Political Communication in the Age of Dissemination: Media Constructions of Hezbollah

by

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the concept and forms of dissemination in political communication and news media. It investigates the new age of dissemination of global communication manifested in a new relationship between political communication and media systems.

The broad aim of this project is to investigate the ‘media reality’ of political communication in this new age of dissemination. Working within the sphere of political communication and interconnected media systems, the thesis examines how the information in news source texts and responses to them is recontextualised and disseminated worldwide, and fed back again through recursive communication. Specifically, the thesis also considers ways in which the aims of the political phenomenon of Hezbollah are disseminated and connected across various news media outlets. In particular, the process of recursive dissemination of communication is analysed in three news media outlets, namely Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

The project has three principal conceptual building blocks: dissemination, political communication, and discourse and intertexts. The theoretical framework has determined the methods used to undertake a qualitative analysis of the data. Discourse analysis is used to consider intertexts and sub-texts, legitimation processes, framing, representation, and schematisation in the data. These dimensions are highly useful tools in identifying shifts across the three media organisations.

This thesis has three specific objectives. Its first aim is to reconceptualise communication, establish a communicative model characterised by recursivity (one in which political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, which add intensity), and show how recursivity has gained in importance in the context of mass mediatisation, bringing about a new age of dissemination. That is, the political messages of Hassan Nasrallah, which polarise representations, are recontextualised and disseminated across media contexts in complex processes involving recursive media interplays. These processes have a direct link with the historical context in the sense that political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops. The
second aim is to investigate the appropriate approaches for the study of that communication in terms of the relationship between intertextuality, discourse, ideology as belief systems, framings, and competing framings which create new realities; this connects well with the conceptual framework of recursivity and dissemination. The third aim is to achieve in the data analysis a more sophisticated understanding of Hezbollah as a highly significant political actor, by creating a multicontextual analysis of recursive framing.

The thesis demonstrates the complexity of recursivity and dissemination of political communication. It sets out to improve our understanding both of Hezbollah and of the politics the Middle East. The core of this thesis lies in its concern in reconceptualising political communication and applying it to the analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches and their recontextualisation in the above three global media organisations.
Dedicated to the memory of Dad and Tareef; always in my heart
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Chapter 1   Introduction

1.1 Definition of the theme of Dissemination

I take it as axiomatic that politics pervades every aspect of human thought and activities to a greater or lesser degree. We are governed by politics and politicians, democracy at one extreme, monarchy or its modern form, dictatorship, at the other [...] Politics is the most general and universal aspect and sphere of human activity. (Newmark, 1991: 146).

Today the international arena is witnessing radical social and political changes. Although the role of communication in political growth is not new, its quality has changed (Volkmer, 1999). The shift in political communication has “profound political and sociological effects. Of critical significance among these is the rearrangement of power relations among key message providers and receivers [...], and the “mediatization” of politics” (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Castells, 2000, 2001; Edwards, 2001; Luhmann, 2000; Meyer, 2002, in Crozier, 2007: 2).

The crux of the theme of this study is the notion of dissemination (a term borrowed, mutatis mutandis, from Jacques Derrida, 1977: 9, see also Grant, 2007), as a dynamic (in the sense that suggests change and instability and movement but not in a particular direction) and fluid concept, exemplified in the recursivity of political communication and news media. This thesis investigates a new age of dissemination of global communication, which is exemplified in a new relationship between the political communication system and the media system. This is a phenomenon that can be seen in general terms on a global scale and in Lebanon in particular. That is, one in which the political messages are recontextualised, transformed, and thus disseminated through the media system – with ideological implications. The notion of the recursivity of communication is vital to this study in the sense that it emerges more strongly with mass mediatisation; however, Luhmann maintains that “communications are possible only within a system of communication and this system cannot escape the form of recursive circularity” (Luhmann, 1990: 145–146, in Grant, 2003: 113), and thus perceives recursivity as more inherent property. Contrary to Luhmann’s understanding of recursivity, this study argues that ‘the new age’ is marked by mass mediatisation and the web. Thus, recursivity is intensified and disembodied from original speeches. This produces a new quality and intensity of the
dissemination process. Dissemination has always been in communication, but it now reaches radically new heights. Recursivity (that is, political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, which add intensity), is a form of dissemination in communication in the age of dissemination. Dissemination is placed on a higher level and functions as a more global concept. In other words, recursivity is a facet of communication systems and a property of dissemination.

The case study of this thesis concerns the media construction of the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah (Arabic lit.: [Hizb Allah] Party of God). In the process of dissemination, Hezbollah is subject to contested and conflicting media representations, intertexts, and the ideologically determined interpretation from media organisations that report on its activities. These media presentations and representations will be investigated in the news coverage of three media outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, because of their global pre-eminence in news broadcasting and for their particular dominance in the Middle East. Reference will be made to Al-Jazeera English output rather than Al-Jazeera Arabic for the sake of conducting comparative analysis with the English outputs of the BBC and CNN.

My reason for adopting this approach is precisely because Hezbollah is significant worldwide; indeed, according to Karagiannis, “no other Islamist group has provoked more controversy” (2009: 365). Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shiite political party and guerrilla force, but, as noted above, it has been labelled in Western terms as a “terrorist movement”. In short, it sits at an ideological fault line in the Middle East, in global politics, and in media representations. Moreover, Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, is a charismatic and eloquent Shiite political speaker. His speeches are highly significant for media coverage and they are represented across contexts in various media outlets, undergoing variation and change in the process of dissemination. It is asserted in this respect that the political phenomenon of Hezbollah is significant for news media coverage across the world as a key – and deeply contested – actor in Middle East politics.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese political context also has special regional significance. Lebanon has been described as the crossroads of Arabic-based information (McEnery
and Wilson, 2001: 63). Lebanon’s political system has a unique character and it is a distinctive case of intense ideological “dialogism” (Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003: 63). The communication system is uniquely intertextual owing to its marked inherently historical and religious roots, and the country’s confessional political regime, and these features are heightened by intense media scrutiny. Media content in Lebanon manifests clear-cut political orientations (Kraidy (2012).

1.2 Reflections on Theory

The empirical subject matter of this thesis relates to a particular set of media representations which have profound political relevance for the present age. Hezbollah is referred to either as a terrorist organisation or as a political player in the Lebanese political process. Since 9/11, this particular interface of the war on terror and the Arab spring has acquired new saliency and greater relevance for news media. One can argue that the relevance is nowhere more acute than in Lebanon. Lebanon’s external relations in relation to Hezbollah are exemplified in the relationship with countries that have the most influence in one way or another with respect to the politics of Lebanon, namely Syria, Iran, Israel, the USA, the EU, and the Palestinian Territories.

In order to conceptualise the representation and self-representation of this organisation, this thesis will consider carefully the following:

The representations of Hezbollah are recursive, and that recursivity expands, which means that self-representations by Nasrallah are received and modified by media outlets from different ideological perspectives, and are reported on by the BBC and CNN into different ideological perspectives and feed back into Hezbollah’s self-understanding. All three media outlets interact to create the political reality of Hezbollah.

A cluster of concepts will be brought together from a range of different theoretical approaches, which will provide a conceptualisation of media communication. The theoretical framework will be based on three building blocks: dissemination, political
communication, and discourse and intertexts. These concepts connect strongly with the methods used to undertake a qualitative analysis of data. Thus, discourse analysis will be an appropriate tool for data analysis because this study is looking at sub-texts, legitimation, framing, representation, and schematisation in the data, dimensions which are very useful trends in identifying shifts across the three media organisations. The significance of the thesis stems from employing these different concepts to offer new analytical insights into complex communications. Further, there is a conceptual history to interpenetration; this conceptualisation will be used in a much more empirical way, in addition to their implications for the framing of a highly significant actor such as Hezbollah. These concepts provide useful insights into the process of recontextualisation and dissemination in media political news, and help the study by enriching its framework of explanation in many ways.

The concept of ideology will be considered because it is explicit in Hezbollah. All media outlets frame their objects; nevertheless, Hezbollah is framed in various different ways. Language is used in news media as a highly “constructive mediator” to “form ideas and beliefs”, “presuppositions and ideology” (Fowler, 1991: 1). Thus, dissemination of political communication brings about changes in the structure of political reality. In this context, Luhmann’s binary codes and rules of schematisation, Foucault’s exclusionary mechanism, and the polarised ideological square of van Dijk are essential parts of texts, and contribute efficiently to exploring the treatment of Hezbollah in those recursive processes.

The concept of intertextuality provides a rich area for exploring certain aspects of the process of dissemination in political communication. Intertextual allusions in political discourse(s) can be effective instruments of persuasion. Whereas dissemination operates at the level of media communication systems, intertextuality has a complementary focus, namely the text or the voice. Intertextuality operates in the texts of media organisations. Thus, the conceptual relationship between recursivity, intertextuality, and discourse is vital.

Translation, as a “mediated communicative event” (Baker, 1993: 243) in news media and political communication is adopted as a new contribution in this field. Besides, drawing on Bell’s theory of audience design in political news is a trend that has rarely
been adopted in exploring translation in political global news. This theory is particularly helpful to this study because ‘audience design’ is a key notion in understanding “how the text producers gear their output to receivers” (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 12). In addition, the notion of audiences appears striking in this study, since the data corpus is significant; it entails multiple audiences worldwide, including news media systems and various political systems. These political speeches are especially rich and helpful in the analysis of discourse and style shifts in news translation or text production in news media, because they target a multiplicity of audiences.

Therefore, the above concepts fit well with the overall methodology of this study. It is founded on these conceptual formulations and analytical perspectives. The insights of the notions of recursivity and dissemination of political communication are applied to the context of the news media and to insights into political communication.

The importance of data analysis is that it demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical power of the concepts discussed in the theoretical part, precisely in connection with the power of the notions of recursivity, dissemination, and recontextualisation.

The above concepts are useful in explaining shifts across media organisations throughout the processes of recontextualisation that operate in the corpus of this study. These shifts give much room for news recontextualisation and dissemination across various media channels in the new age of dissemination. Moreover, they have a profound impact on political reality worldwide. For many lay and expert observers, the dissemination of reality in news media is their only reality, where the ‘object of truth’\(^1\) is displaced.

\(^1\) The ‘object of truth’ is reminiscent of the orders of ‘Baudrillard’s Simulacra’ through which he suggests that our ability to make sense of the distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘artifice’ is lost, in the sense that we are confronted with a “precession of simulacra”; that is, the representation precedes and determines the real. It is confirmed in this respect that the distinction between reality and its representation is lost; and the ‘simulacrum’ is what only preserved (Baudrillard, 1994).
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis

This study has three primary objectives. First, to reconceptualise specific forms of communication as a system of recursivity and place communication in the historical context in the new age of dissemination. In other words, to investigate the process of recursive political communication as media reality. It examines how the production, representation, and responses to representations of the political messages in the spheres of political communication and media systems are recontextualised and disseminated worldwide, and fed back again through recursive communication. Second, to investigate the appropriate approaches for the study of those communications in terms of the relationship between discourse and ideology as belief systems, framings, competing framings which create new realities; this fits well with the conceptual framework of the recursivity (that is, political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, which add intensity), and dissemination (that is the hallmark of contemporary communication systems in which technologies play a key role; it is placed on a higher level and functions as a more global concept). Third, to achieve in the data analysis of this thesis a more sophisticated understanding of Hezbollah as a highly significant phenomenon, by creating a multicontextual political context of recursive framing.

The specific aims are fivefold:

1. To establish an interdisciplinary theoretical framework capable of examining recursivity and dissemination in political communication. To create a corpus which will then be sampled and analysed with respect to the operations of recursivity and dissemination in political communication.

2. To identify a set of analytical tools appropriate for the investigation of processes of recursive communication in the original political phenomena and their recontextualisations across the three news media outlets, namely, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

3. To develop a methodological framework for analysis to conduct qualitative analyses of the data in order to identify examples of the framing and self-framing of Hezbollah in the three media outlets’ news coverage, and to explore evidence of various processes of recontextualisations and recursive communication.
4. To conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of recursive representations and contested recontextualisations, and the connection between the recursivity of such representations and the contestations which accompany it across the three media outlets.

1.4 Overview of the Structure of the Thesis

The focus of this study is both theoretical and empirical. The summarised content of the following chapters gives a broader conception of its content and structure.

Chapter 2 investigates dissemination, which marks the new age of political communication, an extremely fluid and interconnected system. The importance of recursivity (which is a form of dissemination) in communication in the age of dissemination (which is enabled by technologies across communication systems and is placed on a higher level and functions as a more global concept) will be particularly highlighted in the field of news media that is globally disseminated. In discussing the interpenetration of political communication and media systems in the age of dissemination, the argument will focus on a new intensity in the intersection of media systems and political communication. The chapter also illustrates the kind of convergence that shapes the relationship between media systems and political communication.

Chapter 3 investigates the concept of discourse and the intertextual manifestations in political communication as communicative flows and structures which articulate the hybridity of discourses, and play a key role in the process of dissemination in political communication and news media.

This chapter also explores the processes of the selection of information, framing and reframing, schematisation, and recontextualisation as characteristics of dissemination which are now markers of a new intensity of political communication and news media because they mark the new realities (in Luhmann’s sense) of the content message. Moreover, the chapter will discuss changes in communication technology and the way they contribute to the emergence of a new age of political communication. The
discussion will also focus on the ideological implications of the interpenetration of politics and mass media through the procedures of inclusion/exclusion, schematisation, framing, and recontextualisation. In addition, this chapter will briefly consider recursivities and interpenetrations between political communication and media systems. It will highlight how ideology functions in news media and political communication, and the consequences of language, power, and ideology. In the context of ideological motivations and implications of dissemination, the argument will explore how ideology is articulated and thus operationally defined, recontextualised, and disseminated in political and media systems.

In addition, in the process of the production of discourse, the procedures of exclusion and inclusion, as essential notions in Foucault’s understanding of discourse, are also examined. The structures and strategies of discourses and the ways in which these relate, in terms of communication, to institutional arrangements on the one hand, and to audiences on the other, are highlighted. In addition, the multiplicity of discourses and their recontextualisation and schematisation in political and media systems will also be addressed.

This chapter continues by examining Bakhtin’s dialogism and Kristeva’s intertextuality and how they are operated and recontextualised in news media and the implications in multiple contexts, along with the ideological dimension of intertextuality, which carries heavy ideological weight.

Translation will also be examined as an important mediating factor in political communication across cultures and media systems and as a unique source of sensitive, value-laden dissemination. Since media institutions are forces of social power that have a characteristic role in constructing the reality in which multiple audiences are involved, this chapter considers their interconnectedness in a global media system which gives them huge disseminating power. Here, the process of news translational recontextualisation through media systems will be examined. In addition, the multiple media audiences and the concepts of localisation and globalisation will be also explored in the process of dissemination and translation as political communication in news media.
In Chapter 4 attention will focus on operationalising this conceptual framework in the analysis of news media and political communication. Particular emphasis here will be given to the recontextualisation and dissemination of the source phenomenon in political speeches, those of Nasrallah for example, and their dissemination through media systems, feeding forward into the three media systems, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, and back again (e.g. through Nasrallah’s statements), only to be fed forward once more to the interlocking global media system. Moreover, the chapter aims to explain the methodology to examine the question of recursive communications across local and global media contexts.

For the purpose of operationalising the theoretical framework for the investigation of media constructions of Hezbollah and its recursive representations, a multi-layered methodological approach is necessary to derive a rich body of data for analysis. The approach will be to use qualitative methodology based on thematic analysis, discourse analysis, text analysis, and intertext analysis. Such an approach assists a conceptual explanation of the theoretical framework of recursivity of political communication. The approach also makes the above themes of dissemination in communication systems and recursivity in discourses evident and explicit in respect of news media constructions and the way they are recontextualised and disseminated.

The discussion then illustrates and justifies the most appropriate methodological tools to use for the creation of a corpus of data of Hezbollah statements as a primary source and its representations across the polycontexts of the three media outlets as a secondary source.

This chapter presents the methods, approaches, and procedures employed in the collection, selection, and design of the data corpus. Two main steps are involved here: first, identifying salient political statements, as defined by the dissemination potential in the multi-media construction of Hezbollah; and second, designing the corpus by deciding upon the selection criteria. That is starting from selected significant statements in the source text (speeches of Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah 2006 to 2009) and ending with their recursive representations in the multiple media target texts (which are the English web print output of the three media outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN).
Following the description of the research design and methodology, Chapter 5 applies the selected methodological tools in order to explore wider implications of the concept of dissemination.

Information on the political and historical background is a pre-requisite for understanding Hezbollah and the situation in the Middle East. This is provided as a framework within which to consider the data analysis and provides a valuable reference point. It discusses aspects of the international dimension to the Lebanese context and their relevance for Hezbollah. This feature is exemplified in the relationship between Lebanon and countries that have the most influence upon its politics, namely Syria, Iran, Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In addition, US interest in the region is demonstrated in its new Middle East Doctrine, adopted in 2006.

This chapter also focuses on how the three media organisations frame Hezbollah in terms of aspects of recursive communication in individual media outlets and across media outlets as an interrelated complex. It analyses examples of Hezbollah’s self-representations and their salient features of discourse. The analysis will rely on Nasrallah’s speeches as its primary sources. Finally, the chapter presents representations and contested recontextualisation in the news media. The analysis aims to explore how the process of recontextualisation takes place across media outlets as an interrelated complex. The study is undertaken using selected examples from Nasrallah’s speeches and their recontextualisations across the above three media outlets. This chapter also investigates ideologically motivated dimensions manifest in lexical choices and intertexts and their employment and construction, in news reporting in the three media outlets as recursive representations and how they are disseminated and recontextualised across media contexts. A political context, which is multi contextual, is set out in order to understand Hezbollah. Four different approaches to the recursive framings will be adopted: representations by the media outlets in the system; Hezbollah responses and feedback; media as audiences in themselves in terms of framing and reframing processes; and the role of translation within the recursive system.
Chapter 6 will present the main findings arising from application of the theoretical framework and data analysis, and will provide concluding reflections on the contribution made by this research to wider understanding of the concept of recursivity and dissemination in political communication, and suggest areas for further research. Particularly that Hezbollah today remains the source of much controversy in many countries in the world, constituting an ongoing dilemma.

1.5 Concluding Observations

In assessing the source literature about Hezbollah, it is evident that a substantial amount of work has been published (cf. Kalb and Saivetz, 2007; Alagha, 2007; Matar, 2008; Karagiannis, 2009; Khatib, and Dodds, 2009; Lamloum, 2009; El Husseini, 2010; Norton, 2009; El Husseini, 2010; Badran, 2010; Hadad, 2013, and many others). However, many of the available studies can be described as untheoretical, uncomprehensive and pay more attention to context than being analytical. Therefore a new theoretical and methodological framework needs to be adopted in order to analyse the data in all its richness. This is the fundamental aim of this thesis.
Chapter 2 Dissemination in a New Age of Political Communication

Discussion in this chapter will focus on dissemination. Fluid and interconnected dissemination marks a new age of political communication.

The discussion will include a review of developments in the field of political communication since the middle of the last century. The interface of political communication and media systems will be explored as a recursive, interconnected process in which communication is becoming increasingly complex.

2.1 Defining Political Communication

Political communication is dealt with in the context of communication dissemination for two reasons. First, the modern political reality of communication is overwhelmingly caught up in a process of dissemination, particularly in the past two decades (e.g. the Gulf and Lebanon wars, and the recent Arab spring in different countries in the Middle East). Second, there is now an abundance, variety and diversity of media institutions – particularly news media – in an age that is characterised by advanced technology, which has led to dissemination of political phenomena on a global scale. Dissemination is the hallmark of contemporary communication systems in which technologies play a key role.

Political communication is a dynamic field, although the study of it is not new and is as old as “political activity itself” (de Vreese, 2006: 6); however, it is a discipline of study that is somehow young. Research in the field of political communication is considered to be at the core of the “development of communication science” (ibid.).

Today, the international arena is witnessing social changes and a growing interest in political communication. Although a stable set of theoretical constructs rather than a single overarching theory has dominated the study of political communication, the different theoretical approaches display some common themes, such as a lasting concern with communication effect (Rogers, 2004), that is, the effect of technology and mass media on the political messages. It is argued here that despite the fact that
the role of communication in political growth is not new, its quality has changed (Volkmer, 1999). For example, Grant points out that “from government eavesdropping to internet crime, reality TV to computer-mediated communication and mobile telephones the face of communication has fundamentally changed” (2003: 1), and this applies in the field of political communication.

Harold Lasswell may have been the first to use the term political communication, and its organised study as a separate field is assumed to be dated from his analysis of the propaganda techniques that were used in World War I (Chaffee, 2001). Lasswell is best remembered today for “two pithy aphorisms”: his book entitled Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936) and for his suggestion that an act of communication can be analysed in terms of “who/ says what/ in which channel/ to whom/ with what effect” (Lasswell, 1948: 37 in Chaffee, 2001: 238). Even today, these ideas still inform classical thinking about communication processes in general and political communication in particular (de Vreese, 2006).

However, political communication, according to McNair, is a term that has proved difficult to define precisely “because both components of the phrase are themselves open to a variety of definitions, more or less broad” (2003: 3). While there are many modes of political communication, its primary focus is intentionality, i.e. purposeful communication about politics (ibid.: 4), i.e. “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors” (ibid.). However, as far as the theme of this thesis is concerned, dissemination means that communication is always contested, because there are recursivities which occur across media outlets. ‘Dissemination’ influenced by a Derridian understanding, plays an important role in shaping the political reality. It is manifested in the new relation between political communication and the media system as will be discussed in the following sections.

Denton and Woodward identify political communication as “pure discussion about the allocation of public resources (revenue), official authority (who is given the power to make legal, legislative and executive decision), and official sanctions (what the state rewards or punishes)” (1990: 14, in McNair, 2003: 3). However, McNair, points out that this definition includes verbal and written political rhetoric but excludes “symbolic communication” (2003: 3).
Symbolic communication means mythological communication in the “Barthian sense” (ibid.: 103), that is myth which is based on a preconceived symbolic coding of discourse, a chain of signs that make up a picture’s narrative in order to communicate hegemonic social and political concepts. It is becoming increasingly significant for establishing an understanding of the political process as a whole (ibid., 2003).

Symbolic communication involves values, emotions and symbolism (ibid.) used by political actors – whether speakers or media agents – in order to reinforce, promote, and emphasise their intended communication that are associated with the cultural and religious symbols of the target audience(s). In addition to political advertising of symbols of power and status (ibid.: 105), the Al-Manar TV station (run by Hezbollah), for instance, associates political speeches with prominent events using archive footage of the actions of Hezbollah in recent years in defending Lebanon against Israel. This is accompanied by highly emotional, patriotic music and well-composed military songs with the aim of acquiring more credibility in voicing certain political issues. These visuals, which range within the scope of symbolic communication, become “powerful signifiers of authority” (McNair, 2003: 106).

Denton and Woodward are still surely right to say that “[t]he “crucial fact that makes communication political is not the source of a message but its content and purpose” (1990: 11, in McNair, 2003: 4). But this content and purpose is itself transformed, recontextualised, and disseminated, as will be investigated below, through various phases. Different ideological motivations and interpretations are carried through different media systems in each of these new contexts. Systems interpenetration makes this effect more acute. In this respect, interpenetration is a coupling between different social systems where each system stabilises its own complexity, but achieves double contingency (Luhmann, 1995). Contingency according to Luhmann is an element of factor of uncertainty in the “process of selecting from a range in a complex context” (Grant, 2007: 9). Double contingency, according to Parsons (1951) lends attention to the “potential hazard of conflict between individuals confronting each other face-to-face; on the other hand, it points toward accomplishments that could lead to cooperation and sharing. The doubly contingent situation is an unavoidable basic condition that generates a problem at the social level that requires a solution if social interaction and social order are to be possible” (Vanderstraeten, 2002: 78).
other words, it is “selections of ego from a communication range, selections of alter from ego’s range and other communications and forms of communication themselves” (Grant, 2007: 9). It is therefore “inextricably linked to uncertainty” (Grant, 2007: 9). Perloff (1998: 8) views political communication as “the process by which a nation’s leadership, media and citizenry exchange and confer meaning upon messages that relate to the conduct of public policy”, while according to McQuail (2004), it is what refers to all processes of information including opinions, beliefs; exchange engaged in by participants in the course of institutionalised political activities. Although the academic field of political communication began by studying the effects of the print media and radio on individual voting voice, it expanded to include more aspects of communication and political behaviour (Rogers, 2004). All political institutions depend on communication because of its symbolic representation of authority and power; political communication concerns the flow of both information and ideas (McQuail, 2004).

Political communication systems are dynamic, evolving, and unstable (Swanson, 2004), not least under conditions of globalisation. These multiple dimensions of the term political communication lie within the framework of the relation of political communication and mass media as a part of a social system. They are relevant to this study in terms of exploring the notion of recursive communication and its instabilities across multiple contexts and across outlets, countries, and audiences.

The main elements of the political communication process, as Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) suggest, are identified in a framework of a system that consists of four broad terms, namely: political institutions in terms of their communication aspects; media institutions in terms of their political aspects; audience orientation to political communication; and the relationship between communications and culture.

According to Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), two points of entry to the analysis of political communication systems should be focused on. The first is the notion of audience roles and the second stems from the necessary involvement of “two kinds of actors – political spokespersons and media personnel” (ibid.: 17). These are “in recurrent patterns of interaction with each other” (ibid. – my emphasis). Further, these two are seen as operating on two levels: first, maintenance of relations among
organizations to facilitate the function of the political system, and second, message production. This is an implicit reference to the theme of recursivity of political communication which is the core interest of this study.

These two points are important and relevant to the argument in this study. The notion of audience is crucial, because the Hezbollah leader/Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah addresses a wide range of primary target audiences (as will be examined in the next chapters); meanwhile, media agencies such as Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN are secondary audiences (in the sense that they are recipients of his political statements, who recontextualise and disseminate them in new contexts of news media production).

Moreover, stressing the intentionality of political communication, which is defined by McNair as “purposeful communication about politics” (ibid.: 4), comes within the scope of the theory of audience design (borrowed from translation studies\(^2\)), which will be adopted in this study as an approach to explore the processes of dissemination of news translation in political communication.

It is often asserted in the literature that understanding the current political scene cannot be achieved without appreciating the role and impact of the mass media. Media and politics have always depended on each other. This study does not aim to investigate the effects of the mass media on public opinion; but on the ongoing media communications process. Nevertheless, it is useful to point very briefly to early research conducted in the field of mass media as a starting point for considering the contemporary trends of political communication.

In 1922, Walter Lippmann’s \textit{Public Opinion} provided the foundations of what later developed into the study of media effects (de Vreese, 2006). Lippmann was important for identifying the role of the mass media in public opinion formation, in which he contrasted real world indicators with public formation of issues and discussed the role of the press as an “intermediary” (ibid.: 6).

\(^2\) For example, Bell, A., 1984, “Style as Audience Design”, and Mason, I., 2000 “Audience Design in Translating”.
Similarly, in contrast to the approaches of those such as Siebert et al., which stress treating the media as a ‘dependent variable’ in relation to a ‘system of social control’, the helpful concept of the ‘system’ proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004: 8) is based on “mutual dependency between political and media institutions and practices” (Jones and Pusey, 2010: 455).

A political communication system consists of two kinds of institutions: the political and media organizations which are involved in message preparation and which function and interact in “horizontal” interaction (ibid.); but also those individuals and groups that participate as actors in such systems. They are engaged separately and jointly in a “vertical” axis in addressing, disseminating, and processing information and ideas to and from the mass body politic (ibid.: 12). The interaction of these two institutions depends to a certain extent on their mutual power relations; that is, they both have independent sources of power in society, one of which is derived from their relations with the audience. The power of political institutions exists in their performance “as articulators of interest and mobilisers of social power for purposes of political action” (ibid: 12).

2.2 The Historical Development of Political Communication since 1945

It would be useful to offer a brief historical background that traces the development of the field of political communication since 1945 as a baseline for comparison (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). The reasons for choosing this starting point are threefold: the first concerns historical convention, whereby 1945 marks the beginning of a post-war consensus and the acceptance of principles relating to a mixed economy and welfare provision in the USA that were similar to those in Western Europe; second, to appreciate the cumulative impact of the changes which have entailed the transformation of political communication since 1945; third, because the 1945 election in the USA was one of the last in which television did not play a dominant role in the campaign (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). These elements of post-war change and transformation in political communication are crucial with respect to the current discussion, particularly in relation to the use of advanced technology in the field of
media and communication. Since 1945 there has been a radical transformation on various political, economic and technological planes.

There are three major historical ages in political communication in Western democracies in the second half of the twentieth century (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999). The first age is the 1950s, before the arrival of television; a period characterised by easy access to media, stable political communication, strong and stable political institutions. In the second age, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the focus shifted to passing messages to the media with limited-channel network television, increasing importance of political communication, and an increasingly important role for the media in the political process together with increased demands for communication professionals. The third age, from the 1990s to present day, is characterised by an abundance of media channels and a more evident professionalisation of political communication (Marrek and Wolfsfed, 2003), but above all by technological advance – especially with the age of the internet.

It could be argued that there is also a fourth age which differs from the preceding three. It is characterised by a higher level of communication complexity accompanied by multi-polar discourses and was exemplified in the three wars which were launched in the Middle East. They were the two Gulf Wars in Iraq; the first was launched by the USA and coalition of 32 states in 1991, and the second, in 2003, involved the largest “US mobilization” since World War II (Downey and Murdock, 2003: 74). The 1991 Gulf War has been called the “First Information War”. It therefore provides an “instructive test case” (ibid.). The third war was the Israeli interventions in Lebanon in July 2006, which marked a new phase of political communication in various terms, both locally and globally.

As far as this study is concerned, war is newsworthy and of compelling interest to the media (Webster, 2003). It thus represents a top priority for news-makers; the “inherent newsworthiness of war remains and increases the likelihood of it receiving prominent and sustained attention” (ibid.: 58).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the absolute interpretation of media and warfare produced an emergent kind of conflict called “diffused war”, that is,
following Cottle (2006) involved in and produced through a new ‘media ecology’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010: 7), which entails dissemination. In fact, the media ecology is multivoiced and interpenetrative.

It is also noteworthy in this respect to refer to the “war on terror”, which was launched in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, in addition to the “Bush Doctrine” (which entitles the USA to attack any country and any organisation that is involved with terrorism). According to Jackson, this strategy is the most profound and “extensive counter-terrorist campaign in history and the most important conflict since the fall of the Berlin Wall” in 1989 (2005: 8). Further, it has had a considerable impact on international relations and the domestic politics of many countries. Hezbollah, for instance, is one of the organisations that is being targeted in this campaign that is being led by the USA and other Western countries (ibid., 2005).

For the purposes of this thesis, the “war on terror” is also a media campaign; these aforementioned wars make it complex in media terms, and this adds a new intensity to the intricacies of media and politics in the wider context. However, in the age of dissemination, the media have become an essential part of warfare; that is to say, there has been a “mediatisation” (Ensink, 2003) of wars and politics. With growing interpenetration, they not only frame the news of warfare: they also frame political reality itself. The mediatisation of war is important because various perceptions are vital to war; it is through the media that such perceptions are sustained and challenged (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010).

In addition, the launch of the Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel in 1996, which is the Arab world’s sole independent, professional news and information television channel, came as a landmark in this fourth age. Al-Jazeera has become essential viewing for millions both in the Middle East and among the “Arab Diaspora” (Miladi, 2003: 150), challenging major Western news outlets with its “controversial coverage of the United States’ ‘war on terror’” (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002, in Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 153). Al Jazeera is in itself part of the new age of communication dissemination in which media representations interpenetrate: it “comes of age in a global media stage outside of previous parochial markets” (Schleifer 2003, in ibid.: 155). It represents an alternative to “dominant news agenda and news reporting available from
the West” (Sakr, 2007: 105). In other words, Al-Jazeera has contributed to the change in the status of media power relations in the sense of the production and dissemination of media messages (ibid., 2007). It is part of a multi-polar communication world.

Further, the creation of rival stations, although not at the same professional level, such as Al-Arabiyya and Al-Hura, which are characterised by a “change in format, programming and presentation styles on state-owned television stations” (Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 145), has added another dimension to the recontextualisation dynamics of news media across various audiences. The evolving broadcasting environment of the 1990s in the Arab region was marked not only by a plethora of government and private television outlets and by a “globalization of transmissions to audiences beyond national frontiers”, but also by the adoption of new patterns of political communication (Ayish, 2002: 137). There were two new patterns of political communication in the Arab world, namely the “reformist government broadcasting pattern and the liberal commercial pattern” which coexist uneasily in an environment distinguished by its diversity of “political and social orientations, economic uncertainty, and market competition” (ibid.).

Yet change is an ongoing process in the field of political communication. The current historical period is described by Holland as “the information age”, in which many sources of information can be obtained through various forms of mass media, and the past decade is marked by an “explosive proliferation of mediatised news on a global scale” (2006: 230).

2.3 The Concept of Dissemination

It is argued here that we are witnessing a new age of global communication called dissemination (a term borrowed, mutatis mutandis, from Jacques Derrida (1977: 9, see also Grant, 2007), exemplified in a new relation between the political communication

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3 Launched in 2003 and based in Dubai Media Center; it is funded by the Saudi broadcaster Middle East Broadcasting (MBC), Lebanon’s Hariri Group, and other investors from the Gulf States. It adopts a neutral, non-supportive attitude when covering sensitive Islamist issues.

4 A USA-based TV channel, sponsored by the US Government, launched in 2004.
system and the media system. Dissimination in the usual sense is the promulgation and circulation of information and news; however, in the Derridian sense, dissemination crosses contexts; it is “every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written […] can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable” (Derrida, 2000: 12, in Grant, 2007: 87). Derrida maintains that “communication must be repeatable-iterable in the absolute absence of the receiver or of any empirically determinable collectivity of receivers” (Derrida, 2000: 7, in Grant, 155). That is, texts according to the structural terms of Derrida are “infinitely iterable (re)writings” (Grant, 2007: 155). Derrida also argues that the media “help to inaugurate a new mode of existence in which the ontological ‘presence’ of dominant political and cultural conditions is potentially undermined” (Pawling, 2013). His concept of ‘iterability’ is important conceptually for this study; it is closely related to the concept of porosity in communication which signifies an environmentally open hybrid state and dynamic process which in turn make the operational closure of systems highly unstable (Grant, 2007: 155, emphasis in original). This can be seen on the global scale in general and in Lebanon in particular. This new relation of media, communication, and technology has also created a new dynamic that is especially volatile in the Middle East, as graphically illustrated by the ‘Arab Spring’ and the ‘media wars’ – both formal and informal – that have marked it.

As stated above, surely the dissemination itself is dynamic and fluid. Thus, recursive communication (that is the dynamic circulation of news stories around different outlets) is manifested in a dense interconnection of recontextualisation (framing and reframing), and schematisation. The term ‘recursive’, as defined by Luhmann, refers to the processes of self production in a system. That is to say, communications do not merely “establish a connection with external reality”, but also “recursively construct communications” (Grant, 2007: 124). Thus, “recursivity implies feedback, which implies redundancy and redundancy creates meaning” (ibid.).

Recontextualisation (cf. section 4.5.3), which is the process of shifts of news media from one context to another, concerns the processes by which media production occurs across fluid contexts of reception and dissemination in various contexts (that is deliberate ideological frames or schemata, such as understandings of the relations
between citizens/state, freedom of expression/ theological control), and in the transformation process that takes place in the journey of the reconstruction of political phenomena. These features give much room for news recontextualisation and dissemination across various media channels in this age, and they have a profound impact on political reality worldwide. For many lay and expert observers, the dissemination of reality in news media is the only reality. Thus, the notion of recontextualisation is present in “dissemination of discourses across structural and scalar boundaries” (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007: 71).

Before investigating these frameworks more deeply, a background briefing about Hezbollah – our case study in dissemination as contested reality – is presented below.

Hezbollah comprises several elements. On the one hand it is a Shiite Lebanese militia called the Islamic Resistance Movement. It is also a Lebanese political party which has seats in the elected parliament. Furthermore, it is an organisation that provides social welfare services and contributes to the development of the Shiite community in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s origins go back to the Iranian-born Imam Musa Al-Sadr. In 1957 he came to Lebanon from Iran, and in 1974 founded a movement called “Harakat al-Mahrumin” (the Movement of the Deprived) (Alagha, 2006: 29). In 1975 this developed into a militia known by its acronym AMAL (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah (Karagiannis, 2009: 367). AMAL, which translates as The Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance, had a military wing, and also sought to achieve social and political reforms; however, its main aim was to safeguard South Lebanon from Israeli invasions (Alagha, 2006). After the disappearance of Al-Sadr during an official visit to Libya, and in the wake of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon in 1982, some AMAL members, including Hassan Nasrallah, broke away from the movement and founded Hezbollah (Karagiannis, 2009).

Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah continued to resist the Israeli army in South Lebanon, while, under the new leadership of Nasrallah, it participated in the Lebanese political system and took the initiative to make a rapprochement with “non-Islamist parties, prompting some analysts to claim” that Hezbollah was preparing for a process
of “Lebanonization” (Ranstorp, 1998 in Karagiannis, 2009: 367). In 2000, Israel’s “unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon was largely seen as a victory for Hezbollah, the first ever victory achieved by an Arab military force against the unbeatable” Israeli army (ibid.). However, Hezbollah resumed fighting against Israel, owing to its claim that the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms area was Lebanese territory (ibid.).

In July 2006, following Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a war against Lebanon that lasted for thirty-four days and in which Hezbollah strongholds were targeted. The end of this war marked a new phase for Lebanon: Hezbollah subsequently gained increased popularity among the Lebanese people, and achieved more political influence, thus altering the balance of power within the political system (Karagiannis, 2009).

In November 2006, in collaboration with the AMAL Movement and the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) headed by General Aoun, Hezbollah pressed for the establishment of a national unity government, in which it would have a one-third block vote in the Lebanese cabinet (ibid.). The ruling March 14 Alliance refused this request, which led to the resignation of the Shiite members of the cabinet, thereby sending the political system into crisis. In December 2006, massive Hezbollah-led demonstrations against the Siniora Government shook the country’s political system in an attempt to overthrow it (ibid.). The situation remained unstable until May 2008, when Hezbollah and Government supporters clashed with each other in West Beirut “over the fate of the pro-Hezbollah airport security chief” (ibid.: 369), and the Hezbollah telecommunications network was dismantled. Finally, the “deadlock between the ruling March 14 Alliance and the Hezbollah-AMAL-FPM opposition was resolved by the Doha Agreement in 2008” (Karagiannis, 2009: 369).

Although Hezbollah has constantly denied responsibility, it has been held accountable for attacking Western military targets in 1983, which caused the deaths of almost 300 US and French troops in Beirut (Karagiannis, 2009). Consequently, Hezbollah has long been on the US terror list. In 2002, George W. Bush declared in his State of the Union address that Hezbollah was part of a “terrorist underworld which threatened US national security”. Most European governments, however, were reluctant to place
Hezbollah on their terrorist blacklists, instead tending to ban only its military wing. Throughout the Arab world, Hezbollah is “largely viewed as a legitimate national liberation movement” (ibid.: 367).

As far as this thesis is concerned, it is important to stress that Hezbollah is a Shiite movement. The Shiites form an Islamic sect which originated as a political sect supporting Imam Ali, the fourth orthodox Caliph in the early Islamic State (656-661) and the first cousin of the Prophet Muhammad. The Shiites believed that Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, the sons of Caliph Ali, and their descendents should have been the rightful successors of the Islamic Caliphate as part of the dynasty of the Prophet Muhammad. The evolution of this sect into a religious grouping is believed to have been initiated with the death of Al-Hussein in 680 in Karbala, Iraq. This tragic event is still commemorated in the Shiite world on the 10th of Muharram (a month in the Islamic lunar year). The largest Shiite population is found in Iran, and smaller numbers live in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and some other Arabic and Islamic countries. With its strong historical, cultural, religious and political affiliations to Shiites throughout the region, Hezbollah is therefore a highly significant political and religious actor in and beyond Lebanon. And this significance owes much to the mass media.

Nevertheless, it would be useful if we start the discussion of the concept of dissemination in political communication and media systems by providing a definition of the term mass media. According to Luhmann, mass media is a term which includes:

All those institutions of society which make use of copying technologies to disseminate communication. This means principally books, magazines and newspapers manufactured by the printing press, but also all kinds of photographic or electronic copying procedures, provided that they generate large quantities of products whose target groups are as yet undetermined. Also included in the term is the dissemination of communication via broadcasting. (Luhmann, 2000: 2).

Mass media, as Luhmann suggests, depend on a technological mechanism in the process of their production of news and consequently their dissemination. Thus, the basic feature that is of significance to mass media communication is (the technology of) dissemination. This constitutes a medium that allows for “formations of forms”, which, in turn, opens the communicative operations which make the functional
differentiation of systems possible. In addition, interaction between senders and receivers is accomplished through the technology of dissemination (video, audio, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, TV, the internet), although audiences are never entirely predetermined, i.e. address is uncertain.

Since politics is interpreted as a struggle for power between those who attempt to maintain it and those who resist it (Chilton and Schaffner, 2002), media systems as such are part of this struggle. And political communication is “largely mediated communication, transmitted through the print and electronic media” (McNair, 2003: 29). Although print media have been important in the process of political communication, it is argued here that new media organisations introduce a new intensity of dissemination (cf. Taylor, 1997). Television has notably gradually assumed a greater role, evolving from being an observer of events and provider of stories to a definer and constructor of political reality (ibid.; cf. Gurevitch et al., 2009: 164) to such an extent that television and politics have become two complementary institutions. They are now mutually dependent so that politics offers the raw materials while television packages and delivers them to the audiences after reconstructing them (Gurevitch et al, 2009).

However, ‘new’ media such as the Internet are “displacing television or reconfiguring the political communications ecology” (ibid.: 167). The most significant change has been the “encroachment” of the Internet on the area so far dominated by television (ibid.: 167). In this process of displacement, audiences have access to inexpensive communication technologies in which they interact with the media, produce their own content, and “create alternative networks of information dissemination” (ibid.). That is a profound role taken by the (under-determined) audience as “senders and addressees of mass-circulating messages” (ibid.).

Luhmann points out that the process of dissemination, which is of particular interest to this study, is “only possible on the basis of technologies. The way in which these technologies work structures and limits what is possible as mass communication” (Luhmann, 2000: 2). This notion is illustrated in the way advanced technology of video-conference has helped facilitate the dissemination of Nasrallah’s speeches over a wide range, since he televises his speeches online in face-to-face mass
communication through a screen and interacts directly with his primary, unmediated audience.

As a key actor in Middle East politics, Nasrallah is significant for news media coverage across the world because his speeches are represented across contexts in various media outlets, undergoing variation in the process. Nasrallah, too, is ‘multivoiced’: he addresses a variety of audiences in his political speeches with different messages for his various constituencies. There is a strong connection between multivoicedness (heteroglossia or the plurality of meanings, cf. Bakhtin, 1981) and dissemination.

These developments lead us to the conclusion that media communications are recursive in the sense that they intersect in a continuous loop with all social systems, framing and reframing media reality in a recursive dynamic of dissemination. The political message is recontextualised, transformed, and disseminated across media contexts in complex processes, namely the media interplay of representation. This has a direct relationship with intertextuality: political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, which add increasing intensity. For example, in the corpus data of this thesis (Chapter 5), one can see that Hezbollah took over Beirut after the Lebanese Government dismantled its telecommunication system. Al-Jazeera described it as a “clash in the streets of Beirut”; on CNN “gun battles break out in Beirut”; while for the BBC, “deadly gun battles [shook] Beirut”. Hezbollah stated recursively that taking over the city of Beirut was a “correctionist” move. Recursive communication in this example is traced where recontextualisation of discourse moves from one setting to other new ones, which remain interconnected.

The performance of media systems illustrates the fact that political communication and media systems undergo a new kind of intersection in the age of dissemination. The political message is recontextualised, transformed, and disseminated through the media system with ideological implications. A typical case is the reality of the Lebanese mass media in which all the conflicting forces employ their privately-owned TV stations to promote their articulations of the political scene in Lebanon. This connects multivoiced political realities in a new intensity of dissemination.
This argument leads us to re-emphasise that Luhmann’s understanding of the notions of selectivity and information/non information is a useful further conceptualisation of the process of recontextualisation and dissemination in media political news – a point echoed by Norman Fairclough, who maintains that:

Elements of social events are selectively ‘filtered’ according to such recontextualising principles (some are excluded, some are included and given greater or lesser prominence). These principles also affect how concretely or abstractly social events are represented, whether and how events are evaluated, explained, legitimised, and the order in which events are presented (2003: 139).

The concepts of inclusion and exclusion are manifested in the form of “concrete and abstract” (ibid.: 137) representations of elements of social events in which the included ones are represented as salient and prominent (ibid., 2003). Consequently, these elements are recontextualised and transformed in new media settings and hence carried and disseminated across mass media both locally and globally (ibid.).

To further elaborate, as Grant argues, “the exclusion depends precisely on schematisation” of communication forms (Grant, 2004: 220). The “formation of dichotomies is an example of schematisation strategies”, and, according to Grant, “manicheisms in the fight against terror are examples of such complexity reduction” (ibid.). Schematisation of Hezbollah by different media outlets can be cited here as an example (for example, by using polarised lexical selections, such as martyrs vs. suicide bombers or freedom fighters vs. terrorists that are all highly ideological).

Within this argument, it is important to refer to the connection between the conceptual pair of schema and schematisation and the studies of framing in news media (cf. Martin and Oshagan, 1997; Neuman et al., 1992; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Simon and Xenos, 2000, in de Vreese et al., 2001: 108), as an important element in the process of dissemination since dissemination is driven by saliency and news is selective. For example, according to Grant, “the exclusion depends precisely on schematisations” (2004: 220); whereas Entman argues that “successful political communication requires the framing of events, issues, and actors in ways that promote
perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other” (2003: 417). 5

Entman argues how framing is by definition a process of selection and saliency; in this respect framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993: 52, italics in original).

Since framing involves a “communication source presenting and defining an issue”, the “potential of the framing concept lies in the focus on communicative processes”, in the sense that communication is “not static but rather a dynamic process that involves frame-building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience predispositions)” (de Vreese, 2005: 51). This dynamism demonstrates the processes of recontextualisation across a chain of contexts in news media and political communication, which contribute widely to the analysis of relevant incidents in the data corpus of this study.

Since the main dimensions of a frame lie in processes of selection and organisation, they lend focus to given aspects of reality, and at the same time they exclude others. This framing, which is defined by Gitlin as “patterns [...] of presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion” (1980: 7, in de Vreese, 2001: 108), contributes to the reinforcement of the particular role played by the media as ideological institutions in the representation, reproduction, recontextualisation, and dissemination of communication, and also in the dissemination of preferred and schematised ways of using language in the political sphere.

Within this framework, Entman (2004) provides his “cascade model” of activation in which he stresses how the differences among the elites became the prevailing rule. Following Gamson (1992), frames go through three stages: they “diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe” (Entman, 1993: 52). Further, Entman (2004: 5) introduces two classes of framing: “substantive and procedural”. The substantive frame performs essential

functions in covering “political events, issues and actors”, such as “defining effects or conditions as problematic”; “identifying causes”; “coveying a moral judgement”; and “endorsing remedies or improvements” (ibid.). While procedural frames, have narrower functions in the sense that they imply evaluation of the legitimacy of political actors on the bases of their “technique, success, and representativeness” (ibid.: 6). It was observed by scholars of domestic politics that procedural framing occupies much of the domestic and foreign news and has a small role in motivating the public to be engaged in political deliberation (ibid., 2004). The effects of framing, in the case of media frames, is the “most logical outcome is the link to audience frames” (Scheufele, 1999: 106). The framing and presentation of events and news in the mass media can “systematically affect how recipients in the news come to understand these events” (Price, Tewskbury, & Powers, 1995: 4, in ibid.: 107).

The concept of framing provides a way to describe the “power of a communicating text” (Entman, 1993: 51). The “power of a frame can be as great as that of language itself” (ibid.: 55). In this context, it is noteworthy that, in Goffman’s terms, recontextualisation usually “amounts to reframing” (1974), in which certain aspects of discourse, political discourse in particular, can be recontextualised in terms of lexical expressions, concepts, facts, and values and ideologies (Linell, 2004). Reference to recontextualisation is made here in terms of various relations between the “global scale and the national/local scale”, and also between the present and the past (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007: 71).

This approach is useful in exploring how events and issues are framed in the news (de Vreese, 2001), in the sense that each category of actors uses its favoured frame, which undergoes a process of transformation (Entman, 2003). The “portrait” of framing which involves “important implications for political communication” through focussing attention on some “aspects of reality while obscuring other elements” (Entman, 1993: 55) entails a process of dissemination (as exemplified in the interconnected recontextualisation data). Framing thus reflects to the target ideological schema, when the political statement is disseminated and transformed across various contexts. Understanding how frames work enables one to measure the distance between the original political phenomenon of Nasrallah of Hezbollah and the
ways in which the media actually frame and reframe, contextualise and recontextualise his statements.

There are good illustrations in this regard: Nasrallah often refers to Israelis as “Zionists”; ‘Zionism’ is the Jewish nationalist movement, (cf. Section 5.3.2.4). It is a salient intertext because Hezbollah regards Israel an entity that is usurping the land of others; it also regards the ‘Zionists’ as foreigners who have occupied “Palestine” and established “Israel” there. It is transferred in the process of recontextualisation into “Israelis” in almost every (other media) context, while Israel is framed by some as “the occupied lands” or “the occupied Palestine”. This is a highly significant political recontextualisation.

In the light of this discussion, it is argued that the processes of the selection of information, framing and schematisation and recontextualisation are all forms of dissemination, which are becoming increasingly marked in political communication and news media.

In investigating notions of recontextualisation and dissemination, it is worth reflecting further on the notion of uncertainty as a key component of dissemination that challenges stable frames. Grant argues that in social communication systems uncertainty is “recursively fed back into the system for the purposes of stabilization. Since they are actually defined by communications, social systems are environmentally open and thus remain sensitive to environmental instabilities” (2007: 120). Communication is “inherently uncertain by virtue of its reliance on media, agents, contexts and listeners” (Grant, 2004: 221); Further, Grant developed and modified Luhmann’s theory of the social system to stress that this system is self-referential and seeks to “attenuate complexity”, which is associated with the environment and consequently depends on communication (ibid.).

Grant developed the theoretical model of porous communication in an attempt to integrate the concepts of vagueness and cognitive closure at the communication level (2004). He then related it to social communication by identifying the improbability of social consensus as an ontological fact or reality. Thus, “the concept of porosity in terms of form in communication theoretical terms signifies an environmentally open
hybrid state and dynamic process (see above) which in turn makes the operational closure of systems highly unstable” (Grant, 2007: 120). Examples of this hybridity in communication are seen in intertextuality where private and public discourses are articulated (ibid.).

To go further, porosity is a property of all communications and “implies that communication structures from syntax to ideologies are always permeable”. Thus communication is porous, signs are given and systematically stabilised; however, it remains uncertain and could be iterated and subverted in context and in the act of communication itself (Grant, 2007: 95).

Having uncertain communication and consequently an uncertain social system inevitably leads to uncertain political communication; thus, it could be argued that dissemination and uncertainty are two-sides of one coin. Communicative uncertainty as a key component of dissemination can be conceptualised, according to Grant, as “porous” communication “since it is context, agent and medium dependent” (2004: 224). The theory of “porous communication integrates higher levels” of the “complex entities of structures and spaces” of different kinds that introduce “contingency and uncertainty” (ibid.). According to Luhmann:

> Complexity [….] means selection pressure, selection pressure means contingency and contingency means risk. Every complex state of affairs is based on a selection of relations among its elements […]. The selection positions and qualifies the elements, although other relations would have been possible. We borrow the tradition-laden term ‘contingency’ to designate this ‘also being possible otherwise’. (Luhmann, 1995: 25)

When two similar statements are made within different contexts to different audiences at different times, they will convey different meanings (ibid., 2004), and therefore a process of recontextualisation and dissemination takes place. Recontextualisation and dissemination function in an unstable way, and they blossom in an environment of open systems, including media systems, in which recursivity is unavoidable. Ideological framing becomes dynamic.

This increasing uncertainty of the environment in which political communicators act has created a wide variety and diversity of responses to ensure that specific goals can
still be secured (Stanyer, 2007). The notion of uncertainty in the political field is discussed by Sparrow (2006: 146) who also views “uncertainty as being at the core of media behaviour”; however, it is an unusual form of “uncertain environment” (ibid.). He elaborates by saying that the existence of the media stems from an open system approach that “emphasises the fact that the media organizations exist in an uncertain political and economic environment, one in which they have to stabilize their position in order to flourish” (ibid.). However, recursivity makes such stabilisation highly contingent.

