reinventionist positions. By drawing out the leading factors, they will be contrasted against the particular role that corporate lobbying plays in contemporary politics. This will then lead into the proposition for the Politics of Performance. This theoretical context will provide the background and explanation for the focus on corporate lobbying as the vanguard of the Politics of Performance narrative. It will also reveal some of the challenges that it faces. With the construct of the theoretical Politics of Performance in place, the chapter will then review the key factors that constitute the definition of the Politics of Performance transformation with
assessments taken from the comparative assessment. By combining these two case study examinations, this chapter will underline that through assessment of the Channels of Influence assessment factors and evidence of a SMART professional approach, the Politics of Performance transformation is clearly discernible. Moreover, in the final section the transformation will be further demonstrated by showing the direct theoretical threads that run through the Channels of Influence to show the link between the framework and the case studies. This summation is an attempt to crystallise the Politics of Performance synthesis and evidence it took place by showing that the transformation narratives as told by the End of Politics and Reinvention of Politics schools are deficient and that by recognising the role of corporate lobbying it is possible to see where the narrative came from and where it is heading. By crisply showing the before and after conditions, the role of corporate lobbying will be underscored as acting as a mobilising factor. This is the driving force that underpins the transformation and is the essence of the conclusion in favour of the Politics of Performance as a narrative that better explains the role of corporate lobbying in the modern UK polity.

**Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Political Lobbying in Politics**

In considering the narratives that had attempted to delineate the role of business in politics following the end of the cold war, the Endist corporate takeover interpretation and the Reinvention literature mark out two distinct and radical positions. These fashionable and populist narratives depict corporate lobbying as all encompassing and dominating of the political sphere on one hand, while in the case of the latter, is treated as almost a non-political actor or one that operates only at the fringes or in opposition to the activities of civil society and in particular NIMBY activism. In challenging these narratives in Chapter Two, the leading tenets were drawn out and examined. These have been condensed here to focus on the more fragile parts in order to refresh the understanding that the Politics of Performance argument seeks to overcome these inadequacies in appreciating the role of business in a more balanced approach.

Three elements of the Endist corporate takeover narrative will be considered. The overarching proposition from the corporate takeover argument is firstly centred around the decline of ideology as the galvanising force in politics and the subsequent colonisation of this space by business. Using such highly charged imperialistic language, protagonists, such as Boggs (2000) and Monbiot (2001), litter their arguments with these heavily laden terms to support their view that business opportunistically has sought to fill the void left by the reduced sense of political cohesion provided by ideology. This extreme interpretation of the triumph of liberalism and capitalist as “encroachment” (Boggs, 2000, p.43) fails to recognise the democratic party shift to the centre ground and almost unilateral support for greater participation of business in the public sector. Outsourcing in the public sector, PPPs, together with increased employee exchange programmes between the civil service and the private sector demonstrate that it is fair to claim that business involvement has increased but not correct to characterise as a takeover. Nonetheless, Klein’s highly successful No Logo (2001) helped to provide visual imagery of the billboards sponsorship of schools in America as a vision of how business in the public sector could move in the UK. However, rather than lurch off in an anti-capitalist critique, it becomes difficult to fully appreciate the underlying argument of the corporate takeover narrative as the broad functions of the state remain in place. The delivery method in a few areas shows experiments with a changed approach, notably Foundation Hospitals and New Labour’s much-feted private sector supported
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educational Academies. These must of course be seen in context and noted that there are at the time of writing relatively small projects in terms of entire UK-wide NHS or educational set up. These are some of the stronger arguments the corporate takeover narrative can muster and to claim they represent evidence that the involvement of business has increased so exponentially to have filled the vacuum once occupied by ideology is an overstatement.

As much as business can be seen to have been pushing on the door of the public sector to gain entrance to reach in to the public purse inside, it was actually invited in. Clear policy shifts as part of the modernisation programme of government started in the 1990s by the Conservatives and have been deliberately extended by New Labour from 1997 until the current day. These have led to senior civil servants asking to be briefed by business and their communications teams: their corporate lobbyists. Business could not have worked in the public sector if it had not received the invitation and benefited from the change in policy. Therefore the implicit claim that business attempted to mastermind a “takeover” is absurd. While the lexicon of “partnerships,” “collaboration” and “consultation” between public and private sector on many major issues and policies may appear a little fatuous given that the aim of business is to see where they can turn a profit from government policy, it says more about the slow-moving process of doing business with government in terms of project development and sign-off rather than calculated assessment on the part of business at the expense of the public sector. In short, the corporate takeover claim that business replaced ideology as the mobilising factor in politics is simply a gross and patronising overstatement.