2.4 The Age of “Dissemination”

The notions of change and transformation help to conceptualise political communication in the age of “dissemination” in the Derridian sense. As Derrida points out, dissemination “designates the idea that meaning is never stable, or fixed, but is, rather, dispersed or scattered throughout the language system” (cited in Childs and Fowler, 2006: 61). In terms of the political/media interface, this means that the political message is recontextualised, transformed, and disseminated through media systems, leading to unavoidable ideological transformations.

The historical developments of political communication mentioned above have reinforced and allowed for a process of dissemination in this age in contrast to the tendency to monopolise political news orientations by local governments in the Middle East in general and in Lebanon in particular. However, while news has become increasingly globalised in certain aspects, and despite the recent rise of non-Western media outlets such as Al-Jazeera, the means of gathering and disseminating “news largely remain concentrated in a handful of big, western-based institutions” (Bell, 1991:15–17; Herman and McChesney, 1997: 18–19, in Holland, 2006: 230). Thus, these institutions continue to exercise powerful authority in terms of deciding “what is – and is not – ‘significant’ and in representing ‘the news’ to the world” (van Ginneken, 1998: 22-40, in ibid.). However, local newsworthiness can inform global newsworthiness and greater contestation is generated across media systems. Nevertheless, changes in communication technology have made a significant and
great contribution to the emergence of a new era of political communication (Marrek and Wolfsfeld, 2003).

In this context, it is worth referring to globalisation as a term that “usefully refers to a specific set of dynamics and concrete processes, which have particular social, economic and political causes” (Munck, 2005:14). These economic and political transformations associated with the development of globalisation have enormous social effects (ibid., 2005), as will be explored elsewhere. In the face of new emerging issues such as globalisation, which could be reflected as a new ‘heterarchical’6 (the term derives from Deleuze and Guattari, in Grant, 2007: 165) power system, political institutions may seem less effective in the face of what emerges outside the political system (Swanson, 2004).

Castells similarly argues that “the enhancement of telecommunications has created the material infrastructure for the formation of a global economy” (Kiely, 2005: 20), and hence has direct effects on the nature of the political behaviour in the field of political communication. In addition, the implications of the development and expansion of information technology are also enormous (ibid.) and significant in the domain of mass media. It is also important here to point out Castells’ “network society7” which constituted itself as a “global system, is an information-based society and therefore a globalised society, in which information flows and the power relations around these flows change the social relations of industrial capitalism” (ibid.: 21).

It is widely accepted that economic globalisation is linked to a considerable extent to the development of new information technologies (Olssen et al., 2004). Indeed, these new technologies have altered political communication and the way it is studied (Chaffee, 2001: 237), to the extent that the technologies and institutions of communication, which have become central to world politics and economics throughout the past few decades, have contributed fundamentally to changing the

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6 Heterarchies are “systems in which multiple dynamic power structures govern the actions of the system and represent different types of network structures that allow differing degrees of connectivity” (http://www.answers.com/topic/heterarchy).

7 “In his three-volume work The Information Society, 18 Castells attempts to ground the notion of time-space compression within the context of the rise of what he calls the network society” (Kiely, 2005: 20).
nature and sources of power and influence, at both local and global levels (Taylor, 1997: 2).

It is noteworthy that globalisation in the context of political news is not merely the most recent phase in a “process that began with development with the news wire services” (Swanson, 2004). Rather, a new phenomenon has been created in the interconnection of television news with a global system mainly exemplified in the “proliferation of communication satellites, expansion of international news video services, organization of regional television news exchanges, and growth of international satellite-delivered news services” as key elements of this global system (ibid.: 56).

This new situation has entailed creating a new type of widely disseminated international media with dispersed global audiences (ibid.), which is the case today in regions of conflict, and in Lebanon in particular. Resorting to such a strategy is dictated by security reasons. For example, since the beginning of the war in Lebanon in 2006 until 2008, Nasrallah has appeared in public only once, to mark the occasion of “victory day” at the end of the war in August 2006. This has no precedent in the history of political communication. Bin Laden also transmitted his political messages to the media through tapes, e-mails and pre-televised video messages but has never addressed people directly through a video screen in the way Nasrallah does.

The fact that Arab ‘public opinion’ was largely kept under control by governments (until the outbreak of the ‘Arab spring’) can be explained in part by the constraints imposed by states over the media (Zayani, 2006). However, at the turn of the century the case is not the same anymore owing to the rise of a wide spectrum of satellite channels, many of which have addressed issues of common concern to all Arabs, a matter which had a great impact (Zayani, 2006). A relevant case concerns public opinion voiced in the Arab states during the first Gulf War on Iraq in 1990. Although the ‘Arab street’ was generally against the US-led war against Iraq, several Arab governments were not prevented from cooperating strategically with the USA, and implemented their pro-Western foreign policies (ibid.). A similar situation occurred during the Israeli interventions in Lebanon in 2006, in which some Arab governments
ignored the demands and wishes of public opinion and adopted counter-Hezbollah positions.

In today’s political arena, a noticeable transformation has taken place not only in Lebanon but also in the whole region, where the Hezbollah military wing is the dominant fault-line of the Middle East, particularly in the Lebanese-Israeli borders (ibid.).

2.4.1 The Interpenetration of Political Communication and Media Systems in the Age of Dissemination

The argument advanced in this section focuses on a new intersection of media systems and political communication in the new age of dissemination. Against all the above processes, political communication can be described as highly disseminated. As noted above, mediatisation (that is to say a process that is shaped by mediating technologies and media organisations – a form of “transformational framing” (Ensink, 2003: 72) by which media shape and frame the processes and discourse of political communication) has undergone various phases in every age. Radio, for instance, was heavily used to serve the aims of propaganda before television and the age of the internet. In fact, what characterises modern political communication is the new age of dissemination arising from the production of different media actors and their interrelations and their entry into uncertain dialogue with multiple and connected users in a multi-voiced way.

In the case of Lebanon there are sui generis intersections, for example, with multiple religious discourses and proxy actors. In addition, the economic and political intersection, or “the political and economic environment as an inter-organizational field” (Sparrow, 2006, 146), (that is the proliferation of media outlets driven by private ownership funding and affiliated to the different political, religious and ideological factions) in the political realm in Lebanon has growing implications for various political issues (as will be explored later in this section), while the religious system is a key issue in Lebanese politics.
There is a crucial link between the religious denominations and the political regime in terms of the three main political governing authorities, which are arranged and distributed on the basis of religious affiliation, among Muslim Sunni, Muslim Shiite, and Christian sects. The President of the State is a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim; the Speaker of the Parliament is a Shiite Muslim. Even the territories are distributed among the various religious denominations: Sunni, Christians, Shiite, and Druze.

As will be explored in this study, the two sets of political and media organisations overlap. In Lebanon, almost each political trend has its own media channel to promote and disseminate its own ideological and political orientations. In this interlocking media system, Nasrallah’s voice is highly influential, as can be seen in the fact that Al-Manar (operated by Hezbollah) has millions of users and viewers; it “has been reaching as many as 10,000,000 viewers worldwide” (Harmon, 2008: 49). Its audience is not only “national, but also regional and transnational” (Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 31). Also, the crowds who attend his speeches number thousands, and include Christians, Sunnis, and Druze supporters.

Further, three sources of media power may be identified, namely: “structural, psychological and normative” (ibid., 1995). The structural root of the power of the mass media stems from their unique capacity to convey to the politician an audience which is unavailable to him through other channels (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). The psychological bases of media power are derived from the relations of credibility and trust developed by different media organizations with their audiences on the basis of fulfilling audience expectations and the reinforcement of past trust relationships, “which in turn are dependent on legitimized and institutionalized routines of information presentation evolved over time by the media” (ibid.: 13). The normative root of media power stems from the “respect that is accorded in competitive democracies to such tenets of liberal philosophy as freedom of expression” and the need for the concerned bodies to protect citizens against potential of violation of political authority (ibid). It also helps legitimate the independent role of media organisations in the political field and to safeguard them from explicit endeavours to bring them under the political umbrella (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). An example which can be given in this connection from the news reports as a cultural repertoire is
“suicide bombing”, the highly salient lexical selection that is employed by the BBC and CNN, while Al-Jazeera, in certain instances, employs “martyrdom bombing” when reporting bombing operations in Gaza and the Palestinian territories. Islamic religious revivalism and the concept of national Jihad underpin the culture of “martyrdom”, which is framed as an act of redemption and a struggle against unjust occupation, and has different Western connotations. The lexical choice “suicide bombers” reflects the opposite understanding of the same action.

Nevertheless, Blumler and Gurevitch are surely right with their emphasis on the interaction of the political and media institutions; in the age of information flow and the technological revolution, and in the light of changes that have taken place in the political scene, particularly in the past decade, media systems have assumed a more powerful role and are stronger than ever. This is reflected in Lebanon, for instance in terms of the power relations between the mass media and political parties, including Hezbollah, in the intersections of the economic and financial system (for example, the privately owned TV Satellite channels run by political factions) and the diversity of religious discourses.

At this point it can be recalled that one of the transitional trends which contributed to the development of the modern model of political communication was the proliferation of commercial mass media (Swanson, 2004). The expansion of privately-owned media compared with public broadcasters, has created in almost all countries a huge and intensely competitive media environment (ibid.), i.e. internal dissemination in the Derridean sense. Crucially, greater competitive pressure now exists between news media, yet this has been identified as one of the causes of significant changes in the content and character of the news, political news in particular. Consequently, when the mass media becomes the principal site in which much of politics and government is represented, its news coverage becomes more important to political actors (ibid.).

In media systems, power is exerted by agents who work across systems at their intersections, including relevant political sectors, such as reporters, whose work is based on the selection of political information, and who thereby intervene in “both the formation of public opinions and the distribution of influential interests” (Habermas,
The use of media power is reflected in the choice of information and "format, in the shape and style of programs, and in the effects of its diffusion – in agenda setting, or the priming and framing of issues" (Callaghan and Schnell, 2005, in Habermas, 2006: 419). With growing interpenetration, media not only frame ‘the news’, they also frame political reality itself.

This is especially true in Lebanon, where a diverse density of media channels is found. Media ownership in Lebanon is recognised as being highly concentrated. Lebanon is a battlefield of opinions, ideas, and agendas of competing media whose influence reaches beyond the nation’s borders.

Television in Lebanon is restricted in terms of the political perspectives that it covers, and is privately owned (Khatib, 2007). The main political blocs (both alliance and opposition) have their privately owned TV channels which represent their views and whose ideological motivations are evident in the reporting of political events (cf. section 5.1.1. It is important to draw attention to the varying impacts or influences of these private providers in contrast to those of the state providers. Private providers employ their TV satellite stations to promote their parties’ ideological orientations, while the state providers maintain the official state political agenda. However, Lebanon does not yet have a fully owned state television (Kraidy, 2012). That is to say, “the postwar regulatory challenge consisted in finding a formula that restored the authority of the state while preserving a politically representative media system” (Kraidy, 2007: 148). According to Kraidy, the process by which broadcasting licenses were distributed was totally political, and was subjected to the influence of “leading politicians according to the Lebanese confessional power-sharing formula, which distributes resources and positions according to sectarian affiliation” (ibid.).

Increasingly, under conditions of globalisation, and especially in the Middle East, “transnational forces”, as Kraidy (2012: 180) suggests, have the capacity to shape both national politics and national media institutions. Media content in Lebanon, for instance, manifests political orientations; moreover, it is captured in a wider political structure (ibid., 2012). In such scenarios, media workers are heavily involved in political life and act as “analysts and commentators” rather than “neutral reporters of information” (ibid., 183). In processes of recursivity and dissemination, and during
the journey of the news story across multiple media contexts and audiences (schematisations, representations, recontextualisation and also mistranslation and misinterpretation), a new political reality is created.

Attention now turns to the operationalisation of this conceptual framework in the analysis of news media and political communication. There is a particular emphasis on the recontextualisation (the process of shifts from one context to another) and dissemination of the source message in political speeches. For example, those of Nasrallah and their dissemination through media systems, feeding forward into other media systems (e.g. Al Jazeera, BBC, and CNN) and back again (e.g. through Al Manar), only to be fed forward once more to the interlocking global media system.

By way of illustration, in the course of the complications associated with her announcement of the “New Middle East Project” during the war on Lebanon in 2006, Condoleezza Rice announced “the birth pangs of a new Middle East” and expressed the view that “what is happening is a painful birth”. Nasrallah responded by asking: “Did Rice not say that Lebanon’s war was the labour pangs of the new Middle East?” and added provocatively that it “was stillborn because it was an illegitimate child” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 1 January, 2008). It was picked up by Al-Jazeera for instance, which reported that Nasrallah’s vision of this project was that it “has been left in shambles” (Al-Jazeera news website, 29 July, 2007).

Another example that best demonstrates the recursivity of communication lies in the controversy of framing and self-framing of Hezbollah, as broadly illustrated in the data analysis of this study. Its self-representation is:

“Hizbullah is a resistance jihad movement”, (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 1 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

It was framed and recontextualised across the three news media outlets as follows:


Hezbollah [...] is a powerful political and military organisation of Shia Muslims in Lebanon. (BBC news website, 22 August, 2006 – my emphasis).
Hezbollah, a Shiite group which is supported by both Syria and Iran. (CNN news website, 25 May – my emphasis).

It was fed back again; Nasrallah says:

Why skip saying ‘Lebanese Hizbullah’, to insist instead on saying ‘Hizbullah the pro-Iranian the Shii party’. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 7 September, 2008).

And:

There is a campaign coming from every-which-direction; its main objective is labelling Hizbullah as a terrorist, a fraudulent mafia group of killer gangsters. This is completely unfounded, because Hizbullah is a resistance jihad movement, that is genuine, honest, clean, pure, enduring, sincere and genuine, and for them the problem it represents is that it is a serious and victorious resistance jihad movement. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 1 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

A detailed micro-level comparison of the above extracts which frame Hezbollah reveals striking differences. While Hezbollah frames itself as a resistance jihad movement, it is recontextualised as a “Shiite group” by Al-Jazeera; a “powerful political and military organisation by the BBC; and as “Shiite group which is supported by both Syria and Iran” by CNN. The self-framing of Hezbollah is fed back again by Nasrallah in rejecting such framing and insisting on its national Lebanese status and its identity as a ‘Jihadist movement’. This process of transformation reveals the articulation of multivoiced discourses in conveying the same political phenomenon.

To sum up, political communication in the age of dissemination undergoes particular and uncertain dynamic, thereby leaving media objectivity as a myth.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

It was argued in this chapter that there is a new age of global communication called the age of dissemination, which is key feature in a new relationship between the
political communication system and the media system. This can be seen in general terms on a global scale and in Lebanon in particular.

Discussion in this chapter focused on political communication in the age of a heightened dissemination of political news. It was argued that the processes of the selection of information, framing and reframing, schematisation, and recontextualisation are all forms of dissemination which are also markers of political communication and news media.

The interpenetrations of political communication and media systems were highlighted as an interconnected process in which communication is complex. This was seen on the global scale in general and in Lebanon as a particularly salient example. It was stressed in this respect that this new revolution has reset relations between the media, communication, and technology which have also created a new dynamic that is particularly volatile in the Middle East.

The discussion revealed that political communication in the age of dissemination undergoes a new intensity and quality of recontextualisation, creating a new and uncertain dynamic and leaving ‘media objectivity’ a myth.
Chapter 3    Orders of Discourse and Intertexts

The previous chapter argued that “dissemination” marks the new age of political communication as an extremely fluid and interconnected system. Recursive political communication in the age of a heightened dissemination of political news was seen as a key feature in the processes of the selection of information, framing and reframing, schematisation, and recontextualisation which are all markers of political communication and news media.

The discursive constructions in news media and political communication media forms are also the foundations for wider social transformation in a global media village. The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework which examines discourse as an “instantiation” of the dissemination dynamics of media-realities (Schmidt, 2001:11, in Grant, 2003: 16).

This chapter will also propose a theoretical framework of ideology in relation to discourse and communication. It will also draw attention to the ideological implications of the interpenetration of politics and mass media through the procedures of inclusion/exclusion, schematisation, framing, and recontextualisation. The approach also involves an investigation of discourse constructions, intertextuality in political communication, and news translation in media and political communication systems in terms of the dissemination and schematisation of communication. The processes of schematisation and dissemination will be explored in the data corpus of this thesis.

3.1 Approaches to Discourse

There is a widespread consensus among a diverse group of scholars that the term ‘discourse’ used in current studies originated with Foucault (Sawyer: 2002). However, the term ‘discourse’, as one element in Foucault’s work (Mills, 1997), is used to refer to various peceptions of the structure of knowledge and social practices (Fairclough, 1992a).
In *The Order of Things* Foucault lends special focus to “discursive practices as constitutive of knowledge, and the conditions of transformation of the knowledge associated with a discursive formation into a science” (ibid.: 38). That is to say, episteme (knowledge systems) refer to the orderly ‘unconscious’ structures underlying the production of scientific knowledge in a particular historical epoch.

Discourse, according to Foucault (1972), does not consist of texts but of formulated statements. Each statement is the basic unit of discourse which has its own meaning, and it functions as the outcome of a discursive practice; hence, each particular statement has its own rule.

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, and sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. (1972: 80).

Foucault here invokes added meanings for the term *discourse*. In the first meaning, “the general domain of all statements”, he implies that discourse is generally about texts and utterances which have meanings and implications, while in his second definition, “an individualizable group of statements”, he signals discourses as certain specific groups of statements which have a basis in coherent codes and rules.

Thus, discourse for Foucault is defined in terms of statements, “énoncés”, of “things said” (Olssen et al, 2004: 22), as an essential element; thus, ‘a discourse’ is a group of them, a system, i.e. a speech or a conversation, and therefore must be an “event of language” (Sawyer, 2002: 440). Statements are also events of specific forms which are both connected to historical context and vulnerable to repetition (Olssen et al., 2004). He thus views discourse as the rules, i.e. practices that make it possible for certain statements to occur and others not at particular times, places, and institutional locations (Foucault, 1972).

This understanding of discourse could be applied to schematisation and dissemination. For instance, in political discourse each period of time is characterised by special lexical ideological choices and metaphors, depending on the context of that period, which at times is characterised by mitigators or attenuators, and sometimes
antagonisms. Van Dijk, for example, refers to political discourse as “replete with variously demeaning metaphors that derogate the ‘enemy’” (1995: 30). A good illustration of this point can be found in the reference made by the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to former US President George W. Bush who he described as “the devil” in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly (CNN news website, 22 September, 2006).

From Foucault’s perspective, knowledge production is embedded in discourses of social institutions which undergo multiple dissemination across political communication and news media.

As noted above, the episteme, from Foucault’s perspective is defined as follows:

The total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientficity, and formalization are situated and operate. (1972: 191).

Foucault distinguishes four levels of emergence of a discursive formulation: the thresholds of episteme, positivity, scientificity, and formalisation. Foucault, in his quest for “analytic endeavour”, traces the appearance of various discursive formations across different thresholds which are vital in showing how concepts develop and gain scientific status; how various experiences are given scientific status or formed as a scientific area, in addition to tracing the sequence by which these sciences emerge from pre-scientific domains (Olssen, 1999: 27).

Episteme is a concomitant of Foucault’s use of the term of archaeology. In describing the archaeology of knowledge, Foucault (1972) uses three concepts: discursive formation, positivity and archive (Sawyer, 2002). At this point, the “archaeological analysis individualizes and describes discursive formations” and “reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)” (Foucault, 1972: 157,162, in Sawyer, 2002: 437).

Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves,
those discourses as practices obeying certain rules. [...] It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse. (Foucault, 1972: 138).

In this sense, archaeology seeks to uncover the episteme (knowledge system) that relates to past experience and the prevailing thinking in certain periods of history. So discourses, in Stephen Ball’s words (1990a: 2), “embody meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power relations” (in Olssen, 2004: 22).

Knowledge systems (epistemes) are reflected in the forms of schematisations (which presuppose exclusion procedures) in Nasrallah’s speeches in the articulation of two discourses, the religious and the political. For instance, he refers to a political group in the USA named “Christian Zionism”, which forms a key part of a strong alliance against Hezbollah and similar movements. As Grant argues, “the exclusion depends precisely on schematisations and the forms of such schematisations are communication forms such as speeches” (Grant, 2004: 220).

Discussing the concept of ideology without exploring its relation to discourse would be insufficient. Discourse plays an influential role in reproducing and reshaping and disseminating ideologies through language. Therefore, the next section will deal with ideology as a reproduction enacted by discourse, and will explore how discourse and ideology are interlinked.

3.2 Discourse and Ideology

Ideologies are formulated, reproduced, and reinforced through discourse (Barker and Galasinski, 2001), as the process of exercising power in modern society is realized through ideology and, more specifically, through the “ideological working of language” (Fairclough, 2001: 2). Thus, discourse is a site of power and struggle in which the ideologies incorporated in discursive choices constitute the subject of struggles for dominance between social groups (Billig et al., 1988).

This approach to discourse is of primary concern because it contributes to the examination of intertextual manifestations in political communication as
communicative structures, which serve to articulate the plurality and hybridity of discourses.

Discourse, therefore, plays a fundamental role in communication production of ideology. In recent decades, studies of ideology from a linguistic point of view have provided insights which increase the understanding of how ideology shapes discourse and how practices of discourse help to “maintain, reinforce or challenge ideologies” (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 143). The use of the term “discourse” is associated with ideology as an “institutionalized mode of speaking and writing”, which describes certain attitudes towards areas of socio-cultural activity (ibid.): Discourse “essentially serves as the medium by which ideologies are persuasively communicated in society” and consequently helps “reproduce power and domination of specific groups or classes” (van Dijk, 1997: 25) through “discourse comprehension, sharing, abstraction and generalization” (ibid: 31).

It is opportune to refer to early Foucault’s repressive notion of discourse. Foucault’s conception of power changes between his early work on institutions (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish) and his later work (The History of Sexuality). Foucault’s early concept of discourse “proceeds from the centrality of the discursive norm”, discourses are “temporally and spatially legitimated languages linked to power; accordingly, discourse is ruled by procedures of exclusion” (Grant, 2007: 154). As Grant writes, since The History of Sexuality, the later Foucault, in his analysis of the relations between “sexuality and communication, refers to the pluralization of modes of discourse” (Foucault, 1984: 25, in ibid.). Exclusion procedures are always relative and induce instabilities, thus, excluded communications do not “disappear – they are part of a global communication system” (Grant, 2007: 154). Said differently, Foucault’s earlier work is based on his understanding of discourse in terms of power repression and control, while he turns in his later work to the freedom of power which is concerned with power/knowledge understood as epistemic orders (knowledge system). This study borrows from the later Foucault and thus discourse is not seen in terms of repression, rather in terms of multiplicity and dynamism of discourses of power relations in the context of communication (as will be discussed in section 3.2.3).
As far as this study is concerned, discourse as a site of struggle and contestation is of primary concern. Since politics is interpreted as a struggle for power between those who attempt to maintain it and those who resist it (Chilton and Schaffner, 2002). The political scene experiences an ideological struggle: Lebanon is a scene of struggle and resistance in which all conflicting factions, including Hezbollah, is a manifestation of the binary polarisation of Us and Them at the local and global levels which are striking evidences in terms of legitimation and delegitimation processes.

This study will draw on different dimensions of the classifications of discourse: ‘threads’ (a continuous ‘narrative’ or theme with connections across content); ‘levels’ (textual, subtextual, and intertextual), relating to subject matter and speaker group; and positions of discourse (e.g. discourse of detachment, legitimation, and authorisation.

3.2.1 Recursivities and Interpenetrations between Political Communication and Media Systems

In bolstering an argument about how ideology functions in news media and political communication, and the consequences of language, power, and ideology, news can rightly be seen as a “representation of the world in language” using a “semiotic code” (Fowler, 1991: 4). It is, moreover, a “constructive practice” (ibid., 25) that is “impregnated with ideology” (ibid., 24). Language is used in news media as a highly “constructive mediator” to “form ideas and beliefs”, “presuppositions and ideology” (Fowler, 1991: 1). In this sense, several cultural, institutional, and economic features of the press lend a unique importance to its reproduction and reshaping of ideology (ibid., 1991).

In news media, events and ideas could not be communicated in a neutral way, because, as Fowler states:

They have to be transmitted through some medium with its own structural features, and these structural features are already impregnated with social values which make up a potential perspective on events. (1991: 25).
This means they are transformed and recontextualised and, as argued above, disseminated into a new setting. In other words, what counts is not what is communicated but how the event is processed and widely disseminated to multiple audiences. The intensity of this recontextualisation is increasing and is especially acute in the dense media matrix of Lebanon. However, of concern here is the question of how ideologies can be linked to lived experience and political interaction.

It is necessary to point out the relevance of the concept of legitimacy in relation to ideology in this respect. To elaborate: in social and political theory the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation are used within the framework of argumentation, providing rationale and justification (Itecu-Fairclough, 2008). Legitimation is the “institutional counterpart” of these justifications (van Dijk, 1998: 256). Therefore, ideologies are intertwined with the field of political communication in a context that is closely related to questions of domination and power (cf. section 3.2.2), (van Dijk: 1997), whereas dominant groups in a social system develop their own ideology in order to “reproduce and legitimate their domination” (van Dijk: 1997: 25). In order to accomplish such legitimation, one of the strategies adopted is to present domination as inevitable for the dominated groups (ibid., 1997).

In political communication, questions often arise concerning the ways in which power and its influence are expressed and received, whether in the context of interpersonal dialogue, news reports, or via Internet channels (Herbst, 2006). Issues include who has authority, why they have it and the role of the media in the exercise of authority where it does exist (ibid.). With dissemination, that authority is less monological than in the past, even for established news organisations such as the BBC. The structural transformation of the media landscape that is taking place in the age of dissemination, the diversity, multivoicedness, (cf. Bakhtin) and plurality in media systems (particularly dense and volatile in the Middle East), and the rise of Al-Jazeera all created opportunities for media forces to operate on a different scale, and created a multi-voiced discourse with respect to the influence of media power and authority.

The notion of legitimation is crucial in relation to ideologies and discourse, and is accounted for as one of the essential functions of the use of discourses. It is investigated here as an important concept in the context of ideology and power. It has
a prominent function in language use and discourse (van Dijk, 1998). Legitimation is, for example, a “discourse that justifies ‘official actions’ in terms of the rights and duties, politically, socially or legally” associated with a “special role or position” (ibid., 1998: 256). It is thus a social and political act which is exercised by talk or text; moreover, it has an “interactive dimension as discursive response to a challenge of one’s legitimacy” (ibid.: 255). From a pragmatic point of view, legitimation has to do with the speech act of defending oneself; i.e. the speaker provides reasonable justifications or accepted motivations for past or present behaviours that could be vulnerable to criticism by others (ibid., 1998).

The notion of legitimation connects strongly with the concept of dissemination and recursive communication in this study. Legitimation is the ways in which discourse supports or undermines belief systems. Legitimation has a function to play in supporting ideology; i.e a legitimating tactic would support ideology, while a deligitimating tactic would exclude it. Ideology is a subordinate category and a belief system which requires other instruments to function in its support, such as legitimation. The data corpus demonstrates the way the political scene, particularly in Lebanon, experience an ideological struggle. The presentations of the political phenomena of Hezbollah and their representations across news media outlets are striking evidences in terms of legitimation and delegitimation processes.

As an ordering, schematising principle of communication, discourse can legitimise, silence, or delegitimise Foucault’s epistemes (van Dijk, 1998). In the study of ideology, domination is often associated with its legitimation. Indeed, not only is the process of legitimation based on presupposed moral or legal grounds for the judgment of official actions, but also ideologies, which are considered to be the basis of social representations of groups and their members, presuppose morals and values (ibid.). Furthermore, these norms and values regulate the actions of group members, and they may be used to justify the social position of the group in relation to other groups, where ideology and legitimation specifically interact in controlling these inter-group relations, namely power, dominance and resistance (ibid.).

In addition, power is an important and central factor in the process of legitimation. It is confined to social power as defined by law, rights, or duties which exemplify the boundaries of official institutional decision-making and action. It is mandatory for
members of institutions to have power in order to legitimate their actions. Thereby, legitimation is related not only to individuals who occupy an official position but also to institutional actors, such as official organisations; i.e. it may be a form of collective action that justifies the very behaviours of the institution (van Dijk, 1998).

Recent debates about the conditions of the legitimacy of law and political domination are centred and framed by the dispute between Jürgen Habermas’ concept of legitimation and Niklas Luhmann’s “autopoietic” systems theory (Priban, 1997: 332). Both models dwell on the notion of legitimation with the aim of elucidating the way it influences the structural relations of a society. However, each of them has a different perspective and understanding of communication and the concept of legitimation in particular.

A brief exposition of Habermas’ important normative understanding of the concept of legitimation will provide a useful starting-point for the investigation conducted in this section, which will include Luhmann’s descriptivist understanding of exclusion and inclusion, framing, schematisation, recontextualisation, and dissemination, all of which are of concern for this study.

In his famous normative approach, Habermas rejects Luhmann’s “systematic procedural grounds of legitimation and the legalist approach of Carl Schmitt” (Priban, 1997: 332). According to Habermas, the belief in legitimacy is based on the view that the “existing order or system is true” (ibid.). His viewpoint in this respect is that the system demands of the “state organisation, expressed by law” in late capitalist societies leave a lack of legitimacy that entail a “crisis of political domination and authority” (ibid.). The political system can, to a certain extent, produce conformity by offering different compensations; however, when these demands for compensations exceed the capacity of the system, this leads to a point of crisis (ibid.). It is clear that this normative model is contested by contemporary media realities, not least in Lebanon.

Habermas’ work is significant in formulating and developing a “unified and systematic perspective” (Habermas, 1976: vii) in terms of his theory of communicative competence. Luhmann and Habermas have essentially different
perspectives. However, Luhmann’s social theory of communication and his understanding of legitimation are felt to be more relevant to this study. Luhmann’s interpretation of society (1982), on the basis of the notion of the “totality of communication”, gave a new turn to the theory of the functional differentiation of society (Tsivacou, 2005: 511). It is argued here that this is closer to empirical reality, because it describes the way discourse functions.

Of relevance to this investigation of the political and ideological implications of the interpenetrations of media and political communication are the notions of exclusion and inclusion in political communication processes.

In this context, interpenetration, according to Luhmann, is:

[t]he condition of possibility for self-referentially closed autopoiesis. It enables the emergence of autopoietic systems by opening up environmental contact on other levels of reality. Interpenetration makes it possible to keep functional levels of operative information processing separate and yet to combine them, and thus to realize systems that are open and closed to their environment at once. And this combination seems to have opened the possibility of stabilizing the difference in a relative degree of complexity between system and environment with greater complexity on both sides. (1995: 410)

In this quotation, interpretation means a process in which social systems constitute connections between each other through ‘meaning’. This interaction between systems is important because each system needs an environment that provides complexity and reinforces its autopoiesis, (Luhmann uses this term in order to explain the way social systems conduct the production and reproduction of communication that constitute their environmental reality).

Luhmann thus maintains that the “conceptualization of this situation presupposes the interplay of a plurality of distinctions” (1995: 220). It is further a “reciprocal contribution to the selective construction” of the intersection of elements (Luhmann, 1995: 215). Luhmann’s theory of social systems and his idea of legitimation as

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8 Luhmann believes that any social system is based on communication (1995), and elaborated his theory of social systems to include mass media as systems of social communication. Hence, ideological interpenetrations entail a process of inclusion and exclusion. In this respect, the biological concept of autopoiesis is one aspect of Luhmann’s social systems that is of relevance to this study and contributes, to a great extent, to the illustration of its theme. He uses this term in order to explain the way social systems conducts the production and reproduction of communication which constitute their environmental reality.
procedure constitute an important contribution to understanding the ideological interpenetrations and implications within the framework of communication and mass media. Procedure in this context is the system of inclusion/exclusion which essentially forms a correlation of functional differentiations. These differentiations imply that the communication between exclusion and inclusion is not closed but dynamic in the sense that in sub-systems (e.g. Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN are media systems which produce sub-systems) one can lead to the other.

Every social communication is interpreted as having a meaning, and is therefore structured according to functionally differentiated subsystems, such as mass media through binary codes. In such a way, these systems contribute to the construction of a reality of a society, and introduce their own codes of inclusion/exclusion, such as war/peace or terrorism/resistance, as can be seen in the case study in question here. Therefore, a binary code is a “double-sided form” (Luhmann, 2000: 16), (e.g. identity/difference, legal/illegal) which contains a value and its counter-value, constituted by a pair of opposed, codified, linguistic generalisations that emerge from the “medium of meaning to limit its excessiveness and facilitate the system’s choices” (Tsivacou, 2005: 512). In other words, it is selection. Moreover, function systems, as in the case of the mass media, operate by means of a binary code “which fixes a positive and a negative value while excluding any third possibility” (Luhmann, 2000: 16), i.e. legitimising or delegitimising in the processes of recontextualisation of the political phenomenon across media systems.

According to Luhmann (1990), selection refers is key way mass media function (ibid.: 2000). A social system selects binary codes which account for the rules of attribution and have relations with the environment. These choices constitute the system and bring its identity and unity together while differentiating it from other systems (ibid.). Every system has its own procedures of selectivity in making its selection of autopoiesis (or ‘self-generation’) rather than stopping it (Luhmann, 1990). Thus a “communication system can continue to communicate on the basis of the ongoing communication” (ibid.: 13). One can translate this theory into an empirical analysis of the recursive disseminations of media organisations, which is denied by the normative model proposed by Habermas.
In this respect, the theme of selection (Luhmann) or exclusion (Foucault) is vital to the theme of dissemination which echoes processes of selection. That is to say, the presence of selection is demonstrated in media systems, where contemporary issues are debated and reported on the basis of, for instance, information selection, in which each media institution reflects its own ideological stance. This may be seen in the framing and reframing of Hezbollah in the news coverage of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN in which different ideological selections and perspectives are evident in their respective news discourses.

In this connection, framing, as a process of selection (cf. p. 35), in the news have been defined in academic studies as “patterns of presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion”, whereas the central dimensions of a frame lie in the selection, organisation, and focus on some aspects of reality, to the exclusion of others (Gitlin, 1980: 7, in de Vreese et al., 2001: 108). To frame is to emphasise selectively, to evaluate given aspects of a perceived reality and thus “make them more salient in a communicating text” (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2010: 142). Hezbollah, for instance, is internationally framed as a “terrorist movement” by the mass media and political systems. However, it frames itself as a “resistance movement”. Its media ‘meaning’ oscillates between these two discourses or narratives, reflecting a dynamic uncertainty.

In many respects, the concept of recontextualisation and thus dissemination again becomes prominent. The uncertain dynamics of discourses are indicated by the example of the understanding of the lexical choice “martyr” (shaheed in Arabic, شهيد) employed in news media. In any treatment of the recurrent word shaheed (Baker, 2007), the cultural background, in addition to its historical and religious roots, impacts upon the selection whenever reference is made to those who died during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. Although shaheed has an English equivalent in “martyr” (Baker, 2007), neither in English nor other Western cultures, does shaheed “semantically map onto martyr in full” (Baker, 2007: 165). It is particularly associated with Islamic culture, and is usually employed symbolically and figuratively when referring to those who die for the sake of a noble cause. It may also refer to people who die violently, particularly in war, whether or not involvement in war is their own decision and irrespective of their religion (ibid., 2007). Christian martyrs were passive
victims, but the term “martyr” does not have the connotations of militancy and extremism that it has come to acquire in English, regarding the Arab and Islamic world (ibid.) Recontextualisation creates a dynamic that takes source meaning into entirely new media realities. In other news outlets such as the BBC, the alternative lexical choice could be “dead”, “killed”, or “victims”, as “martyrs” has a different cultural connotation in Western societies.

It goes without saying then that selection and framing are ideological. The Al-Manar TV station, for instance, uses schematisation to refer to the Israeli Defence Minister as “Minister of War”. This form is always employed by Al-Manar quoting Nasrallah in referring to the Israeli “Minister of Defence”, which is used by all other media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN. Also, this ideological selection is manifested in the reference made by CNN to South Lebanon (which is the homeland of Hezbollah) as the “terror capital”, besides framing Hezbollah as a “formidable enemy” and “ominous threat”.

Another example in this context is the media portrayal of the assassinated Imad Mughniyeh (a senior military member of Hezbollah). Hezbollah stated that Mughniyeh was “martyred at the hands of the Zionist enemy” (Al-Manar TV Station, 13 February, 2008b); the BBC described Mughniyeh as a “murderer and terrorist” (BBC news website, 14 February, 2008). CNN reported the assassination thus: “Mughniyeh, whom intelligence sources described as one of the craftiest and deadliest terrorists in the world” (CNN news website, 15 February, 2008); Time World called him “Hezbollah’s shadowy hero” (Time World news website, February 13, 2008); while Al-Jazeera portrayed him as a “senior Hezbollah commander” (Al-Jazeera news website, 14 February, 2008). This demonstrates how competing frames and schematisation are embedded in the process of news media recontextualisation.

In the case of this study, the concepts of selection and dissemination are largely manifested in the way media systems select, distribute, transform, evaluate, and recontextualise Nasrallah’s political statements. There are significant contrasts between source messages and their eventual constructions. These contrasts arise from the process of ideological framing and the way in which the meaning is encoded, modulated, and implied in the construction of an ideological message for different
target audiences, is in contrast with the source message transmitted to particular different audiences, to the implied audience and the implied reader.

An example of recontextualisation in the news media can be found in Al-Jazeera programmes which are considered to be social and political spaces in which “multiple audiences appropriate and negotiate the meaning of events” (Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 157) in particular ways; unlike Foucault’s repressive notion of discourse, these notions are manifested in later Foucault’s focus on uncertainty in discourse (cf. 3.2). Dissemination intensifies this (Grant, 2007). In such programmes the authority of speakers is consistently challenged and transformed (e.g Al-Jazeera talk shows, From Washington (من واشنطن) and Islamic Law and Life (الشريعة والحياة)), whereas reporters and programme moderators frame successive discussions, following Bakhtin, “as responses to previous critiques and guests, and interlocutors re-contextualize utterances made at different times and in different places by individuals not present at the time of dialogue” (Bakhtin, 1981, in Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 157). In this sense, the modus operandi of Al Jazeera is unique in that it has gained a reputation for breaking news and for providing a forum for wide-ranging and unfettered debate. The BBC World adopts a similar approach with its programme Hard Talk. Al-Jazeera, following the BBC, has also opened up an invaluable space for democratic exchange. In its coverage of the uprisings in several countries in the Middle East in 2011 (particularly in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), despite the obstacles impeding its progress, Al Jazeera has continued to bring coverage from these areas, and has striven to paint a more complete picture of these historic revolutions. This is in spite of the fact that its bureaux have been closed, its journalists beaten and detained, and tapes and equipment confiscated and destroyed. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera has continued to give room to the voices of other opinions so that they can be heard.

3.2.2 Ideological Motivations and Implications of Dissemination

Since ideologies are representations which contribute to the “constitution, reproduction, and transformation of social relations of power and domination” (Thompson 1974, in Fairclough, 2006: 23), this section will explore how events are
recontextualised and disseminated in political and media systems with ideological consequences.

The common “political slant” applied to the term ideology often has negative connotations and it is sometimes taken to be a “system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs” (Van Dijk, 1998: 2, in Calzada Perez, 2003: 3). This is usually practised in the Marxist and neo-Marxist traditions which associated ideology with political domination, and hence the concepts of power and hegemony are always involved (ibid.). Therefore, according to this view, “ideology is imposed surreptitiously” and becomes common thinking (ibid.: 4).

In what follows, the post-structuralism exemplified in van Dijk’s multidisciplinary approach to ideology will be examined in relation to the theme of dissemination. But before we begin this discussion, the Marxist concept of ‘ideology’ will be briefly considered. The reasons are twofold. The first is that Marx’s thinking demonstrates an essential position in the history of the concept of ideology within the framework of the structuralist approach. The second is that Marxist theory concerning ideology constitutes an attempt to distinguish different kinds of ideological contexts, including false consciousness (Eagleton 1991).

Historically, the term ideology was first coined by Antoine Destutt De Tracy during the French Revolution in the eighteenth century to define a “science of ideas” (van Dijk, 1998: 1). Although it was De Tracy who coined the term “ideology”, the concept and its theorisation stem from Karl Marx (Drucker, 1972). Marx was concerned with the connections between ideas and explored the relation of ideas and sensations (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993). Ideology, in the origins of this new science, “represented a philosophical attempt to develop scientific ideas as the basis of political order” (Kinloch 1981: 5, in Fine and Sandstorm, 1993: 22).

In this context, the question of dominant ideology arises as an important issue. This is due to the peculiar nature of the data under investigation. In Lebanon, the level of ideological and multi-system (i.e. intertextual) complexity is high, as is the case of mass media in Lebanon in general and the satellite TV channels in particular, as examined in section (5.1.1) in this study.
In one of his earliest arguments about the concept of ideology, Marx maintains that the ruling and dominant material life in society is the sole body that holds and controls the mental production (Marx, 1970). That is to say, society is characterized by two types of ideologies, the dominant and the subordinate. The means of production have a direct influence on ideology, in which human beings are essential in the process of production; they produce their means of production in order to meet and satisfy their needs (ibid.). Thus, a material life determines the condition of social life and hence develops modes of economic structure which exist as long as there are productive forces (Drucker, 1972).

In the age of dissemination, it is important to see ideology as part of the dynamics of communication, or, in Grant’s expressions, fluidity and liquid communication; it thus prevents any exploration of the impact of dissemination and recontextualisation on ideology and power relations.

The Marxist tradition places much focus on the socio-economically defined classes; however, from the perspective of van Dijk, “ideologies in contemporary societies are not limited to classes”; i.e. there are other factors which have an important role in forming ideologies rather than “classes” (van Dijk, 1998: 181). He thus argues that the “arguments for the dominant ideology hypothesis are not very persuasive” and do not seem to be held true in many situations (ibid., 1998: 185). A detailed theory of ideology is therefore required in order to specify how and where it should or should not be applied. In addition, it is a very general and abstract thesis that necessitates interpretation into detailed structures in terms of “social cognition, discourse, communication and social structures” before it is subjected to evaluation (ibid.).

Van Dijk thus questions whether ideologies are by definition “dominant”, or if they should be defined in broader terms, “independent of whether or not groups are dominant”, or whether ideologies have the ability to dominate people’s way of thinking (van Dijk, 1998: 179). He also questions the nature of this domination, or even whether they exist in the first place (ibid., 1998). He argues that the “arguments for the dominant ideology hypothesis” are not “persuasive” because it ignores a detailed study of text and talk and an important content of the dimension of ideology (ibid.: 185). In addition to that, the dominant ideology hypothesis becomes very
difficult to defend in a world dominated by dissemination and recursivity because it is heteroglot. There are too many voices and too many media organisations. It is all about the system of communications. In fact the idea of one dominant ideology is not there. Otherwise, for instance, the Arab spring would be a linear process.

In assessing van Dijk’s perspective, one might perceive that he rightly argues that the “dominant ideology hypothesis” does not seem to hold true, and his claim is surely sound when he stresses that the arguments for it are not persuasive (van Dijk, 1998: 185). As van Dijk argues, Marx’s traditional approach is mostly “philosophical either with little interest in detailed study of text and talk and other ideological practices, or ignoring the important cognitive dimension of ideology” (van Dijk, 1997: 25). Van Dijk’s approach, in contrast, embodies different understandings and a multidisciplinary approach to ideology.

Van Dijk’s conception of ideology goes beyond earlier definitions (1998), and establishes a detailed multidisciplinary approach which sees it as serving as the “interface between social structure and social cognition” (1998: 8). Here, social cognition is defined as the “system of mental representations and processes of group members” (van Dijk, 1995: 18) which “monitor” the practices of social actors, such as journalists (van Dijk, 1998: 119). This theory of ideology consists of three main components: social functions, cognitive structures, and discursive expressions and reproductions (ibid., 1998). The last components are important in tracing the discourse of reporting news media, and consequently the way ideologies play a role in reshaping, reproducing, recontextualising, and consequently disseminating news media.

Van Dijk maintains that ideologies can be approached and produced within a wide variety of social and political institutions. In other words, van Dijk’s theory of ideology not only accounts for the ways ideological discourses are produced and understood, but also how ideologies themselves are discursively reproduced by groups and acquired by their members (van Dijk, 1998).

Thus, the definition of ideologies to be adopted in this study is as defined by van Dijk:
The basis of the social representations shared by members of a group. This means that ideologies allow people, as group members, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly. (1998: 8, emphasis in original).

Here, belief systems are socially and collectively shared by the members of social actors (van Dijk, 2006). Further, ideologies underpin social representations which reflect the “social identity of a group, that is its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction” (ibid.: 116). Ideologies thus are “foundational beliefs that underlie the shared social representations of specific kinds of social groups” (van Dijk, 2006: 120).

Ideology, according to van Dijk, has the form of an ideological “group schema that reflects our fundamental social, economic, political or cultural interests” (1998: 69) or, as mentioned above, a “self-serving schema for the representations of Us and Them as social groups” (ibid., emphasis added). In group conflict, as with the political case in Lebanon, this “polarization schema” of the opposition between Us and Them is reflected in the ideological image and representation which groups build of themselves and others, “in such a way that (generally) We are presented positively, and They come out negatively” (ibid.). It goes without saying that “positive self-presentation and negative other presentation seem to be a fundamental property of ideologies” (ibid.).

Lebanon is a scene of struggle and resistance in which all conflicting factions, including Hezbollah, are a manifestation of the binary polarisation of Us and Them at the local and global levels constituted by their stands towards the Israeli interventions in Lebanon. For example, the Israelis label themselves as Us – victims, while referring to Hezbollah as Them – terrorists.

Thus, this framework provides a useful means by which to analyse the various related representations in political speeches and in news media, e.g. speeches by Nasrallah and representations and (mis)representations of his statements in Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

Drawing on this conception of ideology allows the establishment of a “crucial link between macro-level analyses of social groups, social formulation and social
structure, and micro-level studies of situated, individual interaction and discourse” (van Dijk, 1995: 18), with the aim of operationalising the concept of dissemination of political communication across media systems.

In the light of this argument, a modified version of van Dijk’s model of ideology will be drawn on; ideologies will thus be identified in terms of foundational group beliefs, as also consisting of all ideological group beliefs, including the more specific group knowledge and attitudes (van Dijk, 2006). but also in the fluid contexts of interconnected communications. This modified version will be based on evaluative schematisation. Moreover, it will encompass the notion that various leading figures in society, particularly politicians, members of political parties, and journalists, also form their dominant classes – or they are part of them. In such cases they develop and create their own ideologies on the basis of their own interests, aims, and power (van Dijk, 1998), all of which are “ideologically motivated” (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 144).

These representations constitute the basis of discourse and other social practices, and thus control the ‘biased’ personal mental models that underlie the production of discourse (van Dijk, 2006: 121). Moreover, and even more crucially to this study, “ideologies are formed, changed and reproduced largely through socially situated discourse and communication”; they are largely expressed and acquired by discourse by spoken or written communicative interaction (ibid.).

As the mass media are important social institutions, they are integral to these ideological motivations of news representations in which power and ideology are crucial in this respect (Bell, 2001). In Lebanon, as an example, there are competing ideologies manifested in the conflicting group beliefs of various types at a level of intensity unrivalled in the world; these include Muslims, both Sunni and Shiite; Christians: Orthodox, Catholics and Maronites; and Druze, but all interact with each other.
3.2.3 Exclusion and Inclusion

Foucault had also represented discourse “as one of a variety of practices whose most significant units are ‘serious speech acts’, both written and spoken” (Olssen, et al., 2004: 22). According to Foucault (1980), ideology is forms of power/knowledge and hence discourses (understood as epistemic orders). Foucault “replaces the concept of ideology with that of discourse which is defined in terms of “statements (énoncés), of ‘things said’” (Olssen et al., 2004: 22). This thesis adopts a concept of discourse closer to the History of Sexuality than to Foucualt’s earlier work.

Foucault’s foundational argument is that the “deeper level of codes and ideologies is an abstraction”, and sometimes a valuable one, invented by analysts to make sense of how people gain power over each other by prejudging them in negative ways. Foucault discusses how discourse is regulated by institutions in order to “ward off some of its dangers by describing the processes of exclusion which operate on discourse” in order to put limits on what can be said and what can be considered as knowledge (Mills, 1997: 57).

The notion of exclusion is essential in Foucault’s understanding of discourse, which conceives discourse as existing because of a complexity of practices which either allow such statements to be circulated (Mills, 2003) and consequently disseminated, or restrict them and hence fragment them and impede their circulation. The exclusionary mechanism that Foucault deals with is also an essential element in discussing his theory of power, which is examined in section (3.2.3) of this study.

In the *Order of Discourse* Foucault takes up the analysis of the “internal procedures of exclusion”, which are the rules that govern discourses and require that statements must conform to being “in the truth”; hence, this analysis asserts the external procedures of exclusion which also govern discourse (Han, 2002: 92). In this connection, as power proceeds from the institution, Foucault states:

> In any society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a number of procedures whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to master the unpredictable event. (Foucault, 10– 11, cited in Sheridan, 1980: 119).
In this hypothesis, Foucault differentiates between two main types of procedures of exclusions concerning discourses: the first are those which control their power from the outside of the order of discourse, and hence operate as systems of exclusion. The second type is that certain discourses possess particular power and, therefore, danger which motivate the need to control (Sheridan, 1980).

Here, Foucault defines three principles that characterise external procedures. The first is “prohibition” (Han, 2002: 93) or “taboo” (Mills, 1997: 64). The second exclusion about what can be said centres around the discourse of those who are considered insane and therefore not rational (Mills, 1997: 65), i.e., the “opposition between madness and reason” (Han, 2002: 93). The third exclusion maps out what is considered a statement, and hence part of a discursive framework and is the division between knowledge which is perceived to be true and that which is considered to be false (Mills, 1997). Thus, Foucault calls this transition a movement towards the “will to truth” (Mills, 1997: 66): This concern to produce ‘true’ representations seems to many self-evident, and the search for ‘truth’ seems to some a possible goal for academic study. Whilst we often experience this will-to-truth as a richness, a fecundity, a gentle and insidiously universal force [...] we are unaware of the [...] prodigious machinery designed to exclude. (1981: 56).

Therefore, exclusion is one of the most important ways in which discourse is produced (Mills, 1997). The will to truth, according to Foucault, is the main system of exclusion that produces and creates discourse; it is considered to be the most dominant system and is of special relevance to the discussion in this study. A connection here is made with Luhmann in terms of his concept of selection and schematisation (discussed in Chapter 3), which is manifested in representations and (re)representations of news in the mass media. Exclusion thus contributes, in given circumstances, to the creation of new contexts through the processes of dissemination in political communication across media systems.

Rules of schematisation/exclusion operate clearly in the corpus of this study. For example, in the process of breaking the news, the BBC, Al-Jazeera and CNN are confronted with complexities; thus, the actions taken in reporting political news amount to a process of selection in which certain ideological binary codes frame content and ideological stance. For example, Hezbollah is multiply framed as a
resistance movement, martyrs, freedom fighters, terrorists, a party of fraud and a state within a state.

Ideology formation can be seen as comprising functions of power and legitimacy, exclusion, and schematisation. Since ideology is a significant element in establishing “common sense” in society through discourse, it is the “key mechanism of rule by consent, and because it is the favoured vehicle of ideology, discourse is of considerable social significance in this connection” (Fairclough, 2001: 28). This necessitates touching on the notion of the orders of discourse. An order of discourse (cf. Grant, 2004, 2007) is not a closed or rigid system; rather, it is an open system, which is put at risk by what happens in actual interactions (Fairclough, 2002). Similarly, Wodak (2002a) asserts that discourses are open and hybrid and not closed systems, implying the intertextuality and interdiscursivity of dissemination processes.

Open systems have ideological implications in allowing recontextualisation and dissemination in the political sphere of communication. Such notions are reflected in the stances and reactions of the Lebanese political figures and factions, both individual and institutional, including Hezbollah, towards the announcement of the ‘New Middle East’ project. Launched in 2006 by Rice, this confirmed an Anglo-American-Israeli “military roadmap” in the Middle East. The dissemination of relevant representations and thus recontextualisations were largely manifested in the news media.

According to Fairclough, the orders of discourse are defined thus:

The totality of its discursive practices, and the relationships (of complementarily, inclusion/exclusion, opposition) between [...]. The order of discourse of a society is the set of these more ‘local’ orders of discourse and the relationships between them. (Fairclough, 1995a: 132).