A second major plank of the corporate takeover argument is the link to the End of Politics concept of anti-politics. These purports that business is against politics and houses within it forces which seek to destroy political interaction. It notes that capitalism seeks to secure the maximisation of profit and this set objective is not a political aim. The key deficiency with Boggs’ analysis resides in his specific definition of politics. His restrictive analysis of what can be considered political rests on a form of liberal democratic plurality in which all views are held in balance. This view in which all interests are held in apparent balance of one another fails to recognise that dictatorships came from political situations. Indeed, the highly specialised interpretation appears one that in this sense can be seen to support the corporate takeover critic of multinationals standardisation of experience through product and cultural homogeneity in many of their operations. The populist criticism of Starbucks and McDonalds having “taken over every high street corner” is seen as evidence of this. It is the misconception of capitalism as anti-politics and the development of businesses purportedly colonising the retail and other business areas that fails to properly account for the role of business in politics. Indeed, at a rudimentary level, the symbiotic relationship between business and government is not recognised by this narrative. The state needs business for taxes, and business needs government for regulation in order to operate fairly and safely in competitive markets. This relationship demonstrates that on the most direct and base level, the political legitimacy of business operating in politics and having the right to representation.

The final key idea that the corporate takeover espouses builds on the two aforementioned elements and in considering business as destructive to discourse and democracy it argues the emergence of post-modernity is part of a wider post political set up for decision-making. This is a bold argument that would require significant substantiation that the corporate takeover argument never managed to achieve. Indeed, in deconstructing ideas, this opens up new political aspects. The entire approach of viewing the crisis of modernity as one in which values were no longer hinged together in cohesive ideologies does not mean that values are no
longer evident in politics or that they have weakened. While the increased role of business is found to be not to the taste of corporate takeover protagonists, the concept remains weak. The new casting of politics in terms of the greater working between business and the public sector sets out a new agenda which the Third Way sought to encapsulate. While the success of this has been criticised (Callinicos, 2001), it recognises that the theoretical post political view cannot be attached to the post modern argument successfully. Moreover, rather than view politics as having atrophied, the continual re-interpretation of mobilising factors in politics supports the stronger view that it is more accurate to see politics as transformational and in flux with narratives developing the story and telling it in new ways as most appropriate to the time. This more fluid approach renders the didactic corporate takeover claim redundant and anachronistic. The increase of a plurality of single issue interests also needs to be addressed.

However, the view of political renewal only through civil society activism as a narrative also has its failings especially in terms of explaining the role of corporate lobbying. This is not to seek to reduce the importance of civil society and the explosion of participation in single issues groups, which have clearly contributed to the growth of political engagement in their specific and specialised areas. It is important that in focusing on the celebration, triumph and diversity of single issue group growth, that it is seen as part of a wider development of inter-related newly defined structural political working. Gone are the neatly demarcated ideological camps of left and right and the attendant sub-branches in which, for example, ecological views were traditionally said to stem from liberal, left wing thinking, as today, groups such as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) take a distinctly non-liberal, combative direct action approach in an attempt to prevent and end animal testing and whose terrorist behaviour led to changes in sections 145-149 in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 to better protect animal research organisations. The approach for classifying groups through the Cold War lens no longer readily applies and viewing political renewal through this neat process of codification is also impossible and inappropriate. Instead a more sophisticated and broader approach is required that registers the political reality that there are a multitude of actors bustling for influence. In appreciating that there can be many different types of political expression builds on the idea that the structures have changed with business now also playing an ever greater political role as outlined above.