It is useful here to note that Fairclough himself embeds his analysis of language and power within the Foucauldian concepts of social and discursive orders and practices which act on each other (Foucault 1972, 1980, 1984). Fairclough uses the term orders of discourse which he recontextualises in his vision of critical discourse analysis for the semiotic dimension of articulated networks of social practices. This is relevant to
the political field which, according to Fairclough, is partly constituted as a particular order of discourse.

3.3 Discourse and Communication

In order to understand the role of the news media and its constructions, it is necessary to focus attention on the structures of discourses and on the ways in which these relate in terms of communication to institutional arrangements on the one hand, and their relationships with audiences on the other.

For the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on the multiplicity of discourses, and their recontextualisation and schematisation in political and media systems. In addition, the target primary and secondary audiences, including media outlets as audiences, are crucial in the process of analysis, particularly since Nasrallah constructs his self-communication with a range of specific and general audiences in mind.

Discourse will be investigated as a social construction of reality (cf. Foucault) with particular emphasis on framings that are fluid and dynamic.

3.3.1 Discourse and Power as a Communication Medium

Power in terms of political discourse is of special relevance to this study. It is a key element in any related discussion of discourse, particularly in relation to political communication and media institutions; it connects with ideological substantiations. Foucault (1977) defines power as the ability to function; it is thus possessed “by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate” (in Kogan, 2005: 12). Power for Foucault is understood in terms of performance. He emphasises the point that any construction and building up of power relations in social issues requires production of a discourse which is described in terms of multiplicity and dynamism of power relations in the context of communication. Since the
Dissemination of discourse is a significant key of the analysis of the data of this study, exploring multiple power relations is extremely relevant – as Foucault anticipated:

Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization: as the process which, through ceaseless struggle and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or even reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect. (1979: 92).

Alternatively, Foucault puts forward several notions of power: that power is not possessed but exercised; it is productive as well as repressive; is not centralised, but rather dispersed (one could say disseminated), flowing from bottom up (Olssen, 1999) and top-down in a recursive process; it is also assimilated in practices rather than in agents (Olssen et al, 2004). Foucault characterises power as relational, i.e. a multiplicity of force relations is imminent in the areas which constitute its own organisation; nevertheless, owing to its being relational it is therefore “omnipresent” in the sense that it implies an ongoing production among people as well as social institutions (McLaren, 2002).

As far as this study is concerned, media and political spheres are conceived as sites of power and struggle which entail resistance; i.e. a form of power that circulates. Dissemination of communication in such cases is best illustrated and realised in the multiplicity of discourses constructed by forces in Lebanon as a vital site of struggling group beliefs expressed by various religious sects and political orientations (cf. 5.1.2). This is the status of the context of political debates in Lebanon in which there are multiple intersecting discourses that divide and polarise group beliefs. These discourses are embedded in a series of different local and regional, and indeed global, contexts in the processes of dissemination in political communication and news media. This is related to Foucault’s earlier understanding of repressive discourse which is closer to Gramsci’s repressive power and hegemony. Hegemony according to Gramsci refers to the process by which the dominant classes or class fractions, through their privileged access to social institutions, spread and encourage values that support control over the economic condition of society and consequently politics. These values constitute dominant ideologies in society (Gramsci, 1971), (see the distinction between early and later Foucault in section 3.2).
In the domain of news media in which dynamic discourses travel across social spheres, the dissemination potential of communication has become acute. Media organisations are locked into each other, even if they might prefer not to be.

These power relations are illustrated in Nasrallah’s words as he addresses his multiple audiences – adherents and opponents on the same footing – and conveys messages to both of them. He says:

My message on this occasion is devoted to the men of the [Islamic] Resistance, [...] people, kinfolk, beloved ones, friends, [...] and the faithful ones in Lebanon and outside Lebanon who stood by us throughout this war. (Nasrallah, the Arabist website, 14 August, 2006).

In these words, power relations are interpreted across different audience contexts: Nasrallah’s relations with both his allies and opponents on the one hand, and power relations with the mass media on the other.

By contrast, Luhmann constructed his theory of power in terms of communication, which is closer to the conceptualisation of this study. He bases his theory on overcoming a “casual notion” of power, and thus replaces the classical theory of power with a system notion of power (Borch, 2005: 156). Luhmann signals that power is a “code-guided communication” (Luhmann, 1979: 116):

The function of a communication medium lies in transmitting reduced complexity. [...]. In the case of power too, it is this transmission of selection which is the main point of interest. (ibid.: 113).

Power is thereby presented as a question of transmission of selections. However, Luhmann (1979) rejects the metaphorical view of communication as transmission, as an unsuitable to an understanding of power for it is restricted to the relation of sender and receiver. Instead, Luhmann’s model is based on conceptualising communication as based on triple selections: utterance, information, and understanding (Luhmann, 1995). Luhmann implies here that the utterance indicates the message transmitted by the speaker; the information introduces new content that is against what had been previously communicated. After being communicated and understood, it is then available for subsequent communication.
This implies that media communications cannot be seen as linear; they are recursive, because they are not self-contained flows in one direction (e.g. from production to reception as an ‘endpoint’). Both productions and receptions form a recursive whole in the age of dissemination (they link into each other as authorship and audience vie for a voice – consider the impact of social media on mainstream media). This recursivity of communication is manifested in the discursal framings of news media.

As discourse produces knowledge as one of the effects of power, it also produces truth: two interwoven elements. As already stated, discourse, according to Foucault, has its own rules of appearance and its own conditions of appropriation and operation. Thus, from the very beginning of its existence, it poses the question of power; “an asset that is, by nature, the object of a struggle, a political struggle” (Foucault: 1972: 120). Thus, the “configuration” of Foucault’s discussions of power, knowledge and truth is a key element in what constitutes discourse (Mills, 1997: 17).

In any society [...] there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. (Foucault, 1980: 93).

It follows from this discussion of the notion of selection that reference should be made to Luhmann’s notion of binary codes. There is a very useful conceptual complementarily or connection to be made between Foucault’s selection/discourse concept and Luhmann’s binary code concept (that is the distinction between opposed values, e.g. globalisation/localisation, peace/war, us/them, East/West), (cf. section 3.2.1). Discourse as a knowledge system is manifested in the process of schematisation (Luhmann’s binary distinctions) in the news media which is a form of communications (Grant, 2007); that is the included representations are represented as salient and prominent. A similar view is found in Schmidt (2001: 17) where he refers to the need of “cognitive schemata” to reduce complexity by the process of selection. He also refers to the “semantic programme” of a society which determines the dichotomies of world models, typically the same as knowledge systems (ibid.). He argues in this respect that:
knowledge systems, world models are based on dichotomies and differences [...] What ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘true’ or ‘false’, ‘sane’ or ‘ill’ really mean in a society and what relevance these distinctions and their combinations actually possess, are determined by what might be called the semantic programme of a society. Only this programme gets and keeps the world model going. Accordingly, I propose that this programme of socially obligatory semantic instantiation of world models be called culture. (Schmidt, 2001: 18)

These knowledge systems, as stressed earlier, are produced in discourse. In such a context of communication, semantic devices act as dichotomies (which denote divisions in positions, e.g. citizen/state). This is particularly helpful in indicating how these dichotomies operate in the communication process related to the data corpus of this study; it is exemplified, for instance, in the different references to members of Hezbollah in media outlets as terrorists/freedom fighters.

The uprising in Egypt in January 2011 offers an interesting example of the dynamic interplay of discourse and power, and the intensity of recontextualisation processes. News reporting in various news media outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, the BBC, CNN, and Al-Manar, among many other local and global media agencies, exercised various forms of framing and schematisation and hence (re)contextualisation. The official Egyptian TV satellite station and other state mass media, for instance, took an approach in concealing the event and conducting practices which included impinging on communication by describing the events as a “demonstration of few thousands of citizens”; meanwhile the BBC (Arabic and English), Al-Jazeera (Arabic and English), Al–Manar, and CNN reported the event as a “crisis”, “revolution”, “unrest”, and “uprising”. Thus, reframing process takes place as the original event is transformed from its original content and oscillates across multiple new media contexts; in each phase it is transformed into a new discourse in different ways subject to ideological evaluations. Within these representations, and transformations, a dynamic and uncertain process of dissemination emerges, which marks the new realities of the content of the message (cf. van Leeuwen, 2009).
3.4 Intertextuality and Dissemination

Intertextuality provides a rich area for exploring the process of dissemination in political communication. Whereas dissemination operates at the level of media communication systems, intertextuality has a complementary focus, namely the text or voice.

Dissemination operates on the level of recursivity of media outlets counting on each other, rephrasing, paraphrasing, contextualising. The concept of intertextuality is important for this study because it operates in the texts of media organisations.

Discussion in this section will draw on the two concepts of Bakhtin’s dialogism and Kristeva’s intertextuality, for three reasons:

Intertextuality (that is a text is embedded in a context which is “synchronously and diachronically” (Blackledge, 2005: 10) built on many other texts) is a wide-ranging textual phenomenon and indispensible communicative ideological manifestation in the field of political communication and media systems. It is crucially relevant because political rhetoric and news media employ various types of intertextuality with the aim of reinforcing a message in terms of “legitimisation or delegitimisation” (Chilton and Schaffner, 1997: 23), and projecting effects on the target audiences. Intertextuality is a dimension of recursivity. Intertexts operate at the level of textual links of various forms; while recursions operate at a higher level across media systems in terms of ‘threads’ (a continuous narrative with connections across content) and ‘levels’ (textual, subtextual and intertextual). Dissemination functions on a higher level as a more global concept.

Secondly, intertextuality and dialogism presuppose a plurality of voices and meanings, which is an important theme for the argument of this study with its focus on the dynamics of communication across media recursivities and the endless shifts in media contexts. In this sense, Bakhtin and Kristeva suggest that all texts are in ongoing contexts of productivity, change, and transformation of meanings. Since intertextuality can illuminate the hidden political and ideological conflicts in society, this will be a significant asset in the data analysis of the study under investigation.
The theorising of intertextuality proposed by Kristeva provides a new “theoretical strategy” (Vargova, 2007: 425) in terms of the notion of recontextualisation and dissemination.

Thirdly, Lebanon is a unique case of intense ideological ‘dialogism’ because its confessional political system is rooted in historical and religious intertextuality. The communication system is uniquely intertextual and thus heightened by intense media scrutiny. Lebanon lies at the frontline of the West and the Middle East. In addition, the political speeches of Nasrallah are heavily loaded with intertextuality which is ideologically motivated.

Since intertextuality is a “precondition for the intelligibility of texts involving the dependence of one text as a semiotic entity upon another, previously encountered, text” (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 219), it is also a significant mechanism through which a text refers to other texts (cf. it is a form of recursivity at the textual level) in alluding to future or present contexts, by invoking meanings expressed in those other texts. It is important to understand the function of intertextual references which are often ideologically charged, as is the case with the data in this study, with the aim of understanding the invoked intended meaning in a given political text.

This section examines the concepts of dialogism and heteroglossia as developed by Bakhtin. It also provides a sense of the overall shape and development of the use of specific forms of intertextuality to highlight the ideological dimension of the concept of intertextuality as a whole, that is, as a condensation point for recursive processes. As a result, this will support my hypothesis, namely, that these communicative categories play a central role in the field of media systems and political communication. Therefore, exploring how these two concepts of dialogism and intertextuality operate and are recontextualised in news media and the implications in multiple contexts is crucial.
3.4.1 Dialogism, Heteroglossia, and Intertextuality

In what follows, Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism and heteroglossia will be explored before we move to investigate Kristeva’s understanding of the term intertextuality. Kristeva is concerned with laying out the manner of constructing the text out of already existing discourse (Allen, 2000).

The theory of intertextuality proposes that no text is original and unique in itself, but is a tissue of inevitable sources and quotations from other texts; i.e. the text is an intervention in a cultural system. Intertextuality is therefore a useful concept for literary study as it concerns the study of cultural sign systems generally (Allen, 2000). The same holds for media systems. It is extremely useful because it “foregrounds notions of relationality, interconnectedness and interdependence in modern cultural life” (ibid.: 5).

The concept of dialogue is at the core of Bakhtin’s theory, and it is the key function of intertextuality in which Bakhtin focuses on the ‘social significance’ and the ‘historical performance’ of language and linguistic interaction; thus, utterance is a critical term for Bakhtin (Allen, 2000: 17). Heteroglossia, double-voiced discourse and hybridisation are complements of the term of dialogism (ibid., 2000). They are the textual and discursive manifestations of the communicative phenomenon of dissemination.

Bakhtin believes that languages and discourses are inherently dialogical, and hence they account for constant communication and interaction. The literary text, according to Bakhtin, (although the focus of this study is on media dissemination) is not a mere object that comprises words; that is, every utterance has centripetal and centrifugal – two conflicting – forces:

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity. (Bakhtin, 1981: 272).
The “centripetal force is ‘verbal-ideological’, centralizing, authoritative and normative, while the centrifugal is a decentring, ‘decrowning’, changing and openly heteroglot force” (Orloff, 2001: 101).

Here, the authoritative force, which is located in a “distanced zone” (ibid.), is exemplified in a static and monologic language, and it is always opposed to the reality of heteroglossia, whereas the persuasive force is exemplified in an open and plural language which allows active communication. Therefore, communications situated in these forces involved in the utterance are constantly conflicting with each other. In other words, dissemination is dialogism in the age of media globalisation.

Thus, the notion of heteroglossia (multivoicedness) is especially rich in the analysis of political discourse. Consider the following example:

The US defence secretary has warned that Hezbollah now has more rockets and missiles than most governments. Robert Gates accused Syria and Iran of supplying weapons of “ever-increasing capability” to the military wing of the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement. “This is obviously destabilising for the whole region”, he said following talks with his Israeli counterpart. (BBC news website, 28 April, 2010).

The notion of heteroglossia is reflected here in a plurality of voices that are found in the same text; they belong to different bodies in negotiating the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. Several voices of multiple participants are reflected in this dialogue. First, there is the reported voice of Gates, the US Secretary of Defence; and second, the voice of the BBC in its ideological framing of Hezbollah as “Shiite”, and in its reference to the military wing of Hezbollah, endorsing, thereby, UK government orientations in making a distinction between the two wings of Hezbollah: the military and the political.

Because a dialogical heteroglossia is dynamic and thus a recontextualisation, the reference to Hezbollah is transferred to another discourse in the reporting of CNN, where it is described as “the terrorist movement of Hezbollah”, and as the “Islamic Movement of Hezbollah” by Al-Jazeera. The identity of the object – Hezbollah – is thus also deeply contested by multiple voices.
The aim of this section is to demonstrate that the concept of dialogism is also highly relevant in political discourse and communication. In spite of the fact that Bakhtin’s work was originally developed in the study of literary texts, particularly the genre of the novel, its justifications go beyond that field restriction.

Literary discourse is conceived by Bakhtin as an “exemplar of heteroglossia, more specifically, in the range of literary genres, the novel is held to be most dialogical” (Grant, 2007: 53). The very idea that language is dialogical embodies a plurality of meanings, as it is characterised by heteroglossia, a plurality of voices behind each word, regardless of the intentions of the speakers (Irwin, 2004). Utterances are interrelated: Bakhtin uses the term “dialogism” along with its two forces: the centripetal and centrifugal exemplified in the monologic and the dialogic (Allen, 2000). The reason is to designate the relation of every utterance to other utterances, which are typically analogous but not identical to the relations between the exchanges of a dialogue (Todorov, 1984). In other words, any relation between two utterances is necessarily intertextual9 (ibid.).

According to Bakhtin (1981: 271), a “unitary language” gives expression to forces working toward concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralisation, which develop in vital connection with the processes of socio-political and cultural centralisation. Language has certain centripetal forces which work to render it monologic, a “unitary language”. The centripetal forces of language life, which are manifested in unitary language, occur in the midst of heteroglossia, which grows, spreads more widely, and penetrates deeper levels as long as language is alive (Holquist, 1981).

More specifically, the concept of power operates in the struggle between these two forces that are operating with heteroglossia. But monologism would position the reader as a subject who sees “the objective events of the book” unfold and derives their meanings (Hirschkop, 1985: 775). Meanwhile, dialogism, having no stable outside position, would force the reader to participate in this ideological struggle “enacted in the text’s attempts to represent reality” in which there would be no

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9 This includes the sense of one drawing on formulations of the other.
objective events on which the reader could judge the claims of conflicting ideologies. In other words, “every utterance is analysed as a battle between two logics which can end in victory for one logic (monologism) or a standoff (dialogism)” (ibid.: 772). Recursivity means that even attempts to close down interpenetration fail given the pressures of dissemination. Dissemination can be said to be not genre-specific in this sense.

In the words of Todorov, Bakhtin always expresses his opposition to “the monological dialectic”, because it does not open up to other discourses in social history and hence prevents communication; while dialogism is infinite and open to new discourses and contexts (Todorov, 1984: 160). This connects with the recontextualisation and dissemination in the domain of political communication, particularly news media, because, in the age of dissemination significant dynamic and hybrid recursive communication is enabled through dialogised heteroglossia at the communication system level. This process takes place in the recontextualisation and transformation of the original political phenomenon through multiple and diverse domains of media contexts. Thus, recursivity frames political communication as an essentially dialogical process.

The emphasis on the double-voiced discourse causes Bakhtin to be not only concerned with the clash between different character-centred discourses, but also an essential element of the discourse of each individual (Allen, 2000). Todorov (1984) comments on these two aspects of “monologue” and “dialogue” by suggesting that Bakhtin uses the dialogic and dialogism widely to an extent that makes the monologue dialogical in the sense that it has an intertextual dimension.

The US and Israel view Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Its members were involved in kidnapping westerners and in attacks on foreign troops who were based in Lebanon during the civil war. The UK says the military wing of Hezbollah is a terrorist group, but not the political side of the organisation. UN Security Council resolutions call for armed militia groups like Hezbollah to disarm. (BBC News website, August 22, 2006).

Heteroglossia is reflected and disseminated here in a plurality of voices that are found in the same context; they belong to different bodies in negotiating the issue of disarming Hezbollah. First, there is the voice of the BBC reporter, and secondly he is
reporting the voices of Israeli, the USA, the UK and the UN. Each has its view and demands.

The term “hybridization” is of special importance to dialogism. Bakhtin presents a differentiation of three degrees of the presence of the discourse of the author: the explicit dialogue, the reproduction of other’s discourse, and hybridisation. It is a “generalization of free indirect style” (Todorov, 1984: 73), that is, any utterance of a single speaker, but which contains within it utterances of double manners, languages, styles and axiological horizons of social voices rather than that of the individual voice. The two concepts of dialogicity and heteroglossia, which index plurality, help to “restore to textual practice the material interplay of ideological and axiological positions in discourse and their overlapping contextual domain” (Thibault, 1991: 120). This becomes even more acute in interlocking media systems in the age of dissemination.

This supports my hypothesis in implying that the dynamic nature of specific texts reflects communicative plurality, and interwoven multiple rhetorical and linguistic elements of this dynamic nature necessarily are part of a process of recontextualisation and dissemination of communication across media and political systems.

Heteroglossia has been an influential element in challenging the “hermetic” perspective of communication “and thus increasing sensitivity to complexity” (Grant, 2007: 19). It contributes to a “better theoretical understanding of complexity” (ibid.). Bakhtin’s originality and influence on the social human sciences stems from his specific characteristics through which he absorbed the concept of “dialogicality and from the tenacity with which he pursued the ideas of boundlessness”, which offered new openings for interpretations of language and a multivoiced world devoid of constraints (Marková, 2003: 32). Dialogicality implies that every individual lives in a world of other’s word (1979/1986: 143, in ibid.: 33). Worton and Still also emphasise this idea, pointing out that the theory of intertextuality implies that a text “cannot exist as a hermetic or self-sufficient whole, and so does not function as a closed system” (1990: 1).
The notion of dialogism draws attention to the process of recontextualisation and dissemination in the field of political communication and news media. The “already uttered” in politics enters into contests over how best to represent and reformulate previously uttered words. That is to say the previous discourses are recontextualised in news discursive events with “varying degrees of precision and impartiality (or more precisely partiality)” (Bakhtin, 1981: 339, in Hodges, 2008: 484).

In this way, intertextual “links across speech events figure prominently” in how political issues are represented according to the various perspectives involved in the debates (ibid.) of the bodies involved in the news media. Here, discourses are transformed, circulated, and recontextualised and disseminated into new discourses “across domains of practice and knowledge; words and ideas wander from mouth to mouth, and across minds, texts, and discourses, in an intercrossing of contexts and positions” (Linell, 2004: 116).

The term “intertextuality” was first coined by Kristeva in Desire in Language: a Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, published in English translation in 1980 (Bazerman, 2004), along with Todorov’s Le Dialogique in 1981. These works were the main contributions to “easing the reception of Bakhtin’s work in theories of intertextuality”, and influenced literary and translation theories during the 1980s and 1990s (Grant, 2007: 45).

In her synthesis of Saussurian structuralism and Bakhtin’s dialogism, Kristeva draws attention to the “post-structuralist position that there is no transcendental signified” (Irwin, 2004: 228). Her semiotic approach represents an attempt to examine the text within a textual arrangement of elements that have double meaning, one in the text and the other in the historical and social context (Allen, 2000); she argues that “every text is under the jurisdiction of other discourses” (Worton and Still, 1990: 9).

The text, in Kristeva’s view, is a productive structure, a “practice” and a “productivity”, particularly in poetic language (Allen, 2000: 36). It is also “a permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text”, where utterances from other previous texts “intersect and neutralize one another”, so the individual and the cultural text belong to the same textual material and they are inseparable (ibid.:
Her approach is an attempt to employ a vision of texts in a state of production rather than “products to be quickly consumed”, taking into consideration not only the object of the study but also the subject, the author, and the reader (ibid.: 34).

Nevertheless, Allen argues that in this case we should not think of the notion that texts present a unified meaning; rather, we should begin to view them as a combination and compilation of sections of the social text. As such, “texts have no unity or unified meaning on their own; they are thoroughly connected to ongoing cultural and social processes” (Allen, 2000: 37).

Although Bakhtin’s work embodies two axes, dialogue and ambivalence, Kristeva expresses the view that they are not distinguished enough; she writes:

Horizontal axis (subject-addressee) and vertical axis (text-context) coincide, bringing to light an important fact: each word (text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read. (1980: 66).

Therefore, Kristeva refers to texts and defines the dynamic literary word in terms of two axes: the first one is a horizontal axis, the status of discourse that connects the author and reader of a text, and the other is a vertical axis, which connects the text to other previous texts. Consequently, these two axes are considered to share the same unifying codes (Allen, 2000). Further, the horizontal relations between primary texts are less explicitly linked, while vertical intertextuality explicitly refers to other texts (Fiske, 1987).

The vertical axis is manifested in the following extract:

To those who claim that the French and Vietnamese resistance groups handed over their weapons to the authorities, I say that there are some resistance groups which have taken or demanded authority after victory. (Nasrallah, Tebyan website, 26 May, 2008).

In this form of direct and explicit intertextuality, Nasrallah is referring here to the debates about the necessity of handing over Hezbollah’s weapons shortly after the end of the Israeli interventions in Lebanon, which were conducted by some political factions in the Lebanese society.
The historical allusion to the French Revolution which started in 1789 and the Vietnamese resistance of 1961-1971 against the Americans is used here by the speaker to reinforce the idea that these two did not hand over their weapons after their missions had been accomplished. A comparison is made here in which Hezbollah’s status as a resistance movement underlines for the reader that the request is illogical. Yet, historically it is not the first incident, because there are earlier precedents. It could be stated that Nasrallah is seeking to create a historical narrative.

Kristeva also examines Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogue and ambivalence, and ascribes to him the concept of dialogism; thus, she writes: “Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (1980: 66).

These insights are related to the core theme of this study: dissemination in news media and political discourse. In certain incidents this dialogue takes place through the process of storytelling, for instance, starting a journey from text production to reception by means of a process of multiple versions of translating into the target language designed for multiple audiences before it is recontextualised and disseminated across various orders.

As far as this study is concerned, modified categorisations of intertextuality will be adopted to meet its purposes in terms of mediated processes of dissemination and recontextualisation. It could be stated that the intertextual approach of Bakhtin and Kristeva pluralises the notion of communicative normativity, making it an open and heterogeneous textual ‘stratum’ (Vargova, 2007: 422). This approach further connects communication textuality to the “broader social practices and transformative struggles in society” (ibid.), which makes it suitable for the investigation of the data of the study in hand.

In addition, as intertextuality is an attempt to “disrupt notions of stable meaning and objective interpretation” (Allen, 2000: 3), it thus implies recontextualisation and dissemination of communication.

Since this study is concerned with examining how a political phenomenon is contested, reshaped, transformed, recontextualised, and disseminated in news media, the notion of
polycontextuality (cf. Grant, 2007) is relevant to the data analysis as it supports tracing the process of recontextualisation and dissemination in political communication and news media.

The concept of poly-contexts is employed by Derrida and Luhmann; unlike multiple contexts, polycontexts imply interrelations of dynamics and unstable structures. Derrida’s significant conception of “polycontextuality” suggests that writing as communication is detached from intention and inevitably dependent on polycontexts (Grant, 2003: 5). Within the framework of Grant’s conception of uncertainty, it is argued that multiple uncertainties of communication imply that it is possible to explore contexts as multiple and changeable “constraints which are temporarily stabilized by interests” (2007: 152). These interests, which are possible to be “codified as ideologies”, are in turn produced as discourses, while a process of continuous reactivation is required with the aim of sustaining their validity. Grant argues in this context that texts, as “semiotic instantiations” of communication, operate with a series of assumptions and expectations, which are in turn unstable, and generate “polycontextual” interactions of unstable ideologies and axiologies10 (Grant, 2007: 152).

3.4.2 Intertextuality and its Role in Political Communication

[A]t any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth. (Bakhtin, 1981: 291).

Legitimacy (cf. section 3.2.1) is a key issue in political discourse and news media because the primary function of intertextuality is to generate legitimation. The legitimating functions of discourse including intertextuality have an important role to play in maintaining or asserting power and ideology. In employing intertextual

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10 Axiology as a “subjective value sphere is the irreducible subjectivity of evaluation in a social context” (Grant, 2007: 149). That is to say, “mediation at the subjective level is axiology, or subjective valuation, whereas mediation at the social level is ideology” (ibid: 150). Axiology “constitutes a belief system” that is “peculiar to the world view of a language” which is “located amidst the tensions of centripetal and centrifugal forces of discourse” (ibid).
references in political communication, the process of legitimation is highly significant, since intertextuality carries special weight in establishing the historical textualisation of the narrative of identity. It also represents organisational principles to support narratives (e.g. of resistance, defence, destiny, victimhood) and plays a vital role in legitimation and delegitimation.

The question of the narrative of identity connects well with the case study of Lebanon as a special case of the larger context of the narrative of identities; i.e. the national, confessional (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, and Christians), sectarian, linguistic, and geographical. What is interesting about Lebanon is that all of these many forms of identities intersect.

In investigating the role of intertextuality in relation to legitimation in political discourse, it is stressed that legitimation which is “closely linked with power and attempts to establish legitimacy” (Vaara et al, 2006: 4) is a key issue in political speeches. Political and media discourses are tightly linked to what is called, in the words of Joseph Nye (2004: 5), soft power (symbolic), that is the power of “getting others to want what you want” (Chouliaraki 2007: 1). This recent understanding, according to Chouliaraki, is well-established in comparison with previous understandings of the conception of power, such as the Sophists’ conviction of the ability of rhetoric to have strong material impacts on the world. Media wars use soft power and are the new proxy wars (e.g. in North Korea, Zimbabwe, and Iran).

Thus, intertextuality is employed in political communication as soft power, as it were, to establish the legitimation of political messages. Meanwhile it is also used to achieve delegitimation, which is the “essential counterpart: others (foreigners, ‘enemies within’, institutional opposition, unofficial opposition” (Chilton and Schaffner, 1997: 213) to present the voice of others negatively, and hence to delegitimise it. With respect to legitimation, which is one of the “main social functions of ideologies” (van Dijk, 1998: 255), the characteristics of political discourse are based on establishing a “hierarchy between Us and Them” (ibid.: 157). It is also argued that in employing certain intertextual references in political discourse and news media, (de)legitimation could be maintained through reverting to “self-
justification” exemplified in positive self-representation and negative misrepresentation of the other (Simpson and Mayr, 2009: 47).

These notions are relevant because they make a direct link between political discourse and the (de)legitimation of the intended political message to be conveyed to target audiences. This is seen in given extracts from the data corpus which delegitimise Israel as a legal state when Nasrallah labels it the “Zionist entity”. Fairclough (2003: 47) also claims that the focus on a “set of other texts or sets of voices”, whether included or excluded, in a text is a key strategy to absorb and realise the embedded intertextuality in such voices.

As discussed earlier, legitimation in political discourse is associated with the need to promote certain representations (Chilton, 2004). Therefore, as far as social actors are concerned, their representations lead to social categorisations, which concern the “processing of information and creating a mental picture of the other as a way of coping with the complexity of the outside world” (Sharzynska, 2002: 253, in Chovanec, 2010: 63).

For example, on the first anniversary of the victory of Hezbollah on 14 August, 2007 Nasrallah uses the following Quranic Verse:

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الْقُرْانُ ﻟِلْمُفْسِدِينَ 

(And We wished to be Gracious to those who were being depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in Faith) and make them heirs. To establish a firm place for them in the land, and to show Pharaoh, Haman, and their hosts, at their hands, the very things against which they were taking precautions. (The Holy Quran, Sura 28, Verses 3-6), (Source added), (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 16 August, 2007).
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In marking the first anniversary of the end of the war in 2006, this intertextual religious Quranic reference was deployed by Nasrallah as an act of persuasion which
serves as a basis for gaining an authoritative voice, thus legitimising the intended message to be conveyed to the (various) target audiences. Nasrallah adopts various discourse registers when addressing audiences of different political orientations, including religious discourse for the sake of maximising his influence when addressing his constituencies (Lahlai, 2012).

Pharaoh and Haman his counsellor are references to America and Israel which are framed as oppressors and tyrants on earth, who caused the killing of women and children during the war in Lebanon, as he says “to ward the tyrants off them”. Its recontextualisation in the Quranic reference lends it considerable historically rooted power.

Thus, the reference here is to the USA being responsible for the atrocities committed in Lebanon, in exactly the same way as Israel. Furthermore, the emphasis here is on women and children because most men, in particular the young men, were fighting on the front as soldiers in the resistance movement. However, despite the advanced military capability of the Israeli Armed Forces, a guerrilla movement with all its limited military aids was able to defeat this legendary army. A comparison is made with Pharaoh, whose rule over the people of Israel also came to an eventual end. In pointing to the relation of two contexts where there is a similarity between the present and the past, the words of Kristeva are recalled here as she maintains, “the textual system both establishes continuity with the past and renews itself for the future” (1980: 66). Using this religious intertextual reference “highlights a historical view of texts as transforming the – past existing conventions, or prior texts – into the present” (Fairclough, 1995a: 134). It is a textual instantiation of recursivity. It could be argued that this “analogy has been employed for ideological reasons” (Lahlali, 2012: 10).

The main concern of the following section is to explore the ideological saliency of intertextuality in translation as a communicative form in the political field, particularly in the way it is transformed and recontextualised and schematised in political communication.
3.4.3. The Ideological Dimension of Intertextuality

Intertextuality carries heavy ideological weight. The “relationship between ideology and texts is richly imbricated and not one of external determination” (Grant, 2007: 157).

The Bakhtinian ideological self or ideological becoming refers to the way we develop the way in which we view the world and our systems of ideas (Freedman and Ball, 2004). This ideological “becoming” takes place in an ideological environment which has multi-voices, in which possibilities of new communication challenges and opportunities for cherishing people’s understanding of the world exist; that is “human consciousness does not come into contact with existence directly, but through the medium of the surrounding ideological world” (Bakhtin/Medvedev, 1978: 14, in Freedman and Ball, 2004: 6), through which a process of “selectively assimilating the words of others” takes place (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Such a process describes a typical modern state of affairs in news media and political discourse.

For Kristeva, the subject is a semiotic level within a process of signifying practices, in which the signifier is taken as the model of the signified. Kristeva therefore views the text or its constituent parts as ideologeme (Allen, 2000), a term that enables her to absorb the inherent ideological value of the sign (Moi, 1986) as having a historical and social combination located within the text of society and history (Valdeon, 2007).

The implications of this notion in Nasrallah’s speeches are shown, for example, in his statement about “Wilayat al-Faqih” (the guardianship of the jurist), which mirrors a historical and religious ideological sign.

The Wilayat al-Faqih is a doctrine established by Ayatollah Khomeini, who used it to take power as Supreme Leader of Iran in 1979. It claims worldly, political, and social authority over all Shiites. More specifically, it entails the recognition of the absolute worldly authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The teachings of the guidance of the theologian-lawmaker stem from a theory of power drawn up by Khomeini which is prescribed in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.
of Iran. Moreover, it endows the “theologian-lawmaker with both spiritual power and political leadership” (El Husseini, 2010: 359).

In referring to such a doctrine in a political speech, Nasrallah is articulating a historical religious discourse in a modern political discourse in an attempt to revive or remind his audience of such a doctrine and its implications for different social and political levels.

Multiple languages in texts “live a real life, they struggle and evolve in an environment of social heteroglossia” (Bakhtin, 1981: 292); this textual heteroglossia, along with social pluralism, entail that texts are the “embodiment” of an existing socio-ideological dialogue between the present and the past and between different groups in society (ibid., 291, in Valdeon, 2007: 423). Thus, it could be stated that our political reality is the result of the media dissemination processes.

For example, Nasrallah says during the war in Lebanon in 2006:

If you bombard Beirut, the Islamic Resistance will bombard Tel Aviv. [...] Whenever [sic!] you decide to stop your campaigns against our cities, villages, civilians and infrastructure, we will halt our rocket attacks on the Israeli settlements and cities. (Nasrallah, BBC World Monitoring translation, 3 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

Here, Nasrallah offers an initiative which implies that Hezbollah would stop rocket attacks on Israel if Israel stops its attacks on Beirut. It was picked up and recontextualised and disseminated by media outlets in different frames, such as

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has threatened to bomb Tel Aviv if Israel hits Beirut. (BBC news website, 3 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

Hezbollah leader offers ceasefire to Israel. (Breaking news website11, 3 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

Nasrallah vowed to strike Tel Aviv [...] Nasrallah also offered an olive branch in his lengthy statement (CNN news website, 3 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

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It is interesting to note in the last extract that CNN incorporates political, religious, and historical discourses in which the metaphorical intertext of “an olive branch” is employed to describe Nasrallah’s initiative to stop bombing. It is widely known that an olive branch represents a symbol of peace and reconciliation in Christianity and Islam. It is also associated with ancient Greek tradition.

3.5 Translation and Dissemination as a Political Communication Process

Political communication across cultures and media systems requires translation. This makes translation a unique source of sensitive, value-laden dissemination. Intertextuality is “key to translation of any kind” (Baines and Dalmasso, 2007: 237). The key purpose of this section is to provide an account of translation in the multiple contexts and audiences of political communication as an important medium that has effects on the dissemination processes of news media. Translation is important in political communication because information is made available across linguistic borders, and reactions to statements released in a given country are but “reactions to information as it was provided in translation” (Schaffner, 2004: 120, in Bielsa and Bassnett, 2009: 11).

Translation in news media is highly challenging for this study, which contextualises translation as a highly significant dimension of political communication. In addition, only some studies in translation have given sufficient focus to audience design in terms established by Bell (1984, 1991), which is again challenging for this study.

As far as this study is concerned, the reasons for considering news translation are threefold. First, translation as a mediator factor (Bielsa, 2005) is a relevant feature in the process of recontextualisation and dissemination in the domain of political discourse and political news. News translation is mediation as a recursive communication. It is applicable to “the case of text production in news media (Valdeon, 2005: 198). Evidently, “news text producers occupy a central position between the source of the news and their readership” (ibid.). As such, the process of transformation of news media is not separate from translation for every translation involves transformation (Schaffner, 2010). Analysis of “translational
recontextualisations can contribute new insights into the representation of politics and politicians across linguistic, cultural, and ideological barriers” (Schaffner, 2008: 23).

Second, as translation involves recontextualisation across linguistic, cultural and ideological boundaries, it is as “an integrated part of the politics of international relations” (Schaffner, 2010: 275). It is further to be stressed that the production, distribution, and consumption of translations are discursive practices which are determined by socio-political factors on a large scale.

Third, there is a gap in the field of translation in political discourse and communication and political text analysis (cf. Bassnett, 1990, 2002; Snell-Hornby, 1990, 2006; Pym, 2004; Schaffner, 2004, 2010; Holland, 2006; Delabastita, 1990 among others). Furthermore, the role played by translation in the “global news” has only recently enjoyed sufficient attention (Holland, 2006: 230).

All of these elements emphasised the lack of intrinsic interest in translation studies in the field of news media and political discourse. It has been more than twenty years since those calls were expressed, however, until today, the need to fill this gap has been a pressing one.

3.5.1 Translation and Dissemination in News Media

In placing translation in a broader framework of media recontextualisation, an attempt is made to approach translation in news media and political communication as part of a new theoretical framework in this field. Besides, drawing on audience design in political news is a trend that has rarely been adopted in exploring translation in global political news. Such an approach will be applied effectively to the corpus data of this study. The political speeches and statements of Nasrallah and their recontextualisations across news media outlets during the war in Lebanon along with their translations, recontextualisation and disseminations worldwide across media systems constitute an interesting source of material to be explored in the light of the notions which will be discussed.
As translation means “one of the many forms in which works of literature are rewritten, one of many rewritings” (Bassnett and Lefevere 1990: 10 – emphasis added), recontextualisation processes are necessarily conceptualised in this process of translation and in the way it is disseminated across various contexts in news media.

In the following section the process of news translational recontextualisation through media systems will be examined. In addition, the multiple audiences in the media and the concepts of localisation and globalisation will be also investigated in the process of dissemination of translation as political communication.

3.5.1.1 News Media

Translation and the media are said to have a common function: communication, which is particularly relevant to the theme of translation of news media (Cronin, 2005). News translation is a new area of translation studies research which can be regarded as a sub-branch of mass media translation (Orengo, 2005). Despite the predominance of English as a global lingua franca, the significance of translation is increasingly growing; translation is thus becoming a key mediator of global communication (Bielsa, 2005). It is no coincidence that Al Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN have both English and Arabic services.

In political discourse translation plays a pivotal role in negotiating cultural difference and in shaping the “dialectics between homogeneity and diversity in the production of global news” (Bielsa, 2005: 142). Similarly, it plays the same central role in the global circulation of news, which is mainly produced by powerful organisations such as Western news agencies (ibid.).

It is important at this stage to make a clear distinction between literary translation, or translation studies, and news translation, which is of concern in this study. The paradigm is different with regard to news reporting. A story about a political event is generated in an oral or written form; it is then “rewritten in a different language in an agency and sold around the world” (Bassnett, 2005: 125). A text here is not likely to be translated in the traditional sense of the term; different textual practices are
adopted, including “summary, paraphrase, addition and subtraction, reshaping in accordance with target culture conventions, rewriting in a particular house style” (ibid.), (or according to the ideological motivation of the media producers in the case of this study). News stories undergo a series of textual transformations in which the objective is to represent that text to a specific audience, on their terms (ibid., 2005), which maps onto the theory of audience design which will be investigated in the next section.

As translation is a necessary mediating factor, Bielsa stresses the need for examining homogenising trends along with “domesticating strategies aimed at a fluid communication with target readers and exoticising devices through which the discourse of the Other is staged in the media” (2005: 142). Mediation is defined here as a process which

involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, significant and insignificant, as media texts and texts about media circulate in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production. (Fairclough, 2006: 23).

These mediated meanings circulate in primary and secondary texts through a series of intertextualities and in “the interminable discourses, both off-screen and on-screen, in which we as producers and consumers act and interact, urgently seeking to make sense of the world” (ibid.: 23). They thus play an essential and important role in the process of dissemination in the new political age.

News media can be accounted for as “culture-bound texts” (Hatim and Mason, 1990: 190), as they are manifested in the ideological nuances of the various organisations in communicating with the target audience. Thus, translation in news media takes the form of double mediation between politics and reception and across media contexts in the global media system.

Translation is a regular phenomenon for news production, even if this is not always explicitly shown, particularly so when a journalist’s text comprises quotes from various foreign sources; these are usually incorporated in the text in a coherent way without any reference to the fact that they were originally made in another language.
(Hatim and Munday, 2004). The addition of ‘said through a translator, or an interpreter’, is the exception rather than the rule in media news texts (ibid.).

The news production system reveals its real complexities with news media; that is in the process of production of news language as layered in the vertical dimension rather than fragmented horizontally in which different texts are produced in the final analysis (Bell, 1991). Such processes in the news media necessarily involve a process of translational recontextualisation, especially when the source text, such as the statements of Nasrallah during the war in Lebanon in 2006, is translated by different media agencies.

Fowler (1991) illustrates how discourses of the news are related to their institutional and economic positions and circumstances. In other words, cultural and economic factors play a significant role in shaping the reproduction of ideology, and hence translation. For example, the local news in Lebanon, apart from the government official channels, is presented by several TV and satellite channels financially established and supported by different ideological categories of leading figures in political life, e.g. Al-Manar (cf. section 5.3).

Media, according to Luhmann (2000), create suspicion about their reported news. This is because the dependence of audiences on news media entails a number of “paradoxical” positions (Ross and Nightingale, 2003: 151). An example that best demonstrates such positions is that numerous and diverse reports about an event make people feel hesitant and less certain about the available information and hence refer to the media for answers (ibid.: 2003). Consequently this uncertainty leads media audiences towards more dependence on the media. As such, this mainstream of media in maintaining a “web of meaning” results in allowing and reverting to framing the “unusual or cataclysmic” which leads to the decontextualisation of information by making it ‘news’ and consequently recontextualising the reported-events as “contemporary history” (Ross and Nightingale, 2003: 151). By the same token, some aspects of mainstream media practices are labelled as professional ones which seek to separate knowledge from its users, marginalise the audiences and keep them outside the news creation circle. This immobilisation (that is a state of ineffectiveness, i.e. rendering audiences inoperative) of audiences practised by the mainstream media is
shown to be as fertile ground for promoting a sense of manipulation by the media (ibid., 2003).

In assessing some similar views, Venuti (1995), in the context of misrepresentations in translation, challenges representing violence (towards the original enunciation or text) which is embedded in the purpose and activity of translation, and postulating the concepts of domestication and foreignisation. Vidal Claramonte points out that “a translation is a re-writing of the original text and the translator, inevitably a manipulator; we are faced with the problem of what to do with text of an ideology which does not coincide with our own” (2003: 71). This implies that the process of translation in given contexts, e.g. news media, is but a recontextualisation, where at times in the last phase of transformation, to borrow Barthes’s expression (1968), the death of the source text is announced; but a new process, following Derrida (1977), of ‘infinite dissemination’ is begun. Translation is an important component of wider dissemination processes.

On the other hand, Luhmann argues that this notion of manipulation is caused by how the news is produced, by the fact that audiences have to engage with the available news production in order to know the “concealed going-on, of political machinations” (2000: 39). This very notion is highlighted by some researchers in translation from Arabic into English in the domain of culture in general and in political communication in particular. For example, manipulation of certain terms in Arabic, such as jihad, “triggers images of violence, terrorism and fundamentalism; labels among many that are pretexts but serve as pretexts reserved for the Arabs and Islam” (Faiq, 2004: 11). This practice leads to influencing the views of target audiences on the source culture, a matter which “ultimately leads to subversion of texts through translation and/or other discourses at all levels” (ibid.: 16).

This is seen in an example from the corpus of this thesis. In referring to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a prominent figure in Hezbollah, Nasrallah says:

We believe that “Israel” is the enemy and that it is responsible for the assassination. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 22 February, 2008).

Meanwhile, the Guardian reported the event as follows:
Supporters gather to mourn the death of Imad Mughniyeh, while a rally marks the anniversary of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri’s assassination. (The Guardian news website, 14 February, 2008 – emphasis added).

There is a range of discourses and double meanings articulated in reporting and translating this event. A particular effect is the adoption of the ideological lexical choice “death” in pointing to Mughniyeh, while referring to the death of Hariri as “assassination”, although both were assassinated, as reported by some media outlets at the time of the incident.

Since the corpus of the current study pertains to the domain of news translation from Arabic into English, it is useful in this respect to refer to some main themes in this domain.

As far as news translation from Arabic is concerned, translating from Arabic into mainstream Western languages is based on an established system of “topoi” that has characterised both micro and macro dimensions of translation (Faiq, 2004: vi).

It is true that intercultural translation has a role in bridging the gaps of hierarchies between cultures and people; however, it has given rise and form to discourses of both domination and resistance, “becoming therefore the interplay of cross-cultural pride and prejudice” (Faiq, 2004: 12). It is argued that, in referring to the practices of cultural translation from Arabic into English, the cultural encounter in translating from Arabic determines the production, circulation, and reception of texts; any differences brought by the translation is now designed (Faiq, 2004) for the target-language culture, within a framework of “double-edged” identity formation, an ideological position of “intelligibility” shaped by its canons, taboos, and codes (Venuti, 1995: 10).

Nevertheless, research suggests that news translation is a significant instrument contributing to shaping domestic attitudes towards foreign countries. As Schaffner and Kelly-Holmes (1995: 10) put it, “attaching esteem or stigma to specific ethnicities, races and nationalities able to foster respect for cultural difference or hatred based on ethnocentrism, racism, or patriotism”, could fit well in analysing the data of the current study in terms of how news translation plays an essential part in the
process of recontextualisation and dissemination as a mediator in the realm of political communication.

This could be related to some recent writings in the field which reflect some consequences of certain practices of news media translation. A remarkable series of events related to the Arab and Muslim world have taken place in the last two decades, in which the rise of “militant Islam” has come to the surface, and Islam, Muslims, Arabs, the Arab world, and the Middle East have featured prominently in the mass media as a result of these events (Elzain, 2008: viii). Translation from Arabic, even of pragmatic texts as defined by Lefevere (1996), still makes immediate use of the fixed structures and vocabulary that have persisted for many centuries, associated with the image of the Arab and Islamic culture as fundamentalist (Faiq, 2004). The images of Arabs and Islam are not only normally translated into established discursive strategies (or schemata) and a range of allusions for the target language readers, but also according to the norms of translation choice and ways of publishing and reviewing (ibid.).

Thus, the heteroglossia in translation and the recursivity of communication is especially relevant in the field of news media and the process of translation, recontextualisation and intensified by dissemination worldwide (cf. Schaffner, 2008).

3.5.1.2 Localisation and Globalisation in the News Media

From the perspective of translation, localisation involves:

taking a product and making it linguistically and culturally appropriate to the target locale (country/region and language) where it will be used and sold. (Lisa: 2003, in Pym, 2004: 29).

While ‘globalisation’ could be illustrated in this sense as: “the widening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (Held et al., 1999: 2, in Bielsa and Bassnett, 2009: 19). According to this definition, which identifies globalisation as increased connectivity, it is perhaps necessary to state the position of translation within the framework of globalisation.
News texts are global products; they are distributed through a localisation process involving reception by locales of a given text, and simultaneous multiple versions of the new report in addition to the production of a new target text in which translation is just a part of the journalist’s aim (Orengo, 2005). The opposition (or interaction) between globalisation and localisation, Orengo argues, characterises the new forms of translation, which are “intrinsic to environments and contexts” where texts are to be increasingly disseminated and adapted to more than one “locale at once and in real time”, and new forms of translation encounter these texts against other types of translation (Orengo, 2005: 169), such as news media.

Global news transmission can be accounted for as a form of communication, (following O’Hagan-Ashworth, 2002), in terms of “translation-mediated communication”, where mediation occurs through the process of translation with the involvement of new technologies globalisation dynamics on a wide scale (Orengo, 2005: 174). Thus, in this context of communication, globalisation means “a process to enable the message to be adaptable to the condition that may be imposed by receivers who do not share the same linguistic and cultural backgrounds as the sender” (ibid.).

An analysis of translation as a “key infrastructure of globalisation” opens avenues to conceptualise how cultural difference is negotiated within globalisation. This analysis also allows for an assessment of how “present trends towards cultural homogenisation and Anglo-American domination are mediated at the local level through strategies of domestication and hybridisation” (Bielsa, 2005: 143), through which a dominant discourse is effectively rewritten in new contexts. This necessitates examining globalisation as translation on the basis of “articulation of the global and the local” (Bielsa and Bassnett, 2009: 18).

A typical example is how the American ideological mainstream, following the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September, 2001, portrayed their worldview as a struggle between the Western world and a dangerous, extremist world, led by some Arab and Islamic groups. This helped legitimate the terms of response to terrorism and fundamentalism, particularly through processes of “rewriting” and thus recontextualising and disseminating involved in news media translation. In turn, these
ideological selections are localised and reproduced and disseminated through news translation.

As stated earlier, it is a process of representations of events that are transformed into new settings, either through adding new elements, or through deleting others; thus, the arrangement of events may change in the new context, or some elements may be substituted for others. Such argumentation strategies, which are identified in local news text and political discourse, can be raised and repeated in a new setting, incorporating new ‘voices’ as they go (Blackledge, 2005), (cf. Grant, Bakhtin). Thus, translation is an activity that is doubly contextualised, since the text has a place in two cultures (Bassnett, 1990), and in our case here in multiple media systems.

3.5.2. Multiple Media Audiences

As noted above, Hezbollah needs to consider multiple audiences at national, regional, and international levels. This is the logic of dissemination. For this reason, the discussion in this section will draw on Allan Bell’s theory of audience design as an approach for investigating the dissemination processes involved in the multiple constructions of Hezbollah.

Bell’s theory of audience design is particularly helpful to this study for three reasons. First, it is useful in examining and tracing discourse shifts in translation and their causes (Mason, 2000) across different contexts, starting from the source text, within the process of (re)production in news media. It is a particularly important feature of investigation in the process of news translation, recontextualisation, and dissemination.

Second, audience design is a key notion in understanding “how the text producers gear their output to receivers (Hatim and Mason, 1997: 12). It informs all levels of communication (Bell, 1984), including “a speaker’s linguistic choices (Gal, 1979; Dorian 1981, in Bell 1991: 105). That is to say, choice is motivated; choice is a selection and evaluation.
Third, Bell’s theory (1984, 2002) assumes that speakers design their style of talk for their audience and examine their performance within this framework. This is extremely helpful because the genre of the study under investigation includes a multiplicity of audiences in political discourse communication and news media as interlocking parts of a global media system.

Bell introduces the notion of audience design as a framework which acknowledges that much of “our inter-personal linguistic behaviour” exemplifies a distinctive pattern which is guided mainly by our response to our audience (Bell, 2001: 165). Meanwhile, he understands referee design dimension as an integrated framework which acknowledges that creative and dynamic choices about the linguistic representation of identities are constantly made, particularly in relation to others we are interacting with or “who are salient to us” (ibid.). Audience design is important in investigating recontextualisation in news translation; Bell asserts that “we should no more conceive of language without audience than of language without speaker” (2002: 144). Since the use of English gives room to newsmakers to address the outside world in a direct way, it then also offers them more chances for “audience design” (Bell 1984, in Holland, 2006).

In audience design, Bell (1991) argues that style is the speaker’s response to his / her audience; an “accommodation” model which explains the justified reason behind having an audience design (ibid.). It involves an assumption that speakers accommodate their speech style to their addressee with the aim of having their approval (Giles and Powesland, 1975; Giles and Smith 1979, in Bell, 1984: 162). It also assumes, as Bell (1984) maintains, that persons respond mainly to other persons, that speakers take most account of hearers in designing their talk. Media language, moreover, is regarded as “referee designed”: i.e. the media audience is separated from the communicator, yet it still receives the communication (ibid.: 191). It is ”audience” in the sense of style which consists of four categories:

1. Addressees whose presence is known; they are ratified participants in the event and are directly addressed;

2. Auditors: they are known, ratified but not directly addressed;
3. Overhearers: they are known to the speaker but not addressed in a direct way.

4. Eavesdroppers: their presence is not known by the speaker (ibid.: 192).

For example, Hassan Nasrallah begins one of his speeches after the end of the war in Lebanon in 2006 by saying:

> With your steadfastness and resistance a man such as Chavez [...] can say what he said yesterday in the United Nations. The Lebanese resistance today inspires all the resistance in the world, all the free persons, all the noble people and all who refuse to surrender to American humiliation in the world. This is our victory and this too is the result of our battle. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 22 September, 2006).

These are the declared (as opposed to implied) audiences which Nasrallah is addressing; however, in delivering such a speech after the end of a war which occupied the attention of a number of concerned social and political bodies worldwide, he is indeed aware of the forces of mass media and political institutions, and more important, Israel, the country which started the war.