Unfortunately, the functioning of business as a political actor is not supported by the Reinventionist view, which cast politics as being renewed essentially by civil society. More concerned with social capital than financial capital, this narrative does not give credit to the role of business as a non-traditional actor. This prejudiced view also fails to appreciate the impact business can have and seeks to segment politics into a domain in which only civil society is able to be considered genuine agents for engaging in politics. This patronising view of civil society as the great hope is not only distant from the demands of economic survival and the needs of business to provide the basic requirements to live, it also reflects the wider liberal tendency to prefer popular issues such as the green agenda. However, in today’s economic climate, it is especially prescient that business is recognised as a political player not least with the numerous requests from the banking and manufacturing sector for financial and regulatory support from governments across the world in light of the difficulties faced.

Due to the inadequacies of the corporate takeover argument in over-stating the role of business and the focus on civil society in Reinventionism, the opportunity to better explain the situation is offered. Looking at the representation of business views in politics: corporate lobbying, this is also important to be considered due to the substantial increase in its role. As outlined, the
proliferation of PPPs across sectors, the movement to outsource large swathes of public sector work to the private one and the impact of privatisation from the mid 1980s has led to government now tendering major public contracts to business where in the past this work would have gone to other parts of the public sector, all demonstrates supply side reasons for the increase in business in politics. In 2007 a report by Kable, the public sector research company, estimated that the outsourcing of services commissioned by government from the private and third sectors was estimated to be around £74bn. By 2012 it is estimated that this will have grown to a market worth almost £100bn (Kable, 2007). Naturally, with a profit to be made, business has been keen to exploit these opportunities and the augmentation of corporate lobbying was powerfully supported and incentivised. Out of this background, the conceptual development of the Politics of Performance definition took shape.

The theoretical foundation rested on two pillars. Encapsulated within the presentation-performance pillar are the ideas that corporate lobbying was helping to increase the importance of message development and the sophisticated projection of an argument in how politics was analysed. Careful crafting of messages based on assessment of audience reception and communicated in ways which resonated chimes with the Marshall McLuhan belief that the “medium is the message” (2001, pp.7-24). The presentation-performance pillar builds on the development in new technology and media and registers the game playing and simulation of paid lobbyists acting out genuine belief in the cause they lobby for through professional commitment. This practice is further supported by the delivery-performance pillar which recognises the delegation of authority from the belief holding actor to the lobbyist who is better able to influence the decision making process. Supported by the tenets of managerial politics in which the aim is to create a network of clients who are serviced and rewarded in the decision-making process further supports the conceptual development. This characterisation, as drawn out in Chapter Three, sets the stage for the comparative case study analysis.

**Practical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Political Lobbying in Politics**

Both the transposition into UK law of the ELV Directive and the enhancement to the UK ID card by the IT business community demonstrate sophisticated presentation-performance as analysed by the Channels of Influence. The case studies also support the delivery-performance pillar, showcasing the commitment to SMART objectives and ultimate focus on the successful execution of the campaigns. This high level summary captures the purpose of the case studies: to show two practical examples of recent lobbying activity which exhibit the characteristics described as the Politics of Performance. However, in order to gain a deeper insight into the case studies, it is also valuable to consider theoretical threads that run through the Channels of Influence to show the link between the conceptual framework of the twin pillars and the case studies. The purpose of this deeper practical analysis is to demonstrate that in each Channel of Influence, a clear change in theory is needed to analyse what is happening. This granularity will show at a grass roots level that a transformation has taken place as a result of corporate political lobbying and provide further evidence of this shift.

In the direct Channel of Influences that include industry to government and civil servant relations, industry to media relations and the more generic industry to opinion former relations the End of Politics core argument that there has been a corporate takeover of the chorus of voices that speak out different views is not found. While Nick Reilly, Chairman of Vauxhall
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during 2001-02 arranged twice yearly meetings with Tony Blair, Prime Minister at the time, this cannot be considered a cosy or particularly close relationship. While a lobbyist would prize influencing the agenda of the monthly Prime Ministerial press conferences, a cursory review of the past year include critical stories toward business covering a range of damning subjects from “obscene” City bonuses (Treanor, 2010) to companies trading with rogue states (Booth, 2010). Similarly, the direct Channel of Influences, it cannot be claimed that civil society is the primary mobilising factor and that business does not have a share of voice. Without doubt Liberty and other civil liberty groups actively engaged throughout the 2002-2006 procurement window for the ID card. However, the role of Intellect in helping define the procurement needs and playing an instrumental role in inflating the cost of the design should not be ignored. The narratives as told by the End of Politics and the Reinvention of Politics positions do not match the reality. It is only when business is afforded a significant political role that a more accurate description is observable. In the light of this development, the post narrative conveys that business seeks to overcome the challenges that inhibit profit maximisation by professionalising a division of labour.