Nevertheless, according to Bell (1984: 177), in mass communication, the case is not typically the same; a mass media audience includes:

1. Addressees: the target audience;

2. Auditors: who are not targeted but are known to be receivers;

3. Overhearers: who are effectively the entire remaining population, since a mass medium is defined by its general availability (ibid.).

In this context, it is worth noting that the target audience for Nasrallah is more than one specific audience at the local level; it is multiple, as stated earlier. In the case of this thesis, assuming multiple and implied addresses as target audiences will be made operational in tracing evidence of implicit and explicit audience design in the exemplars in the corpus data because the data reveal precise extracts of multiple implied audiences. News media outlets are themselves secondary audiences, but, as
mentioned before, they at the same time construct their news stories about Hezbollah targeting specific audiences as well.

In such a classification, mass communication inverts the normal hierarchy of audience roles, and mass auditors are likely to be more important to a communicator than immediate addressees (ibid., 1984).

The possibility of having multiple and implied audiences as addressees in the same political speech of the speaker is large, hence could be valid in the case of the following example from the corpus of this study, the BBC quoting Hassan Nasrallah:

Personally, I consider it a natural decision coming from a country which founded the Zionist entity {Israel}, a main partner in uprooting the Palestinian people and the creation of the usurping state of Israel. (BBC news website, 2 July, 2008).

The above is an extract, referring to the UK, from one of Nasrallah’s speeches which is quoted and translated by the BBC.

In this excerpt there could be multiple layers of audiences of the speaker (Israel, USA, UK, EU, UN, the Arab countries, the Muslim countries (for instance, Iran); the auditor (those to whom the target text is made available), and the eavesdroppers (BBC readers). There is an attempt to situate the translation vis-à-vis the socio-textual practices of the target readers, e.g. in adding Israel within parentheses, which implies political and ideological transformation through a translational recontextualisation.

Media institutions are agents or forces of social power which have a characteristic role in constructing reality in which multiple audiences are involved. Their interconnectedness in a global media system gives them huge disseminating power.

The notion of audiences is characterised as “problematic”, as pointed out by Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998: 1), through expressing concerns about the effects of mass media on different categories of audiences, and at the same time worries about the role of media in the ideological framing. Ruddock (2001) refers to the concept of reception as evidently a complex procedure, to the extent that, according to Abercrombie and Longhurst, all audiences are ‘active’ to a degree. However, media audiences are large and multilayered; they thus represent an important influence in
media content, particularly within the interaction between the ways in which language and media work (Bell, 1991). Several disciplines have approached audiences from different perspectives, including the approach of audience-oriented research, which focuses on media content and asserts the fact that media “live by the size and composition of their audiences” (Bell, 1991: 84).

Some publications on critical audience research, such as those of Lewis, 1991; Morley, 1992; Moores, 1993, 1996; Nightingale, 1960; and Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998 have focused on the qualitative audience research of the 1980s and 1990s; however, little attention has been paid to the theories and methods of other paradigms (Ruddock, 2002). Consequently, the pre-1980 era has little to tell about media audiences and the nature of media effects, which Ruddock considers to be a gap in this respect. Therefore, an understanding of social phenomena is based on building complex pictures of reality using the many tools available to the researcher, and if all research traditions are paradigms – whether strong or weak – the ways in which these non-critical research traditions have informed our understanding of audiences should be considered in this case (ibid.).

According to Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998), there are three contrasting types of audience where ‘performance’ is pivotal in their construction. The first is the simple, direct audience where there is a communication between the sender and the receiver. The second is the mass audience, evolving throughout modern history and “aligned to the boundaries of the nation state and so most readily identified with both public service and the needs of citizens” (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998, in Livingstone, 2005: 26). The third is the diffused audience, “no longer containable in particular places and times”, but rather closely related to all aspects of daily life, “certainly in industrialised” countries (ibid.).

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter developed a theoretical framework which explores discourse as textual instantiations of media-realities. It sought to investigate discourse constructions,
intertextuality in political communication, and news translation in media and political communication systems in terms of the dissemination of communication.

Attention was drawn to the role of ideology in language use and discourse; the way ideology in the political sense is employed as a communicative structure; and the ideological implications of the interpenetration of politics and mass media through certain procedures such as inclusion/exclusion, and schematisation. Ideology is mediated by discourse which schematises, legitimates, excludes, includes, and frames.

Discourse was highlighted as conceptually vital with respect to dissemination. In addition to that, in the production of discourse, the procedures of exclusion and inclusion were also examined. Discourse was also investigated as a social construction of reality, with particular emphasis on framings that are fluid and dynamic.

This chapter also explored the concepts of Bakhtin’s dialogism and Kristeva’s intertextuality and applied these to the recontextualisation processes in news media.

An attempt was also made to integrate translation in news media and political communication. The discussion in this section drew on Allan Bell’s theory of audience design as an approach to investigate the dissemination processes involved in the multiple constructions of Hezbollah. The discussion also drew on media institutions as agents or forces of social power which have a characteristic role in constructing the reality in which multiple audiences are involved. Their interconnectedness in a global media system gives them significant disseminating power.

The discussion illustrated how text producers in news media play a significant role in “mediating between politicians and the general public”, and therefore, the way in which they contextualise the discourse of political news (Schaffner, 2008), thus circulating and recontextualising it.

The argument revealed that media communications are not linear, but indeed recursive in the sense that they intersect with all social systems, framing and
reframing media reality in a recursive dynamic of dissemination. It was evident that in processes of recursivity and dissemination, and during the journey of the news story across multiple media contexts and audiences (schematisations, representations, recontextualisation and also mistranslation and misinterpretation), a new political reality is created.
Chapter 4    Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to set out the methods used for the investigation of the media constructions of Hezbollah and their recursive representations of the process of dissemination. This is informed by the theoretical framework in the second and third chapters, namely: reconceptualisation of political communication in complex media environments and the recursive communications between media organisations and political systems, in addition to their implications for the framing sequences of significant actors.

This chapter proceeds with an overview of the advantages of adopting a qualitative method of analysis in view of the aims and objectives of this study. Moreover, it aims to explain the methodology derived from the theoretical framework outlined to treat the question of recursive communications across local and global media contexts. For this purpose, the approach of this chapter will be to demonstrate the process of recursivity of original political statements of Hezbollah and their representations across the polycontexts of the three media outlets. It will be noted that these recursivities (the circulation and recontextualisation of news stories across different outlets) are defined by significance. It will also outline the procedures of analysis of the data with the aim of explaining and developing a better understanding of the scope of the methodological tools chosen. This approach will be applied to online original texts of addresses delivered by Hassan Nasrallah and the competing representations of these texts in the web print output of the three news media outlets, namely Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. The empirical analysis of this study in Chapter 5 will then seek to demonstrate the processes of recursive political communications and their implications for the framing of Hezbollah and Nasrallah.

The chapter then examines the methodology and the procedures of data analysis, collating the data and the rationale behind data selection, justifying the choices of tools for the case study, and reconstructing the necessary instruments for establishing a framework for the data analysis, using a qualitative methodology, namely: discourse analysis, text analysis, and thematic analysis.
4.1 Dissemination, Recursivity and Qualitative Methodology

Methodology provides the “theoretical perspective that links a research problem with a particular method or methods” (Hesse-Biber, 2010: 456). In order to arrive at a successful achievement of the objectives of the study at hand, it is important to take into consideration the approaches and tools to be followed in analysing the data corpus.

Any discussion of a research method is “dichotomized and presented in either a quantitative or a qualitative” approach (Glenn, 2010: 99) in which each represents a particular discourse (ibid., 2010); it would be useful at the outset to centre discussion in this section around which approach, quantitative or qualitative, provides the best possibility of achieving maximum insight into the features of the data corpus of this study.

The case study is concerned with the competing media constructions of Hezbollah and their representations across news media outlets. Qualitative methodological analysis was chosen in order to meet the objectives of this study. It is the most adequate methodology for the analysis of the corpus which aims to conduct a comparative analysis to identify traces of recursive communication in news media. This technique may inspire new investigations of the ways in which news media are disseminated and recontextualised as a consequence of media connectivity.

Since the theoretical model of this thesis focuses on some aspects of media recursivity, the media system and its sub-systems, the web output of these three media outlets provides evidence of the recursive construction of a political phenomenon. It also increases the number of variables, such as ideological motivation, and ensures a comparative basis for the data analysis, which is a key issue in the discussion and analysis of the recursive framing of Hezbollah.

Thematic analysis will also be carried out, comprising specific, salient themes of statements by Nasrallah. This will be followed by an analysis of the different transformations and recontextualisations which take place across news media.
The qualitative method is most appropriate to the methodological model of this study for five reasons.

First, qualitative research seeks “depth rather than breadth” (Ambert, et al., 1995: 880), an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons behind it (Glenn, 2010). Qualitative researchers seek to acquire “in-depth information” about a smaller sample (Ambert, et al., 1995: 880), which focuses more attention on the context of the phenomena which are analysed (Miles and Huberman, 1984). However, representativity will be gained through the corpus range (68 articles from the outputs of the three media, and 62 articles taken from 31 speeches by Nasrallah, 2006-2009) and by taking a comparative approach to different outputs.

The above implies that qualitative analysis, as a means to explain a phenomenon, does not seek to assign frequencies (Alasuutari, 1995). In this case, a qualitative approach to analysis, through using a number of different data instruments, enables an interpretation and explanation of the process of recursivity and dissemination of political communication in media systems.

Second, qualitative research often allows theoretical conclusions to be made as well as empirical results which may be used in later research (Alasuutari, 1996). It enables, according to McEnery and Wilson “fine distinctions to be drawn [...] the ambiguity which is inherent in human language – not only by accident but also though the deliberate intent of language users – can be fully recognised in the analysis” (2001: 62), whereas quantitative analysis does not. In other words, qualitative analysis is exploratory “hypothesis-generating”, whereas quantitative research is concerned more with “testing hypotheses” (Glenn, 2010: 96). According to Alasuutari, in respect of methodology, conducting qualitative research is a “very data-driven process in the sense that most of the time one has to proceed inductively from empirical observations towards more general ideas” (2004: 595).

Third, qualitative research makes it possible to “make sense of a particular, unique phenomenon, to come up with a local explanation of a local matter” (Alasuutari, 1996: 378); i.e. to adopt a context-sensitive approach. This is all the more important when working across contexts. It may be possible to extract some clues from the
research in order to obtain support for the task of “local explanation” (ibid.). Since functional qualitative interpretation is “an essential step in any corpus-based analysis” (Baker, 2006: 2), qualitative techniques, taking into account analysis of the social, political, historical, and intertextual contexts “which go beyond analysis of the language within texts” (Baker, et al., 2008: 274) are most helpful in the case of this study.

Thus, this approach is consistent with the purpose of this work: that is to dissemination and the recursivity of political communication evident and explicit in respect of news media constructions; and to demonstrate the way political communications are recontextualised and disseminated. This will be achieved by taking examples of significant political phenomena, and tracing how they were reconstructed, represented, and disseminated across Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

Fourth, qualitative research frequently falls within the context of “discovery” rather than “verification” in the sense that it gives room to the emergence of new information which might manifest new practices and/or new forms of social structure (Ambert, 1995: 880). An example is the context of the war on Lebanon and the related discursive and social practices in the context of selected significant texts. Qualitative research may also “involve complete redirection, or modification of, or additions to, existing ideas” (ibid.) within the notion of dissemination and recontextualisation. That is to say, the role of the researcher is key and must reflect his/her role in the research process and manifest this in the analysis, and it can yield useful insights about programme implementation (Glenn, 2010). It is interesting to note that Alasuutari (2004: 604) suggests that “uniqueness of each research process is characteristic of qualitative research”; qualitative researchers in this sense may be commended for their innovativeness that “defies all the rigid rules of science”. Contrary to the quantitative approach, qualitative research enjoys the merit of flexibility (Alasuutari, 1995). It is thus particularly well suited to the analysis of the process of recursivity and dissemination of political communication.

Fifth, qualitative research aims to refine the process of theory emergence through a continual “double-fitting” in which researchers generate conceptual images of their settings, before a process of shaping and reshaping of these settings takes place.
according to their continuous observations, enhancing thereby the validity of their developing conceptualisation (Ambert, 1995: 881).

One of the recognised major disadvantages of qualitative methods for corpus analysis is that “their findings cannot be extended to wider populations with the same degree of certainty with which qualitative analysis can because although the corpus may be statistically representative, the specific findings of the research cannot be tested to discover whether they are statistically significant or likely to be due to chance” (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 63). However, adopting a qualitative approach enables the researcher to conduct an in-depth analysis based on context sensitivity. In other words, qualitative analysis follows and captures small variations, motivations, and intensifications which add depth to data analysis.

4.2 Selection of Data Sources

The case study of this project concerns the media construction of the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon which has special regional significance. Lebanon has been described as the “crossroads of Arabic-based information” (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 63). It is a region where political events are condensed and many political interests coexist.

As an example of a newsworthy phenomenon, Hezbollah is mainly a Lebanese Shiite Islamic militia and a political party, and it operates on two levels: military and political. It has had a great influence on Middle Eastern and international affairs. For example, Hezbollah, as part of the political system, has an influence on shaping the Lebanese political mainstream, controlling the situation in Beirut in 2008 (cf. 5.4.1.2) – an incident that provoked strong local and global controversy.

In 2000, Hezbollah was the first group to force Israel to withdraw from an Arab country, Southern Lebanon, which had been occupied by Israel in 1982. A few years later, targeting Hezbollah in the south, after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a war in Lebanon in July 2006, which lasted for thirty-four days. This war provoked controversy in the Lebanese social and political communities.
Since this event, the political phenomenon of Hezbollah was almost always been significant for news media coverage across the world as a key – and deeply contested – actor in Middle East politics it is represented across contexts in various media outlets, undergoing variation and change in the process. It is described as a terrorist organisation but also as a social movement; and an internal opposition movement. Nasrallah, too, is multivoiced: he addresses a variety of multiple audiences in his political speeches with different messages and different discourses (religious, political, welfare-focused, and historical) for his constituencies. These are his supporters and opponents in Lebanon from different religious dominations: Christians, Muslims, and Druze, in addition to the outside world. Local newsworthiness can inform global newsworthiness; on the local level, he thus addresses Lebanese society with all its different sectors and political stances on the one hand, and the Arab world, particularly Lebanon’s neighbouring countries, on the other. On the international level various audiences, such as Israel, the US, the UN, the EU, Iran, and other implied audiences, are addressed. In addition, the different media outlets themselves constitute secondary audiences in this process. Here, a ‘secondary audience’ means Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and the CNN as part of a recursive communication system in several contexts.

The corpus data is very rich in religious and historical intertextuality, which is politically marked and carries a heavy ideological weight and, furthermore, Nasrallah is a charismatic and eloquent Shiite political speaker and natural interlocutor of the Iranian regime.

Moreover, Hezbollah is significant worldwide. As a source of social and military power in Lebanon, the heated controversy over the arming of Hezbollah constitutes an ongoing issue on both national and global levels. It is a Lebanese Shiite political party and guerrilla force, but, as noted above, has been labelled in Western terms as a “terrorist movement”. In short, it occupies an ideological fault line in the Middle East and global politics and media representations.

The time-frame from 2006 to 2009 was chosen because during this period, the war in Lebanon took place in July 2006 and lasted for thirty-four days; it placed Hezbollah in an intensified media spotlight. The same period also witnessed more salient and
significant events than ever before and fierce group conflict over authority between opposition and alliance. In addition to that, this period witnessed the end of the parliamentary elections which marked the winning of the 14 March Alliance (cf. section 5.1.2) in the parliamentary elections and the appointment of Saa’d Al-Hariri as the new Prime Minister of Lebanon.

Since war is newsworthy, it is of compelling interest to the media and comes as a top priority for news makers (Webster, 2003), a matter which represents a good research area for recursive communication.

The form of the data will be transcripts of web print output rather than TV output and the press. There was no real basis for comparison for video output because it is difficult to access and its availability in the archive is limited. The BBC, for instance, archives only the most recent video tapes.

Some types of texts entail problems to the corpus builder (Baker, 2006) such as spoken data. According to Baker, (2006: 35), digital video output needs to be transcribed by hand – a process that takes much longer than written texts for several reasons. First, news broadcast or spoken texts can be unclear in some of its parts with the possibility of “overlapping dialogue”. The “tape recorder or audio file need to be stopped and rewound as people normally talk faster than the average typist can keep up with”. In addition, more information is also involved than may be required, such as the people who are speaking at any given point and the way they speak; e.g. “prosodic information such as volume, speed and stress as well as paralinguistic information (laughter, coughing, etc.) and non-linguistic data (dog barking, car passing)”. Other problems could be involved in “accurately rendering different types of accents or other phonetic variations which can add to the complexity of spoken data” (ibid.).

Within the proposed conceptual framework, written electronic formats are the most appropriate technique for collecting the data of this study, rather than the audio-visual formats. It was decided to draw on them for two reasons: first, the web output is not only accessible to researchers but it is also accessed and used by millions of people, which indicates the scale of the communication system and how influential it is, particularly in the Middle East.
Second, the web output has added advantages. Obtaining written format is much easier than spoken data. It can be easily communicated and retrieved, which is not the case for video output or television news. The proliferation of the use of the internet means that the written form of news texts can be available on the archives of the web-based output of news texts of these outlets, which allows comparison concerning processes of recontextualisation and framing during the same period on the same news story.

The corpus under analysis was (130) articles, taking into account the multiplicity and diversity of the web output of the three aforementioned media outlets as part of a political communication system. The corpus also comprises speeches that have been delivered and transcribed verbatim, together with articles as the most frequently encountered, and therefore standard, genres in web-based outputs.

4.2.1 Primary Sources: Hassan Nasrallah – Speeches and Contexts

The speeches of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah only from 2006 to 2009, are the primary source of the corpus of this study, selected for their significance, their frequency and the saliency of reports about Hezbollah across a range of different media in this strongly contested terrain.

This project sets out to examine the discursive representations of salient statements about the speeches of Nasrallah, defined by recursive communication; that is, their recontextualisation and representations across media outlets in different frames, between July 12, 2006 and the end of September, 2009. During this period, these speeches were mainly focused upon: the Israeli interventions in Lebanon, which took place over thirty-four days in July 12, 2006; its ongoing consequences at various local and global levels; and a variety of political issues related to Lebanon and the Middle East.

The Arabic source text of these speeches and their English translations are the primary sources for analysing selected statements defined by their saliency (i.e. level of re-presentation in news outlets) and their recursive interaction of such re-

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presentations across media outlets and back into Hezbollah communications. The choice of news web outlets was guided by the reading and viewing of their representations in the news web output of the three media outlets that are mentioned below.

The aim was to conduct a comparative analysis of the interface of the aforementioned representations with media outlets, one defined by recontextualisation and dissemination. In view of this purpose, three different categories and orientations of news media outlet were found to be the best brands for comparing news media representations. The “framing of news from CNN, as the leading US company in global news reporting, and BBC, as the top company in British news operations”, is worthy of exploration (Tian and Stewart, 2005: 290). Al-Jazeera demonstrates the influence of a new “diverse voice” (Seib, 2005: 601) in the realm of news reporting, which is distinguished from Western networks by the fact that it “broadcasts Middle Eastern news from an Arab perspective. Its Muslim-centred news reporting” (Karaiskou, 2007: 3) has grasped the attention of “more viewers, including many in Europe and the US who seek an alternative to the Western outlook” (ibid.). Therefore, Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN are the “most appropriate brands for comparison in global news reporting” (Madia, 1998, in Tian and Stewart, 2005: 290).

In the following section, the choice of the three media outlets – Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN – will be justified.

4.2.2. Secondary Sources: Al-Jazeera Web Output

Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based 24-hour satellite channel, was established in 1996 as a network which operated on the model of Western media, and the English language channel was launched in 2006. The funding for Al-Jazeera came from an initial Qatari government grant of $137 million, in addition to revenue from its advertising sponsorship (Wojcieszak, 2007).

Al-Jazeera has been seen as the culmination of Qatar’s process of democratisation. It is considered to be the first 24-hour Arab satellite news network to have “turned the
tables on state-controlled Arab media” (Karaiskou, 2007: 2). By dealing with controversial issues and “levelling criticism at both religious and political officials”, Al-Jazeera provided its audiences with “alternative news reporting, and challenged the official pro-governmental Arab version of events” (ibid.). Also, as a satellite channel “semi-autonomous from domestic regulations, Al-Jazeera has instigated numerous reforms in the Arab world, and has thus been considered a “counter-hegemonic force in the Arab world” (Wojcieszak, 2007: 119). This is especially true in its reporting of Hezbollah and its coverage of the war in Lebanon in 2006. Al-Jazeera also operates a network with several outputs including the Arabic and English web output.

A complex number of issues surrounds Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting discourses. Owing to the fact that it displayed “shockingly balanced narration of the news and provided an equal platform to all”, it is often described as an “influential challenger to Western monopoly in international television news” (Sakr, 2007: 104). Al-Jazeera at times is identified as striving to demonstrate to Western media its commitment to objectivity (e.g. it acts within the framework of its motto of ‘the opinion and the counter opinion’), while also “catering to the ideals of the Arab-Islamic world” (Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 147).

Much has been said about “Al-Jazeera’s objectivity or lack thereof” (Seib 2005; Hudson 2005; El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; in ibid.: 144). Some recognise Al-Jazeera’s methods as “extreme”; they “incite rather than inform”; it is “disloyal to Arab unity and breaks the long-honoured tacit regional agreement not to use state media to rat on one’s neighbours” (Ajami 2001; Waxman 2001, in Schulthies and Boum, 2007: 145). This could be detected in the “diplomatic scandals and international pressure” on Al-Jazeera from some Arab countries after it broadcast the bin Laden tapes in October 2001 (ibid.: 145), and its coverage of the news of the current uprising in Syria. However, Al-Jazeera “operates on the model of Western media, such as BBC and CNN, pursuing editorial impartiality and independence and becoming increasingly competitive” (Karaiskou, 2007: 3). Al-Jazeera has an audience of approximately 40 million, including 175,000 in the United States (ibid., 2007).
Al-Jazeera is widely known as a major media player. Previous research on the “content, ideological underpinnings and operation” of Al-Jazeera English show that its “approach to and production of news differ significantly from that of other major transnational media organizations like CNN International and BBC World” (El-Nawawy and Powers, 2010: 72). It is further known as “the first news channel based in the Mideast to bring news back to the West” (ibid.: 74).

Al-Jazeera English operates an efficient news output; “visits to its website increased from one million a day before September 11 to seven million daily soon thereafter” (Seib, 2005: 603). The increased availability of its online news has made the news business even more competitive, giving the audience the opportunity to compare the information they are receiving from different sources” (ibid.: 605).

4.2.3 Secondary Sources: BBC Web Output

It is well known that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is the world’s first public service broadcaster and is the largest broadcaster in the world. It is recognised as a global brand and as one of the top providers of information in news media (Oakland, 2011).

The BBC World Service was formerly funded by the Foreign Office but is now also funded by licence fees, i.e. a method of funding by payers not by the Government. The “level of the licence fee is set by the Government”, which means that “the BBC’s activities are not influenced by the interests of shareholders or of advertisers”12.

The BBC World Service is a subsidiary of the BBC (the public broadcaster). It is self-governing in the sense that its various organisational structures contain different programming goals and different requirements for coordinating with other channels in order to gain access to news sources and to “pool its international news-gathering resources” (Barkho, 2008: 129). It has a reputation for “objective news reporting and programmes” (Oakland, 2011: 269). The BBC World Service operates in English as

12 http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/bbc
well as forty-two other languages abroad, on radio, TV, and online (Oakland, 2011), in addition to its English and Arabic news web output.

The BBC purpose has been “to inform, educate and entertain”. Arguably, its values are to remain “independent, impartial and honest” (BBC, 2012). The BBC’s general orientation is that it “does try to be neutral in political matters” (ibid.). It built a “reputation for impartial news reporting and excellent programmes” (Oakland, 2011: 267); however, the framing of any news phenomenon is inevitably partial, and this also extends to the BBC’s representation of Hezbollah – primarily but not exclusively – as a terrorist group.

The BBC “Networking Club— in practice” is one of the pioneer UK internet service providers (Moe, 2008: 226). From 1998 to 2006, the site expanded into a “wide-ranging portal, hosting a long line of innovative services” (ibid.: 227), and, after Moe, is described “by far the most developed and comprehensive” (ibid.: 230). It has a news website which is at present the “most popular online source of updated news and is a free service” (Oakland, 2011: 258), with over 50 million users. Its news service has been labelled one of the best and most comprehensive available (Moe, 2008: 227). It also, along with its online services in general “challenges the core public service broadcasting value of universality”, in the sense that it should it be “available for all citizens and not exclude based on geography, costs, or competence” (Moe, 2008: 226).

The BBC’s international-facing website, bbc.com, is “now attracting 29 million unique users per month (eight million from Europe), with 50% visiting the news pages” (BBC World Press Release, 2008). The BBC World News, previously known as BBC World, is positioning itself as a “tri-media news service, delivering international news and information across multiple platforms – TV, online and mobile”. It is seeking to deliver “live up-to-the-minute news reporting across a broader news agenda” (ibid.).
Cable News Network (CNN) was founded in 1980 by Ted Turner. It is now officially entitled the CNN News Group, and is engaged in a broad range of broadcasting activities across a variety of media, including Cable News Network, CNN Headline News, CNN International, CNNfn, CNN/SI, CNN en Español, CNN Airport Network, and CNN Interactive (Küng, 2000).

CNN has gained a world-wide reputation for live coverage, and it operates as one of the top round-the-clock news reporting channels. Moreover, in addition to its several commercial news services, it has international divisions in nearly 200 other countries, with access to 1.7 million subscribers (ibid.).

Since its inception, CNN has been a “global participatory model”, which relies increasingly on news agency journalism (Volkmer, 1999); it gained an international reputation for its live coverage of world events, such as the First Gulf War. CNN is also known for its in-depth news coverage and for its significant effect on shaping public opinion; however, since the mid-1990s, CNN has witnessed intensified competition owing to the large number of new market entrants (including FNC, FNN, MSNBC, and BBC World) who entered the round-the-clock news field, giving the network its “first taste” of “full-blown direct competition” (Küng, 2000: 106). (Al-Jazeera, too, is now one of CNN’s most significant competitors). CNN has about forty-five news bureaux around the world, including fifteen in the US. Apart from its television service, CNN also operates the top-ranked CNN.com news website outlet, providing syndicated news services.

CNN funding is derived from two main sources of income: subscription fees from cable operating companies and advertising (Küng, 2000). The main concept behind CNN was to concentrate on news and cover that news with global orientation (Küng, 2000). Owing to its being organised on a commercial basis as “both a news channel and news source in one”, it covers “attractive mass news events, such as the Challenger explosion”, and sells this type of programmes to broadcasters and large audiences (Volkmer, 1999: 128). According to Tucker (2010), CNN is now owned by the media giant Time Warner.
Ideologically, views vary about the objectives and orientations of CNN; it is asserted by some observers that CNN sought to underline the distinctiveness of its news product by presenting it in a radically different way to the “slick, groomed approach of the US networks” (Küng, 2000: 104). “We are the underdogs and outsiders of US broadcasting - and proud of it” is one of the “four dominant beliefs that drive CNN's corporate culture and the attitudes arising from them” (Küng, 2000: 106). According to Küng, the concept that CNN is an “underdog” or pioneer, a “battling outsider”, was essential to its “cultural paradigm and linked many of its beliefs” (ibid.: 105). CNN, however, has been criticised about its international news coverage, particularly in the Middle East, for reporting news events from an American perspective, sometimes lacking fairness and accuracy. However, CNN has achieved tremendous success as an international and regional news provider throughout the world (Tian and Stewart, 2005) over a period of thirty years. It is noteworthy in this respect to state that one of the guiding principles of CNN is to create “a role in the process for our viewers” (Peters, 1992: 33, in Küng, 2000: 105); creating an “impression of immediacy and authenticity, of real news stories evolving as viewers watched” (Küng, 2000: 105).

CNN has an established online news production. Beyond its breaking news coverage, its website has experienced impressive growth in key sections with 32 million average monthly page views (CNN website, 18 January, 2013).

The BBC and CNN are known for their widespread name recognition. The BBC is a highly significant UK public institution, while CNN is a globally influential private US broadcaster. This allows for a comparative approach to the way they frame and represent issues and events related to the Middle East, and Hezbollah in particular. Further, the focus on a giant – and increasingly influential – developing world broadcaster, namely Al-Jazeera, can support the comparative approach adopted in this study. It can also help to establish views on how these networks create and disseminate news, which will in turn enable more valid and reliable representative findings to be extracted.

It is noteworthy to state here that the data source was to have included Al-Manar, which is run by Hezbollah, because it represents another giant media organisation with a different ideological orientation. However, owing to obstacles which impeded
the process of collecting related articles from their web output, and the deteriorating situation in Syria and its effects on neighbouring countries, it was difficult to travel to Lebanon in order to fulfil this task. The decision to exclude Al-Manar had some implications for this thesis: its web news output would have been a valuable addition to the data analysis, which would have extended the project’s comparative dimensions.

4.3 Data Collection

The point of departure for the qualitative data collection process was the fact that this study incorporates significant statements of the political speeches of Hassan Nasrallah and their recontextualisations in Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN web output.

The choice of these international media broadcasters was made on the basis of their strong global projection, and their different cultural and ideological backgrounds. The next section will illustrate how they employ various discursive strategies and patterns to represent the same events. This will allow for an exploration of the processes of dissemination of communication.

As has been established, corpora are materials “put together for a particular purpose and according to explicit design criteria in order to ensure” that they are “representative of the given area or sample of language” they aim to account for (Baker, 1995: 225). Therefore, any corpus-based qualitative approach requires methodological procedures for collecting the data (Glenn, 2010).

Sampling in qualitative analysis is not conducted randomly, it is basically purposive. Moreover, data analysis differs considerably, and researchers should be careful in their coding of data and in identifying themes in a consistent and reliable way (ibid.). That is, the representativity of the sample comes from the fact that it is comparative and takes place over a three-year time scale, as mentioned earlier. Analysis will be comparative in the sense that the representations of web outputs of three different media outlets, namely: Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN, emerge in the process of a set of communications of a single political issue.
For the purposes of this study the corpus will comprise four multiple texts of articles, taken from the web output of three news media outlets and also Nasrallah’s speeches. These articles represent manifestations of dissemination of communication; that is, four separate sources of discourse analysis of the way in which a political phenomenon spreads and connects across various constructions of news media outlets for the sake of identifying the process of dissemination of communication in these media polycontexts.

The issue of representation is a vital feature in the corpus base of this study in connection with tracing evidence of dissemination (that is, the transformation process that takes place on the journey of the reconstruction of the political phenomena across multiple new contexts), and recontextualisation (that is “dissemination of discourses across structural and scalar boundaries” (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007: 71)), which is investigated in this framework as a contingency (cf. 2.3) of media construction.

The criterion for text selection will be saliency in the multi-media construction of Hezbollah. The data on which this study is based are drawn from four categories of multiple texts, namely, speeches of Hassan Nasrallah, along with a corpus of statements (taken from 31 speeches) selected by their newsworthiness in addition to articles of the three web output: Al-Jazeera (19 articles), the BBC (23 articles), and CNN (26 articles), over a three-year period between July 2006 and September 2009.

Contemporary qualitative studies are sometimes supported by computer programmes, the benefits of which are mostly limited to storing and segregating data, rather than processing or analysing them (Glenn, 2010). It is useful to utilise software packages such as NVivo, which provides a set of tools that assist in undertaking an analysis of qualitative data (Bazeley, 2007).

NVivo offers simple and organised coding capabilities, and allows for the categorisation of such coding into more encompassing themes. It also enables the researcher to link personal memos to electronic text (Davis and Meyer, 2009). However, despite advantages throughout the analysis process, disadvantages exist

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13 Nvivo, full title NUD.IST Vivo, is designed by QSR International.
The process of simple coding may lack flexibility, “such as when the simple code for specific meaning units needed to be broken down into more specific terms” (ibid.: 122). In addition, the accuracy of simple coding can be questioned; the researcher may assign incorrect code names to meaning units, thus, “mislabelling of meaning unit codes may result in an inaccurate representation of theme frequencies within the data as well as the double-coding of meaning units” (ibid.). Moreover, the possibility of computer or electrical malfunction is an added disadvantage to using any qualitative data analysis software (Davis and Meyer, 2009). Therefore, it was decided not to use NVivo in the process of qualitative analysis, and to use manual data analysis techniques instead, which I believe to be a more appropriate approach in the case of the data of this study. This is owing to the fact that for this context, the software cannot replace the human manual analysis. In the end, NVivo can at best only assist analysis by the researcher, especially in qualitative research.

4.4 Corpus Design

In order to conduct a qualitative analysis of recursive communication, it is necessary to look at the polycontexts that connect the original speeches of Nasrallah and their representations in web-based news media texts.

Two main steps are involved in the process of corpus design: first, identifying saliency, as defined by the dissemination potential in the multi-media construction of Hezbollah; and second, designing the corpus by deciding upon the selection criteria.

Since two languages are involved in the data analysis corpus, namely, Arabic and English (the Arabic source text and the English web output of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN), it was decided that the corpus should involve both Arabic and English versions of the selected statements in the speeches of Nasrallah, (when tracing the process of dissemination across the three media outlets in section 4.5 of the data analysis on the role of translation within the recursive system) for the sake of clarity for the readers who read both languages.
The data were collected using the qualitative method of field research; two stages were pursued:


2. The selection on the basis of the significance of these speeches as framed in the web output of the three media outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

Although the news is in Arabic, the focus of the comparison will be only on English-language versions of these three outputs, namely, Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. It is noteworthy that the BBC and CNN did not have Arabic web outputs during the time-frame of the data (2006-2009); they only recently began to use them, the BBC Arabic news web output was launched in 2008. The BBC Arabic Service was established earlier as a commercial joint venture with Orbit, but it collapsed in 1996 after the BBC broadcast an episode of Panorama that was critical of the Saudi royal family. In addition, generally speaking, the BBC and CNN Arabic reports are translated from the Arabic source texts into English. Therefore, it was important and significant to focus on the English translation of the political phenomena, owing to the assumed role of translation (cf. section 3.5) in the process of dissemination in news reporting. Al-Jazeera English will also be the basis of selection of articles for the sake of comparative analysis with the BBC and CNN English web outputs.

As for the corpus size, small sizes are common in qualitative research methods; however, as Biber notes, “sample size is not the most important factor in selecting a representative sample” (1993: 243). Given that this project is equally theoretical and empirical, and, in order to explore the discursive construction in the process of building a specialised corpus (Baker, 2006) of the theme of this project, the selection of the data had to be large enough to be representative of the theme of this study.

Gaining access to a complete set of the original speeches was not an easy task. In most cases the search revealed a number of speeches of Nasrallah; however, there were several difficulties with collecting the full set of speeches delivered within the specified period. For instance, not all of the speeches were available online. In certain cases it was necessary to use You Tube to refer to the Arabic source speech in order to
resolve this problem. Further, some of the Arabic versions of the selected examples are not available on the official website of ‘Hezbollah Resistance Movement’. They have in-house translation into English in addition to different translations of other websites including the BBC Monitoring Translation.

4.5 Data Instruments

The aim of data analysis is fundamentally to address the media constructions of Hezbollah as a uniquely contested news phenomenon in media environment characterised by recontextualisation. That is, in order “to chart shifts of meanings either within one genre – as in different versions of a specific written text – or across” different genres (Wodak 2000: 192 in Blackledge, 2005: 121), a process of recontextualisation takes place which necessarily involves distortion, misrepresentation, exclusion/inclusion, censorship, schematisation, etc.

The analysis will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a form of discourse analysis, as the most appropriate method for analysis drawing on specific aspects of van Dijk’s approach to ideology and Fairclough’s communicative model. To achieve this, two inter-related methodological techniques will be adopted, namely, discourse analysis and text analysis, including thematic analysis. As noted above, discourse analysis focuses on representations. A political phenomenon or a news story is recreated and transformed into a new context, it thus constitutes the basis of discourse and also other social practices; (epistemic frames, that is the way that discourse frames knowledge, reality, truth; and ideological motivations, which represent the way ideology is conceptualised and recontextualised and disseminated in political and media contexts). While text analysis is a sub-component of discourse analysis, it is designed to examine representations through texts for the level of textual choices in, for example, lexis, grammar, reference, tone (where this demonstrates ideological choice), and intertextuality (where this elaborates narratives of legitimation and delegitimation).
4.5.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

This chapter considers a range of different methodologies relating to text analysis for the level of lexis, metaphors of schematisation, of knowledge, of culture, of reality; however, the most appropriate method is discourse analysis, because it integrates text analytical approaches, which is good on the micro level, but in addition, has a particular focus on the political process beyond discourse analysis.

Thus, CDA fits well methodologically with the data set of this study, which operates with media communication by and about Hezbollah; it relates directly to a very dense confluence of power and ideology expressed through intertextuality, metaphor, and salient lexis.

As noted above, discourse analysis is the study of communicative resources which focuses on the social meaning of linguistic structure, while the main goal of CDA in the study of language is to articulate the rich and complex interrelation of language and power, and to explore the “connections between language use and unequal relations of power” (Fairclough, 2001: 1). Discourse analysis reveals complexities of language which embody particular meanings, while critical discourse analysis focuses on the role of language and social interaction in the production of power relations (cf. Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; van Leeuwen, 1993; van Dijk, 1993, 1997; and Wodak, 1995, 1997).

The emphasis on “discourse reflects a broader focus on ‘all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developments of use’” (Blommaert, 2005: 3, cf. Martin and Wodak 2003: 4, in Hodges and Nilep, 2007: 14). Thus, several identifiable features of theoretical positions have been adopted in discourse analysis research; among which is representations of a politically salient phenomenon are locked in a cycle of reschematisations that constantly displace and contest the object of representation; therefore, it will be adopted as a methodological approach to data analysis for the following reasons:
First, as stated before, this study is specifically interested in media representations at the interface of politics and media, and assumes that they intersect in a number of ways. The multiple dimensions of the term political communication lie within the framework of the relation of political communication, media, and religious systems. Their relevance here comes in terms of exploring the recursive communication and its instabilities (in terms of dynamism which suggests instability and movement but not in a particular direction) across multiple contexts. That is, the political message is recontextualised, transformed, and disseminated.

CDA opts for the “intense tradition of analysing the social and political problems of discourse in general and the discourse of news media in particular” (Valdeon, 2005: 196). Methodologically speaking, in the case of this analysis, this means that an attempt will be made to demonstrate how “a new discourse enters potentially transformative relationships with existing discourses in the recontextualising context” (Erjavec, 2007: 71) across news media contexts. A related example of this would be the way a specific discourse is appropriated from past to present or from a global to a national context in order to legitimise certain practices (Erjavec, 2007), such as when Nasrallah refers to the Vietnam War in the 1960s. This helps to articulate an explanation for social, ideological, and political developments and to expose certain “assumptions made by the media as regards ideology, production and audience” (Valdeon, 2005: 196). For instance, Nasrallah uses in certain instances the marked lexical choice “the Zionist enemy” in referring to Israel, which is recontextualised in different ways and frames by the BBC as “Israel” and sometimes as “the Israeli occupier” or the “Jewish state” by Al-Jazeera. The “Jewish state” refers to the growing demand of the Israeli politicians for a “Jewish state” (the world’s only Jewish majority state), and for the recognition of the Palestinians of this. Moreover, the employment of this by Al-Jazeera, could also communicate with the diplomatic failed negotiations which called for a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian one.

Second, CDA conceives of language as a social practice (Blackledge, 2005). That is to say, language serves a representational and a textual function in which elements of it are responsible for making discourse appear as text and at the same time reflecting its relevance to the context in which it appears (Barker and Galasinski, 2001); it also considers text as the basic unit of communication (Wodak and Weiss, 2005). It seeks
to comprise linguistic views as an integral part of the material social process (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). This is relevant because Nasrallah’s original statements echo lexical selections with heavily loaded intertextuality.

The term discourse is used here in a precise way to show how discourse in the sense of language use functions as a form of social practice that constructs the object about which it claims to speak (Cameron, 2001). Institutional or mediated discourse is of importance in the work of CDA, whereas institutions such as media are important sites for discourse in terms of its ideological significance (ibid.).

CDA thus explores the tension between understandings of language as being socially shaped, and language as socially shaping, i.e. language use constitutes social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief to varying degrees (Fairclough, 1995a). That is to say, language users constitute social realities, their knowledge of social situations, the interpersonal roles they play, their identities and relations with other interacting social groups through discourse (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). In the words of Blackledge (2005: 7), discourse is “a shifting, unstable and broad-based field”. Media interfaces intensify this process through recursive communication.

Fairclough (1992b) argues that systematic textual analysis is a part of discourse analysis; he thus distinguishes between two types of textual analysis, namely: linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis. The diverse approaches to discourse analysis can be enhanced through systematic use of the said two types of text analysis.

Third, in identifying language as a social practice, CDA invests great importance in the context of language use and the relationship between language and power (Wodak, 2002b). It thus takes into account the interface of political and media discourses in the widest sense of the term which testify to the existence of explicit relations of conflict and struggle (ibid.). For example, in referring to the “New Middle East Project”, Rice, the former US Secretary of State during Israel’s war in Lebanon, used the term “creative chaos” – a controversial issue among the different media outlets. It underwent a recursive transformation, starting from the reaction of Nasrallah who said that “[t]hose who sowed chaos, destroyed and killed in Lebanon
are Bush and Condoleezza Rice” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 30 January, 2007); and ending with the media recontextualisations of Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN, reporting it in ways such as a “new project for peace and democracy”. CDA is an approach concerned with describing discursive practices; it illustrates how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies and the effects of discourses on social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough, 1992a).

Fourth, CDA has a special concern with language and power. Its focus is basically on “analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak, 2002b: 2), and it asserts that developing a theory of language which incorporates the notion of power is a central element of social life. This study illustrates how the political communication and media systems undergo a new kind of interpenetration in the age of dissemination. They constantly play back on each other, a matter that adds increasing intensity. This approach is methodologically useful in analysing complex processes, such as the interplay of media representations in the way they reframe an original statement of Nasrallah about, for instance, the “New Middle East project”. An example would be how the diversity of media channels and their power relations with political parties, including Hezbollah, and the intersections of the economic and financial system; and the diversity of religious discourses, all function as conflicting forces employing their media outlets to promote their articulations of the political scene in Lebanon. This could be illustrated in the different reactions and standpoints of the various privately owned Lebanese TV satellite channels in reporting Israel’s war in Lebanon, variously supporting and condemning Hezbollah.

This approach has special views of the relationship between language and society as well as the “relationship between analysis and the practices analysed” (Wodak 1997: 173, in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448). Thus, according to the viewpoint of CDA, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; since it is a blurred power object in modern societies, CDA focuses on making discourse more “visible and transparent” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448). Through discourse social actors constitute knowledge, social roles, identities and interpersonal relations between different social groups (Wodak, 2002c). Discourse is socially constitutive in
the sense that helps to “sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it may contribute to transforming it” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258, in Blackledge, 2005: 4). In this sense discourses may serve to construct national identities (Wodak, 2002c.) or categories such as ‘‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘citizen’, may perpetuate such categories, and may even dismantle or destroy them” (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 40, in Blackledge, 2005: 4). In addition, discursive acts might restore or justify a specific social status quo, or perpetuate and reproduce it. At the same time these discursive practices “may have an effect on the transformation or even destruction of the status quo” (Wodak, 2002c:149). The multifunctionality of language in texts is used by Fairclough who operationalises the way texts and discourses are socially constitutive: “Language use is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and beliefs” (Fairclough, 1993: 134). Fairclough also maintains that these three aspects often exist simultaneously and one may take precedence over the others as will be discussed later in this chapter (ibid., 1993). For example, responses by other media organisations might build on the discourse threads and levels of Nasrallah’s speeches, showing how discourse is intertwined with worldviews.

This is most relevant to the case of this study. Lebanon is a site of struggling forces and challenges of power relations which are indicated in and expressed by language, at the level of marked lexis, or intertextual reference, and disseminated across political and media systems. For example, in Lebanon, these communicative patterns across news media contexts indicate the relationship between linguistic practice and social structure; and, in the process of data analysis, enable linguistically grounded explanations for changes in power relations to be provided.

CDA, by contrast to DA, is a discipline that is concerned with the study of text and talk in context (van Dijk, 1999), that is, the way groups control or influence each other through the form and content of talk and text, below the level of conscious awareness (Stoltz, 2007), to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality, and bias and the way these sources are reproduced and transformed within specific social, political, economic and historical contexts (van Dijk, 1999).
In the light of the above, Fairclough’s communicative approach to CDA (in comparison with other approaches to CDA, such as Wodak’s linguistically oriented approach) provides multiple points of analytic entry (Janks, 1997) and a methodological “blueprint” for discourse analysis in practice (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448), as will be discussed in the next section.

Thus, CDA as a form of discourse analysis will be pursued for data analysis drawing on two trends from CDA approaches, namely, a modified version of specific aspects of van Dijk’s model of ideology and Luhmann’s concept of evaluative schematisation according to belief systems, and a modified multidimensional communicative model of Fairclough which offers an innovative approach to analysing media discourse.

Fairclough’s approach offers a complementary approach to that of van Dijk (discussed in section 3.2.2) to social cognition and discursive components. Van Dijk’s conception of ideology as a framework for political discourse allows the establishment of a “crucial link between macro-level analyses of social groups, social formulation and social structure, and micro-level studies of situated, individual interaction and discourse” (van Dijk, 1995: 18), and his evaluative schematisation according to belief systems.

Like van Dijk, Fairclough’s approach to CDA is a model that combines text analysis with an analysis of discourse processes in studying text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1992a, 1995a). In this sense, and as far as this work is concerned, this approach is particularly useful to the case study of this thesis because it becomes possible to “foreground links between social practice and language, and the systematic investigation of connections between the nature of social processes and properties of language texts” (Fairclough, 1995a: 96). That is, it “enables the analyst to focus on the signifiers that make up the text”, the specific linguistic choices, their “juxtapositioning”, “sequencing” and layout, along with the historical determination of these linguistic selections (Janks, 1997: 329).

Fairclough’s work is instrumental in helping us understand the way language and the social power of groups and institutions, particularly media institutions, are interrelated (1995a, 1995b, 2001). He attempts to investigate how textual analysis is capable of
reinforcing the analysis of media discourse since power relations play an influential role in the process of reproduction, recontextualisation, and dissemination of news media.

Fairclough (1992a: 85) suggests two complementary levels of analysis: micro and macro. The micro level is concerned with how “participants produce and interpret text on the basis of their members’ resources”, whose nature is manifested only through macro analysis (ibid.); that is, linking the text (micro level) with the underlying power structures in society (macro socio-cultural practice level) through discursive practices. The work of CDA is especially important here, because it combines the two senses of discourse and brings them together. This conception facilitates insights into the data analysis in investigating how language figures in social processes as a communicative property, particularly with respect to the intensity brought about by recursive communication across media contexts. For example, text analysis and discourse analysis could be used both for the use of the lexical choice “the Palestinian occupied lands” by Nasrallah, on the text level (i.e. the intensifying marker Palestinian and occupied), and within the epistemological framework on the discourse level (i.e. the political framing of territory).

Fairclough (1992a) offers a multidimensional model that combines a “social-theoretical sense of ‘discourse’ with the ‘text-and interaction’ sense in linguistically-oriented” CDA; namely – text, discursive practices, and social practices (Fairclough, 1992a: 4). That is, this model is investigated at three levels: “the immediate situation”, “the wider institution or organisation”, and “the societal level” (ibid., 1995a: 97).

The first dimension is the text; it is concerned with a language analysis of text, “the written or spoken ‘product’ of the process of text production” (Fairclough, 1992a: 3). It is a “product rather than a process – a product of the process of text production” (Fairclough, 2001: 20); that is, text is referred to here as the linguistic textual features of concrete instances of discourse and text structure, i.e. vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000).

It is noteworthy in this respect to point out that CDA is distinguished from “germane approaches” in terms of its attention to concrete textual features (Fairclough 1992, in
Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448), and it encompasses more detailed analysis of texts than other studies which have been conducted in social research (Blackledge, 2005). This textual approach will also be adopted in this thesis – for example, in the analysis of recursive intertexts. CDA also pays special attention to the ideological forces embedded in language properties. Alternatively, the ideological processes residing in textual structures, as Fairclough maintains, could be explored within the communicative aspects of the linguistic practice rather than pure textual analysis. Fairclough states that an “alternative ideology would be the discursive event itself”, representing ideology as a “process which goes on in events, and it permits transformation and fluidity to be highlighted” (Fairclough: 1995a: 71). That is, ideologies cannot be ‘read off’ from “texts because meanings are produced through interpretations of texts, and texts are open to diverse interpretations and because “ideological processes appertain to discourses as whole social events – they are processes between people – not to the texts, which are produced, distributed and interpreted as moments of such events” (ibid.).

A further point worthy of attention is that language in text is “multifunctional” (Fairclough, 1995a: 6), i.e. it performs three functions: the “ideational, the interpersonal, and the textual” (Fairclough; 1995b: 58). To elucidate further, the term ‘ideational function’ means that it has to do with the texts’ “representational faculties” (in Barker, 2001: 69); the “interpersonal function” refers to the interaction between the speaker and the addressee by means of the text, while elements in the textual function are responsible for making discourse appear ‘as text’ while relating to the context in which it appears (ibid.).

The second dimension of discourse is the discursive practice, within which Fairclough offers a two-fold approach comprising institutional processes and discourse processes which have impacts on the transformations that take place in production and consumption (1995b). This indicates that it is produced, distributed, and consumed in society (Fairclough, 1992a). Approaching discourse as discursive practice means that in analysing vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure, focus should be centred on three aspects that link text to its context, namely speech acts, coherence, and intertextuality (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). This study focuses on both the
intertextual and lexical choice manifestations of discourse in shifting contexts in order to demonstrate how recursive communication works across media contexts.

The third dimension is concerned with discourse as a social practice whose networks constitute a social order, whereas the semiotic aspect of a social order is considered to be an order of discourse which determines the way in which a variety of genres and discourses are linked together (Fairclough, 2002). Through the third dimension of social practice, Fairclough establishes his approach to change, i.e. “hegemonies change” which can be identified in “discursive change” when it is conceived from the perspective of intertextuality (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 449). Following Fairclough (1995a: 97), the link between text and “sociocultural practice is mediated by discourse practice”; that is, the way in which the text is produced and interpreted depends largely on the “nature of the sociocultural practice which the discourse is part of (including the relationship to existing hegemony)” (ibid.). The model of discourse Fairclough develops is framed in a theory of ideological processes in society. Thus, texts in this context are the products of “discursive processes”.

In this respect, it is interesting to explore the two notions of intertextuality and Bakhtin’s dialogism as well as the notion of recontextualisation and their significance in this connection. Since intertextuality is a salient element in the dimensions of analysis (Fairclough, 1992a), it is particularly useful for the data analysis of the study at hand because the “inherent historicity” of texts enables them to assume their role in contemporary society amid social and cultural changes (Fairclough, 1992a: 102). In this context, the question of intertextuality and dialogism arises as an important one owing to the peculiar nature of the data under investigation. In referring to the situation in Lebanon, the level of ideological and intertextual complexity is high and condensed. Nasrallah’s speeches, as an example, are ‘multivoiced’ 14 to paraphrase Bakhtin.

Moreover, the fast transformation and the restructuring of textual traditions and orders of discourse form a striking contemporary phenomenon, which means that the concept

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14 Multivoicedness is another term for Bakhtin’s heteroglossia or “double-voiced discourse” (1981: 324). “It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions” (ibid.).
of intertextuality is necessarily an important and primary focus in discourse analysis (ibid.).

The model of discourse developed by Fairclough is framed in a “theory of ideological processes in society” because he conceives discourse in terms of processes of hegemony and changes in hegemony (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 449). Therefore, the political concept of ‘hegemony’ can be usefully employed in analysing orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992a), which are open systems and not solid ones (Fairclough, 2002).

This control which is exercised through the hegemony of groups over each other through the form and content of talk and text usually takes place below the level of conscious awareness (Stoltz, 2007). This is typically the case when news recipients perceive the media as “an unbiased window on the world” (ibid.: 106), in the sense that anything that is said about the world is “articulated from a position; language is not a clear window, but a “refracting, structuring medium” (Fowler 1991: 11, in ibid.). Discursive change articulates change in social practice – that is discursive change is social change. Also, discourse is a field of contestation and therefore social practice.

Fairclough’s three dimensional model (1992a: 8) helps evaluate relations between discursive and social change, in addition to relating the detailed properties of a text in a systematic way to “social properties of discursive events as instances of social practice”. In other words, this model consists of three stages: text description, text interpretation in relation to its discourse practice, and text explanation (Fairclough, 2001).