The approach taken by the businesses in the case studies exhibits a focus on performance as presentation and performance as delivery in a way that contrasts with the considered, emotional and authentic way that civil society expresses political views. This fundamental mobilising factor is core to the transformation, marking the difference before the Politics of Performance exposition and after. The calls for the immediate introduction of the ELV Directive implemented verbatim by environmental civil society groups was based on a belief that what they were doing was normatively right. The business opposition was not based on normative consideration but assessment of the financial impact to the business and how it would impinge growth. The strategic government relations, media relations and opinion former plan that was implemented ensured that the key decision makers had heard and understood what immediate introduction of the legislation would do. The suspension of the ELV Directive for five years was evidence of this. It ensured that the British motor industry would not be adversely affected ahead of the rest of Europe and maintained a level playing field. This success was won not by emotional feeling that this was right but by corporate political lobbyists setting out the consequences in a logical and cogent argument consistent with the Politics of Performance twin pillars.

Furthermore, the indirect channel of influences that were considered: the impact of corporate social responsibility and the power of brand equity also demonstrate that a new transformation narrative is needed. While corporate social responsibility is regarded cynically by the Endist perspective as simply buying off critical parties (Klein, 2001, p.338-340), and suspiciously by Reinventionists who question the authenticity of the intent with which donations are made (Callinicos, 2001, p.97), the view offered by the Politics of Performance shows that this is part of the presentation of the business that they need to convey in order to successfully be considered a legitimate entity in society and thereby deliver company’s strategy. From this perspective, a view of business that is not affected by normative judgement is offered but one which fits with the challenge that a business faces of requiring society’s permission to continue to have a licence to operate. If motor manufacturers were to declare that they did not believe in climate change and did not show a commitment to building more efficient vehicles, this would damage their ability to relate to their customers and sell successfully. The importance of protecting a brand’s value is not recognised by the Endist perspective that believes it can takeover in entirety all dissenting voices and does not recognise companies exist in a democracy. These threads run through the indirect Channels of Influence and show
that when interpreting the political landscape through the eyes of the Endist and Reinventionist positions, they do not adequately reflect the role of corporate political lobbying. A better view is afforded when viewing the landscape from the perspective of the Politics of Performance standpoint. As a result of this, a clear transformation of narrative is observable as a result of a practical review of the Channels of Influence.

The Channels of Influence also demonstrate the domains of specialisation in corporate lobbying and are evidence of the professionalisation in the sector and exposition of the proven strategy and tactics. The measured and realistic analysis coupled with a deep understanding of the workings of the political system and decision making process was crucial to the lobbying effort. This approach was undertaken with no emotional engagement in the objective of the business on whose behalf they were acting, and, in contrast to some of the civil society groups, such as Privacy International who, while conveying powerful civil liberty arguments against the ID Card during the Home Affairs Select Committee, their manner of communication was unpolished and unpractised. While this supported the earnestness in the messaging, it undermined the clarity of their communication. By contrast, the members of the business community who gave evidence had rehearsed prepared written and approved scripts, reviewed question and answer documents as well as gone through dry-runs before the day in front of the committee with those who had previously done it and seen it in action. This commitment to refining and enhancing the presentation of the message is a core part of the performance pillar and links directly to the focus on achievement.

However, in terms of the actual workings of corporate lobbyists on a day-to-day level, the opportunistic, dynamic, and rapidity of political developments highlights that the strategic, omnipotent implicit notion of the Politics of Performance cannot be supported. The inventiveness of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders to ridicule the DTI ELV “a farce” (2001) following its delayed announcement demonstrated a prime opportunity to embarrass the government and provide the motor industry with the headlines to inform media copy. This reflects fast thinking rather than strategic intent which was also to show “commitment to the spirit of the legislation” (op cit) Such responsiveness adds an important appendage to the Politics of Performance and in particular the presentation pillar in order to recognise the flexibility of projection rather than conviction in a static set of messages or imagery.