Such features of discourse practices, orders of discourse, and intertextual analysis are especially important and useful for the data analysis in this study. This interconnectivity of the three dimensions reinforces the polycontextuality of the four sources of the data corpus, namely, the original political phenomenon and its contested constructions by the three media contexts involved in the data analysis as mentioned before.
Mechanisms of framing (cf. Entman, 1993\textsuperscript{15}) and schematisation (cf. Luhmann, 1995\textsuperscript{16}, and van Dijk, 1998\textsuperscript{17}), which were discussed earlier, are strictly relevant to the corpus of this study; they therefore provide a useful ground for analysing the various related representations and framings of events and issues along with their effects across news media contexts. Also, analysis of frames identifies clearly the way in which the original political phenomenon is framed and schematised by transferring information from one context to another in news media, since each media outlet presents news through the prism of its own political context and orientation and value system, but in a highly interconnected way in a global media system.

In the data analysis for this study, using a discourse-historical method (cf. van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999) fits well, because it traces the intertextual history of lexis, metaphors, and narratives in the original political phenomenon and proceeds to investigate the process of recursive communication from a study of the ideological salience of discourse as it undergoes mediated dissemination across news media outlets.

4.5.2 Text: Lexical Choice and Metaphor

As stated earlier, discourse analytical approaches are concerned with the analysis of representations, including texts, in a broad sense in terms of their relation to other elements of social processes (Wodak and Fairclough, 2010). The premise of textual analysis in the methodological approach to the data analysis in this section stems from the texture analysis of of the text, including its form and organisation (Fairclough, 1995a). In other words, texts are “increasingly multi-semiotic; texts whose primary semiotic form is language increasingly combine language with other semiotic forms” (ibid.: 4). Social and political analysis can be enriched by this textual evidence, which

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. section 2.3

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. section 3.2.1.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. section 3.2.2.
combines linguistic and intertextual orientations (ibid., 1995a). This is especially the case in media texts.

Moreover, the qualitative approach to textual analysis provides significant insights for a systematic focus and exploration of elements of what is “absent” in the text in addition to what is “present” (Fairclough, 1995a: 5). The analysis of discourse as a text is a form-and-meaning analysis, which includes analyses of “generic structure [...] the distribution; how texts circulated within orders of discourse can be investigated in terms of ‘chain relationships’ within orders of discourse” (Erjavec, 2004: 555).

Any text in the mass media is viewed as the product of an “extended chain of communicative events” (Fairclough, 1995b: 41); this by definition applies even more strongly to texts with more than one language: linguistic (and therefore socio-cultural) plurality must entail additional complexity in the “chain” (Holland, 2006: 230). An example here is the metaphor chain (e.g. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ and Khomeini’s description of the US as the ‘Great Satan’) across various outlets along with their translations and interpretations, and, of course, mistranslations and misinterpretations. This is useful in the case of this study in analysing how “public domain communicative events are transformed as they move along the chain” (Fairclough, 1995b: 41, in ibid.), leading to new intensity of the broader process of dissemination.

The methodological approach to be followed will operate for the analysis of the lexical choices made by text producers selected for their salience. Salience can be measured 1. qualitatively (e.g. the ideological and semiotic markedness of the reference ‘Zionist entity’) and 2. quantitatively (the frequency of use or co-textual reference). It will work on investigating the highly loaded ideological lexical choices as important textual devices. (‘Zionism’ is the Jewish nationalist movement. Hezbollah regards Israel an entity that is usurping the land of others; it also regards the ‘Zionists’ as foreigners who have come from all over the world and formed gangs).

The study of text is not intended to pursue purely lexical selections here; but rather, the focus will be the syntactic style which is combined with the lexical variations in the choice of words (van Dijk, 1998). The form of language represented in “lexical
and syntactic choices identifies a kind of discourse and its context” (Fowler, 1991: 37). Analysis of ideological selection will be conducted through the analysis of beliefs and motivations behind these lexical choices in the diversity of expressions employed by the BBC, Al-Jazeera and CNN media outlets in the process of contestation produced by their recursivity. For example, Nasrallah’s reference to the former US President Bush as a “pharaoh of the age”, and Israel as the “right hand of the USA”, takes various forms of reframing across the representations of these media outlets. At times, the metaphorical expression is paraphrased and recontextualised in a new context; for example, the above metaphors were reported by the media as “Nasrallah is condemning the US and Israeli policy in the region”.

As metaphor is a “means of representing one aspect of experience in terms of another” (Fairclough, 2001: 99), and owing to the nature of the data corpus, political discourse will be examined, according to Chilton and Ilyin (1993: 27) as a “transnational/trans-linguistic discourse”. Using this approach will help in understanding and analysing the way metaphor passes between linguistic and political media systems.

Analysis of patterns of metaphor will help to contribute to the understanding of properties and use of metaphor. Moreover, analysing the ideological impacts of metaphor within the framework of the construction of a political phenomenon in political discourse has very significant implications for framing.

A qualitative methodological approach to analysing metaphors in the corpus of texts will be employed. The linguistic choices and expressions that are retrieved will be grouped semantically, and conceptual metaphors will be proposed to account for them within the context of the data. A further step will be taken in considering the consequences emerging from these conceptual metaphors, the ideologies and motivations these manifest (Deignan, 2005), and how all of them are transformed and recontextualised in other contexts and orders of discourse.

As Deignan (2005: 124), notes, a “recurrent theme of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that metaphors do not directly reflect reality but filter it, so that the metaphorical choices made by a speaker or writer inevitably present a biased viewpoint”. Koller
and Davidson (2008: 307) argue that “conceptual and grammatical metaphor interact because society is metaphorized as a bounded space”. This interconnection of various forms of metaphor “frames the discourse of social exclusion and orients political thought and action towards the reproduction rather than the transformation of inequality” (ibid.), which constitutes a useful tool for exploring metaphors within the framework of the recontextualisation, recursivity, and dissemination of political discourse.

4.5.3. Intertexts and Frames

On a simple level, the major reason for conducting intertextual analysis is to examine how speakers and news constructors draw on other sources in making their statements. Apart from analysing the intertexts employed in the primary source of the speeches of Nasrallah, it will also be traced in the secondary sources of the three news media outlets as a specific form of intertextuality, namely: recontextualisation. As Baker et al. (2008: 273), maintain, conducting CDA qualitative techniques, “taking into account analysis of the social, political, historical and intertextual contexts [...] goes beyond analysis of the language within texts”.

Intertextual analysis is particularly useful in the data analysis of this project. It reveals “how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations of conventionalized practices - such as genres, discourses, narratives found in particular social circumstances” (Fairclough, 1995a: 188). It also functions as a mediator between texts and social contexts, according to “the three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis” (Fairclough, 1995a: 189), which is the methodological model adopted in this study.

From this perspective, intertextuality is employed as the point of departure from which to analyse the practices of each sample text both discretely and as an interconnected system. The concept of recontextualisation is particularly useful here as it allows analysis of the shift of meanings either within a single genre or across genres (Blackledge, 2005: 6), across media outlets, and across epistemic orders as a series of connected political, media and cultural contexts.
The concept of intertextuality investigated in Chapter 3 is influential in the analysis of discursive practices. Since Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s development of the term, it has been widely adopted by discourse analytical approaches (Blackledge, 2005). Language is dialogical and embodies a plurality of meanings and voices, i.e. it is characterised by heteroglossia. This diversity and hybridization of language are the significant characteristics of heteroglossia and are conceptually complementary to the recursive dissemination of political communication. In other words, heteroglossia forms a conceptual whole with recursivity. That is to say, recontextualisation and transformation of the political message takes place across media contexts in complex processes of recursive media interplay of representation. Political communication and media systems play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, which add intensity in the broader processes of dissemination.

As far as political discourse is concerned, CDA stresses the special importance of intertextuality to political discourse as a major ideological tool in which many forms of intertextuality are employed in the media with the aim of reinforcing their message in terms of “legitimization and delegitimization” (Chilton and Schaffner, 1997: 213) by anchoring texts in other texts that are recognised often as canonical usage. Intertextual analysis, following Fairclough, is also useful in discovering the networks through which texts move, including their transformations from one site to another, i.e. the sequence of a political speech as it becomes a news story (Barker and Galasinski, 2001). Indeed, “news is the report or recontextualisation of an event” (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003: 273). This textual manifestation is also noteworthy because of the ideological shifts (e.g. from Hezbollah’s self-reference as a ‘welfare movement’ to CNN’s reference to Hezbollah as ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’) brought about in dissemination processes.

This is illuminating in terms of understanding political discourse in modern times and for identifying the value in understanding the role and power of public discourses. In the case of this study, the discourses of Nasrallah are also historically rooted. They are politically highly salient and embedded in different types of old and new narratives for political reasons. These narratives, which are political, historical, literary, and religious are recontextualised in the new texts – and media systems. For example, in a speech in 2006, Nasrallah referred to Israel as a state which is ‘weaker than a spider’s
web’. This statement was reported by three media organisations, namely, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN and in different ways, including a “fragile” and a “weak” state.

Bakhtin’s conceptual insights remain pertinent in this respect: “In the everyday speech of any person living in society [...] of all the words uttered by him [...] will be someone else’s words [...] transmitted with varying degrees of precision and impartiality (or more precisely partiality)” (Bakhtin, 1981: 339).

Before further operationalising the notion of ‘recontextualisation’, the two reasons for dwelling on this concept in the process of analysis will be explained. First, it is helpful in tracing shifts of meanings – whether within specific genres or across semiotic dimensions, because in order to arrive at an understanding of the life of a discourse, it is necessary to investigate how it is linked to other discourses in the “textual chain” (Wodak, 2000, in Blackledge, 2005: 121). In this way, any social event is recontextualised as it is incorporated within the context of another social event (Fairclough 2003a). This applies particularly to the intensification of this process across media communication, where an original political phenomenon is recontextualised across various media contexts. Polycontextuality (properties of occupying many contexts at the same time) is a key element in this process as it helps in identifying the process of recontextualisation (process of shifts from one context to another) and recursive dissemination of political communication across news media at the systems level. Following Schmidt (2003), media relations are the multi-layered construction of these transformations.

Second, a focus on recontextualisation enables discourse analysis within this framework “to take account of both linguistic and other semiotic productions” (Iedema and Wodak, 1999: 13) of social relevance. It is therefore very similar to the way in which discourse influences properties of social situations, a matter which has generated significant amounts of research, including systemic–functional linguistics, to allow a more explicit conceptualisation of context (van Dijk, 1999).

To elaborate further, recontextualisation is not a process of repeating representations (Blackledge 2005): it involves not only the suppression and filtering of some meaning potentials of a discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999), particularly political
discourse, but also a process that might entail expanding meaning potential, such as deletion, rearrangement, substitution, and addition (van Leeuwen and Wodak: 1999).

The argumentation strategies identified in local news text and political discourse, Blackledge (2005: 121) argues, “may recur in a new setting, incorporating new ‘voices’ as they go”, (cf. section 3.4.1), and may be transformed across genres, but remain identifiable as links in the chain of discourse. This is manifested in political discourse and news media, in which the recontextualisation of arguments and “topoi” is pursued across political genres. This “life of arguments” illustrates the power struggle about specific opinions, beliefs or ideologies (ibid.). Consequently, it is especially useful as it allows the analysis of the shift of meanings within the domain of genres. In this context, Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism has been highly influential in terms of analysing how other texts and voices are included (or excluded), directly or indirectly, attributed, and whether they are directly or indirectly reported.

A typical example would be Fairclough’s use of Foucault’s term “order of discourse”, which itself is used within CDA in a distinctive way to refer to the semiotic dimension of articulated networks of social practices (cf. Fairclough, 1992a, 2003). Thus, the political domain, which is the main concern for this study, is partly constituted as a particular order of discourse, but it cuts across other orders and various contexts – notably religious ones, as in the case of the speeches of Nasrallah.

The news media output about the war in Lebanon in July 2006 is a valid example of the process of transformation across multiple contexts in which various elements, such as deletion, adding, and filtering of some meaning potentials of a discourse were implemented. Of course, transformations that occur in recontextualisation processes are “dependent on the goals, values and interests of the context into which the discursive practice is being recontextualised” (Blackledge, 2005: 122), i.e. framing.

Nevertheless, understanding the process of gaining more authority and power of discourse, and consequently legitimacy in new semiotic domains, is crucial for understanding how existing representations of differentiated groups in society contribute to the forming of dominant ideologies (Blackledge, 2005). This process of the transformation of discourse through the movement of meanings along a chain of
discourse towards a more legitimate and authoritative context, is a key aspect of recontextualisation (ibid.).

Blackledge (2005) draws attention here to two points regarding repetition in the process of recontextualisation. The first one, albeit neglected, is in the context of recontextualisation; that is, when discourse goes across this chain of contexts, it may become less negotiable, but in such a case, the notion of intertextuality is informed by a theory of power. That is to say, in political discourse discriminatory argument often gains power through its repetition in increasingly powerful contexts (ibid.).

The other point concerns the transformation of argument in a new context, which could be a more authoritative, more legitimated voice; each recontextualisation may move the argument into an “increasingly non-negotiable materiality”, which allows it to gain power and status (Blackledge, 205: 13), or to become endlessly negotiable immateriality. This is the case in media communication where, during the process of transformation, a political event undergoes multiple phases of recontextualisation across new contexts of news coverage.

However, against this notion, transformation of discourse may go both ways; i.e., it could also move in the opposite direction: that is, towards a less authoritative, less legitimated context. It is emphasised here that repetition in certain cases is not a useless procedure, but there is a value in repeating the same argument in the same context.

Drawing on this work of van Dijk, and Fairclough, together with Foucault’s philosophical foundations, discourse analysis has been selected as the data analysis method for this thesis. It allows for an appropriate methodological approach to complex processes, namely: recursivity, contestation of legitimacy and ideological belief, and media interplay of representation. It has a direct relationship with intertextuality which is always ideologically charged, particularly with regard to recursive media communications. They play back on each other; and the more they do, the greater the intensity. As stressed earlier, the notion of the recursivity of communication emerges more strongly with mass mediatisation; ‘the new age’ is marked by mass mediatisation and the web. Thus, recursivity is intensified and
disembodied from original speeches, which added new quality and intensity of the dissemination process. Although dissemination has always been in communication, it now reaches radically new heights.

4.6 Data Genres and Ideology

The main concern in the approach to data analysis is to highlight that the contextually sensitive relationship between discourse, power, and ideology is “at the centre of social practice of discourse” (Fairclough, 2001: 35). That is, ideological discourse analysis should be tackled from the perspective of a socio-political analysis of discourse that seeks to relate structures of discourse to structures of society. In other words, social properties are linked systematically to the structural strategies of talk and text embedded in their social, political, and cultural contexts (van Dijk, 1998). This is manifested in the different framing of Hezbollah in the three news contexts of Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN (and, of course, Al Manar), either as, for example, “resistance movement” or as a “terrorist movement”. This framing is also related to the projected and real audiences of the three news media outlets. Thus, Nasrallah, as a metonym for Hezbollah, has highly contested news value, and is subject to renegotiation, reframing, and reschematisation as, for example, a religious, social, political, national, and pan-regional actor.

News media reports mediate a variety of ideological group beliefs and constitutive competing discourses, which fall within the scope of comparing media representations in this study. Some voices are highlighted and represented more heavily than others, owing to the “cross-lingual and cross-cultural recontextualization processes” (Schaffner, 2010: 274) in news media. News media therefore perfectly demonstrate both how ideology manifests itself in contested realities and also how those contested realities form a recontextualisation loop, with Al Jazeera, for example, challenging BBC and CNN hegemony as independent news providers by providing a news framing from a non-Western perspective. In this respect, the analysis of the corpus of this study helps to reveal how a new discourse enters potentially into “transformative relationships with existing discourses in the recontextualizing context” (Erjavec,
A demonstrative example here would be the way news media outlets refer to mechanisms of recontextualisation in referring to the war in Lebanon.

For this study, the analytical value of CDA stems from its potential for “disrupting the naturalized status of text/context relations and for identifying possible sites of intervention in textual, discursive, and ideological formations” (Dunmire, 2009: 196). It follows that discourse as “an ideological practice constitutes, naturalises, sustains and changes power relations”, while discourse as a “political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations and the collective entities” (1992a: 67). It also implies that political and ideological practices are not “independent” of each other (ibid.). This interdependence becomes even more acute in highly contested ‘news landscapes’.

Discourse analysis of the data of this thesis is also concerned with macro structural categories such as the specific genre and text-type categories. As Fairclough, (2000: 170), maintains, “different genres are different means of production of a specifically textual sort, different resources for texturing”. The contestations of realities in news media outlets as increasingly interlocking sub-systems of a global media system are a valid example. It is stressed here that “discoursal practice is a facet of struggle which contributes in varying degrees to the reproduction or transformation of the existing order of discourse, and through that of existing social and power relations” (Fairclough, 1995a: 77). This will be an asset when analysing the recursive dissemination of communication across media contexts.

Investigating processes of the textual production of a highly charged political phenomenon such as Hezbollah, makes it possible to record, describe, and explain the most important recontextualisation strategies and their functions for the structures of different media contexts and discourses. The expectation of the theoretical framework, namely that communications across media outlets are locked into a recursive cycle that displaces the ‘object of truth’ and ‘dynamics’ of truth as properties of dissemination will be tested using the corpus of data to illustrate how thematic framing depends on these ideological selections.
4.7 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter was to explain the methodology derived from the theoretical framework outlined to treat the questions of dissemination and recursive communications across local and global media contexts. The methods used to analyse the data were informed by the theoretical considerations arising from the reconceptualisation of political communication in complex media environments; the recursive communications between media organisations and political actors. Their implications for the framing of a highly significant actor were also considered in this context.

A qualitative methodological analysis was chosen in order to meet the objectives of this study. It aims to conduct a comparative analysis to identify traces of recursive communication and recontextualisation in news media, and provides the most appropriate methodology to analyse the corpus. Using this approach allows for a demonstration of the process of recursivity of the original political communicative phenomena of Hezbollah, defined by significance as a primary source, i.e. Nasrallah – Speeches and Contexts, and their representations across the polycontexts of three media outlets, namely Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN, as secondary sources.

These articles represent the manifestations of dissemination of communication: that is, analyses of the ways in which a political phenomenon spreads and connects across various constructions of news media outlets for the sake of identifying the process of recursive dissemination of communication in these media polycontexts.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the most appropriate method for the analysis of the theme of this study. The analysis will draw on specific aspects of van Dijk’s approach to ideology and Fairclough’s communicative model. Therefore, two interrelated methodological techniques will be adopted, namely, discourse analysis and text analysis, including thematic analysis. These will provide an appropriate methodological approach to complex processes of dissemination, namely: recursivity, meaning, and media interplay of representation. It has a direct relationship with intertextuality which is always ideologically charged, particularly with recursive media communications.
Following a qualitative approach, the data collation, corpus design and the rationale behind its selection were also explained. With a qualitative methodology, the necessary instruments for establishing a framework for the data analysis were based on two inter-related methodological techniques: discourse analysis and text analysis, including some secondary thematic analysis.

The interdisciplinarity of a discourse analytical approach influenced by CDA is crucial for this study in terms of assessing the multivoicedness, heteroglossia, intertextuality and recontextualisation across multiple audiences of media institutions. Thus, the analysis will integrate a text analytical approach which is very closely aligned methodologically with the data set of this study. It operates with media communication by and about Hezbollah as an interrelated whole; it relates directly to a very dense conversion of power and ideology expressed through intertextuality, metaphor, and salient lexis.

With text analysis as an integrated part of discourse analysis, the methodological approach to be followed operates for the analysis of the lexical choices made by text producers selected for their salience. In contrast, intertextual analysis is employed to examine how speakers and news constructors draw on other sources for making their statements. In addition to analysing the intertexts employed in the primary source of the speeches of Nasrallah, they will also be traced in the secondary sources of the three said news media outlets as a specific form of intertextuality; that is the concept of recontextualisation.

The expectations of the theoretical framework; that communications across media outlets are locked into a recursive cycle that displaces the ‘object of truth’, will be tested using data corpus to illustrate how thematic framing depends on these ideological selections.
Chapter 5  Data Analysis

This chapter will apply the theoretical framework and make it operational using the analytic methods established in Chapter four. Further, it will seek to examine the fluid framing of Hassan Nasrallah through specific examples of recursive communication across Al-Jazeera, the BBC and the CNN.

For the purpose of contextualisation, the first sections (5.1.1 to 5.1.4) will set the immediate contextual framework for the data analysis to provide a reference point for the subsequent sections of data analysis.

The following sections will investigate first the framing of Hezbollah by Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN. Second, the self-representations of Hezbollah will be considered, using Nasrallah’s speeches as primary sources. Third, the recursive representations and contested recontextualisation across the above three media outlets will be examined, based on salient features that make up the representation, framing, and reframing processes of Hezbollah in the above three media news as ‘secondary audiences’. The aim of the analysis is to explore recursivities of the process of representation and self-representation in individual media outlets and across media outlets as an interrelated complex.

5.1 Contextual Framework

In order to evaluate the data of this thesis and the extent to which it supports the research hypothesis, that communications are located into a recursive cycle that displaces truth in multiple framings, it is necessary to review the political and media contexts in Lebanon. Such contexts cannot be fully understood unless historical domestic and regional contexts are also taken into account.
5.1.1 The Political and Media Context in Lebanon

Lebanon achieved independence from France in 1943 (Seaver, 2000: 254). It is a region where political events are condensed and many contexts of political interest coexist. A civil war took place between Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians between 1975 and 1989, which ended following the signing of the Ta’if Accord; this strengthened Lebanon’s confessional political system (ibid., 2000). (Confessionalism is a governmental system based on the diversity of religions (Sunni, Shiite, Christian, and Druze) and political parties).

Prior to the civil war, Lebanon had been one of the few liberal democracies in the Middle East. It was a very democratic regime, in spite of its multi-confessional society with an overarching Muslim/Christian divide and seventeen different sects. In this respect, Lebanon’s Muslim population consists primarily of three sects (Shiite, Sunni, and Druze), while its Christian residents are divided into several sects (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian Catholic, among others). Although Lebanon’s “confessional system has always been fragile, it represents the most successful case of consociational democracy in the developing world” (ibid.: 249). In recent decades, Lebanon has been considered a byword for instability owing to the various forms of conflict that come from its situation on the fault lines of a turbulent region. What is unique about Lebanon is that although there were inherent difficulties in rebuilding its technical infrastructure after the damage caused during the civil war, it was one of the first countries to permit use of the public Internet (Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003).

Modern Lebanese society is characterised by diversity and complexity, consisting of a variety of paradoxes (Kraidy, 2005, in Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006). That is to say, relations between its multiple confessions fluctuate between “peaceful co-existence and open warfare”, and its role as a cultural bridge between East and West and “revulsion over persistent inter-communal strife in the 1970s” (Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006: 23). Thus, the political system in Lebanon is based on a power-sharing

18 In original.
agreement, a “prototype of consociational democracy” among its various confessional groups which sometimes experience a kind of “feudalism and clientelism” (ibid.).

Despite the fact that Lebanon is one of the smallest nation states in the Arab World, the legacy of colonial rule, its “delicate demographic balance, fragile political system”, Israeli incursions, “Syrian claims over it and its involvement by proxy” in the Palestinian-Israeli issue, have all contributed to a crisis of identity that has been exacerbated and developed into what is called “signature identities” (Harik, 2003, in Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 23). These identities have been “described as forms of primordial identities”; in the Lebanese context this means religious communalism, a characteristic of the Lebanese political and cultural landscape since 1943 “when the name Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) was inscribed into national consciousness under the National Pact – the unwritten agreement between the country’s two largest confessional communities – the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims” (ibid.). This decreed that the Presidency of Lebanon should go to a Maronite and the Prime Ministry to a Sunni Muslim (ibid., 2006), and that the Speaker of the House of Parliament should be a Shiite Muslim (Baranovich and Moorthy, 2011: 231).

Although it was intended that these various groups should be unified under a Lebanese national identity, this agreement in fact contributed to the enhancement of the competing imaginaries of being Lebanese. Christian Maronites conceived of Lebanon as a Christian nation with Christian traditions and Phoenician roots, while Muslim Sunnis saw themselves as belonging to a Lebanon with a background of “Arab and Muslim cultural traditions” (Ajami 1986, in Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 23). These imaginaries have continued to be the “legitimising identities” of Lebanon. Within this scenario, other influential religious communities, including the Shiites, were given less political space to “weave narratives of their own communal history into the grand fabric of Grand Liban” (ibid.).

“Parallelism” (the “association between the media and the general political tendencies, which are not necessarily related to particular parties” (de Albuguergue, 2012: 92) in Lebanon “aligns with the country’s consociationalism and political sectarianism” according to which the benefits and advantages are distributed among
“the country’s eighteen officially recognised groups”, including the Sunnis, Shiite and Maronite Christians as the largest groups. (Kraidy, 2012: 183).

Lebanon has a rich multi-party tradition which echoes the makeup of Lebanese society, in the sense that, according to Farid el-Khazen, the “political process is centred on party-based politics” and non partisan “independent politicians” (Sorenson, 2010: 75). Despite the fact that Lebanon does not follow a two-party system as the case in functional democratic systems, parties have shaped parliamentary debates and shared in government, particularly the leaders of well-established parties who are “influential political figures” (ibid.).

Lebanon’s political system has a unique character, to the extent that it has been described as being synonymous with conflict. Lebanon is also a unique case of intense ideological ‘dialogism’. The communication system is uniquely intertextual owing to its marked inherent historical and religious roots, and its confessional political regime (covering a series of powerful actors such as the political parties and their media outlets), and this is heightened by intense media scrutiny. It lies at the frontline of the West and Middle East. Lebanon is at the “core of a regional media network with global implications”, whereas the Lebanese played a major role in what can be called the “incubation period” of information technologies in the Arab world (Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003: 63), for example, the growth of the Lebanese satellite TV channels “has been more than spectacular” (ibid.: 64) in providing information and news which has led Lebanon to be the “crossroads of the “Arabic-based” information” (ibid.).

As media and politics have always depended on each other, the political scene in Lebanon cannot be fully conceived without referring to the unique role and impact of the mass media and this adds a new intensity of dissemination to the intricacies of media and politics in the wider context. Lebanon has been considered to be the “crossroads of Arabic based information” (Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003: 63). The Lebanese played a central role in what can be termed the “the incubation period of information technologies in the Arab world (1995-2000)” (ibid.). Lebanon is a special case in terms of a media broadcasting system which also enjoys freedom of expression, unlike any other media broadcasting systems in the region, rather than Al-Jazeera. The Lebanese were pioneers and innovators in this media technology
revolution; their influence in this respect crossed into other arenas beyond their national borders to the extent that Beirut will always be considered “the Arab information highway” (ibid.).

Another distinct feature of the media in Lebanon is that it has always been involved in the mediation of religion through the wide articulation and dissemination of religious and spiritual symbols, values, and ideas through rituals (Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006). The diverse religious discourses are strongly articulated with political discourses, since Lebanon’s political system is based on the confessional or sectarian system. Some privately-owned TV satellites of major political factions, whether Sunnis, Shiites or Christians, are reflections of their religious identity and political orientations. Al-Manar, which is run by Hezbollah and is listed as one of the top four news stations in the Middle East, is a valid example. It produces an interrelated religious and political framework, that of *wilayat al-faqih*” (Harb and Leender 2005, in Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006: 31 – emphasis in original), i.e. the guardianship of the jurist. OTV, which is run by the Free Patriotic Movement Party, is another example in this context which echoes a marked Christian identity with a related political agenda.

The Lebanese media are known for their diverse range of media channels. They have also been recognised as having a highly concentrated media ownership. Lebanon is known to have the most open and diverse media environment in the region, which has been described as a “beacon of plurality” in a region that is considered to have the most restrictive media environment in the world19. The national media in Lebanon have demonstrated a sophisticated level of “external pluralism”; that is, following Hallin and Macini (2004: 29), pluralism that is realised “at the level of the media system as a whole”, as opposed to “internal pluralism within each media entity” (Kraidy, 2012: 183).

Moreover, the intersections of the economic and financial systems (for example, the privately-owned TV satellite channels run by political factions) and the diverse religious discourses have a major role in promoting political beliefs and ideologies and addressing target audiences.

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19 A report on IPI’s Fact Finding Mission to Lebanon, 8-13 December 2006: “Media in Lebanon: Reporting on a Nation Divided”.
The main political blocs (both alliance and opposition) have their privately-owned TV channels, which represent their views and make clear their ideological positions when reporting political events. For instance, the opposition parties have their privately-owned TV channels. Examples include Al-Manar; the OTV Channel of the Christian Maronite Free Patriotic Movement Party; the NBN TV channel (National Broadcasting Network) which is affiliated to Nabih Birri, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament and chief of the Shiite Amal Movement (Khatib, 2007); and the New TV, run by opponents of the Hariri government. Those of the Alliances are the Future TV channel, owned by the Sunni family and associates of Rafiq Al-Hariri and affiliated to the Future Party; and the LBC TV channel (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International) of the Christian Maronite Lebanese Forces Party. In fact, very few outlets “operate free of sectarian or political influence” (Sharaiha and Ibrahim, 2008: 115).

These TV satellite channels are directly affiliated to the different political, religious, and ideological factions in Lebanon, while the pro-Western parliamentary majority unlike the pro-Iranian or pro-Syrian opposition are mainly funded by individual shareholders. These channels include the following: LBC, the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Forces Party, which is owned by Pierre Daher with Saudi Prince Al-Walid Bin Talal as one of its main shareholders; MTV, which is owned by the Christian businessman Gabriel Murr; Future TV and Future News, owned by the pro-Saudi Sunni Hariri family as the mouthpiece of Saudi interests in Lebanon and the region; OTV (Orange TV) the first Lebanese publicly-traded company owned by General Michel Aoun; New TV, owned by the local Lebanese business tycoon Tahsin Khayyat; and Al-Manar, the mouthpiece of Hezbollah, which maintains an Arabic and English website that features news content. In addition to funding from its shareholders, Al-Manar (according to Fandy, 2007: 74) obtains funding from “Iran, Shiite communities and other Arabs and Muslims who support Hezbollah’s mission”.

5.1.2 Lebanese Political Opposition

In surveying the political opposition in Lebanon, Hezbollah emerges as the main opponent party to the Government in Lebanon during the period of focus for this study; that is from 2006 to 2009. Hezbollah emerged in the early 1980s as a “political contender to the existing Shiite political group Amal”, and as a response to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon during the first Lebanon war (Baranovich and Moorthy, 2011: 231). From its beginnings as a military organisation resisting the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah has become a significant force in Lebanese politics, representing the Shiite Muslim community in Lebanon. Hezbollah also gained worldwide recognition for its militant acts targeting Israel and the West (ibid., 2011). This renders it a particularly significant and contested political and religious phenomenon.

Hezbollah has acquired a dual reputation: as a legitimate political actor in Lebanon, and as a terrorist organisation from the US and Israeli perspectives as well as that of other Western countries, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Sultan, 2008). However, Hezbollah’s framing as either an extremist terrorist movement or a legitimate political actor is not always static; the dynamic framing depends on the political situation. The UK official position, for instance, is slightly different and less stark than that of the US Administration in terms of these frames.

The assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 is considered to be a landmark in the last decade in Lebanese politics. It threw the nation into political turmoil, and led to a massive anti-Syrian uprising in Lebanon in which protestors demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops (Khatib, 2007). (The Syrian involvement in Lebanon goes back to 1976 when civil war broke out between the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims; the deployment of the Syrian troops in Lebanon lasted for twenty-nine years21). The assassination caused heavy international pressure for the implementation of UN Resolution 1559, which called for “complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarming of all Lebanese Militias” (Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006: 26). These demonstrations led to the end of the overt Syrian presence in Lebanon and to the formation of a coalition of Muslim and Christian

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21 Damascus has always refused to exchange ambassadors because Syria claims that Lebanon and Syria are one country.
factions, which declared themselves to be the ‘opposition’ to the government, and eventually played an active role in conducting the uprising which was termed the ‘Cedar Revolution’. Furthermore, they brought together Muslim and Christian Lebanese citizens, who gathered in downtown Beirut in a series of demonstrations which lasted from February to April 2005 (Khatib, 2007).

This assassination also led to political reverberations and a long-running investigation that aimed to “implicate pro-Syria actors within the Lebanese government” (Sharaiha and Ibrahim, 2008: 115), including Hezbollah.

This is relevant in the sense that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (an international tribunal for the prosecution of those responsible for the assassination of Al-Hariri) provoked wide-ranging controversy in Lebanon and in the international community.

Another relevant consequence is that in the light of this situation two camps of political parties were created: pro-Syrian camps exemplified in “8 March”, and an anti-Syrian camp exemplified in the “14 March Alliance”, which was a coalition led by Saa’d al-Hariri (ibid., 2008). The 14 March Alliance consists of the following Lebanese parties:

1. The Sunni-dominated Future Movement, headed by MP Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Its support is concentrated in the Sunni areas of West Beirut, North Lebanon, and the southern city of Saida.

2. The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), headed by Druze leader MP Walid Jumblatt, a prominent member of the March 14 Alliance.

3. The Lebanese Forces, headed by Samir Geagea, a Christian party that draws much of its support from Beirut’s Achrafieh district and Mount Lebanon.

4. The Kataeb, which is Lebanon’s oldest Christian political party, founded by Pierre Gemayel in 1936. It is currently run by his son, former President Amin Gemayel.

The opposition, pro-Syrian camp “8 March Alliance” consists of Hezbollah and the following parties:

1. Amal, headed by Parliament’s Speaker Nabih Berri, is another Shiite party and a close ally of Hezbollah.

2. The Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), which is a small party affiliated to a secular form of nationalism that calls for the creation of a “Greater Syrian” state, which would consist of much of the Arab world, along with portions of Cyprus, Turkey and Iran. In reality, the party has been a close ally of the Syrian regime and a junior partner in the Hezbollah-led Alliance.

3. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Christian party headed by General Michel Aoun.

It worth mentioning in this respect that, after signing the Document of National Understanding of the Taif Accord in 1989, all Lebanese militia were disarmed, except for Hezbollah, since it was the only Lebanese “contender on the Southern Front” (Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006: 25). The case of Hezbollah provoked a controversy in the wake of the July war in 2006; the political controversy escalated, leading, in May 2008, to a “long political stalemate” being broken by a “flare up of violence” between government supporters and Hezbollah (Sharaiha and Ibrahim, 2008: 115), demanding that Hezbollah be disarmed.

In the negotiations mediated by Qatar in 2008, Hezbollah gained veto power in the cabinet, despite the fact that the majority of the government wished to disarm it as a military organisation, by promising not to “use armed force within Lebanon to solve internal political problems” (Wiegand, 2009: 669). The Lebanese cabinet then endorsed Hezbollah’s ‘right’ to keep its arsenal of weapons, as a result of its role in defending and liberating the Lebanese territories as a national force backing the Lebanese army.

However, despite the call to disarm and label Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several states, Hezbollah is uniformly recognized as a “legitimate political party”
within Lebanon, throughout the Arab world, and even by some “Western
governments, including the United Kingdom and many other European states” (ibid.: 670).

It is important to state here that Hezbollah supporters consist not only of Lebanese
Shiite but also Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Druze. This support stems
mainly from the credit it earned as a resistance movement for bringing the Israeli
occupation of south Lebanon in 2000 to an end.

Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, and General Michel Aoun, head of
the Christian Free Patriotic Movement party, signed an agreement in February 2006,
called the “Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah”, upon which they created
the 8 March Alliance. This was considered to be an encouraging step towards national
dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon. The memorandum called for support for
consensual democracy, and for electoral law reform emphasising proportional
representation. It stressed positive relations with Syria and the Palestinians; promoted
an improved national defence system in Lebanon; emphasised the right of Lebanon to
to control Shebaa Farms; and demanded the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel

In the context of regional domestic and foreign politics and with its highly mixed
sectarian population, Lebanon became a political battleground for a larger wide-scale
conflict pitting the Syrian-Iranian Middle East axis against a core Franco-American
alliance supported by other Western countries. The following section outlines this
context.

5.1.3 The Wider Contexts

The main focus in this sub-section will be on the external contexts of Lebanon in
relation to Hezbollah. This dimension is exemplified in the relationship with countries

23 After the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon in 2000, a “dispute arose over a 15-square mile
border region called the Shebaa Farms”. Lebanon and Syria insisted that it was Lebanese territory.
Meanwhile, Israel asserted that it was part of the Golan Heights and, therefore, Syrian territory –
though occupied by Israel (El Husseini, 2010: 808); however, it is recognized by the UN as Israeli land.
that have the most influence upon Lebanese politics, namely Syria, Iran, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.

5.1.3.1 The New US Middle East Doctrine

The Middle East has been one of the most volatile subsystems of the global political system. It has been a conflict arena with deep regional tensions, sectarian and ethnic divisions, and has often been conditioned by outside forces, such as the USA. Since the July war in Lebanon, two global foreign policy commitments have informed the US perspective of the Israel-Hezbollah confrontation: “the war on terror and the democratization of the Middle East” (Pressman, 2006: 1). Since 9/11, America’s ‘War on Terror’ (itself a media construct) has been defined such that it now includes several different international actors. These two visions, in addition to the historical context, shaped US policy in the Middle East (ibid., 2006).

The term “New Middle East” was first introduced and launched by Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, in July 2006 during the war in Lebanon, which she saw as being the birth of a new Middle East. It replaced the older “New Greater Middle East” doctrine, which was adopted by the G8\(^\text{24}\) Summit at Sea Island in 2004 (Salamey and Pearson, 2007: 420). This was a US initiative during the war in Iraq in 2003, which sought to have “prioritise(d) political participation, institutional reform, gender equality, minority and ethnic rights, rule of law, privatisation and modernisation” as keys for the creation of a stable and peaceful Middle East (ibid.).

This project was strongly rejected by some countries in the region (such as Syria and Iran), and Hezbollah. It was described as a project for redrawing borders in the Middle East to the strategic advantage of Anglo-American political and economic interests and Israel. It was further perceived as establishing a Western military agenda in favour of the interests of Israel. From the US perspective, the new Middle East was to be a region of democratic countries allied with the United States. In the event of a state rejecting this perspective, the US would impose a combination of sanctions and

\(^{24}\) G8 was the Group of Eight, it consisted of the world’s leading industrialised countries, namely; France, the UK, Germany, Italy, the USA, Japan, Canada, and Russia.
support for democratic movements, such as “the so-called Cedar Revolution of 2005” in Lebanon that led to the ousting of Syrian troops from Lebanon (Ottaway et al., 2008: 1).

This new project implied that geographic and demographic areas of the old Middle East would be reformulated in line with a new roadmap in the Middle East. Lebanon would be the pressure point for realigning the whole of the Middle East, thereby releasing, in Rice’s words, the forces of “constructive chaos” or creative chaos (Nazemroaya, 2006).

The three clusters of countries, namely “Iran-Iraq, Lebanon-Syria, Palestine-Israel”, in addition to three critical, decisive issues, namely “nuclear proliferation, sectarianism, the challenge of political reform”, are all features that define and shape the new Middle East (ibid.: 13). There are the salient faultlines across which the battle of representations in the media is waged.

Although Hezbollah is a nationalist group that defines itself primarily within the Lebanese polity, it also considers itself to be an “anti-imperialist party intent on countering the regional hegemony of Israel and the USA” (El Husseini, 2010: 803). It thus has a role in cross-border politics and addresses multiple audiences, locally and regionally, which contributes actively to processes of dissemination. In this respect, by establishing alliances with Hamas, Iran, and Syria, Hezbollah has become part of a ‘rejectionist’ axis which aims to oppose “perceived imperialism in the Middle East” (Baranovich and Moorthy, 2011: 231). These alliances, which were decisive between 2006 and 2009, the period of the data under investigation, will be briefly considered in the following section.

5.1.3.2 Syria and Iran

One of the alliance formations in the Middle East is exemplified in the Syrian-Iranian nexus. It has existed for more than twenty years and has been an “enduring feature” of the political landscape of the modern, turbulent Middle East (Goodarzi, 2006: 3). Moreover, this relationship has also been highly influential in shaping events and
bringing about major changes in the region (ibid.). It is described as one of the most “intriguing developments in modern Middle East politics” (Goodarzi, 2006: 2). This alliance was marked by the ideological differences between the two countries; Syria as a secular, Ba’athist, pan-Arab socialist republic, and Iran as a Shiite, pan-Islamic theocracy (ibid., 2006).

The new revolutionary Islamist regime and the secular Arab nationalist government in Syria established close bilateral relations and eventually formed an alliance (in 1979) in response to the “direct challenges posed by Iraq, Israel and the USA in the Levant and Persian Gulf during the 1980s and beyond” (Goodarzi, 2006: 2). According to Goodarzi, this alliance has been “basically defensive”, and has responded to the acts of aggression launched by Iraq in 1980 (against Iran) and Israel in 1982 (against Lebanon) (2006: 3). The strategic partnership between the two states began following the overthrow of M. Reza Shah in early 1979, and continued until the “Syrian–Iranian intercession” to end Amal - Hezbollah clashes in Beirut and the end of the first Persian Gulf War in 1988. Subsequently, the parties continued to collaborate, both politically and militarily (Mokhtari, 2006: 391).

The Syrian – Iranian cooperation had a major influence in shaping the course of events in the Middle East and in taking initiatives to make significant changes in the region (ibid., 2006). The fact that Syria has carried the greater part of the burden in checking Israeli power, and Iran’s main role has been to serve as a “bulwark against Iraqi expansionism in the Gulf and beyond”, indicate that the two states have achieved different functions, thereby “reinforcing the rationale and utility of their strategic links” (ibid., 2006: 4). This is evident in their relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon. In its new manifesto, Hezbollah has emphasised the necessity of cooperating with other Islamic states, and acknowledged the importance of the role played by Iran, as a “central state in the Muslim world”, which “supported the resistance movements” in the region, particularly the “Palestinian one” (El Husseini, 2010: 810). However, direct operational “linkages between Hezbollah and Iran are more difficult to pinpoint” (ibid.).

Hezbollah’s leaders were greatly inspired by the Iranian Revolution and were anticipating “backing and reinforcement” from the new Islamic state (Wiegand, 2009:...
The relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is based on their shared rejection of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands (ibid.).

Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria does not have the same direct relationship as that with Iran. Syria and Hezbollah have a relationship of coordination regarding security issues (Wiegand, 2009). This coordination, which is based on their shared problems with Israel, began in the late 1980s, and the Syrian support for Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel has continued (ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the Ba’athist Syrian regime maintains a secular attitude, while Hezbollah maintains a Shiite Islamist belief. Their relationship is one of strategic interdependence: Syria seeks Hezbollah’s support in order to maintain its role in the region and to keep its relevance to Lebanese political issues; while Hezbollah depends on Syria to provide a transit route for its weapons (El Husseini, 2010).

5.1.3.3 Israel

As stated earlier, this thesis is concerned with the period between 2006 and 2009 when the war in Lebanon took place with its significant implications for the entire region. Hence the brief focus in this sub-theme will be on the two wars launched by Israel on Gaza and Lebanon.

The wide ranging ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict began following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The Israeli involvement in Lebanon started in 1982, when Israel invaded and occupied South Lebanon. In the year 2000 Hezbollah ended this eighteen-year occupation.

In July, 2006, Hezbollah military forces captured two Israeli soldiers as hostages in order to induce a prisoner swap. In the wake of this incident, a massive Israeli retaliation pounded Lebanon for thirty-four days. Israeli air strikes destroyed much of Lebanon, but Hezbollah also launched thousands of rockets into northern Israel (Mokhtari, 2006). This war, which caused many deaths and casualties and much destruction, was a hugely significant event nationally and globally. Also, the
implications of the war meant that Hezbollah became the focus of attention and a global media phenomenon. At a later point, negotiations mediated by Germany resulted in a prisoner exchange between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2008; the remains of the two soldiers captured in July 2006 were also returned to Israel (Wiegand, 2009: 673).

Israel’s war in Gaza in 2008 was also launched against a militia movement, namely Hamas following the capture of an Israeli soldier by Hamas in 2006. The goal was to destroy the administrative, security, political, and military infrastructure targets of Hamas in Gaza; many civilians were injured or killed. In response to this massive air attack, Hamas forces launched its Qassem rockets on some Israeli cities. Hezbollah refrained from getting involved in an armed confrontation against Israel; however, this issue remains relevant to Hezbollah, which played an important role during the war and released significant statements in this respect. The media campaigns and propaganda contributed significantly to mobilise the Arab communities across the region. For example, Nasrallah launched a pan-Arab campaign with the aim of bringing the embargo on Gaza to an end.

5.1.3.4 The Palestinian Territories

The Palestinian Territories − the term used by the UN to refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip − were part of Egypt and Jordan before they were occupied by Israel during the war in 1967. Subsequently, the Territories come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority. The Fatah (Palestinian Liberation Front) faction was the official Authority until 2006 when Hamas won a majority in Legislative Council elections. An “uneasy co-existence” between the two factions degenerated amid violence between Fatah and Hamas armed wings and led to Hamas seizing power in Gaza in June 2007. The two Palestinian Authority areas have since been run by the separate factions – the West Bank by Fatah, and Gaza by Hamas.25

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14630174
The reason for referring to this issue in this context is that it is important to explain the political scenarios in the Palestinian Territories and the ideological and political stands of Fatah and Hamas in order to understand the relations between Hamas and Hezbollah.

Following the July 2006 war in Lebanon, a localised conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip instantly became a regional conflagration. Hamas was formed in 1987 with links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It has called for the liberation of Palestine and dismantling of the State of Israel to pursue its political goals (Mokhtari, 2006). Following Hezbollah, Hamas has reformed itself partly as a political party, and, surprisingly, it won the majority of seats in the legislative elections in Gaza in January 2006 (Mokhtari, 2006).

The formation of Hamas was in response to existing factors that included the PLO’s failure to offer any solution to the Israeli occupation and the difficult living conditions of the Palestinians. Hamas recognises itself as an Islamic resistance movement, which struggles for the liberation of the Palestine as well as for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The founding of Hamas by Sheikh Yassin was originally meant to serve as a local political arm for the Muslim Brotherhood, but it functioned separately, beginning in December 1987 after the first “intifada” (uprising) in 1987-1993. In 1988, Hamas published its official charter in which it declared its separation from the Muslim Brotherhood (Baranovich and Moorthy, 2011: 232).

In this context, Hezbollah has its own framing of the situation in the Palestinian Territories. It continued to call for the dismantling of Israel, which is conceived as the oppressor of the Palestinians and occupier of Jerusalem (Wiegand; 2009), and for the liberation of Palestine. Hezbollah remains officially a “designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. Department of State” and other US allies, including Israel, because of its support for Palestinian groups, regardless of its status as a recognised political party (ibid.: 672).

Although Hezbollah did not take military action in this war, it organised media campaigns to support Hamas. In framing the ongoing regional conflict, Hezbollah, on
several occasions, linked the War in Gaza and the reaction of Hamas to the Israeli interventions in Lebanon, declaring that the 2006 campaign had marked the beginning of the decline of the Israeli military within the region. The relationship between Hezbollah and Hamas, which overcomes the Shiite/Sunni divide, is framed as broad “ideological affinity and of emulation on the part of Hamas” (El Husseini, 2010: 812). The affinity stems basically from the rejection of Israeli and US hegemony in the region, as well as the US attempts to shape a New Middle East to serve the interests of Israeli and the US (ibid.). This is highly significant point because it indicates Hezbollah’s role as key player in the region.

5.1.4 Concluding Remarks

In this section, attention was focused on the immediate contextual framework for the data analysis to support the research hypothesis as a reference point for the subsequent sections of data analysis. A review of the political, historical, domestic, and regional contexts in Lebanon was also taken into account. This review highlighted the Lebanese media and their diverse range of media channels, the intersections of the economic and financial systems. Moreover, the section pointed out the Lebanese political opposition, mainly Hezbollah during the period of focus for this study; that is from 2006 to 2009. In addition, the section also pointed the two camps of political parties: pro-Syrian camps exemplified in “8 March”, and an anti-Syrian camp exemplified in the “14 March Alliance”, which were created in the wake of the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.

In addition to that, the section highlighted the dimension of the external contexts of Lebanon in relation to Hezbollah, exemplified in the relationship with countries that have the most influence upon Lebanese politics, namely the alliance formations in the Middle East: the Syrian-Iranian nexus, Israel, and the Palestinian territories, in addition to the New US Middle East Doctrine, including the US “New Middle East Project”.

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5.2 Recursivities and Framings in Media Outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN

This section will seek to illustrate how, against the complex territory mapped above, the three media outlets, namely Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN have framed Hezbollah, and will compare these framings. Thus, the analysis aims to explore how the process of representation and self-representation takes place as recursive communications in and across media outlets as an interrelated complex. It will also seek to provide an insight into the details of the framing process carried out by the text producers of the said media outputs by using interpretive qualitative analysis, which tends to lend more focus on the cultural and political content of news frames.

The following examples are indicative of some of the major framing patterns of Hezbollah in the discourse of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN. Media framing and portrayal of Hezbollah is likely to vary and assumes a plethora of different forms in many news stories by the three media outlets.

5.2.1 Representations of Hezbollah as a Terrorist Movement and a Political Actor

The framing tendencies and schematisations of Hezbollah as a “terrorist movement” can be seen in the following extracts:

Hezbollah is designated a terrorist group by the United States and Israel but is a significant player in Lebanon’s fractious politics. (CNN news website, 2 June, 2006 – my emphasis).

In this extract, CNN gives voice in the first sentence to official designations. The direct speech in referring to the framing of Hezbollah as a terrorist movement is attributed to the approach of the US government in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and to Israel. In this strategy of a process of attribution (referring to other sources) which reflects an ideological selection, CNN adopts a distancing discourse. The lexical choice of “group” suggests multiple potential meanings, denoting less than formal groupings of people with a common ideology and thus somehow denying formal recognition.
However, the use of the cohesive device “but” emphasises a discourse of juxtaposition of two dichotomies: a terrorist group and a political force in Lebanon. CNN points out that Hezbollah actually has a real influence in fractious politics. This articulates a discourse of contrasting the terrorist framing with a “party-political framing. In other words, CNN is following a dichotomising tactic. Moreover, its reference to Hezbollah as a “significant player” implies a neutral discourse used by CNN and a discourse of cautious recognition at the same time.

In the same context, CNN states:

The group has been linked to numerous terrorist attacks against American, Israeli and other Western targets, and the United States lists it as a terrorist organization. But many in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East, particularly Shiites, view Hezbollah militants as freedom fighters. (CNN news website, 2 July, 2008 – my emphasis).

Again, CNN quotes the US government framing of Hezbollah (in contrast to “group” in the previous extract) as an “organization” which conducts terrorist activities in implementing its goals. But at the same time, it follows a neutral discourse in stating that this fact is seen otherwise in the Middle East where members of Hezbollah are recognised as “freedom fighters”. The use of the term “militant” in framing Hezbollah fighters mirrors the CNN voice against “freedom fighters”. The lexical selection of militants connotes with oppositions, and somehow more subtextually, with forms of extremism.

This particular focus of these framing patterns on the violent aspect of Hezbollah and its leader can denote a discourse of delegitimating Hezbollah and being held responsible for this conflict with Israel, and implicitly attempting to legitimise any violent reaction taken by Israel against Hezbollah. Furthermore, employing a official sources also “adds perceived reliability of information, and protection against inaccurate reports” (Hawkins, 2002: 227).

The implication here is that CNN refers to these US administration schematisations which constitute ideological resources from which the framing of Hezbollah as a terrorist movement is derived. Thus, CNN refers to the US voice through which a discourse of delegitimation of Hezbollah is implied.
In contrast with the CNN framing of Hezbollah within the discourse of terrorism, the BBC offers a more fluid and dynamic construction of Hezbollah; moreover, it uses less overt references to Hezbollah as a “terrorist movement”.

The BBC framing of Hezbollah is premised on a distinction between its two wings: the military or ‘militant’ and the political. The BBC, unlike CNN, in covering the news about dropping a ban over Hezbollah’s military wing, eschews the term “terrorist” organisation. This more subtle framing discourse (‘militant group’, ‘military wing’, and ‘political wing’) perhaps comes in referring to the British Government’s stand in unfreezing the diplomatic relations with the political wing of Hezbollah in recognition of its status as a political party. The US government does not make this distinction; its decision to avoid doing so is premised on its conviction that all Hezbollah wings have a unified leadership and they all support violence and aggression:

Britain is considering dropping a ban on contact with the political wing of the Lebanese militant group, Hezbollah. [...] Only last year, the government put Hezbollah’s military wing on a list of proscribed organisations over its alleged training of insurgents in Iraq. (BBC news website, 4 March, 2009 – my emphasis).

There is no direct reference to Hezbollah as a terrorist movement in the BBC extract, but it is referred to as one on the UK list of “proscribed” organisations as noted above, i.e. on the UK black list of terrorist organisation. This indicates a subtle discourse of attenuation on the part of the BBC.


Similarly, Al-Jazeera employs a process of attribution (by quoting the USA) framing Hezbollah as a ‘terrorist organisation’, thus using a discourse of distancing through which it highlights the US voice.
5.2.2 Representations of Hezbollah as a Military and Militant Force

In many instances of news stories in the three media outlets, Hezbollah is framed as a Shiite entity. This ‘entity’ comprises various formal and informal framings of Hezbollah as a group, a movement, a political party, an organisation, militia, as guerrillas, an armed force, and Islamic resistance, and an army. In other words, these news stories comprise a complex of military, religious, and social representations.

CNN, for example, frames Hezbollah as being Shiite militia:

The Shiite militia Hezbollah cast the swap as a victory for all Lebanese, with one official calling it “an official admission of defeat”. (CNN news website, 17 July, 2008 – my emphasis).

Framing Hezbollah as a Shiite militia stresses its religious identity. The subtext of the “Shiite” rhetoric framing here takes an operation of association. CNN proceeds to use discourse of juxtaposition of the Shiite identity of Hezbollah with Iran as its Shiite proxy in Lebanon. It is noteworthy here that the Shiites have assumed a new and different status in the Lebanese community following the end of the civil war in Lebanon and in the aftermath of the Taif agreement in 1989 (according to which all Lebanese militia were disarmed, except for Hezbollah) from which it derived what it claims as its legitimacy, as well as from its relations with the Syrian regime.

On the other hand, the framing of Hezbollah as “militia” is also a marked denotation. As is well known, the term ‘militia’ refers to a group of armed individuals, usually civilians, who are not officially affiliated to the state army. Hezbollah and its status as an armed group pose a significant puzzle for global relations. This framing carries a double marking: as an informal armed group and as a religious group.

CNN uses an additional frame of Hezbollah as a “militant group”:

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26 The Taif Agreement “(officially, the Document of National Accord) was the document that provided the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. [...] The new confessional formula was based on reducing the prerogatives of the President of the Lebanon and transferring the executive authority to the Council of Ministers as a collegial body”, http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
Since a cease-fire between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah went into effect last week, there has been sporadic violence. (CNN news website, 21 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

‘Militant’ is an intertext because it recurs within CNN and across other outlets; it is the recursivity that makes it an intertext and therefore a recursive communication device across media organisations. A militant group in this context signifies opposition and, perhaps more subtextually, extremism.

As stated above, CNN also represents Hezbollah as a “political movement”:

Hezbollah is the largest Shiite Muslim political movement in Lebanon and maintains an armed force that fought a month-long war with Israel in 2006. (CNN news website, 2 July, 2008 – my emphasis).

Of interest here is the fact that CNN does not uniformly frame or label Hezbollah as a “terrorist” force. Rather, it maintains dynamic frames which undergo change. Although the US Government does not officially acknowledge Hezbollah, or any of its wings, reference is constantly made by CNN to its double identity as both a political and military force which are not seen as separate wings. Rather, the political movement “maintains” an “armed force” unlike a regular army. The concept of ‘armed force’ is usually applied to a regular army of a country. It covers all kinds of military forces that subordinate themselves to work under the command of a group or an organised resistance movement, including political movement in the case of Hezbollah.

At the same time, CNN acknowledges the social role of Hezbollah, stating:

The Shiite group is a political party and a major provider of social services in Lebanon but also operates a militant wing. (CNN news website, 14 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

Here, CNN is drawing the attention to the triple identity of Hezbollah. The dynamic framing of CNN also shifts to label Hezbollah not only as a political party but also as a provider of social network services, alongside a ‘militant wing’. It thus acknowledges the broad range of functions of Hezbollah. By using the cohesive device “but also” CNN highlights the significant militant facet of Hezbollah.
The BBC also acknowledges the status of Hezbollah as a movement which comprises two wings, a political and a military one, as shown in this extract:

The British ambassador in Lebanon has held her first meeting with a senior official from the Hezbollah movement. The contact follows the UK’s decision to allow talks with political members of the Shia militant and political movement for the first time since 2005. (BBC news website, 18 June, 2009 − my emphasis).

The BBC here employs three framings. The first framing acknowledges Hezbollah broadly as a movement (subtext: informal, perhaps even popular) whereas the second framing refers to Hezbollah as a political movement in multi-confessional Lebanon. The third part of the same framing labels Hezbollah as a Shia militant movement thus, like CNN and Al-Jazeera, emphasising its religious Shiite identity, and stressing the military form of Hezbollah. One cannot escape noticing in this respect that CNN (as seen above) in its reference to Hezbollah uses a discourse of dichotomisation which separates the militant and political aspects. It uses the frame of ‘militant wing’ and ‘political movement’, whereas the BBC uses a discourse of juxtaposition which connects both of the two forms in this extract as one movement, which stresses its editorial freedom as a media outlet.

Al-Jazeera employs a broadly similar framing:

Lebanon’s government is to take legal action against a private communication network established in the country by Hezbollah, the Shia political organisation and armed group. (Al-Jazeera news website, 9 May, 2008 − my emphasis).

Al-Jazeera also classifies Hezbollah in terms of two camps or wings: in the first framing the reference to the political aspect is made within the more formally organised framework of an “organisation” (i.e. functional description: functionally defined and ideologically relevant), while the military aspect is framed within “an armed group”. Recognition is made here to a demarcation between the political and military roles assumed by Hezbollah.

Like CNN, Al-Jazeera uses a dichotomy which separates the framing of the militant and political aspects of Hezbollah. It frames Hezbollah as a political organisation, thereby indicating a discourse of acknowledgement, while it frames the militant aspect as an armed group, so conferring an informal status upon it.
In comparing Al-Jazeera’s frame of an “armed group” with the BBC and CNN frames of “militant wing” and “militant movement”, an “armed group” signifies an arguably more extreme form of opposition. The demarcation of these roles is ideologically relevant owing to the fact that the political aspect of Hezbollah is acknowledged by some Western countries such as the UK as stated earlier.

By contrast, it is striking in this respect that Al-Jazeera Arabic, during the same period of time and within the same context of the Israeli interventions in Lebanon, framed Hezbollah as an ‘Islamic resistance’ movement. By doing so, Al-Jazeera Arabic “gave Hezbollah an Islamic legitimacy, consisting of representing Islamic nations and engaging in a holy war” (Lahlali, 2011: 142). It also described Hezbollah as “the victim and the underdog which had taken on a military super-power”, and tried to “show Hezbollah as victimised” (ibid.: 149).

In comparison, it is also noted that the interpretations of all three media outlets recognise the powerful status of Hezbollah, both politically and militarily:

With one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, Hezbollah is poised to lead Lebanon’s government with the help of Lebanese Christian opposition leader, Gen. Michel Aoun. (CNN news website, 17 May, 2009 − my emphasis).

In comparison to the previous framings, this reference to Hezbollah takes a slightly different dynamic form: CNN here employs a contradictory framing discourse. It generally tends to stress the voice of the US government in framing Hezbollah as terrorist movement (see examples in this chapter); however, on this occasion CNN recognises Hezbollah not only as an “army”, a framing that is rarely used by CNN, but also as an organisation which is powerful. This framing signifies an embedded discourse of recognition of a formal status of a regular state army, which is not normally the status quo of Hezbollah in the news media, particularly in CNN. That is to say, the discourse of formal recognition of Hezbollah as an army is usually denied across these three media outlets.

In addition, the term “poised” alludes explicitly to the imminence of a threat, which denotes a discourse of suspecting the reactions of Hezbollah. It can also have the connotation that Hezbollah has the status of an opposition force in cooperation with General Aoun who also leads an opposition party, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.
The BBC and Al-Jazeera refer to Hezbollah’s powerful military status in a similar manner:

It has become the most powerful military force in Lebanon, but also has a parliamentary party with MPs, and has held seats in the cabinet. (BBC news website, 22 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

And

The Arab street, disenfranchised from the decision making process in the region, may have been revitalized by Hezbollah chutzpah in taking on the most powerful military in the region. (Al-Jazeera news website, 1 August, 2006 − my emphasis).

The BBC refers to Hezbollah as a powerful force, signalling the discourse of a more balanced treatment in establishing a distinction between the military and political forms. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera uses quite an informal term “chutzpah” which means arrogance; it is almost personalisation because this term usually refers to people not movements.

It is noted from the analysis of the above examples that despite subtle shifts in framing, the military capacity of Hezbollah is a dominant reframing discourse across the three media outlets. Here, ‘truth’ is seen as stability in meaning, not as something ontological, thus reframing displaces that stability and therefore also ‘truth’.

5.2.3 Representations of Hezbollah as a Guerrilla Force

The three outlets converge in their representations of Hezbollah as guerrilla movement:

The Israeli military on Wednesday suffered its largest loss of life in its 15-day offensive against Hezbollah guerrillas as nine Israeli soldiers were killed while fighting in southern Lebanese towns. (CNN news website, 27 July, 2006 − my emphasis).

It is well known that guerrilla warfare is a conducted by a kind of irregular group (cf. the descriptors ‘wing’, ‘group’ and ‘militant’) of small bands of armed civilians who participate in a conflict using unorthodox and unexpected tactics in military confrontations, such as ambush and surprise raids.
Framing Hezbollah as guerrillas again implies that it does not have the same status as a regular army. That is because a guerrilla can be irregular, unpredictable and therefore less stable and more dangerous.

Similarly, Al Jazeera classifies Hezbollah in this framing as a “guerrilla” force:

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerrillas in Southern Lebanon crossed the border into Israel and killed three Israeli soldiers. (Al-Jazeera news website, 31 December, 2008 – my emphasis).

On the other hand, the BBC adopts two positions in framing Hezbollah as a “guerrilla”, as seen in the next two framings:

The political and guerrilla organisation says the system played a key role in its war with Israel in 2006. (BBC news website, 6 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

And

The group’s military wing, the Islamic Resistance, is believed to have 500-600 full time, highly trained and motivated fighters. (BBC news website, 22 August, 2008 – my emphasis).

In the first framing, the military wing of Hezbollah is as an organisation, while in the second framing, the militant aspect is framed as “military wing”. Of interest here is the fact that for the first time the BBC frames Hezbollah as the “Islamic Resistance” (in Arabic: Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) which is the official title of the movement. Employing such framing can signify a discourse of balanced treatment by the BBC reporter.

5.2.4 The Discourse of Religious Identity

In an article published on the CNN World website, Matthew Levitt27 states the following:

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27 Matthew Levitt is Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Affairs. He is the author of the forthcoming book, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's "Party of God."

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Hezbollah: Party of Fraud. [...] A similar but worldwide effort today [...] would weaken Hezbollah’s global support network and undermine its reputation at home and across the globe, exposing it as a criminal gang rather than a standard bearer of “resistance” in Lebanon. (29 July, 2011 – my emphasis).

The use of the intertext “party of fraud” employs an irony against the Arabic meaning of the Name of “Hezbollah”. It is well known to CNN reporters and writers that Hezbollah means “Party of God” in Arabic. It is noteworthy here to state that the origin of the title of Hezbollah is borrowed from the Quranic verse 5/56: “Then surely the party of God are they that shall be triumphant” (فإن حزب الله هم الغالبون).

In this Quranic verse, the “party of God” means the faithful group of men, the adherents of God and his Prophet who turn for fellowship to God, his apostle, and the (fellowship of) believers; it is this fellowship of God whose triumph is held to be certain.

In employing such a discourse, the author is ironising Hezbollah, and revealing a degree of bias in expressing this overt opinion. This irony is located in the device of describing Hezbollah as a party of deception.

As a co-text, Levitt goes on to use dichotomisation which contrasts Hezbollah as a “criminal gang” with its being a “standard bearer of resistance” (which is referred to in quotation marks), thus anathematising the status of Hezbollah as a resistance movement, schematising it as a criminal force, and delegitimating it as a resistance movement.

Van Dijk’s model of schematisation or group schema exemplified in outgroups vs. ingroups or “Them” and “Us” (cf. section 2.5.1) can be seen in these framings.

By contrast, for the BBC:

Hezbollah – or the Party of God – is a powerful political and military organisation of Shia Muslims in Lebanon. (BBC news website, 22 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

In focusing on the framing of Hezbollah as the “party of God”, the BBC is using a merely descriptive discourse derived from the actual meaning of the title of Hezbollah. This approach underlines multiple readings. The first is to provide a
simple clarification of the etymology of Hezbollah for the Western audience, while in the second reading a denotation of the religious nature, identity and convictions of this party can be detected.

Al-Jazeera also provides etymological clarification and frames the movement as a political party as opposed to a terrorist grouping:

Sayed Hassan Nasrallah is the secretary-general of Hezbollah (Party of God), the Lebanese political party. (Al-Jazeera news website, 10 April, 2006 – my emphasis).

Although Al-Jazeera only occasionally resorts to this framing, as concluded from the data samples, it can imply the same meanings as above, particularly since the English web output of Al-Jazeera targets Western audiences and other non-native speakers of Arabic.

5.2.5 National Identity and Beyond

This theme is salient in the data. CNN enters another phase by suggesting that Hezbollah is more than a national or Lebanese movement:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Thursday that she hopes a U.N. Security Council resolution will be reached “within days” that addresses the hostilities between Israel and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah militia. (CNN news website, 4 August, 2006a – my emphasis).

This framing echoes a wider ideological and cultural, religious and political background. The primary reference lies in the intertext “Lebanon-based Hezbollah militia”, which suggests that although Hezbollah is based in Lebanon, it has wider connections with wider influences and interests in the region. In a subtle emphatic discourse, CNN draws attention to the fact that Hezbollah is more than a national or Lebanese movement. There is also a subtextual inference to Syria and Iran in this context.

The same framing of Hezbollah is employed by the BBC:
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has warned Israel of launching new attacks against his Lebanon-based Shia Muslim group. (BBC news website, 14 August, 2007 – my emphasis),

And:

The 34-day war started with a border incursion by Lebanon-based Hezbollah, who killed eight Israeli soldiers and snatched two more. (BBC news website, 19 January, 2008 – my emphasis).

The same connotations are evident in the above extracts. In the first excerpt, the BBC stresses the Shiite identity of Hezbollah as a group based in Lebanon, whereas in the second excerpt it is framed as broadly being based in Lebanon.

It can be inferred here that both the BBC and CNN uses a discourse of questioning Hezbollah’s status as a national Lebanese movement, laying implicit claim to it being a force of wider connections, influences, and interests in the region. The reference to Hezbollah in this context as Shiite can also imply that it represents a symbolic extension of the Shiite Iranian revolution outside Iran with an affinity and a deep connection with the Iranian system.

By contrast, Al-Jazeera seems to recognise Hezbollah as a movement with stronger Lebanese roots:

At the beginning stages of the Israeli conflict with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, US President George Bush said he was concerned about keeping the democratic process alive in Lebanon. (Al-Jazeera news website, 1 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

Here, in contrast to the BBC and CNN interpretations, Al-Jazeera relies upon a slightly different framing by using the intertext “Lebanon’s Hezbollah”, thereby employing a discourse of tradition and of identity. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah” also frames the status of Hezbollah as being perhaps more strongly rooted in Lebanon.

5.2.6 Representations of Hezbollah as a Proxy for Syria and Iran

As an extension of the subtexts discussed above, Hezbollah is framed by CNN as:
Hezbollah, a Shiite group which is supported by both Syria and Iran, is considered a terrorist organization by the United States. (CNN news website, 25 May, 2009 − my emphasis).

In this excerpt, CNN clearly frames Hezbollah as an organisation that is supported by Iran and Syria. As a co-text ‘Shiite group’, CNN proceeds to use an operation of association and juxtaposition of the Shiite identity of Hezbollah with the support of Iran and Syria. The voice of CNN is emphasised here in also framing Hezbollah as a “group”, thus denying its formal recognition. On the other hand, CNN employs a process of attribution, through using the intertext “terrorist organisation” which stresses the voice of the US government. On the other hand, the voice of CNN is highlighted through an explicit discourse of juxtaposition in which Hezbollah’s identity as Shiite and its Syrian and Iranian support coalesce, thereby laying implicit claim that the organisation is their ally.

Likewise, the BBC refers to Hezbollah as a movement that is supported by both Iranian and Syrian, stating in the following extract:

Syria and Iran, both strong supporters of the Lebanese-based Shia movement. (BBC news website, 14 July, 2006a − my emphasis).

Again, there is an emphasis on the Shiite identity of Hezbollah in relation to the Shiites of Iran, labelling (mostly through juxtaposition and subtextual reference) Hezbollah as a movement with a Shiite Islamic identity which has historical roots in relation to Iran.

However, Al-Jazeera follows the same discourse of reaffirming Syrian and Iranian support for Hezbollah without reference to its Shiite identity: “Hezbollah is backed by both Syria and Iran” (Al-Jazeera news website, 17 February, 2008). Moreover, the BBC and CNN draw attention to more details of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran: “Hezbollah retains strong ties with Syria as well as with its Iranian sponsors” (BBC news website, 13 July, 2006a − my emphasis)

The use of the intertext “Iranian sponsors” carries a discourse of negative connotation by means of imprecise designation. In this framing, it is suggested that Iran is the main source of funding on which Hezbollah depends. It could be understood here that
the BBC stresses in a reaffirming discourse that Iran is the state sponsor through which it pursues its strategic objectives in supporting terrorism. This funding can include all aspects of Hezbollah activities; namely, social welfare, political, and military activities. Also, the intertext “sponsor” suggests dependency and is linked intertextually to state-sponsored terrorism as a common trope in the framing of movements in the Middle East: “Bush said Iran ‘provides Hezbollah with financial support, weapons and training’” (CNN news website, 14 August, 2006 – my emphasis).

CNN uses direct speech by quoting the voice of the US President Bush, and employing the attribution “Bush said”. Like the BBC’s reporting, Iran is represented here as a sponsor of Hezbollah which offers comprehensive support to the organisation.

The three media outlets followed a discourse of reaffirmation of the support of Syria and Iran for Hezbollah. Whereas the BBC and CNN linked this relation intertextually to state-sponsored terrorism as a common trope in the framing of movements in the Middle East.

5.2.7 The Framing of Hezbollah Members

In an article by R. Emmett Tyrrell, a nationally syndicated columnist at CNN, an overt and stark framing of Hezbollah members as “killers” criminalises their actions. This discourse of criminalisation is articulated with a discourse of denying the cause they fight for; in other words, delegitimating Hezbollah:

    The week brings some very dour news for the Hezbollah killers and their Iranian masters. (CNN news website, 4 August, 2006b – my emphasis).

The lexical ideological selection of “their masters” is a relevant recurrent intertext, because it is related to the question of proxies, of enforcement of Shiite alliance with their guardians from evolutionary Iran. It also suggests that they are slaves of the Iranians who use them as savage tools to implement their violent murders of innocent human beings. The force of “killer” in this context collocates with motivated violent
actions and is ideologically associated with the US faming of Hezbollah as a (base) terrorist movement. The fighters of Hezbollah are also juxtaposed with the Iranians within the same frame of terrorism.

Al-Jazeera and the BBC frame members of Hezbollah as “fighters”:


And:

It is also the symbolic end of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. That conflict began on July 12th when Hezbollah fighters ambushed an Israeli patrol. (BBC news website 17 July, 2008 – my emphasis).

In this strong intertext, the framing of “fighters” has more neutral and less marked connotations. On one hand, a fighter is a person who takes part in a defence against an oppressive aggression or violation against his country or homeland. The lexical choice of “fighters” is also a synonym for war warriors, soldiers, and resistance fighters.

In the above news story from Al-Jazeera, the immediate subtext of this framing could be ‘freedom fighters’ who are possibly acting in (self-) defence, defending their own land against the Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

Al-Jazeera and the BBC, respectively, adopt another framing in another incident:

Israel killed four guerrillas on Monday and took three of the bodies, while the fourth Hizb Allah member died on the Lebanese side. (Al-Jazeera news website, 25 November, 2005 – my emphasis).

And:

Israel and the Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah have exchanged the remains of an Israeli civilian for a prisoner and the bodies of two Hezbollah guerrillas. (BBC news website, 15 October, 2007 – my emphasis).

The reference to Hezbollah men as “guerrillas” stresses Hezbollah’s position as a guerrilla group. The term stops short of a terrorist framing, but it does stress militancy. It is also noteworthy that Al Jazeera adopts a transliteration of the
organisation’s name that preserves Allah as a more identifiable lexeme. This is a key religious reference that is arguably lost in the more conventional transliterations of the BBC and Al Jazeera. The use of the term “Hezbollah guerrillas” indicates a more direct discourse of identification of the organisation with guerrilla warfare.

5.2.8 The Framing of Hezbollah’s Stronghold

Hezbollah’s theatre of influence is often framed as a “stronghold” – a classic trope in describing concentrations of activity (e.g. Taliban, neo-Nazi). First, a stronghold denotes a strong building or a fortress which stands strong and can be defended from the attacks of conquerors. Second, it suggests a structure of an underground building that used to be built for similar purposes. Third, it has a possible connotation with a spiritual religious meaning in both Islam and Christianity, which in this context implies protection and relief.

In employing the lexical selection of the intertext “stronghold” as a reference to Hezbollah’s headquarters, these denotations could be ascribed symbolically first to the Hezbollah military performance in southern Lebanon during the thirty-four days of the Israeli war against Lebanon, which gives a glimpse of the battlefield setting in which trenches and warrens were used to combat the Israeli invasion; and second, to the religious identity of Hezbollah as a Shiite movement.

The BBC news story runs: “Israel has hit strategic sites in Lebanon, and Hezbollah strongholds” (BBC news website, 14 July, 2006b – my emphasis).

The BBC’s framing reference is “strongholds”, a term which usually denotes a geographic location in the sense of locality. It also signifies the popularity, representivity and security of Hezbollah.

On the other hand, CNN intensifies the stronghold frame and gives voice to an intertextual secondary frame provided by the Israeli army:
Israel takes aim at Hezbollah stronghold [...] Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants battled Monday in southern Lebanon around what the Israeli military has dubbed Hezbollah's "terror capital". (CNN news website, 25 July, 2006 – my emphasis).

CNN resorts to the same lexical framing; however, it also employs in the same news article a metaphoric framing of Hezbollah’s residence as “terror capital” by quoting the Israeli military, which suggests that Hezbollah’s stronghold is a base for terrorism. Southern Lebanon constitutes a nuisance for Israel, which views it as a land that is ostensibly occupied as the homeland of the Lebanese Shiite, but in actual fact is a centre where terrorism is manufactured, plotted, and exported worldwide. The motivation for quoting the term used by the Israeli military “terror capital” is either to reinforce the US government approach to delegitimate Hezbollah through framing it as a terrorist organisation that is jeopardising Israel, or to adopt a discourse of distancing which may still imply confirmation through attributing the intertext to the Israeli officials.

By contrast, Al-Jazeera’s framing takes place in a slightly different way:

In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s traditional stronghold, Lebanese soldiers now stand on the front line with Israel. (Al-Jazeera news website, 11 July, 2007 – my emphasis).

The orientation of Al-Jazeera differs as shown in its position towards Hezbollah’s status. Al-Jazeera represents Lebanon as the “traditional” stronghold of Hezbollah. So the subtexts and intertexts connect with locality, belonging, and identity. This framing is associated with the fact that the Lebanese Shiites are based in southern Lebanon; it has been their original homeland for a long time. Thus, it is natural for it to be the headquarters of Hezbollah’s presence. Using the term “traditional” also implies that Hezbollah has another stronghold; that is the Southern Shiite suburb of Beirut.

5.2.9 The Framing of Nasrallah

The leader of Hezbollah is a significant political, religious, and media actor, whose speeches are broadcast, quoted and requoted across the world (cf. Matar, 2008). Indeed, Hezbollah even has its own TV station and multilanguage website – Al Manar – as discussed earlier. Unsurprisingly, since Hezbollah is a contested phenomenon,
the three media outlets have framed Nasrallah in different ways, as “leader”, “chief”, and “head” of Hezbollah:

**Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah**, has vowed to rain down more rockets on Israel. (Al-Jazeera news website, 30 July, 2006 − my emphasis).

**Hezbollah’s chief** on Monday announced the group’s new “manifesto”. (CNN news website, 30 November, 2009 − my emphasis).

**Hezbollah head** praises “victory”. (BBC news website, 22 September, 2006 − my emphasis).

The title “chief” in CNN’s reporting denotes a less neutral intertext with military connotations.

However, it is interesting to note that other, different titles are used by these media outlets in various different ways. For example, the BBC and CNN refer to Nasrallah as “Sheikh”:

**Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah** accused Israel of being behind a blast in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (CNN news website, 15 February, 2008 − my emphasis).

Viewed by many Israelis as a terrorist and religious fanatic, **Sheikh Nasrallah** has become a vastly influential figure in Lebanon [...] Diplomats and others who have met him describe him as highly intelligent, widely-read and politically astute (BBC news website 13 July, 2006b − my emphasis).

The title of “Sheikh” employed by the BBC and CNN has several meanings and functions. First, it is a title associated with the Sunni tradition and attributed to eminent scholars of Islamic sciences. Second, it is a title that designates elderly male members of a nomadic tribe as those deserving respect and holding specific and important responsibilities. Third, it is also a title attributed to members of prominent families in specific communities of the Arab world, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It is noteworthy in this respect that it is not only associated with Islamic tradition, but also familiar in the Christian community in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the BBC uses a dichotomy which contrasts Nasrallah who is labelled internationally as a terrorist figure (particularly by the US and Israel), with one having characteristics that frame him as a highly influential figure in the political scene.
Interestingly, the title of “sheikh” is not familiar in the Shiite tradition; it is thus misplaced in this context by both the BBC and CNN. The alternative title in the Shiite tradition is “Sayyed”, used correctly by Al-Jazeera:

Moves by the government to disable Hezbollah’s telecommunications system [...] have angered Hezbollah’s Sayed Hassan Nasrallah. (Al-Jazeera news website, 10 May, 2008a – my emphasis).

The title “Sayyed” in Arabic literally means “mister”; however, it is one of the highest titles among the ranks of Shiite clerics; an honorific title restricted only for eminent religious figures, including Nasrallah.

In other frames of his leadership, unlike CNN, the BBC and Al-Jazeera frames Nasrallah as follows:

Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah, has said his organisation is prepared to expand its sphere of operations against Israel. (Al-Jazeera news website, 17 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

In framing Nasrallah in this way, Al-Jazeera adopts his official political title. However, the lower case is used in this news article which indicates a generic and descriptive reference to the position that Nasrallah occupies.

In a similar way, the BBC states:

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah – or Party of God – has re-positioned the Shia organisation as a major player in Lebanese politics. (BBC news website, 13 July, 2006b – my emphasis).

In contrast with the framing of Al-Jazeera, the BBC in rare cases adopts the same title, but with using the upper case in quoting the official title of Nasrallah. This implies a discourse of a more formal recognition of his status as the Secretary General of Hezbollah.

Another qualified view of Nasrallah is found in the news coverage of CNN:

Reclusive Hezbollah leader praises Ahmadinejad ahead of Lebanon visit. (CNN news website, 9 October, 2010 – my emphasis).
Following the end of Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Nasrallah has refrained from public appearance owing to security concerns. The CNN employs here the framing lexical choice “reclusive” on the occasion of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon. This framing is used here in order to describe the new situation of Nasrallah following the end of the Israeli interventions in Lebanon. It refers to Nasrallah as a reclusive man who is living in seclusion and solitude, in other words, as an enigmatic (subtext: dangerous) figure. There is also a suggestion that this situation is one of the outcomes of the war decisions taken by Hezbollah and their global and national consequences.

The framing of Nasrallah as “reclusive” also maintains his inability to coexist with the environment around him and with the rest of the world. There are added suggestions about his trustworthiness and perhaps reliability – he is almost cast as being anti-social.

CNN further opts to use another frame as follows:

The fiery leader of Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant movement assured Lebanon on Monday that his movement will cooperate in the country’s political life. (CNN news website, 26 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

This description suggests someone who is easily aroused or provoked, ardent, very active, and impetuous, thus questioning Nasrallah’s reliability.

In a discourse of schematising Nasrallah through the co-text “fiery leader”, CNN is first describing Nasrallah as a leader who takes hasty and emotionally charged decisions which caused the launch of the Israeli war on Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s kidnap of two Israeli soldiers. Second, CNN is alluding to Nasrallah’s role as a speaker who addresses mass audiences, thus triggering fears of a new civil war that could further destabilise the volatile region, as when Hezbollah took over Beirut in 2008.
5.2.10 Concluding Remarks

The analysis in this subsection has focused mainly on illustrating the representational diversity of the three media outlets in framing Hezbollah and its leader. The analysis was focused on exploring how the process of framing takes place in terms of aspects of communication in individual media outlets and across media outlets as an interrelated complex.

The crux of the issue is that Hezbollah’s salient self-framing is as a ‘resistance movement’; the analysis revealed that this primary discourse of resistance is decontextualised in the processes of reporting by Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. Thus, the centrality of resistance was lost in the process of dissemination. It underwent various recontextualisations across the three media outlets, whereas a battle of contestations over the definition and framing Hezbollah was demonstrated. This is evidence that the object of truth is displaced by the circulation of media images which has a direct link with the dynamics of dissemination of communication systems and the recursivity of political messages.

The framing tendencies and schematisations of Hezbollah as a “terrorist” force were dominant in the framings used by CNN. It adopts a blunt and strong rhetoric against Hezbollah’s self-framing, giving voice in specific cases to the US government and Israel; and employing discourses of anathematisation, schematisation, and criminalisation of Hezbollah which thus echo a discourse of delegitimation. By contrast, the reference to Hezbollah as a terrorist movement was mitigated in the BBC extracts, but Hezbollah is referred to as being on the US list of ‘proscribed’ organisations. This indicates a subtle discourse of attenuation on the part of the BBC. By contrast, Al-Jazeera frames the movement as a political party as opposed to a terrorist grouping.

There was a shared discourse of emphasis on the Shiite identity of Hezbollah. This identity comprises various framings of Hezbollah as a group, a movement, a political party, an organisation, militia, guerrillas, an armed force, an Islamic resistance and an army. CNN uses a discourse of dichotomisation which separates the militant and political aspects. It uses the frame of ‘militant wing’ and ‘political movement’;
whereas the BBC uses a discourse of juxtaposition which connects both of the two forms in this extract as one movement. Like CNN, Al-Jazeera uses a dichotomy which separates the framing of the militant and political aspects of Hezbollah. It frames Hezbollah as a political organisation.

Both the BBC and CNN use a discourse of questioning the status of Hezbollah as a national Lebanese movement, laying implicit claim to its being a force of wider connections, influences, and interests in the region. By contrast, Al-Jazeera recognises Hezbollah as a movement with stronger Lebanese roots, thus employing a discourse of tradition and identity.

The three media outlets followed a discourse of reaffirmation of the support of Syria and Iran for Hezbollah. Whereas the BBC and CNN linked this relation intertextually to state-sponsored terrorism as a common trope in the framing of movements in the Middle East.

It can be stated that these framings demonstrate how, in the case of news media, text producers play an important role in circulating and recontextualising political discourse. In other words, dissemination and recursivity were manifest in the representation of framings in various texts of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN.

It is evident that there was real contestation concerning these framings of Hezbollah as revealed in many different recontextualisations and demarcations. In the process of dissemination, the various framings of Hezbollah were recontextualised in a fluid context across the three media outlets. CNN gave greater voice to the US and Israel; Al-Jazeera gave voice to a discourse of tradition; whereas the BBC functioned in a more subtle discourse, in the sense that it adopted a dynamic framing of Hezbollah. Moreover, Nasrallah’s representations across the three media outlets oscillate; it is difficult to define and difficult to stabilise them in discourse.

The analysis revealed a fascinating battle over the definition of Hezbollah between the three media outlets. This battle could be described a new form of a proxy war, and it could be stated that war is becoming electronic.
The analysis in this section draws on Nasrallah’s speeches as primary sources. One of the most basic and effective ways by which Hezbollah frames itself is through multifaceted media. The development of Hezbollah media outlets and the ways in which these have been deployed, both to disseminate Hezbollah’s own discourse of identity and to interact with the rest of political society, is echoed in the context of its self-framing.

As stated earlier in this study, Hezbollah runs Al-Manar (‘the Beacon’) satellite TV station. Al-Manar is a professional news organisation; it is distinguished from its counterparts in the Middle East in terms of its “focus on Hizbullah’s resistance operations in the south”, which acts as “the channel of the resistance” (Dajani, 2001: 8, in Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 31 – emphasis in original). It is even described as an “unexpected rival of Al-Jazeera” (Gondalez-Quijano, 2003: 74), and as a media player “more significant than the presence of the Arab media giants so well represented in Lebanon” (ibid.: 75).

Al-Manar is based in the Shiite southern suburb of Beirut. It was established in 1991 as an “offshoot” of al-Nour radio station close to Shiite “resistance” until 1996, when it became a formally established TV station (ibid.: 74), that is Al-Manar. It opened an internet site in the same year which achieved growing success to the extent that its owners had to buy a new site address in 2000 to accommodate the large number of users (ibid., 2003). It also maintains a multi- language website in Arabic, French, Spanish and English, featuring news, which is a signal that it is targeting foreign audiences.

Al-Manar is owned by Hezbollah and they are said to “breathe life into one another. Each provides the other with inspiration” (Fandy, 2007: 74). This is evident in its news coverage and representations of Hezbollah, including Nasrallah’s statements. To elaborate, Al-Manar calls itself the station of resistance; its categorisation as a political channel has been associated with its “championing a religious and moral discourse – what An Na’im (2006) calls the politics of religion” (Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 31). Moreover, it adopts a discourse of the “community of
resistance”, which initially referred to the Shiites in the south, but has since extended to include the Palestinian issue and the war in Iraq.

Al-Manar articulates four discourses: a Shiite religious discourse, social welfare discourse, political discourse, and the discourse of militancy. That is, it represents Hezbollah’s social, religious and political activities which “operate as an integrated and holistic network, disseminating the values of resistance while constructing a collective identity derived from the notion of the [...] ‘Islamic sphere’” (Harb and Leenders, 2005: 192-93, in Matar and Dakhllallah, 2006: 25). In many respects Al-Manar preserves its Shiite religious identity while maintaining at the same time its political discourse. It further represents a counter ideology to Western discourses. That is to say, Al-Manar articulates Hezbollah’s resentment towards American and Israeli policies in the Middle East. Because Al-Manar produces most of its own content in-house, it is considered one of the most expensive channels to run in the Middle East (ibid., 2007). It is suggested that in addition to funding from its shareholders, Al-Manar, according to Fandy (2007: 74), obtains funding from “Iran, Shiite communities and other Arabs and Muslims who support Hezbollah’s mission with the station”.

Furthermore, the self-projection of Hezbollah operates through other different forms of media communication apparatus, such as Al-Nour (the light) radio station; Al-Ahad, a weekly newspaper established in 1984 and renamed “al-Intiqad” (criticism), which is available in both print and as an online electronic version; in addition to publishing houses such as Dar Al-Hadi, and the monthly Magazine Baqiyatu Allah (what remains with God), established in 1991.

In addition to its media outlets, Hezbollah has resorted to other media. Hezbollah released an anti-Israel war video game, “Special Force 2”, based on the ‘Israeli war in Lebanon’ in 2006, which lasted for 34 days. This game, which is designed for children, was released at the Spider’s Web museum, established by Hezbollah in Beirut, to commemorate the victory of Hezbollah over Israel in that war.
5.3.1 Implicit and Explicit Audiences

Nasrallah’s speeches are closely intertwined with Hezbollah in their positions on a variety of issues pertaining to Lebanon and the Middle East. They are tailored to address many explicit and implicit audiences.

It could be stated that Nasrallah addresses his audiences in three categories. First, on the domestic level, there is the Lebanese government, the opposition parties, and the allied parties: Sunni, Christian, and Druze. On the social level, there is the Lebanese nation exemplified in the Lebanese people: supporters and opponents, the supporters of the concept of resistance who contribute significantly in forming public opinion in Lebanon, and Lebanese prisoners in Israel.

Second, on the regional level, there are the Arab and Islamic governments; the Arab, Islamic and international communities; the Palestinian people, including the Palestinian Government; and other political factions such as Hamas, the people of Gaza, and the Arabs who live in Israel, the people of the Intifada (uprising), and Palestinian and Arab men and women detained in Israeli jails.

Third, on the global level, Nasrallah addresses multiple national and global audiences of different categories. There are the Israeli government (which is a primary audience), Mossad, and the Israeli citizens of different ideological categories; the EU; the UN; the US, including the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Other implied audiences are exemplified in the sympathisers and supporters in the international community of the mass battlefield against Israel and the USA agenda in the region. His voice is truly global.

At the same time, there are the different media outlets in which Nasrallah operates between political and media systems; these include, among many others, Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN, which are regarded as secondary audiences in themselves (in the sense that they are recipients of his political statements as part of a recursive communication system in several contexts, which are recontextualised and disseminated into new contexts of news media production). In other words, these outlets operate in an audience loop: they report on Hezbollah and on each other, they
report on each other intertextually, explicitly and implicitly. It is worth noting here that modern political communication is marked by the new age of dissemination arising from the production of different media actors and their interrelations, and they enter into uncertain dialogue in a multi-voiced way. Thus, Nasrallah’s speeches, as stated earlier, are highly significant for news media coverage because they are represented across contexts in various media outlets, undergoing variation and change in the process of dissemination.

The communication system comprises a number of different actors and voices. Because within a system they unavoidably refer to each other, all of these actors occupy the same communication space, and consequently they have awareness of each other and differentiate themselves from each other. This differentiation is not a separate issue but a connection. These distinctions across media organisations are actually forms of recursivity themselves in the sense that they relate to each other. In terms of texts, these relations can be explicit, challenge the response, the quotation, the reported speech, but very often they can be quite implicit. Recursivity is a general circular flow of communication in the system, and within that recursivity there is implicit and explicit relationship through texts.

5.3.2 Salient Features of Discourse

The discourse of Nasrallah in his attention-grabbing speeches is rooted in historical intertexts; it is politically highly salient and embedded in different types of old and new narratives for political reasons. Hezbollah narratives are political, historical, literary, and religious, and are recontextualised for political impact in the speeches of Nasrallah in full knowledge of his many audiences.

The self-representations and representations of Hezbollah are multivoiced (Bakhtin, 1981), that is, they incorporate several dimensions: its role as a religious military resistance movement; a political Islamic manifesto party; and its role as a social welfare network. All these aspects constitute elements that reinforce the significant role assumed by Hezbollah in Lebanon and world news.
5.3.2.1 The self-representation of Hezbollah as a Resistance Movement

The dominant and most salient self-representations of Hezbollah rest largely on its self-description as an “Islamic resistance movement”: “Our core cause since 1982 has been the resistance” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 19 November, 2006). Other roles and discourses are subordinate to this dominant discourse. Hezbollah represents itself as a legitimate, national Islamic resistance movement. Moreover, its raison d’être is found in its discourse of resistance against Israel, which Hezbollah delegitimises as an occupier of the Lebanese and Palestinian lands.

In the previous section, various framings of Hezbollah by the above three media outlets were cited, among which is framing as a “terrorist movement”. This discourse contrasts intertextually with the theme of resistance as Hezbollah’s dominant discourse of self-representation and identity.

The concept of resistance not only rests on the goal of resisting the Israeli occupation, but also stems from the concept of Jihad:

There is a campaign coming from every-which-direction; its main objective is labelling Hizbullah as a terrorist, a fraudulent mafia group of killer gangsters. This is completely unfounded, because Hizbullah is a resistance jihad movement, that is genuine, honest, clean, pure, enduring, sincere and genuine, and for them the problem it represents is that it is a serious and victorious resistance jihad movement. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 1 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

As stated in the previous section, Hezbollah has been classified as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US, some Western countries, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK, and this view has been given a voice, particularly in CNN and, in a more nuanced way, by the BBC and Al Jazeera. Against these allegations, Nasrallah tends to put special emphasis on fostering the values of the religious discourse of resistance based on the concept of Jihad, which is regarded as part and parcel of its primary goals. Linguistically, the term “jihad” means to struggle or to strive. It also has the connotation of ‘warfare’. Thus, “Jihad” is an Islamic concept which means a collective duty for Muslims in their military struggle against oppression and persecution on behalf of the Ummah at large for the sake of God. It is classified either as the greater Jihad (al-jihad al-asghar in Arabic) or the lesser jihad
which implies an inward struggle directed against one’s self desires, or working hard to achieve and maintain difficult tasks), or the greater jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) which is an outward one against injustice. In the case of Hezbollah, Jihad is conducted in the first place to liberate the occupied Lebanese lands by Israel. Here, when Nasrallah says Hezbollah is “victorious resistance” he explicitly thematises and recontextualises its representation in other media – a clear example of the recursive character of the communication ‘battle’ over Hezbollah’s definition.

On the other hand, there is a dichotomisation which contrasts Hezbollah’s representation as a terrorist ‘fraudulent mafia group’ by ‘every-which-direction’, with Hezbollah’s self-representation as a resistant ‘jihad movement’. Nasrallah here also equates the religious discourse of Jihad with the discourse of resistance (for a variety of viewpoints on this issue, see El Husseini, 2008; Heidekat, 2010).

More specifically, Hezbollah frames its jihad against Israel as both a Lebanese and pan-Arab affair:

We on the other hand are with all the resistance in Palestine, Iraq and every place where an honorable nationalistic person takes up his weapon to liberate his land from occupation, hegemony and tutelage. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 12 December, 2006 – my emphasis).

The target audiences in this statement are multiple: the Arab governments who refrained from supporting the resistance movements in these countries; the Israeli government along with the American administration; on the one hand, and key media outlets.

A discourse of collectivity is also employed by Nasrallah by his use of the first person plural ‘we’, associated again with a discourse of resistance. He is making a recursive claim that resistance reinforces a discourse of pan-Arab affairs; equating thereby the resistance in Lebanon with the resistance movements in Palestine and Iraq. The power of persuasion resides here in displaying an emotional argument that can penetrate the Arab audience and influence their emotions (Mazraani 1993; Johnstone 1994, in Lahlali, 2012: 2). Nasrallah is also trying to reinforce his authority and status among Arab and Muslim audiences.
The co-text “liberate” reflects a discourse of delegitimation of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and the US presence in Iraq. A discourse of juxtaposing Israel and the US as aggressors is thus developed.

Hezbollah intertextually frames military jihad against Israel as a mandatory religious duty, not only of the Lebanese but also of all Arabs and Muslims, building a discourse of duty and obligation. The framing of Jihad is constructed as a pan-Arab issue, particularly in connection with the Palestinian issue:

The resistance project is not one of war: we are clear even about liberating Palestine... we say that our duty as Lebanese is to support the Palestinian people’s resistance”. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 27 September, 2008 − my emphasis).

In this transnational dimension, a discourse of duty is evident. Hezbollah represents itself as a supporter of the Palestinian people under the Israeli occupation in order to project a pan-Arab communication. Nasrallah thus uses the discourse of juxtaposition in which Lebanese resistance coalesces with Palestinian resistance. Moreover, the discourse of dichotomisation contrasts the sub-text ‘war’ with ‘liberating’ Palestine. The repetition of the use of the first-person plural ‘we’ signals again a discourse of collectivity, which reinforces Hezbollah national discourse. This is constantly reiterated in Hezbollah’s rhetoric. Nasrallah uses repetition in his speeches “not only to elevate his language style, but also to serve various ideological purposes”, with the aim of reinforcing his various strategies, and influencing and persuading his audience (Lahlali, 2012: 11). Thus, repetition is deliberately used to reinforce Nasrallah’s different political strategies, which have been devised to address various Lebanese factions (ibid., 2012).

The discourse of duty is juxtaposed with the religious discourse of jihad:

If we view this battle as an honorable wholly humanitarian and a legitimate battle, the fighter in this battle becomes a resistance fighter, a struggler, a Mujahid [...]. A dead person in such a battle is viewed as a martyr [...] who sacrificed [sic!] for the sake of his nation, the people and sanctities. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 17 July, 2009 − my emphasis).

In this quotation, Nasrallah uses the discourse of honour to convey the intended communication to the target audiences that the fighters of Hezbollah operate within a
context of a noble goal; that is, they are defending their country and liberating it from Israeli aggression. Thus, he maintains the discourse of legitimation through the intertext of “battle” in order to reinforce the status of Hezbollah fighters as Mujahideen (plural of fighters in Arabic) and as martyrs whose primary purpose is resistance. Nasrallah thus juxtaposes the discourse of resistance with legitimising the battle of Hezbollah.

The concept of “jihad” is an explicit intertext with the Quran that describes the fighters of Hezbollah as martyrs who sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country, i.e. martyrdom is jihad. Thus, the discourse of Islamic religious revivalism and national jihad underpin the culture of “martyrdom”, which is self-framed as an act of redemption and a struggle against unjust occupation; but it is often framed in CNN and in the BBC in more subtly as terror. This is the discourse through which Hezbollah approaches Jihad – furthermore, it is noteworthy that it places this concept against the idea of suicide bombing. It further emphasises the discourse of resistance as its central self-representation, in the battle against Israeli aggression. Nasrallah thereby endows the concept of resistance with a higher status. Martyrdom and jihad constitute a particularly salient discourse frame. Nasrallah, through using the intertext “martyr” is rooting the discourse in Islam (religious discourse), and is rooting the discourse of resistance. In other words, the discourse of martyrdom grounds the political discourse in one religion.

Nasrallah elaborates on the culture and aims of the discourse of resistance, saying:

> The Islamic resistance became the backbone of the Lebanese resistance. [...]. To the resistance, the removal of the occupation and enemy aggression, liberating the land and freeing the prisoners, to us, formed a sacred cause, as well as a religious and moral obligation. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 4 January, 2008 – my emphasis).

In this excerpt, Nasrallah prioritises (through intertextual repetition) the status of Hezbollah as a force of resistance. As a co-text, he proceeds to use a dichotomy which contrasts that resistance and its related term ‘liberation’ with a group of related concepts – aggression, occupation, and the enemy. These co-texts of occupation, enemy, liberation, liberating the land, prisoners, sacred cause, exemplify a divine discourse, a religious discourse. Nasrallah is making a claim in a recursive process
that resistance, liberation, and removal of aggression are to be fulfilled by Hezbollah, which signal a discourse of the status of the sacred. It is noteworthy in this respect that these discourses were excluded – not reported – by the BBC or CNN, or even Al Jazeera, particularly in the period of the data of this study (2006-2009).

In another sense, Nasrallah uses the religious discourse of the ‘sacred’ to equate an Islamic resistance with a national ‘Lebanese’ resistance, laying implicit claim to being a force of nationhood. That is to say, he identifies the discourse of identification through equating the Islamic or religious discourse of resistance with Lebanese resistance, i.e. the discourse of nationhood: Lebanon. There is also a second reference to the religious and the sacred, in which Nasrallah extends the religious narrative by connecting it with the discourse of duty, which is both moral and religious and an ‘obligation’. It is also explicit that the religious discourse as a main characteristic of its resistance is substantially emphasised. On the other hand, the term “sacred cause” suggests again an implicit religious intertextual reference to the concept of jihad in Islam.

The rhetorical device of repetition is used frequently. Nasrallah mentions the intertext “resistance” three times in one line in a way designed to be persuasive to his target audiences. Repetition can also have a “persuasive and emotional impact on the audience (Mazraani 1993: 265–267; Johnstone 1994: 6, in Lahlali: 2012: 2).

Put differently, through the co-text “the enemy”, Nasrallah uses binary dualisms and schematisation, which manifests a process of dichotomisation, resistance and aggression. The co-text “the enemy”, that is Israel, denotes a discourse of anathematisation of and delegitimation, and at the same time legitimates Hezbollah as a resistance movement with a sacred goal to overcome the aggression of Israel. The speaker here seeks to persuade his audiences through the representation of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (van Dijk, 1991) which is “often elaborated on to demonstrate different strategies by speakers to polarise opinion (Lahlali, 2011: 131).

Moreover, the co-text ‘liberating the land’, signals a discourse of liberation which connects with resistance, and he comes back to it in the same statement in a recursive communication because he always refers to Hezbollah as a resistance movement not
as a militia or an army, which is conceptually related to resistance, and liberation. In other words, Nasrallah’s recontextualisation becomes the decontextualisation; his framing of Hezbollah is different, it is political but it is rooted in tradition – a polarisation of representation.

A counter-discourse to CNN and other media framings of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization may be detected here. Nasrallah reframes the cause of defeating Israel as being based upon noble morals and manners, relying thus on a dominant discourse of resistance. Indeed, Nasrallah stresses these foundations, stating:

We are not a random or sophistry [sic!] resistance movement. We are not so drawn to the earth that we only see soil and dust nor are we a resistance of chaos. A resistance that is devout, god trusting, passionate and knowing is also a resistance that has knowledge, wisdom, planning, training and equipment. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 22 September, 2006b – my emphasis).

It is interesting to consider here the role of translation as a mediated factor. The BBC World Monitoring translation has another English version as follows:

We are neither a disorganized and sophistic resistance, nor a resistance pulled to the ground that sees before it nothing but soil, nor a resistance of chaos. The pious, God-reliant, loving, and knowledgeable resistance is also the conscious, wise, trained, and equipped resistance that has plans. (BBC World Monitoring translation, 22 September, 2006).

The discourse of resistance is again persistent in Nasrallah’s rhetoric. The functional rhetorical repetition of the intertext “resistance” is therefore ideologically marked. It aims through this recurrence to reinforce a religious discourse of accentuation of the value of Hezbollah as a resistance movement. In addition, this repetition suggests a warning of the consequences of challenging Hezbollah’s abilities. Moreover, at the text level, it represents a key point of persuasion in the argument, and constructs communication between Nasrallah and his target audience (a conclusion reached by Lahlali, 2012).

The employment of the marked use of the plural first person “we” in referencing the “resistance movement” further articulates a discourse of collectivity and reflects again a discourse of persuasion. The repetition of the lexical choice ‘resistance’, followed by “positive attributes, is equally designed to persuade the audience of the wisdom of
Hizbollah’s action, and refute those sceptics who laid the blame on Hizbollah for causing the conflict in the first place” (Lahlali, 2012: 6). The repetition is used here to “serve two main functions. The first is to persuade and the second is to warn. The impetus behind repetition of this kind is to portray the speaker as a knowledgeable, powerful, strong and confident leader” (ibid.).

Thus, Nasrallah frames Hezbollah through employing dichotomisation which contrasts two forms of resistance movements. Nasrallah emphasises here the discourse of religious fervour of Hezbollah as a devout genuine religious resistance movement and at the same time as a movement which is based on a well organised and developed military dimension. This is evident in the discourse of pride in the declarative narrative: “Hizbullah was born victorious” (Nasrallah, 4 September, 2008). This discourse is emphasised in employing the metaphoric terms of soil and dust; it is suggested here that Hezbollah is not an aimless movement that cannot see beyond its nose. On the contrary, it has a far-sighted vision that plans and acts.

The focus on the resistance is also manifested when Nasrallah switches abruptly from “we” to the “resistance”. In an attempt to convey a message which implies that Hezbollah has a strong and well prepared leadership with future anticipation, Nasrallah “uses ‘we’ when he refers to issues related to management, organisation and long-term vision, but refers to the resistance when speaking about training and equipment” (Lahlali, 2012: 5).

The above excerpts are highly significant because in many conventional representations of Hezbollah and in particular in the CNN representation, Hezbollah is stabilised broadly as a terrorist organisation; however, there is a tension between the representations, by the CNN for example, and the self-representation of Hezbollah which is multidimensional: religious, political, social movement, etc. This reflects a further illustration of the battle of ideas in the Middle East.

Another aspect Nasrallah is trying to focus on is that Hezbollah has no hidden agenda, as claimed by media outlets, Israel, the US and other Western countries:
Hizbullah’s image is as bright and clear as the sun and cannot be disfigured by anyone. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 8 May, 2008b – my emphasis).

Against the putative attempts to distort the image of Hezbollah, the figurative metaphorical language of “the sun” which Nasrallah uses in a declarative voice denotes clarity, purity and light. It is reminiscent of Plato’s source of intellectual illumination in his “Allegory of the Cave”, which was presented after the metaphor of the sun. Another counter dimension of self-representation recursively rejects the label of a “militia”: “We told you that these are arms of a resistance organization, not a militia” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 4 August, 2007 – my emphasis).