The Future of The Politics of Performance

While the Politics of Performance narrative more fully explains the impact of corporate lobbying and the way we describe the polity, there are challenges to the model. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the Politics of Performance highlights unelected, undemocratic sources of power. This can be seen to directly oppose social contract theory by cutting across the link between the individual citizen and their equality of access to those in power. By this, the celebration of presentation and achievement performances in politics involves the reduction of viewing debate, discussion and democracy as prime and replaces them with persuasion and commitment for the delivery of populist ends.

This critique casts a moral shadow over the Politics of Performance and can be seen as part of Chomsky and Herman’s (1988) eponymous “manufacturing [of] consent” superstructural argument. Through supposed manipulation of environment around the policy making process,
it is considered that business is able to exert undemocratic influence. This Socialist perspective will always be a criticism that corporate lobbying will have to face. However, it is, and has always been, a limited view on how decisions are made. While social contract theory sets out the equality of access, it does not prescribe that each individual has equality of influence. The Politics of Performance is a celebration of differentiation. In can be seen to be in closer alignment with elitism theory in its recognition that there is a small group who are highly able to persuade and influence change in the decision process.

While Domhoff (2006) asked *Who Rules America?*, the Politics of Performance can be seen as a contribution to this work from a UK standpoint. Although the focus of the narrative put forward by this thesis is less on networks and their inter-relation with power, the pillars that uphold the edifice of the Politics of Performance help to describe the characteristics of those individuals within the networks. With regard to who rules the UK, it is certainly not the intention that the Politics of Performance narrative is seeking to claim that corporate lobbyists have a dominant position, but rather that they are a key part of the plurality of factors that influence the decision making process. A business lobbyist is, of course, ultimately interested in the pursuit of profit for the specific business they are representing and so are not interested in the full gamut of a Government’s public policy. Nonetheless, with corporate lobbying as the vanguard of the Politics of Performance, the increase in the profession is a clear sign of the emergence of the transformation. In 1996 it was estimated that in the UK expenditure on commercial political lobbying, both in-house and by independent lobbyists, was around £300 million and that the sector employed over 4,000 people directly (Harris and Lock, 1996, p.313). By 2007, the Hansard Society estimated that the UK lobbying industry was worth £1.9 billion and employed over 14,000 people (Parvin, 2007, p.12). Furthermore, given the range of consultants, financial advisers, city analysts and other parties who could also be considered to act as lobbyists this number could be far greater (ibid).

Modern Britain enjoys a democratic structure that affords a meritocratic approach to becoming a lobbyist. While access to the function is open and available, it remains the preserve of those who can afford it and fundamentally is a management tool that will be increasingly sought provided that the conditions of new legislation are faced, Government outsourcing supplies contracts to the private sector and reputations and brand continue to be highly valued. Nonetheless, it is the process of professionalisation which casts light on the future of the sector. One of future hallmarks of the Politics of Performance will be an increase in the quality of presentations in the decision making process led by corporate political lobbying. With charities, civil society bodies and government departments, among others, adopting increasingly sophisticated communication techniques, there is the potential for a system of governance that can be better equipped to respond to the needs of society. In this sense the growth in corporate lobbying can be considered a positive phenomenon that nurtures and enhances democracy. The challenges around lobbying leading to manipulation and spin are also the search for truthfulness and honesty as a core part in the identity of a lobbyist as an individual and member of society. As a paid advocate, devoid of emotional commitment to the cause they are seeking to advance, the normative question at debate is around whether or not the future of the narrative will be good for democracy and whether or not it matters if views are represented authentically or not.

Either way, in the more competitive world of the Politics of Performance, the challenge will continue to be securing share of voice. Through understanding the transformations underway in modern British politics all organisations can benefit from taking a structured, dispassionate
and professional approach. While corporate lobbyists have mobilised this narrative, it is not owned by them and the lessons are clear for all groups seeking to influence the decision making process. The real test for the future of the Politics of Performance will depend upon how successfully other actors in the polity can be seen to adopt the achiever and presenter characteristics. In this way, the Politics of Performance has the potential become a dominant analytical narrative and one that celebrates communication and delivery as essential elements of modern democracy.
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