In a recursive counter-framing to the contestation of Hezbollah as a militia in the three media outlets, Nasrallah’s discourse of denial rejects such allegations through strongly emphasising its discourse of resistance. It stresses Hezbollah self-representation as an armed resistance organisation which does not operate outside the Lebanese political polity, but does constitute a significant key player in the Lebanese political system and beyond in the region, thereby emphasising a hybrid discourse of nationhood and legitimation.

It is worth stating here that Hezbollah was deemed a legitimate resistance movement by the Lebanese cabinet in December, 2009, which endorsed the right of Hezbollah to keep its arsenal of weapons in order to liberate the Lebanese territories.

Following the 1989 Al-Taif accord, Hezbollah issued an official document which made a clear-cut distinction between the militia and resistance movement. Moreover, Hezbollah was committed to abide by the security rules which prohibited the appearance of its armed fighters in their military uniform inside the Lebanese territories. This is a significant recursive battle for the definition of Hezbollah, for the other broadcasters conflate the two. However, the framing of Hezbollah is recursively represented across contexts in various media outlets and oscillated; it undergoes variation and change in the process of dissemination which makes it difficult to define and to stabilise in discourse.
Furthermore, Hezbollah, in a discourse of denial, claims that framing it as a “state within a state” by media outlets is not its mission:

I do not agree that we are a State within a ‘State’. [...] Talk of ‘a State within the State’ comes from George Bush, because such generalization comes from there. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 8 April, 2007 – my emphasis).

In a further ‘counter-framing’, the intertext a “state within a state” is used twice in the above text. Nasrallah again uses a discourse and rhetoric of denial “I do not agree” to express rejection of the putative allegation that Hezbollah constitutes a parallel state-like structure in the absence of a well-established political system and military infrastructure. The second time Nasrallah uses this intertext he explicitly addresses the Bush administration and the international community at large. He acknowledges the sovereignty of the Lebanese State as the sole authority which rules and conducts the affairs of the country.

At the same time, Hezbollah acknowledges its status as a resistance movement:

The resistance in Lebanon [...] is a true popular state, with the capacity to produce leaders at all levels, leaders it does not bring from theoretic posts, but from the heart of suffering, the heart of experience, and the heart of the field of work, blood and tears. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 16 September, 2008 – my emphasis).

One can see here the frequent use of the discourse of resistance in the self-representations of Hezbollah. Nasrallah uses this narrative to denote the legitimate status of Hezbollah as a “popular state” which suggests different connotations and denotations. There is a discourse of dichotomisation which contrasts the leaders who only occupy senior posts with the leaders who experience suffering. This discourse is linguistically realised in a distinctive lexicalised description of the background of Hezbollah leaders exemplified here in the collocation of the two intertexts “blood and tears”. Nasrallah thus emphasises, in a discourse of legitimisation, that this popularity is attained through using this collocation, which suggest a subtextual reference to the marginalised Shiite community that offered sacrifices in defending Lebanon.

An implicit reference can be detected to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, who was commander of Hezbollah’s military forces. Nasrallah, targeting the Israelis, whom he accused of assassinating Mughniyeh, emphasises the discourse of resistance
in the sense that the process of preparing and creating qualified leaders is ongoing with the aim of achieving victory over Israel.

Since the July War in 2006, Hezbollah’s self-representation has undergone significant shifts:

The resistance is ready to pounce and create the historic victory that changes the face of the region. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 11 November 2007 – my emphasis).

In an emphatic passage Nasrallah reaffirms the discourse of resistance through using the lexical choice “to pounce” a historic victory in the region, that is the Middle East, indicating a discourse of extending the role of resistance, not only in Lebanon but also beyond, which further operates through a discourse of a pan-Arab resistance movement.

Within a year, Nasrallah reconfirmed his view in a more confident tone and reframed Hezbollah resistance as being stronger than ever before:

Today, the resistance is fully prepared to confront any possible ‘Israeli’ war. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 14 February, 2008b – my emphasis).

Nasrallah stresses a primary discourse of resistance here to indicate its new status against Israeli aggression. In this context, two discourses are used: first, the discourse of delegitimising “Israel”, which is referred to in quotation marks. Nasrallah thus denies its status as a state; second, is the discourse of legitimating Hezbollah as a resistance movement against Israel. It is noteworthy that this primary discourse of resistance is decontextualised in the processes of reporting by the three media outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN as stated in the previous section. In other words, the centrality of resistance is lost.

5.3.2.2 The Self-Representation of the Socio-Political Dimension of Hezbollah

As we have seen, Hezbollah’s self-framing uses discourses along multiple axes: the religious, the political, and the social:
The resistance jihad option, with its armed military resistance as the spearhead of this comprehensive Jihad resistance, that involves resistance in culture, knowledge, education, politics, media and mobilization, etc...alongside it. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 20 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

In this excerpt, Nasrallah articulates multiple discourses to frame the role of Hezbollah as that of a resistance movement. He constantly refers to Hezbollah’s dominant religious discourse of resistance which is juxtaposed with the discourse of jihad and hence extended to be framed as a comprehensive grass-roots project. The second function of the discourse of resistance operates on additional multiple planes of discourses. It not only has the characteristic of a discourse of military orientation but also is concerned with other various aspects of a civil society, such as the educational, cultural, political, social, and emotional ones, in addition to the media strategies which are considered the most important mechanisms of the warfare of Hezbollah; in another sense, the discourses of wider social engagement. In addition, the media communications of Hezbollah are a decisive factor; particularly the role assumed by its websites and privately-owned Al-Manar TV station.

As noted above, Hezbollah has become incorporated into the Lebanese political system, and has become a part of its government. Its political discourse has always been portrayed by the party itself as being complementary to the discourse of resistance. Furthermore, this political identity offered Hezbollah a platform from which to be a key player in Middle East politics, particularly in respect of the US policy in the region.

In the field of social welfare, Hezbollah has, as is well documented, established networks of social services and welfare for the Shiite Lebanese community to contribute to improving socio-economic conditions for the population. The socio-political wing of Hezbollah maintains a large network of social welfare organisations manifested in multiple activities among which was a process of reconstruction and the provision of shelters for displaced people following the bombardment by Israel during the July war in 2006, which caused widespread destruction to civilian infrastructure. (See Karagiannis, 2009, in which he establishes a framing analysis to highlight the way Hozbollah communicates its goals and the way it makes sense of its social world and mobilises support within its Shiite constituency).
In addition, the Al-Shahid (martyr) Institution was established in 1989, according to Nasrallah, with the aim of sponsoring and fostering the families of Lebanese martyrs.

Today, this institution owes its existence primarily to his eminence the late Imam Sayyed Musawi Khomeini [...], in whose path, ideology and thought exists a distinct unique mark of taking special and explicit care for martyrdom, martyrs and the families of martyrs (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 11 November, 2007 – my emphasis).

This institution, which is based on the Iranian Shiite model, represents a social extension to the concept of martyrdom. The religious discourse is again dominant in this statement, exemplified in the use of the lexical selections of the intertexts “eminence”, “path”, and “martyrs” clustering around martyrdom.

The term “eminence” is a title given both to prominent scholars of Islamic Shari’a, and to high ranking Christian clergy. Its employment in this context serves to legitimate Nasrallah by association in reinforcing the objectives of this institution. Similarly, the ideological lexical selection “path” represents a religious intertext which Nasrallah utilises as a Shiite narrative and a religious symbol to mobilise support to the same cause.

Furthermore, the repeated clustering of ‘martyr’ and related terms signals a strong emphasis on the importance of fostering such a social institution which has a political dimension. These highly loaded ideological lexical choices are significant textual devices in the reinforcement and legitimation of Hezbollah’s self-construction.

Al-Shahid (martyr) Institution is described by Nasrallah thus:

A forward outpost of the resistance, in the continued procession of struggle, sacrifice and contribution. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 11 November, 2007 – my emphasis).

Nasrallah further uses the political and military discourses of resistance to represent Hezbollah’s social dimension on the national level, manifested in reinforcing the continuation of confrontation with Israel through this social charitable institution. In doing so, he again articulates the religious discourse by employing the collocation of the two intertexts: “struggle” and “sacrifice” as characteristics of the role of this institution in its discourse of resisting Israel.
The discourse of resistance is framed here on a higher moral plane, with a divine motivation which is often lost in the ‘desacralised’ reporting of the three media outlets.

5.3.2.3 The Self-Representations of Hezbollah Fighters

The framings of the fighters of Hezbollah by CNN, as described in the previous section, are countered by Nasrallah in recursive anti-framings which offer an intertextual response. For example, Nasrallah asserts that Hezbollah resistance fighters are by no means terrorists and killers: “We don’t have the hobby of spilling blood” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 26 May, 2007—my emphasis).

Here, Nasrallah employs a metaphoric self-framing in denying allegations about Hezbollah in respect of targeting civilians, replayed with particular force not only by CNN but also by the BBC and Al Jazeera. The metaphor, “spilling blood”, suggests literal and symbolic meanings. It is used figuratively in response to the various framings of the fighters of Hezbollah as killers and terrorists. It thus carries the symbol of “terrorism” and is suggestive of inhuman acts of slaughtering and killing human beings at random as a “hobby”.

Also, in employing the term “hobby”, Nasrallah’s discourse ironises the apocalyptic allegations of terrorism as being arbitrary. Multiple meanings are inferred here to draw the attention of the target audience to the context of this self-framing.

There is a significant recursivity where Nasrallah’s counter-discourse recontextualises the metaphor of spilling blood by suggesting that the trait of killing should be ascribed to Israel in the first place:

The Zionist entity that is based on spilling the blood of the innocent and committing massacres. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 7 January, 2009 – my emphasis).
In this excerpt, explicit intertextual reference is made to the chain of massacres committed by Israel against the Palestinian and Lebanese civilians since 1948, starting from *Deir Yassin* in 1948 in Palestine; the *Sabra and Shatila* massacre of the two Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in 1982; the first and second *Qana* massacres in 1996 and 2006 in Lebanon; and the war on Gaza in 2008.

Nasrallah uses the charged metonym “Zionist” (cf. section 5.3.2.4) in the embedded intertextuality of an ideological framing, which points to the Palestinian and Lebanese historical contexts. This intertextuality implies a discourse of delegitimation of Israel which is referred to as a ‘Zionist entity’. The employment of “entity” suggests that Israel is a fake construct or even illegal state, whereas the intertext “blood of the innocent” carries loaded ideological weight that criminalises Israel and produces a schema of the victim (Hezbollah fighters) and the oppressor (Israel).

Moreover, Nasrallah schematises Israel as the greatest “killing machine”, the concept itself being a media construct:

> Those human rights defenders occupy themselves in denouncing all Resistance movements and seek to give justifications for the criminals who possess the greatest killing machine, and then come to say that ‘Israel’ is defending itself. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 7 January, 2009 − my emphasis).

In this interesting recontextualisation as counter-discourse, Nasrallah answers that reality is the other way round: the Israelis should be labelled as criminals. The metaphorical term “killing machine” denies the human characteristics of the Israelis and denounces the Israeli army which possesses weapons of mass destruction. This operation of the discourse of juxtaposition of “killing” and “machine” conveys images of programmed inhuman and unethical actions on the part of Israel. Consequently, it conveys a discourse of delegitimation of such Israeli practices.

Nasrallah’s discourse here also ironises human rights organisations, thus criticising and accusing them of double standards.

On the other hand, he employs a religious discourse when he makes clear that the fighters of Hezbollah are called “martyrs” after their death, and are more likely to be killed, in the battle of resistance, than to kill civilians:
Being killed is a habit of ours [...] it’s natural that we offer martyrs on the way of our resistance. (Nasrallah, intheireyes.info website, 16 February, 2009 – my emphasis).

The use of the plural first person “ours” and “we” emphasises a hybrid discourse of collectivity and nationhood as a force that is defending the Lebanese lands. The above excerpt also reflects a strong religious recursivity (‘martyr’), whereas through using the discourse of religion, the concept of martyrdom is constantly reinforced as the resistance fighters’ core framework. The constant use of the term resistance coupled with the term martyr implies intensification of rooting the discourse of resistance in Islam.

5.3.2.4 Hezbollah Anti-Framings to its Representations as a Proxy for Iran and Syria

In response to the dominant framings of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, Nasrallah refutes the allegations that Hezbollah is an extension of the Iranian regime in Lebanon. In this respect, his discourse stresses the identity of Hezbollah as a genuinely independent Lebanese resistance movement, a matter which is asserted on almost every occasion: “the Lebanese resistance” (Nasrallah, 16 August, 2007); that is, Hezbollah emphasises the idea of “Lebanonisation” as its prime identity, particularly since the new manifesto of Hezbollah, launched in November 2009, following El Husseini (2010: 806), “cut some of the Islamist rhetoric, dropping any reference to an Islamic republic in Lebanon”. That is to say, Nasrallah also employs nationalist and religious narratives to shape the identity of Hezbollah.

In the context of power struggles about opinions, beliefs, and ideologies, Nasrallah emphasises the territorially defined Lebanese roots of Hezbollah for the purpose of legitimation:

We along with our fathers and ancestors belong to its civilization, to its monotheistic religions, to its rich culture, literature, poetry, heroism, manhood and knighthood, to its affection, and morals, to its righteous prophets and messengers, great Mujahideen and martyrs, we belong to its Torah, Bible and Quran. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 20 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

It is interesting to note that multiple discourses are articulated in the above excerpt including religious discourse. Again, the consistent use of the plural first person
signals collectivity in order to reinforce the idea of community. Further, the terms “fathers” and “ancestors” represent a significant allusion to a discourse of tradition employed by Nasrallah to reinforce Hezbollah’s traditional Lebanese roots.

What is also interesting is the pan-confessional discourse, which is traced in the reference by Nasrallah to the “Torah, the Bible and the Quran” which is invoked to present the three principal monotheistic religions in the region: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. At the same time it reaches out to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, reinforcing the idea of collectivity and pan-confessionalism, thus seeking to demarginalise Hezbollah and allowing it to escape its narrow definition as a Shiite or Islamic movement to a larger one that has traditional roots and represents all these elements. This pan-confessional discourse is designed to challenge the view of Hezbollah as an ‘external’ or ‘marginal’ movement.

The acknowledgement by Nasrallah of the “Torah” (Old Testament) is quite significant. It indicates a distinction between Judaism and Zionism. It is crystal clear that Hezbollah has a fierce stand against what it frames as the Zionist occupier and the ideology the Zionist movement represents. This distinction signals a discourse of delegitimation of Israel but also recognition of Jewish holy scripture.

Moreover, Nasrallah in this excerpt is targeting national and global audiences; the Lebanese public sphere, including his opponents, Sunni Muslims, Druze and Christians; and the media outlets in order to legitimate its nationalist credentials. The diversity of Nasralla’s target audiences has an impact on the different discourse articulated by him to reinforce his authority and his ideological stance.

A counter religious discourse is adopted by Nasrallah to the framing of Hezbollah fighters as criminals and terrorists by some media outlets, including CNN. The religious discourse of ‘jihad’ is manifest through Hezbollah's self-framing of its fighters as “Mujahideen” and martyrs, as illustrated above, articulated with the discourse of resistance to stress the identity of Hezbollah as a resistance movement along with other, similar Lebanese resistance movements whose sacrifices, according to Nasrallah, are acknowledged.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah refuses to be schematised as non-Lebanese:

Why skip saying ‘Lebanese Hizbullah’, to insist instead on saying ‘Hizbullah the pro-Iranian the Shiea party?’ [...] Because the aim was to put two barriers between us and the Arab world: a sectarian barrier to say that they are ‘Persians’ friends, when you are Arabs’. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 7 September, 2008 – my emphasis).

In a recursive anti-framing, Nasrallah poses a rhetorical question to which he already has the answer: the insistence of various media outlets on ignoring the Lebanese identity of Hezbollah, instead labelling it a Shiite Iranian front in Lebanon. In answering this proclamation, he confirms deliberate efforts to provoke sectarian and nationalistic obstacles. This approach of Nasrallah again articulates a nationalist discourse to stress the Lebanese identity of Hezbollah.

The target audience here is twofold: first, on the domestic level, Nasrallah is addressing the various sectarian sects of the Lebanese community, particularly the Sunni Muslims. Second, on the regional level, Nasrallah is addressing the Arab communities and the Arab governments. An implicit reference by Nasrallah to hidden motives to provoke a dispute between the Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims on the national level and on the regional level can be detected here. This reference echoes a hybrid discourse of pan-confessionalism and pan Arab affairs employed by Nasrallah.

A historic intertext is employed here by using the term “Persian” instead of “Iranian”, which has an ideological implication. It suggests a reminder of historical ethnic disputes during the Persian Empire and the zenith of the Islamic State. It is known that Persia started to be called Iran from 1935. Thus, Nasrallah, in a discourse of pan-Arab affairs, attempts to draw attention to a sectarian barrier that would entrench a belief that Hezbollah prefers the friendship of the Iranians, who were once known as Persians, to its relationship with the Arabs. Nasrallah thus has always confirmed that: “Our weapon is against the Zionist enemy only” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 12 December, 2006 – my emphasis).

In this excerpt, the use of the marked lexical choice “Zionist enemy” as an implicit historical intertextual reference to the Zionist movement which has occupied Palestine and parts of some other Arab countries such as Lebanon. Thus, Nasrallah articulates
two discourses here: first, the discourse of delegitimation of the legal status of Israel as a state through using the intertext “Zionist”; second, the discourse of anathematisation through using the second intertext “enemy”.

A shift takes place in the second part of intertext “enemy” from a historical connotation to a contemporary political reality which is exemplified in the enemy that Hezbollah is combating. Nasrallah then alleges that these accusations are part of a campaign against Hezbollah:

Attempts are always made to distort its image, and injure it with accusations [...]. They also tried hard to label the resistance as “Syrian resistance” or as “Iranian resistance” [...] the attempt to give this resistance a religious or sectarian characteristic. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 7 September, 2008 – my emphasis).

In this recursive process, Nasrallah ‘replays’ and recontextualises the media frames of Hezbollah. In a declarative narrative, Nasrallah here draws attention to the misrepresentation through using the two lexical choices “distort” and “injure” by both media outlets and other political factors.

Nasrallah furthermore uses a discourse of distancing Hezbollah from media frames and what he sees as their misrepresentations by explicitly pronouncing that labelling Hezbollah a Syrian or Iranian resistance denies its independence and its national identity as a Lebanese resistance movement. The distancing move is also detected in the lexemes of “attempts” and “accusations” which imply that Nasrallah is distancing Hezbollah from being a proxy of a foreign interest.

As a Shiite movement, Hezbollah is using again a discourse of negation and distancing itself from having a wider, cross-border agenda:

Some of the American entourage in the region were the ones who spoke of a Shiite crescent being formed from Iran to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 19 November, 2006 – my emphasis).

Nasrallah is directly accusing the US of propagandising for the Shiite Crescent Project through its agents. The lexical selection of “entourage”, which is a derogatory term, has an implicit subtextual denotation to the role performed by the US allies in the region as being redundant and perhaps even shadowy.
The “Shiite Crescent” is a geo-political term employed to refer to those countries whose majority is Shiite, or countries that have a Shiite minority, such as Lebanon. This term is often described as an ideological construct, and it is used to allude to the potential for the emergence of any threat these countries might pose to the region, i.e. to the Middle East, from Beirut, (the reference here is to Hezbollah) to the Persian Gulf (i.e. Iran). There has been a concern at a growing bloc of an ideological Iranian-Arab rivalry has occupied political debates in many political fora in the region. This concern was about the expansion of the Iranian role and power in the region and the potential coalitions of Shiite governments in the said countries.

This Shiite rhetoric has created a certain sensitivity among the Sunnis; furthermore, from the perspective of the Sunnis, it might jeopardise their status in the region. On the other hand, it constitutes a threat to Israel, which regards this project as a corridor from Beirut, via Damascus and Gaza, to Baghdad and, finally, from Iran to Saudi Arabia to Yemen. Moreover, it provokes Western concerns about a potential entrenchment of Shiite proxies.

In an interesting discoursal counter-move, a process of recontextualisation takes place here where Nasrallah transports the debate into another setting:

There has been an intersecting U.S. – Western – ‘Israeli’ effort along with the efforts of some Arab states, attempting to present or create an illusory enemy to divert the nation away from the real enemy and true confrontation. This is illusory enemy is sometimes called the Islamic Republic in Iran, presented under the title of ‘Persian ambitions in Arab territory’ for which the historical Persian Safavid dynasty and its struggle with the Ottoman Empire is evoked, at times this is also presented through the title of Shiaas, ‘conversion to Shiism’, the ‘Shiaa invasion’, the ‘Shiaa Crescent’ and the like. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 20 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

Here, Nasrallah employs a vertical historical intertextual axis in making an analogy between the past and the present through pointing out that these intersecting collaborating efforts, exemplified in the efforts by U.S-Western-Israeli forces, are attempts to revive the past and widen the gap between the Sunnis and Shiites.

Through this historical intertextual reference, Nasrallah is addressing the Arab communities, particularly the Sunni Muslims, to delegitimate the above intersecting efforts, and he warns of the results of reinforcing these pretexts. It is also suggested
that these efforts are pushing for using religion as a weapon to provoke a geopolitical power conflict. Moreover, Nasrallah adopts here a discourse of dichotomisation between the creation of an ‘illusory enemy’, represented by Iran, in order to divert the Arabs from their core conflict with Israel and the above “Shiite Crescent” project. To elaborate: in referring to the efforts of all the countries above as an ‘intersecting’ alliance, Nasrallah employs a discourse of dichotomisation between the efforts of the countries to create an ‘illusionary enemy’ and the ‘real’ enemy and ‘true’ confrontation. It is associated with a discourse of national identity detected in referring to motivation of the above approach exemplified in diverting the “nation” away from the real “enemy”. Thus, the recurrence of the term “illusionary” represents a repetition which is ideologically charged in the sense that it emphasises the notion of creating a fake or unreal enemy. This is reminiscent (following Grant, 2007) of the concept of manicheisms as the denial of uncertainty.

The dominant discourse of delegitimation is used again by referring to “Israeli” efforts in quotation marks. Nasrallah is thereby again delegitimating Israel as a legal state and denies acknowledgement of its status, unlike his reference to the efforts of other countries, such as the US, or Western and Arab efforts. On the other hand, Nasrallah stresses the fact that the frame of the so-called Shiite Crescent represents a fictional construct; it is discursively constructed as having been imposed by foreign agents, namely the US and its allies. Thus, Nasrallah uses a discourse of denial of the allegations of adopting the project of the “Shiite Crescent”.

These allegations against the project of the Shiite Crescent could be associated with the idea of “Wilayat al-Faqih”, endorsed by Nasrallah:

Many media outlets have attempted to distort the truth. They mistakenly think that Hezbollah is ashamed of its relations with the Wilayat Al-Faqih (Just Jurisprudent). Never! I declare here and now as I have done on numerous occasions before that I am proud of being among the supporters of the Just Jurisprudent, who is fair, knowledgeable, courageous, truthful and sincere. He has told us that Lebanon is a country of diversity and that it is our duty to save it. (Nasrallah, Tebian website, 26 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

A recursive process, in the sense of intertextually confronting the media allegations, is embedded in the explicit reference Nasrallah makes to the attempts of media outlets to “distort” the truth, and that they “mistakenly think” that Hezbollah distances itself
from the concept of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ (the guardianship of the jurist; cf. section 3.4.3). In this way, Nasrallah establishes a concatenation of communications with media outlets. More specifically, he constructs a counter-discourse to the framing of Hezbollah by the three media outlets as a movement that is seeking to apply the concept of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ to Lebanon. It is manifest here in the reference of Nasrallah to the allegations of the Americans against Hezbollah and the intimidations that the threat of the Shiite Crescent in the region might arouse.

The switch of Nasrallah here from the collective voice, encoded by the collective plural first person “we”, to the personal voice, encoded in the singular first person “I”, reflects a discourse of self-expression of affirmative personal beliefs and convictions of ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’. Here, Nasrallah uses a discourse of dichotomisation through which he contrasts and distinguishes his personal position with Hezbollah’s position as a movement or institution. Matar, (2008: 122) throws an interesting light on Nasrallah’s “mediated charisma and his political-religious discourse” in which she maintains that these elements “provide compelling forms of rhetorical political communication that can be effective in specific contexts”.

Nasrallah also articulates two discourses in this respect to make it clear to the Lebanese audiences that, although Hezbollah represents itself strongly as a clear supporter of “Wilayat al-Faqih”, which endows and reinforces the discourse of spiritual power and political leadership, Hezbollah simultaneously reinforces the discourse of identity of Lebanon as an independent Arab country of diversity and variety and Hezbollah as a national movement, as seen on several occasions above. More specifically, Nasrallah, in targeting the multivoiced Lebanese public sphere, attempts to show strong willingness in a discourse of nationhood and commitment to allaying fears that might emerge from adopting beliefs which entail the domination of the Shiite Iranian regime over Lebanon. This is evident in the use of the strongly recursive intertext “our duty”, which intensifies a discourse of collectivity articulated with a nationalist discourse in referring to the task of saving Lebanon.

In the same context, Nasrallah goes on to describe the nature of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran:
No one should be ashamed to say: Yes, we are in contact with Iran and we are proud of the Iranian support. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 20 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

In a declarative narrative, Nasrallah employs the lexical choice “yes” as a strong discourse of assertion of the good relation between Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The linguistic features of “support”, which suggest an explicit relationship with Iran as a source of pride and honour, signal a discourse of legitimation of this relationship. The repetition of the use of the plural first person in reference to Hezbollah reflects another attempt to persuade his audiences of the argument.

He thus refers here to the stance of the Western and global community towards Iran, while addressing at the same time multiple audiences: the media outlets (as a secondary audience), the American administration, Israel, the Western countries, and the regimes of some Arab countries that opposed this relationship at the time, such as Egypt.

Hezbollah, moreover, frames Iran as the sole force that is assisting it as a resistance movement in combating the illegitimate “Zionist Project”, as seen in the next extract:

We hope that all Arab governments and regimes lend a helping hand to resistance movements like Syria and Iran are doing. Iran is the only voice standing against the Zionist project. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 20 May, 2009 – my emphasis).

The persistent intertext of the concept of “resistance” is used again as a discourse of pan-Arabism, through which Nasrallah refers to Syria as a country that is supporting resistance movements. Nasrallah, articulates multiple discourses in this context; he therefore juxtaposes Syria and Iran in supporting resistance movements, while at the same time he uses dichotomisation which contrasts the stands of other Arab governments with those of Syria and Iran.

An interesting dichotomy is depicted in the concatenation of these framings. There is a textual suggestion that the real threat in this context is the “Zionist project” which Hezbollah delegitimates. The lexical choice “Zionist project” implies a religious and
historical intertextuality, for Zionism is the Jewish nationalist movement, the roots of which go back to Hovevei Zion, the precursor of the Zionist organisation in 1882, which marked the first of four waves of Jewish settlers in Palestine. It is claimed that Zionism arose as a flawed response to European anti-Semitism and the Nazi pogroms. However, Hezbollah often refers to it as a pre-meditated and pre-planned campaign of Palestinian land theft. In the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British government stated its support for the establishment of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine, which took place later, in 1948. Hezbollah regards Israel an entity that is usurping the land of others; it also regards the ‘Zionists’ as foreigners who have come from all over the world and formed gangs. With the support of the British occupation at that time, according to Nasrallah, they and many other countries invaded the Palestinians’ land, with desperate consequences.

Also, in this process of recursive communication (Nasrallah’s dialogues with media and historical texts) of the project of the Shiite Crescent, there is an explicit intertextual link with the ‘Zionist project’ which allegedly seeks to dominate the region from the River Nile to the Euphrates:

There is the Greater ‘Israel’. It supposedly extends geographically from the Nile to the Euphrates, as signified by the two blue lines on the ‘Israeli’ flag, representing the two rivers. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 16 September, 2008 – my emphasis).

However, as a counter discourse to the putative project of the Shiite Crescent, Nasrallah makes it clear, in a declarative narrative, that the victory of Hezbollah over Israel in 2000 has brought this project of Greater Israel to an end.

Greater ‘Israel’ is no more. But if I wanted to say who put the last nail in the coffin of Greater ‘Israel’, [...] it was when the resistance in Lebanon inflicted ordinary ‘Israel’ with the in 2000 defeat [sic!], Greater ‘Israel’ ended there. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 16 September, 2008 – my emphasis).

The sentence communicating the idea of dismantling Greater Israel appears in the initial position of the quotation; it functions to make the main rhetorical point of a statement which the remaining text supports.
In anchoring a discourse of delegitimation, Nasrallah uses an extended metaphor as a vehicle for announcing the ‘death’ of Greater Israel and the same time victory of Hezbollah. The term “coffin” is entrenched in the rhetoric of warfare, by pounding the last nail into its coffin, whereas the term “last nail” implies that there were other previous nails hammered into the coffin, and the last was the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. In another sense, Nasrallah, by saying “the resistance in Lebanon”, articulates double discourses; the discourse of resistance and the discourse of nationalism to describe the movement of Hezbollah as a force of nationhood in 2000.

Another dimension of self-representation in the same context is the victory of Hezbollah over Israel in the July war of 2006, which is metaphorically constructed by Nasrallah in the form of “cutting” the hand of Israel:

The ‘Israeli’ hand extended to the resistance’s arms [sic!] in the July war and it was cut. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 8 May, 2008b – my emphasis).

In this excerpt, the intertext of “resistance” represents a dominant discourse of Nasrallah in the context of Hezbollah’s self-framing. Nasrallah also uses a religious discourse which is echoed through an extended metaphor. It is identified in “the hand” and in “cutting off the hand”, through which Nasrallah connects the hand with the action of cutting it off. The metaphor “cut” suggests the violent prevention of an action from taking place. Employing this common figurative expression not only adds depth to descriptions of reality, but also intertextually articulates an old Islamic religious discourse (cf. 5.4.1.1 of this chapter) which implies cutting off the hand as a penalty for theft.

The self-presentation of Hezbollah does not end with confronting Israel, but also extends to confronting another contemporary American project. It is interesting to note that Nasrallah seeks to identify (through extensive intertexts with his own communications) to his target audience (whether the Arab Islamic supporters and opponents, or the implied Western audiences who might hold a neutral stance towards Hezbollah), the core cause of the conflict with Israel. He reveals some facts that encompass certain pertinent issues in respect of this conflict, pointing out his
approach to the US policy in the region by claiming that this Israeli ‘Zionist project’ is an extension of the American ‘Zionist project’:

And the world knew that this war against Lebanon and the Lebanese resistance, that it was to subjugate Lebanon to implement resolution 1559 in order to attach Lebanon to the American-Zionist project, and that it was to pave the way for the auspicious-birth of a new Middle East, a threat to all countries and peoples of the region. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 16 August, 2007 – my emphasis).

The American “project” is exemplified in the reference by Nasrallah to the US New Middle East project which, as we have seen, he recontextualises as the American Zionist project. The formulation of the marked ideological expression “the American Zionist project” equates Israel as an aggressor with the US. Nasrallah uses a discourse of juxtaposition with the project of the “New Middle East”. Crucially, the concatenation of the intertext “Zionist” in each project and the sustained recursivity in referring to the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 are highly significant. This new Middle East project was launched, as mentioned earlier in this study, by Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, during the July war in 2006.

The marked intertext “threat” suggests that this project jeopardises the interests and security of the region of the Middle East. It is also juxtaposed with the putative “birth” of the project. Nasrallah thus ironises the project and reasserts the discourse of the broad national status of Hezbollah. Consequently, by confronting this project in a counter response, Nasrallah declares that:

The Resistance is ready to defend all of Lebanon and make the historic victory which will change the face of the region. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 11 November, 2007 – my emphasis).

As we have repeatedly seen, the frequent use of resistance, a form of an intertextual core, tells us how Nasrallah tends to define Hezbollah in a discourse of national representation with a pan-confessional resistance movement. The discourse of resistance and the juxtaposition with the discourse of Lebanese nationhood in repeated intertexts come to the surface as being dominant in this context. Nasrallah, in a declarative narrative, tries to project Hezbollah not as a Shiite militia, not as a military movement but as a national representative that is not interested in terror but in correcting injustice. Thus, the intertextual intensification “defend all of Lebanon”
represents an interesting shift to a discourse of pan-confessionalism in the self-framing of Hezbollah as a resistance movement. In addition, another implicit reading can be detected in Nasrallah’s promise to establish a new roadmap in the Middle East as a discourse of counter force to the American ‘New Middle East project’.

A nationalist discourse is used in the context of self-representation of Hezbollah and schematisation of Israel and the US. This is manifest in a cluster of metaphors which will be illustrated in the following examples:

You are called upon to renew your pledge of hostility to ‘Israel’ and the Great Satan that orders ‘Israel’. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 6 January, 2009 – my emphasis).

Another dimension to Hezbollah’s framing of Israel and the US in the context of schematisation of the ‘other’ is stressed by Nasrallah in giving voice to Iran through using the intertext of the ‘Great Satan’. It is a very marked term and a very salient persistent intertext in official Iranian pronouncements in addressing the US.

In addressing his supporters, both nationally and globally, as well as relevant eavesdroppers, such as the Arab and Muslim audiences worldwide and the wider media systems, Nasrallah urges confrontation with American and Israeli practices in the region. In doing so, a persuasive attitude is adopted by using metaphorical expressions associated with a relation of language with power.

The above metaphorical construction once again schematises and anathematises (cf. Grant, 2007) Israel and the US with the status of the ‘enemy’ in order to delegitimate them and assert Hezbollah legitimacy. It is interesting to note that the political and religious intertext “The Great Satan” is originally an Iranian derogatory epithet for the US first released by the supreme leader of the Iranian revolution Ayatollah Khomeini.

This excerpt represents an interesting recursivity of the CNN framing of Hezbollah fighters as “killers and their Iranian masters” (cf. 5.3.2.4 of this chapter). This ideologically salient intertext is related to the question of Hezbollah as a proxy for Iran and the Iranian political orientation towards the US.
Another metaphorical example of schematising and equating Israel with the USA in the context of Hezbollah self-representation is: “Israel is an American bullet in the heart of the region” (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 6 January, 2009 – my emphasis).

The conceptual metaphor “American bullet in the heart of the region” stresses the historic intertextual reference to the regional situation which is identifiable in “war” and “conflict” in the Middle East. The employment of the term “bullet” implies the American-developed arsenal which is constantly being exported to Israel. As a result, the region, i.e. the Middle East, is presented as a symbolic person of life: that is, the “heart” is suffering agony because of the Israeli wars being waged on it, such as the wars on Lebanon and Gaza. In other words, it represents a juxtaposition of life and death, good and evil.

The above extracts clearly show how Nasrallah employs a continuous narrative with connections across content. Knowledge systems (epistemes) are reflected in the forms of discourses of schematisations (which presuppose exclusion procedures) in Nasrallah’s speeches in the articulation of two particularly dominant discourses: the religious and the political.

5.3.2.5 The Self-framing of Hezbollah: the Historical and Religious Narratives

In the self-representation of Hezbollah, Nasrallah resorts to articulating two religious and historical discourses to demonstrate a political reality at work. It is worth stating that Nasrallah invokes religious and historical narratives in order to delegitimate the Israeli occupation of Arab land, and at the same time to legitimate and sustain the role of Hezbollah (in the framework of its self-representation) as a resistance movement against these foreign political forces.

In the following excerpts Hezbollah is framed as a new and unprecedented model in the world:
The resistance usually liberates territory but a resistance that repels aggression against a country is something new!. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 22 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

As previously seen, a prominent intertextuality with the discourse of resistance remains; further, it is extended with the co-texts “liberates” and “repels”, reinforcing the discourse of resistance.

To elaborate, in this context, the intertext “resistance” is repeated twice above. In the first use it is associated with the co-text: “liberates” which constitutes a pair; i.e. the role of any resistance movement; whereas in the second use it is associated with another pair exemplified in the co-text “repels” and the intertext “aggression” which distinguishes the role of Hezbollah as a resistance movement. In addition dichotomisation is in operation between the forces of resistance, which connects with Lebanese nationhood, and aggression, which connects with the “Israeli Zionist”.

In order to legitimate and sustain its decision to keep its arms, Nasrallah employs vertical intertextuality, saying:

To those who claim that the French and Vietnamese resistance groups handed over their weapons to the authorities, I say that there are some resistance groups which have taken or demanded authority after victory. (Nasrallah, Tebian website, 26 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

The use of the lexical choice “to those who” indicates a direct address to multiple and yet also undefined audiences. Here, Nasrallah is articulating a historical intertext discourse in order to denote a present political reality. This is illustrated in the historical intertextual allusion to the French Revolution, which started in 1789, and the Vietnamese resistance of 1961 to 1971 against the US. It is used here by the speaker to reinforce the idea that these two did not hand over their their arms to the new national authority, after achieving liberation.

In a form of a direct and explicit intertextuality, Nasrallah distances himself from an appeal to abandon the struggle, and then reasserts his commitment to that struggle, which signals a typical rhetorical device of distance and commitment. It is noteworthy in this respect to see how Nasrallah shifts to use historical discourse rather than religious discourse when he addresses audiences beyond Lebanon and the Middle
East region. This shift reflects the impact of the different category of the audience he is addressing.

It can be stated that Nasrallah is seeking to create this historical narrative, which he extends:

Lebanon had two options: with its lands occupied, its sovereignty seized and its dignity trampled upon by Israel it could have become either like Hong Kong or similar to the glory of the East. Hanoi. [...] the resistance is sure that Hong Kong and Hanoi are not the models to be followed, but rather we must set our own model. (Nasrallah, Tebian website, 26 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

Although Hezbollah is labelled a Shiite movement, Nasrallah here is emphasising the discourse of nationhood, which is exemplified in the co-text “its lands”. He then opts for the discourse of occupation implied in the lexical selections: “seizure” of “sovereignty”, the “trampling” of “dignity”, which connects with the discourse of violation. Resistance is again invoked as persistent intertext in this context. Moreover the intertexts of the reference to Hong Kong and Hanoi are a special case; the discourse of dichotomisation is detected in rejecting the model of Hong Kong or Hanoi, but rather adopting a Lebanese model.

It is well known that Hong Kong was a British colony after 1842, whereas Vietnam had a long struggle with the Americans as stated above; thus both models represent and stand for resistance through which Nasrallah is trying to reinforce the discourse of the Lebanese resistance.

This illustrates how the imagery in political speeches alludes to historical ideological intertextual metaphors that interact form a certain understanding of the intended communication; i.e. how the historical text is inserted in the present political context.

Following Fairclough (2003), these religious and historical intertextual references link the text to its context. There is no doubt that various types of Quran-inspired discourse are recontextualised in the context of the resistance battle in recent decades. Hezbollah plays an active role in the media dissemination and employs the historic religious discourse in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict to gain ground and legitimation of his position before his Arab and Muslim audiences. The use of this
religious discourse is “intended primarily to subversively reconstitute Arab consciousness” and to “reinvent the Arab national memory” (Khoury and Da’na, 2009: 136).

On the other hand, Nasrallah employs religious rhetoric in a salient self-framing of Hezbollah in order to sustain legitimacy and credibility. Karagiannis has a similar viewpoint, asserting that Hezbollah frames have gained increasing publicity “because they draw their legitimacy from the Quran and other Islamic sacred texts” (2009: 370). It is also maintained that “religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be accessed and appropriated by movement leaders and it is a reliable a source of emotion, religion is a recurring source of social movement framing” (Tarrow, 1998: 112, in ibid.), particularly in the case of Islam which is “rich in narratives, rituals and symbols” (ibid.).

For example, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the resistance and liberation of South of Lebanon in 2000, Nasrallah employed the following religious Quranic intertext (as a source of legitimacy):

Pharaoh had tyrannized on Earth, divided people into groups. He oppressed one group on behalf of the others, slaughtering its children, and ravishing its women. Indeed, he was among those corruptors. The Pharaohs of our time are the USA and its right hand, Israel. (Nasrallah, Tebian website, 26 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

In using the ideological lexical choice “Pharaoh” as schematisation and anathematisation of the US and Israel, there is a religious intertextuality which implies Quranic connotations with infanticide, tyranny, and bestiality. The term “tyrannized” implies two readings in a reference to the Arab / Israeli wars that have taken place in recent decades, ending with the last one in Lebanon, namely, violent Israeli practices towards Palestinian children on the one hand and Lebanese children on the other hand.

On the other hand, the discoursal framing of the term “oppressed” implies a discourse that demonises US and Israeli practices. There is also a marked intertextuality in the lexical selections of the expression “divided people”, a framing attitude in pointing to the external, divided situation in Lebanon caused by what is framed as the American
and Israeli political agenda. Thus, an attitude of emotionalisation and mobilisation is involved here, exemplified in the lexical choices “tyrannized” and “divided”.

Furthermore, the discursive choices can be identified in concrete terms. The term “slaughtering” is a marked salient intertextual device in pointing to killing children, as was the case of Pharaoh when looking for the Prophet Moses. This intertextual expression in describing the brutal treatment of children is highly ideologically charged, whereas the two terms, “ravishing” and “corruptors” are two familiar Quranic expressions used in a religious discourse, which denote a shift from historical connotation to the present political reality in Lebanon and Palestine. They are associated with injustice and oppression committed against innocent people. An allusion is made here to the biased US approach against the Arab interests in favour of Israel. Nasrallah is thus anathematising the US and Israel by using these religious intertexts.

With the employment of the metaphorical expression in referring to Israel as the “right hand” of America, an attitude is adopted to indicate the extent to which America depends on Israel for implementing its interests in the Arab region. It is suggested here that all of the above elements can be applied to “our times”; that is the present day political reality.

The intertextual intensification and recursivity processes are highly salient in the above example. Its recontextualisation in Quranic reference lends it considerable historically rooted power and an influential tool of persuasion and legitimation.

Nasrallah uses this marked religious discourse in order to maximise his influence when addressing his constituencies. It is also intended to give him authority and power over his domestic and regional target Muslim audiences “to promote his religious identity with his followers” (Lahlali, 2012: 11). Nasrallah seeks to persuade the audience through the group schema of ‘Them’ against ‘Us’ which has been used by various political figures during times of conflict to pledge support of people behind them (van Dijk 1991).
5.3.3 Concluding Remarks

The analysis in this section relied on Nasrallah speeches as primary sources. The examples analysed in the context of the self-representation of Hezbollah in opposition to the media framings of Hezbollah have demonstrated recursive processes of political communication.

The analysis in this section revealed that the self-representations and representations of Hezbollah are multi-voiced, that is they incorporate several aspects: its role as a religious military resistance; a political Islamic manifesto party; and a social welfare network.

The analysis revealed that Nasrallah uses different dimensions of classifications of discourse which are operated on the textual and epeistemic orders. Knowledge systems (epistemes) are reflected in the forms of discourses of schematisations (which presuppose exclusion procedures) in Nasrallah’s speeches in the articulation of two particularly dominant discourses: the religious and the political. Power is thereby presented as a question of transmission of selections. The analysis also revealed how discourse is socially conditioned and socially constitutive in Nasrallah’s speeches.

In this context, the dominant and most salient discourse rests largely on its capacity as a resistance movement against Israel, through which Hezbollah legitimises itself and delegitimises Israel as an occupier of Lebanese and Palestinian lands; using thus a discourse of anathematisation and schematisation. Hezbollah employs the discourse of resistance which is often juxtaposed with the discourse of martyrdom and jihad. However, in the process of recursive communication and dissemination across the three media outlets, the core theme of resistance was decontextualised and thus recontextualised as demonstrated in the previous section. The analysis also revealed that the media meanings oscillate between Hezbollah discourses and narratives, reflecting uncertainty in the process of dissemination.

The discourses of collectivity and pan-confessionalism are articulated by Nasrallah to demarginalise Hezbollah in order to escape its narrow definition as a Shiite movement or an Islamic movement and to a bigger one that has traditional roots and represents
all of these elements. Nasrallah employs a national discourse to stress again the
Lebanese identity of Hezbollah and to legitimate its nationalist credentials. Moreover,
the discourse of resistance is used to reinforce a discourse of pan-Arabism, equating
the resistance in Lebanon with the resistance movements in Palestine and Iraq.

Furthermore, Hezbollah, through Nasrallah, employs a discourse of distancing and
rhetoric of denial in rejecting the allegations against it being an extension of the
Iranian regime in Lebanon, and refuses to be orchestrated by the Iranian regime.
Meanwhile, the discourse of nationhood exemplified in the “Lebanonisation” of
Hezbollah as its prime identity and as a genuinely independent Lebanese resistance
movement is strongly emphasised.

The self-representation of Hezbollah is brought about within discourses of historical
and religious narratives in which extended metaphor and intertextuality are employed
to denote a contemporary political reality and to sustain its legitimacy and credibility.
Further, Hezbollah plays an active role in the media dissemination of the various
types of the religious Quran-inspired discourse which are recontextualised in the
context of the resistance battle in recent decades.

The different audiences Nasrallah addresses in his speeches have an impact on the
way he articulates multiple discourses articulated to sustain authority and power and
to legitimate his ideological orientations.

The presentation of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (van Dijk, 1998, 1991) is clearly manifested in
Nasrallah speeches in legitimating the ‘Self’ and delegitimating the ‘Other’. In the
context of self-representation the religious discourse is intensively used by Nasrallah
to legitimate Hezbollah and to serve various ideological purposes, with the aim of
reinforcing his authority over his audiences. It is also used as a tool of persuasion and
influence.

The analysis also demonstrates how discourses of framing, dichotomisation, and the
operation of association and juxtaposition were embedded in a process of
recontextualisation in political communication, whereas the analysis of these
mechanisms of framing (cf. Entman, 1993) and schematisation (cf. Luhmann, van
Dijk) provided a useful ground for analysing the various related re-framings and self-representations of Hezbollah.

The next section focuses on the role played by translation as one element of the recursive process, and the connection between the recursivity of such representations and the contestations which accompany it.

5.4 The Role of Translation within the Recursive System

As discussed above, translation is one element in the communication system. In this section, attention will therefore focus on a specific aspect of recursivity, namely the communicative process from Arabic original to English translation and their recursions in media outlets.

Having discussed the self-framing of Hezbollah, this section will concentrate on selected examples from Nasrallah’s speeches and their recontextualisations across the three media outlets: Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. It will also investigate how ideologically motivated lexical choices and intertexts are employed and constructed in news reporting of the three media outlets as recursive and intertextually interconnected representations, and how they are disseminated and recontextualised across media contexts. The analysis aims to explore how the process of recontextualisation takes place across media outlets as an interrelated complex.

The representations of discourse in these news extracts will also highlight the schematisation processes in the various discoursal selections which constitute complex recontextualisation processes in the news media. That is, the news story transformed in multiple contexts across media outlets by means of intertexts, contexts, reference, and quotation. While stories remain interconnected, they shift with each subsequent ‘move’.

Unlike the previous sections of this chapter, this section will include the Arabic source of the political phenomenon of each selected example. This is so that the Arabic source reference for the media outlets’ news stories can be authenticated. The
focus of section 5.2 was on recursivities and framings of Hezbollah in the three media outlets Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN separately; while the aim of section 5.3 was mainly to demonstrate the self-representations of Hezbollah and based on Nasrallah’s speeches as primary sources. The function of this section is to demonstrate another aspect of the process of recursivities and framings across the above three media outlets; the way communications between media outlets are recursive. Comparisons therefore become possible, first, between the Arabic source text and the English target text; second, between multiple English versions of the same excerpt which are available, in the case of some examples, on other websites in addition to the website of Hezbollah. The purpose of this comparison is to demonstrate the processes of recontextualisation that takes place in news translation.

5.4.1 Media as Audience: Framing and Reframing Processes

Since Hezbollah is a highly significant political and religious actor in and beyond Lebanon, this section will offer a discussion of salient features that make up the representation of Hezbollah in the media as ‘second audiences’, namely, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN. These media organisations are frequently the direct addressees of Nasrallah’s speeches in the ‘media battle’ for the definition of Hezbollah.

5.4.1.1 The Recursive Communication of the Takeover of Beirut

In what follows, extracts are taken from news reports in connection with the events in Beirut following the Lebanese Government’s controversial decision to shut down the Hezbollah telecommunication network on 7 May, 2008. This act was, in itself, a demonstration of the power of communication in today’s world of ‘porous communication’ (Grant, 2007). In addition, the security chief at Beirut airport was dismissed because of his alleged ties to Hezbollah. In response to the decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunication system, Nasrallah was reported as stating that the only way out of the crisis was for the government to revoke the decisions it had taken.
The examples below illustrate how the event is recontextualised in the process of news reporting that is typical of a closely connected set of media outlets including different English and Arabic framings in the same outlet:

"هذا القرار هو اولا بمثابة اعلان حرب... ان اليد التي تمتد الى سلاح المقاومة مبنية ما كانت ومن اين اتت سنقطعها."


The first version of the English translation is:

This decision is a declaration of war and a commencement of war. [...] The hand that extends to the resistance’s arms [sic!] whomever it is for and wherever it comes from...we will cut it. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 8 May, 2008b – my emphasis).

The second version of the English translation is:

This decision is first of all a sort of a war declaration and starting the war [...]“the hand that approaches the arms of the Resistance of whoever or wherever it might be, it shall be cut”. (Nasrallah, Official website of Norman G. Fenkelstein, 8 May, 2008c – my emphasis).

“This decision is tantamount to a declaration of war” (literal translation – TK).

In the excerpt of the Arabic source text, Nasrallah employs a discourse of intensification through the use of the intertext “war”, labelling the decision as (tantamount to) a declaration of war. An old intertextual religious discourse, through using the intertexts “cut” and “hand”, is associated by Nasrallah with the present day political events. It also echoes an extended metaphor which connects the intertext “hand” with the intertext “cutting it off”. It is noteworthy that this intertext has associations with other contexts in Nasrallah’s earlier speeches. It is interesting to note again the consistent discourse of the intertext “resistance”. It is also noteworthy to draw attention here to the lexical choice of ‘the hand that extends’. Whereas ‘extending a hand’ implies a gesture of friendship for English readers, the implication of the statement is that such a gesture will be considered far from friendly. The expression is mistranslated from the Arabic source which reads literally ‘the hand that is raised against’ the resistance.
An attempt is clearly made here by Nasrallah to revive the intertext of the penalty for theft and to employ, through this intertextual allusion, a discourse of warning towards the government about the consequences of such a reaction, which indicates the seriousness of the situation in Beirut at that time.

As a further connection in the recontextualisation process, Al-Jazeera reported the statement as follows:

Nasrallah hits out at government

Hezbollah leader in Lebanon says government is trying to push his group to war. Hezbollah’s leader has warned any crackdown by the government on the Shia organisation would be tantamount to a “declaration of war”. [...] He said that Hezbollah would act to stop any attempt by the government to dismantle the network. (Al-Jazeera news website, 10 May, 2008b – my emphasis).

Unlike the first English translation above, Al-Jazeera used the term “tantamount” as stated in Nasrallah’s Arabic original statement. However, it avoided representing the threat of Nasrallah by avoiding reference to “cutting off the hand”, and employing desacralisation (Grant, 2008). That is to say, Al-Jazeera adopted a discourse of attenuation of the religious content, i.e. without referring to the religious intertext in conveying the self-construction of Hezbollah exemplified in simply confronting the decision of the Lebanese cabinet from being implemented.

On the other hand, there is also the indirect speech which is explicitly grounded in the referencing “said that”, in which Al-Jazeera distances itself from reporting Nasrallah’s threat directly. In addition, following Fairclough, the quotation marks disappeared and the conjunction “that” links the subordinate clause to the reporting clause. Furthermore, employing the term “push” suggests that Hezbollah is reluctant to take this stance; that is of considering waging a war on the Lebanese Cabinet.

Al-Jazeera follows a discourse of ‘specification’, apart from labelling Hezbollah a Shiite organisation it does not frame Hezbollah as an ‘Islamic’ or ‘Lebanese’ movement. This is an interesting contrast with Nasrallah’s speeches.

Similarly, the CNN news story was as follows:
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said recent government actions amount to “a declaration of open war” [...] In his televised speech, Nasrallah offered harsh words for the government, blaming it for declaring war by banning Hezbollah’s telecommunications system. (CNN news website, 8 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

Here, CNN has reported the exact words of Nasrallah represented in the term “amount to”, which indicates that CNN has its own source of translation from Arabic into English. CNN also resorts to rephrasing the threat launched by Nasrallah rather than using the direct speech represented in the quotation. The lexical selection “harsh words” is employed as an alternative choice to quoting the exact words of Nasrallah: “cut off the hand”. Thus, this indirect reporting of speech indicates an evaluative ideological orientation on behalf of CNN. It also reinforces the voice of CNN.

In contrast, the BBC recontextualises the incident in a discourse that is slightly different from that of CNN and Al-Jazeera:

Hezbollah warns cabinet of ‘war’

The leader of Hezbollah has said the Lebanese government’s decision to close down its private telecommunications network was a “declaration of war” [...] and vowed to “cut off the hand” that tries to dismantle it. (BBC News website, 8 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

Of interest here is that in the discourse of translation from Arabic into English, a process of recontextualisation takes place through deleting the term “tantamount”, which conveys more intensified communication. The BBC here reported the news story closely following the first English translation above, in which the term “tantamount” was deleted and thus the meaning is recontextualised into another, more intensified context.

Further, the same excerpt from the BBC involves a process of information selection as manifested in avoiding the reference to the word “tantamount” which appears in the Arabic text. This recontextualisation process, which is ideologically relevant, is reflected in referring to the act of the government as a direct declaration of war.

The term “warns” in the above extract represents a threat, while the term “war” is constructed (in ellipsis) in an affirmative manner, where the term “declaration” is rendered “was” (simplification as a statement of fact within the verb “was”) and consequently leads to the issue of a threat. This threat is exemplified in the quoting of
the metaphorical expression “cut off the hand”. The use of this intertextual reference constitutes, following Venuti, a foreignisation that leads to enacted religious dissemination. This contrasts clearly with the ‘domestication’, or the replacement of the source culture with the target culture (Venuti, 1995) process operated by CNN and Al-Jazeera.

Moreover, the direct speech used in BBC news reporting involves a form of evaluation manifested by employing the lexical selection “vowed”, which adds greater intensity to the self-construction of Nasrallah and reinforces the embedded meaning as a source of imminence. The BBC employed the direct quotation “cut off the hand”, which represents the actual words of Nasrallah; this is a form of intertextuality in news reporting which conveys a stronger and more marked meaning of the self-construction of Nasrallah rather than rephrasing this threat or summarising it in a substituting process.

5.4.1.2 The Framing of the Takeover of Beirut

Within the framework of the same incident, and as a reaction to the decision of the Lebanese Government, Hezbollah took control of Beirut. The BBC’s reports of this development read as follows:

**Deadly gun battles shake Beirut.** At least seven people have been killed in fighting between supporters of Lebanon’s government and followers of the Hezbollah-led opposition in Beirut. (BBC News website, 9 May, 2008 – my emphasis).

The BBC here adopts a discourse of intensification. The use of the term “battle” denotes a confrontation between armed opposing military forces. The BBC, through its lexical qualifier “deadly”, uses a dramatic discourse which portrays a fatal war situation in Beirut.

The two conflicting sides are framed in a discourse of dichotomisation which contrasts the pro-Lebanese cabinet with the opposition block led by Hezbollah. This framing can denote a discourse of distancing the opposition from being purely Shiite, because the opposition block in Lebanon, headed by Hezbollah at that time, consisted
of different religious political factions, namely, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Christians, and Druze.

Similarly, CNN reported the incident as follows:

“Gun battles break out in Beirut. [...] There are reports of open street battles in at least one neighborhood. Video showed people throwing stones at each other, as Lebanese soldiers used tear gas to disperse the crowds” (CNN news website, 8 May, 2008− my emphasis).

The same incident is recontextualised by CNN through the lexical selection “gun battles”, which suggests a representation similar to that of the BBC, with an allusion, however, to a less tense situation because the street battles are framed as being “open”, but not “deadly”. Moreover, the reference by CNN here to the co-text “open street battles” with people using stones as weapons suggests that some of the conflicting sides are unarmed, a matter which adds a slightly different narration in recontextualising the same news story in a slightly less severe situation than that reported by the BBC. CNN also, by reporting that the Lebanese soldiers ‘used tear gas to disperse the crowds’, suggests that the Lebanese Government is trying to prevent battles between two other factors.

On the other hand, Al-Jazeera frames the same event:

Does civil war loom in Lebanon?

Pro-government and opposition supporters clash in the streets of Beirut. Gunfire has been echoing through the streets of Beirut as supporters of Hezbollah and Sunni supporters of the Lebanese government clash across the country’s capital. (Al-Jazeera Website, 10 May, 2008a − my emphasis)

The lexical selection of “clash” suggests an encounter (which could be relatively minor) between the two conflicting forces. The use of the term “gunfire” suggests a discourse of attenuation in describing the situation in Beirut. It echoes a less complex situation than that suggested by the BBC and CNN above. Again, Al-Jazeera recontextualised the Beirut incident by using a mitigated discourse which indicated less tension in Beirut. Further insights can be added to the narrative discourse of the reporting of Al-Jazeera in the above extract in which there is no explicit reference to the role of Hezbollah in the events, but a direct reference to its supporters.
How the same event is represented and recontextualised (process of shifts from one context to another) in three different media actors is apparent here. This is manifested by adopting the lexical choice “deadly” in the BBC’s description of the precarious situation in Beirut, which portrays a picture of an extremely violent situation. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera refers to the same event by reporting it as a clash between the two sides, which mitigates the tension of the situation.

In comparison with the reporting of the same news story above by CNN and Al-Jazeera, it could be stated that the BBC’s framing is more dramatic and explicit. Moreover, the Hezbollah is not referenced at all by name in CNN and Al-Jazeera.

5.4.1.3 The Religious Discourse of Hezbollah

Al-Manar announced the death of a top senior militant leader of Hezbollah in 13 February, 2008. The statement reads as follows:

"بكل اعتزاز وفخر نعلن التحاق قائد جهادي كبير من قادة المقاومة الإسلامية في لبنان بركب الشهداء الأبرار. فبعد حياة مليئة بالجهاد والتضحيات والإنجازات، وفي شوق شديد للقاء الأحبة، قضى الْخ القائد الحاج عماد مغنية (الحاج رضوان) شهيدا على يد الإسرائيليين الصهاينة."

With all pride we declare a great jihadist leader of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon joining the martyrs [...] the brother commander Hajj Imad Moghaniyah became a martyr at the hands of the Zionist Israelis [sic!]. (Al-Manar TV Station, 13 February, 2008b – my emphasis).

The declaration of the death of Mughniyeh consists of very intense and prominent religious intertexts which signal multiple discourses. The death of Mughniyeh is contextualised in a concatenation of religious discourse identified in using the intertexts of “jihadist, Islamic, and martyrdom”, coupled with the discourse of veneration exemplified in the intertexts “all pride”, “great”, “leader”, “brother”, and “commander”. That is to say, the above announcement embeds a strikingly and intensely religious dominant discourse.
As previously seen, a prominent intertextuality of the discourse of resistance remains; it is further juxtaposed with the discourse of nationhood invoked in the intertext “Islamic resistance in Lebanon”.

The above statement complies with the belief system of Hezbollah, which lends special emphasis to fostering the religious discourse of “Jihad” and martyrdom which are conducted to liberate the Lebanese lands occupied by Israel in 1982. In addition, the discourse of rejection which is signalled in using the consistent intertext “Zionist”, in referring to the Israelis who are constantly schematised by Hezbollah as “Zionists”. This is also coupled with a discourse of delegitimation of Israel which is explicitly accused by Hezbollah of causing the death of Mughniyeh.

In contrast, the reports of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN show, in respect to the death of Mughniyeh, recontextualisation of the discourses of the original political phenomenon moves from one setting to new multivoiced ones (cf. the reflections on Bakhtin in Section 3.4.1).

Al-Jazeera reported the Al-Manar announcement as follows:

Hezbollah mourns senior leader.

Organisation [sic!] says security official Imad Moghaniyah died in Tuesday’s Damascus car bomb. Hezbollah has announced the death of one of its senior military commanders in a car bomb in the Syrian capital, Damascus, on Tuesday. (Al-Jazeera news website, 17 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

There is a significant transformation through the employment of a discourse of desacralisation, where the content of the entire religious discourse is removed. It is notable here that Al-Jazeera’s comment on his death is extremely functional. Mughniyeh is reframed by Al-Jazeera as a “senior military commander” without any reference to his framing by Hezbollah as a “jihadist” and as a “martyr”, as stated in the announcement of Al-Manar TV. Al-Jazeera reporting also reflects a foreignisation strategy in the context of reframing Mughniyeh.

The BBC recontextualisation is as follows:

Bomb kills top Hezbollah leader
The Lebanese group, Hezbollah, says one of its top leaders, Imad Mughniyeh, has died in a bombing in Damascus [...] Mughniyeh is widely believed to be behind a wave of Western hostage-taking in Lebanon during the 1980s. (BBC news website, 13 February, 2008a – my emphasis).

Similarly, the BBC employed the lexical choices “kills” and “died” which also signal a discourse of desacralisation. The BBC also adopted a profile of past, not current, actions of Mughniyeh. It considered him to be responsible for anti-Western activities in a counter discourse to the framing of Mughniyeh as a jihadist and martyr.

In a discourse of attenuation, the lexical choice “group”, used above as a framing of Hezbollah, suggests multiple potential meanings, denoting less than formal groupings of people with a common ideology, and thus somehow denying formal recognition.

On the other hand, in contrast with the reporting of the BBC and Al-Jazeera, CNN adopts a highly evaluative counter discourse in schematising (cf. Luhmann, 1995, section 3.2.1) Mughniyeh as follows:

Reputed terrorist long sought by CIA killed in explosion

A Hezbollah commander suspected [sic!] in some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the last 25 years and a reputed role model for Osama bin Laden has been killed in Syria, Hezbollah TV said Wednesday. Imad Mughniyeh died in an explosion in a residential section of the Syrian capital, Damascus, said Hezbollah’s television station, Al-Manar. (CNN news website, 13 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

The dominant framing discourse of Mughniyeh is intensely critical. CNN relays a deliberate operation of generalisation and vagueness of the source of the news story exemplified in using the passive voice ‘long sought’. The highly salient lexical selections “reputed terrorist”, and “deadliest terrorist attacks” are ideologically motivated schematisations.

Also, the framing of the linguistic selections of “reputed” and “long sought” denote a discourse of assertion which is implicitly inserted in the narrative of the CNN reporting. This discourse of assertion is adopted in an indirect way, using attenuations of the surface, but associating him with the model of Bin Laden, whereby the source is not given. At the same time there is a discourse of juxtaposition of two persons here that represent, a ‘role model’ of terrorist organisations, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda
headed by Osama Bin Laden as the most extreme force of terrorism. Thus, a discourse criminalising Mughniyeh is employed by CNN in this respect leading to a different reality being created, just as Hezbollah does in the original announcement of Mughniyeh’s death.

A process of attribution is presented here by CNN in referring to Al-Manar as its news source; however, a process of recontextualisation takes place in adopting again a discourse of desacralisation as the BBC and Al-Jazeera did in the previous extracts.

The above excerpts demonstrate that a dynamic transformation, which takes source meaning into entirely new media realities, is created through processes of recontextualisation from one reality to a different one. Also, the above textual manifestation highlights the ideological shifts brought about in dissemination processes from the framing by Hezbollah of Mughniyeh as a ‘jihadist’ and “martyr” to the BBC and CNN references to him as a “terrorist”.

5.4.1.4 The Framing of Mughniyeh

A counter framing discourse is adopted by the three media outlets to the framing of Mughniyeh by Hezbollah. Al-Jazeera opts for a foreignisation strategy; the BBC employs a desacralising discourse; while CNN invokes a discourse of criminalisation by juxtaposition.

A detailed micro-level comparison of the above clauses which refer to Mughniyeh reveals striking differences. While Hezbollah frames Mughniyeh as a Jihadist, the BBC and CNN use a process of attribution which schematises him as a terrorist, which reflects multiple discourses and frames in conveying the same political phenomenon.

The BBC reframed Mughniyeh as follows:

Mughniyeh is widely believed to be behind a wave of Western hostage-taking in Lebanon during the 1980s. (BBC news website, 13 February, 2008a – my emphasis).
And:

He was wanted by the United States and Interpol in connection with bloody attacks around the world. Some US officials dubbed him the “faceless terrorist”, (BBC news website, 13 February, 2008b − my emphasis).

Of interest here is that in these two excerpts the BBC gives voice to quotation. Through using the reporting of the indirect speech of the passive voice “widely believed”, the BBC in the first excerpt does not specify the source, which again echoes a discourse of operation of generalisation of the source of the news story.

By referring to the quoted US frame “faceless terrorist”, which labels him as a menacing but invisible figure, the BBC relays here highly marked lexical selections in representing Mugnhiyeh. Also, the BBC uses an indirect quotation within quotation. In employing this technique, the BBC is adopting a discourse of distancing itself from establishing a direct framing of Mugnhiyeh. There is a deliberate operation of generalisation exemplified in using the passive voice and indirect reference, which could also imply a discourse of detachment, distancing and neutrality which reflects a classification of discourse position.

The recursive process extends these framings:

Intelligence sources described Mugnhiyeh as one of the craftiest and deadliest terrorists in the world who managed to elude capture for decades by changing his appearance and covering his footsteps. (CNN news website, 13 February, 2008 − my emphasis).

In this extract, CNN borrows the frame of loosely defined sources which signals again a deliberate operation of generalisation and vagueness of the source of the news story exemplified in “intelligence sources” which represent Mugnhiyeh as the “craftiest” and “deadliest” “terrorist”. This technique emphasises a discourse of distancing which is a particular structural format of using language which signals a rhetorical purpose to convey ideological communication to the target audience. Further, Al-Jazeera’s reframing is as follows:

According to the US and the West, he was a “top terrorist” and was involved in the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut in April 1983. (Al-Jazeera news website, 17 February, 2008 − my emphasis).
Here, in comparison to the discourse of the BBC and CNN, Al-Jazeera employs a discourse of less overt allusion to terrorism. It resorts to reflecting the framing of the Western mainstream media concerning Mughniyeh, incorporated through the use of quotations and indirect speech. By incorporating these elements from other texts, Al-Jazeera is also distancing itself from taking the same stand.

Although Al-Jazeera English Channel targets a wide spectrum of Western audiences, it takes into consideration the pulse of the Arab street, and the norms emanating from cultural and religious connotations of the prevailing political mainstream of the Arab and Islamic nations in the region.

The story is reflected in this process of variable framings. The above example illustrates how communicative events are transformed as they move along new settings in an extended chain, following Fairclough (1995a, 1992a), leading to high dissemination potential. The particular framing of Mughniyeh as a “terrorist” has become so widely established that it appears in new contexts (recontextualisation) where media reporters expect their audiences to recognise it, and no longer to require an explicit reference to the original statement. The object of ‘truth’ is seen as stability in meaning, not something ontological, thus reframing displaces that stability.

The extracts above indicate how communicative construction of ideology play a role in language use and discourse, and the way ideology is deployed for political purposes in a fluid communicative structure.

5.4.1.5 Recursive Communication of the Political Discourse of Hezbollah

Nasrallah released the following political statement during the funeral of Mughniyeh the next day:

"لقد قتلتم الحاج عماد خارج الأرض الطبيعية للمعركة، نحن وإياكم كنت معركتنا وما زالت على أرضنا اللبنانية وكتبت تقتلونا على أرضنا اللبنانية ونقاتلكم في مواجهة كيانكم الغاصب، لقد اجتزتم الحدود، لن أتكلم الآن تيراما ولكنني سأستعير عبارة واحدة من حرب تموز عندما خاطبتمكم في المرة الأولى وقلت لكم: أيها الصهاينة إن أردتموها حربا مفتوحة فلتنمو حربا مفتوحة."
You killed Hajj Imad outside our natural battleground. Our battleground with you is on the Lebanese territory as it has been; now you have overstepped the border. [...] Zionists: confronted by this killing, its timing, place and the manner with which it was carried out, I say that if you (‘Israelis’) choose this type of open war, then so be it. (Nasrallah, 14 February, 2008b – my emphasis).

Nasrallah proceeds to add a discourse of nationhood in related terms such as “natural battleground” and “Lebanese territory”, as well as the repetition of the salient lexical choice “battleground”, which lays implicit claim to the identity of Hezbollah as a Lebanese resistance force. Nasrallah threatens the Israelis through using the co-texts “overstepped” the borders, “if”, and “open war”.

On the other hand, a degree of evaluation is seen in the translation from the Arabic source text into English; it reveals a shift of the discourse of translation manifested in adding the word “Israelis” within parentheses. These additions can be characterised as interventions by the translator to exemplify a referent for an evaluative phrase. This reveals an attempt to situate the translation vis-à-vis the socio-textual practices of the target readers (Western audiences) which implies political and ideological transformation through a translational recontextualisation. This addition can be characterised as translators’ “intervention in that they specify a referent for an evaluative phrase” (Schaffner, 2010: 271).

CNN recontextualised the original statement as:

Hezbollah leader: Israel faces 'open war'

BEIRUT, Lebanon (CNN) -- The head of Hezbollah threatened “open war” against Israel as mourners gathered in Beirut Thursday for the funeral of a senior commander in the Islamic militant group organization killed this week. [...] Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah accused Israel of being behind a blast in the Syrian capital, Damascus, which killed militant commander Imad Mughniyeh on Wednesday. (CNN news website, 15 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

Nasrallah’s launch of the collocation of “open war” is quoted here by CNN, followed by a discourse representation in which an explicit intertext is incorporated with the device of the reporting clause “threatened”. CNN here uses a dramatic discourse in recontextualising Nasrallah’s statement.
CNN’s framing of Hezbollah as an “Islamic” organisation distances its identity as a
Shiite movement; at the same time Hezbollah is being labelled as both a “group” and
an “organisation”, which incorporates a juxtaposition of two different forms of
military force.

**Nasrallah promises to expand fight**

Hezbollah set to widen battle against Israel after death of commander, leader says. [...] He made the declaration after he accused the Jewish state of assassinating Imad Moghniyah, a senior Hezbollah commander, in Syria’s capital Damascus. (Al-Jazeera news website, 14 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

In comparison to CNN’s collocation “threatened open war”, the collocation “promises to expand fight” suggests a more attenuated position from Al-Jazeera to convey Nasrallah’s words. It is noted here that Al-Jazeera uses the direct speech by employing marked ideological lexical choices manifested in the term “Jewish state” in referring to Israel, and in the term “assassination” in referring to the death of Mughniyeh.

The BBC report ran as follows:

**Hezbollah chief threatens Israel**

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has warned that the militant group is ready for “open war” with Israel, after the killing of one of its leaders in Syria. [...] Nasrallah made the declaration during a fiery speech at the funeral of Imad Mughniyeh in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut. (BBC news website, 14 February, 2008 – my emphasis).

In contrast, the approach by the BBC to the same event carries the marked collocations “threatened [Israel]” and “warned [of war]”. In a process of evaluation, Nasrallah’s speech is further framed as a “fiery” one, and Hezbollah is framed as a “militant group”. As stated in section (5.2.2) the BBC employs a variety of framings of Hezbollah; the selection of “militant group” in this excerpt reinforces the status of Hezbollah as an armed force inside a state. The imminence of conflict is heightened by the expression “ready for open war”, and the threat is further intensified by the intertext that connects Nasrallah’s “warning” and “fiery speech”.
It is noteworthy that the three media outlets have avoided reporting the first part of Nasrallah’s statement in which he uses the conditional “if”, which means that Nasrallah is here is leaving the door open for not going to war – unless the Israelis took the initiative.

5.4.1.6 The Reframing of the New Middle East Project

As stated in section 5.3.1 of this chapter, the term “New Middle East” was first introduced and launched by Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, in her visit to the Middle East during the July War in 2006, which she saw as being the birth of a new Middle East Project. It is important to see how relevant statements about this project are reframed and recontextualised. She stated:

What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new Middle East. And whatever we do, we have to be certain that we are pushing forward to the new Middle East, not going back to the old one. (Condoleezza Rice, CNN news website, 22 July, 2006 – my emphasis).

By using the plural first person “we” (which is repeated four times in two lines, and is used in reference to the US government) to indicate the policy of the US government in the Middle East, Rice is grounding a discourse of assertion about the US project.

The metaphor “birth pangs” alludes to the complex political context in Lebanon during the July War and the potential difficulties associated with launching such a project at a transitional time. The idea is that a new situation in the Middle East, particularly Lebanon, will emerge in the aftermath of this process. A juxtaposition of the preliminary steps of the newly launched project is exemplified in the contractions and pain experienced by a woman while giving birth, and the situation afterwards when the mission is completed. Rice also uses a discourse of dichotomisation which contrasts the ‘old’ Middle East with a strong commitment to a ‘New’ Middle East.

In a speech delivered to mark the end of the July War, Nasrallah reframes the statement of Rice about this “New Middle East Project”, as follows:
Today, we celebrate the significant historic Divine and strategic victory. [...] your resistance and steadfastness dealt a severe blow to the New Middle East Project, of which Condoleezza Rice said that the July war was its labor pains, the illegitimate child now aborted [...] no army in the world can take the weapons from our hands and fists as long as this proud and loyal people believe in this resistance. [...] Today, I [...] tell the enemy that the resistance has more than twenty thousand rockets. (Nasrallah, official website of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, 22 September, 2006b – my emphasis).

In a recursive process in response to Rice’s above statement, Nasrallah uses association and juxtaposition in representing the outcome of a victory of Hezbollah over Israel, and severe blow to the US New Middle East Project. Nasrallah again employs the discourse of anathematisation through using the consistent metonym of “enemy”, which is again a reference to Israel as an ‘occupier’ of the Palestinian and Lebanese lands, and to the US.

The discourse of the sacred is echoed in using the term “divine”, which is an intertextual reference to the identity of Hezbollah as a religious movement conducted by the religious discourse of Jihad as stated earlier. The use of the lexical choice ‘divine victory’ is intended to demonstrate that the war with Israel was a “holy war, conducted by ‘Islamic fighters’” (Lahlali, 2011: 139). By resorting to a religious discourse, Nasrallah promotes his religious identity with his constituencies and “appeals not only to the Arab public, but to all Muslims across the globe” (ibid.).

On the other hand, the term “historic”, is used here to indicate the fact that this is the first ever victory to have been achieved by an Arab military force against the Israeli army in modern history. In this respect, Nasrallah refers to this war in the same speech, saying: “we fight a war the Arabs called the sixth and the Zionists called the first” (Nasrallah, 22 September, 2006b), thereby delegitimizing the status of Israel (Zionists) and legitimating the stance of the Arabs. Furthermore, there is a
demarcation of the US initiative of the New Middle East Project (cf. 5.1.3.1) and the growing military capacity of Hezbollah.

As we have seen previously on several occasions, the frequent use of resistance, as a form of an intertextual core, tells us how Nasrallah always seeks to frame Hezbollah, namely as a national, pan-confessional resistance movement which confront this US project. The discourse of resistance is again coupled with the discourse of pride of the Lebanese people and their loyalty to this resistance.

In referring to the “New Middle East Project”, a modified recursive process is detected. Nasrallah replies to Rice and employs the intertextual (and therefore ideologically salient) metaphor “illegitimate child”, in a discourse of association with religion. He thus articulates a discourse of stigmatisation and delegitimation of Rice’s project (aborted). This carries a significant ideological value in conveying the intended strong communication of rejecting this project if it is addressed to an audience from a culture similar to that of the speaker.

In some cultures, particularly Arab and Islamic cultures, the idea of having a child outside the institution of marriage is totally rejected by society, and thus it is considered a taboo. Although in some Western canon laws and in most religious jurisdictions the child of unmarried parents is not a legitimate heir in law, the reception in the Western culture of such an expression does not convey the intended construction of Nasrallah in describing this project. The dynamic equivalent term was not successfully conveyed in the target English language, and consequently it was not significant for the media outlets (second audience); consequently, it was recontextualised with unavoidably different connotations in different representations, as will be illustrated in media excerpts.

In the same context, anathematisation (the enemy) is dominant again in the context of the delegitimation of Israel, and legitimating the right of Hezbollah to arm itself with rockets.

It is worth stating that the BBC monitoring translation from Arabic into English below was almost a close version of the above in-house Hezbollah website English
translation, and also failed to convey the right equivalence to the Western target audiences:

We are today celebrating a big strategic, historic, and divine victory. [...] Our resistance and steadfastness dealt a severe blow to the New Middle East plan, which Condoleezza Rice said would be born in the July War [Boos]. But it was stillborn because it was an illegitimate child. [...] I tell them: No army in the world can make us lay down our arms. No one can do that, so long as these loyal and brave people believe in this Resistance.[...] Today, I say [...] to the enemy as well, that the resistance today has more – pay attention, underline the word “more” – than 20,000 rockets. (BBC World Monitoring translation, 23 September, 2006 – my emphasis).

The BBC World Monitoring English version above conveyed the implied discourse of Nasrallah; its use of the term “victory” along with its adjectives “divine” and “strategic” signalled in quotation marks, highlight the voice of the speaker, namely Nasrallah, with emphasis on the number of rockets Hezbollah owns.

In the process of communication across media outlets, the BBC recontextualised the statement of Nasrallah as follows:

Hezbollah head praises ‘victory’

The Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has hailed his group’s “victory” over Israel, boasting that the group still has 20,000 rockets. In his first public appearance since the recent conflict, he said Hezbollah would never be disarmed by force and called for a new Lebanese government. (BBC news website, 22 September, 2006 – my emphasis).

Here, in a multivoiced discourse, the BBC resorts to the speech reporting techniques exemplified in indirect speech as well as direct quotation. The two lexical selections “hail” and “boast” reinforce the voice of the BBC reporter in portraying a confident Nasrallah as he addresses his audiences, whereas the term “victory” is placed within parentheses, which questions plausibility. In the first sentence, the demarcation between the voice of the BBC and the voice of Nasrallah of Hezbollah is represented by using the quotation marks around his actual words; whereas an indirect discourse is used in which the discourse represented is exemplified in the conjunction “that”, which connects the clause which is grammatically subordinated to the reporting clause. It is noticeable here that, in the second sentence, the BBC refers to the July War in Lebanon as a “conflict”, which denotes not only the recent war in Lebanon,
but also the historical discourse of the conflicting relationship of Hezbollah and Israel. Moreover, the employment of the term “said” implies a simple report of the statement of Nasrallah, which indicates a discourse of neutral orientation and distancing on behalf of the BBC in respect with this statement.

The BBC reporting came devoid of the content of Nasrallah’s discourse of prioritisation of the status of Hezbollah as a national resistance force. Thus, in a process of recontextualisation, the focus of the BBC reporting here is on the position taken by Hezbollah in its decision to keep its arms, while any reference to comments made by Hezbollah on the new US Middle East project is absent. This may be for several different reasons, among which are ideological motivations, or mistranslation of the source text, or belief that the statement of Nasrallah was not significant.

The term “still” reflects a proclamation which suggests that the militant ability of Hezbollah, as a group in a small country like Lebanon, was not neutralised in the July War and its missile arsenal has not yet run out. Indeed “rearranging information can be seen as ideologically significant since it allows to give a more prominent position to a specific topic” (Schaffner, 2008: 22).

Similarly, with the same salience, CNN has recontextualised the original statement, in a different headline, stating:

Hezbollah leader: Militants ‘won’t surrender arms’

BEIRUT, Lebanon (CNN) -- In a speech to thousands of cheering supporters, the leader of Hezbollah vowed Friday the militants never will give up their arms, as called for in the U.N. resolution that ended its 34-day war with Israel last month. “No army in the world will force us to drop our weapons, force us to surrender our arms, as long as people believe in this resistance,” said Hassan Nasrallah, who claimed Hezbollah victorious in the fighting. [...] Hezbollah, he said, should celebrate the “divine and strategic victory”. (CNN news website, 22 September, 2006 – my emphasis).

The focus of the CNN report again lies on Hezbollah’s discourse of refusal to give up its weapons. The emphasis on the assertion verb “won’t”, which is placed in parentheses, highlights the voice of Hezbollah in reporting the event.

Direct and indirect discourses are employed by CNN in this news extract. The marked evaluative lexical choice “vowed” is used in a direct discourse and indicates a highly
ideological orientation by CNN towards the position taken by Nasrallah towards Hezbollah’s arms. As with the BBC, the framing of Hezbollah’s victory over Israel as a “divine and strategic” is signalled in quotation marks, highlighting the voice of the speaker, namely Nasrallah rather than the voice of the BBC, which thereby is distancing itself from adopting such a frame.

Al-Jazeera reported the event as follows:

Speaking at a victory rally in south Beirut in his first public appearance since the war with Israel, [...] Nasrallah said his group still had more than 20,000 rockets available. Nasrallah joined hundreds of thousands of Hezbollah supporters who filled the devastated southern suburbs of Beirut on Friday [...] to celebrate “divine victory” in their month-long war against Israel. [...] Nasrallah said his fighters will give up their weapons only when “Israel’s threats” end and the Lebanese government is strong enough to protect the country. (Al-Jazeera news website, 22 September, 2006 − my emphasis).

Contrary to the news reporting of the BBC and CNN, Al-Jazeera emphasises the consequences of the ‘Israeli war in Lebanon’ over the Southern suburb of the Shiite population, through use of the lexical choice “devastated”. Al-Jazeera thus juxtaposes the devastated Shiite area (the stronghold of Hezbollah) with the announcement of Nasrallah about Hezbollah’s having more rockets. On the other hand, similar to the BBC and CNN, the framing of “divine victory” is signalled by Al-Jazeera in quotation marks, highlighting the voice of the speaker and distancing itself at the same time. However, unlike the BBC and CNN, Al-Jazeera refers to this victory without using the definite article “the”, which denotes a deliberate ideological selection in a discourse of attenuation. Moreover, Al-Jazeera recontextualised the words of Nasrallah in a way slightly different from that of the BBC and CNN: it employed a discourse of dichotomisation which contrasts the surrendering of the weapons of Hezbollah while ending the Israeli threats along with having a strong reliable Lebanese government. Again the dominant religious discourse of Nasrallah exemplified in “divine victory” is desacralised here. However, in a subsequent article, Al-Jazeera reported the above statement of Nasrallah as follows:

Nasrallah says the US vision of a “new Middle East” has been left in shambles. (Al-Jazeera news website, 29 July, 2007 − my emphasis).

Here, Al-Jazeera recontextualises the metaphorical expression of Nasrallah in labelling the US New Middle East Project “an illegitimate child” through using
another, different metaphorical lexical selection manifested in “left in shambles”. In the process of recontextualisation, this lexical employment attenuates the discourse of stigmatisation. Al-Jazeera also desacralises the religious discourse in Nasrallah’s statement.

It is apparent that desacralisation is dominant again in the framings of the above three news outlets, in which the content of the religious discourse of Hezbollah is transferred into a new a new purely political setting.

These instances of highly contested political discourse illustrate evidence of processes of communication; across themes, intertexts, and discourses. As Schaffner notes, in news reporting, “deletions, rearrangements of information, substitutions and paraphrasing are typical examples of transformations that text producers […] make use of in the recontextualisation processes” (2008: 13).

5.4.2 Concluding Remarks

Selected examples from the three news media outlets – Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN – were presented to demonstrate the processes of communication that are a key part of the interpenetration of media and political systems including recursivity.

Several interesting aspects emerged from a comparative analysis of all the above extracts, with respect to dialogue, discourses, views, and voices emanating from different vantage points and perspectives, revealing that Hezbollah employed a strikingly and intensely religious dominant discourse coupled with anti-Israeli discourse. Other discourses were employed by Nasrallah, such as veneration, a discourse of nationhood, a discourse of stigmatisation and delegitimation; the dominant discourse of anathematisation was used in the context of delegitimation of Israel.

Counter-discourses are adopted by the three media outlets. CNN invoked a discourse of criminalisation, a deliberate operation of generalisation and vagueness of the source of news story; whereas the BBC’s framing of some news stories was more
dramatic and explicit. Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera employed a discourse of less overt allusion to terrorism, a discourse of mitigation, and a discourse of attenuation. Moreover, all three of them gave voice to quotation in the context of reframing Mughniyeh.

Noticeably, there was a significant transformative recursivity through employing a discourse of desacralisation, where the content of the entire religious discourse of Hezbollah was removed in the reporting of the three media outlets, because it is based on the ideological implications of the interpenetration of politics and mass media.

In other words, the religious discourse was desacralised and largely transformed and disseminated into a more overtly political setting. This is a clear example which demonstrates how the myth of truth is displaced by the circulation of media images.

The analysis demonstrates how the news story, in moving along contexts, suffered reconstruction in new settings and hence new discursal representations. Meanwhile, in this transformation, these messages have undergone processes of filtering, adding, and substituting, as seen from the variety of ideological lexical choices used in describing the same political event. These recontextualised messages are politically and ideologically marked. A recursive communication process also takes place, using discourses of legitimation and delegitimation in the narrative of Hezbollah drawing on the news coverage of the three media outlets.

Analysis of specific examples also demonstrated how news translation can yield useful insights into the process of dissemination, and how its role as a mediation of communication can contribute to the creation of a new political reality.

To conclude, the analysis demonstrated a layer of recursivity, and revealed the nuanced and complex nature of the discourses.
Chapter 6 Conclusion

The broad aim of this study has been to investigate the media construction of a major contemporary political actor in the dissemination age of political communication. The study examines how the, representation, and responses to representations of news source text in the spheres of political communication and interconnected media systems are recontextualised and disseminated worldwide, and fed back again through recursive communication.

This concluding chapter draws on the main findings developed from both the literature review and the data analysis to assess the extent to which the objectives of the study were met. In addition, it highlights the contribution that these findings make in the wider field of the analysis of political communication. The chapter concludes by identifying some of the limitations of this study and gives recommendations for further research.

6.1 Main Findings of the Study

A number of interesting findings emerged from the study that confirmed the theoretical, methodological, and analytical concerns set out above.

6.1.1 Theoretical Conclusions

This study developed an innovative, interdisciplinary theoretical framework which reconceptualised political communication in the age of a heightened dissemination of political news. It also demonstrated how the processes of the selection of information, framing and reframing, schematisation, and recontextualisation are all forms of dissemination which are markers a new intensity of the interpenetration of political communication and news media. It also highlighted recursions and interpenetrations between political communication and media systems as being an interconnected process in which communication is complex.
The study explored the communicative construction of ideology in language use and discourse, and the way ideology is deployed for political purposes in a fluid communicative structure. It further demonstrated how the notions of inclusion/exclusion and schematisation in the context of dissemination, are evident in the process of the recontextualisation of Hezbollah across Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. The study also revealed that political communication in the new age of dissemination undergoes a new intensity and quality of recontextualisation, creating a particular and uncertain dynamic. That is to say, as mentioned earlier, ‘truth’ is seen as stability in meaning rather than something ontological, thus reframing displaces that stability.

The analysis showed further how text producers in news media play a significant role as mediation of communicative events. It was made evident that the process of news translation and dissemination through media systems is involved in the multiple constructions of Hezbollah. The study also revealed how media institutions as agents or forces of social power have a role in constructing the reality in which multiple audiences – including media organisations themselves – are involved, and how their interconnectedness in a global media system gives them significant disseminating power.

The study confirmed that media communications are no longer linear, but indeed recursive in the sense that they intersect with the political system, thereby framing and reframing reality in a recursive dynamic. The political phenomenon was found to be recontextualised, transformed, and disseminated across media contexts in complex processes, namely the contested media interplay of representation and back again. Intertextuality plays a role in this process, which is always ideologically charged, particularly where media communications are recursive. The analysis revealed how they play back on each other in feedback and feed-forward loops across and within outlets and their recipients, in ways that add increasing intensity. It also demonstrated that modern political communication is indeed marked by a new age of dissemination arising from the production of different media actors which enter into uncertain dialogue. It was evident that in processes of recursivity and dissemination, and during the journey of the news story across multiple media contexts and audiences (by means of schematisations, representations, recontextualisation and also mistranslation and
misinterpretation), new political realities were created. For example, during the Israeli
in Lebanon, Nasrallah addressed Israel by saying that if it stopped its bombardment
on Lebanon, Hezbollah would halt its rocket attacks against it. The statement was
recontextualised by media outlets in new settings, with statements such as ‘Hezbollah
vows to strike Israel’, and ‘Hezbollah threatens Israel’.

6.1.2 Empirical Findings

In the context of illustrating the contested representations by the three media outlets
of Hezbollah and its leader, and upon exploring how the process of framing takes
place in terms of communication in individual media outlets and across media outlets
as an interrelated complex, it was found that while Hezbollah’s salient self-framing is
as a ‘resistance movement’, the discourse of resistance is decontextualised in the
processes of reporting by Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, and recontextualised. Thus,
the centrality of resistance was lost in the process of dissemination. The message
underwent various recontextualisations across each of the media outlets, whereby a
battle of contestations over the framing and definition of Hezbollah was
demonstrated.

In the case of CNN, recontextualisation was evident in framing tendencies and
schematisations of Hezbollah as a “terrorist” force. CNN adopted a blunt and strong
rhetoric against Hezbollah’s self-framing, giving strong voice to the US government
and Israel; and employing discourses of anathematisation, schematisation, and
criminalisation of Hezbollah, which articulate a discourse of delegitimation. By
contrast, in the case of the BBC, references to Hezbollah as a terrorist movement,
while unequivocally critical, referred to it as being on the US list of ‘proscribed’
organisations. This indicates a subtle discourse of attenuation on the part of the BBC.
By contrast, Al-Jazeera frames of the movement as a political party.

All three outlets stressed the Shiite identity of Hezbollah as a group, a movement, a
political party, an organisation, militia, guerrillas, an armed force, an Islamic
resistance, and an army. CNN used a discourse of dichotomisation which separated
the militant and political aspects of Hezbollah. It used the frame of ‘militant wing’
and ‘political movement’, whereas the BBC used a discourse of juxtaposition which connected both of the forms in this extract as one movement. Like CNN, Al-Jazeera used a dichotomy which separates the framing of the militant and political aspects of Hezbollah. It framed Hezbollah as a political organisation.

Both the BBC and CNN used a discourse that questioned the status of Hezbollah as a national Lebanese movement, laying implicit claim to its being a force of wider connections, influences, and interests in the region. By contrast, Al-Jazeera recognised Hezbollah as a movement with stronger Lebanese roots, thus framing it in a discourse of tradition and identity.

All three media outlets asserted the framing of the support of Syria and Iran for Hezbollah; however, the BBC and CNN linked this relation intertextually to state-sponsored terrorism as a common trope in the framing of movements in the Middle East.

The analysis revealed that these framings demonstrate, in the case of news media, how text producers play an important role in circulating and recontextualising political discourse – a process in which they also become receivers, or ‘secondary audiences’. In other words, dissemination were evident in the representation of intertextual framings in various texts of Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN. The notion of the recursivity of communication was evident in the sense that it emerges more strongly with mass mediatisation.

It was also evident that there was marked contestation concerning these framings of Hezbollah as revealed in many different recontextualisations. CNN gave greater voice to the US and Israel; Al-Jazeera gave voice to a discourse of tradition of the region; whereas the BBC functioned with a more subtle discourse, in the sense that it adopted a framing of Hezbollah in which its representations oscillate between different reframings across media outlets. As stressed earlier, a ‘dynamic’ in this sense is a term that suggests instability and movement but not in a particular direction, which is also the link with recursion.
The analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches demonstrated recursive processes of political communication within his speeches and across the texts of the outlets. The analysis revealed that the self-representations and external representations of Hezbollah are ‘multi-voiced’ (Bakhtin, 1981), including those of religious military resistance; a political Islamic manifesto party; and a social welfare network. All these discourses constitute dynamic (which suggests instability and movement but not in a particular direction) frames for the significant role assumed by Hezbollah in Lebanon and in cross-border politics.

It was found that the dominant and most salient discourse consists of Hezbollah’s capacity as a resistance movement against Israel, through which Hezbollah legitimates itself and delegitimates Israel as an occupier of Lebanese and Palestinian lands, thus using a discourse of anathematisation and schematisation. Hezbollah employs the discourse of resistance which is often contextually associated with the discourse of martyrdom and jihad. However, in the process of recursive communication and dissemination across the three media outlets, the core theme of resistance was decontextualised and thus recontextualised in new settings in which the core concept of resistance is lost. The analysis also revealed that the media meanings oscillate between Hezbollah discourses and narratives, creating a dynamic (unstable, undergoing change, and thus, not static) uncertainty in the process of dissemination.

The discourses of collectivity and pan-confessionalism are articulated by Nasrallah to demarginalise Hezbollah in order to escape its narrow media definition as a Shiite or Islamic movement and redefine it as a bigger one that has traditional roots and represents all of these elements. Nasrallah employed a national discourse to stress the Lebanese identity of Hezbollah and to legitimise its nationalist credentials. Moreover, the discourse of resistance was used to reinforce a discourse of pan-Arabism, equating the resistance in Lebanon with the resistance movements in Palestine and Iraq.

Furthermore, Nasrallah employed both a discourse of distancing and a rhetoric of denial in rejecting the allegations of its being an extension of the Iranian regime in Lebanon, and refused to be orchestrated by the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, the discourse of nationhood exemplified in the ‘Lebanonisation’ of Hezbollah as its prime
identity and as a genuinely independent Lebanese resistance movement was strongly emphasised.

The self-representation of Hezbollah was articulated with allusions of historical and religious threads in which extended metaphor and intertextuality were employed to denote a contemporary political reality and sustain its legitimacy and credibility. The self-representation of Hezbollah was recontextualised with particular force by the three media outlets. Further, Hezbollah played an active role in the media dissemination of the various types of religious Quran-inspired discourse which were recontextualised in the context of the ongoing Israel-Hezbollah confrontation.

Discourses of resistance, nationhood, and justice, and the religious and sacred discourses were articulated in the self-representations of Hezbollah. The analysis also demonstrated dichotomisation, and that operations of association and juxtaposition were embedded in a process of recontextualisation in political communication. Framing (cf. Entman, 1993) and schematisation (cf. Luhmann, 1995 and van Dijk, 1998) provided a useful basis for analysing the various related re-framings and self-representations of Hezbollah. The analysis showed that Nasrallah’s self-framing is as a political, social and religious movement; however it is rooted in tradition and religion. The analysis of the processes of recursive communication in the three news media outlets also revealed the connection between the recursion of the self-representations of Hezbollah, including Nasrallah, and the contestations which accompany it.

Several interesting aspects emerged from a comparative analysis of extracts with respect to dialogue, discourses, views, and voices emanating from different vantage points and perspectives. Hezbollah was shown to have employed a strikingly and intensely religious dominant discourse coupled with an anti-Israeli discourse.

A counter-discourse to Hezbollah as a resistance movement was adopted by the three media outlets. CNN invoked a discourse of criminalisation and deliberate generalisation and vagueness of the source of the news story. The BBC’s framing of some news stories was more dramatic and explicit. Al-Jazeera employed a discourse of less overt allusion to terrorism, a discourse of attenuation or mitigation.
Interestingly, the analysis of media texts revealed a significant and a salient transformative recursion through employing a discourse of desacralisation, where the content of the entire religious discourse of Hezbollah was removed in the reporting of all three media outlets, and largely transformed and disseminated into an entirely new setting.

Another important finding demonstrated how examination of news translation can yield useful insights into the process of dissemination, and how such mediated communication contributes to the creation of a new political reality. The analysis demonstrated how the news story, in moving through recursions, contributed to the construction of new settings and hence new discoursal representations. Meanwhile, in this transformation, these contexts have undergone processes of filtering, adding, and substituting, as was evident from the variety of ideological lexical choices used in describing the same political event. These recontextualised contexts proved to be politically and ideologically marked.

Interestingly, the study revealed a very striking contrast between Al-Manar and Al-Jazeera. Al-Manar adopts a religious discourse, it is also known for its “adoption of the notion of the community of resistance” (Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 31), whereas Al-Jazeera desacralises. It is noteworthy that Al-Jazeera English, unlike the BBC and CNN, neither framed Hezbollah as a ‘resistance movement’ nor framed it as a ‘terrorist movement’.

In a recursive process media outlets acted as recipients and producers of communication, and Hezbollah framed and reframed itself in dialogue with the media systems. Broadly speaking, the analysis revealed that recursive communication processes took place using discourses of legitimisation and delegitimation, both in the self-representation of Hezbollah and in the framing of Hezbollah in the news coverage of the three media outlets, which broadly reflects van Dijk’s paradigm of “Them” against “Us” (1998: 2).

Interestingly, the analysis showed that CNN did not uniformly frame Hezbollah as a “terrorist” force. Rather, it maintained fluid frames. Although the US Government
does not officially acknowledge Hezbollah, reference was constantly made by CNN to its dual identity as both a political and military force.

The analysis demonstrated multiple layers of recursion, and revealed the nuanced and complex nature of the competing media constructions of Nasrallah’s speeches, which proved highly fluid, multivoiced and in constant recontextualisation. The analysis revealed a fascinating battle over the definition of Hezbollah by the three media outlets. This battle could be described as a new form of proxy war, and it could be stated that war is becoming electronic in this new age of dissemination.

Indeed, the media are playing a role in both regional and global political outcomes, where new realities are constantly created. What is interesting about Hezbollah is that even more multiple settings of recursive communication in this new era of dissemination of political communication are anticipated because of its ongoing political role in the region, particularly in Syria.

6.2 Main Contribution of the Study

This study adds to a growing body of research in political communication across media systems. Although a substantial and considerable amount of work has been published on Hezbollah, the available studies have only dealt with specific aspects of Hezbollah as a significant phenomenon. Some studies pointed to the political aspect of Hezbollah, whereas others dealt with its social dimension in Lebanon and its media communication. Other studies discussed Hezbollah as a terrorist movement vis-à-vis its self-representation as a resistance movement. Few studies to date have understood the complex communication system in which Hezbollah operates, and used a corpus across four sources to investigate these various dimensions in one whole work.

This thesis is a comprehensive study of a key political phenomenon. In contrast to the previous studies, the value of this thesis lies in the richness of the comparative approach of a detailed qualitative analysis of media texts and discourses, combining macro and micro-analysis. The thesis is moreover situated at a crossroads of disciplines, concepts, media organisations, and voices.
The contribution of this study occurs at three levels: the theoretical, the methodological, and the analytical.

First, one of the key contributions of the theoretical model of this study is that it introduces an innovative, interdisciplinary combination of a range of different theoretical approaches rarely brought together (Luhmann’s concepts of binary codes and schematisation, Foucault’s exclusion concept, Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism and multivoicedness, Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality, Entman’s framing theory, and van Dijk’s ideological schema, Fairclough’s communicative model, and Bell’s audience design). This synthesis provides a new conceptualisation of media communication that is appropriate to the data; that is to the speeches of Hassan Nasrallah and their recontextualisation across news media outlets. In addition, this theoretical approach allows for a particular analysis of the framing of a highly significant actor.

On reflection, the theoretical model has enabled me to explore discourse as textual instantiations of media realities. It investigated discourse as conceptually vital with respect to dissemination as a social construction of reality with particular emphasis on framings that are fluid and dynamic. This connects with the theme of this study in terms of schematisation by and dissemination of discourses in political communication. Knowledge systems (epistemes) are reflected in the forms of schematisations (which presuppose exclusion procedures) in Nasrallah’s speeches in the articulation of two particularly dominant discourses: the religious and the political. Power is thereby presented as a question of transmission of selections. This implies that media communications cannot be seen as linear, they are recursive; this recursivity of communication is manifested, for instance, in the dynamic interpenetrating of news production, reception and reaction; because they are not self-contained flows in one direction (e.g. from production to reception as an endpoint). Both productions and receptions form a recursive whole in the age of dissemination (they link into each other as authorship and audience vie for a voice.

Rules of schematization/exclusion, as part of discourse clearly operate in the corpus of this study; for example, in the process of communicating breaking news. Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN use selection. Inevitably certain ideological binary codes
are involved and manifested in the way such political news is constructed. In addition, translation in news media and political communication was approached since translation is an important part of the media-political interpretation. It is a highly significant dimension of both the political process and mediated political communication.

Second, this study’s context-sensitive methodological framework connects strongly with the theoretical framework. The particular methodological framework was exemplified in demonstrating the effectiveness of using discourse qualitative analysis because of the subtlety of its account of conflicting realities.

This methodological model contributes to our understanding of the process of the recursive communication of Hezbollah. In other words, the political source texts (Nasrallah’s speeches) are defined by significance which themselves are a contested construction in their representations across the polycontexts of the three media outlets, namely, Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN, as secondary sources.

The study in hand could have used computerised methods of data analysis, such as NVivo software packages, which are “more efficient for social scientists to store and analyze data” (Davis and Meyer, 2009: 116). However, manual analysis was preferred for three principal reasons. First, using computerised software “does not provide ‘automatic’ solutions to problems of representation and analysis” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 203, in ibid.: 116). Second, computerised software such as NVivo lacks a “mechanistic substitute” for “complex processes of reading and interpretation” (ibid.). Third, the software cannot replace manual human analysis owing to the nature of the corpus data of this study, which focuses on complex recursions within and across different genres, outlets, contexts, audiences and languages.

Finally, the expectations of the theoretical framework – that communications across media outlets are locked into a recursive cycle that displaces the ‘object of truth’ – were applied, to a certain extent, to the data corpus and this demonstrated how thematic framing depends largely on the heavily loaded ideological selections.
Thus, the methodology I followed in my analysis allows for the exploration of new avenues in further research. Through text analysis, as an integral part of discourse analysis, it was found that the methodological approach operated successfully for the analysis of the lexical choices made by text producers selected for their salience. Complementing this, intertextual analysis contributed by examination as of how speakers and news constructors draw on other sources in making their statements. It also contributed by analysing the intertexts employed in the primary source of the speeches of Nasrallah, and by looking at their recontextualisations in the secondary sources of the three said news media outlets, as a specific form of recursivity of recontextualisation.

On the other hand, qualitative discourse analysis provided an appropriate methodological approach to examine complex processes of dissemination, namely: recursion, and media representation. These have a direct relationship with intertextuality, which is always ideologically charged, and gains greater intensity with recursive media communications.

The interdisciplinarity of discourse analysis was very useful for assessing the varying employed concepts, which are key elements in the analysis of language properties, and their recontextualisation across multiple audiences of media institutions. Through integrating CDA with a text analytical approach, which is very closely aligned methodologically with the data set of this study, the data set of this study operated with media communication by and about Hezbollah. It revealed a very dense convergence of power and ideology expressed through intertextuality, metaphor, and lexis.

The importance of data analysis resided in the way it demonstrated the analytical power of the concepts discussed in the theoretical sections, precisely in connection with the intensity of a new age of dissemination marked by media recursions. The contribution of the data analysis lies in opening up the multiple constructions of Hezbollah, which is politically a very significant phenomenon. In short, this study has contributed to the understanding of this complex political process.
6.3 Further Research

The range of evidence of dissemination and recursivity of political communication leaves some questions outstanding. As is the case with any research this thesis is subject to a number of limitations, which thus encourages and reinforces the need for further research.

While many important questions are addressed, the study could have included audience reception research. In that sense, a wider spectrum of western audiences, in addition to local and regional audiences, might have added value to the study. However, this would have overburdened the thesis and is anyway partly addressed in the view of media outlets as secondary audiences in the context of the notions of dissemination and recursivity of political communication. It was felt that the focus on media and self-representations justified the selection of data for this project.

Second, in order to evaluate the process of the recursions of messages on a wider scale, a longer time-span might have been advisable. Ideally, the analysis could have included the developments regarding Hezbollah as a global significant phenomenon which have taken place since 2009. These developments are related to vital political issues and decisions on a wide scale. A useful example in this respect is the crisis in Syria and the role of Hezbollah in that context, which has significant political implications both regionally and globally. These developments would have added further insights into the recontextualisation and recursivity of political communications, as Hezbollah remains closely associated with Assad. Both the theoretical and methodological instruments can be readily applied to more contemporary events.

Third, in the context of news media outlets, analysis was limited to the three media institutions of Al-Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. Investigating the notion of dissemination across other media organisations such as Al-Manar (the mouthpiece of Hezbollah) would have enriched and widened the scale of analysis. It would also have enabled a comparative analysis vis-à-vis Al-Jazeera. However, this data was not widely available.
Fourth, the analytical study did not focus primarily on news translation and news production. In this sense, it could have conducted a comparative analysis of original Arabic source texts along with the English translations that are used as samples in this study. Further research in this respect would have enhanced the findings. That said, the study seeks to integrate translation studies approaches and argues that the concept of recursion includes translation processes. Attention remains strongly focused on the dynamics of representations of which translation is but one part.

Fifth, the study might usefully have included the visual elements of TV broadcast material, which represent a rich source of conscious and unconscious framing, such as symbols, flags, backdrops, tone, and music. Hezbollah’s symbolic role might thereby have been considered. However, this was not pursued because the main focus of this study is on the web output.

Notwithstanding these limitations, it is hoped that the value of this thesis lies in its concern to reconceptualise political communication and in its forensic analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches now so connected with their media recontextualisations in three global media organisations.

Hezbollah today remains the source of much controversy in many countries in the world, constituting an ongoing dilemma for the UK, the USA, the EU, Israel, Lebanese factions and others in the Middle East. This analytically-informed study improves our understanding both of Hezbollah and of the politics of the Middle East, and suggests why effective dialogue fails to take place.
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2. Secondary Literature


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